Philosophy, Law and Environmental Crisis: Workshop of the Swiss Society for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, September 12–13, 2014, Swiss Institute of Comparative Law, Lausanne / Philosophie, droit et crise environnementale: Congrès de l’Association Suisse de Philosophie du Droit et de Philosophie Sociale, 12–13 septembre 2014, Institut suisse de droit comparé, Lausanne 9783515113878

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Philosophy, Law and Environmental Crisis / Philosophie, droit et crise environnementale Workshop of the Swiss Society for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, September 12–13, 2014, Swiss Institute of Comparative Law, Lausanne / Congrès de l’Association Suisse de Philosophie du Droit et de Philosophie Sociale, 12–13 septembre 2014, Institut suisse de droit comparé, Lausanne Edited by Alain Papaux and Simone Zurbuchen

ARSP Beiheft 149 Franz Steiner Verlag

Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie

Philosophy, Law and Environmental Crisis / Philosophie, droit et crise environnementale Edited by Alain Papaux and Simone Zurbuchen

archiv für rechts- und sozialphilosophie archives for philosophy of law and social philosophy archives de philosophie du droit et de philosophie sociale archivo de filosofía jurídica y social Herausgegeben von der Internationalen Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie (IVR) Redaktion: Dr. Annette Brockmöller, LL. M. Beiheft 149

Philosophy, Law and Environmental Crisis / Philosophie, droit et crise environnementale Workshop of the Swiss Society for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, September 12–13, 2014, Swiss Institute of Comparative Law, Lausanne / Congrès de l’Association Suisse de Philosophie du Droit et de Philosophie Sociale, 12–13 septembre 2014, Institut suisse de droit comparé, Lausanne Edited by Alain Papaux and Simone Zurbuchen

Franz Steiner Verlag

Bibliografische Information der Deutschen Nationalbibliothek: Die Deutsche Nationalbibliothek verzeichnet diese Publikation in der Deutschen Nationalbibliografie; detaillierte bibliografische Daten sind im Internet über abrufbar. Dieses Werk einschließlich aller seiner Teile ist urheberrechtlich geschützt. Jede Verwertung außerhalb der engen Grenzen des Urheberrechtsgesetzes ist unzulässig und strafbar. © Franz Steiner Verlag, Stuttgart 2016 Satz: DTP + TEXT Eva Burri, Stuttgart Druck: Druckhaus Nomos, Sinzheim Gedruckt auf säurefreiem, alterungsbeständigem Papier. Printed in Germany. Franz Steiner Verlag: ISBN 978-3-515-11387-8 (Print) Franz Steiner Verlag: ISBN 978-3-515-11388-5 (E-Book) Nomos Verlag: ISBN 978-3-8487-3214-2

Contents Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

7

Simone Zurbuchen (Lausanne) Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

9

Alain Papaux (Lausanne) La crise environnementale ou la modernité retournée contre elle-même : et si homo sapiens n’était que faber ? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

17

Catherine Larrère (Paris) Responsabilité à l’égard des générations futures et justice intergénérationnelle Quelques interrogations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

47

Michel Bourban (Lausanne) Nouvelles questions de justice climatique . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

61

Jaap Spier (The Hague) Intergenerational equity: an aspiration or an effective weapon? . . . . . . . . . . . .

69

Edwin Zaccai, Marine Lugen (Brussels) Common but differentiated responsibilities against the realities of climate change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

79

Alice Kaswan (Berkeley, California) Climate Adaptation and Theories of Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

97

Ivo Wallimann-Helmer (Zurich) Differentiating Responsibilities for Climate Change Adaptation . . . . . . . . . . . 119 Peter Ørebech (Tromsø, Norway) Attaining Differentiated Responsibility: The Hard Life of Governmental Command in Fighting Ecological Ruin and the Triumph of Customary Law & General Principles of Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133

Acknowledgements The papers comprised in this volume were presented at the international workshop “Philosophy, Law and Environmental Crisis” organized in Lausanne in 2014 by the Swiss Association for the Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy in cooperation with the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law, the Law Faculty and the Department of Philosophy at the University of Lausanne . The workshop and the publication of this volume would not have been possible without the help of many people and institutions . The editors would like to thank in particular Michel Bourban, assistant to the chair of philosophie moderne et contemporaine at the University of Lausanne, who contributed substantially to the elaboration of the workshop proposal, Dr . Lukas Heckendorn Urscheler, vice director of the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law, who accepted to function as co-organizer of the workshop, and Marie Papeil for her organizational assistance . We are also very grateful for financial contributions we received from the Law Faculty of the University of Lausanne, the Swiss National Foundation and the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law . Lausanne, February 2016 Simone Zurbuchen & Alain Papaux

simone ZurbuChen (Lausanne) IntroductIon The papers comprised in this volume have been presented at the international workshop “Philosophy, Law and Environmental Crisis – Philosophie, droit et crise environnementale”, organized by the Swiss Association for the Philosophy and Law and Social Philosophy in collaboration with the Swiss Institute for Comparative Law in September 2014 in Lausanne . At that time, the 2015 United Nations Climate Conference was still quite far ahead, and it was not clear whether the Parties would achieve an agreement . Despite the positive outcome of the Conference, there is no doubt that climate change will remain on top of the political agenda during many years to come . Climate change belongs to the most pressing environmental problems the present generation has to tackle . In light of the magnitude of the damages likely to be caused by anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions on the one hand, and of the as yet intractable conflicts about the way in which responsibilities to take action have to be assigned within the global community of nations on the other, climate change is the most salient feature of what is perceived today as environmental crisis . The main objective of the Lausanne workshop was to engage a dialogue between philosophers and lawyers on some of the intricate questions related to this crisis . If philosophers often tend to favor an idealist or top-down approach to environmental problems by developing theories of global and intergenerational justice,1 lawyers rather adopt a realistic or bottom-up approach by referring to judicial practice with respect to national, EU or international law .2 By putting these two disciplines in dialogue, the workshop attempted to bring out the respective strengths and weaknesses of their approaches and to promote innovative solutions to pressing ecological issues . The present volume is devoted to three main issues . The first one deals with the nature of the environmental crisis, more precisely with the salient discrepancy between the pressing need for action on the one hand, and the inertia of political and economic leaders to take and implement appropriate decisions on the other .3 How do we explain, for instance, that the warnings of scientists about the devastating impacts of global warming went for a long time largely unheard? This can be clarified by briefly considering the principle of precaution and the meteoric rise it experienced since the early 1990 s .4 Some twenty years ago, only a few specialists in environmental law were familiar with this principle . It has since then established itself as a general principle of international law, and it has also come to occupy an uncon1 2 3 4

For a comprehensive overview cf . Axel Gosseries / Lukas H . Meyer (eds .), Intergenerational Justice, Oxford, 2009; Stephen M . Gardiner et al. (eds .), Climate Ethics: Essential Readings, Oxford, 2010 . See Malgosia Fitzmaurice et al. (eds .), Research Handbook on International Environmental Law, Cheltenham/Northampton, MA, 2010 . One of the best analyses of the nature of this crisis has been provided by Stephen M . Gardiner, A Perfect Moral Storm: the Ethical Tragedy of Climate Change, Oxford, 2011 . Nicolas de Sadeleer, The principles of prevention and precaution in international law: two heads of the same coin? in Fitzmaurice et al. (footnote 2), 182–226 .

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tested position in EC law, as well as in the national legislation of several European countries . The areas of application of this principle are indeed impressive . They include marine pollution, fisheries, rivers, air pollution and climate change, nature and biodiversity, waste management, chemicals and nuclear energy . This is however not my concern here . I am rather interested in the way in which the precautionary principle is related to a philosophy of anticipated action . In this context, it seems useful to compare it with the principle of prevention . Unlike curative measures aiming to remediate environmental damage, preventive measures do not depend on the appearance of environmental problems; they rather “anticipate damage or, where it has already occurred, try to ensure it does not spread” .5 Although future oriented, prevention is not the same as precaution . As Nicolas de Sadeleer explains, precaution epitomizes a paradigmatic shift: “Whereas, under a preventive approach, the decision-maker intervenes provided that the threats to the environment are tangible, pursuant to the precautionary principle authorities are prepared to tackle risks for which there is no definitive proof that there is a link auf causation between the suspected activity and the harm or whether the suspected damage will materialize . In other words, precaution means that the absence of scientific certainty – or conversely the scientific uncertainty – as to the existence of the extent of a risk should henceforward no longer delay the adoption of preventive measures to protect the environment .”6

De Sadeleer refers here to the fact that new technologies have caused a new generation of risks to emerge . Since these risks challenge the ability of science to anticipate and prevent harm, they are different from traditional industrial risks: their impacts are wider and diffuse, it is impossible to determine their probability, and it is difficult to determine the damages they may provoke . Given these uncertainties and the complex process of risk assessment the precautionary principle requires, it is not surprising that the responsible actors are at pains to take and implement appropriate decisions . Some scholars even contend that the notion of risk is no longer appropriate for describing our current situation . In order to understand their skepticism, one needs to recall the theory of ‘risk society’ developed by sociologists such as Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens in order to account for the way in which modern society organizes itself with response to risk .7 When the notion ‘risk society’ was coined in the 1980 s, it was not unilaterally linked with the new generation of risks I just mentioned . However, when the notion gained popularity in the 1990 s, it got closely linked with the growing environmental concerns of the same period . In a collection of essays published in 2013 under the title Du risque à la menace: penser la catastrophe (From risk to threat: conceiving the catastrophe) Dominique Bourg, Alain Papaux and others re-examine the notion of ‘risk society’ and question the very ability of modern society to become reflexive, that is, to critically examine itself in the face of the risks produced by human activity, and to transform itself in the process .8 In their view, it is problematic to account for environmental damages that are likely to occur 5 6 7 8

De Sadeleer (footnote 3), 183 . De Sadeleer (footnote 3), 184 . Ulrich Beck, Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, transl . Mark Ritter, London, 1992 (reprinted 2000); Anthony Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity, Stanford, 1990; idem, The Politics of Climate Change, second, fully revised ed ., Cambridge, 2011 . Dominique Bourg et al. (eds .), Du risque à la menace: penser la catastrophe, Paris, 2013 .

Introduction

11

in the future in terms of risks, since this would suggest that we are able to handle these problems on the basis of risk assessment and with a view on traditional insurance models instead of confronting ourselves with the idea of arriving at a tipping point where the very survival of mankind is at stake . In the present volume Alain Papaux proposes to interpret the environmental crisis as a crisis of modernity . In his view, the conception of the relationship between human beings and nature, which became prominent with the development of the natural sciences from the 16th century onwards and subsequently influenced the new theories of law and politics of the 17th and 18th centuries, are at the root of the problems mankind is facing today . Drawing on the opposition between homo sapiens and homo faber, Papaux sets out to show in his paper how in the early modern period man began to view himself as a ‘maker’, a being endowed with volition and the capacity to freely define and sculpt himself, without any limit or end being imposed on him by nature . By linking the image of the ‘maker’ with the mythical figure of Prometheus, the creator and greatest benefactor of mankind, he suggests that qualities such as hybris and ruse (metis) fused in the ‘modern Prometheus’: a craftsman able to work with zeal and perseverance, relying on the power of his will . Papaux relies on a wide range of sources in order to demonstrate how the Aristotelian doctrine of the four causes, which acknowledged the relevance of final causes in nature, was supplanted, in modern natural philosophy, by the theory of efficient causality, a process that went hand in hand with the establishment of a binary opposition between mind and body, or subject and object . As a result, a wholly new account of reality emerged that Paolo Rossi resumed in four key ideas: first, nature is not the manifestation of a living principle, but a system of matter in movement regulated by laws; second, these laws can be determined with mathematical precision; third, a very small number of these laws is sufficient to explain the universe; and fourth, any reference to vital forces or to final causes is excluded from the explanation of nature . In the second part of his paper Papaux aims at showing that by adopting the geometrical mode of reasoning in the domain of law and politics, early modern philosophers subscribed to the model of the ‘maker’ and to the theory of efficient causes when they endowed human beings with rights, understood as ‘prerogatives’ or powers . Assuming that the rights of one individual are limited by the rights of others, they would have excluded that anything like natural ends or the common good of the community might limit individual liberty . In this vein, modern natural jurisprudence and political philosophy ensured that the law of the state could only appear as heteronomous law . Drawing on the ‘real’ Aristotelian wisdom, which was subsequently transformed by the modern artful Prometheus, Papaux concludes his analysis by surmising that by confronting man to the limits of the biosphere, and to his own finitude, the environmental crisis might well remind him that acknowledging that living well together, which presupposes a healthy environment, is part of the human condition . At the end of his paper, he points to a few instances in the domain of law announcing, perhaps, the surpassing of the thought structures of modernity and the return of wisdom . As we have already seen, the temporal dimension of ecological problems is very important . This is reflected in theories dealing with the responsibility towards future generations . This is the second major issue this volume deals with . Philosophers often tackle this kind of responsibility in the context of theories of distributive justice and

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Simone Zurbuchen

focus on two prominent problems . The first one is called the non-reciprocity problem . Following Edward Page, who explains this problem with regard to climate change, we can assess it in the following way: suppose that an Agreement on Climate Change such as the Kyoto Protocol or perhaps the Paris Agreement that will replace it in 2020, is fully complied with . The vast majority of the persons that will be the main beneficiaries of the greenhouse gas reductions involved will never be in a position to repay their predecessors for their compliance since these predecessors will be dead before the beneficial impacts of their restraint have materialized . On the other hand, if we conceive of justice in terms of reciprocity (involving equal sacrifices or costs, or involving equal benefits), we are obligated to provide benefits to others, including members of different generations, only if these persons are in a position to reciprocate . Why would it then be just for earlier generations to sacrifice their own well-being for the sake of later generations whom they will never meet and who cannot reciprocate the benefits they received?9 The second major problem philosophers are dealing with is called the non-identity problem . The basic question here is whether members of the present generation can in fact harm members of future generations, that is, persons that do not yet exist . If so, it would be rather easy to develop a strong argument to show why members of the present generation are obligated to reduce greenhouse gas emissions . Since these emissions are largely responsible for global warming, and since the consequences of global warming will have significant and harmful effects on the well-being of future persons, we could simply refer to the duty not to harm someone else in order to justify the present generation’s obligation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions . Things are however far more complicated than this . Indeed, those who try to explain our duties to future generations in the language of harm are confronted to “a unique philosophical puzzle” first addressed by Derek Parfit and restated by Edward Page in the following way: Put simply, the puzzle is that actions or social policies that will lower future quality of life will harm few, if any, members of future generations because they are also necessary conditions of these people coming into existence .10

Why is it not possible to harm persons if their coming into existence depends on the actions and policies that will lower their future quality of life? The argument can be elucidated by means of Parfit’s example of the 14-years-old girl .11 At age 14, a girl chooses to have a child . We think that it would have been better for the girl to wait for several years to have a child and that what the girl has done was wrong . The reason we believe the girl’s choice was wrong is that we think her baby will have a bad start in life . But could we also say that by her decision to have a child at age 14 the girl made her child worse off or that she harmed her child? Parfit argues that we can’t . The reason for this is that this particular child could not have existed at all had the girl waited until she was older to have a child . Had she waited, she would have 9 10 11

See Axel Gosseries, Penser la justice entre les générations: de l’Affaire Perruche à la réforme des retraites, Paris, 2004, 124–183; Edward Page, Climate Change, Justice, and Future Generations, Cheltenham/ Northampton, MA, 2006, 99–131 . Page (footnote 6), 132 . Derek Parfit, Energy Policy and the Further Future: The Identity Problem, in Gardiner (footnote 1), 112–121, here 113 .

Introduction

13

given birth to a different child . As a consequence, the child coming into existence has no reason to complain that her mother made him worse off or that she harmed him . In consequence, if it is the case that the actions and social policies the present generation adopts are necessary conditions of the very existence of future persons, it will be impossible to argue that these people were harmed by members of the present generation . Philosophers have dealt with these problems at great length and proposed solutions to resolve them, for instance by developing theories of indirect reciprocity or of a non-relational concept of harm .12 In the pages below, Catherine Larrère discusses a number of these theories with the aim to show that they all rely on the idea that accounting for future generations requires extending the moral community to beings that had so far been excluded from it (besides future generations, animals are yet another example for this) . She then sets out to show that this way of assessing the environmental question is flawed, since this amounts to defining the environmental crisis in terms of scarcity of resources . Seen from this angle, the novelty of the environmental problems consists in the scarcity of resources (such as the Earth’s capacity to absorb carbon dioxide) formerly considered as inexhaustible . The question then is how these scarce resources ought to be distributed justly between present and future generations . As Larrère argues, theories of distributive environmental justice do not adequately capture the problems we are facing, since by defining them as problems of ‘stocks’, they oppose man to the environment or to nature instead of considering men as part of the biosphere . Doing the latter would require rethinking the concept of nature in terms of processes . In this perspective, climate change needs to be accounted for on the basis of the effects the consumption of resources has on the processes, which constitute the great cycles of the biosphere, most notably the carbon cycle . In the last part of her paper, Larrère discusses how it could be possible to develop a new framework or a complex system allowing to integrate, in one and the same community, living and non-living beings, humans and non-humans, and to assign each of them a place . In a paper stimulated by Larrère’s critical account of the main stream approaches to intergenerational justice Michel Bourban argues that the latter are unable to account for the evolution of empirically based scientific knowledge about environmental problems . Based on a number of recent findings, he concludes that the most important thing to be done appears no longer to be, as this was suggested by the concept of sustainable development, the decoupling of economic growth and the consumption of scarce resources, but rather to restrain the flow of fossil energy in order to ensure that future generations will not be forced to live in a world highly detrimental to their well-being . Viewed from this angle, the main problem is not how to allocate the emissions rights fairly, but how not to exceed the remaining carbon budget, which is very limited indeed . This reasoning has important consequences for the highly contested question to what extent historic emissions (i . e ., CO2 emissions before 1990) ought to be accounted for in future climate negotiations . While acknowledging that the polluter pays principle (which accounts for past and present emissions) remains relevant, Bourban argues that it becomes much 12

For the former, cf . Gosseries (footnote 9), 124–183 . For the latter, cf . Lukas H . Meyer / Dominic Roser, Enough for the Future, in Gosseries/Meyer (footnote 1), 219–248, here 230–232 .

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more important today that developing countries such as China, India, Brasil and South Africa, which have substantially increased their contribution to global warming during the past two decades, need as well to participate in the ecological transition . For this reason, the dichotomy between developed and developing countries, on which most philosophers greatly insist, seems no longer in tune with the rapidly evolving realities . While Jaap Spier considers intergenerational justice from a very different, namely legal, angle, he proves as well to be rather skeptical about the effects of this concept on climate change mitigation and adaptation . Hence he shows in his paper that the meaning of intergenerational equity remains too vague to be of much use in the debate about mitigation, especially in the legal arena . Discussing the role it might play in adaptation, he argues that in light of the difficulties to properly account for the needs of the present generation, it seems rather unlikely that we really need intergenerational equity to forge effective remedies . The damages resulting from climate change will in most instances materialize already in the decades to come . The third part of this volume deals with the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, which plays a key role in environmental law and ethics . This is for example the first principle invoked in article 2 of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and it serves as a basis for philosophical reflections on the distribution of the costs and benefits linked to greenhouse gas emissions . The principle is also mentioned in the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), drafted in 1992 under the supervision of the UN . A number of difficulties have been raised regarding this principle . One of them concerns the way in which responsibility for environmental damages ought to be conceived: is the responsibility in question individual, collective, or both? Is it direct or indirect? Should we understand it as outcome responsibility, as remedial responsibility, or both? To answer these questions it is useful to consider different versions of this principle: it can be interpreted as a polluter pays principle (those who have caused and are still causing environmental injustices or damages must pay for it), as ability to pay principle (those who can pay to prevent or compensate an environmental injustice or damage, even if they are not causally responsible for it, must do it), or as beneficiary pays principle (those who benefit from environmental injustices or damages must pay for them) . All of these interpretations of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility have their strengths and weaknesses . This is why the question arises of how to balance or hierarchize these different principles: is each principle equally important or are there reasons for implementing one of the principles in priority? How should we decide about their proper interpretation and about balancing them against each other? Is there a methodology for doing so or is this a matter of casuistry? In their very instructive paper, which takes account of empirical data of CO2 emissions in a wide range of countries, Edwin Zaccai and Marine Lugen deal with the crucial elements at stake in international negotiations about climate change responsibilities . They first show how difficult it is to differentiate responsibilities of mitigation according to the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities . One proposal is to define responsibilities on the basis of past and present emissions .

Introduction

15

In this case, all depends on the criteria on which one relies to calculate emissions: one can consider a country’s emissions for a specific year or time period; it is also possible to consider the total emissions of a country or the per capita emissions; countries may as well be ranged on account of the rate of emission; or it is also possible to measure the carbon intensity of GDP (the relation between CO2 emissions and GDP) . Even if it were possible to agree on measuring emissions on the basis of one or several of these criteria, the problem would not be resolved . For causal responsibility remains highly contested in international negotiations . To strengthen their position in regard of this, developing countries often argue that the impacts of climate change will be felt in different way by various countries and regions in the world, which is yet another way of assessing climate change responsibility . The second element the authors consider is climate change adaptation, which has also become an important issue in international negotiations . Whether the responsibility to finance adaptation is defined on the basis of a consequentialist approach or on account of the ability to pay, Zaccai and Lugen conclude, based on empirical findings, that financial aid in this domain remains as insufficient as in the domain of official development aid . As the latter case demonstrates, one of the major problems seems to be that aid is mainly driven by political motivations, i . e ., the degree of compatibility between donors’ interest and development objectives of the recipient countries . The third crucial element in climate change negotiations the authors deal with is technology development and transfer, aimed at climate change mitigation and adaptation . In this context, they show that technology transfer from developed to developing countries is often used as a tool in the competition between OECD countries . They also consider that the principle of different standards allowing a lesser level of harshness for environmental protection in developing countries, which was adopted in the Rio Declaration, is not compatible with the goals of climate change mitigation . One of the major defects of this principle is that it invites investors to produce with lower environmental standards in these countries . Based on these findings, Zaccai and Lugen conclude that urgency of climate change policy calls for agreements on mitigation and adaptation measures that are more demanding than those established by currently accepted principles . In their view, this requires above all the definition of criteria and categories, which better reflect the difference between various states, especially in terms of growth and power . Alice Kaswan discusses the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities in the context of different theories of climate justice in the domain of adaptation . She begins by highlighting that climate effects will most likely disproportionately affect the poor and vulnerable, and thereby exacerbate inequalities already existing inside as well as between states . This is why she considers justice to be a key principle when it comes to define responsibilities in adaptation policies . In a broad overview of theories of justice, comprising both corrective and distributive justice as well as the various ways of explaining these notions, she explores the relevance these theories assign to differing principles of responsibility, including the ‘polluter pays’, the ‘beneficiary pays’ and the ‘ability to pay’ principles . A distinctive feature of her account is that Kaswan deals with responsibility not only in the international era, where it is most often discussed, but in the domestic realm as well . Another salient aspect of her reflections consists in the proposal to integrate theories of corrective

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and distributive justice instead of considering them as mutually exclusive . Since corrective justice focuses on the role of the causal agent, it relies on the polluters pay principle . In contradistinction, distributive justice considers the degree to which an existing distribution of resources matches a conception of fairness, whereby the latter can be defined in terms of equality or sufficiency . Theories of distributive justice will thus lay greater weight on the beneficiary pays and on the ability to pay principles . The last feature to be highlighted in Kaswan’s contribution is the significance she attributes to participatory justice . In her view, participation of the most vulnerable in domestic as well as international negotiations is an essential requirement of just adaptation policies . Ivo Walliman-Helmer’s paper provides an excellent complement to Kaswan’s discussion of just adaptation . Based on a critical account of the Cancun Adaptation Framework, the author attempts to show why differentiating adaptation responsibilities based on the causal responsibility for greenhouse gas emissions is problematic . Taking account of the complexity of adaptation processes, he proposes to define responsibilities in regard of the capacity of countries and communities to subsidize, implement, and maintain adaptation measures . Since implementation and maintenance of such measures depend on the active participation of developing countries, the latter need to be duly respected when it comes to the assignment of responsibilities for adaptation . Peter Ørebech, a law scholar specialized on customary law, elaborates on the working hypothesis that a bottom-up approach to legal norms and principles is best suited for fostering shared, but differentiated green responsibility . He first examines the kinds of obstacles different decision-making regimes may encounter when they try to resolve ecological issues, for instance market allocation and outsourcing, or regulation defined via negotiation and coordination, which are all too often dismissed in practice . Adopting the model of an autopoietic system, he then proposes to conceive the norms assuring protection of the environment on the basis of customary international law and general principles of law . While no one dictates these norms in particular, their success would rely on the interest of individual human beings and nations alike to benefit from a viable and stable solution assured by reciprocity . In the last part of his paper Ørebech attempts to show, relying on various concrete cases, how it might be possible to bridge the gap between philosophy and law, between idealism and pragmatism, by developing case law on environmental issues . Criticizing the positivistic position, which aims at downplaying the role of customary law and general principles as sources of international law, he contends that it is the role of the judge to decide which of two norms is applicable, and that equity is a relevant source of international law . Drawing on a detailed account of customary law and general principles of law, Ørebech aims at demonstrating how the latter can contribute to a green future .

aLain PaPaux (Lausanne) lA

crIse envIronnementAle ou lA modernIté retournée contre

elle-même : et sI homo sapiens n’étAIt que faber ?

La crise environnementale a rendu apparentes diverses limites de la biosphère, restituant du même coup l’homme à sa finitude . Si la notion de finitude n’a rien de nouveau, le retour de fins naturelles – dont le bien vivre ensemble, qui présuppose un environnement sain – ne contrevient pas moins à la volonté infinie présupposée par la notion moderne de droit-prérogative, « droit-puissance (pouvoir) de », laquelle irrigue une large part de la philosophie politique moderne . La force (potestas) dans les sciences et le pouvoir (encore potestas) dans les humanités autorisent une conception homogène du réel, à laquelle appelait Descartes avec « La » méthode pour les premières, la philosophie politique des droits de l’homme pour les secondes . S’annonce le règne de la causalité efficiente (dans l’exemple classique de la statue, la force de l’artiste la sculptant), désormais seule causalité pertinente, conduisant à la techno-science et au scientisme d’un côté, à la sociologie du pouvoir (pour laquelle le droit n’est que la résultante « mécanique » de forces sociales) et à l’économisme (dont la version politique du new public management a envahi la cité) de l’autre côté . Plutôt que l’homo sapiens porté par les affirmations humanistes de la Renaissance et des Lumières, c’est un homo faber qui s’installait, légitimé par le mot d’ordre de « la » modernité, « verum et factum convertuntur » (l’équivalence entre la vérité et le faire), lequel ouvrait la voie à la maîtrise et de la nature et de la société (social engineering) . La perte de maîtrise que porte en elle la technoscience avec ses pouvoirs-faire, ses puissances qui excèdent notre savoir, sonne la fin du solipsisme moderne, de l’individu matriciel, réciproquement le retour de la nature comme creuset des conditions d’existence même de l’homme, une confusion des horizons – que traduit le terme anthropocène – par préférence réaliste aux dualismes aussi rassérénants qu’illusoires signant la modernité : essence vs existence, res extensa vs res cogitans, âme vs corps, law in books vs law in action, etc . Des indices du dépassement des structures de pensée de « la » modernité se laissent entrevoir, modestes certes, mais bien réels puisque le droit, par nature reflétant des habitus et aspirations déjà quelque peu inscrits socialement, en a lui-même enregistrés . Certains, relevant du droit international public, en seront présentés, en guise de conclusion .

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1. Prolégomènes :

de lA fIctIon rAtIonAlIste du logos

à lA réAlIté PrAtIque de lA mètIs

(effectuAtIon)

(PrésentAtIon)

« On dirait que le règne du droit naturel moderne commence en même temps que les révolutions scientifique, technique et industrielle, avec la maîtrise et la possession du monde »1

Nous entretenant de La sagesse du monde, cherchant à surmonter « Le grand partage »2 moderne, Brague « risque [donc] quelque chose comme une histoire de l’être-dans-lemonde »3 . Heureuse caractérisation de l’homme, plus neutre qu’une « nature », plus descriptive qu’une « essence », furieusement incarnée : « ce que nous faisons sur terre »4 . Cette expression toute générale, sied à l’homme de le rue, non convoqué en son acception vulgaire et condescendante, mais en ce qu’il dit l’homme incarné hic et nunc, en ce qu’il renvoie à une doxa positivement reçue, à l’opinion, mais qu’en bon aristotélicien, Brague considère avec la plus grande bienveillance : elle livre quelque vraisemblance sur notre être-au-monde, et nous le dit faber infiniment plus que sapiens . Notre présence concrète au monde, celle d’hommes incarnés volens nolens, pourrait-elle être autre que de l’ordre d’un faber principiellement ? Si ce constat vaut de toute éternité (en Occident pour ce que nous connaissons), la Modernité le porte à son excellence, insérant l’homme dans un réel régi par la seule cause efficiente, un monde de forces (potestas), la « philosophie mécanique » (Rossi), plus gravement « le dogme de la force », expression d’autant plus déroutante que la force est loin de constituer une « idée claire et distincte » à la Descartes mais plutôt « une grandeur mythique qui n’a pas sa source dans l’expérience scientifique mais dont elle prédétermine au contraire la structure »5, attitude que Spengler caractérise lumineusement : une « volonté de puissance qui se rit de toutes les limitations temporelles ou spatiales, qui considère précisément l’illimité et l’infini comme constituant ses objectifs spécifiques »6 . Si la « philosophie mécanique » pouvait sembler adéquate aux relations nécessaires – une large part de la philosophie naturelle, à l’exception du vivant, lequel fonda le modèle organiciste, concurrent du mécanicisme –, elle s’éprouve incongrue à la sphère de l’action où règnent le choix et la contingence : la philosophie pratique . Le rationalisme qui la sous-tend se trouve dépassé dès le fondement du politique 1 2

3 4 5 6

Michel Serres, Le contrat naturel, Paris, 1990, 68–69 . Catherine et Raphaël Larrère, Du bon usage de la nature. Pour une philosophie de l’environnement, Paris, 2009, 93, ressort des dualismes (modernes), identifié comme l’une des sources majeures de nos rapports biaisés avec la nature . Latour, sous la plume duquel se trouve également la formule (Bruno Latour, Nous n’avons jamais été modernes, Paris, 1991), montre à quel degré ce partage Sujet/Objet est fictif, soit à quel point les fondements de la modernité philosophique sont sablonneux ou, moins gravement exprimé, ressortissent du discours (logos) ou Présentation – la façon dont on prétend que l’entreprise a été conduite – bien plus que l’Effectuation – la façon concrète, pratique, suivant laquelle l’entreprise a effectivement été conduite . Les juristes connaissent bien cette distinction, le jugement rédigé pour publication ne reflétant que peu le raisonnement mené par les juges . Rémi Brague, La sagesse du monde, Paris, 1999, 7 . Ibid ., 11 . Spengler cité par Dominique Lecourt, Prométhée, Faust, Frankenstein. Fondements imaginaires de l’éthique, Paris, 1996, 158 . Spengler cité par Lecourt (note 5), 157, qui précise que la culture occidentale dont Spengler annonce le déclin « se caractérise par la volonté de dominer les apparences » .

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comme le relève avec sagacité et impuissance Rousseau : « Il faudrait que l’effet pût devenir la cause, que l’esprit social, qui doit être l’ouvrage de l’institution, présidât à l’institution même et que les hommes fussent avant les lois ce qu’ils doivent devenir par elles »7 . Une fiction préside ainsi aux développements de la philosophie politique et juridique8 moderne . C’est dire combien les réalités demeureront éloignées des discours qui, au regard de ce hiatus, n’en peuvent être les modèles . Et si l’on souhaite conserver la qualification de rationnelle pour pareille construction, on aura soin de préciser la nature idéaliste, et par là aisément « constructiviste » (faber), de ce rationalisme, les existants (pragmata) ne nous y obligeant cognitivement . Dupuy y reconnaît l’une des marques caractéristiques du sacré, l’« auto-transcendance », habillée sous la rationalité « merveilleuse » de l’auto-limitation, celle d’un homo sapiens à suivre cette fiction rationaliste . Par fiction rationaliste, nous n’entendons pas seulement une œuvre de la raison reconstruisant les origines du politique, à la manière d’un mythos mais une fiction de (la) rationalité, comme si la raison se trompait elle-même – et elle le fait en effet – en déclarant rationnel ce qui relève du sacré, selon notre lecture de Dupuy en son très lumineux La marque du sacré . Troublant sacré, qui montre surtout, selon nous, qu’il ne s’agit pas de raison au sens classique d’objectif, déductif, linéaire et nécessaire mais de mètis, ruses de l’intelligence, aux formes multiples, dont le mode a été occulté par la domination d’un logos idéaliste précisément, d’obédience platonicienne surtout . Là se love l’une des caractéristiques de la Modernité, le hiatus entre d’une part son discours, qui se veut raison, selon le double sens de logos – la Présentation du réel tel qu’idéalisé par la raison9 – et d’autre part sa pratique résolument faber jusqu’à la techno-science – sa démarche effective au sein de ce réel, son Effectuation – infiniment plus mètis . Par le ministère de C . Linné, l’homme moderne se prétendra sapiens, jusqu’à la boursouflure en la prétention à avoir éliminé toute transcendance, excepté la sienne propre, auto-transcendance délicatement dénommée « autonomie » : il est à lui-même sa propre norme, auto-nomos . Pratique de faber toutefois : la révolution industrielle n’est guère spirituelle, moins encore sapientiale, et le bénéfice de 7

8

9

Jean-Pierre Dupuy, La marque du sacré, Paris, 2008, 17, citant Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Du contrat social, livre II, chap . 7 . Analogue aveu d’impuissance chez Platon soulignant qu’il n’y aura de cité juste qu’avec des hommes justes, et des hommes justes que dans une cité juste, moins paralogisme que mise en garde contre tout constructivisme social prétendant à application – social engineering –, guère entendue par les platonismes de la Renaissance et de la Modernité . Mystérieuse encore la volonté générale chez Rousseau dont on sait de manière certaine qu’elle n’est pas la somme des volontés individuelles mais alors une affaire de mètis ? (infra) Même au sein du positivisme juridique le plus élaboré – la Grundnorm de Kelsen est simultanément « positive » comme norme et hypothétique (de contrainte logique) pour échapper, en apparence, au paralogisme – et du positivisme juridique le plus étriqué – qui prétend pouvoir dériver tout le droit de la Constitution, sans jamais poser authentiquement la question du fondement : qui a constitué le (premier) Constituant (de la première constitution) comme Constituant ? Exemple parlant d’auto-transcendance . Dans la science même, paradigme de la pensée moderne, le modèle mécaniste n’a jamais été suivi en pratique : « les théories physiques classiques sont des idéalisations » selon Niels Bohr cité par Larrère (note 2), 110, qui soulignent la nature Présentation du modèle mécanique : sa « domination […] aurait ainsi d’autant mieux marché qu’elle n’a jamais vraiment marché […] la mécanique classique a, pour sa part, progressivement déserté le soin d’expliquer le monde macroscopique qui nous entoure et que nous pratiquons » [les soulignés sont de nous] (108) .

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ses conquêtes heureuses manque désormais explicitement de prudence . Le faire pour le faire ne se justifie d’aucune sapience, en particulier plus de celle de se faire un monde (Welt) pour s’y tenir, dans une veine arendtienne, pour contenir notre angoisse métaphysique . Par où l’on entend que le faire comme tel n’est pas coupable, disant notre état même d’être-au-monde . L’imprudence, pis la négligence pour nous mieux rapprocher d’Epiméthée, tient dans l’habillage de ce faire dans un logos, jusqu’à nous le masquer . Ne pas voir ce faber de l’être-dans-le-monde, et par là ne pas l’assumer, comme dans la précellence moderne d’homo sapiens, assure de mal poser les questions, environnementales en l’occurrence, enferme dans une sphère de réflexions toute théorique souvent sans lien, sauf l’utopie ou l’espérance, avec le monde de l’action, la pratique, l’Effectuation . Et si les réponses à la crise environnementale n’étaient pas de l’ordre d’un idéaliste logos, de la raison, mais tenait davantage de la mètis, des ruses de l’intelligence ? 2. comPendIum d’un

homme moderne Aveuglément faber

En exergue de L’œuvre au noir, M . Yourcenar emprunte à Pic de la Mirandole une dignité humaine campant de manière édifiante le projet moderne d’un homo faber, auteur de lui-même, littéralement s’auto-fondant par son propre faire, sans devoir à quelque héritage de nature ou de culture . Est ainsi dite l’autonomie, si caractéristique de la modernité, l’auto-transcendance d’une créature prétendant ne connaître liens que choisis : « Je ne t’ai donné ni visage, ni place qui te soit propre, ni aucun don qui te soit particulier, ô Adam, afin que ton visage, ta place, et tes dons, tu les veuilles, les conquières et les possèdes par toi-même . Nature enferme d’autres espèces en des lois par moi établies . Mais toi, que ne limite aucune borne, par ton propre arbitre, entre les mains duquel je t’ai placé, tu te définis toi-même . Je t’ai placé au milieu du monde, afin que tu puisses mieux contempler ce que contient le monde . Je ne t’ai fait ni céleste ni terrestre, mortel ou immortel, afin que toi-même, librement, à la façon d’un bon peintre ou d’un sculpteur habile, tu achèves ta propre forme . »10

Langage éminemment moderne, en effet, que celui : – de la volition, faculté éminente de l’homme, au point de négliger la raison, pas même mentionnée, néoplatonisme encore résonnant de sa lecture franciscaine et nominaliste, en ce qu’elle promeut le plus significativement l’individualité de l’agent : l’acteur est singulier par sa volonté, ses actes, dont il pourra ainsi répondre, non en sa raison, universelle et par là anonyme en toute rigueur de pensée ; – de l’illimitation, aucune borne, aucune fin ne s’impose à lui, qu’on l’entende au sens d’un terme, une limite ou d’une finalité, une nature qui tracerait, pour part au moins, la voie à suivre ; ainsi s’annonce l’auto-définition de cette créature auteur d’elle-même, parce qu’à l’image de Dieu, auquel elle finira par se substi10

Marguerite Yourcenar, L’œuvre au noir, Paris, 1968, 559, citant l’Oratio de hominis dignitate de Pic de la Mirandole ; les soulignés sont de nous . La référence à Adam voudrait-elle traduire une volonté de tout reconstruire, mieux une auto-fondation du projet moderne, remontant en quelque sorte aux origines, l’humus d’Adam, pour identifier l’homme nouveau, en instaurer la « re-naissance » ?

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–

–

–

–

21

tuer . Cette inclination est d’autant plus forte que les deux premières caractéristiques, la volition et l’illimitation, résonnent de concert dans la notion de « volonté infinie », ressort d’une large part de la philosophie politique moderne, celle d’un homme enfin débarrassé de Dieu dont l’existence même semblait limiter sa liberté, pour qui du moins conçoit leur relation sur le modèle de causes partielles et concourantes se concurrençant sur la même action . Rendre l’homme libre requiert en conséquence de diminuer les pouvoirs de Dieu, de le faire disparaître donc ; d’où l’auto-définition, consonnant avec l’absence de mention de la raison au sens d’une mise à l’écart de toute fin naturelle, préparant l’anti-naturalité de l’homme (d’un Ferry ou d’un Prochiantz notamment), par contraste avec la surnature des médiévaux, « a-nature » qui s’exprime par l’idée d’arrachement aux instincts, au rebours de l’enfermement du pigeon de Rousseau… ou de son chat . La société aussi sera un artefact . Voilà l’individu s’auto-créant citoyen selon la voie d’un solipsisme ontologique et social, exemplairement soutenu par Descartes au « je » repris à St-Augustin, inspirateur des franciscains et de la primauté de la volonté sur la raison ! du toi-même librement, qui prolonge l’auto-définition, annonçant une conception idéaliste de la liberté comme absence de contraintes – singulièrement de fins naturelles qui nous limiteraient –, en rejet de toute insertion dans un « déjà-là » par hypothèse indisponible à la volonté humaine, vécu alors comme la contrariant, la diminuant . L’« auto-nomie » des Modernes y est toute contenue, cadre de pensée au sein duquel le droit ne pourrait être qu’un droit-prérogative, un « pouvoir de », un « droit de », ressortissant du sujet même, non de la relation qu’il entretient désormais accidentellement avec autrui conformément au solipsisme de ce « pur » individu . Ainsi en droit le titre (juridique, le « droit de »), précède-t-il la mesure (l’insertion de ce droit dans le tout qu’est la cité, d’un mot honni : bien commun), le sujet existant pleinement hors relation d’un point de vue ontologique, ce qui la rend précisément accidentelle, non-nécessaire à son identité, par là parfaitement disponible, le laissant sculpteur de lui-même ; du sculpteur de soi-même, puisqu’aucune nature propre ne s’impose à lui . On retrouve l’exemple classique de la statue, utilisé pour illustrer les quatre causes aristotéliciennes, le sculpteur campant la force, puissance ou potestas nécessaire pour produire, faire ( !) la statue, soit la cause efficiente, dont l’exclusivité – les autres causes ne sont pas mentionnées – concentre en quelque sorte toute la modernité, en l’installant dans un paradigme du faber, à l’encontre de ses propres discours souvent ; habile et donc adapté, en écho à l’exemple scolaire de la statue . Simultanément aveu terrible : le propos est placé hors sphère (sémantique) de la raison ; il ressortit du savoir-faire (« bon peintre », « sculpteur habile ») ou de l’action (« arbitre »), inscrit de la sorte le nouvel homme, l’homme moderne, dans le champ de l’art, ars : moins que l’episteme, mais plus que l’expérience nue, de l’ordre de la mètis bien plus que du logos, lequel éclipsa pourtant dans le discours la connaissance conjecturale, mètis ou ruse de l’intelligence laquelle « s’exerçait sur des plans très divers mais toujours à des fins pratiques : savoir-faire de l’artisan, habileté du sophiste, prudence du politique ou art du pilote dirigeant son navire . La mètis impliquait ainsi une série d’attitudes mentales combinant le flair, la sagacité, la

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débrouillardise… Multiple et polymorphe, elle s’appliquait à des réalités mouvantes qui ne se prêtent ni à la mesure précise ni au raisonnement rigoureux . Engagée dans le devenir et l’action, cette forme d’intelligence a été, à partir du Vème siècle, refoulée dans l’ombre par les philosophes . Au nom d’une métaphysique de l’être et de l’immuable, le savoir conjectural et la connaissance oblique des habiles et des prudents furent rejetés du côté du non-savoir . »11 Ce constat donne à voir un retournement dans le discours moderne, en Présentation, prétendu de la Raison ou Logos ou encore sapiens, qui masque une Effectuation bien davantage de l’ordre de la volonté, de la mètis, d’homo faber . 3. qu’homo

fAber cArActérIse bel et bIen lA modernIté

3.1 Prométhée moderne et maîtrise du monde Au fil de ces brèves esquisses, apparaît un homo faber manière Pic de la Mirandole, nous emportant bien au-delà du sentiment premier d’un Epiméthée12, un homme sans qualités (propres) auquel incombe la tâche de « se faire » . Les conséquences du comportement négligent (infra) du titan, savoir le reliquat des qualités essentielles à distribuer laissant à l’homme seule l’adaptation, demeuraient inscrites dans le monde, alors que la version moderne, et caricaturalement hypermoderne (bien plus que postmoderne) du transhumanisme, lui préfère la plus glorieuse domination, sur le monde, par maîtrise, tant ses puissances (potestas) lui semblent grandes, illimitées de principe ainsi que l’illustre son frère, corrélat (donc indissociablement lié) s’il en est, Prométhée : « Le Prométhée définitivement déchaîné auquel la science confère des forces jamais encore connues et à l’économie son impulsion effrénée »13 . Dans cette veine de la dénonciation de l’« attitude prométhéenne » de l’homme moderne, la technique en son essence : « revient à mettre l’existant à disposition de l’entreprise humaine visant à dominer la nature . Et cette mise à disposition, dont les sciences modernes rationalisent les procédures et amplifient les résultats, menace la planète d’une dévastation totale . »14

11

12 13

14

Marcel Détienne / Jean-Pierre Vernant, Les ruses de l’intelligence. La mètis des Grecs, Champs essais, Paris, 2009 (1974), quatrième de couverture . Anne Cauquelin, L’art du lieu commun. Du bon usage de la doxa, Paris, 1999, 15, à propos de la doxa aux analogies serrées avec des dimensions de la métis, parle de « l’exil officiel où on la tient depuis l’Antiquité » . Lecourt (note 5), 185, affirmant que le discours sur la dignité de Pic de la Mirandole a bien pour modèle Prométhée dont l’œuvre est le corrélat des agissements malhabiles de son frère Epiméthée . Hans Jonas, Le Principe responsabilité : une éthique pour la civilisation technologique, Paris, 1990, en première ligne de la Préface . Le discours du « plus renommé des chimistes de son temps », Humphry Davy, que Lecourt verrait bien dans la bouche du docteur Frankenstein, l’annonçait clairement : « La science a doté l’homme de pouvoirs que nous pouvons presque qualifier de créateurs [interrogeant la nature] comme un maître, actif avec ses instruments » (Lecourt [note 5], 108, pour les deux citations) . Le Docteur Frankenstein écoutait avec délices les affirmations du Professeur Waldam parlant des scientifiques qui « ont acquis des pouvoirs nouveaux et presque illimités » écrit Mary Shelley (107) . Lecourt (note 5), 10 .

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Classiquement déjà, Prométhée redresse la négligence de son frère par son faire, légendaire, et son hubris, principielle, le vol du feu aux dieux, par ruse (mètis), ensuite d’une autre ruse, arrogante – « Prométhée qui riait derrière son [Zeus] dos » –, consistant à tromper les dieux à propos des fausses bonnes parts offertes d’un taureau sacrifié . Comment cette quintessence de mètis ne se refléterait-elle pas sur la race humaine dont Prométhée est le créateur et qui perdure par l’art de la tromperie ? Plus avisé que son frère Epiméthée15, « le plus avisé de sa race » même, n’enseigna-til pas aux hommes les « arts utiles », si efficacement que Zeus en prit ombrage, voyant « leurs pouvoirs s’accroître sans cesse »16 ? Mètis et faber semblent se fondre, éminemment en le Prométhée moderne : « je suis foncièrement industrieux, appliqué . Un artisan apte à travailler avec ardeur et persévérance », se fiant « au pouvoir de sa volonté » souligne Lecourt17, qui renvoie également à l’homme faustien de Spengler, un type d’homme qui désormais a voulu « construire soi-même un monde, être soimême Dieu »18 . Le propre de la Modernité en matière de techniques ne tiendrait-il pas dans le renversement de l’ordre « Epiméthée, oublieux, alors Prométhée, réfléchi », nous, Modernes, débutant au faber pour ensuite, penauds et médusés de nos propres comportements, nous révéler être irréfléchis « bien que » puissants, nous laissant, de par cette configuration paradoxale, sans maîtrise ? Cette séquence, aussi édifiante qu’inquiétante, n’est jamais que la conséquence de l’autonomie revendiquée et gagnée (en théorie) par la Modernité, homme « auto-nomos », homme auteur des normes qui le régissent, accomplissant enfin le stade ultime – et puéril – d’une liberté définie absence d’obstacle extérieur, éminemment moderne19 . Lord Byron et Percy Shelley « exaltaient au même moment [Prométhée] comme le type même du libre-penseur révolté, triomphant de la tyrannie divine »20 . Comme si la causalité de Dieu et celle des hommes se situaient sur le même plan, supposant que ce que l’un possède est nécessairement retiré à l’autre, en diminution de ses propres prérogatives . On gagnait alors un monde de la stricte horizontalité, dans lequel la causalité repose sur des causes partielles et concourantes, sur le modèle du char tiré par plusieurs chevaux ne suivant pas forcément la même direction, par contraste avec des causes réciproques et totales, chacune se révélant être cause de la causalité en acte de l’autre, figure gnoséologique dénommée relation transcendantale : « Par relation 15 16

17 18 19

20

Dont le nom signifie « qui réfléchit après coup » . Sur ces différents points, nous suivons Robert Graves, Les Mythes grecs, Paris, 1967 (1958), vol . 1, 157 ss . Les soulignés sont de nous . Epiméthée personnalise aussi l’imprévoyance (163) . Lecourt (note 5), 12, que l’on ne saurait vraiment pas accuser de technophobie, citant A . Leverkühn à propos du Faust de Goethe, souligne à l’endroit de l’homme (moderne) ce désir de puissance excessive, homme « qui se donne au Diable par une soif insolente de connaissance et de pouvoirs magiques » [nous soulignons] . Lecourt (note 5), 111 . Lecourt (note 5), 159–160 . D’une lucidité sans concession, Dupuy (note 7), 105, souligne : « Lorsque la finitude de la condition humaine est perçue comme aliénation et non comme source de sens, on perd quelque chose d’infiniment précieux en échange de la poursuite d’un rêve puéril » ; affirmation qui, au rebours, n’entraîne aucunement adhésion à la liberté des Anciens, comme si le monde était bivalent ; en revanche la conscience de la finitude que traduit cette dernière nous serait fort précieuse aujourd’hui . A suivre Lecourt (note 5), 11 .

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transcendantale nous entendons une réalité qui se réfère à une autre par tout ce qui la constitue en elle-même . Pareille réalité est donc intégralement pénétrée de relativité . C’est de cette manière que nous concevons les principes constitutifs qui forment la structure de l’être particulier, tels que l’essence et l’existence, la matière et la forme, la substance et les accidents, les facultés et les actions »21 . Chaque cause exerce sa causalité propre seulement sous l’effet de la causalité en acte de l’autre, causes réciproques en toute rigueur, savoir dont l’acte s’avère commun et un, des causes réciproques dans l’exercice même de la causalité propre à chacune . Le paradigme classique en est l’« unité substantielle âme-corps » : l’âme, ou d’un latin suggestif anima, n’est âme qu’en animant un corps, lequel « alors » passe à l’acte, est à même d’exercer sa nature, vertus de corporéité disposées en vue de l’âme ; et simultanément comme réciproquement, le corps permet la causalité en acte de l’âme anima, animatrice de ce corps précisément . La pensée se trouve d’entrée de cause confrontée à un véritable tout, un un confus parce que concret (le ens concretum confusum de la tradition philosophique médiévale), non pas un ensemble, quand bien même la langue nous condamne-t-elle à l’ambiguïté avec le mot « parties » laissant entendre quelque composé alors que les causes (ou entités) concernées s’éprouvent intrinsèquement relatives l’une à l’autre au sein de ce tout, « relatives ‘essentiellement’ » pour être exact et non secondairement ou de manière accidentelle comme une qualité se surajoutant à un sujet sans en modifier l’essence ou la définition . Aussi Descartes, prétendant apporter la rupture d’avec la philosophie médiévale qu’il croyait tout affidée à l’aristotélisme, séparera et opposera dans un dualisme exemplaire res cogitans et res extensa, opposition binaire dans laquelle se coulera toute la Modernité sous l’enseigne du dualisme Sujet / Objet que thématisera si puissamment Kant . En toute cohérence, le « transcendantal » de la « relation transcendantale » ne saurait recevoir son sens classique kantien désignant les conditions de possibilité de tout savoir authentique accessible au Sujet, désincarné (et « transcendantal » en ce sens) usant correctement de sa raison, singulièrement les catégories a priori de l’entendement . Celles-ci ressortissent en effet du seul Sujet, dussent-elles être remplies par l’Objet via l’empirie, conformément au grand partage moderne, tout le jeu consistant à créer, trouver et souvent multiplier les intermédiaires pour rendre compte de la rencontre du premier avec le second, jusqu’aux tentatives les plus mécanicistes, mais là encore exemplaires : de la tringlerie des animaux-machines et de la glande pinéale à la Descartes jusqu’au schématisme à la Kant . Nous entendrons ici, au rebours, « transcendantal » en son sens génuine, emprunté au latin transcendit, « qui lie deux réalités entre elles en ce qu’elle pénètre, traverse de part en part (transcendit), imbibe (imbibit) l’une à l’égard de l’autre . »22 Pareille imprégnation de deux réalités, tout compénétrées, ne vaut-elle pas (peutêtre) pour la citoyenneté à l’ancienne, constitutive de l’identité même de chacun des membres de la cité – non en tant qu’individu évidemment, cette dernière caractérisation ne jouant qu’un rôle secondaire – selon une nature de zoon politikon moins caricaturale que sa traduction en liberté des Anciens : le bien commun n’absorbe pas l’individu, mais finalise le citoyen, accomplit son humanité, parfait ses potentialités, 21 22

Louis de Raeymaeker, Philosophie de l’être, Louvain, 1970, 125 . André de Muralt, Néoplatonisme et aristotélisme dans la métaphysique médiévale, Paris, 1995, 111– 112 .

