Policy Analysis in Thailand 9781447367109

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INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF POLICY ANALYSIS SERIES EDITORS: IRIS GEVA-MAY & MICHAEL HOWLETT

POLICY ANALYSIS IN

Thailand

Edited by Ora-orn Poocharoen and Piyapong Boossabong

POLICY ANALYSIS IN THAILAND



International Library of Policy Analysis Series editors: Iris Geva-May, Simon Fraser University, Canada, Carleton University, Canada and NYU Wagner, US and Michael Howlett, FRSC, Canada Research Chair (Tier 1) and Simon Fraser University, Canada This major series brings together for the first time a detailed examination of the theory and practice of policy analysis systems in a specific country. It therefore provides a key addition to research and teaching in comparative policy analysis and policy

Each volume includes a history of the country’s policy analysis well as the country in question. In doing so, the books in the series provide the data and empirical case studies essential for instruction and for further research in the area. They also include expert analysis evolution and operation. Volumes in the series include the following countries: Australia • Brazil • Czech Republic • France • Germany • Japan • Israel • The Netherlands • Turkey • Colombia • Spain • Mexico • Taiwan • USA • Canada • Belgium • Ireland • South Korea and build into an essential library of key reference works. The series will be of interest to academics and students in public policy, public administration and management, comparative politics and government, public organisations and individual policy areas. It will also interest people working in the countries in question and internationally. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis. See more at comparativepolicy.org/about-jcpa-icpa-forum/ or at policy. bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/international-library-of-policy-analysis.

POLICY ANALYSIS IN THAILAND Edited by Ora-​orn Poocharoen and Piyapong Boossabong

International Library of Policy Analysis, Vol 19

First published in Great Britain in 2023 by Policy Press, an imprint of Bristol University Press University of Bristol 1–​9 Old Park Hill Bristol BS2 8BB UK t: +​44 (0)117 374 6645 e: bup-​[email protected] Details of international sales and distribution partners are available at policy.bristoluniversitypress.co.uk © Bristol University Press 2023 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-1-4473-6708-6 hardcover ISBN 978-1-4473-6709-3 ePub ISBN 978-1-4473-6710-9 ePdf The right of Ora-​orn Poocharoen and Piyapong Boossabong to be identified as editors of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of Bristol University Press. Every reasonable effort has been made to obtain permission to reproduce copyrighted material. If, however, anyone knows of an oversight, please contact the publisher. The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of the editors and contributors and not of the University of Bristol or Bristol University Press. The University of Bristol and Bristol University Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any material published in this publication. Bristol University Press and Policy Press work to counter discrimination on grounds of gender, race, disability, age and sexuality. Cover design: Qube Design Image credit: iStock Bristol University Press and Policy Press use environmentally responsible print partners. Printed and bound in Great Britain by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

Contents List of figures and tables List of abbreviations Notes on contributors Editors’ introduction to the series Introduction Ora-​orn Poocharoen and Piyapong Boossabong

vii ix xii xiv 1

Part One:  History, styles and methods of policy analysis in Thailand one two

History and styles of policy analysis in Thailand Piyapong Boossabong Methods of policy analysis in Thailand: bureaucratic, managerial, academic and participatory orientations Arunee Santhitiwanich

11 28

Part Two:  Policy analysis within executive government three four five

Policy analysis in central government Theerapat Ungsuchaval Policy analysis in Thai local governments Pobsook Chamchong Collaboration, networks and policy analysis in Thailand Chatthip Chaichakan

49 67 88

Part Three:  Policy analysis beyond executive government six seven eight nine

ten

Monarchy and Thai meta-​policy: the early years of Rama X’s reign Khorapin Phuaphansawat and Puangchon Unchanam The role of the Thai military in policy analysis: unpacking three faces of the military in the non-​military policy domain Wasin Punthong Parliamentary committees, legislative supporting agencies and policy advice Tatchalerm Sudhipongpracha The role of expert policy advisory boards, consultants and think tanks in policy analysis Ora-​orn Poocharoen, Patamawadee Jongruck, Phanuphat Chattragul and Malinee Khumsupa Political movements as expression of public opinion for agenda setting in Thailand Watcharabon Buddharaksa

107 137 155 170

186

v

Policy Analysis in Thailand Part Four:  Political parties and interest groups in policy analysis eleven

Political parties and policy analysis Chanintorn Pensute twelve Business associations and policy analysis Warathida Chaiyapa and Vorapat Chutima thirteen The role of the community sector and civil society in policy analysis Theerapat Ungsuchaval and Wachirawat Ariyasirichot fourteen The influence of Thailand’s social movements on policy analysis Nattakant Akarapongpisak

203 219 230 248

Part Five:  Policy analysis education and research fifteen

Policy analysis instruction in Thailand Piyakorn Whangmahaporn sixteen Non-​traditional policy studies in Thailand Theerapat Ungsuchaval seventeen Policy research in academic institutions Chumphol Aunphattanasilp eighteen Transition and prospects of Thai policy analysis Ora-​orn Poocharoen and Piyapong Boossabong

273

Index

337

vi

286 303 320

List of figures and tables Figures 2.1 4.1 7.1 7.2 7.3 8.1 8.2 9.1 12.1 12.2 15.1 17.1 17.2 17.3 17.4 17.5

Tables 1.1 2.1 2.2 2.3 4.1 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.4 7.1 7.2 7.3

The guidelines of the Office of the Public Sector Development Commission ‘One Plan’ concept for formulating and coordinating plans at the provincial level Thailand’s annual defence budget from 2008 to 2022 Internal Security Operations Command’s annual budget from 2009 to 2022 Office of the National Security Council’s annual budget from 2009 to 2022 Conceptual framework Structure of the Thai parliament Consultant projects in Thailand Line structure of national Joint Public and Private Sector Consultative Committee Agenda selection process from provincial to national level Frequency of public policy instruction in political science, public administration and arts courses The number of policy research pieces, 1985–​2019 The categorisation of policy research The scope of policy research topics The location of case studies Popular policy research paradigm

Critical incidents of policy analysis in Thailand Types of policy analysis methods in Thailand Public policy hierarchies in Thailand Number of registered consultants in Thailand Structure of Thailand’s local government revenue, fiscal years 2017–​2019 Enclosure of public land during 2016–​2019 Annual budgets of the monarchy, 1960–​2010 (millions of baht and millions of US dollars) Annual budgets of the monarchy, 2016–​2020 (millions of baht and millions of US dollars) Annual budgets for ‘strengthening the nation’s principal institutions’, 2017–​2020 (millions of baht and millions of US dollars) Selected examples of area-​based projects with Internal Security Operations Command’s official partnership Military for development provision in the Constitution of Thailand since 1974 Armed Forces Development Command’s selected projects

38 77 142 145 146 157 159 182 224 225 278 307 308 309 309 310

20 29 33 36 80 125 126 127 128 147 148 149 vii

Policy Analysis in Thailand 7.4 8.1 12.1 15.1 17A.1 17A.2 17A.3 17A.4

viii

Navy Radio Broadcasting Station services Standing committees in the Senate and the House of Representatives of Thailand List of interviewees Frequency of public policy instruction in political science, public administration and arts courses Number of policy research pieces in each paradigm, 1985–​2019 Types of policy research Number of research themes in each paradigm Locations of case studies in each research paradigm

150 161 220 277 317 318 318 318

List of abbreviations ABB ACT AFDC AOP APOs BP BRH CDA CGN CLR CLT CODI CPB CPD CS-​Nets CSOs CWF DDC DLAP EEC FFP FIT FTI HiAP IGP IPPS IPSR ISOC JPPSCC JSCCIB KPI KPIs LDAP LDI LGBTQ LRNT MMA MPA MPs NBTC

Area Based Budgeting Action Coalition for Thailand Party Armed Forces Development Command Assembly of the Poor autonomous public organisations Bhumjaithai Party Bureau of the Royal Household Constitution Drafting Assembly Chula Global Network common land registration community land title Community Organization Development Institute Crown Property Bureau Campaign for Popular Democracy Civil Society Networks civil society organisations community welfare fund Democracy Development Committee Department of Local Administration Promotion Eastern Economic Corridor Future Forward Party Future Innovative Thailand Institute Federation of Thai Industries Health in All Policies Institute for Good Governance Promotion Institute of Public Policy Studies Institute for the Population and Social Research Internal Security Operations Command Joint Public and Private Sector Consultative Committee Joint Standing Committee on Commerce, Industry and Banking King Prajadhipok’s Institute key performance indicators Local Development Assistance Programme Local Development Institute lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer Land Reform Network of Thailand Mixed Member Apportionment Master of Public Administration Members of Parliament National Broadcasting and Telecommunication Commission ix

Policy Analysis in Thailand

NCPO NESDB NESDC NESDP NFA NGO-​CORD NGOs NHA NHCO NICs NIDA NPF NPP NRBS NRC OCSC OHM OPDC ORDPB PA PAD PAO PART PDRC PMQA PPB PPP PTP RA RBE RDM RTA RTN SCB SCG SDGs SEP SNA SPBB SWOT TAO TBA TCC TDRI x

National Council for Peace and Order National Economic and Social Development Board National Economic and Social Development Commission National Economic and Social Development Plan Northern Farmers’ Alliance NGO Coordinating Committee on Rural Development non-​governmental organisations National Health Assembly National Health Commission Office Newly Industrialised Countries National Institute of Development Administration Northern Peasants’ Federation New Politics Party Navy Radio Broadcasting Station National Reform Council Office of the Civil Service Commission Office of His Majesty’s Principal Private Secretary Office of Public Sector Development Commission Office of the Royal Development Project Board Public Administration People’s Alliance for Democracy provincial administrative organisations Performance Assessment Rating Tool People’s Democratic Reform Committee Public Sector Management Quality Award Privy Purse Bureau Palang Pracharat Party Pheu Thai Party Royal Agencies Reform Before Election Rural Doctor Movement Royal Thai Army Royal Thai Navy Siam Commercial Bank Siam Cement Group Sustainable Development Goals Sufficiency Economy Philosophy Social Network Analysis Strategic Performance Based Budgeting Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats tambon administrative organisations Thai Bankers’ Association Thai Chamber of Commerce Thailand Development Research Institute

List of abbreviations

TFF THPF TLPP TNCA TRT TSDP UCS UDD WRM

Thailand Future Foundation Thai Health Promotion Foundation Thai Local Power Party Thai NGO Coalition on Aids Thai Rak Thai Thai Social Democratic Party Universal Health-​Care Coverage Scheme United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship Water Resource Management

xi

Notes on contributors Nattakant Akarapongpisak is Assistant Professor at the College of Politics and Governance, Mahasarakham University, Mahasarakham, Thailand. Wachirawat Ariyasirichot is Assistant Professor at the College of Politics and Governance, Mahasarakham University, Mahasarakham, Thailand. Chumphol Aunphattanasilp is Lecturer at the Graduate School of Public Administration, National Institute of Development Administration, Bangkok, Thailand. Piyapong Boossabong is Assistant Professor at the School of Public Policy, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand. Watcharabon Buddharaksa is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science and Public Administration, Faculty of Social Sciences, Naresuan University, Phitsanulok, Thailand. Chatthip Chaichakan is Assistant Professor at the School of Political and Social Science, University of Phayao, Phayao, Thailand. Warathida Chaiyapa is Assistant Professor at the School of Public Policy, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand. Pobsook Chamchong is Assistant Professor at the School of Public Policy, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand. Phanuphat Chattragul is Researcher at the School of Public Policy, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand. Vorapat Chutima is PhD Candidate at the School of Public Policy, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand. Patamawadee Jongruck is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Political Science and Public Administration, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand. Malinee Khumsupa is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Political Science and Public Administration, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand. Chanintorn Pensute is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Political Science and Public Administration, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand.

xii

Notes on contributors

Khorapin Phuaphansawat is Lecturer at the Department of International Relations, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand. Ora-​orn Poocharoen is Director of the School of Public Policy, Chiang Mai University, Chiang Mai, Thailand. Wasin Punthong is Lecturer at the Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand. Arunee Santhitiwanich is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Political Science, Ubon Ratchathani University, Ubon Ratchathani, Thailand. Tatchalerm Sudhipongpracha is Associate Professor at the College of Interdisiciplinary Studies, Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand. Puangchon Unchanam is Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science, Naresuan University, Phitsanulok, Thailand. Theerapat Ungsuchaval is Lecturer at the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Mahidol University, Bangkok, Thailand. Piyakorn Whangmahaporn is Associate Professor at the Graduate College of Management, Sripatum University, Bangkok, Thailand.

xiii

Editors’ introduction to the series Professor Iris Geva-May and Professor Michael Howlett, ILPA series editors

Policy analysis is a relatively new area of social scientific inquiry, owing its origins to developments in the US in the early 1960s. Its main rationale is systematic, evidence-based, transparent, efficient, and implementable policy-making. This component of policy-making is deemed key in democratic structures allowing for accountable public policies. From the US, policy analysis has spread to other countries, notably in Europe in the 1980s and 1990s and in Asia in the 1990s and 2000s. It has taken, respectively one to two more decades for programmes of public policy to be established in these regions preparing cadres for policy analysis as a profession. However, this movement has been accompanied by variations in the kinds of analysis undertaken as US-inspired analytical and evaluative techniques have been adapted to local traditions and circumstances, and new techniques shaped in these settings. In the late 1990s this led to the development of the field of comparative policy analysis, pioneered by Iris Geva-May, who initiated and founded the Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, and whose mission has been advanced with the support of editorial board members such as Laurence E. Lynn Jr., first coeditor, Peter deLeon, Duncan McRae, David Weimer, Beryl Radin, Frans van Nispen, Yukio Adachi, Claudia Scott, Allan Maslove and others in the US and elsewhere. While current studies have underlined differences and similarities in national approaches to policy analysis, the different national regimes which have developed over the past two to three decades have not been thoroughly explored and systematically evaluated in their entirety, examining both sub-national and nonexecutive governmental organisations as well as the non-governmental sector; nor have these prior studies allowed for either a longitudinal or a latitudinal comparison of similar policy analysis perceptions, applications, and themes across countries and time periods. The International Library for Policy Analysis (ILPA) series fills this gap in the literature and empirics of the subject. It features edited volumes created by experts in each country, which inventory and analyse their respective policy analysis systems. To a certain extent the series replicates the template of Policy Analysis in Canada edited by Dobuzinskis, Howlett and Laycock (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007). Each ILPA volume surveys the state of the art of policy analysis in governmental and non-governmental organisations in each country using the common template derived from the Canadian collection in order to provide for each volume in the series comparability in terms of coverage and approach. Each volume addresses questions such as: What do policy analysts do? What techniques and approaches do they use? What is their influence on policy-making xiv

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Editors’ introduction to the series

in that country? Is there a policy analysis deficit? What norms the work done by policy analysts working in different institutional settings? Contributors focus on the sociology of policy analysis, demonstrating how analysts working in different organisations tend to have different interests and to utilise different techniques. The central theme of each volume includes historical works on the origins of policy analysis in the jurisdiction concerned, and then proceeds to investigate the nature and types, and quality, of policy analysis conducted by governments (including different levels and orders of government). It then moves on to examine the nature and kinds of policy analytical work and practices found in non-governmental actors such as think tanks, interest groups, business, labour, media, political parties, non-profits and others. Each volume in the series aims to compare and analyse the significance of the different styles and approaches found in each country and organisation studied, and to understand the impact these differences have on the policy process. Together, the volumes included in the ILPA series serve to provide the basic data and empirical case studies required for an international dialogue in the area of policy analysis, and an eye-opener on the nuances of policy analysis applications and implications in national and international jurisdictions. Each volume in the series is leading edge and has the promise to dominate its field and the textbook market for policy analysis in the country concerned, as well as being of broad comparative interest to markets in other countries. The ILPA is published in association with the International Comparative Policy Analysis Forum, and the Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, whose mission is to advance international comparative policy analytic studies. The editors of each volume are leading members of this network and are the best-known scholars in each respective country, as are the authors contributing to each volume in their particular domain. The book series as a whole provides learning insights for instruction and for further research in the area and constitutes a major addition to research and pedagogy in the field of comparative policy analysis and policy studies in general. We welcome to the ILPA series Volume 19, Policy Analysis in Thailand, edited by Ora-orn Poocharoen and Piyapong Boossabong, and thank the editors and the authors for their outstanding contribution to this important encyclopedic database. Iris Geva-May Professor of Policy Studies, Baruch College at the City University of New York, Professor Emerita Simon Fraser University; Founding President and Editor-in-chief, International Comparative Policy Analysis Forum and Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis Michael Howlett Burnaby Mountain Professor, Department of Political Science, Simon Fraser University, and Yong Pung How Chair Professor, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore xv

Introduction Ora-​orn Poocharoen and Piyapong Boossabong

Unlike Western societies, where significant reflections on policy analysis have been made throughout history (Blum and Schubert, 2013; Nispen and Scholten, 2014; Hird, 2018), the state and the development of this subject have never been thoroughly examined in Thailand. This volume aims to fill that large gap. It provides rich descriptions of Thailand’s policy analysis system and its actors. It describes historical trajectories to explain why Thailand is where it is today. It also offers insights into the the future and recommendations for advancing policy analysis education, training and practice in the country. Policy analysis in Thailand is heavily influenced by the West. This is part of global history that has contributed to the continuous epistemic isomorphism and knowledge transfer from advanced economies to Asia, particularly Southeast Asia (Ungsuchaval et al, 2023). This started during the colonial period and was amplified during the Cold War (Turner, 2018). Such isomorphism and knowledge transfer in the global domain are never-​ending processes. We observe that the field of public policy and the practice of policy analysis is slowly progressing in Thailand. This is a result of the domination of senior scholars, who framed the static standard of policy knowledge, and the rigid Thai bureaucratic system that operates in a weak democratic, high power-​distance political and cultural context. With this process, it is also worth learning how such isomorphism and knowledge transfer have so far been assimilated into the social, economic and political contexts of Thailand. The discussion in this volume points out the key critical reflection that most policy knowledge selected to be transferred to Thailand mainly promotes depoliticised policy analysis. The field of public policy is thus perceived by most scholars and practitioners as the subfield under the umbrella of public administration, with the old mindset of the politics–​ administration dichotomy (Ungsuchaval et al, 2023). As a consequence, policy analysis in Thailand rarely challenges the political power, while many times it legitimises the political domination and protects unjust structures. This became the foundation of the field, until only recently, when public policy extended its boundary to be more interdisciplinary with new schools of thought (Boossabong and Ungsuchaval, 2021). However, the attempt to create the new frontier with more progressive, innovative, inclusive and critical orientations during the past decade still has a long way to go. In the same line, the dialogue of policy analysis in Thailand is also fruitful for the global epistemic community as it paves the way towards a better understanding of the tension between the academic and practical worlds of policy analysis, especially when the story here is compared to other contexts. 1

Policy Analysis in Thailand

Although the common challenge in other countries seems to be that scholars and practitioners are at different corners, the special tension in Thailand is that the boundary of the two worlds is blurred, as well-​recognised scholars mainly work as practitioners serving the political and bureaucratic systems. This can be seen from the pragmatic perspective of policy analysis, but with that there is only a small space for critical reflections of the foundation of the existing systems. The policy world in Thailand places too much emphasis on ‘how to do’, paying too little attention to ‘how to think’. And this goes beyond regulations, past experiences, manuals, step-​by-​step guidelines, models or best practices. To move from the larger context to a more specific focus, this volume constitutes a detailed examination of Thailand’s different landscapes of policy analysis. Various books and articles, primarily written in Thai, have been produced (for example, Yavaprabhas and Whangmahaporn, 2009; Whangmahaporn, 2010; Prommarin, 2011; Boossabong, 2017). However, to date, none have been as detailed, comprehensive, or up-​to-​date as this volume. By setting out the current state of the art, this volume sheds light on Thai policy characteristics and highlights different policy actors and their interactions in the policy arena. It provides a broad view of history, styles and methods of policy analysis in Thailand. It examines policy analysis both within and beyond the executive government and reveals the roles of parties and interest groups in public policy analysis. In addition, the volume also pays particular attention to a coherent overview of policy analysis instruction and research in Thailand, which is relatively new compared to the West. First, Part One of this volume provides a thick description of policy analysis in Thailand, including the historical background, styles and methods of policy analysis. Briefly, the history of approximately 120 years started with the period between 1899 and 1956, when policy analysis was introduced as the  elites’ governmental instrument and bureaucratic practice. After that, with the domination of the United States during the Cold War, especially from 1956 to 1978, policy analysis in Thailand was influenced by the American system. Following this was the era of policy analysis under the rise of think tanks, corporations and money politics from 1979 to 1996. Then policy analysis shifted to meet citizens’ demands for participation from 1997 to 2006, when Thailand had a democratic constitution and when populism policies emerged (Prommarin, 2011; Yavaprabhas and Whangmahaporn, 2009). The current thinking of policy analysis reflects the paradoxical and complex landscape depicting the tug-​of-​ war between old and new values in Thai society. Policy analysis is now highly polarised between conservatives and progressives. The traditional power (for example, network monarchy and the deep state) has resurfaced in the face of many global challenges, such as the decline of democracy, the climate crisis and the era of post-​truth politics. Considering different styles of Thai policy analysis, Chapter One proposes a critical assessment based on Howlett and Ramesh’s (1995) framework. The assessment proposed that the main style of Thai policy analysis is one that 2

Introduction

is reactive to problems and is based on an imposing relationship rather than anticipating problems and depending on a consensus relationship. Going deeper, the chapter addresses how policy analysis in Thailand usually goes beyond speaking truth to power; how it operates within the coexistence of formal and informal contexts in a highly centralised system; how it is like dancing in the dark –​operating within the black box; how something is always going on behind the scenes; and how knowledge, policy, practice and learning are usually at different junctions –​without a clear connection. The last point critically reflects the incoherent nature of policy analysis in Thailand. Policy analysis instruction in Thailand is mainly based on what governments do in existing systems, but it does not explain what governments should be doing differently. Most policy researchers separate the stages of knowledge generation and policy decision-​ making from each other. Policy researchers, thus, usually end their reports with impracticable policy recommendations. Chapter Two elaborates on the key methods of policy analysis in Thailand, classified by underlying values and policy learning continuity. Four types of methods are highlighted, including bureaucratic-​oriented methods, managerial-​ oriented methods, academic services methods and participatory methods. It is evident that bureaucratic-​oriented methods are primarily used and that they operate through the mechanisms of advisory boards, planning divisions and information hierarchies. In contrast, participatory methods are introduced as complementary methods, especially through ad hoc and third parties. The main process of public participation is via public hearings or referendums, which are usually limited in influencing policy decisions because they are perceived only as one item on the checklist of things to do for managing public projects. Chapters Three and Four unpack the key elements of policy analysis within the government, from the central administration to local levels. In the central landscape, policy analysis is based on governmental systems including the emergence of the governance mechanisms. Policy analysis in the central government determines the policy development of the whole country. Statism and elitism are the main characteristics of national policy analysis. Corporatism and pluralism can be captured in the policy landscape, especially when the government needs to incorporate key business associations and civil society movements into the policy processes. To understand policy analysis at the national level, there needs to be an understanding of the interactions among actors of the institutional arrangements in which policies are defined and developed. The central government uses regional governmental bodies as its limbs and intervenes in local government with rigid regulations and guidelines. The local government, however, has some policy roles to play within its autonomous authority, especially regarding basic services within its geographical boundary. Thailand has a two-​tier system –​the provincial administration in the upper tier and the municipality/​subdistrict administration or local government in the lower tier, by which local policy analysis is based mainly on legal framework and 3

Policy Analysis in Thailand

resources dependency. Local governments are highly reliant on intergovernmental transfer revenue. Chapter Five discusses collaboration and networks across boundaries. Although this element is highlighted in the previous chapter as well, this chapter digs deeper into different types and interpretations of intergovernmental relations in Thailand. The author maps out the role of different actors in policy analysis within an interactive policy ecosystem. The chapter connects real-​world practices to ongoing debates of power relations, benefits and limitations of collaboration and networks. Chapter Six decodes the key characteristic of policy analysis beyond the central, regional and local governments in Thailand, which is the role and power of the monarchy in Thailand. This characteristic is unique compared to many other countries. This volume provides insights that have not been documented by most Thai policy-​related literature, especially regarding royal interventions in national politics and public policy. The chapter details key policies initiated by the palace that have radical implications for the relationship between the monarch, the monarchy institution, the government and citizens. Unlike most European models of constitutional monarchy, the Thai monarch’s role has not been restricted to merely symbolic and ritualistic realms. Chapter Seven addresses three faces of the military in the non-​military policy domain, including internal security, development and telecommunications policy. It illustrates that the military’s political influence is far from limited, as reflected by the fact that the military is actively involved in public policy-​making processes. This indicates that the military’s political intervention comes with additional civilian actions. The chapter outlines how the Thai military’s role is embedded in policy analysis practices. It highlights how the political developments since the 2006 coup have opened more institutional channels for the military to further be involved in non-​military public policy domains. In addition to the monarchy and the military, Chapter Eight elaborates on how the Thai parliament is notorious for its contentious power struggle and unsatisfied-​quality debates. It addresses the questionable role of policy analysis in parliamentary work, highlighting how Thai parliamentarians have actually attempted to incorporate policy analysis tools into their legislative tasks. This chapter examines how their attempts are hampered by the fusion-​of-​power parliamentary system and the current constitution that is premised against elected officials. Furthermore, it discusses how the research and administrative services provided by the parliamentary administration are limited, worsening the information asymmetry between the executive and legislative branches. Chapter Nine provides a broad picture of consultants, think tanks and advisory committees in Thailand’s public policy ecosystem. The role of foreign advisors or consultants prior to 1932, before Thailand’s transition to a modern-​ day constitutional-​monarchy system, is provided to explain how Thailand was modernised in the same direction as the West, despite not having been colonised by the British or other Western powers at the time. It also describes 4

Introduction

the establishment of the Privy Council, the advisors to the monarch, who play important roles in many policies in Thailand. This chapter also covers the emergence and typologies of modern-​day policy advisory boards, consultants and think tanks between 1932 and 2020. It provides a picture of how consultants and advisors are highly influential and important in Thailand’s policy networks today. Additionally, it argues that consultants are policy actors, who should be held accountable for their services, should be regarded as a profession, and should not perpetuate the noble aristocratic role of elites in the past. The chapter suggests opportunities for healthy development within the new ecosystems of digital technologies of today, where policy data and knowledge are no longer scarce resources. Chapter Ten examines political movements as a form of public opinion expression. It provides thick descriptions of five political movements that have pivoted the directions of policy analysis in Thailand. The main goal is to investigate how the agenda-​setting process may be seen as a struggle to construct a new public discourse rather than be seen as merely a fight for sending messages to the government. The chapter employs Antonio Gramsci’s notion of ‘war of position’ –​struggle in the terrain of ideas, thought and culture via mass media as a crucial tool –​as a framework to explain the politics of agenda setting in Thailand. Since the 1997 political reformation, there were five distinct attempts to construct public discourse: demanding a strong state; rallying against Thaksin; challenging the old regime; subverting the common sense; and, once again, political reform. Part Four of this volume explores the roles of political parties and interest groups in policy analysis in Thailand. Chapter Eleven begins with the evolution of the role of political parties. It explains the history of the establishment process for Thai political parties, the political party approach, and the public policies of these parties from past to present. It also discusses the roots of populist policy and the trend of political parties in the country, which tend to imitate previous policies that were successful. Chapters Twelve, Thirteen and Fourteen highlight the role of different interest groups, beginning with business associations. Chapter Twelve elaborates on the influence of such associations in the Thai public policy landscape. It discusses business–​government relations and the role of main associations in the country, especially after the establishment of the Joint Public and Private Sector Consultative Committee (JPPSCC) in 1981. The structure of the JPPSCC and its key implications on the membership structure is highlighted before discussing its current role in governmental public policy formation. The chapter illustrates how business associations, officially and systematically, influence public policy both at the national and provincial levels. Compared to the business sector, the role of the community sector and civil society in the policy-​making process seems to be much less official and systematic. Chapter Thirteen critically discusses key developments, major roles, and prominent approaches and methodologies employed by this sector. The community sector and civil society are operating across policy fields and taking 5

Policy Analysis in Thailand

up various roles, ranging from being a watchdog and a policy advocate of selected policy issues to a partner for public governance and policy execution. Their role in area-​based policy is highlighted as it is the most productive. Unsurprisingly, their main challenge is the fact that changes in small areas or localities do not result in national-​level changes. Working with local governments usually results in improvements only to basic services. They can only incorporate themselves into an area-​based policy as an actor within the specific collaborative policy networks. Looking at the influence of social movements on public policy, Chapter Fourteen explores how social movements have a considerable impact on Thailand’s public policies. It begins with an overview of the upsurge and then the decline of social movements in the country. The focus is on how social movements placed their programmes on the political agenda, aided the agenda’s passage into policy and supported their enforcement, even influencing the policy process from within. Further, this chapter offers an analysis of how the colour-​coded politics, the 2014 coup and the 2019 election remarkably shaped the movements’ strategies for policy engagement. As for the final part of the volume, the discussion turns to policy analysis instruction and research. Chapters Fifteen and Sixteen examine the landscape of educational policy courses provided across recent programmes by major universities throughout the country, considering both traditional and non-​ traditional approaches. In Thailand, public policy schools − education institutions which devote their overall teaching and research to public policy − are a relatively recent phenomenon marked by the introduction of the School of Public Policy at Chiang Mai University, the first ‘standalone’ public policy school in the country, in 2017. However, teaching public policy as an academic course can be traced back to the late 1970s when public administration (PA) majors and programmes in established universities started to introduce new subjects and aimed to create graduates who can work at the management and policy levels. Since then, public policy has become a core pedagogical element of PA education and developed its trajectory under the shadows of PA. This development established conventional policy education in Thailand. Some universities tried to develop their own specialisations in public policy within PA or political science and this resulted in creating educational institutions focused on policy. Although they are not genuine policy schools, these policy educational institutions incorporate policy courses as a key part of their education visions or strategic focuses, which are worth considering for understanding the journey of policy education in Thailand. Chapter Seventeen explores the different approaches used to conduct policy research by academic institutions in Thailand. It is important to note that most policy studies are either empirical-​based or normative-​based and that these are not usually connected to real policy debates and analysis. There is a lack of research that can be used to guide policy direction in the real world. There are few pragmatic and transformative policy studies that aim to handle real-​world problems and make substantive changes. The more impactful existing policy studies are the result of consultancies. These are advocacy projects rather than 6

Introduction

research studies because they come with an expected goal depending on who is commissioning the policy analysis project. These policy studies do not generate specific policy knowledge or serious discussions. Lastly, the final chapter in this volume discusses the transition and prospects of Thai policy analysis in a comparative perspective. This chapter highlights that policy analysis in Thailand is in an ‘in-​between’ state. It is not led strongly by the state nor is it led by non-​state actors. It is caught in the tension between old and new, conservatives and progressives. It is also caught in a limbo of static democratic development. At the same time, there are signals of transitions towards a new focus on policy networks, governance and collaboration in the face of complex policy issues. This means that there will be a more deliberative orientation amid demands for democracy and participation, and more spaces for promoting innovative policy analysis by incorporating design, future, complexity and critical thinking. At the same time, it is evident that there is a rise in policy data analytics and nudging. Policy analysis in Thailand tends to be more sectoral and area-​specific and, like many other countries, it focuses more on global perspectives with increased sensitivity to a just, sustainable future. In sum, this volume covers Thailand’s policy analysis landscape, histories, styles, actors, ecosystems, education, research and comparative perspective. It is intended for both beginners and advanced learners of Thailand. It is also meant to connect the story of Thailand to the rich field of comparative policy analysis. We are grateful to take part in this International Library of Policy Analysis series and we hope readers find this volume useful for a better understanding of the Royal Kingdom of Thailand. Note Some views and content in this volume may be controversial. The authors of each chapter are solely responsible for the content of their chapters. The views in the chapters are not necessarily the views of the editors. References Blum, S. and Schubert, K. (eds) (2013) Policy Analysis in Germany, Bristol: Policy Press. Boossabong, P. (2017) ‘Policy analysis in Thailand: Comparing the roles of expert and local knowledge’, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 19(2): 173–​183. Boossabong, P. and Ungsuchaval, T. (eds) (2021) Policy Studies from Different Perspectives, Chiangmai: Chiang Mai University School of Public Policy. [in Thai] Hird, J.A. (ed) (2018) Policy Analysis in the United States, Bristol: Policy Press. Howlett, M. and Ramesh, M. (1995) Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Nispen, F.V. and Scholten, P. (eds) (2014) Policy Analysis in the Netherlands, Bristol: Policy Press.

7

Policy Analysis in Thailand

Prommarin, N. (2011) The Evolution of the Thai Public Administration Paradigms: A Survey of the Thai Public Administration Literature from the Past to the Present, Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Press. [in Thai] Turner, M. (2018) ‘Public sector reform and national development in East and Southeast Asia: Specificity and commonality’, in S. Bice, A. Poole and H. Sullivan (eds) Public Policy in the ‘Asian Century’: Concepts, Cases and Futures, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 209–​236. Ungsuchaval, T., Boossabong, P. and Hartley, K. (2023) ‘Public policy education in Thailand: From caged pedagogy to disciplinary independence?’, Journal of Asian Public Policy, 16(1): 75–95. Whangmahaporn, P. (2010) The Development, the Status of Leaning and Teaching and the Research of Thai Public Policy, Bangkok: Sripatum University. [in Thai] Yavaprabhas, S. and Whangmahaporn, P. (2009) Thai Public Policy: The Origin, the Development, and the State of the Art, Bangkok: Jud Thong. [in Thai]

8

Part One History, styles and methods of policy analysis in Thailand

ONE

History and styles of policy analysis in Thailand Piyapong Boossabong

Introduction Similar to many countries, policy analysis in Thailand still faces unequal power relations and weak democratic governance. Thai policy makers and analysts still depend mainly on technical policy knowledge from abroad. Under the incoherent governance structures, there are many gaps and conflicting values to be defined. To review the history of policy analysis and capture Thai policy styles, thus, requires a critical assessment and even a reinterpretation of the formal stories that have been told so far. This chapter aims to examine Thailand’s chaotic and complex historical background as well as Thai styles of policy analysis. This chapter also plays an important role in providing grand narratives and the main turns –​clear changes –​in the field of public policy analysis in Thailand. Exploring these grand narratives and turns will help to determine the important shifts and draw a holistic picture of the policy landscape of the country before the subsequent chapters, which are more focused and go deeper into details. However, it should be noted here that this chapter does not aim to provide a linear and non-​subjective explanation. Different interpretations, therefore, are possible and should be proposed to stimulate the ongoing dialogue on the histories and styles of policy analysis in Thailand.

Historical background of policy analysis in Thailand To make clear distinctions in time periods of policy analysis in Thailand is certainly impossible as clear historical breaking points cannot be identified. However, there should still be attempts to capture the main changes. Therefore, this chapter proposes five periods classified according to the commonalities and connected critical events of that period. The first period of policy analysis, 1899–​ 1956, is defined by the governmental instruments and bureaucratic practices of the elites. Then, the second period, 1956–​1978, can be perceived as policy analysis under the shadow of the American system. After that, the third period is the period of policy analysis during the rise of think tanks, corporations and money politics between 1979 and 1996. With the severe economic crisis and political movement towards the people’s constitution, the fourth period of policy analysis, 1997–​2006, coincides with the rise of people’s demand for 11

Policy Analysis in Thailand

participation, an emerging governance system and populism. The fifth period represents the paradox of policy analysis and the complex landscapes of turns and returns –​back and forth –​from 2006 to the present. The following sections provide further explanation. Policy analysis as governmental instruments and bureaucratic practices of the elites between 1899 and 1956 Attempts to develop policy knowledge in Thailand started in 1899 when the School for Civil Service Studies was established for training civil servants. The newly founded school included a course called ‘national policy studies’, which sparked interest, although it was not the modern policy studies we know today. The reason for establishing this school was that there was a need for more bureaucrats, especially after the public service reform of 1892. Additionally, Rama V, who established the school, was influenced by the British system, as he was a British graduate. The school was meant to produce civil servants, mainly from the elite class, who would serve the monarchy. In 1916, this school became the Faculty of Public Administration of the first university in Thailand, Chulalongkorn University (Prommarin, 2009). The move to transfer knowledge of modern, technically oriented policy studies, particularly from the United States, was made during the Cold War, after a Faculty of Law and Political Science was established at Thammasat University in 1933. It was from this faculty that the Faculty of Public Administration broke away and established itself in 1955 (Yavaprabhas and Whangmahaporn, 2009). The prime minister at that time, General Plag Piboonsongkram, influenced the establishment of the new faculty. It was his opinion that Thailand was ‘lacking in good policies and plans for guiding proper national development’ (Nakata, 2015: 9). The study of public policy in this faculty aimed to train old and new generations of public servants working in the Thai bureaucratic system under the regime at that time, known as the ‘bureaucratic polity’ (Riggs, 1966). The new generation of public servants included ordinary citizens who did not have a privileged background, though were not extremely underprivileged either. They were not linked to the monarchy as a consequence of the revolution in 1932, in which citizens seized power from the monarch and established a new regime called ‘the monarchy under a constitution’. The development of experts in policy analysis and planning was also a consequence of the need for knowledge to develop a five-​year National Development Plan. The first one was created in 1961, about ten years after the establishment of the National Economic and Social Development Board in 1950. Policy analysis under the shadow of the American system during 1956–​1978 Considering the first period, the study of policy analysis, now under the umbrella of public administration, was supported by Indiana University. This gave an 12

History and styles of policy analysis

international perspective to the programme, enabling it to be standardised in line with modern public administration and policy studies globally. During the Cold War period, 38 professors from Indiana University went to Thailand to train those who would be teaching the first Master of Public Administration (MPA) programme, which started in 1956. The prime minister himself and his ministers created the committees which oversaw the programme. Modern research studies were also a welcomed result of the establishment of the Thailand Research Council. These American scholars returned to their home country in 1963, as the contract came to an end. Later, the new faculty supported the emergence of the National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA), which offered a significant number of training programmes for professional administrators and policy analysts from 1966 onwards. This was done in cooperation with the Rockefellers, the secretary of the National Economic Development Board, the prime minister, councillors and the American ambassador to Thailand (Nakata, 2015: 3–​28). The first generation of public administration and technocratic policy scholars were granted permission to study in the United States under the auspices of the Midwest Consortium for International Activities. This was in cooperation with the East-​West Centre, the Columbo Plan Secretariat, the AIDS programme, and the United Nations. Thirty scholars studied for an MPA, and six did a PhD at Indiana University, Bloomington. As for the rest (six people), they studied at the University of Hawaii, Syracuse University, the University of Wisconsin-​ Madison, and Vanderbilt University (Nakata, 2015: 10). The advantage was that these scholars returned to Thai universities (mainly Chulalongkorn University, Thammasat University and the NIDA) and taught American-​centric public administration and policy influenced mostly by behaviouralism. To teach American-​centric public administration and policy, the newly minted scholars needed to articulate American approaches to existing European administrative and legal systems that had been part of the Thai system since the colonial period. With this, a new form of colonialism emerged, called intellectual colonialism. Public policy studies were initially included as a topic in the following subjects: development administration; economic development; administrative planning; and project management. The first relevant academic work written in Thai was produced in 1960 and entitled Objectives, Policy and Plan, written by Malai Huwanun, who graduated with an MPA from Michigan University and a PhD from Indiana University. His work had a significant influence as he was the dean of the Faculty of Public Administration and then president of the NIDA. Public policy became a subject when the MPA programme at the NIDA was approved in 1973 after the return of grant-​funded scholars from the United States, particularly Uthai Lauhavichien, Tawat Vichaidit, Patom Maneeleart and Thinnapan Nakata. The focus was to deliver development policy for specific programmes and projects that were established. The course was designed for a practical, rather than an academic, purpose and, because of this, policy theories were not engaged with, and policy studies focused mainly on the adoption of a 13

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nuts-​and-​bolts approach for developing policy analysts, planners, administrators and development specialists. It should be noted that key scholars worked in both academia and policy administration. They usually worked as advisors to the prime minister, and even in the position of minister in the process of the administrative colonisation. Technocratic policy analysis was widely promoted after the establishment of the first policy and planning divisions in public agencies in 1966, and these divisions were expanded across the whole country in 1975. Policy expertise was also promoted after the establishment of regional and local universities from 1977 onwards. This process was delayed because studying law and political science was not widely promoted, as the government feared that people far from the central area (that is, far from the point of control) might become communists and work against them (Lauhavichien, 2015). Policy analysis in the rise of think tanks, corporations and money politics between 1979 and 1996 The turning point came in 1979, after which full-​time master’s and doctoral programmes were opened within the country. Such programmes clearly inculcated expert knowledge to prepare an elite body of professional policy scholars and policy analysts working for government offices. In other words, the education and training systems that dealt with policy analysis in Thailand mainly promoted technocratic policy experts by creating new agents and policy think tanks, training existing policy analysts and introducing new methods. They also attempted to standardise the studies and practices of technocratic policy analysis in the country, aiming to influence government policies and shape policy and planning systems (Boossabong, 2017). Alongside the increase in the number of individual university scholars, the institutionalisation of technocratic think tanks is a trend that clearly emerged after the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) was formed. This board played a role in creating a development plan for the country. This five-​year plan became the meta-​policy for Thailand as it shaped the upper tier of government policies. The board was legitimised by the constitution due to the need to develop quality among the politicians so that they can develop rational policies. Well-​known policy scholars, top bureaucrats and outstanding graduate students were encouraged to work here. The board also granted high-​achieving students scholarships to study abroad before returning to work in Thailand. People who worked for the board are known widely in Thailand as technocrats (Boossabong, 2017). The institutionalisation of think tanks in Thailand also came in the form of a team for advising the prime minister. This was seen as a personal think tank for the prime minister, and it made its appearance in 1988 with the institution known as Baan Pitsanulok or the house of counsellors (Tuntrajin, 2015). At that time, the members of the house of counsellors were political insiders who walked 14

History and styles of policy analysis

in and out of the prime minister’s workplace freely and influenced his policy decisions in a direct manner. They were comprised of well-​educated people who mostly graduated from abroad. They began to take up key positions and they were expected to bring in fresh and progressive ideas at an international level. Their role was very significant at a time when Thailand’s political and policy environments were changing from being managed by a bureaucratic polity to espousing liberal corporatism (Laothamatas, 1991). This was a major turning point, and from this time on, future prime ministers had mainly business backgrounds, rather than bureaucratic backgrounds, as used to be the case. Also, since the 1980s, globalisation was considered as a significant phenomenon. As such, Thailand saw the need to develop a global vision to create neoliberal policies that will bring competitive advantages. In addition to globalisation, Thailand discovered natural gas in the Thai gulf in the early 1980s and, thus, the country set its sights on becoming one of the Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs). From 1981 onwards, Thailand saw a rise of business associations, in particular the Board of Trade of Thailand, the Federation of Thai Industries and the Thai Bankers’ Association. Through the mechanism called the Public-​Private Joint-​ Committee, these business associations played significant roles in public policy. It should be noted that the emergence of the house of counsellors created a new policy culture, and since that time, prime ministers have made considerable use of their advisory teams. The people from the Baan Pitsanulok, or house of counsellors, continue to become policy advisors and work for many successful politicians and political parties. For example, Punsak Vinyarat became the leading member of the Policy and Strategy-​Making Committee of Yingluck’s government from 2011 to 2014, while Bowonsak Uwanno has been the key man in the military-​supported government from 2015 to 2022. Many independent think tanks have transitioned to become institutions and have attempted to propose effective policies for the government. For example, the Institute of Public Policy Studies (IPPS) was established in 1985 with the support of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation of Germany. The IPPS claimed to be politically neutral when proposing rational public policies for promoting the public interest. Chai-​anan Samuttawanich, the leading professor of political science, was its first director. Also, there were some think tanks that aimed to challenge the government, rather than work with it in the way that the IPPS did, and these included the Public Policy Watch and the Free Trade Agreement Watch. In addition to these, some think tanks were non-​political, as they attempted to propose apolitical policy and avoid involvement in political conflicts; these included the Thailand Development Research Institute and the National Health Assembly (Boossabong, 2009). Regarding resources, most Thai policy scholars and practitioners rarely read English textbooks. As a result, translated books made an impact in the field. The technocratic public policy textbook that had the most influence is Public Policy Analysis: An Introduction, written by William Dunn (1994 [1981]). It was translated into Thai by Professor Supachai Yavaprabhas (1990). This book has been reprinted 15

Policy Analysis in Thailand

more than ten times with at least 10,000 copies in total (Boossabong, 2017). Because of this work, policy knowledge transferred to Thailand is dominated mainly by the logical framework, system theory and stages approaches. Policy analysis in the face of people’s demand for participation, an emerging governance system and populism from 1997 to 2006 A key event that shifted policy analysis in Thailand again was the start of a severe economic crisis known as ‘Tom-​Yom-​Kung’ crisis in 1997. People were sceptical about the role of technocrats. Some blamed them as being the cause of the economic crisis because of their guidance towards imbalanced development. It seemed to them that only the rich can benefit from the system, while the socioeconomic circumstances of people and the environment were ignored and exploited to promote the unequal economic growth strategy. Thus, laypeople wanted to step into the political realm and were more active in participating in policy processes. In the same year, the constitution of 1997 was announced, and it proved that in the crisis there was an opportunity. This new progressive constitution promoted and secured many rights of the citizens with more decentralised structures of power. Citizens then included themselves in the emergence of ‘organic’ governance systems. This was, somehow, legitimised by the ‘mechanistic’ good governance discourse introduced by the World Bank and became one of the conditions for loan approval from the International Monetary Fund. This is because one of the good governance principles is to promote public participation. Another supportive discourse is the self-​sufficiency economy, which was clearly introduced as a meta-​policy by Rama IX and leading figures and advocated for the empowerment of self-​reliant practices including public policy from and by the people at the grassroots level. During this period of increased public participation, there was the rise of health promotion agencies such as the National Health Promotion Foundation and the National Health Assembly, which gained money from collected ‘sin taxes’. With the broad definition of what a healthy society is, those health promotion agencies opened the window of opportunities for citizens to access public funding for creating a bottom-​up policy process that promotes people-​centred and community-​based development. The participatory public policy process, led by a civil society organisation, was introduced to Thai society and was perceived as a new phenomenon (National Health Assembly, 2006). From 2001 onwards, the general election brought about a new political landscape where the policy competition could determine the election result. In other words, the embedded political power of public policy came to light. At the time, the Thai Rak Thai party won the election by proposing a series of policies developed from the findings of policy research conducted by the party. The prime minister himself had a business background. Therefore, there was a rise of business models in policy analysis (or New Public Management models), primarily when 16

History and styles of policy analysis

the Office of Public Sector Development Commission was formed to support the prime minister’s ideas. With the neoliberal direction, public policy was developed as a product to sell to citizens who were now perceived as the customers of the government. This was very clear after 2005 when Thai Rak Thai –​the old party –​was re-​elected with substantial support from the public because of the public policy initiative that resonated with people’s demands. On the one hand, this initiative created a new policy culture called ‘populist policies’, and many political parties, after proposing their own policies, realised that this is what seemed to get people’s support. On the other hand, populist policies brought about the decline of the role of old technocrats, such as the NESDB. This resulted in a shift in the political paradigm from ‘speak truth to power’ to ‘power in action’, and this also meant that the ruling government started to depend less on think thanks. Instead, they preferred to directly respond to people’s concerns to enhance quality of life and to gain political support. It should be noted that this period was also referred to as the golden era of policy studies in Thailand as a significant number of new policies were introduced by the government to learn from and many tools were adopted to operate within the Thai bureaucratic system. There were also many academic books written on the topic of public policy during this period. The one that was selected as the main handbook for policy studies in educational institutions was Policy Analysis for the Real World, written by Brian Hogwood and Lewis Gunn (1984) and translated by Mayuree Anumarnratchaton (2006). Thomas Dye (1969) was another influential policy expert whose work on models of public policy was referred to many times in Thai policy books (for example, Thamronthannawong, 2001; Kaisronpong, 2005). Thus, the development of policy analysis in Thailand seemed to be 20–​30 years behind policy analysis development in Western countries. Policy analysis in the complex landscapes from 2006 to present From 2006 to 2022, public policy in Thailand has been analysed under vivid political polarisation as a consequence of the coexistence of government regimes both for and against military-​led governments. Since 1932, although the Thai governmental regime has been shaped by constitutions that combined old and new powers, the opposing viewpoints prevented a successful compromise. The old powers were those of the monarchy, the military and the conservative parties who took back power by eliminating the new powers who were re-​elected in the previous six elections. This return of traditional power was facilitated by two coups d’état, in 2006 and 2014, as well as the biased new election rule which then brought about the rearrangement of the political and policy landscapes. In current times, politics and policies have operated within the strong network monarchy and the informal deep state embedded in the formal one (learn more from McCargo, 2005; Mérieau, 2016). 17

Policy Analysis in Thailand

The legitimacy of the return of traditional and conservative powers was the main claim of morality-​led politics as an opposition of money politics shaped by rich politicians who invested in political activities and expected a return. However, those traditional and conservative powers later took money politics back in the new form as they also spent money to boost their political popularity. The policy world now, thus, is a paradox and is complex. The ongoing tug-​of-​ war between different sides also happens within the context of global challenges of public policy, including the poor quality of democracy, climate crisis, inequalities, unsustainability, post-​truth politics and technology advancement. With such challenges, the new turn offers a more serious introduction of critical, interpretive and deliberative policy analysis in Thailand. The entry point of this introduction is that technocratic policy analysis might not work in the same way in the new contexts (Getsuwan, 2009; Songkin, 2013; Boossabong, 2016; Fischer and Boossabong, 2018; Boossabong and Chamchong, 2019). Furthermore, there is currently a new type of policy analyst in Thailand. They perceive themselves as facilitators rather than professional experts. The emergence of the ashrams is the first major development. Their members are not monks, but they somehow attempt to connect some of the elements of religious thought to facilitation practices. These ashrams have begun trying to influence public policy by proposing alternative training programmes to the public agencies. In addition, a wide range of policy makers have learned from them. They are outstanding in proposing the practices of mindful dialogue. Wongsanit Ashram, for instance, organised a training program that promotes facilitation skills. This ashram has succeeded in developing many facilitators working in the public sector at national, regional and local levels (Hutanuwat, 2014). The institutionalisation of facilitation skill development in modern education was clearly established with the opening of the Contemplative Education Centre at Mahidon University in 2006. The centre’s main mission is to create facilitators and mediators. It is famous for organising training programmes on the facilitation and mediation processes and on the development of leadership skills for the future. The centre’s aim is to organise training programmes for generations of civil servants. According to Nilchaigovit and Juntarasuk (2015), the centre recognises that only when facilitation is included in policy processes, there will be inclusive development. Apart from the Contemplative Education Centre, other similar institutions have been established and have made an impact by developing policy facilitators and mediators in different areas. These include the Learning Science and Education Institution at Thammasat University (2015), the Confucius Institute at Mahasarakham University (2015) and the School of Public Policy, Chiang Mai University (2017). However, it should be noted that most departments of public administration that offer students policy studies rarely focus on this new approach as they perceive the facilitation and mediation processes as an art, as opposed to something important to policy development. So, they ignore them to ensure that policy knowledge continues to be seen as a science and that technocratic 18

History and styles of policy analysis

policy analysis is still taught, believing that their field is professional and policy knowledge is technical. As a summary, Table 1.1 provides a list of critical incidents in the evolution of policy analysis in Thailand from the early development to the present day.

Thai policy styles According to Howlett and Ramesh (1995), different policy styles consider the different dominant approaches to problem-​solving and different relationships between the government and the society. The primary Thai policy analysis style is one that is reactive to problems and is based on an imposition relationship rather than one that anticipates future problems and depends on a consensus relationship. To dig deeper, it has been observed that policy analysis in Thailand goes beyond speaking truth to power. It has operated within the coexistence of formal and informal forces in a highly centralised system. It needs to be operated without clear roles and boundaries of relevant policy actors (like dancing in the dark), and there is always something going on behind the scenes (policy as an output of decision-​making in the black box). This aside, knowledge, policy, practice and learning are at the different junctions, as discussed in the next section. Beyond speaking truth to power Policy analysis in Thailand is less about speaking truth to power and is more about bargaining within complex power structures. The bargaining starts from among the political parties. Then, the government needs to bargain with business sectors and some of the radical civil society groups. And, specifically, public policy needs consent from the military and even the monarchy. Policy analysts, therefore, play a role in researching and referring to the specific knowledge to back up and legitimise any proposed public policy. There are only a few cases in which evidence-​based policy formulation is truly adopted and this is mostly in specific sectors such as professional engineering, architectural and medical standards. With this, policy analysis at all governmental levels in Thailand is, in practice, not purely technocratic as rational calculations are not actually proposed, and most policies are guided by normative assumptions and emotions of leaders. However, this does not mean that policy analysis in Thailand is critical and interpretive as the scientific and economic modes of rationality still have the most influence in guiding the policy direction. This is because economic growth is still always prioritised as the top priority of the state and scientific knowledge is only the form of knowledge that is considered as valid in Thai education systems. Policy analysis in Thailand seems to be mainly pragmatic as it usually entails usable, workable and practicable knowledge working towards acceptable solutions and specific actions for coping with the dynamics and uncertainties of any situation. However, the worldview of policymakers is often inconsistent. With the epistemological paradox, they claim evidence-​based policy analysis and the 19

Policy Analysis in Thailand

Table 1.1: Critical incidents of policy analysis in Thailand Time

Key events

1899

Under the administrative reform during Rama V, the School for Civil Service Studies was established for training elite civil servants.

1916

The establishment of the Faculty of Public Administration, Chulalongkorn University (able to be accessed by middle and higher classes).

1933

Faculty of Law and Political Science was established at Thammasat University (able to be accessed by anyone as it was an open university, but still limited accessed by underprivileged people).

1950

The NESDB was formed.

1956

Thirty-​eight professors from Indiana University came to Thailand to train those who would be teaching on the first MPA programme. Modern policy research studies were supported after the establishment of the Thailand Research Council.

1960

The first relevant academic work on public policy written in Thai was produced (influenced by American approaches).

1961

The first five-​year National Development Plan was made.

From 1966

The emergence of the NIDA, which provided many training programmes for professional administrators and policy analysts. The first generation of Thai public administration and technocratic policy scholars were granted permission to study in the United States. The emergence of the first policy and planning divisions in public agencies.

1973

The return of many grant-​funded Thai scholars from the United States (at the time, they heavily influenced the field).

1975

Policy and planning divisions in public agencies were expanded across the whole country.

From 1977

The establishment of regional and local universities which provided degree programmes on public policy.

From 1979

Full-​time master’s and doctoral programmes related to public policy were created in Thai universities.

1980–​1985

The emergence of the policy goal aiming to be a NIC after natural gas discovered in the Thai gulf.

From 1985

Independent think tanks have been formed, for example, the IPPS, the Thailand Development Research Institute and the National Health Assembly.

1988

The appearance of a personal think tank, for the prime minister, known as Baan Pitsanulok (house of counsellors).

1990

Public Policy Analysis: An Introduction written by William Dunn (1994 [1981]) was translated into Thai.

From 1997

The interface of a crisis and an opportunity: economic crisis and progressive constitution (in term of people’s rights). The emergence of ‘organic’ governance systems within the ‘mechanistic’ good governance discourse. Self-​sufficiency economy was introduced as the meta-​policy.

From 2001

The first election result that depended highly on policy competition. The rise of business models in policy analysis. Shift from ‘speaking truth to power’ to ‘power in action’.

From 2005

Populist policies as the new policy culture. Policy that connects to people and the decline of the role of old technocrats.

2006

Policy Analysis for the Real World written by Brian Hogwood and Lewis Gunn (1984) was translated into Thai. Participatory public policy process was introduced by the National Health Assembly.

20

History and styles of policy analysis

Table 1.1: Critical incidents of policy analysis in Thailand (continued) Time

Key events

From 2006

Public policy under the clear political polarisation. The return of traditional power (network monarchy and the deep state). The introduction of critical, interpretive and deliberative policy analysis in Thailand. The clear impact of the global challenges in public policy in Thailand (for example, poor quality of democracy, climate crisis, unsustainability, post-​truth politics in an online platform, and technology advancement)

importance of public participation, although their decision is mainly political, and they pay special respect to the voices of experts. Moreover, it is not truly pragmatic, as the serious feasibility studies and risk assessments that could confirm whether a policy is sound and practicable are rare in Thai policy culture. Coexistence of formal and informal forces in a highly centralised system The highly centralised administration system in Thailand was established during Rama V’s revolution and in the face of colonisation in Southeast Asia in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. As pointed out by Paik and Vechbanyongratana (2019), the state centralisation in this country is a consequence of Western colonial pressure. Rama V adopted geographical administrative boundaries and incorporated its traditional governance structures into a new, centralised governance system. This influence of Western colonial threats on the Thai internal political reform turned into a historical legacy that could not be changed as, with such a system, the country can be the only one in the region that remained independent from the Western imperialist powers (Dixon and Parnwell, 1991; Winichakul, 1994). The early centralisation during the Western colonial era has continued to be strongly associated with the claims for national sovereignty. This relationship persists today and, with that, demands for decentralisation are usually interpreted by the government as threats to Thai sovereignty and security (Ferrara, 2015). The progress of decentralisation in the country thus happens very slowly alongside the endless control of the centralised bureaucratic polity of the Thai state in which military and civil bureaucracies are combined (Raksasataya, 1996; Wongsekiarttirat, 1999). With the historical condition, policy analysis at the regional and local levels is not autonomous from the central government. Under this highly centralised system, to avoid structural and administrative reforms, innovation enhancement is promoted by the central government, especially at local and regional levels, to shift the attention from the constraints in the system to the lack of initiatives to going beyond limitations by thinking out of the box. Limited powers within area-​ based governance, policy networks and collaboration in Thailand have emerged, but they operate under the embedded structure of social hierarchies. Also, they are always driven by both formal and informal forces within the fragmented area-​based, function-​based and 21

Policy Analysis in Thailand

agenda-​based governance systems. As shown by a study in the largest part of the country with a survey of 881 areas, policy networks emerged widely and they were driven by the collaboration among plural policy actors including public, private and people organisations. These policy phenomena happened as area-​ based development could not be determined by merely one actor regarding power and resources interdependency. The emergence of policy networks was different and depended on the scales of the localities and policy issues. The survey also explored that policy issues that were commonly found within networks included environmental policy, elderly care policy, waste management policy, disaster relief policy, agricultural infrastructure policy, tourism policy and cultural promotion policy (Boossabong et al, 2016). Furthermore, Boossabong et al (2016) found that the reasons that policy networks emerged were because of organisational resource constraints, especially lack of information and knowledge (39.51 per cent), insufficient budget (37.09 per cent), inadequate staff (30.91 per cent), and inadequate tools and technology (25.22 per cent). Also, another main reason was the fact that they were facing ‘wicked problems’ that could not be handled by merely their authority and went beyond their territory, such as air pollution and disasters (40.53 per cent). The condition that most affected the ability to have an enduring collaboration was the unsupported legal framework for working across boundaries (27.2 per cent). The second condition was the unequal relations among partners (14.6 per cent), while the lack of incentives in initiating collaboration (9.8 per cent), without adequate deliberation (7.1 per cent) and the lack of collaborative skills (7.1 per cent) were mentioned by some local governments as well. Additionally, this study found that the role of the leaders was essential in developing and sustaining collaboration and found that the duration in taking a position of leadership correlated significantly with the duration of collaboration (Boossabong et al, 2016). Operating without clear roles and boundaries of relevant policy actors (dancing in the dark) Another style of Thai policy analysis is that it likes ‘dancing in the dark’, as most policies are operated without clear ends and means. It should be noted that parliamentary committees and legislative support agencies have limited roles in policy advising as the executive government usually dominates the decision-​ making process and controls the policy domain. On the other hand, political consultants work closely with the executive government and have more of an influence on the policy advising process as political strategies are well connected to public policy in this country, such as the Baan Pitsanulok that was mentioned in the first section of this chapter. The influence of public opinion and the media on public policy in Thailand seems to have increased in this digital era, but such influence could not steer a clear consensual policy direction. This is because while citizens and the media 22

History and styles of policy analysis

step in to promote a policy, others usually debate and challenge it. Thai media culture is, therefore, shaped by unreliable information, ‘fake news’ and alternative facts. This phenomenon is increasingly more complex in this post-​truth era. The government attempts to control it, but online platforms seem to be the only open and free platform that citizens have, hence why citizens try to protect it from government surveillance. Political parties in Thailand mainly propose policy proposals for making political effects rather than pushing for real change after winning an election. Although the emergence of the Future Forward Party and its promises of progressive development before the 2018 election is a new phenomenon, the party was not able to make an impact to public policy nor make any substantive changes. Another practice of policy analysis that looks like dancing in the dark is the role of general consultants and think tanks that mostly operate only at the administrative level by serving the bureaucratic system (for example, planning, measuring, and so on) rather than changing the fabric of its structure. Transparency is not a policy norm as there is always something going on behind the scenes Thai policy styles also include the fact that there is always something going on out of public view. For example, within exclusive structures, the monarchy and the military have played the pre-​eminent role throughout the history of modern public policy in Thailand. During the last decade, they have also been criticised widely for influencing the courts in policy decision-​making. The exercise of such complex power is not observable by the public, but people in general could sense this and understand the implicit role of the monarchy, the military and the courts due to the emergence of many situations and signals. This aside, the business associations always work behind the scenes of policy analysis in Thailand, regardless of whichever political group is in power. The difference is that, in the last two decades, businessmen have transitioned to the forefront of the Thai political game more than before. However, the majority still choose to support all big political parties in the shadows with the expectation of being promoted later by some pro-​r ich policies. Such policies were created in the era that placed emphasis on the strong populist policies for the laypeople. In other words, even though the policy, overall, seems to have a pro-​poor orientation, the rich who supported the party that won the election still gained some benefits from some of the sectoral policies. Knowledge, policy, practice and learning are rarely articulated The last Thai policy style is the incoherent nature of policy analysis. For example, most non-​governmental actors, including the community sector, civil society organisations and social movements, advocate public policy without generating practical knowledge for policy interventions and without engaging 23

Policy Analysis in Thailand

in the policy process to realise the constraints of the administrative system. Some of them can generate useful knowledge, but the number is small, and they could only do it at a specific place and time, such as the non-​governmental actors that are connected to the National Health Promotion Foundation or the National Health Assembly. On the other hand, policy analysis education in Thailand is mainly based on what governments do in existing systems. This is the way to guarantee that new policy analysts will be able to operate in such systems. Thus, the instruction focuses mainly on Thai legal frameworks and ongoing administrative techniques. However, this focus could not lead new generations of policy analysts to look at what governments should do to make a difference. Although some programmes aim to go beyond that conventional line, the transition is slow and is limited by the expectations of students who want to work in the existing system after their graduation. At the same time, policy scholars still need to work with the public sector within such traditional structures. Apart from that, most policy researchers in academic institutions are either empirical or normative in orientation. Such research separates the stage of knowledge generation and the stage of policy decision-​making from each other. Policy researchers usually end their reports with impracticable policy recommendations and blame policy makers for ignoring the suggestions. Pragmatic policy research, which translates knowledge into action in particular policy conditions, is rare. This creates tension between epistemic and practical concerns. Although recently there has been an attempt to promote a pragmatic research direction, the new direction rather promotes an advocacy project that allows policy researchers to put their ideas, if not their ideology, into policy interventions without a transformative learning process. Some cite Karl Marx’s classic phrase that it is most important to move from interpretation to change. The problem in Thailand is that much of the action research aims to make change without a clear understanding and thorough interpretation.

Conclusion It has been approximately 120 years since policy analysis began gradually developing in Thailand. The practice has moved very slowly and fluctuated with some ‘turns’ and ‘returns’. However, it is still removed from citizen-​centric policy analysis, and its styles are not necessarily democratic and inclusive-​oriented. As a result, policy analysis in Thailand still has a long way to go, with some opportunities and constraints. The most important opportunity is the fact that policy analysis in Thailand has significant room for improvement. The biggest limitation is that the public sector in Thailand does not have inclusive structures, means, ends and even mindsets. The challenge that we are facing is that policy analysts are not necessarily perceived as important agents in this country. Astrologers, known in Thailand as the ‘forecasting doctors’, somehow have played more significant roles in guiding 24

History and styles of policy analysis

the future of the country. At the local level, Buddhist monks seem to have a louder voice than policy scholars, especially when discussing ‘good governance’, as this term was translated using a Buddhist term (‘Thamma phiban’). The policy knowledge that we have is also less convincing in social and political realms. Instead of searching for relevant policy knowledge, the government would rather support traditional ceremonies, such as the annual agricultural productivity forecast (Lag-​na-​khaun), prayers for rain and respect for the figure of the river mother (Boo-​cha-​pha-​mae-​kong-​ka). Such knowledge is incorporated into the Thai policy culture, without challenging structurally unjust conditions that exist and still promoting the politics of surrender. With this historical background and the snapshot of policy styles in Thailand, this chapter draws a holistic picture of the foundation and basic understanding of policy analysis in this country. By adopting critical assessment and historical interpretation approaches, the chapter also provides alternative narratives about policy histories and styles than could be found in formal records thus far. However, this is not to claim that this chapter could provide a better explanation than the previous works, but rather that it aims to promote further dialogue in relation to the proposed arguments. As mentioned from the beginning, the main role of this chapter is to map out the storylines. Other following chapters will go into the details and shed light on policy analysis within specific policy sectors or by specific policy actors. References Anumarnratchaton, M. (2006) Public Policy, Bangkok: Expernet. [in Thai] Boossabong, P. (2009) Public Policy Making: Paradigms, Models, Frameworks and Techniques, Bangkok: Sematham. [in Thai] Boossabong, P. (2016) Deliberative Policy Analysis and Planning, Bangkok: Common Books. [in Thai] Boossabong, P. (2017) ‘Policy analysis in Thailand: Comparing the roles of expert and local knowledge’, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 19(2): 173–​183. Boossabong, P. and Chamchong, P. (2019) ‘The practice of deliberative policy analysis in the context of political and cultural challenges: Lessons from Thailand’, Policy Studies, 40(5): 476–​491. Boossabong, P., Chopyot, S., Akkasaeng, A., Ariyasirichot, W. and Chamchong, P. (2016) Exploring Collaborative Local Governance in North-​East Thailand, Bangkok: Thailand Research Fund. [in Thai] Dixon, C. and Parnwell, M.J.G. (1991) ‘Thailand: The legacy of non-​colonial development in south-​east Asia’, in C. Dixon and M. Heffernan (eds) Colonialism and Development in the Contemporary World, New York: Mansell Publishing, pp 204–​225. Dunn, W. (1994 [1981]) Public Policy Analysis: An Introduction (2nd edn), Hoboken: Prentice-​Hall. Dye, T. (1969) Understanding Public Policy, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-​Hall. 25

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Ferrara, F. (2015) The Political Development of Modern Thailand, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Fischer, F. and Boossabong, P. (2018) ‘Deliberative policy analysis’, in J. Dryzek and A. Bächtiger (eds) Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Getsuwan, R. (2009) ‘Critical policy science’, NIDA Development Journal, 49(1): 41–​66. [in Thai] Hogwood, B. and Gunn, L. (1984) Policy Analysis in the Real World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Howlett, M. and Ramesh, M. (1995) Studying Public Policy: Policy Cycles and Policy Subsystems, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hutanuwat, P. (2014) Authentic Leadership, Nakorn Pathom: Mahidol University. [in Thai] Kaisronpong, K. (2005) Modern Public Policy Principles, Bangkok: Political Science Books Publishing Program. [in Thai] Laothamatas, A. (1991) Business Associations and the New Political Economy of Thailand: From Bureaucratic Polity to Liberal Corporatism, Boulder: Westview Press. Lauhavichien, U. (2015) ‘Public administration in Thailand: Changes in the characteristics of the discipline and new directions’, in S. Bunyarattapun (ed) Public Administration in Thailand: Changes, Development and Trends, Bangkok: National Institute of Development Administration, pp 51–​84. [in Thai] McCargo, D. (2005) ‘Network monarchy and legitimacy crises in Thailand’, The Pacific Review, 18(4): 499–​519. Mérieau, E. (2016) ‘Thailand’s deep state, royal power and the constitutional court (1997–​2015)’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 46(3): 445–​466. Nakata, T. (2015) ‘Past, present and future Thai public administration paradigms’ in S. Bunyarattapun (ed) Public Administration in Thailand: Changes, Development and Trends, Bangkok: National Institute of Development Administration, pp 3–​28. [in Thai] National Health Assembly (2006) Participatory Public Policy Process: New Phenomenon of Thai Society, Bangkok: Healthier Public Policy Development Programme. Nilchaigovit, T. and Juntarasuk, A. (2015) The Art of Facilitating Learning Process for Changes: Facilitator Handbook, Nakorn Pathom: Contemplative Education Centre, Mahidon University. [in Thai] Paik, C. and Vechbanyongratana, J. (2019) ‘Path to centralization and development: Evidence from Siam’, World Politics, 71(2): 289–​331. Prommarin, N. (2009) The Evolution of Public Administration Paradigms in Thailand during 1955–​2008, MPA Thesis, Department of Public Administration, Chulalongkorn University. [in Thai] Raksasataya, A. (1996) ‘Centralization-​decentralization: A hundred-​year tug-​of-​ war in Thailand’, in S. Kurosawa, T. Fujiwara and M.A. Reforma (eds) New Trends in Public Administration for the Asia-​Pacific Region, Tokyo: Local Autonomy College, Ministry of Home Affairs, pp 73–​78.

26

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Riggs, F.W. (1966) Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity, Honolulu: East-​West Center Press. Songkin, P. (2013) Public Policy: Interpretive Approach, Mahasarakham: College of Politics and Governance. [in Thai] Thamronthannawong, S. (2001) Public Policy: Concepts, Analysis and Process (27th edn), Bangkok: Sematham. [in Thai] Tuntrajin, P. (2015) ‘Pr ime Minister’s think tank dur ing Shat-​shai’s government: An emergence, roles and consequences in policy making in Thailand’, in W. Leaungprapat, T. Unsuchaval and P. Tuntarajin (eds) Unpacking Public Policy: Perspectives in Modern Public Policy Studies, Bangkok: Thammasat University, pp 331–​376. [in Thai] Winichakul, T. (1994) Siam Mapped: A History of the Geo-​Body of a Nation, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. Wongsekiarttirat, W. (1999) ‘Central-​local relations in Thailand: Bureaucratic centralism and democratization’, in M. Turner (ed) Central-​Local Relations in Asia-​Pacific: Convergence or Divergence?, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 71–​96. Yavaprabhas, S. (1990) Public Policy, Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Press. [in Thai] Yavaprabhas, S. and Whangmahaporn, P. (2009) Thailand’s Public Policy: The Emergence, Development and Status of the Science, Bangkok: Judtong. [in Thai]

27

TWO

Methods of policy analysis in Thailand: bureaucratic, managerial, academic and participatory orientations Arunee Santhitiwanich

Introduction To understand how governments perform public policy, recent studies on public policy analysis highlight the roles of institutions, practices, instruments and the interplay of policy actors. For instance, Lascoumes and Le Gales (2007) and Peters (2016) point out the importance of the institutional rule and how de jure and de facto standards affect actors’ policies and their interactions with different values and preferences. Howlett (2018) emphasises character and context in policy choices. Knoepfel et al (2007) state that policy design could be shaped by the culture, structure and procedure of highly fragmented state entities. Margetts and Hood (2016) focus on various instruments and how policy choices are made. These factors explain different ‘methods’ of policy analysis. This chapter explains how the methods are utilised in Thailand. Underlying values and policy learning continuity classify the four types of policy analysis methods in Thailand. The observed methods can be categorised into bureaucratic-​oriented, managerial-​oriented, academic services and participatory methods (see Table 2.1). Each method shapes policy by its purposes, dominant values, institutional rules and key actors in a particular political context (Mayer et al, 2013; Clemons and McBeth, 2017). This chapter will demonstrate the four classifications of methods of policy analysis in Thailand. Its purposes, background, the context in which it is applied, institutional rule and de facto standards, and instruments or tools will be clarified. Moreover, the advantages and disadvantages of each type will be discussed. The last section provides suggestions for further studies on the methods of policy analysis.

Bureaucratic-​oriented methods The bureaucracy is rather stable while the political apparatuses are short-​lived in Thailand. Bureaucracy has been able to provide stability even without stable governments. As Etzioni-H ​ alevy (1983), Poocharoen (2012) and Bowornwathana (2013) have mentioned, political instability has offered great opportunities for the administrative actors to expand their authority in the political area. The 28

Methods of policy analysis

Table 2.1: Types of policy analysis methods in Thailand Underlying values Rationality

Satisfy

Continuity

Bureaucratic-​oriented methods Advisory boards, planning division, information hierarchy

Managerial-​oriented methods Performance management, strategic tools, policy resource

Discontinuity

Academic services methods Academic services, consultants, think tanks, outsourcing

Participatory methods Ad hoc, referendum, participation, third party

underlying value of this method is continuity of development. Institutional rules and the skills of officials within public agencies are, fundamentally, the means used by governments for continuing policies, defining policy problems, designing policies and learning policy outcomes. It is claimed that this institutional structure and career-​trained analysts could formulate policies rationally. Bureaucrats have played a key role in running the government since the administrative reform of Rama V. Even during and after the 1932 revolution in Thailand, bureaucrats played major roles in governing the country. Riggs (2009) termed this as a bureaucratic polity in the 1960s. Moreover, the political situation in Thailand before the 1997 Constitution was unstable. Military and civilian coalition governments took turns to capture the state authority. Meanwhile, the core entity of policy decision-​making is the short-​term cabinet, which made decisions based on information from the appointed analysts, both technocrats and bureaucrats (Riggs, 2009). In this chapter, the term technocratic is used for standardised processes or procedures based on expertise or technical knowledge, while the term bureaucratic is used in accordance with Weber’s approach, which is based on rule and coercion authority and formalisation. The methods of policy analysis following the bureaucratic-​oriented approach include setting advisory board committees, establishing policy and planning units or agencies, and organising hierarchy and procedure standardisation of policy proposals. First, setting advisory boards for considering, analysing and making a policy suggestion for the cabinet or the decision-​makers. Rational decision-​makers need systematic information. Receiving opinions and recommendations from experts is a convenient method for decision-​makers. The board committee which appointed several experts in various fields could provide the decision-​maker with enough information to decide. The advisory board appointment does not focus only on policy knowledge, but also takes account of administrative and political aspects. In the earlier phase, experts and professionals from various fields were appointed to the boards. However, in recent years, there is a tendency to increase the number of heads of public agencies to carry out related policies of these advisory boards. It shows the coordination function of advisory boards in a highly fragmented structure at 29

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present. The chairperson of the board is considered a political position. Thus, his or her preference can de facto predict the policy direction. Throughout the years, Thailand has set up many advisory board committees. The King’s Council of State (Krisdika) was established in 1874 to make administrative suggestions to the monarch. After 1932, Krisdika, filled with technocrats, provides the government with opinions on administrative issues and screens bills before legalisation. The Civil Service Commission was set up in 1934 to advise the cabinet on policies and strategies regarding human resource management in the public sector. The National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) was established in 1950 to advise the government on economic and social issues. It issues the National Economic and Social Development Plans and scrutinises other policies and development proposals before submitting them to the cabinet for consideration. The NESDB is responsible for giving suggestions on the National Reform Strategy and all other master plans. The Board of Investment of Thailand was formed in 1966 to make investment promotion policies for the government. The National Energy Policy Commission was established in 1986 to recommend national energy policies and plans. The Office of Public Sector Development Commission (OPDC) was set up in 2003 to direct good governance reforms in the bureaucracy. Due to the complexity of current social issues, there has been an increase in issue-​specific advisory boards. Examples include the Board of Correction, National Reform-​driven Commission, Sufficiency Economy-​driven Commission, Eastern Economic Corridor Policy Board, Cane and Sugar Board, National Land Policy Board, Board of Strategy for Reconstruction and Future Development, National Digital Economy and Society Commission, Southern Border Provinces Development Commission, National Cyber Security Committee, Electronic Transactions Commission, National Elderly Board, National Herb Policy Commission, and so on. There are rules and guidelines to help make the board function. Abiding by the laws of the advisory board establishment, decision-​makers must consider these boards’ recommendations when making decisions during cabinet meetings. This rule ensures that decision-​makers have sufficient information to make rational decisions. This instrument is convenient, providing that the decision-​ maker’s alternative perspectives are based on technical and bureaucratic expertise. However, according to the Council of State, the board of committee system is dispensable. The Act of Principle of Draft Legislation Provision and Evaluation the Outcome of the Law 2019 states that the board of committee system should be utilised only when making policies or setting criteria. Extensive reliance on recommendations made by board committees diminishes the authority of decision-​makers, especially the elected officials who have mandates from the public. Furthermore, the secretariat offices answerable to these boards are usually embedded within ministries and other public agencies. This ensures the continuity of policy information provided within the related public agencies, even when the 30

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board committee has been changed. This structure allows appointed officials to influence policies continuously. They can manipulate, overemphasise or ignore information, should they choose to. It is considered a political game of the bureaucrats to advocate their policy ideas in the political arena. In addition, senior bureaucrats are usually appointed to legislative committees and would, on behalf of the government, defend and consider the government’s proposal at the House of Representatives. Second, establishing policy and planning units. The bureaucracy as a public policy instrument is a primary method of policy analysis in Thailand. The creation of a permanent authority directly responsible for policy and planning accommodates the continuity of the policy development and policy learning within the related ministry or public agency. The appointed policy analysts account for providing policy-​relevant information and policy proposals to the decision-​maker. Policy analysts must accumulate knowledge and skills related to specific policy issues. The key performance indicators of policy and planning units are research reports and policy recommendations, which are conducted internally or outsourced to academics and consultancy companies. On the whole, policy and planning units provide continuity of policy trajectories based on bureaucratic knowledge and experiences related to the policy problem. There are three types of policy and planning units. First is the Policy and Planning Division in the Office of the Permanent Secretary in every ministry of the Thai government. These units support policy information related to the organisation’s mission. Second are the policy and planning departments that oversee policy issues that span across several public agencies, for instance, the Office of Transport and Traffic Policy and Planning, the Fiscal Policy Office, Energy Policy and Planning Office, Trade Policy and Strategy Office, Department of Public Works and Town and Country Planning, National Science, Technology and Innovation Policy Office, Office of Natural Resources and Environmental Policy and Planning, Office of Justice Affairs, Health Systems Research Institute, and the Office of Secretary of Policy Commissions. This type of policy and planning unit helps integrate the bureaucracy’s highly fragmented structure. Third are the central policy and planning agencies that provide overarching policy direction and information. They are the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Council (established in 1950), the National Research Council of Thailand (established in 1956), the National Statistical Office (established in 1963) and King Prajadhipok’s Institute (established in 1995). The aforementioned policy and planning units cover large-​scale national policy issues. Their policy recommendations and information are delivered to the cabinet or the parliament. Government agencies and stakeholders can access such information and use it to adjust their policy design and direction. According to the institutional-​structural approach, a fundamental characteristic of an institution is its stability regardless of the political environment (Peters, 2016). Setting permanent units or agencies can ensure the continuity of authority, staff and financial resources for achieving missions. An advantage of this structure 31

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is that it allows analysts to pay full attention to policy developments rationally. Having said this, while working in a stable environment, the analysts must still answer to hierarchical structures. As policy information and recommendations from the rational policy analyst travel up the hierarchical structures of the bureaucratic decision-​making process, the information could be reshaped to fit the policy direction or pre-​existing institutional values of the top. The role of the policy analyst in this method may vary from ‘rational researcher’ to ‘hired gunman’ depending on the leadership style of the top. The third method is the organising policy hierarchy. This method results from a highly centralised administration tradition, whereby the central government determines all policy directions. The hierarchical arrangement of policies and their sub-​policies are used to cascade implementation, which follows the state administrative system. This means that local government policies must comply with the provincial level policies aligned with central government policies. Administrative reform efforts in 2002, which introduced the strategic and performance management system to Thailand, added the four-​year national strategy to guide the direction of all government agencies. The State Administrative Act 2007 added the Provincial Cluster Development Plan for directing area developments. The national reform efforts in 2017 created the 20-​ year National Plan, the Master Plan, the National Reform Plan and the Regional Development Plans. These plans are seen as dominating tools for policy analysis and the direction of development for the country (see Table 2.2). The level added caused more complexity to policy analysis in Thailand. The policies at the ministerial and departmental levels must align with the first level, which is the Constitution and the 20-​year National Strategic Plan, and the second level, which is the 20-​year Master Plan, the National Reform Plan, the National Economic and Social Development Plan and the National Policy and Plan on National Security. Furthermore, at the provincial level, their plans must not only align with the first and the second-​level policies, but also with the ministerial and departmental levels. In addition, like the upper levels, the local governments must correspond to all other upper-​level plans. One can imagine the complexities of aligning plans and trying to satisfy the policy directions, though it can be conflicting on some occasions at the local government level. Technocrats in the National Economic and Social Development Council (NESDC) design the de facto standardisation of policy development and the monitoring system for the government. The policy proposal forms require evidence or explanation of alignment with upper-​level policies. Policy owners must present the logical correlation of their proposals to the first-​and second-​ level plans to the NESDC technocrats, so their proposal would be accepted in the annual government budget plan. The logical chain of policy alignment at all levels has budget implications. Three tracks of budget allocation were introduced in 2003, including function-​ based (ministry mission), area-​based (province cluster development direction) and integrating-​based (more than one agency works together in the mission). 32

Methods of policy analysis

Table 2.2: Public policy hierarchies in Thailand Before 2003: 6 levels

Constitution (1997) The National Economic and Social Development Plan (five years) Central government policy (four years) Ministry policy Provincial policy Local government policy

2003–​2007: 11 levels

2008–​2017: 12 levels

2018–​present: 17 levels

Constitution (1997) The National Economic and Social Development Plan (five years) Central government policy (four years) Ministry strategy (four years) Ministry operational plan (one year) Department strategy (four years) Department operational plan (one year) Provincial strategy (four years) Department operational plan (one year) Local government strategy (four years) Local government operational plan (one year)

Constitution (2007) The National Economic and Social Development Plan (five years) Central government policy (four years) Ministry strategy (four years) Ministry operational plan (one year) Department strategy (four years) Department operational plan (one year) Provincial cluster development plan (five years) Provincial development strategy (four years) Department operational plan (one year) Local government development strategy (four years) Local government operational plan (one year)

Constitution (2017) The 20-​year National Strategic Plan The 20-​year Master Plan (23 plans: Burankan, integration plan) The National Reform Plan (five years) The National Economic and Social Development Plan (five years) The National Policy and Planning on National Security (four years) Central government policy (four years) Ministry strategy (five years) Ministry operational plan (one year) Department strategy (five years) Department operational plan (one year) Regional development plan (five years) Provincial cluster development plan (five years) Provincial development strategy (four years) Department operational plan (one year) Local government development strategy (four years) Local government operational plan (one year)

The integration-​based budget allocation was seriously implemented in 2018. The 20-​year Master Plan indicates 23 policy issues that government agencies are asked to work on collaboratively. This track has a policy master, Chao Pab, which is the agency tasked to undertake leadership in organising, gathering, screening, analysing and packaging policy proposals from the others to pre-​ ceiling proposals in each policy issue. Each agency would design its policy to achieve the key performance indicators in the related policy tracks and guarantee budget allocation for its plans. The policy master is also responsible for reporting the outcome of the policy and lessons learned to decision-​makers. An advantage of the policy hierarchy method is that it ensures that all levels of policies will be implemented in the same directions as planned by the national government. But this centralised system may not respond well to all policy problems found in different contexts. Furthermore, the top-​down direction does not encourage innovation and initiation from the differing levels and policy actors. 33

Policy Analysis in Thailand

The three types of bureaucratic-​oriented methods are operated by technocratic agencies. The Council of State and the Budget Bureau initially suggested that the cabinet appoint an advisory board. The OPDC advised the cabinet of the appropriateness of creating policy analysis units or agencies. The Budget Bureau and NESDC organised the alignment of policy hierarchy and budgetary preference for the cabinet and the House of Representatives. These technocratic standards have continuously been under the bureaucratic tradition. For effective implementation, rules and formalised forms were launched for orderly compliance. This method is based on a centralisation tradition, both government structure and flow of information. The dominant policy values depend on the preferences of the top-​ranking officials following the chain of command, economic growth during unstable governments, popularity and efficiency of stable elected governments, the sufficiency economy principles of Rama IX, and security and harmony under military governments. The primary concern of the policy entity is to design policy according to its given authority and key performance indicators created by the entity’s higher authority. Under the Thai bureaucratic-​oriented methods, there are two ways that policy changes can take place. First, policy analysts make incremental changes according to new conditions, training and experience. But since these analysts work under the Thai bureaucratic system, which prefers incremental changes, it makes more sense to the Thai bureaucrats to choose small policy modifications rather than drastic changes. Second, on rare occasions, major changes in policy direction may take place when a new government or minister wants to make some key transformations to the government policy.

Academic services methods Outsourcing in Thailand is used for searching for possible alternatives, rationality, legitimacy and efficiency. Designing policy by appointed bureaucrats may have drawbacks due to their limited knowledge, personal preferences and not always being direct in communication. Using academic services, consultants or think tanks with interdisciplinary perspectives may offer different policy options, rationalities or legitimacy for controversial proposals. Moreover, outsourcing think tanks may help policy analysts to deal with overloaded problems in the bureaucracy and, hence, avoid institutional inefficiency. This method offers external perspectives, which can be valuable. The outsider analysts with experiences in different settings can give recommendations or policy options that may lead to policy changes (Adams and Tovey, 2012). This method could be categorised into two approaches –​outsourcing academic consultants and offering research grants. First, the consultants are the outsourced response to get work completed and, hence, following the terms of reference is their priority. Accordingly, client agencies are welcome to be part of the policy formulation as they provide relevant 34

Methods of policy analysis

information. Typically, they are academic consultants from universities and think tanks who are hired for a specific agreement such as researching possible problem-​solving options, assessing the possibility of policy initiation, designing implementation guidelines or evaluating policy outcomes. Institutions with academic services, both inside and outside universities, as independent agencies have been established since the 1970s, such as the Social Research Institute, Institute of Population Studies and Transportation Institute in Chulalongkorn University; the Institute for Population and Social Research in Mahidol University; the Research and Development Institute, Energy Engineering Institute in Kasetsart University; the Thailand Development Research Institute; and other consultant companies. The establishment of research agencies was promoted by the former members of the NESDC, which was an attempt to push knowledge-​based policy. Furthermore, there are also consultant institutes within the government agencies. These institutes may be solely founded by the government or co-​ founded with other private agencies. For example, the Office of the Civil Service Commission (OCSC) established the Thailand Innovative Administration Consultancy Institute to give advice to other agencies about organisational efficiency. The Ministry of Public Health founded the International Health Policy Program Foundation to provide consulting services about foreign healthcare policies. The NESDC created the Research and Development Institute of Sufficiency Economy Philosophy Foundation to advocate for the development policy on Rama IX’s sufficiency economy scheme. The Administrative Court co-​founded the Foundation for Research and Development of the Administrative Justice System to provide administrative law consultancy services. The OPDC established the Institute for Good Governance Promotion (IGP), which aims to provide management and development services. The consultants working in these organisations tend to be retired bureaucrats, university academics and permanent research staff. In Thailand, the consultant services have largely grown since New Public Management reform in the 2000s. Technocratic agencies, such as OCSC and OPDC, played a major part in this boom. These organisations, which are good governance regulators, pressured state agencies to assign independent consultants to reliable evaluation tasks and other consultancy services. Moreover, the agencies are also pressured to hire only registered consultants because recommendations from unregistered consultants would be viewed as unreliable and overlooked. This practice often raises questions about conflict of interest, since many of the consultants are retired high-​ranking bureaucrats who still have connections with technocratic agencies. Table 2.3 shows the number of registered consultants in Thailand. The number of corporations or companies is the highest at 1,627 entities. In the second approach, policy analysis can be done by granting research funds to academics or researchers who work in think tanks or universities. The aims of the funding need to be in line with the direction of government policy. 35

Policy Analysis in Thailand

Table 2.3: Number of registered consultants in Thailand Type

Number

Individual consultant

315

Corporation/​company

1,627

University

110

Foundation

48

Association

42

Governmental agencies

17

Source: Thailand Consultant Database Centre (2020)

The research-​based policy recommendations are believed to be independent, more rational and high quality. Academic services could also give an advantage in broadening perspectives on certain issues since the recommendations would come from outsiders. Kingdon (1984), Snare (1995) and Gupta (2001) indicated that at the formulation stage, policy makers do not want the absolute best choice. They look for policy options, checking which policy actors they are satisfied with. On this method, the result of the analysis may be a compromise between the academics and the bureaucrats. While the academics tend to conduct an objective analysis, which may result in a more radical recommendation, the bureaucrats would rather influence the process by using the contract agreement. Appointed analysts who might know the science of policy well do not engage in the research process, but they work with the terms of reference or research according to the direction and scope indicated in the agreement. However, this method does not guarantee that policy recommendations will be adopted. Academic work may be good in quality, but it certainly lacks connections from retired high-​ranking bureaucrats, which may be helpful in getting government approval.

