philosophical topics vol. 48, no. 2, Fall 2020 Socializing the Means of Free Development [48]

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philosophical topics vol. 48, no. 2, Fall 2020

Socializing the Means of Free Development

Carol C. Gould

City University of New York

ABSTRACT. This paper investigates the import for a conception of demo­ cratic socialism of Marx’s well-­known principle “From each according to their abilities, to each according to their needs,” arguing that it is best taken together with another of his principles: “The free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.” It considers their implications for the near term rather than some possible ultimate form of communal society, and also brings in a principle that I have developed previously—­equal positive freedom—­which in some ways synthesizes the other two. In analyzing the abilities and needs principle, the notion and extent of needs are explicated, seeing them as including not only material needs, but needs for recognition and for relationships. Marx’s crucial insight that distribution largely depends on the organization of the production process also comes into play. On these bases, the paper proposes that a system of democratically managed firms forms the centerpiece for democratic socialism, supplemented by some other institutions that would work to meet basic needs. The paper also proposes a role for the norms of reciprocity and solidarity, in addition to those of freedom and equality that are most evident in the three principles. Finally, the relative inattention to social reproduction in the early Marxist tradition is addressed with an interpretation of the notion of socializing care and a consideration of its import for institutional design, including cooperative ways of providing such care. Throughout, Marx’s distinctive notions of

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social individuality, socialized wealth, and the free development of individuals are appealed to for the guidance they can provide for interpreting the abilities/needs principle for the period ahead.

INTRODUCTION Marx’s famous principle, “From each according to their ability, to each according to their needs,” has been a source of inspiration for socialists. It has been variously interpreted since Marx first enunciated it in his critical remarks about the German social democratic “Gotha Program” almost 150 years ago.1 My aim in this paper is not to offer an interpretation of Marx’s own principle per se but to take it as a jumping-­off point for reflecting on the directions for a viable democratic socialism in the period ahead. Although Marx saw this abilities/needs principle (ANP) as relevant only for the ultimate stage of communal society where abundance has been achieved, I see it as providing some helpful guidance for the nearer term as well. However, I will propose that for both the near and far term, it has to be interpreted in light of a second of Marx’s principles, this one promulgated with Engels in The Communist Manifesto. That second principle (FDP) asserts that “the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.”2 I want to suggest that these two principles, when taken together and suitably updated for contemporary societies, can help us articulate a conception of demo­ cratic socialism that can fulfill the norms ingredient in these principles, chiefly equality, freedom (as free development), and social cooperation. In fact, I will suggest that a third principle, which I have developed at length elsewhere, helps to synthesize these various norms and retains much of the content of Marx’s two principles. This is the principle of Equal Positive Freedom (EPF) as a comprehensive principle of justice. It shares this concern with justice with the ANP but at the same integrates within its very formulation the notion of the free development of each individual, as articulated in Marx’s FDP. From a political economic standpoint, these various principles serve to tie the distribution of consumption goods to the organization of production, a connection that Marx pointedly emphasized. But it will be important to extend the range of these norms (suitably modified in some ways) to the domain of social reproduction and the informal spheres of life. Together, these principles also highlight the deep interconnectedness of people in both of these spheres, based on Marx’s innovative relational social ontology. I will also touch on the elaboration that this social ontology has recently received, especially in feminist philosophy, and attempt to delineate its importance for understanding the possibilities for a really democratic 1. Marx 1875/1978, 531. For some useful discussions of this principle, see Geras 1985, Nell and O’Neill 2003, Carens 2003, Gilabert 2015, and Spafford 2020. 2. Marx and Engels 1848/ trans. 1888/1978, 491.

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form of socialism. Clearly, we cannot give a comprehensive account of all of this here, but I hope to sketch some of the outlines of the account.

THE ABILITIES AND NEEDS PRINCIPLE AND THE PROJECT OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM First, we need to begin on a cautionary note. Although we can gain both guidance and inspiration from the abilities/needs principle, I think we need to be wary of taking it to be literally applicable in the present or the immediate near term. Marx himself regarded the principle as pertaining to a fully realized communal society of the future3 where an abundance of goods has been achieved through the transferring of most production to machinery. It is premised on a high development of science and technology, such that (in his terms) science itself becomes the agent of production in place of traditional labor.4 Marx thought it likely that the period after capitalism would in fact exemplify a different principle from the ANP. We can characterize it as the ACP, “To each according to their contribution,” with contribution understood in terms of the labor performed.5 “So, for parallelism with the first, we could phrase this as “From each according to their labor, to each according to their contribution as measured in those terms.” In this way, according to Marx, the period following capitalism would realize the norm that supposedly governs distribution under capitalism but in fact fails to do so, namely, fair return from labor expended. Under capitalism, each is supposedly getting back from society the right to purchase a bundle of goods equivalent to what they have worked for, in a fair exchange. In actuality, that reward for contribution is not possible under capitalism, according to Marx, because capitalists own the means of production and workers need to sell their labor power to capital, getting back only a wage, rather than a proportional share of what they contribute to producing. In what might seem like an equal exchange of labor for a wage, the capitalist in fact benefits by gaining control over the creative power of labor during a certain time, where this living labor can produce more for the capitalists than it costs to reproduce the workers. In the period immediately following capitalism, which is the period most rele­ vant to us today, moving to democratic socialism would require that workers would really get back in proportion to their contribution. In this context then, the 3. I am here and elsewhere in this article following my own coinage in Gould 1978 of the term “communal society of the future” as an interpretation of Marx’s own projected “third” stage of historical development in the Grundrisse. To my mind, this terminology avoids the inevitable negative associations of “communism” and captures the core features of enhanced cooperation and community that Marx thought could follow from eliminating exploitation and the other deep and pernicious inequalities of capitalism. 4. Marx 1858/1973, 699–706. 5. Marx 1875/1978, 529–31.

