Policy Analysis in Spain 9781447353768

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INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF POLICY ANALYSIS SERIES EDITORS: IRIS GEVA-MAY & MICHAEL HOWLETT

POLICY ANALYSIS IN

Spain

Edited by Laura Chaqués-Bonafont and Jacint Jordana

POLICY ANALYSIS IN SPAIN

International Library of Policy Analysis Series editors: Iris Geva-May, Simon Fraser University, Canada, Carleton University, Canada and NYU Wagner, USA and Michael Howlett, FRSC, Canada Research Chair (Tier 1) and Simon Fraser University, Canada This major series brings together for the first time a detailed examination of the theory and practice of policy analysis systems at different levels of government and by non-governmental actors in a specific country. It therefore provides a key addition to research and teaching in comparative policy analysis and policy studies more generally. Each volume includes a history of the country’s policy analysis which offers a broad comparative overview with other countries as well as the country in question. In doing so, the books in the series provide the data and empirical case studies essential for instruction and for further research in the area. They also include expert analysis of different approaches to policy analysis and an assessment of their evolution and operation. Volumes in the series include the following countries: Australia • Brazil • Czech Republic • France • Germany • Japan • Israel • The Netherlands • Turkey • Colombia • Spain • Mexico • Taiwan • USA • Canada • Belgium and build into an essential library of key reference works. The series will be of interest to academics and students in public policy, public administration and management, comparative politics and government, public organisations and individual policy areas. It will also interest people working in the countries in question and internationally. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis. See more at comparativepolicy.org/about-jcpa-icpa-forum/ or at policy. bristoluniversitypress.co.uk/international-library-of-policy-analysis.

POLICY ANALYSIS IN SPAIN Edited by Laura Chaqués-​Bonafont and Jacint Jordana

International Library of Policy Analysis, Vol 17

First published in Great Britain in 2022 by Policy Press, an imprint of Bristol University Press University of Bristol 1–​9 Old Park Hill Bristol BS2 8BB UK t: +​44 (0)117 954 5940 e: bup-​[email protected] Details of international sales and distribution partners are available at policy.bristoluniversitypress.co.uk © Bristol University Press 2022 British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN 978-1-4473-5374-4 hardcover ISBN 978-1-4473-5377-5 ePub ISBN 978-1-4473-5376-8 ePdf The right of Laura Chaqués-​Bonafont and Jacint Jordana to be identified as editors of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved: no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise without the prior permission of Bristol University Press. Every reasonable effort has been made to obtain permission to reproduce copyrighted material. If, however, anyone knows of an oversight, please contact the publisher. The statements and opinions contained within this publication are solely those of the editors and contributors and not of the University of Bristol or Bristol University Press. The University of Bristol and Bristol University Press disclaim responsibility for any injury to persons or property resulting from any material published in this publication. Bristol University Press and Policy Press work to counter discrimination on grounds of gender, race, disability, age and sexuality. Cover design: Qube Design Front cover image: iStock Bristol University Press and Policy Press use environmentally responsible print partners. Printed in Great Britain by CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY

Contents List of figures and tables Notes on contributors Editors’ introduction to the series Foreword Joan Subirats one

Policy analysis in Spain: actors and institutions Laura Chaqués-​Bonafont and Jacint Jordana

vii ix xvi xviii

1

Part One:  Examining the policy analysis context two three

Historical forerunners in Spanish policy analysis Albert Carreras and Anna Maria Aubanell-​Jubany Policy analysis and policy evaluation as a profession Verónica Viñas

21 46

Part Two:  Policy analysis by governments four five six seven

Policy analysis in central government: still in its infancy Salvador Parrado Policy analysis and regional governments Andrea Noferini and David Sancho Policy analysis in local government: objects, perspectives, and actors Esther Pano, Lluís Medir, and Jaume Magre Domestic policy analysis by international actors Oriol Costa and Margarita León

67 83 102 124

Part Three:  Policy analysis beyond executive in the public sphere eight nine ten eleven

Parliamentary committees as policy analysis institutions Anna M. Palau and Andreu Rodilla Policy analysis and public opinion Laura Chaqués-​Bonafont, Mónica Méndez Lago, and Yeimy Ospina Participatory institutions and advisory councils Joan Font and Pau Alarcón Policy analysis at universities and research centres Ivan Cerrillo and Jacint Jordana

141 165 186 203

v

Policy Analysis in Spain Part Four:  Policy analysis by parties, interest groups, and other actors twelve

Political parties and policy analysis Oscar Barberà, Juan Rodríguez-​Teruel, and Fernando Casal thirteen Trade unions, policy analysis, and the policy process Oscar Molina and Alejandro Godino fourteen Business associations and policy analysis Iván Medina fifteen NGOs as policy analysis partners: from invisibility to expansion Luz Muñoz Márquez and Noemí Orué Guerrero sixteen Think tanks and policy analysis Jordi Bacaria

225 246 265 283 303

Index327

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List of figures and tables Figures 5.1 6.1 6.2 6.3 8.1 8.2 8.3 8.4 8.5 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.5 9.6 10.1 10.2 11.1 11.2 11.3 11.4 11.5 11.6 11.7 11.8 15.1 15.2 15.3

Regional Authority Index –​Spain (1978–​2016) Municipal compulsory activities Organic position of the areas Availability on the municipal websites of mechanisms for planning, analysis, and evaluation Number and type of parliamentary committees by legislature (1982–​2019) Permanent legislative committees: percentage by policy area and legislature (1982–​2019) Interests’ groups’ parliamentary appearances (1986–​2019) Authorities and public officials’ parliamentary appearances (1986–​2019) Tenure in parliamentary committees (1982–​2019) Evolution of surveys over time by type (absolute numbers)  Evolution of main survey topic, 1978–​2018 Evolution of main survey topics, 1978–​2018: policy areas with increasing attention Evolution of main survey topics, 1978–​2018: policy areas with decreasing attention Evolution of surveys by geographical scope Surveys by target population 1995–​2018 (absolute numbers) General overview of the contents of the chapter General research design Distribution of research centres by autonomous community Number of research centres per policy area Evolution of research centres for policy analysis (1975–​2020) Geographical location of research projects Distribution of research projects per policy area Yearly publications on policy analysis (1992–2018) The number of policy papers from universities and research centres Distribution of topics in policy research journal articles Year of establishment of NGOs participating in the policy process in Spain NGOs involved in hearings of parliamentary committees from 1996 to 2019 Policy issues in which NGOs participate in parliamentary hearings (percentage)

86 106 112 112 146 147 152 153 155 172 175 176 176 179 180 187 195 208 210 210 212 213 215 217 218 286 293 293

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Tables 3.A1 5.1 6.1 6.2 6.3 7.1 7.2 8.1 9.1 9.2 9.3 9.4 9.A1 12.1 12.2 12.3 12.4 12.5 12.A1 14.1 14.2 14.3 15.1 15.2 15.3 15.4 15.A1

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Master’s and PhD programmes in policy analysis, public policy, and policy evaluation Subnational government expenditure by function (as a share of total subnational government expenditure, 2016) Local entities in Spain Municipalities and population of Spain (2019) Policy analysis and allied services in large Spanish cities Supranational organisations and state-​level policy analysis Coercion, teaching, coordination: supranational organisations in state policy analysis MP participation in parliamentary committees: number of committees, issue diversity, and tenure (1982–​2019) Directors of the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas Descriptive statistics –​CIS studies (1978–​2018) Percentage of surveys by policy area The evolution of the percentage of surveys by policy areas (1978–​2018) Coding scheme Spanish political parties: human resources (2018) Spanish party think tanks: basic data Sectoral organisation in Spanish parties’ executives Party think tanks’ thematic areas of specialisation circa 2010s Spanish parties’ international connections at the end of the 2010s Spanish political parties: basic info CEOE’s policy analysis and related tasks, 2018 Business associations’ strategies for policy analysis Cámara de Comercio de España’s 2020 annual budget (in €) Type of information prepared by NGOs that they perceive as important to policy-​makers NGOs involved in debates on bills across time, 1996–​2019 How often NGOs deliver policy analysis related to parliamentary activities Percentage of NGOs active as policy experts in the executive and parliamentary arenas NGOs most present in parliamentary committees by issue and legislature

57 87 104 105 111 129 135 156 168 170 174 178 183 230 231 233 234 238 241 273 277 279 289 294 295 296 298

Notes on contributors Pau Alarcón is a research assistant at Universitat Pompeu Fabra and a researcher at the Fundació BCN Formació Professional. His research interests include local participation processes, deliberative democracy, political attitudes, and behaviour. His work has been published, among others, in the European Journal of Political Research, Policy & Politics, Acta Politica, Revista Internacional de Sociología, and the Journal of Public Deliberation. Anna Maria Aubanell-​Jubany is Professor in the Department of Economics and Economic History at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. She has been a lecturer at the University of Aberdeen, Scotland. Her research interests are on Spanish economic and business history focusing on utilities. Publications in English include: together with Terry Gourvish, ‘Performance of European Transport and Utilities’ in Youssef Cassis et al (eds), The Performance of European Business in the Twentieth Century (Oxford University Press, 2016). Recent publications include: ‘Emprendedores, técnicos y capitalistas de la industria del gas’ in I. Bartolomé et al (eds), Cercanas pero distintas (Marcial Pons, 2020). Jordi Bacaria is Professor of Applied Economics at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. He is editor-​in-​chief of the journal Foreign Affairs Latinoamérica published in Mexico. His areas of research are in economic policy, public choice and European integration. Publications include Disrupted Global Value Chains and Geopolitical Shifts, Monografías Cidob; N.º 79, pp 19–​26, 2020; Atlantic Maritime Transportation: Impacts of the Atlantic Trade on Shipping Transport Emissions and International Regulation, with N. Soler-​Huici, Center for Transatlantic Relations The Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies The Johns Hopkins University, pp 153–​80, 2017. Oscar Barberà is Associate Professor at Universitat de València. His main areas of interest are party politics, decentralisation, and political elites. His latest contributions are in Comparative European Politics, Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft, Revista de Estudios Políticos, and several edited volumes from the Spanish Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas. Albert Carreras is Full Professor in the Department of Economics and Business at Universitat Pompeu Fabra. He has been professor at the Department of History and Civilisation of the European University Institute, Florence (1989–​94) and Prince of Asturias Professor at the Edmund A. Haas School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University (2007–​8). He has co-​edited, with Xavier Tafunell, three volumes of Spanish historical statistics: Estadísticas Históricas de España (siglos XIX–​ XX) (Fundación BBVA, 2005). He has recently published, also with Xavier

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Tafunell, Between Empire and Globalization: An Economic History of Modern Spain (Palgrave Macmillan, 2021). Fernando Casal is Associate Professor in the School of Politics and International Relations at the University of Nottingham. He is co-​director of REPRESENT: Research Centre for the Study of Parties and Democracy and member of the OSCE/​ODIHR ‘Core Group of Political Party Experts’. His work has been published in the Journal of Politics, European Journal of Political Research, Sociological Methods and Research, Journal of Democracy, Electoral Studies, West European Politics, and Party Politics. He was awarded the 2017 Gordon Smith and Vincent Wright Memorial Prize and the 2017 AECPA Prize for the Best Article. His last monograph is titled Party System Closure: Party Alliances, Government Alternative and Democracy in Europe (Oxford University Press, 2021). Ivan Cerrillo is Adjunct Lecturer and PhD candidate at the Department of Political and Social Sciences, Universitat Pompeu Fabra. His research interests include policy analysis, evaluation, and public administration. Laura Chaqués-​Bonafont is Professor of Political Science at Universitat de Barcelona, and research fellow at the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals. She develops research about agenda dynamics in a comparative perspective and political representation. She collaborates actively with the comparative agendas project, aimed to provide new tools for the quantitative analysis of agenda dynamics across time, countries, policy issues, and levels of governance. At present, she is leading the Quality of Democracy research group (www.Q-​dem. com). In 2014, she won the Icrea academia prize. Oriol Costa is Associate Professor of International Relations at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona and a senior research associate at Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals. He has co-​edited two books on EU foreign policy (both with Palgrave) and two special issues on ‘Politicization of EU Trade Policy across Time and Space’ (Politics and Governance, 2020) and ‘Contestation and Politicization of European Foreign and Security Cooperation’ (European Security, 2021). He has published journal articles on EU foreign policy in the Journal of European Public Policy, Cooperation and Politics, European Security, Comparative European Politics, Politische Vierteljahresschrift, Mediterranean Politics, and the Cambridge Review of International Affairs. Joan Font is Research Professor at the Institute of Advanced Social Studies (IESA-​ CSIC). His research interests involve the different ways public administrations have to know citizen preferences, including elections, surveys, local participation processes, citizen juries, deliberative polls, referendums, or advisory councils. His books include, with D. della Porta and Y. Sintomer (eds), Participatory Democracy in Southern Europe: Causes, Characteristics and Consequences x

Notes on contributors

(Rowman and Littlefield, 2014), and, with M. Méndez (eds), Surveying Ethnic Minorities and Immigrant Populations: Methodological Challenges and Research Strategies (Amsterdam University Press, 2013). Alejandro Godino is Postdoctoral Researcher at the Centre d’Estudis Sociològics sobre la Vida Quotidiana i el Treball and Eurofound correspondent in Spain. He holds a degree in sociology from the University of Granada, a master’s degree in European social and employment policy and a PhD in sociology from Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. His main interests include employment relations, organisational changes, and labour market inequalities. Jacint Jordana is Professor of Political Science and Public Administration at Universitat Pompeu Fabra. He is the Director of the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals since June 2005. His main research area focuses on the comparative analysis of public policies, with special emphasis on regulatory policy and its institutions. He has published extensively on the diffusion of agencies, the challenge of accountability, and the constraints to their political independence. He also has been working on topics related to public policy, governance, and collective action. Margarita León is Associate Professor of Political Science at Universitat Autònoma Barcelona. Between 2010 and 2015 she was a ‘Ramón y Cajal’ Research Fellow at the Institute of Government and Public Policies at Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. From 2003 until 2010 she was lecturer in European social policy, University of Kent. Her main area of research is comparative social policy. She has published in international peer-​reviewed journals, co-​edited with A. Guillén The Spanish Welfare State in European Context (Ashgate, 2011) and edited The Transformation of Care in European Societies (Palgrave, 2014). In 2018 she was awarded ICREA ACADEMIA for excellence in research. Jaume Magre is Associate Professor of Political Science at Universitat de Barcelona. He is a specialist in comparative local government, electoral systems, and electoral behaviour. He is Principal Investigator of the Research Group in Local Studies and Director of the Carles Pi i Sunyer Foundation for Autonomous and Local Studies, the main research centre of local government in Spain. He is the author of several reports for different authorities, such as the report on local governments and the municipal executives of the EU, and the report on the direct election of the mayor, commissioned by the Ministry of Public Administration. Iván Medina is Associate Professor of Political Science at Universitat de València. His research focuses on business associations, interest groups, and regionalism in Spain. He is member of the COMPASSS network (compasss.org) ‘Comparative Methods for Systematic Cross-​Case Analysis’. His work has been published in European Urban and Regional Studies, Contemporary Politics, Regional and Federal xi

Policy Analysis in Spain

Studies, Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas, and Revista de Estudios Políticos. He is co-​editor of the book Los grupos de interés en España (Tecnos, 2016). Lluís Medir is Associate Professor at Universitat de Barcelona, in the Political Science Department. He is coordinator of the master’s degree in public management is in charge of the institutional transparency policies for the university. He belongs to the research group on local government (www.ub.edu/​ grel), and his research interests include local government, intergovernmental relations, transparency, and public policies at the local level. He has published in Local Government Studies, the International Journal of Public Sector Management, and Revista Española de Ciencia Política among others. Mónica Méndez Lago is Senior Advisor at the Research Department of the Sociological Research Center (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas) since 2005, where she has coordinated a large number of surveys dealing with a wide variety of social and political attitudes, including several rounds of the European Social Survey and the International Social Survey Programme in Spain. Her fields of expertise are the study of political and social attitudes and behaviour, as well as survey methodology. In this latter field, together with Joan Font, she has co-​edited the book Surveying Ethnic Minorities and Immigrant Populations: Methodological Challenges and Research Strategies (Amsterdam University Press, 2013). Oscar Molina is Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology and researcher at Centre d’Estudis Sociològics sobre la Vida Quitidiana I el Treball and the Institute for Labour Studies, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. He holds a degree in economics (Pompeu Fabra University) and a PhD in social and political science (European University Institute). His research focuses on the comparative analysis of industrial relations and collective bargaining, trade unions, labour markets, and comparative political economy. He has worked as external collaborator for the ILO on several projects and coordinates Eurofound’s national correspondent team in Spain. Luz Muñoz Márquez is Professor of Political Science at Universitat de Barcelona. Her research focuses on interest groups politics, advocacy, and legal mobilisation. Other topics of interest are agenda setting and government–​opposition dynamics. She is a member of the research group ‘Quality of Democracy’ (www.Q-​dem. com), aimed to analyse the interrelation between governmental, parliament and media agenda, as well as the interest groups politics. Her research has been published in the Journal of Public Policy, West European Politics, Voluntas, Journal of Legislative Studies and Interest Groups and Advocacy, among others. Andrea Noferini is Professor at the Center for International Affairs (CEI Barcelona) and Adjunct Professor at the Department of Political and Social xii

Notes on contributors

Science of Universitat Pompeu Fabra. His main research area focuses on public policies with a special emphasis on EU policy-​making, multilevel governance, cross-​border cooperation, cohesion policy, and development cooperation. He has participated in several projects for different organisations like the United Nation Development Program, the European Commission, the Spanish Agency for Cooperation and Development as well as public administrations at the national, regional, and local level. Noemí Orué Guerrero is a PhD student at Universitat de Barcelona. Her research interest is the behaviour of NGOs as political actors in the parliamentary, governmental, and judicial arenas. She has professional experience in the field of international cooperation with UNDP-​Ecuador and currently works for the NGO Fundación Vicente Ferrer in Spain. Yeimy Ospina holds a degree in law from Universidad Autònoma de Barcelona and a master’s degree in international relations from the Institut de Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals. She is an expert in the management of national and international innovation and research projects, building trusting relationships with partners, national and European authorities, and the technical preparation, coordination, and financial execution of projects. Anna M. Palau is Serra Húnter Associate Professor at Universitat de Barcelona (Department of Political Science). Her research focuses on the analysis of agenda-​ setting dynamics and parliamentary behaviour, and has been published in journals such as Journalism Studies, European Union Politics, Parliamentary Affairs, Comparative Political Studies, West European Politics, and the Journal of Legislative Studies. She is also co-​author of the book Agenda Dynamics in Spain (Palgrave, 2015, with Laura Chaqués-​Bonafont and Frank Baumgartner). Esther Pano has a PhD in political science from Universitat de Barcelona. She is Associate Lecturer of Political Science at Universitat de Barcelona. She directs the ‘Local Government Observatory’ held by the Fundació Carles Pi i Sunyer (www.pisunyer.org/​). She is a member of the GREL (www.ub.edu/​ grel). Her research interests are related to empirical institutional analysis and local government. Her publications include ‘The Architecture of the Local Political Community: France, Italy, Portugal and Spain’ with Jaume Magre in The Routledge Handbook of International Local Government (Routledge, 2019) and ‘Dealing with Austerity: A Case of Local Resilience in Southern Europe’ in Local Government Studies. Salvador Parrado teaches public administration at the Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia (Spanish Distance Learning University), Madrid, and is associate faculty at the Hertie School, Berlin. He is founding director of

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Governance International (www.govint.org). He has carried out comparative research on executive politics, administrative systems, public management, service co-​production, public values, public–​private partnerships, and the civil service. His work has been published in Regulation & Governance, West European Politics, Public Policy and Administration, and the Journal of Social Policy among others. Andreu Rodilla is a pre-​doctoral researcher at Universitat de Barcelona (Department of Political Science). His main research interests include the analysis of parliamentary dynamics, judicial politics, and the study of judicial behaviour. Juan Rodríguez-T ​ eruel is Associate Professor at Universitat de València. He has also been lecturer at the Autonomous University of Barcelona and visiting fellow at the universities of LSE, Edinburgh, Leiden, Université Libre de Bruxelles and Nottingham. His main areas of research are executive elites and party politics. He is author of Ministers in Democratic Spain (Linz Award 2007, in Spanish). His work has been published in South European Politics and Society, Ethnic and Racial Studies, Comparative European Politics, Acta Politica, and Contemporary Sociology. David Sancho is Professor at the Department of Political and Social Sciences of Universitat Pompeu Fabra of which he has been director between 2015 and 2020. His areas of research are focused on the study of public policies and government intervention: innovation in public management, design and evaluation of public policies, regulation models, strategies for modernising public management through the use of new information and communication technologies. He directs different master’s and postgraduate programmes in these thematic areas. Joan Subirats holds a PhD in economics from Universitat de Barcelona and is Professor of Political Science and founder and researcher of the Institute of Government and Public Policies of Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. His research interests are in public policy analysis. He collaborates regularly with El País, Diario.es, and other media. Recent books include Social Innovation and Democratic Leadership: Communities and Social Change from Below (Edward Elgar, 2017), Canvi d’època i de polítiques públiques a Catalunya (Galaxia Gutenberg, 2019), Du Social Business a l’Economie Solidaire. Critique de l’innovation sociale (Érés, 2020), and Repensando la Administración ante los nuevos riesgos sociales y globales (INAP, 2021). Verónica Viñas is Associate Professor of Political Science, Department of Social Sciences, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid (Spain). She has written several books, book chapters, and articles in specialised journals related to the analysis and evaluation of public policies, referring both to theoretical and methodological issues and to the results of empirical research. She has received two important awards for her publications, from the Spanish Association of Political Science,

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and from the Ministry of Public Administration –​National Institute of Public Administration. Her recent publications include: ‘Policy Change: Which Are Its Dimensions and How Can It Be Measured?’ and ‘Public Policies on Restorative Justice in Juvenile Justice: Comparative Analysis between Autonomous Communities’ in Revista del CLAD. Reforma y Democracia.

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Editors’ introduction to the series Professor Iris Geva-May and Professor Michael Howlett, ILPA series editors Policy analysis is a relatively new area of social scientific inquiry, owing its origins to developments in the US in the early 1960s. Its main rationale is systematic, evidence-based, transparent, efficient, and implementable policy-making. This component of policy-making is deemed key in democratic structures allowing for accountable public policies. From the US, policy analysis has spread to other countries, notably in Europe in the 1980s and 1990s and in Asia in the 1990s and 2000s. It has taken, respectively one to two more decades for programmes of public policy to be established in these regions preparing cadres for policy analysis as a profession. However, this movement has been accompanied by variations in the kinds of analysis undertaken as US-inspired analytical and evaluative techniques have been adapted to local traditions and circumstances, and new techniques shaped in these settings. In the late 1990s this led to the development of the field of comparative policy analysis, pioneered by Iris Geva-May, who initiated and founded the Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, and whose mission has been advanced with the support of editorial board members such as Laurence E. Lynn Jr., first co-editor, Peter deLeon, Duncan McRae, David Weimer, Beryl Radin, Frans van Nispen, Yukio Adachi, Claudia Scott, Allan Maslove and others in the US and elsewhere. While current studies have underlined differences and similarities in national approaches to policy analysis, the different national regimes which have developed over the past two to three decades have not been thoroughly explored and systematically evaluated in their entirety, examining both sub-national and nonexecutive governmental organisations as well as the non-governmental sector; nor have these prior studies allowed for either a longitudinal or a latitudinal comparison of similar policy analysis perceptions, applications, and themes across countries and time periods. The International Library for Policy Analysis (ILPA) series fills this gap in the literature and empirics of the subject. It features edited volumes created by experts in each country, which inventory and analyse their respective policy analysis systems. To a certain extent the series replicates the template of Policy Analysis in Canada edited by Dobuzinskis, Howlett and Laycock (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2007). Each ILPA volume surveys the state of the art of policy analysis in governmental and non-governmental organisations in each country using the common template derived from the Canadian collection in order to provide for each volume in the series comparability in terms of coverage and approach. Each volume addresses questions such as: What do policy analysts do? What techniques and approaches do they use? What is their influence on policy-making xvi

Editors’ introduction to the series

in that country? Is there a policy analysis deficit? What norms the work done by policy analysts working in different institutional settings? Contributors focus on the sociology of policy analysis, demonstrating how analysts working in different organisations tend to have different interests and to utilise different techniques. The central theme of each volume includes historical works on the origins of policy analysis in the jurisdiction concerned, and then proceeds to investigate the nature and types, and quality, of policy analysis conducted by governments (including different levels and orders of government). It then moves on to examine the nature and kinds of policy analytical work and practices found in non-governmental actors such as think tanks, interest groups, business, labour, media, political parties, non-profits and others. Each volume in the series aims to compare and analyse the significance of the different styles and approaches found in each country and organisation studied, and to understand the impact these differences have on the policy process. Together, the volumes included in the ILPA series serve to provide the basic data and empirical case studies required for an international dialogue in the area of policy analysis, and an eye-opener on the nuances of policy analysis applications and implications in national and international jurisdictions. Each volume in the series is leading edge and has the promise to dominate its field and the textbook market for policy analysis in the country concerned, as well as being of broad comparative interest to markets in other countries. The ILPA is published in association with the International Comparative Policy Analysis Forum, and the Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, whose mission is to advance international comparative policy analytic studies. The editors of each volume are leading members of this network and are the best-known scholars in each respective country, as are the authors contributing to each volume in their particular domain. The book series as a whole provides learning insights for instruction and for further research in the area and constitutes a major addition to research and pedagogy in the field of comparative policy analysis and policy studies in general. We welcome to the ILPA series Volume 17, Policy Analysis in Spain, edited by Laura Chaqués-Bonafont and Jacint Jordana, and thank the editors and the authors for their outstanding contribution to this important encyclopedic database. Iris Geva-May Professor of Policy Studies, Baruch College at the City University of New York, Professor Emerita Simon Fraser University; Founding President and Editor-in-chief, International Comparative Policy Analysis Forum and Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis Michael Howlett Burnaby Mountain Professor, Department of Political Science, Simon Fraser University, and Yong Pung How Chair Professor, Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore xvii

Foreword Joan Subirats The development of public policy analysis studies in Spain began in the mid-​ 1980s and especially in the 1990s, essentially in the academic sphere. In those early years of democracy, the institutional dynamics were still very much marked by an administrative structure that had emerged during the years of political reform under Franco, which sought to combine administrative effectiveness and efficiency with political authoritarianism and state hierarchy. Public administrations therefore focused their actions on the legal processes of decision-​making, from a logic centred on procedures and guarantees. Decision-​making mechanisms combined informal mechanisms for consulting the main stakeholders with regulatory processes without any tradition of consultation, transparency, or accountability. The interest in public policy analysis in Spain resulted from the rapid increase in public spending by administrations, greater institutional complexity, and the emergence of a public sphere of communication in which public problems, measures taken by institutions, and the outcomes of all this were debated, with the usual controversy between the different political actors. Giandomenico Majone said that public policy analysis is more interested in producing evidence and arguments to be used in the political and institutional debate than in turning its work into strictly academic material. It is therefore not surprising that, with a certain speed and in the midst of the process of ‘administrative modernisation’, the interest in seeking instruments of analysis more focused on the capacity for transformation of public action than on strict compliance with the law, led in the 1990s to the appearance of texts, journals, and courses in universities and civil servant training centres linked to the ‘policy analysis’ approach. As we know, the way public authorities act is highly regulated. From the procedure for taking the relevant decisions, to the procedures to be followed to bring those decisions to a successful conclusion, or the status of the personnel in their service or the means of recruitment, all these aspects are regulated in some way or another. The institutional rules that have accompanied the public authorities since the distant times of the liberal (re)founding of modern states were very much focused on scrupulous compliance with legality, understood as a direct expression of the general will, within a context that placed public administrations in a clear subsidiary role and in defence of the internal and external order that would enable the market and social interactions to function properly. Accordingly, it is hardly surprising that in Spain the strictly administrativist approach was hegemonic at the time of its transition to democracy and in the first years of democratic government. Although, from the point of view of policy-​ making, the process was opening up, incorporating economic, social, and political criteria, from the point of view of public policy assessment the situation did not evolve with the same speed. The fact that the main assessment criteria are based xviii

Foreword

on the regularity of the administrative process and on criteria of compliance with legality, within a framework of subsequent jurisdictional control, was and still is regarded as natural. This contrasts with the extension of the objectives of public authorities and their administrations, which have been broadening the bases of legitimacy of these administrations from strict compliance with current legality to forms that rely more on the capacity to meet social demands and needs. It should no longer be enough for Spanish public administrations to comply with the law in the deployment of their actions. They should also aim at total or partial satisfaction of the social needs that have been added to the public authorities’ agenda over the years. The current reality requires public authorities to deploy a wide range of actions in very different spheres, in a context of restraint or financial restrictions that make it necessary to fine-​tune programmes, control processes, and examine the results achieved, given that citizens and the plurality of groups in which they are organised, and the media acting as their mouthpieces, are becoming more demanding about the final destination and the impacts generated by the very significant flow of resources that public administrations manage on their behalf. On the other hand, it is worth remembering that Spain is one of the most decentralised countries in the world. And it is not easy to approach policy-​making and policy assessment criteria without considering the consequences of all this in a complex government structure. Planning processes are highly politicised, and this requires attention not only to the contents of the policies to be deployed, but also to the whole process leading to decisions that can be assumed by all parties. Decision-​making can only be conceived as the staging of consensus between authorities endowed with political autonomy who, in a positive-​sum game, agree on common definitions of their needs, on the identification of higher priorities and on the allocation of resources in accordance with these priorities. From this perspective of non-​hierarchical coordination, the actor seeking to position him-​or herself at the ‘centre’ or node of joint decision-​making and assessment processes should be able to combine, to varying degrees, the roles of expert, arbitrator, and recognised authority, responsible for defending the whole over the parts. In order to excel in this integrating role, it is essential that such an actor should have, beyond formal titles, the capacities and means (especially financial and cognitive resources) with which to bring the parties together in common commitments. And, in this respect, information-​sharing is crucial. Without sufficient and accurate information flows in all directions, it is not possible to make joint assessment functions viable. At the same time, the quantity and quality of information shared is a good measure of the trust capital in the system, without which coordination in a decentralised environment can hardly progress. In short, 30 years after the recovery of democracy in Spain, it is now commonplace to discuss in legislative assemblies, in forums for political debate, or in articles in the daily press about public policies, hearings, experts in a specific policy, or the still evident need to reinforce the mechanisms for evaluating public policies. The book I have the honour to preface highlights two things. On the xix

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one hand, it shows that we cannot yet state that the analysis of public policies is a common practice both within public administrations and by the actors who try to influence the decisions to be taken, the ways of implementing them or the debate on their effectiveness. At the same time, however, it is noteworthy that there is already a more than significant academic work and a significant presence of offices, companies, and experts located in and related to policy-​making in state, regional, local, or European institutions. Although several volumes and many papers and reports have already been published on the different sectoral public policies of the state, the Autonomous Communities, and local governments, this volume incorporates a new approach and allows for a detailed analysis of the practice of policy analysis in Spain. By following the structure of other volumes already published in the International Library of Policy Analysis, it allows for a detailed analysis of the different institutional processes of policy-​making and the role of the different actors in them. Without attempting to provide a detailed explanation of its structure, I would like to emphasise that the mere fact of being able to edit and publish this book indicates a certain degree of maturity in the study and practice of policy analysis in Spain. The historical foundations are combined with the complex structure of multilevel government, the growing influence of the analytical perspective in the public sphere is addressed, and a significant tracing of policy analysis in the very diverse actors that are present in the configuration, implementation, and evaluation of public policies is incorporated. And all of this is done from plural disciplinary approaches and from methodologies that are also diverse, but united by a specific and common interest. In the book we find the essential outlines of what an approach to policy analysis implies and its insertion in the Spanish institutional scenario: decision-​ making processes, the complexity of spheres of government, interactions between institutions and public actors and stakeholders, prescriptive elements on how to face the future, and the difficulties of maintaining the necessary legitimacy of all public action in times of notable distrust of public powers. In short, this volume incorporates the case of Spain into the global map of policy analysis, demonstrating the growing normalisation of its perspective in the studies, diagnoses, and balances of the action of the complex network of public authorities operating in Spain. Thirty years after this analytical approach first appeared in our country, we should congratulate ourselves on the release of a volume such as this one and its articulation with the global debate on problems and the public agenda, institutional decisions and their implementation, and the demand for accountability and outcome evaluations. The more we take an interest in public policy, the more consolidated our democracy will be. We will be moving from a political culture that is narrowly focused on ends and values, on the one hand, and means and procedures, on the other, to a political and administrative management approach that seeks in the means-​ends-​outcomes relationship the justification for public action, the ultimate justification for public decision-​makers and managers. xx

ONE

Policy analysis in Spain: actors and institutions Laura Chaqués-​Bonafont and Jacint Jordana

Introduction Policy analysis refers to studies for the policy process, not to the study of the policy process. It is concerned primarily with the production of knowledge and policy alternatives for policy-​making purposes. It aims to generate systematic and empirical studies about policy problems and discuss the possible course of action, considering the different views and ways of thinking in a society. Policy analysis involves the efforts of governmental actors, interest groups, political parties, international organisations, think tanks, research institutes, and universities to improve public policy outputs and procedures by applying ‘systematic evaluative rationality’ (Howlett and Lindquist, 2004: 225; Colebatch, 2006). In this sense, policy analysis provides analytical support to governmental actors for structuring information, developing policy frameworks, and identifying alternatives for policy-​makers, to solve social, economic, and political challenges they face. Policy analysis is a way to construct better policies. Yet, there is no unique way to define policy analysis. According to Colebatch (2006) there are three main perspectives to examine policy analysis. First, the top-​down approach considers policy analysis an instrument through which policy advisors ‘speak the truth’ to governmental actors (Wildavsky, 1987; Sabatier, 1999). In this view, policy-​ makers should use rigorous evidence instead of ideological common sense and/​ or short-​term interests to make decisions. The complexities and technicalities around policy areas oblige policy-​makers to rely on the expertise of policy experts to make policy decisions. Policy-​makers follow the advice of policy advisors and experts who have a profound knowledge of the issues under dispute. Policy advisors are considered rational actors with a scientific background that can provide neutral, non-​ideological knowledge about issues. No one denies the importance of quality scientific data and evidence-​based assessments to produce better policies. Policy-​makers need empirical research and objective criteria to respond to citizens’ preferences and make successful policies. However, as the structured-​interaction approach and the social construction perspective emphasise, policy-​making is not only about applying technical and economic efficiency criteria or collecting massive datasets on social and economic problems (Howlett and Lindquist, 2004; Colebatch, 2006). It is also about responding to citizens’ preferences and connecting policy decisions to 1

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existing values, principles, and ways of thinking in a society. Hence, policy-​ makers’ decisions about most issues also require a political assessment of its impact beyond empirical evidence. Constructing better policies also requires information about the principles, values, and ways of thinking of those involved in the policy-​ making process. The structured-​interaction approach emphasises the relational character of policy analysis. Policy-​making is a complex, non-​linear process that includes a variety of policy actors with different and often conflicting ways of thinking about issues. Policy-​makers need advice, not only about what to do but also about how to achieve policy goals. In the context of increasing public intervention and administrative complexity, the role of the policy analyst is not only to generate scientific knowledge on policy impact (ex-​ante or ex-​post), but also to define optimal strategies about how to advance policy goals, when to negotiate –​and about what –​with other actors in the same or related policy areas. From this perspective, policy analysis goes beyond the generation of knowledge about specific issues. It also focuses on political strategy, value discussion, and the assessment of policy instruments. Policy analysis aims to inform policy actors about implementing policy options by adapting existing knowledge under specific circumstances. Finally, the social construction approach emphasises the role of policy analysis as a persuasion agent. The main idea is that, in politics, there is no ‘truth’ to talk about. There is no single way of thinking about policy issues, and there is no sense in identifying the ‘best knowledge-​based policy’ option. All problems can be framed from different perspectives and can benefit other interests or values. Policy analysts produce knowledge, but this knowledge is not neutral; it is always sensitive to different perception biases and policy interests. Thus, from this perspective, policy analysis is aimed to further support, challenge, or test specific values (Radin, 2000; Fischer and Miller, 2006). At the least, one may consider whether the lack of neutrality is intended. In some cases, experts produce information and knowledge with a clear ideological purpose, while others try to adopt a more scientific, fact-​based perspective. In both cases, policy analysis aims to generate knowledge (identifying facts and connections) and develop persuasive arguments that may impose a particular view of the policy-​making process. All these three perspectives –​top-​down, structured-​interaction, and social construction –​emphasise policy analysis aims to contribute to the design and implementation of better policies. Still, they differ in the way this goal can be achieved. The top-​down or rational approach emphasises that limiting ideology’s role and promoting scientific knowledge in decision-​making are crucial to fostering efficient policies. In the case of the structured-​interaction approach, policy analysis is more about defining optimal courses of action to achieve policy goals. Finally, the social construction approach considers that policy analysis is specifically about producing persuasive arguments that policy-​makers may use to advance their policy positions and their ways of thinking in debates about policy issues. 2

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In this book, we aim to scrutinise how policy analysis is done in Spain. We examine the production of policy analyses across institutional venues and types of actors, leaving aside the normative views about what policy analysis should be. Contributors to this volume do not adopt the same analytical perspective in all instances to this purpose, but in many cases, they move beyond the first perspective, not expecting problem-​free analyses of policies by neutral scientists, and they consider, to some extent, different elements of the other two perspectives, including the relational nature of policy analysis and the interactions that emerge, as well as the role of ideas and values that inspired policy diagnosis, aiming to shape policies in particular directions. In doing this, their purpose is to explain which policy actors participate in policy analysis, how they applied policy analysis to promote policy change, and how political realities are transformed as a result. The following sections summarise the goals and main findings of this edited volume.

Policy analysis in Spain This book offers the first comprehensive study of how policy analysis is produced in Spain, by focusing on the actors and institutions involved. The chapters in this volume explain how policy actors generate and share technical and political information to address social, economic, and political issues across institutional scenarios, policy areas, and time. More specifically, each chapter focuses on three main aspects of policy analysis: the intensity with which policy actors –​from non-​governmental organisations (NGOs) to business organisations, trade unions, think tanks and universities, and members of governments and parliaments –​ participate in the creation of policy analysis; the strategies and resources policy actors have to elaborate and disseminate policy analysis; and the nature of policy analysis they produce. The contributions of this edited book argue that there is a gradual transformation of policy analysis in Spain from a closed model to a more pluralist and specialised model. Policy analysis in Spain has increased in terms of the number of actors involved, the issues under discussion, and the type of information for the policy process produced. In contrast to previous decades, governmental actors –​mainly top public servants –​together with a small community of policy experts who traditionally participated in knowledge production – have lost their monopolistic position in favour of other actors. The proliferation of the number and type of actors involved in policy analysis has expanded policy analysis to multiple areas that are the interest of researchers and experts, and it has also altered the power relations in the policy-​making process, moving towards a more complex and fragmented political scenario. It also evidences a transformation in the production of policy analysis from a legalist approach to a new culture of reporting based on empirical sources, examining facts, and applying technical knowledge, as well as confronting views and values to inspire public policies. For decades, policy analysis demand from most governmental bodies was scarce and, in most cases, it was focused on fulfilling mandatory legal requirements, 3

Policy Analysis in Spain

such as budget implementation oversight. When effective analyses were required, often they were commissioned and elaborated by public civil servants, university professors, and a few external political advisers. Most of them had a legal academic background, except those with specialised profiles as economists or engineers, and they shared a professional career inside the bureaucracy and a common understanding of the purpose of policy analysis as a purely technical matter. This informal framework constituted one of the main factors preventing a transformation of policy analysis in Spain for many years, as it was quite resistant to open technical and narrow policy discussions to a broader audience. Actually, such a policy culture prevented for many years that policy analysis could rely on independent reporting, or to expand regular consultations with academia, citizenship, or with interest groups, to contribute to the extension of public policies in Spain and associated public opinion debates. In the 2020s, some of the elitist and legalist features that traditionally characterise Spain’s policy analysis still prevail, but multiple axes of change have begun to emerge for the last decades. Thus, it is a fact that policy analysis in Spain has expanded hugely, both in terms of specialisation and analytical capabilities, compared to the last decades of the past century. Different factors explain this transformation. The consolidation of Spain as a multilevel governance system, as well as diverse globalisation trends, generated an increase of policy actors on the public side capable of producing knowledge for policy-​making (Chaqués-​ Bonafont et al, 2015). Also, national governments increasingly delegate authority upwards to supranational institutions (basically to the European Union, EU) and downwards to subnational governments (Comunidades Autónomas). As a result, the production of knowledge across levels of governance has challenged the monopolistic position enjoyed by the Spanish central government for decades. Regional governments, EU institutions, and international organisations now participate in the production of policy analysis in Spain, contributing from multiple angles to existing debates. Examples are plenty, including recent Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development (OECD) or International Monetary Fund (IMF) reports on different policy topics such as education or financial stability after the economic recession. Each level of governance develops policy analysis across many issues, although they tend to focus on the matters under their jurisdiction. Regional governments are especially active in producing knowledge about welfare-​related topics, while the EU focuses on economic-​related policy areas, environment issues, and good governance. At present, it is quite common that different public institutions produce policy analyses about similar topics, contributing to enlarged public debates, although intensity is much varied, depending on each policy area. Such a transformation is not complete, however. Still most governmental actors keep following the legalistic approach that traditionally has characterised Spanish policy-​making, not being particularly innovative. Actually, often they do not rely on independent reports, or ‘white papers’ elaborated by experts outside public institutions to define policy goals and strategies. They adopt an hierarchical and 4

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centralised administrative model, according to which to produce better policies is to make better laws. In contrast, the EU introduced an opposite approach to policy analysis, characterised by a culture of independent reports to guide policy-​making. It promotes a new way of thinking based on facts and technical information and a more open and transparent political debate about issues. To this view, to reach better policies is about generating knowledge, making this knowledge available to policy actors, and promoting political debate according to evidence and scientific research. The proliferation of the number of policy actors involved in the production of policy analysis has contributed to create a more pluralist environment, including also contributions adopting an evidence-​oriented policy analysis approach, despite the persistence of some traditional patterns, as we referred to before. Currently, it is quite common that members of government and public officials would share their political views with members of parliament, political parties, interest organisations, think tanks, consultants, universities, research institutes, and individual experts –​although in some policy areas conversations are much more intense than in others. Each policy actor differs in terms of their institutional position in the policy process, the type of information they produce, and the policy issues they study. We find multiple approaches, from legal discussions to evidence-​based analysis, or deliberative interpretations, each one proclaiming the relevance of the approach adopted. In some cases, interest organisations and think tanks provide facts and information about the magnitude of some problems, and they elaborate specific reports that assess existing policy programmes. Often, they take the lead, producing original data and detailed policy analysis about issues of concern to them. On other occasions, interest groups may act more as promoters than producers of policy analysis. Their aim is to endorse their views on policy problems, provide arguments, and use data selectively to justify a specific policy option, or to introduce particular values in the public debate. Many configurations are possible, and these chapters will show some of them in detail. In either case, these organisations, jointly with universities and research institutes, allocate an increasing level of resources and interest to perform policy analysis across a wide variety of policy areas. Variations are also possible to find across policy areas, venues, and levels of governance, as the chapters of this book indicate. In contrast to previous decades, studies for the policy process are not only about basic state functions –​mainly national security, foreign affairs, economic growth, and fiscal policy. Policy analysis has expanded to many other policy areas, including welfare-​related issues, the environment and sustainability, and issues such as transformations of work and technological change. To some extent, the expansion of state action could explain the increase in the production of knowledge across policy areas. From the 1970s to the late 1990s, both the Spanish economy and Spanish society experienced a significant transformation, moving from being considered a developing country, and receiving financial support from the OECD, to being perceived as a strong 5

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economy with a gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of only 10 per cent below the average of OECD countries. Spain was a far-​reaching welfare state that manages more than 40 per cent of its GDP and shares most of the characteristics that Gosta Esping-​Andersen attributes to the corporatist-​statist model institutions. However, state expansion probably is only a facilitating factor, and democratisation (since 1977) and European integration (since 1986) became major drivers of such transformations that brought growing state intervention in society –​while retrenching its role in the economy –​that also generated significant changes in civil society and political participation outside the electoral process. In any case, it appears that, in parallel with a fully integrated economy in Europe, and within an extended welfare state, in recent decades interest groups –​ NGOs, trade unions, business, and professional organisations –​ have joined public debates on public policies with think tanks, which also have developed intensively during this period. These actors have grown exponentially and have become more complex and professionalised in the process. The intense policy changes that occurred in the previous decades opened multiple debates in prominent areas such as education, social policy, economic policy, the environment, etc. for their revision and improvement. These debates progressively triggered policy analysis contributions and opened spaces for the emergence of such a varied group of specialised policy actors. This escalation is especially significant in the case of NGOs, many of which were competing increasingly for public attention with political parties and traditional economic groups –​such as trade unions, business, and professional associations –​ to represent citizens’ preferences on many issues. In the early 1980s, those representing private interests were mainly socio-​economic or industrial interest groups that represented and defended the interests of those directly involved in the production processes in one policy area or economic sector (Subirats, 1999). By the 2000s, these traditional organisations had already become less decisive, and a more diffuse collection of entities became more relevant in the production of policy analysis, linked to broad constituencies.

Previous research This volume offers a novel contribution to research on public policy in Spain for different reasons. First, its perspective on the production of policy analysis, and not on policy-​making, makes a significant innovation and opens new directions to explore and discuss. Second, general interpretative frameworks about the policy process in Spain are not very common, and this volume contributes with a different angle. Discussions regarding patterns in policy process have been very occasional, and most of them focused on policy-​making. To start with, it is necessary to refer to the classical book of Gunther (1980) on public policy in Spain during the Franco dictatorship, as it represents the first case of a comprehensive study on Spanish policy process. Dealing with the policy-​making process after the transition to democracy in Spain, we find a small but exciting 6

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number of contributions that aim to discuss the general characteristic of the policy process in Spain. First, we should highlight Joan Subirats’s essay on policy styles in Spain, inspired by the Richardson framework (1982). In the early 1990s, Subirats (1992) argued that the policy style of democratic Spain is characterised by developing consensual practices among relevant actors, avoiding confrontation, and establishing many restrictions for new actors to enter into the policy debates. In a similar vein, Gunther (1996) argues that policy-​making in Spain changed tremendously during the democratic age, and most of the problems linked to the authoritarian regime tended to disappear while new policy challenges emerged (see also Heywood, 1998; Chari and Heywood, 2009). They examine how these new challenges brought the proliferation of policy actors involved in the policy-​making process and the consolidation of multilevel governance systems, but these authors do not focus on how these new actors were involved in the production of policy analysis. Overall, existing research emphasises the elitist character and the predominant position of the Spanish executive in the policy-​making process, combined with a consensual style in some policy areas. To some extent, policy analysis in the first decades of the democratic period also reflected this situation. Research on this period suggested that policy networks were also an important source of policy stability that reinforced the existing character of policy-​making in Spain, combining strong capacity of exclusion and some consensual dynamics (Chaqués, 2004; Jordana and Sancho, 2005). Once they were formally institutionalised, policy networks tended to act as gatekeepers imposing strict limits on introducing new issues and policy proposals that do not match the principles, values, and preferences of governmental actors and other veto players in the political arena (Gomá and Subirats, 1998; Chaqués, 2004). An extensive set of empirical studies, primarily sectoral studies, illustrate this argument. We can highlight collective efforts to advance research on this topic from the mid-​1990s, like Politicas Publicas en España edited by Ricard Gomà and Joan Subirats (1998). This book provided a comprehensive interpretation of the expansion of public policy-​making in Spain across different sectors since the 1970s, focusing on the emergence of multiple actors and the configuration of a multilevel policy-​making space. Other studies provided a sectoral approach, as for example, the cases selection edited by Grau and Mateos (2002), and there was an increase in the explicit introduction of theoretical backgrounds compared to earlier contributions. In this sense, we find examples using the advocacy framework coalition, for example, in the case of illegal drug policy (Martinón, 2011), or the punctuated-​equilibrium theory in analysing pharmaceutical and food safety regulation (Chaqués and Palau, 2009). In more recent times, however, policy networks became more fragmented across different types of policy actors, including traditional economic groups like business organisations and unions, and also NGOs, multinational companies, foundations, and epistemic communities. Increasingly, a larger and more diverse number of non-​state actors interact with governmental actors exchanging of 7

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resources and information to produce policy outcomes Existing research on public policy has illustrated these transformations, as for example examining accountability in health policy (Subirats and Gallego, 2002; Pérez Durán, 2016), Telecommunications regulation (Jordana and Sancho, 2005) Pharmaceuticals policy (Chaqués-​Bonafont, 2002), discussing the welfare state framework for social policies (Gallego and Subirats, 2011; del Pino et al, 2016; Brugué et al, 2018), technology policies within the developmental state (Sanz-​Menéndez, 1997), interest groups access to policy-​making (Molins et al, 2016; Chaqués et al, 2021), environmental policy (Aguilar, 1994, Fernández et al, 2010) and gender studies (Bustelo and Lombardo, 2007), among others. Other authors have focused on the impact of European integration on policy analysis in Spain. Several edited volumes have collected a large number of sector analyses that take into account such transformations (Barbé, 1999; Closa, 2001; Mateo and Morata, 2007; Palau and Chaqués-Bonafont, 2012). Thus, in these volumes and beyond, multiple contributions have discussed the role of EU policy frameworks in the processes of policy convergence in Europe in many different policy areas, suggesting an important role as a trigger for policy change between the 1980s and the 2000s. Among them, some comparative efforts, including a few countries and/​or sectors, have produced more elaborate discussions on the logics of policy change in Spain and the constraints on the role of the EU as policy moderniser (see for example Aguilar, 1994; Jordana et al, 2006).

Multilevel governance Spain is a complex case in terms of the territorial distribution of its power between national, subnational, and local governments. For this reason, we have included in this volume specific analysis focusing on the production of policy analysis by each level of government. However, it is essential to note that Spain shows a gradual delegation of issue jurisdiction downwards towards subnational and local institutions, which complicates most exercises of policy analysis. In the Spanish case, there is shared jurisdiction with many policy domains that makes most intergovernmental relations quite conflicted, not to mention the conflict of the unresolved problem of multiple national identities within the country. So, to perform policy analysis, these intricacies make an effective assessment of the policy problems difficult in many cases. In this sense, and in many cases in Spain, the complexities of territorial politics no doubt complicate the purpose of policy analysis efforts by different types of actors. To take into account such constraints is important to assess correctly how influential each policy level has been in any particular policy domain in recent decades. In addition, the strong policy analysis capabilities of all EU institutions have been increasingly important for framing policy analysis in many areas and sectors of Spain. On the other hand, policy decentralisation in Spain has created multiple spaces in which policy analysis can be focused, and policy comparisons at the regional 8

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level have become a very relevant perspective for many analytical exercises. Policy emulation has also been common among regional governments, and policy analysis contributions in many cases have contributed to foster such a phenomenon. But this has not been a well-​organised deliberation process, either bottom-​up or top-​down. In fact, the policy style in Spain is far from following an orderly, productive, and cooperative process between its government levels. Multilevel policy-​making is not a collaborative endeavour but a very chaotic environment in which many policy confrontations and policy disconnections arise (Jordana, 2019). In the last decades, particularly, there has been increasing distrust and rivalry between different levels of government and different territories, for instance after claims for confederation from the Basque Country (the Ibarreche Plan in 2004) and the claim for secession (2016–​17) from Catalonia, respectively. From 2000 onwards, in contrast with previous decades, the attempts to discuss policy coordination between national and subnational governments by means of policy analysis have not proliferated, and most policy actors’ contributions have tended to focus their analyses on more fragmented and specialised policies that considered single government levels only. Overall, the fragmentation of policy analysis across different policy venues, together with the difficulties of coordination, and, in most cases, the lack of public institutions to coordinate different policy analysis initiatives, has generated an important imbalance in the quantity and quality of policy analysis across policy areas. As discussed before, in recent decades the expansion of policy analysis capabilities in Spain has been impressive, with a large increase in activity by traditional policy actors, and the emergence of new actors who also contribute to policy debates. This expansion has completely changed the capabilities of policy analysis in Spain, which are now much greater and more diversified. However, we also observe that these capabilities appear fragmented between policy levels and across policy sectors and issues, with no mechanisms for establishing linkages across areas and between levels. Not only this, but the articulation of policy debates also tends to be very specialised and narrowly defined in many cases. They are also very fragmented within each policy community, and there are many limitations for expanding these debates to the public or to open spaces. In some cases, such as environmental policies, policy analysis has increased mainly because of the mobilisation of interest organisations, while in other cases, such as security or equality issues, relevant policy analysis is not very widespread and relies only on some public agencies and small, specialised NGOs. Capabilities differ enormously across different policy sectors. In some areas, we find entities related to private actors, as for example, business associations or trade unions, with some potential to intervene in the policy debate by means of relevant policy analysis capabilities. But in many other cases, the intervention of policy actors does not involve the strong use of policy analysis as a tool to improve their positions. There are many more actors involved in the policy process, and the number of policy analysis contributions has exploded. But we also find that fragmentation, persistence of traditional restricted networks, and the absence of deliberation are common 9

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characteristics of many areas of policy analysis, despite the growing density of the number of contributions and studies. This has important implications for the effectiveness of public policy as well as for the quality of democracy as a whole.

The role of experts Finally, it is worth mentioning that in Spain, as in many other EU countries, there is no fluid connection between policy analysis in governments and academic research. The weakness of institutional mechanisms that could facilitate exchanges between different policy analysis initiatives and potential policy-​makers creates an important disconnection of the quantity and quality of policy analysis across policy areas, as well as the impact of such analysis on the public debate. However, this can be compensated for by the quality and relevance of policy analysis, that may also vary across and within countries, depending on the level of professionalisation of the political actors (Peters and Parker, 1993). In the Spanish case, different organisations, units, and agencies related to the executive branch of government might show more involvement in debates that are relevant to policy analysis, to bridge existing disconnections. This might happen as soon as producers of policy analyses, or even a commissioner of relevant reports and studies, develop strong ties with political actors. In recent decades, both central and subnational governments have promoted policy analysis by establishing specialised units, although a growing capability for policy analysis of legislatures has not emerged –​and the main traditional approaches still remain. This has resulted in a significant impact on the type of policy debates and the corresponding analytical background. In many cases, policy communities experience difficulties articulating broad debates on the policy goals they would like to pursue, and the discussion remains focused on legal details. From other countries’ experience, we know that this led to patterns of closed sectoral bargaining relationships among major government, business, and labour actors, not subject to great public scrutiny (Atkinson and Coleman, 1989; Pross, 1992; Montpetit, 2002). By the same token, universities, research institutions, and think tanks have become highly professionalised institutions with a growing capacity to develop facts, information, and specific analytical reports, but often experience difficulties to establish interactions with relevant actors about major policy issues. However, all these organisations, together with interest groups, are dedicating an increasing quantity of resources to perform policy analysis across a broad variety of policy areas. Thus, we realise that policy capacities are now much more developed in Spain compared to a few decades ago, but they are still lacking a much stronger capability for informed policy debates. Maybe the absence of a stronger social demand, together with a weak level of intermediaries and policy specialists in media, has created particular difficulties to overcome these problems and shortcomings. This edited volume aims to assess the extent to which this general picture can be sustained effectively when we start to examine in detail 10

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different policy actors and institutional areas. The professional characteristics of policy analysts –​including their background, training, and technical capabilities –​ are important assets in this respect, as are their policy analysis activities and the results they produce in the overall policy debates in the country.

Contributions of the book This volume brings together a team of researchers with outstanding knowledge and experience in policy analysis in Spain. It serves several goals. First, it provides a comprehensive study of how policy analysis is carried out in Spain. Second, it contributes to future development in the different spheres in which policy analysis is practised, detailing the problems and limitations existing nowadays. And third, it identifies possible ways to overcome some of the shortcomings of policy analysis in Spain. These shortcomings are mainly inequalities in the quantity and quality of policy analysis across policy areas and the lack of exchange and debate among the different organisations that participate in policy analysis across venues (government and parliamentary arenas), levels of government (national and subnational), and experts. The shortcomings of policy analysis in Spain should emerge from a detailed observation of its capabilities across multiple settings and from the assessment of the quality that policy analysis itself conveys. In our globalised world, to what extent has Spain really developed a system of policy analysis strong enough to cope with the multiple challenges that confront policy-​making nowadays? Where are the main problems really located? Are they concentrated on the analytical capabilities of the actors involved, or are they related to the weaknesses of the actors involved in policy analysis in most sectors? And, finally, is there a problem of cohesion between policy analysis and policy-​making, where no effective conversation occurs for many reasons, such as the requirements of political culture and institutional behaviour in Spain? The book is structured as 15 chapters in four parts. Part I focuses on the background of policy analysis in Spain, its historical origins, and its development over time as a profession. Part II of the book examines policy analysis by different levels of government, including national, regional, and local levels. Part III focuses on policy actors and institutions in the public sphere beyond the executive. It also studies the role of parliaments in policy analysis. Finally, Part IV examines the role of parties, interest groups, and other actors that carry out policy analysis in Spain. In Part I, Chapter 2 provides a general overview of policy analysis during the 20th century, before Spain’s return to democracy in the 1970s. The analysis focuses on the development of analytical tools for policy evaluation, developed by a wide array of policy actors. The authors argue that there is a long tradition of policy evaluation in Spain, starting in the late 18th century, but that it has undergone important institutional shifts and setbacks, reflecting major political conflicts. During the collapse of the Ancien Régime and the development of the Liberal Revolution in the 19th century, the main policy analysis contributions 11

Policy Analysis in Spain

came from ‘heroic’ individuals who devoted their time and resources to developing data and information about policy issues. Progressively, individuals were displaced by parliamentary commissions, which provided a political space to promote political debate between conflicting interests, as well as research units linked to some banks and large firms. In both cases, some policy debates to which they contributed became very visible, although not very frequently. Under the Franco dictatorship, there was little general interest in creating institutions to assess public policy, although some initiatives did emerge. At very different times, starting in the 1960s, some high officials promoted policy analysis tools within the Spanish administration that were important for suggesting changes in economic policy. Chapter 3 focuses on how the professions related to policy analysis and policy evaluation in Spain have expanded in recent decades. It explains how experts perform policy analysis, and whether they do it for private policy actors or public agencies, providing arguments and using data that serve the justification of a specific policy. The chapter also discusses whether policy analysis, more particularly policy evaluation, has become a distinct profession in Spain in recent years. This discussion is based on the emerging nucleus of professionals working in this area who share an identity beyond the traditional boundaries of their disciplines. The role of postgraduate programmes in the area, professional associations, conferences, and other network-​like activities are also highlighted in the discussion. Part II focuses on policy analysis at different levels of government. Chapter 4 describes the policy analysis capabilities at the national level in Spain during recent times. It focuses on the executive –​ministries and associated agencies –​ and uncovers where policy analysts’ capabilities are located: either at sector level or considering a cross-​sectional view to public policies. Their capabilities in terms of producing policy reports and policy advice are also assessed, as far as their proximity to policy decision-​making makes their tasks particularly relevant. Chapter 5 concentrates on policy analysis by regional governments. Regional governments sustain important and densely populated administrative structures that include significant policy analysis capabilities. The chapter assesses where these capabilities are located and their strength and potential to advise policy-​ making. Chapter 6 is devoted to policy analysis at the municipal level. Cities, metropolitan areas, and provinces constitute a dense but highly fragmented administrative reality in Spain. The chapter maps the internal capacity of policy analysis at this level and identifies the areas in which policy analysis in local administration are more relevant. The final chapter in Part II (Chapter 7) discusses domestic policy analysis by international actors, for example the OECD and the EU. From the inexhaustible reports of the OECD, always with a strong governmental backup, to the indexes and rankings produced by Transparency International and Human Rights Watch, the density and intensity of policy analysis on multiple policy fields is extremely large. In many cases, they have a strong media impact and a great effect on public opinion. This chapter 12

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explores some particular cases and examines how policy analysis is carried out, as well as the nature of the impact that the analyses have at the national level. Part III explores the role of different policy actors in the production of policy analysis. Chapter 8 explains the role of parliaments in policy analysis, relying on the datasets developed by the Quality of Democracy research group (www. Q-​dem.com). It argues that the number of parliamentary committees has increased over time and across policy areas due to the increasing complexity of society, the expansion of the welfare state, the regulatory dimension of the public sector, as well as conjunctural factors such as the economic recession of 2008–​11. The chapter also argues that the type of policy analysis conducted by Spanish parliamentary committees is political rather than fact-​driven. Finally, the chapter argues that MPs’ specialisations are very limited and most of the time are not compensated by the presence of experts and technical advisors. Chapter 9 explains the role of the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas in the production of public opinion data. It presents the origins, regulation, and the main features of the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas itself, and explains the main results of the 2,087 surveys and studies carried out by this institution from 1978 to 2019. For this, the chapter relies on novel datasets with detailed information from these surveys and studies. It argues that the preferences of the party in government and changing economic and social conditions partly explain variations in issue-​ attention in public opinion surveys. It also argues that most public opinion surveys cover Spanish nationals exclusively, thus disregarding the opinion of more than 10 per cent of people living in Spain. Moreover, most public opinion surveys are state-​wide, covering the whole territory of Spain, which limits the opportunity to compare citizens’ perceptions, values, and principles across territories. This is especially problematic in the context of Spanish politics, which is characterised by the increasing delegation of the jurisdiction of issues from national to subnational governments. Chapter 10 focuses on the role of advisory bodies and participatory processes in the production of policy analysis. The chapter points out that participatory institutions have become more widespread over the last decades, although in most cases they lack the necessary resources to function correctly and to guarantee their stability regardless of government changes. It argues that participatory activity has clearly been more important at the local level, and in most cases has been consultative in character. Participatory institutions have had a limited policy-​making impact because most participatory processes have dealt with very minor issues. These institutions have also shown a tendency to cherry-​pick ideas from the participatory processes, mainly implementing those that were less risky and less costly, or those that were more compatible with the administration’s own priorities. Chapter 11 informs about the role of universities and research centres as providers of policy analysis to the public sector in Spain. It describes the institutional settings that allow teaching staff and researchers based in universities to be active in policy analysis undertakings, including policy and programme 13

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evaluation. In particular, the chapter explains the importance of organisational structures established by universities as well as the sources of funding that allow university personnel to pursue applied research on public policy issues in Spain. These analyses rely on a bibliographic dataset that allows to measure output on policy analysis by scholars in universities and research centres, by collecting data on public policy topics that are published in indexed academic journals. Part IV of this edited volume focuses on the role of political parties, interest groups, and other actors in the production of policy analysis. Chapter 12 examines how policy analyses are conducted within political parties. First, it provides a description of the main characteristics, developments, and trends of policy analysis in mainstream parties, challenger parties, and small and regional parties with representation in the Spanish parliament. From here, the chapter explains the similarities and differences between the types of parties and how they have evolved over time. The final part of the chapter discusses the connection between political parties and other organisations –​mainly think tanks –​in performing policy analysis. Chapter 13 explains the role of trade unions in the production of information for policy-​making. It argues that trade unions’ capacity for influencing the policy-​making process depends to a great extent on their capacity to provide information about policy problems and solutions, to monitor policy implementation, to evaluate policy results, and to provide ideas and alternative programmes for reaching more efficient outcomes. The chapter informs about the economic and organisational resources these organisations use to reach these goals. From here, the chapter discusses the capacity of these organisations to make a difference in policy analysis. In a similar vein, Chapter 14 explains the role of employers’ associations. It highlights that business associations are highly professionalised organisations with a division of labour across specialised departments, and with a large number of specialised staff who lobby all levels of governments and other policy actors. The chapter describes how business associations generate policy proposals to capture the attention of public authorities, the business community, and other actors involved in the policy-​making process. It compares the activities of five of the most important business associations in Spain: the Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales (CEOE), the Cámara de Comercio de España, the Instituto de Empresa Familiar (IEF), and the local business think tanks, particularly the Círculo de Empresarios (Madrid), and the Círculo de Economía (Barcelona). Chapter 15 focuses on NGOs. It argues that there has been a dramatic increase in the number of NGOs that now participate in the policy-​making process and have become key providers of policy analysis. Yet their incorporation into the policy-​making process has occurred with some delay compared with other advanced democracies. The chapter also argues that, on most occasions, NGOs lack economic and human resources to develop information, resulting in important variations across policy areas and political venues. Their empirical analysis relies on the interest groups’ survey conducted by Q-​Dem in 2016.

14

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Finally, Chapter 16 argues that think tanks have become key actors in Spanish politics in the last two decades. This chapter first analyses the evolution of this type of political organisation from the late 1980s to the present, and, following existing classifications, it describes the different types of think tanks in terms of different categories: (1) academic versus ideological bias; (2) internationalisation; (3) resources; and (4) functions. From here, the chapter ends by explaining thinks tanks’ capacity to make a difference in the decision-​making process.

Conclusion The main goal of this volume is to examine how policy analysis is produced in Spain and discuss to what purposes it is used in the context of public policy-​making. Contributors to this volume combine different perspectives and focus on different actors and institutions, but in all cases they share a common understanding about the relevance of policy analysis to make an impact on the policy process. To analyse the production of policy analysis, their current shortcomings and recent developments, each chapter explains the topics of policy analysis under scrutiny, the resources available to each policy actor, the methods policy actors use to develop policy analysis, and how they make the analysis visible and effective for public debate and decision-​making. In doing this, the contributors of this book argue the relevance, intensity, and diversity of policy analysis to shape the policy process in recent decades in Spain has represented a serious transformation, compared to previous periods, when policy analysis was more concentrated, specific, and occasional. Nowadays, multiple actors are active in providing policy analysis on the same topics, and this allows the confrontation of ideas and discussion of policy results. However, pluralism in policy analysis for the Spanish case should be qualified by some relevant considerations, as for example the persistence of elitist and closed network traditions in many policy areas, or the complexities of a multilevel governance, creating some challenges for the production of policy analysis to many actors. All in all, the case of Spain shows how a rapid transformation in the role of policy analysis for policy processes, involving a large expansion in a relatively short period of time, with many more actors and views involved and a much larger production of analysis, creates multiples spaces for discussion and an enriched view of policy-​making. However, many problems also arise from such expansion: on the one side, problems related to the strong influence of previous patterns of producing and managing policy analysis in the country that have not disappeared, but remain relevant in shaping actors’ interactions and also constraining public deliberations; on the other side, difficulties related to the complexities of analysing policies in advanced societies. The interaction of policies across sectors and territorial levels produces often unexpected outputs that are not easy to analyse within the framework of conventional policy analysis, but most actors, both emerging or well-​established, do feel more conformable 15

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in ‘niche’ perspectives of policy analysis, rather than broader views that integrate multiple angles and values. The chapters in this volume provide detailed analysis of the general trends we delineated here, but also elaborate in-​depth scrutiny of particular actors and institutions involved in policy analysis in Spain, including also original interpretations. They aim to cover a comprehensive interpretation of how policy analysis production and management occurs nowadays in Spain –​and also provide relevant insights from past periods. In doing this analysis, they also open new questions and identify intriguing puzzles for further research into such topics, to better understand how policy analysis in Spain could become more plural and vibrant, contributing to a stronger democratic society. References Aguilar, Susana (1994) ‘Convergence in environmental policy? The resilience of national institutional designs is Spain and Germany’, Journal of Public Policy, 14(1): 39–​56. Atkinson, M.M. and Coleman, W.D. (1989) ‘Strong states and weak states: Sectoral policy networks in advanced capitalist economies’, British Journal of Political Science, 19(1): 47–​67. Barbé, Esther (1999) La política europea de España, Barcelona: Editorial Ariel. Brugué, Q., Gomà, R., and Subirats, J. (2018) De la pobreza a la exclusión social. Nuevos retos para las políticas públicas. Revista internacional de sociología, 60(33): 7–​45. Bustelo, M. and Lombardo, E. (2007) Políticas de igualdad en España y en Europa, Madrid: Catedra Ediciones. Chaqués-​Bonafont, Laura (2002). Estructura y Política Farmacéutica, Madrid: Cetro de Investigaciones Sociológicas. Chaqués-​Bonafont, Laura (2004). Redes de Políticas Públicas, Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas. Chaqués-​Bonafont, Laura and Palau, Anna (2009) ‘Comparing the dynamics of change in food safety and pharmaceutical policy in Spain’, Journal of Public Policy, 29(1): 103–​26. Chaqués-​Bonafont, Laura, Baumgartner, Frank R., and Palau, Anna (2015) Agenda Dynamics in Spain, Berlin: Springer. Chaqués-​Bonafont, Laura, Medina, I., and Muñoz, L. (2021). La representación de intereses en tiempos de crisis. Revista Española De Ciencia Política, 57: 13–​19. Chari, Raj and Heywood, Paul M. (2009) ‘Analysing the policy process in democratic Spain’, West European Politics, 32(1): 26–​54. Ciccia, Rossella and Lombardo, Emanuela (2019) ‘Care policies in practice: How discourse matters for policy implementation’, Policy and Society, 38(4): 537–​53. Closa Montero, Carlos (ed) (2001) La europeización del sistema político español, Madrid: Istmo. Colebatch, H.K. (2006) ‘Mapping the work of policy’, in H.K. Colebatch (ed) Beyond the Policy Cycle: The Policy Process in Australia, Sydney: Allen & Unwin, pp 1–​19. 16

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Del Pino Matute, E., Canosa, M.Á.A., Calzada, I., Colino-​Cámara, C., Pulido, J.M.D., León, M., Fernández, J.L., Marbán, V., Mari-​klose, M., Mari-​Klose, P., and Fernández, L.M. (2016) Los Estados de Bienestar en la encrucijada: Políticas sociales en perspectiva comparada, Madrid: Tecnos. Fernández, A.M., Font, N., and Koutalakis, C. (2010) Environmental governance in Southern Europe: The domestic filters of Europeanisation. Environmental Politics, 19(4): 557–​77. Fischer, Frank and Miller, Gerald J. (2006) Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods, London: Routledge. Gallego, R.G. and Subirats, J. (eds) (2011). Autonomies i desigualtats a Espanya: percepcions, evolució social i polítiques de benestar. Institut d’Estudis Autonómics. Gomà, Ricard and Subirats, Joan (1998) Políticas públicas en España. Contenidos, redes de actores y niveles de gobierno, Barcelona: Editorial Ariel. Grau, Mireia and Mateos, Araceli (eds) (2002) Análisis de Políticas Públicas en España: enfoques y casos, Valencia: Tirant Lo Blanc. Gunther, Richard (1980) Public Policy in a No-​Party State, Berkeley: University of California Press. Gunther, Richard (1996) ‘The impact of regime change on public policy: The case of Spain’, Journal of Public Policy, 16(2): 157–​201. Harguindeguy, Jean-​B aptiste and Echavarren, José M. (2016). ‘The institutionalization of policy analysis in Spain: A dual scientific field’. Gestión y política pública, 25(2): 663–​98. Heywood, Paul (1998) ‘Power diffusion or concentration? In search of the Spanish policy process’, West European Politics, 21(4): 103–​23. Howlett, M. and Lindquist, Evert (2004) ‘Policy analysis and governance: Analytical and policy styles’, Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 6(3): 225–​49. Jordana, Jacint (2019) Barcelona, Madrid y el Estado, Madrid: Catarata. Jordana, Jacint and Sancho, David (2005) ‘Policy networks and market opening: Telecommunications liberalization in Spain’, European Journal of Political Research, 44(4): 519–​46. Jordana, Jacint, Levi-​Faur, David, and Puig, Imma (2006) ‘The limits of Europeanization: Regulatory reforms in the Spanish and Portuguese telecommunications and electricity sectors’, Governance, 16(3): 437–​64. Martinón, R. (2011) Las políticas de drogas en España (1982–​1996) a través del marco de las coaliciones promotoras: un estudio del cambio en las políticas públicas, Madrid: CIS. Mateo, Gemma and Morata, Francesc (eds) (2007) España en Europa-​Europa en España (1986–​2006), Barcelona: Fundació Cidob. Molins J., Muñoz, Luz, and Medina, Iván (eds) (2016) Los grupos de interés en España: la influencia de los lobbies en la política española, Madrid: Tecnos. Montpetit, Eric (2002) ‘Policy networks, federal arrangements, and the development of environmental regulations: A comparison of the Canadian and American agricultural sectors’, Governance, 15(1): 1–​20. 17

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Pérez Durán, I. (2016) ‘Assessing formal accountability for public policies: The case of health policy in Spain’, International Review of Administrative Sciences, 82(4): 784–​806. Peters, B. Guy and Parker, Anthony (eds) (1993) Advising West European Governments: Inquiries, Expertise and Public Policy, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Pross, A.P. (1992) Group Politics and Public Policy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Radin, B.A. (2000) Beyond Machiavelli: Policy Analysis Comes of Age, Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. Richardson, Jeremy (1982) Policy Styles in Western Europe, London: Routledge. Sabatier, P.A. (1999) Theories of the Policy Process, Boulder: Westview Press. Sanz-​Menéndez, Luis (1997) Estado, ciencia y tecnología en España: 1939–​1997, Madrid: Alianza Editorial. Subirats, Joan (1992) Un problema de estilo: la formación de políticas públicas en España, Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales. Subirats, Joan and Raquel Gallego (2002) Veinte años de autonomías en España: leyes, políticas públicas, instituciones y opinión pública, Madrid: CIS. Wildavsky, A. (1987) ‘Speaking truth to power: The art and craft of policy analysis’, in W. Dunn (ed) Policy Analysis: Perspectives, Concepts, and Methods, Greenwich: JAI Press, pp 3–​22.

18

Part One Examining the policy analysis context

TWO

Historical forerunners in Spanish policy analysis Albert Carreras and Anna Maria Aubanell-​Jubany

Introduction Historical policy analysis is the core of the activities of political historians. Let’s remind the reader of some classical and some more recent references. For a long time, the most influential book was Raymond Carr’s Spain, 1808–​1939 (1966). If we bridge over half a century of intense scholarship, it is worth quoting Pamela Beth Radcliff (2017) with a volume with a very similar title, and the ten volumes of the series edited by Josep Fontana and Ramon Villares, five of which are devoted to the post-​1808 period and four to the long 20th century (2007–​17). As there is already so much written using this approach, and of such a high quality, it would be well beyond our forces to attempt a brief summary for the 20th century, pre-​Political Transition Years.1 To provide a useful set of interpretative clues, we have focussed on the development of policy analysis tools –​mostly policy evaluation and assessment –​looking for the policy actors behind them. In our search we have included a wide array of actors and tools: individuals writing monographs, lobbies, civic associations, public and private institutions, charities, public administrations, parliamentary commissions, research bureaux, and so on. All of these actors were considered after they provided relevant data or a reason for analysing policy. Spain has a fairly long tradition –​although not continuous –​of policy evaluation and assessment, starting in the late 18th century, but it has undergone important institutional shifts and setbacks, which reflect major political conflicts. At times, when politics became more open, the influence of policy evaluation and assessment was very relevant in promoting major policy changes, while at other times –​the setbacks, when the sword was the source of legitimacy –​it almost disappeared. On several occasions, however, what was done in Spain met the international standards of the time. We will survey seven periods in the study of policy evaluation and assessment. The first period corresponds to the years usually called the end of the Ancien Régime and the ‘Liberal Revolution’. The Spanish Empire had been crushed under the weight of the French Revolutionary Wars and the Napoleonic invasion. The half-​century after Napoleon’s retreat and defeat were years of tension between the new liberal order and the defenders of the Ancien Régime. Everything that happened in Spain related to this essential conflict, as in many other European 21

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countries, but on an imperial scale. The major contributions to designing and implementing policies came from outstanding individuals. These kinds of efforts geared towards policy design and promotion lasted well into the 19th century. The second period, overlapping with the previous one, is the first era of parliamentary politics (1830s to 1880s). As liberal regimes got a stronger hold, political and parliamentary life enjoyed moments of great intensity that could be followed in the proceedings of parliament meetings and in the enquiries launched to clear up some of the most controversial and politically salient issues, such as tariff policy or the building of the railway network. The third period deals with the second era of parliamentary politics (1880s to 1914). New issues, such as labour conditions and labour movement, challenged the parties usually in government and forced them to start new initiatives to deal with the unknown. This model of parliamentary commissions gained both reputation and recognition and became institutionalised, even though it had nothing to do with the nature of the newly created institutions. The Commission for Social Reforms is a remarkable outcome of this new way of functioning. From 1914 to 1923 –​the fourth period of the development of policy analysis –​ Spanish politics became extremely tense. Neutrality during the Great War was not enough to calm down Spanish political life. There was a permanent explosion of conflicts, issues, and policy proposals to deal with new political and social cleavages. In the midst of these explosions, a new formula for evaluating and designing policies emerges: the research bureau, which was associated with a new kind of politician: Francesc Cambó. Cambó was a lawyer and politician, and eventually he became a very successful businessman. He was a conservative Catalan regionalist who achieved political success when male universal suffrage was established, becoming the leader of Lliga Regionalista. He represented it at the Spanish parliament most of the time from 1907 to 1923. He served as a government minister on two occasions and passed important laws that had strong economic effects which lasted for many years. The fifth period, from 1923 to 1939, starts with the Primo de Rivera dictatorship (1923–​30), which froze political debate. The dictatorship was unstable and collapsed, opening the way for the Second Republic (1931–​9). Part of Spanish society was thirsty for reforms, be it for land ownership, labour rights, secularisation, or political devolution for historically differentiated regions. The policy conflicts were intense, and all the available policy evaluation tools were mobilised: outstanding individuals, parliamentary commissions, and research bureaux. The depressed international economic and political environment did not assist in smoothing out these political conflicts. A coup d’état, led by General Franco on 18 July 1936, started the Civil War in Spain. Franco won the war in early 1939. Meanwhile, there was a true battle of political, social, and economic systems in Spain. The following period, the sixth, deals with early Francoism. Franco’s power was outstanding, as he managed to eliminate all his enemies and to neutralise his supporters, thus preventing anyone becoming too powerful. Policy analysis in 22

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this period is little more than Franco’s political biography. This diagnosis is valid for the whole of the period of the Franco regime (1939–​75), but much more so in those early years up to 1959. In the 1950s, there were some timid movements that allowed different interest groups to emerge from within the regime. The research bureau once again became a useful, low-​key tool to assess, promote, and influence public policies. During Late Francoism (1959–​75), the seventh period studied, this emerging trend was confirmed when the collapse of the autarchic policies and the opening up to the United States and Western Europe made the Franco regime feel safer. Late Francoism did not change its strong dictatorial character, it simply provided less harsh conditions, even increasing welfare for a growing middle class. New political challenges were addressed with new, more sophisticated tools. A new university-​trained elite emerged and was tasked with making sense of the ongoing economic and social changes. Many of these elites would become the main characters in the following chapters of this book (post-​1975).

The late 18th and early 19th centuries: the era of individual achievement during the collapse of the Ancien Régime and the Liberal Revolution Between 1788, when King Charles III, Spain’s enlightened monarch par excellence died, and 1839, when the First Carlist War ended, or 1874, when the First Republic was suppressed, Spain started an era of liberal regimes. The French Revolution brought an abrupt end to enlightened governments; new ideas were no longer welcome, and new policies were even less welcome. Those who dared to think ‘new’ were imprisoned (like Jovellanos, statesman and reformer). The French Revolutionary Wars, followed by the wars with France against Great Britain, were ruinous for Spain, which lost territories and monies. The Napoleonic invasion put an end to the Bourbon dynasty, but it was unable to take full control of Spain. For the next generation, conflicting ideas and policies (liberals versus reactionaries) were clearly stated, but their choices were only carried out by means of revolutions, wars, and pronunciamientos (coups d’état). In the late 18th and early 19th centuries, policy evaluation in Spain existed but was limited to individuals’ work. A significant number of major intellectuals, policy-​makers, social reformers, and top administrators made important contributions which were usually classified under other headings such as political, social, or economic thought. Political turmoil, wars, exiles, imprisonments, and regime shifts triggered a number of in-​depth studies of major issues such as agrarian, fiscal, educational, and social reforms, as well as the corresponding policy evaluation and the first attempts of quantitative measurement. Some major works of this kind include Eugenio Larruga’s Memories (Larruga, 1787–​1800); Jovellanos and his fundamental Informe sobre la Ley Agraria (Jovellanos, 1795); José Canga Argüelles and his Diccionario de Hacienda (Canga Argüelles, 1826–​7 [1968]); Sebastián Miñano’s Diccionario Geografico-​Estadístico de España y Portugal (Miñano, 23

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1826–​9); and, a bit later, during the tense years of Queen Isabel II, Pascual Madoz and his Diccionario Geográfico-​Histórico-​Estadístico (Madoz, 1845–​9) and Ildefons Cerdá and his Teoría General de la Urbanización (Cerdá, 1867 [1968]), to name only the most important works. The common obsession was to gather and provide data to build an objective assessment of the problem to be solved. Therefore, for the systematic and rational diagnosis of problems, statistics, dictionaries, and maps were commonly used tools. Many of these lengthy monographs included both a description of relevant phenomena and a reform proposal. Indeed, some of them inspired major policy changes, as was the case of Jovellanos and agrarian law, land ownership, and trade regulations, promoting the liberal reforms that were approved over the next three generations, or Canga Argüelles on public finances, Madoz on economic promotion, and Cerdá on urban planning as applied to Barcelona. These men dealt with the main policy issues of their generation: how to change from the Ancien Régime to the liberal regime, or how to build a modern treasury after the loss of the American colonies, or how to promote the economy under such stressful circumstances. All of them had in common a highly sophisticated scholarship, based on intense, sometimes lifelong, commitments to particular issues of general public interest. Madoz and Cerdá organised major enquiries and statistics of their own, with no support from public institutions, but with the cooperation of many officials. Both men enjoyed fairly quick success with their proposals. Madoz’s focus on economic promotion became government policy and was achieved during the short but transformative, progressive liberal government of 1854–​6. Cerdá’s Teoría General de la Urbanización was the scientific foundation for his proposed, approved, and developed urban plan for Barcelona’s growth beyond its walls.

The central decades of the 19th century (1830s to 1880s): the era of parliamentary commissions During the 1830s, the Spanish parliament began to meet regularly (Cortes Generales or Congreso de Diputados). As a new regime, major legal changes had to be introduced and many decisions were highly controversial, even within the liberal side. Political alignment may have explained many decisions, but there were many others that crossed through the main parties. Typical cases were the construction of the railway or the tariff policy. It is true that Spanish liberals tended to be more railway builders and more free traders than conservatives, but there were many exceptions to this rule of thumb. When there was a major external shock, such as the phylloxera epidemics that destroyed European vineyards or the agrarian crisis, all parties were involved. In all these cases, there was the need for a cross-​party solution. The first institutional attempts to develop policy evaluation in Spain correspond with a number of enquiry initiatives developed by the Spanish parliament. These enquiries, which started at the very beginning of the parliamentary regime,2 were important and quite frequent during the central decades of the 19th century. The Comisiones (similar to the Royal Commissions 24

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in Britain) would call to report all the interests involved in the matter under debate –​at least all those that could provide a representative. The commissioners would present all the information provided by the interested parties (witnesses), which would then provide the opportunity to assess diverse and even conflicting policy assessments. It is worth recalling the policy assessments that attracted the attention of scholars, as they highlight where the focus of the debates was, and where there was a widespread need for policy evaluation as a prerequisite for policy analysis. Railway design and promoting the railways were two of the first major issues. As Spain was lagging behind the more advanced economies in regulating and promoting the construction of railways and a railway network, a commission was created which explicitly followed British Royal Commissions.3 After a successful first move, the ambition became larger and a major enquiry was designed.4 This commission became the Spanish model for the new initiatives, starting with the one of 1856 on tariff reform. Indeed, tariff policy raised a lot of political passion and triggered several commissions and lengthy reports. By 1840, there was a special commission on whether tariff reform was needed.5 This opened up an era of continuous debates on the issue. By 1856, there was another commission which was oriented more towards free-​trade policies.6 A few years later (1865–​ 7), the four volumes devoted to analysing the impact of a new tax aimed at discriminating against foreign-​flagged ships gave an overview of the diffusion of the industrial revolution in Spain and the obstacles to it.7 Twelve years later (1879–​83), three thick volumes reported on the impact of the removal of this tax.8 Less than ten years after that (1887–​9), when Europe saw the invasion of cheap overseas wheat, a commission devoted much time and effort –​eight thick volumes! –​to assessing the agrarian crisis.9 It was the start of a major protectionist turn that was studied at another famous commission (1889) on tariff reform. This commission provided the foundation for the first movement in the opposite direction from all those of the previous 50 years.10 It was reassessed in 1894.11 When, 12 years later in 1906, a new commission was created, its discussion was much shorter and less interesting.12 Each of these enquiries was massive in size, and massive in the number of entities and individuals who testified. Among those who testified were prominent lobbies or associations that made a positive effort in assessing public policies. They were the forerunners of specialised agencies devoted to policy evaluation. The boundaries between public policy assessment and policy promotion were narrow, of course, but the effort that was made to provide quantitative and qualitative assessment was quite impressive. Two major examples were the Asociación para la Reforma de los Aranceles and the Sociedad de Estudios Económicos.13 The first, based in Madrid, was a free-​trade lobby, and the second, based in Barcelona, was a protectionist lobby. Both made their best arguments to promote their policies. All in all, the basic policy trends were reasonable and could be explained in the words of the day as well as in today’s words. The major reports allowed for representation of the interests at stake. 25

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Was most political activity built around these parliamentary commissions? Certainly not. This was the most civilised part of the political conflict, when parliaments could be properly elected. But during those decades, there were also many pronunciamientos (military coups d’état, successful or failed), many internal wars, such as the second (1846–​9) and third (1872–​6) Carlist Wars, and colonial wars, such as the one with Morocco (1859–​60), or the Cuban War (1868–​78). All these conflicts asked for very little policy evaluation or assessment. The interests at stake were quite straightforward. But in other cases, parliamentary life was central, as with the design of railway policy, the change of the royal dynasty (1870), the voting of the First Republic (1873), and the reaction to major financial and agrarian crises (1866 and 1882). Parliamentary commissions were a positive attempt to provide proper arguments in favour of or against major policy decisions, when all the parties involved looked for a wider acceptance of their positions or when they were overwhelmed by the circumstances.

The end of the 19th century and early 20th century: institutionalising the commissions The format of the commissions enjoyed such success that it became a model for other instances of policy assessment across the political spectrum and for the mobilisation of key stakeholders. A good example of this was the creation of the Social Reforms Commission in 1883.14 Its full name was the ‘Commission for the study of questions that concern the improvement or welfare of the working classes, both agricultural and industrial, and that affect the relations between capital and labour’. It was an institutional innovation: the first state institution with no decision-​making power –​but with an advisory remit –​to gather expert opinion and data on the various elements that constituted the social issues in need of reform. It immediately received a substantive report on the issue written by Jaime Vera on behalf of the recently created Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE).15 The hearings of the Social Reforms Commission became a major political event, and because both Liberals and Conservatives were uncomfortable with social issues, important opportunities opened up to newcomers. The commission was enlarged in 1890 when provincial delegations were created, and the commission’s name was changed and shortened to Comisión de Reformas Sociales, as it had already come to be known.16 In 1903, it became the Instituto de Reformas Sociales (Social Reforms Institute), and it accelerated the publication of reports, some of which became very relevant for changing public opinion and for influencing legislators and, eventually, governments.17 This tradition of parliamentary commissions was kept alive in the early years of the 20th century with many enquiries. It is worth mentioning those that related to the crisis of some agricultural sectors, echoing the impact of the Comisión para el estudio de la crisis Agrícola y Pecuaria.18 In a different vein, there was the commission that reviewed the case for the suspension of the impuesto de consumos (sales tax, 1909).19 This tax on basic consumer goods was hated by the 26

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majority of the population. It was the major change in the programme of the revolutionary liberals in 1868 which ended the monarchic regime of Isabel II. The revolutionary provisional government immediately abolished the tax on basic consumer goods. Once the monarchy returned, consumption taxes also returned. By 1909 it seemed reasonable to take a fresh look at consumption taxes.20 The fiscal issues required much more analysis after the major fiscal reforms that were implemented just after Spain’s defeat in the Spanish–​American War, and they produced some major monographs.21 In both cases, agrarian and fiscal reforms, there was a top civil servant (and full professor at the university) who was involved and who ensured a high-​quality outcome.22 The emergence of such an expert was an interesting development, as it enhanced the reputation of the commission’s activities and its conclusions. A person such as Flores de Lemus became the paradigm of the public civil servant, with solid training and expertise, and no political debts. As in previous periods, the most important events, such as the Spanish–​ American War (1895–​98), occurred without any policy assessment or evaluation at all. The war was a matter of power and national pride which was shared by the main political parties. Therefore, cost considerations were out of the question. In the case of the Spanish–​American War, the United States offered Spain 2.5 billion dollars to buy Cuba. Spain refused, of course. The compensation paid to the US during the Paris Peace Treaty amounted to approximately the same amount, but was to be paid to the US instead. The case of Spain’s growing involvement in the Rif region of northern Morocco from 1909 onwards was different. The interests promoting the war were purely business-​based. Some of the wealthiest Spanish families had mining interests in Morocco and took advantage of their good connections with the Crown to promote Spanish military involvement in the region for their own benefit. Therefore, there was very little public discussion, much propaganda, and a lot of conflict with the Rif communities that resisted colonisation. As in the previous period of the 1830s to the 1880s, the parliamentary commissions were useful tools to search for shared, cross-​party, inclusive solutions to major challenges. They inspired new institutions to deal frequently with the rise of labour issues. But they had to coexist with major political decisions that were supported by broad political consensus, or with decisions that the main political authorities wanted to keep away from parliamentary scrutiny.

The First World War and the collapse of the parliamentary regime (1914–​23): the first research bureau for years of high politics The First World War was an important turning point. Spain, a neutral power during the war years, enjoyed an economic bonanza period. Savings accumulated in Spanish banks, and many fortunes were built up in full awareness of the need to make careful investment decisions. The challenges of the new map of Europe, the Russian Revolution and internal political instability were very present. Therefore, 27

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there was the need for high-​quality, detailed research into the state of the world and the opportunities presented for Spanish investment. The political challenges triggered by the war and by Spain’s neutrality were enormous. To begin with, there was a division within Spain between those who supported the Axis powers and those who supported the Allies. Even the royal family was divided on this particular big issue. The profits of neutrality were huge, as were the losses of the war. There were politicians, such as Santiago Alba, who raised the issue of taxing windfall profits to compensate the losers. Among the losers were entire regions and sectors. All the exporters of agricultural and mining products to Europe were losers. In contrast, exporters of equipment to the French army were winners, as were manufacturers serving the forgotten markets of Latin America. The issue of taxing windfall profits became increasingly tense as inflation soared and real wages suffered. The entire labour movement mobilised around this issue. Alba made the point of ‘selling a safety net’ to the newly enriched capitalists. He lost (Cabrera and Del Rey, 2002, 2007). Francesc Cambó, the Catalan politician, played a prominent role in his defeat. The first modern servicio de estudios (research bureau) was promoted by Francesc Cambó, head of the Lliga Regionalista, the conservative party representing Catalan self-​government ambitions as well as a modernisation programme for Spain. As a lawyer for multinational companies, he was familiar with the research bureaux of banks and large companies that employed engineers, lawyers, and economists to process the information generated in the major countries and markets, so he set up a small information office in his law firm. He had been appointed commissioner of the International Exposition of the Electric Industries scheduled for 1917 in Barcelona. The outbreak of the First World War forced the event to be postponed. Cambó used part of the funds allocated for the administration of the exposition to create the first modern servicio de estudios in 1915 (Almendros, 2000: 87–​8; Riquer, 2011). At the same time, he created a servicio de estudios in the political headquarters of the Lliga Regionalista in Barcelona and in Madrid. He created another one in 1911 in Barcelona in the Casa de America, an institution created by Catalan industrialists and Cambó to promote cooperation between Catalonia and America. Cambó used a part of his wealth to create his own servicio de estudios, which became the nerve centre of policy-​making. It was the centre of a system that would connect all the research bureaux he promoted (Casa de America, Lliga Regionalista and the Compañía Hispano Americana de Electricidad (CHADE)) (Almendros, 2000: 84–​102). All these servicios had the same objective: to gather the information necessary to assess both the international and Spanish economy and policies, as well as for law-​drafting, so that his collaborators could use the material to produce reports that he could then use for his political and economic endeavours. Cambó made most of his capacity to gather and digest information on similar reforms-​in-​the-​making to attack, in the parliament, the changes proposed by Santiago Alba. His method was successful on a number of occasions when he 28

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was leader of the opposition, and also when he was a government minister, as was the case on a couple of important occasions. Some major reforms from the immediate post-​war years –​such as ownership and the management of the railways, central banks and the banking system, and tariff reform –​were drafted from these memoranda and eventually approved.23 Each of these reforms was a reaction to major external shocks. Railways came out of the First World War with their ownership in Spanish hands –​rather than in foreign hands –​but with obsolete equipment and tough competition from road transport. As the concession was coming to an end, it seemed necessary to give more guarantees to the owners to push them to continue investing in the railways. Regarding the banking system, the war induced some banks to invest in German currency, a decision that appeared as completely wrong once the Treaty of Versailles made clear the financial obligations of the German Republic to the victorious powers. Most of the money invested in Reichsmarks was lost. Some major banks, starting with the most important fully private bank –​the Bank of Barcelona –​went bankrupt. Cambó passed a law reorganising the banking system and giving more regulatory powers to the Bank of Spain. The 1922 tariff was a reaction to the de facto reduction in tariff protection after the war, as tariffs were defined as fixed nominal amounts that became less important as prices rose. When the first window of opportunity to change the 1906 tariff appeared in 1921, the tariff was immediately increased. These legal, regulatory changes were made by Cambó, who had a complete overview of the changes needed to protect Spain’s big-​business interests. All the information gathered and the international contacts made by Cambó paid off with the creation of CHADE in 1920. The German shareholders of multinational companies feared that their assets would become part of the war reparations. Therefore, the shareholders of Deutsch-​Überseeische Elektrizitäts-​Gesellschaft (DUEG) sold their shares to CHADE, thus escaping expropriation (Hausman et al, 2008; Riquer, 2016). This transaction and the large profits of the following years made Cambó a very rich man. In 1923, as a president of the board of directors, he asked Romà Perpiñà to organise the company’s servicio de estudios. Romà Perpiñà had studied in Germany and worked at the Royal Institute for Maritime Traffic and Global Economics, which, in 1933, would be renamed the Institute for the World Economy, located in Kiel.24 He was to became an important promoter of research institutes. Cambó’s servicio de estudios gained a good reputation at the time and might have had an imitating effect. During those years, the Banco de Urquijo –​an industrial investment bank closely associated with Cambó in the Spanish bank syndicate that launched CHADE –​created the foundations of what became, years later, its servicio de estudios.25 It also influenced Joan Carandell, an educated economist, lawyer, and businessman who had started his library in 1926, accumulating more than 27,000 volumes specialising in business, economic, and social issues. He moved to a very large house in Barcelona with the vision of creating a servicio de estudios (Permanyer, 1987: 32). His 26 collaborators summarised the 29

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important information from the books and journals onto more than 1,400,000 record cards.26 On a public-​based affiliation, the Instituto de Reformas Sociales became a major provider of new data on wages and labour conflicts, as well as, broadly speaking, becoming a promoter of social reform.27 In 1920, the institute became part of the newly created Ministerio de Trabajo (Labour Ministry), the innovation of the conservative Eduardo Dato’s new government, which was born in a period of labour unrest and dissolved in 1924 during Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship. The nine years under consideration were perhaps the best example of the intensive use of sophisticated information collected and processed by research bureaux to achieve political success. During this period was Spain’s biggest strike (in 1917); the killings of trade unionist and business leaders, especially in Barcelona; recourse to martial law, and the growing involvement of the military in Spanish political life. All this suggests that the findings of policy analysis would show nothing more than a pure class struggle in a violent format. Indeed, the parliamentary regime was suspended by Miguel Primo de Rivera’s coup d’état. Its explicit goal was ensuring a peaceful atmosphere in Barcelona streets although the implicit goals were protecting the king from being prosecuted, the suspension of Catalan’s limited self-​government (the Mancomunitat, ‘community of provinces’) and the suspension of trade unions, especially the Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT), the strong pro-​anarchist trade union. Political life consisted of having or not having guns, and the monopoly of violence. Even so, specialised agencies like the Instituto de Reformas Sociales or the research bureaux, such as the one promoted by Cambó, introduced a new way of assessing policy design and reform simultaneously with the most advanced industrial countries of the day. Labour and business issues oscillated between pure power and well-​ founded arguments.