Managerial-​oriented methods The objectives of the managerial approach are organisational efficiency, political effectiveness and satisfaction of all parties. The New Public Management concept was a megatrend in administrative reform in many countries during the 1990s. In 1997, as part of the World Bank’s debt relief package, it was recommended that Thailand adopt the new managerial instruments and the OCSC was then responsible for implementing the tools. This approach works well with Thaksin Shinawatra, billionaire-​turned-​politician, who was elected as Thai prime minister in 2001. Thaksin was a business-​style leader, and he was eager to see the government agencies implement his party’s populist policies. Thaksin pushed hard for administrative reform, which he believed would make the government more efficient and implement his policies effectively. With the World Bank’s recommendation on New Public Management instruments, 36

Methods of policy analysis

Thaksin eagerly issued the 2003 Good Governance Decree, which makes the government agencies more effective and more accountable. Good practices lead to good policies. The technocrats standardised the work of policy making for all public agencies, prioritising organisational adaptation and survival. Several instruments, such as Strengths, Weaknesses, Opportunities and Threats (SWOT) analysis, strategic planning, performance agreement, and self-​assessment report following Deming’s cycle and Public Sector Management Quality Award (PMQA) have been applied to the government administration. The OPDC was established to design a ‘good governance’ process, set the regulations, procedures and tools for government agencies. The strategic planning procedures began with reviewing the organisation’s environment. Then, SWOT analysis and Balanced Scorecard were used by the analysts to make recommendations to the OPDC. This step allowed the agencies to realign their direction and mission to be coherent with organisational contexts, such as political, social and cultural, economic, technology and directions of organisations on the higher levels in the hierarchy. Collective methods were used to review documents and previous performances, interview political leaders and senior appointed officials, conduct focus group interviews with heads of middle-​level of bureaucracy, academics and stakeholders, and do related surveys. Moreover, public service providers must ask and listen to both demand and complaints from their clients to analyse the appropriate vision and strategies in later steps. The initial procedure aimed to ensure that all stakeholders’ demands would be considered in designing the policy direction. Then, the planning and project posts would analyse all collected information and design the strategies, which are not only related to organisational missions but also to organisational learning introduced by the OPDC. To design strategies for highly fragmented agencies, the OPDC guidelines suggested that such agencies should group all responsible missions into a few clusters before specifying strategies for each one. With the definition of each cluster, it would become beneficial for senior appointed officials, since the number of clusters define the number of Deputy Permanent Secretary positions. It was the solution suggested by the OPDC to deal with the situation where no exact organisation takes charge as Chao Phap because the problems involve more than one agency. The package of the four-​year organisational strategy contained the result of the SWOT analysis, organisational visions, strategies to achieve the vision, expected outcomes of strategies, and key performance indicators (KPIs) of the outcome (see Figure 2.1). Not only does strategic planning advocate that the agencies learn and adapt themselves to any environment, but also achieve political satisfaction from elected officials. The elected officials would be satisfied with the application of the performance agreement to control results of implementation in any level. The four-​year strategy of any level of government agencies with KPIs needs to be in line with the performance agreement between the minister-​principals and the head official-​agent along the hierarchy. Every KPI achievement would be claimed as improved government performance to gain popularity. 37

Policy Analysis in Thailand

Figure 2.1: The guidelines of the Office of the Public Sector Development Commission Department Department A

B

Department Department Department C

D

E

Department F

Cluster 1

Cluster 2

Cluster 3

Strategy 1

Strategy 2

Strategy 3

Office of the Permanent Secretary

Strategy 4

Source: Office of the Public Sector Development Commission (2020)

Generally, the strategies were acceptable because the analysts would try to compromise all related perspectives. These strategies further framed the direction of any policy and project of the agencies. The annual proposal form required the proposer to specify the strategy and outcome that it served. In practice, goal displacement can occur if the proposals were not based on the expected outcomes of strategies but rather on achievement of the KPIs. The critique was that KPIs were based on what the agencies could possibly achieve and not on what they should have done to achieve the expected outcome. The OPDC also designed the performance evaluation framework and criteria for the government to decide on performance agreement. The framework consisted of effectiveness, service quality, efficiency and organisational development. However, the weight of perspectives depended on the government preference recommended by the OPDC. In addition, the Strategic Performance Based Budgeting (SPBB) was implemented in 2003. The budget allowance of the government was allocated in coherence with the annual operational plan and the government strategy. Also, the level of agency performance based on the signed agreement would be considered to provide the budgetary allowance in the next fiscal year. The Performance Assessment Rating Tool (PART), applied by the Budget Bureau, was used in 2006 to evaluate the budgeting productivity and performance effectiveness of the agencies. The PART has five main questions: coherence of hierarchy of plan and target groups; coherence of organisation outcome and the missions; coherence of operational plans, expected output and outcome, activities, and timing and resources; management process delivering the expected output; and internal evaluation and independent evaluation. The Budget Bureau is the external assessor who evaluates the agencies and reports its evaluation to the cabinet. Moreover, the PMQA1 was implemented by the OPDC. It was introduced for excellence in organisational management by the systematic improvement of planning, work systems, evaluation, learning and adaptation. This instrument forced the agencies to provide an information system for learning and adaptation which could support policy analysis. With this approach based on technocratic design, the key analysts are managerial experts, such as consultant firms, university scholars, think tanks and technocrats 38

Methods of policy analysis

in public agencies. They play the role of facilitator or process manager. In 2005, the OPDC established the IGP for managerial consultant services for the agencies. Likewise, the OPDC and Ministry of Finance supported TRIS Corporation Limited to be an independent evaluator for the government agencies and state enterprises in the first decade of implementation on the Good Governance decree. These managerial experts, with the ‘know how’ in the Laws and Hajer (2008) concept, have become the key policy network in policy subsystems. The planning and policy analysis officials learned from the experts for a decade such that they could be the process managers and facilitators at present. An advantage of the method is that the organisational adaptation includes a variety of environments and contexts, including client’s demand, organisational capacity, past performances, competing values and other challenges. However, the SPBB system was not divided into routine and strategic functions. Therefore, the strategic planning participants focused on analysing ‘words’ of strategies that covered their organisational mission to guarantee budget allowance. Moreover, PMQA and PART had driven the goal displacement for practitioners. They focused on the achievement of KPIs instead of policy outcomes.

Participatory methods Individual participation in policy analysis in Thailand is dynamic and complex. Normally, people can participate through their representatives and in some cases by themselves. This section only focuses on the people’s direct participation. In most cases, the participations are either passive or tightly controlled by the state officials. In the past, making the public aware of upcoming state projects had been officially counted as participation. However, as there were many protests against government projects, which had been planned and completed without people’s actual participation in the 1990s, the Thai government began to change its policies with the aim of becoming more open and transparent. The people since then can participate via different means, including joining committees in special provincial boards, taking part in the project assessment process, and sharing opinions in the stakeholder evaluation in local government, and so on. Since public participation is the result of people’s dissatisfaction with the government’s development policies, the underlying values of the participation in policy analysis are legitimacy and a reduction in dissatisfaction. There is wide public participation but its impact on policy is limited to the policy analyst’s perspective and mechanistic design. Normally, there are three main reasons why people’s participation is part of the Thai bureaucratic process. First, public participation abided by laws such as public hearings on local government planning, stakeholder consulting in widely and highly tangible impact projects, people connected in provincial good governance committees, and lastly, public hearings on draft making. The government has learnt from previous policies that had negative impacts on people. Policy assessment regulations before the 1997 Constitution did not require 39

Policy Analysis in Thailand

stakeholder consideration. This changed after the Promoting and Maintaining Quality Environment Act 1992 was enacted. The law states that people have the right to receive information and compensation from the state. This means that people’s opinions would only be considered when the officials deemed it necessary. There had been many infrastructure development projects in the 1970s and public participation in policy assessments was optional. During the 1980s, those negatively impacted by the government’s development projects called on the government to halt their suffering. Because of this, any proposed development projects were met with resistance. As a result, the 1997 Constitution stated that any activities with the potential to negatively impact the community had to have an environmental impact assessment and an environmental and health impact assessment. Since then, all stakeholders, including those who may be affected, have the right to express their opinions, as required by law. However, officials are also given authority to control the participation process as they see fit. The officials can determine what sort of activities cause negative impacts, or who should be considered stakeholders. Furthermore, the officials may consider stakeholder opinions, but the government is not required to follow up on or incorporate them into their policy. In practice, public participation is only a protective mechanism for the Thai officials from public objection. At the local planning level, public participation was a regular occurrence. Without public hearings or deliberative processes, the local development plans of any municipalities were not valid. Moreover, the frequency and level of participation were part of the good governance criteria of Local Performance Assessment for every municipality. The designer of the policy process within the local government was the Department of Local Administration, which was responsible for promoting and regulating the administration of local governments. The 1997 Constitution established the National Consultant Council, which was comprised representatives of civil society organisations (CSOs), the business sector and think tanks. The Council had responsibility for raising the policy issues and making recommendations to the cabinet. However, its role was limited because no law or regulation that stated that the cabinet had to consider the Council’s opinion. The Council was terminated in 2016 by the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO), citing reasons for the redundancy, with the commission on Promotion of the National Reform, Strategy and Cohesion established by the NCPO. Second, the reason why participation is open to the public is because of executive policy. The Good Governance Decree 2003, Thamma phiban reform, supported public agencies following participatory governance. This decree was not enforcement but, rather, suggested. The OPDC, which played an important role in designing the governance system in Thailand, created the Thailand Excellent Participatory Governance Awards in 2013 to encourage agencies to adopt participatory governance. The important criteria for this were creating participatory boards, adding participation promotion wording in the agency’s strategy, including participation in the strategic planning processes, and the 40

Methods of policy analysis

satisfaction of participants. These criteria were not enforced in every agency as it depended on the leadership style of the heads of public agencies. Furthermore, at the provincial level, the Integrally Provincial and Cluster Provincial Administration Decree of 2008 encouraged the participation of CSOs and the business sector in the provincial development process. The law indicated that the government needed to gather information regarding local people’s expectations of the provincial development strategy. The provincial authorities often obtained the required information from other second-​hand sources, such as reviewing community expectations from local government plans, which are based on deliberations with local people. However, the governor can used other methods to compile public expectation, such as participation in planning workshops, interviewing the chief of community, using surveys, or conducting community focus groups. The decree also stated that the representatives of the business sector and CSOs are legally selected by the provincial governor, together with heads of public agencies in the province, and needed to provide recommendations on the draft provincial strategy before it was authorised. This step has no influence on changing the strategic direction, but it could change minor details. Finally, participation is utilised as an instrument to reduce dissatisfaction among those who are negatively affected by government policies. From the government’s perspective, participation is a quick way to solve problems or reduce resistance from members of the community. Both the online and offline protesters are calmer when their demands are acknowledged and considered by the authorities. However, the engagement levels in offline platforms range widely. Examples include demonstrations informing the authorities of their dissatisfaction; proposal petitions to the representatives of the authorities; participation as members of a joint committee that considers problem-​solving options; and becoming consultants of government agencies or members of a research team for assessments or evaluation. It should be noted that officials usually play passive roles in offline platforms. A noteworthy case was the Pak Mun Dam project, an energy development plan, approved in 1989. There was a lack of credible and transparent cost-​benefit analysis and its impact led to changes in the occupation of the major stakeholders, from fisherfolk to labourers. Some even had to migrate to other provinces. Some fish species were thought to be extinct because of the dam. A thousand people affected by the project protested against the Thai governments during the 1990s. In 1990, a compensation commission was formed. In 1991, the representatives of the local people affected by the project were appointed to a joint committee to start dealing with the issues. In 1993, the government and the representatives of the local people signed a Memorandum of Understanding to commit to resolving the negative impacts of the dam and to consider compensation for those affected. In 1996, the people affected by Pak Mun Dam and other development projects, 47 cases, established the Assembly of the Poor as their political strategy.2 From 1997 to the present, the government set up several commissions and 41

Policy Analysis in Thailand

appointed local representatives as part of the problem-​solving procedure. With this method, stakeholders were able to participate in the analysis processes but, in their view, the governments established too many commissions and proposed too many research teams only because they wished to appease the protesters (Wasinpiyamongkhon, 2013: 102). As a result, the problem-​solving process was always delayed. The Future Forward Party, which first entered parliament in the 2019 elections, created a new offline platform for participation. The chairman of the House of Representatives Commission, chaired by the Future Forward Party, invited the stakeholders and other affected people to be informants in the commission meeting. This showed that participation at the governance level was not reserved for only the representatives, but also for the people. Moreover, it was known that the party’s main supporters are a young generation who are not afraid to voice their opinions. This makes significant changes in politics as well as in the policy arena. As a result, many public policies were questioned intensely, which had never been done before. Anyone can voice their own interests via online platforms and authorities may pay attention to their expressions on Facebook, Twitter and Change.org. Nevertheless, online platform participation often consisted of complaining about being dissatisfied about issues and less about proposing actual solutions. Its impact is in verifying the problem, criticising the policy idea and evaluating the policy performance. Although the general public could participate in developing policy options and influencing policy direction, the nucleus of developing the policy is still within the government agencies. The agencies set several administrative mechanisms to filter the negative feedback from the public. First, participation was set at the lower level of hierarchy. Local government planned to have a public hearing before local council consideration and district chief approval. Krueathep (2004) referred to this participation as ‘artificial’ participation. Buchenrieder et al (2017) explained that cultural practice in the localities did not support open discussions in the participatory process. Local government plans and direction can be shaped and changed by the superior authorities. Second, the influence of those who participated was limited. Sometimes, local people can participate through a joint commission. However, the commissions usually have very limited authority to ensure that the government agencies abide by the results. The joint commission, consisting of the people affected, is usually formed at the provincial level while the decision-​making authority is located in the central government. The proposals recommended by the joint commissions faced difficulty in getting implemented, including cases involving people living in the communities whose lands overlap with areas designated as national parks, dam gate agreements and compensation for dam victims. Finally, not everyone could be participants. According to the regulations, public sector representatives are defined by law as chiefs of registered social groups or social organisations, such as village headman, village health volunteers, chamber 42

Methods of policy analysis

of commerce committees, elderly clubs, community committees, and so on. Generally, these groups have interdependent relationships with government agencies, therefore the ideas and preferences on policies might not vary greatly. If the laws do not specify participants, the agencies tend to select those who have ties with the agencies, especially retired government officials. These people not only understand the nature of public work, but they also speak in the same language as the government officials. As shown in this chapter, the three administrative mechanisms help the government to control public participation. This kind of superficial participation is advantageous in that it quickly legitimises policies. Policy analysts could guide the policy towards the directions, which are preferred by those in power. However, public concerns may help the analysis to be more comprehensive. On the other hand, superficial participation may not lead to trust and open discussion. It can question the democratic and representative aspects of participation and the rationality of information from the participants.

Conclusion In short, this chapter has identified four methods of policy analysis based on the underlying values and the continuity of policy. These are the bureaucratic-​ oriented, managerial-​oriented, academic services and participation methods. An examination of each method of policy analysis has spotlighted context, procedures and tasks, and its objectives and characteristics. As Howlett (2018) and Mayer et al (2013) pointed out, the context and character of the policy instrument are the essential elements of understanding policy design. Lasswell (1971) and Knoepfel et al (2007) indicated that policy variation depends on the actors involved in the given contexts. Moreover, Bots (2013) and Snare (1995) stated that different methods create windows of opportunity for different actors. This chapter has shown how the actors can influence each method of policy analysis. Bureaucracy is the foundation of the policy system. Unstable politics and a coalition government necessitated a bureaucratic method, which was embedded within the system. Under this centralised system, technocrats tend to play a central role in designing and regulating the use of other methods of policy analysis. As explained in this chapter, method designs were incrementally developed not only to solve the public basic problems or realise government expectations, but also for the survival of public agencies. This chapter discussed methods of policy analysis in Thailand, based on the bureaucratic tradition. Technocrats might have the relevant knowledge for policy design, but effective implementation relies on institutional rules. Standardisation of practices is indispensably required. From the practitioner’s aspect, it is safe to follow the rules and given procedures. From the central authority’s aspect, it is easy and convenient to unite as one for decision-​making. Moreover, the technocrats who design the method would make sure that every actor will follow the expectations and the rules. 43

Policy Analysis in Thailand

Furthermore, non-​public sector actors who are involved in policy analysis have to be selected by authorities. This gives power to authorities to influence the belief and ideology in policy. This shows that those in positions of power are the most important actors. They only adopt the result of policy analysis when it is compatible with the policy preference, regardless of the method. For example, the sufficient economy principles of Rama IX have been supported, on paper, by most, if not all, government agencies in Thailand. Since the idea was introduced and supported by the most revered King, it is always at the top of the government agenda. This chapter also shows that the choice of the method leads to the change of power. Different methods give power to different policy actors. The participatory method, for example, gives voices to the people while the bureaucratic method holds power for the powers that be. Bowornwathana (2005), Santhitiwanich and Bowornwathana (2013) and Bowornwathana and Poocharoen (2010) suggest that decision-​making processes of designing and implementing the administrative reform are political. However, this chapter does not focus on the political nature of policy analysis. More studies on this political struggle or political actors would be useful for further theoretical discussions. Notes 1 2

PMQA changed its name to become the Public Sector Excellence Awards (PSEA) in 2018. See details in Prachatai Working Group (2013).

References Adams, R. and Tovey, W. (2012) Consultancy in Public Services: Empowerment and Transformation, Bristol: Bristol University Press. Bots, P.W.G. (2013) ‘Designing the policy analysis process’, in W.A.H. Thissen and W.E. Walker (eds) Public Policy Analysis: New Developments, New York: Springer, pp 103–​132. Bowornwathana, B. (2005) ‘Administrative reform and tidal waves from regime shifts: Tsunamis in Thailand’s political and administrative history’, The Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration, 27(1): 37–​52. Bowornwathana, B. (2013) ‘The politics of becoming a top bureaucrat in the Thai bureaucracy’, Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration, 35(2): 195–​206. Bowornwathana, B. and Poocharoen, O. (2010) ‘Bureaucratic politics and administrative reform: Why politics matters’, Public Organization Review, 10(4): 303–​321. Buchenrieder, G., Dufhues, T., Theesfeld, I. and Nuchanata, M. (2017) ‘Participatory local governance and cultural practices in Thailand’, Cogent Social Sciences, 3(1). doi:10.1080/​23311886.2017.1338331 Clemons, R.S. and McBeth, M.K. (2017) Public Policy Praxis: A Case Approach for Understanding Policy and Analysis (3rd edn), New York: Routledge. Etzioni-​Halevy, E. (1983) Bureaucracy and Democracy: A Political Dilemma, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 44

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Gupta, D. (2001) Analyzing Public Policy: Concepts, Tools, and Techniques, Washington, DC: QC Press. Howlett, M. (2018) ‘The criteria for effective policy design: Character and context in policy instrument choice’, Journal of Asian Public Policy, 11(3): 245–​266. Kingdon, J. (1984) Agendas, Alternatives, and Public Policies, Boston: Little, Brown. Knoepfel, P., Larrue, C., Varone, F. and Hill, M. (2007) Public Policy Analysis, Bristol: Policy Press. Krueathep, W. (2004) ‘Local government initiatives in Thailand: Cases and lessons learned’, Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration, 26(2): 217–​239. Lascoumes, P. and Le Gales, P. (2007) ‘Introduction: Understanding public policy through its instruments –​from the nature of instruments to the sociology of public policy instrumentation’, Governance, 20(1): 1–​21. Lasswell, H.D. (1971) A Pre-​view of Policy Sciences, New York: Elsevier. Laws, D. and Hajer, M. (2008) ‘Policy in practice’, in M. Moran, M. Rein and R.E. Goodin (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy, New York: Oxford University Press, pp 409–​424. Margetts, H. and Hood, C. (2016) ‘Tools approaches’, in B.G. Peters and P. Zittoun (eds) Contemporary Approaches to Public Policy: Theories, Controversies and Perspectives, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 133–​154. Mayer, I.S., van Daalen, C.E. and Bots, P.W.G. (2013) ‘Perspectives on policy analysis: A framework for understanding and design’, in W.A.H. Thissen and W.E. Walker (eds) Public Policy Analysis: New Developments, New York: Springer, pp 41–​64. Peters, B.G. (2016) ‘Institutionalism and public policy’, in B.G. Peters and P. Zittoun (eds) Contemporary Approaches to Public Policy: Theories, Controversies and Perspectives, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 57–​72. Poocharoen, O. (2012) ‘Bureaucracy and the policy process’, in E. Araral, S. Fritzen, M. Howlett, M. Ramesh and X. Wu (eds) Routledge Handbook of Public Policy, Abingdon: Routledge, pp 331–​346. Prachatai Working Group (2013) 24 Years, 13 Prime Ministers and 16 Governments: Epic Grassroots Anti-​Pak Mun Dam Struggle, Bangkok: Prachatai Special Report. Riggs, F.W. (2009) ‘Bureaucratic links between administration and politics’, in A. Farazmand (eds) Bureaucracy and Administration, New York: CRC Press, pp 85–​109. Santhitiwanich, A. and Bowornwathana, B. (2013) ‘High public officials and the politics of administrative reform in Thailand’, Journal of Social Science and Humanities, Kasertsart University, 39(2): 202–​211. [in Thai] Snare, C.E. (1995) ‘Windows of opportunity: When and how can the policy analyst influence the policymaker during the policy process’, Review of Policy Research, 14(3): 407–​430. Wasinpiyamongkhon, N. (2013) People’s Politics in Thailand: A Critical Study of the Assembly of the Poor, 2001–​2010, PhD Thesis, University of Leeds.

45

Part Two Policy analysis within executive government

THREE

Policy analysis in central government Theerapat Ungsuchaval

Introduction Developing countries, including Thailand, are believed to hold distinct characteristics regarding policy making and governance of the state which cannot be completely described by explanatory accounts of public policy formulated in more developed countries (Horowitz, 1989; Mooij, 2003). This focus on policy making in developing countries is vital to understanding the nature of policy analysis in the central government. In particular, the policy process in developing countries is seen more realistically through an interactive approach which regards public policy as a result of interactions among different, interrelated actors (Narain, 2018). With this in mind, this chapter argues that to develop an explanatory account of Thai public policy, interactions among actors manifested through the structure of the institutional arrangements in which policies are defined and developed should be key to this explanation. This chapter aims to examine the nature of Thailand’s governance configuration and development in the public policy-​making processes of the central government since modernisation, starting from the early 1930s.1 By discussing governance at the level of policy making, this chapter is focused on the changing role of the state vis-​à-​vis society and its consequence for policy making. In other words, it is interested in how public policies are created and who puts them on the policy agenda of the central government. A significant portion of the public policy making in Thailand is executed by the state and its government. The Thai state represents a centralised and ‘activist state’ (Samudavanija, 2009) that plays a leading role in every programme within Thai society. Policy changes are usually driven, if not dominated, by the state and its apparatuses, when compared to non-​state entities. Not only does the state shape policy but it also shapes the governance of policy, namely the institutional arrangements which give rise to policy. This is usually done through several broad policy frameworks such as the Constitutions and the National Economic and Social Development Plan (NESDP). Through the central government, the state is conditioning policy changes and is responsible for policy development of the country over time.

49

Policy Analysis in Thailand

The rise of bureaucracy in modern governance and public policy (1930s–​1960s) Modern governance and public policy in Thailand began in the early 1930s when the country underwent a dramatic revolution in 1932 resulting in a regime change from an absolute monarchy to a parliamentary system. Yet, scholars suspected that the 1932 revolution was an uprising of and for bureaucracy (Riggs, 1966; Ockey, 2004), which paved the way for the enduring hegemonic position of power of elites, namely the bureaucrats and military elites, in the governance of public policy in Thailand. As such, the elites occupied the cabinet, the highest decision-​ making mechanism in the central government. For the first time, the position of the government as a focal actor in public policy processes was strengthened through the directive principles of state policies under a constitution, a law that guides governments to fundamental policy making, originally developed in the 1949 constitution (see Boonchit, 2012). Bureaucratic polity The monopolisation of major policy decision-​making, politics and public administration is centred around the power elites between the 1930s and 1960s and was well-​characterised by the notion of ‘bureaucratic polity’ (see Riggs, 1966).2 The polity was neither considered as traditional nor modern governance. It is not traditional because the polity managed to give rise to a wide range of modern, differentiated bureaucratic mechanisms. And yet, it is not modern because the polity failed to build non-​bureaucratic mechanisms and accountability systems to function with the bureaucracy. The polity also came with the significant expansion of bureaucratic mechanisms within the central government of the state, especially ministries, departments and administrative officers.3 Bureaucracy has become a persisting, prestigious and significant policy-​ making mechanism of the central government. Sarit’s regime and the rise of technocracy In the mid-​1950s, Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat seized power and governed Thailand with his ‘despotic paternalism’ (Chaloemtiarana, 2007), which was backed by a strong bureaucratic polity. Sarit centralised decision-​making power over policy and public administration to himself while he weakened the power of the ministries. This implies the institutionalisation of central power, led by the single leader, to completely monopolise the state apparatuses in order to pursue his vision of policy development (Satitniramai, 2013). Sarit sought legitimacy in the ideology of development. He initiated numerous intensive developmental policies, intended to modernise the country, such as infrastructural expansion and agricultural intensification accompanied by increased industrialisation. The first NESDP4 was launched in 1961, which marked the ‘era of development’ 50

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(Baker and Phongpaichit, 2014) where the course of national policy development was closely linked to economic growth guided by private capital. In this policy development approach, technocrats held a significant role in cooperating with international organisations and Western governments (Muscat, 1994). Change was rapid under the top-​down development policy scheme of the Sarit government, which was later believed to have caused inequitable economic growth (Kelly et al, 2012). Considering this background, the 1950s and 1960s gave rise to the advance of technocracy in governance and policy making where prominent, highly skilled people with Western educations were working in the bureaucratic administration to modernise the country in various policy fields (Stifel, 1976). These technocrats acted as experts and exerted extraordinary influence over the formulation and execution of policy. A few of the most widely recognised technocrats were those associated with the Ministry of Finance, the Budget Bureau, the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) and the Bank of Thailand. Together, they later constituted the major institutional pillar of national economic policy making, which was responsible for framing and directing the national policy development as well as the extent to which extra-​bureaucratic actors can participate. Implications of bureaucratic polity for public policy Bureaucratic polity is criticised for being responsible for some of the major policy concerns. First, it led to the problem of ‘departmentalism’ (Samudavanija, 2002): the authority in control of decision-​making and the administration of public policy was divided and channelled through rigid departmental structures. This suggested that there was fragmented, weak policy coordination within central government. Second, the polity produced a ‘weak state’ system which resulted in inefficient policy development. Given the fragmented policy coordination, policy goals of the government were not unified. Compared to the East Asian Newly Industrialised Countries, which pursued the single goal of industrialisation and economic growth, Thailand’s growth paths and growth performances were directed by weak, fragmented leadership. As such, the weak state system that characterised the government was unsuitable for long-​term developmental policies (Siriprachai, 2012). Third, the polity gave rise to the overwhelming influence of bureaucracy over parliamentary mechanisms. This suggests that bureaucracy could obstruct and delay policies proposed by the parliament (Ockey, 2004). Later, when political appointees governed, public policy was hindered without bureaucratic support. The parliament was then often impelled to stay in a reciprocal relationship with the sympathetic bureaucrats and cultivate ties in bureaucracy. Fourth, the polity represented the lack of extra-​bureaucratic forces, namely other governmental bodies and non-​governmental actors (Laothamatas, 1992). It 51

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did not permit the development of such the forces outside central government. Input from extra-​bureaucratic forces was considerably little, if not absent, and limited to the implementation stage rather than the decision-​making stage of policy. Thus, politics and policy were not about competition and negotiation among various interest groups except for a patron–​client relationship; a social organisation where non-​bureaucratic actors need to gain their legitimacy and worth, and possibly their identity, from the statuses and relationships they have with the bureaucratic state (Gilley, 2014).

Semi-​democratic regime and the rise of interest groups outside the central government (1970s–​1980s) At the beginning of the 1970s, a student uprising brought down a 16-​year military regime which became an ordeal for the power elites (Samudavanija, 1987). This resulted in the formation of democratic movements, including the rise of interest groups, outside of the government. However, democratisation did not go uncontested. Tension between the military regime and the democratic movements was observed. The government of Thailand, between the late 1970s and the late 1980s, had been in a ‘semi-​democratic’ regime (Samudavanija, 1989), where some democratic mechanisms were available, such as a general election and the parliament, but the control of policy decision-​making still remained in the hands of the powerful elites. It was a unique time in history when elected and unelected power holders coexisted. Nevertheless, it was the technocrats and top bureaucrats who truly had control over the process of national policy making, including designing policy interventions to fix the ‘undesired’, in their eyes. In this respect, the government still managed to retain their autonomy and power over the policy and legislative processes while acknowledging the emerging influence of the non-​state actors. The development of the private sector was encouraged for the first time by the state as was addressed in the third NESDP in 1972. Then, the sector was institutionalised and integrated into the state project in the later NESDPs.5 By the late 1970s, business associations increased their roles as autonomous extra-​ bureaucratic policy actors. They did not only function as policy advocates but also as partners of public agencies (see more details in Chapter Twelve on business associations). Policy making, especially in the area of economic policy, evolved under more ‘pluralist’ politics and can be characterised by the notion of ‘corporatism’ (see Laothamatas, 1992; Siroros, 1995). This reflects the way in which the Thai government was not only active in governing but also in crafting institutional relations between groups and connecting them to the government. Business associations and corporatism Research on industrial and infrastructure policy development suggests that, since the 1970s, the area of economic decision-​making was no longer exclusively 52

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occupied by the power elites but, instead, was driven by private business and shared between the state, local and foreign capitalists (Siroros and Haller, 1994). In other words, the governance of policy making was more influenced by cooperative, contractual relations. However, the type of contractual relationship that developed is suspected to be the type whereby the bureaucratic state retained control of the administration of the policy and programme. It did not require political accountability in a sense that the cabinet and the parliament are made passive during the contracting process (Siroros and Haller, 1994). In particular, organised businesses are found to have increased their roles in the realm of economic policy and, in turn, they manage to significantly advise, initiate, transform or block the policies of the government (Laothamatas, 1992). These extra-​bureaucratic groups have resulted in the formation of a joint-​ committee system, namely the Joint Public and Private Sector Consultative Committee (JPPSCC). The JPPSCC was established in 1981 as a public mechanism to institutionalise business participation in national policy making; soon after, it became the centrepiece of government–​business relations during the ‘semi-​democratic’ regime (Laothamatas, 1992). The JPPSCC was seen as an elite proxy of selected business associations used to negotiate with the government and to push forward their interests through the policy process (Tanapornpun, 1989);6 this is a good example of a patron–​client relationship embedded in the social organisation of Thai society where the policy making is a process of rent-​seeking of the ruling elites. Public policy is about sharing resources and interests, as seen in this case, among businesses and power elites. Business associations that were able to develop strong ties with the power elites in a patron–​client manner became successful in pushing their policy agendas and interests. Clinging to the central power was a key strategy.7 Under the JPPSCC, national policy development prioritised resource exchanges among the central agencies, economic growth and urban development over equal resource distribution, poverty reduction and rural development. Nonetheless, the role of business associations in national policy making should not be over-​exaggerated. According to Samudavanija (2011), private sector organisations joining the government in policy making did not necessarily mean that the actual power of policy decision-​making automatically rested on the non-​state organisations. Instead, these organisations were only allowed to get closer to the government and use the joint-​committee system to merely issue complaints gained from the bureaucratic inertia. They were not yet able to drive systematic change in the governance of policy making. In addition, the state and the business sector had different views on the role of the JPPSCC in the policy-​making process. Business organisations envisioned the JPPSCC as a power structure which they could have shares in. On the other hand, the government saw the JPPSCC as an advisory body in economic development that merely gave an opinion on certain issues (see Chapter Twelve for more discussion on the JPPSCC). 53

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The golden age of technocracy The rise of the JPPSCC came with the golden age of the technocrats in national policy development. The means by which the technocrats retained their role in national policy making can be clearly seen from the way they were positioned in the policy process in the 1980s. Since 1981, boards, committees and councils of the government always included technocrats (Samudavanija, 2011). The governance structure of policy making was systematised. Government advisory councils were classified into specialised areas such as economics, politics and society. These advisory bodies had a role in recommending policy options to the prime minister and, in turn, the prime minister would convey the policy options to the cabinet meeting. Despite the increasing role of organised businesses, major policies were designed and implemented by the new technocrat-​bureaucrat elites.8 The new elites were also suspected of avoiding political accountability mechanisms within the parliament when they sought to develop policy. The mechanisms were not utilised during policy decisions as they were supposed to be in accordance with the principle of representative democracy. The new elites favoured their own bureaucratic mechanisms where they could decide and control the decision-​making. Arguably, the overwhelming influence of technocracy in national policy development of this period was derived from the political context of a coalition government which brought fragmented political directions. Many public policies developed during this time were unsustainable. The development of a new policy or the continuation of an existing policy thus required a ‘depoliticised’ mechanism (Boossabong, 2017). Technocrats who resided in bureaucratic departments were assumed to be able to perform tasks without political intervention from politicians. The JPPSCC and the new technocrat elites were made less active in the late 1980s (see Laothamatas, 1992). Instead, the newly elected government, led by General Chatchai Chunhawan, created a new system using its own advisory councils, one of which was the so-​called ‘Baan Phitsanulok’ (see Hewinson, 1993; Tantrajin, 2015).9 This advisory council had the task of providing relevant information to the cabinet so that policies will be created based on this information. The council was not convinced of the way the previous technocrats developed and ran national policy. Instead, this was a team of outsider intellectuals and academics which emerged to replace the previous technocrat-​bureaucrat elites. The elected government relied less on bureaucratic departments, especially those that previously handled economic policy, and started to develop major policies by on its own. This created a more significant role for academics and other experts in the policy agenda setting, which later became a common practice even into the 2010s (see Dyussenov, 2017). The rise of non-​bureaucratic advisors in policy development, employed by the elected government, caused a deep tension between bureaucrats and the elected government (see more on the consultants and advisory committees in Chapter Nine). 54

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Changing state governance, changing policy making (1990s–​2000s) From the late 1980s onwards, civil society underwent a growth and development phase, which, in turn, contributed to policy changes in many areas. Its growth represents the more diversified interests of society and stakeholders in the policy process (see Gohlert, 1990; Sangiampongsa, 2003). Groups such as non-​ governmental organisations (NGOs) and community organisations became essential for the social and political transformation of the era; they started to become an important part of the governance of public policy of central government. Arguably, the public policy-​making process became characterised by the notion of ‘new governance’ (Rhodes, 1996) whereby central government is differentiated and the state does takes on more of a guiding role rather than an implementing role. Mechanisms of governance and policy making were devolved to non-​departmental bodies and a variety of joint-​committees between the state and non-​state actors. The way the government made policy was challenged as well as supplemented by civil society. The national policy discourse began to incorporate terms such as partnership, participation, civic assembly and good governance. This reflects the changing governance arrangement in public policy making where multiple actors from different sectors intervened in the policy process. New governance The beginning of the 1990s saw a major political reform movement try to promote democratisation in the country. ‘Bureaucratic polity’ within central government was made the primary target of the reform movement. At the time, the movement was pivotal to the changing landscape of governance and policy making because it later generated the first wave of administrative reforms of the modern public sector (Luangprapat, 2008) which oriented the policy direction of the government in a new governance and neoliberal manner. For example, in 1996, the Office of the Public Sector Development Commission introduced the concept of participatory governance in public administration and policy (see Siroros, 2009). Such a participatory approach was further advanced in the 1997 and 2007 constitutions which unprecedentedly positioned public participation as a part of the directive principles of fundamental state policies and as a prerequisite of policy making of the government at all levels, respectively. Privatisation of large-​scale public ownership of infrastructure, to reduce the government’s fiscal and financial control and burden, was also a controversial policy of the 1990s and the 2000s (see Sirasoontorn and Quiggin, 2007). Notably, the 1997 Constitution systematically transformed the structure of the government from a unitary administrative system to a multiple, decentralised system. Subsequently, there was the ‘autonomisation’ of the state resulting in the creation of autonomous public organisations (APOs) which are neither bureaucratic departments nor state enterprises (Bowornwathana, 2006). These 55

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APOs have been a crucial element in governance and policy making because they represented the idea of new governance favouring a networked government. New APOs, like the Thai Health Promotion Foundation (THPF) and Community Organization Development Institute (CODI), started to develop a new approach to public policy which heavily engaged civil society and promoted multisectoral collaboration (see Rakyutidharm, 2014; Pitidol, 2016; Ungsuchaval, 2019). Policy making within the central government was differentiated with new modes of governance that were not confined to hierarchies. The area of health policy best exemplifies this new governance in policy development which is driven by partnerships of voluntary and horizontal relations between government agencies, bureaucrats and NGOs (see Ramesh et al, 2015; Prakongsai, 2016). Further, changes in governance and policy making were driven by the 1997 Asian financial crisis and increased globalisation. The government was shaken by the crisis and global actors such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund held a strong bargaining position in negotiations with domestic players as they provided significant financial support. The government became less self-​reliant and increased their collaborative efforts with non-​state actors and public–​private partnerships (Kitthananan, 2015). As a result, they were compelled to start using the concept of ‘good governance’ (Orlandini, 2003) as well as a series of neoliberal reforms under a ‘structural adjustment package’ (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2014) as the prime policy agenda to help the country recover from the crisis. Thaksinocracy The 1997 Constitution and the 1997 financial crisis did not only provide a platform for change, but also saw the rise of Thaksin Shinawatra, who won a large electoral victory in 2001. The police-​officer-​turned-​tycoon, Thaksin and his party were made up of a group of Bangkok businessmen from various sectors and also some provincial ‘political godfathers’ (McCargo and Pathamanund, 2005). During this time, the businessmen started running the government and introducing ‘big money politics’ (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2009). Essentially, the government of Thaksin attempted to reform the governance of Thailand by creating a strong state system led by a capitalist-​politician coalition, thereby transforming a traditional bureaucratic polity into a modern, managerial state (Painter, 2006; Akira, 2014; Suehiro, 2014). Private-​sector principles and values were adopted in the state system. The country became a big company managed by a single prime ministerial power (Bowornwathana, 2004). Decision-​making power of national policy was increasingly transferred from bureaucratic mechanisms to the prime minister and his selected political executives. For instance, the bureaucrats from the NESDB and the Ministry of Finance became less influential in the structure of policy making. Furthermore, Thaksin significantly reduced and dispersed the power of central bureaucracy by expanding the number of ministries from 14 to 20 and setting political appointees to regulate ministries. Decentralising occurred when Thaksin appointed ‘chief 56

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executive officer (CEO) governors’ to manage provincial areas with him being the country’s super-​CEO and changing the budgetary process. This government’s success came from a series of populist policies, which, for grassroots organisations, were powerfully attractive. These populist policies established direct relationships between the government and the people by, for example, giving direct funding to, and empowering, communities. This resulted in the strengthening of Prachakhom (organised community) around the country and encouraging active rural citizens (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2008). The policy later was criticised as being degenerative and sabotaging the intermediary role of NGOs. Although the Thaksin government was fully democratically elected, it does not necessarily mean that the governance of policy making was inherently democratic. Thaksin’s government was heavily criticised for creating an ‘authoritarian’ policy process and preventing, or even suppressing, other policy actors from meaningfully participating in the process (Pongsudhirak, 2003; Satha-​Anand, 2006; Tejapira, 2015).10 Eventually, the new governance processes of the 1990s initiated under the Thaksin government were perceived to threaten the conservative power elites (see Ouyyanont, 2014). As a result, this led to the return of the power elites, typically the military complex in contemporary governance.

The return of (new) authoritarian governance (2006–​present) From the mid-​2000s, the power elites, led by the military, returned to occupy the government and took control over the governing apparatuses of the country and the public policy processes. The return of authoritarianism was derived from two coups: September 2006 and May 2014. However, these coups were unlike anything Thailand had ever experienced. They were dubbed ‘civil society coup[s]‌’ (Arugay, 2013) because their success was not only based on military intervention but also on civil society mobilisation. Paradoxically, civil society, which was a force for democracy, together with the military complex, played a significant part in the mobilisation against elected governments (Kuhonta and Sinpeng, 2014). As society continued to develop, the power elites learned to exploit civil society to legitimise themselves (Pathmanand, 2008). They became a ‘softie or semi-​dictatorship’, a type of government that owed its success to the collaboration of people and civil society (Tejapira, 2007). These governments included many non-​state actors such as NGO activists, businessman and thinkers who later became appointed to a variety of positions in many committees to help the governments administrate society and make decisions about the national economic and social policies. This period is one where the power elites and the non-​state actors formed ambiguous partnerships to develop public policy. Consultative authoritarianism and Prayuth’s regime Under the new authoritarian governance, central government allowed the non-​state actors to negotiate and exert influence over the process, albeit being 57

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authoritarian. This led to a process whereby public policy was made through a cooperation between elites from the military-​bureaucratic complex, business associations and civil society. This new authoritarian governance of public policy can be characterised as ‘consultative authoritarianism’ (see Teets, 2013), where the state seeks to incorporate the beneficial aspects of the non-​state actors while discouraging their dangerous aspects. Public policy was then made through a certain social management system where the government enhances and exerts its technocratic power through its selected organised society. Mechanisms of control and support were simultaneously utilised in governance. ‘Prayuth’s regime’ (Kongkirati and Kanchoochat, 2018) can be considered a version of this new authoritarian governance. In 2014, General Prayuth Chan-​ocha staged a coup against the elected government and took control. His government aimed to recentralise the decision-​making powers and the state structures into the hands of the power elites, in particular the military complex, at the expense of the extra-​bureaucratic and non-​state actors. All key ministries were governed by military leaders with Prayuth as the prime minister. In general, policies of the government are highly susceptible to subjugation and dissent by exercising a series of controls and censorship. Also, the new government increased Bangkok’s administrative and financial control over provincial areas and officials; this was envisioned as a threat to the central power elites (Ouyyanont, 2014). A study of land and natural resource management policy found that the military government moved the control mechanism of the policy from the Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment to the military-​centric authority under the control of the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC), which resulted in a mass violation of human and community rights (Ongla and Buddharaksa, 2019). The ISOC became a central policy mechanism of control, employed by the military, that routinely penetrated the sociopolitical sphere (see Pawakapan, 2017).11 Heavy suppression of public assembly was also observed. The government exploited the 2015 ‘Public Assembly’ Act and used it to control the opposition to the coup by adding conditions for activists who wanted to mobilise collective actions against the government (Archamas, 2019; Kongcharoen and Kumboonreung, 2019). Many of the new governance mechanisms created since the 1990s empowered independent organisations, such as the election commission, the constitutional court and the anti-​corruption commission; these were manipulated and used as veto mechanisms against the government’s opposition (Kongkirati and Kanchoochat, 2018). However, it is thought that bureaucracy and Prayuth’s government did not work as collaboratively like bureaucracy and the military governments did in the past (Kongkirati and Kanchoochat, 2018). Policy coordination was difficult to achieve under the normal government because, since the 1990s, bureaucracy became divided and highly fragmented due to political crises and governance reforms. Bureaucracy is no longer a straightforward policy instrument of the government. The government then created Section 44 of the 2014 Interim Constitution as a tool to solve administrative and policy problems. This tool provided the prime 58

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minister, as the leader of military government, the final and absolute power to issue any order, which was deemed lawful and constitutional. Section 44 immediately became a favourite instrument of control of the government to develop a wide range of policies and to govern the country (see iLaw, 2015). On the other hand, the military government supported the association of organised society in national policy development. It enacted the ‘Regulations of the Office of Prime Minister on Supporting and Developing Civil Society Organizations’ in 2015 to promote and strengthen the role of organised civil society. The regulation ordered the establishment of a national committee dedicated to the development of civil society. However, this can be seen as a co-​optation strategy of the government. Specifically, the regime established the National Reform Council (NRC): a mechanism to co-​opt and reward its sympathisers, elite groups of unelected organised society and businesses that paved the way for the coup (see Kanchoochat, 2016). These groups then became an integral element of the regime and played an important part in policy development in many areas. They saw the NRC as a platform to advocate for their policy agendas though being sceptical of the government. The regime successfully co-​opted several non-​state actors and developed public policies, which, to a certain degree, were supported by political and civil society. However, the regime managed to remain in a dominant position by allowing only its members to share the decision-​making power. No other elite groups were permitted. Non-​bureaucratic state bodies were deactivated or marginalised. An expansion of military power in state enterprises and autonomous public organisations were highly visible. The state power was then recentralised into the central government. Even when faced with crisis requiring collaboration across sectors in society, the government still highly centralised its policy decision-​making power. The way the government has coped with COVID-​19 illustrates this point. Policy responses to the crisis were heavily based on the power elites and selected governmental experts, which resulted in ineffectiveness and inefficiency due to the insensitivity of sociocultural dimensions of policy making and tensions among governmental departments created by the highly centralised government (Boossabong and Chamchong, 2020; Ungsuchaval and Kumlungpat, 2020). A key moment in the policy development of the Prayuth regime, the so-​called ‘Pracharath’ (a state of the people) scheme was launched in 2015. Arguably, major parts of this scheme were derived from Thaksin’s previously populist scheme, done to gain popularity within the provincial areas. This scheme entailed a partnership between the state, the business and the social sector and aimed to strengthen (the governance of) the economy at the local level. The business element comprised of major conglomerates which were expected to help the government with knowledge and market access. These conglomerates were given certain privileges from the government even though they were already prosperous. The social sector comprised of major NGOs and revolved around the 59

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THPF, especially the CODI. These NGOs were expected to provide innovative ideas and connections to communities. In return, they were granted the privilege of pursuing their policy agendas in institutional political settings. This again emphasises the patron–​client relationship in public policy and governance. The Pracharath partnership with policy development hence represents a ‘strange bedfellows’ kind of arrangement. Nevertheless, it is imperative to note that there was an asymmetry in the partnership with the business-​bureaucratic complex occupying the direction of the scheme in practice. Nonetheless, the Pracharath scheme was generally criticised for lacking clear results and progress. This is partly because the scheme did not aim to produce policy content but, instead, focused on the structural cooperation between the different sectors (see Rukhamate, 2019). A major policy outcome of the Pracharath scheme was the ‘Pracharath Rak Samakkee’, a programme aimed to build local social enterprises in provincial areas. These enterprises were a smaller version of the national partnership comprising of the three collaborative sectors with the main objective of supporting small-​and medium-​sized enterprises, farmers and low-​income earners through adding value and rebranding key products of the local areas.

Conclusion Public policy in Thailand is heavily based on the initiation of governmental actions while having an increased amount of non-​state initiatives. Since 1932, high-​ranking bureaucrats have become the new governing class which constituted the power elites and dominated the governance of public policy in the central government of Thailand. During the 1970s, the government started to develop policy by coordinating key elite interest groups focused on commissions. The government has started to share its power over the policy-​making process with the non-​state actors in a more corporatist manner. Since then, it was difficult to continue characterising the governance of policy making in terms of a bureaucratic polity. At least in economic policy, the polity lost its power. Yet, the decision-​making process in certain other policy areas might continue to be strongly bureaucratically governed. Although there has been the rise of non-​ state actors in the governance of policy making, bureaucratic influence over the governance has persisted. In the 1990s, the governance of policy making became increasingly differentiated and underwent a new governance reform. Organised civil society and partnerships were a significant feature included in policy development of the central government. It was no longer possible and appropriate for the government to be the single policy actor. Being a single policy actor also ceased to be appropriate when the bureaucratic polity was strongly attacked. Although losing power, the bureaucratic polity regularly occurred in the background of policy making and its variant returned to the stage since the middle of the 2000s. Indeed, as argued by Kumlungpat (2021), bureaucratic polity never 60

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disappeared because it is not a political system but, instead, it is a network of actors in a bureaucracy that have a capability to adapt, often by including selected social forces, to maintain power in formulating key national policies. The new authoritarianist governance unprecedentedly allowed the coexistence of the strong power elites and vibrant, active organised society representing an interdependent relation between the state and society. Instruments of control were used alongside those of support in policy development. It is evident that the four major developments characterising the governance of policy making (bureaucratic polity, corporatism, new governance and consultative authoritarianism) function in parallel to contemporary policy making, albeit having emerged from different eras and contexts. As a result, public policy in Thailand is interesting because multiple developments of governance can, and do, govern policy making of the central government. Notes 1

2

3

4

5

6 7

It is important to note that this chapter does not aim to discuss every policy-​making decision that happened within every policy area. Instead, it looks at grand patterns or arrangements which can be seen in national policy making. Indeed, the concept was originally developed as a model for analysis. However, it was often used as a description of reality (Ockey, 2004). This chapter treats the concept as it was used to describe a character of Thai politics. Also, it is imperative to note that bureaucratic polity is not an exotic phenomenon of Thailand (see Girling, 1981). Yet, the Thai society is a classic case of the polity. Between 1933 and 1979, for instance, the number of ministries increased by 85.7 per cent while the departments increased by 191.1 per cent (Chandarasorn, 2000). Likewise, by 1965 the number of civil servants was three times larger than in 1932 (Siffin, 1966). Given this, it is no wonder that bureaucracy dominated the political and policy process which in turn created a situation where public policy is created to be more responsive to the interests of the bureaucratic system than those of societal actors outside central government. In the polity, it can also be considered that the political dominance of the bureaucrats in public policy and governance was derived from the frequent military coups. There were 14 coup attempts between 1932 and 1973. The coups have become ‘semi-​officialised’ as a device for taking control of the government (Mosel, 1957). The first NESDP was called the ‘National Economic Development Plan’. The aspect of social development was added in the later plans, thereby becoming the ‘National Economic and Social Development Plan’ (emphasis added). The NESDPs are criticised for ineffectively creating systemic changes. Rather, they are seen as a framework to legitimise the rationale of the further expansion of the state and bureaucracy in both scope and scale by exploiting the non-​state actors (Samudavanija, 2009). For further details on how the JPPSCC functions, please see Chapter Twelve about business associations and policy analysis. Moreover, a study on politics and business collusion in public transportation and agricultural policy in the 2000s found that the informal networks of business corporations and political authorities, especially politicians, utilised their formal authority to either bend the interest of the policy in their favour or to prevent the policy consequences which were undesirable for them (Tangsapwattana, 2013). The patron–​client relationship in policy has thus been evident throughout history. It can be concluded that the interest groups have obviously been involved in the policy process in order to capture a certain degree of state power and use it to their advantage. 61

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9 10

11

A good example of the prominent role of technocrats in national public policy can be seen in the currency adjustment policy of 1981. There were only six people involved in the adjustment and they all did not belong to political parties and functioned as an excellent technocrats-​ bureaucrats (Samudavanija, 2011). For further details on technocracy in public policy and ‘Baan Phitsanulok’, please see Chapter One in this volume. On the other hand, it is paradoxical in Thailand that a coup government could conduct a wide and successful participatory policy process (see Siroros and Ungsuchaval, 2012; Ungsuchaval, 2014). Hence, it can be argued that, when it comes to policy making, the motivation behind what generates government policies does not necessarily correlate with the type of government (democratic or authoritarian) (Fisher, 1998; Weir, 2003). For further details on the operation of ISOC, please see Chapter Seven about the role of the Thai military in policy analysis.

References Akira, S. (2014) ‘Technocracy and Thaksinocracy in Thailand: Reforms of the public sector and the budget system under the Thaksin government’, Southeast Asian Studies, 3(2): 299–​344. Archamas, N. (2019) ‘Consider military junta’s order to ban of political gatherings as state repression in Thailand’, CMU Journal of Law and Social Sciences, 12(2): 1–​ 39. [in Thai] Arugay, A. (2013) ‘Saviors or spoilers? Explaining “civil society coups” among democratizing regimes’, Thammasat Review, 16(1): 167–​187. Baker, C. and Phongpaichit, P. (2014) A History of Thailand (3rd edn), Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Boonchit, N. (2012) The Sanctions of Directive Principles of Fundamental State Policies under the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand, B.E. 2550, MA Thesis, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand. [in Thai] Boossabong, P. (2017) ‘Policy analysis in Thailand: Comparing the roles of expert and local knowledge’, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 19(2): 173–​183. Boossabong, P. and Chamchong, P. (2020) Coping with COVID-​19 in a non-​ democratic system: Policy lessons from Thailand’s centralised government, International Review of Public Policy, 2(3): 358–​371. Bowornwathana, B. (2004) ‘Thaksin’s model of government reform: Prime ministerialization through “a country is my company” approach’, Asian Journal of Political Science, 12(1): 135–​153. Bowornwathana, B. (2006) ‘Autonomization of the Thai state: Some observations’, Public Administration and Development, 26(1): 27–​34. Chaloemtiarana, T. (2007) Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books. Chandarasorn, V. (2000) The Organizational Expansion of Thai Bureaucracy: Problems, Obstacles and Trends, Bangkok: Thai University Researchers Association. [in Thai] Dyussenov, M. (2017) ‘Who sets the agenda in Thailand? Identifying key actors in Thai corruption policy, 2012–​2016’, Journal of Asian Public Policy, 10(3): 334–​364.

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Fisher, J. (1998) Nongovernments: NGOs and the Political Development of the Third World, West Hartford: Kumarian Press. Gilley, B. (2014) The Nature of Asian Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Girling, J. (1981) The Bureaucratic Polity in Modernizing Societies: Similarities, Differences and Prospects in the ASEAN Region, Singapore: The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Gohlert, E.W. (1990) Power and Culture: The Struggle against Poverty in Thailand, Bangkok: White Lotus. Hewinson, K. (1993) ‘Of regimes, state and pluralities: Thai politics enters the 1990s’, in K. Hewinson, R. Robinson and G. Rodan (eds) Southeast Asia in the 1990s Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism, St. Leonards: Allen and Unwin, pp 159–​189. Horowitz, D.L. (1989) ‘Is there a third-​world policy process?’, Policy Sciences, 22(3/​4): 197–​212. iLaw (2015) Report on the Exercise of Power under Section 44 of the Interim Constitution of Thailand, 18 November, available from https://​ilaw.or.th/​node/​3938 Kanchoochat, V. (2016) ‘Reign-​seeking and the rise of the unelected in Thailand’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 46(3): 486–​503. Kelly, M., Yutthaphonphinit, P., Seubsman, S. and Sleigh, A. (2012) ‘Development policy in Thailand: From top-​down to grass roots’, Asian Social Science, 8(13): 29–​ 39. Kitthananan, A. (2015) ‘Governance and policy making in Thailand’, in W. Luangprapat, T. Ungsuchaval and P. Tantrajin (eds) Unpacking Public Policy: Perspectives in Modern Public Policy Studies, Bangkok: Thammasat University Press, pp 406–​433. Kongcharoen, N. and Kumboonreung, W. (2019) ‘The law on public assembly under the military coup power’, CMU Journal of Law and Social Sciences, 12(2): 40–​63. [in Thai] Kongkirati, P. and Kanchoochat, V. (2018) ‘The Prayuth regime: Embedded military and hierarchical capitalism in Thailand’, TRaNS: Trans–​Regional and –​ National Studies of Southeast Asia, 6(2): 279–​305. Kuhonta, E.M. and Sinpeng, A. (2014) ‘Democratic regression in Thailand: The ambivalent role of civil society and political institutions’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 36(3): 333–​355. Kumlungpat, C. (2021) Prayuth is not Sarit: The Dynamic of Thai Bureaucratic Polity from the Golden Age to the Declining Period, Bangkok: Illuminations Editions. [in Thai] Laothamatas, A. (1992) Business Associations and the New Political Economy of Thailand: From Bureaucratic Polity to Liberal Corporatism, Boulder: Westview Press. Luangprapat, W. (2008) Public Sector Reform in Thailand: Causes and Consequences, PhD Thesis, Kobe University, Japan. McCargo, D. and Pathamanund, U. (2005) The Thaksinization of Thailand, Copenhagen: NIAS Press. 63

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Mooij, J. (2003) ‘Smart governance? Politics in the policy process in Andhra Pradesh, India’, ODI Working Paper 228, available from www.odi.org/​publi​ cati​ons/​1793-​smart-​gov​erna​nce-​polit​ics-​poli​ cy-p​ roce​ ss-a​ ndh ​ ra-​ pradesh-i​ ndia Mosel, J. (1957) ‘Thai administrative behavior’, in W. Siffin (eds) Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration, Indiana: Indiana University’s Department of Government, pp 278–​331. Muscat, R. (1994) The Fifth Tiger: A Study of Thai Development Policy, Helsinki: United Nations University Press. Narain, V. (2018) Public Policy: A View from the South, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ockey, J. (2004) ‘State, bureaucracy and polity in modern Thai politics’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 34(2): 143–​162. Ongla, O. and Buddharaksa, W. (2019) ‘Integral state: Critical study on land and forest management in the post-​May 2014’, CMU Journal of Law and Social Sciences, 12(2): 64–​84. [in Thai] Orlandini, B. (2003) ‘Consuming “good governance” in Thailand’, The European Journal of Development Research, 15(2): 16–​43. Ouyyanont, P. (2014) ‘Thailand: A new polity in the making?’, ISEAS Perspective 59, available from www.iseas.edu.sg/​ima​ges/​pdf/​ISEAS_​Pers​pect​ive_​2014​_​ 59.pdf Painter, M. (2006) ‘Thanksinisation or managerialism? Reforming the Thai bureaucracy’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 36(1): 26–​47. Pathmanand, U. (2008) ‘A different coup d’état?’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 38(1): 124–​142. Pawakapan, P. (2017) The Central Role of Thailand’s Internal Security Operations Command in the Post-​Counter-​insurgency Period, Singapore: ISEAS –​ Yusof Ishak Institute. Phongpaichit, P. and Baker, C. (2008) ‘Thaksin’s populism’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 38(1): 62–​83. Phongpaichit, P. and Baker, C. (2009) Thaksin: The Business of Politics in Thailand (2nd edn), Chang Mai: Silkworm Books. Pitidol, T. (2016) ‘Redefining democratic discourse in Thailand’s civil society’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 46(3): 520–​537. Pongsudhirak, T. (2003) ‘Thailand: Democratic authoritarianism’, in D. Singh (ed) Southeast Asian Affair 2003, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp 275–​290. Prakongsai, P. (ed) (2016) Thailand Health Profile 2011–​2015, Nonthaburi: Bureau of Policy and Strategy, Ministry of Public Health. [in Thai] Rakyutidharm, A. (2014) ‘Patronage, dominance, or collaboration? Thailand’s NGOs and the Thai Health Promotion Foundation’, in P. Liamputtong (ed) Contemporary Sociocultural and Political Perspectives in Thailand, Dordrecht: Springer, pp 517–​531.

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Ramesh, M., Wu, X. and Howlett, M. (2015) ‘Second best governance? Governments and governance in the imperfect world of health care delivery in China, India and Thailand in comparative perspective’, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 17(4): 342–​358. Rhodes, R.A.W. (1996) ‘The new governance: Governing without government’, Political Studies, 44(4): 652–​667. Riggs, F.W. (1966) Thailand: The Modernization of a Bureaucratic Polity, Honolulu: East-​West Center Press. Rukhamate, P. (2019) ‘Development of an evaluation model regarding effectiveness of Pra-​cha Rat policy: The grassroots economic development of the General Prayuth Chan-​ocha Government’, King Prajadhipok’s Institute Journal, 17(1): 23–​57. [in Thai] Samudavanija, C. (1987) ‘The bureaucracy’, in S. Xuto (ed) Government and Politics of Thailand, Singapore: Oxford University Press, pp 75–​109. Samudavanija, C. (1989) ‘Democracy in Thailand: A case study of a stable semi-​ democratic regime’, in L. Diamond, J. Linz and S.M. Lipset (eds) Democracy in Developing Countries: Asia, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, pp 305–​346. Samudavanija, C. (2002) Thailand: State-​Building, Democracy and Globalization, Bangkok: IPPS. Samudavanija, C. (2009) The State, Bangkok: Institute of Public Policy Studies. [in Thai] Samudavanija, C. (2011) State and Society: Three-​dimensional State in Siam’s Plural Society (2nd edn), Bangkok: Institute of Public Policy Studies. [in Thai] Sangiampongsa, P. (2003) ‘Non-​g overnmental organizations and public organizations in the Thai public policy: Their characteristics, roles, and relations’, Warasam Pattana Borihansat (Thai Journal of Development Administration), 43(1): 93–​129. Satha-​Anand, C. (2006) ‘Fostering “authoritarian democracy”: The effect of violent solutions to southern Thailand’, in V.R. Hadiz (ed) Empire and Neoliberalism in Asia, London: Routledge, pp 169–​187. Satitniramai, A. (2013) The Thai State and Economic Reform: From the Origin of Private Bankers to the 1997 Economic Crisis, Bangkok: Sameskybooks. [in Thai] Siffin, W.J. (1966) The Thai Bureaucracy: Institutional Change and Development, Honolulu: East-​West Center Press. Sirasoontorn, P. and Quiggin, J. (2007) ‘The political economy of privatization in the Thai electricity industry’, Journal of the Asia Pacific Economy, 12(3): 403–​419. Siriprachai, S. (2012) Industrialization with a Weak State: Thailand’s Development in Historical Perspective, Singapore: NUS Press. Siroros, P. (1995) Thai State and Development of Automobile Industry, Bangkok: Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University. [in Thai] Siroros, P. (2009) ‘Participatory governance’, in K. Phusavat, N. Methairat, P. Decharin and V. Ongsakul (eds) Towards Good Governance in Public Sector: A Thai Chronicle, Bangkok: Office of the Public Sector Development Commission, pp 125–​144. [in Thai] 65

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Siroros, P. and Haller, K. (1994) ‘Thai-​style contractual relationships: Two case studies’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 16(3): 317–​341. Siroros, P. and Ungsuchaval, T. (2012) ‘Public participatory policy process in the establishment of Thai Public Broadcasting Service’, in Proceeding of the International Conference for Case Studies on Development Administration 2012 (NIDA-​ ICCS 2012), Bangkok: National Institute of Development Administration, pp 379–​398. Stifel, L.D. (1976) ‘Technocrats and modernization in Thailand’, Asian Survey, 16(12): 1184–​1196. Suehiro, A. (2014) ‘Technocracy and thaksinocracy in Thailand: Reforms of the public sector and the budget system under the Thaksin government’, South East Asian Studies, 3(2): 299–​344. Tanapornpun, R. (1989) Economic Policy-​making Process in Thailand: A Historical Political Economy Analysis from 1932–​1987, Bangkok: The Social Science Association of Thailand. [in Thai] Tangsapwattana, E. (2013) The Relationship between Policy Decision-​making of the Cabinet and the Interests of Business-​politics Collusion Represented through News: The Case of NGV Bus and Rice Mortgage Policy, Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Press. [in Thai] Tantrajin, P. (2015) ‘Policy advisory council of the PM (Baan Phitsanulok) during Chatchai’s government: Origins, roles and consequences for policymaking in Thailand’, in W. Luangprapat, T. Ungsuchaval and P. Tantrajin (eds) Unpacking Public Policy: Perspectives in Modern Public Policy Studies, Bangkok: Thammasat University Press, pp 331–​376. [in Thai] Teets, J.C. (2013) ‘Let many civil societies bloom: The rise of consultative authoritarianism in China’, The China Quarterly, 213: 19–​38. Tejapira, K. (2007) Coups and Thai Democracy, Bangkok: The Foundation for The Promotion of Social Science and Humanities Textbooks Project. [in Thai] Tejapira, K. (2015) ‘Policy-​making process of Thailand: Past, present, and future’, in W. Luangprapat, T. Ungsuchaval and P. Tantrajin (eds) Unpacking Public Policy: Perspectives in Modern Public Policy Studies, Bangkok: Thammasat University Press, pp 18–​23. [in Thai] Ungsuchaval, T. (2014) ‘Policy transfer in decision-​making process: The establishment of the Thai Public Broadcasting Service’, Journal of Social Science, 44(1): 55–​82. [in Thai] Ungsuchaval, T. (2019) Metagovernance and NGOization in Thailand: An exploratory study of the Thai Health Promotion Foundation (THPF) and Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), PhD Thesis, University of Kent, Canterbury, UK. Ungsuchaval, T. and Kumlungpat, C. (2020) ‘Public health governance mechanisms of Thailand in response to COVID-​19’, Journal of Social Sciences, Naresuan University, 16(2): 37–​76. [in Thai] Weir, K.A. (2003) The Paradox of NGO-​State Relations, PhD Dissertation, University of Connecticut, United States.

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FOUR

Policy analysis in Thai local governments Pobsook Chamchong

Introduction The decentralisation process and local government reform experienced in Thailand since the late 1990s have led Thai local governments to embark on an analysis of their policies. Essentially, the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E.2540 (1997) and the Determining Plans and Process of Decentralisation Act B.E. 2542 (1999) were promulgated to guarantee the autonomous status of local governments. This means that Thai local governments are authorised by law to have a considerable degree of autonomy over local development planning and budgeting, with respect for the demands of local citizens through public participation processes (Krueathep, 2004). Interest in local governments’ policy making has increased since the decentralisation era. Much of the Thai literature examines local governments’ planning and budgeting processes and activities by using the regulations and guidelines of local development plans that are issued by central government agencies. However, research that focuses on how and how much local governments can develop their own policies and initiatives is somewhat limited. This chapter seeks to provide a fresh insight into policy analysis as revealed through the investigation of the autonomy of Thai local governments over policy making. Essentially, the legal-​institutional framework is employed to examine the formulation of local development plans –​the most important official local policy documents –​and the activities relating to it. It draws on content analysis of relevant documents, non-​participatory observations of meetings at both national and local levels and interviews with local governments’ mayors and officials. The findings demonstrate that policy analysis in Thai local governments is considerably centrally driven, that is, planning processes and activities are shaped and intervened heavily by central government’s interventions, particularly laws and regulations. Local planning is, therefore, centralised and standardised in both processes and formats. This forced local governments to focus greatly on following regulations, guidelines and templates for developing plans instead of paying attention to actual policy design and learning. Moreover, the latest military government revitalised the past legacy of centralisation and restored the hidden bureaucratic dominance which undermines local governments’ power and autonomy over local policy development. The chapter begins with a brief overview of local government in Thailand, by providing structure and the responsibilities of Thai local governments. It then 67

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describes the nature and the importance of local development plans as well as the procedures and processes related to creating these plans. Then, it illustrates the phenomena of local planning in real-​life settings which enables the author to argue that local governments’ policies are heavily top-​down and centrally driven.

A brief overview of local government in Thailand Local government system within Thailand’s public administration Thailand is a unitary state governed by a parliamentary system. It incorporates three layers of administration: central administration, regional or provincial administration, and local administration, that is, local government system. The central administration is based upon the concept of centralisation. It is constituted by the Prime Minister’s Office and the cabinet, covering several ministries and governmental bodies. The regional or provincial administration represents ‘a field-​level territorial extension of central administration’, covering 76 provinces throughout the country (Haque, 2010: 675). Within a provincial territory, the provincial administration covers several administrative levels, namely provinces, districts, subdistricts and villages. Each province is divided into districts, and then each district is divided into subdistricts. Then, each subdistrict is divided further into villages. A province is headed by a Provincial Governor appointed by the Ministry of Interior. It also includes provincial-​level officials appointed and sent from several ministries and departments to carry out their work assigned by the central government and work under the supervision of the Provincial Governor (Haque, 2010). Each district is headed by a Chief District Officer. Similar to Provincial Governors, Chief District Officers are central government officials appointed by the Ministry of Interior. The Chief District Officer has the statutory authority to command and direct those provincial-​level officials from various ministries and central government bodies in their territory (Nagai et al, 2008 cited in Haque, 2010: 679). Subdistricts and villages are headed by a Subdistrict Chief and a Village Head respectively. Because they are representatives selected from people in their areas, they are not central government officials. However, they work as the Ministry of Interior’s agents who are subordinate to Chief District Officers and the Provincial Governor (Haque, 2010: 680). The local government system operates under the concept of decentralisation. Significant local government reform took place in the 1990s as the 1997 Constitution and the Determining Plans and Process of Decentralisation Act 1999 were promulgated to provide legal basis for decentralisation. According to the key laws, the central government is mandated to decentralise responsibilities and resources to local governments to have autonomy over their policy making and internal management. Regarding the structure, the local government reform of the 1990s resulted in a two-​tier local government system across the country. It is made up of three types of local governments, namely provincial administrative 68

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organisations (PAO) (76 units), municipalities (Thesaban) (2,442 units), and tambon administrative organisations (TAO) (5,332 units). Besides the regular form of local government, there are two special local government units, namely Bangkok Metropolitan Administration and Pattaya City, authorised to have a unique form and function to govern their specific metropolitan areas. In total, there are 7,852 local government units (Department of Local Administration, Thailand, 2019). For the standard form of the local government system seen throughout the country, there are two tiers of local governments within a provincial territory. PAOs are the upper-​tier of local governments and are responsible for public service provisions covering the entire provincial area, as well as for large-​scale initiatives that exceed the capacity of other lower-​tier local governments in the provincial territory. In other words, PAOs are responsible for service provisions that cross the boundaries of any of the single lower-​tier local governments. The municipality (Thesaban) and TAOs are the lower tier of local governments responsible for providing local services to their defined territories. While municipalities are designed to provide public services in urban areas, TAOs are established to deliver services in rural communities and to nurture grassroots democracy. Each local government at all tiers comprises the executive body and the legislative function. The executive power is exercised by a directly elected mayor. The legislative function, that is, the local council, consists of local councillors who are locally elected by local residents and headed by the chairman who is elected by these local councillors. The mayor and local councillors serve a four-​year term. Moreover, each local government runs its own system of administration with government officials employed by the local governments. Responsibilities of local governments Thai local governments are only able to perform their statutory tasks –​the principle of ultra vires (Chamchong, 2020). Hence, their policies and initiatives must be in compliance with their responsibilities as stipulated by relevant laws. According to the Decentralisation Plan and Process Act of 1999, a large number of functions have been devolved from central to local government. Such a major law mandates that local governments ought to carry out duties and provide a diverse array of services within six areas, including (Varanyuwatana, 2017): 1. Public infrastructure investment, such as the public transportation system, the traffic light system, urban planning, local roads and walkways construction and maintenance, and local markets. 2. Improvement of quality of life, including social services such as housing and restoration, primary healthcare and medical services, education, social welfare for children, the elderly and disabled persons. 3. Public safety and security, including disaster prevention and mitigation services, stimulating public participation in local policy and activities, and promoting democratic values. 69

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4. Planning, local investment promotion, commerce and tourism, including formulating local development plans, promoting local economic development, trade, investment, employment and tourism. 5. Management and conservation of natural resources and environment, such as waste collection and management, parks and recreation, and sanitation and cremation services. 6. Local culture, tradition and local wisdom, such as local arts and cultures preservation and promotion. While the municipality and TAOs, the lower tier of local governments, are required to perform similar functions to those mentioned here only in their specific territories, PAOs, the upper tier of local governments, are obliged to focus on providing services for residents covering an entire province. In other words, PAOs are expected to perform the following functions (Krueathep, 2004: 272–​273): 1. Formulating local development plans for its territories and coordination among lower-​tier local governments in the provincial area. 2. Providing large-​scale public services, that is, services that benefit people throughout the province or services that cannot be performed by any other lower-​tier local governments. For example, waste disposal and landfill sites, wastewater treatment plant, large-​scale public transportation, and urban planning for the entire province. 3. Social services provision including education, public health, and social securities and safety at the provincial level. 4. Protection of natural resources and the environment. 5. Facilitating economic development, such as promoting trade, investment and tourism. 6. Providing support, both technical and financial, to lower-​ tier local governments to strengthen their capacity in service provision. Given the wider context of Thailand’s administration as illustrated earlier, it is evident that there is territory overlap between the regional administrative and local government systems. In other words, ‘the local government system came to coexist with the regional administration dominated by the central government’ (Haque, 2010: 676). However, from a legal perspective, the rationale and functions of the two administrative levels are different. First, regarding autonomy over policy decision-​making, as regional or provincial government bodies are designed as branches of central government, they have neither absolute autonomy nor entire power over policy decision-​making in their respective areas (Krueathep et al, 2010). By contrast, Thai local governments are incorporated on the principle of autonomous local self-​government, which has been guaranteed since 1997 by the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2540 (1997) until the present constitution. Second, in terms of responsibility and accountability, the chief 70

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executive officers at the provincial administration level are officials, appointed by central government to ensure the implementation of national government agencies’ policies. The mayors, that is, the political executives, and the councillors of each local government at all levels who serve four-​year terms, by contrast, are directly elected by and accountable to the local constituents in their areas (Haque, 2010). The regional administration has been coexisting with the local government system for decades. Along the journey towards decentralisation and local self-​ governance, as the central government has been promising since the 1990s, the existence of a regional administration, particularly Provincial Governors and Chief District Officers, has been frequently critiqued and questioned by scholars and the public alike. This is because, in reality, rather than running in parallel with the local government system in the same geographical area, the regional administration was designed to have significant power to intervene in local governments’ policy development. The situation regarding the relationship between central, regional and local governments undermines the Thai local governments’ autonomy over their local development plans and policies. This will be illustrated and discussed in the following sections.

Local development plans Typically, the main sources of local governments’ policies and initiatives are their mandates and responsibilities that are stipulated in the relevant laws, as mentioned earlier. Also, the policies and initiatives of local governments can come from other sources including the national government’s policies, the mayor’s agendas and the voices of local communities (Yavaprabhas and Whangmahaporn, 2012). To formulate the local policies needed, respond to specific issues and meet the national government’s agendas, local governments can administer their duties in two ways. First, they might consider enacting local laws and regulations, subject to the endorsement by the chief regional officer of their territory. Second, and the most important, they are required by law to formulate local development plans, as mentioned in the previous section. These plans can be seen as the most significant official policy documents that identify local policies and initiatives, the way in which public services will be provided and budgeted for. According to two key laws, the Decentralisation Plan and Process Act of 1999 and the Regulation of Ministry of Interior on the Formulation of Local Development Plans 2005 (Ministry of Interior, 2005), Thai local governments are required to create local development plans. Specifically, the Ministry of Interior’s regulation stipulates that local governments must develop three types of local development plans, namely a Strategic Development Plan, Three-​ Year Development Plan and Action Plan. The Strategic Development Plan is a long-​term economic and social development plan that specifies the vision, mission and goals of a local government organisation. Essentially, the plan must be in line with Thailand’s National Economic and Social Development Plan, 71

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regional administration’s plans, that is, province’s and district’s plans, and the community plan. Working in coordination with the Strategic Development Plan to achieve its vision, mission and goals, the Three-​Year Development Plan specifies the list of projects and budgets for three fiscal years. It is a rolling plan that is expected to be revised annually. In particular, the Three-​Year Development Plan is used by local governments as a guideline for producing an annual budget. It is important to note that the procedure for developing this plan was changed twice due to the national government’s interventions. In 2018, it was initially amended to the Four-​Year Strategic Plan, according to the proclamation of regulation of the Ministry of Interior on the Formulation of Local Development Plans 2018 (Ministry of Interior, 2018). Following this, it was changed again to the Five-​Year Development Plan after the announcement of the Department of Local Administration Promotion (DLAP), Ministry of Interior, the government organisation responsible for the management and improvement of Thai local governments. On 15 May 2019, a formal letter together with the standardised format and outline for creating the plan, and the expected contents of the Five-​ Year Development Plan (2018–​2022) were sent from the DLAP to the local governments throughout the country and mandated that they comply. This resulted in disorder among the local governments’ policy analysts, as they were asked to revise their existing Four-​Year Plans within a month. It is important to note that the main reason for this change was the idea of area-​based management initiated by the national government. The letter stated: The Rule of the Office of the Prime Minister on the Integrated Area-​based Administration, B.E. 2560 (2017), section 7, stipulates that Provincial Development Plan, Provincial Cluster Development Plan, and Regional Plan must be five-​year plans. Therefore, in order that local governments’ plan will have initiatives and activities to be in line with those plans, the local governments’ Four-​Year Development Plan must be amended to be Five-​Year Plan. (Ministry of Interior, 2019b) Inevitably, local governments had to revise their existing Four-​Year Plans (2018–​2021) to Five-​Year Plans even though they were recently amended. This was the national government’s attempt to ensure that the local governments’ initiatives and activities would be coherent with the 20-​Year National Strategy (2018–​2037), Thailand’s National Economic and Social Development Plan, and various development plans of the regional administration, to achieve the area-​ base development idea. Finally, the Action Plan needed to be conducted and this described the details about the projects and activities as well as their budgets for a specific fiscal year. Chapter Two on methods of policy analysis in Thailand in this volume also discusses the implications of alignment of all levels of plans in Thailand. 72

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The development of local development plans in practice The previous sections discussed the institutional-​legal framework that mandates local governments to develop local development plans. From this discussion, it appears that Thai local governments are expected to enjoy substantial autonomy as they are guaranteed by law to have authority and discretion over their internal management, including formulating their own policies and initiatives. However, in practice, there is still significant criticism about the way in which the central government exercises excessive control over local governments. Seemingly, Thai local governments appear to be semi-​autonomous bodies as they are still heavily intervened in and controlled by various instruments of the central government. Considering the formulation of local development plans, the objective of this chapter is to provide a broader policy analysis of the ways in which planning activities and procedures are conducted, in reality, by local governments. It draws on the data from documentaries and exploratory analyses, complemented by non-​ participant observations and in-​depth interviews with the mayors and officials of relevant central government organisations. The findings allow the researcher to argue that although local governments are obliged to formulate local government policies, they continue to have limited power and capacity, due to central government control, to initiate their own innovation policies and initiatives. Essentially, policy analysis in Thai local governments is centrally driven, that is, planning procedures, content and activities are shaped heavily by central government’s interventions, especially with laws and regulations. Local policies are, therefore, compulsory, centralised and standardised. The return of bureaucratic polity and the recentralisation Prior to the early 1990s, Thailand was characterised as a bureaucratic polity as it has a long history of substantial bureaucratic domination and is a highly centralised state (Riggs, 1996). With regard to central–​local relations, local governments were excessively controlled by the central government and relations were predominantly based on local dependency as local governments heavily relied on financial assistance from the central government. Essentially, local governments had to prepare budgets and development programmes based on predicted grants from the central government. In particular, the local government units were chaired by central government officials instead of elected local representatives. Also, most councils had both appointed and elected members (Haque, 2010). Further, the Ministry of Interior and provincial governors were authorised by law to terminate the heads of local governments and/​or councillors, and were even allowed to abolish entire local councils (Haque, 2010). Following this, local governments did not have absolute power over their policy making. Their local regulations, local development initiatives and budget and expenditure plans needed to be approved by central government officials, that 73

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is, the Provincial Governor and district officers (Nagai et al, 2008). In essence, the Provincial Governors could ignore decisions made by local governments. Also, most local development projects were determined and financed by central government ministries (Haque, 2010). Throughout the 1930s–​1980s, therefore, Thai local governments could be perceived as a subordinate mechanism created by the central government to carry out minor services such as garbage collection and street cleaning for residents. Due to the deep-​rooted practices of bureaucratic polity, there were limited attempts to shift local governments to becoming elected autonomous units and then transfer authority and responsibilities to them, that is, flourishing decentralisation in the form of devolution. Since the mid-​1990s, there have been efforts to reform and decentralise state power and shift duties and resources to local governments. In line with the global trend of local governance, the decentralisation initiatives under the local government reforms have been used to expand devolution and reduce deconcentration (Haque, 2010: 681). Essentially, the autonomous status of local governments are guaranteed by the promulgation of the Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2540 (1997) and the Determining Plans and Process of Decentralisation Act B.E. 2542 (1999). These key laws required significant increases in the local government’s share of total government revenues. Also, some key services were transferred to local governments such as quality of life, infrastructure, local investment promotion, commerce and tourism, and environmental protection. This meant that Thai local governments were authorised by law to have a considerable degree of autonomy over policy formation, local development planning and budgeting with respect of the demands of local citizens through public participation processes (Krueathep, 2004). Considering structural composition of local government, local representatives, such as mayors, councillors and chairs of local government units, are now directly elected by local residents (Thamrongthanyawong, 2009). Specifically, this change resulted in a significant positive shift in the direction of less central control and bureaucratic intervention (Governors and Chief District Officers) as those elected local representatives (both executive and legislative functions) have more power and greater autonomy (Haque, 2010). According to Suwanmala (2007), as this change diminished the pre-​existence of central government officials, particularly district officers and governors in local government units, this was seen as the first big step towards local self-​government. Although Thailand experienced a period of decentralisation for more than two decades, it was interrupted by a coup d’état on occasion. According to Haque (2010: 674), ‘the bureaucratic rule became further strengthened by frequent military intervention and dictatorial rule’. The latest 2014 military junta, headed by Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-​ocha, confirmed in Haque’s statement, froze the local government systems, brought back bureaucratic polity to local governance and recentralised power to central government. Rather than continuously moving forward with decentralisation initiatives and strengthening the capacity of local governments, the military government, 74

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headed by Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-​ocha, recentralised power and revitalised bureaucratic domination over local governments. This had a significant impact on local governments’ autonomy in policy formation which will be discussed in the following sections. The emergence of area-​based development and ‘One Plan’ mechanisms In 2008, the enactment of the Decree on Integrated Provincial and Provincial Cluster Administration, B.E. 2551 (2008) can be seen as the initial stage of the government’s official move towards implementing the ‘area-​based development’ concept. However, the Rule of the Office of the Prime Minister on the Integrated Area-​based Administration, B.E. 2560 (2017), issued during Prayuth Chan-​ocha’s military government in 2007, can be considered as an important law. This is because it led to the creation of various relevant laws, regulations and mechanisms designed to achieve the area-​based development goal. However, those mechanisms also resulted in negative effects on local government’s autonomy over policy development. The implementation of the area-​based development concept could be seen as an attempt of the central government to achieve increased policy coherence among governmental departments and agencies for a specific local area. On the other hand, it is argued that area-​based development is a discourse employed to overshadow the demand for moving towards autonomous, devolution-​ based local governments. The term ‘area-​based’ could mislead the public that the government is now focusing on decentralising power and resources to the local area. Instead, it is about enhancing the capacity of central and regional/​ provincial administrations. In practice, it focuses on creating mechanisms to minimise the overlapping and duplication of tasks of governmental agencies working at the regional and local levels. For instance, the Area Based Budgeting (ABB) mechanism was initiated to improve efficient budget allocation to various governmental agencies working in the same specific geographical area to meet the demand of this area. Nevertheless, the ABB is not about increasing the capacity of the local governments regarding financial resources. Evidently, in 2019, all local governments still accounted for less than 30 per cent of the total national expenditure (Office of the Decentralization to the Local Government Organization Committee, Thailand, 2019). With this continuous limited fiscal autonomy and capacity, facilitated by the area-​based development discourse, most Thai local governments were barely able to initiate innovative policies and initiatives and play a significant role in providing key services compared with the central government and its regional offices. Moreover, the new legislative mechanism called ‘One Plan’, recently initiated by the central administration, imposed legal obligations on local governments regarding the way in which local development plans should be made. The Ministry of Interior believes that the One Plan can be used as a tool for regulating and overseeing administration in a specific geographical local area 75

Policy Analysis in Thailand

in order to promote efficiency, efficiently solve problems and assure integration in area-​based development. However, it can be argued that this is the new regulatory intervention that the government used to recentralise power as well as to strengthen the central and provincial administration’s power over local governments. The One Plan was created under the Regulation of Ministry of Interior on the Formulation and Coordination of Area Development Plan in District and Subdistrict Levels, B.E. 2562 (2019). Reinforced by the area-​ based development discourse, One Plan marked a significant impact on the local government system as it undermined local governments’ power and autonomy over their own policy development. Specifically, it provided power to provincial authorities, that is, Provincial Governor and Chief District Officers appointed by the Ministry of Interior, to monitor and intervene in the local government’s policy decision-​making. As was stipulated in section 30 of the law: Provincial Governor and Chief District Officers are authorised to direct and supervise local governments to formulate local development plans as well as to coordinate those plans to be coherent with provincial development plan [provincial administration’s plan]. This is to comply with relevant laws on the establishment of local governments as well as laws on the determining plans and process of decentralisation. (The Formulation and Coordination of Area Development Plan in District and Subdistrict Levels, B.E. 2562, 2019) Hence, it is evident that the One Plan is a new central government intervention to restore the deep-​rooted legacy of bureaucratic dominance, that is, provincial authorities, to the local government system. Before the emergence of the area-​based development and One Plan initiatives, there was already a dual system in the provincial geographical area based on the coexistence of local governments with elected representatives and provincial administration with appointed central government officials (Haque, 2010: 683), as previously discussed. However, the provincial administration has limited power and resources over planning and budgeting in provincial areas. It operates as a top-​down command mechanism or central government with extended branches to carry out their tasks assigned by the central government. Also, the provincial administration has some power over the policies of local governments as the outputs including local ordinances, local development plans and annual budgets created by local governments must be approved by Provincial Governors and Chief District Officers (Suwanmala, 2007; Nagai and Kagoya, 2008; Haque, 2010). The military government made the current dual system worse as it allowed the provincial administration to have significant power over the policy-​making decisions of local governments, using the area-​based development concept as the rationale for doing so. The One Plan concept (see Figure 4.1) provides a framework for how plans at each local level within a provincial area should be formulated, coordinated and 76

Policy analysis in local governments

Figure 4.1: ‘One Plan’ concept for formulating and coordinating plans at the provincial level

Source: Adapted from Ministry of Interior (2019a)

integrated based on the area-​based development idea. Arguably, the provincial/​ regional administration is predominant in this framework; it was designed based on the structure of provincial/​regional administration. Nonetheless, local government units were not considered as political bodies that should represent the local resident. Rather, they are seen to be merely the units under bureaucratic dominance. It is important to note that rather than being considered as autonomous bodies that have discretion over their policy decision-​making, local governments appear to be considered as administrative agencies that carry out duties at the local administrative level that operates within the regional/​ provincial administration. Chief District Officers, heads of district administration appointed by the Ministry of Interior, are now authorised to be key linkage points in policy formulation and coordination at the local level. These central government officials are authorised to supervise, direct and monitor local governments’ plans, related procedures and activities. The central administration claimed that the justification for doing so is to ensure that those plans comply with Thailand’s 77

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first 20-​year National Strategy (2017–​2036), set up by the military government, and the provincial development plan that supports the area-​based development agenda. This rationale has been confirmed by a senior officer of the Ministry of Interior during a meeting of the Subcommittee under the Committee on Interior Administration of the House of Representatives on 20 January 2020 as follows: ‘It has to be the Chief District Officer’s role [a regional government officer] to monitor the local government plans in the district area. Especially, when small local governments develop their plan, the neighbouring councils may develop each own plan without consulting to each other. For example, one decided to build the road but the other did not consider doing that but the road must across their boundaries. In the situation like this, the district chief must take a key role and actions in supervising and recommending them to amend their plan.’ (Interview, senior officer of the Ministry of Interior, 20 January 2020) This study argues that the rationale of One Plan, as demonstrated here, is insufficient for designing central and regional administration control and interference in the policy development of local governments. In particular, when it comes to policy coordination among local governments, the local government does not need government officials to intervene for at least two reasons. First, a two-​tier local government system is in place to handle such issues. The Decentralisation Plan and Process Act of 1999 stipulated that it is the role of PAOs, the upper-​tier of local government, to coordinate the plans in the provincial area among the lower-​tier local governments. Also, PAOs are obliged to provide public services for an entire provincial area to handle cross-​boundary issues cannot be addressed by the lower-​tier local governments. Furthermore, existing literature demonstrates that there is a proliferation of inter-​ local collaboration nationwide in various policy fields at the local government level, such as disaster management (Chopyot, 2016; Chamchong, 2020), waste management (Tantivejjavanichaya and Luangprapat, 2019; Chamchong, 2020), and tourism promotion and integrated coastal zone management (Tantivejjavanichaya and Luangprapat, 2019). Having limited resources, that is, money, qualified staff and equipment, to efficiently provide services as well as facing wicked and cross-​ cutting issues have influenced relatively small, lower-​tier local governments to voluntarily initiate cross-​council collaboration policy over decades (Krueathep et al, 2010). Such policy decisions do not require the central government’s force. Hence, instead of creating control and command mechanisms, the central government should play a significant role in creating policy interventions such as regulations and incentive measures to support inter-​local collaboration. The most important is that increasing local governments’ autonomy, particularly fiscal self-​reliance, should be the focus of consistent and continuing efforts from the central government (Krueathep, 2013). This is because initiating innovative local development policies and delivering services to ensure the quality of life of local 78

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residents relies more on local governments’ capabilities and resources than the central administration’s command and control. If local self-​government is being deliberately pursued, why enable regional administration to intervene in the local government system? Fiscal autonomy and dependency As previously mentioned, local governments must create local development plans as policy documents that specify local policies, initiatives and service provision in relation to their defined responsibilities and local preferences. However, under the existing centrally imposed local revenue structure, Thai local governments have limited discretion over how their budget is spent for service provision. Also, their capacity to form policy initiatives and create tailor-​made public services according to the needs of the local population is curtailed because of a lack of fiscal autonomy (Haque, 2010; Varanyuwatana, 2017). Essentially, locally collected revenue is inadequate as most revenues are collected by the central government. Moreover, levying any new local tax bases to increase self-​collected tax revenue is still not allowed under existing law (Varanyuwatana, 2017). Under these circumstances, local governments are forced to rely heavily on intergovernmental transfer revenue, particularly grants from the central government. This ultimately prolongs their dependency on the central government which undermines their self-​determination to form policies and provide public services (Haque, 2010; Varanyuwatana, 2017). The ability of local governments to initiate local policy initiatives and consider public service provision depends largely on their resources, in particular, their revenue (Yavaprabhas and Whangmahaporn, 2012). The existing local revenue structure is comprised of three main sources, namely locally levied revenue, centrally shared revenue including surcharges and shared taxes, and grants from the central government. As demonstrated in Table 4.1, locally levied revenue is small and accounts for less than 20 per cent of the total local revenue. The intergovernmental transfers, including taxes collected by national government and agencies, shared taxes and grants take the major share of total local revenue, at approximately 80 per cent. Grant transfers constitute the largest part of intergovernmental transfers as they account for roughly 40 per cent of total local revenue. This results because local governments still lack the discretionary power to levy tax and impose fees to raise their own tax revenues (Haque, 2010). Moreover, the central government opted to use an intergovernmental transfer approach in form of tax sharing and grants to fill the gap of expenditure needs and to strengthen the fiscal capacity of local governments (Pumkaew, 2016; Varanyuwatana, 2017). This approach is believed to assist local governments in achieving their mandated duties to efficiently deliver essential public services to their constituents (Wongpredee and Sudhipongpracha, 2014). Grants, the primary source of local revenue, are classified into two types: general grants and specific grants. General grants are designed to assist 79

Policy Analysis in Thailand

Table 4.1: Structure of Thailand’s local government revenue, fiscal years 2017–​2019 Fiscal year (unit: million baht) Source of revenue

2017 (amount)

%

2018 (amount)

%

2019 (amount)

%

1. Locally collected revenue

112,000.00

16.28

112,000.00

15.54

112,000.00

14.90

2. Taxes collected by and allocated from central government

218,800.00

31.81

229,900.00

31.89

240,350.00

31.98

3. Shared taxes

111,000.00

16.14

115,000.00

15.95

123,000.00

16.37

4. Grants

246,091.62

35.77

263,922.04

36.61

276,135.16

36.75

Total local revenue

687,891.62

100.00

720,822.04

100.00

751,485.16

100.00

Net government revenue

2,343,000.00

Share to net government revenue

2,450,000.00 29.36

2,550,000.00 29.42

29.47

Source: Office of the Decentralization to the Local Government Organization Committee, Thailand (2019)

local governments to overcome fiscal constraints in performing their duties and devolved functions under limited self-​collected revenue. Notably, it is comprised of two types, namely general purpose grants and general specific grants. While the former is an unconditional grant over which local governments have considerable spending discretion, the latter has conditions attached it. In fact, the general specific grants can only be used for the programmes designated by the central government based on national priorities (Sudhipongpracha, 2017), whether or not those programmes are policies of the local governments (Yavaprabhas and Whangmahaporn, 2012). Examples of programmes under the general specific grants include allowances for the elderly and people with disabilities, salaries of local school teachers and funds for local government childcare centres. In addition to general grants, specific grants are transferred with pre-​defined programmes and purposes decided by the Ministry of Interior (Yavaprabhas and Whangmahaporn, 2012). Local governments are unable to decide on what and how to spend those funds. According to Varanyuwatana (2017), general specific grants together with specific grants account for approximately 28 per cent of total local revenue. This creates a serious challenge of decentralisation as the government has direct control over a quarter of the local expenditure (Varanyuwatana, 2017). Furthermore, many lower-​ tier local authorities do not collect large amounts of self-​ collected revenue as Chamchong (2020: 84) described: ‘In 2017, 96.93 percent of lower-​tier local governments (i.e. municipalities and TAOs) received less than 20 million Baht (c. $635,000) from locally collected revenue. If they do invest in initiatives, such as the construction of waste water disposal systems, they face issues associated with economies of scale’ (Chamchong, 2020). Hence, intergovernmental grants become their fiscal arteries as ‘more than half of their annual revenues come from specific grants 80

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alone’ (Wongpredee and Sudhipongpracha, 2014: 350). A senior officer of the central government agency illustrated this: ‘Most of Thai local governments reply on grants from central government which is given for a specific purpose as defined by central government agencies. Hence, initiatives and activities on the local plan are mostly centrally pre-​defined. There are just some of them [councils] that have capacity in terms of having a large amount of locally collected revenues which allows them to develop and carry out their own initiatives.’ (Interview, senior officer of the Office of Decentralisation Committee, 21 January 2020) Apart from financial dependency, there is also the issue of autonomy. Although some councils have a large proportion of locally collected revenues, they are not easily able to create innovative policies and initiatives and spend their self-​collected revenues on these activities. Primarily, local governments cannot operate ultra vires. They take on risk if they initiate any innovative tailor-​made projects without having the necessary laws and regulations giving permission. This is because doing so could be judged as an abuse of power by the State Audit Office. Aside from gaining a negative reputation, the mayor must repay any money spent on such innovative projects to the state (Chamchong, 2020). Specifically, because the State Audit Office focuses on scrutinising the activities of local governments, the mayors of local governments are reluctant to initiate any new policies, even those that respond to the needs and concerns of the local residents. Due to these conditions, initiating any policy innovation and new initiatives requires a brave and strong mayor. Furthermore, although there is a window of opportunity for them to launch new initiatives addressing local needs, they are unable to readily do so if it was not previously defined in the action plan developed earlier in the fiscal year. To summarise, the decision-​making authority and capacity of local governments remain restricted as their fiscal autonomy is strongly curtailed by the central government. In reality, local policy initiatives generated at the behest of local governments as a direct response to their area and constituents are limited. Rather, local programmes tend to be top-​down and centrally controlled. In this view, Thai local governments are simply considered as either ‘a deconcentrated arm of the government’ (Varanyuwatana, 2017: 42) or ‘mere implementers of centralized policy decisions’ (Wongpredee and Sudhipongpracha, 2014: 350) even though their local autonomy is constitutionally enshrined. Land and building tax: a new mechanism to increase local governments’ capacity? The Land and Building Tax Act was enacted in March 2019. According to Laovakul (2016), this new tax base was designed and believed to be an effective mechanism that will assist local governments with increasing their locally collected revenue, achieving added fiscal autonomy and alleviating wealth 81

Policy Analysis in Thailand

inequality in the country. However, it is currently being criticised as a new central government instrument that undermines local governments’ capacity and autonomy. Essentially, prior to the enactment of the new mechanism, there was the Local Development Tax and the Building and Land Tax, that is, revenues that were locally collected by local governments as their own source of revenue. The Building and Land Tax was the key source of self-​collected revenue as it constituted the largest proportion of locally levied taxes (Varanyuwatana, 2017). However, it could not make a substantial contribution to the total local revenue. The share of locally levied taxes was considerably low as they accounted for around 10 per cent of total local government revenue since 1999 (Laovakul, 2016; Varanyuwatana, 2017). Hence, the Land and Building Tax was intended to replace those outdated and regressive property taxes that were associated with many problems and did not substantially contribute to local government revenue. Although the Land and Building Tax could be a good source of local revenue, it contains tax loopholes. Also, there were many tax exemptions created by the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Interior. That is the reason why key scholars and many local government officers forecasted that the enforcement of this new tax law will dramatically reduce locally collected revenues of local governments, which was already low. This lessened fiscal capacity and autonomy weakened local governments’ capacity to create their own initiatives and policies in response to specific local issues and demands in their areas.