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operative principle would in fact be something like “from each according to their labor, to each according to their realized and demonstrated abilities,” where reward would be proportional to their contribution as measured by the amount and quality of their laboring activity. Without elaborating what this would look like with any specificity, at one point Marx refers to giving workers certificates for the hours worked, thereby rewarding them in proportion to their labor.6 On another model that I will discuss, that of democratically self-­managing firms, workers would be in a position to get their fair share, at least in comparison to capitalism, since capitalist exploitation would be replaced by worker control. The profits would be shared among all who work in the firm, after deductions are made for reinvestment in the firm, the acquisition of new technologies, etc., with the workers having the power to determine the distribution of the surplus. (Of course, this in itself would not guarantee that they allocate profits in accordance to their contributions, but it would at least make that possible.) In Marx’s account, in the stage immediately following capitalism, even a fair and equal division of the surplus in proportion to contribution or labor expended in fact tends to incorporate a deep inequality. In particular, it still favors those workers with the greatest abilities and those who are strongest or most able to work. It treats weaker, or needier, or less standardly abled workers unequally, to the degree that their contribution would be less. Instead of incorporating equal right, then, the application of this principle in fact involves a (sometimes hidden) inequality.7 Even a transition to worker-­controlled corporations or firms would not necessarily eliminate this inequality. Even if the workers within a firm choose an equal distribution of profits, there would certainly remain inequalities between firms, with workers in more successful firms faring better than their counterparts in less successful ones. (This indeed would represent a limitation in a system of co-­ops or worker-­managed firm, if taken alone and without further efforts to establish greater equality on the side of distribution.) It is Marx’s insight regarding the inequality that would remain in this stage following capitalism that leads him to propose the ANP as a principle for a fully developed communal society of the future. He says that it can be implemented when “the springs of cooperative wealth flow more abundantly.”8 When, moreover, the division of labor has been overcome and “labor becomes not a means of life but life’s prime want,”9 with the concomitant change in the nature of production, it will be possible to distribute to each according to what they need. Since people have some differing needs, and even differ to a degree in what would fulfill their most basic needs, this principle is responsive to a deeper understanding of equality. In this reading, people are understood as equal in their differences. Moreover,

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6. Marx 1875/1978, 530. 7. Marx 1875/1978, 530–31. 8. Marx 1875/1978, 531. 9. Marx 1875/1978, 531.

although a society organized around this principle would continue to prioritize labor or work, it would be free labor. Such “really free labor” not only goes beyond the realm of necessary labor but would also be creative and responsive to people’s own determination, rather than being under the control of capitalists, as it is in the existing capitalist form of production. The new stage, at least in its developed form, is also understood by Marx to be based on explicitly cooperative forms of production and distribution, in place of the competitive and zero sum modes of wealth accumulation under capitalism.10 But what does the ANP really mean, not only as a feature of Marx’s theory, but for us? As enunciated, it raises a host of problems of interpretation, whether within the frame of Marx’s theory or more generally. Perhaps the main one concerns the meaning of the clause “to each according to their needs.” Is Marx referring only to basic needs (and indeed, are these only material needs, or are other needs basic)? Is he in fact intending to include all needs in the ANP, encompassing the (so-­called) higher needs? And if the latter, would that not raise the difficulty as to what could properly serve as a limit on distributions to provide the resources for meeting these needs. Really free laboring activity can be relatively costly (e.g., if it involves astrophysics) or somewhat less so (Marx’s own example is musical composition). How can a society deal with equilibrating the needs for the variety of means to carry out such diverse activities? In addition, is the abundance that Marx suggests is required to enable the move to the ANP really a desirable norm after all, especially in view of the perils we face of climate change and the destruction of the earth’s resources and the contribution of growth economies to those transformations? Yet another question is whether, if we detach people’s contribution from reward in the form of compensation for their labor, they would actually perform the labor—­however residual—­that will still be needed to produce this abundance. This poses the problem of so-­called “material incentives” which may be required as a motivation for working. Finally, the entire emphasis on work and labor does not seem to adequately address the importance of reproductive work and more generally of social reproduction and caring modes of being together. Like the creative activity involved in work, such caring ways of being are essential to being human, as feminist philosophers have effectively argued. 10. Although the particular forms such cooperation would take can be understood variously in the interpretations of Marx rather sparse practical remarks (e.g., whether they are to be understood as national or subnational or indeed transnational), nonetheless the core notions of “cooperative property” and “cooperative wealth” are prominent in his account, as is the insistence that forms of distribution should depend on a thoroughgoing reorganization of the production process. This is even evident in the very sections under consideration here in Marx 1875/1978, 531–32. In a related way, in his Grundrisse, Marx describes the communal stage as follows: “Free individuality, based on the universal development of individuals, and on their subordination of their communal, social productivity as their social wealth” (1858/1973, 158). In contrast, in capitalism, “individuals are subsumed under social production; social production exists outside of them as their fate; but social production is not subsumed under individuals, manageable by them as their common wealth” (158–59); and later in that same work, he writes that “a communal production, communality, is presupposed as the basis of production” (171–72).