Primo de Rivera’s dictatorship and the Second Republic (1923–​39): taking advantage of all possible tools for tougher conflicts The Primo de Rivera dictatorship (1923–​30) put an end to the vibrant parliamentary life of the previous decades. The dictator had most of the power in his hands, but even so, there were times when independent, technical expertise was needed. The format of specialised non-​partisan commissions, created through the initiative of parliament or the government, was still used on the occasion of the hotly debated issue of whether Spain should enter into the gold exchange standard in 1929. The report, written largely by Antonio Flores de Lemus, has been one of the most famous pieces of policy analysis and economic advice of the first half of the 20th century.28 In the early 1930s, awareness of and diffusion of more sophisticated policy evaluation triggered the creation of more specialised entities. The Bank of Spain set up its own servicio de estudios in 1930, which has lasted until today and has been one of the most authoritative policy evaluation institutions since 30

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its inception.29 This servicio was valuable and highly influential as a tool to provide high quality assessments of the development and potential impact of the international crisis. In 1932 it was the turn of Banco de Bilbao, which created a Servicio de Estudios Económicos (Economic Research Bureau). Chambers of Commerce also provided permanent teams and some valuable studies. Their yearbooks were widely read and influential, and covered a wide range of controversial topics. Some individuals, like the demographer and statistician Josep Antoni Vandellós, promoted entities such as the Institut Català d’Investigacions Estadístiques, a private–​public partnership that went far beyond a regional statistical agency (Pascual, 2001: 199–​203).30 Romà Perpiñà, who worked for Francesc Cambó for many years, created his Valencia-​based centre for economic studies (Centre d’Estudis Econòmics Valencians) (Palafox, 2001: 173–​98). Both movements reflect the emergence of regionally diverse communities, each with their own political administrations and goals. Pascual Carrión studied agrarian ownership with a view of passing an agrarian reform law. His monograph was a landmark on the issue and inspired the agrarian reform (Carrión, 1932 [1975]). He worked with Antonio Flores de Lemus in the Technical Commission for Agrarian Reform, which assisted the Parliamentary Commission on Agrarian Reform chaired by Felipe Sánchez-​Román. However, the eventual approval of the Agrarian Reform did not depend on this high-​ quality, technical work, but on other actors and events. The defeated coup d’état of General Sanjurjo in 1932 was more important, as it provided the political willingness to promote and approve the reform, even with enormous opposition from both small and large landowners. Something similar happened with other major Republican public reforms. The political devolution that inspired the regional statutes for Catalonia, the Basque Country and Galicia was also approved because of the failed Sanjurjo coup d’état. The widespread early retirement of military officers –​a natural consequence of the need to downsize an army inflated after years of colonial wars in northern Morocco –​or the change in Church support were ‘Republican’ issues. Nevertheless, the Spanish parliament, as a place to assess public policies, was less active than a generation or two earlier, although its law-​making activity was much more hectic, especially during the years of the Second Republic (1931–​6). Policy-​making during the Civil War was undertaken on the basis of previously accumulated knowledge. This meant that all the analytical capacity could be applied immediately in both camps: Republican and Nationalist.31 The institutions and scholars involved in policy analysis on both sides were called upon to manage the new situation. Those on the Republican side ended up in exile, others went into a long inner exile or managed to survive by betting on the winning side.32 This was the first and most obvious reason for the sharp discontinuity in policy assessment and public policy design. Much expertise was developed during the years before the Franco coup d’état, but much was lost afterwards. 31

Policy Analysis in Spain

Early Francoism: no open analysis under strong dictatorship (1939–​59) The Civil War was another watershed for policy analysis. The new Francoist state was not interested in policy assessment and evaluation, which had become synonymous with political reform. All legislation was aimed at eliminating the laws approved under the Republic in order to return to the pre-​1931 situation. The only centre devoted to political issues –​the Instituto de Estudios Políticos (Sesma Landrín, 2013: 253–​88) –​was under severe political control; it was more an ideological mouthpiece of the new regime than anything else. The official trade union, Central Nacional Sindicalista –​usually called Sindicato Vertical (vertical trade union) –​was the only legal trade union, and joined employers and employees in a typical fascist way. Sindicato Vertical was the institutional basis for the drafting of studies that ended up supporting lobbying efforts disguised as policy analysis.33 Nevertheless, in the early 1940s, the Banco de Urquijo created its servicio de estudios (Puig and Torres, 2008). It invested in facilities –​a good library to start with –​and in 1940, it created a Comisión de Estudios. Later in the decade, 1944, it was transformed into a well-​funded and very ambitious servicio de estudios. It served the bank in a number of obvious ways, such as preparing the information for decision-​making in an active investment bank that was interested in whatever relevant business issues might arise. The technical expertise needed justified a different Servicio Técnico (technical bureau) which focussed on specific technical knowledge. This research bureau launched the first specialised economic journal in Spain (Moneda y Crédito –​Money and Credit), as well as a series of yearbooks on the Spanish economy. It also created a publishing house that promoted both well-​ established expertise and promising new talent. For decades, the high profitability of Banco Urquijo sufficed to pay for the ambitions of the research bureau; it even became a refuge for scholars who were in inner exile. The ability to navigate the very troubled waters of the Second World War; the complete economic closure of the Spanish economy; the Marshall Plan years; the privatisation of the German firms that were expropriated after the Bretton Woods agreement; the partial economic liberalisation of 1959–​60, as well as the golden years of the 1960s and early 1970s, provided huge profits and sophisticated methods of policy analysis. For decades, the Banco de Urquijo’s research bureau was the most envied research institution in Spain. Its political safety net was very strong. Nothing more happened as policy evaluation and assessment is concerned until the mid-​1950s, when the Franco regime felt safer thanks to US support and the overall change in the political atmosphere worldwide. The Cold War was good for the survival of the Franco dictatorship. It became possible to design plans and policies, and to begin to analyse the current ones but only in small political and business circles supportive of the Franco regime. In 1957, Franco replaced some of his Falange ministers with technocrats, mostly from Opus Dei, a secular religious institution, who were much more growth-​oriented. With 32

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economic growth promoted by the partial economic liberalisation of 1959, and, a few years later, with the partial relaxation of censorship, came a new wave of private initiatives. During the 1950s, it was possible to detect the beginning of a small wave of creating institutions, in one form or another, dedicated to assessing policies. The chronology is interesting enough. On the private side, it is worth highlighting the role of all those institutions that developed under the umbrella of the Catholic Church. The Catholic Church was a major supporter of the Franco regime, and enjoyed much more organisational freedom than any other institution. In Barcelona, under direct episcopal protection, an institute called the Institut Catòlic de Ciències Socials de Barcelona (ICES, Barcelona Catholic Institute for the Social Sciences) was created in 1951 by Joan A. Ventosa and Emili Boix i Selva. It was a research bureau for social issues from a Catholic perspective. In 1966, the institute developed into a kind of postgraduate school for social sciences (Escola Superior de Ciències Socials), establishing sociology as a distinct field of study in Barcelona. The movements on the European political and economic map triggered the creation of pro-​European associations. These would not have been approved before, but they were now.34 In 1956, the Liga Europea de Cooperación Económica (LECE, European League of Economic Cooperation) was created under the chairmanship of Miguel Mateu, former Spanish ambassador and first mayor of Barcelona after the entry of Franco’s army into Barcelona in 1939. The LECE mobilised businessmen, politicians and academics who supported, and wanted to promote, European integration, mostly from an economic point of view (the political approach was impossible under the dictatorship).35 In 1958, the Círculo de Economía (Economic Circle) was created, with a similar profile but with a wider set of interests: ‘the modernisation of Spanish economic, social and political life’.36 Both institutions were based in Barcelona. This reflected the greater ease with which new initiatives could be promoted a little further away from the site of political power in Madrid (see Gasòliba, 2017). In fact, it was the Instituto de Estudios Políticos in Madrid that was responsible for supervising and inspiring a turn towards Europe in the official public discourse of the Franco regime (Sesma Landrín, 2005). In 1956, ambitious businessmen and top managers promoted a professional association that was separate and distant from the official vertical trade unions: the Asociación para el Progreso de la Dirección (APD).37 Another set of private agents that was allowed to deploy policy analysis were financial institutions. It is worth mentioning the publication, by the Banco de Bilbao’s servicio de estudios, of a new collection on the Spanish gross domestic product (GDP) and its provincial distribution. In years of data scarcity, this bank promoted research into the provincial breakdown of the Spanish GDP. These publications became the quasi-​official reference on regional GDP, and remained so for more than 40 years. Based on this expertise, they expanded their policy assessment capacity and developed one of the most important research bureaux in Spain.38 Beyond banks, the main economic industries –​especially the more 33

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capital-​intensive industries –​began to have their own servicio de estudios that combined lobbying with policy analysis. At the interface between private ownership and public commitment, the servicio de estudios of the Bank of Spain, which had been dormant since 1939, changed completely when Joan Sardá was appointed director in 1957.39 He became instrumental in the coordination of all the efforts of the reformist team of new Franco ministers and top civil servants who wanted to replace autarchy with an open economy.40 It is worth mentioning that the Bank of Spain was privately owned until 1962, when it was nationalised. It is fair to say that from 1921, central bank public regulation was very strict (following a law passed by Francesc Cambó), and the influence of the government was more important than before. Franco’s regime was a clear discontinuity of everything related to policy analysis. A civil war, harsh repression, and a massive exile made things completely different after 1939. Many emerging institutions dedicated to policy evaluation were closed. The very issue of assessing policies was unacceptable under the dictatorship. Only large private business interests such as the banking oligopoly or Church initiatives could be accepted. It was surprising to see how the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) provided some room for debate on alternative policies in a regime where there was only one legal viewpoint on almost everything. In fact, a lot has been researched on the various political families under the Franco regime (Miguel, 1975). The most prominent individuals suffered from external or internal exile, and they could only survive under the protection and support of the more liberal of these Francoist political families.

Late Francoism: a dictatorship under Western scrutiny (1959–​75) When, in 1958/​9, the Spanish government turned to some international organisations –​the IMF, the World Bank, and the OEEC –​for financial support or for economic advice and support to switch from an autarchic regime to a more open economy, these international organisations provided very influential reports that functioned as policy evaluations as well as policy advocates. The World Bank published the most influential of these reports (Banco Mundial, 1962). It made such a positive impact that the Spanish government commissioned another report from the World Bank to focus on agriculture.41 The World Bank report triggered the first discussion on its recommendations in economic and business journals and newspapers. The examples of the Banco Urquijo and the Banco de Bilbao were replicated by other banks that entered the field of creating their own analytical capabilities as servicios de estudios. This was the case with Banesto, which published detailed market analyses, Banca Catalana, which was very active in industrial, regional, and urban economic analysis, and several savings banks. The major savings banks created their own analytical capacities (Caixa de Pensions, Caixa de Catalunya), as well as together through the Confederación Española de Cajas de Ahorros (CECA, the Spanish Savings Banks Confederation), thus creating a powerful 34

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joint facility.42 The Chambers of Commerce also invested heavily in their policy analysis, reporting, and design. The high economic growth rates achieved in the 1960s and early 1970s provided a new legitimacy to pay more attention to the conditions, causes, and consequences of economic growth. On the public side, the Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (IEF), created in 1960 by the Finance Ministry, was a major initiative for fiscal policy evaluation, focussing entirely on this issue.43 The IEF increasingly included public finance and public economics within its range of interests, and its collection of reports, journals, and monographs has been, since its very start, the best in this field. At the Ministry of Commerce, a team of young economists found the professional freedom to launch specialised journals that promoted trade liberalisation, as well as other initiatives to dissolve the autarchic era and its policies. The monthly journal Información Comercial Española (Spanish Trade News) was an influential opinion-​ maker arguing for the liberalisation of Spanish foreign trade and Spain’s opening up to the economic opportunities of European growth and integration. Enrique Fuentes Quintana was the author of many articles and was the editor of the journal for a while. The name of Enrique Fuentes Quintana, who became Economy Vice President in 1977, is to be highlighted. He was one of a number of new, top civil servants who were market-​oriented and pro-​European. He was also director of the IEF, with an agenda of preparing the ground for the fiscal reforms to come, mostly on personal income taxation. Another relevant state-​created institution for policy analysis was the Public Opinion Institute (Instituto de la Opinión Pública, IOP), established in 1963. It was a place where university-​based sociologists (such as Juan J. Linz) could develop polling studies under government and directors’ initiatives (Alcobendas, 2006). The Instituto de Estudios Políticos (IEP), as the first Franco-​created, policy-​oriented institute, became an important political entity that hired scholars such as Juan J. Linz himself. In fact, Linz, usually with a foreign university affiliation, was the most influential and qualified university expert involved in these studies. The successor to IEP –​from 1977, the Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, transformed by 1997 into the current Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales –​published his selected works, translated into Spanish, in seven thick volumes between 2008 and 2013.44 Many of them were commissioned by the IEP in the 1960s as a series of papers on the business elites and the Spanish economy (volume 5 in his selected works). Perhaps the most interesting innovation during the 1960–​70 decade of high growth was the design of the reform of the public education system. Under the auspices of the new Education Minister, José Luis Villar Palasí, a ‘white paper’ on the state of public education was prepared and published in 1969.45 It was a critical analysis of the existing education system and a proposal for its reform. In many ways it ushered in a new era of public policy assessment. The white paper’s formula echoed the good practices of democratic Europe in policy evaluation where the aim was to build broad political consensus. Villar Palasí 35

Policy Analysis in Spain

was a transformative figure who was also responsible for an important shake-​ up of Spanish university life with the creation in 1968 of new universities in Madrid, Barcelona, and Bilbao, as well as Higher Polytechnical Institutes –​which became Polytechnical Universities two years later –​in Barcelona and Valencia. The new universities –​two of them were called ‘autonomous’ –​appointed younger teaching staff. Some of those academics ended up providing specialist support in policy assessment and design. Another major public involvement in policy evaluation was the creation of the Comisaría del Plan de Desarrollo, that is, French-​style ‘indicative’ planning. After the liberalising measures adopted in 1959, under severe pressure from the balance of payments, the powerful economic forces that felt threatened by the new policies managed to press for a new interventionist turn (Torre and García Zúñiga, 2009). The main outcome was the introduction of indicative planning, which was presented as a new, modern, public policy tool. The preparation of the economic plans for 1964–​7, 1968–​71 and 1972–​5 required the creation of an important cabinet department devoted to the coordination, design, and drafting of these ‘development plans’. A top economics professor at the University of Barcelona, Fabián Estapé, was appointed by the minister in charge, Laureano López Rodó, who was himself a university professor of administrative law. The reports prepared by the Comisaría del Plan de Desarrollo replicated the format of the white papers, making important contributions to the analysis of current policies and the design of new ones. As a collection of policy evaluations, they are worth remembering. Private initiatives remained relevant. Fundación FOESSA (1965, created by Caritas Española, a Catholic charity) was a good example.46 It promoted applied social research –​mostly sociological in method and in tradition –​and appointed young scholars with international backgrounds, such as Amando de Miguel, a student of Juan Linz, to direct its first major report (Informe FOESSA) in 1965, which was repeated in 1968. The Informe FOESSA had a tremendous impact, as it opened the door on many social issues that were completely forbidden to mention, such as ‘de facto’ divorce, abortion, extreme poverty, social exclusion, and so on. Indeed, knowing the real social situation in Spain was its first major objective. When the Franco regime reached its biological end –​ Franco died on 20 November 1975 –​there were quite a number of public and private institutions with well-​established capacities to assess and evaluate public policies. Economists were very much at home in these institutions. The success of the Stabilisation Plan of 1959, and the subsequent ‘golden years’ of Spanish economic growth, provided the economists a good reputation. By being able to replicate similar successes in the fight against the rising inflation of the 1970s, provide technical support and the rationale for the building of a new welfare system, and to lead the negotiations to join the EEC, they were collectively successful. This success provided them with political centrality for years. Contributions from the new political scientists and sociologists also existed, but were more complex, as these 36

Historical forerunners in Spanish policy analysis

researchers were under close scrutiny and suspicion by the Franco regime. They could only thrive under private protection, be it Banco Urquijo, the Church, or on the periphery of state institutions. Looking at the last years of late Francoism, the role of a new generation trained at the universities, and the emerging or well-​established university professors and researchers, made a big difference to policy analysis. Once again, the discontinuity with the Republican and parliamentary past was striking. But the skills, agendas, and ambitions of this young talent were so oriented towards policy issues that it is not surprising that they played an increasingly important role in policy-​making. This was happening as a new democratic regime and a set of new municipal, regional, and state-​wide elections began to change the political landscape in a very few years.

Conclusion Much research remains to be done into the early stages of policy assessment in Spain before 1975. As with many other aspects of historical experience, Spain enjoyed some early successes and many failures. During the collapse of the Ancien Régime, and during the development of Liberal Spain, the main contributions came from heroic individuals who worked hard to create the data to support their cases for new policies, which they had also designed. The period, made up of outstanding individuals, was followed by the era of parliamentary commissions. These commissions provided a political space to advocate for conflicting interests, and enjoyed a number of successes and good recognition. Indeed, the formula was replicated to build specialised institutions to deal with emerging, politically hot issues which were difficult to deal with from a partisan point of view. At some point during First World War the research bureau appeared, to remain for decades as a major tool for policy assessment and design. Indeed, Spain was one of the first countries in the world to hold free elections (Linz et al, 2005), but it was also one of the first to see them suspended for long periods of time. Ways of openly displaying political agendas were always complicated, and during the dictatorship periods this was impossible. Every time democratic elections came back, the number and intensity of suppressed conflicts was such that it created great weaknesses to reformist agendas. The early capacity to create parliamentary commissions provided superb proceedings, which are still valuable to read and are worthy of admiration. But these commissions did not become a well-​rooted tradition, and they mostly disappeared due to the eventual collapse of the parliamentary regime. The Civil War suddenly put an end to most of the previous advances in policy evaluation within the context of policy design and definition. Although these advances were very valuable, they never had the opportunity to be continued. During the first decades of the Franco dictatorship, there was no interest in creating institutions to assess public policy. Given the very nature of the Franco regime, these institutions only emerged when they were promoted by business 37

Policy Analysis in Spain

leaders and lobbies –​often responding to the challenge of European integration –​ by financial institutions and by the Catholic Church. In 1975, when Franco died, there were quite a number of these institutions. They were all very active during the transition years. It is worth noting the capacity of some high officials to create, at very different times, policy evaluation and design within the Spanish government and administration. The initiatives of the 1960s and early 1970s were also crucial in providing expertise and personnel, typically from university backgrounds or from employment, to the new democratic leadership. The issues at stake –​the substantive content of policies –​changed a lot during the whole period considered. This was partly due to changes in the global environment and partly due to issues being suppressed during absolutist regimes and dictatorships. In these cases, the issues re-​emerged in an explosive way when the parliamentary regime was re-​established. There were recurring themes: political regime change, land ownership, industrial relations, state–​ Church relations, and the devolution of power to historical regions with strong cultural identities. The intensity of the conflicts caused a lot of political instability, expressed in coups d’état, civil wars, and the suspension of parliamentary regimes. The duality of civilised politics and military power politics became the main feature of Spanish policy-​making, leading to policy styles that were diametrically opposed –​the pen and the sword. As mentioned previously, Spain was among the very first Western countries holding free elections, but it has also been the one with more violent interruptions of representative and democratic regimes. Policy evaluation and assessment had flourished under the latter and had vanished under military regimes. Policy analysis capacity could even develop under the two poles, but legitimacy issues were always paramount. By 20 November 1975 –​when Franco passed away –​legitimacy was the major issue at stake. Notes 1 2 3 4

5 6

7

38

The closest most recent effort we are familiar with is Cabrera and Del Rey (2007), which is a shortened version of the original Spanish text: Cabrera and Del Rey (2002). See the Guía de Fuentes of the chapter by Linz et al (2005) for an overview of the political history of Spain seen from the point of view of production of data and reports. Its first outcome was the Dictamen de la comisión acerca del proyecto de ley sobre ferrocarriles, Diario de Sesiones, 14 January 1850. Información parlamentaria hecha por la Comisión de Ferrocarriles nombrada por el Congreso de los Diputados en 10 de enero de 1850, Madrid: Imprenta Nacional, 1850, 252 dense pages. These have been carefully studied by Mateo del Peral (1978). Dictamen de la Comisión especial arancelaria para informar sobre los puntos más capitales y de mayor influencia en la industria nacional del Proyecto de Nuevos Aranceles y Ley de Aduanas, Madrid, 1840. Comisión parlamentaria de las Cortes Constituyentes (1856) Audiencia pública sobre la reforma de aranceles a consecuencia del proyecto de ley presentado por el Gobierno en 16 de noviembre de 1855, Madrid: Imprenta Nacional. Información sobre el derecho diferencial de bandera y sobre las aduanas exigibles a los hierros, el carbón de piedra y los algodones, presentada al Gobierno de S.M. por la Comisión nombrada al efecto en Real Decreto de noviembre de 1865. Vol. 1, Derecho diferencial de bandera. Vol. 2, Hierros. Vol. 3, Carbones. Vol. 4, Algodones, Madrid, 1867.

Historical forerunners in Spanish policy analysis 8

9

10 11

12 13

14

15 16 17

18

19 20

21

22

Información sobre las consecuencias que ha producido la supresión del derecho diferencial de bandera y sobre las valoraciones y clasificaciones de los tejidos de lana, formada con arreglo a los artículos 20 y 29 de la ley de presupuestos del año 1878–​79, por la Comisión especial arancelaria creada por Real Decreto de 8 de septiembre de 1878. Vol. 1, Derecho diferencial de bandera. Vol. 2, Industria lanera. Vol. 3, Industria lanera y naviera, Madrid, 1879–​83. La crisis agrícola y pecuaria. Actas de las sesiones de la comisión creada por Real Decreto de 7 de julio de 1887 para estudiar la crisis por la que atraviesan la agricultura y la ganadería, 8 vols, Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1887–​9. A shorter report was published on another agrarian crisis affecting the rice producers: La crisis arrocera. Actas y dictámenes de la comisión creada por Real decreto de 20 de julio de 1886 para estudiar la situación y producción del arroz en las provincias del Levante, su coste de producción, las causas de la crisis que atraviesa y los remedios que podrían imponerse para conjurarla, Madrid: Establecimiento Tipográfico ‘Sucesores de Rivadeneyra’, 1887. La reforma arancelaria y los tratados de comercio. Información escrita de la Comisión nombrada por Real Decreto de 11 de octubre de 1889, 6 vols, Madrid, 1890. Información oral parlamentaria sobre los tratados de comercio presentados por el Gobierno de S.M. en el Senado en el mes de abril de 1894, convocada por la Comisión nombrada por las Secciones de dicha alta Cámara, 1894. Carefully studied by Sabaté (1992) in her PhD thesis and later on in Sabaté (1996). There is a huge amount of literature on the Spanish debate between free-​traders and protectionists, and their main associations. A good set of papers by the relevant scholars on the field is Fuentes Quintana (1999a) and Fuentes Quintana (1999b). Comisión de Reformas Sociales, 1883. The full name of the commission was: Comisión para el estudio de las cuestiones que interesan a la mejora o bienestar de las clases obreras, tanto agrícolas como industriales, y que afectan a las relaciones entre el capital y el trabajo. Jaime Vera, Informe a la Comisión de Reformas Sociales por la Agrupación Socialista Madrileña en el año 1883, Madrid. Reformas sociales (1890) Información escrita practicada en virtud de la Real Orden de 5 de diciembre de 1883, 2 vols, Madrid: Minuesa. Instituto de Reformas Sociales (1904) Informe referente a las minas de Vizcaya, Madrid: Imp. Suc. M. Minuesa de los Ríos; Instituto de Reformas Sociales (1904–​23) Boletín; Instituto de Reformas Sociales (1913) Memoria redactada por la comisión nombrada por el Instituto para estudiar las condiciones del trabajo en las minas de Riotinto, Madrid: Imp. Suc. M. Minuesa de los Ríos; Instituto de Reformas Sociales (1914) La jornada de trabajo en la industria textil. Trabajos preparatorios del Reglamento para la aplicación del Real Decreto de 24 de agosto de 1913, Madrid: Imp. Suc. M. Minuesa de los Ríos; Instituto de Reformas Sociales (1915) Suplemento a la información sobre la regulación de la jornada de trabajo en la industria textil, Madrid: Imp. Suc. M. Minuesa de los Ríos. A necessary reference is Palacio Morena (1988). For Instituto de Reformas Sociales see: Carr (1966). [Congreso de los Diputados] (1909) Comisión para el estudio de la producción y consumo de trigo. Su nombramiento. Actas de sus sesiones. Dictámenes y Apéndice, Madrid: Imprenta de Sucesores de M. Minuesa de Los Ríos. Documentos y trabajos de la comisión extraparlamentaria para la transformación del Impuesto de Consumos, 5 vols, Madrid: Imprenta de Sucesores de M. Minuesa de los Ríos, 1906–​10. See also: Congreso de los Diputados (1910), Información Pública abierta por la Comisión General de Presupuestos sobre el proyecto de reforma del impuesto del azúcar, Madrid: Establecimiento Tipográfico ‘Sucesores de Rivadeneyra’. Ministerio de Hacienda (1913 [1957]) Memoria de la Dirección General de Contribuciones, Madrid: Talleres del depósito de la guerra [1957: reprint Revista de Economía Política, 3, pp 1055–​198]. This was Antonio Flores de Lemus. He has been extensively researched. See Fuentes Quintana (2001: 45–​272).

39

Policy Analysis in Spain 23 24 25

26

27

28

29

30

31

32 33 34 35

36

37 38 39 40

40

Cambó (1918, 1919, 1921a, 1921b, 1999). This 1999 reference is a recollection of Cambó’s papers. Almendros (2000: 94) notes that Perpiñà had learned the technique of classifying documents in the Institute for the World Economy. This new facility published the successful, high-​quality volume Banco Urquijo (1920). For a detailed account of the early steps of the Banco Urquijo research bureau see Puig and Torres (2008). The Biblioteca Econòmica Carandell (Carandell Economic Library), is currently hosted by Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona. See www.uab.cat/w ​ eb/o ​ ur-c​ ollections/s​ pecial-c​ ollections/​ detall-​1345738248220.html?elementid=​1345739967629 [Accessed 14 March 2021]. See Instituto de Reformas Sociales (1916) Coste de la vida del obrero. Estadística de los precios de los artículos de primera necesidad en toda España desde 1909 a 1915, Madrid; Instituto de Reformas Sociales (1923), Movimiento de los precios al por menor en España durante la guerra y la postguerra, 1914–​22, Madrid. Dictamen de la Comisión nombrada por Real Orden de 9 de enero de 1929 para el estudio de la implantación del patrón oro, Madrid: Consejo Superior Bancario, 1929 (reprint in Información Comercial Española, 318, 1960, pp 51–​83). For a complete history of this institution see Martín-​Aceña (2000). For the organizational and institutional context, Martín-​Aceña (2017). Fuentes Quintana (2001: Vol. 6) devotes four chapters to review the history of the servicio de estudios Martín-​Aceña (2001: 11–​20), Almenar (2001a: 21–​110), dedicated to the early director, Olegario Fernández Baños, and Almenar (2001b: 111–​32) and Ruiz (2001: 133–​72) on another director, Germán Bernácer Tormo. A much longer essay is Pascual’s (1975) unpublished doctoral dissertation on Vandellós’s biography and works. There are bits and pieces published by Pascual as introductory essays to the reprints of some of Vandellós’s books, as, for instance, his ‘Prologue’ to Vandellós (1991). A lot is explained in Fuentes Quintana and Comín (2008: Vol. 2, 9–​335). Its third part, Los economistas, las ideas y las propuestas económicas, provides nine high-​quality essays on expertise, initiatives, and policy design between 1931 and 1939. Also in Fuentes Quintana and Comín (2008), it is worth mentioning Claret (2008: 411–​34), Martín Rodríguez and Fernández Clemente (2008: 435–​64), and Aznar Soler (2008: 465–5​ 20). There were many of this kind. A well-​known example is Beltrán (1943). Guirao (2021) goes deep into the causes of Franco’s consent of European economic integration lobbies. In their own words: ‘the Spanish Committee of the European League for Economic Cooperation (LECE, from the Spanish acronym) contributes to the defence of the values and principles typical of the free and democratic European societies that founded the founding states of what is now the European Union’. www.leceonline.org/​en/​spanish-​committee/​ [Accessed 14 March 2021]. For its trajectory since its founding, see: Camí and Carulla (1983), edited to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the organisation. Also see Maluquer de Motes (2008). This book captures the life of the organisation until 2008. Association for the Advancement of Management, inspired by the American Management Association. Banco de Bilbao (1955 and ff.) La Renta Nacional de España y su distribución provincial, Bilbao: Banco de Bilbao. On the Servicio de Estudios of the Bank of Spain see Martín-​Aceña (2000). The role of Joan Sardá in the Bank of Spain’s relation to the promotion of the Stabilisation Plan of 1959 has been described on many occasions as one of the very high moments of policy-​making influence by a top civil servant in Franco’s Spain. All his reports, and those that he promoted, were evaluations of the current autarchic economic policy with the view of discrediting it. Sardá took advantage of his earlier career as economist-​in-​chief of Venezuela’s central bank (when Venezuela was a well-​off country), as well as his international contacts, to

Historical forerunners in Spanish policy analysis

41

42 43 44

45 46

pilot Spain to a more open economy with the support of the major international economic institutions: the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank and the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC). See Ros Hombravella (2015). Banco Internacional de Reconstrucción y Fomento y de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Agricultura y la Alimentación (1966). Esther Boserup was the deputy head of the mission. CECA was created in 1928 as a common service for all Spanish saving banks. It was involved in the drafting of collective opinion since 1971. There is no proper history of this important institution. Montero and Miley (2008–​13). The titles of the seven volumes in the collection are self-​ explanatory: 1. Fascism: historical and comparative perspectives; 2. Nation, State and language; 3. Totalitarian systems and authoritarian regimes; 4. Democracies: failures, transitions and challenges; 5. Economy and businessmen in Spain; 6. Parties and political elites in Spain; 7. History and society in Spain. Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (1969). Ricardo Díez Hochleitner was the person in charge of this milestone in Spanish policy analysis. FOESSA stands for Fomento de Estudios Sociales y Sociología Aplicada (Promotion of Social Studies and Applied Sociology).

References Alcobendas, M.P. (2006) IOP. Historia del Instituto de la Opinión Pública 1963–​ 1977, Madrid: CIS. Almenar, S. (2001a) ‘Olegario Fernández Baños: de la geometría a la econometría’, in E. Fuentes Quintana (ed) Economía y economistas españoles, Vol. 6: La modernización de los estudios de economía, Barcelona: Galaxia Gutenberg, pp 21–​110. Almenar, S. (2001b) ‘Germán Bernácer: neogeorgismo y teoría de la demanda efectiva’, in E. Fuentes Quintana (ed) Economía y economistas españoles, Vol. 6: La modernización de los estudios de economía, Barcelona: Galaxia Gutenberg, pp 111–​32. Almendros, A. (2000) Francesc Cambó: la forja d’un policy maker, Barcelona: Publicacions de l’Abadia de Montserrat. Aznar Soler, M. (2008) ‘Literatura y cultura en el exilio republicano de 1939’, in E. Fuentes Quintana and F. Comín (eds) Economía y economistas españoles en la Guerra Civil, 2 vols, Barcelona: Galaxia Gutenberg, pp 465–​520. Banco Internacional de Reconstrucción y Fomento y de la Organización de las Naciones Unidas para la Agricultura y la Alimentación (1966) El desarrollo de la Agricultura en España, Madrid: Ministerio de Hacienda. Banco Mundial (1962) Informe del Banco Mundial. El desarrollo económico de España, Madrid: BIRF. Banco Urquijo (1920) El progreso y la riqueza de España, Madrid: Imprenta de Samarán y Compañía. Beltrán, L. (1943) La industria algodonera Española, Barcelona: Ministerio de Trabajo. Sección de Trabajo de la Industria Textil Algodonera. Cabrera, M. and Del Rey, F. (2002) El poder de los empresarios. Política y economía en la España contemporánea (1875–​2000), Madrid: Taurus. 41

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Cabrera, M. and Del Rey, F. (2007) The Power of Entrepreneurs: Politics and Economy in Contemporary Spain, New York and Oxford: Berghahn Books. Cambó, F. (1918) Elementos para el estudio del problema ferroviario en España, 3 vols, Madrid: Ministerio de Fomento. Cambó, F. (1919) Vuit mesos al Ministeri de Foment. Ma gestió ministerial, Barcelona: Editorial Catalana. Cambó, F. (1921a) El problema ferroviario en España, Barcelona: Editorial Catalana. Cambó, F. (1921b) Ordenación Bancaria de España, Madrid: Ministerio de Hacienda. Cambó, F. (1999) Política económica, Barcelona: Editorial Alpha. Camí, I. and Carulla, F. (eds) (1983) Cercle d’Economia 1958–​1983: A Trajectory of Modernisation and Coexistence, edited to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the organisation. Barcelona: L’Avenç. Canga Argüelles, J. (1826–​7 [1968]) Diccionario de Hacienda, Madrid: Imprenta Española de M. Calero. Reprinted in Spain in 1833, 2 vols, Madrid: Imprenta de D. Marcelino Calero y Portocarrero. [1968 reprint: Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Fiscales.] Carr, R. (1966) Spain 1808–​1939, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Carrión, P. (1932 [1975]) Los latifundios en España. Su importancia. Origen. Consecuencias y solución, Barcelona: Ariel. Cerdá, I. (1867 [1968]) Teoría General de la urbanización y aplicación de sus principios y doctrinas a la reforma y ensanche de Barcelona, Madrid: Imprenta Española. [1968 reprint together with a study by F. Estapé, 3 vols, Madrid: Instituto de Estudios Fiscales.] Claret, J. (2008) ‘La destrucción de capital humano. El caso de la universidad española’, in E. Fuentes Quintana and F. Comín (eds), Economía y economistas españoles en la Guerra Civil, 2 vols, Barcelona: Galaxia Gutenberg, pp 411–​34. Fontana, J. and Villares, R. (eds) (2007–​17), Historia de España, 10 vols, Barcelona: Crítica and Marcial Pons. Fuentes Quintana, E. (ed) (1999a) Economía y economistas españoles, Vol. 4: La economía clásica, Barcelona: Galaxia Gutenberg. Fuentes Quintana, E. (ed) (1999b) Economía y economistas españoles, Vol. 5: Las críticas a la economía clásica, Barcelona: Galaxia Gutenberg. Fuentes Quintana, E. (ed) (2001) Economía y economistas españoles, Vol. 6: La modernización de los estudios de economía, Barcelona: Galaxia Gutenberg. Fuentes Quintana, E. and Comín, F. (eds) (2008) Economía y economistas españoles en la Guerra Civil, 2 vols, Barcelona: Galaxia Gutenberg. Gasòliba, C. (2017) ‘La Barcelona europeísta de la década del 1950’, in F. Guirao (ed), 60 anys dels Tractats de Roma, Barcelona: CeGe, pp 24–​32. Guirao, F. (2021) The European Rescue of the Franco Regime, 1950–​1975, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Hausman, W., Hertner, P., and Wilkins, M. (2008) Global Electrification: Multinational Enterprise and International Finance in the History of Light and Power, 1878–​2007, New York: Cambridge University Press.

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Jovellanos, G.M. (1795) Informe de la sociedad económica de Madrid al Real y Supremo Consejo de Castilla en el expediente de ley agraria, extendido por su individuo de número el señor don Gaspar Melchor de Jovellanos, a nombre de la junta encargada de su formación, Madrid. Larruga, E. (1787–​1800) Memorias políticas y económicas sobre los frutos, comercio, fábricas y minas de España, con inclusiones de los reales decretos, órdenes, cédulas, aranceles y ordenanzas expedidas para su gobierno y fomento, 45 vols, Madrid: Imprenta de Benito Cano por Antonio Espinosa. Linz, J.J., Montero, J.R., and Ruiz, A.M. (2005) ‘Elecciones y política’, in A. Carreras and X. Tafunell (eds) Estadísticas Histórica de España, Bilbao: Fundación BBVA, pp 1027–​154. Madoz, P. (1845–​9) Diccionario Geográfico-​Histórico-​Estadístico de España y sus posesiones de Ultramar, 16 vols, Madrid: Est. Literario-​Tipográfico de P. Madoz y L. Sagasti. Maluquer de Motes, J. (2008) El largo camino a Europa. 50 años del Cercle d’Economia, Barcelona: Centro Editor PDA. Martín Rodríguez, M. and Fernández Clemente, E. (2008) ‘Sesenta economistas académicos del exilio (1936–​1939)’, in E. Fuentes Quintana and F. Comín (eds), Economía y economistas españoles en la Guerra Civil, 2 vols, Barcelona: Galaxia Gutenberg, pp 435–​64. Martín-​Aceña, P. (2000) El Servicio de Estudios del Banco de España, 1930/​2000, Madrid: Banco de España. Martín-​Aceña, P. (2001) ‘El Servicio de Estudios del Banco de España’, in E. Fuentes Quintana (ed) Economía y economistas españoles, Vol. 6: La modernización de los estudios de economía, Barcelona: Galaxia Gutenberg, pp 11–​20. Martín-​Aceña, P. (2017) The Banco de España, 1782–​2017: The History of a Central Bank, Madrid: Banco de España. Mateo del Peral, D. (1978) ‘Los orígenes de la política ferroviaria en España (1844–​1877)’, in M. Artola (ed) Los ferrocarriles en España. 1844–​1943, Vol. 1: El Estado y los Ferrocarriles, Madrid: Banco de España, pp 31–​159. Miguel, A. de (1975) Sociología del franquismo. Análisis ideológico de los ministros del régimen, Barcelona: Euros. Miñano, S. (1826–​9) Diccionario Geográfico-​Estadístico de España y Portugal, 11 vols, Madrid: Impr. de Pierart-​Peralta. Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia (1969) La Educación en España. Bases para una política educativa, Madrid: Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia. Secretaria General Técnica del Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia. Montero, J.R. and Miley, T.J. (eds) (2008–​13) Obras escogidas, 7 vols, Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales. Palacio Morena, J.I. (1988) La institucionalización de la reforma social en España, 1883–​1924: la Comisión y el Instituto de Reformas Sociales, Madrid: Ministerio de Trabajo y Seguridad Social.

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Palafox, J. (2001) ‘El Centro de Estudios Económicos Valencianos. Román Perpiñà i Grau: del fomento de la industrialización competititiva al estudio de los desequilibrios regionales’, in E. Fuentes Quintana (ed) Economía y economistas españoles, Vol. 6: La modernización de los estudios de economía, Barcelona: Galaxia Gutenberg, pp 173–​98. Pascual, J. (1975) Un economista catalán: José Antonio Vandellós Solá: 1899–​1950, doctoral thesis, Barcelona: Universitat de Barcelona. Pascual, J. (2001) ‘El Institut d’Investigacions Econòmiques. José Antonio Vandellós Solá (1899–​1950)’, in E. Fuentes Quintana (ed) Economía y economistas españoles, Vol. 6: La modernización de los estudios de economía, Barcelona: Galaxia Gutenberg, pp 199–​203. Permanyer, L. (1987) ‘Joan Carandell’, La Vanguardia, 20 September, p 32. Available from: http://​hem​erot​eca.lavan​guar​dia.com/​prev​iew/​1987/​09/​ 20/​ p ag​ i na- ​ 3 2/ ​ 3 2999 ​ 0 10/ ​ p df.html?sea ​ rch= ​ j oan%20ca ​ r and ​ e ll [Accessed 13 March 2021]. Puig, N. and Torres, E. (2008) Banco Urquijo. Un banco con historia, Madrid: Banco Urquijo Sabadell Banca Privada. Radcliff, P.M. (2017), Modern Spain: 1808 to the Present, Hoboken: Wiley-​ Blackwell. Riquer, B. de (2011) ‘Francesc Cambó: una biografía necesaria y compleja’, Cahiers de civilisation espagnole contemporaine, 8, https://​doi.org/​10.4000/​ ccec.3769 [Accessed 13 March 2021]. Riquer, B. de (2016) Cambó y Argentina. Negocios y corrupción política, Barcelona: EDHASA. Ros Hombravella, J. (2015) Joan Sardá Dexeus: un economista clave en la España del siglo XX, Madrid: Aranzadi/​Thomson Reuters. Ruiz, G. (2001) ‘Germán Bernácer Tormo (1883–​1965)’, in E. Fuentes Quintana (ed) Economía y economistas españoles, Vol. 6: La modernización de los estudios de economía, Barcelona: Galaxia Gutenber, pp 133–​72. Sabaté, M. (1992) La reforma arancelaria de 1906: la protección legitimada, doctoral thesis, Universidad de Zaragoza. Sabaté, M. (1996) El proteccionismo legitimado. Política arancelaria española a comienzos de siglo XX, Madrid: Civitas. Sesma Landrín, N. (2005) ‘La construcción del discurso europeísta del franquismo desde el Instituto de Estudios Políticos (1948–​1956)’, Historia Contemporánea (UPV), 30: 159–​97. Sesma Landrín, N. (2013) ‘Sociología del Instituto de Estudios Políticos. Un grupo de elite intelectual al servicio del partido único y el Estado franquista (1939–​1969)’, in M.A. Ruiz-​Carnicer (ed) Falange. Las culturas políticas del fascismo en la España de Franco (1936–​1975), Zaragoza: Institución Fernando el Católico, pp 253–​88.

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Torre, J. de la and García Zúñiga, M. (eds) (2009) Entre el mercado y el Estado: los planes de desarrollo durante el franquismo, Pamplona: Universidad Pública de Navarra, Servicio de Publicaciones. Vandellós, J.A. (1991) Crisis i cicles econòmics: textos publicats entre 1925–​1948, Barcelona: Diputació de Barcelona.

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THREE

Policy analysis and policy evaluation as a profession Verónica Viñas

Introduction Experts are involved in policy analysis in diverse ways, from the university professor who does independent research to the academically trained expert employed by a consultancy or a firm. Yet, the boundary separating scientific policy advice from consulting and interest organisations’ lobbying activities has become blurred. This makes it difficult to assess the extent to which policy analysis, and particularly policy evaluation, has become a profession in Spain. This chapter begins with a discussion on the concept of ‘profession’, to clarify its multidimensional and ambivalent nature and to frame the discussion on policy analysis as a profession in Spain. Although policy analysis and policy evaluation have different definitions, and different functions and methodologies from each other, both will be considered, as both ‘produce knowledge of and in the policy process and are client and decision-​making oriented’ (Geva-​May and Pal, 1999: 259, 264). In the following sections, the chapter explains the evolution of the professionalisation of policy analysis and policy evaluation in Spain for the last decades, and describes the milestones that are still driving the professionalisation of policy analysis, taking into account the importance of postgraduate programmes, professional associations, conferences, and other network-​like activities, and Spain’s entry into the European Union (EU). Finally, this chapter presents what may be one of the challenges for the future of policy analysts and evaluators, as well as one of the lines for future research: big data. The last section brings together the main findings of the chapter.

Reflections on the concept of profession There is a long and intense debate about what constitutes a ‘profession’ and ‘professionalism’ and the characteristics that define them. Millerson’s (1964) or Wilensky’s (1964) works are often cited as reference points. According to Millerson, a profession ‘is a type of higher-​grade, non-​manual occupation, with both subjectively and objectively recognised occupational status, possessing a well-​defined area of study or concern and providing a definite service, after advanced training and education’ (1964: 10).

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Policy analysis and policy evaluation as a profession

According to this definition, a profession exists to the extent that it has been formalised as an occupational class. An occupation that entails lengthy training and a formal qualification, like medical doctors, judges, lawyers, or engineers, would be a profession. Furthermore, the body of knowledge must be standardised by professional associations that control the entry into the profession (Di Francesco, 2015). Professionals are protected by professional associations that select and reject members, set up educational and training programmes, and establish and enforce codes of conduct ‘to guarantee autonomy as well as the appropriate usage of autonomy’ (Noordegraaf, 2007: 765–​7; Noordegraaf, 2016: 784). This definition of a profession has been used for decades, debating the nature of professions and/​ or analysing whether certain occupations can be considered professions (Brint, 1994; Reed, 1996; Fournier, 1999; Freidson, 2001). However, several authors have questioned this definition of a profession (Noordegraaf, 2007, 2016; Adachi, 2017; Donaldson, 2019). One of the main critiques is that this definition of a profession is too narrow, and it excludes a large number of occupational groups. The post-​industrial era and the knowledge-​based society is transforming existing occupational structures. In this new context, it becomes necessary to review and reformulate the concept of a profession and search for more open notions of professional work. In this line, Adachi (2017: 19) suggests using this occupational designation for every type of knowledge work that satisfies the following conditions. An occupation is recognised as being professional when: it requires skills that are based on broad theoretical knowledge, with some experience; when there is a considerable demand for the service it provides; when it commits to the public good; and when its practitioners share a minimum level of professional ethics. If these characteristics are considered, policy analysis is undoubtedly a profession. However, it varies from one country to another whether policy analysis is established as an occupation with a considerable demand for the service provided by its members (Adachi, 2017).

The evolution of policy analysis and policy evaluation in Spain In recent decades, in the context of a democratic consolidation of citizens’ demands for accountability and transparency in public administration, together with fiscal scarcity and limited budgets, the need for policy analysis has increased in most advanced democracies (Radin, 2013: 9). This process has occurred in parallel with the institutionalisation of policy analysis and evaluation as a field of research and with undergraduate and graduate academic programmes in universities and a technical field within public administrations. In the last decades, policy analysts have analysed and evaluated policies and programmes either in-​ house or externally to the government at a national, regional, or local level. The profiles of policy analysts are pretty diverse. In some cases, policy analysts are academics who perform independent research for private companies or the government. Others are professional experts hired directly by public administrations as consultants or work for private companies that consult public 47

Policy Analysis in Spain

administrations. Finally, policy analysts also work as think-​tank employees, in political parties or as interest-​g roup staff, and so on (Aubin et al, 2017: 15). Furthermore, professional policy analysts are not a homogenous group in terms of the range of their activities. They are experts in different policy-​related activities such as policy appraisal, implementation, strategic planning, and evaluation, and they use different analytical techniques across a wide variety of policy areas (Howlett and Wellstead, 2011: 626). As with any other profession, policy analysts share common skills and experiences. However, they come from different academic backgrounds and training paths. They mainly include social scientists with backgrounds in economics, political science, and sociology, and other academic disciplines such as lawyers, engineers, physicians, and social workers. In most cases, they work as policy analysts with a high level of specialisation in one specific policy sector (Kohoutek et al, 2013: 32; Radin, 2018: 47). For these reasons, a broad conception of a policy analyst is necessary to understand the involvement and contribution of every stakeholder in policy analysis. As Howlett and Wellstead (2011: 615) highlight, the profession of policy analysis has a multidimensional, varied, and complex nature. This complex and multidisciplinary reality makes it difficult to consider all policy analysts as a single professional community.

Consolidation as a profession Five milestones have contributed to this process of professionalisation of policy analysis since the beginning of the 1990s. Three of them are related to the supply side –​the introduction of public policy analysis as a field of study after the reform of the undergraduate degree curricula in universities, the emergence of public policy and evaluation postgraduate programmes, which allowed for a consolidation of teaching and research in public policies, and the creation of professional associations and the organisation of conferences related to public policies, enhancing the visibility of policy analysis as a profession. The other two are related to the demand side –​Spain’s entry into the EU, triggering increased demand for research on public policies, and the creation of the Spanish Agency for the Evaluation of Public Policies and Quality of Services (AEVAL), which contributed to the institutionalisation of policy evaluation in Spain. However, as we shall see in the following sections, these factors are closely connected. The evolution of each of them explains, to a large extent, the appearance and development of the others. Changes in the undergraduate degree curricula in universities: ‘public policy analysis’ became a field of study Until the 1980s, lawyers developed most policy analyses in Spain. This corresponded to the conception that it was necessary to modify regulations and/​ or the organisational structures in charge of implementing regulations to achieve 48

Policy analysis and policy evaluation as a profession

better policies (Vallès, 1991). This situation also corresponded to the majority of lawyers being in intermediate and senior positions in public administrations. Later, economists, who focused mainly on economic policies, and sociologists, who focused on social policies, came to play an essential role in policy analysis. Before the 1990s, political scientists in Spain were not very numerous,1 their approach was more theoretical than applied, and they had not yet had specific training in policy analysis. Hence, their participation in public policy analysis was not relevant. Nevertheless, since the reform of university study plans began in 1987, ‘public policy analysis’ was introduced as a specific subject in political science undergraduate degrees and other degrees such as sociology and labour relations.2 This was accompanied by the first publication of textbooks in Spain on policy analysis (Subirats, 1989) and policy evaluation (Alvira, 1991; Ballart, 1992), the incorporation of chapters on public policy analysis in Spanish textbooks introducing political science,3 and the elaboration of academic material and publications about public policy. Over the years, more public policy textbooks were published due to the growth of universities offering undergraduate degrees in political science4 and the consequent increase of students studying subjects related to policy analysis and policy evaluation. This new political science specialisation in public policy analysis has led to a growing number of political scientists dedicated to the study of public policy and to introducing a different vision for policy analysis. The training of these analysts does not specialise in sectoral policies, but rather it presents a holistic picture of policy analysis with global concepts and standard methodologies. In this way, the previous legal, economic, and sociological visions are complemented, giving public policy analysis a multidisciplinary character. The emergence of public policy and policy evaluation postgraduate programmes: consolidation of teaching and research in public policies In Spain, as in many other countries (Adachi, 2017: 20), the increasing demand for policy analysts has fostered the professionalisation of policy analysis, and universities have begun to offer postgraduate programmes to train public policy analysts and evaluators. This section relies on a novel dataset that gathers information about the postgraduate university programmes on policy analysis and/​or policy evaluation in Spain in the 24 top universities (according to the U-​Ranking of Spanish Universities5). In contrast to the Universia Foundation6 dataset, we have created a dataset that includes both master’s degrees and PhD.7 Following a keyword search, the author identified in the web pages of these 24 universities 32 postgraduate programmes (27 master’s degrees and five PhD) dealing with policy analysis and/​or evaluation. Table 3.A1 in the Appendix provides further information about each university’s programmes, indicating the department, faculty, centre, school, or institute responsible. This dataset gives a snapshot of 49

Policy Analysis in Spain

master’s degree and PhD programmes in 2021. Although there is no comparable data across time, none of these programmes was available before 2002, and most are less than ten years old.8 As Table 3.A1 shows, five of the 27 master’s programmes deal with the analysis or evaluation of public policies in general.9 In contrast, the remaining 22 are focused on specific policy areas, notably, social policies (9), but also on economic policies, taxation, and employment (5), development and human rights policies (3), environmental policies (2), educational policies (2), and gender policies, defence policies, and language policies (1 each). On the other hand, three of the programmes specialise in public policy evaluation: two in general policy and one in social policy. Among the five PhD programmes, two address public policies in general, one with a focus on international relations and the other on law. The remaining three specialise in social policies, welfare policies, gender or equality policies.10 Even though policy analysis has been developing worldwide as a sub-​field of political science (Pannowitsch, 2013: 45; Di Francesco, 2015: 263; Yildiz and Babaoglu, 2018), only six of the 27 master’s programmes analysed are based in departments, schools, or institutes of political science, government, public administration, or public policies. Another six are based in departments of law, five in economics departments, three in multidisciplinary institutes, and the rest in departments or institutes of social work, education, humanities and communication, international studies, sociology and communications, and gender. The five PhD programmes are in a similar situation: one is based in the Institute of Government and Public Policy, and the rest in departments or institutes related to law, social welfare, gender, or economics. The diverse allocation of the programmes mentioned in this section underlines the multidisciplinary nature of Spain’s analysis of public policies. After analysing the contents of master’s degrees in public policy analysis, it can be concluded that education for the profession is not homogeneous. The universities try to attract students, so the curricula present a considerable differentiation in the training content (Parrado, 2015: 167). This is possible because no regulations establish the content to be taught in master’s degrees (unlike bachelor’s degree programmes, which are standardised by law). There is neither a formal standardisation of the master’s curricula nor are there associations to oversee policy programmes’ standards or define a core curriculum for professional degrees.11 On the other hand, although it is difficult to generalise about public policy education in Spain due to the diversity of the programmes, most of the policy-​ focused programmes in Spain have a professional orientation, as in other countries (Geva-​May, 2005: 16; Thissen, 2015; Botha et al, 2018: 439). The programmes seek to provide students with skills and understanding they can use in practice, rather than just academic knowledge. It is also interesting to note that the growing number of PhD theses related to the analysis of public policies,12 and the increase of articles in specialised journals, are clear examples of the development and consolidation of the institutionalisation of public policy research in Spain. 50

Policy analysis and policy evaluation as a profession

In 1994, the National Institute of Public Administration (Instituto Nacional de Administración Pública –​INAP) began to publish the journal Management and Analysis of Public Policies (Gestión y análisis de políticas públicas –​ GAPP) as an instrument for the development of the discipline of analysis and management of public policies. In addition, articles related to the analysis of public policies were also published in other Spanish scientific journals, such as, among others and in alphabetical order, Cuadernos de Gobierno y Administración (Government and Administration Notebooks); Documentación Administrativa (Administrative Documentation); Gestión y Política Pública (Management and Public Policy); Política y Sociedad (Politics and Society); Revista Española de Investigaciones Sociológicas (REIS, Spanish Journal of Sociological Research); Revista Andaluza de Administración Pública (Andalusian Journal of Public Administration); Revista de Administración Pública (Journal of Public Administration); Revista de Educación (Journal of Education); Revista de Estudios Regionales (Journal of Regional Studies); Revista Española de Ciencia Política (Spanish Journal of Political Science); Revista Española de Desarrollo y Cooperación (Spanish Journal of Development and Cooperation); Revista Galega de Administración Pública (Galician Journal of Public Administration); Revista Internacional de Ciencias Administrativas (International Journal of Administrative Sciences); and Revista Vasca de Administración Pública (Basque Journal of Public Administration). Although many scientific journals publish public policy analysis and evaluation articles, there are no major conceptual, methodological, and analytical debates between them. The creation of professional associations and the organisation of conferences related to public policies: the visibility of policy analysis as a profession In Spain, there are different associations aimed at the professionalisation of public policy analysis. In 2013, the Government, Administration and Public Policy Research Group (Grupo de Investigación en Gobierno, Administración y Políticas Públicas –​GIGAPP) was created. It was an initiative promoted by a team of academics and researchers whose primary purpose was to contribute to the debate and generate new concepts, approaches, and frameworks of analysis in government, management, and public policy. They aimed to encourage the creation of a space for permanent exchange and collaboration and facilitate the creation of networks and joint projects based on teaching, research, technical assistance, and extension activities.13 Furthermore, it is worth mentioning the creation, in 1993, of the Spanish Association of Political Science and Administration (Asociación Española de Ciencia Política y de la Administración –​AECPA). In 2022 there are eight permanent groups within the AECPA. One such group is the Policies and Public Management Group, thus highlighting the importance of this sub-​field within political science. In addition, the inclusion from 1996 of working groups on policy analysis at the conferences organised by AECPA,14 and from 2016 in the meetings organised by the Spanish Federation of Sociology (Federación Española 51

Policy Analysis in Spain

de Sociología –​FES),15 shows the consolidation of the institutionalisation of research on public policy in Spain, in addition to the growth of PhD theses and scientific articles in the fields already mentioned. However, in Spain, as in other countries, there is no professional association of policy analysts similar to that of physicians, lawyers, and other professional groups, which establishes professional standards with a code of ethics, and which specifies duties and rights (Geva-​May, 2005: 41). Professional associations of political scientists exist, but none currently includes a section or working group of public policy analysts; neither is membership compulsory for political scientists.16 The situation for policy evaluation professionals is different. The Spanish Evaluation Society (Sociedad Española de Evaluación –​SEE) was established in 200117 with the objective of developing a culture of policy evaluation that contributes to improving the efficiency, effectiveness, and usefulness of the actions of public administrations. Since 2001, SEE has organised national and international conferences, and it has worked with other international organisations to prepare the European Evaluation Society (EES) conference, which was held in Sevilla in 2002. From 2006, SEE has issued a periodic bulletin (SEE-​valuación) (Feinstein and Zapico-​Goñi, 2010: 16). However, it has no code of conduct that prescribes effective working methods or should be strictly observed by its practitioners. SEE has no power, nor the intention, to limit the practice to credentialed members who have demonstrated a certain level of professional knowledge and acquired formal certification. Its membership is not compulsory to work as a policy evaluator. The SEE contributes to raising awareness of the role that policy evaluation can play in policy-​making, and it supports the establishment of a network of Spanish evaluators (Feinstein and Zapico-​Goñi, 2010: 16). In 2014, the Iberian Association of Evaluation Professionals (APROEVAL) was created as a new network of evaluation professionals working in Spain and Portugal. It reflects the growing interest of evaluation professionals in networking and supporting new initiatives which enable reflection and learning.18 Spain’s entry into the EU: increasing the demand for the analysis and evaluation of public policies and programmes There is a consensus among analysts that during the 1990s in Europe almost all national evaluation systems were influenced by the requirement to evaluate programmes co-​financed by EU funds (Derlien and Rist, 2002: 451; Furubo and Sandahl, 2002: 18; Pazos and Zapico-​Goñi, 2002: 294–​9; Fernández-​Ramírez and Rebolloso, 2006: 137). This evaluation imperative has had implications for national evaluation mechanisms, especially in countries that receive large amounts of EU funds. In countries such as Ireland and Spain –​and Germany since 1990 –​ programme evaluation has received, and is still receiving, an essential boost due to the influence of the EU (Derlien, 1998: 19–​20; Viñas, 2009). Not only is it essential to adequately define the problems and needs of the regions, as well as the design programmes that solve those problems and meet those needs, but 52

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also to establish an evaluation system that periodically allows analysts to assess the effectiveness, efficiency, impact, viability, pertinence, and sustainability of the interventions. The education, health, and social sectors are the main areas where evaluations are carried out. However, high-​cost programmes such as infrastructure programmes, due to their special legitimation needs, are also candidates for evaluation (Derlien, 1998: 20). Thus, the evaluation of programmes, projects, and public services has become a growing field of professional application and scientific inquiry, almost as a speciality within policy analysis (Ballart, 1992: 45). In other words, evaluation is not only a professional field, it is also an area of multidisciplinary research. This has been accompanied by the growth of national and regional evaluation associations, and by the birth of the International Organization for Cooperation in Evaluation (IOCE)19 (Mark, 2001: 474). In Spain, as in other European countries, the expansion of evaluation to almost all areas of public activity is a consequence not only of the aforementioned obligation to evaluate the programmes co-​financed by the EU, but also of the growing public demand for transparency, effectiveness, and efficiency in public administration. It is a fact that as a result of this situation a ‘culture of evaluation’ has started to be implemented. In other words, among politicians and public managers, the evaluation of programmes and services has started both to be taken for granted and to be considered useful (Viñas, 2005). However, evaluation is not yet fully used to support public decision-​making. The creation of the Spanish Agency for the Evaluation of Public Policies and Quality of Services: a contribution to the institutionalisation of evaluation in Spain The evaluation of public policies is a central aspect of advanced democracies, since it has a close relationship with democratic legitimacy and transparency. The aim of evaluation is not only to optimise the use of public resources, but also to provide accountability of the activities of governments and public administrations. In December 2006, the State Agency for the Evaluation of Public Policies and Quality of Services (Agencia Estatal de Evaluación de las Políticas Públicas y la Calidad de los Servicios –​AEVAL) was created,20 which was an acknowledgement of the importance of evaluation.21 It was an autonomous agency whose main objective was ‘the promotion and realization of evaluations of public policies and programs whose management corresponds to the General Administration of the State, promoting the rational use of public resources and the management of the quality of services’.22 Although before the creation of AEVAL, there were already bodies in charge of measuring the effectiveness of programmes and the quality of services provided in some public areas23 –​in addition to the experiences of evaluating programmes co-​financed with funds from the EU and of the international development cooperation programmes (Garde Roca, 2006; Viñas, 2009; Feinstein and Zapico-​ Goñi, 2010) –​the creation of AEVAL meant the institutionalisation of evaluations 53

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in Spain, as it was a central multisector evaluation unit that did not exist before. The institutionalisation of evaluation is understood as: [T]‌he political process by which an adequate normative framework for the development of the function of the evaluation is legitimised, from the structuring of spaces and instances of the administrations to which to entrust such function, placing them at the different levels of government and according to the different activities or sectors to be evaluated. (Garde Roca, 2006: 18) Institutionalisation is not just about carrying out evaluations. It is about incorporating policy assessment and its results as a priority of the government agenda and into policy-​making and policy implementation processes. Although fewer evaluations were carried out than expected, due to budget and staff cuts (Rivera, 2018), AEVAL –​being a reference in the process of the institutionalisation of evaluations –​played an essential role in promoting public policy evaluation as a profession, thanks, among other things, to the dissemination of the evaluation methodology through methodological guides and training activities (Garde Roca and Ruíz Martínez, 2019). However, according to various analysts, AEVAL’s trajectory was hindered from the beginning by a lack of the resources it needed to do its work,24 by the poor administrative culture in terms of evaluating and measuring the impact of public policies in Spain, and also by political scepticism about evaluation, which relegated it to a secondary concern (Campos, 2017). In addition, AEVAL’s dependence on the executive branch25 diminished its independence since its mandate was to evaluate the executive branch (Rivera, 2018). With the change of the party in government after the November 2011 elections, the lack of support for AEVAL became apparent, and it was dissolved in 2017. With the dissolution of the State Agency body, its competencies passed to the Secretariat of State for Public Function (Ministry of Territorial Policy and Public Function), through the Institute for the Evaluation of Public Policy, with the rank of sub-​directorate general. This lowering of the status of the former AEVAL, and the incorporation of the new institute into the organisational structure of a specific ministry, reduced its autonomy and confined its actions to that ministry (Bustelo, 2020: 316). Juan Antonio Garde, President of AEVAL from its beginnings until 2011, and Ana Ruíz Martínez, Garde’s successor until the abolition of AEVAL, broadly agree with these analyses (Garde Roca, 2017; Garde Roca and Ruíz Martínez, 2019).

A new challenge to policy analysis: big data Whereas our analysis has addressed the milestones that mark the development of policy analysis as a profession until today, globally generated data (big data) will foreseeably mark the development of the profession in the future. In recent years we have witnessed a huge growth in big data. The use of big data can be a 54

Policy analysis and policy evaluation as a profession

valuable way to support decision-​making at all levels of public administration and government in an era of scarce resources. However, there is little scientific debate on integrating big data into public policy analysis and policy evaluation, resulting in both professions lagging in adopting big data into their practices. Therefore, it would be interesting to understand better the reasons for this situation and the main challenges and opportunities for integrating big data in public policy analysis and evaluation. Predictably, this will lead to changes in the profiles of public policy analysts or the emergence of new data-​analysis professions that combine new sources of data relevant to policy with the use of new analytical techniques (Longo and McNutt, 2018: 370). This new scenario opens up an interesting field of analysis.

Conclusion The field of policy analysis and policy evaluation seems to be moving towards having a professional identity in Spain. However, it is still an emerging profession not yet recognised by explicit labels and job positions, as in other countries (Aubin et al, 2017: 13).26 The development and evolution of its professionalisation are related to the country’s historical, social, and political context, which has led to the growing need for the analysis and evaluation of public policies and programmes. More specifically, this professionalisation is associated with five crucial milestones: three of them are connected to the supply side (changes in undergraduate and postgraduate training, and the creation of professional associations and the organisation of conferences), and two of them are related to the demand side (Spain’s entry into the EU and the creation of AEVAL). Due to the growing demand for specialised policy analysis professionals, policy analysis has emerged as a field of study in Spain, although, as in other countries (Brans et al, 2017: 295; Mendez, 2017: 19), it is relatively young as an academic discipline, only being included in the academic curricula of universities at the end of the last century. It arose at undergraduate level in the early 1990s and a decade later at postgraduate level (master’s and PhD programmes). At the undergraduate level, its disciplinary home has been as a sub-​field in political science, but it has a more multidisciplinary focus at master’s and PhD level. Following the analysis carried out with the database generated for this study, it is known that at present, the top 24 universities in the U-​Ranking of Spanish Universities teach 32 postgraduate programmes (master’s and PhD) related to policy analysis and/​ or policy evaluation. Such development corresponds to a professionalisation of policy analysis (Pannowitsch, 2013: 53). In Spanish academia, policy analysts gain a professional identity through the establishment of research foci, professorships, public policy research groups, such as GIGAPP, and working groups in professional associations, such as AECPA and FES. The government’s interest in promoting the rational use of public resources led to the creation of AEVAL in December 2006. This was an acknowledgement 55

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of the importance of evaluation, and it contributed to the institutionalisation of policy evaluation in Spain. But, as noted earlier, this has not been accompanied by expectations about either core competencies or professional accreditation. The dissolution of AEVAL, and its conversion to the Institute for the Evaluation of Public Policy –​of lower institutional rank, and with less autonomy and independence –​in 2017, in some ways reflects the ups and downs of the executive branch’s interest in strengthening public policy evaluation as a tool for accountability and learning, and for improving public policy. Although the use of occupational titles such as ‘policy analyst’ or ‘policy adviser’ is increasing and can be recognised as a type of professional practice (Geva-​May, 2005: 16), and because a wide range of professionals from different background disciplines are producing knowledge for policy-​making (Vaitsman et al, 2013: 14), a professional association is not required. Policy analysts do not have a professional association that might limit the practice of the profession to those credentialed members who have acquired formal certification. Even though a professional association for evaluators has existed since 2001 (SEE), it does not control entry to the profession. Neither does it select its members or introduce a code of conduct. However, although policy analysis is practised outside the academic field, Spanish offers of employment rarely ask for policy analysts or demand a qualification in policy analysis in the job description. This is different for the field of evaluation, both in national or international consulting and in NGO work or in public administration employment, where evaluators are sometimes required for specific jobs. For this reason, among the other issues already mentioned, it may be convenient to distinguish between ‘policy analyst’ and ‘policy evaluator’ as two different professions. Results of policy analysis are mostly instrumental, they are made to provide arguments to politicians, top civil servants or policy actors to support or oppose programme proposals. For that reason, policy analysts deal with many types of clients, with different perspectives and values (Radin, 2013). This affects the kind of analysis carry out and the methods used in providing evidence (Majone, 1989). Consequently, they will have to adapt to new challenges and opportunities emerging from demands of governments and civil society, and to new needs, research techniques and data sources (as big data).

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Appendix Table 3.A1: Master’s and PhD programmes in policy analysis, public policy, and policy evaluation University*

Department/​school

Master’s degree**

Alicante (UA)

University Institute of the Water and the Environmental Sciences

Technologies and Public Policies on Environmental Management

Autónoma de Barcelona (UAB)

Faculty of Political Science and Sociology

Social Policy, Employment and Welfare

PhD degree

Education Policies for Global Development School Doctor Robert

Social Policy and Community Action

Department of Political Science and Public Law (Institute of Government and Public Policy) –​ Department of Public Law and Historical-​Legal Sciences Autónoma de Madrid (UAM)

Politics, Policies and International Relations

Department of Economic Structure Economic Development and and Development Economics Public Policy and Department of Economy and Public Finance –​Faculty of Economic and Business Sciences Faculty of Law

Barcelona (UB)

Faculty of Law

Law, Government and Public Policy Public Policy and Public Management

Carlos III (UC3M) Pascual Madoz Institute of Territory, Urbanism and Environment

Law and Policies of Sustainable Development

Complutense (UCM)

School of Government

Childhood and Adolescence Policies: Current Challenges

Faculty of Political Science and Sociology

Defence and International Security Policy

Institute of Administration Science

Dependence, Public Policies and Social Innovation for the Elderly

School of Government

Evaluation of Programs and Public Policies

Department of Social Work and Social Services –​Faculty of Social Work

Community Social Work, Management and Evaluation of Social Services

Granada (UGR)

Department of International and Spanish Economics –​Faculty of Economics and Business

Employment: strategies, services management and territorial employment policies

Málaga (UMA)

Faculty of Education Sciences

Educational Innovation Policies and Practices

Faculty of Economics and Business International cooperation and development policies

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Policy Analysis in Spain University*

Department/​school

Master’s degree**

Murcia (UMU)

Faculty of Law

Government, Administration and Public Policies

PhD degree

Nacional de Political Law and Legal Philosophy Human Rights and Public Policy Educación a Departments –​Faculty of Law Distancia (UNED) Faculty of Law Public Management, Public Policies and Taxation Department of Social Services and Historical-​Legal Foundations –​ Faculty of Law

Social Policies and Dependency

País Vasco (UPV)

Institute of Basque –​Faculty of Humanities and Educational Sciences

Language Policy and Planning

Pompeu Fabra (UPF)

Barcelona School of Management –​Public Policy Center

Public and Social Policies

Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals (IBEI)***

Public Policy

Public Law Department

Monitoring and Evaluation of Public Policies

Department of Sociology and Communication

Public Services and Social Policies

Faculty of Economics

Economic Policy and Public Economics

University Institute of Women’s Studies –​Faculty of Social Sciences

Gender and Equality Policies

Salamanca (USAL)

Valencia (UV)

University Institute for Research in Social Welfare Policies Zaragoza (UNIZAR)

Gender Studies and Equality Policies Design, Management and Evaluation of Public Policies of Social Welfare

Faculty of Economics and Business Sociology of Public and Social Policies Sociology of Public and Social Policies

Note: * In the cases of inter-​university master’s (with the participation of two or more universities) only the coordinating university is mentioned. ** Its current name is mentioned. In some cases, they were the formative part of the doctoral programmes from the start. Up to 2001, doctorates had both a training and a research component. After that date, in order to adapt to the Common European Space, the training part was renamed master’s, and doctorates were limited to the research component (Organic Law 6/​2001, of 21 December, on Universities). *** IBEI is an inter-​university institute created in 2004 as a joint effort of all five public universities in the Barcelona metropolitan area and CIDOB (Barcelona Centre for International Affairs), but this master’s programme is coordinated by Universitat Pompeu Fabra, and participted by Universitat de Barcelona. Source: Prepared by the author with information from the websites of the universities.

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Notes 1

2 3 4

5

6

7

8

9 10

11 12

In 1944 the Faculty of Political and Economic Sciences was opened at the Complutense University. In 1969 the teaching of political science was separated from that of economics and business. Four years later, the Faculty of Political Science was renamed Political Science and Sociology. It was not until 1986 that a second Faculty of Political Science was opened at the Autonomous University of Barcelona, and later at the National University of Distance Education (UNED) (1987), the University of Granada (1988), and the University of the Basque Country (1989) (Jerez Mir 1999: 54–​5). Since then, the number of universities offering this degree has continued to grow, and there are currently 25, including both public and private universities. Previously, notions about public policies were included in general political science courses or as a section in a course on public administration. For example: Alcántara and Martínez (1997); Caminal Badía (1999); Olmeda (1999); Vallès (2000); among others. Currently, the degree in political science can be studied in 25 universities (18 public and seven private). The growth of political science studies in Spain is reflected in these data: in 1984 the number of students in this degree was around 4,500; by 2015 it had almost tripled to 13,000. In 1984 there were eight professors and 44 lecturers in this discipline, reaching 54 and 121 respectively in 2014 (Jerez and Luque, 2016; García Díez et al, 2018). https://​www.u-​rank​ing.es/​en/​anali​sis.php [Accessed 25 January 2021]. The 24 universities considered are the following (in alphabetical order): Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Universidad Complutense, Universidad Carlos III, Universidad de Alcalá, Universidad de Alicante, Universidad de Granada, Universidad de Málaga, Universidad de Murcia, Universidad de Oviedo, Universidad de Salamanca, Universidad de Santiago de Compostela, Universidad de Sevilla, Universidad de Valladolid, Universidad de Zaragoza, Universidad del País Vasco, Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia, Universidad Politécnica de Madrid, Universidad Rey Juan Carlos, Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona, Universitat de Barcelona, Universitat de València, Universitat Politècnica de Catalunya, Universitat Politècnica de València, and Universitat Pompeu Fabra. https://c​ urs​ os.univers​ ia.es/m ​ aste​ rs.html [Accessed 25 January 2021]. According to the Universia database (which does not include PhDs), there are 50 master’s degrees on public policy in Spain. However, when compared with the universities’ websites, this search engine was found to be incomplete and outdated, and therefore did not allow further detailed analysis. Master’s degrees that entail content related to public policies but do not focus on training professionals in the analysis and/​or evaluation of public policies, for example those focused on public management and some of those linked to management training, have not been included in the analysis. Our objective is to focus on the specialised postgraduate programmes in policy analysis and/​or evaluation. Some of them originated as the formative part of the doctoral programmes. After the reform of postgraduate studies in Spain, to adapt to the European Higher Education Area (Organic Law 6/​2001, of December 21, on Universities), they became a master’s programmes, like the current master’s in Social Policy, Employment and Welfare, at the Universidad Autónoma de Barcelona. Universidad de Barcelona, Universidad Complutense, Universidad de Murcia, Universidad Pompeu Fabra, and Universidad de Salamanca. After the reform of postgraduate studies in Spain, to adapt to the European Higher Education Area (Organic Law 6/​2001, of December 21, on Universities), PhD programmes have no formative courses. For this reason, their names only indicate the topics on which the doctoral theses registered in these programmes should focus. An example of this type of association in other countries is the National Association of Schools of Public Affairs and Administration (NASPAA), in the United States (Di Francesco, 2015: 262). According to the Doctoral Thesis Database (TESEO) of the Ministry of Education, the first doctoral thesis in Spain in the field of public policy was defended in 1994. One was presented 59

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13 14 15 16

17

18 19

20

21

22 23

24

25

26

60

in 1995, two in 1996, one in 1997, two in 1998 and 1999, one in 2000, four in 2001, and more and more in the following years. At present, this database contains 228 theses, which include under the title the concept ‘public policies’. Available from: https://​www.educac​ion.gob.es/​ teseo/​irGe​stio​narC​onsu​lta.do [Accessed 9 December 2021]. http://​www.gig​app.org/​index.php/​nosot​ros [Accessed 9 December 2021]. With the inclusion at the II Conference (1996) of the thematic area ‘Public policies’ (https://​ aecpa.es) [Accessed 9 December 2021]. From the XII Conference (2016) the Working Group ‘Social Policies and Social Work’ was incorporated (https://​fes-​soc​iolo​g ia.com) [Accessed 9 December 2021]. For example, the Professional Association of Political Science, Sociology and International Relations of the Community of Madrid (Colegio Profesional de la Ciencia Política, la Sociología y las Relaciones Internacionales de la Comunidad de Madrid –​https://​www.colpol​soc.org/​ ), the Professional Association of Political Science and Sociology of Catalonia (Colegio de profesionales de la Ciencia Política y de la Sociología de Cataluña –​https://​www.col​pis.cat/​ ), and the Professional Association of Political Science and Sociology of Andalusia (Colegio Oficial de Ciencias Políticas y Sociología de Andalucía –​https://​www.colpol​soc-​andalu​cia. org/​) [Accessed 25 January 2021]. https://​ w ww.soc​ i eda​ d eva​ l uac​ i on.es/​ and https:// ​ w ww.faceb ​ o ok.com/ ​ S ocie ​ d ad-​ Espa%C3%B1ola-​de-​Evalu​aci%C3%B3n-​1641​1513​6982​976/​ [Accessed 9 December 2021]. Since its foundation, the SEE has had a total of 2,346 members (58 per cent women and 42 per cent men). APROEVAL: http://a​ proev​ al.net/​ [Accessed 9 December 2021]. In 2018 it had 130 members (no updated data available). ‘The IOCE represents international, national, sub-​national and regional Voluntary Organizations for Professional Evaluation (VOPEs) worldwide. It strengthens international evaluation through the exchange of evaluation methods and promotes good governance and recognition of the value evaluation has in improving peoples’ lives’ (https://w ​ ww.ioce.net) [Accessed 9 December 2021]. Royal Decree 1418/​2006, of 1 December, approving the Statute of the State Agency for the Evaluation of Public Policies and Quality of Services. Depending on the Ministry of Public Administration, and since 2009 on the Ministry of the Presidency (Feinstein and Zapico-​Goñi, 2010: 5). It began its operations in January 2007. Some regional governments (Comunidades Autónomas) also created their own evaluation agencies, such as the Catalan Institute for the Evaluation of Public Policies (Institut Català d’Avaluació de Polítiques Públiques –​Ivàlua), in Catalunya (https://​iva​lua.cat/​en) [Accessed 9 December 2021]. Article 1.2. Royal Decree 1418/​2006, of 1 December, approving the Statute of the State Agency for the Evaluation of Public Policies and Quality of Services. Such as the ANECA (National Agency for the Evaluation of Quality and Accreditation –​ Agencia Nacional de Evaluación de la Calidad y Acreditación) or the INECSE (National Institute of Evaluation and Quality of the Educational System –​Instituto Nacional de Evaluación y Calidad del Sistema Educativo) in the educational field, and the Quality Agency of the National Health System (Agencia de Calidad del Sistema Nacional de Salud) in health policy. The maximum number of people in the Agency (60) was reached in 2009 and fell to 39 in 2014, even though the forecast was for 79 in 2009. The budgets followed the same trend, growing until 2009 and declining during the following years (Rivera, 2018). AEVAL was attached to the Ministry of Public Administration. The programmes and policies to be evaluated were approved by the Council of Ministers. The President was appointed by the Council of Ministers on the proposal of the Ministry of Public Administration. Its Governing Council was also controlled by the executive branch (most of its members were politically appointed, except for three independent members of recognised prestige) (Rivera, 2018). In only a few countries can we mention policy analysis as an emerging profession in the 1960s: the United States (Radin, 2018) and Canada (Brooks, 2018) are two examples.

Policy analysis and policy evaluation as a profession

References Adachi, Y. (2017) ‘The policy analysis profession’, in M. Brans, I. Geva-​May, and M. Howlett (eds) Routledge Handbook of Comparative Policy Analysis, New York: Routledge, pp 1–​23. Alcántara, M. and Martínez, A. (eds) (1997) Política y gobierno en España, Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch. Alvira, F. (1991) Metodología de la evaluación de programas, Madrid: CIS. Aubin, D., Brans, M., and Fobé, E. (2017) ‘The policy-​analytical profession in Belgium’, in M. Brans and D. Aubin (eds) Policy Analysis in Belgium, Bristol: Policy Press, pp 13–​34. Ballart, X. (1992) ¿Cómo evaluar programas y servicios públicos? Madrid: MAP. Botha, J., Geva-​May, I., and Maslove, A.M. (2018) ‘Public policy studies in North America and Europe’, in L. Dobuzinskis and M. Howlett (eds) Policy Analysis in Canada, Bristol: Policy Press, pp 421–​46. Brans, M., Aubin, D., and Ruebens, S. (2017) ‘Policy analysis instruction in Belgium’, in M. Brans and D. Aubin (eds) Policy Analysis in Belgium, Bristol: Policy Press, pp 295–​309. Brint, S. (1994) In an Age of Experts, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Brooks, S. (2018) ‘The policy analysis profession in Canada’, in L. Dobuzinskis and M. Howlett (eds) Policy Analysis in Canada, Bristol: Policy Press, pp 27–​47. Bustelo, M. (2020) ‘Spain’, in R. Stockmann, W. Meyer, and L. Taube (eds) The Institutionalisation of Evaluation in Europe, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 303–​27. Caminal Badía, M. (ed) (1999) Manual de Ciencia Política, Madrid: Tecnos. Campos, C (2017) Desaparece AEVAL ¿Por qué no interesa la evaluación de las políticas públicas? Available from: http://​conce​pcio​ncam​pos.org/​des​apar​ece-​ aeval-​por-​que-​no-​inter​esa-​la-​eva​luac​ion-​de-​las-​politi​cas-​publi​cas/​ [Accessed 9 December 2021]. Derlien, H.U. (1998) ‘Una comparación internacional en la evaluación de las políticas públicas’, Gestión y análisis de políticas públicas, 11–​12: 13–​22. Derlien, H.U. and Rist, R.C. (2002) ‘Policy evaluation in international comparison’, in J.E. Furubo, R.C. Rist, and R. Sandhl (eds) International Atlas of Evaluation, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, pp 439–​55. Di Francesco, M. (2015) ‘Policy analysis instruction in Australia’, in B. Head and K. Crowley (eds) Policy Analysis in Australia, Bristol: Policy Press, pp 261–​82. Donaldson, S.I. (2019) ‘Where do we stand? Recent AEA member views on professionalization’, Evaluation and Program Planning, 72: 152–​61. Feinstein, O. and Zapico-​Goñi, E. (2010) Evaluation of Government Performance and Public Policies in Spain, Washington, DC: World Bank, ECD Working Paper Series, No. 22. Fernández-​Ramírez, B. and Rebolloso, E. (2006) ‘Evaluation in Spain: Concepts, contexts, and networks’, Journal of MultiDisciplinary Evaluation, 3(5): 134–​52. Fournier, V. (1999) ‘The appeal to “professionalism” as a disciplinary mechanism’, Sociological Review, 47(2): 280–​307.

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Freidson, E. (2001) Professionalism: The Third Logic, Cambridge: Polity Press. Furubo, J.E. and Sandahl, R. (2002) ‘A diffusion perspective on global developments in evaluation’, in J.E. Furubo, R.C. Rist, and R. Sandahl (eds) International Atlas of Evaluation, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, pp 1–​23. García Díez, F., Myers-​Gallardo, A., Plaza-​Colodro, C., and Tomé-​Alonso, B. (2018) ‘Spanish political science in Spain and abroad: Top-​ranked publications (1999–​2014)’, European Political Science, 17(1): 32–​56. Garde Roca, J.A. (2006) ‘La institucionalización de la evaluación de las políticas públicas en España’, Auditoria Pública, 39: 17–​26. Garde Roca, J.A. (2017) ‘AEVAL y su muerte anunciada’, Cinco Días. Available from: https://​cincod​ias.elp​ais.com/​cincod​ias/​2017/​08/​04/​midin​ero/​150185​ 7354​_​174​399.html [Accessed 9 December 2021]. Garde Roca, J.A. and Ruíz Martínez, A. (2019) ‘La institucionalización de la evaluación en España y la experiencia de AEVAL’, in M.J. Garde Garde, J. Gascón Catalán, and T. Merola Macanás (eds) Hacienda pública y gobernanza fiscal en España: desafíos 2020, Madrid: Ministerio de Hacienda, Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, pp 257–​67. Geva-​May, I. (2005) ‘Thinking like a policy analyst: Policy analysis as a clinical profession’, in I. Geva-​May (ed) Thinking Like a Policy Analyst: Policy Analysis as a Clinical Profession, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 16–​50. Geva-​May, I. and Pal, L.A. (1999) ‘Policy evaluation and policy analysis: Exploring the differences’, Evaluation, 5(3): 259–​77. Howlett, M. and Wellstead, A.M. (2011) ‘Policy analysts in the bureaucracy revisited: The nature of professional policy work in contemporary government’, Politics & Policy, 49(4): 613–​33. Jerez, M. and Luque, J. (2016) ‘Treinta años de Ciencia Política en España: profesionalización, expansión y ajuste’, Revista Española de Ciencia Política, 40: 179–​215. Jerez Mir, M. (1999) Ciencia política, un balance de fin de siglo, Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales. Kohoutek, J., Nekola, M., and Novotný, V. (2013) ‘Conceptualizing policy work as activity and field of research’, Central European Journal of Public Policy, 7(1): 28–​58. Longo, J. and McNutt, K. (2018) ‘From policy analysis to policy analytics’, in L. Dobuzinskis and M. Howlett (eds) Policy Analysis in Canada, Bristol: Policy Press, pp 369–​91. Majone, G. (1989) Evidence, Argument, and Persuasion in the Policy Process, New Haven: Yale University Press. Mark, M.M. (2001) ‘Evaluation’s future: Furor, futile, or fertile?’, American Journal of Evaluation, 22(3): 457–​79. Mendez, J.L. (2017) ‘Evolution of policy analysis as a field of study in Mexico’, in J.L. Mendez and M.I. Dussauge-​Laguna (eds) Policy Analysis in Mexico, Bristol: Policy Press, pp 11–​28.

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Millerson, G. (1964) The Qualifying Association: A Study of Professionalization, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. Noordegraaf, M. (2007) ‘From pure to hybrid professionalism: Present-​day professionalism in ambiguous public domains’, Administration & Society, 39(6): 761–​85. Noordegraaf, M. (2016) ‘Reconfiguring professional work: Changing forms of professionalism in public services’, Administration & Society, 48(7): 783–​810. Olmeda, J.A. (1999) Ciencia de la Administración. Volumen I. Teoría de la organización y gestión pública, Madrid: UNED. Pannowitsch, S. (2013) ‘Professionalisation of policy analysis in Germany: On the way or faraway?’, in S. Blum and K. Schubert (eds) Policy Analysis in Germany, Bristol: Policy Press, pp 45–​57. Parrado, S. (2015) El análisis de la gestión pública, Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch. Pazos, M. and Zapico-​Goñi, E. (2002) ‘Program evaluation in Spain: Taking off at the edge of the twenty-​first century?’, in J.E. Furubo, R.C. Rist, and R. Sandahl (eds) International Atlas of Evaluation, New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, pp 291–​306. Radin, B.A. (2013) ‘Policy analysis reaches midlife’, Central European Journal of Public Policy, 7(1): 8–​27. Radin, B.A. (2018) ‘The evolution of the policy analysis profession in the United States’, in J.A. Hird (ed) Policy Analysis in the United States, Bristol: Policy Press, pp 31–​53. Reed, M.I. (1996) ‘Expert power and control in late modernity’, Organization Studies, 17(4): 573–​97. Rivera, R. (2018) ‘La AEVAL: crónica de una muerte anunciada’, Expansión. Available from: https://​hay​dere​cho.expans​ion.com/​2018/​01/​22/​la-​aeval-​cron​ ica-​una-​mue​rte-​anunci​ada/​ [Accessed 23 December 2020]. Subirats, J. (1989) Análisis de políticas públicas y eficacia de la Administración, Madrid: MAP. Thissen, W. (2015) ‘Policy analysis as instruction’, in F. Van Nispen and P. Scholten (eds) Policy Analysis in The Netherlands, Bristol: Policy Press, pp 217–​29. Vaitsman, J., Lobato, L., and Andrade, G. (2013) ‘Professionalisation of policy analysis in Brazil’, in J. Vaitsman, J. Mendes Ribeiro, and L. Lobato (eds) Policy Analysis in Brazil, Bristol: Policy Press, pp 13–​26. Vallès, J.M. (1991) ‘Political science in Spain, 1960–​1990: The unfinished history of its coming of age’, European Journal of Political Research, 20(3–​4): 431–​44. Vallès, J.M. (2000) Ciencia Política. Una introducción, Barcelona: Ariel. Viñas, V. (2005) ‘La profesión del evaluador de políticas, programas y servicios públicos: perspectivas de futuro’, RIPS (Revista de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociológicas), 4(1): 27–​37. Viñas, V. (2009) ‘The European Union’s drive towards public policy evaluation: The case of Spain’, Evaluation, 15(4): 459–​72.

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Wilensky, H.L. (1964) ‘The professionalization of everyone?’, American Journal of Sociology, 70(2): 137–​58. Yildiz, M. and Babaoglu, C. (2018) ‘Public policy education in Turkey’, in C. Bakir and G. Ertan (eds) Policy Analysis in Turkey, Bristol: Policy Press, pp 271–​88.

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Part Two Policy analysis by governments

FOUR

Policy analysis in central government: still in its infancy Salvador Parrado

Introduction Policy analysis refers to the generation of knowledge, organised or sponsored by the government, to be used in policy-​making (Wollman, 1989; Leeuw, 1991; MacRae, 1991; Adams, 2004). In this chapter, policy analysis refers to the research that executive governments produce or access to understand, forecast, and anticipate public opinion, users’ needs, potential actions on the part of businesses, and policy impacts. Policy analysis is, therefore, an essential prerequisite for evidence-​based policy-​making (Howlett, 2009: 161). The use of policy analysis is narrower than policy advice (Tiernan, 2011). Whereas analytical capacity focuses on medium-​to long-​term agenda-​setting (the focus of this chapter), policy advice refers to providing analysis and information for the short-​to long-​term at all policy process stages. Policy advice entails analytical skills, the coordination of opinion from several governmental and non-​ governmental sources, and accountability between the adviser and the decision-​ maker (Lindquist, 2010). The knowledge of how policy analysis is performed in Spain is limited. There are no data regarding the number of policy analysts in government. The scholarly work on the process to convert research into decisions is scarce. The academic community knows little about how public officials consume policy analysis and what sources they use. A review of secondary sources and official websites shows that the engagement with independent external policy analysis is restricted, and public agencies produce research and analysis but do not systematically feed the decision-​making process. Experts and academics are consulted on policy initiatives. Still, this consultation is seldom accompanied by a systematic review of the evidence with the production of evidence-​based policy papers that supplement expert advice. For instance, in an area where abundant data is available, train infrastructure, public authorities did not use evidence to plan the fast-​speed railway network, according to the Autoridad Independiente de Responsabilidad Fiscal (Independent Authority for Fiscal Responsibility) (AIReF, 2020). Political decisions were more relevant than data analysis. Although some units or persons carry out policy analysis (and evaluation) in different government parts, their networking activity is informal and not institutionalised. Finally, the 67

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civil service authority has not implemented a competency framework focusing on policy analysis like the United Kingdom or Australia. The chapter focuses on policy analysis and policy advice for decision-​making and is distributed in three sections. The first section illustrates the drivers of policy analysis in central government. For the Spanish case, the following drivers are analysed: the role of reform processes in triggering policy analysis, the relevance of granting autonomy to agencies delivering advice, and the need for government coordination and the (potential) use of big data. The second section focuses on the challenges of policy analysis. The final section reviews the actors that convert policy analysis into policy advice.

Drivers of policy analysis The literature has identified several drivers for using government policy analysis since the 1970s (see Parrado, 2014). These drivers will be adapted to assess the Spanish central government’s analytical capacity. Policy reforms and the use of evidence In Western Europe, ‘evidence-​based’ policy reflected centre-​left governmental interests in the 1970s (Head, 2008). Policy analysis emerged in the late 1990s partly due to the reform efforts to restructure the welfare state. A more ‘solid’ evidence base of ‘what works’ was needed to achieve successful reforms. Another movement with a focus on service users and impact on policy analysis took place in Western Europe also in the 1990s. Accordingly, attention was directed at studying specific services and programmes to determine what works and what options would deliver more effective and more efficient results (Davies et al, 2000), in line with the modernisation of the state. This trend led to the expansion of analysis-​related units at the top of public administration in the centre of government. In Spain, a long tradition of policy analysis and evaluation, interrupted at some periods, was present during the first three-​quarters of the 20th century (see Chapter 2 in this volume), albeit in a different fashion from what is nowadays understood as policy analysis. A review of the use of policy analysis to support reform processes offers mixed results in more recent times. The interaction between policy analysis and decision-​making is sector-​specific. For instance, social welfare-​related areas like the ongoing reform of the system of social security pensions or the introduction of the minimum living income are preceded by evidence-​based analysis given their economic impact on the public budget. The ministry in charge of these reforms and the relevant stakeholders produce evidence-​based analysis to feed the discussion. However, the four major administrative reforms of the last 50 years that belong to the ‘modernisation’ type, as coined by Pollitt and Bouckaert (2017), have exhibited a minimal use of policy analysis. A shared feature of all reforms is 68

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the lack of publicly available policy documents that analyse the evidence that triggered the reform. A study of the official papers and scholarly publications about the three first reforms (Parrado, 2017) shows that reformers deployed a legalistic approach. The analysis of data is absent from their considerations, or at least not publicly expressed. For instance, the administrative reform launched in 2012 entailed a considerable legislative activity with 101 pieces of legislation related to public administration reform: three organic laws, 23 laws, one royal-​ decree law, eight royal legislative decrees, and 66 royal decrees. The reforms did not rely on publicly available policy analysis. As a potential explanation, the promoters of the reform and the chairs of the different commissions are generally civil servants belonging to corps (groups of public servants) with a legal background. State attorneys were predominant in the last administrative reform. Furthermore, despite the collegiality of government decisions at the top, most ministries work on the principle of autonomy. Consultation with other ministries is only practised whenever a topic cuts across ministerial borders (Parrado, 2017). Therefore, unlike other countries, the Spanish bureaucracy relies on internal knowledge. Policy analysis is not transparent to the outside. A typical approach for governance-​related reforms is to amalgamate the ministries’ proposals, without a holistic prioritisation process. This was the operating procedure to design the economic relief packages to overcome the effects of the financial and economic global crisis of the 2010s or the reform of the administration in 2012 (Parrado, 2017, 2018). Hiving off policy analysis to agencies Since the 1990s, policy analysis was transferred to semi-​autonomous agencies in different countries. For example, the adoption of more US-​style competition law across the European Union led to developing other regulation technologies, such as impact assessment and risk-​based policy tools, that required analytical support. The growing concern about ‘risk’ as a central theme in policy-​making promoted quantification to justify governmental (in)action (Black and Baldwin, 2010). This concern was transferred to central banks and other economic independent agencies, resulting in the ‘econocratisation’ of analytical capacity in executive government. Spain has not escaped this ‘econocratic’ trend. Some agencies provide the policy analysis on economic and non-​economic related matters lacking in the ministries. Some examples illustrate this point. The European Commission imposed the creation of an independent authority for fiscal responsibility (AIReF), as a condition to the disbursement of funds to overcome the economic and fiscal crisis of the 2010s. Since its launch in 2014, AIReF preserved its autonomy from the government and gained a considerable reputation. The government appoints the head of the agency, who needs the majority of the Lower Chamber for a non-​renewable six-​year term. This non-​partisan appointment and the capacity to generate income by charging for its mandatory audit reports provide the agency 69

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with an active role in feeding analysis into policy-​making and monitoring. Its experts have issued evidence-​based opinions and recommendations on a wide range of economic areas: the sustainability of social security, public pensions, railway infrastructures, compliance with the fiscal deficit and public debt-​related goals, and a wide range of macroeconomic and budgetary stability topics. The role of AIReF also includes monitoring the public accounts of the autonomous regional authorities and evaluations of specific policy programmes. According to an independent review by Kasperskaya and Xifré (2018), AIReF has managed to become a truly independent agency that has significantly contributed to strengthening the Spanish public sector’s budgetary stability. Under the Ministry of Finance’s supervision, other institutions issue policy analysis on economic matters such as the Bank of Spain and the Institute for Fiscal Studies (Instituto de Estudios Fiscales, IEF). Like its European counterparts, the Central Bank analyses the economy or other policy sectors with an economic impact. The research unit of the bank features its publications in different outlets that range from working papers and reports to academic articles. Occasionally, the governor uses these analyses to report some recommendations for the government in the media, notably when the public accounts’ evolution diverges from the desired path of fiscal balance. Caballero et al (2012) identified a limited research output of the Central Bank. It had an inadequate pool of 37 researchers compared to more than 50 scholars in two leading university economic departments from Carlos III, Madrid and Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona. The authors could not find evidence of the influence of the bank’s research on policies. Furthermore, the Central Bank rarely voices a critical view of government in public. Often, the Central Bank experts have fluid relationships with the analysts from the ministry of finance and the economic branch of the prime minister’s advisory unit. However, sometimes those views diverged (monetarist versus Keynesian) when dealing with the global economic crisis of the 2010s (Fleischer and Parrado, 2010). The IEF features the opinions of individual authors on taxation and financial law on its website. Those documents, though, do not express the institution’s views and the IEF does not support prescriptive recommendations or analysis. This institution carries out an annual survey on citizen opinion about fiscal matters, but there is no apparent use of this information to feed policies. The IEF’s role does not differ from the analytical work carried out by the foundations of some private banks such as Caixa or BBVA. AEVAL (Agency for the Evaluation of Services and Public Policies), created in 2007, was meant to serve as a cornerstone of policy evaluation and analysis in Spain (see also its role in developing the profession, discussed in Chapter 3 of this volume). It was launched as an independent agency to perform policy evaluations and promote the quality of public services. The original idea was to entrust the semi-​autonomous agency with the review of policies. It should produce independent reports to be used by the government in policy-​making. The government’s interest in AEVAL’s products and the influence of AEVAL 70

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waned over time (Alonso et al, 2014). For ten years, the agency delivered reduced output and focused on unimportant issues. The government gradually relegated AEVAL from mainstream policy-​making (Parrado, 2017) and abolished it in 2017. Its functions were transferred to a unit of the ministerial directorate of public governance. The agency’s mandate to evaluate policies and services independently was formally diminished. In reality, the agency’s relevance was minimal since its inception, according to the reduced number of evaluation reports that the agency published during its lifetime. As an illustration, only two evaluation reports were issued in 2016, one in 2015 and none in 2014. Overall, the agency carried out around 40 evaluations between 2007 and 2017. This low yield obeys to different causes according to interviewees, including lack of agreement in the Council of Ministers on what to evaluate due to the reluctance of sector ministers to be assessed and the electoral instability with several changes of government and a chronic lack of human resources to carry out the agency’s tasks. Besides, AEVAL was not provided with enough financial resources to contract out evaluations (Parrado, 2018). ONTSI (National Observatory for Telecommunications and Information Society) is another think tank that generates knowledge for policy-​making. This government institution reports on a broad spectrum of topics connected to the Information Society. Despite the aspiration of ONTSI to provide knowledge for policy-​making, most analyses and studies offer a neutral picture of critical issues without considering proposals for future development. It is up to the different authorities to use these generic non-​binding reports issued by ONTSI. The primary recipient of the analysis is the central government, but regional authorities can use many reports since the data is disaggregated territorially. Analysis for coordination purposes Better government ‘coordination’ has demanded policy analysis to support decisions that cut across horizontal and vertical organisations. The operation of governmental agencies in ‘silos’ and problems falling between the cracks of different departmental jurisdictions is hardly new. ‘Czars’ and ‘commissioners’ populated several governments in the late 1990s with the task of understanding and bringing together different demands of stakeholders within a policy domain and mediating among diverse interests. Such a position requires the analytical capacity to move between different knowledge communities and stakeholder groups, reflecting a certain ‘boundary spanning’ capacity. Also, in multilevel systems with complex intergovernmental arrangements, permanent intergovernmental bodies require the analytical ability to address equity and imbalances in the system. In the Spanish central government, there have been some examples of High Commissioners for Agenda 2030 on sustainable development, for the trademark of ‘Spain’, or for the demographic challenge of an ageing society. The number of instances is reduced, and many of them have not survived the change of 71

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government. The current commissioner for Agenda 2030 must make proposals on sustainable development to other ministries. However, it seems that the role is limited. Most of the reports issued by the institution are evaluatory, and there are no recommendations based on the analysis on how to proceed. The political decentralisation of the Spanish polity and the overlapping of governmental powers in some policy sectors triggered the implementation of sector intergovernmental bodies, so-​called conferences. In these bodies, the central government and the regions perform interterritorial coordination. In 2019, 45 sector conferences were still operational, although the degree of activity varies among them. Some sector conferences on agriculture, fisheries, the environment, education, and health meet regularly, while others on sports, local affairs, national security, or energy seldom convene. An analysis of the most relevant sector conferences shows that they do not have permanent units devoted to doing system-​wide analysis on behalf of all the governmental departments. For instance, there is a national information system in health, with controversies on how to collect information. However, no intergovernmental body is issuing policy papers to address common problems like the increasing costs of prescriptions, the growing waiting time for surgery, or how to face the challenges of a pandemic. The COVID-​19 pandemic is likely to foster such an institution (Parrado and Galli, 2021). Data science and decision-​making Big data is becoming a relevant source of policy analysis in government worldwide thanks to self-​learning algorithms to gear policy advice. Data science promoters claim that public (and private) sector organisations may make more efficient decisions when using evidence and insights to escape traditional data analysis. According to Manyika et al (2011), big data can provide the public sector with strategies to increase operational efficiency and effectiveness. Big data refers to a high volume of information that can be created and stored at high speed. It shows considerable variation in the characterisation of the unit of analysis and displays complex interconnections among variables (Desouza and Jacob, 2017). Therefore, organisations with access to, for example, high number of records from patients, tourists, or students can profit from big data to program algorithmic analysis according to a set of pre-​established features. The use of big data in government is still underdeveloped, and the ethical considerations about individuals’ privacy regarding the use of data are insufficiently understood. Big data is entering government gradually in the EU member states (DG DIGIT 2017). In this report, Spain counted only one example of big data analysis (out of 103 cases reported for publication) while the Netherlands and the United Kingdom revealed over ten cases each. The EU Commission, Italy, Ireland, and Belgium had over six authorities each using data analytics. In comparative terms, Spanish authorities are lagging in the use of big data for decision-​making. 72

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The report identifies the Secretary of State for Telecommunications and the Information Society for its use of big data to evaluate research and development grants in the digital sector. After the publication of the report, other experiences have joined the pool of cases. For instance, the national police have designed VERIPOL, a software-​based algorithm that predicts the possibility of someone filing a false accusation. The State Secretary of Tourism uses artificial intelligence to create smart touristic destinations. The Ministry of Transport, Mobility and Urban Agenda used big data to track the movement of persons and goods during the pandemic.

