Phantasia in Aristotle’s Ethics: Reception in the Arabic, Greek, Hebrew and Latin Traditions 9781350028005, 9781350028036, 9781350028029

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Phantasia in Aristotle’s Ethics

Bloomsbury Studies in the Aristotelian Tradition General Editor: Marco Sgarbi, Università Ca’ Foscari, Italy Editorial Board: Klaus Corcilius (University of California, Berkeley, USA); Daniel Garber (Princeton University, USA); Oliver Leaman (University of Kentucky, USA); Anna Marmodoro (University of Oxford, UK); Craig Martin (Oakland University, USA); Carlo Natali (Università Ca’ Foscari, Italy); Riccardo Pozzo (Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, Rome, Italy); Renée Raphael (University of California, Irvine, USA); Victor M. Salas (Sacred Heart Major Seminary, USA); Leen Spruit (Radboud University Nijmegen, The Netherlands). Aristotle’s influence throughout the history of philosophical thought has been immense and in recent years the study of Aristotelian philosophy has enjoyed a revival. However, Aristotelianism remains an incredibly polysemous concept, encapsulating many, often conflicting, definitions. Bloomsbury Studies in the Aristotelian Tradition responds to this need to define Aristotelianism and give rise to a clear characterization. Investigating the influence and reception of Aristotle’s thought from classical antiquity to contemporary philosophy from a wide range of perspectives, this series aims to reconstruct how philosophers have become acquainted with the tradition. The books in this series go beyond simply ascertaining that there are Aristotelian doctrines within the works of various thinkers in the history of philosophy, but seek to understand how they have received and elaborated Aristotle’s thought, developing concepts into ideas that have become independent of him. Bloomsbury Studies in the Aristotelian Tradition promotes new approaches to Aristotelian philosophy and its history. Giving special attention to the use of interdisciplinary methods and insights, books in this series will appeal to scholars working in the fields of philosophy, history and cultural studies. Available titles: The Aftermath of Syllogism, edited by Marco Sgarbi, Matteo Cosci Elijah Del Medigo and Paduan Aristotelianism, Michael Engel Pontano’s Virtues, Matthias Roick

Phantasia in Aristotle’s Ethics Reception in the Arabic, Greek, Hebrew and Latin Traditions Edited by Jakob Leth Fink

BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC Bloomsbury Publishing Plc 50 Bedford Square, London, WC1B 3DP, UK 1385 Broadway, New York, NY 10018, USA BLOOMSBURY, BLOOMSBURY ACADEMIC and the Diana logo are trademarks of Bloomsbury Publishing Plc First published in Great Britain 2019 Paperback edition published 2020 Copyright © Jakob Leth Fink, 2019 Jakob Leth Fink has asserted his right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as Editor of this work. Series design: Catherine Wood Cover image: Rembrandt van Rijn, Aristotle with a Bust of Homer. 1653 Oil on canvas. Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York/Alamy Stock Photo All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission in writing from the publishers. Bloomsbury Publishing Plc does not have any control over, or responsibility for, any third-party websites referred to or in this book. All internet addresses given in this book were correct at the time of going to press. The author and publisher regret any inconvenience caused if addresses have changed or sites have ceased to exist, but can accept no responsibility for any such changes. A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library. A catalog record for this book is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN:

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Contents Preface

vi

1

Introduction Jakob Leth Fink and Jessica Moss

1

2

THE ANCIENT GREEK TRADITION ‘What Appears Good to Us’ in Aspasius and Alexander of Aphrodisias Frans A. J. de Haas

15

THE ARABIC TRADITION Averroes’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics Frédérique Woerther

37

THE MEDIEVAL GREEK TRADITION Eustratius of Nicaea on Nicomachean Ethics 6.5.1140b17–18 Michele Trizio

65

THE MEDIEVAL LATIN TRADITION Phronêsis, Pleasure and the Perception of the Goal Iacopo Costa

79

3

4

5

6

7

THE MEDIEVAL HEBREW TRADITION Reception and Interpretation of Aristotle’s Concept of Phantasia in the Hebrew Translations and Commentaries on Nicomachean Ethics 6.5.1140b16–17 and 1.13.1002b9–11 Chaim Meir Neria 103 ARISTOTLE AND THE ARISTOTELIAN TRADITION Aristotle on Deliberative Phantasia and Phronêsis Jakob Leth Fink

Bibliography Index Locorum Index Nominum Index Rerutm

127 148 160 166 169

Preface This volume originated in a seminar held in November 2015 at the University of Gothenburg. The seminar was organized by me with the financial support of the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation as part of the project Representation and Reality in the Aristotelian Tradition, also funded by the Foundation and the University of Gothenburg. Iacopo Costa, Jessica Moss (per Skype), Michele Trizio, Frédérique Woerther and I presented papers on that occasion. Subsequently, Frans de Haas and Chaim Neria were also involved and contributed a chapter each. Apart from my colleagues at Representation and Reality in the Aristotelian Tradition, Gösta Grönroos from the University of Stockholm offered valuable comments on the papers presented at the original seminar. Margareta Fredborg took language revision of the chapters upon her, and David Bennett, one of my wonderful colleagues at Representation and Reality, helped me type some Arabic texts. The board at Bloomsbury Studies in the Aristotelian Tradition offered helpful comments in the early stages of bringing this volume to realization. The series editor, Marco Sgarbi; my copy editors, Andrew Wardell, Helen Saunders and Bindhiya Nirmalkumar; and the project manager, Manikandan Kuppan, were supportive and very patient from beginning to end. I wish to thank everyone mentioned here. Your involvement has been invaluable. Jakob Leth Fink, Copenhagen, April 2018

1

Introduction Jakob Leth Fink and Jessica Moss

Scope and aims of the volume As originally conceived, this volume was to be devoted to a single sentence in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, eleven words altogether (EN 6.5.1140b17–18). Here, Aristotle puts forward a remarkable claim concerning the appearance (phantasia) of moral principles. The chapters were to describe the reception of this string of words among a number of interpreters from the Arabic, Greek, Hebrew and Latin Aristotelian traditions from Antiquity to the late Middle Ages and ascertain its philosophical merits. But it soon became clear that this narrow focus on one sentence would have to be widened to a more general focus on phantasia in Aristotle’s Ethics. Due to the hazards of transmission, there is simply not enough material devoted to the sentence in the Ancient Greek, Arabic and Hebrew traditions. Nevertheless, these traditions do contain interesting material concerning phantasia more generally. As a result, the present volume discusses the relevance of phantasia in Aristotle’s Ethics generally, while never losing sight of the one claim concerning the appearance of moral principles from Nicomachean Ethics 6.5. The aims remain the same. They are to describe the reception of phantasia in Aristotle’s Ethics among ancient and medieval Aristotelians – as far as possible with this one sentence in view – and ascertain its philosophical merits. It might seem odd to focus on just one sentence out of the entire Nicomachean Ethics. However, from Aspasius in the Imperial Period of Rome to Joseph b. Shem-Tob in Renaissance Spain, commentators on the Nicomachean Ethics proceeded by singling out passages and scrutinizing the argument in them.

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Phantasia in Aristotle’s Ethics

So the present volume merely adopts an approach found in its sources. This has the advantage of making otherwise unwieldy material, spanning four language traditions and more than a thousand years, manageable. Since our commentators basically follow the same approach, their interpretations are actually directed at the same problem posed in fairly similar terms. This gives a reasonable coherence to the discussions of these very different commentators. But obviously this focus comes at a price. The volume covers neither the Nicomachean Ethics in its entirety nor the reception of it in the entire Aristotelian tradition. Far from it. It covers a specific topic, phantasia, and a single passage as interpreted by a select number of interpreters across the Aristotelian tradition. Readers who wish to know more about the general reception of Aristotle’s Ethics are advised to consult the survey literature on this subject.1 Our focal point sentence appears in the chapter on phronêsis (‘practical wisdom’, ‘prudence’). Aristotle says: But the principle does not immediately appear (euthus ou phainetai archê) to the person who has been corrupted by pleasure or pain. (EN 6.5.1140b17–18; trans. J. Fink)2

On a straightforward reading, Aristotle seems to say that an agent of a certain kind suffers from what might be called moral blindness. The agent lacks a certain sort of moral perception, it seems. But on further reflection, the claim provokes a number of questions. Is it a principle (archê) of action or of deliberation that does not appear; is it a principle that or a principle why? What is the force of immediately (euthus), and how can pleasure and pain corrupt an agent’s moral phantasia? What kind of moral agent does Aristotle have in mind, an incontinent or a vicious one, and why is this corrupted agent introduced here in the chapter on phronêsis? Finally, and directly addressing the theme of this volume, what does appear (phainetai) mean? What is the role of phantasia in Aristotle’s moral psychology? It is slightly surprising, perhaps, that standard commentators of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and their contemporary colleagues do not attach importance to the occurrence of phainesthai here. Sometimes a mere paraphrase is given with a reference to Plato’s Cratylus in explanation of a strange piece of etymology in the immediate context; and where an

Introduction

3

interpretation is suggested, it takes phantasia, usually with no further argument, in a predominantly intellectual sense; that is, they take Aristotle to be saying that the person corrupted by pleasure and pain does not have the right intellectual grasp of the starting point.3 Among Aristotle’s medieval interpreters the situation is different. They share the emphasis on the intellectual aspect of phantasia, but expand on how this is to be spelled out in terms, for example, of the practical syllogism or the ‘eye of the soul’ mentioned by Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics 6.12. So they support by arguments what most commentators of the last decades seem simply to assume. The editor’s ambition in publishing this volume is twofold: (1) to present the ideas and observations found in the Aristotelian tradition as worthwhile additions, or even challenges, to contemporary scholarship on Aristotle’s moral psychology, and also (2) to challenge the basic tenet of the ancient and medieval interpretations themselves: the focus on phantasia in the Ethics as something predominantly intellectual.

Phantasia in Aristotle’s Ethics: Contemporary Perspectives Our sentence speaks of how things appear (phainetai) to an agent. How should we understand this notion? In Greek, as in English, talk of how things appear can be broad, indicating how we think or are inclined to think things are, or narrowly perceptual, indicating how things look or otherwise appear to sensory perception. Moreover, in Greek as in English talk of appearance can be committal, non-committal (sometimes called ‘epistemic’ and ‘non-epistemic’) or even sceptical: sometimes ‘It appears to me that p’ entails that I believe that p, while sometimes it is neutral and sometimes suggests that I doubt that p – that it merely appears to me to be so. How do we decide what use Aristotle has in mind here? It may seem that we are without guidance here, but in fact Aristotle’s Ethics contains valuable resources to help us, for this is far from the only passage in which it discusses the appearance of the principle (archê). Consider the following: Practical syllogisms are equipped with a principle: ‘Since the end and the best is of such a sort’. And this does not appear (phainetai) except to the

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good person. For vice perverts, and makes us be deceived about the practical principles. (EN 6.12.1144a31–36; trans. J. Moss)4 Should we say that what is wished for without qualification is the good, but for each person the apparent (phainomenon) good? …. For the virtuous person discerns each thing rightly, and in each case the truth appears (phainetai) to them. (EN 3.4.1113a23–33; trans. J. Moss)5 And suppose someone said that everyone longs for the apparent (phainomenon) good, but they are not in control of the phantasia: whatever sort of person one is, in that way the end [i.e. principle – see 1114b31] appears (phainetai) to one? … Whether then the end does not appear (phainetai) in whatever way to each person by nature, but is partly due to himself, or whether the end is natural … vice will be no less voluntary [than virtue]. (EN 3.5.1114a31–b20; trans. J. Moss)6

All these passages, like ours, speak of how things appear to people of different characters, and in particular of how the starting point or first principle or end or goal of action appears. The language is strikingly similar between these passages, and so it would be desirable to give a univocal interpretation of ‘appears’ across them. What interpretation should that be? Does Aristotle think that the principle of action appears to us quasi-perceptually? Intellectually? Commitally? Non-commitally? This is not a question that has received much attention, but it is one worth pressing. Aristotle’s texts give us resources for two very different ways of answering it, which will in turn have very different repercussions for our understanding of his moral psychology and moral epistemology. First, there is what most readers have probably assumed as the default interpretation: there is no special significance to his choice of phainetai here, despite its frequent repetition; Aristotle simply means to capture in broad and neutral terms the notion that the vicious person does not have the right view of the principle – the right idea or conception or belief. Second, there is a possibility that is usually overlooked – Aristotle may have in mind a narrow or technical sense of phainetai closely connected to a notion he develops in the psychological works: phantasia. Phantasia is, very briefly, a close cousin of perception. To have a phantasia of something is to have a quasi-perceptual appearance of it, one traceable to an actual perception of that thing or something similar (see DA 3.3, Insomn., Mem. and Section ‘Phantasia and phainesthai’ in Chapter 7

Introduction

5

of this volume). Phantasia is active in after-images, hallucinations, misperceptions, dreams and memory; it also seems to play a crucial role in locomotion, and in all thought. It is found in most non-human animals, and in humans its primary locus is the non-intellectual, perceptive part of the soul. Aristotle beyond doubt sometimes uses phainesthai to indicate an appearance to phantasia; is that what he is doing in our passages about how the principle appears? Our answer to this question will have very significant consequences for our interpretation of Aristotle’s moral epistemology, and thereby for his moral psychology and his ethics. Aristotle clearly thinks that bad moral character interferes with one’s grasp of moral principles. Does he however think that this failing is in the first instance intellectual – that a bad character directly corrupts our powers of moral reasoning or intellectual intuition? This is a possibility at least left open, and perhaps strongly suggested, by the broad, neutral reading of his talk of appearances. Or does he instead think that the failing is primarily a failing of the non-intellectual, emotional part of the soul – a failure in how we perceive and have quasi-perceptual appearances (phantasiai) of moral qualities? More generally, does he think judgements of moral principles are the province of reason, with emotions playing merely a supporting conative or affective role, or does he think that the emotions play a crucial role in moral cognition even of our ends? There has not been much attention to the question of how to interpret Aristotle’s appearance talk in these passages.7 There is however extensive debate over a parallel thesis about a closely related topic, and we can use that debate to illuminate this one. We have in mind the interpretation of appearance words in Aristotle’s account of emotions in the Rhetoric. Here too Aristotle uses variants on phainesthai and phantasia in connection with things appearing good, just as he does in our passages on the principle. And here there are two clear camps in the secondary literature. Phantastic interpretations take the appearance talk to be narrow and technical: Aristotle is speaking of exercises of phantasia. Intellectual interpretations by contrast take the appearance talk to be broad and non-technical: Aristotle is talking about how we believe things to be, and uses appearance words to emphasize that the beliefs that play a role in emotions are vivid, or subjective.8 The strongest arguments for the phantastic account note similarities between Aristotle’s descriptions of the

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Phantasia in Aristotle’s Ethics

appearances that play a role in the emotions and those that he describes in the psychological works as literal phantasiai. The strongest arguments for the intellectual account note problems in spelling out the notion of phantasia of value-qualities (by contrast with sensory ones), and they note reasons to take the relevant representations as intellectual, tied to beliefs rather than nonintellectual appearances. Let us see how these considerations bear on our present topic. In support of the phantastic interpretation of our passages, we can note: 1. In the passages which discuss how the principle appears, quoted above, Aristotle leans heavily on perceptual analogies, indicating that the appearances in question are quasi-perceptual. The virtuous person ‘sees’ the truth; we grasp the end as if through a ‘sense of sight’. Most compellingly, virtuous discernments of value are like healthy discernments of the bitter, sweet, hot and heavy – paradigm perceptible qualities. A sick body distorts not (or not directly) one’s intellectual beliefs about perceptible qualities but instead one’s perception of them; likewise, Aristotle seems to suggest, a vicious character distorts one’s perception or quasi-perception – phantasia – of value. 2. Aristotle claims repeatedly that we get our moral principles through habituation. On a widespread although contested interpretation, his claim is that habituation achieves this feat by shaping the non-intellectual part of our soul – in particular, our non-intellectual dispositions to feel pleasure and pain. For example, repeatedly acting bravely and feeling pride in that action disposes one to take pleasure in future brave actions, and more generally in the idea of acting bravely. If there is a cognitive aspect to this habituation, it must primarily be a non-intellectual one: a shaping of our perceptions, and consequently of our phantasiai – brave actions come to appear good, cowardly ones bad. This suggests an account of what it means for the principle to appear: someone who has been well-habituated and hence has a virtuous character is subject to a perception-based appearance of the virtuous life as the good one – the principle (the end and goal) appears correctly to her; someone who has been poorly habituated and hence has a vicious character is subject to a perception-based appearance of the life of bodily pleasure as the good – the principle appears incorrectly to her. In both cases the appearance is a literal phantasia.9

Introduction

7

There are also compelling considerations against this interpretation and in support of the intellectual one: 1. Many find the notion of value-appearances highly suspect. How can we literally perceive things – and thus come to have literal phantasiai of things – as good or bad? These seem more properly to be intellectual judgements, ones that may use the data of perception as aids or inferential bases. Indeed when Aristotle gives a detailed account of the objects of perception in De anima 2.6 – proper, common and incidental – value-properties seem nowhere to be found. 2. If our grasp of moral principles occurs through non-intellectual phantasia and perception, what room is there for Aristotle’s all-important phronêsis, a clearly intellectual virtue? Aristotle thinks that being virtuous requires having an intellectual grasp of moral facts, including facts about the end or principle. Thus, we should take the appearance talk in our passages as ways of describing how one intellectually thinks things are. The phantastic interpretation may be able to meet these objections. Concerning the first, perhaps we can derive an account of literal moral perception from Aristotle’s texts. Concerning the second, certainly we can draw on his account of induction to show how perception and phantasia can offer material that is then taken up by intellect, leaving room for both a phantastic grasp of the principle and arising from that an intellectual one. There is room for more work to be done on both sides of the argument.

The privileged position of the Nicomachean Ethics Three versions of Aristotle’s Ethics have come down to us: Nicomachean Ethics, Eudemian Ethics and The Great Ethics (Magna Moralia). Most consider The Great Ethics spurious, so we can leave it out of consideration here. But why focus on the Nicomachean Ethics at the expense of the Eudemian? The simple answer is that the Aristotelian tradition, at least since Aspasius in the second century AD, has commented on the Nicomachean Ethics.10 Why is this so? Here the simple answer is: We do not know. The fate of the Eudemian Ethics among ancient philosophers up until Aspasius is poorly understood.11 The question

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concerning the Eudemian Ethics probably rewards serious attention. But it is a question that falls entirely outside the limited scope of this volume.

Structure of the volume Chapters 2 to 6 follow in chronological order. Each chapter begins by offering a short survey of the transmission and translation (where relevant) of the Nicomachean Ethics within that tradition. Chapter 7 attempts to balance the predominantly intellectual interpretation of phantasia found in the ancient and medieval Aristotelian tradition by an account of the physiological mechanisms of phantasia underlying Aristotle’s account of phronêsis. Chapter 2: The Ancient Greek Tradition. The earliest extant commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, in fact the earliest extant commentary on any Aristotelian text, was written by Aspasius in the first century AD. This is where Frans De Haas sets in. It is well-known that Aspasius’s comments on Book 6 have not come down to us. But it seems that Aspasius endorsed an intellectual approach to phantasia, unless he is just being careless in rephrasing the ‘apparent good’ (to phainomenon agathon) as ‘what is believed to be good’ (to dokoun agathon). De Haas shows that Aspasius, and after him Alexander of Aphrodisias, made good use of Nicomachean Ethics 3.5, part of which was quoted above (Section ‘Phantasia in Aristotle’s Ethics: Contemporary Perspectives’), in discussion with contemporary philosophers (the Stoics). Their use of this part of the Ethics throws some light on their interpretation of phantasia. Chapter 3: The Arabic Tradition. The only extant commentary on the Ethics in the Arabic tradition is by Averroes. To a certain extent it is more a rewriting and disambiguation of the Nicomachean Ethics than a commentary. Since the commentary influenced the early Hebrew tradition, what they read was a partly ‘Averroerized’ Ethics. The Middle Commentary on the Ethics is presented by Frédérique Woerther. This task is complicated by the fact that Averroes’s commentary is mainly extant in Latin and Hebrew translations. Woerther demonstrates that Averroes based his comments on our claim in Nicomachean Ethics 6.5 on a mistranslation of the text. However, by going through all relevant comments to the remainder of the Ethics, Woerther brings

Introduction

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out that even though Averroes takes an intellectual approach to phantasia, he does distinguish the sort of phantasia relevant for phronêsis as concerned with the common sensibles, and thus closer to sense perception than to the mathematical perception that is analogous to it. Chapter 4: The Medieval Greek Tradition. Among the Byzantine commentators, whose commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics have not all been edited yet, only Eustratius of Nicaea contributes anything to the interpretation of our passage. Michele Trizio points out that Eustratius connects our claim to what he, Eustratius, takes to be an account of how phronêsis develops out of deinotês (‘shrewdness’). Whereas modern commentators tend to understand Aristotle’s reference to an ‘eye of the soul’ in Nicomachean Ethics 6.12 as referring to deinotês, Eustratius believes that this refers to the practical intellect where phronêsis resides. This might be a somewhat strained interpretation of Aristotle, but a quite original one at that. Eustratius interprets our passage in light of phronêsis and the practical intellect (nous praktikos) rather than in light of phantasia itself. Chapter 5: The Medieval Latin Tradition. The Latin schoolmen were to some extent helped to an understanding of Aristotle’s Ethics by the Byzantine commentators. But they soon developed a distinctive philosophical tradition of their own. Iacopo Costa focuses on three thirteenth-century commentators, Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and Radulphus Brito, whose commentaries cover the entire Nicomachean Ethics and not just parts thereof, as the earliest Latin commentaries do. Albert and Radulphus adopt the practical syllogism in their account of our passage from Nicomachean Ethics 6.5 and rehearse its different applications to the claim that a moral principle fails to occur. Aquinas gives a more theologically informed interpretation in that he incorporates our passage into his analysis of the capital sins. Chapter 6: The Medieval Hebrew Tradition. The Hebrew reception of the Nicomachean Ethics was first developed under the influence of Arabic translations and interpretation and subsequently under the influence of the medieval Latin tradition. Chaim Neria points out that particularly Thomas Aquinas’s literal commentary, Sententia Libri Ethicorum, was influential. Aristotle’s Ethics was, at a later point, translated into Hebrew from Grossetest’s (revised) Latin translation by Don Meir Alguades. His translation formed the basis for the commentary by Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob. Joseph’s commentary

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attempts to familiarize the Jewish reader with Aristotle’s moral philosophy by introducing terms and examples familiar from the Jewish tradition. Neria demonstrates that Joseph’s comments on phantasia had a limited philosophical impact, but did influence Rabbinic literature and legal discussions in the Hebrew tradition and that Joseph’s commentary indeed ‘judaized’ Aristotle’s Ethics. Chapter 7: Aristotle and the Aristotelian Tradition. As a way of concluding, Jakob Leth Fink offers an interpretation of what Aristotle in De anima calls ‘deliberative phantasia’. Based on recent developments in Aristotelian scholarship, Fink argues that the physiological account of phantasia found in De anima and Parva Naturalia forms the basis on which phronêsis operates. The corrupted agent in Nicomachean Ethics 6.5 is introduced by Aristotle to throw a contrasting light on his direct opposite, the practically wise (ho phronimos). In consequence, the passage under consideration offers information concerning the moral phantasia of the practically wise, which we would otherwise lack. Aristotle’s account of deliberative phantasia makes this clear and thus holds the key to understanding our passage from the Ethics.

Main results and further perspectives It is not surprising that the commentators in this volume treat Aristotle’s text and the theme of phantasia in the Ethics very differently. Anything else would have been startling indeed. What the following chapters demonstrate is how they differ in what they found important to comment on in the Ethics. In itself, this is quite fascinating, and, if nothing else, it demonstrates just how complicated and vulnerable the reception of Aristotle’s Ethics was in the periods considered. This being said, there is a common current among the commentators. As mentioned already, the majority of the ancient and medieval commentators presented in this volume side with an intellectual against a phantastic (or physiological) interpretation of phantasia in the Ethics, and they elaborate this position in considerable detail. The odd man out, as always, one is tempted to say, is Averroes. His remarks suggest that he saw connections between phantasia in the Ethics and phantasia in the Parva Naturalia. So he might

Introduction

11

have been willing to consider a route to the Ethics that originated in Aristotle’s natural philosophy. It would be interesting to investigate whether the medieval Aristotelian traditions do contain attempts to analyse Aristotle’s moral philosophy, or parts of it, in light of his natural philosophy, in particular De anima, Parva Naturalia and De Motu Animalium. To the editor, this seems to be a major perspective for future reflection opened by this volume.

Note on texts and translations Since the volume endeavours to be of interest to readers from all the traditions covered in the following chapters, and since not all readers will be familiar with Arabic, Greek, Hebrew and Latin, all quotes from these languages are given in English translation. Furthermore, it seemed unnecessarily cumbersome to include text in the Arabic, Greek or Hebrew alphabets in the main body of the chapters. This means that all original texts have been confined to the notes, where the specialist might want to check them against the translations. Only where original texts are directly compared (as in Chapter 3) have non-Latin letters been accepted in the main text. Otherwise, Arabic, Greek and Hebrew terms are transliterated into Latin letters. For the Greek text of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, references are to Aristotelis Ethica Nicomachea, edited by Ingram Bywater, Oxford: Clarendon, 1894, which has been reprinted several times. The authors have either translated original texts themselves or given references to the translation being used.

Notes 1

See the chapters in Jon Miller (ed.), The Reception of Aristotle’s Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) and René A. Gauthier and Jean Y. Jolif, Aristote: L’Éthique à Nicomaque (Louvain-la-Neuve: Éditions Peeters, 2002), vol. i.1: 91–240.

2

τῷ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ δι’ ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην εὐθὺς οὐ φαίνεται ἀρχή.

3

We take the following commentaries (in alphabetic order) to be fairly standard works of reference. There is very little comment in John Burnet, The Ethics of

12

Phantasia in Aristotle’s Ethics Aristotle, edited with Introduction and Notes (London: Methuen, 1900), 263; Franz Dirlmeier, Aristoteles: Nikomachische Ethik, übersetzt und kommentiert, 10th reprint (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1999), 450; Alexander Grant, The Ethics of Aristotle (1885; New York: Arno Press, 1973), vol. 2: 160; Leonard H. G. Greenwood, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics Book VI: With Essays, Notes and Translation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1909), 51–54; Gauthier and Jolif, Aristote: L’Éthique à Nicomaque (as note 1), vol. ii.2: 473; Terence Irwin, Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, translated with Introduction, Notes, and Glossary, 2nd edn. (Indianapolis, IN and Cambridge, MA: Hackett, 1999), 243; Harold H. Joachim, Aristotle, the Nicomachean Ethics: A Commentary, ed. D. A. Rees (Oxford: Clarendon, 1951), 211–12; Christopher Rowe and Sarah Broadie, Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 369; No comment at all in David Reeve, Aristotle on Practical Wisdom: Nicomachean Ethics VI, translated with an Introduction, Analysis, and Commentary (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2013).

4

οἱ γὰρ συλλογισμοὶ τῶν πρακτῶν ἀρχὴν ἔχοντές εἰσιν, ἐπειδὴ τοιόνδε τὸ τέλος καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, ὁτιδήποτε ὄν (ἔστω γὰρ λόγου χάριν τὸ τυχόν)· τοῦτο δ’ εἰ μὴ τῷ ἀγαθῷ, οὐ φαίνεται· διαστρέφει γὰρ ἡ μοχθηρία καὶ διαψεύδεσθαι ποιεῖ περὶ τὰς πρακτικὰς ἀρχάς.

5

ἆρα φατέον ἁπλῶς μὲν καὶ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν βουλητὸν εἶναι τἀγαθόν, ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον;… ὁ σπουδαῖος γὰρ ἕκαστα κρίνει ὀρθῶς, καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις τἀληθὲς αὐτῷ φαίνεται.

6

εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι πάντες ἐφίενται τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ’ ὁποῖός ποθ’ ἕκαστός ἐστι, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ… εἴτε δὴ τὸ τέλος μὴ φύσει ἑκάστῳ φαίνεται οἱονδήποτε, ἀλλά τι καὶ παρ’ αὐτόν ἐστιν, εἴτε τὸ μὲν τέλος φυσικόν… οὐθὲν ἧττον καὶ ἡ κακία ἑκούσιον ἂν εἴη·

7

For interpretations relevant to the defence of the reading on which literal phantasia is involved, see Deborah Achtenberg, Cognition of Value in Aristotle’s Ethics: Promise of Enrichment, Threat of Destruction (Albany, NY: SUNY, 2002); Burnet, The Ethics of Aristotle (as note 3); Troels Engberg-Pedersen, Aristotle’s Theory of Moral Insight (Oxford: Clarendon, 1983) and Jessica Moss, Aristotle on the Apparent Good: Perception, Phantasia, Thought and Desire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012); for an argument against that reading see John M. Cooper, ‘Reason, Moral Virtue and Moral Value’, in Rationality in Greek Thought, ed. Michael Frede and Gisela Striker (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), 81–114.

8

For intellectualist readings see among many others Jamie Dow, ‘Feeling Fantastic: Emotions and Appearances in Aristotle’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 37

Introduction

13

(2009): 143 and Martha C. Nussbaum, ‘Aristotle on the Emotions and Rational Persuasion’, in Essays on Aristotle’s Rhetoric, ed. Amélie O. Rorty (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1996), 303–21; for phantastic readings see among many others Moss, Aristotle on the Apparent Good (as note 7), 69–99; Paul Nieuwenburg, ‘Emotions and Perception in Aristotle’s Rhetoric’, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 80 (2002): 86–100. 9

For a detailed defence of this interpretation see Moss, Aristotle on the Apparent Good (as note 7), 153–233.

10 It is not, in fact, entirely clear what texts Aspasius takes to belong to the version of the Nicomachean Ethics that he comments on; see Aspasius in EN, 151.19–26; 161.9–10 and Jonathan Barnes, ‘Introduction’, in Aspasius: The Earliest Extant Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. Antonina Alberti and Robert Sharples (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1999), 19–21. 11 For an overview and discussion, see Chris Bobonich, ‘Aristotle’s Ethical Treatises’, in The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Richard Kraut (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), 12–36.

T H E A N C I E N T G R E E K T R A D I T IO N 2

‘What Appears Good to Us’ in Aspasius and Alexander of Aphrodisias Frans A. J. de Haas

‘Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and choice, is thought to aim at some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which all things aim’ (EN 1.1.1094a1–2). This familiar opening sentence of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics hides considerable problems. Let us first give a concise survey of these problems and their solutions as found in Aristotle before turning to Aspasius and Alexander of Aphrodisias to see how the problems were received in the first and second centuries ad. First of all, how do we identify what is good in order to use it as the aim (telos) or final cause of our action and choice? Aristotle’s De anima and Nicomachean Ethics each hold puzzling parts of the answer to this question. In De anima 3.2.426b17–29, it becomes clear that the distinction between good and bad, like every distinction between different and opposite items, has to be made by a single power of the soul in a single moment of time. Apparently we have in our souls a capacity to discern good from bad. How does this work? Aristotle defines pleasure or pain as ‘to act with the perceptual mean in relation to what is good or bad insofar as such’ (DA 3.7.431a10–11). In this context he explains what is going on by means of the following analogies1: To perceive, then, is like bare saying or thinking; but whenever it is pleasant or painful, the soul as if it were affirming or denying pursues or avoids, and to feel pleasure and pain is to act with the perceptual mean in relation to what is good or bad insofar as they are such, and avoidance and pursuit when actual are the same. And what is capable of pursuing and what is capable of avoiding are not different, either from one another or from what is capable

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of sense-perception; but their being is different. (DA 3.7.431a8–14; trans. Corcilius)2

To perceive something pleasant or painful is not a rational judgement, because in the context of De anima it should apply to animals as much as to humans. This is also apparent from the fact that to feel pleasure and pain is to be active with one and the same perceptual mean (energein têi aisthêtikêi mesotêti) towards the good or bad as such. In that sense flight and desire in actuality are the same thing, and the capacity for flight and the capacity for desire are the same thing in two modes of being; what is more, they are both identical with the capacity of sense perception (the common sense) whose state acts as its mean.3 The state of the single perceptual mean distinguishes good from bad sense impressions, followed by the experience of pleasure or pain respectively, for animals and human beings alike. Since we are born with the capacity for sense perception, good and bad things are differentiated in accordance with what is beneficial or harmful for the existence, or for any of the life activities characteristic of our species. However, the text in De anima 3.7 immediately extends the same principle to the thinking soul (têi dianoêtikêi psuchêi): To the thinking soul images (phantasmata) serve as if they were contents of perception (and when it asserts or denies them to be good or bad it avoids or pursues them). That is why the soul never thinks without an image. The process is like that in which the air modifies the pupil in this or that way and the pupil transmits the modification to some third thing (and similarly in hearing), while the ultimate point of arrival is one, a single mean, with different manners of being. (DA 3.7.431a14–20, Revised Oxford Translation)4

Also in the absence of sense perception5 the discursive soul can operate analogously on the image provided by the imagination. The famous statement that ‘the soul never thinks without an image’ has its place in this context, and for a reason: without these images the discursive soul cannot discern good from bad. From this text it is clear that the activity of thinking does not use the perceptual mean, but sets up a different, intellectual, mean that is merely analogous to the single mean where all perceptual data come together (which was the common sense6). This is about as clear as it gets in the De anima

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concerning the role of the imagination in determining what is good or bad. From the Nicomachean Ethics we can gather that the states we call virtues of character are such means for discerning the good from the bad in their domain.7 As Aristotle will argue at length in the Nicomachean Ethics Books 7 and 10, the experience of pleasure and pain should not serve as criterion of good and evil, but these feelings supervene on our actions and activities. If we have learned to feel pleasure in the wake of natural and wholesome activities, and pain in the wake of their opposites, such feelings will support our desire for the good and our avoidance of evil, but no more than that. After all, virtue is defined as dealing correctly with pleasure and pain, that is to have appropriate feelings as the time, place and situation require (EN 2.5.1106b16–23). In this sense acquiring virtues of character under the guidance of phronêsis is a way of aligning our application of the perceptual and intellectual means in relation to the good and bad. The detrimental role of pleasure and pain when taken as criteria for good and evil is also what perspires in the context of the sentence that is central to this volume: For it is not any and every belief that pleasant and painful objects destroy and pervert, e.g. the belief that the triangle has or has not its angles equal to two right angles, but only beliefs about what is to be done. For the principles of the things that are done consist in that for the sake of which they are to be done; but any such principle forthwith fails to appear to the man who has been ruined by pleasure or pain – that for the sake of this or because of this he ought to choose and do whatever he chooses and does; for vice is destructive of the principle. (EN 6.5.1140b13–20; trans. RevOT modified)8

As has been explained in the introduction to this volume, the Nicomachean Ethics holds a series of passages in which the fact that good and bad indeed appear to us is reason for further discussion. In EN 3.4 Aristotle investigates two claims concerning rational wish (boulêsis), which has an aim. Some believe that wish concerns only the good – so, Aristotle wonders, if someone makes a bad choice, this was not aimed at any good at all? Others believe that wish always aims at the apparent good, which can be different or contrary for different people. Does this mean that

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there is no natural object of wish? Or do we have to infer that the good is only the object of the wish of the good person, who alone can act as a competent judge? For good and pleasant things are specific according to each state of character, and perhaps the good man differs from others most by seeing the truth in each class of things, being as it were the norm and measure of them.9 In most things the error seems to be due to pleasure; for [pleasure] appears as good when it is not. We therefore choose the pleasant as a good, and avoid pain as an evil. (EN 3.4.1113a31–b2; trans. RevOT modified)10

In this paragraph the psychology of De anima finds its application: what is considered good and pleasant correlates with each state of character, and pleasure and pain cause errors in this regard. Only a good person can distinguish good from bad in each case – this seems to be Aristotle’s preferred view. In EN 3.5 Aristotle sets out to uphold the thesis that both virtue and vice, and therefore virtuous and vicious actions, are up to us, because they are voluntary and based on deliberation and choice (1113b3–7). We can always do or refrain from doing something, whether it is good or bad (1113b7–14). This thesis would be contradicted by the claim that no one is voluntarily wicked or involuntarily blessed (1113b14–17). Here we recognize the position that the corresponding passage in Magna Moralia 1.9.1187a5–19 attributes to Socrates by name: ‘No one does wrong voluntarily.’ In order to uphold that also our wrongdoing is voluntary, Aristotle refers to [1] the common practices of reward and punishment by law (1113b21–30), [2] punishment for cases of ignorance and carelessness in which the agent is in control (1113b30–1114a3) and [3] the voluntariness of some vices of the body (1114a21–31). In the context of the discussion of carelessness in [2], Aristotle elucidates that even if someone is not able to stop being careless once this disposition has (perhaps unwittingly) gained a foothold in one’s soul, the bad consequences of this disposition may well be involuntary. However, Aristotle maintains that we remain responsible for the beginning of this process (1114a3–31). It is as if one first disregards a doctor’s advice when one could have acted otherwise, only to find oneself so sick that it is difficult or impossible to recover. In this way our (current) states are voluntary, because in the beginning it was up to

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us to behave in this way or not. This defence of the voluntariness and (hence) responsibility for states of character merely serves to confirm that it is correct to hold people responsible for certain kinds of ignorance and carelessness, as is commonly done. Here Aristotle raises an objection that is worth quoting in full, since it will gain a different significance in Aspasius and Alexander: Now some one may say that all men aim at the apparent good, but have no control over how things appear to him; but the end appears to each man in a form answering to his character. – We reply that if each man is somehow responsible for the state he is in, he will also be himself somehow responsible for how things appear; but if not, no one is responsible for his own evildoing, but everyone does evil acts through ignorance of the end, thinking that by these he will get what is best, and the aiming at the end is not self-chosen but one must be born with an eye, as it were, by which to judge rightly and choose what is truly good, and he is well endowed by nature who is well endowed with this. For it is what is greatest and most noble, and what we cannot get or learn from another, but must have just such as it was when given us at birth, and to be well and nobly endowed with this will be complete and true natural endowment. If this is true, then how will excellence be more voluntary than vice? To both men alike, the good and the bad, the end appears and is fixed by nature or however it may be, and it is by referring everything else to this that men do whatever they do. Whether, then, it is not by nature that the end appears to each man such as it does appear, but something also depends on him, or the end is natural but because the good man does the rest voluntarily excellence is voluntary, vice also will be none the less voluntary; for in the case of the bad man there is equally present that which depends on himself in his actions even if not in his end. If, then, as is asserted, the excellences are voluntary (for we are ourselves somehow part-causes (sunaitioi) of our states of character, and it is by being persons of a certain kind that we assume the end to be so and so), the vices also will be voluntary; for the same is true of them. (EN 3.5.1114a31–b25; RevOT)11

It is important to note again, as Sauvé Meyer has stressed in her analysis of the chapter,12 that this entire discussion is still part of the refutation of the Socratic claim that we only do the good voluntarily, not the bad. Also the discussion whether ‘the eye, as it were’, by which we discern good from bad is wholly or partly determined by nature from birth, regards this particular context only.13

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For this ‘eye’, whatever it is, or however we acquire it, would recognize both good and evil.14 It is important to see that this is not an argument in a debate about responsibility for our character, let alone a debate about securing moral responsibility tout court. Aristotle is perfectly willing to allow natural virtue, upbringing and education to play a role in the formation of our character as well, before we become rational adults that are capable of deliberation and choice and fully determine our character by performing good or bad actions.15 For Aristotle’s argument against Socrates and his followers, it is sufficient to make the point that to whatever extent we are co-responsible for our character, we are co-responsible for both the good and the bad. From the above we may surmise that taking guidance from pleasure and pain provides us with a poor measure of what is in accordance with right reason and what is not. The distinction between what is truly good and evil for us hinges on applying the perceptual and intellectual means to the good and bad. If the state of the soul is not yet virtuous, or virtuous but diverted from its proper course by pleasure and pain, the good as final cause of choice and action is wrongly identified. What appears good to us in accordance with the state of our soul, as is the rule, will be merely what appears good to us and will not constitute a truly good aim for our choice and action. It is intriguing to see how far-reaching the formation of character is in Aristotle. By developing virtue we do not only acquire a new state of our soul, improve the quality of the actions that proceed from it and profit from the pleasures that accompany this better life, but also change the way the world appears to us – at least in terms of good and bad.

Two ancient commentators on Aristotle Aspasius (c. 100 CE) and Alexander of Aphrodisias (c. 200 CE) have been singled out in this paper because they are the two major representatives of the ancient commentary tradition on the Nicomachean Ethics. We know of several commentaries and/or comments on the Nicomachean Ethics before Aspasius, for example by Andronicus, Boethus and Ariston, from whom only fragments and brief reports remain. Nonetheless in recent years a series of

Aspasius and Alexander of Aphrodisias

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publications on this period has clearly shown that the 500 years that separate Aristotle from Alexander saw a lively debate on ethics among Peripatetics, sparked by discussions with Platonists and Stoics, as well as by real or perceived discrepancies in Aristotle’s texts.16 Major issues involve the role of external goods in addition to virtue, the definition of choice, the classification of feelings and emotions, and the incorporation of oikeiôsis in Aristotelian philosophy, on the basis of Aristotle’s discussion of friendship. However, since none of these issues seem to have given rise to a discussion of our key text here, I confine myself to these brief indications of a growing field of investigation. To Aspasius we owe the first extant ancient commentary on Aristotle, and also the only extant commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics from the period between Andronicus and Simplicius. From the ten books of the Nicomachean Ethics, it covers Books 1–4, and the second half of Book 7 (starting 7.6.1149a24) to the end of Book 8.17 Consequently, we do not possess Aspasius’s comments on our key phrase in EN 6.5, but his commentary does cover some of the parallel passages referred to above. The commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics by Alexander of Aphrodisias, if it existed, is lost to us. All we have is a set of shorter discussions of ethical issues in his Ethical Problems, De fato and in some of the treatises that make up the second book of his De anima, better known as the Mantissa.18 These discussions contain a few references to our key phrase in EN 6.5 and the issue of our responsibility for what appears good or bad to us. Since we know that Alexander used Aspasius’s commentaries,19 Alexander’s discussion of our passage may also reflect Aspasius’s approach. In addition, we have several works on psychology by Alexander, including Alexander’s own De anima (not a commentary on Aristotle but covering the same ground). Unfortunately Alexander does not address the topics referred to above in his discussions of appearance and desire.