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But they do not play much of a role in standard theories of socialism, including that of Marx himself. We need to ask then: What inspiration can we draw from the ANP, as well as from Marx’s own critique of capitalism, as to what the next stage should be (rather than inquiring into a more distant communal society)? And how can the ANP be usefully supplemented by the free development principle (the FDP) for this upcoming period? We can recognize that Marx had good reason to be cautious in addressing how to conceive the period following capitalism and what principles should be implemented in future forms of social organization, without following him in almost wholly eschewing analysis of these questions. Certainly, it would be best to remain focused on fairly close-­in and practicable transformations given the compelling need to peacefully move toward a better form of society, by way of a democratic transition (which Marx actually foresaw would be possible in certain liberal democratic societies11). Moreover, inasmuch as the people who could be expected to undertake this move have been socialized within present capitalist forms, as Marx himself observes, we cannot presuppose entirely transformed characters. Nonetheless, I think that we can derive considerable insight for the shape of this next stage by taking both the ANP and the FDP as, in a certain sense, regulative principles to guide us going forward. (In my own view, as I will only be able to suggest in this essay, they can be synthesized in the more comprehensive EPF principle.) What would justify using the ANP in this way, presumably against Marx’s own advice? Although Marx rarely lets himself project the future, especially in view of his critique of utopian socialists, the ANP nonetheless has a clear normative core that evidently goes beyond its preconditions of abundance and scientific dominance. It would take us too far afield to lay out the argument for Marx’s own commitment to the norm of recognizing differentiated individuals and their needs, or more generally for the importance in his thinking of norms of freedom, equality, reciprocity, solidarity, and even justice, however contested such a claim may be. (I have presented arguments on this point in my study of Marx’s Grundrisse.12) But whether or not Marx explicitly countenances normativity of this sort, however embedded and socially and historically contextualized, we can see that the ANP in fact does have normative dimensions that are themselves suggestive even for our present context, and that can provide some guidance for developing institutions for democratic socialism. The notion of needs is itself suggestive, as I shall argue, and has obvious contemporary import, as is the idea of an economy founded on the ability to contribute. My focus here will be more on the second (‘needs’) half of the ANP rather than on its first (‘abilities’) part, but the latter has received some interesting analyses by others.13 11. For a discussion, see Schaff 1973. 12. Gould 1978. See also Gould 1994. 13. See, for example, Carens 2003.

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Before turning to the interpretation of the concatenation of the ANP and the FDP and a consideration of the guidance they may provide, we should acknowledge a potential objection to this entire program. At this point in time, with democracy itself under threat, it may seem fanciful to be discussing progress to another, more democratic, stage. Yet I believe that the necessity of having some norms and guidelines for moving ahead remains real, despite the fact that our immediate focus must inevitably be on countering the rising authoritarianism. Indeed, I have elsewhere argued that one way (probably the best way) to combat this pernicious development is precisely to more fully realize democracy—­to deepen it and to extend it to economic life—­in ways that are adumbrated in the project of democratic socialism.14

THREE PRINCIPLES Turning now to the guidance we can derive from the ANP, we can first observe the demandingness of this principle, which resides in a number of its elements and implications: It evidently places central importance on meeting at least people’s basic needs and potentially also “higher” needs. Ingredient in its phraseology of “From each” and “to each” is also a sort of egalitarianism and in particular one that would be supple enough to respond to differences in the specific form and range of people’s needs. We also can observe some measure of reciprocity and solidarity implied there, as I will discuss below. The connection between the two parts of the principle, moreover, introduces an emphasis on social cooperation, which would also need institutional expression. And given Marx’s insight that the organization of production should have priority over distributive considerations (because the former largely determines the latter), we would need to find ways of constructing more egalitarian and cooperative forms of production, as I will also elaborate in what follows. When we bring in the FDP, it becomes clear that society would need to provide conditions for enhancing people’s opportunities to freely develop themselves. Indeed, given the international perspective Marx adopts, we would have to find ways to assure that people worldwide have effective opportunities for self-­ transformative activity, and indeed, at both individual and collective levels. More generally, the science and technology that will likely underlie the fulfillment of both of these principles would have to be reoriented to constructive rather than destructive uses. Finally, the design of economic, social, and political institutions to meet these various egalitarian and cooperative aims would somehow contribute to the sorts of personality and character traits that lend support to a voluntaristic interpretation of the first part of the ANP, namely, “From each according to their

14. Gould 2019.

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abilities.” And at the personal level, people would need to develop steady dispositions to give attention to the diversity of needs and capacities both of themselves and of others. Meeting these various requirements is a tall order indeed. But before exploring some concrete suggestions for beginning to realize them, we can further consider the interpretation of the ANP and the FDP. Especially in view of the FDP, the application of the ANP in the near term—­ and in some ways in the far term as well—­suggests that the free development of individuals has to be equal. In previous work, I have interpreted this requirement in terms of a third—­related—­principle of justice that I call Equal Positive Freedom (EPF).15 This enunciates a requirement for (prima facie) equal rights of access to the conditions for self-­development. Since societies cannot guarantee self-­development itself, this principle should not be taken to be a perfectionist one. Rather, it is only possible to provide (relatively) equal access to the conditions for such self-­transformative activity. Self-­development is not to be understood in terms of defined and essential characteristics (as might be connoted by a notion of self-­realization or self-­actualization), but it is also not reducible to mere free choice although it presupposes that. It is an open, processive, and relational notion of the self-­transformative activity of an individual over time by way of access to the conditions that enable such an expansion and development of capacities and relations along with the realization of core projects. It thus has a biographical and embodied dimension in contrast to traditional liberal notions of free choice and autonomy. It is a notion of effective freedom, the precise dimensions of which cannot be predicted in advance.16 The argument for equal rights of access to the conditions needed for such free development follows from a recognition of p ­ eople’s basic human agency (in this open sense), as I have elaborated in other work.17 The conditions that are necessary include both material and social ones that would enable people to meet basic needs (in a sense to be specified below), along with a range of further conditions that are required for their fuller flourishing, that is, for self-­development and self-­transformation over time. These conditions include the absence of constraining conditions (as in standard negative liberty accounts that protect life, liberty, and security), to which I add freedom from domi­ nation, exploitation, or oppression. They also include the provision of enabling conditions of action and self-­development, such as access to extensive educational opportunities, healthcare, childcare, legal and social forms of equal recognition, and the means for cultivating talents, capacities, and relationships over time. 15. My initial elaboration of this principle was in Gould 1988, 31–90. It was influenced especially by the theory of C. B. Macpherson, 1973, although my view differs from his in various ways (see Gould 1988, 18–20). 16. For a fuller account, see Gould 1988, 35–60; 2004, 50–77; 2014, 58–80. 17. The first formulation and its extension to an expansive requirement for democracy is in Gould 1988, 60–90.

