Plural Policing in the Global North: Insights into Concepts, Aspects and Practices 3031162722, 9783031162725

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Nathalie Hirschmann · Tobias John · Frauke Reichl · Jacqueline Abigail Garand   Editors

Plural Policing in the Global North Insights into Concepts, Aspects and Practices

Plural Policing in the Global North

Nathalie Hirschmann • Tobias John • Frauke Reichl • Jacqueline Abigail Garand Editors

Plural Policing in the Global North Insights into Concepts, Aspects and Practices

Editors Nathalie Hirschmann University of Münster Münster, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Germany

Tobias John University of Münster Münster, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Germany

Frauke Reichl University of Münster Münster, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Germany

Jacqueline Abigail Garand University of Münster Münster, Nordrhein-Westfalen, Germany

ISBN 978-3-031-16272-5 ISBN 978-3-031-16273-2 https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16273-2

(eBook)

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

The production of public security and order is constantly changing. In many countries, a growing number of organisations, institutions, and a variety of (police and non-police) stakeholders are involved in policing activities aiming to achieve public security and order. This development is discussed as “pluralisation of policing” or “plural policing”. The specific shape of plural policing differs between countries. But as day-to-day security is mainly produced at the local level, local actions are highly significant for combatting crime and disorder, maintaining or producing safety, security, and order, and increasing the public’s sense of security. In the context of this local nature, there is also a diversity of plural policing in each country. This allows us to identify a broad range of possibilities for designing plural policing that could be transferable between countries. This volume is based on the contents of a virtual workshop in 2021, hosted by the junior research group “Pluralisation of local urban security production—interdisciplinary analysis for a context adequate, legitimate, efficient and effective plural policing (PluS-i)” situated at the Institute of Political Science, University of Münster (Germany). The PluS-i project is funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research in the context of the call “Promotion of young researchers by establishing interdisciplinary competences” in the programme “research for civil security 2012– 2017”. By examining different basic concepts of plural policing and comparing examples of national approaches, a range of case studies from the Global North can be provided, to complement and update the existing literature on plural policing. This is particularly relevant with regard to plural policing, as it is hardly possible to speak of a new phenomenon anymore. Instead of looking at the “newness” of plural policing and its basic structures in different countries, this book puts an emphasis on more specific aspects and practices of plural policing deriving from (local) examples

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in different countries of the Global North about which little is known so far. Hence, the book aims to feature a broader view of plural policing by providing insights into the different ways in which policing is pluralised in the Global North. Münster, Germany May 2022

Nathalie Hirschmann Tobias John Frauke Reichl Jacqueline Garand

Contents

Plural Policing in the Global North . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tobias John, Jacqueline Garand, Frauke Reichl, and Nathalie Hirschmann Part I

Concepts of Plural Policing in the Global North

The Contradictory Institutionalization of Plural Policing in Continental Europe: A Comparative Perspective . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Jan Terpstra A Taxonomy of Plural Policing in the United States . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Seth W. Stoughton Plural Policing in Germany—Heterogeneity and the Contingency of Its Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Tobias John Part II

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Practices of Plural Policing

Plural Policing of Immigrant Neighbourhoods in Germany: An Understanding of the Concept and Resulting Recommendations for Action . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bernhard Frevel and Sigrid Pehle Supporting and Developing Police Support Volunteers in a Large Urban Constabulary in England, UK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Melissa Pepper

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Volunteer Police Services in Germany: Two Case Studies on Goals and Underlying Forms of Legitimacy .. . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111 Frauke Reichl

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Plural Policing in Norway: Regulation, Collaboration, and the Public Interests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 Martin Nøkleberg Part III

Additional Aspects of Plural Policing

Pluralized Narratives of Security: Descriptive Insights from the Private Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161 Massimo Fattori, Gabriele Jacobs, and Daniel Trottier Trust in Private Security: Current Research in Finland.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 177 Elsa Saarikkomäki, Jyri Paasonen, and Sanna Haarla “If You Put Two Lazy People Together or Two Stupid People Together, You Don’t Get Much Out of It”. A German Case Study on Plural Policing and Crime-Related Feelings of (In-)Security in an Inner-City Area .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197 Benjamin Coomann, Saskia Kretschmer, and Tim Lukas Empirical Insights into the Complexity of a Pluralised Security Work: “It Is Very Complex, Which of Course Also Does Not Always Work Completely Smoothly” .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 217 Nathalie Hirschmann and Frauke Reichl

Editors and Contributors

About the Editors Nathalie Hirschmann is a sociologist and criminologist. She is project leader of the junior research group “Pluralisation of local urban security production— interdisciplinary analysis for a context adequate, legitimate, efficient and effective plural policing (PluS-i)” at the Institute of Political Science at the University of Münster (Germany), which is funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research. Previously, she worked as researcher in various projects. Her research interests are amongst others the sociology of professions and organisational sociology in the context of security, criminology, and empirical social science research. She received a doctorate at the University of Potsdam. In her doctoral thesis, she focused on commercial security services in Germany employing a sociology of professions and neo-institutionalist perspective. She is also a trainer for behavioural and communication training and a coach. She has written a range of academic articles and papers in the areas of plural policing, commercial security production, criminology, and security product certification. Tobias John is a political scientist and at the moment deputy head of the junior research group PluS-i at the Institute of Political Science at the University of Münster (Germany) funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research. Beforehand, he was involved in research projects regarding crime prevention (“KoSiPol”) as well as security in public transportation (“SkoBB”). He received a doctorate in political science at the University of Münster (Germany). In his doctoral thesis, he examined a theoretical perspective focusing on inconsistent developments in the political area of internal security. Frauke Reichl is a political scientist. She is a research assistant at the PluS-i project at the Institute of Political Science at the University of Münster (Germany). Within PluS-i she is dealing with aspects of legitimacy and context adequacy regarding police volunteers and citizen policing groups. Her research interests are amongst others citizen participation, state and security production, vigilantism, and ix

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digital vigilantism. She has written articles on police volunteers, citizen policing groups, and digilantism. Jacqueline Garand graduated in European Studies and is currently doing her master’s degree in political science at the University of Münster (Germany). In the context of the PluS-i project, she is a student research assistant. Her research interest includes security production in urban spaces and the perception of order and security in cities.

Contributors Benjamin Coomann VDI Technologiezentrum, Düsseldorf, Germany Massimo Fattori Department of Media and Communication of Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands Bernhard Frevel University of Applied Sciences for Police and Public Administration in North Rhine-Westphalia in Münster, Münster, Germany Sanna Haarla Institute of Criminology and Legal Policy, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland Gabriele Jacobs Erasmus University College, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands Saskia Kretschmer Institute for Public Safety and Emergency Management, University of Wuppertal, Wuppertal, Germany Tim Lukas Institute for Public Safety and Emergency Management, University of Wuppertal, Wuppertal, Germany Martin Nøkleberg NORCE Norwegian Research Centre, Bergen, Norway Jyri Paasonen University of Vaasa, Vaasa, Finland Sigrid Pehle Institute of Political Science, University of Münster, Münster, Germany Melissa Pepper School of Law and Criminology, University of Greenwich, London, UK Elsa Saarikkomäki Faculty of Law, University of Turku, Turku, Finland Seth W. Stoughton University of South Carolina School of Law, Columbia, USA Jan Terpstra Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands Daniel Trottier Department of Media and Communication of Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, Netherlands

Plural Policing in the Global North Tobias John, Jacqueline Garand, Frauke Reichl, and Nathalie Hirschmann

Abstract In the last decades the production of public security and order, ultimately seen as a responsibility of the state, has seen changes across the world. Nowadays a variety of (police and non-police) stakeholders are involved in policing activities, a development discussed as ‘pluralisation of policing’ or plural policing. Plural policing varies on the international level as well as on the local level, since day-today security is mainly produced locally. This book brings together a group of authors providing their perspectives on basic concepts, specific aspects and practices of plural policing with a focus on the Global North. These contributions are presented and placed into the context of the broader concept of the book. Keywords Policing · Security · Public security · Plural policing · Security production · Security stakeholders · Local urban security production

The state of security and order is one aspect of the basic human need of safety (Maslow 1943) and a central need for societies and people’s community life, competing with but also enabling the other basic need of modern democratic societies and community life—freedom. As such, the provision of security is an important task in societies, mainly attributed to the state. Following Weber (1922, 29–30) statehood is established by the existence of a state’s monopoly on the use of force, defining the understanding of states. Since the possibility of using force is a necessary condition for enforcing internal security and order, the state—in this view—has the role of ensuring internal security and order. If the state cannot provide such security, the monopoly on the use of force would be called into question and hence, statehood itself could be called into question too (John 2012, 7–9). In this view internal security and order—at its core, the activities known as policing, which encompass “organized forms of order maintenance, peacekeeping, rule or law

T. John () · J. Garand · F. Reichl · N. Hirschmann University of Münster, Münster, Germany e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. Hirschmann et al. (eds.), Plural Policing in the Global North, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16273-2_1

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enforcement, crime investigation and prevention and other forms of investigation and information-brokering” (Jones and Newburn 2006, 3–4)—are ultimately seen as a responsibility of the state. While this Weberian approach still forms the basis for understanding the modern state (Anter 2020, 168), the perception of the provision of policing, regarding the production of internal security and order, has changed in recent decades. Policing is confronted with pluralisation which means, it is no longer seen as limited to state— mainly police—activities. Instead, policing is changed to plural policing, involving further providers of policing (Terpstra et al. 2013, 9). Thus, an increasing amount of public, commercial, private and social sector actors are involved in ensuring and providing security and order in the public sphere. Therefore, according to Wakefield (2009, 227), “the growing role of non-police providers in policing and the diversity of different public, private, and voluntary agencies now involved in the activity” could be said to be the distinctive feature of plural policing. Moreover, it seems to be generally accepted that in many countries policing is now authorised and carried out by various networks of national and local governments, individual citizens, commercial security services, as well as public police forces. This is not necessarily affecting the Weberian criteria for statehood retaining state control over the legitimate use of force. However, it is important to gain insight into and an understanding of the pluralistic nature of policing as it may have implications for state accountability as well as for the fulfilment of meeting aspects of the basic need for safety (Maslow 1943). Since the emergence of the phenomenon of plural policing at the end of the twentieth century, numerous scholars have addressed this issue. The initial research aimed at gaining better knowledge of its impact, policing issues and reasons for its development. It should be noted here that early research focused on the AngloSaxon world (e.g., Loader (2000), Johnston (2003) for the UK, Bailey and Shearing (2001) for the USA). This led to the ambivalence that the early generalisations of the concept of plural policing were based on only one point of view, that of the Anglo-Saxon view. It was only a few years later that the first comparisons between the police structures of different European countries were elaborated, including a number of continental Western European countries such as Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and France (e. g. Jones and Newburn 2006; Terpstra et al. 2013; Terpstra and Devroe 2015). Overall, the existing literature describes plural policing as a more or less heterogenous phenomenon, with different understandings and diverging specific practices of plural policing, not only in comparison between countries but also, to some extent, in the distinctive features within the countries themselves. As such plural policing is not one homogeneous scheme of policing activities, but a trend in policing that is not fixed to a particular set of concepts, practices and aspects. In times of changing narratives and norms of security, it seems essential for plural policing to take into account the diversity of security, to bundle the different competencies of the actors in an expanded field of security and to serve the diverse expectations of the citizens. This is why the volume on plural policing aims to feature a comprehensive view on plural policing by providing insights into the

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diverse pluralisation of policing in different contexts and presenting contemporary findings on the subject.

1 Structure and Objectives of the Book The chapters in this volume discuss the general concepts of plural policing, look at practices as well as specific aspects of plural policing, and thus illustrate the variances and heterogeneities of plural policing as a phenomenon. This is done from a broader transnational perspective—specifically in relation to the Global North. Focussing on the Global North offers a range of countries with stable Western statehood, in which plural policing marks, at least in part, a change from the classic perception of policing as police or state activity, giving a collective backdrop for the discussed subjects: general concepts, practices and additional aspects of plural policing.

1.1 Concepts of Plural Policing in the Global North Although the term “plural policing” is commonly used in the research community and therefore initial findings from research in the United States of America (USA) and the United Kingdom (UK) are sometimes generalised, there is still discourse about the understanding and scope of plural policing in different contexts. Thus, there is no single concept. Instead, there are multiple understandings that diverge in their details. While the plurality of policing providers is at the core of all definitions, there are differences regarding the core conceptual dividing features between the traditional understanding of policing as primarily police task and the more recent pluralistic conception of policing. These conceptual distinctions seem to correspond with the context of different political traditions, perceived in particular in the differentiation between the Anglo-Saxon and the continental European sphere. This perceived distinctiveness of different plural policing concepts is discussed in the first section of the volume. The scope of the differences is argued, and two examples of distinctive concepts are presented. Jan Terpstra questions whether Anglo-Saxon views on plural policing, in which a blurred distinction between public and private policing is seen as key feature, also applies to continental European countries. He argues in his contribution that in Western European countries, the state is still the dominant actor and not one node among many. In doing so, Terpstra shows that the assumption of plural policing resulting from neoliberal policy is not universal, but that plural policing in continental European countries is, in contrast to the Anglophone world, less linked to marketisation and is rather characterised by public forms of non-police policing bodies. Furthermore, the pluralisation of policing in continental European countries is characterised by contradictions. While in many cases there is a reluctance against

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the privatisation of policing, pluralisation is nevertheless developing—especially on the local level certain interests and pragmatic motives are stronger than statecentred views and principles. Nevertheless, Terpstra concludes that “it may be seriously questioned if the claim of the disappearing public-private divide holds true in continental European countries”. Seth W. Stoughton shows an example of Anglo-Saxon concepts of plural policing by developing a taxonomy for the USA. This addresses the spectrum between public and private policing, as the difference between public and private policing in the USA is blurred rather than clear-cut. Understanding policing as a form of social control, the developed taxonomy has two dimensions: The intersection of the character of the entity engaged in policing and the nature of the interest served. The four parts emerging from these considerations are public policing, semiprivate public policing, semi-public private policing and private policing. While the meaning of public and private policing seems to be clear—a public interest is addressed by a public entity vs. a private interest is addressed by a private entity–, the other two forms are characterised by a misalignment. However, because of the intertwining of public and private policing Stoughton shows how the lines between public and private policing are blurred in all four parts of his taxonomy. Based on this circumstance, he pleads for a view on policing that does not narrow down on policing as a government institution but that is seen as “a practice implemented by multiple institutions, both public and private”. Tobias John provides an example for a more continental European concept of plural policing by looking at the German situation. In contrast to Stoughton’s USA-centric taxonomy, plural policing is not conceptualised around the publicprivate-divide. Instead, John presents different general developments in German policing, including a pluralisation in the public sphere itself through the addition of new public providers of policing activities—municipalities, subpolice forces and police-guided volunteers—next to privatisation tendencies. Referring to the research of the project “Pluralisation of local urban security production—interdisciplinary analysis for a context adequate, legitimate, efficient and effective plural policing (PluS-i)”, four models of plural policing are described, which also include models with plural policing that only include public providers in public space and show the heterogeneity of the pluralisation of policing in Germany. Based on the observed heterogeneity, John discusses the proclaimed distinctiveness of the different national approaches to plural policing, using a policy-making perspective based on pragmatism. He concludes by questioning the assumption of clearly delineated concepts of plural policing—e. g. an Anglo-Saxon and a continental European view.

1.2 Practices of Plural Policing in the Global North The second section of this volume encompasses contributions that examine different practices of plural policing. As has been shown in the previous section, there is great variety in terms of plural policing between different countries and the involved

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actors. For this reason, the following section aims to provide a deeper insight into specific practices of plural policing by presenting particular empirical studies. Bernhard Frevel and Sigrid Pehle discuss the requirements for security and law enforcement work in migrant neighbourhoods based on results from the project “Migration and Security in the City (migsst)”. It is made clear that “plural policing” according to, for instance, the working definition within the PluS-i project plays an important role, but only covers parts of the necessary and required security work. Thereby it is highlighted that, especially in the migrant-dominated neighbourhoods, there are special requirements for preventive work within the framework of plural policing which take into account the increased vulnerability of those neighbourhoods. Thus, it is shown that collective efficacy approaches can be used to create plural policing strategies that go beyond the more repressive control strategies of a police presence. In light of these findings, Frevel and Pehle argue that a definition or conceptualisation of plural policing in the context of a heterogeneous network should not only include institutions such as the police and regulatory authorities, but should also include various other organisations such as social services in the network. Melissa Pepper’s chapter explores the infrastructure required within the police (and beyond) to adequately support, develop and engage Police Service Volunteers (PSVs) in the UK. Her presentation is based on a mixed-methods study including PSVs, strategic stakeholders and volunteer managers. Pepper looks at the coordination of volunteers—from a top-down vision to an on-the-ground implementation—and the central role of volunteer managers in supporting and developing PSVs. Drawing on this, she elaborates the challenges police services will face in the future as they rethink and reallocate their roles—and redefine the role of PSVs in this context—against a backdrop of shifting priorities, diminishing resources and a pluralising “workforce”. In light of her research, Pepper finds that leadership and volunteer management are of growing importance, especially in light of the reduced budget admitted to the police services. Frauke Reichl’s contribution deals with voluntary policing in Germany. For this purpose, she presents two different examples of volunteer police services in two German cities asking what kind of legitimacy should be enhanced by the implementation of voluntary policing in practice. In this context, volunteer police services are understood as one tool out of a community policing toolbox. Since citizen-oriented policing is associated with increasing legitimacy, Reichl draws on Scharpf’s (1999) concept of input and output legitimacy in this context by operationalising the concept in relation to the phenomenon of voluntary policing. By discussing the goals of the two voluntary police services presented, Reichl shows that the underlying idea is to increase output rather than input legitimacy. Martin Nøkleberg, drawing on empirically grounded research—utilising qualitative data and network data—in the Norwegian context of (plural) policing at global transportation hubs, examines how the dynamics of private security regulation influence and create conditions for police actors’ working practices. Building on this, he solves the puzzle regarding the public-private partnerships that develop to secure global hubs. In light of his findings, Nøkleberg discusses the role of the

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state in plural policing arrangements in Norway. He highlights that the idea of a Nordic policing exceptionalism does not cover the full picture, as the traditional state centrism in Nordic policing is encroached on by private entities in different areas. But regarding the policing of global hubs, he questions such a paradigm shift by attributing a salient role to public policing providers. In conclusion he pleads for an empirical approach to plural policing.

1.3 Aspects of (Plural) Policing in the Global North While the general concepts and the practices of plural policing give an insight into the changes of policing in the Global North, the third section of this volume focusses on additional aspects of plural policing. The different contributions give a glimpse at implications going along with the pluralisation of policing, especially for the relation between policing providers and politics, policing providers and the public as well as relations in the policing network itself. It should be borne in mind that while the chapters provide insights, however, they do not offer a comprehensive overview of all aspects that can be taken into account for plural policing. Massimo Fattori, Gabriele Jacobs and Daniel Trottier deal with the aspect of security narratives impacted by pluralisation. Specifically, they focus on the narratives provided by the private security industry, introducing their interests to its customers, especially potential clients out of politics and administrations. Such security narratives of private stakeholders add to the states and public’s narratives and lead to a pluralisation of such narratives, potentially impacting decisions on policing as well as the public’s perception of security and policing. Based on the public presentation of security companies’ websites the authors identify the core strands of the provided security narratives and point out the potential impact the narratives generated by the industry can have on the broader security discourse. With this Fattori, Jacobs and Trottier indicate the effect that plural policing can have on the discourse regarding security and its production, caution against the risk of a dominating role of the private sector in shaping the definition and understanding of security, and advise for a “quadruple-helix dynamics that serve the public interest”. Elsa Saarikkomäki, Jyri Paasonen and Sanna Haarla discuss the aspect of trust in the context of plural policing, in particular trust in policing by private security guards in comparison to the police in Finland. Trust in policing providers is seen as important for a functioning relationship between policing providers and the public and is a central aspect on which policing activities have an impact on. While trust in the police is often viewed as high, trust in private security is often seen as more problematic. Based on a number of empirical findings, the authors reflect on trust in private security guards and identify challenges and potentials in this area. In addition, this chapter presents an innovative Finnish approach to increase trust in the relationship between private security services and the public, especially in the often tense relationship with youth groups, by expanding the training of security forces. The inclusion of social and youth-related content in a specific training programme

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is seen as positive for building trust between guards and youth groups and reducing conflicts and frictions between these groups. Benjamin Coomann, Saskia Kretschmer and Tim Lukas look at the publics feeling of (in-)security, an aspect often seen as impacted by the visibility of policing providers. In this context, the authors present findings from the research project “Kooperation Sicherheit Innenstadt/Döppersberg (KoSiD)” on the impact of plural policing on the perception of (in-)security in the inner city of Wuppertal, Germany. Based on qualitative and quantitative data Coomann, Kretschmer and Lukas link the results obtained on crime-related perceptions of security with the perceptions of policing providers, compare the impact of municipal guard services and the police, and provide statistical findings on the effects that different stakeholders in plural policing can have on this often politically debated aspect of public security and order. Nathalie Hirschmann and Frauke Reichl deal in their chapter with complexities of a pluralised security working field, more specifically with the question of how complexity manifests itself in plural policing. According to the authors, plural policing is inherently complex. This is shown by presenting three aspects of plural policing which exemplify the complexity of a pluralised security work: Based on data from the PluS-i project they firstly present different forms of plural policing in five investigated German cities, which can hold a certain complexity both superordinate and in themselves. Secondly, they show how pluralisation of policing stays largely invisible for the citizens and identify possible consequences that a “uniformity in a professional appearance”, as they call it, can provide. And thirdly, they describe friction points between theory and practice or “the may”, “the ability”, “the shall” and “the will” of (plural) policing using a concrete example of everyday policing work. Hirschmann and Reichl conclude that while some structural changes might reduce complexities of plural policing, for instance through more visible distinctiveness between different policing providers, not all frictions can be dissolved by structural changes. This leads to the assumption that complexity in the sense of friction points can not always be reduced but must be at least made visible so that “they can be accepted better by policing providers”. The varying exemplary backgrounds—the USA, the UK, Finland, Norway and Germany—of the chapters just presented show commonalities of plural policing in the Global North. All examples deal with changes to a supposed monopoly of the police in relation to policing. However, these developments are not as homogenous as the common use of the term plural policing may suggest. Instead, the specifics of plural policing in the different countries of the Global North, but also within these countries, are heterogeneous and diverse. This shows that the picture of plural policing in the Global North is diverse and not as clear-cut as some scholars may suggest. In addition, the contributions make it clear, that the discourses on the pluralisation of policing do not necessarily have anything to do with a divide related to political traditions, regions and countries. Probably the pluralisation of policing is best seen as a trend rather than a specific development or practice—neither global nor regional nor national.

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References Anter A (2020) Staat. In: Müller HP, Sigmund S (eds) Max Weber-Handbuch – Leben – Werk – Wirkung. JB Metzler, Berlin, pp 167–169 Bayley DH, Shearing CD (2001) The new structure of policing. Description, conceptualization, and research agenda. U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC John T (2012) Interagency policing, Münster Johnston L (2003) From ‘pluralisation’ to ‘the police extended family’: discourses on the governance of community policing in Britain. International Journal of the Sociology of Law 31:185–204 Jones T, Newburn T (eds) (2006) Plural policing. A comparative perspective. Routledge, London, New York Loader I (2000) Plural policing and democratic governance. Soc Leg Stud 9(3):323–245 Maslow AH (1943) A theory of human motivation. Psychol Rev 50(4):370–396 Scharpf F (1999) Governing in Europe. Effective and Democratic? Oxford University Press, New York Terpstra J, Devroe E (eds) (2015) Special issue: plural policing. European Journal of Policing Studies 2(3):235–244 Terpstra J, van Stokkom B, Spreeuwers R (2013) Who patrols the streets? An international comparative study of plural policing. Eleven International Publishing, Den Haag Wakefield A (2009) The disordered police state. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Weber M (1922) Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundrisse der verstehenden Soziologie. JCB Mohr (Paul Siebeck), Tübingen

Tobias John is a political scientist and at the moment deputy head of the junior research group PluS-i at the Institute of Political Science at the University of Münster (Germany) funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research. Beforehand, he was involved in research projects regarding crime prevention (“KoSiPol”) as well as security in public transportation (“SkoBB”). He received a doctorate in political science at the University of Münster (Germany). In his doctoral thesis, he examined a theoretical perspective focusing on inconsistent developments in the political area of internal security. Jacqueline Garand graduated in European Studies and is currently doing her master’s degree in political science at the University of Münster (Germany). In the context of the PluS-i project, she is a student research assistant. Her research interest includes security production in urban spaces and the perception of order and security in cities. Frauke Reichl is a political scientist. She is a research assistant at the PluS-i project at the Institute of Political Science at the University of Münster (Germany). Within PluS-i she is dealing with aspects of legitimacy and context adequacy regarding police volunteers and citizen policing groups. Her research interests are amongst others citizen participation, state and security production, vigilantism, and digital vigilantism. She has written articles on police volunteers, citizen policing groups, and digilantism. Nathalie Hirschmann is a sociologist and criminologist. She is project leader of the junior research group “Pluralisation of local urban security production—interdisciplinary analysis for a context adequate, legitimate, efficient and effective plural policing (PluS-i)” at the Institute of Political Science at the University of Münster (Germany), which is funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research. Previously, she worked as researcher in various projects. Her research interests are amongst others the sociology of professions and organisational sociology in the context of security, criminology, and empirical social science research. She received a doctorate at the University of Potsdam. In her doctoral thesis, she focused on commercial security

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services in Germany employing a sociology of professions and neo-institutionalist perspective. She is also a trainer for behavioural and communication training and a coach. She has written a range of academic articles and papers in the areas of plural policing, commercial security production, criminology, and security product certification.

Part I

Concepts of Plural Policing in the Global North

The Contradictory Institutionalization of Plural Policing in Continental Europe: A Comparative Perspective Jan Terpstra

Abstract Since the late 1990s worldwide, there has been an increasing number of studies about plural policing, especially in the English-speaking world. These studies created a certain image of plural policing, often with the implicit assumption that the arrangements and problems of plural policing are more or less universal. This chapter will deal with this assumption. It shows that in Western European countries, the state is still the dominant actor in the landscape of plural policing. There is no reason to follow the neoliberal inspired view on the state as only ‘one node among many’. The strong post-war continental European tradition of state corporatism (sometimes called the Rheinland model) seems to be more promising as a perspective on plural policing in Western Europe. Keywords Plural policing · Institutionalization · International comparison · Western Europe · Private policing

1 Introduction About 25 years ago, in their now classic and often cited paper on The Future of Policing, Bayley and Shearing (1996) stated that throughout the developed democratic world, crime control and law enforcement had reached what they called a ‘watershed’ in their evolution. In their view, one of the core developments in this radical process was that policing could no longer be defined as the monopoly of the public police (as far as it ever was (Johnston 1992)). As Bayley and Shearing put it, this monopoly has been broken by the creation of a host of other institutions, such

Many thanks to Pieter Leloup, Bas van Stokkom and Adam White for their comments and suggestions made about an earlier version of this chapter J. Terpstra () Radboud University Nijmegen, Nijmegen, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. Hirschmann et al. (eds.), Plural Policing in the Global North, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16273-2_2

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as private security companies. With this development, policing and the police have become increasingly distinct concepts (Bayley and Shearing 1996, 585–586). Since then, this phenomenon that is usually called plural policing, has become even stronger and more articulated. Many countries have been confronted with the rise and growth of new non-police providers of policing, both public and private, often resulting in complex policing and security networks (Crawford 1999; Bayley and Shearing 2001; Dupont 2004; Terpstra 2008a; Whelan and Dupont 2017). More or less parallel to this process, an increasing number of studies has been conducted into plural policing. In many respects, these studies have contributed to a much better understanding of this phenomenon, its backgrounds and its impacts, as well as the important normative and political issues that it may raise. Until a couple of years ago, studies on plural policing almost exclusively concentrated on the English-speaking world with countries such as the UK, Canada, Australia, and the USA. This has created an image of plural policing that is not only highly Anglo-centric, but that has also contributed to the often implicit suggestion that the arrangements and patterns of plural policing found in these studies are more or less universal and may also exist elsewhere (Devroe and Terpstra 2015; Terpstra 2017; van Stokkom and Terpstra 2018). However, over the past years, several comparative studies and international overviews (Jones and Newburn 2006; Jones et al. 2009; Terpstra et al. 2013; O’Neil and Fyfe 2017; Singh and Light 2019), as well as an increasing number of more recent case studies in several continental European countries, such as France (Bonnet et al. 2015; de Maillard and Zagrodzki 2017; Ocqueteau 2020; Malochet 2021), Belgium (Devroe 2015, 2017), Austria (Fuchs 2005; Terpstra 2017), Sweden (Hansen Löfstrand 2019), Norway (Nøkleberg 2020a, 2020b), Germany (Frevel 2015; John and Hirschmann 2020) and the Netherlands (van Steden 2007, 2017, 2021; Terpstra 2008b; Eikenaar 2017, 2019) have provided sufficient reason to question if plural policing in continental Europe corresponds with the image built up in the Anglophone world. First, all of the continental European countries mentioned above have witnessed some form of pluralization of policing over the past decades. In studies from the English-speaking countries, pluralization of policing is usually primarily associated with privatization and marketization. However, in most continental European countries, public forms of non-police policing agencies are often more important than in the Anglophone world (although continental countries often also have had a growth of the private security sector). Since the famous paper by Bayley and Shearing (1996), it has become quite usual to assume that the pluralization of policing implies a ‘withering away’ or declining importance of the state and state institutions in disorder management, crime control and law enforcement. As was already shown by Ferret in 2004, this assumption does not fit in with the situation, major traditions and dominating political and cultural views in relation to the state in most of the countries in ‘Old Continental Europe’ (see also Abrahamsen and Williams 2009). Finally, an important issue in the studies in the Anglosphere is the assumption that with the pluralization of policing, the (conceptual) distinction between public and private is losing its relevance, both in its empirical and normative meaning (Bayley and Shearing 1996; Shearing 2006; Schuilenburg 2015). Of course, with

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the increasing complexity of policing and the rising numbers of both public and private agencies involved, the distinction between public and private may be become less sharp. However, it may be seriously questioned if the claim of the disappearing public-private divide holds true in continental European countries (Abrahamsen and Williams 2007; Nøkleberg 2020a). Many of these assumptions and notions from studies on plural policing in the English-speaking world are closely related to the neoliberal discourse (Harvey 2007; Mudge 2008; Birch 2015). Since the 1980s this discourse, with its emphasis on privatization, deregulation, monetarist-inspired policies, and marketization of public services, has become highly influential, almost worldwide. Especially in the English-speaking world, it has dominated economic and political debates, for instance about the position of the state. In continental Europe, however, the support for neoliberal notions such as the superiority of the market or the disappearance of the public-private divide has often been more ambivalent and contradictory. To understand plural policing in continental Europe, it is important to realize that although in many continental European countries since the 1980s neoliberalism has also been important as an economic and political discourse, there has also been much resistance against it. The impact of neoliberalism has also differed strongly between EU-countries (Schmidt 2009). To understand the institutionalization of plural policing in this context, it is important to realize that this has happened ‘in spite of a widely held view that policing should be a public task’ (Hansen Löfstrand 2019, 2). This is an important starting point for understanding plural policing in continental Europe, the issue of this chapter. Here, the pluralization of policing cannot be understood as the automatic result of neoliberal policies. For that reason, in this chapter I will try to answer the question of why this process of pluralization (including privatization) has happened in spite of these conflicting views. In its most simple formulation: most relevant stakeholders did not seem to want this pluralization, so why and how did it still happen? Does this also mean that there is a distinct style of plural policing in continental Europe that contrasts with the dominating style of plural policing in the Anglosphere? In this chapter, first I will deal with some of the most important theories about plural policing. Next, the theoretical approach of this chapter – focussing on the institutionalization of plural policing - will be briefly sketched. Then some of the main methodological problems in international comparative studies will be mentioned. The main part of this chapter is an analysis of private policing in continental European countries. This will be illustrated with three case studies: Austria, Sweden, and Belgium, representing Central Europe, the Nordic countries, and Western Europe, respectively. Both southern and eastern European countries will be excluded here.

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2 Prevailing Theories and some Shortcomings One of the most important approaches in the study of plural policing has been the so-mentioned nodal governance of security. This approach was developed by Shearing and several of his colleagues (Johnston and Shearing 2003; Wood and Dupont 2006). This perspective has been presented as an alternative for the once dominating view of the monopoly of the state on police work and security, leaving not more than only a marginal (‘junior-partner’) role for other initiatives. In this approach, plural policing and security are analysed as a complex of nodes with various relations of dependencies. Each node is seen as a ‘site of governance’ consisting of certain mentalities, technologies, resources, and institutional structures (Wood and Shearing 2007). Instead of one centre of governance (the state), the nodal governance approach suggests a complex of hybrid arrangements and practices in which different forms of governance co-exist, without a priority given to any particular node. In other words, the core assumption of the nodal governance approach is that the state has lost its special position. A more or less similar phrasing is often used by Shearing and his colleagues: the state (or the police) is ‘just one node among many’ (for instance: Johnston and Shearing 2003, 144; Shearing 2005, 58). In a comparable line is the belief of nodal governance scholars that the distinction between the public and private sphere has lost much of its relevance. This approach does not only have an explanatory, but also a normative element. Shearing and his colleagues believe that problems in the governance of policing and security should not be solved by re-establishing state governance or by making the state stronger. Instead of putting trust in the state, much more is expected of plural solutions, delivered mainly by private and community initiatives (Johnston and Shearing 2003; Wood and Shearing 2007). The nodal governance perspective has met several critical reactions. According to Crawford (2003), the nodal governance approach has underestimated the importance of the state and the risks of ‘security clubs’ for contributing to policing as a public good. In Shearing’s view, the resistance to the notion of a universal and inevitable nodal governance has ‘deep European roots’. The dominance of the ‘Hobbesian-Weberian paradigm’ is seen as the main reason why certain scholars refuse to acknowledge the superiority of the nodal perspective (Shearing 2006, 19–22). Endeavours to restore state governance are rejected as ‘nostalgic’ (Shearing and Wood 2003, 217). However, it would be better to study the historical, cultural, and social circumstances that contribute to a stronger role of the state in policing and security in continental European countries, instead of defining existing state centrism in policing as only ‘nostalgia’. The nodal governance perspective, however, fails to provide the guidance for such an approach (White 2010; Terpstra 2017). The second important theoretical approach of plural policing was developed by Loader and Walker (2007) and is known as the anchored pluralism model. This model also has both an empirical and a normative dimension. This model can be seen as a critical reaction to both the neoliberal view and the nodal governance

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approach. These latter approaches agree in their belief that the state is losing and should be losing its position as the central actor in policing and security. While Loader and Walker also see a return to a monopoly of security by the state is not the way to go, they still believe that the state alone, ‘or its functional equivalent’, is capable of realizing ‘the necessary virtue’ in policing and security (Loader and Walker 2007, 171–173). The main reason why in their view only the state (or the police) can fulfil this function is in its unique symbolic power. For that reason, ‘the state (-) should remain the anchor of collective security provision’. But on the other hand, they stress that ‘there should be as much pluralism as possible . . . ’ (Loader and Walker 2007, 193). The anchored pluralism model is better equipped to understand complex combinations of state and private actors in policing and security, thanks to the fact that it also recognizes the importance of political and cultural norms in relation to policing and security, as well as the symbolic aspects of the police. But for international comparison of plural policing, it would also be necessary to answer the question of how plural policing is being institutionalized in different contexts, with different actors, different cultural and political norms, and with differences in historical and economic context and in (power) relations (cf. White 2010, 31–33). Possibly because of its focus on normative issues, the anchored pluralism perspective seems to neglect these elements of the institutionalization of plural policing (cf. Nøkleberg 2020b). Over the past few years several comparative studies have been published as a follow-up of the debates between the nodal governance and the anchored pluralism models. These studies may also be relevant for understanding the differences and similarities in plural policing between continental Europe and Anglophone countries. Several studies have shown important differences, for instance in the position of the state, the extent of privatization and in the regulation of private security (Jones et al. 2009; Devroe 2017; Terpstra 2017; Button and Stiernstedt 2018; van Steden 2021). Van Stokkom and Terpstra (2018) point to the risk of an Anglocentric bias in the study of plural policing, for instance that core concepts will be used that are actually strongly related to the context of the Anglosphere. Leloup and White (2021) found in their comparison of plural policing in the Anglosphere and in continental European countries not only divergence, but also important similarities. To understand these patterns of divergence and convergence they showed that in both the UK and Belgium similar ‘advocacy coalitions’ have been involved in processes underlying the current systems of plural policing. They conclude that as a consequence, the differences in plural policing between these two countries (and between the Anglosphere and continental Europe) should not be overstated. Singh and Light (2019) showed that the well-known factors that are generally used to explain the growth of private security in the Anglosphere (such as rising levels of crime and fear of crime, the increasing importance of mass property, the loss of informal social control and the dominance of neoliberal views) are often not very helpful to understand why in many other countries private security remains much smaller or even an underdeveloped sector. Their findings suggest that

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the development of private security and the constraints to this growth, should be understood by looking at the relevant political and cultural circumstances. These may also be relevant to understand international differences in the development of plural policing.

3 The Institutionalization of Plural Policing To better understand (international) differences in plural policing, it is important to investigate the underlying processes of institutionalization. This implies a double shift from the usual perspectives in studies about plural policing. First, it means a shift from the predominantly normative perspective to a more empirical approach (Nøkleberg 2020b). Secondly, a focus on processes of institutionalization also implies a shift from a mainly synchronic to a more diachronic approach. This double shift is also important for (international) comparative studies. Here the question is how in different social, cultural, and political contexts, the multi-faceted institution of plural policing has been produced and reproduced. Differences in plural policing can be understood at the (provisional) outcome of different processes of institutionalization, each in their own context. Institutions, understood as consisting of shared rules, norms, and culturalcognitive beliefs, together with certain associated activities and resources, can give meaning and stability to social life (Scott 2014, 56–57). On the one hand, institutions are created or produced, but on the other hand, they can also be perceived as ‘objective reality’, structuring behaviour and everyday decisions by human actors (Berger and Luckmann 1967; Giddens 1984). The institutionalization of plural policing is often not (only) a linear or goaloriented process, for instance resulting from a certain governmental policy. It is a continuous process in which many actors are involved, often with their own views, interests and resources, and in different power relations. Their positions may be dependent on conflicting institutional logics (Thornton et al. 2012), for instance between the actors from the public and those from the private sectors (Nøkleberg 2020a). This process may be characterized by negotiations between different coalitions with different views and interests (see Leloup and White 2021), but also by open conflicts or by periods of ‘truce’, depending on how actors operate and how the process of institutionalization evolves. Processes of institutionalization are also dependent on unacknowledged conditions and may have unintended consequences (which in their turn may have an impact on future decisions and behaviour (Giddens 1984)). Institutions, and this also applies to plural policing, are built on different pillars, such as regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive systems. This means that in plural policing different forms of order, coordinating mechanisms, and logics may operate (Scott 2014, 59–84). It implies that not only instrumental elements are important to understanding plural policing and its development, but also norms, beliefs and symbols, and even sensibilities and emotions. As a consequence, interna-

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tional differences and similarities in plural policing may relate not only to economic and instrumental elements or indicators (such as the growth of private security, financial turnover or the number of companies and private security workers), but also to cultural beliefs about for instance state responsibilities or the use of symbols, such as the use of police-like uniforms or cars by other agencies than the public police to promote their legitimacy and public image (Puck and White 2022). The institutionalization of plural policing may occur at different levels, not only at the national level, but also the international (Abrahamsen and Williams 2007) and local level (Terpstra et al. 2013; Hansen Löfstrand 2019; John and Hirschmann 2020). In some cases, the developments at the different levels may support each other, but in other cases, they may be in conflict. This may complicate international comparison of plural policing, for instance because of processes of isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) and policy transfer (Jones and Newburn 2004). On the other hand, international comparison may be difficult because differences within countries at the local level may be as large as differences between countries (Terpstra et al. 2013).

4 Methodological Notes Since the year 2006 a small, but increasing number of international comparative studies has been published about plural policing. A significant number of these studies (also) concerned continental European countries. International comparative studies of plural policing may be confronted with a number of methodological problems (Terpstra et al. 2013). First, many researchers have had to cope with the problem of a lack of reliable empirical data. Because the use of public and private non-police officers in the public space is generally organized at the local level and differences between locations may be significant, it may be difficult to get an accurate overview of for instance the numbers of these officers. In many cases, data on citizens’ views about different aspects of plural policing are missing or incomplete. This may complicate international comparison about crucial aspects of plural policing such as citizens’ trust and the legitimacy of non-police policing agencies. In many cases, it proves to be hard to find detailed information about the daily implementation and work of non-police, public and private policing and security officers. As a consequence, international comparison may only relate to the policy or rhetorical level of plural policing and not to the actual work and work routines of non-police policing agencies. Secondly, even within the continental European context, international comparison of plural policing may be confronted with considerable differences in formal rules, procedures, and legal terminology. If these differences are not correctly understood or overlooked, this may result in serious misconceptions. For instance, there are important differences in the legal meaning of ‘public space’ between, for example Austria and the Netherlands. If this difference is not correctly understood,

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this may lead to wrong conclusions about the formal role and powers of the police in semi-public spaces such as large shopping malls (Terpstra et al. 2013). Third, compared with the legal context, the informal, mostly unwritten contexts may be even more difficult to understand for a researcher who is not very familiar with the situation in one or more of the countries that are being investigated. Here traditions, sensitivities, emotions, and interests that may have a strong, but often largely hidden impact on how plural policing operates and is perceived in a certain context. What makes it even more difficult is that these cultural, socialpsychological, and symbolic elements may be so taken for granted for native members of a community, that they will not be mentioned in documents, but also not in interviews. Still their (unrecognized) impact may be very large. However, these ‘soft’ elements may be fundamental to understanding the differences in plural policing. For researchers doing comparative studies, it may be difficult to collect reliable and valid information about these issues (Nelken 1994, 2002). Finally, many forms of plural policing are at the local level and dependent on local circumstances. This may make that international comparison between countries may be partly at the wrong level. In other words, differences within a country may be larger than differences between countries. For that reason, in comparisons between countries, it should be recommended to collect information also about local developments and local situations by doing local case studies in addition to investigating at the national level.

5 Plural Policing in Europe: An Overview In 2013 a study on plural policing in four European countries (Belgium, England & Wales, the Netherlands, and Austria) showed that despite important differences in social and political context, legal conditions and the position of the state, there were considerable similarities in plural policing in public places and in the processes and circumstances that have contributed to this pluralization (Terpstra et al. 2013; Terpstra and van Stokkom 2015). In the past few decades, each of these countries had witnessed the introduction and increasing importance of non-police providers of policing. One of the main factors contributing to this process was the failure of the police to realize visible presence in the public space. A lack of resources and a withdrawal by the police, both from the local level and from their presence on the streets, have contributed to this. The negative consequences of this development have mainly been felt at the local level. Local politicians often felt that the lack of visible uniformed presence in the public space had contributed to citizens’ feelings of insecurity. Solutions for these problems have also been created mainly at the local level, by local governments and other local agencies. In each of these countries new uniformed policing workers were introduced in the (semi-)public places, such as city guards, wardens, and private security guards. In most cases, these new public and private providers of security and rule enforcement operate alongside the regular

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police, with the exception of England & Wales with its community support officers who are members of the regular police services. In many cases, the organization and implementation of these local forms of non-police policing differ between municipalities. The introduction and growth of these new security and policing officers have resulted from social, political, and economic circumstances that could be found in each of these four countries. Some of these common factors are the increasing social and political importance of public safety, changes in urban economy (like the rise of the night-time economy) and the loss of (informal) social control by other workers, such as the conductor in public transport or the doorman in large housing complexes. Because the police often proved not to be willing or able to meet the need for (more) uniformed visibility on the streets, local governments often decided to create their own municipal guards or wardens. Between these four European countries, there are also important differences in how these non-police policing workers are organized and operate. First, there are important differences in the regulation of non-police policing activities. On the one hand, Belgium has the most clear-cut and elaborate framework for the regulation of private security. On the other hand, in Austria there is no specific legal framework for the regulation of private security (see also: Button and Stiernstedt 2018). The countries also differ in the degree of separation/integration between the non-police policing officers and the regular police. In Austria there is a sharp (legally defined) separation between the police and the municipal city guards. England and Wales with its community support officers represents the opposite model. Finally, these four countries differ in the extent to which policing and security in the public space have been privatized. For instance, Belgium has no private security officers working in public places (with the exception of parking wardens in a limited number of municipalities). In the Netherlands local governments may contract private security workers for patrolling the streets, who may have some formal powers. Here private security companies may also be contracted by residents for residential patrol, although this practice is limited to only a few affluent neighbourhoods (Terpstra 2008b).

6 Some European Cases: Austria, Sweden, and Belgium The general picture of the pluralization of policing in continental Europe can be illustrated with three countries, Austria, Sweden, and Belgium, covering different parts of the continent. These case studies show differences in how plural policing was established and in how it has been organized and implemented.

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6.1 Austria Austria, one of the Central European countries, has two kinds of police forces. At the national level, there is the Federal Police, with over 20,000 officers working in more than 1000 police stations. In addition, there are also 38 municipal police forces, mainly in the western part of the country. These municipal forces are much smaller. So-called Statutarstädte, generally the large cities, such Vienna, Linz, Graz, Salzburg, and Innsbruck, are forbidden by law to have their own municipal police force, an arrangement going back to the 1920s, a period of great political unrest in Austria. In Austria there is a general and strong belief in the state and an overwhelming consensus that only the state should be responsible for policing and that other agencies should not be involved. Plural policing is often seen as a highly politicized and sensitive issue. Important elements of this emotional framing of plural policing are derived from the Austrian political history, especially the age of the violent political clashes of the 1930s. Still, Austria has some forms of plural policing, although at a modest scale (Terpstra et al. 2013; Terpstra 2017). In 2007 two types of non-police providers of policing were introduced in Austria. First, since that year governments of Statutarstädte have started to establish local organizations with uniformed officers to patrol the public space, called Ordnungswache or Public Order Guards (not to be confused with the municipal police forces mentioned before). The formal powers of these officers are quite minimal, usually not more than the so-called Everyman’s Right (Jedermannsrecht), the rights that every citizen has in this country. The local governments of these large Austrian cities decided to establish these public order organizations for several reasons. Despite the fact that the level of crime is relatively low in Austria, since the 1990s public safety has become an important political issue. For that reason, local governments felt the need for visible measures, such as uniformed patrol. However, since about fifteen years there has been a widening gap between the federal police and local communities. Since the police reform of 2005, large numbers of police stations were closed. Because the local governments of these Statutarstädte do not have the legal possibility to create their own municipal police force to fill the gap created by the withdrawal of the federal police, they created their own alternative. This was the creation of the municipal Ordnungswache or Public Order Guards. Secondly, since about 2005 about 40 to 50 mainly medium-sized municipalities have chosen for another option. These municipalities have contracted private security guards to patrol the streets. However, these municipalities do not have a municipal police force or municipal Public Order Guards. The reasons why these local governments decided to contract private security are similar to the arguments used by the large cities to establish Public Order Guards: the need for uniformed patrollers in the streets of their city in combination with the fact that the Federal Police do not meet this local need or only to a limited degree. In Austria private security officers working in public places do not have special powers.

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Given the reluctance against plural policing in Austria, it is quite remarkable that this country does not have a special legal framework for plural policing and private security. It looks as if the strong orientation to the state results in a lack of awareness of the ongoing pluralization of policing. In earlier papers, it was suggested that the taken-for-granted position of the state might be so strong and self-evident that there is a ‘state of denial’ of this pluralization process (Terpstra 2017; van Stokkom and Terpstra 2018).

6.2 Sweden More recently Hansen Löfstrand (2019) examined the marketization of policing in Sweden. Similar to Austria, in Sweden policing is generally strongly focussed on the state. Just like in Austria, in Sweden the pluralization of policing has occurred in spite of a broad consensus that policing should be a public task. A main argument here has been that the police should have the monopoly of the use of coercion and of other means of policing. As a consequence, according to Hansen Löfstrand (2019), there has been no political party in Sweden that has supported the marketization of policing. Just like in Austria, in Sweden the pluralization of policing is a politically sensitive issue. However, the underlying factors of this sensitivity differ. One of the main sources of resistance against marketization of policing in Sweden, is that in this country the state is generally perceived as ‘the people’s home’. This notion and the related feelings can be seen as a central part of the Swedish self-image, closely linked to values of solidarity, collectiveness, and security. This emotional framing has contributed to a strong resistance against marketization of policing and security in public places in Sweden (Hansen Löfstrand 2019). In Sweden these emotions are so strong that not only police unions, but also unions of private security workers have resisted the replacement of the police by private security. Also in their view, police powers should remain in the hands of the police (Hansen Löfstrand 2019). As has also been the case in Austria, despite the general resistance against private security, this sector has acquired a position in policing at the local level in Sweden. Since a couple of years, municipalities and other local public organizations have contracted private security organizations for patrolling the city centres. One of the main arguments here was the increasing importance attached to citizens’ feelings of security. As a consequence, as Hansen Löfstrand (2019, 10) showed, in Sweden there is now a gap between the political rhetoric about private security involvement and the factual role that it has. What in relation with Austria was mentioned a ‘state of denial’ looks very much like what Hansen Löfstrand calls a ‘politics of silence’ in Sweden. It looks as if there is now a sort of ‘silent political approval’ of the factual involvement of private security in public policing. The Swedish case shows that marketization of policing can happen without a clear policy basis and without the state-centred policing framework losing anything of its political and emotional importance. An institutional and regulatory ‘void’

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created the opportunity in Sweden for the successful mobilization of the private security sector and the expansion of local-level markets in policing (Hansen Löfstrand 2019). Both in Austria, and in Sweden, the pluralization and privatization of policing and security do not mean that the state is now not more than just one node among many, as the nodal governance scholars have supposed. The central position of the state is still an undeniable fact in both countries.

6.3 Belgium Despite the fact that Belgium has had private security companies since the early twentieth century (Leloup 2019, 2021), traditionally private security in this country has had a very limited role in policing the public spaces. In Belgium there is an overwhelming consensus that patrolling the streets and rule enforcement in the public places should only be performed by state institutions, especially the police. This is certainly the dominating view about the use of coercive means, that is seen as the monopoly of the state (Terpstra et al. 2013; Devroe 2017). This may also be the reason why Belgium has the highest level of regulation of private security of all countries in the European Union (Button 2007; Button and Stiernstedt 2018). Despite this strong focus on the state in matters of policing, Belgium also has had its processes of pluralization. However, in this country, the most important form of plural policing in public places is by state (municipal) organizations, at the local level. This is largely based on the Municipal Administration Sanctions Act (MAS-Act), that was introduced in 1999 (Devroe 2015, 2017). With the rising level of crime and increasing feelings of insecurity in the 1990s, the public prosecution agency increasingly found that it did not have the resources to deal with all cases of petty crime and disorder. For that reason, the Belgian government decided to devolve more powers to manage petty crime and disorder to the local authorities. The government had several objectives with the introduction of municipal administrative sanctions based on the MAS-Act. First it should compensate for what was perceived as an enforcement deficit. Local governments should have their own enforcement means to manage petty crime and disorder. The MAS-sanctions should make the more ‘soft’ municipal preventive strategies more effective. Finally, the MAS-act should be an answer to the need for more visible uniformed surveillance in the public space (Devroe 2012). In the first years after its introduction, the MAS-act raised a lot of confusion, mainly because there was not one clearly defined group of officers responsible for patrolling the streets and because those officers did not have formal powers to do so. In 2007 the government decided to end this confusion. In that year the Community Guards Act replaced a high diversity of many ‘new occupations in security’ by one new category of municipal wardens, called community guards, wearing the same uniform in the whole country. In addition, community guards could have the formal power to make a report of certain infringements that may result in an administrative sanction.

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This implies that despite the general resistance against pluralization of policing, in Belgium since 2007, there are non-police municipal officers who are involved in policing the public places with formal powers for certain infringements. It does not mean that in Belgium there is nowadays a general support for this form of plural policing. In fact there is a strong contrast between Flanders and Wallonia, the French-speaking part of the country. In Wallonia there are almost no community guards with the formal power to record infringements. Here the traditional view that the police alone should be policing the public space, is still strong and dominating. It illustrates the strong state-orientedness in Belgium in relation to policing and security. Although there are important similarities in the pluralization of policing between the three countries dealt with here, Belgium differs from the other two countries in one important respect. In both Austria and Sweden, plural policing was not only established at the local level, but also without a national policy or legal support, in some cases even against the existing national policy. In Belgium however, the pluralization of policing at the municipal level was only possible because at the national level new acts were introduced in 1999 and 2007.

7 Concluding Remarks In this paper I have tried to understand differences in plural policing by looking at the underlying processes of pluralization, which may be understood as processes of institutionalization. Here many actors are involved, each with their own views and interests. This process of institutionalization is usually not based on an explicit policy plan, but dependent on unacknowledged conditions and unintended consequences. This paper shows that plural policing in continental European countries differs in many respects from what earlier studies in the Anglophone world found. In these countries, plural policing should not be seen as a consequence of a goal-oriented policy of marketization or privatization. Even in cases where there has been a considerable pluralization of policing, the state is still perceived and treated as the central actor in policing and security. In continental European countries, processes of pluralization are usually concentrated at the local level, with an important role for municipalities and other local actors. What is even more important, in many cases there is a general reluctance or even resistance against the pluralization or privatization of policing (see also Singh and Light 2019). As Hansen Löfstrand (2019) for instance noticed in the case of Sweden, pluralization of policing has happened despite the dominating view that policing should be a public task of the state. In other words, the pluralization of policing in continental European countries is often a contradictory process: on the one hand, it is a successful process of institutionalization, but on the other hand, it is conflicting with dominating views and values. Pragmatic motives, especially at the local level, and certain interests (the

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successful mobilization and lobbying by the private security sector) are stronger than the state-centred views and principles (although private security may try to legitimize itself with the claim that it contributes to public values) (White 2010; Hansen Löfstrand 2019). One of the consequences is that in several of the continental European countries, the role of private security in patrolling the public places is often absent or quite small. The most important non-police providers of policing are usually public agencies. These findings also show that the assumption that with the increasing pluralization of policing, the conceptual distinction between public and private has lost its relevance, does not hold true for continental European countries. It raises serious questions about the claimed universality of this development (see also Nøkleberg 2020a; Abrahamsen and Williams 2007). Plural policing in continental European countries with a central position of the state should not be too easily interpreted as an indication of what Loader and Walker (2007) call anchored pluralism. Systems of plural policing are often full of tensions and conflicts, simply because market values and public values often cannot be brought in line easily. Besides, the notion of anchored pluralism may suggest too much of a sort of pre-existing design, where in fact plural policing is usually the (temporary and partly unintended) outcome of a complex process in which many actors, each with their own views and interests, are involved. The notion of anchored pluralism may suggest too much of stability and order, based on a goaloriented plan. It seems to be more fruitful to understand plural policing against the background of permanent processes of change and conflict. In such a context, the notion of an anchor is inappropriate to understand how different actors in policing and security operate and how public and private values relate and conflict. A central position of the state in plural policing does not automatically mean that the state operates as a normative or regulatory ‘anchor’. Each of the three cases described before has shown that despite the strong orientation to the state and the general reluctance to accept pluralization and certainly marketization of policing, still at the local level, there has been a pluralization of policing, in Austria and Sweden also with a marketization of policing in public places. This pattern is not unique for these three countries, but can also be found in other continental European countries, such as France (Malochet 2021), the Netherlands (Terpstra et al., 2013), Germany (John and Hirschmann 2020) and Norway (Nøkleberg 2020b). To what extent is there something like a continental European style of plural policing? First, important differences were found in plural policing between continental European countries. However, the differences in plural policing between the continental European countries and what was found in studies in the Anglophone world, are still considerable. In continental Europe the position of the state is much stronger, there is often reluctance to accept pluralization or even resistance against privatization of policing, especially in the public space. Pluralization is often mainly a local development, and the distinction between public and private still has a clear impact on policing and on the relations between security agencies (Nøkleberg 2020a). The differences in style of plural policing, however, are not clear cut, nor

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is there a hard line between them, as Leloup and White (2021) have rightly noted. These differences in plural policing between countries are the outcomes of processes of institutionalization in different contexts, in which different actors, rules, views, and interests may be involved, but also with corresponding elements and processes of policy transfer and policing imitation that may give rise to similarities, although generally the differences are considerable.