Aspasius The commentary by Aspasius reads like a modest paraphrase with regular short quotes from Aristotle’s texts, not divided in lemmata or lessons as later commentaries would have. Aspasius rarely changes the order of topics in

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Phantasia in Aristotle’s Ethics

Aristotle, but he sometimes inserts brief discussions of textual variants and allows himself an additional example or two to explain Aristotle’s train of thought more clearly. All that is interesting and potentially innovative has to be gleaned from a careful comparison of Aspasius and the text he is paraphrasing. How, then, does Aspasius deal with EN 3.4–5 outlined above? In the context of this volume it is relevant to note that Aspasius fully accepts the idea that the aim of our choices and actions is the good as it appears to us, even though we lack information on his view of the psychological details of this appearance.20 As we will see, he follows Aristotle’s arguments that seek to elucidate this notion. Furthermore, we can observe a growing interest in the question to what extent nature or habit determines the state of our character, an interest that goes beyond the use that Aristotle made of our responsibility for character. This tendency will be even more visible in Alexander. As we have seen, in EN 3.4 Aristotle introduced two opinions concerning the goal of wish (boulêsis); some people believe it is the good, others the apparent good. If only the good is truly to-be-wished-for, an apparent good chosen by a bad person is not to-be-wished-for by nature. What is it that Aristotle considers unsatisfactory here (1113a22–23), according to Aspasius? He claims the problem must be that in such circumstances there is nothing that is by nature to-be-wished-for (or rather: if everyone aims at the apparent good there seems to be no way of knowing what is really to-be-wished-for). By way of solution Aspasius proposes: Perhaps one could say that there is nothing that is by nature to-be-wished-for, but rather what is by nature is good,21 whereas what each particular person wishes is [merely] to-be-wished-for, as Aristotle himself says. (Aspasius in EN 75.26–27; trans. Konstan, modified)22

Aspasius does not propose, as Aristotle did, that the good is what is simply and truly to-be-wished-for, whereas the apparent good is what happens to be what each individual wishes for (1113a23–24), but instead he separates ‘by nature’ from the notion of to-be-wished-for (boulêton). Using Aristotle’s medical example from the sequel (1113a26–29), he links the good to people who are in a state that is in accordance with nature: Just as what is healthful is, on the one hand, what suits a person who is in a state that is in accord with nature – for example, we say that those foods

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23

and drinks are healthful which are proper to those bodies that are in a state in accord with nature – but, on the other hand, what suits sick people is not simply healthful; ‘and similarly’ some things are, on the one hand, simply ‘bitter and sweet and hot and heavy things’ (1113a28–9), namely those that appear such to people who are in a state in accord with nature, but on the other hand those that appear so to people who are sick are not so simply; so too whatever a worthy person wishes is simply to-be-wished-for, and this is the good, but to each particular person the apparent good is not what is simply to-be-wished-for, when a base person wishes it. For in every matter ‘the worthy person judges particular things correctly’ (1113a29–30) and is the standard for the nature of each particular thing. ‘For in accord with each individual state’, both of the soul and bodily, ‘specific things appear both good and pleasing’ (1113a31), but what is thought so (to dokoun) by particular individuals differs. (Aspasius in EN 75.28–76.5; trans. Konstan)23

There is no absolute health because what is genuinely wholesome for a sick person may not be so for a healthy person. In the same way, there is nothing that appears as an absolute good or an absolute boulêton to everyone. This does not make goodness purely relative because the criterion for goodness lies with nature: what appears good to someone who is in a natural state is what is good and to-be-wished-for in the proper sense. Although this paragraph returns to the vocabulary and meaning of Aristotle’s text at the end, it seems that for a moment Aspasius moves closer to Stoic vocabulary of living a life ‘in accord with nature’, in a context where Aristotle no longer speaks of nature, but of truth and good disposition.24 People in a state in accord with nature, ‘both of the soul and bodily’, judge particular things correctly. In the case of health, food that is proper for people in a state in accord with nature is simply healthy, whereas food proper for sick people is not simply healthy.25 In the same way sick people have different sensations as to taste, temperature and weight as well.26 Analogously, what appears good to virtuous people is simply to-be-wished-for; what appears good to others is not simply to-be-wished-for. In other words, the good is simply to-be-wishedfor only in the case of virtuous people, that is, people in a state in accordance with nature. This seems to be different from Aristotle in not making the true good what is simply to-be-wished-for absolutely. It is also different in that for Aristotle virtue is not a natural, but an acquired state that goes beyond natural endowments. We will see that the issue of how much exactly of our psychic

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and bodily states we have by nature, and how much is our own doing, was also an issue for Alexander. As to EN 3.5, Aspasius duly summarizes the argument against Socrates, without identifying the opponent (from 77.28 onwards). More clearly than Aristotle, Aspasius indicates that someone might seek to excuse ignorance through idleness or negligence by saying ‘that their nature was the cause of their negligence’ (77.31–32). Aristotle phrased the excuse as ‘he is such that he is careless’.27 This assumption is indeed what prompts Aristotle to deny that such habitual states are by nature. ‘For in fact it is not nature that one must hold responsible for people being unjust or dissolute, but each particular person himself ’ (78.1–2). Here nature must refer to natural endowment from birth, since it is opposed to acquired nature and habitual state. In this light it may be significant that Aspasius is keen on the limited responsibility of nature and chance as opposed to our larger personal responsibility for habituation by repeated voluntary actions: [Aristotle] did not say that all people are simply responsible for their habitual states but rather that they are co-responsible (sunaitioi), perhaps attributing something also to nature, but a small amount and that able to achieve correction, and perhaps too something to chance, by having fallen in with wicked people from the beginning. But nevertheless in all these cases the greatest part is ours, in choosing to practise noble or shameful things. (Aspasius in EN 79.33–80.3; trans. Konstan, my emphasis).28

Since Aristotle does not provide us with a clear calibration of these factors in determining our responsibility for our character states, we may infer that this clarification may have been prompted by the same concern for determination by nature. In discussing the objection that all aim for the apparent good, while not being responsible for the appearance (1114a31–32), Aspasius once more stresses that people’s nature, not the appearance, makes the difference: But it is not, in fact, from the appearance (ek tês phantasias), but rather in accord with his nature (kata tên phusin) that each person sees his own end and good. In reporting, in what follows, the account of those people he acts as advocate for it. For he says that it is then clear also that ‘he to whom this pertains by nature is someone naturally good’ (1114b8). And this would be the perfect good nature. (Aspasius in EN 79.10–14; trans. Konstan)29

Aspasius and Alexander of Aphrodisias

25

Here we may begin to suspect that Aspasius is using Aristotle to argue against the epistemic priority of the kataleptic appearance, which the Stoics believed to demand assent and consequential action.30 In those cases the appearance would be crucial, not so much the nature of the recipient, although the Stoics would maintain that we remain responsible for our assent. Especially in a context concerned with discriminating the true from the apparent good, the Stoic would maintain against the Sceptic that the criterion of truth is an appearance ‘that is stamped and reproduced from something which is, exactly as it is, of such a kind as could not arise from what is not’, and that we are capable of recognizing them as such and to improve that skill. In this respect Stoic moral and intellectual progress is not unlike Aristotelian habituation.31 If we picture Aspasius and his Aristotle in this debate, we can see how Aristotelians could draw on Aristotle’s defence of our responsibility for our appearances to set themselves apart from the Stoics and undermine the Stoic position. If our voluntarily acquired nature determines what appears good and bad to us, for which the virtuous person is the norm, there is no need for the Stoic kataleptic appearance. In conclusion, we may surmise that Aspasius shows more interest in the distribution of responsibility for character states between nature and habit than we would expect from Aristotle’s argument. In addition, the notion of appearance in determining what is good seems to gain new significance in the light of the role of (kataleptic) appearances in Stoic epistemology.

Alexander of Aphrodisias Surprisingly, in Alexander’s psychological work, namely his De anima and parts of the Mantissa, as well as those Problems that pertain to psychology, we find no reference to the crucial passages about the perceptual and intellectual means in Aristotle, and their relevance to identifying good and bad. The work that comes closest to our concerns is Ethical Problem 29 (158.3– 161.29), entitled ‘Interpretation of another passage in the third [book] of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, by which it is shown that vices too are in our control in a similar way to virtues’. The title immediately conveys the true aim of Aristotle’s EN 3.5, which is indeed borne out by the interpretation offered by the treatise.32 Although it provides a rearrangement of material from all

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of EN 3.1–5 in order to explain the text quoted at the start – all people desire the apparent good, but are not in control of how things appear33 – it does not contain the kind of shifts we noted above in Aspasius. It needs to be said that Alexander’s rearrangement further obscures the dialogue that Aristotle set up between his own arguments and the objections he raises against it. Moreover, the Socratic background is simply no longer evident. However, at the end of the treatise Alexander’s concern with the role of natural endowment in the acquisition of virtue comes to the fore: [1] The person who is going to acquire virtue or vice must indeed have a certain natural endowment (phunai), if not every living creature is able to acquire these, but only man. But it is not the case that, if the living creature that will possess these [needs] a certain type of nature, [therefore] he must also already possess by nature that eye by which he will judge well the things that he judges and choose that which is truly good, that is, virtue. [2] For the senses are not natural in the same way as the virtues; [while] the senses are themselves natural, virtue is not itself natural; the capacity (dunamis) to acquire it is natural, but it itself is not natural. [3] And for this reason virtue is natural in a similar way to skills, rather than to the senses. For as with the skills our being able to acquire them is something which belongs to us by nature (dektikois phusei), but no one comes to be a craftsman by nature, in the same way it is also in the case of the virtues. And for this reason, while no one would ever acquire the sight that is a matter of sense perception if he did not possess it by nature, in the case of the ‘sight’ that goes with virtue one does not need to be born (phunai) possessing this sight. But one does need to be born being able to acquire it (phunai dexasthai dunasthai), and to try to get possession of it by our own efforts. [4] And the person who is well endowed by nature (euphuês) is not the person who already has virtue and this [moral] eye, but the person who is able to acquire it more easily than [someone] else, as was shown to apply also in the case of skills. (Alex. Eth.Probl. 29.161.14–29; trans. Sharples, my numbering)34

This text shows a number of details that are characteristic of Alexander, not least the sensitivity to relevant stages of potentiality and actuality (which,

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27

we may recall, is absent from Aspasius’s account). For humans to differ from animals in acquiring virtue, they must have an additional natural endowment that animals do not have. On the other hand, it is not necessary that the ‘eye’ that discriminates appearances correctly and chooses the true good is already fully actualized from birth [1]. Here the analogy between this ‘eye’ and ordinary sight breaks down: if we did not have the fully developed power of sight from birth, we would never develop it [2]. The analogy with skills is more helpful: they are not present by nature, but we are born with the potentiality to acquire them [3]. The same goes for the ‘sight’ that goes with virtue: we are born with the potentiality to acquire it, but we need to try to get possession of it by our own efforts – for which we are responsible. This entails that ‘well endowed by nature’ means not ‘to possess virtue and this eye’, but ‘to be able to acquire it more easily than others’ [4]. This passage highlights a wider discussion that appears in several of Alexander’s treatises. In Mantissa 23 Alexander discusses ‘what depends on us’. One argument he addresses claims that if people choose the same end in the same circumstances, it seems that the circumstances determine their choice, which would then not depend on them (174.3–7). In reply (174.7ff) Alexander allows that if an agent has only one goal, it would be reasonable to make the same choice every time. But there is more. In fact, Alexander argues, there are several goals to choose from: ‘he has both the pleasant, and the advantageous and the noble before his eyes’ (174.18–19), which have different relations to the circumstances. So people may have good reasons to make different choices in the same circumstances. As Sharples notes, it is remarkable that the three different choices of life in Aristotle appear here as options from which a single person has to choose on each occasion.35 Alexander states: And by means of this one might resolve the argument which attributes responsibility for the actions to the appearance on the grounds that no-one would ever do anything contrary to what appears better to him. For there are several goals with reference to which the decision about the appearance is made. (Alex. Mant. 23.174.24–27; trans. Sharples)36

In this short paragraph we find an echo of the Socratic maxim that nobody acts contrary to what appears better to him. For Alexander this is now the grounds for his opponent’s maintaining that the appearance is responsible for

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the actions. The fact that people have to decide about the appearance with reference to several goals is another way of safely shifting the responsibility to the agent. Because agent responsibility is now his main concern, Alexander returns to the issue more than once, in more and more optimistic tones37: [1] And that the beginning of our coming to be of a certain sort in character – on account of which we make choices [of] different [sorts] – rests with ourselves, [this] is clear from the fact that it is through habit that we come to be of a certain sort, and that most of our habits depend on us. For even if someone developed bad habits at first when he was still a child,38 yet by nature all people, when they are fully developed, are capable of perceiving the things that are noble. At any rate no one who is in a natural state lacks the conception of which things are just and which unjust, which noble and which base. [2] Good or bad natural endowments for certain things, as long as they preserve a person in his own proper nature, contribute only to the easier or more difficult acquisition of the things for which [people] are well or badly endowed by nature. For it is possible for all people who are in a natural state and not perverted (astrophois) in their judgement and choice to acquire virtue, and possible [to do so] through one’s own [agency]. And for this reason some people who are rather poorly endowed by nature often become better than many who are well endowed by nature for virtue, remedying the deficiencies of their nature by the power (exousia) that comes from themselves. (Alex. Mant. 23.175.9–15; 25–32; trans. Sharples, my numbering)39

Even if our childhood starts off on the wrong foot, and we acquire bad habits, we can still develop virtue and attain the perception of things that are truly noble on account of our underlying natural capacity which remains untainted – as underlying potentialities do in Alexander. The only condition is that we are in a natural state, that is, not deformed in any way [1]. In the second part [2] we find an echo of Aristotle’s distortion (diastrephei) by pleasure and pain from the immediate context of the key text of this volume (EN 6.5.1140b14): the denial of perversion (astrophois) in judgement and choice (175.28). Again optimism reigns: even when poorly endowed, great results are possible, on the grounds of our own power (exousia). By allowing successful recovery, on account of our underlying capacity, and by stressing our power, Alexander’s

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29

optimism seems to move beyond Aristotle who, in EN 6.5, has people more easily go astray by pleasure or pain. As is well-known, exousia is a key term in Alexander which brings him on the verge of attributing to human beings the power of a will that may override even the most rational choice.40 Here the framework of appearances of the good that inform us about the goal for the actions that will shape our character breaks down. In Alexander’s De fato, his battle against Stoic determinism demands more freedom: the power to act or not to act at all times, notwithstanding one’s natural capacities or one’s duly acquired virtues: We showed that it is in this way that it depends on the wise man himself to be someone of such a kind, that he is himself responsible for such a disposition and the acquisition of it, because he previously had the power also not to become like this. He does not then possess the disposition any longer as [something that] depends on him (just as [it no longer depends on] the person who had thrown himself from a height to stop, though he did have the power both to throw himself off and not to); but it is in his power also not to perform some of the activities which he performs through possessing the disposition. (Alex. De fato 199.24–30; trans. Sharples)41

Again Alexander seeks his point of departure in EN 3.5. For dramatic effect Aristotle’s stone that cannot be stopped once it has been thrown (1114a17–18) is replaced by a person who throws himself from a height. But why is it in a wise person’s power not to perform some virtuous activities that should arise from his disposition? Alexander gives us two reasons: the first is that in practice such things admit of some breadth without opposing reason and wisdom (199.30–200.2). The second is again worth quoting in full: Next, it is not by compulsion that the wise man does any one of the things which he chooses, but as himself having control also over not doing anyone of them. For it might also sometimes seem reasonable to the wise man not to do on some occasion what would reasonably have been brought about by him – in order to show the freedom in his actions, if some prophet predicted to him that he would of necessity do this very thing. (Alex. De fato 200.2–7; trans. Sharples)42

A wise man has the power not to act in accordance with his reason and wisdom, if he decides the situation calls for it. We have come a long way from

30

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the appearances of good and bad as part of Aristotle’s argument that our wrongdoings are equally as voluntary as our good actions (pace Socrates). If we ask Alexander, the power to make a free choice between two alternatives remains at all times: what appears good or bad to us depends on our state of character, which we have the innate capacity to develop ourselves through our actions. We are free to do so at the beginning, even if we may not be able to alter a disposition once it has been fully established. But Alexander is optimistic that on account of our unalterable capacity for virtue we may revise our dispositions all the same. If not, they still fail to determine our actions because we can always refrain from any action our good or bad character prescribes – if only to spite false prophets. To conclude, we can surmise that both Aspasius and Alexander accept and develop the role of phantasia in the Nicomachean Ethics, though in different ways, motivated by different philosophical concerns. They illustrate that the ancient commentators are not our fellow commentators helping us to understand Aristotle better. They suppress or highlight aspects of Aristotle’s discussions as they see fit and develop it against the background of, for example, Stoic philosophy. For Aspasius and Alexander the commentary format is the vehicle they use to develop and disseminate their own brand of Peripatetic philosophy that answers the needs of the philosophical debate of their time.

Notes 1

See Klaus Corcilius, ‘Aristotle’s Definition of Non-Rational Pleasure and Pain and Desire’, in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: A Critical Guide, ed. Jon Miller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 122–40 for a detailed analysis of this passage. Corcilius rightly emphasizes that in this passage the De anima account needs to apply to all, even the most primitive, animals without reason. However, Aristotle continues immediately (431a14–17) to apply the same analogy to the discursive soul (see further below).

2

τὸ μὲν οὖν αἰσθάνεσθαι ὅμοιον τῷ φάναι μόνον καὶ νοεῖν· ὅταν δὲ ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν, οἷον καταφᾶσα ἢ ἀποφᾶσα διώκει ἢ φεύγει· καὶ ἔστι τὸ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τὸ ἐνεργεῖν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ᾗ τοιαῦτα. καὶ ἡ φυγὴ δὲ καὶ ἡ ὄρεξις ταὐτό, ἡ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν, καὶ οὐχ ἕτερον τὸ ὀρεκτικὸν καὶ τὸ φευκτικόν, οὔτ’ ἀλλήλων οὔτε τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ· ἀλλὰ τὸ εἶναι ἄλλο.

Aspasius and Alexander of Aphrodisias 3

31

For further details of the mechanism of perception and its mean, see Klaus Corcilius, ‘Activity, Passivity, and Perceptual Discrimination in Aristotle’, in Active Perception in the History of Philosophy: From Plato to Modern Philosophy, ed. José Filipe Silva and Mikko Yrjönsuuri (Dordrecht: Springer, 2014), 31–53. For my own developing view on these matters, see De Haas, ‘The Discriminating Capacity of the Soul in Aristotle’s Theory of Learning’, in Metaphysics, Soul, and Ethics in Ancient Thought: Themes from the Work of Richard Sorabji, ed. Ricardo Salles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 321–44 and ‘Aristotle and Alexander of Aphrodisias on Active Intellectual Cognition’, in Active Approaches to Intellectual Cognition: From Late Antiquity to the 20th Century, ed. Ana María Mora Márquez and Véronique Decaix (Dordrecht: Springer, in press).

4

τῇ δὲ διανοητικῇ ψυχῇ τὰ φαντάσματα οἷον αἰσθήματα ὑπάρχει, ὅταν δὲ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακὸν φήσῃ ἢ ἀποφήσῃ, φεύγει ἢ διώκει· διὸ οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ἡ ψυχή. – ὥσπερ δὲ ὁ ἀὴρ τὴν κόρην τοιανδὶ ἐποίησεν, αὕτη δ’ ἕτερον, καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ ὡσαύτως, τὸ δὲ ἔσχατον ἕν, καὶ μία μεσότης, τὸ δ’ εἶναι αὐτῇ πλείω.

5

Cf. DA 3.7.431b4–5.

6

Cf. DA 3.7.431b5–6. This intellectual mean, I have argued elsewhere, is what is developed into the dispositions some of which we call virtues, during the process of habituation of good (or bad) behaviour, by performing good or bad actions. See De Haas, ‘The Discriminating Capacity of the Soul’ (as note 3).

7

Cf. EN 6.12.1144a7–11: ‘Again, the function of man is achieved only in accordance with practical wisdom as well as with moral excellence; for excellence makes the aim right, and practical wisdom the things leading to it.’

8

οὐ γὰρ ἅπασαν ὑπόληψιν διαφθείρει οὐδὲ διαστρέφει τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷον ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὰς περὶ τὸ πρακτόν. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα τὰ πρακτά· τῷ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ δι’ ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην εὐθὺς οὐ φαίνεται ἀρχή, οὐδὲ δεῖν τούτου ἕνεκεν οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦθ’ αἱρεῖσθαι πάντα καὶ πράττειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ ἀρχῆς.

9

Here Protagorean relativism is decided in favour of the virtuous judge.

10 καθ’ ἑκάστην γὰρ ἕξιν ἴδιά ἐστι καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα, καὶ διαφέρει πλεῖστον ἴσως ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ τἀληθὲς ἐν ἑκάστοις ὁρᾶν, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὤν. ἐν τοῖς πολλοῖς δὲ ἡ ἀπάτη διὰ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἔοικε γίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ οὖσα ἀγαθὸν φαίνεται. αἱροῦνται οὖν τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς ἀγαθόν, τὴν δὲ λύπην ὡς κακὸν φεύγουσιν. 11 εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι πάντες ἐφίενται τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ’ ὁποῖός ποθ’ ἕκαστός ἐστι, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ· εἰ μὲν οὖν ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ τῆς ἕξεώς ἐστί πως αἴτιος, καὶ τῆς φαντασίας ἔσται πως αὐτὸς αἴτιος· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐθεὶς αὑτῷ αἴτιος τοῦ κακοποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι’ ἄγνοιαν

32

Phantasia in Aristotle’s Ethics τοῦ τέλους ταῦτα πράττει, διὰ τούτων οἰόμενος αὑτῷ τὸ ἄριστον ἔσεσθαι, ἡ δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφεσις οὐκ αὐθαίρετος, ἀλλὰ φῦναι δεῖ ὥσπερ ὄψιν ἔχοντα, ᾗ κρινεῖ καλῶς καὶ τὸ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθὸν αἱρήσεται, καὶ ἔστιν εὐφυὴς ᾧ τοῦτο καλῶς πέφυκεν· τὸ γὰρ μέγιστον καὶ κάλλιστον, καὶ ὃ παρ’ ἑτέρου μὴ οἷόν τε λαβεῖν μηδὲ μαθεῖν, ἀλλ’ οἷον ἔφυ τοιοῦτον ἕξει, καὶ τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλῶς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ἡ τελεία καὶ ἀληθινὴ ἂν εἴη εὐφυΐα. εἰ δὴ ταῦτ’ ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ, τί μᾶλλον ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς κακίας ἔσται ἑκούσιον; ἀμφοῖν γὰρ ὁμοίως, τῷ ἀγαθῷ καὶ τῷ κακῷ, τὸ τέλος φύσει ἢ ὁπωσδήποτε φαίνεται καὶ κεῖται, τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ πρὸς τοῦτο ἀναφέροντες πράττουσιν ὁπωσδήποτε. εἴτε δὴ τὸ τέλος μὴ φύσει ἑκάστῳ φαίνεται οἱονδήποτε, ἀλλά τι καὶ παρ’ αὐτόν ἐστιν, εἴτε τὸ μὲν τέλος φυσικόν, τῷ δὲ τὰ λοιπὰ πράττειν ἑκουσίως τὸν σπουδαῖον ἡ ἀρετὴ ἑκούσιόν ἐστιν, οὐθὲν ἧττον καὶ ἡ κακία ἑκούσιον ἂν εἴη· ὁμοίως γὰρ καὶ τῷ κακῷ ὑπάρχει τὸ δι’ αὐτὸν ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι καὶ εἰ μὴ ἐν τῷ τέλει. εἰ οὖν, ὥσπερ λέγεται, ἑκούσιοί εἰσιν αἱ ἀρεταί (καὶ γὰρ τῶν ἕξεων συναίτιοί πως αὐτοί ἐσμεν, καὶ τῷ ποιοί τινες εἶναι τὸ τέλος τοιόνδε τιθέμεθα), καὶ αἱ κακίαι ἑκούσιοι ἂν εἶεν· ὁμοίως γάρ.

12 Cf. Susan Sauvé Meyer, Aristotle on Moral Responsibility: Character and Cause (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 122–45. 13 For Aristotle’s own view see, for example, EN 6.12.1144a29–37: ‘And this eye of the soul acquires its formed state (hexis) not without the aid of excellence (aretê) as has been said and is plain; for inferences which deal with acts to be done are things which involve a starting-point, viz. “since the end, i.e. what is best, is of such and such a nature”, whatever it may be (let it for the sake of argument be what we please); and this does not appear except to the good man (touto d’ei mê tôi agathôi, ou phainetai); for wickedness perverts us and causes us to be deceived about the starting-points of action. Therefore it is evident that it is impossible to be practically wise without being good’ (trans. RevOT, slightly modified). It will be clear that this text can be read as an echo and further elucidation of our text in EN 6.5. On natural versus developed virtue see EN 6.13.1144b4ff. 14 Here Aristotle tacitly criticizes Plato’s innate ‘eye of the soul’ that is obscured by birth but can be cleansed during life by applying dialectic; see Rep. 7.533C–D, with 518A–D. 15 See, for example, EN 2.1.1103b12–25; 2.3.1104a27–b3. 16 See, for example, Robert W. Sharples, ‘Schriften und Problemkomplexe zur Ethik’ (in English), in Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen: Von Andronikos bis Alexander von Aphrodisias, vol. 3, ed. Paul Moraux (Berlin and New York: Walter

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de Gruyter, 2001), 511–616; Richard Sorabji and Robert W. Sharples (eds), Greek and Roman Philosophy, 100 BC–200 AD (London: Institute of Classical Studies, 2007); Robert W. Sharples, Peripatetic Philosophy 200 BC to AD 200: An Introduction and Collection of Sources in Translation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Brad Inwood, Ethics after Aristotle (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 2014); Han Baltussen, The Peripatetics: Aristotle’s Heirs, 322 BCE–200 CE (London and New York: Routledge, 2016); Andrea Falcon (ed.), Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Aristotle in Antiquity (Leiden: Brill, 2016). 17 See Antonina Alberti and Robert W. Sharples (eds), Aspasius: The Earliest Extant Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1999); David Konstan, Aspasius: On Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1–4, 7–8 (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2006). 18 See Robert W. Sharples, Alexander of Aphrodisias on Fate (London: Duckworth, 1983), id., Alexander of Aphrodisias: Ethical Problems (London: Duckworth, 1990), id., Alexander of Aphrodisias: Supplement to On the Soul (London: Duckworth, 2004), id., Alexander Aphrodisiensis De anima libri mantissa: A New Edition of the Greek Text with Introduction and Commentary (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 2008); Arthur Madigan SJ, ‘Alexander of Aphrodisias: The Book of Ethical Problems’, in Aufstieg und Niedergang der Römischen Welt, vol. II 36.2, ed. Wolfgang Haase (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1987), 1260–79. 19 Alexander refers to Aspasius by name in Metaph. 41.27; 59.6; 379.3; in Sens. 10.2; in Meteor. 129.36. Jonathan Barnes, ‘An Introduction to Aspasius’, in Aspasius: The Earliest Extant Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics (as note 17), 8–13 records the common suspicion that references to Aspasius in later commentaries, such as Simplicius in Physica, in De Caelo and Boethius in De interpretatione, were taken from Alexander’s commentaries. 20 At in EN 76.5 (quoted below) Aspasius paraphrases to dokoun for phainetai which may suggest that he is tacitly thinking of (rational) opinions in this context of ethics for human beings – or he is using his terms loosely. 21 Konstan, Aspasius: On Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1–4, 7–8 (as note 17) translates ‘but rather there is good by nature’, which seems to fit the context less well. 22 ἴσως γὰρ εἴποι τις μηδὲ εἶναι φύσει τι βουλητόν, ἀλλ’ ἀγαθὸν μὲν εἶναι τὸ φύσει· βουλητὸν δὲ ὃ ἕκαστος βούλεται, ὥσπερ αὐτὸς λέγει· 23 καθάπερ καὶ ὑγιεινὸν τὸ μέν ἐστι ὃ τῷ κατὰ φύσιν διακειμένῳ ἁρμόττει, οἷον σιτία καὶ ποτὰ ὑγιεινά φαμεν τὰ οἰκεῖα τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν διακειμένοις σώμασι·

34

Phantasia in Aristotle’s Ethics τὸ δὲ ὑγιεινὸν οὐκ ἔστι ἁπλῶς, ὃ ἁρμόττει τοῖς νοσοῦσιν· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ πικρὰ καὶ γλυκέα καὶ θερμὰ καὶ βαρέα τὰ μέν ἐστιν ἁπλῶς καὶ ἃ τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν διακειμένοις φαίνεται τοιαῦτα, τὰ δὲ οὐχ ἁπλῶς ἃ τοῖς νοσοῦσιν, οὕτω καὶ βουλητὸν ἁπλῶς μέν ἐστιν, ὃ βουληθείη ἂν ὁ σπουδαῖος· τοῦτο δέ ἐστι τὸ ἀγαθόν· ἑκάστῳ δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον ὃ οὐκ ἔστιν ἁπλῶς βουλητόν, ὅταν ὁ φαῦλος βούληται. ἐν παντὶ γὰρ πράγματι ὁ σπουδαῖος κρίνει ἕκαστα ὀρθῶς καὶ κανών ἐστι τῆς ἑκάστου φύσεως· καθ’ ἑκάστην γὰρ ἕξιν καὶ ψυχικὴν καὶ σωματικὴν ἴδια φαίνεται καλὰ καὶ ἡδέα, διαφέρει δὲ ἐν ἑκάστοις τὸ δοκοῦν.

24 Arist. EN 3.4.1113a21 has phusei boulêton, but after that Aristotle speaks of kath’ alêtheian (1113a23–24, 25, 27, 30), krinei orthôs (30) and apatê (34), and refers to the healthy as eu diakeimenois (1113a26–27). 25 We would here expect a reference to what is known as the focal meaning of healthy in the case of healthy people, and a derived meaning of (e.g.) ‘healing’ or ‘promoting health’ in the case of sick people. For now Aspasius seems satisfied with the opposition of simply and not simply healthy. On focal meaning in Aspasius, see further Enrico Berti, ‘Amicizia e “Focal Meaning”’, in Aspasius: The Earliest Extant Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics (as note 17), 176–90. 26 At in EN 152.25–153.2 (ad EN 7.13.1153b25–31) Aspasius adds pleasure to this list, and widens the analogy to all animal species whose different natures entail different best states and hence different experiences of pleasure. 27 Arist. EN 3.5.1114a3–4: ἀλλ’ ἴσως τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὥστε μὴ ἐπιμεληθῆναι. ἀλλὰ τοῦ τοιούτους γενέσθαι αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι ζῶντες ἀνειμένως. ‘But perhaps a man is the kind of man (toioutos estin) not to take care. Still they are themselves by their slack lives responsible for becoming men of that kind (toioutous genesthai)’ (trans. RevOT). 28 οὐκ εἶπε δὴ πάντας ἁπλῶς αἰτίους ἑαυτοῖς εἶναι τῶν ἕξεων ἀλλὰ συναιτίους, ἴσως νέμων τι καὶ τῇ φύσει, βραχὺ δὲ καὶ δυνάμενον τυχεῖν ἐπανορθώσεως· ἴσως δὲ καὶ τῇ τύχῃ, τῷ ἐξ ἀρχῆς περιπεσεῖν μοχθηροῖς ἀνθρώποις· ἀλλ’ ὅμως ἐν πᾶσι τούτοις τὸ πλεῖστον ἡμέτερόν ἐστι αἱρουμένων ἐπιτηδεύειν τὰ καλὰ ἢ τὰ αἰσχρά. 29 οὐχὶ δέ γ’ ἐκ τῆς φαντασίας, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν ἕκαστος τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τὸ τέλος ὁρᾷ καὶ τὸ ἀγαθόν. συνηγορεῖ δὲ διὰ τῶν ἑξῆς τὸν ἐκείνων λόγον λέγων. λέγει γὰρ ὅτι τότε ἐστὶ δῆλον καὶ ὅτι εὐφυής, ᾧ τοῦτο πέφυκε· καὶ αὕτη δ’ ἂν εἴη τελεία εὐφυΐα. 30 For a discussion of this notion see, for example, Michael Frede, ‘Stoic Epistemology’, in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. Keimpe Algra et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 300–16. Cf. Sextus

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M 7.247–60 (Long & Sedley 40E+K), 402–10 (Long & Sedley 40H); Cic. Acad. 2.77–78 (Long & Sedley 40D). Alexander of Aphrodisias De anima 69–70 is confident enough to use Stoic vocabulary in describing the Aristotelian position, but he, too, finds occasion to point out that clear impressions are not the same as true impressions, and that katalêpsis is equivalent to our assent, rather than a quality of a phantasia. 31 See, for example, Pierluigi Donini, ‘Stoic Ethics’, in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy (as note 30), 705–14. 32 In general, as Sharples, Alexander of Aphrodisias: Ethical Problems (as note 19), 76 n. 268 observes after Moraux, the Problems tend to remain closer to Aristotle’s texts, whereas the sections of the Mantissa rather reflect concerns from Alexander’s own works. 33 EN 3.5.1114a31–b12, for which see above p. 19. 34 [1] φῦναι μὲν γὰρ δεῖ πως τὸν μέλλοντα ἀρετὴν ἢ κακίαν δέχεσθαι, εἴ γε μὴ πᾶν ζῷόν ἐστι τούτων δεκτικόν, ἀλλ’ ἄνθρωπος μόνον· οὐ μὴν εἰ ποιᾶς φύσεως τῷ ταῦτα ἕξοντι ζῴῳ, ἤδη δεῖ καὶ ἔχειν αὐτὸν φύσει τὸ ὄμμα τοῦτο, ᾧ κρινεῖ τὰ κρινόμενα καλῶς καὶ τὸ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθὸν αἱρήσεται, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἀρετή. [2] οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως αἵ τε αἰσθήσεις καὶ ἀρεταὶ φύσει, ἀλλ’ αἱ μὲν αἰσθήσεις αὐταὶ φύσει, ἡ δὲ ἀρετὴ οὐκ αὐτὴ φύσει, ἀλλ’ ἡ μὲν τοῦ δέξασθαι δύναμις αὐτὴν φύσει, αὐτὴ δὲ οὐ φύσει. [3] διὸ μᾶλλον ἡ ἀρετὴ ὁμοίως φύσει ταῖς τέχναις, οὐ ταῖς αἰσθήσεσιν. ὡς γὰρ τῶν τεχνῶν τὸ μὲν εἶναι δεκτικοῖς ἡμῖν αὐτῶν ὑπάρχει φύσει, οὐδεὶς δὲ γίνεται τεχνίτης φύσει, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀρετῶν ἔχει. διὸ καὶ τὴν μὲν αἰσθητικὴν ὄψιν, εἰ μὴ φύσει τις ἔχοι, οὐδ’ ἂν κτήσαιτο αὐτήν ποτε, ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς κατὰ τὴν ἀρετὴν ὄψεως οὐ φῦναι ἔχοντα δεῖ τήνδε τὴν ὄψιν, ἀλλὰ φῦναι δεῖ δέξασθαι δύνασθαι αὐτήν, τὸ δὲ ἔχειν αὐτοὺς παρ’ αὑτῶν πειρᾶσθαι λαμβάνειν, [4] καὶ ἔστιν εὐφυὴς οὐχ ὁ ἤδη τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχων καὶ τὸ ὄμμα τοῦτο, ἀλλ’ ὁ ῥᾷον ἄλλου λαβεῖν αὐτὴν δυνάμενος, ὃν τρόπον καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν τεχνῶν ἔχον ἐδείχθη. 35 Sharples, Alexander of Aphrodisias: Supplement to On the soul (as note 19), 212 n. 702. 36 λύοιτο δ’ ἂν διὰ τούτου καὶ ὁ τῇ φαντασίᾳ τὴν αἰτίαν ἀνατιθεὶς τῶν πραττομένων λόγος, διότι παρὰ τὸ φαινόμενον ἄμεινον αὐτῷ οὐδεὶς ἄν τι πράξαι ποτέ. πλείους γὰρ οἱ σκοποί, πρὸς οὓς ἡ τῆς φαντασίας κρίσις. 37 In De fato 197.3–199.7 the fact that natural endowment is not changed by any habituation is stated most clearly. 38 A different approach to the same issue is found in Alex. Mantissa 17.152.27–30, as one of the arguments in the debate about the first oikeion we desire: ‘But

36

Phantasia in Aristotle’s Ethics since it is impossible for us to have apprehension of the true good as soon as we come into [existence], we have appetition for the apparent good. And the apparent good is what is pleasant. So it is what is pleasant for us that is the first appropriate thing, that is, the apparent good.’ (ἐπεὶ δὲ εὐθὺς γενομένους ἀδύνατον τοῦ ἀληθῶς ἀγαθοῦ ἀντίληψιν ἴσχειν, τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ ὀρεγόμεθα. φαινόμενον δὲ ἀγαθὸν τὸ ἡδύ. τὸ ἄρα ἡμῖν ἡδύ ἐστι τὸ πρῶτον οἰκεῖον, τουτέστιν τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν)

39 [1] ὅτι δὲ καὶ τοῦ ποιοὶ γενέσθαι τὸ ἦθος αὐτοὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἔχομεν, δι’ ἃ καὶ τὰς αἱρέσεις διαφόρους ποιούμεθα, δῆλον ἐκ τοῦ διὰ τῶν ἐθῶν ἡμᾶς ποιοὺς γίγνεσθαι, τῶν δὲ ἐθῶν τὰ πλεῖστα ἐφ’ ἡμῖν εἶναι. καὶ γὰρ εἰ τὰ πρῶτά τις μοχθηρῶς ἐθισθείη παῖς ὢν ἔτι, ἀλλὰ φύσει γε πάντες ἄνθρωποι διορατικοὶ τῶν καλῶν εἰσιν τελειούμενοι. οὐδεὶς γοῦν κατὰ φύσιν ἔχων ἀνεννόητός ἐστιν, τίνα μέν ἐστι δίκαια, τίνα δὲ ἄδικα, καὶ τίνα μὲν καλά, τίνα δὲ αἰσχρά [2] αἱ δὲ εὐφυΐαι τε πρός τινα καὶ ἀφυΐαι ἔστ’ ἂν ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ φύσει τηρῶσιν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, πρὸς εὐκολωτέραν ἀνάληψιν τούτων συντελοῦσιν μόνον ἢ χαλεπωτέραν, πρὸς ἃ πεφύκασιν εὖ τε καὶ κακῶς. πᾶσιν γὰρ ἀνθρώποις τοῖς κατὰ φύσιν τε ἔχουσιν καὶ ἀστρόφοις ἐπὶ τὴν κρίσιν τε καὶ τὴν αἵρεσιν δυνατὸν ἀρετὴν κτήσασθαι καὶ δυνατὸν δι’ αὑτοῦ. διὸ πολλῶν καλῶς πρὸς ἀρετὴν πεφυκότων φαυλότερόν τινες πεφυκότες ἀμείνους γίγνονται πολλάκις τὴν ἔνδειαν τῆς φύσεως ἰασάμενοι τῇ παρ’ αὐτῶν ἐξουσίᾳ. 40 For free will as the product of the debate between Peripatetics and Stoics, see Susanne Bobzien, ‘The Inadvertent Conception and Late Birth of the Free-Will Problem’, Phronesis 43 (1998): 133–75; cf. Michael Frede, A Free Will: Origins of the Notion in Ancient Thought (Berkeley; Los Angeles; London: University of California Press, 2011). 41 ἐδείξαμεν δὲ ὅτι οὕτως ἐπ’ αὐτῷ τῷ φρονίμῳ τὸ εἶναι τοιούτῳ, ὅτι τῆς τοιαύτης ἕξεως καὶ τῆς κτήσεως αὐτῆς αὐτὸς αἴτιος τῷ καὶ τοῦ μὴ γενέσθαι τοιοῦτος ἔχειν πρότερον τὴν ἐξουσίαν. τὴν μὲν οὖν ἕξιν μηκέτ’ ἔχει ὡς ἐπ’ αὐτῷ (ὥσπερ οὐδὲ τῷ αὑτὸν ἀπὸ ὕψους ἀφέντι τὸ στῆναι καίτοι τοῦ ῥῖψαί τε καὶ μὴ τὴν ἐξουσίαν ἔχοντι), ἐπ’ αὐτῷ δὲ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ὧν τὴν ἕξιν ἔχων ἐνεργεῖ καὶ μὴ ποιῆσαί τινα. 42 ἔπειτα δὲ οὐ κατηναγκασμένως ὁ φρόνιμος ὧν αἱρεῖταί τι πράττει, ἀλλ’ ὡς καὶ τοῦ μὴ πρᾶξαί τι τούτων αὐτὸς ὢν κύριος. εὔλογον γὰρ ἂν δόξαι ποτὲ τῷ φρονίμῳ καὶ ὑπὲρ τοῦ δεῖξαι τὸ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἐλεύθερον καὶ μὴ ποιῆσαί ποτε τὸ γινόμενον ἂν εὐλόγως ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ, εἰ προείποι τις αὐτῷ μάντις ἐξ ἀνάγκης αὐτὸν τοῦτο πράξειν.

T H E A R A B IC T R A D I T IO N 3

Averroes’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics Frédérique Woerther

This chapter starts out with a survey of the transmission and translation of the Nicomachean Ethics into Arabic and a general account of the concept of phantasia/taḫayyul among pre-Averroistic philosophers. After these preliminaries, I give a general introduction to Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics (henceforth McNE), in order to show what can be expected from such a talḫīṣ (middle commentary) in general, and from this commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics in particular. Then, I will examine the passage under discussion in Averroes’s Commentary, which is extant in its Latin and Hebrew versions only. Finally, I turn to six other passages from the commentary, where the term phantasia/taḫayyul has been identified as such by Averroes in the Arabic version of the Nicomachean Ethics and then discussed in his commentary. I offer my conclusions at the end.

Transmission and translation into Arabic The Arabic version of the Nicomachean Ethics is extant in only one copy, preserved in the Qarawīyīn Library in Fez, dated h 619/ad 1222. This manuscript, composed of two parts discovered by Douglas D. Dunlop and Arthur J. Arberry, has been the object of two modern editions: ʽAbd al-Raḥmān Badawī published the first one in 1979,1 Anna A. Akasoy and Alexander Fidora the second one in 2005.2 Recently, Manfred Ullmann has offered an exhaustive description of the language and tradition of this Arabic version of the Nicomachean Ethics, in a two-volume edition published in 2011

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and 2012.3 He also suggested corrections to the Greek text and identified the presence of two different translators,4 whereas modern critics, following the testimony of Ibn al-Nadīmʼs notice,5 tend to attribute the whole of the Arabic translation to Iṣhāq Ibn Ḥunayn.6 In fact only Books 1–4 are in reality the work of Iṣhāq Ibn Ḥunayn, while Books 5–10 were translated into Arabic by Eustathius, probably at the request of al-Kindī (d. 252/866).7 It is based on this composite, Arabic version of the Nicomachean Ethics that Averroes wrote his Middle Commentary. As several surveys have already demonstrated,8 the impact of the Nicomachean Ethics on the medieval Islamic world was fairly small, probably because in an Islamic environment ethical writings were already shaped by the Qur’ān – ‘although the Qur’ān does not present coherent, systematic views on certain questions’.9 The earliest mention of the Nicomachean Ethics appears in a short Letter on the Number of the Books of Aristotle and What Is Needed to Acquire Philosophy (Risāla fī kammīya kutub Arisṭūṭālīs wa-mā yuḥtāğ ilayhi fī taḥṣīl al-falsafa), where al-Kindī enumerates the three Aristotelian treatises on Ethics. However, it is likely that he did not have direct knowledge of these treatises and that he depends here on a Greek source. Yet direct influence of the Nicomachean Ethics is demonstrated in the case of al-Fārābī (d. 339/950), who wrote a commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics (Šarḥ kitāb al-aḫlāq liAriṣṭuṭālīs), which is now lost but is mentioned by several medieval Arabic authors and survives in several fragments.10 This commentary was probably known to Albertus Magnus in a Latin translation. Moreover, both in alFārābīʼs Harmony between the Opinions of the Two Wise, the Divine Plato and Aristotle (Kitāb al-ğamʽ bayna raʼyay al-ḥakīmayn Aflāṭūn al-ilāhī waArisṭūṭālīs) – where the vocabulary shows that the Second Master used a different translation from the one that is now extant in the Fez Unicum – and in his Selected Aphorisms (Fuṣūl muntazaʽa), where the Aristotelian division between intellectual and ethical virtues is attested, although the Aristotelian concepts in Arabic are not the same as in the Fez Unicum (cf. nutqī vs. fikrī; hayʼā vs. ʽāda), there are plenty of reminiscences of Aristotelian doctrine. Another important figure in the Arabic reception of the Nicomachean Ethics is al-ʽĀmīrī (d. 381/992), who wrote the Book of Happiness and Making Happy (Kitāb al-saʽāda wa-al-isʽād). Although al-ʽĀmīrī’s wording does not always coincide with that of the Fez Manuscript, several references to the Aristotelian

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39

treatise tend to confirm that another Arabic version of the Nicomachean Ethics circulated in the early to mid-tenth century – unless al-ʽĀmīrī knew of the Aristotelian doctrine indirectly. Following the progression of the Nicomachean Ethics, the Book of Happiness and Making Happy offers its information in the form of an anthology, adding Platonic and Galenic elements, and does not try to give a harmonized account of ancient and late antique ethics. Miskawayh (d. 421/1030), author of The Refinement of Character (Tahḏīb al-aḫlāq), also knew of the ethical doctrine of Aristotle, but more likely through the Summa Alexandrinorum – a summary whose origin may lie in a Greek summary of the Nicomachean Ethics which was later translated into Arabic and Hebrew – rather than the Nicomachean Ethics itself. We may add to this list Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274) or Ibn Bāğğa (d. 533/1138 or 1139), whose Regimen of the Solitary (Tadbīr al-mutawaḥḥid) and Epistle of Farewell (Risāla al-wadāʽ) indicate that their author used the Arabic version of the Nicomachean Ethics and/or the Summa Alexandrinorum along with al-Fārābī’s commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics (and also possibly Porphyry’s commentary). Ultimately, it seems that the influence of the Nicomachean Ethics on the Arabic tradition was mostly indirect, following a diffuse tradition through compendia and summaries, among which the Summa Alexandrinorum is the best known. Apart from al-Fārābī (whose commentary is now lost), no other commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics is known until that of Averroes: hence the emphasis on Averroes’s interpretation of Nicomachean Ethics 6.5.1140b17–18 in this chapter.

Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics: General presentation The composition of the McNE was completed by Averroes (1126–1198) on 26 May 1177.11 The McNE is now lost in its original Arabic version, except for thirty small fragments, the longest of which does not exceed two lines,12 preserved in the margins of the Unicum of Fez. This Commentary was translated into Latin by Hermann the German in 1240 in Toledo,13 and later, from a different copy of the Arabic text but still belonging to the same tradition,14 into Hebrew, by

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Samuel of Marseilles in 1322. The Hebrew version is available today in a modern critical edition, established by Berman.15 The Latin translation of Hermann is extant in thirteen manuscripts and at least thirteen Renaissance prints.16 I am editing right now the Latin translation of Averroes’s Commentary. Before examining the passage that corresponds to Nicomachean Ethics 6.5.1140b17–18, we will discuss the main characteristics of the Middle Commentary (ar. talḫīṣ) in order to make clear what we can expect from such a text. From a general point of view, the talḫīṣ, usually translated into Latin with the word paraphrasis, does not refer to a specific literary genre. Rather, it can be defined by the goals it sets up. According to Dimitri Gutas,17 who studied the meanings of the word talḫīṣ and gave ‘a brief review of the evidence [that] presents a picture that is rather different from the traditional one’, the word has two basic meanings. The first meaning is ‘to determine, to discriminate, to present something precisely’, whose ‘semantic core lies in the concept of delimitation: to discriminate or distinguish it from heterogeneous elements, determine its precise boundaries and present it by giving precisely and in detail its elements’ (p. 39). The second meaning is a later meaning of the word: ‘from the basic meaning “to determine precisely, discriminate” comes the meaning “to summarize,” i.e., in the sense of “to present the essential points of a book in precise form” after having first determined them’. Then, to sum up, Gutas writes: ‘laḫḫaṣa did not and does not mean “to comment” in the sense of šarh or tafsīr, nor did it mean “paraphrase” as the term is understood either in Greek or in English’ (p. 40). If we now turn to the McNE, we can briefly offer the following remarks that have been drawn from a close examination of the text18 and from a study of the changes that Averroes made while composing his Commentary based on the Arabic version of Aristotle’s text.19 Averroes has first cut Aristotle’s text into sequences of varying length, beginning with the Latin formula dixit (hebr. amar, both corresponding to the Arabic qāla, ‘ said’). While reorganizing the text in this fashion, Averroes introduces Aristotle as the main speaker. But this does not prevent him either from intervening in the first person through interpolated clauses, beginning with the Latin intendo or dico (‘I mean’). These two enunciative instances, Aristotle and the philosophical ‘I’ figure, the latter signifying a

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higher level that guarantees objectivity and scientific status, aim at the same goal: to expose, as much as possible, the truth of the Aristotelian text. Although Averroes sometimes seems to simply recopy the text of the Arabic version of the Ethics in the body of the McNE, he also quite often abridges Aristotle’s text, either by suppressing some words that seemed redundant to him or by rewriting Aristotle’s text in a more concise way, producing by way of synthesis a new text that is not subject to the literal status of Aristotelian Ethics. Averroes also extends Aristotle’s text, either by adding new developments that have no direct correspondence with the Ethics, and for which Averroes is responsible (e.g. the passage that he inserts in the McNE ad Nicomachean Ethics 8.10.1160b19–24, where he compares the classifications of the political regimes in Plato and Aristotle),20 or by inserting some words or groups of words that aim at making Aristotle’s text clearer and suppressing any possible ambiguous interpretation of the Ethics. Finally, Averroes can displace and transfer a more or less lengthy part of the text to a context different from its original one. He can also substitute or replace a term by another one, either more technical or more precise, in order to make Aristotle’s text more coherent and, hence, to modify Aristotle’s original goal. For example, in the McNE ad Nicomachean Ethics 8.1, he substitutes the Arabic word faḥṣ (examination) – rendering the Greek terms skepsis/episkepsômetha – for the Latin term scientia (hebr. khokhme).21 In brief: in the McNE, Averroes not only seeks to smooth out the roughness of the Arabic version of the Nicomachean Ethics. His reading, which is a true and deep rewriting of Aristotle’s treatise, reformulates the Nicomachean Ethics in a less ambiguous way by making explicit the implicit terms, without intending, however, to develop more general issues in the text or to establish all the possible links with other Aristotelian treatises.

McNE on 6.5.1140b17–18 If we now turn to the specific passage of the Nicomachean Ethics under discussion, that is 6.5.1140b17–18, a first observation must be made. While the passage is extant in both the Latin and the Hebrew translations of Averroes’s Middle Commentary, it is lost in the extant Arabic version of the Nicomachean Ethics. This means that we do not know the version of the text (or of one

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of the witnesses) that Averroes used to write his Commentary, nor can we reconstruct it – or, to put it in another way: it will not be possible here to make a close comparison between the Greek version of Aristotle’s text and its Arabic translation as a first step, and then between the Arabic version of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Averroes’s Commentary as a second step. In Book 6, chapter 5, Aristotle examines the notion of phronêsis (‘prudence’ or ‘practical wisdom’).22 After he has stated that phronêsis can be studied from the example of those who are prudent (phronimoi), that is those who are capable of deliberating, Aristotle examines the object of deliberation: that is, what is not necessary on the one hand, and what belongs to action, not production, on the other hand. Therefore, phronêsis is not a science or an art, but a ‘true disposition accompanied by reason and capable of acting with regard to the things that are good or bad for man’ (hexin alêthê meta logou praktikên peri to anthrôpôi agatha kai kaka). These first indications are buttressed by the example of Pericles and those who are good at managing households or states, and by an etymological note that opens the passage under discussion. Aristotle’s text reads as follows: This is where the word by which we designate temperance (sôphrosunê) comes from, according to the view that it preserves one’s phronêsis, and what it preserves is a judgement (hupolêpsis) of that kind. For it is not any and every judgement that pleasure and pain destroy and pervert, e.g. the judgement that the triangle has or has not its angles equal to two right angles, but only the judgements about what is to be done (peri to prakton). For the principles (archai) of the things that are to be done consist in the end (to hou heneka) at which the things that are to be done (ta prakta) are aimed; but to the man who has been corrupted by pleasure and pain the principle does not appear immediately, and he is not capable of seeing to what end (toutou heneken) or because of what (dia touth’) he chooses and does whatever he chooses and does; for vice is destructive of the principle. Therefore phronêsis must be a true disposition accompanied by reason and capable of acting with regard to human goods. (EN 6.5.1140b11–21; all translations are my own)23

In this passage, Aristotle makes a distinction between different types of judgements (hupolêpseis) and identifies those that can be altered by the disposition of a subject. Thus, pleasure and pain modify not judgements that are theoretical in nature – like the judgement that the triangle has or

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does not have its angles equal to two right angles – but practical judgements (peri to prakton), that is, those that relate to the actions that we have to carry out. To my mind, these practical judgements (cf. hupolêpsis … peri to prakton) are a complex mode of reasoning on the one hand and an ethical disposition on the other hand, just as Aristotle defines phronêsis in Book 6, chapter 13, as a disposition that cannot be distinguished from the ethical virtue. Aristotle gives the following explanation for what he has just said. The actions that are to be done (ta prakta) are based on principles (archai) that define the end; that is, ‘that for the sake of which’ (to hou heneka) these actions can be done or have to be done. 1. Under these circumstances, one can ask what the plural archai refers to. Does every action rest on one principle only (as we could infer from the singular employed in the subsequent lines), or does every action rest on many principles? 2. What is the form these principles take? Given that the principles are identical with the end towards which the actions are undertaken, can we possibly assume that they take the form of the conclusion of a practical syllogism? Or do they take the form of two parallel and not unified assumptions, one that would be the expression of the reason and the other the expression of the ethical virtue or the choice? The man who cannot attain a virtuous disposition towards pleasure and pain is the man who is corrupted by the lack of metriopatheia and is not capable of making this principle obvious (cf. phainetai) in a correct way, that is, in regard to the complex of dianoetic and ethical dispositions. In other words, a (bad) ethical disposition prevents the phantasia of the principles, which are precisely a mixture of ethical disposition and reasoning. If it is clear that the vice destroys the principle, then it is also clear that the principles of the action share something of an ethical disposition. 3. Aristotle says that the principles do not appear euthus, that is, without mediation, directly and instantaneously. This assumption raises, first, a question about how phantasia is realized. It also raises a question about the precise object of this incapacity: is the man who is incapable of representing to himself the principles of the action that has to be done incapable of representing to himself the end (toutou heneken) or the means to that end (dia

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touth’) or both? Does phantasia divide itself into an appearance of the end on the one hand and of the means on the other hand?

Averroes’s Commentary The text of Averroes’s passage in its Latin version is the result of a collation made from the main manuscripts that have to be taken into consideration for the edition – O (Saint Omer, BM 0623, saec. xiii) and T (Toledo, Biblioteca de la Catedral, 94.14, saec. xiii). The editions of 1483 and 1562, which are supposed to be close to a corrected version of the Latin translation obtained through a collation with the Arabic version of Averroes’s text, have also been used.24 The Latin text has then been compared to its Hebraic counterpart, as it has been edited by Berman. The Hebraic is supposed to be closer to Averroes’s text than the Latin version (see Chapter 6 by Chaim Neria in this volume).

Translations of the Latin (and Hebraic) Text of the McNE25 said. That is why the word ‘temperance’ is derived, in Greek, from the word ‘prudence’. For the prudent is the one who preserves his opinion so it is not destroyed by grief or joy – I mean friendship and desire –, as the temperate person preserves his action so it is not destroyed by pleasure or delight. And it is so, for not every opinion is destroyed by pleasure or sadness. For the destruction of the belief that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles is not on account of pleasure and sadness, but on account of the destruction of the principles that make necessary the destruction of this belief only. However, the prudential opinion is precisely destroyed by these two – I mean by the destruction of the principles and because of pleasure and sadness. And its destruction, when it is on account of pleasure and sadness, is immediately obvious – I mean that it is more obvious than the destruction from the premises. As the true prudential opinion is not accompanied by the destruction on account of the desire, thus, necessarily, the prudent will not choose both things at the same time – I mean to find the good and the bad at the same time –, for to find the bad is from a principle of destruction on account of the desire, and they are also distinguished from each other in as much as to find the bad comes from a vicious disposition.

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And since it is so, prudence according to truth is a disposition capable of realizing, with correct reason, human goods.26

The translation from the Hebrew version does not show many discrepancies in comparison with the Latin version: said. For this reason, ‘temperance’ is called in the language of the Greeks by a term derived from the term ‘prudence’. For the person with prudence is the one who preserves his opinion rather than have sorrow and joy destroy it, I mean, will and desire, just as temperance preserves his action so that pleasure does not destroy it. And indeed the matter is so, for not every opinion is destroyed on account of pleasure and sadness. For the destruction of the belief that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles is not on account of pleasure and sadness, but on account of the destruction of the principles that necessitate the destruction of this belief only. As for the prudential opinion, it is destroyed, therefore, by both of these, I mean on account of the destruction of the principles and on account of the pleasure and sadness. Its destruction on account of pleasure and sadness will appear in its time, I mean that it is more apparent than the destruction that is from the premises. And when the true prudential opinion is that which does not attain the destruction on account of the will, then it necessarily follows that the one with prudence will not choose both these matters together, that is, what comes from the heart of the bad and the good, for what comes from the heart of the bad is from a principle that is destroyed on account of desire and they are separated also because what comes from the heart of the bad is from the characteristic of abundance of desire. And since this is so, true prudence is a characteristic that acts with correct reason for the human good.27

The Hebrew version suggests another phrasing to indicate that the temperate person preserves his opinion against grief and joy (cf. ‘so it is not destroyed by grief or joy’ vs. ‘rather than have sorrow and joy destroy it’). Later in the passage, the Latin suggests that the destruction of the prudential opinion that arises on account of pleasure and sadness is ‘immediately obvious’, whereas the Hebrew says that this destruction ‘will appear in its time’. Finally, at the end of the passage, the Latin and the Hebrew versions show various phrasings but do not suggest different interpretations of the text they translate. According to Averroes, what we earlier called practical judgement (gr. hupolêpsis, probably translated into Arabic as ārā) and what Averroes here calls

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prudential opinion both in the Latin version of the text (opinio prudentialis) and in the Hebrew version (sevara haskelit) can be destroyed in two different ways: either by the destruction of the principles or by pleasure and sadness. For to every action belong both a principle that is rational in nature, on the one hand, and a specific ethical disposition that is a specific reaction to the passions, on the other hand. The following passage – whose translation in Arabic is not extant – has probably been translated and then read by Averroes as follows: (1) Aristotle’s text: τῷ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ δι᾽ ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην εὐθὺς οὐ φαίνεται ἀρχή (2) Misreading of (1): τὸ δὲ διεφθαρμένον δι᾽ ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην εὐθὺς φαίνεται (3) Arabic translation of (2): Not extant (4) Latin translation of (3): Et corruptio ejus que fit ex parte delectationis et tristitiae statim apparet, intendo quod magis apparet quam corruptio que fit ex parte propositionum

The Arabic translator would have misread the dative masculine form τῷ διεφθαρμένῳ for the nominative neuter τὸ διεφθαρμένον; he would have also omitted the negation οὐ, as well as the word ἀρχή. Depending on this reconstructed Arabic misreading (whose version is now lost), Averroes would then have recopied the Arabic translation as such, adding afterwards his own gloss starting with the verb intendo, which is one of the ways used by the philosopher to insert a clarification. Whereas Aristotle says that the person whose judgement is corrupted by pleasure and pain cannot grasp the rational principles that would lead him towards the correct judgement, Averroes claims that the corruption of prudential judgement on account of these two affections – pleasure and pain – appears immediately. When, on the other hand, the corruption of prudential judgement occurs on account of the premises, that is it is a destruction based on the premises, it is neither obvious nor immediate, because it requires an examination of the principles it is based on. At the end of the passage, Averroes states that true prudential judgement cannot be destroyed by desire, if we understand desire as the passion that leads us to choose the bad. To sum up, Averroes’s Commentary introduces here a new way of understanding the passage by underlining that phronêsis is

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the union of moral excellence (i.e. the right use of the passions) and reason. In other words, this passage does not help us understand the way Averroes conceived the role of appearance (phantasia) in grasping the principles of an action, whether these principles are only rational or if they also include an ethical component.

Six other passages on phantasia in the Nicomachean Ethics and the McNE In order to give a slightly more complete idea of the way Averroes has conceived the role of phantasia in an ethical context, I have selected six passages that seem crucial to understanding this issue. I have selected five passages after examining the occurrences of the words with the radical phantas- (i.e. phantasia and phantasma) and of the verb phainô/phainomai throughout the Greek version of the Nicomachean Ethics. The sixth passage is the exegetical development of a passage from Nicomachean Ethics 6.8 devoted to the idea that phronêsis is not a science, where Averroes inserts the concept of phantasia in this gloss, although it does not appear in Aristotle’s original text. For each of the six passages quoted in Latin in my forthcoming edition (a work in progress), I have included in the footnotes the parallel readings that seemed interesting and retained the transliterated terms in the English translations for every time the Arabic translator of the Nicomachean Ethics and the Latin translator of Averroes’s Commentary chose to use such transliterations (note that orthography was not standardized, so sometimes Greek φ is transliterated f and sometimes ph). The general question that we will try to deal with is the following: what can we infer from these passages about the way Averroes conceives of phantasia – how he defines it, what role he assigns to it – in the Nicomachean Ethics?

McNE ad Nicomachean Ethics 1.13.1102b9–11 The first passage comes from Book 1, chapter 13. Distinguishing the different parts of the human soul, Aristotle mentions the nutritive part that is common to all species and not specifically human. This part functions mostly in sleep, while goodness and badness are least manifest in sleep:

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NEgr: Unless perhaps to a small extent some of the movements actually penetrate to the soul, and in this respect the dreams (ta phantasmata) of good men are better than those of ordinary people.28 NEar: This is bound to follow, because sleep is inactivity of the soul, in respect of which it is said to be good and bad, unless indeed some of its movements penetrate to the body in time of sleep little by little, so that thereby the imagination of the good is better than the imagination of the wicked (fayakūn bi-hā taḫayyul al-ḫiyār min al-nās afḍal min taḫayyul al-šarār).29 McNE: And this is right because sleep is inactivity of the soul from which it is said that it is virtuous or vicious, unless some of its movements penetrate to the body little by little toward the rational power and in this respect the fantasmata of good men are better than the fantasmata of wicked ones.30

The Hebrew version reads as follows (the differences/additions are underlined): And this is right because sleep is inactivity of the soul from which it is said that it is virtuous or vicious {or vile}, unless some of its movements penetrate to the body at the time of sleep little by little toward the rational power and in this respect the imagination (dimyon) of good men at the time of sleep is better than the imagination (dimyon) of wicked ones.31

The Arabic translation of Aristotle’s text has correctly understood the root phantas-, as the translator has used the commonly employed Arabic word taḫayyul to translate phantasia in Arabic. Averroes also probably employed this Arabic word in his Commentary, which Hermann later translated by the Latin fantasma, that is, the product of the activity of phantasia (and by Samuel with the Hebrew word dimyon). According to Aristotle’s text, whose meaning has been kept intact throughout the translation up to the Commentary of Averroes, the imagination (understood as a product, not as an activity) of the good and the wicked can be distinguished from an ethical point of view. Thus, there can be an ethical element in the imagination, which is not necessarily and totally irrational, as Averroes says that these movements penetrate ‘toward the rational power’ of the soul.

McNE ad Nicomachean Ethics 3.5.1114a31–b1 In the second passage, Aristotle answers the following objection: NEgr: Now some one may say that all men desire the apparent good (to phainomenon agathon), but have no control over the appearance

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(phantasia), but the end appears (phainetai) to each man in a form answering to his character. We reply that if each man is somehow responsible for his condition (tês hexeôs … aitios), he will also be himself somehow responsible for the appearance (tês phantasias … aitios); but if not, no one is responsible for his own evildoing, but every one does evil acts through ignorance of the end, thinking that by these he will get what is best, and the aiming at the end is not self-chosen but one must be born with an eye, as it were, by which to judge rightly and choose what is truly good … (EN 3.5.1114a31–b8).32 NEar: If anyone says that all men strive towards what is imagined (ilā mā yutaḫayyalu) by them as good, as regards the imagination (al-taḫayyul) it is not in their power, but each of them imagines (yataḫayyalu) the end in accordance with his condition. Now if every man is in a certain sense cause of his condition, he also is in a certain sense cause of his imagination (sababan li-taḫayyulihi), and if no man is cause of the doing of evil deeds, but only does them through his ignorance of the end, and therefore thinks that the best thing is therein, the striving towards the end is not voluntary, but he must have it by nature, as he has sight by which he distinguishes well, and he may choose the authentic good33 McNE: If anyone says that all men desire what seems to them to be good, but the vision is not in their power. But to every man the end seems to be in accordance with his disposition, and this is necessary according to what follows his dispositions. Thus if every man is in a certain way cause of his disposition, and if his phantasia follows his disposition, he will also be in a certain way cause of his fantasia.34

The Hebrew version reads: If anyone says that all men desire what is imagined (mah she-yedummeh) by them to be good, but the imagination (dimyon) is not in their power. But to every man the end is imagined (yedummeh) to be in accordance with his disposition, and this is necessary according to what follows their dispositions. Thus if every man is in a certain way cause of his disposition, and if his imagination (dimyon) follows his disposition, he will also be in a certain way cause of his imagination (dimyon).35

In this second passage, the Greek text has been correctly understood by the Arabic translator. The idea conveyed here by the Stagirite is that men are responsible for the way things appear good to them, because their phantasia –

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the way they represent to themselves the goodness or the badness of things, and also the ethical quality of the results of this activity – is directly connected to their dispositions. Phantasia is therefore and in some way the result of a certain rational choice, just as an ethical disposition is underpinned and controlled by correct reason. Although the Arabic translator has translated every occurrence of the Greek word phantasia with the Arabic taḫayyul, a word that Averroes also very likely used in his Commentary – as the Hebrew translated it with dimyon and the verb of the same root – Hermann has chosen to translate it either with Latin words that have no technical meaning (videre, visio) or with the transliteration phantasia.

McNE ad Nicomachean Ethics 7.3.1147b3–5 The third passage comes from Book 7, chapter 3. Among the different reasons given by Aristotle to identify the cause of incontinence and to demonstrate its relationship to knowledge, there is an explanation that states that one becomes incontinent under the influence of a rule and an opinion: NEgr: It also follows that this is the reason why the lower animals are not incontinent, because they have no universal judgement (katholou hupolêpsis) but only imagination (phantasia) and memory (mnêmê) of particulars. (EN 7.3.1147b3–5)36 NEar: Hence animals are not lacking in self-restraint, since they do not have universal thought but fantasia of the particulars (fanṭāsīyāt alğuzʼīyāt), and they have a certain memory.37 McNE: Aristotle said. And the reason why there is incontinence when desire is contrary to universal opinion, is that we do not say that animals are incontinent, since they do not have any universal apprehension, but they have a particular apprehension, and it is phantasia and memory.38

The Hebrew translation reads as follows: Aristotle said. And because it is not continence when desire is contrary to universal opinion, we do not say of wild animals that they do not have continence, since they do not have any universal apprehension, but they have a particular apprehension, and it is imagination (dimyon) and memories.39

The example that Aristotle introduced at the beginning of the fourth development he devotes to the problem of the cause of incontinence is based on

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a psychological approach. According to it, the universal premise is an opinion that is wrong and contradicts reason, the particular premise is a perception and the conclusion is the production of an action. Averroes begins here by recalling what has been said in the Scientia Naturalis: the apprehension of reason is universal, and the apprehension of phantasia is particular and deals with particulars. He then concludes that incontinence follows the rigorous conclusion of a practical syllogism whose universal premise is true. The presence of a universal thought or judgement is thus required for incontinence. This fact implies that animals cannot be said to be incontinent. According to the three versions of the text – the original Greek, the Arabic translation of Aristotle and the Commentary by Averroes, both in Latin and Hebrew – phantasia is here conceived as something that is closer to perception, like memory, and that deals with particulars, not universals.

McNE ad Nicomachean Ethics 7.6.1149a32–34 In the fourth passage, Aristotle examines the question whether incontinence in respect of anger is less disgraceful than that in respect of the appetites. Aristotle describes how anger functions: NEgr: For argument (logos) or imagination (phantasia) informs (edêlôsen) us that we have been insulted or slighted, and anger, reasoning as it were that anything like this must be fought against, boils up straightway. (EN 7.6.1149a32–34)40 NEar: For reason and fantasia (al-fikra wa-al-fanṭāsīyā) have shown that there has been a calumny or a slight, then anger, as if it has concluded that it must make war on anyone of this kind, becomes difficult at once.41 McNE: For reason and phantasia both make known the power of anger.42

The Hebrew version suggests the same text and the translation of fanṭāsīyā with the word dimyon: For reason and imagination (dimyon) make both known.43

According to Averroes’s Commentary, which stays close to the Arabic translation of Aristotle, phantasia does not necessarily imply a rational element. Anger is triggered by an argument or an appearance, which seems to take the role of a perception. According to the doctrine of the De sensu et

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sensato (which Averroes has commented on), the word intellectus here refers to the cognitive part of the soul. From what Marc Geoffroy indicated to me, this passage has been read by Averroes in reference to the theory of reason, imagination (taḫayyul), cognition (fikr) and memory (ḏikr), all of which located in the lobes of the brain, in opposition to the intellect (‘aql), which is a faculty that is not located in the body. Memory and imagination are both involved in anger because they are somehow linked to the body, insofar as they are located in the pneuma circulating in the cervical lobes, which are parts of the body, whereas the intellect, being an incorporeal faculty, even if it uses cognition, imagination and memory in the operation of dianoetical reason, cannot be affected in a corporeal way when exercising its proper function, namely, to conceive theoretical or practical things apart from corporeal affections.

McNE ad Nicomachean Ethics 7.7.1150b19–28 The same distribution between logos and phantasia takes place in the next passage, which deals with incontinence. Among the different forms that intemperance can take, Aristotle distinguishes impetuosity and weakness. The people who suffer from the impetuous form of intemperance suffer from a lack of deliberation and are led by their emotions only. They do not await argument: NEgr: It is keen and excitable people that suffer especially from the impetuous form of incontinence; for the former by reason of their quickness and the latter by reason of the violence of their passions do not await argument, because they are apt to follow their imagination (phantasia). (EN 7.7.1150b25–28)44 NEar: It is the hasty and excitable who are lacking in restraint with unrestrained impetuosity, for some of them owing to quickness and others owing to vehemence do not wait for reason, because they follow their fantasia (al-fantāsīyā).45 McNE: Aristotle said. And those who are not continent with foresight are those where black bile dominates. For they do not follow reason: some of them, because of the quickness they have, some others, because of pleasure, I mean that they do not obey what reason orders and follow their phantasia.46

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The Hebrew version is, here as well, very close to the Latin: Aristotle said. And those who are not continent with victory are those where black bile dominates. For they do not follow reason: some of them, because of the quickness they have, some others, because of the abundance of pleasure, I mean that they do not obey what reason orders and follow their imagination (dimyon).47

Again, in these three versions, phantasia plays the role of the uncontrolled passions when reason is absent.

Another final passage on phantasia in Averroes’s Commentary There is another passage where Averroes mentions phantasia, although the term is not explicitly used here by Aristotle. As it is an excerpt from Book 6 of the Nicomachean Ethics, it will not be possible to compare the Greek and the Arabic versions of Aristotle’s text, and I will confine myself to giving an English translation for the (often quite controversial) passage in Book 6.8.1142a23–30, devoted to phronêsis. NEgr: That phronêsis is not science is evident; for it is, as has been said, concerned with the ultimate particular thing (to eschatos), since what has to be done (to prakton) is of this nature. It is opposed, then, to intellect (nous); for intellect is concerned with definitions (horoi), for which no reason can be given, while phronêsis is concerned with the ultimate particular (eschatos), which is the object not of science (epistêmê) but of perception (aisthêsis) – not the perception of the particular (ta idia) but a perception akin to that by which we perceive that the particular figure before us is a triangle; for in that direction as well we will have to stop. But this (sc. mathematical perception) is rather perception than phronêsis, and it is specifically different from phronêsis.48 McNE: Aristotle said. And prudence is not a science, because prudence is the apprehension of a thing that has been done, and the thing that has been done is opposed, from its place, to the intellect. For the intellect does not apprehend particular things that can be done, whereas prudence is the apprehension of sensible things. And I do not mean by sensible that which the senses perceive, but I rather mean by this the power that perceives that the simplest figure is the figure with three angles, and it is the power of phantasia. But the power of phantasia that makes us see what can be done is closer to the sense than the power of phantasia which is in the theory.49

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The Hebrew version reads as follows: Aristotle said. Prudence is not knowledge, because prudence is the apprehension of a thing that has been done, and the thing that has been done is opposed by convention to the intellect. For the intellect does not apprehend particular things that are done, whereas prudence is the apprehension of sensible things. And I do not mean by sensible that which the senses perceive, but I rather mean by this the faculty that perceives that the simplest figure is the figure with three angles, and it is the imaginative (ha-medummeh) faculty. But the imaginative (ha-medummeh) faculty that sees what is done is closer to the sense than the imaginative (hamedummeh) faculty that is in mathematics.50

This passage aims at defining phronêsis as a direct apprehension of particular, practical objects. In so far as it is concerned with the ultimate particular thing, phronêsis is similar to perception and opposed to science. It differs from perception, though, as it is not the perception of particular sensibles – which are known by the corresponding particular senses (sight, hearing etc.) – but of common sensibles,51 such as movement, rest, form, number and those which are perceived by a common sense, which is ‘a kind of elementary discursion of intellectual nature, and is contemporary to any representation and as such superior to sensation, which is the starting point of experience’, and whose ‘function consists, in sum, in creating the unity of conscience’.52 As phronêsis is not concerned with particular sensibles, it is concerned with common sensibles, and it is analogous to the mathematical perception through which one can perceive, for instance, that a particular figure is a triangle. But phronêsis is also different from mathematical apprehension, in so far as it is an intellectual perception, which is not concerned with sensible things. Averroes adds in this context a development where he explicitly connects the perception of common sensibles to the power of phantasia and concludes that the phantasia which is phronêsis is closer to perception than to theoretical phantasia, which would be, in this context, the phantasia linked to mathematical perceptions (as corroborated in the Hebrew). Led by the analogy between phronêsis and mathematical perception suggested by Aristotle, Averroes develops this idea by arguing that the perception of common sensibles that occurs both in phronêsis and in

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mathematical perception involves a certain kind of phantasia – although it is not the same in both cases. The idea that the perception of common sensibles involves a certain kind of phantasia is genuinely Aristotelian and can be explicitly found in at least two treatises of the Stagirite. In On Memory 1.450a11–12, Aristotle says that ‘representation (to phantasma) is a phenomenon of common perception’. But Averroes did not draw this idea from On Memory: not only does his Commentary on the Parva Naturalia not show this phrasing or even a gloss of this passage,53 but the text he relied on is more an adaptation of Aristotle’s text than a translation of it into Arabic54; and in the De anima – a treatise that Averroes commented on in a Short, a Middle and a Great Commentary –55 where phantasia is defined as a ‘movement resulting from an actual exercise of a power of perception’ (DA 3.3.429a1–2), this perception is introduced as something that can relate to ‘the common sensibles which accompany the concomitant objects to which particular sensibles attach (I mean for instance of movement and magnitude)’(DA 3.3.428b22–24). If we confine ourselves to the limits of the Nicomachean Ethics, Averroes does not say much more about the kind of phantasia that is involved in the exercise of phronêsis than that it is phantasia involved with the perception of common sensibles, and that it is closer to the senses than to the mathematical perception that is analogous to it.

Conclusion Observation of the passage in 6.5 that was originally under discussion did not allow us to examine more precisely the role of phantasia in the apprehension of the archai of the thing that has to be done: indeed Averroes, who likely followed the Arabic translation of the Ethics here (although the Arabic translation of Book 6 is not extant), did not identify any technical use of the concept of phantasia. The other passages in the Nicomachean Ethics where such a technical use of phantasia seems to have been identified by Averroes lead us to conclude that Averroes usually stays close to Aristotle’s text in its Arabic translation and does not do more than smooth out the Arabic version of the text by

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rewriting or simplifying it without adding any further development. There is only one exception: in Nicomachean Ethics 6.8, Averroes invokes the notion of phantasia, whereas it is not explicitly mentioned by Aristotle in the text of the Nicomachean Ethics, and he does that in accordance with the doctrine expressed in the De anima that we also find in the Greek text of On Memory. More generally, the examination of the passages quoted in this presentation leads to the following conclusions: 1. The Greek notion of phantasia has been translated in Arabic either by taḫayyul (Books 1 and 3) or by fanṭasīā (Book 7), reflecting the analysis of Schmidt and Ullmann, who demonstrated that the Nicomachean Ethics had been translated into Arabic by two different translators56 – Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunayn (second part of the ninth century) who translated Books 1–4 and Eustathius, who translated Books 5–10 at the request of al-Kindī (died c. ad 866). 2. Although the Greek phantasia has been translated into Arabic in two different ways, it seems that Averroes recognized the same concept under the two words taḫayyul and fanṭāsīyā. For both words have been translated in the Hebrew version with dimyon, which reflects the use of the word taḫayyul in the Arabic version of Averroes’s Commentary. As I have demonstrated elsewhere, the Latin translation by Hermann does not reflect the use of the Arabic concepts in the McNE, because Hermann sometimes follows a stylistic rule of variatio in his translations, which leads him to translate the same Arabic term by different terms in Latin.57 3. The analysis of the passages of the McNE has shown that Averroes did not devote a specific passage to the role played by phantasia in an ethical context. Only the additional passage (McNE ad 6.8.1142a23–30) points towards different kinds of phantasiai (one, which is phronêsis and is closer to the senses; another, which is less close to the senses and belongs to a mathematical context). This last comment recalls the need to consider the entire framework of Averroes’s philosophy by analysing the specific context of the faculties of the composed soul in the Arabic tradition. Understanding of the role of phantasia is determined by the doctrine of the faculties of the soul.

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Notes 1

Al-Aḫlāq taʼlīf Ariṣtūṭālīs, tarğamat Isḥāq Ibn Ḥunayn, ḥaqqaqū wa-šaraḥahū wa-qaddama lahū ad-duktūr ʽabd-al-RạÌmaān Badawī (al-Kuwait: Wakālat alMaṭbūʻāt, 1979).

2

Anna A. Akasoy and Alexander Fidora (eds), The Arabic Version of the

3

Manfred Ullmann, Die Nikomachische Ethik des Aristoteles in arabischer

Nicomachean Ethics (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2005). Übersetzung, Teil 1. Wortschatz, Teil 2. Überlieferung, Textkritik, Grammatik (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2011 and 2012). 4

Ernst A. Schmidt and Manfred Ullmann, Aristoteles in Fes: Zum Wert der arabischen Überlieferung der Nikomachischen Ethik für die Kritik des griechischen Textes (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter, 2012).

5

Muḥammad Ibn al-Nadīm, Kitāb al-Fihrist, vol. I, ed. Gustaf Flügel (Leipzig: F. C. W. Vogel, 1871), 252.2ff; it is customary to refer also to the edition by Tağaddud: Kitāb al-Fihrist, ed. Rida Tağaddud, Tehran, 1971, 312.18ff.

6

See for example Mauro Zonta, ‘Les Éthiques: Tradition arabe’, in Dictionnaire des philosophes antiques: Supplément, ed. Richard Goulet (Paris: CNRS, 2003), 191; or Anna Akasoy, ‘The Arabic and Islamic Reception of the Nicomachean Ethics’, in The Reception of Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. Jon Miller (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 89ff.

7

Long before Ullmann, Dorothy G. Axelroth had demonstrated that Book 10 of the Arabic version of the Nicomachean Ethics could not be attributed to Iṣhāq Ibn Ḥunayn, in Dorothy G. Axelroth, An Analysis of the Arabic Translation of Book Ten of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, PhD Dissertation (Philadelphia, PA: The Dropsie College, 1968).

8

On the reception of the Nicomachean Ethics in the Islamic tradition, see the introduction of Douglas M. Dunlop, in Akasoy and Fidora (eds), The Arabic Version of the Nicomachean Ethics (as note 2), 1–109; René A. Gauthier and Jean Y. Jolif, Aristote: L’Éthique à Nicomaque (Louvain-la-Neuve: Éditions Peeters, 2002); Zonta, ‘Les Éthiques: Tradition arabe’ (as note 6); Akasoy, ‘The Arabic and Islamic Reception of the Nicomachean Ethics’ (as note 6); Josh Hayes, ‘The Arabic Reception of the Nicomachean Ethics’, in Aristotle and the Arabic Tradition, ed. Achmed Almishah and Josh Hayes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 200–13.

9

Cf. Akasoy, ‘The Arabic and Islamic Reception of the Nicomachean Ethics’ (as note 6), 103.

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10 See Chaim Neria, ‘Al-Fārābīʼs Lost Commentary on the Ethics: New Textual Evidence’, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 23 (2013): 69–99. An excerpt of this Commentary can be found in a Latin translation, in the Ms. Saint-Omer, BM 0623: see Dominique Salman, ‘The Mediaeval Latin Translations of Alfarabi’s Works’, The New Scholasticism 13 (1939): 250; Frédérique Woerther, Le plaisir, le bonheur, et l’acquisition des vertus: Edition du livre X du Commentaire moyen à l’Ethique à Nicomaque d’Averroès, accompagnée d’une traduction française annotée, et précédée de deux études sur le Commentaire moyen à l’Ethique à Nicomaque d’Averroès, Islamic Philosophy, Theology and Science (Leiden: Brill, 2018). 11 See McNE, explicit: Et ego quidem explevi determinationem istorum tractatuum quarto die Iovis mensis qui Arabice dicitur Ducadatin, anno Arabum quinquagesimo septuagesimo secundo. Et grates Deo multe de hoc (As for me, I have completed the commentary on these treatises on the fourth Thursday [lit. Day of Jupiter] of the month that is called Ducadatin [ḏū al-qaʽda] in Arabic, in the year 572. Many thanks to God for this!) = McNEheb, Averroes, Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics in the Hebrew Version of Samuel ben Judah, ed. Lawrence V. Berman (Jerusalem: Israel Academy of Science and Humanities, 1999), 355. Op.cit., 742–44, Berman writes: ‘Ibn Rushd completed his Middle Commentary on the Ethics eight hundred years ago on Thursday of the fourth week of Dhu’l-Qaādah, 572 AH e.c. which corresponds to May 26, 1177’ and id., ‘Ibn Rushd’s Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics in Medieval Hebrew Literature’, in Multiple Averroès, ed. Jean Jolivet (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1978), 291: ‘The precise date is based on the text of the Hebrew translation; the Latin translation is corrupt.’ 12 See Lawrence V. Berman, ‘Excerpts from the Lost Arabic Original of Ibn Rushd’s Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics’, Oriens 20 (1967): 31–59; Frédérique Woerther, ‘Les fragments arabes du Commentaire moyen à l’Éthique à Nicomaque d’Averroès’ (forthcoming). 13 Cf. McNE, explicit: Dixit translator. Et ego complevi translationem ejus ex Arabico in Latinum tertio die Jovis mensis Junii, anno ab Incarnatione Domini mccxl apud Vrbem Toletanam in capella Sancte Trinitatis, unde sit benedictum nomen Domini, qui est trinus et unus. ‘The translator said. I completed the translation from Arabic into Latin on the third Thursday [lit. Day of Jupiter] of the month of June, in the year of the incarnation of our Lord 1260, in Toledo, in the chapel of the Holy Trinity, where the name of our Lord, who is one and three, has been blessed.’ 14 See Lawrence V. Berman, ‘Revised Hebrew Translation of Averroes’ Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics’, Seventy-Fifth Anniversary Volume of

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the Jewish Quarterly Review 57 (1967): 104–20; id., ‘Greek into Hebrew: Samuel ben Judah of Marseilles, Fourteenth-Century Philosopher and Translator’, in Jewish Medieval and Renaissance Studies, ed. Alexander Altmann (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967): 292, n. 23; id., ‘Ibn Rushd’s Middle Commentary’ (as note 11), 293. 15 Berman, Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (as note 11). 16 See the preliminary study by Jerzy B. Korolec, ‘Mittlerer Kommentar von Averroes zur Nikomachischen Ethik des Aristoteles’, Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum 31 (1992): 61–118. 17 Dimitri Gutas, ‘Aspects of Literary Form and Genre in Arabic Logical Works’, in Glosses and Commentaries on Aristotelian Logical Texts: The Syriac, Arabic and Medieval Latin Traditions, ed. Charles Burnett (London: Warburg Institute, 1993), 38–43. 18 Maroun Aouad and Frédérique Woerther, ‘Le Commentaire par Averroès du chapitre 9 du livre X de l’Éthique à Nicomaque: pédagogie de la contrainte, habitudes et lois’, Mélanges de l’Université Saint-Joseph 62 (2009): 353–80; Frédérique Woerther, ‘Le Commentaire moyen à l’Éthique à Nicomaque d’Aristote par Averroès: méthode exégétique et valeur philosophique’, in Averroes: From Cordoba to Cologne, ed. David Wirmer (Berlin and New York: De Gruyter, unpublished). Steven Harvey and Frédérique Woerther, ‘Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics’, Oriens 42 (2014): 254–87. 19 A complete version of this study will be presented in the introduction to my forthcoming book devoted to the edition, translation and commentary of Averroes’s Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, Book 10 (as note 10). 20 See Aouad and Woerther, ‘Le Commentaire moyen à l’Éthique à Nicomaque’ (as note 18). 21 Arist., EN 8.1.1155b8. Cf. the Arabic Nicomachean Ethics (= NEar), The Arabic Version of the Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Akasoy and Fidora (as note 2), 429.2 and the Hebrew, Averroes, Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics in the Hebrew Version of Samuel Ben Judah (as note 11), 255.37–8. See further, Frédérique Woerther, ‘Le statut scientifique de l’éthique d’après le Commentaire moyen d’Averroès à l’Éthique à Nicomaque d’Aristote’, Oriens (forthcoming). 22 On the phronêsis / taḫayyul, see Steven Harvey, ‘Alfarabi, Averroes, and the Medieval Islamic Understanding of Phrónesis’, in Phronesis – Die Tugend der Geisteswissenschaften? ed. Gyburg Radke-Uhlmann (Heidelberg: Universitätsverlag Winter, 2012), 177–94.