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par participation ontologique – au sens philosophique de l’insertion de l’exercice dans son être – au collectif en la manière d’un exhaussement de sa personne et non son sacrifice . Pour dur que puisse apparaître ce régime civil, parfois proche de la délation de tous par tous, il ne se confond pas avec un système totalitaire dans lequel l’individu est « néantisé » par le collectif . Anachronisme, en effet, que de le décrire avec les yeux du citoyen (simple individu à dire vrai) d’aujourd’hui, de l’homme sans qualité, orphelin de toutes finalités naturelles, erreur de perspective qui emporte Serres luimême, dans une légèreté d’autant plus troublante que le marin et militaire qu’il est fait de la vie sur un bateau – cet espace confiné à l’extrême – le modèle des comportements respectueux, à adopter notamment à l’endroit de la nature . Dans cette veine, d’un point de vue écouménal23, Anthropocène24 dit peut-être quelque intimité « transcendantale » entre l’homme – moderne pour le coup et faber pour l’essence – et la biosphère, pouvant basculer à tout instant de la fragile relation de symbiote à la funeste intrication de parasite . Symbiote ou parasite, pareille affirmation doit se comprendre d’un point de vue anthropocentrique, vis-à-vis de nous, humains, car d’un point de vue absolu, vu de Sirius, la Terre n’a que faire de l’homme : elle restera planète, dussions-nous la quitter et nous quitter pour toujours… en disparaissant, genre mortel que nous sommes devenus25 . La causalité de causes partielles et concourantes nous a conduit à concevoir la nature en extériorité par rapport à nous, un autre (voire un « rien », tout du moins un non-pertinent) en face de nous, alors que la causalité de causes réciproques et totales permet d’entrevoir l’intimité homme/nature, mieux la nature comme notre milieu, naturel précisément, manière de co-appartenance (du côté de l’homme-symbiote) de l’homme « à » la nature (plus que de l’homme et la nature) . Dans cette opposition des deux types de causalité, se retrouve tout l’esprit de la « philosophie mécanique » dont la logique embrasse la causalité de causes partielles et concourantes . La traduction de ce mécanicisme en philosophie politique devait donner les doctrines du contrat social, plus généralement le contractualisme et plus tard les droits de l’homme, toutes manières de penser (le politique) issues du droitprérogative, droit-puissance précisément : « j’ai le droit de… » donc le « pouvoir de » . On substitue alors un « ordre de » dans un système politique qui ne peut qu’être une affaire de forces, de puissances, de sanctions, en bref de commandement – l’ordre d’un plus puissant imposant sa volonté à un moins puissant, ressort même du Léviathan – à un « ordre à », lequel sous-entend quelque finalité naturelle, en fonction de laquelle sont attribués les droits selon une justice principiellement distributive . L’ordre comme commandement, entre des égaux – l’horizontalité pure –, ne peut 23

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Du grec oikoumenê signifiant « (terre) habitée », ressort de la pensée d’Augustin Berque, Être humains sur la terre, Gallimard, 1996, passim, distinguant, avec grande fécondité, ce point de vue proprement humain sur l’environnement de l’écologie s’occupant de la terre comme niche de tous les vivants notamment . Une formule de Serres (note 1), 34, permet de saisir toute l’originalité de la situation environnementale, plus exactement écouménale, laquelle compte désormais des objets-monde ou artefacts « dont l’une des dimensions au moins, temps, espace, vitesse, énergie atteint l’échelle du globe » . Günther Anders, Le temps de la fin, Paris, 2007, 11 ss . dont le titre de la subdivision porte « La modification de notre statut métaphysique : notre passage du genre des mortels au genre mortel » .

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qu’aboutir au contractualisme, ne souffrant ni autorité (constitutive ou de jure) ni bien commun intrinsèque26 impliqués par le zoon politikon, configuration synthétisée dans le solipsisme et sa tabula rasa – que n’enregistre aucune histoire du droit par exemple – , marqués par la patte de faber : il faut se faire, s’auto-produire dans un monde dans lequel toute institution est considérée comme un artefact, dont toute finalité naturelle a été écartée : je serai l’auteur de moi-même, je m’auto-créerai citoyen, velléités psychologiques tout au plus27, contrefactuelles pour le moins, cri d’espérance d’un homme sans qualité . L’insistance de Pic de la Mirandole sur cet homme moderne sans qualité ne traduit pas seulement une volonté d’auto-fondation – figure sur laquelle nous reviendrons – mais dit surtout l’absence de nature (humaine) . Serait-ce pour cette raison que La Renaissance est aussi celle du mythe de Prométhée, lequel y « réapparaît flamboyant », carrément « triomphant dans les dernières décennies du siècle des Lumières »28 ? Plus édifiante encore, l’érection, à cette époque, par les poètes, penseurs et artistes « d’un Prométhée artiste-créateur, qui ne doit pas à sa nature la position éminente dans le monde mais au contraire à ce qu’il n’a point de nature au sens où les autres êtres en ont une »29 . Pareil défaut se lit déjà en creux dans la disparition de toute référence à la finalité, figure majeure de l’aristotélisme dont la cause finale reflète l’insertion de l’homme dans la nature, de l’éthique dans la physique, au rebours du dualisme âme/corps, ou Sujet/Objet pour faire moderne . Les époux Larrère relèvent avec subtilité la nature d’artefact de la finalité dans la pensée kantienne, en ruinant la fonction essentielle d’insertion de l’homme dans la nature, son milieu . Ils soulignent d’abord que Kant « reprend la critique moderne : il n’y a pas de fin dans la nature », qu’il en a toutefois besoin pour des raisons épistémologiques (singulièrement pour la connaissance des organismes) et plus encore pour des raisons morales : « Elle [la finalité] fait de la moralité humaine une fin de la nature : « Sans les hommes la création tout entière ne serait qu’un simple désert, inutile et sans but final . » En même temps, Kant étend l’instrumentalité à toute la nature . »30

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28 29 30

D’où la nécessité dans les doctrines contractualistes de réduire d’abord la sphère de compétences de chaque individu – ses « droits de » – pour en déléguer une partie à une institution, ce faisant et alors seulement créée, « construite », soit un artefact – encore du faber . Pareilles homogénéisation et horizontalité ne sauraient, de droit (en principe), souffrir la moindre autorité-auctoritas, laquelle présuppose la reconnaissance de quelque supériorité, à laquelle la force (potestas) est inutile, à tout le moins secondaire et accidentelle . Et non pas ontologiques car le solipsisme y apparaîtrait immédiatement fruit d’une posture contrefactuelle : des parents sont déjà là, des institutions, une culture, une langue au sein de laquelle le « je » se constitue, souvent en s’y opposant, mais jamais en s’en excluant, car là encore il passerait par sa culture – celle même dont il cherche à s’éloigner . Par où le solipsisme (moderne) se révèle position tout artificielle, comme sa prétention corrélative à la tabula rasa . Serions-nous d’autant plus libres que ces figures et institutions sont artificielles ? Alors nous rejoignons la logique moderne de laboratoire : ce qui y est produit est plus vrai qu’en la nature car il est maîtrisé, contrôlé, nouveau verum et factum convertuntur ou version, pour la philosophie pratique, du « maker’s argument » (Larrère [note 2], 67 et note 141) . Pour de plus amples développements, infra, section 3 .2 . Lecourt (note 5), 21, pour les deux citations . Lecourt (note 5), 63–64 . Larrère (note 2), 87, citant Emmanuel Kant, Fondements de la métaphysique des mœurs, section II, in Œuvres philosophiques, t . II, Paris 1980–1986, 294 .

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On connaît la noble raison qui convainquit en fin de compte de condamner certaines thèses de Thomas d’Aquin, et principalement son finalisme et par là son prétendu déterminisme : Dieu n’y devenait-il pas l’auteur du mal alors que l’homme devait en être reconnu le seul responsable ? Lecture erronée de Thomas et de son Maître Aristote, montrant que la philosophie médiévale ne constitue en aucune façon un commentaire de la seule philosophie du Stagirite, mais dont l’erreur même ramasse et prépare la Modernité : s’il existe des finalités naturelles, alors nous ne sommes pas libres, lecture appauvrie du monde selon la seule causalité de causes partielles et concourantes . Mais alors tout est littéralement à faire, y compris notre nature ; Pic de la Mirandole n’interpelle-t-il pas l’homme « ô Adam » ? Si « Dieu est mort, alors tout est permis » n’est donc pas le fond du problème, lequel s’entend plus philosophiquement de la disparition ou de la négation de toute cause finale naturelle… alors l’homme serait comme Dieu . 3.2 Le règne de La CausaLité effiCiente : un monde affaire de forCes Insistera-t-on assez sur cette caractéristique de la Modernité, décisive pour sa compréhension et le règne sans partage d’homo faber : l’homogénéisation du monde, par le ministère de sa mathématisation principalement . Eculé, Galilée ? Pénétrant assurément, surtout par l’effacement de la distinction entre les cosmos sublunaire et supralunaire, et de la notion même de cosmos, au profit de l’univers, même (« uni- » ) dans toutes les directions (« -vers ») ; original également par son éducation, et dans la mathématique d’esprit pratique mais de solidité théorique d’Archimède – « un moyen d’étudier la nature et de mettre au point des machines » –, et dans « la physique qualitative d’un Aristote », formation double induisant « le dilemme fondamental de son système du monde : Un vaste organisme mû par des qualités anthropomorphiques, ou une machine à structure rigoureusement mathématique ? »31 On ne peut manquer alors de penser à Hobbes se représentant la cité comme une machine et l’homme comme un rouage . La disparition de la causalité finale aristotélicienne conduisait en effet à préférer le second terme de l’alternative, le ressort de la philosophie politique hobbésienne se prenant de la cause efficiente ou force, le plus puissant commandant aux moins puissants, sorte de quantitativisme se prolongeant dans certaines conceptions sociologiques du droit l’affirmant résultante32 d’une lutte entre forces sociales . Les « sciences humaines » ne faisaient alors jamais que transposer dans leurs champs le modèle mathématique – dont le more geometrico – et physique – le pouvoir-force (potestas) – structurant les sciences de la nature, à l’exemple de maints jusnaturalistes, des Grotius ou autres Pufendorf . La philosophie mécanique ainsi triomphe, pour un temps, long, dans tous les savoirs, imposant une lecture du réel en quatre idées-force : « 1) la nature n’est pas la manifestation d’un principe vivant, mais un système de matière en mouvement régi par des lois ; 2) on peut déterminer ces lois avec une précision mathématique ; 3) un tout petit nombre de ces lois suffit à expliquer l’univers ; 4) l’explication des comportements de la nature exclut de principe toute référence aux forces vitales ou aux 31 32

Pour les trois citations, Georges Minois, Galilée, Paris, 2000, 6–7 . Vocabulaire ressortissant à la mécanique .

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causes finales »33 . La mécanique des physiciens en épousait parfaitement les réquisits, devenue alors son parangon, avec la force, puissance ou potestas comme ressort . Descartes la dota au reste d’une rassérénante philosophie, volontiers more geometrico, d’autant plus efficace qu’elle unifiait le savoir : l’arbre de la connaissance aurait pour racine la métaphysique et pour tronc, soit le pilier du savoir, la physique, dont l’une des trois branches principales sera la mécanique ; il affirmait dans la même veine l’unité méthodologique de tout le savoir, littéralement un discours de la méthode34 . Quel sens recevrait alors, dans l’esprit de la philosophie mécanique triomphante, l’adage de Vico verum et factum convertuntur ? Pourrait-il échapper à sa réception comme le symbole même d’un homo faber, non en un sens trivial s’agissant d’une nature (infra « La subtilité d’homo faber »), d’une réalité ontologique ? Cet homo faber est un homme qui sait, qui connaît la réalité parce qu’il l’a produit « en laboratoire, dans des circonstances parfaitement connues, qu’elle est vraie » selon le maker’s argument, « argument du fabricant » qui dit littéralement faber, « [d]ans un retournement complet de la notion d’artifice » soutenu par Boyle35 . Que la « condition de validité de l’expérimentation est donc l’identité de l’artificiel et du naturel »36 ne constituerait-il pas un tour des plus subtils de la mètis, intelligence de la ruse, plus modeste que le logos, ce que montrait la pratique scientifique telle que Boyle, exemplaire, la conduisait : un vrai issu du faire bien plus que du logos, patent en l’appel à témoins d’aristocrates et autres notaires afin d’attester de la réalité exhibée par l’expérimentation, suivant une démarche fort analogue à la pratique judiciaire, plus exactement la rhétorique (au sens noble) juridique dont la science s’inspire en vérité depuis ses débuts grecs37 . Au demeurant, si la vérité (scientifique) dans sa découverte ressortissait au logos, à quoi bon des témoins, qui plus est, dignes de foi ? Combien étrangère à la rationalité s’éprouve cette dernière exigence, sauf à comprendre l’autorité (auctoritas) en son sens non dévoyé, que Gadamer tente de réhabiliter, contre la Modernité précisément, à la rationalité étriquée . L’auctoritas participe pleinement de la rationalité, affirme-til, mais d’une rationalité sans boursouflure, sans hubris, bel et bien affaire de con33 34

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Paolo Rossi, Aux origines de la science moderne, Paris, 2004 (1999), 191 . Où se lit le puissant projet moderne d’homogénéisation du réel, au rebours du modèle aristotélicien reconnaissant une logique propre à chaque champ spécifique du savoir : on ne saurait attendre d’un juriste ou d’un rhéteur la même rigueur que celle d’un mathématicien soulignait le Stagirite . Larrère (note 2), 67, pour les trois citations . Ils relèvent (321, note 141) de manière troublante l’idéalisme encore plus prononcé de l’interprétation de Hobbes du même maker’s argument, ainsi résumé : « nous connaissons la géométrie parce que nous en construisons les figures . La physique reste pour lui une discipline d’observation, qui recueille des faits et qui, pour cette raison, ne peut être certaine . D’où son opposition à Boyle et à l’invention de l’expérience . » Larrère (note 2), 66 . En quoi tient l’enseignement le plus original peut-être de Serres (note 1) . Karl Raimund Popper, dans La logique de la découverte scientifique, Paris, 1990 (1935), 111, établit expressément cette filiation du scientifique au juridique par référence à l’ancienne procédure pénale anglaise devant le jury en matière d’établissement des faits . Même un positiviste aussi strict que Jean Bricmont, Comment justifier l’autorité scientifique ?, in De l’autorité, ed . Antoine Compagnon, Paris, 2008, 174, en vient à souligner l’analogie profonde de la « méthode scientifique » avec la comparaison des preuves et des arguments produits devant un tribunal . Son compère, Alan Sokal (cité p . 175) ne soutient-il pas l’idée d’un continuum entre sciences et pseudo-sciences, à l’instar de nombre d’auteurs cités dans l’étude ?

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naissance mais tout aussi bien et simultanément de reconnaissance « que l’autre est supérieur en jugement et en perspicacité, qu’ainsi son jugement l’emporte, qu’il a prééminence sur le nôtre […] acte de la raison même qui, consciente de ses limites, accorde à d’autres une plus grande perspicacité . »38 Le rétrécissement moderne de la raison prend notamment pour forme le rejet de la mètis et la disqualification de la doxa39, deux figures dont use abondamment la philosophie pragmatique aristotélicienne . Son rejet par la Renaissance, avec une pointe de mépris même sous la plume de Descartes, indique en creux notre fuite dans le logos, dans la Présentation des phénomènes, dans un tour volontiers néo-platonicien que devait camper pour l’éternité l’Ecole d’Athènes de Raphaël . « Empire, puissance, commander, obéir, une ambition [l’empire de l’homme sur les choses] ‘pure’, ‘noble’, ‘auguste’ : ce vocabulaire [de Bacon] de la domination assimile le rapport de l’homme à la nature (la possession, le dominium) aux rapports des hommes entre eux (le commandement, l’imperium) . On comprend que Spinoza puisse dénoncer là une conception anthropomorphique, qui voit l’homme « comme un empire dans un empire » et confond lois naturelles et décrets humains : « C’est toutefois par métaphore que le mot de loi se voit appliqué aux choses naturelles, car communément on n’entend pas par loi autre chose qu’un commandement » . A affirmer de la sorte une volonté de puissance illimité […] on ne rencontre pas la nature »40 concluent les époux Larrère . Et pourquoi la brutalité de Bacon assimilant la nature à une femme de petite vertu qui ne mérite que d’être violentée pour nous satisfaire ? Les Larrères avancent une raison troublante et bien peu triomphante, moins encore triomphale : la nature comme automate nous exclut du monde, la mécanique n’a aucun souci de l’homme, lequel tente alors de se la réapproprier par sa puissance : « passer d’une natura naturans qui exclut l’homme, à une natura naturata qui est sa chose . »41 Notre angoisse si profonde, métaphysique dit le lieu commun, ne méritait-elle pas pareille utopie, indispensable à cet homme, sans qualité, nature triste que l’on traduira plus positivement en « volonté infinie » ? Pareil excès nous fait évidemment quitter le logos, renoncer à la sapience qui nous rappellerait à notre finitude : il s’agit d’une ruse, d’un « comme si » ; Descartes lui-même y insistait, le fameux « comme maître et possesseur [nous soulignons]… » et Kant y souscrivait à propos des causes finales, ontologiquement inexistantes mais épistémologiquement nécessaires42 . La mètis se trouve ainsi au principe du projet moderne – et de sa logique masquée, l’auto-transcendance ajouterait Dupuy (infra) –, si accomplie qu’elle rend expresse la fiction et tout à la fois parvient à la faire accroire rationnelle si ce n’est réelle, bien moins oeuvre du logos que fuite dans les logoï en vérité .

38 39 40 41 42

Hans-Georg Gadamer, Vérité et Méthode, Paris, 1996, 300 . Souligné en particulier par Détienne et Vernant (note 11) ainsi que Anne Cauquelin, L’art du lieu commun. Du bon usage de la doxa, Paris, 1999 . Larrère (note 2), 85, citant Spinoza réagissant aux propos de Bacon . Larrère (note 2), 84 . Soulignent Larrère (note 2), 87, à l’endroit de la Critique du jugement .

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3.3 Le règne de La CausaLité effiCiente dans La sPhère juridique Ces considérations épistémologico-métaphysiques auront un poids immense en droit moderne, des jusnaturalismes aux positivismes juridiques, dont le projet commun consiste en la mise en forme scientifique du droit, découvert ou inventé, qui imitant les mathématiciens, qui les physiciens, qui mêlant les deux démarches . Goyard-Fabre a montré les incohérences, à tout le moins les embarras multiples et insurmontables, dans lesquelles les jusnaturalismes se sont enferrés . Malgré leur objet prima facie universel et pérenne, et leurs prétentions, ces doctrines juridiques n’échappent pas à l’esprit du temps : « On ne peut pas, dès l’abord, ne pas remarquer que le sens qui lui [le droit naturel] est accordé en l’insérant dans le registre philosophique dominant des différentes époques est générateur de vertiges sémantiques troublants d’où naissent de nombreux problèmes . »43 En l’occurrence, l’insertion dans la philosophie mécanique donnera, du côté de la raison, une rationalité réduite, en théorie, à la seule déduction . Edifiante à ce titre l’attitude de l’immense Newton masquant sa démarche réelle dans la découverte de la nature composée de la lumière, tissée de serendipité et d’habileté sensorielle, présentée pourtant comme parfaitement rationnelle (logos) : une loi de la nature élaborée théoriquement, littéralement contemplée ; une expérience pour en prouver la véracité ; les faits qui suivent la théorie . Il alla jusqu’à réécrire ses carnets de laboratoires afin que sa découverte découlât du seul Logos, passant sous silence les paris cognitifs ou conjectures tentées (abductions), donnant autant de tâtonnements, sans parler des manipulations, des approximations, des savoirs implicites et autres savoirs-faire, que comportent toute expérience, procédés médiocres à l’aune de la glorieuse Raison44 descendante . L’insertion dans la philosophie mécanique donnera, du côté de la volonté, le (quasi) monopole de la causalité efficiente, les droits-prérogatives ou droits comme « puissance de » c’est-à-dire une volonté que ne guide plus aucune fin naturelle, arrêtée « mécaniquement » par la force équivalente (ou plus grande d’un Léviathan par exemple) d’un autre atome sociétal : « ma liberté s’arrête où commence celle d’autrui », affaire d’équilibre, résultante de forces . A la lumière du motto de Pic de la Mirandole, la fonction des droits vise à l’autoproduction de l’individu, autocréation du citoyen, érection du sujet, littéralement droits subjectifs, de l’ordre de l’être, par conséquent non indexé comme tel sur le collectif ou finalisé à quelque bien commun . Corrélativement, le droit d’autrui, de la cité (l’Etat) en particulier, ne se peut vivre que sur le mode de l’hétéronomie, jamais de l’exhaussement ou accomplissement d’une certaine nature humaine . Il est, sous cet angle extériorité, à laquelle on souscrit ou se plie, sur le principe ou les modalités, par instinct (de conservation), calcul ou contrainte . Et plus l’hétéronomie va en se marquant, plus les droits subjectifs doivent être renforcés et comme ils le sont par ce qui les menace (et les garantit !), l’Etat, la fuite dans les logoï semble inévitable ; l’assise matérielle des droits n’est plus assurée et pourtant le droit reconnu, les législateurs distribuant des 43 44

Simone Goyard-Fabre, Les embarras philosophiques du droit naturel, Paris, 2002, 7 . Philippe Hamou, The Footsteps of Nature . Raisonnement indiciaire et « interprétation de la nature » au XVIIe siècle . Quelques considérations historiques et épistémologiques, in L’interprétation des indices. Enquête sur le paradigme indiciaire avec Carlo Ginzburg, ed . Denis Thouard, Villeneuve d’Ascq, 2007, 203–204 .

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titres sans grand souci de leur mesure . La morale y trouve son compte ; le droit, plus pragmatique, son désenchantement : toujours plus de droit, formellement, le titre, toujours moins de justice, matériellement, la mesure ? Titre sans mesure est droit artefact, qui donnera le moderne social engineering (l’engine d’homo faber) et le contemporain State building . Et l’on entrevoit alors comment les structures de pensée du jusnaturalisme moderne ont pu donner les doctrines du contrat social et elles-mêmes, à leur tour, le positivisme juridique . Cette « continuité » laisse apparaître une teinte volontariste au principe de ces courants, souvent tapie sous les apparences des discours45 . A quoi peut bien servir la Raison si l’on ne reconnaît plus aucune finalité naturelle, ce qu’exclut précisément le principe cardinal de la modernité, l’autonomie : « se donner à soi-même les normes » ? Si je les tire de la Raison qui déduit, ai-je encore quelque choix ? Et il les vaudrait mieux en effet nécessaires pour assurer leur universalité . Mais si je n’ai plus de choix, alors il n’y a plus de droit… au sens des juristes à tout le moins . Ou alors la raison, à défaut de reconnaître des fins naturelles, opère quelque calcul, d’utilité ou d’optimum, se muant en raison instrumentale et par là en attribut d’homo faber . La référence à la déduction (à partir de la raison, affirmée ensuite plus abstraitement encore « transcendantale ») est cruciale, à l’exemple canonique de Suarez, obligeant à porter le débat sur les structures épistémologiques au fondement de ces droits naturels, affirmés ressortir d’une démarche scientifique . Pour opérer de manière logique, au sens le plus rigoureux de logos, et prétendre ainsi aux canons scientifiques, les principes ou majeures des syllogismes doivent être nécessaires ; l’idée de choix en est donc exclue et nous sortons de la sphère du juridique; peut-être entrons-nous dans celle du « droit moral », affaire de méta-juridique en tous les cas . Si ces principes ou majeures conservent une composante de choix, non nécessaire absolument, nous sortons de la sphère du scientifique46 pour gagner, par ces enthymèmes, au mieux le domaine des régularités et règles, au pis celui des contingences . Les déductions prétendues relèvent alors, en toute rigueur, des seules apparences, de la Présentation, ruse masquant des choix sur les principes mêmes, soit, en Effectuation, la médiation de la volonté . Les premiers jusnaturalistes modernes se fourvoyèrent moins en affirmant les principes génuines du droit naturel issus 45

46

Le « même » – Goyard-Fabre souligne cette (relative) unité de structure – droit naturel (moderne) s’affirme pourtant découler de la volonté, ou de la raison, ou des deux, sans grande cohérence ainsi que le souligne Goyard-Fabre (note 43, en particulier 81 à 84), en particulier chez Grotius, carrément volontaire chez Pufendorf, par exemple . On devrait s’interroger sur les liens entre jusnaturalisme moderne et ratio scripta désignant une certaine réception et reprise du droit romain à partir de la Renaissance (pour ne pas parler des glossateurs et post-glossateurs, très « juristes ») . Cette confluence est manifeste chez un Grotius dont les quatre premiers principes sont tout bonnement repris du droit romain le plus classique . Et si un tel corpus devait constituer une sorte de droit naturel universel et éternel (aux contenus si vagues qu’il engage peu), on aura à cœur de ne pas oublier que le jusnaturalisme romain n’est pas le produit de la raison mais essentiellement de la volonté et de la tradition, insiste Aldo Schiavone, Ius. L’invention du droit en Occident, Paris, 2008 (2005), 299 . Du scientifique de cette époque, moderne, la science contemporaine ayant, elle, pris conscience des choix divers et multiples qui émaillent sa démarche ; voir notamment Léna Soler, Introduction à l’épistémologie, Paris, 2009, passim . La notion d’abduction n’affirme pas autre chose . La diversité, grande de surcroît, des principes du droit naturel « déduits » de la raison, pis de la Raison, atteste de la part décisive de choix dans leur « découverte » .

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de la volonté ou commandement de Dieu . La ruse consista souvent à affirmer découvrir au sein de la raison humaine ou dans le cœur – que l’on ne sache pas siège du logos mes des affects – des hommes ces principes déposés par Dieu, la volonté – de Dieu – se transformant ainsi en raison – de l’homme –, puis en Raison une fois le Divin abattu . Mauvaise ruse puisqu’elle cèle la finitude de l’homme en qui la raison n’est pas par elle-même agissante ni la volonté par principe rationnelle . Le droit comme l’économie se fourvoieront dans cette prétention rationaliste à l’extrême, consonant avec un individualisme dont les ressorts métaphysiques remontent principiellement au nominalisme, même si leurs origines sont évidemment multiples et hétérogènes . Eminente philosophie de l’acte, du « en acte », le nominalisme est rivé sur l’individu – seul existant au sens fort, les collectifs n’étant eux que des mots ou étiquettes – et sur ce qu’il fait, littéralement acte, configuration à laquelle répond le droit-pouvoir et qui en ouvrait la consonance à la philosophie mécanique ultérieure, convainquant que l’on pourrait alors « réduire » le droit en système et le couler dans les formes scientifiques, que le juste, nécessairement affaire d’axiologie, de choix, de jugement, deviendrait affaire de raison47, de calcul, d’algorithme : juste parce que rationnel . Les ACB (analyses coûts/bénéfices) réalisent dans le monde contemporain ce vieux rêve du droit naturel moderne, jusqu’à pénétrer les questions environnementales, en permettant d’organiser rationnellement le sacrifice de tel ou tel service écosystémique, au préalable dûment monétarisé, dans le cadre du principe du développement durable, dans sa variante faible évidemment, la seule compatible avec homo faber : le faire technique voire le faire institutionnel (sociétal) est affirmé substituable au capital nature48 . Les ACB n’ont-elles pas pour fonction de rendre, idéalement, et selon l’oxymore, le choix objectif, perpétuant, par un réductionnisme grossier, l’illusion de maîtrise ? Ainsi du quasi paralogisme de l’absence de marché conduisant aux questions de type « Combien seriez-vous prêt à payer pour… », nous invitant à trouver la procédure qui permettra enfin d’articuler les préférences et expectatives savamment analysées . Mais c’est précisément cette procédure qui n’existe pas, ni sous la forme de l’algorithme, ni sous celle de la regula (car elle manquerait elle aussi les singularités comme telles), ni sous celle des statistiques dont le sousbassement probabiliste indique que leur légitimité a pour aune les hypothèses arrêtées et non la réalité extérieure, donnée . La plupart des théories sur la justice environnementale demeurent muettes quant aux procédures concrètes et commensurables au réel à suivre : dans les visions idéalistes, l’existence apparaît toujours comme un accident (au sens philosophique) de l’essence, une simple modalité, à l’opposite du rasoir d’Occam juridique (de la philosophie politique) : que puis-je plaider demain 47

48

Ci-gît l’ambiguïté de la notion de « droit naturel » . Dans la dimension « droit » résonne le choix, dans la dimension « naturel » la nécessité soit l’absence de choix ; d’où les embarras philosophiques du jusnaturalisme, dans sa version « nature des choses » comme dans sa variante « nature humaine » . Seule une nature guidant et non commandant la volonté humaine est compatible avec le ressort du choix, nous conduisant vers une conception modeste de la liberté, une liberté d’insertion, et non vers la très orgueilleuse liberté d’indifférence ou liberté absence d’obstacle extérieur, qu’on l’affirme négative ou positive . La variante forte (ou « mixte » : substituabilité autorisée pour les ressources renouvelables et dans cette mesure, comme le défend le Tribunal fédéral suisse) du développement durable ferait montre de grande sagesse mais pointe alors vers homo sapiens .

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matin devant le tribunal ? Le juste en effet ne recoupe pas nécessairement le vrai, n’en déplaise à l’orgueil du logos, qui transparaît dans les droits naturels modernes aussi bien que dans les ACB pratiquées à la manière d’un algorithme . En d’autres termes, la déduction est « de l’ordre de la preuve »49 rappelle le logicien, en cela ressortit du vrai et non du juste . Sans doute les jusnaturalistes modernes cherchent-ils à réduire le droit en système, à faire du droit science et non à assumer une pratique qu’ils ne pouvaient au demeurant qu’à peine connaître en l’absence de publications et de compilations générales . De la bonne mètis est pourtant envisageable, savoir confesser que les principes sont issus d’un choix – ce qui n’équivaut aucunement à s’abîmer dans l’arbitraire, entre la raison et la volonté pures, la palette est riche – mais que ce choix est rendu sciemment indisponible50, sorti des valeurs négociables, démarche qui se veut proprement dogmatique, position plus guère avouable eu égard à l’autonomie individuelle, tout aussi dogmatique – utopique même – pourtant, mais pensée ou prétendue « naturelle », objective . On comprend aussi pourquoi les doctrines du contrat social n’auront aucune difficulté à avancer un pied dans le jusnaturalisme – de l’instinct naturel ou calcul, la raison nous « commande » de passer le contrat et de nous y tenir – et un pied dans le volontarisme, le faber y devenant plus expresse qu’en le droit naturel déductif . La question du droit naturel n’est cohérente qu’envisagée au sein d’une démarche inductive, à l’exemple de celle d’Aristote en ses enquêtes . En l’absence de possible déduction, donc d’univocité, les principes du droit naturel s’éprouvent ou vagues – guides, directions, littéralement « indications » (éduquer ses enfants, payer l’impôt) – ou épais – un bon gouvernement se compose toujours de royauté, d’oligarchie et de démocratie, aux proportions changeantes –, variables en tous les cas . D’où la formule de Gadamer concernant le droit naturel du Stagirite : « la position d’Aristote sur le problème du droit naturel est de nature extrêmement subtile et ne peut absolument pas être mise sur le même plan que la tradition ultérieure du droit naturel »51 . Si la raison induit, alors l’inférence est privée de toute nécessité, relevant de la conjecture (plus précisément abduction, soit ni déduction, ni induction) ou du pari . Le problème épistémologique dit « de l’induction » montre à quel point le mode de penser bottom-up (dont participe pour partie l’abduction et la mètis) oblige à prudence puisqu’opérant hors champ d’application de la logique formelle . On comprend alors pourquoi le droit naturel d’un Aristote demeure si modeste : jamais le titre ne peut y précéder la mesure puisqu’inductivement, la connaissance débute aux existants (pragmata), dans leur co-présence, les uns par rapport aux autres, donc selon la mesure . Le titre en résulte, contrairement aux droits individuels modernes qui constituent le point de départ de la démarche juridique . Avoir des titres sans mesure présuppose de concevoir le réel homogène . Et il faudra donc commander pour ordonner car un conflit de droits absolus ne connaît aucune solution « logique » ; il conduit à une aporie (aporos), 49 50 51

Jean-Blaise Grize, Déduction et inférence, in Lire le droit. Langue, texte, cognition, ed . Danièle Bourcier / Pierre Mackay, Paris, 1992, 233 . Pareille démarche est rendue évidente par les études en droit international privé, droit comparé ou encore droit international public, dès lors qu’une extranéité est en jeu, faisant apparaître les catégories juridiques comme pratiques et non ontologiques . Gadamer (note 38), 341 .

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dont on sort en argumentant, non en déduisant, par mètis et non par logos, aporie gelant par sa nature même l’intervention de la raison-logos . Or, la crise environnementale nous installe, fort malheureusement mais très précisément, dans une situation fondamentalement aporétique . Formulé en termes de droits de l’homme, le paradoxe, souligné par J .-P . Dupuy, prend la forme d’une aporie « pragmatique », quand bien même la raison, orgueilleuse, la pourra résoudre avec un « y a qu’à » qui montre toute la négligence à propos de ce que l’on nomme précisément « mise en œuvre », dans une inversion, si caractéristique, des titres et de la mesure : ou l’Occident promeut véritablement les droits de l’homme pour tous mais réduit alors drastiquement son mode de vie, sachant que son extension à tous les humains ruine la biosphère et entame gravement l’avenir des générations futures et nous-mêmes déjà peut-être ; ou l’Occident décide de conserver son mode de vie extraordinairement dispendieux mais doit renoncer à son grand projet, voire son identité morale, de démocratie pour tous et de droits de l’homme pour chaque habitant de la planète . Où nous voyons que les droits de l’homme, dont ressortissent bien des modèles de justice environnementale par ailleurs, éminemment individualistes et en ce sens version hypermoderne des droits naturels, ne seront pas d’un grand secours pratique . Et d’autant moins que nous avons déjà choisi la branche de l’alternative… en ne faisant rien, à peu près, « commission par omission » disent les juristes, qui équivaut parfaitement à une action et à un choix . C’est ainsi encore et toujours le « faire » qui est négligé, les pragmata qui sont oubliés, comme dans la notion de « droits subjectifs », les droits des sujets, mais en vérité du Sujet, désincarné, « transcendantal », abstraction et idéalisation en quoi consiste l’un des ressorts de nos échecs . Pour controversées que soient les origines des « droits subjectifs », il semble difficile d’en admettre la pleine consistance avant que ne s’affadisse et disparaisse la communauté comme attracteur du juridico-politique, communauté prise en un sens pragmatique de bien commun réel et non simplement postulé ; lorsqu’elle ne constitue plus ce qui finalise la vie du citoyen, littéralement l’exhausse vers le bien commun au sein duquel prend sens son existence comme humain, alors peut-on commencer de concevoir le droit comme intrinsèque à l’individu et rayonnant à partir de lui, à l’identique pour les autres hommes, donc à l’équilibre mécanique, couché dans quelque loi naturelle (automatique), introuvable pourtant, par là se muant, ultimement et pragmatiquement, en volontarisme juridique . En Présentation on peut évidemment prétendre les droits subjectifs (droits naturels ou libertés fondamentales ou droits de l’homme) « déduits » de la Raison, bien que l’affirmation soit logiquement douteuse . En Effectuation, on ne sait trop ce que signifie un titre sans mesure, laquelle requiert d’en réinsérer les prétentions dans un contexte donné et particulier, appréhension du singulier (du contexte comme du cas) qui échappe par nature à la Raison, faculté des généralités, des nécessités, non du contingent et du singulier, au reste de caractérisation infinie . Le droit qui y doit être dit sera donc bien d’avantage d’ars ou de mètis que de logos ; à l’instar des conflits de droits subjectifs (prétendus) absolus : seule la volonté du tribunal fera la mesure, l’aporie émasculant la raison, nous précipitant aux portes de l’arbitraire, quasi non-droit . Aussi est-ce bien la pratique qui fait le contenu de ces droits, accomplissant ce qui était au mieux une esquisse légale, d’évidence d’autant plus grande qu’ils s’énoncent en open textures, empêchant toute possible déduction, élaborés au contraire en contexte – seul à en pourvoir la chair – aucunement constatés .

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En d’autres termes, construit sur la puissance – droit-prérogative, « pouvoir (de) » –, le droit subjectif, individualiste, non-relationnel par soi, procède d’une logique des causes partielles et concourantes : dans un monde sans verticalité naturelle, dans lequel on ne dispose pas de quelque ordre intrinsèque entre les monades rayonnant chacune les mêmes droits subjectifs, la prescription ne peut que devenir imposition, par l’institution c’est-à-dire par un droit-prérogative plus puissant, doté d’une potestas supérieure : sans « ordre à » ne restent que les « ordres de », les commandements et donc in fine la volonté . Les droits naturels ne peuvent alors échapper dans leur mesure au non-naturel, à l’artifice, au « décisionisme » de quelque cour, quand bien même les affirmerait-on rationnels dans leur titre . Le peu de cohérence des droits naturels modernes52, que relève avec sagacité Goyard-Fabre, le doit à leur principe même, incompréhensible pour un juriste : les grandes œuvres des jusnaturalistes modernes cherchèrent à faire science… omniprésence du « déduire », dans les traductions du moins, modèles explicites des mathématiques ou de la physique ou des deux, principes affirmés nécessaires… Se voulant science, leur sied le vrai alors que le droit, comme toute philosophie pratique, recherche le juste . Dira-t-on que l’équilibre de trois billes au fond d’un bol ou leur position respective après leur collision sur un plan horizontal n’est pas juste ? Cette confusion des registres de pertinence, sciemment recherchée par un Grotius en le chef du mot « loi », dénoncée par Spinoza (on l’a dit), constitue non seulement une erreur épistémologique monumentale, favorisée par l’homogénéité de l’univers et son corrélat la méthode, mais témoigne surtout d’un orgueil démesuré du logos, d’une prétention illimitée de la Raison, traduite dans une autonomie contrefactuelle, qui oblige à rester sur le plan des discours, des « idéalisations » aux dires d’Hegel53, masquant une pratique infiniment plus mètis, faber même dans son constructivisme, nous renvoyant à la plus grande modestie, l’humilité d’une liberté d’insertion dans du déjà-là . La crise environnementale requiert pour première démarche cette assomption du déjà-là, et comme horizon d’action un bien commun concret, voire une communauté éprouvée et pas simplement postulée54 . Trop de modèles de justice environnementale négligent les procédures par lesquelles seraient réalisées les distributions élaborées théoriquement, commettant, d’un point de vue pragmatique, la même erreur de perspective que les droits naturels modernes, distribuant des titres sans se soucier de la mesure ou plus légèrement encore souscrivant à « l’intendance suivra »… alors que c’est elle, en réalité, par « rétroactions » concrètes, qui détermine les authentiques possibles . Croire que le logos agit par soi, que l’édiction d’une norme emporte solution du problème sans intégrer les contraintes de son application concrète – savoir les conditions de possibilité de son exercice pratique, dans 52

53

54

Goyard-Fabre (note 43), 81–83, souligne à propos de la conception des droits naturels chez Grotius qu’ils sont œuvre de la raison humaine mais telle que la volonté de Dieu l’a mise en le cœur de l’homme, Dieu qui l’a ordonné et commandé mais qui, pourtant, n’aurait rien pu changer à ce droit naturel… « […] au lieu d’ouvrir un débat approfondissant qui porte sur la réalité du droit naturel, ils [les jusnaturalismes des 17 et 18èmes siècles] ont tenté de clore une querelle multiséculaire en faisant appel à un intellectualisme désincarné et mystificateur . Quelle qu’ait été la pente philosophique de leurs différents systèmes, les jusnaturalismes, de Hobbes à Fichte, ont été, aux yeux de Hegel, le creuset d’une magistrale erreur dont on mesure les funestes effets en les comparant aux philosophies anciennes . » (Goyard-Fabre [note 43], 120) . Voir notre dernière subdivision consacrée au droit international public .

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notre monde tel qu’il est, là –, témoigne de notre orgueil ou de notre négligence, et dans tous les cas d’un fourvoiement à l’endroit de la nature profonde de l’homme « incarné », vivant hic et nunc, fondamentalement faber . 4. PourquoI

ne voIt-on PAs notre nAture d’homo faber

A la question « Pourquoi ne voit-on pas notre nature d’homo faber » Bergson apporte une réponse lucide et terrible à la fois : « Si nous pouvions nous dépouiller de tout orgueil, si, pour définir notre espèce, nous nous en tenions strictement à ce que l’histoire et la préhistoire nous présentent comme la caractéristique constante de l’homme et de l’intelligence, nous ne dirions peut-être pas Homo sapiens, mais Homo faber » (Bergson H ., L’Évolution créatrice, Chapitre II) . Bergson cherche à dire l’essence de l’homme à partir de constats empiriques, il est alors pragmatiquement conduit à retirer à l’homme sa qualité de sapiens pour le rabattre en faber . Non seulement l’orgueil de nous croire sapiens mais encore l’orgueil dans la sphère même du faber où tout devient sciences, du droit à l’économie, de la politique à l’herméneutique : l’ars juris n’est-il pas exhaussé au rang de Rechtswissenschaft – alors que ni ses lois ne sont nécessaires ni ses démarches déductives mais argumentatives – ou l’ars interpretandi au rang de science herméneutique ? En apparence inversement, les sciences (dures) se muaient en techno-sciences ; en vérité, elles s’éloignaient d’un discours idéalisé55 sur leurs propres démarches pour se rapprocher, sous l’influence des science studies notamment, de leurs modes réels de procéder, de l’Effectuation, alors que les sciences humaines et sociales, en mal de scientificité (mal comprise), forçaient du côté de la Présentation c’est-à-dire du logos, confirmant l’effacement de la mètis, en la modestie même de ses opérations cognitives, humilité qui siérait pourtant bien à un véritable homo sapiens . Au rebours, par là s’initie la démesure, plus guère aperçue tant elle constitue un ressort de la modernité : l’hybris généralisée56, fatalement favorisée par la disparition de la cause finale, sa relégation à tout le moins au statut de simple accident . N’étionsnous pas trop « animal » dans sa lumière ? Affirmés sapiens, notre singularité paraissait sauve .

55

56

Larrère (note 2), 105 ss, en particulier 107 : « l’on peut se demander si la promotion de cette mécanique en paradigme de la science moderne n’est pas une invention tardive de l’épistémologie et/ou de l’histoire des sciences . » Faut-il en conséquence affirmer la modernité (scientifique) hypocrite ou naïve ? C’est en tous les cas affirmer, d’une part que la théorie ne reflète pas la pratique, confirmant le hiatus entre Présentation et Effectuation, d’autre part que la pratique scientifique ne ressortit pas principiellement du logos mais de la mètis . Nous ne voulons décidément pas reconnaître notre nature de faber à laquelle nous nous abandonnons par ailleurs si aisément . Aristote aurait de surcroît raison contre Descartes, et donc une très large partie de la modernité : l’affirmation d’une méthode unique, « la » méthode, pour tous les objets est une pure vue de l’esprit, un effet du logos, discours comme Raison . Pour des développements sur cette thématique dans ses liens avec la « crise » environnementale, lire notamment Dominique Bourg / Alain Papaux, Biosphère, modernité et déni de la finitude, in Biosphère, environnement et droits fondamentaux, Zurich, 2011, 53–82, ou Alain Papaux, Nature d’hier et d’aujourd’hui : de l’illimité à l’indisponible . Ou ne plus parier le genre humain, in Crise écologique, crise des valeurs ?, Genève, 2010, 113–127 .

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4.1 SapienS Comme identité, poSée, de La modernité La « nature » de sapiens fut explicitement posée par le très chrétien C . Linné, fantasmée jusqu’à Darwin au moins, persistante néanmoins jusqu’à nos jours tant cet homme redoute une proximité avec l’animal, qu’elle se déploie sur les plans ontologique ou gnoséologique . Ainsi en droit constitutionnel suisse, par crainte d’une proximité trop grande avec l’animal, un haut fonctionnaire a-t-il décidé, de son propre chef, de travestir la version allemande de la « dignité de la créature », soit Würde der Kreatur, pour « intégrité des organismes vivants », le mot « créature » lui paraissant établir une trop forte communauté entre les humains et les animaux57 ; l’homme en sortit sauf… en langue française tout du moins . Sur le plan gnoséologique, nous retrouvons l’effacement de la mètis, au profit du seul logos, dont le paradigme fut souvent l’intelligence « animale », opposition superbement résumée par Whitehead la personnifiant en Platon et Ulysse: « l’un partage la Raison avec les Dieux, l’autre la partage avec les renards »58, rappelant que le renard est l’un des emblèmes les plus reconnus de la mètis, habileté, ruse ou intelligence des pragmata, qu’Ulysse pratique excellemment, lui le polymètis, l’homme aux mille ruses, qualification dont est aussi revêtu Prométhée, quintessence de faber . Voulant éliminer l’animalité de l’homme, on supprimait sa métis aussi bien, la conscience de notre nature faber s’estompant dans le même élan . Détienne et Vernant offrent à la faveur de l’ultime phrase de leur conclusion, une synthèse sans doute sévère mais combien pertinente de cette fuite dans les logoï, cette boursoufflure du logos : « Si, dans le discours savant tenu sur les Grecs par ceux qui s’en proclamaient les héritiers, le silence a continué de se faire si longtemps autour de l’intelligence rusée, ne serait-ce pas essentiellement pour deux raisons : d’abord, sans doute, parce que, dans la perspective chrétienne, le fossé séparant les hommes des bêtes ne pouvait que se creuser davantage et la raison humaine apparaître plus nettement encore que pour les Anciens séparée des aptitudes animales ; mais n’est-ce pas aussi et surtout le signe que la Vérité platonicienne, reléguant dans l’ombre tout un plan de l’intelligence avec ses façons propres de comprendre, n’a jamais réellement cessé de hanter la pensée métaphysique de l’Occident ? » 59

Le discours de la raison s’affiche infiniment plus glorieux et libérateur, jusqu’à substituer l’homme à Dieu . Simultanément sur cette longue période, en particulier avec la Renaissance d’obédience platonicienne, l’artiste se sépare emblématiquement de l’artisan, lequel occupera une place de plus en plus basse alors que s’affirme socialement l’individualité de l’artiste jusqu’à la moderne « originalité pour l’originalité », sapant au fur et à mesure toute logique d’insertion dans un « déjà-là » . Les derniers ouvrages du critique d’art contemporain J . Clerc disent avec éloquence cette recherche effrénée de la transgression : esthétique de l’art contemporain, pointe de la modernité, confinant à l’immonde, Immundus, d’œuvres faites de sperme, de sang, de 57

58 59

Pour une synthèse de cette question en droit constitutionnel helvétique, voir Alain Papaux / Alessandro Brenci, « Würde der Kreatur » ou « Intégrité des organismes vivants » : le biocentrisme est-il légal ? Bref historique d’une question mal résolue, in Biosphère, environnement et droits fondamentaux, Zurich, 2011, 117–136 . Alfred North Whitehead, The Function of Reason, cité par Antoine Culioli, Variations sur la rationalité, in Cahiers de l’ILSL, hors série (juin 2005), 15 . Détienne/Vernant (note 11), 306 .

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muscle, de cheveux, nous ramenant au pur biologique, au nu vivant (zoon), à l’animalité ; et pour nous en démarquer tout de même, dans un ultime sursaut, l’Hybris, exact opposé de l’insertion, pour recouvrer l’a-nature vers laquelle tendrait notre nature (selon le biologiste A . Prochiantz ou le philosophe L . Ferry), l’arrachement à l’instinct dans lequel l’animal demeure à tout jamais enfermé, sans autonomie . Au sein de pareille constellation, le savoir-faire ne pouvait qu’être renvoyé au vulgaire et la dimension faber de tout homme rabaissée, et tue la mètis dans la même mesure . Seul restera digne le discours – logos – de la raison – logos encore –, soit un logos de logos, déjà une ruse, au cœur même du logos, en son principe, en tous les cas une mise en abîme, condamnant le logos à son auto-transcendance, à la manière du « bootstrapping » du baron de Münchhausen – pour se tirer hors de la glèbe de la mètis -, position que Dupuy qualifie de « sacré », une geste inavouable pour l’autonomos d’une part, pour le laïc d’autre part . Pourtant, la ruse consistant à faire passer de la mètis pour du logos se retrouve au cœur du droit naturel moderne, comme de sa rivale germanique, l’Ecole historique du droit60, au demeurant . Le droit naturel moderne se déploie selon un jeu peu clair, rusé à tout dire, de la raison et de la volonté . Que la raison puisse livrer des commandements précipite déjà dans la confusion . Ces commandements s’avèrent, de surcroît, si généraux et si abstraits que, d’un point de vue pratique – perspective très généralement ignorée des jusnaturalistes en ce qu’elle nous situe expressément du côté du faire, de la pratique, aux exigences et démarches guère congrues à la raison au sens fort d’objective et déductive – le juriste n’est guère avancé, restant avec des principes demeurant à la surface des choses juridiques, quelle qu’en soit – et elle est immense – la valeur morale . L’homo sapiens, juriste ou non, se reconnaît aisément dans les quatre premiers principes d’un Grotius par exemple – ne léser personne, poursuivre l’auteur d’un dommage, réparer le dommage et pacta sunt servanda ; pour le praticien, à peine un point de départ du raisonnement juridique, vacuité que l’on retourne habilement (mètis) en qualifiant le « qu’en faire? » de simples modalités, pis de modalités d’exécution ou d’application . Quand ils se proposent de donner un tour plus pragmatique à leurs idéalités juridiques, les jusnaturalistes, non sans quelque ruse là encore, inconsciente peut-être, reprennent assez volontiers des règles du droit positif du lieu affirmées valides universellement . Pour rudes que soient les dénonciations du droit international public pour européano-centrisme et des droits de l’homme pour occidentalo-centrisme, on comprend désormais, d’un point de vue pratique, qu’elles ne sont pas dénuées de pertinence… pour améliorer ces deux corpus juridiques eux-mêmes . 60

Ecole opposée à la législation comme source authentique du droit et qui finira pourtant par souscrire à la codification du droit allemand via la science juridique, authentique source du droit, droit savant, issu d’une double activité des juristes, « matérielle en tant qu’ils poursuivent l’activité génératrice du Droit du peuple même, formelle et purement scientifique en tant qu’ils se saisissent de ce Droit pour l’exprimer et le formuler de manière scientifique . » (Von Savigny cité par Alfred Dufour, Droits de l’homme. Droit naturel et histoire, Paris 1991, 250) . Ce droit savant est censé simplement prolonger et accomplir, par la voie de la raison scientifique, les coutumes sécrétées spontanément par le Volksgeist, alors que le peuple n’y aura jamais songé, ruse intellectuelle des romanistes de l’Ecole pour finalement participer à l’élaboration du code prussien, notamment en la personne de Savigny .

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On le comprendra d’autant mieux que le juriste véritable, toujours se rapportant à la praxis, peu ou prou praticien dès lors, ne peut pas ne pas adopter une démarche inductive . Elle modifie profondément le sens du droit naturel, plus humble parce que pénétré de la relation transcendantale que ce soit, principiellement, de l’âme et du corps obligeant à parler d’hommes incarnés, ou plus spécifiquement du droit naturel et droit positif, le premier fondant le second, réciproquement et intrinsèquement le second exerçant le premier, lequel n’est connaissable véritablement – mais point complètement – qu’à travers les cas pratiques, les espèces comme disent parfois encore les juristes . Apparence de logos mais pratique de mètis encore dans les doctrines du contrat social, hiatus tellement insurmontable qu’aucune n’échappe au paralogisme du contrat social, ruse magnifique de surcroît, jouant d’un « dedans/dehors simultanément », une auto-fondation soit encore la figure (moderne) du sacré, indiquant la présence de la mètis au cœur d’une grande partie de la philosophie politique moderne s’affirmant rationaliste . Ce mélange inextricable de raison et de volonté ne faisait problème quand le Grand Fabricateur ou Horloger instaurait lui-même, directement ou indirectement (en le cœur ou l’esprit des hommes) l’ordre politico-juridique . En effet, en son chef, la volonté est rationnelle et la raison agissante par soi, mais l’homme se substituant au Tout-Puissant en ce rôle fondateur ne bénéficie manifestement pas de la même sapience désintéressée ni d’un faire semblablement performatif, masquant mal la ruse utilisée pour fonder la nécessité et l’objectivité des premiers principes que le logos humain prétendra ensuite découvrir en sa propre sapience ou prudence61 rationnelle . Il en va ainsi de la forme dont il revêt volontiers « le » droit naturel, un more geometrico aux apparences rationnelles et déductives . L’impossibilité rationnelle d’une telle dérivation par inférences en conformité aux canons de la logique formelle incline à y reconnaître de la ruse, rhétorique témoignant de la force d’attraction du modèle scientifique sur les différents « arts » ou « pratiques » . Au demeurant, le ressort de la volonté est si puissamment opérant que les modèles jusnaturalistes finiront par accoucher des doctrines du contrat social puis du positivisme juridique, en des codifications nationales, lois locales et non plus universelles que les juristes ont le courage de caractériser pour ce qu’elles sont : le fruit de la volonté du législateur, constat qui n’empêche évidemment pas quelque médiation de la raison . D’un point de vue structurel, si la volonté est conçue infinie, non finalisée « intrinsèquement » par des fins « naturelles », auxquelles elle demeure au reste libre de ne pas adhérer, alors le droit ne peut qu’être en son principe même commandement, affaire de force, de puissance, de contrainte comme Hobbes le relève si lucidement . La raison ne disparaît évidemment pas pour autant mais se mue en ruse, mimant un point fixe (sur quoi est bâti (faber) le système, comme Descartes et son point d’Archimède) exogène, transcendant alors qu’il est établi par ceux-là même qui affirment y être soumis, soit un principe endogène : le ressort de la volonté de chacun présentée comme Raison, donc de tous forcément, selon la figure de l’auto-transcendance ou de l’auto-fondation . Et dans la mesure où les fins naturelles ont été éliminées, que la liberté ne se comprend plus comme l’adhésion à ces fins mais 61

On soulignera, d’un tour piquant, que mètis signifiait aussi, avant son éclipse, sagesse et prudence incarnées évidemment, plus exactement induites des vécus .