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I have also proposed that we use the already recognized human rights in their full range (including civil, political, social, economic, and cultural rights) to specify these various conditions necessary for self-­developing or self-­transformative activity. Yet, in contradistinction to the standard reading in which human rights are all equiprimordial, as it were, I propose that it is helpful to distinguish between basic or primary human rights, understood as those required for any human life activity whatever, and secondary, but still essential, human rights, namely, those required for fuller flourishing. In this reading of human rights, they go beyond legal claims against state actors to include more fundamental social claims on each other, realized through a range of institutional forms.18

NEEDS AND THEIR FULFILLMENT Perhaps the key question in interpreting the ANP is to determine what the meaning of needs is and how such needs are related to the notion of free development. In Globalizing Democracy and Human Rights, I proposed a tripartite account, which adds to the standard notions of material needs and the need for recognition of a third category—­the need for relationships.19 The first two of these types have received considerable attention, the first especially by Marx (and his followers) who tended to include here material and sensuous needs, and the second by Hegel (and more recently by Axel Honneth and Charles Taylor, among others).20 But the third domain of relationships has not often been articulated as an arena of need; rather it has been understood primarily in terms of care, in feminist ethics, for example, in the work of Joan Tronto and Virginia Held.21 In my view, material needs do not always have priority over the other two types, though one cannot live for long without them. But one can also not live without some recognition and some supportive relationships. So I would resist the temptation to prioritize just one type of need. There is much that can be said about the nature of these various types of needs and the range of more specific needs that fall under them. And beyond the theoreti­ cal issues, getting a sense of the ways that the needs can be fulfilled through social, political, and economic practices would be important for understanding the guidance that the ANP can provide for developing new forms of society. Although I cannot pursue these questions of theory and practice in any depth here, we can note, first, that needs generally are not to be taken reductively as only biologistic or restricted to the necessities of organic life (although many of them are responsive to that). They are framed by, or even arise from, social practices, and thus have a 18. Gould 2004, 37–38, 71–73; 2014, 13–57. 19. Gould 2004, especially 94–102. 20. Marx 1845/1978, 146–200; Hegel 1807/2014, 175–88; Honneth 1996; Taylor 1992. 21. Tronto 1993, 2013; Held 2005.

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socially constructed and elaborated aspect. Needs generally signify a lack and an awareness of lack, relative to some end or norm with respect to which the lack is understood. In this way, they are necessary only with respect to human ends. Moreover, needs are relational, in entailing specific relations to nature and/or to other people, both in terms of what they are as needs and in regard to the modes of fulfilling them. The first type, that of material and sensuous needs, includes bodily requirements for food, clothing, shelter, etc., and these needs are often satisfied by the creation of useful objects through work. Following Marx, we can see this work as a process of objectification, of transforming nature and appropriating it for use, and involving also an embodiment of our own capacities, in processes of shaping objects to satisfy these needs. Sensuous needs can be met through such processes but also through the creation of art, which can satisfy a demand for creative expression. Providing for material needs requires an organized form of political and economic life that can produce and deliver goods and services, including not only systems of production, distribution, and markets, but also appropriate regulations and infrastructure, among other necessities. Crucial, too, are systems of education, healthcare, welfare, and provisions for ensuring human security. Sensuous needs call for a decent and sustainable environment, architectural planning and design, and the availability of opportunities for recreation, as well as public support for the arts. The second basic type of need—­for recognition—­applies both to recognition of the self and to recognition of the individual as part of a community. It involves supportive and responsive interactions that acknowledge both individual and group identities. In the latter case, this tends to involve not only ascribed group characteristics but also opportunities for self-­ascription and for multiple group affiliations. The need for recognition can be protected through a range of politi­ cal and legal rights that secure the freedom and equality of persons and guard their dignity, including protection against discrimination and exploitation. The recognition of group identities, in turn, includes not only the status and rights of citizenship or, more generally, of membership in a polity, but also democratic rights of participation, opportunities to affiliate in civil society groups and voluntary associations, and a variety of cultural rights and opportunities, including freedom from oppression due to one’s group membership. The most distinctive feature of the account I give is the inclusion of a third type of basic need, the need for relationships, where this encompasses both interpersonal and communal relationships. In distinction from the need for recognition, which involves a conscious and explicit acknowledgment of a person’s identity and respect for it, here what the person needs is to be in the relationship. At this level of generality, this refers to a need for sociability of some sort, as either an end in itself or as instrumentally valuable. The range of relationships extend from interpersonal ones like friendship, love, nurturance, and family, to associational ones like clubs and interest groups, to membership in cultural groups, and local, national, transnational, and perhaps also global communities. Even where these

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relationships satisfy economic, educational, cultural, or other needs, there is often an autonomous need for being in the relationship itself. Of course, some of these relationships may run counter to an individual’s other needs, especially for recognition, e.g., relations of domination. And given that having relationships to others seems to be inevitable, it might seem strange to refer to them as a need. Yet, people can also experience an insupportable and nearly unbearable sense of deprivation when they are isolated from others (in the extreme case, against their will), which reveals the extent to which this sociability is in fact a need for them. Even those who eschew relationships (e.g., the traditional hermit or Robinson Crusoe character) evidently need some relationships for their language and thought itself, and for their ways of being and doing which are dependent on social practices, even if these people may be disinclined to acknowledge their indebtedness to others. Political society can provide the conditions for the free development and cultivation of the range of people’s relationships, or can instead hinder them. Para­ doxically, perhaps, supporting them publicly can often require respecting their privacy, along with recognizing rights of free association. Each of these forms of relations also has a variety of concrete social conditions for their facilitation. For example, for the family, these include (equal) parental leave and extensive childcare provision, as well as support for housework. Some of the modes of meeting material needs also prove beneficial for these relations, including welfare or basic income, education, and healthcare. Additional social and economic factors such as the availability of open and accessible means of communication can facilitate the flourishing of interpersonal, associational, and communal relations. So also can opportunities to express solidarity with others through a range of practices, customs, and cultural traditions. Finally, keeping in mind that the individuals here are to be understood as individuals-­in-­relations with capacities for self-­determination, it is obviously necessary to eliminate dominating, oppressive, or exploitative practices if we are to meet the FDP and EPF principles, and to assure that all communal contexts of engagement are as inclusive as possible.22

IMPLEMENTING THE THREE PRINCIPLES IN FORMS OF DEMOCRATIC SOCIALISM This account of needs, understood in terms of Marx’s FDP and my own principle of EPF, suggests some aims for economy, society, and politics in the period ahead. But we require a better idea of how these might be implemented in practice. A crucial question is how the modes of distribution to meet the three sorts of needs in democratic socialism can be closely tied to the organization of production, so that these productive processes will have immediately just distributive consequences to 22. The above account of needs and their fulfillment is drawn from Gould 2004, 94–102.