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23 Ἔνθεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην τούτῳ προσαγορεύομεν τῷ ὀνόματι, ὡς σῴζουσαν τὴν φρόνησιν. Σῴζει δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ὑπόληψιν. Οὐ γὰρ ἅπασαν ὑπόληψιν διαφθείρει οὐδὲ διαστρέφει τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷον ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὰς περὶ τὸ πρακτόν. Αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα τὰ πρακτά· τῷ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ δι᾽ ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην εὐθὺς οὐ φαίνεται ἀρχή, οὐδὲ δεῖν τούτου ἕνεκεν οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦθ᾽ αἱρεῖσθαι πάντα καὶ πράττειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ ἀρχῆς. Ὥστ’ ἀνάγκη τὴν φρόνησιν ἕξιν εἶναι μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικήν. 24 See Korolec, ‘Mittlerer Kommentar’ (as note 16); Frédérique Woerther, ‘Les translittérations dans la version latine du Commentaire moyen à l’Éthique à Nicomaque d’Averroès’, Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale 56 (2014): 61–89; Frédérique Woerther, ‘Les noms propres dans le Commentaire moyen à l’Éthique à Nicomaque d’Averroès: Contribution à une étude sur les traductions latine et hébraïque du Commentaire’, Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale 59 (2017): (forthcoming). 25 Hebrew, p. 209. 134–210.146 Berman. I wish to thank Steven Harvey for his help with the Hebraic version of Averroes’s Commentary. 26 Dixit. Ideo nomen casti [castitatis (Ar. ‘iffa, Heb. yir’at ḥeṭ) correxi: casti O, T, 1483, 1562.] in Graeco derivatum est a nomine prudentie [prudentie O, T: prudentis 1483, 1562]. Prudens enim est qui custodit opinionem suam ne corrumpant eam maeror aut gaudium, intendo dilectionem et concupiscentiam, sicut custodit castus [castus O, T, 1562: castum 1483] actionem suam ne corrumpat eam delectatio vel voluptas. Et est quidem sic eo quod non omnis opinio corrumpitur a voluptate et tristitia. Corruptio namque credulitatis quod tres anguli trianguli sunt aequales duobus rectis non fit ex parte voluptatis et tristitiae, sed ex parte corruptionis principiorum que necessariam faciunt corruptionem credulitatis tantum. Opinio autem prudentialis corrumpitur quidem ex istis duobus, intendo ex parte corruptionis principiorum et gratia delectationis et tristitiae. Et corruptio ejus que fit ex parte delectationis et tristitiae statim apparet, intendo quod magis apparet quam corruptio que fit ex parte propositionum. Cumque opinionem prudentialem certam non comitetur corruptio ex parte concupiscentiae, tunc de necessitate prudens non eliget res ambas simul, intendo ad inventionem boni et mali simul, eo quod inventio mali est a [a om. 1483, 1562] principio corruptio ex parte concupiscentiae et distinguuntur etiam, eo quod inventio mali est ab habitu malitioso. Et cum sic sit, tunc prudentia secundum veritatem est habitus effectivus cum ratione veridica bonorum humanorum.

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‫‪27 I thank Steven Harvey for his helps with translating the medieval Hebrew‬‬ ‫‪translation of Averroes’s Commentary. This passage is found in McNEheb, ed.‬‬ ‫‪Berman (as note 11), 209–10:‬‬ ‫אמר‪ :‬ומפני זה יקרא היראת חטא בלשון היונים בשם הנגזר משם ההשכל‪ .‬וזה כי בעל ההשכל‬ ‫הוא ישמור סברתו מאשר יפסידה האבל והשמחה‪ ,‬רצוני הרצון והתאוה‪ ,‬כמו שישמור הירא חטא‬ ‫פעולתו משיפסידה התענוג‪ .‬ואמנם היה הענין כן לפי שאין כל סברא נפסדת מפני התענוג והצער‪.‬‬ ‫כי הפסד האמנה שהמשולש זויותיו השלש שוות לשתי ניצבות לא יהיה מפני התענוג והצער‪ ,‬אבל‬ ‫מפני הפסד ההתחלות אשר יחייבו הפסד זאת ההאמנה לבד‪ .‬ואולם הסברא ההשכלית הנה תפסד אם‬ ‫כן משני אלו‪ ,‬רצוני מפני הפסד ההתחלות ומפני התענוג והצער‪ .‬והפסדה אשר יהיה מפני התענוג‬ ‫והצער יראה לשעתו‪ ,‬רצוני שהוא יותר נראה מההפסד אשר יהיה מההקדמות‪ .‬וכשהיתה הסברא‬ ‫ההשכלית האמתית היא אשר לא ישיגה הפסד מפני הרצון הנה אם כן בהכרח שיהיה בעל ההשכל‬ ‫לא יבחר שני העניינים יחד‪ ,‬ר“ל הוצאה מלב הרע והטוב‪ ,‬לפי שהוצאה מלב הרע הוא מהתחלה‬ ‫נפסדת מפני התאוה ויתפרדו גם כן מפני שהוצאה מלב רע הוא מתכונת רבוי התאוה‪ .‬ובהיות זה כן‬ ‫הנה ההשכל האמתי הוא תכונה פועלת עם דבור צודק לטובות האנושיות‪.‬‬ ‫‪28 πλὴν εἰ μὴ κατὰ μικρὸν καὶ διικνοῦνταί τινες τῶν κινήσεων, καὶ ταύτῃ βελτίω‬‬ ‫‪γίνεται τὰ φαντάσματα τῶν ἐπιεικῶν ἢ τῶν τυχόντων.‬‬ ‫‪29 NEar, ed. Akasoy and Fidora (as note 2), 151:‬‬ ‫ﻭﺑﺎﻟﻮﺍﺟﺐ ﻳﻠﺰﻡ ﻫﺬﺍ ّ‬ ‫ﻵﻥ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻡ ﺇﻧّﻤﺎ ﻫﻮ ﺑﻄﺎﻟﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻨﻔﺲ ﺍﻟﺘﻲ ﻳﻘﺎﻝ ﻓﻴﻬﺎ ﺇﻧّﻬﺎ ﻓﺎﺿﻠﺔ ﻭﺧﺴﻴﺴﺔ ﺍﻟﻠﻬﻢ ّﺇﻻ ﺃﻥ‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ً‬ ‫ﻳﻜﻮﻥ ﺑﻌﺾ ﺣﺮﻛﺎﺗﻬﺎ ﺗﻨﻔﺬ ﻓﻲ ﺍﻟﺒﺪﻥ ﻓﻲ ﻭﻗﺖ ﺍﻟﻨﻮﻡ ﻗﻠﻴﻼ ﻗﻠﻴﻼ ﻓﻴﻜﻮﻥ ﺑﻬﺎ ﺗﺨﻴّﻞ ﺍﻟﺨﻴﺎﺭ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﺱ ﺃﻓﻀﻞ ﻣﻦ‬ ‫ﺗﺨﻴّﻞ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﺍﺭ‪.‬‬ ‫‪30 Et hoc rectum est propterea quod somnus est otium animae illius de qua dicitur‬‬ ‫‪quod ipsa est virtuosa aut vitiosa, nisi sint quidam motuum ejus pertranseuntes‬‬ ‫‪in corpore paulatim ad vim rationale [rationalem O, T: rationalem in alio‬‬ ‫‪vel rememorationem partis nutritive anime O (in margine), rationalem vel‬‬ ‫‪rememorationem partis nutritive anime 1483, 1562] et fiant propter hoc‬‬ ‫‪fantasmata bonorum hora somni meliora fantasmatibus malorum.‬‬ ‫‪31 McNEheb, ed. Berman (as note 11), 88:‬‬ ‫ובראוי התחיב זה לפי שהשינה אמנם היא בטול מהנפש אשר יאמר בה שהיא מעולה או פחותה אלא‬ ‫אם יהיו קצת תנועותיה נקשרים בגוף בעת השינה מעט לכח המדבר ויהיה בגלל זה דמיון הטובים‬ ‫בעת השינה יותר מעולה מדמיון הרעים‪.‬‬ ‫‪32 εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι πάντες ἐφίενται τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ‬‬ ‫‪κύριοι, ἀλλ’ ὁποῖός ποθ’ ἕκαστός ἐστι, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ· εἰ μὲν‬‬ ‫‪οὖν ἕκαστος ἑαυτῷ τῆς ἕξεώς ἐστί πως αἴτιος, καὶ τῆς φαντασίας ἔσται πως αὐτὸς‬‬ ‫‪αἴτιος· εἰ δὲ μή, οὐθεὶς αὑτῷ αἴτιος τοῦ κακοποιεῖν, ἀλλὰ δι’ ἄγνοιαν τοῦ τέλους‬‬

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Phantasia in Aristotle’s Ethics ταῦτα πράττει, διὰ τούτων οἰόμενος αὑτῷ τὸ ἄριστον ἔσεσθαι, ἡ δὲ τοῦ τέλους ἔφεσις οὐκ αὐθαίρετος, ἀλλὰ φῦναι δεῖ ὥσπερ ὄψιν ἔχοντα, ᾗ κρινεῖ καλῶς καὶ τὸ κατ’ ἀλήθειαν ἀγαθὸν αἱρήσεται, καὶ ἔστιν εὐφυὴς ᾧ τοῦτο καλῶς πέφυκεν.

33 NEar, ed. Akasoy and Fidora (as note 2), 211: ّ ‫ﻓﺈﻥ ﻗﺎﻝ ﻗﺎﺋﻞ‬ ‫ﺇﻥ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﺱ ﻛﻠّﻬﻢ ﻳﺘﻮﻗﻮﻥ ﺇﻟﻰ ﻣﺎ ﻳﺘﺨﻴّﻞ ﻟﻬﻢ ﺃﻧّﻪ ﺧﻴﺮ ﻓﺄ ّﻣﺎ ﺍﻟﺘﺨﻴّﻞ ﻓﻠﻴﺲ ﻫﻮ ﺇﻟﻴﻬﻢ ﻟﻜﻦ ﻛ ّﻞ ﻭﺍﺣﺪ ﻣﻨﻬﻢ‬ ً ‫ﻳﺘﺨﻴّﻞ ﻟﻪ ﺍﻟﻐﺎﻳﺔ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺣﺴﺐ ﺣﺎﻟﻪ ﻓﺈﻥ ﻛﺎﻥ ﻛ ّﻞ ﻭﺍﺣﺪ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﺱ ﻫﻮ ﺑﺠﻬﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺠﻬﺎﺕ ﺳﺒﺒﺎ ً ﻟﺤﺎﻟﻪ ﻓﻬﻮ ﺃﻳﻀﺎ‬ ‫ﻳﻜﻮﻥ ﺑﺠﻬﺔ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﺠﻬﺎﺕ ﺳﺒﺒﺎ ً ﻟﺘﺨﻴّﻠﻪ ﻭﺇﻥ ﻟﻢ ﻳﻜﻦ ﺃﺣﺪ ﻣﻦ ﺍﻟﻨﺎﺱ ﺳﺒﺒﺎ ً ﻟﻔﻌﻞ ﺍﻟﺸﺮﻭﺭ ﻟﻜﻨّﻪ ﺇﻧّﻤﺎ ﻳﻔﻌﻠﻪ ﻟﺠﻬﻠﻪ ﺑﺎﻟﻐﺎﻳﺔ‬ ّ ‫ﻳﻈﻦ‬ ّ ‫ﺃﻥ ﺍﻷﻣﺮ ﺍﻷﻓﻀﻞ ﻓﻲ ﺫﻟﻚ ﻛﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﺘﻮﻗﺎﻥ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﻟﻐﺎﻳﺔ ﻟﻴﺲ ﻫﻮ ﺑﺈﺭﺍﺩﺓ ﻟﻜﻨّﻪ ﻳﺤﺘﺎﺝ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺃﻥ ﻳﻜﻮﻥ ﻟﻪ‬ ‫ﻭﻟﺬﻟﻚ‬ .‫ﺑﺎﻟﻄﺒﻊ ﻣﺜﻞ ﻣﺎ ﻟﻪ ﺍﻟﺒﺼﺮ ﺍﻟﺬﻱ ﺑﻪ ﻳﻤﻴّﺰ ﺗﻤﻴﻴﺰﺍ ً ﺟﻴّﺪﺍ ً ﻓﻘﺪ ﻳﺨﺘﺎﺭ ﺍﻟﺨﻴﺮ ﺍﻟﺤﻘﻴﻘﻲ‬ 34 Si autem dixerit quis quoniam omnes homines desiderant illud de quo eis videtur quod sit bonum, sed visio non est in posse eorum. At vero unicuique eorum talis finis videtur qualis dispositionis ipse fuerit, et hoc est per necessitatem consequendi dispositiones suas. Si ergo fuerit unusquisque hominum per aliquem modorum causa dispositionis sui ipsius, et fuerit phantasia sua sequens sui dispositionem, erit etiam quodam modo causa fantasiae suae. 35 McNEheb, ed. Berman (as note 11), 126: ‫ואם אמר אומר שהאנשים כלם ישתוקקו אל מה שידומה להם שהוא טוב ואולם הנה הדמיון אינו‬ ‫ אבל אם היה כל‬.‫להם אבל כל אחד מהם ידומה לו התכלית כפי ענינו וזה בהכרח הנמשך לעניניהם‬ ‫אחד מן האנשים הוא בצד מהצדדין סבה לתואר נפשו והיה הדמיון נמשך לתוארו הנה הוא גם כן‬ .‫בצד מהצדדין סבה לדמיונו‬ 36 ὥστε καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὰ θηρία οὐκ ἀκρατῆ, ὅτι οὐκ ἔχει καθόλου ὑπόληψιν ἀλλὰ τῶν καθ’ ἕκαστα φαντασίαν καὶ μνήμην. 37 NEar, ed. Akasoy and Fidora (as note 2), 383: ّ ‫ﻣﻦ ﺃﺟﻞ ﻫﺬﺍ ﻟﻴﺲ ﻟﻠﺴﺒﺎﻉ ﻻ ﺿﺒﻂ ﻣﻦ ﺃﺟﻞ ﺃﻧّﻪ ﻟﻴﺲ ﻟﻬﺎ‬ .‫ﻅﻦ ﻛﻠّﻲ ﺑﻞ ﻟﻬﺎ ﻓﻨﻄﺎﺳﻴﺎﺕ ﺍﻟﺠﺰﺋﻴﺎﺕ ﻭﻟﻬﺎ ﺫﻛﺮ ﻣﺎ‬ 38 Dixit. Et propter hoc quod incontinentia fit quando concupiscentia contraria fuerit opinioni universali, non dicimus quod ferae habeant incontinentiam, cum non sit eis apprehensio universalis, et est quidem eis apprehensio particularis, et est phantasia et memoria. 39 McNEheb, ed. Berman (as note 11), 234: ‫אמר ומפני שלא לחיצה תהיה כשהיתה מתהפכת התאוה לסברה הכוללת לא נאמר בצבועים שהם אין‬ .‫לחיצה להם אחר שהיה אין להם השגה כוללת ואמנם להם השגה חלקיית והיא הדמיון והזכרונות‬

Averroes’s Middle Commentary

63

40 ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος ἢ ἡ φαντασία ὅτι ὕβρις ἢ ὀλιγωρία ἐδήλωσεν, ὃ δ’ ὥσπερ συλλογισάμενος ὅτι δεῖ τῷ τοιούτῳ πολεμεῖν χαλεπαίνει δὴ εὐθύς. 41 NEar, ed. Akasoy and Fidora (as note 2), 393: ّ ‫ﻓﺈﻥ ﺍﻟﻔﻜﺮﺓ ﻭﺍﻟﻔﻨﻄﺎﺳﻴﺎ ﻗﺪ ﺩﻟّﺖ ﻋﻠﻰ ﺃﻧّﻪ ﻗﺪ ﻛﺎﻧﺖ ﻓﺮﻳﺔ ﺃﻭ ﺿﺠﺮ ﺛ ّﻢ‬ ّ ‫ﺃﻥ ﺍﻟﻐﻀﺐ ﻛﺄﻧّﻪ ﻗﺪ ﺟﻤﻊ ﺟﺎﻣﻌﺔً ﺃﻧّﻪ ﻳﻨﺒﻐﻲ‬ .‫ﺃﻥ ﻳﺤﺎﺭﺏ ﻣﻦ ﻛﺎﻥ ﻋﻠﻰ ﻫﺬﻩ ﺍﻟﺤﺎﻝ ﻓﻴﺘﺼﻌّﺐ ﻣﻦ ﺳﺎﻋﺘﻪ‬ 42 Etenim intellectus et phantasia ambae scire faciunt vim irascibilem. 43 McNEheb, ed. Berman (as note 11), 240: ‫כי התבונה והדמיון כל שניהם ידעו‬ 44 μάλιστα δ’ οἱ ὀξεῖς καὶ μελαγχολικοὶ τὴν προπετῆ ἀκρασίαν εἰσὶν ἀκρατεῖς· οἳ μὲν γὰρ διὰ τὴν ταχυτῆτα οἳ δὲ διὰ τὴν σφοδρότητα οὐκ ἀναμένουσι τὸν λόγον, διὰ τὸ ἀκολουθητικοὶ εἶναι τῇ φαντασίᾳ. 45 NEar, ed. Akasoy and Fidora (as note 2), 399–401: ّ ‫ﻭﺍﻟﻤﺮﺓ ﺍﻟﺴﻮﺩﺍء‬ ‫ﻓﺈﻥ ﺑﻌﻀﻬﻢ ﻟﻤﻜﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﺴﺮﻋﺔ ﻭﺑﻌﻀﻬﻢ‬ ‫ﻭﺇﻧّﻤﺎ ﻳﻜﻮﻧﻮﻥ ﻻ ﺿﺎﺑﻄﻴﻦ ﺑﺈﻗﺪﺍﻡ ﻻ ﺿﺒﻂ ﺃﺻﺤﺎﺏ ﺍﻟﺤﺪّﺓ‬ ّ .‫ﻟﻤﻜﺎﻥ ﺍﻟﺸﺪّﺓ ﻻ ﻳﻨﺘﻈﺮﻭﻥ ﺍﻟﻨﻄﻖ ﻷﻧّﻬﻢ ﻳﻤﻴﻠﻮﻥ ﺇﻟﻰ ﺍﺗّﺒﺎﻉ ﺍﻟﻔﻨﻄﺎﺳﻴﺎ‬ 46 Dixit. Et illi qui sunt non continentes cum praevisione sunt quibus dominatur cholera nigra. Etenim quidam istorum propter velocitatem quae est in eis et quidam eorum propter voluptatem non sequuntur rationem, intendo non auscultant ad hoc quod mandat ratio et sequuntur phantasiam. 47 McNEheb, ed. Berman (as note 11), 246: ‫אמר ואשר הם לא לוחצים בהתגברות הנה הם בעלי המרה השחורה כי קצת אלו בגלל המהירות‬ ‫ רצוני לא יניחו למה שיצוה בו‬,‫אשר יהיה בם וקצתם בגלל ריבוי התאוה לא יהיו נקשרים לדבור‬ .‫הדבור ויקשרו לדמיון‬ 48 ὅτι δ’ ἡ φρόνησις οὐκ ἐπιστήμη, φανερόν· τοῦ γὰρ ἐσχάτου ἐστίν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται· τὸ γὰρ πρακτὸν τοιοῦτον. ἀντίκειται μὲν δὴ τῷ νῷ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὅρων, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος, ἣ δὲ τοῦ ἐσχάτου, οὗ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ’ αἴσθησις, οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀλλ’ οἵᾳ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι τὸ [ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς] ἔσχατον τρίγωνον· στήσεται γὰρ κἀκεῖ. ἀλλ’ αὕτη μᾶλλον αἴσθησις ἢ φρόνησις, ἐκείνης δ’ ἄλλο εἶδος. 49 Dixit. Neque prudentia est scientia, eo quod prudentia est apprehensio rei operatae et operatum oppositum est situ intellecto. Etenim intellectus non apprehendit res particulares operabiles, prudentia vero apprehensio quidem est rerum sensibilium. Et ego non intendo per sensibilia hoc quod apprehendunt sensus, immo volo equidem per illud potentiam illam quae sentit quod simplicius illud quod est in figuris est figura trium angulorum et est phantastica.

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Phantasia in Aristotle’s Ethics Attamen phantastica quae videre facit operabile propinquior est sensui quam phantastica quae est in doctrina.

50 McNEheb, ed. Berman (as note 11), 215: ‫ והנעשה מקביל בהנחה למושכל‬.‫אמר ואין ההשכל ידיעה מפני שההשכל הוא השגה לדבר הנעשה‬ ‫ ואולם ההשכל הנה הוא השגת הדברים המוחשים‬.‫כי השכל לא ישיג הדברים החלקיים הנעשים‬ ‫ולא ארצה במוחשים מה שישיגו החושים אבל אמנם ארצה בזה הכח אשר ירגיש שהיותר פשוטה‬ ‫ אבל המדומה אשר תראה הנעשה יותר‬.‫שבתמונות היא התמונה בעלת שלש זויות והיא המדומה‬ .‫קרובה אל החוש מהמדומה אשר בלמודיים‬ 51 Cf. Arist., DA 2.6.418a17–21 and 3.1.425a14–30. 52 Jules Tricot, Aristote: Éthique à Nicomaque (8th reprint; Paris: Vrin, 1994), 297, note 4: ‘sorte de discursion élémentaire à caractère plutôt intellectuel, contemporaine de toute représentation, supérieure comme telle à la sensation, et qui est le point de départ de l’organisation de l’expérience’… whose ‘fonction est en somme d’opérer l’unité de la conscience’. 53 Averroes, Epitome of Parva Naturalia, in Corpus Commentarium Averrois in Aristotelem: Versio Anglica, vol. 7, trans. Harry Blumberg (Cambridge, MA: Mediaeval Academy of America, 2012). 54 Cf. Rotraud Hansberger, The Transmission of Aristotle’s Parva Naturalia in Arabic, PhD Dissertation (University of Oxford, 2007). 55 Averroes, Commentarium magnum in Aristotelis De anima libros, ed. F. Stuart Crawford (Cambridge, MA: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953); Richard C. Taylor (trans.), Averroes: Long Commentary on the De anima of Aristotle (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 2009); Alfred Ivry (ed.), Averroes: Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s De Anima (Provo, UT: Brigham Young University Press, 2002); Averroes, Talḫīṣ kitāb al-nafs li-Abī al-Walīd Ibn Rušd wa-arbaʼ rasāʼil, ed. Aḥmad FuʼĀD al-Ahwāni (Cairo: No publisher given, 1950); Averroes, Epitome de anima, ed. Salvador Gómez Nogales (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, 1985); Averroes, La psicologia de Averroes: Comentario al libro sobre el alma de Aristóteles, ed. Salvador Gómez Nogales (Madrid: Universidad Nacional de Educacion a Distancia, 1987). 56 Schmidt and Ullmann, Aristoteles in Fes (as note 4). 57 Woerther, Le plaisir, le bonheur, et l’acquisition des vertus (as note 10).

T H E M E D I EVA L G R E E K T R A D I T IO N 4

Eustratius of Nicaea on Nicomachean Ethics 6.5.1140b17–18 Michele Trizio

Before presenting and discussing the Byzantine texts on Nicomachean Ethics 6.5.1140b17–18, I think it is important first to situate Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics within the broader Byzantine curriculum and briefly comment on the Byzantine authors discussed in this paper. The Byzantine schools’ institutional framework provides little evidence that the Byzantine schools of the various periods of time regularly and consistently taught Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. In this respect the Byzantine and the medieval Western traditions could not have been more different: Arts faculties found in the Latin West extensively taught Nicomachean Ethics1; and while each master was expected to incorporate the text within the curriculum, he was also encouraged, when possible, to compose a commentary on it. This explains, besides other things, the vast number of medieval Latin commentaries vis-à-vis the Byzantine ones. In contrast to all this, it is unclear whether the most important Byzantine commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics were actually connected with teaching purposes or whether they were rather the result of private scholarship written, for example, for courtiers. Although the Nicomachean Ethics was not entirely ignored in Byzantine schools, scholars who composed commentaries on Nicomachean Ethics to facilitate their teaching activity produced compendiary works that simplified – rather than elaborated and developed – Aristotle’s text. In other words, we are miles away from the Latin commentaries and quaestiones of Albert the Great and others who scrutinized and parsed details of the Nicomachean Ethics, often by unpacking rather than squeezing Aristotle’s text into their discussions or quaestiones.

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The most important commentaries on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics written in Byzantium are as follows2: 1. A compilation of Greek–Byzantine commentaries assembled around the end of the eleventh century to the beginning of the twelfth century that included ancient and Byzantine commentaries on Aristotle’s text. Apparently, the composition of this patchwork was sponsored by Princess Anna Komnene (1083–1153). In its different versions the compilation includes commentaries on Book 1 by the Byzantine scholar Eustratius of Nicaea (c. 1050–1120) and Aristotle’s ancient commentator Aspasius (first century AD); on Books 2–4 by an anonymous ancient commentator and Aspasius; on Book 5 by the anonymous ancient commentator and the Byzantine Michael of Ephesus (eleventh to twelfth century); on Book 6 by Eustratius of Nicaea; on Book 7 by an anonymous Byzantine commentator; on Book 8 by Aspasius; and on Books 9 and 10 by Michael of Ephesus.3 All these commentaries have been edited in the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca series. 2. Two commentaries by the late thirteenth-century polymath and scholar George Pachymeres. Pachymeres commented on the Nicomachean Ethics twice. The first commentary is a kind of epitomized paraphrase included as Book 11 in the miscellaneous work on the corpus aristotelicum known as Philosophia (edited in 2005 in the series Corpus philosophorum medii aevi, Philosophi Byzantini); his second commentary has never been edited and is a running commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics preserved in fragmentary form in three manuscripts: Marc. gr. 212 (ff. 1–44v), copied by the fifteenth-century Cardinal Bessarion; the sixteenth-century Escorial. T.I.18 (ff. 1–74v); and the sixteenth-century Vat. gr. 1429 (ff. 1–76v) copied by the prolific scribe Camillo Zanetti. The existence of this commentary has often been neglected because the manuscripts preserving this work have a misleading description of the contents.4 For example, Mioni’s catalogue of the Marciana library wrongly lists this commentary as if it were contained in the above-mentioned Philosophia.5 On the contrary, just as he did in the cases of his commentaries on Organon, Physics and Metaphysics, Pachymeres commented twice on the Nicomachean Ethics as well.6

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3. A paraphrase of the Nicomachean Ethics edited in the Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca series written by an otherwise unknown Heliodorus of Prusa and attributed in other manuscripts to Andronicus of Rhodes or Olympiodorus. None of these attributions are reliable. In fact this paraphrase closely follows, book after book, the above-mentioned Greek– Byzantine commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics. The only thing we know for sure on this text is that, according to the subscription found in several manuscripts preserving this work, it was copied in 1366, following a request of the ex-emperor John Kantakouzenos and that the first-known manuscript preserving this work has been copied by a scribe known for having worked on other occasions for Kantakouzenos.7 In a previous study, I suggested that this work possibly originated in the mid-fourteenth century.8 4. Prolegomena to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics by the fifteenth-century scholar and later Patriarch George Scholarius. These are preserved in three fifteenth-century manuscripts: Par. gr. 1417 (ff. 72–164), Barb. gr. 85 (ff. 1–186), Alex. 342 (ff. 1–206), the first two coming from the circle of Scholarius or copied by scribes known for having worked for him. Unfortunately, not all of these works are useful for studying the Byzantine reception of Nicomachean Ethics 6.5.1140b17–18. First, Book 11 of George Pachymeres’s Philosophia pretends to be an epitome of Aristotle’s text that includes some notes by Pachymeres himself, and he does not paraphrase – nor even mention – our passage (EN 6.5.1140b17–18). Moreover, Pachymeres’s commentary on Nicomachean Ethics also cannot be included among the Byzantine witnesses. In fact, I had access to manuscript Marc. gr. 212 (ff. 1–44v) and to manuscript Vat. gr. 1429 (1–76v), which depends upon the Marcianus, and, in both, Pachymeres’s commentary ends abruptly at the beginning of Book 6. As for the third manuscript preserving this work, Escorial. T.I.18 (ff. 1–74v), a colleague with access to a microfilm version of this codex told me that this manuscript also shows Pachymeres’s commentary ending at the beginning of Book 6. Secondly, Ps.-Heliodorus’s paraphrase only provides readers with a basic explanation of Nicomachean Ethics 6.5.1140b17–18 that is sympathetic to that of Eustratius of Nicaea (more on which later). Thirdly, Scholarius’s prolegomena must be ruled out as well. Having consulted two of the three manuscripts preserving this work (viz. Par. gr. 1417 [ff. 72–164], Barb. 85 [ff. 1–186], both

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available to me in digital reproduction), it seems that while these manuscripts preserve Scholarius’s notes on Nicomachean Ethics in margin to Aristotle’s text, Scholarius did not comment upon the text lemma after lemma, but rather summarized Aristotle’s text to make it easier to understand. In fact, neither of the manuscripts includes marginal notes to the portion of text we are investigating. A few lines later, the marginal notes reappear in a chapter on technê and another one on phronêsis, both of which simply elaborate the difference between technê and phronêsis with respect to the other truth attaining dispositions mentioned by Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics 6.2.1139b16–17, that is to say, intellect, science and sophia. Here, Scholarius seems to oversimplify explanations found in Eustratius of Nicaea’s commentary on Book 6 of the Nicomachean Ethics. This is confirmed by a recent study by Tiziano Dorandi on the proemium of Scholarius’s prolegomena which demonstrates the author’s dependence upon Eustratius’s commentary on Nicomachean Ethics 6.9 Therefore, we are left with only one useful Byzantine witness for approaching Nicomachean Ethics 6.5.1140b17–18: Eustratius of Nicaea. Eustratius does not seem to interpret Nicomachean Ethics 6.5.1140b17–18 as referring to phantasia, that is sense perception-based knowledge, but rather as referring to phronêsis and the psychological foundation of the Nicomachean Ethics: the rational and irrational parts of the soul. Moral agency only occurs when the rational part dominates the irrational; on the contrary, when passions and vices rule, the mechanism of deliberation does not function properly. As to Aristotle’s reference to the ‘principle’, Eustratius argues that the Philosopher here refers to the final cause. More importantly, the commentator understands this passage as relating to Nicomachean Ethics 6.12.1144a28–31, where Aristotle discusses phronêsis as a disposition evolving from deinotês, that is cleverness, here defined as ‘the eye of the soul’, with the aid of ethical virtues. Although a Platonic imagery (cf., for example, Symp. 219a and Rep. 518c), ‘the eye of the soul’ appears quite often in Eustratius’s commentary on Nicomachean Ethics 1 and 6, whereas Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics only mentions it once. The text runs as follows: Phronêsis is not the faculty, but it does not exist without this faculty. And this eye of the soul acquires its formed state not without the aid of excellence, as has been said and is plain (EN 6.12.1144a28–31; trans. Revised Oxford Translation. Slightly altered).10

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I will discuss Eustratius’s understanding of this text later. Let me now turn my attention to the commentator’s exegesis of Nicomachean Ethics 6.5.1140b17–18: Aristotle shows how, while dealing with pleasures and pains, temperance preserves phronêsis in the soul, and maintains that principles of the actions are the final causes. In fact when we consider these and set them earlier as the objects of our desires, in this way we attempt to act. He defines things to be done as the results accomplished by means of actions when each of these is performed in view of a particular goal, be it absolutely good or supposedly good (dokoun agathon). Therefore, in those men whose reason is subdued by a pleasure or pain, reason becomes corrupted, as if it were an eye of the soul blinded by a dominating passion, and is not capable of seeing the principle straightly, that is to say the final cause, but requires practice in order to recover from the passion and strive steadily for the good. Being subject to the passions prevents precisely from this, for this condition makes anyone lazy who is affected by it with regard to the quest for the good to such an extent that he also errs with respect to the desire, he strives for one thing instead of the other and fall into the worse state. The sentence nor that he ought to choose all things and to act for the sake of this and on account of that has to be understood while keeping in mind the words it will not appear to him. For anybody who is corrupted by a pleasure or pain with regard to his intellect the principle is not at all appearant, that is to say the final cause, nor that he ought to choose all things and to act for the sake of this and on account of that in order for us to achieve a scope which is authentically good. (Heylbut 1892, 311.29–312.25; my translation)11

According to Eustratius, during the process of deliberation passions obscure the final cause from reason (logos), which is here identified as the eye of the soul. Moreover, Eustratius refers again to the eye of the soul while commenting on Aristotle’s rather harsh judgement (EN 1.3.1095a6–11) that youth, because of their inexperience, cannot benefit from listening to the Nicomachean Ethics: In fact a young person is not really unfit to these discourses because of his age, but rather because he is dominated by passions; he is like someone who is oppressed by the burden of depravity with respect to his rationality, someone who looks to the ground and enjoys it, without being allowed to raise his head up; or he is like someone whose eye of the mind has been adumbrated by the passions as if they were a mass of clouds, and cannot see what is good. (Heylbut 1892, 26.11–17; my translation)12

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Elsewhere, Eustratius refers once more this metaphor (here in the plural) to the intellect and dianoia involved in moral agency: In politics as well there is a great engagement of the intelligible eyes of the soul, intellect and dianoia, in order, on the one hand, to escape confusion and blindness when they are obscured by the irrational faculties and, on the other, in order to avoid being oppressed by the heavy body with respect to the apprehension of the truth and the good. (Heylbut 1892, 110.28–31; my translation)13

It seems to me that Eustratius here introduces Platonic and Christian elements into an Aristotelian context. In fact, Neoplatonic literature often refers to the eye of the soul as the intellectual power in its purest state, which the shock of birth and the bond with the body render inactive or, like in this latter case, with the dianoia.14 Eventually, it would be fruitful investigating whether or not Eustratius here intends dianoia to mean thought in general or takes it as discursive reasoning specifically, so that the passage at hand describes the impossibility of concluding a practical syllogism. Yet Eustratius offers no insight on this. What is clear to me is that the commentator goes further than Aristotle, extending this imagery from deinotês evolving into phronêsis to reason (logos) – tout court. The Platonic root of this imagery is actually evident in another passage (Heylbut 1892, 279.18–31) where the commentator compares the desire for the good in the separate divine substances and in the human being. In short, Eustratius here claims that in the separate substances such desire is an immediate and direct one, whereas mankind need the whole process of deliberation involving choice and will. In this text the ‘eye of the soul’ seems to refer to the intellect as a whole in its state of ignorance due to the soul’s generation and embodiment. As for the Christian undertones of these texts, it is worth noticing that in the last two texts quoted here Eustratius borrows the expressions pachutêti têi empatheiai and tôi pachei tou sômatos from Gregory the Theologian to describe the body’s influence on reason.15 By contrast, in two other passages, Eustratius explains that the eye of the soul must be understood as the practical intellect specifically as that which grasps the principles in moral agency. In the first one (381.21–25), Eustratius comments on Nicomachean Ethics 6.11.1143b1–14, where Aristotle

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distinguishes the theoretical intellect from the practical one on the basis of their respective objects. The former grasps the first and unchanging principles; the latter grasps the last and contingent fact (the minor premise). Facts are the principles for our knowledge of the end. However, Aristotle here once more connects intuitive knowledge of practical matters with old age and experience. Accordingly, he maintains that one must follow the opinions of those who among old people are wiser and more experienced, ‘for because experience has given them an “eye” (omma) they see aright’ (EN 6.11.1143b13–14; trans. RevOT). Since here Aristotle does not equate this eye to deinotês or to phronêsis as evolving from deinotês, but rather in general to the capacity of older men to engage in particular situations in a morally correct manner, I believe that this text might have suggested to Eustratius the above-mentioned identification between the eye of the soul with the whole intellect, first, and with practical intellect, now. For instance, Eustratius claims: In fact by experience, that is to say by intense practice and acquaintance with particular circumstances, they acquired the eye in the soul, that is to say the intellect which has a clear sight of the principles, namely the premises which we infer from the many particular actions (and from these we look at the results). (Heylbut 381.21–25; my translation)16

Notably, in Nicomachean Ethics 6.11.1143b15 Aristotle writes that older and wiser men acquire this ‘eye’ through experience; that is, ‘they see aright’ (horôsin orthôs) or judge correctly. Since Aristotle himself here describes the older men’s skills in dealing with particular facts as an ‘eye’ and uses an ocular vocabulary, Eustratius identifies this ‘eye’ with the eye of the soul that Aristotle discusses in 6.12.1144a28–31. However, because the context of this passage distinguishes the theoretical and the practical intellect, Eustratius is now forced to qualify this image as referring to the practical intellect specifically and not the intellect or reason tout-cour. More importantly, this Eustratius passage further illuminates his comments on Nicomachean Ethics 6.5.1140b17–18, in which the text used by the commentator reads that the principle ‘will not appear (ou phaneitai) to him’ (future tense). This future tense, which almost pushes the text towards admonishment, seems to have had an impact on the Latin and Hebrew translations of the Nicomachean Ethics. Grosseteste’s Latin translation follows

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Eustratius (apparebit) and this might have led the Hebrew translator Alguades, who made a Hebrew translation of Grosseteste’s Latin translation, to his construction of the passage (see Chaim Neria’s Section ‘Pleasure, grief and the corruption of judgement’ with note 22 in Chapter 6). As we have seen before, Eustratius understood this phaneitai precisely in terms of seeing or discerning, where the vision here at hand stands metaphorically for the intellect’s grasping of the principles. In fact, in 311.36 Eustratius wrote that people who are corrupted by vice have a reason that ‘does not see the principle straightly’ (ouch horai tên archên euthus). Furthermore, the comment at 381.21–25 demonstrates that Eustratius understands both EN 6.5.1140b17–18 and 6.11.1143b1–14 as Aristotle’s reference to the clear vision of the principle (which, in his view, is the end or goal) and to having good sight in particular circumstances as a metaphor for the practical intellect grasping the principles. The only difference between the two passages is that in 311.29–312.25 (and elsewhere) Eustratius identifies the eye of the soul with reason and rationality as such, whereas in 381.21–25 it is identified with the practical intellect. In the second passage (393.22–27), Eustratius continues discussing this Aristotelian eye of the soul (EN 6.12.1144a28–31) as being involved in the evolution of deinotês into phronêsis in a way which is coherent with the approach just outlined above. Basically, here the Philosopher states that without the ethical virtues we cannot turn cleverness, that is the ability of doing things in order to achieve a morally unqualified scope, into something morally good. Just as he did with Aristotle’s reference to older men having an ‘eye’ trained by experience by which they ‘see aright’, that is they judge correctly when involved in practical matters, Eustratius makes once more clear that the eye of the soul has to be understood as the practical intellect, probably on the basis that Aristotle immediately afterwards (EN 6.12.1144a31–33) ends his discussion of the difference between phronêsis and deinotês by referring to practical syllogisms. In other words, contrary to modern readers, the commentator does not seem to understand Aristotle’s reference to the eye of the soul as referring to deinotês, but as to that part of the intellect of which phronêsis is the corresponding virtue. Eustratius’s text runs as follows: This disposition which evolves from deinotês, that is to say phronêsis, occurs in this eye of the soul. What eye of the soul? The one already mentioned, that is to say the practical intellect (praktikos nous). This is the same as the

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theoretical one in substance, but differs from it with regard to the operation, as it has been said before. (Heylbut Eustr. 393.22–27; my translation)17

To sum up, whereas Aristotle only speaks of the eye of the soul with respect to the evolution of deinotês into phronêsis, Eustratius’s commentary on Nicomachean Ethics 6 serially adopts this image as either the reason in general or the practical intellect specifically. In this respect Eustratius interprets Nicomachean Ethics 6.5.1140b17–18 as referring to the effects of bodily affections on the eye of the soul for the identification of the final cause within the process of deliberation. In particular, the commentator interprets Aristotle’s references to seeing and having sight aright as the practical intellect’s grasping of the principles. Eustratius believes that this eye of the soul, the practical intellect, is also what Aristotle means in Nicomachean Ethics 6.11.1143b14, where the Philosopher speaks of the ‘eye’ of the more experienced older men as their capacity of judging correctly on practical matters. However, the commentator makes no connection between these Aristotelian texts and Nicomachean Ethics 3.5.1114b3–8, where Aristotle discusses the possibility that men are born with a ‘sight’ (opsis) whereby they judge correctly and choose what is truly good. Finally, while identifying the ‘principle’ referred to by Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics 6.5.1140b17–18 with the final cause and the faculties involved in perceiving this principle with reason and the practical intellect, I believe there is room for speculating that, according to our commentator, phronêsis is involved in this peculiar perception of the end or goal in moral agency. What Eustratius does not do is to connect his exegesis on Nicomachean Ethics 6.5.1140b17–18 with Nicomachean Ethics 6.8.1142a25–30. However, Eustratius’s comments on this passage are worthy of mention. Here Aristotle writes: It is opposed, then, to comprehension: for comprehension is of the definitions, for which no reason can be given, while phronêsis is concerned with the ultimate particular, which is the object not of knowledge but of perception – not the perception of qualities peculiar to one sense but a perception akin to that by which we perceive that the particular figure before us is a triangle; for in that direction too there will be a limit. But this is rather perception than phronêsis, though it is another kind of perception. (EN 6.8.1142a25–30; trans. RevOT. Slightly altered)18

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Eustratius comments: The sense-perception which deals with the object of phronêsis is not – Aristotle says – the sense-perception which, for each type of sensible objects, perceives the corresponding object … but rather that which perceives in an absolute manner the particular facts which happen to be the objects of sense-perception-based knowledge. In fact, if one deliberates whether under certain conditions it is the best moment to agree upon an armistice or to make war, whether this will take place or not, and – if it will take place – how this will happen and for what reason, or, in the same manner, if there won’t be any war, he does not deliberate on that which is the proper object of only a certain sense perception, but rather on a simple and individual object of perception … and as an example of what has been said, Aristotle offers the case of the triangle as the last term in mathematics. In fact, while it is true that to mathematical science belongs demonstrating the properties that pertain as such to the triangle, and that the demonstration happens to be a universal one, however, of the last individual singular triangle as such there is no science, but there is sense-perception … after mentioning objects of action and deliberation as well, and after maintaining that also these individually are objects of sense-perception (and phronêsis concerns these, so that the ratiocinative part of the soul is that which grasps them attentively), Aristotle makes a sort of association between perceiving through phronêsis the individual object and perceiving in general, that is to say according to common sense. (Heylbut 351.23–352.27; my translation)19

Eustratius maintains that this sort of sense perception should not be thought of as corresponding to objects proper to each sense, but rather as something akin to common sense. If I understood the text correctly, here the commentator argues that when we perceive a given particular thing as what it is, in so doing we rely on that general perception when we say something about it, be it a triangle or object of deliberation such as waging war or not. Phronêsis deals with an ultimate, singular practicable object which is a thing to be done. Of this there cannot be scientific demonstration (for there is no scientific knowledge of singulars) and it is the last term in the process of resolution from the more universal to the particular. Just like an individual object of sense perception is not perceived by one of the senses, but is apprehended by the inner common sense which perceives each individual thing as sensibly conceivable, so the facts which are object of deliberation are perceived as simple individual facts.

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If this is correct, then the reference to a triangle as the eschaton in mathematics has to be explained in the sense that in mathematics we perceive the triangle as singular because we conform to a sensibly conceivable singular. By analogy, even though perception and phronêsis are not the same thing, phronêsis perceives a single individual circumstance as such. The interest in this comment rests in that it was adopted as a sound explanation of Aristotle’s text by Thomas Aquinas and later by Gauthier and Jolif, thus forming a bridge towards the later medieval interpretations of Nicomachean Ethics 6.8.1142a25–30.

Notes 1

David Lines, Aristotle’s ‘Ethics’ in the Italian Renaissance (ca. 1300–1650): The Universities and the Problem of Moral Education (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 65–108.

2

See Linos G. Benakis, ‘Aristotelian Ethics in Byzantium’, in Medieval Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Charles Barber and David Jenkins (Leiden: Brill, 2009), 63–70, with some caveats.

3

H. P. F. Mercken, ‘The Greek Commentators on Aristotle’s Ethics’, in Aristotle Transformed: The Ancient Commentators and Their Influence, ed. Richard Sorabji (London: Duckworth, 1990), 407–43.

4

Pantelis Golitsis, ‘Georges Pachymère comme didascale: Essai pour une reconstitution de sa carrière et de son enseignement philosophique’, Jahrbuch der Österreichischen Byzantinistik 58 (2008): 66.