Challenges to policy analysis The challenges to the adequate use of policy analysis in decision-​making are related to the absence of a culture of independent and critical reporting commissioned by the government, the institutional constraints to policy analysis, and the scarce use of the consultation results in the policy process. Absence of a culture of independent reporting Policy analysis faces challenges in the policy process. Some of those challenges have particular features in the Spanish system. For instance, policy-​making is not a value-​free exercise, and evidence-​based analysis contains a political dimension (Cairney, 2017). In an era with highly demanding citizens, contradictory attitudes to economic growth, environmental sustainability, social integration, fiscal consolidation, immigration, and job creation, the required evidence to justify or dismiss some initiatives is not straightforward. Politicians may not want to receive findings that suggest that their preferred topic is not having the desired impact if these initiatives are popular among voters. Politicians are not interested in ‘evidence’ in itself but rather in the process of bargaining values and interests with different stakeholders (Head, 2008, 2010). Furthermore, the evidence is also not neutral: it matters what kind of methodologies are used, how experiments and pilots are set up, and how information is presented. More generally, the existence of competition for value claims suggests that analytical capacity can only be one aspect of policy-​making and will never (and should never) play a dominant role. A pluralist approach to policy analysis, with distinct evidence and political values, may open up a context where the evidence can help the government make better-​informed decisions, according to Cairney (2017). Contestation of values and interests is a process whereby policy analysis can offer the best evidence possible. In Spain, public authorities do not deal with an independent provision of analysis through contestation. For instance, unlike countries such as the United Kingdom, a culture of white papers or independent reports commissioned to high calibre experts with enough funding on particular issues is lacking. The system is then deprived of external analysis with the subsequent reaction of the 73

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government to that analysis stating what parts of the independent report will be used for what decisions. Therefore, opposing government views typically come from traditional pressure groups or think tanks (trade unions, business associations, political party foundations, and the like). Political interests against sound technical studies, for instance, seem to have prevailed in building high-​speed infrastructure in Spain, an area where technical expertise and the consideration of data would have offered different solutions (AIReF, 2020). Institutional constraints The electoral cycles affect the exercise of analytical capacity. Policy analysis produced for the previous government may not be of interest to the next incumbent. Priorities change, and therefore, analytical concerns vary, leading to the abandonment of some critical studies. This is particularly challenging in Spain due to recent high electoral turnover and the dominance of minority and coalition governments. Between 2016 and 2020, there have been four legislatures, with the last elections held in December 2019. Under these circumstances, the government’s capacity to perform long-​term analysis and planning has been severely curtailed. Furthermore, the dominance of a two-​party system during most of the democratic period has given way to a five-​party system, with difficulties to form even a coalition government. For the first time in recent democratic times, a coalition has ruled central government since 2020. The new governance setting is likely to influence how policy analysis is conducted and feeds the policy-​ making process. Another type of institutional constraint is generated by different understandings about the role of bureaucracy. In a high legalistic system (also reproduced at the regional level, see Chapter 5, this volume), empirical evidence will play a different role than in a system that is staffed by ‘generalist’ civil servants with a background in social sciences. Similarly, bureaucratic career structures that bridge civil service paths from various ministries will lead to a different policy analytical thinking than bureaucratic structures where cross-​domain mobility is not present. In general, the Spanish system is characterised by limited interdepartmental mobility. However, this is partially overcome by the ministerial cabinets and the state secretaries’ cabinets (see the section on the role of policy advisers in policy making) and by some corps of civil servants (for instance, civil administrators) who travel across departmental boundaries like their counterparts in France. Consultation for decision-​making as pro forma exercise Consultation in Spanish central administration is limited. Line ministries must have by law consultation mechanisms in their websites to get inputs for their policies. In practice, the frequency, institutionalisation, and substance of this 74

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support vary considerably among sectors and ministries. Currently, ministries do not usually report on the uptake of the consultation nor on its results or how the consultation has affected the policy. Publicly available information on the practice of consultation is lacking. Unsurprisingly, the public and stakeholders may lose their confidence in these mechanisms that seem to please the formal requirement but not the essence of consultation. There are exceptions to this formal exercise of public participation. For instance, the Digital Strategy for an Intelligent Spain (2017)1 entailed a public consultation that contained relevant aspects for its credibility. Apart from the text subject to consultation, the website includes 98 of the 109 contributions (some participants did not want to disclose their name and contribution), and a report summarising and quantifying the consultation results. Feedback on the concrete actions of the government after the consultation is missing. However, this area could be considered a role model for public consultation on legislative proposals in Spain compared to other policy sectors. Unfortunately, the Digital Strategy was not approved by the Council of Ministers because the government lost a successful censure motion. There have been issues of straining relationships with NGOs involved in international aid because of the budgetary cuts. Think tanks are starting to shape the public discourse on economic matters through different foundations related to the employers (Círculo de Empresarios, Círculo de Economía, FEDEA [Foundation for Applied Economic Studies], COAG [Coordination of Farmers], ASAJA [Association of Young Farmers]) or the trade unions (Fundación Largo Caballero) or even consumer associations. However, it is unclear how their analyses shape the views of the government. According to Molina et al (2016), think tanks and associations focusing on non-​economic topics have been relatively weak in Spain to exert sufficient influence on the policy-​making process. Low scores, an average of 5 out of 10, in the dimension ‘Societal Consultation’ of the annual reports on the Sustainable Governance Indicators of the Bertelsmann Foundation from 2014 to 2020,2 confirm civil society’s weakness in contributing to policy-​making. The most relevant groups are the national branches of international organisations like Greenpeace, Amnesty International, and Intermon Oxfam. Some exceptions are the LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transsexual) movement that has supported same-​sex marriage or CEPES (Spanish Business Confederation of Social Economy) in charge of social-​economic issues. Perhaps the most successful civic group was the platform created out of the 2015-​M movement (indignados). Apart from triggering the creation of several platforms in defence of people who have lost their houses, it planted the seeds of Unidas Podemos. This political party entered the coalition government led by the socialist party in 2020. Traditionally, the influence of interest groups is not strong, and the corporatist tradition has dominated. Lobbying is instead exerted through business associations and trade unions. The entry into the European Union and the international 75

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context have promoted this dialogue among different social actors instead of undermining their capacity to strike enduring deals (Royo, 2006; Jordana, 2016). Citizens do not play a significant role in decision-​making, although they must be consulted on legislative proposals since 2016. In sum, the system has a coordinated and incrementalist policy style with evident traits of a corporatist approach. Citizen participation in policy-​making is weak, and the impact of recent legislative measures to enhance citizen participation remains to be seen. Consulting with academia The communication between the research community and government is critical for policy analysis (Mayntz and Scharpf, 1975). Outside of well-​established professional channels, decision-​makers and researchers do not meet regularly. In the absence of this interaction, research institutes may develop their agenda far removed from government needs. Such conflicts arise from the self-​definition of researchers who may not be willing to conduct ‘applied’ research or explore themes of interest to those that distribute taxpayers’ money. According to Mayntz and Scharpf (1975), the relationship between ministries and research institutes in Germany is problematic because research institutes try to establish independence and autonomy in their work. This autonomy has two potential consequences: either the research priorities of the institutes are irrelevant to government decision-​making processes, or they are too dependent on the needs of government. Though rarer, this dependency may jeopardise the legitimacy of the advice given. While frequent interaction between researchers and government is likely to generate a consensus about problems and potential methodologies for studying particular issues, such institutional settings are also associated with risks related to including or excluding individual scientific opinions over others. The decision of what kind of expertise should be represented in these interactive fora matters (Cairney, 2017). Anecdotally, Spanish academics are consulted by the government in different policy areas. In this volume, Cerrillo and Jordana (Chapter 11) report an institutionalisation of policy analysis in universities since the 2000s with an increase of publications and policy commissioning by different government levels. Also, university professors and researchers are invited to the ministries or asked to participate in some expert commissions. They contribute to policy framing through the political party foundation study units or other think tanks. Ideological synergy among academics and authorities seems to play a role in selecting expertise according to anecdotal evidence. Central public authorities seldom engage the academic community in open consultation by granting resources to analyse a policy problem. A more varied picture is observed in regional governments and some local authorities, which might explain the increase of applied research in universities as encountered by Cerrillo and Jordana (see also Chapter 11 in this volume). 76

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Policy analysis going public? The role of policy advisers Policy advisers and ‘spin’ doctors are consumers and producers of policy analysis, and they use it to feed the decision-​making process. ‘Spin’ doctors and the role of social media In some countries, the late 1990s witnessed the growing prominence of analytical capacities associated with ‘spin’ doctors, able to frame ideas to influence the political and policy discourse in favour of their masters. Policy advice to enhance the electoral profile of a minister or the government has always been present. The growing prominence of these ‘masters of spin’ (Jones, 1999) reflected a strengthening of these analytical capacities, especially regarding how governments communicated with the media and how electoral and other campaigns were conducted. In other words, ‘spin doctors’ are characterised by their ability to read the rules of the political game and the trends in public opinion when conveying their analysis to the political master. In other systems, ‘spin doctors’ enjoy visibility and attract considerable attention despite their low numbers. ‘Spin doctors’ are uncommon or not visible in the Spanish system. The heads of the ministers’ advisory units or the state secretary seldom make press conferences and only recently are starting to occupy the social media space. This space is becoming a relevant instrument in government to ‘spin’ the visibility of political leaders. In Spain, social media is widely used by most public sector organisations, often for propagandistic purposes. As an exception, the National Police uses this instrument not only to inform citizens as regards acceptable practices but also to gather knowledge on specific cases. Therefore, social media is still a nascent instrument of policy analysis in central government. Policy advice and the ‘thickening’ of the apex In the absence of external ‘spin doctors’, the Spanish bureaucracy monopolises policy advice in central government. Although external experts are engaged in supporting particular government policies, executive political appointees rely on senior civil servants and political advisers, many of whom are civil servants. In a system with a high number of policy advisers and political executive appointees, the role of professional civil servants is restrained. Political appointees customarily change with each government, which endangers the sustainability of policies since projects are unlikely to outlast their promoters. There are policy sectors in which a struggle among opposite advocacy coalitions operate. Each political party change promotes significant policy change (social services, abortion, the territorial policy, or the education system, to name just a few). The advisory machinery relies on a web of units (labelled cabinets) reporting to ministers and state secretaries since 1977, similarly to parallel units in France since 77

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1795 (Bouvet, 2015), Belgium since 1911 (Goransson, 2008), or Greece since 1974 (Gouglas, 2015). Unlike special advisers, these cabinets entail purposeful bureaucracy restructuring for the principal to gain political control on the bureaucracy (Moe, 1989). The cabinet then is a formal and institutionalised instrument used by the principal to check the activities of senior civil servants and political appointees. The role of these cabinets may often go beyond the ‘formal’ responsibility of giving advice. For instance, Wright (1996) describes the French cabinets as small units composed of politically sensitive and policy-​ oriented advisers, recruited by the minister, acting as her eyes and ears to define the minister’s policies and ensure that her programme is implemented. Besides, these units take care of the parliamentary and constituency work of the ministers. In Spain, there are periods when cabinets’ role in decision-​making has been considerable (Fleischer and Parrado, 2010). Spain has experienced a ‘thickening’ of the government in the last five decades, both with political appointees and policy advisers. Although this ‘thickening’ could be attributed to the expansion of the welfare state, the transfer of functions to the regions (approximately 40 per cent of public expenditure is managed by them) has reduced the state’s delivery role. However, the expansion of political appointees and policy advisers is still ongoing. Since 1977, the thickening of political appointees has been qualitative, while the number of policy advisers has expanded. On the one hand, two layers of political appointments were added: the state secretaries and the secretary generals. On the other hand, the legal consolidation of the ministerial cabinets since 1982 seems to be a reaction against the possibility of senior civil servants not fully being responsive to their political masters. The numbers of political appointees have steadily grown. However, the overall quantitative expansion of the apex in central bureaucracy masks a flip-​flop evolution during democratic times. Before the advent of democracy, the number of political appointees was 88 in 1973. The central government spent 90 per cent of total public expenditure and local government the remaining 10 per cent. Political appointees descended by 27.6 per cent between 1986 and 2015 due to the transfer of functions to the regional government and the crisis of the 2010s (Arenilla and Delgado, 2014). However, the number of policy advisers increased in the same period by 244.6 per cent from 204 to 703. During this period of political decentralisation of powers to the regions, the central government only managed 23.3 per cent of public expenditure in 2015, while the regions and local authorities were responsible for the rest (Parrado, 2017). The ministerial cabinets’ growth is striking since a royal decree of 2004 capsized the number of advisers to five and three for ministers and state secretaries, respectively. In 2014, the formal maximum number of ministerial cabinet members for deputy prime ministers was decreased from ten to nine (Royal Decree 1887/​2014: Art. 14). Furthermore, available data demonstrate that the average size of these ministerial cabinets increased as well. Whereas approximately two-​thirds of all ministerial 78

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cabinets were relatively small during the 1980s, between one and ten members, two-​thirds of all ministerial cabinets during the late 2000s had between 11 and 20 members. Official statistics do not show the ‘real’ size of ministerial cabinets. In some instances, cabinets engage staff that is not funded out of the cabinet’s payroll or even the ministry. For example, some public foundations may pay for advisory staff working for the minister. More importantly, the size of Spanish ministerial cabinets provides apparent organisational capacities to monitor the activities of a ministerial branch. In sum, although the political appointment area has ‘thickened’ during the last four decades, policy advisers’ presence has grown faster than that of political appointees even though the legislation has tried to limit them. Policy advisers do not replace civil servants in performing policy analysis, as confirmed in interviews. Still, they possess more informal powers than attributed to them to introduce their views in policy-​making. Through the head of the cabinet (state secretaries’ and ministers’), policy advisers are granted informal access to the agenda formation of the policy process (Parrado, 2017). The downside is that despite the growth of advisory units, they do not have direct access to sources of information to produce analysis and advice. They rely on civil servants for this. Therefore, an intricate relationship between these two groups takes place in each ministry.

Conclusion This chapter shows that the academic knowledge about how the Spanish central government conducts policy analysis is limited. In general, this is an internal job in which civil servants play a significant role, and policy advisers have a say in how policy analysis is manufactured. Cross-​cutting horizontal reforms like the modernisation of governance seldom rely on evidence collected systematically at a more general level. Governmental businesses rely on the analysis carried out by civil servants and policy advisers. The engagement with independent external policy analysis is not typical and commissioned research seldom makes it to the public. When academics and non-​academic experts are consulted on policy initiatives, this consultation process is rarely accompanied by systematic commissioned research that supports expert advice. Meetings in which experts express their knowledge on the subject substitute evidence-​based policy analysis. Although there have been some experiences of units or persons devoted to policy analysis (and evaluation) in different parts of government, their networking relation is informal. Policy analysis is not a function that receives formal treatment in government, and one can conclude that there are signs that evidence-​based analysis is practised in single cases. In general, policy analysis is still in its infancy in central government. There are different potential explanations for these observations. First, the civil service is dominated by a legalistic culture. The recruitment process based 79

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on memory-​intensive exams and the dominant legal profile of Spanish public bureaucracies attract graduates from law faculties. These professionals are less likely to engage with evidence-​based training compared to social scientists. The areas where other social sciences like economics, political science, and sociology are more relevant have a different policy analysis approach. However, even a handful of government agencies that carry out economic research cannot prove the use of analysis by the government. Second, the political culture of government with an increasing degree of polarisation between the right and the left might be risk-​averse to a public debate of data and systematic analysis by independent parties. A general lack of transparency of government might influence this pattern. Finally, Spain may still be caught in the institutional path dependency of the Napoleonic state tradition, characterised by a technocratic state ruling from the top without listening to the citizens. There are opinion surveys that increasingly ask citizens about policy issues (see Chapter 9 in this volume), and ministries must consult for legislative proposals. However, the public debate of these consultation processes and opinion polls and their contribution to policy-​making is absent. All these potential explanations merit empirical research. Notes 1 2

https://​avance​digi​tal.gob.es/​es-​es/​Partic​ipac​ion/​Pagi​nas/​Cerra​das/​consu​lta-​est​rate​gia-​digi​tal. aspx [Accessed 6 February 2021]. https://​www.sgi-​netw​ork.org/​2020/​Publi​cati​ons [Accessed 5 December 2021].

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Policy analysis and regional governments Andrea Noferini and David Sancho

Introduction As democratically elected institutions responsible for nearly half of total public expenditure and for more than 20 per cent of national gross domestic product (GDP), regional governments are one of the key actors in the provision of public policies in Spain.1 With the widening of the welfare state, the Europeanisation of domestic policies, and the emergence of intricate policy issues (digitalisation, sustainability, urbanisation, to name only some of them), the role of regional governments as policy analysts has increased notably. Today, regional governments participate in the policy analysis process and generate their own information and technical knowledge about policy problems. These instances of regional government activity have evolved from policy analysis processes characterised by the participation of a few actors in the production of information for the policy process to a new model in which more public and private organisations interact in the construction of policy analysis strategies (Mota and Subirats, 2000). Among the European Union (EU) member states, Spain has provided one of the most relevant examples of decentralisation by moving, in the last four decades, from a centralised state to a decentralised state in which up to six levels of government coexist (Heywood, 1995; see Chapter 6 in this volume).2 Spanish political articulation still remains a very complex system regarding the territorial distribution of powers among national, regional, provincial, and local governments (Agranoff, 2010). Understanding how policy analysis is performed at the regional level thus requires analysing how regional and central governmental actors cooperate in the definition and implementation of multilevel domestic public policies. It also requires considering how regional governments gather information, data, and knowledge for the definition of evidence-​based regional policies in those sectors that fall under their responsibility. In this chapter, we focus on regional governments as policy analysts in a context of increasing state intervention, greater decentralisation, and growing policy complexity. The main research question concerns how policy analysis is performed at the regional level by focusing on: (a) how regional governments have become crucial actors in the articulation of policy analysis over time; (b) to what extent they coordinate their activities with the central government; and (c) the main characteristics of policy analysis process at the regional level.

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If we consider policy analysis, in a broad sense, as those activities performed by governments for the definition, implementation, and evaluation of public policies (Chapter 4 in this volume), this chapter shows that increased state intervention, higher decentralisation, and a new emphasis on good governance and policy coherence have increased the demand for policy analysis at the regional level. Policy analysis can indeed play a valuable role in specifying and predicting the consequences of alternative policies, as well as in defining what is feasible and what is not. The good governance paradigm of the 1990s already included a comprehensive list of the policy analysis activities that were necessary for determining the priorities of public problems, allocating the resources to respond to them, and for improving service delivery from public administrations. Today, this paradigm has evolved by putting at the centre of the debate the concept of policy coherence as one of the drivers for enhancing policy analysis activities (Grindle, 2004). Policy coherence is also one of the guidelines contained in the 2030 Agenda,3 the universal roadmap approved in 2015 by the United Nations, aimed at producing more democratic, sustainable, and effective public policies.4 In this chapter, we consider this greater demand for policy analysis at the regional level in the light of the territorial distribution of powers between the centre and the periphery; the historical and administrative legacy of the Spanish administrative system; the role of regional government in some basic policy areas of welfare; and the localisation of the 2030 Agenda in two regions: Catalonia and the Basque Country. Among the main conclusions, we can anticipate that on one side, the pressures for more evidence-​based, multilevel, and multi-​actor public policies have enhanced policy analysis processes across sectors and scales of governance, and on the other side, regional governments in Spain have not converged towards a common model of policy analysis. On the contrary, the multilevel structure of Spanish territorial politics, a lack of horizontal cooperation, and a lack of administrative and institutional legacies have encouraged the emergence of different and regionalised styles of policy analysis. The chapter is structured in three sections. In the first part, it illustrates the constitutional and institutional contexts that regulate the relations between the central state and the regions by focusing on regional authority. The second section focuses on the principal features of policy analysis at the regional level by considering the historical evolution of regional governments as policy analysts. Finally, in the third section, we present some illustrative cases related to policy analysis activities and dynamics in the fields of education, health, and, in the case of the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, two Spanish regions: Catalonia and the Basque Country.

Spain’s territorial configuration and its impact on policy analysis Spain is a parliamentary democracy that in the last decades has experienced a dramatic process of political decentralisation. This process produced a formal unitary system, but with strong federalising trends that also included some 84

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relevant asymmetries (Agranoff, 1996). In the end, decentralisation configured a multilevel system of governance in which the overlapping of executive powers in some policy sectors increased the need for cooperation between central and regional governments for the definition and implementation of domestic public policies. The consolidation of Spanish democracy has received attention from scholars in comparative studies of political systems and public policy (Gunther, 1996; Subirats and Gomá, 1998; Gunther et al, 2004; Colino, 2009; Keating and Wilson, 2009; Vampa, 2016). With respect to the territorial distribution of powers, however, the Spanish model continues to generate disputes regarding the degree of de/​centralisation. Although being a formally unitary state, several authors have described Spain as a ‘quasi-​federation’, an ‘incomplete federation’ (Agranoff, 1996, 2010) or a ‘de facto federal state in all but name’ (Moreno and Colino, 2010). The key turning point is 1978, when, after the end of Franco’s regime, the new political constitution was created. The new constitutional charter established what is today known as the State of the Autonomies (Estado de las Autonomias), which for many authors is an open-​ended process of decentralisation rather than a definite territorial model (Requejo and Nagel, 2009).5 This new territorial organisation provided the regional governments with an open framework of competencies (art. 148 and 150.2 of the Constitution) for whose exercise they enjoyed guaranteed financial autonomy with a system of their own or with transferred resources (art. 156 and 157). In the initial stages, this multi-​track model of decentralisation meant that levels of self-​government varied consistently among regions. Catalonia, the Basque Country, and Galicia moved into the ‘fast track’ from the beginning by claiming more responsibilities for public services delivery and for more political autonomy. Over time, however, those regions that had gained their Statutes of Autonomy through the ‘slow route’ quickly converged to the role of the most active regions. The result was a mixed map of the 17 regional political arenas: regions with a clear cultural identity (Catalonia, Galicia, and the Basque Country), historical regions (Andalusia, Aragon, Asturias, the Canary Islands, Valencia, Navarra, Extremadura, and the Balearic Islands), improvised macro-​regions (Castile-​Leon, Castile La Mancha) and regionalised provinces (Cantabria, La Rioja, Madrid, Murcia). In the last four decades, the number and the salience of policy sectors assigned under the responsibility of regional governments, as well as the degree of autonomy over these sectors, have progressively widened. Regional authority has constantly increased regarding both the extent to which regional governments can decide their own policies (self-​rule) and the extent to which regional representatives co-​determine national policies (shared rule) (Figure 5.1).6 As the policy sectors under the responsibilities of regional governments enlarged, the demand for policy analysis also became more urgent. The definition of effective policies in the fields of economic development, education, health, and environment encouraged the need for more evidence-​based policies, sectoral 85

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Figure 5.1: Regional Authority Index –​Spain (1978–​2016) 35 30 25 20 15 10 5

16

14

20

12

20

10

20

08

20

06

20

04

20

02

20

00

20

98

20

96

19

94

19

92

19

90

19

88

19

86

19

84

19

82

19

80

19

19

19

78

0

Source: Data by Hooghe et al (2016)

and technical knowledge, as well as the need for greater coordination among sectoral departments and with central government. Spain’s accession to the EU in 1985 –​and the supra-​nationalisation (or Europeanisation) of some policy areas under the exclusive responsibilities of regional governments –​implied, for example, a greater relevance of European affairs in the regional policy-​ making in Spain. Information and news produced and coming from Brussels started to be relevant for anticipating the implications of European norms for regional scenarios, as well as being relevant for exploiting to the maximum the financial support framed within the context of EU financial instruments. As a consequence, regional governments started to establish departmental units –​in many cases constituted by one or a few civil servants –​and interdepartmental commissions charged with the role of coordinating European affairs within and across the regional public administration. Often these units were supported by the creation of regional delegations and offices in Brussels, whose main goals consisted of providing resources, knowledge, and information to regional sectoral units involved in, or affected by, EU initiatives (Tatham, 2008; Greenwood, 2011; Noferini, 2012). Following the legalistic and closed nature of policy analysis expressed at the central level (Chapter 4 in this volume), policy analysis at the regional level relied mainly upon internal knowledge produced by the regional bureaucracy, knowledge which very often was not accessible to the public. The participation of citizens and sectoral agents in the development of policy analysis at the regional level was initially scarce. Open participation processes were very few and were very formal, and in many cases they were driven top-​down. Moreover, the low level of coordination with central government’s ministerial departments and the 86

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lack of a political culture of cooperation, inhibited regional governments from using and profiting from policy analysis activities performed at the central level.

Regional governments’ expenditure and revenues Within the Spanish constitutional setting, regions are self-​governing units that have established consolidated political arenas with their own institutions: in some cases, a specific political climate, and in all cases, a complex network of territorial actors. Formally, each region has a legislative assembly elected by direct universal suffrage. The regional parliament elects a president who later appoints the regional executive. The 1978 Constitution sets out the division of power between the centre and the periphery by explicitly reserving some competences for the central state. According to Articles 148 and 149 of the 1978 Constitution, each region holds all the powers that are listed in its own Statute of Autonomy. These powers are effectively transferred to the regions by the central state.7 Statutes of Autonomy represent quasi-​constitutions that define the institutions and powers of each region.8 At first, and until the mid-​1990s, important differences existed between regions. Nonetheless, all regions today enjoy the same degree of political autonomy, and the differences between the ways in which they exercise their powers are rather small, limited to some specific cultural and linguistic powers, civil legislation and some specific provisions for policing and public security, and immigration.9 As the decentralisation process evolved, regions played an essential role as legislators and policy providers in many sectors of welfare –​health, education, housing, and social policies –​as well as in economic development, transport, environment, and other public services for citizens. Today in Spain, subnational government expenditure (Table 5.1) is equivalent to 49.2 per cent of total public expenditure (40.4 per cent in the OECD), and 20.8 per cent of GDP (16.2 per cent in the OECD).10 Health and general public services represent 49.0 per cent of subnational expenditure compared with

Table 5.1: Subnational government expenditure by function (as a share of total subnational government expenditure, 2016) Spain (%)

OECD average (%)

Health

26

18

General public services

23

14

Education

18

25

Other

14

15

Economic affairs

12

14

Social protection

 7

14

Subnational expenditure per capita

US$7,545

US$6,817

Source: OECD/​UCLG (2019)

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32.0 per cent in the OECD area (OECD/​UCLG, 2019). Spanish regions are also among the larger providers of public investments: 67.5 per cent of total public investment is carried out by subnational governments, compared with an OECD average of 56.9 per cent. In terms of revenue, Spain’s subnational governments are responsible of 54.5 per cent of total public revenue (16.9 per cent is local government expenditure), which is equal to 20.6 per cent of the GDP. The Spanish Constitution, and the successive reforms of 1981, 1983, 1993, 2001, and 2009, provide two types of financing for regions: the common system and the autonomous system (sistema foral) for the Basque Country and Navarra, pointing to the asymmetry of the system.11 In the common system, the taxes are collected by the central government and redistributed to the regions according to population, insularity, age of population, and the distribution of municipalities. Within this common-​regime system, between 85 per cent and 95 per cent of the regional financial resources are derived from taxes ceded totally or partially by the state (Beramendi, 2012; Sorribas-​Navarro et al, 2017). In the autonomous system, the Basque Country and Navarra can levy, manage, settle, and collect their own taxes. They transfer a fixed quota to the central government. Overall, the model of fiscal transfers between the centre and the regions has worked reasonably well (De la Fuente Moreno, 2019). Over the last four decades, successive financing models have adapted to the country’s growing decentralisation, allowing the transfer of powers to the new regional administrations, and providing them with greater financial resources (Del Pino and Fernandez, 2019). Nevertheless, today there is a consensus among specialists regarding the urgency of fiscal reform in order to improve transparency, fiscal equity, and autonomy (Monés et al, 2016; Llera, 2018; Torralvo, 2020).

Policy analysis at the regional level: the first stage of a closed model (1978–​95) The systems for generating public policies in the regions reproduce the administrative traditions or cultures present in Spain. The Spanish case would be a clear exponent of the so-​called Napoleonic administrative model (Ramió, 2001). This administrative model, which exists in different countries of continental Europe, represents a typical example of the centralist state in which the presence of public administration is an indispensable factor in the life of the country, promoting processes of statist or clientele political interaction with a set of social actors. This administrative tradition, present in the central state administration before the establishment of the 1978 State of the Autonomies, was reproduced in the new regional governments. Within this context, public and private management were considered fundamentally different. The values that inspire the understanding of public management in this type of administrative tradition also differ significantly from those in the Anglo-​Saxon tradition, especially with regard to the role of the 88

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state in the economy and society when articulating public policies: from Anglo-​ Saxon pluralism to statist or corporatist perspectives on the European continent. Two key characteristics were quickly assumed by the new administrative culture of the regions: the hierarchical and centralised nature of their administrative structures and the strongly dirigiste and interventionist impulse. These characteristics would also define the formulas for generating policies of the regions, especially in their first years of existence. The style of policy analysis used in Spain could be described as an institutional design based on hierarchy and top-​down management (Jiménez et al, 2014; Chapter 4 in this volume). The reason why the regions quickly adopted this role was twofold: first, in the creation of the regional institutions, the organisational and human resources models were transferred mimetically from the Spanish central administration to regional governments. Thus, for example, the public organisations which had provided public health services under the orders of the central government were transferred directly to the regions. This also meant transferring their personnel, and with them their administrative culture. Second, the context of social needs did not allow the regions to innovate by creating a new organisational culture. In Spain in the early 1980s, basic welfare services were being set up in response to an urgent demand from citizens, who were in great deficit during the previous period of Franco’s dictatorship. The emulation of the Spanish central administration by the newly established regional government generated key trends for understanding their model of closed policy analysis. This model was not very plural and not very sensitive to the network participation of social agents. Decision-​making was highly personalised and centralised in the management services of the regional government, reproducing the decisional centralism of Madrid, typically controlled by the closed elites of civil service bodies (Lapuente, 2018). However, unlike the central administration, the structure of civil service bodies of the regional administrations would never acquire as much formal and informal power as in the case of the Spanish central administration. In countries with weaker, less controlling, and less hierarchical central state institutions, it is easier for new ideas and formulas for policy design to appear in administrative departments. These new policy designs open up new spaces for the plural participation of actors, think tanks, and social agents in the design, implementation, and evaluation of public programmes. In the Spanish case, therefore, the administrative tradition was a brake on the regions’ opportunities for innovation when establishing new models of policy analysis, especially in their first decades of configuration. As a result, at its origin, policy analysis at the regional level was developed by senior public officials who advised government actors in closed circles. Over time, this traditional style of policy analysis was transformed, opening up to more participatory and plural models. This transformation was also influenced, across the European member states, by the consolidation of modern systems of multilevel governance, which meant an increase in the number of actors involved in the policy-​making process (Piattoni, 2010). 89

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Towards a more open and innovative policy analysis model at the regional level (1996–​2020) From the second half of the 1990s, regional governments began to see the implementation of partial innovations in the use of policy analysis aimed at improving information systems and increasing the participation of sectoral agents, citizens, experts, and think tanks in the definition of public policy. These innovations included strategic planning, the introduction of participatory democracy initiatives, sectoral agreements, the prospective analysis of scenarios, and so on. Some of these initiatives were introduced into the Spanish public administration in the form of new public management or new managerialism (Hood, 1991; Pollitt, 1993). These novel principles proposed the inclusion of new management techniques that did not exist in traditional public administration models. Among the management strategies proposed by the new public management, some have a relevant impact on the formulas for the use of policy and analysis by the regions: • Management by objectives, which implies the need to articulate new and solid information systems for decision-​making. • Organisational simplification and reduction of hierarchical levels to achieve a more flexible and open working environment. This encourages creativity and new ways of working, and is less hierarchical and more team-​based. • Transparency and accountability based on a series of pre-​established objectives. Again, this implies a need to increase studies, analyses, and assessments of indicators, management models, and evaluation systems. • Customer orientation and quality of services. Public administration users are no longer beneficiaries or contributors who become public administration customers, so their point of view must be taken into account. • Networked public administration. The government must not row but lead, so open models of agreement and negotiation are needed to include the position of sector agents in decision-​making processes and in models for implementing public programmes. The influence of new public management has penetrated the regional public service delivery models deeply. Some of these management schemes, based on the theory of public choice, were taken on board, thus promoting the de-​ bureaucratisation of public systems and the recovery of analysis and control mechanisms in the search for efficient action. From this point on, regions made use of their political autonomy and initiated innovative experiences with a greater use of policy analyses in the design, execution and evaluation of their programmes. The regional departments responsible for policy development encouraged collaboration with other departments (for project-​based programmes) and increasing the participation of external consultants to meet specific demands for new studies and analyses. If there was insufficient internal experience within 90

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the administration, the departments increased their collaboration with networks of researchers, universities, and think tanks. Overall, policy analysis activities at the regional level have notably improved in the last decades. Nevertheless –​and similar to what has happened at the central level (see Chapter 4 in this volume) –​the regions have not converged towards a common and institutionalised model of policy analysis. In many policy sectors, the engagement with independent external policy analysis is restricted, and public regional agencies produce research and analysis, but do not systematically feed into the decision-​making process. Additionally, experts and academics are consulted on policy initiatives, but –​apart from some exceptions, and in contrast to policy analysis at the local level (see Chapter 6 in this volume) –​their consultations are seldom accompanied by a systematic review of the evidence with the production of evidence-​based policy papers that supplement expert advice. Finally, although some technical units in the regional departments carry out policy analysis and policy evaluation, their activity is still informal and not systematic.

Policy analysis instruments at the regional level: a sectoral perspective At the regional level, there have been areas in which the use of the instruments of policy analysis and evaluation have traditionally been practised with intensity. In some cases, this has occurred under coercive incentives, as in the case of development cooperation and programmes financed by European funds, which require solid evaluation models. In some other policy areas, these instruments have been introduced through the creation of specialised bodies or units, as in the case of two of the major public policy competencies assigned to regions: health and education. In the area of public health, a whole set of institutions, bodies, and administrative units responsible for managing information, establishing analyses, and carrying out evaluations of the management of health services began to be established at the regional level from the mid-​1990s.12 Since 2006, within the framework of the National Health System Quality Plan, these agencies have intensified their cooperation. In 2012, a Spanish Network of Health Technology Agencies of the National Health System was created. This was made up of these regional agencies or units plus the central administration, with the aim of promoting quality, efficiency, and sustainability in the assessment of health technologies and policies. The activities performed by these units in the health sector involve the use of rigorous scientific research and analysis processes to produce structured information aimed at facilitating the choice of the best possible alternatives for health programmes. Under this scheme, health technologies are evaluated for diagnosis, treatment, and prevention; even the organisational structures and choices of the units are analysed. The ultimate aim is to facilitate informed decision-​making on health technologies and services. To this end, clinical practice 91

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guidelines and evidence-​based recommendations and methodology documents are drawn up for evaluation of the health institutions and the health services. The emergence and development of this type of agency in the regions was inspired by the need to respond to rising healthcare costs and citizens’ demand for better healthcare services at a sustainable cost. Indeed, in recent years, collaboration and cooperation in the development of evaluation projects between regional health agencies and state public evaluation bodies has increased notably. As a result, the exchange of knowledge and resources among public administrations at different levels of government has contributed to the production of studies and evaluations which have been used for the analysis of the policy outcomes achieved in the sector. Education is the other sector in which the regions have made extensive use of policy analysis instruments. Since the 1990s, specialised units and bodies have been set up which have established methodological standards to analyse, evaluate, and guarantee the quality, validity, and reliability of educational programmes.13 Other regions have articulated analysis and evaluation processes through specialised administrative units within the organisational structures of their departments of education. The development of indicator systems at different levels of education has produced the publication of several studies and evaluations at the regional level. These are aimed at improving the decision-​making processes in education. The introduction of evaluation and other policy analysis instruments has been particularly intense in the field of tertiary education. In Spain, the functions of regulation and quality assurance of university studies are a shared responsibility between the Spanish agency ANECA (National Agency for Quality Assessment and Accreditation) and the regional agencies in those territories where they have been created. Over time, many regions have created their own agencies.14 The main purpose of these regional agencies is to promote and guarantee the quality of higher education, in accordance with academic and international quality standards. In addition, they provide higher education agents with criteria and benchmarks to achieve the highest quality standards in the fulfilment of their functions. These criteria and benchmarks promote the articulation of a solid information system for carrying out relevant studies and evaluations of decision-​ making in higher education programmes. Apart from the areas of health and education, we must mention the emergence of some initiatives of regional institutions or agencies which focus exclusively on the evaluation of public policies. Following the creation of the Agencia Estatal de Evaluación de las Políticas Públicas y la Calidad de los Servicios (AEVAL) in 2006 at the central level (see Chapter 4 in this volume), the use of public policy evaluation is being expanded, and in some regions new formal organisations are being created to promote the use of this type of policy analysis model in the normal operation of administrative departments (Aguilar and Bustelo, 2010). In this context, the Catalan case is a special case, with the creation in 2008 of IVALUA (Institut Català d’Avaluació de les Polítiques Publiques), a public consortium that has carried out more than 50 evaluations of public policy 92

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programmes in Catalonia in the last decade. In the case of Navarra, the Comisión Foral de Evaluación de las Políticas Públicas y la Calidad de los Servicios has also developed training, raised awareness, and promoted evaluation activities in recent years and also maintains a register of policy evaluations. A similar situation exists in the Basque Country, where the creation of a public policy evaluation observatory is being promoted and is currently in the implementation phase. Despite having sufficient administrative capacities, these cases reveal some coordination problems that are related both to the degree of complexity of the regional administrations’ institutional structures, and, above all, to the lack of a culture of coordination between the different administrative departments and the new evaluation agencies.

Policy analysis in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda at the regional level: the cases of Catalonia and the Basque Country Approved in 2015 at the United Nations headquarters by 193 countries, the 2030 Agenda represents the global strategy for moving towards sustainable and inclusive development. In a nutshell, the implementation of the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) aims to introduce a new policy framework based on enhanced policy coherence, greater interinstitutional coordination, and the involvement of stakeholders in the design and implementation of public policies. Undoubtedly, the Agenda’s transformative character challenges more traditional styles of policy-​making and increases the need for policy analysis. At the territorial level, regional governments are key actors in the localisation of the 2030 Agenda, that is, in adapting the universal goals and principles of the Agenda to the territorial priorities (OECD/​UCLG, 2019). From a policy analysis perspective, localising the SDGs presents three basic challenges: (a) to map the current state of the regional context with respect to the goals and to set regional policy priorities; (b) to enhance coordination among sectors and departments in order to guarantee policy coherence; and (c) to gather data and information in order to pledge the monitoring process that accompanies the implementation of the Agenda. In Spain, there are already several regions that have, autonomously –​and in some cases ahead of the central government itself –​defined and approved their own strategies for implementing the 2030 Agenda. Among the pioneering and most emblematic cases are the strategies approved in the Basque Country, Catalonia, the Valencian Community, Andalusia, and Navarra. In this section, we compare two regional governments: Catalonia and the Basque Country. These examples are illustrative and show, from the perspective of policy analysis, some changes that the 2030 Agenda has already prompted in regional public administrations. A first common point deals with the external dimensions of the 2030 Agenda. The implementation of the SDGs is usually framed within the context of development cooperation and international affairs. Among the Spanish regions, Catalonia and the Basque Country represent regional governments 93

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that have historically attached a great relevance to the external actions and the international representation of territorial interests. Indeed, both regional administrations were among the first to establish dedicated units aimed at including international debates and inputs in regional policy-​making. Therefore, this international dimension of the 2030 Agenda can explain why both regions showed, from the very beginning, a clear commitment to the localisation of the Agenda. Indeed, under the leading role of the respective departments of their presidencies, both regional governments took their initial steps towards localising the SDGs much earlier than the Spanish central government and the majority of the other Spanish regions. In 2015 –​the same year as the approval of the 2030 Agenda –​the Government of Catalonia announced the elaboration of a National Plan for the implementation of the SDGs which was finally approved in 2017. In 2016, the Basque Country had already dispensed with its own strategy (Agenda Euskadi 2030) by aligning the universally agreed SDGs to the topics and objectives of the 2017–​20 Basque Government programme (Levarlet et al, 2019). To define their regional strategies, both governments relied upon in-​house knowledge produced by sectoral departments and agencies as well upon data and information provided by societal actors. In Catalonia, the Advisory Council for Sustainable Development of Catalonia (CADS)15 assumed a relevant role from the start by publishing a report –​The 2030 Agenda: Transform Catalonia, Improve the World –​which, with contributions from more than 60 experts from academic institutions and civil society organisations, identified the challenges that Catalonia had to face to achieve the SDGs. In the case of the Basque Country, civil society and other external stakeholders contributed to the definition of the regional agenda through the Advisory Council on External Action,16 chaired by the regional president. With regard to the inclusion of civil society actors in the implementation of the SDGs, it is relevant to stress the active role assumed by the two regional parliaments. In 2020, the Parliament of Catalonia urged the regional government to promote an alliance of public and private actors. The outcome was the creation of Alliance Catalonia 2030, a forum made up of 33 organisations and entities from the universities, the third sector, the local entities, trade unions, representatives of the elderly, the LGBTQI community, and environmental associations. The alliance constitutes a transverse coalition whose main goal consists of sharing resources, information, and knowledge in order to promote joint initiatives in favour of the 2030 Agenda, for instance, the need to accelerate energy transition, digitalisation, and a circular economy in Catalonia. In the Basque Country, the Basque Parliament created a Working Group on the 2030 Agenda to strengthen alliances and to work with other organisations, institutions, the private sector, academia, and the third sector to implement Agenda Euskadi 2030. An example of this participation is the 17x17 initiative promoted by the regional UNESCO office (UNESCO Etxea) that includes partners from charitable organisations, public service providers, third-​sector foundations, think tanks, a business support 94

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organisation, as well as industrial and commercial enterprises, including the multinational utility enterprise Iberdrola. Given the holistic and integrative nature of the SDGs, the definition of the regional strategy for their implementation at the territorial level required an enhanced method of coordination across the sectoral departments of the regional public administrations. Improved coordination and inter-​administrative cooperation served to collect and share data, information and sectoral knowledge for planning activities that helped regional governments define their initial point of departure (the status quo) and monitor the distance from the expected goals for each of the 17 SDGs. In Catalonia, as well as in the Basque Country, policy innovation occurred through the creation of new interdepartmental structures aimed at enhancing coordination among sectoral departments. In Catalonia, the National Plan for the implementation of the 2030 Agenda created an interdepartmental commission –​as well as a technical commission divided into 17 working groups –​with an internal mandate to promote the interchange of information, knowledge, and practices among departments. Each working group focused on a single SDG and was coordinated by the department that had the most competencies related to that SDG.17 In the Basque Country 2030 Agenda, the General Secretariat of the President’s Office leads the entire governmental action with the support of the General Secretariat for External Action which promotes coordination among the other departments through the Interdepartmental External Action Committee. Coordination is aimed at fostering synergies and complementarities with other public policies, as established in existing sectoral plans at the departmental level. For instance, an action promoted under Goal 1 (ending poverty) was to establish an interinstitutional technical commission for joint management and optimisation of the income guarantee system, consolidating it as an instrument for social cohesion. Another relevant example, aimed at encouraging provincial and municipal participation in the Agenda Euskadi 2030, was the creation of the Interinstitutional Commission, a working group that includes all levels of Basque public administration: municipal, provincial, and regional. For two years, this Interinstitutional Working Group worked in a coordinated manner in order to adapt demands, priorities, and peculiarities of each territory into a territorially integrated strategy.18 Finally, regarding the monitoring process, the 2030 Agenda established 17 goals and 169 associated targets. Indicators are the backbone for monitoring progress towards the SDGs at the local, regional, national, and global levels. A sound indicator framework turns the SDGs and their targets into management tools to help governments to develop implementation strategies and to allocate resources accordingly. The SDGs require reporting with high-​quality data from all administrations. This, in turn, implies much greater investment in building independent, impartial, national statistical capacities and strengthening statistical quality and standards. In Catalonia, monitoring activities have promoted the collaboration between the Catalan government –​through CADS –​and the regional statistical office (Idescat). Taking the Eurostat indicators as a reference, 95

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CADS and Idescat signed a formal agreement, according to which Idescat undertook to provide its statistical knowledge and to ensure that the project met the quality and soundness of the standards required by official statistics. For its part, CADS provides its knowledge on the SDGs and coordinates the requests for statistical information with all the departments of the Catalan government. In the Basque Country, after the approval of the Law of the Basque Statistics Plan 2019–​22, the regional statistical agency (Eustat) launched an ambitious process in 2019 to adapt the international indicators of the 2030 Agenda for the region. The main goal was to established a battery of statistical indicators that were aligned with the framework established by the United Nations and available to the different social and territorial agents. From the beginning, the platform for the dissemination of the indicators of Eustat was established with the firm intention of it becoming the place where all the sustainable development indicators were grouped in an integrated manner.

Conclusion In analysing the role of regional government as policy analysts in Spain, this chapter has shown how policy analysis activities and processes have grown notably in the last decades. This growth was due to various factors, such as the increasing intervention of public administrations under the welfarist model, the widening of the policy sectors under the responsibility of regional governments, and finally, the emergence of new challenges and novel policy paradigms, for example, good governance and policy coherence. Constrained by the legacy of Spanish administrative culture, regions initially copied the style of policy analysis established at the central level and characterised by the prominence of civil servants and sectoral agencies in the production and provision of data, information, and knowledge for the definition of regional public policies. Indeed, the administrative tradition and political culture present in Spain had a defining influence by limiting the participation of non-​public actors with policy analysis capacities such as interest groups, think tanks, and non-​governmental organisations. This closed model was maintained over time, although it has been tempered by the introduction of new models of management based on new public management, good governance, and open government. Indeed, from the mid-​1990s, these new principles promoted an increase of the relevance of cooperation, transparency, and accountability for policy analysis at the regional level. This led regional governments to look for creative ways of taking advantage of in-​house knowledge through coordination initiatives across departmental units, the establishment of sectoral agencies, and also by enhancing the participation of analysts, researchers, consultancy firms, and universities. As a result, the model of policy analysis that emerged at the regional level was not the product of a regular and planned collaboration between governments and actors from civil society, but more the outcome of an incremental effort under the pressures of designing 96

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more evidence-​based public policies. Most policy analyses followed case studies and qualitative approaches and were focused on a specific policy area, particularly those areas that consumed a great amount of regional budget. From the perspective of multilevel governance, and from the effectiveness and efficiency of using policy analysis models, the complexity of Spanish territorial settings has shown to be more of an obstacle than an advantage. Indeed, the lack of articulation of a multilevel governance system that presents solid institutional mechanisms for intergovernmental relations has promoted territorial fragmentation and the establishment of regionalised styles of policy analysis. If the Spanish experience is analysed, examples of transitions towards new forms of territorial governance based on participation, coordination, responsibility, efficiency, territorial coherence, and so on, are scarce; there are many more examples of bad practice than examples of good multilevel governance (Subirats, 2019). There is a high level of segmentation in regional public policies and a fragmentation of the institutional map, which is characterised by weak and informal coordination systems. Under the increasing uncertainty and complexity of contemporary public policies, regional governments have been asked to change their approach of copying the culture and the centralised model of the central administration and adopting a more proactive approach. Policy analysis at the regional level still requires imagining new methods of coordination and cooperation with social actors, as well as promoting systems of shared analysis for the formulation and evaluation of public programmes. As we have seen in the case of the implementation of the 2030 Agenda, when incentives are well defined, regional governments have shown to be sufficiently capable of applying more open and participatory models of policy analysis when defining modern and evidence-​ based public policies. Notes 1

2

3

4 5

Comunidades Autónomas (autonomous communities) according to the Spanish Constitution (Chapter VIII). The vocabulary is often contested and the literature uses a variety of terms such as regional governments, subnational authorities (SNAs) and sub-​state authorities (SSAs). According to the Regional Authority Index (Hooghe et al, 2017), a region is considered a level of government if: a) it refers to a given territory; b) it is intermediate between local and national governments; c) it owns a set of legislative and executive powers responsible for authoritative decision-​making; and d) the geographical area has a considerable population (greater than around 150,000 persons). This is the meaning we will apply to Spanish regions in this chapter. Formally, there is a three-​tiered governance system in Spain: (central) government, the regions (Comunidades Autonomas –​Autonomous Communities (CCAA)), and the local governments (including provinces and municipalities). Policy coherence means defining and implementing public policies that are sectorally integrated, vertically coordinated among different levels of government and that balance short-​term priorities with long-​term sustainability objectives. For a critical review of the shift from good governance to policy coherence see Grindle (2004). The complexity of territorial politics in Spain stems from the historical circumstance in which the territorial model is not the result of an agreement between pre-​existing states/​polities,

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6 7

8 9 10 11

12

13

14

15

16

17

98

but the result of a pact that allowed the decentralisation of an existing, strongly centralised administration, while preventing its total disintegration (Máiz et al, 2010). Based on the Regional Authority Index (Hooghe et al, 2016). Regions may assume competences in the following fields: organisation of regional government institutions; changes in municipal boundaries; public order; planning; urbanism and housing; public works of regional interest; transport (regional railway and road networks; regional transport; ports and airports not engaged in commercial activities); agriculture and forestry; environment (protection); water management; promotion of economic development within the frame of the national policy; culture (museums; libraries and music conservatories of regional interest; cultural heritage; promotion of culture and of the regional language, when relevant); promotion of regional tourism; promotion of sports and leisure activities; social assistance, and health and hygiene. The Statutes must be approved by the Cortes and thus constitute part of Spain’s domestic legal infrastructure. The Statutes are subordinate to the Constitution. The only exception is the specific financial system of the Basque Country and Navarra. Subnational government expenditure also includes expenditure made by local governments. In Spain, local government expenditure for the period 2015–​19 was 5.9 per cent of GDP. Furthermore, there is a different economic and tax system for the Canary Islands ‘due to historical and geographical reasons’ and in line with the European Union’s provisions for ultra-​ peripheral regions. Some examples include: Osteba (Servicio de Evaluación de Tecnologías Sanitarias) in the Basque Country; AQuAS (Agencia de Calidad y Evaluación Sanitaria) in Cataluña; Avalia-​t (Unidad de Asesoramiento Científico Técnico de la Axencia de Coñocemento en Saúde) in Galicia; AETSA (Evaluación de Tecnologías Sanitarias) in Andalucía; IACS (Instituto Aragonés de Ciencias de la Salud) in Aragón; SESCS (Servicio de Evaluación del Servicio Canario de Salud) in Canarias, and UETS (Unidad de Evaluación de Tecnologías Sanitarias) in Madrid. Examples include Catalonia, with the Consell Superior d’Avaluació del Sistema Educatiu; Aragon, through the Centro de Evaluación, Formación y Calidad de Aragón (CEFyCA) or the Basque Country, through the Instituto Vasco de Evaluación e Investigación Educativa (ISEI-​ IVEI). Agencia Canaria de Calidad Universitaria y Evaluación Educativa (ACCUEE); Agencia Andaluza de Evaluación (AGAE); Agencia Canaria de Evaluación de la Calidad y Acreditación Universitaria (ACECAU); Agencia de Calidad y Prospectiva Universitaria de Aragón (ACPUA); Agencia de Evaluación de la Calidad y Acreditación del Sistema Universitario Vasco (UNIBASQ); Agència de Qualitat Universitària de les Illes Balears (AQUIB); Agencia para la Calidad del Sistema Educativo Universitario de Castilla y León (ACSUCYL); Agència per a la Qualitat del Sistema Universitari de Catalunya (AQU); Agència Valenciana d’Avaluació i Prospectiva (AVAP); Axencia para a Calidade do Sistema Universitario de Galicia (ACSUG) or Fundación para el Conocimiento Madrid. CADS, created in December 1998, is an advisory body of the Government of Catalonia, whose functions include advising on the integration of sustainability in policies, territorial and sectoral planning instruments, in legislative and regulatory projects, and in projects or strategic initiatives promoted by the government. The Advisory Council on External Action is made up of actors from various areas (social, academic, cultural, scientific and technological, environmental, business-​related, and so on) who have knowledge and experience of international affairs. Its remit is to involve civil society in external actions by the government. For example, the Working Group on SDG 1 (‘End poverty in all its forms everywhere’) has been coordinated by the Department of Labour, Social Affairs and Families and includes representatives from the following departments: the Presidency; the Vice Presidency, Economy and Finance; Foreign Action, Institutional Relations and Transparency; Education; Digital Policies and Public Administration; Health; Enterprises and Knowledge.

Policy analysis and regional governments 18

Another relevant example of interinstitutional coordination with local organisations in the field of media, is the AliaODS initiative, led by the local UNICEF office and focused on the local promotion of SDGs. The partnership brings together 16 media organisations in the region that are responsible for 28 media outlets including newspapers, television channels, radio, and web-​based news outlets that –​under a single brand –​promote awareness with regards to the implementation of the 17 SDGs at the territorial level.

References Agranoff, R. (1996) ‘Federal evolution in Spain’, International Political Science Review /​Revue Internationale De Science Politique, 17(4): 385–​401. Agranoff, R. (2010) Local Governments and Their Intergovernmental Networks in Federalizing Spain, McGill-​Queen’s University Press, Montreal. Aguilar, L. and Bustelo, M. (2010) Gobernanza y evaluación: una relación potencialmente fructífera. Gestión y Análisis de Políticas Públicas, Nueva época, 4: 23–​51. Beramendi, P. (2012) The Political Geography of Inequality: Regions and Redistribution, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Colino, C. (2009) ‘Constitutional change without constitutional reform: Spanish federalism and the revision of Catalonia’s statute of autonomy’, Publius, 39(2): 262–​88. De la Fuente Moreno, Á. (2019) Financiación autonómica: una breve introducción. La riqueza de las regiones: aportaciones de la ciencia regional a la sociedad. Thomson Reuters-​Civitas: 41–​60. Del Pino, E. and Fernandez, R. (2019) ‘Ajustes e impactos de la crisis sobre el gasto social de las comunidades autónomas’, in A. Cuenca and S. Lago (eds) Sector Público español: reformas pendientes, FUNCAS, Madrid. Field, B.N. (2014) ‘Minority parliamentary government and multilevel politics: Spain’s system of mutual back scratching’, Comparative Politics, 46(3): 293–​312. Greenwood, J. (2011) ‘Actors of the common interest? The Brussels Offices of the Regions’, Journal of European Integration, 33(4): 437–​51. Grindle, M. (2004) ‘Good enough governance: Poverty reduction and reform in developing countries’, Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions, 17: 525–​48. Gunther, R. (1996) ‘The impact of regime change on public policy: The case of Spain’, Journal of Public Policy, 16(2): 157–​201. Gunther, R., Gibert, J.R.M., Montero, J.R., Botella, J., and Corral, J.B. (2004) Democracy in Modern Spain, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT. Heywood, P. (1995) The Government and Politics of Spain, Macmillan International Higher Education, London. Hood, C. (1991) ‘A public management for all seasons?’, Public Administration, 69(1): 3–​19. Hooghe, L., Marks, G., Schakel, A.H., Osterkatz, S.C., Niedzwiecki, S., and Shair-​Rosenfield, S. (2016) Measuring Regional Authority: A Postfunctionalist Theory of Governance, Vol. I, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 99

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Jiménez, F. , García-​Quesada, M. , and Villoria, M. (2014) ‘Integrity systems, values, and expectations: Explaining differences in the extent of corruption in three Spanish local governments’, International Journal of Public Administration, 37(2): 67–​82. Keating, M. and Wilson, A. (2009) ‘Renegotiating the state of autonomies: Statute reform and multi-​level politics in Spain’, West European Politics, 32(3): 536–​58. Lapuente, V. (ed) (2018) La calidad de las instituciones en España, Círculo de Empresarios Madrid, Madrid. Levarlet F., Celotti, P. and Alessandrini, M. (2019) A Territorial Approach for the Implementation of the SDGs in the EU: The Role of the European Committee of the Regions, Commission for Economic Policy, Brussels: European Committee of the Regions. Llera, R.F. (2018) ‘Calidad democrática, financiación autonómica y tributación: entre propuestas técnicas y acuerdos políticos’, in Libro Blanco sobre la calidad democrática en España, Marcial Pons, Madrid, pp 293–​310. Máiz, R., Caamaño, F., and Azpitarte, M. (2010) ‘The hidden counterpoint of Spanish federalism: Recentralization and resymmetrization in Spain (1978–​ 2008)’, Regional & Federal Studies, 20(1): 63–​82. Monés, M.A., Balletbó, A., and De la Fuente, A. (2016) ‘Elementos para un nuevo sistema de financiación de las comunidades autónomas’, Discusión y conclusiones. FEDEA Policy–​2016/​09. Moreno, L. and Colino, C. (2010) Diversity and Unity in Federal Countries, Vol. 7. McGill-​Queen’s University Press, Montreal. Mota, F. and Subirats, J. (2000) ‘El quinto elemento: el capital social de las comunidades autónomas. Su impacto sobre el funcionamiento del sistema político autonómico’, Revista Española de Ciencia Política, 1(2): 123–​58. Noferini, A. (2012) ‘The participation of subnational governments in the council of the EU: Some evidence from Spain’, Regional & Federal Studies, 22(4): 361–​85. OECD/​UCLG (2019) 2019 Report of the World Observatory on Subnational Government Finance and Investment: Country Profiles. Piattoni, S. (2010) The Theory of Multi-​level Governance: Conceptual, Empirical, and Normative Challenges, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Pollitt, C. (1993) Managerialism and the Public Services: Cuts or Cultural Change in the 1990s, New York: Blackwell Business. Ramió, C. (2001) ‘Conceptos y metodología para la evaluación de los procesos de descentralización político-​administrativa: la evaluación del rendimiento institucional de las comunidades autónomas de España’, Congreso Internacional del CLAD sobre la Reforma del Estado y de la Administración Pública, Buenos Aires, Argentina. Requejo, F. and Nagel, K.J. (eds) (2009) Descentralització, asimetries i processos de resimetrització a Europa. Bélgica, Regne Unit, Italia i Espanya, Barcelona: Institut d’Estudis Autonòmics.

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Sorribas-​Navarro, P., Castells, A., Solé-​Ollé, A., Bosch, N., Duran-​Cabre, J.M., Esteller-​Moré, A., and Vilalta Ferrer, M. (2017) ‘The long-​awaited reform of the regional financing system/​La esperada reforma de la financiación autonómica/​ L’esperada reforma del finançament autonòmic’, Institut d’Economia de Barcelona (IEB), Barcelona. Subirats, J. (2019) ‘Dilemas: gobierno multinivel, gobernanza en red y coproducción de políticas’, in David Gómez-​Álvarez, Robin Rajack, Eduardo López-​Moreno, and Gabriel Lanfranchi (eds) Gobernanza Metropolitana: El gobierno de las metrópolis para el desarrollo urbano sostenible, Washington, DC: BID, p 92. Subirats, J. and Gomá, R. (1998) ‘La dimensión de estilo de las políticas públicas en España: entramados institucionales y redes de actores’, in Políticas públicas en España: contenidos, redes de actores y niveles de gobierno, Ariel, Barcelona, pp 388–​406. Tatham, M. (2008) ‘Going solo: Direct regional representation in the European Union’, Regional and Federal Studies, 18(5): 493–​515. Torralvo (2020) ‘La evolución del modelo de financiación autonómica en España evaluación y perspectivas’, Revista Jurídica de Investigación e Innovación Educativa (REJIE Nueva Época), 22: 73–​94. Vampa, D. (2016) ‘Spain: Finding a balance between territorial equality and strong regional identities’, in The Regional Politics of Welfare in Italy, Spain and Great Britain: Comparative Territorial Politics,Palgrave Macmillan, Cham, pp 95–​113. Other references Centro de Cooperación al Desarrollo, Universidad Politécnica de Valencia • https://​reds-​ sdsn.es/​ w p-​ content/​ u ploads/​2 017/​1 1/​ES_​Encuentro-​de-​ Gobiernos-​Regionales_​links.pdf Consell Assessor per al Desenvolupament Sostenible, Regional Government of Catalunya • http://​cads.gencat.cat/​web/​.content/​00_​agenda_​2030/​acord_​nacional_​ agenda_​2030_​a_​catalunya.pdf • http://​ c ads.gencat.cat/ ​ web/ ​ . content/ ​ 0 0_ ​ a genda_ ​ 2 030/ ​ M emoria- ​ P la-​ nacional-​Agenda-​2030.pdf 2030 Agenda Euskadi Basque Country –​ Regional Government of the Basque Country • https://​www.euskadi.eus/​contenidos/​informacion/​agenda2030/​es_​def/​ adjuntos/​Agenda_​Euskadi_​Basque_​Country_​2030_​desarrollo_​sostenible.pdf • https://​www.euskadi.eus/​contenidos/​informacion/​agenda2030/​es_​def/​ adjuntos/​agenda_​multinivel.pdf • https://​www.euskadi.eus/​agenda-​2030/​seguimiento-​2019/​

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Policy analysis in local government: objects, perspectives, and actors Esther Pano, Lluís Medir, and Jaume Magre

Introduction Studies of policy analysis at the local level in Spain emerged in the mid-​1980s. The first studies were mainly intended to explain local political elites, the configuration of local institutional structures after the transition to democracy (Baras et al, 1988; Botella, 1992; Capo, 1992), and the political process in the local area (Subirats et al, 1985). Subirats et al (1985) developed one of the first studies of economic and social-​economic policy initiatives at the local level, even before the passing of the new law on local government. In this seminal study, Subirats et al (1985) aimed to ‘consider the current problems of the city and its future projection. The development of the city as a milestone imposes a new mentality, a new management and a project for the future’. This sentence illustrates the political moment. The local arena and local policies were still developing, and at the same time, the tools and approaches of policy analysis also began to yield studies and contributions. Local governments were particularly active in the development of policy analysis with significant differences across policy areas. In some cases, such as policies regarding citizen participation, policy design and implementation resulted from an open dialogue between local governments and academia. This collaboration allowed scholars to have direct access to data, politicians, and practitioners, and local governments and institutions also benefited from the direct link with academia. This interaction provided innovative practices, new tools, and narratives and also channelled the transference of knowledge to the local government network, enabling the elaboration of applied analysis but with an undeniably theoretical dimension. Policy analysis at the local level has three main features: (1) in most cases, policy analysis is the result of an intense and regular collaboration between local governments, university scholars, and research institutes, which in some cases are directly incorporated into administrative structures; (2) most policy analyses follow case studies and qualitative approaches in terms of the methodological design –​in most cases, these are single case studies based on in-​depth interviews and focus groups; and (3) most analyses are focussed on a specific policy area. The particular policy area is relevant because it has an impact on the methodological approach. Policy analysis of basic and compulsory services is 102

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mainly driven by economic and quantitative approaches, whereas with non-​ compulsory services the approaches are far more fragmented, qualitative, and less economically driven. This chapter aims to explore policy analysis in local government and examine the relationship between academic studies and institutionalised policy analysis processes in local governments. To achieve this objective, we first explore the structure and different layers of Spanish local government. Then we focus on specific areas; first, on basic mandatory tasks in the fourth section, and non-​ compulsory policies in the fifth section. Large cities and urban policies such as major policy analysis actors are the focus in the sixth section, and finally we also suggest a reflection on the relationships between the analysts and the objects of analysis.

Plurality and stratification: the Spanish local system Local government in Spain is highly fragmented across different types of entities. As Table 6.1 illustrates, there are seven different types of local entities: municipalities, provinces, islands, counties, metropolitan areas, IMA (Inter-​Municipal Association) and consortia, which account for almost 10,000 different local entities, with significant differences in terms of numbers, size, political features, and functions. The system works like a Russian doll or a jigsaw puzzle –​every piece fits into an asymmetric structure. As for the municipalities, the Spanish municipal map presents similar features to the French or Italian case (Magre and Pano, 2018). As part of the ‘Franco-​Napoleonic’ tradition (Page and Goldsmith, 1987; Hesse and Sharpe,1991), the municipal system is composed of a high number of municipalities, most of them with a low number of inhabitants (Table 6.2). Size, in terms of volume of the population, has always been a relevant subject. From the legal point of view, regulations establish different thresholds of population to assign functions. Moreover, from a theoretical perspective, size has always been considered a key factor in the analysis of local government (Mirrlees, 1972; Denters et al, 2014). The Local Government Act (Ley 7/​1985) assigns different functions to the municipalities depending on their population (Figure 6.1). In this framework, large cities are a significant political actor. This fact is particularly apparent in Madrid and Barcelona, the two largest cities, which have specific regulations. From an institutional perspective, local governments do not account for a clear and substantial set of competencies in the Constitution. Local political autonomy is granted; however, in practical terms it is narrow and conditioned. In fact, the legal configuration of local governments is quite particular, being an expression of a complex multilevel system, where the state dictates the basic regulations, and the regions can develop and implement this legal basis. The imbricated multilevel government of Spain produces a system of local governments with strong political autonomy but with limited economic capacity (Medir et al, 2018; Vilalta, 2018). 103

newgenrtpdf

Entity

Number

Political Institution

Political autonomy

Elections

Territorial scope

Functions

Municipalities

8,129

City council

Constitutionally granted autonomy

Direct elections

Present in all the territory

General purpose government; provide municipal activities, policies, and services directly to the citizens

Provinces

50

Provincial council

Constitutionally granted autonomy

Indirect elections

Present in all the territory

General purpose government; municipal support and some particular direct services

Islands

11

Island council

Legally granted autonomy

Direct elections

Islands

General purpose government; municipal support and direct services depending on the territory

Counties

82

County council

Legally granted autonomy

Indirect elections

Only in some Autonomous Communities

General purpose government; municipal support and some particular direct services

Metropolitan areas

3

Metropolitan entity

Legally granted autonomy

Indirect elections

Created by the Autonomous Communities in specific urban areas

Depending on the definition in their regulation; municipal support and some particular direct services

IMA

954

Inter-​Municipal Association

Legally granted autonomy

Appointment of the board by the members

Non-​compulsory associations only present in the area of the members

Special purpose government: functions defined in their regulations

Consortia

725

Consortia

Legally granted autonomy

Appointment of the board by the members

Non-​compulsory associations only present in the area of the members

Special purpose government: functions defined in their regulations

Source: Own elaboration based on data from Ministerio de Hacienda y Función Pública https://​www.pap.hacie​nda.gob.es/​inven​te2/​Pag​Menu​Prin​cipa​lV2.aspx?Ento​r no=​2 (accessed January 2020)

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Table 6.1: Local entities in Spain

Policy analysis in local government

Table 6.2: Municipalities and population of Spain (2019) Municipalities

Inhabitants

Population (number of inhabitants)

Number

Percentage

0–​500

3,997

35.7

501–​1,000

1,003

1,000–​2,500

1,150

2,501–​5,000 5,001–​10,000

Number

Percentage

735,212

1.1

15.8

721,203

1.4

16.2

1,852,618

3.3

679

10.1

2,390,595

4.4

549

9.4

3,865,826

8.3

10,001–​20,000

340

6.0

4,787,781

10.8

20,001–​50,000

265

4.3

7,765,329

16.8

50,001–​100,000

85

1.4

6,075,765

12.4

100,000+​

63

1.1

18,831,879

41.5

8,131

100.0

47,026,208

100.0

Total

Source: Own elaboration from data from Instituto Nacional de Estadística (www.ine.es, accessed January 2020)

Provinces are second-​tier local government, and the regulation defines their main tasks in the fields of coordination and assistance to municipalities. As Table 6.1 shows, provincial councils are established in the Spanish Constitution and enjoy a protected status both in terms of their boundaries and also with regard to their capacity to self-​govern. They form their political bodies by indirect elections, according to the municipal elections result. This network of territorial bodies is completed with two cooperative tools: inter-​municipal associations (mancomunidades) and consortia (consorcios). Both of these are voluntarily constituted, but they also require a complex process of formalisation. In this map of overlapping layers of institutions, the different actors have neither the same functions nor the same capacities. The effects in areas such as policy analysis will be relevant. Some of the entities must implement some policies by law, but they do not always have either the resources or the capacity for sophisticated processes beyond the standards strictly established by regulations. This generates clear differences between the large and the small municipalities and implies the need for support from second-​tier entities, particularly in fields that require more capacity for analysis and expertise.

Grounded on the ground: compulsory tasks of local policy-​making The Local Government Act (Law 7/​1985) includes the activities and services that local councils must provide. The list is organised according to the number of inhabitants; that is to say, all the municipalities must provide some services while others are compulsory only for local councils of towns and cities of a specific population threshold (Figure 6.1). 105

Policy Analysis in Spain

All municipalities

More than 5,000 inhabitants

More than 20,000 inhabitants

More than 50,000 inhabitants

Figure 6.1: Municipal compulsory activities Public lighting Cemeteries Waste collection Street cleaning Drinking water supply Sewerage Access to urban areas Paving of public roads Public park Public library Solid waste treatment Civil protection Evaluation of, and immediate attention to social exclusion Prevention and extinguishing of fires Sports facilities Collective urban transport Urban environment protection activities

Source: Own elaboration from Law 7/​1985

As Figure 6.1 shows, small local councils must provide a wide range of different services, some of them rather challenging and, in general, with a strong territorial dimension. The size and the fragmentation of Spanish municipalities introduce some elements that have often become the focus of debate, particularly regarding these compulsory and basic tasks. The literature has tended to be specialised and has often been focused on specific areas, following an economic theory approach and using quantitative methodological models. This literature contributes to the discussion of policy analysis in these fields and aims to provide elements to inform the decisions regarding the implementation of these activities. Waste management and water provision have been recurrently analysed using different methods and perspectives (Bel and Fageda, 2007; González-​Gómez et al, 2011; Plata-​Díaz et al, 2014; Zafra-​Gómez et al, 2016; Fernandez-​Aracil et al, 2018). These studies are generally focused on the form of delivery of one particular service, and water supply and waste management are the activities that have been studied most frequently. Cooperative relations in the provision and delivery of services in Spain have also been addressed in the literature (Bel et al, 2014). In addition, size is discussed in the studies as a relevant variable (Zafra-​ Gomez et al, 2013; Pérez-​López et al, 2016; Zafra-​Gomez and Chica-​Olmo, 2018). In this case, the analysis of different options generates knowledge regarding the choice of implementation strategies.

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Both in terms of public debate and in the literature, the last trend has emerged around the possibility of re-​municipalisation or contracting back. There are doubts about the conceptual construction of the term, since it may include different options of provision and degrees of public control (Clifton et al, 2021). The perspective of the analysis, in this case, may include factors beyond economic efficiency (Campos-​Alba et al, 2017; Albalate et al, 2019). The elements in the analysis may vary, but the ultimate object is to discuss the effects and results of these changes in systemic terms. From an applied perspective, some initiatives developed from a top-​down strategy have attempted to introduce a general analysis in these fields. Along these lines, the reform of the Local Government Act in 2013 included some particularly relevant elements which must be framed in the context of economic crisis and as a result of the indications of European and international organisations. One of the main points of the reform was related to a rearrangement of responsibilities that could be considered a de facto rescaling process. The reform aimed to introduce a method of analysis and evaluation of these activities in terms of efficiency and economic sustainability, and it established the concept of the effective cost of municipal services. This programme implied the creation of a comprehensive dataset of information from a large number of municipalities. However, this dataset is still not very frequently used for research purposes, and –​at least at the current moment –​this information has not been used and has had a scarce impact in policy analysis terms.

Optional does not mean dispensable: providing welfare and strengthening bonds as non-​compulsory activities Local governments in Spain are, de facto, fundamental producers of welfare. Even if they account for only 5.9 per cent of government expenditure in the percentage of national GDP, according to Eurostat 2019, the large array and variety of services and policies place them as relevant actors in the provision of welfare activities. Even if regions are the main providers of welfare state policies –​ health, education, and social policies –​municipal governments have extended their activities to areas beyond those originally assigned to them (Navarro and Medir, 2020). Beyond the compulsory activities, other sectoral laws –​that vary among the 17 regions of Spain –​attribute several functions to towns and city councils. In most cases, these functions are not tied to any population threshold, configuring them as obligatory for all municipalities. Political autonomy enables local authorities to supplement the actions of other levels of government and, thus, local elected elites have strong incentives to promote diverse welfare policies as a fundamental tool for re-​election, engaging in a sort of a limited Thiebaut competition. These factors might explain the evolution of a municipal dynamic of policy provision well beyond the regulatory framework expectations (Navarro and Velasco, 2016).

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As a result, local governments in Spain decide on and implement mechanisms among very diverse and crucial policy areas, mainly related to welfare and designed to strengthen local communities: social services and integration of minorities, employment, education policies, youth and aged people, culture and sports. The particular financial and legal framework produces a push–​pull phenomenon: these policies are largely dependent on political alignment with the regulations issued by the regions and most of the time local governments need external financial and technical support to develop these policies. The heterogeneity of local government in Spain derives from a fragmented and diverse provision of local policies and makes it very difficult to identify generalised and comparable non-​compulsory policies. Still, some areas are rather frequent. This is the case with regard to nursery schools (the local provision of childcare services for children under three years old), financial support for civil associations in town, at-​home help for elderly people, and participatory councils or consultative bodies for policy action in towns, for example. To implement these non-​compulsory policies, local governments usually receive support from second-​tier entities. As we explain later, a wide array of private actors related to academia and associations of local elected politicians or private foundations provide policy analysis. Related to political coordination, and leaving aside regional governments, usually provinces and other supra-​municipal tiers of government provide financial aid via grants and financial programmes for local governments linked to specific public policies. The same types of political entities usually provide policy coordination services and policy advice to local units as well as other tools of policy analysis. The National Institute of Public Administration (called INAP in Spain) and regional institutes of public administration develop a wide range of different tasks, some of them related to boosting knowledge in policy analysis. They promote training and retraining in local and administrative matters for local workers and policy analysis through encouraging, funding, and spreading technical and academic reports on local policies. There are also para-​public associations (such as consortia and public–​private entities, for instance) and private foundations that usually offer technical support and specific policy-​relevant knowledge to local governments in order to assist them with their decisions. The Federación Española de Municipios y Provincias is the national association of local governments and multiple analogue entities at the regional level act as lobbies since they participate in parliamentary hearings and provide their policy position when European, national, and regional regulations have an impact on local interests. These entities, generally funded with public resources, also provide technical assistance, training for local bureaucrats, and policy analysis to facilitate local governments’ tasks. There are also public foundations, such as Fundación Democracia y Gobierno Local or Fundació Carles Pi i Sunyer d’Estudis Autonòmics i Locals, which provide policy advice and analysis for local governments. They perform a dual role, acting as research centres and also ensuring the transference of this knowledge to local government. Finally, there are also quasi-​private foundations 108

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that provide such help for local policies, often linked to academia (two examples are the Instituto de Derecho Local and the Institut de Dret Públic), performing the role of think tanks, with great capacity for highlighting new issues, boosting policy dissemination, and contributing to define the local agenda. Hence, policy analysis in these areas of activity is mostly developed outside the structure of the municipalities and is articulated as a mechanism of multilevel support. Specialised entities also provide useful knowledge, but local councils do not have any obligation to adopt their advice or recommendations. Political autonomy entitles municipalities to develop these policies and also protects them from the intervention of other levels of government. In a framework of scarce resources, efforts are focused on implementing policies more than on analysing them, and practices of policy analysis in these fields are scattered, exceptional, and generally not institutionalised.

The urban factor: large cities and the metropolitan vision The local map of Spain is very diverse with many small towns and a few large cities; this generates consequences in a wide range of aspects related to institutional capacities, which means that the fields of policy-​making and policy analysis are significantly affected. While small towns are seldom capable of conducting their own analyses and have not been the focus of research very frequently, large cities have been major actors in the public policy process in Spain. This activity can be identified both in the literature and in the structure of municipal organisations. A long tradition of debate and discussion on policy analysis was born through the development of urban policies. As a city and as a metropolitan vision, the city of Barcelona generated a tradition of narrative and analysis of urban public policies that coined the concept of the ‘Barcelona Model’. This process indicates the existence of efforts in Barcelona City Council and interest among scholars and analysts to explore the process of policy design and implementation. The development of urban policies in Barcelona was the focus of attention from an early stage. There is ample evidence of such efforts from the first years of the new democratic city councils (Bohigas, 1977, 1982; Borja, 1995, 2010; Ferrer and Nel·lo, 1998), which offered a vision of the transformation of the city that tended to become more critical (Monclús, 2003; Capel, 2005; Muñoz, 2008). Most of these studies were related to urban planning and the territorial effects of the policies. Urban planning was a relevant area in other cities and similar approaches can also be identified for Madrid (Alguacil and Denche, 2003; Díaz Orueta, 2007; Fernández, 2007), Bilbao (Álvarez Mora, 1999; Esteban, 2000; Areilza, 2002), Sevilla (León Vela, 1986; Fernández Salinas, 1993; Moral Ituarte, 1993), Valencia (Gaja, 1996; Gaja and Boira, 1994), and also other areas such as Galician cities (Aldrey and Vicente, 2009) or Murcia (Aliaga, 2008). This interest in the analysis of urban transformation processes follows a similar sequence: a first stage describing the transformation which tends to generate a model or depict the impact of an important event or fact that acts as a turning point –​the 109

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Olympic Games, global expositions, or the opening of a new museum could be good examples of these crucial catalysts –​and then a more critical vision of the evolution. Other areas of analysis have also focussed attention on city councils from a more general perspective based on the capacity to design policies (Brugué and Gomà, 1998a, 1998b; Subirats, 2002; Centelles, 2006; Iglesias et al, 2011). Furthermore, strategic planning has been a relevant subject, and both scholars and city councils have produced abundant literature on this matter (Brugué and Jarque, 2002; Fernández, 2007). Policies related to citizen participation have frequently been analysed using the experience of local government (Subirats et al, 2001; Blanco and Gomà, 2002; Brugué, 2002; Del Pino and Colino, 2003; Arenilla Sáez et al, 2007). A parallel approach regarding metropolitan areas has complemented this process implying a broader concept of urban areas not strictly limited by municipal boundaries. In fact, the objects of analysis are not metropolitan policies but the need for a metropolitan policy definition or the identification of trans-​municipal problems that would require a metropolitan approach. Academic attention has included aspects related to proposals for delimitation (Feria Toribio, 2011) and also general overviews of this reality in Spain (Alba and Navarro, 2005; Tomàs, 2017). The urban areas of Madrid (Bahamonde and Otero, 1989; Gutiérrez Puebla and García Palomares, 2010) and Barcelona (Négrier and Tomàs, 2003; Tomàs, 2010) have been analysed profusely, including comparative perspectives (Navarro and Tomàs, 2007), but studies on metropolitan visions have covered other areas such as Sevilla (Almoguera Sallent, 1989, 2008) or Galicia (Márquez, 2007; Rama and Luaces, 2007), to mention just two examples. This long tradition of analysing the policies implemented by large cities has generated contact spaces, and institutions and scholars have not only collaborated but even produced synergies. The largest municipalities regularly publish many policy-​related materials, some of them also authored by scholars (see Subirats and Rius, 2005; Ramió and Salvador, 2019 as some examples). It is difficult to establish how the interactions among practitioners, academia, and institutions have worked and to what degree we would be able to identify effective institutionalisation triggered by these studies. We developed a dataset with information about the policy analysis activities of large municipalities. A ‘large city’ is –​according to the Local Government Act (Law 7/​1985) –​a city with more than 250,000 inhabitants (art. 121).1 According to this definition, there are 62 large cities, including Madrid and Barcelona, which are subject to the Local Government Act and also to specific regulation (Law 1/​2006 for Barcelona and Law 22/​2006 for Madrid). To identify which of these cities conduct policy analysis, we contacted the municipalities in order to identify specific units in the municipal organisations that included explicit references to policy analysis. We took into account units dealing with statistics and data management, transparency and open-​data, accountability and open-​ government units. 110

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Table 6.3: Policy analysis and allied services in large Spanish cities Specific units

Functions

Number

%

Number

%

Number

Not Identified

%

Total

Policy analysis, planning, or evaluation

50

78.1

6

9.4

8

12.5

100.0

Statistics and data management

62

96.9

2

3.1

0

0.0

100.0

Transparency and open data

50

78.1

6

9.4

8

12.5

100.0

Source: Own elaboration

Table 6.3 summarises the results. The category of ‘specific units’ includes the cities that have created structures; ‘functions’ implies that the functions have been defined and assigned but there is not a particular administrative unit; and ‘not identified’ implies that neither the functions nor a unit could be detected. All the municipalities develop statistics and data management tasks. These activities are mainly related to the management of the municipal census, but clearly not to this function alone. At least 17 (close to 27 per cent) affirmed that they offer support for planning, analysis, or evaluation. Only eight municipalities (12.5 per cent) could not identify structures or functions in their organisation related to policy analysis, planning, or evaluation. The same results were collected regarding transparency and open data, although the municipalities were different. These data illustrate a situation which, although not ideal, supposes the existence of interest and instruments. We believed that analysing the linkage among the three areas could also be an interesting aspect. We examined whether there was a coincidence in their related units –​that is to say, whether the units or functions were located as the responsibility of the same political or administrative area. Figure 6.2 illustrates the results for this question. Almost half of the units were not located under coinciding upper structures. The other half (58 per cent) showed some kind of organisational alignment and, in fact, in this case, the most common situation was that the three units or areas were under the same political or administrative area. We also found that the statistics and data management units or services regularly provide information for design or planning purposes in 17 of the analysed cases; this number, in fact, is a low figure. We also gathered information about budget, staff, and activity, but we did not acquire sufficient data to analyse these questions. In some cases, the justification for the lack of information was related to the effects of processes of change after the local elections (which took place some months before). These difficulties, however, also provide us with useful information. First, these units may experience significant transformations due to political reasons. Second, they do not always have a steady administrative structure with a clear budget and personnel assignment. The overall vision offers a twofold picture. On the one hand, units or functions related to design, analysis, or evaluation of policies are frequent and widespread among the largest cities in Spain. At the same time, they also show some features indicating that their position is not fully institutionalised. 111

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Figure 6.2: Organic position of the areas

14% 16%

58 %

42%

22% 6%

Without political link

Statistics + transparency

Statistics + analysis

All of them

Transparency + analysis

Source: Own elaboration

Figure 6.3: Availability on the municipal websites of mechanisms for planning, analysis, and evaluation 74.2

25.8

17.7

82.3

Yes

No

60%

80.6 50%

19.4

Space on website for evaluation of local services

40%

Performance and quality measures of local services

30%

79.0

20%

77.4

21.0

0%

22.6

Evaluation of plans and programmes

10%

Results of evaluations of local services

100%

35.5

70%

64.5

90%

Local services charters

80%

Planning and programming tools

Source: Own elaboration

In recent years, transparency regulations have also included obligations related to different aspects of the process of policy planning. These do not directly imply the performance of policy analysis practices but the information and the procedures for providing it might boost policy analysis both from inside the institutions and from scholars and external analysts. Figure 6.3 displays information on the availability on municipal websites of some mechanisms for planning, analysis, and evaluation of policies. Most of the municipalities analysed provide planning, programming tools, and services charters on their websites, while the number of municipalities offering specific tools for evaluating or publishing the results of performance indicators is clearly lower. These results might reinforce the idea of widespread interest and practices but without a complete institutionalisation of this field. 112

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Building a network: the provinces and the supra-​municipal factor Second-​tier institutions exist in almost every European country (Heinelt and Bertrana, 2012), and they often develop functions of assistance and support in a logic of multilevel governance. In the Spanish case, this position could be of particular importance. Taking into account the specific shape of the Spanish municipal map, there would be several opportunities for active support in different policy stages. In the framework of a quasi-​federal structure, some Autonomous Communities, such as Catalonia and Aragon, have defined their strategy and created a particular system of second-​tier institutions that constitute a unique multi-​layer institutional system (Pano et al, 2018). However, provinces are second-​tier institutions that exist throughout the Spanish territory, with some peculiarities in some specific areas such as the islands (both Canary and Balearic), the autonomous cities of Ceuta and Melilla and some autonomous communities constituted by an only province where the provincial council was substituted by the autonomous government, such as Madrid. The fitting of the provincial governments into the system of autonomous governments has not been without friction, due in part to the difficulties in the process of decentralisation and the concurrence of multiple layers in the institutional network that can generate competition and tension. In practice, some of the theoretical tasks attributed to the provinces have hardly been performed, and the function that has characterised the regular activity of Diputaciones is related to the design of programmes and plans to provide and guarantee municipal services and also to offer support and assistance to the city councils (Bertrana et al, 2012). The process of programming and planning implies an adequate position to perform analysis. However, there are few studies that offer information about their contribution to this matter. Navarro and Rodríguez (2009) conducted one of the few empirical analyses that explored the performance of Diputaciones as institutional mechanisms to offer tools related to these tasks, and they concluded that the Diputaciones took part in the process of design and implementation of policies and programmes and the analysis of efficacy and efficiency. According to the authors, this implies that, at least from an institutional point of view, the Diputaciones can develop a relevant and strategic role in terms of coordination of policies (Navarro and Rodríguez, 2009: 164). To explore these options, we selected one single case, the Diputació de Barcelona, to examine whether it is conducting this role. This approach does not allow us to reach general conclusions, but it can be useful to illustrate the potential position of the institution. It is essential to consider that the Diputació de Barcelona is a unique case. The specific political distribution in the different institutions in Catalonia and the difficulties in finding an appropriate role in the process of decentralisation for the autonomous government, the Generalitat, generated a particular tension in terms of defining the organisation and also offering useful tools to the institutional network. In other words, the Diputació de 113

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Barcelona has experienced specific conditions that push the institution to be especially active. The Diputació (Diputació de Barcelona, 2019a, 2019b) conducts systematic activity of analysis, planning, coordination, and evaluation of policies. These activities can be channelled in two different ways. One mechanism is the internal Service of Planning and Evaluation, which has objectives that include promoting the planning of corporate strategies and policies, contributing to the continuous improvement of quality and boosting the evaluation of policies. This unit performs its activity as an internal service, although it might involve other organisations in this process. In 2018, 11 professionals worked in this area, and most of them were characterised by a high educational profile. Although the activity of the unit is permanent, not all the policies are continuously analysed, and the unit acts under internal requirements. It focuses its attention on the actions of the Diputació, but the recipients of these policies are usually the municipalities that receive the effect of assistance or support. Another channel to perform activities of analysis and support in the process of policy design would be related to the tasks of assistance allocated in the province. In this case, the Diputació de Barcelona offers a catalogue of services of support addressed to the municipalities. Here the Diputació works with the municipal practitioners to develop a tailored solution to the needs of the municipality that requires the action. The Diputació not only provides specific support for designing, planning, or evaluating policies, but this situation also implies the existence of a general programme detecting needs and potential deficiencies. In 2018, 22 professionals worked in this area. The analysis of the activity of the Diputació de Barcelona seems to confirm the approach proposed by Navarro and Rodríguez (2009) in their conclusions about the potential capacity to contribute to the coordination of policies, particularly in smaller municipalities. The variety of conditions of the other provinces forces us to be prudent in the interpretation of this particular circumstance. This might not be the most frequent situation, but it is potentially a role that could be played. Thus, the provincial council is in an optimal institutional position to boost policy analysis, both internal for its own policies, and external in terms of support to policy analysis in medium-​size towns that do not hold sufficient resources and capacities.

Analysts and objects of analysis The institutionalisation of the analysis and evaluation of public policies in local public administrations has only recently begun to be implemented. As seen in previous parts of this chapter, however, this implementation shows strong interconnections among different spheres and actors involved in policy analysis processes. Namely, literature, applied studies, and institutional practices suggest the existence of an academic community conducting and publishing local policy analysis and structures designed to carry out functions within this field. It is 114

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also not uncommon to identify specific organisations devoted to research on local policies. This research can have a general approach related to the level of government (local government), or it can be specialised in one particular policy area. A close examination of the studies, the actors, and the institutions reveals the existence of a network comprising scholars, practitioners, and even politicians and permanent and institutionalised organisations, in some cases with a formal dependence on a university or an educational structure, in other cases formally independent but funded by the public sector, and in some very particular cases dependent on private funds. These intense interconnections on a permanent and steady basis could be analysed in terms of an epistemic community (Haas, 1992; Radaelli, 1995; Thomas, 1997; Evans and Davies, 2002). Local governments and scholars have generated particular spaces to facilitate flows of knowledge in both directions in a cooperative logic, implying that all the actors could enjoy some benefits from this relationship. The case of Barcelona local institutions is particularly illustrative and quite different from Madrid, which constitutes the largest city and capital of Spain. Madrid does not have other local governments and presents a different pattern of relations due to the stronger links with the autonomous community and the central state (Alguacil et al, 2012). In fact, de la Fuente and Velasco (2012) consider that the intense activity and presence of central and autonomous institutions reduces the role of local institutions in the definition and production of urban policies. In the case of Barcelona, we can identify at least three different local governments very active in terms of promoting the generation of knowledge: Barcelona City Council, the Metropolitan Area, and the Provincial Council (Diputació de Barcelona). At the same time, we can also identify different scholars and organisations undergoing research in this field: Institut de Govern i Polítiques Públiques (IGOP), Institut d’Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona (IERMB), Fundació Carles Pi i Sunyer, and the ESADE Centre for Public Governance (ESADEgov), among others. The interconnections between these entities and the local governments are intense. Although there is formal independence, we can even identify practitioners and political elites circulating from one space to the others. At the same time, these entities have generated knowledge, analysing policies of different structures of the public sector that were sometimes published by institutional publishers. Regarding these entities, they constitute completely different institutional profiles. IGOP is a research centre of the Autonomous University of Barcelona. It derives from the research group Political Analysis Team, which was recognised as a research group in 1990. According to its website, the main aims of IGOP are promoting research, training and dissemination of knowledge in the areas of government and public policies. The entity highlights its capacity to combine academic excellence with social impact. Its primary research areas are governance and democratic innovation, analysis and public policy management and new technologies, social networks and common goods. According to an institutional 115

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memorandum (IGOP, 2019), approximately 50 per cent of the organisation’s funding came from applied research. This research has mainly been funded by local governments or dependent structures. IERMB is a consortium attached to the Àrea Metropolitana de Barcelona, which aims to promote research, training and dissemination activities in urban, social, environmental, economic and territorial fields throughout the area and the metropolitan region of Barcelona. The IERMB consortium was born in 1984 in the form of an agreement between the Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona (Corporació Metropolitana de Barcelona), the Autonomous University of Barcelona (Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona), and the Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Navigation of Barcelona (Cambra de Comerç, Indústria i Navegació de Barcelona). According to the 2019 budget (IERMB, 2020), its funds came almost entirely from public entities, and most of them came from local governments or dependent structures. The Carles Pi i Sunyer Foundation is a space for the study, research and promotion of knowledge in the field of local government and the Autonomous Communities constituted in 1986. Intending to make significant academic contributions, the foundation combines internal research work with external research assignments for people from various social science disciplines. According to its 2019 budget (Fundació Carles Pi i Sunyer, 2020), the funds come almost entirely from public entities, and principally from local governments. ESADEgov is the most unusual of these entities because it is a private centre depending on a private university. Its aims are to contribute to improving governance and developing responsible leadership in the public sector. It promotes research using a structure of public–​private collaboration around subjects related to public leadership and professional public executives and public management. The importance of knowledge in the policy process has often been discussed (Gaffney, 1991; Radaelli, 1995). In this case, however, although it is difficult to ascertain the exact degree of impact of the work and activity of these interactions in the implementation of policies and the institutionalisation of policy analysis-​ related activities, they have generated a propitious environment. It is also interesting that there is no empirical work analysing these organisations and the interactions and impacts in terms of institutional change and policy design. A preliminary observation indicates several connections in all directions. In some cases, the public administrations externalise functions related to policy analysis for these entities. At the same time, these organisations extract funding, information, and capacity of transference from this relationship. These institutions become a node that enables contact and interchange from the research and academic fields to institutions, practitioners, and policy arenas.