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comme l’absence d’obstacle extérieur, que pourrait donc nous indiquer cette Raison d’essentiel ? C’est dire que le droit moderne est construit principiellement sur la volonté, ce qui se voit éminemment dans les droit-prérogatives, naguère droits subjectifs, aujourd’hui droits de l’homme, dont la potestas, la « puissance de » constitue la texture, une puissance, plus ou moins civilisée, un pouvoir plus ou moins domestiqué . Or, c’est bien cette potestas qui fait aujourd’hui difficulté . Et du point de vue des sciences dures, l’homme étant devenu trop puissant pour ce que peut supporter la Terre ou la nature en tant qu’habitable pour lui . Et du point de vue des sciences humaines, du droit singulièrement, où les discours fondés sur les droits-prérogatives, comprenant le droit international public dans la mesure où les Etats y sont conçus comme des individus éminemment volontaires, s’avèrent structurellement incompatibles avec la notion de bien commun . A quoi pourrait servir la finalisation à quelque collectif « surplombant » du moment que les titres juridiques ont déjà été distribués ? A fixer la mesure assurément, mais conçue conséquemment comme simple modalité du titre, savoir accidentelle ; les conventions de sauvegarde des droits de l’homme ne s’en occupent pas . A l’inverse de cette conception individualiste et solipsiste de l’homme et de ses droits, qu’ils soient naturels, positifs ou humains, les Anciens pensaient la cité, le bien commun politique, comme un attracteur de la nature de chacun en son accomplissement (zoon politikon), conception que reflète exemplairement le droit, même regardé d’un point de vue « individuel » : « le droit individuel n’est pas l’origine mais le résultat du processus juridique . »62 A cette caractéristique, Sève ajoute la non-séparabilité du droit et de la justice, laquelle consonne avec la non-confusion du droit et de la loi et la nécessité de la jurisprudence63, toutes propriétés rabaissées, disqualifiées parfois, par la pensée juridique moderne « volontariste », des droits naturels jusque dans les positivismes . L’auteur ne relève-t-il pas que toute la conception moderne est traversée par la notion de puissance, aussi bien le droit subjectif que le droit objectif, puissance d’un pouvoir… producteur (l’étoffe de faber) de règles qui s’imposent à une pluralité d’individus dans cet instrument (soit un moyen) pris pour la fin, que l’on dénomme « loi » ? 4.2 saPiens Comme fruit de L’histoire de La PhiLosoPhie Une raison d’histoire de la philosophie nous empêche, peut-être, aussi de voir notre nature d’homo faber : le retournement de la modernité serait le retournement du platonisme lui-même auquel est si viscéralement attaché l’Occident parce qu’il en procède en grande part . En adoptant pour modèle de ses Idées, les réalités vraies, au Ciel des Idées, non corrompues par leur incarnation dans notre ici-bas, l’eidos, Platon, prince du logos, a de manière édifiante usé de mètis puisque eidos serait le modèle concret, pragmatique, qu’utilise l’artisan pour exécuter son œuvre selon Arendt . Typiquement un 62 63

René Sève, entrée « Droit », in Les Notions Philosophiques, Encyclopédie philosophique universelle, vol . 1, Paris, 1990, 696 . Sève (note 62), 696 .

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paradigme d’homo faber, retourné en quintessence de logos, qui imprégnera tout l’Occident philosophique via le platonisme et le néoplatonisme, l’augustinisme, le franciscanisme, le protestantisme, la Renaissance, comme nous l’illustre encore si brillamment Raphaël en la fresque L’Ecole d’Athènes . On se gardera d’oublier, ici, que la mètis n’est pas par nature négative, ouvrant à une lecture bienveillante de la ruse de Platon point faite pour tromper son monde, mais notre destin, assez médiocre, d’homo faber . Platon est trop clairvoyant pour désigner par logos-nous notre nature profonde . Son Socrate n’est-il pas le parangon de lucidité, montrant qu’aucune notion fondamentale n’est simple, moins encore définissable selon l’univocité – de là l’échec de tous les dialogues –, que l’on ne se connaît pas – d’où sa devise résumant l’effort philosophique d’une vie : « connais-toi toi-même » . Il nous sait peu rationnels, au point que la raison (nous) nous vient du dehors, nous advient des dieux, par quelque étincelle, au mieux . Somme toute nous dit-il déjà faber mais le masque parce que nous sachant trop orgueilleux pour admettre si humble condition, modestie à laquelle l’humanisme moderne ne souscrira que peu . La Modernité ne lui donne-t-elle pas raison, désignant par « sapiens » dans ses nomenclatures nouvelles la position ineffable de l’homme ? Fort de pareille morgue, sa vérité d’homo faber ne lui pourra (re)devenir consciente par ses propres moyens mais de l’extérieur seulement, par la biosphère marquant les limites naturelles de la charge que nous représentons . La communauté humaine devenue puissance physique64, c’est l’histoire qui se fait géographie, via de nombreux objetsmonde . Ne suffirait-il pas alors de simplement retourner ces apparences, les traverser pour retrouver notre nature modeste d’homo faber ? La démarche est trop simple ou trop sage – le sapiens qui manque tellement à homo – pour être envisagée car, nous l’avons mentionné, c’est par la Raison que l’homme moderne justifie la rupture d’avec le passé et sa singularité comme moderne . L’arrachement à la nature comme signe de cette spécificité ne le dit-il pas de la plus claire des façons ? Il n’est pas aisé de remettre en jeu l’identité qui nous a construit, dont les ressorts ont de surcroît permis des prouesses de santé, de longévité, de confort, … Affirmer la nature faber reviendrait à retourner ce platonisme, comme l’esquissent Détienne et Vernant ou Cauquelin, à abandonner nos chers dualismes, si rassurants . L’inclination de notre civilisation s’y oppose ; et l’individu tout aussi certainement, pour de profondes et graves raisons éthologiques : comme tous les animaux, nous n’aimons guère demeurer dans les tensions et polarisons volontiers savoirs et positions afin de diminuer notre angoisse . 5. lA

subtIlIté d’homo faber

Disant homo faber, on se gardera de quelque péjoration que ce soit . Cette expression semble traduire une part, importante parce qu’essentielle, de notre nature, celle d’animal, de vivant (zoon) . Le faire réduit l’incertitude, nous inscrivant dans un espace et un lieu donnés, nous situant dans le monde en nous y ancrant, permettant 64

« Au temps présent, voici qu’il [l’homme] devient une variable physique, par échange de puissance, de faiblesse et de fragilité . » (Serres [note 1], 37) .

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alors un véritable exister « ex-sistere » . Le faber d’homo traduit bien l’essence profonde, principielle, de l’homme, sans doute pas tout entière mais vitale, là où nous nous révélons à nous-mêmes « animal », qu’on entende ce faber au sens noble de mètis-habileté, savoir-faire, prudence, pour faire un monde en particulier, ou au sens triste de mètis-ruse, duplicité, impudence pour le défaire ou le polluer . Et si l’homme ne peut pas ne pas être faber, la modernité, jusque dans la révolution industrielle, n’est plus à condamner comme telle puisqu’elle ne fait (!) qu’accomplir au plus haut degré cette nature . Le plaisir intense procuré par la technique, atteignant parfois la fascination, ne s’observe-t-il pas, secrète consonance avec la nature faber qui nous rassérène et nous accomplit mais qui comporte des limites, point rendu aveugle par l’hubris généralisée et encouragée, désignant un problème tellement moderne : l’« orgueil » écrivait Bergson, si bellement métaphorisé sous les espèces de Prométhée, Icare, de l’Apprenti-sorcier, du Golem, de Faust ou encore Frankenstein, … Le problème ne réside donc pas dans le fait d’être faber, inclination dont l’exercice sain, mesuré, nous procure un monde souligne Arendt, par le ministère de laquelle nous pouvons faire un monde, « faire monde », nous tenir dans le monde, bâtir une assise, non seulement au sens d’un « habitable » mais plus génériquement d’un ordre, pour un être-là solide, ferme, et par là apaisant notre angoisse du « jetélà » . Fait problème bien plutôt de nier la finitude humaine, de celer ce faber, de le masquer derrière quelque logos grossi jusqu’à se donner pour l’essence même de l’homme suivant notre orgueil moderne . Ce faber « existentiel »65 comme habileté, mieux savoir-faire, indique la mètis au principe de l’ordre, non le logos comme on le pense trop rapidement . Lecourt le remarque sans y prêter une attention suffisante ni a fortiori une analyse développée : Kronos est un être aux pensées fourbes, de mètis mauvaise, Zeus un être rusé, mètis plutôt66 bienveillante, pour gagner l’auto-transcendance ou l’auto-fondation, forme noble, rationnelle même, de la mètis, laquelle se décline donc sur trois modes au moins . Lecourt67 entrevoit, une nouvelle fois, la fécondité de la mètis, dont il semble toutefois ne pas connaître la notion, en relevant la distinction possible entre bonne et mauvaise ruse . Athéna n’est-elle pas, au reste, un parangon de la duplicité de la mètis, déesse des arts, roublarde quand il se doit, prudente dans les moments délicats, sage jusqu’à instaurer la « première » juridiction humaine, Aréopage, en offrant – en échange aussi habile que rusé – aux terribles Erynies, un culte ? Ses yeux pers, mélangés donc, expriment encore, à leur façon, la duplicité de la mètis, pendant que la naissance de la déesse a toutes les manières de l’auto-transcendance : ne vient-elle pas au monde toute équipée, armes et bouclier à la main, complètement « faite » ? Enfin, l’histoire, en sa ruse même, fera d’Athéna la déesse de la sagesse, la patronne des philosophes, achevant la subtilité de la mètis dont procède faber : son champ sémantique s’étend jusqu’à comprendre la sophia, résonnance de quelque logos .

65 66 67

De l’ordre d’un « ex-sistere », d’une existence qui exerce l’essence, non qui la précède, selon une relation transcendantale, plus réaliste qu’un existentialisme . Lecourt (note 5), 29 . L’adverbe souligne la duplicité de la mètis, qui n’en est pas un défaut mais sa texture même . Lecourt (note 5), 32 .

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6. homo

43

faber essoufflé… lA nAIssAnce d’homo sapiens ?

La modernité en général, et d’homo faber en particulier, se signe par le paradoxe de nous retrouver prisonniers de notre propre puissance (potestas), dans un monde fini de surcroît . En résulte l’« enfermement planétaire »68 : polluant la nature, excessivement, nous nous polluons nous-mêmes, funestement… apprentis-sorcier . Plus philosophiquement, nous sommes prisonniers de notre propre savoir-faire, la techno-science n’étant plus un synonyme fidèle de progrès . Arendt a sonné le glas de cet aveuglement irénique, le dénonçant qui plus est de l’intérieur de notre inclination au faber, en l’identifiant à la dissociation, moderne, entre pensée et savoir, grande menace métaphysique, désormais existentielle, pesant sur la condition de l’homme moderne : « Il se pourrait […] que nous ne soyons plus jamais capables de comprendre, c’est-à-dire de penser et d’exprimer, les choses que nous sommes cependant capables de faire […] S’il s’avérait que le savoir (au sens moderne de savoir-faire) et la pensée se sont séparés pour de bon, nous serions bien alors les jouets et les esclaves non pas tant de nos machines que de nos connaissances pratiques […] »69

Pour homo faber, en son rêve même de se rendre comme maître et possesseur, ce savoir s’entend d’un savoir-faire typique de l’ingénieur, c’est-à-dire une forme d’intelligence qui focalise son pouvoir cognitif sur les seuls moyens, la considération des fins, celles naturelles à tout le moins, comme le « bien vivre ensemble », étant devenue ontologiquement secondaire dans la pensée moderne et la volonté de l’individu prétendue « in-finie », réduisant la société à un simple artefact que l’on configure à bien plaire comme si tout était disponible à cet atome sociétal . Mais la crise environnementale a rendu apparentes diverses limites de la biosphère, éminemment de la Terre en tant qu’habitable, restituant du même coup l’homme à sa finitude . Si la notion de finitude n’a rien de nouveau, le retour de fins naturelles – dont la réinsertion de l’homme dans la nature, la reconnaissance de « déjà-là » ou encore le bien vivre ensemble comme condition de l’humanité, qui présuppose un environnement sain – ne contrevient pas moins à la volonté infinie présupposée par la notion moderne de droit-prérogative, « droit-puissance (pouvoir) de », laquelle irrigue une large part de la philosophie politique moderne . Nous restent, au mieux, des victoires à la Pyrrhus, amères, voire mortifères . Le terme d’homo faber aura été repoussé seulement, non surmonté par quelque homo sapiens . Des indices d’une amorce de sagesse émergent certes du droit international, mais dont la traduction en habitudes quotidiennes progresse avec bien trop de lenteur eu égard à l’allure, vive, du désastre environnemental .

68 69

Selon le titre de l’ouvrage d’André Lebeau, L’enfermement planétaire, Paris, 2008 . Hannah Arendt, Condition de l’homme moderne, traduction de G . Fradier, Paris, 1961, 9–10 .

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7. déPAssement

de lA modernIté ?

quelques

IndIces en droIt InternAtIo-

nAl PublIc

Pour un juriste, les réflexions sur la justice doivent s’inscrire au sein d’un ordre juridique, sous peine de vacuité, littéralement d’« u-topie » – sans lieu – combien étrangère à son esprit pragmatique : il a affaire à des existants, en acte ou pour le moins en puissance, à du hic et nunc, à du « situé », de l’« inscrit », comme l’y invite la procédurale et humblement réaliste « justiciabilité » . Si l’échelle idoine sur laquelle envisager des solutions à la crise environnementale est le monde global, alors l’ordre juridique pertinent pour compasser ces propositions sera, en première ligne, le droit international public . Nombre de développements théoriques sur la justice environnementale, globale, ou encore intergénérationnelle se muent, à ce moment précis, en élégantes mais vaines démonstrations de par leur incommensurabilité à la texture même de ce droit, plurielle – les grands auteurs parlent de droit international public français, chinois, étasunien, etc . – et « fragmentée », expression impropre en ce qu’elle suppose une unité, en quête de laquelle le droit international se trouve précisément engagé ; elle montre toutefois déjà que la globalité recherchée pour les solutions à la crise environnementale ne peut être conçue sur le mode de l’univocité, mais au mieux d’une pluralité réglée . En bref, trop de logos, de theoria et pas assez de mètis, d’habileté pragmatique, de savoir juridique, dût-il être souvent technique . Du point de vue de la structure informant ce droit, et dont toute proposition réaliste de justice globale doit en conséquence tenir compte, on distinguera au moins, fût-ce schématiquement, le droit international interétatique de la société des Etats dans leur ensemble (« inter-étatique » classique, à savoir de juxtaposition), le droit international interétatique de la société des Etats dans son ensemble (interétatique à esquisse de transcendance ou verticalité, expresse parfois, comme dans le crime d’agression ou l’obligation dite assumée), le droit international supra-étatique (en dépassement de ses réinscriptions dans les ordres juridiques internes qui l’exécutent, avec les Global Public Goods, le patrimoine commun de l’humanité, ou encore l’esprit même de la Convention de Montego Bay sur le droit de la mer, élaborée au nom de « l’humanité tout entière » (art . 136)), et le droit international méta-étatique (considérant l’humanitas en l’homme, non l’individu)70 . La pluralité à assumer s’éprouve plus délicate encore puisque « le » droit international public est nécessairement exercé (et non simplement exécuté) par les droits internes, dont la médiation pratique lui interdit toute univocité… hormis celle de pur discours . Pour le juriste, la précellence de droit de l’Etat (de par sa souveraineté quasi absolue) et surtout sa primauté de fait, y compris au sein des deux derniers degrés de notre échelle de l’interétatique, inscrit tout juste universel ou même simplement global non pas dans l’univocité – « pragmatiquement utopique » pour l’exprimer dans les formes de l’oxymore, hors « réalités de terrain » dans le langage sociologique –, ni dans l’équivocité – relativisme qui ruine toute idée de justice – mais dans l’analogie71 . 70 71

Sur les différents modes de l’interétatique, voir Eric Wyler / Alain Papaux, Le mythe structurant de l’humanité : la communauté internationale vivante, in Unité et diversité du droit international, ed . Denis Alland et al., Leiden/Boston, 2014, 175–200 . Alain, Papaux / Eric, Wyler, The search for universal justice, in Towards world constitutionalism : issues in the legal ordering of the world community, Leiden/Boston, 2005, 273–302 .

La crise environnementale ou la modernité retournée contre elle-même

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La responsabilité commune et72 différenciée se déploie précisément dans une métaphysique de l’analogie : commune pour le « même », différenciée pour l’« autre », jeu simultanée de « même » et d’« autre » au principe de la notion d’analogie, et responsabilité pour marquer quelque transcendance, fût-elle de l’ordre d’un point fixe endogène comme l’humanitas . 8. conclusIon Assuré de ce que « nous avons toujours trouvé », le lieu commun distingue pour origine de la crise environnementale un homo pas encore assez sapiens pour créer des techniques préservant la biosphère et maintenant notre mode de vie, en de nombreux points si agréable . Pareille assurance ou inférence s’avère non seulement erronée, revêtant toute la naïveté coupable du « problème de l’induction », mais surtout peu sapientiale, nouvel habit pour l’éculée idéologie du progrès, laquelle s’est désormais largement retournée contre l’ingénu optimisme moderne . Aussi l’âme sage entendrait tout le contraire : nous ne sommes pas encore assez sapiens pour renoncer à de trop nombreuses techniques fort polluantes ou dispendieuses en énergie mais indispensables à notre confort . Dans cette configuration paradoxale, plus nous pensons être – c’est-à-dire opérer, agir, maîtriser – sages, plus nous accroissons la puissance, le faber, l’hybris… et plus nous nous offrons un désastre environnemental . La créature autonome de Pic de la Mirandole dans sa noblesse se devait « aventurier du savoir », que campait si bien Zénon dans L’œuvre au noir, mais la pertinence du monde réduite peu ou prou à la seule cause efficiente, à la techno-science, en ferait un « aventurier de la puissance »73, peu sapiens au point de prendre le dernier pour le premier . bIblIogrAPhIe Anders, Günther, Le temps de la fin, Paris, 2007 . Arendt, Hannah, Condition de l’homme moderne, traduction de G . Fradier, Paris, 1961 . Berque, Augustin, Être humain sur la terre, Gallimard, 1996 . Bourg, Dominique / Papaux, Alain, Biosphère, modernité et déni de la finitude, in Biosphère, environnement et droits fondamentaux, Zurich, 2011 . Brague, Rémi, La sagesse du monde, Paris, 1999 . Bricmont, Jean, Comment justifier l’autorité scientifique?, Antoine Compagnon (dir .), De l’autorité, Paris, 2008 . Cauquelin, Anne, L’art du lieu commun. Du bon usage de la doxa, Paris, 1999 . Culioli, Antoine, Variations sur la rationalité, in Cahiers de l’ILSL, hors série (juin 2005) . Détienne, Marcel / Vernant, Jean-Pierre, Les ruses de l’intelligence. La mètis des Grecs, Champs essais, Paris, 2009 (1974) . Dupuy, Jean-Pierre, La marque du sacré, Paris, 2008 . Dufour, Alfred, Droits de l’homme. Droit naturel et histoire, Paris 1991 . Jonas Hans, Le Principe responsabilité : une éthique pour la civilisation technologique, Paris, 1990 . Gadamer, Hans-Georg, Vérité et Méthode, Paris, 1996 . Goyard-Fabre, Simone, Les embarras philosophiques du droit naturel, Paris, 2002 . 72 73

Non pas mais, lequel soulignerait l’incompréhension de ce qu’est l’analogie . Yourcenar (note 10), 564, pour les deux expressions .

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Graves, Robert, Les Mythes grecs, Paris, 1967 (1958) . Grize, Jean-Blaise, Déduction et inférence, in Lire le droit. Langue, texte, cognition, ed . Danièle Bourcier / Perre Mackay, Paris, 1992 . Hamou, Philippe, The Footsteps of Nature . Raisonnement indiciaire et « interprétation de la nature » au XVIIe siècle . Quelques considérations historiques et épistémologiques, in L’interprétation des indices. Enquête sur le paradigme indiciaire avec Carlo Ginzburg, éd . par Denis Thouard, Villeneuve d’Ascq, 2007 . Larrère, Catherine et Raphaël, Du bon usage de la nature. Pour une philosophie de l’environnement, Paris, 2009 . Latour, Bruno, Nous n’avons jamais été modernes, Paris, 1991 . Lebeau, André, L’enfermement planétaire, Paris, 2008 . Lecourt, Dominique, Prométhée, Faust, Frankenstein. Fondements imaginaires de l’éthique, Paris, 1996 . Minois, Georges, Galilée, Paris, 2000 . Muralt (de), André, Néoplatonisme et aristotélisme dans la métaphysique médiévale, Paris, 1995 . Papaux, Alain, Nature d’hier et d’aujourd’hui : de l’illimité à l’indisponible . Ou ne plus parier le genre humain, in Crise écologique, crise des valeurs ?, Genève, 2010 . Papaux, Alain / Brenci, Alessandro, « Würde der Kreatur » ou « Intégrité des organismes vivants » : le biocentrisme est-il légal ? Bref historique d’une question mal résolue, in Biosphère, environnement et droits fondamentaux, Zurich, 2011 . Papaux, Alain / Wyler, Eric, The search for universal justice, in Towards world constitutionalism : issues in the legal ordering of the world community, Leiden/Boston, 2005 . Popper, Karl Raimund, La logique de la découverte scientifique, trad . fr . Paris, 1990 (1935) . Raeymaeker, Louis (de), Philosophie de l’être, Louvain, 1970 . Rossi, Paolo, Aux origines de la science moderne, Paris, 2004 (1999) . Schiavone Aldo, Ius. L’invention du droit en Occident, Paris, 2008 (2005) . Serres, Michel, Le contrat naturel, Paris, 1990 . Sève, René, « Droit », in Les Notions Philosophiques, Encyclopédie philosophique universelle, 2 vol ., Paris, 1990 . Soler Léna, Introduction à l’épistémologie, Paris, 2009 . Yourcenar, Marguerite, L’œuvre au noir, Paris, 1968 . Wyler, Eric / Papaux, Alain, Le mythe structurant de l’humanité : la communauté internationale vivante, in Denis Alland et al . (ed .), Unité et diversité du droit international, Leiden/Boston, 2014 .

Catherine Larrère (Paris) resPonsAbIlIté

à l’égArd des générAtIons futures et justIce

IntergénérAtIonnelle

quelques

InterrogAtIons

Depuis – au moins – l’article fondateur de Joel Feinberg, « The Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations » (1974),1 on reconnait que l’on peut difficilement faire face aux problèmes normatifs (éthiques et juridiques) posés par les questions environnementales, sans étendre nos responsabilités et désigner de nouveaux sujets de droit, parmi lesquels il faut compter les générations futures . En 1979, dans Le Principe responsabilité, Hans Jonas a insisté sur l’étendue et la portée de cette responsabilité: notre puissance technique a des répercussions tant spatiales (la planète entière) que temporelles (sur des milliers et des milliers d’années), ce qui rend nécessaire une éthique de la technique qui soit une éthique du futur .2 C’est l’avenir de l’humanité, la possibilité même de son existence, qui sont en jeu . L’idée que nous avons des devoirs envers les générations futures est donc devenue une composante incontestée de la question environnementale . La réflexion à ce sujet a débordé le domaine spécialisé de l’éthique environnementale pour être accueillie au sein des courants dominants de la philosophie morale, qu’il s’agisse de l’utilitarisme3 ou des théories de la justice distributive, issues de la réflexion de John Rawls . Les questions de justice intergénérationnelle s’ajoutent ainsi aux questions de justice intragénérationnelle quand il s’agit (mais pas seulement) de justice environnementale .4 C’est que l’attention portée aux générations futures ne relève pas seulement de l’intérêt philosophique . Les générations futures ont une place centrale dans le rapport Brundtland (1987) où le développement durable (ou soutenable) est défini comme « un mode de développement qui répond aux besoins des générations du présent sans compromettre la capacité des générations futures à répondre aux leurs », définition qui est reprise, sans modification décisive, dans la Déclaration de Rio de 1992, ce qui lui donne une portée officielle . Les générations futures sont donc une référence obligatoire des politiques environnementales, à quelque niveau (international, régional, national) qu’elles se situent . Amartya Sen peut ainsi écrire, dans un article récent, que, en ce qui concerne les décisions politiques en matière d’environ-

1 2 3 4

Joel Feinberg, The rights of animals and unborn generations, in Philosophy and Environmental Crisis, ed . William T . Blackstone, Athens, 1974, 43–68, repris dans Joel Feinberg, Rights, Justice and the Bounds of Liberty, Princeton, 1980 . Hans Jonas, Le principe responsabilité, 1979 (trad . fr . Paris, 1990) . Voir à ce sujet Dieter Birnbacher, La responsabilité envers les générations futures, 1988 (trad . fr . Paris, 1994) . Voir Axel Gosseries, Penser la justice entre les générations. De l’affaire Perruche à la réforme des retraites, Paris, 2004 .

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nement, « the most immediate problem arises from the involvement of different generations in any decision » .5 Cependant, pour centrale qu’elle soit, cette prise en considération des générations futures ne va pas de soi . L’introduction de nouveaux membres dans la communauté morale pose des problèmes philosophiques qui n’ont pas manqué d’être relevés . On a également fait ressortir les conflits possibles entre justice intra- et intergénérationnelle et le danger qu’il y aurait à sacrifier l’une à l’autre . Bien sûr, il y a des réponses aux objections ainsi présentées et celles-ci n’ont pas interdit à la réflexion sur les générations futures de se développer . Mais cela contribue à faire des générations futures des sujets faibles, dont le statut normatif est contestable . Si l’on fait de l’implication des générations futures la dimension principale des politiques environnementales, cela fragilise l’adoption de celles-ci . Les environnementalistes, qui font référence à nos devoirs à l’égard des générations futures, s’exposent à une variante du ‘Après moi le déluge!’ . Pourquoi se préoccuperait-on de générations qui ne sont pas encore nées, alors qu’il y a des problèmes autrement urgents à l’égard de celles qui existent maintenant et qui coexistent souvent difficilement? C’est pourquoi nous voudrions étudier le problème sous un autre angle . La question des générations futures est le plus souvent abordée du point de vue de l’extension de notre considération morale . Nous voudrions l’envisager non comme une extension mais comme une restriction de la définition du problème environnemental . Il ne s’agit pas, le plus souvent en effet, d’ajouter les générations futures à d’autres destinataires de la responsabilité (la nature, les générations présentes), mais de restreindre la responsabilité aux seules générations futures . Il en résulte une méconnaissance des problèmes réels posés par la crise environnementale . C’est pourquoi, après avoir rappelé les principales objections adressées à l’introduction des générations futures dans la communauté morale, nous voudrions montrer comment privilégier les devoirs à l’égard des générations futures revient à s’en tenir à une définition de la crise environnementale en termes de rareté des ressources . Or cette définition est très inadéquate, du moment où les problèmes environnementaux ne sont pas tant des problèmes de stocks qu’ils n’engagent la connaissance de processus . Cela nous conduira, dans une troisième partie, à proposer une conception inclusive, et non pas extensive, de la place des générations futures dans le souci environnemental . 1. les

générAtIons futures et leurs crItIques

Feinberg, comme Jonas, voient dans la préoccupation pour les générations futures un problème d’extension du domaine de la moralité . Feinberg aborde la question en termes de droits . Selon lui, s’il va de soi que tous les êtres humains ont des droits, la question se pose de savoir si les êtres humains non encore nés en ont eux aussi . Jonas, après avoir remarqué le caractère limité, à la fois spatialement et temporellement, des éthiques traditionnelles, depuis l’antiquité, part de l’idée que le dévelop5

Amartya Sen, Global Warning Is Just One of Many Environmental Threats, The New Republic, August 22, 2014 . URL= http://www .newrepublic .com/article/118969/environmentalists-obsess-about-global-warming-ignore-poor-countries (25 .04 .2015) .

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pement récent de notre puissance technique nous oblige à ne pas nous en tenir aux seuls humains vivants, mais à mettre les générations futures et l’avenir de l’humanité au centre de notre souci moral . Dans les deux cas, il s’agit donc d’élargir la communauté morale, en y accueillant les humains à venir . Or une telle extension pose immédiatement problème : quels devoirs pouvons-nous avoir à l’égard de gens qui n’existent pas? Plus précisément, l’argument invoqué est celui de la réciprocité : pour que l’on puisse envisager les droits de façon juste (et qu’il ne s’agisse pas d’injustes privilèges réservés à quelques uns) il faut satisfaire à des exigences d’égalité et de réciprocité . Egale dignité de tous, et réciprocité des droits et des devoirs (tout ce qui est droit pour moi correspond à un devoir de respecter les mêmes droits chez les autres) . Or quelle réciprocité peut-on avoir avec des êtres qui n’existent pas? Cet argument, de type déontologique, est représentatif des théories contractualistes comme celles de Rawls .6 Derek Parfit a introduit, dans la perspective utilitariste, qui est celle d’une évaluation conséquentialiste, un argument qui a souvent été retenu pour mettre en question la pertinence de la prise en considération des générations futures : c’est le problème dit de non-identité ou de non-existence .7 Il y a une imprécision radicale en ce qui concerne les générations futures, plus précisément les individus qui les composeront, non seulement parce qu’ils n’existent pas encore, mais parce que leur existence est liée à nos actions d’aujourd’hui . Des décisions prises par les générations actuelles dépendent l’existence et l’identité des individus qui existeront dans l’avenir . Dès lors comment évaluer les conséquences des décisions sur les individus futurs, si l’on ne connait pas leur identité? On peut faire des raisonnements contrefactuels pour comparer deux formes de vies d’un même individu, mais on ne compare pas l’existence à la non existence : il n’y a pas à raisonner sur ce que je pourrais souffrir si je n’existais pas .8 Je ne peux pas me plaindre de ma vie si cela me conduit à penser qu’il aurait mieux valu pour moi que je n’existe pas . Les deux arguments (l’un déontologique, l’autre conséquentialiste) font tous les deux ressortir que les générations futures sont des membres douteux de la communauté morale : soit qu’ils ne puissent être considérés comme des personnes morales à part entière, soit que leur absence d’identité ne leur permette pas d’être inclus dans le calcul des conséquences . Tout cela met en cause la pertinence d’une extension de la communauté humaine à ses membres non encore existants . On peut cependant également arguer que cette extension, même contestable, fragilise, en leur suscitant des concurrents, les membres existants, et reconnus, de la communauté morale (et politique) . C’est l’argument souvent avancé pour affirmer que les politiques en faveur de l’environnement se font au détriment des plus pauvres (nations ou individus) . Bjorn Lomborg, dans L’environnementaliste sceptique, affirme ainsi que l’argent

6 7 8

Voire la présentation que fait Martha Nussbaum de l’argument de Rawls dans Frontiers of justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, Harvard, 2007, 325–338 . Derek Parfit, Reasons and Persons, Oxford, 1984, Part IV: Future Generations . Ibid . Pour l’application du paradoxe de la non identité aux questions environnementales, plus spécialement climatiques, voir Derek Parfit, Energy Policy and the Further Future: the Identity Problem, in Climate Ethics, Essential Readings, ed . Stephen M . Gardiner et al., Oxford, 2010, 112–121 .

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dépensé à prévenir un changement climatique – de la réalité duquel on n’est même pas complètement sûr – serait mieux employé à aider les pauvres du monde entier .9 Tel qu’il est présenté par Lomborg, l’argument est fallacieux car il suppose que l’alternative est entre s’occuper des pauvres ou lutter contre le changement climatique, alors qu’il s’agit plutôt d’écarter toute politique volontariste pour continuer à faire comme d’habitude (« business as usual »), c’est-à-dire, notamment, à donner de l’argent aux banques plutôt qu’aux pauvres . Mais, qu’il puisse être formulé de façon aussi ouvertement corrompue (au sens où Stephen Gardiner parle de « corruption morale », comme déguisement d’un intérêt particulier en argument général désintéressé10) ne retire pas sa force à l’argument, qui est celui du conflit possible entre justice intragénérationnelle et justice intergénérationnelle, et, plus généralement, entre les objectifs sociaux et environnementaux des politiques écologiques . Des trois critiques opposées à l’inclusion des générations futures dans notre souci moral et dans nos décisions politiques, c’est, nous semble-t-il, la plus sérieuse . Aux deux premiers arguments invoqués contre l’attribution d’un statut moral aux générations futures, il a déjà été répondu, et de façon convaincante . L’argument de la réciprocité ne vaut pas uniquement contre les générations futures, mais aussi contre toute une série de candidats au statut moral qui n’ont pas, de façon évidente, les qualités qui font d’un individu une personne morale, selon Rawls (la capacité à avoir une conception du bien, et la possession d’un certain sens de la justice), à commencer par les animaux . C’est pourquoi Feinberg, avant d’en venir aux générations futures, envisage toute une série de cas (les foetus, les morts, les plantes, les humains réduits à une condition végétative…), en commençant par les animaux, parce que la question des droits lui paraît pratiquement résolue pour ceux-ci : il suffit de s’appuyer sur une conception des droits qui n’a pas pour condition l’existence de la volonté (et donc de la capacité à faire valoir soi-même ses droits), mais l’existence d’un intérêt (qui est liée pour lui, en ce qui concerne les animaux, à la vie conative) .11 Mais si l’ordre argumentatif adopté par Feinberg conduit à donner un statut moral aussi fort aux animaux dotés de sensibilité qu’aux générations futures, l’argumentation plus fréquente consiste plutôt à montrer que ce sont les générations futures, parce qu’il s’agit d’humains potentiels, qui échappent le plus facilement à l’objection de la réciprocité . Ainsi, Martha Nussbaum ne prend pas en compte les générations futures dans sa réflexion sur les « frontières de la justice », comme si leur appartenance à cette sphère était acquise .12 Hans Jonas, de son côté, répond à l’objection de la réciprocité en posant que sa théorie de la responsabilité, comme prise en charge globale des conditions de vie des existants, n’exige pas de réciprocité de la part de ceux envers qui nous sommes responsables : le modèle paradigmatique de la responsabilité qui est celui des parents vis-à-vis de leur nouveau-né montre que l’on peut être totalement engagé dans une responsabilité vis-à-vis d’un être auquel on ne demande rien en retour . L’argument de la réciprocité s’efface alors devant celui de la fragilité ou de la vulnérabilité et de 9 10 11 12

Born Lomborg, L’écologiste sceptique: le véritable état de la planète, 2001 (trad . fr . Paris, 2004) . Stephen Gardiner, A Perfect Moral Storm: Climate Change, Intergenerational Ethics, and the Problem of Moral Corruption, in Gardiner (note 8), 87–100 . Joel Feinberg, The rights of animals and unborn generations, in Blackstone (note 1), 43–68 . Martha Nussbaum, Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership, Harvard, 2007, 325–338 .

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la responsabilité qu’elles créent . Cela peut s’appliquer aussi bien à la nature qu’aux générations futures .13 L’argument de Parfit n’est pas non plus sans réponse . On peut lui objecter que, même si le souci des générations futures est individualisé (ce que suppose une théorie des droits), cela n’implique pas que l’on connaisse l’identité de chacun de ces individus . Mais on peut même mettre en doute que le souci des générations futures doive être individualisé . C’est ainsi que Baird Callicott, qui défend une approche holistique des problèmes environnementaux, voit dans l’argumentation de Parfit non pas un obstacle dirimant, mais, bien au contraire, la preuve de la faillite des morales individualistes à faire face aux questions environnementales .14 En revanche, la question de savoir comment accorder les exigences présentes d’une situation sociale marquée par les inégalités et la pauvreté et les demandes à long terme de protection de l’environnement n’a pas encore reçue de réponse satisfaisante . C’était l’interrogation qui était au coeur du rapport Brundtland et de l’idée du développement durable: à partir du moment où l’on considère que la pauvreté est l’une des principales causes de dégradation environnementale, il n’y a pas lieu d’opposer développement et protection de l’environnement . Sortir de la pauvreté par le développement se fera au bénéfice de l’environnement . Mais cette proposition n’est pas vraiment convaincante, car elle oublie que le développement est aussi source de dégradations environnementales, et ceci d’autant plus que l’on ne spécifie pas de quel développement il s’agit et dans quelles conditions politiques il s’effectue .15 Aussi l’argument revient-il sans arrêt . Il est significatif que l’article d’Amartya Sen récemment publié dans the New Republic figure sous le titre « environmentalists-obsess-about-global-warming-ignore-poor-countries », alors que le contenu ne correspond pas exactement à cette accroche, car son objectif est plutôt d’établir que le changement climatique n’est pas la seule question environnementale à prendre en considération . Mais cela montre bien à quel point l’opposition entre le social et l’environnemental est prégnante et tend à remettre en question la priorité – sinon l’exclusivité – accordée aux générations futures dans certaines façons d’envisager les questions environnementales .16 C’est pourquoi, cessant de considérer que le problème posé par la prise en considération des générations futures est celui de l’extension de la communauté morale humaine, nous voudrions nous attacher à montrer le caractère restrictif de cette façon d’envisager la question environnementale, notamment quant à ses conséquences dans l’appréhension des problèmes environnementaux .

13 14 15 16

Hans Jonas, Le principe responsabilité, Paris, 1990, 134: «la responsabilité, une relation non réciproque» . J . Baird Callicott, Thinking Like a Planet, The Land Ethic, and the Earth Ethic, Oxford, 2013, 283– 286 . Éloi Laurent, Social-Écologie, Paris, 2011 . Amartya Sen, Global Warning Is Just One of Many Environmental Threats, article cité .

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2. stocks

ou Processus?

Si le Programme des Nations Unies sur l’Environnement (PNUE) et la conférence de Rio qui en marqua l’aboutissement en 1992, (et dont le rapport Brundtland fut une étape décisive) furent à la recherche d’une conciliation entre les demandes en développement des nations les plus pauvres et les exigences de protection de la nature des environnementalistes, on peut considérer que l’accord sur le développement durable, auquel on s’est finalement rallié, s’est fait au détriment des défenseurs de la nature (ce qui ne signifie pas qu’il soit véritablement à l’avantage des plus pauvres) . Le terme de nature ne figure pas dans la définition que donne le rapport Brundtland du développement durable: elle ne mentionne que les générations présentes et futures . La Déclaration de Rio qui engage à « satisfaire équitablement les besoins relatifs au développement et à l’environnement des générations présentes et futures », ne fait figurer l’environnement que comme un instrument au service des besoins humains, sans mentionner la nature . Faut-il alors considérer que le ‘chauvinisme humain’, comme disent les critiques environnementalistes de l’anthropocentrisme, l’a emporté sur le souci de la nature et que la considération des générations futures, qui est celle des seuls humains, est un alibi pour exclure la nature de nos préoccupations? À vrai dire, un tel recentrement sur les préoccupations humaines, à partir du moment où l’on se situe, comme le fait la Déclaration de Rio, dans une perspective globale, est inévitable : si l’on prend en considération la planète entière, on y trouve les hommes, et on ne peut, à ce niveau global, se préoccuper de la seule nature, comme si les humains n’existaient pas . L’humanité fait nécessairement partie des solutions globales aux problèmes environnementaux . Cela conduit Callicott, dans le livre où il réfléchit sur les conséquences morales de la globalisation des questions environnementales, à faire la différence entre l’anthropocentrisme moral (qu’il admet, car les hommes, du fait de leur statut de victimes de la crise climatique, sont des objets de considération morale pour le souci environnemental) et l’anthropocentrisme métaphysique (selon lequel tout est fait pour l’homme et rien que pour l’homme, ce qu’il rejette) .17 La question, alors, n’est pas d’opposer l’homme à la nature, mais d’envisager la place des hommes dans la biosphère, et donc de se demander, lorsque l’on met à ce point les hommes sur le devant de la scène, à quelle conception de la nature cela peut correspondre . Car, même instrumentalisée, même réduite à l’environnement (celui de l’humanité), il y a bien une conception de la nature dans le développement durable (ou soutenable) . C’est celle d’un patrimoine à transmettre . Dans un article sur la justice intergenérationnelle, Brian Barry définit ainsi la soutenabilité : « The core concept of sustainability is, I suggest, that there is some X whose value should be maintained in as far as it lies within our power to do so, into the indefinite future . »18 Tel est bien le cadre que les différentes versions de la soutenabilité se sont efforcées de remplir en donnant leur interprétation du X et de sa « valeur » . Les économistes vont ainsi parler de « capital naturel » à propos des ressources naturelles, l’objectif du dé17 18

Callicott (note 14), 167–168 . Brian Barry, Sustainability and Intergenerational Justice, in Environmental Ethics: An Anthology, ed . Andrew Light / Holmes Rolston III, Oxford, 2003, 491 .

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veloppement durable étant alors d’assurer que le stock de capital à disposition de la société reste intact d’une génération à l’autre .19 Les différences d’interprétation portent notamment sur la possibilité ou non de substituer du capital technique au capital naturel, ce qui fait la différence entre les versions faibles (qui affirment la substituabilité du capital technique au capital naturel) et les versions fortes (qui posent qu’il y a du non substituable dans la nature) de la soutenabilité . On trouve ainsi d’un côté l’approche de type néo-classique (actualisée par Solow) et, de l’autre, celle de l’économie écologique (Costanza et Daly) qui cherche à définir les limites écologiques à l’activité humaine . Mais, dans les deux cas, il s’agit bien de transmettre un patrimoine d’une génération à l’autre, en en maintenant la valeur . C’est pourquoi on se trouve dans les conditions de la justice, telles que les définit Rawls, à la suite de Hume . Ce sont celles de « la rareté relative des ressources » : quand « les ressources naturelles et autres ne sont pas abondantes au point de rendre les systèmes de coopération superflus, mais [que] les conditions ne sont pas non plus difficiles au point que les tentatives positives soient vouées à l’échec » .20 La nouveauté du problème environnemental vient de ce que ce contexte de rareté comprend maintenant des ressources jugées jusque là inépuisables, ou sur les limites desquelles on ne s’était pas interrogé, à tel point que, pour certains, il ne s’agit plus d’une situation de rareté relative (ce qui correspond à l’analyse néo-classique) mais de rareté absolue (situation dite malthusienne reprise par l’économie écologique)21 . C’est bien parce que la rareté est celle de ressources non renouvelables que le problème de la coopération et de la distribution n’est pas interne à la génération présente, mais pose une question de justice intergénérationnelle : il faut se préoccuper des ressources dont disposeront les générations à venir, ce qui est un problème de justice sociale, en l’occurrence d’allocation de ressources rares entre générations . La question – celle de la transmission d’un patrimoine – peut donc être traitée comme une question d’épargne intergénérationnelle, le problème étant d’en trouver le « juste principe » : question abordée par Rawls dans les paragraphes 44 et 45 de la Théorie de la justice . On voit donc comment, en excluant tout devoir direct vis-à-vis de la nature, en limitant l’extension de la communauté morale aux seules générations futures, et en comprenant le problème environnemental comme celui de la transmission de ressources limitées à nos descendants, on parvient à inscrire les questions environnementales dans le cadre conceptuel dominant, celui des théories de la justice distributive et on fait du développement durable un problème d’épargne intergénérationnelle . Ainsi circonscrite, la question peut être élaborée avec toute la rigueur de la philosophie morale analytique .22 Car les problèmes sont nombreux . Ils concernent notamment le type de partenariat ou de contrat qui lie les générations successives les unes aux autres, et qui implique des questions de propriété, conçue comme rapport entre les hommes à propos des choses : y a-t-il un type de propriété qui corresponde

19 20 21 22

Franck-Dominique Vivien, Le développement soutenable, Paris, 2005 . John Rawls, Théorie de la justice, 1971 (trad . fr . Paris, 1987), 160 . Vivien (note 19), 62 . Voir, en français, Cédric Rio, Justice sociale et générations. Pourquoi et comment transmettre un monde plus juste, Rennes, 2015 .

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à ce mode de transmission?23 La question est aussi celle du taux d’épargne, et de son actualisation d’une génération à l’autre . On sait que le rapport Stern a apporté une réponse à la critique de Lomborg en montrant que, plus on attendait pour faire face aux coûts du changement climatique, plus ces coûts seraient élevés . Mais cette réponse reposait sur le taux d’actualisation – bas – choisi par Stern, ce qui a entrainé une vive polémique24 . Cela a fait ressortir que le taux d’actualisation n’est pas un problème purement technique mais mesure la préférence que nous accordons (ou non) aux générations présentes par rapport aux générations futures, ce qui engage donc un jugement normatif .25 Mais peut-on s’en tenir à une vision aussi étroite des problèmes environnementaux? Envisager la question comme un problème de stocks (le stock de capital naturel à disposition de la société) peut encore s’inscrire dans la perspective du rapport Meadows, qui, en 1972, a attiré l’attention sur le caractère limité des ressources, notamment énergétiques, dont dispose l’humanité .26 Mais à partir du moment où l’on prend au sérieux le changement climatique (le GIEC est créé en 1988), la question n’est pas seulement celle de l’épuisement des ressources, elle est aussi celle des effets de la consommation de ces ressources sur les grands cycles biogéochimiques, notamment celui du carbone . On ne peut plus alors raisonner uniquement en termes de stocks, il faut envisager des processus, qui constituent les systèmes biosphériques, et étudier, à partir de là, la question des limites de l’activité humaine .27 Il ne s’agit plus seulement de savoir comment nous allons transmettre une ressource rare à ceux qui viendront après nous, mais de nous préoccuper de ce que nous consommons maintenant et surtout de la façon diversifiée dont nous consommons . Le changement d’un raisonnement en termes de stocks à un raisonnement en termes de processus est suffisamment important pour qu’on ait pu faire remarquer (avec seulement l’apparence du paradoxe) que le problème n’était pas que nous manquions de pétrole, mais que nous en avions trop .28 Cela ne signifie pas qu’il faille se désintéresser de l’avenir (et des générations futures) mais qu’il faut porter une attention différente au présent . Un des problèmes posés par la notion de soutenabilité c’est que le X, dont il faut maintenir la valeur dans un avenir indéterminé, est supposé avoir un contenu uniforme, qui ne varie pas d’un pays ou d’une culture à l’autre . D’où le soupçon que la conception occidentale du développement (ou, plus simplement, de la croissance) lui sert de modèle, que la durabilité dont il s’agit est celle de l’économie occidentale, et que le développement durable traduit le désir des pays nantis de transmettre leurs avoirs uniquement à leurs descendants au détriment des plus pauvres, ce souci des généra23 24 25 26 27 28

Axel Gosseries, Les théories de la justice intergénérationnelle . Synopsis à l’usage des durabilistes pressés, Raison Publique 8, avril 2008, 7–29 . URL= http://www .raison-publique .fr/article272 . html (25 .04 .2015) . Nicholas Stern, The Economics of Climate Change, in Gardiner (note 8), 39–76 . Dale Jamieson, Reason in a Dark Time, Oxford, 2014, 110–143 . Donella H . Meadows et al., Halte à la croissance?, 1972 (trad . fr . Paris, 1972) . Cependant, le rapport Meadows engageait une approche systémique de ces questions, ne s’en tenant à une seule étude de stocks . Sarah Cornell, On the System Properties of the Planetary Boundaries, Ecology and Society 17/1, 2012; Johan Rockström et al ., Planetary Boundaries: Exploring Safe Operating Space for Humanity, Ecology and Society, 2009 . Henri Prévot, Trop de pétrole! Énergie fossile et réchauffement climatique, Paris, 2007 .

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tions futures n’étant peut-être d’ailleurs que l’alibi moralisateur qui couvre en fait la volonté de maintenir le statu quo, le business as usual . Maintien du statu quo qui trouve argument dans la constatation de fait, en économie, de la préférence pour le présent . Mais même si l’on ne pousse pas jusque là le soupçon de corruption morale, on ne peut qu’être frappé par la façon dont l’approche dominante des questions de justice intergénérationnelle fait peu de place à la diversité, aussi bien celle de ce que l’on peut vouloir transmettre que celle des différentes façons d’y parvenir . La critique qu’Amartya Sen adresse aux environnementalistes, dans son article du New Republic, n’est pas tant de sacrifier l’aide qui devrait être apportée aux pauvres à la lutte contre le changement climatique que de se concentrer sur la seule réduction des émissions sans prendre en considération la diversité des situations à travers le monde, diversité qui fait partie des conditions, mais aussi des opportunités d’une amélioration de la situation environnementale . C’est pourquoi il ne s’en tient pas, dans la définition du développement durable, à la seule satisfaction des besoins (y compris en interprétant ceux-ci comme maintien d’une qualité de vie), mais pose que le X à maintenir comprend les libertés (comprises à partir de la théorie des capabilités, ce qui permet d’inclure des références à l’environnement dans cette conception des libertés) .29 Une telle façon d’envisager les choses conduit à passer d’une approche purement quantitative à une approche plus qualitative . Tenir compte des inégalités, dans cette perspective, ce n’est pas seulement évaluer les compensations financières afin de réduire les inégalités de revenu, c’est aussi tenir compte de la diversité des situations et de la variété des développements que cette diversité autorise . C’est là que les différences de climat (au sens ancien du terme de zones géographiques) doivent être prises en considération : « The availability of a strong sun, of which Bangladesh and India and much of Africa get a great deal more than does Europe (which is currently the center of environmental activism in the world) makes it possible for many of the poorer areas of the globe to use a gigantic supply of energy, if environmentally sound ways of harnessing, storing, and utilizing solar energy can be developed » .30 Cela permettrait également à des pays pauvres d’Afrique subsaharienne qui n’ont que peu ou pas de ressources fossiles de tirer parti d’autres formes d’énergie, ou à d’autres pays pauvres de remplacer leurs ressources en charbon très productrices de CO2 par des énergies moins polluantes . L’opposition entre l’environnemental et le social tend donc à s’affaiblir quand on prend en compte la diversité des situations, et qu’on n’envisage pas l’environnement seulement comme un ensemble de contraintes, mais qu’on l’étudie comme un contexte, et même une communauté de vie . Appréhender l’environnement en termes de stocks (de ressources naturelles à notre disposition) c’est en effet l’appréhender comme un objet, ou un ensemble de choses, dans une vision dualiste des hommes et de leur environnement (ou de la nature) . À partir du moment où l’on raisonne en termes de processus, on abandonne l’opposition dualiste entre les hommes et la nature, on s’intéresse à une diversité de populations humaines, chacune étant située dans un contexte environne29 30

Sur le passage des besoins aux libertés dans la définition du développement durable, voir Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice, Harvard, 2009, 248–252 . Amartya Sen, Global Warning Is Just One of Many Environmental Threats, The New Republic, August 22, 2014, 3 .