References Abrahamsen R, Williams MC (2007) Securing the city: private security companies and non-state authority in global governance. Int Relat 21(2):237–253 Abrahamsen R, Williams MC (2009) Security beyond the state’ global security assemblages in international politics. Int Political Sociol 3(1):1–17 Bayley DH, Shearing CD (1996) The future of policing. Law Soc Rev 30(2):585–606 Bayley DH, Shearing CD (2001) The new structure of policing: description, conceptualization and research agenda. US Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice, Washington, DC Berger PL, Luckmann T (1967) The social construction of reality. A Treatise in the sociology of knowledge. Penguin, Harmondsworth Birch K (2015) Neoliberalism: the whys and wherefores . . . and future directions. Sociol Compass 9(7):571–584 Bonnet F, De Maillard J, Roché S (2015) Plural policing of public places in France. Between private and local policing. European Journal of Policing Studies 2(3):285–303 Button M (2007) Assessing the regulation of private security across Europe. Eur J Criminol 4(1):109–128 Button M, Stiernstedt P (2018) Comparing private security regulation in the European Union. Polic Soc 28(4):398–414 Crawford A (1999) The local governance of crime: appeals to community and partnerships. Oxford University Press, Oxford Crawford A (2003) Plural policing in the UK: policing beyond the police. In: Newburn T (ed) Handbook of policing. Willan, Cullompton, pp 136–168 de Maillard J, Zagrodzki M (2017) Plural policing in Paris: variations and pitfalls of cooperation between national and municipal police forces. Polic Soc 27(1):54–67 Devroe E (2012) A Swelling Culture of Control? De genese en toepassing van de wet op de gemeentelijke administratieve sancties in België. Maklu, Antwerpen Devroe E (2015) Purple vests. The origins of plural policing in Belgium. The European Journal of Policing Studies 2(3):304–325 Devroe E (2017) Bringing politics back into the study of policing? A case study on the policing of social disorder in Belgium. Polic Soc 27(1):82–103 Devroe E, Terpstra J (2015) Plural policing in Western Europe: a comparison. European Journal of Policing Studies 2(3):235–244 DiMaggio PJ, Powell WW (1983) The iron cage revisited: institutional isomorphism and collective rationality in organizational fields. Am Sociol Rev 48(2):147–160 Dupont B (2004) Security in the age of networks. Polic Soc 14(1):76–91 Eikenaar T (2017) Municipal disorder policing. Dealing with annoyances in public places. Eleven, The Hague Eikenaar T (2019) Plural policing as professional strife. Municipal officers and police officers in the Netherlands. International Journal of Police Science & Management 21(3):146–155 Ferret J (2004) The state, policing and “old continental Europe”: managing the local/national tension. Polic Soc 14(1):49–65

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Frevel B (2015) Pluralisation of local policing in Germany. Security between the State’s monopoly of force and the market. European Journal of Policing Studies 2(3):267–284 Fuchs W (2005) Private Sicherheitsdienste und öffentlicher Raum. Ein Überblick über die öffentlich-rechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen in Österreich rechtstatsächlichen und kriminologischen Anmerkungen. Dissertation, Universität Innsbruck Giddens A (1984) The constitution of society: outline of the theory of structuration. Polity Press, Cambridge Hansen Löfstrand C (2019) Marketization in a state-centred policing context: the case of Sweden. Eur J Criminol. https://doi.org/10.1177/1477370819882905 Harvey D (2007) A brief history of neoliberalism. Oxford University Press, Oxford John T, Hirschmann N (2020) Polizeiliches Handeln im Kontext pluralen Polizierens – Erkenntnisse aus dem Forschungsprojekt PluS-i. In: Hunold D, Ruch A (eds) Polizeiarbeit zwischen Praxishandeln und Rechtsordnung. Empirische Polizeiforschungen zur polizeipraktischen Ausgestalyung des Rechts. Springer, Wiesbaden, pp 255–278 Johnston L (1992) The rebirth of private policing, vol 63. Routledge, London, p 341 Johnston L, Shearing C (2003) Governing security: explorations of policing and justice. Routledge, London Jones T, Newburn T (2004) The convergence of US and UK crime control policy: exploring substance and process. In: Newburn T, Sparks R (eds) Criminal justice and political cultures. Willan, Cullompton, pp 135–163 Jones T, Newburn T (eds) (2006) Plural policing: a comparative perspective. Routledge, London Jones T, van Steden R, Boutellier H (2009) Pluralisation of policing in England & Wales and the Netherlands: exploring similarity and difference. Polic Soc 19(3):282–299 Leloup P (2019) A historical perspective on crime control and private security: a Belgian case study. Polic Soc 29(5):551–565 Leloup P (2021) De ontwikkeling van de private bewakingssector in België (1907–1990). Boom, Den Haag Leloup P, White A (2021) Questioning Anglocentrism in plural policing studies: private security regulation in Belgium and the United Kingdom. Eur J Criminol. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 14773708211014853 Loader I, Walker N (2007) Civilizing security. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Malochet V (2021) The pluralization of local policing. In: de Maillard J, Skogan WG (eds) Policing in France. Routledge, New York, pp 147–163 Mudge SL (2008) What is neo-liberalism? Soc Econ Rev 6(4):703–731 Nelken D (1994) Whom can you trust? The future of comparative criminology. In: Nelken D (ed) The futures of criminology. Sage, London, pp 220–243 Nelken D (2002) Comparing criminal justice. In: Maguire M, Morgan R, Reiner R (eds) The Oxford handbook of criminology, 3rd edn. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 175–202 Nøkleberg M (2020a) The public-private divide revisited: questioning the middle ground of hybridity in policing. Polic Soc 30(6):601–617 Nøkleberg M (2020b) Examining the how of plural policing: moving from normative debate to empirical enquiry. British J Criminol 60(3):681–702 Ocqueteau F (2020) The expansion of private policing in France. In: de Maillard J, Skogan WG (eds) Policing in France. Routledge, New York, pp 133–146 O’Neil M, Fyfe NR (2017) Plural policing in Europe: relationships and governance in contemporary security systems. Polic Soc 27(1):1–5 Puck L, White A (2022) Cultural and symbolic capital in the market for security: police-private security relations in Mexico and the United Kingdom. Polic Soc:1–15. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 10439463.2021.1984472 Schuilenburg M (2015) The securitization of society: crime, risk, and social order. NYUP, New York Schmidt VA (2009) Putting the political back into political economy by bringing the state back in yet again. World Polit 61(3):516–546

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Scott WR (2014) Institutions and organizations: ideas. Interests, and identities, vol 17, 4th edn. Sage, Los Angeles, p 136 Shearing C (2005) Nodal security. Police Q 8(1):57–63 Shearing C (2006) Reflections on the refusal to acknowledge private governments. In: Wood J, Dupont B (eds) Democracy, society and the governance of security. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 11–32 Shearing C, Wood J (2003) Nodal governance, democracy, and the new ‘denizens’. J Law Soc 30(3):400–419 Singh AM, Light M (2019) Constraints on the growth of private policing: a comparative international analysis. Theor Criminol 23(3):295–314 Terpstra J (2008a) Police, local government, and citizens as participants in local security networks. Police Pract Res Int J 9(3):213–225 Terpstra J (2008b) New security patrols in public places: reassurance, fragmentation, and marketization. In: Easton M, Gunther Moor L, Hoogenboom B, Ponsaers P, van Stokkom B (eds) Reflections on reassurance policing in the Low Countries. Bju, The Hague, pp 105–126 Terpstra J (2017) ‘Not just one node among many’–plural policing in a state-dominated context: the case of Austria. Polic Soc 27(1):68–81 Terpstra J, van Stokkom B (2015) Plural policing in comparative perspective. Four models of regulation. European Journal of Policing Studies 2(3):325–343 Terpstra J, Stokkom B, Spreeuwers R (2013) Who patrols the streets? An international comparative study of plural policing. Eleven, The Hague Thornton PH, Ocasio W, Lounsbury M (2012) The institutional logics perspective. A new approach to culture, structure, and process. Oxford University Press, Oxford van Steden R (2007) Privatizing policing. BJU, Amsterdam van Steden R (2017) Municipal law enforcement officers: towards a new system of local policing in the Netherlands? Polic Soc 27(1):40–53 van Steden R (2021) Theorising and illustrating the collaborative practices of plural policing: an analysis of three cases in the Netherlands and Belgium. Int J Comp Appl Crim Just. https:// doi.org/10.1080/1924036.2021.1953553 van Stokkom B, Terpstra J (2018) Plural policing, the public good, and the constitutional state: an international comparison of Austria and Canada–Ontario. Polic Soc 28(4):415–430 Whelan C, Dupont B (2017) Taking stock of networks across the security field: a review, typology and research agenda. Polic Soc 27(6):671–687 White A (2010) The politics of private security: regulation, reform and re-legitimation. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke Wood J, Dupont B (eds) (2006) Democracy, society and the governance of security. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge Wood J, Shearing C (2007) Imagining security. Willan, Cullompton

Jan Terpstra is a professor emeritus of criminology at the Radboud University, Nijmegen, the Netherlands, and a fellow at the Free University of Brussels (Research Group Crime & Society), Belgium. His main topics of research are the police, plural policing, police and security policies, local security arrangements, and policing cultures.

A Taxonomy of Plural Policing in the United States Seth W. Stoughton

Abstract The contemporary conception of policing in the USA is of a foundationally governmental function. Private security, in sharp contrast, is often viewed as fundamentally non-governmental. The reality is more complex; the patrol and investigative aspects of the police function are shared between a range of entities that exist on a spectrum from purely public to purely private. This chapter will explore that spectrum and offer a four-part taxonomy for understanding policing as it is practiced in the USA: public policing, semi-private public policing, semipublic private policing, and private policing. Each component of the taxonomy will be defined and explained, and each reflects the inherent interrelatedness of public and private policing. Keywords Policing · Private policing · Public policing

1 Introduction In 2019, Alabama—a state in the southeastern USA—authorized the formation of a new police department. Like other officers in the state, officers at the new agency must be certified by the Alabama Peace Officers Standards and Training Commission (ALA. CODE § 16–22-1(c) (2019)). Unlike most officers in Alabama, though, the officers at the new agency would not be city, county, or state employees. Instead, they work for a private religious institution, the Briarwood Presbyterian Church, which was specifically authorized to “appoint and employ one or more persons to act as police officers to protect the safety and integrity of the church and its ministries” (ALA. CODE § 16–22-1(a) (2019)). These officers are “charged with

This chapter is adapted from Stoughton (Stoughton 2017b). S. W. Stoughton () University of South Carolina School of Law, Columbia, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. Hirschmann et al. (eds.), Plural Policing in the Global North, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16273-2_3

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all of the duties and invested with all of the powers of law enforcement officers” (ALA. CODE § 16–22-1(a) (2019)). A church with its own police department seems like a radical departure from modern practices. And it is, but to a much lesser extent than casual observers would realize. Policing in the USA is popularly viewed as exclusively or primarily governmental, a conclusion that follows syllogistically from the observations that the principal function of police agencies is to engage in order maintenance and crime control and that “maintaining order and controlling crime are paradigmatic governmental functions” (Sklansky 1999, 1168). Advocates of police abolition, a political movement that has gained popularity in the USA in recent years, decry the harms committed by “agents of the state,” echoing the traditional view of policing as fundamentally governmental (Kaba and Ritchie 2020). But as policing scholars in the USA and abroad have recognized, that conception of policing, however common, is incomplete (Smith and Alpert 2011; Sklansky 2006; Mazerolle and Ransley 2005; Joh 2004, 2005; Crawford et al. 2005; Button 2002; Sarre and Prenzler 2000); Buerger 1998, 89–90). Policing is, inherently and inseparably, a form of social control. Social control theory is concerned with the “social forces [that] create patterns of association between members of society” (Chriss 2007, 15) and defines different social spaces (Herbert 1997, 9–11, 21–23) in which certain associations and behaviors are permitted or prohibited. To use an obvious example, the type of loud cheering that is entirely acceptable during a sporting event may be deeply disruptive if it occurs in the midst of a theatrical performance. Such behavior might be policed—in the informal sense of the word—by the dark looks of the other theater patrons, the quiet admonishments of the ushers, or even, should the situation become untenable, by the interruption of the performance and the expulsion of the offending party by security personnel acting at the behest of theater officials. It may even become policed— in the formal sense—should the theater summon the local constabulary. As that example demonstrates, both public and private entities engage in social control.1 That example also demonstrates a more complex phenomenon; social control is exercised to serve both public and private interests. A theater disturbance is, in the immediate sense, a private matter that involves a specific business and its customers. In another sense, though, the incident is a public matter; causing a public disturbance can be a criminal act, an offense against the state that justifies prosecution. Identifying these two different dimensions—the characterization of the entity engaged in the police action and, separately, the nature of the interest being served by the police action—allows for the development of a taxonomy of plural policing derived from the intersection of the character of the entity engaged in policing and the nature of the interest served, both of which exist on a spectrum from public to private. That taxonomy is reflected in the following Fig. 1.

1

I acknowledge that they can, in various legal frameworks, hold a practical monopoly on certain social control mechanisms, such as arrest and criminal prosecution. Such mechanisms, however, are a means of social control rather than its ends.

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Fig. 1 Plural policing as the convergence of interest and entity

“Public policing” refers to those situations in which a public entity addresses a purely public interest. When a municipal police officer stops someone for committing a traffic violation, for example, both the nature of the interest and the entity taking action are public. “Private policing,” in contrast, refers to those situations in which a private entity addresses a purely private interest. When a security guard at a night club refuses to admit or ejects a patron who is violating the business’s dress code, both the nature of the interest and the entity taking action are private. “Semi-public private policing” and “semi-private public policing” refer to situations in which there is a mismatch between the character or authority of the entity engaged in policing and the nature of the interest being served by the police action in question. When a municipal police officer works for a private employer or a city hires a security guard, it creates a misalignment between the nature of the interest served and the entity engaged in police action. The remainder of this chapter expounds on the four-part taxonomy of plural policing in the USA, providing examples and explaining how, even within each category, the line between “public” and “private” policing is indelibly blurred.

2 Public Policing The vast majority of officers in the USA are employed at the state and local level. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics’ data from 2008, the most recent year for which full survey data is available, more than 15,000 state and local general-purpose law enforcement agencies employ almost 725,000 full-time officers (Reaves 2011, 2). Additionally, more than 1700 special jurisdiction agencies— agencies with either a special geographic jurisdiction, such as a university or public transportation system, or with limited enforcement responsibilities, such as alcohol control agencies—employ an additional 57,000 full-time officers (Reaves

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2011, 2). The 638 constables and marshals’ agencies left in the country employ a total of about 3500 full-time officers (Reaves 2011, 2). In total, there were approximately 780,000 full-time, sworn law enforcement officers working for state or local governments in the USA. The ratio of 252 officers per 100,000 people means that there is one state or local officer for roughly every 400 people (one officer for every 300 adults) in the population (Howden and Meyer 2011, 2, tbl. 1). These officers interacted with approximately 61.5 million people in 2018, the most recent year for which data are available (Harrell and Davis 2020, 4). Many—maybe most—of these interactions are straightforward examples of public policing, involving an officer working in the course of her employment with a local or state government. But certain investigative techniques, funding and equipment, and the reliance on private parties to assist with police investigations can blur the line between public and private policing. On at least some occasions, officers act in an official capacity outside of the jurisdiction in which they have lawful authority. The International Liaison Program implemented by the New York Police Department, for example, has stationed Intelligence Officers in 14 cities outside of the geographic boundaries of New York. Posting officers internationally allows for “firsthand intelligence on worldwide counterterror operations” and lets officers “build[] contacts with local law enforcement agencies and provid[e] in-depth analysis to their counterparts back home” (NYC Police Foundation n.d.). When officers act outside of their jurisdictional limits, they may be effectively limited to doing no more than what any other member of the public might do. In essence, officers sometimes act in their public position without the mantle of state authority. Outside the relatively confined context of extrajudicial action, several common investigative tactics depend on obscuring the line separating public and private action, and for good reason; officers simply would not be effective if they operated in a way that continually advertised their official affiliation. In plainclothes operations, for example, officers engage in surveillance or proactive patrol while wearing ordinary attire rather than police uniforms. The objective is to observe people without advertising officers’ official identities until it becomes advantageous to do so, e.g., when initiating an investigative detention. The difficulty of identifying officers in these circumstances has become an issue in several high-profile incidents, including the shootings of Amadou Diallo, Sean Bell, and, more recently, Corey Jones (Buckley and Rashbaum 2006; Fritsch 2000; Carrero et al. 2015). Undercover operations blur the line of public and private policing even more. There are different degrees of “cover” under which an officer can operate. At one end of the spectrum is superficial cover, as with officers engaged in stings, in which officers pretend to be clients purchasing illegal goods (such as drugs) or services (such as prostitution), and reverse stings, in which officers pretend to be sellers of illegal goods or services. Other operations require modest preparation, as with officers who create misleading personal accounts to investigate child pornography (Lourdeau 2004, 21). At the far end of the spectrum are sophisticated cover identities that require “backstopping,” the creation of fictitious information to support a cover identity (MacDonald and Kennedy 1983, 121–135). The paradigmatic example of

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a sophisticated undercover operation involves an officer using a cover identity to infiltrate a criminal network (Queen 2005), but that is hardly the only example. In “stash-house stings,” undercover officers recruit suspects to help them rob nonexistent drug dealers, which requires them to create a fake stash house (where the arrest will ultimately take place) (Heath 2013). Some undercover operations can be even more sophisticated. In late 2013, for example, the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives was rocked by the public disclosure of a series of sting operations in which ATF agents operated fake businesses that conducted illegal transactions (such as purchasing illegal firearms and stolen goods) so as to eventually arrest their “customers” (Diedrich and Rutledge 2013). Beyond plainclothes and undercover operations, the use of informants is another common investigative practice that can blur the line between public and private policing (Natapoff 2011, 25–27). Informants can be passive, in the sense that they pass along information to the police but play no other role in the investigation, but it is active informants, who engage in information gathering or participate in operations at the explicit direction of officers, who raise the specter of private policing. Informants can set law enforcement priorities (Natapoff 2011, 35–36), work to attract would-be wrongdoers (Opinion 1981), and facilitate prolonged investigations (Natapoff 2011; Joh 2009; Dennis 2009). The way in which police acquire and deploy surveillance or investigative equipment can also blur the line between public and private policing, particularly in the modern era of stretched public budgets. As part of its 2006 downtown, urban revitalization efforts, for example, the Minneapolis Police Department partnered with the Target Corporation—a large retail chain—to install security cameras (Giles 2012). The number grew from the original 30 to over 100 cameras deployed in the 40-block area, monitored by both private security personnel and the city police department (Giles 2012). In 2012, Target Corporation’s Vice President of Assets Protection estimated that Target has partnered with about two dozen cities to provide similar access to security cameras. Target is far from alone. A range of private businesses in metropolitan Grand Rapids, for example, allow public police agencies to access and monitor their security video feeds in real time (Ellison 2014). In Minneapolis, the SafeZone Collaborative formed a non-profit organization, then successfully lobbied for the metropolitan area to be zoned as a Downtown Improvement District (a type of Business Improvement District (Briffault 1999)), where a special tax on property owners funds continued security efforts (Giles 2012). Public officers have come to rely on private actors for everyday police operations. Private police support services—such as private companies that provide call-taking and dispatch services (Perin 2013) or private forensic laboratories that contract with police agencies (Velasquez 2016; Police eye partnership 2008)—are common, but so, too, is private entanglement in what would otherwise appear to be public police investigations. The National Automobile Theft Bureau—a private, not-for-profit organization created in 1912 with the support of the private insurance industry— managed databases that collected information about stolen vehicles (Marx 1987) before being replaced by the National Insurance Crime Bureau in 1992. In many

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states, law enforcement officers were required to report information about motor vehicle thefts to the Bureau, including details about the vehicle and the theft itself (Marx 1987). A more contemporary and mundane example of officer reliance on private actors may be found in the context of DUI enforcement. According to Uniform Crime Reporting data, more than one million persons were arrested for driving under the influence in 2019 (FBI 2019, tbl. 29). Some number of those arrestees were subjected to a blood draw, initiated by officers to obtain the suspects’ blood-alcohol levels. It is typically not an officer who draws blood. Although precise data are unavailable, it seems safe to say that medical professionals usually conduct the blood draw (Birchfield v. North Dakota 2016; Missouri v. McNeely 2013); indeed, state law may limit blood draws to medical technicians (N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1194(4)(a)(1)). In short, in the context of blood samples, officers’ investigative efforts are heavily dependent on the cooperation of private actors.2 In some jurisdictions, “cooperation” is misleading; the assistance of medical professionals is so essential that state law may require medical authorities to assist police investigations by performing blood draws (at least when the officer has the legal authority to require the subject to submit to provide a sample) (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 28–1388; N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1194(4)(a)(1).

3 Semi-Private Public Policing Semi-private public policing occurs when public police authority or resources are used to address private interests. Examples can be found in special jurisdiction agencies, special appointments, and the widespread practice of private employers hiring off-duty officers to engage in law enforcement or security services. Special jurisdiction agencies are police organizations that serve either a special geographic jurisdiction that does not align with political subdivisions—university or transit police, for example—or engage in enforcement activities that narrowly focus on a particular area, such as the Enforcement Division of Nevada’s Gaming Control Board (Enforcement division n.d.). As of 2008, there were more than 1700 special jurisdiction agencies that employed just under 57,000 full-time, sworn officers (Reaves 2011, 8). Of the more-than 1700 special jurisdiction police agencies, most serve public school districts (250), higher education facilities (779), transportation systems (167), parks and recreational areas (124), and hospitals or other healthcare facilities (48). Many of these, perhaps most, do little to blur the line between public and private policing. Some, however, do. The Federal Reserve System, a unique public/private entity, has its own law enforcement agency, the US Federal Reserve Police (12 U.S.C. §

2

I recognize, of course, that there are a number of public medical institutions, including university hospitals that do not fit into a strict definition of “private actors.”

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248(q)). Officers may be “designated or authorized by the [Federal Reserve Board] or a reserve bank,” and are authorized to carry firearms, make arrests, and access law enforcement information (12 U.S.C. § 248(q)(3)). Another example, and one less connected to government entities, can be found in private universities’ police departments. Campus police officers at Yale, for example, “wear New Haven Police Department badges and are invested with their powers of arrest through the City of New Haven,” even though “the Yale Police Department and New Haven Police Department are in fact two separate entities” (Jahnig 2015, 264 footnote 96 (quoting Ayyar 2007)). The blurring of public and private policing can be even more dramatic. Headquartered in Memphis, Tennessee, the FedEx Corporation is a publicly traded multinational business organization with annual revenue of more than $69 billion in 2016 (FedEx Annual Report, 2020 n.d.). It does not just maintain a massive fleet of air carriers that service more than 350 airports, it also maintains a private police force, the FedEx Air Carrier Police. Because Tennessee law allows for the creation of “transportation security officers” (Tenn. Code Ann. § 38–3-120(j)(2017)) who have “all of the powers of a peace officer” (Tenn. Code Ann. § 38–3-120(j)(3) (2017)). FedEx employs a (relatively small) number of officers who can make arrests, apply for warrants, initiate pursuits, carry weapons, and participate in a Regional Joint Terrorism Task Force (Fields 2003). And, of course, there is the example of the Briarwood Presbyterian Church and its in-house police force mentioned in the introduction (Ala. Code § 16–22-1(a) (2019)). And Tennessee and Alabama are not the only states that allow private entities to establish police forces who act with fully public authority. In Arizona, a private railroad company can, on its own, designate “railroad police,” who “aid and supplement . . . . law enforcement agencies . . . . in the protection of railroad property and the protection of the persons and property of railroad passengers and employees” (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40–856 (2015)). Other states blur the line between public and private policing even more. In Virginia, a private corporation or the private owner of “any place within the Commonwealth” can ask a circuit court judge to appoint a “special conservator of the peace” (Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-13A (2017)). A special conservator can be designated a “law-enforcement officer” and may identify themselves as “police” on uniform or badge, including a badge that bears the state seal. Special conservators can serve up to a four-year term, and in that time “have all the powers, functions, duties, responsibilities and authority” of a police officer, at least within “such geographical confines as the court may deem appropriate . . . . within the confines of the county, city or town where the corporate applicant is located.” Courts may, but need not, “limit the use of flashing lights and sirens on personal vehicles used by the conservator in the performance of his duties” (Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-13A (2017)). A special conservator must register with the Department of Criminal Justice Services and may have to go through basic police training, although exemptions are permissible. There are, however, benefits to going through a police academy. A special conservator “who has completed the minimum training standards established by the Department of Criminal Justice Services . . . . has the

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authority to [e]ffect arrests, using up to the same amount of force as would be allowed to a law-enforcement officer employed by the Commonwealth or any of its political subdivisions when making a lawful arrest” (Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-13A (2017)). Special conservators of the peace are public officers who may be requested by a private corporation or property owner, but the special conservator is a public officer who can be, but is not necessarily, an employee of the requesting party. Special conservators are, in essence, privately requested police officers without an agency; they work outside both the normal market controls of a private security company and the normal political controls of a local police officer. Not every private entity can create their own police force, nor do most of them need to do so. Private interests can leverage public policing by shifting the costs of security from their own expenditure to the public coffers. According to a review of Walmart stores in the Tampa area, for example, local police agencies “logged nearly 16,800 calls” over the course of 2015, or “two calls an hour, every hour, every day” (Sampson et al. 2016). One officer described the situation this way: “We are, as a department, at the mercy of what they [Walmart] want to do” (Sampson et al. 2016). According to retail analyst Burt Flickinger, “‘Law enforcement becomes in effect a taxpayer-paid private security source for Walmart’” (Sampson et al. 2016). Private industry does not always rely on the largess of public police; various investigative efforts may be privately funded. In the early 1980s, the National Automobile Theft Bureau provided personnel and funding for a joint operation with the Tennessee Department of Revenue and the Metropolitan Nashville Police Department that, under the supervision of a prosecutor, used extensive undercover investigations to target vehicle theft in eastern Tennessee (McElreath et al. 2013, 168). More recently, licensed taxis in Los Angeles pay a $30 monthly fee to fund police sting operations directed at ferreting out unlicensed taxis since 2006 (Improved bandit tax 2007). In the modern era of ride-sharing apps like Uber and Lyft, this funding has been used to identify drivers who illegally accept cash payment (instead of demanding payment through the app, as required) (Sibilla 2016). Businesses can acquire police services even more directly by hiring uniformed officers to provide law enforcement services while they are off-duty, a practice known as “moonlighting” (Stoughton 2017a). According to prior research, the vast majority of police agencies permit officers to engage in moonlighting (Reiss 1991, 226; Cunningham et al. 1990, 286–290; Reiss 1988). A more recent survey of more than 160 police agencies that collectively employ over 143,000 full-time, sworn officers—almost a fifth of all state and local officers in the country—found that approximately 80% permit moonlighting (Stoughton 2017a). The agencies that track the relevant data reported that 42.63% of their full-time, sworn employees worked in a law enforcement capacity for a private employer (Stoughton 2017a, 1864). To the casual observer, it can be difficult or impossible to distinguish between moonlighting and public policing, as off-duty officers typically wear the same uniform and provide the same wide range of services that on-duty officers might

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otherwise provide. The single most important difference—how an officer is being compensated—is something that observers simply are not privy to. [U]niformed officers may be paid for providing security at a nightclub or bar or for directing traffic outside of a church or synagogue. Officers may also receive free or discounted rent at an apartment complex (so-called “courtesy officers”) in exchange for parking their marked police vehicle in a visible spot or for responding, when off-duty, to non-emergency calls like noise complaints. Officers may be compensated directly by the private entity that hires them, or the employer may pay the city or agency so the officer’s compensation is channeled through the public payroll system. Officers may also receive collateral benefits from private employers, such as employee discounts and earlier-than-public access to information and products. (Stoughton 2017a, 1854)

The manner in which officers engage in moonlighting can further blur the line. Some agencies employ in-house coordinators to facilitate officers’ off-duty employment; private employers who want to hire off-duty officers approach the agency itself, which then makes the job available to officers. Other agencies take a more handsoff approach, leaving it to private employers and individual officers to find each other and work out the details of a moonlighting job, subject only to agency approval. This has created something of a private market for off-duty officers. Phoenix-based security firm Law Enforcement Specialists, for example, takes a traditional approach to providing security personnel, but offers off-duty officers instead of regular security guards (Email correspondence 2016). The technology start-up CopsForHire—which has since changed its name to Blucadia—takes a different tack, having established a “platform for the on-demand marketplace of cops working off-duty” (Email correspondence 2016). Their online marketplace follows the example of Uber, the popular ride-sharing app, by connecting private employers with local officers who would be interested in working off-duty. The appeal of this approach isn’t limited to officers who independently seek their own moonlighting opportunities; police agencies can also adopt the Blucadia platform for internal use, essentially hiring Blucadia to play a coordinating role (Soper 2016).

4 Semi-Public Private Policing Just as public police employees can operate as semi-private entities by addressing private interests, private personnel can engage in semi-public policing by addressing public interests. Although precise numbers are difficult to come by,3 one thing is certain: there are more—probably many more—individuals working in private security than in public policing (Joh 2005; Sklansky 1999, 1175). As of 2015, the Bureau of Labor Statistics estimated that there were almost 1.1 million private security guards responsible for “guard[ing], patrol[ing] or monitor[ing] premises”

3

This is true in part because there is no uniform definition about what constitutes “private security.” For a useful discussion of the conceptual difficulties that complicate attempts to define that term, see Shearing & Stenning (1981, p. 195–198).

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(Security guards 2020; Security guards and gaming surveillance officers 2020). The National Association of Security Companies agrees, estimating that, in 2006, “between 11,000 and 15,000 private security companies employ[ed] more than 1 million guards” (Strom et al. 2010, 4–8). The broader private security industry, which includes individuals who conduct background investigations, provide armored transport services, offer personal protection, manage correctional facilities, and perform security-related tasks other than those that fall under the general classification of “patrol,” is even larger (Strom et al. 2010, 4–6; Groundbreaking study, 2013).4 Further, private security as an industry is growing faster than public policing. The Bureau of Labor Statistics predicts that the ten-year period from 2014 to 2024 will see 4% growth in public policing, but 7% growth in the private security industry (Police and detectives 2020; Security guards and gaming surveillance officers 2020; Groundbreaking study, 2013). This follows ten-year predictions from 2020 to 2030 of 7% and 15%, respectively (Police and detectives 2020; Security guards and gaming surveillance officers 2020). Historically, the thirty-year period from 1980 to 2010 saw an 80% growth in contract security firms (Strom et al. 2010, 4–3). Local police departments, on the other hand, saw only a 34% increase in officers in the 26 years between 1987 and 2013 (Reaves 2011, 2). Further, the total number and rate of growth do not include individuals who work in a primarily security capacity for non-security businesses, such as loss prevention employees working for retail stores, or the wide range of employees such as “store clerks, insurance adjustors, and amusement park attendants” who have some security-related responsibilities, even if their primary duties are unrelated to security (Sklansky 1999, 1175). Today, there can be a close working relationship between public police agencies and their private counterparts. That was not always the case. “Historically, a patronizing, if not suspicious and antagonistic, attitude on the part of public police toward their private counterparts seem[s] to have been the dominant theme” (Sarre and Prenzler 2000, 2). As of 1972, “no city . . . . contracted directly with a private firm for all police services, and less than 1 percent of the cities surveyed dealt with private firms for subservice functions like crime labs” (Benson 1998, 18). In 1977, the US Private Security Advisory Council, which advised the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration at the Department of Justice, identified several major barriers between private and public policing, including “lack or mutual respect,” “lack of communication,” and “lack of cooperation” (Private Security Advisory Council 1977, 2–3). Perhaps the most significant barrier, however, was the belief that public policing was about protecting public concerns, while private security efforts were directed exclusively at private concerns (Private Security Advisory 4

I have intentionally left unmentioned the private security industry’s “hardware security” component, which manufactures, installs, and monitors alarm systems. Although closely related to law enforcement, this function may be seen as distinct from the modern conception of policing. There are some potential parallels, though: law enforcement agencies have been instrumental in installing and monitoring emergency call boxes in some public spaces; these alarms are a familiar sight on many university campuses.

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Council 1977, 5–10). “[P]rivate security,” it was thought, “ought to stay well away from the realm of investigation and public service, and to take a purely passive and preventative role” (Sarre and Prenzler 2000, 93). Although the status differential and other factors undoubtedly remain an area of conflict between public police and private security agencies, there appears to be a higher degree of cooperation than in earlier eras. By the late 1990s, it was estimated that about 45% of local government entities were hiring private companies to provide at least some security services (Sklansky 2006). And this excludes local government agencies that contract for “police support services, such as accounting, maintenance, communications and dispatch, data processing, towing illegally parked cars, fingerprinting prisoners, crime laboratory investigations, performing background checks on job applicants, guarding school crossings, directing traffic, transporting prisoners, and guarding prisoners in hospitals” (Benson 1998, 18). In all likelihood, the percentage of local government that retain private security services has only increased. Government agencies employ the third largest number of private security employees, after only manufacturing firms and retail businesses, “and the expenditures for such services run in the multibillion dollar range” (Benson 1998, 18). In 2004, the International Association of Chiefs of Police issued a summit report urging “the major law enforcement and private security organizations [to] make a formal commitment to cooperation” because such publicprivate partnerships were to be viewed as “a preferred tool to address terrorism, public disorder, and crime” (National policy summit, 2004, 19). What exactly are those private security agencies doing for their public employers for that multibillion dollar payoff? The short answer is: Just about everything. Private security guards have been used to supplement traditional public policing by, for example, providing static, preventative security. Today, thousands of federal buildings around the country are protected by some 15,000 private security guards contracted by the Department of Homeland Security’s Federal Protective Service (Strom et al. 2010, 4–15). Local governments, meanwhile, contract with private security agencies to guard “public buildings, sports arenas, schools, public housing projects, convention centers, courts, airports, and other public facilities (Benson 1998, 18; Sklansky 1999, 1177). Local governments also fund private security efforts. In Washington, D.C., the Private Security Camera Incentive Program provides “a rebate for residents, businesses, nonprofits, and religious institutions to purchase and install security camera systems on [the exterior of] their property and register them with the Metropolitan Police Department” (Private security camera incentive program n.d.). The stated purpose of the program is “to help deter crime and assist law enforcement with investigations” (Private security camera incentive program n.d.). As of October 2020, the program has issued more than 1800 rebates, funding the installation of more than 4079 private security cameras (Private security camera incentive program fiscal year, 2020 annual report, n.d.). Security personnel and private security efforts are not purely passive; private policing can also be responsive; “the Toronto [Canada] Police Department reports that more than 60 percent of all calls to the police are handled by ‘alternative response’ units, which could include private policing acting as a supplement to

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public police departments” (Pastor 2003, 49). In the USA, local governments contract with private security agencies to provide many different aspects of the patrol function previously fulfilled by public police, including directing traffic when necessary (Sklansky 1999, 1177). Government entities might also use private contractors to respond to some calls for service. Burglar alarms are a perfect example: when an alarm accurately identifies a burglary in progress, it may be vastly preferable to have a police officer—with a potentially faster response time and the benefit of more training, better equipment, and the availability of backup—respond to the scene. Unfortunately, alarms are rarely accurate; various studies have found that false positives account for up to 95% of all alarms (Pastor 2003, 50). And there can be lots of alarms; “alarm responses account for 10% to 30% of all calls for police service” (Pastor 2003, 50). A Department of Justice report estimated in 1998 that responding to alarms cost public law enforcement agencies $1.5 billion (Sampson et al. 2016, 1), or more than $2.2 billion in 2021 terms (CPI n.d.). To preserve scarce resources, many police agencies have stopped responding to non-verified alarms, meaning alarms that are triggered but have not been verified by a video or auditory feed or a live complainant such as a resident or security guard (Grace 2003; False alarm study 2018). And when public police pull out, “private police can contribute . . . . by patrolling and by handling certain service functions, such as alarm response” (Pastor 2003, 50). Beyond the relatively limited context of burglary alarms, private security personnel also engage in proactive policing by patrolling assigned beats (Pastor 2003, 50). Although the paradigmatic deployment of private security patrols involves personnel reporting incidents to sworn, public officers (Benson 1998, 18), private security employees engage in what many modern viewers would consider to be more invasive law enforcement activities. Parking enforcement is perhaps the least objectionable aspect of proactive policing (Sklansky 1999, 1177), but it may also be true that private police perform “more stops, searches, and interrogations than is often imagined” (Sklansky 1999, 1179). Unfortunately, such police actions by private actors are either rarely documented or such documentation is not publicly accessible. On some occasions, semi-public private policing blurs the line even further, as when political subdivisions hire private security companies to be the primary provider of policing services (Joh 2005, 614–615; Lyons Lyons n.d.; Goldstein 2007; Marx 1988, n. 4). Kalamazoo, Michigan, for example, contracted at one point with the private security company Charles Services “for street patrol and traffic control” (Benson 1998, 20). Under that arrangement, “private personnel were sworn in as deputy sheriffs in order to ensure compliance to the law, but the personnel were paid by the hour so that they could be released during slow periods and provided in larger force during peak periods” (Benson 1998, 20). Hiring a private firm as the primary provider of policing services isn’t common, but Kalamazoo isn’t unique. Cities in Arizona, Florida, New Jersey, Ohio, and West Virginia have also contracted with private security agencies to provide policing services, including two—Indian Springs, Florida, and Buffalo Creek, West Virginia—that did so for over five years (Benson 1998, 20).

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5 Private Policing Across the USA, private employees conduct a range of what we would otherwise identify as law enforcement activities. The comparison can be a point of pride for security personnel and a selling point for their employers. Elizabeth Joh’s seminal article on the private security industry opens with a quote from a security guard describing his agency as “very policelike” (Joh 2004, 49 (quoting Hazelkorn 2003, 14, 17)). That description captures the broad involvement of private security personnel in patrol, investigations, and surveillance, as well as their authority to stop, search, and arrest. Uniformed security guards engage in patrol on behalf of private businesses, community centers, and neighborhoods. In many gated communities, security guards physically control space (Stoughton 2014b, 2199; Herbert 1997, 9– 11, 21–23) by screening vehicles and pedestrians at entry checkpoints that only residents and duly designated guests are permitted to pass (Blakely and Snyder 1997, 2–3). They respond to complaints and alarms, from the mall security officers called to deal with an obnoxious patron in the food court to mobile security officers who respond to residential burglar alarms. With both a preventative and responsive aspect, private security patrol closely parallels the public police patrol function. Patrol may be the “mainstay of police work” (Fritsch et al. 2009, 17; Stoughton 2014a, 879–880) but policing also includes an investigative component; police agencies are expected to investigate and solve crimes so they can apprehend offenders and support successful prosecutions (Kaste 2015; Larson 2015; Winkley 2015).5 Those investigations may include surveillance, either targeted surveillance that tracks a subject suspected of wrongdoing (United States v. Jones, 2012)- or drag-net surveillance that captures a range of individuals in an attempt to ferret out wrongdoing that has not yet been identified (ABC 13 2012).6 Just as private parties parallel the public police’s patrol function, so too do they engage in similar investigative behaviors. The Bureau of Labor Statistics projects a “faster than average” growth for private detectives and investigators (Occupational Outlook Handbook n.d.), who “increasingly are hired not only to watch for shoplifters, but also to investigate and not infrequently to spy on everyone from insurance claimants and litigation opponents to employees, business partners, and even prospective neighbors” (Sklansky 1999, 1176). In addition to targeted surveillance, private security efforts include pervasive surveillance of public or private space. Such surveillance is not intended to gather information about a particular person, but rather to observe the behaviors of a group of people (whoever happens to be in camera range) so that wrongdoers can be identified in real time or after the fact. Casino surveillance is perhaps the most obvious example of privately administered pervasive surveillance. In Nevada, for example, the Gaming Commission requires licensed casinos that operate at least 5

Indeed, this expectation is so persistent that the failure to do so is considered newsworthy. For example, the New York Police Department’s surreptitious surveillance of Muslim communities in New Jersey.

6

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three gaming tables to have the capacity to “monitor and record: (a) each table game area with sufficient clarity to identify patrons and dealers; and (b) each table game surface, with sufficient coverage and clarity to simultaneously view the table bank and determine the configuration of wagers, card values, and game outcomes” (Surveillance standards, 2005, 2). According to a long-time casino security engineer, a large casino like the Bellagio may have more than 2000 active cameras (Brodkin 2008). While this is a rather extreme example, and one largely directed at private space, private surveillance in more public areas is a fact of modern life: outwardfacing security cameras are a common feature of parking lots, gas pumps, ATMs, apartment building entrances, urban storefronts, and so on. Not only do private actors share many of the duties of their public counterparts, they also share some of the same legal authority. At common law—that is, under the legal principles articulated by judges, especially the historical laws of England that were adopted by the USA when it was founded, which remain in place until overwritten by statutory law enacted by legislatures –private citizens had a limited power to arrest: the proverbial “citizen’s arrest.” Like public officials, private citizens could arrest for felonies committed outside of their presence but could only arrest for misdemeanors and breaches of the peace committed in their presence (Note 1965, 504–505; Carroll v. United States, 1924). If the person arrested for the misdemeanor was not the perpetrator of the crime, or if no felony had actually been committed, a public officer was immune from civil and criminal liability so long as they had a good faith belief amounting to probable cause at the time of the arrest. But a private citizen had no such protection; having a good-faith, probable cause belief that the perpetrator committed a crime will not insulate a community member from liability for a range of intentional torts and their criminal analogues (Note 1965, 511; Scope of legal authority, 1976).7 Private security guards, on the other hand, have less to worry about. The law in many jurisdictions gives more flexibility to private businesses and their employees than it does to citizens. Statutes that codify the common-law doctrine known as “shopkeeper’s privilege” or “merchant’s privilege,” for example, provide a probable cause defense for business owners and employees who arrest someone for larceny (Main 2000, 293–294). Further, merchants may be explicitly authorized to use force to effectuate the arrest or protect their property in a way that private citizens are not (Main 2000, 295). Such statutes may provide “absolute immunity from civil liability for intentional torts . . . which may occur during the apprehension and detention of a customer suspected for shoplifting” (Kaminsky 2008, 82). And while a merchant and the merchant’s agents face less civil or criminal liability than a private individual would, the perpetrator of the crime may face more; in some states, resisting a merchant or private security guard’s attempt to arrest carries a separate

7

Some states have provided substantive protections by immunizing private citizens who have some quantum of proof—probable cause or reasonable cause are the two most common—supporting their actions (Scope of legal authority 1976).

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criminal penalty in much the same way that it is a crime to resist a police officer’s attempt to arrest (Fla. Stat. Ann. § 812.015(6)). Private security guards acting on behalf of their employers are not just given more protection than private citizens, they may also be given more authority. In some states, private security guards are explicitly equated to public police. In South Carolina, for example, an individual “hired or employed to provide security services on a specific property is granted the authority and arrest power given to sheriff’s deputies” while on that property, so long as the security guard is “registered or licensed” (S.C. Code Ann. § 40–18-110 (2000)). Further blurring the line between public and private policing, it is the South Carolina State Law Enforcement Division that does the registering and licensing for security guards in the state, as well as playing a central role in the regulation of private security and investigations businesses and employees (S.C. Code Ann. §§ 40–18-30 to −100 (2000)). The equation of private actors with public officials also plays prominently in the history of bounty hunting. The authority for bounty hunting dates from 1873, when the Supreme Court held that, under the common law, a bondsman has “dominion” over a defendant whose bond he had paid (Taylor v. Taintor 1873). That control, the Court held, “is a continuance of the original imprisonment,” with the bondsman’s authority to apprehend “is likened to the rearrest by the sheriff of an escaping prisoner.” Today, a few states explicitly prohibit bounty hunting, while most states impose a variety of regulations that limit the common law rules, but the common law rules remain in effect in eighteen states (Johnson and Stevens 2013, 194–200). Given the broad authority, it should be no surprise that private parties engage in the rather specialized function of fugitive apprehension. According to one source, private “[b]ounty hunters claim to catch 31,500 bail jumpers per year, about 90 percent of people who jump bail in the United States” (Meadows 2012, 155). Indeed, private actors may well have more authority than public officers (Sparrow 2014, 6; Johnson and Stevens 2013, 190, 192). They are not regulated by the constitutional doctrines or state analogues that restrict police actions, nor are they subject to judicial remedies like the exclusionary rule or liable under federal civil rights statutes that apply to public actors (Sklansky 1999, 1240). As a result, private actors can act when and in manners that public officers cannot. In 2013, for example, an appellate court in North Carolina held that a private security guard hired by a Homeowners’ Association to patrol a private neighborhood was not a state actor and thus was permitted to conduct a traffic stop without meeting the legal threshold that would have been required for a public officer to initiate the stop (State v. Weaver 2013).

6 Conclusion This chapter observes that plural policing can be conceptualized as the intersection of a particular interest (public or private) and the entity or authority that addresses that interest (public or private). It illustrates that conceptualization by offering a

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four-part taxonomy that covers the spectrum of plural policing in the USA: public policing, semi-private public policing, semi-public private policing, and private policing. Although each category in the taxonomy is clearly definable, the lines between categories can be thin, blurred, or practically nonexistent, demonstrating the inherent interrelatedness of public and private policing. Unfortunately, this broad conceptualization of policing goes largely unnoticed in public discourse. In the USA today, the role of policing is very much at the center of public debate. When police apologists defend officer actions, when elected officials promise police improvements, and when activists call for the abolition of policing, they adopt a view of policing as a government institution. A more holistic understanding of what policing is—a practice implemented by multiple institutions, both public and private—can better inform conversations about what policing should be. The inclusion of plural policing in those conversations is increasingly critical. Formalized plural policing has always featured prominently in the public safety and security landscape in the USA, going back at least as far as Pinkerton National Detective Agency in the 1850s (Marx 1988, 28–29). It is highly likely that plural policing will become progressively more important to the co-production of public safety and security in the USA, especially as the country grapples with whether officers operating under the public policing paradigm are suitable to play the myriad of roles in which they have been cast (Friedman 2021, 954–979).

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Harrell E, Davis E (2020) Contacts between police and the public, 2018 – Statistical tables. Retrieved April 13, 2022, from https://bjs.ojp.gov/library/publications/contacts-betweenpolice-and-public-2018-statistical-tables Hazelkorn B (2003) Making crime pay, vol Aug. 17. Chronicle Magazine, San Francisco Heath B (2013, June 28) ATF uses fake drugs, big bucks to snare suspects. USA Today Retrieved April 13, 2022, from https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2013/06/27/atfstash-houses-sting-usa-today-investigation/2457109/ Herbert S (1997) Policing space: territoriality and the Los Angeles police department. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN Howden LM, Meyer JA (2011) Age and sex composition: 2010. Retrieved April 13, 2022, from https://www.census.gov/library/publications/2011/dec/c2010br-03.html Improved bandit taxi enforcement program (2007) Council file: 06–0142. LA City clerk connect. Retrieved April 13, 2022, from https://cityclerk.lacity.org/lacityclerkconnect/ index.cfm?fa=ccfi.viewrecord&cfnumber=06-0142 Jahnig LJ (2015) Note. Under school colors: private university police as state actors under § 1983. Northwest Univ Law Rev 110(1):249–282 Joh EE (2004) The paradox of private policing. J Crim Law Criminol 95(1):49–131 Joh EE (2005) Conceptualizing the private police. Utah Law Rev 2:573–617 Joh EE (2009) Breaking the law to enforce it: undercover police participation in crime. Stanford Law Rev 62(1):155–198 Johnson BR, Stevens RS (2013) The regulation and control of bail recovery agents: an exploratory study. Crim Justice Rev 38(2):190–206 Kaba M, Ritchie AJ (2020, December 6) We want more justice for Breonna Taylor than the system that killed her can deliver. Essence. Retrieved April 13, 2022, from https://www.essence.com/ feature/breonna-taylor-justice-abolition/ Kaminsky A (2008) A complete guide to premises security litigation, 3rd edn. ABA Publishing, Chicago, IL Kaste M (2015, March 30) Open cases: Why one-third of murders in America go unresolved, NPR. Retrieved April 13, 2022, from https://www.npr.org/2015/03/30/395069137/open-caseswhy-one-third-of-murders-in-america-go-unresolved Larson J (2015) New Harris County numbers show many unsolved crimes. Click2houston. Retrieved April 13, 2022, from https://www.click2houston.com/news/2015/05/19/new-harriscounty-numbers-show-many-unsolved-crimes/ Lourdeau KL (2004, May 6) Online pornography: Closing the door on pervasive smut. Hearing before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection. Retrieved April 13, 2022, from https://www.scribd.com/document/334922801/HOUSE-HEARING-108THCONGRESS-ONLINE-PORNOGRAPHY-CLOSING-THE-DOOR-ON-PERVASIVE-SMUT Lyons J. (n.d.) Privatization of police services. Florida Department of law Enforcement. Retrieved April 13, 2022, from https://www.fdle.state.fl.us/FCJEI/Programs/SLP/Documents/Full-Text/ Lyons.aspx MacDonald JM, Kennedy J (1983) Criminal investigation of drug offenses: The narcs’ manual. Retrieved April 13, 2022, from https://www.ojp.gov/ncjrs/virtual-library/abstracts/criminalinvestigation-drug-offenses-narcs-manual Main AG (2000) Note, racial profiling in places of public accommodation: theories of recovery and relief. Brandeis Law J 39(1):289–316 Marx GT (1987) The interweaving of public and private police undercover work. In: Shearing CD, Stenning PC (eds) Private policing. Sage Publishing, Thousand Oaks, CA Marx GT (1988) Undercover: police surveillance in America. University of California Press, Berkeley, CA Mazerolle L, Ransley J (2005) Third party policing. Cambridge University Press, New York McElreath DH et al (2013) Introduction to law enforcement. CRC Press, Boca Raton Meadows RJ (2012) Bounty hunters. In: Miller WR (ed) The social history of crime and punishment in America: an encyclopedia. Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, CA Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1561 (2013), pp. 154–156

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N.Y. Veh. & Traf. Law § 1194 (2020) N.Y.C. Police Foundation. (n.d.) International liaisons. Retrieved April 13, 2022, from https:// www.nycpolicefoundation.org/ Natapoff A (2011) Snitching: criminal informants and the erosion of American justice. New York University Press, New York, NY National policy summit: Building private security/public policing partnerships (2004) International Association of Chiefs of Police. Retrieved April 13, 2022, from https://www.theiacp.org/ resources/national-policy-summit-building-private-securitypublic-policing-partnerships Note (1965) The law of citizen’s arrest. Columbia Law Rev 65(4):502–513 Occupational outlook handbook, private detectives and investigators (n.d.) U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. Retrieved April 13, 2022, from https://www.bls.gov/ooh/Protective-Service/Privatedetectives-and-investigators.htm Opinion (1981, May 5) the two faces of Abscam New York Times: A22. Retrieved April 13, 2022, from https://www.nytimes.com/1981/05/05/opinion/the-two-faces-of-abscam.html Pastor JF (2003) The privatization of police in America. McFarland and Co, Jefferson, NC Perin M (2013, July 16) Private 911 police telecommunications: Same job, different boss. Officer. Retrieved April 13, 2022, from https://www.officer.com/command-hq/ technology/communications/dispatch-technology/article/10959085/private-911-policetelecommunications-same-job-different-boss Police and detectives (2020) Occupational outlook handbook. Retrieved April 13, 2022, from https://www.bls.gov/ooh/protective-service/police-and-detectives.htm Police eye partnership with Portland crime lab (2008, Mar. 31) Town of Cape Elizabeth News Private Security Advisory Council (1977) Law enforcement and private security sources and areas of conflict and strategies for conflict resolution. Retrieved April 13, 2022, from https:/ /www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/44783NCJRS.pdf Private security camera incentive program, fiscal year 2020 annual report (n.d.) Office of Victim Services and Justice Grants. Retrieved April 13, 2022, from https://ovsjg.dc.gov/service/ private-security-camera-system-incentive-program Queen W (2005) Under and alone: the true story of the undercover agent who infiltrated America’s most violent outlaw motorcycle gang. Random House, New York, NY Reaves BA (2011) Census of state and local law enforcement agencies, 2008. Retrieved April 13, 2022, from https://bjs.ojp.gov/library/publications/census-state-and-local-law-enforcementagencies-2008 Reiss Jr AJ (1988) Private employment of public police. Retrieved April 13, 2022, from https:// babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=mdp.39015019163800andview=1upandseq=3 Reiss AJ Jr (1991) Private employment of public police. In: Gormley WT (ed) Privatization and its alternatives. University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, WI, pp 226–240 S.C. CODE ANN . §§ 40–18-30 to −100 (2000) Sampson ZT, Morel LC, Eli M (2016, May 11) Walmart. Thousands of police calls. You paid the bill. Tampa Bay Times. Retrieved April 13, 2022, from https://projects.tampabay.com/projects/ 2016/public-safety/walmart-police/ Sarre R, Prenzler T (2000) The relationship between police and private security: models and future directions. Int J Comp Appl Crim Just 24(1):91–113. (providing examples from Australia) Scope of legal authority of private security personnel (1976) Private Security Advisory Council. Retrieved April 13, 2022, from https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/146908NCJRS.pdf Security guards (2020, May) Occupational employment and wages. Retrieved April 13, 2022, from https://www.bls.gov/oes/current/oes339032.htm Security guards and gaming surveillance officers (2020) Occupational Outlook Handbook. Retrieved April 13, 2022, from https://www.bls.gov/ooh/protective-service/securityguards.htm Shearing CD, Stenning PC (1981) Modern private security: its growth and implications. Crime Justice 3:193–245

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Sibilla N (2016, December 9) LAPD should stop stings against Uber. Orange County register (Cal.) (Dec. 9, 2016). Retrieved April 13, 2022, from https://www.ocregister.com/2016/12/09/ lapd-should-stop-stings-against-uber/ Sklansky DA (1999) The private police. UCLA Law Rev 46(4):1165–1287 Sklansky DA (2006) Private police and democracy. Am Criminal Law Rev 43(1):89–105 Smith HP, Alpert GA (2011) Joint policing: third parties and the use of force. Police Pract Res 12(2):136–147 Soper T (2016, October 10) Seattle police department picks CopsForHire as platform to handle off-duty assignments. GeekWire. Retrieved April 13, 2022, from https://www.geekwire.com/ 2016/seattle-police-department-picks-copsforhire-platform-handle-off-duty-assignments/ Sparrow MK (2014) Managing the boundary between public and private policing. New Perspectives of Policing Bulletin NCJ 247182:1–24 State v. Weaver, 752 S.E.2d 240 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) Stoughton SW (2014a) Policing facts. Tulane Law Rev 88(5):847–898 Stoughton SW (2014b) The incidental regulation of policing. Minn Law Rev 98(6):2179–2235 Stoughton SW (2017a) Moonlighting: the private employment of off-duty officers. Univ Ill Law Rev 5:1847–1900 Stoughton SW (2017b) The blurred blue line: reform in an era of public and private policing. Am J Crim Law 44(2):117–155 Strom K et al. (2010) The private security industry: A review of the definitions, available data sources, and paths moving forward. Retrieved April 13, 2022, from https://www.ojp.gov/ pdffiles1/bjs/grants/232781.pdf Surveillance standards for nonrestricted licensees (2005) Nevada Gaming Commission. Retrieved April 13, 2022, from https://gaming.nv.gov/modules/showdocument.aspx?documentid=2944 Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 371 (1873) TENN . CODE ANN § 38-3-120 (2017) United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012) VA . CODE ANN . § 19.2-13A (2017) Velasquez JJ (2016, Nov. 3) Austin contracts Dallas forensic lab to address rape kit backlog. Community impact newspaper. Retrieved April 13, 2022, from https://communityimpact.com/ austin/central-austin/city-county/2016/11/03/austin-contracts-dallas-forensic-lab-addressrape-kit-backlog/ Winkley L (2015, April 11) Murders mostly solved, not minor crimes. San Diego union tribune. Retrieved April 13, 2022, from https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/sdut-police-clearancerates-murders-fbi-stats-2015apr11-story.html

Seth W. Stoughton is a Professor at the University of South Carolina School of Law and a Professor (Affiliate) in the university’s Department of Criminology and Criminal Justice.

Plural Policing in Germany—Heterogeneity and the Contingency of Its Making Tobias John

Abstract In the last decades the production of public security in Germany has changed, from a—at least by the public perceived—monopoly of the police to a provision of security by different stakeholders. This form of security production, described as plural policing, is common in Germany, but it is not shaped identically throughout Germany. Instead it is varying between federal states as well as municipalities in regard to involved policing actors and relations between policing actors. As such, plural policing in Germany is a heterogenous phenomenon. Based on research of the research group PluS-i in five German cities, this chapter shows this heterogenous nature of plural policing in Germany by discussing different observed models of plural policing. These exemplify varying ways plural policing can be shaped by policy making processes. Following, this heterogenous nature is further discussed in the context of the different understandings and approaches to plural policing in other central European and Anglo-Saxon countries, utilising a pragmatistic theoretical perspective on policy making. Keywords Plural policing · Security · Contingency · Policy making · Pragmatism

1 Introduction Research on the provision and production of security and order in a broad range of countries shows changes and developments subsumed under the heading of a pluralisation in security production (Jones and Newburn 2006a; Terpstra and Devroe 2015; Terpstra et al. 2013). At the core of these changes is that the state is no longer perceived as the singular or monopolistic provider of (public) security—instead a number of other providers (e.g., private security companies and municipality

T. John () Institut of Political Science, University of Münster, Münster, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. Hirschmann et al. (eds.), Plural Policing in the Global North, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16273-2_4

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guards) are (increasingly) established as stakeholders in security production (Devroe and Terpstra 2015, 235; Terpstra and van Stokkom 2015, 326). One area in which pluralisation is especially visible are policing activities—now often referred to as plural policing (Terpstra et al. 2013, 9; Jones and Newburn 2006c, 4). On the forefront of the findings regarding plural policing has been the research in the Anglosphere, shaping the early picture of plural policing in an anglocentric perspective—focused on plural policing mainly as the process of substituting or supplementing policing by the police with policing by private/commercial policing providers (see, e.g., the taxonomy in the article by Stoughton in this volume as well as Stoughton 2016). While this focuses on plural policing as privatisation has gained an international reach, influential for the understanding of plural policing, research on plural policing in continental Europe (Terpstra and Devroe 2015) shows another picture of plural policing—identifying other or additional substituting or supplementing policing providers in different countries as well as other developments forming plural policing next to the anglocentric shift from state to private policing. One example, adding to, expanding on and diverging from the anglocentric understanding of plural policing, is the pluralisation of policing in Germany, this chapter will focus on. Research shows a number of developments, equally or probably more formative for German plural policing than privatisation (Frevel 2015; John and Hirschmann 2020). As such, the formerly mainly, quasi monopolistically police provided policing now involves a variety of different actors. While there are also private security firms taking part in plural policing, depending on local circumstances municipalities and to some extend volunteers play an important part, especially regarding the plural policing aiming at public security and order (Frevel 2015, 270–273; John 2020, 17–21). Further the character of German plural policing is not only diverging from this anglocentric understanding but it also shows a more or less high degree of variations on the state as well as the local level (John et al. 2018, 10–14; John and Hirschmann 2020, 263–264). Based on the exploratory research by the junior research project “Pluralisation of local urban security production”1 (see for further information Hirschmann and John 2019), the following chapter aims to explore and outline the various, still state-focused German approaches to plural policing—exemplifying a continental European understanding in contrast to the anglocentric concept. In addition this heterogenous character shall be discussed from a theoretical point of view, understanding the variances as results of contingent options in policy making—providing a view on plural policing as a phenomenon creatively designed and designable in the political process, that is not overall determined by the circumstances.

1

The junior research project “Pluralisation of local urban security production” (PLuS-i) is funded by the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) in the context of the call “Promotion of young researchers by establishing interdisciplinary competences” in the programme “research for civil security 2012–2017”.

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The chapter is divided into two main parts. Part one is focused on the nature of plural policing in Germany. At the outset this chapter discusses the underlying understanding of policing and plural policing used in this chapter, which is driven by the understanding developed in the research project PluS-i, the presented findings regarding plural policing in Germany are based on. The second section deals with the different developments, summarised as pluralisation in German policing and describes the associated actor-centred forms of policing in Germany in general. In the third section the existing variances in plural policing on state level and the general heterogeneity of plural policing on the local level in Germany are discussed. The fourth section is closely based on central preliminary results from the PluS-i research project. Four different exemplary models of German plural policing are presented—identified by explorative empirical research in PluS-i. The second part looks at the German characteristics of plural policing in context of a bigger picture and proposes a specific theoretical perspective. The fifth section looks at the variance in German plural policing in context of other plural policing approaches in the global north and describes the partly existing divergences and convergences between plural policing in the context of different circumstances. In section six a pragmatistic theoretical perspective is proposed, viewing the heterogeneity as a result of contingent policy making. In the following discussion the empirical observations on German plural policing, described in the first part, are put into context to the different scientific understandings on plural policing in the global north, utilising the described theoretical perspective, before conclusions are drawn in section eight.