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the degree possible, alleviating the almost total reliance on redistributive mechanisms as at present. After considering these issues, we will finally be in a position to reflect more directly on how the resulting form of society embodies greater soli­ darity than we presently experience, and can also be said to involve some sociali­ zation of the means of free development (as suggested in the title of this paper). In order to get a sense of a possible political economic organization for socialism, we need to bring in not only norms of freedom and equality involved in the three principles but also a conception of democracy, as I have argued at length elsewhere.23 The principle of equal positive freedom gives rise to a requirement for democratic decision making in all contexts of common (or collective) activity since it requires equal access to the conditions of self-­developing activity, and opportunities to engage in such joint or common activities is one of these conditions.24 But if people are to be self-­determining rather than dominated or controlled by others, they would have to be able to co-­determine these activities. This suggests the need to enable democratic decision making not only in politics but in all institutional contexts of common activity, including in economic life, and especially in firms, where it would take the form of self-­management or workplace democracy.25 (A somewhat similar result arises from reflecting on the desirability of cooperative forms of activity in economic life, to replace the competitiveness and antagonistic modes characteristic of capitalism.) A question arises as to whether implementing democracy in economic life should instead be interpreted primarily in political terms, where it would involve large-­scale democratic political control over the economy. In fact, there is some ground in Marx to think that he did understand the desideratum of shared control in economic life in that sense. An alternative interpretation, to which I incline, takes the requirement for democratic decision making to apply in the first instance on a smaller scale, namely, in firms and at work more generally. In this reading, a requirement for democratic political control over the economy as a whole may hold in the abstract, but would not require fully collectivized control over means of production and certainly not “central planning.” The approach recommended here would also differ from older views in taking a ground-­up approach, beginning with joint democratic decision making in firms and corporations, and suggesting alternative ways of gaining the representation of all the workers in contexts that go beyond these more local ones. I have called this desideratum one of demo­cratic management, a term that better reflects contemporary conditions of work in a global economic frame, where workplaces per se are no longer always rele­vant. (Hence, it is probably best to avoid the commonly used term “workplace democracy.”) The above reflections suggest, at least for the immediately next stage, a model of jointly owned and controlled firms, operating within a market (of goods and 23. Gould 1988, 31–90, 133–59; 2004, 13–49; 2014, 81–96, 226–69. 24. On the notion of common activity, see Gould 1988, 78–80. 25. Gould 2014, 81–96, 242–55.

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services, though for the most part not one in labor).26 While Marx himself may have been critical of markets, I think that a market in consumption goods and services is necessary at least in the near term, especially given the decisive failures of central planning in the Soviet Union and in other examples of “actually existing socialism.” Self-­managing firms would eliminate capitalist exploitation (at least within firms and corporations), but it would still involve differential rewards for work according to the economic success of the firms. A tendency toward commodification would unfortunately remain, though probably less potent than at present. At least for this next stage, worker self-­managed firms, within a suitably regulated context, would thus constitute a salutary change from the present by greatly reducing exploitation and alienation at work, while preserving productivity. A substantial increase in the number of such firms is also achievable, with the help of government loans to help them get started. In the somewhat longer term, forms of more thoroughgoing collective control over investment may be possible, as is advocated by David Schweickart in his own model of self-­management.27 But even without implementing those far-­reaching changes, clearly it would be important to have new avenues of public investment in order to support the crea­ tion of cooperatives and self-­managed firms. Effective economic democracy along these lines and involving a thoroughgoing reorganization of the production process could be expected to do reasonably well in meeting basic needs, including material ones, if designed efficiently. Workers would be incentivized to work productively, since profits would be divided among themselves. It would also meet social needs better than contemporary capitalism does, by enhancing equal recognition of those who work in a firm. And it would clearly be superior in meeting relationship needs by increasing solidarity and sociability, at least within firms. It is evident, however, that not all needs, even basic ones, can be met, even with this reorganization. If we look to the ANP for some guidance for structuring democratic socialism even before a stage of abundance and free labor can be achieved, people would have to provide each other with the resources for satisfying needs beyond those that would be met through these cooperative and democratic arrangements. Some avenues for doing so could be a guaranteed basic income, and assuredly a more extensive welfare system than exists at present. Provision would also be needed for those who cannot work for various reasons. It is clear too that beyond this, society would require an effective and intensive system of education, from pre-­K through to university or comparable opportunities for training, along with universal healthcare and childcare, and other forms of support for families. As we shall see, these various dimensions of public support would ideally be developed in ways that themselves rely on communal or cooperative (and, wherever relevant, democratic) modes of operation. 26. An initial presentation of this model can be found in Gould 1988, 247–61. 27. Schweickart 2011.

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In its recommendation for extensive provisions of this sort—­for welfare, thoroughgoing education, and universal healthcare—­the approach here is aligned with that of property-­owning democracy.28 And in advocating worker-­managed firms or democratic management more generally, the model proposed here overlaps with what David Schweickart has called economic democracy29 (which tends to be differentiated from property-­owning democracy30). However, I believe it is distinguishable from both of these alternatives, and in some ways falls between them, though it is closer to economic democracy. The requirement for democratizing all common activities, including at work, differentiates it from property-­ owning democracy, which seeks equality by widely dispersing ownership not only of human capital but of productive assets. That approach, however, apparently retains much of the capitalist structure and institutions, while expanding the range of people who are shareholders in corporations. It does not require democratic control of a firm’s decision making, or even the accountability of managers to workers as is necessary in my own view.31 Yet, the approach here also does not follow some thoroughgoing socialist attempts, like Schweickart’s own, which require full-­scale public ownership of means of production or of capital for investment (at least for corporations or firms of a certain size), although it agrees in seeing a need for greatly increased public investment for initiating and supporting worker-­controlled firms, along with substantial regulation of economic activities. The emphasis here is on implementing democratic decision making in all contexts of joint institutionalized activity. Like strong views of economic democracy, it rejects a market in labor. But unlike some socialist approaches, it does not eschew all uses of a market in goods and services, except perhaps if some viable alternative were to be developed that offered very substantial opportunities for expression of choice by individual consumers.32