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mental avec lequel elle est en interaction . On ne peut plus appréhender les problèmes environnementaux comme des éléments exogènes intervenant dans un processus d’accumulation endogène qui a son unité propre . Il faut prendre en considération les interactions des humains avec leur environnement naturel, avec lequel ils forment un même système, une même communauté de vie . Une fois que l’on a adopté cette perspective, et que l’on veut tenir compte, y compris de façon normative, des difficultés durables que nous rencontrons dans ce système, il ne suffit plus d’étendre la communauté morale aux seules générations futures . Il faut prendre en considération des ensembles complexes, dans lesquels humains et non humains interagissent de façon dynamique . 3. lA

PlAce des générAtIons futures dAns lA communAuté de vIe

Dès que l’on se préoccupe d’un certain nombre de problèmes moraux relativement inédits (comme les problèmes environnementaux), le cadre habituel des théories morales, surtout contractualistes, pour lesquelles seule compte la communauté humaine actuelle, ne suffit plus et de nombreux prétendants à l’entrée dans la communauté morale se présentent . Mary Midgley, dans un passage où elle examine les limites de l’approche contractualiste, en fait une énumération, dont elle prévient qu’elle n’est nullement exhaustive . La liste dressée, en effet, est longue, et composite . On y trouve, pêle-mêle, parmi les humains : les morts, la postérité, les enfants, les vieillards séniles, ceux qui sont temporairement fous, ceux qui le sont de façon permanente, ceux qui sont réduits à l’état végétatif, les embryons humains… Parmi les animaux : les animaux doués de sensibilité, ou pas… Dans le registre des êtres inanimés : toutes les sortes de plantes, les objets artificiels y compris les oeuvres d’art . A cela s’ajoutent des catégories collectives, humaines (groupes sociaux) ou non (écosystèmes), jusqu’à la biosphère . Et dans une dernière catégorie, elle ajoute « les arts, les sciences, soi-même et Dieu » .31 Que faire, devant cette collection hétéroclite? Faut-il examiner chaque élément séparément, et tenter de les inclure un par un dans la communauté morale élargie, ce qui permet de continuer à raisonner sur une base contractualiste? C’est ce qui a été fait pour les animaux (doués de sensibilité) comme pour les générations futures . Le résultat n’est pas satisfaisant car, en ce qui concerne les générations futures, il conduit à une méconnaissance, et même à un déni de la réalité, de l’ampleur et de la complexité de la crise environnementale . Au lieu d’étendre, jusqu’à le distendre, sinon le rompre, le cadre contractuel, il est peut-être préférable de chercher une autre solution : trouver un autre cadre ou plutôt un système complexe capable d’inclure les différents prétendants dans leur complexité tout en permettant de prendre en considération leurs interactions . C’est la proposition que fait Aldo Leopold dans sa Land Ethic, avec le concept de communauté biotique,32 et la métaphore (presque le modèle) qu’il en donne dans « Penser

31 32

Mary Midgley, Evolution as a Religion: Strange hopes and stranger fears, London/New York, 1985, 184 . Que nous rebaptisons ici «communauté de vie», pour bien montrer à quel point humains et non humains s’y retrouvent, dans des formes de vie partagée (bios et pas seulement zoon, pour reprendre la distinction entre deux sens du mot vie) .

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comme une montagne » .33 Il s’agit de trouver le niveau où s’intègrent, dans une même communauté, vivants et non vivants, humains et non humains, et qui leur assigne à chacun leur place . Dans l’Almanach d’un comté des sables, élaboré dans la première moitié du 20e siècle, ce niveau est local . La globalisation de la question environnementale nous oblige-t-elle à passer du local au global, de la montagne à Gaïa? C’est la position qu’adopte Callicott dans son dernier livre, Thinking Like a Planet, où il présente le passage de la Land Ethic à la Earth Ethic34 . Cela ne va pas de soi et la discussion reste ouverte quant aux conséquences d’un tel changement d’échelle . Mais on peut retenir l’idée que, devant l’échec d’une solution extensive – celle du schéma contractualiste – la solution inclusive – celle de la communauté de vie – est préférable . Quelle place les générations futures peuvent-elles y avoir? Il ne s’agit pas, en effet, d’arrêter de se soucier des générations futures . Mais cela doit se faire d’une façon qui ne fasse pas des générations futures un objet séparé . Or, c’est ce qui se passe avec les approches dominantes qui, dans leur façon d’envisager des générations futures, en font l’un des termes d’une alternative, qui apparaît facilement exclusive . C’est le cas de l’opposition entre nature et générations futures, comme de l’opposition entre environnement et pauvreté . Mais cela conduit aussi à une opposition entre le présent et l’avenir . À force de privilégier le rapport aux générations futures dans la question environnementale, et particulièrement dans le changement climatique, on en vient à considérer que celui-ci est encore à venir, que les problèmes sont pour demain, ce qui ne peut que fournir des arguments à ceux qui veulent continuer à faire comme si de rien n’était . Prendre le point de vue inclusif de la communauté biotique, c’est se donner les moyens de mettre en rapport ces éléments trop souvent considérés indépendamment les uns des autres . C’est d’abord surmonter l’opposition entre les hommes et la nature, la vision inclusive n’étant pas une vision dualiste : les hommes font partie de communautés de vie qui réunissent humains et non humains, et dont les éléments sont interdépendants . Cela permet également de revenir sur l’opposition, si insistante, entre les pauvres et la nature . À partir du moment où l’on ne s’en tient pas à une vision purement quantitative, en termes de revenus, des inégalités entre pauvres et riches (inégalités Nord/Sud ou intérieures à chaque pays), mais où l’on prend en compte la diversité des situations environnementales, on peut surmonter l’opposition du social et de l’environnemental . Une des inégalités – et des injustices – du changement climatique vient de ce qu’il affecte différemment les régions du globe et ceux qui les habitent . Prendre en compte ces inégalités écologiques, c’est se donner les moyens d’aborder en même temps les questions écologiques et les questions sociales, au lieu de les opposer . Il faut pouvoir également prendre en considération la dimension temporelle . Amartya Sen a raison de faire remarquer que les décisions sur les questions environnementales sont des décisions sur le long terme qui engagent les générations futures . Il s’agit donc d’inclure, dans les décisions présentes, leur horizon temporel . Cela suppose qu’on ait recours à d’autres outils quantitatifs que ceux utilisés actuellement dans le calcul économique en termes de coûts/avantages . Celui-ci est en effet 33 34

Aldo Leopold, Almanach d’un comté des sables, 1949 (trad . fr . Paris, 1995) . Callicott (note 14) .

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notoirement défaillant lorsqu’il s’agit de prendre en considération le long terme, et l’une des raisons de la préférence pour le présent admise comme un fait par la vision économique dominante (et qui représente un obstacle important à la prise en considération des générations futures) est sans doute la difficulté qu’il y a, dans le calcul économique, à concevoir l’avenir autrement que comme l’indéfinie répétition de l’instant présent .35 Si les préférences immédiates pèsent tant dans les décisions, cela tient à ce que les agents économiques perçoivent mieux ce qu’est leur futur immédiat, mais aussi à ce que la définition d’un long terme souhaité relève d’options politiques de sociétés qui portent bien au delà de ce que les acteurs ont en main de par leurs possibilités budgétaires . Notre rapport à l’avenir n’est pas affaire de préférences, ne serait-ce que parce que nous n’avons pas les moyens de savoir ce que seront nos préférences ultérieures, encore moins celle des générations futures . Notre rapport à l’avenir est affaire de mondes possibles, parmi lesquels nous cherchons à choisir celui où nous nous trouverons le mieux . Cela implique que l’on passe, comme le fait Amartya Sen, des besoins aux libertés . Cela implique aussi que l’on se situe dans une perspective politique . La définition des possibles et leur regroupement en options bien définies sont au cœur du processus démocratique . Faire de la communauté de vie une communauté politique, capable d’agir démocratiquement dans les questions environnementales, telle doit être l’ambition de la prise en compte des générations futures . Cette tâche est difficile . Car elle pose d’abord la question de la communauté politique, du ou plutôt des niveaux d’existence de cette communauté . Le problème est également celui de la justice qui peut être définie à l’intérieur de cette communauté . Certes, il nous semble admis (du moins est-ce ce que nous avons essayé de montrer) qu’à vouloir faire rentrer les questions environnementales, notamment climatiques, dans les cadres existants de la justice distributive, qui sont ceux d’une justice centrée sur l’humain, dans lesquels les rapports à la nature sont des problèmes simplement techniques qui n’impliquent pas de réévaluation morale d’envergure, on est conduit à mésestimer ces problèmes .36 Cela a des conséquences importantes, car les problèmes environnementaux sont indistinctement naturels et sociaux, et les sousestimer aurait non seulement des conséquences sur notre environnement, mais aussi sur la vie sociale, tant domestique qu’internationale . Mais il reste à trouver une solution positive, et dans celle-ci, il y a aussi la réponse aux questions de justice posées par les dégradations environnementales . Cela demande donc que l’on redéfinisse les cadres de la justice . bIblIogrAPhIe Ackerman, Frank / Heinzerling, Lisa, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis and Environmental Protection, University of Pennsylvania Law Review 150 (2002), 1553–1584 . Barry, Brian, Sustainability and Intergenerational Justice, in Environmental Ethics: An Anthology, ed . Andrew Light / Homes Rolston III, Oxford, 2003 .

35

36

Sur la difficulté du calcul économique à prendre en compte le long terme et les distorsions que cela implique dans les calculs portant sur la protection de l’environnement, voir Frank Ackerman / Lisa Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis and Environmental Protection, University of Pennsylvania Law Review 150 (2002), 1553–1584 . Voir Frédéric-Paul Piguet, Justice climatique et interdiction de nuire, Genève, 2014 .

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Birnbacher, Dieter, La responsabilité envers les générations futures, trad . fr . Paris, 1994 . Callicott, J . Baird, Thinking Like a Planet, The Land Ethic, and the Earth Ethic, Oxford, 2013 . Cornell, Sarah, On the System Properties of the Planetary Boundaries, Ecology and Society 17/1 (2012) . Feinberg, Joel, The rights of animals and unborn generations, in Philosophy and Environmental Crisis, ed . William T . Blackstone, Athens, 1974, 43–68 . Gardiner, Stephen M . et al. (ed .), Climate Ethics: Essential Readings, Oxford, 2010 . Gosseries, Axel, Penser la justice entre les générations. De l’affaire Perruche à la réforme des retraites, Paris, 2004 . Gosseries, Axel, Les théories de la justice intergénérationnelle . Synopsis à l’usage des durabilistes pressés, Raison Publique 8 (2008), 7–28 . Jamieson, Dale, Reason in a Dark Time, Oxford, 2014 . Jonas, Hans, Le principe responsabilité, trad . fr . Paris, 1990 . Laurent, Éloi, Social-Écologie, Paris, 2011 . Leopold, Aldo, Almanach d’un comté des sables, Paris, 1995 . Lomborg, Bjorn, L’écologiste sceptique: le véritable état de la planète, trad . fr . Paris, 2004 . Meadows, Donella H . et al., Halte à la croissance? Paris, 1972 . Midgley, Mary, Evolution as a Religion: Strange hopes and stranger fears, London/New York, 1985 Nussbaum, Martha, Frontiers of justice: Disability, Nationality, Speciec Membership, Harvard, 2007 . Parfit, Derek, Reasons and Persons, Oxford, 1984 . Piguet, Frédéric-Paul, Justice climatique et interdiction de nuire, Genève, 2014 . Prévot, Henri, Trop de pétrole! Énergie fossile et réchauffement climatique, Paris, 2007 . Rawls, John, Théorie de la justice (1971), trad . fr . Paris, Le Seuil, 1987 . Rio, Cédric, Justice sociale et générations. Pourquoi et comment transmettre un monde plus juste, Rennes, 2015 . Rockström, Johan et al ., Planetary Boundaries: Exploring Safe Operating Space for Humanity, Ecology and Society 14/2 (2009) . Sen, Amartya, The Idea of Justice, Harvard, 2009 . Vivien, Franck-Dominique, Le développement soutenable, Paris, 2005 .

miCheL bourban (Lausanne) nouvelles

questIons de justIce clImAtIque

Dans la littérature philosophique anglophone, ce sont les théoriciens de la justice distributive qui se sont en grande partie appropriés la question de nos responsabilités envers les générations futures . Pour la plupart de ces auteurs, l’éthique intergénérationnelle se réduit à une question de répartition de ressources rares ou de transmission d’un patrimoine entre les générations, le problème central étant celui de la durabilité .1 Les sujets d’étude principaux qui sont abordés dans ce cadre de recherche sont le taux d’épargne intergénérationnel2 et le taux d’escompte social,3 deux questions qui ont été élaborées, pour reprendre l’expression de Catherine Larrère, « avec toute la rigueur de la philosophie morale analytique » . Son article montre que cette manière de cadrer l’éthique intergénérationnelle vise certes une extension du domaine de la morale aux personnes futures, mais témoigne en même temps d’une restriction de la définition des problèmes écologiques de notre époque procédant d’une méconnaissance des dimensions les plus préoccupantes de la crise environnementale . Comme manière alternative d’aborder notre rapport aux générations futures, elle propose une Land Ethic (inspirée d’Aldo Léopold) ou une Earth Ethic (inspirée de Baird Callicott) mettant fin à l’opposition dualiste entre l’homme et la nature . La question de fond soulevée par son article est, à mon sens, celle de l’impact de l’évolution de nos connaissances scientifiques des problèmes environnementaux sur notre perception des questions morales qu’ils soulèvent . En me focalisant sur le cas du changement climatique, je cherche à montrer que la transformation des données empiriques a, en effet, des implications non négligeables – et pourtant trop souvent négligées – sur la manière dont nous percevons les problèmes normatifs actuels les plus préoccupants . Je propose de réorienter les recherches en justice climatique dans trois domaines : le taux d’épargne intergénérationnel, la distribution des droits d’émission, et enfin la responsabilité historique . J’explique avant de conclure que ce recadrage partiel du champ de recherche fait surgir un problème de justice intergénérationnelle distinct de la non-identité et de la non-réciprocité . L’objectif est d’esquisser une approche en justice climatique plus sensible à l’évolution des connaissances scientifiques que les théories dominantes d’éthique intergénérationnelle, qui tendent à laisser de côté des données empiriques cruciales pour cerner les problèmes écologiques de notre temps .

1 2 3

Pour deux ouvrages récents avec cette approche, voir Joerg C . Tremmel, A Theory of Intergenerational Justice, New York/London, 2009 et Janna Thompson, Intergenerational Justice: Rights and Responsibilities in an Intergenerational Polity, New York/London, 2009 . Voir par exemple Axel Gosseries, Penser la justice entre les générations: De l’affaire Perruche à la réforme des retraites, Paris, 2004, chap . 4 : La croissance est-elle injuste ? Simon Caney a publié plusieurs articles sur cette question, le dernier en date étant Climate Change, Intergenerational Equity, and the Social Discount Rate, Politics, Philosophy & Economics 13 (2014), 320–342 .

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1. de l’éPArgne

IntergénérAtIonnelle à lA créAtIon d’un monde dAngereux

Selon Catherine Larrère, la plupart des théoriciens de la justice distributive prenant part aux débats d’éthique intergénérationnelle s’en tiennent à une vision trop étroite des problèmes environnementaux . Posant une distinction centrale entre les problèmes de stocks et ceux de processus, l’auteure explique que les défis environnementaux les plus redoutables s’apparentent moins, aujourd’hui, à des problèmes d’épuisement de ressources que de perturbation de grands cycles biogéochimiques, notamment celui du carbone . Comme la théorie des limites planétaires le montre, la source majeure des problèmes écologiques n’est effectivement plus la finitude des ressources naturelles, mais le dérèglement de la biosphère causé par l’explosion vertigineuse des flux de matière et d’énergie sous-jacents à nos activités économiques depuis les années 1950 .4 Les sciences du système Terre ont récemment découvert l’existence de seuils dans le système climatique, au-delà desquels certaines boucles de rétroactions capables de rendre le changement climatique autonome sont susceptibles de s’enclencher .5 Une fois que nous dépassons ces seuils de dangerosité, le réchauffement global peut passer d’un modèle linéaire à un modèle abrupt . Si un tel cas de figure venait à se réaliser, les réductions des émissions anthropiques de gaz à effet de serre ne pourraient plus parvenir à stabiliser les températures mondiales . L’atmosphère, la biosphère et les océans sont les trois puits de carbone qui composent le cycle du carbone . Tant la biosphère que les océans peuvent se transformer, au-delà d’un seuil d’émissions globales qui reste encore à définir, en sources de gaz à effet de serre . Par exemple, de larges quantités de dioxyde de carbone et de méthane se trouvant actuellement emprisonnées dans le pergélisol sibérien pourraient être émises dans l’atmosphère ; de même, les océans pourraient émettre des stocks substantiels de méthane se trouvant actuellement congelés dans leurs profondeurs . Dans les deux cas, l’augmentation des températures globales se verrait radicalement amplifiée .6 La perturbation du cycle du carbone peut donc contribuer, avec d’autres dégradations de la biosphère, à créer des conditions bien moins favorables à l’épanouissement du genre humain que celles qui ont prévalu les dernières dix à douze mille années de l’histoire de notre planète . Ces nouvelles données dont nous ne disposions pas dans les années 1990 et au début des années 2000 nous font réaliser que l’impératif climatique n’est plus, comme le développement durable le proposait, de chercher à découpler croissance économique et consommation de ressources rares en vue d’en transmettre suffisamment aux générations futures ; l’impératif est désormais de parvenir à une décroissance des flux d’énergie fossile avant de créer un monde beaucoup plus dangereux que le nôtre . Comme nous le verrons plus bas, cet impératif n’est pas forcément incompatible avec une croissance économique s’enracinant dans de nouvelles formes d’énergies . L’important ici est de comprendre qu’il ne s’agit plus vraiment de se demander quel est le taux d’épargne intergénérationnel le plus équitable (com4 5 6

Dominique Bourg, L’impératif écologique, Esprit 12 (décembre 2009), 59–71 . Pour un article récent développant cette théorie, voir Will Steffen et al., Planetary Boundaries: Guiding Human Development on a Changing Planet, Science 347 (February 2015), 736–747 . Voir, par exemple, David Archer, The Long Thaw: How Humans are Changing the next 100,000 Years of Earth’s Climate, Princeton, 2009 .

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bien économiser pour les générations futures ?), mais plutôt comment ne pas forcer les personnes futures à vivre dans des conditions hautement défavorables à leur bien-être (comment garantir une réduction drastique des émissions globales de gaz à effet de serre ?) . Autrement dit, échouer dans l’entreprise de stabilisation de ces émissions « à un niveau qui empêche toute perturbation anthropique dangereuse du système climatique »7 n’équivaut pas seulement à ne pas transmettre assez de ressources aux générations futures ; cela revient avant tout à augmenter les risques de création d’une planète bien plus hostile dans un futur relativement proche . Comme Catherine Larrère le souligne, « [n]otre rapport à l’avenir est affaire de mondes possibles » : notre priorité est de nous assurer que nous ne léguions pas aux générations futures un monde plus dangereux .8 2. de

lA dIstrIbutIon des droIts d’émIssIon à lA trAnsItIon énergétIque

Les théoriciens de la justice distributive ne se sont pas limités à formuler le défi climatique comme un problème d’épargne intergénérationnelle ; ils l’ont également en grande partie défini comme un problème d’allocation d’émissions à travers le globe et entre les générations . De fait, les débats en justice climatique se sont largement penchés sur la question de la distribution des droits d’émission .9 Or, l’évolution de notre savoir vient ici aussi changer notre manière de dessiner le contour des défis éthiques qu’il soulève . Les résultats récents des sciences du climat nous montrent que, quel que soit le principe d’allocation, le budget de carbone restant est très restreint si l’on veut parvenir à éviter une augmentation dangereuse des températures globales . Dans les années 1990, les émissions des pays industrialisés dépassaient largement celles de pays comme la Chine et l’Inde ; nous croyions également que la durée de résidence dans l’atmosphère du dioxyde de carbone était d’environ 100 ans . En conséquence, la question principale était: « comment distribuer équitablement les droits d’émissions entre pays et générations en vue de stabiliser le climat ? » . Depuis, nous avons appris que la durée de résidence du dioxyde de carbone est de deux à trois siècles, avec environ 25 % de l’ensemble des particules émises par l’homme qui restent dans l’atmosphère pour plus d’un millénaire .10 Nous avons également découvert qu’au rythme où nous l’utilisons, le budget global de carbone sera épuisé dans les quelques décennies à venir .11 Aussi, la question normative directrice est désormais moins celle de la distribution équitable des parts du « gâteau carbone » que celle de la création d’un « gâteau pauvre en carbone » . La première interrogation demeure importante, mais la seconde est devenue plus urgente . 7 8 9 10 11

Nations Unies, Convention-Cadre des Nations Unies sur les Changements Climatiques, New York, 1992, Article 2, http://unfccc .int/resource/docs/convkp/convfr .pdf . Consulté le 09 .12 .2014 . Je reprends cette expression à l’excellent article de Henry Shue, Deadly Delays, Saving Opportunities: Creating a More Dangerous World? [2010], in Climate Justice: Vulnerability and Protection, Oxford, 2014, 263–286 . Se référer ici aussi aux articles de Caney, dont sa contribution la plus récente : Simon Caney, Just Emissions, Philosophy & Public Affairs 40 (2012), 255–300 . Archer (note 6) . Voir notamment Thomas F . Stocker, The Closing Door of Climate Targets, Science 339 (January 2013), 280–282 .

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L’abondante littérature sur la question de la distribution des droits d’émission présuppose qu’il existe une possibilité de se partager les émissions globales de telle manière que l’on puisse stabiliser le climat et protéger les générations futures . Nous pensions qu’il existait un flux annuel d’émissions de carbone pouvant être réparti équitablement et sans danger . Face à l’explosion des émissions globales dans les années 1990 et 2000, cette hypothèse doit désormais être écartée . Il faut certes toujours chercher à répartir les émissions qui restent dans le budget de carbone aussi équitablement que possible, mais le nouvel enjeu de l’éthique intergénérationnelle est celui des conditions de création d’un régime énergétique à faible densité carbone . Le nouvel impératif est le suivant : nous devons tous cesser, dans les quelques décennies à venir, de nous procurer notre énergie à partir des combustibles fossiles, quelle que soit la manière dont nous choisissons de distribuer le peu d’émissions qu’il nous reste avant de passer les fatidiques points de basculement dans le système climatique .12 3. des

émIssIons hIstorIques Aux émIssIons Présentes

S’il devient certes progressivement moins pertinent d’aborder la justice climatique à partir des thématiques du taux d’épargne et de l’allocation des permis d’émission, la question plus générale de la distribution des coûts et bénéfices liés aux émissions de gaz à effet de serre, qui a également fait couler beaucoup d’encre, garde toute son actualité .13 Puisque la transition à un régime énergétique alternatif sera forcément coûteuse, il est toujours aussi important de se demander qui devra assumer ces coûts, et jusqu’à quel point . Mais une fois de plus, l’évolution des données empiriques appelle à un recadrage des débats philosophiques . La question directrice du débat sur la répartition des fardeaux climatiques est celle de la justification de la prise en compte des émissions historiques des générations passées pour évaluer les devoirs de justice climatique des différents pays . Dans ce contexte, le principe du pollueur-payeur joue un rôle clé . Partant de l’intuition morale selon laquelle nous devons assumer les torts que nous causons, ce principe exige que les coûts climatiques soient à la charge des principaux émetteurs historiques et présents de gaz à effet de serre . Bien qu’intuitif, le principe du pollueur-payeur pose plusieurs problèmes . D’un côté, puisque nos ancêtres ne pouvaient pas savoir que leurs émissions contribueraient au changement climatique, leur ignorance semble a priori excusable . D’un autre côté, la plupart des pollueurs historiques sont morts, et les générations présentes ne peuvent pas a priori être considérées comme responsables pour leurs émissions . Pour répondre à ces deux objections, les principes de la capacité à payer et du bénéficiaire-payeur ont été forgés . Or, il existe aussi plusieurs objections à ces deux autres principes, qui ont donné naissance à plusieurs réponses, qui à leur tour ont bien évidemment créé d’autres objections, et ainsi de suite . Ce débat illustre parfaitement les dangers qu’il y a à déployer « toute la rigueur de la philosophie morale analytique » lorsque l’on traite d’un sujet éminemment 12 13

Un des rares philosophes à en avoir pris conscience est Henry Shue, notamment dans son Introduction in Climate Justice: Vulnerability and Protection, Oxford, 2014 . Voir par exemple Edward A . Page, Climatic Justice and the Fair Distribution of Atmospheric Burdens: A Conjunctive Account, The Monist 94 (2011), 412–432 .

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pratique comme le changement climatique . À force de développer des distinctions conceptuelles toujours plus subtiles pour justifier pourquoi nous devrions – ou ne devrions pas – prendre en compte les émissions passées, beaucoup de théoriciens de la justice climatique s’éloignent progressivement des réalités qui se trouvent au fondement des réflexions philosophiques et s’égarent dans des querelles conceptuelles obscures se rapprochant du « tâtonnement entre de simples concepts » où Kant voyait la marque de la métaphysique .14 Sans vouloir sous-estimer l’importance de ce débat, ma proposition est de réorienter les réflexions vers des préoccupations plus concrètes, notamment en termes d’évolution des émissions globales au fil des deux dernières décennies . Pour parvenir à établir qui doit fournir le plus d’efforts pour rendre possible la transition énergétique, il est tout aussi important de prendre en compte les émissions présentes que les émissions passées . Depuis la rédaction de la Convention-cadre des Nations unies sur les changements climatiques (CCNUCC) dans le début des années 1990, la répartition de la responsabilité a largement évolué . Cette donnée a été en large partie négligée dans les débats philosophiques, figés par la problématique de la responsabilité historique qui se focalise en majeure partie sur les émissions avant 1990 . Comme Stephen Gardiner l’écrit, « il y existe une convergence surprenante des philosophes qui écrivent sur le sujet : ils sont quasiment unanimes dans leur conclusion que les pays développés devraient prendre le rôle de leader dans le financement des coûts du changement climatique, tandis que les pays moins développés devraient pouvoir augmenter leurs émissions dans un avenir prévisible . »15 Si ce quasi-consensus était pertinent dans les années 1990, il doit aujourd’hui être remis en question en raison de l’augmentation massive d’émissions de gaz à effet de serre de la part de nouveaux pays émetteurs . Sous l’influence de leur croissance économique et démographique, des pays comme la Chine, l’Inde, le Brésil et l’Afrique du Sud ont substantiellement augmenté leur contribution au réchauffement climatique au fil des deux dernières décennies . Tant que ces pays continuent à augmenter leurs émissions au rythme actuel, une réduction des émissions mondiales est inenvisageable, et une perturbation anthropique dangereuse du système climatique devient inévitable . La responsabilité de ces pays pour la lutte contre le changement climatique s’accroît au fur et à mesure que leur contribution au problème augmente, raison pour laquelle ils doivent être inclus dans le projet de transition énergétique . En admettant que les principaux fardeaux climatiques reviennent aux pays de l’Organisation de coopération et de développement économiques (OCDE), ces derniers n’ont pas à faire figure de leader en prenant en charge de manière unilatérale les coûts liés à la transition énergétique . L’impératif est plutôt de parvenir à un accord dans lequel les pays de l’OCDE et les nouveau pays émetteurs s’engagent simultanément à réduire leurs émissions à un niveau permettant d’éviter toute perturbation anthropique dangereuse du système climatique . Le but n’est pas d’évacuer le 14

15

Pour deux des publications les plus récentes symptomatiques de cet écueil, voir Ewan Kingston, Climate Justice and Temporally Remote Emissions, Social Theory and Practice 40 (2014), 281–303 et Göran Duus-Otterström, The Problem of Past Emissions and Intergenerational Debts, Critical Social Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 17 (2014), 448–469 . Les références pourraient aisément être multipliées . Stephen M . Gardiner, Ethics and Global Climate Change, Ethics 114 (2004), 579 .

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principe du pollueur-payeur ; au contraire, il s’agit de le conserver, tout en le réinterprétant à la lumière des nouvelles données, ce qui implique, entre autre, de cesser d’utiliser, comme beaucoup de philosophes ont tendance à le faire, des dichotomies simplificatrices comme pays développés/pays en développement ou pays du Nord/ pays du Sud .16 4. de lA non-IdentIté et l’Inter-générAtIonnel

de lA non-récIProcIté Au conflIt entre l’IntrA- et

Les arguments de la non-identité et de la non-réciprocité sont les plus influents dans la littérature sur la justice intergénérationnelle . Or, comme Catherine Larrère l’explique, ils ont non seulement déjà fait l’objet de réponses convaincantes, mais ils manquent en outre le problème le plus sérieux, à savoir les conflits possibles entre justice intra- et inter-générationnelle : « comment accorder les exigences présentes d’une situation sociale marquée par les inégalités et la pauvreté et les demandes à long terme de protection de l’environnement » ? Avant de conclure, j’aimerais montrer que les réorientations des débats envisagées ci-dessus font surgir un problème similaire . Pour éviter la création d’un monde dangereux dans un futur proche, il faut drastiquement réduire les émissions globales de gaz à effet de serre . Pour y parvenir, il est impératif de mettre en place la transition énergétique . Pour prendre cet impératif au sérieux, il est nécessaire d’attribuer un prix aux combustibles fossiles, par exemple en introduisant une taxe carbone ou un marché du carbone . Le problème est que, ce faisant, nous risquons d’attribuer des coûts supplémentaires à des personnes vivant dans une situation de pauvreté énergétique, dans laquelle l’accès aux biens et services principaux en matière de subsistance et de santé est déjà précaire . En augmentant le prix du pétrole, du charbon et du gaz, nous risquons de faire payer les personnes pauvres existantes pour la protection des personnes futures, créant ainsi une tension entre justice climatique globale et intergénérationnelle . Aussi, le nouveau défi qui se dessine est le suivant : faire face au changement climatique sans rendre impossible la lutte contre la pauvreté globale, tout en faisant face à la pauvreté globale sans rendre impossible la lutte contre le changement climatique .17 Ce dont les personnes pauvres ont besoin, ce ne sont pas des émissions de gaz à effet de serre ; c’est de l’énergie . Pour cette raison, ce que nous devons en priorité leur garantir, c’est l’accès à des sources non polluantes d’énergie . La bonne nouvelle est que, comme Catherine Larrère le montre en s’appuyant sur un article d’Amartya Sen, des États comme le Bangladesh et l’Inde, ainsi que de nombreux pays en Afrique, jouissent tous de dispositions géographiques très favorables au déploiement de sources alternatives d’énergie, notamment l’énergie solaire . Si ces pays parvenaient à exploiter cette source gigantesque d’énergie, le défi serait au moins partiellement relevé . C’est pour cette raison qu’aux dispositifs d’attribution d’un prix au carbone il faut ajouter des investissements publics substantiels dans les sources 16 17

Voir ici Jonathan Pickering et al ., “If Equity’s In, We’re Out”: Scope for Fairness in the Next Global Climate Agreement”, Ethics & International Affairs 26 (2012), 423–443 . Henry Shue, Climate Hope: Implementing the Exit Strategy [2013], in Climate Justice: Vulnerability and Protection, Oxford, 2014, 321 .

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alternatives d’énergie dans tous les pays du monde, mais principalement aux frais de ceux qui ont rendu la transition énergétique nécessaire : les pays de l’OCDE et les nouveaux pays émetteurs . Il nous faut viser le point d’intersection entre la courbe descendante des prix des énergies alternatives et la courbe ascendante des prix des combustibles fossiles, où ceux-ci perdent leur avantage compétitif et ceux-là deviennent accessibles à tous . Ici aussi, les débats philosophiques gagneraient à être plus sensibles à la réalité, notamment en se préoccupant davantage des effets potentiellement nuisibles des politiques qu’il faut mettre en œuvre pour réduire les émissions globales de gaz à effet de serre . Tandis que Catherine Larrère propose en guise de solution au problème d’articulation entre justice intra- et inter-générationnelle une éthique de la Terre, je proposerais pour ma part, même si je n’ai pas la place de la développer ici, une éthique des incitations .18 Cette approche représente moins une alternative qu’un complément à la résolution d’un des problèmes d’éthique intergénérationnelle les plus importants aujourd’hui . 5. conclusIon Dans l’article précédemment mentionné, Gardiner annonçait que sa synthèse concernant les débats sur la distribution des droits d’émission, sur les émissions passées et sur les fardeaux climatiques pourrait être rapidement dépassée .19 Dix ans plus tard, ce diagnostic prend tout son sens : les questions d’allocation des permis d’émission, de la responsabilité historique et du rôle de leader des pays développés gardent une pertinence relative, mais elles sont devenues moins préoccupantes que celles des mondes possibles, de la transition à un nouveau régime énergétique global et de la prise en compte de la responsabilité des nouveaux pays émetteurs . Puisque nous ne pouvons désormais éviter la création d’un monde dangereux sans une transition énergétique qui menace de plonger des millions de personnes supplémentaires dans la pauvreté énergétique, un défi central et rarement souligné est celui des tensions possibles entre justice intra- et inter-générationnelle . Philosopher à partir des données implique parfois ce type de recadrage : il faut s’attendre à ce que les questions normatives les plus importantes évoluent avec la transformation des connaissances empiriques . Cet article est programmatique : il ne fait qu’esquisser les contours des questions actuelles de justice climatique, à partir des réflexions de Catherine Larrère . Mon objectif n’est ni de sous-estimer l’importance des développements encourageants du champ de recherche de la justice climatique depuis la deuxième moitié des années 2000, ni d’approfondir les nouvelles questions soulevées ci-dessus . Il est simplement de lancer un appel à une réorientation des recherches vers certains thèmes qui me semblent trop négligés, en renvoyant dès que possible à des études récentes qui me semblent aller dans la bonne direction . Le message méthodologique de mon article est que la justice climatique gagnerait à être moins analytique et plus soucieuse de 18 19

Michel Bourban, Vers une éthique climatique plus efficace : motivations et incitations, Les ateliers de l’éthique 9 (2014), 4–28 . Gardiner (note 15), 595 n127 .

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l’évolution des données empiriques – bien qu’il n’y ait pas une opposition systématique entre les deux approches et que l’une et l’autre demeurent nécessaires . bIblIogrAPhIe Archer, David, The Long Thaw: How Humans are Changing the next 100,000 Years of Earth’s Climate, Princeton, 2009 . Bourban, Michel, Vers une éthique climatique plus efficace : motivations et incitations, Les ateliers de l’éthique 9 (2014), 4–28 . Bourg, Dominique, L’impératif écologique, Esprit 12 (décembre 2009), 59–71 . Caney, Simon, Just Emissions, Philosophy & Public Affairs 40 (2012), 255–300 . Caney, Simon, Climate Change, Intergenerational Equity, and the Social Discount Rate, Politics, Philosophy & Economics 13 (2014), 320–342 . Duus-Otterström, Göran, The Problem of Past Emissions and Intergenerational Debts, Critical Social Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 17 (2014), 448–469 . Gardiner, Stephen M ., Ethics and Global Climate Change, Ethics 114 (2004), 555–600 . Gosseries, Axel, Penser la justice entre les générations: De l’affaire Perruche à la réforme des retraites, Paris, 2004 . Kingston, Ewan, Climate Justice and Temporally Remote Emissions, Social Theory and Practice 40 (2014), 281–303 . Nations Unies, Convention-Cadre des Nations Unies sur les Changements Climatiques, New York, 1992, http://unfccc .int/resource/docs/convkp/convfr .pdf . Page, Edward A ., Climatic Justice and the Fair Distribution of Atmospheric Burdens: A Conjunctive Account, The Monist 94 (2011), 412–432 . Pickering, Jonathan / Vanderheiden, Steve / Miller, Seumas, “If Equity’s In, We’re Out”: Scope for Fairness in the Next Global Climate Agreement, Ethics & International Affairs 26 (2012), 423– 443 . Shue, Henry, Deadly Delays, Saving Opportunities: Creating a More Dangerous World? [2010], in Climate Justice: Vulnerability and Protection, Oxford, 2014, 263–286 . Shue, Henry, Climate Hope: Implementing the Exit Strategy [2013], in Climate Justice: Vulnerability and Protection, Oxford, 2014, 319–339 . Shue, Henry, Introduction, in Climate Justice: Vulnerability and Protection, Oxford, 2014, 1–26 . Steffen, Will et al., Planetary Boundaries: Guiding Human Development on a Changing Planet, Science 347 (February 2015), 736–747 . Stocker, Thomas F ., The Closing Door of Climate Targets, Science 339 (January 2013), 280–282 . Thompson, Janna, Intergenerational Justice: Rights and Responsibilities in an Intergenerational Polity, New York/London, 2009 . Tremmel, Joerg C ., A Theory of Intergenerational Justice, New York/London, 2009 .

jaaP sPier (the hague)1 IntergenerAtIonAl equIty: An AsPIrAtIon or An effectIve weAPon? “The earth was designed as the permanent abode of man through ceaseless generations . Each generation, as it appears upon the scene, is entitled only to use the fair inheritance . It is against the law of nature that any waste should be committed to the disadvantage of succeeding tenants . … That one generation may not only consume or destroy the annual increase of products of the earth, but the stock also, thus leaving an inadequate provision for the multitude of successors which it brings to life, is a notion so repugnant to reason as scarcely to need formal refutation .”2

1. IntroductIon Over the last decade, “intergenerational equity” (a shorthand for obligations towards future generations) has become a hotly debated topic . That goes for the political arena, philosophers and lawyers alike . That is quite understandable in light of the deadlocked positions in relation to the looming crises as a consequence of our unsustainable lifestyle and the unwillingness to change course .3 More likely than not, many of the global challenges will jeopardise future generations . That goes for climate change, but also for the impairment of biodiversity, overfishing, warming and acidification of oceans, plastic debris in oceans and major pollution to name just a few . These challenges have a lot in common: they are largely human-induced and will cause a lot of evil around the globe . Large-scale misery is – inter alia – about huge amounts of money . Hence, sustainability increasingly becomes a lawyer’s paradise, an alleged new goldmine . Measures aimed at prevention are less popular among lawyers; there is little money in it . So they rarely care for strategies aimed at preventing harm . That is exactly where the debate about intergenerational equity could play a role . Hereinafter, I will focus on the question whether we have obligations towards future generations and, if so, whether this intriguing concept adds much to the already available legal toolkit . My focus will be on climate change as a pars pro toto for other sustainability issues .

1

2 3

Advocate-General in the Supreme Court of the Netherlands; honorary Professor (em) at the University of Maastricht . I have borrowed from a contribution to the Liber amicorum in honour of Johann Neethling; that contribution, in turn, was influenced by my presentation to a conference in Lausanne in 2014 . U . S . argument in the 1893 Bering Sea Fur Seals Arbitration, quoted by Burns H . Weston / Tracy Bach, Recalibrating the Law of Humans with the Laws of Nature: Climate Change, Human Rights, and Intergenerational Justice, Vermont Law School, 2009, 38 . See, inter alios, Edith Brown Weiss, In Fairness to Future Generations and Sustainable Development, American University International Law Review 8/1 (1992), 26 .

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2. future

generAtIons And clImAte chAnge

According to the predominant view, only disputed by an ever smaller number of sceptics,4 the increase of global surface temperature must be kept below 2 degrees Celsius, compared with the pre-industrial era .5 That requires major steps: significant reduction of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, higher energy efficiency, arguably other solutions such as carbon storage and in the longer term perhaps novelties such as geo-engineering, once we understand and can control the inherent risks . More likely than not, a change of paradigm and, by the same token, of our unsustainable lifestyle will be(come) unavoidable . Despite a few hopeful signs, the political discussions are deadlocked . For a series of reasons, it would be quite a miracle if the COP-meeting in Paris by the end of 2015 would bring the bitterly needed international consensus . Even in the unlikely scenario that “Paris” would be a major success, it is unrealistic to assume that it will get the right follow-up, if not for other reasons thanks to the US Tea party and its allies . Not surprisingly, those who already experience the consequences of a series of unprecedented droughts, hurricanes, excessive rainfall and other natural catastrophes get increasingly worried and frustrated . Probably because people have lost their belief in preventive solutions, the discussions are ever more about compensation of losses suffered by the consequences of climate change .6 Major investors, particularly pension funds, realise that they may face huge difficulties to meet their future obligations if the fatal consequences of climate change materialise . If society doesn’t change course radically at great pace, the toll will be massive human suffering . Besides, the global economy will be put on its knees . Some – ever more – politicians and captains of industry are seriously willing to stem the tide . But so far, they don’t get much, let alone enough, support . Few states and corporations are keen to be the first to act, also because they would put themselves at a competitive disadvantage . Hence, the future looks grim . It is unlikely that there is a panacea for climate change or any of the other looming sustainability crises . No single solution will work . That is not to say that we should sit down in despair . Quite a lot of strategies may contribute to global solutions . That is also true for legal strategies . In that context, I will address whether the concept of obligations towards future generations can facilitate legal strategies . The concept can only foster legal solutions if intergenerational equity has a sufficiently concrete meaning . If we do not have a clue what it means, which obligations we have towards future generations, it is doomed to be no more than a sound bite or at best a nice and innocent soft toy for lawyers . That may be very different in the philosophical arena or in the debate about moral obligations . Moral claims 4 5 6

This is not to suggest that I discredit their view . They may be right; experience has shown that majority views can be mistaken . It is quite possible that an increase by 1,5 degrees already entails serious risks . Telling is a litigation started by a Peruvian farmer . He has sued the German enterprise RWE for the loss he fears as a consequence of RWE’s GHG emissions; see http://www .theguardian . com/environment/2015/mar/16/peruvian-farmer-demands-climate-compensation-from-german-company .

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and philosophical notions may play a role in determining the meaning of intergenerational equity, but one also needs a more or less sound legal basis to discern the legal boundaries of this rather elusive phenomenon . 3. the

legAl ArenA

Over the last almost sixty years, the concept of intergenerational equity has gained ground .7 It is acknowledged in a series of international instruments, pledges, national laws and constitutions, as well as case law .8 By way of example: in 1997, UNESCO has issued a Declaration on the Responsibilities of the Present Generation Towards Future Generations . Article 1 puts it seemingly in bold and unequivocal terms: “The present generations9 have the responsibility of ensuring that the needs and interests of present and future generations are fully regarded .”

Article 2 adds that it is “important” “to make every effort to ensure, with due regards to human rights and fundamental freedoms, that future as well as present generations enjoy full freedom of choice as to their political, economic and social systems and are able to preserve their cultural and religious diversity” .

Article 4 reads: “The present generations have the responsibility to bequeath to future generations an Earth which will not one day be irreversibly damaged by human activity . […]”

As to ecosystems article 5 para 1 adds that “the present generations should strive for sustainable development and preserve living conditions, particularly the quality and integrity of the environment .”,

whilst according to para 4 “present generations should take into account possible consequences for future generations of major projects before these are carried out” .

These texts are rather ambiguous, if not vague and undetermined . One cannot escape the impression that they are inconsistent . For instance, art . 1 does not go beyond “responsibilities”, which do not commensurate obligations . Other parts are even less spectacular . The mere fact that something is labelled “important” does not create any (enforceable) obligation . “Strive” and “take into account” do not go far beyond good intentions; this is not easy to reconcile with article 1 . That said, it remains an important document . 7

8 9

See in considerable detail Edith Brown Weiss, Implementing intergenerational equity, in Research Handbook on International Environmental Law, ed . Malgosia Fitzmaurice / David M . Ong / Panos Merkouris Cheltenham, UK . / Northampton, MA, USA, 2011, 103 ff .; Peter Lawrence, Justice for Future Generations: Climate Change and International Law, thesis Tilburg 2013, 77 ff . and 119 ff .; Weston/Bach (footnote 2), 28 ff . and the separate opinion of Judge Cancado Trindade in the ICJ case Whaling in Antarctic, § 41 ff . See in more detail Brown Weiss (footnote 7), 100 ff . Personally, I have no difficulty in accepting that we have legal obligations towards future generations . The quotation, in particular the plural, is correct .

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Principle 3 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development10 is more explicit: “The right to development must be fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of the present and future generations .”

Thus, it seems to require balancing of the respective and often diverging interests . But it does not shed any light on the weight of the respective interests . Put differently: what is meant by “equitably”? 4. PreventIon

should be the keyword

The only sensible solution in relation to almost11 all global challenges is prevention: it is the only way to avoid grievous harm for a huge amount of people . Nature will be jeopardised: bio-diversity will be impaired and so on and so forth .12 In the realm of climate change major reduction of GHG emissions or other measures to reduce the level of GHGs in the atmosphere are required .13 If we fail to achieve that goal, there no longer is any proper solution . Widespread compensation (damages), advocated by fortune-hunters and other adventurers, is simply unaffordable in light of the aggregate losses world-wide . Make no mistake: these losses will increase annually as things get worse . More importantly, it would mean that those who did not cause the mess, i . e . largely future generations, would have to settle the bill of our recklessness . That is not a very tempting scenario .14 It would also undermine the essence of intergenerational equity . 5. legAl

strAtegIes: core questIons

Legal action aimed at prevention of fatal increase of global surface temperature is only a starter if we can discern: 1) how much GHG emissions have to be reduced on a global level; 2) how to allocate the reduction-burden among the respective players (nation states and enterprises) . Answering these questions is quite a challenge . But it is doable .15 Do we need the concept of intergenerational equity to answer these questions, or would it make it 10 11 12 13 14 15

The fruit of a UN Summit held at Rio de Janeiro in 1992 . Plastic debris in the oceans may be an exception; the same may in part go for a few other global challenges . See IPCC, Fifth Assessment Synthesis Report, Longer Version, Adopted November 1, 2014: Climate Change 2014,18 ff . Url: https://www .ipcc .ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/syr/SYR_AR5_ FINAL_full .pdf See for a concrete trajectory Expert group on global climate change obligations, Oslo Principles on Global Climate Change Obligations, launched in London on March 30, 2015 . I disclose that I was one of the two co-founders and the rapporteur of this group . See in much more detail my contribution to Jaap Spier / Ulrich Magnus (eds .), Climate Change Remedies: Injunctive Relief and Criminal Law Responses, The Hague, 2014, 5 ff . See the Oslo Principles, mentioned before . Url: http://www .osloprinciples .org/

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easier to do so? My straightforward and disappointing answer is two times: no, it does not . Let me explain why . 6. the

strength And weAkness of the concePt of IntergenerAtIonAl equIty

It is quite possible to answer the question how much GHG emissions have to be reduced on a global level . According to the Oslo Principles the answer is: “3 . Permissible quantum of GHG emissions: Maximum amount of total global GHG emissions per capita in a given year, calculated on a global basis, that, based on Principle 1 .a, may be allowed consistent with a plan of steady emissions reductions to ensure that the total global average surface temperature increase ultimately caused by GHG emissions never exceeds pre-industrial temperatures by more than 2 degrees Celsius .”

Principle 1 .a, the precautionary principle, reads: “a . The Precautionary Principle requires that: 1) GHG emissions be reduced to the extent and at a pace necessary to protect against the threats of climate change that can still be avoided; […]”

It seems rather self explanatory that we do not need the concept of intergenerational equity to arrive at the conclusion just mentioned . Thus we turn to the allocation of GHG reductions . Can it still be at all helpful in answering that question? The Expert group tends to answer that question in the negative on the following grounds: “By referring to ‘future generations’ we probably do not have to answer the question whether or not the current generation has obligations towards future generations . The measures advocated in our principles are sufficiently founded in the interests of current generations, although the most grievous effects of unchecked GHG emissions will be felt at some time in the future . Thus we do not have to dwell on the question whether we have ‘additional obligations’ towards future generations . We attempt to side-step this question as the state of the law makes it difficult to draw confident conclusions about the existence and extent of ‘additional obligations’ towards future generations .”16

I wholeheartedly endorse that view .17 The argument is twofold: first the obligations towards the present generation are a sufficient legal underpinning of the reduction obligations (of states) . Secondly and not unimportantly: the concept of intergenerational equity is still in its infancy . Its meaning is too undetermined, as may follow from the brief excursion in section 3 above . Even if we would need this concept, it is still too vague to be of much use in this debate . Prima facie, one may wonder whether I am not overstating my case . After all, a lot has been written about this undeniably important topic . Am I really suggesting that these writings are of no avail? Certainly not . They are stimulating and also useful for several reasons . First and foremost: the idea that we have to care for future generations is appealing . Hence, it may influence the debate; it may contribute to the sense of urgency and by the same token the willingness to take action . But that does not mean that it is also of much avail in the legal arena .

16 17

Commentary on the Precautionary Principle, first paragraph (p . 54) . Url: http://www .yale .edu/ macmillan/globaljustice/Oslo%20Principles%20Commentary .pdf Not surprisingly, because I have drafted the quoted text .

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As already mentioned, the most intriguing and important question is how to allocate the reduction-burden . Seen from a legal angle, it is very difficult to understand what the concept has to tell us about the GHG reductions that must be achieved by, for instance, Germany, Brazil, Japan or South Africa . 7. the

tIme lIne

It could be argued that I have, so far, overlooked one vital issue: the pace of reductions . It would be possible18 to be more demanding as to the reductions required in the very short term . Put differently: why should the next generation have to assume part of the responsibility for the reductions that can be attributed to the present generation? I do not deny that this is a fair question . It could indeed be argued that the present generation should do more, perhaps even much more, and by the same token the next (much) less . It is also true that the concept of intergenerational equity could come into play in this respect . So much is clear: it must be avoided that the fatal threshold of 2 degrees C will be passed . If that could not be achieved by postponing GHG reductions,19 I have little doubt that it would be in blatant conflict with intergenerational equity to delay far-reaching reductions . Even if its precise meaning is still in the dark, it does not allow carrying reduction-obligations forward if that would end up in catastrophe . Nor would it allow putting our cards on the hope that technological advance would solve the problem . But we do not need intergenerational equity to arrive at these conclusions . It seems difficult to challenge the view that it would be a clear violation of a series of legal concepts to hope for the better in the realm of climate change .20 If I would be mistaken, intergenerational equity could certainly play a most useful role to that effect . As already mentioned, it is beyond reasonable doubt that we must start right now to reduce GHG emissions to a considerable extent .21 The argument that we should do more in the years to come and less in the, say, two or three decades to come is quite tenable; it is, seen from a moral angle, possibly very appealing . That view could be fostered by the concept of intergenerational equity . But it would be a magic word for the reason already mentioned before: so far, there is too little legal basis for such a view . That may change over time . International tribunals, superior courts of major countries, emerging opinio iuris22 and even more so clear and distinct international instruments may – and hopefully will – swiftly develop to this effect . 18 19 20 21

22

It might have a rather significant adverse impact on the economy, but it would not be impossible . A rather theoretical assumption, I think . See Commentary to Oslo Principles (footnote 15), The precautionary principle, general observations . Not necessarily so in line with the Oslo Principles . There may be alternatives, but I am inclined to believe that the margins are rather small . That said, one could argue that self acclaimed developed countries are under more stringent obligations to the benefit of poorer countries . Thus we enter the scene of another ambiguous, if not utterly vague, concept: common but differentiated responsibilities; see below supra 8 . That won’t be decisive, but is far from irrelevant .

Intergenerational equity: an aspiration or an effective weapon?

8. bAlAncIng

75

Acts In the vAcuous sPAce

My key message, so far, is that we need to intensify the debate about intergenerational equity . We should make it as concrete as possible . That requires difficult balancing acts and a justification why we believe that a specific “balance” is the most justified . Similar difficulties arise in the context of another evergreen: the common but differentiated responsibilities . So much is clear: the most vulnerable states do have little, if any, reduction obligations at their own expense . The trick lies in striking the right balance between the richest and the emerging economies . I don’t have a readymade solution .23 All the more so as poor countries do not understand why people living in the wealthiest countries need all kind of luxuries, whilst the latter are unwilling to accept that they may no longer be affordable . In his “Memoirs”, one of the most admirable and most effective advocates for a better and more sustainable world, my friend and Indian colleague M . C . Mehta, wrote: “we are too attached to our personal ambitions or too accustomed to luxury and excess to be truly free . We are possessed of our possessions . In this way, we are enslaved by our lifestyles and our lifestyles rest on the cornerstone of injustice . […] I would like to bring up the fact that people use the term ‘poor’, without really considering the particularities of condition . Traditional living is not necessarily poor, lack of material possessions is not necessarily poverty and economic indicators of wealth and poverty are rarely helpful in pointing out what really matters . We must think twice before we call either a person or a nation poor . […] Only when the environment is degraded, or the people ripped away from their connections with the Earth, can they truly be considered poor .”24

Mehta eloquently and convincingly gnaws at the foundations of our traditional way of thinking . He challenges both ends of the spectrum: don’t assume too easily that people are poor and don’t lament that wealthy people and countries are not in a position to do more than they are often willing to do . Thus, he adds a new dimension to the debate . More likely than not, his view is rather controversial; it will be despised by many short-sighted people, or people very much clung to all kinds of unsustainable luxury . It may equally be challenged by industry all over the world . But it shows the inherent challenge to strike the right balance . 9. stIll

A role for IntergenerAtIonAl equIty?

Whatever the role of intergenerational equity in relation to the reduction of GHGs, it could arguably play a more important role in the debate about climate change adaptation. The same may hold true for other sustainability-issues . For now, I confine myself to adaptation in relation to climate change . 23

24

The drafters of the Oslo Principles struggled with the same challenge . It follows from the commentary on the per capita approach that they realised that their solution may not do full justice to countries with small GHG emissions in the past; but they could not discern a sound basis for another approach . M . C . Mehta, In the Public Interest: Landmark Judgments & Orders of The Supreme Court of India on Environmental & Human Rights, vol . 1, 2009, xxiii–xxiv .