2 Policing and Plural Policing Policing as well as plural policing has been an object of interest for research as part of the scientific discourse on safety and security. However, there are a number of understandings of the two terms and concepts. On the one hand, there is a broad understanding of policing. For example, policing is seen as “the activity of making societies safe” (Bayley and Shearing 2001, 1) or as a broad range of different activities: “organized forms of order maintenance, peacekeeping, rule or law enforcement, crime investigation and prevention and other forms of investigation and information-brokering” (Jones and Newburn 2006c, 3–4). This wide understanding is not limited to the Anglosphere as the background of its prominent proponents might suggest, it has also found proponents in continental Europe. Reichertz (2007, 128), for example, sees all state, private and societal activities aimed at the attainment or preservation of security as policing. On the other hand, there are also more narrow conceptualisations, e.g., in continental European Germany, focussing on policing as activities exclusively performed by the police (Feltes and Reichertz 2009), linking policing to one sole actor: the police. This chapter, and the PluS-i research project on whose findings this chapter is based (on), focuses on policing, or more specifically on German “Polizieren”, as

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a subset of the broad range of activities considered policing in the Anglo-Saxon context. The previously scarcely used term “Polizieren”, hereafter translated for simplicity as policing, has been occupied by PluS-i in order to create a more focused object of research. While derived from the Anglo-Saxon policing—especially maintaining the focus on non-actor specific actions—actions and context have been specified, narrowing “Polizieren” to activities of security work directly perceivable by the public, e.g., patrols, guards, or technical appliances like CCTV cameras, independently of the actor (Hirschmann and John 2019, 4). As such, policing is seen here as a bundle of visible activities to generate security and order, performed by divers actors, whether it is the police or others, regardless of how and by whom security and order are defined. Both, policing in general (the wider term) as well as the more specific policing understanding as used in this context here, have been subject to changes, coined as pluralisation by the scientific community. On the one hand, especially in research in the Anglosphere, pluralisation is in part viewed as mainly a trend of privatisation of policing activities, as it can be seen, for example, in Stoughton (see article in this volume as well as Stoughton 2016) taxonomy of US plural policing, varying between state and private policing. On the other hand, research adds additional areas of pluralisation, e.g., policing by additional state/public actors or civil societal stakeholders (Devroe and Terpstra 2015, 238–239; Jones and Newburn 2006c, 4). In part, this is also discussed in the Anglosphere, e.g., in the United Kingdom (Jones and Newburn 2006b) and, for example, in the continental European context, as in Germany (Frevel 2015, 270–273), France (Bonnet et al. 2015), or Belgium (Devroe 2015). As such plural policing in general can be summed up as “rise of new non-police providers of policing services” (Devroe and Terpstra 2015, 235) or the emergence of a police extended family (Johnston 2003) of security stakeholders. In context of the here used understanding of policing as visible security work, plural policing is understood as such policing enacted by more than one actor, is it in cooperation or in coexistence, in the same, overlapping or bordering spaces (Hirschmann and John 2019, 4). This understanding is closely related to other descriptions of plural policing (Terpstra et al. 2013, 9; Jones and Newburn 2006c, 4). In addition to the regular public police there are now all kinds of (non-police) guards, patrollers, wardens and officers working in the public space, under the eyes of the general public. What has arisen in a period of only two decades is a complex of bodies and agencies for guarding, surveillance and enforcement tasks, both in the public domain (on the streets, the market or in the parks), and in areas that are privately owned but are perceived by many citizens as public and freely accessible (often called the semi-public space), such as large malls, entertainment areas or business parks. (Terpstra et al. 2013, 9)

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3 Plural Policing in Germany—Developments and Forms of Policing Plural policing in Germany, as in most countries where plural policing exists, has developed over the last decades. While in the past policing has been mainly attributed to the different state and federal police forces (the police)—it was not only seen as predominantly provided by police but also as monopolistically provided by the police—currently there is a number of other stakeholders established as policing providers. For plural policing in Germany four different developments are most relevant in shifting policing to a more or less pluralistic nature by adding different forms of policing to the fundamental policing provided by the state police forces and federal police forces (police policing). Each of these developments leads to a category of non-police policing providers and as such a specific form of policing as part of the plural policing landscape in Germany. • Remunicipalisation of policing/policialisation of municipalities (municipal policing): Municipalities responsibilities regarding the provision of public security and order are not new in Germany, these already existed before. But in light of the here used understanding of policing, these responsibilities were not primarily linked to policing activities—what is new are the municipal security activities visible by public in public. In the past these responsibilities were enacted mainly as administrational task not as publicly visible actions of the municipalities. The visible control and enforcement of order and security responsibilities of the municipalities were provided by the police forces, utilising official assistance or express jurisdiction. But this has in part changed in the last decades, as municipalities partially resumed their responsibilities on the streets. Parts of policing got remunicipalised (Behr 2002, 95–96) or vice versa municipalities got policified (Söllner 2011) by the establishment of municipal security forces. More and more municipalities added their own patrol services, municipality guards, complementing the patrol activities of the police and enforcing the already existing municipal responsibilities at least in part by their own. Today, almost all bigger German cities have municipality guards patrolling the public space, providing security and order to some extent. Powers and equipment of these municipal security forces vary between municipalities (Frevel 2015, 270), responsibilities and according powers vary from mainly or merely showing presence to enforcement tasks, often municipality guards wear more or less police like uniforms but with a big variation in its likeness and the labelling. The armament varies to a big extend from no weapons to non-lethal weapons and rarely firearms. Hence these specific differences, municipalities became (in the understanding of PluS-i) policing actors, providing visible security work. But, as the resources and authorities of the municipal security forces are still limited, the police forces are still enforcing municipal responsibilities to some extent, e.g., at night times, when municipality guards are not on duty or when there is the necessity for a robust use of force. This is not a development specific to Germany,

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it is rather common in other countries, like the Netherlands, the UK or Austria (John 2020, 17–18). • Privatisation (commercial policing): Privatisation is the probably internationally most common development linked to plural policing. Security activities by private companies, either as in-house security or contracted to and provided by security companies, are not new in the German context. These have a long tradition in security of private properties, e.g., industrial plants, night clubs (Hirschmann 2016, 111–120; Frevel 2015, 270–271; Braun 2012). Like in other countries the private security sector has grown (Hirschmann 2016, 120–132). Part of this growth is a rise in demand of such traditional security services. But there is also growth in newer fields of business with more publicly visible activities by the private security sector (Frevel 2015, 271; Braun 2012). In context of this chapter these activities are understood as commercial policing. This can especially be seen in the more and more common private guard and patrol duties in the growing semi-public spaces, e.g., shopping malls, in public transportation, in transitional spaces between public and private spaces of inner cities. Such commercial policing of semi-public-spaces is a standard in all big cities in Germany, seen at the main railroad stations as well as the typical malls. Further, there are some examples of commercial policing in public spaces, security companies acting on behalf of municipalities as patrol service for certain areas or places. To set the limits, such privatisation is not existing regarding the policing by the police, direct contracting of security firms by the police for policing activities are not known of, but there might be rare indirect effects of privatisation involving the municipality as kind of an intermediate. In order to clarify the developments of privatisation should not be confused with a general substitution of policing by state actors, as commercial policing is mainly a supplement in the private or semiprivate domain. • Laicisation (voluntary policing): Not new, but expanding especially in recent decades, the “laicisation” of policing (Behr 2002, 93–95) is the third development involved in the pluralisation of policing in Germany. Enabling and promoting civic engagement for public security in shape of a police integrated or police promoted policing by volunteers started in the 1960s but expanded in the 1990s and 2000s. This voluntary policing (Reichl 2018) is a distinct form of engagement by private citizens, regulated, controlled and promoted by the state and codified in state laws as it is part of police related regulations—in Germany in the domain of the federal states (Bundesländer). While there are differences on such legislation, not only in regard to their existence but also on the specifics, existing voluntary policing is either integrated into the police managed by the police or at least controlled by the police (see in more detail in Sect. 4). Voluntary policing as civic engagement should not be mistaken for other involvements of private citizens in the context of security production like vigilantism. Internationally voluntary policing can also be seen in other countries like England and Wales (see the article by Pepper in this volume as well as Jones and Lister 2015, 247) or the Netherlands (van Steden and Huberts 2006, 23–24).

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• Dequalification (subpolice policing): The fourth and as well not new development is a dequalification (Behr 2002, 93–95) in regard to policing. This development has the basic characteristic of adding less qualified personal as an organisational unit inside the police organisations. In Germany these units are called “Wachpolizei”, providing services such as guard activities, protection of properties as well as patrol activities. As these units are part of the police but less qualified in comparison to police officers in general, policing by these units can be seen as subpolice policing. Such developments exist as well outside of Germany (John 2020, 18–19) and are coined as second tier policing by Jones and Newburn (2006a, 37). These four basic developments result in changes of policing in Germany. All four developments have an impact on policing by providing additional visible security work to existing police activities, thereby shaping the pluralisation of policing in Germany. Fundamental qualitative impact is especially related to policing in public or as such perceived spaces, while changes in the private and semiprivate spaces are less significant, as there is only a quantitative expansion of commercial policing, which was already common. As such the research on plural policing in the research project PluS-i is focussed on the public sphere, the common public spaces and hybrid spaces, not easily distinguishable from the public (because these are missing the architectural boundaries common for semiprivate spaces like the usual shopping mall or railway station, providing distinction from the surrounding public sphere, perceivable by the public).

4 Heterogeneity and Variance of German Plural Policing Utilising an evaluation of public information on policing in all 80 German cities with a population of over 100.000 residents (in 2018), the empirical observation shows that these already described forms of policing are empirically present to a different degree and in different combinations in the cities all over Germany (John et al. 2018). While police policing is the overarching foundation of plural policing all over Germany, there are differences regarding the additional forms of policing. The research shows that in 2018 there were 10 different constellations of plural policing in the 80 big cities in Germany (John et al. 2018, 12). These range from the most common constellations like a set of police policing, municipal policing and commercial policing (limited to private or semiprivate spaces) as well as police policing, municipal policing, voluntary policing and commercial policing (limited to private or semiprivate spaces) to less common constellations with plural policing only consisting of police policing and commercial policing (limited to private or semiprivate spaces) or police policing, voluntary policing and commercial policing (limited to private or semiprivate spaces). On the one hand, this heterogeneity and variance in plural policing are based on legislative differences existing on state level in the federal structure of Germany.

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Laws and legislation regarding policing can differ between the states (Bundesländer) as public security and order are mainly a state matter, not a national one. On the other hand, differences are based in the varying enactment on the municipality level. On both levels, state and municipal policies enable or limit different forms of policing, framing and/or shaping plural policing as a combination of different forms of policing adding to the standard basis of policing by the police forces. The specific implementation of the described possible additional forms of policing on the local level is at the end driven by local/municipal policy making regarding decision for or against these forms of policing and in case of decision for forms of policing further decisions on the specific how of the implementation. Regarding two forms of policing—voluntary and subpolice policing—the local freedom of decision is heavily limited by and dependent on state legislation, giving the legal framework for their implementation differing fundamentally between the federal states in Germany. Regarding the other two—municipal and commercial policing—the legislations on state level have only minor differences. Fundamental variance on state level concerns the voluntary policing and subpolice policing, both are closely related and organisationally interlaced with the state police forces and as such part of police legislation on the state level. Regarding the voluntary police services there are at the moment only 5 out of 16 states with legislation establishing the possibility for such a form of policing: BadenWuerttemberg (since 1963), Bavaria (pilot project since 1993, implemented 1996), Brandenburg (since 1994), Saxonia (since 1998), Hesse (since 2000) (Reichl 2018, 4–10).2 In all other states such legislation is absent and voluntary police services are non-existent. Further the states legislation on voluntary policing have major differences regarding the role and organisation of these services. For example, in Baden-Wuerttemberg the voluntary police service is not only closely linked to the police it is seeing citizens volunteering legally as police officers with all the rights of ordinary police officers as well as the full range of equipment from police uniforms (with specific signifiers) up to firearms. In contrast the so-called Sicherheitswacht or security watch in Brandenburg is not a part of the police. It is only affiliated to and appointed by the police, with no special rights or equipment. Subpolice forces or “Wachpolizeien” are as well limited to selected states by existing legislation. Only four states, Berlin, Bremen, Hesse and Saxonia, have these additional policing forces integrated in the state police (John et al. 2018, 7–8). In all other states subpolice policing is not provided for in legislation. In contrast to the voluntary policing the existing foundational legislation is not as disparate, e.g., these are all organisational units within the police force, while using different designations, and strongly deployed in property protection. While the state level legislations variance is mainly of importance for the voluntary and subpolice policing, differences of local implementation are of importance for all four additional forms of policing discussed in regard to German

2

There has been a 6th state with voluntary policing—Berlin—but the voluntary police service in Berlin, first establishing in 1961, was terminated in 2002 (Reichl 2018, 19).

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plural policing. Municipalities and the police forces on the ground (the state police organisational units on the local level) have at least some leeway regarding the implementation of different forms of policing. Municipal policing is dependent on the municipal legislation. The PluS-i research in late 2017 still showed two big cities without a municipal policing service, while all other big cities (some in the same state) already established such services (John et al. 2018, 12). Further, there are differences in the specific implementation of municipal policing in regard to competences and equipment derived from local decisions. The same dependence on local decision making is true for commercial policing in public spaces, in the existing examples for German big cities these are linked to contracts and thereby decisions of local stakeholders. Both forms of policing are mainly in the domain of the municipalities as provider or client of such policing activities. In regard to voluntary and subpolice policing the local police forces are responsible and in some cases of voluntary policing municipalities are as well involved in the implementation, deciding about the specific deployment. As such, deployment can but does not need to include policing activities (in the here used sense), local decisions have an additional impact on the implementation of state legislation. These in part multi-level dependencies of different forms of policing are the basis for the described variance and heterogeneity of plural policing in big cities in Germany. Since regulations and implementations are the result of political decisions, heterogeneity is ultimately a result of policy making at the various levels.

5 Models of Plural Policing in Germany The assumption of a heterogeneity of plural policing in Germany was the starting point of the research project PluS-i and was verified by the described research. Based on this empirically verified heterogeneity the main research on plural policing in PluS-i was conducted. One of the aims was to identify most different exemplary approaches to plural policing on the spectrum of the heterogenous plural policing in Germany. These exemplary approaches are the basis for further research questions regarding the impact different approaches have on various aspects (a sociological context adequacy, political legitimacy, effectiveness and efficiency). As such, the project studies plural policing in five big cities in Germany and thus has an exemplary and explorative nature. The five cases were selected on basis of a most different approach to plural policing, while trying to keep the most relevant margin variables steady (John et al. 2018, 4), aiming to allow an analysis of and conclusions regarding the impact on the before mentioned aspects. Overall the research project utilised different qualitative and quantitative methods (Goldig et al. 2020). The results of the research regarding the approaches to plural policing referenced here are drawn from the (theory driven) qualitative content analysis (Hirschmann et al. 2020) of the interview material generated by interviews with different policing stakeholders in all five cities in the first two out of four survey/research/inquiry phases. Focussing on mentions and statements

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of policing actors as relevant for provision of policing activities in the selected cities (specifically in as public perceived spaces in the inner cities) and the basic structures of the different policing providers interactions four different models of plural policing have been identified (John and Hirschmann 2020, 259–264). These can be seen as an exemplification of different approaches to plural policing in Germany, explicitly these are results of an exploratory research and as such these examples are not providing a complete overview over all possible approaches to plural policing in Germany. The identified four models are positioned on a spectrum of decreasing state centrism and control. • The first and least pluralised and most state centric model is the administrative model. This model is characterised by a strong focus on the provision of policing by a plurality of state actors (actors as part of a governmental body): the administrative actors police and municipality policing services. Police officers and municipality guards are the sole policing actors in the public space or as public perceived space. These providers are separate entities, acting predominantly independently and in some part in cooperation. In private spaces and semiprivate spaces policing is provided commercially, as common. The main development this model is driven by is the municipalisation of policing. In the specific case this model is based on, there is the additional possibility of voluntary policing, but the locally decided deployment is not entailing patrol duties in the public space. It is focussed on an utilisation in other areas of the police work (e.g., support in detention services). Thereby the policing on the ground is here limited to two main actors out of the administrative sphere. • The public model is, in distinction from the administrative model, characterised by a further pluralisation under the umbrella of state institutions. In addition to the common policing activities by police and municipality patrol services there are other public providers involved in policing of public spaces, the voluntary police as well as subpolice services. Especially with the addition of the voluntary police service—which can be seen as a public entity, adding to the administrative stakeholders—this model is not limited to the administrations as policing providers. Commercial policing providers are limited to a flanking role in private (semiprivate) spaces. At the core, this model is driven by municipalisation, laicisation and further dequalification of policing. This model is based on two studied cases of plural policing in big cities, both showing a core of policing by the police and the municipality with additional voluntary and/or subpolice policing and the common commercial policing in the private sphere. • The two previous models are focused on policing in the public provided by a plurality of state and public actors, the role of commercial policing is limited to the private sphere. Whereas the integrative model utilises commercial policing in the public space as well, next to police and municipal policing. Commercial policing’s greater role is achieved by the integration of commercial policing into the existing municipality policing service—as personal reinforcement of the municipality policing service. Such integration can basically hide the addition of commercial policing in the public space, as the integration—e.g., because of

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uniformity of uniforms (Hirschmann and Groß 2012, 68)—can prevent a direct visibility by the public and is in so far hidden from the public eye. As such there is not a coexistence or cooperation of commercial policing with police and municipal policing in the public space. Instead there is subordination and integration in the relation between public and commercial policing in the public sphere. The integrative model shows a specific option of commercial policing gaining a role in policing of public spaces. Developments that mainly drive this pluralisation model are municipalisation and the privatisation of policing. In the specific case this model is based on, the integration is far reaching and hidden, as the commercial security providers employees are wearing the same uniform and are deployed in double patrols with the municipality guards, undistinguishable by the public, while there is some transparency as the basic policy of commercial reinforcement of the municipality guard service is discussed publicly. • A second—probably closer to the Anglo-Saxon, more privatisation-oriented understanding of plural policing (see the article by Stoughton in this volume as well as Stoughton 2016)—model of plural policing utilising more common privatisation is the hybrid model, flanking the state focussed policing of public spaces with coexisting commercial policing. In distinction from the integrative model, policing of the public is provided by a hybrid and visible approach of state and commercial stakeholders, with the commercial policing not subordinated and integrated but instead acting on its own in public and as such perceived places—coexisting and in part cooperating with the police and municipality. In this model commercial actors have policing responsibilities in specific public or as public perceived spaces overlapping with the other actors, generating a hybrid of state and commercial provision of policing in such spaces, called hybrid spaces by policing providers. In the case this model is based on, contracts with the commercial policing sphere exist to police in certain spaces of the inner city—like open space shopping areas, public places. Additionally commercial policing is present in public spaces around different transportation hubs all over the inner city because of its responsibilities in public transportation but without responsibilities in these adjacent public spaces. These four models are examples (but not all encompassing) of the heterogeneity of approaches to plural policing in Germany, showing a range of possibilities plural policing can take shape. Overall the four models show that at the core of plural policing in Germany, hence the existing variances, is a strong provision of policing by state actors, especially the police and the municipalities, already a plural approach in itself compared to the quasi monopolistic policing by the police in the past. Frevel (2015, 268) states that the “ ‘plurality’ of policing has enhanced rather than reduced the role of the state in policing”, which can be seen as a result of such pluralisation inside the state domain. The heterogeneities are established by different additions of policing providers to this core, varying in the degree of state centrism and state control enacted on policing overall. As such, the various exemplary approaches to plural policing can be seen on a spectrum from state-focused provision of policing, which derives its plural character from

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the multiplicity of state actors involved, to on the other side a less state-focused plural policing consisting of provision by commercial policing providers coexisting in limited public spaces alongside the state’s provision. In between are different additions with a high degree of state control enacted. The four exemplary models show the varying extent to which the discussed developments of pluralisation are taking place in different local contexts. While the remunicipalisation of policing (Behr 2002, 95–96) or policialisation of municipalities (Söllner 2011) is seen in all models, the other developments are not as universal to German plural policing. Privatisation, while common in the private space, is limited to two models, with different ways of enactment, and laicisation as well as dequalification (Behr 2002, 93–95; Hirschmann and Groß 2012; Reichl 2018) is seen only in one of the four models.

6 Variances of Plural Policing in a Broader View As already discussed, the shown variance and heterogeneity of plural policing in Germany are based in the differences of policies on different levels—on state as well as on the local level—in the structure of the German political system.3 As such the differences are a result of policy making on the different levels. Explaining these seems simple as it could be assumed that there are political differences the state and local level decisions are dependent on, concluding in the variance of plural policing—a comprehensive, logical and rational explanation coherent with common foundational theories of social science, e.g., rational choice or institutional theories (at last deriving policies based on situational and political conditions following a rational argument of decision making of some scope). But while such explanations seem coherent, especially looking at a single country like Germany and the existing variance, expanding the view generates further questions and leads to doubt regarding such an explanation. The broader view, looking at plural policing in different countries, shows heterogeneity of plural policing on the local level in each of the different countries (Devroe 2015, 238; John 2020, 36–38; Jones and Newburn 2006a; Terpstra et al. 2013). A comparison of plural policing in different countries (John 2020, 32–36) additionally shows an overlap or a partial convergence of the heterogenous shapes of plural policing on the local level between different countries with clearly different jurisdictional and political conditions. If one understands plural policing as a set of policies: on the one hand, there appears to be a variation of policies under nearly similar conditions for policy making within a country. On the other hand, there is an overlap or convergences

3

This heterogeneity is also perceivable for the pluralisation of policing in the larger sense, regarding an understanding of policing wider than the understanding in PluS-i including, e.g., crime prevention activities, etc. (John 2020, 37–38).

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of parts of the variable policies (between different countries) and, therefore, in part an overlap between the policy making in different countries with fundamentally different jurisdictional and political conditions. This may seem counterintuitive to the common understanding based in rational or institutional microfoundations, which let assume a similarity of policies in comparable conditions and divergence of policies in context of different conditions (John 2020, 48–49, 56–65). More coherence with a theoretical view can be achieved by utilising alternative perspectives, especially the pragmatistic view on action (Joas 1996). Such a perspective on policy making, developed in the specific context of the pluralisation of security production, has been explored with the pragmatistic approach of a “policy making in spaces of possibilities” (John 2020).

7 Policy Making in Spaces of Possibilities and the Contingency of Plural Policing Policies Based on the pragmatistic theoretical understanding of action by Hans Joas (1996)—creative action4 —and the common heuristic of relations between action on the micro level and developments on the macro level by James S. Coleman (1991, 10–16),5 policy making can be seen as an interlinked sequence of—non teleological, non-deterministic and probabilistic—creative actions by a variable number of policy makers (John 2020) aimed at resolving policy problems. Following the pragmatistic microfoundation, policy making is based on policy makers reflection of policy problems—breaking with existing habits—and the resulting creation of the so-called spaces of possibilities (conceptualised in more general terms by Schubert 2003, 142–163) entailing a number of possible actions to resolve the problem by different means with potentially different ends-in-view. Out of these a final selection by trial and error or experimental selection (Herrigel, 2010, p. 20; Joas, 1992, p. 294) takes place, which is neither determinable nor predictable in pragmatistic view. Adapting Schuberts (2003, 145–146, 151) more

4

In short: creative action is a theory of action by Hans Joas (1996) specifically focussing on creativity instead of rationality as core principle. Action is—based on the pragmatistic school of thought and the pragmatistic philosophical understanding of action—seen as a cyclical process between habitual action and creative action generated by situations calling into doubt the existing habitual patterns of action. These situations are seen as situations of real doubt in distinction from the all-encompassing doubt of Descartes skepticism and only perceivable in context of actions, agency and habits of action (Joas 1996, 195, 233). At the core, such situations are the starting points for creative processes of action (Joas 1996, 190, 196; Festl 2018, 69–70), resolving situations of real doubt by reflexion on basis of the actors experiences and the creation of a number of new possible actions (means) with possibly different ends-in-view, in part also developed in the course of the reflexion. In the pragmatistic view the selection of final actions is not rationality based but instead probabilistic or experimental, by real and mental trial and error (Herrigel 2010, 20). 5 In context of policy science this heuristic has been adapted in the Boudon-Coleman-explanation for policy change (Schneider and Janning 2006, 39).

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general thoughts regarding the formation of political spaces of possibilities6 by taking into account contemporary theories of the policy process, John (2020) sees policy makers spaces of possibilities as formed by, on the one hand, (1) existing policy-subsystems as manifestation of more or less firmly anchored habits of action—providing mainly minor modifications of such habits or continuity focused options of action. On the other hand, (2) additional experiences through exchange with outside actors—the wider social network of policy makers—as well as (3) the reinforcing public discourse on events and policy-ideas provide alternative and probably innovative policy-ideas and in this the corresponding options of action for policy makers. But policy making—or more specifically the formulation and implementation of policies—is most often not done by one single action of one actor. It is instead the result of a number of actions by different policy makers: a single selected action is often only one step to a policy, triggering other actors creative action, again potentially triggering further policy makers action, thereby generating a sequence of actions aka a policy process (John 2020, 109–112). But because of the probabilistic nature of creative action, the probabilistic selection of potential actions out of spaces of possibilities, all single actions can potentially trigger a number of different sequences of actions. In this view policy making can be seen as a further and further branched out branch, entailing the different potential sequences of creative action. These again can be framed in a space of possibilities— a collective space of possibilities—aimed at the collective of policy makers and picturing the overlap of their individual spaces of possibilities (John 2020, 112). As such these are again formed by (1) existing policy-subsystems, (2) additional experiences through exchange with outside actors as well as (3) the public discourse on events and policy-ideas, entailing the potential results of policy making, the different potential policy options realisable, regarding the final realisation dependent on the probabilistic sequential selection of actions by the sequentially involved policy makers. In accordance with this theoretical concept, policy change on the macrolevel can be conceptualised as aggregation of political action and policy processes on the microlevel or mesolevel (John 2020, 113–114). As such policy change is an aggregate of probably different and varying policies—especially in context of policy making happening on local or state level in a federal system or policy making in multi-level systems (Benz 2009, 13–14, 17–18), like it can be seen in the plural policing in Germany and the four described models. And in the pragmatistic view, this aggregation has to also include the unrealised policy options, hence an aggregated space of possibilities, the possible and probable variances of policy change, is contained in (John 2020, 114). In such a theoretical perspective on policy making, a variety of options exist to resolve policy problems, which are entailed in spaces of possibilities. Their

6 In Schuberts view political spaces of possibilities are formed by four structural elements: (1) the element political order and institutions, (2) the element structures—both elements providing mainly continuity –, (3) the element experience and (4) the element coincidences—both elements introducing innovation (Schubert 2003, 145–146, 151).

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realisation is subject to probabilism, in contrast to common approaches attributing policies more or less directly to the conditions as determining factor, here conditions are framing the variety of options in the spaces of possibilities not determining the realisation of policies. Hence the policy making is open to different possibilities or going further: the realised possibilities are not necessary and could be different. Such an explicitly non-deterministic perspective on policy making can be seen as corresponding with the basic idea of contingency—the assumption that everything that was/is/will be as not necessary, could instead have been/be/can be different (Bandelow and Hegelich 2011, 426), while not being arbitrary or pure coincidence (Abels 2007, 221–222; Joas 2012, 33–34. In this view policy making itself can be seen as contingent,7 as all policies are only the one realised policy option out of the wider spectrum of options in the space of possibilities, which is not arbitrary as it is framed and thus limited by conditions seen in the aspects forming these spaces. In light of this theoretical perspective and its inherent idea of contingency the variations seen in plural policing inside of countries under nearly similar conditions can be seen not as a result of minor differences—as probably commonly assumed, e.g., in context of a rational perspective—but as a manifestation of contingency only revealing the different contingent possibilities. The partial convergences between different countries with diverging conditions—probably more difficult to explain out of a rational perspective—can be seen as an overlap of the contingent possibilities in spite of the diverging conditions. Following Rüb (2012, 118, 125) the described contingency in policies—here the contingent plural policing approaches—can already be seen in the policy making itself, especially as the policy field of public security is heavily dependent on political regulation and decisions of policy makers (John 2020, 50–51). As such heterogeneity of plural policing in Germany (and in other countries) can be understood as a contingent political phenomenon and as a result of a contingent policy making in its policy field.

8 Discussion The empirically based examples in form of the four different models out of the research in PluS-i show the heterogenous nature of plural policing in Germany. There is not one singular homogenous approach to plural policing, instead plural policing seems to be shaped by the respective state context in the German federal system and further on the local level plural policing is enacted. This heterogeneity can be seen in the differences of the four different exemplary models of plural policing identified by the explorative research in PluS-i. These four models—hence their exemplary nature—are only capturing a specific scope of heterogeneity and there is no claim to completeness, more minor distinctions can be assumed and

7

Following Rüb (2012, 118,125) it can be assumed that contingency is not limited to the policyoutcomes, instead it is already part of the policy making.

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potentially more extreme diverging characteristics are possible than made visible by these exemplary models. But nevertheless, there seems to be one common characteristic in the models of plural policing, although the variations in the specific models and some additions of privatisation in certain models: these are widely based on state centric or state controlled developments of pluralisation, as seen in context of the developments of municipal, voluntary and subpolice policing. These are all a matter controlled by the administration and as such state centric developments in policing. In this the plural policing in Germany can be seen as distinctive from certain anglocentric understandings of plural policing framing plural policing mainly as a shift from policing by the police to more private provision of policing and a linked withdrawal of the state (e.g., as described by Stoughton in this volume and in Stoughton 2016), which is only a minor aspect in the discussed models. In this the German approach(es) to plural policing seems to match over all a more continental European understanding of plural policing, as described in the contribution of Jan Terpstra in this publication, with a lesser focus on privatisation and outsourcing. The presented research supports Frevels (2015, 282) conclusion that “Germany tries to keep the state in a stronger role”. But this distinctive view on German plural policing as a state centric, central European plural policing, is probably not as clear cut as it could be assumed. Out of the outlined pragmatistic theoretical perspective on the policy making— a “policy making in spaces of possibilities”—the existing heterogeneity of the different models of plural policing in Germany and the overlaps and distinctions with the heterogeneity of plural policing in other continental European and AngloSaxon countries generates an alternative perspective. The common view is based on the already varying plural policing in Germany and its—as seen in the four models—typically strong reliance on state-focused pluralisation. But considering the pragmatistic theoretical perspective on the policy making behind it, this view on German plural policing—derived from the sum of the typical plural policing policies observed—is only displaying a section of the possible and probable. But what is, is not necessary and could be different. In this contingency oriented perspective it is to assume that there are more and alternative policy options with different means and ends in a space of possibilities that have not been realised but are as probable to be realised. As such the common view on plural policing in Germany seems limited by the focus on and generalisation of typical realised plural policing characteristics, missing the contingent policy options as existing alternatives to the realised policies entailed in an aggregated space of possibilities on the macro level, the understanding of German plural policing as policy change is based on. Considering the contingent policy options given by the individual and collective spaces of possibilities of (especially local) policy makers all over a country, the scope of the understanding of plural policing in Germany has to be widened. While in the realised policies the state centric nature of plural policing is typical and thereby seen as the important characteristic, describing plural policing for the German context, alternative contingent policy options are either unrealised or only seen in context of outliers, e.g., seen in the hybrid model with its tendency towards a lesser state driven policing. These unrealised or rarely occurring outlying policies

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are marginalised or altogether missed regarding their potential for realisation. But considering the contingency of policies and policy making, these alternatives are possible, probable and probably already existing, perceived as atypical outliers. Out of the pragmatistic and contingency oriented view, the realised policies are not determined and the existing alternatives could have been realised just as likely. As such they are not unlikely or untypical. Therefore, these should be noted as well to generate a wider understanding of plural policing—which is calling the existing understanding of German plural policing as driven by heavy state centrism into question.

9 Conclusion In light of the heterogeneity identified by the explorative empirical research into plural policing in Germany and the reflexion of this heterogeneity on basis of a pragmatistic theoretical perspective, plural policing policies as well as the policy making these are based on can be understood as contingent—and plural policing as a whole can be seen as a contingent phenomenon. As such the dominant view of plural policing in the German context— characterised by its high degree of state centrism—should be taken with caution, as it may be related to the realised typical policies but is not taking into account the contingency of these. This, while describing the typical set of plural policing policies at the moment, is in the pragmatistic view not as set and stable as it may be assumed. As the policy making regarding plural policing is framed but explicitly not determined by the conditions and happens in spaces of possibilities with contingent policy options, alternative and diverging developments are always possible. Thereby, plural policing is not following the TINA-principle of political rhetorics— suggesting that there are no alternatives to proposed and set policies (Séville 2017, 9–10). Instead there is the probable potential for further and fundamental change, contradicting the at the moment typical understanding of German plural policing, and this without a fundamental change in the circumstances, as plural policing policies are at last contingent. As such a broadening of the understanding of German plural policing from the typical and realised to the probable and contingent possibilities should be considered to provide a better—contingency sensitive—view on plural policing now and in the future. Such considerations have also implications for the scope of distinctiveness between different understandings of plural policing in different contexts (like specific countries or the Anglo-Saxon and continental European sphere). The already in part blurred lines between the different understandings get more blurry as the contingent policy options—the spaces of possibilities—regarding plural policing in the different contexts have to be noticed. This is not to say, there are no differences between the plural policing in different contexts, as the spaces of possibilities framed by the different conditions can diverge in regard to certain possibilities, but there are probably a number of overlaps not as prominently perceived in the

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classical view. With this the distinctions between the different understandings of plural policing get probably a lot more gradual than commonly discussed. As such the German plural policing is one that is gradually nearer to other continental European understandings in the possibilities and alternatives provided, but it is not determined in this characteristics. Acknowledgments This research has received funding from the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) in the context of the call “Promotion of young researchers by establishing interdisciplinary competences” in the programme “research for civil security 2012–2017”.

References Abels H (2007) Einführung in die Soziologie. Band 1: Der Blick in die Gesellschaft, vol 1, 3rd edn. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden Bandelow NC, Hegelich S (2011) Pluralistische Policy Analyse: Methoden des Handelns. In: Bandelow NC, Hegelich S (eds) Pluralismus – Strategien – Entscheidungen, VS Verlag, Wiesbaden, pp 425–439 Bayley DH, Shearing CD (2001) The new structure of policing. Description, conceptualization, and research agenda. U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC Behr R (2002) Rekommunalisierung von Polizeiarbeit: Rückzug oder Dislokation des Gewaltmonopols. Skizzen zur reflexiven Praxisflucht der Polizei. In: Prätorius R (ed) Wachsam und kooperativ? Der lokale Staat als Sicherheitsproduzent, Nomos, Baden-Baden, pp 90–107 Benz A (2009) Politik in Mehrebenensystemen. VS Verlag, Wiesbaden Bonnet F, de Maillard J, Roché S (2015) Plural policing of public places in France. Eur J Policing Stud 2(3) Braun F (2012) Private Sicherheitsdienste. https://www.bpb.de/themen/innere-sicherheit/dossierinnere-sicherheit/76663/private-sicherheitsdienste. Accessed 8 Apr 2022 Coleman JS (1991) Grundlagen der Sozialtheorie, Übersetzung von Michael Sukale, vol 1: Handlungen und Handlungssysteme. Oldenbourg, München Devroe E (2015) Purple Vestes. The origins of plural policing in Belgium. Eur J Policing Stud 2(3):304–324 Devroe E, Terpstra J (2015) Plural policing in Western Europe. A comparison. Eur J Policing Stud 2(3):235–244 Feltes T, Reichertz J (2009) Vorwort. In: Feltes T (ed) Neue Wege, neue Ziele. Polizieren und Polizeiwissenschaft im Diskurs, Verlag für Polizeiwissenschaft, Frankfurt a.M., pp 7–8 Festl MG (ed) (2018) Handbuch Pragmatismus. J.B. Metzler, Stuttgart Frevel B (2015) Pluralisation of local policing in Germany. Security between the state’s monopoly of force and the market. Eur J Policing Stud 2(3):267–284 Goldig D, Hirschmann N, John T, Kuperan K, Pehle S, Reichl F, Vogt L (2020) Forschungsmethoden im PluS-i Projekt. Münster Herrigel G (2010) Manufacturing possibilities: creative action and industrial recomposition in the United States, Germany, and Japan. Oxford University Press, Oxford Hirschmann N (2016) Sicherheit als professionelle Dienstleistung und Mythos. Eine soziologische Analyse der gewerblichen Sicherheit. Springer VS, Wiesbaden Hirschmann N, Groß H (2012) Polizierende Präsenz. Kommunale Sicherheitspolitik zwischen Polizei, Verwaltung, Privatwirtschaft und Bürgern. Verlag für Polizeiwissenschaft, Frankfurt a.M. Hirschmann N, John T (2019) Projekt PluS-i: Forschungsgegenstand, Forschungsziele und Forschungskonzeption. PluS-i Working Paper Nr. 1. Münster

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Hirschmann N, John T, Reichl F (2020) Qualitative leitfadengestützte Interviewforschung. In: Goldig D, Hirschmann N, John T, Kuperan K, Pehle S, Reichl F, Vogt L (eds) Forschungsmethoden im PluS-i Projekt, pp 23–50 Joas H (1996) Die Kreativität des Handelns. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. Joas H (2012) Politik und Kontingenz. In: Toens K, Willems U (eds) Politik und Kontingenz, Springer VS, pp 25–37 John T (2020) Policy-Making in Möglichkeitsräumen. Pluralisierung der Sicherheitsproduktion, Doctoral thesis WWU Münster. Springer VS, Wiesbaden John T, Hirschmann N (2020) Polizeiliches Handeln im Kontext pluralen Polizierens – Erkenntnissen aus dem Forschungsprojekt PluS-i. In: Ruch A, Hunold D (eds) Polizeiarbeit zwischen Praxishandeln und Rechtsordnung. Empirische Polizeiforschungen zur polizeipraktischen Ausgestaltung des Rechts, Springer VS, Wiesbaden, pp 255–278 John T, Goldig D, Hirschmann N (2018) Plurales Polizieren in deutschen Großstädten – Überblick und Fallauswahl für das Projekt PluS-i. Münster Johnston L (2003) From ‘pluralisation’ to ,the police extended family: discourses on the governance of community policing in Britain. Int J Sociol Law 31:185–204 Jones T, Lister S (2015) The policing of public space. recent developments in plural policing in England and Wales. Eur J Policing Stud 2(3):245–266 Jones T, Newburn T (eds) (2006a) Plural Policing. A comparative perspective. Routledge, London; New York Jones T, Newburn T (2006b) The United Kingdom. In: Jones T, Newburn T (eds) Plural policing. A comparative perspective. Routledge, London; New York, pp 34–54 Jones T, Newburn T (2006c) Understanding plural policing. In: Jones T, Newburn T (eds) Plural Policing. A comparative perspective. Routledge, London; New York, pp 1–11 Reichertz J (2007) Auf dem Weg zu den Polizeiwissenschaften? Bemerkungen aus soziologischer und kommunikationswissenschaftlicher Perspektive. In: Liebl K (ed) Kriminologie im 21. Jahrhundert, Springer VS, Wiesbaden, pp 125–143 Reichl F (2018) Ehrenamtliches Polizieren in Deutschland. Münster Rüb FW (2012) Politik und Kontingenz. In: Toens K, Willems U (eds) Politik und Kontingenz, Springer VS, pp 117–142 Schneider V, Janning F (2006) Politikfeldanalyse. Akteure, Diskurse und Netzwerke in der öffentlichen Politik. Springer VS, Wiesbaden Schubert K (2003) Innovation und Ordnung. Lit Verlag, Münster Séville A (2017) There is no alternative – Politik zwischen Demokratie und Sachzwang. Campus Verlag, Frankfurt a.M.; New York Söllner S (2011) Die Verpolizeilichung. Grenzen, Chancen und Risiken einer neuen Sicherheitsarchitektur. Carl Heymann Verlag, Köln van Steden R, Huberts L (2006) The Netherlands. In: Jones T, Newburn T (eds) Plural policing. A comparative perspective. Routledge, London; New York, pp 12–33 Stoughton SW (2016) The blurred blue line: Reform in an era of public & private policing. Am J Criminal Law 44(2):117–155 Terpstra J, Devroe E (eds) (2015) Special issue: plural policing. European Journal of Policing Studies 2.3 edn. Maklu, Antwerpen Terpstra J, van Stokkom B (2015) Plural policing in comparative perspective. Eur J Policing Stud 2(3):325–343 Terpstra J, van Stokkom B, Spreeuwers R (2013) Who patrols the streets? An international comparative study of plural policing. Eleven International Publishing, Den Haag

Tobias John is political scientist and at the moment deputy head of the junior research group PluS-i at the Institute of Political Science at the University of Münster, Germany. His research is focussed on the policy field of internal security. In his doctoral thesis, completed at the University of Münster, he explored a contingency sensitive theoretical perspective for policy making in this field.

Part II

Practices of Plural Policing

Plural Policing of Immigrant Neighbourhoods in Germany: An Understanding of the Concept and Resulting Recommendations for Action Results from the Project Migration and Urban Security Bernhard Frevel and Sigrid Pehle

Abstract With regard to the results of the research project Migration and Urban Security (migsst [Migration und Sicherheit in der Stadt – migsst]), the requirements for security and public order work in neighbourhoods characterised by migrants, are presented. It is made clear that “plural policing” in a close understanding, for example according to the definition in the PluS-i project, plays a significant role, but can only cover parts of the required security work. It is precisely in these neighbourhoods, that there are special requirements for preventive work as part of policing which consider the increased vulnerability of the neighbourhoods and their reduced resilience. With approaches according to Sampson’s collective efficacy or the “Communities that Care”-concept, strategies of plural policing can be devised that go beyond the rather repressive control strategies of a policing presence. Keywords Migration · Plural policing · Neighbourhoods · Vulnerability · Resilience

1 Introduction Plural policing in Germany can be examined from different academic disciplines as well as with different questions in mind. For example from a political science perspective, it can be interesting to see how plural policing is constituted and developed

B. Frevel () Hochschule für Polizei und Verwaltung Nordrhein-Westfalen, Münster, Germany e-mail: [email protected] S. Pehle Institute of Political Science, University of Münster, Münster, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. Hirschmann et al. (eds.), Plural Policing in the Global North, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16273-2_5

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against the background of legal framework conditions. From a sociological point of view, it could be of interest to see how the starting conditions, such as education and training paths of the different groups of actors, influence their daily work. But also criminological, economic, legal and ethical questions can be the basis for the analysis of plural policing. The answers to the specific questions are usually given against the background of an underlying understanding of the term. Hirschmann and John, for example defined a close understanding of plural policing in the context of the research project Pluralisation of Local Urban Security Production1 (PluS-i): Policing stands for (a) patrolling in person and/or (b) guarding in person and/or (c) visible technical surveillance of public or semi-public spaces as well as measures directly resulting therefrom. Policing refers to the task of maintaining or achieving security and order, regardless of how and by whom security and order are defined. [ . . . ] plural policing is defined as the coexistent and/or cooperative policing of at least two different distinguishable stakeholders in congruent, overlapping or continuous areas of competences. (Hirschmann and John 2019, 4)

In the context of PluS-i, policing thus includes surveillance of people and/or patrolling and/or technical surveillance and refers to situations that take place in (semi-) public spaces or to measures that result from the situations. The focus of the activity is the maintenance of security and order. Thus, plural policing is oriented towards specific situations and exclusively encompasses the field of security work. The project Migration and Urban Security (migsst) also focusses on security work, but chooses a more comprehensive view. Thus, in addition to questions about security and order, questions about segregation and possible connections between segregation and security and order are also of interest in the research project. These issues, in combination with the selected and studied spaces, provide a different insight into the concept of (plural) policing. A description of the research project as well as a specific approach to the understanding of the plural policing term is presented in the following chapter. Following the presentation of the project and the results, differences to the conceptual understanding of the Plus-i project presented at the beginning are identified and critically examined.

2 The Research Project Migration and Urban Security This chapter focusses on the presentation of the research project including background information, research questions and methods, results as well as recommendations for action.

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Hirschmann, Reichl, Garand and John present further details of the project in this anthology.

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2.1 Background Information on the Research Project In 2016 the Federal Ministry of Education and Research published a call “Civil Security—Immigration Issues”, stating The topic of migration attracts a lot of attention within the public discourse. All involved actors have to face many challenges, e. g. managing flows of persons within a very narrow timeframe. Therefore, while the raised questions in the context of migration will remain, it is very important to focus on a humane analysis approach (Federal Ministry of Education and Research - Bundesministerium für Bildung und Forschung, 2016, transl. by the authors)

While the call for research mainly focussed on technical questions addressing the refugee debates of 2015, the researchers agreed on focusing on another challenge Germany had and still faces due to the continuous influx of immigrants: the situation of people from diverse ethnic, cultural and heterogeneous backgrounds living alongside each other in cities and municipalities. A research proposal was submitted by the University of Applied Science for Police and Public Administration North Rhine-Westphalia, the Universities of Tübingen, Münster and Bielefeld, the German Police University and the Federal Criminal Police Office. The research consortium finally got the approval and carried out the research from October 2018 until December 2021.

2.2 Research Questions Cities and municipalities have always faced big challenges while fulfilling the task of integrating large numbers of refugees or other migrants. Those challenges not only include the fields of work, housing or education, but the topic of security is becoming increasingly important. Therefore, the research group focused on the question, “what kind of integration and/or segregation increases or decreases conflicts, disturbances of order or crime in neighbourhoods marked by migration?”, tried to identify specific forms and to analyse how those increase or decrease. Regarding the often below-average socio-economic status of immigrant neighbourhoods (Farwick 2014), these areas might be more vulnerable. Inhabitants have lower socio-economic resources and face (intercultural) challenges to adjust. Within this process, there are more challenges to overcome. Furthermore, ethnically diverse neighbourhoods tend to be more attractive for other migrants as other migrants move into neighbourhoods with as much familiarity as possible. Hence, these immigrant neighbourhoods play an important role in further integration as well. The assumptions of being more vulnerable and having an impact on further integration are the reasons why the research focusses on (potential) conflicts regarding different social and ethnic groups.

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The empirical data of migsst is based on different case studies in German cities. Four major cities were chosen2 and in each two districts were examined to compare inter-municipal and intra-municipal topics such as social structure, governmental and societal actions, as well as inhabitant’s self-organisation. The aspects of security and perceived security within the population are examined within different areas of a neighbourhood, including residential areas and infrastructure, for example playgrounds, school/kindergarten, commerce, places of worship, public institutions, etc. The aim of enhancing transparency of the existing security work, including tools as well as actors, is leading the research to identify areas of action.

2.3 Research Methods Since the research project focused on an interdisciplinary perspective (sociology, politics, criminology, ethics and law), different research methods were applied. Ethnographic field-work in particular led to an inside view of the neighbourhoods, complemented with conversations with inhabitants or shopkeepers and their customers, innkeepers, non-residential employees working in the area, etc. Furthermore, participatory observations in meeting groups such as round tables such as crime prevention councils or expert groups of quarter management, guided interviews with experts from the municipalities and the police, group interviews and workshops with residents, analysis of documents (e. g. newspaper articles) as well as quantitative analyses of socio-economic and socio-demographic structures in the quarters and a public survey about the citizens’ estimation of security helped to find answers to the questions presented earlier. Those answers, or at least a summary of the great number of results regarding security and public order, will be presented in the next chapter.

2.4 Results While comprehensive project results can be found in Frevel (2021), this article mainly provides insights into the project results regarding the topics of security and order. Both objectively measurable and subjectively perceived findings are presented.

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The selection criteria concentrated mainly on the facts (a) metropolis with more than 250,000 inhabitants, (b) spatial situation in different federal states, (c) diver-gent history of migration, (d) existence of at least two neighbourhoods with an above average share of migrants and tendency of ethnic segregation, (e) willing-ness to participate of municipality and police.

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The topics of security and perceived security, the situation of public order and the evaluation of the phenomena of incivilities and disorder are of varying relevance in the research neighbourhoods. Due to different recording systems and technical inaccuracies, however, small-scale criminal statistical analysis is significantly more difficult and thus valid, percentage-specific data, which can be presented in tables and graphs, are unfortunately not available for the research neighbourhoods. However, based on the larger-scale Police Crime Statistics (PKS) and police deployment data, as well as the interview statements of police employees, the picture emerges that the research neighbourhoods are not characterised by crime with serious bodily injury, rape or homicides and that robbery offences also occur rather rarely, but are more typically characterised by theft and other property crime, forms of damage to property as well as drug offences. However, this occurs at such a level that it cannot be described as crime hotspots or unsafe places. Most residents in the study neighbourhoods claim to feel safe. Nevertheless, the survey of residents conducted by the survey organisation BEMA (Droste et al. 2021) shows that the subjective assessment of security is more critical than the crime data show—just as a discrepancy between the objectified situation and subjective assessment can be observed almost consistently in security and crime surveys (Sessar 2003; Hahne et al. 2020, 21 f.). The criminological literature describes a variety of reasons for this difference. The studies show that in addition to the assessment of the neighbourhood with regard to incivilities and the degree of local organisation as well as social ties—and not primarily the incidence of crime— the image of the neighbourhoods conveyed by the media and discourse also has a powerful influence on individual perceptions and the statements related to them. The social control perspective or the social problem perspective for explaining the fear of crime (cf. Boers 2003) make it clear that the perception of security is influenced by phenomena that are not included under the heading of crime. This was particularly evident in neighbourhoods where the bulky waste issue was virulent, graffiti and soiling of public space were evident (Kunkel 2021). The more or less noticeable scene of trafficking in soft drugs, which was found in almost all of the neighbourhoods studied, also has a partial effect on the perception of security, without directly affecting personal security. Following the Broken Windows Theorem (Kelling and Wilson 1982), it can be stated that disorder and visibility of light and medium crime, drug use and drug dealing are interpreted as signs of insecurity and danger and make people feel insecure. As mentioned above, drug-related issues and problems can be found in almost all neighbourhoods investigated and concern both the use of and (often in a seamless transition) the trafficking of mostly light drugs, especially cannabis and light synthetic party drugs such as ecstasy. It is usually people who have grown up in the neighbourhood and have lived there for many years (with and without a migration background) who are involved. For them, consumption is a form of escapism from their precarious situation; the trade serves to generate income in general or specifically to finance their own consumption (Howe 2021). The assessment of the problem is mostly very heterogeneous in the neighbourhood and fluctuates between acceptance as an everyday occurrence and the massively

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expressed rejection and counteracting activities, especially by parents—and here again especially by mothers, who are concerned about health and the risks of their children’s criminal actions. The fear that children who are not of the age of criminal responsibility will be used as couriers and that they will get used to “easy money” is expressed. Another factor in the assessment of the security situation are social conflicts in the neighbourhoods, differences over social positioning or the direct encounter of groups in public, which, however, do not so much result in offences or even crimes, but rather represent conflicts over the use of space. These conflicts can also exist between ethnic groups, but are more often between age groups, especially children vs. teenagers and adolescents, for whom very different spaces with age-oriented design are available, and to a certain extent between the sexes—with the effect of the lower visibility of girls in public space. The often-inadequate provision of spaces for young people leads to the appropriation of other spaces (e. g. parks, playgrounds, car parks, shopping areas), whose actual users understandably view this critically, as the “re-use” of the spaces is also associated with youth-specific behaviour, which includes, for example loud music, group behaviour and testing of boundaries, and is quickly perceived as disturbing. In the overall view of the security and order situation, the neighbourhoods studied do not stand out as particularly conspicuous in terms of serious crime, but incivilities and petty offences such as littering and vandalism, the occasional appearance of male youths (often with a migration background) sometimes with a lawlessness character, as well as drug consumption and offences of barely concealed drug dealing are interpreted by residents as well by authorities as signs of insecurity, lead to the criminalisation of the neighbourhood and its residents, and are understood as signs of the need for action. Against this background, security work that is primarily oriented towards intervention and law enforcement with a focus on the police is not very effective. Rather, a strategy is needed that exploits the entire value chain of security creation, which includes prophylaxis (especially through educational projects, social integration through community work), situational prevention, promotion of resilience (and on the flip side: reduction of vulnerability), as well as the strengthening of coping skills and restoration after disruptions to the security situation. For such a broad-based approach to security, the now established concepts that focus on the situation of young people, such as “Communities That Care”, which are being promoted in Germany, especially by the Lower Saxony Prevention Council (Landespräventionsrat Niedersachsen 2015), show promising possibilities. Furthermore, the work of Sampson and others (1997) with its focus on collective efficacy with the promotion and use of social capital in neighbourhoods, points to potentials for crime prevention, strengthening communities, building trust (also with authorities) and developing individual resilience. Both approaches have in common the idea that the participation of neighbourhood residents and the strengthening of their potential for action (“empowerment”) offer the key to more security. The fact that both concepts are compatible with the approaches to dealing with segregation and can also be complemented with

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the possibilities of urban and architectural prevention (CPTED—Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design, cf. Cozens et al. 2005) and ideas of the Socially Integrative City increases their potential impact.

2.5 Areas of Action and Recommendations: Research Based Hypotheses At the end of three years of research in an interdisciplinary consortium, the various conclusions and findings were presented in books, articles, working papers and videocasts (see migsst.de/aktuelles). Based on these findings are the following hypotheses (Frevel 2021, 242–248): Security is a basic human need. It is socially constructed through the classification of social action as conforming or deviating, socially shaped in the everyday management of conflicts and collisions of interests, socially communicated in the negotiation processes of interpreting dangers and risks. Striving for security and a sense of security requires one’s own action, communal activity and also the action of corporate actors such as the police, the municipality and civil society organisations, which participate in the creation of security in very different ways. The creation of security is therefore much more than the prevention of danger by the police, intervention and prosecution, which follow a very specific logic and must meet special requirements in a constitutional state. The following considerations of fields of action and recommendations for action do not focus on the activities that are possible or required by criminal and police law, but rather shed light on how the social construction of security takes place in predominantly immigrant neighbourhoods and can be shaped with a broader understanding of the creation of security based on prevention. 1. Making (police) security work proactive and problem-oriented Security work in largely migrant or deprived neighbourhoods is, of course, to a certain extent related to police work with its mandate to prevent crime, avert threats and enforce the law. Crime and violence are problems that require police action. But these phenomena do not stand alone. They must be seen in the context of, for example socio-economic causes, situational conditions, functions and effects, which also result, among other things, from the socio-spatial, socio-demographic and socio-economic framework conditions. In line with the problem-oriented policing approach of Herman Goldstein (1979), it is necessary to address the problems instead of implementing exclusively phenomenon-centred, mission-oriented and reactive policing. Security work requires proactive policing (Barthel 2022) in combination with interdisciplinary cooperation between authorities and civil society.

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2. Identify needs for action based on analysis and prioritise measures This requires a structured analysis of the above-mentioned framework conditions as well as the external and internal preconditions for action strategies. The concept developed by the Federal Criminal Police Office in a subproject of the migsst-project (Mayer 2021; Mayer and Cornelius 2022), which is largely based on aggregated quantitative data, captures essential factors with the SWOT-based analysis model and shows their interdependencies with the context model, which identifies various fields of intervention for action planning, gives indications for prioritisation and thus also points to actors with the power to act. Approaches such as Smart Policing (Coldren et al. 2013) or Intelligence-led Policing (Ratcliffe 2016), which have already been further developed in the USA and UK but are still in the early stages in Germany, can help to design city-, district- and neighbourhood-specific security work. 3. Meeting the complexity of the security with an expanded concept of security and attention to the value chain Both in the model of the Federal Criminal Police Office developed in the Migration and Urban Security project (Mayer 2021) as well as in the analyses of the other project partners, it is clear that security work must be based on an expanded concept of security that, according to Daase (2012), takes into account the spatial, danger, material and reference dimensions of security. In addition, the entire value chain of security (prophylaxis—prevention—resilience—security— intervention—coping—restoration, cf. Frevel 2015) must be kept in mind. Such a multidimensional perspective on security allows for a topical, spatial and target group-oriented consideration of (a) risks and challenges, (b) the specific actors who are competent to act, and (c) differentiated cooperative action. 4. Reduce vulnerability and strengthen resilience The neighbourhoods studied are often home to people with below-average economic, cultural, social and symbolic capital—using Bourdieu and Wacquant’s (1996) differentiation. This increases their vulnerability in various contexts, e. g. health (e. g. the particular vulnerability to COVID diseases), but also the risks of becoming victims of crime and violence or becoming criminals themselves. In this respect, activities are required that strengthen the resilience of the residents. Social benefits, as welfare payments, can only strengthen economic capital to a limited extent, so that the social and socio-political objective must be geared towards participation in working life. However, there are certainly extended opportunities for support regarding cultural and social capital. Education, participation in the neighbourhood and in social networks can be mentioned as examples. Social capital also includes low-threshold access to contacts with the authorities that are free of fear and easily accessible. Considering the basic human need for belonging and recognition, a particular challenge lies in building up symbolic capital. There can be a danger that the search for recognition does not take place in a socially adequate framework, but is instead sought and achieved, for example through

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deviant behaviour and even violence. The so-called “othering” (cf. Howe 2021, 67ff.) involving the social devaluation, discrimination and stigmatisation of people with a migration history can be understood from this perspective as a criminogenic factor. A culture of recognition is therefore needed to increase resilience, reduce vulnerability and have a (crime-)preventive effect. 5. Use the diversity of actors in the neighbourhood, but do not instrumentalise them for security tasks In accordance with the various security dimensions and elements of value creation, it becomes clear that security work is not or cannot be the sole task of the police and regulatory authorities, but rather must include the work of other actors, e. g., the education, counselling and care system, the housing industry, civil society self-help, cultural, recreational and sports organisations and, above all, individual residents. These different actors each have specific competencies, self-conceptions, goals and points of orientation, logics of action and organisational prerequisites. It is important to respect these and not to re-shape them with a predefined overarching system of goals ([often under-defined] security, crime prevention, integration). This would be risking the fact that some actors would not feel addressed or would withdraw because they do not want to be seen as, for example security actors. For example youth work has its own purpose, which can probably have a positive impact on security or integration, but without prioritising this aspect and anchoring it in the self-image of youth work. 6. Strengthen (municipal) cross-policy coordination The requirement for coordination across policy areas is a core element of the concept of the citizens’ community (Bogumil et al. 2003). The need for such a form of administrative work becomes obvious when we look at the needs and requirements in neighbourhoods dominated by migrants, where aspects of social policy, housing, education, migration and integration, urban development, security and order, youth and family policy cumulate. A departmental and pillarized administrative work and local policy runs the risk of missing out on synergy effects and instead triggering competing and possibly mutually counteracting activities. 7. Recognise diversity of network structures and include them in neighbourhood management In the cities and neighbourhoods, a variety of network structures can be found that are designed to promote communication, cooperation and coordination among the various actors: crime prevention councils, security and public order partnerships, neighbourhood councils, neighbourhood networks, city sports associations, interfaith working groups and many more. In some of the neighbourhoods studied, it became clear that these bodies exist side by side, pursue some of the same interests and create the same measures, but in some cases do not know each other or communicate with each other. Here, for example quarter managers have an important role in network analysis and support.