5

Elpido Mioni, Bibliotecae Divi Marci Venetiarum Codices Graeci Manuscripti (Roma: Istituto Poligrafico dello Stato - Libreria dello Stato) [Indici e Cataloghi, Nuova Serie, 6], 1967–1985 (Mioni 1981, 326).

6

Golitsis, ‘Georges Pachymère comme didascale’, 55–59.

7

Brigitte Mondrain, ‘L’ancien empereur Jean VI Cantacuzène et ses copistes’, in Gregorio Palamas e oltre: Studi e documenti sulle controversie teologiche del XIV secolo bizantino, ed. Antonio Rigo (Florence: Olschky 2004), 249–96 et 8 pl., 265, n. 22.

8

Michele Trizio, ‘Eliodoro di Prusa e i commentatori greco-bizantini di Aristotele’, in Vie per Bisanzio: Atti del VIII Congresso Nazionale dell’Associazione Italiana di Studi Bizantini. Venezia, 25–28 novembre 2009, ed. Antonio Rigo et al. (Bari: Pagina, 2013), 803–30.

9

Tiziano Dorandi, ‘Préliminaires de Georges Scholarios à l’Étique à Nicomaque d’Aristote et aux

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Phantasia in Aristotle’s Ethics Entrétiens d’Épictète’, in Rhetorica philosophans: Mélanges offerts à M. Patillon, ed. Luc Brisson and Pierre Chiron (Paris: Vrin, 2010), 297–309.

10 ἔστι δ’ ἡ φρόνησις οὐχ ἡ δύναμις, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἄνευ τῆς δυνάμεως ταύτης. ἡ δ’ ἕξις τῷ ὄμματι τούτῳ γίνεται τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ ἄνευ ἀρετῆς, ὡς εἴρηταί τε καὶ ἔστι δῆλον· 11 Δείκνυσι πῶς ἡ σωφροσύνη περὶ ἡδονὰς καταγινομένη καὶ λύπας τῇ ψυχῇ σώζει, καί φησιν ὡς αἱ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὰ τελικά ἐστιν αἴτια. εἰς ταῦτα γὰρ ἀφορῶντες καὶ ταῦτα ἑαυτοῖς ὡς ἐφετὰ προτιθέμενοι πρότερον, οὕτως ἐπιχειροῦμεν ταῖς πράξεσι. πρακτὰ δέ φησι τὰ κατορθούμενα διὰ πράξεων ἐνεργήματα, ὧν ἕκαστον διά τι τέλος ἐνεργεῖται, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἀγαθὸν ἢ δοκοῦν ἀγαθόν. ᾧ οὖν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὁ λόγος ὑπὸ ἡδονῆς ἢ λύπης κατακρατούμενος διαφθείρεται ὥσπερ ὀφθαλμὸς ὢν τῆς ψυχῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ κατακρατοῦντος τυφλώττεται πάθους, καὶ οὐχ ὁρᾷ τὴν ἀρχὴν εὐθύς, ἤτοι τὸ τελικὸν αἴτιον, ἀλλὰ δεῖ αὐτῷ μελέτης, ἵνα ἀνανήψῃ ἀπὸ τοῦ πάθους καὶ ἀπλανῶς ἐντρανίσῃ τῷ ἀγαθῷ. ἀπείργει δὲ καὶ τούτου ἡ ἐμπαθὴς διάθεσις ὀκνηρὸν ποιοῦσα τὸν ὑπὸ ταύτης κρατούμενον πρὸς τὴν ἔρευναν, ὥστε καὶ πεπλανημένως ἔχει περὶ τὴν ὄρεξιν καὶ ἄλλου ἀντ’ἄλλου ἐφίεται καὶ περιπίπτει τῷ χείρονι. τὸ δὲ οὐδὲ δεῖν τούτου ἕνεκα οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦθ’ αἱρεῖσθαι πάντα καὶ πράττειν δεῖ νοεῖν ἐξακούοντας τὸ οὐ φανεῖται. τῷ γὰρ δι’ ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην διεφθαρμένῳ τὸν νοῦν οὔθ’ ἡ ἀρχὴ φαίνεται, ἤτοι τὸ τελικὸν αἴτιον οὔτε τὸ δεῖν ἕνεκα τοῦδε τοῦ τέλους, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πάνθ’ αἱρεῖσθαι καὶ πράττειν, ἵνα τοῦ ὄντως ἀγαθοῦ τέλους ἐπιτευξώμεθα. 12 καὶ γὰρ ὁ νέος οὐ τοσοῦτον διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν τῶν λόγων τούτων ἀνοίκειος, ὅσον διὰ τὴν τῶν παθῶν κατακράτησιν, ὥσπερ κύφωνι τῇ μοχθηρίᾳ τὸν λογισμὸν βαρυνόμενος καὶ πρὸς γῆν ὁρῶν καὶ τὴν ταύτης ἀπόλαυσιν, ἀνανεῦσαι δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἄνω μὴ συγχωρούμενος ἢ ὡς νέφους παχύτητι τῇ ἐμπαθείᾳ τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν τῆς διανοίας ἐπιπροσθούμενος καὶ διαβλέψαι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν μὴ δυνάμενος· 13 καὶ τῇ πολιτικῇ περὶ τῶν νοητῶν ὀφθαλμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν σπουδὴν εἶναι μάλιστα, νοῦ καὶ διανοίας, ὡς ἂν μὴ συγχέοιντο καὶ ἀμβλυώττωσι τοῖς ἀλόγοις ἐπισκοτούμενοι πάθεσι, μηδ’ ἐπιπροσθοῖντο τῷ πάχει τοῦ σώματος εἰς τὴν τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ κατανόησιν. 14 Michele Trizio, Il Neoplatonismo di Eustrazio di Nicea (Bari: Pagina, 2016), 100–03. 15 Trizio, Il neoplatonismo, 184. 16 ἐκ γὰρ τῆς ἐμπειρίας, φησίν, ἤγουν τῆς πολυπειρίας καὶ τριβῆς τῆς ἐν τοῖς καθ’ ἕκαστα, ὄμμα ἐκτήσαντο τῇ ψυχῇ, ἤγουν νοῦν διορατικὸν τῶν ἀρχῶν, ἤτοι τῶν προτάσεων, ἃς ἐκ πολλῶν τῶν πραττομένων καθ’ ἕκαστα ποριζόμεθα, καὶ ὁρῶμεν ἐξ αὐτῶν τὰ ἀποβησόμενα.

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17 ἡ δὲ ἕξις ἡ ἐπιγινομένη τῇ δεινότητι, ἥ ἐστιν ἡ φρόνησις, γίνεται τῷ ὄμματι τούτῳ τῆς ψυχῆς. ποίῳ τούτῳ; ἤγουν τῷ εἰρημένῳ, ὅ ἐστιν ὁ πρακτικὸς νοῦς. οὗτος δέ ἐστιν ὁ αὐτὸς μὲν τῷ θεωρητικῷ κατὰ τὴν οὐσίαν, τῇ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ, ἕτερος, ὡς καὶ πρότερον εἴρηται. 18 ἀντίκειται μὲν δὴ τῷ νῷ· ὁ μὲν γὰρ νοῦς τῶν ὅρων, ὧν οὐκ ἔστι λόγος, ἣ δὲ τοῦ ἐσχάτου, οὗ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐπιστήμη ἀλλ’ αἴσθησις, οὐχ ἡ τῶν ἰδίων, ἀλλ’ οἵᾳ αἰσθανόμεθα ὅτι τὸ [ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς] ἔσχατον τρίγωνον· στήσεται γὰρ κἀκεῖ. ἀλλ’ αὕτη μᾶλλον αἴσθησις ἢ φρόνησις, ἐκείνης δ’ ἄλλο εἶδος. 19 οὐχ οὕτω, φησίν, αἴσθησιν λέγομεν τὴν ἐνεργοῦσαν περὶ τὸ ὑποκείμενον τῇ φρονήσει, ὡς λέγομεν ἐφ’ ἑκάστου γένους τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ἰδίαν εἶναι αἴσθησιν τὴν ἐνεργοῦσαν περὶ αὐτό… ἀλλ’ ἁπλῶς τὰ καθ’ ἕκαστα καὶ ἐν οἷς ἡ αἰσθητικὴ γνῶσις ἐνεργεῖν πέφυκεν. εἰ γάρ τις περὶ τῆσδε τῆς εἰρήνης ἢ τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου βουλεύοιτο, εἰ δεῖ ἔσεσθαι ἢ μή, καὶ εἰ ἔσται, πῶς ἔσται καὶ διὰ τί ἔσται, καὶ εἰ οὐκ ἔσται ὡσαύτως, οὐχ ὡς περὶ ἰδίου μιᾷ τινι τῶν αἰσθήσεων βουλεύεται, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ἁπλῶς καὶ καθ’ ἕκαστα αἰσθητοῦ… τίθησι δὲ καὶ παράδειγμα τοῦ εἰρημένου τὸ τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς ἔσχατον. εἰ γὰρ καὶ μαθηματικῆς ἐπιστήμης ἐστὶ τὸ ἀποδεῖξαι περὶ τῶν καθ’ αὑτὸ ὑπαρχόντων τῷ τριγώνῳ, καὶ καθόλου ἡ ἀπόδειξις γίνεται, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔσχατον τρίγωνον ἤτοι τὸ ἄτομον καὶ καθ’ ἕκαστον ᾗ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν οὐκ ἐπιστήμῃ, ἀλλ’ αἰσθήσει ὑπόκειται… ἐπεὶ περὶ τῶν πρακτῶν καὶ βουλευτῶν εἴρηκε καὶ ταῦτα εἶναι καθ’ ἕκαστα καὶ αἰσθητά, καὶ περὶ ταῦτα τὴν φρόνησιν καταγίνεσθαι, ὡς εἶναι τὸ λογιζόμενον προσεχῶς αὐτῶν ἐφαπτόμενον, ὥσπερ σύγκρισιν ποιεῖται τοῦ μετὰ φρονήσεως αἰσθάνεσθαι τοῦ καθ’ ἕκαστα καὶ τοῦ ἁπλῶς, ἤτοι κατὰ τὴν κοινὴν αἴσθησιν.

T H E M E D I EVA L L AT I N T R A D I T IO N 5

Phronêsis, Pleasure and the Perception of the Goal Iacopo Costa

The passage, which is the object of this chapter, is a crucial passage in the Nicomachean Ethics: it occurs in Book 6, in a chapter that deals with the definition of phronêsis (‘practical wisdom’, ‘prudence’) as a ‘state grasping the truth, involving reason, and concerned with action about human goods’ (6.5.1140b20–21; trans. Irwin, lightly modified). Temperance or selfcontrol, Aristotle explains, preserves phronêsis, as the etymology of the name ‘temperance’ shows (sôphrosunê: sôizousa tên phronêsin, saving phronêsis); indeed temperance controls physical pleasure, and physical pleasure destroys knowledge, not however every kind of knowledge but only practical knowledge, that is the kind that is concerned with moral agency and phronêsis, since vice destroys the principle (i.e. the goal) of human action. This is also how we come to give temperance its name, because we think that it preserves phronêsis. It preserves the sort of supposition (hupolêpsis). For the sort of supposition that is corrupted and perverted by the pleasant or painful is not every sort – not, for instance, the supposition that the triangle does or does not have two right angles – but suppositions about what is achievable in action. For the principles of things achievable in action are their goal, but if someone is corrupted because of pleasure or pain, the principle does not immediately appear to him, and it cannot appear that this is the right goal and cause of all his choice and action; for vice corrupts the principle. And so phronêsis must be a state grasping the truth, involving reason, and concerned with action about human goods. (EN 6.5.1140b11–21; trans. Irwin, altered)1

These few lines contain the essence of Aristotle’s theory of phronêsis. Nevertheless, understanding this passage is not easy. One of the issues is

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the meaning of the expression ‘ou phainetai archê’: what does it mean that the principle appears or ceases to appear? I will refer to Nicomachean Ethics 6.5.1140b11–21 as to the ‘goal’s destruction (or disappearance) passage’ (GDP). First, I would like to explain this passage in the light of Aristotle’s conception of phronêsis; more specifically, I will focus on the following problem: what does it mean to say that one has knowledge by phronêsis? And what kind of knowledge is phronêsis? Indeed, our passage implies phronêsis to be a hupolêpsis (supposition, judgement, belief or notion) strictly connected to emotional and affective conditions of the moral agent.2 Secondly, in order to present some important stages of the medieval Latin reception of this passage, I have selected three commentators: Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas and Radulphus Brito. As I will show, these authors approach GDP in terms of intellectual knowledge, rather than in terms of physiological perception.

GDP in the context of Aristotelian psychology In a recent paper, Carlo Natali states that phronêsis has to find the means that cause the end and that it ‘must have some supposition of the end’.3 This claim is correct, but we have to add some details about the nature of knowledge by which phronêsis knows: it is undeniable that phronêsis cannot have knowledge of something in the manner of scientific knowledge or philosophical wisdom. The main problem is that Aristotle has to treat separately two things – phronêsis and moral virtue – which are certainly not identical, but cannot exist without one another; in order to clarify the problem of the object of phronêsis, we have to examine its relation to moral virtue. I will present three points: (i) phronêsis fully knows the end; (ii) phronêsis is imperative compared both to the means and to the end; and (iii) phronêsis is not distinct from moral virtue concerning its object, but only concerning its subject. Before that, I will recall one of the most important points: knowledge belongs to the cognitive faculties, while desire belongs to the appetitive faculties; cognitive powers cannot desire, and appetitive powers cannot know something. That being said, there are some forms of desire, which cannot be achieved without knowledge, as well as some

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forms of knowledge, which cannot be achieved without desire. This is precisely the case of the relationship between phronêsis and moral virtue. (i) As far as the first point is concerned (phronêsis knows the end), Aristotle states clearly that phronêsis knows the ultimate end, and this with no restrictions. This is first clear in the GDP: explaining the etymology of temperance, Aristotle states that pleasure4 destroys wisdom since it destroys the knowledge of the principle (archê – in practical matters, the principle is the ultimate end – to hou heneka, 1140b16–17). When pleasure destroys the principle, the principle is no more visible (literally, it does not appear anymore: tôi de … ou phainetai archê, 1140b17–18). This seems to suggest that the wise man can see the principle (i.e. the end).5 This is even more clear in the following passage: ‘That is why Pericles and such people are the ones whom we regard as wise (phronimoi), because they are able to study (dunantai theôrein) what is good for themselves and for human beings’ (EN 6.5.1140b7–11; trans. Irwin, lightly modified). By ‘what is good for themselves and what is good for human beings’, Aristotle certainly means the ultimate end: the wise man knows how to direct his own actions and, consequently, the actions of individuals composing the political community. Besides, Aristotle states that the matter of phronêsis is human good (ta anthrôpina agatha) (1140b21), that is to say the end and what produces it. Finally, Aristotle states that phronêsis is the true estimation (alêthês hypolêpsis) of the end (6.9.1142b32–33). Knowing the end is not the task of moral virtue: moral virtue is a form of desire, and desire is not a cognitive power. Knowing the end is neither the task of the virtues of the speculative part of the intellect, whose matter is the unchangeable realities. Hence, knowing the end is the proper task of phronêsis. It is true that this knowledge of the end to some extent depends on moral virtue (see below, point iii); nevertheless, phronêsis sees, or knows, the principle, which is the end of moral action; the reason is that phronêsis is identical to such knowledge. (ii) Concerning our second point (phronêsis is imperative compared both to the means and to the end), we have to specify that phronêsis is not a speculative disposition: the rational soul is divided into two ‘parts’, a scientific part (epistêmonikon) and a calculative part (logistikon) – phronêsis belongs to the latter and is the principal virtue of it. Phronêsis being a practical virtue (6.5.1140b21) means that it commands (epitattei) (6.13.1145a9) and that it is, in its essence, imperative (epitaktikê) (6.10.1143a8).

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To say it in a very simple way, phronêsis commands and it could not be otherwise: no matter what its object is (the end or the means), the nature of its knowledge is necessarily imperative. It does not seem to me that Aristotle has ever stated that the imperativeness of phronêsis is restricted to means: phronêsis is in itself an imperative disposition. Nonetheless, it is a form of practical intelligence, and its task is to discover the means to the end, but it discovers the means in order to command their execution, execution that aims at the end. Thus, the imperativeness of phronêsis concerns both the means and the end, while deliberation only concerns means (see EN 3.3.1112b11–20). Phronêsis includes other dispositions of practical intelligence, which help its achievement and are partly natural dispositions (man can have them by birth or natural constitution). Euboulia (‘good deliberation’) is the capacity of finding the means to the end. Nevertheless, this disposition does not make us wise, since it does not know the true end (6.9.1142b31–32); the wise man has euboulia, with the addition of the intelligence of the end. On the other hand, sunesis (‘comprehension’, 6.10.1142b34–1143a18) is the disposition by which one judges correctly the objects of action (which constitute the matter of phronêsis); nevertheless, this disposition does not mean that the action follows the judgement; that is because, contrary to phronêsis, sunesis is not imperative. If we remove from phronêsis the capacity of directing actions towards the end, phronêsis would be no different than euboulia; if phronêsis were a form of nonimperative knowledge of the end, it would be no different than sunesis. What is then the origin of this imperative character? This will appear in the next point. (iii) Finally, how should phronêsis and moral virtue be mutually distinguished? To say that phronêsis is imperative towards the end does not imply reducing the importance of moral virtue; indeed, phronêsis and moral virtue cannot exist without one another (6.12.1144a23–b1). Moral virtue is essential to phronêsis and vice versa: without the energy of moral virtue, phronêsis would not be phronêsis; without the intelligence of phronêsis, moral virtue would not be moral virtue. Hence, if we state that phronêsis concerns the end, that is because Aristotle admits with no restriction that the action of phronêsis and the action of moral virtue ‘overlap’, that is to say: they mutually follow each other in the whole process of moral action, from the end to the means (formal causality: phronêsis) and from the means to the end (efficient causality: moral virtue). We can even state that phronêsis and moral virtue do

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not simply follow each other, but that they rather make each other mutually possible (1144a34–b1; 1144b17): without moral virtue, phronêsis is nothing but deinotês (i.e. a non-moral skill), as well as without phronêsis, moral virtue is nothing but a natural aptitude which is analogous in men and animals; the same relation exists between deinotês and phronêsis and between natural virtue (aretê phusikê) and the accomplished moral virtue (cf. 1144b1–4; 14– 17). Being a non-cognitive disposition (quality), moral virtue is blind: it could never be itself a hupolêpsis of the end. Phronêsis knows and commands the end thanks to moral virtue’s energy; moral virtue desires the end and recognizes the means thanks to the intelligence of phronêsis (virtue makes someone desire a mean only if it produces a virtuous end: the brave man does not desire in itself the act of putting his own life in danger, he only desires putting his own life in danger if such an action produces a higher, virtuous end, for example, saving his country). Phronêsis is then a natural practical intelligence brought to perfection by virtue, and virtue is a natural positive quality of character brought to perfection by phronêsis. If phronêsis and moral virtue are not separate in reality, nevertheless they have two different structures: virtue is the perfection of the desire, while phronêsis is the perfection of the calculative part of the rational soul. To put it in other terms, these two perfections share the same object. This is a point on which Aristotle could not have been more clear: true reasoning of phronêsis affirms (phanai) and right desire of virtue pursues (diôkein) the same thing (ta auta) (EN 6.2.1139a25–26); nevertheless, they differ in comparison to their subject: while desiring soul is the subject of virtue, rational soul is the subject of phronêsis. On the basis of these remarks, let us return to GDP. How does one have to understand that the principle does not appear as a principle in the agent who is corrupted by pleasure? This means that, in the absence of phronêsis and moral virtue, the agent cannot recognize the principle as a true principle of moral action: even if he had it in mind, he would not feel that this principle has to be the goal of his actions. Phronêsis being the union of practical intelligence and moral virtue, it is inconceivable that a morally wise man does not control the passions of the sensitive appetite; on the contrary, the agent whose passions overcome the strength of reason, that is a vicious or incontinent man, does not know or does not see the principle (i.e. the end) as an imperative. Hence

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it seems reasonable to conclude that the appearance, or the disappearance, of the goal–principle (ou phainetai archê) (1140b18) does not mean a purely epistemological act: it rather means the capacity, or the lack of capacity, of practical reason in feeling the imperative strength of a virtuous goal. One last question has to be mentioned: is the person who cannot see the principle rather vicious or incontinent? The first answer seems to be more likely, since vice (kakia) is mentioned at the end of GDP as being the disposition which destroys the principle. Indeed, Aristotle affirms, in Book 7, that the goal is preserved in the incontinent: This, then, is the incontinent person (akratês). He is better than the intemperate person, and is not bad without qualification, since the best thing, the principle, is preserved in him (sôizetai … hê archê). (EN 7.8.1151a24–26; trans. Irwin)6

Nevertheless, we have to admit that, even in the case of the incontinent, the principle can be subjected to a temporary, transitional, disappearance: Aristotle presents different typologies of incontinent characters, and while in some cases passion completely hides the right deliberation, in others the incontinent deliberates correctly but then he does not succeed in acting according to the deliberation: Among the incontinent people themselves, those who are out of themselves are better than those who have reason but do not abide by it. For the second type are overcome by a less strong passion, and do not act without having deliberated, as the first type do. (7.8.1151a1–3; trans. Irwin, modified)7

Now, given that deliberation includes the knowledge of the goal–principle, both cases seem to entail some disappearance of the goal, since the first type of incontinent completely loses control of his own behaviour, while the second type, even standing firm in the knowledge of the principle, does not possess it as an imperative knowledge, as it should be.

Reception of GDP in the Latin Middle Ages It is well known that, from the beginning of the thirteenth century, the Nicomachean Ethics had an extraordinary importance for the development of

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ethics. As it is the case for most Aristotelian treatises, Nicomachean Ethics was known to the Latin West through translations from both Greek and Arabic.8 Burgundio of Pisa made the most ancient translation in the mid-twelfth century. Of this translation, only Books 2–3 (Ethica vetus) and 1 (Ethica nova) had a large diffusion, were objects of commentaries and are nowadays extant.9 Among the commentators of this ancient translation, we find Robert Kilwardby, the pseudo-Peckham and some anonymous authors.10 At the beginning of the 1240s, Hermann the German translated into Latin Averroes’s Middle Commentary, as well as the Summa alexandrinorum, that is an Arabic summary of the Nicomachean Ethics; these Arabo-Latin versions did not have the same impact as the Greco-Latin translations.11 In 1246/1247, Robert Grosseteste made a new complete translation of the Nicomachean Ethics, as well as of a selection of Greek commentaries. This translation (translatio lincolniensis), which served as base for a later revision made, according to some scholars, by William of Mœrbeke, was greatly influential and was commented by masters of arts and of theology, such as Albert the Great, Thomas Aquinas, Peter of Auvergne, Radulphus Brito, John Buridan, Guiral Ot and Walter Burley.12

Albert the Great The first complete commentary on Nicomachean Ethics is the lectura cum quaestionibus written by Albert the Great around 1250.13 Albert introduces the practical syllogism to explain how pleasure and pain corrupt phronêsis (of which ‘prudentia’ is the Latin rendering).14 The following is an example of a ‘practically wise syllogism’: (M)ajor: one should not fornicate; (m)inor: having an intercourse with this particular woman is an act of fornication; (C)onclusion: the action follows: the subject abstains from having this intercourse.

According to Albert, the practical syllogism is, at all its stages, a precept, that is an imperative (dictamen) accomplished by phronêsis, which is the main virtue of practical intellect. Prudentia then commands the whole (M)-(m)-(C) sequence.15

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The problem is to know how pleasure interferes with the practical syllogism in order to make the principle (i.e. the goal) disappear. Albert answers that pleasure destroys neither prudentia as a disposition nor the precept of (M) that is the imperative of the goal: indeed, pleasure does not directly affect universal knowledge (Radulphus Brito will carefully explain this point, as I will show below). Pleasure partially destroys (m) and totally destroys (C). Here are the reasons of this claim. Pleasure affects (m), that is the imperative knowledge of the particular which has to be subsumed under the universal (M): pleasure does not destroy particular knowledge in itself, but it rather offers a different and corrupted proposition (henceforth mc) which cannot be subsumed under (M). According to Albert, the alternative, corrupted (mc) would be ‘this woman is a possible source of pleasure’. Here pleasure takes control, while the task of (m), when things do not go wrong, should only be that of estimating if having an intercourse with this woman is or is not an act of fornication. On the other hand, pleasure totally destroys (C). Because of the substitution of (m), the universal (M) proposition disappears, and this is both a logical and a psychological disappearance; pleasure destroys the syllogism and the power of (M): indeed when the corrupted (mc) replaces (m), the conclusion-action (C) expresses nothing of (M).16 We can mention the fact that Albert highlights the idea of the blindness of reason in such cases: ‘Reason is completely corrupted with regard to the conclusion and becomes blind.’17 This means that reason does not see, or consider, (M) anymore, because (M) is overshadowed by the (mc) proposition.18 As we will see below, the same idea of blindness will occur in Aquinas’s theory of lust. Albert’s exegesis suggests that he read GDP as a description of incontinence: he states indeed that (M) is not corrupted by pleasure. What is destroyed by pleasure is the relationship existing between (M) and (m). This is confirmed by a parallel text of Book 7 where Albert, describing the psychological conditions of incontinence, implicitly evokes GDP and gives some details about the ‘invisibility of the goal’: If scientific knowledge only concerns the universal, or major proposition, one who has scientific knowledge can nevertheless be torn by passions, since scientific knowledge is destroyed in relation to the action or conclusion, that is the judgement about the action, and partly in relation to the particular or minor proposition; such a destruction of scientific knowledge does not depend on the fact that one cannot see, but rather on the fact that one cannot

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look at, since passion closes the eyes of the mind, so that a particular object of action cannot be subsumed under the major proposition [literally: the major extremity] and the force of the major proposition does not reach back again to the conclusion. (my translation and italics)19

Albert introduces here a difference between the impossibility of seeing the principle (i.e. the major proposition) and the impossibility of looking at it. Even in the absence of more details, we can reasonably think that the former impossibility means a definitive condition, due to vice or illness, making the agent absolutely incapable of knowing virtuous goals as true and good principles of action; on the contrary, the latter impossibility means a temporary inhibition of the capacity of perceiving the truth of virtuous goals. If this interpretation is correct, this would confirm that Albert applies GDP to the incontinent.

Thomas Aquinas In his Sententia libri Ethicorum (i.e. the literal commentary), Aquinas gives a more cursory explanation than Albert.20 Pleasure and pain destroy judgement (existimatio, Gr. hupolêpsis) concerning the objects of moral action (operabilia). Man always acts for the Good (in an absolute sense: optimum); now, the Good, or the end, is not objective; it is subjective: every man can identify the Good with a different object (wealth, honour, contemplative life etc.); the Good is then an interchangeable object, since it depends on subjective conditions, which are unstable. If man is under the influence of a violent passion, the source of pleasure (or of avoidance of pain) can appear excellent (optimum) to him. This means that the person who is under the influence of passion judges the objects of moral action in a different way than someone who is not under such an influence (or who can resist it).21 Unlike Albert, Aquinas seems to have read GDP as a description of vice rather than of incontinence: he states indeed that pleasure distorts (or destroys) the perception of the optimum, and he concludes by affirming that ‘every vice (malitia), that is every vicious habit (habitus vitiosus), destroys the principle, insofar as it destroys the right belief about the end, and temperance is what mostly prevent such a destruction’.22

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One can find, in Aquinas’s theological works, some developments of this Aristotelian theory, namely, in his treatise on capital sins (included in the De malo). Here, Aquinas implicitly uses GDP in his own treatment of lust (luxuria). In De malo 15.4 (treating the question: ‘Whether lust is a capital sin’), Aquinas explains what it means for lust to be a capital sin, and to do so, he introduces Gregory the Great’s position, for whom lust is a capital sin that has eight daughters. Gregory states: ‘Lust generates blindness of the spirit, lack of judgement, inconstancy, haste, self-love, hate of God, love of worldly things, horror and desperation about the future life.’23 Sins that have pleasure (delectatio) as their object are capital sins.24 The object of lust is sexual pleasure (delectatio uenereorum); when the intention of the soul is vehemently directed at an object–source of sexual pleasure, the superior powers of the soul (i.e. intellect and will) are in a state of disorder. Such a disorder affects both reason and appetitive powers. First, lust destroys the acts of practical reason, which are four: intellect, or intelligence of the goal, deliberation, judgement and precept. The action of lust on intellect (intelligence of the goal) produces blindness of the spirit concerning the end (a). The action of lust on deliberation produces lack of judgement about the means (b). The action of lust on judgement about what one should choose is the cause of haste, since by lust one acts suddenly without attending the judgement of reason (c). The action of lust on precept causes inconstancy, since lust prevents the agent from following the imperative of reason (d). Secondly, lust destroys the two genera of acts of appetitive powers, which are desire for the end and desire for the means producing the end. The action of lust on the desire of the will towards the end has two effects: self-love, that is disordered desire of pleasure (e), and hate of God (f), since God prohibits the excess of pleasure. The action of lust on the desire of the will towards the means has also two effects: love of worldly things (g), and horror and desperation (detachment) about the future life (h).25 (See Table 5.1.) Despite its non-Aristotelian nature, this is indeed a very interesting solution: according to Aquinas’s theory of the cardinal virtues (as exposed, for example, in De virtutibus cardinalibus 1), temperance is not only a ‘special virtue’ (i.e. a virtue ruling the desire of a specific object, for example sexual pleasure, honour and so on), but it is also a condition of virtuous acts in general, since all virtues deal, in a certain way, with some kind of pleasure. This means that

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Table 5.1 Thomas Aquinas, De malo 15.4 (see above, p. 88) Maxima delectatio Filiae luxuriae (daughters of lust, see Gregory the Great): circa venerea: finis luxuriae (supreme ex parte rationis (depending on reason) erotic pleasure: end (a) caecitas mentis (blindness intellectus (intellect) of lust) of the spirit) (b) inconsideratio (lack of consideration)

consilium de agendis (deliberation on things to do)

(c) praecipitatio (precipitancy)

iudicium de agendis (judgement on things to do)

(d) inconstantia (inconstancy)

praeceptum de agendo (command of the action)

ex parte inordinationis affectus (depending on the disorder of the appetites) (e) amor sui (love of self) (f) odium Dei (hate of God) (g) affectus praesentis saeculi (affection of the present world) (h) desperatio futuri saeculi (despair towards the afterlife)

appetitus delectationis ut finis (desire of pleasure as an end)

appetitus eorum per que consequitur finem (desire of the means leading to pleasure)

lust, which is the vicious counterpart of temperance, is a condition of every vicious act. Following this, Aquinas concludes that temperance saves phronêsis not as a special virtue but as a general condition of virtue, which consists in moderating pleasures (not only culinary and sexual pleasures but every form of pleasure which necessarily goes with vice).26 However, what is chiefly interesting for our purpose is to point out the role of the Aristotelian theory of phronêsis in Aquinas’s description of caecitas mentis (blindness of the mind or of the intellect). Explaining the effect of lust on the intelligence of the goal, Aquinas states: The first of the four acts by which reason directs human acts is an act of intelligence (intellectus) giving fair judgement about the goal, which is the principle in objects of action, as the Philosopher says in Physics 2; and this act is prevented by one of the daughters of lust, that is blindness of the

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mind, according to Daniel [13.56]: ‘Beauty seduced you, and concupiscence perverted your heart.’ (my translation) 27

We saw above Albert using the idea of blindness to describe the effect of pleasure on practical intellect; the same idea occurs in Aquinas, and it is more than likely that, in this section of De malo, Aquinas has GDP in mind: as well as in the Sententia, he points out the destruction of the principle caused by immoderate pleasure.

Radulphus Brito Further interesting exegetical developments are to be found in Radulphus Brito. This famous Parisian Master of Arts has written two commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics: the first commentary was written at the end of the 1290s (likely after 1295/1296) and the second at least ten years later (after 1304, since Radulphus knows the Quodlibet XV of Godfrey of Fontaines). The former is the result of Radulphus’s teaching at the Faculty of Arts, while the latter is a ‘theological’ commentary, since at that time Radulphus was preparing to become master of theology (indeed, one finds in this second redaction several parallels with his commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences).28 In neither the first nor the second redaction do we find a plain explanation of GDP, so it is not possible to know if Radulphus read it as concerning vice or incontinence. Nevertheless, questions 166–67, Book 7, of his second commentary provide noteworthy theories. Question 166 (‘whether one who has true universal and particular knowledge can perform incontinent acts’)29 explains accurately how passion can bind or tie intellect’s acts (i.e. to say, how it can make intellect powerless). In the solution, Radulphus presents four cases. (i) Incontinence is compatible with speculative universal and particular knowledge. Speculative knowledge (e.g. mathematics) does not come into direct conflict with the ‘affective’ character of moral action (no matter if virtuous or not). This statement, together with the example of the triangle used by Radulphus, shows that he is presenting continence in the light of GDP.30 (ii) Practical universal knowledge (i.e. the knowledge of moral principles) does not come into conflict with incontinence: according to De anima 3.11.434a16–21, universal notions, or principles, being static and not

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dynamic, cannot give origin to a motion (action). This can be the case of the continent that has universal notions, which, however, do not lead to action (they remain potential).31 (iii) The presence of conscience (conscientia) in the fourth case discretely shows the theological context of this second redaction. Resuming the latest position of Aquinas about the subject of continence, Radulphus assumes here that incontinence (and continence) depends on the will (i.e. to say: will is the subject of incontinence). The person who has true (practical) universal and particular knowledge only as a powerless disposition (in habitu solum ligato) can be incontinent: first, his intellect is overwhelmed by phantasmata provoking a strong passion; second, his will does not want to consider practical knowledge or the act of conscience. Turning away from the principle is then considered a voluntary, deliberate action.32 (iv) The person who has true (practical) universal and particular knowledge, and not as a powerless disposition (non habendo habitum ligatum), cannot be incontinent.33 As we can see, Radulphus thinks that acting according to continence or incontinence depends on judgement. This is the consequence of Radulphus’s intellectualist psychology, according to which the evaluation of (m) and its opposite (mc), the virtuous and the vicious minor propositions in a practical syllogism, is made by the intellect and finally approved and executed by will. In the following part of the question, Radulphus explains this point. He asks: if, in these conditions, the will (uoluntas) necessarily does or does not act in a continent way, how can we affirm that the will is still free? Indeed, necessity excludes liberty.34 The solution to this question is useful in order to understand Radulphus’s interpretation of GDP. Certainly, we have to say that will’s action is always contingent, and hence, even if a volition of x is necessary when the will desires x, it is nevertheless contingent that the will wants, or desires, x. Now will is free insofar as it makes intellect deliberate about particular actions and other faculties act in order to realize what the intellect thinks to be the best thing to do in a particular situation.35 But another doubt arises: if will follows what intellect believes to be good, how does one consciously sin? Radulphus’s answer takes the practical syllogism into account and seems in some parts close to Albert’s position. Intellect does not necessarily connect universal and particular knowledge about an object of action; if intellect knows a virtuous (M) and the connected virtuous (m), it can equally know the same virtuous (M) and a (mc) contrary to the virtuous

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one. The strength of passion can make intellect turn away from the virtuous (m) and make the agent act according to the vicious (mc); this has the effect of hiding or inhibiting the universal right knowledge. This process, finally, has the power to generate vice: since the incontinent is attracted by the vicious (mc) and repeatedly acts according to it, he generalizes the content of it and ultimately comes to know a vicious moral principle (Mc) as true.36 If we have then: (M) virtuous: fornication is bad; (m) virtuous: there should be no fornication with this woman; (mc) vicious: there should be fornication with this woman;

and if (mc) often prevails over (m), it will completely corrupt the virtuous (M) proposition and generate: (Mc) vicious: fornication is good.

If we compare this psychological process to GDP, we can affirm that the goal– principle disappear to the eyes of both the incontinent and the vicious, but its disappearance is occasional to the former and definitive to the latter. Question 167 asks whether passion (i.e. a motion of the sensitive appetite) can modify the actual use of knowledge (i.e. a disposition of the intellect) and it appears connected to the issue of question 166. Radulphus’s theory involves three faculties: intellect, sensitive appetite and will (which is the appetitive faculty of the rational soul). Indeed, acting according to a habitus always demands the intervention of will: one employs a habitus only if he wants to.37 Acting according to the habitus of scientific knowledge, or of any form of knowledge, implies a free (voluntary) act making the power actually realize itself. But even human will is somehow submitted to the influence of inferior appetite (sensitive appetite); so, if the appetite presents to the will and to the intellect a delectabile conueniens, that is an object–source of pleasure that catches the attention of the subject and provokes passion, the appetite can succeed in attracting rational faculties on this object; hence, the will is no more capable of making the intellect practise knowledge and the whole intellectual soul will bring its attention to the object–source of pleasure. This is, according to Radulphus, a purely psychological obstacle to acting virtuously. The second part of the solution of question 167 analyses a second kind of impediment,

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which is material, or bodily. Imagination (fantasia) is indeed the faculty of the soul which transmits to the intellect the objects of sensibility, and if imagination is bound (or attached: fixed to an object), intellect cannot perform its acts, as in the case of the person asleep or drunk. This is the case of incontinence: passion ‘modifies’ not only imagination but also bodily conditions (as in the case of erotic love that makes us turn pale or shame that makes us blush). In this second case too, the use of knowledge is not possible. What is the difference between the two modalities? In the first case, action is only inhibited; in the second case, the inhibition is physical, more deep-rooted and possibly definitive.38

Conclusion After this brief investigation, how can we evaluate the medieval Latin reception of GDP? The three cases presented in this chapter are indeed of great interest: Albert has tried to understand GDP within the framework of the theory of practical syllogism; his analysis probably influenced Radulphus’s commentary. Aquinas’s appropriation of GDP in his theory of the capital sins is indeed a significant example of the theological reception of Aristotelian psychology. Finally, Radulphus partly employs GDP in formulating his intellectualist conception of free will and of human agency. These results deserve attention both from an exegetical and a philosophical point of view.

Notes 1

ἔνθεν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην τούτῳ προσαγορεύομεν τῷ ὀνόματι, ὡς σῴζουσαν τὴν φρόνησιν. σῴζει δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ὑπόληψιν. οὐ γὰρ ἅπασαν ὑπόληψιν διαφθείρει οὐδὲ διαστρέφει τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ λυπηρόν, οἷον ὅτι τὸ τρίγωνον δύο ὀρθὰς ἔχει ἢ οὐκ ἔχει, ἀλλὰ τὰς περὶ τὸ πρακτόν. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα τὰ πρακτά· τῷ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ δι’ ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην εὐθὺς οὐ φαίνεται ἀρχή, οὐδὲ δεῖν τούτου ἕνεκεν οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦθ’ αἱρεῖσθαι πάντα καὶ πράττειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ ἀρχῆς. ὥστ’ ἀνάγκη τὴν φρόνησιν ἕξιν εἶναι μετὰ λόγου ἀληθῆ περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα ἀγαθὰ πρακτικήν.

2

The explanation that I sketch in the present paper would certainly require further analysis. This issue has been the object of intense debates in the last decades: see

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Phantasia in Aristotle’s Ethics Ronald Polansky (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014). Hereafter, I will partly follow Gauthier’s interpretation: René A. Gauthier and Jean Y. Jolif (eds), Aristote: L’Éthique à Nicomaque (Louvain-La-Neuve: Peeters, 2002), vol. II.2, 563–78.

3

Carlo Natali, ‘The Book on Wisdom’, in The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle’s

4

In this paper, I will use ‘pleasure’ instead of ‘pleasure and pain’: indeed, Aristotle

Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Roland Polansky (as note 2), 194. considers pain as being the opposite of pleasure (EN 7.13.1153b1–7), so the saying that ‘pain corrupts the principle’ means exactly that ‘the opposite of pleasure corrupts the principle’. 5

For a different interpretation, see Jessica Moss, Aristotle on the Apparent Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), especially 153–99.

6

οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ ἀκρατής, βελτίων τοῦ ἀκολάστου, οὐδὲ φαῦλος ἁπλῶς· σῴζεται γὰρ τὸ βέλτιστον, ἡ ἀρχή. Quoted by Gauthier and Jolif, Aristote: L’Éthique à Nicomaque (as note 2) ad 6.5.1140b11–21.

7

αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων βελτίους οἱ ἐκστατικοὶ ἢ οἱ τὸν λόγον ἔχοντες μέν, μὴ ἐμμένοντες δέ· ὑπ’ ἐλάττονος γὰρ πάθους ἡττῶνται, καὶ οὐκ ἀπροβούλευτοι ὥσπερ ἅτεροι·

8

See Gauthier and Jolif, Aristote: L’Éthique à Nicomaque (as note 2), vol. I.1, 107ff. The translations from Greek are edited in Ethica Nicomachea, Aristoteles Latinus vol. XXVI 1–3, fasc. 1–5, ed. René A. Gauthier (Brussels and Leiden: Desclée de Brouwer and Brill, 1972–1974).

9

On Burgundio’s translation, see Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem and Marwan Rashed, ‘Burgundio de Pise et ses manuscrits grecs d’Aristote: Laur. 87.7 et Laur. 81.18’ , Recherches de Théologie et Philosophie médiévales 64 (1997): 136–98. Note that Gauthier (as note 8), at the time when he published its critical edition, considered this translation to be anonymous.

10 On the first reception of the Nicomachean Ethics, see Georg Wieland, Ethica, scientia practica: Die Anfänge der philosophischen Ethik im 13. Jahrhundert, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, neue Folge 21 (Münster: Aschendorff, 1981). The critical editions of the commentaries by pseudo-Peckham and Robert Kilwardby are in progress, respectively by Valeria Buffon and Anthony J. Celano. The anonymous of Paris (book I) has been edited by René A. Gauthier, ‘Le cours sur l’Ethica nova d’un maître ès Arts de Paris (1235–1240)’, Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge 42 (1975): 71–141 (books II-III will be edited by Irene Zavattero). The Anonymous

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of Naples has been edited by Martin J. Tracey, ‘An Early 13th-Century Commentary on Aristotle’s ‘Nicomachean Ethics’ I, 4–10: The ‘Lectio cum Questionibus’ of an Arts-Master at Paris in MS Napoli, Biblioteca Nazionale, VIII G 8, ff.4r-9v’, Documenti e Studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 17 (2007): 23–70. The edition of the Anonymous of Avranches is in progress, by Violeta Cervera Novo. 11 On the Arabic tradition, see Frédérique Woerther’s contribution in the present volume. 12 Here is the translation of GDP according to Grosseteste, Ethica Nicomachea, 258.4–14: ‘Hinc et temperanciam hoc appellamus nomine velud salvantem prudenciam. Salvat autem talem existimacionem. Non enim omnem existimacionem corrumpit neque pervertit delectabile et triste, puta quoniam trigonum duos rectis equales habet vel non habet, set eas que circa operabile. Principia quidem enim operabilium, quod cuius gracia operabilia. Corrupto autem propter delectationem vel tristiciam, confestim non apparebit principium, neque oportere huius gracia, neque propter hoc eligere omnia et operari. Est enim malicia corruptiva principii. Quare necesse prudenciam habitum esse cum racione vera circa humana bona operativum.’ 13 In the present study, I will leave Albert’s second commentary (usually called Ethica), whose contribution to this issue appears to be less interesting. 14 Albertus Magnus, Super Ethica 6.7, qu. 8, Opera Omnia, editio coloniensis, vol. 14.2, ed. Wilhelm Kübel (Münster: Aschendorff, 1987), 440–41. 15 Ibid., 441: ‘Dictamen autem hoc est tripliciter, scilicet in maiori propositione, quae est scire in universali, ut non esse fornicandum, et dictamen in minori propositione, quod est scire in particulari, ut huic commisceri est fornicari, et dictamen conclusionis, quod est scire in agere, quando iam scilicet sententiatur de faciendo vel non faciendo.’ Note that Albert thinks then that phronêsis is imperative towards the end, that is, towards the (M) proposition. 16 Ibid. ‘Delectatio igitur intemperantiae non corrumpit habitum prudentiae, sed dictamen ipsius, et non in maiori propositione, quia scit in universali hoc non esse faciendum, sed in minori propositione partim corrumpit, quia proponit sibi particulare simpliciter, non secundum quod stat sub universali; proponit enim, quod mulier est pulchra, et ideo ex toto corrumpitur in conclusione et caecatur ratio, quia virtus universalis non venit in conclusionem, unde sententiat in contrarium.’ 17 See previous note. As it concerns the idea of blindness, Albert could have been inspired by Eustratius: see Michele Trizio’s paper in the present volume.