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If we cannot come to grips with the looming threats of climate change, global catastrophes will occur . Vital interests of many people will be impaired . Major floods or hurricanes will ruin villages, cities or even countries; agriculture will be adversely affected . The rise of sea level will have even more draconian consequences: cities or even major parts of countries are doomed to disappear . The forecasted shortage of water will impair decent living conditions of hundreds of millions . In the upshot many economies will be ruined; this will jeopardise a series of human rights, social and economic rights included . Unlike many other disasters, the losses will not stop at some stage . They will get worse, year after year . As already mentioned, compensation is a daydream . The funds needed won’t be available . The amounts needed for global adaptation purposes may be affordable, particularly so in the short term . If we can safely assume that they will be affordable, adequate adaptation steps must be taken .25 More likely than not, even adaptation will be extremely costly . Terribly difficult choices will be unavoidable . In such a scenario, it is not self-explanatory that, e . g ., indigenous people and cultural sites should get a better treatment compared with people whose basic rights or possessions are impaired or at threat . For istance, that a famous cultural site has to be removed or protected, but that there is insufficient money to build safer houses for the not so wealthy people to resist severe hurricanes . Thus we enter a minefield . The diverging rights and interests need to be balanced .26 If, e . g ., indigenous people would be worse off, compared with many others, their interests will carry weight, of course; in such a scenario, these people may well get a high priority .27 All the more so if these group(s) are vital to and active in relation to many ecosystems .28 Balancing will be terribly difficult and unavoidably arbitrary . It will also be a very delicate exercise . Unfortunately, the law is of little avail to this effect; it is still in its infancy in this realm . Even if intergenerational equity could play a role in the context of adaptation, it may beg more questions than it could answer . These examples don’t mean that intergenerational equity cannot play any useful role in relation to sustainability issues . If, for instance, an enterprise would emit toxic substances that will ruin nature, impair the living conditions of indigenous tribes and/or destroy cultural monuments, obligations towards future generations may serve as an effective weapon to stop these emissions . But in most instances, the harm will materialise in the decades to come . In those scenarios the rights of the present generation will be impaired too, so we do not need intergenerational equity to forge effective remedies .

25 26 27

28

See about a range of adaptation issues Michael B . Gerrard / Katrina Fischer Kuh (eds .), The Law of Adaptation to Climate Change, U. S. and International Aspects, 2012 . See Sébastien Jodoin / Katherine Lofts, Economic, Social & Cultural Rights and Climate Change, A Legal Reference Guide, New Haven, 2013 . Many of them are already vulnerable and experience harsh living conditions; cf . Margaux J . Jall / David C . Weiss, Climate Change Adaptation and Human Rights: An Equitable View, in Climate Change: International Law and Global Governance, ed . Oliver C . Ruppel / Christian Roschmann / Katharina Ruppel-Schlichting, vol . 1, Baden-Baden, 2013, 276–277 . Cf . United Nations, Climate change and indigenous people, Backgrounder . Url: http://www . un .org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/backgrounder%20climate%20change_FINAL .pdf

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There are other instances where the concept of intergenerational equity could play a role . Thus, e . g ., in relation to the fundamental question whether each generation should pass the earth on in the same condition as it inherited our planet . For instance, are we allowed to dig up very rare metals and, if so, to what extent? Or: are there limits to fish unrestrictedly, even if that might or even will have an adverse impact on the fish stock for future generations? As to these concrete examples: seen from a moral and intuitively also from a legal perspective, an answer in the negative obtrudes . But that does not go for the more important subsequent question: how to draw borderlines? 10. conclusIon Obligations towards and rights of future generations is a fascinating topic . But at the end of the day, we cannot escape answering the core question: does it work and do we need it? My very brief analysis seems to suggest that the answer is in the negative . Let me conclude with a positive note . We desperately need in-depth discussions about intergenerational equity . We need to find appealing submissions on how to strike the right balance . The more appealing they are, the more likely they will win ground, even in the legal discourse . bIblIogrAPhy Brown Weiss, Edith, In Fairness to Future Generations and Sustainable Development, American University International Law Review 8/1 (1992), 19–26 . Fitzmaurice, Malgosia / Ong, David M . / Merkouris, Panos (eds .), Research Handbook on International Environmental Law, Cheltenham, UK . / Northampton, MA, USA, 2011 . Gerrard, Michael B . / Fischer Kuh, Katrina (eds .), The Law of Adaptation to Climate Change, U. S. and International Aspects, American Bar Assiciation, 2012 . Jall, Margaux J . / Weiss, David C ., Climate Change Adaptation and Human Rights: An Equitable View, in Climate Change: International Law and Global Governance, ed . Oliver C . Ruppel / Christian Roschmann / Katharina Ruppel-Schlichting, vol . 1, Baden-Baden, 2013, 276–277 . Jodoin, Sébastien / Lofts, Katherine, Economic, Social & Cultural Rights and Climate Change, A Legal Reference Guide, New Haven, 2013 . Mehta, M . C ., In the Public Interest: Landmark Judgments & Orders of The Supreme Court of India on Environmental & Human Rights, vol . 1, 2009 . Lawrence, Peter, Justice for Future Generations: Climate Change and International Law, thesis Tilburg, 2013 . Spier, Jaap / Magnus, Ulrich (eds .), Climate Change Remedies: Injunctive Relief and Criminal Law Responses, The Hague, 2014 . Weston, Burns H . / Bach, Tracy, Recalibrating the Law of Humans with the Laws of Nature: Climate Change, Human Rights, and Intergenerational Justice, Vermont Law School, 2009 .

edwin ZaCCai, marine Lugen (brusseLs)1 common

but dIfferentIAted resPonsIbIlItIes AgAInst

the reAlItIes of clImAte chAnge

1. IntroductIon Economic development is constrained by environmental limits, particularly through anthropogenic climate change . This major issue requires an international coordination which is hard to reach, and in which political principles interact with practical situations . This article analyses in particular the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) as it was originally laid in the Rio Declaration in 1992, differentiating developed and developing countries . We confront this distinction with a wide variety of national situations in terms of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions . We then consider the official development aid vectors oriented towards environmental issues, climate change and more specifically adaptation to climate change, to conclude that those mechanisms show a low corrective power in relation to the processes involved . Looking at technology transfer promoting climate mitigation, we argue that another principle in the Rio Declaration, which deals with “different standards” between developed and developing countries, is also questioned by evolutions in the economic competition between states . Finally, we conclude by calling for a pragmatic approach that would not skip regulating principles but would fully takes into account their connection and combination in diverse and changing situations . 2. clImAte

chA(lle)nge And develoPment

2.1 through the Lens of the iPat equation One way of seeing in simplistic terms how growing impacts on the environment challenge the trajectories of societies is by using the “IPAT equation”, conceptualized by Ehrlich and Holdren2 . This equation describes how the combination of growing population, affluence and technology contributes towards the impacts of human activity on the environment . I (Impact) = P (Population) x A (Affluence) x T (Technology) World population has increased by a factor 4 during the 20th century, while economic growth increased by a factor 14 and industrial production by a factor 403 . 1

2 3

The authors would like to gratefully thank Etienne Hannon for his numerous comments on an earlier version of this paper, and also Romain Weikmans for his careful and informed reading . This article was made possible thanks to the Belgian Federal Development Cooperation funded R&D Platform on Development Cooperation KLIMOS (http://www .kuleuven .be/klimos) . Paul R . Ehrlich / John P . Holdren, Impact of population growth, Science, New Series 171/3977 (1971), 1212–1217 . John R . McNeill, Du nouveau sous le soleil : histoire de l’environnement modial au XXe siècle, trad . fr . Philippe Beaugrand, Seyssel, 2010, 44 .

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Population and affluence, for ethical and practical considerations, are usually not the main focus for actions . It is sometimes possible to reduce population growth, but to question the growth of wealth is difficult by and large, within the actual political and economic systems, be it in poor or rich countries . Therefore the “T” factor remains the main factor with some potential to reduce the human impact on the environment in a substantial proportion . This equation is a very simple way of looking at a complex problem, however it captures the difficulty of limiting environmental impacts when technological solutions are insufficient or considered as non-affordable4, without deeper changes within the systems of production and consumption . 2.2 unreaChabLe 2 °C? Actually, combating climate change requires substantial changes in the economy, especially in the energy sector, but also within the production and consumption patterns . However two decades of climate change negotiations proved to be insufficient to achieve this result5 . The Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) agreed in 2009 in Copenhagen to limit the increase in global temperature below 2 °C compared to the preindustrial era (around 1750), in order to avoid dramatic and unmanageable impacts of climate change . Yet under current trends this objective, even though technically achievable, is unlikely to be reached, knowing that the increase has already reached 0 .8 °C at present times . Scenarios based on policies currently implemented (called “baseline scenarios”) suggest that temperature could reach up to 4 .8 °C by the end of the century compared to the 1986–2005 period6 . Global CO2 emissions tend to increase with economic growth, especially energy-related ones . According to several studies, current proven fossil-fuel reserves are at least three times larger than the remaining carbon budget compatible with the 2 °C goal7 . The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) estimates that the world since the industrial revolution has emitted about two thirds the carbon that is compatible with keeping climate change within a safe range8 . This situation is especially worrisome as it means that a great deal of fossil fuel resources have to be left in the ground (especially for coal), which is opposite to current trends of further exploitation9 .

4 5 6 7 8 9

Edwin Zaccai, Over two decades in pursuit of sustainable development: Influence, transformation, limits, Environmental Development 1 (2012), 79–90 . Stefan Aykut / Amy Dahan, Gouverner le climat? 20 ans de négociations climatiques, Paris, 2014 . Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate change 2014 – Synthesis Report, 2014, 77 . E . g . Michael R . Raupach et al., Sharing a quota on cumulative carbon missions, Nature Climate Change 4 (2014), 873–879 ; Christopher McGlade / Paul Elkins, The geographical distribution of fossil fuels unused when limiting global warming to 2 °C, Nature 517 (2015), 187 . Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, (footnote 6), 10 . Jos G . J . Oliver / Greet Janssens-Maenhout / Marilena Muntean / Jeroen A . H . W . Peters, Trends in global CO2 emissions – 2013 Report, The Hague, PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, 2013, 7 .

Common but differentiated responsibilities against the realities of climate change

3. cbdr, PrIncIPles

81

And emPIrIcAl dAtA

3.1 Common but differentiated resPonsibiLities (Cbdr) This problem of compatibility between growth and climate change stabilization has to be considered in the context of very diverse societies in our world . The negotiations led under the UNFCCC struggle to find principles acceptable to all in order to share the burden of necessary changes to be made, taking into account the specific contributions of different nations . In this context, a major principle we would like to discuss here is the Common but differentiated responsibility principle. This principle is enclosed in the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992) (principle 7), a major piece of the architecture of sustainable development international policies . It is also included in the UNFCCC (Article 3), which was launched during that same Rio conference, and has been reiterated since then as for instance at the United Nations Summit on Sustainable Development, the latest major summit on sustainable development, held in Rio in 2012 . Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration reads as follows: “States shall cooperate in a spirit of global partnership to conserve, protect and restore the health and integrity of the Earth’s ecosystem . In view of the different contributions to global environmental degradation, states have common but differentiated responsibilities. The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command”10 .

The CBDR principle promotes equity considerations in international environmental law and has at least two consequences . First, common responsibility means that all states shall cooperate to protect the environment and restore ecosystems . It also implies that our generation has a responsibility towards future generations . Second, differentiated responsibilities proceed from inequalities across states be it in capacities, socioeconomic situations or historical, current and future contributions to global environmental problems . CBDR links the exploitation of global commons with a special responsibility to take actions in order to reduce damages . The Rio Declaration specifically mentions developed countries as carrying this responsibility . We will see below that this apparently clear cut distinction between developed and developing countries has become problematic in many respects, and certainly in the context of climate change . The CBDR principle is different from the polluter-pays principle (also included in the Rio Declaration, Principle 16), as there is no legal responsibility for the polluter as such . Instead it aims at bringing substantive equality in the regime by introducing distributive rules . To date, there are two main applications of differentiation in the case of climate change . First, it becomes mandatory for some countries to commit to quantified emissions reductions while this obligation does not hold for others (see below, the Kyoto Protocol) . Second, the level of implementation of laws can be different between states, and some can benefit from incentives such as deferred compliance dates, technology transfer or financial assistance11 . 10 11

United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992 . Rowena Maguire, The Role of Common but Differentiated Responsibility in the 2020 Climate

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3.2 emissions of major and minor emitters in the worLd After this general presentation of the context of global climate change and of the CBDR principle, we introduce two tables of empirical data of CO2 emissions from a number of countries . Table 1 shows the top 15 emitters for the period 2003–2012 . Among them, a significant number belongs to the group called “non-Annex I parties” (i . e . developing countries) in the vocabulary of the negotiations under the UNFCCC (China, India, Iran, Saudi Arabia…) (see next point on the Kyoto Protocol) . Table 2 shows the 15 countries with the lowest human development index (HDI)12 for the same time period . All of these countries are also considered in the UN context of the UNFCCC or Rio and post-Rio summits as part of the same “non-Annex I” group . In these two tables, we have included the most recent complete data from the “Global carbon budget”13, accounting CO2 emissions per country in million tons of carbon per year . As we can see in Table 1 big “developing countries” might have levels of emissions similar or above those of “developed countries” included in the same table (Japan, South Korea, …), while other “developing countries” in Table 2 emit at a much lower level, illustrating the wide range of national circumstances within developing countries . There is a factor 50 or 100 between typical emissions per capita in Table 1 countries (level of 10 TCO2/cap .) compared to countries in Table 2 (level of 0,1 to 0,2 T CO2 /cap .) Table 1 shows also that the GHG emissions’ growth rate (see line A) of the biggest emitters is quite high for the emerging economies but negative or relatively low for a majority of developed countries . Many countries announced policies to curb the rate of their future emissions, and for instance China has pledged in 2014 that it would peak its emissions in 2030 . However, the IPCC considers that respecting the target of 2 degrees seen above would be difficult without peaking the global emissions around 2020 . In comparison, Table 2 shows a trajectory where national emissions and per capita emissions (see line C) remain extremely low . Those data clearly highlight the gap between emerging economies and the world’s poorest countries although once again all of them are included in the same category of “developing countries” . In summary, industrialized countries such as China or India are now far bigger emitters than major European countries . China has been the biggest world emitter since 2006, in terms of CO2 emissions and since 2004, for all GHG emissions14 . In 2012, China had a 29 % share of global emissions, more than the US (16 %) and the EU (11 %) combined . India is to date the third biggest emitter for all GHG-emis-

12 13

14

Regime: Evolving a New Understanding of Differential Commitments, Carbon & Climate Law Review: CCLR 7/4 (2013), 261 . According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) classification 2012–2013 . The Global Carbon Budget provides annual updates of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions (from fossil fuel and cement production) and trends . It is part of the Global Carbon Project, a broad scientific partnership formed to provide mutually agreed knowledge base to support policy debate and action for mitigation (http://www .globalcarbonproject .org/) . Gregg Marland / Tom Boden / R . J . Andres, Global, Regional, and National Fossil-Fuel CO2 Emissions, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge, 2013 .

2480,04

2625,73

112 .78

8 .75

9 years

7,1

2011

2012

A . Growth rate %3

B . Compound Annual Growth rate %

C . Years before doubling 2003 emission4

D . CO2 per capita emissions (2012)5

16,4

/

-1 .14

-9 .81

1397

1450

1482

1449

1543

1590

1565

1589

1579

1549

United States

lndia

367,75

611,23

567,32

547,81

540,57

7,4

/

-1 .49

1 .6

12 years

6 .4

-12 .65 74 .85

967

980

1012

990

1071 493,94

1094 439,43

1107 410,24

1104 384,82

1110

1107 349,58

EU (28)

12,4

54 years

1 .3

12 .37

491,84

492,85

474,71

429,33

467,86

454,76

455,31

440,60

437,13

437,68

South Korea

Iran 89,25

150,86

10,4

438 years

0 .16

1 .43

13

21 years

3 .05

31 .1

5,3

18 years

4 .14

44 .02

16,2

15 years

4 .95

54 .49

342,27 166,68 164,50 137,88

16

/

-1

-8 .64

137,82

320,14 164,91 159,61 130,25 138,71

319,26 154,78 155,88 126,67 136,12

300,15 138,91 157,48 117,54 140,15

329,13 138,55 155,60 114,06 148,62

341,19 135,22 147,20 107,32 152,93

335,78 128,39 139,05 118,01 150,05

337,66 126,24 127,99 108,44 153,55

2

16 years

4 .64

50 .47

129,99

128,90

118,35

123,56

112,46

102,41

94,12

93,26

92,07

86,39

99,05

94,81

94,71

92,13

87,71

Brazil

137,43 100,12

4

39 years

1 .8

17 .47

129,94

6,3

33 years

2 .15

21 .08

2 .3

19 years

3 .74

39 .19

125,74 122,08

124,80 124,51 118,48

120,99 125,48 114,47

121,69

128,56 126,81 105,72

124,31 120,98

120,48 115,86

118,64 108,02

112,01 116,48

110,62 103,85

Saudi Canada lndonesia Mexico South Arabia Africa

343,51 131,52 122,03 107,95 150,63

337,45 127,14 114,22

Russian Japan Federation

18,8

93 years

0 .76

7 .05

101,15

103,41

101,74

107,74

105,71

102,87

101,23

98,91

95,11

94,49

Australia

1 . Data from Thomas A . Boden, Glenn Marland, R . J . Andres, “Global, Regional, andNational Fossil-Fuel COEmissions”, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U .S . Department of Energy, Oak, 2013 . Allv alues are in million tonnes of carbon per year (1MtC = 3 .664 billion of tonnes of CO2 per year) 2 . Countries are organized in thet able in descending orders of emissions 3 . For the period 2003–2012 (own calculation) 4 . Based on the CAGR, starting at 2003 (own calculation) 5 . Data from Jos G . J . Olivier and al, “Trends in global CO2 emissions: 2013 Report”, Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, 2013,52

2097,69

2259,86

2010

1918,58

2008

2009

1749,24

1852,14

1578,95

2005

2007

1442,10

2004

2006

1234,03

2003

China

Table 1 . CO2 emissions per country1: Top 15 emitters in 20122

Common but differentiated responsibilities against the realities of climate change

83

35 .56

3 .44

21 years

0,1

2012

A . Growth rate %3

B . Compound Annual Growth Rate %

C . Years before doubling 2003 emissions4

D . CO2 per capita emissions (2010)5

0,1

13 years

5 .05

55 .77

0,81

0,77

0,79

0,70

0,64

0,65

0,54

0,50

0,52

0,52

0,0

10 years

7 .39

90

0,57

0,54

0,55

0,51

0,40

0,39

0,37

0,40

0,32

0,30

0,1

13 years

5 .51

62 .07

0,47

0,44

0,46

0,45

0,46

0,45

0,37

0,31

0,30

0,29

0,1

22 years

3 .35

62 .05

0,39

0,38

0,39

0,30

0,25

0,22

0,22

0,23

0,26

0,24

0,1

21 years

3 .36

34 .62

0,35

0,33

0,34

0,29

0,32

0,26

0,26

0,25

0,27

0,26

0,1

/

-0 .94

-8 .11

0,34

0,32

0,34

0,34

0,33

0,33

0,32

0,32

0,37

0,37

0,2

17 years

4 .35

46 .67

0,22

0,21

0,22

0,14

0,16

0,19

0,21

0,20

0,17

0,15

0,1

118 years

0 .6

5 .56

0,19

0,18

0,19

0,18

0,18

0,17

0,20

0,15

0,18

0,18

0,0

50 years

1 .4

13 .33

0,17

0,16

0,17

0,17

0,16

0,16

0,16

0,16

0,15

0,15

0,1

/

-3 .89

-30

0,14

0,13

0,14

0,14

0,11

0,16

0,15

0,21

0,21

0,20

0,0

24 years

2 .96

30

0,13

0,12

0,13

0,12

0,14

0,13

0,11

0,11

0,10

0,10

0,0

11 years

6 .75

80

0,09

0,08

0,08

0,05

0,07

0,05

0,05

0,04

0,05

0,05

0,1

41 years

1 .73

16 .67

0,07

0,07

0,07

0,06

0,06

0,06

0,06

0,06

0,06

0,06

0,2

19 years

3 .81

40

0,07

0,06

0,07

0,06

0,06

0,06

0,06

0,06

0,06

0,05

Mozam- Congo Burkina- Niger Malawi Guinea Liberia Sierra- Mali Eritrea Chad Burundi Central Guineabique (RDC) Faso Leone Afric-an Bissau Republic

1 . Data from Thomas A . Boden, Glenn Marland, R . J . Andres, “Global, Regional, and National Fossil-Fuel CO2 Emissions”, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge National Laboratory, U .S . Department of Energy, Oak, 2013 . All values are in million tonnes of carbon per year (1MtC = 3 .664 billon of tonnes of CO2 per year)2 . 2 . Countries are organized in the table in descending orders of emissions 3 . For the period 2003–2012 (own calculation) 4 . Based on the CAGR, starting at 2003 (own calculation) 5 . Data from the World Bank, 2010 (metric tons per capita)

1,75

1,83

2011

1,77

2010

1,61

2007

1,74

1,48

2006

1,82

1,38

2005

2009

1,43

2004

2008

1,35

2003

Ethiopia

Table 2 . CO2 emissions per country1: Lowest 15 Human Development lndex2 (2012) .

84 Edwin Zaccai, Marine Lugen

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sions, though its level of emission per capita is the lowest in Table 1 . In 2013, nonOECD countries accounted for 60 % of global emissions, up from 45 % in 200015, a massive change . But while some emerging countries have a growing influence in the occurrence of climate change, some of the poorest countries have extremely low emissions’ profiles and annual growth rates, and they continue to have a very low share in global GHG emissions . 3.3 Kyoto’s attemPt to share Commitments Compared to the general categorization of developed/developing included in the CBDR principle, the UNFCCC has established a more technical division between countries . The convention distinguishes between “Annex I Parties” (industrialized countries that were members of the OECD in 1992, plus countries with economies in transition), “Annex II Parties” (OECD member countries only) and “non-Annex I Parties” . Under the UNFCCC, Annex I Parties are to reduce their GHG emissions and Annex II Parties are to provide financial assistance and technologies to non-Annex I Parties to help them mitigate their emissions and adapt to the effects of climate change16 . However in the “non-Annex I Parties”, the heterogeneity sketched above still remains . Launched in 1997, the Kyoto Protocol represents the main agreement framing the commitments towards mitigation at global level . It creates two types of differentiation . First, it defines obligations to reduce emissions for Annex I Parties and no legally binding obligations for non-Annex I Parties . Second, there is a differentiation in individual targets for Annex I Parties17 . However, the flexibility of the system undermined its effectiveness as major Parties withdrew from the Protocol (United States and Canada) while others didn’t pursue their engagement for the second commitment period (2013–2020) (Japan, Russian Federation and New Zealand) . Furthermore some of the biggest emitters in the “non-Annex I” category have no legal obligations to reduce emissions . Altogether the share of global emissions still to be reduced under the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol is minor . During the COP20, held in Lima in December 2014, it was made clear that next generations of agreements would imply for all countries to commit towards mitigation . Yet countries as China, Brazil and India already claimed that their commitment should be reviewed considering national contexts18 . Under the lead of India, developing countries pushed towards the addition of a paragraph in the text resulting from the COP19 about differentiation, saying that the principle of categorizing countries would be based on their ability to pay20 . The re-categorization of coun15 16 17 18 19 20

International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook Special Report – Redrawing the Energy-Climate Map, 2013, 29–30 . Maguire (note 11), 261 . Ibid ., 262 . Submissions from Parties to the ADP, in the UNFCC website : http://unfccc .int .ezproxy .ulb . ac .be/bodies/awg/items/7398 .php Conference of the Parties (UNFCCC), Lima call for climate action, Decision – CP20, 2014 . Press Trust of India, Lima climate talks: India, 189 UN members reach deal, 2014: http://www .finan-

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tries, and of their responsibilities and commitments, will for sure be a major issue during the next climate summit, planned in Paris by early December 2015 . 3.4 severaL tyPes of indiCators ranKing Countries’ resPonsibiLities Returning to the CBDR principle, informed by these empirical data, we understand the complexity of the aim of determining “differentiated responsibilities” . While economists often link differences in CO2 emissions across countries with per capita income, many other factors actually play a major role, including geographical location, availability of renewable energy sources, historical events, implemented policies, etc .21 Arguably it would be necessary to take all those factors into account but this would raise huge methodological challenges . However, several approaches may be used to calculate GHG emissions . The fact that they lead to distinct countries’ profiles implies that the choice of the approach would play an important role in the debates and negotiations, even if it is apparently technical . First, most methods consider only CO2 emissions, leaving out non-CO2 emissions of greenhouse gases and land-use emissions . This benefits for instance countries with high emissions from deforestation22 such as Brazil23 . Second, the responsibility of emissions are attributed to states where these emissions occur, overlooking the fact that part of them is used for products that are exported to other countries for the benefit of consumers in other states . More generally, different criteria can be applied as in the examples showed in the tables above: it is possible to consider a country’s emissions for a specific year, or a time period; it is also possible to consider the total emissions for a country or per capita emissions instead, or the growth rate of the emissions . It is also conceivable to measure the carbon intensity of GDP (relation between CO2 emissions and GDP) – a factor that often advantages OECD countries . These different methods answer different questions and lead to (very) different rankings of emitters among different states . For example, China is by far the biggest polluter today based on its total amount of emissions, while the United States is historically the most important one (accumulation of CO2 in the atmosphere) and Qatar takes the lead if per capita emissions are considered24 .

21 22 23 24

cialexpress .com/article/economy/lima-climate-talks-india-189-un-members-reach-deal/19110/ Eric Neumayer, National carbon dioxide emissions: geography matters, Area 36/1 (2004), 10– 11 . Deforestation and forest degradation are considered to account for about 20 % of global GHG emissions, because of their role as carbon reservoir but also due to the modification of land-use potentially towards a more polluting activity . Michel G . J . den Elzen / Jos G . J . Olivier / Niklas Höhne / Greet Janssens-Maenhout, Countries’ contributions to climate change: effect of accounting for all greenhouse gases, recent trends, basic needs and technological progress, Climatic Change 121 (2013), 398 . François Gemenne, Géopolitique du changement climatique, Paris, 2011, 35–40 . As for cumulative emissions, it is important to specify that the data apply for the period 1850–2011, during which data only on CO2 emissions are continuously available . The United States account then for 27 % of world total cumulative CO2 emissions, followed by the European Union (25 %) and China (11 %) (Mengpin Ge / Johannes Friedrich / Thomas Damassa, 6 Graphs Explain the World’s

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A recent study25 quantifies countries’ contributions to cumulative GHG emissions, and shows that even for historical emissions, different accounting methods will also end up in highly different results . Factors identified in this study are: (a) technological progress: developing countries, coming later in the process, can benefit from more advanced technologies emitting less CO2 for the same level of output than developed countries decades ago; (b) the time period: choosing a late start date, for example after 1990, increases largely the relative contributions of emerging economies and decreases the contributions of early emitters26; (c) deducting emissions necessary for ‘basic needs’ (e . g . heat and cooking) by following the principle that countries cannot carry the same responsibility for those . According to the CBDR principle, causal responsibility could apply for historical emissions of industrialized countries, which altogether are clearly more important than emissions of developing ones (although the global picture is rapidly changing in this regard, due to the dramatic increase of GHG emissions in emerging economies) . Yet, some countries, mostly developing ones, have also argued that the system should incorporate clear compensation by the incorporation of historical emissions, which would involve financial flows . This vision of retributive justice has not gained the international arena, where distribution rules have been given so far the priority27 . This line of argument is combined with the fact that the impacts of climate change will be felt with important differences among countries and regions in the world . As underlined by the IPCC, both impacts and adaptive capacities differ much between regions and societies28 . LDCs and Small Island Developing States (SIDS) are likely to be among the most challenged by climate change due both to their geographic location and their socioeconomic situation29 . The problem of unequal impacts and adaptation capacity to the detriment of poor developing countries has been a growing issue of negotiations and it constitutes a major issue in the context of international aid for development, as we will see in the next section .

25 26 27 28 29

Top 10 Emitters, World Resource Institute, 2014, http://www .wri .org/blog/2014/11/6-graphs-explain-world%E2 %80 %99 s-top-10-emitters) Den Elzen et al. (note 23), 404–409 . The study shows that, if we consider emissions for the period 1990–2010, countries such as China, Saudi Arabia and South Korea will see their relative contributions increase for a factor 1 .3–1 .8, while the US and the EU will see it decreases by a factor 0 .7–0 .8 . Sonja Klinski / Hadi Dowlatabadi, Conceptualizations of justice in climate policy, Cimate policy 9/1 (2009), 89–91 . Cf . also Valentine van Gameren / Romain Weikmans / Edwin Zaccai, L‘adaptation au changement climatique, Paris, 2014 . Saleemul Huq / Atiq Rahman / Mama Konate / Youba Sokona / Hannah Reid, Mainstreaming Adaptation to Climate Change in Least Developed Countries (LDCs), International Institute for environment and Development, 2013 .

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4 evolutIons

of

odA

lInked to AdAPtAtIon to clImAte chAnge, And more

broAdly consIdered

4.1 adaPtation aid is in PraCtiCe Limited International financial assistance is typically provided through the official development aid (ODA) vectors . Among ODA, the part actually dedicated to environment issues is low . Based on a self-assessment made by OECD countries using the Rio markers30 for the period 2010–2011, only 19 .7 % of total ODA could be linked to the environment, to various degrees . Among the total of sector-allocable aid, around 6 % directly targets the environment – which represents a bit more than US$ 5 billion in 201031 . If we focus on climate change, we see that financing adaptation has become an important issue in international negotiations . Pledges of donor countries can be an argument to convince developing countries to participate in international agreements, meaning to contribute to the efforts towards mitigation32, at least through commitments on future emissions for those countries that are minor emitters . CBDR in climate policy context is located somewhere between consequentialist approaches for which states have a moral duty to take responsibility for the consequences of their actions, and non-consequentialist approaches where dealing with climate change should be based on the capacity of countries to pay in the name of solidarity . In this case, historically responsible countries tend to be the wealthy ones, which helped to translate those considerations in financing countries that have little responsibility for the problem (very low emissions) but great impacts to bear, or are vulnerable to them33 . Yet, financing adaptation to climate change suffers major limits, similar to those encountered in ODA but more specific to this new field of activity . First, the amounts are not sufficient compared to the needs . Moreover, the reality of budgets made available must be distinguished from the sums that are pledged . In Copenhagen (2009), developed countries jointly pledged to provide nearly US$30 billion in “fast start” finance in 2010–2012 to support mitigation and adaptation actions in developing countries . They also committed to mobilize US$100 billion a year by 2020 from a variety of sources34 . In 2014, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) estimated that only for adaptation, those amounts were probably two to three times underestimated in the period after 2030 and plau30

31 32 33 34

And more precisely DAC countries, which are the members of the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD, gathering the largest aid donors . The Rio markers are a tool used by the DAC to monitor external development finance targeting environmental objectives by reporting for each aid activity whether they target or not specific issues (being: biodiversity, climate change adaptation, climate change mitigation, desertification) . OECD, Aid in support of environment, 2013 . Laurence Tubiana / François Gemenne / Alexandre Magnan, Anticiper pour s’adapter. Le nouvel enjeu du changement climatique, Paris, 2010 . Rob Dellink / Michel den Elzen / Harry Aiking / Emmy Bergsma / Frans Berkhout / Thijs Dekker / Joyeeta Gupta, Sharing the burden of financing adaptation to climate change, Global Environmental Change 19 (2009), 412–414 . Antonio Gambini, Financing the fight against global warming: will the financial markets come to the South’s rescue? Point Sud. A CNCD-11.11.11 study, 2011, 5 .

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sibly even more so towards 205035 . However, only 18 % of the amounts provided between 2010 and 2012 (less than 7 billion dollars) would have targeted adaptation in developing countries . In addition, only a third of “fast start” finance is really new and additional, while more than 50 % is made up of loans and not grants36 . There are stark differences between the estimation of needs, pledges, and available money . Second, some developing countries, especially LDCs, do not have the institutional resources to manage inflows and adequately implement the programs that are foreseen for adaptation to climate change . Projects, for instance led by NGOs, can make a difference locally, but the weakness of institutions and of capacity hinders the scale of implementation of broader national policies in poor countries37 . In addition, it is very difficult to label the share of aid aimed specifically at climate change within the global set of development projects . (This is also one of the reason why the Rio Markers mentioned above are imprecise .) Indeed many strategies and activities planned to reduce vulnerability to climate change are very similar to actions used to address non-climate problems . Conversely, any adaptation action will achieve other objectives at the same time . Moreover, the complexity of the climate system makes it extremely hard to distinguish natural actual climate variability from anthropogenic forcing in concrete cases of impacts38 . 4.2 oda as a PartiaL veCtor of equiLibration As we suggest above, the way in which the fulfilling of responsibilities of rich countries towards poor ones impacted by climate change could be accomplished through aid to adaptation appears, at least at present, quite limited . These limitations can be analyzed within the broader context of the evolution of ODA in general, and of its own limitations . Globally ODA has a relatively decreasing share in international trade and financial flows . It represented 70 % of total North-South flows of finance in 1970 and only 13 % in 2011 . This shows the growing role of trade and private financial flows, an evolution which may undermine some effects of policies conducted under ODA39 . This evolution influences also the distribution of finance flows between countries . Combining low scores with regard to GDP/inhabitant, economic growth, financial development and country openness, LDCs are unlikely to attract such private inflows . Their low economic growth and political instability make transaction appear insecure to private investors40 . 35 36 37 38 39 40

United Nations Environment Programme, The Adaptation Gap Report: A preliminary Assessment, 2014, 33 . Gambini (note 34), 7 . Edwin Zaccai, L’échec de Copenhague en perspective, Esprit 362 (2010), 11 . Heather McGray / Anne Hammill / Rob Bradley, Weathering the Storm . Options for framing Adaptation and Development, World Resource Institute Report, 2007, 5–9 . Arnaud Zacharie, Mondialisation: qui gagne et qui perd? Essai sur l’économie politique du développement, Le bord de l’eau/La Muette, 2013, 236 . Robert Lensink / Howard White, Does the Revival of International Capital Flows mean the End of Aid? An Analysis of Developing Countries’ Access to Private Capital, World development 26/7 (1998), 1230 .

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Authors agree that ODA is mainly driven by political motivations, including ideological ones41 . The degree of compatibility between donors’ interests and development objectives of recipient countries is a main determinant of the impacts of cooperation policies on political objective within developing countries42 . For some developing countries amongst the poorest, ODA is the main financial inflow with Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and remittances sent home by migrants . These states can be completely dependent on ODA for public expenditure, which is another difficulty for the sustainability of the system43 and shows the dependency of governments in LDC’s to richer countries’ governments . Another concern is that donors’ interests may not be consistent with sustainable development objectives to be followed in host countries44 . 5. technology

trAnsfer And dIfferent stAndArds

In the first two sections we have considered some points of articulation between the CBDR principle and the reality of emissions of greenhouse gases among different countries . In the third section we had a look on the limitation to use ODA, and especially for its application to adaptation to climate change . In this last section, we turn to another crucial element in international climate cooperation already mentioned in our introduction: the greater availability of technologies . We will see that if the CBDR principle is also relevant in this respect, other principles are used in combination, and that recent evolutions question the implementation of those principles . 5.1 ComPetition on green teChnoLogies Technology development and transfer, aimed at mitigation of climate change and adaptation is rather important under the UNFCCC, which expressly mentions this objective in its article 4 .745 . While this article does not explicitly mean that technology transfer should be a way to achieve socioeconomic goals alongside with environmental objectives, it has been interpreted that way by a number of Parties . An important instrument in this regard is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)46, a part of the Kyoto Protocol . In terms of contribution in capital, technology and skills transfers towards developing countries, CDM has shown limited success . The majority of the projects has been implemented in emerging economies and contri41 42 43 44 45 46

Peter Blunt / Mark Turner / Jana Hertz, The meaning of development assistance, Public Administration and Development 31 (2011), 172–187 . Zacharie (note 39), 238–240 . Ibid ., 234–236 . Laurens M . Bouwer / Jeroen C . J . H . Aerts, Financing climate change adaptation, Disasters 30/1 (2006), 55 . United Nations, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992 . The CDM, defined in the Kyoto Protocol, is a flexibility mechanism where countries with obligations to reduce GHG emissions can fund GHG reduction projects in developing countries and therefore earn credits that count for the calculation of their own targets .

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butes little to environmental sustainability in poorer ones47 . We encounter again here some earlier points in our analysis: the differences between several types of countries within the “developing” countries group, and the difficulty to attract investments in poorer countries . A more recent issue in the field of technology transfer is the competition between some OECD countries, especially the EU and the US, and emerging countries for the production and commercialization of green technologies . Since the early 90’s, the EU has considered that a major benefit of its sustainable development goals for its economy would be the development of green technologies within the Member States, as a possible source of growth for its industries and services . However, these last years, in some sectors like the photovoltaic for instance, the import of products from China has been massive, up to an unanticipated level and to the detriment of domestic industry . A similar evolution has happened in the US . Photovoltaic is not the only case of competition in green technologies, and some authors speak here of a “next generation of environmental conflicts”, linked to the rise of environmental policies across different states in the world48 . Acknowledging this evolution, we see that the principle of technology transfer from developed to developing countries to mitigate climate change and to adapt is scrutinized by states during the negotiations under the UNFCCC in order to take into account its possible consequences on industrial competition between historically industrialized countries and emerging economies . At a global level, it is not an unfavorable evolution that more affordable green technologies would be produced in countries that use them within their current industrialization, on the contrary . Nor does this evolution hinder the need to transfer relevant technologies and capacity to LDCs . However, we see that the principle of technology transfer has to take place in a more competitive context than before . 5.2 new imPLiCations of the different standards PrinCiPLe We can consider this evolution more broadly through the lenses of another important principle included in the Rio Declaration, allowing for different standards in environment, between developed and developing countries . We first explain this principle and its initial background, and will then see how the recent evolutions described in this paper might shed another light on it . The principle 11 of the Rio Declaration reads as such: “States shall enact effective environmental legislation . Environmental standards, management objectives 47 48

Arnaud Brohé, Whither the CDM? Investment outcomes and future prospects, Environment, Development and Sustainability 16 (2014), 318–320 . In 2012 the EU, Japan and the US set up a case at the World Trade Organization (WTO) over China’s export restrictions on rare earth minerals covered under environmental concerns . Same year, Japan and EU had oral arguments over Ontario’s feed-in tariffs for renewable energy (which would be found later by WTO as being illegal) and US accused China to practice unfairly dumping with solar panels in their market while China was pointing US’s rebates for renewable energy installation (Mark Wu / James Salzman, The Next Generation of Environment Conflicts: The rise of Green Industrial Policy, Northwestern University Law Review 108/2 (2014), 401–474) . Those are just but a few examples .

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and priorities should reflect the environmental and development context to which they apply . Standards applied by some countries may be inappropriate and of unwarranted economic and social cost to other countries, in particular developing countries”49 . This principle can be applied to national standards (for example in the Rio Declaration) or international standards (for example in Agenda 21, paragraph 39 .350) . Importantly, the UNFCCC mentions it as well in the acknowledgments, using the exact same words . As we see, the Different Standards (DS) principle means in this context applying different level of harshness for environmental protection to developed and developing countries . It can involve two kinds of application: delayed implementation51, or less stringent commitments . Theoretically, this principle can be interpreted as an application of weak sustainability . The distinction between weak and strong sustainability is developed by ecological economists when considering sustainable development52 . In strong sustainability, some parts of the choices are not negotiable: for instance some levels of environmental protection are required at any costs . In weak sustainability, substitutions are possible between a gain in some aspects (generally in the economy) and loss in others (generally the environment) if the trade-off is positive between this gain and loss . Although the measurability and the very principle of this trade-off can be highly contested53, weak sustainability is the overall framework of nearly all sustainable development policies . In the principle presented above, weak sustainability is reflected in the idea that a country might “lose” on environmental standards, but instead would “win” in economic development, or competitiveness . As a matter of fact, numerous UN documents defend conceptions of a “right to development” which are not necessarily compatible with the objectives of sustainability and of social justice54 . On the other side, the DS principle favors the attractiveness for investors who may produce with lower environmental standards . This possibility is used by some transnational corporations, which initially belong to OECD countries . Moreover, non-tariff barriers based on higher standards of environmental protection are sometimes used by richer countries with the objective of protecting their domestic industry55 . So, even if it could be detrimental for environmental protection, and in the case we analyze, to climate change, we see that this 49 50 51

52 53 54 55

UNCED (note 10) . United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Agenda 21, 1992 This first type is indeed typical of international economic agreements . It especially appears in many WTO agreements . To name some major ones : the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS), the Agreement on Agriculture, the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to trade . Zaccai (note 4), 82 . Edwin Zaccai, 25 ans de développement durable, et après?, Paris, 2011 . Lars Löfquist, Climate change, justice and the right to development, Journal of Global Ethics 7/3 (2011), 251–252 . A few of those cases were discussed at the WTO justice court to find out if those non-tariff barriers were covered by the Article XX GATT or if it was a form of green protectionism . Article XX GATT allows some trade restrictions if they pursue specific goals, including “to protect human, animal or plant life or health” . Positions of the Court were not always consistent and most cases turned out to be rather sensitive (Olivier De Schutter, Le Commerce au Service du Développement durable: Associer le Commerce aux Normes environnementales et aux Droits du Travail, 2003) .

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principle has had a number of justifications and utilizations both in the North and the South . However, at least three evolutions are challenging the context sketched above . First, the seriousness of climate change as a threat is hardly compatible with major emerging countries striving for lower standards on green technologies, and this is an evolution that is visible during the last decade56 . Second, as we mentioned above, a number of greener products, traded internationally, have been manufactured increasingly in developing countries . This is a different situation than at the time of the Rio Conference where this principle was promulgated . Third, and quite ironically here, it can be seen that in climate negotiations, some developed countries demand that developing countries decarbonize their pathway to growth in a much quicker way than industrialized countries did in historical times . In this perspective, environmental standards would be more stringent for developing countries than for the developed ones, in opposition to the letter of the principle of different standards in the Rio Declaration . This is a perspective that developing countries are of course reluctant to adopt during the negotiations . More precisely, we encounter here a possible link with implications of the CBDR seen above . Indeed, the discussion on emissions standards for developing countries may be linked to different issues such as the negotiation of emission standards for developed countries, different forms of finance transfers, or to technology transfers . 6. conclusIon The architecture of sustainable development built in Rio reflects a dichotomy between the so-called developed and developing countries . We have seen that shaping the environmental law regime, at least in the field of climate change with this traditional North-South comprehension does not mirror present realities in a number of ways . This perspective is challenged by the power of emerging economies and their recent contributions to GHG emissions, by the lack of aid effectiveness including in environment, by new unforeseen implications of general principles . Principles which are the basis of Treaties act altogether, not separately, in a world characterized by diverse and changing societies . This leads to reconsider agreements in a more iterative way of thinking . The case of different standards for instance illustrates that a principle may have important connections that were overlooked in the original context of its formulation (in this case trade competition), but ended up influencing its actual applications and should therefore be included increasingly in the negotiations in order for them to be effective . If treating responsibilities and reaching justice in climate change policy is a very difficult objective, the urgency of dealing with it calls for settlements over mitigation and adaptation that are much stronger than current ones . As we have seen, an issue yet to be resolved is the development of criteria and categories to better reflect the broad range of state players at international level, especially in terms of growth and power . Considering equity and justice leads to a variety of ways to integrate this differentiation . Capability and responsibility, both for past and present, are major 56

Neil Carter / Arthur Mol (eds .), Environmental Governance in China, London, 2013 .

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factors to discuss in order to define obligations and create effective differentiation . Defining the differentiation model will be a key issue of the next climate summit in Paris of December 2015 . This may contribute to a new understanding of the principles discussed in this paper . bIblIogrAPhy Aykut, Stefan / Dahan, Amy, Gouverner le climat? 20 ans de négociations climatiques, Paris, 2014 . Blunt, Peter / Turner, Mark / Hertz, Jana, The meaning of development assistance, Public Administration and Development 31 (2011), 172–187 . Bouwer, Laurens M . / Aerts, Jeroen C . J . H ., Financing climate change adaptation, Disasters 30/1 (2006), 49–63 . Brohé, Arnaud, Whither the CDM? Investment outcomes and future prospects, Environment, Development and Sustainability 16 (2014), 305–322 . Carter, Neil / Mol, Arthur (eds .), Environmental Governance in China, London, 2013 . Conference of the Parties (UNFCCC), Lima call for climate action, Decision – CP20, 2014 . Dellink, Rob et al., Sharing the burden of financing adaptation to climate change, Global Environmental Change 19 (2009), 411–421 . Den Elzen, Michel G . J . et al., Countries’ contributions to climate change: effect of accounting for all greenhouse gases, recent trends, basic needs and technological progress, Climatic Change 121 (2013), 397–412 . De Schutter, Olivier, Le Commerce au Service du Développement durable: Associer le Commerce aux Normes environnementales et aux Droits du Travail, 2003 . Ehrlich, Paul R . / Holdren, John P ., Impact of population growth, Science, New Series 171/3977 (1971), 1212–1217 . Gambini, Antonio, Financing the fight against global warming: will the financial markets come to the South’s rescue? Point Sud. A CNCD-11.11.11 study, 2011, 5 . Ge, Mengpin / Friedrich, Johannes / Damassa, Thomas, 6 Graphs Explain the World’s Top 10 Emitters, World Resource Institute, 2014, http://www .wri .org/blog/2014/11/6-graphs-explainworld%E2 %80 %99 s-top-10-emitters . Gemenne, François, Géopolitique du changement climatique, Paris, 2011 . Huq, Saleemul et al., Mainstreaming Adaptation to Climate Change in Least Developed Countries (LDCs), International Institute for environment and Development, 2013 . Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate change 2014 – Synthesis Report, 2014 . International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook Special Report – Redrawing the Energy-Climate Map, 2013, 29-30 . Klinski, Sonja / Dowlatabadi, Hadi, Conceptualizations of justice in climate policy, Climate policy 9/1 (2009), 88–108 . Lensink, Robert / White, Howard, Does the Revival of International Capital Flows mean the End of Aid? An Analysis of Developing Countries’ Access to Private Capital, World development 26/7 (1998), 1221–1234 . Löfquist, Lars, Climate change, justice and the right to development, Journal of Global Ethics 7/3 (2011), 251–260 . Maguire, Rowena, The Role of Common but Differentiated Responsibility in the 2020 Climate Regime: Evolving a New Understanding of Differential Commitments, Carbon & Climate Law Review: CCLR 7/4 (2013), 260–269 . Marland, Gregg / Boden, Tom / Andres, R . J ., Global, Regional, and National Fossil-Fuel CO2 Emissions, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, Oak Ridge, 2013 . McGlade, Christopher / Elkins, Paul, The geographical distribution of fossil fuels unused when limiting global warming to 2 °C, Nature 517 (2015), 187–190 . McNeill, John R ., Du nouveau sous le soleil : histoire de l’environnement modial au XXe siècle, trad . fr . Philippe Beaugrand, Seyssel, 2010 .

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McGray, Heather / Hammill, Anne / Bradley, Rob, Weathering the Storm . Options for framing Adaptation and Development, World Resource Institute Report, 2007 . Neumayer, Eric, National carbon dioxide emissions: geography matters, Area 36/1 (2004), 33–40 . OECD, Aid in support of environment, 2013 . Oliver, Jos G . J . et al., Trends in global CO2 emissions – 2013 Report, The Hague, PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, 2013 . Press Trust of India, Lima climate talks: India, 189 UN members reach deal, 2014: http://www .financialexpress .com/article/economy/lima-climate-talks-india-189-un-members-reach-deal/19110/ Raupach, Michael R . et al., Sharing a quota on cumulative carbon missions, Nature Climate Change 4 (2014), 873–879 . Tubiana, Laurence / Gemenne, François / Magnan, Alexandre, Anticiper pour s’adapter. Le nouvel enjeu du changement climatique, Paris, 2010 . United Nations, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1992 . United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, 1992 . United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED), Agenda 21, 1992 . United Nations Environment Programme, The Adaptation Gap Report: A Preliminary Assessment, 2014, 33 . Van Gameren, Valentine / Weikmans, Romain / Zaccai, Edwin, L’adaptation au changement climatique, Paris, 2014 . Wu, Mark / Salzman, James, The Next Generation of Environment Conflicts: The rise of Green Industrial Policy, Northwestern University Law Review 108/2 (2014), 401–474 . Zaccai, Edwin, Over two decades in pursuit of sustainable development: Influence, transformation, limits, Environmental Development 1 (2012), 79–90 . Zaccai, Edwin, L’échec de Copenhague en perspective, Esprit 362 (2010), 6–13 . Zaccai, Edwin, 25 ans de développement durable, et après?, Paris, 2011 . Zacharie, Arnaud, Mondialisation: qui gagne et qui perd? Essai sur l’économie politique du développement, Le bord de l’eau/La Muette, 2013 .

aLiCe Kaswan (berKeLey, CaLifornia)* clImAte AdAPtAtIon

And

theorIes

of justIce

The inevitable consequences of climate change – rising seas, intensified weather events, drought, fire, and all their socioeconomic implications – will fall unequally . Globally and within nations, the consequences will be much more severe for the poor and marginalized than for the wealthy . Where addressing that inequity requires some to sacrifice on behalf of others, it raises questions of justice . Clarity about the operative theories of justice can facilitate the impassioned and critically important national and international debates about what constitutes adaptation injustice and, where such injustice is identified, clarify debates about who is responsible for providing adaptation assistance . In this essay, I identify the ways in which climate vulnerability is a reflection of underlying socioeconomic vulnerability and provide a brief sketch of the types of adaptation policies at issue . I then turn to principles of substantive justice that inform our sense of what constitutes injustice and who should be responsible . I analyze variants of corrective and distributive justice and their implications for adaptation policy, both internationally and domestically . I then assess some of the limitations associated with the relevant theories, and discuss the ways in which they relate to one another . Turning to the development of adaptation policies, I acknowledge the importance of participatory engagement, a key facet of adaptation justice . A few preliminary clarifications are in order . The goal of this essay is not to articulate a single theory of justice; multiple theories are relevant and the reality of global and domestic politics is that multiple ethical arguments will inform the debates . And, although I offer a few thoughts, the primary purpose of this essay is not to provide a set formula for future policy, but to clarify the landscape of operative principles . Moreover, the essay focuses on how principles of justice can inform adaptation policy debates; it does not analyze all the variables relevant to adaptation policy choices, including incentive and deterrent effects for both emissions and adaptation, spreading the risk of loss, or, for the most part, political viability .1

*

1

My thanks to Simone Zurbuchen and Alain Papaux for organizing the Conference on Philosophy, Law, and Environmental Crisis for which this essay was prepared . I am also grateful to Eric Biber, Michel Bourban, Holly Doremus, Dan Farber, Amy Sinden, Manuel Vargas, Rob Verchick, Ivo Wallimann Helmer, and the participants in the Berkeley Law Environmental Colloquium for their extremely helpful comments . For a more complete discussion, cf . Daniel A . Farber, Adapting to Climate Change: Who Should Pay, Journal on Land Use and Environmental Law 23 (2007), 1–37 .

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1. clImAte chAnge, InequAlIty,

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AdAPtAtIon

1.1 CLimate Change and inequaLity Professor Robert Verchick has said it best: “Catastrophe is bad for everyone . But it is especially bad for the weak and disenfranchised .”2 Vulnerability to climate impacts is shaped by multiple factors, including exposure, sensitivity to harm, and the capacity to cope, all of which are mediated by socioeconomic and political factors . Exposure is defined by physical factors (like elevation in the flood context, or residence in dense urban environments in the heat context) as well as by socioeconomic and political factors, like race and income, that determine who lives in areas more vulnerable to harm . Sensitivity to harm is shaped by demographic features, like age or disability, as well as by socioeconomic factors, like income and underlying health conditions often associated with socioeconomic status . The capacity to cope is defined largely by socioeconomic factors, like insurance coverage, wealth, social capital, and geographic mobility . Thus, vulnerability to climate impacts is a function of both physical and social vulnerability . As climate change increases the frequency and severity of disasters, like flooding and wildfires, poor and marginalized populations are likely to experience more severe consequences .3 Scholars have documented persistent disparities .4 Of course, proximity to risk is not necessarily correlated with income and privilege; wealthy landowners occupy scenic seashores and riversides, or live on large wooded lots at risk from wildfire . But, in some regions, low-lying floodplains and riverside industrial areas are disproportionately populated by low-income communities . Internationally, the five nations with the greatest population residing in vulnerable low-lying coastal areas are all developing or newly industrialized countries, including Bangladesh, China, Vietnam, India, and Indonesia .5 Low-income and marginalized communities are also more likely to reside close to industrial and hazardous waste sites, and disproportionately face the indirect risks caused if these sites flood or burn . Low-income families are less likely to have the resources for adequate preparation, like installing storm shutters and elevating homes . Renters often not only lack financial resources, but the capacity to make necessary adjustments . Vulnerability during disasters also varies . The capacity to evacuate is tied to available transportation and to the ability to afford a decent place to flee . Elderly and disabled residents confront unique and severe evacuation challenges . Disaster recovery is strongly me2 3

4 5

Robert M . Verchick, Facing Catastrophe: Environmental Action for a Post-Katrina World, 2010, 106 For elaboration on disparities in developed countries, see Heather Cooley et al., Social Vulnerability to Climate Change in California, 2012; Rachel Morello-Frosch et al ., How Climate Change Hurts Americans and How to Close the Gap, 2009; U . S . Global Change Research Program (USGCRP), Climate Change Impacts in the United States: 3rd National Assessment, 2014, 288; Verchick (footnote 2), 105–170; Alice Kaswan, Domestic Climate Change Adaptation and Equity, Environmental Law Reporter (2012), 11126–11138 . For international impacts, see Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, 2014, http://www .ipcc .ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg2/ar5_wgII_spm_en .pdf . Robert M . Verchick, Disaster Justice: The Geography of Human Capability, Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum 23 (2012), 41–46 . IPCC, Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (footnote 3), § 5 .3 .4 .1 .