Conclusion Policy analysis in local government in Spain advanced following the evolution of local government in Spain. Empirical studies began even before the legal 116

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framework was effectively developed. In fact, some of the original works in policy analysis were based on local policies. These activities were promoted by an emerging academic community and adopted by the institutional network that was experiencing a transformation from the old structures of the Franco regime to a newly born democratic framework. This evolution must be interpreted in the frame of a particular municipal map, comprising a high number of small towns and a few very populated urban areas, and considering a regulation that implies limitations on the promotion of policies due to a rigid and theoretically symmetric structure. Despite these constraints, local governments have managed to accomplish a wide range of functions and generate strong links with the population. However, these elements are relevant in any examination of their capacity to perform analysis. Different kinds of actors –​small municipalities and large urban areas –​have played entirely different roles in this process. The smaller entities, mostly devoted to basic services, do not have the tools and resources to carry out activities related to policy analysis. Nevertheless, these entities have focused the attention of the academic community and also of other levels of government. Notwithstanding, it is difficult to say to what extent this knowledge is effectively used in the process of policy-​making. The other side of this story would be illustrated by the larger urban areas and some second-​tier institutions that have become promoters and sponsors and have shown permeability to policy analysis practices. The interaction with the academic community and the creation of steady structures to generate flows of knowledge would also contribute to formulating an encouraging environment to improve both applied practices and theory. The deficiencies in this case would be related to the weakness of the internal structures, the dependence on the political spheres and the lack of capacity to act systematically, even so, large cities proved capable of creating their own narratives and policy models. The actors in the process of local policy analysis use a variety of approaches and techniques. These include economic methodologies, as well as architectural or urban planning visions and also strategies and perspectives from political science and sociology. A distinction can be drawn between compulsory basic services, which often focus attention from an economic perspective using strictly quantitative methodological designs, and non-​compulsory policies, such as participation or social services, which present different approaches and methodologies, including quantitative methods, but also qualitative designs that may focus on entirely different aspects. Hence, local governments have been objects, performers, and adopters of policy analysis but without an institutionalised pattern. Probably the next steps will be related to the capacity to generate systematic mechanisms of analysis and to improve the generation and use of datasets with public data. These transformations are crucial to make better decisions and to boost accountability and, in fact, regulations currently in force, such as laws for transparency and good government, push in this direction. The particular shape of the local-​government 117

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Spanish map may entail a challenge to achieve these objectives; still, after more than 40 years since the first democratic local elections, this should not be an obstacle or, at least, it can no longer be an excuse. Note 1

The Local Government Act (art. 121) considers large cities to be municipalities of more than 250,000 inhabitants; provincial capitals with more than 175,000 inhabitants; and municipalities that are the capital of the province, regional capital, or headquarters of the autonomous institutions. Municipalities above 75,000 inhabitants, which present special economic, social, historical, or cultural circumstances can be considered large cities by agreement of the regional assemblies. This implies that the list is not automatically generated, and there is no public register of cities under this special framework. We carried out a first stage of research that ended in December 2019 in order to identify these cities. We conducted the fieldwork from September 2019 to March 2020 using website information and direct telephone contact with the director or other staff of the units.

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Bahamonde, A. and Otero, L.E. (1989) ‘Madrid, de territorio fronterizo a región metropolitana’, in J.P. Fusi (ed) España. Autonomías, Madrid: Espasa Calpe, pp 517–​615. Baras, M., Colomé, G., Botella, J., and Capo, J. (1988) ‘La formación de una élite política local’, Revista de estudios políticos, 59: 199–​224. Bel, G. and Fageda, X. (2007) ‘Why do local governments privatise public services? A survey of empirical studies’, Local Government Studies, 33(4): 517–​534. Bel, G., Fageda, X., and Mur, M. (2014) ‘Does cooperation reduce service delivery costs? Evidence from residential solid waste services’, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 24(1): 85–​107. Bertrana, X., Espinosa, M., and Magre, J. (2012) ‘Spain’, in H. Heinelt and X. Bertrana (eds) The Second Tier of Local Government in Europe, London: Routledge, pp 242–​60. Blanco, I. and Gomà, R. (eds) (2002) Gobiernos locales y redes participativas, Barcelona: Ariel. Bohigas, O. (1977) Barcelona entre el Pla Cerdà i el barraquisme, Barcelona: Edicions 62. Bohigas, O. (1982) La reconstrucció de Barcelona, Barcelona: Edicions 62. Borja, J. (1995) Barcelona: Un modelo de transformación urbana, Quito: PGU. Borja, J. (2010) Llums i ombres de l’urbanisme de Barcelona, Barcelona: Empúries. Botella, J. (1992) ‘La galaxia local en el sistema político español’, Revista de Estudios Políticos, 76: 145–​60. Brugué, Q. (2002) ‘Nuevos ayuntamientos, concejales diferentes: del gobierno de las instituciones al gobierno de las redes’, Revista Española de Ciencia Política, 7(October): 9–​37. Brugué, Q. and Gomà, R. (1998a) ‘Las políticas públicas locales: agendas complejas, roles estratégicos y estilo relacional’, in Q. Brugué and R. Gomà (eds) Gobiernos locales y políticas públicas. Bienestar social, promoción económica y territorio, Barcelona: Ariel, pp 25–​38. Brugué, Q. and Gomà, R. (eds) (1998b) Gobiernos locales y políticas públicas: bienestar social, promoción económica y territorio, Barcelona: Ariel. Brugué, Q. and Jarque, M. (2002) ‘Planes estratégicos locales y redes participativas: entre el discurso y la práctica’, in I. Blanco and R. Gomà (eds) Gobiernos locales y redes participativas, Barcelona: Ariel, pp 46–​63. Campos-​Alba, C.M., Higuera-​Molina, E.J.D.L., Pérez-​López, G., and Zafra-​ Gómez, J.L. (2017) ‘Explanatory factors in the renewal of contracts for the privatisation of public services’, Journal of Strategic Contracting and Negotiation, 3(1): 3–​19. Capel, H. (2005) El modelo Barcelona, un examen crítico, Barcelona: Ediciones el Serbal. Capo, J. (1992) ‘La élite política local en España’, Revista de estudios políticos, 76: 127–​44. Centelles, J. (2006) El buen gobierno de la ciudad. Estrategias urbanas y política relacional, Madrid: INAP.

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Clifton, J., Warner M.E., Gradus, R., and Bel, G. (2021) Re-​municipalization of public services: trend or hype?, Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 24(3): 293–​304. De la Fuente, R. and Velasco, M. (2012) ‘La política urbana en Madrid: un relato provisional’, Geopolítica, 3(1): 35–​9. Del Pino, E. and Colino, C. (2003) Las nuevas formas de participación en los gobiernos locales, Madrid: Fundación Alternativas. Denters, B., Goldsmith, M., Ladner, A., Mouritzen, P.E., and Rose, L.E. (2014) Size and Local Democracy, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Díaz Orueta, F. (2007) ‘Los grandes proyectos de desarrollo urbano y la reconfiguración socio-​espacial de las ciudades: el barrio de Lavapies (Madrid)’, Cuaderno Urbano, 6: 169–​94. Diputació de Barcelona (2019a) Memòria corporativa 2018, Barcelona: Diputació de Barcelona. Available from: https://​seu​elect​ roni​ ca.diba.cat/s​ erve​ is-d​ e-l​ a-s​ eu/​ memo​r ia-​corp​orat​iva/​fitx​ers/​memo​r ia2​018.pdf [Accessed 15 June 2020]. Diputació de Barcelona (2019b) Informe de Balanç del Mandat de Govern 2016–​ 2019, Barcelona: Diputació de Barcelona. Available from: https://​transp​aren​ cia.diba.cat/​sites/​transp​aren​cia.diba.cat/​files/​pub​lic/​node/​field_​fitx​ers/​inf​orme​ _​de_​bala​nc_​2​016-​201​9_​pa​m_​2.pdf [Accessed 15 June 2020]. Esteban, M. (2000) Bilbao, luces y sombras del titanio: el proceso de regeneración del Bilbao metropolitano, Bilbao: UPV. Evans, M. and Davies, J. (2002) ‘Understanding policy transfer: A multi-​level, multi-​disciplinary perspective’, Public Administration, 77(2): 361–​85. Feria Toribio, J. (2011) ‘La ordenación del territorio en las áreas metropolitanas españolas’, in J.M. Jurado (ed) Ordenación del Territorio y Urbanismo: Conflictos y oportunidades, Sevilla: Universidad Internacional de Andalucía, pp 127–​58. Fernández, J.M. (2007) ‘25 años de planificación estratégica de ciudades’, Ciudad y Territorio, Estudios Territoriales, 154: 621–​37. Fernandez-​Aracil, P., Ortuno-​Padilla, A., and Melgarejo-​Moreno, J. (2018) ‘Factors related to municipal costs of waste collection service in Spain’, Journal of Cleaner Production, 175: 553–​60. Fernández Salinas, V. (1993) ‘Las grandes transformaciones urbanas de Sevilla durante los años previos a la exposición universal’, Estudios Geográficos, 54(212): 387–​408. Ferrer, A. and Nel·lo, O. (1998) ‘Las políticas urbanísticas en la Barcelona metropolitana: 1976–​1997’, in Q. Brugué and R. Gomà (eds) Gobiernos locales y políticas públicas. Bienestar social, promoción económica y territorio, Barcelona: Ariel, pp 189–​210. Fundació Carles Pi i Sunyer (2020) Activitats i pressupost 2019. Available from: https://​pisun​yer.org/​la-​funda​cio/​som-​trans​pare​nts/​lnies-​dactu​aci-​i-​ pre​ssup​ost [Accessed 15 June 2020]. Gaffney, J. (1991) ‘The political think-tanks in the UK and the ministerial cabinets in France’, West European Politics, 14(1): 1–​17. Gaja, F. (1996) ‘La transformación de Valencia (I): grandes proyectos urbanísticos’, Urbanismo, 28: 78–​85. 120

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Gaja, F. and Boira, J. (1994) ‘Planeamiento y realidad urbana en la Ciudad de Valencia (1939–​1989)’, Cuadernos de Geografía, 59: 63–​89. González-​Gómez, F., Picazo-​Tadeo, A.J., and Guardiola, J. (2011) ‘Why do local governments privatize the provision of water services? Empirical evidence from Spain’, Public Administration, 89(2): 471–​92. Gutiérrez Puebla, J. and García Palomares, J.C. (2010) ‘Procesos de descentalización de la actividad en el Área Metropolitana de Madrid’, in La ciudad metropolitana en España: procesos urbanos en los inicios del siglo XXI, Madrid: Thomson Reuters-​ Civitas, pp 377–​407. Haas, P.H. (1992) ‘Epistemic communities and international policy coordination’, International Organization, 46(1): 1–​35. Heinelt, H. and Bertrana, X. (eds) (2012) The Second Tier of Local Government in Europe: Provinces, Counties, Departements and Landkreise in Comparison, London: Routledge. Hesse, J.J. and Sharpe, L.J. (1991) ‘Local government in international perspective: Some comparative observations’, in J. Hesse (ed) Local Government and International Affairs in International Perspective, Baden-​Baden: Nomos. IERMB (2020) Liquidació del pressupost 2019. Available from: https://​iermb. uab.cat/c​ a/p​ or​tal-​de-​transp​aren​cia-​2/​det​all-​liq​uida​cio-​de-​pre​ssup​ost/​ [Accessed 15 June 2020]. Iglesias, M., Martí-​Costa, M., Subirats, J., and Tomàs, M. (eds) (2011) ‘Políticas urbanas en España’, Grandes ciudades, actores y gobiernos locales, Barcelona: Icaria. IGOP (2019) MEMÒRIA 2018 Generem i compartim coneixement per al progrés de la societat, Barcelona: IGOP. Available from: https://​igop.uab.cat/​wp-​cont​ent/​ uplo​ads/​2019/0​ 7/M ​ EMOR ​ IA-I​ GOP-U ​ AB-2​ 018.pdf [Accessed 15 June 2020]. León Vela, J. (1986) Sevilla ante la Exposición Universal de 1992. Problemas urbanísticos de su implantación, doctoral thesis, Universidad de Sevilla. Available from: http://​ hdl.han​dle.net/​11441/​15564 [Accessed 20 March 2020]. Magre, J. and Pano, E. (2018) ‘The architecture of the local political community: France, Italy, Portugal and Spain’, in Kerley, R., Liddle, J. and Dunning, P.T. (eds) The Routledge Handbook of International Local Government, London: Routledge, pp 418–​32. Márquez, G. (2007) ‘Os instrumentos de xestión pública na àrea metropolitana de Vigo’, in A. Rojo Salgado and E.J. Varela Álvarez (eds) A gobernanza metropolitana, A Coruña: Xunta de Galicia, pp 165–​278. Medir, L., Magre, J.M., and Tomàs, M. (2018) ‘Mayors’ perceptions on local government reforms and decentralization in Spain’, Revista Española de Ciencia Política, 46: 129–​55. Mirrlees, J. (1972) ‘The optimum town’, The Swedish Journal of Economics, 74(1): 114–​35. Monclús, F.J. (2003) ‘El “modelo Barcelona” ¿una fórmula original? De la “reconstrucción” en los proyectos urbanos estratégicos (1979–​2004)’, Perspectivas Urbanas, 3: 1–​13.

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SEVEN

Domestic policy analysis by international actors Oriol Costa and Margarita León

Introduction The concept of intergovernmental organisation (IO) refers to an entity created by treaty, involving two or more nations to work on issues of common interest (Harvard Law School, 2021). Founded in 1945 to guarantee peace and security at an international level, the United Nations is the largest IO in the world. Other large IOs include the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European Union (EU). In this chapter, we mostly look at IOs’ capacity to influence policy-​making at national level through a variety of mechanisms. IOs have been seen as promoters of norms, standards, and policies. Beyond the view that IOs are only about the (effective or ineffective) coordination of policies between states, or instruments in the hands of influential powers pursuing their national interests, constructivists and other authors from other sociological strands have looked at them as embodiments of particular policy preferences and as teachers –​that is, as actors who foster the adoption of those same preferences by other actors. Decision-​makers ‘do not think about what states are supposed to be doing in a vacuum; they think about it in a world of other people thinking about what their states are supposed to be doing’. To be sure, there is a local component in such understandings of which policies are right, wrong, or misleading, but many of them ‘are shared cross-​nationally’ (Finnemore, 1996: 35). A good deal of the process by which such transnational views are constructed takes place within the framework of IOs. They are often seen as disinterested, expert, rational bureaucracies that stand above the fray of national interests and for that reason are ‘granted substantial authority and prominence’ (Meyer, 2009: 127). In addition, they are also ‘focal points for international community … places where people from many states gather to rethink … the appropriate responsibilities of political organizations, usually states’ (Finnemore, 1996: 35). This role of IOs as teachers is no stranger in the literature and has helped account for the fact that ‘states with “enormous differences” in terms of resources, traditions and needs have developed strikingly similar strategies and structures to deal with similar problems’ (Meyer et al, 1997: 145). This chapter sees policy analysis as one of the ways in which IOs achieve this.

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Spain and the script Not all states will be equally prone to embrace norms and policies promoted by international actors. As argued by Jupille and Jolliff, ‘the more problematic an actor’s identity, the more readily it should embrace the … script of modernity’ as defined by IOs (Jupille and Jolliff, 2011: 16; see also Meyer, 2009: 347). More to the point, states on the lookout for external sources of legitimation for their policy choices will be particularly ready to accept policy recommendation from IOs and other international actors. By endorsing the standards and policies sponsored by them, they will try to adjust to the ‘meanings, norms of good behavior … and categories of legitimate social action in the world’ (Barnett and Finnemore, 2004: 7). Spain’s self-​understanding, as reconstructed in the last decades, has been described in terms that are broadly compatible with such a predicament. ‘Spain’s “other” is the country’s own past of authoritarian dictatorship’, and this being so, ‘Spanish atraso (backwardness) was to be overcome by entering the [European] integration process and fully embracing political modernization’ (Risse, 2010: 69; see also Díez Medrano, 2003). Inasmuch as IOs (and the EU) can be seen as aligned with political modernisation and as ‘prime carriers of world society’ or even ‘the embodiment of its cultural core’ (Drori and Krücken, 2009: 15; Meyer, 2009: 127), we expect its policy analyses to have a fair amount of influence in Spanish decision-​making circles. Furthermore, the degree to which IOs have the capacity to influence a particular policy domain will depend on the features of the policy field as such, on the existence of formal channels of communication with governmental agencies, on the array of domestic actors involved in the policy-​ making process, and on the specific circumstances surrounding the interactions. As mentioned in the introduction to this volume, Spain is a complex case with regards the territorial distribution of power between national, subnational, and supranational governments. After the incorporation of Spain into the EU, European institutions became an important source of legitimation in the framing of policy analysis. The EU provided at the same time expertise knowledge and a political and technical framework for the design of new policies or reform of existing ones. To the extent that the level of trust on EU institutions has always been high among Spaniards, policy-​makers had important incentives to rely on the advice of policy experts at EU level as a policy learning strategy on the one hand and as a blame avoidance strategy in the case of unpopular reforms on the other hand. As expressed by Moreno and Serrano (2011: 39), the Spanish welfare state changed greatly since the early 1980s largely as a result of the influence of economic and symbolic processes of EU integration. First, Europe became an essential benchmark for good practices. Second, social and economic actors used the appeal to Europeanisation as a proxy for progress and modernity. For this chapter we propose to focus specifically although not exclusively on the relationship between international actors and domestic policy analysis in Spain in the management of the two most recent transboundary crises: the 2010 125

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sovereign debt crisis and the –​still ongoing at the time of writing –​COVID-​19 pandemic. All in all, IOs have always played a key role in crisis management of different sorts. It is during episodes of transborder problems when the need for decentralised decision-​making becomes more evident. Hence, crises become the perfect lens through which to study the ability to alter organisational process and power structures that can lead to structural change (Boin, 2005). In line with this project’s objectives we interrogate whether these IOs are acting as promoters or as producers of policy analysis and the factors that might facilitate or hinder this role. Following the work of Jordana and Triviño-​Salazar (2019) our goal is to understand the conditions under which supranational institutions have the capacity to exercise a leading role in providing for adequate response to the management of these crises or else what might prevent them from playing such a role. We expect a differentiated impact of international institutions on crisis management at national level depending on the different nature of these two exogenous shocks, including the policy domains to which they pertain, and the degree of sovereignty exercised at state level, which in turn explains the degree of enforcement mechanisms in place. The chapter is organised as follows. The next section offers a literature review on the influence of IOs on state policy analysis. The third section presents the relationship between international organisations and nation-​states in times of global crises. By comparing the 2010 banking crisis with the current COVID-​ 19 crisis we are able to draw some interesting parallels regarding the conditions and nature of such relationship.

The influence of international organisations on state policies International organisations (IOs) have been seen as promoters of norms, standards, and policies. Beyond their role as facilitators of the (effective or ineffective) coordination of policies between states, international relations scholars have looked at IOs as the embodiment of particular policy preferences (and evaluations of policies) that they want states to endorse. There seem to be two mechanisms by which such promotion can take place –​ one is championed by authors of a sociological strand, the other by rationalists. The former sees IOs as teachers of norms and standards that exert their influence by providing states with models that they choose to adopt out of genuine conviction (persuasion), or out of group pressure (socialisation). According to this view, the influence of IOs would not come from their (usually very limited) capacity to enforce compliance of internationally sanctioned rules and policies, or their capacity to alter the cost–​benefit calculations of governments. It would rather be associated with the fact that IOs are perceived as providing rational, well-​informed guidelines and recommendations for decision-​makers in the lookout for internationally validated (and low-​r isk) policy approaches (Finnemore, 1996: 35). And this is something that often takes place in the framework of IOs. 126

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This is so not only because of the obvious fact that IOs are intergovernmental and thus by definition venues for state representatives to meet. The fact that they are bureaucracies plays a role too. IOs are seen as disinterested, expert, rational bureaucracies that stand above the fray of national interests. For that reason, they are ‘granted substantial authority and prominence’ (Meyer, 2009: 127). This role of IOs as teachers has helped account for the fact that ‘states with “enormous differences” in terms of resources, traditions and needs have developed strikingly similar strategies and structures to deal with similar problems’ (Meyer et al, 1997: 145). According to this view, there is a cultural encoded modern script embodied by IOs from which actors need to read in order to be on the right side of political and policy debates. That is why ‘across radically different circumstances … actors, purposes, action and organization are understood and structured in identical ways’ (Jupille and Jolliff, 2011: 3; see also DiMaggio and Powell, 1983: 152). To be sure, there is a local component in any understanding of which policies are the most appropriate. Similarly, this does not mean that IOs are devoid of conflict. IOs are not neutral fora and are often venues in which state representatives fight over what should be done internationally and domestically. Policy-​making is ‘no more inherently consensual at the international level than it is at the domestic level’ (Finnemore, 1996: 35). But debates take place within the limits allowed by organisational and expert/​legal cultures, and consensuses are couched in such terms too. We can expect this soft influence of IOs on states to be particularly strong (a) the more IOs are perceived as technical, neutral organisations, and (b) more they deal with issues over which states lack certain information and off-​the-​ shelf policies. The first point is counter-​intuitive, because it also implies that IOs perceived as weaker can be more influential than they seem at first sight –​ precisely because they are weak. According to this hypothesis, a non-​invasive, advisory, and narrowly technical IO can enjoy more influence over states than one that is more politically involved and endowed with authority, since the latter will be seen as more invested, less disinterested, and thus less neutral and rational than the former. A case in point is the influence exercised by the OECD on national educational policy through the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA). In a purely technocratic fashion, PISA has become an influential tool in educational policy across the globe (Grek, 2009; Engel, 2015). According to Rautalin et al (2018), education policy debates feature an increasingly global discourse in which the OECD has gained an authoritative role. In the case of Spain, Engel (2015) argues that PISA has been used to press forward a reform agenda to boost performance and as an evaluation kit where the overall underscoring is used to pinpoint the pitfalls of the educational system. Nevertheless, the sociological argument about how IOs can be influential is not the only one. There is another influence mechanism, associated with a rationalist view of international relations. This mechanism has to do with the capacity of IOs to change the cost–​benefit calculations of governments and nudge states 127

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towards the endorsement of particular norms, rules, and policies. IOs can offer material inducements, both positive and negative, to influence policy adoption by states. Hence, they can make access to their funds conditional on the adoption of particular policies (as is the case of the International Monetary Fund), or sanction states that are in no compliance with agreed rules (as in the case of the WTO). By increasing the benefits and costs of certain paths of action, IOs aim to change the incentives faced by policy-​making when taking decisions. The EU is equipped with a particularly mighty version of such armoury –​to the point that the EU stands at the border between a strong EU and a confederal polity. Nevertheless, also within the EU there is variation regarding the robustness of its enforcement mechanisms, which depends on the degree to which member states have chosen to pool their sovereignty. The whole of the European integration project contains a myriad of soft-​and hard-​law mechanisms depending on the degree to which the EU has a strong or a weak policy mandate in a given policy field. Within the domain of social policies for instance, the Open Method of Coordination (OMC) was introduced as a soft policy learning and policy diffusion instrument between European institutions and individual member states as well as between member states given a clear lack of inducement capacity to force policy adoption by states. Through non-​binding mechanisms non-​state actors had the capacity to shape the formulation and implementation of numerous national reform plans (Heidenreich and Zeitlin, 2009). The success of the OMC as a policy analysis tool by IOs is subject to the ways in which transnational steering operates across different policy fields. Several authors (see for instance Radaelli, 2003) have stressed the frailty of the OMC to coordinate policies when different levels of governance do not share the same policy goals or have unequal implementation capacity. One could think of these two mechanisms for IO influence upon state policy choices as occupying two different regions of one continuum. At one end of the spectrum, technical IOs wield the sort of influence espoused by IR authors of a sociological strand –​an influence based on (the appearance of) rationality, expertise, and neutrality. At the other end, more openly political and intrusive IOs can alter cost–​benefit calculations by states by way of the kind of incentives and de-​incentives underlined by rationalists. In between both extremes of the spectrum, a range of IOs lack the right conditions to wield any of these two dominant forms of influence. This does not mean that they are irrelevant. They can be effective in helping states coordinate their behaviour and overcome collective action problems, and in the long run can facilitate the emergence of shared understandings. But other than that they will have little influence upon underlying preferences. Table 7.1 exemplifies the mechanisms and resources employed by different supranational organisations depending on whether they belong to the Coercion, Teaching, or Coordination type. Hence, whether IOs sit in this continuum will be determined by the very own features of these organisations and the domain they fit into. We expect the World Health Organization (WHO) to sit squarely in the first category. This is 128

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Table 7.1: Supranational organisations and state-​level policy analysis Type

Mechanism

Resources

Coercion

It changes cost–​benefit calculations in a material way. Hard law

Sticks and carrots and legal obligations

Teaching

Provides information and institutional/​political legitimacy

Technical expertise

Coordination

Provides a venue for policy coordination between states. Soft law

Long-​term, mostly bottom-​up construction of common understandings

Source: Own elaboration

a technical organisation that gathers expert information and analysis, and then makes suggestion over public health policies. It is a paradigmatic example of an international bureaucracy. We expect the European Commission or the European Central Bank (including the European Banking Authority (EBA)) to sit at the other end of the continuum, particularly when it comes to issues that are close to the core of the European integration project such as the European Monetary Union. From this point of view, as we will explain in the following section, the mechanisms introduced during the banking crisis in 2010 by the Troika (European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the International Monetary Fund) to ensure compliance with the Excessive Deficit Procedure is a most unusual example of a high degree of surveillance of IOs over domestic policy decisions, casting doubts over issues of national sovereignty (De la Porte and Heins, 2015). At the same time, the EU can find itself in the central region of the continuum, the no-​man’s land in which none of the two dominant influence mechanisms apply. This is the case of health and other coordination competences as defined in TFEU art. 6. The almost irrelevant role that the European Centre for Disease Control (ECDC) has played as a coordinating agent for a common European response to the COVID-​19 crisis is a good example of this ‘in between’ space.

International organisations and nation-​states in times of global crises Coercion Organisations with a capacity to wield sticks and carrots will be able to coerce states into complying with their own preferences over policies. Governments will calculate the costs and benefits of the available options and recalibrate their choices accordingly. The armoury of sticks and carrots at the disposal of organisation can change over time –​and crises can provide them with additional clout if states find themselves in more need of carrots and more fearful of sticks. In 2010 countries affected by a sovereign debt crisis had to rely on the assistance of the EU and IMF to re-​finance public debt. Between 2010 and 2013, the 129

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Troika offered full or partial financial rescue packages through different types of financial conditionality. In the aftermath of the Eurozone crisis, a new economic governance architecture was created to protect the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) against macroeconomic imbalances tightening the existing budgetary governance regime. This new governance structure imposed severe control mechanisms that led to across-​the-​board spending cuts in those member states under bailout. In these countries, strict surveillance and enforcement mechanisms of the European Semester were directly responsible for major retrenchment in their welfare states (Dukelow, 2015; Pavolini et al, 2015; Sacchi, 2015; Theodoropoulou, 2015). The intrusive role that European institutions and the IMF played through the Memoranda of Understanding or equivalent instruments in Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, and Spain in major areas of their welfare states where national sovereignty has always prevailed (from health to education, pensions or labour market policies) had no precedent in the history of European integration. As some authors have outlined, the fiscal austerity imposed by international actors was a source of legitimation for national centre-​ right governments that enacted strong spending cuts in essential public services (Dukelow, 2015; Pavolini et al, 2015). The European Banking Authority (EBA) played a key role in the strict surveillance of member states to ensure compliance with EU financial rules. In 2012, financial supervision of this agency shifted from soft coordination based on recommendations and guidelines, to important hard law instruments. As Jordana and Triviño-​Salazar (2020: 5) point out, the role of the agency was facilitated by a legal mandate that gave it the ability to obtain information from national authorities. Although the agency was still dependent on cooperation from national agencies to obtain this information, the incentives for such cooperation were very strong. In the Spanish case, given the extremely fragile situation of the banking system, the ECB played an active role together with the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the IMF in the design and implementation of the European Stability Mechanism’s aid package. The political compromises in the area of banking regulation gave the European agency a leadership role in the coordination of the responses of member states. The economic crisis in this case and the weak situation of periphery economies within the EMU contributed to give these international actors a key management role with a degree of intrusion in national affairs unknown until that point. To be sure, the establishment of the EMU gave relevance to some level of transnational social policy integration but the design and implementation of policies remained tied to sovereign nation-​states. The 2010 sovereign debt crisis changed this arrangement of supranational and national cooperation almost overnight. The different instruments for EU macroeconomic governance (Six-​Pack, Two-​Pack, Fiscal Compact and the European Semester) exercised a degree of control over member states that had no precedent in the history of European Integration. Furthermore, the new EMU governance structure paved the way for new forms of ‘backroom diplomacy’ between the European Commission and countries under surveillance (Pavolini et al, 2015; Sacchi, 2015). 130

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This redesigning of the financial supervision from the part of the EU is relevant to understand how and why countries might decide on shifting EU coordination from soft law to hard law mechanisms. According to Hennessy (2014) under economic shocks with significant redistributive consequences, the more powerful countries can force weaker countries to accept judicially enforceable hard law principles. This sort of replacement of policy learning and knowledge exchange based on common interest by strict rule enforcement signifies a very different relationship between supranational institutions and national governments. But the European integration project has paid a price for the enforcement of austerity politics from the supranational to the national level. As expressed by Hemerijck (2014), even if European institutions are only partially responsible, since national governments still had flexibility as to in which direction to go with budget cuts and welfare retrenchment, regressive policy recipes combined with prolonged economic recession creates a fertile ground for rising Euroscepticism and domestic populism which further undermines trust in the European project as a whole. To alleviate the financial crisis caused by COVID-​19, the EU has temporarily put on hold some of the most stringent measures of the EMU governance structure. As was the case in the 2008 crisis, Spain will remain one of the countries most severely affected by the pandemic in terms of number of deaths as well as by the economic consequences of a long and strict lockdown. The financing of the economic and social policy packages put in place will, in the short and long term, be highly compromised by slow economic recovery –​with tourism being the most important economic sector –​and very high levels of public debt. Spain together with the other Southern European countries asked for mutualisation of the debt to alleviate the economic repercussions of the COVID-​19 pandemic. While back in 2010 the Spanish government, as indeed all other countries under financial rescue plans, had no negotiation power, they did not seem ready to let that happen again. The capacity of Spain and Italy to navigate through the COVID-​19 crisis is to a considerable extent hindered by a decade-​long austerity imposed upon them from Brussels. It is with this antecedent that both countries were demanding collective action within the eurozone. At the European Council of the 23 March 2020, the Spanish Prime Minister proposed a recovery fund financed through perpetual EU debt. The plan was backed up by the Portuguese and Italian prime ministers but rejected initially by Germany and the Netherlands. The so-​called ‘coronabonds’ were meant to provide greater spending power to individual governments by sharing the risk in the whole of the Eurozone while the Eurozone’s designated crisis-​fighting device, the European Stability Mechanism, is seen as a ‘humiliating disciplinary device through which northern-​European euro-​area members impose their policy agenda on the wayward south’ (Tooze, 2020). Despite the open conflict between the so-​called frugal states of the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, and Denmark and countries of the South, particularly, the EU Summit on 21 July 2020 finally sealed a deal for a 750 billion euro COVID-​19 Recovery Plan in 131

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the form of non-​repayable grants to countries most badly hit by the pandemic. Although there will be some form of conditionality and surveillance on the part of the EU on the implementation of this fund by member states, the control mechanisms will be not as stringent as with the European Semester and thus the influence of IOs on the national reforms will probably be more of a teaching than a coercive style. Teaching Organisations that are able to master information and expertise will be seen as having rational, evidence-​based views on policy options. Accordingly, governments will take their advice as a safe option –​both because of their alleged rationality and because following such advice can become a way to deflect criticism at home. On many occasions, the professional background of practitioners and decision-​makers at the meso-​level of national ministries will also be well aligned with the kind of expertise pooled in that kind of IO, thus reinforcing the value of their claims on policies. Although responses have pretty much remained within the borders of nation-​ states, the need for transboundary expert knowledge and guidance has been of paramount importance in the COVID-​19 crisis as indeed in any other major global health crisis. The WHO provides for expert advice grounded in a solid international scientific community in terms of data-​gathering, risk assessment, and guidelines for action. Although countries have differed in the way in which the measures have been introduced –​mostly explained by the evolution of the curve in each territory, responses have by and large been pretty homogenous. Even countries that were slower to implement restrictions, such as the UK and its plan A of herd immunity, had to back off pretty quickly as soon as it became evident that its National Health Service was at risk of collapsing. Politically, following the advice of WHO has also become an important source of legitimacy for the enforcement of unprecedented mandatory restrictions to freedom of movement. The forcefulness of the measures that governments had to implement in such a short period of time could only be supported by know-​how optimal strategies of politically neutral experts. Likewise, governments safeguard their actions by accepting guidance from supranational entities. As it becomes increasingly evident that the delay in the response to COIVD-​19 was a key factor in explaining the severity of the outbreak, it is in individual governments’ best interest to show that they were being guided from above. In the case of Spain, during the ‘State of Alarm’ (March–June 2020) policy-​ making discretion is transferred, in legislative terms, to the executive. It concedes the central government extraordinary powers in terms of both the centralisation of policy-​making and the introduction of stringent measures via Royal Decrees outside therefore the reach of parliamentary control. This extraordinary delegation of power to the executive in demand for swift action was already seen in the management of the previous crisis. In the COVID-​19 crisis the 132

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implications are stronger given the intrusive constraints on civil liberties and the interventions in health policy which is a key element in the Spanish multilevel system of governance. The Ministry of Health shifted from having very limited competencies to all of a sudden centralising all decision-​making capacity. Therefore, one would expect that as a way to compensate for this extraordinary concentration of power in the hands of the executive, it would be in the government’s best interest to follow the script established by a solid international scientific community. Two international organisations have the role to assist individual countries in times of global medical crisis such as the COVID-​19 pandemic: the WHO and, at the European level, the ECDC. The WHO establishes supranational coordination by creating a coherent system for sharing procedures and protocols. There is a well-​established bilateral system for sharing information, guidelines, and protocols between the WHO and health emergency units at state level. The presence of WHO General Directorates in individual countries guarantees the flux of information and coordination between the IO and national centre for emergencies. In the case of Spain, the Center for Coordination of Alerts and Sanitary Emergencies (Centro Coordinación de Alertas y Emergencias Sanitarias, CCAES) is the governmental unit responsible for the elaboration and development of emergency plans against threats to public health. Within this body the Centro Nacional de Enlace (CNE) applies the International Health Regulations (RSI) dictated by the WHO.1 Coordination Some international institutions will have little capacity to set incentives and de-​ incentives for states to change their cost–​benefit calculations on different policy options. They can also be unable to offer views on policies that states consider rational and well-​informed, or at least easy to defend. Such institutions will have to limit themselves as venues for the coordination of national agencies, in the hope that a long process of exchanges will allow for the gradual emergence of shared understandings among states. The ECDC is responsible for the Epidemiological Surveillance Network (ESN) and the Early Warning and Response System (EWRS) which is based on scientific and technical data that member states submit to the agency. The ECDC failed to anticipate the scale of the health crisis,2 and perhaps partly as a result, its role in coordinating an EU response to the emergency was very limited. When the ECDC recommended severe social distancing measures policies (12 March 2020) Italy had already introduced a full national lockdown, which came into force that very same day, and the Spanish government was already preparing for the State of Alarm which was approved by the Council of Ministers on 14 March. It is quite clear that its role in coordinating an EU response has been very limited (Crawley, 2020). Direct costs of healthcare efforts have been mostly assumed by nation-​states individually with scattered bilateral aid. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the low 133

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mandate on health policy, the EU has shown no capacity to coordinate the distribution of essential medical equipment or coordinate aid among countries. Precisely because institutional channels of communication and cooperation between the national health emergency units (CCAES in the Spanish case) and the WHO are already in place and because the response to COVID-​19 has by and large been a national one, the ECDC has not served as a mediating agent between the WHO and individual countries within the EU. There are however structural factors behind the limited role played by the ECDC also. As Greer (2012) puts it, the ECDC is a ‘hollow core’. First, it is one of the weakest EU agencies in terms of executive powers and resources. Second, the ECDC appears in a crowded institutional landscape. As Greer (2012) points out, the agency has two kinds of rivals. On the one hand other IOs such as the WHO are better positioned to influence policy analysis at country level since it already has a well established reputation –​in dealing also with previous global health crises –​and does not serve particularistic political interests. On the other hand equivalent agencies at national level with, as already described, well established communication channels with the WHO, leave no space for a European one especially since health remains a policy domain within the limits of the nation-​state. In many countries the responsibility of health emergencies is actually the responsibility of regional governing bodies which might be another disincentive for countries to share sovereignty. The ECDC seems inadequate to deal with rapidly developing crises. As argued by Jordana and Triviño-​Salazar (2020: 515), ‘the pandemic intensified within a very short period [and] such a quick escalation became an obstacle to coordination at the EU level –​a scenario where the ECDC could have been called to have a more active role, on behalf of the European Commission and the member state’. Crawley has also made the point that lack of influence on the part of the ECDC perhaps ‘was a result of the speed with which the crisis developed’ (Crawley, 2020). The patient construction of shared understandings is not adept at crisis management, particularly if the institutional landscape is populated by other organisations such as the WHO that can muster information and analysis on the pandemics and policy responses from all relevant countries across the world. Table 7.2 summarises our empirical arguments under the analytica lenses presented.

Conclusion IOs vary in their capacity and means to promote specific views on policy options. Some are well equipped enough to change the material costs faced by states when taking decisions, in a coercive manner. Others, precisely because they are careful about seeming too intrusive and muscular, manage to shape the perceptions of meso-​level decision-​makers by offering them information and analysis over the policies they have to deal with. These sources of influence become more influential in times of crisis, when states are more in need to align their choices 134

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Table 7.2: Coercion, teaching, coordination: supranational organisations in state policy analysis

EMU eurozone crisis

Type

Mechanism

Resources

Coercion

Surveillance institutions, conditionality, MoU, European Semester, BCE support for ESM countries, hard law (EBA)

Rescue packages, BCE liquidity, scapegoating/​legitimacy, legal obligations

WHO COVID-​19 crisis

Teaching

Shared procedures and protocols, close cooperation between WHO and CCAES

Information on the international evolution of COVID-​19. Helps legitimise extraordinary measures. Validates new knowledge on the virus

ECDC

Coordination

Common understandings already have a venue: WTO

ECDC crowded out by WTO

Source: Own elaboration

with those backed by supranational institutions, as they need their resources, information, and legitimacy. At the same time, some other supranational institutions lack both the muscle and the credibility as sources of expertise. These organisations will have to rely on their role as venues for policy coordination between states, and perhaps as propitious frameworks for the emergence of shared understandings. Inasmuch as these are valuable contributions to the solution of international problems, they do not make for effective responses to crises. They need time, and when push comes to shove they can be crowded out by more established institutions of the two previous kinds. This pattern matches our findings. Coercion was the primary kind of influence by the EU upon Spain during the Great Recession, and its effect was a major retrenchment of major domains of the welfare state, including health, education, pension, and unemployment benefits. This intrusive role of European institutions upon social policy was unprecedented, and legitimised deep spending cuts implemented at state and sub-​state levels. At the other end of the continuum, the WHO has had a less conspicuous but very relevant influence during the management of the COVID-​19 crisis in the form of teaching. The WHO has been a key information provider, it has legitimised hard policy choices restricting both economic activity and key civil liberties on behalf of global public health, and has maintained continuous exchanges with national authorities. National, meso-​level decision-​makers have internalised the central role of the WHO in their daily work. The hypothesis that weak, non-​mandatory supranational institutions can be influential in a crisis deserves a more focused research, but it is interesting and is compatible with both seeing such organisations as teachers of norms and policies and with the role the WHO has played in Spanish policies and politics during the COVID-​19 crisis. At the moment of writing this text (spring 2021) this is a counter-​intuitive claim. The crisis of COVID-​19 has been seen as one in which all eyes have been set upon nation-​states. National governments have taken harsh measures, while tapping into re-​discovered reservoirs of popular trust in national institutions. 135

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At the same time, a closer look reveals how dependent such measures have been upon the advice of the WHO. It is also striking that re-​nationalisation has dominated the narrative when so many EU member states turned their sights to the EU in the search for solutions to the economic upheaval created by quarantines and other public health-​related issues –​not to talk about the role of the European Central Bank. Finally, the ECDC has not (yet) found its voice in this crisis. The WHO has acted as the default coordination device. Scale and time are factors relevant here. The global scale of the pandemic makes the WHO a better match than the ECDC; and the WHO International Health Regulations, adopted in 2005, have been in existence long enough to become part of the routine of national public health agencies. The ECDC has thus been crowded out by the central role of the WHO and by the need for a rapid response that national governments could at least try to organise on their own. Our findings might be biased by the fact that our empirical illustrations all focus on Spain –​a country where modernisation has been a consensual and powerful (if vague) aspiration and where internationalisation and Europeanisation have been associated to that term too. We expect variation to exist between states in their openness to the views of supranational institutions as regards policy options. The credibility and legitimacy ascribed to international bureaucracies, and the sensitivity to their sticks and carrots, will vary for different states. In an age of contested supranational governance, this variation can be particularly stark, and it is in itself an interesting avenue for further research. Notes 1

2

See ‘Sistema de Alerta Precoz y Respuesta Rápida’, Secretaría General de Sanidad y Consumo, Ministerio de Sanidad, Asuntos Sociales e Igualdad. https://​www.mscbs.gob.es/​profes​iona​les/​ salud​Publ​ica/​cca​yes/​SIARP/​Msssi​_​SIA​PR_​2​1032​013.pdf [Accessed 6 December 2021]. ‘Los guardianes de la salud europea subestimaron el peligro del virus’, El País, 19 May 2020. Available at: https://e​ lpa​ is.com/s​ ocied​ ad/2​ 020-0​ 5-​18/​los-​gua​rdia​nes-​de-​la-​salud-​euro​pea-​subes​ tima​ron-​el-​peli​g ro-​del-​virus.html [Accessed 6 December 2021].

References Barnett, M. and Finnemore, M. (2004) Rules for the World: International Organizations in Global Politics, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Boin, A. (2005) ‘Disaster research and future crises: Broadening the research agenda’, International Journal of Emergencies and Disasters, 23(3): 199–​214. Crawley, S. (2020) ‘The EU’s “moment of truth” ’, Cambridge Globalist, 11 May 2020. https://​cam​brid​gegl​obal​ist.org/​?p=​2072 [Accessed 6 December 2021]. De La Porte, C. and Heins, E. (eds) (2015) ‘A new era of European integration? Governance of labour market and social policy since the sovereign debt crisis’, Comparative European Politics, 13(1): 8–​28. Díez Medrano, Juan (2003) Framing Europe: Attitudes to European Integration in Germany, Spain, and the United Kingdom, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 136

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DiMaggio, P.J. and Powell, W.W. (1983) ‘The iron cage revisited: Institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields’, American Sociological Review, 48(2): 147–​60. Drori, G.S. and Krücken, G. (2009) ‘World society: A theory and a research program in context’, in G. Krücken and G.S. Drori (eds), World Society: The Writings of John W. Meyer, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 3–​35. Dukelow, F. (2015) ‘Pushing against an open door: Reinforcing the neo-​liberal policy paradigm in Ireland and the impact of EU intrusion’, Comparative European Politics, 13(1): 93–​111. Engel, L. (2015) ‘Steering the national: Exploring the education policy uses of PISA in Spain’, European Education, 47(2): 100–​16. Finnemore, M. (1996) National Interests in International Society, Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press. Greer, S. (2012) ‘The European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control: Hub or hollow core?’, Journal of Health Politics and Law, 37(6): 1001–​30. Grek, S. (2009) ‘Governing by numbers: The PISA effect in Europe’, Journal of Education Policy, 24(1): 23–​37. Harvard Law School (2021) Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs). Available from: https://h ​ ls.harvard.edu/​dept/​opia/​what-​is-p​ ublic-i​ nterest-l​ aw/p​ ublic-s​ ervice-​ practice-​settings/​public-​international-​law/​intergovernmental-​organizations-​ igos/​ Heidenreich, M. and Zeitlin, J. (eds) (2009) Changing European Employment and Welfare Regimes: The Influence of the Open Method of Coordination on National Reforms, London: Routledge. Hemerijck, A. (2016) ‘Foreword’, in C. De la Porte and E. Heins (eds) (2016) The Sovereign Debt Crisis, the EU and Welfare State Reform, London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp v–​xv Hennessy, A. (2014) ‘Redesigning financial supervision in the EU 2009–​2013’, Journal of European Public Policy, 21(2): 151–​68. Jordana, J. and Triviño-​Salazar, J.C. (2019) ‘European Union agencies: A global governance perspective’, Revista de Estudios Políticos, 185: 169–​89. Jordana, J. and Triviño-​Salazar, J.C. (2020) ‘EU agencies’ involvement in transboundary crisis response: Supporting efforts or leading coordination?’, Public Administration, 98(2): 515–​29. Jupille, J. and Jolliff, B. (2011) ‘Regionalism in the world polity’, prepared for 18th Conference of the Europeanists, June, Barcelona. Meyer, J.W. (2009) ‘Globalization: Sources and effects on national states and societies’, in G. Krücken and G.S. Drori (eds) World Society: The Writings of John W. Meyer. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 159–​69. Meyer, J.W., Boli, J., Thomas, G.M., and Ramirez, F.O. (1997) ‘World society and the nation state’, American Journal of Sociology, 103(1): 144–​81. Moreno, L. and Serrano, A. (2011) ‘Europeanization and Spanish welfare: The case of employment policy’, in A. Guillén and M. León (eds) The Spanish Welfare State in European Context, Farnham: Ashgate, pp 39–​58. 137

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Pavolini, E., León, M., Guillén, A. and Ascoli, U. (2015) ‘From austerity to permanent strain? The EU and welfare state reform in Italy and Spain’, Comparative European Politics, 13(1): 56–​76. Radaelli, C. (2003) The Open Method of Coordination: A New Governance Architecture of the European Union? Stockholm: Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies. Rautalin, M., Alasuutari, P., and Vento, E. (2018) ‘Globalisation of education policies: Does PISA have an effect?’, Journal of Education Policy, 34(4): 500–​22. Risse, T. (2010) A Community of Europeans: Transnational Identities and Public Spheres, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Sacchi, S. (2015) ‘Conditionality by other means: EU involvement in Italy’s structural reforms in the sovereign debt crisis’, Comparative European Politics, 13(1): 77–​92. Theodoropoulou, S. (2015) ‘National social and labour market policy reforms in the shadow of EU bail-​out conditionality: The cases of Greece and Portugal’, Comparative European Politics, 13(1): 29–​55. Tooze, A. (2020) ‘Corona bonds and Europe’s north south divide’, Social Europe, 13 April. www.socialeurope.eu/​corona-​bonds-​and-​europes-​north-​south-​divide [Accessed 6 January 2021].

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Part Three Policy analysis beyond executive in the public sphere

EIGHT

Parliamentary committees as policy analysis institutions Anna M. Palau and Andreu Rodilla

Introduction All parliaments have increased their analytical capacity and expertise through some division of labour and specialisation by means of parliamentary committees (Mattson and Strøm, 1995; Strøm, 1998). Even though there is large variation in their structure and functions, committees conduct policy analysis in parliamentary democracies to help parliaments perform their most basic functions: to legislate and control the executive. Before parliaments vote on laws, committees can discuss and examine the bills and provide expert evaluation of the pros and cons associated with policy alternatives. Regarding their oversight functions, they use knowledge and information to monitor policy implementation and scrutinise executive actions, to ensure transparency and accountability. However, structural arrangements granting executives special powers, and processes such as increasing political polarisation or delegation of competences to supranational institutions, have promoted a conception of parliaments as institutions that are mainly tasked with approving policies designed and negotiated elsewhere (Russell and Cowley, 2016: 122). In recent decades, interest in the problem-​solving capacity of legislatures and in the functioning of committees has increased significantly (Weiss, 1989; Adler and Wilkerson, 2013). However, we still have little empirical information regarding their actual role as policy analysis institutions, especially in parliamentary democracies. This chapter contributes to filling this gap by exploring the case of Spain. Chapter 2 in this book explored the emergence of Spanish parliamentary committees along the 19th century as early promoters of policy analysis. Here, we focus on their role in the actual democratic period (1982–​2019) with three main goals. First, we explore the type of policy analysis conducted by parliamentary committees. The main question is whether they conduct policy analysis to buttress preset political positions, as a partisan logic would suggest, or provide independent analysis that is separable from politics, driven by systematic and objective evidence, more in line with an informational logic (Gilligan and Krehbiel, 1990; Aldrich, 1995). We show that the tasks of Spanish committees are likely to be driven by partisan logic. However, as Krehbiel (2004) argues, the conceptualisation of these logics as mutually exclusive is to some extent artificial. Policy analysis provides reason and persuasion to illuminate and alleviate 141

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problems, but it is also related to a normative task referring to value judgement about what ought to be, and it involves a complex trade-​off among competing values (Dunn, 2016). This is especially evident in the face of a crisis that requires new and rapid policy measures on problems where scientific opinion is divided or even nonexistent. The COVID-​19 outbreak, for example, has illustrated the importance of evidence-​based policy-​making but also of accommodating conflicting, sometime irreconcilable, policy interests. Effective leadership during the pandemic has involved dialogue and deliberation among many institutions and policy actors leading up to decision-​making and parliaments have worked as the legitimate forums for such dialogue, improving government proposals in a number of cases (Murphy, 2020). Second, we explore the scope of policy analysis conducted by parliamentary committees. As emphasised in the introduction of the book, the increasing complexity of societies and the expansion of the state’s regulatory dimensions has led to an increase in the number and type of issues on which policy analysis is conducted. Governments play a central role in the problem-​solving process, given their agenda-​setting control and access to bureaucratic knowledge and expertise through their ministries, which provide unrivalled insight into how legislation works (Damgaard and Jensen, 2006: 436). However, without cooperation with other actors, they cannot develop and process all the information required to assess concrete policy alternatives and draft legislation in a way that satisfies all technical and legal requirements (Laver and Shepsle, 1994, 1996). In this chapter, we explore the scope of policy analysis conducted by parliamentary committees, measured in terms of the number and type of committees and the diversity of issues on which they conduct their activities. Some of the questions we answer are whether the number of parliamentary committees has increased over time, whether they are established in a wide variety of policy areas that mirror the complexity of modern democracies, or whether there are differences across legislatures depending on which party holds the parliamentary majority. Finally, the chapter also provides information about the resources parliamentary committees use to conduct policy analysis. Regarding intra-​parliamentary resources, committees’ capacity to perform their functions effectively depends on the chamber’s human and economic resources, including lawyers and administrative staff that assist MPs and parliamentary groups in their tasks. Committees also rely on specialisation to increase their efficiency and productivity. Extra-​parliamentary resources come from committees’ capacity to involve other actors in policy analysis. For example, interest groups might make appearances focused on providing information on policy problems or monitoring the implementation of policies, among other aspects (Baumgartner et al, 2009; Chaqués-​Bonafont and Muñoz, 2016). In addition, authorities and bureaucrats from ministerial departments can be invited to provide expert knowledge and technical information on policy problems (for example, Workman et al, 2017). Other external resources include mass and social media, which publish a considerable amount of information on topics of legislative interest (Weiss, 1989; 142

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Griffith and Leston-​Bandeira, 2012). In addition, parliaments are increasingly open to receiving direct input from citizens on the most pressing problems in society and the most appropriate solutions. The chapter is organised as follows. The next section explains the main characteristics and types of parliamentary committees in Spain and explores whether an informational or partisan logic is likely to prevail in their policy analysis tasks. The second section focuses on the scope of policy analysis provided by these committees and contains detailed information on the type of committees created in Spanish parliament from 1982 to 2019, and the variety of issues on which they have conducted activities. The third and fourth sections explore the purpose of policy analysis by focusing on external resources (participation of interest groups, public officials and authorities), and internal resources (MPs’ specialisation and chamber staff) available for policy analysis. The chapter relies on the databases developed by the research group Q-​Dem (www.q-​dem.com) and the Spanish chamber (Congreso de los Diputados) (www.congreso.es).

The characteristics of Spanish parliamentary committees In Spain, parliamentary committees may be permanent or non-​permanent. Permanent legislative committees are created at the beginning of each legislature, within ten days of parliament’s constituent session. They usually mirror the structure of the executive (ministerial organisation) (see Caballero, 2006 or Senén, 2018). They have no competence to initiate legislation. Formed by a group of deputies, they conduct policy analysis during the legislative process on issues previously introduced into the agenda. Permanent committees are responsible for discussing amendments to legislation and write proposals that will be later discussed and voted in the plenary. Under some circumstances, they are granted full legislative competence to pass legislation. They also conduct oversight activities to hold the executive accountable. To carry out their tasks, they rely on the government’s appearances –​at its own request or at the request of the committee –​or other appearances by authorities or experts, information requests, non-​legislative motions, or other motions or questions to be answered orally. They can also organise work sessions and meetings with citizens and actors from civil society on issues of their competence. The congress standing orders allow for the creation of other permanent (non-​ legislative) committees. There are three types (committee on internal rules, on MP statute and on petitions) that exist in all legislatures. Beyond these, which mainly deal with institutional and internal affairs, permanent committees can be created on other issues. A final type of permanent committee is a permanent joint committee, which include deputies and senators that cooperate to discuss selected issues. Contrary to permanent committees, non-​permanent committees are ad-​hoc temporary organs created to conduct particular tasks. Investigation committees are among the most popular and are the only type that is specifically contemplated in the standing rules. The congress rules allow for the creation 143

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of other non-​permanent committees. These include what are known as study committees, which existed until 2004, joint non-​permanent committees (from 1996 to 2011), and other non-​permanent committees (since 1993). Finally, within committees, the complexity and sophistication of parliamentary activities has led to a further division of labour into working groups (ponencias) and subcommittees. These are mainly focused on helping committees to work more efficiently and productively. If we turn to the type of policy analysis conducted by parliamentary committees, a number of features signal that their tasks are likely to be influenced by partisan logic. First, committee meetings in Spain are public, which dissipates some of the information advantages committee members may acquire (Strøm, 1998: 42). Open meetings are less likely to foster inter-​party compromises and may encourage committee members to use the forum for electoral purposes such as claiming credit, publicity and position taking. The task of working groups facilitates more party pledges because they exchange information and opinions informally, without the presence of the public or the media. Subcommittee meetings are not public but, unlike working groups, they are subject to the principle of publicity as all reports, including specific votes and the final texts passed by the commission, are published in the chamber’s official bulletin. However, informal meetings between subcommittee members and accredited media representatives typically occur after sessions (Vila, 2008: 129). Second, as Gilligan and Krehbiel (1990) argue, to understand committees’ informational role, it is important to understand the interaction between the committees and the plenary. When the plenary can amend a committee’s proposal without restrictions, the proposal becomes merely cheap talk and does not convey any credible information (Diermeier, 2014: 38). In these cases, committees will have no incentive to acquire costly information about policy consequences and specialisation is not a likely outcome. In Spain, the committee’s version of the bill becomes the plenary agenda, but the plenary has the right to reject amendments or force an up-​or-​down vote on a bill. As Martin and Vanberg (2020) signal, this is a characteristic of weak legislative institutions. Subcommittees have full autonomy to conduct their work, but they are not decision-​making bodies. Their reports have to be submitted to the corresponding committee for approval. In the debate, parties can introduce specific votes to fix their positions. Exceptionally, the chamber board, at the request of the committee and having heard the meeting of the spokespeople, can decide that the report should be debated in the plenary. Third, specialisation is dependent on the procedure for committee assignment, which in Spain is strongly influenced by political factors. In systems where committees can independently determine seat allocation, seniority rules and stable assignments enable members to invest time and energy in acquiring expertise and building personal networks, which might lead to considerable rewards for loyal, hardworking members (Strøm, 1998: 40). However, partisan logic is likely in parliamentary systems where committees work as extensions of party powers. 144

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They are instruments of the majority party, and parties take strong control of appointments. In Spain, committee members are not fixed, and seat allocations are based on the relative sizes of parliamentary groups. Therefore, in practice committees work as a subset of the legislature. Parliamentary groups freely appoint MPs who vote in a way that is coherent with the decisions of the group, behaving under strong party discipline (Sánchez de Dios, 1999). The majority group(s) dominate the committee system so that the same preferences control the plenary and the committees, especially when there is an absolute majority (Caballero, 2007). Parties also negotiate the selection of roles of responsibility within committees (the president, two vice-​presidents, and two secretaries). All in all, the influence of partisan interests on parliamentary committees can be traced back to their structure and composition. However, it can also be found in the tasks and issues on which they conduct policy analysis. For example, permanent legislative committees are associated with the structure of government and therefore its policy priorities. In contrast, non-​permanent committees can deal with a wide range of issues, including those that embarrass the executive (consider investigation committees, for instance). However, because the parliamentary majority controls the creation of committees this is likely only under minority governments. Considering all these political factors, in the next section we explore the scope of policy analysis, to then examine the information resources the committees use from outside and inside the parliamentary arena, to conduct policy analysis.

The scope of policy analysis: parliamentary committees’ attention to policy issues Figure 8.1 shows the number and type of parliamentary committees by legislature from 1982 to 2019.1 Permanent legislative committees are far the most numerous type of committees in Spain. The number of committees is important because, given the lack of time, numerous committees facilitate legislative productivity (Strøm, 1998: 24). All else being equal, the larger the number of committees the higher the potential output of parliaments. For the period 1982–​93, when the PSOE (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, Spanish Socialist Workers' Party ) governed with an absolute majority, there was stability in the number of committees (11) and the issues they analysed. This was in line with most European parliaments, which on average had between 10 and 20 law-​making committees (Strøm, 1998: 31). As Figure 8.2 shows, the same permanent legislative committees existed during these legislatures, with a predominance of those related to basic state functions, mainly economic issues, government issues, defence, and external affairs. There were a couple of committees related to welfare issues (education and social policy). In 1993, when the socialists held a minority government, there was an increase in fragmentation (14 committees were created during the legislature) and more diversity of issues, with topics like health or environment entering the committee structure. These reforms can be explained by the type 145

Policy Analysis in Spain

Figure 8.1: Number and type of parliamentary committees by legislature (1982–​2019)

20

15

Permanent legislative committees Permanent non-legislative committees Ivestigation committees Study Committees Other non-permanent committees Permanent joint committees Non-permanent joint committees

10

5

19 –9 89 – 19 3 19 93 96 –6 –2 0 20 00 00 20 –4 0 20 4–8 08 20 –11 11 20 –16 16 20 –16 16 20 –18 18 –1 9

86 19

19

82

–6

0

Source: Q-​Dem databases (www.q-​dem.com)

of government and by transformations in the scope and activities of the Spanish state (Chaqués-​Bonafont et al, 2015: 55). During the minority government of the PP (Partido Popular, Popular Party), from 1996 to 2000, there was a slight increase in the number of legislative committees, which were later reduced when the conservatives held an absolute majority in the 2000–​4 legislature. While there was no significant variation in the number of committees during these two terms, the committee structure reflects some interesting variations in terms of issues. These variations were mainly the result of changes in ministerial structure, like the creation of a committee on environmental affairs and another on science and technology (mirroring the two ministries created on these issues in the 1996–​2000 legislature). Environmental issues entered the Spanish agenda many years later than in other European countries and their regulation and unprecedented attention is mainly explained by pressure from the European Union (Börzel, 2000). Tourism also entered the committee structure in 1996 (in the committee on industrial affairs, energy, and tourism), and sports in 2000 (in the committee on education, culture, and sports). Following the return of the socialists to office, Zapatero’s two terms showed an increase in the number of committees,2 compatible with the government’s minority status and higher issue fragmentation. While some committees created during the Aznar government were kept (like the environmental committee), new issue priorities like culture, housing, equal opportunities, and aid cooperation entered the committee structure. Most of these changes can be partially explained by ministerial reforms and the prime minister’s preferences. 146

Parliamentary committees as policy analysis institutions

Figure 8.2: Permanent legislative committees: percentage by policy area and legislature (1982–​2019) Committees percentage % 20

10

0

20

10

0

20

10

0

20

0

10

Agriculture Commerce & banking Law & crime Culture Defence Economy Education Energy Environment Government Health Housing International Labour Rights Science and technology Transport Welfare Inmigration Foreign trade Water

2016–16

2004–08

1993–96

1982–86

Agriculture Commerce & banking Law & crime Culture Defence Economy Education Energy Emironment Government Health Housing International Labour Rights Science and technology Transport Welfare Inmigration Foreign trade Water

2016–18

2008–11

1996–2000

1986–89

Agriculture Commerce & banking Law & crime Culture Defence Economy Education Energy Environment Governement Health Housing International Labour Rights Science and technology Transport Welfare Inmigration Foreign trade Water

2018–19

2011–16

2000–04

1989–93

Note: The figure shows the percentage of permanent legislative committees on different policy issues by legislature, coded according to CAP methodology. We coded the topic of the committees. As only one code can be assigned to each committee, those that cover more than one topic (for example, the Committee on Economy, Commerce and Finance) were coded considering the first of the issues mentioned (in this example, the economy). Source: Q-​Dem databases (www.q-​dem.com)

147

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Rodriguez Zapatero sought to transform the regulation of moral issues, gender discrimination, immigration, and access to housing, bringing attention to rights issues to unprecedented levels, even compared to former socialist presidents (Chaqués-​Bonafont et al, 2015). Following the return of the conservatives to government in 2011 there was a reduction in the number of committees (as well as ministries). This was related to the type of government, which had an absolute majority, and the result of the economic crisis. There was an increase in the number of committees related to economic issues, for example, a new committee was created on economy and competitiveness. While these variations fit the conservative profile of the executive, committees on issues that are traditionally associated with the left, like culture, aid cooperation, and equal opportunities, remained in the committee structure during this term. This illustrates variations in citizens’ issue priorities, like gender discrimination. Therefore, the focus of committees is influenced by parties’ ideology and moral stances but also depends on social and cultural change. Finally, in the 2016–​19 legislature, the committee structure was influenced by a motion of censure in June 2018 and the existence of two governments in that period. During Rajoy’s government (conservatives), a total of 22 permanent legislative committees were created (three were replacements), which is the highest number during the period analysed. During Pedro Sánchez’s government (socialists), there were 21 committees of this type. Regarding issue diversity, a new committee was created on the study of climate change during the first part of the legislature. This committee was re-​named under Sánchez’s government, as the committee for the ecologic transition. Environmental issues seem to have entered the political agenda to stay. As Figure 8.1 shows, since the mid-​1990s other permanent non-​legislative committees have been the highest in number. Until Aznar’s first legislature, these included the three compulsory committees, plus a committee on parliamentary control over public TV and, until 1993, a committee on the ombudsman. From 1996, new committees were created that showed a trend towards increasing diversity: a permanent committee on international development cooperation (1996–​2000 legislature); an advisory committee on appointments (2000–​4); a committee on control of credits focused on reserve expenses (2004–​8); on integration of people with disabilities (2008–​11); on the evaluation and monitoring of the Toledo Pact, and one on road safety and sustainable mobility (2011–​16). Finally, in the 2016–​19 legislature, new permanent non-​legislative committees were formed on childhood and youth issues, the quality of democracy and corruption, and violence against women, to reflect the importance of these issues in the political agenda. Two permanent joint committees, which include deputies and senators, have existed in all legislatures: one on the relationship with the Court of Auditors and one on the European Community (later the European Union). The first is the most important governmental accounting body, with functions to guarantee the transparency of public accounts at national, regional, and local level, and the 148

Parliamentary committees as policy analysis institutions

accountability of political parties. The second is mainly focused on guaranteeing the participation of parliament on EU-​related issues, especially since the Treaty of Lisbon reinforced the functions of domestic parliaments, for example in relation to the application of the subsidiarity principle. Apart from these two committees, the creation of additional joint committees illustrates patterns of issue prioritisation among legislatures. Under the socialist government in the 1986–​9 legislature, two new committees were established: one on scientific investigation and one on equal opportunities for women. The latter, together with the joint committee on drugs, which was created during the 1989–​93 legislature, have existed in all legislatures since their establishment. During the legislatures when Aznar was governing, no new committee of this type was created.3 During the Rajoy governments, the only new one was the joint committee on national security, which was maintained when Pedro Sánchez took office. The creation of this committee was envisaged by the National Security Law passed in 2015. It was focused on reinforcing parliament’s information on national security issues because of new security threats related to terrorism and internal affairs. Investigation committees have existed in all legislatures, from 1982 to the present, but there has been a significant increase in recent times. In the 2016–​19 legislature, five investigation committees were created, the highest number since the transition to democracy. They were mainly focused on investigating corruption cases and lowering the extent of tragedies (air and railway accidents and terrorist attacks). This increase is related to the minority status of the government, and the entry of new opposition parties into parliament: Podemos and Ciudadanos. When the governing party has an absolute majority in the chamber, opposition parliamentary groups face major barriers to create investigation committees on issues that might embarrass the executive. The fact that Rajoy (and then Sánchez) in this legislature governed with a minority facilitated the establishment of new committees on issues like political corruption scandals, on which new opposition parties had articulated a political discourse against traditional mainstream parties depicted as corrupt, non-​transparent organisations. Most of these committees, which are not binding and have no effect on judicial procedure, have a purely political goal and reflect party strategies. Their establishment depends on the will of the majority. Therefore, even if opposition parties participate and even if they are on the rise, it has been questioned whether they are instruments of effective parliamentary control that can improve the quality of policy analysis. In addition to investigation committees, other non-​permanent committees deal with a large variety of issues and some subsequently become permanent committees. For example, before the establishment of the permanent non-​legislative committee on climate change in the 2016–​19 legislature, there was a non-​permanent committee on this topic from 2011 to 2016. The same is true of the topic of road safety. Overall, the analysis of the scope of policy analysis conducted by parliamentary committees suggests that there has been an increase in the number of committees over time and in the diversity of issues on which they conduct their activities. Interestingly, the evolution of working groups and subcommittees show an 149

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opposite trend. The number of working groups and subcommittees progressively increased until 2000, regardless of whether we consider absolute numbers or weight them considering the total number of committees per legislature. In 1989–​93, there were 20 working groups (0.8 per committee). In 1993–​6, the number increased to 24 (which also represents 0.8 per committee). In 1996–​2000, when there was already the opportunity to create subcommittees, there were 14 working groups and 15 subcommittees (a total of 29, one per committee on average). Since 2000, the number of working groups and subcommittees has started to decline. In the 2016–​19 legislature, there were only 16 working groups and subcommittees. These specialised bodies mainly conduct work related to legislative activities: 93 per cent of subcommittees and 57 per cent of working groups are created within permanent legislative committees. In the case of working groups, a significant proportion (27 per cent) are attached to permanent joint committees, mostly the EU joint committee, were they work as specialised units for the analysis and debate mainly of EU treaties and key events, such as the creation of the European Economic Union.

Extra-​parliamentary resources: interaction with interest groups, public officials, and authorities In Spain, the chamber standing orders (art. 44) state that each committee, through the president of the congress, decides whether to invite members of government, public officials, interest groups, or other authorities to oversee policy implementation, to provide information or explain their policy position on specific issues.4 Figures 8.3 and 8.4 show the total number of appearances scheduled and carried out with interest groups, public officials, and authorities in Spanish parliamentary committees for the period 1986–​19. Because the numbers cannot be compared across legislatures in absolute terms, we also provide information on the rate of appearances adjusted by the length of legislatures (in days). Notably, the participation of public officials and authorities is significantly higher than that of interest groups. On average, 521 appearances are scheduled with interest groups per legislature, and 1,342 appearances of public officials and authorities. Second, not all scheduled appearances are carried out. On average for the period 1986–​19, only 64 per cent of appearances scheduled with interest groups and 65 per cent of those scheduled with public officials and authorities actually take place. To explore the circumstances under which these actors are invited to make parliamentary appearances is beyond the scope of this chapter. Indeed, this question has already been analysed for interest groups (see Chaqués-​Bonafont and Muñoz, 2016). However, some aspects are of interest to understand actors’ contributions to policy analysis. One is related to the impact of the type of government. Existing research corroborates that interest groups are more likely to be invited to make parliamentary appearances when there is a minority government (Chaqués-​Bonafont and Muñoz Márquez, 2016). The data in 150

Parliamentary committees as policy analysis institutions

Figures 8.3 and 8.4 corroborates that this is the case for interest groups but not for public officials and authorities. In the 1986–​9 legislature, the actual involvement of interest groups was very low, with an average of 0.03 appearances per day of legislature. The rate increased in the next legislature but especially in that of 1993–​6, when the socialists governed with a minority. From then, there was a decline during Aznar’s conservative governments, especially when he governed with a majority. The numbers increased again during the minority legislatures of Zapatero. When Rajoy governed with an absolute majority (2011–​16), the involvement of interest groups declined, even though it was slightly higher than during Aznar’s absolute majority. In the 2016–​19 legislature, when both Mariano Rajoy and later Pedro Sánchez (following the June 2018 motion of censure) governed with a minority, there was a considerable increase in the average number of hearings per day. Interestingly, the results look quite different in the case of the appearances of public officials and authorities. During Aznar’s first legislature, when he held a minority position, the participation of public officials and authorities was higher, with an average of 119 appearances per day. In his second legislature, with an absolute majority, this rate decreased to 91. During the two minority governments of Zapatero, the number of appearances of authorities and public officials decreased (88 and 78 respectively) but during the absolute majority government of Rajoy (2011–​16) it significantly increased. Looking at these descriptive trends, it seems that, unlike interest groups, participation is not associated with variations in the type of government. Overall, the percentage of appearances scheduled and carried out does not increases significantly under minority governments. A second area to examine to understand the role of these external actors in policy analysis is their participation during the legislative process, when bills are discussed and amended in parliament. To analyse this question, we explored the effective participation of interest groups, public officials, and authorities (the number of appearances) during the parliamentary process in relation to all executive bills passed from 1996 to 2019. The results illustrate that participation is very low. On average, only 7.5 per cent of the total executive bills passed during this period involved appearances of interest groups, and this percentage decreased to 5.9 per cent in the case of public officials and/​or authorities. Most executive bills become law without any participation of external actors during the legislative process. There are also considerable asymmetries in the topics of the bills associated with these appearances. In the case of interest groups, a considerable proportion of hearings are held on executive bills related to education (21 per cent of appearances), justice (14 per cent), and industrial policy (12 per cent). On the contrary, the participation of interest groups in hearings on issues like the economy, energy, immigration, and housing during the legislative process is almost inexistent. When interest groups are involved, they make an average of 11 appearances per bill, but the number ranges from 1 to 45 and was highest for the executive bill on improving the quality of the education system. The results are completely different if we look at the appearances of 151

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Appearances scheduled and held

Held per day rate 1.00

1,200

0.75 800 Held

0.50

Scheduled 400 0.25

Source: Q-​Dem databases (www.q-​dem.com)

8 19 6–8 8 9 1 9– 19 993 93 96 –9 – 6 20 200 0 0 20 0–0 0 4 20 4–0 0 8 20 8–1 1 1 20 1–1 1 6 20 6–1 1 6 20 6–1 18 8 –1 9

0.00

19

19

86 19 –8 8 9 19 9–9 19 93 3 96 –9 – 6 20 200 0 0 20 0–0 04 4 20 –0 0 8 20 8–1 1 1 20 1–1 16 6 20 –1 1 6 20 6–1 18 8 –1 9

0

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152

Figure 8.3: Interests groups’ parliamentary appearances (1986–​2019)

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Figure 8.4: Authorities and public officials’ parliamentary appearances (1986–​2019) Appearances scheduled and held

Held per day rate 125

100

2,000

Held 1,000

Scheduled

60

25

Source: Q-​Dem databases (www.q-​dem.com)

86 19 –8 8 9 19 9–9 19 93 3 96 –9 – 6 20 200 0 0 20 0–0 04 4 20 –0 0 8 20 8–1 1 1 20 1–1 16 6 20 –1 1 6 20 6–1 18 8 –1 9

0

19

19

86 19 –8 8 9 19 9–9 19 93 3 96 –9 – 6 20 200 0 0 20 0–0 04 4 20 –0 0 8 20 8–1 1 1 20 1–1 16 6 20 –1 1 6 20 6–1 18 8 –1 9

0

153

Parliamentary committees as policy analysis institutions

75

Policy Analysis in Spain

public officials and authorities. In this case, 71 per cent of appearances are on bills related to economic issues. On average, there are also 11 appearances per bill, but the number ranges from 1 to 245. Budget laws are most closely associated with their participation during the legislative process. These results illustrate that most appearances are likely to occur in oversight activities rather than legislative activities, as shown by Chaqués-​Bonafont and Muñoz (2016) in the case of interest groups. Overall, these results provide important information regarding how the chamber’s resources are used for policy analysis. The participation of external actors in the process is focused on meeting information needs to take better decisions, but also reflects political and partisan logic (Chaqués-​Bonafont and Muñoz Márquez, 2016). In the case of interest groups, variations in parliamentary appearances can be partially explained by the type of government. However, as Chaqués-​Bonafont and Muñoz Márquez (2016) demonstrate, other factors should be considered, such as the committee structure or the politicisation of issues. The participation of interest groups increases on conflictive issues or those that can be approached from competing perspectives. However, existing literature points to an opposing effect in the case of public officials and authorities. While interest groups participate more when issues are politicised, public inattention to an issue is generally considered the primary factor that contributes to bureaucratic dominance (Rourke, 1984: 210). The participation of interest groups is also focused on providing information to maximise the correspondence between policy decisions and citizens’ preferences (Chaqués-​Bonafont, 2020: 5). This explains why the participation of citizens’ interest groups is higher in parliaments than that of business or trade associations. The participation of public officials and authorities is not so focused on helping policy-​makers to decide or justify policy goals, but is of a much more technical nature. Why appearances are scheduled at different times, with different actors or on particular issues can be explained by formal rules, politicisation dynamics, and policy-​makers’ needs for guidance, which vary strongly across issues and are higher for those of a technical nature (Chaqués-​Bonafont, 2020).

Intra-​parliamentary resources: specialisation of MPs and chamber staff According to an informational logic, MPs receive committee assignments that allow them to specialise at low cost, for example because of their professional training or previous experience (doctors may become members of health committees). As indicated before, Spanish parliamentary committees do not have an independent say on the appointment of their members and the process is driven by partisan logic. However, some specialisation could exist if parliamentary groups appoint MPs to serve on committees for a long time and if they are appointed repeatedly to the same committee. As Saalfeld and Strøm (2014) points out, the division of labour across policy areas generates a significant degree 154

Parliamentary committees as policy analysis institutions

Figure 8.5: Tenure in parliamentary committees (1982–​2019)

% MPs

9

6

3

20 200 1– 3 30 00 1– 4 40 00 1– 50 500 1– 60 600 1– 7 70 00 1– 8 80 00 1– 90 90 1– 0 10 100 01 0 11 –11 01 00 – 12 12 01 00 13 –13 01 00 –1 40 >1 0 40 1

1–

10

0–

10

0

0

Number of days (range) Note: The figure show the average number of days that MPs stay on parliamentary committees. The first bar, for example, shows that 7 per cent of MPs stay on the same committees between 1 and 100 days. Source: Q-​Dem databases (www.q-​dem.com)

of expertise, especially when there is some continuity among the members of committees over time. Specialisation occurs if MPs spend a reasonable period of time carrying out committee tasks, but also if these are conducted on the same policy area. As a result, we analysed tenure and to what extent MPs serve on committees that address similar topics or whether there is high mobility, so that politicians change from committees working on one topic to committees dealing with totally different issues. About half of the total MPs who attended parliamentary committees from 1982 to 2019 served in only one legislature. Figure 8.5 shows the average number of days Spanish MPs remain on parliamentary committees.5 On average, MPs that have been on committees stay in office for 749 days. A total of 51 per cent of MPs stay between 1 and 800 days, on average. Of these, 5 per cent stay less than 100 days and 19 per cent less than a year. This data can be better evaluated if we consider the average length of legislatures. If we consider the period 1982–​19, legislatures lasted 1,314 days on average (1,212 if we do not consider the 2016–​16 legislature). This means that, on average, half of MPs that serve on parliamentary committees do not remain even an entire legislature in their position. Only 7 per cent spend more than 1,300 days on parliamentary committees. Table 8.1 shows the number of committees that MPs served on, and the number of policy areas covered by these committees. Values in parentheses show the average number of days they stayed on the committee. From 1980 to 2019, 18 155

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Number of policy areas

Number of committees

1

1

18 (752)

2

3.9 (768)

10.3 (676)

3

0.9 (838)

4.1 (756)

6 (731)

4

0.2 (839)

1.3 (705)

3.9 (766)

3.6 (707)

5

0.1 (934)

0.6 (753)

2 (792)

2.3 (810)

1.4 (829)

6

0.1 (876)

0.7 (758)

1.2 (829)

1.9 (790)

1.5 (815)

0.5 (909)

7

0.04 (873)

0.3 (789)

1.0 (784)

0.9 (785)

1.8 (696)

0.8 (841)

0.4 (697)

8

0.04 (1318)

0.1 (658)

0.6 (763)

1.2 (667)

1 (721)

0.9 (888)

0.5 (821)

0.04 (501)

9

0

0.3 (903)

0.5 (895)

0.8 (659)

0.7 (635)

0.6 (728)

0.3 (839)

0.04 (1000)

0

10+​

0

0.3 (757)

1.4 (749)

2.8 (789)

4.5 (741)

3.7 (687)

3.4 (719)

2.2 (792)

1.9 (735)

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10+​

2.4 (818)

Note: The table shows the percentage of MPs that have attended different numbers of committees and their issue diversity. For example, 18 per cent of MPs have attended only one committee dealing with a single policy area and 10.3 per cent have attended two committees dealing with two policy areas. In parentheses are the average number of days they stay on the committees. Source: Q-​Dem databases (www.q-​dem.com)

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156

Table 8.1: MP participation in parliamentary committees: number of committees, issue diversity, and tenure (1982–​2019)

Parliamentary committees as policy analysis institutions

per cent of MPs served on only one committee covering one policy area.6 Values on the left lower quadrant of the table, which refer to highly specialised MPs (working on a large number of committees but all dealing with the same policy area) are very low at close to 0. If we aggregate the percentages, we find that more than half of MPs (52 per cent) served on four committees or less covering four policy areas or less. However, to reach some conclusion on specialisation from this data requires a combined analysis with data on tenure. The 18 per cent of MPs serving on only one committee could attain specialisation if they stayed in office for long time. However, the data shows that this is not the case. On average, this group of MPs do not remain for an entire legislature but for more than two years (752 days) on committees (range from 7 to 2,155 days). Specialisation occurs but it seems to be an exception. The maximum specialisation, the 0.04 per cent of MPs that participate in eight committees that work on the same policy area, with an average of 1,318 days in office, corresponds to a single deputy of the conservative party with a diplomatic career who attended committees on issues like external affairs, EU affairs, or international cooperation. The next question is to what extent there is variation across parties. Saalfeld and Strøm (2014) argued that larger, more stable parties are more capable of establishing internal specialisation patterns that may give legislators access to legislative policy committees or to managerial or leadership positions outside formal government. We could expect that if such internal specialisation exists, it should be reflected in how groups assign MPs to parliamentary committees. According to this, we should see that mainstream parties, namely the PP and the PSOE, have more specialised MPs than non-​mainstream parties. The data show that both the PP and the PSOE have a large proportion of MPs working on a single (or very few) committees, without significant differences with non-​mainstream parties. In the case of the PP, 21 per cent of MPs serving on committees participated in only one committee. For the PSOE, this percentage is slightly lower (16 per cent). Results are similar in the case of non-​mainstream parties (16 per cent CIU (Convergència i Unió, Convergence and Union), 15 per cent PNV (Partido Nacionalista Vasco, Basque Nationalist Party), 30 per cent CC (Coalición Canaria, Canarian Coalition), and 14 per cent ERC (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, Republican Left of Catalonia) with the exception of the far left, where the percentage drops to 5 per cent. The MPs of IU (Izquierda Unida, United Left) serve on a proportionally higher number of committees than other groups and the differences cannot be explained by variations in the number of seats the parliamentary groups have. Similar differences exist if we look at the issue of committee diversity. In the case of the PP, 28 per cent of MPs serving on a committee work on a single policy issue. This is mainly explained by the fact that 21 per cent serve on only one committee. Therefore, only 7 per cent have served on more than one committee on the same policy topic. In the case of the PSOE, 21 per cent of MPs have focused on a single policy area, but of these only 5 per cent have attended more than one committee. The percentages are similar in the case of non-​mainstream 157

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parties, with the exception of the far left, whose MPs proportionally attend more committees on more diverse policy areas. In addition, the MPs of the far left spend less time on committees (446 days on average) than the rest of the groups (PP 799 days, PSOE 766, CIU 776, PNV 664, and CC 786). If we focus only on MPs serving on one committee, these MPs could achieve specialisation if they do committee work for a long time. The data show that on average MPs of the PP and the PSOE stay 757 and 762 days on committees respectively. Results are similar for CIU (734 days) and slightly lower in the case of PNV (619 days) and ERC (587). The MPs of CC are those that remain longest in office (915 days) and those of IU stay less time (372 days). However, while this data can shed some light on the specialisation of MPs, more research is required that considers MPs’ careers and professional profiles. Finally, regarding the chamber’s internal resources, the main question is to what extent these help Spanish committees to perform better policy analysis. Some comparative research on the topic suggests that the Spanish parliament has less resources than other European parliaments. Pendás (1990) noted that the French and Italian chambers had three times as many public servants as Spain. However, to our knowledge, there is no research that empirically explores the chamber’s personal and economic resources and their evolution from the transition to democracy to the present. The legal dispersion and the lack of a common regulatory framework until the approval of the Chamber Staff Statute in 2008 made it difficult to conduct such a task. However, it is possible to track the evolution of some staff in recent legislatures, mainly lawyers who have more important functions in guiding and assisting MPs and parliamentary groups in committee work in Spain.7 The standing rules establish that lawyers will provide committees with the necessary legal and technical advice to facilitate committee work and will be responsible for writing the corresponding reports and judgements, reflecting the outcome of adopted agreements. They appear in the composition of committees in the tenth legislature (2000–​4), when 34 legal advisers were working on parliamentary committees. This number increased slightly in the next two legislatures, reaching 42 and 46. Following the start of the economic crisis, the number of legal assistants decreased to 38, mirroring a decrease in the number of permanent legislative committees. In the short 2016 legislature, there were 36 legal advisers, reaching 65 (including both Rajoy’s and Sánchez’s governments) in the 2016–​19 legislature. It is not possible from this data to draw conclusions on the relationship between committee staff and their efficiency or capacity to conduct policy analysis. However, in all legislatures the committee that proportionally has more lawyers is the committee on internal rules, focused on reforming the rules that govern the working of the parliamentary institution. This shows that these staff are not primarily providing support on tasks related to public policies. Lawyers who participate in parliamentary committees are part of the bureaucratic structure of the chamber. Namely, they are assigned to the committee, but there 158

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are also resources assigned to parliamentary groups. The chamber rules establish an economic allocation, financed by the chamber’s general budget, for each parliamentary group set up to assist them in their parliamentary tasks. However, it is difficult to know how these resources are used, whether they are devoted to counselling on parliamentary tasks or something else (Tudela, 2009; González-​ Juliana, 1994). Groups have to keep accounts of the expenses, but they need to make this information available only when specifically requested by the chamber board. There are no public records of these accounts. As this economic allocation is comprised of a fixed part and another part depends on the group’s number of seats, it might further reinforce asymmetries among groups due to resources provided by party structures, for example. Big party structures can facilitate access to administrative and legal staff, or think tanks providing support for policy analysis tasks within and outside the parliamentary arena. Those who have explored the parliamentary administration from a qualitative perspective (see Herránz, 2002; García-​Escudero, 2003, 2004; Miralles, 2006a, 2006b; Tudela, 2009, 2010) have already highlighted a number of shortcomings that need to be addressed and that are relevant in the context of exploring the policy analysis capacity of Spanish parliamentary committees. First, the monopoly of lawyers as the most important staff is questionable. Staff specialised in other areas should be incorporated to counsel on specific issues, especially given the increasing complexity of policy problems. To achieve this, some legislatures have already created Technology Assessment Offices to promote evidence informed policy-​making (see Cruz-​Castro and Sanz-​Menéndez, 2005). The Science in Parliament campaign (www.cienciaenelparlamento.org) launched by a team of scientists is campaigning to create an office of this type in Spain. So far, the initiative has obtained the support of the congress, which has committed to the creation of a Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology Advice (Santillán-​ García et al, 2020). Second, it is also necessary to halt endogamic trends, promote a change in administrative culture, and put an end to the excessive proximity between staff and political power, as a means to improve the capacity of the chamber’s staff to contribute to better decisions.

Conclusion With regards to the scope of policy analysis, this chapter has illustrated that from 1982 to 2019, there has been an increase in the number of parliamentary committees over time, and in the number of issues on which they conduct their activities. Chapter 2 signalled that along the 19th century, they worked as institutional settings to make arguments in favour of or against major policy reforms, mainly on the areas of railway design, tariff reform, or agrarian issues. During the actual democratic period, issue diversity has significantly grown, illustrating the increasing complexity of societies, the expansion of the welfare state, and the regulatory dimension of the public sector but also the advent of critical junctures, variations in partisan preferences, or in the type of government. 159

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Broader cultural and social changes have also played a role, as illustrated by the inclusion of issues like environment or gender violence on the agenda of both left-​and right-​wing parties in recent decades. When issues become of interest to large parts of the public, it is costly to remove them from the political agenda. Yet, as Senén (2018) argues, the increase in the number of committees runs the risk of diluting their political importance. The existence of more committees does not necessarily translate into these committees conducting better policy analysis. Indeed, the opposite is true if the committees do not have more resources and time to conduct quality committee work. Concerning the type of policy analysis conducted by Spanish parliamentary committees, conclusions mainly point to a political rather than fact-​driven type of analysis. However, as emphasised in the introduction, policy analysis can hardly be separated from politics. The influence of political factors can be traced back to the structure and composition of committees. It is seen in a number of ways, including the resources that committees use to conduct their activities. Committees rely on extra-​parliamentary resources, such as the participation of interest groups, public officials, and authorities in parliamentary appearances. As Chaqués-​ Bonafont and Muñoz (2016) demonstrated, the involvement of interest groups responds to variations in the type of government and the politicisation of issues, among other factors. The purpose of their participation, and consequently of the policy analysis activity conducted by committees, is technical but also deeply political. The involvement of public officials and authorities in committee tasks is overall higher than that of interest groups but they participate less in legislative activities. Interestingly, unlike interest groups, it seems that their participation in parliamentary appearances is not related to variations in the type of government. This could be explained by the purpose of the policy analysis that these public officials might conduct and whether it is more closely related to the technical requirements of legislation and implementation details than to assisting in the definition of policy goals. However, this is something that needs to be confirmed in future research, considering the public officials’ background and connection to political power. Regardless of their specific goals, the fact that appearances of interest groups and public officials and authorities are proportionally more closely related to overseeing activities than to legislative ones indicates that they play a modest role in policy analysis, at least in the policy design process in the parliamentary stage. Regarding internal resources, it seems that the specialisation of MPs in parliamentary committees is very low and not associated with the type of party. Even mainstream parties with more seats and parliamentary experience have a very low specialisation rate among their MPs. Namely, MPs participate in a very low number of committees on which they do not stay too long and if they attend more committees these tend to be on different policy areas. In Spain, there are structural biases caused, among other factors, by the procedures for committee assignments that hamper the specialisation of MPs and the working of Spanish parliamentary committees under an informational logic. This lack 160

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of specialisation does not seem to be widely compensated for by the human resources that the chamber makes available to MPs and parliamentary groups. Even if the situation has improved, the legal bias must be overcome by allowing the entry of specialists other than lawyers to conduct support tasks, as a way to improve the policy analysis capacity of parliamentary committees. Launching the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology Advice would definitely help to incorporate scientific advice, improving the chamber’s policy analysis capacity. This is especially important to compensate for the extra-​parliamentary resources that come from party structures or support from think tanks, for example. As these respond to political interests, they might create considerable asymmetries among parliamentary groups in the policy analysis tasks they conduct in the parliamentary arena. Notes 1

2

3 4

5

6 7

In all the figures the last legislature (2016–​19) is split to show variations between the government led by Mariano Rajoy and that of Pedro Sánchez, as a result of the motion of censure voted on 1 June 2018. The increase in the number of committees in the second term (from 16 to 22) is partly explained by the fact that four of these 22 committees are replacements. Therefore, the maximum number of committees working simultaneously during the legislature was 18. Only the scientific investigation committee was eliminated and no new committees were created. The committee board sets the agenda for each session. Subcommittees and working groups can also invite interest groups, public officials, and authorities. However, no systematic public data is gathered on this type of appearances. We considered all committees attended by MPs at legislature level (if they attended the same committee in different legislatures these were considered different committees and the average was taken). The data does not include MPs from the 2016–​19 legislature when, at the time of creating the dataset, they had not concluded their committee work so there was no information on a leaving date. We coded the committee’s main topic. As only one code can be assigned to each committee, those including more than one topic were coded considering the first of the issues mentioned. There are others like documentarists and administrative staff, but much fewer than lawyers.

References Adler, E.S. and Wilkerson, J.D. (2013) Congress and the Politics of Problem Solving, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Aldrich, J.H. (1995) Why parties? The origin and transformation of political parties in America, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Baumgartner, F.R., Berry, J.M., Hojnacki, M., Leech, B.L., and Kimball, D.C. (2009) Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why, Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Borzel, T.A. (2000) ‘Why there is no “southern problem”: On environmental leaders and laggards in the European Union’, Journal of European Public Policy, 7(1): 141–​62.

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Caballero, G. (2006) ‘La economía política de la organización industrial del Congreso de Diputados en España: Derechos de propiedad, transacciones y jerarquías’, El Trimestre Económico, LXXIII 3(291): 637–​65. Caballero, G. (2007) ‘Comisiones, grupos parlamentarios y diputados en la gobernanza del Congreso de los Diputados’, Revista de Estudios Políticos, 135: 67–​107. Chaqués-​Bonafont, L. (2020) ‘Parliamentary lobbying’, in P. Harris, A. Bitonti, C. Fleisher, and A. Skorkjær Binderkrantz (eds) The Palgrave Encyclopedia of Interest Groups, Lobbying and Public Affairs, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 90–​112. Chaqués-​Bonafont, L. and Muñoz, L.M. (2016) ‘Explaining interest group access to parliamentary committees’, West European Politics, 39(6): 1276–​98. Chaqués-​Bonafont, L., Palau, A., and Baumgartner, F.R. (2015) Agenda dynamics in Spain, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Cruz-​Castro, L. and Sanz-​Menéndez, L. (2005) ‘Politics and institutions: European parliamentary technology assessment’, Technological Forecasting and Social Change, 72(4): 429–​48. Damgaard, E. and Jensen, H. (2006) ‘Assessing strength and weakness in legislatures: The case of Denmark’, The Journal of Legislative Studies, 12(3–​4): 426–​42. Diermeier, D. (2014) ‘Formal models of legislatures’, in The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 29–​56. Dunn, W.N. (2016) Public Policy Analysis: An Introduction, London: Routledge. García-​Escudero, P. (2003) ‘La ponencia en el procedimiento legislativo en las Cortes Generales’, Revista de las Cortes Generales, 74: 141–​215. García-​Escudero, P. (2004) ‘Parlamento y futuro, los retos de la administración parlamentaria’, Asamblea, Revista parlamentaria de la Asamblea de Madrid, 10(18): 3–​10. Gilligan, T.W. and Krehbiel, K. (1990) ‘Organization of informative committees by a rational legislature’, American Journal of Political Science, 34(2): 531–​64. González-​Juliana, A. (1994) ‘Las subvenciones a los grupos políticos en las asambleas legislativas españolas’, Revista Digital de Derecho Administrativo, 11(1): 77–​113. Griffith, J. and Leston-​Bandeira, C. (2012) ‘How are parliaments using new media to engage with citizens?’, The Journal of Legislative Studies, 18(3–​4): 496–​513. Herranz, F.J.B. (2002) ‘Modernización de los parlamentos: nuevas herramientas de gestión para su organización y funcionamiento’, in F. Pau (ed) El Parlamento del siglo XXI, Madrid: Tecnos, pp 157–​87. Krehbiel, K. (2004) ‘Legislative organization’, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 18(1): 113–​28. Laver, M. and Shepsle, K.A. (1994) ‘Cabinet ministers and government formation in parliamentary democracies’, in M. Laver and K.A. Shepsle (eds) Cabinet ministers and parliamentary government, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp 3–​12.

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Laver, M. and Shepsle, K.A. (1996) Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Martin, L.W. and Vanberg, G. (2020) ‘Coalition government, legislative institutions, and public policy in parliamentary democracies’, American Journal of Political Science, 64(2): 325–​40. Mattson, I. and Strøm, K. (1995) ‘Parliamentary committees’, in H. Döring (ed), Parliaments and majority rule in Western Europe, New York: St. Martin’s Press, pp 249–​307. Miralles, J.L. (2006a) ‘La administración parlamentaria: una visión comparada a nivel autonómico’, in P. Oñate (ed), Organización y funcionamiento de los parlamentos autonómicos, Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, pp 341–​70. Miralles, J.L. (2006b) ‘Reforma estatutaria e Institución parlamentaria’, in G.J. Ruíz-R ​ ico (ed) La reforma de los Estatutos de Autonomía: actas del IV Congreso de la Asociación de Constitucionalistas de España, Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch, pp 679–​706. Murphy, J. (2020) ‘Towards parliamentary full cycle engagement in the legislative process: Innovations and challenges’, The Journal of Legislative Studies, 26(3): 469–​93. Pendás, B. (1990) ‘Procedimiento legislativo y calidad de las leyes’, Revista española de derecho constitucional, 28: 75–​110. Rourke, Francis E. (1984) Bureaucratic Power in Public Politics, Boston, MA: Little, Brown and Co. Russell, M. and Cowley, P. (2016) ‘The policy power of the Westminster parliament: The “parliamentary state” and the empirical evidence’, Governance, 29(1): 121–​37. Saalfeld, T. and Strøm, K.W. (2014) ‘Political parties and legislators’, in S. Martin, T. Saalfeld and K. Strøm (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Legislative Studies, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 371–​98. Sánchez de Dios, M. (1999) ‘Parliamentary party discipline in Spain’, in S. Bowler, D.M. Farrell and R.S. Katz (eds) Party Discipline and Parliamentary Government, Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press, pp 141–​62. Santillán-​García, A., Oliver, E., Shamagian, L.G., Climent, A.M. and Melchor, L. (2021) ‘Ciencia en el Parlamento: La necesidad de una oficina parlamentaria de asesoramiento científico y tecnológico’, Gaceta Sanitaria, 35(3): 293–​7. Senén, M. (2018) ‘Comisiones legislativas permanentes’, Revista de las Cortes Generales, 103: 367–​98. Strøm, K. (1998) ‘Parliamentary committees in European democracies’, The Journal of Legislative Studies, 4(1): 21–​59. Tudela, J. (2009) ‘La posición del diputado en el Parlamento español desde un estudio de los reglamentos internos de los grupos parlamentarios’, Asamblea: revista parlamentaria de la Asamblea de Madrid, 20: 157–​200. Tudela, J. (2010) ‘La Administración parlamentaria en la encrucijada de la renovación’, Corts: Anuario de derecho parlamentario, 23: 157–​91.