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8. Develop participation formats that take into account culturally different patterns of participation Some of the observed networks and committees follow the organisational principles as they have developed in the industrial society in the course of the last 150 years in Germany based on the division of labour, the bureaucracy and the clubs and societies system. These principles are certainly functional, but they are also partly outdated. Other forms of communication have emerged, some more focused on cross-functional and common issue encounters, direct personal contact or family networks. These different forms of communication then lead to an alienation in the neighbourhoods from organised neighbourhood work, if it is perceived as indoctrinating and educationally bourgeois, so that direct participation is even less than it would otherwise be in committees. Participation therefore requires an invitation at eye level, an action-oriented practice and a corresponding openness and competence on the part of the organizers. 9. Professionalise quarter management and qualify it for interculturality The concept of quarter management has become established in many large cities, especially in the context of the “Socially Integrative City”, and is continuously being professionalised, even if the neighbourhood managers have very different professional and qualification backgrounds. These interface actors are being qualified for responsible network work through advanced training in various aspects such as project management, urban and spatial design, the use of funding programmes, intercultural training, etc. However, it is not only these people who are being challenged. The representatives of the corporate network partners also need to develop their knowledge and competence specific to the field of action. Intercultural competence is a relevant building block here, but knowledge of the institutional goals and interests, preconditions for action and organisational principles of the various partners is also a prerequisite for low-conflict and synergetic cooperation (cf. Kober et al. 2012). This is also a key to breaking down prejudice structures, for example between regulatory authorities and social work.

3 Conceptual Understanding of Policing in the Context of the Migration and Urban Security Project (Migsst) In conclusion, how can the concept of policing be located within the framework of the migsst-project? The previous results make it clear that the police and the public order services assume an important task in security work, even though they mainly have the option of being reactive in their area of responsibility. However, in terms of the security value chain (Frevel 2015), reactive activity is not sufficient for effective security work. Criminological research has already identified criminogenic factors that are used as explanations for deviant behaviour. However, these are neither explicit

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nor conclusive. Hence, criminogenic factors can be multi-layered and cannot be identified conclusively. One of the many factors to be considered are, for example problems at school. However, these cannot be considered in isolation, but in an overall context of possible causes, forms and effects. This means that the actors involved in the school context (for example: school, parental home, social worker, sports club, interpreter, etc.) have to communicate with each other. This individual example can also be transferred to societal processes: The establishment of cooperation between authorities and actors as well as the resulting networks contribute to the full realisation of the security value chain. This cooperation should be established at small-scale levels, so that attention can already be paid to specific heterogeneity and individuality in streets and neighbourhoods, rather than having to act on a city-wide basis. Against the background of the definition of plural policing presented at the beginning of this article, which was developed in the PluS-i project, a major difference becomes apparent at this point. There, it is merely assumed that (at least) two actors are already policing together. Policing here refers specifically and exclusively to the maintenance of security and order, but neglects the view of upstream and downstream processes such as prevention and restoration. In order to ensure that plural policing is also effective in a broader context, the definition of the PluS-i project should be supplemented by the insights gained in the Migration and Urban Security project. Police and public order services are an essential component of security work. Nevertheless, other actors should be involved in the networking. The multitude of thematic focal points in the work of the various organisations and the resulting diversified exchange can make local residents feel subjectively safer and thus be an enrichment for the planning and design of plural policing.

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Bernhard Frevel is a Professor of Social Sciences at the University of Applied Sciences for Police and Public Administration of North Rhine-Westphalia in Münster (Germany). He coordinated the research project “Migration and Urban Security”, and was scientific leader of its subproject “segregation and victim protection” (2018–2021). Sigrid Pehle is a postgraduate at the University of Münster in the Research Project “Pluralisation of local urban security production—interdisciplinary analysis for a context adequate, legitimate, efficient and effective plural policing” (PluS-i). Within the project, she leads the working package efficiency of plural policing.

Supporting and Developing Police Support Volunteers in a Large Urban Constabulary in England, UK Melissa Pepper

Abstract Police Support Volunteers (PSVs)—citizens who give their time freely to perform tasks that complement the duties of officers and staff—feature in every police service in England and Wales. Emerging in the early 1990s, the nonwarranted and (usually) non-uniformed PSV is a relatively new addition to an established police volunteer history, performing a variety of tasks from administration and station front counter duties, to traffic speed checks and viewing CCTV footage. Drawing on a mixed-methods study including PSVs, strategic stakeholders, and volunteer managers, this chapter will explore the infrastructure required within (and beyond) policing to adequately support, develop, and involve volunteers. It will consider co-ordination of volunteers—from ‘top down’ vision to ground level delivery—and the pivotal role of volunteer managers in supporting and developing PSVs. Finally, the chapter will turn to the future—the challenges that police services face in rethinking and reassigning tasks against a backdrop of shifting priorities, diminishing resources, and a pluralising ‘workforce’—and reimagine the role of PSVs within this. Keywords Police · Volunteers · Police Support Volunteers · Volunteer Management

1 Introduction Volunteers are a familiar presence in British policing with the most recognisable figure—the volunteer Special Constable, who holds the same powers, uniform, and equipment as a regular paid officer—enshrined in legislation just two years after the formation of the modern police service in 1829. Volunteers in British policing are unpaid, with individuals receiving no monetary remuneration for their

M. Pepper () University of Greenwich, London, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. Hirschmann et al. (eds.), Plural Policing in the Global North, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16273-2_6

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time, other than reimbursement of reasonable ‘out of pocket’ expenses (e. g., travel costs). Volunteer roles span a range of areas including those managed within the police service (e. g., Special Constables, police cadets—uniformed volunteers aged 13–18 years who participate in community-, social-, and sports-based activities to enhance life and citizenship skills), partnered and supported by the police service (e. g., Neighbourhood Watch—networks of neighbours who work together to prevent crime, citizen patrols—members of the community who provide support and additional resources to the public and emergency services, often in town centres with busy night time economies), and which act to hold the police service to account (e. g., Independent Advisory Groups or community monitoring networks—both of which bring the police and community members together to improve service delivery around issues such as hate crime, stop and search, and other intrusive police tactics) (Bullock 2014; Millie 2019). Emerging in forces from the early 1990s onwards, the non-warranted and (usually) non-uniformed Police Support Volunteer (PSV)—citizens who give their time freely to perform tasks that complement the duties of police officers and staff— is a relatively new addition to an established police volunteer landscape in the UK. The development of the PSV role coincided with the growth of community policing and pluralising approaches to policing more broadly, which recognised the limited capacity of the formal state-owned criminal justice system to control crime alone (Crawford 2008). The involvement of volunteers in policing also chimed with UK political thinking at this time, with themes of civic renewal, decentralised decision making, inter-agency partnerships, strengthening communities, and forging a democratic, inclusive society featuring heavily within Prime Minister Tony Blair’s New Labour (1997–2010) narrative of capacity building, cohesion, and collective civic engagement (Zimmeck 2012; Bullock 2014). This was an agenda in which the ‘active citizen’, perhaps best epitomised by the volunteer, fitted neatly—and continues to do so. The focus of UK police forces now seems to have shifted from one centred around community engagement and quality of police-public encounters (prominent throughout the 1990s and early part of the twenty-first century), to increased emphasis on global security, serious, organised and cyber-enabled crime, and tackling threat, harm, risk and vulnerability (Higgins and Hales 2016). However, with the National Police Chief’s Council Policing Vision 2025 (undated, 3) referring to the link between communities and the police as ‘the bedrock of British policing’, it is clear that citizens are still expected to play their part in this. Indeed, volunteers in policing continue to feature prominently within the UK police ‘family’; although the extent to which they are adequately supported and developed to perform their roles, in order to maximise the contribution that they bring, remains uncertain. Until recently systematically collected data on the number of PSVs was limited; however, the UK Home Office included PSV data as part of their Police Workforce Returns for the first time in 2018. Data to September 2020 places the number of PSVs in England and Wales at 7891, with the figure remaining broadly similar compared to the previous year (Home Office 2021).

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Police forces are given scope to define their own PSV roles, although within a set of broader parameters that excludes a core list of powers reserved for warranted officers (e. g., arrest, stop and search) and positions that are seen as a substitute or ‘back fill’ for a previously paid role (discussed in more detail later in the chapter). The extent to which PSV role descriptions are formalised varies by force; however, volunteers generally perform regular tasks within a designated area of the police organisation (rather than moving around frequently). PSV tasks include administration and front counter duties, community engagement activities and operational functions (e. g., traffic speed checks and viewing CCTV footage), and specialist skill or interest roles such as scientific support, gardening, puppy walking, equine assistance, and mountain rescue, with the nature of volunteering varying by force location environment. Training to enable PSVs to carry out their tasks varies between forces; however, is often delivered ‘on the job’ by more experienced volunteers or members of staff, alongside standard induction training sessions (health and safety, IT, data security, etc.). While there is no set number of hours that PSVs are expected to volunteer, forces often implement their own guidelines around this (for example, in the force area that the fieldwork for this study was carried out there was an expectation that PSVs would volunteer for a minimum of ten and a maximum of 60 hours per month). A 2018 benchmarking survey highlighted over 1100 PSV role profiles across forces in England and Wales, reflecting the diversity of PSV tasks and the contribution that they make (Britton et al. 2018). PSVs now feature in every police service in England and Wales, forming ‘just one limb of the policing tree’ (other ‘branches’ of which include private security, government agencies, the third sector, and community groups) (Ayling 2007, 74). However, despite their presence across the breadth of police organisations, research exploring their involvement remains scarce. As new opportunities to involve volunteers in policing emerge—most notably through the UK Policing and Crime Act 2017 which allows chief officers to confer a range of powers to volunteers (excluding those in a core list reserved for warranted officers)—the development of a robust evidence base around volunteers in policing becomes increasingly urgent. This chapter adds to that evidence base, exploring the infrastructure required to adequately support and develop PSVs, and optimise their contribution to policing. The chapter is based on fieldwork conducted as part of a PhD study, drawing on freetext comments from a survey of PSVs (n = 140) and interviews with PSVs (n = 20) and volunteer managers (paid members of police support or ‘civilian’ staff) (n = 5) in a large urban constabulary in England, UK, and interviews with key stakeholders (paid, often senior, members of police forces/national oversight bodies with a role in setting the strategic direction of PSVs) (n = 7) conducted between 2015 and 2017. Interviews were face-to-face and largely conducted in the location that the volunteering (or paid work, in the case of volunteer managers and stakeholders) took place—usually a police station. Topics covered within the PSV survey and interview

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schedule included: motivations for volunteering; role and contribution1; experiences of supervision and support; relationships with others (officers, staff)2 and views on policing; satisfaction with role; the PSVs’ plans for the future in relation to volunteering. The volunteer manager and stakeholder interview schedule covered the following areas: understanding the place of PSVs in the organisation (role, tasks, contribution, support/infrastructure available); relationships between PSVs and officers and staff; external issues (unions, impact of austerity); and final points around factors that need to be in place in order to involve volunteers, successes and challenges for PSV programmes, and looking to the future. Interviews were audio recorded, transcribed in a Word document and transferred to NVivo qualitative data analysis computer software package for thematic coding. This was approached from a grounded theory stance, allowing categories and themes to emerge and guide the analysis, so that research participants—PSVs, volunteer managers, and key stakeholders—held a pivotal role in ‘setting the agenda’ of the study (Patton 2002). The chapter is organised under four key headings: organisational approaches to PSVs; supporting and developing PSVs through dedicated volunteer management; resourcing volunteer programmes; involving PSVs in austere times. Finally, the chapter turns to the future—the challenges that police services face in rethinking and reassigning tasks against a backdrop of shifting priorities, diminishing resources, and a pluralising workforce—and reimagines the role of PSVs within this.

2 Organisational Approaches to PSVs Involving volunteers in policing requires commitment from the organisation at both strategic and operational level (Gravelle and Rogers 2009a; Carr 2012). Those who make volunteering work ‘on the ground’ (most notably, volunteer managers, whose role will be explored in detail later in the chapter) are clearly instrumental; however, the overall ethos of involving volunteers is directed and dictated by the top-level organisational approach to volunteering. The extent to which police leaders consider both paid and unpaid members within the fabric of their workforce sets the tone for involving volunteers in the day-to-day delivery of policing. An organisation needs vision in terms of how and why volunteers will add value, a strategy which embeds volunteers within it, senior management who are active in demonstrating support, and comprehensive written policies outlining the practicalities of involving volunteers in delivering services (College of Policing, undated; Brudney 2000). Indeed, Gill (1986) argues that it is organisational policy and strategic leadership that determines the extent to which the volunteer potential is maximised. However,

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For a full discussion of the motivations and contributions of PSVs in this study please see Pepper (2021a) and Pepper et al. (2020). 2 For a full discussion on PSVs’ relationships with others in policing, please see Pepper (2021b).

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a lack of clear leadership and failure to develop the role of the volunteer and coordinate their involvement has been noted across the criminal justice system, not least in policing, where strategy and policy have often failed to foreground the role of volunteerism (Neuberger 2009; Britton and Callender 2018).

2.1 Clarifying a Corporate Position for Involving PSVs Interviews conducted with stakeholders and volunteer managers as part of this study highlighted the importance of organisational direction and leadership in involving volunteers in policing. However, there was concern about a general lack of structure or approach regarding the position and direction of PSVs within policing, both nationally and within individual forces. Stakeholder interviewee Neil commented on the national PSV picture, arguing that there are currently ‘43 forces [in England and Wales], 43 different opinions on the value of the role and appetite for it [involving volunteers]’. This somewhat disparate approach to volunteers in policing at national level leaves individual forces with little in the way of central direction or good practice upon which to scope and develop their own programmes. Indeed, volunteer manager interviewees in this study were often unclear about the vision or ‘steer’ for PSVs with one arguing that their police force needed to ‘firm up’ their position on whether they considered ‘volunteering as a valuable function or a valuable part of our family’ (Annabelle, volunteer manager interviewee). Volunteer manager Colby felt that it was important to establish a sense of organisational ethos and direction around volunteering, and that the force needed to ‘decide how it wants to use volunteers, what volunteers should be doing and, not mandating, but encouraging the utilisation of volunteers in particular areas’. For these volunteer managers, a corporate approach was important to ‘set the tone’ for involving volunteers across the organisation, enabling consistent communication that they are part of the workforce and how the organisation ‘does business’. This corporate approach, routinely factoring PSVs in to policing at strategic, operational, and tactical level would, according to stakeholder interviewee Clive, help to ensure that PSVs are ‘ . . . not a bolt on anymore’.

2.2 The Influence of Individual Leaders The success (or failure) of PSVs being involved in tasks within a police department was often linked to the presence of motivated and enthusiastic individual officers and staff—usually those in positions of power or influence which, in a policing context, equated to rank. Volunteer manager Colby argued that the extent to which PSVs are able to take part in meaningful tasks is ‘very dependent on individuals being knowledgeable about volunteering and seeing the benefits . . . when someone who’s interested in volunteers, sees the benefit of volunteers, arrives in the department,

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that department can sometimes flourish with volunteers’. Volunteer manager Derek commented on the success of a unit in the police force that had been recognised nationally for their volunteer involvement: A lot of that is to do with who was running the unit . . . He embraced volunteering and to a certain extent that’s critical because, if somebody higher up the chain in any organisation embraces an idea, then it filters through because people agree.

Derek returned to this point later in his interview stating: ‘it’s like everything, if you’ve got a good leader that . . . tends to infuse its way down’. Stakeholder interviewee Neil agreed, emphasising the importance of leadership that is committed to involving volunteers: ‘you need to have leadership internally. So, it needs to be a priority. So, you need a chief officer sponsor who believes in it and it will work’.

2.3 Changing Leadership Messages While the influence of police leaders can be positive in terms of greater PSV involvement, volunteer manager and stakeholder interviewees also highlighted challenges that this can pose. Long-serving volunteer manager Marsha reflected on changing messages when there is turnover of senior officers from ‘they’re [PSVs] not really important but not said they’re not really important, to really, really important, they will be on our commendation ceremony’. Marsha spoke about a particularly enthusiastic senior officer that she worked alongside who has since moved on to another area: He got all the Senior Leadership Team on board with it. The engagement was off the scale. He injected volunteers into every single meeting, every talk he done, just everywhere. It was like thank you, the Messiah had arrived! Although he’s left that legacy, it hasn’t continued at the pace because the passion that he had for it isn’t the passion that the current one [senior officer] has.

Stakeholder interviewee Beth highlighted similar views: ‘You could get an area within the police service that had been completely pro-volunteers, really engaged, really used them at every opportunity, then personalities change, and a different set of attitudes come in and it’s different’. This shines a spotlight on the fragile and tenuous nature of PSV involvement where organisational ‘take up’ of volunteer programmes is dependent on the personality, drive, and operational focus of a small and often changing cohort of senior leaders.

2.4 A Volunteer ‘Hierarchy’ However, even for the most enthusiastic police leaders who are committed to involving PSVs, the demanding and changeable nature of the ‘day job’ can quickly displace their focus. Volunteer manager Annabelle acknowledged the challenging

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position of volunteering in an environment of varied, wide-ranging, and frequently changing police priorities: I mean let’s face it, we’re a police force, we’ve got to sort out the operational first and I don’t think anyone is denying or thinking it should be otherwise. I’m not saying they’re not good leaders. I’m just saying that volunteering is very low down that list.

Furthermore, PSVs were seen to occupy a considerably lower position on that ‘list’, compared to those who give their time in other unpaid police roles. Indeed, a perception of a police volunteering ‘hierarchy’ seemed evident here, with the PSV viewed as the ‘poor relation’ within this. The Special Constable and Volunteer Police Cadet programmes—the two other key volunteering roles managed within police services in England and Wales—were seen to attract considerably greater interest and investment compared to PSVs, which some volunteer manager and stakeholder interviewees related to their visibility (both are uniformed roles), measurable performance indicators, and resultant political and public ‘currency’: The Specials get recognised, the Specials get free travel [on public transport], the Specials get, the Specials get, the Specials get! I know that it’s a very different job in terms of what PSVs do, but they do add value and I think we could do a little bit more for them (Marsha, volunteer manager interviewee). The focus is predominantly on Specials and Cadets, so PSVs can often be forgotten corporately. Corporate messages that go out talk about staff, officers, Specials. PSVs are often left out . . . They’re a hard sell. To tell members of the public “oh did you know you’ve got PSVs helping support police?” it means absolutely zero (Colby, volunteer manager interviewee).

Stakeholder interviewee Kenneth felt that PSVs challenged conventional police measures of value—‘part of the problem is the return. You can’t measure it. You can’t touch it’—whereas Special Constables and Volunteer Police Cadets lend themselves more readily to traditional police performance frameworks in terms of quantifiable patrol hours, visibility, and (for Special Constables) arrest rates. Securing top-level ‘buy in’ is an important starting point for creating an environment in which volunteers can be part of policing, with senior management active in demonstrating support. However, both the strategic vision for involving volunteers and the practical tools for embedding them must be woven throughout the organisation (Myhill 2006; van Caem et al. 2013). A dedicated volunteer manager is at the core of this, interpreting senior-level strategies and policies and communicating them to ‘ground level’, advocating the role of the volunteer within the workforce, and being a visible and accessible figure for both PSVs and the officers and staff that involve them in their teams (Brudney 1999 in Bullock 2017; Phillips and Terrell-Orr 2013; Millie 2018). The next section of this chapter turns to the volunteer manager, highlighting the importance that PSVs in this study attached to their role.

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3 Supporting and Developing PSVs through Dedicated Volunteer Management Dedicated volunteer management is the catalyst for factors that have been identified as central to volunteer experiences3—undertaking tasks that enable PSVs to make a valid contribution and fulfil their motivations for volunteering, having access to resources and feedback that allow them to feel supported and develop in their roles, and operating within teams and alongside officers and staff that recognise and value the time and skills they bring (Shin and Kleiner 2003; Phillips and Terrell-Orr 2013; Bullock 2017; Millie 2018). Indeed, PSVs that took part in this study, together with stakeholders, and volunteer managers themselves, frequently emphasised the importance of volunteer managers, pointing to the essential nature of the role to successful volunteering in the police service. PSVs often praised their volunteer managers in terms of understanding their skills, providing personal and professional support in identifying volunteering roles that ‘speak to’ their interests (including paid positions within policing for those PSVs who had career-related motivations for volunteering in unpaid roles4 ), recognising and facilitating flexible arrangements for those with care, study or other responsibilities, and arranging opportunities for development and recognition of their contribution. Saskia, a PSV survey respondent, related enjoyment in her role to an effective manager who seemed invested in maximising her experiences as a volunteer: I’ve really enjoyed the last couple of years and plan to continue [volunteering]. A lot of that is down to having a good volunteer manager who has been able to find areas that match my skills and areas in which I’m interested.

Indeed, it seemed to be those managers that took the time to develop relationships with their volunteers and understand individual motivations for giving time, who garnered the most positive feedback. PSV interviewee Katy commented: I had a really good volunteer manager. She wasn’t just a manager, she was like a really good friend, like a life coach. She turned things around for everybody, not just with me, every single person—and she could see that I was keen so whatever role there was available she would say to me ‘if you’re interested, take part in it’ and that helped me to build my confidence up.

PSV interviewee Harley also spoke about the support his volunteer manager offered in terms of searching for paid employment: ‘He is lovely! I can only give that man praise . . . we’re in a process, every single paid position that comes his way he sends the link to it straight away’. Features identified by PSVs in this study as important to their volunteer experience—most notably here, understanding and attempting to respond to volunteer motivations, and creating meaningful tasking opportunities—frequently fall within the remit of the volunteer manager role. For

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For a full discussion on PSVs’ experiences while volunteering and alongside others in policing, please see Pepper (2021b). 4 For a full discussion on the motivations of PSVs in this study please see Pepper (2021a).

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PSVs Saskia, Katy, and Harley, the role that their volunteer managers undertook held great influence in terms of fulfilling reasons for giving their time and creating a positive experience for them as a volunteer in policing.

3.1 An Emotional Contract Volunteer manager interviewees frequently highlighted the importance of their relationship with the PSV. Volunteer manager Marsha spoke of a multi-faceted relationship, which stretched far beyond the straightforward administration of management: I am mother, aunt, sister, counsellor, confidant. This role is so much more than what’s on paper. A big part of it is the emotional side and keeping people engaged. What I find is that the volunteers will volunteer for you—rather than volunteer for the organisation first. They see the police force and, yes, that’s what they put themselves forward for, but when they actually join it’s not the logo or the police force brand that keeps them, it’s the [volunteer] manager.

Marsha referred to a unique ‘emotional contract’ that she felt volunteer managers need to have with PSVs—an unwritten agreement of mutual obligation, and interactions that take on perhaps elevated levels of importance for unpaid members of the organisation. Volunteer manager Annabelle made reference to the alternative ‘carrots and sticks’ available when managing unpaid staff, and the importance of ‘engaging with and knowing your volunteers’ as part of this: ‘ . . . we undervalue engagement and we undervalue the personal relationship—knowing the person, their skills and their strengths, and playing to them’.

3.2 ‘Championing’ PSVs and the Voluntary Contribution The relationships that volunteer managers in this study held frequently stretched beyond the PSV, with ‘outward facing’ links across the wider organisation, and promoting and championing the voluntary contribution, viewed as essential features of their role. Volunteer manager interviewees spoke about attending force tasking meetings to identify volunteer opportunities, and the importance of getting to know teams in the force area in order to promote the voluntary resource that is available to them. As volunteer manager Jennifer commented: ‘It’s really just being a part of the area. Finding out things that are happening’, highlighting the volunteer manager role as the ‘face of volunteering . . . negotiating and speaking to people but also having their [the PSVs] best interests at heart’. Volunteer managers emphasised the importance of their role in both supporting the PSV and being accessible to the paid workforce in order to identify and develop the voluntary contribution within the police force.

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PSVs themselves also recognised and valued their volunteer manager’s role in this. PSV interviewee Salma commented: I have a manager who does a fantastic job and is quite forward thinking in terms of “who do I have in my cluster who has these skills I need for such and such a thing?” And therefore—because they know us so well—is quite quick to say to senior officer X “I have two volunteers who could potentially help you with that, I’ll put you in touch with them today” and then things can move along quickly.

PSV interviewee Alan highlighted the role of their manager in ‘bring[ing] people together’—both PSVs and paid members of the organisation, emphasising the manager’s unique position as an interface between the volunteer resource and the wider police service. Referring to a large-scale filing task that a group of PSVs undertook to support a team who were preparing for a high-profile case to go to court, Alan stated: ‘But that’s because of the strong manager being there to accept the work, get the volunteers in. We can’t do that on our own. We can’t build up the relationship’. Volunteer managers have been recognised as the ‘interface’ between the organisation and the volunteer, and the ‘nexus’ of a range of factors that have been identified as integral to the volunteer experience both in policing and more broadly: role development, recruitment, training, understanding and responding to motivations, managing information and communication, and creating an environment which fosters commitment (Shin and Kleiner 2003). It is at the volunteer manager level where policies or programmes (where they exist) are interpreted and communicated from the ‘top’ to the ‘street’, where the individual volunteer may have most direct contact with representatives of the organisation (particularly in the early phases of their service), and where officers and staff often have their first experiences of PSVs (Phillips and Terrell-Orr 2013). These initial ‘encounter phases’—predominantly delivered or facilitated by a strong volunteer manager—are vital for new volunteers in terms of ‘sense making’ (Weick 1995), ‘meaning making’ (Schnell and Hoof 2012), ‘membership negotiation’ (Castor and Jiter 2013), and ‘organisational socialisation’ (Kramer 2001). Furthermore, these experiences serve to develop PSVs’ understanding of organisational priorities and offer a space to connect with them, signalling the value that the organisation places on them and their role. Indeed, Callender et al. (2019, 401) found a significant association between self-reported perceptions of whether the force was good at managing volunteers and PSV morale, pointing to the ‘importance of a positive, pro-active approach to volunteer management in which PSVs are able to see how their activities ‘fit’ within the totality of policing activity and feel appreciated for their inputs [helping them to] . . . actively integrate and feel part of the wider policing team’. The volunteer manager role is a skilled one and, although there are some similarities with theory and practice underpinning traditional (that is, paid) human resource functions, Gay (2000 in Howlett 2010) posits that volunteer management requires a broader, more eclectic set of skills—co-ordinating, managing, developing, representing, campaigning—which operate alongside a limited set of ‘levers’ to

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engage and incentivise people. In the absence of monetary compensation or material incentives, Shin and Kleiner (2003, 63, 69) argue that ‘the effective management of unpaid volunteers is crucial in instilling and maintaining the spirit of volunteerism among individuals’ and, because volunteers give their time and energy to the organisation at their own cost, they must be ‘managed with special care’. However, volunteer management of this quality can only be achieved within an organisation that is prepared to invest and develop an adequately resourced and sustainable programme—themes that are explored in the next section of this chapter.

4 Resourcing Volunteer Programmes Good quality volunteer management and co-ordination, together with features that have been recognised as essential to the volunteer experience—recruitment, comprehensive induction, training and development opportunities, schedule flexibility, rewards and recognition, information and communication, and access to resources—each have costs attached, negating any suggestion that PSVs are a ‘free’ resource (Millie 2019). As Clive, a stakeholder interviewee, highlighted, although ‘unpaid’ in terms of salary, volunteer programmes require investment: ‘it’s not a no cost option—it’s a low-cost option’. However, adequate resources to support volunteer programmes are often underestimated and, particularly during times of fiscal restraint, may not be forthcoming. This section considers the diminishing investment in volunteer management that took place throughout the lifetime of this study in the force area in which fieldwork was conducted, and the implications of this in terms of managing PSVs with fewer resources and concerns about losing the ‘profile’ of the PSV programme within the force.

4.1 Diminishing Investment in Volunteer Management One of the clearest indications of the impact of budget restrictions on the force’s PSV programme during this study was the significant reduction in dedicated volunteer manager posts that took place throughout the lifetime of the research. Although clearly holding a vested interest in terms of their own ongoing employment, volunteer managers were pessimistic about the future of the volunteering programme in the absence of dedicated co-ordination, frequently commenting on this throughout interviews: Who is going to manage our volunteers? Because we have a really great additional workforce that gives their time willingly; however, a lot of it is based on their personal relationships with their volunteer manager, and the motivation and the contact they have (Colby, volunteer manager interviewee). I think once the volunteer managers go that will in itself reduce the number of volunteers because of the dedication and commitment they have to the volunteer manager. They won’t

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Volunteers themselves were also concerned about the loss of their volunteer manager, a reality which some seemed keenly aware of: ‘Uncertainty of volunteer manager job has created an uncertain future for the volunteer programme with a lack of proactive approach for roles to keep volunteers busy and interested’ (Gail, PSV survey respondent); ‘The current cull of volunteer managers and the way it is being implemented has affected morale’ (Kyran, PSV survey respondent); ‘I am losing my volunteer manager, who has been a staunch supporter for years. Those with less experience as volunteers may feel cast adrift’ (Alana, PSV survey respondent). PSVs also raised issues around the increased workload for remaining managers, and the impact on their ability to engage and retain volunteers. PSV survey respondent Nancy stated: ‘I personally have felt a diminished connection with the volunteer managers because they are decreasing in number’, while PSV survey respondent Saskia highlighted the effect on volunteer numbers: The force needs to be careful to retain a good volunteer management team. A good volunteer manager can deliver a lot of value through the people they recruit and manage (many multiples of what they cost). Losing the expertise here could mean a dwindling in numbers and quality.

4.2 Managing PSVs with Fewer Resources In interviews, volunteer managers reflected on the wider changes they were experiencing ‘on the ground’ against a backdrop of reducing budgets and organisational re-structuring in order to meet financial targets—in particular, centralisation of the recruitment process for both paid and unpaid members of the workforce. Volunteer managers were concerned about the priority that PSVs would hold alongside filling officer, staff, and Special Constable positions, and their now-reduced opportunities to inform, manage expectations, and identify positions for volunteers. Volunteer manager Derek commented on his more limited role in PSV recruitment and the implications of this: You interview people and you were thinking what sort of role you could offer them . . . I think that’s important to make sure the right people are in the right job, and to a certain extent that is going to be taken away from us.

Derek went on to reflect on the problems associated with identifying and developing volunteer opportunities, and placing them in teams without considerably increasing the workload of those officers and staff who oversee their work on a dayto-day basis that may arise with fewer volunteer managers: If they didn’t have managers, I do worry that the programme would die. The team leaders are quite busy as it is. So, if you’re told “here’s another 20 volunteers you’ve got to look after” . . . the volunteers might go to them with a problem and they might not have time to

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sort it out. If they’ve got a senior leader saying, “I want this done now” and the volunteer saying, “I’ve got a problem with my computer”, I’m afraid . . . priorities . . .

Volunteer manager Annabelle commented: ‘If you lose the manager then often the programme begins to crumble . . . You lose that local level management line or ‘go-to’ person for that volunteer, you lose the volunteer’. Stakeholder interviewee Beth raised a similar concern: ‘It is important to recognise and harbour volunteering opportunities. All the while we have dedicated volunteer managers—things will happen. If or when they go, the likelihood of this will reduce’. Beth went on to highlight the importance of adequately resourced volunteer management, providing ‘central direction’ and ‘someone paid to be that point of contact’. As stakeholder interviewee Neil commented: ‘It’s got to be your full-time job to worry about volunteers’. Inconsistent and inadequate management and support have been highlighted in other studies of police volunteers. Bullock (2017) recognised variance in the levels of supervision, guidance, and management afforded to PSVs, while respondents in Millie’s (2019, 414) study referred to a limited ‘organisational infrastructure and sufficient personnel’ to manage and develop volunteers. This has implications for the way in which PSVs are involved in policing, the contribution they are able to make, and their likelihood of continuing to give their time. Failing to embed effective volunteer management and supervision can lead to challenges around retention, with lack of induction, development, and training—central features of a well-resourced and managed volunteer programme—more often drivers for volunteers to leave the organisation than poor initial selection reasons (Bullock 2017).

5 Involving PSVs in Austere Times The challenge of resourcing volunteer programmes and delivering policing services in austere times presented itself throughout data collection for this study, perhaps most notably in relation to the infrastructure (or lack of) in place to support the involvement of PSVs. Indeed, police services in the UK have had to face up to the difficult realities of operating in a climate of fiscal constraint. According to a 2018 report by the National Audit Office, police forces have experienced 30% real term budget reductions since 2010/11 and are finding it harder to deliver an effective service, not only in terms of financial cuts but the significant costs of investigating terrorism and increased reports of high harm crimes such as sexual offences. There is the suggestion that this has been further exacerbated by the Covid-19 global pandemic, with forces required to invest resources into a new and unfamiliar terrain of public health policing, as well as protective equipment and technology to enable officers and staff to work from home (Clements and Aitkenhead 2020; Dodd 2020). Budget reductions have had implications across the broad remit of policing—

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including, according to participants in this study, the manner in which PSVs are involved in the delivery of services.

5.1 The PSV ‘Offer’: Additionality or Substitution? While the involvement of volunteers in policing, as respondents in Bullock’s (2017, 346) study reflected, offer a ‘pragmatic response to economic reality’ in financially precarious times, balancing the ‘additionality’ that PSVs can bring alongside concerns about job substitution is a challenging path to negotiate. Similar to other areas of public life including health (NHS England 2017) and community services (e.g., libraries) (Forkert 2016), the financial—as in cost saving—contribution of volunteers is a thorny issue. Unpaid (although by no means ‘cost free’) volunteers have been viewed, according to some studies, as an effective means of compensating for increasingly scarce police resources (Ren et al. 2006; Ayling 2007; Gravelle and Rogers 2009a, 2009b; Phillips 2013). However, in a UK context, volunteering activity (in any realm—not just policing) cannot be seen as a substitute for paid work (Compact Code of Good Practice on Volunteering 2005). Despite this, issues around additionality and substitution in relation to volunteering activity remain contentious, not least in the police service with a report by the public services union Unison (2014, 3, 8) referring to ‘volunteer mission creep’, suggesting that some police volunteer roles ‘look remarkably like established police staff posts’, with PSVs being ‘quietly recruited’ to replace job cuts. Issues around the volunteer input bringing ‘additionality’ or veering into substitution of paid members of staff arose throughout fieldwork in this study, particularly during interviews with stakeholders and volunteer managers. Stakeholder interviewee Beth set out the current parameters clearly: ‘A volunteer should not replace a member of staff. It should not be a job substitution. Volunteers bring additionality. They should be completing tasks that otherwise would not be done . . . improving, rather than delivering core business. We should be able to function without them . . . Whilst volunteers are a huge benefit there is a limit to how much the organisation can call on them’.

Stakeholder interviewee Clive—a senior officer responsible for direction of PSVs at a national level—spoke about the importance of systems of accountability to ensure that the ‘limits’ around involving PSVs that Beth referred to above were adhered to: It’s [PSV roles] as wide as your imagination, isn’t it? The important thing is that in my view you’ve got a mechanism in your force to make sure that you’re not doing what Unison accuses us of which is mission creep. You’re being careful that your organisation has agreed what tasks it will allow their volunteers to actually do and that it’s got the relevant support and development mechanisms in place to allow it to happen.

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Volunteer manager interviewee Derek highlighted his role in ensuring and communicating the nature of volunteer tasks, emphasising the supportive (rather than replacement) intentions of their PSVs: You have to be conscious of job substitution, so whenever we put forward a new volunteer role it has to go to the committee, you know to make sure that it isn’t going to impact and people don’t consider that job substitution . . . sometimes they [PSVs] are looked upon as a threat when they’re not. They’re there very much as a support and I emphasise that. They are there to support staff, not to take over their job.

5.2 The Challenges of Balancing Additionality and Substitution in a Changing Service However, volunteer managers also outlined the challenges of remaining on the ‘right side’ of the additionality vs. substitution ‘debate’ in a climate of reductions in paid police staff (i.e., non-warranted or ‘civilian’ roles5 ), and when trying to source meaningful and fulfilling PSV roles that meet the needs of the force: That line is becoming more and more grey, more and more wide . . . I personally would like to see the force not replacing people’s jobs—absolutely not—but being quite realistic with what a volunteer can do, what help we need, and looking at other organisations and how they utilise volunteers (Marsha, volunteer manager interviewee). We are restricted in terms of what practically a volunteer can do because of job substitution. So that means where, as a volunteer in theory could do 20 things for a team, in reality it comes down to ten . . . I certainly appreciate that some of our volunteers will be underutilised. I don’t know how that will be changed without a dynamic shift in the way that the organisation views volunteers . . . then you’re blurring the lines (Colby, volunteer manager interviewee).

Stakeholder interviewee Beth reiterated the difficulties of balancing a ‘fine line between what a volunteer can and can’t do, and what a member of paid staff should be doing’ and concerns of volunteers themselves around this: ‘It’s wrong to think that we can survive on just volunteers. You can’t, you wouldn’t—the volunteers wouldn’t want to do it. If they knew they were taking someone’s paid livelihood from them, we wouldn’t keep them in the organisation’. Indeed, a small number of PSVs in both surveys and interviews acknowledged these issues when considering their contribution as a volunteer, indicating a clear stance around job substitution: ‘One wants to assist without depriving anyone of a job’ (Michelle, PSV survey respondent); ‘I joined because I wanted to help my local officers in any way I could. It definitely was not to take jobs away from the force. I stipulated that from the start and have maintained that stance since’ (Danielle, PSV survey respondent). PSV interviewee Pippa was also firm about this point: 5

A reduction of over 10,000 posts across forces in England and Wales (from 81,772 to 71,996) between 31 March 2010 and 31 March 2020. This increased to 75,625 in most recent data to 31 March 2021 (Home Office 2021).

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I would like to stress this, that one of the first questions I asked—and I asked it repeatedly to be sure—I was very worried about taking someone’s job . . . Because that was really important to me. The truth is, if I thought that was going to be the case, I wouldn’t do it. It’s as simple as that.

5.3 Changing Conversations in a Changing Landscape The rapidly changing landscape in which policing operates, largely prompted by fiscal constraint, led some stakeholders to reflect on the need for renewed debate around who does—or could—carry out policing tasks in the future. Stakeholder interviewees were under no illusion about the magnitude of this, referring to a ‘sea change’ in terms of involving PSVs (Kenneth, stakeholder interviewee), confronting ‘difficult, crunchy issues’ (Clive, stakeholder interviewee), and ‘working out a pragmatic response’ to no longer being able to say that ‘volunteers should never replace paid staff’, while acknowledging that this can be ‘very, very damaging where that does happen’ (Nathan, stakeholder interviewee). However, there was recognition that this position may not remain static, particularly in a changing police environment where finances are contracting but demands to deliver a broad service continue unabated. According to stakeholder interviewee Clive, ‘there is a demand out there for policing services and a significantly reduced workforce left to do it, so you’ve got to think of different ways of achieving that’. Stakeholder Kenneth questioned whether the ‘game would change’: ‘Will austerity push the fact that forces will say one day “we cannot do all this without volunteers’? Stakeholder Neil broadened the focus to wider issues around pluralisation of policing: I think that the expectation on what the police will do as an organisation will change. The police organisation will do less. But it doesn’t mean that there will be less policing. It just might be that work will happen outside of the formal police service . . . This opens up the potential for more activity to be done by volunteers.

Moving conversations forward to more imaginatively consider the role of PSVs in policing demands strategic vision and an adequately resourced infrastructure to support and develop volunteers. Indeed, failing to invest in the resources necessary to appropriately involve volunteers, according to stakeholder interviewee Nathan, may risk leaving ‘a trail of destruction behind you’.

6 Discussion and Concluding Thoughts This chapter has highlighted that the support, direction, and overall ethos of inclusion that the police service offers (or, indeed, fails to offer) to volunteers fundamentally underpins each of the issues that PSVs in this study—and wider studies of volunteers in policing and other environments—have identified as important to

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the volunteer experience: motivations being recognised and fulfilled; meaningful, interesting tasks that provide a genuine feeling of ‘being useful’; and working alongside officers and members of staff who acknowledge and value the time and skills that they bring. Experiences, perceptions, or feelings about the way in which the organisation treats volunteers can affect the extent to which volunteers define, understand, and identify with their role, and the connection and attachment that they feel to it (Grube and Piliavin 2000; Penner 2002; Marta et al. 2014). The greater the connection and attachment that the volunteer feels within the organisation, the more important the volunteer identity becomes to their sense of self—features that have been shown to be influential on volunteer satisfaction and retention (Laverie and McDonald 2007; van Ingen and Wilson 2017). Achieving this has been closely linked to an adequately resourced volunteer programme (including a paid manager or coordinator) and an organisational approach which embraces (or, at least, notices and considers) volunteers (Brudney 2000; Shin and Kleiner 2003). As Cordery et al. (2015) argue, organisations that dedicate resources to volunteer programmes and adopt effective management practices are likely to benefit most from involving volunteers in their work. However, leadership and direction, dedicated volunteer management, and an adequately resourced infrastructure to support and develop volunteers has often shown to be lacking in the policing paradigm (Britton and Callender 2018; Callender et al. 2019). Indeed, this seems to resonate across volunteering spheres beyond policing, with Howlett (2010) commenting that organising and co-ordinating the tasks of unpaid ‘amateurs’ is frequently seen as unimportant and low value compared to managing paid ‘professionals’. This has implications for the resources that are allocated to involving and embedding volunteers within policing, with the nature of volunteer co-ordination and management expertise often not readily recognised.

6.1 The Importance of Leadership Findings from this study pointed firmly to the importance of leadership at national, force, and individual team level—themes that have featured prominently throughout volunteering literature more generally (e.g., Grossman and Furano 1999; Brudney 2000)—however, concern that this was lacking in parts. Indeed, stakeholder and volunteer manager interviewees referred to a lack of clarity around strategic vision for PSVs, disparate approaches to their involvement, and lower priority afforded to this type of police volunteer compared to their Special Constable and police cadet counterparts. The tone of this was often set by individual leaders, and the transitory nature of senior officer positions—a trend exacerbated in a changing police organisation—often led to a lack of consistency around how PSVs were viewed, involved, and valued. Notwithstanding, volunteer managers also spoke of a number of committed senior leaders who recognised the contribution that volunteers could bring, placing them at the heart of service delivery alongside officers and staff, and of teams that welcomed volunteers and made clear that they were valued.

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However, this was often dependent on enthusiastic individual officers and staff, rather than sustainable, comprehensive policies that embedded volunteers within the workforce and viewed their presence as ‘business as usual’.

6.2 The Importance of Volunteer Management The influence of management on volunteer experience was clear from PSVs who took part in this study. The volunteer manager was instrumental in terms of understanding PSVs’ skills and reasons for giving their time and identifying opportunities for them to fulfil them. They also took on an important ‘outward’ facing role, championing and promoting PSVs throughout the police service and acting as an interface between the individual volunteer and broader organisation. These initial encounter phases—in which the volunteer manager plays a central role—enable both the individual and the wider police service to understand where the PSV ‘fits’ and the contribution they can make, supporting their integration within the organisation (Callender et al. 2019). Many PSVs shared positive stories of supervision and support from their volunteer manager. Some spoke about development opportunities and the effort that volunteer managers invested in identifying roles that matched their interests, and allowed them to see the contribution they made to policing—features that volunteers have been shown to attach importance to in both policing (Callender et al. 2019) and non-policing (Jamison 2003; Wisner et al. 2005) spheres. However, a number of PSVs—and the volunteer managers that supported them—reported a less positive range of experiences: of limited access to training and other opportunities to develop, of depleting resources and structural changes that vastly reduced volunteer management capacity, and of a lacking infrastructure to support a sustainable volunteer programme.

6.3 The Impact of Austerity The impact of austerity and the fallout of a police service struggling to deliver services in the face of reducing budgets featured prominently throughout discussions on volunteer programme infrastructure. Volunteering is not free: an adequate programme to effectively involve, support, and develop PSVs requires investment (Wolf and Bryer 2020). However, throughout the lifetime of this study, investment in the volunteer programme in the police force where fieldwork was conducted was diminishing—most visibly in terms of large-scale reductions in volunteer manager posts. Both PSVs and volunteer managers themselves (albeit acknowledging their vested interest here) were concerned about the future of the PSV programme once these changes started to take effect, and those that had already begun to do so as a result of streamlined recruitment processes and centralisation of local departments. These changes, they felt, would impact negatively on the profile of the volunteer

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programme at local level and the ability of volunteer managers to influence and be involved in the recruitment and development of volunteers. The challenges of tasking PSVs, while negotiating the somewhat thorny ground around ensuring that volunteers bring additionality rather than substituting previously paid roles, also emerged here. This can present barriers to volunteer managers and other staff when identifying the meaningful tasks that PSVs in this study attached much importance to. There was a sense from stakeholder and volunteer manager interviewees that this debate needed to move forward, and that the difficult issues surrounding appropriate involvement of volunteers would need to be confronted in light of a changing policing landscape.

6.4 Looking to the Future: PSVs in a Changing Policing Landscape The final section of this chapter seeks to explore and imagine the PSV role going forward in a rapidly changing police service. With considerably smaller budgets available to UK police services over recent years, there has been a ‘narrowing of the front-line and a narrowing of the police task in general’ to create ‘post-austerity policing that is both slimmer and fitter’ (Millie 2014, 7). This climate has required forces to reconsider their priorities and the overall ‘shape’ of policing in light of available resources. The ability of policing services to meet the challenges they are currently presented with arguably will, in part, depend on their willingness to embrace the ‘fullest advantages of the opportunities that a pluralised approach can offer’ (Stenning and Shearing 2015, 7) and ‘adapt to a context in which they are no longer perceived as the monopolistic provider’ (Crawford 2008, 175). As police services attempt to more realistically align their responsibilities with available resources, they must consider those who may be better placed to take on some of the tasks that form part of ‘wide policing’—broad and diverse objectives that feature within an expanded policing mission (Millie 2014). Indeed, it may be that the contribution of those beyond the warranted officer or paid member of staff— other statutory agencies, community groups, and volunteers, including the PSV, with their potential to draw in new skills, experience, capacity, and capability— are at the forefront of helping to meet some of the challenges currently facing the police service (Britton and Knight 2016; Britton and Callender 2018; Callender et al. 2019). Reimagining the involvement of PSVs in this way requires a new approach, one that enhances creativity, and attempts to view their role more broadly than through the narrow policing focus currently adopted (Callender et al. 2020). Indeed, the processes and patterns of ‘being’ a volunteer do not have to mirror those of paid officers and staff. Episodic stints of volunteering, relying on a registered bank of individuals or companies willing to share their (or their staffs) time and skills during periods of demand, or when workloads require specialist knowledge which may not be available in the paid workforce (e. g., languages, financial knowledge, or

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IT expertise), could prove particularly fruitful in a police environment where tasks are becoming increasingly global and complex in nature, allowing a more flexible approach within the organisation in which volunteering takes place (Fairley et al. 2014). Furthermore, exploring alternative arrangements for management external— but closely linked to—the police service could offer some merit. Such an approach may expand capacity to better provide PSVs with the features that this study and others have shown to be important—flexibility, opportunities for development, appropriate and meaningful tasking, and dedicated volunteer management that seeks to understand and respond to individuals’ motivations for giving their time—while offering the police service a reliable and well-managed resource that they can tap in to on a regular or sporadic basis depending on need. New approaches to involving volunteers must aim to foster an environment in which they are recognised, valued, able to develop, and contribute to both existing operating models and new directions in policing practice, and where there is a genuine enthusiasm for enabling volunteers to become part of policing ‘business’ (Callender et al. 2019). Policing is an evolving sector that must be capable of responding to rapidly shifting priorities. For volunteers to continue to be a relevant part of this, the way they operate within the police service must also be adaptable. Adopting a flexible and imaginative stance, and thinking more creatively about the potential of the volunteer contribution, is essential as police services navigate their way through challenging climates that have been further compounded by the uncertainty and blurring of boundaries around policing tasks in the Covid-19 global pandemic (Farrow 2020). Assuming that PSVs will continue to play a role in policing, the need for an adequately resourced infrastructure to support and develop PSVs remains— indeed, takes on increasing prominence during unstable times. This calls for a two-pronged approach: dedicated volunteer management ‘on the ground’ to support and develop PSVs, and strategic leadership to set the overall vision for involving volunteers in the organisation. Indeed, the appetite and motivation of police leaders to engage with volunteers has been recognised as indicative of the ‘future prospects for the[ir] meaningful integration . . . within contemporary policing’ (Wells and Millings 2019, 377). The absence of such commitment and investment presents an unstable and precarious future for the PSV. If the failure of police leadership, strategy, and policy to foreground volunteering continues (Britton and Callender 2018), it is unlikely that police services will be able to capitalise on the value that PSVs can bring to contemporary plural policing.

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Van Caem B, Steden R, Boutellier H, van Stokkom B (2013) Community policing ‘light’: on proximity and distance in relationships between Neighbourhood coordinators and citizens. Policing: A Journal of Policy and Practice 7(3):263–272 Van Ingen E, Wilson J (2017) I volunteer, therefore I am? Factors affecting volunteer role Identity. Nonprofit Volunt Sect Q 46(1):29–46 Weick K (1995) Sensemaking in Organisations. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA Wells H, Millings M (2019) Scrutinising the appeal of volunteer community Speedwatch to policing leaders in England and Wales: resources, responsivity and Responsibilisation. Policing and Society: An International Journal of Research and Policy 29(4):376–391 Wisner P, Stringfellow A, Youngdahl W, Parker L (2005) The service volunteer – loyalty chain: an exploratory study of charitable not-for-profit service Organisations. J Oper Manag 23:143–161 Wolf R, Bryer T (2020) Applying an outcomes-based categorisation to non-warranted/non-Sworn volunteers in United States policing. The Police Journal: Theory, Practice and Principles 93(1):42–64 Zimmeck M (2012) Government and volunteering: towards a history of policy and practice. In: Rochester C, Ellis Paine A, Howlett S (eds) Volunteering and society in the 21st century London. Palgrave Macmillan

Melissa Pepper is a senior lecturer in criminology in the School of Law and Criminology, University of Greenwich, London, UK. Prior to joining Greenwich, Melissa worked in government social research for 18 years, first in the UK Home Office, then in the London Mayor’s Office for Policing and Crime.

Volunteer Police Services in Germany: Two Case Studies on Goals and Underlying Forms of Legitimacy Frauke Reichl

Abstract This chapter deals with voluntary policing in Germany. In Germany, there are opportunities to volunteer in the context of policing and the police in five out of 16 federal states. In this chapter, I look at two different examples of volunteer police services. Volunteer police services are thereby understood as a tool out of the “community policing toolbox”. As community policing is connected to increasing legitimacy, I draw on the conception of input and output legitimacy by Scharpf (Governing in Europe. Effective and democratic? Oxford University Press, New York, 1999) and operationalize it in relation to the phenomenon of voluntary policing to answer the question: What kind of legitimacy shall be increased by the implementation of voluntary policing in its practice? Discussing the goals of the two volunteer police services, I show, that the underlying idea is to increase the output rather than the input legitimacy. Keywords Volunteer police services · Voluntary policing · Community policing · Legitimacy · Pluralization of policing

1 Introduction The pluralization of policing is a development in the context of the production of security and order in German municipalities. Next to the police private security companies, the municipal law enforcement services and citizens are engaged in policing. The latter can be labeled as voluntary policing and occurs in different forms: in volunteer police services (e.g., Fickenscher 2006; Hirschmann and Groß 2012) as well as in neighborhood watches (e.g., Birenheide 2009; Lub 2018; Butcher 2019) or even vigilante groups (e.g., Schmidt-Lux 2018; Quent 2016).

F. Reichl () University of Münster, Münster, Germany Zeppelin University Friedrichshafen, Friedrichshafen, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. Hirschmann et al. (eds.), Plural Policing in the Global North, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16273-2_7

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This chapter deals with voluntary policing in volunteer police services in Germany. These volunteer police services are initiated top down, are regulated by specific laws and the volunteers are selected by the police after handing in an application. In five of 16 federal states, citizens can volunteer in the context of policing within or under the supervision of the police. The five volunteer police services have different names: Freiwilliger Polizeidienst in Baden-Württemberg and Hesse, Sicherheitswacht in Saxony and Bavaria, and Sicherheitspartner in Brandenburg. Despite the same or different names, all forms of volunteer police services differ in, for example, the training and the equipment available to the volunteers, the rights they have, and the tasks they perform. However, they all have in common that citizens are at least in part visible as policing stakeholders in the public space (Hirschmann and Reichl 2020, 48). The differences in the structures of the volunteer police services are rooted in different laws upon which the volunteer police services operate—the federal states in Germany have different laws concerning both the police and the volunteer police services. Volunteer police services are often discussed in the context of community policing (also see Pütter 1999; Kreuzer and Schneider 2002, 15–16; Schreiber 2005, 79). However, community policing is not a clear-cut concept but rather a framework of different approaches and measures that are implemented differently in various contexts, e.g. in different municipalities. In principle measures or approaches subsumed under community policing are oriented toward citizens needs and should foster cooperation between police and citizens. Thereby, the idea of community policing is linked to legitimacy: “as originally conceptualized, community policing was intended to be a broad philosophy; a strategy of policing designed to restore legitimacy through decidedly democratic means” (Ray 2014, 3); it is associated with “the quest for a new kind of legitimacy for the police in a democratic society” (Ray 2014, 147). However, since the concept is implemented in different ways, it is unclear what kind of legitimacy is meant to be restored, or at least strengthened. Since volunteer police services are understood in this chapter as one tool out of a community policing toolbox (Funk 1999), it seems relevant to take a closer look at legitimacy and how it is approached in the concrete practice of volunteer police services. Therefore, I operationalize the idea of input and output legitimacy of Scharpf (1999), which he developed in the context of the European Union, for this specific context. In the following, output legitimacy is linked to increase policing output, input legitimacy focusses on the role of citizens, which means that civic resources are used. The guiding question of this chapter is therefore: what idea of legitimacy shall be strengthened with volunteer police services? Using the developed concept of legitimacy, I look empirically at two examples of volunteer police services in two cities, which I refer to as city D and E,1

1

The cities are two of the five cities we look at in the PluS-i project and which are anonymized to guarantee the anonymization of the interviewees (Hirschmann 2020, 7).

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located in two different federal states, drawing on qualitative interviews with police officers and volunteers. In the analysis of the interviews, I focus on the goals of the volunteer police services from which I draw conclusions concerning the underlying understanding of legitimacy that these two services should generate. First, I give an overview of the concept of community policing clarifying, why I consider volunteer police services as a mean of community policing and point out criticism toward community policing. Second, I operationalize the input and output legitimacy in regard to voluntary policing. Subsequently, I describe the introduction and structure of the two volunteer police services: their appearance, equipment, rights, training, and assignment. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the goals of the two volunteer police services examined in terms of the idea of legitimacy underlying each, which is reflected in a conclusion in which I also draw on the criticism of community policing.

2 The Broader Picture: Community Policing, Volunteer Police Services, and criticism Community policing is more of a framework of different approaches and measures than a clear and unambiguous concept, instruction for action or even theory. The concept evolved in the USA in the 1960s and the 1970s. Ray (2014) states that “in the case of community policing, the practice precedes theory” (Ray 2014, 12) and it emerged from a series of commission reports (see detailed Ray 2014, 13–15). Fleming (2009) states that although the definition of community policing has generated much conceptual confusion [ . . . ], despite its elusiveness, most commentators agree that community policing is about partnerships, consultation and building trust in communities. It is generally regarded as representing a major philosophy of organizational change, accompanied by a range of programmes and activities designed to reduce and prevent crime by increasing interaction and cooperation between local law enforcement agencies and the public (Fleming 2009, 38).

Improving community distress, crime, and disorder is in the focus of those strategies.2 Tilley (2008) elaborates: “The fluid ways in which community policing has been characterised mean that what is done in its name varies very widely” (Tilley 2008, 393). Funk (1999) refers to community policing as a toolbox consisting of general ideas and measures that are held together by a philosophy of the orientation to the needs of citizens (Funk 1999).

2

The concept of community policing is supplemented, respectively, specified for addressing concrete problems by further approaches. Problem-oriented policing means that for concrete crimes criminogenic factors are identified and these problems should be considered when acting in regard to security (Frevel 2012, 602). For a detailed examination of the relationship between community policing, problem-oriented policing, and intelligence-led policing, see Tilley (2008, 386–388). As this chapter deals especially with legitimacy and community policing, the question which tasks and goals might also be interpreted as problem-oriented policing will not be addressed.

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Next to variations on the local level, there are also differences between countries concerning the implementation of community policing or measures that are seen as a part of community policing (see also Fleming 2009, 38).3 E.g. for the USA and Germany, there are important differences regarding the thoughts and approaches of community policing. In the USA, community policing was seen as a supposedly useful way out of the crisis urban policing was facing4 and a strategy to bridging the divide between police and residents and using civic resources for crime control (Frevel et al. 2009, 149). Although the community policing idea had a great impact especially on German local politicians and was used as a point of reference by implementing measures in the context of the Kommunale Kriminalprävention (local crime prevention) in the 1990s (Wurtzbacher 2008, 57), it was especially a strategy against fear of crime and an expression of a changed or changing police selfimage—toward a preventive alignment of policing that is close to the community and citizens in the neighborhood (Frevel et al. 2009, 149).5 Frevel (2002) writes that the core thought of community policing is that crime prevention or crime reduction, the improvement of the feeling of security, the implementation of prevention work and the implementation of security-enhancing structures is best to achieve by a cooperation between the police, the municipality, and citizenry (Frevel 2002, 81). Citing Tilley (2008), Frevel (2012) writes community policing is the “policing with and for the community rather than policing of the community” (Tilley 2008, 376; Frevel 2012, 601). Rather than just repressively focusing on criminals, community policing involves the task of addressing local issues and the resulting offences, crime, and misdemeanors. Greater proximity to citizens, the observation of security-relevant developments and a responsibility for the public space should, following the community policing approach, be proactively instead of only responsively prevent crime (Frevel 2002, 601). Examples for community policing in Germany are “Bezirksdienstbeamt:innen” (“district service officers”), increased foot patrols of police officers as well as mobile police stations for low-threshold contacts to citizens.6 With reference to the

3

An overview over community policing in selected states is given by different authors in Wakefield and Fleming (2009, 38–47). 4 This crisis rooted in political and social turmoil in the 1960s and the 1970s where the police “in some instances exacerbated situations” (Ray 2014, 1) when sent to conflicts. Furthermore, crime was on the rise, especially in urban areas, but the strategies of the police increased the distance between the police and citizens: “In short, it seemed at times that the cure for crime was as bad, if not worse, than the disease itself” (Ray 2014, 2). 5 With reference to Pütter (2002), Wurtzbacher (2008) sees the difference in the community policing philosophy and the Kommunale Kriminalprävention in the concrete strategies and police procedures of community policing that are different to the diffuse alignment of Kommunale Kriminalprävention on communication and cooperation between local politics, police work, and residents (Wurtzbacher 2008, 160). 6 The municipality is involved in community policing, when they are thinking about crime prevention in case of planning (architectural) changes in the public spaces, when they are having concepts against littering or when they are engaged in the support of deprived persons (Frevel 2012, 602).