NORMS OF RECIPROCITY, COOPERATION, AND SOLIDARITY Before addressing other features of institutional design, and especially the undertheorized issue of the socialization of care work, we need to take note of some additional norms beyond freedom and equality that are implicit in Marx’s two 28. See O’Neill 2009, Hsieh 2009, Hussain 2009, and Williamson 2009; and O’Neill and Williamson 2012. Of course, those provisions could also be supported by egalitarian forms of the capitalist welfare state, in particular, in their social democratic variants. 29. Schweickart 2011. 30. Schweickart 2012. 31. For a dissenting view, see O’Neill 2008, who defends economic democracy from within a Rawlsian property-­owning framework. 32. For a critique of markets and of market socialism, see Cohen 2009, 53–79; Spafford 2019, 235–37; and the sections by Ticktin and Ollman (along with the defenses by Schweickart and Lawler) in Ollman 1998/2016.

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principles.33 These additions are required even if we take equality in Marx’s sense of differentiated equality, that is, as a norm that is responsive to individual differences. One central notion, related to equality and democracy but still distinct from them, is social cooperation. This goes beyond the customary instrumental interpretation in which people cooperate in order to advance their own ends. Although cooperating does generally tend to enhance the situation of each, in Marx’s approach cooperation is more of an ontological and historically developing fact, a feature of economic and social life that can take various forms in this process. In capitalism, cooperation in a certain sense can be seen to increase over time; but it operates behind people’s backs, as it were, through globalization and the division of labor, which tend to draw people together indirectly (e.g., in global supply chains or as workers in far-­flung corporations, and in the world market in goods and services). However, these increasing, and most often problematic, interconnections can potentially also set the conditions needed for greater public-­ mindedness, which Marx expects can only come to fruition in a more communal society of the future. Needless to say, the interconnections often work negatively to spread global harms widely and quickly, as in the viral pandemic of 2020, so there is certainly no guarantee of felicitous consequences. Moreover, these external forms of cooperative activity can produce a backlash and a return to nationalist and other forms of exclusion, especially insofar as capitalist-­driven globalization most often involves a race to the bottom, with an attendant diminution in the status of workers. If we take seriously the desirability of noninstrumental forms of social cooperation, we can discern some additional ways in which a future society could socialize the means of free development accordingly. In noninstrumental cooperation, each takes themselves to be responsible for doing their part to help provide the conditions that all need (themselves and others) for their free activity. Practically, this could be accomplished most simply if each supports the introduction and maintenance of institutions that serve to provide these conditions for everyone. In other words, here mutual concern need not be taken as a requirement on each to provide for all others (in what we could call an interpersonal interpretation of the demand), which indeed would be impossible. Rather, it is instantiated in each jointly supporting institutions and practices that provide these conditions for all (what we can call an institutional reading of what mutual concern requires).34 Such socially cooperative relations can also exemplify reciprocity, both empiri­ cally and normatively. I have elsewhere offered the following definition of reciprocal 33. They also have resonances in my own integrative principle of equal positive freedom. On its relation to social relations of reciprocity and common activities, see for example Gould 1988, 71–80, and on some of its extensive interconnections with the notion of solidarity, see Gould 2014, 99–131. 34. This distinction harkens back to that between the interactional and institutional interpretation of human rights in Pogge 2008.

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relations: “Each acts towards the other on the basis of a shared understanding and a free agreement that their actions are equivalent.”35 As a norm, we see reciprocity operative in both of Marx’s principles: In the ANP, reciprocity can be found in the conjunction of the two parts of the principle (from each and to each recipro­ cally).36 In the FDP, it consists in the reciprocal relation between the individual’s freedom and that of the others (that the freedom of each is reciprocally related to the freedom of each of the others). The conception of reciprocity relevant to a future society based on these principles goes beyond the idea of reciprocal recognition in Hegel and of course also beyond the instrumental reciprocity characteristic of capitalist modes, which I characterize as “tit-­for-­tat” reciprocity. The norm first of all requires reciprocity of respect and the elimination of nonreciprocal relations of domination and exploitation. But it points to an even more demanding instantiation, which we can call mutuality.37 This need not be taken in an excessively idealistic sense of the term, such as may have been characteristic of utopian socialism, in which each is called to dedicate themselves to the well-­being of each of the others. It also cannot be taken simply as the mutuality that is characteristic of some close relationships, e.g., love, in which each aims directly at the enhancement of the other, since that interpretation would obviously be overly demanding if it were applied to everyone in society and politics at large. These observations cast doubt on some readings of democratic socialism that see it as essentially requiring strongly communal relations to permeate economic life, as in G. A. Cohen’s account or that of some social anarchists. This demanding view may lead theorists to eschew any exchange of equivalents at all, or even any market relations whatever, insofar as they exemplify purely formal reciprocity and some degree of instrumental reciprocity.38 This rejection leads to a puzzling account of how a socialist economy would operate without any such exchanges at all, that is, not only without a market in labor, which seems essential, but also one in goods or services as well. How, then, can mutuality (in a more modest sense) plausibly be embodied in institutions? However admirable personal altruistic or mutualist acts may be, it is difficult to make them the basis of general economic and social relations. Marx himself seemed to appeal to a more political notion of cooperation and mutual aid among members of the working class.39 He sees all such notions as emerging and evolving over time in the historical development of social relations. As a feature of economic relations under capitalism and in class societies more generally, mutual aid or solidarity (as it came to be referred to more widely in subsequent years by socialists) tends to aim at fulfilling shared class interests, where these cannot be 35. Gould 1983. 36. On this point, see also Gilabert 2015, 208–10. 37. Gould 1983. See also Gould 1988, 71–78. 38. Cohen 2009; Spafford 2020. 39. Liedman 2002.