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Vila, B. (2008) ‘Las Subcomisiones parlamentarias: una propuesta más en la mejora de la calidad técnica de los trabajos legislativos’, Revista de las Cortes Generales, 73: 111–​47. Weiss, C.H. (1989) ‘Congressional committees as users of analysis’, Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 8(3): 411–​31. Workman, S., Shafran, J., and Bark, T. (2017) ‘Problem definition and information provision by federal bureaucrats’, Cognitive Systems Research, 43: 140–​52.

164

NINE

Policy analysis and public opinion Laura Chaqués-​Bonafont, Mónica Méndez Lago, and Yeimy Ospina

Introduction Public opinion surveys provide critical information about the public’s issue priorities and policy positions. They provide insights into citizens’ ideas, beliefs, preferences, attitudes, values and opinions, and provide information on what they want from their government. In a democracy, policy-​makers define policy priorities, take political decisions and adapt existing policies, taking into account citizens’ preferences on issues (see Page, 1994; Przeworski et al, 1999). As Gallup (1957: 27) pointed out long ago, ‘Without polls, [elites] would be guided only by letters to congressmen, the lobbying of pressure groups, and the reports of political henchmen’. A large body of studies focuses on the link between public opinion data and policy-​making (see Rothmayr and Hardmeier, 2002; Petry and Mendelson, 2004; Heith, 2004; Druckman and Jacobs, 2006; Font et al, 2015; Berinsky, 2017). Some authors (Chaqués-​Bonafont and Palau, 2011; Soroka and Wlezien, 2010; Green-​Pedersen and Walgrave, 2014; Baumgartner et al, 2019) focus on policy responsiveness and explain the conditions under which public opinion and political decisions correspond. In particular, Page and Shapiro (1992) demonstrate that policy changes follow shifts in public opinion (the US from the 1930s to the 1980s). In the case of Spain, Chaqués-​Bonafont and Palau (2011) show that policy-​makers follow the public’s issue priorities with significant differences across issues and political activities. Other authors (Druckman and Jacobs, 2006; Font et al, 2015) focus on a previous step and describe the type of public opinion surveys used by governments. These studies give an overview of the extent to which public opinion data is available, whether public or/​and private institutions conduct this research, whether public institutions directly carry out survey research or rather outsource it to private institutions, and about which issues there are data available. This chapter relates to this second kind of study. Its goal is to shed light on public opinion survey data in Spain. The analysis relies on a novel dataset containing all the surveys carried out from 1978 to 2018 by the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS), the leading public opinion data producer in Spain. For each survey, we have collected information about the survey’s issues, the policy actor that commissioned the study, the target population, and the survey’s geographical scope. The analysis does not consider public opinion data 165

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private companies produce because, in most cases, it is not publicly available, and it constitutes a marginal share of the production of this type of survey data.1 The analysis does not consider public opinion data that only covers a region in Spain. Other public institutions similar to the CIS work at a subnational level, such as the Gabinete de Prospección Sociológica (Polling Cabinet) in the Basque Country since 1996 or the Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió (Opinion Study Centre) in Catalonia since 2005. These institutions only provide public opinion data at a regional level. The analysis of the period between 1978 until 2018 illustrates public opinion surveys carried out by the CIS increasingly focused on policies instead of politics. Compared to the 1980s and early 1990s, survey data increasingly inform about citizens’ preferences regarding policy issues and less about elections and voting behaviour. Also, results illustrate that only a few public opinion surveys report about citizens’ preferences towards existing regulations and government performance, with some exceptions, mainly health-​related surveys. Regarding the issues included in public opinion surveys, results illustrate surveys have increasingly provided detailed information about citizens’ preferences about the economy or the functioning of public services. In contrast, issues related to intergovernmental relations have declined dramatically to almost disappear from the CIS agenda. Finally, results illustrate that most surveys cover Spain’s whole territory, but sample sizes are usually not large enough to allow for a comparison across regions. Most of the surveys are addressed to Spanish nationals, thus, given the increase in immigration rates in Spain, from the mid-​2000, a large part of surveys do not provide information about the preferences of around 12 per cent of the population residing in Spain. The chapter argues public opinion survey data varies depending on party preferences and changing social and economic conditions. The chapter is organised as follows. The first section explains the origins, regulations, and features of the CIS, while the second describes the characteristics of the 2,087 surveys and studies carried out by this institution from 1978 to 2019. The third section explains the types of public opinion surveys. The fourth explains the issues on which public opinion surveys focus and how they change across time, taking as explanatory factors party preferences and changing political and economic conditions. In the last section, there is a summary of the results and a discussion of lines for future research.

Public opinion research output in Spain: the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas The origins of public opinion surveys in Spain date back to the 1960s. In 1963, the Instituto de Opinión Pública (IOP, Public Opinion Institute) was created as a public institution under the supervision of Manuel Fraga Iribarne, Minister of Information and Tourism, to conduct public opinion surveys in Spain. During the same period, a few market research companies and institutions, like the Fomento de Estudios Sociales y Sociología Aplicada (FOESSA, Organisation 166

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for the Promotion of Social Studies and Applied Sociology), were created to conduct social and political surveys. Creating these public and private institutions indicates the increasing importance of survey research data for political purposes (Giner, 1983: 185–​6). During the transition to democracy, the IOP changed its name to the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, adapting the way it operated to the new democratic political scenario. From the late 1970s onwards, the CIS became a central institution in Spanish politics, intended to provide public opinion data on Spanish society and politics to policy-​makers, academia, the media, and the general public (Torres Albero, 2003: 34). The CIS played a crucial role during the transition to democracy, as some of the most relevant political decisions, such as the legalisation of the Communist Party in 1977, partially relied on public opinion data. It also played a role in expanding social sciences in Spain. Since its origins, the CIS promoted an academic orientation of survey activities and forged strong links with universities (see the interviews with former CIS directors in Torres Albero, 2003, Chuliá, 2015). As a result, the CIS gradually became a hybrid organisation between a ‘presidential pollster’, a social scientific and academic-​oriented research organisation, and a survey data provider for public administration and policy-​makers. As we shall see throughout the chapter, the tension between these three roles has characterised the evolution of the CIS ever since its creation. Since 1978, the CIS has been a public institution attached to the Spanish government.2 The Spanish government appoints the director of the CIS, who represents the institution, oversees the senior management of the institution, promotes and coordinates activities, and develops the annual programme of activities. Since 1978, 11 men and 3 women have occupied the directorship of the CIS. Almost all of them have an academic background in sociology or political science, strengthening the CIS’s academic research orientation. To date, the appointment and dismissal of virtually all the CIS’s directors occurred right after a new party got into office, which indicates the strong connection between the CIS director and the party in government (see Torres Albero, 2003) (Table 9.1). The privileged position of the Spanish government in having access to the CIS survey data is one of the most debated aspects of the CIS activities (Torres Albero, 2003: 35). The controversy is more intense regarding election forecasts, pre-​election, post-​election surveys, and voting intention surveys. Pre-​election surveys are a source of extreme attention from the media, politicians, and the general population, while academics mostly use post-​election surveys. Policy actors recognise the importance of the CIS as a public institution that promotes survey data and, more generally, scientific insight into Spanish society and politics. The problem is that during its early years most data and studies were not fully available to the public or stakeholders. The Law 39/​1995 of 19 December on the Organisation of the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas changed some crucial aspects concerning disseminating survey data and the Institute’s relations with the Spanish government 167

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Table 9.1: Directors of the Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas CIS director

Term begins

Term ends

Governing party

Juan Díez Nicolás

October 1976

April 1979

UCD

Rafael López Pintor

April 1979

January 1983

UCD

Julián Santamaría Ossorio

January 1983

March 1987

PSOE

Rosa Conde Gutiérrez del Álamo

March 1987

July 1988

PSOE

Luis Rodríguez Zúñiga

September 1988

May 1991

PSOE

Joaquín Arango Vila-​Belda

July 1991

May 1996

PSOE

Pilar del Castillo Vera

May 1996

April 2000

PP

Ricardo Montoro Romero

May 2000

May 2004

PP

Fernando Vallespín Oña

May 2004

May 2008

PSOE

Belén Barreiro Pérez-​Pardo

May 2008

September 2010

PSOE

Ramón Ramos Torre

September 2010

January 2012

PSOE

Félix Requena Santos

January 2012

December 2016

PP

Cristóbal Torres Albero

December 2016

June 2018

PP

José Félix Tezanos Tortajada

June 2018

PSOE

Source: Own elaboration

and parliament. Since the late 1990s, the CIS director has reported on the Institute’s activities through regular reports through a parliamentary hearing. Also, regulatory change was oriented to define which surveys and microdata should be available and on which terms. Before 1995, publishing survey data was not compulsory, and the rules and formal procedures regarding data access and publication were rather vague. As a result, the CIS director could decide which survey data was available to the public, when, and how. The 1995 Act stated that all CIS public surveys and studies that included questions regarding voting intention and rating party leaders and the performance of government or the opposition should be accessible to the public within 15 days of completing fieldwork and registering the data. In the case of all other surveys and studies, the timing for data publication varies between three months and one year, depending on which institution commissioned the study. In the case of surveys commissioned by ministries and other public administrations, they had exclusive use of the data for up to one year, after which the data would be accessible to all users through the CIS Data Bank. Interestingly, these changes only occurred soon after the Spanish Socialist Party (Partido Socialista Obrero Español, PSOE) lost its absolute majority of parliamentary seats in 1993. New communication technologies have reinforced this trend towards facilitating greater access to survey data. In 1998, the CIS launched a website for the first time, which significantly promoted the dissemination of its surveys, studies, and other activities. Since 2009, CIS survey microdata has been readily available and free of charge through its webpage. The number of downloads of microdata files 168

Policy analysis and public opinion

has increased from around 500 in 2008 to over 10,000 in 2011 and over 25,000 in 2017.3

Public opinion data produced by the CIS: an overview The empirical analysis presented in this chapter relies on a novel dataset that contains information on all the surveys and qualitative studies carried out by the CIS from 1978 to 2018, either by the Institute itself or, in a very few cases, outsourced to private firms that conducted the fieldwork (Table 9.2). All the information included in the dataset has been directly gathered from the CIS website (ww.cis.es), which provides information on the contents and the main methodological features of each survey or qualitative study. The dataset contains 2,083 studies (2,008 surveys and 75 qualitative studies). For each of the 2,008 surveys, we have collected data on the issues covered by each survey, whether it includes questions about specific laws, regulations, or policy decisions, the organisation that commissioned the study (whether it was commissioned by the CIS or an external public institution, such as a ministry or a regional government), the target population covered, and the territorial scope of each survey. Concerning the qualitative studies, we have just coded the main issue(s) covered in each case. The dataset classifies the CIS public opinion studies into seven categories in line with the classification used by the CIS on its website: monthly barometers, Consumer Confidence Index surveys (CCI), electoral surveys (including referenda), international surveys, commissioned surveys (that is, conducted on request from other public administration departments), other monographic surveys, and qualitative studies. As Table 9.2 illustrates, electoral studies account for 30 per cent of all surveys (626 surveys since 1978), followed by monographic surveys (23 per cent) and monthly barometers (20 per cent). Qualitative studies have a marginal role in the CIS’s activities (about 4 per cent of all studies). Each type of survey has different potential uses from the perspective of policy-​making. Monographic and commissioned surveys generally provide in-​ depth analysis on one issue. The main difference is that monographic surveys are included in the CIS annual budget, and commissioned studies are formally requested and funded by other institutions, including many policy actors, from civic associations to state-​owned companies (for example, Iberia before its privatisation). The questionnaires used in international surveys are usually the same in all the countries participating in the survey project. Hence, they provide information on Spain’s standpoint on different issues and allow to carry out comparative analyses with other countries. Barometers have been conducted regularly (monthly since the end of the 1980s), and their questionnaires share a standard set of sociodemographic and political questions over time. They also include questions about the past, current, and prospective evaluation of the economic and political situation and Spain’s most important problem (MIP). The MIP data is available from 1993 169

Policy Analysis in Spain

Table 9.2: Descriptive statistics –​CIS studies (1978–​2018) Type

Year first launched

N

%

Barometer

1979

417

Commissioned

1978

367

Qualitative

1978

75

Electoral

1978

626

CCI

2011

86

International

1994

31

Monographic

1978

481

Total

1978

2,083

Annual mean

Issues (mean)

Std dev.

20.02

10.69

1.22

0.513

17.62

9.18

1.27

0.613

3.60

1.88

1.15

0.456

30.05

15.65

1.01

0.122

4.13

12.29

1

0

1.49

1.29

1.81

1.108

23.04

12.03

1.12

0.365

52.075

1.13

0.507

100

Note: The annual mean refers to the number of surveys. Source: Own elaboration based on CIS data (www.cis.es)

onwards on an irregular basis, but only monthly since 2000. It provides critical insights into what citizens identify as the most important issues for the country. As shown in previous studies (Chaqués-​Bonafont and Palau, 2011; Chaqués-​ Bonafont et al, 2015), the MIP is an essential tool that policy-​makers consider when defining their issue priorities in and outside of the government’s agenda. The more the public identifies a policy area as relevant, the more political debates there are in the parliamentary arena and the media. Aside from this stable core set of questions, each barometer also contains additional questions on particular issues. The CCI survey is a much more recent feature of the CIS’s research agenda. It was first issued by the CIS in November 2011, after taking over from the institution that had previously prepared the index, the Instituto de Crédito Oficial (State Finance Agency). Since then, it has been calculated monthly to capture consumer attitudes and behaviour. In contrast to most other surveys carried out by the CIS in the period covered in this chapter, the CCI survey is conducted using telephone interviews rather than face-​to-​face interviews. Lastly, the CIS has conducted at least one pre-​election and one post-​election survey in every election –​national, subnational, or European election –​held from 1978.4 Pre-​election surveys tend to be shorter and concentrate on questions regarding voting intention. In contrast, post-​election questionnaires include a wider variety of questions, and they have been used for studying political and electoral behaviour in academic research. We reviewed the questionnaires of every survey to identify the main policy areas covered in each survey following the methodology of the Comparative Agendas Project (CAP, www.comparativeagendas.com), as detailed in Table 9.A1 in the appendix. In some cases, questionnaires gave different policy areas roughly equal attention. For example, a questionnaire may have the same number of questions on perceptions about the economy, the labour market, and research technologies. In that case, these three policy areas will be coded 170

Policy analysis and public opinion

for the same survey. The number of policy areas covered in each survey ranges from one to five, although most public opinion surveys mainly focus on one policy area (89 per cent of the surveys). For reliability purposes, we compared those results with the classification used by the CIS, which can be accessed via its website. The correlation between both classifications is high and positive for all issues. We have also identified whether the survey includes any specific question about a particular law, a governmental or parliamentary bill MPs debate in parliament, or a policy proposal. This indicator assesses whether surveys are aimed to capture the public’s view of one specific policy decision before or after it has been taken or implemented. Lastly, for each survey, we have identified the sample size, the territorial scope, and the target population (for example, a survey may be aimed at the general population, all residents in Spain, only those with Spanish nationality, specific subgroups, either defined in terms of age or another criterion such as place of birth, residence, and nationality). In the case of the geographical scope, we mainly look at whether the survey covers the whole country, a specific region/​subset of regions, and/​or cities. The rest of the chapter describes how public opinion surveys evolve, which issues these surveys cover, and whether they include specific questions about laws, regulations, government decisions/​measures, and the definition of the target population. To describe survey data, we also consider contextual information –​ such as the date of the survey, the term/​legislature, whether or not the year in question was an election year, the governing party in Spain at a national level, and the CIS director at the time each survey is conducted.

Social and political surveys over time Figure 9.1 shows the annual number of studies carried out by the CIS since 1978. Overall, the number of surveys has decreased since the late 1970s, with significant differences by type of survey. The number of barometers and commissioned, international, and CCI surveys have increased over time, while the opposite occurs in the case of qualitative studies and monographic and electoral surveys. Very similar conclusions are reached when considering the number of individual interviews in each survey (using the achieved sample size instead of surveys as the units of analysis). The number of monographic surveys decreased significantly after the mid-​ 1990s, from an annual average of 20 monographic surveys from 1978 to 1995, to six from 1996 to 2018. In contrast, the surveys commissioned by other organisations increased from an annual average of seven from 1978 to 1995 to 11 after 1995. Changing regulations in 1995 may explain this dramatic increase. Commissioned surveys were among the few surveys on which the CIS could impose a year-​long embargo before the survey data was fully released. Hence, policy actors increasingly requested commissioned surveys to ensure exclusive access to survey data for one year. In other cases, the increase of commissioned 171

Policy Analysis in Spain

Figure 9.1: Evolution of surveys over time by type (absolute numbers) 160 140 120 100 80 60 40

Qualitative

Commissioned

ICC

International

Monographic

8 –1 16

5 –1 11

20

1 08 20

Barometer

20

–1

8 –0 04 20

00

–0

4

0 –2 96

19

20

00

6 –9 93

9

19

–8 86 19

–8

6

2

82 19

–8 79 19

19

77

–7

9

20

Electoral

Source: Own elaboration based on CIS data (www.cis.es)

surveys is linked to the good governance paradigm and the need to get information about citizens’ perceptions and preferences towards issues and policy decisions. Some ministerial departments have been particularly active in terms of requesting surveys. The Ministry of Health has commissioned the Health Barometer every year since 1995; the Ministry of Defence has commissioned the Defence and Armed Forces Survey, every year or every other year since 1997; the Institute for Youth has commissioned the surveys on Spanish youth every year from 1997 to 2014; and the Agency for the Evaluation of Public Policies and the Ministry of Public Administration have commissioned the surveys on the quality of public services regularly since 2006, while the surveys on attitudes towards immigration have been done annually from 1997. In contrast, regional governments have commissioned fewer surveys over time. In some cases, this reduction may be explained by the creation of regional survey institutions, such as the Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió in Catalonia (www.CEO.gencat.cat), whose purpose is similar to that of the CIS. Figure 9.1 also shows that the number of electoral surveys significantly diminished across time. Before the mid-​1990s, for the same election or referenda the CIS conducted several surveys. The obligation that came into force in 1995 to make electoral surveys available within a short period after data collection reduced this practice which gave the Spanish governments a privileged position in front of any other policy actor. The 1986 referendum on Spain remaining in NATO provides an excellent example of the impact of this change. Before winning 172

Policy analysis and public opinion

the general elections in October 1982, the Socialist Party campaigned against Spain being a member of NATO. Once in government, it changed its policy position and campaigned in favour of remaining within the organisation. The CIS launched 12 surveys between December 1985 and March 1986, right before the NATO referendum took place, designed to capture very detailed aspects of the public’s perceptions and policy positions on Spain’s situation within NATO. These data provided crucial information, which was used to design communication strategies during the referendum campaign. In the new regulatory context of greater transparency after 1995, it would have been difficult to justify the need to conduct 12 surveys on the same issue within less than five months.

Attention to policy areas in surveys In this section we analyse the issues covered by CIS surveys. As Table 9.3 illustrates, most CIS surveys focus on elections and political behaviour (44 per cent of the surveys) or social behaviour (9.6 per cent). These include questions about voting intention, policy-​maker performance assessment, participation and trust in political institutions, or the citizens’ ideology. Moreover, a significant number of surveys are aimed at tracking changes in social behaviour, including questions about everyday leisure, holidays, social relations, family relationships, religion, reading habits, media and cultural consumption, knowledge of languages, sports practice, healthy habits, and future expectations, among other factors. Most surveys dealing with policy areas other than elections and social perceptions focus on the economy, taxes, and fiscal policy (about 9 per cent), followed by governmental issues (about 6.4 per cent), healthcare (6.3 per cent), and working conditions (2.2 per cent). Governmental issues include surveys about the functioning of public administration, the privatisation of public services, or, more broadly, the citizens’ evaluation of the performance of the government, the parliament, and other institutions. In the case of labour, surveys include questions about unemployment, trade unions, employer relations, and, to a lesser extent, youth employment and working conditions. Table 9.3 also shows that a large number of CIS surveys are designed to capture the public’s attitudes on welfare-​related issues, especially healthcare and, to a lesser extent, family (2.2 per cent), gender (2 per cent), and education (1.3 per cent). Surveys dealing with health mainly focus on understanding citizens’ perceptions of how public healthcare services function and the regulation of particular issues, mainly tobacco, alcohol, and illegal drugs. In contrast to education and other social policy issues, most health surveys are monographic studies designed to gather in-​depth data about citizens’ perceptions of healthcare services. Similarly, surveys dealing with health are mainly commissioned by the Ministry of Health and only occasionally by universities and research institutes. Regional governments do not commission these surveys, despite having political autonomy to regulate and implement decisions about welfare-​related issues in their region. Further analysis is required to assess the extent to which regional governments 173

Policy Analysis in Spain

Table 9.3: Percentage of surveys by policy area Policy area

Elections and political behaviour

%

44.0

Social behaviour

9.6

Macroeconomics

6.6

Government

6.4

Health

6.3

Labour

2.6

Family issues

2.2

Defence

2.2

Gender

2.0

European Union

1.8

Crime and justice

1.8

Foreign affairs

1.7

Culture

1.6

Immigration

1.6

Intergovernmental relations

1.5

New technologies

1.5

Education

1.3

Environment

1.0

Elderly and care policies

0.9

Rights

0.7

Energy

0.6

Social policy and participation

0.5

Agriculture

0.5

Housing

0.5

Transportation

0.3

Commerce and banking

0.3

Source: Own elaboration based on CIS data (www.cis.es)

obtain information about the public’s perception of these issues through means other than the CIS surveys. Lastly, a smaller percentage of CIS surveys deal with foreign affairs (mainly the EU), defence, agriculture, transportation, or new issues, such as immigration, the environment, and new technologies. These policy areas are not among the CIS’s top priorities. They are included in CIS surveys quite sporadically, mainly to respond to particular events, such as an environmental catastrophe, a food safety scandal (for example, BSE), or controversial policy decisions (the government’s decision regarding the Iraq War). In the case of defence, most surveys deal with specific policy events, such as Spain’s entry into NATO in the mid-​1980s, the reform of the military service in the late 1990s, or the Iraq War in the first decade of this century. 174

Policy analysis and public opinion

Finally, on some occasions, the CIS has covered extensively particular issues as a response to academic research interest. This is the case of immigration, for which the CIS has conducted surveys regularly since the mid-​1990s. To launch a survey about immigration in the early 1990s was not a response to the importance of immigration as an issue –​immigrants represented less than 2 per cent of the total resident population before 2000 –​but most likely a response to academic research interests of the CIS directorate. The rapid growth of immigration from 2000, reaching more than 15 per cent of the resident population in Spain in 2005, explains the continuity of public opinion surveys dealing with immigration to 2018.

Variation in issue attention across time At first sight, Figures 9.2, 9.3 and 9.4 show three different trends regarding issue attention in public opinion surveys. First, public opinion surveys focus less and less on social and voting behaviour. The number of surveys about political competition decline dramatically after the mid-​1990s. By the same token, behavioural survey studies decline in relative terms from over 40 per cent of the surveys in the 1980s and early 1990s to less than 25 per cent from 1995. These results indicate public opinion surveys increasingly ask citizens about policy issues and less about voting behaviour. Second, the economy is the issue that gains most of the attention in the CIS’s public opinion surveys, with its relevance increasing dramatically after 2008. Third, attention on specific issues has decreased over the last few decades, despite being predominant on the political agenda. This is the case of intergovernmental relations, which declined from being the main topic in the early 1980s (around 7.6 per cent of the surveys) to almost disappear as a survey topic from 2010 onwards. Moreover, the number of questions about how government and political

Figure 9.2: Evolution of main survey topic, 1978–​2018

19 78 19 80 19 82 19 84 19 86 19 88 19 90 19 92 19 94 19 96 19 98 20 00 20 02 20 04 20 06 20 08 20 10 20 12 20 14 20 16 20 18

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0%

Political decentralisation

Economy

Social & political behaviour

Source: Own elaboration based on CIS data (www.cis.es)

175

Policy Analysis in Spain

Figure 9.3: Evolution of main survey topics, 1978–​2018: policy areas with increasing attention

Rights

Immigration

Health

Social Policy

2018

2016

2014

2012

2010

2008

2006

2004

2002

2000

1998

1996

1994

1992

1990

1988

1986

1984

1982

1980

1978

50% 45% 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5% 0%

Tecnology

Source: Own elaboration based on CIS data (www.cis.es)

Figure 9.4: Evolution of main survey topics, 1978–​2018: policy areas with decreasing attention 40% 35% 30% 25% 20% 15% 10% 5%

National security

Labour

2018

2016

2014

2012

2010

2008

2006

2004

2002

2000

1998

1996

1994

1992

1990

1988

1986

1984

1982

1980

1978

0%

Government and public services

Source: Own elaboration based on CIS data (www.cis.es)

institutions function falls in relative terms from around 10.7 per cent (16 surveys directly ask citizens about the functioning of political institutions and public services in the second and third legislature in the 1980s) to less than 6 per cent of surveys (11 surveys cover this issue in the tenth legislature, 2011–​15). In some cases, changing economic, political, and social conditions explain variations in the percentage of surveys dealing with specific policy areas while, in others, party preferences are the main explanation (Baumgartner and Jones, 176

Policy analysis and public opinion

1993). Once in government, political parties tend to request survey information about the public’s opinions on issues based on the policy promises made during the electoral campaign and the political agenda presented during the investiture debate. They do so to assess whether the public’s values and policy positions align with their party manifesto and, more precisely, their political agenda over their term of office. Furthermore, policy actors request public opinion data on unexpected political events during the term in office. For a more in-​depth analysis, we ran a simple OLS regression. The dependent variable is the percentage of surveys covering a specific issue in a particular year, and the independent variables are the party in government (PP=​1 and PSOE=​0) and time. The number of observations is 30, one per year from 1978 to 2018. We measure the probability that public opinion surveys ask questions about a particular topic due to party preferences, changing economic, social, and/​or political conditions, or both. Table 9.4 summarises the results. It shows that the conservative governments of the Partido Popular request significantly more surveys about public perceptions about the economy, healthcare services, and new technologies (significant coefficients). In contrast, socialist governments of the PSOE request significantly more surveys about social policy and rights-​ related issues. These results support previous research on agenda-​setting (Green-​Pedersen and Walgrave, 2014; Chaqués-​Bonafont et al, 2015; Baumgartner et al, 2019), which argues that political parties tend to pay more attention to the issues on which most citizens consider their party has a comparative advantage over their opponents. The PSOE is particularly interested in getting information on the public’s opinion on issues that play a crucial role in its political agenda, such as social inequality, rights issues, care policy, and other social policy issues. In contrast, the PP is more interested in getting information on citizens’ economic perceptions and healthcare and public service reforms. Table 9.4 also shows that, for most policy areas, differences in the preferences of the governing party cannot explain variations in the number of surveys over time. As Table 9.4 highlights, there are no significant differences in the percentage of surveys conducted by the CIS on national security (mainly terrorism) or immigration under PP and PSOE governments. In the case of terrorism, the share of surveys declines after the terrorist organisation Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) ceasefire in 2011, irrespective of which party is in power. Likewise, the percentage of surveys on the public perceptions of immigration increases from 2000 onwards, as the number of migrants entering the country rose exponentially, to reach more than 10 per cent of the country’s population in 2020. Other issues, such as the economy, are affected by both party preferences and changing economic conditions. Lastly, in contrast to other policy areas, the percentage of studies on the public’s perceptions of political decentralisation is neither linked to party preferences nor changing political and social conditions. As shown in Figure 9.2, the percentage of surveys covering attitudes towards political decentralisation and the functioning 177

Policy Analysis in Spain

Table 9.4: The evolution of the percentage of surveys by policy areas (1978–​2018) Issues

Time trends

Technology (PP)

Increases over time

Economy (PP) Health (PP) Social policy (PSOE) Immigration Rights National security

Decreases over time

Government Labour Foreign affairs (EU)

No significant variation over time

Defence Environment Education Note: The table shows the results of the OLS regression. ‘Decreases over time’ refers to issues with negative and significant coefficients for the variable time; ‘Increases over time’ refers to issues with positive and significant coefficients for the variable time. Issues for which attention significantly increases (significant coefficients) during PP or PSOE governments are indicated in brackets. Source: Own elaboration based on CIS data (www.cis.es)

of subnational institutions is exceptionally high from 1978 to 1985. Most of these surveys focus on the passing of regional constitutions (Estatutos de Autonomía) in the regions known as the historic Autonomous Communities (Andalusia, the Basque Country, Catalonia, and Galicia), while only a few cover particular aspects regarding political decentralisation. From the late 1990s to halfway through the following decade, public opinion surveys developed in line with the increasing delegation of jurisdiction over specific issues (mainly fiscal autonomy) to subnational governments, and the demands from some territories (the Basque Country and Catalonia) to increase their political autonomy. However, once political autonomy and independence movements became a top priority on the political agenda at the start of this century, public opinion surveys on this issue practically disappeared from the CIS agenda. Lastly, only a tiny proportion of CIS surveys (about 20 per cent) assess the public’s preferences towards existing regulations and government performance. In the 1980s and early 1990s, it was pretty uncommon to ask citizens about policy decisions or their implementation. During the socialist government’s last term under Felipe González (1993–​6), questions on the public’s opinion on particular regulations and their performance increased dramatically, before declining again during the two terms of the Popular Party government led by Aznar (1996–​2004). When the socialist government of Rodríguez Zapatero was in power (2004–​11), there was a significant increase in this type of question. This is interesting because it coincides 178

Policy analysis and public opinion

with the rise in surveys commissioned by other government departments and public institutions and indicates a shift towards using CIS surveys more explicitly for policy-​making purposes. However, after 2011, the use of this type of question declines dramatically to less than 10 per cent of surveys. The only exception is health-​related surveys, commissioned mainly by the Ministry of Health, including specific questions on existing regulations and policy implementation.

Territorial scope and target population Two additional matters are relevant in this analysis: the territorial scope and target population of the surveys. Regarding the territorial scope, only a few public opinion surveys cover one region (or Autonomous Community), and on most occasions, they are pre-​election or post-​election surveys covering a regional election (Figure 9.5). Also, the number of surveys covering one region has declined across time from the mid-​1990s to virtually disappear from the CIS agenda (except for regional elections). Results also indicate that most public opinion surveys carried out by the CIS are not designed to compare citizens’ preferences across issues and regions, with some exceptions. The Health Barometer is based on a yearly sample of nearly 7,000 individuals and thus allows for (cautious) comparison of results across regions. The survey on the quality of the evaluation of public services (Calidad de Servicios Públicos), conducted regularly since 2006 on commission from the Agency for the Evaluation of Public Policies and the Ministry of Public Administration, used in 2009 a large sample (8,000 individuals compared to 2,500 in other editions). Also, up to 2012, public opinion surveys dealing with issues like the territorial organisation of Spain, the development of the State of Autonomies, or intergovernmental relations, have a sample size of over 10,000 individuals,5 allowing for in-​depth comparison across issues and regions. However, from 2012

State-wide

Regional (one/several regions)

2018

2016

2014

2012

2010

2008

2006

2004

2002

2000

1998

1996

1994

1992

1990

1988

1986

1984

1982

1980

90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

1978

Number of surveys

Figure 9.5: Evolution of surveys by geographical scope

Province-local level

Source: Own elaboration based on CIS data (www.cis.es)

179

Policy Analysis in Spain

surveys about these matters almost disappeared from the CIS research agenda, even though they have remained prominent in the political arena. Hence, policy-​ makers lack information about the opinions of citizens living in different regions on specific policy areas, with the main exception of healthcare issues. Regarding the target population, CIS surveys have always considered ‘the Spanish population’, following the inertia of what its predecessor, the Instituto de Opinión Pública, did for a decade. Between the late 1970s and the end of the 1990s, the foreign population residing in Spain was so low that, in practical terms, referring to the ‘Spanish population’ was equivalent to the population with Spanish nationality and, for that matter, to the entire population residing in Spain. The increasing presence of a foreign/​immigrant population from the end of the 1990s onwards gradually changed the implications of the vague definition of ‘Spanish population’ used to define the target population, referring to Spanish nationality (Méndez et al, 2013). By the mid-​2000s, conducting a survey aimed at the ‘Spanish population’ (that is, Spanish nationals according to the CIS’s operationalisation) left out approximately 12 per cent of the adult population living in Spain (that is, people without Spanish nationality). The definition of the target population was first questioned in the surveys on subjects related to public policies and the provision of public services (see Figure 9.6). As a result, in 2003, for the first time, the population universe for the Health Barometer was the resident population in Spain and not just individuals holding Spanish nationality. It has since then remained the same in these particular surveys. The number of CIS surveys aimed at the resident population has increased gradually along with the variety of topics covered, including aspects such as the evaluation of public services, sexual health, and attitudes towards the treatment of terminally ill patients, among others. In the case of commissioned surveys, 70 per cent are aimed at the entire resident population, thus including non-​nationals. In contrast, virtually all the

Figure 9.6: Surveys by target population 1995–​2018 (absolute numbers) 80 60 50 40 30 20

Spanish/population with voting rights

2018

2017

2016

2015

2014

2013

2012

2011

2010

Resident population (including immigrants)

Source: Own elaboration based on CIS data (www.cis.es)

180

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

0

1999

10 1998

Number of surveys

70

Policy analysis and public opinion

monographic surveys and barometers still focus solely on Spanish nationals. Also, pre-​and post-​election surveys only use the Spanish population over 18 as the target, except for surveys related to local and European elections, in which residents from the European Union and a few non-​EU countries (in the case of local elections) have the right to vote. However, the target population is no longer decided ‘automatically’ or based on habit in recent years. This can be seen, for instance, in new studies such as the monthly survey carried out to produce the CCI, which includes the resident population over 16, regardless of their nationality.

Conclusion Public opinion survey data in Spain increasingly inform about citizens’ preferences towards policy issues, going beyond party competition and elections. Most CIS survey output focuses on voting intention and political and social behaviour, but the importance of these issues significantly decreases over time. The study of all the surveys carried out from 1978 to 2018 by the CIS illustrates that policy-​makers request information about citizens’ policy preferences with significant differences across issues. The economy and the functioning of public services occupy a privileged position on the CIS survey research agenda. In contrast, issues related to intergovernmental relations have declined dramatically to almost disappear from the CIS agenda. From the early 2010s, public opinion surveys do not provide in depth information about citizens’ attitudes towards one of the issues most citizens identify as the most important problem in Spain. The chapter argues that the issues the CIS includes in each survey vary across time depending on contextual factors and party preferences. Conservative governments significantly request more survey data about the economy and healthcare reform, and socialist governments about social inequality and rights related issues. However, survey data is quite stable for most issues, especially those related to the welfare state’s functioning. Also, governmental actors do not request much information about citizens’ opinions regarding particular laws, bills, or policy proposals, regardless of party ideology. Hence, surveys do not seem to be a tool policy-​makers regularly use to assess what citizens think about particular policy proposals and policy implementation. In line with the rest of the chapters in this volume, the lack of survey data might be related to the long-​standing lack of a tradition of ‘evidence-​based’ policy-​making in Spain and the low prevalence of evaluating public policies. This study also illustrates an increase in the number of surveys aimed at the whole resident population, rather than solely at Spanish nationals. But in the late 2010s, the target population in most surveys only cover Spanish nationals, disregarding the opinion of more than 12 per cent of people living in Spain. Moreover, most public opinion surveys are state-​wide, covering the whole territory of Spain. Still, the design and size of the survey samples do not usually 181

Policy Analysis in Spain

enable thorough comparisons of citizens, perceptions, values, and principles about policy areas across territories. The chapter also explains the role of the CIS as the primary institution producing survey data in Spain. The chapter argues the importance of changing regulations in the mid-​1995 to promote the transparency of the CIS’s activities and data access to the general population. Changing regulations also limited governmental actors’ privileged position in accessing public opinion data and generated a significant increase in the number of surveys conducted on commission from other public administrations. Leadership factors, such as the fact that CIS directors are virtually all academics, have fostered the transformation of the CIS between 1978 and 2018 from a ‘presidential pollster’ to a hybrid institution, providing public opinion data to advance academic research. Further research is needed to assess whether larger transparency of the CIS regarding data dissemination has encouraged policy-​makers to obtain data through other means, such as commissioning these studies from private firms. The lack of a register to collate information about all the surveys carried out with public funding makes it impossible to ascertain the extent to which this might be happening. In any case, future research on the existence and use of public opinion data for policy-​making purposes should certainly try to enlarge the focus to obtain information on public opinion surveys carried out by firms/​ organisations other than the CIS.

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Appendix

Table 9.A1: Coding scheme Code

CAP code equivalent

CIS category

Social behaviour

Not available

Comportamientos, población

Political/​electoral behaviour

Not available

Valores y actitudes

Technology

17. Research, technology and communication

Comunicación, Ciencia y tecnología

Rights

2. Rights, liberties, and issues related to minorities

Agriculture

4. Agriculture

Economy

1. Macroeconomy

Economía, ICC

15. Commerce and banking 1. Macroeconomy Education

6. Education and culture

Eduación

Government

20. Governmental issues

Política

Immigration

9. Immigration and refugee issues

National security

12. Crime and justice

Seguiridad ciudadana, terrorismo

Environment

7. Environment

Medio ambiente/​catástrofes

Social policy

1308. Work–​life balance and childcare

Familia, Mayores y dependencia

1303. Elderly issues and elderly assistance programmes

Participación social

13. Social policy Defence

16. Defence

Foreign affairs

19. Foreign affairs

Conflictos internacionales

Health

3. Health

Sanidad

Labour

5. Labour

Trabajo

Transportation

10. Transport

Transporte

Housing

14. Housing issues and community development

Vivienda

Political decentralisation

2001. Intergovernmental relations and local government

Autonomous Communities

Note: political decentralisation is coded as a subtopic of the government policy category. This subtopic is included in government unless otherwise indicated.

183

Policy Analysis in Spain

Notes 1

2 3 4

5

According to the 2018 annual report of the main association of marketing and public opinion firms, studies for NGOs and the public sector constituted around 2 per cent of their overall market activity: https://​ia-​esp​ana.org/​wp-​cont​ent/u ​ ploa​ ds/2​ 020/0​ 9/E ​ stud​ io-I​ ndustr​ ia-2​ 018. pdf (Accessed December 2021). From its creation, the CIS has been attached to the Ministerio de la Presidencia or the Vicepresidencia del Gobierno. Data obtained from the different CIS Annual Reviews of Activities (available at www.cis.es). In the case of municipal elections, the situation is quite heterogeneous; while, in the 1980s and early 1990s, a high number of surveys were carried out in large and medium-​sized Spanish cities, from the mid-​1990s onwards, the tendency has been to concentrate on just a few cities or not to do specific samples and just oversample the residents of large cities in surveys covering regional elections. These surveys are called ‘Instituciones y autonomías’ (CIS study 2286, 1998, sample size 10,046), ‘Instituciones y autonomías II’ (CIS study 2455, 2002, sample size 13,000), ‘Barómetro autonómico’ (CIS study 2610, 2005, sample size 10,547), ‘Barómetro autonómico II’ (CIS study 2829, 2010, sample size 10,500), and ‘Barómetro autonómico III’ (CIS study 2956, 2012, sample size 11,290).

References Baumgartner, Frank and Jones, Bryan D. (1993) Agendas and Instability in American Politics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Baumgartner, Frank, Breunig, Christian and Grossman, Emiliano (eds) (2019) Comparative Policy Agendas: Theory, Tools, Data, New York: Oxford University Press. Berinsky, Adam (2017) ‘Measuring public opinion with surveys’, Annual Review of Political Science, 20(1): 309–​29. Chaqués-​Bonafont, Laura and Palau, A.M. (2011) ‘Assessing the responsiveness of Spanish policymakers to the priorities of their citizens’, West European Politics, 34(4): 706–​30. Chaqués-​Bonafont, Laura, Baumgartner, F.R., and Palau, A. (2015) Agenda Dynamics in Spain, New York: Palgrave MacMillan. Chuliá, Elisa (2015), ‘El Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas y el studio de la opinion pública en España’, in Torres Albero, Cristóbal (ed.) España 2015. Situación Social, Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, pp 1518–​28. Druckman, James and Jacobs, Laurence (2006) ‘Lumpers and splitters: The public opinion information that politicians collect and use’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 70(4): 453–​76. Font, J., García, Patricia and Alarcón, Pau (2015) ‘Las Encuestas en las Administraciones Públicas Españolas: Evidencias Preliminares de un Escenario Multinivel’, Revista de Estudios Políticos, 170: 155–​85. Gallup, George (1957) ‘The changing climate for public opinion research’, Public Opinion Quarterly, 21(1): 23–​7. Giner, Juan Antonio (1983) ‘Political opinion polling in Spain’, in Robert M. Worcester (ed) Political Opinion Polling: An International Review, London: Macmillan. 184

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Green-​Pedersen, Christoffer and Walgrave, Stefaan (2014): Agenda Setting, Policies and Political Systems. A Comparative Approach. Chicago: Chicago University Press. Méndez, Mónica, Ferreras, Marisa, and Cuesta, María (2013) ‘Immigration and general population surveys in Spain’, in Joan Font and Mónica Méndez (eds) Surveying Ethnic Minorities and Immigrant Populations, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pp 195–​217. Page, Benjamin I. (1994) ‘Democratic responsiveness? Untangling the links between public opinion and policy’, Political Science and Politics, 27(1): 25–​9. Page, Benjamin I. and Shapiro, Robert Y. (1992) The Rational Public: Fifty Years of Trends in Americans’ Policy Preferences, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Petry, François and Mendelson, Matthew (2004) ‘Public opinion and policy making in Canada 1994–​2001’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, 37(3): 505–​29. Przeworski, A., Stokes, Susan C., and Manin, Bernard (eds) (1999) Democracy, Accountability, and Representation, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Rothmayr, Christine and Hardmeier, Sibylle (2002) ‘Government and polling: Use and impact of polls in the policymaking process in Switzerland’, International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 14(2): 123–​40. Soroka, Stuart N. and Wlezien, Christopher (2010) Degrees of Democracy: Politics, Public Opinion and Policy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Torres Albero, Cristóbal (2003) IOP/​CIS 1963–​2003: entrevistas a sus directores y presidentes, Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.

185

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Participatory institutions and advisory councils Joan Font and Pau Alarcón

Introduction Participatory institutions have become increasingly widespread in Western societies. From Irish citizens selected at random making decisions about their constitutional reforms through Citizen Assemblies, to German Länder using bottom-​up referenda more often, or almost 2,000 Polish municipalities discussing their finances through participatory budgeting, these institutions are more usual today than a few decades ago. Spain has also participated in this evolution, at a slower pace and with different characteristics, as will be discussed in this chapter. These institutions have been created for different reasons. In a context of growing political distrust, some of their promoters are especially concerned about improving the relationship between citizens and elected representatives, others want to create more educational opportunities for participation, while others consider them especially important to improve policy-​making or produce social change. In any case, it is clear that both for political theorists and participants, the policy outputs of these institutions, their potential role in discussing and formulating policies are fundamental reasons to exist. Their contribution to the policy-​making process may sometimes focus on technical aspects, either adding or amending detailed policy proposals, whereas in others it may draw attention to issues that should be raised or which are important concerns for specific political actors. Whatever their final impact on specific policies, their value cannot be assessed without considering their role in the policy-​making process. Our definition of participatory institutions is broad, but does not include all kinds of citizen participation activity. Voices that come from society (citizens or civil society organisations) must be present (thus, we exclude from our analysis advisory bodies formed exclusively by experts or administration members). These institutions have been normally created, or at least approved, by public administrations. Beyond these two central characteristics (citizen voices present and some kind of recognition from above), they include a wide range of institutions, from more formal and permanent ones (for example advisory councils), to one-​shot consultations or to long-​term processes that aim to be repeated on a regular basis (for example participatory budgeting). This chapter has two main sections (see Figure 10.1). The first one offers a general overview of these institutions, whereas the second section tries to provide 186

newgenrtpdf

Figure 10.1: General overview of the contents of the chapter

General overview: all types of participatory institutions

Issues and actors – Is participation concentrated around specific issues/policies? – Which is the role played by public administration and different types of societal actors in them?

Impacts – Do they have a real impact on policy decisions? – How, why or in which cases?

187

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Case study: detailed picture of the most common institution – advisory councils

Territorial perspective – Comparison of their reality at different territorial levels – Chronological perspective (evolution during the last four decades)

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a more detailed picture by focusing on the most common participatory institution (at least in the Spanish case), advisory councils. In both sections we apply the same analytical perspective. First a description of the existing realities is provided combining two criteria: place and time. We show where these institutions have existed, looking at the different territorial levels (local, regional, national) but also analyse how much they have changed over the four decades of the democratic period. Then, a complementary perspective is offered based on specific crucial questions for policy analysis. First, we analyse the issues (policies) discussed by these institutions and the role played in their promotion and development by different types of political actors. Second, we look at their impact on policy-​ making, to explore whether their role has been mostly to provide legitimacy, or when and how they have had an influence on the final policies adopted. A final section summarises the most important conclusions reached through the chapter.

Participatory institutions in Spain: a general overview The territorial and longitudinal perspective Participatory institutions in policy-​making have been more the exception than the rule. In fact, this pessimistic assessment would be more appropriate for the territorial level where we find the most promising results: the local arena. At the other administration levels (national and regional) participatory institutions have been either quite absent (national) or an evenly extended reality that has only started to emerge during the last decades. Thus, the two more general patterns that we can identify are that participatory institutions are less exceptional the closer we get to local administrations and to the present. At the national level, only a few institutionalised realities have existed since the early years of democracy. First came the establishment of an increasing number of national-​level advisory councils, developed since the mid-​1990s, a subject that will be described more in detail in the second part of the chapter. Second, came the use of referenda. They can be binding and mandatory (to approve or to reform the Constitution) or optional and consultative. National referenda have been used on three occasions: to approve the 1978 Constitution, to consult the decision to remain in NATO (1986) and to adopt the European Constitution (2005), resulting in the three cases in the approval of the proposed legislation (Gómez and Font, 2014).1 Since their role is limited (low frequency and no citizen initiated referenda), and more related to providing legitimacy to important decisions rather than to be a forum in which to listen, discuss, or create new policies, we will not devote much further attention to them. Third, the existence of a system of Iniciativa Legislativa Popular (Citizens’ Initiatives). In contrast with other countries with more ambitious provisions, these only result in tabling a proposal in Congress provided a sufficient number of signatures is collected (what is known as agenda initiative). This means that, since the implementation of this initiative in the mid-​ 1980s, and until 2019, 107 proposals were registered, but most of them either 188

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were not accepted because of their content, or because they were not backed by the regulatory number of signatures. Only 13 of them were finally voted in Congress, and three were finally approved (Morales Arroyo, 2017).2 Beyond those three institutions (and informal negotiations with stakeholders, not covered here), no other relevant participatory moves have occurred at the national level. The Open Government terminology reached the Spanish Government Third Plan for Open Government (2017), which included the first specific ideas to move in this direction. However, even if the Plan had more ambitious goals (including the development of an observatory of participation and the development of pilot trials of supra local participatory budgeting) the only real steps taken were a few meetings with experts and a limited data collection effort about participatory institutions.3 At the regional level the process took off slowly, but it gathered pace in the first decades of the 21st century. We can observe different policy strategies unevenly combined in each of the 17 regions. One of the most common strategies has been the legal one, with agenda initiative laws approved in many regions since the mid-​1980s. Adopting transparency and/​or participation laws has also been common in the last two decades in almost all regions. Many of these laws still need to be developed in more specific regulations or programmes and no specific budgets have been earmarked for their development. Some regional governments have also adopted more active policies to promote citizen participation, in some cases linked to the development of participation laws (for example Andalusia), or of more proactive policy initiatives. These have included funding and promoting local participation activities (for example Catalonia), online participation portals including all participation related information (for example Aragon) or the development of participatory processes around specific policies. For example, Catalonia developed interesting participatory processes to draft social policies (Brugué, 2008), or to adapt EU water regulations. Aragon has a regulation according to which a participatory process is mandatory for the approval of laws or ambitious policy packages, except if the regional government department promoting them duly justifies not instituting such processes. As a result, dozens of participatory processes on specific policies have been developed at the regional level in Aragon. In the Basque Country some of the more interesting initiatives have been developed by its powerful diputaciones (provincial institutions). For example, a 2010 Guipuzkoa law lays down provisions to enable citizens to propose new legislation through the development of deliberative processes if they are able to collect the signatures of 2 per cent of the citizens of the province. Provincial governments have also played a participatory role in other areas of Spain, mostly providing coordination, know-​how, or funding for local governments to develop their own participatory institutions. The Barcelona provincial government, for example, played a very proactive role providing crucial know-​how to many small municipalities in the 1990s, while the Malaga one facilitated the creation of a network of local governments interested in participatory budgeting. 189

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Even if the activity of these intermediate (regional or provincial) institutions has been more intense than that of national ones, the setting where participatory institutions have been more active has been, by far, the local level. This pattern does not mean that some kind of local participatory paradise has existed. On the contrary, most local policy-​making has been developed using traditional instruments, either solely developed by the local administration, or through informal negotiations with crucial stakeholders. The existence of local participatory institutions has also been extremely heterogeneous. Unlike other countries that have faced nationally developed waves of local participatory institutions (from France through the politique de la ville to the UK, to mention just a couple of examples), in the Spanish case no important national laws have been passed,4 nor have there been other types of incentives to promote local participation. As a result, the development of participatory institutions has been extremely uneven, completely dependent on the very diverse political wills or political approaches of each administration. Thus, we can find cases where, at least to a certain extent, a degree of participation was developed and maintained, despite changes in the local government (for example Barcelona since the late 1980s or Donosti since the 1990s).5 By contrast, there are other cases where strong participatory institutions existed but almost disappeared with the replacement of local governments (Madrid in 2019), whereas in most cases their existence has been quite exceptional and discontinuous, beyond a few small municipalities that developed more ambitious provisions. In any case, the tendency of local participatory institutions to spread has been constant (Colino and Del Pino, 2008; Font et al, 2014) and in the 21st century most medium-​size and large cities have some sort of more or less deliberative, and more or less influential participatory institution (Navarro et al, 2009). The second part of the chapter will discuss the most common of these institutions: local advisory councils. Beyond them, the most widespread experiences are temporary processes that may have an ad-​hoc, one-​shot format (for example different kinds of participatory planning or local consultations around single issues, Font et al, 2014) or recurring programmes, often to be repeated annually, such as participatory budgeting (Ganuza and Francés, 2012). The legislative strategy has also been important at the local level, with large efforts being devoted to devising local regulations on participation (often through imitation of similar cases). The contents of these regulations have become more specific and more ambitious over the years (including new opportunities for bottom-​up participation or creating new deliberative institutions), but not all the interesting institutions mentioned in these regulations have been finally implemented. Actors and issues in policy analysis From a comparative perspective, one of the salient characteristics of the Spanish participatory landscape has been the clearly dominant role played by public 190

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administrations (Alarcón and Font, 2014). While in many other Western societies other actors, namely civil society groups, academics, or foundations, have played a key role in the intellectual support, funding, and implementation of these practices, in the Spanish case almost all these roles have been predominantly played by public actors (politicians and public servants). For example, Font et al (2014) analyse a large number of cases and conclude that 90 per cent of them were promoted by the local administration (82 per cent in Italy). Fully bottom-​up promoted local participatory processes that have achieved some level of recognition by local administrations, as legitimate places for public policy debate, have been extremely rare. Even if the predominance of the public administration is overwhelming, some other actors have also played a role in promoting or developing participatory processes. For example, Font (2011) reports 73 per cent of Andalusian experiences promoted by local administrations, but 41 per cent of the processes had a co-​organiser, a role played either by civil society organisations or by other public administrations. In any case, the dominant leadership of a single public administration does not appear to be good news, since the existing research point to better democratic qualities when the process responsibility is shared with other actors (Font and Galais, 2011). Other public sector actors have sometimes also played a role, from public sector companies (with a clearly less active role than they have in other countries such as France), to the Federation of Municipalities (FEMP), which has facilitated the dissemination and exchange of ideas among municipalities. Also the International Observatory of Participatory Democracy (whose membership includes local governments, academics, or non-​governmental organisations [NGOs]) has played a similar role as a think tank and platform for the exchange of ideas. The type of civil society actors engaged depends on the administration level involved. Thus, at the national level this role is often mostly played by large organisations or platforms with important human, economic, or symbolic resources. If we observe the promoters of the most successful agenda initiatives we find that large unions have been crucial promoters in many of them, but also less institutionalised social-​movement-​type actors have been important promoters in other cases (for example against gay marriage or to stop evictions). By contrast, at the local level, even if quite different types of organisations have been involved, neighbourhood associations have played the leading role. While their participation has been extremely broad in scope (from exerting pressure on local governments, as they did, for example, for the introduction of participatory budgeting, to being active co-​organisers or mere participants), they have also been reluctant to engage when they thought that the introduction of participatory institutions would limit their informal negotiation power (Ganuza and Francés, 2012).6 Other civil society organisations have also played an interesting role. The Jaume Bofill Foundation in Barcelona in the 1990s, for example, played a very active role in promoting and co-​organising local participatory processes and disseminating know-​how about them.7 Or, more recently, several civil society organisations 191

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have been working to provide online facilities (for example Sufragium) to develop participatory practices. Or still others, playing a watchdog role over public administrations, demanding (and facilitating) that they become more open and transparent in their practices, as Civio has done. The role played by other actors in this field, namely the growing number of professionals from different sectors (at least 96 small businesses), universities and research institutions has been analysed by Martínez-​Palacios (2019). The academic institutions involved have played quite a crucial role in providing intellectual legitimacy and ideas, as well as training practitioners and supporting public administrations in their implementation efforts. In recent times, their role has evolved from the one played in the first decades of this century (promotion of participation) to a more analytical one, the priority no longer being maximising participation but providing critical thinking about how to do it and to what end. Finally, we could go back to public administrations and explore which ones have been especially active in this field. Politically, there is no doubt that left-​ wing governments were crucial for the early development of these processes, and probably they continue to be associated with putting more energy into these projects (Della Porta et al, 2014). In any case, today the quantitative differences between right and left tend to be small, at least when only the number of experiences developed is considered and when other explanatory variables are introduced into the analyses (Font, 2011). Specific research about the topics covered in participatory institutions is quite rare. The general impression today is that in the local arena, debates broach almost any aspect of the policy agenda. For example, the most complete research about participatory experiences in Andalusia (Font, 2011) shows that all sorts of issues have been covered, with differences in the policy agendas depending on the size of the municipality (for example focusing more on social welfare or culture in smaller municipalities, or on issues such as immigration and mobility in larger ones). In terms of how issues get onto the participatory agenda, the only general impression (lacking more detailed research) is that the more important ones have a longer and more complex route to cover before participatory practices can broach them. Thus, the early participatory agenda of Catalan municipalities in the 1990s did not include the most central issue, urban planning. Twenty years later, in Catalonia, this issue had been placed on the agenda of these institutions, but in the more recent tradition of participation in Andalusian municipalities it has not been incorporated into the agenda of participatory institutions (Font, 2011). Impact The limited impact on policies of participatory institutions has been considered their main ‘Achilles’ heel’ (Della Porta et al, 2014). This general pattern is even more evident in Spain: a comparison of the influence on policies between Spanish and Italian municipalities shows the former ones were less influential (Della Porta et al, 2014). 192

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In Spain, the outcome of participatory processes is not legally binding, except in the case of constitutionally mandatory referenda. In all the other cases (at any territorial level and be it referenda or participatory budgeting), the final decision must be approved by the elected representatives. Despite this limitation governments are entitled to consider politically binding the proposals put forward by participatory institutions. Then, are proposals coming from participatory processes really implemented? Information regarding supra-​local levels is limited. However, we have systematic evidence regarding the local arena: the cherry-​ picking project analysed what happened to 600 proposals that had been approved in 39 local participatory processes developed in three Spanish regions. The research points to one-​third of proposals as fully implemented, about one-​third partially implemented (or implemented with significant changes), and the other third being completely ignored. Of course, the approval rate of proposals is not random: the less financially burdensome and the more suitable ones according to the public administrations’ preferences and traditions have much greater chances of being approved (Font et al, 2018). One of the questions this project has not answered is whether the level of final implementation varies depending on the centrality of the issue in question. Even if systematic evidence is lacking, there is anecdotal evidence of the existence of a certain trade-​off between how important the issue at stake is and how decisive the voice of participants is going to be. Thus, for minor issues, the possibility of achieving a politically binding decision in the participatory arena is greater, whereas for more influential issues the final decision will often be in the hands of institutions and elected representatives (Nez, 2010). The impact of participatory institutions could well go beyond policies and reach other realms. First, though only a few participatory institutions achieve an educational or mobilisation effect on participants, this could be quite significant in some of them (Talpin, 2011). Of course, the opposite is also possible, so a frustrating personal experience with these institutions might produce negative cultural effects (Font and Navarro, 2013; Fernández-​Martínez et al, 2019). Second, they could contribute to forging a different relationship between civil society and public administrations, a result that again occurs in only quite a limited number of cases (Bherer et al, 2016). Finally, they might have an impact on elections. Even if critics have considered electoral gains as a major explanation for their development, the limited empirical evidence available points to quite a heterogeneous effect (if any), favouring or punishing incumbents depending on several contextual factors (Anduiza et al, 2008). The next section will analyse whether these patterns are similar in the most widespread participatory institution in Spain, advisory councils.

Advisory councils Advisory councils8 (ACs) are a key participatory institution through which governmental actors cooperate with diverse stakeholders in order to advance 193

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and fulfil policy goals. Among formal participatory mechanisms designed to incorporate citizens in decision processes, they are currently the most common type in many countries, in Europe and beyond (Cooper and Musso, 1999; Coelho, 2006; Sintomer and De Maillard, 2007). In Spain, they were first implemented in the 1980s, and by the 1990s local district advisory councils existed in more than 70 per cent of the Spanish cities of over 20,000 inhabitants (Navarro, 1997). By the 2000s, ACs were already consolidated as key governance institutions (Blanco and Gomà, 2002). The operational definition of ACs used here includes the following characteristics: they have a formal existence linked to public administrations, they are permanent and include some degree of citizen presence (often through associations).9 ACs can be understood as a form of associative democracy (Cohen and Rogers, 1995), due to their multi-​stakeholder character involving normally both civil society actors and public officials. Bringing together a variety of social interests, associative democracy is expected to increase the legitimacy of government by ensuring that all relevant stakeholders are able to contribute to policy development (Held, 1993). Most often, ACs operate through plenaries (with usually 20 to 80 attendees in the Spanish case) that meet a few times per year. Smaller working groups and commissions generate a process in which participants have a say and where communicative interaction with other viewpoints takes place. ACs can be either territorial (considering all policies in a specific district or neighbourhood) or sectoral (focused on particular policies or sectors of the population). Public decision-​makers inform and consult these institutions, whose advice may have to be heard (not necessarily followed) in some cases and which can be quite diverse in nature, from general consensual agreements to formally voted detailed reports. We analyse ACs in Spain using the information provided by three datasets generated through the ASSODEM research project.10 The first one maps ACs at three territorial levels: local (the 25 Spanish cities over 250,000 inhabitants or over 175,000 inhabitants which are province capitals), regional (17 regions), and the national level. A total of 2,013 ACs have been identified in these public administrations (Font et al, 2021). Departing from this initial list, a more detailed dataset was built and a survey of participants was conducted.11 A sample of ACs was selected resulting in a database with 70 ACs (see Figure 10.2). The information regarding their aims, composition and organisation was extracted from the statutory documents and rules governing each of the ACs, as well as from complementary Internet searches. An online survey was conducted in 2017 among their members to register their subjective perceptions (569 participants). The territorial perspective The geographical distribution of regional and local ACs shows a widespread yet uneven presence of these tools throughout Spain. The density of ACs is 194

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Figure 10.2: General research design General Dataset N = 2,013 Acs National level 17 regions 25 largest cities and province capitals

Thematic Dataset Documents, rules and web N = 70 ACs sample Satisfaction Dataset Online questionnaire N = 569 participants in 70 ACs

probably related to population size and economic power, but also to the regional institutional promotion and tradition of citizen participation (Sintomer and Del Pino, 2014). More regional ACs are developed in Catalonia (308), Andalusia (240), Valencia region (177), and the Basque Country (142); similarly, local ones are also quite unevenly distributed (from 152 in Barcelona to about 12 in some other provincial capitals). Are there important differences in how these ACs work at the three administration levels? Brugué et al (2020) have systematically compared them, showing that there are more similarities than differences among territorial levels. The most important differences are related to the satisfaction of participants, which is higher in local and regional councils. More specifically, satisfaction with the interaction dynamics in the council plenary, as well as with the content and influence of the results is higher in these subnational ACs. These differences continue to exist even when taking into account council composition and other relevant variables, and also show up in the qualitative analysis developed. The smaller territorial scope seems to afford an advantage for more personal relationships to be established, both among the council members, and between them and the political and administrative authorities. By generating a positive climate of mutual understanding and close relations, proximity appears to improve the functioning of the councils and their perceived influence, while difficulties appear to become gradually more serious as the territorial scope increases. The output of regional (and sometimes national) councils is also different since the laws establishing them require that they draft mandatory reports, by way of reacting to the government agenda. In contrast, local councils do not normally play this role, making it easier for participants to be more proactive, fostering their own initiatives and the creation of an independent agenda channelling demands of the civil society they represent (Brugué et al, 2020). Actors and issues in policy analysis If several other chapters in the book show that the number of actors performing policy analysis in Spain has significantly increased in the last decades, ACs are not 195

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an exception to this rule. The first councils followed a corporatist model, aimed at incorporating trade unions and business organisations in the policy analysis. Other actors were brought into the tent (Schattan, 2006) later on under a more pluralist model of democracy, with the institutionalisation of ACs in other policy areas (Jiménez, 2001). The composition of ACs responds to their goal of bringing together members of civil society and the public administration, as well as independent experts. According to our data, civil society is the most represented sector (62 per cent of all participants). In this sector, traditional organisations (unions and business organisations) have a relevant presence (23 per cent of participants), but less than associations and NGOs (37 per cent), while individual citizens attend ACs in just a few cases (2 per cent of participants). The administration is represented by one-​ third of participants (combining officials, high ranking political appointees, elected politicians from the organising administration and, sometimes, representatives from other public administrations). The remaining 9 per cent are mostly experts.12 This composition is mostly similar in the three levels of the administrations, but some differences appear: for example, in local councils it is fairly usual to include opposition political parties, but attendance of experts is scarce. In most cases the composition of the councils, as well as the procedures for the selection of members in the plenary are laid down by their rules. Most individual members (80 per cent) are appointed by the organisation or group they represent, being residual more formalised selection procedures, such as voting among peers or random selection. The usual inequalities that pervade all forms of political participation are also found among the members of ACs. Thus, the typical participant is a 50-​year-​ old man, with higher education, and a highly qualified full-​time job. Compared with the general population, women, young people, and, especially, people from a lower education and labour status are clearly under-​represented (Font et al, 2021). ACs may have other virtues, but they only attract traditional participants, showing that they hardly ever contribute to mobilising participants from other socially excluded sectors (Navarro and Font, 2013). In recent decades, as ACs spread to the regional and local levels, the main topics covered have increased, incorporating new policy areas such as youth, women, sports, education, and others (Navarro, 2004). In our mapping of ACs in Spain, the most usual issues are the economy (20 per cent), the environment (14 per cent), and local territorial councils (14 per cent), followed by education (6 per cent) and healthcare (6 per cent). Our most recent mapping in Andalucía (2021) covering local councils in smaller municipalities shows a larger presence of those devoted to specific sectors of the population (children, women, aged people), reaching 28 per cent, followed by the economy (14 per cent). Therefore, the scope of issues covered is quite diverse, with very few areas (for example defence, security) excluded. In these sectoral councils, policy analysis focuses on one single policy area, or on specific sectors of the population. In contrast, non-​specialised territorial councils were designed during the 1980s to address a 196

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broad range of issues and policies (housing or public works, among others) in a district or neighbourhood. From processes to impact The AC meetings include information sharing and discussion, and in many cases voting, as well as drafting and approving specific reports. In general, most of the limited comparative research points to a limited influence on policy of ACs and an almost purely symbolic role for them (Blakeley, 2010; Hendriks et al, 2013). The Spanish case is not very different: their connection with the decision-​making process is not obvious at any step of their activity. To start with, as regards their formal objectives, only 39 per cent of them have the explicit goal of influencing public policies. If we go one step further and examine their outputs, the situation looks more promising: 74 per cent of them produce policy proposals, 67 per cent an annual report, and 47 per cent a diagnostic report. These outputs amount to the transmission of the policy analysis to the political authorities. However, most research on public policy has shown that one of the crucial issues in any institution is who drafts the agenda. In fact, many ACs are more oriented to react to government initiatives (in 53 per cent of our cases it is compulsory for public authorities to consult ACs, usually regarding new regulations or strategic planning). This could afford an interesting opportunity for civil society to raise its voice in the policy-​making process, but in these cases participants seem to be less satisfied with the advice produced, pointing to a trade-​off between influence and initiative: satisfaction increases when ACs are less constrained in their attributions and civil society can place issues on the agenda, even if final policy influence could be more blurred (Brugué et al, 2020). In terms of the impact on policy-​making, the practice of ACs varies. While some of them generate specific outputs aimed at policy analysis, others are more a forum for information exchange rather than for decision-​making. In any case, ACs’ powers are limited to providing policy advice, and do not often include policy-​making activities such as detailed policy design or implementation. These institutions are dedicated to enriching the policy-​making process by incorporating information from diverse stakeholders. Specific information about the degree of implementation of their proposals is not available, but only 11 per cent of ACs have formal follow-​up mechanisms for the proposals, which seems to imply a very low level of accountability regarding their impact in the policy process. Two final observations are necessary. First, influencing policy-​making is only one of ACs’ possible goals. For participants, motivations to be active are quite diverse, from influencing policy-​making, to interacting with others (both with the public administration and with other civil society actors), to gaining organisational recognition (Gamson, 1975), or even to fulfil their role as ‘good citizens’ (Font et al, 2021). Second, ACs’ impact might exceed the participants’ and reach a broader public and influence public debates. ACs make some attempts to move in this 197

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direction: only 6 per cent of them do not have some kind of web presence. The web content is updated in 56 per cent of cases, reports and recommendations generated by the council are available online in 51 per cent of them, while the meeting minutes are published by 41 per cent of the councils, showing a considerable degree of transparency. In any case these efforts seem to have only limited results: most participants are critical regarding their possibilities of reaching a wider public while only a limited number of citizens are aware of their work, even in the most participatory cities where the environment for their visibility is most favourable (Navarro et al, 2009).

Conclusion We organise this final discussion focusing on some traditional central questions: how, who, why, and what for? Regarding the how, strategies used in Spanish participatory institutions have been clearly dominated by the legal side, compared to the economic one. Drafting laws and regulations to establish new institutions has been quite more common than providing them with the necessary resources to function correctly and to guarantee their stability regardless of government changes. Thus, we find a rich legislative reality which contrasts with limited resources, poorer results, and lack of continuity. Regarding who are the main organisers, even if important changes have occurred during the last four decades, participatory activity has been clearly more important at the local level, with a more reluctant attitude at the national level and quite a diversity of situations at the regional one. The different territorial levels have clearly influenced one another, but the local one has played a more active leadership role in this field. Which are the motivations to develop and to get involved in these institutions? Given the scarce impact on policy-​making the question of why tens of thousands of participants continue to engage in all those participatory exercises arises: recognition, networking, and civic duty are also important motivations, possibly together with relevant social and emotional benefits in a considerable number of cases (see also Curato et al, 2013 for a similar argument). For public administrations, beliefs of politicians and bureaucrats, expected electoral recognition, or the legitimacy achieved may be important motivations, but further research is clearly needed in this area, including the role played by administration officials and external practitioners. While the spread of these institutions has clearly increased, their political impact is less obvious. On the one hand, there is clear evidence that these processes have mostly had a consultative character. On the other hand, in practice, some cases have gone beyond this consultative level, reaching decisions that have been implemented by the authorities as suggested by participants. In general terms, two characteristics have limited the policy-​making impact: the fact that proposals have mostly dealt with very minor issues, while important policies have remained mostly beyond participatory influences, and the tendency to cherry-​pick ideas 198

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from participatory processes, mainly implementing those less risky and costly, or more compatible with the administration’s own priorities. These facts lead to additional questions. Should we interpret these institutions as steps towards bringing back decision-​making to citizens? Or, instead, as additional power tools to be strategically used by policy-​makers to legitimise some decisions at their own convenience, or to unlock difficult conflicts (Jiménez, 2001)? Whatever the answer to this question, at least two qualifications are necessary. First, the strategic behaviour of political actors is present in this field and is not exclusive to the administration side. Political parties try to give further voice to their allies and use them to promote their policy agenda (Navarro, 2004), but this behaviour also exists among civil society actors (Hendriks, 2006). Although increasing participatory institutions meets with general approval, quite often this goal ranks second to debates about which political area or institution is the more conducive one to win each specific policy battle (Werner et al, 2020), and this applies equally to most citizens, political elites, or civil society organisations. Second, even with these important limitations, participatory institutions should not be understood as useless from a democratic point of view since they have afforded opportunities to incorporate citizens’ views to some policy decisions and contributed, in a few cases, to build a richer public sphere. Policy analysis cannot ignore relevant policy-​making arenas such as these, despite their quite diverse and heterogeneous roles, from minor and detailed policy proposals to bringing to the table the concerns of relevant social actors and contributing to develop a public discussion regarding new policy ideas. Notes 1 2

3

4

5 6

Referenda have also been used to approve or to reform Estatutos de Autonomía (regional constitutions) on seven occasions and several more at the local level. For more details about its regulation and use see https://​civio.es/​2019/​05/​30/​inic​iati​vas-​legis​ lativ​ as-p​ opular​ es/​ (accessed June 14, 2021) . The citizens’ initiative also exists at the regional and the local levels, in most cases also with limited political influence. For a review of its comparative use, mostly at the local level, see Alarcón et al (2018). In 2018, the Citizens’ Dialogues about the EU, initially promoted by the French President Emmanuel Macron, were also developed in Spain. However, the initiative had an extremely limited budget and timing and ended up being a collection of 47 small gatherings and dialogues about Europe attended only by people very interested in the subject and whose results were finally aggregated in a single report that received no significant visibility or impact. See the full EU report at https://​ec.eur​opa.eu/​com​miss​ion/​sites/​beta-​politi​cal/​files/​eu-​progr​ess-​ rep​ort-​consul​tati​ons-​111218​_​en.pdf (accessed 14 June 2021). The 1985 and 2003 local laws promote the establishment of social councils in large cities. No systematic comparative research about them exists, and this very fact may be a significant pointer to the current general impression that their role has been quite limited in most cases. The Barcelona case has received particular visibility in academic research. See, for example, Blakeley (2004) or Font and García-​Espín (2019). This pattern has not been exclusive to the Spanish case (see, for example, Hendriks, 2006). Also, while it more often involves neighbourhood associations due to their central role in the local arena, the same situation has affected other civil society organisations. 199

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8 9 10

11 12

The Foundation contributed to fund and develop several local experiences, published a dozen books and reports, and organised seminars to reflect about them, in cooperation with public administrations or universities. We use the general label ACs, but in practice they are also called by other names, namely associative bodies, deliberative councils, sectoral consultation councils among others. Therefore, we exclude councils whose members are exclusively politicians and/​or experts, as well as ad-​hoc committees created for solving a specific matter. The initial project was supported by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness (Grant Number CSO2015-​66026-​R) and a follow-​up in the Andalusia region by an Andalusia Government Research project (Grant number P18-​RT-​2785). We selected four policy areas: a) education; b) environment; c) immigration; and d) city centre district councils. See Font et al (2021) for details. This composition of our sample of survey respondents is almost identical to the one provided by the official rules of these 70 ACs (Font et al, 2021).

References Alarcón, P. and Font, J. (2014) ‘Where are the boundaries of deliberation and participation? A transatlantic debate’, Journal of Public Deliberation, 10(2): Article 11. Alarcón, P., García-​Espín, P., Welp, Y., and Font, J. (2018) ‘Influencing politics with signatures? Models and experiences of local citizens’ initiative’, OIDP Report. Available from: https://w ​ ww.oidp.net/​docs/​repo/​doc​482.pdf [Accessed 14 September 2021]. Anduiza, E., Font, J., Mas, P., and De Maya, S. (2008) ‘The electoral impact of direct-​democratic practices’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 32(2): 473–​91. Bherer, L., Fernández-​Martínez, J.L., García-​Espín, P., and Jiménez Sánchez, M. (2016) ‘The promise for democratic deepening: The effects of participatory processes in the interaction between civil society and local governments’, Journal of Civil Society, 12(3): 344–​63. Blakeley, G. (2004) Building Local Democracy in Barcelona, Lampeter: Edwin Mellen Press. Blakeley, G. (2010) ‘Governing ourselves: Citizen participation and governance in Barcelona and Manchester’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 34(1): 130–​45. Blanco, I. and Gomà, R. (2002) Gobiernos locales y redes participativas, Barcelona: Ariel. Brugué, Q. (2008) ‘Modernizar la administración a través de la participación: la experiencia de la Generalitat de Catalunya’, Revista Internacional de Organizaciones, 1: 39–​53. Brugué, Q., Font, J., and Ruiz, J. (2020) ‘The closer, the better? Comparing advisory councils at different government levels’, Administration & Society, 53(6): 844–​71. Coelho, V.S. (2006) ‘Democratization of Brazilian health councils: The paradox of bringing the other side into the tent’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 30(3): 656–​71. 200

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Cohen, J. and Rogers, J. (1995) Associations and Democracy, London: Verso. Colino, C. and Del Pino, E. (2008) ‘Democracia participativa en el nivel local: debates y experiencias en Europa’, Revista Catalana de Dret Públic, 37: 247–​83. Cooper, T. and Musso, J. (1999) ‘The potential for neighborhood council involvement in American metropolitan governance’, International Journal of Organization Theory and Behavior, 2(1/​2): 199–​232. Curato, N., Niemeyer, S., and Dryzek, J. (2013) ‘Appreciative and contestatory inquiry in deliberative forums: Can group hugs be dangerous?’, Critical Policy Studies, 7(1): 1–​17. Della Porta, D., Reiter, H., and Alarcón, P. (2014) ‘Institutional participatory initiatives and democratic qualities’, in J. Font, D. Della Porta, and Y. Sintomer (eds) Participatory Democracy in Southern Europe: Causes, Characteristics and Consequences, London and New York: Rowman and Littlefield, pp 71–​114. Fernández-​Martínez, J.L., García-​Espín, P., and Jiménez, M. (2019) ‘Participatory frustration: The unintended cultural effect of local democratic innovations’, Administration & Society, 52(5): 718–​48. Font, J. (ed) (2011) Democracia local en Andalucía: Experiencias participativas en los municipios andaluces, Seville: Junta de Andalucía. Font, J. and Galais, C. (2011) ‘The qualities of local participation: The explanatory role of ideology, external support and civil society as organizer’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 35(5): 932–​48. Font, J. and García-​Espín, P. (2019) ‘From indignad@s to mayors? Participatory dilemmas in Spanish municipal movements’, in C. Flesher Fominaya and R. Feenstra (eds) Handbook of Contemporary European Social Movements, London: Routledge, pp 387–​401. Font, J. and Navarro, C. (2013) ‘Personal experience and the evaluation of participatory instruments in Spanish cities’, Public Administration, 91(3): 616–​31. Font, J., Della Porta, D., and Sintomer, Y. (2014) Participatory Democracy in Southern Europe: Causes, Characteristics and Consequences, London and New York: Rowman and Littlefield. Font, J., Smith, G., Galais, C., and Alarcon, P. (2018) ‘Cherry-picking participation: Explaining the fate of proposals from participatory processes’, European Journal of Political Research, 57(3): 615–​36. Font, J., Pasadas, S., and Fernandéz-​Martínez, J.L. (2021) ‘Participatory motivations in advisory councils: Exploring different reasons to participate’, Representation, 57(2): 225–​43. Gamson, W.A. (1975) The Strategy of Social Protest, Homewood: Dorsey Press. Ganuza, E. and Francés, F. (2012) El círculo virtuoso de la democracia: los presupuestos participativos a debate, Madrid: CIS. Gómez, B. and Font, J. (2014) ¿Cómo votamos en los referéndums?, Madrid: Catarata. Held, D. (1993) Prospects for Democracy: North, South, East, West, Stanford: Stanford University Press.

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Hendriks, C.M. (2006) ‘When the forum meets interest politics: Strategic uses of public deliberation’, Politics & Society, 34(4): 571–​602. Hendriks, C.M., Bolitho, A. and Foulkes, C. (2013) ‘Localism and the paradox of devolution: Delegated citizen committees in Victoria, Australia’, Policy Studies, 34(5–​6): 575–​91. Jiménez, M. (2001) ‘Sustainable development and the participation of environmental NGOs in Spanish environmental policy’, in K. Eder and M. Kousis (eds) Environmental Politics in Southern Europe, Springer: Dordrecht, pp 225–​54. Martínez-​Palacios, J. (2019) ‘El giro participativo neoliberal. Institucionalización y profesionalización de la participación ciudadana en España (1978–​2017)’ unpublished monograph. Morales Arroyo, J.M. (2017) ‘La práctica de la iniciativa legislativa en el constitucionalismo español reciente’, Revista Chilena de Derecho y Ciencia Política, 8(2): 87–​104. Navarro, C.J. (1997) ‘El nuevo localismo democrático: análisis descriptivo de algunas tendencias’, Gestión y análisis de políticas públicas, 9: 95–​104. Navarro, C.J. (2004) ‘Participatory democracy and political opportunism: Municipal experience in Italy and Spain (1960–​93)’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 28(4): 819–​38. Navarro, C.J. and Font, J. (2013) ‘The biased inclusiveness of local democratic innovations: Vehicles or obstacles for political equality?’, in M. Joas and B. Geissel (eds) Democratic Innovations in Europe, Leverkusen: Budrich-​Verlag, pp 95–​122. Navarro, C.J., Cuesta, M., and Font, J. (2009) ¿Municipios participativos?: Participación política y ciudadana en ciudades medias españolas, Madrid: CIS. Nez, H. (2010) Les savoirs citoyens dans l’urbanisme participatif regards croisés sur les expériences de Paris et Cordoue, PhD thesis, Universitat Autònoma Barcelona. Schattan, V. (2006) ‘Democratization of Brazilian health councils: The paradox of bringing the other side into the tent’, International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 30(3): 656–​71. Sintomer, Y. and De Maillard, J. (2007) ‘The limits to local participation and deliberation in the French “politique de la ville”’, European Journal of Political Research, 46(4): 503–​29. Sintomer, Y. and Del Pino, E. (2014) ‘The national and regional contexts of participatory experiences’, in J. Font, D. Della Porta, and Y. Sintomer (eds) Participatory Democracy in Southern Europe: Causes, Characteristics and Consequences, London and New York: Rowman and Littlefield, pp 21–​36. Talpin, J. (2011) Schools of Democracy: How Ordinary Citizens (Sometimes) Become Competent in Participatory Budgeting Institutions, Colchester: ECPR Press. Werner, H., Marien, S., and Felicetti, A. (2020) ‘A problem-​based approach to understanding public support for referendums’, European Journal of Political Research, 59(3): 538–​54.

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Policy analysis at universities and research centres Ivan Cerrillo and Jacint Jordana

Introduction This chapter discusses the extent to which universities and research centres are providers of policy analysis to the public sector in Spain and identifies their activities in this domain. To obtain a detailed perspective of how they serve as a source of capacity for public policy analysis across the country –​advising and supporting the public sector and the politicians who lead them –​we examine their activities towards this end from different perspectives. First, we examine the extent to which policy analysis and policy advice are components of knowledge transfer by Spanish universities which support the public sector in a similar way as the transfer of knowledge to industry and entrepreneurship (Berbegal-​Mirabent et al, 2013). Second, we identify which type of research activities and academic structures are more common in the different academic fields related to policy analysis, and which policy areas are more frequently scrutinised. We also identify the growing specialisation among policy analysts and experts in academia and the different roles of university personal in policy analysis. Finally, this chapter considers the nature of university–​public-​sector interactions in Spain and more specifically the collaboration between policy-​makers and the academics who act as policy analysts. Among the models that characterise the relation between applied research and policy analysis identified by Trow (1984), three models can be highlighted: the percolation model, which considers that research inspires policy indirectly because outputs contribute to enlightening the policy understanding of actors who are involved in policy-​making and shape their views regarding different alternatives. The second model, called the political demand model, expects the direct or indirect commissioning of research by policy-​makers to eventually justify their decisions or just to reinforce some arguments in a particular policy area. A third one, the collaborative model, can also be defined based on a different logic of collaboration between academics and policy-​makers. This model describes the collaboration between scientists and the administrative structures in the public sector, and how scientists act as network brokers continuously connecting academics and bureaucrats in search of policy evidence and policy analysis (for example, Doubleday and Wilsdon, 2013, or Lambright and Zinke, 1989). In this chapter, we will show how these three models have developed in Spain in recent decades, 203

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while also discussing which models have been more prevalent in recent years in the relations established between the public sector and universities. Considering the weak research profile of Spanish universities until the 1980s, particularly in social sciences, it can be said that policy analysis based on the percolation model –​meaning relevant research on public policy and policy analysis –​arrived quite late in Spanish universities in many policy areas (Vallès, 2020). However, the political demand model based on commissioned research by public actors was an occasional activity by university personnel when democratic institutions were established in Spain after the transition from the authoritarian regime in the late 1970s (Requejo et al, 2000). Actually, in the same way that it occurred in other European countries, a policy direction change in Spanish academia –​meaning an intensification of research activities that focused on policy issues –​emerged after a period of concentrating on fundamental research that had occurred in parallel with the expansion of public universities in the country from the 1960s to the 1990s. In Germany, for example, the change in policy had already occurred in the 1980s (Saretzki, 2007). In the case of Spain, such a policy change did not appear until the 2000s, although some studies which focused on particular policy fields were produced before this (see, for example, Subirats and Gomà, 1998 for a selection of studies in different policy areas). In this context, we will describe in the following pages how policy analysis in Spanish universities has become more institutionalised since the 2000s. We will also show how the publication output in many different fields has increased largely, while in parallel, academic personnel were active in policy commissioning and giving policy advice to the public sector. This chapter includes three sections, each one focusing on different characteristics of universities and research centres. This approach allows us to identify their contributions to policy analysis in Spain and to describe the nature of the expansion of policy analysis in recent decades, according to the conceptual framework introduced in this chapter. In the first section, we detail the institutional settings that permit teaching staff and researchers based in universities to be active in policy analysis undertakings, including policy and programme evaluation. Special attention is given to particular organisational structures established by universities that allow a concentration of analytical capabilities in particular fields of public policy. We also plan to identify which institutional structures and procedures in universities and research centres allow the transfer of policy analysis and the elaboration of commissioned work for public entities in Spain or beyond. In the second section, we examine the sources of funding that allow university personnel to pursue applied research on public policy issues in Spain, either at national, subnational, or local levels. Here we identify the different sources of competitive public funding available to them, in particular for national research programmes, although we also recognise that these are not the only possible funds for policy analysis activity within universities. In particular, we provide a detailed analysis of research projects financed by the Spanish government to investigate the projects’ thematic content and geographical distribution. 204

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Finally, in the third section, we focus on research outputs. As an approach to policy analysis activity in academic settings in Spain, we measure the bibliographic output on policy analysis by scholars in universities and research centres by collecting data on public policy topics published in indexed academic journals. Here we identify the most productive universities and academic research centres for the provision of policy analysis, and in which policy areas most of the outputs are concentrated. To this end, we examine articles published in academic journals (as included in the SCOPUS bibliographic databases) in the last two decades whose content is focused on policy analysis topics in the Spanish context.

Policy analysis by academic personnel in universities and research centres University departments and academic research centres are repositories for multiple capacities for policy analysis in Spain. Since Spain’s transition to democracy, university academic staff have been very open to demands from governments and public administration units at different levels for policy advice and policy analysis, although much less frequently from the legislature. During the 1980s and 1990s university academic staff, either as individual experts acting as consultants to public institutions or as formal research units within the universities, were often commissioned by different public bodies to prepare on-​demand policy analysis reports (Requejo et al, 2000). In many cases, academics also elaborated or advised on policy proposals, for example drafting law projects, programme designs or systematic policy reviews, producing an evaluation of existing public programmes, or examining broader policy implication of governmental initiatives. Among many other examples, a pioneering example is the evaluation of the impact on legislation requiring motorbike riders to use helmets, an initiative that was conducted and the results published by two researchers from the Autonomous University of Barcelona (Ballart and Riba, 1995). In most cases, this policy advisory activity by academic personnel remained behind the scenes, as public administrators usually neither noticed these activities nor published most of the reports. Although this type of collaboration has not fully disappeared, in recent decades a growing specialisation has emerged and different types of public and private entities have been established on the basis of initiatives launched by academic personnel. These contributions were possible, and continue to be possible, because Spanish legislation for universities (Ley Orgánica de Universidades, LOU 6/​2001 and subsequent amendments) is quite flexible regarding university contracts with public and private entities (art. 83).1 Public universities and research centres are allowed to establish contracts of any type using their human resources to do the required technical and advisory tasks. Such activities are internally regulated by the universities or research centres to ensure that they fulfil the legal criteria and are formalised though memorandums of understanding between the university and the firm or administrative body interested in receiving the report or the 205

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service. Actually, such activities are not particularly centralised by the universities, although in some research centres there is more strategic guidance. Most of the time these initiatives show a bottom-​up logic. A particular faculty member, research group, or established research unit (for example, a centre or an institute) is approached by an external firm or a public body for a prospective activity or service. After reaching an agreement on the tasks to be performed, they then approach the administrative services of the university to formalise the agreement and to manage the legal and technical aspects of the contract. In most cases, the university, as the legal institution, is required to include an overhead in the budget, and it transfers the rest of the budget to the operating unit within the university to proceed with the commissioned research. In many cases, this budget transfer supplements the salary complement to the researchers involved in the research or activity. There is a wide variety of organisational procedures and schemes in universities and research centres for managing such requests for policy support and policy advice, but by their nature they are predominantly decentralised. This framework allows very flexible contributions to many bodies in the Spanish public sector which helps academic personnel who are interested in providing policy analysis services to all levels of government in Spain. A large number of research groups in universities and research centres have developed capacities to provide such policy analysis services, as well as programme evaluation, to multiple organisations in the public sector. For many years, these collaborative activities of university academic staff were most likely a particular feature related to the underdevelopment of more specialised interfaces –​in organisational terms –​in Spain. As an example, think tanks and advisory firms were able to provide the public sector with technical and analytical support as well as providing qualified staff as policy analysts. Whether this was an old characteristic that is currently in regression, and whether such a logic has moved from traditional informal networks to more articulate and visible structures of collaboration between universities and public administration, is something that still largely remains to be scrutinised. In any case, compared with other European countries, it appears that the third model of the relation between academic and bureaucrats we referred to before –​the collaborative model –​still remains at a nascent and mainly informal stage in Spain. Occasionally, we also find cases of university academic staff with a dual affiliation to think tanks or private research centres. What is less frequent, however, is the existence of formal mechanisms which allow the secondment of university personnel to public administration units. Neither dual affiliation nor secondment allows for part-​time relationships. Also, the possibility that academic staff might provide policy analysis to the public sector while they still participate in private or semi-​public structures on a temporary basis –​on the basis of a contract with the respective employer to facilitate the transfer of policy expertise –​is not at all usual in Spain. However, we should mention that only recently has there been legislation that makes possible the temporary participation of university personnel and research-​centre scientific staff in the creation of spin-​offs and start-​ups of a private nature (Ley 14/​2011 de la Ciencia, Tecnologia e Innovación, art. 18). 206

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In a few cases, but not many, these new firms may specialise in providing policy analysis services to the public sector. In order to provide an overview of the research structure that carries out policy analysis, we rely on data from the official registry of the Ministry of Science and Innovation: the Registry of Universities, Centres and Degrees (RUCT). RUCT was created in 2008 (Real Decreto 1509/​2008) to gather the most relevant information about the Spanish university system. The registry is public, accessible, and is continuously updated with official data of each higher education and research centre operating in the country; 1,898 centres are registered. We also included in the analysis 120 research centres owned by the Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC).2 Building on these data, we created a database comprising all research centres in Spain dealing with policy analysis. The selection process we introduced was a combined-​keywords search followed by a manual review. We first filtered the research centres’ names by applying a broad list of relevant words to the registry data: policy analysis, public policy, policy evaluation, policy, as well as other sectoral keywords like education, health, and so on. We then manually inspected the results to refine the selection. Using these criteria, we identified 57 centres out of 2,018 universities and research centres in Spain with names that clearly identified them as performing policy analysis. Our database included descriptive variables already available in the official registry such as the name of the university the research centre belongs to, the autonomous community in which they are located, year of foundation, kind of funding (public or private), and their institutional affiliation. We also created a new variable to categorise the sectoral specialisation of the centres. The development of this database allowed us to describe and analyse several factors regarding the Spanish research infrastructure for policy analysis. More specifically, we focus on: (a) the institutional structure; (b) geographical distribution; (c) the institutional distribution of centres; (d) policy areas of specialisation; and (e) the historical evolution of the research infrastructure. Institutional structure We found that the research infrastructure for policy analysis constitutes around 3 per cent of the total, rising to 11 per cent if we only consider research centres. The vast majority of centres dealing with policy analysis are publicly owned (n=​51, 89.5 per cent). According to Viñas (Chapter 3, this volume), the emergence of, at least, 32 training programmes on public policy and evaluation contributed to the development of policy research. Most of the research centres belong directly to public universities or to the CSIC, with a smaller group of affiliated research centres being the exception. These affiliated research centres are managed independently, but they are also part of the public-​sector research system, since they receive public funds and collaborate extensively with universities. In Spain there are 50 public and 33 private universities, therefore it seems that most policy analysis comes from public institutions. In contrast, private 207

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research centres which conduct policy analysis represent a small fraction of the total (n=​6, 10.5 per cent). Some of these centres belong to private universities, whereas the rest of them are privately funded by companies, foundations, or associations, but are affiliated with public universities. Geographical distribution Research centres that carry out policy analysis are unevenly distributed throughout Spain. Even though 12 of the 17 autonomous communities have research centres, there is a significant concentration in the central and northeast areas of the country (see Figure 11.1). More than half of the centres (30) are located in three autonomous communities: Valencian Community, Community of Madrid, and Catalonia. These regions have a solid base of research structures for policy analysis (top three), since they each host ten research centres or more. Other autonomous communities that stand out are Basque Country, Castile and León, and Andalusia, which range from three to six centres each. However, 11 of the autonomous communities and the two autonomous cities (Ceuta and Melilla) have between two and no centres. Overall, research centres seem to be very concentrated in a few territories, with most of them being located in the medium-​low part of the distribution. Five autonomous communities, together with Ceuta and Melilla, have no research centres addressing policy analysis. This raises the question of why such territorial differences exist. Are these differences the result of a decentralised research policy? Institutional distribution of centres When we analysed research centres at the institutional level, we also detected differences in the distribution of centres per institution. Of the 83 universities

Figure 11.1: Distribution of research centres by autonomous community

0 2 4 6 8 10 12

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in Spain, 27 of them –​including CSIC’s research centres –​performed policy analysis. The Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB) is the university with the most research centres: seven. Of the seven centres it hosts, a good example is the Institut de Govern i Polítiques Públiques (IGOP), which is a consolidated research centre addressing policy analysis. The University of the Basque Country (UPV/​EHU) and the University of València (UV) have five centres each, such as the Instituto de Economía Pública and Instituto de Derecho Cooperativo y Economía Social (GEZKI) from the Basque university, and the Instituto Universitario de Investigación de Políticas de Bienestar Social (Polibienestar) in València. These universities are immediately followed by CSIC, which runs three centres for the study of public policies, for example the Instituto de Políticas y Bienes Públicos (IPP). Even so, the number of centres for the rest of the institutions range from one to three, with most institutions having just one research centre. From the institutional point of view, we find that most of the centres dealing with policy analysis are concentrated in only seven institutions. Specialisation by policy area We detected a low level of specialisation, with few research centres dedicated exclusively to policy analysis. In general, this kind of research is not a central activity of the centres but rather just one of the activities they focus on, among others. In fact, many of these centres were created under a generalist logic. This is a relevant finding because it means that policy analysis is present in research centres whose purpose is other than this area of research, for instance, including applied or theoretical research among their activities. Specialisation increases slightly according to topic and policy area, but the pattern is similar (see Figure 11.2). Despite 13 research centres working on various policy areas at the same time (n=​13, 22.8 per cent), our data show a wide range of areas in which they specialise. These include international policy (n=​9, 15.8 per cent), public economy (n=​6, 10.5 per cent) and health policies (n=​6, 10.5 per cent), the top three areas of specialisation. Other relevant topics are gender (n=​5, 8.7 per cent), social (n=​4, 7 per cent), education (n=​3, 5.2 per cent) and urban policies (n=​3, 5.2 per cent), to name but a few. Similarly, autonomous communities do not seem to be specialised in specific policy areas either. To summarise, we find that a low level of specialisation is the dominant trend across the country. Historical evolution Another interesting factor to analyse is the historical development of Spain’s infrastructure for policy research. Figure 11.3 illustrates the evolution in the number of centres dealing with policy analysis between 1975 and 2020. The top line with triangle markers shows the total number of centres, whereas the asterisk and cross-​shaped markers represent the public and private centres respectively. As we can see, there is a gradual increase over the whole time period. From 1993 209

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Figure 11.2: Number of research centres per policy area 14 12 10 8 6 4

Migration

Labour

Environment

Defence

Tourism

Criminology

Urban

Education

Social

Gender

Health

Economic

International

Various

2

Figure 11.3: Evolution of research centres for policy analysis (1975–​2020) 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 1975

1980

1985

1990 CENTRES

1995

2000 PUBLIC

2005

2010

2015

2020

PRIVATE

to 2008, the creation of new centres grew constantly, and the new university law (LOU 6/​2001) did not alter this trend in a significant way. The moderate increase during this period is an overall trend for both public and private institutions. However, the number of public research centres is higher at all times, with public funding clearly leading the system. The private sector seems to follow in the wake of the public centres, but in a much more moderate way. For instance, between 1987 and 1993 and between 2008 and 2010, when the rate of growth of the public centres remained fairly constant, the growth in the number of 210

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private sector centres also flattened out. However, private centres have gained some momentum since the mid-​1990s.