Top-​down and centrally driven local policies Operating under the concept of ultra vires, the national regulations and standard toolkits are useful interventional mechanisms to recentralise power. Essentially, there are various instruments of central control created and employed in Thailand. Regarding laws and regulations, there are specific laws and formal guidance issued by central government organisations for enforcing and guiding the development of the local development plans that local governments must comply with. As a result, the local development plans of local governments throughout the country have the same format regarding the way in which the plans should be formulated and the structure of the content. A senior officer of the central government department stated: “Local governments hardly develop their own innovative policies and initiatives. They are able to do things they are statutorily permitted to do. In fact, local policies are top-​down. Local policies must comply with the provincial development strategies and the 20-​year National Strategy” (interview, senior officer of the Department of Local Administration, 21 January 2020). Moreover, it is stated in the Regulation of Ministry of Interior on the Formulation of Local Development Plans 2005 that local development plans, together with budget and expenditure plans created by local governments, are still needed to be endorsed by central government officials, that is, the Provincial Governor and Chief District Officer who are the Ministry of Interior’s officers (Haque, 2010). Even though the interior ministry’s influence appears to have 82

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diminished as a result of the decentralisation process, it remains an essential and influential actor in the Thai local government system (Sudhipongpracha, 2014: 265–​266). The policy decisions of local authorities could be suspended by Provincial Governors, and most local development projects were determined and funded by central government ministries (Haque, 2010). Furthermore, there is a mechanism of central control –​the State Audit Office of the Kingdom of Thailand –​which leads to reluctance by the mayors and local officials to initiating any innovative policies and projects, as previously mentioned. These circumstances inhibit local governments from developing the innovative initiatives to deal with challenges in their local areas. The standardised procedure To develop local development plans, local governments must comply with the laws, regulations and guidelines for local planning, budgeting, accounting and financial management as issued by the DLAP under the Ministry of Interior. In addition to the guidelines and the standardised procedures and formats, the DLAP regularly sets training programmes related to local development plans for officers within local governments. For instance, on 11 December 2018, a formal letter was sent from DLAP to Provincial Governors throughout the country to inform the local governments about joining the training on the creation of local development plans for fiscal year 2019. The key objective of the training programme was to ensure that local development plans follow and align with the 20-​Year National Strategy (2018–​2037), Thailand’s National Economic and Social Development Plan and the area-​base development strategy. Also, the training programme aims to provide the standardised policy evaluation form and techniques as a manual for local policy analysts to use. Resultantly, the development plans and evaluation techniques of local governments throughout the country have the same format and procedures, which could be argued as centralised and standardised planning. This creates the practices on policy analysis in local governments that do not promote the core principle of local autonomy and decentralisation. Particularly, local policy analysts are forced to pay attention to following and accomplishing those rules, guidelines and techniques rather than performing policy analysis, policy design and policy learning. A mayor stated: ‘I prefer not to send my staff to the training programmes set by the central government agency. The staff who were sent to a training programme, for example, a training on how to conduct the local development plans, they always came back and got so scared to develop any initiatives. It’s like the central government body just provides you the boxes/​forms to fill in. It prohibits you from initiating your own policies and activities outside those boxes.’ (Interview, mayor, 29 January 2020) 83

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Local participation In Thailand, public participation in the decision-​making process of local governments has been promoted since the promulgation of the 1997 Constitution which is recognised as the early stages of decentralisation reform. To develop local development plans, local governments are authorised by law to hold local forums so that local citizens can participate in developing local policies and providing views and information on local issues and preferences. Still, several guidelines and instructions on local planning and budgeting as well as local forums have been issued by the DLAP (Krueathep, 2004). Participatory approaches have been promoted by the DLAP as an important mechanism in local planning. Some local governments initiated innovative ways of participation such as town hall meetings and civic forums to engage local citizens in the local planning process (Krueathep, 2004). However, most of them still emphasise following the regulations and guidelines on creating local forums. There is a notable example that illustrates how centralised systems and hierarchical culture are embedded in the mindset and practices of people working in local governments regarding conducting public participation in local development plans. In December 2017, there was a situation that a TAO, a lower-​tier local government, sent letter to a Chief District Officer, the regional administration officer in their area, asking about the procedure to conduct a local forum. The TAO asked if they could allow people who were not registered residents but were living in the area to provide opinions on the local development plans. This letter was then sent from the Chief District Officer to the Provincial Governor of that province asking the same question. Next, this letter was sent from the Provincial Governor to the DLAP asking for a clear answer. Finally, DLAP replied to the letter stating that local governments can allow local people to be involved in local forums. However, if there will be a vote, only registered citizens can participate. This phenomenon clearly demonstrates that some local governments still do not recognise themselves as local self-​government organisations that have discretionary power over their policy initiation and related activities. They appeared to be reluctant to make decisions even on the minor points as they might not comply with the guidelines issued by the DLAP –​the central government department. Furthermore, in practice, there are small proportions of the budget that local governments can put towards local community planning resulting from local forums on their local development plans. This is because a large proportion of local revenue is a specific grant, as previously described.

Conclusion This chapter investigates the way in which Thai local governments initiate their own policies. The formulation of ‘local development plans’ –​the most important official local policy documents –​and the related procedures and activities have 84

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been examined. Operating within the highly centralised state, this chapter found that local governments faced various key challenges in developing tailor-​made local policies. In essence, the central government exercised expansive control over various interventions and mechanisms of central control to local governments. The procedures and activities of local development plans are heavily shaped by relevant laws and regulations promulgated by the central government as well as other instruments of central control such as fiscal dependency and the State Audit Office. Local governments’ policy decision-​making autonomy and capacity remain restricted as their fiscal autonomy is intensely curtailed by the central government. As evidenced by their high share of intergovernmental transfer revenue, Thai local governments remain highly reliant on the central government for financial assistance. The area-​based development discourse and One Plan initiative initiated by the central government obviously undermine the local governments’ autonomy in policy decision-​making. More important is that they overshadow the decentralisation and autonomous, representative local government system. Local programmes are largely top-​down and centralised while local policy initiatives created at the behest of local governments in response to their local preferences and issues are limited. Under these circumstances, Thai local governments appear to be considered as semi-​autonomous units, only able to do the things they are statutorily permitted to do, even though their autonomous status is constitutionally guaranteed. References Chamchong, P. (2020) ‘How cultural and organizational conditions impact on policy entrepreneurship: Evidence from Thailand’, Journal of Asian Public Policy, 13(1): 79–​93. Chopyot, S. (2016) ‘The study of local administrative cooperation on disaster management: A case study of Roi-​E t municipality and adjacent local administrations’, Thai Journal of Public Administration, 14(2): 129–​154. [in Thai] Department of Local Administration, Thailand. (2019) Information on local government, available from www.dla.go.th/​work/​abt/​ Haque, M.S. (2010) ‘Decentralizing local governance in Thailand: Contemporary trends and challenges’, International Journal of Public Administration, 33 (12–​ 13): 673–​688. Krueathep, W. (2004) ‘Local government initiatives in Thailand: Cases and lessons learned’, Asia Pacific Journal of Public Administration, 26(2): 217–​239. Krueathep, W. (2013) ‘Municipal response to fiscal austerity: The Thai case’, International Journal of Public Administration, 36(7): 453–​468. Krueathep, W., Riccucci, N.M. and Suwanmala, C. (2010) ‘Why do agencies work together? The determinants of network formation at the subnational level of government in Thailand’, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 20(1): 157–​185. Laovakul, D. (2016) ‘Property tax in Thailand: An assessment and policy implications’, Thammasat Review of Economic and Social Policy, 2(1): 24–​53. 85

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Ministry of Interior (2005) The Regulation of Ministry of Interior on the Formulation of Local Development Plans 2005, available from www.dla.go.th/​upl​oad/​reg​ulat​ ion/​type2/​2017/​1/​131​8_​1.pdf?time=​149024​1434​457 Ministry of Interior (2018) The Regulation of the Ministry of Interior on the Formulation of Local Development Plans 2018, available from www.dla.go.th/​upl​oad/​reg​ulat​ ion/​type2/​2018/​10/​167​4_​1.pdf Ministry of Interior (2019a) Manual for Planning and Coordinating Plans in Local Areas, available from www.dla.go.th/​serv​let/​Ebook​Serv​let?_​mode=​read&ebo​ okCo​lum=​6093#/​page/​1 Ministry of Interior (2019b) The revision of the existing plan and the formulation of the Five-​Year Development Plan (2018–​2022), available from www.dla.go.th/​ work/​ref​er2/​refe​renc​e17.pdf Nagai, F. and Kagoya, K. (2008) ‘Local capability and decentralization in Thailand’, in F. Nagai, N. Mektrairat and T. Funatsu (eds) Local government in Thailand: Analysis of the local administrative organization survey, Chiba: Institute of Developing Economies, pp 51–​60. Nagai, F., Funatsu, T. and Kagoya, K. (2008) ‘Central-​local government relationship in Thailand’, in F. Nagai, N. Mektrairat and T. Funatsu (eds) Local Government in Thailand: Analysis of the Local Administrative Organization Survey, Chiba: Institute of Developing Economies, pp 1–​30. Office of the Decentralization to the Local Government Organization Committee, Thailand (2019) Share of Local Revenue: Fiscal Years 2017–​2019, available from www.odloc.go.th/​web/​?page​_​id=​1562 Pumkaew, D. (2016) ‘Intergovernmental transfer in Thailand: A test of horizontal equity’, Thai Journal of Public Administration, 14(2): 49–​92. Riggs, F.W. (1966) Thailand: The modernization of bureaucratic polity. Honolulu: East-​ West Center Press. Sudhipongpracha, T. (2014) ‘Local emergency management in decentralized Thailand: Analysis of Thai municipal administrators’ perceptions of democratic accountabilities in the post-​decentralization era’, Journal of Asian Public Policy, 7(3): 259–​274. Sudhipongpracha, T. (2017) ‘Do the poor count in fiscal decentralization policy? A comparative analysis of the general grant allocation systems in Indonesia and Thailand’, Journal of Asian Public Policy, 10(3): 231–​248. Suwanmala, C. (2007) ‘Civic participation in sub-​national budgeting in Thailand’, in A. Shah (ed) Participatory Budgeting, Washington, DC: The World Bank, pp 127–​154. Tantivejjavanichaya, C. and Luangprapat, W. (2019) ‘Establishment of inter-​local governance cooperation case study eastern Thailand: Key success factors and barriers’, Journal of Integrated Sciences, 16(1): 91–​133. [in Thai] Thamrongthanyawong, S. (2009) ‘Effects of global economic crisis upon Thai local government’, paper presented at the Conference on Public Governance on Challenging Economic Times, Seoul, South Korea, 19–​23 October 2009.

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Varanyuwatana, S. (2017) ‘Fiscal decentralisation and intergovernmental transfer in Thailand’, Thammasat Review of Economic and Social Policy, 3(2): 6–​50. Wongpredee, A. and Sudhipongpracha, T. (2014) ‘The politics of intergovernmental transfers in northeast Thailand’, Journal of Developing Societies, 30(3): 343–​363. Yavaprabhas, S. and Whangmahaporn, P. (2012) Public policy in Thai local government. Bangkok: Joodtong. [in Thai]

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FIVE

Collaboration, networks and policy analysis in Thailand Chatthip Chaichakan

Introduction In recent decades, intergovernmentalisation and government externalisation have dramatically increased, resulting in governments adapting to operate effectively within their systems. Networks and collaboration, including interaction between public and private sector organisations, have become essential to the policy process and analysis. Policy analysts thus continuously create and employ various frameworks to extract knowledge from practices. According to Fischer et al (2007: xix), ‘policy analysis emerged to both better understand the policy-​ making process and to supply policy decision-​makers with reliable policy-​relevant knowledge about pressing economic and social problems’. This chapter aims to provide a better understanding of collaboration and networks regarding the policy process in Thailand. It also aims to discuss the formation and implementation of the two concepts in Thailand’s policy analysis. In order to do so, it is important to clarify ‘network’ and ‘collaboration’, the link between them, differences between the two concepts, the analytical frameworks usually employed, and the findings of such analyses. To begin with, ‘network’ is a term being used in the everyday lives of politicians and public managers to refer to a web of relationships between organisations that work together within entities (Rhodes, 2003). It also refers to ‘clusters of different kinds of actors who are linked together in political, social or economic life’ (Peterson, 2003: 1). In policy analysis, the term usually connotes ‘a cluster of actors, each of which has an interest, or “stake” in a given sector and the capacity to help determine policy success or failure’ (Peterson and Bomberg, 1999: 8). This is based on the policy network approach, which tends to ‘concentrate on elucidating relationships of influence and the direction of interactions which occur in policy-​making processes’ (Howlett et al, 2017: 234). This approach is expected to shed new light on the study of policy success or failure (for example, Kenis and Schneider, 1991; Atkinson and Coleman, 1992; Schumaker, 2002; Considine, 2003; Peterson, 2003). For instance, the policy network approach is considered as an ‘important innovation’ (Atkinson and Coleman, 1992) and ‘important explanatory power both on the level of strategic interaction processes as well as on the level of institutional relations’ (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000: 135). On the other hand, this approach has not been short of critics, often regarded as a 88

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metaphor, too fluid, uncertain and vague (Klijn and Koppenjan, 2000; Peterson, 2003; Bevir and Richards, 2009). Despite the criticism, literature on network analysis continues to grow. A continuum of ‘policy community’ and ‘issue network’ proposed by Rhodes (1997) is a renowned proposition on the policy network approach. At one end, tightly integrated policy communities emerge, capable of single-​minded collective action. On the other, the network issue is loosely affiliated and far more difficult to mobilise collectively (Peterson, 2003). This collective action is, in fact, related to what Agranoff et al (2013: 361) refer to as ‘collaboration imperative’, specifically, ‘the actions of officials and managers crossing the boundaries of their organisations working in dyadic, triadic, or networked relationships that are transactional’. This exemplifies how collaboration and networking are linked in policy analysis. Like the network approach, collaboration is a concept developed with the aim of improving policy outcomes through governance. These two concepts are usually discussed together either implicitly or explicitly. For example, in collaboration, there is a conductive organisation which ‘continuously generates and renews the capabilities to achieve breakthrough performance by enhancing the quality and flow of knowledge and by calibrating its strategy, culture, structure, and systems’ externally (Saint-​Onge and Armstrong, 2004: 213). The role of this conductive organisation seems similar to that of policy brokers, summarised by Howlett et al (2017: 234) as ‘[being] in a position to forge and also exert control over connections in the subsystem’. Therefore, these two approaches are sometimes combined to deepen the analysis and perhaps formulate a better solution to address policy problems (Rethemeyer, 2005; Agranoff, 2006). Basically, the distinction between a network and collaboration relies on the argument that network analysis focuses on structure and relationships while collaboration focuses on activity and leadership. Although it is hard to entirely separate the two approaches, it is important to make a clear distinction for further discussions in this chapter. Simply put, collaboration is an action beyond cooperation in which organisations work jointly to create or discover solutions within given constraints (Agranoff et al, 2013). A network is a web of relationships between public and non-​public sectors where actors interact with each other for specific purposes (Considine, 2003). In Thailand, the analytical frameworks of network and collaboration in policy analysis have been applied in studies and practices for years. Several studies in Thailand show that network and collaboration are either essential mechanisms of policy making (Chareamphan, 2012; Suksong, 2015) or key success factors for policy implementation (Siroros, 1998; Krueathep et al, 2010; Sansaneewittayakul, 2013; Kamolvej, 2015; Chaichakan, 2018). Networks are even considered as ‘innovations’ for Thai local governments (Krueathep, 2007). Whereas other studies found certain pitfalls in network management of which practitioners, politicians or even policy analysts need to be aware (Boossabong and Chamchong, 2018). 89

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Like other countries, there are ongoing parallel discussions in Thailand between academia and the real world. While practitioners are preoccupied with forming and working within networks, academia pays attention to developing analytical frameworks for policy networks and collaboration. In Thailand, interestingly, social capital and local knowledge are emphasised as important features for understanding policy networks and collaboration (Boossabong, 2017; Jantanasakulwong, 2017). The following sections explore the above discussions in detail for unpacking the evolution of collaboration and network analysis concerning public policy in Thailand. Discussed in three parts, the first part examines the derivation stages of two concepts: the policy network and collaboration in Thailand. Key events are identified and the cultural and ethical aspects of networks and collaboration explored in relation to Thailand’s policy analysis. The second part traces the development of collaboration and network analysis in Thailand, with examples from previous related studies. It presents a frequently used framework of cases in the real world. Lastly, the third part discusses critiques and trends of collaboration and network analysis in Thailand, involving three issues: bridging collaboration and network analysis; the legitimisation of government actions through network and collaboration; and multisector network building with social capital and local knowledge.

Interpretations and discourses in Thailand Tracing back to the origin, Siroros’s work (1998) is one of the earliest studies on policy network analysis in Thailand. Funded by Thailand’s Health Systems Research Institute, this study analyses policy networks and processes in road accident prevention using Blom-​Hansen’s framework. There are three underlined assumptions of this study. The first assumption is that government is part –​not the centre –​of network and collaboration building. Second, the institutional arrangement of networks and collective actions are effective solutions for existing problems. Third, the bargaining view of institutions is an essential strategy for policy makers. Later on, more and more studies were carried out employing various frameworks such as Rhodes’ (1997) and Heclo’s (1978). Particularly, from the 2000s, network and collaboration analysis have started to flourish and have appeared in Thai textbooks and research studies. Derivation of the concepts in Thailand In early 21st century, network and collaboration are at the forefront of policy analysis in Thailand. Both academia and practitioners have strived to employ the two concepts in their works. Academic researchers were given the question of how and why policies achieve better outcomes through network and collaboration. Practitioners needed to design activities to build networks and collaboration in response to the top-​down policy of Thai government. 90

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It is almost an impossible task to delineate derivation of the concepts in Thailand. In Thai textbooks, both concepts have been defined briefly in the past decade (Siriprakob, 2015; Siroros, 2015; Reuangtham, 2017; Wangmahapon, 2017; Lueangprapas, 2018). To understand this further, how the terms ‘network’ and ‘collaboration’ have been interpreted and applied in Thailand’s policy analysis needs to be illustrated. Unsurprisingly, network appears in Thailand’s policy analysis prior to collaboration and is defined, in the field of sociology, as a relationship between two or more actors or entities as being specified. Many scholars sometimes preferred using this definition in their studies, while many others preferred to use the term with the implication of ‘network governance’ and ‘governance network’. Considering the existing literature, there are at least four ways of interpreting policy network in policy analysis in Thailand: • Policy network as a policy-​making network. This interpretation is usually based on political aspects of policy making. The studies in this group discuss who, why and how policy actors interact and eventually decided to formulate policies (for example, Suksong, 2015; Chareamphan, 2016). • Policy network as a governance network. Studies with this interpretation tend to look at the network as either policy implementation network, management network or intergovernmental network (Siroros, 1998; Kamolvej, 2014). They would look at the network as a key success factor of policy. In fact, it is based on the classic questions of policy implementation like ‘how and why policy implementation succeeds or fails’ (Siroros, 2015; Lueangprapas, 2018). • Policy network as network governance. Several studies on policy networks focus on this aspect of network governance. This interpretation is quite similar to previous interpretations but with a particular focus on management and governance ‘within’ policy networks (Chansiri, 2015; Wangmahapon, 2017). It is indeed surprising how the two concepts are mixed up and become part of policy analysis in Thailand. These studies are quickly growing both in quality and quantity. • Policy network as a social network. Interestingly, some studies mention policy network as a social network. Using a brief version of policy network as ‘network’ and employing the Social Network Analysis (SNA) method, Kamolvej (2015) compares findings from two studies and presents them in visual format. This study not only shows how a policy network is perceived as a social network but it also became a seminal piece of work in Thailand’s policy analysis using SNA. Moreover, in terms of a unit of analysis, we can understand the current trends using Rhodes’ concept of issue network and policy community. For instance, many choose to study issue networks. In these cases, they attemt to analyse the extent to which the network could become a policy community. Several studies 91

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look at loosely structured networks with a high potential for becoming a policy community. It is sometimes difficult, however, for these studies to distinguish between a policy network and an issue network. This results in policy analysis in which the different networks become vague and confusing. On the other hand, despite the fact that a policy community is ideal with a low chance of materialising, many studies apply the concept to select their case studies (for example, Sansaneewittayakul, 2013). The objectives of these studies are usually to explore the potential of selected networks and the extent to which they could grow into an ideal policy community. Eventually, these studies would provide policy recommendations for network improvement. While ‘network’ has been in fashion for public policies in Thailand for a few decades, ‘collaboration’ is seemingly blurred and sometimes perceived as outdated terms like ‘cooperation’ or ‘coordination’ (see Reuangtham, 2017; Wangmahapon, 2017). With its ambiguous nature and diverse interpretation, the concept of collaboration seems difficult to apply to the Thai context. No Thai interpretation of ‘collaboration’ is widely accepted. Sometimes, it is translated into ‘kaan abhibaan paan kwaam ruam mue’ (Reuangtham and Panthasen, 2010), which is difficult to understand due to the length and complex vocabularies. Other times, it is translated into ‘kwaam ruam mue’, which is essentially the same meaning as ‘cooperation’ (Chamchong, 2018a, 2018b). It may also be translated into ‘kaan ruam kid ruam tum’, which literally means think and work together (Lueangprapas, 2018). Lastly, it can be translated into ‘kaan pra saan kwaam ruam mue’, which connotes the integrative meaning of collaboration between actors with shared goals (Chaichakan, 2017). There have been several attempts to apply the collaborative governance concept to academic research, as seen with Boossabong et al (2017), Chaichakan (2018) and Reuangtham and Panthasen (2010) and also dissertations including Kariji (2018), Srisompong (2016) and Thongjan (2016). Chiefly, these studies analyse the current status of collaboration in specific policy arenas and then provide policy recommendations for improving collaboration. Based on these studies, it is undeniable that the concept of collaboration in Thailand has been a choice of those who seek to understand cooperation in the new public governance era. Finally, in some studies, the application of these two concepts –​policy network and collaboration –​in Thailand has become intertwined with those studies on collaborative networks (Rethemeyer, 2005). With their diverse meanings, this combination between the two concepts remains ambiguous. For example, Charnsamorn (2016) ambitiously employs the analytical frameworks of network governance and collaborative governance together. This study will explain the collaborative network and its mechanisms that lead to so-​called better policy outcomes. The findings, unsurprisingly, describe network and collaboration separately. Thus, the discussion on collaborative policy networks is yet to grow. Meanwhile, scholars and practitioners in Thailand have been trying to understand these connected yet confusing terms. 92

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Collaboration and networks in Thailand: a new hope to whom? Generally, collaboration and networks are expected to help improve policy outcomes (Kickert, 1993; Sandström and Carlsson, 2008) and, therefore, it brings new hope to those who work and study public policy. In Thailand, both concepts have been brought into action with high hopes from many national government organisations (see KPI, 2007; OPDC, 2017). Seemingly, the Thai government promotes network and collaboration as a panacea. The concepts are valued as an always-​better solution to public services and community development. Also, the term ‘network’ has been used as a metaphor to show how open the government is to public participation. Multisector networks are particularly preferred in provincial and local development policies and plans so that they can get extra funding. Moreover, in the past decade, policy analysts were indirectly forced to bring the network and collaboration approach into their studies through grant mechanisms. While basic research on policy analysis is not prioritised, area-​based development research is emphasised through the central government’s mechanisms. Regarding the policies of some research funding agencies in Thailand, the researchers who can establish relationships with existing networks or, in some cases, establish new networks may have an advantage in the award consideration process. Doing area-​based development research requires researchers to be increasingly more collaborative. Particularly, those who work in regional universities, or select local communities as their case studies, need to seek partnerships or build a network. This is so they can have a better chance of being awarded a grant and closing their projects. This, therefore, means that they need to be both academic researchers and collaborative leaders (Chaichakan et al, 2020) and be able to work closely with their partners, such as community leaders, local governments, provincial government organisations and civil society organisations. Under Thai political uncertainty, civil society networks (CS-​Nets) have played important roles in community development and improving people’s quality of life. When collaboration and networks were brought to the government for consideration, they were aware that CS-​Nets were crucial to achieving better policy outcomes. Public organisations thus need to connect with CS-​Nets to ensure their expected outcomes. For example, Wisetsilpanon’s (2012) work on the community welfare fund network found that this particular CS-​Net was originally run by community organisations. Later on, public and private organisations became involved and helped each other to achieve shared goals. Into the real world Since the concepts of policy network and collaboration were brought to the fore, the Thai government included them in many policy papers and implemented them in various policy arenas. For example, in the sixth National Economic and Social Development Plan, the term ‘network’ officially appeared in the national 93

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plan for the first time. The term was used with two implications: one is a network as in information and communication technology and the other is a community development network. Then, from the seventh National Economic and Social Development Plan until the present, the term has become a buzz word and appears in many areas within the national plans. The interpretation has since become extremely variable since then. Contrarily, the term ‘collaboration’ seems to be less popular in the national plan. Instead, it appears in the medium-​and-​ long-​term plans of several government organisations. When it comes to policy implementation many government organisations set their goals to align with the central government’s goals. Often, network building and collaboration are quantified and the number of network members or participants is set as one of their key performance indicators. Theoretical meanings of network and collaboration were forgotten as Boossabong (2017: 177) points out, ‘the real-​world policy phenomena that exist in the context of Thailand do not reflect a world in which expert knowledge always functions successfully’.

Analysing collaboration and networks in Thailand: application and debates With a growing number of studies on collaboration and networks, some studies provide interesting examples of cases and analytical methods. This section presents selected literature and discusses common themes and observations. This examination provides grounds for further understanding on the application of both concepts. Additionally, it explores the debates on key actors in networks and collaboration in Thailand. Policy network analysis as relationship analysis? Classic questions of policy network analysis include ‘who are the actors?’ and ‘how do they relate to one another?’. In Thailand, it is undeniable that most studies start with these questions. However, some studies go further and explain policy networks and raise interesting questions for future research. This could be summarised into four approaches with examples from selected studies. The first approach analyses the policy network with a new public service lens. For example, Santhitiwanich (2019) chooses to look at an elderly care network in Ubon Ratchathani province with a co-​production framework. The findings not only illustrate the roles and relations between actors but also the direction of the relations. In other words, this study further clarifies vertical relations in the network and argues that services provided by this network are not co-​produced but are being managed from top to bottom. The second approach analyses the policy network with a narrative lens, an approach mainly found in sociological studies. One example is Hankiattiwong’s work (2018) which studies the network of policy actors in coping with air pollution problem in Doi Tung, a district in the North of the country. This study 94

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employed an ethnographic methodology and situated the network in sociocultural contexts. Another example is Chareamphan’s work (2012) which explores the community land title deeds policy network. Using Marsh and Smith’s dialectic approach (2000), this study explained that there are not only structures and strategies in the policy network but there are also sociopolitical contexts of network formation and decision-​making. The third approach analyses the policy network with a critical lens. At present, there are a limited number of studies that could be categorised with this approach; this may be because using a critical lens requires a comprehensive understanding of narrative, deliberative and discursive perspectives. Another prominent study on policy networks is by Boossabong and Chamchong (2018). This study not only delineates relationships within the networks but it also analyses narratives and discourses in selected policy arenas. Moreover, it employs deliberative analysis to discuss the findings and provides recommendations for increasing collaborative and democratic networks. The last approach analyses policy networks with a complex adaptive lens. This approach is based on Kamolvej’s work (2014); no other similar study on policy analysis in Thailand has been found. Interestingly, this work employs a complex adaptive system approach to analyse and compare disaster management networks in the 2004 tsunami and the 2011 flood in Thailand. While clearly mapping the networks with the SNA method, Kamolvej delineates the adaptive capacity of selected networks and discusses improvements and fallbacks of these networks. Technically, this study not only employs a thought-​provoking framework but it also uses advanced methods which deliver robust arguments. To conclude, although policy network analysis in Thailand seems like relationship analysis at first glance, the body of knowledge in policy network analysis has obviously been developed in both depth and breadth. In depth, it goes beyond the descriptive analysis of roles and relations into narrative and discursive analysis or, in brief, critical policy studies. In breadth, it takes new public governance into account and looks at the changing roles of public organisations and adaptive capacity within policy networks. Collaboration versus collaborative governance studies To this point, analysing collaboration in Thailand could be summarised into two groups of studies. One group of studies focuses on collaboration, which mostly looks at the analysis of components, typology or determinants of collaboration. Another group focuses on collaborative governance in which collaboration occurs. A notable example of work examining collaboration studies was conducted by Boossabong et al (2017). This study exhaustively explored collaboration in Northeastern Thailand by looking at the emergence and synthesising forms of collaboration along with collaborative actors, levels, issues and continuity. Its findings contribute to wider and deeper knowledge of collaboration in Thailand. It illustrates formation, types and strategies of collaboration at the local level. 95

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Indeed, this study also applied the collaborative governance concept as part of its framework. However, its main focus is on collaboration and related components in particular. For collaborative governance studies, their focus is on understanding the collaboration and governance regime in which they were constructed. Reuangtham and Pantasen’s work (2010) is one of the first studies employing the concept. In an attempt to analyse the ways in which actors collaborate for corruption prevention in Thailand, this study looks at collaboration as a governance system and seeks out new forms of networks and organisational structure in policy making and implementation. Another example of collaborative governance studies is Chaichakan’s (2018) work on local welfare delivery in Nan province, which employs Emerson and Nabatchi’s (2015) integrative collaborative governance framework. This study not only looks at collaborative activities and leaders but also discusses different contexts, driving forces and dynamics of selected collaborative governance regimes. Indeed, there remain other issues for discussion on collaboration in wider contexts. For example, the issue of collaborative leaders is popular among international scholars. In Thailand, however, an in-​depth study on this issue has not been done. This is possibly because the concept of a collaborative leader, sometimes regarded as a collaborative public manager, is still new in Thailand. Thus, highlighting a gap for future research in either collaboration and collaborative governance studies. Key actors in network and collaboration in Thailand Understanding key actors in network and collaboration can be done in four stages of an organisational life cycle –​formation, growth, maturity and decline. In Thailand, like other countries, network formation can start in various ways and within any sector. At the national level, it is usually started by policies and regulations. At the local level, local governments and civil society organisations usually play an important role in collaboration and network building. However, growing and sustaining the network usually relies on external resources and, particularly, a grant provided by third-​party organisations. Acquiring a grant requires a leading actor who can write an outstanding proposal and has the skill set of a collaborative leader. At the decline stage, it is still unclear who makes a final decision on whether to terminate either the network or the collaboration. More evidence is needed in order to draw a conclusion. Debates on key actors in network and collaboration in Thailand are on the continuum between key resource holders and collaborative leaders. On one end, this spectrum complies with theories of collaboration and network in that collaborative leaders are essential. As collaborative leaders are believed to have a certain skill set (O’Leary et al, 2012), this theory leads to an emerging trend of leadership training in Thailand. However, this does not always play out in practice. Being either public or non-​public organisations, the key actors –​a 96

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person, a group or an organisation who makes important decisions within each network –​are those who received a grant or possessed key resources. The water resource management (WRM) network in Phrae exemplifies a network of which the key actor is a public organisation, namely the Phrae provincial administrative organisation (PAO). According to a study on good practices in local network building, the Phrae PAO not only allocated its own budget for the network management, but it also connected with various organisations to access additional resources and find partners with shared goals. These partners were central departments and non-​profit organisations with missions related to WRM. With this strategy, the Phrae PAO established the WRM network through the Water School for village leaders across the province. This school not only provides training for related skill sets but it also creates ties between community leaders. Another e­xample –​ the community welfare fund (CWF) network management –​depicts a network with which non-​public organisations play the role of key actors. At the beginning, CWFs were initiated by community leaders like Kru Mookda in Phayao and Kru Chob in Songkhla. From the best practice, the concept of the CWF was transferred nationwide. The CWFs in various provinces are connected with support from various organisations, for example, the Community Organization Development Institute and the Ministry of Social Development and Human Security. Principally, the CWF network in a province is comprised of public and private organisations, village and district representatives and others related to community welfare issues (Wisetsilpanon, 2012). Adequate network functioning needs leaders who can pull resources into the operation. According to Chaichakan et al (2018), this type of network is bonded together by shared goals and missions. However, when it comes to the operation, it needs financial support from the funding agency, for example, the Thai Health Promotion Foundation, and strategic collaboration with public organisations.

Critiques and trends Despite its popularity in Thailand, the concept of network and collaboration has never been short of criticism. In theory, the concept has been labelled as a metaphor and as empty. In practice, the concept is either the central government’s tool to manipulate local actors or propaganda to maintain peace at the local level. This is elaborated in the three subsections that follow. Bridging collaboration and network analysis in public policy Collaboration and networks are two concepts that ought to be considered together for a better understanding of policy process and outcomes (Kenis and Schneider, 1991; Agranoff and McGuire, 2001; Rethemeyer, 2005; Skelcher et al, 2005; Ospina and Saz-​Carranza, 2010; Scholz et al, 2008; Ulibarri and Scott, 2017). Generally, Thai textbooks explain both terms together or one 97

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after the other. Many studies also discuss both concepts while focusing on either concept. For example, Boossabong and Chamchong (2018) propose an analytical framework for the articulation of network analysis, democracy and justice, the quality of deliberation, and autonomy as well as the capacity of each network constituent actor. Meanwhile, in an attempt to bridge network and collaboration analysis for better policy outcomes, public innovation became popular. This led to new concepts of ‘collaborative innovation’ and ‘innovative collaboration’. While the first refers to new outcomes delivered from collaboration, the latter refers to new ways of collaboration. These are challenging yet promising concepts for policy analysts and practitioners in Thailand since they could lead to the formulation of constructive and effective policies in the future. Legitimisation of the government’s actions through network and collaboration Under a centralised system in Thailand, network and collaboration appeared to become the stamp of legitimacy for the government’s actions. Indeed, successful and genuine collaboration and networks exist in many parts of the country. In a large number of cases, network and collaboration are presented at the forefront while, in reality, the actors are loosely connected. In some cases, public organisations in Thailand need to increase their budget by utilising the Provincial Cluster Development Plan. Some of these grants give preference to those who can form a team and, thus. apply for the grant as a ‘network’. Therefore, these organisations need to work with civil society organisations in the province. Building multisector networks with social capital and local knowledge Numerous studies on building network and collaboration provide knowledge and lessons learned. Sustaining network and collaboration, however, is a long process for practitioners and scholars alike. One of the many propositions is to build multisector networks with social capital and local knowledge; a task associated with a considerable amount of preference and bias. Thus, it requires significant effort to assimilate people from various backgrounds. As Weare et al (2014: 590) state, ‘Cultural theory indicates that actors with different cultural viewpoints have distinct and predictable biases in terms of their expectations of collaboration and their preferences concerning how collaborative policy networks are structured.’ In the Thai context, Boossabong (2017) and Jantanasakulwong (2017) observe this situation and, with the acknowledgement of such biases, reinstate the importance of local knowledge and spiritual leaders in the policy process. The CS-​Nets in Phayao and Nan exemplify the ways in which local knowledge and social capital are strategically used to strengthen and sustain the network. In Phayao, civil society organisations (CSOs) have jointly built a network called ‘Khruea Kaai Saang Baan Paeng Mueang’ –​which literally means ‘Home 98

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Creation and City Development Network’ –​for a few decades. This network connects leaders from villages, subdistricts and districts in Phayao. Whether formal or informal leaders, the network members have deep local knowledge and experience in their specific issues and areas. Thus, the network is a place to share, learn and work together to develop Phayao. Similarly, the Hug Nan Foundation was founded by a group of leaders in Nan. These leaders have worked together for several decades. Some of them have entered local politics and became city mayors while other remained working in CSOs. Both Phayao and Nan have become prominent actors in provincial development and collaboration with public organisations. When provincial committees are to be appointed, members of these networks are the first to be considered as CSO representatives.

Conclusion This chapter has provided a description, explanation and critiques of the concept of network and collaboration for policy analysis in Thailand. Although there are some existing practices as illustrated in this chapter, it is rather still a new phenomenon in Thailand. Networks and collaborations are potential powerful tools for policy change, analysis and execution in the face of resources scarcity. It is of interest to see where Thailand goes from here, particularly how the country could shift away from its rigid vertical structure and harness a more horizontal relationship. References Agranoff, R. (2006) ‘Inside collaborative networks: Ten lessons for public managers’, Public Administration Review, 66(s1): 56–​65. Agranoff, R. and McGuire, M. (2001) ‘Big questions in public network management research’, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 11(3): 295–​326. Agranoff, R., McGuire, M. and Silvia, C. (2013) ‘Governance, networks and intergovernmental systems’, in E. Araral, S. Fritzen, M. Howlett, M. Ramesh and X. Wu (eds) Routledge Handbook of Public Policy, New York: Routledge, pp 361–​373. Atkinson, M.M. and Coleman, W.D. (1992) ‘Policy networks, policy communities and the problems of governance’, Governance, 5(2): 154–​180. Bevir, M. and Richards, D. (2009) ‘Decentring policy networks: A theoretical agenda’, Public Administration, 87(1): 3–​14. Boossabong, P. (2017) ‘Policy analysis in Thailand: Comparing the roles of expert and local knowledge’, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 19(2): 173–​183. Boossabong, P. and Chamchong, P. (2018) ‘The importance of network in public policy and governance: Critical perspectives and an analytical framework for going beyond an empty signifier’, Journal of Social Science Naaresuan University, 14(2): 113–​136. [in Thai] 99

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Boossabong, P., Chopyot, S., Chamchong, P., Ariyasirichot, W., Akkasaeng, A. and Phomlha, W. (2017) Collaborative Local Governance: Exploring Practices in the North-​eastern Thailand, Bangkok: Thailand Research Fund. [in Thai] Chaichakan, C. (2017) ‘Collaborative governance: Concepts, selected literature and key definitions’, Veridian E-​Jornal, 10(3): 286–​298. [in Thai] Chaichakan, C. (2018) ‘Approaches for developing collaboration in in-​cash welfare provision in Nan’, King Prachadhipok Institute Journal, 16(2): 81–​103. [in Thai] Chaichakan, C., Khampeng, D. and Mongkolkaew, A. (2018) Final Report on ‘Knowledge Management for Health Promotion for Informal Labours in Phayao: Status of the Organization’, Phayao: University of Phayao. [in Thai] Chaichakan, C., Khampeng, D., Rohotarachon, P. and Sinthunava, N. (2020) Final Report on ‘Community-​based Planning for Water Balance Management’, Phayao: University of Phayao. [in Thai] Chamchong, P. (2018a) Local Innovation through Collaborative Governance, Mahasarakham: COPAG Press. [in Thai] Chamchong, P. (2018b) ‘Inter-​local cooperation in international context: Reasons, types, and key success factors’, Local Administration Journal, 11(3): 1–​22. [in Thai] Chansiri, N. (2015) ‘Network governance in public policy processes’, Walailak Abode of Culture Journal, 15(1): 145–​153. [in Thai] Chareamphan, P. (2012) Politics of Community Land Title Deeds Policy Making Process, MA Thesis, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok. [in Thai] Chareamphan, P. (2016) ‘Critical realism’s epistemology and explanation in policy network theory’, Songkhlanakarin: Humanities and Social Science, 22(2): 3–​30. [in Thai] Charnsamorn, S. (2016) Collaborative Networks for Livable Community Building in the Context of ASEAN Regionalisation : The Case of Koh Kret, Nonthaburi, MA Thesis, Thammasat University, Bangkok. [in Thai] Considine, M. (2003) ‘Networks and interactivity: Making sense of front-​line governance in the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and Australia’, Journal of European Public Policy, 10(1): 46–​58. Emerson, K. and Nabatchi, T. (2015) Collaborative Governance Regimes, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Fischer, F., Miller, G.D. and Sidney, M.S. (2007) Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods, Boca Raton: Taylor & Francis. Hankiattiwong, T. (2018) ‘Haze problem policy networks in Doi Tung Development Project (Royal Workspace) founded and sustained by Princess Srinagarindra, The Princess Mother of The Kingdom of Thailand’, PhD in Social Sciences Journal, 8(3): 128–​142. [in Thai] Heclo, H. (1978) ‘Issue networks and the executive establishment’, in A. King (ed) The New American Political System, Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, pp 87–​124. Howlett, M., Mukherjee, I. and Koppenjan, J. (2017) ‘Policy learning and policy networks in theory and practice: The role of policy brokers in the Indonesian biodiesel policy network’, Policy and Society, 36(2): 233–​250. 100

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Jantanasakulwong, S. (2017) ‘Policy issues in Thailand: Local knowledge matters’, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 19(2): 184–​186. Kamolvej, T. (2014) ‘Has Thailand disaster management, from tsunami to flood, been better?’, Journal of Politics and Governance, 4(2): 103–​119. Kamolvej, T. (2015) ‘Social network analysis in public policy’, in W. Luenangprapas, P. Tantrajin and T. Ungsuchwal (eds) Unpacking Public Policy, Bangkok: Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, pp 122–​155. [in Thai] Kariji, K. (2018) Collaborative Governance in Industrial Projects for Sustainable Job Creation in Thailand’s Three Southern Border Provinces, MPA Thesis, Bangkok: National Institute of Development Administration. Kenis, P. and Schneider, V. (1991) ‘Policy networks and policy analysis: Scrutinizing a new analytical toolbox’, in B. Marin and R. Mayntz (eds.) Policy Networks: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, pp 25–​59. Kickert, W. (1993) ‘Complexity, governance and dynamics: Conceptual explorations of public network management’, in J. Kooiman (ed) Modern Governance: New Government-​society Interactions, London: SAGE, pp 191–​204. Klijn, E.-​H. and Koppenjan, J.F.M. (2000) ‘Public management and policy networks: Foundations of a network approach to governance’, Public Management: An International Journal of Research and Theory, 2(2): 135–​158. KPI (King Prachadhipok Institute) (2007) Local Cooperation: Modes and Possibilities, Bangkok: King Prachadhipok Institute. [in Thai] Krueathep, W. (2007) Networks: Local Governments’ Innovations, Bangkok: Thailand Research Fund. [in Thai] Krueathep, W., Riccucci, N.M. and Suwanmala, C. (2010) ‘Why do agencies work together? The determinants of network formation at the subnational level of government in Thailand’, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 20(1): 157–​185. Lueangprapas, W. (2018) Public Policies in Global Contexts, Bangkok: Sukhothat Thammatirat Open University Press. [in Thai] Marsh, D. and Smith, M. (2000) ‘Understanding policy networks: Towards a dialectical approach’, Political Studies, 48(1): 4–​21. O’Leary, R., Yujin, C. and Gerard, C.M. (2012) ‘The skill set of the successful collaborator’, Public Administration Review, 72: S70–​S83. OPDC (Office of Public Sector Development Commission) (2017) Participatory Governance: Techniques and Applications, Bangkok: Office of Public Sector Development Commission. [in Thai] Ospina, S.M. and Saz-​Carranza, A. (2010) ‘Paradox and collaboration in network management’, Administration & Society, 42(4): 404–​440. Peterson, J. (2003) Policy Networks, available from https://​irihs.ihs.ac.at/​id/​epr​ int/​1506/​1/​pw_​90.pdf Peterson, J. and Bomberg, E. (1999) Decision-​Making in the European Union, Basingstoke: Palgrave.

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Rethemeyer, R.K. (2005) ‘Conceptualizing and measuring collaborative networks’, Public Administration Review, 65(1): 117–​121. Reuangtham, S. (2017) People’s Public Policies, Khon Kaen: Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Khon Kaen University. [in Thai] Reuangtham, S. and Pantasen, A. (2010) ‘Application of collaborative governance in corruption protection’, King Prachadhipok Institute Journal, 8(2): 59–​74. [in Thai] Rhodes, R.A.W. (1997) Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability, Philadelphia: Open University. Rhodes, R.A.W. (2003) ‘Putting people back into networks’, in A. Salminen (ed) Governing Networks, Amsterdam: IOS Press, pp 9–​22. Saint-​Onge, H. and Armstrong, C. (2004) The Conductive Organization Building beyond Sustainability, New York: Elsevier. Sandström, A. and Carlsson, L. (2008) ‘The performance of policy networks: The relation between network structure and network performance’, Policy Studies Journal, 36(4): 497–​524. Sansaneewittayakul, I. (2013) ‘The analysis of social enterprise policy by using policy network approach’, New Public Management Journal, 11(2): 39–​57. [in Thai] Santhitiwanich, A. (2019) ‘Network management: A case of elderly care in Warin Chamrap Municipality and Namyuen Municipality, Ubon Ratchathani Province’, Humanities & Social Sciences Journal, 10(1): 296–​313. [in Thai] Scholz, J.T., Berardo, R. and Kile, B. (2008) ‘Do networks solve collective action problems? Credibility, search, and collaboration’, The Journal of Politics, 70(2): 393–​406. Schumaker, A.M. (2002) ‘Interorganizational networks: Using a theoretical model to predict effectiveness of rural health care delivery networks’, Journal of Health & Human Services Administration, 25(3): 371–​406. Siriprakob, P. (2015) 3 Paradigms of Public Administration: Concepts, Theories, and Practices, Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Press. [in Thai] Siroros, P. (1998) Policy Networks and Process of Road Accident Prevention, Bangkok: Health Systems Research Institute. [in Thai] Siroros, P. (2015) ‘Governance in policy studies: Understanding governance, governance network and metagovernance’, in W. Luenangprapas, P. Tantrajin and T. Ungsuchwal (eds) Unpacking Public Policy, Bangkok: Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, pp 82–​121. [in Thai] Skelcher, C., Mathur, N. and Smith, M. (2005) ‘The public governance of collaborative spaces: Discourse, design and democracy’, Public Administration, 83(3): 573–​596. Srisompong, W. (2016) Collaborative Governance in Klong Mhonna Project, Ramdang Sub-​District, Singhanakorn District, Songkhla Province, MPA Thesis, Prince Songkhlanakarin University, Songkhla. [in Thai] Suksong, K. (2015) Rice Price Policy: A Study in Politics of Policy Process and Network, PhD Thesis, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok. [in Thai]

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Thongjan, S. (2016) Collaborative Governance and the Driving Force of Thai Government Policy: A Case Study of Tackling Poverty Conducted to Phitsanulok Province, MPA Thesis, Thammasat University, Bangkok. [in Thai] Ulibarri, N. and Scott, T.A. (2017) ‘Linking network structure to collaborative governance’, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 27(1): 163–1​ 81. Wangmahapon, P. (2017) Thai public administration: State-​People Collaborative Public Management, Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University Press. [in Thai] Weare, C., Lichterman, P. and Esparza, N. (2014) ‘Collaboration and culture: Organizational culture and the dynamics of collaborative policy networks’, Policy Studies Journal, 42(4): 590–​619. Wisetsilpanon, P. (2012) ‘The management system of community welfare fund network of district’, Journal of the Association of Researcher, 17(3): 63–​73.

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Part Three Policy analysis beyond executive government

SIX

Monarchy and Thai meta-​policy: the early years of Rama X’s reign Khorapin Phuaphansawat and Puangchon Unchanam

Introduction The specific attribute of the policy landscape in Thailand, which might not be detected elsewhere, is the hidden and explicit roles of the monarchy in Thai meta-​ policy, either to frame it or to be its exception. The chapter will provide insights that have not been documented in most policy-​related literature about Thailand, particularly about royal interventions in national politics and public policy. It will also highlight that, unlike a typical European model of constitutional monarchy, the Thai monarch’s role has not been restricted to merely symbolic and ritualistic realms. With the focus on the monarchy and Thai meta-​policy, it is clear that so far the policies the palace has pursued, especially in the era of Rama X, are exceptional from the implementation of existing meta-​policies in the country. These policies include the adopted principles of good governance, the rule of law, democracy, human rights protection, welfare provision and reduction of social inequality. On 13 October 2016, Bhumibol Adulyadej, the ninth monarch of the Chakri dynasty, titled Rama IX, passed away. At the time of his death, the 88-​year-​old monarch was the world’s longest-​reigning head of state and the longest-​reigning monarch in Thai history. Ascending the throne on 9 June 1946, Rama IX had reigned for 70 years and 126 days. Thanks to his seven-​decade reign, he was the only monarch whom most of the 69 million Thais had ever known, and thus it was hard for them to imagine how the kingdom would be under the new reign. Above all, Rama IX was one of the most popular monarchs in Thai history. During his historic reign, the kingdom had transformed from an underdeveloped and agrarian society to a newly industrialised country. Under his guidance, as the palace has long promoted, royal development projects helped countless Thais, who could not support themselves as the kingdom rapidly industrialised and urbanised, improve their standard of living. His public image and personal ethic also made him a beloved monarch. While an ancient monarch in Thai kingship was perceived by his subjects as a divine, mysterious and lavish sovereign, Rama IX presented himself to the public as a frugal, diligent and humble father of the nation. As a result, when the popular monarch breathed his last, fear, anxiety and uncertainty loomed large in the kingdom.

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The 64-​year-​old heir apparent, Crown Prince Maha Vajiralongkorn, was different from his father in political skills, mannerisms and interests. He did not have political experience or royal projects under his belt. His notorious lifestyle frequently topped tabloids around the globe. He had been perceived by his subjects as an erratic and enigmatic person. When the historical reign of Rama IX came to an end, therefore, the prospects of the new reign looked bleak. Immediately, the odds were stacked against the new sovereign, Rama X. While millions of Thais nationwide mourned when the palace announced the death of Rama IX, one might have wondered whether and how long they would shout ‘Long live the King!’ to the newly crowned Rama X. Based on the early predictions made by several scholars who have long observed politics and the monarchy in Thailand, the new monarch would not stand a chance of filling his father’s shoes. The transition from the ninth to the tenth reign would be tumultuous or even violent, and it was likely to see military control over the unpopular and unskilled monarch. Looking at Rama X’s personal traits and notorious background, Christine Gray (2016) asserted that ‘I truly believe that Thailand is entering a Dark Age’. Andrew Marshall (2014: 3) claimed that ‘most of Thailand’s elite are implacably opposed to the prospect of Vajiralongkorn succeeding his father and are prepared to go to extreme lengths to sabotage the succession’, so the ‘the succession will unleash a period of severe conflict and instability’ (2014: 215). Reviewing a close and enduring association between the monarchy and the military under the former reign, Paul Chambers and Napisa Waitoolkiat (2016: 440) made a bold prediction that the new monarch ‘will need a strong military to protect palace interests, but such strength will mean that the military will be a “senior” partner and more difficult to control’. Pavin Chachavalpongpun (2016) predicted that the new monarch ‘could threaten the future of the monarchy’ and ‘if he chooses to maintain his alliance with the military and refuses to work with democratic governments, his reign will be contested and may not survive’. Believing that Thailand had long been stabilised by the ‘Bhumibol consensus’, which is based upon political harmony and class compromises under the reign of Rama IX, Kasian Tejapira (2017) worried that the death of the beloved king would usher in an age of uncertainty, conflict and violence in the kingdom. With a notorious monarch on the throne, Giles Ungpakorn (2016a) claimed that ‘the Thai monarchy is well past its sell-​by date’. Strongly believing that ‘it is time for a genuine democratic republic’, he even announced, a day after Rama IX was laid to rest, ‘The King is dead! Long live the Republic!’ (2016b). Living up to his reputation, Rama X kicked off his reign with controversy. Once his father passed away, instead of ascending the throne immediately to assure the continuity of the monarchy, the Crown Prince broke royal tradition. He surprisingly asked for time to mourn and to prepare himself before being proclaimed the new sovereign of the kingdom. After the longest interregnum in Thai history, the heir apparent was ready to accept the crown on 1 December 2016. In the early years of his reign, Rama X wasted no time in shaking things 108

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up. Reviewing a final draft of the latest constitution, the king demanded some changes that were associated with royal prerogatives. He also asked the government to transfer all royal bureaus and some security units from the state’s management to the king’s personal control. He appointed, promoted, demoted and deposed state officials under his command as he pleased. He showed political solidarity with the military regime by endorsing junta leader-​turned-​prime minister Prayut Chan-​o-​cha. Signed and endorsed by the king, new acts were frequently promulgated in the new reign, and many of them led to the enclosure of public land, historic sites and recreational centres for the construction of new palaces. State budgets of the crown also rose steeply. On top of that, the Crown Property Bureau (CPB) –​a quasi-​government institution that manages royal wealth –​was transferred to the monarch’s full private ownership. During the early years of his reign, Rama X successfully consolidated his power and wealth, and there is a sign that he is steering the crown away from a constitutional monarchy even further than his father did. In this regard, what scholars predicted about the new reign seems to be correct. Under the new reign, the throne is occupied by an unpredictable monarch, and the kingdom is entering an age of uncertainty. Despite the demise of the popular king and numerous controversies surrounding the new monarch, the crown did not crumble. Instead, it survived the death of one king and remains a dominant institution in the kingdom. Under junta rule, the succession went smoothly. There was no bloody contest initiated by any royal or elite fraction to sabotage Rama X as he ascended the throne. Expected to be a powerful force that took the wheel in the alliance between the monarchy and the military and tamed the incompetent king, the army let the monarch do what he pleased. Although the mass media kept reporting the reorganisation of the crown under the new reign, they merely announced the new acts and decrees which were associated with the palace. When it came to Rama X’s personal life, wealth accumulation and political intervention, there was no scoop, investigation, comment or criticism by journalists in the kingdom. Worse than that, several royal initiatives and monarchy-​related policies are at odds with the principles of democracy, the rule of law, good governance, social welfare, human rights and freedom of speech –​all of which policy makers and technocrats claimed that they eagerly pursued. This contradiction under the new reign, however, did not pass unnoticed among many Thais, particularly the youth. In fact, since 2020, several waves of protests were held on the streets of Bangkok and major cities around the kingdom. Recognising the king’s active and unconstitutional acts of concentrating of wealth and power at the expense of the public, the protesters unprecedentedly demanded reforms of the monarchy. The people’s voices, nevertheless, had fallen on deaf ears, as the crown did not respond to the demand but relied on criminal charges and forces to silence the anti-​monarchists. It is this conflict between the aggressive monarchy and the angry masses that defines the early years of Rama X on the throne. 109

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How did Rama X manoeuvre his reign once he became king? What were the consequences of his centralisation of royal power and wealth? How did his action contradict the state’s policies and public interests? This chapter is set to examine those questions. It argues that Rama X should not be perceived as a powerless monarch. Right from the start of his reign, Rama X has shown to the public that he is a much shrewder king than people expected. He does not shy away from, but rather engages in, royal intervention in national politics and royal investments in the market. His political intervention and capital accumulation, in contrast to what people earlier perceived, are not simply thoughtless, impromptu and amateurish. Instead, they are purposeful, strategic and legally binding. Furthermore, this chapter brings to light a critical contradiction of Thai politics. While policy makers, technocrats and intellectuals have long scrutinised and stigmatised politicians, capitalists, generals and policemen as the roots of corruption, abuses of power, authoritarianism and crony capitalism in the kingdom, they let the monarchy off the hook. In fact, although the monarchy is an intrinsic part of those problems, the crown is, ironically, praised not only as a neutral institution that is above political contention but also as a national pillar that stabilises the kingdom when it faces social conflicts. Most important, this chapter reveals that, instead of conforming to national policies, the monarchy actively pursues its own agenda. This gets defined as ‘exceptional policies’, policies that are more powerful, longer-​lasting and more unchallenged than any plan that a government tries to form and implement. Long neglected by scholars in Thai studies, those policies have recently become a point of contention. While the elites still rally to protect the crown’s exceptional policies, the masses, in disagreement, take their anti-​monarchist demands to the street. This chapter begins with a review of Thailand’s contemporary policies; policies that have been promoted by the government, policy makers and technocrats since Rama X became king. Good governance, the rule of law, democracy, human rights protection, welfare provision and reduction of social inequality are national agendas set as meta-​policies that policy makers claimed that the kingdom would follow as the new reign began. The next section, nonetheless, shows a different story of policy formation and implementation in Thailand; public policies are rarely applied to the monarchy. Instead, the crown tends to have its own agenda that is diverging from national policies and public interests. In other words, the kingdom apparently has exceptional policies and practices that do not conform to any Thai meta-​policies but rather to the monarchy’s rules. This section investigates five exceptional policies related to the power of the monarchy that have been decided upon and implemented. Those are: (1) the transfer of the CPB from government control to the monarch’s sole ownership; (2) the establishment of Royal Agencies (RA); (3) the royal enclosure of public land; (4) the sharp increase of state allocations to the monarchy; and (5) the monarch’s personal intervention in national politics. In its conclusion, this chapter calls for a rethinking of policy making in Thailand. The monarchy should not be treated as an exception when it comes to policy formation and implementation. 110

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Instead of giving it a free pass, policy makers, if only they could learn from the street demonstrators during the early years of Rama X, must pay attention to the crown –​one of the most powerful and wealthiest institutions of the kingdom –​ and hold it accountable. In sum, this chapter illustrates the fact that any study of policy analysis in Thailand would be incomplete if the royal role and power are not included.

The promised kingdom: understanding Thai meta-​policies On paper, the prospects of Thailand look bright. Ratified on 6 April 2017, the twentieth constitution of the kingdom, the first under Rama X’s reign, showed a lot of promise. According to the constitution, ‘Thailand adopts a democratic regime of government’ (Thai Constitution, article 2); ‘sovereign powers belong to the Thai people’ (article 3); ‘human dignity, rights, liberties and equality of the people shall be protected’; ‘the Thai people, irrespective of their origins, sexes or religions, shall enjoy equal protection under this Constitution’ (article 4); and, above all, ‘the Constitution is the supreme law of the State’ (article 5). As the supreme law of the kingdom, the constitution hits the right note by highlighting and promoting crucial concepts that fit well with constitutional monarchy and liberal democracy: good governance, civil liberties, human rights, social equality and the rule of law. Furthermore, this constitution was nicknamed the ‘Bill of Eradiating the Corrupted’ (ratthathammanun chabap prap kong) thanks to its content that aims to end corruption, cronyism and nepotism which have long plagued the kingdom (iLaw, 2016). Significantly, the constitution pays homage to the late monarch. The Sufficiency Economy Philosophy (SEP) –​Rama IX’s vision of national development based on self-​reliance, sustainability, moderation, prudence and abstinence from conspicuous consumption –​is incorporated into the charter. One of the major national policies, the constitution underlines, is to establish ‘the sustainable development of society, the economy and national security by promoting the implementation of the Sufficiency Economy Philosophy with significant regard to overall benefits of the nation’ (Thai Constitution, article 75). The SEP can be considered an attempt to form a meta-​policy, a guiding principle that guides all other policies. Likewise, Thailand’s 2017–​2021 National Economic and Social Development Plan, the twelfth plan of the kingdom and the first under the new reign, was full of promise. According to the plan, the government will implement public policies that aim to create a just society and reduce inequality in the kingdom. Those include land redistribution, the provision of public health services to the poor, a more equal distribution of quality education across geographical areas, a more redistributive fiscal policy that effectively favours the low-​income population, the provision of monthly allowances to the elderly and persons with disabilities, and the promotion of local communities’ capacity for economic development and entrepreneurship (NESDC, 2016: 96–​98). Moreover, the development plan is set to work in tandem with the constitution. Highlighting the problems of an 111

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ineffectiveness of law enforcement, a lack of transparency and good governance, and inequality and unfairness in the process and systems of justice, the twelfth plan promises that the country will significantly change in the next five years. As it states, ‘The public management system should become transparent, efficient, and accountable, and the monitoring of its effectiveness should involve popular participation. Public management tasks should be decentralised, as [is] appropriate, among central, provincial, and local administrations’ (NESDC, 2016: 160). On top of that, the plan guarantees that Rama IX’s vision of national development will be continually promoted in the kingdom. The SEP, as the plan emphasises, ‘provides the necessary basis for sustainable development’ and ‘enhances chances for everyone to live happily and harmoniously, while the growth of the Thai economy increases continuously, appropriately, stably, fairly, inclusively, and friendly to the environment’ (NESDC, 2016: 5). Despite coming to power through a coup d’état and ruling the country by military oppression, Prayut promised that his administration, under the new reign, would implement public policies that follow the constitution and the development plan. On the International Anti-​Corruption Day, 8 December 2018, he launched a national campaign of ‘Zero Tolerance’ towards corruption, claiming that his government would step up efforts in fighting graft and turning the country into a ‘corruption-​intolerant society’ (Bangkok Post, 2018d). Responding to Rama X’s appointment of him as the first prime minister of the new reign, Prayut vowed that he would ‘develop the country in all economic and social aspects, including eradicating corruption, reducing inequality and elevating the welfare of the people, especially those in the agricultural and commerce sectors, through effective and transparent government spending’ (Thai PBS, 2019). Above all, whenever he had a chance, Prayut did not forget to praise the SEP and gave his word that the SEP would be the guiding policy of his government. ‘One of the greatest gifts that His Majesty the Late King bestowed upon us’, Prayut claimed, ‘is the Sufficiency Economy Philosophy’. As a result, he urged the Thai people: ‘as the torch bearers of His Majesty’s legacy for development and the betterment of the nation, all Thais should strive to apply the philosophical framework of [the] SEP in each and every aspect of our lives to honour His Majesty’s memory’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2017: 25). In this regard, the constitution, the development plan and the government seem to be all in sync. Under the new reign, Thailand will be driven by public policies that promote democracy, the rule of law, good governance, decentralisation, human rights protection, welfare provision, social equality and the SEP. Based on how it was officially planned, therefore, the kingdom is on the right track, and the prospects of the new reign did not look as bleak as it was forecasted. The monarchy, however, has been a wild card in Thai politics. As the next section will show, whatever the supreme law of the kingdom, the development plan and national policies are set to implement and accomplish, the palace tends to have a different idea. The new king, especially, wants to play by his own rules. 112

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The palace and its exceptional policies and practices Since being crowned king, Rama X has been active and aggressive when it comes to royal power and wealth. In just the first three years of his reign, the government passed several acts and decrees that are related to the reorganisation of the monarchy. Similarly, the palace frequently announced various royal orders and Rama X’s personal statements, declaring what the new monarch wanted and how he would like to reign in his kingdom for years to come. Diverging from the constitution, the development plan and public policies, the crown’s recent moves can be categorised into five themes. They are the exception from the Thai meta-​policy decisions that defies all legal constraints in the context of constitutional monarchy. The consolidation of royal wealth Since the new millennium began, the Thai monarchy has been ranked the wealthiest crown on earth (Serafin, 2008, 2009, 2010; Investopedia, 2011). Unlike constitutional monarchies in Europe and Japan, however, the main source of royal income for the Thai crown does not come from the allocation of state budgets. Instead, it is derived from royal investments through the CPB. Owning many valuable historical properties in Thailand, the CPB is one of the biggest landlords of the kingdom. In 2012, the CPB reportedly held 3,320 acres in the capital and 13,200 acres outside. The Bangkok portion alone was worth almost US$33 billion (Grossman and Faulder, 2012: 284). Furthermore, the bureau accumulates wealth by investing in the kingdom’s two giant corporations. One is the Siam Cement Group (SCG), the largest industrial conglomerate not only in Thailand but also in all Southeast Asian countries (Akira, 1999: 239). Another is the Siam Commercial Bank (SCB), Thailand’s first commercial bank and one of the ten largest banks in Southeast Asia (Forbes, 2019b). As the major stockholder in the SCG (33 per cent ownership) and SCB (23 per cent ownership), the CPB received dividends of more than US$200 million in 2010 (Grossman and Faulder, 2012: 283). Thanks to the massive wealth of the CPB, which was worth around US$30 billion in 2008, Rama IX was crowned the richest monarch in the world by Forbes magazine (Serafin, 2008). Since 2008 Forbes has published lists of the world’s richest royals three times, 2009, 2010 and 2011, and no royal on earth could dethrone Rama IX from the top spot in all these lists (Serafin, 2009, 2010; Investopedia, 2011). Ironically, the incredible amount of capital that the CPB has accumulated, and the wealthy status of Rama IX, did not fit well with what the late monarch preached to his subjects. While the SEP promotes self-​sufficiency, moderation and abstinence from capital accumulation, the crown is active in the market and royal wealth is massive and escalating. The history of the CPB is contentious. Founded by an absolute monarchy in the late 19th century, it was formerly called the Privy Purse Bureau (PPB). 113

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Drawing around 15 per cent of total government revenue, the bureau financed the expenses of royal household, managed royal wealth and estates, and invested royal capital in the market. With the PPB behind them, monarchs were able to meet the demands of royal expenses, ranging from paying numerous members of the royal family to funding funeral ceremonies for royal relatives (Wattanasiri, 1986). The end of Thai absolutism in 1932, however, led to a significant reconstruction of the PPB and the deprivation of royal wealth. Under a constitutional monarchy, the post-​1932 government attempted to divide royal properties into three groups: those that belonged to the monarch personally; those that belonged to the kingdom as national treasures; and those that were used to fund the monarchy. The latter included the crown’s investments in the SCG, the SCB and land development. With the promulgation of the Crown Property Act 1936, this type of royal wealth was placed under the management of a new office, the CPB. It was chaired by the Ministry of Finance, and thus it was under state control. As a department within the government, the CPB was tax-​free. Instead of by the king’s command, the directors of the CPB were appointed by the government, and the management of the CPB’s wealth was up to government leaders. The days of a tamed monarchy, nonetheless, did not last long. Thanks to the royalist-​military coups and the revival of royal power in the late 1940s, the CPB was transferred from state management to crown control. The critical moment for the crown was the enactment of the Crown Property Act 1948, which was passed by the royalist-​military government. According to the act, although the Minister of Finance continued to serve as a chairman the CPB, its board of directors were appointed by the monarch. The act also stated that how the income and resources of the CPB were used was ‘up to the king’s pleasure’. In spite of being transferred from the government to the crown, the act still allowed the CPB to be untaxed. Most important, the act positioned the CPB as an ambiguous institution in the kingdom. It was legally protected like a state enterprise while relentlessly accumulating wealth like a private company. Since the ratification of the 1948 act, the CPB has faced legal disputes with private citizens on several occasions, and the Council of State persistently provided unclear verdicts regarding the status of the CPB. On four different occasions the Council defined the CPB differently. It was categorised as a private company in 1975, a government department in 1990, a state enterprise in 1993 and ‘a unit of the state’ in 2001 (Jeamteerasakul, 2006). Under the reign of Rama IX, the confusing status of the CPB benefited the crown. While the CPB was considered by Forbes as a private company serving only the interests of the monarchy, it was promoted by the palace as a state enterprise promoting the common interests of the nation. According to the palace, the prosperity of the CPB should not be questioned. Rather, it should be welcomed by all Thais since it was the wealth of the Thai nation, not a personal fortune of the monarch. This royal justification had dominated the kingdom and kept Rama IX –​despite being crowned the world’s wealthiest monarch by foreign observers –​mostly free from criticism by his subjects. 114

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However, what was ambiguous about the CPB became clear when the new reign began; the wealthy bureau belongs to and serves only His Majesty. In the first year of Rama X’s reign, the junta government terminated the 1948 act and announced the Crown Property Act 2017. According to this act, all royal assets would be transferred to the full ownership of the king, and the management and investment of those assets would be used at ‘the king’s pleasure’. Those assets include not only land, stocks and enterprises that the CPB has managed for decades but also palaces and royal residences, a type of property that used to be categorised as national treasures under the previous act. In this regard, national properties that once belonged to the common citizenry were taken over by the crown. The 2017 act also excludes a finance minister from serving on the board of directors, and thus the government no longer has any role in the management of the CPB. Instead, the monarch holds the authority to choose members for the board as he pleases. His close associate, Air Chief Marshal Satitpong Sukvimol, was handpicked by the king for the post of CPB director, replacing Chirayu Isarangkun Na Ayuthaya, who led the bureau and served Rama IX for three decades. After the act was ratified, the CPB announced that its stocks in the SCB and SCG were completely transferred to the monarch’s personal control. According to the CPB, this move was initiated by Rama X because the monarch ‘would like to take the burden of taking care of the bureau’s businesses by himself and make sure that the businesses will sustainably operate and develop for Thailand’s benefit’. The CPB also stated that Rama X recognised the untaxed status of the bureau as problematic, and, as he took full control of it, the monarch proposed that the CPB ‘must follow the laws regarding taxation and it must carry the burden of paying taxes, as ordinary people do’ (BBC, 2018). Furthermore, in the second year of Rama X’s reign, the Crown Property Act 2018 was promulgated. The latest act retains much of the 2017 act but adds the authority of the monarch to settle any legal dispute about the crown’s assets. ‘Any dispute over what[ever] assets are considered the Crown Property under the royal ancient traditions’, the 2018 act states, ‘must be referred to His Majesty’s judgment’. In other words, the act allows the king to have the final say in any dispute about royal wealth. Taking full control of the CPB, Rama X instantly became a major stockholder in the SCG and SCB, among the biggest conglomerates in Southeast Asia. On top of that, with the CPB’s lands under his control, the king is one of the biggest landlords in the kingdom. Thanks to these valuable properties, Rama X is indisputably the world’s richest monarch and one of the wealthiest men on earth. According to Kevin Hewison (2019: 3), the monarch’s fortune in 2019 could be around US$70 billion, and ‘clearly, the royal family would be ranked at the pinnacle of Thailand’s richest lists’. If Rama X were included among the ranks of the world’s richest (non-​royal) billionaires in 2019, he would have finished in fourth place after giant magnates like Jeff Bezos, Bill Gates and Warren Buffett but standing above members of affluent capitalists in America such as Larry Ellison, Mark Zuckerberg and the Koch brothers. Inside the kingdom, Rama X 115

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outranked the richest members of the Thai bourgeoisie, Dhanin Chearavanont of CP, and Charoen Sirivadhanabhakdi of ThaiBev, whose total personal assets in 2019 were US$15.2 billion and US$14.5 billion respectively (Forbes, 2019a). What is outstanding about the consolidation of royal wealth during the early years of Rama X’s time on the throne is how the crown used legal means to legitimise its move. In contrast to his reputation as an arbitrary, careless and irrational person, the new monarch solidified royal wealth and reorganised the CPB through state acts. Despite being promulgated under the junta regime, those acts were passed in the parliament. Once the acts were promulgated in the royal gazette, the monarch had the political legitimacy and legal authority to do as he pleased with what is claimed now as the crown’s property. In this regard, far from using brute force and secret plans as people predicted, Rama X used a legal, official and state-​authorised approach to take control of the royal wealth. As was the case in the former reign, the massive wealth of the new monarch is at odds with public policies promoted by the constitution, the development plan and the government. While those policies aim to reduce a gap between the rich and the poor, the monarchy actively accumulates capital in the market. As the monarch aggressively consolidates his grip on royal wealth, the gap between him, the richest royal on earth, and his subjects keeps expanding. While policy makers promote the SEP as a model for the kingdom’s development, the crown’s assets are far from moderate and sustainable. Head and shoulder above other monarchies, the Thai crown is in the same league with the world’s wealthiest conglomerates when it comes to capital accumulation and concentration. While the condition of life among the poor and the underprivileged in the kingdom needs to be improved by the government, the welfare of royalty tells a different story. With the CPB as their money-​making machine, they live life larger than their compatriots by far. In normal circumstances of democratic development, it would be natural to turn Thailand’s CPB into a sovereign wealth fund fully controlled by the government, like countries such as Norway, Australia, China, Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea. The consolidation of royal power In addition to wealth, the monarchy under Rama X’s early reign has accumulated and consolidated political power. Significantly, this royal move led to several institutional changes in the state apparatus, changes that make the Thai state incompatible with what Max Weber described as a modern state. According to Weber (1958: 196–​198), key characteristics of a modern bureaucracy are a well-​ defined and legally-​rationally based hierarchical subordination, scope of authority, impersonal relationship and specialisation. Weber’s ideal type of bureaucracy also includes a clear separation between private and public spheres that prevents a conflict of interest, and the assignment and distribution of official duties in a fixed and stable way. He added that the modern ‘civil service separates the bureau from the private domicile of the official’, and ‘official activity’ is thus 116

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‘distinct from the sphere of private life’ (Weber, 1958: 197). These distinctive features, for Weber, serve effective, predictable, accountable and consistent public administration. Ideally, a modern bureaucratic system goes against the notion of abusing public position for private personal gains, known as corruption, and against overlapping authorities among bureaucratic units. As a result, Weber pointed out, the process of promotion, demotion or removal from office should take place in accordance with formal written rules rather than emotional bias or personal related reasons of the superior. Each unit and each civil servant are supposed to be aware of to which chain of command they belong. If there is a case of demotion or removal, the action should go through investigative and appeal procedures before any final decision is made. The latter process resonates with the principle of transparency and accountability within an organisation. For Weber, a state institution, a bureaucracy or even a non-​state organisation is considered modern only when it acquires those characteristics. Under Rama X’s reign, the kingdom is diverging from the Weberian path. Thanks to the active role of the crown in the bureaucracy, chains of command become obscured, official duties become unmoored, and the distinction between public and private spheres is blurred. During the first three years under the new reign, the government passed several laws that created new ranks and new bureaucratic units under the direct command of the king. These transformations contradict the kingdom’s public policies, especially decentralisation, transparency and anti-​cronyism. The most important case that shows how the crown is flexing its muscle in the bureaucracy is the establishment of the RA in 2017. With the RA, Rama X suddenly gained personal power and control over a large part of budget as well as over human resources. Founded through the Royal Service Decree 2017, the RA alters the status, scopes of duties and the hierarchy of power within Thailand’s bureaucratic system. That is, many state officials who used to be civil servants (kharatchakan) have now legally obtained a new status –​they become ‘the king’s servants’ (kharatchakan nai phra-​ong). Moreover, the appointment, promotion or dismissal of these royal servants is done at the monarch’s pleasure. In the earliest years of Rama X’s reign, the palace frequently publicised one-​ or-​two-​page royal announcements concerning its servants’ behaviours. In the announcements, while some servants, including those who had had personal connections to the king, were rapidly moved up the ladder, some were suddenly removed from office without due process of law and away from public scrutiny. This obscurity is due to the nature of the RA, a new bureau created to be responsible to nobody but His Majesty. According to the Royal Service Decree 2017, the RA comprises of three major units: the Office of the Privy Council, the Bureau of the Royal Household (BRH) and the Royal Security Command. The RA’s main task, the decree asserts, is ‘to perform royal service missions for the Monarch and members of the royal family at the royal pleasure, and they shall be directly subject to the Monarch’. From the outset, the decree differentiates between state bureaucrats and royal bureaucrats, who serve in the RA. The latter can be promoted, demoted 117

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or removed from positions at the monarch’s pleasure (Royal Service Decree 2017, article 10; see also Tulathon, 2017: 112). It is important to note that most of these royal bureaucrats already had government experience as they used to be state officials affiliated with other government bureaus. In other words, the creation of the RA led to an extraordinary empowerment of the monarch at the expense of state institutions. Gone under the new reign, therefore, were several executive agencies and military units previously run by bureaucratic leaders. The establishment of the RA has reshaped Thailand’s bureaucracy in several ways. Under the new reign, the Office of His Majesty’s Principal Private Secretary (OHM), a bureau that was responsible for arranging daily activities of every member of the royal family, was abolished. In the former reign, the OHM used to be under the administration of the Prime Minister’s Office. So did the BRH, which still exists but is now under His Majesty’s control. According to the 2017 decree, the BRH is commissioned with a duty concerning ‘the custody of the property of the Monarch and other affairs at the royal pleasure’ (Royal Service Decree 2017, article 6). In any case, both duties of the OHM and the BRH, previously administered by the Prime Minister’s Office, have now been transferred to the RA, and the king can directly manage them as he pleases. In the same fashion, under the 2017 decree the RA is authorised to incorporate some security bureaus into a new unit, the Royal Security Command. Those bureaus are the Royal Guard Command, the Royal Aide-​de-​Camp Department and the Royal Court Security Police. While the former two bureaus previously belonged to the ministry of defence, the latter was part of the police department. Moreover, on 30 September 2019, the government issued an emergency decree transferring two army units –​the 1st and 11th Infantry Regiments –​to the direct command of the palace (Royal Agencies Act 2019). They became royal units within the Royal Security Command. The decree was later approved by the parliament. Again, this incident shows how many state officers, in this case army and police forces, have been transformed into the king’s servants. More important, it also reflects an unequal relationship between the monarchy and the military. Far from being tamed by the military, the monarch seemingly occupies the dominant position, being able to make organisational changes within the army, intervene in its affairs and take over its resources as he likes. These institutional changes were taken to the extreme as the monarch decided to get involved even in the military’s daily functioning. For instance, in 2017 the military was ordered by the palace to implement a new salute to the king, a stricter new dress code and a new shorter haircut which are modelled after those employed by the king’s bodyguards (Reuters, 2019). The monarchy’s active role in shaping state institutions has also affected the police. On 30 September 2019, 873 police officers needed to report for special training to qualify as royal guards (Marshall, 2019; Royal Thai Police, 2019). Afterwards, some of the officers reported as ordered but stated that they were not ready to join the training. Consequently, the police issued another order that sent these disorderly officers to the training centre in the southern Yala province 118

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to ‘discipline themselves’ (see Marshall, 2019). All these cases show how the new king has tried to put himself in a superior position above the military and the police. The transfers of both soldiers and police officers to the RA happened without consent from the parliament, the heads of the army and the police, or those officers individually. As some have observed, these developments might be a sign that the monarch wants to create his own private squad in the palace (Asia Sentinel, 2019). What significantly marks the difference between being a state bureaucrat/​ civil servant and a royal bureaucrat/​royal servant can be summed up in one phrase, ‘at the royal pleasure’, which is used ubiquitously in the RA decree. While the former’s career path depends on his or her performance evaluated through examinations or formal assessment, years of work and partly judgements of those in command, the latter depends solely on His Majesty’s judgement. So far, there are no formal written rules regarding chains of command, a career path, evaluative process, or check-​and-​balance mechanisms within the RA, let alone the rights and welfare of those officers within this bureau. As the decree states, ‘the requirement that any royal officer, save a royal officer holding a position of Privy Councillor, perform works at any royal agency and hold any position, as well as the transfer, removal, and vacation of position, shall be at the royal pleasure’ (Royal Service Decree 2017, article 13). As a result, after the founding of the RA, several RA staff members were stripped of their ranks and removed from offices without due legal process. For example, on 5 December 2018, a soldier who served under the RA was stripped of his rank because he was allegedly ‘lazy and negligent’ of his duty (Dismissal of Royal Army Servant Announcement, 2018). On 1 March 2019, another soldier was dismissed by the RA because he, despite having a child and wife, allegedly ‘had an affair with another woman who was legally married to another man’. Therefore, he was a homewrecker and tarnished the crown’s reputation (Dismissal of Royal Army Servant Announcement, 2019a). Likewise, on 29 October 2019, two royal bedroom guards were dismissed since they allegedly committed adultery (Dismissal of Royal Civil Servants Announcement, 2019). Although names of the accused are made public, there has been no channel for them to make a defence, appeal or objection. The Thai media merely reported those royal announcements without making any further investigation. These controversial cases of the crown’s actions hence quietly faded away with no public attention. The most notorious case surrounding the RA was Rama X’s grant of royal ranks to his latest concubine. On the king’s 67th birthday, 28 July 2019, the monarch appointed a 34-​year-​old former nurse, Sineenat Wongvajirapakdi, as ‘Chao Khun Phra’ or noble consort. This rank had never been granted to anyone since the end of an absolute monarchy in 1932. According to the Appointment of Consort Announcement 2019, Sineenat, an RA staff member, had served the king well, tremendously lightened His Majesty’s burdens and gained royal trust; therefore, she deserved to be appointed as the noble consort. However, it was unclear where this position is ranked within Thailand’s royal hierarchy of power. 119

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Also, the reintroduction of the noble consort raised some questions concerning rules of conduct and freedom of expression. For example, many subjects in the kingdom might wonder whether the royal language should be applied to the consort. If so, since the royal language in Thailand is extremely hierarchised, ranging from words that are used exclusively to address the monarch to those that are applied to his distant descendants, it was legitimate to wonder what kind of royal language should be applied to her. Furthermore, Thailand has long been criticised by the global community because the kingdom enforces the lèse majesté law harshly on its subjects. According to the Criminal Code (article 112), any subject who ‘defames, insults or threatens the King, the Queen, the Heir-​apparent or the Regent’ can face between 3 and 15 years of imprisonment. Given the ambiguous status of the king’s consort, it is unclear if this draconian law also applies to protect Sineenat. Like a roller coaster, Sineenat’s story has been full of dramatic turns. Her story is a good example of how an RA official could be rapidly promoted, removed from and reappointed to the royal bureau without due process of law and away from public scrutiny. With Rama X’s strong support, Sineenat had been on the fast track when she started her career as a military official in 2008. As Somsak Jeamteerasakul (2017a) noted, the record shows that Sineenat was promoted from lieutenant and became a colonel in December 2016. This promotion took place within only two years, from 2014 to 2016. It was an outstandingly great leap upward within a very short period. Somsak also pointed out that Sineenat’s rise in the military hierarchy is especially remarkable when her ascension is compared with the case of General Prem Tinsulanonda. While it took two decades for Prem, a veteran, royalist and charismatic soldier, to climb up from captain to colonel, Sineenat received the latter rank when she was only 31 years old. By the time she obtained the rank of noble consort in 2019, Sineenat had become a Major General. Just three months after being conferred a royal consort, nonetheless, the prospects of Sineenat suddenly declined. On 21 October 2019, the royal gazette issued the Dismissal of Royal Army Servant Announcement (2019b). It states that consort Sineenat was stripped of her military and royal ranks because of her seditious acts against the monarchy and the Thai nation. Written in details about her wrongdoings with strong language, the announcement accuses Sineenat of her several subversive acts. Those include ambitiously wishing to elevate herself to be a queen, undermining and violating the king’s and queen’s power, abusing her position to expand influence and popularity, being ungrateful to the king and causing faction among the king’s servants. The two-​page announcement was the only official document that provides any testimony about this former consort. After the announcement, Sineenat not only disappeared from the Thai royal news but was also deprived of her voice. It took almost a year for Sineenat to appear in the media again, which happened when she was reappointed to a royal consort. On 29 August 2020, the royal gazette issued the Appointment of Royal Ranks and Decorations Announcement 120

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2020, declaring that Sineenat was found ‘untainted’ and thus regained all her ranks and titles. Rising like a phoenix from the ashes, Sineenat returned to public spotlight, attending events and rituals alongside the king and other royal family members including the queen. Despite Sineenat’s exquisite appearance and happy face shown in the media, one cannot easily conclude that this is a happy ending for her fairytale-​like story. As a royal servant, her right to due process of law was subsumed under the unaccountable and arbitrary power of the king. It is important to note that the king’s dismissal and reappointment of his consort was not illegal. Instead, it was justified because of the Royal Service Decree 2017. In short, several institutional changes have been taking place under the new reign. These gradual transformations introduced into the kingdom new ranks, new types of state officials, new positions and new agencies, all of which have scopes of authority that overlap with, if not dominate, existing government offices. Therefore, far from being scrutinised, downsized or undermined, the post-​Rama IX monarchy, as the case of the RA illustrates, appears to be the kingdom’s most powerful institution unchecked by the military, the parliament and the media. The RA is heading towards a different path from that which policy makers plan for the kingdom: the end of corruption, cronyism and nepotism. The emergence of the RA can be read as the monarch’s attempt to centralise and directly control not only his own affairs, royal officers and properties, but also those of the royal family (Jeamteerasakul, 2017b). Notably, this attempt has been made formally through legislative processes and promulgation of laws; therefore, it can be considered as one among the kingdom’s exceptional policies, diverging from Thai meta-​policies and defying any mandates that are nominally enshrined in the constitution and the development plan. The royal enclosure of common spaces Along with wealth, power and human forces, land has become another target of the monarchy’s accumulation. During the first three years of Rama X’s time on the throne, there were significant changes in the status of land estates, mostly in Bangkok. These lands used to be partially or fully public spaces which anyone could access, but they have now obtained an ambiguous status under the new reign. Without warning, some sites have been enclosed and made inaccessible to outsiders, while some remain accessible but with additional restrictions imposed upon visitors. Both cases, however, went through a similar status change. That is, they are de jure and de facto transformed into royally enclosed lands, the private properties that are used at the royal pleasure. The monarchy’s dispossession of common spaces can be illustrated through two controversial cases: the enclosure and restriction of historic tourist attractions in the Dusit district, and the transformation of lands that formerly belonged to the 1st and 11th Infantry Regiments into royal estates. The first case is the most significant. It has social, cultural and historical impact in the kingdom. Encompassing the famous old city zones alongside the Chao Phraya River, the 121

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Dusit district attracts millions of Thai and foreign visitors. Legally, a vast amount of land in this district was owned and managed by the CPB and BRH. In the former reign, however, the palace did not use them for royally private purposes. Instead, the crown allowed those lands to be used for the public good. Some were preserved as historic sites such as the Dusit Zoo and Vimanmek Mansion. These were popular tourist attractions which visitors could enter daily. Some were operated as educational institutions such as Suan Sunandha Rajabhat University and Suan Dusit University. Although these lands were in Bangkok, the most expensive area of the kingdom, the CPB leased them at a rate that was lower than the market price. During the new reign, unfortunately, the crown changed its land management policy: those famous sites were closed, and the leaseholds were terminated. On 31 August 2018, the Dusit Zoo, the first zoo of the kingdom, was closed for good. The zoo was located nearby many famous Bangkok sites such as the statue of Rama V, the Old Parliament House and the Vimanmek Mansion. The zoo had been a property of the BRH for a century and was a resting park for royalty under the reigns of Rama V and Rama VI. After that, Rama VII improved the conditions of the park and opened it to the public. In 1938, six years after the end of Thai absolutism, the park was eventually transformed into a zoo, which was easily accessed by Bangkok inhabitants (Prachatai, 2018). Eighty years later, the zoo’s administration declared that it would move to Pathum Thani province where up to 1,000 animals would enjoy more spacious environments. The new location covers 118 acres of land granted by the new monarch. The new zoo, however, has still been under construction. As the old zoo was abruptly closed without proper preparation, it was reported that a thousand animals, for the time being, were separately distributed to many different temporary shelters around the kingdom (Bangkok Post, 2018b). Located next to the Dusit Zoo is the Vimanmek Mansion. Built in 1900, the Victorian-​style royal mansion was constructed entirely with golden teak. Formerly Rama V’s residence, it was transformed into a museum, which had welcomed millions of visitors since 1985. The place embraced a nostalgic atmosphere of the royal past where visitors could walk through a hallway, appreciating the king’s reception hall, dining room and bedroom. Once a popular tourist attraction, the mansion, however, has been closed since 21 July 2016. The BBC reported that there would be a reconstruction project, to be conducted by the Department of Public Works and Towns and Country Planning. The department entered a contract with the Stonehenge Limited Company, which was scheduled to carry out the project from 27 September 2018 to 26 September 2019. When the scheduled completion date passed, the BBC contacted the company but received no response. On the other hand, an official in the OHM insisted, in July 2019, that the mansion would be ‘rebuilt exactly as it was’. Despite many uncertainties surrounding the renovation of the mansion, there is one aspect that is certain about this historic site. Like the Dusit Zoo, the mansion virtually entered a twilight zone in the kingdom. It was no longer publicly accessible, and people 122

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had no idea whether it would be reopened. The BBC theorised that the mansion will likely be restored but will be turned into a royal residence (BBC, 2019b). Like the Vimanmek Mansion, other historic sites such as the Ananta Samakhom Throne Hall, the equestrian statue of Rama V and the People’s Party’s plaque faced a similar situation under the new reign. Located opposite the Dusit Zoo, the Throne Hall was a grand European-​style reception hall that was used by royalty in the age of absolutism. After the absolute monarchy was overthrown, it was used as the kingdom’s first parliament house. Later it served as a museum, exhibiting arts and handicrafts, and as a reception hall welcoming guests of the state. Open to the public for decades, the hall, nonetheless, was closed on 1 October 2017. The media only reported that the hall would be under reconstruction, but they did not provide any information about an exact reopening date (Thairath, 2017). In front of the hall, there is a large field called the Royal Plaza where visitors, mostly Thais, could pay homage to two iconic historic entities, Rama V and the People’s Party. While the former was the great absolutist monarch of the kingdom, the latter was the political force that ended Thai absolutism and established a constitutional monarchy. For decades, the equestrian statue of Rama V was located side by side with the People’s Party plaque, a round brass plate fixed on the ground. Erected on 11 November 1908, the statue was a popular site for royalist Thais, who often came to offer flowers and pay respect to the great king. The devotees believed that Rama V’s divinity would bring ‘wealth and good luck’ to them (Jackson, 2010: 44–​45). Embodying anti-​royalist ideology, the plaque, on the other hand, was made in 1936 to salute the historic moment when the People’s Party declared the end of the absolute monarchy. It is engraved with the following sentence: ‘In the dawn of June 24, 1932, at this place, the People’s Party bore the constitution for the sake of national prosperity.’ Annually, on 24 June, political activists used to visit the memorial plaque to show admiration towards the revolutionary group (see Prakitnonthakan, 2013; Chotpradit, 2016). Under the new reign, the Royal Plaza has undergone significant changes. Although the statue of Rama V remains, it has been restrictively fenced in. Worshippers of Rama V can only access a limited area in front of the statue, where they are allowed to kneel and pay respect to the absolute king. Meanwhile, the People’s Party plaque mysteriously disappeared in early April 2017. Oddly, it was substituted by a new plaque, which reads, ‘May Siam prosper forever [with] happy fresh-​faced citizens as the force of the nation’, and ‘Respect and loyalty to the Buddhist Triple Gems [and] to one’s family clan and being honest toward one’s King are tools for making the state prosper’ (Lorwattanatrakul, 2019). Put simply, the new plaque appears to promote royalism and Buddhism, which are crucial parts of Thai nationalism in a traditional sense. Apart from enclosing the public spaces, this incident has political implications. Several scholars see it as the establishment’s attempt to erase the People’s Party and its anti-​absolutist legacy from Thailand’s public memory. In the words of Kongpop Arrerat (2017), the removal of the plaque signifies ‘killing the spectre of [Thai] democracy’. 123

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The second case of royal dispossession of common spaces is the transfer of some estates from the military’s management to the monarchy’s control. Thanks to the Royal Agencies Act 2019, the 1st and 11th Infantry Regiments are now under the control of the Royal Security Command. The act not only implies royal domination over military forces but also royal control over military estates. For instance, since early 2019 the 1st Infantry Regiment has increasingly tightened security and public accessibility. For decades, every morning and evening, residents who lived nearby often visited the regiment’s recreation areas to exercise, thanks to its abundant greenery. Now, at every entrance of the regiment, there are signs declaring that this is a ‘royal estate zone’ (khet phraratchathan). All vehicles are ordered to slow down and lower the car windows. The same restriction applies to the Royal Thai Army Club and the Thai Army Sports Stadium, which are located nearby the regiment. These two sites are owned by the army. As the headquarters of the Thai Army United FC, the stadium held several football matches and could seat up to 20,000 spectators. Moreover, it also hosted international concerts with artists such as David Bowie and Phil Collins. Daily, the stadium was open for athletes and citizens of any age. Amateur joggers, cyclists or dog walkers could also exercise outside the stadium. Since late 2019, however, this stadium has been closed indefinitely, and the football club needs to find a new home arena (Football Tribe, 2019). At the entrance, there is also a sign announcing that the club and stadium areas are parts of the royal estate zone. Those two controversial cases that occurred in the early years of Rama X’s reign can be explained by Marxist concepts of primitive accumulation and accumulation by dispossession. According to Karl Marx (1990: 895), capitalist exploitation begins with ‘primitive accumulation’ or the violent ‘theft of common land’. At the dawn of capitalism, land which used to be communal property was usurped and transformed into private estates for profit-​making and wealth accumulation. This resulted in the expulsion of the population, deprivation of the means of production and proletarianisation. Force and legal means also played an important role. As Marx pointed out, ‘the parliamentary form of the robbery is that of “Bills for Inclosure of Commons” ’ (1990: 885). Nowadays, under late-​capitalism or neoliberalism, David Harvey argued that primitive accumulation, or what he calls ‘accumulation by dispossession’, exists and serves to reproduce an exploitative economic system (Harvey, 2003). Likewise, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2009: viii) point out that under the capitalist system, the poor multitudes have been deprived of common goods. As they argue, ‘the common’ –​including ‘the air, the water, the fruits of the soil, and all nature’s bounty’ which the public could enjoy and share –​have been destroyed, stolen and commodified for private gain. Applying these notions to the Thai case, we can see the big picture of what happens under the new reign. The transformation of public historic sites in the Dusit district and the enclosure of many recreation and sport areas –​these are parts of a recent development in the kingdom. It is the royal accumulation of land that deprives public goods from the multitudes of Thai commoners. 124

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Table 6.1: Enclosure of public land during 2016–​2019 Sites

Closing dates or dates when the sites became (partially or fully) inaccessible/​non-​public spaces

Vimanmek Mansion

21 July 2016

People Party’s plaque

1–​8 April 2017

Anata Samakhom Hall

1 October 2017

Dusit Zoo

31 August 2018

1st and 11th Infantry Regiments of Thai Royal Army

17 October 2019

Note: Data collected from various acts, decrees and news reports

Land inequality and the lack of public common spaces have long been critical problems in Thailand. Aiming to create a just society, policy makers, as expressed in the development plan, see land redistribution as their priority. It is common for critics and the media to hold big corporates responsible for land enclosure and monopoly, especially when these incidents impact local communities and environments. However, another type of land enclosure is taking place in the post-​Rama IX era. Table 6.1 sums up the royal accumulation of lands under the new reign, showing that the accumulation gives Rama X several estates and thus makes him, an already land-​rich holder, even richer. Left unnoticed and uncriticised, these incidents gradually unfold without any overt oppositional movement. It remains unclear what those enclosed sites will be transformed into in the future. For the time being, however, they are parts of the royal estate zone and, legally, they can be used at the king’s pleasure. The increase of government allocations to the monarchy Even though the Thai monarchy is the world’s richest crown, government budgets are annually allocated to support the expenses of members of the royal family as they perform royal duties and ceremonies. As Table 6.2 shows, budgets of the monarchy escalated during Rama IX’s reign. In 1960 the palace received approximately US$2 million. These budgets were provided to the BRH and the OHM, the royal bureaus that managed daily activities of the royal family and maintained palaces. Five decades later, the crown was given almost US$200 million. Those massive budgets were funded by the government to support not only those two bureaus but also royalty’s other activities that thrived in the later years of Rama IX’s reign. Those included travelling inside and outside the kingdom, hosting guests of the state and initiating development projects. The latter activity was administrated by the Office of the Royal Development Project Board (ORDPB), and this bureau was also fully funded by the government (see Chitbundid, 2011). In this regard, the trajectory was clear when Rama IX was still on the throne: the longer his reign continued, the more the state provided budgets to the monarchy. This phenomenon could be credited to several factors 125

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Table 6.2: Annual budgets of the monarchy, 1960–​2010 (millions of baht and millions of US dollars) 1960

1970

1980

1990

2000

2010

BRH

40.3 (US$1.9)

46 (US$2.2)

141 (US$6.8)

450.4 (US$17.5)

1,028.30 (US$27.2)

2,578 (US$77)

OHM

0.6 (US$0.03)

1.6 (US$0.07)

7.8 (US$0.38)

14.6 (US$0.56)

251.2 (US$6.6)

1,190 (US$35.7)

Travelling and hosting

—​

12.5 (US$0.6)

16 (US$0.78)

40 (US$1.5)

200 (US$5.3)

500 (US$15)

Development projects

—​

—​

—​

—​

2,000 (US$53)

2,300 (US$69)

ORDPB

—​

—​

—​

—​

—​

83 (US$2.5)

Total

40.9 (US$1.93)

60.1 (US$2.8)

164.8 (US$7.9)

505 (US$19.5)

3,479.50 (US$92.1)

6,651 (US$199.2)

Note: Data adapted from National Statistical Office of Thailand, various years

such as the revival of royal power under Rama IX’s reign, the longevity of his reign, the popularity of the monarch himself and the thousands of royal projects initiated by the late king. When Rama IX passed away, however, it might have been reasonable to assume that the monarchy would no longer be so munificently sponsored as it had been in the previous decades. Rama X has just begun his reign, he was deemed unfit to fill his father’s shoes and he did not hold the popular status in Thai society that his father did. Worse than that, compared with other members of the royal family, he did not have his own philanthropic organisations and development projects that could justify a large government budget. In this regard, it might be supposed that the new king would tighten his belt. Gone with the former reign, seemingly, were the days when the crown could devour excessive budgets from the state. Nonetheless, against all odds, the monarchy under the new reign not only retains massive funding from the government, but the crown also receives state budgets more than those in the former reign. As Table 6.3 reveals, although the monarchy in 2016, the last year of Rama IX’s reign, already secured the substantial budget of US$226 million, the new reign has seen larger funds allocated to the crown, and they are escalating each year. Especially after Rama X restructured the royal bureaus and founded the RA, the budgets for the crown have skyrocketed from US$227.5 million in 2017 to nearly US$400 million in 2020. In other words, in just three years after the new reign began, state financing of the monarchy has doubled. In addition to those multimillion-​dollar funds allocated to support the monarchy’s institutional routines and development projects, there is another type of state budget billed to the promotion of the royalist ideology under the new reign. Since 2017, many state departments have foregone a substantial part of their budgets to fund a national policy called ‘strengthening the nation’s principal 126

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Table 6.3: Annual budgets of the monarchy, 2016–​2020 (millions of baht and millions of US dollars) 2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

BRH

3,435.4 (US$95.2)

3,492.3 (US$97.5)

—​

—​

—​

OHM

641.7 (US$17.8)

544.8 (US$15.2)

—​

—​

—​

Travelling and hosting

900 (US$24.9)

900 (US$25.1)

900 (US$27.5)

1,000 (US$30.9)

1,000 (US$33.1)

Development projects

2,500 (US$69.3)

2,500 (US$69.8)

2,500 (US$76.6)

2,500 (US$77.2)

2,500 (US$82.8)

ORDPB

678.4 (US$18.8)

715.6 (US$19.9)

712.1 (US$21.8)

780.3 (US$24.1)

846.6 (US$28)

RA

—​

—​

4196.3 (US$128.6)

6800 (US$210.1)

7,685.2 (US$254.7)

Total

8,155.5 (US$226)

8,152.7 (US$227.5)

8,308.4 (US$254.5)

11,080.3 (US$342.2)

12,031.8 (US$398.6)

Note: Data adapted from National Statistical Office of Thailand, various years

institutions’ (soemsang khwam mankhong khong sathaban lak khong chat). According to the government, although those ‘principal institutions’ include the nation, religion and people, the most important institution is undoubtedly the monarchy (Chan-​o-​Cha, 2019). As a result, several departments have funded public campaigns that aim to raise the people’s reverence of, allegiance to and loyalty towards the crown. Taking place in local communities throughout the kingdom, those campaigns include changing curriculums to emphasise the revered status of the monarchy; publishing official handbooks which reveal the ‘truth and facts’ about the monarchy to children and teenagers; promoting royal projects and the SEP nationwide; and encouraging local vigilantism that aims to protect the monarchy from those who dare to defame, insult or threaten the monarch and other members of the royal family (Prime Minister’s Office, 2015). As Table 6.4 shows, state departments that participate in this policy are the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of the Interior, the Ministry of Labour, the Prime Minister’s Office and the police. Starting with a total budget of US$40.5 million in 2017, this policy received the massive amount of US$177.2 million three years later. With the enormous budgets funding both its routine maintenance and its ideological indoctrination, the crown, which was already rich and well sponsored under the former reign, gets richer as the new reign continues. While policy makers promise the people that there will be a more redistributive fiscal policy that effectively favours the low-​income population, the way that state finance is managed tells a different story. Multimillion-​dollar budgets from the government are disproportionately offered to the palace.