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description of Funk (1999) (see above) of community policing as a toolbox, in this chapter, volunteer police services are understood as one tool. Looking at some tasks of volunteers like increasing the feeling of security or activities in the context of prevention campaigns, it is obvious. However, not all tasks may fit into the notion of community policing, for example, when volunteers work in non-public spaces such as in police custody. But because the community policing concept is broad, there is no checklist of actions or tasks that must be either done or eliminated to qualify as community policing, it is not useful to further look at the different concrete tasks of volunteer police services, but to look at its principle. And it is above all citizens who are involved in the volunteer police services. Thereby, it is a form of cooperation or interaction between citizens and the police, and this fundamental orientation of the services makes it reasonable to consider them in the context of community policing. Furthermore, volunteer police services are also discussed in the context of community policing in different other studies (Pütter 1999; Kreuzer and Schneider 2002, 15–16; Schreiber 2005, 79). Frevel (2012) outlines the chances of community policing (and cooperative security politics): Risks are recognized in the light of urban and criminal-sociological findings and a problem-oriented approach to crime is aimed at by the cooperation of different state and civil society stakeholders, whereby a reduction of the opportunities for crime is focused as well as social measures to address causes of deviance. In this understanding, the state becomes a services provider acting according to civic needs (Frevel 2012, 605). But there are also risks of community policing approaches. Frevel (2002) critically points out that community policing, sympathetic and meaningful at first glance, is implemented in various ways in Germany, with liberal approaches as well as more restrictive and repressive ones (Frevel 2002, 82). Frevel (2012) identifies four areas of concern regarding community policing. First, which behavior is right or wrong, deviant, normal or criminal depends on values and norms. It can be observed that the interpretations of the employed, financially secure, and freespending middle class prevail with regard to correct behavior in the city center (Frevel 2012, 606). This leads, secondly, to the exclusion of the groups of people considered as deviant.7 Third, securitization (see also Frevel and John 2014) can be observed at the local level, when social or economic phenomena and problems are reinterpreted as security problems, so that problem-solving measures become security oriented.8 Finally, the construction of inclusion and exclusion in the context of securitization fosters a changed culture of security (Frevel 2012, 607–608).9 7

Despite the fact that it is public space, groups of persons are excluded, for example, by the engagement of private security or by measures of spatial design, like benches on which one can only sit and not lie (Frevel 2012, 606). 8 This can lead to discursive changes: the primary focus on risks and potentially dangerous persons can result in the limitation of openness and tolerance (Frevel 2012, 607). 9 A security-oriented culture of control is not only relevant on an (inter)national level but also on the local level, where, for example, video surveillance is introduced with the referral that the well-behaving citizens have nothing to worry about (Frevel 2012, 608).

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Especially in the light of this criticism,10 it seems to be important to envision that the idea of community policing is linked to restoring legitimacy (Ray 2014, 3), or, as in the German context community policing approaches were not implemented in regard to a crisis of policing, strengthening legitimacy. However, Funk (1999) points out that social scientists as well as politicians often proclaim community policing as a new form of direct democratic participation. But thereby, it is unclear how exactly this democratic participation might be realized, so that this stays an open question to be clarified in the course of the process (Funk 1999).

3 Voluntary Policing and Legitimacy For a closer look at the kind of legitimacy that shall be strengthened by voluntary policing in volunteer police services, the differentiation in input and output legitimacy by Scharpf (1999) can be used and operationalized. Scharpf (1999), although in the context of government in the European Union, distinguishes between output and input legitimacy. Output legitimacy emphasizes the “government for the people,” where “political choices are legitimate if and because they effectively promote the common welfare of the constituency in question” (Scharpf 1999, 6). Input legitimacy is linked to the “government by the people,” where “political choices are legitimate if and because they reflect the ‘will of the people’—that is, if they can be derived from the authentic preferences of the members of a community” (Scharpf 1999, 6). In the context of civic engagement, Zimmer points out that civic engagement is associated with great expectations by the state regarding inputoriented authenticity and output-oriented effectiveness (Zimmer 2003, 75, 83). Concerning voluntary policing, the research question regarding the kind of legitimacy that the implementation of voluntary policing in volunteer police services shall strengthen, can be complemented respectively differentiated: Should volunteer police services increase policing output and thereby output legitimacy, or is the role as citizens central, should civic resources be used to increase input legitimacy? In regard to the description of Tilley (2008), is it a policing of citizens by citizens or policing for and with citizens11?

10 Furthermore, it should be added that the term “community” in community policing is plausibly criticised as the “‘community’ of ‘community policing’ is elusive and may in many cases be illusory. Ironically, those least likely to take part in it are just those whose disaffection with the police lay behind many calls for community policing” (Tilley 2008, 377). The term furthermore implies “shared norms, values and ways of life” while in reality even smaller areas like neighbourhoods are often divided and places of conflicts (Tilley 2008, 377). 11 In this research question as well as in the following chapter, it will often be referred to “the citizens” and “the police.” Here, it is important to state that thereby it is not the intention to deny police officers their role as citizens—you could say that it is always citizens policing citizens. But in this chapter, I refer to police officers in their role as bearer of the monopoly of force, as members of the police force who are equipped with extensive rights in their role as police officers, which, in my opinion, justifies this functional division.

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Table 1 Operationalizing output and input legitimacy, own illustration Output legitimacy Policing in the foreground: citizenry not that important Doing police work that would otherwise be done by a police officer Substitute Focus on efficiency of regular policing

Input legitimacy Policing explicitly as citizens = bringing in civic resources Bringing in an advantage in relation to police officers Additionally Focus on civic resources, community orientation

The focus on output legitimacy would be a focus on the efficiency of general policing. For example, when police volunteer services are used as a substitute for police officers due to a lack of personnel in the police, where the volunteers are doing policing work that would be otherwise done by police officers. The citizens would thus be policed by citizens instead of police officers. Input legitimacy might be increased when police volunteers are used supplementarily to function as a mouthpiece for citizens’ concerns into the police or to act as low-threshold contact persons and thus represent a bridge between police and citizens. Here, the focus would be on the policing for and with citizens. Thereby, the differentiation is idealtypical and in practice, there will be overlaps. But in regard to the questions of legitimacy, it turned out to be a structured and useful approach to this topic (Table 1). Thereby, it is necessary to have a look at the goals of the volunteer police services, as one and the same task can be interpreted in terms of input as well as output legitimacy. For example, being present in the streets might generate output legitimacy as the police can increase uniformed patrols by using volunteers. At the same time, it could also be related to input legitimacy when the volunteers are used as low-threshold contacts for the citizens which the police might not be for everyone. So, the underlying goals must be carefully discussed as it is not always possible to draw a conclusion regarding the different kinds of legitimacy by looking at the tasks of the volunteers. Before addressing the question of legitimacy and discussing it in regard to the different goals, I provide an overview of the used methodology.

4 Methods For a comprehensive overview over volunteer police services in the two case studies, I draw on the results of the qualitative interviews from the project PluS-i. In that context, 31 transcripts of interviews with police officers, police officers responsible for the volunteers, and volunteers in the years 2018, 2019, 2020, and 2021 were analyzed.12 The semi-structured interviews were conducted in one police station

12 Some of the volunteers and police officers were interviewed up to three times over the course of the years. The 31 interviews were conducted with 25 different persons.

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in each of the two cities and, in the corona pandemic years 2020 and 2021, by telephone. The year is always cited in the reference. The interview guides for the interviews with the volunteers and police officers responsible for the volunteers covered different topics like deployment, selection procedure, motivation, collaboration with the police, training, perception of citizens, and criticism (for the construction of the interview guide, see Hirschmann et al. 2020, 33–34; Helfferich 2011). Over the years questions that worked well13 were continued to be used, others were adapted. Second interviews with the same volunteers or police officers especially concentrated on changes of the volunteer work. The interviews with police officers not responsible for the volunteers focused on wider themes in the context of the project PluS-i and only included one question concerning the volunteer police services. All the interviews were transcribed and analyzed with qualitative content analysis by building a coding frame that was partly concept-driven and partly data-driven (Schreier 2012; see in detail Hirschmann et al. 2020, 44–47). For this chapter, the identified goals of the volunteer police services were analyzed as they represent the basis for the following analysis and discussion since from the goals and their implementation it can be concluded on the underlying idea of legitimacy. Supplementary to the interviews a questionnaire was sent to the police officers who are responsible for the volunteer police services. It contained questions concerning the number, age, and gender of the volunteers as well as the duration of the commitment of the volunteers. These data are part of the overview of the two case studies in the next section.

5 Voluntary Policing: Two Case Studies First, I describe the introduction and developments of the volunteer police services on the political level. Then I give an overview of the implementation of the services: how the volunteer police services are structured and what volunteers do in the police force. These two sections provide the background information for the following discussion of the goals and the underlying idea of input and/or output legitimacy.

5.1 Implementation and Developments of the Volunteer Police Services As already mentioned, the volunteer police services in Germany vary from state to state. The two voluntary police services I look at in this chapter are located in cities in two different federal states and, as such, are structured differently.

13 Questions that did not generate queries and that did not create ambiguity, but made the interviewees talk about their experiences as volunteers.

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The volunteer police service in the federal state in which city D is located has quite a long history as it was already introduced in the 1960s. Thereby, it is the oldest still active volunteer police service in Germany. It was founded in a phase of economic growth, an associated shortage of workforce in the public service, and in the time of the cold war (Ehm 2005, 23–24). In this context, the discussion about a police reserve gained momentum and in 1963 the Landtag (State Parliament) decided the law Gesetz über den Freiwilligen Polizeidienst (Law on the volunteer police service) (Hirschmann and Groß 2012, 26–27; Ehm 2005, 34). After the reunification of Germany in 1990, the volunteer police service was questioned, and the external image changed. The democracy-promoting, civic aspect of the volunteer police service was emphasized (Hirschmann and Groß 2012, 27). No new volunteers have been trained or hired for a few years as the state government changed and the new government wanted to close the volunteer police service altogether. In the next legislative term, the government changed again and the coalition partners agreed on a compromise on restructuring the volunteer police service (Reichl 2018, 4–5). However, a plan for this has not yet been implemented or introduced. While the volunteer police service in the state of city D has a longer history, in the state of city E, it was introduced in 2000 and is thereby the youngest of the volunteer police services in Germany (Reichl 2018, 7). It was introduced after the conservative party focused on “law and order” (Stienen 2011, 165) in their election campaign 1999. During the election campaign, the party advocated the introduction of private prisons, a tightening of asylum law, an increase in police presence and also the introduction of a volunteer police service (Stienen 2011, 164–165; Reichl 2018, 7). During the implementation process, experience from other federal states was drawn upon (Kreuzer and Schneider 2002, 21–26). While for the volunteer police service in city D, there were already concrete efforts to be discontinued, for the service in city E no such efforts were undertaken by the governing parties of the federal state.

5.2 The Volunteer Police Services in D and E There are just under 20 (D) and just over 10 (E) volunteers actively taking part in the volunteer police services in 2021. Although the numbers of volunteers have declined since a couple of years in both cities, the commitment of volunteers is all in all still given as the active volunteers have been active for a couple of years. Most of the volunteers have been part of the volunteer police service for more than 15 years and there are persons volunteering for up to about 25 years in D and up to about 20 years in E (as the volunteer police service is not that old).14 Thus, it is not surprising that

14 The data regarding the current maximum duration of still active volunteers in the voluntary police service comes from the interviews (D-F8-1-2020: 43; E-F1-2-2020: 128).

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Fig. 1 Duration/age, questionnaire for the police officers, own illustration

voluntary policing tends to be conducted more often by older volunteers. In city D, 50% of the volunteers, and, in city E, 45% of the volunteers are older than 50 years (Fig. 1). However, the older age, respectively, the small (E) and absent (D) number of volunteers under 30 is affected by the fact that the volunteer police services in both cities have not hired and trained volunteers for a couple of years. In D, the latest new volunteers began in 2010, in E in 2015. Currently, there are no large deviations in numbers of men and women who are policing voluntarily; it is about 53% men and 47% women in City D and 55% men and 45% women in City E. In city D, the volunteers wear police uniforms that only differ concerning the epaulettes where police officers have stitched stars and the volunteers have stitched broad slashes. They carry a weapon and have the same rights as police officers. The volunteers completed a training course of 100 h during which they learned about legal aspects, learned how to act in different situations in practical trainings, and had shooting practice. Around 10 years ago, the volunteers were patrolling together with a police officer, but this assignment was criticized by some political parties represented in the state parliament and when the political leadership changed, their tasks were reduced a lot. Right now, they are especially working on events to regulate the traffic or sometimes patrol at events or take over driving services as

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well as working at crime prevention events and information campaigns, such as police information booths on the topic of prevention. Some of the volunteers are also doing tasks that do not take place in the public space directly, like working in the police custody (Table 2). In city E, the volunteers wear uniforms as well, but the uniforms are printed with “Freiwilliger Polizeidienst” (volunteer police service), and they carry pepper spray but no weapon. In a training of 50 h the volunteers also learn about legal aspects of their voluntary work and have practical trainings. When they are in the streets as police volunteers, they have extended rights such as giving out expulsions and proving someone’s identity. But they do not have all rights police officers have. The main task of the city E volunteers is the patrolling in the city, the inner city as well as special places like public parks, playgrounds, or schools. In doing so, they perform regulatory tasks such as addressing people crossing red traffic lights, report parking violations or also sporadically write them down by themselves and check some regulatory requirements at market stalls. Not yet implemented is the idea to let the volunteers look out for prohibited objects that are sold at markets as these tasks would need further training which could not be held due to the corona pandemic and associated contact restrictions (Pehle and Reichl 2021). Sometimes the volunteers work, like in D, at crime prevention events and information campaigns, like police information booths on the topic of prevention (Table 2).

Table 2 Volunteer police services in city D and E, own illustration Appearance/Equipment

Training

Rights Assignment

City D Police-like uniform, weapon

100 h of training • Legal aspects • Practical training • Shooting practice Rights of a police officer Change of tasks: from integration in the police patrolling service to: • Traffic regulation • Patrolling at events • Driving services • Police custody • Crime prevention events

City E Dark-blue uniform (imprint: “Freiwilliger Polizeidienst”), pepper spray 50 h of training • Legal aspects • Practical training Extended rights Patrolling • In the city • At special places (playgrounds, public parks, schools) • Regulatory tasks • Working at • Events • Crime prevention events

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5.3 Goals of Voluntary Policing and Their Connection to Increasing Input and Output Legitimacy After the overview over the two volunteer police services, I turn to the goals of voluntary policing in regard to input and output legitimacy. In other words, I look at the goals and the way they should be achieved and discuss what stands behind these different implementations: to increase input or output legitimacy? The goals that could be identified and that are thus discussed in the next sections are for both cities: reducing the fear of crime/increasing the feeling of security, building a bridge between citizens and the police, control and prevention of crime and misdemeanor, and taking the workload of the police/supporting the police (see for city E also Pehle and Reichl 2021).

5.3.1 Reducing the Fear of Crime/Increasing the Feeling of Security The reduction of the fear of crime is regarded as a central goal of voluntary policing by the interviewees in both volunteer police services. It has principally the potential to increase both input and output legitimacy of policing. Concerning the input legitimacy, it would have to be mentioned in the context of establishing good or better relationships with citizens, or with “the community”—the aim of building a “bridge between citizens and police” (see below) could, in this case, also be a mean to achieve the goal to reduce the fear of crime15 by building trust in the police.16 But in both cases, the reduction of the fear of crime is not primarily associated by the interviewees with building trust through bridging the gap between citizens and the police, but with an increase in the presence of patrols by uniformed personnel in the streets. This can indeed overlap with a trust building approach as the volunteers are in contact with citizens while showing presence in the streets, but the emphasis in the interviews is on the uniformed presence through which it is believed the fear of crime might be reduced. Volunteers and police officers in both cities reflected that clearly when I asked them whether the volunteer police service strengthens the feeling of security:

15 Fear

of crime and feeling of security are used synonymously here. Gerhold (2020) writes that the operationalization of fear of crime or feeling of security is by no means simple or unambiguous and that rather different perspectives in this thematic area are possible (Gerhold 2020, 11). As this discussion would exceed the scope of this chapter, see for detailed description and discussion of the fear of crime, its different dimensions and their measurement, for example Hahne et al. (2020); Gerhold (2020); Schartau et al. (2018); Pehle (2019). 16 Here, it is to emphasize that studies have shown different influencing factors and different explanations concerning the feeling of security and fear of crime (e.g. Hahne et al. 2020; Schartau et al. 2018). Hahne et al. 2020 summarize that the most important root cause for fear of crime are social problems, so that good social policy is the key to success—which is as well true for crime (Hahne et al. 2020, 70).

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Yes definitely, of course. [ . . . ] The citizen outside does not differentiate between a police volunteer and a fully trained police officer. You can tell when you are on the move. (D-F31-2019: 28, police officer, responsible for the volunteers)17 I would rather say, [the feeling of security increases] through the presence in itself. [ . . . ] Yes, I guess, what is important for the citizen is to show presence in general. (E-F3-1-2019: 107–110, volunteer)18

Although a police officer in E stressed that the volunteer police service is used to increase the feeling of security by the volunteers who are low-threshold stakeholders, below the police, the uniform is mentioned and thus seems to be an important aspect: The citizens’ feeling of security should be increased, this is why they [the volunteers] are being used as low threshold stakeholders below the police who, through their presence in uniform, can possibly increase the feeling of security (E-F1-1-2019: 72, police officer, responsible for the volunteers)19

Furthermore, the same police officer states that by the many stakeholders who are policing in E, it is quite difficult for citizens to differentiate between the different uniformed stakeholders and that volunteers are not always recognized as such, but that the citizens are “glad to see presence”20 (E-F1-2-2020: 73, police officer, responsible for volunteers). In D, the distinguishability of police officers and volunteers is even given to a lesser extent as they are wearing nearly the same uniforms (see above). Thus, the idea behind the reduction of the fear of crime respectively an increasing feeling of security seems to be the strengthening of output legitimacy of general policing rather than the input legitimacy. The focus is not as much on the citizens who are policing, but on uniformed personnel in general that is policing. Efficiency should be strengthened and thus (output-)legitimacy should increase by an increase of policing presence.

5.3.2 Building a Bridge Between Citizens and the Police The aim of building a bridge between citizens and the police is somewhat related to increase input legitimacy, as there are citizens working within the police voluntarily.

17 Original quote: “Ja definitiv, klar. [ . . . ] Der Bürger draußen, der unterscheidet nicht zwischen einem Polizeifreiwilligen und einem vollausgebildeten Polizeibeamten. Das erkennt man auch wenn man unterwegs ist.” This quote and all the following quotes from the interview transcripts, stated in the footnotes, are translated by the author. 18 Original quote: “Ich würde eher sagen, durch mehr Präsenz an sich. [ . . . ]. Ja, wichtig an sich ist, für den Bürger, überhaupt Präsenz, denk ich mal.” 19 Original quote: “Das Sicherheitsgefühl der Bürger soll erhöht werden und deshalb werden halt unterschwellig unterhalb der Polizei Personen eingesetzt, die mit ihrer Präsenz mit ihrer Uniform auch möglicherweise dieses Sicherheitsgefühl erhöhen können.” 20 Original quote: “die sind ja froh, wenn da Präsenz gezeigt wird.”

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But beyond that, the way this goal of bridging the gap between citizens and police is explicitly addressed presents itself differently in City D and City E. In city D, the interviewees especially focus on the volunteers themselves who get insights into the police organization, which as one police officer states, was intended from the beginning: So, the aim was to achieve proximity to citizens [..], the military has always been a closed unit, police is something uniformed, is a closed unit. You want to be close to citizens, want to reveal what is happening, what is going on. This is why we bring ordinary citizens into the police force.21 (D-F1-1-2018: 181, police officer, responsible for the volunteers)

Another police officer summarizes, that this is still the case, volunteers are thereby “allowed to look over the shoulder of the police officer and participate [...] and [...] are also allowed to pass on what [they] experience, how the service in the police is like”22 (D-F8-1-2020: 125, police officer, responsible for the volunteers) and that is, next to the aim to take the workload of the police officers (see below), one main goal of voluntary policing. The volunteers seem to be thought of as transparency multiplicators, in this form of a volunteer police service. However, another police officer states that he thinks the first thought was to build a closer proximity to citizens, but that “thereby, one saw how positive it was in regard to personnel measures”23 (D-F1-1-2018: 183, police officer, responsible for the volunteers). Citizens being allowed to participate and to watch over the shoulder of police officers, acting as transparency multiplicators might transport the police perspective into the population, which is hoped to lead to a closer proximity of police and citizens and increasing input legitimacy seems to be the underlying goal. However, the focus is more on the volunteers passing the message of the police into the population and not the volunteers passing messages (or interests) of citizens into the police. So the input might indeed be limited, and the output legitimacy is still central. In E, the aspect of increasing input legitimacy regarding trust building between citizens and the police is seen when a police officer describes a special task of a police volunteer: Last year in September there was a big children’s festival and there we appointed three of them [police volunteers], because I said, on this festival, to show presence, to be a contact person and that was very well received. The fact that you are not from the Landespolizei or the Bereitschaftspolizei, it looks very different when they go along, than when employees

21 Original quote: “Also das Ziel war wohl eine Bürgernähe damit zu erreichen [ . . . ]. Militär war früher immer schon ne geschlossene Einheit. Polizei ist auch was Uniformiertes, ist ne geschlossene Einheit. Man will bürgernah sein, man will offenlegen, was da passiert, was da läuft. Und deshalb holen wir den normalen Bürger in die Polizei rein.” 22 Original quote: “man darf der Polizistin, dem Polizisten über die Schulter schauen und sich selbst beteiligen und man darf das auch weitersagen, was man da erlebt, wie der Dienst bei der Polizei ist.” 23 Original quote: “und dann hat man dadurch gesehen, was das auch Positives bewirkt an Personalmaßnahmen.”

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from the police go along there. That was a nice assignment.24 (E-F1-2-2020: 105, police officer, responsible for the volunteers)

Here the volunteers are policing as volunteers because they do not have the potentially intimidating equipment, like weapons, that the Landes- or Bereitschaftspolizei25 has. Hence, it is not only the presence of any uniformed personnel, like above, but explicitly the presence of the volunteers that is wanted. Also, a police volunteer emphasizes the importance of citizen contacts and that she personally feels as a “mediator between the full-time colleagues and the citizens”26 (E-F3-12019: 22, volunteer). The underlying idea seems to be to increase input legitimacy. However, another police officer also states that the police are not doing foot patrols anymore, so that: I think, there is the volunteer police service, or, just to suggest this proximity to citizens, you can almost say.27 (E-LP2-1-2018: 166, police officer)

In this case, the volunteers are not anymore policing because of their role as a volunteer, because the appointment of volunteers might add advantages compared to police policing (like above), but instead “suggest” proximity to citizens as police officers. Thereby, the efficiency should increase and thus output legitimacy is in the focus. All in all, it is striking that this goal, that is already implicitly connected with an input legitimacy perspective as it is about citizens, is implemented in a way that still the thought of increasing output legitimacy is central.

5.3.3 Control and Prevention of Crime and Misdemeanor: Deterrence, (Non)intervention, and Prevention The objectives of crime prevention and crime control as well as prevention and control of misdemeanor are visible in both volunteer police services. But there are small differences in how it should be achieved.

24 Original quote: “Letztes Jahr im September [hatten wir] hier so ein großes Kinderfest und da haben wir auch drei eingesetzt, weil ich gesagt habe, einfach auf diesem Fest, um da nochmal Präsenz zu zeigen, Ansprechpartner zu sein und das kam auch ganz gut an. Dass man da jetzt nicht von der Landespolizei oder Bereitschaftspolizei da, das sieht ja auch nochmal ganz anders aus, wenn die da durchrennen, als wenn jetzt Mitarbeiter vom Freiwilligen Polizeidienst dort durchlaufen. Das war auch ein schöner Einsatz.” 25 The Bereitschaftspolizeien are a special unit in the Landespolizeien (federal polices) of the 16 federal states. They are primarily used in the context of special occasion situations, like gatherings, state visits, or large-scale events (Bundesministerium des Innern, für Bau und Heimat 2020). 26 Original quote: “Mittler zwischen den hauptamtlichen Kollegen und eben dem Bürger.” 27 Original quote: “Ich denke, da ist dann der freiwillige Polizeidienst oder einfach wieder diese Bürgernähe wahrscheinlich zu suggerieren, kann man fast sagen.”

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The deterrent effect on potential criminals is expected to come with the uniform the volunteers wear.28 Crime prevention and crime control should, by the focus on the deterrent effect, not come through trust building measures to the “community,” but through a focus on opportunity structures, which are hoped to be reduced by reducing the opportunities for crime.29 This is especially evident in city E where the volunteers are doing foot patrols: “Of course, we are mainly there [at a market] to minimize thefts”30 (E-F3-2-2020: 49, volunteer). Misdemeanor is also hoped to be deterred, for example, when the volunteers are patrolling areas where property damage occurred; places where, for example, “benches are being damaged”31 (E-F4-1-2021: 118, volunteer). In city D, there is only one volunteer who refers to a deterrent effect on criminal activities through his presence, which might also be explained by the traffic regulation being the main task of the volunteers in D: And it [the presence of the volunteers] might deter other people [ . . . ], who might have been up to something, even if it is just a pickpocketing, it does deter32 (D-F2-1-2018: 231, volunteer)

Preventing misdemeanors in city D comes less through deterrence but more through intervention, at least in the traffic sector, when volunteers are supposed to stop people from driving through a street. Thus, with this kind of traffic control they prevent misdemeanors, although other misdemeanors do not fall within their scope of tasks. In the case of criminal offences, the volunteers are allowed to intervene. Although their tasks were reduced and they usually do less dangerous tasks, a volunteer took part in arrests and summarizes33: I have experienced many things. Where I had to take action myself. [ . . . ] You get scared sometimes. That is always, you do not wish this to anyone34 (D-F6-1-2019: 35–40, volunteer)35

28 As

with the feeling of security, the uniform seems to be important. in detail regarding the roots of the idea to minimize opportunity structures: Kunz and Singelnstein (2016, 155–156); Neubacher (2020, 106–113). 30 Original quote: “Natürlich sind wir halt hauptsächlich dazu da, dass die Diebstähle sich minimalisieren.” 31 Original quote: “Da werden halt gerne Bänke und so weiter beschädigt.” 32 Original quote: “Und es schreckt vielleicht [ . . . ] viele andere, die vielleicht etwas vorhatten, und sei es bloß ein Taschendiebstahl, schreckt das die schon ab.” 33 This does not mean that volunteers never involve police officers (they do) or stay in the background, but there are volunteers who do intervene along with police officers, and they have the right to do so. 34 Original quote: “Also ich habe schon sehr sehr viel mitgemacht. Wo ich auch selber schon tätig werden musste. [ . . . ] dann geht dir schonmal die Düse. Das ist natürlich, wünscht man niemanden.” 35 This does not mean that the volunteers are not calling the police or request support in critical situations. But they have the legal rights to intervene in critical situations as police officers. Despite that, as highlighted the volunteers should no longer be used for tasks, where it is likely that they might get into critical situations. 29 Cf.

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In E, the volunteers are not directly intervening in situations like that, or directly intervene when criminal offenses occur, as they do not have the rights to do so but should call the police and should leave the direct intervention to the police. Furthermore, they should prevent crime by passing information to the police; one police officer sums up that he thinks that “from the police’s point of view we also get knowledge through [the volunteer police service]”36 (E-LP5-1-2018: 212, police officer) and another police officer states: Reporting things [ . . . ]. Depending on what it is, they [the volunteers] can sort things out by talking. Or it is something where we have to intervene or where we need to get to, so a patrol of ours. But in the end, they are an eye and ear for us.37 (E-LP4-1-2018: 176, police officer)

Concerning misdemeanor, the volunteers in E primarily pass information to the right stakeholder, police or municipality. But as they also have the rights to intervene, e.g., to give out expulsions and prove someone’s identity, they, at least sporadically, do so: What often happens in playgrounds is teenagers who smoke or sometimes smoke a joint and when they see us, they leave [ . . . ]. Or adolescents who drink alcohol [ . . . ], when they see us, we approach them and say: ‘Guys [playgrounds] are [for children] up to 12 years, not so great when you are here’, and they go away. Sometimes this leads to discussions, nothing serious, but we are talking to them normally and when they are gone the mothers and fathers smile38 (E-F2-2-2020: 101, volunteer)

All these strategies that are pursued following the goals to control or prevent crime and misdemeanor can, for both services, clearly be interpreted in regard to the output legitimacy, as police volunteers have the potential to increase efficiency of general policing when they are used to deter or intervene. Concerning the intervention, they are citizens policing citizens. The only strategy concerning this goal that might next to the focus on output legitimacy additionally focus on increasing input legitimacy is an example of volunteers working at a police information stand on the topic of prevention and

36 Original quote: “ich glaube schon, aus polizeilicher Sicht kriegen wir auch Erkenntnisse über diese Schiene.” 37 Original quote: “Die Dinge zu melden [ . . . ]. Und je nachdem, was es ist, können sie das in einem Gespräch auch selbst klären. Oder es ist eben was, wo wir einschreiten müssten, oder wo wir dann kommen müssten, also eine Streife von uns. Aber letztendlich sind sie für uns auch Auge und Ohr.” 38 Original quote: “was so oft auf Spielplätzen vorkommt sind heranwachsende Jugendliche, die dann halt rauchen, auch mal jointen und dann sehen die uns, dann gehen die direkt weg und das freut die Mutter, die dort mit Kleinkindern sind oder es gibt auch Jugendliche, die dann auch mal Alkohol trinken, [ . . . ] wenn die uns dann sehen, dann gehen wir dahin und sagen, Jungs hier ist ab 12 Jahren hier, nicht so toll, wenn ihr hier da seid und dann gehen die auch weg. Wir diskutieren auch manchmal, also jetzt nichts Gravierendes, aber halt mal eine normale Diskussion, dann erzählen wir denen ganz normal und wenn die dann weggehen und dann manche lächeln die Mütter, die Väter”

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also informing citizens about volunteer police services. There, police volunteers are used to inform citizens: The police had an information stand [ . . . ] [at the children’s festival] and I played the [police mascot] and a colleague from the volunteers explained to the young people that there is a volunteer police, and that we are on the move and how our uniform looks like [ . . . ]. Then we had a police vehicle for the children, where they got on and off and played [ . . . ]. Then we explained [to the parents] what we do and what our tasks are.39 (E-F2-2-2020: 75, volunteer)

Here the focus is not only on the general policing but on policing by the volunteers and the focus is also on the policing for and with citizens. In D, police volunteers might also be appointed to information booths at festivals or events. Furthermore, a police officer reports that the volunteers might generally be used at prevention events when they are qualified: For example, there is a primary school teacher in the volunteer police service. And then I have the possibility to say, I organize a prevention event somewhere [ . . . ]. There I can deploy her and say: Here, you now convey the message of the police. That is something she can do 100 percent. Partly even better than we can, you know. So, these are the areas in which we can use the volunteers.40 (D-LP6: 242-244, police officer)

Although the focus here is on police tasks, respectively, to convey the message of the police, the volunteer is used for her skills, she might bring in civic resources. But all in all, the control and prevention of crime and misdemeanor should be reached in a way that is connected to increasing output legitimacy.

5.3.4 Taking the Workload of the Police/Supporting the Police In a former conception,41 the police volunteers in D constituted a substitution—one volunteer and one police officer patrolled as a team instead of a team of two police officers. After the reform this is no longer the case, but the tendency stays: the volunteers are especially there to take the workload of the police by doing tasks that do not necessarily need to be done by police officers—like the traffic regulation at 39 Original quote: “Da hat die Polizei ein Infostand [ . . . ] [auf dem Kinderfest] und ich habe wie gesagt das [Polizeimaskottchen] gespielt und ein Kollege von den Freiwilligen hat auch den Jugendlichen mal gezeigt, dass es auch die Freiwillige Polizei gibt und den Leuten auch erzählt, dass wir unterwegs sind und dass wir halt, wie unsere Uniform aussieht. [ . . . ]. Dann hatten wir noch ein Polizeifahrzeug für die Kinder, wo die ein und aussteigen und rumspielen, rumschauen konnten. [ . . . ] Dann haben wir [den Eltern] auch erklärt, was es ist, was wir machen, was unsere Aufgaben sind.” 40 Original quote: “Ich habe zum Beispiel eine Grundschullehrerin, die sagt ich mache freiwilligen Polizeidienst. Und dann habe ich die Möglichkeit zu sagen ich mache Präventionsveranstaltungen irgendwo. [ . . . ] Dann setze ich die ein und sage: Hier, du vermittelst jetzt die Botschaft der Polizei. Das kann die hundertprozentig. Teilweise vielleicht sogar besser als wir, ne. Also da, für diese Bereiche nimmt man die dann.” 41 Here, I refer to a former conception of the volunteer police service, not the police reserve as it was conceptualized before the 1990s.

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football games. The volunteers thereby relieve police officers who can then “pursue an even more original [police] task than closing a road. That does not necessarily have to be undertaken by [a police officer], that can be done very well by someone from the volunteer police service”42 (D-F7-1-2019: 18, volunteer). Also, when the volunteers work in the police custody, one volunteer describes the volunteer police service as a flexible tool (D-F4-1-2019: 184, volunteer) with which the police can react to staff shortages: They [the officers who work in the police custody] are also sparsely staffed and are happy when someone comes and supports them43 ( D-F4-1-2019: 184, volunteer)

A police officer even stated that it is the most important goal concerning the volunteer police services to use volunteers when there are staff shortages (D-F3-1-2019: 26, police officer, responsible for the volunteers). Another police officer describes that the feedback from within the police concerning the specific collaboration with the volunteers also often focusses on this aspect44: The feedback that always comes is that ‘we are happy, when there is someone from the police volunteers who fills in, because right now we have a lot of sick people or there is someone marrying and needs a day off.’ So, there is a relief there and that is also reported back45 (D-F8-1-2020: 89, police officer, responsible for the volunteers)

All in all, today the police volunteers in D are not used as a substitution like before, in substituting a police officer on patrol, but the aim of taking the workload of the police officers is still central (Hirschmann and Reichl 2020, S. 49). This use of police volunteers has foremost the potential to increase output legitimacy by providing for a general policing performance of the police. It is about increasing efficiency of policing and especially a substitute for missing personnel. In E, the focus is more on the support of police officers. Sometimes the objective to take the workload of the police is visible, but first of all they should generate additional security in the streets (see also Hirschmann and Reichl 2020, S. 48–50). Here, the idea of increasing input legitimacy is visible as the volunteers are lowthreshold contact persons who have the primary task to be there for citizens. But it is also clearly visible that the division between support of police officers and the focus on taking the workload of the police mix up: volunteers can be used as low-

42 Original quote: “einer noch originäreren Tätigkeit nachgehen wie jetzt, ich sag jetzt mal eine Straße zu sperren oder so. Das muss er nicht unbedingt machen, kann aber sehr gut einer machen vom Freiwilligen Polizeidienst.” 43 Original quote: “Die sind auch dünn besetzt und da sind die froh, wenn man mal jemand kommt und sie unterstützt.” 44 Although it has to be added that the voluntary police service is controversial within the police force, with police officers who are positive about it but also with police officers who strongly criticize it (also see Hirschmann and Reichl 2020, 49). 45 Original quote: “Ja, also Rückmeldung, die eigentlich immer kommt, ist ja, wir sind froh, wenn jemand von den Polizeifreiwilligen da oder da einspringt, weil wir haben gerade zu viel Kranke oder bei uns heiratet einer, der braucht da und da frei. Also es ist schon eine Entlastung da und das wird auch rückgemeldet.”

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threshold contact persons who are explicitly used because of their civic resources, because of the low-threshold factor. But still, they might be seen as a substitution for an activity the police do not have time for anymore: Something like a foot patrol doesn’t exist here anymore. I can’t remember the last time we had someone do a foot patrol in the inner city. There is not enough time for that.46 (E-LP2-1-2018: 166)

Furthermore, in E, the focus on efficiency becomes apparent when the volunteers are used for further tasks that are possible within the scope of their rights. This is especially evident with the idea of training the volunteers concerning prohibited objects at markets (see above)—here they can patrol on the markets, being lowthreshold contact persons, but also do a more quantifiable task by controlling the market stands, thus increasing policing efficiency. Here, the volunteers seem to be simultaneously used to increase input legitimacy, but also output legitimacy— although not concerning the policing by the police, but more in regard to the tasks of the municipality. All in all, in this context in D, the output legitimacy is in the focus. In E, the output legitimacy is more and more gaining momentum and seems to only be supplemented by aspects of input legitimacy.

6 Discussion and Conclusion As already mentioned, the theoretical differentiation between input and output legitimacy has overlaps and is ideal-typical. This is also reflected empirically in the fact that with volunteer police services there are various goals pursued. Furthermore, voluntary policing is at least to some extent connected to increasing input legitimacy as there are citizens integrated, more or less, within the police force. But still, the two studied volunteer police services are implemented in ways that are a lot more associated to increasing output legitimacy than input legitimacy (Table 3). In D, the focus on output legitimacy is already inherent in the design of the volunteer police service, although there were changes in the tasks over time and from the 1990s on the civic aspect of the volunteer police service was emphasized (Hirschmann and Groß 2012, 27, see above). Here, it seems to be the long history and the police rights the volunteers have, which go back to the original use of the volunteers, that influence the conception of the volunteers especially as filling in for police officers. In this way, they contribute to the policing work of the police, and it seems to be primarily an orientation to the needs of police officers. In E, the idea of input legitimacy is more obvious, but it is still the output legitimacy that seems to be the primary idea behind most of the ways with which 46 Original quote: “So was wie eine Fußstreife, das gibt es bei uns gar nicht mehr. Also ich kann mich nicht entsinnen, wann wir das letzte Mal jemand eine Fußstreife durch die Innenstadt gemacht hat. Dafür ist auch gar nicht die Zeit da.”

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Table 3 Goals of voluntary policing in volunteer police services and the underlying idea of legitimacy in city D and E, own illustration City D City E Reducing the fear of crime/increasing the feeling of security (by increasing the number of uniformed persons in the streets) • Idea of output legitimacy prevails Bridge between citizens and police Bridge between citizens and police • Transparency of the police organization • Low threshold contacts between citizens and • Idea of input legitimacy is visible, but the volunteers idea of increasing output legitimacy is still • Idea of input legitimacy prevails, but the central idea of increasing output legitimacy still has an influence Prevention and Control of misdemeanors Prevention and Control of misdemeanors through: through: – Intervention – Intervention – Passing information to the right stakeholder Prevention and Control of crime Prevention and Control of crime through: through: • Deterrence • Deterrence • Passing information to the police • Intervention • Idea of output legitimacy prevails, only • Idea of output legitimacy prevails, only small aspects of the idea of input legitimacy small aspects of the idea of input legitimacy Focus on taking the workload of police Focus on support of police officers officers (aspects of taking the workload of police • Idea of output legitimacy prevails officers) • Idea of output legitimacy gained momentum, but the idea of increasing input legitimacy is also visible

the goals of voluntary policing should be accomplished. In practice the focus is on increasing uniformed personnel in the street and one can see a search for additional tasks, like the regulatory tasks, that should be “co-delivered” while policing. This means that solely policing and acting as a low-threshold contact person for citizens does not appear to be sufficient. This seems to be connected to a general thought about the cost–benefit ratio concerning the volunteers: volunteers always tie up police resources (e.g., for the training and management) and they also receive at least a small compensation for their efforts. The low-threshold existence for citizens, which is difficult to quantify, is therefore supplemented by additional tasks. It seems that the idea of increasing output legitimacy gained and gains momentum. In general, it can also be stated that increasing input legitimacy with the goal of bridging the gap between citizens and the police recedes into the background the more the focus is on the output legitimacy perspective. Frevel et al. (2009) already stated for the 1990s, when community policing, respectively, Kommunale Kriminalprävention was introduced, that the goal of bridging a gap between citizens and the police was not central: in Germany the trust between police and the citizenry was not primarily the reason for implementing communityoriented policing policies. For the voluntary policing, it is rather output legitimacy

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that is the focus of the volunteer police services: to have another “eye and ear” (D-F7-1-2019: 20; volunteer) in the streets which might lead to more efficient policing, which is hoped to decrease the fear of crime and furthermore contribute to the control and prevention of crime and misdemeanor. Here, the goals might even be opposed to each other, when the proximity to citizens that volunteers might generate is undermined by more repressive policing aspects—this is something Kreuzer and Schneider (2002) already pointed out when a volunteer police service in Hesse was introduced. There, the authors stated that the strengths of the volunteer police services lie in increasing the feeling of security and communicating with citizens which requires that sanctioning of misdemeanors and crime recede into the background (Kreuzer and Schneider 2002, 69–70). So, the strong focus on output legitimacy has at least the potential to generate tensions—for example, the proximity to citizens and low-threshold contacts might be compromised by the assumption of more regulatory tasks. This is furthermore evident when recalling Frevel’s (2012) criticism concerning community policing. That criticism goes along with the enforcement of norms the consumptive middle class prevail and that can lead to the exclusion of groups. For example, when volunteers are more and more used in an “output way” to sanction misdemeanor, not only parking violations but especially the sending away of persons, which is at least visible in E, as there the focus is more on misdemeanors, this kind of community policing might indeed foster a kind of securitization instead of orienting itself on the needs of all citizens. And that even though the services, at least in E, offer the potential to have a policing below the police that might really add to the policing by the police when it is understood as a low-threshold offer to all citizens. In D, the goal of building a bridge between police and citizens is not in the foreground anyway. Here, volunteers are not used as low-threshold contact persons, but as police officers. The focus on output legitimacy is even clearer and tensions in the practice might rather occur regarding their appearance as police officers. Tensions that stem from policing as police officers might be visible if they do not meet the demands placed on them by citizens—at least this is something police officers who were interviewed brought up: “the feeling of security [they should generate] might not be met, when it is getting serious”47 (D-LP1-2018: 227).48 All in all, if we understand volunteer police services as a tool from the “community policing toolbox” which is connected to a general orientation on citizen needs and an attempt to increase legitimacy of policing, the practice of voluntary policing in the two cities seems to try to strengthen especially the output legitimacy. As this chapter was intended to bring light into the practice of voluntary policing in volunteer police services and its aims and not as an evaluation of these services, important open questions remain for further research. Are the aims reachable at

47 “das

Gefühl wird eventuell nicht unbedingt bestätigt, wenn’s da mal ernst wird.” police volunteers in E are also sometimes mistaken for police officers it might be visible there, too. But in D, the volunteer police service is already designed in this way, that volunteers are policing as police officers and furthermore they are wearing a more similar uniform (see above). 48 As

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all? Research from the PluS-i project, for example, indicates that the volunteer police services are not known to the broader population (Pehle and Reichl 2021), which influences the potential for reaching the aims and (actually) increasing input legitimacy. Concerning the output legitimacy, it might be argued that it does not matter if volunteers are known and recognizable as long as they perform their tasks properly and thereby increase efficiency. Further open questions are: how are police volunteers integrated into the pluralized policing landscape, how do they cooperate or coexist practically, how are they trained, and is the use of police volunteers always context appropriate? These questions should be addressed in the future to get a more comprehensive overview over the little researched topic of voluntary policing in Germany as well as in other European states.

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Schreiber V (2005) Regionalisierungen von Unsicherheit in der Kommunalen Kriminalprävention. In: Glasze G, Pütz R, Rolfes M (eds) Diskurs—Stadt—Kriminalität—Städtische (Un)Sicherheiten aus der Perspektive von Stadtforschung und Kritischer Kriminalgeographie. Transcript, Bielefeld, pp 59–104 Schreier M (2012) Qualitative content analysis in practice. Sage, Los Angeles Stienen L (2011) Privatisierung und Entstaatlichung der inneren Sicherheit—Erscheinungsformen, Prozesse und Entwicklungstendenzen. Eine empirische Untersuchung zur Transformation von Staatlichkeit am Beispiel der inneren Sicherheit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Verlag für Polizeiwissenschaft, Frankfurt am Main Tilley N (2008) Modern approaches to policing: community, problem-oriented and intelligenceled. In: Newburn T (ed) Handbook of policing, 2nd edn. Willan, Portland, pp 373–403 Wakefield A, Fleming J (2009) The Sage dictionary of policing. Sage, Los Angeles Wurtzbacher J (2008) Urbane Sicherheit und Partizipation. Stellenwert und Funktion bürgerschaftlicher Beteiligung an kommunaler Kriminalprävention. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften / GWV Fachverlage GmbH Wiesbaden (Stadt, Raum und Gesellschaft), Wiesbaden Zimmer A (2003) Rahmenbedingungen der Zivilgesellschaft. Die unterschätzte Rolle des Staates. Forschungsjournal Neue soziale Bewegungen 16(2):74–86

Frauke Reichl is a political scientist. She is a research assistant at the PluS-i project at the Institute of Political Science at the University of Münster (Germany). Within PluS-i, she is dealing with aspects of legitimacy and context adequacy regarding police volunteers and citizen policing groups. Her research interests are, among others, citizen participation, state and security production, vigilantism and digital vigilantism. She has written articles on police volunteers, citizen policing groups, and digilantism. Website: https://plus-i.de/en/frauke-reichl/

Plural Policing in Norway: Regulation, Collaboration, and the Public Interests Martin Nøkleberg

Abstract It has become a truism that policing is no longer the monopoly of the (public) police, and reference has been made to “policing beyond, below, above, and through the government,” “the policing complex,” and “the mixed economy of policing” to capture the emergence of (other) public, private, or volunteer policing actors. Following the trend of pluralization, policing scholars have examined concepts such as networks, partnerships, and alliances, but also the regulatory regimes, to make sense of the unique characteristics and diversity of plural policing practices in different (inter)national contexts. The existing scholarship on Nordic plural policing is, however, still limited, and more studies are needed to develop a fuller understanding of Nordic plural policing practices and of how they have changed. Drawing on empirically grounded research in the Norwegian context of (plural) policing of global hubs, this chapter aims to; first, examine how the dynamics of private security regulation affect and set conditions for the working practices of policing actors; second, unpack the public–private partnerships that evolve to secure global hubs; and third, discuss the role of the state in plural policing arrangements in Norway. By doing this, the chapter will contribute with new empirical and conceptual insights into plural policing and security governance from the Nordic context. Keywords Plural policing · Collaboration · Security networks · Regulation · The public–private divide · Nordic policing

1 Introduction Over recent decades, it has become a truism that the provision of policing and security is no longer the sole responsibility of the state and the police. As a result, it

M. Nøkleberg () NORCE Norwegian Research Centre, Bergen, Norway e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. Hirschmann et al. (eds.), Plural Policing in the Global North, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16273-2_8

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has been pointed out that, in most countries, key functions such as patrol, investigation, crime prevention, social control, and security provision are now carried out by numerous public, private, and third-party organizations (Bayley and Shearing 1996; Johnston and Shearing 2003; Leloup and White 2021; Van Steden 2021; O’Neill and Fyfe 2017). To capture the emergence of pluralization in policing and to unpack the roles and contributions of the various actors, reference has, for instance, been made to “policing beyond, below, above, and through the government,” “the policing complex,” and “the mixed economy of policing” (Jones and Newburn 1998; Loader 2000; Crawford et al. 2005). Moreover, the changes in how policing and security are structured also seem to require collaborative relationships to emerge. In this regard, it is suggested that communication and exchange of information, knowledge, expertise, and resources across organizational boundaries are needed to secure the efficiency in governing security and policing (Fleming and Rhodes 2005; Nøkleberg 2020a; Brewer 2014; Bjelland and Vestby 2017). However, it has previously been noted that collaboration and exchanges between policing actors may take many shapes, ranging from harmonious and productive relations to competition and conflict (Jones and Newburn 1998; Crawford 1997, 2006; Diphoorn and Berg 2014). Following the trend of pluralization and collaboration, policing scholars have utilized concepts such as networks, partnerships, and alliances (Nøkleberg 2020b; Brewer 2017; Dupont 2004, 2006a; Whelan and Dupont 2017; Quéro and Dupont 2019), but also explored regulatory regimes (Leloup and White 2021; White 2010, 2012), to make sense of the unique characteristics and diversity of plural policing practices in different (inter)national contexts. Given the range of actors now involved, a significant part of the literature is concerned with the distinctions between policing actors working for the public good and those governed by market logic and the profit ethos, giving rise to conceptual and normative debates (Loader and Walker 2007; White and Gill 2013; Johnston and Shearing 2003). Altogether, this has provided crucial insight into how various policing systems are structured and organized. Yet, much of our knowledge about plural policing originates from the Anglosphere (Van Stokkom and Terpstra 2018), which may lead to an overemphasis on the Anglocentric findings (e.g., the USA, Britain, Australia). This may be accompanied by the potential risk of overlooking local nuances and the importance of placebased specificity in the contemporary policing landscape (Lum and Fyfe 2015). In recent years, one can observe a growth in comparative research on plural policing, focusing in particular on the context of Continental Europe, with several studies from the Netherlands, France, Austria, and Belgium (Devroe et al. 2017; Van Steden 2017; Devroe 2017; De Maillard and Zagrodzki 2017; Terpstra 2017). This comparative scholarship is important as it helps uncover local specificity concerning plural policing practices. However, quite recently, Leloup and White (2021), while acknowledging that notable divergences exist, argue that the Anglocentric bias in the literature tends to overemphasize the levels of divergence between regions in plural policing. They point out common ground, for instance, concerning the regulatory regimes of the private security industry, and thus suggest that convergences across

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different contexts are also important to explore to advance our understandings of the governance of security and pluralized policing. Notwithstanding the increasing interest in exploring different (inter)national contexts, the existing scholarship on Nordic plural policing is, however, still limited, and more studies are needed to develop a fuller understanding of Nordic plural policing practices. Although limited, the Nordic literature has been growing in recent years, in which empirical contexts of street-level policing in urban areas, town centers, and parks have been explored, with studies examining nightlife policing partnership (Søgaard et al. 2016), collaborative structures and security networks (Nøkleberg 2016, 2020a, b), the practices of private security guards in public space (Kammersgaard 2021), encounters between private security and young people (Saarikkomäki and Kivivuori 2016), and differences in logics and aims between public and private policing actors (Lomell 2007; Stenström 2018, 2019; Foshaugen 2020). Taking the Norwegian context of plural policing at global transportation hubs as its point of departure, the objective of this chapter is three-folded: (1) describe how the dynamics of private security regulation have developed and set conditions for the working practices of policing actors; (2) unpack the public–private partnerships that evolve to secure global hubs and in particular analyze the distinct social structure of the networked policing and challenges to collaboration; and (3) based on the empirical observations, discuss the role of the state in plural policing arrangements in Norway. By doing this, the chapter contributes with new empirical and conceptual insights into plural policing and security governance from the Nordic perspective, which can help to produce a richer theorization of contemporary practices of plural policing. The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. First, I will briefly lay out the research design of the current study. Following these considerations, the next section is a description, through historical lenses, of the Norwegian pluralized policing context and regulatory regimes set out to govern (private) security provision. This is followed by a presentation of the empirical analysis of public– private partnerships and collaborative practices amongst policing agencies within the maritime port and airport environment in Norway. The final section discusses the role of the state in Nordic plural policing.

2 The Empirical Context of Global Transportation Hubs The empirical materials for this chapter are drawn from a larger project exploring practices of policing and security governance at global transportation hubs in Norway, with a particular emphasis on how policing agencies experience and perceive their collaborative relations and everyday practices when dealing with matters of security. The project focuses on airports and maritime ports as the empirical sites, which are seen as geographically bounded centers where an immense flow of people, goods, and capital is facilitated every day. In 2019, for instance, Oslo airport

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handled nearly 28.6 million passengers, which made it one of the busiest airports in the Nordic region, and thus a crucial infrastructure for the economy and trade regime. Due to their integrated role in society, global hubs are often considered as critical infrastructure by governmental institutions. In the Norwegian context, the transport sector is among those considered critical, meaning that airports and ports are essential components of the process of maintaining vital societal functions (DSB 2017). Although the Norwegian aviation sector has been affected by neoliberal ideas, most airports (including Oslo) are still owned and operated by the state-owned limited company Avinor, and Oslo airport is therefore managed by a public entity. As Avinor is a state-owned limited company, the Ministry of Transport manages the government’s ownership of it, and the Ministry has overall responsibility for the civil aviation sector. With regard to the maritime sector, public ownership of ports is the norm in Norway, and most ports are organized as municipal enterprises, which have the overarching responsibility for the administration and maintenance of their port facilities and infrastructure. Being important crossroads, global hubs may also attract illicit activities and criminal exploitation, and therefore be exposed to numerous security risks (Cowen 2014; Sergi 2020). In this sense, global hubs are viewed as important, but at the same time vulnerable, spaces in need of security and protection. As several observers have noted previously, the security infrastructure of these places often involves multiple organizations and interests, making pluralized and networked policing approaches commonplace (Berndtsson and Stern 2011; Brewer 2014; Eski 2016; Van Sluis et al. 2012). The policing practices of global hubs, both in Norway and elsewhere, have thus created highly dynamic and flexible environments, with many public and private agencies operating with different logics and interests. This makes airports and maritime ports prime locations for understanding the nature of plural policing and exploring collaborative structures.

3 Research Design This chapter uses data derived from survey responses and qualitative in-depth interviews with key representatives of organizations involved in security governance and policing at Norwegian airports and ports. The study covers the full spectrum of policing and security agencies, including the police, governmental organizations (e.g., the Ministry of Transport and Communications), regulatory authorities (e.g., the Norwegian Coastal Administration), customs, publicly-owned companies, private security companies, and business or industry stakeholders (e.g., airlines, shipping companies). Some of the agencies, such as the police, regarded security as their primary responsibility, while others (e.g., customs, industry stakeholders) saw security as one concern among others. All agencies possessed experience and knowledge relevant to the research questions at hand. In the first part of 2017, a questionnaire aimed to explore how collaboration was perceived and to map the collaborative relations connecting policing agencies

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was distributed. The questionnaire received 511 participants responses, giving a response rate of 57%. The scope of the survey included five airports and five ports in the following cities: Oslo, Kristiansand, Stavanger, Bergen, and Tromsø. For the purpose of analyzing the distinct social structure of the networked policing relevant to this chapter, the relational data from the survey was used to create a security network, which captures all collaborative ties1 between the policing and security agencies at the Port of Bergen. Looking at security governance through the lens of networks is not new as such (Dupont 2006a), but there seems to be a growing interest in utilizing network concepts in policing studies. Thus, to explore the agencies’ relationships within the network at the Port of Bergen, the chapter applies analytical tools drawn social network analysis (SNA). The basic idea of SNA is to view organizations (or individuals) as being embedded in a social or relational structure that can be examined by various mathematical and analytical techniques (Borgatti et al. 2013). SNA thus focuses on relations between actors, and has been defined as “the disciplined inquiry into the patterning of relations among social actors, as well as the patterning of relations among actors at different levels of analysis” (Breiger 2004, 505). As mentioned above, previous studies have used concepts such as networks, partnerships, and alliances to capture plural policing responses. With regard to security networks, it has been shown that well-positioned actors hold a greater ability to influence the course of events (Dupont 2006a), suggesting that power and influence are relational—it is a consequence of an actor’s position in a network (Borgatti et al. 2013). In this chapter, the analysis of the security network aims to chart the relational positions of the policing and security agencies and to understand the distribution of network power across the public–private divide. The connections were analyzed using the SNA software UCINET and Gephi (Borgatti et al. 2002; Bastian et al. 2009). In addition to the survey, the chapter draws on in-depth interviews. Between 2015 and 2017, a total of seventy-six interviews were conducted at Oslo airport, the Port of Stavanger, and the Port of Kristiansand. Interviewees included both management and frontline workers at the global hubs, which enabled a thorough mapping of collaborative relationships and agencies’ experiences of these relations. The semistructured interviews covered a range of topics, including participants’ experience of collaboration and involvement in security networks (e.g., trust and reciprocity and sharing of information). Questions were open-ended, enabling interviewees to go into detail about what they considered as significant. Interviews generally lasted between one and two hours and were recorded and transcribed.

1

Relational ties were operationalized as (1) physical interactions between actors on issues concerning security and policing, such as meetings or briefings, (2) the transfer of information, expertise, and knowledge, (3) the pooling of common resources, such as CCTV and communication equipment, and (4) the physical movement of actors, such as joint operations and task forces (Brewer 2014). To measure these ties, respondents were asked to name organizations with which partnerships—either formal or informal—had been maintained over the previous 12 months.

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To facilitate the analysis of the qualitative data, the principles of thematic analysis were used (Braun and Clarke 2006; Nowell et al. 2017). First, all transcripts were read and re-read, to increase my familiarity with their content, but also to develop initial codes. Analytical categories and themes were then identified inductively from the data. However, the codes were undoubtedly influenced by my prior theoretical familiarity with policing and security literature. To amend for this, the themes identified were therefore revised in light of the overarching conceptual framework guiding the broader research project (see Nøkleberg 2021 for a full description). For this chapter, the analysis aimed to identify overarching themes pertaining to agencies’ experiences of policing and collaborative practices that cut across the public–private divide, and to give a thick and rich description of these themes. The quotations used in this chapter have been selected for their informative value, and the analysis was facilitated by NVivo 11.

4 The Pluralized Policing of Norway and the Regulatory Regime It is argued that the Nordic policing model is connected with a strong state (Høigård 2011), in which the police are viewed as the central institution responsible for providing public security and maintaining public order and law enforcement (Gundhus and Larsson 2007). From a historical perspective, this has had consequences for how the police are organized, but also how the boundaries between other (private) policing arrangements are drawn. In the Nordic countries, the police are largely unitary, state-organized, and centralized forces (Ugelvik 2016) and generally enjoy a high level of trust among citizens (Kääriäinen 2007; Thomassen and Kääriäinen 2016). In the Norwegian context, the police has since the early 1980s been guided by ten principles, as outlined by the Police Role Committee in 1981.2 While these were viewed as important guidelines for the structure and activities of the police, they can also be seen as an expression of the basic values that the police should seek to maintain within society. In particular, the principles suggest that the police should be unitary, of a civilian character, decentralized, and integrated into the local community, so that officers could interact closely with the public. The ten principles have been crucial in setting the direction for the development of the Norwegian police since the 1980s, through various reforms and reorganizations. Thus, in many ways, the nature of the Nordic policing model can be understood to be highly statecentered.

2

The principles suggest that (1) the police should reflect the ideals of society, (2) be of a civilian character, (3) unitary, (4) decentralized, (5) police officers should be generalists, (6) the police should have close cooperation and interaction with the public, (7) the police should be integrated into the local community, (8) representativeness, (9) have prevention as the main goal, and (10) the police should be subject to effective control from the public.