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diated by financial resources, with more severe consequences for poor families without the means to rebuild or who confront a net loss of rental housing . For immigrants, those who do not speak the dominant language, or those who are alienated from the dominant society, the challenges multiply, impairing the capacity to receive and act upon critical information about disaster preparedness, warnings, and recovery resources . Whether through recurrent disasters, increasing disaster risk, or less dramatic impacts like drought or unsustainable heat, certain areas will become increasingly uninhabitable . Lower land values could attract poor and of-color residents with relatively few housing options, increasing the relative risk of these populations . More generally, decreasing habitability in certain areas is likely to prompt international and domestic migration . Although affluent newcomers are likely to find or trigger the construction of sufficient new housing, less affluent migrants risk substandard housing and homelessness given the persistent shortages of adequate affordable housing in the United States and much of the world . Climate impacts on public health could also disproportionately affect the poor . In the United States, residents of urban centers vulnerable to the heat island effect are more likely to be poor and of color, and more likely to experience heat waves and the increasing pollution associated with higher temperatures . Although recent improvements in health insurance in the United States have broadened access to health care, in much of the world, access to health care is mediated by income . Poor populations without health care will be especially vulnerable not only to increasing heat, but also to increasing air and water pollution, and the widening distribution of allergens and disease-carrying insects . As agriculture is disrupted by drought, heat, or spreading pests, those reliant on subsistence agriculture or unable to afford the cost of increasing food prices confront the risk of malnutrition and starvation . Climate change will also have a wide range of indirect economic consequences that will be more severe for marginalized populations . For example, when disasters cause economic disruption, higher-income professionals continue to receive salaries, while low-income workers lose their hourly wages immediately . Agricultural disruptions will ruin the livelihoods of subsistence farmers and low-wage agricultural workers, and lead to higher food prices with disproportionate impacts on the poor, who spend a significant portion of their income on food . In the long term, as government resources are diverted to prepare for and respond to climate impacts, climate adaptation efforts could also undermine social services, like education and the economic safety net . Measures to prepare for climate change, like making infrastructure and communities more resilient, protecting them, or moving them if necessary, are expected to cost billions of dollars . Responding to climate-enhanced disasters is likely to cost billions more . Within developed countries, unless and until a tax or fee on carbon generates adaptation funds, these costs could divert government resources from essential services .6 Developing countries are unlikely to have the necessary resources, and will be unlikely to adapt adequately without external support .7 6 7

W . Neil Adger / Sophie Nicholson-Cole, Ethical Dimensions to Adapting to Climate Change-Imposed Risks, in The Ethics of Global Climate Change, ed . Denis G . Arnold, 2011, 268 . IPCC, Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability, (footnote 3), § 5 .5 .5 .

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1.2 imPLiCations for adaPtation PoLiCy Adaptation policies can play a critical role in addressing these vulnerabilities . I begin by specifying the kinds of adaptation policies the essay addresses . I include proactive measures that help prevent and reduce sensitivity to impacts, like hazard planning, land use measures to reduce or escape from risk, water conservation measures, or re-tooling agriculture for new weather patterns . I also include reactive measures that help people cope once impacts have occurred . Reactive measures include, for example, developing emergency response measures for evacuation and housing in response to natural disasters, food security measures to address drought and potential famines, and preparing for the domestic and international migration that is predicted to occur in response to acute or chronic climate impacts . In the political discourse about adaptation assistance, there is some debate about whether “adaptation” refers only to preparation and, thus, whether responsibility for post-impact recovery measures should be considered accountability or compensation for “loss and damage,”8 rather than adaptation . For purposes of this essay, I address assistance with post-impact recovery as a general form of adaptation assistance . Principles of corrective justice and the polluter pays principle may well play a role in assigning responsibility, but I address such responsibility in terms of a general obligation to provide adaptation assistance; I do not delve into the additional and difficult legal questions raised by the question of direct liability for discrete climate harms . Careful attention to the key variables determining vulnerability, including income, race, age, disabilities, and political or cultural marginalization, will be central in designing appropriate adaptation policies . Achieving adaptation justice requires policy measures that address identified vulnerabilities, resource transfers to enable adaptation, and participatory opportunities to enable meaningful engagement and control .9 At the policy level, for example, antidiscrimination rules could protect vulnerable communities whose interests might otherwise be disregarded as local governments make difficult land use and infrastructure decisions .10 In addition, adapta8 9 10

The issue is contested because it implicates the degree to which responsibility for loss and damage can be considered “owed” as compensation for past emissions, rather than simply charitable “aid” . W . Neil Adger / Jouni Paavola /Saleemul Huq, Toward Justice in Adaptation to Climate Change, in Fairness in Adaptation to Climate Change, ed . W . Neil Adger et al., 2006, 14; John H . Knox, Climate Ethics and Human Rights, Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 5 (2014), 29 . Mark Stallworthy, Sustainability, Coastal Erosion and Climate Change: An Environmental Justice Analysis, Journal of Environmental Justice Analysis 18 (2006), 362–363 . In the aftermath of recent disasters in New Orleans and Galveston, Texas, decisions about how and where to rebuild, and how and where to retreat, have been fraught with debates about racial justice . See Kaswan (footnote 3), 11132 . To avoid disadvantaging poorer regions, decision-making metrics need to incorporate factors in addition to land value . For example, decisions about coastal protective measures focused solely on the financial “benefits” of protection would be likely to protect higher-valued property at the expense of lower-valued property, creating a systemic bias against low-valued property occupied by poorer communities . While land value is not irrelevant, additional factors that reflect the value of existing communities and their existing social capital should be incorporated in the difficult land use decisions ahead . Adger / Nicholson-Cole

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tion decision criteria could stress that decisions about what land to protect and what to sacrifice should not be based solely on land value, to the detriment of poorer communities . Explicit efforts to allow and develop affordable housing would help meet the needs of the poor who are forced to migrate due to disasters or the slow erosion of living conditions . Tailored warning systems, evacuation systems, and shelter conditions that meet the needs of young, the old, the disabled, and different cultural groups would enhance adaptation equity .11 Adaptation justice is not just a question of good policy, however . Because many domestic and international adaptation disparities are a direct function of wealth inequalities, adaptation justice will necessarily implicate the distribution of resources . For example, on a domestic scale, wealthier private individuals and businesses may have the resources to finance their own proactive and reactive adaptation efforts, whether through personal resources or the capacity to buy insurance . In contrast, the poor are unlikely to be able to adapt without financial assistance . At the international scale, the least developed countries and many other developing countries do not have the resources to invest in the preventive or reactive measures necessary to prevent or address devastating harm . In addition to direct financial transfers, international aid could include technology transfer and capacity building that would enable vulnerable countries to better assess and develop their own adaptation responses . The extent to which adaptation justice is tied to underlying socioeconomic vulnerability that implicates resource transfers raises the question of how adaptation justice relates more broadly to the pursuit of social justice . The two are unquestionably related; social justice measures to address underlying vulnerabilities, like poverty, access to medical assistance, access to housing, and social and political marginalization will be key to enhancing resilience .12 That said, however, Posner and Weisbach’s suggestion that climate justice concerns should be addressed by direct wealth transfers from rich to poor nations, without explicit linkage to climate policy,13 is unlikely to achieve adaptation goals . Such general wealth transfers are un-

11 12

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(footnote 6), 269 (describing UK focus on benefit-cost assessments and the failure to include “more intangible factors such as landscape value, community identity, and sense of place”) . For a more detailed inventory of principles and measures for achieving equitable adaptation, see Kaswan (footnote 3), 11138–43 . Adger / Paavola / Huq (footnote 9), 4; Kristin Dow / Roger E . Kasperson / Maria Bohn, Exploring the Social Justice Implications of Adaptation and Vulnerability, in Fairness in Adaptation to Climate Change, ed . W . Neil Adger et al., 2006, 79; Robin Leichenko / Karen O’Brien, Is It Appropriate to Identify Winners and Losers?, in Fairness in Adaptation to Climate Change, ed . W . Neil Adger et al., 2006, 111 . Anna Grear sees climate injustice as not simply about certain actors causing emissions, but as a reflection of underlying economic and political structural conditions that create endemic power imbalances . Cf . Anna Grear, Climate Justice? A Critical Reflection on Legal Subjectivity and Climate Injustice: Warning Signals, Patterned Hierarchies, Directions for Future Law and Policy, Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 5 (2014), 105, 118, 120 . Barnett similarly suggests that a just climate policy would focus not just on the distribution of costs, but “would be based on a broader spatial, temporal, and ethical analysis of the political and economic relationships among societies .” Cf . Jon Barnett, Climate Change, Insecurity, and Injustice, in Fairness in Adaptation to Climate Change, ed . W . Neil Adger et al., 2006, 129 . Eric A . Posner / David Weisbach, Climate Change Justice, 2010, 73–98 . Posner and Weisbach discuss the issue in terms of responsibility for reducing emissions, but similar arguments could apply to responsibility for adaptation .

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likely to ever reach the levels necessary to address significant vulnerabilities and are unlikely to focus on the long-term adaptation needs of the most vulnerable . Broad social justice initiatives will contribute to adaptation justice, but adaptation-specific efforts remain important . In addition to developing policies tailored to specific vulnerabilities and resource transfers, adaptation justice is best served by inclusive participatory opportunities at the international and domestic scale . 1.3 the state of adaPtation suPPort for the most vuLnerabLe In developed countries like the United States, federal agencies have acknowledged socioeconomic disparities in climate vulnerability and articulated at least general principles to address them .14 Because adaptation planning and implementation remains largely decentralized and is in its early stages, however, the nation and its states have yet to fully confront the difficult distributional questions that lie ahead . At the international level, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) states that developed countries should help developing countries cope with the costs of adaptation .15 Several steps to implement that commitment have emerged . Through the Adaptation Fund, a small percentage of funds generated by the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean Development Mechanism are devoted to adaptation . In the Cancun Adaptation Framework, adopted in 2010, developed countries committed to create a Green Climate Fund that would, by 2020, channel $100 billion per year from developed countries to developing countries for both mitigation and adaptation . More recently, in late 2013, the parties established the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage, intended to help the most vulnerable developing countries cope with unavoidable climate change . Although some adaptation funds are flowing to developing countries, experts predict a multi-billion dollar shortfall between existing commitments and short-and medium term needs .16 Negotiations over the Loss and Damage Mechanism also reveal sharp disputes about how to characterize financing: whether it should be considered a form of aid or a form of compensation . Debates about responsibility for financing adaptation are thus brewing within developed countries and quite robust at the international level . The remainder of this essay considers how theories of justice can inform these debates .

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USGCRP (footnote 3), 12, 32 . A national task force on adaptation articulated, as a guiding national principle, that federal agencies should “prioritize the most vulnerable” and address “[i]ssues of inequality and environmental justice associated with climate change impacts and adaptation […] .” White House Council on Environmental Quality, Progress Report of the Interagency Climate Change Adaptation Task Force, 2010, http://www .whitehouse .gov/sites/default/files/ microsites/ceq/Interagency-Climate-Change-Adaptation-Progress-Report .pdf . The UNFCCC states that “developed country Parties and other developed Parties […] shall […] assist the developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects .” U . N . Framework Convention on Climate Change, art 4 .4 . United Nations Environment Program, The Adaptation Gap Report 2014: A Preliminary Assessment Report, 2014, http://www .unep .org/climatechange/adaptation/gapreport2014/

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Many substantive and participatory adaptation policies to help vulnerable populations are simply “smart policy,” like communication outreach in multiple languages, or holding hearings at accessible times and locations . Proposals that require wealth or resource transfers within or between countries, however, are more controversial . Where adaptation policies require some sort of sacrifice or shift in resources, then questions of who owes what to whom – the justice questions – come into play .17 To clarify what constitutes substantive injustice, this essay illuminates dominant corrective and distributive justice theories .18 These conceptions of justice in turn inform the relevance of differing principles that shape responsibility for injustice, including “polluter pays,” “beneficiary pays,” and “ability to pay .”19 These central theories are echoed in the principle of common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR) embodied in the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change . The CBDR states that the parties shall engage in protection “[…] on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities .”20 The text echoes concerns about equity, reflecting distributive justice, it recognizes differential responsibilities, reflecting corrective justice, and it recognizes differing capabilities, reflecting differences in the ability to pay . The terms “corrective” and “distributive” justice have a multiplicity of meanings, and I will begin by clarifying how I distinguish them . I define a theory as a “corrective justice” theory if it defines injustice through reference to a causal agent – if injustice is perceived because somebody has done something to someone . In contrast, I define a theory as a “distributive justice” theory if it focuses on the justness of an existing distribution, independent of who or what caused that distribution .21 Both corrective justice theories and distributive justice theories can inform how resources should be distributed, but they differ in their relative focus on a causal actor versus an existing distribution .

17 18

19

20 21

See Knox (footnote 9), 22 (noting that “proposals that ask us to compromise […] interests for the benefit of others are usually premised, tacitly or explicitly, on ethical principles”) . Dow, Kasperson, and Bohn identify several similar theories for determining why the most vulnerable deserve special attention: equality, desert (which I define as a potential reason to diverge from equality), liberty, or need (which I define as a “minimum capabilities” approach) . Dow/ Kasperson/Bohn (footnote 12), 80 . For a general elaboration on the distinction between polluter pays and ability to pay approaches, cf . Henry Shue, Subsistence Emissions and Luxury Emissions, Law & Policy 15 (1993), 51–53 . Simon Caney argues that all of these theories are designed to determine how to achieve “Burden-Sharing Justice .” Simon Caney, Two Kinds of Climate Justice: Avoiding Harm and Sharing Burdens, Journal of Political Philosophy 22 (2014), 125–26 . His reference to “Harm-Avoidance Justice” focuses on the duties of actors who can indirectly influence climate harm, and does not relate to this essay’s inquiry into direct responsibility for adaptation assistance . United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, art . 3, para .1 . Relatedly, Simon Caney has noted that principles of distributive justice “warrant obligations on others, even without recourse to the polluter pays principle” (cited in Adger/Nicholson-Cole (footnote 21), 259–60) .

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2.1 CorreCtive justiCe and the ComPLexity of assigning bLame For some, the existence of a blameworthy agent is the hallmark of a claim for justice; it is what distinguishes a mere “misfortune” from an “injustice” that entitles its victims to a remedy,22 and what distinguishes climate-change impacts from natural processes .23 The theory of responsibility that flows from corrective justice principles is “polluter pays:” those who cause harm are responsible for remedying it . The scope of corrective justice is subject to interpretation; it is at its most capacious when referring to pure causal responsibility, but is also often qualified by various factors, including moral responsibility, as elaborated below . A second form of corrective justice focuses not only on the harm caused to the victim, but on the benefits that the causal agent reaped as a consequence, a form of unjust enrichment .24 Although this notion has a distributive dimension, since it is focused on the distribution of harms and benefits, I class it as a “corrective justice” theory because it remains focused on the causal actor, and is intended to “correct” for unfairness not only in what causal actors have done, but also in what they have gained as a consequence of their actions . The correlative theory of responsibility is “beneficiary pays”: the beneficiary of the harmful activity must pay .25 Before exploring the intricacies of corrective justice, it is worth clarifying the relevance of a corrective justice framework, which often focuses on responsibility for past harms, to the issue of future adaptation assistance, which is the focus of this essay . Although the issue of compensation for identified climate harms is important, this essay focuses instead on duties to provide adaptation assistance to help people prepare for future climate impacts and to help them recover when they occur .26 So does corrective justice apply? I argue that corrective justice is a relevant 22 23 24

25

26

Verchick (footnote 4), 27, 28, 52 . Verchick’s description of disaster justice draws here upon the work of political theorist Judith Shklar . Adger/Nicholson-Cole (footnote 6), 255–56 Paul Baer, Adaptation: Who Pays Whom?, in Fairness in Adaptation to Climate Change, ed . W . Neil Adger et al., 134; Dow/Kasperson/Bohn (footnote 12), 79; Farber (footnote 1), 24, 29; Amy Sinden / Carl Cranor, Toward Distributional Justice, in Economic Thought and U. S. Climate Change Policy, ed . David Driesen, 2010, 243–244 This use of the term “beneficiary pays,” which focuses on the beneficiary of the harmful activity paying, should be distinguished from another use of the term “beneficiary pays”: that the beneficiaries of an environmental policy, like adaptation, should pay for the policy from which they benefit . Farber uses this second meaning of “beneficiary pays” . Farber (footnote 1), 26–28 . I do not explore the option of having the beneficiaries of adaptation pay their own costs because this essay presupposes that the beneficiaries will not have sufficient resources to finance their own adaptation . Moellendorf rejects the beneficiary pays approach articulated in this essay, arguing that receipt of incidental benefits does not typically justify compensation . Darrel Moellendorf, The Moral Challenge of Dangerous Climate Change: Values, Poverty, and Policy, 2014, 169–170 . However, the beneficiary pays approach in the climate context contemplates not simply taking responsibility for incidental benefits received (as in paying your neighbor because you enjoy the benefits of their nice paint job), but responsibility for the harmful activities from which the actor obtained benefits (as in paying for climate harm because you received the wealth and benefits of industrialization) . I acknowledge that the line between claims for adaptation assistance and reparations claims is blurry; indeed, reparations for past harms can be effectuated through adaptation assistance . Cf . Maxinne Burkett, Climate Reparations, Melbourne Journal of International Law 10 (2009), 531–534 .

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framework because, given the long time lag between GHG emissions and their climate consequences, past emissions will cause future harms . Thus, accountability for past emissions includes preparing for future harm .27 In addition, since emissions will inevitably continue, corrective justice principles can help define responsibility for adapting to future harm from future emissions . Lastly, I note that this essay implicitly assumes, without discussing, that at least some degree of assistance to future generations is justified . Numerous complexities emerge in interpreting the scope of corrective justice . Should corrective justice be founded upon strict liability or fault? If fault, then how should fault be defined? How should we take into account not only past emissions but also ongoing emissions? And, in the international context, how do we negotiate a system where responsibilities are assigned to nation-states, but degrees of relative responsibility vary significantly within states? Because the analysis of corrective justice differs in the international and domestic contexts, I discuss them separately . 2 .1 .1 Corrective Justice and International Responsibility Corrective justice principles are frequently invoked in debates about international responsibility for climate change harm . Developed countries contributed the majority of the emissions that are currently causing climate change .28 Moreover, although emissions in newly industrializing countries are increasing, a significant proportion of the emissions can be attributed to industrial production that serves developed country consumption . Meanwhile, the least developed countries continue to have very low total emissions, with around 1750 mtCO2e from least developed countries in 2011, compared with global emissions of over 43,000 mtCO2e .29 Thus, developed countries’ emissions have disproportionately caused harm to developing countries . In addition, developed countries have obtained widespread economic and societal benefits from their emissions-causing industrial development . The first question to address is the role of fault: whether to take a strict liability approach, under which causation alone is sufficient, or instead to find responsibility only where harm is caused by wrongful conduct . Under a “beneficiary pays” approach to corrective justice, which focuses on whether a country obtained benefits from its harmful actions without having accounted for their costs, fault is irrelevant; the benefits industrialized societies have obtained from their historic and current resource use justifies assigning responsibility for the uncompensated harms they have imposed .30 Although developing countries have undoubtedly received some benefits from 1st-world industrialization, and some in the developing world are well off, overall, the dramatic difference in standards of living suggests that the traditionally industrialized nations continue to reap most of the benefits of their energy-intensive economies . More broadly, focusing on the polluter pays principle, some argue for strict liability . As Peter Singer states, “as far as the atmosphere is concerned, the developed 27 28 29 30

Cf . Amy Sinden, Allocating the Costs of the Climate Crisis: Efficiency versus Justice, Washington Law Review 85 (2010), 336 . Baer (footnote 24), 132 . World Resources Institute CAIT 2, http://cait2 .wri .org/equity/ Baer (footnote 24), 136 .

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nations broke it . If we believe that people should contribute to fixing something in proportion to their responsibility for breaking it, then the developed nations owe it to the rest of the world to fix the problem with the atmosphere .”31 This perspective suggests that the issue is taking responsibility for harms done, not punishing wrongdoers, and so developed nations should “fix” the problem whether their actions were wrongful or not .32 In contrast, many reject a strict liability approach, arguing that corrective justice includes a moral element that requires some sort of wrongful conduct before holding an actor responsible .33 Moreover, under most tort law systems, strict liability applies only to unusually dangerous activities, not the everyday energy-generation that causes most GHG emissions .34 Assuming that the principle of corrective justice is applied only where fault can be established, a second complexity emerges: how should fault be determined? Many argue that knowledge of harm is a critical factor . Commentators generally conclude that developed countries knew about the consequences of climate change by the early 1990 s, after the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change published its 1990 report linking GHG emissions and climate change and after many nations signed the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change in 1992 .35 Under this approach, nations would be responsible in proportion to post-1990 emissions, but not before . Jamieson has, however, argued that while knowledge might be sufficient to establish fault where the connection between action and harmful consequences is immediate and direct, it is not sufficient in the climate change context because the actors causing climate change are too diffuse, the causal chains are too complex, and GHG-emitting actions are not inherently harmful in nature .36 Jamieson therefore concludes that developed nations cannot ethically be considered at fault for GHG emissions .

31 32

33 34

35 36

Peter Singer, One World, 2002, 33–34 . Henry Shue, Global Environment and International Inequality, International Affairs 75 (1999), 535; Sinden (footnote 27), 329; Marco Grasso, An Ethical Approach to Climate Adaptation Finance, Global Environmental Change 20 (2010), 74–81 (defending “outcome responsibility,” which requires agency in causing impacts, but is distinguishable from and broader than “moral responsibility”) . Posner/Weisbach (footnote 13), 110; Matthew D . Adler, Corrective Justice and Liability for Global Warming, University of Pennsylvania Law Review 155 (2007), 1859–1860 . Dale Jamieson, Climate Change, Responsibility, and Justice, Science Engineering Ethics 16 (2010), 437; Moellendorf (footnote 25), 164–73 . Moellendorf argues that the circumstances justifying strict liability are not present: strict liability can be justified if the actors have notice that their conduct is dangerous and serves to provide a strong incentive to reduce emissions . Neither condition is met for carbon emissions generated by prior generations . Moellendorf (footnote 25), 168–169 . Farber (footnote 1), 29–30 . Baer suggests that a strict liability approach that does not base responsibility on fault has its advantages, and might, accordingly, adjust the cutoff date to a somewhat earlier point . Baer, (footnote 24), 139 . Jamieson (footnote 34), 436–437 . Matthew Adler argues that, at least at the individual level, climate change presents a “moral collective action” problem in which people’s individual actions have adverse consequences, but each individual is morally justified in his or her actions . Adler (footnote 33), 1862–1864 .

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Others, like philosopher Stephen Gardiner, disagree . Gardiner argues that, although these factors complicate the political debates about responsibility for climate change, traditional ethical principles still apply: developed countries’ clear role in emitting high levels of GHGs and the clear evidence of harm that those emissions are causing and will cause continues to present a powerful corrective justice claim .37 Whether one takes a strict liability or a fault-based approach, a third issue arises: arguably, responsibility should be qualified by whether the emissions were unavoidable .38 Emissions could be unavoidable because they were necessary subsistence emissions, because the emitter has already taken steps to reduce emissions, or because a nation lacks the means to control them . Luxury emissions, in contrast to subsistence emissions, could be considered avoidable emissions .39 Assuming that low per capita emissions are more likely to represent subsistence emissions, countries with low per capita emissions would have comparatively little responsibility because most of their emissions are subsistence emissions . For example, in Bangladesh, 2010 per capita emissions, measured in tons of carbon dioxide equivalent, were 0 .84 per person, in comparison with 21 .56 per person in the United States .40 Although total emissions in emerging countries have recently increased substantially, per capita emissions remain much lower than in developed countries, suggesting a higher proportion of unavoidable subsistence emissions . For example, per capita emissions in China, the world’s highest emitter, were 7 .24 per capita in 2010, one-third the level of US per capita emissions .41 Of course, per capita emissions are only a rough proxy for distinguishing subsistence versus luxury emissions; needs could depend strongly on context-specific factors like weather and geography, and the question of what constitutes a “subsistence” versus a “luxury” emission is likely to be highly contested . In addition, the degree to which a nation has attempted to reduce emissions could qualify responsibility: the less a nation has done to reduce its emissions, the more its high emissions levels could be considered avoidable, and the greater that country’s relative responsibility .42 Correspondingly, the more a nation has adopted climate mitigation policies to reduce emissions, the more its remaining emissions could be considered unavoidable . Lastly, a nation’s underlying natural resource base and its economic capacity to develop low emission alternatives are also relevant . For example, sunny rich countries have a greater capacity to develop no-emission solar resources than poor cloudy countries . For poor countries with limited resources to invest or few renewables re-

37 38 39

40 41 42

Stephen Gardiner, Is No One Responsible for Global Environmental Tragedy? Climate Change as a Challenge to our Ethical Concepts, in The Ethics of Global Climate Change, ed . Denis G . Arnold, 2011, 38–59 . Baer (footnote 24), 135 . The distinction is attributable to Shue, Subsistence Emissions and Luxury Emissions (footnote 19) . Further discussion qualifying responsibility based upon need is in Dow/Kasperson/Bohn (footnote 12), 79; Jamieson (footnote 34) (observing that emissions from rich countries are “unnecessary”), and Sinden (footnote 27), 327 . World Resources Institute, (footnote 29) . World Resources Institute (footnote 29) . Sinden (footnote 27), 327; Daniel A . Farber, Apportioning Climate Change Costs, UCLA Journal of Environmental Law & Policy 23 (2008), 40–42 .

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sources, emissions may be less avoidable than in countries with greater financial resources and alternative energy options . A fourth controversial question is how responsibility for cumulative emissions should be weighed against current emission levels, even if countries are deemed responsible only for post 1990 emissions .”43 In recent years, the relative proportion of emissions from developing countries has significantly increased, evidenced most prominently by China’s becoming the world’s largest emitter .44 Although low per capita emissions reveal that a significant proportion of China’s emissions remain subsistence, and hence unavoidable, emissions, developing countries nonetheless are increasingly responsible for current emissions levels . Principles of corrective justice suggest that they have some role to play in financing adaptation needed to address the consequences of their current and future emissions, even if their historic contributions were low . At the same time, under any calculation, developed countries have contributed much more to the build-up of GHGs that is causing climate change . According to one source, the United States, with less than five percent of the world’s population, is responsible for 20 percent of accumulated GHGs .45 Given the disparity in responsibility for the accumulation of GHGs, the relative weight associated with cumulative rather than current emissions – even if measured from only 1990 to the present and not earlier – could significantly impact relative responsibility . A fifth complexity emerges in applying principles of corrective justice to nation states . Some argue that corrective justice principles can apply only to individual moral actors, not nation states .46 However, nation states provide a mechanism for allocating collective responsibility, and ethical principles can help define when such responsibility should or should not be assigned . Lastly, assigning responsibility to a nation as a whole can appear unfair where emissions vary substantially within the country . For example, in some developing countries, the elite have high per capita emissions that are comparable to those in developed countries, and it is questionable whether high-emitting elites should receive a free ride on the coattails of their poorer fellow citizens . However, as several scholars have demonstrated, these internal variations can be taken into consideration in developing national obligations .47 In sum, corrective justice presents a central theory for allocating responsibility in the international sphere, but its precise dictates depend upon the resolution of 43 44 45 46 47

Posner/Weisbach (footnote 13), 33–39; Farber (footnote 42), 45–46; Michael Grubb, Seeking Fair Weather: Ethics and the International Debate on Climate Change, International Affairs 71 (1995), 491 . World Resources Institute (footnote 29) . Sinden/Cranor (footnote 24), 242 . Posner/Weisbach (footnote 13), 101 . Baer (footnote 24), 146–149; Shoibal Chakravarty et al., Sharing Global CO2 Emissions Reductions among One Billion High Emitters, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106 (2009), 11884–11888 . Complexities emerge: if a nation’s obligations incorporate a small high-emitting population notwithstanding low per capita emissions, to what degree can we be assured that, internally, the obligation will be met by the high emitters rather than being spread across the low emitters? The same issues do, of course, arise when imposing obligations on countries which have had high per capita emissions, but in that context more of the nation’s citizens are likely to have generated or benefited from the high emissions .

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many critical value choices . Critical variables are whether to take a strict liability or a fault-based approach, the degree to which responsibility can be qualified by need, by efforts to control emissions, or by country-specific capabilities, and the relative weight to be attached to cumulative versus current emissions . 2 .1 .2 Corrective Justice and Domestic Responsibility In the domestic context, nations will have to determine how to pay for adaptation assistance to the most vulnerable . Under a corrective justice framework, and its associated polluter pays principle, nations could impose some form of carbon charge on GHG-emitting sectors . A carbon tax or a cap-and-trade system could be applied to specific industries, like electricity generation, fuels, or other sectors . The cost would then be borne by the industries themselves and would be passed along to those who use those industries’ products . The greater the GHG emissions, the more the producer or user would have to pay . Principles of corrective justice and the polluter pays principle provide a reasonably compelling justification for concluding that GHG emitters should generate revenue for adaptation . A separate question, however, is whether principles of corrective justice and the polluter pays principle justify providing adaptation resources to the most vulnerable, like poor communities unable to adequately prepare or relocate in response to climate risks . The principles resonate in the international context, where high-emitting developed countries’ emissions have impacted vulnerable low-emitting countries . And the principles might resonate in some developing countries characterized by large internal disparities in emissions . However, within relatively wealthy developed countries, corrective justice principles do not resonate as well because internal domestic adaptation injustices are largely a function of underlying socioeconomic disparities that are not linked to striking difference in emissions . At least in developed countries, emissions are relatively high across the spectrum, and so adaptation assistance to the most vulnerable cannot be justified based upon differences in emission levels . Instead, adaptation justice within industrialized countries may be better addressed by theories of distributive justice that focus more directly on underlying differences in vulnerability, rather than who caused climate change . 2.2 distributive justiCe The distributive justice inquiry starts from an analysis of whether the existing distribution of climate change vulnerability is just . A number of theories are available for assessing the justice of an existing distribution: a utilitarian emphasis on the greatest good for the greatest number, principles of equality, or a minimum resources or capabilities approach, each of which is discussed below . To the degree that injustice under any of these theories is identified, an additional theory of responsibility is available: the “ability to pay .”48 Thus, on an inter48

Henry Shue discusses the essential features of the “ability to pay” principle . Shue, International Inequality (footnote 32), 537–540 .

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national scale, wealthier countries could transfer adaptation resources to poorer countries . On the domestic level, the “ability to pay” theory of responsibility justifies redistributive policies within countries, including the use of tax revenues to help poorer communities prepare and adapt to climate change .49 Although the “ability to pay” theory of responsibility uniquely tracks distributive justice theories of injustice, other theories of responsibility, including polluter pays and beneficiary pays, could also be marshalled to justify responsibility for remedying distributive injustices . Thus, corrective and distributive theories of justice affect but do not fully determine the relevant theory of responsibility . 2 .2 .1 Utilitarian Theories of Distributive Justice There are numerous variants on utilitarianism, a number of which provide useful insights for considering responsibility for adaptation assistance . Under a simple formulation of utilitarianism, resource allocations should provide the greatest good to the greatest number, maximizing aggregate welfare, without regard to the distribution of benefits and costs .50 If this principle is interpreted to focus on serving the greatest number of people rather than those most in need, it would not provide a strong justification for helping the most vulnerable .51 Furthermore, if aggregate welfare were measured solely in economic terms, then it could lead to greater protection and assistance for the most valuable property, to the detriment of those who live and rely on less valuable property .52 Some utilitarians have, however, suggested that transfers from the rich to the poor could enhance aggregate social welfare because the resources are more valuable to the poor than to the rich – they have a diminishing marginal utility .53 Thus, providing adaptation resources for those with the least could increase aggregate social welfare by more than if the resources to adapt remained concentrated in the wealthy . In addition, utilitarian theory could justify assistance to the most vulnerable in order to protect the general public . Severe impacts from climate change could lead to homelessness and unrest, with broader impacts on the larger society,54 impacts 49 50 51

52

53 54

Leichenko and O’Brien suggest that egalitarian liberals, following Rawls, would argue “that it is the responsibility of society to address losers” . Leichenko/O’Brien (footnote 12), 110 . Adger/Paavola/Huq (footnote 9), 13, 15 (describing “universal metric” for determining distributive justice); Leichenko/O’Brien (footnote 12), 109 . John Knox observes that human rights approaches that focus on “the weakest and most vulnerable” do not necessarily maximize the collective good . Knox (footnote 9), 23–24 . Stadelmann and his co-authors observe that utilitarianism “does not distinguish between benefits accruing to the most vulnerable and those accruing to less vulnerable actors and is therefore often seen as inequitable” . Martin Stadelmann et al., Equity and Cost-Effectiveness of Multilateral Adaptation Finance: Are They Friends or Foes?, International Environmental Agreements 14 (2014), 105 In evaluating funding decisions by the Adaptation Fund, which distributes funds generated through the Clean Development Mechanism, researchers have noted that an approach focused on maximizing economic savings would lead to greater funding for projects benefitting wealthy countries given higher-valued properties at risk, a result in tension with equity goals . Stadelmann (footnote 51), 115 . Cf . Sinden (footnote 27), 322, 347 (describing argument); Singer (footnote 31), 42 . Farber (footnote 1), 22–23 .

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that could be avoided by providing adaptation assistance to those most desperately in need . Utilitarian reasoning thus cuts in multiple directions . While some variants do not justify distributions to help the most vulnerable populations, a utilitarian focus on distributions that enhance overall welfare by providing it where it is most needed, or that help stabilize civil society for the general welfare, would justify adaptation assistance to the most vulnerable . 2 .2 .2 Distributive Justice and Equality Egalitarian approaches to distributive justice start from a position of equality – here, equality in resilience to future climate impacts . John Rawls’ original position, behind a veil of ignorance, helps us visualize the appeal of egalitarianism: for a person behind the veil, not knowing whether vulnerable or safe, “the sensible thing for him to do is to acknowledge as the first principle of justice one requiring an equal distribution .”55 He could not justify being better off than others, and would certainly not choose to be worse off . Rawls and many who came after him have debated the wide range of variables that could justify deviations from equality . In the adaptation context, a relevant variable could be “desert”: whether people deserve to have less or more based on their conduct . One type of desert resonates with corrective justice principles: people could deserve to have disparate impacts because they did more to cause climate change . However, in the climate context, responsibility and vulnerability are often inversely related, with more severe impacts in the developing countries that contributed the least emissions . And within countries, poorer and more marginalized households have generally contributed at least somewhat less to climate change than richer households better able to cope with climate impacts . So, vulnerable populations do not deserve their more desperate circumstances because of their role in causing the problem .56 Another way in which people could arguably deserve their vulnerability is if their own choices placed them in harm’s way .57 However, if the available choices are constrained by poverty or socioeconomic conditions, like racial discrimination, then they cannot be deemed to deserve the resulting increase in vulnerability . For example, poor African-Americans facing explicit and implicit racial bias will experience constrained housing options . Risk could decrease property values, making riskier areas more attractive to populations with few choices . Thus, marginalized populations could persistently end up in riskier conditions, but their fate is not deserved because of the constraints affecting their choices .

55 56 57

John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, 1971, 150 . Rawls states that “[a]ll social values […] are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution […] of these values is to everyone’s advantage” . Rawls, 62 . Dow/Kasperson/Bohn (footnote 12), 82 . Moreover, providing resources could create a moral hazard – could induce people to take risks that they would have avoided if preparation or recovery assistance had not been available . Farber (footnote 1), 21 .

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2 .2 .3 Distributive Justice and a Minimum Level of Resources or Capabilities Rather than starting from equality, other theories of distributive justice start by evaluating whether all have a minimum level of necessary resources, or minimum capacity to meet their needs .58 Climate change will threaten fundamental interests in “life, health and subsistence,”59 and, under this principle, justice would require providing adaptation assistance to the degree necessary to protect these fundamental interests . Having basic capabilities is important not only to ensure human comfort, but to achieve liberty: adequate capabilities give people the opportunity to make choices and experience freedom .60 A critical question is the relevant currency: whether it is a minimum level of wealth or a minimum capacity to achieve certain ends . Numerous philosophers, including Amartya Sen, suggest that the issue is not simply minimum financial resources, but having minimum capabilities .61 Given differing circumstances in differing countries and contexts, the resources and social arrangements necessary to achieve a certain degree of capability are likely to differ,62 depending upon location-specific risks and the combination of economic and social factors that determine vulnerability .63 Another critical question is: “how much”? Is justice served by a minimalist degree of preparation that avoids the worst threats to survival, an approach embodied in human rights approaches to climate change adaptation?64 Or, as Amartya Sen 58

59

60 61 62 63

64

Shue (footnote 32), 540–541 (describing obligation to provide a basic minimum as a central principle of equity); Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice, 2009, 295–298; Dow/Kasperson/Bohn (footnote 12), 82 (describing Amaryta Sen’s interpretation of distributive justice as “equality of capability”); Grasso (footnote 32) . Because achieving capabilities can conflict with other considerations, Sen does not argue for equality of capability . Sen, 295–98 . Adger/Nicholson-Cole (footnote 6), 259; Simon Caney, Climate Change, Energy Rights, and Equality, in The Ethics of Global Climate Change, ed . Denis G . Arnold, 2011, 78; Simon Caney, Cosmopolitan Rights, Global Justice, and Climate Change, Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence XIX (2006), 259–62 . Sen (footnote 58), 253 . Sen (footnote 58), 233–234, 253; Caney, Climate Change, Energy Rights, and Equality (footnote 59), 94–97 . Caney focuses on the distribution of emission rights, not adaptation resources, but the principle is equally applicable to adaptation . Sen (footnote 58), 254–57 (describing numerous diverse factors, besides income, that influence capabilities) . Dow, Kasperson and Bohn note that poverty alone does not define vulnerability, but that it is nonetheless a good indicator of vulnerability . Dow/Kasperson/Bohn (footnote 12), 86 . Similarly, financial resources alone do not determine the capacity to adapt, but financial resources are an important component of that capacity . Simon Caney has argued that there is a human right not to suffer from dangerous climate change . Adger/Nicholson-Cole (footnote 6), 259 (citing Caney); Caney, Cosmopolitan Rights (footnote 59), 277 . John Knox and Stephen Humphreys argue that climate change will jeopardize fundamental rights like the “rights to life, health, and property .” Knox (footnote 9), 28; Stephen Humphreys, Introduction: Human Rights in Climate Change, in Human Rights and Climate Change, ed . Stephen Humphreys, 2010, 1–33 . See U . N . Human Rights Council, Human Rights and the Environment: Regional Consultation on the Relationship between Human Rights Obligations and Environmental Protection, with a Focus on Constitutional Human Rights, 2014, http:// ieenvironment .org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Johannesburg-consultation-report-final1 .pdf . This essay is focused on minimum human capabilities as an ethical principle, and does not engage the additional questions that arise in determining what constitutes “rights”, whether moral

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would argue, does justice require the minimum capabilities necessary to lead a good life, including adequate food, shelter, education, health care, and the capacity to avoid premature death?65 The question of degree could have a significant impact on the wealth transfer necessary to achieve this form of distributive justice . 3. AssessIng

And

IntegrAtIng theorIes

of justIce

3.1 assessing theories of justiCe Each of these theories of justice and responsibility have their limits . I make a few observations about both corrective and distributive justice theories . A consequence of corrective justice theories is that they limit responsibility to the extent an actor is deemed to have caused harm, a limitation with especially substantial consequences under a fault-based version of corrective justice . Under a fault-based version of corrective justice, no one would be considered responsible for the substantial emissions that occurred prior to the late 1980 s or early 1990 s .66 In addition, although corrective justice claims premised on wrongdoing generally have a particularly strong moral power,67 in the climate change context, where the causal chains are long and complex, where many different actors are collectively causing a remote harm, and where harm is speculative or uncertain, the sense of moral wrongdoing may be less powerful than in contexts where there is a closer nexus between individual or national actors and direct and discrete harm .68 This is not to suggest that there is no moral claim; only that it is somewhat muted . Lastly, while developing countries are drawn to corrective justice theories that acknowledge the role of developed countries in contributing to climate change, developed countries have resisted them not only due to the moral stigma, but because they fear that admitting responsibility could ultimately lead to legal liability . Thus, because the “ability to pay” theory of responsibility is less morally and legally loaded, it may, somewhat ironically, be more politically acceptable than polluter pays theories based upon causation or fault .69 Corrective justice principles have a role to play, but it is nonetheless important to recognize the political challenge they raise . Distributive justice theories are likely to encounter their own limits and controversies . Egalitarian theories are likely to be highly contentious, particularly given the substantial redistribution required to achieve some semblance of equality .70 While there is likely to be a higher degree of support for providing a minimum level of

65 66 67 68 69 70

rights or legal rights, or on the many complex legal issues raised by enforcing human rights . Many of these complexities are discussed in Knox (footnote 9) and Humphreys . Sen (footnote 58), 233–234, 253 . Moellendorf (footnote 25), 166 . Sinden (footnote 27), 323 . Jamieson (footnote 34), 436–437 . Baer (footnote 24), 132 . Cf . Stadelamnn et al. (footnote 85), 105 (noting high cost of achieving adaptation vulnerability equality) .

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assistance for survival, all distributive efforts are nonetheless likely to encounter resistance to redistribution, especially if that redistribution raises tensions with other perceived rights . 3.2 integrating theories of justiCe As I have defined the terms, what distinguishes corrective justice from distributive justice theories is that corrective justice focuses on the role of a causal agent to determine what constitutes an injustice, while distributive injustice defines injustice by the degree to which an existing distribution of resources matches a conception of what is fair . These two theories of justice are not mutually exclusive, a given degree of vulnerability or harm can be unjust because it was caused by another actor and because it reflects an unjustified difference in vulnerability to harm . Once injustice has been defined through principles of corrective justice, distributive justice, or both, then several non-exclusive theories of responsibility are available to address them . The polluter pays and beneficiary pays theories of responsibility arise from corrective justice principles . And the ability to pay theory of responsibility arises from distributive justice principles . These theories might lead to the same conclusions . For example, at the international level, Simon Caney observes that under “any plausible account of moral responsibility,” whether the polluter pays principle or the ability to pay principle, responsibility rests with “affluent industrialized countries […] .”71 The operative theory of justice does not always define the relevant theory of responsibility . A distributional justice theory could identify injustice in the availability of necessary adaptation resources . But in determining how to provide the necessary resources, polluter pays, beneficiary pays, and ability to pay theories could all provide relevant bases for providing assistance that would remedy the distributional injustice . It is, however, important to recognize the potential for divergence among the polluter pays and ability to pay theories . As Paul Baer has observed, some countries most responsible for historic emissions (with a relatively large responsibility under the polluter pays principle) are quite poor (with a relatively low capacity under the ability to pay approach) .72 For example, Eastern European countries that relied heavily on coal-fired power could have relatively high historic and current emissions but be relatively poor . Moreover, to the degree that corrective justice principles focus on knowing, and hence more recent, emissions, recently developed countries could have high levels of responsibility but little ability to pay .73 In contrast, some countries with relatively low historic emissions are quite wealthy, with a high ability to pay .74 Similarly, some rich countries, like the Scan71 72 73 74

Caney, Climate Change, Energy Rights, and Equality (footnote 59), 84 . Baer (footnote 24), 140 . Largely for this reason, and in light of the developing world’s right to develop, Darrel Moellendorf advocates, in the climate mitigation context, that the duty to mitigate should track the ability to pay rather than responsibility for emissions . Moellendorf (footnote 25) . In 2010, Kuwait’s per capita GDP was over $81,000, while it’s cumulative GHG emissions from 1850–2010 were only 1817 mtCO2e, and cumulative per capita GHG emissions from

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dinavian countries, have a high ability to pay, but might have lower responsibility under the polluter pays principle given their robust efforts to lower emissions .75 Thus, the degree to which policymakers focus on one or the other principle, could influence responsibility for providing adaptation assistance . 4. PArtIcIPAtory decIsIon-mAkIng Processes These substantive theories of justice do not provide a complete map of the theories of justice necessary to guide adaptation policy for the most vulnerable . A critical question is who participates in and makes adaptation policy . Participatory justice in planning and political processes is an essential component of adaptation justice, both in international negotiations and in domestic decision-making . Substance and process are related: inclusive and empowering decision-making processes can provide information that leads to fairer outcomes, including better tailored and more appropriate substantive policies .76 Inclusive political processes are not solely instrumental, however; they also present an inherent goal . Participatory processes provide affected communities with a voice and a sense of empowerment in the decisions that affect their lives, and legitimize governmental decisions .77 In countries with marginalized populations, like racial minorities in the United States, explicitly inclusive participatory processes could reduce the risk of disparities by enhancing participation by groups that consistently have less influence in government decision-making .78 While participation is not equivalent to influence, a seat at the table increases transparency and accountability and is more likely to avoid behind-the-scenes decision-making that privileges the privileged . Focusing on domestic decision-making, inclusive political processes can be integrated into many features of domestic adaptation . Adaptation will require extensive planning, including disaster management planning, local land use planning, and infrastructure planning . Inclusive participation that reaches out to and incorporates citizens in bottom-up decision-making structures will be essential to providing impacted communities with a role in their fate, and in reducing the risk of decision-making that reinforces or worsens imbalanced power structures .79 Providing a role for at least some degree of localized decision-making can also be more effective because it can better reflect the varied circumstances nations and communities face .

75 76 77 78 79

1850–2010 were 607 .4 . In contrast, the United States’ 2010 per capita GDP was a little over $49,000, while its cumulative GHG emissions from 1850–2010 were 355,966 .93 and its per capita emissions from 1850–2010 were 1150 .78 . World Resources Institute, CAIT 2 .0 (footnote 29) . Sinden (footnote 27), 335 (observing that the efforts of wealthier countries, like Sweden, to reduce emissions would not receive any credit under a pure “ability to pay” approach) . Adger/Paavola/Huq (footnote 9), 14 . Grear (footnote 12), 130–131; Adger/Paavola/Huq (footnote 9), 10, 14–15; Jouni Paavola / W . Neil Adger, Fair Adaptation to Climate Change, Ecological Economics 56 (2006), 601–602 . Robert D . Bullard / Beverly Wright, The Wrong Complexion for Protection: How the Government Response to Disaster Endangers African American Communities, 2012 . Adger/Paavola/Huq (footnote 9), 13; Verchick (footnote 4), 66 .

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Inclusive participation is not only a function of setting public hearing dates . It will require culturally relevant communication and participation structures .80 For example, in the United States, the inclusion of immigrant communities will require carefully tailored mechanisms that address language barriers, culturally-appropriate communication mechanisms, and address undocumented immigrants’ fears of potential deportation if they avail themselves of government services . At the international scale, adaptation decision-making will primarily be about which nations should provide financial, scientific, technological, and capacity-building expertise to other nations . Such decisions will be enhanced by ensuring the role of marginalized populations and countries in such negotiations .81 Responsibility to provide assistance should be largely de-coupled from dictating more specific adaptation choices . Otherwise, donor countries will end up making critical adaptation decisions and undermine the participatory democratic decision-making that is essential at the domestic level . International aid should be earmarked for adaptation, but recipient countries should take primary responsibility for adaptation planning and implementation . In addition to providing adaptation funds, where recipient countries lack effective decision-making structures, international aid can support enhanced decision-making capacity-building as well as substantive adaptation measures . 5. conclusIon: the PursuIt

of

AdAPtAtIon justIce

The primary purpose of this essay is to map how theories of justice apply to adaptation in order to facilitate a more transparent and focused debate . While many different theories justify providing adaptation assistance,82 numerous questions and tradeoffs remain and clarity about the relevant value choices may lead to more thoughtful solutions . Nonetheless, I will hazard a few general conclusions . I argue that distributive justice principles focused on providing a minimum capacity to survive should be the starting point for analyzing adaptation justice . In a world of limited resources, resources should go where they are most needed . Without assistance for the most vulnerable, colossal suffering lies ahead . That said, multiple theories are available for determining who should be responsible for remedying distributive injustices . Once underlying needs are assessed pursuant to principles of distributive justice, the polluter pays, beneficiary pays, and ability to pay principles can all play a meaningful role in determining how to provide for those most in need . Particularly in the international context, the polluter pays principle is relevant because some degree of accountability for both past and on-going emissions is appropriate . At the same time, questions of knowledge, the remoteness of the harms, and the incompleteness of the polluter pays principle in accounting for all harms suggest it is not a sufficient theory of responsibility . More80 81 82

Verchick (footnote 4), 66 . Grasso (footnote 32) . Dow, Kasperson, and Bohn observe that the goal of helping the most vulnerable could be justified by many different principles, and that people could agree on the outcome even if they disagree about the justification . Dow/Kasperson/Bohn (footnote 12), 80–81 .

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over, the polluter pays principle could create its own injustice if it obligated an impoverished country to provide adaptation assistance due to past or current emissions . So while the polluter pays principle can influence decisions about responsibility, the ability to pay principle can be applied to avoid the gaps and potential inequities created by the polluter pays principle, and to provide a more complete mechanism for addressing distributional disparities . The beneficiary pays principle could, to some degree, buttress the ability to pay principle: in many instances, a nation’s ability to pay could stem from the benefits it has reaped from past and present emissions .

bIblIogrAPhy Adger, W . Neil / Paavola, Jouni / Huq, Saleemul, Toward Justice in Adaptation to Climate Change, in Fairness in Adaptation to Climate Change, ed . W . Neil Adger et al., MIT, 2006, 1–19 . Adger, W . Neil / Nicholson-Cole, Sophie, Ethical Dimensions to Adapting to Climate Change-Imposed Risks, in The Ethics of Global Climate Change, ed . Denis G . Arnold, Cambridge, 2011 . Adler, Matthew D ., Corrective Justice and Liability for Global Warming, University of Pennsylvania Law Review 155 (2007), 1859–1867 . Baer, Paul, Adaptation: Who Pays Whom?, in Fairness in Adaptation to Climate Change, ed . W . Neil Adger et al., MIT, 2006, 121–153 . Bullard, Robert D . / Wright, Beverly, The Wrong Complexion for Protection: How the Government Response to Disaster Endangers African American Communities, New York, 2012 . Burkett, Maxinne, Climate Reparations, Melbourne Journal of International Law 10 (2009), 509–542 . Caney, Simon, Two Kinds of Climate Justice: Avoiding Harm and Sharing Burdens, Journal of Political Philosophy 22 (2014), 125–149 . Caney, Simon, Cosmopolitan Rights, Global Justice, and Climate Change, Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence XIX (2006), 255–278 . Caney, Simon , Climate Change, Energy Rights, and Equality, in The Ethics of Global Climate Change, ed . Denis G . Arnold, Cambridge, 2011, 77–103 . Chakravarty, Shoibal et al., Sharing Global CO2 Emissions Reductions among One Billion High Emitters, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 106 (2009), 11884–11888 . Cooley, Heather et al., Social Vulnerability to Climate Change in California, California Energy Commission, 2012, accessed 12 April 2015 . Dow, Kristin / Kasperson, Roger E . / Bohn, Maria, Exploring the Social Justice Implications of Adaptation and Vulnerability, in Fairness in Adaptation to Climate Change, ed . W . Neil Adger et al., MIT, 2006, 79–96 . Farber, Daniel A ., Adapting to Climate Change: Who Should Pay, Journal on Land Use and Environmental Law 23 (2007), 1–37 . Gardiner Stephen, Is No One Responsible for Global Environmental Tragedy? Climate Change as a Challenge to our Ethical Concepts, in The Ethics of Global Climate Change, ed . Denis G . Arnold, Cambridge, 2011, 38–59 . Grasso, Marco, An Ethical Approach to Climate Adaptation Finance, Global Environmental Change 20 (2010), 74–81 . Grear, Anna, Climate Justice? A Critical Reflection on Legal Subjectivity and Climate Injustice: Warning Signals, Patterned Hierarchies, Directions for Future Law and Policy, Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 5 (2014), 103–133 . Grubb, Michael, Seeking Fair Weather: Ethics and the International Debate on Climate Change, International Affairs 71 (1995), 643–696 . Humphreys Stephen (ed .), Human Rights and Climate Change, Cambridge, 2010 . Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation (2012) accessed 10 April 2015 .