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Table 6.4: Annual budgets for ‘strengthening the nation’s principal institutions’, 2017–​2020 (millions of baht and millions of US dollars) 2017

2018

2019

2020

Ministry of Defence

159.9 (US$4.4)

164 (US$5)

459.6 (US$14.2)

511.3 (US$16.9)

Ministry of Interior

1,269.7 (US$35.4)

3,832.1 (US$117.4)

4,852.5 (US$149.9)

2,420 (US$80.2)

Ministry of Labour

27.9 (US$0.7)

5 (US$0.1)

5 (US$0.1)

—​

Prime Minister’s Office

—​

—​

333.7 (US$10.3)

443.9 (US$14.7)

Police

—​

—​

—​

1,975.7 (US$65.4)

Total

1,457.5 (US$40.5)

4,001.1 (US$122.1)

5,650.8 (US$174.5)

5,350.9 (US$177.2)

Note: Data adapted from National Statistical Office of Thailand, various years

Royal intervention in national politics Unlike his late father, Rama X seems to lack experience, charisma and power in national politics. On top of that, his notorious reputation as a crown prince might not make him a popular monarch among his subjects. As a result, it was expected that Rama X would keep a low profile on the national stage and stay away from any political action that could harm his reputation even further. Also, he was expected to play second fiddle to the junta leaders, as the latter had ruled the kingdom since the final years of the former reign and smoothed the way for the royal succession. Against all expectations, Rama X has shown the public that he does not shy away from, but actively intervenes in, national politics, especially when royal interests are on the line. A few months after his ascent to the throne, the junta leaders asked the new monarch to sign off on the latest constitution. Drafted by the military to prolong its rule, it was approved by national referendum in 2016. Unexpectedly, Rama X vetoed and demanded the junta to revise those parts of the charter of which he disapproved (Streckfuss, 2017). Two of them are associated with royal prerogatives. First, while the draft required that the monarch must appoint a regent when he is away from the kingdom or unable to perform his duties, Rama X asserted that it is up to the monarch himself whether to appoint a regent to represent him pro tempore. Frequently visiting his luxury villa in Munich, Rama X could take advantage of this revision by reigning from the German republic instead of from his Thai kingdom. Another section in the draft of which Rama X disapproved is related to the role of the monarchy to resolve a constitutional crisis. With an assumption that the new monarch would lack leadership and political skills, the junta drafted a constitution that transferred the power to resolve a constitutional crisis, which included the right to dissolve the parliament and the right to appoint an interim prime minister, 128

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from the crown to the constitutional court and the parliament. Rama X, however, disapproved of this draft and reclaimed the royal prerogatives in a constitutional crisis. After the junta complied with the royal demands, the king finally approved and signed off the 2017 Constitution, the first charter under his reign. In early 2019, as the kingdom held its first election since the 2014 coup, Rama X also made several moves that showed political solidarity with Prayut, who ran for prime minister as a candidate for the pro-​military Palang Pracharath Party. At the same time, those royal interventions showed the king’s disapproval of anti-​ military parties such as the Pheu Thai Party and Thai Raksa Chart Party. Both were closely linked with Thaksin Shinawatra and his sister Yingluck, the two former prime ministers who were toppled by the last two coups in Thailand. On 8 February 2019, Thai Raksa Chart nominated Rama X’s elder sister, Princess Ubol Ratana, as its candidate for prime minister. Within 24 hours of the nomination, the monarch issued a statement that condemned his sister’s bid and prohibited her from entering politics. ‘Involvement of a high-​ranking member of the royal family in politics, in whatever way’, Rama X said, ‘is considered an act that defies the nation’s traditions, customs and culture, and therefore is considered extremely inappropriate’ (BBC, 2019a). Just two weeks before the general election, the Constitutional Court followed the king’s disapproval of Thai Raksa Chart by ordering the dissolution of the party and by banning its leaders for a decade (Bangkok Post, 2018a). On 23 March, a day before the election, Rama X issued another statement that apparently discouraged voters from supporting Pheu Thai. In the statement, the king invoked his father’s famous speech that endorsed ‘good people’ (khon di) to rule the kingdom, while prohibiting ‘bad people’ (khon mai di) from coming to power. ‘In the country’, Rama IX once said, ‘there are both good and bad people’. As a result, the late monarch asserted, ‘to give the country normality and order is not about making everyone become good people, but it lies in supporting goodness, so that good people govern the country and restrain bad people from having power in order not to create confusion’ (Prachatai, 2019a). Although the king’s statement sounded neutral, the term good people, bad people is partisan in contemporary politics. While good people is usually used in favour of royalists, junta leaders and pro-​military parties, bad people is slanted against their opponents in the context of corruption, cronyism and abuse of power. In fact, the latter term has been frequently used to refer to Thaksin and his proxy parties. In the 2019 election specifically, Rama X’s reference to good people, bad people suggested that Thai voters must choose carefully in the ballots: good people were in Palang Pracharath, bad people in Pheu Thai. The election was a tight race. Although Pheu Thai emerged as the largest party with 136 seats and formed a seven-​party alliance soon after the election, it was unable to form a government. Meanwhile, although Palang Pracharath came second in the polls by winning 116 seats, it received the most votes, and it successfully formed a 19-​party coalition government led by Prayut. As an incumbent premier, Prayut was heavily criticised and there are claims that he 129

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used several political tactics to gain the upper hand in the election. Under the 2017 Constitution, the prime minister is chosen by the full parliament, which also includes 250 members of the Senate, instead of only members of the House as was done previously. As all the sitting senators were selected by the junta, they returned the favour by voting for Prayut (Prachatai, 2019b). Moreover, Palang Pracharath enjoyed not only support from government figures and agencies but also partisan gerrymandering under the new constitution (Bangkok Post, 2018c; The Nation, 2018a). Adding to this, Prayut was accused of using populist policies such as the ‘state welfare card’ (bat sawatdikan haeng rat) distribution to solicit support from voters (The Nation, 2018b). During the cabinet’s swearing-​in ceremony, Prayut made his premiership look worse, as he failed to recite the full text of the oath. Taking the oath in front of Rama X, Prayut left out a sentence that he would protect and abide by the constitution. For the opposition parties, this incomplete oath of allegiance rendered Prayut’s cabinet illegitimate and unfit to perform its duties. Seeing that Prayut was in the hot seat, Rama X intervened. Amid backlash towards the oath gaffe, the king gave messages to Prayut and his cabinet members individually. In those messages, which Prayut proudly presented to the press, Rama X did not mention the controversy surrounding Prayut’s incomplete oath. Instead, the monarch gave moral support to the government and urged it to be strong (Bangkok Post, 2019). Thanks to the king’s intervention, the oath-​taking saga practically came to an end. As Rama X made it clear that Prayut and his cabinets are all the king’s men, the opposition parties had to find other ways to challenge this royally endorsed government. As the early years of his reign reveal, Rama X had been active in national politics. The king’s political interventions show that the monarchy is far from neutral or being constrained by the supreme law of the kingdom. In fact, the monarch likes to play by his own rules and is not afraid to steer the crown away from constitutional monarchy. He commanded a rewriting of a constitutional draft that was already approved by a national referendum. He made public statements without any approval from the parliament. He showed his political position that encouraged the rule of junta leaders and pro-​military parties, while disapproving their opponents. In the latest election, the king was partisan. He persuaded voters to make a decision that followed the royal advice. In short, Rama X tends to do as he pleases in national politics. This active role of the monarchy that is not restrained by any law is at odds with what is written in the constitution. If the principles of the rule of law, good governance, transparency and accountability are not applied to the monarchy, they tend to be merely catchwords among policy makers.

Conclusion As discussed in this chapter, the Thai monarch’s role has not been restricted to merely symbolic and ritualistic realms. The royal power expands to political 130

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processes and economic activities. Duncan McCargo (2005) argued that the crown’s ‘moral check and balance on government’ manifests itself in instances of interference by the so-​called ‘network monarchy’ or ‘proxies’ including privy counsellors, state bureaucrats, leading businessmen and public intellectuals. Thongchai Winichakul (2014: 88) called this political system ‘democracy with the monarchy standing above politics’. Here ‘above politics’ means being ‘clean’, ‘incorruptible’, ‘superior to’ and exceptional from normal parliamentary politics. This type of power hence deviates from both the principles of popular sovereignty and those of the constitutional monarchy. In other words, the Thai crown possesses extra-​constitutional powers to advise, criticise and occasionally intervene in legislative bodies and public policies as well as in the state administration. As this chapter has shown, during the early years of the new reign, Rama X has been able to consolidate his immense wealth, strengthen his power over state officials including the military, and exert influence over parliamentary politics. In contrast to several apocalyptical views regarding post-​Rama IX Thailand, the transition took place quite smoothly without overt opposition from the old establishment, the military and the business elites. On the one hand, these developments imply characteristics that are more ruthless, arbitrary and centralised than those of the previous reign. To borrow McCargo’s framework, under Rama X’s reign, ‘network monarchy’ has been downsized and the king himself tends to exercise royal power in more direct and explicit fashions. On the other hand, it is also crucial to note that these transformations have taken the form of official announcements, state decrees and legal acts passed by the parliament. In other words, Rama X’s consolidation and personalisation of power and wealth have proceeded through formal and legally authorised channels. Above all, they have frequently been exempted from public scrutiny and thus should be considered as the kingdom’s exceptional policies reinforcing the above-​politics status of the monarchy. Often overlooked by policy analysts, these exceptional policies, nevertheless, have recently been brought to light by street protesters who demand a monarchy reform. Since early 2020, the anti-​government movement, composed primarily of urban secondary-​school and university students, has hit the bull’s-​eye and attacked the monarchy for its undemocratic political power and immense wealth. On August 2020, youth activists listed the ten demands of monarchy reform including the abolition of the Crown Property Act 2018, the RA and the lèse majesté law (Prachatai English, 2020). On the street, protesters broke anti-​royalist traditions and criticised the monarchy in an explicit manner. Popular slogans such as ‘I order you to be under the constitution’ and ‘I order you to be self-​sufficient’ illustrated Thailand’s latest wave of anti-​royalism (Manager, 2020). Despite being cracked down, charged, arrested and demoralised, the 2020 movement and protesters have created new possibilities in Thailand’s politics. Unlike policy makers and technocrats, the protesters realise that the crown’s recent moves run counter to and even impede the core values of sound public policy and national policies such as accountability, transparency, the rule of law, decentralisation, distributive justice and liberal democracy. Put concretely, 131

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many Thais today have started to pay more attention to contradictions between Thailand’s royally related policies and government meta-​policies nominally written on paper and promoted by the elites. Those contradictions, as this chapter reveals, include the juxtaposition of massive wealth of the CPB and the campaigning of the SEP; the monarch’s political interventions and electoral parliamentary politics; the RA directly controlled by the king and the principle of decentralisation; the appointment and demotion of state officials at royal pleasure and the rule of law; extravagant state expenses to support the monarchy and distributive justice; and the enclosure of public spaces and the idea of the public good. Although it can be argued that there is always a gap between idealist official plans and policies at the level of implementation, monarchy-​driven policies should not be seen as a problem of policy implementation. Indeed, they are central components that create and continue political instability, economic inequality, corruption, cronyism and underdevelopment in Thailand –​ all of the fundamental problems that policy makers want to solve in the first place. If only policy makers and policy and administration scholars could listen carefully to the angry voice of street protesters, they might have learned a lesson that has not been taught in any policy institute: unless these royally related exceptional policies are taken into account and opened for public discussion and criticism, other national plans and public policies striving for democratisation, equality and wealth distribution –​no matter how beautifully they are written and sound –​are unlikely to be achieved. Before His Majesty, they are humbled. References Akira, S. (1999) Capital Accumulation in Thailand 1855–​1 985, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books. Arrerat, K. (2017) ‘Killing the spectre of democracy: 1932 Revolution plaque removal’, Prachatai, 21 April, available from https://​pracha​tai.com/​engl​ish/​ node/​7090 Asia Sentinel (2019) ‘Thai king’s absolute reign’, Asia Sentinel, 9 October, available from https://​www.asias​enti​nel.com/​soci​ety/​thail​and-​king-​absol​ute-​reign/​ Bangkok Post (2018a) ‘Constitutional court disbands Thai Raksa Chart’, Bangkok Post, 7 March, available from https://w ​ ww.bang​kokp​ost.com/​thail​and/​polit​ics/​ 1640​796/​con​stit​utio​nal-​court-​disba​nds-​thai-​raksa-​chart Bangkok Post (2018b) ‘Dusit Zoo to close for good at the end of this month’, Bangkok Post, 8 August, available from https://​www.bang​kokp​ost.com/​thail​ and/g​ ener​ al/​1518​054/​dusit-​zoo-​to-​close-​for-​good-​at-​the-​end-​of-​this-​month Bangkok Post (2018c) ‘New EC boundary ruling under fire’, Bangkok Post, 18 November, available from https://​www.bang​kokp​ost.com/​thail​and/​polit​ics/​ 1577​702/​new-​ec-​bound​ary-​rul​ing-​under-​fire Bangkok Post (2018d) ‘Prayut declares zero-​g raft tolerance’, Bangkok Post, 8 December, available from https://​www.was​hing​tonp​ost.com/​news/​glo​bal-​opini​ ons/​wp/​2016/​10/​14/​thai-​kings-​succes​sor-​could-​threa​ten-​the-​fut​ure-​of-​the-​ monar​chy/​ 132

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Bangkok Post (2019) ‘Prayut, cabinet members receive King’s message’, Bangkok Post, 27 August, available from https://​www.bang​kokp​ost.com/​thail​and/​polit​ ics/​1737​667/​pra​yut-​cabi​net-​memb​ers-​rece​ive-​kings-​mess​age BBC (2018) ‘CPB explains its stockholder to be held under the name of King Rama X’, BBC, 16 June, available from https://​www.bbc.com/​thai/​thail​and-​ 44507​711 [in Thai] BBC (2019a) ‘Thailand’s king condemns bid by sister to become PM’, BBC, 8 February, available from https://​www.bbc.com/​news/​world-​asia-​47175​604 BBC (2019b) ‘Having been a museum for 3 decades, Wimanmek Mansion now closes for public access’, BBC, 5 August, available from https://​www.bbc.com/​ thai/​49220​381?ocid=​ socialflow_​f acebook&fbclid=​IwAR1UDokJtNnBI3 wq3JY04453A4q9Kv3znpzxtCHVVUPV1VbTeaSw7yGMl1o [in Thai] Chachavalpongpun, P. (2016) ‘Thai king’s successor could threaten the future of the monarchy’, Washington Post, 15 October, available from https://​www.was​ hing​tonp​ost.com/​news/​glo​bal-​opini​ons/​wp/​2016/​10/​14/​thai-​kings-​succes​ sor-​could-​threa​ten-​the-​fut​ure-​of-​the-​monar​chy/​ Chambers, P. and Waitoolkiat, N. (2016) ‘The resilience of monarchised military in Thailand’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 46(3): 425–​444. Chan-​ o -​ C ha, P. (2019) The Cabinet’s Statement Regarding State Policies, Bangkok: Prime Minister’s Office. [in Thai] Chitbundid, C. (2011) The Royally Initiated Projects: The Making of King Bhumibol’s Royal Hegemony, Bangkok: The Foundation for the Promotion of Social Science and Humanities Textbooks Project. [in Thai] Chotpradit, T. (2016) Revolution versus Counter-​revolution: The People’s Party and the Royalist(s) in Visual Dialogue, Doctoral Dissertation, Birkbeck University of London, School of Arts. Football Tribe (2019) ‘Thai FA Cup Final moved to Leo Stadium’, Football Tribe, 18 October, available from https:// ​ f ootb ​ a ll- ​ t ribe.com/​ asia/ ​ 2 019/ ​ 1 0/ ​ 1 8/ ​ t hai- ​ f a- ​ c up- ​ f inal- ​ m oved- ​ t o- ​ l eo- ​ s tad ​ i um/ ​ ? fbc ​ l id=​ IwAR3mWMICW3mvUzOoHApniOZocBVn_​7yV​HYf4​zKhV​zxUO​lEG9​ 6mei​NOXc​YDk Forbes (2019a) ‘The richest people in the world’, Forbes, 4 March, available from https://​www.for​bes.com/​billi​onai​res/​#50150​b125​1c7 Forbes (2019b) ‘The world’s largest public companies’, Forbes, 5 May, available from https://​www.for​bes.com/​compan​ies/​siam-​com​merc​ial-​bank/​?list=​glo​ bal2​000#1aafa​2d12​656 Gray, C. (2016) ‘Speaking of the succession’, New Mandala, 14 October, available from https://​www.new​mand​ala.org/​speak​ing-​on-​the-​suc​cess​ion/​ Grossman, N. and Faulder, D. (eds). (2012) King Bhumibol Adulyadej: A Life’s Work, Singapore: Editions Didier Millet. Hardt, M. and Negri, A. (2009) Commonwealth, Cambridge: Belknap Press. Harvey, D. (2003) The New Imperialism, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hewison, K. (2019) ‘Crazy rich Thais: Thailand’s capitalist class, 1980–​2019’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 51(2): 262–​277. 133

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iLaw (2016) ‘Summaries of the constitution draft: Mechanism for eradicating the corrupt politicians’, iLaw, available from https:// ​ w ww.ilaw.or.th/​ node/​4044 [in Thai] Investopedia (2011) ‘The world’s richest royals’, Forbes, 29 April, available from https://​www.for​bes.com/​sites/​inves​tope​dia/​2011/​04/​29/​the-​wor​lds-​r ich​est-​ roy​als/​#46f59​cb97​39f Jackson, P. (2010) ‘Virtual divinity: A 21st century discourse of Thai royal influence’, in L. Isager and S. Ivarsson (eds) Saying the Unsayable: Monarchy and Democracy in Thailand, Copenhagen: NIAS Press, pp 29–​59. Jeamteerasakul, S. (2006) ‘What is the crown property bureau?’, Fa Diew Kan, 4(1): 67–​91. [in Thai] Jeamteerasakul, S. (2017a) [Facebook page] 7 January, available from https://​ www.facebo ​ ok.com/​photo.php?fbid=​11910​5691​7614​252&set=​pcb.11910​6412​ 7613​531&type=​3&thea​ter Jeamteerasakul, S. (2017b) [Facebook page] 11 May, available from https://​www. faceb​ook.com/​som​sakj​eam/​posts/​13084​2129​2544​480 Lorwattanatrakul, A. (2019) ‘2 years 2 months: The disappearance of People Party’s plaque’, Prachatai, 23 June, available from https://​pracha​tai.com/​jour​ nal/​2019/​06/​83100 [in Thai] Manager (2020) ‘Savagely! “Big Penguin” is overconfident. #I order you to be under the constitution’, Manager, 17 May, available from https://​mgronl​ine. com/​polit​ics/​det​ail/​963000​0118​815 [in Thai] Marshall, A. (2014) A Kingdom in Crisis: Thailand’s Struggle for Democracy in the Twenty-​first Century, London: Zed Books. Marshall, A. (2019) [Facebook page], 11 October, available from https://​www. faceb​ook.com/​zenjou​r nal​ist/​posts/​101571​7802​0591​154 Marx, K. (1990) Capital, volume I, translated by B. Fowkes, London: Penguin. McCargo, D. (2005) ‘Network monarchy and legitimacy crises in Thailand’, The Pacific Review, 18(2): 499–​519. Ministry of Foreign Affairs (2017) Sufficiency Economy Philosophy: Thailand’s Path towards Sustainable Development Goals, Bangkok: Ministry of Foreign Affairs. NESDC (National Economic and Social Development Council) (2016) The Twelfth National Economic and Social Development Plan (2017–​2021), Bangkok: NESDC. Prachatai (2018) ‘Dusit Zoo shut down by the end of this August, distributing animals to six nationwide zoos, waiting for the new place at Khlong 6 to be constructed’, Prachatai, 8 August, available from https://p​ rachat​ ai.com/j​ our n ​ al/​ 2018/​08/​78197 [in Thai] Prachatai (2019a) ‘ “Support good people to rule this country”, says King of Thailand on eve of election’, Prachatai, 24 March, available from https://​pracha​ tai.com/​engl​ish/​node/​7990 Prachatai (2019b) ‘All goes wrong with unelected Thai senate’, Prachatai, 16 May, available from https://​pracha​tai.com/​engl​ish/​node/​8049

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Prachatai English (2020) ‘The demonstration at Thammasat proposes monarchy reform’, Prachatai English, 11 August, available from https://​pracha​tai.com/​ engl​ish/​node/​8709 Prakitnonthakan, C. (2013) ‘The People’s Party after the September 19 coup’, Read, 4(4): 19–​39. [in Thai] Prime Minister’s Office (2015) ‘The approaches for protecting the security of the principal institutions of the nation under the democratic form of government with the king as head of state’, Bangkok: Prime Minister’s Office. [in Thai] Reuters (2019) ‘Thailand’s king takes personal control of two key army units’, Reuters, 1 October, available from https://​www.reut​ers.com/​arti​cle/​us-​thail​and-​king/​thaila​ nds-​king-​takes-​perso​nal-​cont​rol-​of-​two-​key-​army-​units-​idUSKB​N1WG​4ED Royal Thai Police (2019) ‘Police officers giving extra police service order’, available from http://​www.roya​ltha​ipol​ice.go.th/​. [in Thai] Serafin, T. (2008) ‘The world’s richest royals’, Forbes, 20 August, available from https://​www.for​bes.com/​2008/​08/​20/​worl​ ds-r​ iche​ st-r​ oya​ ls-b​ iz-r​ ichro ​ yals​ 08-​ cz_​ts​_​082​0roy​alin​tro.html#25342​e554​4e9 Serafin, T. (2009) ‘The world’s richest royals’, Forbes, 17 June, available from https://w ​ ww.for​bes.com/​2009/​06/​17/​monarc​ hs-w ​ eal​ th-s​ cand​ al-b​ usine​ ss-b​ illi​ onai​res-​r ich​est-​roy​als.html#874c4​ba65​955 Serafin, T. (2010) ‘The world’s richest royals’, Forbes, 7 July, available from https://​ www.for​bes.com/​2010/​07/​07/​r ich​est-​roy​als-​wea​lth-​mona​rch-​wedd​ing-​divo​ rce-​bill​iona​ire.html#f9534​0a15​d6f Streckfuss, D. (2017) ‘In Thailand, a king’s coup?’, New York Times, 9 April, available from https://​www.nyti​mes.com/​2017/​04/​09/​opin​ion/​in-​thail​and-​ a-​kings-​coup.html Tejapira, K. (2017) ‘Analyzing political landscapes and the redrawing of power relations under the absence of hegemony’, 20 June, available from https://​pracha​ tai.com/​jour​nal/​2017/​06/​72028 [in Thai] Thai PBS (2019) ‘Prayut vows to keep Thais happy, unified and prosperous’, Thai PBS, 11 July, available from https://​www.thaip​bswo​rld.com/​pra​yut-​vows-​to-​ keep-​thais-​happy-​unif​i ed-​and-​pro​sper​ous/​ Thairath (2017) ‘Ananta Samakhom Throne Hall to be closed for reconstruction until further notice from October 1, 2017’, Thairath, 30 September, available from https://​www.thair​ath.co.th/​news/​local/​bang​kok/​1085​809 [in Thai] The Nation (2018a) ‘No special treatment for pro-​Prayut group’, The Nation, 2 July, available from https://​www.nat​iont​hail​and.com/​polit​ics/​30349​145 The Nation (2018b) ‘EC to speed up poll breach probe’, The Nation, 25 December, available from https://​www.bang​kokp​ost.com/​thail​and/​polit​ics/​1600​090/​ec-​ to-​speed-​up-​poll-​bre​ach-​pro​bes Tulathon, C. (2017) ‘The crown’s properties: Royal assets during transitional period and two coups’, Fa Diew Kan, 15(2): 85–​115. [in Thai] Ungpakorn, G. (2016a) ‘Thailand should be a republic’, Uglytruth-​Thailand, 16 October, available from https://​uglytr​utht​hail​and.wordpr​ess.com/​2016/​10/​

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Ungpakorn, G. (2016b) ‘King Pumipon of Thailand’, Uglytruth-​Thailand, 13 October, available from https://​uglytr​utht​hail​and.wordpr​ess.com/​2016/​10/​ Wattanasiri, C. (1986) Investment of the Privy Purse, 1890–​1932, Master’s Thesis, Silpakorn University, Faculty of Arts. [in Thai] Weber, M. (1958) From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, edited by H.H. Gerth and C.W. Mills, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Winichakul, T. (2014) ‘The monarchy and anti-​monarchy: Two elephant in the room of Thai politics and state of denial’, in P. Chachavalpongpun (ed) Good Coup Gone Bad: Thailand’s Political Development since Thaksin’s Downfall, Singapore: ISEAS, pp 79–​108.

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SEVEN

The role of the Thai military in policy analysis: unpacking three faces of the military in the non-​military policy domain Wasin Punthong

Introduction Political changes in Thailand have been profoundly associated with the intervention of the military in domestic politics and policy analysis processes. With 12 successful military coups since 1932 (Tamada, 2019: 272), it has become politics-​as-​usual in Thailand when the military steps in to end political conflicts and stays in power to oversee the post-​coup political arrangements. This striking feature in Thai politics points to the military’s decisive role in shaping the country’s political outcomes. Although the military regime has become outmoded in the context of expanding global democracy, the case of Thailand speaks differently. It illustrates that the military’s political influence is far from limited as reflected by the fact that the military has been actively involved in public policy-​making processes. This chapter investigates the Thai military’s wider involvement in public policy-​making processes in the wake of the past two successful coups. In particular, it closely inspects three non-​military domains which explicitly characterise the military’s permeating role in shaping policy analysis and policy outcomes, namely internal security, development and telecommunications policies. The existing scholarship on the role of the military in Thai politics is sated with an analysis of either civil–​military relations in the context of democratisation or military coups and their political consequences (Panduprasert, 2013; Tantikul, 2014; Bamrungsuk, 2015; Bunbongkarn, 2019). To put the case of Thailand in comparative perspective, the civilian–​military relations literature analysing the expansive role of the military in the new nations illustrates that after the military seizes state power, it has to mobilise mass support (Janowitz, 1964). This indicates that the military’s political intervention comes with additional civilian actions. Among other things is the participation in policy-​making processes to ensure its interests are protected. While the bulk of similar literature is in place, less attention had been paid to the military’s influence on public policy making in Thailand, except for Bunbongkarn’s (1988) work that already highlighted a wide array of non-​military affairs in which the military participates. This lacuna dictates academic exploration. The reorientation towards the military’s pervasive 137

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role in a non-​military policy arena is needed as it points to a key feature in Thai politics in which the military’s almost all-​encompassing role largely defines the country’s policy-​making frontier. As will be discussed later, the extent to which the policy frontier in certain issues could be negotiated is shaped by the military’s acquiescence particularly in the three policy domains under study. This chapter makes three arguments. First, the Thai military’s role in the non-​ military public policy-​making processes is not outmoded but has become an embedded practice. Second, post-​coup political developments since the 2006 coup have opened more institutional channels for the military to be further involved in non-​military public policy-​making processes. Third, from a wider perspective, as the military is trying to exert its influence on domestic politics in the political struggle to retain its prominent role, political resistance to the military has grown more obvious. In this respect, criticisms against the military in its involvement in non-​military policy-​making processes have become more vocal.

A historical overview of the military’s role in the policy domain in the non-​military sphere This section reviews the history of the Thai military’s role in Thai politics. Since the bloodless coup in 1932 by the People’s Party, to change Siam from absolute monarchy to constitutional monarchy, which marked the beginning of the country’s democracy struggles, the military has been a pre-​eminent actor in deciding the country’s administrative directions. The post-​revolution politics were characterised by open political conflicts between the People’s Party government and the royalists. This means that the People’s Party government had to rely on the armed forces to stabilise its leadership. Phraya Phahonphonphayuhasena, the head of the military clique of the People’s Party and the army chief, was appointed prime minister of Siam from 1933 to 1938. After he stepped down, Field Marshal Phibunsongkhram, his protégé, took over the job. Phibunsongkhram concurrently held the position of the Commander of the Army. Under his leadership, the grand nation-​building project was initiated, followed by the implementation of a plethora of ultranationalist policies. For instance, the National Cultural Council was founded in 1942. The ‘occupation reservation for the Thai national’ policy was also among the prominent nationalist policies. What he had done in parallel was to modernise the armed forces to consolidate his power (Boontandha, 2016: 286–​288). However, the military’s influence in public administration had seen the limit when Phibunsongkhram initiated a mega-​project to move the capital city from Bangkok to Phetchabun province. Civilian bureaucrats, in general, opposed the plan and quietly resisted by delaying his orders (Kasetsiri, 2019: 315–​317). The draft of Phetchabun Metropolitan Decree was later voted down. This shows that the negotiating power of the civilian bureaucracy in the policy-​making process remains significant even in the time of military dominance. Later, scholarly discussions on the autonomy of Thai bureaucracy pointed out the 138

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‘departmentalism’ attribute in state-​building in Thailand in which administrative power is considerably vested in the department-​level of public administration (Samudavanija, 2002). The power of the bureaucracy and its method of policy analysis was elaborated in Chapters 1 and 2. The successive military regimes, thus, have to ally with the bureaucracy to co-​exercise the policy-​making power in non-​military policy areas. The military government cemented its links with the civilian bureaucracy during the Sarit government in the 1950s. Riggs (1966) conceptualised the military-​bureaucracy takeover of the national administration in Thailand within the bureaucratic polity framework. After Phibunsongkhram was forced to resign, short-​lived civilian governments were struggling to survive the post-​Second World War political turmoil in Thailand. The political crisis culminated in the 1947 coup in which Phibunsongkhram made a return for his second premiership. It is argued that such military intervention paved the way for the military to be firmly involved in domestic politics and the policy-​making process (Yimprasert, 2008: 65). In 1957, roughly a decade under Phibunsongkhram’s shaky regime, Field Marshal Sarit Thanarat, the Commander in Chief of the Royal Thai Army, staged a coup to overthrow Phibunsongkhram. While he held the position of prime minister, he retained his rank of the Chief of Defence Forces. The Sarit regime was founded on the concept of despotic paternalism; approximating the traditional value of paternalism with strong autocratic-​militaristic leadership (Chaloemtiarana, 2007). Endeavouring to modernise the country, Sarit exercised his dictatorial power to accelerate economic and social progress in Thailand through national economic development programmes and social reforms (Darling, 1960). The ensuing national economic development, including the country’s first long-​term national economic plans, industrial promotion and rural development policy, are thus the initiatives of Sarit’s government. The military style of command and control permeated and shaped the top-​down nature of Thai style bureaucracy today. In 1963, Sarit established the Ministry of National Development to hasten the country’s modernisation, covering irrigation, highways and land development, particularly in the rural areas. In this respect, Sarit’s regime, with the support from the armed forces, provides a channel for the military to exert influence on the direction and objectives of national development policies. Moreover, concurrently holding the chief position in both the executive branch and the armed forces, Sarit placed a large number of resources to modernise the military and authorised military officers to direct policy-​making and legislative processes. For instance, 75 per cent of the Constitution Drafting Assembly of the Constitution of Thailand B.E. 2511 were military and police officers (Tantiratanapisan, 1989: 83). The Thai Military Bank was created to ensure the military establishment’s financial security. Shortly afterwards, the Royal Thai Army Radio and Television was established, allowing military directorates to take control of several radio and television channels (Yimprasert, 2008: 100); they are still in operation today. In fact, the armed forces traditionally had considerable influence on telecommunications policy through the military-​backed radio channels. A number of local radio 139

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channels were created as a part of the military’s anti-​communist propaganda. The military-​owned Channel 5 even hosted a programme which invited high-​ranking military officers to discuss communist threats (Kongkirati, 2005: 162). Currently, the military possesses the majority of the radio frequency spectrum in Thailand (BBC, 2017). Furthermore, the regime’s coalition with civilian technocrats, who usually act as policy advisors to the government and businesses, helps to extend Sarit’s reach in the bureaucracy (see, for example, Meechai, 1983). This led to the practice of inviting high-​ranking military officers to sit on the boards of large corporations for informal protection. In short, Sarit’s regime facilitated the expansion of military involvement in non-​military affairs and influenced public policy-​making in those areas. Meanwhile, as the Cold War loomed in Southeast Asia, the United States became a supporter of Sarit’s government in the crusade against local communist movements. Sarit utilised the armed forces to make an excursion into the country’s remote areas to provide development assistance, preventing villagers from falling under communist influence. Up-​country troops operated in communist-​dominated areas and executed civic actions such as building roads or checking dams. Rural development is therefore considered to be a military task. The development–​security nexus thus appeared in the rural development policy under the government’s development for security programme (Kraisoraphong, 2014: 82). Hence, the counterinsurgency efforts contributed to the creation of institutional structures in the military that handled not only internal security but also rural development policy. The armed forces’ rural development efforts proved successful even though it was part of the extension of regime paternalism (Chaloemtiarana, 1978: 409; see also Ockey, 2004: 12–​15). In this respect, it is not unusual for the military to shape internal security and rural development policies as its official role; this institutionalised its role in non-​military areas until today. Besides, the military under Sarit’s command was successful in ‘maintaining internal and external security without transforming Thailand into a police state’ (Nuechterlein, 1964: 843). After Sarit passed away in 1963, Field Marshal Thanom Kittikachorn continued Sarit’s military regime as his political successor. As Thanom intensified the combat against the local communist movement, the military’s role in the internal security affairs had grown more entrenched in Thai society. In his address to the parliament on 19 December 1963, Thanom emphasised the continuation of development and internal security policies devised during Sarit’s incumbency (Office of the Permanent Secretary, 1963). Thanom’s efforts to maintain tight political control and neutralise opponents notwithstanding, the student movement culminated in the popular protests of 14 October 1973 which led to the eventual collapse of the Sarit–​Thanom military regime. The political crisis seemed to subside as the student-​led democratic forces toppled the ruling military dictators. However, as student activism grew more radicalised, relentless reactionism from the ultra-​r ight-​wing, including royalists, middle-​class intellectuals and members of military wives clubs, and so on at the same time beset the democratic forces 140

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(Lertchoosakul, 2012: 61). More ominous political turbulence reached a climax on 6 October 1976 when a massacre took place as left-​wing student activism was linked with communist aspirations. In short, the fall of the Sarit–​Thanom regime led the military to realise that the democratic forces were trying to keep military interventions in politics at bay. Nonetheless, it made a comeback in the 1980s, successfully ridding its dictatorial-​militaristic mirage under the ‘Pax Premism politics’.1 Under the premiership of General Prem Tinsulanonda, the military was given a developmental role in the anti-​communist strategy, relying less on military actions. In this respect, the military formally launched a myriad of development-​related policies in parallel with civilian bureaucracy, invigorating its agency in the national development scheme. Moreover, to subtly dissimulate the military’s activism in non-​military policy domains, the newly established Office of the Royal Development Projects Board provided an institutional channel for the armed forces to implement its developmental programmes (Prompanjai, 2015). Post-​Prem politics was followed by a coup against the army general-​turned-​ politician Chatichai Choonhavan’s government in 1991. As a result of the first post-​coup general election, General Suchinda Kraprayoon, the seemingly de facto head of the National Peace Keeping Council, who staged the coup, returned as a candidate for the premiership after five political parties nominated him. This resulted in mass protests against him, culminating in the Black May incident of 1992 in which the popular rally faced a military crackdown. King Bhumibol Adulyadej eventually stepped in to end the political standoff. In the aftermath of such political turmoil, a cross-​party consensus on political reform to end military intervention in politics had materialised in the form of the 1997 Constitution, which is seen as one of the most democratic constitutions Thailand has ever had. The success of such a large-​scale political reform led scholars to believe that the tenacity of the military was waning (see, for example, Bunbongkarn, 1999). A decade-​long hiatus of the military ended when General Sonthi Boonyaratglin staged a coup to topple Thaksin Shinawatra’s government in 2006. The post-​ coup political crises, marked by colour-​coded political struggles between the monarchist Yellow and electoralist Red, left Thailand in what Saxer (2015) calls the ‘vertigo of change’. Since then, the military has kept a firm grip on the country’s domestic politics. The notoriously high military spending of the past decade asserts this point as shown in Figure 7.1. After the 2011 general elections, Yingluck Shinawatra, who is Thaksin’s sister, became the prime minister. Her government was toppled by a military coup led by General Prayuth Chan-​o-​cha who has been the premier since 2014. Prayuth’s regime has consolidated its power through political engineering, designing formal institutions such that the military can officially be involved in national public policy-​making (see, for example, Sawasdee, 2020). For instance, the Constitution of Thailand 2017 stipulates in section 52 that the ‘Armed forces shall also be deployed for the purpose of developing the country’. Besides, top military officers, namely chiefs of the armed forces as well as army, navy, air force and police, are ex officio in the National Strategy Committee, which has been 141

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142

Figure 7.1: Thailand’s annual defence budget from 2008 to 2022 2,50,00,00,00,000

Thai baht

2,00,00,00,00,000 1,50,00,00,00,000 1,00,00,00,00,000 50,00,00,00,000 0 2008

2009

2010

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Source: The Budget Bureau (www.bb.go.th/​top​ic3.php?gid=​862&mid=​545)

2013 2014 Year

2015

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The role of the military in policy analysis

mandated to oversee the 20-​year national development plan. In this respect, the reinvigorated royal–​military–​bureaucracy triumvirate has continued to dominate Thai politics and the post-​2014 coup has formalised institutional routes for the military to play an active role in national decision-​making processes. At the same time, the weakened parliamentary oversight and crippling public scrutiny associated with the Prayuth government further allowed him to bring the armed forces closer to the executive branch, particularly in the three policy areas under investigation. In sum, this historical survey of the role of the military in Thai politics and policy making in the past eight decades shows that the armed forces have never restricted themselves in their activism in domestic politics. The expanded role of the military institutionalised its involvement in three policy domains under investigation to the extent that the military can independently exercise its veto power in certain circumstances. Such a historical underpinning should be taken as a backdrop against which policy-​making processes in Thailand are conducted.

The military and the internal security policy The role of the military in the management of internal security policy is not a case specific to Thailand. In fact, military policy making towards internal security has been practised by the United Kingdom since the First World War period (see, for example, Jeffery, 1981). In its Northern Ireland operations, the British Army even ‘organised sporting events for young people and ran discos’ (Rasmussen, 1999: 19). What makes the case of Thailand stand out is the unrestrained and expanded role of the Thai military in internal security policy making even in the post-​Cold War context. Since the 1950s, when the Cold War heated Southeast Asia, Thailand became a close American ally to contain the spread of communism in the region. The military regime under Sarit Thanarat was supported by the United States in his anti-​communist efforts. With significant American foreign aid and technical assistance (Hagelin, 1988), Sarit utilised the armed forces to stabilise communist threats and maintain the country’s internal security. As a matter of fact, the military’s civic action was validated in the official US military doctrine of counterinsurgency in underdeveloped countries (Bobrow, 1966), such as Southeast Asian (Berger, 1976) and Latin American countries (Black, 1977). Hence, the American troops buttressed the Thai Armed Forces’ civic action to ameliorate local living standards. At that time, the Internal Security Operations Command (ISOC) was tasked with counterinsurgency campaigns against local communist movements. In practice, the ISOC did not only execute virulent suppression tactics but it also conducted psychological operations through mass mobilisation. In the 1980s, Premier General Prem Tinsulanonda introduced the Prime Minister’s Office Order No. 66/​2523 which was an alternative approach in combating communism by fostering a friendly relationship with local people to win over their hearts and minds. This led to several military-​sponsored rural development initiatives. 143

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As the communist threats subsided, the ISOC thus restrained its iron-​fisted operations and relied instead on ‘political soldiering’ (Raymond, 2018: 123). Two years later, the Prime Minister’s Office Order No. 65/​2525 led to the launch of the political offensive scheme to engage with local people. For instance, in the south of Thailand, the Fourth Army Area had received 616 ex-​communist combatants in November 1981 to the ‘Tai Rom Yen’ social reintegration programme, literally translated as ‘peaceful South’ (Yuthong, 2015). Such a shift in the counterinsurgency strategy in the late-​Cold War period legitimised the role of the armed forces in the mass organisation venture and rural development policy (Bunbongkarn, 2019: 128–​129). Meanwhile, the Office of the Prime Minister’s Order No. 18/​2518 kicked off the Development and Self-​Defense Volunteer Programme in 1975 (Phiboonwutthikul, 1994: 41). The main objective of this programme was to provide social and economic assistance to poor village people who are in communist-​prone or communist-​dominated areas. The ISOC was tasked with an oversight capacity. The programme was legalised in the Organisation of Village Development and Self-​Defense Volunteer Act, B.E. 2522. Currently, the ISOC is a focal point in coordinating village development and self-​ defence activities. This shows the micro-​level mass mobilisation through the implementation of ISOC’s policy at the grassroots level. There is also a plethora of programmes run by other provincial civilian agencies with the ISOC as a partner. After the Cold War ended, it was expected that the dominant role of the ISOC would diminish. However, the reality unfolded otherwise. The ISOC successfully rebranded and adjusted itself to the post-​Cold War internal security settings. Particularly, in the wake of the two coups in 2006 and 2014, the ISOC was appropriated by the military junta to exert its sociopolitical control over society to defeat the challenging democratic forces (Pawakapan, 2017). The ISOC’s bureau of mass organisation and information, consisting of four sections, namely, planning and budget, information, development affairs and mass organisation, grew more assertive in engaging with local communities through a wide array of programmes. Furthermore, the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) order 51/​2560 expanded the scope of the ISOC’s authority to incorporate more civilian bureaucrats into the ISOC’s administrative structure which, in practice, is under the military’s influence. Bamrungsuk (2017) rightly points out that the ISOC is becoming a super-​ministry with all-​encompassing authority in relation to internal security matters. As a consequence, the coordination of all internal security policy actors, civilian and military, is executed by a single all-​ encompassing organisation and its overarching policy framework is set by the National ISOC Committee with the presence of all armed forces chiefs. The current ISOC Act further provides that by virtue of their position, the Prime Minister is the Director of the ISOC while the Army Commander is the Deputy Director. The Army Chief of Staff is the ex officio Secretary of the Committee. Moreover, the ISOC had been playing a pre-​eminent role 144

The role of the military in policy analysis

Figure 7.2: Internal Security Operations Command’s annual budget from 2009 to 2022 12,00,00,00,000

10,00,00,00,000

Thai baht

8,00,00,00,000

6,00,00,00,000

4,00,00,00,000

2,00,00,00,000

0

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Year

Source: The Budget Bureau (www.bb.go.th/​top​ic3.php?gid=​862&mid=​545)

in the internal security decision-​making regarding the protracted conflict in the deep south of Thailand. The organisation received a significant portion of the budget ‘allocated to security and development activities in the south’ (McCargo, 2012: 9). The increase in the ISOC annual budget particularly after the 2014 coup is illustrated in Figure 7.2. The COVID-​19 pandemic that continues to pressure the government financially seems to account for the recent decrease in the ISOC annual budget. Nonetheless, as shown in Figure 7.3, the ISOC annual budget is incomparably higher than the annual budget of other national security bodies such as the Office of the National Security Council. The ISOC underwent an empowering transformation in 2008 with the adoption of the Internal Security Act, B.E. 2551 supported by the military-​ backed General Surayud Chulanont’s government. The ISOC thus expanded its mission to the regional provincial level. In accordance with this law, the regional ISOC can be created with the Army Area Commander sitting ex officio as the regional director. Moreover, every province has its own provincial ISOC committee. The provincial governor is the ex officio director of the provincial ISOC whereas the position of deputy director is reserved for 145

Policy Analysis in Thailand

Figure 7.3: Office of the National Security Council’s annual budget from 2009 to 2022 35,00,00,000 30,00,00,000

Thai baht

25,00,00,000 20,00,00,000 15,00,00,000 10,00,00,000 5,00,00,000 0

2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 Year

Source: The Budget Bureau (www.bb.go.th/​top​ic3.php?gid=​862&mid=​545)

ISOC personnel only. In practice, this means that at the regional level, the Army Area Commander exercises the ultimate authority concerning internal security policy. In this regard, political setbacks in Thailand from 2006 onwards renewed the military’s adherence to internal security policy making by creating an enduring political platform, for example, ISOC. Besides, the ISOC inherited the political aspirations of the NCPO junta (iLaw, 2019). In the past few years, the ISOC closely monitored the anti-​regime groups online and offline. It also started an online crusade against the oppositions leading to the crackdown of 143 websites (BBC, 2019). The ISOC still assumes the omnipresent tasks in the implementation of internal security policy as shown in Table 7.1. In addition to the unchecked expansion of its mission, the ISOC’s ability to command civilian bureaucratic agencies indicates that the military has established its involvement in civilian policy making on a firm footing (Pawakapan, 2021).

The military and rural development policy The previous section shows how the armed forces militarised internal security policy through myriad civic actions and civil defence programmes. This section takes stock of the military’s rural development policy within its authority, aiming to illustrate the implementation of the parallel rural development policy. This 146

The role of the military in policy analysis

Table 7.1: Selected examples of area-​based projects with Internal Security Operations Command’s official partnership Province

Selected area-​based projects

Target group(s)

Amnat Charoen

Solidarity-​building Outreach

Villagers

Bueng Kan

Environmental, Energy and Food Awareness Programme

Students

Buriram

Peaceful Buriram Training

Students

Chaiyaphum

Outreach and Survey of Low-​income Earners and Landless Villagers

Local low-​income earners

Kalasin

Assistance Programme on Land Right in the Area of ‘Dong Ra Nang’ National Reserved Forest

Community leaders and local villagers

Khon Kaen

Integrated Operation on Drug Abuse Screening

Drug abusers

Loey

Check Dam-​Building Project

Villagers

Makasarakham

Local Livelihood Development Programme

Villagers

Mukdahan

Drug Smuggling Surveillance Operation during the Chinese New Year Festival

Drug smugglers

Nakhon Phanom

Natural Environment Protection Programme

Local civilian public officers

Nakhon Ratchasima

Mass Media Relations Programme

Local media staff

Nongbua Lumphu

Lunch Programme in Local Schools

Students

Nong Khai

Mass Media Relations Programme

Local media staff

Roi Et

Annual Mass Organisation for Reconciliation Programme

Community leaders and villagers

Sakhon Nakhon

Meeting Regarding Dust and Overweight Truck Problems

Local civilian public officers

Sisaket

Moral Village Training

Local students, teachers and villagers

Surin

Training on Organic Fertiliser Production

Villagers

Ubon Ratchathani

Aid Programme for Pineapple Farmers

Local pineapple farmers

Udonthani

Meeting Regarding Human Trafficking

Local civilian public officers

Yasothon

Bestowing Vegetable Seed from Princess Maha Chakri Sirindhorn Ceremony

District Agricultural Learning Centre

Source: ISOC online press releases (https://​www.isoc.go.th/​miss​ionl​ist.php?key=​&unit_​ id=​117&cate_​id=​ &page=​1)

indirectly influences decision-​making in this policy area in the sense that the military’s mere existence as a rural development actor can press for certain policy outcomes. In other words, the military is a passive policy entrepreneur who shapes the rural development policy norm with what can be called dual-​rural development policy arrangements. Hence, there are two decision-​making centres of rural development policy. Although the military sees that this rural development effort is supporting a non-​military strategy in the military operations, the impact on the rural development landscape is far-​reaching because it facilitates the social recognition of the armed forces’ rural development actorness. Studies show that, overall, local people are satisfied with the military’s rural development initiatives (see, for example, Benjawilaikul, 2017). In fact, the official role of the armed 147

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Table 7.2: Military for development provision in the Constitution of Thailand since 1974 Constitution

Section

Constitutional drafter

Constitution of Thailand B.E. 2517

70

Constitution Drafting Commission led by Prakob Hutasingh

Constitution of Thailand B.E. 2521

56

Constitution Drafting Commission led by Chitti Tingsaphat

Constitution of Thailand B.E. 2534

61

Constitution Drafting Commission led by Meechai Ruchuphan

Constitution of Thailand B.E. 2540

72

99 indirectly elected Constitution Drafting Commission with Uthai Pimchaichon as the president

Constitution of Thailand B.E. 2550

77

Junta-​selected Constitution Drafting Commission with Prasong Soonsiri as the president

Constitution of Thailand B.E. 2560

52

Junta-​selected Constitution Drafting Commission with Meechai Ruchuphan as the president

forces in national development is promulgated in several constitutions of Thailand as shown in Table 7.2. In this respect, the military’s development mandate has been derived from the constitution since the 1970s. Therefore, this formal development role connects the military to the development policy-​making circle. In particular, as the armed forces have been working on several development projects extensively in the remote areas, their transactions in this policy area have become institutionalised. The Armed Forces Development Command (AFDC) of the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters is responsible for the military development policy. The AFDC was created in accordance with the 162/​40 (Classified) Order of the Royal Thai Armed Forces Headquarters in 1997 (Pikulthong, 2010: 2). It comprises of nine units, namely Development Office Regions 1–​5, Military Development Office, Supporting Office, Special Development Unit, and Disaster Mitigation Training Centre. There are additional mobile development units in each regional office. It covers nine policy areas, namely, transportation, agricultural and cooperative support, water resource improvement, community and infrastructure development, healthcare, education, religion and culture, public relations and psychological operation, and social work (AFDC, 2020). The AFDC’s selected projects are illustrated in Table 7.3. This is further cemented by the development tasks of the rangers (Thahan Pran), particularly in the border areas. In the past, communist insurgent groups dominated such areas. However, although there were changes in the post-​Cold War security environment, the rangers are still executing local development projects. For instance, in the deep south in which prolonged conflict remains, the local ranger regiments focus on building friendly relationships with local villagers, conducting multicultural activities and monitoring drug abuse (Matichon, 2019). In 2020, there were 13 ranger regiments stationed in the deep south (Chambers and Jitpiromsri, 2022: 149), implementing a variety of area-​based development programmes. Furthermore, closely inspecting each military force’s development initiatives, the Royal Thai Navy (RTN) has been playing a pivotal role in sea 148

The role of the military in policy analysis

Table 7.3: Armed Forces Development Command’s selected projects AFDC

Area of service

Selected military development projects

Region 1

Central region

‘Blue Flag’ Bargain Market Programme

Region 2

Northeast region (northern area)

Aquifer Well Construction Project

Region 3

North

Haze and Forest Fire Response Training

Region 4

South region

Support of School Activity

Region 5

Northeast region (southern area)

Drought Mitigation and Construction Programme

Source: AFDC online regional press releases (https://​mdo.rtarf.mi.th/​inde​x_​2.html)

turtle conservation policy, utilising both proactive and reactive communication strategies to connect with the public (Boonfak, 2007). The RTN is a policy expert in this development area. The RTN also runs the Sea Turtle Conservation Centre, which welcomes visitors such as students, conservationists and tourists. The RTN also participated in the artificial reef-​building project together with its civilian counterparts, such as the Department of Marine and Coastal Resources and the Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand. In summary, as the military has been working as a development actor with legal mandates, practically without any civilian oversight, it is free to set its own rural development policy directions. Therefore, in rural development policy, civilian and military establishments operate in parallel. The well-​established position of the military in this regard is a base from which it influences development policy-​making.

The military and telecommunications policy The Thai military has a high-​stakes investment in the country’s telecommunications business. In particular, the Royal Thai Army (RTA) owns the commercial Royal Thai Army Radio and Television Station, publicly known as Channel 5. According to an investigative report, it was discovered that the Army-​owned Channel 5 profited 97 million baht from the public agency’s public relations advertisements (Isranews Agency, 2013). Besides, the Navy Radio Broadcasting Station (NRBS), widely known as the Voice of Navy, is also a popular radio channel. It is owned and operated by the RTN. The NRBS deserves our attention because of its popularity. The ‘Six O’Clock Talk’ Programme (Kui Kamhong Hok Mong Chao), which has been airing for three decades, attracts a large number of listeners nationwide (Matichon, 2017). The NRBS broadcasts news, entertainment and miscellaneous content nationwide through its local stations, as shown in Table 7.4. Both are the armed forces’ key communication channels. Channel 5 has unsurprisingly always been dominated by senior army officers. The RTA is considered as a ‘telecommunications gatekeeper for potential concessionaires’ (Waitoolkiat and Chambers, 2017: 68). In fact, since its inception in 2010, the 149

Policy Analysis in Thailand

Table 7.4: Navy Radio Broadcasting Station services Region

Service area

Frequency

NRBS –​North

NRBS 11 Chiang Mai

88 (FM)

NRBS 8 Phitsanulok

1170 (AM)

NRBS 7 Nakhon Phanom

97.5 (FM)

NRBS 9 Ubon Ratchathani

1161 (AM)/​104 (FM)

NRBS 12 Nong Khai

95.75 (FM)

NRBS 2 Bang Na

675 (AM)

NRBS Wang Nantha Uthayan

88.5 (FM)/​93 (FM)/​106 (FM)

NRBS 4 Chanthaburi

1170 (AM)/​88.75 (FM)

NRBS 5 Pattaya

104.75 (FM)

NRBS 10 Trat

93.75 (FM)

NRBS 5 Sattahip

720 (AM)

NRBS 3 Phuket

1458 (AM)/​88 (FM)

NRBS 14 Phang Nga

97.25 (FM)

NRBS 6 Songkhla

1431 (AM)/​94.5 (FM)

NRBS 15 Narathiwat

94.75 (FM)

NRBS –​Northeast

NRBS –​Central NRBS –​East

NRBS –​ West-​coast South NRBS –​East-​coast South

Source: NRBS website (https://​www.voic​eofn​avy.com/​index-​991.html)

National Broadcasting and Telecommunication Commission (NBTC) has been dominated by military officers. The previous chairmen of the NBTC were generals in the military –​Air Chief Marshal Thares Punsri and General Sukrit Khamasunthorn respectively. Following the 2014 coup which left Thailand deeply polarised, television stations and radio channels were used by different political camps to spread their biased information (Kongkirati, 2019: 36). Although claiming to be politically neutral in its journalism, Channel 5 paid lip-​service to the armed forces (Jiajanpong, 2018: 2640). Moreover, when the military staged the coup in 2014, Channel 5 was the only television channel allowed to broadcast, as provided by the NCPO order 4/​2557. The NCPO order 97/​2557 further restricted the broadcast content of national and local television and radio stations, seemingly rendering Channel 5 the only voice of the country. It is necessary to take this matter into telecommunications policy analysis as Channel 5 facilitates the institutional ties between the military and other telecommunications actors on which the military can exert dramatic influence.

Conclusion With a series of coups followed by junta governments, the Thai military’s role in domestic politics and national policy making is abundantly prominent. The Royal Thai Armed Forces can exert considerable, and sometimes unchecked, influence on national public policy making. This has been noted in many areas, 150

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including shaping the policy agenda to directly interfering in the adoption and implementation of internal security, rural development and telecommunications policies. All of which encompass the interests of the armed forces. Despite a brief departure of the military from the political scene in the aftermath of the Black May incident of 1992 and the subsequent repositioning of its role, the coups in 2006 and 2014 enabled the armed forces to return to the political arena with the instalment of several military officers in key political and bureaucratic positions. Currently, civilian authorities’ control of its decision-​making in certain policy areas remains, therefore, conditional upon the consent of the military as the institution is still a veto player. This shows that the military’s post-​coup political intervention is still in its toolbox. Moreover, as already highlighted, the armed forces have justified its non-​military policy extension through the legal and institutional mechanisms of which they contributed to the design. The past two coups further entailed the almost indefinite definitions of internal security ranging from military-​led civil defence to a myriad of civic actions. Close institutional interactions between the military and the civilian public officers as well as community leaders and local villagers help to act as a conduit for the military to engage in policy-​making processes in the three areas under investigation. Additionally, it is the political strength of the armed forces that influences the policy trajectory. Note 1

Thai politics under the premiership of General Prem Tinsulanonda is characterised by political consensus across different political groups, namely, military, bureaucracy and political parties, under his charismatic leadership. See, for example, Thaiprayoon and Wanthana (2017).

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Black, K. (1977) United States Penetration of Brazil, Pennsylvania: University of Pennsylvania Press. Bobrow, B. (1966) ‘The civic role of the military: Some critical hypotheses’, Political Research Quarterly, 19(1): 101–​111. Boonfak, K. (2007) Network and Communication Process of Sea Turtle Conservation Center, The Royal Thai Navy, Master’s Thesis, Chulalongkorn University. Boontandha, T. (2016) King Vajiravudh and the Making of His Military Image, Bangkok: Matichon Publishing. Bunbongkarn, S. (1988) ‘The Thai military’s effort to institutionalise its political role’, Pacific Review, 1(4): 400–​411. Bunbongkarn, S. (1999) ‘Southeast Asia after the crisis: Thailand’s successful reforms’, Journal of Democracy, 10(4): 54–​68. Bunbongkarn, S. (2019) The Military and Political Development in Thailand, Bangkok: Kobfai Publishing Project. Chaloemtiarana, T. (1978) ‘Reflections on the Sarit regime and the process of political change in Thailand: Some conceptual and theoretical reassessments’, South East Asian Studies, 16(3): 400–​410. Chaloemtiarana, T. (2007) Thailand: The Politics of Despotic Paternalism, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University. Chambers, P. and Jitpiromsri, S. (2022) ‘Frontline informality: Paramilitary forces and pro-​government militias in Thailand’s Deep South counterinsurgency’, in A. Yasutomi, R.A. Hall and S. Kiba (eds) Pathways for Irregular Forces in Southeast Asia Mitigating Violence with Non-​State Armed Groups, London and New York: Routledge, pp 135–​158. Darling, C. (1960) ‘Marshal Sarit and absolutist rule in Thailand’, Pacific Affairs, 33(4): 347–​360. Hagelin, B. (1988) ‘Military dependency: Thailand and the Philippines’, Journal of Peace Research, 25(4): 431–​448. iLaw (2019) ‘Article 44 and its role in expanding power of the military through internal security operations’, iLaw, 4 July, available from https://​ilaw.or.th/​ node/​5315 [in Thai] Isranews Agency (2013) ‘Thai army radio and television gained 97 million baht for public announcement’, Isranews, 29 June, available from https://​www.isran​ ews.org/​isran​ews-​scoop/​22080 [in Thai] Janowitz, M. (1964) The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis, Chicago and London: Phoenix Books. Jeffery, K. (1981) ‘The British Army and internal security 1919–​1939’, The Historical Journal, 24(2): 377–​397. Jiajanpong, A. (2018) ‘The role of Thailand’s media in the political transformation’, Veridian E-​Journal, Silpakorn University, 11(3): 2632–​2647. Kasetsiri, C. (2019) A Political History of Thailand: Siam, 1932–​1957, Bangkok: Social Sciences and Humanities Textbooks Foundation.

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Kongkirati, P. (2005) And Then the Movement Emerged: Cultural Politics of Thai Students and Intellectuals Movements before the October 14 Uprising, Bangkok: Thammasat University Press. Kongkirati, P. (2019) ‘From illiberal democracy to military authoritarianism: Intra-​ elite struggle and mass-​based conflict in deeply polarized Thailand’, The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 681(1): 24–​40. Kraisoraphong, K. (2014) ‘Crossing the threshold: Thailand’s path to rethinking security sector governance’, in Yuji Uesugi (ed) Peacebuilding and Security Sector Governance in Asia, Berlin: Lit Verlag, pp 77–​104. Lertchoosakul, K. (2012) The Rise of the Octobrists: Power and Conflict among Former Left Wing Student Activists in Contemporary Thai Politics, PhD Thesis, London School of Economics. Matichon (2017) ‘Rebrand “Voice of Navy”: 70 years of Navy’s radio’, Matichon, 4 October, available from https://​www.matic​hon.co.th/​prac​hach​uen/​prac​hach​ uen-​scoop/​news​_​685​370 [in Thai] Matichon (2019) ‘The heart of the new generation of scouts is to take care of the people’, Matichon, 30 May, available from https://​www.matic​hon.co.th/​ bul​let-​news-​today/​news_​1516​768 [in Thai] McCargo, D. (2012) Mapping National Anxieties: Thailand’s Southern Conflict, Copenhagen: NIAS Press. Meechai, T. (1983) The Effects of the Interactions between Business Groups and Bureaucracy on Thai Politics, Master’s Thesis, Chulalongkorn University. Nuechterlein, E. (1964) ‘Thailand after Sarit’, Asian Survey, 4(5): 842–​850. Ockey, J. (2004) Making Democracy: Leadership, Class, Gender, and Political Participation in Thailand, Hawaii: University of Hawaii Press. Office of the Permanent Secretary (1963) Policy Statement of the 31st Council of Ministers, 19 December 1963. Bangkok: The Prime Minister’s Office. Panduprasert, P. (2013) ‘The military and democratization in Thailand since 14 October 1973’, Political Science and Public Administration Journal, 4(1): 89–​123. Pawakapan, P. (2017) The Central Role of Thailand’s Internal Security Operations Command in the Post-​Counterinsurgency Period, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing. Pawakapan, P. (2021) Infiltrating Society: The Thai Military’s Internal Security Affairs, Singapore: ISEAS Publishing. Phiboonwutthikul, C. (1994) Factors Affecting Rural Development of the Voluntary Development and Self-​Defense Villages: A Case Study of Chiang Rai Province, Master’s Thesis, Chiang Mai University. Pikulthong, D. (2010) Farmers’ Needs for Agricultural Extension from Extension and Cooperatives Unit, the Third Regional Development Office, Armed Forces Development Command, Independent Study, Chiang Mai University. Prompanjai, A. (2015) Thai Politics under General Prem Tinsulanonda: Political Management, 1980–​88, PhD Thesis, Chulalongkorn University. Rasmussen, M. (1999) The Military Role in Internal Defense and Security: Some Problems, Monterey: Naval Postgraduate School.

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EIGHT

Parliamentary committees, legislative supporting agencies and policy advice Tatchalerm Sudhipongpracha

Introduction The Thai parliament is notorious for its contentious power struggle and low-​ quality debates. The role of policy analysis in parliamentary work is questionable. Based on a series of interviews with senators, members of the House of Representatives and parliamentary administrators, the central argument of this chapter is that Thai parliamentarians have attempted to incorporate policy analysis tools into their legislative tasks. However, their attempt is hampered by the fusion-​of-​power parliamentary system and the current constitution that is premised against elected officials. Furthermore, the research and administrative services provided by the parliamentary administration are limited, worsening the information asymmetry between the executive and legislative branches. Political journalists in Thailand enjoy an annual tradition of giving satirical names to politicians occupying top leadership positions in government.1 In 2021, ‘parasites’ and ‘termites’ were chosen to mock the two chambers of the national legislative branch. Members of the House of Representatives or members of parliament (MPs) were dubbed ‘termites in a rut’ as they always appeared to keep themselves busy with their political survival and power struggle at the expense of the public interest. Parliamentary debates and committee meetings were frequently disrupted by a lack of quorum (Bangkok Post, 2019). On the other hand, the senators appointed by the former National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO)2 were described as ‘parasites’ due to their connection to the senior junta figures and their insidious manoeuvring of the legislative process to ensure continuity of the NCPO’s work (Bangkok Post, 2019). The two monikers suggest that both the upper and lower houses of the Thai parliament did not take their duties seriously. Policy analysis in the Thai parliament seems out of the question. Contrary to the political satire, this chapter argues that Thai senators and MPs have attempted to incorporate policy analysis tools into their work. However, the legislators’ use of evidence in legislative agenda setting may appear uncommon or even unlikely in the public eye for two reasons. First, while the national legislature in a parliamentary democracy is regarded as an institution whose primary task is to legislate, modern parliaments are more concerned with advancing (or scrutinising if a parliamentarian belongs to a minority party) the legislative agenda put forth by the executive branch (Bräuninger and Debus, 2009). The executive branch commands 155

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a parliamentary majority, sets the legislative agenda and gets its bills passed without difficulty (Norton, 1990; Döring and Hallerberg, 2004). Further, as Rozenberg and Surel (2018) observe, not all parliamentary activities require policy analysis. Some are based on compromises. Others, such as oral questions and vote of confidence debates, call for nothing but bad faith in government. However, this chapter argues that shaping legislative outcomes is not the only goal for Thai parliamentarians, particularly the opposition MPs. They do not criticise the government’s bills for the sake of derailing them. Neither do they propose bills with the hope of getting them passed. Instead, their legislative proposals are intended to spur public discourse and communicate to the public that alternatives to the government’s agenda exist. Policy analysis tools, such as stakeholder interviews and statistical analyses, are used to make these alternatives appear viable and attractive. However, since these alternatives rarely get translated into action because they do not directly come from the executive branch, the general public has limited knowledge of them, and the policy analysis tools used to produce them. Second, the current constitution harbours distrust and disdain towards elected representatives (Pongsudhirak, 2017). It curtails much of the parliamentary oversight authority. The decline of the Thai parliament coincides with the ‘de-​ parliamentarisation’ phenomenon or erosion of parliamentary control over the executive branch around the world (Siefken and Schüttemeyer, 2013; Martin et al, 2014; Yamamoto, 2014; Khmelko et al, 2020). An important aspect of this phenomenon is the information asymmetry between the executive branch and the legislature that weakens parliamentary scrutiny of the government in power. In Thailand, this information asymmetry has been exacerbated by the 2020 constitutional court ruling that took away the parliamentary committees’ subpoena power. Thus, weakened by the parliament’s limited in-​house research support and stripped of their constitutional authority, Thai parliamentarians find it difficult to carry out meaningful analyses of the government’s bills and policies. The rest of this chapter proceeds in the following order. First, it introduces a conceptual framework for scrutinising policy analysis in the Thai parliament and then describes the cases in this study and the data collection process. Second, the chapter analyses the structure of each legislative chamber in Thailand and the functions that may require policy analysis. This section focuses on how the current constitution has deprived the parliament of its legislative and oversight powers. Third, the parliament’s administrative capacity is discussed, particularly the policy analysis support services for senators and MPs. Finally, the chapter summarises the factors with a significant impact on the level of policy analysis in the Thai parliament.

Conceptual framework and methodology Conceptual framework Policy analysis refers to ‘professionally provided advice relevant to public decisions and informed by social values’ (Weimer and Vining, 2017: 9). Such advice 156

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comes from a process of multidisciplinary inquiry designed to create, assess and communicate policy-​relevant information (Dunn, 2016: 2). The traditional scholarship on research utilisation (for example, Lasswell, 1971; Weiss, 1979; Weiss and Bucuvalas, 1980; Webber, 1987) and more recent studies (for example, Al-​Ubaydli et al, 2021; Chhetri and Zacarias, 2021) have pointed out that policy analysis plays a crucial role in public policy making. On the one hand, policy analysis is assumed to produce scientific evidence to improve policy (Sager, 2007; Isett et al, 2016). On the other, the evidence from policy analysis can be used by politicians, interest groups and government agencies to advance political, rather than instrumental, causes (Boswell, 2009; Parkhurst, 2016; Newman, 2017; Schlaufer, 2018). The political use of evidence is not necessarily antithetical to democratic discourse but can strengthen it by ‘increasing the focus on policy and raising the levels of justifications, responsiveness, and respect’ (Schlaufer et al, 2018: 647). Based on these streams of literature, this chapter adopts a broad definition of policy analysis pertinent to the legislative branch. Parliamentary or legislative policy analysis relies on a wide range of information sources and analytical techniques (for example, statistics, programme evaluation, opinion survey, expert interview, stakeholder analysis) to support the parliamentary functions. The conceptual framework in this study analyses two issues related to policy analysis in the Thai parliament (Figure 8.1). First, this study examines the parliamentary structures and functions that give Thai parliamentarians the opportunity to incorporate policy analysis tools in their work. Emphasis will also be placed on the impact of current constitutional provisions on how the parliamentarians fulfil their duties

Figure 8.1: Conceptual framework

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by using evidence. Second, this study analyses the research and administrative support system for senators and MPs, including the internal services provided by the parliament and assistance from external experts and political parties. Case selection and data collection This chapter specifically focuses on policy analysis in the 12th Senate and the 25th House of Representatives, both of which are the first legislative chambers under the 2017 Constitution and began their terms after the 2019 general election. Although the 2017 Constitution has been criticised for weakening the parliament’s oversight and legislative authorities (Lertchoosakul, 2020), the author aims to examine whether and how the senators and MPs have utilised available resources to perform their constitutional duties. To collect data for this study, the author conducted face-​to-​face and online interviews with a total of 12 individuals, including two senators, five MPs, two senior officials from the Secretariat of the Senate, and three senior officials from the Secretariat of the House of Representatives. The interviewees in this study were given the definitions of policy analysis as previously described and were then asked questions about the parliamentary functions that require policy analysis and the research and administrative support for senators and MPs. To supplement the interview data, the author also gathered secondary data from the Standing Rules of the Senate, B.E. 2562 (Secretariat of the Senate, 2019), and the Standing Rules of the House of Representatives, B.E. 2562 (Secretariat of the House of Representatives, 2019).

Parliamentary structures, functions and opportunities to incorporate policy analysis tools Under the 2017 Constitution, the Thai parliament is a bicameral legislature with a 250-​member Senate and a 500-​member House of Representatives (Figure 8.2). Members of the Senate are selected from ten social and professional groups determined by Organic Law on the Selection of Members of the Senate, B.E. 2561 (2018). Members of the House of Representatives are divided into two groups. The first group, consisting of 350 members, is elected by the first-​ past-​the-​post electoral system. The second group (150 members) comes from the proportional representation system. An important mechanism of the 2017 Constitution designed to ensure the continuity of the NCPO’s work is its transitional provision, which enabled the NCPO to handpick members of the entire Senate. This transitional Senate serves a full five-​year term and joins the House of Representatives in choosing the prime minister after a general election. Although the Senate cannot initiate a no-​confidence motion against the executive branch, the transitional provision empowers the appointed Senate to monitor and accelerate the government’s implementation of the national reform plan and the national strategy. 158

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Figure 8.2: Structure of the Thai parliament

‘Question time’: still an oversight instrument? The Senate and the House of Representatives, under the 2017 Constitution, have two important instruments to request information from government agencies. One of the commonly and frequently used instruments is a parliamentary question by which senators and MPs ask oral and written questions to the prime minister or ministers to gain information on a government programme or to scrutinise government actions. In Thailand, the so-​called ‘question time’ occurs on the floor of each chamber while the parliament is sitting and is broadcast live on 159

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television and social media platforms. The 2019 Standing Rules of the House of Representatives have also created a new parliamentary question category (‘specific question’), which allows MPs to pose questions about specific government projects and constituencies. Contrary to the oral and written questions that are asked and answered on the floor of the lower house, the ‘specific question’ session is held in a separate session. Typically, the parliamentary questions are subject to less party control and procedural constraints than other oversight instruments (for example, motion of no-​confidence) (Martin, 2011). In some countries (for example, Belgium, the Netherlands), the parliamentary questions can be used to scrutinise a certain policy, require justification from an individual government minister, and lead to a vote of no-​confidence. In Thailand, the parliamentarians have been actively using this oversight instrument since parliamentary democracy was restored in 2019.3 However, under the current constitution, the prime minister and ministers can refuse to answer questions posed by senators and MPs if they view the questions as threatening to ‘safety and vital interest of the State’ (Thai Constitution, article 7, § 4, cl. 150). Since the constitution provides no definitive guidelines to determine what ‘safety and vital interest of the state’ constitute, it appears unlikely that ‘question time’ would enable Thai parliamentarians to obtain information for policy analysis and scrutinise government actions.4 However, almost all MPs in this study do not seem to view ‘question time’ as an oversight instrument to hold the executive branch accountable.5 Instead, they use the parliamentary questions to “tell stories about our constituencies”6 and “make public statements about our political and ideological positions”.7 Empirical evidence is regularly used during ‘question time’ to convince others of a political position and never presented “just as facts”.8 Therefore, just as ‘question time’ has lost its value as an oversight mechanism under the current constitution, it has gradually become a tool for democratic discourse. Evidence is incorporated into the stories and narratives in the parliamentarians’ questions. Parliamentary committees: ‘council of paper tigers’ The Thai parliament relies on committees as its central mechanism of making laws and shaping public policies. Though regulated by each house’s standing rules, the number of committees, appointment of committee members, terms of office, functions and procedure of conducting business are similar. There are two basic types of committees: standing and ad hoc committees. Standing committees are permanent committees established under the standing rules of each house and specialising in particular subject areas, such as public health, local administration and energy. Currently, there are 27 standing committees in the Senate and 35 standing committees in the House of Representatives (see Table 8.1). Ad hoc committees are created on an ad hoc basis as each house deems necessary9 to review bills or consider motions put forward by the parliamentarians. These ad hoc committees are dissolved after they complete their assigned tasks. 160

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Table 8.1: Standing committees in the Senate and the House of Representatives of Thailand The Senatea

The House of Representatives

1. Committee on Poverty and Inequality Reduction 2. Committee on Sports 3. Committee on Agriculture and Cooperatives 4. Committee on Transportation 5. Committee on Economics, Monetary Affairs, and Finance 6. Committee on Foreign Affairs 7. Committee on Armed Forces and State Security 8. Committee on Tourism 9. Committee on Local Administration 10. Committee on Administration of State Affairs 11. Committee on Energy 12. Committee on Political Development and Public Participation 13. Committee on Social Development, Children, Youth, Women, Elderly, Persons with Disabilities, and Vulnerable Populations 14. Committee on Laws, Justice, and Police Affairs 15. Committee on Labour 16. Committee on Higher Education, Science, Research, and Innovation 17. Committee on Information Technology and Communication, and Telecommunication 18. Committee on Religion, Morality, Ethics, Arts, and Culture 19. Committee on Education 20. Committee on Public Health 21. Committee on Independent Agency Affairs 22. Committee on Natural Resources and Environment 23. Committee on Studying and Inspecting Corruption, Misconduct, and Promoting Good Governance 24. Committee on Commerce and Industry 25. Committee on Human Rights and Consumer Protection 26. Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review 27. Committee on Monitoring, Recommending and Accelerating National Reform and the Preparation and Implementation of the National Strategyb 28. Ad Hoc Senate Committee on Rules and Administrationc 29. Ad Hoc Committee on Protecting and Upholding the Monarchyd

1. Committee on Law Enforcement, Justice, and Human Rights 2. Committee on Rules and Administration 3. Committee on Court of Justice Affairs, Independent Agencies, Public Prosecutors, State Enterprises, Public Organisations, and Public Funds 4. Committee on Sports 5. Committee on Children, Youth, Women, Elderly, Persons with Disabilities, Ethnic Groups, and Gender-​ diverse Persons 6. Committee on Reducing Household Debt 7. Committee on Agriculture and Cooperatives 8. Committee on Transportation 9. Committee on National Security, Border Affairs, National Strategy, and Reform 10. Committee on Consumer Protection 11. Committee on Monetary and Fiscal Policies, Financial Institutions, and Money Market 12. Committee on Foreign Affairs 13. Committee on Police Affairs 14. Committee on Budget and Fiscal Review 15. Committee on the Armed Forces 16. Committee on Tourism 17. Committee on Land, Natural Resources, and Environment 18. Committee on Public Administration 19. Committee on Decentralisation, Local Government, and Special Administrative Areas 20. Committee on the Prevention and Suppression of Money Laundering and Narcotics 21. Committee on the Prevention and Mitigation of Natural Disasters and Hazards 22. Committee on the Prevention and Suppression of Corruption and Misconduct 23. Committee on Energy 24. Committee on Political Development, Mass Communication, and Public Participation 25. Committee on Economic Development 26. Committee on Commerce and Intellectual Property 27. Committee on Labour 28. Committee on Science, Technology, Research, and Innovation 29. Committee on Agricultural Commodity Prices 30. Committee on Religion, Arts, and Culture 31. Committee on Education 32. Committee on Social Welfare 33. Committee on Public Health 34. Committee on Communication, Telecommunication, Digital Economy, and Society 35. Committee on Industry

Note: a Based on the 2019 Senate Standing Rule No. 77. b Created by the Senate Standing Rule No. 175 in pursuance of the 2017 Constitution (Thai Constitution, article 16, cl. 270). c Created by the Senate Standing Rule No. 81. d Created by the Senate Standing Rule No. 82.