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18 The same idea occurs in the literal explanation: ibid., 443: ‘Et dicit, quod corrumpit quantum ad principium sui, quia principium operabilium est id cuius gratia fit operatio, sed propter delectationem vel tristitiam non statim in promptu apparet hoc principium, in quantum est terminus operis, neque apparet, quod gratia huius oporteat operari et eligere omnia propter hoc, scilicet finem illum, delectatione velante oculos rationis in minori propositione et conclusione, quia malitia, idest inordinata delectatio, large pro quolibet vitio, est corruptiva principii, quod est finis, inquantum est terminus operis huius.’ 19 Ibid., 7.2, 522; Here is the entire passage: ‘Dicendum quod scientia non dicitur hic “habitus demonstrativus”, sed certitudinalis cognitio operabilium; haec quidem igitur scientia potest esse perfecta, quando scilicet aliquis habet rectam aestimationem de operabilibus et in universali et in particulari et in agere, et tunc impossibile est, quod scientia a passionibus pertrahatur, et sic verificatur dictum Socratis. Si autem scientia est tantum in universali sive in maiori propositione, potest esse nihilo minus sciens hic tractus a passionibus, inquantum corrumpitur scientia in agere vel in conclusione, quae est sententians de agendo, et partim in particulari sive in minori propositione, et haec corruptio scientiae non fit per non posse videre, sed per non inspicere, passione oculos mentis claudente, ut particulare operabile assumptum non accipiatur sub maiori extremitate neque iterum virtus maioris propositionis ad conclusionem deveniat. Et sic patet quomodo Aristoteles et Socrates quodammodo verum dicunt.’ 20 On Aquinas’s conception of practical principles, see Tobias Hoffmann, ‘Prudence and Practical Principles’, in Aquinas and the Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Tobias Hoffmann, Jörn Müller and Matthias Perkams (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 165–83. 21 Thomas Aquinas, Sententia Libri Ethicorum 6.4, ed. Leon., vol. 47.2., ed. René A. Gauthier (Rome: Ad Sanctae Sabinae, 1969), 346: ‘quia prudentia est circa bona vel mala agibilia, inde est quod temperantia vocatur in graeco soffrosini, quasi salvans mentem, a qua etiam prudentia dicitur fronesis. Temperantia autem, in quantum moderatur delectationes et tristitias tactus, salvat talem existimationem, quae scilicet est circa agibilia, quae sunt hominis bona vel mala. Et hoc patet per contrarium, quia delectabile et triste, quod moderatur temperantia, non corrumpit, scilicet totaliter, neque pervertit, in contrarium deducendo, quamcumque existimationem, puta speculativam, scilicet quod triangulus habeat vel non habeat tres angulos aequales duobus rectis, sed delectatio et tristitia corrumpit et pervertit existimationes quae sunt circa iudicia operabilium. Qualiter fiat talis corruptio, ostendit consequenter. Manifestum est

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enim quod principia operabilium sunt fines cuius gratia fiunt operabilia, qui ita se habent in operabilibus sicut principia in demonstrabilibus, ut habetur in II Physicorum; quando autem est vehemens delectatio vel tristitia, apparet homini quod illud sit optimum per quod sequitur delectationem et fugit tristitiam, et ita, corrupto iudicio rationis, non apparet homini verus finis, qui est principium prudentiae circa operabilia existentis, nec appetit ipsum, neque etiam videtur sibi quod oporteat omnia eligere et operari propter verum finem, sed magis propter delectabile. Quaelibet enim malitia, id est habitus vitiosus, corrumpit principium, in quantum corrumpit rectam existimationem de fine, hanc autem corruptionem maxime prohibet temperantia. Et sic concludit ex praedictis signis quod necesse est prudentiam esse habitum operativum circa humana bona cum ratione vera.’ 22 See previous note. 23 Gregorius Magnus, Moralia in Iob XXXI, xlv, 88, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina, vol. 143B, ed. Marci Adriaen (Turnhout: Brepols, 1985), 1610: ‘De luxuria, caecitas mentis, inconsideratio, inconstantia, praecipitatio, amor sui, odium Dei, affectus praesentis saeculi, horror autem uel desperatio futuri generatur.’ 24 Since it has a general object (as pleasure is), a sin is a capital sin: Aquinas has made this point clear in Qu. disp. de malo, 14.3, resp., ed. Leon., vol. 23, ed. Pierre-Marie Gils (Rome and Paris: Commissio Leonina and Vrin, 1982), 252. 25 Ibid., 15.4, resp., 277–78: ‘Responsio. Dicendum, quod sicut supra dictum est, quia delectatio est una de conditionibus felicitatis, inde est quod uitia que habent delectationem pro obiecto sunt capitalia utpote habentes finem maxime appetibilem ad quem alia nata sunt ordinari. Delectatio autem uenereorum que est finis luxurie est maxima inter delectationes corporales, et ideo luxuria debet poni uitium capitale; et sunt octo filie eius: uidelicet “cecitas mentis, inconsideratio, inconstantia, precipitatio, amor sui, odium Dei, affectus presentis et desperatio futuri”, ut patet per Gregorium XXXI Moralium. Manifestum est enim quod quando intentio anime uehementer applicatur ad actum inferioris potentie, quod superiores potentie debilitantur et deordinantur in suo actu; et ideo quando in actu luxurie propter uehementiam delectationis tota intentio anime trahitur ad inferiores uires, id est ad concupiscibilem et ad sensum tactus, necesse est quod superiores, scilicet ratio et uoluntas, defectum patiantur. Sunt autem quatuor actus rationis secundum quod dirigit humanos actus: quorum primus est intellectus quidam quo aliquis recte existimat de fine qui est sicut principium in operatiuis, ut Philosophus dicit in II Phisicorum; et

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Phantasia in Aristotle’s Ethics in quantum hoc impeditur ponitur filia luxurie cecitas mentis, secundum illud Dan. xiii “Species decepit te, concupiscentia subuertit cor tuum”. Secundus actus est consilium de agendis, quod per concupiscentiam tollitur. Dicit enim Terentius in Eunucho “Que res in se neque consilium neque modum habet ullum, eam consilio regere non potes”, et loquitur in amore libidinoso; et quantum ad hoc ponitur inconsideratio. Tertius actus est iudicium de agendis; et hoc etiam impeditur per luxuriam. Dicitur enim Dan. xiii quod “auerterunt sensum suum ut non recordarentur iudiciorum iustorum”; et quantum ad hoc ponitur precipitatio, dum scilicet homo inclinatur ad consensum precipitanter non expectato iudicio rationis. Quartus actus est preceptum de agendo, quod etiam impeditur per luxuriam, in quantum homo non persistit in eo quod diiudicauit, sicut etiam Terentius dicit in Eunucho “Hec uerba”, que scilicet dicis te recessurum ab amica, “una falsa lacrimula restringet”; et quantum ad hoc ponitur inconstantia. Ex parte uero inordinationis affectus duo sunt consideranda: quorum unum est appetitus delectationis in quem fertur uoluntas ut in finem; et quantum ad hoc ponitur amor sui, dum scilicet inordinate sibi appetit delectationem, et per oppositum odium Dei, in quantum scilicet prohibet delectationem concupitam. Aliud uero est appetitus eorum per que consequitur quis hunc finem; et quantum ad hoc ponitur affectus presentis seculi, id est omnium eorum per que ad finem intentum peruenit qui ad seculum istud pertinet; et per oppositum ponitur desperatio futuri seculi, quia dum nimis affectat carnales delectationes magis despicit spirituales.’ See also the parallel text in the Summa theologiae 2.2, 53, 6, ed. Leon., vol. 8, ed. cura et studio Fratrum Praedicatorum (Rome: Typographia Polyglotta, 1895), 393–94.

26 In the Sententia Libri Ethicorum, Aquinas only affirmed that intemperance destroys wisdom at the highest point (maxime), which doesn’t explain how other vices can have the same effect (see note 21 above). 27 Text quoted in note 25 above. 28 First redaction is edited in Radulphus Brito, Le questiones di Radulfo Brito sull’‘Etica Nicomachea’, ed. Iacopo Costa (Turnhout: Brepols, 2008). I’m currently preparing the critical edition of the second redaction, only preserved in MS Vat. lat. 2173: I will here quote the provisory critical text (Radulphus’s Sentence commentary is unedited too; it is preserved in MS Pavia, Univ. Aldini 244). 29 utrum habens scientiam rectam in uniuersali et in particulari possit incontinenter agere. 30 Radulphus Brito, Questiones super lib. Ethicorum, editio secunda, 7, qu. 166, resp., MS Vat. lat. 2173, f. 49rb (critical edition in preparation): ‘aliquis potest

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habere rectam scientiam de aliquo speculatiue aut practice; si habeat rectam scientiam speculatiue solum, sic habens rectam scientiam de aliquo in uniuersali et in particulari potest agere incontinenter, cuius ratio est quia propter habere illud quod nullo simpliciter modo facit ad continentiam uel incontinentiam, non debet aliquis posse agere incontinenter uel non agere; set scientia alicuius speculatiue solum, dummodo non applicetur ad opus, nullo modo facit ad continentiam uel incontinentiam, unde ita bene continens potest scire triangulum habere tres, ut dicit Philosophus, sicut et incontinens et e conuerso, quia talis conclusio non est nisi propter speculationem; ideo etc.’ 31 Ibid. ‘Si autem aliquis habeat rectam scientiam de aliquo practice, aut habet rectam scientiam in uniuersali solum, aut habet rectam scientiam in uniuersali et in particulari. Si habeat rectam scientiam in uniuersali solum practice, sic habens rectam scientiam practice potest incontinenter agere quia, sicut apparet III De anima, uniuersale non mouet ad operationem, ergo dato quod aliquis rectam scientiam practice in uniuersali habeat circa actus continentie, potest incontinenter agere.’ 32 Ibid., f. 49rb-va: ‘Si habeat rectam scientiam in uniuersali et in particulari in habitu solum ligato et habendo rationem dubiam circa conditiones et circumstantias illius particularis quod sumitur sub propositione uniuersali solum, sic habens rectam scientiam potest incontinenter agere, et sic habentes rectam scientiam comparat Philosophus uinolentis et ebriis, quia sicut dicit ibi Eustratius, sicut caput ebriorum grauatur ex euaporatione uini ita quod non possint recta habere, immo eorum phantasmata obnubilata sunt, ita intellectus alicuius propter fortem motum concupiscentie est ligatus, ita quod non potest exire in actum cum uoluerit secundum habitum ligatum quem habet ex passione; etiam in non considerando circa habitum quem habet, quia non uult considerare nec aduertere circa actus conscientie, potest incontinenter agere; etiam si rationem dubiam habeat circa illud particulare quod sumitur sub maiori propositione dubitans utrum meliores sint conditiones eius oppositi quam sint conditiones sue, potest per hoc incontinenter agere.’ 33 Ibid., f. 49va: ‘Si autem habeat rectam scientiam in uniuersali et in particulari circa aliquid practice in actu non habendo habitum ligatum nec rationem dubiam circa conditiones illius particularis sumpti sub minori propositione secundum rationem certam dicendo quod omnibus conditionibus pensatis illud est melius quam eius oppositum, sic habens rectam scientiam in uniuersali et in particulari non potest incontinenter agere quia, sicut uisum est prius, incontinens est ille qui ex electione dimittit rationem et sequitur passionem;

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34 Ibid. ‘Set tunc manet difficultas: ex quo necesse est sic uolentem uelle continenter agere et non incontinenter, quomodo manebit libertas uoluntatis ? Et uidetur quod tunc uoluntas non sit libera quia de necessitate uult illud et non oppositum.’ 35 Ibid. ‘unde uoluntas sic dicitur esse libera, quia uoluntas potuit inclinare intellectum ad considerandum circa hoc et circa eius oppositum et circa illud et circa eius oppositum, et alias potentias habet inclinare in suos actus, ut secundum quod necesse est disponant ad hoc quod homo per uoluntatem possit prosequi illud quod ab intellectu eius est cognitum ut bonum prosequendum. Et per istum modum dicitur homo esse dominus suorum actuum.’ 36 Ibid. ‘Quomodo autem homo dicitur peccare ex certa malitia ? Dicendum est quod per istum modum quia quando aliquis habet rectam cognitionem de aliquo agibili in uniuersali et in particulari, sic tamen quod non sumit particulare illud sub uniuersali nec aduertit ad illud ut est agibile in particulari set magis ad suum oppositum quando operatur malum, sic dicitur quod homo peccat ex certa malitia, sicut propter passionem: quantumcumque aliquis in uniuersali sciat quod malum est fornicari, tamen incontinentia dicet sibi: “cum ista muliere est fornicandum”, et mouebit ipsum ad fornicandum siue ad incontinenter agendum, quia particularia plus mouent quam uniuersalia, unde ista particularis que dicit quod cum ista muliere est fornicandum est contraria maiori uniuersali que dicit quod fornicari est malum. Verumptamen ille qui sic propter concupiscentiam mouetur uel propter inconsiderationem circa oppositum non aduertit ad hoc nec inducit eam sub maiori, et quia non aduertit ad relationem minoris ad maiorem, ita fornicabitur et amittet usum rationis, nec operabitur secundum usum rectum rationis quamuis habeat rectam rationem in uniuersali, unde ille decidet a sua uera opinione, quia circa ista contingentia particularia que possunt aliter se habere de facili potest aliquis decidere a sua opinione, ita quod poterit decidere a scientia non solum in particulari, immo etiam in uniuersali, quia qua ratione contra rationem dicet quod fornicandum cum ista muliere, dicet quod bonum

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est fornicari cum illa et sic de aliis, et sic dicet quod fornicari non est malum ut sic, tamen non debetur peccare sibi ex certa malitia, set secundum modum qui dictus est.’ 37 See the Scholastic definition of habitus as ‘quo quis utitur cum voluerit’. This adagium comes from Averroes and Augustine, as has been pointed out by Gauthier; see Thomas Aquinas, Sententia Libri de Anima, ed. Leon., vol. 45.1, ed. René A. Gauthier (Rome and Paris: Commissio Leonina and Vrin, 1984), 223*–24*. 38 Radulphus Brito, Questiones super lib. Ethicorum, editio secunda, 7, qu. 166, resp., MS Vat. lat. 2173, f. 49vb: ‘Dicendum quod passio bene potest impedire actum scientie. Quia habens habitum scientie non considerat in actu nisi quod uoluerit: uoluntas enim est principium operandi uel agendi, ipsa enim potest mouere omnes uires, ut dictum est in III huius. Et ideo si scientia debeat adipisci actum suum, oportet quod prius inclinet ipsum ad hoc uoluntas, unde si uoluntas inclinet intellectum ad optimum scientie, quod est actus eius, tunc sciens actu considerabit secundum habitum. Si autem uoluntas trahatur a passione presentante aliquid delectabile conueniens, contingit statim appetitum, et etiam uoluntatem per consequens, in id ferri, et tunc uoluntas inclinabit ad prosecutionem passionis et non scientie. Et sic uno modo impeditur scientia per passionem in actu suo. Alio modo contingit eam impediri quia sicut dormiens uel ebrius potest considerare secundum habitum suum propter ligamentum organi phantasie, que est ministra intellectus, et talis transmutatio secundum corpus impedit actualem considerationem, similiter accidit in incontinenti in passione: contingit enim non solum organum ymaginationis transmutari per passionis motus set etiam corpus transmutatur, ut amantes amore erreos palescunt, pudibundi autem rubescunt facie. Et ideo sic ligat habitum scientie ne possit in actum exire. Set ymaginatione fortiter mota a passione et presentato fantasmate fortiter passionatiui, contingit per accidens uoluntatem ferri in talia ut conuenientia, et tunc impeditur scientie actus et prosequitur passionatus operationem secundum passionem. Sedato autem motu passionum contingit hominem ad usum intellectus redire et tunc penitet memorans commissa. Et ideo dicit VII Phisicorum quod anima sedendo et quietando fit sapiens et prudens.’

T H E M E D I EVA L H E B R EW T R A D I T IO N 6

Reception and Interpretation of Aristotle’s Concept of Phantasia in the Hebrew Translations and Commentaries on Nicomachean Ethics 6.5.1140b16–17 and 1.13.1002b9–11 Chaim Meir Neria

Introduction In what follows, I will describe the reception and interpretation of Aristotle’s concept of phantasia in the Hebrew tradition of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, focusing on translations and commentaries. The main focus of this chapter will be Nicomachean Ethics 6.5.1140b16–17 but I will also discuss Nicomachean Ethics 1.13.1102b9–11. I will analyse Samuel ben Judah’s Hebrew translation of Averroes’s Middle Commentary and compare it with Don Meir Alguades’s Hebrew translation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. In addition, I will discuss Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob’s commentary on this passage of Nicomachean Ethics and compare it to its use in the sermons and biblical commentaries of Rabbi Isaac ‘Arama – a younger contemporary of Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob.

The reception and transmission of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics in Hebrew Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics is not only a basic text in Greek and Arab philosophy that exerted a tremendous influence on contemporary ethical philosophy, but also one of the works that occupies the heart of commentaries

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and philosophical works in medieval Jewish thought. Maimonides, influenced by the Arabic version of the Nicomachean Ethics, both directly and indirectly, is the first Jewish philosopher to quote from and refer to this work in his writings.1 And yet, the Ethics was not translated during the early stages when much philosophical literature was being rendered from Arabic into Hebrew.2 Over one hundred years were to pass from the death of Maimonides until 1321, when the Nicomachean Ethics appeared in its first Hebrew translation, entitled Sefer Ha-Middot. The translator was Samuel ben Judah of Marseille,3 who did not translate this Aristotelian text itself but Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Ethics.4 Because of the Arabicized Hebrew of the translation, its syntactical difficulties and Samuel ben Judah’s own oversights in understanding the Nicomachean Ethics, the influence of his translation on Jewish philosophical thought was quite limited. Samuel ben Judah himself edited an additional edition of his translations, and further editions apparently were published by circles associated with him. But despite the improvements and search for accuracy, the book’s influence on Jewish philosophy remained limited.5 A notable additional development is the anonymous Hebrew supercommentary on one of the editions of Samuel ben Judah’s Hebrew rendition of Averroes’s Middle Commentary, which includes translations of significant and extensive excerpts from Thomas Aquinas’s important work, Sententia Libri Ethicorum.6 This translation enriched Jewish philosophy, by providing a new angle for the reading of Aristotle’s Ethics, namely, the Latin, scholastic angle. This perspective also brought into sharper focus the distinction between the aspiration for worldly happiness, the pursuit of which Aristotle is an authority, and perfect, heavenly happiness, regarding the attainment of which the divine Torah is the authoritative guide, not Aristotle. It was only at the beginning of the fifteenth century that the chief rabbi of Castille, Don Meir Alguades, took upon himself to translate the complete text of the Nicomachean Ethics into Hebrew. As a basis for his translation, Alguades relied on Grosseteste’s edition of the Latin text and on the Christian-scholastic commentary.7 His translation was smoother, more eloquent and clearer than that of Samuel ben Judah. In addition, Alguades, who wrote in a mosaic writing style, inserted into the text fragments of biblical verses, and even gave biblical names to the Aristotelian virtues, providing the reader of the Hebrew text a sense a familiarity, rather than alienation, towards the Aristotelian text.

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The ‘Judaization’ process of the Aristotelian text gave the Jewish readership a feeling that the text spoke in their language and conversed with their tradition in the deepest manner.8 In contrast to the translation of Samuel ben Judah, that of Alguades became tremendously popular, and by the end of the fifteenth century, it had become the most quoted philosophical source in Jewish homiletical literature. A remarkable and perhaps unprecedented phenomenon thus unfolded: a book translated in the fifteenth century that in effect constituted a fresh or new source of philosophical ideas became more popular than any of the philosophical works that preceded it. In the case of Sephardic rabbinic thought of the fifteenth century, the Ethics was quoted by Zerahiah ha-Levi Saladin, Joseph Albo, Moses Argal, Joseph b. Shem-Tob, Shem-Tob b. Joseph Shem-Tob, Abraham Shalom, Joel ibn Shueib, Joseph Hayyun, Isaac Abarbanel, Isaac Arama and many others. If, in 1442, Joseph b. Shem-Tob complained that Aristotle’s Ethics was the least known work among the Jews, not much time passed until this claim no longer reflected the reality, inter alia due to his efforts to accelerate the book’s popularization. In summary, here is a list of the most relevant texts in the Hebrew tradition of the Nicomachean Ethics that will be discussed here: 1. 1321 Samuel ben Judah’s Arabic-Hebrew translation of Averroes’s Middle Commentary, first edition, ed. Berman, 1999 (henceforth: McNEheb). 2. Fourteenth-century anonymous Hebrew super-commentary on Averroes’s Middle Commentary, based on Aquinas’s Sententia Libri Ethicorum. MS Oxford, Bodleian, MS Oppenheim 591 (Neubauer 1426) (henceforth: Super-commentary on McNEheb). 3. Early fifteenth-century Alguades’s Latin-to-Hebrew translation of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Neria, 2015 (henceforth: NEheb). 4. 1455 Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob’s Hebrew Commentary on NEheb MS Saint Petersburg, Heb 379. 5. The sermons of Rabbi Isaac Arama.

Nicomachean Ethics 6.5.1140b11–25 in McNEheb In his McNE, as described by Frédérique Woerther in this volume, Averroes first divides Aristotle’s text into sections – each beginning with the Arabic qāla

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translated into Hebrew as amar, that is, ‘ said’. For our purposes, Averroes’s division of the text into paragraphs will serve as the basic literary unit. In our present discussion, according to the McNE in Latin and Hebrew, the paragraph starts at 6.5.1140b11 and continues to 6.5.1140b25. Frédérique Woerther translated this in her article, which I cite here with a few modifications and additions9: said. For this reason, ‘fear of sin’ (sôphrosunê, ‘iffah, yirʾaṯ ḥēṭ) is called in the language of the Greeks by a term derived from the term ‘prudence’ (phronêsis, haś-kēl). For the person with prudence is the one who preserves his opinion so it is not destroyed by grief or joy – I mean will and desire – in the same manner in which a sin-fearing [man] preserves his action from being corrupted by pleasure. And indeed the matter is so, for not every opinion is destroyed on account of pleasure and sadness. For the destruction of the belief that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles is not on account of pleasure and sadness, but on account of the destruction of the principles that necessitate the destruction of this belief only. As for the prudential opinion, it is destroyed, therefore, by these two – I mean on account of the destruction of the principles and on account of the pleasure and sadness. And its destruction on account of pleasure and sadness will appear timely – I mean that it is more apparent than the destruction that is from the premises. And when the true prudential opinion is that which does not attain the destruction on account of the will, then it necessarily follows that the one with prudence will not choose both these matters together, that is, what comes from the heart of the bad and the good, for what comes from the heart of the bad is from a principle that is destroyed on account of desire and they are separated also because what comes from the heart of the bad is from the characteristic of abundance of desire. And since this is so, true prudence is a characteristic that acts with correct reason for the human good. Therefore,10 art requires virtue but prudence is almost virtue by itself. Also one who does involuntary error or voluntary error in art it is similar whereas in the sphere of prudence voluntary error is worse,11 as it is in the sphere of the virtues. It is therefore clear that prudence is a virtue, and not an art – I mean craft. (McNEheb, ed. Berman, 1140b11-24, 209–210)12

Averroes’s text is generally difficult, but I would like to focus on the Hebrew translation and its unique character. One of the strangest discrepancies in the

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Hebrew is the translation of the Greek sôphrosynê to the Hebrew yirʾaṯ ḥēṭ, ‘the fear of sin’. Any reader can easily notice that the Greek sôphrosynê is not only different from the Hebrew yirʾaṯ ḥēṭ, ‘the fear of sin’, but belongs to a different semantic field. How did this happen? In an article dedicated to sôphrosynê and enkrateia in Arabic, Latin and Hebrew, Lawrence V. Berman traces the development of these terms in reference mainly to Nicomachean Ethics 3.10.1117b23.13 According to Berman, the Arabic ‘iffah stands in between the Greek sôphrosynê and the Hebrew yirʾaṯ ḥēṭ. The Arabic term creates the initial linkage between sôphrosynê and sexual abstention on the one hand, and sôphrosynê and unlawfulness on the other. Describing the Latin translations of sôphrosynê, Berman argues that Hermannus Alemannus, who translated Averroes’s McNE, seems to follow the Arabic text and translate ‘iffah with castitas; however, Robert Grosseteste, who translates directly from Greek, chooses the term temperancia. As to the Hebrew term yirʾaṯ ḥēṭ, ‘the fear of sin’, Berman argues that this term possibly takes the Arabic ‘iffah farther into the religious semantic field; but he thinks that it is not the case so much of ‘Judaizing’ Nicomachean Ethics as ‘secularizing’ the Bible by using biblical terms as technical philosophical terms. Berman is not the first to note that the term yirʾaṯ ḥēṭ is foreign to the Aristotelian world. The anonymous compiler of the Super-commentary on McNEheb knew Latin and had access to interpretive traditions that did not rely on Averroes’s mediation. Therefore, he was able to compare, and sometimes criticized, the text or translation of McNEheb. Indeed, the anonymous compiler of the Super-commentary on McNEheb refers to the various terms while suggesting different Hebrew terms to replace yirʾaṯ ḥēṭ. At first, he only transliterates the Greek sôphrosynê and phronêsis, and instead of yirʾaṯ ḥēṭ, he suggests the Hebrew term shivvui – literally, even minded or sound or equanimity as a better Hebrew translation of sôphrosynê. He explains that sôphrosynê has the sense of preserving reason: ‘For the person with phronêsis is the one who preserves his opinion so it is not destroyed by grief or joy.’14 Rabbi Don Meir Alguades based his translation (the NEheb) on Grosseteste’s Latin translation. As mentioned above, Grosseteste uses the Latin term temperancia for sôphrosynê, hence Alguades introduces a different Hebrew term – histappkut, meaning sufficiency or contentment – to translate temperancia.15

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Finally, when we turn to Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob’s Hebrew commentary on NEheb we find something rather odd: In one sentence Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob presents almost all of the various Hebrew terms as expressions of one concept, so that he then uses all of them interchangeably. According to Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob: This is why sufficiency (histappkut), which is the ‘fear of sin’ (yirʾaṯ ḥēṭ) and middle way with respect to pleasure (mitsuˈ betaˈanugim), is called in the Greek language by a name related to prudence, since equanimity in pleasure (shivvui betaˈanugim) preserves prudence and reason. (MS Saint Petersburg, Heb 379, 181a; my translation)

Thus, the Greek sôphrosynê has at least four different possible translations in the medieval Hebrew translation and commentaries to Nicomachean Ethics. Chronologically, it starts with yirʾaṯ ḥēṭ, ‘the fear of sin’ which is a profoundly religious term. It is then neutralized again by using the terms shivvui (literally, even minded or sound or equanimity) and histappkut (sufficiency; contentment) to contextualize again with profoundly religious meaning, in the sense that Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob argues that all these terms have the same meaning, that is yirʾaṯ ḥēṭ, ‘the fear of sin’ equals histappkut (sufficiency; contentment). As stated above, Berman argued that translating sôphrosynê as ‘fear of sin’ (yirʾaṯ ḥēṭ) is not so much ‘Judaizing’ the Nicomachean Ethics as secularizing the Bible by using biblical terms as technical philosophical terms. I think that the process of secularizing biblical terms into technical philosophical may have double meanings, and in the case of Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob the opposite is true. He could have chosen any of the above neutral and technical terms to explain sôphrosynê. However, he insisted on using the religious term ‘fear of sin’ (yirʾaṯ ḥēṭ), and emphasizing the identity of sufficiency, contentment (histappkut), fear of sin (yirʾaṯ ḥēṭ) and a middle way in pleasure (mitsuˈ betaˈanugim). In so doing, he is deliberately ‘Judaizing’ the Nicomachean Ethics.

Pleasure, grief and the corruption of judgement Aristotle’s main point in Nicomachean Ethics 6.5.1140b16–20 is as follows: For the principles of things achievable in action are their goal, but if someone is corrupted because of pleasure or pain, the principle does not immediately

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appear to him, and it cannot appear that this is the right goal and cause of all his choice and action; for vice corrupts the principle. (trans. Irwin, altered)16

According to Thomas Aquinas in Sententia Libri Ethicorum – which is the basis for the interpretive tradition in three of the later Hebrew sources (Super-commentary on McNEheb, NEheb and Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob Hebrew Commentary on NEheb) – Aristotle’s intention in this paragraph is to explain his previous definition of phronêsis as a truth-attaining rational state, concerned with action in relation to things that are good and bad for human beings (EN 6.5.1140b4–6).17 Aristotle argues that pleasure and pain do not distort principles that have to do with speculative judgement, but it perverts estimations that have to do with actions – hence, phronêsis, which is concerned with things related to actions, is destroyed by pleasure and pain. The question remains, what is the exact mechanism by which pleasure and pain distort phronêsis and good actions? According to Thomas Aquinas’s Sententia Libri Ethicorum, Aristotle provides the following explanation: the principles of action are the end to which our acts are means – as principles of demonstration are to demonstration. Aquinas supports this by referencing Physics (2.9.200a15–b8). However, to a person experiencing intense pleasure or pain, (1) things appear best by either attaining great pleasure or avoiding pain. So, (2) when his judgement is distorted by intense pleasure or pain, a person does not clearly see the end (which, for actions is the principle of phronêsis); and (3) does not desire the end, but rather, to experience pleasure or avoid pain. (4) A person also does not think that it is necessary for him to act on account of the true end, but on account of pleasure or pain. (5) Finally, every bad habit – not only the experience of intense pleasure or pain – distorts the correct estimation of the end; however, this can be disciplined by temperance.18 In NEheb, Alguades translates 6.5.1140b11–17 as follows: Therefore, contentment (sôphrosynê; histappkut) is called in the Greek language by a name like that (phronêsis; prudence), for it (sôphrosynê; contentment) preserves prudence, and that judgment preserves that [kind of] estimation (dimyon).19 Indeed, pleasure and grief will neither destroy all judgment, nor reverse it, for example that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles or not, but they distort judgments dealing with the practicable. Since the principles of action are [the end] to which acts

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are means. If however, they20 will be corrupted21 by pleasure and grief, the principle does not appear, neither what is appropriate to do for them nor that for which it is appropriate for them to choose all things and to do them, since this [pleasure and grief] is a serious vice [lit. bad illness] that distorts the principle. (Alguades, NEheb, ed. Neria, ‘It Cannot Be Valued’, Appendix 2, 497; my translation)22

The text of NEheb is sometimes hard to follow or understand, although the NEheb presents the reader with the main arguments in this section in line with Aquinas’s reading. In the last sentence Aristotle states that vice corrupts the principle. However, in Alguades’s translation it is not vice in general, but ‘this’ vice (i.e. intense pleasure and grief) that destroys the principle. Clearly Alguades is not so far from Aristotle here, since pleasure and grief are involved in all sorts of vice, and for this reason the entire treatise is concerned with pleasure and grief, as Aristotle repeatedly states (EN 2.3.1104b3–1105a16). Still the emphasis on pleasure and grief as such was very useful for Jewish rabbis and preachers. Of all, the last sentence was coined in the Jewish tradition as an axiom. At least in Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob’s commentary and in Rabbi Isaac ‘Arama’s sermons, these words, that ‘excess in pleasure and grief is a serious vice that distorts the principle’, developed into major moral teachings that served for these two authors as viable explanations of Jewish law and biblical teachings.

Rabbi Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob’s commentary on NEheb 6.5.1140 b11–25 In his commentary on NEheb 6.5.1140b11–25,23Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob consulted all the relevant materials available to him in Hebrew in order to explain the text to the reader. He clearly knows McNEheb very well, uses the Supercommentary on McNEheb and adds cross-references to the entire Aristotelian corpus – especially via Averroes’s summaries and commentaries – but Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob is unique in his explicit efforts to ‘Judaize’ the Aristotelian text. Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob’s commentary is brimming with biblical excerpts, explanations of the reasons for the commandments in light of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, discussions of the behaviour of biblical characters and

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explanations of various events from traditional history. He often integrates rabbinic passages – from early rabbinical sources until his own. Among other things, Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob presents examples from Jewish legal discussions (Halakhic materials), Aggadah, Jewish philosophy, Jewish history and Jewish historical figures. These examples appear on almost every page of his book, and usually follow the conclusion of a technical discussion of Aristotle’s text – the goal being to shed light on the topic discussed and bring the Jewish reader closer by offering a familiar example from the reader’s own cultural world. In his commentary on Nicomachean Ethics 6.5.1140b17–18, he refers to two Jewish sources in particular. The first tries to help the traditional Jewish reader to accept Aristotle’s argument about the distortion of reason by the pursuit of pleasure, the ‘proof ’ for which he finds in Deuteronomy 16.19: You shall not take bribes, for bribes blind the eyes of the discerning and upset the plea of the just.

In this case, Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob argues that the biblical bribe is equivalent to the Aristotelian love of pleasure. In the same way that, for Aristotle, the ability to see the principle of action is corrupted by love for pleasure – so, in the Bible, bribe or the love of pleasure will ‘blind the eyes of the discerning’. In addition, a judge who is ready to accept a bribe clearly does not think that it is necessary to act on account of the true end but on account of pleasure or grief.24 The second argument Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob seeks to explain is that ‘pleasure and grief do not destroy or pervert all beliefs … but only beliefs concerning action’. He explains this by citing an example that would be familiar to his Jewish reader. The example differentiates between the process of finding or collecting facts, and the process of making judgements and acting: And therefore the lover and the hater [of a certain person] may not adjudicate [him] lest their opinion will be corrupted due to pleasure [in the case] of the lover and to grief [in the case] of the hater. But they are permitted to testify since what is achieved by senses is not subject to corruption by love or hate, in the same way that the opinion of things that are subject to demonstration are not subject to corruption [by love or hate]. (MS Saint Petersburg, Heb 379 181b; my translation)25

Here Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob cites the Jewish rule that ‘a judge may not adjudicate a case where a friend is a party to the action … Similarly, he may not adjudicate

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a case of one he hates … Instead, the two litigants must be looked upon equally in the eyes and in the hearts of the judges’.26 While this is the law concerning judges, there is no comparable law that prohibits witnesses testifying either for their friends or against their foes. The difference, argues Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob, is that in contrast to judgement which occurs in the realm of the preferential and normative and therefore is prone to potential bias, testimonials are based on senses, focus on factual information rather than judgemental and therefore are less prone to be moved by feelings such as love or hatred, pleasure or grief. This argument is similar to Aristotle’s here that opinions in areas that are subject to scientific or logical demonstration are not subject to corruption by love or hatred, that is, pleasure or grief. Hence, judges are prohibited from serving as judges when a friend or foe is a party to the action, because judicial processes involve more than simply reporting what one has seen with one’s own eyes; among other things, a judicial process requires the virtue of phronêsis – a type of normatively laden wisdom which is subject to corruption by either love or hatred, pleasure or grief. Regardless of the differences between the varying traditions, for the Jewish reader the similarities create a sense of familiarity between the words of Aristotle and the words of the Torah. In this way it is easy for the traditional Jewish reader to accept the Aristotelian argument that love for pleasure can distract the wise person and to feel comfortable with the text.

Nicomachean Ethics 6.5.1140b11–25 in the sermons of Rabbai Issac ‘Arama In the introduction to his commentary on NEheb, Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob goes to great lengths to praise Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, claiming that it is not just a masterpiece, but a rare uncontroversial work that complements rather than clashes with traditional Jewish views. In light of this compatibility, he complains of the lack of knowledge and access to this book ‘among the members of our community’: And the words of this book, which ‘cannot be valued with the gold of Ophir’ (see Job 28.16), are like the words of a ‘sealed book’ (Isa. 29.11) because there is no man from among the members of our community present in this land

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‘designated by name’ (I Chron. 16.41 etc.) who is ascending the ladder of exalted wisdom, who has descended into the depths of the sea to lift in his hands the sapphires and pearls it contains, with their intellectual desire to understand these matters based on what they have already tasted and seen in the other areas of wisdom, of incomplete treatises, leaving them with the pain of desire, and little to hope for. (MS Paris BNF, Heb 996 2a)27

Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob argues that, unlike other books, the Nicomachean Ethics had never benefited from a Hebrew commentary, and therefore it remained like the ‘sealed book’ in Isaiah, that is, a book that one cannot easily approach in order to mine its jewels.28 In contrast to Christians who had written wonderful interpretations of Nicomachean Ethics, ‘the members of our community present in this land’ forgot the book itself and the realm of ethics, and none of them – including the great philosophers – made an effort to extract its hidden treasures. However, within a few years this impression seems to have changed. For several years, Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob’s commentary remained the only original commentary on the NEheb, but, as Marc Saperstein has argued, ‘after the Bible, rabbinic classics, and perhaps [Maimonides’] the Guide of the Perplexed, Aristotle’s Ethics was the most widely cited work in the [Hebrew] sermons of the fifteenth century’.29 Rabbi Issac ‘Arama, a younger member of Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob’s generation, was a popular preacher30 and is known for his book ʿAqedat Yitzḥaq (Binding of Issac), which is one of the most popular and classic works of Jewish homiletics and is still widely read today. If Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob explains the Nicomachean Ethics using Jewish sources, ‘Arama uses Aristotle as an explanation of the Bible – while closely following Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob’s commentary. In at least three of his sermons on the Torah, ‘Arama refers to Nicomachean Ethics 6.5.1140b11–25. In Exodus 31 he finds in Aristotle’s words proof for the inherently corrupt nature of human beings ‘brought forth in iniquity’ (Ps. 51.5) and ‘formed out of the clay’ (Job 63.6).31 According to ‘Arama, more than any other creature human beings have a tendency to be governed by their most basic urges, so that legislation to prevent this is crucial to society. In Leviticus 15 he argues that the aim of biblical dietary laws is to purify human nature so that human beings will not be ruled by their basic urges related to pleasure and grief.32 Finally, in Deuteronomy 16 he explains the prohibition against taking

114

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bribes in relation to the fact that an excess in pleasure or grief has the power to corrupt judgement. Following Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob’s commentary closely, he says that even the best man is not immune to the abuse of power; the Torah therefore warns against these tendencies, and a judge may not adjudicate a case of someone he hates or when one of the litigants is a colleague, friend or fellow judge.33 Since ‘Arama was a very popular preacher, Aristotle’s words that ‘since this [pleasure and grief] is a serious vice [lit. bad illness] that distorts the principle’ were transmitted indirectly to other authors who knew ‘Arama’s sermons but not Aristotle. A good example is an Italian rabbi from the sixteenth century who cites Aristotle’s words without reference to the source as if they are simply a well-known saying. What Aristotle wrote in Nicomachean Ethics, in other words, at least in this milieu, had become conventional wisdom.34

Dreams, prophecy and imagination in Nicomachean Ethics 1.13.1002b9–11 In Nicomachean Ethics 1.13.1002b9–11, Aristotle discusses the question of whether good virtue in a person has some kind of connection to the irrational elements of the body and, particularly, to the ‘nutritive faculty’. In an aside, Aristotle claims tentatively that if we assume that people’s dreams during sleep are influenced by daily activities, it may be that decent people will have better and more decent dreams than those who are not decent. Averroes’s McNEheb, as described also by Frédérique Woerther in this volume, does not add much to these words of Aristotle in terms of content. Rather, he remains vague and presents Aristotle’s ideas as mere conjecture. The only change Averroes does make is to posit a connection between the effect of good and fine behaviour on the koaḥ ha-medabber, that is the intellectual faculty, and on the power of imagination.35 In short, Averroes adds the concept of influence of good deeds on dreams and via dreams on the intellectual faculty but his main point remains, like Aristotle, that there might be an ethical dimension to imagination. In contrast to the minor attention that Averroes lends to these matters in Aristotle, already in Alguades’s translation from the Latin, the Aristotelian conjecture becomes an asserted fact. Still Alguades omits all the references

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suggested by Averroes on the possible influence of dreams on the intellectual, rational faculty. In the language of Alguades, this claim is formulated as follows: Yet perhaps certain activities while awaking do penetrate the sleep gradually. Therefor the imaginations of the virtuous become better than [the imaginations] of other persons. (Alguades, NEheb, ed. Neria, ‘It Cannot Be Valued’, Appendix 2, 434; my translation)36

In Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob’s commentary on this paragraph, Aristotle’s incidental conjecture, which was formulated by Alguades as an assertion, constitutes a basis for a two-staged conversation. First, Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob stretches Alguades’s formulation even further. According to Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob: And therefore, the imaginations of virtuous people and their dreams during sleep will be better than other people, since one who imagines during sleep will utilize his activities while waking. And therefore, the righteous and the evil will not be at all equal during their sleep, for the evil person will imagine that in his sleep he is doing evil things, while the righteous person ‘loves righteous deeds’ [Ps. 11.7]. (MS Saint Petersburg, Heb 379 41b–42a; my translation)37

Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob asserts that there is no similarity whatsoever between the imaginations of righteous and evil people. The evil person performs – or at least it seems that he performs – evil deeds in his sleep, while the righteous person magnifies his sense of justice and love of the good in his sleep. But Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob does not stop at this claim regarding the essential difference between the dreams of righteous and evil people, using it rather to transition into a discussion of prophecy. Since human deeds and occupations, as well as cognitive functions, have an effect on what happens in one’s sleep, Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob determines that ‘prophecy regarding exalted matters descends on prophets during sleep, since the imagination of prophets during sleep is based on that which is in use while awake’.38 In other words, the sleep time thought of the prophets, whose daily activities were good and excellent, is full of fine and divine things; hence, their power of imagination is enhanced and functions differently than in those who are not prophets. Joseph b. ShemṬob then proceeds to discuss Averroes’s Epitome of the Parva Naturalia,39 where the latter launches into a more comprehensive discussion of the connection between wakeful and sleeping times and the nature of dreams and prophecy.

116

Phantasia in Aristotle’s Ethics

Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob elaborates on the excerpt from the Ethics, quoting Averroes’s claim in the Epitome that due to the fact that the prophet’s waking soul is busy with spiritual and intellectual matters, he can produce true visions. Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob goes on to explain Averroes’s opinion in the Epitome that due to the fact that the soul and the intellect are at rest during sleep, the prophet cannot employ the active intellect while sleeping. The active intellect, claims Averroes, can only be reached through theoretical, logical reasoning and not through prophecy. Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob, however, rejects Averroes’s attempt to differentiate between theoretical and prophetic knowledge. In Joseph b. ShemṬob’s view, prophetic knowledge is knowledge of the secrets of existence, which lie beyond the theoretical knowledge accessible to all. Prophecy is not a natural phenomenon but divine miracle hence the prophet may employ the active intellect while sleeping.