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However, it has been observed that the Nordic policing system is changing, following the trend toward pluralization and network organization that is found elsewhere (Gundhus and Larsson 2007; Stenström 2018). Now a wide variety of other public and private actors have sprung up as providers of security and policing. One can observe that collaborative practices between the police and external (private) agencies have become even more prominent in today’s policing environment (Nøkleberg 2016; Wathne et al. 2019). In Norway, private or communal policing is not a new phenomenon as such, as one can find descriptions of what can be seen as private arrangements for delivering policing services that date back to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries (Finstad 2012; Spurkland et al. 2013; ValenSendstad 1953). That is an institution in which the whole local community was engaged in policing, encompassing responsibilities such as fire protection and public order and safety. Although these arrangements were perceived as being private, they were still closely connected with the state, as one could receive payment from the state for arrest, they had made. The first modern (for-profit) private security companies in Norway were set up in the early 1900s, with the establishment of the Christiania and district Night Watch Company in 1905. This company quickly became the biggest one in Norway and changed its name to the Norwegian Security Company; it was eventually acquired by Securitas AB (NOU 1984). The late 1920s and the early 1930s saw the emergence of several other private security companies operating in different Norwegian cities (Spurkland et al. 2013). After World War II, the range and number of services provided by private security companies increased significantly. The main services these early private security companies provided were fire protection and safety services, guard and patrol services, and theft prevention, targeting the protection of assets of businesses and households. In the late 1940s, the total revenue of private security companies in Norway exceeded for the first time NOK 1 million. The total revenue increased from NOK 144 million in 1977 to NOK 270 million in 1981 (NOU 1984), which indicates a considerable speed of growth within the industry. Despite these developments in the sector of private security, it is still common, in Norway, to mark a distinction between private security before and after the 1980s. Before the 1980s, there was no government control or regulation of the industry, and more importantly, the Ministry of Justice expressed no particular interest in doing so either. Thus, governmental institutions stated numerous times when confronted by questions concerning regulation or licensing that they had not observed any significant problems regarding the activities of the private security companies which made stricter governmental regulation necessary (NOU 1984). For instance, the Director of Public Prosecutions noted in 1972 that: “It is reasonable to assume that competition between the companies will intensify and that their professional and moral standard will increase if a system of authorization was introduced. Yet, I do not think that there is much need for such rules for security companies” (cited in NOU 1984: 24, 6, translation by the author). This, however, may seem surprising as, both unions and the security industry itself were amongst the strongest proponents of stricter state regulation of their

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businesses and sought to raise the issue on several occasions prior to the 1980s. Following the lack of legislation, anyone could establish or work in a security company regardless of any criminal record, and there were no requirements to be met regarding the companies’ organizational structure, management, activities, or scope. In general, this led to concerns about the legitimacy and accountability of the private security industry as a whole, but privacy concerns also emerged following technological development. Moreover, several incidents involving some private security companies and their employees were reported, which received considerable media attention, and this strengthened the concerns. However, it was not only the industry that put pressure to make changes in the provision of private security; even some politicians raised questions about the lack of a regulatory regime. In 1979, the Minister of Justice was asked during the Parliament’s Question Time whether he saw the need for legislation that could regulate these companies’ services and activities. Based on recent developments, both the rapid increase in the security sector and the reported incidents, the summary of his response was: “I believe that the time has now come for the Ministry of Justice to take a closer look at aspects of the security companies and their activities, also with regard to the need for a system of authorization and the necessities of proper legislation” (cited in NOU 1984: 24, 8, translation by the author). The Police Role Committee report, published in 1981, was the first attempt to examine the industry. Yet, it should be noted that this was only done indirectly because the mandate of the Committee was to define the role and tasks of the public police, and not to focus on private policing per se. Nonetheless, in the process of doing this, the Committee needed also to discuss and draw a line and distinguish between tasks that should be performed by the police and tasks which could be performed by other actors, particularly private security companies. In the report, concerns were raised about the use of private security in public areas open to everyone, particularly as the Ministry of Justice had emphasized that maintaining public order and security was and should be a task for the police. This concern was linked to the guiding principles of the Norwegian police, which suggest that the police should be unitary. The expanding private security industry was seen as a potential threat to this ideal. Thus, it was recommended by the Committee that “private security companies should not assume responsibility for law and order in public places. The lack of police resources should not be used as an argument for employing private guards in law enforcement” (NOU 1981, 206, translation by the author). Yet, the Committee saw some areas in which private security could be performed, such as the protection of (private) property not accessible to the public, in-house security at corporate entities. Accordingly, the Police Role Committee makes clear that private security should not take place in open public spaces. Following the discussion of the boundaries of the police and private policing in the Police Role Committee report, together with the demands from the security industry, it was decided that the need to establish a regulatory framework should be explored in more detail. As such, the Security Company Committee was appointed by the Ministry of Justice in late 1981 and published their report in 1984.

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The mandate of the Committee was to consider the need to introduce requirements for the approval of private security companies. By doing this, the Committee was somewhat similar to the above-mentioned Police Role report as it also set out to examine and discuss where to draw the line between the activities of security companies and the police. It is, however, possible to observe some disagreement between the two committees in terms of what tasks the private security industry could and indeed should perform. The Security Company Committee (NOU 1984, 53) suggests, contrary to the Police Role report, that one should accept the presence of private security guards in some “open private space” and “open public space,” including shopping centers, leisure parks, railway/bus/metro stations, public parks among others. In this regard, the Committee writes that it is somewhat of a paradox that the owner of such sites can establish their in-house security to guard the spaces, while it would be illegal for them to employ security guards from a company (NOU 1984, 53). Therefore, it seems to be a shift in the governmental understanding of the private security sector and particularly concerning what role they can play in society. The Committee makes clear that there are strong arguments for public regulation of the private security companies and concludes by recommending that the regulation should take the form of a system of licensing. The Security Company Committee’s report can be seen as a precursor to the Security Guard Services Act of May 13, 1988. However, only 7 years after the passing of the 1988 law, a new committee was commissioned to revise the regulatory regime. Although the Act was considered to have had many positive effects, for example, by strengthening the dialogue between the authorities and the security sector and improving the professional standard, both industry representatives and the Ministry of Justice stressed that the legislation needed revision in certain respects, e.g. training and education. So then, a third committee—the Private Security Act Committee—presented their report in 1997 and suggested several changes. First, the committee acknowledged that it was indeed difficult to decide how police and private security companies’ activities and responsibilities should be demarcated (Vaktvirksomhetslovutvalget 1997, 151). According to the Committee, the deciding factor when drawing this line should be the nature of the task or activity that actors were performing when delivering security. In this regard, it was made clear that the majority of private security companies’ activities were concerned with prevention or damage reduction to property or assets, that is loss prevention, and were not considered to represent a challenge to the role of the public police. Yet, as many of the private companies also provided services where the purpose could be understood as crime prevention and in cases where private security was employed in public areas, the demarcation was more challenging. In Norway, the police act (section 2 Police functions) specifies that the police shall maintain public order and security and prevent crime. Moreover, the police has the monopoly on the use of physical force in the performance of their duties. The Committee noted that private security guards do not possess any legal authority to exercise physical force, and suggested that security guards, as a clear general rule, should limit themselves to observing and reporting. However, the Private Security Act Committee did not find it possible to formulate a legal rule in order

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to draw clear boundaries between the activities of the police and private security companies. Nonetheless, the Committee noted: “the private security companies are undoubtedly here to stay, and in the view of the Committee they represent a mainly positive supplement to the public police” (Vaktvirksomhetslovutvalget 1997, 134, translation by the author). Again, there seems to be a change in the perception of the use of private security companies, as it now seemed to be acknowledged that their activities played an important role in preventing crime and increasing (public) security. However, a significant aspect of the Committee’s revision of the legislation is the greater emphasis on the government’s role, through the police, as a regulator controlling the activities of the industry (Vaktvirksomhetslovutvalget 1997). The revisions suggested in the Committee’s report resulted in a proposal for new legislation to govern the conditions of private security companies (the Security Guard Services Act of January 1st, 2001), which still regulates how private security companies operate—though with some minor revisions. Under this law, private security activity is understood as the provision of security services for third parties and/or self-protection services. A decisive element is that the services are provided in return for remuneration. The Security Guard Services Act also specifies what is understood as security services: By security guard services is meant services whereby, by employment of personnel, CCTV monitoring, electronic monitoring, or in other ways: (a) Surveillance is performed of private areas or of areas accessible to the general public (b) Control services are performed (c) Guarded transport of valuables is performed (d) Security escort services are performed (e) Alarm signals are received from assault alarms or burglar alarms or Security checks in response to such signals or (f) Training or education in security services The law also requires that private security personnel should have proper training, both theoretical and practical. Before they can provide security services, private companies must be authorized by the Norwegian Police Directorate, and the police district in which the services are to be provided. The police directorate is not only responsible for the licensing processes of the industry, but also operates as the overseer of private security companies, to which the companies must report on an annual basis. The police directorate has the opportunity to withdraw the license. As the above description indicates, as has been observed in other countries (Bayley and Shearing 1996; Jones and Newburn 1998), Norway has experienced considerable changes regarding the provision of security, and there has been an increase in the number of private security providers. By 2011, there were 243 approved private security companies, with a total turnover of NOK 8.9 billion (Spurkland et al. 2013). In 2021, the number of approved companies had decreased to 192. Nonetheless, these figures indicate that private security companies in Norway are no longer peripheral providers, but key actors in the production and delivery of security. The proliferation of the private security sector has thus

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influenced the way in which security and policing are structured and delivered within the Norwegian context. What the above description clearly indicates is that the general attitude toward and perception of the private security sector changed over time. The initial skepticism held by the Ministry of Justice of introducing a regulatory regime was challenged on numerous fronts, and union and industry pressure eventually elicited a governmental response in the early 1980s. As the industry increased in size and scope, coupled with some incidents in which security guards exceeded their powers, regulation and control of the industry were sought achieved by implementing the first Security Guard Act in 1988. Now, it was accepted by the Government that private security companies were here to stay. Thus, the legislation was assumed to increase the quality of the security services provided and to improve public control. Together with revisions and subsequently the replacement of the Security Guard Act in 2001, there seems to have been established a more positive understanding of the security industry, as it has been stated by governmental actors that the numerous security companies fulfill an important task in creating secure and safe environments, and in some ways are considered a useful supplement to the police. Nonetheless, one recurring feature of the discussions since the 1980s has been where the boundaries between the police and private security should be drawn. In this regard, the police are considered as the main guarantors of security, and throughout this period, the Ministry of Justice makes clear that maintaining public order is a police task, and that law enforcement in organized forms is a public task. Despite pluralization in policing practices, the Nordic policing model seems to be rather state-centric in nature, with rather strong state involvement. In this respect, previous studies from the Norwegian context have also shown how public policing actors tend to occupy the most central positions in the networked policing (Nøkleberg 2016), indicating that public agencies often have great power to control and facilitate the exchange of information and resources in plural policing processes. The next section turns the attention to exploring the public–private divide in more detail by focusing on the collaborative structure of the networked policing at global transportation hubs.

5 Security Networks and Collaboration at Norwegian Maritime Ports and Airports As pointed out above, exchanges across organizational boundaries are often viewed as crucial in plural policing arrangements. This is particularly the case concerning the security practices at global transportation hubs, where the importance of collaborative relations has been highlighted (Eski 2016). However, a range of barriers to collaboration has also been observed in the plural policing literature, which can include unwillingness to share information or resources, structural or legal limitations, and cultural differences (Crawford and Cunningham 2015). As a

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result, collaborative practices may be challenging. Thus, power struggles sometimes develop and influence the practices of policing (Dupont 2006b). In this respect, Giacomantonio (2014, 2015) underscores how collaborative structures frequently involve negotiations, which can be very demanding, on organizational boundaries regarding goals, resources, activities, prestige, and interests. With this in mind, this section looks closer at how collaborative relations are understood and perceived by the various policing actors, with a particular emphasis on the distribution of network power and influence across the public–private divide. In the Norwegian context of airport and port security, policing actors devote considerable time and resources to collaboration. Thus, numerous public–private collaborations have emerged to improve the policing and governance of security, ranging from formal and strategic meetings for top management to informal and temporary joint operations and exchanges of information at the operational level. As a result, the policing actors are involved in a vast set of linkages, and security is viewed as being produced and delivered through (security) networks. A security network is defined in this chapter as a set of institutional or individual actors or nodes that are directly or indirectly connected to authorize and/or provide security for internal or external actors (Dupont 2004, 2006a). In order to examine how power is distributed within networked forms of policing, the distinct pattern of relations can be mapped by applying tools from social network analysis (SNA). As noted above, SNA provides several analytical techniques to identify and understand how different policing agencies are connected, and unpack the positions occupied by central or peripheral actors. In this chapter, the security network at the Port of Bergen has been mapped and serves as an empirical example. In total, 34 organizations, both public and private, were involved in policing and securing the waterfront in Bergen. By using the typology by Whelan and Dupont (2017), the network is seen as a “local exchange network,” which helps to facilitate the exchange of resources and information on (local) security issues within the port environment across the organizational boundaries. Depending on their responsibilities, actors in the network may develop a distinct form of expertise— an expertise that may serve as a resource for exchange. One important motivation for security actors to engage in network practices is “the need to reduce exposure to uncertainty” (Dupont 2006a, 168), and this is most often achieved by increasing their ability to pool resources from different sources and to establish collaborative relations with other actors. As will become evident below, the actors in the network seem to have developed unique expertise corresponding to their responsibilities and core tasks in policing. The collaborative landscape at the waterfront in Bergen can be viewed as complex given the number of actors involved. Drawing from the SNA toolbox, visualization can be a fruitful starting point for exploring the structure of this network. Figure 1 represents the pattern of relations that exist between the 34 policing actors delivering security at the port. In the figure, the nodes represent the agencies and each line between the nodes represents a relational tie. Based on the operationalization of collaborative relations outlined above, 353 ties were reported to be active in the network over the last 12 months (at the point of data

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Fig. 1 Relational structure in the Port of Bergen. Size corresponds to betweenness centrality and shape represents cluster belonging

collection). From the visualization, it becomes evident that this is a rather dense and complex network. Moreover, some of the most central policing actors belong to the public sector, e.g. Norwegian Coastal Administration (NCA) and Port Authority of Bergen (PoB). However, conducting analysis solely based on visualization can be challenging, particularly if the network consists of many agencies and relational ties that make up a complex structure—which is the case for the security network identified in this chapter. One way to overcome this is to employ SNA measurements and techniques since these can be used regardless of the size and complexity of the network under investigation (Breiger 2004; Wasserman and Faust 1994).

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Table 1 Network characteristics, average values Port of Bergen

Density 31.5 %

Geodesic distance 1.75

Centralization 61.2%

Based on the analysis of network characteristics (see Table 1), the average density in the network is 0.315, which means that 31.5% of all possible relational ties between the actors at the waterfront are considered to be active. To determine whether density should be considered high or low, one needs to look at the type and number of actors involved. As such, the density of the security network in the Port of Bergen is considered to be rather high due to the number of actors and their heterogeneity in terms of their tasks and size. Some work directly with the provision of security (e.g., police, private security), while others are concerned with security regulation, and some are responsible for the day-to-day operation of different port facilities. In addition, the analysis shows an average geodesic distance3 of 1.75, implying that the network has a high degree of connectivity. Thus, overall, the actors are well connected and each actor can come in contact with all the others through just under two intermediaries. In this sense, the policing actors have many alternatives to reach collaborative partners and in such a dense network the potential for information and resource exchange is high. As seen in the above visualization, the different actors (nodes) belong to different clusters or sub-groups. In line with previous studies of the Norwegian port security environment (Nøkleberg 2020b), each cluster within the security network at the Port of Bergen is related to the distinctive powers and responsibilities they possess. The analysis of clustering effects shows three clusters and in Fig. 1 they are represented by different shapes. The first cluster (square) is interpreted as law enforcement, intelligence and securing critical infrastructure and is constituted by a homogeneous group of public actors. The (public) regulatory authorities seem also to be grouped together in the network and form the second cluster (circle). Finally, a mix of both private and public actors forms the third cluster (diamond). These actors share expertise in the operational work and are responsible for the everyday practice of port activities and security. Furthermore, the clustering metrics show that density within each cluster is higher than the average density of the network, which is an indication that actors are more active within the confinement of their clusters. One possible consequence of the clustering is that the exchange of network resources may be “siloed,” and some may miss out on crucial information Another important aspect of the network analysis is concerned with centrality and power. Drawing from SNA, the security network at the waterfront has a centralization index4 of 61.2%, which is considered high, suggesting that some

3

In graph theory, geodesic distance refers to the shortest distance or path between two nodes in a network (Borgatti et al. 2013). The average geodesic distance is applied for the network as a whole. 4 Centralization is a measurement at the macro-level and a network with a high centralization index implies that the network is dominated by one or a few nodes (Wasserman and Faust 1994).

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Table 2 Betweenness centrality scores Rank (Port of Bergen) 1 2 3 4 5

Actor Norwegian Coastal Administration (public) Port Authority of Bergen (public) Western Police District (public) The Norwegian Police Security Service (public) Recognized Security Organization (private)

Betweenness 242.6 170.2 92.2 64.7 58.6

actors dominate the network. Thus, these actors may have a greater potential of controlling the flow of information or resources compared to others. With this in mind, it is of interest to explore in more detail the micro-properties of network power, to determine which actors occupy the most central positions. This chapter uses betweenness centrality5 (Freeman 1979) to examine the distribution of power. Betweenness is often interpreted in terms of potential for controlling the flow and exchange of network resources: an actor with high betweenness is viewed as a broker. Table 2 shows the distribution of betweenness in the security network found in the Port of Bergen and includes the five actors with the highest scores. These metrics clearly point out that policing actors who represent a public interest hold the most central position in the network. For instance, the Norwegian Coastal Administration is considered to be strategically positioned with regard to betweenness, followed by the port authority in Bergen and the police. An interesting feature, following the analysis, is that these top three policing actors belong to three different clusters. As a result, they are well-positioned to take up the role of brokers and to facilitate exchanges in the entirety of the network. The empirical assessment of the security network at the waterfront illustrates that public actors generally assume the most significant roles, particularly by being positioned strategically as intermediaries. Thus, their network power far exceeds the influence exerted by their private counterpart. However, this does not mean that private actors’ contribution to securing the port is irrelevant. On the contrary, they can and do play a crucial role in the security governance system. But in the examined collaborative processes there is an uneven power distribution, where private actors are more reliant on accessing these public power brokers in order to reach otherwise unconnected policing actors or clusters of expertise. As a result, collaboration processes within the port environment necessitate negotiations across the public– private divide. While the perspective of social network analysis is valuable in mapping central and peripheral actors, it does not necessarily capture whether the potential to exert power and influence is successfully exploited by the actor(s). Thus, to support the analysis of the quantified and relational data, the next section draws

5

The betweenness centrality captures the probability of a node to fall along the shortest path between any two nodes in the network (Borgatti et al. 2013; Wasserman and Faust 1994).

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on qualitative accounts and explores the collaborative relations in more detail by zooming in on challenges deriving from the public–private divide.

6 Collaboration and the Challenges of the Public–Private Divide As noted above, the exchange of network resources can be constrained by different factors and lead to tension and frustration among the actors (Crawford 1997). In this part of the chapter, the presence of power struggles has been explored by focusing on the perception of collaborative practices among the policing actors. These analyses are mainly drawn from the qualitative accounts of plural policing at Oslo airport, the Port of Stavanger, and the Port of Kristiansand. The main issues raised by several interviewees about establishing and maintaining collaboration were connected to the public–private divide already described in the SNA regarding the Port of Bergen, particularly the underlying differences in interests following from the divide. In describing how to create good relationships between the many actors involved, one police officer at the airport pointed out the importance of mutual understanding: In those partnerships I experience as good, expectations are always made clear, and this includes goals, resources, time, and direction. If one manages to develop a mutual understanding, I believe collaboration has a better chance of being effective and successful. (Interview 15, police)

It is assumed establishing mutual understanding can help to create stable and predictable collaborative environments. In this regard, Fleming and Rhodes (2005, 195) have shown that shared values are often the glue that holds a complex set of relationships together. However, the process of creating consensus and setting direction for the collaboration can be demanding and give rise to organizational tensions. In this study, the process of agreeing seems dependent on the type of relationship. Several interviewees distinguish collaborations of an informal nature and ones seen as formalized and containing a contractual element. The latter, according to the interviewees, is in fact considered to be less challenging. For instance, the process of contracting out security services to private firms, which is a frequent practice at the ports and airport under examination, demonstrates how objectives, procedures for information and resource sharing, and general guidelines are most often outlined in written agreements (e.g., memorandum of understanding) signed by the parties involved. Arguably, if any disputes arise, these agreements can be used to settle the disagreement, or at least decrease the level of conflict among the partners. Nonetheless, there are numerous instances where reaching consensus is challenging, regardless of the degree of formalization, as one manager at a security company puts it: It makes no difference being familiar with each other’s expertise and resources, when we sometimes can’t make use of them collectively or can’t agree on how to do so. I feel the problem is related to the interest we represent, since we’re from the private sector. Some

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organization sees this as an issue, that we’re different in some ways. And it can be a significant source of frustration for us when trying to create good working relationships. (Interview 7, private security)

In a similar fashion, a police officer argued: This depends on whom you work with. I find it easier to work with the Customs or any other public institution than with private actors. Because when only public actors participate, there’s always an understanding of what they can contribute with, you know the structural limitations, and we have a common public objective guiding us. (Interview 21, police)

These quotes recognize one major challenge in the networked policing environment at Norwegian ports and airports, namely how inter-organizational power struggles seem to be connected with the notion of publicness–privateness, and collaborative practices are in many ways constrained by lacking recognition of other actors’ knowledge and perspectives. Thus, the empirical exploration shows how the distinction between public and private clearly affects actors’ practices, particularly as policing and security actors with shared interests experience greater reciprocity in collaborative practices. In this respect, many of the interviewees understood public– public or private–private collaboration as easier than those relationships cutting across the public–private divide.

7 Concluding Discussion: Nordic Policing Exceptionalism? The empirical observations presented in this chapter relate to the Norwegian context of networked and plural policing, with a particular emphasis on the security actors at global transportation hubs. Since much of the literature on plural policing originates from the Anglosphere, the current study is a response to the recognized need for studies of empirical contexts outside the Anglosphere (O’Neill and Fyfe 2017; Van Stokkom and Terpstra 2018), and therefore adds an important piece to the literature. By focusing on the Nordic context, one can raise the question about how this might influence the empirical observations that are presented in this chapter, particularly concerning the seemingly central position occupied by public policing actors in collaborative relations. Historically, the ideals, discourses, and organization of the public police in the Nordic countries have been rooted in and affected by the ideology of the Scandinavian welfare model, which features an extensive role for the state, a wide scope for public policies, social cohesion, conformity, and egalitarianism (Esping-Andersen 1990; Pedersen and Kuhnle 2017). As already noted, this has led the Nordic policing model to be characterized by a strong state apparatus (Holmberg 2014; Høigård 2011; Wathne 2018), and along with the strong position of the welfare state model, the public police is generally considered the main provider of policing services (Gundhus and Larsson 2007). In comparative policing research, it has therefore been argued that contemporary Nordic policing constitutes a distinctive system (Houtsonen and Huotari 2019; Virta and Taponen 2017), which can have

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implications for the way in which security governance arrangements function. In comparison to the Anglosphere, where scholars often situate plural policing in neoliberal discourses and where private-sector mechanisms thrive (Loader 1999; Loader and Walker 2007; Van Stokkom and Terpstra 2018), the Nordic policing model has been more reluctant to accept neoliberal perspectives. Following these distinctive historical and political features, and the notion of Scandinavian or Nordic penal exceptionalism6 (Pratt 2008a, b), some observers have framed the contemporary landscape of policing through the lens of Nordic policing exceptionalism (Ugelvik 2016), which is assumed to have implications for how public policing agencies are organized and how they are demarcated from other (private) policing bodies. Although not making an explicit argument for Nordic policing exceptionalism, previous studies of Nordic collaborative structures and security networks have shown the dominant role of the state, with the governance of security being anchored and controlled by the public agencies (Nøkleberg 2016). In the case of the plural policing of fraud in Sweden, it has been argued that “state sovereignty is continuously being reaffirmed in the set-up of power, and thus influences plural policing practices and professional identities” (Stenström 2020, 36). Similarly, studies of local crime prevention strategies in Norway have highlighted how practices of crime prevention are developed by and integrated into municipal institutions and the police (Egge and Gundhus 2012). The empirical evidence provided in this chapter concerning the pivotal role of public policing agencies in collaboration at global hubs, indicates the relevance of anchored pluralism to explaining the distinct social structure of the networked policing, which emphasizes the power, both symbolic and regulatory, cultural authority, and distinctive capabilities of the state (Loader and Mulcahy 2003; Loader and Walker 2007). Thinking in terms of exceptionalism and framing the findings from this chapter as an example of Nordic policing exceptionalism may be valuable. However, the notion of exceptionalism does not fully capture the current empirical situation at global hubs, as nuances seem to exist in the realm of policing. Following from the empirical descriptions in the current study and by others, the pluralization of policing is evident and private-sector agencies (together with other public agencies) encroach on the preserve of the public police (Bjelland and Vestby 2017; Kammersgaard 2021; Stenström 2018, 2019; Søgaard et al. 2016). Although the “political, cultural and emotional norms and sentiments” of the Nordic countries “fostered a resistance to—and did for a long-time hamper—the marketization of policing” (Hansen Löfstrand 2019, 16), the traditionally state-centered model of Nordic policing has been put under pressure by the emergence of marketization and privatization— in the same way as policing in the Anglosphere. Moreover, it has been pointed out that the Norwegian police has been transformed by new public management reforms, with their strong emphasis on efficiency and quantifiable results, which

6

Nordic penal exceptionalism refers to both low rates of imprisonment in the Nordic countries and relatively benign prison conditions (Pakes 2020).

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has narrowed the police’s core tasks (Wathne 2018, 2020). While this might be true for some elements of local policing (e.g., street-level policing in public areas), greater challenges seem to be present in the context of global hubs, which are more politicized and considered essential to national security. As was made clear above, in Norway, airports and ports are seen as sites of critical infrastructure, in which governmental institutions are the main actors for maintaining security and policing, which, along with the continuing importance of the Nordic welfare model, may explain the central position occupied by public actors observed in this study. By demonstrating the salient role public policing actors play in policing global hubs in Norway, the chapter questions whether the paradigm shift in policing and crime control observed by Brewer (2017), whereby private policing agencies take over the dominant positions following their “entrepreneurial” imperatives, can be said to be universal. It also suggests that studies of plural policing should pay greater attention to the empirical context from which they draw their findings, to avoid neglecting significant local nuances (Lum and Fyfe 2015). As already mentioned, this is not to make the argument that the contribution of private agencies to policing is irrelevant or that such agencies can never occupy prominent roles in plural policing and security networks—they certainly can, and do at times (Wakefield 2003, 2008; White 2010, 2012). However, this chapter understands the composition of plural policing and security governance to be a question for empirical inquiry rather than something to be assumed a priori.

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Martin Nøkleberg holds a Ph.D. in criminology from the Department of Criminology and Sociology of Law, University of Oslo. Nøkleberg is currently working as a researcher at NORCE Norwegian Research Centre. His research focuses on maritime port and airport security, plural policing, governance, collaboration and security networks, and social network analysis.

Part III

Additional Aspects of Plural Policing

Pluralized Narratives of Security: Descriptive Insights from the Private Industry Massimo Fattori, Gabriele Jacobs, and Daniel Trottier

Abstract Feeling (un)safe in public spaces depends upon numerous factors which exceed fear of crime and violence. Population growth, urbanization, technological developments, economic and political stability are only a few of the elements that influence our perception of public safety. How safe we feel is a complex question, and the answer depends on multiple factors, including which entity must carry out the task of delivering public safety. One could argue that the state needs to ensure that this goal is fulfilled. However, both state and non-state actors address public safety challenges. The private sector assists public bodies, even substantially, in guaranteeing protection of people. Considering the diverse range of actors involved in conceptualizing security, in this chapter we offer an outlook of how public safety can better be understood in light of the narrative of the private industry. In particular, we delve into the public–private sector interplay for delivering safety solutions through a content analysis of private companies’ web marketing efforts. Here, we posit that the notion of public safety is shaped by narratives from involved and invested actors. Hence, led by the main research question of how the private industry frames the idea of security, we explore content and discourses that exemplify this framing. We find that the private security narrative can be characterized by three main aspects, namely (a) describing a disruptive future, (b) stressing the need for an efficient public sector, and (c) offering to be trusted partners. We argue that for a fair and transparent joint quadruple helix (Schütz et al. She Ji J Des Econ Innovat 5(2):128–146, 2019) approach between public sector, private sector, academia, and civil society the role and impact of the private sector narratives on approaches and

M. Fattori () · D. Trottier Department of Media and Communication, Erasmus School of History, Culture, and Communication, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] G. Jacobs Erasmus School of Social and Behavioral Sciences, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands Erasmus University College, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. Hirschmann et al. (eds.), Plural Policing in the Global North, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16273-2_9

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solutions to public safety needs to be well understood and reflected upon by all involved stakeholders. Keywords Plural policing · Security · Public safety · Security industry · Quadruple helix

1 Introduction We build on the concept of security as the configuration of measures put in place to protect society, and on the notion of safety as people’s perception of being sheltered from harm. Security can be seen as a function of individual safety (Waldron 2006). Delving deeper into the idea of safety, this entails four conditions, namely, having a climate of social cohesion, respecting individual values, preventing and controlling harm, and holding necessary societal resources (Maurice et al. 2001). In addressing the role of the private sector in its joint delivery of security and safety with public bodies, there are several pressing factors. First, the industry might enjoy a greater degree of freedom than public bodies in the development of technologies, in how to organize research and development, and in which direction to drive innovation. Yet this freedom in creating security solutions could clash with laws and regulations put in place by the public sector. Too many rules can in fact hinder the collaboration between private and public bodies: from privacy regulations to specific requirements that might entail certificates, or licenses, and therefore costs the industry must cover. For the industry, overregulation can stifle cross-sector cooperation. Furthermore, the undeniable business interests of private companies can push the latter to sustain contact with public bodies to understand their needs, their urgent necessities, as well as to construct them, too. Hence, this co-production of needs generates a dialogue, a communication channel between the two—what we may call a “grey area” of collaboration where interests and goals meet. In addition, the private sector might not be involved in all security issues the same way. This means there could be safety concerns that do not see significant commitment from the industry, such as bias-motivated crime (be it racism, homophobia, transphobia, violence against women, or alike). It may be in fact more possible to find civil society organizations more involved in these areas, perhaps pushing private companies to address the consequences of their low engagement. On the other hand, the position of the public sector can as well be distinct yet complementary to the perspectives of the private industry. Public bodies such as municipalities, police forces, governments, and other law enforcement agencies might lack technology, services, or specific expertise and therefore may need industry tools and services. Public bodies purchase private sector’s solutions for safety and security, especially on cyber threats and technological gaps that might need to be filled. Also, public bodies may miss the goal when addressing security and safety: there are indeed several obstacles the public sector may encounter when

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developing security policies. For instance, a possible hurdle when agreeing on policies could be heavy political commitment—something that may not (at least, not fully) limit private industry decision-making. The same applies if we think of bureaucracy or regulatory frameworks that can slow public sector’s work. If we included another actor in the interplay, we could see changes in the synergy between private and public sector. For instance, civil society organizations could redirect public bodies on what the public interest for security truly entails. In doing so, civil society might also make sure the right social groups and the right issues are tackled when intervening for improving security and safety. Civil society organizations can in fact be the key for reaching stakeholders at a local level, where perhaps no public nor private sector is capable. All these perspectives and hypotheses can highlight how much a strong dialogue between these actors is needed to develop proper security policies. The cooperation, the transparency between these players can be paramount for delivering effective safety solutions with high societal impact.

2 Literature Review From the start of the millennium, there have been major shifts in challenges to public safety and security due to technology, globalization, and other societal changes (The Police Foundation 2020). Alongside new challenges we find a shift in core understandings of security and safety. Although often used interchangeably, these two terms embody distinct concepts. On the one hand, security can be understood as the collection of measures taken for protecting subjects from harm, while safety relates more to the resulting feeling of freedom of danger, or lack thereof, and the eventual fulfillment of given societal conditions. Hence, one could position security as the entire process of ensuring individuals’ safety (Coursen 2014). Debates about relations between safety and security suggest that these two concepts are essential for the protection and well-being of individuals. In fact, security and safety share the same goal of maintaining the integrity of a system (Karanikas 2018). Indeed, they are two reciprocally dependable notions since a safety problem can prompt a security concern and vice versa. They are part of the same notion, where safety is the nut, and security its shell (Friedman 2021). Yet as stated above, both terms have undergone significant shifts: for instance, the idea of security changed deeply after the end of the Cold War and its bilateral international structure (Ball 2019). In fact, public safety converted into a political issue most notably by the turn of the millennium (Van Swaaningen 2005). Understanding which aspects constitute the core idea of security and safety is crucial for understanding dynamics within the quadruple helix (Schütz et al. 2019) of public sector, private sector, academia, and civil society. Security and safety are not only impacted by war, violence, or crime, but also by a variety of societal and personal circumstances. New technologies have also complicated governments’ duties, and they now play a role in ensuring society is safe (Etzioni 2002). Day-today security can include economic stability, nutrition, dependability of institutions,

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political freedom, and many other factors that constitute multi-faceted societies (Ball 2019). All these aspects fuel the notion of public safety. As argued by Maslow in his pyramid of needs, personal safety and self-protection are core priorities for people (Kenrick et al. 2010). However, safety can be broadly unfolded. For Friedman, there is much more than just protection from harm in the definition of public safety. In fact, for exploring the web of components that constitute public safety many factors need to be included. First, a set of human needs for basic subsistence, such as food. Second, Friedman continues, housing is fundamental when defining safety, for without housing people are more vulnerable to threats. Third, the extensions of food and water such as healthy nutrition and clean water. He goes as far as to include health care and access to health providers. Fourth, Friedman mentions “opportunity” as constituting safety. Here, basic education and access to higher education, together with job security, are included as relevant elements that lead someone to feel safe. It is not hard to understand the underlying reasoning: if one cannot study and fails to secure a job that allows for necessities such as food or housing, they risk of falling into poverty and thus unsafety. Lastly, safety can include access to transportation, such as public transit to reach school or to work, and access to other necessities—phones, elevators, and so forth—to which categories of people within society might not have full reach. Disabled people, women, people of color, LGBTQI+ individuals are some of the groups that can experience unequal treatment or discrimination in this regard, resulting in diminishing levels of public safety for them (Friedman 2021). Hence, feeling safe today cannot be solely understood as protection from physical harm. There is much more to consider in the twenty-first century, and security—together with safety—is all-encompassing (Ball 2019). Security can be defined as the operational arm that ensures law and order (Manunta 1999). Public security is a vital need of a nation, for fostering it has favored social development. Up to the end of the cold war it mainly related to military threats (Flyghed 2019). Yet the contemporary, expanded view of security contemplates harms that go beyond purely military activities, and begins to consider other typologies of threats—such as terrorism, radicalization, cyberattacks, organized crime, structural discrimination, excessive use of police force, and even environmental crimes. This concept extends to the point that the interplay between public sector and private industry seems inevitable. This communalizing alliance or nodal network (Den Boer 2021) facilitates the co-production of security solutions and provides multi-sectoral, coordinated action for the protection of citizens, thus improving public safety. Technological developments represent a major component in the security equation. Private companies are in fact producers and vendors of security technology, intelligence, and expertise, while also generating different visions on public concerns. Private industry solutions may include software and hardware products that may comprise biometrics, algorithms, wearable weapons and gadgets, drones, cloud services, and personal safety equipment. This technology-driven approach may also seem strategic for solving public security problems: a bias-free, intelligence-led policing that revolutionizes law enforcement. Data can tell us things we have not been able to recognize in the past (Riggs 2019). However, this solutionist approach

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(Morozov 2014) might not be the answer to security issues. Technology can in fact justify and perpetuate systemic biases, and it would mostly be unable to change the mentality of law enforcement agents in any case (Green 2020). Also, it is relevant to understand whom the improvement brought by technology is for: governments, citizens, police? New technologies bring along many doubts, including ethical ones, for their unintended and unwanted impacts on social and economic life can be substantial (Coeckelbergh 2020). The interplay and the relation between actors involved in the delivery of security and safety is important. Effectiveness and success of public security policies are clearly influenced by citizen’s perception of their legitimacy and of the underlying rationale (Barton and Beynon 2015). Relations surrounding trust and confidence stand out in the literature. In fact, security and safety as concepts are driven by trust. Citizens might feel safer when they believe police is acting in their best interest. Trust in institutions and law enforcement is pivotal for secure and safe societies and this is shaped by multiple factors. Citizens evaluate not just what police do, but also how, and they gather recent personal experiences from family and friends—often amplified by social media—to develop a judgment on law enforcement’s attitude (Gau 2010). The resulting level of trust in police forces is a decisive factor for a society’s security. Public trust in the justice system of a country indicates maturity and functioning of the process of criminal justice (Barton and Beynon 2015). Indeed, higher levels of public trust in law enforcement suggest that the justice system is working (Barton and Beynon 2015). Trust is key in the security discourse. When citizens perceive police as procedurally fair and trust their motives, they are more likely to cooperate in investigations, more likely to abide the law, and more likely to respect officers (Jackson and Bradford 2010). In other words, trust enhances security. In the long run, crime-fighting can be more efficient, more cost-effective, and more ethical if the public is treated in a way that is perceived fair (Jackson and Bradford 2010). Also, given that objective measures are only modest predictors of citizens’ judgement, one’s own encounters with police are the main drivers for people’s trust: no additional money, nor workforce might be needed, but only fair treatment (Gau 2010). In addition, higher trust in the role of police and institutions implies public agents will be less distracted with controlling or surveilling citizens, focusing instead on the unlawful few (Barton and Beynon 2015). Higher trust implies higher safety, not only as a flow from citizenry toward police or institutions, but also vice versa. Mutual trust is essential for a fruitful collaboration between police and the public (Kääriäinen and Sirén 2012). Police trust toward citizens might be driven by generalized trust within society, yet the authoritarian position of law enforcement makes it slightly more complex (Kääriäinen and Sirén 2012). Trustworthy exchanges among actors are paramount for a fruitful dialogue and enrich the security equation while furthering effective policies. Therefore, levels of public safety in urban environments also shape the state’s governing capacity and legitimacy. Hinging on trust dynamics, the way states handle safety in urban spaces determines people’s views of state-accountability when upholding the social contract (Felbab-Brown 2016). If public safety encompasses all aspects of society and is also an element through which the legitimacy of the

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state can be challenged, this shall be a top priority of governments worldwide. For the European Union, citizens need to feel confident that their security and their freedom are duly protected across the Union (EC 2015). The EU has established three main priorities for European security, and these are: terrorism, serious and organized cross-border crime, and cybercrime (EC 2015). It is exactly by addressing causes and risk factors that public authorities can foster public safety and inevitably promote social cohesion and inclusion in collective spaces (EC 2019). States must hold public safety as priority and they often face the challenge of clashing with commercial interests—think, for instance, of dealing with night-time economies that bring considerable revenues while burdening public safety (Crawford and Flint 2009). Ensuring safety means looking at societies from all angles and the delivery of public security and safety is everyone’s responsibility (Riggs 2019). The way private companies portray security plights and the narrative they use while advertising security solutions inform dialogue and trust dynamics for public– private partnerships for security. Consequently, these portrayals of public security and safety matters inevitably influence public perceptions of safety and, eventually, what being safe entails. Hence, analyzing the approach of the private security sector is essential for understanding shifts in the security paradigm.

3 An Illustration: Narratives on Private Security Vendor Websites Given the significant role played by private industry for the delivery of safety and security, its way of addressing public institutions might contribute to how public security and safety are perceived. By conceiving the latter also as the result of this rhetoric, we aimed at identifying, describing, and deconstructing this private industry narrative. For this reason, we conducted a content and discourse analysis of private companies’ webpages. Our sample included 116 websites of security companies that we accessed at the beginning of the year 2021. The target is represented by companies who directly address public sector for the delivery of public security. Hence, choosing those who actively discuss safety issues and present and pitch their products to authorities was deemed the best option. In doing so, we selected companies that are among the partners and exhibitors at three important European security conferences taking place in 2021: the European Police Congress in Berlin,1 the International Security Expo in London,2 and the World Border Security Congress in Athens.3 The lists of exhibitors at these large conferences combined are quite extensive, thus indicating an adequate and diverse representation of private firms. 1

More at www.european-police.eu. More at www.internationalsecurityexpo.com. 3 More at www.world-border-congress.com 2

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Importantly, as terms can be similar, by “private security companies” we do not intend firms that provide for personal security, bodyguards, or human force. Instead, we mean companies that develop a range of security tools, services, and technologies for the public sector. Hence, our sample included companies active (also) in Europe which produce software or hardware tools for access control and biometrics, CCTV surveillance, communications, perimeter protection, personal protection, security screening and scanning, weapons, wearables, and cybersecurity. Within these webpages, our selection focused on content of sections redirecting users to “government,” “law enforcement,” “military,” and segments alike. By including all these categories, we were sure not to exclude any content meant to address all layers of the public sector—from police, to soldiers, to public institutions. We considered both textual and visual material, including titles, descriptions, slogans, videos, and images. After conducting open and axial coding (Williams and Moser 2019), this content analysis revealed a shared structured narrative that can impact how public security and safety are regarded today. The analysis revealed a narrative that is constituted by three strands of rhetoric. These are three key categories that embody crucial messages invoked by the private industry when addressing the public sector. These rhetorical spheres are: the disruptive future demanding innovation, the major improvement in efficiency, and the development of trustworthy relations. Although each of these strands is essential for our study, the trust-driven rhetoric might stand as the most relevant and thus warranting greater consideration, as it encapsulates links and relations between all possible societal actors in the security and safety discourse. All three categories building the industry’s narrative are considered below.

3.1 A Disruptive Future The first rhetoric purported by the private sector entails a vision of the foreseeable future describing the public sector as deficient. The message conveyed is that public authorities and agencies are not ready for what lies ahead. Through this rhetoric, the security market speculates on three aspects: (1) on future threats, (2) on the inability of public bodies to face those threats, and (3) on future economic profit (Hoijtink 2014). What does this future look like, then? First, it is filled with forthcoming dynamic threats. Second, data and technology drive the world, and if public bodies fail to keep up with innovation it will be difficult for them to properly deliver security and thus will fall vis-à-vis those threats. This positions the technology advertised by the private industry as an indispensable tool to face this future. The industry conveys this idea, on the one hand, by highlighting these “future-proof” solutions, contextualized within a threat rhetoric, and on the other by insisting on a compelling necessity for change. Regarding the latter, companies depict public bodies as on the verge of a critical transformation. These notions of imminence, emergency, and requisite innovation feed into the idea of “economy of emergence,” where speculation is the driving force behind innovation and market profit (Cooper

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2006). The influence of statements like “forging the future of today,” “technology developed for the needs of tomorrow,” or “cities of the future are on their way” is strengthened by striking visuals. For instance, almost all of the introductory or showcasing videos on these websites hold a fast-paced beat, as for stressing the imminent, rapid, and cascading changes we are witnessing. In doing so, the industry stresses four focal points that inform this narrative: a fast and radical change in what is required to be secure and safe, the necessity to update the public sector and its way of guaranteeing security, an obsolete obstructive technology that needs to be replaced, and the growing concerns in security breaches. In fact, the idea that threats are to be expected at anytime and anywhere is recurrent. Observed literature confirms this notion is frequently associated with the desire to consistently merge security with economic profits of the industry (Hoijtink 2014).

3.2 A More Efficient Public Sector Public bodies are reminded that costs of solutions are “less than the cost of a single corrections officer” (Geovox 2021), that “our lives consist of minutes” (Regula Forensics 2017), or that “breaches cost money and time” (Hitachi 2021). The private sector addresses two points: time and money. In their timesaving narrative, not only do companies highlight the benefits of completing more tasks in less time, but also go further to tell law enforcement agents what role society expects them to play. For instance, officers should be out in the streets, and not behind a desk filling out paperwork. Officers should be close to the community and not busy with administrative tasks. The industry explicitly addresses the public sector in asserting where societies want their officers, and how citizens expect them to act. On the other hand, through a money-saving narrative, the industry understands the tight budgets to which public officials bound and stresses how their tools can fulfill the financial needs of the public sector. For instance, relieving burden on staff, reducing complexity of services, and investing in cost-effective tools. The industry claims to know the expectations and needs of public agencies, and it also explicitly addresses how affordable their solutions are, from purchase to deployment and maintenance.

3.3 Ensuring Trustworthy Relations Although trust can have a broad interpretation, this analysis identified two leading threads within: trust between industry and public sector, and trust between public sector and citizens. Narratives of trust between industry and citizens was not evidenced during the analysis: most probably because companies are addressing public bodies and a rhetoric of trust between companies and citizenry would exclude their targeted actor. In the former, companies wish to build trust between them and governments by stressing reliability, transparency, and credibility of products they

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sell. In addition, the industry emphasizes how it has the exact same goals, aims, and priorities of the public sector. Sharing objectives and opponents is indeed a compelling way of conveying trust: it is indeed easier to trust someone’s solutions if that someone shares your purposes. Some companies even bear slogans that closely resemble police’s or governments’, for instance, “to protect and serve” or “dedication, enforcement, coordination.” These kinds of similarities enhance perceptions of trust. Moreover, a verb frequently invoked is “to understand”: companies understand that governments have limited budgets, they understand the active role of officers in protecting the homeland, they understand how paramount safety is for the state, they understand consequences of the 2008 credit crunch, and so forth. This empathy delivers trust. However, this is not the only identifiable conveyed trust-channel: private sector seems to aim at being considered a sort of intermediary between public agencies and citizens because it can provide tools to strengthen their trust. So, how does the private sector convey this trust promise? First, by highlighting citizens’ expectations: through the tools they offer, the state will have no issue in meeting people’s hopes. Citizens expect the state to have appropriate technologies able to protect them in plights where public safety is at risk. For example, a person going to a stadium to watch a football match theoretically expects the state to have prevented possible terrorist attacks, or to have adequate tools that can identify danger. Second, the industry stresses how straightforward the security-trust relation is: increased security means safer citizens who support, trust, and vote for the government. Lastly, the industry shares relevant values in a society that add up to a state’s reputation—the latter being a recurrent factor in the narrative. This means that the private sector upholds values at stake for societies that also governments need to uphold and defend, such as protection of privacy or anti-discrimination policies. There is also a perceivable sense of a “switch in roles”: these webpages do not just convey the idea that the industry is there to help the public sector in delivering security, but that it works together with it, especially when reading sentences such as “our daily goal is to create more trust, safety and security across every spectrum of everyday society.” Companies share missions with law enforcement agencies. They hold the same vision of public bodies, and so they should be the ones safeguarding communities, protecting people, and ensuring safety (all governmental tasks). For instance, they frequently use the plural “We” or “Our” when referring to the carrying out of safety tasks: conveying an overlap in responsibilities that indeed feeds into the idea of plural policing.

4 Discussion While public security has been traditionally considered the prerogative of the state (Hobbes 1651), today the duty of maintaining public security cannot be solely attributed as such. Governing security, in the sense of guaranteeing physical safety of citizens, is surely a responsibility of the state (Bislev 2004). However, ensuring citizens’ protection, public order, and national security may be too burdensome a

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task to be carried only by governments. Public–private interactions for delivering safety and security are already in place worldwide. Pressure on police departments to keep criminal activity low, better time management of officers, and tight budgets are among the main reasons why partnerships are necessary for public security (Jones 2018). Taking as example the cybersecurity field, partnerships at the EU level are widely present and show a sophisticated collective approach toward cybercrime (ENISA 2017). At the European level, investments for security and safety research projects (e.g., within Horizon 2020) involving all sectors are substantial. Indeed, research on security fostered through those projects is and will remain among the major practices pushing the civil security market (Hoijtink 2014). New issues, new needs, and new societal developments are studied, and new technologies are continuously implemented. Here, our emphasis is placed upon the functioning of these public–private synergies. The private sector can deliver security mainly in two ways: by offering security personnel, hence providing for people to hire as professional security guards, or by offering privately developed tools and instruments—say, technologies—that can be purchased. Our analysis focused upon the latter. There are many instances where the private industry joins the public sector for maintaining and fostering safety and security nowadays. Let us look into two examples where this role is evident: (1) illicit trade of tobacco products and (2) the smuggling of illegal goods, mostly drugs. In the first instance, public– private synergies are quite essential. In this case, illicit trade of tobacco products brings social and economic harms (Allen 2012). Tobacco is in fact one of the most trafficked goods in the world (Transcrime 2016). In this regard, estimated national and EU yearly losses in 2010 amounted to ca. 10 Bn A C (Allen 2012), and concern about this illegal trade is constantly increasing (Transcrime 2016). The public sector cannot fight illicit trade alone, and necessitates support from the private sector (Lapprand 2021). Agreements with private industry—paramount for countering illicit tobacco trade—are in place already at the EU level between the Commission and tobacco giants. In the second example, public–private alliances are evident against the smuggling of illegal goods, mostly drugs, via parcel transporters. Here, private companies might indeed be victims of illegality, since their services are exploited for crime, but can also serve as an ally for public authorities. In the end, security of businesses is strongly linked to public security (Pierre 2021). Partnerships at EU and local levels to counter drug trafficking are numerous, including relations between the Lithuanian customs department and DHL (Baltic Times 2000). A broad range of variables can affect the notions of security and safety, including anti-social behavior, as well as discriminatory policies and practices. Anti-social behavior can be categorized as personal when an individual or a community are targeted, as a nuisance when causing trouble and distress to a community, or as environmental when actions affect public spaces (Met Police). Forms of bias feed into race, ethnicity, and class-based discrimination. In this setting, public bodies partner with private companies to stop, prevent, or reduce hurdles to safety. Among others, a reason why public bodies choose to partner with private industry can lie in

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the technologies the latter might hold. These tools, for instance, may supposedly be free of bias and allegedly delivering an objective service. As well, private companies might be able to look at public safety and security from a different perspective with respect to public bodies. Technology is the factor driving and transforming the criminal landscape (Wittendorp 2020). The rapid digitalization of societies and economies brings opportunities for criminals to act (Europol 2021). If technology empowers criminals, it needs to be efficiently deployed by law enforcement agencies, too. The private industry stresses this point quite in depth when conveying its narrative of a disruptive future, as we described in our illustrations above. It is thereby suggested that a joint action by private and public actors is paramount for effectively delivering security and safety. In fact, especially in cybersecurity, threats can be too difficult for governments alone to overcome (Mee and Chandrasekhar 2021). The collaborative performance by state and non-state actors—where these public–private synergies are inscribed—is referred to as “plural policing” (Stenning 2009). Considering the commercial side of these partnerships, these involve investments, products, sales, and strategies, we should conceive the provision of public safety as embedded in a market. Hence, we need to consider demand, supply, and product (i.e., safety). Analyzing the dynamics of the security market is crucial, given its tremendous size. Globally, the public safety and security market is expected to reach $516.5Bn by 2025 (Markets and Markets 2020). As the European Commission states, EU research funding from 2014 to 2020 allocated around 2 billion A C to security research through Horizon2020 projects—around 50% of the entire public financing for the EU civil security research.4 As of 2020, Europe is the second largest security services market in the world, valued $36Bn (Statista 2021; Hirschmann 2021). Drawing from these numbers it is evident that the provision of public safety understood as officers arresting criminals or chasing delinquents is an obsolete perception. Stake- and shareholders are not only capable of shaping the idea of what it means to be safe, but they can also redress traditional ways of delivering safety (as policing, or surveillance) by introducing tools capable of impacting citizens’ lives. This broadening of the perception of security and safety might also be suggested by the private sector’s narrative focused on trustworthy relations, which we have explained above. Relations of trust between public bodies, private actors, and citizenry may indeed influence the understanding of public safety and security in a given society. Considering security and safety as commodities exchanged in a market, we can understand conventional market dynamics therein. The industry has marketing strategies and narratives through which it aims at convincing public bodies. Sellers hold primarily a profit-driven interest, while buyers must unbiasedly operate in the public interest. In this objective account of the security and safety market, crime is

4

For more information on how the EU Commission supports achievement of the Security Union via funding security research visit: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-we-do/innovation-andindustry-security_en

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less a moral wrong than a source of profit driving the demand curve (Zedner 2006). Referring to our illustrations above, the private sector narrative targeting budgetaryand time-constraints of public bodies might in fact suggest how important it is to balance necessities and public interest. In fact, being safety a good—marketed, priced, sold, used, and reviewed—there might be a possible clash of interests to consider, too. Private industry’s interests are indeed business related, whereby companies seek to maximize market share and to increase profit (Flyghed 2019). Private interests may not match what the public interest entails, yet these must somehow compromise and merge in an ideal balance to deliver fair and effective solutions. In fact, most private businesses are generally prone to pursue different choices than public agencies’ when countering contemporary safety threats (Bures 2017). The private industry is not accountable to the public, unlike public bodies, but to the clients its services are contracted for (De Waard 1999). Yet, the client in these security and safety contracts is the public. Thus, the concept of security and safety stems out also from the continuous dialogue between the two sectors and is then influenced by their narratives. This chapter has explored the narrative the private sector conveys when promoting public security issues and solutions.

5 Conclusion The polychromatic concepts of security and safety bring along relevant challenges for today’s societies, starting with the very core idea of what it means to be secure and to feel safe in our public, and private spaces. Despite the myriad of factors defining these concepts, it is essential to regard security and safety also as the result of exchanges and dynamics that involve public sector and private industry. In our analysis, we delved into the narrative of the private industry. Indeed, the concept of security and safety is shaped and influenced also by how the private sector frames what safety means, and what is needed for securing a society. Public sector and private industry are two actors in a system that can make even betterinformed decisions when understanding and recognizing narratives and rhetoric within this system. Therefore, we tried to illuminate these dynamics by addressing the private sector’s security discourse. Indeed, it is herewith encouraged further research onto the eventual impact industry narratives have upon the development of public security policies. In our analysis, we gathered both textual and visual material. Here, we identified three main strands of rhetoric that probably influence the perception of security and safety of public bodies, resulting in how the latter conceive security policies. First, the private industry conveys an idea of a threatening future for which authorities, and societies, are not ready for, and thus need support of companies. Second, the industry stresses the alleged benefits of their tools in terms of efficiency, focusing on timesaving and budget-compliant solutions. Lastly, there is a strong trust-conveying channel, where the industry shares trust messages that also target the relationship between citizens and authorities.

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Hence, we identified a triad of elements—future, efficiency, and trust—that ultimately defines the security narrative of the private industry. It is also critical to understand what drives this narrative, and what thread connects all the elements of this discourse. The leading feature might be “risk”: the industry conveys a risk of an imminent dangerous future where threats evolve every minute, a risk of having law enforcement agencies too slow or with obsolete tools they cannot afford, and a risk of losing citizens’ trust from a political viewpoint. However, another leading aspect is “control”: this is indeed a compelling narrative able to control public– private interactions and dynamics that can determine what it means to be safe and secure in a contemporary society. If able to control how dialogue is shaped, a party can indeed divert the resulting synergies in its favor while tackling issues from a viewpoint that better benefits that same party. It is also possible to envision some of these players as trust-intercessors who help others thrive. This implies actors might as well work in a grey area in which diverse aims and needs meet. It would be possible to delineate a model of multi-agency in the shaping of security and safety. Although these notions are in fact defined by a plurality of actors, we identified a strong and powerful narrative of the private industry that might influence how security and safety are conceived today. Further research on the impact of narratives here described could shed a light on whether these do or do not influence what societies and public authorities perceive as danger or threat, what is needed for creating safety, and how to lead interactions between sectors. Looking at the results of our content analysis, we argue that the understandings of security and safety should be co-shaped and critically reflected by all stakeholders. We see a certain risk, based on the big impact the private sector has, that the private sector might dominate the definition and understanding of safety and security. We consider it as crucial for well-functioning quadruple helix dynamics that serve the public interest and protect individual citizens that the understanding of safety and security is truly co-created by all stakeholders. We call for a more substantial and deeper role of academia and academic investigation for safety and security research able to feed into and integrate players’ dialogues. In other words, we strongly encourage a true quadruple effort in defining public security and safety. We envision this as a joint action that ultimately results in the development of better and more democratic safety and security policies. Acknowledgements This research has received funding from the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 882749.

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Van Swaaningen R (2005) Public safety and the management of fear. Theor Criminol 9(3):289–305 Waldron J (2006) Safety and security. Neb Law Rev 85(2):454–507 “What is antisocial behaviour?”. Metropolitan Police. https://www.met.police.uk/advice/adviceand-information/asb/asb/antisocial-behaviour/what-is-antisocial-behaviour/? Williams M, Moser T (2019) The art of coding and thematic exploration in qualitative research. Int Manag Rev 15(1):45–55 Wittendorp S (2020) “Disruptive technologies”. Security and Global Affairs. https:// leidensecurityandglobalaffairs.nl/articles/disruptive-technologies. Accessed 6 July 2021 Zedner L (2006) Liquid Security: managing the market for crime control. Criminol Crim Just 6(3):267–288

Massimo Fattori is a Doctoral Candidate at the Department of Media and Communication of Erasmus University Rotterdam. His current research explores multi-actor approaches to public security and safety for better mapping synergies and tensions among stakeholders. Massimo holds a master’s degree in International Law obtained at Tilburg University, the Netherlands. Gabriele Jacobs is a Professor of Organisational Behaviour and Culture at Erasmus University College at Erasmus University Rotterdam. Her current research interests lay on the implications of technology on quadruple helix solutions in public safety, and the questions around polarization and forced migration. Daniel Trottier is an Associate Professor at the Department of Media and Communication of Erasmus University Rotterdam. His current research considers the use of digital media for the purposes of scrutiny, denunciation, and shaming. Daniel completed a Ph.D. in Sociology at Queen’s University in Kingston, Canada.