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In most parliamentary democracies, standing and ad hoc committees are important arenas of legislative decision-​making and the entire public policy process. The literature on legislative decision-​making has explored the role of policy analysis in parliamentary committees’ activities and has identified factors that determine the extent to which evidence is used in committees’ decision-​ making process (for example, Auerswald, 2017; Mills and Selin, 2017; Geddes, 2018, 2021; Beswick and Elstub, 2019; Hendriks and Kay, 2019; LSE GV314 Group, 2020). The first factor is how much authority parliamentary committees can conduct classified oversight, subpoena witnesses who must testify under oath, and have staff and information resources at their disposal (Auerswald, 2017; Geddes, 2018). In a separation of power system (for example, the United States), congressional committees wield considerable constitutional powers over the federal government’s agenda-​setting, budgetary and legislative processes, as well as executive appointments (Marsh and Halpin, 2015). In the Thai parliamentary system where the legislative and executive branches are fused, most committees in the House of Representatives are under the control of government coalition parties. Similarly, committees in the Senate –​the supposedly non-​partisan chamber under the 2017 Constitution –​are controlled by NCPO-​appointed senators. Due to this fusion-​of-​power system and the composition of the Senate, the parliamentary committees’ law-​and policy-​shaping roles have been limited.10 Also, since the current constitution prohibits parliamentarians from getting involved in the internal operations of executive agencies,11 the two chambers’ standing rules greatly restrict their respective committees’ access to internal government documents.12 In October 2020, the Constitutional Court dealt a major blow to the parliamentary privilege by declaring the committees’ subpoena power unconstitutional.13 The second factor is the parliamentary committees’ degree of independence in legislative work (Polsby, 1975). Comparing parliamentary systems in different countries, Steffani (1979) differentiated between ‘working parliaments’ and ‘debating parliaments’. Based on this classification, committees in working parliaments focus on transforming proposals to laws, while debating parliaments place emphasis on debates and discussions. The Thai parliament is an example of a debating parliament where law-​making and policy analysis are less important than debates and discussions. All five MPs in this study pointed out that under the current constitution, MPs and senators cannot actively engage in government agenda-​setting and legislative work. Instead, committees, especially the standing committees, have become “a grievance redressal mechanism for citizens and a debate arena for the parliamentarians”.14 This point echoes previous and subsequent chapters of this book that have explained about the stronger roles of bureaucracy, the military, elite networks and central administrative agencies in the policy analysis and policy-​making processes of Thailand. The third factor is the scope of the parliamentary committees. As Santos (2013) observed in the Brazilian parliament, a standing committee with a broad 162

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scope handles a higher workload and faces more difficulty in conducting an in-​depth analysis of proposed legislations than an ad hoc committee with a specific mandate. Likewise, the ad hoc committees in the Thai parliament are more likely than the standing committees to perform analyses of bills and public policy issues.15 However, due to their limited constitutional power, the ad hoc committees struggle to collect data and ask persons to testify.16 The committees led by the opposition parties have been relatively unsuccessful in turning their policy research findings into legislation.17

Research and administrative services for parliamentarians Research and administrative services for parliamentarians have been central to the parliamentary reform discourse and capacity-​building efforts around the world (Wolfs and De Winter, 2017; Obaidullah, 2019). Many countries have sought to enhance parliamentary research and administrative capacity to overcome the information asymmetry between the legislative and executive branches. The goal is to strengthen the checks and balances in the public sector. In Thailand, the executive branch enjoys an advantageous position over the legislative branch in terms of resources, information and expertise. The parliament’s heavy reliance on information from the government, in particular, has compromised its oversight authority. Similar to other parliaments around the world, the Thai parliament has adopted measures to increase its staff levels and policy analysis capacity.18 Parliamentary capacity building is a political process. As Wolfs and De Winter (2017) argue, how the parliament’s internal services are organised reflects a particular normative view of how the parliament should function. That is, should the parliament strengthen its capacity to address each parliamentarian’s individual/​ partisan interests or the parliament’s collective demands? Not every parliament has addressed partisan and collective interests equally. A number of factors contribute to these differences, particularly each country’s political and electoral systems. This section explores the research and administrative support services for the parliamentarians in Thailand’s fusion-​of-​power system. Personal staff of individual members of parliament According to the Parliamentary Rules for the Appointment of Experts and Personal Assistants of Members of Parliament, B.E. 2554 (2011), a maximum of eight persons can be appointed as the personal staff of each senator and MP. These include one policy expert, two chief administrative assistants and five administrative assistants that are directly paid by the parliament. However, the 2011 rules do not provide a specific job description for each of these positions. Instead, their job descriptions appear in handbooks assembled by the Secretariat of the Senate and the Secretariat of the House of Representatives. The policy experts serve as advisors on legislative matters. The chief administrative assistants support senators and MPs in legislative tasks, such as preparing motions, drafting 163

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bills and analysing public policy issues. The administrative assistants help manage the senators and MPs’ daily schedules and other administrative tasks. Yet, in practice, these job descriptions are not strictly adhered to.19 Some political parties use the administrative assistant positions as consolation prizes for their party members who lost in the 2019 general election.20 In other words, MPs who belong to these parties do not choose their own administrative assistants and may not even be assisted by these party-​appointed administrative assistants. Two senators and several MPs in this study lamented that the parliamentary rules have made it difficult to find qualified individuals to fill the policy expert and chief administrative assistant positions.21 For instance, government bureaucrats and university professors with specialised technical expertise cannot be appointed as policy experts. As a result, some senators and MPs have chosen not to appoint policy experts, while many are left with underqualified policy experts.22 General parliamentary services In contrast to the parliamentarians’ personal staff, whose responsibility is partisan in nature, policy analysts in the parliamentary administration are expected to take a non-​partisan approach (Zaal, 2014). Parliamentary administrators (that is, appointed officials in the parliamentary bureaus and offices) should uphold scientific standards and avoid producing policy analyses that serve a particular legislator’s ideology (Lee, 2009). Marschall (2013) argues that this expectation places the parliamentary administrators in a complex situation where they must balance conflicting political, institutional and professional accountabilities. Motivated by an attempt to overcome the information asymmetry between the executive and legislative branches in Thailand, the Secretariat of the Senate and the Secretariat of the House of Representatives have sought to strengthen their internal research services over the past few years. Currently, policy analysts work for the parliament in the Parliamentary Bureau of Research, the Parliamentary Budget Office, the Parliamentary Bureau of Legal Affairs and the Bureaus of Parliamentary Committees. The analytical agendas of these offices are set primarily by the parliamentary leadership, but sometimes also by committees.23 However, whether the Thai parliament has actually been able to overcome the executive-​legislative information asymmetry through strengthening policy support by the parliamentary administration remains in doubt.24 Despite an attempt to increase staff levels, the two parliamentary secretariats’ overall research capacity is still limited because they heavily depend on the executive branch for resources.25 Policy analysts make up only a minority of the parliament’s workforce. As a result, providing high-​quality policy analysis continues to be a challenge. As a senior parliamentary official emphasised in an interview, the budget and personnel designated to conduct policy analysis determines the quality of policy support provided for the parliamentarians. The more parliamentary administrators can engage in policy analysis, the more they can provide better research support.26 164

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Another observation is that the Thai parliamentary administrators’ role is confined to procedural work, such as preparing for meetings and writing meeting minutes. Even those deployed to do policy analysis are primarily involved in the data collection stage.27 They do not conduct their own primary research or are involved in drafting legislative paperwork.28 In most cases, they search for secondary data and compare research reports produced by other institutions.29

Conclusion This chapter has given an overview of the structures of the Senate and the House of Representatives, as well as the functions that may allow the parliamentarians to incorporate policy analysis tools in their work. These functions include the parliamentary ‘question time’ and parliamentary committees. The former enables parliamentarians to scrutinise the executive branch and acquire information necessary for their legislative tasks, while the latter is an important mechanism to make laws and shape public policies. This chapter also dedicated a section to the parliament’s research and administrative services, including the personal staff, for each individual parliamentarian and general research services offered by the parliamentary administration. As mentioned in the introduction, comparing Thai senators and MPs to ‘parasites’ and ‘termites in a rut’ is too simplistic and misses the bigger picture of political and constitutional contexts that lurk behind the Thai parliamentary work. The fusion-​of-​power parliamentary system in Thailand coupled with the current constitution have a significant impact on the level of policy analysis used in the parliament. Under the 2017 Constitution, the prime minister and government ministers are not obliged to respond to the parliamentary questions posed by the senators and MPs. The parliamentarians are also prohibited from direct and indirect involvement in governmental affairs. Even parliamentary committees have lost their subpoena power, which was a crucial tool to acquire internal government information for their analyses of proposed legislation and public policy issues. As a result, the Thai parliament has been left with limited oversight authority and become a ‘debating parliament’ where debates take precedence over policy analysis. The number of staff and the institutional structure of the Thai parliament also determine the role of policy analysis in the legislative process. Despite efforts to strengthen the parliament’s research and administrative support capacity, the Thai parliament still has considerable information disadvantages compared to the executive branch. The lack of resources and limited number of research staff hamper parliamentary policy analysis. In sum, the political system and constitutional framework in Thailand have systematically turned the senators and MPs into ‘parasites’ and ‘termites in a rut’. They do not become parasitic, indolent and occupied with their own survival by choice. This chapter has demonstrated that the Thai parliamentarians have tried to use what they have to stimulate democratic discourse and communicate to the 165

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electorate that alternatives to the executive branch’s policy proposals are available. In sum, the legislative branch requires significantly more capacity building, resources and support to fully function as a key institution of the policy analysis process that can check and balance the executive branch and that can provide alternative views and direction of public policies. Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

The tradition was paused after the 2014 military coup d’état and did not resume until after the 2019 general election. Official name for the military junta that ruled Thailand from the 2014 coup d’état to 2019. Based on interviews with three opposition MPs on 15 September 2020 and a senator on 24 November 2020. From an interview with an opposition MP on 26 August 2020. From interviews with two MPs from the government coalition parties on 19 August 2020 and three opposition MPs on 15 September 2020. Direct quote from an MP from a government coalition party interviewed on 19 August 2020. Direct quote from an opposition MP interviewed on 15 September 2020. Direct quote from an MP from a government coalition party interviewed on 19 August 2020. Two ad hoc committees are created by the Standing Rules of the Senate, B.E. 2562 (Secretariat of the Senate, 2019): (1) the ad hoc committee on rules and administration; and (2) the ad hoc committee on protecting and upholding the monarchy. From interviews with two MPs from the government coalition parties on 19 August 2020 and three opposition MPs on 15 September 2020. See Article 9, Clause 185 of the Constitution. See the Senate Standing Rule No. 90 and the House of Representatives Standing Rule No. 97. See the Constitutional Court’s decision (32/​2562). Direct quote from an interview with an opposition MP on 26 August 2020 (translated into English by the author). Based on interviews with two MPs from the government coalition parties on 19 August 2020, three opposition MPs on 15 September 2020 and two senators on 22 December 2020. Based on an interview with an opposition MP on 26 August 2020. Based on interviews with three opposition MPs on 15 September 2020. From an interview with three senior officials from the Secretariat of the House of Representatives on 22 September 2020. Based on interviews with two MPs from the government coalition parties on 19 August 2020. Based on interviews with three opposition MPs on 15 September 2020. Based on interviews with two MPs from the government coalition parties on 19 August 2020, three opposition MPs on 15 September 2020 and two senators on 22 December 2020. Interviews with two MPs from the government coalition parties on 19 August 2020. Based on an interview with a senior official in the Secretariat of the House of Representatives on 20 August 2020. Based on interviews with a senior official in the Secretariat of the House of Representatives and a senior official in the Secretariat of the Senate on 20 August 2020. Based on interviews with a senior official in the Secretariat of the House of Representatives and a senior official in the Secretariat of the Senate on 20 August 2020. Based on an interview with a senior official in the Secretariat of the House of Representatives on 20 August 2020. Based on interviews with a senior official in the Secretariat of the House of Representatives and a senior official in the Secretariat of the Senate on 20 August 2020. Based on an interview with a senior official in the Secretariat of the House of Representatives on 20 August 2020.

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Based on an interview with a senior official in the Secretariat of the House of Representatives on 20 August 2020.

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LSE GV314 Group (2020) ‘UK parliamentary select committees: Crowdsourcing for evidence-​based policy or grandstanding?’, The Journal of Legislative Studies, 26(2): 223–​247. Marschall, S. (2013) ‘Parliamentary in-​house research services and policy-​making in Germany: Sancho Panza or David’s sling?’, in S. Blum and K. Schubert (eds) Policy Analysis in Germany, Bristol: Policy Press, pp 149–​160. Marsh, I. and Halpin, D. (2015) ‘Parliamentary committees and inquiries’, in B. Head and K. Croawley (eds) Policy Analysis in Australia, Bristol: Policy Press, pp 137–​150. Martin, S. (2011) ‘Using parliamentary questions to measure constituency focus: An application to the Irish case’, Political Studies, 59(2): 472–​488. Martin, S., Saalfeld, T. and Strom, K. (2014) ‘Introduction’, in S. Martin, T. Saalfeld and K. Strom (eds) Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies, London: Oxford University Press, pp 1–​25. Mills, R.W. and Selin, J.L. (2017) ‘Don’t sweat the details! Enhancing congressional committee expertise through the use of detailees’, Legislative Studies Quarterly, 42(4): 611–​636. Newman, J. (2017) ‘Deconstructing the debate over evidence-​based policy’, Critical Policy Studies, 11(2): 211–​226. Norton, P. (ed) (1990) Legislatures, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Obaidullah, A.T.M. (2019) ‘Reorganization of parliament secretariat: Barriers to the capacity development’, in A.T.M. Obaidullah (ed) Institutionalization of the Parliament in Bangladesh: A Study of Donor Intervention for Reorganization and Development, Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 81–​106. Parkhurst, J. (2016) The Politics of Evidence: From Evidence-​Based Policy to the Good Governance of Evidence, New York: Routledge. Polsby, N. (1975) ‘Legislatures’, in F. Greenstein and N. Polsby (eds) Handbook of Political Science, Boston: Addison-​Wesley, pp 257–​319. Pongsudhirak, T. (2017) ‘Challenges, prospects of 2017 constitution’, Bangkok Post, 7 April, available from https://​www.bangk​ okpo ​ st.com/o ​ pini​ on/o ​ pini​ on/​ 1228​316/​cha​llen​ges-​prospe​cts-​of-​2017-​const​itut​ion Rozenberg, O. and Surel, Y. (2018) ‘Beyond weakness: Policy analysis in the French parliament’, in C. Halpern, P. Hassenteufel and P. Zittoun (eds) Policy Analysis in France, Bristol: Policy Press, pp 137–​156. Sager, F. (2007) ‘Habermas’ models of decisionism, technocracy, and pragmatism in times of governance: The relationship of public administration, politics, and science in the alcohol prevention policies of the Swiss member states’, Public Administration, 85(2): 429–​447. Santos, F. (2013) ‘The role of the Brazilian legislature in the public policy decision-​ making process’, in J. Vaitsmain, J. Mendes Ribeiro and L. Lobato (eds) Policy Analysis in Brazil, Bristol: Policy Press, pp 119–​131. Schlaufer, C. (2018) ‘The narrative uses of evidence’, Policy Studies Journal, 46(1): 90–​118.

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Schlaufer, C., Stucki, I. and Sager, F. (2018) ‘The political use of evidence and its contribution to democratic discourse’, Public Administration Review, 78(4): 645–​649. Secretariat of the House of Representatives (2019) Standing Rules of the House of Representatives, B.E. 2562 (2019), Bangkok: Secretariat of the House of Representatives. Secretariat of the Senate (2019) Standing Rules of the Senate, B.E. 2562 (2019), Bangkok: Secretariat of the Senate. Siefken, S.T. and Schüttemeyer, S.S. (2013) ‘The German Bundestag and external expertise: Policy-​orientation as counterweight to deparliamentarization’, in S. Blum and K. Schubert (eds) Policy Analysis in Germany, Bristol: Policy Press, pp 161–​180. Steffani, W. (1979) Parlamentarische un präsidentielle Demokratie: Strukturelle Aspekte westlicher Demokratien, Opladen Westdeutscher verlag. Webber, D.J. (1987) ‘Legislators’ use of policy information’, American Behavioral Scientist, 30(6): 612–​631. Weimer, D. and Vining, A. (2017) Policy Analysis: Concepts and Practice, London: Routledge. Weiss, C.H. (1979) ‘The many meanings of research utilization’, Public Administration Review, 39(5): 426–​431. Weiss, C.H. and Bucuvalas, M.J. (1980) ‘Truth tests and utility tests: Decision-​ makers’ frames of reference for social science research’, American Sociological Review, 45: 302–​313. Wolfs, W. and De Winter, L. (2017) ‘Policy analysis in the legislative branch’, in M. Brans, I. Geva-​May and M. Howlett (eds) Routledge Handbook of Comparative Policy Analysis, New York: Routledge, pp 199–​212. Yamamoto, H. (2014) ‘Parliamentary reform and good governance: Theoretical basis and the relationship between the government and parliament in Japan’, in Y.N. Zheng, L.L. Fook and W. Hofmeister (eds) Parliaments in Asia: Institution Building and Political Development, Abingdon: Routledge, pp 155–​184. Zaal, K. (2014) ‘Policy analysis in the Dutch Parliament’, in F. Nispen and P. Scholten (eds) Policy Analysis in the Netherlands, Bristol: Policy Press, pp 171–​186.

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The role of expert policy advisory boards, consultants and think tanks in policy analysis Ora-​orn Poocharoen, Patamawadee Jongruck, Phanuphat Chattragul and Malinee Khumsupa

Introduction This chapter provides a broad picture of the role of policy advisory boards, consultants and think tanks in Thailand’s public policy ecosystem. Utilising the concept first proposed by Howlett and Migone (2017) on the role of policy consultants or the ‘consultocracy’ in the ‘policy advice system’, this chapter explores the types of policy advisory boards, consultants and think tanks, including their magnitudes of power and influence in Thailand. The first part of this chapter provides an analysis of the role of foreign advisors or consultants prior to 1932, before Thailand’s transition to the modern-​day constitutional monarch system. The role of international consultants or experts was a phenomenon in shaping Thailand’s modern administration. Thus, despite not having been colonised by the British or other Western powers at the time, Thailand modernised in the same direction as the West. The second part of this chapter covers the emergence and typologies of modern-​day policy advisory boards, consultants and think tanks between 1932 and 2020. Data is drawn from publicly available statistics of consultants, individuals and organisations that have been hired for various public projects. Such statistics are available through procurement and registration systems managed by the Ministry of Finance. It gives the picture of how consultants and advisors are highly influential and important in Thailand’s policy networks today. The third section provides a discussion on the historical view as well as the contemporary view of the role of consultants in Thailand. We see traces of historical influence in consultants’ roles today. Critical discussion is made on the implications of viewing consultants as policy actors. Consultants should be held accountable for their services; they should be regarded as a profession, and they should not perpetuate the noble aristocratic role of elites in the past. There are optimistic opportunities for the healthy development of advisory boards, consultants and think tank ecosystems for Thailand. With the digital technologies of today, policy data and knowledge are no longer scarce resources, and there is a need to develop innovative ways to better integrate, share and 170

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utilise policy knowledge for better sound policy designs and management. Policy advisory boards, consultants and think tanks will continue to have important roles to play in this regard.

Historical view of the emergence of consultants Historically, since the beginning of the building of the modern nation-​state of Thailand, advisors and consultants have been drawn on extensively. This section focuses on the historical events during Rama V’s reign (1868–​1910) where international advisors and a handful of key domestic actors were heavily relied upon to set up a modern Thailand, including the judicial system, the police and foreign policy. This historical institutionalism approach helps us to better understand the role and power of international advisors and the ruling class up until today, which includes the role of multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank, and key domestic institutions of the present. It also sheds light on the path of dependency that certain policy advice has created for modern-​day Thailand. Prelude Advisors and consultants have been influential in shaping Thailand for centuries. Their existence can be traced back to the Siamese court, between 1681 and 1932 (Nakiraks, 1981). During this time, ordinary people were not involved in government or public affairs. Starting from the founding of Bangkok and the establishment of the Chakri dynasty, only nobles and experts hailing from Ayutthaya were allowed to shape the new capital. Not only the image of Ayutthaya was restored, but the form of Ayutthaya government also followed. Bangkok continued to grow based on patronage and personal ties between important families and the Chakri royalty. In the early Rattanakosin period (Rama I to Rama IV –​1782–​1873), the great nobles dominated the central administration, in particular the Bunnag family, who had been Rama I’s retainer since the Thonburi period (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2014: 29). During the Rama IV and Rama V’s era, between 1851 and 1899, the Kingdom of Siam was fiercely challenged with both opportunities and threats from the West. The interactions with the West brought Siam new types of knowledge, especially ideas of progress and modern technology. Rama IV himself was fascinated by this introduction. Before his accession, he and his group learned English and other European languages, printing and mathematical precision of astronomy from the missionaries (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2014). In his reign, scientific thinking started to replace superstition. Nevertheless, the Bunnag household and a group of reformist elites still held power to select the patriarchs (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2014). Nevertheless, the role of great aristocrat families as advisors later declined as the Chakri substituted them with their own sons, most notably during the Rama V to Rama VII period when the royal population was enough to occupy most of the highest-​ranking positions in Siam. 171

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Coupled with opportunities, the arrival of the West threatened Siam. The Bowring Treaty (1855) significantly marked Siam’s bondage to the global free-​ trade capitalism and the era of new imperialism in the 19th century under the monopoly of Western powers (Seton-​Watson, 1971; Wright, 1976). To rescue the monarchy (sovereignty) from Western colonisation, there was an urgent need to replace the Ayutthayan model of guidance with a more Western one. From that period, the Siamese court started to rely on foreign advisors and experts to modernise itself and maintain the kingship of the Chakri (Numnonda, 1974). During Rama IV’s period, foreigners with royal connections were employed as court servants. However, their prominent rise came in the age of the next king (Wright and Breakspear, 1994). In Rama V’s era, the pace of modernisation was accelerated. Rama V started with the intention of making tremendous changes in the state bureaucracy. In the late 1870s, the king and his brothers took up roles in the arduous task of implementing reforms (Webster, 1998). For example, the government declared its intention to eventually abolish the system of farming taxes. In 1873, the king appointed an official who was to take charge of all finances, regularise tax collection and oversee the necessary appointment of supervisory officers in the office (Vella, 1955). Furthermore, Rama V’s rule had further embedded the role of ‘consultocracy’ in Thai political culture and the modern nation-​state. Like his predecessors, the high-​born or nobles (phu di)1 with the right connections were appointed as consultants. Those high-​born also extended to foreign consultants. Foreign consultants, such as Gustave Rolin-​Jaequemyns, Émile Jottrand and Henry Alabaster, all held high positions before entering the Siamese court to set up the judicial system and map-​making. Along with the appearance of foreign advisors, the royal bloodline grew. The descendants of the Chakri were able to overshadow the aristocrats, such as the Bunnag, in governance. Thanks to the practice of royal polygamy as well as incest, Rama V had many half-​siblings and sons. They were sent abroad to the West and came back as ‘fathers of modern sciences’. These included Damrong Rajanubhab as the father of Thai history and archaeology, Mahidol Adulyadej as the father of modern medicine and Raphi Phatthanasak as the father of Thai law. On the other hand, other lower positions were also secured for phu di who were either from the great households or the nouveau riche with better connections. Path dependency of the consultocracy Before 1932, the family that one was born into largely determined one’s success and destiny. As a part of Rama V’s modernisation projects, the Privy Council and the State Council, bodies of appointed advisors to the king, were established. These councils were patterned after the West, but they were modified to fit the traditional Thai concepts. The Privy Council was strictly a consultative body. It was not a cabinet in any sense. None of its members had any responsibility for the control of branches or departments of the government. 172

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Members of the Privy Council were supposed only to consult with the king and to brief him on matters that would be discussed in the Council of the State. The Privy Council was under the immediate authority of the king and had no power to draw up legislation and it could make proposals only to the king or the Council of State. The Privy Council met only at the king’s command. Both members of the Privy Council, like those of the Council of State, were chosen by the king. At the time, the Privy Council numbered 49 persons. It was considered an innovation that constituted a radical departure from old governmental customs. Council members were encouraged to make new and independent suggestions and produce new ideas for the king. They gave opinions to the king and gave information on many things that the king did not see or hear (Vella, 1955). This was in stark contrast to the contemporary role of Privy Council members that were expected to preserve traditions, make appearances on behalf of the king and implement projects as directed by the king (see Chapter Six on the role of the monarch for more details). Many policies are initiated from the palace and are managed through the networks of Privy Councils. At the same time, by maintaining informal ties with the British, Siam was successful in providing benefits to the British. This was a major factor in maintaining formal independence (Webster, 1998). It brought about the reformation which happened due to two reasons. First, having a state mechanism of modernisation to protect against abuse of power by the nobles damaging state revenue; and, second, recruiting foreign advisors and officials to reform and maintain the state’s independence (Numnonda, 1976). During colonisation, in order to reach more favourable settlements during the negotiation, and the best way to avoid a crisis, was to look for foreign advisors whom Thailand could rely upon. These foreign advisors not only helped to modernise Siam, but they also prevented Western powers, which looked at Siam’s lesser developed status, from exerting further influence (Numnonda, 1974). Western-​style techniques of operation were adopted, such as the formation of functional ministries, to replace old-​style departments (Vella, 1955). The fiscal autonomy of the departments ended. Ministers were required to submit estimates of expenditures for the upcoming year to the cabinet and the king for approval. Ministers also had to provide monthly accounts of their expenditures (Vella, 1955). In the past, before the reformation in 1892, the former administration of Siam was composed of two prime ministers or Akkraramahasenabodi, one for civilian affairs, the Mahatthai, and the other for the military affairs, the Kalahom. The four supporting ministers are known as the Senabodi and the system was called ‘Chatusadom’, which comprised the Minister of Metropolis (Wieng), the Minister of the Palace (Wang), the Minister of Finance (Khang) and the Minister of Agriculture (Na) (Vella, 1955). Subsequently, the project of reformation, launched by the announcement of the appointment of the 12 ministers in the reign of Rama V, was declared on 1 April 1892. The ministers took responsibility in each ministry such as Foreign Affairs, 173

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Finance, War, Justice, Royal Household, Public Works, Local Government, Agriculture and Public Instruction (Brummelhuis, 2005). These ministers and their councils became a milestone in the development of Thailand’s administrative institutions. Throughout Rama VI’s and VII’s eras, the councils evolved into more complex divisions, yet remained unchanged in essence. These alternations were principally directed by the king who was obsessed with appointing jao2 and phu di as advisors. These jao and phu di were provided with the best education, economic opportunities and social connections available. This upbringing ensured that they and their descendants remained in the higher social and economic class of Thai society. Hence, the councils, despite being regarded as progressive at the time, inevitably sustained the absolutist power of the Chakri dynasty. The culture of the selected ‘consultocracy’ did not exist only in the court. Rama V’s campaign of centralisation also subordinated provincial rulers to the king (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2014). Governors (mostly of royal descent) from Bangkok were appointed and dispersed across the Siamese territory to supervise provincial governance, following the model of colonial cantonment learned from the West. This model of pyramidal governance has survived until today, as all provincial governors of Thailand except Bangkok are appointed by and sent from the central government in Bangkok, the metropole. The appointment and shuffling of provincial governors is managed by the Ministry of Interior (see Chapter Two on methods of policy analysis). Though the court and great families dominated Siam’s progress, they did not have full monopoly. A number of talented Thai citizens were allowed to participate in public affairs. However, they were deprived of the opportunity to rise to high-​level posts (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2014). Thus, it is understood that until 1932, the governing affairs of Siam were exclusively limited to the court. Nevertheless, between Rama VI and Rama VII, foreign advisors gradually withdrew from Siam due to the Great War and the Great Depression, which coincided with the collapse of trades and millers, as well as the growing nationalist movement (Numnonda, 1976; Baker and Phongpaichit, 2014). Siam’s advisory committees were left with the royals and their kin, who were becoming increasingly unpopular due to economic mismanagement. However, royalty still retained most of their power and did not take citizens’ opinions into consideration. Thai students in Europe, who saw the deterioration of the absolute monarchist rule, designed a plot to rectify the situation. In 1927, seven Thai students, from various backgrounds, met in Paris and later formed the People’s Party (Khana Ratsadon). Some of the members comprised of students from diverse family backgrounds including rice-​growing farmers from Ayutthaya (Pridi Banomyong), a durian orchard merchant from Nonthaburi (Pleak Phibunsongkhram) and even a wealthy aristocratic ruler from Battambang (Khuang Aphaiwong). Upon returning from Europe to serve the Siamese court and being granted noble titles, the party accumulated approximately a hundred members by June 1932 (Baker 174

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and Phongpaichit, 2014). On 27 June 1932, they abolished the cabinet of princes and ended Rama VII’s absolute rule. Although the name suggests inclusion, the People’s Party’s decision to end the absolute rule was exclusive. The 1932 revolution appeared to indicate another power transition from the old elites to the new elites (also discussed in Chapter Three). Like many of the coups to come, the 1932 revolution was a power transfer from a group of privileged elites to another while the majority of the people did not take part in the adjustment and chose to carry on as they usually do, probably due to a lack of awareness (Stowe, 1991). Many of these members of the People’s Party rose to the highest political positions. This reflected the remnants of the patron–​client relationship that never disappeared from Thai political culture. The People’s Party hegemonised the drafting of the constitution and steps towards democracy. In addition, the decisions made in this formulation of the constitution were also spearheaded by experts, who, again, did not consider the opinions of the public and opposition, just like the 1932 revolution itself. Thus, the 1932 revolution did not cease the reign of royal-​linked experts. Even after the age of the People’s Party, the experts were still around in shaping new constitutions and institutions. Because they were employed as consultants, they tended to only focus on their assigned tasks and utilise their own thoughts in policy making. Most of the time, they did not consult with the citizens, believing that they were not informed and could not make rational decisions, due to a lack of education and proper training (Stowe, 1991). The culture of top-​down and elite-​led decision-​ making is ingrained in the policy analysis processes of Thailand until today. Post-​Second World War order The aftermath of the Second World War remarkably impacted the momentum of Thailand’s consultancy tradition. The patron–​client relations now shifted away from personal ties towards international politics. The United States rescued Thailand from the defeat of the war and became a pioneer in establishing new institutions and in Thailand’s development. Thailand was brought into the ‘free world’ camp, and progressive economic growth was highlighted as a desirable trait to counter communism. Royalists were brought back by Pridi who appreciated their participation in Seri Thai3 (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2014). Many royalist exiles returned to Thailand at this time. They had common values with the United States of being against communism. They also steadily restored their power in politics. During the period of post-​war turmoil, the Democrat Party was founded by royalists Seni and Kukrit Pramoj to revive the power of the monarch. From the 1950s, anti-​communist law and lèse-​majesté law were utilised as instruments to wipe out the political opposition. This strategy to move away from communism, as well as China, impressed the United States at the start of the Cold War. As a result, Thailand’s military was dramatically improved and strengthened by American funds and assistance. Advisors and consultants at this time were 175

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exclusively drawn from an anti-​communist group of experts. Numerous international organisations started pouring into Thailand, including Americans, who came to fight the war against communism in Indochina. Not only did the United States set their bases and headquarters in Thailand, but their advisors also helped Thailand to reform and run bureaucratic organisations –​ a planning board, a budget bureau, an investment promotion machinery and a restricted central bank. Moreover, to perpetuate their influence, the United States granted numerous higher education scholarships for the new generation of Thai technocrats who later took senior positions at the institutions modelled after the United States and other more developed countries. International institutions were also warmly welcomed. Thailand’s first five-​year development plan, which sets the direction of public policy in the country, was based on a World Bank mission report (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2014). This will be elaborated on in the next section. The American economic patronage of Thailand also gave rise to Thailand’s emerging entrepreneurial class. This group of people, mostly of Chinese descent with the right connections, started to dominate Thailand’s business and politics using their accumulated wealth. Furthermore, capitalism also transformed the forested landscape of Thailand into agrarian lands to feed the global trade and industry. New industries and services relocated to Thailand under the scheme of foreign direct investments which led to mass urbanisation and migration. This demographic shift, however, did not break the ‘consultocracy’ system since the bureaucrats still paid more attention to the experts and business elites rather than others with less political power and money. In sum, Thailand has long been reliant on experts and consultants since the formation of the state. Public policy formulation in Thailand is thus driven by these technocrats whose advice was perceived as valued and credible. From the founding of the Chakri dynasty to the Cold War, Thailand continued to be led by elites. Every change in the political structure resulted from the intention of the elites, both domestically and internationally. The country has never experienced a massive bottom-​up reformation or revolution; instead, it was always a top-​down imposition. Another crucial factor is clientelism. Ordinary people with no connections were ignored and were traditionally seen as ignorant, whether during the drafting of constitutions or even during the Cold War when any departure from the state’s zeitgeist was seen as hostile and, thus, eliminated. Throughout the centuries, the system disables and discourages the participation of the citizens. Therefore, it is not surprising that current policy making in Thailand is still affected by the legacies of path dependency and is more likely to endorse the guidance of experts rather than that of the ‘unqualified’ people.

Contemporary landscape and the role of consultants In current times, there are more diverse types of consultants in Thailand’s public policy ecosystem. These actors are rapidly injecting new methods and frameworks for policy analysis. Many are experts for their technical expertise such 176

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as environmental impact assessments, strategic planning, feasibility studies, and so on. Only a handful seriously consider meta-​scale policy analysis processes and radical new ways of framing and analysing policy problems. This section focuses on the emergence and typologies of these modern-​day policy advisory boards, consultants and think tanks in Thailand. Based on contemporary data, it outlines how the public sector in Thailand relies on consultants. It provides a picture of the extent of the ‘contracted out’ state of Thailand. It also discusses potential new actors and new methods of policy advice that are emerging in Thailand. These new innovative smaller consulting companies, or think tanks, are fast becoming part of the main policy ecosystem. Think tanks are public policy research institutes that generate policy-​oriented research, analysis and advice on domestic and international issues, thereby enabling policy makers and the public to make informed decisions about public policy. Think tanks may be either affiliated or independent institutions that are structured as permanent bodies, not ad hoc commissions (McGann, 2019). There are seven types of think tanks according to their affiliations, namely: 1. Autonomous and independent, which are think tanks that are independent from any specific interest group or donor and autonomous in their operation and funding from the government. 2. Quasi-​independent, which are think tanks that are autonomous from the government but are controlled by an interest group, donor or contracting agency that provides much of the funding and has significant influence over its operations. 3. Government-​affiliated think tanks, which are those funded by the government and are part of the formal structure of government. 4. Quasi-​governmental, which are think tanks that are funded exclusively by government grants and contracts but are not part of the formal structure of the government. 5. University-​affiliated think tanks, which are policy research centres at a university. 6. Political party affiliated think tanks, which are formally affiliated with a political party. 7. Corporate think tanks, are public policy research organisations affiliated with a corporation or merely operating on a for-​profit basis (McGann, 2019). According to the 2018 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report, Thailand currently has 15 think tanks and is ranked in fifth place in terms of number in Southeast Asia, whereas Indonesia has the most think tanks (31) in the region (McGann, 2019). All seven of the aforementioned types of think tanks are present in Thailand. This section will highlight some of the influential think tanks in Thailand according to their affiliations. The first think tank in Thailand is a government-​affiliated think tank. Established in 1950 with support from international organisations, the National 177

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Economic Council was the advisory board that provided national economic development guidance to the government after the 1932 revolution. This entity was later institutionalised as the first governmental think tank, in 1959, and named the Office of the National Economic Development Board. It is the national planning agency under the Office of the Prime Minister that is responsible for developing the five-​year national economic plan. The board launched the nation’s first economic development plan in 1961. The social dimension was later included in the national plan and, therefore, the name of the agency was changed to the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) in 1972. The missions of the NESDB were to: 1. Provide opinions and recommendations on national economic and social development to the cabinet. 2. Scrutinise the National Economic and Social Development Plan and other proposals before they are submitted to the cabinet for consideration. 3. Provide the prime minister with opinions concerning economic and social development issues. 4. Set up the coordination mechanism between the NESDB, concerned agencies and state enterprises regarding the planning and implementation of development programmes and projects (NESDC, nd). In 2018, the NESDB changed to the Office of the National Economic and Social Development Council (NESDC) which is responsible for the aforementioned functions and, additionally, to ensure the compliance of all levels of plans within the 20-​year national strategy (2018–​2038). The NESDC also founded a new research centre, the Public Policy and Development Institute, in the same year. This new centre is responsible for the ‘strategic foresight’ mission and research for decent public policy making (NESDC, 2018). In 2021, NESDC together with United Nations Development Program set up Thailand Policy Lab to foster policy innovations and improve policy ecosystems. The NESDC has been a significant think tank in the country and has had a strong influence on government policies. Especially during turbulent times when government instability affects the country’s direction, the national plan provided by the NESDC has been a crucial map for the country’s social and economic development. The country’s first independent non-​profit think tank is the Thailand Development Research Institute (TDRI). It was established in 1984 with initial financial and technical support from both domestic and international agencies such as the NESDC, the Canadian International Development Agency, the United States Agency for International Development, and some of the leading private companies in Thailand. As such, the TDRI has become one of the most influential autonomous think tanks in the country and the region. According to the 2018 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report, TDRI is considered the best think tank in Thailand and is ranked 16th in Southeast Asia and the Pacific (McGann, 2019). To date, the TDRI has conducted more than 800 research 178

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projects and served both domestic and international public organisations (TDRI, nd). The Thailand Future Foundation (TFF), a recently established independent think tank, aims to be a platform to engage, analyse and inform innovative policies. The TFF’s main area of expertise is strategic research and consultancy, the Future Lab Workshop and the Policy hackathon (TFF, nd). The Institute of Public Policy Studies (IPPS) is an example of a quasi-​ independent think tank that has long been influential in Thailand. Since its founding in 1985, the Institute has been supported by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation. The main IPPS programmes and activities are policy analysis and advocacy, and civic education programmes focusing on participatory democracy and good governance in the public sector and civil society (IPPS, nd). Quasi-​governmental think tanks also play important roles in shaping public policies in Thailand. One of the more dominant quasi-​independent think tanks, King Prajadhipok’s Institute (KPI), was founded in 1998 and is affiliated with and funded by the parliament. It is a legal entity that is not part of the formal structure of government. The president of the parliament is the default chair of the institute. The main objective of this think tank is to promote democracy. The KPI’s major roles are, for example, conducting research on democracy development, facilitating and advancing democracy-​promoting activities, providing information on the country’s democracy, conducting democracy promotion training for government agencies, the private sector and the public, and providing academic information for the parliament (KPI, nd). Given its affiliation with the parliament, the KPI has a relatively important role in policy shaping in Thailand, especially in terms of democratic governance, good governance and local governance. Leading universities also have their own research centres that are considered as public policy think tanks, such as the Institute for the Population and Social Research (IPSR), Mahidol University. Established in 1971, the IPSR is the first population research and training institute in the country that helps to address emerging population issues for Thailand and neighbouring countries (IPSR, nd). The Chula Global Network (CGN), Chulalongkorn University, is another example of a university-​affiliated think tank that functions as the integrator of various research centres within the university and helps to accumulate knowledge and expertise to address the important policy issues (CGN, nd). The Chiang Mai University School of Public Policy is a recent university-​ affiliated think tank that aims to address significant policy issues using critical perspective approaches with a special focus on the Sustainable Development Goals (SPP, nd). There are only a handful of political party affiliated think tanks in Thailand. The Future Innovative Thailand Institute (FIT) is the main politically affiliated think tank that is affiliated with the oldest political party in Thailand, the Democrat Party. Founded in 2013, FIT focuses on policy research related to education, the economy, responsive government and infrastructure, including research on corruption. The FIT also runs youth activities, such as the innovative policy lab, and provides consultancy services (FIT, nd). 179

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Corporate think tanks in Thailand are generally company-​affiliated. Kasikorn Research Center Company Limited (KResearch) is a good example of this type. Launched in 1995 as a legal entity under the Kasikornbank Public Company Limited, the company has conducted economic, business and monetary research for both domestic and international clients (KResearch, nd), which provides useful information for Thailand economic and monetary policies. Apart from think tanks, which are institutionalised entities that have played an important part in Thailand public policy, the roles of individual consultants are also significant in shaping public policy. The following sections will provide contemporary information about consultants in Thailand. According to the ministerial regulation of Ministry of Finance 2019, a consultant refers to a person or juristic person who has a profession or a business which offers consultation services or provides advice within various fields, such as engineering, architecture, urban planning, law, accounting, finances, public finances, the environment, science, technology, public health, arts and culture, and research (Ministry of Finance, 2017). Consultation is an academic service which is not offered on a regular basis. There are three main prerequisites for retaining consultants, according to the Ministry of Finance: 1. The organisation lacks employees with abilities in the desired field, or there is a necessity for personnel with knowledge in various sectors, or there are not enough employees for operations. 2. The organisation desires input or a second opinion from an outside source that can offer opinions freely and without bias. 3. The organisation does not want to increase its manpower, as work is available on temporary basis, or the organisation may not be able to increase its manpower due to limitations regarding available positions. However, retaining a consultant should be done with consideration of how best to maximise the use of existing employees, as well as the development of the skills and knowledge of the organisation’s employees. Consultants in Thailand can be categorised into two main types: (1) international or foreign consultants; and (2) domestic consultants. The domestic consultants must be of Thai nationality and registered with the Consultant Database Center in the Ministry of Finance (nd). Domestic consultants are categorised into six types, namely: 1. Independent consultants: 306 registered consultants 2. Company or partnership consultants: 1,610 registered consultants 3. Educational institution consultants: 110 registered consultants 4. Foundation consultants: 48 registered consultants 5. Association consultants: 42 registered consultants 6. Governmental agency consultants: 17 registered consultants 180

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Although the government’s policy encourages the utilisation of Thai consultants, retaining a foreign consultant may be necessary for specific cases, such as projects that utilise loaned funds and are required to allow open competition, except where it is specified that a Thai consultant is to be utilised. Projects where Thai consultants still lack expertise and experience, such as ones requiring high-​level technology or highly complex skills, involving institutional planning or management planning, and reform projects within the public sector, need an experienced foreign consultant. Foreign consultation firms require high remuneration for both Thai and foreign employees. Therefore, retainment of a foreign consultation firm requires thorough evaluation of appropriateness and value. The domestic consultants need to register with the consultant database centre according to their expertise, which are specified into 20 sectors: 1. AG Agriculture and Rural Development Sector 2. BU Building Sector 3. ED Education Sector 4. EG Energy Sector 5. EV Environment Sector 6. FI Financial Sector 7. HE Health Sector 8. IN Industry Sector 9. PO Population Sector 10. ICT Information and Communication Technology Sector 11. TO Tourism Sector 12. TR Transportation Sector 13. UD Urban Development Sector 14. WS Water Supply and Sanitation Sector 15. LW Law Sector 16. QS Quality Standard Sector 17. MID Management and Institutional Development Sector 18. PR Public Relations Sector 19. RE Research and Evaluation Sector 20. MS Miscellaneous Sector Currently (as of December 2019) there are 2,133 domestic consultants and 7,687 consulting personnel registered with the Ministry of Finance (Consultant Database Center, nd). In 2019 there were 26,866 consulting projects. Figure 9.1 shows the number of consulting projects according to the sector. The top three sectors are the Information and Communication Technology Sector, Building Sector and Industry Sector. Their numbers of consulting projects are 3,010, 2,502 and 2,360, respectively. On the other hand, the sectors with the least number of consulting projects are the Population Sector, Miscellaneous Sector and Health Sector, which have 11, 56 and 167 consulting projects, respectively. 181

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Figure 9.1: Consultant projects in Thailand 4,000 3,500 3000 2,500 2,000 1,500 1,000 500 0 AG BU ED EG EV

FI

HE IN PO ICT TO TR UD WS LW QS MID PR RE MS

Discussion on consultants as a policy actor This third section highlights a critical discussion on the dilemmas and challenges of these policy actors. These organisations and individuals operate formally and informally in the policy ecosystem, with unaccounted power, to influence policy discourses, policy designs and policy management systems. In Thailand, individuals who are appointed as policy advisory board members or are hired as consultants for projects mainly come from the higher education sector or are former public sector leaders. More recently, there has been an increase in appointing or hiring from the private sector. The work of advisory boards and consultants is of interest for several reasons. First, their work is not usually systematically documented. Often, new policy ideas are understood to come from mainstream actors such as cabinet members, the political parties or the ministries, while there are many who are behind the scenes of policy development. The process of policy advising within the complex policy ecosystem is not well understood. Therefore, it is challenging to hold specific people accountable for unsound policies and, similarly, it is challenging to credit people for successful policies. Second, the work of advisors, consultants and think tanks is usually paid work. Thus, there is an inherent dilemma in figuring out who will make the payments (the government, the agency, the leader or the public) for these services and for whom these advisors and consultants are working. Most importantly they receive direct monetary benefit for their recommendations and advice irrespective of the outcome of their advice. They outright directly ‘sell’ their advice to governments. And governments ‘buy’ their advice. In this relationship, with this approach, ‘policy advice’ becomes a commodity. This is in stark contrast to participation, where governments listen to stakeholders’ interests and recommendations. The advice and opinions given by the public and other actors are not considered a ‘commodity’ to be bought and sold, but rather valuable sources of public interest and feedback for the government. In addition, these services are intangible, making them difficult to be tracked and assessed to understand their value for money. Corruption is also rampant in this industry due to its lack of transparency 182

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and protection of clients. It is important that all parties involved agree on broad definitions of various types of consultants, the norms of the profession, and the methods of design to hold consultants accountable. Third, in the context of Thailand, there is a long history of appointing aristocrats and nobles related to the royals and close allies as consultants or advisors to the king or to the governing body of the time. Because Thailand’s administrative foundation is feudalistic and is based on patron–​client relations found in the age-​old monarchy system, the roles of consultants and advisors have also reflected this trajectory of development. The current system described in the previous section depicts how the current advisory system is transitioning towards being more open, systematic and accountable. This fits the idea of modern-​day consultants and advisors in many countries, who are seen as knowledgeable and creditable individuals, who work professionally, are paid for their services (such as research, report writing, convening people, sharing ideas and expertise) and are accountable for the outcomes of their advice. In the case of Thailand, however, in practice, the culture and norms of consultants and advisors still are reminiscent of the past, as described in the first section of this chapter. Consultants, especially those appointed by political positions and ministers, are seen as elites, educated (supposedly), noble, connected and prestigious. To have a consultant or advisor position means you are connected and have power. Sometimes ministers and other high-​ranking politicians use this resource to return favours and, thus, end up appointing unqualified individuals as advisors. This deep-​rooted cultural norm of consultants and advisors being viewed as higher than laypeople perpetuates the hierarchical and patriarchal character of Thai society. This perspective continues to impede the advance of an open, flat, equal ecosystem for the meaningful participation of lay people in policy processes.

Conclusion In sum, this chapter has argued that consultants and advisors have played important roles in the policy ecosystem of Thailand for a very long time. Their role and influence today mirror their roles during the monarchy system. Their roles are also intertwined with global geopolitics, and it continues to be so. In this era of a constitutional-​monarchy system, there are many new players that have emerged in recent years. Digital technology is helping to challenge the monopoly of knowledge and expertise. This signals a possible shakeup or breakup of the traditional ‘consultocracy’ that has dominated Thailand. It is hoped that being a professional consultant will be considered a career that requires proper qualifications and expertise, and that anyone can join the policy ecosystem, regardless of background. The road ahead is still long, but there are noticeable improvements overall. Notes 1

‘Good people’; the aristocracy. 183

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A lord; a ruler; and member of the royal family. A Thai underground resistance movement against Imperial Japan during the Second World War, also known as the Free Thai Movement.

References Baker, C. and Phongpaichit, P. (2014) A History of Thailand, Singapore: C.O.S Printers Pte Ltd. Brummelhuis, H.T. (2005) King of the Waters: Homan van der Heide and the Origin of Modern Irrigation in Siam, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. CGN (nd) ‘Home’, available from http://​www2​0100​324.chula.ac.th/​chul​ aglo​bal/​ Consultant Database Center, Ministry of Finance (nd) ‘Consultant Database Center’, available from https://​www.con​sult​ant.pdmo.go.th/​index.php FIT (nd) ‘About us’, available from https://​www.fit.or.th/​about-​us/​ Howle tt, M . and M igone, A. (2 0 17 ) ‘1 0 . T h e ro l e o f p o l ic y consultants: “Consultocracy” or business as usual’, in M. Howlett, A. Wellstead and J. Craft (eds) Policy Work in Canada: Professional Practices and Analytical Capacities in Canada’s policy advisory system, Toronto: University of Toronto Press, pp 155–​182. IPPS (nd) ‘Institute of Public Policy Studies’, available from https://​www.fpps. or.th/​index.php?topic=​about​ipps​eng IPSR (nd) ‘About Institute for Population and Social Research’, available from https://​ipsr.mahi​dol.ac.th/​en/​about-​us/​ KPI (nd) ‘King Prajadhipok’s Institute’, available from https://​www.kpi.ac.th/​ about/​act KResearch (nd) ‘Company background’, available from https://​www.kasik​ornr​ esea​rch.com/​EN/​about/​Pages/​index.aspx McGann, J. (2019) Think Tanks: The New Knowledge and Policy Brokers in Asia, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press. Ministry of Finance (2017) ‘Ministerial Regulation Determining Rules, Procedures and Conditions on the Registration of Consultant, B.E. 2560 (2017)’, available from https://​www.pdmo.go.th/​pdmome​dia/​docume​nts/​ 2019/​Jan/​8.%20%E0%B8%81%E0%B8%8E%E0%B8%81%E0%B8%A3%E 0%B8%B0%E0%B8%97%E0%B8%A3%E0%B8%A7%E0%B8%87%20%E0%B 8%97%E0%B8%B5%E0%B9%88%E0%B8%9B%E0%B8%A3%E0%B8%B 6%E0%B8%81%E0%B8%A9%E0%B8%B2%20EN.pdf Nakiraks, C. (1981) ‘Bohtbaht Khong Ti Preuksa Chao Tang Prathet Nai Rachasamai Phra Baht Somdet Phra Chulachomkhaojaoyuhua’ [Role of foreign advisors during Chulalongkorn’s reign] (in Thai), Bangkok: The Foundation for the Promotion of Social Sciences and Humanities Textbooks Project, available from http://​openb​ase.in.th/​files/​ebook/​text​book​proj​ect/​tbpj​283.pdf

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NESDC (2018) ‘Babraingan Karnprameun Suanratchakarn Tam Matrakarn Karnprabprung Prasithiphap Nai Karnpatibatratchakarn Tangtae Wanti 1 October 2560 Teung Wanti 31 Meenakom 2561 (Rob 6 Duen)’ [Assessment report on measures to improve efficiency on official performance from 1 October 2017 to 31 March 2018 (6 months)], available at https://​www.nesdc.go.th/​ ewt_​dl_​l​ink.php?nid=​12544 NESDC. (nd). ‘Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board’, available from https://​www.nesdc.go.th/​nesdb​_e​ n/​art​icle​_a​ tt​ach/​Brochu​reNE​ SDB_​Eng.pdf Numnonda, T. (1974) ‘The first American advisers in Thai history’, Journal of the Siam Society, 62(2): 121–​148. Numnonda, T. (1976) ‘The American foreign affairs advisers in Thailand, 1917–​ 1940’, Journal of the Siam Society, 64(1): 75–​77. Seton-​Watson, H. (1971) The New Imperialism, London: Bodley Head. SPP (nd) ‘Our thoughts’, available from https://​spp.cmu.ac.th/​our-​thoug​hts/​ Stowe, J. (1991) Siam Becomes Thailand: A Story of Intrigue, London: C. Hurst & Co. Publishers. TDRI (nd) ‘Thailand Development Research Institute’, available from https://​ tdri.or.th/​en/​ TFF (nd) ‘Thailand Future Foundation’, available from https://​www.tha​ilan​dfut​ ure.org/​ Vella, W.F. (1955) The Impact of the West on Government in Thailand, Berkeley: University of California Press. Webster, A. (1998) Gentlemen Capitalists: British Imperialism in Southeast Asia, 1770–​1890, London: Tauris Academic Studies. Wright, A. and Breakspear, O.T. (eds) (1994) Twentieth Century Impressions of Siam: Its History, People, Commerce, Industries, and Resources, Bangkok: White Lotus. Wright, H.M. (ed) (1976) The ‘New Imperialism’: Analysis of Late Nineteenth Century Expansion, Lexington: DC Health & Company.

185

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Political movements as expression of public opinion for agenda setting in Thailand Watcharabon Buddharaksa

Introduction Public opinion expression is a crucial aspect of policy analysis engaged at various stages in a policy cycle. A deliberative policy analysis approach suggests taking people’s opinions seriously as citizens’ voices are valued as a decisive basis for a given policy (Fischer and Boossabong, 2018). Also, policy implementation and evaluation are both processes that benefit from people’s voices. In the context of a consolidated democracy, public opinion expression takes place via both parliamentary politics and political movements. Public opinion can be captured in various forms such as polling, participatory process, public surveys, protests and other forms of disobedience actions. Several distinct political movements have shaped important turning points in contemporary Thailand. These political movements reflect certain aspects of public opinion. Through new discourses and experiences that each movement ignites, they also shape new public opinion. Thus, these movements are not ignored by policy analysts in Thailand. It is well understood that change in the political landscape is a crucial determinant of all public policies and their ecosystems. In fact, political movements and protests have become de facto indicators of public opinion for decision-​makers and policy analysts. Hence, this chapter will focus on describing the key movements in Thailand. The chapter aims to portray political movements as a form of public opinion expression in contemporary Thailand and explain how the movements influence agenda setting. The agenda-​setting process can be seen as a struggle to construct a new public discourse rather than merely a fight for sending messages to the government. The chapter employs Antonio Gramsci’s notion of ‘war of position’ –​struggle in the terrain of ideas, thought and culture via mass media as a crucial tool –​as a framework to explain the politics of agenda setting in Thailand. Since the 1997 political reformation,1 there were five distinct attempts to construct public discourse: demanding a strong state; rallying against Thaksin; challenging the old regime; subverting the common sense; and, once again, for political reform.

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War of position: agenda setting and public attentiveness in a Gramscian perspective Traditionally, the agenda-​setting process is a common point of departure in policy analysis of the ‘policy cycle’ or ‘stage’ models (Jann and Wegrich, 2007). The top-​down perspective conceives of social problems basically from technocratic experts and policy think tanks.2 However, since the emergence of new policy turns (both argumentative and interpretive turns), agenda setting could be reframed as a non-​determinist and interpretive political process (Fischer, 2003). This chapter argues that it should be seen as a struggle to construct a new ‘public discourse’ over society. As an alternative from the post-​structuralist tradition, especially Foucault’s legacies in critical policy studies, this chapter employs Antonio Gramsci’s notions of ‘war of position’ to deal with the politics of public opinion expression struggling to win a new discourse construction rather than a traditional agenda-​setting process. The concept of war of position offers distinct political strategies for citizens and is evident in various social group struggles to express their thoughts, to raise social attention and to set political-​social agendas. War of position In the social and political struggles of each social group, a variety of strategies are utilised in order to achieve goals. The importance of Gramsci’s idea appeared in a note on Political Struggle and Military War in which he describes how the ways in which ordinary people assert themselves in the class struggle provides the crucial political strategy for each social group or the so-​called ‘war of position’.3 Gramsci argues that there are three types of war including war of movement (manoeuvre), war of position and underground warfare (Gramsci, 1971: 229, Q1§134). The first two types of war will be the focus here. War of movement, according to Gramsci, is a kind of strategy that is appropriate where the state and civil society are less developed so that political power is more fragile, and mass trade unions, pressure groups and party organisations are not yet developed (Fontana, 2006; Sassoon, 1982). This is not a suitable strategy for each social force being deployed as a major tool to gain a hegemonic position over other groups within society. While this war of movement, in the sense of a violent struggle, may still occur in order to take control of state power employing only war of movement, it is not sufficient nor can it be sustained to gain either hegemony or a new public discourse. Hence, Gramsci offers an alternative perspective that the subaltern/​subordinate group or ordinary citizen should employ in order to gain the hegemonic position, that is, the ‘war of position’ (Buci-​Glucksmann, 1980; Jessop, 1990). The war of position is a political strategy on the cultural front, metaphorically related to the military term. This strategy requires steady penetration and subversion of the complex and multiple mechanisms of ideological diffusion. The point of the struggle is to conquer one after another: ‘all the agencies of civil society, 187

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for instance, the schools, the universities, the church, the trade unions, and the mass media’ (Gramsci, 1971: 235, 342, Q13§24, Q11§12; Femia, 1981). For the ordinary citizen in a fragile democratic country, in order to construct a new public discourse, they should struggle on the cultural front through a number of possible agencies. The following section describes five distinct agenda-​setting attempts that influenced public policy in contemporary Thai politics between 1997 and 2014.

Five political movement challenges in recent Thai politics demonstrating public opinion expression Contemporary political development in Thailand from the post-​economic crisis in 1997 to the politics in the post-​2014 military coup has been a period of innovative policy discourse constructions by a number of social groups through both channels of political and civil societies. This chapter emphasises four major public opinion expressions through the development of five discourses: demanding a strong state; rallying against Thaksin; challenging the old regime; struggling against double standards and ‘Prai-​Ammat’ metaphor; and requiring political reform. Demanding a strong state: political reform and the making of the 1997 Constitution The first attempt to construct a new discourse is the movement to set policy agenda for political reform in 1997. However, political reformation in that year was related back to an incident in 1991. The military coup in 1991 and the rise to political power of the army in 1992 led to critical middle-​class demonstrations in May 1992 (later known as the Black May of 1992) (Suchit, 1993; Callahan, 1998; Yoshifumi, 2008). After that incident, the military stepped away from politics and then political authority returned to a civilian government under the Chuan Leekpai premiership. It appeared as if Thai politics was in a ‘normal’ situation. However, social groups in Thailand experienced many problems with the Thai democracy and felt that it was time to solve the existing issues of the country. Yoshifumi (2008) argued that a number of problems in Thai politics should be resolved, including corruption among politicians and bureaucrats, violation of election rules, political parties dominated by a small number of funding providers, centralised government administration and weak enforcement of the rule of law. Therefore, Thai society required ‘political reform’ in order to achieve true democracy and to address a number of flaws in Thai politics. The political reform campaign was gradually established in May 1994 during the first Chuan government. Mr Chalard Vorachart, a political activist, began his hunger strike in front of the parliament and demanded the current constitution be amended to stipulate that only elected persons have the right to hold administrative office (Wasi, 2002). In fact, the political climate of the Thai state in 188

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the post-​Black May of 1992 period was exposed to the notion of political reform, for example through Amorn Chantarasomboon’s paper, published in 1993, entitled ‘Constitutionalism’4 (Chantarasomboon, 1996). Nonetheless, Chalard’s hunger strike was crucial because his action brought public attention to the issue of political reform and gained popular support from various social groups who felt frustrated with the existing political situation in Thailand. The Chuan government responded with a political campaign established by the Democracy Development Committee (DDC) on 9 June 1994, hoping to end Chalard’s hunger strike and consider how to reform and amend the constitution. However, the DDC could not do much because they lacked the support of Members of Parliament. Then, the Chuan government dissolved parliament in May 1995 due to the problem of irregularities in the government’s accelerated land reform programme (King, 1997). The general election that took place on 2 July 1995 resulted in the victory of the Chart Thai (Thai nation) party. Banharn Silpa-​archa became the twenty-​first prime minister and formed his seven-​party coalition government in July 1995. The Banharn government aimed to implement their political reform campaign as soon as possible due to its promise to the people who voted for them. Later, the Banharn government launched the Political Reform Committee in order to recommend the amendment of Article 211 of the 1991 Constitution, aiming to set up a constitution-​drafting mechanism (Wasi, 2002: 24). Eventually, after a period of public hearings in a process of public debate, the government established the Constitution Drafting Assembly (CDA) composed of 76 provincial representatives and 33 academic experts in law and political science (Noomnon, 2002). The CDA, led by Uthai Phimchaichon and Anand Panyarachun, secured high popular participation by arranging for a number of public hearings throughout the country. Public debates and academic conferences actively took place and that was the reason that Thai society referred to the new constitution as a ‘people’s constitution’ (Hicken, 2006; Dressel, 2009). In addition, in terms of academic research and opinions, it was supported by the Thailand Research Fund. In summary, even the process of constitutional drafting and public hearings between 1996 and 1997 would be challenged by illiberal forces, however, the draft of the new constitution was approved by the parliament (with 579 supporting votes, 16 against and 17 abstentions) and enacted amidst the economic crisis on 11 October 1997 (Connors, 2002). This sixteenth constitution of Thailand was later considered a strong force in shaping the new relations of power in Thai politics. This constitution helped set the tone and direction of subsequent public policies following 1997. Rallying against Thaksin: the so-​called ‘Yellow Shirts Movement’ The second challenge to create a new political agenda took place around 2005 as a result of the strong state led by the Thai Rak Thai (TRT) government from 189

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2001. The TRT party had conquered Thai politics for the short period between 2001 and 2005. By the end of 2003 the TRT government’s dominant power had been challenged by various social forces. Each social force operated for themselves in order to stand against the Thaksin government for a specific purpose –​but to some extent, all of the social forces lost interest in their own causes–​at a given time between later 2003 and early 2005. It should be noted that the ‘Sondhi phenomenon’ of the ‘Thailand Weekly’ roadshow united a number of social groups in Thailand to form the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD). The PAD, officially formed on 9 February 2006, at the first stage was directed by the five core leaders including Sondhi Limthongkul, a royalist and political analyst; Suriyasai Katasila, full-​time activist and PAD coordinator; Chamlong Srimuang, a former leader of the Phalang Dhama Party, ex-​governor of Bangkok, and leader of the 1992 people’s movement against the military rule; Somsak Kosaisuk, a highly experienced Thai labour union leader; and Somkiat Phongpaiboon, a university lecturer (Tejapira, 2006; Pasuk and Baker, 2009; Asma, 2010). The PAD, the so-​called ‘Yellow Shirts’, is a broad social alliance of various social groups such as the organised labour unions led by Somsak, several non-​ governmental organisations led by Suriyasai and Somkiat, and the Buddhist movement led by Chamlong, which combined to balance the power of Thaksinism in order to secure their own class interests by employing royalism-​nationalism as a hegemonic tool to tie social forces together as a social bloc. These social groups consolidated themselves under the PAD and promoted the ‘yellow’5 colour as symbolic of their movement to signify that they did everything for the sake of the king –​which under the royalist perception means for the sake of the nation also. Protestors wore yellow shirts and other items such as yellow wristbands, hats and scarves to indicate that they were a social group that stood against Thaksinism. The Yellow Shirts movement clearly expressed itself as having an ultimate goal of toppling the TRT government and throwing it away from politics. The term ‘throw away from politics’ will be employed here rather than ‘from power’ because in the perception of the yellow camp, they deeply believed that Thaksin and his allies are the only threat in the recent political conflict in Thailand. From this point of view, Thaksin is the worst germ that causes the nation’s sickness (Chachavalpongpun, 2011). The PAD set up a new discourse about Thaksinism, as a public enemy, through digital media such as Manager Online and satellite television, ASTV. The political agenda of anti-​Thaksin had been set and eventually led to the military coup in 2006 to oust Thaksin from Thai politics. Challenging the old regime: the Red Shirts social forces Since the military coup of 2006, the conservative social forces led by the junta, the Democrat Party and the PAD were active in reshaping the social relations formed under Thaksinism during the early 2000s. To defend their own class interests against conservative social forces, the Red Shirts were formed to balance this political equilibrium. The so-​called ‘Red Shirts movement’, during the 190

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first stage, was a politician-​backed movement in support of the TRT party and against the junta who conducted the coup in September 2006 (Forsyth, 2010). Initially, this movement labelled itself as the ‘Democratic Alliance against Dictatorship: DAAD’ and later changed its name to the ‘United Front of Democracy against Dictatorship: UDD’ (Krachangpho, 2010). The UDD began its official demonstration in 2007 together with other social forces such as the ‘19 September Network and the Saturday People against Dictatorship’ (Kon Wansao Mai Aow Padetkarn) in order to launch a social campaign convincing Thai people to vote ‘no’ in the national referendum regarding the acceptance of the new 2007 Constitution (McCargo, 2008). The first phase of the UDD ended after the People’s Power Party won the election in December 2007. However, they returned to take political action again in early 2009 after the Democrat Party was installed in power undemocratically. The UDD decided to choose the ‘red’ colour as symbolic of its protest.6 During the second phase of its movement, which started around mid-​2009, the UDD changed its political strategy of movement to expand its political involvement to wider audiences in remote areas by changing its name and adding the suffix ‘Red in the Land’ (Daeng Tang Pandin) to its name (Krachangpho, 2010; Charoensin-o ​ -​ larn, 2013). At this stage, from mid-​2009 until the street confrontations of 2010, the ‘UDD-​Red in the Land’ enlarged its support and membership throughout the country through a strategy of what Gramsci calls a ‘war of position’. The war of position that the UDD, or the Red Shirts, was striving to achieve was in providing ‘critical political pedagogy’ through informal and lifelong learning in local villages in most parts of the North and Northeast, two major strongholds of the Reds (de Jong et al, 2012; Thaothawil, 2012; Panyangnoi, 2012). With this political strategy the rural social forces remained in support of the Red Shirts movement and viewed the political situation more critically. To consider who exactly the Red Shirts were and what they represented, it is necessary to consider both political economy and ideological instances. The Red Shirts forces do not constitute a unified social group. Rather, it was composed of many social classes and combined both the rich and the poor in the Weberian sense of income categorisation (Sathitniramai, 2011; Sathitniramai et al, 2013b). This is similar to the Yellow Shirts as it was a social bloc that was comprised of ‘broad social alliances’ of social forces that are able to continually expand and dwindle in terms of its alliances. However, it could be seen that even though the Red Shirts were made up of different socioeconomic classes, they shared some ‘economic incentives’ that were lost after the diminishing of the conservative military coup in 2006. When the Red Shirts came out to protest against the junta and boycotted the new military-​led constitution, most political commentators believed that the Reds were comprised mainly of the rural poor or the peasantry and those that loved Thaksin. However, the Red Shirts are not only the peasant poor7 but rather a broad alliance of, at least, three major social categories. First, the majority of social groups who belong to the Red Shirts movement are the admirers of Thaksin who came from both rural and urban areas. Thaksin’s 191

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admirers were a broad social alliance and from various socioeconomic categories. It was not only the rural peasantry or the workers that supported Thaksin’s hegemonic projects, but also the bureaucrats and the rich who lost many of their benefits after the military coup in 2006 had ousted the TRT government from power. However, recent studies have shown that even though the Red Shirts are not entirely composed of the poor, compared to the Yellow Shirts social group, the majority of Red Shirts supporters have both lower incomes and educational qualifications (Sathitniramai et al, 2013b, 2013c). Apart from the majority of Thaksin supporters, the second social category was determined by the ‘politico-​ideological stance’ of social forces. The Red Shirts in this group were those who insisted on democratic discipline and denied or did not accept the legitimacy of the coup d’état in 2006. These social groups became supporters of the Reds through politico-​ideological incentives rather than the economy, which was the crucial driver in the first category. This social group could be viewed as active citizens who could not stand for the undemocratic means that the army employed to shutdown popular political participation as a means of resolving crisis. Most of this category were middle class from both urban and rural areas and also academic scholars in universities. The last social category of the Red Shirts, and the least numerous, is the social group known as the ‘Red Siam’ or those who were ex-​radical activists and members of student movements of the 1970s (Lertchoosakul, 2012). These social groups were unclear about their positions regarding Thaksin, but these radical factions were appreciative of a republican regime rather than the existing social relations that were closely attached to the monarchy. In short, the construction of the Red Shirts social groups emerged from several social forces that came from different social categories and various socioeconomic statuses. Most of them appreciated and enjoyed economic growth under Thaksinism. Even though they have various political economy incentives, the Red Shirts share a vital point, which is to construct a discourse against undemocratic means or the coup d’état in 2006. They also demanded that the Abhisit government dissolve the House of Representatives and return decision-​ making power to the Thai people as soon as possible. The ‘UDD-​Red in the Land’ or the Red Shirts movement shifted the nature of their movement from one that takes action in supporting a given person (Thaksin) or political party (TRT and People Power Party (PPP)) to become a movement that goes ‘beyond Thaksin’ and questions a number of complicated socio-​economic-​politico problems of the country. In the next section, the political strategies of the Reds will be examined in order to unveil the condition of subalternity that had been oppressed by Thai authoritarian dominant social groups for a long period. Struggling against double standards and the ‘Prai-​Ammat’ metaphor Political strategies of the Red Shirts between 2009 and 2010 should be considered as a ‘war of position’ or political strategies attempting to construct critical 192

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perception in the sphere of civil society on the part of Thai social forces in a broader sense. The Red Shirts as a subaltern social force expressed themselves as a contestant to the old social relations –​those that are constructed around royalist-​nationalist ways of thinking and that pursue exclusionary economic development –​as it appeared in two major political strategies: the struggle against double standards in Thai society and the introduction of the Prai-​Ammat metaphor. These two major strategies contributed to crucial perceptions that the subaltern social forces could feasibly challenge the dominant social class and could balance the class forces, thus overcoming them in the long run. The first political strategy of the Red Shirts, to rally against the old social relations, was to construct critical awareness in Thai society in order to reveal that social forces in the country had long been excluded from the pool of power. In doing so, the Reds focused on the struggle against the ‘double standards’ of the Thai ruling class. The term ‘double standards’ seems to be normal in its ordinary sense, however, the term was first signified by King Bhumibol in his annual speech in December 2001 with the aim of reminding the Thaksin government to run the country for the benefit of the whole nation. Nonetheless, the more critical meaning that the Red Shirts employed in their movement from 2009 was in the aim of criticising the structural problem of the Thai state. Thailand, like other developing countries, is a society that lacks discipline and, also, good governance is not present at any level of social life. The Red Shirts as a subaltern social group contested the common sense in which people were led to believe that double standards are a normal aspect of Thai society. The event that led to the emergence of the Reds’ double standards campaign was the selective operations of the Democrat government which favoured the Yellows over the Reds. The Democrat government was known by Thai society as an undemocratic elite/​military backed government and, in this sense, they had a very good relationship with the PAD because they shared the same goal of ousting the Thaksin regime. The Abhisit government, as the state administration, was clearly seen delaying the process of charging the PAD over the hijacking of Suvanabhumi International Airport in late 2008 and then finally refusing to charge the PAD leaders. Comparing that incident to the Red Shirt movement during the critical period of April 2010, the Abhisit government ordered the police to launch warrants for the arrest of Red Shirt leaders as quickly as possible. Moreover, the feeling of being treated with double standards among the Red Shirts protesters seemed to significantly rise after there were cases of doctors in a number of state hospitals refusing to provide medical services to Red Shirts patients –​this was because, as Winichakul (2010) argues, they saw the Red Shirts as ‘germs’ that could harm others and were a threat to the nation. This may be compared with the case of the queen and her daughter, who donated large amounts of money to treat many Yellow Shirts protesters in 2008 and went to a funeral for one of the victims.8 This could be seen, from the Red Shirts’ perspective, as a double standard and an unfair situation. From this point of view, among the Red Shirts members, the hegemonic project of struggle against double standards sharply 193

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raised critical awareness through many Red Shirts’ new-​social media outlets such as the Reds newspapers, CDs and websites (Thabchumpon and McCargo, 2011). In short, although the term ‘double standards’ is normal and nothing new in its definition, the Reds invested it with great significance by connecting it to the dominant conservative social groups. The second major war of position of the subordinate Red Shirts was the introduction of the metaphor of ‘Prai-​Ammat’ social relations. The term ‘Prai’ means the ‘commons’ or the ‘subjects’ in English and ‘Ammat’ means the ‘elites’ or the ‘aristocrats’ (Thabchumpon and McCargo, 2011; Taylor, 2012). The Ammat-​ Prai social relationship in the Thai ancient sense is quite similar to the lord/​ vassal-​slave relationship in Europe. The Ammat in the older sense could refer to various groups of elites such as the monarchy, the royal family, the landowner and the high-​ranked bureaucrat. Meanwhile Prai could be understood as the commoner who was tied to the authority of their Ammat and had no social and political autonomy. Officially, Thailand subverted the master-​slave system over one hundred years ago (Feeny, 1989). Nevertheless, modern economic and social development brought a new sense of superiority and inferiority in the new social forces and the sense of being Ammat and Prai has never vanished from the Thai state. However, the political discourse of Prai-​Ammat in contemporary Thai politics that was resuscitated by the Red Shirts has a broader meaning than the older sense. The Red Shirt leader employed this metaphor as a leading strategy in the war of position in order to gain consent from various subaltern social forces. The Reds’ political strategy was an attempt to advance a counter-​argument against the Thai ruling class who always claimed that Thailand has no class conflicts and that everyone lives well together under the king’s supremacy (Uwanno, 2009a, 2009b). The significance of this political strategy is that it could illustrate for the wider social groups the picture of the social inequalities between social classes in Thai society. In the broader sense, Prai could mean not only the poor or the working class, but also in the modern sense it could mean those who have been subordinated from inclusion in society with real political liberty. Nevertheless, what is interesting is that, in terms of Ammat, it remains the monarchy, royal family and social elite, for example, high-​ranked army officers and civilian bureaucrats.9 The Reds as a subaltern social force –​who were insulted by the Yellow urban middle class as ‘Kwai Daeng’ (the stupid Reds) and ‘Ban Nok’ (the countryside people) –​propagandised the metaphor of Prai-​Ammat social relations in order to raise the critical perspective of all Thai subaltern social forces, and this attempt should be judged to be a successful political strategy based on the increasing numbers of Red Shirts members and the frequency with which this discourse was employed during street protests (Taylor, 2012; Buchanan, 2013). In short, the Red Shirts’ introduction to the Prai-​Ammat metaphor was a critical political strategy of constructing the discourse of contesting the old political space. It is argued here that this Red Shirt politics of language was successful in terms of the 194

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construction of wider critical consciousness through the Red Shirts and non-​Red Shirts social groups and the expansion of political engagement in street protests. (Once again) requiring political reform: Reform Before Election After two decades of the rally to promote the political reform campaign in the late 1990s, Thailand strives to establish a more consolidated democracy. However, it turned out to be the quest for political reform once again in 2013. The demonstration in early November 2013, initially, emerged from the leading roles of the middle-​class social groups led by many academic institutions in Bangkok to protest against Pua Thai’s attempt to launch the draft of the Amnesty bill (Sinpeng, 2019). The middle-​class social forces in Bangkok believe that this law, to some extent, might clear the corruption cases of the former Thaksin government. However, the demonstration was transformed to be anti-​ Pua Thai and anti-​Thaksinism in late November 2013 under the name of the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC). The PDRC was led by Suthep Tuagsuban, a former MP and executive of the Democrat party and the PAD (the Yellow Shirts). The movements and occupations of bureaucratic offices in Bangkok led the Pua Thai government to dissolve the parliament on 9 December 2013 and announce a new general election to be held on 2 February 2014. At that time, the PDRC employed a new political strategy, Reform Before Election (RBE), to gain popular support mainly via social media platforms like Facebook (on the matter of social media in contemporary Thai politics, see Schaffar, 2019). The RBE was an anti-​democracy campaign promoted by some conservative elites. It demanded the country be reformed by the People’s Council in five major dimensions: election laws reform; reformation against corruption; reformation for increased political participation; reform of social inequality; and reform of police institutions. Under the RBE campaign, the Democrat Party boycotted the general election on 2 February 2014 and the Election Commission could not peacefully hold the election in some areas of the country especially in the South (a major political stronghold of the Democrat Party and the PDRC). The PDRC supporters obstructed state officials from facilitating the election which eventually led to the annulment by the Constitutional Court, as they ordered that the 2 February election was an illegitimate election. Up to May 2014, the political situation in Thailand was still uncertain and seemed to be in deadlock as the Constitutional Court ordered the caretaker prime minister to step down on 7 May 2014 as she had abused her power by transferring the head of the National Security Commission in 2011. Finally, after a few months of political movement rallying for political reform, RBE, the PDRC had successfully paved the way for another coup d’état on 22 May 2014. It would not be an exaggeration to claim that the war of position demanding RBE, led by the conservative PDRC, had dramatically changed the political landscape of Thai politics. 195

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Conclusion Public opinion expressions in contemporary Thai politics have been actively driven by political movements outside formal parliamentary politics. Between 1997 and 2014, there have been at least five major political discourses constructed through a number of wars of position by various political forces. The campaign demanding a strong state and political reform rallied since the mid-​1990s took place via modern mass media such as television, radio and the newspapers. While the next four discourses between 2005 and 2013, anti-​Thaksin by the Yellow Shirts and anti-​conservative by the Red Shirts, emerged through the more sophisticated mass media such as satellite television, internet, news websites and social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter. What we can see from this chapter is the fact that many political movements have emerged within the weak and fragile democratic regime as the official channels have not functioned effectively in sending public voices to the state. Therefore, Gramsci’s war of position is a crucial lens used to construct a political discourse that can shift the politics to another stage, bypassing the ineffective bureaucratic institutions. In the future, policy analysts should take the matter of discourse construction of political and social movements and the consolidation of democratic regimes into consideration together for a better picture of Thai politics and its public policy ecosystem. Notes 1

2 3 4 5

6

7

8

9

This chapter perceives the year 1997 as a milestone for contemporary Thai politics. A number of structural changes, such as a new constitution and the Asian economic crisis, took place that year and paved the way for the rise of the Thaksin regime, the counter-​Thaksin movement and two military coups just in a decade. On the critique of policy expertise see Strassheim (2017) and on the critique on policy think tanks see Plehwe (2017). On the study of metaphoric usage of ‘war’ in Gramsci see Egan (2013). This work significantly urged academic attention in Thailand to be more aware of the idea of political reform at that time. In ancient Thai belief there is a colour-​code for each day in the week. Yellow represents the person who was born on Monday and King Bhumibol was born on Monday, therefore, yellow represents his own royal symbol and that colour has always been used for every royal activity related to the king (McCargo, 2009: 12). Nevertheless, at first the UDD did not officially employ this colour as a theme of protest; it was first employed by Sombat Bun-​Ngamanong, leader of the Saturday People against Dictatorship, who promoted the colour red to struggle against the royalist yellow theme. Sathitniramai (2013b, 2013c) argues that even though the Red Shirts in general have lower incomes than the Yellow Shirts, they are not the poorest group in the country. Rather, he argues, like Walker (2012), that the Reds are, in fact, new rural middle classes while Thabchumpon and McCargo (2011) label them as the ‘urbanised villager’. It was the funeral of Miss Angkana Radubpanyawoot who died in the street clashes between the police and the Yellow Shirts protestors on 7 October 2008. The queen praised Angkana as being a good person who died to protect the nation and the monarchy. One of the major targets that the Red Shirts directly attacked was the head privy councillor, General Prem Tinasulanond. Because the monarchy has a special protection through the

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References Asma, W. (2010) Political Roles of Thai Middle Classes in People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) Under Thaksin’s Regime, MA Thesis, Chulalongkorn University. Buchanan, J. (2013) ‘Translating Thailand’s protests: An analysis of Red Shirt rhetoric’, ASEAS –​Austrian Journal of South-​East Asian Studies, 6(1): 60–​80. Buci-​Glucksmann, C. (1980) Gramsci and the State, translated by D. Fernbach, London: Lawrence and Wishart. Callahan, W.A. (1998) Imagining Democracy: Reading the Events of May in Thailand, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Chachavalpongpun, P. (2011b) ‘The necessity of enemies in Thailand’s troubled politics: The making of political “otherness”’, Asian Survey, 51(6): 1019–​1041. Chantarasomboon, A. (1996) Political Reform, Constitutionalism: The Solutions for Thailand, Bangkok: Institute of Policy Study. [in Thai] Charoensin-​o-​larn, C. (2013) ‘Redrawing Thai political space: The Red Shirt movement’, in T. Bunnell D. Parthasarathy and E.C. Thompson (eds) Cleavage, Connection and Conflict in Rural, Urban and Contemporary Asia, Singapore: Asia Research Institute, pp 201–​221. Connors, M. (2002) ‘Framing the people’s constitution’, in D. McCargo (ed) Reforming Thai Politics, Copenhagen: NIAS Press, pp 37–​55. de Jong, E., Knippenberg, L., Ayuwat, D. and Promphakping, B. (2012) ‘Red-​ Shirt heartland: Village-​level socioeconomic change in northeast Thailand between 1999 and 2008’, Asian Politics & Policy, 4(2): 213–​231. Dressel, B. (2009) ‘Thailand’s elusive quest for a workable constitution, 1997–​ 2007’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 31(2): 296–​325. Egan, D. (2013) ‘Rethinking war of maneuver/​war of position: Gramsci and the military metaphor’, Critical Sociology, 40(4): 521–​539. Feeny, D. (1989) ‘The decline of property rights in man in Thailand, 1800–​1913’, Journal of Economic History, 49(2): 285–​296. Femia, J. (1981) Gramsci’s Political Thought: Hegemony, Consciousness, and the Revolutionary Process, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Fischer, F. (2003) Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Fischer, F. and Boossabong, P. (2018) ‘Deliberative policy analysis’, in A. Bächtiger, J.S. Dryzek, J. Mansbridge and M. Warren (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 584–​594. Fontana, B. (2006) ‘State and society: The concept of hegemony in Gramsci’, in M. Haugaard and H.H. Lentner (eds) Hegemony and Power Consensus and Coercion in Contemporary Politics, Oxford: Rowman & Littlefield, pp 23–​44.

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Forsyth, T. (2010) ‘Thailand’s Red Shirt protests: Popular movement or dangerous street theatre?’, Social Movement Studies: Journal of Social, Cultural and Political Protest, 9(4): 461–​467. Gramsci, A. (1971) Selections from the Prison Notebooks, edited and translated by Q. Hoare and G. Nowell Smith, London: Lawrence and Wishart. Hicken, A. (2006) ‘Party fabrication: Constitutional reform and the rise of Thai Rak Thai’, Journal of East Asian Studies, 6(3): 381–​407. Jann, W. and Wegrich, K. (2007) ‘Theories of the policy cycle’, in F. Fischeer, G.J. Miller and M.S. Sidney (eds) Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods, London: CRC Press, pp 43–​62. Jessop, B. (1990) State Theory Putting Capitalist States in their Place, Cambridge: Polity Press. King, D.E. (1997) ‘Thailand in 1996: Economic slowdown clouds year’, Asian Survey, 37(2): 160–​166. Krachangpho, U. (2010) The Movement of ‘United Front for Democracy against Dictatorship: UDD’ Under Abhisit Government, MA Thesis, Chulalongkorn University. [in Thai] Lertchoosakul, K. (2012) The Rise of the Octobrists: Power and Conflict among Former Left Wing Student Activists in Contemporary Thai Politics, PhD Thesis, The London School of Economics and Political Science. McCargo, D. (2008) ‘Thailand: State of anxiety’, Southeast Asian Affairs, 2008(1): 333–​356. McCargo, D. (2009) ‘Thai politics as reality TV’, Journal of Asian Studies, 68(1): 7–​19. Noomnon, T. (2002) The Constitution Drafting Assembly: The Route to Political Reform, Bangkok: KPI. [in Thai] Panyangnoi, W. (2012) Red-​shirt Village: The Transformation of Powers in Rural Thai Community: A Case Study of Nayai Village, Udonthani, MA Thesis, Chulalongkorn University. Phongpaichit, P. and Baker, C. (2009) Thaksin, Chiang Mai: Silkworms Book. Plehwe, D. (2017) ‘The politics of policy think-​tanks: Organizing expertise, legitimacy and counter-​expertise in policy networks’, in F. Fischer et al (eds) Handbook of Critical Policy Studies, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp 358–​379. Sassoon, A.S. (1982) Approaches to Gramsci, London: Writers and Readers. Sathitniramai, A. (2011) ‘Who are the red shirts? Money-​driven movement, the common or the new middle class: Prospect for Thai society’, in P. Traisuriyatanma (ed) Red Why?, Bangkok: Openbooks, pp 14–​35. [in Thai] Sathitniramai, A., Mukdawijitra, Y. and Pawakapan, N. (2013b) Rethinking Thailand Political Landscape, Bangkok: TUHPP and Thai Health Promotion Foundation. [in Thai] Sathitniramai, A. (2013c) ‘Poverty and inequality are not only cause of the clash between the Yellows and the Red’, Matichon, 1 July, p 7. [in Thai] Schaffar, W. (2019) ‘The social media’, in P. Chachavalpongpun (ed) Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Thailand, London: Routledge, pp 83–​114. 198

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Sinpeng, A. (2019) ‘From the Yellow Shirts to the whistle rebels: Comparative analysis of the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) and the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC)’, in P. Chachavalpongpun (ed) Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Thailand, London: Routledge, pp 145–​155. Strassheim, H. (2017) ‘Politics and policy expertise: Towards a political epistemology’, in F. Fischer, D. Torgerson, A. Durnova and M. Orsini (eds) Handbook of Critical Policy Studies, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp 319–​340. Suchit, B. (1993) ‘Thailand in 1992: In search of a democratic order’, Asian Survey, 33(2): 218–​223. Taylor, J. (2012) ‘Remembrance and tragedy: Understanding Thailand’s Red Shirt social movement’, Journal of Social Issue in Southeast Asia, 27(1): 120–​152. Tejapira, K. (2006) ‘Toppling Thaksin’, New Left Review, 39: 5–​37. Thabchumpon, N. and McCargo, D. (2011) ‘Urbanized villagers in the 2010 Thai Redshirts protests not just poor farmers?’, Asian Survey, 51(6): 993–​1018. Thaothawil, P. (2012) ‘Mooban Kon Suadang Kab Karn Muang Thai’ [Red Shirts village and Thai politics], Prachatai, 20 February. Uwanno, B. (2009a) ‘King Prachadhipok and his self-​sacrificing for peace of the country’, Julniti Journal, 6(3): 23–​27. [in Thai] Uwanno, B. (2009b) ‘Dynamics of Thai politics’, Julniti Journal, 6(3): 28–​37. [in Thai] Walker, A. (2012) Thailand Political Peasants: Power in the Rural Economy, Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press. Wasi, P. (2002) ‘An overview of political reform issues’, in D. McCargo (ed) Reforming Thai Politics, Copenhagen: NIAS Press, pp 21–​28. Winichakul, T. (2010) ‘On the red germs and the Thai-​moral political body’, Read, 2(4): 186–​193. [in Thai] Yoshifumi, T. (2008) Myths and Realities: The Democratization of Thai Politics, Kyoto: Kyoto University Press.

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Part Four Political parties and interest groups in policy analysis

ELEVEN

Political parties and policy analysis Chanintorn Pensute

Introduction Political parties in Thailand have paid most attention to choosing political leaders and mobilising resources for both local and national elections. With that, serious professional policy analysis has been ignored by most political parties. The basic tool that has been used is ‘polling’, to check the popularity of their party, politicians and policies, and thus, in turn, ‘populist policy’ has become the policy culture of political parties in the country (Yeema, 2004; Ear-​apisitpong and Samakkeetham, 2012; Dumrongrat, 2020). To aim for winning the election, comparative policy analysis can be seen as the main approach for most parties. They usually compare policy choices of their competitors and propose the better one, especially with the international reference (Issarachai, 2012; Phoojiwat, 2021). In the national election in 2019, it can be observed that there was a new political party, supported by the younger generation, that attempted to engage with the more critical orientations of policy analysis by challenging short-​term populist policies and proposing some policies based on public deliberation and reinterpretation of the Thai society towards the structural transformation. For a better understanding of the change in policy analysis in political parties, we need to understand first the changing political landscape in Thailand. After the coup d’état in 2014, activities related to political parties in Thailand were halted. For almost five years, there were no elections in Thailand, and in positions that were supposed to be elected, such as the mayor of Pattaya, the government chose to appoint their allies instead. When the then-​military junta government declared an upcoming election in 2019, political parties in Thailand started to emerge once again. Prior to 24 March 2019, the national election date, the government changed the date several times, declaring that Thailand was not yet ready for an election (The Guardian, 2019). Not only was the uncertainty of the election date troublesome to political parties, but rules for establishing political parties were tightly regulated. According to the 2017 Constitution’s Organic Act on Political Parties enacted in late 2017, to be able to establish a political party, the potential political party needs to be founded with at least 500 Thai citizens and its initial capital needs to be one million Thai baht, estimated at approximately US$31,000 (Organic Act on Political Parties, 2560 BE [2017 CE]). Seemingly, these requirements benefited already existing political parties and limited new players from entering 203

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the political arena. On the other hand, they also challenged the existing political parties to adapt accordingly to the most recent constitution change. This is in contrast to the 1998 and the 2007 Acts whereby only 15 Thai citizens were needed to establish a political party. Also, there were no requirements related to the initial capital of the political party (Organic Act on Political Parties, 2541 BE [1998 CE]; Organic Act on Political Parties, 2550 BE [2007 CE]). This chapter will explain the history of the establishment process for Thai political parties, the political party approach, and the policies of these parties from past to present with the particular consideration of their policy analysis. It will explain the root of populist policy and trends of political parties in Thailand, which tend to imitate policies if they were previously implemented and successful.

Thai political parties: theories versus reality There are three main approaches when looking at Thai political parties: the political sociology approach, the political economy approach and the political science approach (McCargo and Patmanand, 2005: 71–​77). These approaches are endorsed by various scholars –​Daniel Aghiros, Michael Nelson and James Ockey support the political sociology approach; Pasuk Pongpaichit, Kewin Hewison and Sungsidh Phiryarangsan support the political economy approach; and Kramol Tongdhammachart supports the political science approach (McCargo and Patmanand, 2005). The political sociology approach sees political parties as the parties of network gatherings that are formed through the connections of cliques (McCargo and Patmanand, 2005: 73–​74, cited in Chanintorn, 2015). The political economy approach focuses on political parties that are based on financial and personal interests (McCargo and Patmanand, 2005: 71–​73, cited in Chanintorn, 2015). The political science approach, which seems to be the most promising after the 1997 Constitution, sees Thai political parties as moving forward into two major political parties competing against one another (McCargo and Patmanand, 2005: 74–​77, cited in Chanintorn, 2015). McCargo and Patmanand (2005) view political parties differently and assert that there is a fourth approach: electoral professional parties (McCargo and Patmanand, 2005: 77–​78, cited in Chanintorn, 2015). Thaksin Shinawatra, former prime minister and key figure for the Thai Rak Thai Party, was the first party leader who started using marketing strategies to attract voters directly (McCargo and Patmanand, 2005, cited in Chanintorn, 2015). Thaksin proved that marketing strategies work because they attracted voters to vote for him, not for members of parliament (MPs) or other political figures. McCargo and Patmanand (2005) claim that marketing strategies allowed political party leaders to communicate directly with voters, which, therefore, reduced the importance of MPs and political cliques (McCargo and Patmanand, 2005, cited in Chanintorn, 2015). Except for the political science approach, the other approaches can be used to explain the formation process of political parties in the 2019 general election 204

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period. The political sociology approach can be used to explain the formation of medium-​sized political parties, such as the Thai Local Power Party (TLPP). This party was formed under the support of Chatchawan Kong-​udom, a businessman based in Bangkok. According to Johnnopadon Vasinsunthorn, a political candidate who represents TLPP, political parties consist of connections among cliques.1 The main candidates in this political party include Rattaphum Tokongsap, a singer and actor, Kowit Phuangngam, a professor and former dean of Thammasat University, and Cheunchob Kong-​udom, Chatchawan’s son. The TLPP was established in 2012, and its members worked for local administrative organisations that wanted to see changes in decentralisation issues in Thailand2. In 2012, there were 30,000 local administrative officers who marched from the countryside to Bangkok and requested that the government fulfil its promise of fiscal decentralisation; that 35 per cent of the national budget should be allocated to local administrative organisations3. TLPP members who worked for local administrative organisations were ‘phuak’ (clans) and the concept of the political party was to endorse decentralised-​related issues. On the surface, the political economy approach is similar to the political sociology approach. Both view political parties as a gathering place for cliques. The political sociology approach leans towards patron–​client relationships, while the political economy approach leans towards financial and personal interests, rather than ideology (McCargo and Patmanand, 2005). The Palang Pracharat Party fits into the political economy approach category. Palang Pracharat recruited former MPs from other political parties. Among the 97 districts that the Palang Pracharat Party won in general election in 2019, 34 seats were held by former MPs who moved from their previous political parties to Palang Pracharat (iLaw, 2019). McCargo and Patmanand (2005) mentioned another keyword related to the political economy approach: opportunism. According to iLaw (2019), there were 91 former political candidates from other political parties who joined the Palang Pracharat Party during the 2019 election. To explain this occurrence of party switching, it can be argued that some experienced political candidates were seeking an opportunity to win the election through a shortcut by becoming part of the government party. The Future Forward Party (FFP) can be considered as an electoral professional party. According to Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, former head of the FFP, the party did not know who their targeted voters were since the party was new and was only established in early 2018, roughly a year prior to the election date. Therefore, the party aimed to reach as many voters as possible4. Apart from visiting urban and provincial areas, Facebook and Twitter were the main means of communication and voter outreach for the FFP. Thanathorn did not have a personal Twitter account until March 2018.5 Within days of the account’s activation, the viral hashtag #Chuai Thanathorn tang chue phak (to help Thanathorn name a political party) was the number one trend on Twitter (VOICE Online, 2018). The FFP also used Facebook Live as a main tool to reach potential voters. The Facebook Live show, called Khuen wan suk hai pra cha chon (Friday Night for 205

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the Citizen), is a parody of the prime minister’s television show called Na yok phop pra cha chon (The Prime Minister Meets Citizen), which aired every Friday. Hence, through social media, Thanathorn communicated directly to potential voters and, during the election, surpassed the number of votes compared to more traditional candidates, such as local leaders and ex-​incumbents. Overall, the political parties that competed in Thailand’s 2019 general election can be divided into three categories: political parties formed under the political sociology approach; parties formed under the political economy approach; and electoral professional parties. Although the FFP was established approximately a year before the 2019 general election, the party used marketing tools to attract and gain substantial attention from voters, especially tech-​savvy young voters. Note that the number of active Facebook accounts in Thailand reached 48 million in 2017, which is about 70 per cent of the total population (The Digital Global Overview, 2018). According to Arvinder Gujral, the managing director of Twitter Southeast Asia, the number of Twitter users in Thailand has increased approximately 35 per cent during the period from 2017 to 2018 (MarketingOops, 2019). Twitter users aged 16–​24 make up 40 per cent of users in Thailand, followed by those aged 25–​34 (26 per cent) and 35–​44 (19 per cent) (MarketingOops, 2019). More than once, when political incidents occur with the FFP, they have become the top trending topic on Thailand’s Twitter, such as when the constitutional court of Thailand dismissed Thanathorn from the House of Representatives, and after the announcement of the dissolution of the FFP. These are just two of the many instances when the FFP gained the attention of Twitter users. Thai Netizens were among those who protested against actions by the court/​government. One way they did this was by making comments on the platform.