Competitive research projects with a focus on policy analysis Competitive research projects are usually very informative on the topics and areas researchers are dealing with, thus representing the material input informing the research. So, once we confirmed the growing trend in recent decades of institutionalising policy research structures, we analysed the extent to which policy analysis is a relevant area of study among the research interests of academic personnel in Spain. To shed light on this aspect of the research, we created a second database to gather information on policy analysis projects based on the Ministry of Science and Innovation’s yearly call for applications. Every year the ministry launches a call for research projects within the State R&D Programme Oriented to the Challenges of Society (Resolution, BOE 17/​11/​ 2020) –​ Programa Estatal de I+​D+​i Orientada a los Retos de la Sociedad –​ whose aim is to finance research projects of two different modalities: Research Challenges and Knowledge Generation –​Retos de Investigación y Generación de Conocimiento. This competitive tender is the country’s broadest and best-​ known opportunity to get public resources for research. Of course, it is not the only source of funding, since the call for applications coexists with other research programmes. For instance, several autonomous communities, as well as the European Union with its framework programmes, or even some companies, also have their own programmes. However, we have focused on the ministry’s yearly call because of its budget (€412,000,000) and the relevant weight it has in the Spanish research system. Our database comprises data extracted from the final resolutions of the Challenges of Society research calls from 2016 to 2018. These calls take effect the following year, so the time period we actually explore is from 2017 to 2019. We included three years because we intended to explore a complete research cycle, given that the extent of a research project is normally three years. Unfortunately, from 2019 onwards, resolutions were published following a different format which makes them incomparable with previous resolutions. To construct the database, we first identified those projects dealing with policy analysis by conducting an automatic keyword search for each year. We then examined the results manually. This database also records additional data related to the research project such as the year of the call, geographical location, the applicant’s institution and policy sectors. Over the last three years, a total of 4,517 research projects from all disciplines and research fields were financed by the programme on a competitive basis. We identified 73 of them as projects dealing with policy analysis, which means that only a small fraction of the projects focuses on this kind of research (1.6 per cent). However, this percentage needs to be interpreted with caution. Not only because the yearly call for applications is very competitive and a lot of projects are rejected, 211

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Figure 11.4: Geographical location of research projects

0 5 10 15 20

but also because many of them, from different fields of research, could somehow contribute to the assessment or improvement of public policies. It is therefore difficult to know how the projects’ results will be used. We observe that research projects that focus on policy analysis (n=​73) are highly concentrated in some autonomous communities (see Figure 11.4). Actually, Catalonia (n=​24, 32.9 per cent), Andalusia (n=​12, 16.4 per cent) and the Community of Madrid (n=​11, 15 per cent) host most of the projects performing policy analysis. Altogether, these regions alone comprise 64.38 per cent of the total number of projects, while they are home to less than half of the total Spanish population. The rest of the projects are irregularly distributed in another seven communities: the Valencian Community (10), Basque Country (7), and Galicia (4) being the communities with the higher number of projects. Four other autonomous communities have between one and two research projects each, whereas the other communities and the two autonomous cities have no projects relating to policy analysis. If we compare the distribution of research projects with the distribution of research centres that address policy analysis, we can see that they do not completely match. For example, Andalusia is an interesting case since it has 16.4 per cent of projects (n=​12) while only hosting three research centres. In contrast, the Valencian Community has a similar share of research projects (n=​10, 13.7 per cent) but far more centres addressing policy analysis (13). Most probably, these research centres also perform policy-​oriented studies from other funding sources, including the European Union and the Horizon 2020 programmes, but more often they commission projects directly from local and regional public administrations. In fact, research projects related to policy analysis are quite scattered within the country’s academic institutions. We identified 36 universities and the CSIC having at least one project which included policy analysis among their research activities. On average, each institution hosts about two projects. This is in contrast 212

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Figure 11.5: Distribution of research projects per policy area 14 12 10 8 6 4

Defence

Tourism

Criminology

Gender

Health

Migration

Labour

Urban

Environment

Social

Economic

Education

2

with the high geographical concentration of projects. On one side, about half of the Spanish universities do not carry out any studies on policy analysis. On the other side, the Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB), Complutense University of Madrid (UCM), and University of Lleida (UdL) are above the average, with five projects each. In the middle part of the distribution, we find a group of seven universities, together with the CSIC, which host between three and four projects each. Actually, more than half of the universities that host projects on policy analysis only have a single project. Regarding the sectoral distribution of projects dealing with policy analysis, researchers focus on a wide variety of sectors. As shown in Figure 11.5, four major areas stand out: education, the economy, social, and environmental. Education is the sector in which the highest number of research projects are carried out (n=​15, 20.5 per cent), followed by public economy, social, and environmental policies with ten projects each (13.70 per cent). This led us to believe that some sort of specialisation exists, since such policy areas cover more than half of the total projects. In a secondary position, we find that urban, labour, migration, health, and gender are also areas in which policy analysis research is conducted. To a lesser extent, criminology, tourism, and defence are other sectors of interest. When analysed at regional level though, this specialisation fades. Most of the autonomous communities obtained research projects about policy analysis across different areas of research, with five policy areas being the average. Due to budgetary increases, the total number of research projects financed by grants from the Challenges of Society programme grew in the three-​year period considered (2016–​18). In parallel, we also observed that the number of projects performing policy analysis also increased. In the call for applications in 2016, 213

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there were only 17 policy analysis projects granted by the programme, whereas in 2018 this number had almost doubled to 34. These absolute numbers showing an upward trend are encouraging, but when we look in relative terms, the picture is not so favourable. Only a small proportion corresponds to research projects on policy analysis (1.66 per cent), a proportion which has remained practically constant over time. Our data show very little increase in the percentage of projects dedicated to policy analysis over the last few years: from 1.57 per cent in 2016 to 1.59 per cent the following year, and finally to 1.67 per cent in 2018. These findings raise new questions: why is there such a low number of policy analysis projects? Are policy analysis projects financed by other applications for research funding, or do they receive external funds? As mentioned earlier, there are other sources of funding, but as the Challenges of Society programme is the most relevant among the competitive calls in Spain, it seems that the institutional development of research centres in recent decades does not correspond with such a low level of research projects. Despite the lack of detailed information, this suggests that direct funding for commissioned policy analysis projects based on public administration demands remains an important source of income for research into policy analysis in Spanish universities.

Policy research outputs in Spanish universities After focusing on the infrastructure and the resources available, in this section we concentrate on the research outputs. To this purpose, we analyse a database on policy research publications by scholars doing their work in Spanish universities and research centres. To put this research into context, we also examine similar outputs in neighbouring countries, such as Italy, France, and Germany, during a similar period. We elaborate on our bibliographic corpus based on the SCOPUS database, aiming to identify academic outputs from policy analysis in Spain. We first established selection criteria to restrict the number of bibliographical references we considered. SCOPUS is a very large database of publications from academic journals that includes peer-​reviewed and other quality controls. The range of academic publications selected is very extensive in the area of social sciences and includes a limited number of books and book chapters. SCOPUS has an international scope and comprises thousands of journals, mostly in English, although journals in other languages are also included. In this sense, it is worth noting that a large majority of the best Spanish journals (mostly in Spanish) in economics, sociology, education, geography, or political science are also listed in SCOPUS –​most of them listed after 2010. To select our corpus, we identified all publications recorded in SCOPUS in which at least one of the authors had an affiliation with a Spanish institution. We also required the word Spain to be in the title, in the keyword list or in the abstract of the paper. We then included as selection criteria the terms policy analysis, public policy, or policy evaluation in the title, keywords, or abstract. From these criteria, we identified an initial corpus of 2,773 documents. References started to appear only rarely in 214

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the1980s and early 1990s (publication years), but increased from the late 1990s and rose very strongly in the second half of the 2010s (see Figure 11.6). There are several reasons which may combine to explain this trend: on one side, many academic journals currently listed in SCOPUS were only included in the 2000s or even later, some relevant articles are not in the database (this is the case for many Spanish journals, for example), and in addition, there is an impressive growth in the number of academic journals in recent decades which facilitates the publication of research results. On the other side, during the last decade, there has been a strong trend in the internationalisation of social sciences in Spain, and publications in English by Spanish scholars have boomed. Actually, many such publications have appeared in international journals listed in databases such as SCOPUS or others. Without doubt, there were many other factors we are unable to identify which combined in the surge of policy analysis publications by Spanish academics in recent years. We might hypothesise that among them, one relevant factor could be the interest of academics to publish their research in international journals. This is actually a demand-​driven process with new evaluation criteria for academic promotion in Spain that have been introduced since the 2000s. This interest has also been stimulated by more focused research funding. The proliferation of Spanish scientific journals on public policy is also a sign of this field’s consolidation in the country (Chapter 3, this volume). However, one thing is clear: a few decades ago, during the 1980s and 1990s, Spanish academics rarely published on public analysis matters, in particular empirical research focusing on Spanish issues, although some findings appeared eventually as monographs and edited volumes. This has changed completely in more recent years. Now, with about 300 peer-​reviewed articles a year, most of this policy research is public and more visible internationally. Such a transformation did not only occur in Spain in recent times. From Figure 11.6, we observe that in Germany, Italy, and Spain the strong growth

Figure 11.6: Yearly publications on policy analysis (1992–2018) 350 300 250 200 150 100 50 0 1992

1997 SPAIN

2002 ITALY

2007 FRANCE

2012 GERMANY

2017

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pattern is very similar, with an impressive increase in the period 2010–​20. The case of France is different. The country does not show a similar increase in recent years, but shows a more stable pattern over the last decade. To discern the logic behind these tendencies would require more detailed analysis, but the strong growth pattern in Spain, with a smaller population and fewer universities than Germany, or even Italy, is quite impressive. As mentioned earlier, it might be that the requirements of peer-​reviewed publications introduced for academic careers in Spain have also triggered an intense pressure to publish at any cost in journals indexed in international databases. Actually, only an analysis of articles’ citations and journals’ rankings would allow a better understanding of the dynamics behind the trends observed. However, when counting citations of the 2,000 most-​cited policy-​analysis publications in Germany, and comparing this with the same kind of publications in Spain, we find that the average for Germany is 18.4 citations per paper, while in Spain it is 12.3 citations, and in Italy it is 11.3 citations. From the number of policy analysis publications over almost two decades, as shown in Figure 11.6, a first question emerges: to what extent is the increase in publications genuine and not just an endogenous phenomenon related to the increase in the number of journals and opportunities for publishing in international journals in recent years? To answer this question, we identified all papers listed in SCOPUS in the social sciences field from 2005 to 2019 that included the word Spain in the title or abstract, and compared this with the number of policy analysis papers. The aggregated results show that while the number of papers increased from 1 to 5.8 for the larger database, including 175,000 references, the corpus of policy analysis publications increased 6.9 times. This means that the rate of publication of policy papers grew faster than the rate for general papers in the social sciences in Spain, although there is not a very disproportionate difference. There are many other questions to focus on to better understand the publication of policy analysis in Spain: where is academic policy analysis on Spain concentrated? Are there big institutions that produce a large amount of policy research? Do independent research centres produce many policy analysis papers, or do the universities produce more? Which topic generates the greatest number of academic papers on policy analysis? From Figure 11.7, we observe that about 45 per cent of the papers are produced by authors based in Catalonia or in the Madrid region. These papers are evenly distributed between the two leading regions. Regarding the rest of the country, only Andalusia and València region show some significant levels of academic production (16 per cent and 9 per cent, respectively), while other regions have more modest contributions. As to specific institutions, the Autonomous University of Barcelona, with the largest number of contributions, presents a more distinctive profile in policy analysis. It is also relevant that private university scholars do not contribute at all to policy analysis in Spain –​they make very few contributions, despite being located in Madrid or Barcelona –​but most public universities, including the smaller ones, across 216

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Figure 11.7: The number of policy papers from universities and research centres Universities

Research centres 0

200

400

600

800

1,000

Comunidad de Madrid Cataluña Andalucía Comunidad Valenciana Galicia Aragón Castilla y León País Vasco Región de Murcia Principado de Asturias Canarias Comunidad Foral de Navarra Castilla-La Mancha Extremadura Cantabria Islas Baleares La Rioja

the entire Spanish geography, show some capacity to perform policy analysis of good academic quality. The contribution of independent research centres, including the largest public research organisation (CSIC), is quite modest, despite the scientific resources and research personnel they have access to. This is probably a consequence of their research agendas not focusing on policy analysis in Spain as a priority. A few think tanks also make some academic contributions, but very few, most likely because publishing papers in academic journals is not their main concern. Regarding the topics and policy areas examined by academics, we find a large diversity of interests and policy problems they consider in the journal articles they publish (Figure 11.8). Considering the entire corpus of 2,773 documents from the early 1990s to 2020, we identified the keywords associated with each article or book chapter, as listed in the SCOPUS database. We then associated these keywords with the list of the 12 sectors –​as presented earlier when we discussed institutions and research projects –​to make the inputs and outputs in policy analysis research more comparable. However, not all documents included keywords, and it was not useful to allocate many of the keywords to particular policy sectors (for example, many of the geographical terms). We finally came out with a list of 2,414 keywords that we were able to connect to one of the 12 sectors referred to previously. Clearly, this is a very rough approximation, as two or more keywords 217

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Figure 11.8: Distribution of topics in policy research journal articles

Education, 5.6% Labour, 5.3% Economic, 15.5%

Environment, 10.5% Tourism, 3.1% Social, 4.7% Gender, 2.7%

International, 26.3%

Various, 11.6%

Urban, 9.8%

Migration, 3.4% Health, 1.6%

might belong to the same paper if they are focused on multi-​sectoral problems or are at the intersection of different policy areas (which we do not control for). The results obtained are undoubtedly not very accurate, but they contribute to a better understanding of where the focus of Spanish academia is with respect to policy analysis. International policy (26.3 per cent), which also includes development and regional studies, is the major group of publications. The second group refers to economic policy issues in Spain, including issues such as macroeconomic management, investment, or how to cope with the financial crisis. The group that follows (various) comprises publications on a variety of topics which could not be classified into the rest of categories. The fourth group (10.5 per cent) concentrates on environmental issues, in particular sustainability, a topic that has generated great interest in recent years. Beyond these four broad policy areas, which account for more than 50 per cent of the keywords, urban policies and education follow with 9.8 per cent and 5.6 per cent of the keywords, respectively. There are many other policies where research-​focused activity is quite relevant: labour (5.3 per cent) and social policies (4.7 per cent). These areas correspond closely with the major policy areas in most other European countries. However, there are also other policy areas that generate significant interest for analysis by academics, such as tourism (3.1 per cent), migration 3.4 per cent), gender (2.7 per cent), and health (1.6 per cent), although these are less intense than the policy areas already mentioned. These are all policy areas that are of particular concern in Spain and which refer to issues of major interest to policy-​makers at different levels of government. Some are emerging areas (such as gender or migration), while others reflect issues related to the challenges of the Spanish economy. When comparing the distribution of keywords with the Italian data, a very similar country in this respect, we find that the areas of research by academics working on policy analysis in either country is quite similar. For Italy, we were able to identify 1,683 keywords, and found about 13 per cent of keywords for the economy and 9 per cent for labour issues. This shows more interest in labour and less in the economy when comparing with Spanish figures, although 218

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there is not a major aggregated difference. Actually, while there is a similar distribution of policy analysis across both countries in most sectors, the most relevant difference we find is in the area of industrial policy, in which there is a very small research activity in Spain but which constitutes a significant area of policy analysis in Italy. In contrast, areas like the environment or tourism appear to be less active in academic research in Italy compared with Spain’s greater interest in them.

Conclusion This chapter has examined the research and knowledge transfer system in Spanish universities and research centres and has discussed how and to what extent research institutions contribute to policy analysis. Although Spain was a latecomer to the policy turn in social sciences, policy analysis in Spanish universities became more established after the 2000s. In order to assess the development of capacity for policy analysis, we have provided and examined data in three areas: research institutions, publicly financed projects, and publications on policy analysis. Overall, we observed that in recent decades Spanish universities have progressively developed consistent structures and know-​how capabilities for policy analysis. During the first decades of democracy, from the late 1970s until at least the 1990s, Spanish governments at the national, regional, and local level commissioned reports and studies from academics or from emerging private consultancy firms, directly or through intermediaries such as think tanks (which had no researchers). More recently, however, most public administrations in Spain have increased their analytical capacities, in some cases establishing internal units and hiring trained staff. Also, think tanks now have their own researchers, and many consultancy firms have become large organisations with dedicated professional staff. The expansion of all these entities that specialise in customised policy analysis is evidence that the role of academic personnel is now generally less central, while public organisations rely on universities as a source of initial trained staff (Chapter 3, this volume). Actually, in recent decades, there has been a process of differentiation and specialisation in policy analysis endeavours in Spain. On the one hand, we observed a strong trend towards a more competitive and international research-​ oriented profile by academics, and on the other hand, we saw an increase in many different specialised policy-​oriented activities outside Spanish universities. We have no detailed information about these trends, but most probably the issues related to public policy analysis in Spain have remained a relevant topic for research. The geographical proximity of the problems to be analysed, the previous experience of researchers in the field as consultants, the relevance of policy-​oriented debates with local political and policy communities, and the ease of achieving publicity and a direct impact of research results, are undoubtedly all aspects that may have helped the boom in academic policy analysis in Spain in many different fields and disciplines. As we have shown, the institutional 219

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infrastructure for policy analysis has increased over time. However, there is a significant concentration of policy research activities in just a few regions –​ Madrid and Catalonia in particular –​not only in the number of institutions but also in the number of research projects and publications. Also, as observed from these different perspectives, most of the activity is concentrated in a small number of universities which have more research-​oriented profiles. We found that only few research centres are dedicated exclusively to policy-​related research, while many are more varied in their range of activities. It is also relevant to mention that the vast majority of research institutions are public (89.4 per cent), while only a small proportion is private. From this study, a very relevant question emerges about analysing the contribution of universities to policy analysis in Spain: How does the large amount of academic research on policy analysis we have identified here impact public policy-​making? Unfortunately, this is something that still needs to be elucidated, and it remains a matter for further research. We conclude this chapter, however, with a few thoughts that connect this question with the different models of the relationships between universities and governments regarding policy analysis concerns. In this sense, we suggest that most of the academic production that focuses on policy analysis has increasingly followed the percolation model in the last decades in Spain, in that it produces policy analysis without a direct connection with public policy-​makers or public servants. Topic specialisation is low among research institutions but increases slightly for research projects and outputs. University researchers focus on a wide variety of policy sectors, with economic policy and international and environmental issues as the most salient. Some of the topics are clearly related to major policy issues in Spain, but this is not always the case; it is the interest of the researcher that directs the focus on the object of the research. The political demand model was prevalent years ago, when a system of policy analysis was not established at all outside the universities in Spain, and was not well-​structured within them either. Actually, the political demand model that emerged from the period of transition to democracy in the late 1970s was not very strong in most policy sectors, and was weakly institutionalised, but it was based on informal networks and personal connections over different partisan sensibilities. In this sense, the process of institutionalisation of policy analysis in Spanish universities and research centres, together with an outstanding increase in the number of academic publications that we identified in this chapter, allows us to sustain this argument. However, the effective impact of such a large amount of research on public policy-​making in Spain, albeit indirect, remains unclear. How to establish new bridges between policy-​makers and policy analysts in academia is an important challenge for the Spanish science system; a challenge that remains to be addressed in the coming years. Finally, the collaborative model, described in the introduction as a case of strong coordination between bureaucrats and academics across different policy 220

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sectors, does not appear to have been visible enough in recent years in Spain, at least based on our indicators. Beyond informal relationships, there is not a well-​established system for universities to advise governments and public administrations which is also capable of providing evidence-​based analysis and policy-​making judgements. Although commissioning policy analysis to university centres and research groups is always a possible door to introducing such collaborative models, beyond ad hoc advisory committees and similar bodies, the lack of formal articulation is very evident. However, we suggest that networks of informal collaboration between bureaucrats, politicians, and academics still exist today but compete against a proliferation of policy analysis activities in the non-​profit and the private sectors. In summary, while the percolation model has been gaining more relevance because of the growth of policy research produced with an academic purpose, we can conclude that the political demand model still exists, although it experiences significant tensions and transformations today because of the institutional transformations of both the universities and the public administration. The third model, however –​the collaborative model –​ still has to be established, as it has not yet been institutionalised in Spain. For example, public administrations do not designate chief scientific officers in their departments, and most universities are not concerned about formalising and promoting the nexus between science and policy with new research and development instruments in their campuses. Yet some interesting questions from our study about the role of universities and research centres in policy analysis in Spain remain unanswered. We have identified some important transformations in recent decades, as well as the expansion of policy-​analysis research in Spanish universities since the mid-​2000s, but we still need to better understand the interactions between politicians, bureaucrats, and academic personnel. For example, further research is needed to properly understand the reasons why institutional differences exist, and what makes policy research so highly concentrated in some regions and not in others. Also, we have not investigated how the recent boom in academic publications truly impacts policy and decision-​making. It would be worthwhile exploring and discussing how the percolation model is effectively working and creating a relevant –​albeit indirect –​impact on policy-​making. Another relevant insight for further research is to study why the recent expansion of the institutional structure for research on policy analysis has not led to a diversification of income sources. It is worthwhile highlighting such major transformations of the universities’ role in policy analysis in Spain in recent decades –​as we identified earlier –​as well as the need to open a discussion about how policy research specialisation and academic and political leadership will lead to further changes in the relationship between academic personnel, politicians, and bureaucrats in Spain. Notes 1

Before the LOU, a similar authorisation was established by the Ley Orgánica de Reforma Universitaria, 11/​1983, in its article 11. 221

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The Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas is an agency within the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation. It is the largest public institution dedicated to scientific research and technological development, whose activity is distributed across the country.

References Ballart, X. and Riba, C. (1995) ‘Impact of legislation requiring moped and motorbike riders to wear helmets’, Evaluation and Program Planning, 18(4): 311–​20. Berbegal-​Mirabent, J., Lafuente, E., and Solé, F. (2013) ‘The pursuit of knowledge transfer activities: An efficiency analysis of Spanish universities’, Journal of Business Research, 66(10): 2051–​9. Doubleday, Robert and Wilsdon, James (eds) (2013) Future Directions for Scientific Advice in Whitehall, Center for Science and Policy, University of Cambridge. Lambright, W. and Zinke, R. (1989) ‘Science, technology, and public administration: The government-​university nexus’, Public Administration Review, 49(2): 206–​9. Requejo, Ferran, Jordana, Jacint, Ramió, Carles, and Gil, Eduard (2000) ‘Els think tanks a Catalunya’, Idees: Revista de temes contemporanis, 7: 42–​61. Saretzki, Thomas (2007) ‘The policy turn in German political science’, in F. Fischer, G.J. Miller, and M. Sidney (eds) Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics and Methods, New York: Routledge, pp 587–​602. Subirats, Joan and Gomà, Ricard (1998) Políticas públicas en España: contenidos, redes de actores y niveles de gobierno, Barcelona: Ariel. Trow, Martin (1984) ‘Researchers, policy analysis and policy intellectuals’, in T. Husen and M. Kogan (eds) Educational Research and Policy: How Do They Relate?, Oxford: Pergamon Press, pp 261–​82. Vallès, Josep Maria (2020) ¿Para qué servimos los politólogos?, Madrid: Catarata.

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Part Four Policy analysis by parties, interest groups, and other actors

TWELVE

Political parties and policy analysis Oscar Barberà, Juan Rodríguez-​Teruel, and Fernando Casal

Introduction As noted in the introduction to this volume, policy analysis can be understood as ‘a method for structuring information and providing opportunities for the development of alternative choices’ (see Chaqués-Bonafont and Jordana, this volume). While such a definition may be widely accepted, its implications are far from obvious, since, for instance, different actors may interpret in substantially different ways how this knowledge should be generated and used. From a purely rationalist approach, knowledge structuring can be conceived (admittedly naively) as a neutral and aseptic process that attempts merely to find the best possible solution to a social or political problem. The extreme opposite of rationalism, constructivism, asserts the complex and controversial nature of social problems. This usually leads to efforts to understand the interests and motivations of different actors in order to enable the commitments that allow for agreed or politically viable solutions to a problem. Concerning the role of policy analysis within political parties, such a variety of interpretations favours the development of different tasks and tools, from data-​gathering or the recollection of good practices, to the analysis of the networks and interests involved in a problem (Moran et al, 2006). The importance of policy analysis for political parties is well established in democratic theory. In liberal democracies organised around party government, political parties play a key role in the governance of political institutions due to their ability to build parliamentary majorities, recruit staff to executives, and draft electoral programmes that are expected to guide public action (Blondel and Cotta, 1996, 2000). Despite their currently changing role as mediators between civil society and the democratic state, parties have tended to be characterised by the recruitment of political personnel as well as by the articulation, aggregation, and mobilisation of social interests (Hershey, 2006). However, these actors’ capacities and contributions to policy analysis are far from being clear and direct, inasmuch as this is gradually ceasing to be one of the central duties that political parties carry out in contemporary political systems. On the other hand, political parties might still have a role in policy-​making processes through other alternative strategies to policy analysis: for instance, clientelism and patronage (Hopkin, 2006). The development of policy analysis within political parties depends substantially on where it is developed. Following Katz and Mair (1993), political parties are 225

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institutions comprising at least three very different faces: the party on the ground, made up of its members and regional structure; the party central office, that is, its organisation and the power relations at the top of that organisation; and the party in public office, which deals with the presence of party members in parliament or government. Each of these faces implies different ways of involving parties in the policy-​making process and in policy analysis. In this chapter we will focus on the top of the organisation and its staff, as well as its regional branches (very relevant in the Spanish case) and on think tanks with a direct link to political parties.1 It must be noted that, because it is difficult to study, this is virtually unexplored territory in the comparative literature. So much so, in fact, that, if recruitment is seen as party politics’ secret garden, policy analysis must be nothing less than its private boudoir. Aiming to shed light on this intimate room, this chapter analyses how the Spanish political parties have managed to develop their role as policy analysts. In particular, we focus on three different decisions adopted by the parties’ central offices to achieve this goal. First, political parties may develop their structural capacities in terms of organisation and resources (personnel, funding). For instance, they can build partisan think tanks as a way of externalising some aspects of policy analysis in order to achieve specialisation, or attract partners with this aim. Second, political parties may expand their sectoral policy expertise by increasing the specialisation of their party bodies and sectoral organisations. For instance, they can create new offices to develop new areas of policy interest (gender, environment, equality) among the party executive committees. Finally, political parties may implement a wide range of tools and strategies to produce policy analysis. In some cases, the implementation is directly carried out by the party, in others it is delegated to external organisations such as think tanks. In the end, the different approaches implemented by political parties to strengthen their capacities in policy analysis are addressed to influencing the political agenda and, eventually, the overall policy-​making process. However, as our study will show, Spanish political parties face severe limitations on producing fruitful policy analysis. On the one hand, parties in Spain play only a small role in shaping public policies. Overall, this is the result of both the existing relatively closed and hierarchical policy networks (Subirats and Gomà, 2020), and an enormous imbalance between the capacities and expertise of governments vis-​à-​vis parliament and parties, which has in turn downplayed the latter’s role in policy-​making (Chaqués-​Bonafont et al, 2015: 50; Rodríguez-​Teruel, 2020: 204). Furthermore, as we will see in this chapter, parties’ economic and human resources are limited and oriented towards the development of their organisation and campaigns. Their most relevant action regarding policies takes place mainly within parliamentary groups. Likewise, political parties’ ties to traditional support groups (universities, trade or union associations, third sector) have weakened substantially in recent years (Verge, 2012). Political parties’ attempts to reconnect with citizens and interest groups have led in the last decade to more 226

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inclusive internal decision-​making mechanisms and, to some extent, to greater responsiveness to the demands of social movements and interest groups (Barberà et al, 2019; Chaqués-​Bonafont et al, 2020). An additional obstacle to checking the effectiveness of their policy analysis is found in their transparency policies. Spanish parties do not publish annual reports of their activities and their accountability is controversial (Verge, 2007: ch 7; Barberà and Correa, 2018; Oñate and Ortega, 2019). The main party think tanks are somewhat more transparent, but they have also been involved in some scandals (Ponsa, 2014; González-​Capitel and Ponsa, 2017; Martín and Martisi, 2018). The aforementioned difficulties within Spanish political parties have produced a ‘policy paradox’: while persisting in their vocation to act as instruments of the social representation of ideas and interests, defining and promoting the public policy agenda from the standpoint of power, the evolution of their capacities, their functioning and their organisation face increasing limitations on achieving that same goal. A way out of that paradox might come by adopting clientelism and patronage as policy-​making strategies. Developing public policies in order to target specific groups in exchange for votes, money, or other resources might have given political parties a key role in policy-​making, although this remains a still very controversial issue beyond the scope of this chapter (Robles Egea, 1996; Corzo, 2002; Pantín, 2020). Following these remarks, the rest of the chapter analyses how and to what extent political parties in Spain have developed policy analysis. The study focuses on the two governing parties since the 1980s, the Spanish Socialist Workers Party (PSOE), and the People’s Party (PP). It also takes into account the main challenger party, the United Left (IU), and those that have made their breakthrough since 2014, such as Podemos, Ciudadanos, and Vox. Finally, the chapter also adds some considerations regarding the main regionalist parties, particularly Catalan and Basque (see Table 12.A1 in the appendix for more basic information on each party). The following pages will, first, give an account of the capacities (personnel, resources) as well as the thematic areas that are prioritised. Second, it is also relevant to understand the types of tools and methods used for their development, and, eventually, the role played by both the delegation of these tasks onto other actors and cooperative relations with ideologically close parties. The chapter ends by considering the extent to which the capacities and tools used by parties lead to influencing the elaboration and implementation of public policies, and hence, to what extent this has solved their policy paradox.

Policy analysis capabilities Political parties’ policy analysis capabilities are scattered across a remarkable number of bodies and offices. To a large extent, this is due to the increasing importance of the professionalisation of politics, which has tended to favour the emergence of new roles and expertise beyond those usually associated with bureaucracy 227

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(Panebianco, 1988). In the Spanish case, as in other Southern European countries, the professionalisation of politics took place in parallel with the renaissance of democracy. That was favoured, among other factors, by significant state funding, as well as a remarkable colonisation of public administrations by national and regional parties (Molas, 1992; Gangas, 1995; Pradera, 1997; Ignazi and Ysmal, 1998; Biezen, 2003). Despite the dispersion, the main capabilities for policy analysis are generally located in two types of department within the highest executive body: a) those in charge of carrying out research, political analysis, training, and preparing electoral manifestos and congressional platforms, generally composed of professional staff; and, b) to a lesser extent, also sectoral areas mostly focused on organising and making sense of bottom-​up participation from the party membership. Both types of department have been present in the PSOE with considerable continuity since 1976. Particularly notable is the prominence of its research and programmes area, occupied by politicians who have carried out important government tasks (Méndez, 2000). IU’s leaders have always organised their executives in a sectoral manner; however, its research and programmes area has not always had much continuity. Julio Anguita, IU’s first party leader, did appoint those responsible for this area, but did not give them continuity. Then, Gaspar Llamazares opted for a name change, switching the name of this position to ‘area coordinator’, although he also opted for not giving it continuity. During his first term, Cayo Lara divided the research and the coordination areas, only to reunite them in his second term. And nothing changed after Alberto Garzón took over IU’s leadership in 2016. As for the main right-​wing party, the PP, changes have depended on different presidents. Manuel Fraga did not organise his executives in a sectoral manner, nor did he create executive positions dedicated to research and programmes (Baón, 2001). José M. Aznar divided his executives sectorally, but assigned them a technical profile, particularly in the research area. Meanwhile, Rajoy suppressed the research area but reinforced the prominence of sectoral areas with emerging figures who would later be allocated important ministerial responsibilities. Pablo Casado’s choice, like Aznar’s, has been to create a double structure of research and of sectoral areas. As for new parties, these show more discontinuity in this regard. Podemos has tended to reproduce both sectoral functioning as well as the creation of various areas of analysis that were distributed among prominent management members. On the other hand, the internal structure of both Ciudadanos’ and Vox’s central organs is functional, diluting the sectoral dynamics of traditional parties. Although there have been secretaries with functions comparable to that of research areas, usually with relevant incumbents, their role has not been continued. At the regional level, national parties have developed executive structures equivalent (or quite similar) to more traditional parties, although in some cases there has been a certain leeway for innovation and differentiation (Fabre, 2008; Astudillo, 2010; Correa, 2015). On the other hand, Non-​State-​Wide Parties (NSWP) have tended to develop alternative structures. During Pujol’s era as 228

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leader of Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC), the elected leadership resulting from caucuses was very small and limited to organisational aspects, whereas a certain sectoral distribution was established later on. Once Artur Mas took over CDC’s leadership, a greater sectoral specialisation was consolidated, also taking the form of research and programmes areas (Marcet, 1987, 2017; Barrio, 2007). As for the Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV), the executive has followed more regional than sectoral representation criteria (Pérez-​Nievas, 2002; Pablo and Mees, 2005). Parties’ ability to carry out policy analysis depends, to a large extent, on the financial and human resources at their disposal. Overall, Spanish political parties’ central office personnel are fairly few, considerably fewer than those in other European parliamentary democracies (Bardi et al, 2017). As Table 12.1 shows, there is a large variation in the amount of spending on staff and in the number of personnel hired by the central organisation. Only PP has a significantly higher number of hired staff, even if PSOE’s declared expenditure on personnel responsible for running the organisation is higher. Although the data has to be taken with caution (in some cases, parties mixed central and regional branches’ staff), such differences could be explained by more part-​time contracts among the PP’s staff. Eventually, that might be also an indication that by then some of PP’s assistants and managers had complemented their party positions with other office positions in either the local or regional governments. Among the new parties Podemos has obtained the most human resources, mostly consisting of supporting staff for public and communication positions. During the early days after the democratic transition, the staff in charge of political analysis and drafting the party manifesto, as well as the bottom-​up sectoral work areas, promoted knowledge and policies through direct collaboration with experts and academics within the party’s sphere. In recent decades, however, political parties have tended to delegate a substantial amount of policy analysis and place it in the hands of think tanks more or less promoted by them. This trend towards ‘semi-​externalisation’ has been quite widespread in Spain regardless of the ideology and size of the parties, and has probably been one of the main strategies to gain influence on the public agenda and the policy-​making process. Following the German example, the most common legal formula for such think tanks has been that of political foundations (Ponsa, 2014: ch 5). Three different types of think tank can be identified, depending on their ability to produce policy analysis and their legal links with a political party. The first group is made up of large think tanks sponsored directly by the parties and with formalised organisational links (Table 12.1). They are generally known as party think tanks and have shown remarkable continuity over time and a relatively large amount of resources. Having historically received direct public subsidies, only since 2007 have they disclosed their accounts to the Court of Auditors (Tribunal de Cuentas). Party leaders usually appoint the main managers of such party think tanks. Controversies regarding their likely involvement in evading legal restrictions on party financing have been common, and not until recent years 229

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Table 12.1: Spanish political parties: human resources (2018) Party

Staff spending in thousands of €

Central office personnel

PSOE

22,719

200

PP

19,563

436

IU

2,647*

9

13,121

127

5,582

n/​a

216

n/​a

CDC/​PDeCAT

1,115

25

PNV

2,652

49

ERC

2,542

91

Podemos Ciudadanos Vox

Note: * 2017 Source: Compiled by the authors using data from the party reports on staff spending and party reports and press on the number of personnel. For some parties (PP, PNV), staff data combines central and regional branches.

have their legal obligations been homogenised with those of the parties. Among this type of organisation, the right-​wing FAES (acronym of the Foundation for Analysis and Social Studies) has been the most influential in policy terms, although it dissociated in 2017 from the PP in order to become, at least formally, an independent think tank. The second group is comprised of institutions that, having direct formal ties with parties, are usually very small, have very few resources and little continuity over time –​considerably limiting their operational capacity. They are also known as party think tanks, but they are subnational political organisations and depend on subsidies linked to the electoral fate of the party’s regional branches or ephemeral private donations. They are also required to make their accounting and activities public, though they often fail to comply with these requirements. Consequently, they have been widely criticised for being merely an alternative instrument for the financing of political parties (Nieto, 2008; Ponsa, 2014; González-​Capitel and Ponsa, 2017; Martín and Martisi, 2018). Finally, the third group is made up of think tanks indirectly promoted by parties but with no formal ties to the organisation. Such institutions also take the legal form of a foundation, but are usually sponsored either by internal factions or by former party leaders. Although they do not receive direct state subsidies, this has not prevented many of them from obtaining (earmarked) public funding on their own. Since the turn of the century these think tanks have certainly been the most influential in the public debate (González, 2010). Some relevant left-​ wing think tanks have followed this pattern, like Alternativas or Sistema, both close to the PSOE, but formally autonomous from the party. More recently, the Center for Economic Policy and Political Economy (EsadeEcPol), promoted by the ESADE Business School and former ministers and party leaders from PSOE, PP, and Ciudadanos, has been created to defend moderate party policies. 230

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Table 12.2: Spanish party think tanks: basic data Main activities

Party

Party think tank

Origin/​ termination

PA

ARG

TRAI

CULT

ARCH

PSOE

Pablo Iglesias

1926 (1977)

X

X

X

X

X

Ideas

2008/​2012

X

X

X

Rafael Campalans

1979

X

X

X

X

X

Cánovas del Castillo

1980/​2002*

X

X

FAES

1989/​2017**

X

X

Concordia y Libertad

2018

X

X

Investigaciones Marxistas

1978

X

X

X

FEC

2001

X

X

X

Podemos

Instituto 25M

2015

X

X

X

CDC

Trias Fargas/​CATDEM

1995/​2017

X

X

X

PNV

Sabino Arana

1988

X

X

ERC

Josep Irla

1997

X

X

PSC PP

IU

X

X

COOP

X X X X X X

X

Note: * Integrated into FAES since 2002; ** not linked to PP since 2017. Acronyms: FAES: Foundation for Analysis and Social Studies; FEC: Foundation for a Citizens’ Europe; PA: policy alternatives; ARG: arguments for the political debate and issue promotion; TRAI: training; CULT: cultural activities; ARCH: archiving and documenting; COOP: foreign cooperation.

Table 12.2 summarises some of the basic characteristics of the first group of party think tanks. From the outset, it is important to note that virtually all parties (except Ciudadanos and Vox2) have chosen to create such institutions. There seems to be no clear pattern regarding their origins. The transition to democracy seems to have had a certain impact on their emergence, but internal factors such as relays in leadership and/​or disputes between ideological tendencies seem to have been more relevant. In the case of Catalan parties, their origins coincide with the first state and regional subsidies in the 1990s (Ponsa, 2014). There is a certain convergence regarding the type of activities carried out by the Spanish party think tanks, which usually focus on: legitimising their parties’ stances on the political debate through opinions and/​or data, or promoting new ideas or issues on the public agenda; disseminating political ideologies and training political cadres; and organising various cultural activities. In the case of parties with the greatest historical tradition, think tanks also serve as archives for administrative documents, political texts (for example, statutes, manifestos, speeches), and political propaganda (for example, posters, merchandising, electoral materials). Activities strictly linked to policy analysis (for example, production of policy papers) only developed from the 1990s onwards, although many think tanks are yet to undertake them. Spanish party think tanks’ capabilities are generally more limited than those of their respective parties’ central offices, and their management and some staff are motivated by partisan connections rather than expertise. In some cases, in order to overcome their organisational weaknesses, parties and think tanks have tended 231

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to create organisational synergies, such as combining their administrative services at headquarters to save costs for the think tank, etc. Their main task regarding policy analysis is to build networks of collaborators (voluntary or underpaid), into whose hands much of the policy analysis work ends up being delegated. For this purpose, some think tanks have created periodical magazines, working papers series, and regular studies, through which they contribute to public debate and public policy generation. It must be noted, however, that not many of their policy papers and publications have an impact on the political agenda or influence the public debate.

Policy areas Political parties are actors with specific positions on a wide range of policy areas. From this point of view, they and their party think tanks should be expected to carry out policy analysis on a wide range of issues. This is particularly true when political parties are in opposition, due to their lack of access to government information and civil servants’ know-​how. However, given the limitations of both resources and capabilities mentioned in the previous section, parties have concentrated their efforts on certain ideas, issues, and policies. Ever since the dawn of mass democracy, and through much of the 20th century, this tended to be associated with parties’ positioning regarding the different cleavages or ideologies that articulated politics in each country. During recent decades, an increasing cognitive mobilisation, greater interest in politics, and a wider access to political information has contributed to focusing more on specific issues or public policies (Budge and Farlie, 1983; Budge, 2015). Comparative evidence, coming from electoral programmes analysis or experts’ opinions, suggests that thematic voting has become increasingly relevant in the majority of Western countries, including Spain (Klingemann et al, 2006; Bakker et al, 2015). Designing sectoral public policies within political parties requires the development of policy analysis expertise within the organisation or, eventually, resorting to delegation and/​or coordination strategies (see next section). A tentative way to check the extent to which parties have increased their concern about sectoral policy analysis is to study the degree of specialisation within a party’s highest executive body. It is inevitable for the party central office to prioritise organisational, electoral, and coordination tasks with the party on the ground and the party in public office. However, over time Spanish parties have also tended to develop a growing sectoral specialisation in their executives (for example, economy, welfare, regional organisation). As Table 12.3 shows, this trend has advanced unevenly according to each party’s ideology. On the left of the political spectrum, functional specialisation of party executives made its appearance earlier on and tended to be all-​encompassing. For the parties closer to the right and the NSWP, the path towards specialisation has been slower, and in some cases it is still limited to the most traditional areas and linked to the main cleavages/​issues in Spanish politics: namely, the socio-​economic dimension, 232

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Table 12.3: Sectoral organisation in Spanish parties’ executives Party

Circ. 1980

Circ. 1990

Circ. 2000

Circ. 2010

Circ. 2020

PSOE

ECO /​SFP

ALL

ALL

ALL

ALL

PP

NO

ECO

ECO /​REG/​SFP

ALL

ALL

IU

-​

ALL

ALL

ALL

ALL

Podemos

-​

-​

-​

-​

ALL

Ciudadanos

-​

-​

-​

NO

NO

Vox

-​

-​

-​

-​

ECO /​REG /​SFP

CDC/​PDeCAT

NO

NO

NO

ECO /​REG /​SFP

ECO /​REG /​SFP

PNV

NO

NO

NO

NO

NO

ERC

NO

NO

NO

ALL

ALL

Note: NO: no sectoral division; ECO: economic and social policies (labour, health, pensions, education, etc); REG: regional and cultural policies; POST: feminism and environment; SFP: security, defence and foreign policy; ALL: all. Source: Authors’ own elaboration from political parties’ executives

regional problems, and foreign politics. These differences between left and right parties also apply to new parties (Podemos, Ciudadanos, Vox). Spanish party think tanks also show interest in a wide range of policy areas. As shown in Table 12.4, there are certain common themes to virtually all parties’ think tanks. Based on the aims stated on their websites and the titles of their main publications around the 2010s, the lowest common denominator themes are socio-​economic issues, dealing with institutional functioning and political participation (eventually, also, historical issues), and those related to comparative and international politics. It is interesting to note that regional problems tend to be the main focus of both right-​wing and NSWP party think tanks. By contrast, the left has usually emphasised the importance of feminist and environmental studies. Finally, it is important to note that party think tanks’ current thematic specialisation is the result of both various processes of rearrangement and of a certain institutional isomorphism. PP was the first party to regroup its think tanks and reorient its activities. While the leadership of its founder (M. Fraga) lasted, PP promoted the Fundación Cánovas del Castillo, which focused on training tasks as well as on the dissemination of conservative thought (Robles Piquer et al, 2010). After Aznar’s arrival at the party leadership, FAES was born and, with its liberal-​oriented positions, steadily gained prominence. The moment Aznar announced his withdrawal from the leadership of the PP, he promoted a merger process that culminated in 2003, in virtue of which all think tanks (including Cánovas del Castillo) merged into FAES. The ‘new’ FAES renewed its goals and working dynamics, which unquestionably contributed towards its increased influence (see the following section) (Carmona et al, 2012). In 2017, Aznar’s disagreements with the PP party leadership led to the end of the FAES’s 233

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Table 12.4: Party think tanks’ thematic areas of specialisation circa 2010s Thematic areas Party think tank

ECO

DEM

SOC

TER

FEM

ENV

SEC

INT

Pablo Iglesias

X

X

X

Ideas

X

X

X

Rafael Campalans

X

X

X

X

Cánovas del Castillo

X

X

X

X

FAES

X

X

X

X

Concordia y Libertad

X

X

X

Investigaciones Marxistas

X

X

X

X

X

FEC

X

X

X

X

X

Instituto 25M

X

X

X

X

Trias Fargas/​CATDEM

X

X

X

X

Sabino Arana

X

X

X

X

Josep Irla

X

X

X

X

X X

X

X

X

X X X

X

X

X

X X

X X

X

X X

Note: ECO: economic and labour policies; DEM: democracy, institutions, history; SOC: social policies (health, pensions, education, etc); REG: regional and cultural policies; FEM: feminism; ENV: environmental policies; SEC: security and defence; INT: comparative politics, international relations, foreign policy, EU. Source: Authors’ own elaboration from Xifra and Ponsa (2009), Ponsa (2014) and Tello (2016), and think tanks’ websites

direct links with the party. Since then the PP has tried to adapt a small collateral organisation devoted to international cooperation into its new party think tank, now renamed Concordia y Libertad. In the mid-​2000s, PSOE went down a similar path by promoting the integration of various think tanks linked to the party, the most important of which was the historic Fundación Pablo Iglesias, which at the time focused on socialist thought and historical issues. Just as in FAES’s case, the Ideas Foundation also gained considerable prominence, until a political scandal forced its closure in 2014. Ever since, the Fundación Pablo Iglesias has been PSOE’s main (but not its only) party think tank. A similar process also took place in the case of CDC, with the 2005 transformation of the Fundación Trias Fargas into the CATDEM Foundation (Ponsa, 2014).

Policy analysis: tools and strategies Previous sections have shown how, despite their limitations of human or financial resources, a growing sectoral specialisation and the creation of semi-​ autonomous organisations as party think tanks have been two of the main strategies implemented by political parties to develop public policy analysis. This section focuses on other tools and internal strategies such as data-​gathering and 234

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participation, but also on external strategies such as delegation and cooperation with other individuals, groups, or parties. Tools and internal strategies The available evidence on the specific tools that political parties use for policy analysis is very fragmentary. For example, parties often commission their own polls for electoral studies, but these are rarely used to monitor policies. As an alternative, they usually make use of databases such as those of the Center for Sociological Research (CIS in its Spanish acronym) or equivalent regional-​level agencies. Parties do not tend to disclose their internal reports, although this is a much more common practice in the case of party think tanks (Botella, 2010; Ponsa, 2014; Martín and Martisi, 2018). Activity at the upper levels of the parties is usually remarkably conditioned by the political affairs of the time, a trait that generally limits their capacity for strategic response, with the exception of specific time-​bound events such as caucuses, electoral campaigns, or conventions on specific issues. On these occasions, the size of the party and its ability to articulate internal participation are key to explaining its autonomy in policy analysis. However, Spanish parties are known for not being particularly successful in stimulating internal participation. Hence, as we will see in the following sections, delegation and coordination strategies are very commonly used instead (Méndez et al, 2004; Verge, 2007: 253–​ 63). This may be the reason why day-​to-​day policy analysis at party headquarters usually focuses on tasks such as specifically defining and establishing the issues on which the party will position itself. Overall, the results of this work culminate during party caucuses, which for Spanish political parties are the main events where the updating of and debate on political alternatives takes place. In-​between caucuses, sectoral conferences are also organised, which in turn encourage during the previous months’ policy analysis work oriented towards the production of manifestos and political agendas. However, access to government influences the predisposition of political parties to come up with political alternatives. Thus, after becoming part of the executive, their political agenda is completely subordinated to government action, and even electoral programmes end up being elaborated largely by government officials. When in opposition, parties with options to access government tend to subordinate their political agenda to the parliamentary group’s strategy, which has more resources and connects its priorities with its opposition role. On the other hand, party think tanks tend to adopt a more rationalist approach based on the strategic priorities established by the party. Hence, one of their fundamental tasks is to contribute to the elaboration of policy alternatives, either on the basis of their own analyses or, more frequently, by comparing public policies implemented by other governments. However, it is important not to overestimate their capacity for analysis as the better part of their attention tends to be diverted to other types of studies and functions, such as those devoted to 235

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historical issues, training, etc. In addition, it must be noted that their capabilities are potentially limited (see the first section of the chapter), a fact which also forces them to articulate delegation and cooperation/​collaboration strategies (Ponsa, 2014). Delegation Given the limitations faced by both parties and party think tanks discussed in the previous section, delegation is one of the most common strategies used for policy analysis. In this case, too, the evidence is fragmentary and should be studied with caution. Undoubtedly, the aspect that has received most attention is the one related to the preparation of electoral programmes. In the case of PSOE, the elaboration of party manifestos is usually directed by the research and programmes areas through various working groups made up of experts from the party, the parliamentary groups, and sympathetic (although not necessarily affiliated) intellectuals and academics. For youth policies, there has been a tendency to count on the so-​called Socialist Youth (PSOE’s youth organisation). In the preparation of the 2004, 2008, and 2015 manifestos, various groups of national and international experts were also given prominent roles. In 2015 the party commissioned a group of academics to prepare a report on constitutional reform that eventually became the basis for the party’s programme on this issue. In addition, since the early 2000s, different think tanks such as the Fundaciones Alternativas, Ideas, and Pablo Iglesias (Giménez Gluck, 2017) have also begun to play an increasing role in the elaboration of party manifestos. One of the innovations that the November 2019 general election brought was an extensive consultation process with close interest groups that was carried out by the party leadership. This resulted in some priorities in the manifesto initially presented at the beginning of that same year being substantially modified. In PP’s case, the leading role usually falls also to the research and programmes area, based on the activity of various working groups made up of affiliates, MPs or senior government officials, and experts related to the party (Verge, 2007: 258–​9). From the mid-​1990s until 2016, FAES played a very important role in manifesto preparation (ABC, 2009). One of the main formulas for articulating internal participation and experts’ contributions has been the holding of conventions focused on both outlining and disseminating certain aspects of the electoral programme for each election. Within IU, whoever is responsible for preparing the manifesto is also responsible for coordinating the party’s different sectoral areas. Over time, considerable importance has been given to favouring affiliates’ participation through various deliberative processes (for example, surveys), although there is little information regarding the role played by experts and external groups (Verge, 2007: 259–​61). In the case of Podemos, the role of the experts was initially quite relevant. Its first party manifesto was characterised by the inclusion of suggestions made by followers via digital media, though it also included a specific document written by an external expert regarding ‘the fight 236

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against corruption’. In the run up to the 2015 elections, the party established several participation structures, and also entrusted various close academics with the preparation of an economic programme (Rodríguez-​Teruel et al, 2016). For the November 2019 elections, the party leadership followed in PSOE’s footsteps and established formal consultation mechanisms with aligned interest groups. For Ciudadanos, the role of academics and intellectuals has been very relevant from the very beginning. Unlike other parties, Ciudadanos has tended to co-​ opt them into key leadership and public office positions rather than opting for delegation strategies. Nevertheless, in 2015 the party commissioned a group of academics to undertake the preparation of a constitutional reform proposal, whose recommendations were later included in its electoral programme (Rodríguez-​ Teruel and Barrio, 2016). In addition to party manifestos, some parties have also partially delegated their ideological renewal processes. One of the most notable examples is that of PSOE, which has held various consultation and conference processes in which experts’ contributions have been highly relevant. A remote and more controversial antecedent of these dynamics was the elaboration of PSOE’s Programa 2000 during the early 1990s (Gillespie, 1993). Since the 2000s, these processes have been frequently used to discuss regional issues and institutional reform proposals. The party held a conference in Santillana del Mar in 2003, another one in Granada in 2013, and another in Zaragoza in 2014. Cooperation Besides delegation, another relevant strategy involves cooperation with other political parties. Within the national arena this kind of strategy has important limitations, due to the usually prevailing logic of electoral competition. However, cooperation has been important at the regional level due to the existence of alliances between national parties and their regional sister parties (for example, in Catalonia or Navarre), as well as the more occasional collaborations between NSWP and national parties in both general and regional elections (Rodríguez-​ Teruel and Barrio, 2017). These cases usually involve the joint preparation of party manifestos. At the regional level, some attempts at formal coordination among NSWP stand out, although these have been rather sporadic. The first of this kind, during the mid-​1980s, consisted of a frustrated attempt to build a new national party, Partido Reformista (Reformist Party), with the support of various regionalist parties (Magaldi Fernandez, 2019). In the late 1990s, the GALEUSCA platform was born out of a cooperation agreement between Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG), Convergència i Unió (CiU), and PNV, promoting a common manifesto and various candidacies for the European elections. Other cooperation projects among NSWP have been even more precarious, such as the rapprochement of Basque nationalist parties during the 1990s or the collaboration between Catalan secessionist parties in the 2010s (Barberà and Barrio, 2017). 237

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Spanish parties’ cooperation dynamics have been most fruitful in the international arena. During the period of transition to democracy, the main ideological currents’ international divisions constituted an important source of legitimacy as well as technical, formative, and economic support for the newly created (or refounded) Spanish parties, particularly the Socialists, Christian Democrats, and Communists. The main German party think tanks (those named for F. Ebert, K. Adenauer, H. Seidel) played a very important role in these supporting tasks, a fact which undoubtedly ended up influencing the Spanish party think tank model (Powell, 1993; Muñoz Sánchez, 2007; Ponsa, 2014). Spain’s entry into the European Economic Community also eased the way for collaborations with its political parties’ European counterparts through Euro-​parties and their corresponding parliamentary groups (Table 12.5). In the case of NSWP, the electoral system used during European Parliament elections favoured the development of various electoral coalitions, such as the aforementioned GALEUSCA between the centre-​r ight parties, as well as other similar ones on the centre-​left and left of the political spectrum. This enabled the intensification of cooperation spaces and knowledge transfers, including in the field of policy analysis (Barberà, 2001). Starting in 2007, the EU institutions promoted subsidies aimed at the creation of Euro-​parties-​linked party think tanks (Table 12.5). This process added momentum to cooperation practices, particularly in those policy areas prioritised by the different Euro-​parties (Lo Presti, 2016). As shown in Table 12.5, at the end of the 2010s almost all the main Spanish parties (or their corresponding think tanks) belonged to an international network of think tanks articulated on the basis of Euro-​parties. In addition to

Table 12.5: Spanish parties’ international connections at the end of the 2010s Party

Party network

Think tank network

PSOE PSC

Party of European Socialists Socialist International

European Progressive Studies Policy Network

PP

European People’s Party Centrist Democrat International International Democrat Union

Wilfried Martens Centre European Ideas Network*

IU

European Left

Transform Europe

Podemos

Now the People!

Transform Europe

Ciudadanos

Alliance of Liberals and Democrats

-​

Vox

European Conservatives and Reformists

New Direction

CDC/​PDeCAT

Alliance of Liberals and Democrats*

European Liberal Forum*

PNV

People’s Party* European Democratic Party

Institute of European Democrats

ERC

European Free Alliance

Coppieters

Note: * Stopped being a member after 2020. Source: Authors’ own elaboration from Xifra and Ponsa (2009), Ponsa (2014) and Tello (2016), and think tanks’ websites

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the European network, the big national parties have also established contacts and collaboration with American think tanks: the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute in PP’s case; the Center for American Progress in PSOE’s case (González, 2010).

Policy analysis and governance As we have observed so far, the scarcity of resources devoted to policy analysis restricts party organisations’ influence on policy-​making. That being said, political parties still have an influence on policy-​making through the selection of political strategy, the drafting of electoral manifestos, the selection of the main issues of party competition, or the promotion of new issues for political debate. Not to talk about clientelistic and patronage practices and strategies –​some of them exposed and prosecuted, but still understudied (for example Corzo, 2002; Pantín, 2020). Their control of the agenda setting has also been shaped by the fact that prime ministers have also been party leaders, trying to reconcile re-​election with their own policy preferences. But even that has faced important challenges. There are several reasons for this. On the one hand, Europeanisation and globalisation processes have imposed increasing restrictions on government’s political alternatives. On the other hand, Spain’s decentralisation process has fragmented policy-​making and substantially augmented its complexity in key policy areas such as health or education. An even greater limitation is posed by the problems associated with delegation losses between the party and its institutional representatives. Spanish executives present a large number of non-​partisan ministers or politicians not having been recruited from the parliamentary group, a trend that has been growing in recent decades (Rodríguez-​Teruel, 2020). This means that those who have promoted policy analysis or even participated in the preparation of manifestos might end up not necessarily having access to positions in the ministries that try to address key political initiatives and redefine or implement them as public policies. Hence, most proposals or specific policy initiatives born from within parties end up being subordinated to the parliamentary group’s actions, and to a greater extent to the representatives in the executive, with whom parties do not usually clash. Such influence sometimes eventually even works in the opposite direction: that is, parties assume policy analysis results carried out by the parliamentary group or (especially) by government. In the latter case, there has been a growing trend whereby parties have tended to incorporate into their manifestos important proposals promoted by senior government officials who are not necessarily affiliated to the party. Accordingly, party influence over governmental agenda has been receding. In the first PSOE governments some important reforms emerged from proposals previously promoted from within the party, concerning education, health, and culture. Later years saw similar dynamics during Zapatero’s governments, in this case affecting gender or sexual equality policies, as well as institutional reforms 239

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of regional decentralisation. However, PSOE’s economic policy has been in the hands of non-​partisan ministers since 1993. PP’s case is entirely different. While its FAES Foundation was very influential in economic, foreign and educational policy during the Aznar governments (Barberá and Arregui, 2011; Saura, 2015; Morales, 2017), regarding social and cultural policies the mismatch between the think tank’s position and the implemented policies was greater. In addition, after the Great Recession, Rajoy’s fiscal policy was strongly contested from within the party itself, just as happened with other regional or health reform measures (for example, on termination of pregnancy). Recently, a successful case of policy analysis delivering a relevant public policy has been the minimum income scheme adopted by the Spanish parliament in July 2020. Preliminary proposals had been elaborated (as early as 2014) within party debates by PSOE’s policy analysts, when the party was still in opposition. Podemos also included this issue in its electoral platform. When PSOE came back to power in 2018, those party experts were appointed to influential posts within the cabinet, contributing to moving this initiative up the government’s agenda. Party think tanks have experienced more autonomy and gained relevance in promoting political initiatives and reforms. These institutions have been linked to the diffusion of values, ideas, policy orientations, and policy proposals not always shared by the party. In the case of FAES it contributed to the diffusion of neoliberal ideas and a more restrictive interpretation of the state decentralisation model. Some of these ideas collided with the more statist conception of Spanish conservatism, with its ties to other political families, such as the Christian Democrats. In PSOE’s case, the appearance of different think tanks is not exempt from either the promotion of different economic policy conceptions or various attempts to integrate new social problems. In this respect, the Pablo Iglesias Foundation has traditionally been tied to the most statist faction of the party, while the Alternativas Foundation and, at some point, the Ideas Foundation tried to renew social democracy based on more liberal postulates. In the case of Catalan nationalism, the renewal of the Trias Fargas Foundation in the new CATDEM also coincided with the fostering of a new, more sovereigntist agenda that helped to break up the legacy of the party founder (Jordi Pujol).

Conclusions In this chapter, we have examined policy analysis within Spanish political parties. We have shown how, in Spain, parties’ policy analysis has overall greatly expanded, both in terms of specialisation and in terms of its analytical capacity. Spanish political parties have developed two main strategies to strengthen the effectiveness of their policy analysis and, hence, their influence on the policy-​making process. First, by enhancing the specialisation of some areas. Second, by delegating policy analysis functions to their party think tanks (generally, without allocating enough human or financial resources), and to the party in the public office. Lately they have also relied on strategies of delegation to external individuals (academics, 240

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intellectuals) or groups in order to draft their programmes and manifestos. Finally, they have also tried to maintain their influence through international participation in their corresponding European parties and through granting a greater autonomy to their regional branches regarding policy initiatives. However, the modest results of parties’ internal policy analysis increasingly suggest a policy paradox. In spite of their prominence in the political process, parties’ role in terms of policy-​making has usually been limited and has gradually decreased over time, despite the highly controversial scope and relevance of clientelism and patronage in Spanish politics. This trend has been accentuated by the gradual delegation upwards to EU supranational institutions, due to jurisdiction issues, and downwards to subnational institutions, due to Spain’s decentralisation process. Multilevel policy-​making constitutes a very complex environment that, indeed, has been quite challenging for Spanish political parties. As a consequence of these evolutions, Spanish political parties should embrace new strategies and adaptations to assert their influence on the policy-​making process of the country.

Acknowledgements This research has been funded through grant PGC2018-​098319-​B-​C22 of the Spanish government. The authors wish to acknowledge Buenaventura Marco’s contribution as research assistant.

Appendix Table 12.A1: Spanish political parties: basic info Party

Founded

Ideology

Regional spread

Seats (2019)

PSOE

1879

Centre-​left

State-​wide

120

PP

1977

Right

State-​wide

89

Vox

2013

Radical right

State-​wide

52

IU

1986

Left

State-​wide

In coalition with Podemos

Podemos

2014

Radical left

State-​wide

35

Ciudadanos

2006

Center

State-​wide

10

ERC

1931

Regionalist Left

Non-​state-​wide

13

CDC/​PDeCAT

1977/​2016

Regionalist Center-​right

Non-​state-​wide

8

PNV

1895

Regionalist Center-​right

Non-​state-​wide

6

Source: Own eleboration

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Notes 1

2

In this respect, the evidence provided in this chapter will be limited to their extra-​parliamentary organisations. Policy analysis in parliamentary groups or governments will be assessed in other chapters of this edited volume. In September 2020, and following the model of American Republican think tanks, Vox promoted the Disenso Foundation, which most probably will share the same features as the institutions analysed in Table 12.2.

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Trade unions, policy analysis, and the policy process Oscar Molina and Alejandro Godino

Introduction In December 2018, the People’s Party presented a bill to create a registry of lobbies in Spain with the aim of increasing transparency in the policy process.1 In the original proposal, trade unions and employer organisations were included, among many other actors, as lobbies. Political parties were, however, divided on this proposal. According to the centre-​r ight Ciudadanos and leftist Podemos, the trade unions and employer organisations should have been included in the lobbies list, while for the socialist party PSOE, the trade unions were already recognised constitutionally and legally through their capacity to participate in public policy processes. As expected, the trade unions fiercely opposed their inclusion in this list. They maintained that as social partners, they had a constitutional right and a clear mandate to participate in and influence policy-​making processes that no other actor had. This recent episode shows the controversy surrounding the two ‘souls’ of trade unions as actors in the policy process. On the one hand, as policy insiders (Grant, 2004), their role as social partners arises in different ways, including in their participation in social security and labour market agencies (Ysàs, 2013), in tripartite social dialogue and policy concertation processes (Molina, 2011), and in national social dialogue institutions (Montalvo, 2008). However, the trade unions are increasingly developing other outsider strategies aiming to influence the policy process, including making policy recommendations, issuing press releases, meeting with members of the parliament, issuing reports, conducting studies on specific topics, etc. These two sides of the trade unions’ policy action have not only changed since the transition to democracy but also evolved as mechanisms for policy intervention. This chapter explores policy analysis in trade unions and reveals three factors that play a key role in explaining the type and intensity of the policy analysis activities trade unions develop: the trade unions’ role in the policy process, the trade unions’ organisational characteristics, and industrial relations institutions. The most representative trade unions enjoy a policy insider position in social and labour market-​related areas through their participation in public agencies, national social dialogue institutions and policy concertation. However, their

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involvement in public policy-​making remains unstable and contingent on the government’s attitude due to weak institutionalisation. Moreover, unions in Spain are characterised as devoting limited resources to policy analysis and to research activities more generally. Several reasons are put forward to explain this lack of devotion of resources. First, the unions have limited financial resources due to low membership levels. Second, the institutional configuration of the industrial relations system in Spain gives the most representative trade unions a quasi-​monopoly in the representation, a strong institutionalisation of industrial relations, and a moderate institutional involvement, hence reducing their incentives to develop a strong policy analysis dimension. The policy analysis activities carried out by the trade unions are mostly aimed at building capacity in collective bargaining, though a shift can be observed towards broadening the scope of analyses in recent years. This analysis also shows an erosion of the forms of institutionalised involvement and intermittent patterns of policy concertation that have reduced the trade unions’ participation in public policy-​making and implementation, especially during the 2008 financial crisis. Before this erosion, the trade unions tried to strengthen their policy analysis capacities, including through the production of evidence-​based reports for policy-​making and more intense use of social networks to reach broader segments of the population, among others. Moreover, they have forged alliances at the EU level in recent years to create and strengthen their research dimension. The chapter is organised in three sections. The first section introduces the trade union movement in Spain, its characteristics, and the main challenges it faces. The second section analyses the role of trade unions in the policy process in Spain. The first important aspect to consider when analysing the participation of the unions in the process of formulating and implementing public policies is the institutional context of industrial relations and the opportunities and/​or incentives it creates to develop these functions. The section explores the various channels for union participation and how they have changed in shape and intensity. The third section explores the form and degree of policy analysis within the trade union organisations, therefore looking at the organisational resources devoted to it, the type of analyses carried out, the objectives, and the mechanisms to enhance their impact on policy-​making. In doing so, the section will discuss how policy analysis is carried out within the two largest confederations in Spain, the topics analysed, and the objectives of these analyses.

Trade unions as political actors in Spain: characteristics and challenges Trade unionism in Spain The trade union landscape in Spain is characterised by the pre-​eminence of two large national confederations, the Comisiones Obreras (CCOO) and the 247

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Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT), along with other smaller confederations that operate at the whole Spanish level2 (such as the Unión Sindical Obrera (USO) and the General Confederation of Labor (CGT)) or regional level3 (ELA-​STV (Solidaridad de Trabajadores Vascos) in the Basque Country, SNG in Galicia, etc.). Similarly, there are specific confederations of the public sector (Central Sindical Independiente y de Funcionarios CSI-​CSIF) as well as so-​called corporate or professional unions that have a particularly strong presence in education and health. Thus, some authors call this system an attenuated union duopoly (Hamann, 2012). The two main confederations that consolidated their supremacy during the transition to democracy followed different strategies during Francoism that partly determined their ideology and political actions in the early years of the democracy. The UGT organised in exile with the support of the ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions), while the CCOO emerged in the 1960s when groups of workers organised to carry out their activities within the ‘legal’ margins established by the regime. These different traditions were reflected in their structures, the degree of centralisation of their organisational structures, and their internal democracy (Fürher, 1996). Thus, the CCOO developed a more decentralised structure, in keeping with the importance of commissions in companies, while the UGT developed a more centralised structure. Similarly, the ideological differences between the two unions became particularly noticeable in the first decade of the 1980s, with the CCOO adopting a position of confrontation and opposition to participation in incomes policy pacts and policy concertation, while the UGT followed a strategy of cooperation and political action based on consensus-​seeking and forming agreements with the government and employers (Molina, 2005). Moreover, the two most representative unions had different views on how the trade union movement should develop in Spain. While the CCOO defended the organic unity of the labour movement, the UGT was more favourable to unitary pluralism. In the same way, the CCOO was in favour of the creation of inclusive and unitary forms of representation at the company level, while the UGT was in favour of the dual channel with the existence of works councils and union sections. The UGT’s greater amount of influence in the government given its strong ties with the PSOE allowed its opinions to form the standards that defined union activity and the forms of representation at the company level. In fact, the role of the two largest confederations as transmission belts of the political parties (the PSOE in the case of the UGT and the Partido Comunista de España (PCE) in the case of the CCOO) contributed to the maintenance of differences and conflict between them. However, the growing autonomy of the two largest confederations vis-​à-​vis the parties favoured the beginning of the unity of action in the late 1980s and its consolidation thereafter in what has been a progressive, organic, and programmatic convergence.

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Evolution and challenges for the trade unions as political actors Since their legalisation in 19774 and institutional consolidation at the beginning of the 1980s, trade unions in Spain have been subject to significant challenges. Thus, they have been exposed to pressures derived from transformations in the production context (decentralisation, outsourcing, and relocation), macroeconomic context (supply-​side policies, the neoliberal orientation of economic policies, and internationalisation), and labour market (segmentation and extension of atypical forms of employment), among others. All these factors have significantly transformed the context where they carry out their roles of representation, negotiation, and political action while eroding their membership base. Moreover, these challenges have led to abundant literature on the union crisis (Gallie et al, 1996) and later on revitalisation strategies (Frege and Kelly, 2004). Thus, the crisis of the unions has been a recurring theme since the 1980s and has usually focused on the decline in membership as the clearest symptom of erosion (Visser, 2006). However, the union crisis is a complex phenomenon that includes, in addition to the decline in membership, difficulties in representing certain groups, the decline in conflict levels and the capacity to mobilise workers, and the loss of social and political influence. In this context, the unions have been forced to develop innovative strategies to revitalise their actions and regain some of their lost power (Miguélez, 1995). On the one hand, their use of militant ‘organising’ strategies stands out, consisting of greater activism by union delegates and representatives in the workplace with the aim of slowing down the decline in membership (Heery, 2005). On the other hand, they have adopted a more cooperative partnership approach at the company level and intensified their political role through participation in social dialogue (Hamann and Kelly, 2004; Martínez Lucio and Stuart, 2004; Molina, 2006). The success of the unions following one or another strategy is subject to the union’s own organisational characteristics and therefore strongly path dependent. Thus, in the Spanish case, the studies carried out show the difficulties in following organising strategies given the institutional context and the organisational characteristics of the unions (Köhler and Calleja, 2013). In contrast, unions in Spain showed greater adaptability in their social dialogue and political action strategies (Molina and Rhodes, 2011). The 2008 financial crisis aggravated some of the structural weaknesses of trade unions while posing new challenges for them (Barranco and Molina, 2014). In this vein, some authors have pointed out that trade unions have lost both the muscle and social legitimacy necessary to force governments to involve them in the policy-​making process (Culpepper and Regan, 2014). This is explained not only by their declining membership but also by the identification of trade unions as part of the political elite. These two faces of the crisis have placed trade unions in a different scenario compared with previous crisis episodes, as their monopoly in channelling social discontent has been contested. New social movements and

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other civil society actors have played a more prominent role in gathering and organising anti-​austerity movements (della Porta, 2015). In doing so, they have relied upon mass protests and demonstrations from which the trade unions have often been excluded or in which the trade unions have played a marginal role or themselves been the target as part of the political status quo.

Trade unions and the policy process in Spain Representativeness and trade unions’ policy involvement in Spain The way in which union action is institutionalised both in the industrial relations sphere and in the political sphere was determined by the pattern of political exchange that took place in the first half of the 1980s. The rapid increase in trade union membership and workers’ mobilisation in the early months of the transition was rapidly brought under control by the two largest union confederations, the CCOO and the UGT (Jordana, 1996). The political exchange underlying policy concertation in these years consisted of granting a strong institutionalisation of industrial relations actors and their participation in policy-​making. More specifically, in exchange for their role in channelling workers’ discontent through negotiation and institutional participation, they were granted strong legal regulation of collective bargaining, a quasi-​monopoly in union representation, and some involvement in policy-​making. This allowed the trade unions to enjoy a strong institutional position. By contrast, according to other traditionally important power resource indicators, the position of the Spanish trade unions remained weak. These indicators include the associational power resource because of the low membership levels caused by the erga omnes extension of collective agreements. The unions in Spain nonetheless retained a strong mobilisation capacity exceeding their organisational and associational power. This institutionalisation relied on the concept of ‘most representative organisations’ implemented in 1985 by the Organic Law on Union Freedom (LOLS) and determined according to an electoral criterion (that is, by considering the results of works councils’ elections) and not according to a membership criterion (that is, the number of affiliates). The 1985 LOLS defines the most representative union status both at the state level and in the autonomous communities, setting the floor to be considered most representative at 10 per cent and 15 per cent of total delegates elected, respectively. The trade unions that meet these criteria are entitled to sign multi-​employer collective agreements, have institutional participation, and obtain access to public funding. The most representative trade unions consider these rules to allow a high level of governability of employment relations while reducing conflict levels. However, the smaller trade union confederations and other professional trade unions criticise the representativeness criteria as nondemocratic, as it deprives many actors on the union side of a voice. 250

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Thus, the main power resource of trade unions is not their membership, which remains low by European standards, but their institutional and, to a lesser degree, political roles. By their institutional role, we mean their statutory involvement in the management of some public bodies, such as the Economic and Social Council, social security, training, the labour market, etc., as well as their institutionalised involvement in works councils at the company level. In both cases, it is the number of representatives elected to works councils (that is, the electoral audience rather than membership) that is the criteria used to determine which unions have access to these institutions. As a consequence, and notwithstanding their very low levels of union density, the two main union confederations in Spain have managed to retain significant social and political roles thanks to the institutionalisation of collective bargaining, their adaptation to the requirements and demands of the new industrial and economic contexts, and their unitary strategies of political action since the mid-​1990s. Based on the evidence just presented, some authors identify Spain as a Mediterranean or weak form of neo-​corporatism (Crouch, 1993) where social partners have traditionally shared public space through six channels (Ebbinghaus, 2002): a) institutionalised integration in the management of tripartite agencies, either through forms of delegated self-​administration or institutionalised co-​determination, in fields such as training, the labour market, education programmes, and social security; b) institutionalised consultation in tripartite deliberative bodies such as the Economic and Social Council (CES); c) collective bargaining in the area of industrial relations (the self-​regulation of working conditions); d) (indirectly) using privilege links to parties in the government; e) sporadic/​ad-​hoc policy concertation (Compston, 1995), either bipartite (self-​regulation of the labour market, industrial relations) or tripartite; and f) institutionalised co-​determination of government policies (institutionalised concertation) (Compston, 1995, 2002). The importance attached to the institutional participation by the two largest union confederations (the CCOO and the UGT) was reflected in the inclusion of a secretariat for institutional relations in their confederal structures. This secretariat was in charge of overseeing and coordinating the activities of the trade union in the different instances where it was involved. Moreover, the secretariat also engaged in other tasks, including the development of relationships with different groups in the parliament. In the case of the UGT, a secretariat for institutional action was in place from the early 1980s until 1995. After disappearing from the confederal structure for some years, the position was restored again in 2009 under the name of institutional participation. However, in the 2016 congress, it was again abandoned, and currently, no such secretariat exists. By contrast, the secretariat for institutional participation has always been in the confederal structure of the CCOO. Two major areas have composed the work of this secretariat: that carried out around the activities of the parliament, the senate, and the Economic and Social Council, and that carried out in Brussels for the CCOO office and for the European Economic and Social Committee (CCOO, 251

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2017: 108–​9). At the national level, the work of the secretariat has been largely focused on the monitoring of parliamentary and legislative activity through the creation of the ‘office for the monitoring of parliamentary and legislative activity’, which also serves to make the different parliamentary groups aware of the union proposals and to report on the parliamentary agenda, anticipating deadlines and legislative initiative procedures. Institutional participation and management of public agencies Institutional participation refers to the involvement of social partners in decision-​ making, as well as the assumption of management and control powers, through participation in bodies and organisations dependent on public administration at the national and subnational levels. Trade unions are represented and involved in tripartite and bipartite bodies (see the next section), where they provide advice and represent workers’ interests. According to the CCOO, it is involved in 2,219 bodies (including bipartite bodies in collective bargaining and bodies at the regional and local levels) and has approximately 4,500 institutional representatives (CCOO, 2017: 110). The trade unions in Spain are also endowed with managerial functions in several tripartite bodies where there is either a management delegation from the state or tripartite co-​determination. The 1982 ANE Tripartite Agreement allowed unions to enjoy a managerial role in a variety of social security and labour market agencies (the INSS (pensions and social security), the INEM (public employment agencies), and the INSALUD (health services)). In the field of industrial relations, the 1985 LOLS institutionalised the participation of trade unions in collective bargaining through the establishment of clear criteria for representativeness that are applied to determine which organisations can participate in policy concertation and collective bargaining (Baylos, 1999). Since then, unions have not extended their managerial participation to any other public agency or regulatory arena. The PSOE did not accede to further improving the demands of the unions for institutionalisation in the policy-​making arena in the 1980s and early 1990s. As a matter of fact, there has been, according to both the CCOO (1988: 49) and the UGT (1998: 40), a downgrading of the institutionalised participation of trade unions due to the PSOE’s already dispersed character and the opposition of employers and executives as well as to the process of decentralisation and privatisation. A clear and recent example of this erosion is the case of active labour market policies. In 1993, trade unions, employer organisations and the government signed the First Tripartite Agreement on Lifelong Learning, in which the Lifelong Learning Foundation (FORCEM) was set up with a tripartite structure. The agreement was renewed twice in the 1990s, and in 2001, FORCEM was replaced by the Tripartite Foundation for Lifelong Learning after the signing of the Third Agreement on Lifelong Learning. Due to some cases of fraud in the use of training funds by some of the employer organisations and trade unions, 252

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the Rajoy government passed Law 30/​2015 on vocational training in 2015. Among other things, this law replaced the Tripartite Foundation for Lifelong Learning with FUNDAE (the Foundation for Lifelong Learning), effectively removing trade unions and employers from the management and implementation of training funds and reducing their role in planning and consultation. Trade unions have expressed their concerns about the erosion of institutional participation and have repeatedly asked for a law on the institutional participation of trade unions and employer organisations. The objective of this law would be to strengthen the involvement of social partners by clearly defining the bodies and organisations where the involvement takes place, social partners’ roles, and the mechanisms to assess social partners’ activities and by identifying new areas to which to extend this participation (UGT, 2016: 245; CCOO, 2017: 110). To date, institutional participation laws have been passed in all Autonomous Communities but not at the national level. The role of the Economic and Social Council The CES is a tripartite institution established in 1991 as a forum for communication between social and economic partners. Even though the 1978 Constitution (art. 131.2) contained a mandate to create a tripartite consultative body, it took almost 15 years for it to be set up. It is made up of employees’ organisations, trade unions, and other representatives of public interests. The CES is an advisory government body in the socio-​economic and employment spheres. There are two main functions of the CES. First, the CES issues non-​binding opinions on a mandatory basis on bills and legislative proposals in the area of labour market and social policies. Second, on a non-​mandatory basis, the CES also studies and analyses social and economic issues of concern to society on its own initiative. An example is its annual memorandum (Memoria Annual), which has become an essential point of reference for understanding Spain’s socio-​ economic situation. This second function became more important in the context of the 2008 financial and economic crisis and is part of a deliberate strategy to revitalise the role of the CES. In addition to the national CES, similar bodies were created at the regional and local levels as the process of decentralisation gained momentum in the 1990s. Under conditions of economic crisis or financial stress, decision-​makers often accuse social dialogue institutions of not being fast or conclusive enough to produce incisive policy solutions. This was precisely the case for the challenges that the CES underwent in Spain. In the context of fiscal consolidation and austerity policies implemented by the PP government following the 2010 sovereign debt crisis, Social and Economic Councils in some regions governed by the PP were suppressed by virtue of their supposedly limited impact on policy (Molina and Miguélez, 2017). It happened in the context of the reform of public administration initiated by the PP government in October 2014 that was aimed at rationalising the public sector, including suppressing institutions whose 253

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functions were duplicated at the national and regional levels. The economic and social councils have been targets of this reform, as it is considered unnecessary to replicate them at the regional level. Moreover, the frequent recourse to emergency procedures by governments for adopting legislation has further eroded the CES’s role in policy-​making. According to the Spanish Constitution (art. 86), the use of urgent procedures for drafting and approving laws by executives should be restricted to cases of ‘utmost and extraordinary urgency and social need’. Under these conditions, the government may legislate using the form of decree law. The delicate financial and economic situation and the difficulties of achieving large majorities in the parliament in recent years have increased the reliance by governments on legislation via the use of royal decrees, which require less discussion in the parliament and for which an opinion by the CES is not mandatory. The presidency of the CES has repeatedly denounced the short time available to provide its recommendations and opinions on particularly important issues. The trade unions share this view and consider the over-​reliance on royal decrees to be a poor democratic practice. In reaction to these challenges, there have been attempts to revitalise the role of the CES. The most important attempt has consisted of the CES adopting a more proactive stance and taking the initiative to elaborate reports on important socio-​economic issues. This is seen as a way to overcome the passive and reactive character of the main function assigned to it, that is, issuing opinions on a mandatory basis on draft bills. Some examples of these reports include those on youth and the labour market, the future of work and the impact of digitalisation, the manufacturing sector, poverty, etc.5 Policy concertation Since the transition to democracy, social dialogue and policy concertation in Spain have played a key role in coordinating collective bargaining, regulating the labour market and governing socio-​economic policy-​making (Molina, 2011, 2021). Following Compston (2002), policy concertation can be defined as a policy-​making method whereby employers and trade unions are involved in the making of decisions that are ultimately the exclusive province of the state, in particular decisions on the contents of legislation, regulations, and administrative orders. Policy concertation implies a formal involvement of social partners in policy-​making and has become a defining trait of the Spanish industrial relations system and a central element of the governance of the socio-​economic model. Its importance and intensity have evolved in accordance with the economic and political context, however. In the aftermath of the transition to democracy, Spanish unions had to strike a difficult balance between their consolidation as class movements and the key role they had to play as political/​institutional actors contributing to the consolidation of the democracy. Their participation in the social pacts of the early 1980s responded to this twofold objective.6 Nonetheless, in a context of still-​weak 254

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institutionalisation of industrial relations structures and consolidation of unions in the labour market, the political role hindered their attempts to articulate a strong working-​class appeal. As pointed out by Lantarón (2000: 70–​1), ‘Spanish trade unions have been preoccupied with improving their institutional role, to consolidate themselves as political actors and collaborators of the state in policy-​ making, thus losing the perspective of the individual worker and leaving the union relatively strong in society, but weak in the workplace and collective bargaining’. As a policy-​making instrument involving social partners and governments, policy concertation might provide both input and output legitimacy to governments. While input legitimacy refers to the actors involved and how representative they are, output legitimacy relates to the effectiveness of the policies.7 Even though there are several dimensions impacting policy effectiveness (including agenda-​setting effectiveness), analytical capacity plays an important role in the policy-​making process, as it provides inputs for policy formulation, therefore contributing to reaching policy goals. This notion refers to the capacity of social partners to analyse a certain policy issue and make policy recommendations or indicate potential avenues to reach the goals. Analytical effectiveness is accordingly a policy good provided by social partners, consisting of their capacity to develop rigorous, independent, and up-​to-​date analyses aimed at providing members and stakeholders with the necessary knowledge to assess and tackle a certain socio-​economic problem (see the third section of this chapter for an assessment of analytical capacities of trade unions). The analysis of policy concertation dynamics in Spain reveals a more important role for input legitimacy in explaining governments’ reliance on policy concertation and a limited role of output legitimacy (Molina, 2021). Policy concertation in Spain is characterised by its low institutionalisation, therefore opening the door to the opportunistic use by governments to enhance their legitimacy, particularly in times of economic crisis or when governments are weak (Baccaro and Lim, 2007). As a policy-​making instrument, it is accordingly characterised by being intermittent and highly context-​dependent. The dynamics of policy concertation in Spain are related to three characteristics. First, the weak and late institutionalisation of policy concertation is due to its development outside institutional mechanisms such as the CES. Second, it has mainly dealt with issues with a strong distributional character (including incomes policies, pensions, minimum wage, etc.), while having a limited impact on general economic policy-​ making, except during the early 1980s. Finally, its discontinuance depends on the economic cycle and the governing party. These three interlinked features were exacerbated by the 2008 economic crisis and help to explain the collapse experienced by tripartite concertation and the weakness of social dialogue during that period. The 2008 financial crisis also added new obstacles for the future of policy concertation and the involvement of trade unions in policy-​making. The political and economic context in which the crisis-​induced austerity reforms occurred was certainly propitious to the abandonment of tripartite concertation and social 255

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dialogue (Molina and Miguélez, 2013; Pedersini and Regini, 2013; Guardiancich and Molina, 2017). The explicit or implicit external imposition of these reforms on governments under strong pressure to comply with fiscal stability led in many cases to unilateral reforms. First, the tightening of fiscal rules and the use of macroeconomic surveillance mechanisms have severely limited governments’ room to manoeuvre and the possibilities to engage in political exchange with their social partners, even in a post-​crisis recovery scenario. Second, the democratic and institutional crisis that weakened the power resources of social partners has further reduced the incentives of the governments to involve them in policy-​making (Molina, 2014). The role of policy concertation as a legitimating instrument rather than a mechanism to boost policy effectiveness thus plays a key role in the explanation of policy concertation and its abandonment in Spain. From the point of view of input legitimacy, declining trust in political parties and trade unions has reduced the incentives for executives to rely on this form of governance. During the Great Recession, the Rajoy executive expressed on many occasions the view that real democratic legitimacy comes from the parliament, and therefore, there is no obligation or need to validate laws through an agreement with social partners. If we add the supranational dimension to this picture, that is, the mandate by the EU to undertake fiscal adjustment, we also find the perception that in regard to economic policies, executives are more accountable to supranational actors than to social partners and the social interests they represent. As a consequence, the opportunity cost to executives of not engaging social partners decreased substantially in the context of the 2008 financial and economic crisis.

Policy analysis in trade unions Trade unions in Spain and their organisation The two largest confederations in Spain are organised according to both sectoral and territorial logic. The sectoral federations constitute the basic organisational axes of the unions, and their importance is reflected in the assumption of key competencies within the unions. At the different territorial levels, the sectoral federations are merged into territorial units with the local/​county units being the lowest, followed by the provincial and regional units. The main triggering factors for their structural reorganisation are increases in atypical forms of employment, the appearance of new occupations, the decline of the industrial sector, the traditional stronghold of union membership, and the existence of fewer financial resources. The main organisational mechanism for responding to these challenges has consisted of merging different sectoral federations,8 as well as creating sections dedicated to specific groups, such as young people, immigrants, pensioners, and workers with non-​standard forms of employment. The distribution of power between the confederation and the sectoral/​ regional federations is established from the top down. In general, and with few differences between the largest union confederations, the sectoral federations 256

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oversee collective bargaining at the sectoral level, the coordination of company-​ level bargaining structures, the development of membership policies and the collection of fees and union training. The confederal level of the organisation oversees and coordinates the sectoral federations, the institutional representation, the social dialogue with the government and employer associations, and the relationships with other social movements or civil society organisations. The UGT followed the German model in its organisation, with union branches at the firm level that are grouped together in local unions. In contrast, the CCOO’s internal organisation more closely resembles the Italian model, which is based on district unions and a peak organisation built along regional and sectoral lines. In this vein, the CCOO’s structure is more decentralised than the UGT’s, which guarantees that the former has the strongest links between its peak and base (Führer, 1996: 157). In the 1980s, there were trends towards organisational centralisation in both unions, although this shift was stronger in the case of the UGT. In the 1990s, the confederations pursued the opposite strategy, trying to strengthen lower-​level structures by, for instance, forming the agreement on monitoring collective bargaining policies at the firm level. Policy analysis in trade unions: resources, organisation, and themes Three factors shape the intensity and characteristics of policy analysis in trade unions. First, the insider position enjoyed by trade unions in the policy process (see the second section of this chapter) has reduced the incentives to develop a strong policy analysis capacity. In a context where trade unions have scant resources and the technical input required in the institutions where they are involved is limited, their participation does not translate into the development of a stronger policy analysis dimension. Second, the organisation of trade unions along sectoral and regional federations, also reduces the resources and capacity of confederal structures to develop policy analysis activities. Regional and sectoral federations carry out analyses with a strong focus on collective bargaining and labour market issues within their regional or sectoral scope to provide those engaged in sectoral-​and company-​level collective bargaining with information on employment developments in the sector, collective bargaining dynamics, the sectoral impact of labour market or industrial relations reforms, etc. Moreover, these analyses also have the goal of shaping employers’ perceptions of collective bargaining processes by highlighting the main challenges affecting the sector or company. Finally, the industrial relations system in Spain where trade unions develop collective bargaining activities has also shaped the orientation of policy analysis activities. Both the CCOO and the UGT carry out research and policy analysis activities at the confederal level. These activities are developed by dedicated research and analysis units within their confederal structures. The UGT has the ‘Servicio de Estudios Confederal’9 (Confederal Research Department), a department within the confederation that is in charge of 257

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carrying out research and analyses on all types of issues of interest to the trade union and to workers more generally. This department consists of full-​time staff varying between 15 and 20 persons. The researchers in this department have different backgrounds but are predominantly economists and lawyers. This department produces different types of documents, including reports on specific topics (digitalisation, platform work, artificial intelligence, pensions, telework, the impact of COVID-​19, etc.), legal analyses of recently approved laws, monthly reports on developments in the labour market at the national and regional levels, etc. The short monthly analysis of labour market developments (Cuadros de evolución sociolaboral) provide the background for the trade union to formulate recommendations in relation to collective bargaining and labour market regulations. These are complemented with topical comparative analyses of employment and labour market dynamics, like unemployment or temporary employment. More recently, the research department has been particularly active in publishing reports in relation to the digital economy and the role of platforms as one of the major challenges facing industrial relations systems and labour markets. The research department at the UGT is particularly active in issuing recommendations on different issues with a view to shaping the public debate. More recently, these include recommendations in relation to increasing the minimum wage, the regulation of remote work, or fair taxation in the digital economy. But it is particularly active in providing analysis of labour law and employment regulations at national and regional level as well as court judgements. In addition to the research department, the Largo Caballero Foundation linked to the UGT also carries out research and policy analysis activities.10 This think tank was set up in 1978 with a twofold aim. First, the foundation aims to be ‘a plural and democratic meeting place for all people and institutions interested in the study of social problems and in the improvement of the living conditions of those most socially disadvantaged groups, promoting progressive ideas and the necessary organizational resources for this’. Second, the foundation has the purpose of safeguarding and putting at the service of researchers, the scientific community, and society the documentary and bibliographic resources of the UGT, since it is the repository of the UGT’s historical archive. There are other think tanks that are tied to the UGT due to the links this trade union has with the socialist party PSOE. The organic relationship between unions and political parties in the early years of the transition to democracy explains that much of the responsibility for public policy analysis is integrated into shared foundations. This was the case, for example, of the Pablo Iglesias Foundation, one of the first think tanks in Spain. Named after the founder of the PSOE and the UGT, this foundation was created in 1925 by a group of UGT members with the purpose of spreading socialist thought. However, the Spanish Civil War and the subsequent military dictatorship truncated the evolution of the foundation, which was practically inactive until the democratic transition. In 1977, the PSOE recovered the initial idea of the Pablo Iglesias Foundation and relaunched the think tank. However, the tensions between the socialist government of Felipe 258

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González and the UGT changed this situation, and currently, this foundation is considered exclusively a think tank of the PSOE. In the last confederal congress of the UGT, the union committed to developing a similar observatory to collect, study, and analyse information and disseminate reports, studies, and good practices on the different subjects: employment, recruitment, occupational health, training, professional qualifications, working time, etc (UGT, 2016: 211). In the case of the CCOO, there is no research department within its confederal structure, although the confederal secretariat has several researchers (lawyers and economists) who provide policy advice and carry out studies on different topics, including labour law and employment regulation, social policy and economic policy. There is on the one hand the Legal Studies Cabinet (Gabinete de Estudios Jurídicos), composed of lawyers, and second the Confederal Economic Cabinet (Gabinete Económico Confederal). The legal studies cabinet provides legal assistance at confederal level and produces analysis of labour laws and regulations. On the other hand, the Confederal Economic Cabinet produces monthly reviews of major economic and labour market variables (including inflation, wage increases, employment and unemployment levels) together with topical reports on aspects like the minimum wage, income inequalities, etc. These two cabinets provide timely information to the confederal structure of CCOO and assist them in social dialogue processes. However, most of the research and policy analysis activities are carried out mostly through the May First Foundation (Fundación 1 de Mayo). This foundation was created in 1988 by the CCOO with the purpose of becoming a benchmark of critical thinking in economic, social, and labour market-​related matters and, consequently, to deepen the study of, reflection on, and debate over the problems that affect the working class, citizens, and trade unionism itself. The foundation has different areas of study and research, including a centre for women’s studies (Centro 8 de Marzo), a centre for peace and solidarity, and a documentation centre. Within the May First Foundation, the Studies and Project Department develops different types of activities related to the production, dissemination, and debate of critical knowledge in economic and social matters, with special attention to the labour market and trade union-​ related matters. This department also coordinates the Collective Bargaining Observatory; since its origins in 2001, the observatory has integrated scholars in the fields of labour law and social security who contribute to the research and analysis of different dimensions of collective bargaining in Spain. The Studies and Project Department is actively involved in EU-​wide research networks and projects and is composed of four full-​time researchers. The internal analytical capacities of CCOO are complemented with the close collaboration with some university research centres and departments with whom they have framework agreements. These agreements allow the CCOO to rely on the expertise of university professors from disciplines like economics, sociology, labour law etc. In 2001, the CCOO created the Collective Bargaining Observatory with the aim of analysing and understanding the characteristics, dynamics, and challenges 259

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of collective bargaining. Another example can be found in the CCOO congress’s 2017 resolutions, which declared the intention to create a ‘centre of affiliation strategy and electoral process’ to carry out the necessary studies and analyses to report on membership and electoral dynamics and promote improvements (CCOO, 2017: 68). The ISTAS (Trade Union Institute of Work, Environment and Health) is a foundation promoted and created by the CCOO in 1996 that carries out research activities for the improvement of working conditions, the protection of the environment and the promotion of health and safety at the workplace. The institute has 16 full-​time researchers distributed among the CCOO’s offices in Valencia, Madrid, and Barcelona. The policy analysis carried out within the two largest trade unions in Spain reveals a picture characterised, first, by the limited amount of resources devoted to it. It is difficult to estimate, but the number of union officials with full-​time dedication to research and policy analysis in the two largest trade unions remains very small (around 25–​30 at confederal level in each trade union) in light of the size of these trade unions and their role in the policy process. Even though some policy analysis activities are carried out in a decentralised way, that is, by the sectoral and regional structures, the capacity of the trade unions to analyse policies and affect public opinion remains accordingly limited. Second, most of these resources are inward-​looking and devoted to the analysis of collective bargaining and labour market issues with a view to informing the strategies and activities carried by the sectoral and regional branches. Third, despite limited resources, an increase in recent years in efforts to enhance the role of policy analysis in shaping the policy debate can also be observed. On the one hand, there has been an increase in the number of research and policy documents published, and the documents cover a wider range of topics, including digitalisation, pensions, education and training, industrial policy, and environmental issues. These efforts at enlarging the analytical and research agenda of trade unions have been accompanied by attempts at reaching a larger audience relying on existing dissemination instruments (journals, books, and webpages) but also intensifying the use of social networks and channels such as Twitter and Instagram. Moreover, the trade unions are making efforts to consolidate their research departments within their structures and to collaborate with supranational actors and think tanks, such as the European Trade Union Institute (ETUI) and the Trade Union Network of Research Institutes (TURI).

Conclusion In this chapter, we have analysed the capacity to generate policy analysis within the largest trade union confederations in Spain and the characteristics of the policy analysis process. Three elements have been found to play key roles in explaining the type and intensity of policy analysis activities carried out by the trade unions. 260

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First, the trade unions’ role in the policy process shapes their policy analysis activities. As policy insiders with institutional participation and a role in social dialogue and policy concertation, the trade unions have limited incentives to generate policy analysis, as they have direct channels to influence the policy process. By granting direct access to the policy-​making process, the weak neo-​ corporatist setting where the most representative trade unions in Spain carry out their functions as policy actors has given a prominent role to institutional power resources and reduced their incentives to develop a strong analytical capacity. This might have a detrimental effect on the future role of trade unions in the policy process. First, it reduces the effectiveness of policies negotiated in the context of the tripartite social dialogue process and policy concertation. This means that governments’ incentives to negotiate policies will be linked to the search for input legitimacy and not to the capacity for policy concertation to deliver more effective policies. Second, it also narrows down the topics that are negotiated in the context of policy concertation to those closely related to industrial relations and the labour market. The erosion taking place in recent years in institutional involvement and social dialogue is probably behind the greater efforts to generate policy analysis. Second, the industrial relations framework where trade unions develop collective bargaining activities has also shaped the orientation of policy analysis activities. More specifically, it has been shown that most of the policy analysis efforts are devoted to analysing labour market trends and collective bargaining issues with a view to providing sectoral and regional federations as well as company-​level elected delegates with specific knowledge about the issues and challenges they face and helping them frame their discourse when engaging in collective bargaining. Finally, the organisational characteristics of the trade unions are another element shaping policy analysis activities. On the one hand, their decentralised organisational structure implies that many research and analysis activities are carried out by regional and sectoral federations. Second, at the confederal level, the two most representative trade unions carry out policy analysis activities on a broader range of topics, but the limited amount of organisational resources devoted to these activities severely limits their impact. Despite this, a stronger focus on policy analysis and research activities can be observed, including the development of joint research and policy evaluation activities with other EU-​level actors. In this context, the chapter has identified some lines of change. First, the erosion of social dialogue and institutional participation of trade unions, especially since the Great Recession, has obliged them to pay greater attention to policy analysis as a mechanism to influence the policy process. This has had a reflection on the consolidation of research structures. Moreover, more resources are now devoted to producing analyses and studies with a view to influencing public opinion, compared to internal documents on the dynamics and evolution of collective bargaining. Together with this, the two largest confederations have 261

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also tried to enhance their communicative power resource and disseminate these policies to reach a wider audience through the use of social networks. Overall, these changes point towards a more important role for policy analysis as a strategic resource for the future of trade unions, that nonetheless contrasts with the insufficient resources devoted to these functions. Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6

7

8

9 10

See: http://​www.pp.es/​sites/​defa​ult/​files/​doc​umen​tos/​14.11.24_​propuesta_​gpp_​r​egul​acio​n_​ re​gist​ro_​l​obbi​es_​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​​.pdf (accessed 3 April 2020). Other confederations include the Sindicato Unificado (SU), Confederación de Trabajadores Independientes (CTI) and Sindicato Independiente (SI). Other regional trade unions include the Intersindical Canaria (IC), Confederació Sindical Catalana (CSC), and the Organización Sindical de Trabajadores de Aragón (OSTA). Law 19/​1977, of 1st April, on the regulation of the right to join trade unions. The list of reports can be consulted at http://​www.ces.es/​infor​mes (accessed 6 June 2020). We can distinguish two phases in the politicisation of the Spanish trade unions. Until 1980, political action to achieve union rights was conducted through grassroots mobilisation. From 1981 to 1986, the politicisation took the form of participation in incomes policies agreements and social pacts, that is, politicisation as contribution to the management of the economy. Within the management-​related literature, according to van de Ven (1976: 74), effectiveness (one of the performance indicators for an organisation) is defined as ‘the extent to which organizational goals are attained. A tangible goal normally specifies a desired level of change in organizational input, transformation, and output within a certain time period. … The extent or percentage of goal attainment at the end of the operating period, then, is the measure of effectiveness’. The main changes in the organisational structures of the unions in Spain have consisted of re-​organising their sectoral federations. There have been various mergers between sectoral federations over the last 30 years, decreasing the number of federations from 25 and 21 for the CCOO and the UGT in 1978, respectively, to only seven and five in 2020. More recently, a new wave of mergers has coincided with the economic crisis that began in 2008. In this case, the mergers have been reactive in nature, in response to the fall in membership fees. For more information, see https://​serv​icio​estu​dios​ugt.com/​ (accessed 3 June 2020). For more information, see https://​fflc.ugt.org/​(accessed 23 May 2020).