Trust in Private Security: Current Research in Finland Elsa Saarikkomäki, Jyri Paasonen, and Sanna Haarla

Abstract Finland as a Nordic welfare state traditionally has a strong emphasis on the state and its police and trust in the police is exceptionally high. Recently, global changes in policing landscape and pluralization of policing have occurred as the private sector participates in delivering security in private, public, and quasipublic spaces. However, even globally, we do not have much information on how these changes in the policing landscape affect trust and how citizens perceive private policing. This chapter points out that trust in private policing is important to study. It suggests that in addition to general trust, trust created or challenged in specific encounters between private policing agents and citizens, particularly among vulnerable groups, is important to consider. We start by describing the current context of the plural policing landscape in Finland. Secondly, we present current empirical research considering (a) citizens’ general trust in private policing, (b) experiences of typical objects of policing, young people, and ethnic minorities, and (c) victimization of security guards at their work. Throughout this chapter, we compare the empirical findings of private security in relation to police. Finally, we suggest some ways of how to improve trust. This paper offers new insights for an international audience from different empirical fields of study and contexts, and it maps out future research agendas to further develop trust in policing. Keywords Plural policing · Procedural justice · Trust · Young people · Ethnic minorities · Victimization at work

E. Saarikkomäki () Faculty of Law, University of Turku, Turku, Finland e-mail: [email protected] J. Paasonen University of Vaasa, Vaasa, Finland e-mail: [email protected] S. Haarla Institute of Criminology and Legal Policy, University of Helsinki, Helsinki, Finland e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. Hirschmann et al. (eds.), Plural Policing in the Global North, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16273-2_10

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1 Introduction In recent years, we have witnessed a global growth in the private security sector. The industry has grown historically from a small number of enterprises into a multibillion Euro industry with at least two million employees in Europe (e.g. Button and Stiernstedt 2017). Private security operates in global and local contexts and therefore different contexts are important to study (Leloup and White 2021). Although the private security field has a long history, in our study context in Finland, and more globally, the extensive rise of private security and the extension of its role indicates interesting changes in policing landscape. For instance, blurring borders of public and private policing is widely discussed (e.g. Wakefield 2003; White 2012; Moreira et al. 2015; Button and Stiernstedt 2017; Gurinskaya and Nalla 2020; Leloup and White 2021). Based on growing research on plural policing, we now have a greater understanding of different pluralized, blurred, and networked modes of policing (ibid.). However, despite the increase of operations of private security companies, and plural policing research, the lack of academic research still characterizes the industry as compared to police research. Overall, these changes in the policing landscape call for a need to have more information also on how citizens are affected. We still lack empirical research and understandings of trust, or lack of trust in private policing, and how citizens formulate their conceptions of trust and perceive private policing. Furthermore, there is little information on how the security officers themselves experience their work. These are issues of which this chapter focuses on. Prior research studying trust in policing has focused on public police and developing rapidly growing procedural justice theory; however, only a small number of studies have focused on the question of citizens trust in private security (see however, e.g., Fagan and Tyler 2005; Gurinskaya and Nalla 2020; Saarikkomäki 2016; Saarikkomäki and Lampela 2022; Fielder and Murphy 2022). Similar to the public police, private policing agents use legal rights to “control” citizens (albeit more limited), and they can infringe basic rights of citizens; the field is therefore particularly sensitive to trust issues. Furthermore, the field where these policing agents operate is sensitive to experiences of violence, which can also diminish mutual trust and relations between citizens and policing agents. Important questions relate, for instance, on general trust in private policing and on how citizens feel treated by security officers, and do they perceive the authorities as procedurally just and fair, or the opposite. Topical issues relate also to the experiences of ethnic minorities, as ethnic profiling, which diminishes trust, is discussed increasingly in the public policing field (e.g. Keskinen et al. 2018; Solhjell et al. 2019; Schclarek Mulinari and Keskinen 2020). Furthermore, this chapter can provide understanding from a fresh context as studies have typically focused on Anglo-American countries (e.g. Leloup and White 2021). Finland provides an interesting context since it is a Nordic welfare state which traditionally has had a strong emphasis on state and high trust on the state and its police. Today, Finland, a Nordic welfare state of about 5.5 million people, is

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no exception in the global changes of policing. Like many other Western countries, Finland has witnessed transformations of policing, increasing pluralization of crime control as policing has become a mixture of public and private policing agents. In this article, we review our prior empirical studies conducted in Finland. An overarching question this chapter focuses on relates to citizens’ trust in private policing and how trustworthy and fair encounters between citizens and private security guards can be accomplished. We wish to raise a question also for the future of how to improve trust in private security—both in practice and in research. This chapter proposes that we need novel research angles to develop methods to study different aspects of trust and trust deficits. We move from general views to more specific encounters. Firstly, we turn to see how citizens overall trust in private security companies (as compared to the police) and are there differences in the level of trust among different socio-demographic groups. Secondly, we focus on those groups who have experienced security guard interventions and are typical subjects of policing: young people and ethnic minority youths. In addition, we discuss a new work method that has been developed to improve trust between security guards and young people in the shopping mall context. Thirdly, we look at private security guards’ side to their work, focusing their experiences of victimization. Finally, we discuss how trust can be studied by using different methods and suggest some future research avenues. Before going to review these studies, we briefly introduce our plural policing context.

2 Private Security in the Finnish Plural Policing Context Private security guards are referred here as policing agents or security officers used by the private or public sectors. They are typically employed by a private company, guarding private, quasi-public, and public places, with a public mandate of order maintenance or a private mandate of securing private property. Even though the private security field is fundamentally private, it is not completely distant from the state in the Finnish context (see, e.g., Paasonen 2020, 2021; Saarikkomäki and Lampela 2022). Although security guards are defined as policing agents and they share many similarities to police officers, they also differ in multiple levels in their nature from the police work (see, e.g., Kerttula 2010; Saarikkomäki 2018; Paasonen 2021). Security services refer to a strong international field that has a very visible role in many countries and the operation fields are varied, such as in maintaining prisons and training security authorities. The number of operators in private security services has grown strongly during the past years. Finland has one of the lowest ratios regarding private security officer number to population (fifth lowest among 34 European countries) and police force number to population (second lowest) (Paasonen 2021). However, the numbers must be interpreted with caution, and it is difficult to obtain reliable statistics. Indeed, it is surprising how little information is available on the field, and Finland is not an exception. Studies and different kinds

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of market reports have been carried out (e.g. the field classification of the Central Statistical Office of Finland), but only very limited conclusions can be drawn. In the future, this needs development. Currently, there is not even an ongoing discussion on how the statistics and definitions could be improved. In Finland, security officers who work, for example, in stores and on public transport and who are allowed to maintain public order and safety have 40 h of basic training. It is possible to work as a part-time security guard with a temporary licence that consists of 40 h of education; however, to work fulltime the 120 h of training is mandatory (see, e.g., Paasonen 2020). Training is organized, for instance, by security companies or adult education centres. Private security industry regulation has a long history in Finland. The first provisions date back to 1924, when an order was given regarding public entertainment in the countryside which decreed the tasks and jurisdictions of doormen. Private security industry regulation in Finland is based on a regulatory body model, which is fairly common in many other countries (Paasonen 2020). The Private Security Services Act (1085/2015) covers guarding services, security steward services, security system installation services, and security check services. Locksmiths and installers of burglar alarms are examples of security system installers. Companies offering private security services must have a license. Nowadays in Finland, public administrative tasks, such as crime control, are firstly a state authority task, but private security can be also involved in order maintenance. Similar to many other countries, the legal rights and jurisdiction of private policing in Finland is limited when compared to police. However, Finland is among those countries who regulate the field more than some other countries in Europe. Furthermore, harmonization of private security industry regulation at the European Union level has been raised; however, it may be very difficult to achieve considering that countries such as the USA and Australia have been unable to standardize the regulation of their private security industry within their country (Paasonen 2020). The private security industry and the European Committee for Standardization (CEN) have been developing standards that also apply to the Finnish context. For instance, a new certifiable standard EN17483-1 (Private security services. Protection of critical infrastructure General requirements) was just released. It lists quality criteria for the provider’s structure, contracts, staff, and service delivery. In the future new standards will come: EN 17483-2 on Aviation Security (integration and update of EN16082), EN 17483-3 on Maritime Security (integration and update of EN16747) and other business environments such as energy, transport, and healthcare. All in all, private security is an interesting phenomenon as it is at the same time local and global. Next, we turn to see studies conducted in Finland related to trust in private security and their work environment. When possible, we compare the findings in relation to the police to gain comparison points.

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3 Citizens’ General Trust in Private Security Companies We focus next on how citizens overall trust private security companies and are there differences in the level of trust among different socio-demographic groups. Country representative studies on citizens’ general trust in private security are scarce, and studies have mainly used student samples (e.g. Moreira et al. 2015; Brands and Doorn 2020; Gurinskaya and Nalla 2020). In this subchapter, the key findings are introduced based on Haarla’s (2021) master’s thesis, which is based on the Police Barometer surveys collected in 2001, 2005, 2010, and 2014 in Finland. Overall, there were 4040 respondents. (When this research was done, the most recent data from 2018 was not available for the analysis.) The Police Barometer is an interview survey, based on a population quota sampling, commissioned by the Ministry of the Interior (Vuorensyrjä and Fagerlund 2016). The respondents were asked, how much do you trust the actions of private security companies and the police on a four-scale measure (a great deal, a fair amount, fairly little, and very little). For the analysis, this was modified into a two-scale measure: trusts a lot and trusts a little. On the questionnaire there was no further explanation what was meant with “private security companies,” so the respondents may think of very different actions. Therefore, the results might be different if respondents were asked to assess their trust in security officers or differentiate between different sectors (e.g., bouncers, airport security, CCTV cameras, cyber security companies, etc.). Even though these definitions are linked to each other and are often used as synonyms, people might have different ideas of what they mean and what they represent when considering trust. Furthermore, it is challenging to define what trust means for the respondents. Often it is defined that at the core of the assessment of trust are assumed expectations for actions (Kasperson et al. 1992), therefore one explanation is that the level of trust is based on how well these institutions meet the assumed expectations. In addition, trust may reflect, for example, the general image or procedural justice. Procedural justice means whether the treatment is perceived as equal and fair (e.g. Fagan and Tyler 2005; Saarikkomäki 2016, 2018; Gurinskaya and Nalla 2020). We first show descriptive statistics and then the multivariate analysis. Multivariate analysis was done with logistic regression and average marginal effect (AME), and the results presented in Table 1 are statistically significant. The analysis compares the mean effect of X on the probability of Y, and the results of logistic regression are given in percentage points instead of odds-ratio due to the use of AME. Percentage points express the difference in the probability of (mean) trust in private security companies or police when compared to the control group and when other variables are standardized. The study found that most of the respondents trusted the actions of private security companies (avg. 70%) and nearly all trusted the police (avg. 94%). Trust towards the police remained the same but the trust towards private security companies has decreased between 2001 and 2014 (Fig. 1). In 2001, every fourth (25%) and in 2014 every third (35%) of respondents reported little or some amount

Private security companies 10 percentage points less*** 6 percentage points less* x 6 percentage points less* 6 percentage points less* 8 percentage points less** x 8 percentage points less** 7 percentage points less** 8 percentage points less** 6 percentage points less***

Men 25–34 years old

35–44 years old 45–54 years old 55–64 years old Over 65 years old Upper secondary school (vocational)

Upper secondary school (general) Polytechnic/university of applied sciences education University education Eyewitness to crimes

4 percentage points more** 4 percentage points more** 5 percentage points more*** x

x 4 percentage points more* 5 percentage points more*** 6 percentage points more*** x

Police 2 percentage points less* x

Police Barometers 2001, 2005, 2011, and 2014 (n = 4040). Logistic regression, marginal effects (AME). *P < 0.05, **P < 0.01, ***P < 0.001. Standardized variables in the model: year, gender, age, education, income, residential area, being victim of a crime, eyewitness to crime, victim of violence, eyewitness to violence, trust in police (only in analysis of PSC)/private security company (only in analysis of PO), fear of crime (sum of variables), and fear of crime

Eyewitness to crimes (when compared to not eyewitnessed crimes)

Educational background (when compared to primary education)

Variable (control group) Gender (when compared to women) Age (when compared to under the age of 25)

Table 1 Variables that explain the probability (in percentage point) to trust the actions of private security companies or police more or less than the control group, when other variables are standardized

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of trust in the private security companies. The respondents left the question on trust more often unanswered when it considered private security companies. The respondents who reported high levels of trust were more likely to have trust in the other institution as well. Accordingly, this might measure general confidence also and not specific trust in the actions of a control agent. The study, based on the combined data of the years 2001, 2005, 2010, 2014, found that gender, age, and educational background influence the level of trust in the private security companies and the police, when all variables were standardized (see later Table 1). The effect on trust varies. We also look at descriptive statistics of age and education as they produced more varied results than the other variables in the logistic model (Figs. 2 and 3; created for this article). All the age groups trusted less in private security companies as compared to the police (Fig. 2). When age group and trust in each year are cross-tabulated (without controlling for other variables, Fig. 2), the effect of age group is slightly different than after the analysis of logistic regression (Table 1). Interestingly trust in public and private policing seems not to go hand in hand. When the trust in the police typically increases among older age groups, trust in private security is more varied (Fig. 2). Regarding multivariate analysis of age and trust in private security companies, older people trust less in private security as compared to the youngest age group (less than 25, Table 1). However, the oldest age groups trust more in the police actions as compared to the youngest age group (Table 1). In addition, educational background influenced trust. When educational background, trust, and year were tabulated before the multivariate analysis, those who were highly educated seem to trust less in the private security companies and

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more on the police than those with lower education background (Fig. 3). In the multivariate analysis, a control group consisted of respondents that had completed primary education level (Table 1). When other (higher) educational levels were compared, the probability to trust in the action of the private security companies was lower on higher educational levels. Again, trust in the police varied differently. The probability to trust the police increased nearly on all the higher education levels when compared to the primary education background. Compared to women, men were less likely to trust the actions of private security companies than the police. The difference between men and women’s trust in the police was small (Table 1). Moreover, when the other variables were controlled for, being an eyewitness to crimes decreases the probability to trust in the actions of private security companies when compared to those who had not witnessed crimes. To conclude, the results show that trust in public and private policing can be considered somewhat high in Finland; however, trust is not equal, and security companies were trusted less than the police and general trust in private security has diminished over time. One interpretation is that Finnish citizens trust the police more than the private security sector because police meet more of their expectations than private security companies. Maybe it is not clear what is expected from the private security companies. Therefore, the decreasing trend of trust might be rooted on unclear assumptions and expectations. Also, the legitimacy of private vs. public policing might be a concern as noted in other studies (e.g. White 2012; Fielder and Murphy 2022). Furthermore, perceptions related to procedural justice likely also influence. Aspects we focus more next. Trust varies to some extent between variables such as gender, age, and educational background. Based on the survey, we do not know exactly why, and we need more information on the quality of trust and more precise questions of “what” and “where”. One possible explanation for gender differences is that men are more likely to be objects of security guard control procedures because of their gender. Regarding age, on the one hand, older generations may have accumulated more negative experiences on private companies over the years than younger and consequently trust less in private security companies. However, this would not explain the higher trust in the police. So perhaps older generations might know the phenomena of privatization of policing less, and therefore “trust the old system”. When considering educational background, one explanation could be the identification of respondents. In Finland, it is possible to work as a security officer with a low educational background. For people with lower educational background, it might be easier to identify with security officers. Similarly, a higher educational background might explain higher trust in police who is also highly educated in Finland. Similar explanation may be for the age group effect also: young people may identify more with private security guards who are typically rather young or more familiar with technological development such as CCTV cameras that are typically associated with private security. Lastly, those respondents who had witnessed crimes trusted less likely the actions of private security companies. One explanation could be that they trust less the ability of private security companies to prevent crimes. At this point, further research on the subject is required to understand the subject on a deeper

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level. Moreover, the results do not indicate whether respondents have experiences of their own on encountering security officers or police or what kind of experiences they have had. A question we focus on next.

4 Young People’s Encounters with Private Security Guards and Ethnic Profiling Globally, and in Finland, there is a lack of research on how targets of private policing experience the interventions and how it affects their trust. A Finnish nationwide survey among young people aged 15–16 indicated that many had experienced security guard interventions (Saarikkomäki and Kivivuori 2016). In this chapter, we review prior Finnish qualitative research that used procedural justice framework to study ethnic majority and ethnic minority young people’s experiences and perceptions of private policing. Procedural justice-based research has grown rapidly, and it has focused on the question of how policing affects citizens and how policing practices that are perceived as unfair can diminish trust (e.g. Fagan and Tyler 2005; Bradford et al. 2017; Fielder and Murphy 2022). Yet prior procedural justice research has not paid much attention to those people who have direct experiences of policing, as prior studies have mainly focused on surveying confidence and general views (of the police) (Schaap and Saarikkomäki 2022). Furthermore, there has been limited attention to the private security sector as compared to the police in procedural justice field, but the research has recently grown (see, e.g., Fagan and Tyler 2005; Gurinskaya and Nalla 2020; Brands and Doorn 2020; Saarikkomäki 2018). A recent survey in Australia found that perception of procedural justice, e.g. fair and neutral treatment, was important for the citizens to build trust in private security, but the security agents were typically perceived negatively and to lack legitimacy (Fielder and Murphy 2022). The public and private policing sectors are often compared to each other, so it is somewhat surprising that the citizens’ experiences and perceptions of the two have seldom been compared (see, however, e.g., Saarikkomäki 2018; Brands and Doorn 2020). Based on in-depth qualitative interviews of underaged young people (nine focus group interviews with 31 young people, conducted in Helsinki), perceptions of private security guards compared to the public police were analysed thematically (Saarikkomäki 2018) and young people’s perceptions of procedurally just policing were analysed with narrative analysis (Saarikkomäki 2016). The study suggested that the interviewed young people based their perceptions of the police and security guards on their views of personal or their friends’ face-to-face encounters (termed trust) and on general assumptions and attitudes towards policing institutions, and on views of legal rights, and education (termed confidence) (Saarikkomäki 2018). Saarikkomäki (2018) found that young people interviewed had more trust and confidence in the police than in the security guards. Although the findings of this qualitative study and the previously presented Police Barometer survey are not fully

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comparative, the finding of citizens’ lower trust in private security than in the police is analogous. Furthermore, a qualitative approach and these comparisons can also give insights of what trust consists of and what is important for young people in fair and just policing. The police were appreciated as they were seen as more educated, professional, predictable, useful, and experienced, and it was perceived to be more demanding to become a police officer (Saarikkomäki 2018). Police officers were considered as more trustworthy and procedurally fair as compared to private security guards. Trust in security guards was occasionally challenged as they were perceived treating young people sometimes unfairly, aggressively, threatening people, using coercive measures, feigning their authority, or exceeding their legal rights (Saarikkomäki 2016, 2018). The young people perceived that they were approached more often for no apparent reason by security guards than the police. The security guards were seen to intervene in more minor things, as can be seen in a statement of an interviewee (Saarikkomäki 2018): I have noticed that security guards are a bit more aggressive towards young people whereas police officers act as if it’s semi-amusing. The police seem like they think of us as a nuisance, that we are only a minor disturbance.

However, the findings also suggest that security guards have some legitimacy, they were seen as a partner of the police, some were emphasized as friendly and helpful, and being closer to young people than the police (Saarikkomäki 2018). These findings supported White’s (2012) argument that private security should be conceptualized as having a vast impact, power, and agency but also still being shaped by the legacy of the state monopoly, in which the public police are prioritized. Furthermore, the study proposed that education is one crucial factor in creating perceptions of confidence, fairness, professionalism, and neutrality. Many interviewees raised concerns about the short training of security guards and that it could lead to unfair policing, for instance, of selective treatment of ethnic minorities (Saarikkomäki 2018). Recently, issues of ethnic profiling and public police treatment of ethnic minorities have awakened much research and media attention globally. Again, issues related to private policing have been discussed and studied less. Private policing is defined as disproportionate and selective when over-policing is found based on characteristics such as male gender, young age, low socioeconomic status, and minority ethnic background, termed ethnic profiling (Saarikkomäki and Kivivuori 2016; Keskinen et al. 2018; Saarikkomäki and Alvesalo-Kuusi 2020; outside Finland, see, e.g., Wakefield 2003; Manzo 2004). A survey indicated that young adult respondents of Somalian and Middle Eastern backgrounds reported security guard interventions more often than the Finnish majority respondents, for no apparent reason (Keskinen et al. 2018). When they interviewed racialized minorities from different age groups about their experiences of ethnic profiling, the study also found experiences related to security guards, of being frequently stopped and discriminated against, disturbing the daily life and creating exclusion (Keskinen et al. 2018).

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A Nordic cross-country project “Experiences of policing among ethnic minority youth in the Nordic countries” focused on the police (e.g. Solhjell et al. 2019; Saarikkomäki and Alvesalo-Kuusi 2020). Interestingly, however, in the Finnish dataset, the interviewees raised instances of frequent encounters with security guards. Encounters with security guards seemed not as common in the other countries studied, or at least they were not raised by the interviewees. Accordingly, one sub-study of the project focused on day-to-day interactions between security guards and ethnic minority youths in Finland (Saarikkomäki and Alvesalo-Kuusi 2020). The article was based on in-depth thematic interviews with 30 youths aged 15–23 living in the capital region of Finland (total 18 interviews of which 12 were individual interviews and 6 group interviews). Nearly all the interviewees raised experiences of security guards asking them to move on from the shopping malls, stores, metro, or train stations. Reasons for being approached are often rather trivial: playing music or chatting too loudly or being in the wrong place. In addition, being under suspicion or being followed by security guards was typical when they conduct daily errands in grocery stores. The interviewees interpreted security guards’ motives for intervening as discriminatory in many of these situations, raising concerns of ethnic profiling. For instance, suspecting ethnic minorities, but not ethnic majorities, of the same activities, eroded belief in the neutrality of security guards. Perceptions of procedural injustice were clear if the participants had faced excessive use of force, racist terms, and escalating conflicts. When the intervention was reasoned, the young people usually emphasized understanding it. The participants however also shared situations in which they felt treated fairly and suggested that not all the security guards are similar (Saarikkomäki and AlvesaloKuusi 2020). Due to increased policing, city spaces risk becoming unwelcoming and exclusive for young people and ethnic minorities. New methods of how to improve these relations have been experimenting, an issue we focus on next.

5 How to Improve Trust: Practical Experiment in the Shopping Mall Context Trust in private security seems lower than trust in the police in Finland, and regarding young people, concerns have been raised that in the shopping malls and city spaces young people do not have safe places to go when they are moved on due to increased surveillance. Furthermore, previously discussed negative face-to-face encounters and ethnic profiling can diminish trust. To improve relations, a Finnish NGO (Youth Service Association) developed a “youth focused security guard” work method, in cooperation with the worldwide security company (Securitas) and Citycon (Nordic shopping centre owner). The idea is to cross boundaries and merge the professional skills and ideologies of youth work with security guards’ work. Special attention was paid to recruit the right kind of security guards who are interested in working with young people. The Youth Service Association

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facilitates cooperation, monitors and trains the youth-focused security guards in three separate three-hour sessions, and an additional training is organized on a yearly basis. The training includes, for instance, knowledge of youth from a biological, psychological, and social perspective and information of difficult life circumstances for understanding different situations. This special training is not included into the basic training of security guards, but it is based on the cooperation and voluntary participation of selected security guards from Securitas. The training is paid with the government funding, or if the funding is not received, by the participating private companies. Recently, Saarikkomäki and Lampela (2022) studied the work of these ten trained security guards (all the “youth focused security guards” in Finland during the study time), who worked as normal security guards in common areas of six shopping malls. Qualitative content analysis was used to analyse data that has not been typically used before, even globally: security guards’ daily reports (n = 1139). The security guards filled up a short report of their encounters with young people after each work shift in 2019. The reports were sent to the Youth Service Association to gain information of the daily encounters. The reports were not meant for research purposes but to reflect the quality of the encounters, but the permissions were obtained later for this study. These reports indicated what types of situations these security guards intervened in and how they intervened. The study found that the encounters between youth-focused security guards and young people consisted of control, care, and cooperation (Saarikkomäki and Lampela 2022). In line with the more traditional role of security guards, different types of youth activities and delinquency were controlled for. However, the study also found that the role of security guards was more extended than this, and the security guards used a lot of time to talk and chat with young people and helped them when in need. They used procedurally just and fair policing tactics also in intervention situations, which seemed to work well, based on the reports, to create friendly and trusting relations. Improved relations were beneficial for both parties: the young people had more freedom in using the space and got help when in need, they were more eager to talk with security guards. The security guards were able to learn new procedures and about work with young people and prevent situations from becoming difficult and coercive. The security guards also aimed to help and solve the problems of those young people who had troubles rather than just merely controlling them or moving them on. The study argued that the role of security guards is even more multifaceted and blurred than previously understood, including sometimes a social orientation, and cooperation with public, private, and third sector agents. Prior research has focused on cooperation between police and security guards, but new types of cooperation arising with different sectors should be also studied in the future (Saarikkomäki and Lampela 2022). The findings are promising, suggesting that by increasing and improving training, which was still rather short, and paying attention to the recruitment, situations can be improved drastically. This requires however that the shopping mall hiring security guards are encouraging for this type of new work format. On a positive side, this can be a sort of win–win situation for both parties if the relations become more friendly

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and fair and mutual trust is built. This study was limited to focus on the reports that the security guards had written themselves; the study did not have a control group, and one could speculate if the security guards wish to give a positive impression of their practices. However, the reports also indicated reflections of difficult situations to handle, giving some confidence that the guards reflected their work from different sides, even if some sides may have been left out (Saarikkomäki and Lampela 2022). In the future, it would be interesting to interview security guards about how they see the work with young people and other groups.

6 Security Guards’ Victimization at Their Work Trustworthy and mutually respectful relations between security guards and citizens might be difficult to accomplish if the relations are at worst conflicting, aggressive, or even violent. We present Finnish research regarding how likely it is for security guards to experience victimization at their work based on survey and register data. The limited number of studies to address work-related victimization of security officers in Finland suggests that it is rather common (see, e.g., Leino et al. 2011; Paasonen and Aaltonen 2020). Paasonen and Aaltonen (2020) used survey data of 539 respondents to study victimization at work among private security officers in different sectors. About three quarters of the respondents had experienced offensive behaviour and two-thirds had been threatened with violence in the past year. The most common form of physical violence reported by the security guards was pushing, experienced by roughly half of the respondents. One in four had experienced kicking or hitting. Altogether 55% reported physical violence, and about one in five had sustained an injury due to violence. The most common injuries were bruises (40%), contusions (17%), and wounds (15%). Verbal insults and threats of violence were even more common. Despite the high risk of victimization, the respondents were not especially worried about experiencing various forms of violence at work in the future. 32% of those who had experienced violence during the past year had at least one act of violence against them reported to the police, and the same proportion also stated that at least one such report led to a fine or conviction for the offender (Paasonen and Aaltonen 2020). The risk of experiencing violence at their work varies considerably within the work sector, order maintenance duties being the ones with the highest risk (Paasonen and Aaltonen 2020). On average, those who work as doormen in restaurants, hospitals, and social services appear to be at the highest risk of physical violence victimization, compared to workers in other locations, such as offices. The risk of violence decreased with age, and women were at a lower risk of violence, even after controlling for location and position (Paasonen and Aaltonen 2020). To gain comparison points, figures based on register data are next compared between security guards and police as well as over time. Aaltonen et al. (2017) examined the extent to which private security officers are involved in policerecorded violence as either victims or offenders, by using national Finnish data on

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police-recorded crimes. Results indicate that in the year 2000, the levels of violence against police and the private security officers were almost equal. However, around the years 2005–2006, violence against security officers started increasing faster, relative to both violence against public officials and all assaults. Since the year 2008, the levels of all three types of violence seem to have levelled off. Some part of the increase in police-reported assaults in Finland is however likely due to increased sensitivity and likelihood of police notification and legal reforms. The results suggest that violence against security officers is now more common in absolute numbers than violence against public officials. There are roughly 2500 annual cases of violence against security officers and around 1600 against public officials. As police-recorded violence excludes hidden crime, it is likely that especially much of the less serious cases are left out (Aaltonen et al. 2017). Security guards’ use of force and violence at their work was also studied using police register data (see more Aaltonen et al. 2017). Victimization at work creates obviously negative relations with targets of policing and violence conducted by the security guards can diminish citizen trust in many ways not only for those who experience it but also for those who witness it.

7 Concluding Discussion In this article, we have reviewed plural policing studies in Finland to gain a broader view of the empirical context of private policing in this Nordic welfare state context. This is the first paper to cover all these studies and it aims to briefly review current private policing studies in Finland. As presented earlier, so far there has not been much research on trust between private security and citizens, even globally, despite the fact that police studies have increasingly focused on the issue. In this chapter, we have proposed that in addition to measuring general trust and confidence, trust created or challenged in specific encounters between citizens and security guards is important to consider. We pointed out that there is overall rather high general confidence in the private security sector in Finland, similar to public police. However, based on surveys, trust in the private security companies was lower than in the police in all the groups studied (Haarla 2021) and youths’ interviews indicated the same (Saarikkomäki 2018). Trust in the actions of private security companies and police varies somewhat depending on the social economic status: men, older people, and respondents with higher education backgrounds were less likely to trust private security companies. Furthermore, a decreasing trend of trust towards private security companies warrants more attention in the future. In addition, we focused on those who are typical targets of policing and have personal experiences of security guards, young people, and ethnic minority youths. We pointed out that the young people interviewed have had encounters that were perceived as negative, such as too much force used and discriminatory practices, and that they diminished trust (Saarikkomäki 2016; Saarikkomäki and Alvesalo-Kuusi

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2020). Low trust in private security guards compared to the police was reasoned based on negative and unfair experiences (such as unprofessional use of force or ethnic profiling) and based on general views of security guards being less educated, less calm and professional than the police (Saarikkomäki 2018). In addition, we looked at a new experiment to improve trust in the shopping mall context. Even a rather short education helped the security guards to improve their work and to build more trustworthy relations with young people (Saarikkomäki and Lampela 2022). Finally, we looked at the nature of violence at private security guards’ work (Paasonen and Aaltonen 2020; Aaltonen et al. 2017). Many had faced violence at their work, as victims or as perpetrators, particularly in the order maintenance duties. Violence against security officers appeared more common in absolute numbers than violence against public officials. This obviously creates challenges for trustworthy relations between citizens and security guards and trust building is particularly important in the risky sectors. Studies conducted in Finland are unfortunately still scarce and fragmented and many research topics are understudied. However, we could see some variety of methods used and different angles: the sides of citizens’ general views, from those who regularly meet security guards, and the work environment of the security guards. One angle missing though in Finland is views of police officers of private security, as well as ethnographic studies. New study approaches and developing methods are still needed globally to analyse citizens’ views of trust in private security in different contexts and in comparison to public police. Our studies produced somewhat differing findings. Based on the Police Barometer Survey older age groups trusted less likely private security companies and more likely police when compared to under the age of 25 (Haarla 2021). Yet qualitative studies and impressions of the youth workers in the field are that many young people have sometimes very conflicting relations challenging trust (Saarikkomäki 2018; Saarikkomäki and Lampela 2022). Furthermore, notions of ethnic profiling related to private policing similarly warrant close attention in the future, and in different contexts, an issue which the police studies have long focused on (Keskinen et al. 2018; Saarikkomäki and Alvesalo-Kuusi 2020). It may be that these studies have measured somewhat different aspects of trust, or different populations, and the questions measured different aspects of the private security field (companies vs. security guards at city space). Surveys typically measure more general views (“confidence”), whereas interview studies come close to personal face-to-face experiences. All in all, this suggests that in the future studies we need multiple ways and methods to study trust and confidence, in different population groups and contexts. Many police studies on trust have focused on the general population, whereas it is suggested that experiences of minorities and vulnerable groups, who potentially have the worst experiences, are crucial to include too (e.g. Schaap and Saarikkomäki 2022). When studying trust in policing, we should consider multifaceted phenomena in which personal, friends’, and families’ experiences as well as general views through the media, socialization, trust in the state, and so on simultaneously affect; issues largely ignored in procedural justice literature (Schaap and Saarikkomäki 2022).

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The findings suggest that not only more research on definitions of trust but also development of better practices for improving trust between security guards and young people, older age groups, and ethnic minorities in particular is important, as is the need for sufficient training and avoidance of over-coercive and frequent interventions. To amend and lengthen the short training of security guards may be a crucial solution to many issues, both related to citizen general trust and personal experiences and to increase work safety of security guards. Furthermore, those young people interviewed who raised experiences of excessive use of force and violence, or ethnic profiling, had not reported it to the police as they worried the adults would not believe their word over the security guard’s word (e.g. Saarikkomäki 2016, 2018). This suggests that we also need new ways to increase the willingness to report if targets of policing feel unfairly or illegally treated. Similarly, the security guards need more support to enhance the work safety at their work that is socially and physically demanding. It is likely that these incidents too are underreported to the police. Regarding some limits of the methods used, the targets of policing see the situations from their part, the policing agents see the situations from their part, and the parties can experience the situations differently. Accordingly, we need several types of data sources and methods to gain multi-sided views. If we were interested to understand more of those points where coercive measures or violence is reported to avoid it, different methods could be used to widen the angles. In addition, the initial police reports of violence by security officers could be followed up through the criminal justice process to define the legal boundaries of use of force, and to investigate how and to what extent such cases proceed through the criminal justice system and lead to sanctions. Nevertheless, focusing on procedural justice, fair treatment and strategically aiming to improve the encounters, seem to be beneficial for both parties. Procedural justice cannot be, however, the only answer (Schaap and Saarikkomäki 2022). Neither the responsibility of security officers solely, we need more structural solutions in the level of workplaces, training, cooperation with different sectors, legislation, and discussions of legitimacy. The private security officers in Finland have voiced a need to clarify their powers, improve criminal liability and criminal law protection issues, and to enhance supervision and cooperation between the private security industry and public authorities (Paasonen and Santonen 2016). It is likely that longer training and paying attention to recruiting people could help to improve these issues to some extent, and especially if the training could be developed to cover issues such as avoidance of profiling and respectful treatment. This also leads to a more comparative question of how training is organized, and how different models of regulation and the operational boundaries in different countries are working and known by the practitioners. This kind of study might reveal a significant shortcoming in education and/or to suggest that private security industry regulation is poorly drafted. These questions too are relevant for procedural justice and trust building. Since our attempt to understand private security is limited by national-level data, generalization on the European and especially on the global level is limited to some empirical and theoretical insights. Accordingly, cross-

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country comparisons between different countries are therefore suggested to consider to further understand plural policing from different angles and contexts in the future.

References Aaltonen M, Paasonen J, Hamari A, Aaltonen O-P (2017) Violence involving private security officers as victims and offenders: analysis of levels, trends and individual-level correlates using police-recorded data from Finland. Tidskrift utgiven av Juridiska föreningen i Finland 153(6):942–961 Bradford B, Sargeant E, Murphy K, Jackson J (2017) A leap of faith? Trust in the police among immigrants in England and Wales. Br J Criminol 57(2):381–401 Brands J, Doorn J (2020) Policing nightlife areas: comparing youths’ trust in police, door staff and CCTV. Polic Soc 30(4):429–445 Button M, Stiernstedt P (2017) The evolution of security industry regulation in the European Union. Int J Comp Appl Crim Just 41:245–257 Fagan J, Tyler T (2005) Legal socialization of children and adolescents. Soc Justice Res 18(3):217– 241 Fielder J, Murphy K (2022) A crisis of legitimacy?: The importance of procedural justice in frontline private security provision. Polic Soc. https://doi.org/10.1080/10439463.2021.2023527 Gurinskaya A, Nalla MK (2020) Citizen satisfaction with private police in Russia: Does satisfaction with public police matter? J Contemp Crim Justice 36(1):4–18 Haarla S (2021) Maailman turvallisin ja luotettavin maa?: Suomalaisten luottamus yksityisiin vartiointiliikkeisiin ja poliisiin sekä rikollisuuden pelko 2000-luvun Suomessa. (The safest and most reliable country in the world? Trust in the actions of private security companies and police, and fear of crime in Finland during the 2000s.) Master’s thesis, University of Turku Kasperson R, Golding D, Tuler S (1992) Social distrust as a factor in siting hazardous facilities and communicating risks. J Soc Issues 48(4):161–187 Kerttula T (2010) Vartijat ja järjestyksenvalvojat julkisen vallan käyttäjinä (Security guards as exercisers of public power). University of Helsinki Keskinen S, Alemanji AA, Himanen M, Kivijärvi A, Osazee U, Pöyhölä N, Rousku V (2018) The stopped—Ethnic profiling in Finland. Swedish School of Social Science, University of Helsinki Leino T, Selin R, Summala H, Virtanen M (2011) Work-related violence against security guards— who is most at risk? Ind Health 49(2):143–150 Leloup P, White A (2021) Questioning Anglocentrism in plural policing studies: Private security regulation in Belgium and the United Kingdom. Eur J Criminol. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 14773708211014853 Manzo J (2004) The folk devil happens to be our best customer: Security officers’ orientations to ‘youth’ in three Canadian shopping malls. Int J Sociol Law 32:243–261 Moreira S, Cardoso C, Nalla M (2015) Citizen confidence in private security guards in Portugal. Eur J Criminol 12:208–225 Paasonen J (2020) Kyselytutkimus vartioimisliiketoiminnan ja vartijan toimivaltuuksien sääntelystä. Oikeustiede–Jurisprudentia -vuosikirja LIII:202–250 Paasonen J (2021) Yksityisen turvallisuusalan historia. Jyri & Laura Paasonen Oy, Helsinki Paasonen J, Aaltonen M (2020) Violent victimization, fear of crime, and experiences of criminal justice processes among security personnel in Finland: evidence from survey data. J Contemp Crim Justice 36(1):161–172 Paasonen J, Santonen T (2016) The functionality of private security regulation in Finland—a practitioner perspective. JFT 1–2(2016):150–178

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Saarikkomäki E (2016) Perceptions of procedural justice among young people: Narratives of fair treatment in young people’s stories of police and security guard interventions. Br J Criminol 56(6):1253–1271 Saarikkomäki E (2018) Young people’s conceptions of trust and confidence in the crime control system: Differences between public and private policing. Criminol Crim Justice 18(2):156–172 Saarikkomäki E, Alvesalo-Kuusi A (2020) Ethnic minority youths’ encounters with private security guards: Unwelcome in the city space. J Contemp Crim Justice 36(1):128–143 Saarikkomäki E, Kivivuori J (2016) Encounters between security guards and young people: The extent and biases of formal social control. Policing Soc 26:824–840 Saarikkomäki E, Lampela P (2022) Improving private security–youth relations in quasi-public spaces: control, care, cooperation. Int J Comp Appl Crim Justice 46(1):15–30. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/01924036.2021.1899000 Schaap D, Saarikkomäki E (2022) Rethinking police procedural justice. Theor Criminol 26(3):416–433. https://doi.org/10.1177/13624806211056680 Schclarek Mulinari L, Keskinen S (2020) Racial profiling in the racial welfare state: Examining the order of policing in the Nordic region. Theor Criminol. https://doi.org/10.1177/ 1362480620914914 Solhjell R, Saarikkomäki E, Haller MB et al. (2019) We are Seen as a Threat: Police Stops of Young Ethnic Minorities in the Nordic Countries. Crit Crim 27:347–361. https://doi.org/ 10.1007/s10612-018-9408-9 Vuorensyrjä M, Fagerlund M (2016) Poliisibarometri 2016 (“Police Barometer Survey 2016”). Ministry of the Interior, Helsinki Wakefield A (2003) Selling security: The private policing of public space. Willan, Devon White A (2012) The new political economy of private security. Theor Criminol 16:85–101

Elsa Saarikkomäki is DSocSci, an Associate Professor in Criminology, and a University Lecturer at the Faculty of Law, University of Turku, Finland. Saarikkomäki’s postdoc research projects focus on plural policing, experiences of policing among ethnic minorities and young people, procedural justice, migration, and victimization. Jyri Paasonen is LL.D, is an Assistant Professor at the University of Vaasa. He has a wideranging work experience in the security field. Paasonen recently completed his postdoc research project where he used diverse materials to study the private security sector. Sanna Haarla is M. Soc. Sc. interested in sociology of law and procedural justice. Haarla wrote her master’s thesis on trust in the police and in private security sector. She works as a technical assistant at the Institute of Criminology and Legal Policy at the University of Helsinki, Finland.

“If You Put Two Lazy People Together or Two Stupid People Together, You Don’t Get Much Out of It”. A German Case Study on Plural Policing and Crime-Related Feelings of (In-)Security in an Inner-City Area Benjamin Coomann, Saskia Kretschmer, and Tim Lukas

Abstract In addition to preventing crime and disorder, the plural policing approach also aims to reduce feelings of (in-)security in public space. However, citizens’ attitudes towards the police and municipal law enforcement agencies are frequently overlooked in the research on fear of crime. We assume a reciprocal relationship between the level of trust placed in different security actors and the degree of perceived (in-)security, which is shaped by local conditions and organisational structures. Since the 1990s, the security architecture of the city of Wuppertal holds a comprehensive cooperation between the municipal law enforcement agency and the local police department leading to joint patrols in central parts of the city. Based on expert interviews and a postal survey (n = 1762) we will address the following research questions: Do the citizens of Wuppertal feel safe and secure in public spaces of the inner city? How much do they trust the police and members of the municipal public order service? To what extent does the perception of municipal law enforcement and police legitimacy influence the degree of perceived (in-)security? Keywords Plural policing · Municipal public order service · Fear of crime · City centre · Public space · Central railway station

B. Coomann () VDI Technologiezentrum, Düsseldorf, Germany e-mail: [email protected] S. Kretschmer · T. Lukas Institute for Public Safety and Emergency Management, University of Wuppertal, Wuppertal, Germany e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. Hirschmann et al. (eds.), Plural Policing in the Global North, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16273-2_11

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1 Introduction Since the 1990s, policing in Germany developed into different ways of preserving safety and security. A process of rearranging the traditionally police-driven security work led to an expanding role of municipal authorities in ensuring security and order. Several major cities in Germany established municipal public order services (MPOS) as part of a community-based security architecture. Shared responsibilities between municipal and state police forces are intended to prevent and prosecute crime and disorderly conduct and to strengthen the perception of safety, security and order in public space. MPOS resemble the appearance of state police forces, but have different tasks, competences and city-dependent resources. The equipment and the staff level of the MPOS vary due to the city’s financial resources and its political perspective on local security challenges. Consequently, already this variance regarding the MPOS leads to differences in forms of plural policing between communities as well as their influence on crime-related feelings of safety and security. In order to examine the influence of plural policing on feelings of (in-)security, we conducted a case study focusing on the German city of Wuppertal in North Rhine-Westphalia. Since the late 1990s, the city’s security architecture follows a plural policing approach between the municipal law enforcement agency and the local police department leading to occasional joint patrols of the MPOS and the police. Shared responsibilities of both authorities are intended to reduce crime and disorder. At the same time, the cooperation aims to reduce fear of crime in public spaces and to promote citizens’ trust towards the police and the MPOS through an increased presence of security forces in the public realm. In order to shed light on this interrelation, we initially give an overview on the theoretical background of plural policing strategies in the context of perceptions of safety and security. Our empirical basis is rooted in a case study based on the research project “Kooperation Sicherheit Innenstadt/Döppersberg (KoSID)”, which focuses on the coordination of safety and security responsibilities in the city centre and near the Wuppertal central railway station. By taking a detailed look into the results of a series of expert interviews and the findings of a postal population survey, we will address the following research questions: How safe do the citizens of Wuppertal feel in the city centre? How much do Wuppertal’s citizens trust the police and the MPOS? How far does the citizens’ perception of MPOS and police influence crime-related feelings of (in-)security? We assume a reciprocal relationship between the level of trust placed in different security stakeholders and the degree of perceived (in-)security, which are shaped by local conditions and organisational structures.

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2 Theoretical Framework Due to the scandalisation of crime rate trends and an orientation of police work towards quality of life, a change in the local security architecture of cities has been taking place since the 1990s. David Garland (2001) has analysed this shift towards an expanding infrastructure of crime prevention and community safety at the local level as a new “culture of control”: Preventative partnerships between state, municipal and private actors thereby constitute the beginning of a new crime control apparatus that moves policing priorities towards fear reduction and order maintenance. By focusing on the fight against crime and gradually withdrawing from the field of regulatory offences, police tasks in the area of administrative law are currently being distributed across several shoulders. Many cities in Western societies now follow a “multiagency partnership approach to the reduction of crime and disorder alongside the fear of crime” (Hughes 2006, 47) with more and more non-police providers becoming engaged in policing activities (Wakefield 2009). Shared responsibility now forms the organisational basis of “a web of linkages between the police, various organizations and the public” (Fleming 2006, 38). With the pluralisation of policing, security stakeholders other than the police are gaining more importance for providing security and public order in a growing number of countries (Jones and Newburn 2006). In Germany, “additional stakeholders appear in conjunction with the police, becoming a complementary agent for security and order” (Hirschmann 2014, 21). Besides private security providers, one of these agents are the MPOS, with which public order policing is being re-municipalised to a greater extent (Behr 2002). While in the USA public order policing evolved as a reaction to the muchcriticised broken windows policing strategies to impose order through strict enforcement (Braga et al. 2019), the origins and formal conditions in Germany are different. The German federal system divides the country into 16 different states. Each state has its own police, which is responsible to police at the federal state level and to coordinate police departments in every municipality of the state. In addition to that, federal police forces are responsible for policing at a national level to control and protect borders, airports, central railway stations, and national property throughout the entire country. Starting from a vacuum created by restructuring police authorities and their areas of responsibility after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, many major German cities established or strengthened MPOS, which resemble the appearance of state police forces, but have different tasks, competences and resources (Morhardt 2019). The employees go through 3 years of training, but the training differs from each other. In a dual system, the police training includes a practical part (apprenticeship) and a theoretical part (academic studies), whereas the training of the MPOS is solely dedicated to vocational training. In addition, the police training system allows for career opportunities, which can be achieved with further educational training. The MPOS, on the other hand, offer hardly any opportunities for professional advancement and correspondingly only few opportunities for further training.

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Equipped with batons and pepper spray, the uniformed forces of the municipal department of law enforcement have considerable powers, which are mainly derived from police and public order laws of the federal states as well as various municipal ordinances (Beck 2018; Lauber and Mühler 2019). The daily work of the MPOS mainly focuses on deviant and marginalised groups, such as homeless people, drug addicts or sex workers, and certain types of disorderly conduct, such as aggressive panhandling, (noise) harassment, public alcohol consumption and camping in public spaces. Nevertheless, the distinction between police tasks and duties of the MPOS is often unclear and leads to a pragmatic division of labour between police forces and MPOS staff in everyday practice (Frevel 2015, 270). Defined in the respective police laws of the federal states (in North-Rhine Westphalia: § 7 Abs. 3 POG NRW), administrative and police authorities have the legal right to exceed their factual or local jurisdictional limits in order to avert danger. Thus, under specific circumstances and case related scenarios both the police and the MPOS have immediate responsibilities to intervene. The presence of the MPOS can be limited to specific areas that are perceived as problematic, or it can be throughout the city. Particularly in “hot spots of fear” (Nasar and Fisher 1993), the presence of uniformed forces is intended to increase the subjective feeling of safety and security of the population. The so-called disorder model identifies signs of incivility as relevant factors that influence the subjective perception of safety and security in public spaces. This includes spatial patterns of physical deterioration as well as certain types of disorderly conduct that are perceived as a disruption of normative order (Skogan 2015). Thus, the perception of urban disorder phenomena is regarded as a trigger of crime-related feelings of insecurity. As described in the broken windows-approach (Wilson and Kelling 1982), incivilities and disorder indicate low levels of social control, which may lead to a higher degree in the fear of crime. Although many studies find a positive correlation between the perception of incivilities and fear of crime (e.g. LaGrange et al. 1992; Lewis and Salem 1986), others, especially multivariate analyses, show contradictory results (e.g. Sampson and Raudenbush 1999; Häfele and Lüdemann 2006). While the determinants of fear of crime have been extensively investigated over the past decades, only few studies use attitudes towards security stakeholders as explanatory variables (Alda et al. 2017). Relevant studies show a systematic connection between trust in the police and the perception of crime-related perceptions of safety and security. Thus, confidence with the police is regularly associated with a lower fear of crime (e.g. Lytle and Randa 2015; Martinez-Ferrer et al. 2018). The same applies to the public assessment of the effectiveness of police work in fighting crime. Several studies report statistically significant correlations between the assessment of police effectiveness and crime-related feelings of safety and security. Respondents’ positive ratings of police effectiveness are generally associated with lower levels of fear of crime (e.g. Oh et al. 2019; Singer et al. 2019). However, a recent analysis finds no evidence for influences of police trust on crimerelated perceptions of safety and security in Germany: Based on the data of the German Victimisation Survey 2017, Hirtenlehner et al. (2021, 13) conclude that a

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fear-reducing impact of personal confidence in the police has to be rejected. While trust in the police is now a well-explored field of research, little is known about trust in the MPOS. Findings repeatedly reveal that gender, age, migration background and fear of crime are statistically significant predictors, whereas socioeconomic status shows a moderating effect on satisfaction with the police (for an overview, cf. Bolger et al. 2021). In our analysis, we want to test the specific predictors in a comparative perspective for the police and MPOS and find explanations for the relationship between fear of crime and trust towards police and municipal authorities.

3 Methods and Data Our analysis is based on data derived from the research project KoSID, which was set up as part of the redevelopment of Wuppertal’s central railway station environment. The redevelopment of the station forecourt (called Döppersberg) can be regarded as the most crucial and influential infrastructure project of the past decades in the centre of the North Rhine-Westphalian city of Wuppertal (362,350 inhabitants in 2020). Wuppertal is located in the Rhine-Ruhr area, close to both the state capital of Düsseldorf and the Ruhr region with the neighbouring city of Essen. While Düsseldorf and Essen serve as business places for a variety of publicly traded and major companies, the economic structure of Wuppertal is characterised by midsized enterprises. From a comparative perspective, Wuppertal is considered a poor city with low purchasing power (Schröder 2019). Municipal finances were also subject to the rules of provisional budget management (“emergency budget”) over the past years. Therefore, the redevelopment of the Döppersberg was a major effort, which is now expected to attract purchasing power from outside the city. Reconstructing the Döppersberg should also contribute to an increase of objective security, despite the fact that crime rates in Wuppertal already declined since 2016. According to police crime statistics (Polizei Nordrhein-Westfalen 2021) 28,620 offences were recorded in Wuppertal in 2020. In relation to 2019, the crime rate further declined by 4.5%. Compared to other major German cities of comparable size, Wuppertal ranks in the middle range with a frequency ratio (cases per 100,000 inhabitants) of 8060 (2020). Given the crime opportunity structures of inner city areas the research area in the city centre of Wuppertal is more prone to crime than other city districts (Projekt KoSID 2021). The redesign of the station’s vicinity was intended to create a direct and attractive “connection between the central station and the city centre—without spaces of fear” (Stadt Wuppertal 2021). The most crucial part of the redevelopment process was the relocation of the predominant car traffic beneath a bridge for pedestrians. The car-free connection between the city centre and the central station forecourt made it possible to reshape the station’s vicinity to a spacious area combining mobility and numerous consumption purposes. New shopping possibilities, a new central bus station and different zones to rest within walking distance provide a high quality of stay. A particular section of the new built central station forecourt

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integrates counselling for substance abuse and homelessness, a nightclub and a tourist information office in order to integrate different social groups and forms of usage. Now the redevelopment of this area represents a caesura and a new beginning in the perception of this central city space, which was on top of the list of places identified in the city’s concept for urban areas of fear for a long time (Stadt Wuppertal 2012). In order to maintain public safety and security in this new environment, the city, the police and the university initiated the local security partnership rooted in the research project KoSID, which brings together stakeholders from different domains and aims to contribute to ensuring security and order through shared responsibilities. In that sense, shared responsibilities include the coordination and discussion of current security-related developments and potential measures of improvement. A special feature of the KoSID project is the accompanying scientific research conducted by the University of Wuppertal. The goal of the research project is to promote close cooperation between urban planning, trade and commerce, public transportation, municipal administration, social and security work in order to enhance security and the feeling of safety and security within the research area. With a specific focus on the area near the central railway station and the city centre, the project intensifies and expands a mode of cooperation that is already established in Wuppertal within the framework of crime prevention partnerships (Stadt Wuppertal 2018). In this context, occasional joint patrols by the police and the MPOS have already become a tradition and are now being transferred to the new urban area. The case study’s analysis on the relationship between the level of trust placed in different security stakeholders and the degree of perceived (in-)security is based on a mixed-methods research design comprising a postal population survey and guided interviews with experts. The mixed-methods approach allows for a closer look into the effects of citizens’ confidence with different local security stakeholders and for analysing the underlying causes. In order to investigate the above-mentioned relationship our analysis follows three different steps. First, we focus on the overall feeling of crime-related safety and security in the research area. Second, we analyse citizens’ attitudes towards different local security stakeholders, and finally, we asked how the level of trust placed in different security actors related to citizens’ feelings of safety and security. The quantitative postal survey was conducted in spring 2021 and targeted adults aged older than 18 in the city of Wuppertal. The sampling process of the survey randomly chose registered citizens spatially divided into different city districts, while intentionally oversampling the city centre. In total, n = 1762 respondents answered the questionnaire, resulting in a total response rate of 22%. As expected, the sample includes a relatively low share of specific population groups (social welfare recipients/households, migrants and foreigners). On average, the respondents’ age is relatively high at 54 years (for a detailed description of the sample, see Table 1). Accordingly, the evaluation of the sample does not claim to be representative. The questionnaire included questions regarding perceptions of disorder and signs of incivility, fear of crime, acceptance of security measures, attitudes towards police and other security stakeholders.

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Table 1 Socio-demographic composition of the population and sample Persons Women Foreigners Migrants Social Welfare Recipients Proportion of people aged ≥ 65

Wuppertal (2020) 362,350 50% 21% 41% 17% 14%

Sample (2021) 1762 55% 6% 15% 6% 32%

We analysed the quantitative data by an initial descriptive analysis, followed by a multivariate analysis of relevant predictors using ordinal regression. The dependent variable is the standard item for fear of crime (“How safe do you feel when you are out alone during the day/in the dark?”) using a four-point rating scale that included response options ranging from 1 (“very safe”) to 4 (“very unsafe”), adapted to our research areas of the new station forecourt and the city centre. As trust towards the police and the MPOS includes at least both an instrumental and a normative dimension, we also tested for the two indices effectiveness and fairness as predictors in the model (Jackson and Bradford 2010, 245). Following Jackson and Bradford (2010), the measurement of fairness is based on agreement (4-point Likert scale) with the statements “the police/MPOS make fair and impartial decisions”, “...treat everyone equally, regardless of whether you are rich or poor”, “...are not influenced by prejudices against people in their work”. The construct of effectiveness, in turn, was measured by the items “...are there when you need them”, “...are successful in ensuring security and order”, “...can be seen frequently enough in public spaces” and the opposing items “...is overburdened”, “...have to be tough to be taken seriously”, “...are unnecessary, they can’t do anything anyway”. The latter were re-coded in the opposite direction so that agreement to the effectiveness items was expressed in higher values. The previously conducted factor analysis results in a splitting of originally nine items into two imputed dimensions (Cronbach’s alpha 0.80 for the police items and 0.87 for the MPOS items). To control the predictors, we used standard socio-demographic characteristics such as gender, educational level, migration background and socioeconomic deprivation. Our quantitative analysis is complemented by a qualitative content analysis, in which the knowledge of experts forms the basis to identify and analyse causal relationships (Bogner et al. 2009). In addition to regular on-site visits with experts in the study area, we conducted 18 guided interviews with 29 experts from different occupational groups and with a professional connection to the research area, covering personnel from both working and management level (Table 2). The goal of the interviews was to obtain an in-depth picture of the research area and to collect relevant background information, contextual knowledge and security-related perceptions of experts. Thus, the interview guidelines included several aspects of safety and security, covering crime-related as well as urban development issues and questions regarding the extent and willingness to cooperate in safety and security matters.

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Table 2 Distribution of interview partners and professions Profession Social Facilities Police, MPOS Marketing and Communication Commerce and Trade Drug Users (Group Discussion) Politicians Municipal Administration: Urban Planning,Social Welfare Municipal Transport Service Total

Interviews 2 6 2 2 1 2 2 1 18

Persons 5 7 2 2 5 2 4 2 29

4 Results This chapter presents the empirical results of the postal population survey and the qualitative expert interviews. The triangulation of quantitative and qualitative data allows for an in-depth analysis of our three research questions.

4.1 Perception of Safety and Security in Public Space First, we will go into the results of the postal survey in order to answer our first research question on the respondents’ feelings of safety and security. When asking the participants about their fear of crime the results show that Wuppertal’s citizens feel rather or very safe at the central station forecourt (87%) and in the area of city centre (90%). Even though there is an expected difference regarding the time of the day, more than one third of the respondents’ state that they feel rather or very safe in the research area at night (station forecourt: 43%; city centre: 37%). The finding is particularly remarkable because the surroundings of railway stations are often generally considered as places that are associated with an increased degree of perceived insecurity and fear of crime (Haverkamp et al. 2018). For the city of Wuppertal, the results can be regarded as a positive effect of redesigning the station forecourt since the vicinity of the central railway station has been at the top of the list of urban spaces of perceived fear for a long time (Stadt Wuppertal 2012). In order to identify hot spots of fear and discomfort in the city centre, the participants were also asked to name places where they feel particularly insecure. We categorised the places mentioned and assigned them to the respective street sections and squares. Figure 1 provides an overview of the places mentioned in the research area. Since the survey data at this point do not depict the reasons for which the respondents feel uncomfortable, the on-site visits with experts show that the perceived quality of stay is noticeably lower. What becomes obvious is that most of

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Fig. 1 Places where respondents feel uncomfortable (own figure based on shapefiles provided by the city of Wuppertal)

the places mentioned are very crowded places in the main shopping street or places with a low quality of stay, which includes signs of incivility and disorder. On the one hand, a relevant factor seems to be the presence of marginalised groups, as the street scenes of drug users and homeless people are still particularly visible around the central railway station and thus contribute to a certain feeling of discomfort. Due to the reconstruction of the area, a drug help facility had to close for a long period, so that the street scenes dispersed in the area of Wuppertal’s city centre without a fixed point of contact. On the other hand, the redesign has brought about numerous improvements that also contribute to the feeling of crime-related safety and security. The majority of expert interviews repeatedly contain statements that positively emphasise the impression that the new central station forecourt leaves today. The following quote describes the current feeling of safety and security as compared to the situation before the reconstruction work began: I even feel very safe there. I remember how unsafe I felt at the old Döppersberg, I found it really scary and threatening. It was quite unpleasant to walk through the underpass. That’s completely different now. (Interview Municipal Administration 2 #00:04:19#)

Compared to the results from other German cities, where crime-related feelings of safety and security in central railway station districts are rather limited (Üblacker and Lukas 2019), we can observe a low level of fear of crime in the research area. The findings of the quantitative analysis are reflected by the results of the qualitative

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interviews. Above all, positive effects on the feeling of safety and security are attributed to the structural redesign, which has turned a place known as a hot spot of fear into a calling card of the city. Reshaping the main connection between the city centre and the central railway station from a desolate underpass to a spacious bridge for pedestrians altered the citizens feeling of safety and security. The former tunnel is made responsible for a “high level of perceived insecurity among the population” (Police 3 #00:07:45#).