On elections: policies and promises The development of democratic politics in Thailand was often disrupted by the military. Since the creation of a modern democracy in Siam (the former name of Thailand) in 1932 to the present, there have been 13 military-​involved coup d’états. Darling (1971) sees the People’s Party as the first political party in Thailand. However, scholars like Croissant and Chambers (2010) declared 1946 as the starting point of the history of modern political parties in Thailand because the 1946 Constitution officially allowed the practice of political parties for the first time. Although 1946 was a positive year for political parties in Thailand, the Democrat Party is the only political party from 1946 that still exists (Croissant and Chambers, 2010). Croissant and Chambers (2010) summarised five characteristics of political parties in Thailand: 1. ‘High fragmentation’ Thai politics, except in the 2005 election, consists of a multi-​party system. 2. ‘Pronounced regionalisation’ political parties cannot win in every region. 206

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3. ‘Weak institutionalisation’ political parties are involved with the politics of clans, personal ties and patron–​client relationships. 4. In ‘strong factionalism’, there are many groups within these political parties that are connected, therefore, the party is not unified but, rather, is fragile with disconnected groups. 5. In ‘dominance of cadre-​and leader-​centred parties’, politicians run for cabinet seats for the sake of getting seats, not for achieving a certain ideology. Thailand’s democracy was interrupted by another coup in 1947. From 1947 to 1977, Thailand was under an authoritarian regime, though eight coups occurred during this time, in 1947, 1948, 1951, 1957, 1958, 1971, 1976 and 1977. By the time Thailand developed a stable democratic regime, the elections began going through a stage of ‘money politics’, which played a significant role during the 1980s and 1990s. Systematic vote-​buying started to take hold in 1981, during the House of Representatives election in the Roi-​et Province. During the election cycle of 1981, a vote canvassing team for General Kriangsak Chamanan, a former prime minister, was found to be buying votes in public spaces. When the opposition candidate, Lieutenant Colonel Boonlert Lertpreecha, tried to appeal to the authorities, such as civil servants from the Ministry of the Interior or police officers, they were all reluctant to help him. In the end, this led to a big win for Chamanan (Isranews Agency, 2018). From a historical point of view, the policies of the different parties did not play significant roles in gaining votes or power in the cabinet. One could mount a coup to seize the cabinet, or resort to money politics to gain votes. With the necessity to form a coalition government, each political party also avoided promising certain policies as they needed to compromise with other parties after the election. Party policies thus did not matter much until Thaksin Shinawatra became prime minister. Thaksin Sinawatra is a Thai–​Sino tycoon, former policeman and son of a prominent family in Chiang Mai Province. Thaksin formed the Thai Rak Thai Party in 1998 and became the prime minister twice, in 2001 and 2005, before another coup occurred in 2006. Thaksin ensured that the policies developed by the political parties became crucial factors in attracting voters. He used policies that were considered to be populist in nature. According to Phongpaichit and Baker (2008), the word ‘populism’ was used for the first time in the Thai political arena to define Thaksin. During Thaksin’s era from 2001 to 2005, his policies included a universal healthcare scheme, reducing farmers’ debts and loans for villages, which were called ‘Village S, M, L’, meaning villages of small, medium and large sizes (Hewison, 2010; Pheu Thai Party, nd). These policies were called ‘populist policy’, which refers to the governmental intervention that aims for increasing political popularity rather than the long-​term developmental impacts (Yeema, 2004). After Thaksin’s cabinet in 2005, in the 2007 general election, political parties in Thailand, such as the Democrat Party and Chart Thai Party, offered policies similar to those of the Thai Rak Thai Party, such as welfare state policies. The 207

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Democrat Party offered free education for all until high school, guaranteed an allowance of 500 baht for the elderly per month and guaranteed crop prices (Prachatai, 2007). The Chart Thai Party offered free education and free lunch for all and provided housing for Thai citizens (Prachatai, 2007). The People’s Power Party, a party connected to Thaksin Shinawatra after the dissolvement of the Thai Rak Thai Party, offered similar policies to Thaksin’s policies initiated in 2005, such as continuing the universal healthcare scheme, developing village funds, allocating funds for villages of all sizes and guaranteeing crop prices (Prachatai, 2007). Interestingly, populist policies were popular among voters but not among scholars and the opposing parties. However, with the success of populist policies, the right-​wing parties, such as the Democrat Party, reduced their rightist policies and increased their more left-​wing policies to gain the attention of more voters. In the 2011 general election, after the dissolvement of the People’s Power Party, another reborn Thaksin-​clan political party, called the Pheu Thai Party, emerged. The Pheu Thai Party offered similar policies to the Thai Rak Thai Party. It wanted to continue the universal healthcare scheme and increase funds to one million baht for each subdistrict level (The Parliament, nd). However, in this election, the Pheu Thai Party slightly varied its policies to gain more attention from middle-​ class voters. For example, its policies now included refunding car taxes for those who bought a car for the first time, refunding taxes to those who bought their first house and reducing income taxes (The Parliament, nd). The Democrat Party offered free transportation for students and the elderly, free universal healthcare for those who provided their Thai identity card, housing for lower-​income citizens, free electricity of no more than 150–​300 baht monthly, and an elderly and disability allowance of 500 baht per month per person (The Parliament, nd). The Bhumjaithai Party (BP), another opposition to the Pheu Thai Party, offered a guaranteed crop price: 20,000 baht for rice per ton (The Parliament, nd). When comparing the policies of the different political parties, it is noteworthy that the political parties tend to duplicate the successful policies developed by other rival parties. For instance, the universal healthcare scheme from the Thai Rak Thai Party can be found in the Democrat Party’s policies, and the guaranteed crop price of the BP is an imitation of Thai Rak Thai’s crop price policy. Such phenomena show that comparative policy analysis has become the main method for most political parties in this country. They, however, have tried to develop their own policy signature after transferring the policy ideas from others. To rebrand with new policy narrative is thus another way to conduct policy analysis by Thai political parties, which stimulates the domain of policy studies to adopt rhetorical and narrative policy analysis to understand policy development among political parties.

Policies of political parties in the 2019 general election After a tumultuous decade of Thai politics, the general election in 2019 provided opportunities for newcomers but also blocked the opposition’s political party from gaining the majority of seats. There were 500 seats for members of 208

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parliament and 250 appointed seats for senators. The electoral system used during the 2019 national election was called Mixed Member Apportionment (MMA). Five hundred seats for the lower house were divided into 350 seats, from 350 constituencies, and were earned by the ‘winner takes all’ method. The other 150 seats came from the calculation from a single ballot vote; therefore, one vote meant the voter chose both candidates in their district and determined the future of the party-​list seats. Punchada (2019) claimed that the electoral system under the 2019 general election (under the MMA) appeared to put the government’s party, the Palang Pracharat Party (PPP), at an advantage, whether intentional or not. Medium-​ to small-​sized political parties were also able to earn more cabinet seats than expected. For instance, the FFP earned 50 seats from the party-​list system, which was more than the winner-​takes-​all 30 seats the FFP earned (Election Commission of Thailand, 2019). The MMA directly hurt the Pheu Thai Party since the party did not receive any extra seats from the party-​list (Election Commission of Thailand, 2019). Political parties during the election campaign in 2019 developed various types of policies, from niche market policies to populist policies. It is also important to mention that there are two main ways of policy generation in political parties: policies that come from within the party and policies that come from the bottom up, meaning that the policies come from the voters themselves. While the former was based mainly on comparative policy analysis and the branding of policy narratives, the latter was based importantly on interpretive and deliberative policy analysis. Different modes of policy analysis, however, were emphasised differently by different parties. Palang Pracharat Party The PPP was established in 2018 and is known to voters as the government-​ backed political party. The word pracharat is troublesome to Thai citizens, and some might mistakenly think that pracharat has the same meaning as populism. According to the personal Facebook Fan Page of Suvit Maesincee, Minister of Higher Education, Science, Research and Innovation, Maesincee declared that, while the meaning of populism has a negative connotation and negative impact in the long term, pracharat produces a positive impact on the nation (Maesincee, 2015). Maesincee (2015) mentioned that pracharat comes from the state, private sector and citizen, and these three can co-​create economic and social impacts that will be sustained. At the end of Suvit’s Facebook post, he specifically mentioned that ‘if one wants short term gain, long term loss, choose populism but if one wants short term loss, long term gain, then choose pracharat’. In a troublesome article published by Maesincee (2015), he compared populism with pracharat but did not give the meaning of pracharat. He simply stated that it will provide positive outcomes in the long term, although generally people cannot see any clear differences between this party’s policies and most previous populist policies. 209

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During the 2019 general election cycle, the PPP announced three missions and 21 policies. These three missions were ‘welfare pracharat, which reduced inequality’; ‘economic pracharat, which creates competency and equal opportunity’; and ‘society pracharat, peaceful, strong, and sharing’ (Savanayana, 2019). Starting with the first mission, welfare pracharat includes one million houses for Thais, pracharat cards, welfare for urban dwellers and welfare for the elderly, disabled, women and workers. The pracharat card is the highlight of the PPP’s policies. The card has been called widely as ‘Poor People’s Card’, as the government of General Prayuth Chan-​ocha claimed that this project has been proposed as an innovative solution to help poor citizens (Thai Koo Fah, 2018). Established in late 2017, pracharat cards can be used to purchase goods from designated shops worth 200–​300 baht per month, depending on the person’s income. They also reduce the cost of transportation by allowing the user to spend up to 500 baht per month on public transportation (Thai Koo Fah, 2018). Economic pracharat includes increasing the capacity of producers, targeting five million smart small and medium-​sized enterprises, one million smart farmers, one million start-​ups and one million local shops. This increases the level of innovation, income and choices, and reduces debt, risk and capital costs. It also endorses local tourism and a creative economy, and it creates more opportunities to do business (Savanayana, 2019). Society pracharat includes smart cities, education pracharat 4.0, decentralised development of regional areas and the development of 15 main cities and 15 second-​tier cities. Apart from these, other policy promises include a guaranteed minimum wage of 425 baht, a minimum salary for a bachelor’s degree of at least 20,000 baht, cash assistance to mothers of 3,000 baht per month, a guaranteed price for rice of 18,000 baht per ton, and a village fund of two million baht per village (Thai PBS News, 2019). Some of the PPP’s policies that were announced during the election campaign were already established and used by the government. Therefore, the policies were used by the political party to claim the previous achievements of the government at the time and to reassure voters that if one decided to vote for the PPP, the benefits one received from the previous government would continue. Even the name Palang Prachart shares a name with the pracharat card, in order to remind the voters of who gave them the Poor People’s Card. The PPP’s policies set forth during the election cycle were obviously mixed with populist style policies. For instance, the promise to give two million baht to each village were no different than Thai Rak Thai’s policy, which gave one million baht to each village in Thailand. Thus, it was clear that most PPP policies were developed based on comparative analysis –​both previous policies and the international practices –​with the rebranding strategy by changing the names of copied policies and the consideration of the satisfaction of the supporters of the current government.

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Bhumjaithai Party The BP played a crucial part in past elections.6 The party directly competed against the Pheu Thai Party, and the main area of victory for both parties was in Northeast Thailand. The BP was established in 2008, and the head of the political party is Anutin Charnvirakul, heir to a public construction company. Policies of the BP during the 2019 general election were, to some extent, unique and innovative when compared to traditional Thai culture. Policies under the brand BP were similar to the policies of the other main political parties such as a guaranteed price for rice per ton of 18,000 baht, but the party also promised to create a ‘rice fund’ and return 75 per cent of profits to farmers (BBC News, 2019). Innovative policies included legalising Grab (an app-​based taxi service), legalising marijuana and supporting a four-​day work week (BBC News, 2019; Thairath Online, 2019). Policies from the BP are a combination of conventional and unconventional policies. The conventional policies are no different from any other large-​scale political party, but the unconventional policies, such as legalising marijuana, contributed to the popularity of the BP. This party also added their previous achievements into their policies. The success story of the BP happened in Buriram Province, where a former national-​level politician and prominent figure of the BP, Newin Chidchob, created a creative economy within the province. Here, the football team reached the top-​tier in Thailand and the province also had a world-​class motor racing track. The BP then decided to apply Buriram’s model to other cities in Thailand (BBC News, 2019). Policy transfer from the local level to the national scale as an approach of comparative policy analysis was, thus, adopted by BP with an emphasis on innovative and creative ideas. Thai Local Power Party The TLPP is often referred to as a niche political party. The name of this political party defines itself, as it is the party that supports the local communities. The TLPP’s slogan during the election cycle was ‘Clear for Thais, Sincere for Local’ (Siamrath Online, 2019). The TLPP promised to create special districts of 19 provinces and eight local administrations and to increase the power of the local government body (Siamrath Online, 2019). The TLPP allows political candidates to create their own local-​level policy. For instance, Johnnopadon Vasinsunthorn, a candidate representative in District 1, Chiang Mai Province, created his own policy that focused on the local forest and weather. Citizens of Chiang Mai suffered the effects from atmospheric particulate matter, which, at the time of the 2019 general election, was a hot issue among the citizens. In Chiang Mai, there were posters of Johnnopadon where he replaced his face with a picture of the forest. In some of the other posters, he was wearing a face mask, symbolising the candidate protecting himself from the smog.

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The TLPP policies came about in two ways: from the bottom up from the candidate within the district and from the top down, where the party focused on empowering local administrations. Both ways showed that TLPP adopted more critical oriented policy analysis than PPP and BP as the party challenged one of the main structural constraints of the country, which is the highly centralised system. The TLPP may not be considered a new political party since it was established in 2012, but the 2019 general election was the first election in which the TLPP had the opportunity to compete. Pheu Thai Party The Pheu Thai Party (PTP) focused on the messages it sent to potential voters. According to the PTP website, the party’s main policy focused on the revitalisation of the state. The PTP claimed that Thailand has been through crises it had never had to endure before, including political, economic, social, environmental and cultural crises (Pheu Thai Party, ndb). The PTP policies are divided into 14 parts: policies related to politics, law and justice, energy, natural resources and environment, agriculture, education, culture, health, workforce and welfare, science and technology, foreign affairs, social development, human development, and transportation (Pheu Thai Party, ndb). What is interesting about the PTP’s policy is that the party repeatedly mentions the word ‘democracy’ and mentions that the political party endorses the concept of being loyal to the monarch. Previously, there were complaints initiated by Sondhi Lim, a media personality, about Thaksin. Sondhi claimed that Thaksin’s acts could be interpreted as disloyal to the monarch (Nelson, 2005). The PTP insisted that the anti-​royal rumour was not true and made it clear that loyalty must be part of the official policy of the PTP in the 2019 general election. Other PTP policies published on the party’s website were general in nature. They supported circular energy instead of biodiesel, value-​added agriculture goods, strong physical and mental health, creating more jobs for Thais, and strong relationships with other neighbouring countries as well as international countries (Pheu Thai Party, ndb). Although many of the PTP’s policies seemed general and plain, there were two policies that were quite distinct from other parties: the one-​ laptop-​per-​child policy (education policy) and the Thainess policy. The Thainess policy is a cultural policy. The PTP encouraged Thais to love their nation and realise the importance of Thai culture. This policy of loving the nation is the policy that PTP used to claim that the party actually loves the nation and does not hate it. Warong Dechgitvigrom, a former Democrat Party MP, claimed that there are five characteristics of those who hate the nation: disloyalty to the monarch; lack of religion; using religion to create conflicts; insulting the state; and involving other nations in the inner businesses of the state –​for example, involving them in the justice system and not accepting the judge’s verdict (Choosri, 2019). The Thainess policy of the PTP is to assure that claims made by the opposing party are not true and that the PTP can be trusted. The key characteristic of policy 212

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analysis of PTP was, thus, the compromise of ideological and normative conflicts by claiming to promote democracy while the party still supported the existing monarchical system. With this policy paradigm, democracy and loyalty were perceived as slippery discourses that were shaped for political purposes. Future Forward Party On 15 March 2018, the first day of the official press release for the FFP, there were 27 founders. Those founders come from various backgrounds, ranging from educators, activists who represent disability issues, student activists and labour union members (The Standard, 2018). Among the 27 founders are Sustarum Thammaboosadee, a lecturer from Thamasat University who specialises in the welfare state; Chamnan Chanruang, a former lecturer who focused on decentralisation; Kunthida Rungruengkiat, a freelance academic who focused on education in Finland; and Nalutporn Krairiksh, a reporter at Thisable.me, a website focused on issues related to disabilities. Given the backgrounds and occupations of the FFP founders, one would assume that the organisation would be another left-​wing political party. However, the FFP did not explicitly indicate its position and its policies did not come out publicly until a later stage. Policies from the FFP came from different methods of analysis about a year prior to March 2019. Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit, Piyabutr Saengkanokkul, a former secretary general of the FFP, and other party members decided to travel across Thailand to gather information from locals through private meetings and then use the information gathered to develop the party’s policies. In Chiang Mai, the private meetings divided party supporters into a few groups: students, businesses and academia, and others7. Supporters who came to the meetings had the opportunity to share their opinions. Thanathorn and Piyabutr carefully listened to local voices and gave speeches afterward. This pattern of visiting, meeting locals and organising local gatherings and sharing sessions happened across the country. Policies of the FFP came from the bottom up, meaning that they came from local voices, from academia, and from experts who devoted themselves to the party. Such practice can be called interpretive and deliberative policy analysis. The interpretive analysis relies on direct observations of different policy problems and perspectives in different settings, while the deliberative analysis depends mainly on policy dialogues in public spheres (Wagenaar, 2015; Fischer and Boossabong, 2018). There are many highlights in the FFP policies, one of which is equal Thais. This policy endorses the concept of the welfare state and guarantees a monthly allowance for children, mothers and the elderly. The party explained that the budget will come from the budget cuts from other ministries, changing the rates of the personal income tax for gaining more from the high-​income group and increasing property taxes (The Future Forward Party, 2018). The second notable policy is the revolution in the education system, which proposed to reduce inequalities (The Future Forward Party, 2018). The third significant policy is to 213

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stop the centralised government system; the party endorsed a more decentralised system in Thailand (The Future Forward Party, 2018). Other policies include government transparency, public transportation for all, an end to anti-​monopoly businesses, creating a digital economy, supporting a sustainable environment, and reforming the army (The Future Forward Party, 2018). All of these can be seen as the outcome of critical policy analysis by the FFP as the structural barriers were unpacked and policy options were proposed to directly tackle unjust conditions, which are at the heart of critical policy approaches (Fischer et al, 2015). In short, the FFP policies were left-​leaning, with a focus on the welfare state and equal opportunity for all. Under the ideological polarisation, the party positioned itself clearly as pro-​democracy. The policies also endorsed a more decentralised state in Thailand and, an idea never brought up by a Thai political party before, reforming the army. Overall, policies from the political parties that competed during the 2019 general election provided a variety of choices for voters to choose from. Populist policies are associated with the PPP and voters are able to see populism elements in this party more than with the PTP. Niche political parties, such as the TLPP, provide a unique policy that focuses on the local arena in Thailand. The FFP provides fresh policies that include an agenda to restructure the army. The BP’s policies mix with similar policies from the PTP, and the party provides its own challenging and innovative policies that had never been seen before in Thailand. For the element of policy analysis, different modes were adopted, as discussed, but it should be noted that the serious objective and professional policy analysis by Thai political parties could not be clearly identified.

Conclusion Political parties have been officially legalised in Thailand since 1946. However, over the past two decades, there were two coup d’états, and the latest coup in 2014 stopped the work of all from Thai political parties for more than five years. Political turmoil in Thailand was partly to blame for the continuity of Thai political parties, but the malpractice of money politics also played a significant role in manipulating voters’ choices. By the time Thailand resumed holding elections, populist policies flooded the political arena. The successful implementation of populist policies resulted in Thai political parties copying policies from one another and it can be identified that comparative policy analysis was the main approach for most Thai political parties. During the 2019 election campaign period, there were three types of political parties: political parties that used populist policies to attract voters; political parties that used mixed types of policies to attract voters, such as a combination of populist and innovative policies; and niche political parties that came up with niche policies and focused on more specific issues and areas instead of focusing on all areas. Among these, there was one party that gave an importance to critical 214

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thinking, an interpretation of different social demands, and deliberation in its policy analysis and development. The MMA method resulted in a government cabinet in 2019 that consisted of the government-​backed party, the PPP, and other medium-​to small-​sized political parties. So far, many of promises made by the PPP have yet to come true, although the party has had political advantages and framed pre-​existing national policy guidelines known as ‘National Strategy’. The minimum wage has not gone up to more than 400 baht. Those with a higher education have not received more than 20,000 baht per month, and many other promises remain unfulfilled. The policies of Thai political parties may be part of the strategy to gain attention from voters, but evidently, this only happens during an election cycle. Not only did the PPP’s policies not materialise, but the promises of coalition parties like the BP, such as the legalisation of Grab and marijuana, also never happened. Thai politics results in sunken promised policies, and voters must have high hopes until the next election cycle begins. Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Author interview with Johnnopadon Vasinsunthorn on 18 January 2018 and 30 March 2019. Author interview with founding member of the Thai Local Power Party on 18 January 2018. Author interview with founding member of the Thai Local Power Party on 18 January 2018. Thanathorn Juangroongruangkit gave a speech during a private meeting in Chiang Mai Province. This meeting was organised by the Future Forward Party on 4 August 2018. See https://​twit​ter.com/​tha​nath​orn_​fwp See https://​www.bhum​jait​hai.com/​party/​about The author went to one of the private meetings organised by the Future Forward Party.

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Pheu Thai Party (nda) ‘Sip song pee kap sarm na yo bai thi yang yu nai chai pra cha chon ma ta lot’ [12 years with 3 policies which still live within the people’s heart], available from https://​www.ptp.or.th/​news/​695 Pheu Thai Party (ndb) ‘Ru chak phak Pheu Thai’ [Getting to know the Pheu Thai Party], available from https://​www.ptp.or.th/​page/​pol​icy Phongpaichit, P. and Baker, C. (2008) ‘Thaksin’s populism’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 38(1): 62–​83. Phoojiwat, P. (2021) ‘Policy-​making mechanisms of Thai political parties’, Journal of Sri Lan Chang Review, 7(2): 23–​30. [in Thai] Prachatai (2007) ‘Na yo bai sip song phak kan mueang’ [Policies of 12 political parties], Prachatai, available from https://​pracha​tai.com/​jour​nal/​2007/​11/​14862 Punchada, S. (2019) ‘Thailand’s puzzling 2019 election: How the NCPO junta has embedded itself in Thai politics’, ISEAS Perspective, 44: 3–​5. Savanayana, U. (2019) ‘Sarm pan tha kit yi sip et na yo bai “Palang Pracharat” ’ [3 missions, 21 policies of ‘Palang Pracharat’], [Facebook] available from https://​ www.facebo ​ ok.com/​PPRPT​hail​and/​pho​tos/​pcb.5381​6685​3356​655/​5381​6655​ 0023​352/​?type=​3&thea​ter Siamrath Online (2019) ‘Pha lang thong thin Thai chu na yo bai “Si chor paet jor” chat chen phuea khon Thai ching chai phuea thong thin’ [Thai local power party endorsed ‘4C8S’ policies -​clear changes for Thais, sincere actions for local], Siamrath, available from https://​siamr​ath.co.th/​n/​60369 The Standard (2018) ‘Thanathorn poet tua Anakhot Mai phak thang lak mai chai thang lueak yam chut yuen pra cha thip pa tai’ [Thanathorn announced that the Future Forward Party will be the main political party that advocates for democracy], The Standard, available from https://​thes​tand​ard.co/​tha​nath​ orn-​the-​new-​fut​ure-​party/​ Thai Koo Fah (2018) ‘Mat tra kan sa wat di kan haeng rat na wat ta kam phuea kae pan ha khwam yak chon’ [Measurement of state welfare, innovation for reducing poverty], available from https://s​ pm.thai​gov.go.th/​FILER​OOM/​spm-​ thai​gov/​DRAWER​004/​GENE​RAL/​DATA0​000/​00000​438.PDF Thai PBS News (2019) ‘Song na yo bai sanya “Palang Pracharat” ’ [Sneak through promised policy of ‘Palang Pracharat’], Thai PBS, available from https://​news. thai​pbs.or.th/​cont​ent/​280​672 Thairath Online (2019) ‘Bhumjaithai dan tham ngan si wan lot kha fun pit chong long chai ya mong kan mueang’ [Bhumjaithai endorsed 4 working days to reduce air pollution –​this is for the country, not for the political popularity of the party], Thairath, available from https://​www.thair​ath.co.th/​news/​poli​tic/​ 1488​069 VOICE Online (2018) ‘Twitter ra dom hashtag “#Chuai Thanathorn tang chue phak” phung an dap nueng’ [Twitter mobilised hashtag ‘#HelpThanathornnamedpoliticalparty’ reached number 1], Voice TV, available from https://​voic​etv.co.th/​read/​r1gxOk​2_​M

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Wagenaar, H. (2015) Meaning in Action: Interpretation and Dialogue in Policy Analysis, London and New York: Routledge. Yeema, B. (2004) Populist Policy and Economic Power: The Political Economy of the Success of Thai Rak Thai Party, Doctoral Dissertation, Chulalongkorn University. [in Thai]

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TWELVE

Business associations and policy analysis Warathida Chaiyapa and Vorapat Chutima

Introduction Business associations are known as one of the interest groups in the public policy landscape. For instance, big corporations employ various techniques to engage with or even influence the government in ensuring that state regulations would not harm their business operation (Moore and Hamalai, 1993; Lim et al, 2021). To name a few, corporations would do lobbying, establish government-​relations departments to contact public officials, make comments on proposed regulations or laws, take consultation positions in government advisory committees, and so on (Godwin et al, 2018). In Thailand, local entrepreneurs who were the forerunner of the bourgeois class were mainly ethnic Chinese. Laothamatas (2019) stated that in the 1940s to 1950s, these Chinese businesspersons secretly influenced public policy by giving bribes or having clientelist relations with bureaucratic leaders. This aligns with the prevalent peasant struggle and relentless push for a nationalistic government policy of that time. However, the status of the middle and business class elevated from a society-​centered model of Western industrialisation and democratisation, which became a new paradigm for the country. One could predict that the business class would assert national leadership or, at the very least, will seek to engage with the public policy formation to ensure that state regulations will be in their favour. What differs from previous decades is that the business class collectively asserts demands to the government in the form of business or trade associations which have gained political and economic power and finally replaced student groups as the strongest among civil society groups in Thailand (Laothamatas, 2019). The establishment of the Joint Public and Private Sector Consultative Committee (JPPSCC) in 1981 was the keystone for the success of the business class’s official and systematic influence on public policy. The JPPSCC was first established at the national level (Bangkok metropolis) and later at provincial levels spreading in 76 provinces. At the national level, the prime minister is the chairperson of the JPPSCC that convened the public and private sectors involving the three most important business associations, namely: the Thai Chamber of Commerce (TCC), the Federation of Thai Industries (FTI) and the Thai Bankers’ Association (TBA). These associations are crucial members of private-​sector stakeholders. This kind of leadership structure replicates in the local chapters of the organisations. For instance, the local JPPSCC follows the line structure at 219

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Table 12.1: List of interviewees No

Affiliations

Level

1

Deputy Secretary-​General National Economic and Social Development Board

National

2

Representative of the Thai Chamber of Commerce, the Federation of Thai Industries and the Thai Bankers’ Association

National

3

Former President of the Chiang Mai Chamber of Commerce

Provincial

4

Head of Chiang Mai Provincial Office

Provincial

the national level where the governor serves as president of the committee that convenes member public and private sectors, including provincial offices of the TCC, FTI and TBA. Due to the highly regarded status of JPPSCC in the economic policy formation process, this chapter aims to investigate the business–​government relation through the case of the JPPSCC (also see Chapter Three on the role of the JPPSCC in connection to the central government). The study takes a historic review approach to examine the role of the JPPSCC on public policy, particularly on economic issues in Thailand, tracing back to the first National Economic and Social Development Plan (NESDP) in the 1960s. The data derives from secondary data review and semi-​structured interviews with key informants from the public and private sectors (see Table 12.1). The chapter is divided into four sections. The first section discusses the business–​government relation mentioned in the 1st–​4th NESDPs. The second section explains the emergence of the JPPSCC in 1981. The line structure of the JPPSCC and key implications on the membership structure is presented in the third section. Lastly, the fourth section discusses the current role of the JPPSCC in the public policy formation of the government led by General Prayuth Chan-​o-​cha.

The role of the business sector and association through the 1st to the 4th National Economic and Social Development Plans In the first and the second NESDPs (1961–​1966 and 1967–​1971), business sectors were encouraged by the government to produce goods and services for domestic consumption. This is according to the liberal economic system, which promotes that the state should leave the business sector to produce goods and products while the state would provide only infrastructure and basic facilities. The role of the government then was to support the expansion of business activities and private investment. In the second NESDP, the government launched three measures to stimulate the expansion of the business sector in Thailand. First, the state would reinforce private investment through the Industrial Investment Promoting Act. Second, the state would not compete with the business sector in the goods and services the private companies would better provide and in areas 220

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with no harm to the common good. Third, the state would build infrastructure to support the work of the business sector to maintain the country’s fiscal and financial stability. From 1972 to 1976, the third NESDP was the first development plan implemented that officially encouraged the formation of business associations. The previous NESDPs only promoted private companies in the industrial sector. According to the 3rd NESDP, the state should promote the establishment and support the role of business associations as a bridge to connect the government with the private sectors. The government is also expected to tighten its relationship with the private sector through business associations. In line with this, business associations would take consulting roles by providing facts and feedback for the government to consider when forming public policies. This initiative was the first time the business sector was officially acknowledged and included in the government’s economic development policy. However, the business associations did not suceed in providing consultation, due to mistrust between the government and the business sector, and the capacity of the business associations was still in its infancy. The former factor resulted from the different work cultures between the two actors. The government worked on a long hierarchical process and regulations, thus, taking time in its operations. On the contrary, the business sector sought efficiency to reduce cost and time. The mismatch in work culture caused mistrust between the two players. In a different light, the business associations lacked strong competency to work collectively among members. This caused a lack of coherence and uniformity in the associations. Besides the internal factors, Thailand was affected by the global economic crisis and unstable political situations. The oil shock in the 1970s wreaked havoc on the world economy, which had a problematic effect on the third world and developing countries, including Thailand. The coup d’etat in 1971 led to the popular uprising against the dictatorship (from 14 October 1973 to 6 October 1976), causing nationwide sociopolitical instability for years. All of these incidents hampered the 3rd NESDP from being fully implemented. The expected strong collaboration between the government and the business sector was thus not realised. Unlike previous NESDPs, the 4th NESDP (1977–​1981) did not mention any support for the role of business associations. This is related to how the government, at the time, wanted to suppress the role of interest groups which have different ideas from the government and tried to steer the government into their direction. In the 4th NESDP, the government prioritised remaining independent from every interest group and paying close attention to maintaining national security against communism. Despite that, the business sectors and their associations developed and became powerful. This started with the coup d’etat in 1977 when General Kriengsak Chamanun became prime minister. Under his leadership, the government overturned the independent policy of the previous prime minister, Thanin Kraivichienm, for instance, amending the constitution and rebuilding relations with socialist countries. 221

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Moreover, the relationship between the government and the private sectors under General Chamanun’s rule was also a significant turning point. In May 1978, the Joint Standing Committee on Commerce, Industry, and Banking (JSCCIB) expressed an intent to Prime Minister General Kriengsak to cooperate with the government to solve the country’s severe deficit problem. The proposal was welcomed and led to establishing a joint standing committee to solve deficit trading and economic crisis. For the first instance, this official involvement with the public policy process of the Thai government showed that the business sector had increasingly gained momentum in state affairs. Pulsirirat (1990) pointed out that the business sector’s influence depended on their involvement in the leadership of three business associations that formed the JSCCIB, which greatly influenced public policy affairs. Later, the leaders from these business groups received political appointments as government ministers. For example, Mr Obb Vasurat, president of the TCC from 1973 to 1979, was appointed a Minister of Commerce from 1979 to 1980. Also, Major General Praman Adireksarn, the president of the FTI from 1969 to 1970 and 1978 to 1979, was the Chart Thai political party leader and a deputy prime minister in 1975. Another is Mr Boonchu Rojjanasatien, the TBA president from 1978 to 1979, who was Minister of Finance from 1975 to 1976, and became a deputy prime minister in 1980. Apart from the fact that leaders of the three core business associations in Thailand were appointed to political positions, an increasing number of members of the House of Representatives after the popular uprising on 14 October 1973 had a background in the business sector. Hence, the business sector’s role in the public policy landscape became increasingly apparent and acknowledged.

The emergence of the Joint Public and Private Sector Consultative Committee The joint standing committee to solve deficit trading and economic crisis established in May 1978 was a key turning point in the relationship between the government and the private sectors. Later, the business sector actively put forward its agenda to be involved in the economic policy system of the country. On 25–​ 27 October 1978, the Thailand Management Association organised a conference on ‘Public and private governance in Thailand: Is it necessary to create a tighter and productive relation?’. The conference invited executives of business sector and high-​ranking government officials to participate in the conference theme discussions. The conference’s agenda was to create a good understanding among the public and private sectors and to point out the importance of collaboration between the two stakeholders. One of the binding agreements of the conference was the consensus that the government and the private sector should collaborate and set up a joint organisation. The conference was an expression of the private sector to urge the government to redefine the role of the private sector and include them in the public policy system of the country. 222

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The private sector increasingly inserted influence in politics and expressed firm determination to be included in the public policy formation and decision-​making process on economic issues with the Thai government. Furthermore, during that time, the world was facing intensive economic competition that was driven by national interests. Under Prime Minister General Prem Tinnasulanon, the Thai government was aware of the importance of collaboration with the private sector since the Thai economy is closely tied up with the global economy. Eventually, the political, economic and social conditions became favourable, resulting in the cabinet’s approval of the law to establish the JPPSCC on 30 June 1981. The fifth NESDP (1982–​1986) explained the establishment of this collaboration: [T]‌he government will set up a permanent and official joint committee between the government and business associations. The joint committee will serve as a center point for collaboration and have the main duty in providing economic consulting (Office of the National Economic and Social Development Council, nd).

The line structure of the Joint Public and Private Sector Consultative Committee and implications The members of the JPPSCC comprise the ministers and the representatives of the JSCCIB. The prime minister holds the chair or president’s position in the national JPPSCC. From the year of the establishment until the early 1980s, three representatives from the TCC, FTI and TBA were invited to be the members of JPPSCC. The Office of the National Economic and Social Development Council serves as secretary of the national JPPSCC. The present line structure of JPPSCC, as shown in Figure 12.1, is not much different from what was initially designed in the 1980s. However, slight updates have included the Tourism Council of Thailand, which will be elaborated on in the next section.

Important implications of the membership of the Joint Public and Private Sector Consultative Committee First, the members of three business associations, namely the TCC, FTI and TBA, are only allowed to be members of the JPPSCC. This exclusive selection means that the government considers these three associations to be representative of the private sector of Thailand. The private companies or professional associations will need to become a member of these three entities if they want to be involved in the public policy affairs of the government. Such criteria meant that the private sector had to work within the framework and rules that the government set up. Second, other professional associations and interest groups are not members of the three business associations, such as the Tourism Council of Thailand, Thai Real Estate Association and National Farmers Council. Therefore, several specific public policies formed by many business associations need to push through the TCC, which has a trading business background. Those specific public policies, such as agriculture, tend to change their goal when presented by persons with no grounded knowledge. 223

newgenrtpdf

Source: Developed by the authors based on raw data from JPPSCC (2020)

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Figure 12.1: Line structure of national Joint Public and Private Sector Consultative Committee

Business associations and policy analysis

Figure 12.2: Agenda selection process from provincial to national level

Source: Developed by the authors based on raw data obtained from JSCCIB (2017)

Third, the JPPSCC line structure comprises horizontal and vertical dimensions that serve as an agenda filler. As shown in Figure 12.2, each provincial business association forwards the agenda to the provincial JSCCIB. Then, the agenda will move to the provincial JPPSCC, which will then be relayed to the provincial cluster JPPSCC before moving towards the regional JPPSCC. It is essential to highlight that there are 18 provincial clusters across Thailand. Hence, the line of transactions in forwarding priorities presented in these dynamics shows intense competition for an agenda to be selected, given that it can be rejected at any level. Therefore, the agenda that can pass through to the national level will then be forwarded for the prime minister and his cabinet’s consideration. 225

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In sum, the decision-​making process, the lines of communication and the grouping of provincial clusters are very similar to how the central government designs its chain-​of-​command, with provincial and local governments described in detail in the chapters on the history and methods of policy analysis (see Chapters 1 and 2). We can infer that the relationship between the government and the business sector is not an equal partnership. The bureaucratic language and procedures are naturally injected into policy analysis conducted by the business sector because it operates under the tightly controlled terms of the central government.

The role of the Joint Public and Private Sector Consultative Committee in the current government under General Prayuth Chan-​o-​cha After the political turmoil in Thailand from October 2013 to April 2014, General Prayuth and the military forces decided to take control of the country for national stability and the protection of the monarchy on 22 May 2014. He served as a prime minister of Thailand under a military regime called the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) from 22 May 2014 to 23 March 2019 and under an elected government from 24 March 2019 to the present (December 2022). Therefore, General Prayuth takes two distinctly separate roles in economic policies during the two periods of government. Under the NCPO regime, his role with business sectors, especially with the JPPSCC, is varied. Prime Minister General Prayuth filled his first cabinet with retired bureaucrats, military officers and some capitalists. Under General Prayuth’s watch after the coup of 2014, the 250 members of the National Legislative Assembly are composed of the military at 58 per cent, police at 5 per cent, civilian bureaucrats at 26 per cent, businesspersons at 8 per cent, and other sectors at 3 per cent (Kongkirati and Kanchoochat, 2018). In dealing with the economic downturn, the NCPO launched a national plan and various economic development projects such as the 20-​Year National Strategy, Pracharath scheme and Eastern Economic Corridor (EEC). These projects are carried out through different mechanisms. First, a special committee named ‘The National Strategy Committee’, with 34 members appointed by the NCPO from active and retired military officers, high-​ranking civil servants and the elite businesses, including heads of business associations from the JSCCIB, implemented the 20-​Year National Plan. The committee’s role is to control and take purview of the parliament, the cabinet and all government agencies to follow the 20-​Year Strategy. Second, General Prayuth’s administration has formed a close partnership with leading Sino-​Thai conglomerates. His government has gained support from these business elites to establish the Pracharath scheme, an overarching economic ideology. Pracharath’s literal definition in Thai means a partnership between (pracha-​) the people and (-​rath) the state. However, in practice, the Pracharath scheme was formed as a 226

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partnership between the state, the business sector and the general public. The Pracharath scheme is implemented by a public–​private partnership mechanism called Pracharath Rak Samakkee Co. Ltd., where all sectors of society supposedly join hands to strengthen the country and boost the economy at a local level in all 76 provinces. Pracharath Rak Samakkee Co. Ltd. is supported by 24 companies that take the lead in the JSCCIB. Some business elites who signed the partnership deal to establish the Pracharath scheme in December 2015 are: [The] Thai Beverage Group, Charoen Pokphand Foods/​True Corporation, Mitr Phol Sugar, Central Group, The Mall Group, Thai Union Group, Bangkok Bank, SCG Group, Thai President Foods, Saha Group, Samart Group, Thai Vegetable Oil, WHA Corporation, Ch Karnchang, Advanced Info Service, Pruksa Real Estate, MK Restaurant, Se-​Ed Education, Muang Thai Insurance, BTS Group Holdings, Bangkok Airways and PTT Group. (Kongkirati and Kanchoochat, 2018) A significant appointment made by General Prayuth was that of Mr Isara Vongkusolkit, then Chairman of the TCC, the Board of Trade, and the owner of Mitr Phol Sugar, to become the chairman of the Pracharath’s private-​sector committee and deputy chairman of the Pracharath’s executive committee. In 2018, Pracharath Rak Samakkee Co. Ltd. was divided into three groups according to their respective function in reducing inequality, enhancing competency and competitiveness, and developing labour. Despite the overarching and mesmerising economic ideology to form a partnership between the state, people and businesses, the Pracharath scheme was criticised for being a platform for Sino-​ Thai business conglomerates to take control of Thailand’s economy and establish the so-​called hierarchical capitalism, which has a clear agenda in replacing former Prime Minister Thaksin’s grassroots development policy, Prachaniyom (Thaksin’s populism) (Kongkirati and Kanchoochat, 2018). Third, General Prayuth’s administration identified critical economic problems, thus citing that the Special Economic Zones initiative has relatively failed in other parts of Thailand, for example, in Tak and Nakhon Phanom provinces. The NCPO realised that one of the main reasons for the failure was the lack of effective supporting investment measures, such as special regulations or tax reductions for some industries. In an initiative, the NCPO used section 44 of the constitution to establish EEC offices and tried to overcome investment obstacles as much as possible, including the suspension of some rights and liberty of people in the EEC area. The main prospect investors in the EEC project are also JPPSCC members such as Chareon Pokphand and foreign investors such as ExxonMobil. Thai people generally view these three projects under the NCPO regime government to be in favour of big corporations and the JSCCIB. With a military 227

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and bureaucratic background, the NCPO government allows business associations at the national level to join in forming national-​level economic policies. The agendas from provincial business associations are sometimes viewed as not aligned with national interests. We can say that the role of the national level JPPSCC is superior to that of the provincial level JPPSCC. And that the central government and cabinet find ways to control the policy analysis process and outputs for key economic policies and development projects. For example, the ‘Haze Crisis’ in the north and other parts of Thailand is understood to come from land fires, a process to rapidly clear land for planting and harvesting animal-​feed corn. The increase in the production area was believed to be supported by big corporations in agriculture, which are members of the national-​level JPPSCC. With the tight relationship between the NCPO government and the JSCCIB through the national-​level JPPSCC, the solution or public policy to tackle this problem has been largely ignored. The government never used section 44 of the constitution to empower local authorities and investigate these kinds of problems, similar to what they have done before (iLaw, 2015). However, after the NCPO regime government stepped down and was replaced by an elected government that installed General Prayuth as prime minister from Phalang Pracharat Party, the power to use section 44 of the constitution also vanished. The elected government seceded primarily on being heavily dependent on the national-​level JPPSCC and its members in forming economic policy. The role of the provincial JPPSCC became significant, together with members of parliament and opposition parties, in observing actions by the current government. For example, the EEC high-​speed train project to be run by Chareon Pokphand was passed down to the Bangkok Dusit Medical Services group.

Conclusion This chapter has described the role and structure of business associations in the formal policy analysis process of the Thai government. Their involvement can be understood as being entirely predictable with clear engagement procedures in place. This reflects the centralised bureaucratic nature of the Thai state. The usual policy analysis conducted by private sector entities in other countries, such as cost-​benefit analysis, strategic planning, stakeholder analysis, environmental impact assessments and feasibility studies, are not covered in this chapter. It is understood that mature private companies would have such policy analysis in place. However, in the case of Thailand, there is limited evidence of systematic linkages between a private sector or business associations’ policy analyses and governments’ public policy analyses. Instead, we can observe the techniques of lobbying, sitting on committees and using informal patron–​client relations to influence policies. This is usually done without proper policy analysis but merely to preserve traditional interests or gain new ones from such policies. 228

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References Godwin, E., Godwin, K. and Ainsworth, S. (2018) ‘Policy analysis by corporations and trade associations’, in J. Hird (ed) Policy Analysis in the United States, Bristol: Policy Press, pp 223–​244. iLaw (2015) Report on the Exercise of Power under section 44 of the Interim Constitution of Thailand, available from https://​www.ilaw.or.th/​node/​3938 [in Thai] JSCCIB (Joint Standing Committee on Commerce, Industry, and Banking) (2017) Provincial and Regional Line Structure, available from https://​www.jsc​cib. org/​en/​econ​omy/​reg​ion [in Thai] Kongkirati, P. and Kanchoochat, V. (2018) ‘The Prayuth regime: Embedded military and hierarchical capitalism in Thailand’, TRaNS: Trans-​Regional and-​ National Studies of Southeast Asia, 6(2): 279–​305. Laothamatas, A. (2019) Business Associations and the New Political Economy of Thailand: From Bureaucratic Polity to Liberal Corporatism, London: Routledge. Lim, G., Gomez, E.T. and Wong, C.Y. (2021) ‘Evolving state–​business relations in an age of globalisation: An introduction’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 51(5): 697–​712. Moore, M. and Hamalai, L. (1993) ‘Economic liberalization, political pluralism and business associations in developing countries’, World Development, 21(12): 1895–​1912. Office of the National Economic and Social Development Council (nd) ‘1st–​5th national economic and social development plan’, available from https://​www. nesdb.go.th/​main.php?filen​ame=​develo​p_​is​sue [in Thai] Pulsirirat, V. (1990) ‘State role on private groups in the Joint Public and Private Consultative Committee (JPPCC)’, available from http://​cuir.car.chula.ac.th/​ han​dle/​123456​789/​62458 [in Thai]

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The role of the community sector and civil society in policy analysis Theerapat Ungsuchaval and Wachirawat Ariyasirichot

Introduction The community sector, civil society organisations (CSOs), non-​profits and non-​government organisations (NGOs) (hereafter the sector) in Thailand are considered relatively vibrant and active among Asian societies (Weiss, 2015). The sector has affected and been influenced by the government and its policy making and implementation, thereby becoming an essential part of the contemporary policy process. According to the National Statistical Office (2019), there are 84,099 non-​profit organisations which constitute the sector in Thailand. They are operating across policy fields and taking various roles ranging from being a watchdog and a policy advocate of certain policy issues to a partner in public governance and policy execution. Since the formulation of the National Economic and Social Development Plan (NESDP), the principal guide for national development, in the 1960s, the sector has gradually been given attention by the government (for details on the policy analysis by the National Economic and Social Development Board, see Chapter Three on policy analysis in the central government). Yet, the sector has not grown much until the late 1980s when government policies became more liberalised and the 1990s where the sector has been favoured to become an active participant in national policy settings. In this sense, the sector is ineluctably conditioned by the sociopolitical milieu (see Manorom, 2020). The trajectory of the sector is closely related to the development of the state. To be precise, the sector ‘operates within the normative confines of the state, is shaped by state policies and discourses, and often finds itself directly incorporated into state policy process’ (Gilley, 2014: 45). This chapter critically examines important aspects of the sector in relation to policy analysis throughout the whole policy process, including key developments of the sector, major roles of the sector, and prominent approaches and methodologies employed by the sector in influencing national and local policy analysis.

The initial development of the sector Traditionally, the sector was not interested in engaging with policy works in institutional settings. It had mainly invested in philanthropic and community works in local areas (see Nitayarumphong and Mulada, 2001). Nevertheless, the 230

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landscape of the sector began to change in the 1960s when the first NESDP was implemented by the government.1 The first NESDP, albeit generating the rapid growth of the national economy, represented the state-​led, top-​down development which caused severe negative externalities, such as the degradation of the natural environment, the fall of the agricultural sector and rural areas, and inequitable economic growth (Kelly et al, 2012). The performance of the state under the NESDP could not satisfy the demands of the people, which led to the emergence of the sector in proposing alternative approaches to development (discussed later) at both national and local levels (Shigetomi, 2004). The sector began to move from philanthropic-​oriented work towards development-​oriented work. In the 1970s, the sector started to affect the broad sociopolitical system thanks to the 1973 student uprising to overthrow the dictator government and promote democracy (Zimmerman, 1974; Pongsapich, 1999; Kongkirati, 2012). Unfortunately, this caused the state to become wary of the sector. Then, the overall atmosphere of the country was still not friendly to the sector for it to thrive. Importantly, the sector had been harshly suppressed and accused of being communist sympathisers. After the Second World War, the communist ideas that spread across Asian countries were seen as an alternative solution to development which challenged the status quo and the stability of the state (Bowie, 1997; Pongsapich and Kataleeradabhan, 1997). They were immediately marked as a serious threat to the national security associated with people’s organisations and needed to be suppressed in Thailand (Mallet, 1978). CSOs working to promote alternative development, supported by foreign bodies, were threatened, framed and trespassed upon by the government (Tieawsatul, 1996; Bunbongkarn, 2004) because they were suspected of being penetrated by foreign, ‘un-​Thai’ bodies. Activities of the sector were then gradually developed during the 1970s. However, the full emergence of the sector happened in the 1980s when the government introduced a series of liberal policies to promote social and economic justice, political participation and democratic institutions, and political freedom (Bunbongkarn, 2004; Taveekan, 2013). There was a dramatic increase in the number of CSOs and NGOs during the 1980s (see Social Research Institute, 2003). This period was then dubbed as the beginning of modern civil society in Thailand (Baker and Phongpaichit, 2014). The sector increasingly became visible to the public and the government (Goldschmidt and Boonyarattanasoontorn, 1992; Prasartset, 1995) as it started to become more involved with urban spaces and complex social and environmental problems. The proliferation of the sector allowed the emergence of political structures where CSOs and NGOs can comment on government policies and launch public campaigns as a means of influencing the state. Subsequently, coordination between the state and the sector was initiated. For example, in 1985, the NGO Coordinating Committee on Development was founded with the support of the National Coordinating Centre for Rural Development. This coordinating body bridged CSOs, NGOs and government agencies at all levels and became a joint strategic committee to promote social development. In addition, 231

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the implementation of the sixth NESDP between 1986 and 1990 formally emphasised, for the first time, the role of the sector in development and promoted self-​reliance in the sector (National Economic and Social Development Board, 1987). Through the NESDP, it became clear that the government would seek help from CSOs for its development policies and plans (Laothamatas, 1991). At the end of the 1980s, the sector was seen as a legitimate and indispensable element in public affairs. It had won a place in the policy process of the government.

Diversified methodologies of the sector in influencing national and local policy analysis Although the sector commonly shared a willingness to act on social injustice, it was not an organised, monolithic and coherent movement concentrating its efforts on specific policy issues. Instead, the sector was inherently diversified with different, or even contradictory, agendas, ideologies and methodologies (Hirsch, 1990; Simpkins, 2003; Phatharathananunth, 2006). The context of the 1980s stimulated the diversification of the sector and two major camps can be identified. These two camps were different in terms of the manifestation, methodologies and approaches used to do policy analysis and to engage in the policy process. The first camp can be seen as moderate or mainstream. Its working strategy was significantly based on a prominent alternative development approach called ‘community culture’. Developed by CSOs and fellow academics, the approach advocated community development, subsistence economy and self-​reliance (Natsupa, 1991; Mukdawijitra, 2005). It held that social problems can be solved at local levels such as in communities. What is more important is that the approach emphasised the necessity of CSOs in development work. CSOs were envisioned as professional development experts who helped communities to develop, recover and sustain their cultural consciousness and way of life. This camp then believed in the professionality of the sector. Policy issues the sector in this camp liked to advocate are dubbed ‘cool’ issues. They refer to the development and welfare-​ related work that are not necessarily against the state and government policies and do not create confrontation but, instead, negotiation (Atchawanitchakun and Vajanasara, 2008). In this regard, the first camp highlighted the potential of the sector to work with the state. This camp is sometimes referred to as the ‘collaborationists’ (Hirsch, 1990). CSOs in this camp can gain legitimacy through collaboration with external experts such as the government and technocrats in need of resources. On the contrary, the second camp was autonomist, highlighting the importance of the independence of the sector. Its working strategy was derived from the ‘political economy’ approach of movement stressing social transformation (Phatharathananunth, 2006). This approach, to some extent, rejected the community culture approach. It did not believe that complex problems can be solved at local levels. Instead, the sector should accumulate bargaining power through mass mobilisation to address policy issues at national levels. Policy issues 232

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the second camp pursued were dubbed ‘hot’ issues. They refer to advocacy and movement-​related works, which, in addition to creating contestation, are inevitably against the state and the authorities (Atchawanitchakun and Vajanasara, 2008). Moreover, this camp tended to be sceptical of the paternalistic and repressive presence of the state and bureaucracy. However, it does not necessarily mean that this camp was completely anti-​government. Working with, without or against the state should be seen as a frame of operation that CSOs can choose. It does not straightforwardly define what they are. Indeed, this second camp denied centralised organisation (Callahan, 1998) and preferred to work with social movements (Phongpaichit and Baker, 1995). These two camps, in effect, were not mutually exclusive. Nowadays, it is highly possible to see a CSO holding methodologies from both camps as they are interdependent and can help CSOs achieve their goals in a complementary way. For instance, methodologies in the second camp can assist CSOs with pushing certain policy issues which might seem radical and, subsequently, may broaden the political dialogue and policy agenda of the state. Nonetheless, without the more mainstream methodology of the first camp to link with the officials and the authorities, policy changes initiated and advocated by the sector were likely to be overlooked and deemed illegitimate (Simpkins, 2003). The real-​world policy advocacy of the sector is then dynamic and flexible.

The era of the public participatory policy landscape and empowered civil society movement Analysts called the 1990s the burgeoning era of modern civil society (Connors, 2002; McCargo, 2004). A rising new middle-​class was observed starting to participate in the sector for political purposes (Dhiravegin, 1990; Laothamatas, 1991; Yoshifumi, 2008), proving the power of the sector in transforming politics. This encouraged the sector to become more focused on policy advocacy and movement-​related works. CSOs increasingly scrutinised government policies and then voiced their concerns when they deemed them suspicious. Although anti-​government protests and attempts to influence government policies were witnessed since the 1980s, they mostly became an extension of the sector’s advocacy work in the 1990s (see more details on political movements in Chapter Ten). Some CSOs adopted the role of social movement organisations and tried to shift issues in local areas to the national arena. The intervention of the sector in public affairs brought about pluralism, the concept of which the Thai society was previously lacking (Gohlert, 1991). In addition, it is asserted that the sector has ‘come to break down the patron-​client relation between the authorities, the elites and the poor and reduce the power of the bureaucracy’ (Dechalert, 1999: 17). CSOs turned out to be intermediary agents between the government and the people in the development and policy sectors. They provided resources and support to the people while providing political links and speaking on behalf of them with the authorities in the policy process. They 233

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performed various advocacy roles such as being the supporter, the partner and the main actor in movements. Networking then became a fundamental strategy for advocacy work in the sector. The 99 Days Demonstration in 1997 of the Assembly of the Poor (AOP) was a successful case in which the sector played an indispensable role in representing the interests of the people, negotiating with the authorities and communicating with the public (see Pintobtang, 1998; Baker, 2000; Missingham, 2003). Created in 1995, the AOP is an organised movement aiming to give voices to villagers and marginalised people, empower CSOs and other people’s organisations, and push the government to better allocate resources and create fair policies. As the AOP increased the visibility of the government’s corruption, inefficiency and unaccountability and succeeded in gaining promises from the government to tackle many of their concerns (see Chalermsripinyorat, 2004), it also enlarged the space for the sector in urban areas and became ‘one of the leading movements in the struggle to strengthen civil society’ in the country’s history (Prasartset, 1997: 97). The AOP became a role model for CSOs that wished to change policies and influence the policy process. The sector has consistently created change momentum which then enlarged the space for the sector in the policy process. The agreeable atmosphere of civil society–​government relations in the 1980s continued to be strengthened through the 1990s when the country became more liberalised. The government had a clear vision to promote NGOs (Farrington et al, 1993). The seventh NESDP, implemented between 1992 and 1996, favourably recognised civil society participation and encouraged the government to allocate funds for CSOs and NGOs. The sector began to help the public sector to deliver public policies and services (Balassiano, 2011). The role of the sector in the public sphere and the policy process was significantly augmented through the notion of Thammarat or good governance (see Banpasirichote, 2004; Tejapira, 2009) which encouraged the incorporation of CSOs and NGOs into the state system of governance (Elinoff, 2014). Civil society involvement became a prerequisite for good governance. As a result, the sector began to foster partnerships with some governmental agencies. Moreover, the promulgation of the new constitution of 1997, also known as the ‘People’s Constitution’ (see Connors, 2002; Thabchumpon and Dhitthapichai, 2002), was essential to the sector in participating in the policy process. The 1997 Constitution marked a critical transformation to a more democratic society by encouraging public participation, decentralisation and human rights. Arguably, it created an ‘institutional civil society’ in which CSOs could increase their participation in the policy process and do meaningful policy analysis rather than organising protests on the streets (see Brenner et al, 1999; Johnson and Forsyth, 2002). Institutional politics then became the centre of attention in the sector. Together with the notion of good governance, the 1997 Constitution is believed to be the catalyst for the emergence of new governance.

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Foreign funding and civil society suppression The introduction of the NESDP in the 1960s brought in foreign assistance in national development, which soon took an interest in the sector. As time passed, the sector became successful in establishing strong ties with foreign bodies. The dramatic rise of the number of CSOs in the 1980s also led an increase of foreign funding for development projects in Thailand (Quinn, 1997; Delcore, 2003). Foreign funding was the major source of revenue for the sector until the middle of the 1990s (Chutima, 2004). This made foreign bodies a considerable and influential player in the sector. For example, between 1985 and 1989, the Canadian International Development Agency funded the Local Development Assistance Programme (LDAP) which, in turn, academically and financially supported CSOs in local areas. The funding has positively affected the sector’s development. The LDAP then developed into the Local Development Institute (LDI) in 1991, with its mission to support local and community development and national CSO networking (see Leangchareon, 2000; Chutima, 2004; Connors, 2005). The LDI was one of the first big foreign financial support packages for the sector and this incubated many key CSOs in the 1990s (Gohlert, 1991; Goldschmidt and Boonyarattanasoontorn, 1992). Unfortunately, the friendly attitudes the sector had towards foreign assistance caused tension between the state and the sector. Throughout history, there were many barriers the government built to constrain the sector. At one time, the government labelled the sector as a group of ill-​intentioned ‘third-​hand’ or ‘foreign-​infiltrated’ bodies (Sattayanurak, 2006). At another time, the government tried to negotiate with the foreign sponsors of the sector to encourage them to withdraw their aid (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2009). A governmental attempt to label the sector as ‘undesired’ or ‘useless’ and creating only conflicts was evident (see The Secretariat of the Senate, 2003). Further, during the 2000s, the role of the sector as an intermediary in development, especially in local areas, was de-​emphasised by the government due to a series of populist policies which directly connect the government and the people without the involvement of the sector (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2008; Prasertkul, 2009). The sector gradually became ‘superfluous’ to the state. Antagonistic critiques towards the sector by the government eventually undermined public support for the sector causing the degradation of the public trust in the sector. The government and its policies have, therefore, conditioned the trajectory of the sector. The situation became worse when the sector experienced fluctuations and, eventually, a decrease in foreign funding from the middle of the 1990s (Chutima, 2004; Parks, 2008). Without alternative funding sources, most CSOs and NGOs were impelled to alter their priorities, activities and goals to serve the limited number of donors they were able to find. This also meant an increase in the sector’s dependency on the state as public funding became the major source of civil society funding since the 2000s.

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Public funding and the rise of quangocracy The major source of revenue for the sector is financial support from other organisations (National Statistical Office, 2019). Scholars argued that funding and other support are the keys that make the sector grow regardless of political regime (Kuhonta and Sinpeng, 2014). When the sector grows, it can participate in the policy process more effectively. The government prefers working with CSOs that are developed, professionalised and institutionalised. It is likely that there were parts of the public sector that endeavoured to improve the professionality of the sector so that CSOs could become better partners. Traditionally, the sector did not welcome funding from the state. Many CSOs rejected financial assistance from the state because they were sceptical about the true motive of the state (Delcore, 2003). They were afraid of being co-​opted and controlled. Moreover, the governmental subsidy for the sector prior to the 2000s was little (Social Research Institute, 2003). It was in the late 1990s that the sector and some public agencies developed a financial relationship. For example, the government, by borrowing loans from the World Bank and other institutions, created the Social Investment Fund to assist CSOs with responding to the 1997 economic crisis (Pongsapich, 2000; Shigetomi, 2006, 2009). Mainly managed by CSOs and their sympathisers, the Social Investment Fund used a participatory approach to improve people’s wellbeing by promoting long-​term self-​reliance and empowerment. It can be said that the Social Investment Fund was the first public fund where the government directly channelled money to the sector (Pongsapich, 1999). Moreover, the context of the late 1990s provided countless opportunities for the sector. Two important parallel developments in political and public sector reform ended up creating a new infrastructure which assisted the sector with engaging in the policy process. The first development was the concept of fiscal decentralisation, initiated in 1992 in the seventh NESDP and continued through the eighth NESDP. This concept resulted in the introduction of financing for social development, which was run by the Policy Committee on Distributing Prosperity to the Provinces and Localities founded in 1995. The policy committee formulated the first Fiscal and Financial Master Plan for Social Development (1997–​2001) to promote the use of fiscal and financial measures for social development purposes and strengthening ties between civil society, the private sector and the state. The second development was through the concept of agencification: the programme of transferring government activities into quasi-​autonomous NGOs, also known as quangos (Bowornwathana, 2006). This idea was a major part of the Master Plan of Public Sector Reform B.E. 2540–​2544 (1997–​2001), which significantly transformed the governance of the public sector. As a result, the Public Organization Act (or the agencification act) was enacted in 1999 and then, as a result, a variety of autonomous public organisations (APOs) were created (both under and outside the supervision of the agencification act) as the quangos in Thailand. APOs are a type of non-​bureaucratic public organisation that operate at arm’s length from the central state administration, carry out public 236

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tasks at a national level, are financed by the state budget, and, to a certain degree, are subject to the accountability system of state governance. Consequently, these two developments jointly produced APOs interested in subsidising and promoting the sector and social development projects. Prominent APOs for the sector include the Thai Health Promotion Foundation (ThaiHealth), the Community Organization Development Institute (CODI) and the National Health Commission Office (NHCO). These newly emerged APOs soon became an essential player in the sector, from the 2000s onwards, as a pivotal part of the infrastructure and a major source of funding. From this regard, the landscape of civil society support, since the 2000s, has changed from foreign patronage to domestic public patronage, or to be precise, ‘quango-​patronage’ (Ungsuchaval, 2019, 2020; see also Srisanga et al, 2015; Rujisatiensap and Yoosamran, 2016). Thai Health Promotion Foundation (ThaiHealth) Established in 2001 through its dedicated legislation outside the supervision of the agencification act, ThaiHealth is the first organisation of its kind in Asia that, through collaborating with all sectors of society, operates to enhance health promotion, advocates for healthy public policies and enables structural change. In practice, ThaiHealth administers a long-​term health promotion fund and provides financial and technical support to its partners. Using a proactive approach to funding (see Galbally et al, 2012), ThaiHealth as a funder has refashioned the funding complex of the sector in such a way that the CSOs are approached by the funder to jointly develop projects and programmes. CSOs are no longer passive recipients of funding but, instead, have become strategic partners for policy analysis and policy change. Through its ‘tri-​power strategy’, which connects political authorities, academic institutes and social mobilisations for policy changes, ThaiHealth has been widely recognised as a pioneer in network governance and innovation creation (Phusavat et al, 2011; Galbally et al, 2012; Sopitarchasak et al, 2015; Watabe et al, 2017). It is a key architect of many social and health policies since the 2000s, such as alcohol and tobacco consumption control, road accident prevention, and civil society empowerment schemes. ThaiHealth likes to claim that its achievements cannot be attributed only to itself but that they should be acknowledged as collective contributions of its civil society partners and collaborating organisations throughout the country (Adulyanon, 2012). ThaiHealth is indeed influential in contemporary civil society. It is one of the largest sources of funding for the sector and has the implicit power to shape the working landscape and methodologies of the sector (Rakyutidharm, 2014; Ungsuchaval, 2019, 2020). Community Organization Development Institute CODI was founded in 2000 by merging the Urban Community Development Office with the Rural Development Fund. Supervised under the agencification 237

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act, it is a governmental attempt to address urban poverty and community development. CODI’s main mission is to support the strengthening of communities and their organisations as key agents of policy change and development. Essentially, CODI provides revolving funds and soft loans to community cooperatives and community networks so that the networks can undertake development initiatives on their own. Networking with local communities, CSOs, local authorities and other relevant bodies is a major strategy for CODI (see Boonyabancha, 2003). The project known as Baan Mankong (or Secure Housing) was initiated in 2003 and aimed to develop urban poor communities. Baan Mankong is one of CODI’s most successful developmental projects that heavily engaged the sector at every major step of the project (CODI, 2019). Scholars contend that CODI’s role as a source of resources and support for the sector successfully replaced foreign donors and became one of the most influential players in shaping the sector’s development and democratic values (Shigetomi, 2004; Pitidol, 2016). In particular, CODI has continued to advance the community culture approach to development. National Health Commission Office With its own legislation like ThaiHealth, the NHCO was set up to carry out the mission of the first National Health Act in 2007. It aimed to advance national health development and to ensure that all parties in society participate. The NHCO actively promoted the Health in All Policies (HiAP) approach in government policy decision-​m aking (Mathurapote et al, 2017).The HiAP refers to a broad strategy to address health challenges and promote behavioural change through an integrated policy response across different sectors of government and intersectoral collaboration (Naidoo and Wills, 2016). The NHCO launched an annual national citizen engagement panel, called the National Health Assembly (NHA), as a major policy tool to attain HiAP. The NHA is a novel policy mechanism in Thailand that the sector has utilised to exchange knowledge and make recommendations on ‘healthy public policy’ (Rasanathan et al, 2012). The idea of healthy public policy suggests that, when making policy decisions, the government should focus on improving the conditions in which people live and promoting their ability to improve their health; the ‘healthiness’ of public policy is measured by its impact on population health (Milio, 2001). At the core of the NHA is the ‘Triangle that Moves the Mountain’ strategy: a principle of public engagement with policy advocacy that encourages networking and knowledge sharing between the social sector, the academic sector and the government/​political sector (Rajan et al, 2017). This strategy is similar to that of ThaiHealth. Given this, the NHA is considered as the first full-​fledged participatory public policy process in Thailand that has empowered the sector to engage in the policy analysis process (National Health Commission Office, 2008).

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NGOisation of civil society and the tendency to institutional advocacy The government and APOs have become new patrons for the sector since the 2000s. This change in the funding of the sector has re-​characterised the nature of the sector, its relationship with the government and its role in the policy process. Scholars suspected that the sector has been impelled to be more institutionalised, centralised, state-​dependent and even runs the risk of becoming an instrument of the state (Shigetomi, 2006; Rakyutidharm, 2014; Kanchoochat, 2019). Arguably, the new characterisation of the sector can be conceptualised as the NGOisation of civil society: the processes and the conditions in which civil society is driven to transform itself to focus more on organisational reproduction, upward accountability and, importantly, institutional advocacy (Ungsuchaval, 2021). Since the 2000s, the sector has been driven to pursue a more institutionalised form of policy advocacy: a mode of policy advocacy that provides the sector with better access to institutional settings, such as lobbying and gaining insider status in policy committees that initiate, prepare, legislate or execute policy change, and helps make the sector look competent and reliable in a particular state governance arrangement (see Lang, 2013). Many believed that institutional advocacy assisted the sector with achieving its policy goals. The focus on institutional advocacy has led the sector to shift its attention away from public forms of policy advocacy which are focused more on achieving policy success through broader public engagement, mass mobilisation and movement, and protests. It is possible to see that the sector has diverted its attention from its constituencies and public movement activities towards funders and institutional politics. Networking strategies heavily promoted by the APOs like ThaiHealth, CODI and NHCO, arguably, encourage the sector to connect and collaborate with the authorities and policy makers in institutional settings. The APOs brought the sector close to state power, allowing the sector to gain better access to public resources and insider information. Contemporary civil society knows quite well how to advocate for policy issues that are under the network of these APOs. Then, institutional advocacy has arguably made CSOs rather compromised and nurtured ‘elite civil society’ that has the capacity to systematically associate with the authorities and familiarise itself with the rules of the game in partnership between the state and the sector. Research found that these kinds of CSOs are able to partially perform certain delegated functions of the public agencies they have formed the network with and, at the same time, help the network to administrate other organisations in the sector (Ungsuchaval, 2019).

Civil society and democratic ambiguity The development of NGOisation cultivated opportunism in CSOs, which in turn, prepared CSOs to work with any governmental arrangement, including

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an authoritarian one, once the arrangement helped them pursue their policy goals. The 2000s in Thailand witnessed events in which the sector supported, implicitly and explicitly, extra-​political forces such as the military. For example, in 2006, middle-​class civil society simultaneously protested the democratically elected government and supported the military coup (see Jäger, 2012), which subsequently developed into a ‘civil society coup’ (Arugay, 2013) to overthrow a democratically elected government. Subsequently, many social activists were appointed to help the coup government administrate society and decide upon favourable social policies, in which some of them can be regarded as successful participants in the policy process (see Siroros and Ungsuchaval, 2012; Ungsuchaval, 2014). On the other hand, Thailand also witnessed a democratically elected government in which the policy process was indeed found to be authoritarianist (Pongsudhirak, 2003; Satha-A ​ nand, 2004; Bowornwathana, 2005) and civil society was harshly subjugated (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2009; Prasertkul, 2009). The motivation behind what generates government policies does not necessarily correlate with the type of government (democratic or authoritarian) (Fisher, 1998; Weir, 2003). Such context allowed the sector and the military government to ambiguously begin to form partnerships. A series of Pracharath policies of the military government, initiated in 2015 (see Kongkirati and Kanchoochat, 2018) (for more details, see Chapter Three on policy analysis in the central government), signified the type of cooperation (or co-​optation) that the government had with the sector. The sector was incorporated into the state system of policy and governance. The CSOs of Pracharath were obviously an elite version of civil society. Research suggested that, in Thailand, the sector does not always and necessarily side with democracy (Elinoff, 2014; Kuhonta and Sinpeng, 2014; Kongkirati, 2015; Kanchoochat, 2016). However, it is misleading to perceive the sector as explicitly against democratic principles (see Pitidol, 2016). Some CSOs choose to support democracy (or choose not to do so) if their interests are aligned. No outright relationship between the sector and democracy has ever been established. The sector has revealed itself to be profoundly ambivalent towards democracy. Therefore, it is possible to conceive the sector as a pragmatic player in the policy process. The sector has prioritised what the government ‘does’ more than what the government ‘is’.

Conclusion The sector is an indispensable player in policy analysis throughout the contemporary policy process in Thailand. The development of the sector is closely related to that of the state. Since the 1980s, the sector has gained influence over the way the government decides and implements public policy. As the sector has grown, its advocacy approaches, methodologies in the development sector and roles in the policy process became diversified. There were CSOs and NGOs 240

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that liked to work with the authorities and advocate for policies in institutional settings, and there were those who preferred to publicly contest the authorities, influencing policy in public spheres through mass mobilisation. When the sector underwent changes in the 1990s, changes in politics and public management reshaped the landscape of the sector. The decrease in foreign funding was an essential occurrence that drove the sector to re-​characterise the relationship it had with the state and public organisations. From the 2000s onwards, the sector has operated under the support of the APOs dedicated to networking and social development. The NGOisation of civil society developed and this drove the sector to focus more on institutionalised forms of policy advocacy. This has eventually resulted in the ambivalent relationship the sector has with democracy in the policy process. Overall, CSOs in Thailand require further capacity building to be able to independently conduct policy analysis or to provide sound policy alternatives to the state. Note 1

In fact, the first NESDP was called the ‘National Economic Development Plan’ (without ‘Social’). It mainly aimed to boost economic and infrastructure development. The aspect of social development was later added from the second plan onwards.

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Leangchareon, P. (2000) Rural Development NGOs: In Three Decades of Thai NGOs, Bangkok: TDRI. [in Thai] Mallet, M. (1978) ‘Causes and consequences of the October ’76 coup’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 8(1): 80–​103. Manorom, K. (2020) ‘NGOs and civil society in Thailand’, in P. Chachavalpongpun (ed) Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Thailand, London: Routledge, pp 366–​ 378. Mathurapote, N., Posayanonda, T., Pitakkamonporn, S., Saengtim, W., Sae-​iew, K. and Putthasri, W. (2017) ‘Thailand’s National Health Assembly: A means to health in all policies’, in V. Lin and I. Kickbusch (eds) Progressing the Sustainable Development Goals through Health in All Policies: Case Studies from Around the World, Geneva: World Health Organization, pp 51–​60. McCargo, D. (2004) ‘Buddhism, democracy and identity in Thailand’, Democratization, 11(4): 155–​170. Milio, N. (2001) ‘Glossary: Healthy public policy’, Journal of Epidemiology and Community Health, 55(9): 622–​623. Missingham, B. (2003) The Assembly of the Poor in Thailand: From Local Struggles to National Protest Movement, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books. Mukdawijitra, Y. (2005) Reading Community Culture: Politics and Writings in the Ethnography in Community Culture School of Thought, Bangkok: Fa Diew Kan. [in Thai] Naidoo, J. and Wills, J. (2016) Foundations for Health Promotion (4th edn), London: Elsevier. National Economic and Social Development Board (1987) Rural Development in the Sixth National Economic and Social Development Plan (1987–​1991), Bangkok: NESDB/​National Rural Development Co-​ordination Centre. National Health Commission Office (2008) Birth of Health Assembly: Crystallization of Learning towards Wellbeing, Nonthaburi: National Health Commission Office. National Statistical Office (2019) The 2018 Non-​Profit Organization Survey, Bangkok: National Statistical Office. [in Thai] Natsupa, C. (1991) ‘The community culture school of thought’, in M. Chitkasem and A. Turton (eds) Thai Constructions of Knowledge, London: SOAS, pp 118–​141. Nitayarumphong, S. and Mulada, S. (2001) Past, Present and Future of Thai NGO, Bangkok: Kobfai Publishing Project. [in Thai] Parks, T. (2008) ‘The r ise and fall of donor funding for advocacy NGOs: Understanding the impact’, Development in Practice, 18(2): 213–​222. Phatharathananunth, S. (2006) Civil Society and Democratization: Social Movements in Northeast Thailand, Copenhagen: NIAS Press. Phongpaichit, P. and Baker, C. (1995) Thailand: Economy and Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Phongpaichit, P. and Baker, C. (2008) ‘Thaksin’s populism’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 38(1): 62–​83. Phongpaichit, P. and Baker, C. (2009) Thaksin: The Business of Politics in Thailand (2nd edn), Chang Mai: Silkworm Books. 244

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Phusavat, K., Anussornnitisarn, P., Rassameethes, B. and Janssens, G. (2011) ‘Success factors of a networked government: Learning from Thai Health Promotion Foundation’, Electronic Government, An International Journal, 8(1): 103–​ 117. Pintobtang, P. (1998) Politics on the Street: 99 Days of the Assembly of the Poor, Bangkok: Krirk University. [in Thai] Pitidol, T. (2016) ‘Redefining democratic discourse in Thailand’s civil society’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 46(3): 520–​537. Pongsapich, A. (1999) ‘Politics of civil society’, Southeast Asian Affairs, 1: 325–​335. Pongsapich, A. (2000) Economic Crisis and Civil Society, Bangkok: Centre for Philanthropy and Civil Society, National Institute of Development Administration. Pongsapich, A. and Kataleeradabhan, N. (1997) Thailand Nonprofit Sector and Social Development, Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University. Pongsudhirak, T. (2003) ‘Thailand: Democratic authoritarianism’, in D. Singh (ed) Southeast Asian Affair 2003, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, pp 277–​290. Prasartset, S. (1995) ‘The rise of NGOs as critical social movement in Thailand’, in J. Boonyarattanasoonthorn and G. Chutima (eds) Thai NGOs: The Continuing Struggle for Democracy, Bangkok: Thai NGOs Support Project, pp 97–​134. Prasartset, S. (1997) ‘Eight propositions about the Assembly of the Poor’, Journal of Political Economy, 8(1): 94–​101. [in Thai] Prasertkul, S. (2009) People’s Politics in Thai Democracy (2nd edn), Bangkok: Wipasa. Quinn, R. (1997) NGOs, Peasants and the State: Transformation and Intervention in Rural Thailand, 1970–​1990, PhD Thesis, The Australian National University. Canberra, Australia. Rajan, D., Mathurapote, N., Putthasri, W., Posayanonda, T., Pinprateep, P., de Courcelles, S., Bichon, R., Allouc, A., Ros, E., Delobre, A. and Schmets, G. (2017) The Triangle that Moves the Mountain: Nine Years of Thailand’s National Health Assembly, Geneva: World Health Organization. Rakyutidharm, A. (2014) ‘Patronage, dominance, or collaboration? Thailand’s NGOs and the Thai Health Promotion Foundation’, in P. Liamputtong (ed) Contemporary Sociocultural and Political Perspectives in Thailand, Dordrecht: Springer, pp 517–​531. Rasanathan, K., Posayanonda, T., Birmingham, M. and Tangcharoensathien, V. (2012) ‘Innovation and participation for healthy public policy: The first National Health Assembly in Thailand’, Health Expectations, 15(1): 87–​96. Rujisatiensap, T. and Yoosamran, W. (2016) A Study of Sources of Income for Civil Society Promotion, Bangkok: Civil Society Empowerment for Fair Healthy Society Project, Family Network Foundation. [in Thai] Satha-​Anand, C. (2004) ‘Fostering “authoritarian democracy” with violence: The effect of violent solutions to Southern Thailand’, paper prepared for the Empire Conference, National University of Singapore, 23–​24 September. [in Thai] Sattayanurak, A. (2006) ‘Truths’ and the Dealing with ‘Truths’ in the Context of the ‘Third-​party Culture’ (1957–​the Present Time), Bangkok: Kobfai. [in Thai] 245

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The Secretariat of the Senate (2003) Report of the Secretariat of the Senate about Role and Activity of NGO, Bangkok: The Senate. [in Thai] Shigetomi, S. (2004) ‘Spaces and performance of NGOs in Thailand: Their transformation in the development process’, in S. Shigetomi, K. Tejapira and A. Thongyou (eds) The NGO Way: Perspectives and Experiences from Thailand, Chiba: Institute of Developing Economies, Japan External Trade Organization, pp 39–​60. Shigetomi, S. (2006) ‘Bringing non-​governmental actors into the policymaking process: The case of local development policy in Thailand’, Institute of Developing Economies, Report number: IDE Discussion Paper No.69. Shigetomi, S. (2009) ‘Institutional readiness and resource dependence of social movements: The case of provincial development forums in Thailand’, in S. Shigetomi and K. Makino (eds) Protest and Social Movements in the Developing World, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, pp 51–​78. Simpkins, D. (2003) ‘Radical influence on the third sector: Thai NGO contribution to socially responsive politics’, in G.J. Ungpakorn (ed) Radicalizing Thailand: New Political Perspectives, Bangkok: Institute of Asia Studies, Chulalongkorn University, pp 253–​288. Siroros, P. and Ungsuchaval, T. (2012) ‘Public participatory policy process in the establishment of Thai Public Broadcasting service’, Proceeding of International Conference for Case Studies on Development Administration 2012 (NIDA-​ICCS 2012), Bangkok: National Institute of Development Administration, pp 379–​ 398. Social Research Institute (2003) Public Interest Organizations in Thailand, Bangkok: Social Research Institute, Chulalongkorn University. [in Thai] Sopitarchasak, S., Adulyanon, S. and Lorthong, T. (2015) ‘Thai Health Promotion Foundation: Innovative enabler for health promotion’, World Health & Population, 16(1): 62–​71. Srisanga, T., Kummuang, S. and Wasi, J. (2015) Social Map of Civil Society Support Organizations Project, Bangkok: Knowledge Management for Advocating Thai Civil Society Fund Project, Thai Health Promotion Foundation. [in Thai] Taveekan, T. (2013) Bridging State and Civil Society at the Grassroots: Networks, Collaboration and Local Governance in Two Rural Thai Communities, PhD Thesis, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia. Tejapira, K. (2009) ‘Thammarat/​good governance in glocalizing Thailand’, in C. Gluck and A.L. Tsing (eds) Words in Motion: Toward a Global Lexicon, Durham, NC: Duke University Press, pp 306–​326. Thabchumpon, N. and Dhitthapichai, C. (2002) ‘The movement for the People’s Constitution and political reform’, in P. Phongpaichit (ed) Livelihood and Struggle: Contemporary Social Movements, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, pp 463–​512. [in Thai] Tieawsatul, K. (1996) The Relationship between the State and Non-​Governmental Organization: The Case of the Foundation of Education for Life and Society, MA Thesis, Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand. [in Thai] 246

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Ungsuchaval, T. (2014) ‘Policy transfer in decision-​making process: The establishment of the Thai Public Broadcasting Service’, Journal of Social Science, 44(1): 55–​82. [in Thai] Ungsuchaval, T. (2019) Metagovernance and NGOization in Thailand: An Exploratory Study of the Thai Health Promotion Foundation (THPF) and Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), PhD Thesis, University of Kent, Canterbury, UK. Ungsuchaval, T. (2020) ‘Reconciling ideas of governance reform: New Public Management (NPM) and New Public Governance (NPG) in the autonomization of the Thai state’, King Prajadhipok’s Institute Journal of Democracy and Governance, 2: 83–​106. Ungsuchaval, T. (2021) ‘NGOization’, in A. Farazmand (eds) Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance, Springer, Cham. https://​ doi.org/​10.1007/​978-​3-​319-​31816-​5_​4​273-​1 Watabe, A., Wongwatanakul, W., Thamarangsi, T., Prakongsai, P. and Yuasa, M. (2017) ‘Analysis of health promotion and prevention financing mechanisms in Thailand’, Health Promotion International, 32(4): 702–​710. Weir, K.A. (2003) The Paradox of NGO-​State Relations, PhD Thesis, University of Connecticut. Weiss, M. (2015) ‘Civil society and democratization in Southeast Asia: What is the connection’, in W. Case (ed) Routledge Handbook of Southeast Asian Democratization, London: Routledge, pp 135–​146. Yoshifumi, T. (2008) Myths and Realities: The Democratization of Thai Politics, Kyoto: Kyoto University. Zimmerman, R.F. (1974) ‘Student “revolution” in Thailand: The end of the Thai bureaucratic polity?’, Asian Survey, 14(6): 509–​529.

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The influence of Thailand’s social movements on policy analysis Nattakant Akarapongpisak

Introduction Social movements have a considerable impact on Thailand’s public policies. They placed their programmes on the political agenda, aided the agenda’s passage into policy and supported the enforcement, and even influenced the policy process from within. However, the academic and journalistic explanations for this significant yet scattered issue remain limited. We have an insufficient account of why some movements in Thailand succeeded in pushing for new and alternative policies but others that emerged around the same time or shared similar backgrounds did not. And rarely do we know how high-​profile political phenomena that entrenched political polarisation in Thailand such as the confrontation between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts, popularly known as the colour-​coded politics, affected the influences of Thailand’s social movements over policy processes. In Thailand, over the decades, we have witnessed a proliferation of civil societies that have morphed into large-​scale social movements. Some social movements have highly influenced political movements. Thus, as covered in the previous two chapters on political movements and civil society, the overlaps between the discussion of civil societies, social movements and political movements are inevitable. To shed more light on these issues, this chapter provides an overview of the upsurge and decline of social movements in Thailand. In doing so, it illustrates the political contexts that enabled some movements to capitalise on political resources but constrained the political influences of many. Following this, the chapter explores the cases of the Assembly of the Poor (AOP) and the Rural Doctor Movement (RDM). By focusing on the actions of the AOP and the RDM from the late 1990s to the early 2000s, this chapter reveals how their choices of strategy –​confrontation or collaboration –​had different impacts on government responses at the policy level. In addition, comparing the AOP and one of its offspring, namely the Land Reform Network of Thailand (LRNT), this chapter demonstrates that originating in different political contexts, these movements from the same origins employed different strategies and succeeded unequally in exerting influence over public policies. This was closely related to the process within which collaboration became co-​optation. Finally, this chapter offers an analysis of how the colour-​coded 248

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politics, the 2014 coup and the 2019 election remarkably shaped the movements’ strategies for policy engagement (for more details on political movements, see Chapter Ten on political movements and policy analysis).

The rise and decline of social movements in Thailand (the 1990s onwards) Social movements had a long history in Thailand, but their breakthrough occurred in the 1990s as their number rose from 42 in 1978 to 998 in 1994 (Pintobtang, 1998). Today, not only do the movements include the more traditional ones that seek community development, sustainable growth and equitable resource distribution but also new pro-​democracy and rights-​based movements and even non-​state religious movements (Sombatpoonsiri, 2018). Back in the 1990s and the early 2000s, social movements in Thailand shared a new distinguishing characteristic. They demanded the right to have rights (Phongpaichit, 2002). Pre-​2003: paving the way for ‘the right to have rights’ Benefiting from the growth of parliamentary politics in the post-​1992 period, social movements in Thailand applied extra-​parliamentary protests to pressure the government and change public policy. Apart from the temporary withdrawal of the military from the political scene, the period was marked by the impacts of globalisation and state development projects on the environment and various groups of people, particularly rural poor people. This political climate enabled the language of civil rights and community rights to be recognised by both the state and the public. From the 1990s to the early 2000s, major people’s movements in Thailand were movements for democracy and movements of the poor. Demanding political reform, movements for democracy campaigned for a democratic process of constitutional drafting, political and administrative decentralisation and public participation (Chiangsaen, 2018). Capitalsing on the ‘reform-​seeking’ campaign that received huge support from Thailand’s urban middle class, grassroots people organised into movements to fight to protect the environment and their livelihoods (Phongpaichit, 2002). The movements for democracy and the movements of the poor achieved landmark successes. The movements for democracy played a vital role in bringing about the 1997 Constitution, which was often called ‘people’s constitution’ due to its democratic nature and the degree of public participation involved in its drafting. Meanwhile, the movements of the poor were able to hold the government accountable for solving their problems at the policy level –​the first time in Thailand’s long history of grassroots movements. Despite its more subtle acts, movements for other causes and from other origins also gained considerable achievement in policy engagement. These included the movements against social discrimination such as the Thai NGO Coalition on Aids (TNCA) and 249

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the movements that originated from professional bodies such as the RDM. The latter was highly recognised for its achievement in realising Thailand’s universal health coverage scheme. Gaining prominence in the late 1990s and the early 2000s, grassroots movements shared various outstanding characteristics and strategies. Full-​time activists helped mobilise the movements. Scholars and public intellectuals assisted in creating policy proposals. The proposals concretely linked issue-​based agendas with public benefit. The movements formed an issue-​based network with an aim to fight for their rights to manage resources within their communities. They staged demonstrations in the capital to draw the attention of the government and the public (Chiangsaen, 2018). Although many grassroots movements were active in Thailand in the late 1990s, the one that made the most of its strategies to assert influence over public policies was, undeniably, the AOP, which was a coalition of groups of villagers, urban slum dwellers and non-​governmental organisations (NGOs) which campaigned around environmental and livelihood issues stemming from development projects or policy (Missingham, 2003).1 As the Cold War and the era of dictatorial rule came to an end in the 1990s, people became more assertive about their rights and roles in society (Phongpaichit, 2002). Emerging in such an epoch, the AOP demanded their rights to hold the government accountable for its involvement in mega-​development projects that were harmful to them (Dechalert, 1999). They also advocated for community rights as a counter-​discourse against market individualism. Furthermore, they demanded the recognition of villagers’ culture and livelihood as a solution to conflicts between the state and the villagers over resources management. Due mostly to its presence in the media space and its influence over the governments that relied on rural electorates, the AOP was able to negotiate concessions from the government, unprecedented in scale and content (Pintobtang, 1998; Baker, 2000; Chalermsripinyorat, 2004). From 2003 onwards: towards the slump of social movements After the AOP decreased its role in the mid-​2000s, there has been no such large-​ scale social movement in Thailand since. According to NGOs and activists,2 two factors induced the decline of social movements in Thailand. One was the antagonistic stance that the government, led by the Thai Rak Thai Party (2001–​2006), held towards them. Another was the ‘colour-​coded politics’ that have marred Thailand’s political scene since 2009. Some scholars also pointed to conflicts within or between social movements as the reason for their decline. Groups of social movements pursued single-​issue-​based campaigns, and thus they were blind to other related social problems. Many competed for resources and prestige. Some sacrificed their political independence for state funding (Sombatpoonsiri, 2018). During its first year in office, the government, led by Thaksin Shinawatra (2001–​2006), acted in favour of social movements. Thaksin himself visited 250

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protestors at their encampment, heard their problems and set up committees tasked with finding solutions (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2009). Close connections between NGOs and activists who worked with the movements and key men in the government played a vital role in the government’s positive attitude towards protestors (Chiangsaen, 2018). Things started to change after August 2001 when Thailand’s Constitutional Court acquitted Thaksin of charges that he concealed assets while serving in a previous government.3 Having secured his power, Thaksin distanced himself from the movements. His government did not act upon the recommendations of the committees it set up to resolve the movements’ problems. Thaksin ordered an inspection of the NGOs’ bank accounts (Phongpaichit and Baker, 2009). On top of that, his cabinet issued a resolution on 23 April 2002 allowing the government to use harsh actions against protestors (Chiangsaen, 2018). These hostile measures spurred the NGOs and activists’ dissatisfaction with Thaksin. It should be noted that dissatisfaction grew even though, following the demands of two social movements, the Thaksin government terminated two development projects operated by private companies in 2003.4 The sour relationship between Thaksin and the NGOs and activists who once supported him would strengthen the coalition of opposition that would topple him later. In 2005, royalists, ultra-​nationalists and the urban middle class formed a loose political movement, which was called the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), to oppose Thaksin whom they accused of corruption, abuse of power and inadequate loyalty to the monarchy. Well-​known NGOs and activists from the AOP and the Campaign for Popular Democracy (CPD) joined forces. As tension between PAD, also known as the Yellow Shirts, and the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship –​supporters of Thaksin and opposition to the military coup who was also known as the Red Shirts –​escalated in 2009, media and public attention focused on the ‘colour-​coded politics’, and this endured for almost a decade (see Chapter Ten on political movements as expression of public opinion for more details). Meanwhile, the AOP decreased its role and other movements developed from the AOP’s member organisations such as the Northern Peasants’ Federation (NPF) or the AOP’s offspring, such as the LRNT, saw their movements overshadowed by the colour-​coded politics. Added to the difficulties that social movements in Thailand were facing, was the withdrawal of foreign donors from Thailand to poorer countries (Pitidol, 2016). Looking for substituted financial support, many NGOs and activists became more reliant on provisions from public organisations, all of which were under the supervision of the state (Rakyutidham, 2011). Being financially dependent on the state limited the movements’ actions. In 2014, as Thailand endured yet another coup, the military junta enforced restrictions on all kinds of political gatherings. Even after the martial law was lifted, the junta, namely ‘the National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO)’, referred to Section 44 of the 2014 Interim Constitution of Thailand to issue orders that curbed political gatherings deemed as threats to peace and national security. Section 44 also enabled the 251

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NCPO to implement policies that were harmful to the poor. This chapter will reveal how these political contexts affected the abilities of social movements to push for policy change.