Conclusion In modern scholarship on Latin Scholastic literature, there is an ongoing discussion regarding the question of the extent to which Aquinas’s commentary on the Ethics is a ‘Christian’ commentary that distorts Aristotelian philosophy, or a balanced commentary that does justice to it, despite occasional digressions.40 It is in any case clear to Aquinas’s readers that for the most part, his commentary attempts to remain neutral and faithful to the original, and was not written to be used as a basis for theological discourse and claims, in contrast, of course, to his practice in his religious writings. Aquinas’s commentary was one of the most popular but not the only medieval commentary on the Ethics. Commentaries were written prior to Aquinas, and many were written based on his commentary or in dialogue with it.41 In contrast to Aquinas, some of these commentaries were openly Christian, and their goal was to interpret Aristotle’s Ethics not in a neutral manner, but to juxtapose them against Christian doctrines of one kind or another. These commentaries make blatant use of Aristotle’s Ethics as a basis for comprehensive theological discussion.42 Given the existence of this literature, it appears that Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob’s commentary on the Ethics forges its own path by way of its attempted ‘neutrality’, and the degree of similarity it identifies between Aristotelian and Jewish

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ethics. To the extent that Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob is elucidating the Aristotelian text, he maintains a professional, technical discourse, brimming with quotes and references to philosophical literature and clarification of logical terms, as well as exposing premises (haqdamot) on which Aristotle relies. Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob’s linking of Aristotle’s philosophical text with Jewish sources occurs usually after he has provided a gloss on the former. The discourse that Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob generates between the different worlds is essential to his view that there is a near-perfect fit between Aristotelian and Jewish ethics. This discourse shapes Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob’s commentary on the Ethics as a ‘Jewish’ commentary and makes for interesting and challenging reading of its various sections. This aspect of the commentary lends it a dimension of novelty and theological daring. It is likely that in many senses, Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob’s great contribution to Jewish thought is precisely in the new discourse that he constructs and develops. The reception and interpretation of Aristotle’s concept of phantasia in the Hebrew translations and Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics reflect the unique history of the Jewish reception of this seminal philosophical work and the shift from the influence of the Arabic tradition to that of the Latin tradition. The assimilation of the Nicomachean Ethics into the Jewish intellectual sphere is achieved not only through the translation into Hebrew and the commentary, but also and mainly through the references to Jewish texts and the exposure of the commonalities between these different traditions.43

Notes 1

Many books and articles have been written about Maimonides’s familiarity with the Aristotelian ethical tradition. Various studies which have been written on the topic claim that when the Eight Chapters was composed, as well as elsewhere in Maimonides’s writings, Aristotle’s Ethics bore no direct influence, except through the mediation of al-Farabi. And yet, in the Guide of the Perplexed, Maimonides mentions Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics explicitly as an important source for his own writing. See Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed, trans. Shlomo Pines (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1963), 3.43, 2.36, 3.49. For background, see Steven Harvey, ‘The Sources of the Quotations from Aristotle’s Ethics in the Guide of the Perplexed and the Guide to the Guide’, Jerusalem Studies in Jewish

118

Phantasia in Aristotle’s Ethics Thought 14 (1998): 87–102 [in Hebrew]; Lawrence V. Berman, ‘The Ethical Views of Maimonides within the Context of Islamic Civilization’, in Perspectives on Maimonides, ed. Joel Kraemer and Lawrence V. Berman (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 13–32; Hermann Cohen, Ethics of Maimonides, ed. and trans. Almut Sh Bruckstein (Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 2004); Herbert Davidson, ‘Maimonides’ Eight Chapters and Alfarabi’s Fusul al-Madani’, Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 30 (1969): 33–50; Herbert Davidson, ‘The Middle Way in Maimonides Ethics’, Proceedings of the American Academy for Jewish Research 54 (1987): 31–72; Raymond L. Weiss, Maimonides’ Ethics: The Encounter of Philosophic and Religious Morality (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). For Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics in Arabic, see Frédérique Woerther’s ‘Introduction’ in Chapter 3 of this volume.

2

Shem Tov Ibn Falaquera did not know the Nicomachean Ethics but the Summa Alexandrinorum, an epitome of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics; see Bruno Chiesa, ‘Una fonte sconosciuta dell’ Etica di Falaquera: la Summa Alexandrinorum’, in Biblische und judaistische Studien: Festschrift für Paolo Sacchi, ed. Angelo Vivian (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1990), 583–612; Harvey, ‘The Sources of the Quotations’ (as note 1), 89–102. It is likely that a translated, perhaps partial copy of the Ethics in Hebrew (Sefer Ha-Middot) was circulating among the Ibn Tibbon family. See the comments by Samuel Ibn Tibbon at the end of his preface to the translation of Maimonides’s Commentary on Tractate Avot, Menahem Kellner, ‘Maimonides and Samuel Ibn Tibbon on Jeremiah 9: 22–23 and Human Perfection’, in Studies in Halakhah and Jewish Thought Presented to Rabbi Professor Menahem Emanuel Rackman on His Eightieth Birthday, ed. Moshe Beer (Ramat-Gan: Bar-Ilan University Press, 1994), 49–57, esp. 57: ‫ ואמר עליהם שאין ראוי להתהלל בהם כמו שזכר בו בפרק‬,‫’וזכר החכמה הגבורה והעושר לבד‬ ‫ כפי שיובן מספר‬,‫הנזכר וכל אילו השלשה חשבוה קצת כתות הקודמין תכלית הצלחת האדם‬ .‘‫המדות לחכם אריסטוטליס‬ See also James T. Robinson, Samuel Ibn Tibbon’s Commentary on Ecclesiastes: The Book of the Soul of Man (Tübingen: Mohr, 2007), 193 and note 23; Levi b. Abraham, Livyat Hen: The Quality of Prophecy and the Secrets of the Torah, ed. Howard Kreisel (Jerusalem: World Union of Jewish Studies, 2007), 683: ‫’וכבר חברו הפילוסופים בהם גם כן ספרים הרבה ובתכונת הנפש חיבר ארסטו ספר המדות‬ ‫ כל אומנות ולמוד ומלאכה ובחירה הם בעבור איזה‬:‫ והתחיל בו ואמר‬.‫והוא ספר נכבד מאד‬ ‫תכלית וטובה וכי שלמות כל אדם שיהיה בעל קנין מועיל ושלמות כל בעל קנין היות בפעל‬ ‫ ותכלית כל קנין והצלחה הידיעה העיונית ובה יהיה האדם בפעל וישלים גדרו כי‬.‫במלאכתו‬

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‫ ותכלית הידיעה‬.“‫ סברא‬,‫תכלית האדם שישכיל וידע האמתות בביארו כאמרם ”אגרא דשמעתא‬ ‘.‫העיונית המדע האלוהי‬ 3

Lawrence V. Berman, ‘Greek into Hebrew, Samuel Ben Judah of Marseilles, Fourteenth-Century Philosopher and Translator’, in Jewish Medieval and Renaissance Studies, ed. Alexander Altman (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1967), 289–320; Lawrence V. Berman, ‘The Revised Hebrew Translation of Averroes’ Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics’, in The Seventy-Fifth Anniversary Volume of the Jewish Quarterly Review, ed. Abraham A. Neuman and Solomon Zeitlin (Philadelphia, PA: Jewish Quarterly Review, 1967), 104–20; Eliezer Z. (L.V.) Berman, The Hebrew Versions of the Fourth Book of Averroes’ Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics (Jerusalem: Magnes Press, 1981) [in Hebrew].

4

Averroes, Middle Commentary on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics in the Hebrew Version of Samuel Ben Judah, ed. Lawrence V. Berman (Jerusalem: The Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1999); Lawrence V. Berman, ‘Ibn Rushd’s Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics in the Medieval Hebrew Literature’, in Multiple Averroès, ed. Jean Jolivet (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1978), 287–321; id., ‘Excerpts from the Lost Arabic Original of Ibn Rushd’s Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics’, Oriens 20 (1967): 31–59; Steven Harvey and Frédérique Woerther, ‘Averroes’ Middle Commentary on Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics’, Oriens 42 (2014): 254–87. Averroes himself relied on the Arabic rendering of the Ethics which is now believed to have been translated partly by Iṣhāq Ibn Ḥunayn and partly by Eusthatius as mentioned in Frédérique Woerther’s contribution to this volume.

5

See Steven Harvey, ‘The Nature and Importance of Averroes’ Middle Commentary on the Ethics and the Extent of Its Influence on Medieval Jewish Thought’, in Averroès et Les Averroïsmes Juif et Latin, ed. Jean-Baptiste Brenet (Turnhout: Brepols, 2007), 257–73; Hava Tirosh-Samuelson, Happiness in Premodern Judaism: Virtue, Knowledge, and Well-being (Cincinnati, OH: Hebrew Union College Press, 2003), 258–59. Gersonides, for example, was familiar with Averroes’s Middle Commentary to the Ethics and quotes from it. However, with the exception of one occurrence, all of his quotations relate to Aristotle’s assertion that every discipline has its manners of proofs and methods, as appears at the beginning of the Ethics (EN 1.3.1094b19–27). See Gersonides, Commentary on the Torah: Genesis, ed. Baruch Braner and Eli Freiman (Jerusalem: Maaliyot, 1993), 5, 85 and 86, and also his Commentary on the Torah: Deuteronomy, on Deuteronomy 6.5. For more references from Gersonides’s

120

Phantasia in Aristotle’s Ethics Commentary on Job and Commentary on Ecclesiastes, see Sara Klein-Braslavy, ‘Without any Doubt’: Gersonides on Method and Knowledge (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 182, note 4. See also Gersonides, Commentary on the Torah: Numbers, 27.

6

On Averroes’s Middle Commentary with Aquinas’s gloss, see: Chaim M. Neria, “It Cannot Be Valued with the Gold of Ophir” (Job 28:16): Rabbi Joseph b. ShemṬob’s Commentary On Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics Sources And Analysis, PhD (University of Chicago, 2015), Appendix 1, 268–382, and references there. See also Berman, ‘Ibn Rushd’s Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics’ (as note 4); Chaim Meir Neria, ‘Al-Fārābī’s Lost Commentary on the Ethics: New Textual Evidence’, Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 23 (2013): 69–99. There are two medieval Hebrew manuscripts: 1. Oxford, Bodleian, MS Oppenheim 591 (Neubauer 1426) and 2. Vatican – Biblioteca Apostolica ebr. 556. Each of these consists of the same anonymous Hebrew super-commentary on Averroes’s Middle Commentary to Aristotle’s Ethics, attributed to Thomas Aquinas. St Thomas’s commentary to Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, is clearly in the background of this super-commentary. However, the Hebrew supercommentary is not a literal translation of St Thomas’s text, and the compiler both uses additional materials and adds some comments. The quotations from Averroes are fuller in the Oxford manuscript, while the scribe of the Vatican manuscript generally copied only the first lemma of Averroes. Since the Vatican manuscript was copied from the Oxford manuscript, I will refer only to the Oxford manuscript in this paper.

7

Aristoteles, Ethica Nicomachea, translatio Grosseteste, rec. recognita, Aristoteles Latinus XXVI 1–3, fasc. 4, ed. Rene A. Gauthier (Brussels and Leiden: Desclée de Brouwer and Brill, 1973). Grosseteste’s original translation of the Nicomachean Ethics has been dated to 1246–1247. The revised version (c. 1260), possibly by William of Moerbeke, remained the most widely used Latin text through the fifteenth century. On this, see Daniel A. Callus, ‘The Date of Grosseteste’s Translations and Commentaries on Pseudo-Dionysius and the Nicomachean Ethics’, Recherches de Théologie Ancienne et Médiévale 14 (1947), 200–209 and Iacopo Costa’s chapter in this volume.

8

For a preliminary edition of Rabbi Don Meir Alguades’s Latin to Hebrew translation of the Nicomachean Ethics, see Neria, ‘It Cannot Be Valued with the Gold of Ophir’ (as note 6), Appendix 2, 383–566, and references there.

9

I would like to thank Frédérique Woerther for permitting me to read and use an earlier version of her article in this volume. Modifications and additions from her translation are underlined.

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‫‪121‬‬

‫‪10 From here to the end it is only my translation.‬‬ ‫‪11 My translation here is based on the problematic Hebrew translation of‬‬ ‫‪Samuel ben Judah’s Hebrew translation; see note 12. The meaning of the‬‬ ‫]‪original Greek text is ‘Also in the arts one who errs involuntarily [is worse‬‬ ‫‪than one who errs voluntarily, whereas in the sphere of prudence voluntary‬‬ ‫‪12 error is worse’.‬‬ ‫אמר‪ :‬ומפני זה יקרא היראת חטא בלשון היונים בשם הנגזר משם ההשכל‪ .‬וזה כי בעל ההשכל‬ ‫הוא ישמור סברתו מאשר יפסידה האבל והשמחה‪ ,‬רצוני הרצון והתאוה‪ ,‬כמו שישמור הירא‬ ‫חטא פעולתו משיפסידה התענוג‪ .‬ואמנם היה הענין כן לפי שאין כל סברא נפסדת מפני התענוג‬ ‫והצער‪ .‬כי הפסד האמנה שהמשולש זויותיו השלש שוות לשתי ניצבות לא יהיה מפני התענוג‬ ‫והצער אבל מפני הפסד ההתחלות אשר יחייבו הפסד זאת ההאמנה לבד‪ .‬ואולם הסברא‬ ‫ההשכלית הנה תפסד אם כן משני אלו‪ ,‬רצוני מפני הפסד ההתחלות ומפני התענוג והצער‪.‬‬ ‫והפסדה אשר יהיה מפני התענוג והצער יראה לשעתו‪ ,‬רצוני שהוא יותר נראה מההפסד אשר‬ ‫יהיה מההקדמות‪ .‬וכשהיתה הסברא ההשכלית האמתית היא אשר לא ישיגה הפסד מפני הרצון‬ ‫הנה אם כן בהכרח שיהיה בעל ההשכל לא יבחר שני העניינים יחד‪ ,‬ר“ל הוצאה מלב הרע‬ ‫והטוב‪ ,‬לפי שהוצאה מלב הרע הוא מהתחלה נפסדת מפני התאוה ויתפרדו גם כן מפני שהוצאה‬ ‫מלב רע הוא מתכונת רבוי התאוה‪ .‬ובהיות זה כן הנה ההשכל האמתי הוא תכונה פועלת עם‬ ‫דבור צודק לטובות האנושיות‪ .‬ולכן היה האמנות יצטרך אל המעלה ואולם ההשכל כמעט‬ ‫שיהיה נפשו מעלה‪ .‬ולכן אשר ישגה באמנות ויטעה ברצונו יותר דומה מאשר יטעה בהשכל‬ ‫והוא בהשכל יותר שפל כמו שהוא במעלות‪ .‬ומכאן נראה שהשכל מעלה מה ושהוא אינו אמנות‪,‬‬ ‫רצוני מלאכה‪.‬‬ ‫‪13 Lawrence V. Berman, ‘Sophrosyne and enkrateia in Arabic, Latin and Hebrew:‬‬ ‫‪The Case of Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle and Its Middle Commentary‬‬ ‫‪by Averroes’, in Orientalische Kultur und Europäisches Mittelalter, ed. Albert‬‬ ‫‪Zimmermann, Ingrid Craemer-Ruegenberg and Gudrun Vuillemin-Diem‬‬ ‫‪(Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1985), 274–87.‬‬ ‫‪14 Oxford, Bodleian, MS Oppenheim 591 (Neubauer 1426), 196b–197a:‬‬ ‫האמת שהשווה יאמר ויקרא בלשון יון פרושיס‪ .‬ר“ל שומר השכל הפך הפסד השכל והוא נגזר משם‬ ‫ההשכל כי יא‘ בלשון יון להשכל פרונישיש‪ .‬וזהו אמרו וזה כי בעל ההשכל בלשון יון יאמ‘ על מה‬ ‫שישמור סברתו מאשר יפסידו האבל והשמחה‪ .‬והירא חטא ג“כ ר“ל השיווי מצד מה שהוא שווי‬ ‫בין קצוות השמחה והצער והוא ימזג אותם ולוקח האמצעי הנה הוא ג“כ שומר פעולתו משיפסידנו‬ ‫התענוג…‬ ‫‪15 histapqut has a background in the earlier translation literature. Usually,‬‬ ‫‪histapqut translates an Arabic term which means contentment, in the sense‬‬ ‫‪of temperance. Yet in NEheb Book 7 Alguades translates the same term,‬‬ ‫‪temperancia, as yosher – straightness.‬‬

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16 αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἀρχαὶ τῶν πρακτῶν τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα τὰ πρακτά· τῷ δὲ διεφθαρμένῳ δι’ ἡδονὴν ἢ λύπην εὐθὺς οὐ φαίνεται ἀρχή, οὐδὲ δεῖν τούτου ἕνεκεν οὐδὲ διὰ τοῦθ’ αἱρεῖσθαι πάντα καὶ πράττειν· ἔστι γὰρ ἡ κακία φθαρτικὴ ἀρχῆς. 17 Thomas Aquinas, Sententia Libri Ethicorum, 6.4, ed. Leon., vol. 47.2, ed. René A. Gauthier (Rome: Ad Sanctae Sabinae, 1969), 346. 18 For a detailed analysis, see Iacopo Costa’s Section ‘Thomas Aquinas’ in Chapter 5. 19 In Greek the text reads ‘σῴζει δὲ τὴν τοιαύτην ὑπόληψιν’ = ‘and it [sc. sôphrosynê] preserves this kind of assumption’. Grosseteste translates this into ‘salvat [sc. prudencia] autem talem existimacionem’. It seems that something in Alguades’s translation has gone wrong. 20 According to Jakob Leth Fink, both the Greek and Grosseteste’s Latin are unequivocal in their use of the singular (he, the man, the person) in Greek: τῷ διεφθαρμένῳ [participle, masculine, singular, dative] and in Latin: corrupto [participle, masculine, singular dative]. However, in Hebrew the noun here is clearly plural. 21 The Hebrew form here is conjunctive in meaning. This meaning is identical in its verbal form to the future form, therefore either ‘will be’ or ‘might be’ seems to me as the proper translation. Grosseteste’s Latin participle is singular and in the perfect tense and his finite verb in the future tense (following the Greek version that Eustratius commented on, see Michele Trizio’s chapter in this volume, page 72). 22

‫ כי תשמור מחשבה זו‬,‫ כי היא תשמור התבונה‬,‫ולזה ההסתפקות בלשון יון נקראת בשם קרוב לזה‬ ‫ כמו אשר למשלש‬,‫ ולא יהפכוה‬,‫ כי אמנם הדבר המהנה והמעציב לא ישחיתו כל מחשבה‬.‫דמיון זה‬ ‫ כי אמנם התחלות‬.‫ אבל ישחיתו המחשבה אשר אצל המעשה‬,‫שתי זויות שוות לשתי נצבות או לא‬ ,‫ אז לא תראה ההתחלה‬,‫ ואם אמנם ישחיתו בעבור ההנאה או העצב‬,‫הנפעלים בעבורם הם נפעלים‬ ‫ כי זאת‬,‫ ולא אשר בעבור זה ראוי לבחור כל הדברים ולעשותם‬,‫ולא אשר ראוי לעשות בעבורם‬ .‫רעה חולה משחתת ההתחלה‬

23 MS Saint Petersburg, Heb 379 181a–181b. 24 MS Saint Petersburg, Heb 379 181b. ‫יר‘ כי ההתדבק בתענוג יותר מן הראוי והבריחה מן הצער של כראוי הוא חולי עצום משחית התכלית‬ ‫האנושי שהוא התחלה לכל הפעולות כי “יעור עיני חכמי“’ עד שלא יושגו ולא ישפוט עליו כראוי‬ ‫וישחיתו בעבור זה כל הפעולות אחר שהם בגלל התכלית כי יפסידו יושר הסברא אל התכלי‘ הנה‬ .‫הנכון שומר סברתו פן תפסד מפאת תענוג או צער או אהבה ושנאה‬ 25

‘‫ולכן היו האוהב והשונא פסולים לדין פן תפסד סברתם מפאת תענוג האוהב וצער השונא והם כשר‬ ‘‫להעיד כי לא תפסד השגת החושים מפאת אהבה ושנאה כמו שלא תפסד הסברא בעניני‘ המופתיי‬

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26 Maimonides, Code: Book XIV, Book of Judges; Treatise I. Sanhedrin, chapter 23.6 and more. 27

‘‫טז( כדברי ה “ספר החתום’ )ישעי‬,‫והיו דברי זה הספר “אשר לא יסולה בכתם אופיר’ )ע‘פ איו‘ כח‬ (‫ מד ועוד‬,‫יא( כי אין איש מאנשי עדתנו הנמצאים בארץ הזאת מ‘אשר נקבו בשמות’ )דה‘י א טז‬,‫כט‬ ‫העולים בסולם החכמות הנשאות אשר ירד לים עומקו להעלות בידו הספירים והמרגליות אשר‬ ‫ עם תשוקתם השכלית לעמוד על אלה העניינים ממה שטעמו בהם ממה שראו בשאר החכמות‬,‫בו‬ .‫החבורים החסרים ונשארו עם כאב התשוקה למיעוט התוחלת‬

28 See Maimonides, Guide of the Perplexed, 2.29. 29 Marc Saperstein, ‘Your Voice Like a Ram’s Horn’: Themes and Texts in Traditional Jewish Preaching (Cincinnati, OH: Hebrew Union College Press, 1996), 79. 30 See Sara H. Wilensky, R. Yitzhak Arama and His Philosophy (Jerusalem: Bialik Institute,1956) [in Hebrew]; Bernard Septimus, ‘Yitzhaq Arama and Aristotle’s Ethics’, in Jews and Conversos at the Time of the Expulsion, ed. Yom T. Assis and Joseph Kaplan (Jerusalem: The Zalman Shazar Center, 1999), 6, note 18 [English section]. 31 Issac ‘Arama, Sefer ʿAqedat Yitzḥaq (Pressburg: V. Kittseer, 1849) ‘Va-Yakhel,’ shaar (chap.) 55. 32 Ibid, ‘Sh’mini’ shaar (chap.) 60. 33 Ibid, ‘Shof ’tim’ shaar (chap.) 95. 34 Meir Bnaiahu and Giuseppe Laras, ‘Nomina di “Deputati alla Sanità” a Cremona nell’anno 1575, e la disputa tra R. Eliezer Ashkenazi e R. Avraham Menakhem Porto Haccohen’, Michael: On the History of the Jews in the Diaspora 1 (1972): 88–143 [in Hebrew], 123. 35 Averroes, McNEheb ad 1.13.1102b9 -11, ed. Berman (as note 4), 88. ‫לפי שהשינה אמנם היא בטול מנפש אשר יאמר בה שהיא מעולה או פחותה אלא אם יהיו קצת‬ ‫תנועותיה נקשרים בגוף בעת השינה מעט לכח המדבר ויהיה בגלל זה דמיון הטובים בעת השינה‬ .‫יותר מעולה מדמיון הרעים‬ Frédérique Woerther suggests in her paper in this volume the following translation: ‘And this is right because sleep is inactivity of the soul from which it is said that it is virtuous or vicious (or vile), unless some of its movements penetrate to the body at the time of sleep little by little toward the rational power and in this respect the imagination (dimyon) of good men at the time of sleep is better than the imagination (dimyon) of wicked ones.’ 36

‫ ועל כן דמיונות המעולים יהיו יותר טובים משאר‬.‫אכן תנועות היקיצה יעברו אל השינה מעט מעט‬ .‫בני אדם‬

124 37

Phantasia in Aristotle’s Ethics ‫ בעבור‬,‫ולכן יהיו דמיונות האנשים המעולים וחלומותיהם בעת השינה יותר טובים משאר האדם‬ ‫ ולכן לא יהיו שוים מכל וכל הצדיקים והרשעים‬.‫שהמדמה בשינה ישתמש בהם שיפעל האדם בהקיץ‬ .(‫ז‬,‫ שהרשע ידמה שיפעל בשינתו דברים רעים והצדיק צדקות אהב )ע“פ תה‘ יא‬,‫בזמן השינה‬

38 MS Saint Petersburg, Heb 379 42a. 39 An edition of Averroes’s Arabic Epitome of the Parva Naturalia (Kitāb alHiss wa-l-mahsūs) is currently being prepared by Rotraud Hansberger. See also Moses Ibn Tibbon’s Hebrew version of Averroes’s Epitome of the Parva Naturalia, in Corpus Commentarium Averrois in Aristotelem: Versio Hebraica, vol. 7, ed. Harry Blumberg (Cambridge, MA: Medieval Academy of America, 1972), 43–60; Shlomo Pines, ‘The Arabic Recension of Parva Naturalia and the Philosophical Doctrine Concerning Veridical Dreams According to Al-Risala Al-Manamiyya and Other Sources’, Israel Oriental Studies 4 (1974): 104–53; Steven Harvey, ‘Shem Tov Ibn Falaquera’s Deot ha-Filosofim’, in The Medieval Hebrew Encyclopedias of Science and Philosophy, ed. Steven Harvey (Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer, 2000), 211–47 esp. 229–32; Aviezer Ravitzky, ‘Hebrew Quotations from the Lost Arabic Recession of Parva Naturalia’, Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam 3 (1981–1982): 191–202. 40 Harry V. Jaffa, Thomism and Aristotelianism: A Study of the Commentary by Thomas Aquinas on the Nicomachean Ethics (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1952), 23–34; James C. Doig, Aquinas’s Philosophical Commentary on the ‘Ethics’ : A Historical Perspective (Leiden: Kluwer, 2001); John Inglis, ‘Aquinas’s Replication of the Acquired Moral Virtues: Rethinking the Standard Philosophical Interpretation of Moral Virtue in Aquinas’, Journal of Religious Ethics 27 (1999): 3–27. There is also a debate on the author’s voice in this commentary. See Mark Jordan, ‘Aquinas Reading Aristotle’s Ethics’, in Ad Litteram: Authoritative Texts and their Medieval Readers, ed. Mark Jordan and Kent Emery Jr. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 229–49; Christopher Kaczor, ‘Thomas Aquinas’s Commentary on the Ethics’, American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 78 (2004): 353–78;Tobias Hoffmann, Jörn Müller, and Matthias Perkams, ‘Introduction’, in Aquinas and the Nicomachean Ethics, ed. Tobias Hoffmann et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 1–12. 41 See Iacopo Costa (Chapter 5). For example, Albert the Great wrote two commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics. See also Stván P. Bejczy (ed.), Virtue Ethics in the Middle Ages: Commentaries on Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, 1200–1500 (Leiden: Brill, 2008). Doig (as note 40) argues that one

Reception and Interpretation of Phantasia

125

of the central purposes of Aquinas’s Sententia Libri Ethicorum is to correct earlier commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics, especially Averroes’s Middle Commentary and Albert’s first commentary (Super Ethica). For the general influence of Aquinas’s commentary, see René A. Gauthier, ‘Appendix: Saint Thomas et l’Ethique à Nicomaque’, in Thomas Aquinas, Sententia Libri Politicorum; Tabula Libri Ethicorum;Appendix, ed. Leon., vol. 48, ed. René A. Gauthier (Rome: Ad Sanctae Sabinae, 1971); and Vernon J. Bourke, ‘The Nicomachean Ethics and Thomas Aquinas’, in St. Thomas Aquinas 1274–1974: Commemorative Studies, ed. Armand A. Maurer et al. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1974), 239–59; Jill Kraye, ‘Moral Philosophy’, in The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy, ed. Charles B. Schmitt et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 301–86, see especially 327 and reference there. 42 See for example Jill Kraye, ‘Coimbra Commentators’, in Cambridge Translations of Renaissance Philosophical Texts, vol. 1, Moral Philosophy, ed. Jill Kraye (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 80–7; John Monfasani, ‘Antonius de Waele’, in Cambridge Translations of Renaissance Philosophical Texts, vol. 1, 120–29. 43 The preliminary process of the ‘judaization’ of the Nicomachean Ethics and presentation of examples that express various attributes in ethics were carried out already by R. Yosef Kaspi in his book, Terumat Ha-kesef; see Barry Walfish, Esther in Medieval Garb: Jewish Interpretation of the Book of Esther in the Middle Ages (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 1993), 45–62. Note that I refer here to the judaization of the Nicomachean Ethics and not of Aristotle’s ethical system which has a deeper, broader and longer history.

A R I ST O T L E A N D T H E A R I ST O T E L IA N T R A D I T IO N 7

Aristotle on Deliberative Phantasia and Phronêsis Jakob Leth Fink

As pointed out in Chapter 1 ‘Introduction’, the representatives of the Aristotelian tradition considered in this volume predominantly interpret phantasia in an intellectualist manner. It is quite natural to focus on the intellectual aspect of phantasia in an interpretation of phronêsis – an intellectual virtue. But in fact, Aristotle is careful to point out that phronêsis is not just a rational state – oud’ hexis meta logou monon (EN 6.5.1140b28). He backs this contention with the somewhat enigmatic claim that phronêsis cannot be forgotten. I think this claim becomes intelligible in light of the passage concerning the phantasia of the corrupted agent with which this volume is concerned (EN 6.5.1140b17–18). That is, a crucial part of Aristotle’s account of phronêsis becomes intelligible in light of his account of a certain kind of phantasia. In order to make this case, I have to give up the predominantly intellectualist interpretation of phantasia and focus instead on the physiological basis on which phronêsis operates. In this I follow what I take to be a recent trend in Aristotelian scholarship spearheaded in different ways by scholars such as David Charles, Klaus Corcilius, Jessica Moss and others.1 One immediate consequence of this is that I will not treat, or even mention, a number of issues that are usually taken up in connection with phronêsis. I have nothing, or very little, to say about the practical syllogism, rational desire (wish) or choice (proairesis). Instead, I invite readers to follow me one step further down into the physiological mechanisms underlying phronêsis. My suggestion is not that in practical thinking physiological processes make

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up one distinctly non-rational component in a two-component model with phronêsis as the distinctly rational component. Rather, I am sympathetic to the suggestion that the practical intellect is just one distinct state, which can be described in various ways.2 However, for clarity, I start by outlining some physiological processes relevant for practical thinking. In a nutshell, my proposal is to balance the interpretation of phantasia found in the Aristotelian tradition by offering an account of deliberative phantasia (bouleutikê phantasia). I want to argue that this notion holds the key to understanding phantasia in the passage from the Ethics under consideration and therefore also to Aristotle’s full account of phronêsis as not just a rational state (EN 6.5.1140b28).

A physiological sketch of the basic terms of EN 6.5.1140b17–18. The following remarks offer no more than a brief rundown of the physiological accounts of the central terms ‘appears’ (phainetai) and ‘pleasure and pain’ (to hêdu kai lupêron) from the passage of Nicomachean Ethics 6.5 that we are dealing with.

Phantasia and phainesthai Quite a lot has been written on Aristotle’s phantasia not least because it is unclear what his account amounts to and whether he holds a consistent view on this most important piece of doctrine. Since I am here concerned with a derived sort of phantasia – the deliberative sort – I will only briefly sketch what I take to be the basic account and focus on the points that are particularly relevant for my present purposes. For a fuller discussion, I refer readers to some of the recent literature with ample references to further literature.3 In its most basic form, phantasia is a movement resulting from an actual perception (aisthêsis) in a living being (DA 3.3.428b11–14). This means that phantasia is accompanied by some kind of change in the bodily conditions of the perceiver (cf. MA 6.701a4–6). That phantasia results from an actual perception means that it is primarily receptive in nature and depends on sense

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perception to come about in the first place. To have phantasia of something, a living being must have seen, heard, smelled, touched or tasted it first. When Aristotle, therefore, talks about the appearance of a moral principle, some sort of sensory perception necessarily precedes this ‘appearing’ (phainetai). The sense impression is somehow converted by phantasia into a so-called phantasma (DA 3.3.428a1–2). Phantasmata are vehicles for what, for lack of a better term, could be called representational content, and they account for dreams, certain other internal perceptions, perceptual illusions and mistakes (Insomn. 1.458b15–29). The term phantasma is often, somewhat misleadingly, translated with ‘image’, but does not exclusively cover visual or pictorial representations even though phantasia in its broader sense is closely related to visual perception (DA 3.3.429a2–4).4 On the contrary, all sensory input can be stored as phantasmata that will linger in the hylomorphic compound of body and soul (Insomn. 3.461a17–23). For my present purpose, it is particularly important to stress that this is, of course, also the case with respect to tactile perceptions (which are crucial to the physiological account of pleasure and pain). Furthermore, phantasmata do not merely store and internally represent the primary objects of sense perception, colour, sound etc., they might represent complex perceptions such as a white cup or even a situation such as a person approaching (Insomn. 3.461b30–462a8).5 Phantasia was a movement in the body of a living being caused by an actual perception. This movement, Aristotle tells us, is necessarily similar to the original perception (DA 3.3.428b14). A phantasma, in other words, has a causal power in the body similar to the causal power of the perception from which it originates. If I see the love of my life, the perception is accompanied by certain changes in my body. My heart beats faster, I blush and so on. In this scenario, the person I love is the efficient cause of these physical changes in my body. More precisely, by being an object of my sense perception she causes the relevant changes that take place in me. What Aristotle insists is that, if I internally represent the love of my life, say by remembering her, a similar process takes place in my body. But in this case, the phantasma of my loved one is the efficient cause of the changes. After all, I do not at the moment actually sense perceptually perceive her (cf. Insomn. 2.460b2–7 for the love story). That is, the soul can – voluntarily or involuntarily – cause internal representations, phantasmata, which exercise a

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causal power in the body similar to that of an external sensory object. One of the many black spots in Aristotle’s account of phantasia is how exactly the soul does this, that is, how it causes or calls phantasia into action.6 The main difference between sense perception and phantasia is, then, that sense perception requires the presence of an external object to come about whereas this is not required for phantasia. Phantasia comes about through the soul, granted of course, that a previous sense perception has taken place.

Pleasure and pain These affections are also closely connected to sense perception. In a famously difficult chapter of the De anima, Aristotle states that: To be pleasured or pained is to be active with the sense perceptual mean (aisthêtikê mesotês) towards the good and bad as such. (DA 3.7.431a10–11; all translations from Greek are my own)7

The passage has been treated in more detail in Chapter 2 by Frans de Haas. On the interpretation I will follow here, Aristotle offers a minimal definition of pleasure and pain designed to cover all animal life and requiring nothing more than the most primitive of the senses (touch) in order to work.8 Sense perception is just a sort of mean between too much and too little (or contraries) with respect to the objects perceived (DA 2.11.424a2–10). Putting my hand into a fire would activate my sense perceptual mean whereby I would discriminate (krinein) a ‘too much’ with respect to heat; withdrawing my hand and placing it in a pile of snow would also activate my perceptual mean, but this time my sense of touch would discern a ‘too little’. I would be pained in both scenarios because the respective sensations deviated from my perceptual mean with respect to what is good for the living organism that I am; that is, both sensations are detrimental to my natural condition. The definition in De anima 3.7 suggests that all pleasure and pain is sense perceptual, if that is what ‘aisthêtikê mesotês’ means here. But this is not Aristotle’s position (cf. EN 3.10.1117b28-1118a1). He points out that in most cases, but not all, pleasure and pain are accompanied by a corresponding heating and chilling of the relevant bodily organs (MA 8.701b33–702a1). The pleasure accompanying the highest form of thinking, that of the unmoved

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131

mover and of pure theoretical thought, has no organ that could be heated or chilled (Metaph. 12.7.1072b14–19; EN 7.14.1154b26–28; DA 3.4.429a22–27). In line with this, pure theoretical thinking cannot be corrupted or distorted by pleasure and pain, as Aristotle points out in our passage from the Ethics (EN 6.5.1140b13–15). It might be distracted or impeded by foreign pleasures (EN 10.5.1175b13–24), but that is another matter and we can leave this case aside here. There are two crucial points for present purposes. The first is that practical thinking can be corrupted or distorted by pleasure and pain (EN 6.5.1140b13– 16). The second is that the relevant pleasure or pain in this corruptive or distorting role is sense perceptual. The form of pleasure and pain involved in practical thinking, then, always produces heating, chilling or some other sense perceptual affection in a relevant part of the human body, even if these processes are sometimes so weak that we are not aware of them (MA 8.702a2). I do not suppose that Aristotle wants to claim that all instances of sense perceptual pleasure and pain are accompanied by a corresponding heating and chilling of the relevant bodily organs (cf. MA 7.701b28–32). Seeing something which agrees perfectly with the sense perceptual mean of sight is pleasant without the eye being warmed and the same is true for listening to something that agrees with the sense perceptual mean of hearing, I take it (cf. EN 10.4.1074b26–31). The ear is not warmed, but the sense of hearing is activated and since the activity is unimpeded and in the right proportion, this activation is accompanied by pleasure. Nevertheless, touch seems to play a crucial role with respect to pleasure and pain. It does so because it is the sense responsible for discriminating (krinein) heat and cold. Touch is a mean for all tactile objects and receives, as Aristotle says, all tactile differences (not just the earthy ones: hard and soft) but also heat and cold and many others (DA 3.13.435a21–24). It is furthermore the most primitive of the five senses and a necessary condition of all animal life (DA 3.13.435b4–5). Tactile perceptions, then, are an animal’s first and most immediate means of discriminating (krinein) pleasure and pain. Now, in order for any activity to count as pleasurable, we have to be aware that it takes place.9 Touch, then, is our most primitive and immediate type of sensual awareness. It is activated as a sense perceptual mean in the pleasures connected most fundamentally to animal existence (nutrition and reproduction), that is,

132

Phantasia in Aristotle’s Ethics

with the types of pleasure and affection with which temperance (sôphrosunê) is concerned. I will return to it below in connection with sôphrosunê as a safeguard for phronêsis (Section ‘Deliberative phantasia and moral blindness’). On the interpretation followed here, ‘good’ and ‘bad’ equal respectively what produces, or maintains, the natural state of a living being and what is detrimental to this state. On this interpretation, the ‘as such’ qualification, in ‘the good and bad as such’ (3.7.431a11), indicates that Aristotle talks about ‘good’ and ‘bad’ not as intellectually perceived or misperceived by humans (or other animals), but exactly as what produces and maintains the natural state of a living organism or what is destructive of such a state.10 Let these sketchy remarks concerning the physiological backdrop of the central terms of our passage from the Nicomachean Ethics serve as a basis for the interpretation of deliberative phantasia.

Deliberative phantasia In De anima 3, chapters 7–12, Aristotle investigates problems concerned with movement, action and related issues not least the role of desire (orexis) and thought (nous) in movement and action. For my present purposes, De anima 3.10–11, where deliberative phantasia is introduced, are particularly important. In this part of De anima, we find a shift in focus from animal movement generally to human action specifically. However, some of the most characteristic aspects of moral action, choice (proairesis) and phronêsis (practical wisdom) are not even mentioned in these parts of De anima. Instead, Aristotle focuses on practical intellect (nous praktikos), and practical thought (dianoia praktikê) (DA 3.10.433a13–18), on rational phantasia (phantasia logistikê) (DA 3.10.433b29), a form of which is deliberative phantasia (phantasia bouleutikê) (DA 3.11.334a7). The reason is, I take it, that he wants to give the broadest possible account of human action and, strange as this might sound, such an account does not involve choice or phronêsis. Bad actions involve choice but not phronêsis, and the so-called ‘actions from disposition’ (apo hexeôs), also called actions taking place ‘suddenly’ (exaiphnês), involve no choice (cf. EN 3.2.1111b9–10) and

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133

do not necessarily involve phronêsis. This last type of action, gut reactions, is particularly important for my present concern, and I return to it in Sections ‘Deliberative phantasia and moral blindness’ and ‘Conclusion’ below. They are dispositional actions taking place on the causal basis of the state (hexis) of the agent exclusively, no matter whether this state is virtuous or wicked. But more on this later. Furthermore, phronêsis is guided by a conception of the good life generally speaking (EN 6.5.1140a25–28). But in De anima 3.10–11, Aristotle is concerned with actions guided by all sorts of reasons, including problematic ones, what appears to be good but might not be (to phainomenon agathon), just as much as correct action in accordance with what is genuinely good (DA 3.10.433a27– 29). What we should expect, then, from De anima is an account of phantasia that has room for morally correct deliberation (the work of phronêsis) as well as morally neutral and morally wicked deliberation. Aristotle offers such a neutral account under the heading ‘deliberative phantasia’. Deliberative phantasia is introduced in the following difficult passage. My translation involves a good deal of interpretation already: As has already been said, the perceptual sort of phantasia belongs also to the other animals, whereas the deliberative sort belongs to those endowed with reason (for it is already the work of calculation (logismos) whether to do this or that; and it’s necessary to measure [this] against one thing, for what is greater is pursued (diôkei); consequently it [deliberative phantasia] can make one phantasma out of many). This is also the reason why they [other animals] don’t seem to have opinion, since they don’t have the [sort of phantasia] based on a string of reasoning (ek sullogismou) … Therefore desire doesn’t have the deliberative faculty. (DA 3.11.434a5–12)11

The passage narrows things down to human affairs by pointing out that other animals do not form opinions and, by implication, do not deliberate. This is consistent with the assertion of Nicomachean Ethics 6.5.1140b25–26 that deliberation belongs to the part of the soul that is concerned with opinion (to doxastikon). Nothing in this passage challenges the suggestion that practical thinking belongs to such a single faculty of the soul, here called ‘the deliberative faculty’ (to bouleutikon). It cannot be reduced to desire exclusively, as Aristotle points out, nor, I think, to reason (nous) exclusively. Practical thinking implies, then, a sort of phantasia which can be described both in terms of intellectual

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activity (logismos, ek sullogismou) and in terms of sense perceptual, desire involving activity (cf. diôkei). It is this sort of phantasia that makes moral situations and moral principles appear to an agent as they do. With these points in mind, let us try to understand how deliberative phantasia makes a moral principle appear (phainetai) or not appear (ou phainetai), as is the case in our passage from Nicomachean Ethics 6.5. First of all, deliberative phantasia is a sort of ‘comprehensive’ capacity in the sense that it can combine more phantasmata into a single phantasma (DA 3.11.434a9–10). Deliberative phantasia has this capacity in common with basic, sense perceptual phantasia. In sense perception, phantasia provides background information for particular perceptions, as when we look at a detail in a picture but perceive, at the same time, the entire picture in outline or as a frame (even though we do not focus on the entire picture, but on a detail).12 I suppose that deliberative phantasia provides the same sort of general perception, or view under which to subsume a particular action (cf. DA 3.11.434a16–21). Providing a framework for deliberation, however, is not all deliberative phantasia does. It also produces unified phantasmata with more or less attraction. In this way, deliberative phantasia seems to facilitate practical thinking with phantasmata that might lead to action depending on which phantasma is more attractive. Taking bravery as an example, I think a story somewhat along the following lines could be told concerning the formation of phantasmata by deliberative phantasia: an agent experiences sense perceptually that his acting bravely in situation x results in something pleasurable, for example acknowledgement (timê) from his surroundings. On another occasion, this same agent experiences again that his acting bravely in situation y has the same result and so on and so forth.13 Aristotle describes this process of character formation as habituation through performing activities of a certain kind (here brave actions) and learning to take pleasure in doing so (EN 2.3.1104b3–16). I take it that the agent’s grasp of the particular situations x, y, z requires a primitive intellectual capacity for forming experience and I take it that Aristotle would invoke nous as this sort of primitive intellectual grasp of particulars (EN 6.11.1143a35–b5; 7.6.1150a4–5; An.Post. 2.19.100a3–13; b14–15).14 The role of deliberative phantasia is to produce one unified phantasma of situations x, y, z, for example, the phantasma of acting bravely being attractive (pleasurable).