4.2 Trust in (Local) Security Stakeholders Before we move on to the question of how local security actors are perceived by the people in Wuppertal, we first contextualise the local situation of plural policing. A variety of different actors such as social institutions (street work, counselling for substance abuse and homelessness), private security forces (DB Sicherheit) and municipal (AWG) or private (ESW) waste disposal companies contributes to feelings of safety and security in the vicinity of the central railway station in Wuppertal. Nevertheless, in the following, we solely concentrate on pluralised policing between the MPOS and the police. The MPOS in Wuppertal comprises a total of 50 staff members who are available on weekdays from 6 a.m. to 10 p.m. and during the weekend from 10 a.m. to 6 p.m. The MPOS commands eight vehicles and primarily works on demand, i.e. event-related in response to complaints. The area of operation covers the entire city area—in contrast to the police, where individual areas of operation can be distinguished due to different precincts. While the police station (Polizeirevier) is responsible for the entire borough, the police post (Polizeiwache) only covers the more restricted area of the city centre and is only accessible during the opening hours of the shops there. In addition, there is a federal police station at the main railway station, which is occupied 24 h a day. While the federal police act relatively dissociated from institutionalised plural policing, the Wuppertal state police forces work in close cooperation with the MPOS. This cooperation is particularly salient in the occasional joint patrolling of the city centre and the station forecourt. In the following, we take a closer look at the citizens’ trust in both the police and the MPOS by analysing the respondents’ assessment of fairness and effectiveness. Initially, we can observe that 88% of the respondents know that there is a MPOS in Wuppertal. About half of the respondents state that they know which tasks (57%) and authorities (53%) the MPOS have and that they occasionally patrol together with the police (53%). In regard to the dimension of fairness, it becomes clear that the respondents’ trust in the police is slightly higher than in the MPOS. While the highest approval ratings are for the item “make fair and impartial decisions”, significantly fewer respondents are willing to admit that the police and the MPOS have no prejudices when dealing with other people (Fig. 2). However, for all the differences between the individual items, the differences between the police and the MPOS are quite marginal but visible. That is, the

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68% 57%

41%

Make Fair & Imparal Decisions

Treat All Equally

Police (n=1,047-1,597)

Are in Sufficient Presence There

MPOS (n=747-1,391)

Fig. 2 Agreement (agree very much/tend to agree) to fairness (own figure)

70%

84% 78%

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70% 71% 57% 41%

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32% 6% Are There Are When You Overloaded Need Them

Are Successful

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Fig. 3 Agreement (agree very much/tend to agree) to effectiveness (own figure)

overall level of agreement regarding the MPOS is slightly lower than concerning the police. Nevertheless, the respondents experience both the police and the MPOS as acting rather fair in dealing with the people. This impression is also reflected in the interviews, where it is said: The feedback indeed is very positive. Both, the public order service and the police are trustworthy. They take care of challenges within the scope of their possibilities. (Interview Trade and Commerce 2 #00:31:09#)

In contrast, a look at the dimension of effectiveness reveals a different picture. The approval ratings for success, necessity and presence of the MPOS are noticeably lower than the ratings of the police (Fig. 3). About 12% of the respondents state that the MPOS is unnecessary, while only 6% agree with this statement for the police. Only a small proportion of respondents believe that security stakeholders are generally unnecessary with a value for the MPOS double as high as for the police. Despite the fact that the respondents view the police as more effective, they also perceive them as overworked after all (84%). At the same time, the MPOS is also regarded as overloaded (78%), but has a lower agreement rate for its effectiveness.

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The overall positive evaluation derived from the results of the postal survey corresponds with the perception of the police officers themselves: I once was a district officer myself. You are always on the streets and that is actually a very positive task for a police officer, I think. Because people are always talking to you. Usually, you try to find solutions. You always get a positive feedback. (Interview Police 4 #00:49:50#)

Considering the low agreement rates regarding the effectiveness of the MPOS, some respondents may actually think that the MPOS does not have the authority to take action. Actually, in North-Rhine Westphalia (§ 14 OBG NRW) the MPOS have similar authorities in order to avert danger, as they may also act on the basis of police law. However, the personnel resources of the MPOS in Wuppertal are very limited, so that in many cases there is a division of labour with police forces who step in during an incident: The municipal public order service is responsible for maintaining public order. However, often they cannot manage to be in the right place at the right time, because they do not have enough personnel. Often we have to step in and do it even when the MPOS is primarily responsible. In the majority of cases, they cannot comply with their tasks. Sometimes that can be problematic. (Interview Police 4 #00:45:00#)

From a police point of view, this appears to be problematic since the MPOS is obviously not fulfilling its tasks due to its low number of personnel. Except from joint patrols with the police, the MPOS works predominantly case related in order to follow calls for service. Consequently, the MPOS cannot show as much presence in the city centre as the police. Lower visibility in public space might also be a driver of the citizens’ image that the MPOS is not available when they need them. Unlike the MPOS, police patrols are able to show more presence in the city centre, which effects the citizens’ picture of a more reliable institution. The citizens’ perception of the MPOS hints at a problem of public acceptance, which MPOS are trying to counter by way of increased cooperation with the police. Having combined forces, the MPOS values plural policing as a promising approach to work more efficient and within a win–win situation for both the police and the MPOS: It’s not like that we are just deputy sheriffs or some crap [ . . . ] if you put two lazy people together or two stupid people, you don’t get much out of it. [ . . . ] But if you have two enthusiastic people who also like each other, well then they can really make a difference. (Interview MPOS 1 #0:21:12#)

At the same time, this is a way of countering the widespread misconception that the powers of the MPOS are significantly less than those of the police: “We very often hear: ‘You are not allowed to do so, only the police are allowed to do so’” (Interview MPOS 1 #00:16:33#). In the perception of the MPOS, joint actions together with the police lead to the fact that such remarks are becoming “fewer and fewer” (Interview MPOS 1 #00:16:41#).

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4.3 The Perception of Security Stakeholders and Perceived Feelings of Security In order to analyse the influence of security stakeholders on feelings of safety and security, we will now look at the perceived sense of safety and security when seeing the police or the MPOS in public space. The respondents were asked “How do you feel when you observe someone/something like that at the New Döppersberg or in the Elberfeld city center?” on a 4-point scale ranging from 1 (“very safe”) to 4 (“very unsafe”) with the extra option “no influence”. A majority of 78% and 61%, respectively, states that they feel rather or very safe when they see the police or the MPOS. Only a small proportion of respondents (11%) feels unsafe when they see the police or the MPOS in the public. Nearly one third of the respondents state that the presence of MPOS has no influence on their subjective feeling of safety and security (29%), while the corresponding figure for the police is significantly lower (12%). Overall, the majority of respondents feel safe in the presence of the police, whereas about two thirds also feel safe in presence of the MPOS. Figures 4 and 5 show the average level of perceived insecurity measured by the standard item of fear of crime. In order to produce a more sophisticated outcome, it is helpful to split the respondents into two groups, when asking about

Fig. 4 Average fear of crime (index of 4-point scale) when seeing the police (own figure)

Fig. 5 Average fear of crime (index of 4-point scale) when seeing the MPOS (own figure)

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the perceived presence of different stakeholders (“How often have you observed someone/something like this in the last 12 months on the New Döppersberg or in the city centre of Elberfeld?”) on a 5-point scale ranging from 1 (“never”) to 5 (“very often”). The first group includes respondents who frequently see the police and the MPOS at the central station forecourt and in the city centre (“often” and “very often”). The second group consists of respondents who rarely or never see one or both of these stakeholders (“never” and “rarely”). If we compare the average ratings of perceived insecurity between these groups, it can be shown that the respondents who see security forces in public space more often show significantly less fear of crime. This finding applies to both the police and the MPOS. While the relationship might be as tautological as the correlation between perceived disorder and fear of crime (Oberwittler 2008), the interviews reveal that the visibility of security forces in public space seems to contribute to an increased sense of safety and security, at least among those respondents who are actually aware of the police and the MPOS: I grew up with the image, that a uniform always gives me a sense of security. Whether it is the police or the public order service that is all the same to me. But as soon as someone uniformed appears, I am feeling safe. (Interview Urban Planning 1 #00:11:11#)

The quote refers to a socialisation effect that associates the visibility of a uniform with safety and protection. While it can be assumed that there are also people who show a contrary association due to negative experiences or distrust, the perception of uniformed patrols—whether it is the police or the MPOS—may create a sense of safety and security, especially among members of mainstream society. In order to go into more detail, we will now discuss the findings of our multivariate analysis. Table 3 shows the results of an ordinal regression model that measures various influences on the fear of crime in the city centre of Wuppertal by night. In this model, a total of 855 respondents are included. The model has a pseudo R2 of 0.0724, which indicates a Cohen f2 of 0.0781 and thus shows a weak to moderate effect. We selected different control variables such as gender, age, education, income, deprivation and migration background in order to exclude socio-demographic distortions of our statistical analysis. Our results show that especially economic factors (subjective deprivation and income) have a significant effect on fear of crime. Gender as a variable is also highly significant. This actively demonstrates that women and people on low income or perceived deprivation have a higher fear of crime. Furthermore, the model shows that three of the four tested factors (effectiveness and fairness of both the police/MPOS) are highly significant. Notably the assessment of effectiveness of the police has a reducing effect on fear of crime. A closer look on the assessment of fairness reveals that only the attitude towards the police is significant with regard to fear of crime. Our statistical analysis revealed a positive correlation between fear of crime and the evaluation of fairness of the police, confirming the so-called age effect in fear of crime research. Several studies have shown that perceived insecurity increases with age due to a higher level of vulnerability (for an overview, cf. Hummelsheim-Doss 2016). The same effect can be measured on the trust placed in security authorities, as the correlation between

“If You Put Two Lazy People Together or Two Stupid People Together, You. . . Table 3 Regression model fear of crime Gender (ref.: Female) Age Age (squared) Educational level Income Subjective deprivation Migration background (ref.: None) Fairness MPOS Fairness Police Effectiveness MPOS Effectiveness Police cut1 cut2 cut3 N R2 adj. R2 pseudo R2

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Fear of crime Coef. Std. err. –1.056*** (0.137) –0.0327 (0.0205) 0.000259 (0.000191) –0.0955 (0.0624) –0.902* (0.374) 0.347*** (0.0786) 0.113 (0.198) –0.0395 (0.0299) 0.0857** (0.0306) –0.0946*** (0.0244) –0.107*** (0.0258) –6.939*** (0.778) –4.259*** (0.748) –1.942** (0.738) 855

0.0724

*p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001

increasing age and trust is also positive (Leitgöb-Guzy 2021). Nevertheless, there are some limitations to the statistical analysis, as significance can be measured for the police, but not for the MPOS. The assessment of fairness has no significant influence if the control variables are taken into account. Other studies draw the conclusion that police have no fear-reducing effect at all (Hirtenlehner et al. 2021, 13). To identify the mechanism behind these results, a look into the interview material might be helpful. As a police officer explains, the overall effect of visibility might reduce fear of crime: When we as uniformed forces are in public space, this is predominantly perceived positively by the people. [ . . . ] People feel safe when they see uniformed police. Because they know that someone is there who can take care of them if something would happen. (Interview Police 2 #01:03:29#)

In the course of the redesign of the station forecourt, the police post that used to be located there had to move and is now found a few hundred metres away from the central railway station. While the police regret the relocation as a severe loss to the sense of security because the police post at this site was a “building block of perceived safety and security” that made “massive differences in perceived security [...]” (Interview Police 2 #00:39:33#), the effect of police presence is rather relativised elsewhere:

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I feel safe, no doubt. The police are present from time to time. Nevertheless, I do not feel it is much necessary because of my general sense of security in the city centre of Wuppertal. It is nice to see police on patrol every now and then. However, I don’t have the feeling that anarchy would evolve if they weren’t visible. (Interview Trade and Commerce 1 #00:07:45#)

As the quote makes clear, impacts of relocating the police post and the influence on the citizens’ sense of security as a consequence are assessable in different ways. Whereas security actors usually rank their self-efficacy high, which includes an improvement of feelings of safety and security through more presence, it is also possible to point out that, an individual’s general sense of security might be a striking reason as well. The interviewee opens up about a high subjective security in the city centre and qualifies that if the police would not be visible, the situation would presumably not differ very much. Difficulties to evaluate influences on the personal sense of security occur because of a variety of reasons. However, redesigning the central station forecourt created an open and welcoming space, which in itself improves crime-related feelings of safety and security through several constructional elements. However, given their specific circumstances of living, the interviewed drug users articulated a different perspective on the redeveloped vicinity of the central railway station. Although all interviewees agree in the perception that they “did not feel unsafe” (Drug Users #00:12:37#) at the underpass, they further highlight that it was easier “to deal drugs” (Drug Users #00:11:48#) prior to the redevelopment. Now it appears to be a “pure disaster” (Drug Users #00:14:59#), since the former drug scene dispersed into different areas of the city centre. Overall, our study indicates that a combination of environmental aspects of urban development and plural policing may impact positively on the citizens’ perception of safety and security, as Wuppertal’s citizens feel mostly safe and show a relatively high trust towards the police and the MPOS.

5 Conclusion While the railway station environment in many German cities is often associated with a dingy image and inner city areas usually show the highest registered crime rates due to their opportunity structures, the results of our case study highlight that Wuppertal’s citizens feel rather or very safe in the direct vicinity of the central station and in the city centre. The respondents also show a relatively high trust towards the police and the MPOS. Even though, our research indicates differences regarding citizens’ attitudes towards the effectiveness and fairness of police and municipal security authorities, as the agreement rates for the MPOS are generally lower than for the police. By using a regression model, our case study illustrates that a positive assessment of MPOS and police effectiveness leads to lower levels of fear of crime. However, our research also shows that seeing police forces is more likely to impact positively on crime-related feelings of safety and security than seeing the MPOS.

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Although our analysis of the Wuppertal case shows a highly significant relationship between the fear of crime and the trust placed into police and municipal security authorities, our research is subject to some limitations. First, our regression model shows a moderate to weak model fit, which implies that other variables may better explain the relationship. Second, it is in the nature of things that our police interview partners emphasise a fear-reducing effect of their own work. Nevertheless, compared to the police the results point to acceptance issues with the MPOS in Wuppertal. Striking reasons for that could be a higher visibility and a more elaborate training of the police. However, as having combined forces, the MPOS values plural policing as a promising approach to work efficient and “learn from each other” (Interview MPOS 1 #00:23:54). Plural policing thus strengthens the relationship between police and municipal authorities since both the police and the MPOS work within a “win-win-situation” (Interview Police 4 #0046:04#). Nevertheless, the presence of security forces (police and MPOS) in public space may generally not only contribute to strengthening feelings of safety and security. It is also possible that intensified security work risks to fail its purpose since the more uniformed security guards are perceivable in public, “the more afraid and insecure we are. It is like scratching an itch that simply gets worse” (Jones and Newburn 2006, 8). Delimitating an intensified presence of MPOS to specific locations that are perceived as being problematic may lead to their spatial stigmatisation. Intensive policing of public space may also provoke reduced feelings of safety and security among marginalised groups. As these groups are generally more vulnerable than mainstream society, increasing policing activities may jeopardise their lifeworld in considerable ways (Lukas and Coomann 2021). Specific circumstances of living (e.g. homelessness, addiction) reinforce their exposure to the streets and their necessity “to do business to be able to make it through the day” (Interview Marginalized Groups #00:13:35#). Accordingly, it is necessary that plural policing also meets the plurality of different security expectations of different social groups.

References Alda E, Bennett RR, Morabito MS (2017) Confidence in the police and the fear of crime in the developing world. Policing Int J 40(2):366–379 Beck D (2018) Die Re-Kommunalisierung polizeilicher Tätigkeitsbereiche mittels Kommunaler Ordnungsdienste. Eine Fallanalyse am Beispiel Baden-Württembergs. Verlag für Polizeiwissenschaft, Frankfurt a.M. Behr R (2002) Rekommunalisierung von Polizeiarbeit: Rückzug oder Dislokation des Gewaltmonopols? Skizzen zur reflexiven Praxisflucht der Polizei. In: Prätorius R (ed) Wachsam oder kooperativ? Der lokale Staat als Sicherheitsproduzent. Nomos, Baden-Baden, pp 90–10 Bogner A, Littig B, Menz W (2009) Interviewing experts. Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke Bolger M, Lytle D, Bolger C (2021) What matters in citizen satisfaction with police: a metaanalysis. J Crim Just 72(C):1–10 Braga AA, Welsh BC, Schnell C (2019) Disorder policing to reduce crime: a systematic review. Campbell Syst Rev. https://doi.org/10.1002/cl2.1050

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Fleming J (2006) Community policing. In: Jones T, Newburn T (eds) Plural policing. A comparative perspective. Routledge, New York, pp 37–47 Frevel B (2015) Pluralisation of local policing in Germany. Security between the state’s monopoly of force and the market. Eur J Policing Stud 2(3):267–284 Garland D (2001) The culture of control. Crime and social order in contemporary society. Oxford University Press, Oxford Häfele J, Lüdemann C (2006) “Incivilities” und Kriminalitätsfurcht im urbanen Raum. Eine Untersuchung durch Befragung und Beobachtung Kriminologisches Journal 38(4):273–291 Haverkamp R, Hennen I, Hohendorf I, Lukas T, Quel M (2018) Sicherheit im Bahnhofsviertel (SiBa). forum kriminalprävention 3:24–27 Hirschmann N (2014) Cooperative policing in the city: Voluntary civic engagement and the citizens’ perspective. Eur Police Sci Res Bull 11:21–33 Hirtenlehner H, Leitgöb-Guzy N, Bacher J (2021) Hebt ein gesteigertes Vertrauen in die Polizei das kriminalitätsbezogene Sicherheitsbefinden? Monatsschrift für Kriminologie und Strafrechtsreform. https://doi.org/10.1515/mks-2021-0115 Hughes G (2006) Community saftey. In: Jones T, Newburn T (eds) Plural policing. A comparative perspective. Routledge, New York, pp 47–49 Hummelsheim-Doss D (2016) Kriminalitätsfurcht in Deutschland. Fast jeder Fünfte fürchtet, Opfer einer Straftat zu werden. Informationsdienst Soziale Indikatoren 55:6–11 Jackson J, Bradford B (2010) What is trust and confidence in the police? Policing 4(3):241–248 Jones T, Newburn T (2006) Understanding plural policing. In: Jones T, Newburn T (eds) Plural policing. A comparative perspective. Routledge, New York, pp 1–11 LaGrange RL, Ferraro KF, Supancic M (1992) Perceived risk and fear of crime: role of social and physical incivilities. J Res Crime Delinq 29(3):311–334 Lauber K, Mühler K (2019) Gute Polizei? Zu den Auswirkungen der Rekommunalisierung von Polizei. In: Kühne E (ed) Die Zukunft der Polizeiarbeit—die Polizeiarbeit der Zukunft. Hochschule der Sächsischen Polizei, Rothenburg, pp 171–200 Leitgöb-Guzy N (2021) Vertrauen in und Erfahrungen mit Polizei und Justiz unter Personen mit Migrationshintergrund. Bundeskriminalamt, Wiesbaden Lewis DA, Salem G (1986) Fear of crime. Incivility and the production of a social problem. Transaction Books, New Brunswick Lukas T, Coomann B (2021) Die Verlagerung von Disorder—Eine Fallstudie zur städtebaulichen Kriminalprävention im Bahnhofsviertel. Kriminologie—Das Online-Journal (KrimOJ) 3(1):54–71 Lytle D, Randa R (2015) The effects of police satisfaction on fear of crime in a semirural setting. Int Crim Justice Rev 25(4):301–317 Martinez-Ferrer B, Vera A, Musitu G, Montero-Montero D (2018) Trust in police and fear of crime among young people from a gender perspective: the case of Mexico. Violence Gend 5(4):226– 232 Morhardt L (2019) Das Erstarken kommunaler Sicherheitsakteure am Beispiel der Stadtpolizei Frankfurt am Main. In: Möllers MHW, van Ooyen RC (eds) Jahrbuch Öffentliche Sicherheit 2018/19. Verlag für Polizeiwissenschaft, Frankfurt a.M., pp 415–424 Nasar JL, Fisher B (1993) “Hot spots” of fear and crime: A multi-method investigation. J Environ Psychol 13(3):187–206 Oberwittler D (2008) Armut macht Angst. Ansätze einer sozialökologischen Interpretation der Kriminalitätsfurcht. In: Groenemeyer A, Wieseler S (eds) Soziologie sozialer Probleme und sozialer Kontrolle. Realitäten, Repräsentationen und Politik. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, pp 215–230 Oh G, Ren L, He P (2019) Social disorder and residence-based fear of crime: the differential mediating effects of police effectiveness. J Crim Just 63(C):1–11 Polizei Nordrhein-Westfalen (2021) Polizeiliche Kriminalstatistik 2020. https:// wuppertal.polizei.nrw/sites/default/files/2021-03/Kriminalstatistik-2020.pdf. Accessed 24 Jan 2022

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Projekt KoSID (2021) Objektive Sicherheitslage am Neuen Döppersberg und in der Elberfelder Innenstadt. Eine kleinräumige Analyse registrierter Straftaten und Ordnungswidrigkeiten (unpublished manuscript) Sampson RJ, Raudenbush SW (1999) Systematic social observation of public spaces: A new look at disorder in urban neighborhoods. Am J Sociol 105(3):603–651 Schröder C (2019) Teilhabemonitor 2019. Regionale Einkommens- und Kaufkraftarmut. Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft, Köln Singer A, Chouhy C, Lehmann P, Walzak J, Gertz M, Biglin S (2019) Victimization, fear of crime, and trust in criminal justice institutions: a cross-national analysis. Crime Delinq 65(6):822–844 Skogan W (2015) Disorder and decline: the state of research. J Res Crime Delinq 52(4):464–485 Stadt Wuppertal (2012) Angstraumkonzept. Geschäftsbereich Soziales, Jugend & Integration, Wuppertal Stadt Wuppertal (2018) Soziale Ordnungspartnerschaften in Wuppertal. Ressort Soziales, Wuppertal Stadt Wuppertal (2021) Häufige Fragen zum Umbau Döppersberg. https://www.wuppertal.de/ microsite/doeppersberg/service/fragen/FAQ.php#wozu-brauchen-wir-die-neugestaltungdoeppersberg. Accessed 25 Jan 2022 Üblacker J, Lukas T (2019) Keine Angst, es ist nur Gentrification? Soziale und ökonomische Ängste, Kriminalitätsfurcht und Verdrängungsdruck im Düsseldorfer Bahnhofsviertel. sub\urban 7(1–2):93–114 Wakefield A (2009) Pluralization. In: Wakefield A, Fleming J (eds) The Sage dictionary of policing. Sage, London, pp 227–229 Wilson JQ, Kelling GL (1982) Broken windows. Atl Mon 249:29–38

Benjamin Coomann is a sociologist and technology consultant at the VDI Technologiezentrum in Düsseldorf. In his PhD thesis, he emphasises on effects of urban development measures on crime prevention and subjective perceptions of security in public space, extremism and terrorism. Saskia Kretschmer is a sociologist and research assistant at the Institute for Public Safety and Emergency Management at the University of Wuppertal. Her research focuses on the analysis of urban development measures on crime prevention and feelings of safety and security, gentrification and social and political participation. Tim Lukas is a sociologist whose research interests focus on urban security and crime prevention. He conducts his research at the University of Wuppertal where he is the leader of the research group Spatial Contexts of Risk and Security at the Institute for Public Safety and Emergency Management.

Empirical Insights into the Complexity of a Pluralised Security Work: “It Is Very Complex, Which of Course Also Does Not Always Work Completely Smoothly” Nathalie Hirschmann and Frauke Reichl

Abstract The list of actors who establish and ensure security and order no longer ends with the police organisation. It is extended by protagonists such as commercial security and regulatory authorities who are active in neighbouring or overlapping areas of policing work. As a consequence, the society is facing a complex field of cooperative and coexistent security work with different responsibilities, powers and actor-related knowledge. The following chapter asks how complexity manifests itself in security and order-related work. Giving empirical insights into the policing work of policing providers in five German cities the question of the manifestation of plural policing’s complexity is pursued, firstly by presenting selected forms of plural policing in Germany, secondly by highlighting the (almost non-differentiated) appearance of security actors and their responsibilities when it comes to policing activities in (semi-)public spaces and thirdly by demonstrating tensions and points of friction between policing actors when doing policing work. Keywords Plural policing · Complexity · Appearance · Responsibilities · Police · Commercial security · Municipal Law Enforcement

1 Introduction “People today operate in complex organisations and societies” (Mainzer 2008, 12; translation by the authors). This is also true for the plurality of police forces and non-police providers in Germany aiming at achieving security and order by acting nowadays practically in overlapping or closely related jurisdictions and thus not

N. Hirschmann () · F. Reichl University of Münster, Münster, Germany e-mail: [email protected] F. Reichl University of Münster, Zeppelin University Friedrichshafen, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 N. Hirschmann et al. (eds.), Plural Policing in the Global North, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16273-2_12

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independent of their respective environment1—even if in theory they each have their own areas of responsibility, powers and actor-related knowledge bases. Hence, a complex field of an actor-oriented cooperative and coexistent security work can be identified which is better known as plural policing. This instance poses challenges to a pluralised security work, making plural policing (more) complex for the individual actor and his environment. Plural policing differs at both levels, the international and local level (see, e.g., Devroe and Terpstra 2015; Terpstra and van Stokkom 2015; Terpstra et al. 2013). As presented, for instance, by John in this volume, the heterogeneity of plural policing is evident in the research findings of the project “Pluralisation of Local Urban Security Production” (PluS-i).2 In this research it is shown that the inner-city areas of five big German cities are structured differently according to the security actor structure, the actor relationship, the decision-making processes (see also John and Hirschmann 2020, 21) and the perception of security actors (see Pehle in press). Plural policing is defined in the context of the PluS-i project as maintaining or producing security and order in public/semi-public spaces through the presence and resulting measures of at least two different actors in congruent, overlapping or adjacent areas of responsibility (Hirschmann and John 2019, 4). One main topic of the PluS-i project deals with the practices of policing and the so-called context adequacy of plural policing which describes policing actions and activities by policing providers coming from the police, commercial security and municipal law enforcement which are appropriate to the actors, according to their qualification, legal3 and accepted by the public. In the course of the empirical evaluation on the context adequacy aspect of plural policing, examples could be encountered that manifest complexities or complexity aspects of plural policing in an exemplary manner. As there is no longer only one actor, the police, doing policing work it becomes obvious to point out these complexities in a first step, because—as it will be shown later on—they can affect and/or challenge plural policing. In a second step, ways of dealing with these complexities are identified, although these are not to be understood as conclusive. Hence, showing specific complexities of plural policing in Germany from a sociological perspective is the topic of the following chapter.4 The structure of the chapter is as follows: First, we present the methods and empirical data used in this chapter in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3.1 follows a brief description of the forms of plural policing found in the examined German cities which have been transferred 1

The neo-institutionalist approach, for example, postulates that organisations are influenced by their environment (cf. Scott and Meyer 1983, 129). 2 PluS-i was funded by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research between 2017 and 2022. 3 This means that the stakeholder constellations found in the cities or the existence of the stakeholders themselves do not constitute a legal problem per se from a legal perspective. 4 The thematic discussion and preparation of the manifestation of complexity with regard to a pluralised security work is the result of a presentation during the closing event of the PluS-i project on March 22, 2022.

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into models of plural policing. In Sect. 3.2, we refer to the naming and forms of appearance of the various security actors identified and the possible consequences that can result from these. And in Sect. 3.3, we demonstrate frictions between theory and practice using a specific example of everyday policing work in the context of a pluralised security scenery and its resulting consequences. All three aspects (form of policing, naming and appearance of policing actor, everyday policing work) make the complexities of plural policing particularly clear. As a result, it is assumed that these complexity aspects and their consequences—possibly also in the sense of opacity—cannot always be reduced or resolved as it will be concluded in Sect. 4. However, making the multilayered aspects of a practical pluralised security work visible might help to understand the concept of plural policing better, might even help to ease complexities or might at least help to learn to deal with or to endure possible frictions in practical pluralised policing work.

2 Methods/Empirical Data The data presented and discussed in this chapter comes from the data collection of the PluS-i project. Between 2018 and 2021, 38 guideline-supported qualitative interviews with actors on an operational level coming from police forces, the commercial security industry and municipal law enforcement of the investigated cities were conducted. The interviews were analysed in terms of their content structure (following the basic method of the qualitative content analysis according to Schreier 2012, 2014; cf. in detail Hirschmann et al. 2020). In addition, the citizen perspective on plural policing or the respective security actors were included via an annual telephone survey of the population between the years 2018 and 2021.5 The data were analysed with descriptive and multivariate procedures (cf. in more detail Pehle and Kuperan 2020) and are the basis for the results in Sect. 3.2.1. The aim of the multi-phase survey (qualitative and quantitative data collection four times during the project) was not only to identify different models of plural policing, but also to observe the city-specific developments of plural policing over time (cf. Hirschmann and John 2019). In order to preserve the anonymity of the interviewees, the investigated cities and the following presented quotes will be reproduced anonymously. Hence, the quotes have been given a code consisting of an assigned letter for the respective city—A

5

The telephone survey is a fixed-network sample. The advantage of a fixed-network sample is, that a regional assignability of the respondents is possible. On the other hand, there is a disadvantage, because a landline connection is not available in all households or is not as flexible accessible as it would be the case with a mobile phone sample. However, the obvious disadvantage was not considered more important than the mentioned and important advantage of the regional assignability (see here Pehle 2019, 4f).

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to E—as well as for the respective security provider. This code shows which of the actors surveyed is policing in the respective city: • S = commercial security • P = state police • M = municipal law enforcement While all interviews were included in the evaluation of the actor perspective in Sects. 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, only the results of the last survey round in 2021 of the quantitative population survey—with a sample size of n = 2.181 persons with an average age of the respondents of 66 years; of which 46% are male and 54% are female respondents—are referred to for the perspective of the urban population surveyed in Sect. 3.2. All interviews quoted below are translated from German to English.

3 Complexity Aspects of Plural Policing in Germany: Empirical Insights In the following, empirical data will be used to show how exemplary complexity aspects of plural policing can manifest themselves and how they are dealt with or can possibly be dealt with: firstly by presenting plural policing in the investigated cities, secondly through the naming and public appearance of the various actors being involved in policing activities and thirdly through everyday policing work which can generate frictions within or between policing actors.

3.1 Plural Policing in Germany 3.1.1 Plural Policing as Representation of Complexity Germany is a federal state consisting of 16 member states (Bundesländer) with independent provincial legislation (derived from Art. 70 Paragraph 1 German Basic Law; see here Groß et al. 2008; cf. Frevel and Groß 2008). In most municipalities in Germany there are at least two, often more organisations being involved in policing activities of publicly accessible spaces. There are public organisations represented by state police forces (Landespolizeien), the federal police force (Bundespolizei), low skilled police forces (e.g. Wachpolizei6), municipal law enforcement or regulatory agencies (kommunaler Ordnungsdienst), commercial security companies

6 Low skilled police forces better known as Wachpolizei are assigned to in the context of the PluSi project to subpolice policing. These units of state police forces provide services such as guard activities, protection or patrol services. See here also John in this volume.

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and citizens participating in policing activities (e.g. Freiwillige Polizeidienste, Sicherheitspartner). In almost all municipalities in Germany plural policing exists, only its form and constellation are varying. There are explicit differences on the German member states level and in particular on the local level meaning that the plurality of security providers on a state level need not to be reflected at the local urban level in the respective state (see also John et al. 2018). This circumstance itself illustrates a certain kind of complexity of plural policing. This complexity can be reduced to some extent by modelling the different manifestations of plural policing. However, this modelling can also hold complexities that one needs to be aware of.

3.1.2 Dealing with Complexity Through Modelling of Plural Policing On the basis of the empirically observable plural policing forms in the PluS-i cities studied, four different models could be derived as shown in Fig. 1: the administrative model and the public model, with exclusively state actors7 policing public spaces, whereas private policing is concentrated on private spaces; the hybrid model and the integrative model in which commercial security services are also active in public spaces. The main difference between the hybrid and integrative model lies in the organisation of the actor relationship between commercial security and municipality: within the hybrid model commercial and municipal law enforcement protagonists are policing independently in the public space, whereas in the integrative model commercial security is integrated in the municipal patrol service.8 The investigated situation of plural policing in the PluS-i cities can be assigned to these four models. City A is assigned to the hybrid model, city C and E to the public model and city D to the administrative model (cf. John 2022). In the case of city B, however, an aspect now comes into play that exemplary represents a further complexity element of plural policing showing plural policing on a concrete case as a changeable phenomenon over time: City B was assigned to the integrative model until the end of 2020, but had to be reassigned with the beginning of 2021 due to changes concerning the actor structure and actor relationship between the commercial security protagonist and municipal law enforcement. Until 2020, commercial security was integrated into the municipal patrol service, since the beginning of 2021, the commercial security is policing independently. Another complexity element is revealed with regard to the PluS-i understanding of plural policing and the PluS-i models of plural policing (see Fig. 2): In city C and city E, which both belong to the public model, there are low skilled police forces that are not relevant for the overarching PluS-i research question because

7

The administrative model includes three groups of security providers coming from police, municipality and volunteering citizens. The public model includes only police and municipality. For more information on volunteer police services in Germany, see Reichl in this volume. 8 For a more detailed overview about the PluS-i plural policing models see John in this volume.

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Fig. 1 Four models of plural policing in Germany. Source: Drawing by Nathalie Hirschmann, 2022 (in the course of the closing event of the PluS-i project on March 22, 2022)

their guarding tasks do not correspond to policing activities relevant according to the PluS-i working definition on plural policing. However, low skilled police forces in these two cities are becoming relevant in terms of the naming and appearance of actors as will be presented in Sect. 3.2. Looking from a research perspective, it is clear that plural policing can differ over time from state to state, even from city to city, which highlights the complexity of the phenomenon of plural policing. The plural policing models identified within the PluS-i project and presented here offer a complexity reduction approach, even though it cannot be precluded that other or modified models of plural policing might to be found in Germany.

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Fig. 2 Particularity of the public model of plural policing. Source: Drawing by Nathalie Hirschmann, 2022 (in the course of the closing event of the PluS-i project on March 22, 2022)

3.2 Actor Naming and Appearance 3.2.1 Lack of Distinctiveness Between Actors as Representation of Complexity . . . I don’t know how we came up with the idea, but everything that used to have other names, someone once said ‘Come on, we’ll call everything police now!’ (E-P2-2018, pos. 94).

Section 12 of the Guarding Ordinance (Bewachungsverordnung)9 provides for the mandatory exclusion of any risk of confusion of the service clothing or insignia of employees of commercial security service providers with the uniforms or insignia

9

“Bestimmt der Gewerbetreibende für seine Wachpersonen eine Dienstkleidung, so hat er dafür zu sorgen, dass sie nicht mit Uniformen der Angehörigen von Streitkräften oder behördlichen Vollzugsorganen verwechselt werden kann und dass keine Abzeichen verwendet werden, die Amtsabzeichen zum Verwechseln ähnlich sind. Wachpersonen, die eingefriedetes Besitztum in Ausübung ihres Dienstes betreten sollen, müssen eine Dienstkleidung tragen.” (§ 12 Bewachungsverordnung—BewachV)

224 Table 1 Proximity to the concept of police

N. Hirschmann and F. Reichl Police policing Subpolice policing Municipal policing

Voluntary policing

LandesPOLIZEI, BundesPOLIZEI AngestelltenPOLIZEI WachPOLIZEI StadtPOLIZEI Gemeindevollzugsdienst OrtsPOLIZEIbehörde Kommunaler Ordnungsdienst Freiwilliger POLIZEIdienst Sicherheitswacht

Source: Own composition; small excerpt from the German situation, not completed

of official forces. Hence, one could assume that the multitude of different actors with their original competences, areas of responsibility, rights and powers could be immediately distinguished from each other, e.g. by a specific name or colouring of the respective uniform or service clothing (as this is referred to in the case of employees in the commercial security industry). However, by taking a closer look the majority of security providers being found in inner-city areas—first and foremost state police forces, commercial security services, municipal law enforcement, but also volunteers—are hardly distinguishable for outsiders: Due to the change from the former beige-green uniform of the police to a blue uniform of the state and federal police forces, albeit they are multifaceted,10 there is a police-like or at least similar look in the design and colouring of the uniforms or service clothing. The former distinguishability between police forces and non-police actors—all ahead between police and commercial security services—is as a consequence no longer given (as already mentioned by Hirschmann & Groß 2012, 123–125). Furthermore, the use of the composites to the basic German word Polizei (police), e.g. Stadtpolizei (city/guard police11), Wachpolizei (low skilled police forces), Freiwilliger Polizeidienst (voluntary police service) suggests that actors who are not originally police are closely related to the police. Table 1 shows a general cityindependent overview of such terms or naming being found in Germany for the different actors and services. The semantic or conceptual and visual proximity of non-police actors towards the police can bring advantages, but also disadvantages or confusions and is assessed differently from an actor perspective as well as a population perspective.

10 However, it cannot be ruled out that in the 16 federal states of Germany, old stocks of beige-green police uniforms are worn or green-white police vehicles are driven. 11 The Stadtpolizei is considered as enforcement service of municipal law enforcement agencies and is assigned to municipal policing in the context of the PluS-i project. See here John in this volume.

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Actor Perspective on the Conceptual and Visual Police Proximity Facilitating the Work of Non-Policing Actors The fact that civilians tend to associate uniforms or service clothing with the image of a dignitary and thus of the police, is seen at least for an interviewee of a commercial security company in city A (hybrid model) as an advantage, as a certain advance on authority is granted to the service clothing perceived as uniform12: Then yes, the inscription also starts with P, yes.... Then there is often the exclamation ‘Oh, the police!’ ... I think that’s good at first. Not to rate myself higher, but when you are first recognised as a police officer [instead of] a security service, I think for the person who is being checked or who is encountered [...] the respect for the police is a bit higher than for the security service. And then I have a bit more peace when I am first recognised as a police officer, and the rest can be sorted out sensibly. (A-S6-2018, pos. 153; 155)

Increasing the Subjective Feeling of Security The outward appearance of the security actors may differ, for example, through shoulder pieces or different coats of arms or even a linguistic distinction (uniforms for state actors vs. service clothing for commercial actors). However, it can be assumed that only those involved or who are experts of the subject are really aware of the differences or the exact meanings of coats of arms, shoulder boards and the designation (uniform vs. service clothing). And even this is not self-evident. The result is a uniformity in a professional appearance. And the uniformity of appearance or the associated opacity might be quite beneficial for the subjective sense of security—at least for a part—of citizens,13 as it gives the impression to the urban population that ‘police’ is omnipresent, regardless of whether they are the ‘real’ police or non-police actors and that help is being provided if needed: That’s just the thing, because the citizen in city C [public model] doesn’t distinguish whether it says [municipal actor], which is now the public order office, or whether it just says police or, as I said, with the federal police it also just says police; ... the citizen sees a uniform and if the citizen has a problem, [he/she] says: ‘Please help me’. [He/she] doesn’t say, (I don’t know) [he’s/she’s] just been beaten and theoretically that’s a matter for the state police, [he/she] then says: ‘Please help me’, even if we then say: ‘Yes, excuse me, we can be on the spot here first’, I don’t know, if the perpetrator is still on the spot there or a suspect, we can more or less just hold him and then still have to wait until the state police are on the spot then. (C-M1-2018, pos. 332)

At this point the supposed advantages already start to turn into potential disadvantages with a view to the expectations of citizens, the danger of confusion

12 The commercial security service industry speaks of service clothing and not of uniforms which is probably due to the guarding ordinance (Bewachungsverordnung). 13 The PluS-i population survey shows a high feeling of security across all cities, at least during the day, with the majority stating that they feel very safe (Pehle and Reichl 2021, 310–311). However, studies show that the subjective feeling of security is influenced by different factors (Pehle and Reichl 2021, 316; cf. also Hahne et al. 2020; Schartau et al. 2018).

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between the various actors and the associated workloads, or even the confirmation of good work that is reported in the wrong place, as described further below. Wrongly Directed Expectations All of the interviewed actors at the operational police, municipal and economic levels have, according to their own statements, been trained for their later policing work. The trainings consisted of training courses, studies or at least instruction in accordance with paragraph 34a of the Trade, Commerce and Industry Regulation Act (Gewerbeordnung). Nevertheless, the above-mentioned circumstance, as a result of an overly high expectation of ‘I will be supported in every situation’ towards non-police personnel, can become problematic for policing that is appropriate to the situation depending on the underlying level of qualification in practice and the limited or non-existent sovereign powers at their disposal. Confusions of Actors and Workload Coming Along with It A disadvantage becomes apparent when the terms authority, city or guard are not perceived in connection with the word police. The same can be said of uniforms or service clothing, since the uniform is generally associated with the image of a dignitary and thus of the police by outsiders. You can’t explain that to anyone that it’s different, you can’t do that, you can do as much public relations work as you want. ... And that sometimes makes life difficult for us when someone tells us: ‘Someone from the police was there’ and only when asked: No, we weren’t, ... police... [municipal public order service was]. (C-P1-2018, pos. 92; 96)

The mentioned disadvantage of similar uniforms/or service clothing in the above stated quote of an interviewed police officer from city C (public model) becomes even clearer in the following quotation of another interviewed police officer from city E (public model): We [are] often approached [...], ... ‘I have already spoken to a police officer’ and then we try to find out who was spoken to, in the incident reports, which patrol was involved and so on and so forth. Then we find out that there was no intervention at all, then we have to start calling [the municipal patrol service]: ‘Have you perhaps spoken to a citizen?’, because we want to help the citizen for whatever reason. (E-P1-2018, pos. 135)

The similarity of the uniforms and service clothing can therefore bind workforce—in this example on the part of the police—and also lead to confusion among citizens: “Yes, citizens are already asking themselves, with so much police, who is responsible for what” (E-M1-2018, pos. 116). But the citizen only sees the police and speaks to the police. And we’ve often had them say: ‘Are you from the real police?’ So that wasn’t just one time, either, where you notice that it says police everywhere and that confuses the citizen. (E-P2-2018, pos. 117)

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Lost Recognition for Good Work An interviewee from the municipal law enforcement service from city E (public model) emphasised: “But I have to be honest, for example, if I don’t see the coat of arms, I don’t distinguish guard police officers [Wachpolizei] from state police officers [Landespolizei] either” (E-M3-2018, pos. 144). Moreover, the perceived lack of distinctiveness may mean that recognition for good work does not reach the institution that was responsible for the former action. Some citizens are also unteachable, you can tell them three times, they just don’t understand. Then you just give up and say: Yes, I am the police. That’s okay. [...] That can also be a disadvantage, of course, because if we’ve done something well, in the end it’s also said that the police did it. (C-M2-2018, pos. 243–245)

Population Perspective The results of the population survey from 2021 confirm the statements of the interviewed security actors, that these are difficult to distinguish for citizens of the cities considered in the PluS-i project. As can be seen in Fig. 2, this is particularly evident in two of the five cities, city C and city E, both of which belong to the public model and in which a comparatively large number of different actors are involved in policing and who are—as already mentioned before—quite similar in their visual appearance and naming. In addition to police policing, there is also municipal, subpolice and voluntary policing (see also Fig. 1). As shown in Fig. 3, 82% of respondents in both city C and city E state that they find it difficult to distinguish between the security actors. Although subpolicing (persons employed by the police) is not relevant under the PluS-i working definition of plural policing (as already mentioned in Sect. 3.1.1), they are still visible to citizens and therefore play a role with regard to the lack of distinctiveness. On the other hand, 51% of respondents in city A and 55% in city B say they have difficulties distinguishing between the security providers. Both cities have in common that they belong to the hybrid model in 2021, in which commercial policing takes place in public spaces.14 Here it can be assumed that the protagonists—first and foremost the police and commercial security—tend to be distinguished more clearly from each other in city A and city B.15 The results of the PluS-i population survey also show that the more difficult it is to distinguish between uniformed actors, the less is known about their rights towards the population. The results of these two statements correlate strongly with each other (Spearmans r = –0.259***), so that, according to Cohen (1992), there is a

14 However, it should be noted that the percentages in the previous years hardly differ from each other. 15 This is, for example, one feedback from an employee of the municipal law enforcement agency in city B, who clarified that employees of the formerly integrated security service are now clearly distinguishable from their own people (B-M3-2021, pos. 57).

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City E

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Fig. 4 “I am aware of what rights the various security forces in city [ . . . ] have towards me” (percentage). Source: 2021 PluS-i population survey, n = 2191; fixed-network sample; 6-point Likert scale

weak to medium effect between the distinctiveness of uniformed security forces and the knowledge about the actor rights. As to be seen from Fig. 4, 68% of respondents in city C (public model), 67% in city E (public model) and 69% in city D (administrative model) say they are not clear about what rights the security actors have towards them. It seems to be somewhat clearer to the respondents in city A and city B (both hybrid model).

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3.2.2 Dealing with Complexity Through More Distinctiveness With regard to the naming and appearance of the actors studied in the PluS-i cities, it can be summarised that the worse the uniformed actors are distinguished by citizens, the less the rights of the security forces are known among the population. Yes, and that’s where it gets a bit complicated, because they all look the same and for people both [subpolice and municipal policing] are often simply seen globally under the term police. And it has to be looked at in a more differentiated way because the areas of responsibility are different, and the legal possibilities also vary greatly. (E-P1-2018, pos. 135)

The stated quote from a police officer from city E (public model with comparatively many actors) sums up the complexity of the outer appearance quite well as there are too many actors that can complicate security work in practice. The analysis has shown that the plurality in policing remains invisible due to an alleged police proximity. At the same time, the uniformity in a professional appearance of the various actors can have an impact on policing also as, for example, it can make work easier when non-police actors are recognised as police officers and hence, are taken more seriously in their policing work. However, extra workload is noticeable if, for instance, actors on duty need to find out which actor citizens have spoken to at first. Finally, the question arises to what extent a conceptual mixture and similarities in the visible appearance also shift the boundaries of areas of responsibility and tasks. The crossing of boundaries in practical policing—e.g. security personnel issuing expulsions that cannot be justified or exceed by their authority—has been reported; however, it cannot be clearly determined at this point whether these occur due to the described circumstances regarding a lack of distinctiveness. At least it can be assumed that that the low level of differentiation creates structures of possibility for transgressions.

3.3 An Example of Friction Points in Plural Policing 3.3.1 Representation of Complexity in Everyday Policing Work The following example is taken from a telephone interview with two employees of the municipal patrol service from city A (hybrid model: coexistent (and cooperative) police, municipal and commercial security policing in public space). One of the two interviewees explained “...we have a relatively large scope of action that allows us to act from a verbal warning to a report. And yes, up to the use of direct coercion” (A-M2-2021, pos. 123). When asked about the situations in which the two encounter other security actors, one point is quickly raised that seems to be a practical challenge for the municipal employees in carrying out their work. They report that “many people are also not aware that we as a public order service have the same powers as the police, only in relation to administrative offences” (AM1-2021, pos. 167).

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Friction Between ‘the May’ and ‘the Shall’ of Policing Now, as an inclined reader you might be tempted to say: ‘Where is the problem that citizens do not know about this’? The answer is: from a citizen’s perspective, this may not be important; from an actor’s perspective, it may even be disadvantageous under certain circumstances as it may restrict policing actors in their policing procedure.16 When the interviewer asked whether the measures taken by them had ever been challenged and orders did not get followed, the answer was that this is regularly the case. The two interviewees illustrate this circumstance with a concrete example: “So dismissals, for example” (A-M1-2021, pos. 173), “namely . . . according to the motto ‘F* you, you’re not allowed to do anything anyway’ and he [a citizen] just sits there” (A-M2-2021, pos. 176) and does not let the reproaches bother him. Once again as a reminder: from a legal point of view, they are allowed to exercise direct use of force/coercion. However, now comes a crucial aspect: the municipal law enforcement officers in city A shall not enforce a dismissal themselves using force: “Let’s put it this way, it’s not wanted from the top, from the city administration. The message is ‘Don’t get into dangerous situations, don’t touch anyone’.” (A-M1-2021, pos. 175). Rather, they are encouraged to involve the police in operations if enforcing a dismissal with the use of force seems to become necessary. ... we don’t pick them [the citizen] up or exert such physical coercion either, .... so the police have to do it. The police can then touch him [the citizen], pick him up and send him away if necessary, or they can confine him, .... (A-M1-2021, pos. 174, 176)

As a result, there is a first clash, a friction in practice between ‘the may’ and ‘the shall’ of municipal policing in city A with the consequence that they need support by the police in order to enforce measures with the instrument of the direct use of force. At the end, one interviewee mentioned that “[f]or some, even pretending to call the police helps. Then they get up. But with most of them, unfortunately, we have to call in our colleagues from the police” (A-M1-2021, pos. 184). This once again shows the challenges that the municipal policing actors are confronted with in their practical work.

Friction Between ‘the May’, ‘the Shall’ and ‘the Will’ of Policing Furthermore, a second friction comes into play which is not the decisive one but complicates matters further: the tension between ‘the may’, ‘the shall’ and ‘the will’ of the municipal policing actor. In response to the interviewer’s question as to which activities the municipal patrol service could take over from other actors, the two referred to “enforce dismissals” (A-M1-2021, pos. 226) in the mentioned example. “...Yes, sending off. That would be good. We enforce them. But especially with 16 It should be noted that a certain degree of non-awareness or ignorance among citizens about security providers can sometimes be beneficial for actors themselves (see Sect. 3.2.1)

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unruly people who stay in their seats ... We have to [call] the police....” (A-M22021, pos. 226). However, it is unclear whether the municipal patrol service would have the necessary competences and sufficient professionalism, for instance, the ability, to actually enforce the expulsion itself, if necessary, also by means of direct use of force; hence, there is a third point of friction here, especially between the willingness and the ability.

Friction Between ‘the May’ and Qualification Competences This friction is set against the background of the duration of the vocational preparation measures, which are obligatory for all new employees in the municipal patrol service. “This is a 14-day course [ . . . ]. One week of theory with administrative law and one week of practice with applied administrative law and also a police course with de-escalation” (A-M1-2021, pos. 226) as well as a practical induction for new colleagues by experienced colleagues of 2–3 months; in addition, the city’s employees should have completed vocational training that does not have to have a direct link to policing activities.

Plural Policing and Its Effects The actor structure in practice within the hybrid model is characterised by the importance of police forces, municipalities and a commercial security actor for policing in public or perceived public space. In other words, the areas of responsibility of commercial, police and municipal policing overlap. Thus, there is a coexistence between the three actors that does not only refer to delimitable spatial responsibilities (private vs. public space), as is usually the case. Based on the example presented above, but also going beyond it, it needs to be asked which effects of plural policing can be observed in city A between the mentioned security providers. Starting with the perception of commercial security which clarifies the position of the municipal patrol service in the structure of the policing actors—even though the interview quote from a commercial employee in city A presented below does not only refer to the expulsion example: I have to be honest and say that the [municipal law enforcement] is a bit of a lost cause, because they are allowed to do relatively little, even though they have sovereign rights, they are not actually instructed to do anything, just to show a presence. And I would say that the work is done by the police, [the security service provider] and [German railways]. But we are supported by the city, it’s not like that, they join in. But first and foremost, it’s the other institutions that work with us. (A-S7-2020, pos. 40)

What becomes clear in this interview quote is that the municipal patrol service in city A does not have the same status for commercial security as the police, who are then called in to support once more than just everyman’s rights of the German civil law, criminal law, criminal procedure law and administrative offences law or private domiciliary rights are needed, which commercial security only has at its disposal.

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What also becomes clear here is that other relevant actors need to know for their own policing what the others should do (order from the organisational leadership), because otherwise it may not be comprehensible why support cannot be given. In the interview quote shown above, it is actually clear to the commercial employee with a consequence for policing work: namely, support is received from the police, not from the municipality. This also means for the police that there are at least two different actors who hark back to them, whereby one only has everyman’s rights and the private domiciliary rights assigned to him (commercial security) and the other one has sovereign rights with reference to administrative offences (municipal patrol service). The municipal patrol service in city A was still relatively young at the time of the interview, meaning it has only existed in city A for a few years. According to an interviewed police officer, the police often seemed to provide police support in the beginning, although the municipal patrol service was introduced to be more active in the cityscape in order to relieve the police by showing presence. Yes, the city, of course, which is increasingly on foot patrol, even before that. So before [the Covid 19 pandemic], who were involved in order to be more active in the cityscape, that is actually their task, so that we are relieved a little. (A-P5-2020, pos. 62)

In the early days, however, this seemed to have not worked well because—at least from the police persons point of view—the municipal actor themselves did not know how far they were actually allowed to act: Of course, there are still some rough edges missing, but before it was really the case that we were called in more, that is, we were called in more, because the level of knowledge was simply not there or they did not know how far [they were] allowed to go. (A-P5-2020, pos. 68)

In the further course, the interviewed police officer raises the issue of an alleged lack of qualification, practical knowledge of responsibilities and competences, experiential knowledge and reflection and thus the point of friction between being allowed and being able to do policing. No, not too much action, but rather too little. We have pointed out ‘You are allowed to do that, that is your task, not ours. We support you’, but it must first be established and the knowledge must be there, and if I increase the forces, which they have done, but do not train them accordingly, then there is a lack of knowledge. (A-P5-2020, pos. 72)

In this case, the policing of the municipal patrol service has an effect on the policing of the police forces; workforce may be tied up because there is a lack of knowledge on the part of the municipal actors and—this can only be an assumption here—the order of the management level of the municipality ‘Do not enter into dangerous situations’ may not be known or at least not conscious on the part of the police and thus the workload cannot be understood.17

17 As the interviews with the municipal law enforcement personnel were conducted in 2021 and the interviews with the police officer in 2020, it should be stressed: The order to not enter dangerous situations is not new. This instruction exists since the beginning of the service.

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3.3.2 Dealing with Complexity by Making Frictions Visible As shown exemplarily, there are complexities in the sense of friction points between theory and practice or ‘the may’, ‘the ability’, ‘the shall’ and ‘the will’ of (plural) policing. This in turn can have an impact on the security work of single actors (in our example, the municipal patrol service) as well as on that of other actors (in our example, police and commercial security). A possible way of dealing with complexities presented here in the sense of a friction between ‘the may’ and ‘the shall’ of everyday policing work would be to adjust one (‘the may’) or the other (‘the shall’)—for instance, by simply adapting organisational regulations to the legal situation. However, it is supposed that such a reduction of complexities could create further frictions (for instance, with regard to the qualification or the self-protection aspect). Because even though it may be frustrating for the municipal actors in the ‘dismissal-example’ to be dependent on protagonists or that the support provided by other actors may be an extra workload, ‘the should’ and ‘the ability’ of the municipal actors in city A are in line (if only because of their very short pre-vocational training measures). Hence, the solution that initially appears to be the simplest might not be the best in terms of a context-adequate plural policing. Because it can be assumed that such frictions presented exemplarily can occur anywhere in practice and may have an impact on and/or challenge a pluralised security work, it makes sense to uncover these kinds of complexities—especially when they cannot be easily reduced.

4 Discussion and Considerations John and Hirschmann (2020) noticed that plural policing can provide relieving, supporting and workload moments, especially for the police operational side, which brings about changes in practical action. “The existence of other security actors thus certainly has consequences for police action, but these cannot be assigned to the specific forms of pluralisation” (John and Hirschmann 2020, 277; translation by the authors). Spoken with Mainzer (2008; see also the introduction) that people today operate in complex organisations and societies, also security providers need to deal with complexities in a pluralised policing world. The focus of this chapter was to uncover complexity aspects of plural policing using specific examples which have been derived in the course of the empirical evaluation on the context adequacy aspect of plural policing. While the presentation of plural policing at federal, state and municipal level itself involves a certain complexity as explained in Sect. 3.1, it is important to note that this complexity can be at least partially reduced by structure. As pointed out in Sect. 3.2, the invisibility of plural policing may pose challenges. This is at first and foremost the police are seen and corresponding expectations, including presumed powers of intervention, are placed on non-police actors, which they simply cannot or

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may not cope with. With regard to non-police providers, there is another aspect: If, for example, the powers of municipal law enforcement organisations are unknown to citizens, this can lead to certain problems of acceptance, as the legitimacy of their actions could be doubted by citizens, despite the fact that they actually have farreaching powers. It can be assumed that in the structure of plural policing, the lack of conceptual and visible distinguishing features creates a certain additional effort for security actors, who constantly have to clarify their powers, areas of responsibility and tasks in practice. From an actors’ point of view, it may be said that it is not important for citizens whether they can actually distinguish between the security actors and know their powers and areas of responsibility in individual cases, but that they will be supported by whichever security provider is needed. This view may be true for a part of the population, but it also harbours a certain potential for danger and excludes citizens who do not associate the police with a helping hand. Thus, coming from a sociological perspective a terminological demarcation and a clearly actor-specific uniformity to prevent possible misunderstandings, false expectations and potentially possible border crossings are not only desirable for affected citizens; it is necessary with a view to transparent, actor-appropriate and qualificationappropriate actions that are legal and accepted by the public. Nevertheless, this form of complexity reduction would also mean that another point marked as an advantage—the increase in the subjective sense of security through a supposed increase in police on the streets—would get lost with the consequence that other frictions may arise. As shown in Sect. 3.2, from a sociological perspective, it must be concluded to dare more distinctiveness. But such a structural change is not always a solution as we have seen in Sect. 3.3, which illustrated friction points in plural policing by using a case study example on enforcing a dismissal. Here, the municipal law enforcement actor is probably not qualified enough to exercise all legal rights—especially with regard to the use of force—even if they theoretically could. The question of qualification or lack of qualification raises another question: To what extent does knowledge of competencies and the underlying qualifications as well as the rights of all police actors in a city must necessarily be known by other actors; especially when it comes to the cooperation between security providers in order to be able to carry out context-adequate security work. For example, “not knowing the area of competence of non-police actors [is problematic] if they themselves are not clear about what may and may not be done, and in practice there are constant ‘border crossings’ by non-police actors” (John and Hirschmann 2020, 272; translation by the authors). This becomes clear in an interview passage by a commercial security guard in city A, which, although not related to the example of the expulsion presented above, is legally sensitive and “must be classified as presumably illegal” (Ruch 2020, 10; translation by the authors): “Some Englishmen were making a fuss in the city, and we informed the police. And we arrested them together with the police. [...] we made the arrest together [with the police]” (AS6-2018, pos. 120). Although all interviewed persons were basically aware of the existence of the policing actors that occur in each city investigated, the knowledge of the existence of the others is not synonymous with knowledge of what the

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other actors do or are allowed to do. For a context-appropriate (security) work in a pluralised security landscape it seems to be relevant to know about the knowledge system of the respective other actor in order to reduce friction between interacting or co-acting actors. But still, while some frictions might be changeable via structural changes, there are friction points that will last. At least they need to be made visible so that they can be accepted better by policing providers. Acknowledgement This research has received funding from the Federal Ministry of Education and Research (BMBF) in the context of the call “Promotion of young researchers by establishing interdisciplinary competences” in the programme “research for civil security 2012–2017”.

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Nathalie Hirschmann (Ph.D.) is a sociologist and criminologist. Currently, she is the project leader of the project PluS-i at the University of Münster (Germany). Her research interests are amongst others the sociology of (plural) policing, the sociology of professions and organisational sociology in the context of security, criminology and empirical social science research. Website: https://plus-i.de/en/nathalie-hirschmann/ Frauke Reichl is a political scientist. She is a research assistant at the PluS-i project at the Institute of Political Science at the University of Münster (Germany). Within PluS-i, she is dealing with aspects of legitimacy and context adequacy regarding police volunteers and citizen policing groups. Her research interests are among others citizen participation, state and security production, vigilantism and digital vigilantism. She has written articles on police volunteers, citizen policing groups and digilantism. Website: https://plus-i.de/en/frauke-reichl/