Confrontation or collaboration? Enabling environment for policy engagement Social movements in Thailand normally employed strategies within the realm of normal institutionalised politics. Among them were lobbying and campaigning, which were mostly undertaken prior to general elections. From the late 1990s and the early 2000s, two unconventional strategies, including confrontation and collaboration, gained prominence and both had tremendous effects on government policies. In this chapter, confrontation is defined as the process of ‘taking an explicitly antagonistic stance against extant institutions, values, and practices’ (Busscher et al, 2019). It ranges from direct actions with an aim to challenge, disrupt and/​or apply pressure on the government’s decision-​making (such as boycott, sit-​ins, occupation and barricade) to the actions institutionalised as norms such as marching and strikes (Pintobtang, 2009). Collaboration, on the other hand, refers to working together based on collective decision-​making to achieve shared goals that could not be fulfilled individually (Busscher et al, 2019). It includes the incorporation of NGOs and movement leaders in the government structure, a formation of alliances between the movements and the government, and an establishment of a joint initiative of the government, NGOs and movement leaders to address social issues (Busscher et al, 2019). From the late 1990s and the early 2000s in Thailand, although most of the movements that caught the public’s attention employed confrontational strategies, their counterparts who sought collaboration with the state were more powerful in influencing public policies. Until today, the AOP was the model of social movement that applied a wide range of confrontational tactics whereas the RDM was acknowledged for its outstanding success, which was enabled by collaboration with state agencies.5 The Assembly of the Poor and its confrontational strategies Established in 1995, the AOP became the leading exemplar of social movements in Thailand. Its remarkable confrontational actions included marching from rural locations to the heart of the capital, staging a series of large-​scale rallies in front of the Government House, and occupying key public spaces (Baker, 2000; Nuttapattanun, 2009). At the peak of its movement, the AOP attracted more than 20,000 participants from 35 provinces nationwide (Chiangsaen, nd). Moreover, its disruptive tactics such as the demonstration in front of the Government House, that lasted for more than three months, captured the attention of the government, the public and the media. 252

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The wide range of attention it gained was meticulously calculated. The AOP strategised to have its negotiations with the state taking place in the public space of the media (Baker, 2000). The AOP articulated ‘injustice’ for diagnostic frames and ‘community rights’ for prognostic frames through various communication forms such as protests, seminars, public forums and articles published on news websites (Nanakorn, 2011). The strategy worked well in terms of the frequency of the appearance of AOP in the media thanks to its connection with the media and support from young reporters, who previously worked with grassroots groups and held positive opinions towards the AOP (Wasinpiyamongkhon, 2013). The AOP’s appearances in the media, the scale of the movement and the effect of the movement on the country’s metropolitan areas, prompted responses from the government. However, the responses did not benefit the AOP members in the long run. In 1996, the AOP staged a rally that resulted in the Banharn Silpa-​acha government (1995–​1996) agreeing to appoint a ‘Special Task Force’ to investigate the AOP’s petitions. Later on, the government set up a joint committee which consisted of representatives from the AOP and the government to supervise and monitor the implementation of relevant cabinet resolutions. Still, the demands of the AOP were not taken seriously (Dechalert, 1999). Although the Chavalit Yongchaiyudh government (1996–​1997) agreed to lift the constraint of the right of local people to reside in ‘forest’ areas (Baker, 2000), forced evictions of forest settlers continued. Adding to this, the Chuan Leekpai government (1997–​2001) reversed all the major concessions that the previous government made to the AOP. As Thailand absorbed the consequences of the 1997 economic crisis, parts of the media and public who started to view the AOP’s disruptive tactics as troublesome turned a blind eye to the aggression of the government towards the AOP protestors (Baker, 2000). Meanwhile, the news reports began to work against the AOP movement. This was because it emphasised dramatising the conflicts between the protestors and the government rather than reporting the demands of the AOP or the background of its problems (Wasinpiyamongkhon, 2013). Suffering a string of failures in bargaining with the government, the AOP shifted from issue-​based struggles (for example, wage increases, debt moratorium or compensation for damages caused by the state’s mega-​projects) to proposing the bills that would benefit it in the long run. A distinctive example was the AOP’s advocacy of the Act on Establishment of Administrative Courts and Administrative Court Procedure of 1999 and the Plant Varieties Protection Act of 1999. The former was aimed at setting up an independent judicial organisation that has the power to hear and adjudicate administrative cases. The latter was aimed at protecting the rights of farmers and plant breeders by establishing an effective system for the protection of new, traditional, community and wild varieties (Nuttapattanun, 2009). In the following years, the Act on Establishment of Administrative Courts and Administrative Court Procedure of 1999 provided legal spaces for the AOP and succeeding movements. For an instance, through the Administrative Courts, environmental movements could file lawsuits against the 253

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state agencies that enabled or failed to put a halt to the operations of businesses that caused environmental problems in communities. These are clear examples on how the AOP, as a social movement, shifted and changed key public policies in Thailand. The AOP was able to advocate for the two Acts under a specific condition that was the enactment of the 1997 ‘people’s constitution’. The constitution was an outcome of the alliance between political elites, the urban middle class and grassroots organisations from various origins. It acknowledged the people’s rights to propose legislation6 –​the AOP made use of this. Much to the AOP’s leaders’ dismay, the AOP’s ability to push for new laws was short-​lived. The other two prominent drafts of the bills they campaigned for, including their drafts of the Community Forest Bill and the Squatter Communities Bill, were brought down (Nuttapattanun, 2009). Although the Community Forest Bill was eventually approved in 2019, it did little to protect hundreds of forest-​dependent communities that live in conservation areas that had been charged with trespassing or were evicted. This was seen as related to the changes in the political context in the following decade in which the network between the elites, the middle class and the grassroots movements became weak, and the society’s focus shifted towards a prolonged political crisis dubbed as the colour-​coded politics. Collaboration and the influence of the Rural Doctor Movement Campaigning around the same time as the AOP, the RDM succeeded remarkably in pushing for new schemes and legal change. Collaboration, as detailed in this section, played an important part in its success. It should be noted that during that time, the RDM was not the only movement that applied collaborative strategy. The TNCA, for example, nominated members to sit in a joint committee with the government to push for policy initiatives on AIDS (Dechalert, 1999). Also, the Thai NGO Coordinating Committee on Rural Development (NGO-​ CORD), who were advisors to various movements, served as the subcommittee on drafting the rural development plan at the national level (Rakyutidham, 2011). Still, the RDM maximised the potential of collaborative strategy. In so doing, it used deliberative tactics to capture influential administrative and political positions (Sapyen, 2013). Organised in 1978, the RDM originated from a professional gathering that moved under the official structure of Thailand’s Ministry of Public Health. Until today, the RDM was comprised solely of doctors –​the profession that was highly acclaimed in Thailand. Originally, the RDM’s aim was to enhance the provision of health services to rural remote areas (Sapyen, 2013). But as Thailand underwent the political changes that encouraged the growth of civil society in the 1990s, the RDM aimed bigger. From 1992 to 2002, its goal became the reform of the entire healthcare system. The goal was ambitious but the RDM achieved it. Among its major successes were the implementation of the Universal Health-​Care Coverage Scheme 254

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(UCS) and the promulgation of the National Health Security Act of 2002. The UCS was the first scheme in Thailand that provided free healthcare at the point of service, and its benefit package generously covered general medical care, rehabilitation services, high-​cost medical treatment and emergency care (ILO Social Protection Department, 2016). The 2002 Act mandated the establishment of the ‘Sor Organisations’7 such as the National Health Security Office, which was responsible for the implementation of the UCS, and the Thai Health Promotion Foundation (THPF). The THPF engaged groups in civil society to work on improving Thailand’s healthcare system through funding (for more details, see Chapter Thirteen on civil society and the policy process). Bringing about these substantial changes at the policy level, the RDM employed three major collaborative tactics. First, key members of the RDM took up major political positions. Surapong Suebwonglee, for example, served as Deputy Public Health Minister in the Thaksin Shinawatra government (2001–​ 2005). While campaigning for election, Surapong, a member of Thaksin’s inner circle, was tasked with formulating a health agenda for the Thaksin-​led Thai Rak Thai Party (Nam, 2015). The National Health Security Act of 2002 was an outcome of the inclusion of Surapong and other RDM members in the government structure. Second, members of the RDM strategised to win seats in the Medical Council of Thailand (Sapyen, 2013). The council was tasked with various regulatory duties including advising the government on medical and public health issues and representing the medical profession in Thailand (Sapyen, 2013). Finally, the RDM had its members appointed to other influential positions in the Ministry of Public Health. Somsak Chunharas, for instance, served as the Director of the Bureau of Health Policy and Planning from 1999 to 2000 (Sapyen, 2013). The RDM forged collaboration not only within the state structure but also with networks of NGOs and the media (Sapyen, 2013). Furthermore, it connected its narratives to popular legitimised notions such as ‘civil society’ and ‘political reform’ as a source of legitimacy (Sapyen, 2013). Drawing on the notion of political reform, which was widespread in the 1990s, the RDM hoped to push for reform through legislation. And it succeeded enormously. All in all, gaining less accomplishment in terms of policy influence, the AOP was able to place its demands on the political agenda (Amenta and Caren, 2004). Some progressive governments that relied on the rural electorate acted in a way that could be seen as recognising the AOP as legitimate (Snow and Soule, 2010). More importantly, the AOP successfully articulated ‘frames’ that enhanced policy dialogues into the legislative realm. However, the success of the RDM was more spectacular. It was even pre-​empted which meant that it received benefits even before mobilising (Snow and Soule, 2010). This was relevant to its members taking up positions on decision-​making boards, making use of the privileged status of their profession to gain public support, and acquiring money and supplies to form the organisations which would help them realise their agendas in the long run. 255

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From this preliminary analysis, collaboration appeared more effective for social movements in Thailand in achieving their policy goals. But this was not always the case. As collaboration was transformed into co-​optation, it not only decreased the bargaining power of the movements but also caused internal conflicts. The case of the Northern Farmers’ Alliance (NFA), which, together with eight other farmers’ organisations, subsequently formed the NPF (Lubanski, 2012) and the LRNT –​an offspring of the AOP –​revealed this reverse side of collaboration. More interestingly, the LRNT case showed that co-​optation was engendered partly as the LRNT formed linkages with the ‘Sor Organisations’ established under the influence of the RDM.

The pitfall of engagement and the restriction of social movements Being co-​opted by political elites was not new to social movements in Thailand. As noted by Baker (2000), being tied to ‘big’ political figures was the usual form of co-​optation the movements in Thailand were drawn to (Baker, 2000). Co-​ optation occurs when movement leaders adjust their positions when working with elites, hoping to gain advantages through compromising. However, they do not receive those advantages. Instead, the elites’ power prevails (Holdo, 2019). Co-​optation includes a strategy of domesticating potentially dangerous ideas by adjusting them to a dominant ideology (Chiengkul, 2013). In this sense, collaboration turns co-​optation as social movements endorse ‘technologies, rationalities, and arrangements by which governments facilitate alignment of subjects with the state’ and thus allow their scope, vision, and activities to be delimited (Busscher et al, 2019). Thailand’s NFA, for example, was recruited to sit on joint committees with the government. From 2003 to 2004, the NFA received financial support from state agencies so that it could conduct studies on resolutions to conflicts between the state and forest-​dependent communities, who were members of the NFA, and offer policy recommendations. The studies proved that forest-​dwellers could live sustainably on the lands the state demarcated as forest areas. It turned out that the recommendations based on those studies were not fed into any policy adjustments (Rakyutidham, 2011). Members of the NFA were not allowed to practice rotational cultivation or even other alternative farming on their lands. Moreover, the government remained indifferent to recognising their rights over land the NFA had advocated for (Rakyutidham, 2011). As the NFA and eight other farmers’ organisations merged into the NPF, it became increasingly co-​opted by the state. Following the 1997 economic crisis, movements of the poor and the new public organisations, which were established by the Thai government but consisted of some former NGOs, applauded localism –​a group of ideas that assert the significance of the rural community as a solution to development problems in Thailand (Pitidol, 2016). The Community Organization Development Institution (CODI), for example, viewed that the community’s self-​determination was disrupted, and its power was 256

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reduced by modernisation and the expansion of the state (Pitidol, 2016), and it had to be revived. In the same vein, influential members of the movements of the poor including those in the NPF rallied against the centralisation of natural resources management and campaigned for the recognition of local wisdoms and traditions (Rakyutidham, 2011). As the movements turned towards discursive frames of localism and became more reliant on public organisations like CODI for funding, they endorsed guidelines and plans designed by these organisations. This type of ideational co-​optation led to the delimitation of their vision and activities. In the case of the NPF, its members strictly followed the administrative procedures required by CODI in exchange for funding. They were kept busy with writing reports for funded projects and did not have enough time to provide the alternatives or to participate in social movements (Rakyutidham, 2009). This confirms how the policy analysis process (that is, the style and format of reporting on projects) set up by central government penetrated civic organisations and social movements (see more details in Chapter Two on methods of policy analysis in Thailand). The infamous colour-​coded politics that loomed in the second half of the 2000s also laid the foundation for an increase of the state’s co-​optation of NGOs and influential members of social movements. Those who co-​opted included the Democrat Party, which saw its popularity among rural voters dwindle due to its political standpoint towards the colour-​coded politics and the authoritarian government, who took up office following the coup that claimed to restore peace and stability hampered by the confrontations between the Red Shirts and the Yellow Shirts. The case of the LRNT revealed that as the colour-​coded politics got increasingly intense, co-​optation became a pitfall for social movements, enabling them to negotiate but denying them substantive changes. After the AOP decreased its role in the mid-​2000s, networks of the people who were affected by the state’s land policies formed the LRNT.8 Unlike the AOP, the LRNT rarely staged large-​scale protest movements. Rather, it ‘reached out’ to the state by tapping into its mechanism. Prior to the general election in 2007, the LRNT submitted a policy proposal to the major political parties (Dondee, 2016). The proposal laid out three mechanisms, including the building of the progressive land tax system, the establishment of a land bank which would collect and allocate deserted lands for landless people on market-​based principles, and the issuance of community land title (CLT) to lawfully recognise community rights in managing land and natural resources (Dondee, 2016). Among the three mechanisms, the Democrat Party, who would later form the government in 2008, was attracted by the progressiveness of the CLT concept (Chariamphan, 2012). In 2009, the Democrat Party-​led government set up a coordinating committee to resolve problems for the LRNT. One year later, it issued the Regulation of the Prime Minister’s Office on the Issuance of CLT. Also, it announced pilot communities in which the regulation would be implemented (Dondee, 2016). 257

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On the surface, the CLT scheme appeared to be a huge success for the LRNT. However, the scheme was substantially diverted from its original course. In a vivid metaphor, Prayong Doklamyai, advisor to the LRNT, compared the idea proposed by the LRNT as ‘a huge log’, the project they wished for as ‘a boat’, and what the government offered as ‘a toothpick’. In his view, the regulation on the issuance of CLT did not truly recognise community rights on land. Rather, it restricted eligibility of the communities who applied for the titles. Only the communities with the self-​initiated organisations that practised land management for at least three years were eligible applicants. They were required to get through all of the complicated document-​related procedures. Also, their performance would be monitored by relevant government agencies every three years. Finally, the communities who did not meet the criteria of assessment would have their titles revoked (Boonchai, nd). At local level, members of the LRNT accommodated the regulations and modified their system of land management to be eligible to participate in the scheme (Akarapongpisak, 2011). Still, they found difficulties in complying with the regulations that prohibited them from selling their land plots (Rakyutidham, 2011). In September 2019, 486 communities submitted proposals for the CLT. But only three communities received them. Approximately 58 communities were approved as eligible for CLT. But the state agencies who governed lands in these communities had not yet given up their control over the lands (Thai PBS, 2019). This points to the strong centrality of the Thai state, a common theme throughout this book, which takes full control of public policies’ directions, implementation processes and evaluations. Noticeably, in all cases where the LRNT succeeded in negotiating with the state, it gained support from the organisations that sided with the Yellow Shirt movement. This included the Democrat Party, the National Health Commission Office (NHCO), the Thai Health Promotion Foundation (THPF), and the NGO-​CORD.9 This was by no means surprising as the organisations and key members and leaders of the social movements that comprised the LRNT took part in the Yellow Shirt movement under the PAD –​the action that stemmed from their discontent with ousted prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra and his cronies (Vongtangswad, 2017; Chiangsaen, 2018).10 It can be argued that the colour-​coded politics offered a passage for the LRNT and its subsequent social movement organisation, called ‘P-​Move’, to introduce their ideas into the policy arena, albeit without much progress in policy implementation. However, as Thailand had yet another authoritarian government following the 2014 coup, the LRNT faced increasing difficulties in influencing policy changes. In pushing for establishing a National Land Bank, the LRNT enjoyed unsteady achievement. A cabinet resolution issued in May 2011 called for the establishment of a National Land Bank. In 2015, the NCPO government formally established the National Land Bank by creating a provisional committee of which an advisor to P-​Move was a member. The National Land Bank was designed to resolve conflicts between landowners and the farmers in 258

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local communities who took over lands from those landowners claiming that the landowners acquired land titles fraudulently and left the lands unused. In doing so, the Land Bank Administrative Institute would buy the lands in dispute from the title-​holders and rent them out to the communities, who formed farmers’ cooperatives, under a low-​interest hire purchase agreement. However, because the land bank’s implementation process took so long, it was not until 2017 that Land Bank Administrative Institute started to buy land. The price of land soared and, as a result, the communities could not afford to buy land through the National Land Bank.11 Another policy initiated by the NCPO government in 2014, namely ‘thii din plaeng ruam’ (common land registration [CLR]), downplayed the CLT. Supervised by the newly established National Land Policy Committee, the CLR was determined to allow forest-​dwellers to live on and use forest lands under the ‘collective title deed’ land management scheme. Unlike the CLT, rather than offering P-​Move an avenue for negotiation, the CLR restricted rights over lands of forest settlers in upland areas, prohibiting those who resided in the watershed class 1 and 2 from cultivating the land.12 Following the NCPO Order Number 64/​2014, forest settlers throughout the country suffered forced evictions. Moreover, various legal measures were taken to prevent any protest movements that would, according to the NCPO, ‘undermine or destroy peace and national security’ (iLaw, 2015).13 This was completely against the will of P-​Move. It also proved that despite an attempt of the NCPO to co-​opt groups in civil society to strengthen its regime (Sripokangkul et al, 2019), the state’s co-​optation of the movements of the poor did not turn out to benefit them. The cases of LRNT and P-​Move reveal how, in attempts to influence public policies, social movements in Thailand ‘reached out’ to the state but could not avoid being co-​opted. The cases also demonstrated that the connection between individual NGO leaders of social movements and conservative elites was forged on the basis that both sides believed electoral politics was marred by corruption (Pitidol, 2016). Whereas this alliance was created, some groups of NGOs discussed using political parties as a platform to voice the demands of social movements. It turned out that both groups of NGOs ran for election in 2019.

Finding ways out under the authoritarian rule The 2019 general election, the first in Thailand since 2011,14 saw the NGO allies of social movements set up political parties and run for the election. This, according to them, echoed three pillars –​their response to the limited political opportunity for people’s participation in policy decision-​making under the NCPO regime, their effort to render the junta-​backed government accountable, and their proposal that parliamentary politics could be the way out for social movements being suppressed by the authoritarian rule to effectively push forward their demands. Considering the movements’ long-​running preferences for street politics, this move came as a surprise for outsiders. 259

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Shortly before the 2019 election, Pak Saman Chon (the Commoners’ Party) publicly declared that it would strive for changes in investment-​favoured policies that, under the NCPO, had increasingly become detrimental to local people, enhanced inequality and obviously ignored the community’s rights in natural resources management (Thai PBS, 2018a; Prachatai, 2019). To them, the solution to these problems is ‘getting the poor to speak for themselves in parliament’ (Rojanaphruk, 2018a). The leader of the Commoners’ Party was a former member of the NGO Coordinating Committee on Development (Northeast Region) whereas other key members of the party were veteran NGOs who had crucial parts in mobilising people’s movements in the northeast of Thailand. The issues they prioritised included the revision of the state permission for mine and dam construction and the revocation of the NCPO orders that enabled land grabs in the Eastern Economic Corridor. Not only did activists who fought for the politics of redistribution jump into the electoral battle but also those who demanded politics of recognition. Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender (LGBT) advocates such as Tanwarin Sukkhapisit were among them. Tanwarin is a party-​list MP of the Future Forward Party (FFP) –​a party later dissolved by Thailand’s Constitutional Court and succeeded by the Move Forward Party.15 She considered parliament as an avenue for the LGBT movement to earn public recognition and amend the laws that prohibited basic human rights for the LGBT community (Buathong, 2019). The large number of NGOs and activists running for election was a new phenomenon. However, according to them, the idea had been discussed long before the election. It was an outcome of deliberative self-​reflection and meticulous evaluations of the ongoing political environment. It could be argued that their turn to the election was encouraged by: (a) a shift in their view towards parliamentary politics, which was partly influenced by their assessment of previous collaborations with key state actors; (b) the influence of the colour-​ coded politics over the shift in the NGOs and activists’ views; and (c) the reviews of the successes of special interest-​based parties in other countries. Most of the Thai NGOs were strongly opposed to electoral politics (Angkoontassaniyarat, 2017), and did not find any engagement with representatives from the election fruitful (Thongdeelert, 2008; Chuachang, 2018).16 However, in the mid-​2000s, the idea of having their own political party was intensely discussed among some veteran activists in the CPD, an organisation of political activists that was known for its pro-​reform actions and its monitoring of the political reform process in the 1990s and early 2000s (MGR Online, 2007; Chuachang, 2018; Thai Post, 2018).17 It can be suggested that Thailand’s long-​lasting colour-​coded politics triggered the shift in the NGOs and activists’ points of view towards creating a political party. For the NGOs who founded the Commoners’ Party, a decision was made after they witnessed the collaboration between many leaders of Thailand’s social movements and the military-​supported government, despite the fact that the military crackdown on the Red Shirt protestors caused the death of almost one 260

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hundred people in 2010 (Chuachang, 2018). These NGOs maintained their distaste against the ‘collaboration strategy’ that their NGO predecessors and counterparts opted for. They criticised how the incorporation of NGOs into various state-​ initiated committees diverted the movements from their original course and how the NCPO military regime’s co-​optation of the NGOs became the rubber stamp for the military to suppress street politics (Chuachang, 2018). To avoid being debilitated by ‘collaboration’ tactics, they strategised that they would have members from social movements discussing, backing or vetoing bills in parliament.18 Reviewing various models of special interest-​based parties in other countries, many NGOs and activists considered the political party a space for social movements in Thailand to participate in politics. This idea increasingly gained momentum as political opportunities were narrowed down under the NCPO regime. The Commoners’ Party, for example, tried to emulate green parties. According to many NGOs, the old model of the Communist Party of Thailand and the model of labour parties in England and Europe were also reviewed. After the NCPO government came to power in 2014, many activists who took part in political movements either against or in favour of the NCPO, saw political parties as the platforms to influence policy changes. Sombat Boonngamanong, leader of the ‘Red Sunday’ group,19 who was well-​known for his tongue-​in-​cheek style of protests, formed Pak Kian (the Firebrands Party) in 2018. Inspired by green parties and pirate parties in other countries, his view was that small parties might not gain many seats in the parliament. However, they could directly communicate with voters and, therefore, influence major political parties to include once-​neglected issues in policy making. Sombat also hoped his party could ‘nudge political unconsciousness’ of the public (Sriyanong and Kritsanaprakornkij, 2019). Meanwhile, Rangsiman Rome, founder of the Democracy Restoration Group,20 who became the party-​list MP of the FFP, evaluated that the Democracy Restoration Group and other movements of pro-​ democracy activists were prone to arrests and charges under the NCPO. He considered that running for the election was a more promising way to check the military’s power over society (Rojanaphruk, 2018b). On the other end of the spectrum, the Thai Social Democratic Party (TSDP) and the Action Coalition for Thailand Party (ACT) grew out of social movements that were aligned with the military and the establishment. In 2009, leaders of PAD, known commonly as the Yellow Shirts, formed a political party called the New Politics Party (NPP). Due to internal conflict, prior to the 2011 general election, the NPP broke away from PAD and was renamed as the TSDP. Publicly announcing that they had cut ties with PAD leaders, the leaders of TSDP hoped to use their political party to address various social problems including corruption, economic inequalities and injustice, which they said originated from the ‘capitalists’ who ruled the country, and pushed for legal changes (iLaw, 2019; Meetaem and Kongsuwan, 2019). Founded in 2018, ACT shared rhetoric and ideas with the People’s Democratic Reform Committee, which was the main opposition to the Red Shirts during the 261

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period 2013–​2014. Inheriting the legacies of the People’s Democratic Reform Committee, the ACT was seen as an ally of the NCPO. Leaders of the ACT considered forming a political party to continue their political reform-​seeking missions (Prachachat, 2018). Despite candidacy of various social and political organisations, the 2019 election result turned out in the NCPO’s and the establishment’s favour. The parties formed by the NGOs and activists did not win any seats in the parliament.21 And prior to the dissolution of the party in early 2020, the FFP, which consisted of progressive social and political activists, came third in the election and, thus, faced many difficulties in influencing any policy and legal changes.22 In August 2019, the party’s LGBT MPs proposed a bid to establish a house committee on gender diversity, but their proposal was rejected by a parliamentary vote (Boonbandit, 2019). One month later, the party announced a plan to table bills in parliament –​the bills to repeal 27 orders and announcements issued by the NCPO, a labour protection bill and a military service bill, which sought to replace the military draft with voluntary enlistment. The FFP eventually submitted its military enlistment bill to the House speaker in November 2019. However, in 2020 Prime Minister Prayut Chan-​o-​cha dropped the bill after it was classified as a financial piece of legislation. Such a classification requires the prime minister to decide whether to push it through to parliament. Attempts for the repeal of the NCPO orders and announcements were halted. In December 2019, the motion, which was proposed by the FFP, to establish a panel on the impact of the orders issued under Section 44 was shot down during the parliament’s re-​vote despite the opposition walking out in protest (Chetchotiros and Sattaburuth, 2019). The repeal of relevant NCPO orders would mitigate the forced eviction of forest settlers –​a problem which the social movement networks on land issues demanded an abrupt solution to. Without any MPs from the political parties formed by the NGOs and activists in the parliament, grassroots movements have to turn to sympathetic MPs who could voice their problems in the parliament. And the MPs who work in the parliamentary committee on land, natural resources and environment from the Move Forward Party, the de facto successor of the FFP, fit this role (Siamrath Online, 2021).

Conclusion Since the 1990s, social movements in Thailand have achieved various forms of policy successes. They helped enhance policy dialogues, earned concessions from the government, engendered legal changes, won revocation of certain development projects and brought in new policies. This chapter points out that political contexts and the movements’ strategies shaped the degree to which, and how, social movements influenced these outcomes. From the late 1990s to the early 2000s, changes in political context encouraged ‘opening opportunities’ for grassroots movements. The most significant case was when the grassroots-​based AOP successfully pressured the authorities to make concessions in 1996 and 1997, 262

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enacted two influential laws in 1999, and revoked state and privately owned development projects in 1996 and 2003. The enabled opportunities included the growth of parliamentary politics; the end of Cold War and the impacts of globalisation that enhanced state and public recognition of the languages of civil and community rights; the rise of media and full-​time activists; and a loose alliance between urban middle class and grassroots people, both of whom sought political and social reforms. Despite organising within a similar context, some movements advanced more than others in bringing about new progressive policies. Comparing the case of the AOP and the RDM, the strategies they employed made the difference. Collaboration with the state allowed the RDM to realise the highly progressive UCS, whereas the AOP, which gained positive responses from the government in the late 1990s, found its confrontational tactics being countered by the government, earning huge popular support without contributions from social movements. Still, it cannot be concluded that collaboration can guarantee more success for the movements than confrontation. The cases of the NPF and the LRNT, which are also the grassroots movements, show that as collaboration became co-​optation, the policy that appeared favourable to villagers in the movements constrained their rights and rendered them submissive to state monitoring. It should be noted that political circumstances shaped the process within which state authorities co-​opted the movements. As the media and the public focused their attention on the colour-​coded politics, the LRNT found public protests unfruitful. They reached out to the authorities who provided them financial support, adjusted their ideas to a dominant ideology, incorporated their members into state mechanisms and thus gained the upper hand in negotiations. Changes in political opportunities also shaped the movements’ strategies and their abilities to influence public policies. The 2014 coup, which was followed by the ascendancy of the junta government, introduced various legal measures that impeded the organisation of social movements. This became a reason for the NGOs and activists who worked with social movements to form political parties or apply for candidacy in the existing political parties. Although the idea of establishing their own political parties was not actually new to them, it was a significant move considering that the NGOs and activists in Thailand kept their distance from parliamentary politics. The election result in 2019, however, was against social movement-​based parties. Members of social movements who won seats in the parliament have rarely succeeded, so far, in pushing for policy changes. Due to various compelling regulations for political parties, the future of the social movement-​based political parties remains unclear. Notes 1

The AOP rallied for solutions to four areas of people’s grievances (that is, those related to land and forests, government schemes, dams, and slums) and for improvements on three issues (that 263

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2

3 4

5

6 7 8

9

10

11 12

13 14

is, alternative agriculture, health and safety in the workplace and small-​scale fishing) (Baker, 2000: 16). In this chapter, the word ‘activist’ refers to the Thai word ‘Nak Kijjakam’, which means the ones who appreciate the need for social change and invest time and energy to bring about the change. In recent years, the word ‘activist’ and ‘activism’ have been discussed widely. Some notions suggest that unlike ‘professional NGOs’ who relied on donor funding and became submissive to a system that disempowers and controls them (Pant, 2017), activists focus on ‘doing’. Activism can range from taking oppositional stances to mainstream policies, creating new structures and alternatives within society, and fundamentally changing society and its major institutions (Permanent Culture Now, nd). Interestingly, at that time, the AOP announced that it would collect signatures in support of Thaksin. It was argued that even under Thaksin’s autocratic regime, there were at least two issue-​based social movements that could engender changes in the government’s decision-​making. One was the ‘Bor Nok-​Hin Krut’ movement, which protested against a coal-​fired power plant project. Another was the movement against the construction of the ‘Klong Dan wastewater treatment plant’. The two projects were terminated in 2003 (Chiangsaen, 2018: 328). The AOP was compatible with the ‘action-​reaction model’, taking on an assumption that movements influenced changes in public policy by disrupting and threatening those in power. The RDM, on the other hand, was inclined towards the ‘access-​influence model’, which proposes that movements matter to policy outcomes because they could use institutional channels (Snow and Soule, 2010: 221, 222). Article 170 of the 1997 Constitution allowed 50,000 eligible voters to submit a petition to the president of the National Assembly to consider their draft a bill. The names of these organisations in Thai begin with the alphabet ‘ส’, which is pronounced as ‘Sor’. The networks included the Northern Peasants’ Federation, the Southern Peasants’ Federation of Thailand, the Northeastern Land Reform Network, the Bantad Mountain Range Land Reform Network, the Klong Yong Agriculatural Cooperative and the Four Regions Slum Network. In 2010, the NHCO incorporated land issues into the national ‘reconciliation plan’ under the Reform Steering Committee and the Committee on Reform Assembly (Dondee, 2016: 176). Meanwhile, the THPF, which was one of the ‘Sor Organisations’, and NGO-​CORD created legal space for the LRNT as they developed a draft for community rights law (Dondee, 2016: 180–​181). The Yellow Shirts rallied against former prime minister Thaksin Shinawatra whom they viewed as corrupt and prone to the neoliberal policies that promoted the benefits of Thaksin and his cronies at the expense of the national interest (Kengkij and Hewison, 2010, cited in Pitidol, 2016: 522). Likewise, many NGOs and activists were discontent with the way that the Thaksin government handled movements of the poor, ignoring their demands for solutions to the problems, and violently suppressing poor protestors (Chiangsaen, 2018: 276–​277). One community was required to pay as much as Bt 3.4 million annually for 30 years –​an amount that exceeded the sum of all villagers’ annual income (Thai PBS, 2018b). NGOs and activists in the movements for community rights over forest land criticised the CLR for allocating an insufficient amount of land for sustainable livelihoods, limiting eligibility criteria (for example, excluding forest-​dwellers in Class 1 and 2 watersheds), and being too centralised, entrusting the provincial governor with the authority to approve the communities’ proposal for working or developing the allocated lands. Among these are the NCPO Order Number 3/​2015, the Public Assembly Act of 2015, Articles 116 and 215 of Thailand’s Criminal Code, and the Road Traffic Act of 1979. The 2014 election is not included because, later on, it was invalidated by Thailand’s Constitutional Court on the grounds that it was not completed within one day throughout the nation.

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16

17

18

19

20 21

22

The FFP was dissolved in a Constitutional Court ruling in February 2020. The court ruled a loan of around US$6 million to the party from its leader was a donation, and therefore illegal. Later on, MPs of the FFP including Tanwarin joined the Move Forward Party –​a de facto successor to the FFP. In October 2020, Thailand’s Constitutional Court disqualified Tanwarin, finding her guilty of breaking rules meant to prevent politicians from owning stock in media companies. This was not compatible with the viewpoints of all groups within the movements. For example, the Small Scale Farmers’ Assembly of Isan in the 1990s faced an internal conflict between one group, which believed that forming a political party or getting involved in parliamentary politics was necessary to defend their interests, and another group which rooted for creating pressure from outside by building up people’s organisations (Phatharathananunth, 2006: 138). Meanwhile, some movements began to send their members to compete in elections at the subdistrict level. Once elected, the members brought the movements’ demands into the decision-​making of their organisations. Some of them could push for change in regulations to benefit the movements (Akarapongpisak, 2011: 209–​210). A key member of the Commoners’ Party revealed that many NGOs got tired of being polarised as either Red Shirts or Yellow Shirts and, therefore, they formed their own political party to represent their political standpoint (Thai Post, 2018). After the crackdown on Red Shirt protestors in 2010, the ‘Red Sunday’ group organised playful nonviolent actions against military intervention in Thai politics and demanding responsibility for the deaths following the crackdown. The Democracy Restoration Group is a group of pro-​democracy activists against the military government. Although the Commoners’ Party did not win any seat in the parliament, it announced its readiness to compete in national and local elections in the future. In a formal message to supporters, the party’s leader insisted that influencing their ideas through the parliament would bring about policy changes and also encourage the public to alternate their mindsets toward policy issues: ‘the party’s leader encouraged the public to change their mindsets toward their involvement in policy making. He insisted that by influencing ideas through the parliament, the public would bring about policy changes.’ The Commoners’ Party also confirmed its political standpoints as a party that worked on environment and inequality issues and, concurrently, used mobilisation to influence public policies (Prachatai, 2019). Being criticised for its bias towards the NCPO, Thailand’s revised election rules inadvertently benefited the anti-​junta FFP. As proved by the 2019 election result, the proportional system allowed some parties to gain numerous seats even if they did not win geographical constituencies. This saw the FFP winning 30 seats from the constituency system and 50 party-​list seats in spite of the fact that most of its candidates were political novices.

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Baker, C. (2000) ‘Thailand’s Assembly of the Poor: Background, drama, reaction’, South East Asia Research, 8(1): 5–​29. Boonbandit, T. (2019) ‘Are we not human? Future Forward MP weeps as gender committee voted down’, Khaosod English, 23 August, available from: https://​ www.kha​osod​engl​ish.com/​polit​ics/​2019/​08/​23/​are-​we-​not-​human-​fut​ure-​ forw​ard-​mp-​weeps-​as-​gen​der-​commit​tee-​voted-​down Boonchai, K. (nd) ‘The community land title deeds policy for social justice: From principles to practices’, RECOFTC, available from https://a​ rchi​ ve.recof​ tc.org/​ node/​48949 [in Thai] Buathong, T. (2019) ‘Future Forward Party: Thailand’s first transgendered MP, genderless dressing and the first step towards equality’, BBC Thai, 24 March, available from https://​bbc.in/​2wh7​3Lm [in Thai] Busscher, N., Vanclay, F. and Parra, C. (2019) ‘Reflections on how state-​civil society collaborations play out in the context of land grabbing in Argentina’, Land, MDPI, Open Access Journal, 8(8): 1–​16. Chalermsripinyorat, R. (2004) ‘Politics of representation: A case study of Thailand’s Assembly of the Poor’, Critical Asian Studies, 36(4): 541–​566. Chariamphan, P. (2012) Politics of Community Land Title Deeds Policy Making Process, MA Dissertation, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand. Chetchotiros, N. and Sattaburuth, A. (2019) ‘Govt shoots down S44 panel motion’, Bangkok Post, 5 December, available from: https://w ​ ww.bangk​ okpo ​ st. com/​thail​and/​pr/​1808​709/​govt-​sho​ots-​down-​s44-​panel-​mot​ion Chiangsaen, U. (2018) The People’s Sector Politics, Bangkok: Matichon Publishing. [in Thai] Chiangsaen, U. (n.d.) ‘The assembly of the poor’, King Prajadhipok’s Institute, avaiable from: http://​wiki.kpi.ac.th/​index.php?title=​สมั​ชชาค​นจน [in Thai] Chiengkul, P. (2013) ‘Trapped in the corporate agri-​food system: Resource grabbing and political-​economic constraints in Thailand’. International Initiative for Promoting Political Economy’s 4th Annual Conference in Political Economy, International Institute for Social Studies, The Hague, Netherlands, 9–​11 July. Chuachang, M. (2018) ‘The political party of “Tasitasa” (Commoners) stepping into a formal political arena: An interview with Lertsak Kamkongsak’, The Momentum, 8 October, available from https://​them​omen​tum.co/​interv​iew-​lert​ sak-​kam​kong​sak-​the-​commo​ner/​ [in Thai] Dechalert, P. (1999) ‘NGOs, advocacy and popular protest: A case study of Thailand’, International Working Paper Series (6), London: Centre for Civil Society, London School of Economics and Political Science. Dondee, S. (2016) Dynamics of the Land Reform Movement in Thailand after the 1997 Constitution: The Case Study of Land Reform Network of Thailand, MA Dissertation, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand. Holdo, M. (2019) ‘Cooptation and non-​cooptation: Elite strategies in response to social protest’, Social Movement Studies, 18(4), 444–​462.

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iLaw (2015) ‘Unofficial translation of Thai junta’s order, replacing martial law with Section 44 of Interim Charter’, Prachatai English, 2 April, available from https://​pracha​tai.com/​engl​ish/​node/​4933 iLaw (2019) ‘Thai Social Democratic Party: Do not side with old-​style political parties and ruling capitalists’, iLaw, 21 February, available from https://​www. ilaw.or.th/​node/​5161 [in Thai] ILO Social Protection Department (2016) Thailand: Universal Health-​care Coverage Scheme, Geneva: International Labour Office. Lubanski, J. (2012) Land is Life: A Policy Advocacy Case Study of the Northern Thailand Land Reform Movement, Master’s Thesis, SIT Graduate Institute, Vermont, United States. Meetaem, T. and Kongsuwan, S. (2019) ‘Think big –​small size: Talking with representatives from small-​scale political parties who wish to transform the country through election’, The 101, 20 March, available from https://​www. the​101.world/​thai-​minor-​politi​cal-​part​ies [in Thai] MGR Online (2007) ‘Suwit Watnu: Hero of the poors from forest, slum and street to an initiation for people’s party’, MGR Online, 13 March, available from https://​mgronl​ine.com/​speci​alsc​oop/​det​ail/​950000​0029​011 [in Thai] Missingham, B. (2003) The Assembly of the Poor in Thailand: From Local Struggles to National Protest Movement, Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books. Nam, I. (2015) Democratizing Health Care: Welfare State Building in Korea and Thailand, New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Nanakorn, W. (2011) ‘Empowerment strategies of social movements through the mediascape in Thailand’, Journal of Mekong Societies, 7(3): 77–​99. [in Thai] Nuttapattanun, E. (2009) ‘The impacts of the poor and the powerless movements in Thai society from 1988 to 2006’, Journal of Social Sciences, 40(2): 220–​272. [in Thai] Pant, S.B. (2017) ‘Why grassroots activists should resist being “professionalised” into an NGO’, The Guardian, 7 July, available from https://​www.theg​uard​ian. com/​glo​bal-d​ evel​ opme​ nt-p​ rofess​ iona​ ls-n ​ etw​ork/​2017/​jul/​07/​why-​gra​ssro​ots-​ activi​sts-​sho​uld-​res​ist-​being-​profe​ssio​nali​sed-​into-​an-​ngo Permanent Culture Now (nd) ‘Introduction to activism’, Permanent Culture Now Website, available from https://​www.perm​anen​tcul​ture​now.com/​what-​ is-​activ​ism Phatharathanunth, S. (2006) Civil Society and Democratization Social Movements in Northeast Thailand, Copenhagen: NIAS Press. Phongpaichit, P. (2002) ‘Recent popular movements in Thailand in global perspective’, in P. Phongpaichit (ed) Asian Review 2002: Popular Movements, Bangkok: Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University, pp 1–​20. Phongpaichit, P. and Baker, C. (2009) Thaksin, Chiangmai: Silkworm Books. Pintobtang, P. (1998) Politics on the Street: 99 Days of the Assembly of the Poor, Bangkok: Centre for Research and Production of Textbooks, Krik University. [in Thai]

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Pintobtang, P. (2009) Framework for Political Analysis: Social Movement, Bangkok: Kledthai. [in Thai] Pitidol, T. (2016) ‘Redefining democratic discourse in Thailand’s civil society’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 46(3): 520–​537. Prachachat (2018) ‘Tawisak –​the wind beneath Suthep’s wings –​the successive episode of the PDRC –​fighting against insurrection charges’, Prachachat, 16 August, available from https://​www.pra​chac​hat.net/​faceb​ook-​inst​ant-​arti​cle/​ news-​205​079 [in Thai] Prachatai (2019) ‘The Commoners’ Party: “If we do not win any seat in this election, we will keep improving and win seats in the next election” ’, Prachatai, 23 March, available from https://​pracha​tai.com/​jour​nal/​2019/​03/​81659 [in Thai] Rakyutidharm, A. (2009) ‘“Making of community’ in a commercialized community in northern Thailand’, Southeast Asian Studies, 47(1): 89–​110. Rakyutidham, A. (2011) ‘Mainstreaming alternative development’, Journal of Sociology and Anthropology, 30(2): 13–​43. [in Thai] Rojanaphruk, P. (2018a) ‘Commoner Party seeks to put the poor in parliament’, Khaosod English, 19 March, available from https://​www.kha​osod​engl​ish.com/​ polit​ics/​2018/​03/​19/​commo​ner-​party-​seeks-​to-​put-​the-​poor-​in-​par​liam​ent/​ Rojanaphruk, P. (2018b) ‘Rangsiman Rome explains leaving protest movement for politics’, Khaosod English, 29 October, available from https://​www.kha​osod​ engl​ish.com/​polit​ics/​2018/​10/​29/​rangsi​man-​rome-​expla​ins-​quitt​ing-​prot​est-​ movem​ent-​to-​bec​ome-​pol​itic​ian/​ Sapyen, C. (2013) A Study of Rural Doctor Movement in the Policy Process of Health System Policy: The Movement of Civil Society and its Contribution toward Participatory Democracy in Thailand, PhD Thesis, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand. Siamrath Online (2021) ‘Leader of the parliamentary committee on land, natural resources and environment and MPs listen to “Sap Kham Pa Lai” villagers and participate in their ceremony to prolong the life of water’, Siamrath Online, 12 December, available from https://​siamr​ath.co.th/​n/​305​154 [in Thai] Snow, D.A. and Soule, S.A. (2010) A Primer on Social Movements, New York: W.W. Norton & Company. Sombatpoonsiri, J. (2018) ‘The legitimacy deficit of Thailand’s civil society’, in S. Brechenmacher and T. Carothers (eds) Examining Civil Society Legitimacy, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp 19–​21. Sripokangkul, S., Draper, J., Crumpton, C.D. and Muangming, A. (2019) ‘Understanding the social environment determinants of student movements: A consideraton of student activism in Thailand and the Thai “social cage” ’, International Journal of Asia Pacific Studies, 15(1): 59–​96. Sriyanong, T. and Kritsanaprakornkij, W. (2019) ‘The 2019 election: An interview with “Bokor Lai Cut” –​being the decoration in Thailand’s politics that could make it colorful and provoke thoughts’, a day BULLETIN, 14 March, available from https://​adayb​ulle​tin.com/​talk-​conve​rsat​ion-​2019-​thail​and-​gene​ral-​elect​ ion-​som​bat-​boonng​aman​ong/​28817 [in Thai] 268

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Thai PBS (2018a) ‘Lertsak Kamkongsak became the Commoners’ Party’s leader’, Thai PBS News, 22 September, available from https://​news.thai​pbs.or.th/​cont​ ent/​274​713 [in Thai] Thai PBS (2018b) ‘Ban Pong: The national land bank has yet to achieve its goal’, Thail PBS News, 14 November, available from https://​news.thai​pbs.or.th/​cont​ ent/​275​685 [in Thai] Thai PBS (2019) ‘Nine years of community titling at the Khlong Yong community: Heading towards security and sustainability’, Thai PBS NEWS, 1 September, available from https://n ​ ews.thai​pbs.or.th/​cont​ent/​283​593 [in Thai] Thai Post (2018) ‘The “Commoners” flagged: Let the poors voice out in the parliament’, Thai Post, 20 November, available from https://​www.ryt9.com/​ s/​tpd/​2917​455 [in Thai] Thongdeelert, C. (2008) ‘A lesson from working as a development activist, according to an ordinary person 01’, VolunteerSpirit Network, 11 November, available from: http://​www.volu​ntee​rspi​r it.org/​?p=​25087 [in Thai] Vongtangswad, N. (2017) The Dynamics of Framing and Mobilization of the Rural Doctor Movement: Conflicts and Political Transformation, PhD Thesis, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand. [in Thai] Wasinpiyamongkhon, N. (2013) People’s Politics in Thailand: A Critical Study of the Assembly of the Poor, 2001–​2010, PhD Thesis, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK.

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Part Five Policy analysis education and research

FIFTEEN

Policy analysis instruction in Thailand Piyakorn Whangmahaporn

Introduction Public policy as a subject of study in Thailand has always been considered as a part of the field of public administration. Public policy has yet to flourish as a field on its own. Only a handful of public policy degree programmes exist in the country. On the other hand, there are over 100 programmes (bachelor’s and master’s combined) in public administration. The scope of public administration education in Thailand usually consists of main subjects such as organisational management, finance and budgeting, human resource management and also public policy. Thus, we can find the course title ‘public policy’ in virtually every university in Thailand. The National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA) in the 1970s first defined public policy as a subject under its master’s degree curriculum in the Department of Administration. In the same department, a subject called ‘government project evaluation’ was included in the bachelor’s degree. Then, in 1976, the Faculty of Political Science at Chulalongkorn University initiated its own public policy course. The subject’s name was ‘process of policy and planning’. The emergence of public policy education occurred around this time to support the training of planning and policy analysts, a job title that first appeared in 1975. Thus, before 1977, the subject name ‘public policy’ did not exist. It was only in 1979 that the bachelor’s degree of the Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University as well as the master’s degree of NIDA opened the course called public policy initially as ‘public policy and project management’. Since then, public policy education has expanded to every university, both public and private, in Thailand where there are undergraduate, master’s and doctoral degrees in public administration. All of them would have public policy as a required subject (Whangmahaporn, 2010). For almost half a century, policy analysis instruction and research focused on policy study or the political science approach to understanding public policy, which gave importance to the use of models to study policy and policy implementation. This is because the topic of public policy was often taught under the faculties of political science, which would host departments of public administration, as already mentioned. However, in the world of practice, planning and policy analysts have responsibilities for policy recommendations, formulating policies, making operational plans, projects or activities, monitoring and evaluation. This has resulted in a gap between what they learn in class and 273

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the practical knowledge that they require in work. If students want good public policy knowledge and know-​how, they must study public administration and project evaluation subjects that are often offered as elective courses. This chapter provides a detailed account of policy analysis instruction in Thailand. It focuses on policy analysis instruction for bachelor’s and master’s levels. The chapter is divided into four parts, including a brief overview of policy analysis instruction in Thailand, status of policy analysis instruction, direction of policy analysis instruction, and conclusion.

Brief overview of policy analysis instruction in Thailand Early years: 1957–​1967 As mentioned in Chapter One, a school for training royal pages and civil servants of Thailand was first established in 1899 during King Chulalongkorn’s reign. Rama VI had a royal initiative to expand the school. Therefore, it was later established as a national university, ‘Chulalongkorn University’, on 26 March 1916. The establishment of the Faculty of Political Science in Thailand occurred in 1948. The following year, Thammasat University established its Faculty of Political Science. Education during that period focused on civil and commercial law, administrative law, constitutional law, international law, and knowledge about working in the bureaucratic system (to train a government official). Although, in 1952, Chulalongkorn University updated the curriculum into four departments, namely, government, general administration, finance and foreign affairs, and diplomacy, policy analysis instruction had not yet appeared (Whangmahaporn, 2010). The NIDA was established in 1966 with a faculty of public administration. Due to Thailand’s first economic development plan in 1961 and the need for public personnel to be in line with the economic development of the country, the government established planning divisions in all of the central ministries and key agencies. Thus, many universities expanded by opening a department of public administration in the faculty of political science, such as Chulalongkorn University in 1966, followed by Thammasat University in 1968 as well as regional universities such as Chiang Mai University and Khon Kaen University. However, during this time, the subject of public policy and policy analysis was not yet explicitly taught (Whangmahaporn, 2010; Ungsuchaval et al, 2023). Years 1968–​1987 At this time, there was an expansion in universities that provided policy related instruction in the faculty of political science, the faculty of social science and the faculty of management science, such as Ramkhamhaeng University, Kasetsart University, Srinakharinwirot University and Prince of Songkla University Hat Yai Campus (Whangmahaporn, 2010). The expansion was a result of the fact 274

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that the government wanted to expand the ‘policy and plan analysis officer’ positions, which began in 1975. In addition, there were professors who had received scholarships to study public administration and government affairs in the United States returning to Thailand. Therefore, various universities began to define policy studies for the first time. For instance, in 1976 Chulalongkorn University created the ‘policy and planning process’ course, and NIDA set up its project management course for the first time (Whangmahaporn, 2010). The expansion of policy education within public administration studies happened at the bachelor’s and master’s degree levels. At the bachelor level, the faculty of political science and other faculties offered the subjects of political science and public administration in various private universities like Krirk University, Dhurakij Pundit University and Sukhothai Thammathirat Open University (a university that offered distance learning system since 1978). While the previously mentioned universities have improved their own courses, Chulalongkorn University, for example, updated the course with a subject called ‘public policy’ as the first required subject in 1979 (Noranitipadungkarn, 2016). In 1979, NIDA enhanced its curriculum at the master’s degree level with the subject of ‘public policy and planning’. The first master of public administration course was opened in Chulalongkorn University in 1983 (although NIDA offered the master’s degree programme first, it was called a master of science in management). The master of public administration was available for the first time as a master’s degree in Chulalongkorn University in 1987 with the subject of ‘public policy analysis’ (Noranitipadungkarn, 2016). Offering a part-​time course gave executives the opportunity to study to upgrade their knowledge and skills. Years 1988–​2007 From establishing a planning division to recruiting personnel to work during the first formation of the Thai Economic Development Plan, the national economy later expanded, and the government established the ‘Policy and Planning Office’. Therefore, the university’s policy education produces people able to work in the government, which caused the unprecedented expansion of universities including private universities, such as Sripatum University and Kasem Bundit University. This period saw the transformation of state universities from colleges that only produced teachers, to universities where courses were offered in many areas. For example, Uttaradit Rajabhat University in collaboration with NIDA opened a public administration programme at bachelor’s and master’s degree. The regional universities also started offering public policy and planning courses, such as Burapha University and Naresuan University. Meanwhile, top universities, like Chulalongkorn University and Thammasat University, have improved their curriculum because of the popularity of public policy studies, which were so popular that public policy and planning groups were created and decided that public policy should be a compulsory subject. 275

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The popularity of public policy studies steadily increased because of the establishment of university expansions. Many private universities were created and all of them offered the public administration course only at the master’s degree level and had public policy as a mandatory course as seen in, for example, North Chiang Mai University, Western University, Rattana Bundit University and Pathumthani University. Another important event was the elevation of Rajabhat institutes to Rajabhat universities, resulting in many additional universities, and all Rajabhat universities offered public administration courses with public policy as a required subject. There were the creation of bachelor’s and master’s degrees in public administration programmes. As a result, in 2005 the regulatory agency, the Office of the Higher Education Commission, announced standard criteria for an undergraduate curriculum and standard criteria for a higher education curriculum, which were the frameworks for managing quality in all curricula (Uthaiboot, 2012). Years 2008–​present During this period, there was a revision of the standard criteria for the undergraduate curriculum of 2015 and standard criteria for the higher education curriculum of 2015. The numerous public administration programmes that were opened, therefore, were being questioned about the quality of students being produced and looking at lecturer qualifications, courses and teaching methods. Tamronglak (2016: 58) said that ‘[t]‌he teaching quality of bachelor’s, master’s and doctoral level begins to deteriorate because focusing on short reports, final examination, lecture and group report while seminars and brainstorming sessions are rare. Each lecturer has a unique teaching style that focuses on using multi-​media, especially PowerPoint’. Therefore, to improve the quality of the curriculum, this led to the realignment of ‘Standard Criteria for Undergraduate Curriculum in Public Administration of 2015 (SCUCPA 2015)’ and ‘Standard Criteria for Higher Education Curriculum in Public Administration of 2015 (SCHECPA 2015)’ (Government Gazette, 2015b) to set a minimum standard of education together with standard criteria for curriculum. The standards cover department characteristics, desired qualifications of graduates, learning outcomes, course structure and comprehension. For the public policy knowledge, the standards identify the main content to cover: the study of public policy process, public options analysis, public policy studies and analysis in various areas, public policy implementation, evaluation of public project possibilities, public project preparation, public project planning and management, and analysis and evaluation of the impact of public programmes, and so on. This also included the formulation of teaching strategies, learning evaluation and lecturer qualifications (Government Gazette, 2015b). The impact on the standardisation of lecturer qualifications in the public administration programme caused many universities to stop accepting master’s and doctoral students since course lecturers’ degree and academic background do not meet the standards. At the same time, public administration lecturers 276

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Table 15.1: Frequency of public policy instruction in political science, public administration and arts courses Bachelor’s degree Political science

Master’s degree

Public administration

Arts

Political science

Public administration

Arts

Autonomous university

7

10

1

2

12

1

National university

5

2

0

4

1

0

Rajabhat university

1

37

0

0

17

0

Private university

8

20

1

0

25

0

Total

21

69

2

6

55

1

Grand total

92

62

Note: ‘Unit’ refers to the number of programmes Source: Author’s own compilation from university websites

needed to develop themselves to meet the specified standards to be appointed to academic positions. From the exploration of degree programmes on the websites of all Thai higher education institutions in November 2019, it was found that although Thai policy analysis instruction was found mainly in public administration, it was taught as well in political science and liberal arts programmes of autonomous universities, national universities, Rajabhat universities and private universities at the bachelor’s and master’s degree levels, as shown in Table 15.1 and Figure 15.1. For bachelor’s degrees, policy analysis instruction was offered in all types of universities, 92 programmes in total, divided into 21 bachelor of political science programmes, 69 bachelor of public administration programmes and two bachelor of arts programmes.1 The course structure of the bachelor’s degree under SCUCPA 2015 requires that the curriculum structure has at least 120 credits. Most educational institutions define the curriculum structure with 120–​169 credits. Knowledge is defined in five areas, as follows: (1) knowledge group of organisation and management; (2) knowledge group of public policy; (3) knowledge group of human resource management; (4) knowledge group of political science; and (5) knowledge group of finance and budget (Government Gazette, 2015b). There are no differences in the courses offered by educational institutions located in different regions in the different knowledge groups, specified in the SCUCPA 2015. However, there is only one university that specifies elective courses according to the characteristics of the region, which is Prince of Songkla University Pattani Campus, where their electives in public policy groups are public policy models in the Muslim state and society. Student admissions at the bachelor’s degree level in various public, private and Rajabhat universities consists of four systems, which are admission, quota, special scholarship and general admission, except for Ramkhamhaeng University that only uses the general admission system. 277

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278

Figure 15.1: Frequency of public policy instruction in political science, public administration and arts courses 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0 Bachelor of Political Science

Bachelor of Public Administration

Autonomous university Source: Author’s own compilation from university websites

Bachelor of Arts

National university

Master of Political Science Rajabhat university

Master of Public Administration

Master of Arts

Private university

Policy analysis instruction

Considering lecturer qualifications, the SCUCPA 2015 identified that programme course lecturers must have a bachelor’s degree in public administration or related fields, have academic positions not lower than an assistant professor, and have at least nine years of teaching experience or graduated with a master’s degree in public administration or related field, and have at least three years of teaching experience or graduated with a doctorate in public administration or related fields (Government Gazette, 2015a). At master’s degree level, policy analysis instruction was offered in all types of universities, 62 programmes in total, divided into six master of political science programmes, 55 master of public administration programmes and one master of arts programme. About course structure under standard criteria for higher education curriculum in public administration of 2015, the curriculum structure of the master’s degree programme has a total of 36 credits which are divided into two plans: Plan A focuses on research and Plan B focuses on instruction. Most educational institutions define the curriculum structure with 36–​48 credits. Knowledge is defined in five areas as follows: (1) knowledge group of organisation and management; (2) knowledge group of public policy; (3) knowledge group of human resource management; (4) knowledge group of political science; and (5) knowledge group of finance and budget. There are no differences in the courses offered by educational institutions located in different regions due to the knowledge groups specified in SCHECPA 2015 (master’s degree) (Government Gazette, 2015a). Student admissions for the master’s degree state that they can graduate from any field. The master’s degree has a method of selection for its students and is divided into three types, as follows: (1) two-​step form (written examination and interview); (2) one-​step form (written examination or interview); and (3) only send the application form. Ramkhamhaeng University uses a general admission system, requiring only an application form (Tamronglak, 2016: 54). The instruction in the institution of education takes place mostly at weekends and most of them provide block courses. Lecturer qualifications under SCHECPA 2015 specified the qualifications of course lecturers must have a master’s degree in public administration or related field, have an academic position not lower than an associate professor, have at least eight years of teaching experience with at least two research papers or graduated with a doctorate in public administration or related field, have an academic position not lower than an assistant professor, have at least two years of teaching experience with at least two research papers. The instructor must have a master’s degree in public administration or related field, have an academic position not lower than an assistant professor, have at least five years of teaching experience with at least two research papers or must have a PhD in public administration or related field. The observation found that course lecturers tended to graduate in political science and public administration. However, it was found that some lecturers do not graduate from the department of public administration or other 279

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related fields. For example, they instead graduated from pharmacy, educational counselling or psychology (Uthaiboot, 2012: 61). From this information, when considering the degree names at the master’s level, in most cases, graduates will receive a master of public administration degree. Some institutions may have specific department names attached to the programme, such as Local Administration (Khon Kaen University) or Public and Private Sector Management Department (Mahasarakham Rajabhat University). Due to meeting the needs of learners and making money from the said programme, some institutions may provide different qualifications, for example master of arts (Kasetsart University), master of political science in public affairs (Thammasat University) and master of political science in public management (Ramkhamhaeng University). When considering the details of the curriculum structure, the master of political science programmes focus on the integration of knowledge in political science and public administration, while the master of public administration programmes do not usually include much teaching and learning related to political science. When examining the details of the courses, it was found that every course provides teaching and learning activities for public policy, public policy analysis, policy implementation, policy evaluation, and project planning and management, that are following the SCHECPA 2015. Besides, the public administration curriculum in Thai universities normally has a subject called ‘public policy’ as a compulsory course and policy analysis, project analysis and project management, policy implementation and project evaluation as elective courses. Next, the chapter will provide details about policy analysis instruction and direction of policy analysis instruction in Thailand.

Status of policy analysis instruction in Thailand The development of the study of Thai public policy analysis coincides with the development of the public administration, political science and arts curriculum. From this development, the author chose specific higher education institutions from autonomous universities, national universities, Rajabhat universities and private universities that organise public policy instruction at the bachelor’s and master’s degree levels. The interviews of key informants –​either programme administrators or lecturers –​from 13 higher education institutions aims to understand the status of policy analysis instruction in Thailand. Those institutions include Chulalongkorn University, Thammasat University, Chiang Mai University, Khon Kaen University, Kasetsart University, Prince of Songkla University Hat Yai campus, Maha Sarakham University, Burapha University, Maha Sarakham Rajabhat University, Naresuan University, Buriram Rajabhat University, Dhurakij Pundit University and Southeast Asia University. The results of the study about the status of policy analysis instruction in the country are detailed in the following sections. 280

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Approaches of policy analysis instruction in Thailand Policy analysis instruction in Thailand has two main approaches, known as the ‘descriptive’ approach and the ‘prescriptive’ approach. Policy analysis instruction that uses the descriptive approach emphasises public policy concepts, meaning, types of public policy, and the public policy cycle that starts from policy formulation and then moves to policy implementation and policy evaluation. The study of descriptive public policy focuses on answering the question of how and why policies are determined. In addition, descriptive public policy is a study of the public policy process and the content of the policy which is about the background, intent, nature and operation of the policy. This approach covers the study of the process of policy formulation and the influence of actors in policy making. The specific policy model is usually employed as a framework for helping to create a better understanding of policy phenomena and generate knowledge. This approach is a common approach for all types of Thai policy analysis instructions, both bachelor’s and master’s degree levels. By using the subject name ‘public policy’, it includes a study of general concepts, public policy environments, policy formulation, policy implementation, evaluation of public policies, principles, tools and policy measures in various forms. This course is compulsory and is the core of the curriculum at both the bachelor’s and master’s degree levels. It is a basic course to give students the foundation needed to understand public policy concepts before continuing to study other subjects in public policy. In the course, there are also subjects that seem to be case-​based learning. Most of them are elective courses that study the content of the specific policy, such as environmental policy and city management policy. This type of course aims to engage in contemporary policy issues, such as the study of various issues related to the environment, stakeholders’ perspectives on the environment at the national and international levels, the complexity of the problem of natural resource management, energy management, pollution problems, participatory environmental management, the evolution of environmental management concepts internationally, and various current movements to develop and conserve natural resources and environment. On the other hand, the prescriptive approach takes various fields of knowledge to use in the analysis of public policy, such as economics, management science and mathematics. With this approach, the focus is to provide information to policy makers for them to be able to make better policy decisions. It thus shifts from ‘how things happen and why’ to ‘how to make things happen’. The relevant courses that adopt this approach include project feasibility, planning and management, project monitoring and evaluation, and policy analysis techniques. In detail, such courses provide quantitative and qualitative techniques, advantages and disadvantages of different analytical tools, the integration of different methods, and the use of policy analysis techniques in practice. 281

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Management and design of policy analysis instruction in Thailand SCUCPA 2015 became the framework for the instruction to be more standardised given that the initial public administration courses –​that cover most policy related subjects –​were being questioned about their quality. Thai higher education institutions are very different in their instruction, in terms of the knowledge that students receive, qualifications of their course lecturers, profiles of programme administrators, and teaching methods. The instruction of public administration has simply become a way to earn money, which erodes the quality of the programme. On the other hand, the standards were criticised as a limitation on the instruction, making it impossible to design subjects which are consistent with the local environment. Specifying the qualifications of course lecturers and programme administrators with academic positions and research papers caused many higher education institutions that were not ready to request time to adjust. Programme administrators had to have degrees that were directly related to the fields of the subject. At the time, many people who ran the programmes did not have the relevant degrees. This caused widespread uneasiness. However, the formal process of managing the programmes demanded all higher education institutions to comply with the qualification standards set forth into law. According to the standards, the instruction of policy related subjects under public administration in bachelor’s degree has been designed through a variety of methods. The common method is to teach students to understand public policy concepts, policy linkage in the national strategy, project plans at national, regional, and local levels. Apart from that, some programmes focus on policy analysis by using different models and tools, and organise field trips to study problems and analyse the consistency between the facts and theories. There are also some programmes that adopt a goal-​oriented project planning approach and problem-​based learning. Students enter the study area of a community or department at the local level and write a project to solve the problem which integrates various subjects, such as strategy, research planning and public policy. Some universities refer to this teaching method as social laboratories or Social Lab, such as Khon Kaen University. For the lectures, the examination and report are the basic performance assessment methods that all higher education institutions use in their education. Adaptation for managing master’s degrees is in accordance with SCHECPA 2015. There are various types of instruction in public policy subject groups that have promoted analytical thinking by using Mind Maps, brainstorming, scenario analysis, cost-​benefit analysis, consultation in public policy, field trips and fieldwork. Besides, some programmes have also invited special practitioners to give lectures and used case studies in the country and abroad for the lectures. The same as the bachelor’s degree, examinations and reports are the basic performance assessment methods that all institutions use.

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The direction of policy analysis instruction in Thailand The reflections on the direction of policy analysis instruction in Thailand from the key informants who are programme administrators and lecturers from the 13 higher education institutions are as follows: • Subject description: Most key informants pointed out that the content of the graduate courses should be based mainly on student production goals. The master’s degree should aim to produce students to be proactive administrators, which requires knowledge and skills in two areas. First, it is the specific knowledge of contemporary policy issues, such as disabled policies, elderly policies, LGBTQ-​sensitive policies, the free abortion policy, stateless people policies, and foreign labour policies. Second, students must be able to suggest better policies which require various data analysis techniques in policy design and evaluation. However, most interviewees seemed to agree that policy knowledge in these two areas should reduce the gap between theory and practice by relying on practical tools and techniques more than abstract theories. In the case of bachelor’s degree, the main objectives of the existing programmes are to produce students who become policy and planning analysts. Many key informants agreed that the course content should consist of project writing, project management, project monitoring and evaluation. At this level, priority should be given to teaching policy processes, relationships between policies, strategies, plans and projects. Also, students should have knowledge and skills in problem analysis and problem-​solving options, knowledge and information acquisition skills, and listening to confirm the options for solving problems by conducting online stakeholder opinions surveys. • Instruction: The interviewed programme administrators and lecturers mentioned that public policy analysis instruction should not be monopolised by only the perspectives of public administration. Instruction requires academics from other fields, such as economics and statistics, for helping to increase the data analysis skills in selecting the policy alternatives. Policy analysis instruction is necessary to integrate knowledge on research and strategic planning to benefit students in generating policy knowledge and putting it into practice. Moreover, informants gave their opinion that the study of problems from the real world is necessary to analyse the effective solution. Thus, case-​based learning should be promoted more in Thai policy education.

Conclusion Public policy has been a popular subject for more than three decades. However, its development in Thailand lags behind countries such as the United States, the United Kingdom and European countries because, as a subject, it has been

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incorporated into public administration programmes that often focus on managerial skills rather than policy analysis skills. In other words, the subject of public policy has not yet grown into a mature field in Thailand (see more discussion in Ungsuchaval et al, 2023). It is yet to be seen how the convergence or divergence between public administration and public policy will play out in Thailand. In the author’s view and conceptualisation, Thai educational institutions usually organise public policy analysis instruction in two ways: descriptive and prescriptive. The purpose of the descriptive approach is to explain how policy is made, who are stakeholders in the policy, their roles, the factors that affect policy making and policy implementation. This approach creates a full understanding of the policy, while the prescriptive approach is an instruction that focuses on the integration of knowledge from various fields and skills in data analysis to analyse policy options and suggest alternatives for policy makers to guide them in solving societal problems. Regarding the direction of Thai policy analysis instruction, the interviews with programme administrators and lecturers from 13 universities found that most of them had a mindset that policy analysis education should help executives to be able to suggest better policies and with that they should have a skillset in data analysis for policy design and policy evaluation. Policy and planning analysts should have knowledge on project writing, project management, project monitoring and evaluation. At the same time, knowledge and skills in problem analysis and problem-​solving in the real world should be promoted. To push the field forward into a more diverse discipline, the standards set by SCUCPA 2015 and SCHECPA 2015 should be unlocked. The qualifications of programme administrators and lecturers are fixed to be of certain degrees related to public administration. This inhibits knowledge transfer from other fields of study. Besides, practitioners should be allowed to share their real-​ world experiences that might go beyond merely ‘the standardised curriculum’, especially in specific policy areas, such as environmental policy and dual-​rail or transportation policy. In this regard, teaching public policy to create a proactive executive or a good public policy analyst in Thailand needs to involve wider knowledge, skills and experiences that support the better analysis of public problems and solutions. Note 1

Uthaiboot’s (2012: 54) survey of the number of public administration programmes at master’s and doctoral degree level found that there are 74 higher education institutions offering master’s degrees and 24 higher education institutions offering doctoral degrees (not including off-​site learning centres). The research of Tamronglak (2016: 44) indicated the number of public administration programmes in Thailand as of 10 September 2012, with 106 bachelor’s programmes, 79 master’s programmes and 19 doctoral programmes.

References Government Gazette (2015a) ‘Standard criteria for higher education curriculum in public administration of 2015’, Government Gazette, 130(170): 13–​24. [in Thai] 284

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Government Gazette (2015b) ‘Standard criteria for undergraduate curriculum in public administration of 2015’, Government Gazette, 132 (170): 12–​20. [in Thai] Noranitipadungkarn, C. (2016) ‘Public administration in Thailand: The generation, expansion and future ideas’, Journal of Public Administration and Politics, 5(1): 198–​210. [in Thai] Tamronglak, A. (2016) ‘The evaluation of the state of education in public administration in Thailand (from 1997 to present)’, Journal of Politics, Administration and Law, 8(1): 35–​70. [in Thai] Ungsuchaval, T., Boossabong, P. and Hartley, K. (2023) ‘Public policy education in Thailand: From caged pedagogy to disciplinary Independence?’, Journal of Asian Public Policy, 16(1): 75–95. Uthaiboot, A. (2012) The Growth of Public Administration Education at the Graduate Level in Thailand: Problems and Future Prospects, Master’s Thesis, Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University. [in Thai] Whangmahaporn, P. (2010) The Development, the Status of Learning and Teaching and the Research of Thai Public Policy, Research Report, Sripatum University. [in Thai]

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Non-​traditional policy studies in Thailand Theerapat Ungsuchaval

Introduction The study of public policy in Thailand can be traced back to the late 1890s where technical policy knowledge was the main kind of policy knowledge that civil servants had to learn for public administration (PA) (Boossabong, 2017c; see also Chapter One, this volume). This establishment has shaped the field of policy studies to prioritise instrumental, technocratic reasoning based on logical positivism under the umbrella of the Cold War version of an American PA and, unfortunately, discourage the development of alternative interpretive and critical reasoning. Policy studies have barely been developed to include alternative approaches in their analyses and methodologies that go beyond the depoliticised economic and managerial perspectives until the 1980s. In this chapter, non-​traditional policy studies can be referred to as ‘alternative approaches’ to the study of public policy that propose propositions and applications of theories, concepts or metaphors of public policy which attempt to transcend empiricist, positivist ways of knowledge generation and/​or naive techno-​rationalist, instrumental, statist views of policy making and analysis both inside and outside the realm of PA. This chapter aims to provide an observation of the major academic developments, albeit selectively, which have arguably helped constitute alternative approaches to the study of public policy in Thailand. Various attempts to provide alternative approaches have gradually developed since the 1980s. They have encouraged us to inquire into the politics and governance in the policy process, interpretation and normative dimensions of policy knowledge, critical theory and limitations of techno-​rationalist/​instrumentalist modes of policy analysis and policy making, to name a few.1

A tale of two policy studies: policy analysis in public administration and policy process in politics The study of public policy in higher education has been largely administrated, educated and researched in the Department of PA as well as the Department of Politics and Government (Ungsuchaval et al, 2023), which has, in turn, classified the study of public policy into two important branches (Sirisamphan,

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1996; Thamrongthanyawong, 1997; Anumanrajadhon, 2004; Yavaprabhas and Whangmahaporn, 2009). The first branch can be perceived as a prescriptive approach that is focused on giving information and suggestions based on several analytical, managerial and economic technics to help develop policy decision-​making and ex-​ante policy analysis. This branch was heavily developed within PA frameworks that prioritise policy choice, factors of policy failures and successes, and policy evaluations, to name a few. On the contrary, the second branch was developed within political science frameworks which are focused on, for example, the content of policies, the role of policy makers and interest groups, the consequence of policies, and stages in the policy process. This branch was considered a descriptive approach, highlighting descriptions and explanations of existing and ex-​post policy evaluation. Arguably, this tradition in the study of public policy has underlined a tale of two policy studies: one closely associated with policy analysis and the other one related to policy process. In a nutshell, policy analysis refers to an analysis for policy. It is an applied activity that is interested in knowledge of the policy process and how to use that knowledge for developing policy solutions. On the contrary, policy process refers to an analysis of policy. It is largely an academic activity that is focused on knowledge of policy and the explanation of the policy process itself (see Hogwood and Gunn, 1984; Hill, 1997). However, public policy studies in Thailand have been, in effect, developed principally within the PA education tradition (see Chapter Fifteen, this volume; Jittaruttha et al, 2008; Yavaprabhas and Whangmahaporn, 2009; Whangmahaporn, 2010). There are a few cases of public policy studies that can be considered as part of political studies or political science (see Kaewmanee and Buddharaksa, 2007). This PA-​led policy studies has subsequently shaped the trajectories of the field of public policy to homogeneously emphasise technocratic and instrumental aspects of policy knowledge with its pivotal purpose to inform policy choice and solve policy problems. Unfortunately, this version of policy studies has not done enough to encourage the development of alternative and critical perspectives in policy studies (Sirosos and Ungsuchaval, 2015). Attempts to develop alternative approaches to studying public policy have gradually advanced and many were formed outside of the traditional PA perspectives. Given the division of policy studies, the two branches have developed their signature alternative approaches. For the policy process, politics and governance have increasingly become a focus of study, which signifies an attempt to transcend the naive stages model and the statist mode of the policy process. For policy analysis, interpretive or deliberative approaches have challenged traditional policy analysis which was focused on an empiricist and positivist knowledge of policy and a techno-​rational approach. As will be shown, in Thailand, policy process preceded policy analysis. Nevertheless, these developments have been influenced by the post-​empiricist/​positivist movement in the study of politics and PA, upon which policy studies were built. 287

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Post-​empiricist/​post-​positivist perspectives in the study of politics and public administration Since the 1980s, the empiricist/​positivist, ‘scientific’ approach to politics and PA, which suggests an objective, rational and systematic manner of studying politics (see Phongphaew, 1981, 1988), has increasingly been questioned by some Thai scholars. In the middle of the 1980s, Chaiwat Satha-​anand, a political philosopher at Thammasat University, examined the sociocultural and historical context that shaped what is referred to as ‘mainstream political science’ in Thailand (see Satha-​ anand, 1985). Satha-​anand discovered that the study of politics has largely been based on epistemological logical positivism, which overly emphasised organisational and human behaviours, and stressed the complexities of methodological technicism. He then called for more attention to be paid to the study of human agency (or agential dimensions of politics) as objects of political study through alternative approaches such as phenomenology and hermeneutics. Satha-​anand explicated his ideas through the analysis of what people at that time normally perceived as the ‘non-​political things’ (for example, novels, gossip, personal experience, human rights teaching, sex, and so on) to show that these were actually as political as formal politics. Arguably, Satha-​anand’s work has created a momentum of ‘upstream political science’ (the subtitle of his book in 1985): the idea denoting an academic movement that was situated and advanced in the opposite direction from that in which the mainstream scientific approaches flow. Similarly, in the late 1980s, Chairat Charoensin-​o-​larn, a political scientist at Thammasat University, expounded on the development of major theories and models used in the study of comparative PA (such as the system theory, the prismatic model and the bureaucratic model). He also discussed the epistemic limitations that these theories and models held (see Charoensin-​o-​larn, 2003). He constructively proposed new approaches to the study of comparative PA, which paid more attention to comparative public policy analysis, the politics of policy implementation, interpretive policy analysis, development administration reconsidered through political and discursive analysis, de-​bureaucratisation and critical theories. Indeed, what Charoensin-​o-​larn did is to chart the alternatives approaches to the study of PA. Charoensin-​o-​larn has continued to criticise mainstream approaches to PA and politics, and developed this critique into ‘critical political science’ (Charoensin-​ o-​larn, 2008) which is essentially aimed at questioning the status and ability of political science, PA theories and proposed critical perspectives to study ‘normalised’ issues in politics and PA, such as development, knowledge, sex, organisation, the discipline of political science and PA, to name a few. In addition, Charoensin-​o-​larn was well-​known for actively introducing the Western concepts of critical and poststructuralist perspectives in political and social science (for example, Charoensin-​o-​larn, 2002, 2013, 2015, 2017) to the Thai academic community, which was long dominated by positivism. 288

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Moreover, in 2009, the National Research Council of Thailand charged a group of political scientists and PA scholars with the task of developing a textbook that introduces theories and concepts of political science and PA in the age of globalisation. This project resulted in a novel book of political science and PA postmodern perspectives edited by Amporn Tamronglak, a PA scholar at Thammasat University (see Tamronglak, 2014). In essence, the book is a collection of writings from several scholars who were well-​known for their post-​positivist knowledge of the study of politics. Each chapter in the book aimed to introduce theories and concepts that transcended positivism, discussed ontology and epistemology underlying each theory and concept, and their potential implications in the study of politics and PA. The theories and concepts introduced are phenomenology, existentialism, the Frankfurt School of critical theory, poststructuralism, postmodernism and feminism. Indeed, the book encouraged students and scholars in the field to challenge mainstream approaches and reflexively and to think about the role of knowledge and knowledge generation in political science and PA. The aforementioned attempts to transcend empiricist/​positivist approach (and there are several more not mentioned in this chapter) have helped encourage the discussion on alternative and critical perspectives in the study of politics, PA and public policy. The attempts share one important point, that is, positivist, instrumental reasoning occupying the field should be challenged and overcome with reasoning that is more interpretive and critical. In other words, only considering technical know-​how is not sufficient; underlying, unobservable elements and normative dimensions should also be paid attention to. To study politics, PA and public policy critically is not enough to straightforwardly solve practical problems, but consideration should be given to whether or not the problems should be solved in the first place and then consider the structure, construction and interaction, to name a few, behind the attempt to solve the problems. Therefore, it can be said that the development of the post-​empiricist/​positivist perspectives in political science and PA have helped move the fields beyond positivism and stimulated engagement with a variety of alternative and critical approaches. This paved the way for scholars and practitioners to engage the study of public policy with alternative, post-​positivist policy perspectives.

The ascent of politics and governance in policy studies Academic interests in politics and governance in public policy in Thailand, in general, were initially developed by political scientists and political economists. Areas of economic policy and state–​society relations were especially considered (for example, Tanapornpun, 1989; Samudavanija, 1990; Teeratayakeenan, 1991; Laothamatas, 1992). The integration of the study of politics and governance with the field of policy studies began in the 1980s. In the late 1980s, Patcharee Siroros, a public policy scholar at Thammasat University, was one of the first academics to introduce and apply aspects of 289

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political analysis to the field of public policy. At this time, public policy was dominated by PA and techno-​rationalist approaches to policy analysis. With her background in comparative politics and political economy, Siroros approached public policy in a way that was considered new by most Thai policy scholars at that time. Siroros, acknowledged as a pioneer in the study of policy process, recognised the dynamic nature of public policy (see Siroros, 2012). Her works on politics in the policy process (Thanamai [Siroros], 1987; Siroros, 1990, 1993; Maxfield and Siroros, 1992), political regime and public policy (Siroros, 1992; Unger and Siroros, 2011), state–​society relations (Siroros and Pakapatwiwat, 1993; Siroros and Haller, 1994; Siroros, 1997; Siroros and Wannitikul, 1998) and policy networks (Siroros, 1998, 1999) were the first of their kind that called for attention to the dimensions of politics and interactions in the policy process. For Siroros, politics should not be ignored even in seemingly technical policy analysis, and there are, invariably, various actors who interact to compete and/​or negotiate with the policy process. Therefore, public policy is dynamic and not only about the state. Naively advocating for the stages model of the policy process (a model suggesting that public policy generally and sequentially starts from formulation and ends with evaluation) obscures the interaction and power relations between policy actors and institutions, which often influence the real policy outcomes. Subsequently, from the late 1990s onward, Siroros gave a special attention to the participatory dimensions of the public policy process (for example, Siroros, 2002, 2003, 2007, 2008, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c; Siroros and Kaewmoonkam, 2017). She emphasised the importance of non-​state actors, deliberative practices, participatory governance and collaborative governance as better ways for the state to solve collective action problems. This has led Siroros to incorporate her policy studies with various concepts of governance. Even in the 2000s, there were very few scholars who integrated governance concepts (such as state–​society relations, policy network and governance network, participatory and collaborative governance, and deliberative democracy) in university public policy teaching in the way that Siroros has (see Jittaruttha et al, 2008; Yavaprabhas and Whangmahaporn, 2009). Even though her public policy teaching was placed under the department of PA for the duration of her 42-​year career as a university professor, she was able, albeit not without challenges, to innovatively develop the trajectory of the public policy knowledge beyond the confinement of traditional PA. It appeared that Siroros was also a pioneer in governance studies in the field of public policy in Thailand. She opened up dialogue with other scholars, some of whom were supporters, in the field of politics and PA, and inspired them to pursue intellectual journeys in policy studies and governance (for example, Kitthananan, 2007; Tamrongrak, 2010; Luangprapat et al, 2015; Luangprapat, 2017; Rukhamate, 2017; Ungsuchaval, 2016, 2017, 2019, 2022). The interest of governance in policy studies is not similar to the interest of governance in PA. The study of governance in policy studies is not focused on how public organisations can organise themselves to deliver public services and 290

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implement policies more effectively in a web of interacting actors. It is, however, about state–​society relations, the changing role of the state and the government in the policy process, polycentric policy making, and governance networks, to name a few (see Siroros, 2014, 2015). Apart from Siroros’ oeuvre, a textbook written in 1999 by Anusorn Limmanee, a political scientist at Chulalongkorn University, should be given mention. Limmanee’s book is at the forefront of policy studies from the perspective of social power, state–​society relations and networks (Limmanee, 2015 [1999]). From a theoretical perspective, he introduced and discussed the role of the state and social forces in the policy process, including how they exhibit power and interact with each other; who dominates the process; how the state intervenes in society through public policy; and how the relationship between the state and society has changed over time, especially in the age of globalisation. With his interest in political economy, Limmanee also researched the way the Thai state has adapted to cooperate with the private sector in national economic development (Limmanee, 1996); his work reflects his academic insight into state–​society relations in state policy. Although he has not taught public policy consistently, like Siroros, his works have similarly influenced a generation of scholars studying public policy, especially from political economy perspectives (for example, Chaipinit, 2010; Wangsatjachok, 2013; Suksong, 2015). It is evident that Limmanee’s works on policy studies contributed to the intellectual development of governance in policy studies. The development of the concept of governance in policy studies has resulted in several published textbooks dedicated to non-​state approaches to public policy. For example, Inna (2005) introduced the study of public policy from the perspective of the business sector, as business organisations have increasingly gained influence in the policy process of the government. Likewise, Roengtam (2017) developed his research on citizen engagement in the policy process into a textbook which focused on the limits of the top-​down policy process of the state while advocating for people’s participation in public policy. The ascent of academic interest in politics and governance, arguably, generated a turn in policy studies in Thailand, referred to as the ‘governance turn’. This turn emphasised the meso-​level analysis that bridges the conventional analysis of the macro-​level and micro-​level, which are focused on broad issues shaping the wide context in which policy is made and managed, and also the most basic units of policy (for example, the role of individuals in the policy process, policy implementation, decision-​making and evaluation). Instead, the meso-​level analysis pays attention to how policy is generated, its inclusion on the policy agenda, and the structure of the institutional arrangements in which policy is defined, developed and implemented. In other words, to look at public policy is also to look at ‘the engine room of the policy process where ideas are tried and tested and through which political interests are filtered’ (Hudson and Lowe, 2009: 11). To sum up, the governance turn in policy studies started in the 1980s and has advocated for the study of public policy to goes beyond statist, top-​down, 291

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technocratic modes of policy making and include networks, participation and collaboration. The turn highlighted that public policy is closely related to politics and polity. The policy process is not only made of sequential stages, but it also consists of dynamic interactions between policy actors and institutions.

Engaging with critical and interpretive approaches The turn to critical and interpretive approaches in policy studies is relatively new when compared to the aforementioned governance turn. In his lecture notes on public policy in 1993, Charoensin-​o-​larn argued that studying public policy is not just learning about policy analysis, but is also about understanding ‘the analysis of policy analysis’, which would make us realise presuppositions about policy theories, models and methodologies (Charoensin-​o-​larn, 1993). Policy analysis, for him, is not value-​free. He also mentioned alternative approaches to public policy such as political economy, interpretive policy analysis and critical theory. Charoensin-​o-​larn’s notes were an exception rather than the norm. The turn to critical and interpretive approaches, however, was not clearly and widely discussed until the late 2000s. In his public policy textbook published in 2007, Ruangvit Getsuwan, a policy scholar at Ubon Ratchathani University, moderately discussed the new direction of policy studies derived from post-​positivism and critical theory. He introduced deliberative practices and critical perspectives in public policy which criticised instrumental rationality and objectivity in mainstream policy theories and, instead, advocated for communicative rationality (see Getsuwan, 2007). Getsuwan continued his theoretical interest in critical policy perspectives and then published his article, ‘The critical policy science’, in 2009. In this article, Getsuwan further discussed the problem of mainstream policy studies built upon rational models and instrumental reasoning and introduced new developments of policy studies based on critical theories (Getsuwan, 2009). He argued that this new development came from three important factors: theoretical movements revolved around Habermas’ critical theory; the epistemological post-​positivist movement; and changing policy and governance of the world into a more networked society. Importantly, Getsuwan argues that the new development of critical policy science impacted the study of public policy in Thailand in many ways, driving policy studies to increasingly consider deliberative practices, public policy at the local level, community-​based policy, resource and environmental policy, and policy networks. Critical theory was further discussed in a novel textbook written by Kitipat Nontapattamadul, a social policy scholar at Thammasat University. Nontapattamadul elaborated and expounded on a number of critical theories and epistemologies in the study of policy and planning (see Nontapattamadul, 2007, 2010). He introduced major critical theorists (for example, Jürgen Habermas, Anthony Giddens, Paulo Freire and Michel Foucault) and policy critiques (for example, radical social work, feminism and Marxism). He argued that these critical 292

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theories help bridge the gap between theory and praxis and broaden the scope of analysis by encouraging policy scholars and analysts to move beyond positivist, value-​neutral and binary thinking to include dialectical thinking and interpretation, to name a few. Specific to policy studies, Nontapattamadul asserted that, with critical theory, the study of policy and planning will focus more on uncovering the domination of the state and the capitalist system, the crisis of welfare, and the asymmetrical social structure underlying policy as well as reconstructing the meaning of policy issues such as human rights, welfare, community, sex, culture and environmental resources. For Nontapattamadul, policy studies must not simply be scientific and economic. Policy knowledge should be for policy making that encourages social transformations and emancipation, empowers citizen politics and advocates for justice and diversity. He concluded that critical policy perspectives were, therefore, necessary for policy research especially focused on policy problems, the policy process and policy consequences. Nontapattamadul’s body of work can be considered as one of the first policy writings which explicitly addressed critical theories and epistemologies in policy studies. From the 2010s onwards, policy research, textbooks and articles discussing and applying discursive and interpretive policy analysis started to appear. In 2013, Prayote Songklin, a scholar at the College of Politics and Governance, Mahasarakham University, reviewed Western concepts of interpretive theories and their implications to the study of public policy (Songklin, 2018). He unorthodoxly invented the term ‘interpretive public policy’ to refer to a variety of interpretive approaches used in the study of public policy. For him, interpretive public policy was classified into four types: (1) interpretive public policy2 focusing on analysing texts; (2) discursive public policy highlighting policy-​as-​discourse; (3) narrative public policy emphasising narratives and people; and (4) deliberative public policy stressing deliberation and communication in public policy. His book was considered a fair endeavour to understanding interpretive approaches to studying public policy. For applied research, Wisankanchana (2012), for instance, investigated the discursive construction of water rights policies in Thailand by looking at the discourse of production, reproduction and transformation of water rights policies within political, economic and social contexts. This research also looked at the politics of meaning involved with various policy actors in the development of the water resources in the policy-​making process. To achieve this, he analysed the language in bill drafts, policy proposals, government reports and discussions among relevant stakeholders during the water bill drafting process between 1992 and 2007. Similarly, Aunphattanasilp (2019) examined language used in the Thai energy policy, which reflect social and political ideas in the deconstruction of power relations between hegemonic and alternative ideas. Using the framework of critical discourse analysis, he analysed at a digital archive of 29 newspapers dated between 1987 and 2017. Wisankanchana’s and Aunphattanasilp’s works, without doubt, are good examples of research applying interpretive approaches to study the policy-​making process. 293

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Even so, one of the main reasons that interpretive policy analysis became more prominent in Thailand since the 2010s, is due to research conducted by Piyapong Boossabong, a policy scholar at the School of Public Policy, Chiang Mai University. Boossabong, in his textbook on public policy making (Boossabong, 2009), explicated the ontological, epistemological and methodological foundations of major contemporary policy paradigms: positivist, post-​positivist, critical theory, constructivist/​hermeneutics, and postmodernist. He also discussed both positivist and non-​positivist models of policy making. Boossabong has advanced his critical perspectives, in both theoretical and practical dimensions, in interpretive and deliberative policy analysis (Boossabong, 2017a; Fischer and Boossabong, 2018; Ariyachaipradit et al, 2018; Boossabong and Chamchong, 2019, 2021a, 2021b), local knowledge in policy analysis (Boossabong, 2017c), inclusive policy design (Boossabong, 2018a; Boossabong and Chamchong, 2020), and policy network and governance (Boossabong, 2011, 2014, 2016, 2017b, 2018b, 2019; Boossabong and Chamchong, 2018). For Boossabong, public policy should not be studied through only positivist approaches and be exclusive to experts and elites. Instead, public policy should be inclusive, participatory, deliberative and meaningful and involve diverse actors, processes and forms of knowledge. Boossabong has not approached critical policy approaches radically. Many of his works implied that critical and interpretive theories should be as practical as they are theoretical. Boossabong also reminded us that to constructively comprehend the alternative, non-​positivist approaches to public policy, sufficient understanding of the mainstream approaches, such as various tools of technocratic policy analysis and planning (for example, cost-​benefit analysis, game theory and the Delphi method for scenario building), is a prerequisite (Boossabong, 2018c). With knowledge of the mainstream approaches, alternative policy scholars can better criticise technocratic approaches of policy making. Through his service on the editorial board and the review editor for the Journal of Critical Policy Studies, the leading global journal dedicated to non-​ positivist policy perspectives, Boossabong helped connect the global community of interpretive policy analysis and the Thai policy community. He has a good working relationship with prominent scholars of interpretive and deliberative policy analysis, such as Frank Fischer and Hendrik Wagenaar, whom he has invited to run workshops and seminars on interpretive and deliberative policy analysis in Thailand. Boossabong has, therefore, embedded his critical approaches in the study of local public policy and communicated his results to the international community. He has, to some extent, showed that the contextualisation of Western theories of public policy in the Thai context is necessary. To sum up, the interpretive and critical turn in policy studies started to appear in the late 2000s onwards and has advocated for the study of public policy to be sensitive to various forms of policy knowledge and has highlighted a number of epistemological post-​positivism perspectives which help broaden the scope and 294

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scale of policy studies. Public policy should be inclusive; it should not only be accompanied and determined by scientific techno-​rational expertise.