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the interests of everyone.40 But given the connections that capitalism establishes between people behind their backs, it is possible that the domain of solidarity and of social cooperation more generally can be enlarged and these norms can eventually be taken as explicit aims that are more widely shared and that could be modeled in new forms of economic and social relations.41 The more robust type of cooperation engendered here could be designated as solidaristic cooperation in distinction from the instrumental cooperation analyzed earlier. What would mutual aid and even mutual enhancement mean as embodied in social practices? In part for Marx, with his emphasis on objectification, it could well involve what he calls “socialized wealth,” understood to be a product not just of individual creativity but also of joint construction over time. That process involves the cocreation of social relations and of a material world that embodies these relations and that reflects human capacities. And it can include (most often through struggle) the introduction of explicitly cooperative forms of economic, social, and political relations that would work to support everyone. Unlike Rawls’s difference principle, the form of social and economic organization here would benefit all not by simply benefiting each in turn or being to the advantage of each, but by establishing directly equal, reciprocal, and democratic relations among people. This would involve social support for both their individual and collective activities. If each develops themselves maximally, where this is understood also as the cultivation of relationships and participation in common activities, rather than only as a set of individual achievements, then this will establish a richly developed context within which people will be socialized and which will provide social support for them and their progeny going forward. This constitutes a conception of wealth as a storehouse of diverse ways of being, both individual and cultural, and a wide diffusion of talents and capacities. The only—­but important—­constraint with respect to these diverse ways of being is that they be compatible with people’s equal freedom and be open to being shared by others and, to the degree possible, be mutually enhancing. I believe that such an account of social and cultural wealth usefully supplements the democratic management model laid out above, where cooperation proceeds through egalitarian forms of decision making in various spheres of life. Although we will likely never get to the point where people work on a wholly voluntary basis, they can come to view themselves as part of a broad, interacting, and interdependent economy and society, and could be expected to be more ready to take on work responsibilities that benefit everyone. In addition, forms of work that involve drudgery and repetition would, to the degree possible, be transferred to machinery, which would be required to avoid dehumanization. Beyond this, technology would be regarded as a useful tool to facilitate human 40. Leidman 2002. 41. For an account of this alternative understanding of transnational solidarity, emerging even under capitalism, and for an analysis of this norm more generally, see Gould 2007 and Gould 2014, 99–131.

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ends and i­ntegrated into activity to that extent (and would cease being primarily an instrument for controlling others or for surveillance). Obviously, people would require suitable and effective forms of education to be able to benefit maximally from the free time created. In terms of the services they would need, to the degree that these cannot be automated, more cooperative or communal ways of providing them would have to be developed and socially supported, as will be discussed in the final section in connection with care. To complete this (rather idealistic) picture, people would have to come to see themselves in egalitarian ways, where this does not signify reduction to the same level. They would need to develop solidaristic dispositions and come to appreciate (more than at present) processes of cultivating relationships and capacities, including the talents of others. These processes in turn presuppose similar supportive relationships and social provision (in a virtuous circle), a fact that is often obscured under capitalism. Clearly, in Marx’s own vision of the feasibility of practical forms of socialism and community, the development of science and technology plays a central role. We can note a potential benefit of such an emphasis for our contemporary problem of uncontrolled profound climate change, assuming the attitude of privileging scientific modes of knowledge came to be widely shared. It would imply a requirement to defer to science regarding the limits needed on growth, at the same time as we depend on those scientific and technological modes in order to build up society’s wealth. In fact, despite some reliance on the “mastery of nature” notion that was prevalent at the time and implied in capitalism, Marx himself provides a basis for thinking that the abundance he predicted has to be consistent with nature. He generally conceived of human beings as part of nature and linked in important ways to nonhuman animals (though also as significantly distinct from them).42

SOCIALIZING CARE If the ANP and the FDP, as well as the EPF principle, were to be fulfilled only through the extension of democracy envisioned above (even if coupled with ample support for those unable to work, strengthened opportunities for education and culture, and universal healthcare), we would have a wholly inadequate model of democratic socialism. What would be missing are new forms of care work practices, given their importance for social reproduction. This topic merits a paper of its own. Here we can only point to some key features of what I call cooperative care beyond capitalism. As it turns out, some of the required elements will involve simi­ lar sorts of democratic management as discussed above as applied to the formal sphere of care work, but the new practices cannot be limited to those.

42. See Marx 1844/1978.

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We can take guidance from feminist care theory as well as from Marx and Engels, who called for the socialization of care in a post-­capitalist society. From the perspective of Marx’s own theory which prioritizes human laboring activity as potentially free activity, we can see that care work has a similar potential for being creative and for being performed in innovative ways. Unfortunately, Marx placed major emphasis on production rather than reproduction and did not say much about the social dimensions of care as themselves an expression of such free human activity. We should acknowledge that not only childcare, but even housework can have its creative dimensions, as in the culinary arts (even though much housework remains hard and repetitive, if not simply a form of drudgery). What would the socialization of care work entail? For one thing, I suggest that it does not imply a mandate for communal forms of childraising or for direct government provision of childcare (although it does not rule those out either). Minimally, it requires fully equal responsibilities of parents for both childcare and housework, and an overcoming of any attribution of fixed gender roles. As liberal feminist theorists have also argued, properly supporting childcare would require equal (and abundant) parental leave, and serious reforms at work, such as flexible working hours.43 We can suggest that democratically managed firms, as described above, would conduce to these reforms, since these demands are of importance for mothers and other caretakers and would almost certainly be implemented at their instigation.44 But governmental action and regulation would also be needed. We need to keep in mind the wide range of care provision besides childcare. There are a host of caring professions and organizations, whether for the elderly, the infirm, and others, and cooperative forms can usefully be implemented in all of these. One possibility for more cooperative forms of care provision is adumbrated in the BeyondCare Cooperative in Brooklyn, New York. As discussed by Ken Estey, this co-­op of immigrant workers has managed to avoid the standard exploitative practices of domestic work by joining together and using a single contract with employers, with a defined range of pay, and with strict provisions designed to implement New York State’s Domestic Workers Bill of Rights.45 Co-­ops like these, with an elected and rotating leadership and where workers are also owners and managers, can bring the benefits of democratic management to the delivery of care services. There are many other possibilities that would need to be explored. Under the general head of “socialization,” we can draw a useful distinction between public provision and public financing. This applies to care organizations, as well as more generally. Public financing can be used without the government being the actual

43. See, for example, Folbre 2008. 44. Indeed, cooperatives and worker-­managed firms more generally have been shown to enhance gender equality, in regard to both women’s income and their management opportunities, although they remain far from full parity in these respects. For a discussion, see Sobering 2016. 45. Estey 2011.