References Baccaro, L. and Lim, S.H. (2007) ‘Social pacts as coalitions of the weak and moderate: Ireland, Italy and South Korea in comparative perspective’, European Journal of Industrial Relations, 13(1): 27–​46. Barranco, O. and Molina, Ó. (2014) ‘Sindicalismo y crisis econòmica: amenazas, retos y oportunidades’, Kult-​ur: revista interdisciplinària sobre la cultura de la Ciutat, 1(2): 171–​94. Baylos, A. (1999) ‘La intervención normativa del Estado en las relaciones labora-​les colectivas’, in F. Miguélez and C. Prieto (eds), Las relaciones de empleo en España, Madrid: Siglo XXI, pp 239–​58. CCOO (1988) ‘IV Congreso de la Confederación Sindical de CCOO. Documentos Aprobados’, Madrid: Confederación Sindical de CCOO. CCOO (2017) Memoria de Actividad, 11 Congreso Confederal, Madrid: CCOO.

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Compston, H. (1995) ‘Union participation in economic policy making in France, Italy, Germany and Britain, 1970–​1993’, West European Politics, 18(2): 314–​39. Compston, H. (2002) ‘The strange persistence of policy concertation’, in S. Berger and H. Compston (eds) Policy Concertation and Social Partnership in Western Europe: Lessons for the 21st Century, Oxford: Berghahn Books, pp 1–​18. Crouch, C. (1993) Industrial Relations and European State Traditions, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Culpepper, P. and Regan, A. (2014) ‘Why don’t governments need trade unions anymore? The death of social pacts in Ireland and Italy’, Socio-​Economic Review, 12(4): 723–​45. Della Porta, D. (2015) Social Movements in Times of Austerity: Bringing Capitalism Back into Protest Analysis, Cambridge: Polity Press. Ebbinghaus, Bernhard (2002) ‘Trade unions’ changing role: Membership erosion, organisational reform, and social partnership in Europe’, Industrial Relations Journal, 33(5): 465–​83. Frege, C. and Kelly, J. (eds) (2004) Varieties of Unionism: Strategies for Union Revitalization in a Globalizing Economy, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Führer, I.M. (1996) Los sindicatos en España: de la lucha de clases a estrategias de cooperación, Madrid: Consejo Económico y Social. Gallie, D., Penn, R., and Rose, M. (eds) (1996) Trade Unionism in Recession, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Grant, W. (2004) ‘Pressure politics: The changing world of pressure groups’, Parliamentary Affairs, 57(2): 408–​19. Guardiancich, I. and Molina, O. (eds) (2017) Talking Through the Crisis: Social Dialogue and Industrial Relations Trends in Selected EU Countries, Geneva: International Labour Organization. Hamann, K. (2012) The Politics of Industrial Relations: Labor Unions in Spain, London: Routledge. Hamann, K. and Kelly, J. (2004) ‘Unions as political actors: A recipe for revitalization?’, in C. Frege and J. Kelly (eds) Varieties of Unionism: Strategies for Union Revitalization in a Globalizing Economy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 93–​116. Heery, E. (2005) ‘Sources of change in trade unions’, Work, Employment and Society, 19(1): 91–​106. Jordana, J. (1996) ‘Reconsidering union membership in Spain, 1977–​1994: Halting decline in a context of democratic consolidation’, Industrial Relations Journal, 27(3): 211–​24. Köhler, Holm-​Detlev, and Calleja, J.P. (2013) ‘Trade unions in Spain: Organisation, environment, challenges’, Friedrich-​Ebert-​Stiftung, Department for Central and Eastern Europe. Lantarón, D. (2000) ‘Reflexiones en Torno al Devenir del Sindicato y a los Factores que Influyen en su Evolución: ¿Crisis y/​o Metamorfosis?’, Revista De Derecho Social, 10: 55–​80.

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Martínez Lucio, M. and Stuart, M. (eds) (2004) Partnership and Modernisation in Employment Relations, London: Routledge. Miguélez, F. (1995) ‘Modernización de los sindicatos en España’, Revista de Derecho del Trabajo, 7: 81–​101. Molina, Ó. (2005) ‘Political exchange and bargaining reform in Italy and Spain’, European Journal of Industrial Relations, 11(1): 7–​26. Molina, Ó. (2006) ‘Trade union strategies and change in neo-​corporatist concertation: A new century of political exchange?’, West European Politics, 29(4): 640–​64. Molina, O. (2011) ‘Policy concertation, trade unions and the transformation of the Spanish welfare state’, in M. Guillén and M. León (eds) The Spanish Welfare State in European Context, Farnham: Ashgate, pp 77–​95. Molina, O. (2014) ‘Beyond de-​centralization: The erosion of collective bargaining in Spain during the Great Recession’, Stato e mercato, 34(3): 397–​422. Molina, Ó. (2021) ‘Enhancing social partners’ capacity and social dialogue in the new world of work: The case of Spain’, in D. Vaughan-​Whitehead, Y. Ghellab and R. de Bustillo (eds) The New World of Work Challenges and Opportunities for Social Partners and Labour Institutions, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 429–​64. Molina, Ó. and Miguélez, F. (2013) From Negotiation to Imposition: Social Dialogue in Austerity Times in Spain, Geneva: International Labour Organization. Molina, Ó. and Miguélez, F. (2017) ‘Post-​crisis social dialogue in Spain: The calm after the storm’, in Guardiancich, I. and Molina, Ó. (eds) Talking through the Crisis: Social Dialogue and Industrial Relations Trends in Selected EU Countries, Geneva: International Labour Organization, pp 257–​79. Molina, Ó. and Rhodes, M. (2011) ‘Spain: From tripartite to bipartite pacts’, in S. Avdagic, M. Rhodes and J. Visser (eds) Social Pacts in Europe: Emergence, Evolution, and Institutionalization, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 174–​202. Montalvo, J. (2008) ‘El consejo económico y social en el trigésimo aniversario de la Constitución Española’, Cauces: Cuadernos del Consejo Económico y Social, 6: 14–​19. Pedersini, R. and Regini, M. (2013) Coping with the Crisis in Italy: Employment Relations and Social Dialogue amidst the Recession, Geneva: International Labour Office. UGT (1998) ‘Resoluciones 37 Congreso Confederal’, Madrid: Secretaría Confederal de UGT. UGT (2016) ‘La Unión en Pie. Resoluciones del 42 Congreso Confederal’, Madrid: UGT. Van de Ven, A. (1976) ‘A framework for organization assessment’, Academy of Management Review, 1(1): 64–​78. Visser, Jelle (2006) ‘Union membership statistics in 24 countries’, Monthly Labor Review, 129: 38–​50. Ysàs, H. (2013) La participación de los sindicatos en las funciones normativas de los poderes Públicos, Albacete: Bomarzo.

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Business associations and policy analysis Iván Medina

Introduction Many of the chapters in this book demonstrate that policy analysis is a relatively underexplored area in Spain. The core argument is that policy analysis has been largely ignored by experts and academics. Instead, government officials have been responsible for choosing the most suitable policy options, selecting the most appropriate indicators by which to evaluate the public sector, and accumulating first-​hand knowledge about policy implementation. This has shaped both public and private actors’ roles in policy-​making for a long time. The former both make decisions and establish barriers to accessing decision-​making,1 while interest groups are expected to come up with new demands that do not put political stability at risk. This has led to the government and political parties’ dominance over policy priorities, though they claim to represent public interests over private ones (Crozier, 1995). Arguably, Molins (2016) states that partisan alliances have long been a determining factor in explaining how much power and levels of access certain interest groups achieve. With regards to private companies, governments always listen to business leaders, according to group theory (Plotke, 1992). While some authors argue that this is due to the quality of the information businesses provide to solve major socio-​economic problems (Salisbury, 1969), others believe that this is instead a result of their structural position in the political, economic, and political systems (Vogel, 1987). Although the concept of ideological proximity can help explain the Franco period (1939–​75) (Sánchez Recio and Tascón Fernández, 2003),2 the modernisation of business–​government interactions that began with the arrival of democracy in 1978 took the form of neo-​corporatist patterns. A series of political consensuses meant that old collective bargaining structures were brought back, and the major business associations (and unions) were incorporated into ministerial forums in order to design economic, labour, and welfare policies. Solé (1990) argued that social agreements on economic policy in the 1980s were a key political resource that was used to simultaneously appease the involutionary spirits of the army and consolidate democracy. Recently, some economists have pointed out that the establishment of coordinated bargaining structures has not translated into effective policies (Bentolila and Jimeno, 2002). Thus, an important part of the literature suggests that business associations and trade unions are obstacles to achieving necessary political reforms in the Spanish labour market. 265

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On the other hand, rather than believing that business associations hinder economic and social progress, industrial sociology literature argues that the contextual pressures of the last few decades have made business associations develop new functions and generate new organisational models (Behrens and Helfen, 2019; Ibsen and Navrbjerg, 2019). From previous research, we know that the dismantling of state monopolies, the incorporation of Spain into the European Union, the development of regional governments, and the rise of new industrial sectors have all led to a push towards more competitive business–​ government dynamics with a larger number of business voices involved (Molins and Morata, 1994; Medina and Bouza García, 2020). The greater the number of actors, the greater the pressure to be heard. Business associations run the risk of losing members. Their collective nature pushes them to bring added value to individual companies, especially in matters of political representation.3 Business associations are key policy analysts. A large part of business groups’ activities is centred around monitoring the activities of various areas of government. They spend a great deal of time and resources gathering data, elaborating reports, and distributing information to governmental actors and other policy actors using different strategies. This is made clear in the reports they periodically send to the ministries. However, little has been said on what business associations do when it comes to policy analysis. So far, the study of business associations in Spain has primarily focused on how employers are collectively organised (Nonell and Medina, 2015). These studies demonstrate that business associations are highly professionalised organisations, with a division of labour across specialised departments, and a large number of specialised staff who lobby the government and other policy actors. Yet there is little analysis either on the degree of members’ participation in internal decision-​making processes, or on how business associations shape their political demands. The goal of this chapter is to fill this gap and to better understand business associations’ contribution to policy analysis in Spain. This chapter describes how business associations generate policy proposals to capture the attention of public authorities, the business community, and other actors involved in the policy-​making process. Given the large number of business associations in Spain, I examine the Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales (CEOE), the Cámara de Comercio de España, the Instituto de Empresa Familiar (IEF), and the local business think tanks, particularly the Círculo de Empresarios (Madrid), and the Círculo de Economía (Barcelona). Whenever possible, data and examples refer to the last four years (2017–​20). Data comes from the business associations’ activity reports and other relevant publications.

Business associations in Spain The most relevant factors that determine the number of business associations are the products, the geographical region, and the size of the companies (Martínez, 266

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1993). These three factors are often intertwined, so business interests in Spain are represented across a large number of voluntary associations, chambers of commerce, and business think tanks (Nonell and Medina, 2016). Although currently business associations are concerned with collecting data, analysing economic reality, and producing reports to influence decision-​making, the history of business associations is characterised by a first phase focused on the local promotion of artisan trades, as well as on the defence of businessmen against the labour movement. The first modern business associative movement took place at the end of the 19th century in the Basque Country and in Catalonia. These regions were where most of Spain’s steel and textile factories were concentrated, while the economy in the rest of the country remained agricultural. While Basque and Catalan businessmen created associations (Liga Vizcaína de Productores and Fomento del Trabajo Nacional, respectively) to demand protectionist policies and tariffs, a large number of individual landowners contributed to advancing clientelist political practices with the help of other powerful political and social sectors (including the army, the Church, the monarchy, and the banking sector). In parallel, agricultural entrepreneurs were creating associations throughout the 19th century with which to protect their crops from looters, modernise agricultural techniques, and deal with the plagues that ravaged the Spanish countryside during the last decades of the century. The most relevant agricultural associations were the Asociación de Ganaderos (1836), the Instituto Agrícola Catalán de San Isidro (1851), the Asociación de Agricultores de España (1881), and Liga Agraria (1887).4 These associations began to collect data on agricultural activity and price controls in order to negotiate protectionist measures with the public authorities. Traders with interests in foreign countries saw an opportunity in the 1887 Association Act to create chambers of commerce throughout the country. This law reinforced the legal pillars of the Royal Decree of 1886, that gave official character to the Chambers of Commerce, Industry and Navigation in a context of agitation of the labour movement. However, the Chambers of Commerce were subject to state control in terms of resources and internal processes, which reduced their ability to evaluate and monitor economic and commercial policy. It was not until 1911 that the Law of Chambers was approved, turning them into public entities of compulsory affiliation. In the absence of powerful associations, businessmen shared ideas in civic forums such as Ateneos, circles or cafés, in which they echoed the contributions of intellectuals in the field of public economy, finance, or urbanisation. It is important to note, following Carreras and Aubanell-​ Jubany’s chapter in this book (Chapter 2), that an important number of economic and social reforms were discussed in Spain at the end of the 19th century, at the same time that the American-​Spanish war shook Spanish politics and put at risk the access to trade routes with the American countries. Concerned about the risks derived from the emergence of socialist (UGT) and anarchist (CNT) unions, Spanish businessmen were creating associations to defend their factories and families. Some examples are the Asociación de 267

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Defensa y Fomento del Comercio y la Industria, the Asociación de Defensa de los Gremios de Ultramarinos y Comestibles, the Círculo de la Unión Mercantil, and the Defensa Mercantil Patronal. These associations were not intended to monitor public policy or contribute new statistical data on business activity. On the contrary, these local associations sought peaceful coexistence with the workers, if at all possible. These associations decided to create a peak state-​wide business association in 1910 which was called Confederación Patronal Española. At the same time, the small artisans and merchants considered the possibility of establishing a specialised employers’ association in the promotion of the guilds. The Confederación Gremial Española was born in 1912, and went on to represent already existing associations such as the Unión de los Gremios del Comercio y de la Industria de Gijón, the Unión de los Gremios de Ultramarinos de Logroño, and the Asociación de Gremios de Vitoria. Del Rey (1992) points out that these entrepreneurs were far from being large landowners or bourgeois. These were modest owners who, in most cases, could not afford to own the premises where their companies were located. Their associations, therefore, specialised in the promotion and preservation of trades. The uneven development of capitalism made it difficult to create a strong Spanish employers’ association until the arrival of the Second Republic in 1931, when the liberal and socialist political parties formed a government.5 The approval of new labour and social policies that benefited the working class and poor was seen as an attack on the bourgeoisie (Cabrera, 1983). The Confederación Española Patronal y Agrícola was born in 1933 with the ambition to unify sectors and types of companies under a single organisation. Businessmen had to actively mobilise before the central government by their own means, seeking alliances with other political sectors. This was something new for the Spanish business community. Previously, authoritarian governments had repressed labour movements while simultaneously favouring the commercial interests of Spanish companies in exchange for bureaucratic corruption. The introduction of records of economic activity and exports during the Second Republic was met with strong opposition from the business community. The arrival of a new republican and democratic political regime, with reformist and modernising ambitions, aroused interest in the evaluation and economic-​social analysis on the part of both the potential beneficiaries of the reforms and the losers. Several research institutes were created at that time, as exemplified by the Bank of Spain’s Centro de Estudios. Businessmen were pushed to contribute to the debate, especially to confront the reformist proposals of left-​wing parties with social and proletarian sensibilities. In 1936, the big industrialists supported the military coup against the Second Republic amidst a climate of fierce conflict with anarchist groups. Like other sectors on the political right, businessmen aspired to restore public order. But the fascists opted for a long-​lived dictatorship. The Franco dictatorship (1939–​ 75) stamped out the political rights of the Spanish people and imposed neo-​ corporatist fascist institutions that served the interests of the state (the so-​called 268

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Sindicato Vertical) while suppressing the vast majority of associations. Some voluntary business associations survived by becoming private companies. Chambers of commerce in rural areas were shut down, and the Ministries of Industry and Commerce exercised strict control over those in industrial areas (Díez Cano, 1992). The incipient economic development from the 1950s onwards inspired a new generation of young entrepreneurs with European and liberal aspirations to form business clubs in major Spanish cities. They were committed to getting rid of state interference in the economy as soon as the dictatorship came to an end. These entrepreneurs belonged to a generation educated in technical and business schools. They knew the importance of economic and technological analysis for the development of their business activities. This was thanks to the creation of economic analysis institutes (Instituto de Estudios Fiscales) and social sciences institutes (Instituto de la Opinion Pública) in the 1960s. This generation was able to achieve success with the resources generated by their own companies, so they rejected the interference of the public administration. A series of business conferences in Barcelona, Madrid, and Valencia took place shortly after the dictator’s death in November 1975. Businessmen were absent from public debate during the dictatorship, so they were eager to gain public and media presence (Flores Andrade, 2000). Press releases were launched from the Sindicato Vertical’s provincial structures warning about the risks of possible labour reforms. In parallel, some associations such as the Consejo Nacional de Empresarios, the Consejo Superior de Cámaras de Comercio or the Consejo Provincial de Empresarios began to meet with Adolfo Suárez’s transitional government in 1976, though these meetings were the result of personal contacts and friendship. There was no state-​wide business association capable of speaking on behalf of the business community as a whole. To solve this problem, three new state-​level associations were created in the first few months of 1977: the Confederación Empresarial Española, the Agrupación Empresarial Independiente, and the Confederación General Española de Empresarios. Along with the Catalan Fomento del Trabajo Nacional, in mid-​1977 these associations merged to form the Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales (CEOE). The chambers of commerce were intentionally excluded. The new democratic period that began with the 1978 Constitution laid the foundations for a pluralist system. Business associations and trade unions took a central role in drawing up new labour market regulations and advising on economic policy.6 The risk of social unrest and the radicalisation of the labour movement paved the way for the creation of alliances between major unions and the CEOE at the state level. This allowed for the rapid development of labour legislation, as well as the consolidation of the trade unions’ and business associations’ organisational structures with the help of public resources. The CEOE became the voice of Spanish companies. The government and the trade unions recognised its representativeness, despite the absence of membership records. Since the first round of social agreements took place, there has been 269

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a declaration of mutual recognition that grants the CEOE a monopoly on representing business interests (García Femenía, 2002). This applies to CEOE’s member associations as well, including the Confederación Española de la Pequeña y Mediana Empresa (CEPYME) which aims to represent small and medium-​sized companies. CEPYME was created in 1977 as an independent association, and three years later it became part of the CEOE. On the sector level, the industry is structured across traditional economic sectors (commerce, construction, energy, banking, pharmacy) and newer emerging markets (renewable energy, digital economy) which generally adopt flexible associative forms. The CEOE’s regional, provincial, and local associations have been gaining political power as the autonomous state becomes increasingly consolidated (Medina and Molins, 2014). The CEOE’s dominant position has generated strong tensions both with other business associations over the years (Nonell and Molins, 2007) and chambers of commerce. The CEOE undertook an intense legal battle in a bid to eliminate compulsory membership in the chambers of commerce, which they won in 2010 (Medina and Molins, 2017). Their aim was to remove the chambers of commerce from the public debate. In 2014, a reform of the chambers of commerce gave more importance to large companies in decision-​making bodies. The old Consejo General de Cámaras de Comercio was replaced by the Cámara de Comercio de España. This new organisation had a reduced representation function and instead focused on the local chambers of commerce’s contributions to improving Spanish companies’ exports. After a few years of serious financial problems, the chambers of commerce managed to increase the number of affiliated companies that chose to pay the now-​voluntary membership fee. The loss of income that had previously come from mandatory fees was offset by public grants for running business advisory programmes. Internal stability generated a renewed legitimacy for the chambers of commerce, and has also led to greater media presence for their leaders in recent years (Medina and Molins, 2021). In the 1990s, the CEOE faced complaints from small and medium enterprises (SMEs). These companies argued that the CEOE was dominated by large companies and so lacked a specific strategy on industrial policy, and also showed an excessive interest in macroeconomic policy (Costas and Nonell, 1996). These companies also criticised CEPYME’s lack of autonomy. Few saw in CEPYME the opportunity to stand up to large companies. This led to the emergence of new business associations in Catalonia (PIMEC), the Balearic Islands (PIMEB), the Valencian Community (L’Empresarial), and other Spanish regions. These new associations aspired to participate in negotiating collective agreements, but very few were actually able to do so. The CEOE asserted its monopoly by rejecting any interference from outside associations. Around the same time, family-​owned companies promoted the creation of the Instituto de Empresa Familiar (IEF) in 1992. Although these companies shared the stance of SMEs, the IEF’s aim was to promote family businesses through studies, university education, and events. The IEF never showed any interest in labour relations. As its objectives were compatible with those of the CEOE, the 270

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IEF has been able to successfully expand its influence in Spanish society without too much pressure. A decade later, amid the 2008 economic crisis, the CEOE faced a severe internal crisis after multiple corruption scandals. Its president, Gerardo Díaz Ferrán, who was in favour of reducing labour rights and implementing austerity policies, was sent to prison. Articles appeared in the press about the large public subsidies that the CEOE received in exchange for its institutional participation. The CEOE’s public image was damaged at a time when the European Union was demanding that the Spanish government implement structural reforms. As a result, a number of the largest Spanish companies (Telefónica, BBVA, Santander, CaixaBank, Corté Inglés, and Iberdrola) promoted the creation of the new Consejo Empresarial para la Competitividad (CEC) to set themselves apart from the CEOE’s poor practices. These companies participated in dozens of meetings and seminars in international forums during the economic recession in order to promote the Spanish economy. The CEC was eventually dissolved in 2017. Large companies have since found a new home in the chambers of commerce and are once again aligned with the CEOE’s agenda of policy reforms. In more recent years, the CEOE has implemented internal changes that include publishing its budget and passing an ethical code. Finally, two more business associative spaces are worth mentioning. The latest wave of business associations in Spain is made up by many associations for self-​employed workers. The first such associations emerged in the mid-​1990s, though they faced serious doubts about their associative nature. Some assumed their members were businessmen (ATA, CEAT, UATAE, CONAE), while others adopted a unionistic profile (UPTA). The growing importance of self-​ employment in the Spanish economy has triggered increased interest from the CEOE and political parties about these associations. The CEOE has established links with ATA and CEAT, while UATAE and UPTA are tied to left-​wing parties. The second type of associations are powerful business think tanks in the largest Spanish cities. These think tanks bring together businessmen, academics, and experts with the aim of understanding the needs of local economies and promoting relevant business projects, such as business schools or investments in infrastructure. The Círculo de Empresarios in Madrid and the Círculo de Economía in Barcelona are the most prestigious, though similar business clubs can also be found in Valencia, Bilbao, León, and Zaragoza.

Interests, patterns, and strategies Business associations in Spain produce policy analysis using their own means. They gather data about economic activities, produce opinion barometers, elaborate in-​ depth reports, and write other documents such as press releases to advance their preferences and policy positions. In general, they examine the data on economic evolution and social spending produced by public institutions such as the Instituto Nacional de Estadística or the Banco de España. This makes it easier for business 271

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associations to react to political and economic events immediately. In other cases, business associations are directly responsible for managing official records. For instance, the local chambers of commerce are in charge of conducting the public business census (censo público de empresas). One way to determine the interests of the various associations is by looking at their departmental structure. Currently, the CEOE is structured across the following departments: international affairs; training; regulatory and European affairs; labour relations; organisations and companies; communication, institutional relations, and sustainability; finances and internal resources; legal frameworks; and economy. Some departments focus on supplying services to members and carrying out administrative tasks, whereas other departments are in charge of analysing the economic and political context and lobbying. In 2018, the CEOE employed 92 workers. Of these, 63 were in charge of consulting, communication and event organisation, while 28 were assistants and drivers.7 The CEOE rarely pays for external reporting. A glance at the 2017 and 2018 budgets shows that the association spent around €95,000 on studies from external experts, which represents a very small share of its €21 million annual budget (0.045 per cent). The CEOE carries out policy analysis both of the governmental committees to which it belongs and of its internal departments. In analyses of the latter, the CEOE’s staff and representatives from member associations discuss proposed laws and government regulations that result in reports. These reports are routinely sent to political parties, member associations, and the media. The CEOE’s departments launch quarterly barometers so that its members can easily access the information.8 In parallel, the CEOE has started publishing a series of white papers (Libros blancos) over the last few years in order to detail its policy proposals in the fields of public health (Libro blanco de la sanidad, 2016), dependencies (Informe dependencia, 2018), education (La educación importa, 2017), energy (Energía y competitividad: propuesta del sector empresarial, 2016), job training (Libro blanco sobre el Sistema de formación en el empleo, 2017), innovation (Decálogo de medidas urgentes para impulsar la I+​D+​i en España, 2017), industrial policy (La industria, motor de crecimiento, 2017), and labour relations (Balance de las últimas reformas laborales, 2017). These documents include a ‘state of the nation’ assessment of various policies, discuss forecasting scenarios, and offer policy solutions. Since the association wants the proposals to be read by the general public, the language and data used are quite accessible. It is important for the CEOE to develop activities for companies and the media, as they are a good opportunity to share information with relevant stakeholders. The CEOE regularly organises trips to countries seeking investment from Spanish companies –​the so-​called misiones comerciales –​which usually precede meetings held in Spain with ambassadors and local authorities from these countries.9 Meetings with sectoral business associations and the media are also frequent. Often, business-​related newspapers organise business breakfasts where political, business, and social elites have the opportunity to exchange thoughts on current issues.10 272

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The CEOE’s policy analysis follows a threefold approach: first, monitoring the government’s and parliament’s regulatory activity; second, policy analysis, which leads to internal discussions and reporting; and third, public dissemination of the policy proposals in workshops, conferences, and seminars. All this results in a constant, intense policy analysis model. Table 14.1 summarises the CEOE’s policy analysis activities for 2018. In addition to traditional business demands (low taxes, private investments, reduction of the bureaucracy, etc), the CEOE

Table 14.1: CEOE’s policy analysis and related tasks, 2018 Department

Reports

Conferences and data

Law monitoring and lobbying

Legal affairs

Events: Public Sector Contract Law; Protection of Business Secrets; Investor’s Protection in State Contracts.

Judicial costs reform; draft law on business secrets; draft law on defence law; transparency law; prevention of money laundering law.

Relations with parliament

Events: MPs have regularly attended events held by the CEOE.

Sending proposals to political parties on the general budgets for 2018, the law that modifies the commercial code; the capital companies’ law; and the accounts auditing law.

Economic and European affairs

Preparation of more than 500 reports, positions, and analysis notes, among which it is worth highlighting the following reports: ‘40 Years of Society, Economy and Welfare State in Spain’; ‘Analysis of the Exporting Company by Size’; and ‘Transport and Logistics Priorities.’

Data: Quarterly Report; Monthly Economic Outlook. Events: 2025 Digital Plan; Rules and Urgent Measures to Promote Innovation in Spain; Challenges and Opportunities of the Circular Economy; Brexit’s Impact on the Spanish Economy.

Draft law on the tax on digital services; the financial transactions tax; draft law on business secrets; draft law on climate change and energy transition.

Labour relations

Bipartite meetings to analyse the IV Agreement for Employment and Collective Bargaining. Hundreds of reports on CEOE’s institutional participation in the Economic and Social Council and many other advisory committees.

Data: documents for the labour market observatory and collective bargaining and labour conflict.

Attendance at dozens of formal social dialogue meetings on topics such as: collective bargaining, labour relations, employment, social security, occupational risk prevention, training, education, health, social affairs, immigration, emigration, and equality.

Training

Regulatory Proposals for Dual Vocational Training.

Data: ‘Faro de la Orientación’. Events: Participation in numerous events on vocational training for employment and in dual vocational training.

Lobbying to achieve the regulatory development of dual FP. Debate on the next National Training Agreement with the unions.

Source: CEOE’s website (https://​www.ceoe.es/​es/​conoce​nos/​la-​confed​erac​ion) (accessed 5 December 2021)

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also highlights its current demands regarding the digitisation of the economy, professional training, and sustainable industrial production. The COVID-​19 pandemic is a major global event that will mark the evolution of politics, the economy, and society over the next few years. Spanish companies have actively analysed the labour, economic, and commercial effects of COVID-​ 19 in novel ways. The CEOE organised a public conference (Cumbre empresarial. Empresas españolas liderando el ocied, 15–​25 June 2020) with the participation of more than 60 prominent businessmen and associative leaders, through which they hoped to get the government to listen to individual companies. With regards to the chambers of commerce, we observe a trend towards greater public dissemination of their political proposals as a consequence of the pandemic. Following the recent regulatory reform, it seemed that Cámara de Comercio de España (CCE) was moving towards carrying out government advisory tasks with a high degree of technical and bureaucratic profile –​and thus away from the media focus. However, contact between the CCE and the government was frequent during 2020. Similarly, the CCE proposed a national recovery plan for the Spanish economy, which focused on tax cuts, external promotion of companies, tourism, and increased digitisation of the economy. In addition, the CCE launched a business survey on the impact of COVID-​19, and has been very active in publishing economic forecasts. It seems the CCE has an interest in post-​COVID-​19 policy-​making. In 2018, the CCE had 14 working groups: Industry; Energy; Commerce; Tourism; Training; University-​Company; SMEs; Circular Economy; Ports; Digitisation; Internationalisation; Communication; Agriculture; and Financing. The CEE invites key companies (Banco Santander, Iberia, MAPFRE, Caixabank, El Corte Inglés, Iberdrola) and local chambers of commerce to coordinate these working groups. Both CCE staff11 and companies participate in the groups. Part of the activity of these groups is geared towards creating guides for companies and compiling statistics. Entrepreneurs can freely access data from the Observatorio de la Competitividad Empresarial, which includes original survey data collected by the CCE itself. The CCE also offers reports on economic prospects in its website. Another important line of work focuses on reviewing regulatory projects. At the request of either the government or as part of a public hearing process, the CCE prepares brief policy statements in which regulatory gaps are detected and business demands are highlighted. Regarding policy analysis, in 2018 the working group on Digitalisation published the reports ‘Spain Digital Enterprise: Digitization as a Lever for SME Competitiveness’, and a ‘Basic Guide for the Digital Transformation of SMEs’. The working group on Ports identified various areas that required public investment. The Energy group organised sessions focused on various topics, such as the digitisation of the energy sector and energy transition. The working group on SMEs developed multiple dossiers, including the Strategic Framework for SMEs. The working group on the Circular Economy wrote a report with specific proposals in accordance with the government’s Circular Economy Action 274

Business associations and policy analysis

Plan. In short, the CCE’s list of primary topics comprises SMEs, infrastructures, energy, and the digitisation of the economy. Local chambers of commerce have contributed extensively to the territorial debate over the past two decades. They have pointed out the importance of investing in infrastructure (roads, ports, airports, and so on) and in local human capital (through training and universities), about which they published a remarkable number of reports and organised multiple conferences. Due to a series of hotly contested economic and political events, these debates have given way to other issues, and local chambers of commerce rarely echo the needs of territorial economies. Many of their infrastructure proposals have been questioned (such as the idea of expanding the airport network to cover small cities), but others are still very much in force, such as the Mediterranean Rail Corridor. In these cases, expert communities, local business think tanks, and local authorities remain interested in them. The Círculo de Empresarios and the Círculo de Economía have taken up certain territorial demands. The Instituto de Empresa Familiar’s Department of Economics and Business is responsible for policy analysis. Other departments deal with international affairs, institutional relations, internal administration, and coordinating territorial branches. The key element that marks the IEF’s policy analysis is that they externalise their reports to prestigious experts and economists. These reports are discussed at the IEF’s annual assembly. The IEF has a strong commitment to the social promotion of family businesses, so it encourages local networks throughout Spain. For instance, the IEF funds a total of 38 university chair positions in family-​run businesses, which are available at most Spanish universities. These positions are intended to provide opportunities for analysis, research, and teaching about the reality of such companies. Recently the IEF has focused on praising the contributions of its members (Mango, Amando Álvarez, Familia Torres, and so on) to initiatives to fight the pandemic, such as the purchase of masks and medical supplies. This revealed the existence of a strategy aimed at giving visibility to its members’ social commitments with regards to policy analysis. Their analysis of the economic situation is less noteworthy. The IEF’s list of priority issues in the pandemic has included helping companies gain access to public credit, telework, employment, and the modernisation of the industry. The IEF allows the public to share its documents online. Since 1992, online publications cover the following topics: family-​run businesses; education; succession in companies; women in business; internationalisation; fiscal policy; legislative affairs; business leadership; economic policy; and business management. The bulk of the IEF’s publications focus on experiences specific to family businesses, so these do not fall within the scope of policy analysis. Their latest stream of policy reports published between 2017 and 2019 focused on business competitiveness (La dimensión empresarial como factor de competitividad, 2017), the financial situation of family businesses (Factores de competitividad y análisis financiero de la empresa familiar, 2018), professional training (Orientación profesional y formación 275

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dual, 2018; Formación de calidad para empleo de calidad, 2019), and the link between universities and business (Red de Cátedras: de la universidad a la sociedad, 2018). These issues fall within the scope of business management. It is in the very nature of think tanks to conduct policy analysis. The Círculo de Economía organises a vast number of conferences and seminars in which businesspeople, experts, and academics share ideas on political and economic challenges. Think tanks know the importance of social media, so the Círculo de Economía offers quite a considerable list of online documents (reports, videos, position papers, and so on). In recent times, the Círculo de Economía has gained a fair amount of media attention by publishing position papers on the digital economy; reform of the state; the challenges of Spanish democracy; reform of the tax system; the future of the European Union; and the needs of the Spanish economy with regards to industrial policy, social inclusion, and public spending. Unlike other associations, the Círculo de Economía has not shown a special interest in evaluating the political and economic consequences of the pandemic. The Círculo de Empresarios’s location in Madrid has long conditioned its corporate mission. The Círculo competes with CEOE and the Spanish Chamber of Commerce for business leadership and media attention, forcing the think tank to cover a multitude of policy issues. This impacts its internal departments, which cover social welfare, economy, education, entrepreneurship, and regulation. When it comes to policy analysis, its reports on the deficits of industrial policy are particularly interesting. In successive reports entitled La empresa media en España (The medium-​sized company in Spain), the Círculo examined the evolution of the business structure in Spain during the recovery phase from 2013 to 2018 following the economic crisis. The Círculo publishes brief monthly documents (Así está … la economía) and quarterly documents that offer data on the global political and economic situation. A series of monthly documents also analyses industrial production in Spain (Así está … la empresa). The Círculo collaborates with other business think tanks on the Circle Barometer, which offers original data on the Spanish economy on an annual basis. In addition, the Círculo regularly holds debate meetings in collaboration with other economic think tanks in the country. Table 14.2 summarises the main topics on which business associations develop policy analysis, as well as the strategies for distributing the results.

Institutional resources for policy analysis Although it is true that the CEOE shares an ideological affinity with the Popular Party and Ciudadanos, social negotiations under leftist governments have been very intense. The CEOE understands the importance of political negotiation with the government and the unions, as it allows the association to be present in a multitude of institutional forums. A clear example of this predisposition to negotiation can be seen in the many agreements the CEOE has reached to tackle 276

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Table 14.2: Business associations’ strategies for policy analysis Business association

Main topics

Strategy

CEOE

Macro economy Labour policy Welfare state

Advisory committees Reports Data analysis Press conferences Position papers

CCE

SMEs Exports Infrastructures Energy Digital economy

Reports Data gathering Data analysis Press conferences Position papers Barometers

IEF

Business management

University chairs Experts’ reports Position papers

Círculo de Economía

Democracy Welfare state Industrial policy

Seminars Position papers

Círculo de Empresarios

Macro economy Welfare state Regulation

Reports Position papers Barometers

Source: Own eleboration

the COVID-​19 pandemic, while the conservative and liberal political parties have refused to reach an agreement with the coalition government. The CEOE holds seats on the boards of important advisory committees and public agencies. They also participate in the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) and the National Accreditation and Certification Entity (ENAC) of the Ministry of Economy, which provides first-​hand data on the evolution of the Spanish economy. The CEOE is present too on the Science and Technology Advisory Council (Ministry of Science and Innovation), making it possible for the association to influence investment in science for productive sectors. The Ministry of Environmental Affairs houses the CEOE on a number of advisory councils such as the Environmental Advisory Council, the National Climate Council, the National Water Council, the Council of the Network of National Parks, the State Council for Natural Heritage and Biodiversity, and the Carbon Footprint Working Group, to name a few. The CEOE shares information with the government, experts, and environmental interest groups in these public agencies, making it possible for companies in the construction, energy, and automotive sectors, among others, to anticipate legislative projects. The list of advisory commissions in which the CEOE is engaged extends to the Ministries of Industry, Tourism, and Commerce; Education; Health and Social Policy; Defence; as well as Labour and Immigration. The CEOE earns significant resources for its institutional participation.12 In order to guarantee business representation within the Consejo Económico 277

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y Social, the CEOE was paid €232,400 in 2018 (the exact same amount as the previous year). This means the government indirectly pays the CEOE to produce policy analysis on relevant economic issues. The Ministry of Labour funded the CEOE with €1,335,571.14 during 2017 (and with €1,298,497.36 in 2016) for its involvement in the Ministry’s public agencies and institutes. In 2017, the CEOE signed a series of agreements with the Fundación Estatal para la Prevención de Riesgos Laborales to advise companies on occupational risks. The budget allocated for three such campaigns was €1,279,876. Additionally, the CEOE signed agreements with the Instituto Español de Comercio Exterior (ICEX) to develop internationalisation programmes for Spanish companies. The ICEX agreed to finance up to 40 per cent of the trade missions, which translates to a €200,000 budget in 2017 (and again in 2018). The Ministry of Public Health, which was in charge of equality policies in 2017, allocated €250,000 to finance the CEOE’s fifth edition of the ‘Promociona Project’ (2017–​18), which aimed to promote female leadership in business. A final instance of such cooperation between the government and the CEOE in 2017 relates to the Ministry of Finance, which contributed €75,000 for the association to identify administrative burdens assumed by medium-​sized companies in the tourism sector. When assessing the CEOE’s possibilities for policy analysis, there is enormous value in considering the permanent cooperation that the government offers to interest groups to design and implement public policies, which is seen in more than just anecdotal evidence. Chambers of commerce also receive public subsidies (see Table 14.3). The chambers of commerce follow a mixed financing model with voluntary contributions from companies and public subsidies. The CCE 2020 budget showed it received €10,635,772 from public subsidies (intended for internal expenses) plus another €56,064,138 that were transferred to the local chambers of commerce.13 This means that voluntary fees represent only 6.8 per cent of the CEE’s 2020 annual budget. Public subsidies finance a large part of the CCE’s activities, staff, and offices. The other business associations do not receive public funding, nor do they have representation in institutional forums.

Conclusion Political science in Spain has long neglected the study of certain areas of government, insofar as it continues to be a social science with strong links to constitutional and administrative law. While the interest in the formal aspects of the bureaucracy still prevails in the literature, a new line of research focuses on the role of actors in policy-​making. The basic interest in understanding the development of a certain policy lies in understanding how the policy network is structured and what kind of resources each of the actors is willing to contribute (Rhodes, 2000). This chapter has described the way in which Spanish business associations perform policy analysis. Business associations want government decisions to be in line with 278

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Table 14.3: Cámara de Comercio de España’s 2020 annual budget (in €) Total revenue

73,716,320

Total expenses

−73,656,328

1.1. Own income

10,635,772

2.1. Own expenses

−17,592,190

Staff

1.1.1. Public grants

10,635,772

European Union

6,915,932

Rentals

−930,903

Spain

3,707,140

Office supplies

−290,982

12,700

Public relations

−426,977

Training

−6,367,091

1.1.2. Provision of Services

2,379,988

Publications

Public and Administrative Functions

1,449,944

Travel expenses

−816,736

930,044

Other services

−8,401,639

Private 1.1.3. Voluntary fees (70%)

3,517,150

Fees to other organisations

1.1.4. Others

1,119,272

Taxes Incidental expenses

1.2. Income transferred to local chambers 1.2.1. Public grants transferred to local chambers 1.2.2. Voluntary fees (30%)

56,064,138 54,556,788 1,507,350

2.2. Expenses transferred to local chambers 2.2.1. Public grants transferred to local chambers 2.2.2. Voluntary fees

−7000

−201,625 −47,127 −102,110 −56,064,138 −54,556,788 -​1,507,350

Source: Cámara de Comercio de España (2020)

their policy preferences, and decision-​makers must listen to those who run the economy and create jobs. The list of reports, surveys, and press releases published annually by Spanish business associations is immense. It is clear that business associations have a vast amount of resources –​both in terms of staff and budgets –​ that allows them to be active in this regard. Another notable factor is that their interests receive high media attention, so information on economic and labour policy is easily accessible. The press wants to hear the opinion of businessmen, so in many cases business associations do not need to prepare detailed reports in order to gain media coverage. Their position for or against a policy alone is often newsworthy. Finally, one of the main conclusions of this chapter is that several strategies exist to analyse business policy. The CEOE collects data, prepares reports, organises discussion sessions, and puts pressure on institutions. They also constantly conduct policy analysis on a multitude of economic, labour, and social issues. The Spanish Chamber of Commerce (CCE) is another good example of a business association engaging in active policy analysis. However, the CCE faces certain legal limitations when it comes to preparing reports on business matters. The historical confrontation between these two business associations favours the production of reports and documents as they compete for leadership in the business conversation. The IEF offers a distinct model of policy analysis based on external research. The IEF has long financed research and teaching projects at major Spanish 279

Policy Analysis in Spain

universities through which to enhance the social relevance of family companies. Of course, the IEF focuses on policy areas, such as university education, in which the CEOE is not usually involved. Finally, business think tanks are constantly examining economic and business data. While the Círculo de Empresarios pays more attention to industrial policy, the Círculo de Economía focuses more on the global political and economic challenges. Other economic clubs in Galicia, Valencia, Andalusia, the Basque Country, Mallorca, and León should be the subject of future research. Notes 1 2

3

4 5

6 7 8 9

10 11

12 13

And with this, the imposition of informal and dependency relationships as the main mechanism for groups to access public administration until the end of the 20th century (Gunther, 1992). In that the businessmen who supported the military coup were rewarded with credentials for the development of economic activities and placed in the governing bodies of large public companies. Some authors, like Brandl and Lehr (2019), point out that companies are no longer interested in joining traditional employers’ associations. Nor are many business associations created today with the intention of negotiating with unions (Gooberman et al, 2020). At the beginning of 20th century a new association was created with the name Confederación Nacional Católico-​Agraria (1917). Several business associations represented the Spanish business community during the Second Republic: the Confederación Española Patronal Agrícola, the Confederación de Entidades Económicas y Círculos Mercantiles, the Confederación Gremial, the Junta de Entidades Catalanas, the Consejo Superior de Cámaras, and the Unión Económica. The Spanish Constitution expressly recognises in its article 7 the political function of trade unions and business associations in the labour and economic sphere. The CEOE employed 90 workers in 2017. This figure includes the general secretary. For instance, the Department of Economy publishes a quarterly report on the Spanish economy. In January 2018, CEOE members were part of the Spanish delegation that received authorities from Puerto Rico, Latvia, India, Sinaloa (Mexico), and Colombia. A full coverage of CEOE’s activities for 2018 can be found in the CEOE 2019 Annual Report (CEOE, 2019). The EFE news agency organises one of the most well-​known such breakfasts (Desayunos informativos), at which, on multiple occasions, the main speaker has been the leader of the CEOE. The CCE employed 98 workers in 2018. Of these, 62 of these were skilled workers (lawyers, economists, political analysts) and two were senior managers. The rest of the workers performed administrative tasks. The CEOE publishes the agreements on its website: https://w ​ ww.ceoe.es/e​ s/c​ onocen ​ os/e​ l-p​ or​ tal-​de-​transp​aren​cia/​conven​ios-​y-​contra​tos (accessed 5 December 2021). https://​www.cam​ara.es/​sites/​defa​ult/​files/​gener ​ico/​presupuest​o_​20​20_​p​orta​l_​tr​ansp​aren​cia. pdf (accessed 26 March 2020).

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FIFTEEN

NGOs as policy analysis partners: from invisibility to expansion Luz Muñoz Márquez and Noemí Orué Guerrero

Introduction NGOs (non-​governmental organisations)1 are relative newcomers to Spanish politics. Absent during Franco’s dictatorship (1939–​1975), except for some social organisations with religious roots, NGOs suddenly emerged during the transition to democracy in the 1970s, thus increasing associative pluralism. However, the upsurge gradually lessened over time (Linz, 1981). Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, NGOs began to represent a more stable group, legitimised by governments as policy actors (Pérez-​Díaz and López-​Novo, 2003; Revilla, 2002; Muñoz Marquez, 2016a). This recognition enabled NGOs to develop their capacity as information providers in the political process. The maturation of NGOs as political actors occurred in parallel with the construction of the welfare state in Spain, the emergence of new social challenges and the secularisation of society, all of which somehow prompted a rise in democratic demand for citizen participation (Pérez Yruela and Giner, 1988; Ruíz Olabuénaga, 2006; Marbán and Rodríguez, 2006; Muñoz Marquez, 2016a). In the last two decades, a consolidation and renovation process has taken place. NGOs have converged with European Union (EU) national models in several respects: 1) growing collaboration with governments; 2) a focus on the provision of social services to the detriment of the civic functions of mobilisation and assertion of rights; 3) functional specialisation among social service provision and advocacy entities, though the most important ones combine both functions; and 4) the creation of platforms and the progressive use of the social economy as a source of funding (Marbán et al, 2020). Most analyses of Spanish NGOs have focused on their weight in the Spanish economy by emphasising, for instance, their contribution to GDP and job creation (Rodríguez Cabrero, 2003; Zurdo Alaguero, 2003; García Delgado and Jiménez, 2004; Ruíz Olabuenaga, 2006; Marcuello, 2007; Ariño, 2008). Some have also evaluated their role as social service providers and in implementing social policies (Moreno, 1995; Mota, 1999; Giner and Montagut, 2005). However, little is known about their role in the political process and, more specifically, on the supply side of policy analysis (Rodríguez Cabrero, 2015; Marbán et al, 2020). This chapter aims to contribute to this branch of research and increase knowledge of the presence of NGOs as policy experts in the 283

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policy-​making process. Specifically, the goal is to explain the extent to which these organisations advise the government and parliament through participatory or advisory bodies. Besides portraying the main characteristics of NGOs in terms of their historical background and human and financial resources, the chapter provides information on the extent to which NGOs act as experts in the governmental and parliamentary arenas. We analyse the issues they address with policy-​makers and the extent to which there are significant differences between the participation levels of NGOs. To analyse the resources and activities of NGOs concerning the political process, we used different databases. The first were those of the research group Quality of Democracy (Q-​Dem),2 which publishes information on a range of interest groups. However, only those categorised as NGOs were used for this study. These databases provide two types of information: a) data concerning parliamentary hearings, including the name of the interest group involved in parliamentary committees, the policy issue under discussion, the type of parliamentary committee and the type of hearing (debate of a bill or policy implementation); and b) data concerning the executive’s advisory bodies, including information on the name of the interest group belonging to the advisory body, the policy issue under scrutiny, and the executive ministry to which it belongs. The total number of NGOs identified in these databases as participants in parliamentary hearings from 1996 to 2015 and members of executive advisory bodies from 2013 to 2015 was 1,172. Second, we used Q-​Dem’s 2015 survey of interest groups, which contains information about NGOs and other types of interest group, their resources, such as annual budgets and staffing levels, and questions on whether they belong to or interact with public actors and international networks (Chaqués-​Bonafont et al, 2021). This survey also contains questions about the type of data they develop to pursue their policy goals, such as legal, economic, and technical information. Finally, we also referred to the 2019 annual report of the Plataforma de Acción Social (Social Action NGO Platform), which summarises its findings based on a survey of social action NGOs, proportionally the biggest NGO policy sector in Spain.3 The report also contains information about organisational resources and characteristics and the type of policy activities they undertake, including those associated with policy analysis. We considered the presence of NGOs in parliamentary or governmental advisory bodies as an indicator of their capacity to develop policy analysis. In other words, they are members of an advisory body and participate in parliamentary hearings because policy-​makers recognise them as having specific experience and knowledge in particular policy domains (Chaqués-​Bonafont and Muñoz Marquez, 2016; Albareda, 2018; Flöthe, 2020). This recognition is based on the organisation’s degree of representation or membership (and, therefore, resources) and on the information held about them based on the reports they draw upon their activities (Binderkrantz et al, 2015; De Bruycker, 2016). NGOs’ involvement in these arenas also corresponds to their willingness to transfer the information 284

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and knowledge they consider relevant to policy-​makers. Access to government bodies and parliamentary decision-​makers provides them with the opportunity to exchange their knowledge and expertise on a particular issue (Fraussen, 2014; Kanol, 2020). Like any other group, NGOs might also use these venues to act as advocacy groups. They use their policy expertise to frame issues following their ideological preferences. Given that NGOs are organisations guided by principles and values, we should expect them to use their knowledge and expertise to frame public problems and alternatives not in a neutral manner but in a way that serves to advance their cause. In this regard, the introduction of this chapter provides a broader discussion on the definition and functions of policy analysis. The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: the next section describes how NGOs become relevant political actors and which issues give them greater visibility; the third section provides information on the issues on which NGOs conduct policy analysis in government advisory bodies, the proportion of NGOs involved in each issue and their degree of presence in these advisory arrangements; the fourth section discusses the policy analysis conducted by NGOs in parliament, concerning the issues they are invited to provide information on and for what purpose, that is, to discuss future legislation or to monitor the implementation of policies; the fifth section briefly reflects on the policy analysis capacity of NGOs by drawing on the analysis of organisations with specific internal units dedicated to developing information and knowledge; and the sixth and final section summarises the main findings of the research.

Key partners in the construction of the welfare state Historically, NGOs have had little involvement in formulating public policies, and their intervention has been more consultative in nature. In the case of Spain, NGOs existed for a long time. However, Franco’s dictatorship hampered their capacity for growth concerning other Western countries,4 which also delayed the institutionalisation of the collaborative relationship with the government with respect to other Western countries. In terms of numbers, this difference was still in place at the end of the 1990s (Salamon and Sokolowski, 2018). Nonetheless, the number of NGOs has proliferated in the last three decades primarily due to the institutional and financial support of the welfare state (Marbán et al, 2020). This trend can be observed in Figure 15.1. If we look at NGOs identified as stakeholders in the policy process, we see that most of them were created between the transition to democracy in the mid-​1970s until the first decade of the present century. There was a significant peak at the end of the 1990s in the number of NGOs that were created and later participated in government commissions or participated in parliamentary hearings. A lower presence of NGOs prior to the 1970s can only be explained by their almost non-​existence before the democratic transition, while a lower presence of NGOs created after 2010 may be due to the fact that the criterion of experience is often taken into account when granting access to policy venues. 285

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Figure 15.1: Year of establishment of NGOs participating in the policy process in Spain 30

Number of NGOs

25 20 15 10

0

1822 1859 1899 1913 1923 1938 1949 1957 1961 1964 1967 1970 1973 1976 1979 1982 1985 1988 1991 1994 1997 2000 2003 2006 2009 2012

5

Year Source: Developed by the authors from Q-​Dem databases on the organizational characteristics of interest groups active in the policy process.

The gradual maturity of Spanish NGOs has been accompanied by a transformation in their role and participation in the policy process associated with the rapid growth of the welfare state in Spain. This trend also parallels the global change of governments, whose response to a wide variety of complex new social issues cannot be provided by policy-​makers alone. Collaboration with civil society thus became desirable to improve governance (Jordana, 2006; Chaqués-​Bonafont, 2004; Torfing, 2020). In addition to delivering social services, the fieldwork of NGOs means that they have the tools needed to develop information on certain issues and possess experience and technical knowledge (Baumgartner and Leech, 1998; Chalmers, 2013; Dür and Mateo, 2013). This has led to their involvement as political actors to respond to the new problems facing society. For instance, in the last two decades, they have been invited to give evidence in the Spanish parliament more than any other citizen group (Binderkratz et al, 2015; Chaqués-​Bonafont and Muñoz Marquez, 2016; Lisi and Muñoz Marquez, 2019). Moreover, the social involvement of these organisations has led to their function as representatives of the interests of civil society, and in many cases they serve as the discursive opposition to state interests, thereby gaining increasing legitimacy, especially due to their networking (Devetak and Higgot, 1999; Hudson, 2001). During the long economic growth between 1995 and 2008, NGOs became part of the welfare system through a stable collaboration with the state. At the same time, they had to compete with the private sector to provide social services (Pérez Yruela, 2015). Such collaboration provided a means of channelling sectoral demands through public policies and offered a space for representation and negotiation. In the 1990s, NGOs went from being almost invisible policy actors to playing an increasingly active role in decision-​making and the implementation of a range of policy issues. They are no longer organisations based on goodwill 286

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and charity but somewhat professional, structured organisations that complement the role of the welfare state in the provision of social services (Ariño, 2008; Muñoz Marquez, 2016b). This has led the Spanish NGO ‘to converge towards the characteristic features of the European model of the non-​profit sector’ and have ‘counted on a specific regulation aimed at consolidating its institutional role and its integration as a specific sphere within the welfare system’ (Marbán et al, 2020: 101). Two parallel institutional reforms have also influenced NGOs’ institutionalisation and organisational features regarding specialisation and policy capacity. On the one hand, the decentralisation of the state has favoured the development of relationships between NGOs and regional and local administrations. In practical terms, this implies functional specialisation in the sector through which umbrella organisations and major NGOs operate at the state level, and small and medium-​ sized NGOs do so locally. On the other hand, Spain’s accession to the European Union in 1986 reinforced the constitutive logic of the mixed welfare system, in which NGOs came to occupy an essential place in the creation of well-​being and shared the management of social services and benefits with the welfare state. This can be depicted in terms of NGOs’ territorial action; according to the 2019 annual survey conducted among the main umbrella organisations in the social services sector by the Plataforma de ONGs de Acción Social, most organisations act at regional and local level (70.7 per cent), while a minority work at state or international level. However, when the evolution of the survey data for 2019 was compared to previous years, it is clear that the state level has gained importance (18.7 per cent of NGOs in 2019 and 12.9 per cent in 2009) and that the international level increased between 2009 (6.3 per cent) and 2019 (10.5 per cent). According to the same report, in terms of the main policy sector in which NGOs are active, most work in social action, integration and insertion, and in social health care, which accounts for around 80 per cent of NGOs, a number that has remained stable since the 2009 survey was conducted.

The main organisational features of NGOs and their capacity to develop policy analysis Spanish NGOs have a chronic financial dependence on public administrations (Moreno, 1995; Mota, 1999; Ruíz Olabuénaga, 2006), which has not been reversed since the economic crisis of 2008. Despite the declining weight of public funding in the sector’s overall revenue since 2013, which fell from 55.3 per cent to 41.4 per cent in the last five years, public administrations (whatever the form) remain the main source of funding. However, the gap between public funding and both private and internal funding, which has acquired significant weight since 2013 (accounting for 26 per cent and 32.6 per cent, respectively, in 2018) is gradually narrowing (Plataforma de Acción Social, 2020). According to Q-​Dem’s 2015 survey on interest groups in Spain, there is also strong polarisation among NGOs, with the majority of resources (both public and 287

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private) being limited to just a few, while the rest remain financially fragile. Just 6 per cent had an annual budget of between one million and ten million euros, while 49.6 per cent had an annual budget of between ten thousand and a hundred thousand euros. Economic resources, in turn, have a high impact on the strength of their human resources, which can be a determining factor in an NGO’s ability to conduct policy analysis. The average number of paid staff members among NGOs in 2019 was 130.5 in organisations with an annual budget of more than one million euros, while small NGOs (up to a hundred thousand euros) employed just 4.5 people (figures calculated from data provided by the Plataforma de Acción Social, 2020). On the whole, the picture reflects a trend in Spain for NGOs to concentrate resources, as well as access to policy-​makers, as explained later in the chapter, in a handful of major NGOs. This creates small clubs of powerful NGOs in different policy issues, such as foreign aid and environmental policy (Jiménez, 2007; Muñoz Marquez, 2016b). The annual report of the Plataforma de ONGs de Acción Social also offers information about the policy analysis activities reported by NGOs. When asked if they carry out awareness-​raising activities, in other words educational campaigns, 81.20 per cent replied positively, while 30 per cent also said that they perform campaigns on human rights reporting and advocacy. By contrast, activities more directly related to the systematisation of knowledge are less important. Only 19 per cent carry out research and needs detection. A total of 18 per cent stated that they maintain dialogue with the public sector and other agents and 8 per cent participate in processes to draw up or modify regulations (Plataforma de Acción Social, 2020). If we consider that there is no single function of policy analysis (see the introduction of this chapter), awareness-​ raising activities could be considered as policy analysis designed to frame policy issues, that is, evaluation of a situation according to certain values and principles, while research and needs detection could serve both to frame and to provide policy analysis based on facts, and therefore to identify the best policy options from a neutral, non-​ideological point of view, as in the top-​down approach to policy analysis. Figures from the Plataforma de ONGs de Acción Social concerning attention devoted to research and needs detection are consistent with those obtained from the 2015 interest group survey by Q-​Dem (Chaqués-​Bonafont et al, 2021). In response to the question ‘How often has your organisation been involved in publishing technical reports over the last 12 months?’, 19 per cent answered at least once, 13 per cent at least once every three months and 7 per cent at least once a month. In addition, 20 per cent said that they had an advocacy office in charge of exchanging information and liaising with policy-​makers, while just 7 per cent had both publication and advocacy offices. In summary, the strong involvement of NGOs in awareness-​raising activities suggests that most efforts are dedicated to frame issues and advocacy activities are devoted more to the general public. We could argue that this could also be translated to policy-​makers in the form of policy analysis rooted in field experience, but the numbers suggest that 288

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NGOs generally do not prioritise their role as policy analysts, although there are some exceptions. Moreover, belonging to an umbrella organisation, especially at international and European level, can be considered an indicator of interest in policy analysis. Research and needs detection, and the sharing of results with members, represent one of the functions of umbrella organisations, but not the only one. Using the Q-​Dem survey already mentioned,5 we looked at NGOs’ answer to the question ‘Is your organisation a member of a European or international organisation or network?’, and found that 35 per cent of the NGOs answered positively. Next, we looked at the question about their reasons for belonging to these organisations and observed that many (45 per cent) said that an important reason for becoming a member was to issue joint statements, reports, and studies, although all of them (100 per cent) stated that the main goal was to obtain information and be represented before European and international institutions. Once again, we observed that policy analysis is an important factor for NGOs that decide to establish networks, but it is not the top concern. Finally, it is also worthwhile mentioning the extent to which NGOs perceive that the policy analysis they provide is important to policy-​makers. When asked the question, ‘With respect to the information generated by your organisation, please rate the level of importance you believe politicians at any territorial level attach to it’, NGOs generally did not consider the information provided to be particularly important for politicians; for example, in relation to information on the adoption of new public policies, 14.5 per cent responded that it is very important. A total of 21.5 per cent considered legal information and the adoption of new public policy reports to be important, while 19 per cent considered that scientific and technical data are somehow important (see Table 15.1 for more detailed information). The perception among NGOs of the low level of importance politicians attach to their policy analysis is somewhat contradictory when one analyses the extent to which they are invited into different policy arenas. As we will explain later, NGOs have gained substantial access rights to the governmental and parliamentary arenas as policy experts.

Table 15.1: Type of information prepared by NGOs that they perceive as important to policy-​ makers Scientific and technical

Very important Somewhat important Not very important Not important

Legal

Economic

Social impact

Public policy adoption

8.1

7.4

7.4

12.6

14.8

19.3

21.5

14.1

17.8

21.5

3.7

5.2

8.1

8.9

3.7

11.1

6.7

6.7

5.9

4.4

Source: Developed by the authors from Q-​Dem’s 2015 interest group survey. The question asked was: ‘With respect to the information generated by your organisation, please rate the level of importance you believe politicians at any territorial level attach to it.’

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It is true that politicians do not have one single objective when they invite NGOs to participate in these policy venues since, in addition to obtaining useful information for policy-​making, they also seek to gain legitimacy and public acceptance by increasing the participation of civil society organisations. However, it is also true that the perception among interest groups is that their voices are not heard by policy-​makers, so this argument also makes sense for NGOs. For NGOs that devote efforts to develop policy analysis, the questions to ask are how many are considered as experts by policy-​makers and on which policy issues are they consulted and therefore act as policy analysts, and with what result?

Participatory consulting at governmental level In Spain, like in other democratic countries, interactions between policy-​makers and societal interests are structured through consultative arrangements such as advisory bodies, working groups, discussion panels, and public committees and commissions. Advisory bodies serve as channels to exchange policy goods, and governments grant legitimacy and access to societal groups in exchange for policy analysis (information, knowledge, and expertise) and for sharing responsibility in policy-​making (Fraussen et al, 2015). Governments aim to involve the organisations they consider to be most representative and/​or knowledgeable in a particular policy domain and use these channels to guarantee citizen participation in the policy process. With this type of advisory body, organisations that have achieved a certain status in the policy process throughout specialisation convey their demands, but also their ideas and the information they consider relevant to governments. Thus, when analysing the role of NGOs as providers of political analysis and knowledge for decision-​making, it is essential to consider the extent to which they have access to or participate in such arrangements. This participation in interactions with social groups, albeit not entirely open, means that Spain resembles a so-​called corporatist model, in which the state plays a leading role in orchestrating the participation of such groups in the policy process (Molins López-​Rodó, 1996; Granados and Knoke, 2005). The policy analysis transferred to advisory bodies is thus conditioned by the access granted by the state. This implies that we should expect differences between the organisations represented in terms of participation (concentration versus fragmentation) and in terms of the policy issues that are discussed. Technical issues or those considered to be of national interest are discussed with social groups to a lesser extent than issues that are more closely aligned with the daily life of citizens, such as social policies. It can therefore be expected that access is not granted equally across issues or across organisations, since the delivery of policy analysis is more fragmented in social issues than in other issues. According to the Q-​Dem database, there are 170 active governmental advisory bodies in Spanish ministries (Chaqués-​Bonafont et al, 2014). NGOs participate as policy experts in more than 70 per cent of these, with a strong concentration 290

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in social policy advisory bodies (60 per cent of members are NGOs). Most of these (70 per cent) participate in only one advisory body and one session, while 5 per cent of NGOs are present in more than five advisory bodies and more than one session. These figures confirm the trend towards a greater concentration of resources in just a few NGOs, which also extends to access. At the same time, most NGOs are more active in policy analysis devoted to social issues (51 per cent), followed by environmental policies with almost 25 per cent, and a very small percentage are active in crime and justice, the economy, labour, and foreign aid (between 6 and 15 per cent). Concerning the NGOs that represent the most prominent source of policy analysis in the governmental arena with respect to their level of participation, a set of NGOs that do not follow the most widespread pattern of being present in just one advisory body can be distinguished. This is especially true of environmental policy issues, where Ecologistas en Acción, Greenpeace Spain, the World Wildlife Fund, and SEO Birdlife can be identified as being present in five or more advisory bodies. These belong to the so-​called ‘Big 5’ group (Jiménez, 2007). In social policy advisory bodies, four NGOs are also more active than the others: Cáritas, Cruz Roja, Fundación Once, and CERMI (Comité Español de Representantes de Personas con Discapacidad [Spanish Committee of Representatives of People with Disabilities]).6 There are important differences between these; while CERMI acts as a policy expert in five advisory bodies, the rest are present in two. Within social issues, it is also interesting to note that there are two umbrella organisations in education policy that have a slightly greater presence than the others; these are CEAPA (Confederación Española de Asociaciones de Padres y Madres de Alumnos [Spanish Confederation of Parents’ Associations]) and CANAE (Confederación Estatal de Asociaciones de Estudiantes [State Confederation of Student Associations]). Finally, consumer rights organisations also provide policy analysis in more than one advisory body; these are also umbrella organisations: UNAE (Unión Cívica Nacional de Consumidores y Amas de España [Spanish Civic Union of Consumers and Housewives]), FUCI (Federación de Usuarios Consumidores Independientes [Federation of Independent Consumer Users]) and UCE (Unión de Consumidores de España [Union of Consumers in Spain]).

Monitoring policy implementation and debating bills in parliament The Spanish parliament provides an interesting venue for NGOs and other social groups for at least two reasons: 1) they can set their agenda through parliamentary activities, particularly policy formulation and monitoring and, more importantly; 2) because of variations in the type of opportunities to influence policy decisions (Chaqués-​Bonafont and Muñoz Marquez, 2016). NGOs do not have free access, however, since they need to be invited by parliamentary committees to participate in hearings to discuss bills and monitor the implementation of policies. They are expected to provide relevant policy information based on their experience 291

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and knowledge, and in accordance with the regulations relating to parliamentary procedures (Figure 15.2). NGOs have been invited to give evidence in parliament more than any other group in the last two decades (Chaqués-​Bonafont and Muñoz Marquez, 2016; Lisi and Muñoz Marquez, 2019). A total of 1,015 NGOs were invited to provide information in parliamentary committees between 1996 and 2018, 67 per cent of them only once. Those that were invited between two and five times represent 28 per cent, while 5 per cent were invited more than five times and, in some case, as many as 60 times. The most frequently invited NGO to give evidence was the umbrella organisation is CERMI, which specialises in providing services for people with disabilities. Yet again we can see that a small subset of NGOs, mostly in the field of social policy, is recognised by policy-​makers as policy analysis providers. These are followed by NGOs specialising in health and the environment. An interest case is foreign aid, in which one single organisation, Oxfam Intermón, has had access during almost all legislatures and with more frequency than all other NGOs dedicated to development (see Table 15.A1 for more details). The testimony of NGOs focuses mainly on the implementation of policies, with the exception of the second government of José María Aznar of the Popular Party and the first mandate of socialist prime minister José Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (the seventh and eighth legislatures, respectively). This is illustrated in Figure 15.3, which reveals that more than 60 per cent of NGO hearings were devoted to monitoring the implementation of public policies. This was specially the case during the last two legislatures, which were atypical, especially the 11th legislature,7 which lasted 111 days, making it the shortest legislature of the current democratic period and the shortest since 1923. It is also clear that almost 90 per cent of NGO hearings were devoted to monitoring during the 12th legislature, which was unstable due to the vote of no confidence that led to the removal of prime minister Mariano Rajoy, who was replaced by socialist Pedro Sánchez. Policy analysis by NGOs is sought primarily in issues related to social policy such as education, health, family, and poverty, with some variations across legislatures. In addition, NGOs working with vulnerable groups such as children, people with disabilities, and immigrants are usually invited to detail shortcomings and present proposals to improve public policy implementation in those areas. Interestingly, NGOs specialising in environmental issues are invited proportionally less often to provide evidence on topics such as climate change and sustainable energy, but the proportion of NGOs invited over time has remained stable at around 10 per cent. Hearings on economic issues are also more stable, at between 15 and 25 per cent, with the exception of the last two legislatures in which virtually no NGOs discussed economic issues such as consumer rights and bank and credit policies. Some new issues have emerged in which NGOs are increasingly being invited to provide their expertise, including transparency and corruption, as well as discussions on the need for a register of interest groups. During the last legislature, there was also a debate on the reform of the public 292

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Figure 15.2: NGOs involved in hearings of parliamentary committees from 1996 to 2019 100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 VI VII 1996–2000 2000–04

VIII 2004–08

IX 2008–11

% Bills

X 2011-16

XI 2016–16

XII 2016–19

% Monitoring

Source: Own elaboration from Q-​dem database on interest groups parliamentary hearings in Spain

Figure 15.3: Policy issues in which NGOs participate in parliamentary hearings (percentage) 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

VI VII 1996–2000 2000–04 Social policy

Rights

VIII 2004–08

IX 2008–11

Basic state functions

X 2011–16

XI 2016–16

Environment and energy

XI 2016–19 Economy

Source: Own elaboration from Q-​dem database on governmental advisory bodies in Spain

security law during which the information and opinions of NGOs were sought. These included some national branches of international organisations, such as Amnesty International and Transparency International, which play an important role in delivering policy analysis to policy-​makers and the general public. As mentioned, NGOs represent the largest interest group in parliamentary hearings. However, there are important nuances; their knowledge and experience are in greater demand in relation to public policies that are already in place than in relation to future laws. Throughout the legislatures analysed, a small proportion of executive bills were discussed with NGOs in parliament; between 4 and 11 per cent over time. It is important to note that executive bills represent more than 80 per cent of laws passed by the Spanish parliament, and that proportion 293

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Table 15.2: NGOs involved in debates on bills across time, 1996–​2019 Legislature

Executive bills

VI (1996–​2000)

191

Bills discussed with NGOs

8

% Bills discussed with NGOs

VII (2000–​4)

172

10

6

VIII (2004–​8)

151

17

11

IX (2008–​11)

147

12

8

X (2011–​16)

163

17

10

XI (2016–​16)

0

0

XII (2016–​19)

49

5

4

10

Source: Developed by the authors from Q-​Dem databases on parliamentary hearings

is even higher during majority governments (Chaqués-​Bonafont et al, 2015). Table 15.2 shows the evolution of executive bills discussed with NGOs and reveals a significant increase; the proportion doubled between the sixth and 12th legislatures. NGOs were invited to discuss bills most frequently during the legislature of Rodríguez Zapatero (the 11th legislature). This increase may be related to different factors, some political in nature, such as closer connections between the parliamentarians of the governing party and the NGO; for example, Leire Pajín, the Minister for Foreign Affairs, was director and member of an NGO for development, Solidaridad Internacional, before becoming minister. This is not uncommon, as members of interest groups often have organisational links to political party members and activists who later go on to hold government positions (Chaqués-​Bonafont et al, 2021). This may also be due to the increased capacity and experience of NGOs, as mentioned in the first section; most NGOs were created during the 1980s and 1990s and had therefore accumulated policy analysis skills by the first legislatures of this century. Also important was the politicisation of rights issues during the first and second legislatures of socialist prime minister Zapatero (2004–​11), when a number of bills on women rights and same-​sex marriage were discussed. NGOs were also invited to discuss the elderly protection and care bill. The politicisation of various issues such as the housing eviction crisis that led to the reform of the mortgage loans law and discussion of the educational reform help explain, at least in part, why this trend remained unchanged in the 10th legislature (that of Rajoy, 2011–​ 16). Other highly politicised issues on which NGOs were invited to provide information were the transparency law and the law on violence against children. Concerning the NGOs that represent the most prominent source of policy analysis in the parliamentary arena with respect to their level of participation, a larger set of NGOs than in the governmental arena can be observed, which implies additional fragmentation but also consistency across issues. The first thing to highlight is that NGOs with the greatest presence in advisory bodies in both arenas are CERMI and the so-​called singular entities, that is, Cruz Roja, Cáritas, and ONCE. One might ask if a relationship exists between a greater 294

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capacity to develop policy analysis and a legal status that implies proximity to the state. Another NGO in the field of social policy that is involved in both arenas is the umbrella organisation for parents’ associations, CEAPA, which plays an active role in education policy. There is also a certain concurrence in environmental policy, with Ecologistas en Acción and Greenpeace present in both arenas. Other prominent NGOs in social policies are present in the parliamentary arena, however, specifically Save the Children and the Federación de Mujeres Progresistas (Federation of Progressive Women), which are recurrent actors that deliver policy analysis in legislative activities. However, when one explores the situation in greater depth, the fragmentation among the most highly sought NGOs as policy experts has increased over time. In the last three legislatures, issues involving just one major NGO (that is, one invited more often than the others) in parliamentary debates such as foreign aid, health, and trade and industry involved other NGOs. In the area of foreign aid, organisations other than Oxfam Intermón have frequently been invited, including CEAR (the Comisión Española de Ayuda al Refugiado [Spanish Committee for Refugee Aid]), Amnesty International (AI), the Red Cross, and Save the Children. In health, the Red Cross and CONCAPA (Confederación Católica Nacional de Padres de Familia y Padres de Alumnos [National Catholic Confederation of Parents and Parents of Students]) were invited during the 12th legislature in addition to the Fundación de Ayuda contra la Drogadicción (Drug Addiction Aid Foundation –​FAD). Finally, in the area of trade and industry, Greenpeace, AI, Save the Children, and Oxfam Intermón have been invited in addition to the Organización de Consumidores y Usuarios (Organisation of Consumers and Users –​OCU) (see Table 15.A1 in the appendix for a complete overview). With respect to the frequency with which NGOs provide policy analysis for different types of legislative initiatives, the 2015 interest group survey conducted by Q-​Dem offers information to shed light on this question in connection with debates on bills, drafting of questions, and amendments. Table 15.3 shows that 25 per cent of NGOs participated in debates on bills at least once a year, a high proportion when one considers that, in parliament at least, very few bills are discussed with NGOs; the highest figure across legislatures was 10 per cent. Fewer NGOs are involved in sending information for drafting questions posed

Table 15.3: How often NGOs deliver policy analysis related to parliamentary activities Frequency

Bill discussion

Writing questions

Amendments

Never

22.2

33.3

27.4

At least once a year

25.2

11.9

17.8

At least once every three months

3.7

3.7

4.4

At least once a month

0.7

0.5

0.7

Source: Developed by the authors from Q-​Dem’s 2015 interest group survey

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Table 15.4: Percentage of NGOs active as policy experts in the executive and parliamentary arenas Arena

Social policy

Environment

Crime and justice

Economy

Labour

Foreign aid

Executive advisory bodies

51.7

24.5

14.9

8.7

6.1

6.1

Parliamentary committees

26.3

7,5

3,5

18,7

5,6

4,3

Source: Developed by the authors from Q-​Dem’s databases on executive advisory bodies and parliamentary hearings

by parliamentary groups to the government and for amendments, with 11.9 per cent and 17.8 per cent participating at least once a year, respectively. In general, very few NGOs engage in these activities more frequently; fewer than 1 per cent deliver policy analysis in all of these parliamentary initiatives at least once a month, and fewer than 5 per cent do so at least once every three months. Finally, if we compare the parliamentary and governmental arenas, some interesting differences arise with respect to the policy issues in which NGOs play a more active role as policy experts. While the most important issues in both venues relate to social policy, more organisations are present in relation to crime and justice and environmental policies in advisory bodies than in parliamentary committees. Likewise, the second policy issue in which NGOs participate most as experts in parliament is the economy, while this represents the fourth most important issue in the governmental setting. Foreign aid and labour are the policy issues with the fewest NGOs, and are therefore areas in which just a few NGOs are concentrated. Table 15.4 provides a summary of this information.

Conclusion Despite the fact that some Spanish NGOs have a long history, their growth in terms of numbers and their consolidation as policy actors have only occurred during the last few decades. This has led to a delay in their incorporation as political actors, including their presence as policy advisors and, therefore, as policy analysis providers. The establishment of the welfare state and the transformation of the Spanish political system into a multilevel system have created a suitable context for their growth and institutionalisation. They are no longer invisible policy actors, but they present some handicaps with respect to their role as providers of policy analysis. Notwithstanding this consolidation in general terms, few have access to funds or economic resources, either private or public, and thus lack the capacity to develop policy analysis. This fact is also evident when analysing the policy sector level. For instance, in terms of the environment and development cooperation, the social policy sector with the highest number of NGOs present, small groups of NGOs –​almost like clubs –​concentrate economic resources and therefore have a greater capacity to recruit staff dedicated to policy analysis. In essence, 296

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a small number allocate continuous and daily resources to develop information for public policy analysis. The vast majority, mostly small NGOs, do not have specialised internal advocacy or reporting units. The responses of NGOs to the survey by Q-​Dem suggest that policy analysis activity is not a priority for most, with just 20 per cent saying that they devote efforts to fact-​driven policy analysis. The majority, more than 80 per cent in fact, indicated that they carry out awareness-​raising activities. Since awareness-​raising is based primarily on campaigns designed to frame issues and thus change people’s minds in accordance with certain values and principles concerning certain issues, these data suggest that most NGOs that carry out policy analysis are ideological driven rather than fact driven, even though some also have policy analysis and advocacy offices whose function is to submit reports to policy-​makers. By the same token, the general perception among NGOs is that the policy information they deliver is not taken into account by policy-​makers. A certain level of concentration in a few NGOs that act as policy advisers is also observed when analysing their presence as policy experts in the governmental and parliamentary arenas. For instance, we have shown that the presence of NGOs in governmental advisory bodies is concentrated, albeit not to a high degree, in issues such as foreign aid and labour. At the same time, we observed a high number of NGOs that were invited to give testimony in parliament only once, or that participated in only one session of one of the several advisory committees a ministry might have. With respect to the parliamentary arena, where NGOs represented the type of interest group most frequently invited, there was greater fragmentation in the participation of NGOs as policy experts. In this venue, the policy analysis they provide focuses mostly on the monitoring of public policy implementation rather than debates on new laws, which may indicate that policy-​ makers expect ideological-​driven rather than fact-​driven policy analysis from them; parliamentary hearings on the implementation of policies are more likely to focus on criticism of government performance in solving policy-​related problems. However, more research is required to gain a more systematic understanding of the methods NGOs use to develop policy analysis and to carry out a more effective assessment of the scope of their role in policy analysis.

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Appendix

Table 15.A1: NGOs most present in parliamentary committees by issue and legislature Legislature

Social policy

VI

Rights

Foreign aid

Environment, energy, and agriculture

Commerce and industry

Health

CERMI ONCE CEAR Cáritas AI Cruz Roja Save the Children CEAPA CONCAPA

OI

Ecologistas en Acción Greenpeace

OCU

FAD

VII

CERMI ONCE Cáritas Cruz Roja CEAPA CONCAPA

CEAR AI

OI

Ecologistas en Acción Greenpeace

OCU

FAD

VIII

CERMI ONCE Cruz Roja CEAPA CONCAPA

CEAR AI CONCAPA FMP

OI

Ecologistas en Acción Greenpeace

OCU

FAD

IX

CERMI ONCE Cáritas Cruz Roja Save the Children CEAPA

CEAR AI CONCAPA FMP

OI

Greenpeace

OCU

FAD

X

CERMI ONCE CEAR Cáritas CONCAPA Cruz Roja FMP Save the Children CEAPA CONCAPA FMP

OI

Ecologistas en Acción Greenpeace OCU

OCU

FAD

XI

CERMI ONCE CEAPA CONCAPA

CEAR

Ecologistas en Acción Greenpeace

XII

CERMI ONCE Cáritas Cruz Roja CEAPA CONCAPA Save the Children

AI Cruz Roja Save the Children CEAR

Ecologistas en Acción Greenpeace OI

OCU Greenpeace AI Save the Children CEAR OI

FAD Cruz Roja CONCAPA

CERMI ONCE AI Save the Children FMP

Crime and justice

CERMI AI Save the Children CEAR FMP

CERMI AI Cáritas

Note: Comité Español de Representantes de Personas con Discapacidad (CERMI); Organización Nacional de Ciegos Españoles (ONCE); Confederación Católica Nacional de Padres de Familia y Padres de Alumnos (CONCAPA); Confederación Española de Asociaciones de Padres y Madres de Alumnos (CEAPA); Amnistía Internacional (AI); Comisión Española de Ayuda al Refugiado (CEAR); Oxfam Intermón (OI); Organización de Consumidores y Usuarios (OCU); Fundación de Ayuda contra la Drogadicción (FAD).

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Notes 1

2 3

4

5

6

7

Given the lack of a theoretical consensus on the number and definition of NGOs, some prior clarifications are needed. First, NGOs are considered to be all not-​for-​profit citizen organisations, including citizen platforms and umbrella organisations, with the exception of professional sports clubs and business foundations. Also excluded are not-​for-​profit trade unions and professional associations that represent only the interests of their profession or economic activity. See, for instance, Baumgartner and Leech (1998); Muñoz Marquez (2013); Baroni et al (2014). More information on these databases is available from https://​q-​dem.com/​ (accessed 17 October 2021). The report is based on a survey of a representative sample of entities of social action NGOs whose sample framework is the Directory of the Third Sector of Social Action (Plataforma de Acción Social, 2020), which includes current contact information for more than 7,200 entities used for the survey. A total of 1,027 NGOs participated in the survey. During Francoism, civil society organisations were subordinated to the state, which eliminated any form of collective action that contradicted its principles. Thus, their proliferation was not encouraged and their existence was restricted primarily to the protection of the various institutions of the Catholic Church. The state maintained a policy of proscription that led to an excessive rise in the costs of collective action (Bloodgood, 2010). Very few associations were allowed, and those that existed included ONCE (Organización Nacional de Ciegos de España), Cáritas and Cruz Roja, which are still considered to be ‘singular’ organisations, given their specific legal status. ONCE is a private non-​profit organisation, but it is not an association or foundation, and it is regulated as a public corporation, which means it has specific functions delegated by the government; Cruz Roja is a non-​profit organisation, but by law it is protected by the state; and Cáritas is the official organisation of the Catholic Church in Spain for social action, and belongs to the Spanish Episcopal Conference (SEC). It is important to note that this figure is higher than that reported by the Plataforma de ONGs de Acción Social, which points out that 17 per cent of the organisations that participated in its survey belong to European and/​or international organisations. CERMI is an umbrella organisation made up of the main national organisations for people with disabilities, several sectoral action entities, and the 19 platforms corresponding to each of Spain’s autonomous communities and cities, all of which, in turn, bring together more than 8,000 associations and entities. The organisation was founded by ONCE and other umbrella organisations such as the Confederación Española de Personas con Discapacidad Física (COCEMFE); Confederación Española de Organizaciones a favor de las Personas con Discapacidad Intelectual (FEAPS); Confederación Estatal de Personas Sordas (CNSE); Confederación Española de Familias de Personas Sordas (FIAPAS); and Federación Española de Asociaciones de Atención a las Personas con Parálisis Cerebral (ASPACE). In 2016, two new parties, Ciudadanos and Podemos, entered parliament and ended Spain’s de facto two-​party system by creating a multi-​party parliament. This led to a blockade that prevented the inauguration of a new prime minister and extended the first government of Mariano Rajoy (the People’s Party); this explains why there was no legislative proposal to discuss.

References Albareda, A. (2018) ‘Connecting society and policymakers? Conceptualizing and measuring the capacity of civil society organizations to act as transmission belts’, Voluntas, The International Journal of the Third Sector, 29: 1216–​32. Ariño, A. (2008) ‘Articulación del tercer sector en España’, Revista española del tercer sector, 10: 107–​32.

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Baroni, L., Carroll, B., William Chalmers, A., Muñoz Marquez, L., and Rasmussen, A. (2014) ‘Defining and classifying interest groups’, Interest Groups and Advocacy, 3: 141–​59. Baumgartner, F.R. and Leech, B.L. (1998) Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Binderkrantz, A.S., Christiansen, P.M., and Pedersen, H.H. (2015) ‘Interest group access to the bureaucracy, parliament, and the media’, Governance, 28(1): 95–​112. Bloodgood, E. (2010) ‘Institutional environment and the organization of advocacy NGOs in the OECD’, in A. Prakash and M.A. Gugerty (eds) Advocacy Organizations and Collective Action, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp 91–​129. Chalmers, A.W. (2013) ‘Trading information for access: Informational lobbying strategies and interest group access to the European Union’, Journal of European Public Policy, 20(1): 39–​58. Chaqués-​Bonafont, L. (2004) Redes de políticas públicas, Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas. Chaqués-​Bonafont, L. and Muñoz Marquez, L.M. (2016) ‘Explaining interest group access to parliamentary committees’, West European Politics, 39(6): 1276–​98. Chaqués-​Bonafont, L., Muñoz Marquez, L., and Palau, A. (2014) ‘Hiding interest organizations? The impact of regulation on interest groups’ representation at the governmental arena’, unpublished manuscript, presented at the ECPR General Conference, Salamanca. Chaqués-​Bonafont, L., Palau, A.M., and Baumgartner, F.R. (2015) Agenda Dynamics in Spain, London: Palgrave Macmillan. Chaqués-​Bonafont, L., Cristancho, C., Muñoz Marquez, L., and Rincón, L. (2021) ‘The contingent character of interest groups–​political parties’ interaction’, Journal of Public Policy, 41(3): 440–​61. De Bruycker, I. (2016) ‘Pressure and expertise: Explaining the information supply of interest groups in EU legislative lobbying’, Journal of Common Market Studies, 54(3): 599–​616. Devetak, R. and Higgott, R. (1999) ‘Justice unbound? Globalization, states and the transformation of the social bond’, International Affairs, 75(3): 483–​98. Dür, A. and Mateo, G. (2013) ‘Gaining access or going public? Interest group strategies in five European countries’, European Journal of Political Research, 52(5): 660–​86. Flöthe, L. (2020) ‘Representation through information? When and why interest groups inform policymakers about public preferences’, Journal of European Public Policy, 27(4): 528–​46. Fraussen, B. (2014) ‘The visible hand of the state: On the organizational development of interest groups’, Public Administration, 92(2): 406–​21. Fraussen, B., Beyers, J. and Donas, T. (2015) ‘The expanding core and varying degrees of insiderness: Institutionalised interest group access to advisory councils. Political Studies, 63(3): 569–​88. 300

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García Delgado, J.L. and Jiménez, J.C. (2004) Las cuentas de la economía social. El tercer sector en España, Madrid: Civitas. Giner, S. and Montagut, T. (2005) ‘Cosa pública, cosa privada: hacia una teoría del Tercer Sector’, in J.L. García Delgado (ed) La economía social en España, Madrid: Fundación ONCE, pp 43–​54. Granados, F.J. and Knoke, D. (2005) ‘Organized interest groups and policy networks’, in T. Janoski, R.R. Alford, A.M. Hicks, and M.A. Schwartz (eds) Handbook of Political Sociology: States, Civil Societies, and Globalization, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp 287–​309. Hudson, A. (2001) ‘NGOs’ transnational advocacy networks: From “legitimacy” to “political responsibility”?’, Global Networks, 1(4): 331–​52. Jiménez, M. (2007) ‘The environmental movement in Spain: A growing force of contention’, South European Society & Politics, 12(3): 359–​78. Jordana, J. (2006) ‘La acción colectiva y las asociaciones de intereses’, in M. Caminal (ed) Manual de Ciencia Política, Madrid: Tecnos, pp 313–​14. Kanol, D. (2020) ‘Interest groups and lobbying in political executives’, in R.B. Andeweg, R. Elgie, L. Helms, J. Kaarbo, and F. Müller-​Rommel (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Political Executives, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp 608–​26. Linz, J. (1981) ‘A century of politics and interests in Spain’, in S. Berger (ed) Organizing Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism and the Transformation of Politics, Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, pp 365–​415. Linz, J. and Stepan, A. (1996) Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-​communist Europe, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Lisi, M. and Muñoz Marquez, L.M. (2019) ‘Interest groups in the Iberian parliaments’, in C. Leston-​Bandeira and J.M. Fernandes (eds) The Iberian Legislatures in Comparative Perspective, London: Routledge, pp 130–​48. Marbán, V. and Rodríguez, G. (2006) ‘Estado de bienestar y tercer sector social en España. El estado de la investigación social’, Revista de Economía Pública, Social y Cooperativa, 56: 117–​39. Marbán, V., Pérez, M., and Rodríguez, G. (2020) ‘Current challenges and prospective analysis of the third sector of social action (TSSA) in Spain’, Revista de Economía Pública, Social y Cooperativa, 98: 95–​126. Marcuello, C. (2007) Capital social y organizaciones no lucrativas en España: El caso de las ONGD, Madrid: Fundación BBVA. Molins López-​Rodó, J.M. (1996) ‘El Estado, el interés general y los grupos de interés’, Gestión y análisis de políticas públicas, 5–​6: 189–​92. Moreno, L. (ed.) (1995) El Estado del bienestar en la Europa del sur, Madrid: CSIC Press. Mota, F. (1999) ‘La realidad asociativa en España’, in J. Subirats (ed) Existe sociedad civil en España. Responsabilidades colectivas y valores públicos, Madrid: Fundación Encuentro, pp 37–​64.

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Muñoz Marquez, L. (2013) ‘Treinta años de cooperación al desarrollo en España: análisis de la continuidad y cambio en las políticas públicas’, Revista Mexicana de Análisis Político y Administración Pública, 2(2): 83–​111. Muñoz Marquez, L. (2016a) ‘El impacto de la regulación estatal en las ONG de desarrollo en España’, Revista de Estudios Políticos, 171: 193–​222. Muñoz Marquez, L. (2016b) ‘The relevance of organizational structure to NGOs’ approaches to the policy process’, Voluntas: International Journal of Voluntary and Nonprofit Organizations, 27(1): 465–​86. Pérez Yruela, M. (2015) ‘El Tercer Sector: economía social y entidades no lucrativas’, in C. Torres Albero (ed) España 2015. Situación social, Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas, pp 888–​900. Pérez Yruela, M. and Giner, S. (eds) (1988) El corporatismo en España, Barcelona: Ariel. Pérez-​Díaz, V. and López-​Novo, J.P. (2003) El tercer sector social en España, Madrid: Ministerio de trabajo y asuntos sociales. Plataforma de Acción Social (2020) El tercer sector de acción social en España 2019. Nuevos horizontes para un contexto sociopolítico, Madrid: Ministerio de Sanidad, Consumo y Bienestar Social. Revilla, M. (ed) (2002) Las ONG y la política: detalles de una relación, Madrid: Ediciones Istmo. Rodríguez Cabrero, G. (2015) ‘Avances, limitaciones y retos del Tercer Sector de Acción Social en España’, Revista Española del Tercer Sector, 30: 75–​97. Ruiz Olabuénaga, J.I. (ed.) (2006) El sector no lucrativo en España: una visión reciente, Madrid: Fundacion BBVA. Salamon, L.M. and Sokolowski, W. (2018) ‘The size and composition of the European third sector’, in B. Enjolras, L.M. Salamon, K.H. Sivesind and A. Zimmer (eds) The Third Sector as a Renewable Resource for Europe, Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, pp 49–​94. Torfing, J. (2020) ‘Governance through civil society’, in Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics. Available from: https://​oxfor​dre.com/​polit​ics/​view/​ 10.1093/a​ crefo ​ re/9​ 780190​ 2286​ 37.001.0001/a​ crefo ​ re-9​ 780190​ 2286​ 37-e​ -1​ 415 [Accessed 25 June 2021]. Zurdo Alaguero, Á. (2003) ‘Voluntariado y estructura social: funciones sociales y límites’, in G. Rodríguez Cabrero (ed) Las entidades voluntarias de acción social en España. Informe General, Madrid: Fundación FOESSA and Caritas, pp 213–​86.

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SIXTEEN

Think tanks and policy analysis Jordi Bacaria

Introduction This chapter uses to various indicators to examine the capacity of Spanish think tanks to carry out policy analysis. The goal of think tanks, as most think tanks explicitly state on their own websites, is to influence society. This purpose can be achieved both directly, by influencing government actions, and indirectly, by generating opinion in civil society. Think tanks do not have a long tradition in Spain. Taking information from various sources, we have registered a total of 87 organisations, which range from independent think tanks to those linked to political parties and government-​ affiliated think tanks (at the national or regional levels). More than half were founded in the last 30 years. Older think tanks did not consider themselves to be think tanks at the time of their establishment, but rather information centres (CIDOB, 1973), research centres (Fundación Ortega y Gasset, 1978), business associations (Institute of Economic Studies, 1979), or study centres (Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies, 1970). The first think tank in Spain, according to its founding principles, was the ‘Cercle d’Economia’ (Economics Circle, 1950). It defines itself as ‘a civic association that seeks to improve the quality of public debate through the publication of independent opinion on the main challenges that determine economic, social and political progress’.1 Currently, the Circle is comprised of 1,250 members and 105 collaborating entities, and is a plural and independent organisation. It is financed by contributions from its partners and collaborating entities. The location of think tanks also largely determines their actions, as it is highly important to interact with political elites. In this sense, a think tank’s location depends largely on its objectives and the fact that being based in major cities attracts talent that can develop a think tank’s activities. Of the 87 Spanish think tanks we identified, 46 are based in Madrid, 22 are based in Barcelona, and the remaining 19 are located in other cities in Spain. If we exclude think tanks affiliated with political parties, a similar proportion emerges. In both cases, more than half of all Spanish think tanks are based in Madrid. The chapter is organised as follows: the following section summarises the typology of think tanks. The third section presents a proposal for classifying think tanks in Spain on the basis of several indicators. The transparency and independence of think tanks are explained in the fourth section. The fifth section 303

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focuses on how think tanks influence politicians and policies. The sixth section summarises 12 think tank case studies. The seventh section concludes the chapter.

Definition and typology of think tanks Think tanks, according to the classic article by Weaver (1989), fall into one of three categories: ‘universities without students’, which are strongly research-​ oriented organisations; contract research organisations that carry out specific research; and ‘advocacy tanks’, or organisations that support and defend policies which are often linked to political parties or lobbyists. According to James McGann (2007), think tanks are an integral part of civil society and serve as catalysts for ideas and actions in both new and consolidated democracies. They are also research centres which often serve as bridges between the academic community and public administration. By becoming independent voices, they transform political debate into language which is understandable and accessible to both politicians and the general public. Think tanks produce ideas and use them to attempt to influence political power and society. They bring together groups of experts for reflection and dissemination of research on various topics such as politics, economics, international relations, strategy, outlook, and culture. Their objective in policy analysis is that their analysis be practically applied to policy. Central to the operation of think tanks is their roles as bridges, facilitating constant communication between policy-​makers, political actors, and stakeholders. In his 2020 Global Go To Think Tank Index report, McGann proposes seven categories of think tank affiliations: Autonomous and Independent; Quasi-​ Independent; Government Affiliated; Quasi-​Governmental; University Affiliated; Political Party Affiliated; and Corporate (for profit). For the sake of simplicity, we classify think tanks into six categories in our work: 1) Independent Boards; 2) Government-​Affiliated 3) University-​Affiliated; 4) Partisan; 5) Corporate (non-​profit); and 6) International Organisations (this category includes the Spanish branches of international think tanks). Government-​Affiliated think tanks are part of the formal structure of a government. Their board members are appointed by the national executive and their budgets come entirely or partially from public budgets. University-​Affiliated think tanks are research centres that belong to or are attached to universities. Partisan think tanks are private, non-​profit think tanks that promote policies linked to particular ideologies and do not belong to the category (which we have excluded from our analysis here) of think tanks which are formally affiliated with political parties (see Chapter 12, this volume). Corporations (non-​profit) operate as public policy research organisations and are funded by corporations that sit on their boards. They are mostly autonomous in their operations. International Organisations are think tanks which are affiliated with international groups or are networks created by think tanks (Euromesco or RIBEI) which can be involved in advocacy tasks, or in international groups for policy analysis. 304

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Our categories fall between those formulated by McGann and the simpler ones devised by Weaver (1989) in his classification of ‘universities without students’, contract researchers, and advocacy tanks. Our purpose in this chapter is to understand what think tanks produce, how they produce it, and what impact they have. First of all, as a necessary condition, think tanks must be centres for research, although not all research centres are think tanks. Think tanks serve as bridges between the academic community and public administration, but they cannot be classified as think tanks unless serving as a bridge is a strategic objective on their part. Think tanks are notably characterised by being independent voices that transform political debate into language that is comprehensible and accessible to both politicians and the general public.