Conclusion In the present day, books and articles in policy studies by Thai scholars that recognise the existence of various alternative approaches are emerging in the epistemic policy community (for example, Chariamphan, 2016; Boossabong, 2017a; Photikanit, 2020; Boossabong and Ungsuchaval, 2021; Ungsuchaval et al, 2023). However, they are still relatively uncommon within policy literature as a whole. And, of those that exist, many are too focused on introducing theories or transferring Western models without contextualising and applying the theories or models to social phenomena in Thailand. Nevertheless, the emerging trends of alternative approaches to policy studies require us to reflexively think about the underlying assumptions of policy theories and perspectives we have held onto, regardless of those theories and perspectives being positivist or post-​positivist, what makes them a theory, how they work as a theory, what are their limitations, and how they can be improved, utilised and adapted. It can be said that the ability to question our own ideas, to be sensitive to the limitations of our conceptualisations, is considered to be the foundation of any critical perspective. Specifically, to critically connect policy studies with interpretive and critical theories is not orthodox and is sometimes seen as a burden among Thai policy scholars. Few funding institutions have supported critical policy research. Further, the overall atmosphere of Thai society has also been dominated by authoritarianism, which, of course, suppresses questioning and criticism. Yet, recently, a group of scholars interested in post-​positivist policy perspectives gathered to discuss the capability and applicability of a number of interpretive and critical theories to study public policy and governance in order to provide alternative explanations and potential policy solutions to policy problems in the age of instability and complexity (see Ungsuchaval, 2020a, 2020b). They formed the ‘Thai Critical Policy Studies Network’. The network was influenced by the global movement of critical policy studies, the academic movement of scholars interested in post-​positivist, post-​empiricist and non-​techno-​rationalistic approaches to public policy that has widely been recognised since the late 1980s (see Fischer et al, 2015). This chapter ends with prospective alternative approaches to policy studies in Thailand, that is, a move towards critical policy studies. Critical policy studies should encourage the study of public policy in three important ways: • To go beyond positivist, empiricist descriptions and methodologies. Critical policy studies should encourage policy scholars and analysts to engage with a wide range of post-​positivist epistemologies, such as interpretive, critical and poststructuralist, to produce an alternative kind of knowledge that is not 295

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merely techno-​rationalist but is empirically grounded, normatively sensitive and theoretically driven. In other words, empirical dimensions of public policy should be considered alongside normative and theoretical dimensions. • To understand and explain the underlying domain of policy actions, decisions or implementation. Critical policy studies should encourage policy scholars and analysts to look at the mostly unobservable realm of public policy, such as the social and political construction of policy problems and solutions, discursive elements governing policy framing and actions, generative and interactive mechanisms of governance, and power structure of policy decisions and institutional arrangement. This also comes with the task of criticising bureaucratic and technocratic culture in policy making and policy analysis. As a critical approach, to criticise hegemonic positions of bureaucracy, monopolised power and expertise, and technocracy in policy making is necessary. Critical policy studies must help to discover the invisible and make it visible. • To bridge theory and praxis. Critical policy studies needs to be constructive as well as disruptive. Theory-​driven practice is important in policy studies as the policy knowledge should be, to a certain degree, used for the purpose of social transformation and change. Apart from providing understanding and description, critical policy studies, thus, should provide sound policy implications or solutions that are inclined towards inclusive, humanist and interactionist modes of solving problems. In this regard, critical policy studies should try to bridge the gap between the two policy studies, policy process and policy analysis. In other words, it is considered a task of critical policy perspectives to provide both an in-​depth explanation of the policy and less technical, more inclusive policy solutions for the policy. Notes 1

2

The author would like to express his special thanks to Associate Professor Dr Patcharee Siroros and Assistant Professor Dr Piyapong Boossabong who have regularly exchanged critical ideas on non-​traditional, alternative approaches to policy studies with the author. Although they are of different generations, epistemological backgrounds and research interests, both of them are great scholars of non-​traditional, alternative approaches to policy studies in Thailand who share a consistent investment in new developments and research in public policy, both nationally and internationally. In his book, Songklin (2018) ambiguously used the term ‘interpretive public policy’ to mean both the umbrella term for interpretive approaches to the study of public policy and a specific type of those approaches.

References Anumanrajadhon, M. (2004) Public Policy: Concept, Process, and Analysis, Chiang Mai: Kanungnit Printing. [in Thai]

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Ariyachaipradit, A., Nimnoo, N. and Boossabong, P. (2018) ‘Empirical and normative considerations of the role of local government in the protection of elderly legal rights: Lessons learned from Thailand’, The Social Sciences, 13(1): 223–​234. Aunphattanasilp, C. (2019) ‘Civil society coalitions, power relations, and socio-​ political ideas: Discourse creation and redesigning energy policies and actor networks in Thailand’, Energy Research & Social Science, 58, 101271. Boossabong, P. (2009) Public Policy Making: Approaches, Styles, Models, Frames, and Techniques, Bangkok: Semathamma. [in Thai] Boossabong, P. (2011) ‘Policy networks: Reconsidering policy actors’, Journal of Politics and Governance, 2(1): 99–​118. [in Thai] Boossabong, P. (2014) Governing the Policy Network on Urban Agriculture in Bangkok: The Role of Social Capital in Handling Cooperation and Conflicts, PhD Thesis, University College London, UK. Boossabong, P. (2016) ‘The governance of Bangkok’s city food system’, in M. Deakin, N. Borrelli and D. Diamantini (eds) The Governance of City Food Systems: Case Studies from Around the World, Milan: Fondazione Giangiacomo Feltrinelli, pp 99–​112. Boossabong, P. (2017a) Deliberative Policy Analysis and Planning, Bangkok: Commonbooks. [in Thai] Boossabong, P. (2017b) ‘Floods and food in the city: Lessons from collaborative governance within the policy network on urban agriculture in Bangkok, Thailand’, in A. Allen, L. Griffin and C. Johnson (eds), Environmental Justice and Urban Resilience in the Global South, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 215–​230. Boossabong, P. (2017c) ‘Policy analysis in Thailand: Comparing the roles of expert and local knowledge’, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 19(2): 173–​183. Boossabong, P. (2018a) ‘Articulating public agencies, experts, corporations, civil society and the informal sector in planning food systems in Bangkok’, in Y. Cabannes and C. Marocchino (eds) Integrating Food into Urban Planning, London: UCL Press, pp 60–​79. Boossabong, P. (2018b) ‘Collaborative urban far ming networks in Bangkok: Promoting collective gardens and alternative markets as theatres of social action’, in Y. Cabannes, M. Douglass and R. Padawangi (eds) Cities in Asia by and for the People, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp 99–​126. Boossabong, P. (2018c) Decoding Public Policy and Planning: Analytical Tools for the 21st Century (2nd edn), Maha Sarakham: College of Politics and Governance, Mahasarakham University. [in Thai] Boossabong, P. (2019) ‘Governing Bangkok’s city food system: Engaging multi-​ stakeholders for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth’, City, Culture and Society, 16: 52–​59.

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Boossabong, P. and Chamchong, P. (2018) ‘The importance of network in public policy and governance: Critical perspectives and an analytical framework for going beyond an empty signifier’, Journal of Social Sciences, Naresuan University, 14(2): 113–​136. [in Thai] Boossabong, P. and Chamchong, P. (2019) ‘The practice of deliberative policy analysis in the context of political and cultural challenges: Lessons from Thailand’, Policy Studies, 40(5): 476–​491. Boossabong, P. and Chamchong, P. (2020) Inclusive Policy Design, Bangkok: Ruenkaew Printing. [in Thai] Boossabong, P. and Chamchong, P. (2021a) ‘Public policy in the face of post-​ truth politics and the role of deliberation’, Critical Policy Studies, 15(1): 107–​124. Boossabong, P. and Chamchong, P. (2021b) ‘Contesting forms of knowledge in policy deliberation: Lessons from disaster coping policies in Thailand’, Journal of Deliberative Democracy, 17(1): 28–​37. Boossabong, P. and Ungsuchaval, T. (eds) (2021) Policy Studies from Different Perspectives, Chiang Mai: Chiang Mai University School of Public Policy. [in Thai] Chaipinit, C. (2010) The Political Economy of the Intellectual Property Rights Policy: A Case Study of Compulsory Licensing in Thailand, PhD Thesis, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand. [in Thai] Chariamphan, P. (2016) ‘Critical realism’s epistemology and explanation in policy network theory’, Songklanakarin: Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, 22(2): 3–​30. [in Thai] Charoensin-​o-​larn, C. (1993) Lecture Note on PO.361 Introduction to Public Policy, Bangkok: Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University. [in Thai] Charoensin-​o-​larn, C. (2002) Semiology, Structuralism, Post-​structuralism and the Study of Political Science, Bangkok: Vipasa. [in Thai] Charoensin-​o-​larn, C. (2003) Comparative Public Administration: Governance in the Post-​Cold War World (3rd and updated edn), Bangkok: Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University. [in Thai] Charoensin-​o-​larn, C. (2008) Critical Political Science (3rd and updated edn), Bangkok: Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University. [in Thai] Charoensin-​o-​larn, C. (2013) Language and Politics/​the Political (2nd edn), Bangkok: Vipasa. Charoensin-​ o -​ l arn, C. (2015) Aesthetics and People’s Politics (2nd edn), Bangkok: Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University. [in Thai] Charoensin-​o-​larn, C. (2017) Development Discourse: Power, Knowledge, Truth, Identity, and Otherness (6th edn), Bangkok: Vipasa. [in Thai] Fischer, F. and Boossabong, P. (2018) ‘Deliberative policy analysis’ in A. Bächtiger, J.S. Dryzek, J. Mansbridge and M. Warren (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Deliberative Democracy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 584–​594. Fischer, F., Torgerson, D., Durnová, A. and Orsini, M. (eds) (2015) Handbook of Critical Policy Studies, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Getsuwan, R. (2007) Public Policy, Bangkok: Bophit Printing. [in Thai] 298

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Getsuwan, R. (2009) ‘The critical policy science’. NIDA Development Journal, 49(1): 41–​66. [in Thai] Hill, M. (1997) The Policy Process in the Modern State (3rd edn), Hertfordshire: Prentice Hall/​Harvester Wheatsheaf. Hogwood, B. and Gunn, L. (1984) Policy Analysis for the Real World, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hudson, J. and Lowe, S. (2009) Understanding the Policy Process: Analyzing Welfare Policy and Practice (2nd edn), Bristol: Policy Press. Inna, N. (2005) Business and Public Policy in the New Century, Bangkok: Jamjuree Product. [in Thai] Jittaruttha, C., Siriprakob, P., Whangmahaporn, P., Chuayprakong, P. and Krueathep, W. (2008) A Review of Public Administration Teaching, Bangkok: Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University. [in Thai] Kaewmanee, D. and Buddharaksa, W. (2007) The Status and Progress of the Study of Government and Politics in Thailand between 1990–​2005, Bangkok: National Research Council. [in Thai] Kitthananan, A. (2007) Governance and Policy-​making in Thailand: A Study of Poverty Alleviation Policy Since 1997, PhD Thesis, University of Bristol, UK. Laothamatas, A. (1992) Business Associations and the New Political Economy of Thailand: From Bureaucratic Polity to Liberal Corporatism, Boulder: Westview Press. Limmanee, A. (1996) The Structural Origin of the State-​Private Cooperation Policy: A Political Economy Analysis on the Changing Thai State, Bangkok: Research and Development Center, Krirk University. [in Thai] Limmanee, A. (2015 [1999]) The State, Society, and Change: A Consideration on Power, Policy, and Relationship Network (2nd edn), Bangkok: Siam Paritat. [in Thai] Luangprapat, W. (2017) ‘Public policy and governance in the global context’, Public Policy in the Global Context, Nonthaburi: Sukhothai Thammathirat Open University, pp 5–​1–​5–​42. [in Thai] Luangprapat, W., Ungsuchaval, T. and Tantrajin, P. (eds) (2015) Unpacking Public Policy: Contemporary Perspectives in the Study of Public Policy, Bangkok: Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University. [in Thai] Maxfield, S. and Siroros, P. (1992) ‘The politics of central banking in Thailand’, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, Washington, DC, 2–​5 April. Nontapattamadul, K. (2007) Critical Theory in Social Policy and Planning, Bangkok: Thammasat University Press. [in Thai] Nontapattamadul, K. (2010) ‘Epistemology for policy studies: Positivism, postpositivism, and critical theory’, Journal of Social Work, 18(2): 171–​198. [in Thai] Phongphaew, P. (1981) Political Science: Developments and Approaches (2nd edn), Bangkok: Sri Anand Printing. [in Thai] Phongphaew, P. (1988) Empiricist Political Science, Bangkok: Faculty of Political Science, Chulalongkorn University. [in Thai]

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Photikanit, K. (2020) Social Policy Theories and Critical Policy, Phitsanulok: Naresuan University Publishing House. [in Thai] Roengtam, S. (2017) People Public Policy, Khon Kaen: Khon Kaen University Press. [in Thai] Rukhamate, P. (2017) Development of the Evaluative Model on an Effectiveness of Pra-​Cha Rat Policy: The Grassroots Economic Development of General Prayuth Chan-​ocha’s Government, Bangkok: Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University. [in Thai] Samudavanija, C. (1990) State and Society: Three-​dimensional State in Siam’s Plural Society, Bangkok: Institute of Public Policy Studies. [in Thai] Satha-​anand, C. (1985) Human Politics: Upstream Political Science, Bangkok: Dokya. [in Thai] Sirisamphan, T. (1996) An Introduction to Public Policy, Bangkok: Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University. [in Thai] Siroros, P. (1990) ‘Politics of the policy process’, in S. Sukatipanta (ed) Leadership Problem and the National Policy Making Process, Bangkok: Thammasat University Press, pp 58–​74. [in Thai] Siroros, P. (1992) ‘Political regimes, Japanese investment and policy choices: A study of the Thai auto industry’, US-​Japan Relations Program Occasional Paper 92–​13, Harvard University. Siroros, P. (1993) ‘The politics of Japanese investment and policy making: An analysis of the automobile industry in Thailand’, Thammasat Economic Journal, 11(4): 57–​83. [in Thai] Siroros, P. (1997) The Thai State and the Automobile Industry, Bangkok: Thammasat University Press. [in Thai] Siroros, P. (1998) Networking and Processes for Road Accident Policy, Health Systems Research Institute, Ministry of Public Health. [in Thai] Siroros, P. (1999) ‘Networks as an approach for Thai policy process study’, Rattasart Sarn [Journal of Political Science], 21(1): 253–​271. [in Thai] Siroros, P. (2002) Public Hearing and Public Listening: From the U.S. to Thailand, Bangkok: Kobfai. [in Thai] Siroros, P. (ed) (2003) Handbook of Public Participation, Bangkok: Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University. [in Thai] Siroros, P. (2007) ‘The state and the people in co-​formulating the draft of the Water Resource Act, B.E. …’, Rattasart Sarn [Journal of Political Science], 28(1): 157–​190. [in Thai] Siroros, P. (2008) The Strategy and Process to Develop Deliberative Practice in Participatory Governance of the 1997 Constitution, Bangkok: Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University. [in Thai] Siroros, P. (2009a) ‘Deliberative democracy: Belief, myth and reality in Thai society’, The Journal of Management Sciences, 26(1): 75–​90. [in Thai] Siroros, P. (2009b) ‘Collaborating in participatory governance’, in 60th Years of Thammasat Political Sciences/​30th of Political Sciences Journal (Volume 3), Pathum Thani: Thammasat University Press, pp 300–​339. [in Thai] 300

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Siroros, P. (2009c) ‘Participatory governance’, in K. Phusavat, N. Methairat, P. Decharin and V. Ongsakul (eds) Towards Good Governance in Public Sector: A Thai Chronicle, Bangkok: Office of the Public Sector Development Commission, pp 125–​144. Siroros, P. (2012) Public Policy Dynamic: The State, the Private, and the Citizenship, Bangkok: Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University. [in Thai] Siroros, P. (2014) ‘Governance and public policy’, Journal of Politics and Governance, 4(2): 1–​12. [in Thai] Siroros, P. (2015) ‘The study of governance in policy studies: Understanding governance, governance network, and metagovernance’, in W. Luangprapat, T. Ungsuchaval and P. Tantrajin (eds), Unpacking Public Policy: Contemporary Perspectives in the Study of Public Policy, Bangkok: Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, pp 82–​121. Siroros, P. and Pakapatwiwat, S. (1993) Thai Politics and the Bank of Thailand, Bangkok: Foundation for Democracy and Development Education. [in Thai] Siroros, P. and Haller, K. (1994) ‘“Thai-​style” contractual relationships: Two case studies’, Contemporary Southeast Asia, 16(3): 317–​341. Siroros, P. and Kaewmoonkham, P. (2017) ‘Participatory governance: Model and case studies for success’, Journal of Public and Private Management, 24(2): 139–​160. [in Thai] Siroros, P. and Ungsuchaval, T. (2015) ‘Unpacking policy studies: Understanding past, present, and future of the study of public policy’, in W. Luangprapat, T. Ungsuchaval and P. Tantrajin (eds) Unpacking Public Policy: Contemporary Perspectives in the Study of Public Policy, Bangkok: Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, pp 26–​79. [in Thai] Siroros, P. and Wannitikul, W. (1998) ‘International competitiveness of indigenous Thai firms: Case studies of the gems and jewelry industry and the Siam Cement Group’, IDRI Occasional Paper No.8, International Development Research Institute, Foundation for Advanced Studies on International Development, Tokyo, Japan. Songklin, P. (2018) Interpretive Public Policy (2nd edn), Maha Sarakham: Apichart Printing. [in Thai] Suksong, K. (2015) Rice Price Policy: A Study in Politics of Policy Process and Network, PhD Thesis, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand. [in Thai Tamrongrak, A. (eds) (2010) Public Governance: Public Administration in the 21st Century, Bangkok: Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University. [in Thai] Tamronglak, A. (ed) (2014) Political Science and Public Administration from the Postmodern Perspectives, Bangkok: Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University. [in Thai] Tanapornpun, R. (1989) Economic Policy-​making Process in Thailand: A Historical Political Economy Analysis from 1932–​1987, Bangkok: The Social Science Association of Thailand. [in Thai] Teeratayakeenan, K. (1991) ‘Public policymaking and new political economy’, Thammasat Economic Journal, 9(2): 69–​100. [in Thai] 301

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Thamrongthanyawong, S. (1997) Public Policy: Concept, Analysis, and Process, Bangkok: National Institute of Development Administration. [in Thai] Thanamai [Siroros], P. (1987) ‘The politics of Thai economic policymaking: A case study of the Investment Promotion Act of 1954, 1960, 1962’, in S. Chanthornvong and C. Sathaanand (eds) Living in Thailand, Bangkok: Thammasat University Press, pp 249–​308. [in Thai] Unger, D. and Siroros, P. (2011) ‘Trying to make decisions stick: Natural resource policy making in Thailand’, Journal of Contemporary Asia, 41(2): 206–​228. Ungsuchaval, T. (2016) ‘Transcending the institutionalist-​interpretivist binary: Realizing critical realist theory of governance as metagovernance’, Journal of Government and Politics, 7(4): 662–​696. Ungsuchaval, T. (2017) ‘Mainstreaming moments in governance theories: Some observations’, Journal of Asian Review of Public Affairs and Policy, 2(3): 23–​54. Ungsuchaval, T. (2019) Metagovernance and NGOization in Thailand: An Exploratory Study of the Thai Health Promotion Foundation (THPF) and Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs), PhD Thesis, University of Kent, Canterbury, UK. Ungsuchaval, T. (2020a) ‘Critical policy studies (1): Public policy and turbulent health crisis’, The 101.World, 8 June, available from https://w ​ ww.the1​ 01.world/​ criti​cal-​pol​icy-​stud​ies-​1/​. [in Thai] Ungsuchaval, T. (2020b) ‘Critical policy studies (2): “Missing pieces” in the government response of the health crisis in Thailand’, The 101.World, 9 June, available from https://​www.the​101.world/​criti​cal-​pol​icy-​stud​ies-​2/​[in Thai] Ungsuchaval, T. (2022) Governance 101: Meanings and Modes, Bangkok: Sanya Dharmasakti Institute for Democracy, Thammasat University. [in Thai] Ungsuchaval, T., Boossabong, P. and Hartley, K. (2023) ‘Public policy education in Thailand: From caged pedagogy to disciplinary independence?’, Journal of Asian Public Policy, 16(1): 75–95. Wangsatjachok, W. (2013) Institutional Arrangement of Rice Pledging Policy, PhD Thesis, Chulalongkorn University, Bangkok, Thailand. [in Thai] Whangmahaporn, P. (2010) The Development, the Status of Learning and Teaching and the Research of Thai Public Policy, Bangkok: Sripatum University. [in Thai] Wisankanchana, K. (2012) The Politics of Policymaking Process on Water Rights in Thailand: A Discourse Approach, MA Thesis, Thammasat University, Thailand. [in Thai] Yavaprabhas, S. and Whangmahaporn, P. (2009) Thai Public Policy: Origin, Progress, and the State of the Field, Bangkok: Goldenpoints. [in Thai]

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Policy research in academic institutions Chumphol Aunphattanasilp

Introduction The synthesis of public policy knowledge in the Thai research community has been produced using three main approaches: (1) analysing university curricula; (2) studying the core content of public policy textbooks; and (3) investigating graduate students’ theses or dissertations (Jarusombat, 2007; Yavaprabhas and Whangmahaporn, 2009; Siriwan, 2013). The first approach reflects the direction of public policy courses at various academic institutions. The second approach illustrates lecturers’ notions and intentions in disseminating public policy knowledge. The final approach presents the classification and categorisation of policy research by employing the policy process, research theme and methodology as the criteria. In other words, the three approaches aim to answer the questions of what kinds of policy knowledge do academic institutions intend to produce; who are the key knowledge providers and what kinds of content do they provide; and what types of policy research do the graduate students produce? However, the previous syntheses of policy knowledge cannot respond to questions such as what kinds of analytical perspectives or paradigms do the policy research community rely on and how do those perspectives or paradigms produce and develop policy knowledge? This chapter, therefore, focuses on the analytical perspectives and paradigms as a lens that scholars, researchers and the general public employ in analysing, understanding and evaluating public policy, as well as in creating policy content. Addressing the previously mentioned questions, this chapter seeks to investigate public policy research conducted by academic institutions in order to identify the key analytical perspectives or paradigms that influence Thailand’s policy research community. The digital archive from the Digital Research Information Center, National Research Council of Thailand, serves as the main data source.1 The centre began digitising policy research in 1985, which is why the selected timeframe for this chapter is from 1985 to 2019. To begin, searching ‘public policy research’ in the database resulted in 883 research pieces. The analysis focuses on the papers’ abstracts, which summarise the key content and findings of the research. If the abstract did not provide a clear summary of the content, more detail was sought in the complete research. This chapter is composed of four sections. The first section explains the concepts used to analyse policy research paradigms. The second section details 303

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the types of policy research, popular research themes, locations of case studies and favoured policy research paradigms in Thailand (1985–​2019). The third section illustrates the key policy research paradigms that the Thai research community has relied on. The final section summarises the findings and their implications for policy research and design.

Analytical concepts: a policy research paradigm The purpose of policy research is typically to seek a better systematic understanding of policy phenomena, policy content, policy processes and interactions between policy actors. To conduct policy research, five main research paradigms are utilised, each of which has different concepts, research questions, basic assumptions, methods and types of policy knowledge. Empirical policy research The empirical paradigm is based on the need to identify and assess the causes that influence outcomes. This paradigm also aims to test the relationship between factors or variables in an effort to identify which factors or variables have a high impact on policy phenomena. The empirical paradigm is normally employed to examine, or forecast, the effect of a given policy intervention (Creswell and Creswell, 2018). The key question of empirical policy research typically based on what is missing in empirical data that can help decision makers to formulate more comprehensive policy. Basic assumptions about policy phenomena are based on objective facts, rational calculations, measurable attitudes, opinions and behaviours. Statistical and econometric techniques are the most popular methods used to collect and analyse data, opinions, behavioural patterns and policy outcomes (Blume et al, 2014). The findings from empirical policy research contribute to empirical knowledge, which exhibits empirical evidence and information from observation, experimentation or survey. Normative policy research The normative paradigm seeks to understand crucial stories, contexts or powerful conditions that can shape and change policies. To understand contexts and conditions, normative policy research looks for the sets of meaning, value and logic that are directed towards a specific policy. The goal of normative research relies as much as possible on the participants’ views of the policy phenomena. The research is guided by the following questions: What is an effective policy for all? Does this policy really work? Why? Therefore, normative policy research relies on the assumption that policy is based on political, social and instrumental construction within a specific context. To further understand the sociopolitical construction that shapes a particular policy, the interpretive method is employed to uncover meaning-​making practices and interactions 304

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between participants. The findings from normative policy research contribute to normative knowledge, which reveals the researchers’ subjective values and rationality towards the policy (Robert and Zeckhauser, 2011; Creswell and Creswell, 2018; Dunn, 2018). Transformative policy research The transformative paradigm has a clear intention to change the existing policy agenda or to redesign an existing policy. Changes to the policy agenda may lead to reconsideration of the problem identification and, further, to redesigning the policy altogether. Moreover, transformative policy research tries to understand the contexts in which agenda change occurs, particularly changes that facilitate the emergence of new policies. Policy research that utilises the transformative paradigm frequently asks the questions: Who gets what, when and how? How to solve, or change, structures and systems? What should those structures and systems look like? While many methods are used to conduct transformative policy research, the fundamental methods include action research (using practical results to address real problems) and critical participatory orientation (criticising the existing policy agenda and engaging stakeholders in the inquiry process) (Sadovnik, 2007). Transformative policy research generates interdisciplinary knowledge, which integrates the cognitive perception of stakeholders in its policy design (Creswell and Creswell, 2018; Chaves-​Avila and Gallego-​ Bono, 2020). Pragmatic policy research The pragmatic paradigm aims to produce solution-​based policy research. Investigators who rely on the pragmatic paradigm normally base their research question on a particular problem that people are facing. Instead of focusing on empirical evidence, subjective values or rationality, the pragmatic paradigm emphasises solution-​oriented research to address current problems. The key theme of pragmatic research questions is to discover possible solutions for current problems, and the basic assumption is that policy design is based on the situation at hand. There is no primary methodology for the pragmatic paradigm, as researchers utilise several methods to produce coping strategies. Research in this paradigm frequently results in usable knowledge or solution-​oriented results (Clemons and McBeth, 2017; Creswell and Creswell, 2018). Advocacy policy research The advocacy paradigm shares some fundamental ideas with the transformative paradigm, as both paradigms aim to influence policy change. However, the advocacy paradigm does not focus on the policy agenda. Instead, it seeks to analyse the causes of a problem and develop policy-​based solutions to effect policy 305

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change. Researchers in the field of policy advocacy need to know not only how to identify problems, but also how to isolate causes, analyse evidence, work with data, develop sound policy options and understand how to fund policy solutions. Policy advocacy efforts typically try to establish new policies, improve existing policies and challenge the development of policies that may create difficulty or injustice for specific groups in society, particularly the more vulnerable or disadvantaged groups. The advocacy paradigm focuses specifically on everyday social oppressions, such as disempowerment, inequality, domination, suppression and alienation. The advocacy paradigm tends to believe that policy is the result of structural constraints, including power, class, exclusion, justice, systems and interactions. The key methodology of the advocacy paradigm is participation-​ oriented. It encourages citizens, civil society groups and local communities to participate in the policy research actively. Generally, advocacy policy research produces knowledge that may influence policy change or lead to the development of new policy (Almog-​Bar and Schmid, 2014). The selection of a policy research paradigm depends on the questions that the researcher wants to investigate. If researchers would like to understand key contexts or the sociopolitical conditions surrounding a policy, the normative paradigm would be a perfect choice. However, if the investigator aims to change an existing policy, the transformative or advocacy paradigm would be the more appropriate model. These five analytical categories are the key criteria used to classify policy research in Thailand.

What did we do for 34 years of policy research? An overview of policy research in Thai academic institutions This section touches upon the historical development of policy research between 1985 and 2019. The core analysis focuses on the number of policy research pieces, the types of policy research, the scope of the issues studies, the location of the case studies and the selected policy research paradigms. This indicates the academic trends, scholars’ concentration, popular areas of policy inquiry and vital frameworks for producing policy explanations and notions. In the first decade (1985–​1994), the number of policy research papers is relatively low (see Figure 17.1). Researchers produced approximately five pieces of policy research per year (see Table 17A.1). There is a dramatic increase in policy research from 2002 to 2007, followed by a silent decline from 2008 to 2010, when approximately 59 pieces of research were produced per year. From 2010 to 2019, the number of policy research papers fluctuates and drops when compared to the previous decade. Why were so many policy research pieces produced between 2002 and 2010? A tentative answer relates to the political context. At that time, the Thaksin government was in power and tried to formulate unique policy packages, the so-​called dual track economic policy, that differed from previous governments (Phongpaichit, 2004). These different policy packages may have drawn the attention of policy researchers. 306

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Figure 17.1: The number of policy research pieces, 1985–​2019 10.0

Per cent

8.0

6.0

4.0

2.0

1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

.0

Year Note: No data available for 1995 Source: Summarised by the author from the digital archive of the National Research Council of Thailand

According to Figure 17.2, the majority of policy research comes from graduate students’ theses or dissertations. From 1985 to 2019, graduate students produced 722 pieces of policy research, whereas university professors and researchers from academic institutions produced only 162 pieces (see Table 17A.2). Based on these statistics, it can be said that graduate students are the key factor driving Thailand’s policy research industry. For 32 years, economics remained the most popular theme within the policy research community (see Figure 17.3). There were 282 pieces (see Table 17A.3) of policy research that concentrated on economic policies and their impacts on economic activities, as well as on patterns of collective human behaviour. The topic of social issues, such as crime, drugs, traffic congestion and road accidents, was also quite common. Researchers also focused on the issues of politics, education and health. However, issues including agriculture, tourism, energy, environment and natural resources were just minor themes within the policy research community. For studies that aim to examine policy implementation and evalution, the researcher generally selects a specific case or area to conduct their inquiry. The central region of Thailand, including Bangkok and its vicinity, is the most common area in which researchers select their case studies (see Figure 17.4). The second most common region from which case studies and locations were selected is the northen region (see Table 17A.4). However, as the majority of researchers focus their investigation on the policy formulation process and the identifation of causal factors that shape policy outcomes, they do not need to collect data 307

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Figure 17.2: The categorisation of policy research 100.0

Per cent

80.0 60.0 40.0 20.0 0.0

Research

Type

Thesis

Source: Summarised by the author from the digital archive of the National Research Council of Thailand

from a case study because their key data comes from governmental agencies at the national level. That is why the number of unidentified locations is relatively high. Both the empirical and normative paradigms are popular frameworks for researchers to employ when conducting their research. In the first period (1985–​1998), the normative paradigm was the most popular (see Figure 17.5) but was surpassed by the empirical paradigm in the subsequent period (1999–​ 2013). Researchers have only just started paying attention to and employing the transformative, pragmatic and advocacy paradigms since the 2010s.

Synthesis of Thailand’s policy research: the hegemony of empirical and normative paradigms This section explains how the Thai research community applies the five policy research paradigms to their inquiries. The findings point to the empirical and normative paradigms as the most common selections, thereby determining the direction of policy research in Thailand. The transformative, pragmatic and advocacy paradigms are selected much less. It should be noted that researchers do not integrate more than one paradigm in order to ensure a better understanding of the complex policy problems and multiple layers of policy outcomes. Empirical paradigm for policy research Empirical policy research can be divided into two subgroups: (1) economic empirical policy research; and (2) non-​economic empirical policy research. Even though the two groups of policy research both employ the empirical

308

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Figure 17.3: The scope of policy research topics 40.0

Per cent

30.0

20.0

10.0

Mixed

Science & Technology

Topic

Tourism

Health

Education

Energy

Politics

Society

Economy

Agriculture

Natural resources

Environment

0.0

Source: Summarised by the author from the digital archive of National Research Council of Thailand

Figure 17.4: The location of case studies 50.0

Per cent

40.0

30.0

20.0

10.0

0.0 North

Center Northeast

West South Location

Unclear

East Cross-region

Source: Summarised by the author from the digital archive of National Research Council of Thailand

309

newgenrtpdf

Research paradigm 60 Empirical Normative

50

Transformative

Count

40

30

20

10

1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019

0 Year Note: No data available for 1995 Source: Summarised by the author from the digital archive of National Research Council of Thailand

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310

Figure 17.5: Popular policy research paradigm

Policy research in academic institutions

paradigm in their investigation, the research scope, questions, topics and policy knowledge differ. Economic-​based policy research The research questions in this field seek to determine causal relations between economic factors and patterns of human behaviour in economic activities. This includes forecasting and monitoring human behaviour after the implementation of economic policies; investigating policy impacts on production, consumption and export; and predicting economic trends from the observed behaviour patterns. Another group of research aims to examine the cost and value of economic policies, for example, how an economic policy can change the price of goods, the cost of each policy option, or how much the government has to pay when a policy will be implemented. Quantitative methodology, which concentrates on numeric data and statistical analysis, is the foundation of economic-​based policy research. Researchers normally collect a set of data that exists continuously in a specified period, referred to as ‘time series data’, such as the rate of inflection from 2001 to 2005. When analysing the data, a mathematical equation or calculation is employed to simulate policy phenomena. This helps to determine the best solutions, predict policy outcomes and evaluate policy impacts. Within the variety of research topics, studies tend to focus on monetary policy, fiscal policy, tax policy, policy rates, policy for public debt management and savings policy. The findings from this type of research contribute knowledge regarding how to calculate the costs and benefits of a policy, as well as how to weigh the cost of each policy option. Moreover, the research results attempt to develop the accuracy of the existing mathematical models and equations in order to better calculate, predict and evaluate the policy cost, outcome and impact. Non-​economic-​based policy research The main questions of this research field seek to investigate policy consumers and stakeholders. The research scope focuses on the following issues: • People’s opinions of, and satisfaction or dissatisfaction with, the policy content and implementation. • Assessing people’s understanding of policies. • Assessing the needs for policies that seek to address public problems. • Seeking factors or conditions that shape people’s attitudes towards and acceptance of policies, which could directly impact the success of implementation. • Analysis of policy dissemination through the media.

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The core analytical technique is the statistical method, which collects empirical data or objective facts, including opinion polls from research samples and statistical data from government reports. Often, researchers will select a sample from a specific area or organisation for their investigation. In addition, personal factors such as gender, age, level of income, education, occupation and residential area are always recorded in order to analyse how they may impact policy implementation and evaluation. This type of research does not have a specific scope, as researchers choose contemporary policies that have been formulated or implemented by the government. The research findings, then, provide empirical information for policy revision, development and implementation. The research recommendations suggest potential future policies. Normative paradigm for policy research The special characteristic of normative policy research is its in-​depth explanations of context, content and important stories that can influence policy. The research pieces in this field have set out to explain which key conditions or historical contexts (social, economic and political conditions) have resulted in policy change or acceptance. The research scope is set up following the policy cycle, particularly during the stages of problem identification, agenda setting, and policy implementation and evaluation. The research scope at the stage of problem identification discusses public opinion in an effort to understand what the problem is and how policies can respond. At the stage of agenda setting, the research seeks to explain how needs become a policy agenda that decision makers must address. The key points of inquiry include communicative strategies to set the agenda, powerful factors and conditions that have a strong influence on policy agenda setting, and which actor groups play a crucial role in formulating the policy agenda. Investigations at the stage of policy implementation raise the following questions: What are the obstacles to policy implementation? What are the conditions, factors and innovative techniques or tools that can ensure successful policy implementation? Are the implementing agencies competent enough to successfully implement the policy? Therefore, in order to evaluate policy, the normative paradigm examines the samples’ opinions of a policy, their level of satisfaction, the impacts after it has been implemented and the conditions that lead to policy failure. Normative policy research frequently employs qualitative methodologies, such as document survey, interviews or group discussions, and observation of behavioural patterns. As already mentioned, the normative paradigm emphasises context and content. To do so, researchers choose a specific case study or policy to deeply investigate its historical development. The issues that the normative paradigm tends to emphasise can be categorised into seven main topics. The first topic focuses on social issues, which consist of drug policies, ageing policies, sport policies, housing policies, traffic policies, social welfare policies and social order policies. The second topic is public health, which relates to 312

Policy research in academic institutions

policies for non-​national workers, healthcare policies, actors’ roles in decision-​ making and human resource policies for managing medical staff. The third topic is energy, which examines energy conservation policies, dam construction for hydropower, policies for the management of energy resources, renewable energy policies, energy price policies, energy importing policies and corruption in the energy sector. The fourth topic involves education, which emphasises policies for education management, policies that address violence in schools, policies for educational quality assurance, policies for promoting digital technology in education and decentralisation policies for local education management. The fifth topic is political affairs, which is associated with foreign policies, corruption policies, security policies, public management policies, decentralisation policies for local authorities, military reform policies, political parties’ policies and policies for public sector reform. The sixth topic focuses on economic activities, which includes policies for solving economic crimes, policies for promoting local enterprises, policies for promoting border economic zones, agricultural subsidy policies, infrastructure development policies, policies for reducing poverty, policies for solving debt in the agriculture sector, privatisation policies of public enterprises and minimum wage policies. The final topic is natural resources and the environment, which involves changes in agricultural resource management, water management policies, food security policies, land management policies, policies for coastal resource management, waste management policies, and policies for addressing air, soil and water pollution. Normative policy research contributes three basic sets of policy knowledge. The first set is that of the conceptual idea, which suggests alternative ways to think of development and presents new ideas to influence change in existing policies. Moreover, this notion also provides an analysis of the weaknesses in decision-​making that could lead to the redesigning of existing policies. The in-​depth explanations of policies (policy phenomena, actors’ interactions and policy processes) make up another set of policy content. These explanations provide the historical context of policies, describe the key content of policy changes and illustrate the backgrounds of actor groups involved in the policies. The final set of knowledge is associated with policy adaptation. Normative policy research contributes many suggestions for how to improve and adapt policies, including institutional reforms, the most common of which are the rearrangement of decision-​making committees, restructuring of policy implementing agencies and amending related regulations. Transformative paradigm for policy research The core concentration of transformative policy research is to influence change in existing policies. To do so, the inquirers start with criticising or pointing out the failures of existing policies, such as environmentally unfriendly pest management policies, unsuccessful implementation of education reform policies or ineffective policies for reducing road accidents. Some examinations try to change the ideas behind the formation of the agenda in order to redesign existing policy, such as 313

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upgrading the idea of a green automotive industry or downgrading the idea of a fossil fuel based automotive industry. The researchers then investigate existing policies to seek more information and identify problems to address in the policy agenda. Once the new policy agenda has been determined, a new policy package is proposed in an effort to better solve the issue at hand. However, a policy agendum must receive broad endorsement from various actor groups. In order to change the existing policy agenda, the transformative paradigm needs to engage key stakeholders in the research, including decision-​makers, implementers, experts and other target groups. If the stakeholders’ ideas and opinions are agreed upon, this consensus can then facilitate changes in the policy agenda more easily. Hence, group discussion between the key stakeholders is a common technique within transformative policy research. Moreover, the inquirers test their findings in either real situations or simulations, utilising both qualitative and quantitative methods, to ensure the success of the policy outcomes. The common topics for transformative policy research are education policy, agricultural policy, healthcare policy, industrial policy and social safety policy, such as decreasing the rate of road traffic fatalities. The results and suggestions from transformative policy research present how positive impacts from the policy experiments can be realised. Such positive impacts are evidence-​based and could convince both decision-​makers and stakeholders to endorse the possible policy alternatives. Pragmatic paradigm for policy research The scope and research questions relative to the pragmatic paradigm focus on current problems that exist in human lives. Most of these problems have clearly identifiable origins and solutions but continue to exist in society and negatively impact wellbeing, disrupt economic prosperity and threaten environmental sustainability. The pragmatic paradigm tries to capture the state of the problem, as well as the conditions or variables that can help to explain the problem. Then, the research evaluates how existing mechanisms could address these problems and what the key obstacles are that could potentially impede the problem-​solving process. Pragmatic research employs both qualitative and quantitative methods to seek solutions to address the problem. The qualitative method is typically employed to understand the context and content of the problem, as well as the meanings, values and ideas behind the problem identification. The quantitative method is employed to collect data through surveys regarding policy needs from the sample demographic in order to identify which solution people desire most. Both methods are combined to help the inquirers design an alternative policy package. The core intention of pragmatic policy research is to address these sets of issues: food insecurity, instability of agricultural markets and prices, competitiveness of industrial sectors, pandemics, environmental degradation, political conflicts, changes in the population structure, lack of basic human 314

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needs, shortages of skilled labour and waste management. The notions from pragmatic research provide sets of solution packages, rather than a single solution, which includes how to develop human skills and knowledge to cope with such problems; how to rearrange institutions and mechanisms, such as the structure of government agencies; regulations for the facilitation of problem-​solving programs; and how to create collaboration between government agencies, the private sector and the people to reduce the impacts of the problems. Advocacy paradigm for policy research The main purpose of advocacy policy research is to propose new powerful ideas that can push alternative policy options into the decision-​making arena, or that can at least attract serious attention from the decision-​makers. The key questions of advocacy research include: Can we replace existing policies with the alternative policy options? How do the alternative options generate more benefits and broader contributions than the existing policy? Inquirers within this paradigm generally pay attention to policies focused on economic, agricultural, free trade, social welfare, healthcare, foreign workers’ rights and national border development. Qualitative methodology is the favoured technique for advocacy research because in-​depth information and broad contexts are necessary to construct a new idea that has enough power to persuade both the decision-​makers and the public to believe in the novel idea. Popular topics in advocacy research include: how to promote border zones as potential special economic areas; how to push the multifunctional agriculture approach as a replacement for the conventional agriculture model; how to promote Islamic bonds in the financial market; how to develop free trade in health services; how to increase green areas in urban cities; how to improve the educational system for poor and disabled students; how to provide comprehensive healthcare for foreign workers; and how to promote gender equity in the Thai civil service. The suggestions provided by advocacy research promote policy options or alternatives. In addition, some research contributes recommended processes and mechanisms as a guideline for the implementation process. The findings of advocacy research are intended to help the decision-​makers to rethink which policy options or alternatives may have been overlooked in the decision-​making stage. Moreover, advocacy research outlines the policy choices that are available to stakeholders to further assist in their bargaining with one other.

Conclusion The findings indicate that the empirical and normative paradigms play a hegemonic role in the Thai policy research community. In contrast, the transformative, pragmatic and advocacy paradigms are alternative options for policy investigators. The number of policy research pieces that relied on the 315

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last three paradigms is quite low compared to that of the two hegemonic paradigms. Surprisingly, no researcher chose to employ a mixed paradigm, which would integrate more than one analytical paradigm into their investigation. Empirical policy research normally produces notions regarding empirical and numeric information to identify causal relations between a policy and its impacts, to forecast policy outcomes and to seek a reliable model to evaluate policy performance. Normative policy research clearly contributes the meanings, ideas, values, actors’ interactions, context, content and logic behind, and surrounding, the policy processes. The three minor paradigms basically provide critical ideas to reshape the policy agenda, creating ideational power and offering possible alternatives to formulate policies with multifaceted benefits. There is less attention on mixed paradigms and critical paradigms, which provide a sceptical view of the established policy knowledge as a significant barrier for improving the analytical policy paradigm (Guba, 1990). Without critical conversations among the investigators who rely on the two hegemonic paradigms, the same explanations to assert their beliefs would be reproduced continuously and they might overlook the weaknesses of each paradigm. Moreover, if the researchers do not take any effort to integrate the analytical paradigms, they may oversimplify policy phenomena or problems in a singular frame. Within these limitations, the investigators may find it difficult to develop novel or valuable questions to further improve the theories and notions of the policy research community. Due to this shortage of novel theories and notions, policy design will be based on the same cycle of knowledge and cannot offer nuanced solutions for coping with complicated issues in a disrupted society. This analysis of policy research paradigms illustrates the trends, major and minor perspectives, key research themes and dominant disciplines within the Thai policy research community. Theoretically, scholars will use this opportunity to develop a novel research proposal, such as: What is an interesting topic, case study or policy that previous scholars have overlooked? Which methodology should be employed to collect and analyse data for new research? What kinds of policy notions should be re-​examined in order to develop a better understanding of the policy phenomena? In practice, therefore, it is not only governmental agencies who are directly involved with policy processes, but also the policy entrepreneurs, including the private sector, public sector, political parties and civil society groups. Such persons can also employ the analysis as a method to develop sound policy proposals for bargaining within the policy arena. This chapter has provided a description of the kinds of policy research work in Thailand. There needs to be a further investigation as to how many, and under what circumstances, policy research works get used by decision-​makers. Only when more policy research work is utilised can we say that Thailand is moving closer to giving full importance to the act of policy analyses.

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Appendix

Table 17A.1: Number of policy research pieces in each paradigm, 1985–​2019 Paradigm Year

Empirical

Normative

Transformative

Pragmatic

Advocacy

Total

1985

0

1

0

0

0

1

1986

1

1

0

0

0

2

1987

0

3

0

0

0

3

1988

1

1

0

0

0

2

1989

0

2

0

0

0

2

1990

4

0

0

0

0

4

1991

1

6

0

0

0

7

1992

3

11

0

0

0

14

1993

5

4

0

0

0

9

1994

7

0

0

0

0

7

1996

3

8

0

0

0

11

1997

6

9

0

0

2

17

1998

4

8

0

0

0

12

1999

12

8

0

1

0

21

2000

10

7

0

0

0

17

2001

11

12

0

0

1

24

2002

30

18

0

0

1

49

2003

54

29

1

1

0

85

2004

55

29

0

1

3

88

2005

36

23

0

1

0

60

2006

31

28

1

0

1

61

2007

28

31

0

0

1

60

2008

21

17

0

1

1

40

2009

26

12

1

3

1

43

2010

37

10

0

1

4

52

2011

17

5

0

0

1

23

2012

15

7

0

3

0

25

2013

16

6

2

1

2

27

2014

11

15

0

2

3

31

2015

7

9

0

3

4

23

2016

6

7

0

2

1

16

2017

7

7

3

2

1

20

2018

3

12

0

2

2

19

2019

0

7

0

1

0

8

Total

468

353

8

25

29

883 317

Policy Analysis in Thailand

Table 17A.2: Types of policy research Frequency

Research

161

Thesis

722

Total

883

Percent

Valid percentage

18.3

Cumulative percentage

18.3

18.3

81.7

81.7

100.0

100.0

100.0

Table 17A.3: Number of research themes in each paradigm Paradigm Research theme

Empirical

Normative

Transformative

Pragmatic

Advocacy

Total

Environment

13

14

0

0

2

29

Natural resources

10

17

0

3

1

31

Agriculture

20

16

1

4

1

42

Economy

181

85

1

6

7

280

Society

90

76

3

5

6

180

Politics

30

74

0

1

0

105

Energy

11

14

0

0

0

25

Education

57

28

2

0

4

91

Health

44

15

1

2

4

66

Tourism

8

10

0

4

4

26

Science and Technology

1

2

0

0

0

3

Mixed

3

2

0

0

0

5

Total

468

353

8

25

29

883

Table 17A.4: Locations of case studies in each research paradigm Paradigm Location

Empirical

Normative

Transformative

Pragmatic

Advocacy

Total

North

66

31

0

0

4

101

Centre

131

51

2

4

3

191

Northeast

31

15

1

3

1

51

West

11

5

0

0

0

16

South

27

24

0

2

1

54

Unclear

177

207

5

15

18

422

24

17

0

0

1

42

1

3

0

1

1

6

468

353

8

25

29

883

East Cross-​region Total 318

Policy research in academic institutions

Note 1

See https://​dric.nrct.go.th/​Sea​rch/​index#top

References Almog-​Bar, M. and Schmid, H. (2014) ‘Advocacy activities of nonprofit human service organizations: A critical review’, Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 43(1): 11–​35. Blume, G., Scott, T. and Pirog, M. (2014) ‘Empirical innovations in policy analysis’, The Policy Studies Journal, 42(1): 33–​50. Chaves-​Avila, R. and Gallego-​Bono, J.R. (2020) ‘Transformative policies for the social and solidarity economy: The new generation of public policies fostering the social economy in order to achieve sustainable development goals: The European and Spanish cases’, Sustainability, 12(10): 1–​29. Clemons, R.S. and McBeth, M.K. (2017) Public Policy Praxis: A Case Approach for Understanding Policy and Analysis, New York: Routledge. Creswell, J.W. and Creswell, J.D. (2018) Research Design: Qualitative, Quantitative, and Mixed Methods Approaches (5th edn), Los Angeles: SAGE. Dunn, W.N. (2018) Public Policy Analysis: An Integrated Approach (6th edn), New York: Routledge. Guba, E.C. (1990) The Paradigm Dialog, Newbury Park: SAGE. Jarusombat, S. (2007) ‘State and progress of public administration field’, Proceeding of the 8th National Conference of Political Sciences and Public Administration at Faculty of Political Science, Thammasat University, Bangkok, Thailand, 13–​14 December. [in Thai] Phongpaichit, P. (2004) ‘Thaksinomics’, in J. Seanjairat (ed) Thaksinomics, Bangkok, pp 109–​131. [in Thai] Robert, C. and Zeckhauser, R. (2011) ‘The methodology of normative policy analysis’, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 30(3): 613–​643. Sadovnik, A.R. (2007) ‘Qualitative research and public policy’, in F. Fischer, G.J. Miller and M.S. Sidney (eds) Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics and Methods, New York: CRC, pp 427–​428. Siriwan, L. (2013) A Synthesis on Public Policy Knowledge in Thailand, Nonthaburi: Sukhothai Thammathirat Open University. [in Thai] Yavaprabhas, S. and Whangmahaporn, P. (2009) Public Policy of Thailand: Origin, Development, and State of the Field, Bangkok: Joodtong. [in Thai]

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EIGHTEEN

Transition and prospects of Thai policy analysis Ora-​orn Poocharoen and Piyapong Boossabong

Introduction Thailand’s practice of policy analysis is comparable to other middle-​income countries where there are policy analyst positions in the public sector and there are academics and think tanks that work on various policy issues. Training, research and education on policy analysis also exist. However, compared to the United States, the United Kingdom and EU member countries, Thailand lags in many aspects of policy analysis, including weak policy making and policy research nexus, lack of professionalisation of policy expertise, limited usage of policy analytical approaches and tools, and an ill-​formed policy ecosystem that is lopsided, favouring only the well-​connected and well-​resourced in society. Using the comparative perspective, this chapter first explains the current context of being ‘in-​between’ that Thailand is experiencing. Then we offer observable six trends of ‘transition’ that might help advance Thailand’s policy analysis and policy-​making practice.

Being ‘in-​between’ In this first section, we propose understanding Thailand as an ‘in-​between’ state. First, the term in-​between refers to how Thailand is neither a strong, state-​ led centralised model nor a strong, democratic, pluralistic society-​led model. It is somewhere in-​between. Unquestionably, Thailand displays authoritarianism and a steady decline of the democratic values of political freedom, civil and human rights, and civil society activism; however, it is certainly not a strong state. A strong state that comes to mind is Singapore, where policy analysis is conducted by top policy analysts who work for the state and implemented with a high success rate (Quah, 2018). In Thailand, there is a constant tug-​of-​war between those who want technocratic policy making and analysis and those who advocate for more autonomy and more democratic policy making and analysis. The state of being ‘in-​between’ explains why policy analysis training in Thailand continues to be hidden in the shadows of the field of public administration. Policy analysis is still thought of as a purely technical activity. As long as this tug-​of-​war exists, it is difficult to have clear directions or consensus on principles for policy analysis in this country. 320

Transition and prospects of policy analysis

Furthermore, Thailand is also ‘in-​between’ in how policy decisions are made and administered. There is a tug-​of-​war between central agencies and local governments for the mandate to do policy analysis, to make policy decisions and obtain budgets for execution. Compared to federalist states such as Switzerland, the United States and Canada, policy making and policy analysis in Thailand are predominately controlled by the bureaucratic, hierarchical central government. Although the Thai constitution endorses decentralisation, most policies proposed by the local government are still framed and closely guided by the legal framework and procedures of policy making controlled by the central authority. Local governments must share power with regional government bodies, who are direct representatives of the central government agencies (see details in Chapter Four on local government of this volume). The regional government bodies represent agencies such as the health ministry, transport, energy, education, commerce, natural resources and the environment. Most ministries and key strategic agencies would set up regional offices around the country. The Thai policy system is thus influenced by the centralised British system with a mix of the French and Japanese regional mechanisms (Yavaprabhas and Whangmahaporn, 2009). Lastly, Thailand is stuck in a tug-​of-​war for power among elites. Its direction of democratisation is always a work-​in-​progress, neither here nor there. This country holds a world record of 19 military coups since 1932, which was when the country became a constitutional-​monarchy system. Coups usually do not lead to the ‘wake up’ of democracy but instead suppress it further (Derpanopoulos et al, 2016). Thailand suffers from repeatedly solving crises through coups, similar to countries such as Egypt, Honduras, Guinea, Algeria and Myanmar. The most recent coup was related to the anxiety around the transition from Rama IX to Rama X’s reign. Due to this background, undoubtedly, elite framing is a key characteristic of policy analysis in Thailand. This characteristic is akin to policy analysis in many other countries, such as South Korea, Colombia, Mexico and Brazil (Vaitsman et al, 2013; Luis Mendez and Dussauge-​Laguna, 2017; Sanabria-​ Pulido and Rubaii, 2020; Lah and Klassen, 2023). Elites in the Thai context include the military, the constitutional and administrative courts, the palace, and its royal members and networks (as discussed in Chapter Six on the monarchy, Chapter Seven on the military and Chapter Nine on consultants). This is in addition to the conventional makeup of elites in other countries, such as political leaders, business conglomerates and old aristocrats.

Being ‘in transition’ Despite the context of being ‘in-​between’, we see transition signals that could lead to a transformative new future for policy analysis in Thailand. From around the year 2000 onwards, similar to other countries, Thailand adopted the rhetoric and tools of policy and administration reforms found in Anglo-​Saxon countries. One trend was the New Public Management movement, which promoted public–​private partnerships alongside performance-​based management. Another 321

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trend was co-​production and collaborative governance, where non-​state actors played more prominent roles in policy subsystems. Most importantly, the trend of universal values of human rights, participatory and deliberative democracy, and freedom of expression witnessed, for example, in the Arab Spring movement and the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong, also reached the shores of Thailand as well. Despite the highly centralised and elite-​dominated system, as new policy actors appear, new approaches to policy analysis are emerging in the Thai public policy ecosystem landscape. New actors include the younger generation, civil society members, pockets of academia, new think tanks and a handful of civic entrepreneurs. These actors raise critical questions about the level of inequality in the country, which is among the highest in the world. The younger generation value equity over efficiency and liberty over security. They are worried about the uncertain future and feel oppressed by the invisible structural violence of the country’s political and policy systems (see discussion on protests in Chapter Ten of this volume). During the 2010s, the online and offline expressions for political freedom, a more accountable palace and monarchy system, better education policies and higher quality participatory processes have multiplied exponentially (for details, see Chapter Thirteen on civil society and Chapter Fourteen on social movements in this volume). As ignoring citizen expectations can lead to a rapid erosion of trust in the legitimacy of government, there are signs that efforts are being made to improve policy analysis to meet expectations. Moreover, the conventional policy analysis approaches based on incremental, linear logic frames and conventional strategic thinking have revealed themselves to be ineffective in the face of new challenges and wicked problems. Linear and one-​dimensional policy analysis of traditional strategic management in Thailand is always divided into components of inputs, processes, outputs and outcomes. All policies are comprised of programmes and projects, and subprojects. Each element has tangible, observable performance indicators –​as they are known in the performance-​based management approach. The fixed approach includes the language of cascading down performance indicators, deployment of vision and mission statements (see details in Chapter Two on methods of policy analysis). Often missing is the effort to complete the learning loop, allow for failures, and genuinely conduct policy formative and summative evaluations. Most importantly, the performance-​based strategic thinking approach used in Thailand’s hierarchical, bureaucratic context does not foster innovations in the policy analysis process. Based on our experience with the public sector, this approach is inadequate for designing inspirational, innovative policy solutions to the many public policy problems Thailand is facing, whether they be the rapidly ageing society, weak and inequitable education system, or the severely declining natural environment and the need for climate adaptation and mitigation. Against this pressing need to improve policy analysis, we see new trends and ideas nudging Thailand forward inch by inch. These trends could steer Thailand into a transition away from existing paradigms and cultures of policy analysis. 322

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In the next section, we provide observations of six emerging trends that are steadily shifting the culture and system of policy analysis and policy making in Thailand. The trends are: the transition towards policy networks, governance, and collaboration; the transition towards deliberative policy analysis amid demands for democracy; the transition towards innovative policy analysis with the promotion of design, future, complexity and critical thinking; the rise of policy data analytics and nudging; increased sectoral and area-​specific policy analysis; and increased global perspectives that address a just sustainable future. Transition towards policy networks, governance and collaboration The Thai government understands that vertical governmental structures do not guarantee the efficiency and effectiveness of complex policy design and implementation (Poocharoen and Ting, 2014). Many governmental departments have become more open to the horizontal governance approach. They are slowly learning to collaborate for policy analysis, primarily through agenda-​based policy analysis, instead of function-​based (see detailed discussion in Chapter Five on collaborations and networks). This does not mean that the government has replaced command and control approaches with this mode of operation. Still, there is evidence that the government accepts that the Thai policy subsystems need to be steered by policy networks rather than a single policy entity. The policy subsystems that steer policy networks include public health policy, environmental resources management policy, disaster policy, agricultural policy, tourism policy, innovation policy and pandemic policy (as partially discussed in Chapters 1, 4, 5, 11, 12 and 13 of this volume). These policy sectors unquestionably require partnerships with state and non-​state actors, especially business, civil society and community volunteers. This trend is found in several other countries, particularly in the domination of issue networks and policy communities in the United Kingdom (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992; Rhodes, 1997, 2006) and the influence of advocacy coalitions and collaborative management in the United States (Sabatier, 1988; Sabatier and Weible, 2007; O’Leary and Vij, 2012). Disaster and water management policies are a clear example in which the government introduces the concept of an ‘agenda-​based mechanism’ to replace the function and area-​based mechanisms. Unsurprisingly, those policy areas are related to common-​pool resources and require collective action, as observed globally by Ostrom (1990) and her colleagues from Bloomington School of Policy Analysis. In the face of COVID-​19, attention is being paid to policy networks, governance and collaboration because a single policy intervention and a single specific policy actor cannot handle such a wicked problem (Boossabong and Chamchong, 2020). An agenda-​based policy design allows policy networks to be built across governmental departments and enable a network to steer the policy together with plural actors, including central, regional and local government bodies, business associations, non-​governmental organisations and 323

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communities. The outcome of the policy, thus, depends mainly on their fluid collaboration and their healthy network governance (Poocharoen and Ting, 2014; Chamchong, 2019). The Thai case demonstrates that networks, governance and collaboration are not necessarily democratic and without domination, as also observed by Davies (2011), Torfing (2016) and Sorensen (2016) in the United Kingdom and Denmark. Political elites sometimes influence the direction of networks, governance and collaboration in Thailand. Policy networks must navigate under a fixed hierarchical system with a top-​down tradition without shared core values. The business sector, as expected, has navigated better than the civil society and community sector. Thus, most policy networks are driven by the state or the private sector (see Chapter Twelve on business associations). The highest level of elitism and power structure is related to the monarchical networks (described in Chapter Six on the monarch’s role). Lastly, Thai policy culture is still a barrier to policy co-​design and co-​ production. While in many European countries, governments focus on the culture of empowerment and facilitation (Sullivan and Skecher, 2002; Skecher, 2005; Bovaird and Loeffler, 2013), the Thai government usually perceives its role as a decision-​making leader who takes all the responsibility for directing and executing policy. Others play only supporting roles. Furthermore, as Dowding (1995) criticised, the concept of ‘network’ here is usually referred to as a metaphor for the attempt at integration rather than serious action. The emergence of coalitions is also based mainly on their everyday discourse rather than actual practice. Such discourse coalitions emerge widely in the European context (Hajer, 1993), and their main limitation is using resource mobilisation to make substantial changes. Thailand is not an exception to this phenomenon (see more in Chapter Five on collaboration and networks, Chapter Thirteen on the community sector and Chapter Fourteen on social movements in this volume). Transition towards deliberative policy analysis amid demands for democracy Policy analysis in Thailand is becoming more participatory in response to a healthier number and quality of civic activists and activities that form the new tides of the democratisation process in the country. As Hajer and Wagenaar (2003) discussed, participation in policy analysis is required when modern society becomes more pluralistic, and policy makers need to be more concerned about its governance performance, which is a direct measure of their legitimacy to govern. As a result, authentic participation in policy analysis is proposed and is referred to as deliberative policy analysis. Deliberation refers to the meaningful and qualitative participation where participants attend policy forums and actively engage and contribute. The role of deliberation in policy analysis in Thailand was recognised widely since 1997 after the endorsement of the progressive constitution and technocrats’ failure in handling the domestic economic crisis, which spread globally and 324

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became known as the Asian Financial Crisis. During this time, the World Bank promoted public participation as one of the essential Good Governance principles. The International Monetary Fund bundled participatory approaches conditionality to its recovery loans, a move that injected instant participatory efforts in Thailand (as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2) and many other countries at the time. However, in the beginning, participatory processes were conducted only to meet the checklist of mandates and for reporting purposes. Authentic and valuable conversations expected of proper deliberative processes were sporadic. Often only after street protests and heavy lobbying would government officials or the executive branch ask for formal consultations, which were negotiation rounds to settle immediate interests. Examples include constructing power plants, dams, coal mines and other natural environment-​related problems (see Chapters 2 and 14 for details). Likewise, at the local level, the opinions of leaders, seniors and experts are given priority over the opinions of lay citizens, especially the opinions of the disadvantaged (Boossabong and Chamchong, 2019). However, having said this, from 1997 to now, we do see progress in deliberative policy analysis, and new forms of participation are materialising. Compared to other weak democratic states, the Thai authoritarian style of a military-​supported government is somewhat friendly towards seeking citizens’ input and supporting co-​production of specific issues, such as healthcare. Election and re-​election naturally force leaders and policy makers to be concerned with citizens’ demands, and near election time, we see some forums and debates around the country. Deliberation is a productive policy instrument for ensuring effective and acceptable policy design in which citizens participate, leading to increased satisfaction with their elected officials and the bureaucratic machinery. We see some key central agencies make an effort to engage with citizens and users of policies through emails, public forums and focus groups. These include the National Economic and Social Development Council (NESDC) during the drafting of the 13th National Plan and the Ministry of Higher Education, Science, Research, and Innovation when it redesigns regulations governing universities, degree programmes, research funding and the academic qualifications of professors. Studies confirm that authoritarian or strong state-​led regimes also use deliberative policy analysis. For example, the Chinese government, for more than two decades, promoted deliberation in policy making at the city level (Li and He, 2016). He and Warren (2011) refer to the system as ‘authoritarian deliberation’, which can also be found in some Western contexts, as seen in France (Romano, 2018). The concept of authoritarian deliberation accurately captures policy deliberation at the central level in Thailand. Active participation is welcomed as long as the deliberation’s result does not challenge the prevailing traditional power structure. The story is more promising at the local level. There are many cases where deliberative policy analysis was used to design area-​specific policies and projects, including city planning, urban renewal projects and waste management projects. 325

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Such cases are documented, studied and shared as lessons with the international community (Fischer and Boossabong, 2018; Sacramento and Boossabong, 2021). Deliberation at this level is not perceived as a tool for compromised authoritarian control but rather as a workable democratic process endorsed by local authorities who disagree with the central governmental system (Boossabong and Fischer, 2022). Thus, authentic conversations occur at the local government level, and the seeds of deliberative democracy can grow. The main challenge of this trend from the comparative perspective is that while many other countries have prepared their new generation of policy analysts to have deliberative facilitation and mediation skills, Thai policy education still limits itself to producing conventional technical experts or administrators. Furthermore, the vertical sociocultural culture does not foster meaningful deliberation. Older and more established people (those with higher education, high titles, more wealth) usually have a more significant say in policy deliberation. In sum, there are signals of deliberation around the country, but there is a long way to go before we see systematic change at the national level. Transition towards innovative policy analysis: design, future, complexity and critical thinking It is evident that linear or logic frame models, including the performance-​based approach, do not allow for policies to be adaptive and respond to complex and constantly evolving problems. Thailand adopted a form of performance-​based budgeting and now has a fully digitalised nationwide system to track public budgeting, which is tied to strategic plans at all levels and government functions. It is called the Government Fiscal Management Information System. This is similar to the United States, Taiwan, China and Malaysia, to name a few. This system has the potential to be used for evidence-​based policy analysis, but we have not come across such cases. It is merely used for budgetary control by the Ministry of Finance and the Bureau of Budget. Similarly, there is limited understanding and use of proper cost-​benefit analyses and feasibility studies. Thorough policy option analyses are either never conducted or never made public. It is not a surprise to find little evidence of rational decision-​making and analysis in the Thai context. However, we do see signals of new trends of policy analysis emerging. First, some public agencies are experimenting with the design thinking approach in policy analysis. The NESDC held workshops and produced a report on this technique in 2019 as part of its Policy Innovation Lab project to build its capacity as the country’s main policy think tank (NESDC, 2019). The Thailand Institute of Justice frequently uses design thinking to improve the prison system and quality of life for female inmates. The Thailand Institute of Justice also does training and advocates for this approach. Australia’s cases of design thinking in the public sector can serve as benchmarks for a country like Thailand (Mintrom and Luetjens, 2016). 326

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Second, the futures approach provides innovative tools for deliberation and conceiving policy solutions. For instance, it was used by the Ministry of Energy in 2018 for deliberation and policy analysis for its energy policy and plan with assistance from the School of Public Policy at Chiang Mai University. Some cities such as Phayao and Songkla have also used this approach for policy analysis and planning. The National Innovation Agency spearheaded Thailand’s first future analysts’ network in 2019. It comprises education institutes such as the School of Public Policy at Chiang Mai University, the National Institute for Development Administration and private-​sector think tanks like the Thailand Future Foundation. This trend is aligned with other countries, such as the Centre for Future Studies in the United Kingdom, the Centre for Strategic Futures in Singapore and the Futures Centre of Australian Federal Police. The Philippine Futures Thinking Society is leading this space in Southeast Asia. Lastly, complexity and critical thinking approaches are embedded in the design and future thinking philosophy and tools. The combination of all four ways of thinking can be found in policy labs in some countries worldwide. Similar terms include ‘living lab’, ‘city lab’, ‘design lab’, ‘public policy lab’ or ‘policy innovation lab’ (Hinrichs-​Krapels et al, 2020). These labs aim to bring policy makers, policy analysts, citizens, academics and stakeholders of policy issues to explore and experiment (conceptually and in practice) theories, concepts and ideas for policy analysis. In 2021, the NESDC and the United Nations Development Program collaborated to set up the Thailand Policy Lab (TPLab). Its tagline is ‘policymaking reimagined’. In 2022, TPLab collaborated with the School of Public Policy at Chiang Mai University to conduct experiments on combining design, future, critical and complex thinking to do policy analysis. Chiang Mai city has a City Lab, supported by academics; the municipality leads it. It supports civic innovators who are passionate about solving the cities’ problems. A comparative study of the United Kingdom, Denmark and Singapore’s policy labs shows that political regimes and the policy environments influence how these policy labs work (Lee and Ma, 2020). It is too early to know whether Thailand’s policy labs and city labs will make a difference, but we think there is promise. The rise of policy data analytics and nudging Information technology and data heavily influence policy analysis today, and Thailand is no exception. Thailand’s e-​government policies date back to 2001 (see more discussion in Chapter Two; Gunawong and Gao, 2017). Since then, data analytics for policy development continues to be promoted by many Thai public organisations, such as the Geo-​Informatics and Space Technology Development Agency, the Digital Government Development Agency, the Digital Economy Promotion Agency, the National Innovation Agency, the National Statistics Office and the Central Bank of Thailand. In 2021, Government Big Data Institute was established. Its tagline is ‘Enabling Data-​Driven Nation’. Its focus is to build the government’s capacity for big data analytics. Also, the government supports open 327

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data platforms (for example, www.data.go.th). Furthermore, the Geographic Information System is used widely as a decision support system, especially in infrastructure development policy, agricultural policy and elderly care policy. With the rise of smart city development, the Thai government promotes and provides incentives to cities that can benefit from technology enhancement, especially those that improve the efficiency of public services (Poocharoen et al, 2020). Such smart city projects, in theory, would be churning out big data relevant for policy analysis. In addition, the Ministry of Finance has built the country’s largest database of 14 million poor and near-​poor people from its Welfare Card programme. This database was used to disburse cash and other relief measures during the COVID-​19 pandemic. This database offers rich insights into the consumption and livelihood behaviours of the vulnerable group. This database is yet to be merged with other databases such as those on vulnerable children, the disabled, the unemployed and the elderly. This database could potentially include all citizens if digital identity cards were issued. The COVID-​19 pandemic has forced the Thai government to execute its e-​payments and e-​services overnight. These services generate big data that can be very useful for policy analysis. To generate big data, there must be more data sharing between departments. Moreover, data falsification is also a problem in some agencies. Overall, Thailand faces similar challenges to other countries regarding data, including reliability, accessibility, accuracy and timeliness. These problems are common in many countries and result from governments not investing sufficiently in digital infrastructure development (Bachner et al, 2017). The delayed digital transformation slows down other processes, as Gil-​Garcia et al (2018) observed. They also note that a digital identity card and open data are the first steps for advancing e-​government systems and data analytics in many countries in the European context. Thailand is getting close but is not there yet. In addition, like in other countries, the behavioural insights approach known as nudging is becoming popular in Thailand. This approach is related to the increased role of data analytics, as behavioural data is mainly used as an entry point for nudging (John, 2016). Nudging is used in the public health policy sector, especially by the Health Promotion Foundation. This organisation has used emotional videos and messages to encourage people to quit smoking and drink less alcohol. Some local governments, such as Yala Municipality, now allow graffiti to motivate citizens to walk more. The Centre for Behaviour and Experimental Economics at Chulalongkorn University is one of the leading think tanks that conducts experiments using this approach. The Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development (OECD, 2017) observes that the behavioural science approach is used widely in public policy development, especially in energy consumption policy, taxation policy, transportation policy, public health policy, saving and investment motivation, organic food promotion policy, and family planning policy. Singapore and the United Kingdom have started using time-​series analysis, machine learning and 328

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artificial intelligence to help behavioural science policy analysis (Strassheim et al, 2015). Although nudging has its limitations (see, for instance, the study by Strassheim et al, 2015), it still benefits Thailand in that it changes the traditional policy culture from ‘forcing’ to ‘guiding’ by sound evidence-​based policy analysis, whereby citizens have some degree of freedom to choose. Thailand can benefit from extending this approach to cover more sectors. The government should also enhance policy analysis capacity at the individual, institutional and nationwide levels. Increased sectoral and area-​specific policy analysis Policy analysis in Thailand is moving away from general policy theories and concepts towards incorporating sectoral and area-​specific perspectives. Each government department has its own policy and planning unit. This administrative arrangement creates sectoral policy analysts, such as investment promotion policy experts, elderly care policy experts, primary school policy experts, climate policy experts, housing policy experts, informal labour policy experts, sanitation policy experts, gender rights policy experts and food policy experts. Each specific sector has its own terminology and approaches to policy analysis. For example, an investment promotion policy expert pays particular attention to competitiveness and comparative advantage. The climate policy expert works with the concepts of risks and vulnerability, resilience, and social and environmental justice. The food policy expert is framed by the notions of food security, food sovereignty and the right to food (Boossabong, 2016). These sectoral policy analysts often do not have backgrounds in political science, public administration, economics, law or public policy. Apart from sectoral orientated policy analysis, the attention on area-​specific or locality-​based policy analysis is increasing. This is partly a consequence of the community-​centric policy development approach, the criticism of the one-​size-​ fits-​all approach, and the government’s avoidance of the word ‘decentralisation’. Sound public policy is policy that is designed to meet the specific needs of each locality, and often the central government does not have enough knowledge and data to solve local issues. This trend supports the increasing role of local government in doing policy analysis and the rise of regional cities where plural actors want to engage in area-​based development. After the endorsement of the eighth National Economic and Social Development Plan in 1997, the focus of national policies shifted from industrialisation to the strength of grassroots organisations. Although most policies still benefit Bangkok’s industrial and commercial sectors, many secondary cities, such as Khon Kaen, Phuket and Chiang Mai, now have distinct policy directions and plans with uniquely specific economic and social identities. Social capital and cultural assets have been promoted widely as a new pathway to sustainable development, like in many countries (Taylor, 2003; Lowndes and Pratchett, 2010; Rydin, 2013). We would like to caution against romanticising the role of the community. A common misunderstanding among Bangkok-​based elites is that, beyond Bangkok, 329

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people live a harmonious, simple life full of traditions, exotic local cuisine, and a clean and green environment. The truth is far from that. Communities compete for scarce resources, budgets, talent, technologies and natural resources. Many communities are polarised due to differing ideologies regarding the monarch’s role and fierce local politics. Some are broken due to religious beliefs. And many communities are devastated due to the decline of natural resources and extreme climates. Some traditions are incompatible with universal values, such as how women in the North are forbidden to access parts of temple buildings or are not allowed to be ordained as monks. Thus, Thailand might not necessarily achieve equality, equity and justice by relying on community-​led policy analysis. It can be misleading to promote community rights and community empowerment in an era where citizens have a strong sense of individualism and new communities are based online. Thais have a strong unrealistic expectation that community leaders must have only altruistic motives to drive community development voluntarily. Community leaders can easily capture locally led policy making and analysis. This clash of community and individual benefits is also found in the Western context (Pennington and Rydin, 1999; Ostrom and Ahn, 2003). There are discussion in the United States on how to control the self-​interests of individuals to achieve collective action (Ostrom, 1990). Such arguments are rare in Thailand. Lastly, sectoral and area-​specific policy analysis is often comparative because it requires finding the best models from one area, aiming to transfer these to other regions (Hadjiisky et al, 2017). As many Thai localities are contemplating new policy ideas and sectoral policy experts are playing more prominent roles, we would like to caution against policy transfer that is not well studied and researched. For instance, Thailand’s elderly care policy that provides pensions for senior citizens originated mainly from Scandinavia. The payment is around 600 TBH (or approximately US$20) per month, which is very low. The government’s rationale is based on the Asian values that expect the community and family to take care of the elderly (Ariyachaipradit and Boossabong, 2018). Also, the tax base in Thailand is low compared to social-​welfare states like Scandinavian countries; thus, the budget is limited. In sum, proper comparative policy analysis is essential for localities to choose appropriate policy principles, rhetoric, tools or entire systems. Comparative policy analysis needs to seriously consider economic, social, historical, cultural and political contexts and implications. We recommend investing more in comparative policy analyses by funding Thais to conduct research overseas, launch international public policy degree programmes, and systematically foster collaboration with international policy labs and academic institutes. Transition towards global perspectives on a just and sustainable future The final trend is policy analysis from a global perspective; this is related to the globalisation of public policy. The United Nations’ Sustainable Development 330

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Goals (SDGs) or Agenda 2030 are the global community’s way of synchronising development and progress towards a just and sustainable world. From the pragmatist perspective, the SDGs and related principles suit any political system (Hartley, 2020). Thai leaders have claimed that Rama IX’s Sufficiency Economy Philosophy (SEP) is fundamentally the core of the SDGs. The Thai government uses the SDGs as guidelines for policy directions and performance evaluations at the ministerial and local levels. In practice, the utilisation of SDGs by the government is limited to administration and monitoring the measurable indicators of sustainability. SEP is used conceptually on paper in nearly every ministerial and departmental plan but never in concrete measurables, except as models of household-​level farming. This aligns with the centralised, top-​down, bureaucratic characteristic of the Thai state that has been highlighted throughout this volume. On the contrary, civil society, academics and activists use the SDGs to question existing political and economic power structures, unfair treatment and social injustices. In other words, while the government tries to depoliticise the discourse, they politicise it. They push it away from a practical orientation towards a transformative policy analysis perspective. We see the advocacy for a just and sustainable future as the new turning point for inspiring new policy goals among non-​state actors. As mentioned in the previous section, new policy players, including political parties such as the Future Forward Party, focus on fairness, justice and wealth distribution before economic efficiency and wealth generation (see Chapter Eleven on political parties). They demand freedom and social welfare more than security. Above all, they want the Thai government to shift from control and regulation to facilitation and empowerment. The Thai context clearly shows the epistemic isomorphism and the knowledge transfer in public policy from the West to the East. As global public policy continues to materialise and is accelerated by information technology and the role of the United Nations and its networks, Thailand will need to develop its capacity to do policy analysis rapidly. Interdisciplinary policy education uses a comparative lens, is future-​oriented, focused on social justice, intergenerational equity, climate crisis and sustainability, and should be supported by government, businesses and civil societies. Thai policy analysis thus needs to become more politicised with the recognition that public policy is, in fact, the transformation of political ideas into political actions, as suggested by Fischer (2003).

Conclusion This chapter has explained Thailand’s three states of being ‘in-​between’ and six trends of being ‘in-​transition’. Thailand’s policy landscape is stagnant yet gradually changing. Like most countries, the Thai policy world now incorporates plural policy actors. The policy system seems to be more decentralised and decentred. However, the central bureaucracy still plays the dominant role in policy analysis, with much influence from the palace and the military. Thai 331

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local governments struggle with limited authority and resources, while most expert policy advisory boards, consultants and think tanks work mainly for the ruling government. At the same time, parliamentary committees and supporting legislative agencies play their role only in providing powerless advice. Over the years, newer political parties have emerged to be active policy players. Business associations have been quite influential because most policies are designed with neoliberal ideology. Due to online platforms, the internet and smart devices, citizen-​to-​citizen communication and mass media can rapidly influence policy narratives and analysis. We also see that the roles of the community sector, civil society and social movements are increasing. They can pause or postpone mega-​ projects in an era where the citizens’ voices cannot be ignored easily, as listening to their concerns helps determine legitimacy. The commonality between all six transitions reveals the conflicting values of old and new. While the evolution of policy analysis in Thailand is becoming increasingly more progressive, traditional policy powers maintain old policy analysis and execution methods that focus on planning, compliance and simple performance indicators such as outputs and outcomes. New players are experimenting with big data analytics, innovative styles of policy communication, crowdsourcing policy solutions, and innovative policy analysis approaches such as design and futures thinking. They do not hesitate to borrow global public policy discourses to challenge the status quo. The convergence of the old paradigm and the new one does not seem possible. Their tug-​of-​war is still ongoing. However, time is on the non-​traditional side. Also, with multiple global concerns and the context of high inequality in Thailand, a just and sustainable future is a must, not an option. To reach this, Thailand needs to undergo a revolutionary transformation. So far, it is evident that the depoliticised policy analysis in Thailand has rarely challenged political power and has often legitimised political domination and protected unjust structures. This tends to stir up reactions from citizens, especially anger and frustration from the young generation. As such, policy analysis in Thailand, both in the academic and practical worlds, needs to be more critical to address the existing cultural and structural barriers. Policy analysts need to incorporate proper and sufficient tangible empirical data and consider less tangible information such as citizens’ normative values, feelings and emotions. The policy sphere should be an empowering space for laypeople, not just persuasive, argumentative and negotiating spaces for powerful actors. Most importantly, policy analysis should not depend too much on so-​called policy experts; it should be an activity that is open to all. References Ariyachaipradit, A. and Boossabong, P. (2018) ‘Empirical and normative considerations of the role of local government in the protection of elderly legal rights: Lessons learned from Thailand’, The Social Sciences, 13(1): 223–​234.

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336

Index A academic research  92, 189 academic services  3, 28–​29, 34–​36, 43 agenda setting  5, 54, 155, 162, 186, 187–​188, 312 Akarapongpisak, Nattakant  248, 258, 265 American system  2, 11–​12 area-​based development  75–​78, 85, 93, 148, 329 Ariyasirichot, Wachirawat  230 Aunphattanasilp, Chumphol  293, 303

B Bankers’ Association  15, 219–​220 Boossabong, Piyapong  1–​2, 11, 14–​16, 18, 22, 54, 59, 89–​90, 92, 94, 95, 98, 186, 213, 286, 294, 295, 320, 323, 325–​326, 329 Buddharaksa, Watcharabon  186, 287 bureaucracy  bureaucratic dominance  67, 76–​77 bureaucratic polity  12, 15, 21, 29, 50, 51, 55, 56, 60–​61, 73–​74, 139 business associations  3, 219, 221–​222, 223, 226, 228, 323–​324, 332 business–​government relations  5

C central government  21, 32–​33, 42, 49, 50, 51, 52, 55, 56, 57–​59, 60–​61, 67, 68, 70–​71, 73–​74, 75–​78, 79–​81, 82–​83, 84–​85, 93–​94, 97, 174, 220, 226–​228, 230, 240, 257, 321, 326, 329 centralised system  3, 19, 21, 33, 43, 98, 212 Chaichakan, Chatthip  88, 92–​93 Chaiyapa, Warathida  219 Chamber of Commerce  219–​220 Chamchong, Pobsook  67, 69, 80, 98, 294 Chan-​o-​cha, Prayuth  109, 127, 141, 226, 262 Chattragul, Phanuphat  170 Chutima, Vorapat  219, 235 civil society  movements  3 policy advocate  6, 52, 230 public funding  16, 235, 236 Cold War  1–​2, 12–​13, 140, 143–​144, 148, 175–​176, 250, 263, 286 collaboration  4, 7, 21–​22, 56, 57, 59, 78, 88–​89, 90–​92, 93–​94, 95–​99, 261, 263, 275, 292, 315, 323–​324, 330

colour-​coded politics  6, 99, 248, 250–​251, 254, 257–​258, 260, 263 community sector  5, 23, 230, 324, 332 comparative policy analysis  7, 203, 208, 209, 211, 214, 330 complex policy issues  7 confrontation  191, 232, 248, 252, 257, 263 conservative elites  195, 259 constitution  constitutional monarchy  4, 107–​109, 111, 113–​114, 123, 130, 131, 138, 183, 321 consultants  4–​5, 22–​23, 29, 34–​36, 41, 54, 170–​172, 175–​177, 180–​181, 182–​183, 321, 322 consultative authoritarianism  57, 58, 61 co-​optation  59, 240, 248, 256–​259 corporatism  3, 15, 52, 61 coup  post-​coup political interventions  151 critical policy studies  critical orientations of policy analysis  203

D data analytics  7, 323, 327–​328, 332 decentralisation  21, 67, 68, 69–​71, 74, 76–​78, 329 deliberation  22, 203, 215, 293, 324–​327 democracy  54, 57, 69, 98, 107–​110, 111–​112, 123, 131, 137, 138, 155, 160, 175, 179, 186, 188–​191, 195, 206–​207, 212–​214, 231, 240–​241, 249–​251, 261, 290, 321–​323, 324–​326 discourse  5, 16, 55, 75–​76, 85, 90, 95, 156–​157, 160, 163, 165, 182, 186, 187–​188, 192, 194, 196, 213, 230, 250, 293, 324, 331, 332

E educational policy courses  6 elections  political competitions  20 executive branch  139, 143, 155, 156, 158, 160–​162, 163, 164, 165–​166, 325

F Federation of Thai Industries  15, 219 foreign advisors  4, 170, 172–​173, 174

337

Policy Analysis in Thailand G

M

governance  collaborative  92, 95–​96, 290, 322 mechanisms  3, 58 systems  16, 20, 22 government responses  248

meta-​policy  14, 16, 20, 107–​109, 111, 113 methods  academic oriented  34 bureaucratic oriented  3, 28–​29, 34 managerial oriented  29, 36 participatory oriented  3, 28 military  coup see coup  114, 137, 141, 188, 190–​192, 240, 251, 321 internal security  4, 58, 137, 140, 143–​147, 151 non-​military policy domain  4, 137, 141 rural development  140, 146 telecommunications policies  137, 150 monarchy  exception  107, 110, 113, 121, 131–​132 monarch  107–​110, 111, 113–​114, 115–​120, 122–​127, 128–​130 palace  107–​109, 113–​122 power  109–​112, 113–​114, 116–​121, 126, 128–​129, 131 role  107, 111, 115–​118, 124, 128–​130 royal interventions  4, 107, 129 money politics  2, 11, 14, 18, 56, 207, 214

H hierarchical capitalism  227 hierarchies  3, 21, 33, 56 historical background  2, 11, 25 historical trajectories  1 House of Representatives  31, 34, 42, 78, 155, 158–​163, 164–​165, 206–​207, 222

I ideological polarisation  214 political polarisation  17, 21, 248 innovative policy analysis  323, 326, 332 complexity thinking  327 critical thinking  7, 323, 326–​327 design thinking  326 future thinking  327 interactive policy ecosystem  4 interest groups  2–​5, 52, 60, 157, 201, 219, 221, 223, 287 intergovernmental relations  4 interpretive policy analysis  288, 292–​294

J Joint Public and Private Sector Consultative Committee  5, 53, 222, 223–​224 Jongruck, Patamawadee  170 just sustainable future  323

K Khumsupa, Malinee  170

L legal framework  3, 22, 24, 73 legislative supporting agencies  155, 332 liberal  15, 111, 131, 220, 231, 277 local governments  authority  81, 332 autonomy  71, 75–​78 decentralisation see decentralisation  21, 67, 68, 69–​71, 74, 76–​78, 80–​81, 83, 84–​85, 112, 117, 131–​132, 161, 205, 213, 234, 236, 249, 313, 321, 329 guidelines  84, 160, 215, 257, 331 policy analysis  3, 230, 232 regulations  73 semi-​autonomous units  85 local knowledge  90, 98–​99, 294

338

N National Strategy  32, 72, 78, 82, 83, 141, 158, 161, 178, 215, 226 network  analysis  89–​91, 94–​95, 97 multi-​sector  56, 90, 93, 98 New Public Management  managerial  36–​38 performance management  29, 32 standardised processes  29 strategic tools  29 non-​state actors  7, 52, 55–​56, 57–​59, 60, 290, 322, 323, 331 non-​traditional policy studies  alternative approaches  231, 286–​287, 288, 292, 295 critical and interpretive turn  187 governance turn see governance  291, 292 interdisciplinary orientation  1, 34, 305, 331 post-​positivism  292, 294 nudging  7, 322, 327–​329

O Office of  OCSC Office of the Civil Service Commission  35 OHM Office of His Majesty’s Principal Private Secretary  118

Index OPDC Office of Public Sector Development Commission  17, 30 ORDPB Office of the Royal Development Project Board  125 outcomes  29, 35, 37–​39, 89, 90, 92–​93, 97–​98, 137, 147, 156, 183, 209, 262, 276, 290, 304, 307, 308, 311, 314, 316, 322, 332 outputs  76, 228, 322, 332 outsider  36, 121, 259

P Parliamentary committees  Parliamentarians  4, 155–​157, 160, 162, 163, 164, 165 Pensute, Chanintorn  203 Phuaphansawat, Khorapin  107 policy advice  155, 170, 171, 177, 182 policy advisory boards  5, 170–​171, 175, 177, 332 policy analysis  approaches  214, 294 education see policy education  6, 273, 275, 283, 326, 331 field of study  286, 289, 306 history  11 institutionalisation  14, 50, 207 pedagogy see policy education  191 practice  113, 320 professional  14, 203, 214 prospects see policy research  7, 130, 112, 120, 320 research  6, 20, 24, 163, 177, 179, 293, 295, 303–​307, 308–​314, 315–​317, 320 system  222, 321, 331 techniques  24, 83, 219, 281–​283 training  12–​13, 14, 18, 34, 83; see also instruction 277–​278, 280 transition  170, 175, 320–​322, 323, 324, 326, 330 policy changes  34, 37, 49, 55, 233, 258, 263, 313 policy culture  15, 17, 20–​21, 25, 203, 324, 329 policy development  3, 18, 31–​32, 49, 50–​51, 52–​53, 54, 56, 59–​60, 67, 71, 75–​76, 182, 208, 327–​329 policy education  descriptive  281, 284, 287 prescriptive  281, 284, 287 policy expert  advisory boards see policy advisory boards  5, 170–​171, 177, 332 consultants see consultants  170 think tanks see think tanks  14, 179, 187

policy isomorphism  1, 331 policy knowledge  1, 7, 11, 12, 16, 18, 25, 29, 274, 283, 286, 287, 290, 293–​294, 296, 303, 304, 311, 313, 316 policy learning  3, 28, 31, 83 policy network  5, 6, 7, 21–​22, 39, 88–​92, 93, 95, 98 policy research  advocacy projects  6 empirical  304, 308, 316 epistemic community  1 normative  304–​305, 306–​308, 312–​313, 315–​316 policy paradigms  294 pragmatic  24, 305, 308, 314–​315 transformative  24, 305–​306, 308, 313–​314, 315 policy styles  11, 19, 23, 24–​25 political movements  186, 195, 196, 248, 251, 261 political reform  186, 188–​189, 195 public discourse  186, 187–​188 public opinion expression  186, 187, 188, 196 political parties  political campaigns  210, 214 politicians  203, 211 political science  12, 14, 189, 204, 273, 274–​275, 277, 279–​280, 287, 288–​289, 329 Poocharoen, Ora-​orn  1, 28, 44, 170, 320 populist policies  17, 23, 36, 57, 130, 203, 207–​208, 209 power elites  50, 52, 53, 57–​59, 60–​61 Privy Council  117–​119, 172–​173 aristocratic role  170 public administration  1–​6, 12–​13, 18, 50, 55, 68, 117, 138–​139, 273, 274–​280, 281–​282, 283, 284, 286, 288, 320, 329 public opinion  22, 175, 186, 187, 188, 196, 312 public participation  16, 21, 39–​43, 55, 67, 74, 84, 93, 234, 249, 325 public hearings  39–​40, 189 referendums  3 public policy  academic research see academic research  303 actors  50 agenda setting see agenda setting  54, 312 development  328 experiments  314 governance  50, 55, 58, 60, 289 process  16, 50, 57, 162, 222, 238, 276, 281 see also media  22 Punthong, Wasin  137

339

Policy Analysis in Thailand Q

regional government  78, 321 resources dependency  4 ritualistic  4, 107, 130 red shirt  190–​195, 248, 251, 257, 261

monarchy  108, 113, 125 parliament  4, 155–​157, 158–​160, 162–​165 politics  110, 112, 137–​138, 143, 188–​189, 190, 194, 195, 196, 206, 208, 215 society  2, 16, 49, 126, 140, 183, 188–​189, 193–​194, 203, 233, 295 Thailand Policy Lab  178, 327 think tanks  2, 4, 11, 20, 23, 29, 34–​35, 38, 40, 170–​171, 177–​180, 182, 187, 320, 322, 327–​328

S

U

quality control  17, 69, 74, 78, 93, 276, 282, 324, 326 policy education  6, 273, 275, 283, 326, 331

R

Santhitiwanich, Arunee  28, 44, 94 senate  235, 130, 158–​159, 160–​162, 163, 164, 165 Shinawatra, Thaksin  36, 56, 129, 141, 204, 207, 208, 250, 255, 258 Sino-​Thai business conglomerates  227 social capital  90, 98, 329 social movements  alternative policies  248 movements’ strategies  6, 249, 262–​263 policy engagement  6, 249, 252 political changes  137, 254 social transformation  232, 293, 296 speaking truth to power  3, 19, 20 standardisation  29, 32, 43, 276 Sudhipongpracha, Tatchalerm  80, 155 symbolic  4, 107, 130, 190, 191

Unchanam, Puangchon  107 Ungsuchaval, Theerapat  49, 230, 237, 240, 286

T

Y

technocratic-​instrumental policy analysis  14, 18, 294 Thai  community  294, 303–​304, 308, 315–​316 constitution  111, 160, 321 military  137, 138–​139, 143, 149–​150

yellow shirt  189–​193, 195, 196, 248, 251, 257–​258, 261 youth activists  131

340

V values  2, 11, 28–​29, 32, 34, 39, 43, 56, 131, 156, 175, 238, 252, 305, 314, 316, 320, 322, 324, 330, 332 vertical  94, 99, 225, 323 voluntary  56, 262 vulnerable  161, 306, 328

W war of position  5, 186, 187, 191, 192–​194, 195, 196 watchdog  6, 230 weak democratic  1, 11, 325 Whangmahaporn, Piyakorn  273, 287

Z Zero Tolerance  112