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Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Climate Change 2014: Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability (2014), accessed 10 April 2015 . International Organization for Migration, ‘Migration, Climate Change and the Environment, accessed 10 April 2015 . Jamieson, Dale, Climate Change, Responsibility, and Justice, Science Engineering Ethics 16 (2010), 431–454 . Kaswan, Alice, Domestic Climate Change Adaptation and Equity, Environmental Law Reporter (2012), 11125–11143 . Kaswan, Alice, Climate Adaptation and Land Use Governance: The Vertical Axis, Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 39 (2014) . Knox, John H ., Climate Ethics and Human Rights, Journal of Human Rights and Environment 5 (2014), 22–34 . Leichenko, Robin / O’Brien, Karen, Is It Appropriate to Identify Winners and Losers? In Fairness in Adaptation to Climate Change, ed . W . Neil Adger et al., MIT, 2006, 97–114 . Moellendorf, Darrel, The Moral Challenge of Dangerous Climate Change: Values, Poverty, and Policy, Cambridge, 2014 . Morello-Frosch, Rachel et al., How Climate Change Hurts Americans and How to Close the Gap (USD Program for Environmental and Regional Equity 2009) accessed 12 April 2015 . Paavola, Jouni / Adger, W . Neil, Fair Adaptation to Climate Change, Ecological Economics 56 (2006), 594–609 . Posner, Eric A . / Weisbach, D ., Climate Change Justice, Princeton, 2010 . Rawls, John, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, 1971 . Sen, Amartya, The Idea of Justice, Harvard University Press, 2009 . Shue, Henry, Subsistence Emissions and Luxury Emissions, Law & Policy 15 (1993), 39–59 . Shue, Henry, Global Environment and International Inequality, International Affairs 75 (1999), 531– 545 . Sinden, Amy, Allocating the Costs of the Climate Crisis: Efficiency versus Justice, Washington Law Review 85 (2010), 293–353 . Sinden, Amy / Cranor, Carl, Toward Distributional Justice, in Economic Thought and U. S. Climate Change Policy, ed . David Driesen, MIT, 2010, 237–255 . Singer, Peter, One World: the Ethics of Globalization, New Haven/London, 2002 . Stadelmann, Martin et al., Equity and Cost-Effectiveness of Multilateral Adaptation Finance: Are They Friends or Foes? International Environmental Agreements 14 (2014), 101–120 . Stallworthy, Mark, Sustainability, Coastal Erosion and Climate Change: An Environmental Justice Analysis, Journal of Environmental Justice Analysis 18 (2006), 357–373 . United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, accessed 12 April 2015 . United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Warsaw Mechanism for Loss and Damage, accessed 10 April 2015 . United Nations Environment Program, The Adaptation Gap Report 2014: A Preliminary Assessment Report (2014) accessed 10 April 2015 U . S . Global Change Research Program, Climate Change Impacts in the United States: 3rd National Assessment (2014) . Verchick, Robert M ., Facing Catastrophe: Environmental Action for a Post-Katrina World, Harvard University Press, 2010 . Verchick, Robert M ., Disaster Justice: The Geography of Human Capability, Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum 23 (2012), 23–71 . White House Council on Environmental Quality, Progress Report of the Interagency Climate Change Adaptation Task Force (2010) accessed 10 April 2015 . World Resources Institute, CAIT 2, accessed 9 April 2015 .

ivo waLLimann-heLmer (ZuriCh)

dIfferentIAtIng resPonsIbIlItIes for clImAte chAnge AdAPtAtIon In the Cancun Adaptation Framework (CAF), the parties to the United Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) agreed “that adaptation is a challenge faced by all Parties, and that enhanced action and international cooperation is urgently required to enable and support the implementation of adaptation actions aimed at reducing vulnerability and building resilience in developing country Parties […] .”1 Furthermore, the conference of the parties (COP) requests the developed countries to provide developing countries with additional finance, technology, and capacity-building .2 This paper argues that this decision tends to oversimplify matters because it seems to differentiate responsibilities for climate change adaptation according to differences in the contribution to anthropogenic climate change only . However, the differentiation of responsibilities for climate change adaptation is more complex than it first appears to be . To show why the differentiation of responsibilities for climate change adaptation is more complex, this paper analyzes the aspects of responsibility as a fourfold concept .3 Someone (i . the subject of responsibility) is always responsible for something (ii . the object of responsibility), answerable to some institution (iii .), and held accountable to some norm (iv .) . The paper argues, first, that the appropriate object of responsibility in climate change adaptation is the burdens to be shared for effective and efficient adaptation . Second, for such adaptation to occur subjects of responsibility should not only be developed countries . If appropriate competence and decision-structures are given in developing countries, these countries should also be deemed responsible for their own adaptation . Third, the paper shows that those vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change should decide on their own what adaptation measures they wish to take . Fourth, the argument of this paper suggests that ability-to-pay principles are the most appropriate norms by which to blame countries for failing their responsibilities in climate change adaptation . 1. whAt Is

the

object

of

resPonsIbIlIty

for

AdAPtAtIon?

The CAF invites all parties to foster action on adaptation by “taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities […]” .4 This invitation does not define how responsibilities for adaptation have to be differentiated . But it says that differentiating responsibilities for adaptation should take into account that not all parties are equally capable of taking responsibility for adaptation . The CAF demands that developed countries subsidize adaptation in devel1 2 3 4

UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its sixteenth session, held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010, 2011, § 11 . UNFCCC (footnote 1), § 18 . Kurt Bayertz, Eine kurze Geschichte der Herkunft der Verantwortung, in: Verantwortung, ed . Kurt Bayertz, 1995, 3–71 . UNFCCC (footnote 1), § 14 .

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oping countries . From an ethical point of view, however, it is not clear why this decision is justified and to what extent differentiating responsibilities for adaptation with regard to financial support is appropriate . One widely recognized principle justifying the responsibility of developed countries to subsidize assistance for adaptation holds that developed countries currently contribute and have historically contributed more to climate change than developing countries . According to this so-called polluter-pays principle, developed countries are responsible for their past and current emissions . Since these emissions cause the adverse effects of climate change, which make adaptation necessary, developed countries have a duty to assist developing countries that have contributed or currently contribute significantly less to climate change . On this account, the quantity of past and current emissions for which countries are responsible decides the way in which responsibilities for adaptation have to be differentiated . This argument disguises the goal of adaptation measures . It emphasizes the idea that polluters should pay for their emissions but ignores the fact that adaptation is meant to enable vulnerable countries or communities to cope with the adverse effects of climate change, which cannot be prevented by mitigation .5 There are two reasons why this is problematic . First, the goal of adaptation is different from that of mitigation .6 Whilst in the case of mitigation it makes perfect sense to differentiate responsibilities according to emissions, this is less convincing in the case of adaptation . It makes sense to differentiate responsibilities for mitigation regarding differences in emissions because the goal of mitigation policy is to prevent dangerous climate change by ensuring that an emission budget is not exceeded . Remaining within an emission budget is necessary to keep the rise of global mean temperature below a certain level . After COP 21 in Paris a threshold well below 2 °C has become prominent, because more warming than this would lead to dangerous climate change .7 Hence, holding countries responsible for their emissions means holding them responsible for their contribution to the overall goal of preventing dangerous climate change . Furthermore, in many cases those countries emitting more are also better able to reduce their emissions . High-emitting countries both typically possess the technological knowledge necessary to reduce their emissions most efficiently and are better able to do so effectively . This effectiveness is because high-emitting countries can often reduce socalled “luxury emissions” but do not have to reduce the emissions necessary to secure subsistence for their citizens .8

5

6

7 8

Note that, in normative literature especially, arguments in favor of the polluter-pays-principle usually do not distinguish between mitigation and adaptation as two different policy goals which might comprise different objects of responsibility (For a collection of essential essays on the polluter-pays principle see Stephen M . Gardiner / Simon Caney / Dale Jamieson / Henry Shue (Ed .), Climate Ethics, 2010) . As the argument of this paper shows this is a significant neglect . An important source of the argument in this section is provided by the conceptual analysis of Christian Seidel, Klimawandel, globale Gerechtigkeit und die Ethik globaler öffentlicher Güter – einige grundlegende begriffliche Fragen, in: Globale öffentliche Güter in interdisziplinären Perspektiven, ed . Matthias Maring, 2012, 179–196 . UNFCC, The Paris Agreement, 2015, Article 2 . The distinction between subsistence emissions and luxury emissions referred to here has been

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In the case of climate change adaptation, by contrast, the goal is different . Adaptation measures are not meant to avoid dangerous climate change by reducing emissions . Rather, adaptation to climate change aims at coping with the threat of climate impacts . For instance, building seawalls prevents or at least minimizes the risk of negative climate impacts . Hence, what matters in the case of adaptation are not emissions but subsidizing, implementing, and maintaining appropriate measures where human beings and natural systems are under threat of climate impacts . Moreover, subsidizing adaptation is more efficient if those who assist already possess appropriate scientific and managerial knowledge . Similarly, adaptation is more effective if those implementing adaptation measures are also able to maintain them for longer periods . Thus, the capacity to subsidize, implement, and maintain adaptation is more relevant to differentiating responsibilities for climate change adaptation than differences in emissions . However, it is important to note that such a differentiation is more plausible if it not only captures the capacity for financial support but also the capacity for transfer of knowledge and technology . Second, there is also an ethical argument why the capacity to subsidize adaptation is more relevant to differentiating responsibilities for climate change adaptation than emissions . Responsibilities for emissions are significantly limited . They can only be ascribed for man-made emissions but not natural climate variability . Natural climate variability is not man-made, so human communities, including countries, cannot be responsible for it . Hence, if responsibilities for climate change adaptation are differentiated according to the quantity of emissions, then the scope of these responsibilities is restricted to climate impacts which are anthropogenic .9 This means that countries would only be responsible for subsidizing adaptation measures if climate impacts were not merely observed but also attributable to anthropogenic climate change .10 Countries and communities vulnerable to impacts due solely to natural climate variability would not be owed assistance . From an ethical point of view, this seems to be erroneous . If human beings face a severe threat they cannot cope with by themselves, they are owed assistance, irrespective of its cause . To be sure, one could counter this argument by saying that, although duties of assistance in cases of natural climate variability exist, they should not be dealt with under the CAF, since the CAF is only concerned with anthropogenic climate change . This critique certainly bears some relevance, but it oversimplifies matters . Anthropogenic climate change is only one of the causes of vulnerability to negative climate impacts . Detecting that a country or a community needs to adapt to climate change is one thing, but attributing this need to anthropogenic climate change is quite another . This is not only because detection and attribution (D&A) research is not able to attribute all hazardous weather events and slow-onset events caused by changing climatic conditions to anthropogenic emissions . The vulnerability of

9 10

introduced by Henry Shue, Subsistence Emissions and Luxury Emissions, in Climate Ethics, ed . Stephen M . Gardiner / Simon Caney / Dale Jamieson / Henry Shue, 2010, 200–214 . Christian Huggel / Dáithí Stone / Maximilian Auffhammer / Gerrit Hansen, Loss and Damage Attribution, Nature Climate Change 5 (2013), 694–696 . M . Hulme, Attributing weather extremes to ‘climate change’: A review, Progress in Physical Geography 38 (2014), 499–511 .

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countries and communities is also increased by socio-economic disadvantage, which is not caused by climate change at all .11 Since in many cases adaptation measures have to be taken today, it would be problematic to wait until D&A research has proven which fraction of climate variability can be distinctively attributed to human emissions . Waiting that long would mean that it is often too late for a country or community to cope with climate impacts by adapting and that they have to face loss and damage which could have been prevented . Moreover, since vulnerability to climate impacts due to socio-economic disadvantage is not caused by climate change, differentiating responsibilities for adaptation according to emissions would not take these disadvantages into account . It would secure measures relative to the magnitude of anthropogenic climate impacts but not in accordance with socio-economic deprivation .12 From an ethical point of view, this approach appears to be devastating, because those vulnerable to climate impacts due to socio-economic disadvantage would be left without appropriately differentiated assistance . However, not only anthropogenic climate change but also natural climate variability and socio-economic disadvantage play their most significant roles in developing countries and communities which are not able to cope with climate impacts on their own .13 Thus, if we believe that those in need are first and foremost owed assistance simply because they need it, rather than trying to differentiate responsibilities according to emissions, ethically speaking it is more appropriate to see which countries and communities are best able to subsidize, and help implement, and maintain adaptation measures irrespective of how much they have contributed to anthropogenic climate change . Both arguments provided in this section suggest that, with climate change adaptation, the object of responsibility should not be emissions . To secure an appropriate distribution of responsibilities for adaptation, it is more plausible to differentiate responsibilities by the different capacities of countries and communities to subsidize, implement, and maintain adaptation measures . Moreover, so as not to leave those most in need of assistance without help, the object of responsibility for climate change adaptation should not be limited to anthropogenic climate impacts . Those capable of subsidizing, implementing, and maintaining adaptation should be deemed responsible for helping those who are not able to cope with the adverse effects of climate change, irrespective of whether climate impacts are anthropogenic or due to natural climate variability .

11

12 13

Dáithí Stone / Maximilian Auffhammer / Mark Carey / Gerrit Hansen / Christian Huggel / Wolfgang Cramer / David Lobell / Ulf Molau / Andrew Solow / Lourdes Tibig / Gary Yohe, The challenge to detect and attribute effects of climate change on human and natural systems, Climatic Change 121 (2013), 381–395 . Hans Visser / Arthur C . Petersen / Willem Ligtvoet, On the relation between weather-related disaster impacts, vulnerability and climate change, Climatic Change 125 (2014), 461–477 . E . g . Robin Bronen, Climate-Induced Displacement of Alaska Native Communities, 2013; N . Hoyos / J . Escobar / J . C . Restrepo / A . M . Arango / J . C . Ortiz, Impact of the 2010–2011 La Niña phenomenon in Colombia, South America: The human toll of an extreme weather event, Applied Geography 39 (2013), 16–25; Koko Warner / Geest, Kees van der, Loss and damage from climate change: Local-level evidence from nine vulnerable countries, International Journal of Global Warming 5 (2013), 367–386 .

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AdAPtAtIon?

According to the argument in the previous section, a crucial distinction between mitigation and adaptation is between the different objects of responsibility they cover . Responsibility for mitigation concerns emissions because the goal of mitigation is to keep global warming below the 2 °C threshold . Responsibilities for mitigation, therefore, can plausibly be differentiated according to differences in emissions . Responsibilities for adaptation, by contrast, concern subsidizing, implementing, and maintaining adaptation measures . In consequence, the object of responsibility for adaptation is more plausibly the burdens of securing adaptation . However, to infer from this conclusion that responsibilities for adaptation should simply be ascribed to developed countries according to their different capacities to subsidize, and help implement, and maintain adaptation is too quick . First, such an inference does not take into account the fact that in 2013 the parties to the UNFCCC established the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) “to address loss and damage associated with impacts of climate change […]” .14 Second, such an inference ignores the fact that, in the long run, implementation and maintenance of adaptation measures are most efficient and effective if the governments and in many cases local communities concerned are suitably involved as responsible agents . This section considers both these claims and reformulates the objectives of responsibilities for adaptation accordingly . First, at their 19th conference in Warsaw (COP 19) the parties to the UNFCCC established the WIM under the CAF, “acknowledging that loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change includes, and in some cases involves more than, that which can be reduced by adaptation, […]” .15 In accordance with the loss and damage (L&D) literature, this acknowledgement states that at least some of the adverse effects of climate change cannot be addressed by “adaptation” measures .16 Hence, according to this political decision there is a difference in the objectives of responsibility when “adaptation” is concerned and when L&D is at issue . This makes it necessary to find a way to distinguish responsibilities for “adaptation” from those for L&D . But since both “adaptation” in the sense of the 2/CP .19 decision and L&D currently figure under the umbrella of the CAF, both kinds of responsibilities can be seen as relevant for differentiating responsibilities for adaptation in a broader sense . Hence, adaptation in the CAF seems to be understood as a wider concept than in the 2/CP .19 decision .

14 15 16

UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its nineteenth session, held in Warsaw from 11 to 23 November 2013, 2014, 2/CP .19 . ibid . I use inverted commas here to highlight that “adaptation” in the sense of the 2/CP .19 decision is different from adaptation the way it is understood within the argument of this paper as a whole . The argument presumes that both “adaptation” measures in the sense of the 2/CP .19 decision and L&D approaches are subsumed under the umbrella of the CAF and are in this sense both instances of adaptation in a broader sense . For two examples of relevant L&D literature see Ainun Nishat / Nandan Mukherjee / Erin Roberts / Anna Hasemann, A Range of Approaches to Address Loss and Damage from Climate Change Impacts in Bangladesh . http://www .loss-and-damage .net/4825, 03 .09 .2014; Warner / Geest, Kees van der (footnote 12) .

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However, it is not an easy task to distinguish between “adaptation” and L&D . One conception which can help to draw such a distinction has been proposed by Dow et al .17 According to them, the limits of “adaptation” are reached when climate risks become intolerable . The object of responsibility in the case of “adaptation” is the implementation and maintenance of measures perceived as having the potential to keep climate risks within a range of acceptable or tolerable risk, for example when dykes are built because they are believed to allow a community to cope with high river flow or sea-level rise . The object of responsibility with regard to L&D is different . L&D measures must enable countries or communities to deal with intolerable risks of climate impacts . Such measures include, for example, early warning systems deemed to minimize the number of deaths instead of keeping the risk of deaths within an acceptable or tolerable range . They also include measures allowing a community to fairly compensate victims of L&D . This paper cannot provide a full justification for why it is appropriate to distinguish between “adaptation” and L&D along the lines proposed by Dow et al ., and neither can it elaborate on the ethical implications of this distinction .18 But since the WIM falls within the scope of the CAF, and if claims in L&D literature are taken seriously, then differentiating responsibilities for adaptation also involves considering the distinction between adaptation and L&D . In the case of “adaptation”, the object is the burdens of keeping risks of climate impacts within an acceptable or tolerable range . With L&D, the object of responsibility is the burdens of realizing measures suitable for dealing with intolerable risks of climate impacts . In light of the different objectives of responsibilities for “adaptation” and L&D, a more fine-grained ascription of responsibilities for adaptation (in the broader sense of the term) is possible . Regarding acceptable and tolerable risks, it seems plausible that countries which command better knowledge and technology in such matters have a greater responsibility to subsidize, implement, and maintain the respective measures . By contrast, the scientific, managerial, and technological capacity to deal with intolerable risks of climate impacts increases the responsibility to subsidize, implement, and maintain L&D measures . In consequence, distinguishing between acceptable, tolerable and intolerable risks of climate impacts allows the differentiation between responsibilities to contribute knowledge, management capacity, and technology to one or the other category of measures . However, attributing responsibility with regard to “adaptation” or L&D measures in the way just proposed tends to charge developed countries with subsidizing adaptation and ignores the fact that the parties to the CAF decided to build resilience and enhance knowledge mainly in and not for the countries and communities most vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change .19 Taking this goal into account leads to further differentiations of responsibilities and changes what assistance appropriate for climate change adaptation from developed countries would 17 18

19

Kirstin Dow / Frans Berkhout / Benjamin L . Preston / Richard J . T . Klein / Guy Midgley / M . Rebecca Shaw, Limits to Adaption, Nature Climate Change 3 (2013), 305–307 . For a more detailed justification of this distinction and discussion of its ethical implications see Ivo Wallimann-Helmer, Justice for Climate Loss and Damage, Climatic Change 133/3 (2015), 469–480, and Alice Kaswan, Climate Change Adaptation and Theories of Justice, Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie (this issue), Sect . 2 .1 . UNFCCC (footnote 1), § 11 .

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mean . Assistance should not be limited to fostering adaptation in vulnerable countries but should also enable the governments and community leaders of these countries to take responsibility for adaptation in their regions of concern . Hence, these governments and leaders need to be provided with knowledge, understanding, technology, and resources so that they and their scientific and managerial staff are able to implement and maintain appropriate adaptation measures . Small Island Developing States (SIDS) are a telling example for illustrating the case . Because of their geographic conditions, SIDS are traditionally used to adapt to varying weather conditions . However, recent empirical research shows that little progress has been made towards appropriate climate change adaptation in SIDS .20 Why is this the case? First, in many SIDS, people, governments and community leaders lack appropriate knowledge and understanding about climate change . And even if there is knowledge and understanding about climate change, climate change is not perceived as a threat but rather as something foreign and distant .21 Second, although both these challenges not only concern SIDS but also other countries, they are more significant in the former, because institutional structures tend to be weak and privilege local leaders rather than central governments . These conditions in SIDS tend to render subsidies for adaptation inefficient, because those who could most efficiently implement adaptation measures have insufficient knowledge and understanding about climate change or tend to see it as a foreign concept not concerning their countries and communities .22 Third, lack of knowledge and appropriate institutional conditions in SIDS tend to render adaptation measures inefficient . The latter are often implemented with donor money . This means that priorities for adaptation are often set by donors as well . Moreover, governments applying for donor money tend to propose the adaptation projects that are most likely to be funded instead of setting their own priorities . As a consequence, adaptation becomes ineffective, either because measures protect infrastructure and coasts inappropriately or because measures lead to more severe impacts elsewhere . Furthermore, SIDS tend to lack resources for maintaining adaptation measures when they are no longer subsidized by donors . They tend to be left as vulnerable as before, or even more vulnerable .23 Generalizing these empirical findings from SIDS, allows the conclusion that assistance in adaptation tends to be inefficient if it is not accompanied by suitable education and training of governments and local political leaders as well as a strengthening of decision structures .24 Furthermore, adaptation tends to become ineffective if vulnerable countries and communities are not involved in decisions concerning which measures have to be implemented and where .25 And when meas20 21 22 23 24 25

For a helpful literature review concerning obstacles for appropriate adaptation in SIDS see Carola Betzold, Adapting to climate change in small island developing states, Climatic Change (2015) . The observations and arguments that follow are based on her analysis . Betzold (footnote 19), Section 4 .1 . Betzold (footnote 19), Section 4 .2 . Betzold (footnote 19), Section 4 .3 . For more empirical data justifying this generalization see Kaswan (footnote 17), Sect . 1 . For a more detailed discussion of the importance to involve countries and communities in decision-making about adaptation see Kaswan (footnote 17), Sect . 4 .

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ures are implemented, adaptation is more effective if governments and community leaders are able to maintain these measures themselves .26 Hence, in line with most invitations in § 14 of the CAF, these observations suggest that the object of responsibility of developed countries concerning adaptation should not be limited to subsidizing adaptation by transferring knowledge, managerial competence, and technology for developing countries . For adaptation to be efficient and effective, the object of responsibility includes fostering appropriate competence and decision structures in developing countries as well . This means that responsibilities for adaptation should be further differentiated among developed countries depending on how well they are suited to support appropriate decision structures and programs for competence building in developing countries . The goal must be to enable vulnerable countries and communities to take responsibility for their own adaptation . Therefore, differentiating responsibilities for adaptation not only concerns developed countries but also developing countries and communities vulnerable to climate change impacts . It is these countries that should be deemed responsible for implementation and maintenance of adaptation measures once the competences and decision structures needed are available or have been built . The example of SIDS suggests that enabling developing countries to take responsibility for implementation and maintenance of adaptation measures is necessary to secure efficient and effective adaptation . 3. AnswerAble

for

AdAPtAtIon

to

whAt InstItutIons?

According to the argument in the previous section, responsibilities for adaptation include both developed and developing countries . The object of responsibility of developed countries is not only to provide knowledge, managerial competence, and technology for developing countries, differentiated by the risks of climate impacts and capacities of developed countries to subsidize assistance . Developed countries are also responsible for helping establish decision structures and for nurturing competence for adaptation in developing countries, the goal being to enable developing countries to implement and maintain adaptation measures on their own . Depending on the strength of decision structures and competence available or built in developing countries, these countries should be deemed responsible for their own adaptation . Turning now to the third aspect of responsibility as a fourfold concept, the answerability to an institution, makes it necessary to consider to which institutions the subjects of responsibility for adaptation identified so far are and should be answerable . With the CAF, the COP in Cancun established the Adaptation Committee (AC) “to promote the implementation of enhanced action on adaptation in a coherent manner […]” .27 The main purpose of the AC is to gather information on needs concerning adaptation, to provide support and guidance, and to ensure availability of information to make adaptation efforts more efficient and effective . The AC is an26 27

To be sure, these conclusions are not original but very much in line with research on development aid in general . I would like to thank Carola Betzold mentioning this observation . UNFCCC (footnote 1), § 20 .

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swerable to the COP, whilst all parties to the UNFCCC are invited to supply information about support provided or needed . In this sense, all the subjects of responsibility for adaptation identified are answerable to the AC, since they are invited to report either the adaptation action taken or the assistance needed for adaptation . However, the AC has a mainly coordinative function and, as no other body of the COP relevant for adaptation, it has any coercive power . The agents bearing responsibility for adaptation, therefore, are not answerable to the AC in the usual sense . The AC can neither enforce the responsibilities of developed countries to subsidize adaptation nor demand from developing countries that they fulfill their responsibilities for implementation and maintenance of adaptation measures . Since neither the AC nor any other body of the COP relevant for adaptation have coercive power, this situation potentially leads to three kinds of disadvantage for developing countries in need of assistance for adaptation . First, countries and communities within which knowledge and understanding about climate change are insufficient may not voice their needs with regard to adaptation appropriately . Second, if decision structures are weak in countries in need of assistance for adaptation, decisions about where and how adaptation measures should be implemented will still very much depend on the interests of donors subsidizing adaptation . Third, even if these challenges can be met, whether or not adaptation can be subsidized depends on the disposition of the countries responsible for assistance to fulfill their financial responsibilities . Telling in this respect are the funds for adaptation finance . Although US$ 100 billion a year by 2020 were pledged for adaptation at Copenhagen in 2009, it is reasonable to doubt whether this money will ever be effectively paid or whether donor countries will simply relabel foreign assistance payments as adaptation finance .28 To address the first kind of disadvantage, insufficient knowledge and understanding about climate change, it is important to develop the appropriate competences in developing countries . In this respect, the function of the AC to strengthen, consolidate and enhance “the sharing of relevant information, knowledge, experience and good practices, at the local, national, regional and international levels […]” becomes extremely important .29 However, sharing of information is not enough if knowledge and understanding is only shared between organizations, centers, and networks promoting adaptation for developing countries . For appropriate assessment of adaptation needs, it is important that knowledge and understanding about climate change reaches all relevant actors with decisional power in countries and communities . Those facing risks of climate impacts are better able to appropriately evaluate whether a risk is acceptable, tolerable, or intolerable . How climate risks are evaluated depends not only on scientific findings and the adaptive capacity of communities but, significantly, also on how they are perceived by those facing these risks .30 In consequence, competence building in developing countries is of high priority . This not only holds because otherwise countries in need of assistance would not be able to advance their claims for assistance appropriately . As argued in the previous section, it is also important because efficient and effective adaptation is more 28 29 30

Mizan R . Khan / J . Timmons Roberts, Adaptation and international climate policy, WIREs Clim Change 4 (2013), 171–189 . UNFCCC (footnote 1), § 20 . Dow/Berkhout/Preston/Klein/Midgley/Shaw (footnote 16) .

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likely when local conditions are thoroughly taken into account . This not only makes knowledge and understanding about climate change a necessary condition; for effective and efficient adaptation, appropriate and functioning decision structures are crucial too . Moreover, these decision structures need to enable communities and even individuals facing climate risks to voice their perceptions of these risks . Without appropriate channels to voice these perceptions, it is most likely that inappropriate adaptation measures are implemented . However, even if the first two disadvantages of developing countries can be overcome, it is still necessary that appropriate finance for adaptation is available . Since the adaptation funds of the COP barely meet the pledges given by developed countries, the third disadvantage is the greatest challenge for efficient and effective adaptation, especially because, according to findings by the World Bank in 2010, far more finance is needed than the annual US$ 100 billion already pledged by developed countries .31 Adaptation finance is the greatest of the challenges, for three reasons . First, whilst the first two challenges can be met with the help of NGOs stepping in for developed countries, these organizations will by no means be able to raise enough finance to ensure appropriate implementation and maintenance of adaptation measures . Second, within the current climate regime, developing countries fully depend on the willingness of developed countries to fulfill their financial responsibilities . The adaptation funding institutions of the COP have no coercive power to make developed countries live up to their pledges . Furthermore, as the example of Canada has shown, if financial burdens become inconvenient, developed countries have a legal right and use this right to opt out of climate agreements .32 To overcome this third disadvantage for developing countries, it is necessary to consider whether there is or should be institutions to force developed countries to meet their financial responsibilities . Due to the legal structure of the COP, granting its adaptation bodies coercive power seems to be unfeasible . In the end, since all these bodies are answerable to the COP, they are answerable to all parties of the UNFCCC, among them being developed countries, which have a legal right to opt out of any agreement . However, since all countries are bound by international and domestic law, another way to make developed countries answerable could be institutions of international and domestic law . As discussed by legal scholars, developing institutions of international and domestic law so as to enable those under threat of climate impacts to file suits for assistance could be an appropriate tool for securing adaptation assistance for developing countries, but also any other community and individuals facing risks of climate impacts .33 31 32 33

World Bank, The Costs to Developing Countries of Adapting to Climate Change, 2010 . Media Relations Environment Canada, Statement by Minister Kent . http://www .ec .gc .ca/ default .asp?lang=En&n=FFE36B6D-1&news=6B04014B-54FC-4739-B22C-F9CD9A840800, 09 .06 .2015 E . g . David A . Grossmann, Warming Up to A not so Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 28 (2003), 1–61; Richard S .J Tol / Roda Verheyen, State Responsibility and Compensation for Climate Change Damages–a Legal and Economic Assessment, Energy Policy 32 (2004), 1109–1130; Daniel A . Farber, The Case for Climate Compensation: Justice for Climate Change Victims in a Complex World, Utah Law Review (2008); Gabriela Blum / Natalie J . Lockwood, Earthquakes and Wars: The Logic of International Reparations, Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series (2012) .

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However, in contrast to international and domestic law suits already filed by plaintiffs facing climate impacts, according to the argument in this paper, they should not file suits against developed countries for causing or contributing to these impacts . Rather, the relevant actors should be sued for not meeting their differentiated responsibilities for adaptation . In the case of adaptation, the governments and leaders of both developed and developing countries should be made answerable for not appropriately contributing to the subsidizing, implementing, and maintaining of adaptation measures, where they are needed . According to the differentiations of responsibilities argued for in the previous section, developed countries have different responsibilities according to their capacities either to subsidize “adaptation” and L&D measures or to foster programs for competence building and appropriate decision structures in developing countries . At the same time, as was shown before, depending on their decision structures and competences, developing countries and their communities should be deemed responsible for implementation and maintenance of adaptation measures . In consequence, it should not only be possible for developing countries to file suits against developed countries but also for communities and individuals of developing as well as developed countries facing climate risks to sue their own governments and leaders for ineffective and inefficient adaptation action . 4. resPonsIble AccordIng

to

whAt norm?

The argument of this paper is based on an understanding of responsibility as a fourfold concept, which allows a differentiation of the responsibilities for adaptation; someone (i . the subject of responsibility) is always responsible for something (ii . the object of responsibility), answerable to some institution (iii .), and held accountable to some norm (iv .) . Thus far, the paper has argued that the appropriate object of responsibility in the case of climate change adaptation is the burdens to be shared for effective and efficient adaptation . For effective and efficient adaptation, however, subjects of responsibility should not only include developed countries subsidizing adaptation . If appropriate competence and decision structures are given in developing countries, these countries should be deemed responsible for their own adaptation as well . To enforce these responsibilities, countries, communities, and individuals facing climate risks should be enabled to file suits against countries, governments, and community leaders who are deemed responsible for a specific aspect of adaptation . Turning now to the fourth aspect of responsibility, it remains to be seen exactly what norms the various subjects of responsibility for adaptation should be accountable to . This poses a challenge to the methodology used for the argument in this paper . To say that someone is responsible for something and answerable to some institution does not imply that the way he or she acts or behaves is blameworthy or not . For this, a norm has to be justified independently of the concept of responsibility . As Bayertz convincingly argued, the concept of responsibility does not found ethical evaluations, but only carries them .34 This is a significant challenge for de34

Bayertz (footnote 3) .

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bates focusing on responsibilities for adaptation, since from an ethical point of view one would like not only to understand how responsibilities can be differentiated but also to know the norms on the basis of which it is possible to blame countries, governments and community leaders for not fulfilling their responsibilities .35 Disregarding this challenge, however, the argument in this paper would suggest that ability-to-pay principles are better suited as norms for evaluating responsible action for adaptation than polluter-pays principles, because in the case of adaptation the object of responsibility is the burdens to be shared but not the emissions causing the need to adapt . Ability-to-pay principles hold that countries, governments, and community leaders should be blamed if they do not meet their responsibilities even though they would be able to do so . According to the argument in this paper, what it means to be able to carry the burdens of adaptation depends on the ascription of responsibilities differentiated as shown in the table below .

Developed Countries

Developing Countries

Subsidize

Implement

Maintain

Provide knowledge, technology and finance for… A .) … measures for “adaptation” . B .) … approaches to L&D .

Foster programs to… C .) … strengthen decision structures . D .) … build competences needed for efficient and effective implementation .

Foster programs to… E .) … maintain functioning decision structures . F .) … build competences needed for sustainable maintenance of measures .

Given C .) & D .): implement “adaptation” and L&D measures

Given E .) & F .): maintain “adaptation” and L&D measures

Indeed, to argue that ability-to-pay principles alone allow countries, governments, and community leaders to be blamed for not meeting their responsibilities for adaptation would once again simplify matters . Currently, the UNFCCC only distinguishes between Annex I and Non-Annex I countries and between developed and developing countries, the latter comprising Least Developed Countries (LDC) and nearly all SIDS as subcategories .36 None of these categories are differentiated according to the capacities to adapt . The relevant criteria to distinguish these countries according to these categories are differences in socio-economic development . Thus, these differences alone do not suffice to ascribe the different responsibilities for adaptation . Also, information about the capacities of countries to subsidize, implement, and maintain adaptation is needed . Before such a categorization of countries is agreed, it is difficult if not impossible for developing countries, communities, and individuals facing risks of climate impacts to legally enforce their claims for adaptation assistance . Thus, as long as it remains unclear which countries, governments, and community leaders can be deemed responsible for what aspect of adaptation, it is unclear which countries, governments and community leaders to target with regard to which unmet respon35 36

For an assessment of different theories of justice and responsibility to justify such norms see Kaswan (footnote 17), Sect . 3 . Note that not all SIDS are developing countries . For example, although Singapore is a SIDS, it is not a developing country but a Non-Annex I country .

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sibilities . This line of argument suggests that, before any such agreement about how to categorize countries with regard to their different responsibilities for adaptation is reached, polluter-pays principles are still a practicable and even very much needed rule of thumb to ensure enhanced action on adaptation . Since the concept of responsibility only carries but does not found ethical norms to evaluate action, this would be a pragmatic argument for why polluter-pays principles should not be dismissed altogether . However, even though it seems highly plausible that developed countries should be deemed responsible for assisting developing countries in adaptation, because developed countries have contributed significantly more to the urgency of adaptation and possess better knowledge, competence, and technology to assist in adaptation in developing countries, there are reasons why developing countries should also assist each other . For reasons of geography and shared experience and culture concerning good practice in adaptation, it might be the case for some developing countries that they should assist other developing countries as well . Differentiating these responsibilities among developing countries, however, requires a categorization of capacities to assist, which neither follows the categorization suggested in this paper nor corresponds to the manner in which the UNFCCC distinguishes between the subcategories of developing countries . But once such a differentiation is developed and agreed upon no field in the table above should be left blank . Acknowledgments I would like to thank Carola Betzold, Simon Milligan, and Simone Zurbuchen for very helpful and much needed comments and feedback . I also would like to acknowledge the generous financial support of Stiftung Mercator Switzerland and the University of Zurich’s Research Priority Program for Ethics (URPP Ethics), without which the research for this paper would not have been possible . bIblIogrAPhy Bayertz, Kurt, Eine kurze Geschichte der Herkunft der Verantwortung, in: Verantwortung, ed . Kurt Bayertz, Darmstadt, 1995, 3–71 . Betzold, Carola, Adapting to climate change in small island developing states, Climatic Change (2015) . Blum, Gabriela / Lockwood, Natalie J ., Earthquakes and Wars: The Logic of International Reparations, Public Law & Legal Theory Working Paper Series (2012) . Bronen, Robin, Climate-Induced Displacement of Alaska Native Communities, 2013 . Dow, Kirstin / Berkhout, Frans / Preston, Benjamin L . / Klein, Richard J . T . / Midgley, Guy / Shaw, M . Rebecca, Limits to Adaption, Nature Climate Change 3 (2013), 305–307 . Farber, Daniel A ., The Case for Climate Compensation: Justice for Climate Change Victims in a Complex World, Utah Law Review (2008) . Gardiner, Stephen M . / Caney, Simon / Jamieson, Dale / Shue, Henry (ed .), Climate Ethics: Essential Readings, Oxford, New York, 2010 . Grossmann, David A ., Warming Up to A not so Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, Columbia Journal of Environmental Law 28 (2003), 1–61 . Hoyos, N . / Escobar, J . / Restrepo, J . C . / Arango, A . M . / Ortiz, J . C ., Impact of the 2010–2011 La Niña phenomenon in Colombia, South America: The human toll of an extreme weather event, Applied Geography 39 (2013), 16–25 .

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Huggel, Christian / Stone, Dáithí / Auffhammer, Maximilian / Hansen, Gerrit, Loss and Damage Attribution, Nature Climate Change 5 (2013), 694–696 . Hulme, M ., Attributing weather extremes to ‘climate change’: A review, Progress in Physical Geography 38 (2014), 499–511 . Khan, Mizan R . / Roberts, J . Timmons, Adaptation and international climate policy, WIREs Clim Change 4 (2013), 171–189 . Media Relations Environment Canada, Statement by Minister Kent . http://www .ec .gc .ca/default .asp?lang=En&n=FFE36B6D-1&news=6B04014B-54FC-4739-B22C-F9CD9A840800, 09 .06 .2015 . Nishat, Ainun / Mukherjee, Nandan / Roberts, Erin / Hasemann, Anna, A Range of Approaches to Address Loss and Damage from Climate Change Impacts in Bangladesh . http://www .loss-anddamage .net/4825, 03 .09 .2014 . Seidel, Christian, Klimawandel, globale Gerechtigkeit und die Ethik globaler öffentlicher Güter – einige grundlegende begriffliche Fragen, in: Globale öffentliche Güter in interdisziplinären Perspektiven, ed . Matthias Maring, Karlsruhe, 2012, 179–196 . Shue, Henry, Subsistence Emissions and Luxury Emissions, in: Climate Ethics, ed . Stephen M . Gardiner / Simon Caney / Dale Jamieson / Henry Shue, Oxford, New York, 2010, 200–214 . Stone, Dáithí / Auffhammer, Maximilian / Carey, Mark / Hansen, Gerrit / Huggel, Christian / Cramer, Wolfgang / Lobell, David / Molau, Ulf / Solow, Andrew / Tibig, Lourdes / Yohe, Gary, The challenge to detect and attribute effects of climate change on human and natural systems, Climatic Change 121 (2013), 381–395 . Tol, Richard S .J / Verheyen, Roda, State Responsibility and Compensation for Climate Change Damages–a Legal and Economic Assessment, Energy Policy 32 (2004), 1109–1130 . UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its sixteenth session, held in Cancun from 29 November to 10 December 2010, 2011 . UNFCCC, Report of the Conference of the Parties on its nineteenth session, held in Warsaw from 11 to 23 November 2013, 2014 . Visser, Hans / Petersen, Arthur C . / Ligtvoet, Willem, On the relation between weather-related disaster impacts, vulnerability and climate change, Climatic Change 125 (2014), 461–477 . Wallimann-Helmer, Ivo, Justice for Climate Loss and Damage, Climatic Change 133/3 (2015), 469– 480 . Warner, Koko / Geest, Kees van der, Loss and damage from climate change: Local-level evidence from nine vulnerable countries, International Journal of Global Warming 5 (2013), 367–386 . World Bank, The Costs to Developing Countries of Adapting to Climate Change, 2010 .

Peter ØrebeCh (tromsø, norway) AttAInIng dIfferentIAted resPonsIbIlIty: the hArd lIfe of governmentAl commAnd In fIghtIng ecologIcAl ruIn And the trIumPh of customAry lAw & generAl PrIncIPles of lAw 1. PresentAtIon The aim of this article is to recommend instruments that may counteract threats to what has been a relatively stable climate for the past ten thousand years . Whether human beings cause the recorded Green House Effect (GHE) is debatable . I do not write to challenge climate change predictions . Assuming that the threats are real, my goal, instead, is to outline a possible route toward restoring degraded nature, whether man-made or not, with the support of international case law (Paragraph 4) . This paper examines legal instruments that may allow us to defend against the predicted ecological disaster . Pollution, contamination and emissions occur in nation states . Typically, the dispersed or accumulated activities of individuals cause them . Nonetheless, their effects are international because these secretions cross borders . For this reason, this study focuses on international law, emphasizing customary law and general principles of law in particular, a platform of which is the “no double standard axiom”, i . e . the position that “human interaction creates reciprocal rights and duties” . These prescriptions are the well-known bottom-up remedies set forth in Article 38(1)(b) & (c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) . As the Corfu Channel,1 the Trial Smelter,2 the Gabcikovo Nagymaros3 and the Bluefin Tuna4 disputes show, case law imposes eco-friendly duties on all members of the international society of states . This is because customary law and general principles of law – unlike conventional law – are binding upon all nation states, whether expressly or tacitly acknowledged, or not . Governmental command is another tool . The Vienna Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer (1985) and the Montreal Ozone Layer Protocol (1987) support a system of negotiations, treaties and domestic legislation . Top-down initiatives like these are welcome because the states parties who agree to these treaties tend to comply . As such, these initiatives are very successful . These instruments bind only the signatories to the international conventions, however . Because so few countries have signed on to many of the most important environmental treaties, the treaties’ effect on the global environment is limited . Emissions Trading Schemes5 or Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQ) is a third route to averting environmental disaster .6 They seek to control emissions through 1 2 3 4 5

ICJ Reports 1949, 4, 22 . Reports of International Arbitral Awards (1938–41), vol . III, 1905–1982 (UN 2006) . ICJ Reports 1997, 7. New Zealand v . Japan; Australia v . Japan, ITLOS, 27 August 1999 . Denny Ellerman / Barbara K . Buchner, The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme: Origins, Allocation, and Early Results, Review of Environmental Economics and Polity 1/1 (2007), 66–68 . For a review of the literature, cf . Frank J . Convery, Reflections: The Emerging Literature on Emissions Trading in Europe, Review of Environmental Economics and Polity 3/1 (2009), 121–137 . Cf .

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private trading . In his famous article, the Tragedy of the Commons,7 Garrett Hardin describes a society of egocentric agents operating in a social vacuum pursuing their private interests, which leads to ruin for all . His intra-subjective model flunks the inter-partes relations of human beings, which Jes Bjarup – supported by this author – takes as a platform for the development of customary law .8 Hardin supported regulation of or restriction on private, individual harvesting rights as the only salvation for the impending tragedy: the loss of the commons . In his later writing, however, Hardin asserted that private-party contracting was as effective in avoiding the tragedy of the commons as government regulation .9 A fourth alternative is to do nothing . Instead of planned, regulated action, we should take our chances and leave it in God’s hands . This position assumes one of two things: either that human beings are incapable of understanding themselves and their world as it develops ex nunc, or that it has become too difficult for people to describe and explain today’s world .10 This human failing makes any system of governmental command seem pointless . My working hypothesis is that the key attributes of bottom-up norms show promise in fostering a shared, but differentiated “green responsibility” . We still have a long way to go, however, since bottom-up decision-making needs authentication to become legal and legitimate . In other words, either it has to go through the political process, or it has to be decided by courts . Finally, the big picture needs setting forth . My aim is to bridge the gap between “ideal theory focusing on the moral foundations of laws and policies” and a legal “realistic or pragmatic approach .”11 What I hope to do is to posit “a theory of justice that can serve as the basis of practical reasoning .”12 Amartya Sen’s approach is rooted in normative economics, and social choice theory, i . e . a capability approach . His aim is by studying procedures, to make visible incompatibility in decision-making principles . This approach is however limited to the intra-subject approach, whether a specific decision-making procedure may lead to systems of more or less uniform choices . My line of thought is the pragmatist’s approach, the common-sense inter-partes intelligible cooperation among legal subjects towards acknowledged, environmental solutions .

6 7 8 9 10 11 12

also Mathias Frisch, Climate Change Justice, Princeton, 2010, and the review of his work by Eric Posner / David Weisbach, Climate Change Justice, Philosophy and Public Affairs 40 (2012), 225–253 . Peter Ørebech, What Can Restoration Schemes Do? Or, Getting It Right Without Transferable Fisheries Quotas, Ocean Development & International Law 36 (2005), 159–78, with further references . Garrett L . Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, Science 162 (1968), 1243–1248 . I am indebited to Jes Bjarup for this clarification . Cf . also Jes Bjarup, Social interaction: the foundation of customary law, in The Role of Customary Law in Sustainable Development, ed . Peter Ørebech / Fred Bosselman, Cambridge, 2005, 147 . Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Unmanaged Commons, Trends in Ecology and Evolution 9/5 (1994), 199 . Hannu Tapani Klami, The Rules of Man, Vammala, 1984 . Workshop paper “Philosophy, Law and Environmental Crisis”, workshop at the University of Lausanne, September 12–13, 2014, 1–2 (hereinafter “Workshop Paper”) . Amartya Sen, The Idea of Justice, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2009 .

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2. the

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“The life of the law has not been logic . It has been experience .” Oliver Wendell Holmes13

Before I head into case law, my goal is to clarify the kinds of obstacles different decision-making regimes may encounter .14 No matter how you try to resolve ecological issues – whether top-down or bottom-up – the problems are not easy to fix . While random events can cause natural disasters and thus radically change the “brute hard facts”, we nonetheless do not have regulatory or disaster management tools in place to ameliorate these disasters . The crux of the matter is that while any one of the planet’s seven billion inhabitants hardly affects the biotope, the accumulated effects of us all are allegedly formidable .15 This is not so in law or politics . In fact, just the opposite is true . A single individual can and often does affect the lives of millions in these fields . Is it even possible to reach our environmental goals through the political process? 2.1 ChaLLenging the “eConomiC man” 1 . The basis of the neo-mercantilist “economic man” paradigm is the unenlightened self-interest, which plays a major role in the ongoing efforts to reduce regulatory power in favor of privatization, market allocation and outsourcing .16 Can such a system of uncoordinated decision-making17 lead to sustainable resources management systems, or is a model like this one ineffective? Is the traditional economic thinking of “every man for himself” preventing us from attaining viable resource management systems? The unbridled “economic man” is the problem, not the solution . 2 . Thorstein Veblen’s theory on the leisure class challenges the view of the “economic man” as problem solver or even entrepreneurial producer . The man whose “only interest is the self-regarding one and whose only human trait is prudence, is useless for the purposes of modern industry,” he claimed .18 I support Veblen’s distinction between the “conspicuous consumer” and the “industrial man” . Veblen characterized industrial man as having middle class values, traits and temperament typical of the (second) industrial revolution .19 The rational, moral agents of this 13 14 15 16 17

18 19

Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law, Boston, 1881 . For a discussion, cf . Michael E . Mann, Do Global Warning and Climate Change Represent a Serious Threat to Our Welfare and Environment, Social Philosophy & Policy 26/2 (2009), 193–230 . UN Five Reports on the Climate Change, at https://ipcc .ch/report/ar5/ (visited January 1st2015) See William D . Grampp, Adam Smith and the Economic Man, Journal of Political Economy 56/4 (1948), 315–336, with further references . Political scientists often use the term “distributive plurality” to describe these situations . Cf ., e . g ., Jon Elster, Arguing and bargaining in the Federal Convention and the Assemblée Constituante, Working Paper, University of Chicago, August 1991 . Available at http://www .reocities . com/hmelberg/elster/AR91AAB .HTM Thorstein Veblen, The Theory of the Leisure Class, New York, 1934, 241 . For a modern, study on socio-economic classes and class-differences, see Thomas Picketty, Le capital au XXIe siècle, Paris, 2013 .

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class know useful things . They have developed core competency and solid work habits through experience . 3 . Diplomats and representatives of nation states need to embrace this same engineering attitude and pragmatic spirit in their day-to-day work of negotiating in the international arena . Their international law decisions must be fact based . In addition, the negotiators should do their utmost to come to a solution . Meeting the other side half way is the type of pragmatism you need to come to terms with others in a fair-minded manner .20 Doing so also complies with nation states’ international legal duty, under Article 33 of the UN Charter, to “seek a solution by negotiation .” Article 63 of UNCLOS (1982) reiterates this duty . The parties “shall seek, either directly or through appropriate sub-regional or regional organizations, to agree upon the measures necessary .” Neither the economic man nor the conspicuous consumer is a satisfactory employee meeting the reasonable expectations of the international society of states . Both lack the values, traits and temperament required to do the work . Instead, Veblen’s “industrial man” fits this job description . Today, neither legal persons nor natural persons are the “predatory barbarian”21 of yesteryear . Instead, they have created the concept of “civilized nations” upon which most countries subscribe (ICJ Statute Article 38(1)(c)) . I assume, as a point of departure, that fellow citizens and fellow states – that is, UN member states – seek to accomplish their goals through negotiation and cooperation . This complies with Article 33 (1) of the UN Charter, which requires disputing parties to “seek a solution by negotiation” or other peaceful means . 4 . Human interaction creates reciprocal rights and duties, as here named the “no double standard axiom” . I subscribe to the view that humans are “born with the intellectual and volitional capacity to become rational persons and responsible agents .”22 The concept of “multi-dimensional man”23 describes the viable practices, customs and choices made by and involved in human reasoning in biological, ecological, social and moral-rational settings . 5 . Market-driven neo-mercantilist thinking seems to distort even reasonable ecological objectives . Bottom-up “trial-and-error” stakeholder participation systems, on the other hand, seem less hostile to viable, long-term and reasonable resources management . 2.2 the daZZLing faCt of “reaL worLd” stoChastiC Chaos The “economic man” posits an ex post facto theory claiming that the random chaos resulting from a non-interventionist state and the social and economic choices made by the unenlightened self-interested “economic men” in that chaos lead to healthy “competition” and eventually create a bottom-up organized order . This attempt to explain how a conglomerate of non-coordinated individual wills may result in a 20 21 22 23

As illustrated by Peter Ørebech, The Barents Sea 2010 Norway-Russia Border: The Triumph of the Negotiation Principle at the Expense of the Median- and Sector Line Pretentions, The Yearbook of Polar Law iv (2012), 505–517 . Veblen (footnote 18), 237 . Bjarup (footnote 8), 207 . Klami (footnote 10), 34 .

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well-lubricated and functioning social order, however, has never been substantiated and fails for lack of proof . Decisions based on egotistical choices demonstrate no intent or purpose . Decisions taken to solve societal problems have intent and purpose . Peaceful and amicable coexistence depends on social norms, especially due to the “increasing interdependence of men in complicated technological conditions .”24 New technology causes unplanned or unexpected results .25 How can we avoid the ecological ruin wrought by human beings and circumvent doomsday scenarios brought about by the combustion engine and the resulting global warming? The answer is that we need to organize the chaos . We have to reverse the Zarathustra syndrome that emancipated all things “from the bondage of purpose“ for the benefit “of hazard” . [“Von Ohngefähr – das ist der älteste Adel der Welt, den gab ich allen Dingen zurück, ich erlöste sie von der Knechtschaft unter dem Zwecke .”]26 The highly elastic “spider’s web”27 exposes how action, interaction and reactions to the brute, hard facts, artefacts and institutional facts are intertwined .28 The wiry threads of nature, socio-economic status and circumstances, and intangible conditions are spun, tangled and tied to each other . Customary law and general principles of law – the legal institutional elements – respond to alterations in the living fabric of life in the same way that the spider’s web responds to natural or human influences . Their dynamism lies in how they react ex post facto. Customary law and general principles of law change slowly, often incrementally . They tend to produce much more consistent and “to the point” outcomes than the “top-down” commands of legislative fiat . Codified law tends to count on logical thinking about unknowable future trends and developments . “Everything is thinkable, and may happen . The open future invalidates even the slightest hope of making a readymade philosophy of life .”29 2.3 the autoPoietiC disCursive PLatform of Customary Law The term “autopoietics” refers to self-creating, self-contained and self-correcting systems. Simultaneously, this system inhibit barriers resulting from the “cement of society”30 erupting from conformist pressures . “Systems” include not only natural systems or systems in nature, but also social institutions such as customary law and general principles of law. Customary international law and general principles of law create

24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Hannu Tapani Klami, The Rule of Law: Are there any Real Alternatives, Turku, 1985 . Cf ., e . g . Naomi Klein, Why Geoengineering Is Untested and Untestable (8 February 2015) . Available at https://www .thenation .com/article/197353/why-geoengineering-untested-and-untestable Friedrich Nietzsche, Also sprach Zarathustra . Ein Buch für Alle und Keinen (1883–1885), Sämtliche Werke (ed . Giorgio Colli / Mazzino Montinari), vol . 4, München/Berlin/New York, 1980. Arne Naess, Økologi og filosofi [Ecology and Philosophy], Oslo, 1972 . As explained in Fritjof Capra / Pier Luigi Luisi, The Systems View of Life: A Unifying Vision, Cambridge, 2014 . As illustrated in Arne Naess, Livsfilosofi [philosophy of life], Oslo, 1998 . Jon Elster, The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order, Cambridge, 1989 .