Think tanks in Spain: a classification Here, we identify Spanish think tanks according to our six categories. We have used various available sources to compile a list of think tanks. There are many proposals about think tanks in Spain, and they do not coincide on how many of these entities exist. Gonzalez-​Capitel and Ponsa (2017) identify 47 think tanks (the purpose of their study is to analyse the transparency of these organisations), some of which have close ties to political parties. Marta Tello (2008) provides a list and precise profile of 30 think tanks, most of which are linked to partisan associations, governments, and political parties. Barberá and Arregui (2011) provide an analysis of the political influence of five think tanks. The Open Think Tank Directory (On Think Tanks) offers profiles of 31 think tanks (2020)2 with relevant and updated information. The 2020 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report by the Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program (TTCSP) of the University of Pennsylvania, reports 95 Spanish think tanks (22 of which are top-​ ranked among global think tanks). However, it is difficult to obtain homogeneous and comparative information about all of them. In the first step of our work, we have selected those organisations that can carry out policy analysis and exert some influence on public policy. We utilise indicators on communication (followers on Twitter), impact (TTCSP and Transparify rankings of top think tanks), and the number of a think tank’s personnel as a proxy for assessing a think tank’s capacity for policy analysis. We furthermore consider mentions in the media, articles, and citations in Google Scholar. However, this information cannot always be provided accurately or for all think tanks. We do not include think tanks in our analysis that are affiliated with political parties or pressure groups which can make use of other means of influence. Excluding political parties and pressure groups, then, the think tanks included in our ranking fulfil the condition of ‘bridges’ indicated by McGann. Our list selects 53 think tanks (see Annex), and as general criteria requires that they be independent organisations with more than ten researchers, which have the capacity for dissemination, public proposals for policies, and international impact. 305

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These indicators are realistic despite the difficulties in updating and harmonising data and having it for all cases. However, by combining different indicators of visibility, we can measure the potential impact of these organisations on civil society as a proxy for influence in public policies. Finally, to provide a more qualitative approach, we include a detailed discussion on 12 relevant cases of Spanish think tanks.

Financial transparency of think tanks The impact of think tanks and their ability to influence policy is closely related to their funding. As Andy Williamson stated in a 2012 post in his website, ‘Quite simply: if you’re trying to influence policy, I want to know who’s trying to influence you!’3 Despite the fact that most think tanks declare themselves to be independent, the sources of their funding must be considered in order to assess their actual levels of independence. Through this lens, transparency indicators for financial resources used here rank Spanish think tanks poorly at the national level and even worse at the international level. The Transparify organisation provides a global rating of their financial transparency. Transparify finds out whether think tanks provide information on who funds them and how much they receive from each source. The Spanish Think Tank Observatory (STTO) carries out a similar task with Spanish think tanks. Transparify and STTO use the same star rating system, taking into account the information published on the websites of think tanks. Think tanks rated five out of five stars are highly transparent about who funds them. Those with four stars are broadly transparent (they do not disclose precise amounts but instead group their donors into several funding brackets). Think tanks with zero stars or one star have highly opaque funding, as they fail to disclose even the names of some or all of their donors. Only one Spanish think tank selected in our analyses scores the maximum of five stars on the 2018 Transparify rating and four on the 2016 STTO rating. Two score five stars for the STTO, five score four stars, one scores three stars, one scores two stars, six score one star, and ten score zero stars. In terms of transparency, think tanks with five and four stars deserve attention. Transparify (2018) awards CIDOB 5 stars, and STTO gives ECODES and CIRCULO de Empresarios a rating of five. The STTO gave four stars to CIDOB, the Elcano Royal Institute, COTEC, the Fundación Alternativas, the Fundació Catalunya Europa, and the Fundación Manuel Giménez Abad. In total, only eight Spanish think tanks are rated Highly Transparent and Broadly Transparent. The relationship of Spanish think tanks with large corporations (benchmarked on the ‘IBEX-​35’ Spanish Exchange Index) is a critical point for identifying the political influence exerted by think tanks linked to these corporations, particularly on economic policies, since some think tanks in this field act more as pressure groups or lobbies. However, it is not always possible to obtain this information, since few Spanish think tanks achieve high transparency ratings. We find that in 306

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particular, think tanks affiliated with political parties have the worst transparency ratings. As Gonzalez-​Capitel and Ponsa (2017: 28) point out, political parties established by private foundations continue to be the think tanks that present the worst transparency score, with a global average of 0.8 stars out of 5. However, transparency among think tanks has improved in recent years. As Gonzalez-​ Capitel and Ponsa (2017) note, an elite section of think tanks raise their scores year after year and show great interest in improving their transparency. This effort by think tanks to improve transparency is seen in the evaluation that Spanish think tanks were twice as transparent in 2016 as they had been in 2014. The average transparency score has risen from 0.7 to 1.4 stars out of a maximum of 5. Many of the transparency problems of think tanks are concentrated in the foundations of political parties, which we have not analysed here. With regards to the rest, the conclusions drawn by Gonzalez-​Capitel and Ponsa (2017) reflect progress, since, in the context of a highly competitive market for ideas in which organisations are increasingly forced to compete for resources, transparency represents added value. Donors will invest earlier in think tanks that present transparent management models where it is clear how allocated resources will be used. Changes in legislation on the transparency of public institutions also oblige transparency in think tanks. However, private donations to certain think tanks are not reflected on the websites of the think tanks which receive them. Furthermore, competition for resources necessarily represents increased competition for prestige, which translates into the adoption of codes of ethics, best practices, and governance sometimes demanded by donors and contractors. As Gonzalez-​Capitel and Ponsa point out, it is not by chance that some of the institutions which show the most interest in transparent management are those which occupy the highest positions in international rankings of think tanks. In the specific case of Spanish think tanks and their financial backers, think tanks have diverse sources of funding. Of the 12 case studies we present at the end of this chapter, only nine think tanks provide information on their budgets. Some refer to the sources of their private donations but do not present budgets. Think tanks which receive public subsidies have a greater obligation to report the sources of their funding, although this cannot always be determined when think tanks do not disclose precise amounts. In the case of corporate think tanks, there is no doubt that their finances come from their corporations. There is still a lack of transparency as to the sources of funding for Spanish think tanks. Positively, however, transparency in this area is increasing as time progresses.

Influence of Spanish think tanks on politics and policy Think tanks and research organisations certainly seek to influence policy ideas and decisions; indeed, this goal is key to the very fabric of these organisations. The ways they actually achieve impact or measure progress along these lines, however, remain unclear and underexplored. McGann’s (2007) research has focused on developing a comprehensive assessment tool for evaluating the impact of think 307

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tanks. The impetus for this research was in part the apparent confusion that exists regarding the differences between outputs and impacts. Outputs, however, are not the only way to measure impact. Impact depends on concrete strategies for setting policy-​oriented goals and shaping public opinion. Especially in Spain, think tanks need tools and tangible metrics to drive and evaluate success. This lack of information makes it difficult to draw comparison between Spanish think tanks. McGann (2021) suggests that diverse metrics work as catalysts for a discussion on how to effectively measure the impact of think tanks and help clarify the distinction between outputs and impacts. There are four types of indicators for observing the quality of policy analysis and its impact: 1) quality of human resources; 2) utilisation as use of the media to gain reputation; 3) outputs such as the number and quality of publications; and 4) the impact of their recommendations adopted by policy-​makers and civil society. Alternatively, other authors such as Selee (2013), Barberá and Arregui (2011), and Gonzalez-​Capitel (2016) have applied the interview method. In particular, Barberá and Arregui conclude that think tanks are increasingly influential at different levels of the political process, on which they exert direct impact thanks to the contacts they have with the different actors in the process. The authors point to the more-​or-​less permanent contact that think tanks maintain with elites as a means they have of exerting influence. However, this is not always the case, particularly when think tanks are closer to civil society than they are to political power or elites and seek to be independent voices. Ponsa (2016) notes that think tanks actively participate in epistemic or political communities. These refer to networks of experts who, by virtue of their experience and competence, are invited to participate in debates or meetings with public decision-​makers. Think tanks are considered to be the main institutions of these communities because of their essential mission in formulating public policies. Research carried out by think tanks has greater applicability and specificity than that carried out by university bodies. Likewise, think tanks are better aware than university bodies of the limits of legislators (policy-​makers) and of the mechanisms and dynamics of the administrative state. These characteristics make think tanks important organisations in the designing and planning of public policies, and therefore strategic actors in expanded intelligence communities. However, the critical element of think tanks is not only what they do and how they do it: according to their goals, the key nowadays is how to continue to have effective impact on policy and stakeholders. Present-​day think tanks are concerned with how to be innovative in order to influence and enter into a very competitive market of ideas in which the costs of both dissemination through social networks and new technologies have fallen for all people. This also applies to the task of neutralising dis-​information and fake news. People and groups who previously faced strong entry barriers in disseminating ideas and opinions now find relative ease in entering the market of ideas, whereas prestigious organisations that are excessively large and inflexible find difficulties in doing so. In this market, groups that no longer face strong entry barriers compete 308

Think tanks and policy analysis

against classical think tanks, advocacy tanks, private consultants, and bloggers (among others) to attract the attention of more-​or-​less-​interested political and public decision-​makers who have simultaneously seen their own costs of obtaining information decrease. This also has consequences on the financing of think tanks and their viability. In addition to producing rigorous work and the ability to offer credibility, modern think tanks must also incorporate flexible communication strategies (based on new information and communication technologies) into their production. Resource indicators are the ability to recruit and retain leading scholars and analysts; the level, quality, and stability of financial support. In this chapter, we use the size of think tanks’ permanent staff. Although in many cases it might be relevant to compare numbers of researchers, associates, or non-​resident fellows between think tanks, not enough information exists to draw contrasts. The caveat concerning our list of think tanks is that we do not have information on staff for all the organisations listed. The think tanks with the greatest numbers of employees are CREAF (150), IH Cantabria (135), and IMDEA (84). These are centres associated with universities or public administration and they focus on laboratory research on environmental issues. Although ISGlobal is the largest organisation, most of its 422-​employee staff are in research and many are associated with health centres and universities in Barcelona and the rest of the world. The 16-​employee Policy and Development team at ISGlobal is the think tank’s communication team. The rest of the think tanks examined here are much smaller by comparison. Those with larger staffs include the Elcano Royal Institute (69), CIDOB (44), FEDEA (40), the Institute of Public Goods and Policies (45), ECODES (34), PoliticalWatch (30), IGADI (30), IEMED (24), FUNCAS (22), CEIGRAM (22), Club de Madrid (20), and the Fundación Alternativas (15). In short, only 12 think tanks in Spain are large enough to be considered relevant in research resources, communication, and managing projects, and the ability to recruit and retain leading scholars. Regarding indicators of utilisation as reputation, the information obtained is very uneven. We have built this ranking based on the number of Twitter followers that each think tank has. This information is available from most think tanks even though it varies greatly on a daily basis. Thirteen think tanks have more than 10,000 followers. The first is the Carolina Foundation (government-​affiliated), with 123,300 followers. This high number of followers is explained due to the fact that part of their activities is to offer grants to students. They are followed by Elcano Royal Institute (55,100), Action Against Hunger (Accion Contra el Hambre) (54,500) a Spanish branch of an international NGO (advocacy) and Fundación COTEC para la Innovacion (42,900) and Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies (41,100) (see annex for detailed results). A caveat to this is that the number of followers that think tanks have on Twitter increases daily (data obtained at the end of March 2021). Planells-​Artigot (2017) uses media mentions to understand the influence of think tanks. However, he does not investigate all Spanish think tanks. The 309

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think tanks most cited in the media during the period studied (2012–​16), using total mentions in online newspapers, are FAES (380 mentions), FEDEA (166 mentions), and the Elcano Royal Institute (144 mentions), followed by Fundación Alternativas (84 mentions) and CIDOB (39 mentions). We update this information with the data from the websites of these organisations (2019–​20). Once again, we must make special mention of ISGlobal: due to the COVID-​ 19 pandemic, it has had a prominent presence in Spanish media, especially on Spanish television. Although this pandemic is a non-​recurring event, its economic and social impact will last over time: the pandemic has taken place in 2020 and 2021, and has been at the centre of media debate. For this reason, not only think tanks specialised in health, such as ISGlobal, but most outstanding think tanks in the field of economics and international relations have dedicated a significant part of their resources to policy analysis. In any case, as Planells-​Artigot points out, the strategy on the part of think tanks of appearing in media (articles, interviews, opinion columns, TV) is very important to their ability to influence political decisions and citizens. Concerning output indicators, detailed information is required for all think tanks that is not available or harmonised on their websites. On the other hand, some think tanks provide this information extensively. For this reason, we took two indicators. Documents produced about the COVID-​19 pandemic and the quality of papers in indexed journals are a sample of impact and know-​how, given the cost of producing such outputs. At the end of 2020, the greatest number of documents about COVID-​19 had been produced by CIDOB (158), ISGlobal (124), Fundación Innovación Bankinter (110), the Elcano Royal Institute (80), FEDEA (49), Action Against Hunger (48), CREAF (37), IECAH (31), the Fundación Alternativas (23), Cercle d’Economia (12), and GRAIN (11). Another output indicator is the journals in international scientific rankings. Only eight think tanks publish their journals: these are CIDOB, FOM, FEDEA, FUNCAS, IECAH, IGADI, UNISCI, and the Institute of Economic Studies. Finally, as impact indicators, we took into account citations on Google Scholar, the top-​ranked think tanks in Global Go to Think Tank Index Report 2020, and awards in transparency (Transparify and Spanish Think Tank Observatory). Articles and citations featured on Google Scholar are a proxy for producing policy analysis. Because Google Scholar includes citations (cited by), related articles, and other types of research, think tanks can have a large number of search results well above their number of actual publications. However, this is not a problem if Google Scholar is used only as an impact proxy for comparing different think tanks. On the other hand, an institution’s age might explain an accumulation of articles. This may be the case with CIDOB, which has 31,500 results. The think tanks with the most results are Elcano Royal Institute (25,400), FEDEA (13,900), and FUNCAS (11,600). In any case, two think tanks specialised in international relations and two specialised in economics, neither linked to universities, are the think tanks that accumulate the most results. Think tanks affiliated with universities are more difficult to include in this type of indicator. This is the case, 310

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among others, with the Ortega y Gasset-​Gregorio Marañón Foundation (FOM), or ISGlobal, which work in the health field. Both were founded in 2010 as the results of mergers of other institutions. International impacts depend on the areas of interest of think tanks and the scope of their production. Publishing in the Spanish language is an advantage in that analysis produced by Spanish think tanks may have a following in Latin America. A common language is also an opportunity for forming links between think tanks from separate regions. The Ibero-​American Network for International Studies (RIBEI), founded in Buenos Aires in 2010 under the initiative of the Elcano Royal Institute, is a network of research and analysis centered on international relations with a focus on Latin America. Their 45 members are Spanish, Portuguese, and Latin American think tanks. On the other hand, think tanks that translate their publications into English have a higher impact abroad, both with stakeholders and general readers, although this depends on publications dealing with topics that appeal to readers and experts. When think tank websites are presented in English (even if their documents are not translated), non-​Anglophones can understand their objectives and levels of transparency. If documents are not translated, think tanks are unlikely to have much impact, but an English website may still help to gain international prestige. This prestige is a concern for think tanks in improving policy analysis and influencing policy decisions.

Major Spanish think tanks Which Spanish think tanks have the capacity to analyse and influence policy? Here we present 12 cases that concern the role of the members of think tank boards of trustees. From the initial list of 53, we set aside think tanks affiliated with governments, universities, and pressure groups. We furthermore excluded NGOs, advocacy think tanks, international networks, domestic branches of international organisations, think tanks whose websites do not contain information about their boards, think tanks with no impact on the international level (based on the Think Tank Index Report and Transparify ratings), and think tanks with less than 5,000 followers on Twitter. To determine the scope of think tank policy analysis and to have a homogeneous comparison, we grouped the selected think tanks into four main groups: • Economic Policy and Innovation • Foreign Policy and International Affairs • Partisans • Specialised ‘boutique think tanks’ For every think tank, we analyse the affiliation of members of their boards of trustees, examining their links with politicians, corporations, elites (diplomats, 311

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former ministers, and deputy ministers), and civil society (foundations, academics, labour unions). For example, a representation of the links between think tanks and economic power would be board members belonging to corporations of IBEX 35, a market capitalisation-​weighted index comprised of the 35 most liquid Spanish stocks traded. Where such information was available, we also incorporate media impact, documents published per year (the last data of their 2019 or 2020 websites), and followers on Twitter (updated at the end of March 2021). We also examine the gender composition of the boards of these think tanks. • Economic Policy and Innovation. In this group of four outstanding Spanish think tanks, two are focused on innovation and two on economics. They are characterised by their links with large businesses and financial corporations. They have few direct political links and few links with civil society, and their ability to carry out policy analysis derives from the prestige of both their staff and academic collaborators. Their direct relationships with political elites give them potential influence on politics. Being non-​profit foundations, these think tanks do not act as pressure groups but produce policy analysis for their pressure groups on issues that are on the economic policy agenda of the moment (pensions, labour reform, impact of the COVID-​19 pandemic, innovation, etc.). Fundación COTEC para la Innovacion (COTEC) is a corporate non-​profit. It serves as an R+​D+​I observatory in Spain and provides analysis and advice on innovation, technology, and economics. The King of Spain is the honorary president of the COTEC board of trustees. There is no information about the members of COTEC’s board of trustees on its website, only the names of firms and institutional members represented on the board. COTEC has political relationships with seventeen regions and local governments, as well as corporate links with sixteen IBEX-​35 firms and 55 other corporations. With regard to elites, one former minister and a cousin of the former King of Spain are represented among COTEC’s founders. Six board members belong to civil society. In this group, COTEC has the highest number of followers on Twitter (42,900). Its media impact is 5,890 mentions (the second-​highest in the group) and it published ten documents in the reference year. Considering this data, COTEC appears to be the most powerful Spanish think tank carrying out policy analysis in innovation and in terms of its capacity to influence policy. Fundación Innovacion Bankinter is corporate non-​profit and belongs to Bankinter. Its Future Trends Forum is an international and multidisciplinary think tank focused on innovation. Its Board of Trustees is independent and includes businesspeople, entrepreneurs, high-​level public officials, and scholars. It has no political or elite links and has one link with IBEX-​35 corporations (through the president of the Board of Trustees) and with three Bankinter members. Eleven board members belong to other corporations, and six are outstanding academics. Of its 21 members, two are women. It has 14,300 followers on Twitter 312

Think tanks and policy analysis

and publishes 37 documents per year. The Foundation has a certain impact on innovation trends-​focused policy analysis. It publishes the Future Trends Forum on its website and spread via ad-​hoc conferences around Spain with the goal of anticipating the future and encouraging innovation within society. Given the Foundation’s poor political links, it seems that influence is more relevant to firms’ strategic decisions on innovation than to public policy. However, open-​access documents and members who are academics give the Foundation high prestige and the ability to be taken into account in the political realm. Foundation for Applied Economic Studies (FEDEA) is a corporate non-​profit. Its founding purpose is to have a positive influence on society by carrying out and publishing research on economic and social issues. FEDEA serves as a bridge between the academic world and society. Its work is based on three fundamental principles: research, influence on economic policy, and dissemination. There is no information about FEDEA’s board members on its website, which only presents information on the organisations represented on the board. FEDEA has no political links, but the Spanish Central Bank is an institutional member of its Board of Trustees. Other institutional members include nine IBEX-​ 35 corporations, plus four other corporations and one foundation. Its media impact is 1,535 mentions. FEDEA has published 140 documents in one year and has 9,191 followers on Twitter. The blog Nada es Gratis is a FEDEA initiative to disseminate and debate economic policy, and has 35,600 followers on Twitter. FEDEA is the most prominent think tank in Spanish economic policy. It conducts in-​depth policy analysis, and its outreach is very effective, particularly in the areas it works in, such as the FEDEA Index of Economic Activity, the Fiscal and Financial Observatory on the Regions, the Labour Observatory on the Crisis, the Business Observatory on the Crisis, and the Air Transport Observatory. Fundación Cajas de Ahorro (FUNCAS) is corporate non-​profit. It is a think tank dedicated to economic and social research and dissemination of this research. It fosters interaction between the academic sphere and the real economy and belongs to the financial sector of non-​profit savings banks. Because FUNCAS’s owners are non-​profit savings banks and have no shareholders, utilities of savings banks are applied to social activities, including FUNCAS’s research. The members of FUNCAS’s Board of Trustees (who are all men) are representatives of different savings banks. FUNCAS has no direct political links or other links with private corporations or civil society. However, savings banks have strong links with regional or local authorities in their territories, as well as with civil society through their foundations. FUNCAS has the greatest media impact of this group of think tanks, with 6,971 mentions and 5,407 followers on Twitter. It publishes several prestigious academic documents and journals (54 per year). FUNCAS researchers have academic prestige and their socially oriented analysis is well known by public decision-​makers. FUNCAS also has the ability to influence economic policy thanks to the political relationships of the savings banks which form part of its Board of Trustees. 313

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Cercle d’Economia is a public utility association based in Barcelona. It describes itself as a socially transverse institution. The Circle, which is oldest think tank in Spain, does not have a research team. It is a platform for dialogue between entrepreneurs, civil society, and public decision-​makers. In addition to being a place of meeting and dialogue, the Circle is a centre of opinion formation. The Circle’s annual meeting gathers academics and specialists in state administration, as well as ministers, regional and local authorities. Throughout its history, its Board of Directors has been characterised by its plurality and renewal; since 1958, the various Boards that have followed, reflect the plurality of professional orientations and political sensibilities of the Circle’s members. Of its 20 2019–​22 board members (eight of whom are women), four are linked to three IBEX-​35 corporations, one is a former minister, two are former mayors, seven are entrepreneurs, and six belong to civil society. The institution has 7,622 followers on Twitter. The Circle is worth citing as a case study because it is the oldest think tank in Spain, independent from sectoral or political interests of all types, and its financing comes only from contributions of its partners and collaborating entities. Although the Circle does not carry out policy analysis as other think tanks do, it can influence civil society and public policy. It is not easy to distinguish between business associations, pressure groups and think tanks. In this chapter we have taken the approach of considering think tanks to be organisations referred to as such in different investigations. This is the case of the Círculo de Empresarios and Cercle d’Economía, which are also considered business associations (Medina, see Chapter 14, this volume). Other business associations with influential policy analysis (see Chapter 14, this volume), such as CEOE, cannot be classified as think tanks following our approach. Likewise, trade unions fall outside the concept of think tanks used in this chapter. Additionally, their limited resources for producing policy analysis (Chapter 13, this volume) place them outside research centres. In economics, it is worth highlighting BBVA Research (1932) and CaixaBank Research as research centres belonging to the most important Spanish private banks. Although they are not recognised as think tanks, these institutions have a long tradition of research in economic policy, geostrategy and international economics. As Parrado (Chapter 4, this volume) points out, the IEF’s (Institute of Fiscal Studies, central government agency) role does not differ from the analytical work carried out by the foundations of some private banks like Caixa or BBVA. • Foreign Policy and International Affairs. In this grouping, we analyse three think tanks specialised in foreign affairs and strategy. These think tanks are characterised by their dependency on public support through subsidies or contracts. Public institutions are on their board of trustees. They have direct political links and some links with civil society. Their ability to carry out policy analysis comes from both their researchers and academic collaborators. Notably, these think tanks cooperate on some strategic issues. They influence policy 314

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through their direct relationships with political decision-​makers, whether these be with the Spanish government or regional and local governments. The Elcano Royal Institute (REI) is a private foundation created at the initiative of the Spanish government in 2001. The Elcano Royal Institute is a think tank specialised in international and strategic studies conducted from a Spanish, European, and global perspective. Its 39-​member (six women) Board of Trustees has political links, with the King of Spain serving as the board’s Honorary President. Five ministers and one mayor also sit on the Board of Trustees. Corporate links are significant, with 11 members related to IBEX-​35 companies and seven to other corporations. Elite members are also relevant, with three diplomats and nine former ministers on the Board of Trustees. The presence of civil society is poor, with only three board members from this sector. The REI has a media impact of 4,180 mentions. It has 55,100 followers on Twitter and publishes 148 documents per year. Some of its documents are its flagship Elcano Global Presence Index, an annual measurement of the global projection of 130 countries, and its Barometer (BRIE), which measures Spain’s international image and Spaniards’ opinions on foreign policy and international relations. The prestige of its policy analysis and the strong Board of Trustees presence of politicians, elites, and corporations is an indicator of the REI’s influence on policy. The Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB) is a private foundation established in 1973 and promoted by members of civil society. It is an international affairs research centre whose mission is to analyse the global issues that affect political, social, and governance dynamics, from the international to local level. Political links on its Board of Trustees include five representatives of the Spanish government as well as regional and local governments. There are five elite members on the board (with a former minister as Honorary President) and 13 members from civil society. Of its 23 members, five are women. CIDOB has no links with corporations. Its media impact is 444 mentions and it has 27,900 followers on Twitter. With 126 documents published per year, CIDOB’s flagships are the CIDOB International Yearbook, which since 1989 has provided keys to interpreting Spanish foreign policy and international relations, as well as an indexed academic journal. CIDOB’s established prestige and outstanding policy analysis grant it some influence on Spanish national and regional politics. Nevertheless, the Centre’s preeminence of regional and local political links, the outsized representation of civil society within it, and its Barcelona-​based headquarters allow it less opportunity to influence Spanish policy. The European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMed) is a think tank specialised in Mediterranean relations. Based on a multidisciplinary and networking approach, the IEMed carries out policy analysis, understanding, and cooperation. It is a consortium comprised of the Government of Catalonia, the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, European Union and Cooperation (MAEUEC), and the City Council of Barcelona. IEMed’s Board of Trustees maintains political links with the President of the Regional Government of Catalonia, the Spanish government, 315

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and the local government, with 16 representatives (nine of whom are women). The Board of Trustees has no links with either corporations or civil society. IEMed coordinates the Euromesco network, which is financed by the European Union. It has 16,700 followers on Twitter and publishes 24 documents per year. Since 2003, it has published the flagship IMed Mediterranean Yearbook. Its policy analysis is carried out by its staff and mostly with associated researchers. Political links on its board indicate potential influence in policy. • Partisans. In this group, we point out three think tanks of three different ideologies: conservative, libertarian, and socialist. They are not affiliated with any party. Their common characteristics are limited research staff, dissemination of political ideas and values through events with high-​level politician participants, few documents (compared to other think tanks), and funding through contributions and donations with some public grant for projects. Their political influence is exerted through political and business contacts. They influence policy when governments are close to their ideology. The Foundation for Social Studies and Analysis (FAES) is a private non-​profit organisation which until 2017 was affiliated to the conservative Popular Party. The president of the Board of Trustees is a former prime minister and the FAES’s links with elites are strong, with 20 former ministers, deputy ministers, and parliamentarians represented on its board. Of the 25 members on its Board of Trustees, six are women. Two members belong to corporations, and four hail from civil society. With 13,600 followers on Twitter and five documents published per year, the FAES’s production of policy analysis is scarce. However, it does influence policy when the Popular Party is in office. The Fundación Civismo is a libertarian partisan think tank which operates as a platform for participation, bringing together independent professionals from different fields and diverse backgrounds. Its Board of Trustees is linked to the field of economics with eight corporations (one IBEX-​35 corporation) represented. It does not have direct links to politics. Other board members include a former deputy minister and four members of civil society. There is one woman on the 13-​member Board of Trustees. The Fundación has 385 mentions in media and 13,000 followers on Twitter. It has 14 links with other think tanks in the world which share its ideology. This think tank does not publish policy analysis, and its production is more related to the dissemination of ideas. The Fundación Alternativas is a partisan, socialist think that aims to analyse Spanish reality, both national and international, as well as implement available proposals to solve societal problems. Its Board of Trustees has one link with corporations, ten members of the elite, and 30 members from civil society. Fourteen trustees are women. The foundation has 10,300 followers on Twitter and publishes 37 documents per year. Its policy analysis is realised through a lab for proposals and its Foreign Policy Observatory (OPEX), which focuses on Spanish foreign policy. As with other partisan think tanks, the foundation’s 316

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capacity to influence policy is related to the government in office at a given time. However, the Fundación Alternativas influences decision-​making and impact public opinion thanks to its links with civil society. • Specialised ‘boutique think tanks’. Boutique think tanks focus on clusters of issues, such as education policy, budget policy, trade policy, or environmental policy. Slaughter and Scott (2015) point out that specialised think tanks have been instrumental in developing innovative policy solutions, including contributions to reforming health care, reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and expanding access to technology. Some specialised think tanks operate more in the field of advocacy or NGOs. However, the boutique think tanks are characterised by their capacity to produce policy analysis and translate it to proposals for practical application. We pinpoint only one think tank in Spain that has these characteristics. Barcelona Institute for Global Health (ISGlobal). ISGlobal’s mission is to improve global health and promote health equity through excellence in research and the translation and application of knowledge. Its concept of translation is to turn knowledge into action. This think tank has two bodies: the first is its core, research and applied research on health affiliated with universities and health centres and the second is its Policy, Global Development and Communications staff, which operates as a think tank. ISGlobal’s Policy Analysis staff monitors the global health agenda within the framework of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and generates proposals and recommendations to inform and influence political decision-​makers. The institution is a partnership between Caixabank (an IBEX-​35 bank), the Spanish government, regional government, local government, two public hospitals, and two universities. Representatives of these institutions sit on ISGlobal’s 21-​member (eight of whom are women) Board of Trustees, the president of which is H.R.H. the Infanta Cristina de Borbón. ISGlobal has a staff of 16 (11 of whom are women) with expertise in scientific outreach and communication. The institute has 18,700 followers on Twitter and publishes 30 documents per year. Although its policy analysis in 2020 and 2021 has been oriented towards the COVID-​19 pandemic, it develops cooperative policy analysis on health concerns and diseases such as AIDS and malaria. ISGlobal is a highly prestigious institution that wields influence both in Spain and internationally.

Conclusion In keeping with the objectives of this book, we have tried to provide a particular view on the influence of Spanish think tanks on the political process of Spain. We identified that think tanks produce policy analysis based on their reputations, prestige with stakeholders, and social impact. Conclusions are not easily drawn, but with the potential to influence political decisions according to these indicators, 317

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a small group of think tanks stands out for their ability to produce outstanding policy analysis. Both regarding the creation of new Spanish think tanks since 2000 (approximately half of existing Spanish think tanks) and their improvement in international rankings, we can conclude that think tanks are increasingly relevant in policy analysis. More think tanks (some created or financed by the Spanish government) have fostered competition in acquiring scarce resources and gaining international prestige. As a result of this competition, think tanks have improved the quality of their products and increased financial transparency in order to obtain financial resources and the attention of media and stakeholders. Given the lack of policy analysis produced by the central government and because this task is in some cases transferred to the central bank and other independent economic agencies (Chapter 4, this volume), the expected result is, on one hand, more competition between think tanks and agencies to produce greater amounts of higher-​quality policy analysis and, on the other hand, increased opportunities for think tanks which in this way complete policy analysis not produced within the central government, particularly in areas where the central government needs to fill a deficiency of policy analysis. As an example of induced competition, the prestige of research by the Central Bank of Spain is well known, but so is that of think tanks oriented towards policy analysis in economics, since these must achieve similar levels of quality. Other fields, such as cooperation or foreign policy, are examples of substitution when the central government seeks the support of think tanks in producing policy analysis through calls for tenders. However, since 2011, funding for this purpose (through Spanish agency for international cooperation, AECID) has suffered major budgetary reduction. As Parrado points out, Spain has not escaped this ‘econocratic’ trend. Some agencies provide policy analysis on economic and non-​economic related matters not addressed in ministries. ISGlobal stands out in the health field and has been very present in the media during the COVID-​19 pandemic, through which it has developed a strong communications policy. In economics, FEDEA has an important national and international impact, followed by FUNCAS. COTEC and the Fundación Innovacion Bankinter stand out in innovation. In international affairs, the Elcano Royal Institute and CIDOB are the first. Both FAES and the Fundación Alternativas have a privileged position on many domestic policies, but they are partisans (conservative and socialist, respectively),4 and their ability to influence policy depends on the government in power and its ideological affinities with these think tanks. That is the case of other independent board foundations with different ideologies, such as the libertarian Fundación Civismo. There are other cases in which indicators do not play the role that they should certainly should in determining their impact on policies, even at the international level. This could be the case of CITpax, a think tank of great international prestige in conflict mediation. The indicators used in this chapter and other treatments of the subject do not allow us to capture the actual relevance of this think tank, which can be seen in examples such as discreet meetings between 318

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conflicting parties which involve no official representatives, but provide access to political leaders with decision-​making capacity. In the same sense, in the cases of some business think tanks which do not act as lobbies, such as Cercle d’Economia and Círculo de Empresarios, the indicators used have not revealed their real importance in exerting influence, especially in the organisation of certain events that allow the interaction of the business world with politics. Two think tanks affiliated with the government, Fundación Carolina and Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies (IEEE), lead in Twitter followers. The explanation for this may be that both organisations, due to their prestige and place within the government sphere, have many Latin American followers. Finally, it is relevant to know whether the influence of think tanks will prevail due to their permanent contact with the elites (for example, their links to communities of ex-​diplomats, ex-​politicians and high officials, and prestigious professors linked to political parties) It is therefore relevant to explore how think tanks relate to elites. therefore, what is relevant is how they relate to elites (Barberá and Arregui, 2011). However, these forms of relationship may be considered obsolete, since they are too elitist to be successful, and it is therefore time to rethink how think tanks can meet evolving challenges (Slaughter and Scott, 2015). Despite this, the central mission of think tanks is the same (to help solve public problems). To adapt to a new model, Slaughter and Scott propose the civic enterprise: ‘civic’ because citizens are engaged as change-​makers, and ‘enterprise’ because of the energy and innovation involved in making change. Like other activities in the fields of communication and policy influence, think tanks are changing in search of new ways to improve their influence through their policy analysis. Nevertheless, it seems that in Spain, location and proximity to elites still matter. In any case, think tanks by definition produce policy analysis in same way that has been pointed out in the introduction to this volume. What is relevant is to identify their quality and independence and therefore their ability to influence and complement the central government’s policy analysis. Their typology, impact on stakeholders, and composition of their board of trustees, that we have presented in this chapter, allows us to highlight the most prominent think tanks in Spain concerning policy analysis.

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Founded Staff size

Twitter

TTCSP 2020

Transparency: Spanish Think Tank Observatory

Twitter followers as of March 2021

Categories top think tanks

Transparify and Spanish Think Tank Observatory

122,300

9

STTO 4 stars

55,100

1, 2, 3, 7, 16, 20, 28

STTO 4 stars

54,500

13

Topics

Category

Premises

year

Fundación Carolina

Cooperation

Spanish government

Madrid

2000

Elcano Royal Institute

International affairs

Independent board

Madrid

2001

Action Against Hunger (NGO)

Food security

International organisation

Madrid

Fundación COTEC para la Innovacion (COTEC)

Economics/​business

Corporate non-​profit

Madrid

1992

Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies (IEEE)

Security/​strategy

Spanish government

Madrid

1970

Ecology and Development Foundation (ECODES)

Environment

Independent board

Zaragoza

1992

34

32,100

Juan de Mariana Institute (IJM)

Education, law, economics

Partisan

Madrid

2005

9

31,000

3, 29

STTO 0 stars

Barcelona Centre for International Affairs (CIDOB)

International affairs

Independent board

Barcelona

1973

44

27,900

1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 20, 25, 29, 30

Transparify 5 stars/​STTO 4 stars

Barcelona Institute for Global Health (ISGLOBAL) Policy, Global Development and Communications

Health

Independent board

Barcelona

2010

16

18,700

8, 26, 32

STTO 2 stars

European Institute of the Mediterranean (IEMED)

International affairs

Government(s) affiliated

Barcelona

1989

24

16,700

3, 16

69

15

42,900

STTO 4 stars

41,100 STTO 5 stars

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Annex: think tanks in Spain ordered by followers on Twitter (excluded political parties affiliation and regional orientation)

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Founded

Twitter

TTCSP 2020

Environment

University

Barcelona

1987

150

15,600

14

Fundación Innovacion Bankinter

Economics/​innovation

Corporate non-​profit

Madrid

2003

8

14,300

10

Foundation for Social Studies and Analysis (FAES)

Policy/​values

Partisan (until 2017 PP)

Madrid

1989

13,600

1, 3, 5,11, 16, 21, 31

Fundacion Civismo

Economics

Partisan

Madrid

2010

Extinction Rebellion

Environment

International organisation

Madrid

2018

GRAIN

Advocacy small farmers

International organisation

Barcelona

1990

13

11,000

15

Fundación Alternativas

International affairs

Partisan

Madrid

1997

15

10,300

1, 2, 3, 17, 18, 20, 24

Foundation for Applied Economic Economics Studies (FEDEA)

Corporate non-​profit

Madrid

1985

40

9,191

3, 5, 25

Club de Madrid

Policy/​values

International organisation

Madrid

2002

20

8,010

Cercle d’Economia

Economics

Independent board

Barcelona

1950

7,622

Fundación Internacional para la Libertad (FIL)

Policy/​values

International organisation

Madrid

2002

7,257

International Observatory on Terrorism Studies (OIET)

Security/​peace

Independent board

Madrid

Fundación Ortega y Gasset-​ Gregorio Marañón (FOM)

Social sciences/​ human studies

University

Madrid

1978

Fundación Cajas de Ahorro (FUNCAS)

Economics

Corporate non-​profit

Madrid

1980

EsadeEcPol

Economics

Independent board

Madrid

2019

14

13,000

STTO 0 stars STTO 0 stars

12,400

STTO 4 stars

STTO 1 stars 32

6,950 5,536 22

STTO 1 stars

5,407 5,252

19

Think tanks and policy analysis

321

Centre for Ecological Research and Forestry Applications (CREAF)

Transparency: Spanish Think Tank Observatory

newgenrtpdf

Twitter

Institute of Studies on Conflicts Conflict resolution and Humanitarian Action (IECAH)

Independent board

Madrid

2000

5

Group for Strategic Studies – GEES

International affairs

Independent board

Madrid

1987

Future Institute (Ifuturo)

Education/​social policy

Independent board

Navarra

2002

4

3,789

Fundació Catalunya Europa

Polity/​values

Independent board

Barcelona

2007

10

3,743

Research Centre for the Management of Agricultural and Environmental Risks (CEIGRAM)

Agriculture

University

Madrid

2007

22

3,100

European Foundation Society and Education

Education

Independent board

Madrid

2003

2

2,748

Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (IEF)

Economics

Spanish government

Madrid

1960

IMDEA Water Institute

Water resources

Independent board

Madrid

IH Cantabria –​Environmental Hydraulics Institute

Environment

University

Santander

2007

Aspen Institute Spain

Policy/​values

International organisation

Madrid

2010

Political Watch (ex CIECODE)

Development

Independent board

Madrid

2010

Euro-​Mediterranean Study Commission (EuroMeSCo) (Secretariat)

Network

International organisation

Barcelona

2010

Galego Institute for the Analysis of International Documentation – IGADI

International affairs

University

Pontevedra

1991

TTCSP 2020

Transparency: Spanish Think Tank Observatory

4,543

STTO 1 stars

4,217

STTO 0 stars 2, 3, 5, 12, 26, 27, 29

STTO 0 stars STTO 4 stars

STTO 1 stars

2,561 84

2,050

135

1,943

10

1,869

STTO 1 stars

1,841

STTO 0 stars

1,712

30

1,520

3, 20

STTO 3 stars

Policy Analysis in Spain

322

Founded

newgenrtpdf

Founded

Economics for Energy

Economics energy

Corporate non-​profit

Vigo

Red Iberoamericana de Estudios Internacionales (RIBEI)

Network

International organisation

Madrid

Navarra Center for International Development

Development

University

Pamplona

Fundación Independiente

Twitter

6 2010 13

TTCSP 2020

Transparency: Spanish Think Tank Observatory

1,409 1,267

20

945

23

Civil society

Independent board

Madrid

1987

888

STTO 0 stars

Fundación Manuel Giménez Abad Policy/​values

Independent board

Zaragoza

2001

749

STTO 4 stars

CITpax. Centro de Toledo para la Paz

Mediation

Independent board

Madrid

2004

8

733

Peace Research Center (Gernika Gogoratuz)

Conflict resolution

Independent board

Gernika

1987

5

637

STTO 0 stars

International Affairs and Foreign Policy Institute (INCIPE)

International affairs

Independent board

Madrid

1991

5

403

STTO 0 stars

Research Unit on International Geoeconomics Security and Cooperation (UNISCI)

University

Madrid

1989

12

109

Basque Centre for Climate Change (BC3)

Environment

Independent board

Bilbao

2008

Fundación Seminario de Investigación para la Paz

Conflict resolution

Independent board

Zaragoza

1984

3

no data

STTO 0 stars

Instituto de Estudios Económicos Economics

Corporate non-​profit

Madrid

1979

7

no data

STTO 0 stars

Circulo de Empresarios

Economics/​business

Corporate non-​profit

Madrid

1977

no data

STTO 5 stars

Institute of Public Goods and Policies (IPP) (CCHS)

Social science

University

Madrid

2007

no data

no data

22

323

Think tanks and policy analysis

45

6

newgenrtpdf

Global futures

International organisation

San Sebastian

Twitter

TTCSP 2020

2010

no data

3

Transparency: Spanish Think Tank Observatory

Policy Analysis in Spain

324 Millennium Project (Spain Node)

Note: 2020 Global Go To Think Tanks categories in the TTCSP 2020 column Top think thanks worldwide (non-​US) 1 Top think thanks worldwide (US and non-​US) 2 Top think tanks in Western Europe 3 Top defence and national security think tank 4 Top domestic economic policy think tanks 5 Top environment policy think tanks 6 Top foreign policy and international affairs think tanks 7 Top global health policy think tanks 8 Top international development policy think tanks 9 Top science and technology policy think tanks 10 Top social policy think tanks 11 Top transparency and good governance think tanks 12 Top food security think tanks 13 Top water security think tanks 14 Best advocacy campaign 15 Best institutional collaboration involving two or more think tanks 16 Best managed think tanks 17 Best new idea or paradigm developed by a think tank 18 Best new think tanks 19 Best think tank network 20 Best think tanks with a political party affiliation 21 Best government-​affiliated think tanks 22 Best university-​affiliated think tanks 23 Best use of social media and networks 24 Think tanks to watch in 2020 25 Think tanks with the best use of the internet 26 Best use of media (print or electronic) 27 Think tanks with outstanding policy-​oriented research programs 28 Best independent think tanks 29 Best quality assurance and integrity policies and procedures 30 Best regional studies centres (free standing) 31 Best policy and institutional response to COVID-​19 32

Founded

Think tanks and policy analysis

Notes 1 2 3 4

See https://​cerc​lede​cono​mia.com/​en/​el-​cer​cle/​ [Accessed 16 June 2020]. https://​onthi​nkta​nks.org/​open-​think-​tank-​direct​ory/​ [Accessed 30 November 2020]. http://​www.and​ywil​liam​son.com/​why-​i-​want-​to-​know-​whos-​fund​ing-​our-​think-​tanks/​ [Accessed 16 January 2019]. FAES was affiliated with the Popular Party until 2017.

References Barberá, P. and Arregui, J. (2011) Naturaleza e influencia de los think tanks en el proceso político en España, Working Paper 292, Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Polítiques i Socials. Gonzalez-​Capitel, J. (2016) ‘Who used our findings? Framing collaboration between American foundations and think tanks through practices in the evaluation of policy influence’, thesis submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Sciences of Georgetown University. Available from: https://​ rep ​ o sit ​ o ry.libr ​ a ry.geo ​ r get ​ own.edu/ ​ b itstr​ e am/​ h an​ d le/​ 1 0822/​ 1 040​ 6 86/​ GonzalezCapitelMarto​rell​_g​ eo​rget​own_​0076M ​ _1​ 33​ 77.pdf?sequen ​ ce=1​ &isAllo​ wed=​y [Accessed 13 January 2018]. Gonzalez-​Capitel, J. and Ponsa, F. (eds) (2017) La Financiación de las Ideas. Índice de transparencia financiera de los think tanks españoles (2016), Observatorio de Think Tanks. Available from: https://​onthi​nkta​nks.org/​wp-​cont​ent/​uplo​ads/​2017/​ 06/​La-​Fina​ncia​cio-​-​n-​2016-​pagi​nas.pdf [Accessed 13 January 2018]. McGann, J.G. (2007) Think Tanks and Policy Advice in the US: Academics, Advisors and Advocates, New York: Routledge. McGann, J.G. (2021) 2020 Global Go To Think Tank Index Report, University of Pennsylvania. Available from: https://​rep​osit​ory.upenn.edu/​thin​k_​ta​nks/​18/​ [Accessed 2 February 2021]. Planells-​Artigot, Enrique (2017) Análisis de la representación e impacto de los think tanks españoles en la prensa online (2012–​2016), PhD thesis, University of Valencia. Available from: http://h ​ dl.hand​ le.net/1​ 0550/​62938 [Accessed 20 March 2018]. Ponsa, F. (2016) ‘Ensanchando el conocimiento. La comunidad ampliada de inteligencia’, Notes Internacionals CIDOB, Working Paper 164, Barcelona: Fundacio Cidob. Selee, A. (2013) What Should Think Tanks Do?: A Strategic Guide to Policy Impact, Stanford: Stanford University Press. Slaughter, A.-​M. and Scott, B. (2015) ‘Rethinking the think tank’, Washington Monthly, November/​December. Available from: https://​washin​gton​mont​ hly.com/​magaz​ine/​nov​dec-​2015/​ret​hink​ing-​the-​think-​tank/​ [Accessed 10 April 2016]. Tello, M. (2008) Guía de Think Tanks en España, Madrid: Fundación Ciudadanía y Valores.

325

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Transparify (2018) ‘How has think tank transparency evolved in 2018?’, Transparify Report. Available from: https://​stat​ic1.squa​resp​ace.com/​sta​tic/​52e1f​399e​4b06​ a94c​0cda​a41/​t/​5b4cf ​a3d7​58d4​63a3​bfb5​4ac/​153177​1467​608/​Tran​spar​ify+​ 2018+​Think+​Tanks+​Rep​ort.pdf [Accessed 23 April 2020]. Weaver, R.K. (1989) ‘The changing world of think tanks’, PS: Political Science and Politics, 22(3): 563–​78.

326

Index References to figures appear in italic type; those in bold type refer to tables. References to endnotes show both the page number and the note number (e.g. 97n2). 2015-​M movement  75 2030 Agenda  see Agenda 2030

A academic community  117 academic research  10; see also research centres; universities academics  67, 91, 236, 237 Action Against Hunger  309, 310 active labour market policies  252–​3 Adachi, Y.  47, 49 Adams, D.  67 Adler, E.S.  141 administrative reform  69 administrative tradition  88–​9 advisory bodies  13, 290–​1; see also participatory institutions Advisory Council on External Action  94, 98n16 Advisory Council for Sustainable Development of Catalonia (CADS)  94, 96, 98n15 advisory councils (ACs)  188, 193–​8 advisory firms  206 AECPA (Association of Political Science and Administration)  51 AEVAL (Agency for the Evaluation of Public Policies and Quality of Service)  48, 53–​4, 55–​6, 60n24, 60n25, 70–​1 Agenda 2030  71–​2, 93–​6 Agenda Euskadi  94, 95 Agranoff, R.  83, 85 agrarian reform  31 agricultural associations  267 Aguilar, L.  92 Aguilar, S.  8 AIReF (independent authority for fiscal responsibility)  69–​70, 74 Alarcón, P.  191 Alba, C.  110 Alba, S.  28 Albalate, D.  107 Albareda, A.  284 Aldrich, J.H.  141 Alguacil, J.  115

Alliance Catalonia  94 Almendros, A.  28 Almoguera Sallent, P.  110 Alonso, J.M.  71 Alvira, F.  49 American think tanks  239 analytical capacity  255 analytical effectiveness  255 Ancien Régime  11, 21, 23–​4, 37 Andalusia  advisory councils (ACs)  195, 196 participatory processes  189, 191, 192 research centres  208 research output  216 research projects  212 Anduiza, E.  193 ANE Tripartite Agreement 1982  252 ANECA (National Agency for Quality Assessment and Accreditation pf Spain)  92 Anguita, J.  228 APD (Asociación para el Progreso de la Dirección)  33 APROEVAL (Iberian Association of Evaluation Professionals)  52 Aragon  113, 189 Arenilla, M.  78 Ariño, A.  287 Arregui, J.  240, 305, 308, 319 Asociación para el Progreso de la Dirección (APD)  33 Asociación para la Reforma de los Aranceles  25 Association of Political Science and Administration (AECPA)  51 Associations Act 1887  267 Astudillo, J.  228 Atkinson, M.M.  10 Aubin, D.  48, 55 Austria  131 authorities  160 parliamentary appearances  153, 154 see also local governments; regional governments Autonomous Communities  113, 179, 208, 211

327

Policy Analysis in Spain Autonomous University of Barcelona (UAB)  59n1, 115, 116, 205, 209, 213, 216 awareness-​raising  288, 297 Aznar governments  146, 149, 151, 178, 228, 240, 292

B Babaoglu, C.  50 Baccaro, L.  255 Bahamonde, A.  110 Bakker, R.  232 Baldwin, R.  69 Balearic Islands  270 Ballart, X.  49, 53, 205 Banco de Bilbao  31, 33 Banco de Urquijo  29, 32 Bank of Barcelona  29 Bank of Spain  29, 30–​1, 34, 70, 268, 313, 318 banking system  29, 34–​5, 130 Baón, R.  228 Barbé, E.  8 Barberà, O.  227, 237, 238 Barberá, P.  240, 305, 308, 319 Barcelona  103, 109, 189, 190, 195, 260, 269, 303 Barcelona Catholic Institute for the Social Sciences (ICES)  33 Barcelona Institute for Global Health (ISGlobal)  309, 310, 311, 317, 318 Bardi, L.  229 Barnett, M.  125 barometers  169–​70, 171, 179, 181, 272, 315 Barranco, O.  249 Barrio, A.  229, 237 Basque Country  advisory councils (ACs)  195 Agenda 2030  93–​6 business associations  267 devolution  31 diputaciones  189 multilevel governance  9 policy evaluation  93 research centres  208, 209 research projects  212 self-​government  85 taxes  88 Basque Nationalist Party (PNV)  157, 158, 237 Baumgartner, F.R.  142, 176, 177, 286 Baylos, A.  252 BBVA Research  314 Behrens, M.  266

328

Belgium  72, 78 Bentolila, S.  265 Beramendi, P.  88 Berbegal-​Mirabent, J.  203 Bertelsmann Foundation  75 Bertrana, X.  113 Bherer, L.  193 Biezen, I. van  228 big data  54–​5, 72–​3 Bilbao  109; see also Banco de Bilbao Binderkrantz, A.S.  284, 286 Black, J.  69 Blakeley, G.  197 Blanco, I.  194 Blondel, J.  225 Bloque Nacionalista Galego (BNG)  237 Boin, A.  126 Boix i Selva, E.  33 Börzel, T.A.  146 Botella, J.  235 Botha, J.  50 Boukaert, G.  68 boutique think tanks  317 Bouvet, M.  78 Brans, M.  55 Brint, S.  47 Brugué, Q.  8, 189, 195, 197 Budge, I.  232 bureaucracy  74, 77–​8 business associations  14, 196, 265–​80 institutional resources for policy analysis  276–​8 interests, patterns, and strategies  271–​6 strategies for policy analysis  277 business conferences  269 business think tanks  271 Bustelo, M.  8, 54, 92

C Caballero, G.  145 Caballero, R.  70 Cabrera, M.  28, 268 CADS (Advisory Council for Sustainable Development of Catalonia)  94, 96, 98n15 Cairney, P.  73, 76 Caixabank  317 CaixaBank Research  314 Calleja, J.P.  249 Cámara de Comercio de España (CCE)  270, 274–​5 2020 annual budget  279

Index Cambó, F.  22, 28–​9 Campos, C.  54 Campos-​Alba, C.M.  107 Canarian Coalition (CC)  157, 158 Canga Argüelles, J.  23, 24 Cantabria  309 Carandell, J.  29–​30 Carlist Wars  26 Carmona, P.  233 Carolina Foundation (Fundacíon Carolina)  309, 319 Carr, R.  21 Carriòn, P.  31 Casado, P.  228 Castile and Léon  208 Catalonia  advisory councils (ACs)  195 Agenda 2030  93–​6 business associations  267, 270 devolution  31 multilevel governance  9 participatory processes  189 policy evaluation  92–​3 research centres  208 research output  216 research projects  212 second-​tier institutions  113 self-​government  30, 85 urban planning  192 Catholic Church  33 CC (Coalición Canaria)  157, 158 CCAES (Center for Coordination of Alerts and Sanitary Emergencies)  133, 134 CCE (Cámara de Comercio de España)  270, 274–​5 2020 annual budget  279 CCOO (Comissiones Obreras)  248, 250, 251, 252, 257, 259–​60 CDC (Convergèncie Democràtica de Catalunya)  229, 234 CEAPA (Spanish Confederation of Parents’ Association)  295 CEC (Consejo Empresarial para la Competitividad)  271 CEIGRAM  309 Center for Sociological Research (CIS) see CIS (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas) Central Bank  see Bank of Spain central government  12, 67–​80 challenges to policy analysis  73–​6 drivers of policy analysis  68–​73 role of policy advisers  77–​9

Central Nacional Sindicalista  see Sindicato Vertical Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió  172 Centre d’Estudis Econòmics Valencians  31 Centro Coordinación de Alertas y Emergencias Sanitarias (CCAES)  133, 134 Centro de Estudios Constitucionales  35 Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales  35 CEOE (Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales)  269–​71, 279 institutional resources for policy analysis  276–​8 interests, patterns, and strategies  272–​4 policy analysis and related tasks  273 CEPYME (Confederación Española de la Pequeña y Mediana Empresa)  270 Cercle d’Economia  303, 310, 314, 319 Cerdá, I.  24 CERMI (Comité Español de Representantes de Personas con Discapacidad)  291, 292, 294, 299n6 CES (Economic and Social Council)  251, 253–​4 CHADE (Compañía Hispano Americana de Electricidad)  28, 29 Challenge of Society programme  211, 213–​14 Chalmers, A.W.  286 chamber staff  158–​9 chambers of commerce  267, 269, 270, 272, 274, 275, 278, 279 Chaqués-​Bonafont, L.  advisory bodies  290 interest groups  142, 150, 160 non-​governmental organisations (NGOs)  286, 291, 292, 294 parliamentary committees  154 pharmaceuticals policy  8 policy actors  4 political parties  226, 227 public opinion surveys  165, 177 punctuated-​equilibrium theory  7 Q-​Dem  284, 288 Zapatero governments  148 Charles III  23 CIDOB (Barcelona Centre for International Affairs)  303, 309, 310, 315, 318 circular economy  274–​5 Círculo de Economía  14, 33, 75, 266, 275, 276 Círculo de Empresarios  14, 75, 266, 269, 271, 275, 276, 319

329

Policy Analysis in Spain CIS (Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas)  13, 165–​9, 235 directors  168, 182 public opinion surveys  data produced  169–​71 evolution over time  171–​3 policy areas covered  173–​5 policy areas, variation over time  175–​9 territorial scope and target population  179–​81 cities  109–​12 citizen participation  86, 143; see also participatory institutions; public opinion surveys Citizens’ Initiatives  188 CITpax  318–​19 CIU (Convergència i Unió)  157, 158, 237 Ciudadanos  228, 233, 237, 246 civic enterprise  319 civic groups  75, 94 civil servants  27 civil society actors  191–​2, 196, 250; see also business associations; interest groups; non-​governmental organisations (NGOs); trade unions; universities Civil War  31, 37, 258 Clifton, J.  107 climate change  149, 292 Closa Montero, C.  8 Club de Madrid  309 CNT (Confederación Nacional del Trabajo) 30 Coalición Canaria (CC)  157, 158 Coelho, V.S.  194 coercion  129–​32, 135 Cohen, J.  194 Cold War  32 Colebatch, H.K.  1 Coleman, W.D.  10 Colino, C.  85, 190 collaborative model  203, 220–​1 Collective Bargaining Observatory  259–​60 colonial wars  26 Comisaría del Plan de Desarrollo  36 Comisión de Reformas Sociales  see Commission for Social Reform Comisión Foral de Evaluación de las Políticas y la Calidad de los Servicios  93 Comissiones Obreras (CCOO)  248, 250, 251, 252, 257, 259–​60 Commission for Social Reform  22, 26 Communist Party  167

330

Compañía Hispano Americana de Electricidad (CHADE)  28, 29 competitive research projects  211–​14 geographical location  212 by policy area  213 Complutense University of Madrid (UCM) 213 Compston, H.  251 Confederación Española de Organizaciones Empresariales (CEOE)  269–​71, 279 institutional resources for policy analysis  276–​8 interests, patterns, and strategies  272–​4 policy analysis and related tasks  273 Confederación Española Patronal y Agrícola  268 Confederación Española de la Pequeña y Mediana Empresa (CEPYME)  270 Confederación Gremial Española  268 Confederación Nacional del Trabajo (CNT)  30 Confederación Patronal Española  268 Confederal Economic Cabinet  259 conferences  72; see also business conferences Congreso de los Diputados  143 Consejo Empresarial para la Competitividad (CEC)  271 Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas (CSIC)  207, 209, 217 consortia  105 Constitution  85, 87, 88, 269 constructivism  225 consultation  74–​6, 91, 290–​1; see also citizen participation; institutional participation Consumer Confidence Index (CCI)  169, 170, 171 consumer rights  291 consumption taxes  27 contracting back  107 Convergència i Unió (CiU)  157, 158, 237 Convergèncie Democràtica de Catalunya (CDC)  229, 234 Cooper, T.  194 cooperation  237–​9 coordination by central government  71–​2 coronabonds  131 corporations  304 corporatist model  290; see also neo-​corporatism Correa, P.  227, 228 Corzo, S.  227 Costas, A.  270 COTEC  306, 309, 312, 318 Cotta, M.  225

Index COVID-​19 crisis  129, 131–​4, 135–​6, 142, 274, 310 Cowley, P.  141 Crawley, S.  133, 134 CREAF  309, 310 Crouch, C.  251 Crozier, M.  265 CSIC (Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas)  207, 209, 217 Cuban War  26 Culpepper, P.  249

D Damgaard, E.  142 data science  72–​3; see also big data; public opinion data Dato, E.  30 Davies, H.T.O.  68 Davies, J.  115 De Bruyker, I.  284 de la Fuente, R.  115 De la Fuente Moreno, Á.  88 De la Porte, C.  129 De Maillard, J.  194 decentralisation  72, 78, 83, 84–​5, 88, 177–​8, 239, 287 defence  174 Del Pino, E.  88, 190, 195 Del Pino Matute, E.  8 Del Rey, F.  28, 268 delegation  236–​7 Delgado, D.  78 Della Porta, D.  192, 250 Denmark  131 Denters, B.  103 Derlien, H.U.  52, 53 Desouza, K.C.  72 development plans  36 Devetak, R.  286 Di Francesco, M.  47, 50 Diermeier, D.  144 Díez Cano, L.S.  269 Digital Strategy for an Intelligent Spain (2017)  75 digitalisation  274 Diputació de Barcelona  113–​14, 115, 189 Diputaciones  113 Donaldson, S.I.  47 Donosti  190 Drori, G.S.  125 Druckman, J.  165 Dukelow, F.  130

Dunn, W.N.  142 Dür, A.  286

E early Francoism  22–​3, 32–​4 EBA (European Banking Authority)  129, 130 Ebbinghaus, B.  251 ECDC (European Centre for Disease Control)  129, 133–​4 ECODES  306, 309 economic analysis institutes  see Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (IEF) Economic Circle  see Cercle d’Economia; Círculo de Economía economic crisis  130, 253–​4, 255; see also financial crisis economic issues  148, 175, 177, 196, 292 Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)  130 economic policy  218, 265 economic policy and innovation think thanks  312–​14 economic reforms  267 Economic and Social Council (CES)  251, 253–​4 economists  49 education  92, 173, 196, 213, 218 education policy  127, 295 education system  35–​6 EEC (European Economic Community)  34, 36, 238 Elcano Royal Institute (REI)  309, 310, 311, 315, 318 elections  37 electoral cycles  74 electoral surveys  172 emergency procedures  254 EMU (Economic and Monetary Union)  130 Engel, L.  127 environmental issues  146, 218, 291, 292 environmental policy  9, 295 epistemic communities  308 equality issues  9 ERC (Esquerra Republicana)  157 ERC (Republican Left of Catalonia)  157 ESADE Centre for Public Governance (ESADEgov)  115, 116 Estado de las Autonomías  see State of the Autonomies Estapé, F.  36 Euromesco network  316 European Banking Authority (EBA)  129, 130 European Central Bank  129, 130

331

Policy Analysis in Spain European Centre for Disease Control (ECDC)  129, 133–​4 European Commission  69, 72, 129, 130 European Constitution  188 European Council  131 European Economic Community (EEC)  34, 36, 238 European integration  6, 8, 33, 128 European League of Economic Cooperation  33 European Stability Mechanism  131 European Union (EU)  4, 5 big data  72 Citizens’ Dialogues  199n3 competition law  69 and domestic policy analysis  125, 128 environmental issues  146 fiscal adjustments  256 and non-​governmental organisations (NGOs)  283, 287 permanent joint committee on  148–​9, 150 research funding  211, 212 Spain’s entry into  46, 48, 52–​3, 75, 86 structural reforms  271 surveys about  181 Eurostat  107 Eurozone  130, 131 Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)  177 Eustat  96 Evans, M.  115 evidence-​based analysis  73 evidence-​based policy  68–​9 evidence-​based policy-​making  142 executive bills  293–​4 experts  10–​11, 12, 27, 46, 67, 91, 308 non-​governmental organisations (NGOs) as  296 see also professionalisation extra-​parliamentary resources  142–​3, 150–​4, 160

F Fabre, E.  228 FAES (Foundation for Analysis and Social Studies)  230, 233–​4, 236, 240, 310, 316, 318 family-​owned companies  270–​1 Farlie, D.  232 FEDEA (Foundation for Applied Economic Studies)  309, 310, 313, 318 Federación Española de Municipios y Provincias  108 Federación Española de Sociología (FES)  51–​2

332

Federation of Municipalities (FEMP)  191 Feinstein, O.  52, 53 Feria Toribio, J.  110 Fernández, A.M.  8 Fernandez, R.  88 Fernandez-​Martínez, J.L.  193 Fernández-​Ramírez, B.  52 financial crisis  131, 249, 253, 255–​6; see also sovereign debt crisis financial transparency  306–​7 Finnemore, M.  124, 125, 126, 127 First World War  27–​9 fiscal austerity  130 fiscal policy  35, 70, 173 Fleischer, J.  70, 78 Flores Andrade, A.  269 Flores de Lemus, A.  27, 30, 31 Flöthe, L.  284 FOM (Ortega y Gasset-​Gregorio Marañón Foundation)  311 Font, J.  188, 191, 192, 193, 194, 196, 197 Fontana, J.  21 FORCEM (Lifelong Learning Foundation)  252 foreign aid  292, 295 foreign policy  318 foreign policy and international affairs think tanks  314–​16 Foreign Policy Observatory (OPEX)  316 foreign population  180 foreign trade  35 Foundation for Analysis and Social Studies (FAES)  230, 233–​4, 236, 240, 310, 316, 318 Foundation for Applied Economic Studies (FEDEA)  309, 310, 313, 318 Foundation for Lifelong Learning (FUNDAE)  253 Fournier, V.  47 Fraga, M.  228, 233 France  77–​8, 190, 216 Francés, F.  190 Franco dictatorship  12, 22–​3, 37–​8, 265, 268–​9 early Francoism  32–​4 late Francoism  34–​7 non-​governmental organisations (NGOs)  283, 285, 299n4 trade unions  248 Fraussen, B.  285, 290 Frege, C.  249 Freidson, E.  47 French Revolution  23 Fuentes Quintana, E.  35

Index Führer, I.M.  248, 257 FUNCAS (Fundación Cajas de Ahorro)  309, 310, 313 Fundación 1 de Mayo  259 Fundación Alternativas  236, 240, 309, 310, 316–​17, 318 Fundación Cánovas del Castillo  233 Fundación Carles Pi i Sunyer  108, 115, 116 Fundación Carolina (Carolina Foundation)  309, 319 Fundación Civismo  316 Fundación COTEC  306, 309, 312, 318 Fundación Democracia y Gobierno Local  108 Fundación FOESSA  36 Fundación Ideas  236, 240 Fundación Innovación Bankinter  310, 312–​13, 318 Fundación Ortega y Gasset  303 Fundación Pablo Iglesias  234, 236, 240, 258–​9 FUNDAE (Foundation for Lifelong Learning)  253 Furubo, J.E.  52 Future Trends Forum  312, 313

G Galais, C.  191 GALEUSCA  237, 238 Galicia  31, 85, 109, 110, 212 Gallego, R.  8 Gallie, D.  249 Gallup, G.  165 Gamson, W.A.  197 Gangas, P.  228 Ganuza, E.  190 García Femenía, A.  270 García Zúñiga, M.  36 Garde Roca, J.A.  53, 54 Garzón, A.  228 gender  173, 209, 218 gender discrimination  148 gender policies  50, 239 German party think tanks  238 Germany  52, 76, 131, 186, 204, 215, 216, 229 Geva-​May, I.  46, 50, 52, 56 GIGAPP (Grupo de Investigación en Gobierno, Administración y Políticas Públicas)  51 Gillespie, R.  237 Gilligan, T.W.  141, 144 Giménez Gluck, D.  236 Giner, J.A.  167 Giner, S.  283

global crises  129–​34 Goldsmith, M.  103 Gomà, R.  7, 194, 226 Gómez, B.  188 González, F.  258–​9 González, N.  230 González-​Capitel, J.  230, 305, 307 González government  178 González-​Juliana, A.  159 Google Scholar  310 Goransson, M.  78 Gouglas, A.  78 governance system  97n2 Government, Administration and Public Policy Research Group  51 government-​affiliated think tanks  304 government coordination  71–​2 governmental actors  4–​5 governmental advisory bodies  290–​1 governmental issues  173 governments  142 GRAIN  310 Granados, F.J.  290 Grant, W.  246 Grau, M.  7 Greece  78, 130 Green-​Pedersen, C.  177 Greenwood, J.  86 Greer, S.  134 Grek, S.  127 Griffiths, J.  143 Grindle, M.  84 gross domestic product (GDP)  6, 33, 83, 87 Grupo de Investigación en Gobierno, Administración y Políticas Públicas (GIGAPP)  51 Guardiancich, I.  256 Guipuzkoa law  189 Gunther, R.  6, 7, 85

H Haas, P.H.  115 Hamann, K.  248, 249 Hausman, W.  29 Head, B.W.  68, 73 health  218, 295, 317 Health Barometer  179, 180 health technologies  91–​2 healthcare  173, 196 Heery, E.  249 Heidenrich, M.  128 Heinelt, H.  113

333

Policy Analysis in Spain Heins, E.  129 Held, D.  194 Helfen, M.  266 Hendriks, C.M.  197, 199 Hennessy, A.  131 Hershey, M.R.  225 Hesse, J.J.  103 Heywood, P.  83 Higgot, R.  286 higher education  92; see also universities historical policy analysis  21–​38 1830s to 1880s  24–​6 1914–​1923  27–​30 1923–​1939  30–​1 1939–​1959  32–​4 1959–​1975  34–​7 end of 19th and early 20th century  26–​7 late 18th and early 19th centuries  23–​4 Hood, C.  90 Howlett, M.  1, 48, 67 Hudson, A.  286 human resources, political parties  229, 230

I Iberian Association of Evaluation Professionals (APROEVAL)  52 Ibero-​American Network for International Studies (RIBEI)  311 IBEX 35  312, 313, 314, 315, 316 Ibsen, C.L.  266 ICES (Institut Catòlic de Ciències Socials de Barcelona)  33 ICFTU (International Confederation of Free Trade Unions)  248 Idescat  95–​6 IEMed (European Institute of the Mediterranean)  309, 315–​16 IGADI  309, 310 Ignazi, P.  228 IMDEA  309 IMF (International Monetary Fund)  4, 34, 128, 129, 130 immigrant population  180 immigration  175, 177; see also migration impact indicators  310 INAP (National Institute of Public Administration)  51, 108 independent agencies  69–​71 independent authority for fiscal responsibility (AIReF)  69–​70, 74 independent reporting  73–​4 indicative planning  36

334

Informe FOESSA  36 infrastructure  275 Initiativa Legislativa Popular  188 input legitimacy  255, 256 Institut Català d’Investigacions Estadístiques  31 Institut Catòlic de Ciències Socials de Barcelona (ICES)  33 Institut d’Estudis Regionals i Metropolitans de Barcelona (IERMB)  115, 116 Institut de Govern i Polítiques Públiques (IGOP)  115–​16, 209 Institute of Economic Studies  303 Institute of Fiscal Studies (IEF)  see Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (IEF) Institute of Public Goods and Policies  309 institutional participation  252–​3 institutionalisation  parliamentary commissions  26–​7 policy evaluation  53–​4 trade unions  250–​2 Instituto de Empresa Familiar (IEF)  270–​1, 275–​6 Instituto Español de Comercio Exterior (ICEX)  278 Instituto de Estudios Fiscales (IEF)  35, 70, 269, 279–​80, 314 Instituto de Estudios Políticos (IEP)  32, 33, 35 Instituto Nacional de Administración Pública (INAP)  51, 108 Instituto de la Opinión Pública (IOP)  35, 166–​7, 269 Instituto de Reformas Sociales  26, 30 inter-​municipal associations  105 interest groups  5, 6, 9, 10, 75, 265 Agenda 2030  94–​5 parliamentary appearances  142, 150–​1, 152, 154, 160 and political parties  226–​7 Q-​Dem survey  284 see also business associations; civil society actors; non-​governmental organisations (NGOs); trade unions international actors  12; see also international/​ intergovernmental organisations (IOs) international affairs  see foreign policy and international affairs think tanks International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU)  248 international/​intergovernmental organisations (IOs)  72, 124–​36 global crises  129–​34 influence on state policies  126–​9

Index International Monetary Fund (IMF)  4, 34, 128, 129, 130 International Observatory of Participatory Democracy  191 international organisations  4, 75, 304 International Organization for Cooperation in Evaluation (IOCE)  53, 60n19 international policy  218 intra-​parliamentary resources  142, 154–​9, 160–​1 investigation committees  143, 149 Ireland  52, 72, 130, 186 Isabel II  27 ISGlobal (Barcelona Institute for Global Health)  309, 310, 311, 317, 318 ISTAS  260 Italy  72, 130, 131, 133, 192, 215, 218–​19 IU (Izquierda Unida)  157, 227, 228, 236 IVALUA (Institut Català d’Avaluació de les Polítiques Publiques)  92–​3

J Jacob, B.  72 Jacobs, L.  165 Jaume Bifill Foundation  191, 200n7 Jensen, H.  142 Jiménez, F.  89, 196, 199, 288, 291 Jimeno, J.F.  265 Jolliff, B.  125, 127 Jones, B.D.  176 Jones, N.  77 Jordana, J.  7, 8, 9, 130, 134, 250, 286 journal articles  218 Jovellanos, G.M. de  23, 24 Jupille, J.  125, 127

K Kasperskaya, Y.  70 Katz, R.S.  225 Keating, M.  85 Kelly, J.  249 Klingemann, H.-​D.  232 Knoke, D.  290 knowledge structuring  225 Köhler, H.-​D.  249 Kohoutek, J.  48 Krehbiel, K.  141, 144 Krücken, G.  125

L labour  173, 218 labour market policies  252–​3

labour market reforms  265 Lantarón, D.  255 Lapuente, V.  89 Lara, C.  228 large cities  109–​12, 118n1 Largo Caballero Foundation  258 Larruga, E.  23 late Francoism  23, 34–​7 Latin America  311 Laver, M.  142 lawyers  48–​9, 158–​9 leadership  142 LECE (Liga Europea de Cooperación Económica)  33 Leech, B.L.  286 Leeuw, F.L.  67 Legal Studies Cabinet  259 Leston-​Bandeira, C.  143 Levarlet, F.  94 Li, S.H.  255 Liberal Revolution  11, 21, 23–​4, 37 Lifelong Learning Foundation (FORCEM) 252 Liga Europea de Cooperación Económica (LECE)  33 Lindquist, E.  1, 67 Linz, J.  35, 37, 283 Lisi, M.  286, 292 Llamazares, G.  228 Llera, R.F.  88 Lo Presti, I.M.  238 local councils  195, 196 local entities  104 Local Government Act  103, 105, 107, 110, 118n1 local governments  78, 102–​18 analysts and objects of analysis  114–​16 compulsory tasks  105–​7 expenditure  98n10 large cities  109–​12 non-​compulsory activities  107–​9 and non-​governmental organisations  287 plurality and stratification  103–​5 provinces  113–​14 public expenditure  78 LOLS (Organic Law on Union Freedom)  250, 252 Lombardo, E.  8 Longo, J.  55 López-​Novo, J.P.  283 López Rodó, L.  36 Luaces, P.  110

335

Policy Analysis in Spain M MacRae, D.  67 Madoz, P.  24 Madrid  103, 115 business conferences  269 CCOO (Comissiones Obreras)  260 participatory institutions  190 research centres  208 research output  216 research projects  212 think tanks  303 urban planning  109, 110 Magaldi Fernandez, A.  237 Magre, J.  103 Mair, P.  225 Majone, G.  56 Malaga  189 management strategies  90 mancomunidades  105 Manyika, J.  72 Marbán, V.  283, 285 Marcet, J.  229 Mark, M.M.  53 Márquez, G.  110 Martín, J.  230, 235 Martin, L.W.  144 Martínez, R.E.  266 Martínez Lucio, M.  249 Martínez-​Palacios, J.  192 Martinón, R.  7 Martisi, B.C.  230, 235 Mas, A.  229 Mateo, G.  8, 286 Mateos, A.  7 Mateu, M.  33 Mattson, I.  141 May First Foundation  259 Mayntz, R.  76 McGann, J.  304, 305, 307–​8 McNutt, K.  55 Medina, I.  266, 267, 270 Medir, L.  103, 107 Mees, L.  229 Members of Parliament (MPs)  13, 145, 154–​8, 160–​1 participation in parliamentary committees  156 tenure in parliamentary committees  155 Mendez, J.L.  55 Méndez, M.  180, 228, 235 metropolitan areas  110 Meyer, J.W.  124, 125, 127

336

migration  218; see also immigration Miguel, A. de  34 Miguélez, F.  249, 253, 256 Millerson, G.  46 Miñano, S.  23 minimum income scheme  240 ministerial cabinets  78–​9 Ministry of Finance  70, 278 Ministry of Labour  278 Ministry of Public Health  278 Ministry of Science and Innovation  207, 211 Mirrlees, J.  103 Moe, T.M.  78 Molas, I.  228 Molina, I.  75 Molina, Ó.  246, 248, 249, 253, 255, 256 Molins, J.  8, 265, 266, 270 Molins López-​Rodó, J.M.  290 Monés, M.A.  88 monographic surveys  169, 171, 173, 181 Montalvo, J.  246 Montpetit, E.  10 Morales, J.C.  240 Morales Arroyo, J.M.  189 Moran, M.  225 Morata, F.  8, 266 Moreno, L.  125, 287 Moroccan War  26 most important problem (MIP) data  169–​70 most representative organisations  250 Mota, F.  83, 287 multilevel governance  8–​10 municipal compulsory activities  106 municipal governments  12; see also local governments municipal system  103 municipalities  see large cities municipalities and population  105 Muñoz, L.M.  142, 150, 154, 160, 284 Muñoz Marquez, L.  283, 286, 287, 288, 291, 292 Muñoz Sánchez, A.  238 Murcia  109 Murphy, J.  142 Musso, J.  194

N Nagel, K.J.  85 Napoleonic administrative model  88–​9 National Agency for Quality Assessment and Accreditation pf Spain (ANECA)  92 national government  see central government

Index National Institute of Public Administration (INAP)  51, 108 National Observatory for Telecommunications and Information Society (ONTSI)  71 National Security Law 2015  149 NATO referendum  172–​3, 188 Navarra  88, 93 Navarro, C.  107, 110, 113, 114, 190, 193, 194, 196, 198, 199 Navrbjerg, S.E.  266 neo-​corporatism  251 Netherlands  72, 131 new managerialism  90 Nez, H.  193 Nieto, A.  230 Noferini, A.  86 non-​governmental organisations (NGOs)  3, 6, 9, 14, 283–​98 on advisory councils (ACs)  196 frequency of policy analysis  295 information prepared by  289 international aid  75 involvement in debates on bills  294 involvement in policy process  285–​7 monitoring policy implementation  291–​6 organisational features and policy analysis capacity  287–​90 in parliamentary committees  293, 298 participatory consulting  290–​1 as policy experts  296 years of establishment  286 non-​permanent committees  143–​4, 145, 149 non-​state-​wide parties (NSWP)  228–​9, 233, 237, 238 Nonell, R.  266, 267, 270 Noordegraaf, M.  47

O OEEC  34 Oñate, P.  227 ONTSI (National Observatory for Telecommunications and Information Society)  71 Open Method of Coordination (OMC)  128 Open Think Tank Directory  305 OPEX (Foreign Policy Observatory)  316 Organic Law on Union Freedom (LOLS)  250, 252 Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development (OECD)  4, 5, 12, 87, 88, 127 Ortega, C.  227

Ortega y Gasset-​Gregorio Marañón Foundation (FOM)  311 Otero, L.E.  110 output indicators  310 Oxfam Intermón  292, 295

P Pablo, S  229 Pablo Iglesias Foundation  see Fundación Pablo Iglesias Page, B.I.  165 Page, E.  103 Pajín, L.  294 Palafox, J.  31 Palau, A.  7, 8, 165 Pannowitsch, S.  50, 55 Pano, E.  103, 113 Pantín, J.M.  227 para-​public associations  108 Paris Peace Treaty  27 Parker, A.  10 parliamentary commissions  22, 24–​7, 37 parliamentary committees  13, 141–​61 characteristics and types  143–​5 extra-​parliamentary resources  150–​4, 160 intra-​parliamentary resources  154–​9, 160–​1 MP participation  156 MP tenure  155 non-​governmental organisations (NGOs)  292, 293, 298 number and type by legislature  146 permanent legislative committees  147 scope of policy analysis  145–​50 Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology Advice  159 parliamentary politics  22 Parrado, S.  50, 69, 70, 71, 78, 79 participatory consulting  290–​1 participatory institutions  13, 186–​99 actors and issues  190–​2 advisory councils (ACs)  193–​8 impact  192–​3 territorial and longitudinal perspective  188–​90 Partido Nacionalista Vasco (PNV)  229 Partido Reformista  237 partisan think tanks  304, 316–​17 party manifestos  177, 229, 236–​7 party think tanks  226, 227, 229–​32, 233–​4, 235–​6, 238, 240 Pavolini, E.  130 Pazos, M.  52

337

Policy Analysis in Spain Pedersini, R.  256 Pendás, B.  158 People’s Party (PP)  see Popular Party (PP) percolation model  203, 204, 220, 221 Pérez-​Díaz, V.  283 Pérez Durán, I.  8 Pérez-​Nievas, S.  229 Pérez Yruela, M.  283, 286 permanent joint committees  148–​9 permanent legislative committees  143, 145, 146, 147, 148 Perpiñà i Grau, Romà  29, 31 Peters, B.G.  10 Piattoni, S.  89 PIMEB  270 PIMEC  270 PISA (Programme for International Student Assessment)  127 Planells-​Artigot, E.  309 Plataforma de Acción Social  284 Plataforma de ONGs de Acción Social  287, 288 plenaries  144, 194 Plotke, D.  265 PNV (Partido Nacionalista Vasci)  157, 158, 237 Podemos  228, 233, 236–​7, 246 Poland  186 policy actors  3–​5, 6, 7–​8, 21, 177, 190–​2, 195–​7 policy advice  67, 197, 205, 290–​1 policy advisers  1, 56, 77–​9 policy analysis  1–​6 evolution  47–​8 historical forerunners  21–​38 1830s to 1880s  24–​6 1914–​1923  27–​30 1923–​1939  30–​1 1939–​1959  32–​4 1959–​1975  34–​7 end of 19th and early 20th century  26–​7 late 18th and early 19th centuries  23–​4 postgraduate programmes  57–​8 previous research  6–​8 professionalisation  48–​56 v. policy advice  67 policy analysis agencies  69–​71 policy analysis instruments  91–​3 policy analysis tools  21, 235–​6 policy analysts  47–​8, 56, 114–​16 policy assessment  21 policy coherence  84, 97n3 policy concertation  254–​6 policy design  114

338

policy evaluation  11, 21, 46 academics  205 Ancien Régime and Liberal Revolution  23–​4 European Union (EU)  52–​3 evolution  47–​8 parliamentary commissions  24–​5 postgraduate programmes  49–​51, 55, 57–​8 professional associations  52 regional governments  92–​3 Spanish Agency for the Evaluation of Public Policies and Quality of Services  53–​4, 55–​6 policy experts  see experts policy implementation  291–​6 policy-​makers  1, 10, 289–​90 policy-​making  1–​2 advisory councils (ACs)  197 Civil War  31 evidence-​based  142 local  105–​7 policy concertation  254–​6 political dimension  73 political parties  225, 227, 239 policy networks  7 policy paradox  227 policy reforms  68–​9 policy research output  214–​19 distribution of topics  218 number of papers  217 yearly publications  215 political appointees  78 political behaviour  173, 175 political communities  308 political demand model  203, 204, 220, 221 political historians  21 political interests  73 political parties  14, 225–​41 basic info  241 human resources  230 international connections  238 and parliamentary committees  144–​5, 157 policy analysis and governance  239–​40 policy analysis capabilities  227–​32 policy analysis tools and strategies  234–​9 policy areas  232–​4 public opinion surveys  177 sectoral organisation in executives  233 and unions  258 see also party think tanks political science  49, 59n4 political scientists  49 PoliticalWatch  309

Index politicians  73, 289–​90 Pollitt, C.  68, 90 Ponsa, F.  229, 230, 231, 234, 235, 236, 238, 305, 307, 308 Popular Party (PP)  delegation  236 non-​governmental organisations (NGOs)  292 parliamentary committees  146, 157, 158 policy analysis capabilities  228, 229 policy analysis and governance  240 public administration reforms  253 public opinion surveys  177, 178 think tanks  233–​4, 316 ports  274 Portugal  130, 131 post-​election surveys  170, 179, 181 postgraduate programmes  49–​51, 55, 57–​8 Powell, C.  238 PP (Partido Popular)  delegation  236 non-​governmental organisations (NGOs)  292 parliamentary committees  146, 157, 158 policy analysis capabilities  228, 229 policy analysis and governance  240 public administration reforms  253 public opinion surveys  177, 178 think tanks  233–​4, 316 Pradera, J.  228 pre-​election surveys  167, 170, 179, 181 Primo de Rivera dictatorship  22, 30–​1 private initiatives  36 professional associations  51–​2 professionalisation  48–​56, 227–​8 professions  46–​7 Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA)  127 Promociona Project  278 Pross, A.P.  10 provinces  105, 113–​14 provincial governments  189 PSOE (Partido Socialista Obero Español)  delegation  236, 237 lobbies  246 loss of majority  168 parliamentary committees  145, 157, 158 policy analysis capabilities  228, 229 policy analysis and governance  239–​40 public opinion surveys  177 think tanks  234, 258–​9 trade unions  248, 252

public actors  190–​1 public administrations  190–​1, 196, 219, 228 public expenditure  87 public foundations  108 public health  see healthcare public investment  88 public management  90 public officials  153, 154, 160 public opinion data  169–​71 Public Opinion Institute (IOP)  35, 166–​7 public opinion surveys  165–​83 Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas (CIS)  166–​9 evolution over time  171–​3 policy areas covered  173–​5 variation over time  175–​9 public opinion data produced  169–​71 territorial scope and target population  179–​81 public participation  see citizen participation public policy analysis  49 public policy postgraduate programmes  49–​51, 55, 57–​8 public revenue  88 public sector actors  191 Puig, N.  32 Pujol, J.  228–​9

Q Quality of Democracy (Q-​Dem)  143, 284, 287, 288, 289, 290, 295, 297 quasi-​private foundations  108–​9

R Radaelli, C.M.  115, 128 Radcliff, P.B.  21 Radin, B.A.  47, 48, 56 railway  24, 25, 29, 67 Rajoy governments  fiscal policy  240 interest groups  151 non-​governmental organisations (NGOs)  294 parliamentary committees  148, 149 policy analysis  228 policy concertation  256 vocational training  253 Rajoy, M.  292 Rama, P.  110 Ramió, C.  88 Rautalin, M.  127 re-​municipalisation  107

339

Policy Analysis in Spain Rebolloso, E.  52 Reed, M.I.  47 referenda  172–​3, 188, 199n1 Reformist Party  237 Regan, A.  249 Regini, M.  256 Regional Authority Index  86 regional councils  195, 196 regional elections  179 regional governments  4, 9, 12, 83–​97, 266 Agenda 2030  93–​6 citizen participation  189 closed policy analysis model (1978–​1995)  88–​9 expenditure and revenues  87–​8 intergovernmental bodies  72 and non-​governmental organisations  287 policy analysis instruments  91–​3 public opinion surveys  172, 173–​4 Spain’s territorial configuration  84–​7 towards a more open policy analysis model (1996–​2020)  90–​1 regional parties  see non-​state-​wide parties (NSWP) regions  97n1 Registry of Universities, Centres and Degrees (RUCT)  207 REI (Elcano Royal Institute)  309, 310, 311, 315, 318 representativeness  250 Republican Left of Catalonia (ERC)  157 Requejo, F.  85, 204, 205 research bureaux (servicio de estudios)  28–​31, 32, 33–​5, 37, 257–​8 research centres  13–​14, 115–​16, 203–​21, 314 competitive research projects  211–​14 geographical location  212 by policy area  213 evolution of  210 geographical distribution  208 per policy area  210 policy analysis  205–​11 policy research output  214–​19 distribution of topics  218 number of papers  217 yearly publications  215 see also think tanks research infrastructure  207–​8 research institutes  76, 192 research projects  211–​14 geographical location  212 by policy area  213

340

resource indicators  309 resources  see extra-​parliamentary resources; intra-​parliamentary resources Revilla, M.  283 Rhodes, R.A.W.  278 Riba, C.  205 RIBEI (Ibero-​American Network for International Studies)  311 Riquer, B.de  28 risk  69 Risse, T.  125 Rist, R.C.  52 Rivera, R.  54 Robles Egea, A.  227 Robles Piquer, C.  233 Rodríguez, G.  283 Rodríguez, R.  113, 114 Rodríguez Canrero, G.  283 Rodríguez-​Teruel, J.  226, 237, 239 Rogers, J.  194 Rourke, F.E.  154 Ruìz Martìnez, A.  54 Ruíz Olabuénaga, J.I.  283, 287 Russell, M.  141

S Saalfeld, T.  154, 157 Sabatier, P.A.  1 Sacchi, S.  130 Salamon, L.M.  285 sales tax  26–​7 Salisbury, R.H.  265 Sánchez de Dios, M.  145 Sánchez government  148, 149, 151 Sánchez Recio, G.  265 Sancho, D.  7, 8 Sandahl, R.  52 Santillán-​García, A.  159 Sanz-​Menédez, L.  8 Sardá, J.  34, 40–​1n40 Saretzki, T.  204 Saura, G.  240 Scharpf, F.W.  76 Schattan, V.  196 Science in Parliament campaign  159 scientific journals  51 SCOPUS  214–​15, 216, 217 Scott, B.  317, 319 Second Republic  31, 268 sector conferences  72 security issues  9, 177 self-​employment  271

Index semi-​autonomous agencies  69–​71 Senén, M.  160 Serrano, A.  125 servicio de estudios  28–​31, 32, 33–​5, 37, 257–​8 Sesma Landrín, N.  32, 33 Sevilla  109, 110 Shapiro, R.Y.  165 Sharpe, L.J.  103 Shepsle, K.A.  142 Sindicato Vertical  32, 269 singular entities  294 Sintomer, Y.  194, 195 Slaughter, A.-​M.  317, 319 small and medium enterprises (SMEs)  270, 274 Social Action NGO Platform  284 social behaviour  173, 175 social construction approach  1, 2 social media  77 social movements  249–​50 social policies  128, 218, 291, 295, 296 social reforms  267 Social Reforms Commission  see Commission for Social Reform Social Reforms Institute  26, 30 social sciences institutes  see Instituto de la Opinión Pública (IOP) Socialist Youth  236 Sociedad Española de Evaluación (SEE)  52 Sociedad de Estudios Económicos  25 socio-​economic issues  233 sociologists  49 Sokolowski, W.  285 Solé, C.  265 Sorribas-​Navarro, P.  88 sovereign debt crisis  129–​30, 253; see also financial crisis Spain  policy analysis in  3–​6 territorial configuration  84–​7 Spanish Agency for the Evaluation of Public Policies and Quality of Services  53–​4, 55–​6, 60n24, 60n25 Spanish-​American War  27 Spanish Association of Political Science and Administration  51 Spanish Constitution  85, 87, 88 Spanish Evaluation Society  52 Spanish Federation of Sociology  51–​2 Spanish Government Third Plan for Open Government (2017)  189 Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies  303, 309, 319

Spanish Network of Health Technology Agencies  91–​2 Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party (PSOE)  delegation  236, 237 lobbies  246 loss of majority  168 parliamentary committees  145, 157, 158 policy analysis and governance  239–​40 policy analysis capabilities  228, 229 public opinion surveys  177 think tanks  234, 258–​9 trade unions  248, 252 Spanish Think Tank Observatory (STTO)  306 spin doctors  77 sports  146 Stabilisation Plan  36 State of the Autonomies  85, 87 Strøm, K.  141, 144, 145, 154, 157 structural reforms  271 structured-​interaction approach  1–​2 Stuart, M.  249 Suárez, A.  269 subcommittees  144, 149–​50 Subirats, J.  6, 7, 8, 49, 83, 85, 97, 102, 226 subnational government expenditure and revenue  87–​8 supranational organisations  129 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)  93, 94, 95, 317 Sustainable Governance Indicators  75 Sweden  131

T Talpin, J.  193 tariff policy  24, 25, 29 Tascó Fernández, J.  265 Tatham, M.  86 taxes  26–​7, 28, 173 Technology Assessment Offices  159 Tello, M.  305 territorial configuration  84–​7 terrorism  177 textbooks  49 Theodoropoulou, S.  130 think tanks  5, 10, 14, 15, 75, 206, 219, 303–​24 business associations  271 classification  305–​6 definition and typology  304–​5 financial transparency  306–​7 Germany  238 influence on politics and policy  307–​11 major Spanish think tanks  311–​17

341

Policy Analysis in Spain ordered by Twitter followers  320–​4 political parties  226, 227, 229–​32, 233–​4, 235–​6, 238, 240 trade unions  258–​9 United States  239 Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program (TTCSP)  305 Thissen, W.  50 Thomas, C.W.  115 Tiernan, A.  67 Tomàs, M.  110 Tooze, A.  131 top-​down approach  1, 2 Torfing, J.  286 Torralvo  88 Torre, J. de la  36 Torres, E.  32 Torres Albero, C.  167 tourism  146, 218 trade  295; see also foreign trade trade liberalisation  35 Trade Union Institute of Work, Environment and Health  260 trade unionist leaders  30 trade unions  3, 6, 9, 14, 246–​62 and advisory councils (ACs)  196 and central government  75 Franco dictatorship  32 labour market reforms  265 labour market regulation  269 organisational structure  256–​7, 262n8 policy analysis in  256–​60, 261 and the policy process  250–​6, 261 as political actors  247–​50, 261 politicisation  262n6 public opinion surveys  173 suspension  30 transparency  112, 198, 227 financial  306–​7 Transparency organisation  306 Tripartite Foundation for Lifelong Learning  252 Triviño-​Salazar, J.C.  130, 134 Troika  129, 130 Trow, M.  203 Tudela, J.  159 Twitter followers  309, 312, 313, 315, 316, 319, 320–​4

U UCM (Complutense University of Madrid)  213 umbrella organisations  287, 289, 291, 292, 295, 299n6

342

undergraduate degree curricula  48–​9, 55 union crisis  249 Unión General de Trabajadores (UGT)  248, 250, 251, 252, 253, 257–​8, 259 United Kingdom  72, 73 United Left (IU)  157, 227, 228, 236 United Nations  124 United States  27, 239 universities  203–​21 and central government  76 competitive research projects  211–​14 geographical location  212 by policy area  213 Franco dictatorship  37 policy analysis  13–​14, 192, 205–​11 policy research output  214–​19 distribution of topics  218 number of papers  217 yearly publications  215 postgraduate programmes  49–​51, 55, 57–​8 undergraduate degree curricula  48–​9, 55 university-​affiliated think tanks  304 University of the Basque Country  209 University of Lleida  213 University of València (UV)  209 urban planning  109, 192 urban policies  218 utilisation indicators  309

V Vaitsman, J.  56 Valencia  advisory councils (ACs)  195 business associations  270 business conferences  269 CCOO (Comissiones Obreras)  260 research centres  208, 209 research output  216 research projects  212 urban planning  109 Vallès, J.M.  49, 204 Vampa, D.  85 Vanberg, G.  144 Vandellós, J.A.  31 Velasco, F.  107 Velasco, M.  115 Ventosa, J.A.  33 Vera, J.  26 Verge, T.  226, 227, 235, 236 Vila, B.  144 Vilalta, M.  103

Index Villar Palasí, J.L.  35–​6 Villares, R.  21 Viñas, V.  52, 53, 207 Visser, J.  249 vocational training  253 Vogel, D.  265 Vox 228, 233 vulnerable people  292

Wilson, A.  85 Wollman, H.  67 working conditions  173 working groups  144, 149–​50, 194, 274 World Bank  34 World Health Organization (WHO)  128–​9, 132–​3, 134, 135, 136 Wright, V.  78

W

X

Walgrave, S.  177 waste management  106 water provision  106 Weaver, R.K.  304 web presence  198 Weiss, C.H.  141, 142 welfare  107–​8, 125, 173 welfare state  286–​7 Wellstead, A.M.  48 Werner, H.  199 Wildavsky, A.  1 Wilkerson, J.D:  141 Williamson, A.  306–​7

Xifré, R.  70

Y Yildiz, M.  50 youth policies  236 Ysàs, H.  246 Ysmal, C.  228

Z Zapatero governments  146, 148, 151, 178, 239–​40, 292, 294 Zapico-​Goñi, E.  52, 53 Zeitlin, J.  128

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“This book provides an unprecedented contribution to the study of policy analysis in Spain. It is a must-read for anyone seeking to understand the challenges of policy making in a multilevel governance context.” Charlotte Halpern, Sciences Po, Centre for European Studies and Comparative Politics “An all-star cast of experts provide a much-needed overview of the most important elements of how policy analysis is organised in Spain. This book will interest anyone who wants to understand why Spanish governments do what they do.” Frank R. Baumgartner, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill This book is the first systematic study of policy analysis activities in Spain. It provides a comprehensive overview of how policy actors, including politicians, think tanks, researchers, interest groups and experts, generate information for the policy-making process. The book explores how executive and legislative actors participate in the production of policy analysis and how all actors elaborate and disseminate information on policy analysis. Contributors consider the ways different policy actors are involved in the production of data and information about policy problems, the resources used to produce policy analysis and the type of analysis produced over time in different policy areas. Features of the ILPA series • a systematic study of policy analysis systems by government and non-governmental actors • a history of the country’s policy analysis, empirical case studies and a comparative overview • a key reference for research and teaching in comparative policy analysis and policy studies Recent volumes published • Policy Analysis in Belgium, edited by Marleen Brans and David Aubin (2017) • Policy Analysis in France, edited by Charlotte Halpern, Patrick Hassenteufel and Philippe Zittoun (2018) • Policy Analysis in the United States, edited by John A. Hird (2018) • Policy Analysis in Canada, edited by Laurent Dobuzinskis and Michael Howlett (2018) • Policy Analysis in Turkey, edited by Caner Bakir and Günes Ertan (2018) • Policy Analysis in Colombia, edited by Pablo Sanabria-Pulido and Nadia Rubaii (2020) • Policy Analysis in Ireland, edited by John Hogan and Mary P. Murphy (2021) LAURA CHAQUÉS-BONAFONT is Professor of Political Science at Universitat de Barcelona and Research Fellow at Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals. JACINT JORDANA is Professor of Political Science and Public Administration at Universitat Pompeu Fabra, and Director of the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis Internacionals.

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