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care provider. The particular avenue chosen—­whether only public financing or also direct public provision—­would depend in part on particular local circumstances. It would clearly be essential to have public funding of childcare, but the care could be provided by co-­ops or other forms of nonprofits, as well as by collectives of parents. Thus the move to socialization in itself involves no implication that governmental agencies must directly provide the care, contrary to claims that are sometimes lodged against socialism. We can note, however, that some European countries—­especially the Nordic ones—­have implemented effective systems of direct governmental provision of childcare, or at least offer substantial subsidies and allowances.

CONCLUSION—­SUPPLEMENTING THE ANP WITH THE FDP I have elaborated some of the import of the ANP, particularly when taken in connection with the FDP and the EPF principle. In this conclusion, I want to focus a bit more on the implications of the Free Development Principle inasmuch as it suggests a distinctive approach to the relation between freedom and sociality, one that, like the ANP, stands in contrast with liberal individualist and capitalist conceptions and principles. Indeed, I think that the FDP provides important guidance for democratic socialism and is a necessary supplement to the ANP in that regard. (I take it as shaping the EPF principle in various ways as well.) In foregrounding sociality and reciprocity, the Free Development Principle presents a vision of what one might call constructive interdependence. Its implementation can be said to represent a kind of social flourishing (rather than just an individualist one), although it proceeds “in and through” each individual’s activity, as well as through their cooperative relations and collective decision making. Indeed, we can see that this principle unifies in a distinctive way the notions of freedom and equality, often interpreted as antagonistic. It is because individuals are equal in their (diverse) capacities for flourishing and are interdependent that each can become freer. This follows from the relational understanding of them as not only creative beings but also as depending on the development of others, where this inter­ dependence can result in mutual enhancement. But, as noted, I do not think this should be interpreted as requiring constant altruism, or a consistent self-­conscious focus on the enhancement of the other. Rather, it proceeds at least in part by way of a democratic socialist project with new forms of cooperation, which come to be embodied in social practices and institutions at various scales and domains, and not only governmental. It does require that essential material and social conditions be made available to everyone so that they can fulfill their needs, as called for by the ANP and the EPF principle. It is in and through actual and concrete relations to others—­mediated by such cooperative social institutions—­that the development of others comes to benefit each and opens new possibilities for them. These relations can become more fully reciprocal, solidaristic, and supportive. In this way, solidarity

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as mutual aid, in an inclusive interpretation that overcomes the exclusivities inherent in capitalism, actually enhances people’s freedom. The operative notions of freedom and solidarity in these senses have not been theorized as much as they should be and especially not in their import for the design of social and economic institutions. In the case of freedom, the notion has tended to be understood as restricted to the interpersonal domain, e.g. in some forms of feminist thought, or it has been understood in liberal individualist terms as a (negative) freedom that is bounded by the scope of the individual. Solidarity, in turn, has often been understood in terms of nationalism, or as pertaining to small groups, taken as ineluctably opposed to other nations or groups. The social relationality that supports freedom has tended to be neglected by theorists in regard to its positive requirements, although there has been an analysis of the need to overcome exploitation, domination, and group oppression. I have suggested that we need to gain more clarity on the relation of these norms to equality and equal rights, as well as to democratic rights of participation in a variety of institutional contexts. It is difficult for us to envision ways of social being beyond the present individualistic and competitive relations because these—­and indeed even dominating and exploitative modes—­frame our everyday experience, except perhaps in our personal relations with family and friends or occasionally when the need to recognize public goods and common interests become paramount (as in the contemporary pandemic crisis). Looking ahead, I have suggested that we need to formulate new modes of solidarity, cooperation, and democratic participation in ways that avoid purely idealistic or utopian thinking and that could begin to be implemented in the short term in relatively small-­scale contexts. In this process, we can be aided by both theoretical and practical interpretations of the various principles of equal positive freedom (EPF), abilities and needs (ANP), and the free development of each in the context of the free development of all (FDP). In sum, we can say that socializing the means of free development involves finding ways to assure that all are able to meet their basic needs and have the range of conditions necessary for ongoing self-­transformative activity, both individually and collectively. It involves overcoming the zero sum mentality of capitalism, and moving to a context where others’ accomplishments are not threatening, but are an ongoing resource for all. They can be viewed as human accomplishments in which we can partake, and which ought to be shared because people come to recognize that these successes and accomplishments presuppose a vast background set of social contributions, by a variety of people, both historical and contemporary, anonymous and known to us, and require the ongoing cooperation of others to be sustained. Socializing the means of free development also crucially signifies a requirement of democratic decision making, which respects people’s rights of co-­ determination in all common activities, particularly in institutionalized contexts. And finally, it will require more extensive cooperative and communal forms of provision for care needs, as well as public support in efficiently fulfilling them.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS This paper originated from a presentation at the University of Montreal Workshop on “From Each according to Their Ability, to Each according to Their Needs,” June 7–8, 2018. I would like to thank the organizers Pablo Gilabert and Peter Dietsch, my commentator Christine Straehle, and the other workshop participants for their helpful comments. I am grateful too for the additional thoughtful suggestions for revision that I received from Gilabert and from Martin O’Neill, the coeditors of this special issue.

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