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“stable interactional expectancies”,31 and are possible tools to avoid environmental tragedies . Having said that, I do not reject that customary law results from individual acknowledged practice in a society .32 Such a position is possible as my thinking permits a simultaneous co-survival of rival principles . Since the autopoietic view frames the individual inter-partes production of customs, the first component does not challenge a system of customary law created by individual, acknowledged practices . This combined system follows from the Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (Stockholm 1972) Principle 23 which reads: ”Without prejudice to such criteria as may be agreed upon by the international community, or to standards which will have to be determined nationally, it will be essential in all cases to consider the systems of values prevailing in each country, and the extent of the applicability of standards which are valid for the most advanced countries but which may be inappropriate and of unwarranted social cost for the developing countries” .

The ideal group of eco-friendly men consists of reasonable community agents who reflect upon means and means-ends-relationships .33 Let me … sum up epigrammatically the reasons for which an autopoietic approach to environmental law is justified: first, autopoiesis is an adequately complex theory to describe the complexity of a newly emerging yet highly technical legal discipline; second, autopoiesis conceptualises systems in a grounded way that, while describing potentialities, marks systemic limitations . This is particularly relevant to a system, like environmental law, whose object constantly redefines in ways in which the system has no control over . Third, the autopoietic mistrust towards prescriptions that encourage control and intervention is particularly apposite to an otherwise aggressively abused branch of the legal system, whose services are variously internalised in order to fit in with more pronounced priorities, such as economics or politics . This does not mean that autopoiesis can change the way reality is, but merely the way it is understood and contextualised .34

Autopoiesis is defined as the capacity to absorb, in the sense of 1) how well normative structures absorb or adapt to ecological change, as shown, for example, by the spider’s web35 and by stakeholders’ “trial and error”; and 2) how great the hope is that human beings absorb, that is, remember and learn from the past, and not repeat its mistakes . A second element of autopoiesis is “deindividuation” . Under the autopoietic model, social systems are not produced by individual practice . Instead, for autopoiesists, social systems and their economic models and legal processes are based on the culture of each society . An example of how this works in practice is that a Scandinavian country might very well challenge its environmental agency for allowing toxic waste from mining to be deposited on the seabed, thus destroying valuable fishing grounds . A similar governmental policy in Russia or China might not raise concerns . The society’s inner logic, premised on different ideological thinking, absorbs different signals regarding human skills, competency, rational and irrational 31 32 33 34 35

Lon L . Fuller, Human Interaction and the Law, American Journal of Jurisprudence 14/1 (1969), 33 . I am indepted to Jes Bjarup for this clarification and example . Bjarup (footnote 8), 147 . Andreas Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (ed .), Law and ecology: new environmental foundations, Routledge, 2012 . Naess (footnote 27) .

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thoughts, moral and immoral conduct, erroneous beliefs or belief systems, etc . The changes experienced by cultures result from prior states and signals . In other words, things are what they are because they were what they were . This autopoietic structure fails to instruct us on what we ought to do in environmental matters . It does not admit utopian or transcendental views . Since radical changes result from de facto progress, the subsequent normative revisions ensue from continuous re-examination, adaptation and prescription . The viable long-term norms are those that equitably distribute the benefits accrued from and burdens imposed by the living fabric of life . 3. the Problem

of eco-frIendly decIsIons: the route AheAd

How can we cope with the widespread, inter-connected difficulties caused by our combustion-driven modern life-style? We are not likely to abandon oil drilling, coalfired power stations,36 forest clearing, cars, airplanes, trucks, or ships . This question is closely connected to a qualified understanding of how to manage human beings and “promote promising and multidisciplinary solutions to pressing ecological issues” .37 Could the law prevent “stochastic often undesired unforeseeable elements from these complicated functions which have grown around different problems of human society?”38 Because the leaders of nation states are both rational persons and moral agents, an ultimate solution is perhaps within reach . We need to figure out how we can get nation states to sign on to a shared, eco-friendly policy . That is the key . 3.1 weaKnesses of toP-down deCision-maKing ProCesses “Rules adopted by ordinary people ‘work’; those they don’t accept, those forced upon them by ‘pig-headed’ legislators, often don’t work .” Peter Karsten39

Is micro-management doomed to fail? In our market-oriented world, my position is that men and women of our time often fail to understand their present world . As a result, I also believe that they cannot accurately predict the future . Goal-oriented planning and regulation, therefore, are unlikely . Is Peter Sloterdijk right? Is there really no way to escape crisis? On ne peut pas échapper à la nouvelle situation mondiale . Dans mon livre, la déesse ou entité divine qui apparaît dans les dernières pages, c’est la crise : elle est la seule instance qui possède assez d’autorité pour nous pousser à changer notre vie .40 36 37 38 39 40

But perhaps times are changing: Obama announces tough measures on coal-fired power plants, See The New York Times, August 2nd 2015 . Workshop Paper, 2 . Klami (footnote 10), 30 . Peter Karsten, Between Law and Custom, Cambridge, 2002, 539 . Des idées-force pour éviter les impasses de la globalisation, Le face-à-face Peter Sloterdijk et Slavoj

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Legislation is often ineffective . Experience shows that it often fails to function as planned or intended . Law in action and law in the books are not the same thing . There are several reasons for this . According to Kahneman and Tversky,41 predictions about society are doomed from the start . Sadly, people are not “clairvoyant” . At first glance, Naess’ eco-friendly, means-end pyramid looks more fertile than non-planned, bottom-up norms . A closer look reveals its flaws, however . Even with clear ultimate goals, a means-end structure will likely collapse because it has no operational blueprint to define how the tools relate to achieving the ends . The tools are on the ground floor . The goal is up above . What is missing, however, is the process . Naess’ model provides no blueprint of steps to move from the tools to the objective . Therefore, a static model based on rational thoughts or beliefs, Naess concludes, will not help us to achieve green goals because it suffers from systematic failures .42 Regulators often refuse to enforce enacted legislation . They reject the law with profound intensity and vehemence . Ministries and administrative and regulatory agencies fail to enforce legislative amendments by simply circumventing or ignoring the rules . Their long-term “non-use-strategy” often results in inefficient or desuetudo laws. Norwegian fishery law is an example of this .43 Contrary to clear codified law, Norwegian regulatory agencies established de facto a New Public Management (NPM) scheme governing a system of Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) . This is an example of how dominant ideologies overturn clear legislation in favor of market-based rules that either benefit44 the lobbyists who influence them or satisfy their own ideological bents .45 The U . S . Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)46 refused to ”issue regulations governing carbon dioxide and other green house gases emitted from motor vehicles”47, an intense and vehement rejection of its administrative48 and enforcement49

41 42 43

44 45 46 47 48 49

Zizek, Le Monde (27 May 2011) . Available at : http://www .lemonde .fr/idees/article/2011/05/27/ des-idees-force-pour-eviter-les-impasses-de-la-globalisation_1528141_3232 .html . Amos Tversky / Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of Decisions, Journal of Business 59 (1986), 251–278; see also Daniel Kahneman, Paul Slovic / Amos Tversky (eds .), Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, Cambridge, 1982 . Naess (footnote 27) . As stated in the Norway Supreme Court (Grand Chamber) 2013 Decision (Volstad Case), Rt . 2013 p . 1345 . See also Peter Ørebech, “Tvers igjennom lov til seier”. Om torskeresolusjonen av 1989. Den skjulte agenda og lukkingen av fiskeallmenningen [Straight through law to victory. The hidden agenda of closing the fisheries commons, with a special emphasis on cod resolution of 1989], Power and Democracy Studies (1998–2003), Report 52 (2003) . See also Torbjörn Trondsen / Peter Ørebech, Rettsökonomi for fornybare ressurser [Law and economics for renewable resource], Oslo, 2012 . See Peter Ørebech, The art of subsidizing fuel-free electricity under the European economic area agreement as illustrated by Norway’s reversion instrument, Chicago-Kent Law Review 74 (2011), 101–131 . For a general account, cf . Dan Wood / Richard W . Waterman, The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy, American Political Science Review 85 (1991), 801–828 . I am indebted to Associate Professor Juliana V . Campagna of the Maurice A . Deane School of Law at Hofstra University for this illustration . Mass. v. EPA, 549 U . S . 497, 505 (2007) . www2 .epa .gov/laws-regulation . www2 .epa .gov/enforcement .

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jurisdiction over the clearly codified federal legislation .50 EPA’s “non-use-strategy” led to 5 years of very costly litigation, and gave industry a ten-year free ride to continue polluting, unchecked .51 EPA did not challenge the factual testimony of any experts, including two Nobel Prize winning climate scientists .52 Instead, it favored a market approach of “voluntary private-sector reductions” rather than actual regulation .53 Other ideologies that dominated EPA included its bent on U . S . environmental foreign policy,54 even though, as the U . S . Supreme Court held, the U . S . State Department, and not EPA, had the clear mandate “to formulate [U . S .] foreign policy with reference to environmental matters relating to climate .”55 Six of the most powerful lobbies in the country filed amicus curiae briefs in support of EPA’s petition, including the Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers, Engine Manufacturers Association, and Truck Manufacturers Association .56 As Nobel Prize laureate Elinor Ostrom, explains,57 resource-managing systems need double procedural rules for basic changes . Without the continuing capacity to match new rules to new circumstances, she suggests that resource managers will “face considerable difficulties in coping with the diverse environmental and strategic threats that arise in dynamic systems .”58 Then again, legislators often overreact . In his book, Law of Fear, Cass Sunstein criticizes the extent to which environmentally conscious citizens over-protect nature, often finding their claims exaggerated .59 3.2 weaKnesses of bottom-uP deCision-maKing ProCesses “Customary law has its origin in interaction .” Lon L . Fuller60

During times of change, bottom-up norms sometimes impose social order .61 Members of society, acting in collaboration, create these norms through consistent practice . Rule of law is necessary . An issue arises, however, as to whether behavioral 50 51 52 53 54 55 56

57 58 59 60 61

The Clean Air Act, 42 U . S . C . §§ 7401 et seq ., 69 Stat . 328, as amended through 104 Stat . 2399, Pub . L . 101–549 (Nov . 15, 1990) . Mass. v. EPA, 549 U . S . at 510; 68 Fed .Reg . 52922 (Sept . 8, 2003); Mass. v. EPA, 415 F .3d 50 (D . C . Cir . 2005) . Mass. v. EPA, 549 U . S . at 511, ref . 66 Fed .Reg . 7486, 7487 (2001) and 68 Fed .Reg . 52924 (2003) . Mass. v. EPA, 549 U . S . at 513 . Id. at 509, 523–24, and 528 . (EPA’s position, in a nutshell, was if India and China are not subject to IPCC targets, why should the U . S . reduce its greenhouse gas emissions?) Id. at 534 . Amicus and parties’ briefs, including 14 amicus curiae briefs filed in support of the plaintiff, are available free to read and download at http://docs .nrdc .org/globalwarming/glo_06083101 .asp . For more information on this case, and to hear the parties’ (live) oral arguments, visit the Oyez Project at IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law , http://www .oyez .org/cases/2000–2009/2006/2006_05_1120 (last visited June 11, 2015) . Elinor Ostrom, Governing the Commons, Cambridge, 1990, 193–202 . Elinor Ostrom, Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems, San Francisco, 1992, 63 . Cass R . Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle, Cambridge, 2005 . Fuller (footnote 31), 1 ff . In contrast to the “metaphysical illusion” of Karl Olivecrona, Law as Fact, London,1971 .

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norms “are the most suitable means for securing the regularity required”?62 The key issue is whether the established normative structure results from and is built upon a well-organized, interactive process . 1 . Customary law, which originates from human beings and their interaction,63 is part of an autopoietic whole (see section 2 above) .64 This is a not too far-flung a truth . Law is an institutional fact, a system subject to human reason . It is moral and logical when it meets the following three requirements: consistency; adherence to the no-double-standard principle; and equal protection (equality before the law) . My position is that the law “is not in fact a completed, but a growing and self-correcting system . It grows not of itself but by the interaction between social usage and the work of legislatures, courts, and administrative officials, and even legal text writers .”65 I agree with Jes Bjarup, who posits the sensus communis view .66 Under this view, the relational perspective of knowledge-based norms – the rational account of social interaction – often develops general principles of law or customary law . No one in particular dictate these norms . The success relies upon the societal mood for seriously considering the needs of “the other”, the mandatory obeisance for basic legal principles – the “no double standard axiom” in particular – and the feeling for dyadic cooperation of which reciprocal acknowledgment is the key . 2 . The question of human behavior leads to another one: what urges a person to act? The political scientist Hannah Arendt made a distinction between what and who a human being is.67 Who refers to the unique individuality of a person that is revealed or expressed by her words and action . What makes up half of our identity, but is beyond what anyone can control . Thus, the who and what connects to Arendt’s distinction between labour, work, and action – three parallel spheres human beings reside in . This distinction is helpful for understanding customary law . Labour is needed to satisfy our biological needs . Work is our culture – ranging from mass production to art . While both labour and work denote spheres in which a person is self-sufficient, action refers to a reality in which human beings cannot cope with the situation on their own, as “solitary ones”: “The newcomer is a beginner and stranger of this world and possesses the capacity of initiative, of setting off unpredictable chains of events – of acting” .68 Contrary to today’s common usage of the term, action occurs when I take an initiative, asking others to help me achieving something . What urges a person to act? Based on Arendt’s distinctions of what and who, of labour, work and action, two positions come to mind . The first refers to the solitary one’s abilities and will, i . e . his freedom . The “alienation” restricts our thinking, convoluted as we are in the belief that freedom refers to the more or less vivid choice 62 63 64 65 66 67 68

Klami (footnote 24), 1 . Klami (footnote 10), 35 . Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (footnote 34) . Morris Raphael Cohen, Reason and Law, New York, 1961, 89, 86 . Cf . Thomas Reid, Essays on the Active Powers of Man, ed . Knud Haakonssen / James Harris, Edinburgh, 2010 . Hannah Arendt, The human condition, Chicago, 1998 . See Erika Sigvardsdotter, Presenting the Absent . An account of undocumentedness in Sweden, PhD Dissertation Uppsala University 2012, 23 .

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between consumption merchandise .69 Subsequently this leads to a voluntary, self-controlled or self-censured approach, i . e . we experiences very limited “possibility conditions” . The second parallels the being-with-others that diminishes free will but enables perspectival freedom . To vivify this, Arendt referred to the ancient Greek concept of daimon . It denoted a spirit, sitting on each person’s shoulder, visible for anyone – except for the person herself . This suggests that identity is beyond my will and control . Simultaneously Arendt’s position illustrates how others allow me to see myself from the outside, from a position that is blurred from my own eyes . This illustrates a fragment of the sphere of action, only . While many find this position difficult to embrace because of the dependency of others and thus unpredictability, the sense of action is rooted in all human beings and makes them spontaneously react to other persons’ initiatives . My self-esteem is resulting from the acknowledgment of the other . This mechanism is based on customary law as well . Some personal actions and behavior are rejected, others are acclaimed . The long-term acclamation may result in not only customs, but also customary law . In this environment, the basic idiom “there is no such thing as double standards” plays a considerable role . It is part of the legal principle of equality before the law . Since most nation states and human beings prefer a viable and stable environmental solution, a legal or physical person cannot condemn actions conducted by “the other” which he finds comfort in . Nevertheless, achieving a successful result of bottom-up produced norms is no easy task: the dynamics of the situation and the ever-pressing need of recruiting future generations– when times comes – to accomplish a viable long-term solution depends upon the resulting benefits for the involved and affected peoples . 3 . The bottom-up system further suffers from the same lack of coordinated direction as the top-down system . In both instances, lobbyists benefit from the absence of legal authority . This downside to the “trial-and-error method” also escapes Professor Karsten . Legislation, unlike custom, “is laid down in advance” . The argument in support of codification is that “the interdependence between men is rapidly increasing but in a manner which is very difficult to foresee .”70 The counter-argument made by Zarathustra is that events are random . This argument lacks merit . If it is true, it is pointless to plan or steer human behavior at all . The only party who can possibly get it right if this is true is the “Monday morning Quarterback”, who has the benefit of hindsight . Garret Hardin’s subsequent comments on his Tragedy of the Commons, first published in 1968, provide further support for bottom-up decision making . Hardin argues that self-governance, influenced by subtle signs of normative structures, meaning self-governing common pools, would not result in a tragedy .71 Uniform inter-partes action requires “regularity in human behavior” .72 4 . For the same reason, you have to recognize that practices regulated by customary law may lose adherents, and thus ultimately wind up repealed . Another problem is that the trial-and-error method is slow . “Tipping points” may occur be69 70 71 72

I am indepted to Jes Bjarup for this clarification . Karsten (footnote 39), 1 . Hardin, (footnote 7) 199 . Klami (footnote 24), 1 .

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fore nation states recognize the warning signs . Further, in a customary law system, no single nation state takes responsibility for the common-pool resource in question, for example, for protecting fishing stocks, reducing CO2 emissions, etc . Finally, non-complying “free-riders” make the law less efficient .73 Without common practices, anarchy ensues, and parties cease to be rule-oriented . Cass Sunstein challenges collective action on the basis that it lacks coordination and expertise . In his view, people’s ignorance of the underlying scientific questions makes customary environmental law inefficient and undemocratic . In Sunstein’s experience, or considered opinion, erroneous beliefs regarding environmental disasters paved the way for legislation that has replaced the common law .74 I find Sunstein’s critique unconvincing because he ignores the result of Coase’s study . “It is my belief,” Coase stated, “that economists and policy-makers generally, have tended to over-estimate the advantages which come from governmental regulation .”75 The international society currently relies on contentious nation states who act as public prosecutors and bring green disputes before the ICJ . This needs to be changed . Instead, the Member States should appoint a UN authority with prosecutorial powers and give the authority to bring UN-member states before the ICJ . Failing such a move, the only viable way to fix this is through authentication, that is, through an international referendum .76 Doing so would separate valid normative structures from invalid ones . 3.3 bridging the gaP between ideaLism and Pragmatism How can we bridge the gap between “an idealist approach” and “a realistic or pragmatic approach”?77 Case law decisions are simultaneously “idealistic” and “realistic or pragmatic” . They are “idealistic” because they require the parties to orient themselves to the rule . They are “realistic or pragmatic” because they apply the rules to a concrete dispute in the living fabric of life . In the next section, I attempt to outline and analyze fundamental ideas for bridging the gap between viable biotopes, scientifically understood, and legal procedures required solving the environmental disputes . 1 . Is utilitarianism a possible moral foundation for law and policy? My proposal for bridging the gap between philosophy and the law follows John Stuart Mill’s basic statement – despite his doubt on whether utility may establish a valid criterion for what is right and wrong78 – on the ultimate value of “modern” societies . “Justice remains the appropriate name for certain social utilities which are vastly more important, and therefore more absolute and imperative than any other are as a class .”79 73 74 75 76 77 78 79

William Poundstone, Prisoner’s Dilemma, New York, 1993, 125–128 . Cass R . Sunstein, Public versus Private Environmental Regulation, Ecology Law Quarterly 21 (1994), 455–456 . Cf . R . H . Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, Journal of Law & Economics 3/1 (1960), 18 . Cf . my project, “Customary Law as Manifestation of Democracy – By the Means of Referendum and other Out-of-Court Resolutions” . Workshop Paper, 2 . John Stuart Mill, Utilitarism. Liberty and Representative Government, Toronto, 1910, chap . V . Mill (footnote 78), 60 .

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Justice is the common good . This normative ideal may subsequently transform into customary law or general principles of law . This is my claim . 2 . Deciding a case through reason reflects the pragmatic point of view on dispute resolution . This view then “leads us to the problem of utility and its incidence within states and between them .”80 The principles of justice and equity is the premise of every positive law on the books, if you believe this, because no legislator could ever imagine that his legislation could lead to unjust consequences. A necessary consequence of this premise is that courts must interpret legal language in the belief that the words written there lead to just outcomes . 3 . Norwegian case law – since as early as the 1920 s – indicates that positivist law and its reliance on extralegal gaps have lost sway . At a court conference in the 1920 s, a Norwegian Supreme Court judge stated that no act of parliament would ever force the court to decide a case contrary to equity law .81 Nobody objected . 4 . Unlike the Norwegian court, the International Court of Justice is divided on this issue . On the one hand, there is ICJ Judge Vladlen Vereshchtin. His position is that courts have “no right to judicial legislation” .82 This is a positivistic position that leaves little room for customary law and general principles of law even though both are sources of law under the ICJ Statute . (See Article 38 (1) (b) and (c) .) On the other hand, ICJ Judge Rosalyn Higgins has stated, “the judge’s role is […] to decide which of two […] norms is applicable […] . As these rules indubitably exist, there can be no question of judicial legislation,” according to Judge Higgins .83 Her position complies with Article 38 (2) of the ICJ Statute, which provides that equity law supplement jus strictum . In lacunas of law, (non liquet) courts may decide the case ex aequo et bono . Accordingly, in international law disputes, equity is a relevant source of law . 5 . ICJ case law follows Judge Higgins’ position . “Justice” bridges the gap between law and ethics . The ratio decidendi of the Corfu Channel Case finds relevant and gives weight to “elementary considerations of humanity” .84 The Barcelona Traction Case looks to a general principle of law “to confirm and endorse the most elementary principles of morality” .85 We can conclude that equity law is unambiguously the nucleus of international law, written as well as unwritten . International law does not import rules of private law in any direct way, however . “International law recruited … many of its rules and institutions from private systems of law… The way in which international law borrows from the source is not by means of importing private law institutions “lock, stock and barrel” … [T]he true view … is to regard any features or terminology which are reminiscent of the rules … of private law as an indication of policy or principle rather than as directly importing these rules and institutions” .86

6 . Can customary responsibility rules save the ecosystem? What is the meaning of “differentiated responsibility“? Does the term “differentiated responsibility need to 80 81 82 83 84 85 86

Klami (footnote 10), 30 . Fredrik Stang, Mine juridiske arbeider [The legal studies of mine], Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap [Journal of Jurisprudence] (1942), 19 . Judge Vereshchtin, ICJ Reports 1996 279–80, Nuclear Weapons Advisory Opinion . Judge Higgins, ICJ Reports 1996 583, 592 . ICJ Report 1949, 4, 22 . ICJ Report 1970, 3, 23 . 1950 Advisory Opinion on Namibia: Judge McNair, 1950 ICJ Report, 148 .

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be defined by one or more of the following three principles? (1) Polluter pays . (2) Pay what you can . (3) The party who benefits pays .87 The Preamble to and Article 11 of the United Nations’ Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and Article 21 of the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), in particular, illustrate these principles . Both instruments form platforms for the development of customary law . What is the basis for liability awards for environmental damages? Who is the liable party? The individual emitter? The emitting state? Both? Are consequential damages available? What about incidental damages? Are defendants liable for the outcome? Do they have a duty to restore? Both?88 The following chapter will consider this puzzle . 4. decIsIon-mAkIng

by AdoPtIng customAry And generAl PrIncIPles of lAw

“Norms, in my view, result from psychological propensities about which we know little .” Jon Elster89

“Self-governing” stakeholder participation is an alternative to top-down systems, which are often corrupt . This section considers a trial-and-error method of these self-correcting systems that could lead to an eco-friendly environment. 4.1 Customary Law: resuLting from “triaL-and-error” adaPtive management How can we build autopoietic structures that support long-term, successful resource management systems? Is this goal attainable? 1 . As to governing instrument, customary law needs authentication . To authenticate or prove the existence of customary law, two conditions must be satisfied . First, the settlement of facts, i . e . the unanimous understanding of practice . Second, its followers must engage in the conduct because they believe the law requires them to do so . 2 . For customary law to function, the legal system needs a procedural structure that considers and adapts to new signs from the arenas of brute, hard facts, artefacts and institutional facts . We need a trial and error system that: – Benefits from • “Regenerative learning” and feedback loops • Environmental operational tools that recognize a history of past adaptation • Group owned, intricate patterns of knowledge • Evolving, time-tested and wise adaptive responses • Procedural mechanisms for making rule changes .

87 88 89

Workshop paper, 5 . Ibid . Elster, Economic Order and Social Norms, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) 144 (1988), 357, 365 .

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Facilitates negotiation of modifications . Provides feedback mechanisms for repeat players . Can be tweaked without wholesale revision . Promotes fine-grained rules that facilitate revision . Allows no privatization rights without privatization duties . Puts ownership duties on par with ownership rights .

3 . Which remedies are available to cure environmental damages? Breach of international law may result in a valid claim of restoration – a kind of specific performance that precludes monetary damages .90 Restoration as remedy repeals “willingness to accept”, which “can lead to more technical difficulties and uncertainties than willingness to pay” .91 Restoration renders ITQs superfluous and prevents resources depletion leading to the “tragedy of the commons” . A restoration quota-management scheme compels fishermen to receive reduced quotas in the future . 4.2 staKehoLder based Customs: from desCriPtions to PresCriPtions “Die Tendenz, das Faktische zum Normalen zu erheben, kann man in voller Reinheit beim Kinde studieren … historisch die ersten Vorstellungen vom Normativen sich in ahnlicher Weise unmittelbar aus dem Faktischen entwickelt haben .” Georg Jellinek92

Stakeholder acts93 follow fixed patterns of behaviour that result in social and legal norms . Descriptive acts convert into prescriptive conduct, referring to the transformation “from teleology into normativity [which] is accepted in a legal positivistic manner .”94 Thus, Jellinek’s “normative Kraft des Faktischen” transform artefacts into institutional facts . This transformative process from facts to norms requires an opinio juris element in addition to a settled practice . Settled practice is relatively easy to prove because it is objective: the practice is settled, or not . While settled practice might seem to require “long time practice,” it does not . Instead, “a passage of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to the formation of a new rule of customary international law .”95 To show opinio juris, however, you need evidence that the parties engage in the customary conduct because they believe that they have a legal duty to do so . Opinio juris is the subjective element implicit in the very notion of the opinio juris sive necessitates . Both elements – settled practice and opinion juris – are

90 91 92 93 94 95

The restoration tool, see Peter Ørebech, Om allemannsrettigheter [On public property rights], Oslo, 1992, chap . 2 . Cf . Ohio v . United States DOI, 880 F .2d 432, 448 n . 89 (D . C . Cir . 1989) . Georg Jellinek, Allegemeine Staatslehre, Berlin, 1914, 337–344 . Abigail Oxley Green / Linsey Hunton-Clarke, A typology of Stakeholder Participation for Company Environmental Decision-making, Business Strategy and the Environment 12/5 (2003), 292 . Klami (footnote 10), 42–43 . North Sea Continental Shelf Case (1969), § 76–77 .

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necessary . Neither one alone is sufficient . The absence of either one defeats any claim to law . That said, not all practices create law . “There are many international acts, e . g ., in the field of ceremony and protocol, which are performed almost invariably, but which are motivated only by considerations of courtesy, convenience or tradition and not by any sense of legal duty .”96 Thus, even widely followed rules or practices are not per se accepted international law .97 4.3 generaL PrinCiPLes of Law – the “worLd of PurPoses and ideas” The development of general principles of law (see Article 38 (1)(c) of the ICJ Statute) differs from the practice-based customary international law discussed above . (See Article 38 (1)(b) of the ICJ Statute .) The first finding a court must make to recognize a general principle of law is the existence of ideas about political, moral, religious and extralegal norms . These ideas constitute the commonsensical ethos among archetypes of civilized nations . Initially, these ideas categorizes as praeter legem. They maintain that status until recognized or approved – that is authenticated – by the court or other tribunal . “Basic rights of the human person, such as protection from slavery and racial discrimination” are examples of general principles of law recognized by international courts .98 General principles emerge from corresponding ideas accepted by and practices used in different states . The norms they produce are so similar simply because they are, or have come to be viewed as common sense . Even where a practice is not common among nations, it may very well be common within nations . This is strong evidence of a general principle of international law . What the court must do is decide whether a normative idea taken from the world of ideas, is now – de facto and de jure – the world’s idea . If so, that idea is a general principle of law . 4.4 a resPonsibLe state: the ratio deCidendi of internationaL Courts’ deCisions In “environmental studies, the principle of common but differentiated responsibility is of crucial importance .” If that is so, then how can we overcome the “number of difficulties”99 encountered by this principle? I propose that we look to international case law . In their decisions, international courts and tribunals delegate the duty of eco-friendly behavior to law-abiding, responsible states who serve as custodians . Only a few conventions bind the vast majority of nation states . This is why I consider customary law, which binds all states (jus cogens), to be the superior source of law for international environmental law purposes. What does customary law tell us about the environmental responsibilities of all national states? 96 97 98 99

Ibid . Right of Passage over Indian Territory (India v Portugal 1960 ICJ 6) . Case Concerning Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Co ., Ltd . (Belgium v . Spain) 1970 ICJ 34 . Workshop paper .

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As stated in the Corfu Channel Case, it is “every state’s obligation not to allow knowingly its territory to be used for acts contrary to the rights of other states” .100 A similar duty arises from the Trial Smelter Case .101 (Canadian poisonous smoke that harmed the U. S.) Referencing the work of Professor Eagleton, the arbitral tribunal adopted his views as the rule . “A State owes at all times a duty to protect other States against injurious acts by individuals from within its jurisdiction .”102 The Gabcikovo Nagymaros Case introduces the precautionary principle as a casuistic result of a universal law principle of cross-border responsibility: “Art .2 § 5(a) of the Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses […] provides support for the obligation in general international law to apply the precautionary principle to protect a transboundary resource .”103 The Bluefin Tuna Case confirms the validity of the precautionary principle: “Considering that, although the Tribunal cannot conclusively assess the scientific evidence presented by the parties, it finds that measures should be taken as a matter of urgency to preserve the rights of the parties and to avert further deterioration of the southern Bluefin tuna stock .”104

4.5 towards a theory on bottom-uP Law instrument International case law decisions support my understanding that courts often ignore the positivist theory on how to address the strict division between extra-legal and legal norms,105 and reject the (positivist) claim that judges may not decide disputes on the basis on extra-legal norms . Neither un-written nor written laws enjoy a priori existence. To be valid at all levels (strata) of brute, hard facts, artefacts and institutional facts, all laws require ethical, moral or social acknowledgment and authentication . This is how they acquire legal status . Customary laws and traditional rights are not metaphysical beliefs, but institutional facts, which can be studied empirically . How do people alter rules that other would like them live by when those rules no longer appear to be compatible with the new conditions or surroundings?106

Under Article 19 (3) of the International Law Commission’s (ILC) Draft Convention on State Responsibility, a breach of green principles constitutes a “crime by a state” against the international society . It is “(d) a serious breach of an international obligation of essential importance for safeguarding the preservation of the human environment, such as those prohibiting massive pollution of the atmosphere or of the seas .”107 This is a draft peremptory norm . As such, it is still praeter legem, and not yet fully-fledged ius cogens . Article 19 (3) does not impose a universal, non-derogable 100 101 102 103 104 105

ICJ Reports 1949, 4, 22 . Reports of International Arbitral Awards (footnote 2) . Responsibility of States in International Law 80 (1928) . ICJ Reports 1997, 7. New Zealand v . Japan; Australia v . Japan (footnote 4) . For a norm-theoretical analysis, rejecting the positivist divide between legal and extra-legal norms, see Nils Kristian Sundby, Om normer [On norms], Oslo, 1976 . For an opposing view, see Jon Elster, The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order, Cambridge, 1989, 101 . 106 Peter Karsten, Between Law and Custom, Cambridge, 2002, 539 . 107 UN Doc .1976/A/31/10 226 .

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obligation on states because the majority of them rejected the proposal .108 Meanwhile, the principles of the draft convention are supposedly part of the customary law that fills in the legal lacunas . Elinor Ostrom takes a less dramatic approach than the ILC Draft Convention when she describes adaptive management . “The rich case-study literature illustrates a diversity of settings in which appropriators dependent on common-pool resources have organized themselves to achieve much higher outcomes than is predicted by the conventional theory [or] under government operation .”109 Other legal scholars believe that sociological factors are relevant and claim that the “ultimate test of a concept intended to have legal force and profound social and economic consequences is whether it changes behavior at both the individual and institutional levels .”110 To put it another way, resilient resource management systems are “adaptive management” systems111 that respond swiftly to unstable environments .112 As Shepard Krech observed, some activities remained effective for centuries while others ruined the resource .113 Management theory emphasizes the benefits of deliberate “regenerative learning” as a feedback mechanism .114 Daniel Farber highlights the importance of monitoring, giving feedback regarding, and evaluating all environmental programs .115 Carol Rose stresses rapid response time as a necessary attribute of feedback provided to community-based common property regimes .116 Legal rules exhibit similar qualities of graininess .117 A rule is fine-grained if it is possible to modify in small increments . Clayton Gillette uses the term “reversibility” to “refer to the capacity of decision makers to revisit the probabilistic connection between the factual predicates for a rule and its justification .” “Reversibility” includes “the capacity to revise, as well as reverse, prior formulations .”118

108 UN Docs . A/C .6/31/SR .13–33 . 109 Elinor Ostrom, Reformulating the Commons, in Protecting the Commons: A Framework for Resource Management in the Americas, ed . Joanna Burger et al ., Island Press, 2001, 17, 20–21 . 110 A . Dan Tarlock, Ideas Without Institutions: The Paradox of Sustainable Development, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 9/1 (2001), 35, 37, with further references . 111 Adaptive Management Practitioners’ Network . 112 Padma Lal / H . Lim-Applegate / M . Scoccimarro, The Adaptive Decision-Making Process as a Tool for Integrated Natural Resource Management: Focus, Attitudes, and Approach, Conservation Ecology 5/2 (2001), 11 . 113 Shepard Krech, The Ecological Indian, Norton, 1999, 212 . 114 A . Dan Tarlock, Environmental Law: Ethics or Science, Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum 7 (1996), 206 (need for feedback loops has long been advocated but ignored in environmental law) . 115 Daniel Farber, Eco-pragmatism: Making Sensible Decisions in an Uncertain World, Chicago, 1999 . 116 Carol M . Rose, Common Property, Regulatory Property, and Environmental Protection: Comparing Common Pool Resources to Tradable Environmental Allowances, Bloomington, Indiana, 2000, 13 . 117 On the importance of a in-depth comprehension of language in interpreting customary resource management rules, see Eugene Hunn, The Ethnobiological Foundation for Traditional Ecological Knowledge, in Traditional Ecological Knowledge: Wisdom for Sustainable Development, ed . Nancy M . Williams / Graham Baines, Australian National University Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies, 1993, 16 . For example, some Peruvian Andes languages use several hundred names for different varieties of the plant that other societies usually just call “potato”, ibid ., 19 . 118 Clayton Gillette, Rules and Reversibility, Notre Dame Law Review 72 (1997), 1415, 1417 .

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A conclusIon

1 . The main purpose of this article is to provide a detailed picture of customary law and general principles of law and to explain how they contribute and can contribute to a green future . Both customary law and general principles of law are self-producing, self-renewing and self-governing systems . Both provide “feedback loops” on the basis of efficient “stakeholder participation” . Societies’ inner logic creates a collective process . The trial-and-error method can succeed if future generations adopt and adhere to the resulting practices . In this way, popular adherence through subsequent and continuous practice will authenticate practices as valid customary law . 2 . A secondary aim of this piece is to call the reader’s attention to a link between law and philosophy . ICJ case law embraces general principles of law suitable to bridge the gap between moral theory, on the one hand, and realistic or pragmatic law and policy on the other . According to John Stuart Mill, justice is frequently – but not without exception119 – the basic social utility . The principle of equity exists in positive law because no legislator believes that legislation should lead to unjust outcomes. Thus, courts must interpret legal texts to effect justice . New disputes resolved by the ICJ establish precedents, which in turn confirm international customary law and develop new principles of law . While breaking these laws does not constitute criminal conduct, it does impose a duty on the wrongdoer, here, the polluter, to restore the environment and compensate the injured parties . 3 . The system – installed on the platform of the “no double standard axiom” – is a dynamic one . New generations reject unsuccessful customs, which ultimately cease to function as laws . This proves the inherent dynamism of the customary law legal system . 4 . As shown, ICJ decisions create general principles of shared but differentiated responsibility . Frequent ICJ decisions help improve the natural environment and strengthen consistent, extensive and well-functioning environmental law . However, the journey has not yet ended . I contend that the key to a well-functioning bottom-up system is a recognized authentication scheme . As discussed above, this requires going through the political process or having disputes decided by courts . This is the way to promote eco-friendly principles of law and the “common environmental good” . The details of this system are still to come . bIblIogrAPhy Arendt, Hannah, The human condition, Chicago, 1998 . Bjarup, Jes, Social interaction: the foundation of customary law, in The Role of Customary Law in Sustainable Development, ed . Peter Ørebech / Fred Bosselman, Cambridge, 2005 . Bosselman, Fred, Limitations Inherent in the Title to Wetlands at Common Law, Stanford Environmental Law Journal 15/2 (1996), 247–337 . Bosselman, Fred et al. (ed .), Energy, Economics and the Environment, Second Edition, University Casebook Series, Foundation Press, 2005 . Bosselman, Fred (ed .), Symposium on Energy Law, Chicago-Kent Law Review 86/1 (2011) . Capra, Fritjof / Luisi, Pier Luigi, The Systems View of Life: A Unifying Vision, Cambridge, 2014 . Cohen, Morris Raphael, Reason and Law, New York, 1961 . 119 D . D . Raphael, Concepts of Justice, Oxford, 2001, Chap .12 .

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Convery, Frank J ., Reflections: The Emerging Literature on Emissions Trading in Europe, Review of Environmental Economics and Polity 3/1 (2009), 121–137 . Coase, R . H ., The Problem of Social Cost, The Journal of Law & Economics 3 (1960), 1–44 . Dahl, Robert A ., Democracy and its critics, New Haven, 1989 . Depledge, Joanna, Adjustments: A Double Hit for Ozone and Climate, Environmental Policy and Law 37/6 (2007), 448–452 . Elster, Jon, Economic Order and Social Norms, Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE) 144 (1988), 357–366 . Elster, Jon, Arguing and bargaining in the Federal Convention and the Assemblée Constituante, Working Paper, University of Chicago, August 1991 . http://www .reocities .com/hmelberg/elster/AR91AAB .HTM Elster, Jon, The Cement of Society: A Study of Social Order, Cambridge, 1989 . Ellerman, Denny / Buchner, Barbara K ., The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme: Origins, Allocation, and Early Results, Review of Environmental Economics and Polity 1/1 (2007), 66–87 . Farber, Daniel, Eco-pragmatism: Making Sensible Decisions in an Uncertain World, Chicago, 1999 . Fuller, Lon L ., Human Interaction and the Law, American Journal of Jurisprudence 14/1 (1969), 1–36 . Green, Abigail Oxley / Hunton-Clarke, Lynsey, A typology of stakeholder participation for company environmental decision-making, Business Strategy and the Environment 12/5 (2003), 292–299 . Gillette, Clayton P ., Rules and Reversibility, Notre Dame Law Review 72/5 (1997), 1415–1448 . Hardin, Garrett L ., The Tragedy of the Commons, Science 162 (1968), 1243–1248 . Holmes, Oliver Wendell, The Common Law, Boston, 1881 . Hunn, Eugene, The Ethnobiological Foundations for Traditional Ecological Knowledge, in Ecologies for the 21st Century: Traditional Ecological Knowledge, Wisdom for Sustainable Development, ed . Nancy M . Williams / Graham Baines, Australian National University Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies, Canberra, 1993, 18–29 . Jellinek, Georg, Allegemeine Staatslehre, Berlin, 1914 . Karsten, Peter, Between Law and Custom, Cambridge, 2002, Klami, Hannu Tapani, The Rules of Man, Vammala, 1984 . Klami, Hannu Tapi, The Rule of Law: Are there any Real Alternatives, Turku, 1985 . Krech, Shepard, The Ecological Indian, Norton, 1999 . Lal, Padma / Lim-Applegate, Hazel / Scoccimarro, Michelle C, The Adaptive Decision-Making Process as a Tool for Integrated Natural Resource Management: Focus, Attitudes, and Approach, Conservation Ecology 5/2 (2001) . Mill, John Stuart, Utilitarism. Liberty and Representative Government, Toronto, 1910 . Naess, Arne, Økologi og filosofi [Ecology and philosophy], Oslo, 1972 . Nietzsche, Friedrich, Also sprach Zarathustra . Ein Buch für Alle und Keinen (1883–1885), Sämtliche Werke (ed . Giorgio Colli / Mazzino Montinari), vol . 4, München/Berlin/New York, 1980 . Olivecrona, Karl, Law as Fact, London,1971 . Osborne, Martin J ., An Introduction to Game Theory, New York/Oxford, 2004 . Ostrom, Elinor, Governing the Commons, Cambridge, 1990 . Ostrom, Elinor, Crafting Institutions for Self-Governing Irrigation Systems, San Francisco, 1992 . Ostrom, Elinor, Reformulating the Commons, in Protecting the Commons in Protecting the Commons: A Framework for Resource Management in the Americas, ed . Joanna Burger et al ., Island Press, 2001 . Picketty, Thomas, Le capital au XXIe siècle, Paris, 2013 . Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, Andreas (ed .), Law and Ecology: New Environmental Foundations, Routledge, 2012 . Poundstone, William, Prisoner’s Dilemma, New York, 1993 . Reid, Thomas, On Practical Ethics, ed . Knud Haakonssen, Edinburgh, 2007 . Reid, Thomas, Essays on the Active Powers of Man, ed . Knud Haakonssen / James Harris, Edinburgh, 2010 . Rose, Carol M ., Common Property, Regulatory Property, and Environmental Protection: Comparing Common Pool Resources to Tradable Environmental Allowances, Bloomington, Indiana, 2000 . Sen, Amartya, The Idea of Justice, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2009 . Stang, Fredrik, Mine juridiske arbeider [The legal studies of mine], Tidsskrift for Rettsvitenskap [Journal of Jurisprudence] 19 (1942) .

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Sundby, Nils Kristian, Om normer [On norms], Oslo, 1976 . Sunstein, Cass R ., Public versus Private Environmental Regulation, Ecology Law Quarterly 21 (1994) . Sunstein, Cass R ., Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle, Cambridge, 2005 . Tarlock, A . Dan, Ideas Without Institutions: The Paradox of Sustainable Development, Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 9/1 (2001), article 3 . Tarlock, A . Dan, Environmental Law: Ethics or Science, Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum 7 (1996), 193–224 . Trondsen, Torbjørn / Ørebech, Peter, Rettsøkonomi for fornybare ressurser [Law and Economics for Renewable Resources], Oslo, 2012 . Veblen, Thorstein, The Theory of the Leisure Class, New York, 1934 . Wood, Dan / Waterman, Richard W ., The Dynamics of Political Control of the Bureaucracy, The American Political Science Review 85 (1991), 801–828 . Ørebech, Peter, ”Tvers igjennom lov til seier”. Om torskeresolusjonen av 1989. Den skjulte agenda og lukkingen av fiskeallmenningen [Straight through law to victory. The hidden agenda of closing the fisheries commons, with a special emphasis on cod resolution of 1989], Power and Democracy Studies (1998–2003), Report 52 (2003) . Ørebech, Peter / Bosselman, Fred, The linkage between sustainable development and customary law, in The Role of Customary Law in Sustainable Development, ed . Peter Ørebech / Fred Bosselman, Cambridge, 2005 . Ørebech, Peter, The art of subsidizing fuel-free electricity under the European Economic Area Agreement as illustrated by Norway’s reversion instrument, Chicago-Kent Law Review, “Symposium on Energy Law”, 74 (2011), 101–129 . Ørebech, Peter / Bosselman, Fred, The Role of Customary Law in Sustainable Development, Cambridge, 2005 .

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2010. 182 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-09608-9 Friedrich Toepel (Hg.) Free Will in Criminal Law and Procedure Proceedings of the 23rd and 24th World Congress of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy in Kraków, 2007, and in Beijing, 2009 2010. 122 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-09320-0 Marcel Senn / Bénédict Winiger / Barbara Fritschi / Philippe Avramov (Hg.) Recht und Globalisierung / Droit et Mondialisation Kongress der Schweizerischen Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 15.–16. Mai 2009, Universität Genf / Congrès de l’Association Suisse de Philosophie du Droit et de Philosophie Sociale, 15–16 mai 2009, Université de Genève 2010. 196 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-09673-7 Imer B. Flores / Uygur Gülriz (Hg.) Alternative Methods in the Education of Philosophy of Law and the Importance of Legal Philosophy in the Legal Education Proceedings of the 23rd World Congress of the International Associaction for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy “Law and Legal Cultures in the 21st Century: Diversity and Unity” in Kraków, 2007 2010. 114 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-09695-9 Sascha Ziemann Archiv für Rechts­ und Sozialphilosophie: Bibliographie und Dokumentation (1907–2009) 2010. 434 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-09719-2 Jan-Reinard Sieckmann (Hg.) Legal Reasoning: The Methods of Balancing Proceedings of the Special Workshop “Legal Reasoning: The Methods of Balancing” held at the 24th World Congress of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy (IVR), Beijing, 2009 2010. 205 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-09723-9

125. Edward Schramm / Wibke Frey / Lorenz Kähler / Sabine Müller-Mall / Friederike Wapler (Hg.) Konflikte im Recht – Recht der Konflikte Tagungen des Jungen Forums Rechtsphilosophie in der Internationalen Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie in Tübingen und Göttingen 2010. 308 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-09729-1 126. Kristian Kühl (Hg.) Zur Kompetenz der Rechts­ philosophie in Rechtsfragen Tagung der Deutschen Sektion der Internationalen Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie vom 24.–26. September 2008 in Tübingen 2011. 140 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-09816-8 127. Stephan Kirste / Anne van Aaken / Michael Anderheiden / Pasquale Policastro (Hg.) Interdisciplinary Research in Juris­ prudence and Constitutionalism 2012. 267 S. mit 2 Abb. und 2 Tab., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-09941-7 128. Stephan Ast / Julia Hänni / Klaus Mathis / Benno Zabel (Hg.) Gleichheit und Universalität Tagungen des Jungen Forums Rechtsphilosophie (JFR) in der Internationalen Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie (IVR) im September 2010 in Halle (Saale) und im Februar 2011 in Luzern 2012. 315 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10067-0 129. Bénédict Winiger / Matthias Mahlmann / Philippe Avramov / Peter Gailhofer (Hg.) Recht und Verantwortung / Droit et responsabilité Kongress der Schweizerischen Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 11.–12. Juni 2010, Universität Zürich / Congrès de l’Association Suisse de Philosophie du Droit et de Philosophie Sociale, 11–12 juin 2010, Université de Zurich 2012. 206 S. mit 6 Abb., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10066-3 130. Thomas Bustamante / Oche Onazi (Hg.) Global Harmony and the Rule of Law Proceedings of the 24th World Congress of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, Beijing, 2009. Vol. 1

131.

132.

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2012. 133 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10081-6 Thomas Bustamante / Oche Onazi (Hg.) Human Rights, Language and Law Proceedings of the 24th World Congress of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, Beijing, 2009. Vol. 2 2012. 192 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10082-3 Yasutomo Morigiwa / Hirohide Takikawa (Hg.) Judicial Minimalism – For and Against Proceedings of the 9th Kobe Lectures. Tokyo, Nagoya, and Kyoto, June 2008 2012. 99 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10136-3 Thomas Bustamante / Carlos Bernal Pulido (Hg.) On the Philosophy of Precedent Proceedings of the 24th World Congress of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, Beijing, 2009 Volume 3 2012. 144 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10150-9 Matthias Kaufmann / Joachim Renzikowski (Hg.) Zurechnung und Verantwortung Tagung der Deutschen Sektion der Internationalen Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie vom 22.–24. September 2010 in Halle (Saale) 2012. 184 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10180-6 Carsten Bäcker / Sascha Ziemann (Hg.) Junge Rechtsphilosophie 2012. 214 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10268-1 Ulfrid Neumann / Klaus Günther / Lorenz Schulz (Hg.) Law, Science, Technology Plenary lectures presented at the 25th World Congress of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, Frankfurt am Main, 2011 2012. 173 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10328-2 Winfried Brugger / Stephan Kirste (Hg.) Human Dignity as a Foundation of Law Proceedings of the Special Workshop held at the 24th World Congress of the Interna-

138.

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tional Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy in Beijing, 2009 2013. 267 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10440-1 Philippe Avramov / Mike Bacher / Paolo Becchi / Bénédict Winiger (Hg.) Ethik und Recht in der Bioethik / Ethique et Droit en matière de Bioéthique Kongress der Schweizerischen Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 11.–12. Mai 2012, Universität Luzern / Congrès de l’Association Suisse de Philosophie du Droit et de Philosophie Sociale, 11–12 mai 2012, Université de Lucerne 2013. 226 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10436-4 Tetsu Sakurai / Makoto Usami (Hg.) Human Rights and Global Justice The 10th Kobe Lectures, July 2011 2014. 167 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10489-0 Bernhard Jakl / Beatrice Brunhöber / Ariane Grieser / Juliane Ottmann / Tim Wihl (Hg.) Recht und Frieden – Wozu Recht? Tagungen des Jungen Forums Rechtsphilosophie (JFR) in der Internationalen Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie (IVR) im September 2012 in Münster und im April 2013 in Berlin 2014. 206 S. mit 3 Abb., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10806-5 Axel Tschentscher / Caroline Lehner / Matthias Mahlmann / Anne Kühler (Hg.) Soziale Gerechtigkeit heute Kongress der Schweizerischen Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 7. Juni 2013, Universität Bern 2015. 139 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10907-9 Daniela Demko / Kurt Seelmann / Paolo Becchi (Hg.) Würde und Autonomie Fachtagung der Schweizerischen Vereinigung für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie, 24.–25. April 2013, Landgut Castelen, Augst 2015. 216 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-10949-9 Jean-Christophe Merle / Alexandre T. G. Trivisonno (Hg.) Kant’s Theory of Law Proceedings of the Special Workshop “Kant’s Concept of Law” held at the 26th

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World Congress of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy in Belo Horizonte, 2013 2015. 138 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-11037-2 Júlio Aguiar de Oliveira / Stanley L. Paulson / Alexandre T. G. Trivisonno (Hg.) Alexy’s Theory of Law Proceedings of the Special Workshop “Alexy’s Theory of Law” held at the 26th World Congress of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy in Belo Horizonte, 2013 2015. 187 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-11043-3 Annette Brockmöller / Stephan Kirste / Ulfrid Neumann (Hg.) Wert und Wahrheit in der Rechtswissenschaft 2015. 113 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-11053-2 Marcelo Campos Galuppo / MÔnica Sette Lopes / Karine Salgado / Thomas Bustamante / Lucas Gontijo (Hg.) Human Rights, Rule of Law and the Contemporary Social Challenges in Complex Societies Proceedings of the 26th World Congress of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy in Belo Horizonte, 2013 2015. 155 S. mit 2 Abb., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-11130-0 Paul Tiedemann (Hg.) Right to Identity Proceedings of the Special Workshop “Right to Identity” held at the 27th World Congress of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy in Washington DC, 2015 2016. 185 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-11244-4 Hajime Yoshino / Andrés Santacoloma Santacoloma / Gonzalo Villa Rosas (Hg.) Truth and Objectivity in Law and Morals Proceedings of the Special Workshop Held at the 26th World Congress of the International Association for Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy in Belo Horizonte, 2013 2016. 158 S., kt. ISBN 978-3-515-11260-4

Climate change belongs to the most pressing environmental problems we are facing today. Despite the agreement reached by the 2015 United Nations Climate Conference, this problem will remain on top of the political agenda during many years to come. This volume presents the proceedings of the workshop held at the Swiss Institute of Comparative Law, Lausanne, in 2014. The main objective was to engage a dialogue between philosophers and lawyers on three intricate questions related to the environmental crisis: first, what is the very nature of this crisis? In what way

does it confront human beings to the limits of the biosphere, and to their own finitude? Second, how should we conceive of responsibility towards future generations from a legal as well as from a moral point of view? Third, how to interpret the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, which plays a key role in environmental law and ethics? How to apply criteria such as the ‘polluter pays’, the ‘ability to pay’, or the ‘beneficiary pays’ principle in the face of empirical data of CO2 emissions in various countries and with a view on mitigation and adaptation?

www.steiner-verlag.de Franz Steiner Verlag

ISBN 978-3-515-11387-8

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