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This phantasma derives from single experiences of sense perception, but it is general and has been formed in a process involving reason, because deliberative phantasia involves reason.15 It is no less a phantasma carrying attraction. It appears (phainetai) attractive to our agent to perform brave actions, because he has learned through habituation to take pleasure in brave actions. In short, the general phantasma of acting bravely being pleasurable now contains a moral principle in its most primitive form: a principle that (hoti) something is case. Through deliberative phantasia it now appears to our agent that acting bravely is attractive. I believe this is what Aristotle has in mind in claiming that phantasia ‘prepares’ (paraskeuzei) desire either through sense perception or through thought (MA 8.702a17–19). Deliberative phantasia ‘prepares’ desire by presenting desire with a goal of action (to hou heneka ta prakta) (EN 6.5.1140b16–17).16

Phantasia and character formation So far, pleasure is the primary motivating factor in the account of how it comes about that acting in a certain way (bravely) appears attractive to an agent. Aristotle’s theory of motivation has recently been interpreted as motivational hedonism.17 Shortly put, the suggestion is that pleasure or pain is involved in the causal explanation of all actions and activities as the efficient cause. The moving cause, in the causal story about what motivates an action, is always either pleasure, which is pursued, or pain, which is avoided. The suggestion is not that pleasure or pain is also the final cause of action and activity. This would make Aristotle a full-blown psychological hedonist and quite obviously he is not that (cf. EN 1.5.1095b14–22). The thing is that through habituation, values other than pleasure are introduced. Even though there is a strong tendency among men to think that something is good, because it is pleasurable (psychological hedonism) (DA 3.10.433b8–10; EN 3.4.1113b1–2), the whole trick with respect to moral education is to make it clear that in some cases, something is pleasurable, because it is good (motivational hedonism). An agent can be habituated into affirming a painful phantasma as ‘good’ and take pleasure in acting in accordance with it – bravery is a case in question as we will see shortly – or into denying a pleasurable phantasma as ‘good’ and

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thus avoid it as painful (‘bad’) in some sense. As pointed out already, character formation is very much a matter of ‘learning’ to take pleasure and feel pain in the right sort of actions or activities (EN 2.3.1104b8–13). Aristotle’s account of this has been well-described more than thirty years ago by Myles Burnyeat and others.18 But what these accounts neglect, it seems to me, is the role of deliberative phantasia here. Two quite famous passages from the Ethics make it clear that phantasia is implied in the process of character formation. I will look at them briefly: Perhaps we should start [ethical teaching] from what is better known to us. Therefore, the one who is to listen to noble, just and quite generally political matters in a satisfactory manner must have been brought up in noble habits. For ‘the that’ (to hoti) is a principle and if this appears sufficiently (ei touto phainoito arkountôs), there is no need for ‘the why’ (to dioti). This kind of listener has or will easily grasp the principles. (EN 1.4.1095b2–8)19

The passage is notable for present purposes because it posits a close connection between habituation and phantasia of moral principles. Habits are the basis for forming a character. Ethos (habit) leads to êthos (character), as Aristotle tells us (EN 2.1.1103a17–18). One salient difference between habit and character is the stability or reliability of either. Habits are less stable, more fluctuating, than character. Furthermore, habits seem to provide an unstable phantasia of moral principles. Aristotle suggests as much in pointing out that if ‘the that’ appears sufficiently (ei touto phainoito arkountôs), there is no need for ‘the why’. The conditional suggests that habits do not always convey a sufficient appearance (phantasia) of ‘the that’. In the process of habituation, it might not always appear to an agent to be the case that acting bravely is attractive and should be pursued. This is quite in line with the position that habituation stands at the beginning of character formation (EN 2.1.1103b21–25). At this stage of forming a personality (or character), our moral phantasia is still flexible or unstable. Otherwise, there would be no room for moral improvement or corruption. On the other hand, a stable appearance (phantasia) of moral principles seems to be part of having formed ones character (êthos). But, in the second passage I want to look at, this leads to a new problem. If, namely, the appearance of a moral principle results from the agent’s character, but the agent is not himself

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responsible for forming his character, the agent will also not be responsible for what sort of moral principle appears to him: Someone might say that everyone aims at the apparent good (to phainomenon agathon), but that they are not in charge of the appearance (phantasia). Instead, the end (telos) appears to each man in accordance with the person he happens to be. (EN 3.5.1114a31–b1)20

This chapter of the Ethics exercised Aristotle’s early commentators and offered some support in their quarrel with the Stoics (see Chapter 2 by De Haas where the argument is pursued in more detail). The position just quoted raises questions concerning moral responsibility, but that is not why it is important right now. It is relevant because it rests on three premises, the last of which is crucial for present purposes: i. Everyone desires what is good or appears good ii. No one is in charge of how the good appears to him or her iii. The good, or end (telos), appears to everyone in accordance with his or her character Aristotle endorses (i) and (iii), but rejects (ii) (EN 3.5.1114b1–25). The term ‘character’ (êthos) is not in the text. But it is what Aristotle has in mind in talking about ‘the person he happens to be’. There are two crucial points here: (a) character implies and, to a certain extent, controls phantasia of moral principles; (b) such a phantasia is more stable than the one we find at the beginning of character formation, just because character is more stable than habits (cf. EN 2.4.1105a32–33). Let us take a closer look at (a). To do so we must briefly return to deliberative phantasia. The previous account of deliberative phantasia seems to suggest that deliberation is simply a matter of calculating and that the greater pleasure is always pursued. In a certain sense this is right. However, this does not mean that pleasure is the final cause of all and every action. The reason is that character formation intervenes as indicated already. An agent’s moral phantasia can be formed, or manipulated, through habituation. It is, for example, possible to produce a phantasma of something very painful that nevertheless appears more pleasant and desirable than any other relevant phantasmata (no matter how pleasant they might appear). Such a phantasma will be pursued as ‘what

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is greater’ (DA 3.11.434a9). It will appear as such in accordance with a settled and stable character. The example concerning bravery is illustrative here. To be brave is not necessarily pleasant, because it implies fear. However, through habituation an agent might be brought to affirm, and thus pursue, the pleasure in acting bravely rather than giving in to fear and flee from his position to avoid a painful situation (cf. EN 3.9.1117a29–1117b13). In this case, the pleasure is connected to the end of acting bravely, saving your city or whatever, but not to the action itself. As Aristotle points out: In fact, pleasurable activity does not belong to all of the virtues except in so far as the end (telos) is concerned. (EN 3.9.1117b15–16)21

So far, all this is fully compatible with thinking that Aristotle’s theory of motivation is full-blown psychological hedonism (we act bravely because of pleasure). But, in fact, this does not follow. Generally speaking, Aristotle believes that three things motivate people to pursue or avoid something: the pleasant, the beneficial, the noble and their opposites (EN 2.3.1104b30–32). Both the noble and the beneficial appear pleasant (EN 2.3.1104b34–1105a1). If they did not, they could not motivate. Desire responds to pleasure and pain. That is, the pleasure in doing what is noble or beneficial motivates the relevant actions in a cause efficient way. However, there is a considerable difference in acting bravely because it is pleasant or because it is beneficial or because it is noble. Pleasure or pain will always be the efficient cause of an agent’s action. But only in case he acts bravely because acknowledgement is pleasant will pleasure also constitute the final cause of his actions (full-blown hedonism). He might be driven to act (cause efficiently) by the pleasure involved in acting nobly, but act in this way because it is noble (kalon) to do so or base not to (EN 3.9.1117b16–17). In this case the noble (not the pleasant) is the final cause of his actions. That it is also pleasant to act in accordance with the noble is accidental with respect to explaining the final reason for our brave person’s actions. To develop into a full-blown virtue of character (bravery), however, it is not enough that our agent acts bravely. He must be disposed to do so in a certain demanding way. First, he must act knowingly; second, he must choose to act bravely and do so because it is brave (not because it is pleasant); and third, he must be consistently disposed to act bravely (EN 2.4.1105a28–33). Virtue of character cannot deliver on all of these requirements all by itself. It must team

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up with phronêsis, in particular with respect to acting knowingly. This means that our agent’s phantasma of the primitive principle that (hoti) acting bravely is good must be integrated into phronêsis as part of an overall conception of living well. This principle appears to our agent in accordance with his settled character. Thus, it is the character virtue of bravery which provides phronêsis with an end (telos) towards which phronêsis finds the means. The brave agent applies his phronêsis in figuring out how to act bravely in a specific situation. But the end (telos) of acting bravely, as we have seen, appears (phainetai) to our agent as a result of his brave character. Without character virtue, phronêsis would be blind. If the integration of character virtue and phronêsis is successful, our agent will be virtuous in the truest sense of the word (EN 6.13.1144b14–17). This means that character virtue and phronêsis mutually depend on each other: you cannot be good in the true sense of the word without practical wisdom (phronêsis) nor be practically wise (phronimos or spoudaios) without virtue of character (EN 6.13.1144b26–32). The last remark implies that if an agent has no phantasia of a genuine moral principle, phronêsis will have nothing, no end (telos), to deliberate about. As things are, however, moral facts and situations do appear in a truthful way to the practically wise (EN 3.4.1113a29–33).

Deliberative phantasia and moral blindness The agent Aristotle talks about in Nicomachean Ethics 6.5 seems to be exactly opposite to the practically wise (ho phronimos). He has been utterly corrupted by pleasure and pain (EN 6.5.1140b17). His phantasia of moral principles is either perverted or completely destroyed. So much so, indeed, that the genuine moral principle does not immediately appear to him (euthus ou phainetai archê) (EN 6.5.1140b17–18). Just as character virtue guards and provides the correct end for morally good deliberation (phronêsis) to figure out how to achieve, so bad character, vice, destroys the correct end (EN 6.5.1140b19–20). What vice offers instead is a perverted or false moral principle (EN 6.12.1144a34–36). The perversion seems to result from a wrong use of pleasure. Our agent has been entirely corrupted in his disposition towards pleasure and pain. In other words, he has

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habituated himself into taking pleasure in all the wrong activities. His defect then reaches all the way down to his most immediate affective disposition towards pleasure. What he lacks seems to be temperance (sôphrosynê). As Aristotle points out at the beginning of our passage, temperance preserves ( sôizei) phronêsis (EN 6.5.1140b11–13). Now, phronêsis is described as a true grasp, or true assumption (alêthês hupolêpsis), of the end (telos) (EN 6.9.1142b33). This is no surprise given the close relation between character virtue and phronêsis just mentioned. Thus, I take it that temperance protects and keeps intact this true assumption concerning moral principles. In line with this, Aristotle immediately points out that not every assumption (hupolêpsis) is perverted or destroyed by what is pleasurable and what is painful; only those concerned with action might be so perverted or destroyed ( EN 6.5.1140b13–16). That is, only assumptions which have a sense perceptual, affective aspect, such as phronêsis, which is a true assumption concerning the end and involves the virtues of character, can be destroyed or perverted by pleasure and pain. It is quite natural to find temperance in this role as saviour and guardian of phronêsis. Temperance is directed primarily at the pleasures connected with touch and, a sub-species of touch, taste (EN 3.10.1118a23–26, cf. DA 2.9.421a18–20). As was pointed out (above in the Section ‘Pleasure and pain’), touch is the single most important physiological element in the account of pleasure and pain, because it is the most immediate form of being affectively aware of these. An agent who lacks temperance has no measured, or reasonable, disposition towards the most primitive and immediate forms of pleasure (those of touch and taste). For this is exactly what temperance is (EN 3.10.1117b24–25). This means that such an agent consistently goes too far with respect to pleasure in actions and activities which are morally bad. In the process of character formation the result of being disposed in this way is disastrous: utter moral ruin, which is exactly the state of the agent in the passage under consideration in this volume (EN 6.5.1140b17). Perversion and destruction of a moral principle seem to go hand in hand in the sense that the perversion consists in a false opinion concerning the principle which pushes out or destroys whatever natural moral principle or disposition might have been present from the outset:

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For virtue and baseness preserves and destroys the principle respectively. In actions that for the sake of which is the principle (just as the hypotheses in the mathematical sciences). But as in the latter case an argument does not teach the principles, so here it does not do so, but virtue either natural or habituated teaches right opinion concerning the principles. The temperate person is someone like this; the dissolute is the contrary. (EN 7.8.1151a15–20)22

The corrupted agent of Nicomachean Ethics 6.5 has no genuine principle at all. His unbalanced and disproportionate character provides only corrupted principles. They appear good to him, but they are not. Aristotle’s account of deliberative phantasia was precisely designed to accommodate this sad case just as well as the case of the excellent moral deliberation of the practically wise. In this lack of any genuine moral principle, our corrupted agent is distinct from the acratic. Aristotle often refers to the morally wicked as similar to the permanently ill in contrast with the acratic, who is like an epileptic, that is, like someone who suffers temporary fits of a disease (EN 7.8.1150b32–35). The difference is that the genuine principle is preserved in the acratic (EN 7.8.1151a24–26), whereas to the utterly corrupted no genuine principle immediately appears at all. That a principle does not immediately appear (euthus ou phainetai archê) does not mean that our corrupted agent is intellectually weak-sighted. It means that his sense perceptual affective disposition does not allow him to discriminate anything that could motivate him to act. Since no phantasma of acting for the sake of the right thing appears to him, he is not cause efficiently motivated to do anything. As we saw above, Section ‘Phantasia and phainesthai’, phantasmata can act as perceptibles and motivate as such (even when no perceptible object is around: the mere thought of the love of my life produces changes in my bodily condition etc.). In a situation where bravery is called for, the practically wise will act bravely, because the principle of acting bravely appears to him as attractive. I think the attraction (pleasure) should mainly be described in terms of tactile perception. To experience pleasure in connection with acting bravely is to feel something immediately and primitively, and might even produce corresponding heatings in the relevant parts of the body. I cannot go further into this here.

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In the situation just described, where bravery is called for, the corrupted agent simply lacks the relevant phantasma of acting bravely. That is, his character provides no motivation whatever for acting bravely. So ‘appears’ (phainetai) means to be affectively, sense perceptually aware that something to be done is attractive. But this is exactly what the corrupted agent does not see or feel. One final point from our passage in Nicomachean Ethics 6.5 needs to be addressed before I can conclude. As Aristotle points out, the principle does not immediately (euthus) appear to our corrupted agent (EN 6.5.1140b17–19).23 ‘Immediately’ (euthus) here refers to what Aristotle elsewhere describes as a gut reaction or an action ‘from disposition’ (apo hexeôs). This is precisely laid down as something that happens suddenly (exaiphnês), in other words, ‘immediately’ (EN 3.8.1117a19–22). This is a sort of action that takes place with no previous reflection implied. In some relevant situation, the agent acts without thinking. Since the agent has no time to think, the action bypasses his choice and takes place ‘in accordance with his disposition’ (kata tên hexin) as Aristotle puts it in the same passage. This fits the interpretation of phantasia in our passage that I have tried to establish. That the principle fails to appear immediately (euthus) is not a failure in our corrupted agent’s intellectual, decisional (proairetic) capacities. It indicates a failure in his ‘dispositional capacity’. In other words a failure with respect to his character (êthos). It simply does not follow from who he is, from his disposition or state (apo hexeôs), that he should act for the sake of some genuine moral end. His character provides him with no ‘instinctive’ moral perception (phantasia) of whatever situation he happens to be in.

Conclusion Why does Aristotle spend time on the utterly corrupted agent in Nicomachean Ethics 6.5 and his perverted phantasia of moral principles? After all, the chapter is devoted to phronêsis, a moral and intellectual excellence. The answer is, I think, that our corrupted agent throws a contrasting light on his exact opposite: the morally virtuous agent (ho phronimos) and his phantasia of moral principles. As mentioned above, and in several of the previous chapters, phronêsis and character virtue mutually depend on each other. So much so that Aristotle

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seems willing to identify them (EN 6.13.1144b21–28). This mutual dependence gives phronêsis a peculiar status as an intellectual virtue. It is, as Aristotle is careful to point out, not just a rational state (oud’ hexis meta logou monon) (EN 6.5.1140b28). A purely rational state can be forgotten. Presumably this means that its propositional content can be forgotten and perhaps that the state itself can be forgotten. We might forget all proofs in the second book of Euclid’s Elements for example, and perhaps even forget how to do geometry altogether. But phronêsis cannot be forgotten (EN 6.5.1140b28–30). In a passage that makes the same distinction concerning states that can and states that cannot be forgotten, Aristotle points out that the morally perfect person lives consistently ‘in’, that is with or through, the character virtues (katazên en autais) (EN 1.10.1100b12–17). The same is true of the practically wise. He lives guided by a true assumption concerning the end, an overall conception of living well (eu zên holôs) (EN 6.5.1140a25–28). As such the moral principles of bravery, temperance and so on have been integrated or internalized irreversibly into his overall conception of living well. He cannot forget phronêsis just as he cannot forget to breathe or forget to eat and sleep. His moral state has become second nature. In contrast to the corrupted agent, genuine moral principles never fail to appear (phainesthai) to the practically wise in relevant situations. How things appear to him, his moral phantasia, is simply better and more true than that of others (EN 3.4.1113a29–33), even to the point that his dreams might be better than those of ordinary men (EN 1.13.1102b3–11). It is not that ho phronimos always knows exactly what specific course of action to take (he has to figure this out through deliberation). What always, and in contrast to his corrupted opposite, immediately (euthus), appears to him and what he cannot forget is for the sake of what a specific course of action has to be found. Ho phronimos is instinctively sensitive to this. His deliberative phantasia is unfailingly triggered by whatever relevant situation he might find himself in.24

Notes 1

Especially important is Jennifer Whiting, ‘Locomotive Soul: The Parts of Soul in Aristotle’s Scientific Works’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 22 (2002): 141–200. She argues, among other things, that Aristotle thinks that we should

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Phantasia in Aristotle’s Ethics not define ‘parts of the soul in terms of their having or lacking logos’, even though we can characterize some parts in one of these ways (176–77). The distinction between rational and non-rational is not discarded but further modified by scholars who emphasize the amount of continuity between humans and other animals in various aspects of Aristotle’s biological thinking, see for example James G. Lennox, ‘Aristotle on the Biological Roots of Virtue: The Natural History of Natural Virtue’ in Bridging the Gap between Aristotle’s Science and Ethics, ed. Devin Henry and Karen M. Nielsen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 193–213; Jean-Louis Labarrière, Langage, vie politique et mouvement des animaux: Études aristotéliciennes (Paris: Vrin, 2004).

2

As advanced, among others, by David Charles, ‘Aristotle’s Desire’, in Mind and Modality: Studies in the History of Philosophy in Honour of Simo Knuuttila, ed. Vesa Hirvonen et al. (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006), 19–40; id., ‘Aristotle on Practical and Theoretical Knowledge’, in Bridging the Gap between Aristotle’s Science and Ethics, ed. Henry Devin and Karen Margrethe Nielsen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 71–93. At EN 1.13.1102a26–32, Aristotle mentions the two-component view as well as the so-called ‘thirdway view’, but refuses to commit himself to either.

3

Krisana Scheiter, ‘Images, Appearances, and Phantasia in Aristotle’, Phronesis 57 (2012): 251–78; Jessica Moss, Aristotle on the Apparent Good: Perception, Phantasia, Thought, & Desire (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 51–57; Christopher Shields, Aristotle:De Anima, translated with an Introduction and Commentary (Oxford: Clarendon, 2016), 274–91.

4

Pace e.g. David Bloch, Aristotle on Memory and Recollection: Text, Translation, and Reception in Western Scholasticism (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2007), 67.

5

Scheiter, ‘Images, Appearances, and Phantasia in Aristotle’ (as note 3), 252. See David Gallop, Aristotle: On Sleep and Dreams, A Text and Translation with Introduction, Notes and Glossary (Warminster: Aris & Phillips, 1996), 6–10 for a discussion of dreams as episodic and dreams as an apparition in Greek thought.

6

Usually, the account of association described in Mem. 2.451b14–22 is invoked to explain the activation of phantasia; see for example Klaus Corcilius, Streben und Bewegen: Aristoteles’ Theorie der animalischen Ortsbewegung (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2008), 215–19.

7

καὶ ἔστι τὸ ἥδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι τὸ ἐνεργεῖν τῇ αἰσθητικῇ μεσότητι πρὸς τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἢ κακόν, ᾗ τοιαῦτα.

8

Klaus Corcilius, ‘Aristotle’s Definition of Non-Rational Pleasure’, in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics: A Critical Guide, ed. Jon Miller (Cambridge: Cambridge

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University Press, 2011), 128. For further discussion of this so-called extentionalist position, see Labarrière, Langage, vie politique et mouvement des animaux (as note 1), 184–86. 9

The point is stressed already by Aspasius in EN 147.18–23.

10 For the rival view that sense perception of good and bad involves perceiving something as good or bad, see for example Deborah Achtenberg, Cognition of Value in Aristotle’s Ethics: Promise of Enrichment, Threat of Destruction (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2002), 161–62 or Henry S. Richardson, ‘Desire and the Good in De Anima’, in Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima, ed. Martha C. Nussbaum and Amélie O. Rorty (Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), 381–99; for discussion of this view, Moss, Aristotle on the Apparent Good (as note 3), 30–41. 11 ἡ μὲν οὖν αἰσθητικὴ φαντασία, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ζῴοις ὑπάρχει, ἡ δὲ βουλευτικὴ ἐν τοῖς λογιστικοῖς (πότερον γὰρ πράξει τόδε ἢ τόδε, λογισμοῦ ἤδη ἐστὶν ἔργον· καὶ ἀνάγκη ἑνὶ μετρεῖν· τὸ μεῖζον γὰρ διώκει· ὥστε δύναται ἓν ἐκ πλειόνων φαντασμάτων ποιεῖν). καὶ αἴτιον τοῦτο τοῦ δόξαν μὴ δοκεῖν ἔχειν, ὅτι τὴν ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ οὐκ ἔχει [αὕτη δὲ ἐκείνην]· διὸ τὸ βουλευτικὸν οὐκ ἔχει ἡ ὄρεξις. With David Ross, Aristotle: De anima, edited with Introduction and Commentary (Oxford: Clarendon, 1961), 319 ad 431a10–11, I take Aristotle to refer to βουλευτικὴ φαντασία when he writes ‘τὴν ἐκ συλλογισμοῦ’. I follow Bywater in excising the words ‘αὕτη δὲ ἐκείνην’ (‘this itself has that’) at 434a11 and I do not accept Cornford’s emendation ‘αὕτη δὲ κινεῖ’. Ronald Polansky, Aristotle’s De anima (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 531, discusses the different interpretative options in detail. 12 See for example Dorothea Frede, ‘The Cognitive Role of Phantasia in Aristotle’, in Essays on Aristotle’s De Anima (as note 10), 282–87. 13 See also Moss, Aristotle on the Apparent Good (as note 3), 200–06. To me, Moss seems to go too far in claiming that habituation is exclusively non-rational. See Charles, ‘Aristotle on Practical and Theoretical Knowledge’ (as note 2), 91–92, for discussion and objections. 14 Here I follow the helpful, but brief, remarks by David Sedley, ‘Aspasius on Acrasia’, in Aspasius: The Earliest Extant Commentary on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. Antonina Alberti and Robert Sharples (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1999), 166–67. 15 The phantasma in question results from a string of reasoning (ek sullogismou). In my understanding, ‘through a string of reasoning’ (ek sullogismou) is just another way of saying ‘make one phantasma out of many’, since sullogismos basically just means ‘counting or putting together’, that is making one out of many.

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16 Phantasia might also indicate that some morally relevant situation is at hand, for example, that a wrong has been committed (EN 7.6.1149a32–33) or present the means for reaching a goal (MA 7.701a32–33). However, since I am concerned with the appearance of the principle, I leave these cases aside. 17 Corcilius, Streben und Bewegen (as note 6), 95–102. 18 Myles Burnyeat, ‘Aristotle on Learning to Be Good’, in Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, ed. Amélie O. Rorty (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980), 69–92; Nancy Sherman, The Fabric of Character: Aristotle’s Theory of Virtue (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), 157–99. 19 ἴσως οὖν ἡμῖν γε ἀρκτέον ἀπὸ τῶν ἡμῖν γνωρίμων. διὸ δεῖ τοῖς ἔθεσιν ἦχθαι καλῶς τὸν περὶ καλῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ ὅλως τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀκουσόμενον ἱκανῶς. ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ ὅτι, καὶ εἰ τοῦτο φαίνοιτο ἀρκούντως, οὐδὲν προσδεήσει τοῦ διότι· ὁ δὲ τοιοῦτος ἔχει ἢ λάβοι ἂν ἀρχὰς ῥᾳδίως. 20 εἰ δέ τις λέγοι ὅτι πάντες ἐφίενται τοῦ φαινομένου ἀγαθοῦ, τῆς δὲ φαντασίας οὐ κύριοι, ἀλλ’ ὁποῖός ποθ’ ἕκαστός ἐστι, τοιοῦτο καὶ τὸ τέλος φαίνεται αὐτῷ· 21 οὐ δὴ ἐν ἁπάσαις ταῖς ἀρεταῖς τὸ ἡδέως ἐνεργεῖν ὑπάρχει, πλὴν ἐφ’ ὅσον τοῦ τέλους ἐφάπτεται. 22 ἡ γὰρ ἀρετὴ καὶ μοχθηρία τὴν ἀρχὴν ἣ μὲν φθείρει ἣ δὲ σῴζει, ἐν δὲ ταῖς πράξεσι τὸ οὗ ἕνεκα ἀρχή, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς μαθηματικοῖς αἱ ὑποθέσεις· οὔτε δὴ ἐκεῖ ὁ λόγος διδασκαλικὸς τῶν ἀρχῶν οὔτε ἐνταῦθα, ἀλλ’ ἀρετὴ ἢ φυσικὴ ἢ ἐθιστὴ τοῦ ὀρθοδοξεῖν περὶ τὴν ἀρχήν. σώφρων μὲν οὖν ὁ τοιοῦτος, ἀκόλαστος δ’ ὁ ἐναντίος. 23 This adverb has a local sense, ‘directly’ or ‘straight up’, and it has a temporal sense. Aristotle must use it temporally here and all translators known to me also take it thus. However, there is disagreement as to whether it qualifies διεφθαρμένῳ or φαίνεται. I take it to qualify the latter and translate with ‘immediately’. Both Greenwood and Rowe translate εὐθύς with reference to the participle (διεφθαρμένῳ), ‘as soon as’ (Greenwood) and ‘once’ (Rowe); see Leonard H. G. Greenwood, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics VI: With Essays, Notes and Translation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1909), 99; Sarah Broadie and Christopher Rowe, Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 180. René A. Gauthier and Jean Y. Jolif, Aristote: L’Éthique à Nicomaque (Louvain-la-Neuve: Éditions Peeters, 2002), vol. i.2, 167 (‘à l’instant’) take εὐθύς to qualify both the participle (διεφθαρμένῳ) and the finite verb (φαίνεται) which upsets the aspect difference between the participle (perfect) and the finite verb (present). Terence Irwin, Aristotle: Nicomachean Ethics, translated with Introduction, Notes, and Glossary (Indianapolis, IN

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and Cambridge, CA: Hackett, 1999), 91, ignores εὐθύς altogether. I agree with, among others, the Latin translation by Robert Grosseteste, Ethica Nicomachea, translatio Grosseteste, rec. pura, Aristoteles Latinus vol. XXVI 1–3, fasc. 3, ed. René A. Gauthier (Brussels and Leiden: Desclée de Brouwer and Brill, 1972), 258.10–11, (‘confestim non apparebit principium’), for more on which see Chapter 5 by Iacopo Costa in this volume. 24 This chapter was written as part of my work in the project Representation and Reality in the Aristotelian Tradition, funded by The Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation. I wish to thank Frans de Haas and Gösta Grönroos for helpful comments. I am, of course, responsible for all remaining shortcomings.

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Index Locorum Authors are listed according to their first names. Since texts by the anonymous Super Commentary on McNEheb, Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob, Commentary on NEheb and Radulphus Brito, Questiones super lib. Ethicorum, editio secunda are either unedited or in preparation, references to these texts include references to the manuscripts. This is indicated by the heading See also with the relevant manuscript (MS) added below. Where more translations of the same text exist, as is the case with Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics and Averroes’s Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, the translations are referred to separately under each text.

Albert the Great Ethica 95 n.13 Super Ethica 6.7. qu. 8 95 n.14, 95 n.15, 95 n.16, 95 n.17 7.2 96 n.19 Alexander of Aphrodisias De anima 21, 25 69–70 35 n.30 De fato 21 197.3–199.7 35 n.37 199.24–30 29 199.30–200.2 29 200.2–7 29 Ethical Problems 21, 35 n.32 29.158.3–161.29 25 29.161.14–29 26 Mantissa 21, 25, 35 n.32 17.152.27–30 35 n.38 23.174.3–7 27 23.174.7 27 23.174.18–19 27 23.174.24–27 27 23.175.9–15 28 23.175.25–32 28 23.175.28 28

in Metaph 41.27 33 n.19 59.6 33 n.19 379.3 33 n.19 in Meteor 129.36 33 n.19 in Sens 10.2 33 n.19 Anonymous Summa alexandrinorum 39, 85, 118 n.2 Super Commentary on McNEheb 105, 107 See also MS oxon. Bodl. Oppenheim 591 196b–197a 121 n.14 Aristotle Analytica Posteriora (An.Post.) 2.19.100a3–13 134 2.19.100b14–15 134 De anima (DA) 56 2.6 7 2.6.418a17–21 64 n.51 2.9.421a18–20 140 2.11.424a2–10 130

Index Locorum 3.1.425a14–30 64 n.51 3.2.426b17–29 15 3.3 4 3.3.428a1–2 129 3.3.428b11–14 128 3.3.428b14 129 3.3.428b22–24 3.3.429a1–2 55 3.3.429a2–4 129 3.4.429a22–27 131 3.7 130 3.7.431a8–14 16 3.7.431a10–11 15, 130 3.7.431a11 132 3.7.431a14–17 30 n.1 3.7.431a14–20 16 3.7.431b4–5 31 n.5 3.7.431b5–6 31 n.6 3.10–11 132, 133 3.10.433a13–18 132 3.10.433a27–29 133 3.10.433b8–10 135 3.10.433b29 132 3.11.434a5–12 133 3.11.434a7 132 3.11.434a9 138 3.11.434a9–10 134 3.11.434a16–21 90, 134 3.13.435a21–24 131 3.13.435b4–5 131 De insomniis (Insomn.) 4 1.458b15–29 129 2.460b2–7 129 3.461a17–23 129 3.461b30–462a8 129 De memoria (Mem.) 4, 56 1.450a11–12 55 2.451b14–22 144 De motu animalium (MA) 6.701a4–6 128 7.701a32–33 146 n.16 7.701b28–32 131 8.701b33–702a1 130 8.702a2 131 8.702a17–19 135 De sensu (Sens.) 51–2

Ethica eudemia (EE) 7 Ethica Nicomachea (EN) 7 1.1.1094a1–2 15 1.3.1094b19–27 119 n.5 1.3.1095a6–11 69 1.4.1095b2–8 136 1.5.1095b14–22 135 1.10.1100b12–17 143 1.13.1102a26–32 144 n.2 1.13.1102b3–11 143 1.13.1102b9–11 48, 103, 114 2.1.1103a17–18 136 2.1.1103b14–25 32 n.15 2.1.1103b21–25 136 2.3.1104a27–b3 32 n.15 2.3.1104b3–1105a16 110, 134 2.3.1104b8–13 136 2.3.1104b30–32 138 2.3.1104b34–05a1 138 2.4.1105a28–33 138 2.4.1105a32–33 137 2.5.1106b16–23 17 3.1–5 26 3.2.1111b9–10 132 3.3.1112b11–20 82 3.4–5 22 3.4.1113a21 34 n.24 3.4.1113a22–23 22 3.4.1113a23–24 22, 34 n.24 3.4.1113a23–33 4 3.4.1113a25 34 n.24 3.4.1113a26–27 34 n.24 3.4.1113a26–29 22 3.4.1113a27 34 n.24 3.4.1113a28–9 23 3.4.1113a29–30 23 3.4.1113a29–33 139, 143 3.4.1113a30 34 n.24 3.4.1113a31 23 3.4.1113a31–b2 18 3.4.1113a34 34 n.24 3.4.1113b1–2 135 3.5 24, 25 3.5.1113b3–7 18 3.5.1113b7–14 18 3.5.1113b14–17 18 3.5.1113b21–30 18 3.5.1113b30–1114a3 18

161

162

Index Locorum

3.5.1114a3–4 34 n.27 3.5.1114a3–1115a3 18 3.5.1114a17–18 29 3.5.1114a21–31 18 3.5.1114a31–32 24 3.5.1114a31–b1 48–9, 137 3.5.1114a31–b12 35 n.33 3.5.1114a31–b20 4 3.5.1114a31–b25 19 3.5.1114b1–25 137 3.5.1114b3–8 73 3.5.1114b8 24 3.5.1114b31 4 3.8.1117a19–22 142 3.9.1117a29–b13 138 3.9.1117b15–16 138 3.9.1117b16–17 138 3.10.1117b23 107 3.10.1117b24–25 140 3.10.1117b28–18a1 130 3.10.1118a23–26 140 6.2.1139b16–17 68 6.2.1139a25–26 83 6.5 29, 32 n.13 6.5.1140a25–28 133, 143 6.5.1140b4–6 109 6.5.1140b7–11 81 6.5.1140b11–13 140 6.5.1140b11–21 42, 79, 80, 94 n.6 6.5.1140b11–25 110 6.5.1140b13–15 131 6.5.1140b13–16 131, 140 6.5.1140b13–20 17 6.5.1140b14 28 6.5.1140b16–17 81, 103, 135 6.5.1140b16–20 108 6.5.1140b17 139, 140 6.5.1140b17–18 1, 2, 39, 40, 41, 65, 67, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 81, 111, 127, 128, 139 6.5.1140b17–19 142 6.5.1140b18 84 6.5.1140b19–20 139 6.5.1140b20–21 79 6.5.1140b21 81 6.5.1140b25–26 133 6.5.1140b28 127, 128, 143 6.5.1140b28–30 143 6.8.1142a23–30 53

6.8.1142a25–30 73, 75 6.9.1142b31–32 82 6.9.1142b32–33 81 6.9.1142b33 140 6.10.1142b34–1143a18 82 6.10.1143a8 81 6.11.1143a35–b5 134 6.11.1143b1–14 70, 72 6.11.1143b13–14 71 6.11.1143b14 73 6.11.1143b15 71 6.12 3 6.12.1144a7–11 31 n.7 6.12.1144a23–b1 82 6.12.1144a28–31 68, 71, 72 6.12.1144a29–37 32 n.13 6.12.1144a31–33 72 6.12.1144a31–36 4 6.12.1144a34–36 139 6.12.1144a34–b1 83 6.13.1144b1–4 83 6.13.1144b4 32 n.13 6.13.1144b14–17 83, 139 6.13.1144b17 83 6.13.1144b21–28 143 6.13.1144b26–32 139 6.13.1145a9 81 7.3.1147b3–5 50 7.6.1149a24 21 7.6.1149a32–33 146 n.16 7.6.1150a4–5 134 7.7.1150b19–28 52 7.7.1150b25–28 52 7.8.1150b32–35 141 7.8.1151a1–3 84 7.8.1151a15–20 141 7.8.1151a15–27 84 7.8.1151a24–26 141 7.13.1153b1–7 94 n.4 7.13.1153b25–31 34 n.26 7.14.1154b26–28 131 8.1 41 8.10.1160b19–24 41 10.4.1074b26–31 131 10.5.1175b13–24 131 EN Arabic Translation (NEar) ed. Akasoy and Fidora 2005 1.13.1102b9–11 48

Index Locorum 3.5.1114a31–b1 49 7.3.1147b3–5 50 7.6.1149a32–34 51 7.7.1150b25–28 52 8.1.1155b8 59 n.21 EN Hebrew Translation (Alguades) ed. Neria 2015 1.13.1102b9–11 114 6.5.1140b11–17 109–10 EN Latin Translation (Grosseteste) ed. Gauthier 1972–1974 6.5.1140b11–21 95 n.12 6.5.1140b17–18 147 n.23 6.5.1140b18 71–2 Magna Moralia (MM) 7 1.9.1187a5–19 18 Metaphysica 12.7.1072b14–19 131 Physica 2.9.200a15–b8 109 Rhetorica 5 Aspasius in EN 75.26–27 22 75.28–76.5 23 76.5 33 n.20 77.28 24 77.31–32 24 78.1–2 24 79.10–14 24 79.33–80.3 24 147.18–23 145 n.9 151.19–26 13 n.10 152.25–153.2 34 n.26 161.9–10 13 n.10

163

Epitome of Parva Naturalia: Versio Hebraica ed. Blumberg 1972 124 n.39 Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics (McNE) ed. Woerther (in preparation) Prooem. interpretis 58 n.13 Prooem. 58 n.11 ad 1.13.1102b9–11 48 ad 3.5.1114a31–b1 49 ad 6.5.1140b11–21 44–5 ad 6.8.1142a23–30 53, 56 ad 7.3.1147b3–5 50 ad 7.6.1149a32–34 51 ad 7.7.1150b25–28 52 ad 8.1.1155b8 41, 59 n.21 ad 8.10.1160b19–24 41 Middle Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics in Hebrew (McNEheb) ed. Berman 1999 Proem. 58 n.11 ad 1.13.1102b9–11 48, 123 n.35 ad 3.5.1114a31–b1 49 ad 6.5.1140b11–21 45 ad 6.5.1140b11–24 106 ad 6.8.1142a23–30 54 ad 7.3.1147b3–5 50 ad 7.6.1149a32–34 51 ad 7.7.1150b25–28 53 ad 8.1.1155b8 59 n.21 Scientia Naturalis 51

Averroes

Bible Daniel 13.56 90 Deuteronomy 16.19 111 I Chron. 16.41 113 Isa. 29.11 112 Job 28.16 112 Job 63.6 113 Ps. 11.7 115 Ps. 51.5 113

Commentaries on De anima 55

Boethius

Epitome of Parva Naturalia: Versio Anglica ed. Blumberg 2012 55

De interpretatione 33 n.19

Epitome of Parva Naturalia: Versio Arabica ed. Hansberger (in preparation) 124 n.39

Cicero Acad. 2.77–78 35 n.30

164

Index Locorum

Eustratius in EN 26.11–17 69 110.28–31 70 279.18–31 70 311.29–312.25 69, 72 311.36 72 351.23–352.27 74 381.21–25 70, 71, 72 393.22–27 72, 73 Gersonides Commentary on the Torah: Deutoronomy 6.5 119 n.5 Commentary on the Torah: Genesis 5 119 n.5 85 119 n.5 86 119 n.5

42a 124 n.38 181a 108 181a–b 122 n.23 181b 111, 122 n.24 Maimonides Code: Book XIV, Book of Judges; Treatise I. Sanhedrin 23.6 123 n.26 Guide of the Perplexed 2.29 123 n.28 2.36 117 n.1 3.43 117 n.1 3.49 117 n.1 Manuscripts

in Exodus 31 113

Alex. 342 67 Barb. gr. 85 67 Escorial. T.I.18 66, 67 Marc. gr. 212 66 Oxon. Bodl. Oppenheim 591 105, 120 n.6 Par. gr. 1417 67 Pavia, Univ. Aldini 244 98 n.28 Saint Omer, BM 0623 44, 58 n.10 Saint Petersburg, Heb 379 105 Toledo, Biblioteca de la Catedral, 94.14 41 Vat. ebr. 556 120 n.6 Vat. gr. 1429 66, 67 Vat. lat. 2173 98 n.28

in Leviticus 15 113

Pachymeres

Sefer ʿAqedat Yitzḥaq 60 123 n.32 95 123 n.33 55 123 n.31

Philosophia 66

Commentary on the Torah: Numbers 27 120 n.5 Gregory the Great Moralia in Iob XXXI, xlv, 88 97 n.23 Issac ‘Arama in Deutoronomy 16 113

Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob Commentary on NEheb Prooem. 112–3 ad 1.13.1102b9–11 115 ad 6.5.1140b11–25 110–11 See also MS Paris BNF, Heb. 996 2a 113 MS Saint Petersburg, Heb 379 41b–42a 115

Plato Republic 7.518A–D 32 n.14, 68 7.533C–D 32 n.14 Symposium 219A 68 Radulphus Brito Le questiones di Radulfo Brito sull’“Etica Nicomachea”, ed. Costa 2008 98 n.28 Questiones super lib. Ethicorum, editio secunda, ed. Costa (in preparation)

Index Locorum Q. 166 90, 92 Q. 166 resp. 101 n.38 Q. 166–67 90 Q. 167 92 See also MS Vat. lat. 2173 49rb 98 n.30, 99 n.31 49rb-va 99 n.32 49va 99 n.33, 100 n.34, 100 n.35, 100 n.36 49vb 101 n.38 Samuel Ibn Tibbon

Thomas Aquinas De malo 14.3 resp. 97 n.24 15.4 88, 89 15.4 resp. 97 n.25 De virtutibus cardinalibus 1 88 Sententia libri Ethicorum 87, 104 6.4 96 n.21, 122 n.17 Summa theologiae 2.2, 53, 6 98 n.25

Translation of Maimonides’ Commentary on Tractate Avot 118 n.2

Yosef Kaspi

Sextus Empericus

Terumat Ha-kesef 125 n.43

M 7.247–60 35 n.30 Simplicius in De caelo 33 n.19 in Physica 33 n.19

165

Index Nominum Abraham, Levi B. 118n.2 Abraham Shalom 105 Achtenberg, Deborah 12 n.7, 145 n.10 Akasoy, Anna A. 37, 57 n.6, 57 n.8, 57 n.9 al-Ahwāni, Aḥmad Fu’ād 64 n.55 al-‘Āmīrī 38 Albert the Great 38, 65, 80, 85–7, 95 n.13, 95 n.17, 124 n.41 Alberti, Antonia 33 n.17 Alexander of Aphrodisias 15, 19, 20, 25–30, 33 n.19 al-Fārābī 38, 39, 117 n.1 al-Kindī 38, 56 Andronicus of Rhodes 20, 21, 67 Anna Komnene, Princess 66 Antonius de Waele 125 n.42 Aouad, Maroun 59 n.18, 59 n.20 Arberry, Arthur J. 37 Ariston 20 Aspasius 1, 7, 13 n.10, 15, 19, 20, 21–5, 26, 30, 33 n.19, 33 n.20, 66 Augustine 101 n.37 Averroes 10, 37, 38, 39–56, 85, 101 n.37, 105, 110, 114, 115, 119 n.4 Axelroth, Dorothy G. 57 n.7 Badawī, ʽAbd al-Raḥmān 37 Baltussen, Han 33 n.16 Barnes, Jonathan 13 n.10, 33 n.19 Bejczy, Stván 124 n.41 Berman, Lawrence V. 40, 44, 58 n.11, 58 n.12, 58 n.14, 107, 117 n.1, 119 n.3, 119 n.4, 120 n.6, 121 n.13 Berti, Enrico 34 n.25 Bessarion, Cardinal 66 Bloch, David 144 n.4 Bnaiahu, Meir 123 n.34 Bobonich, Chris 13 n.11 Bobzien, Susanne 35 n.40 Boethius 33 n.19 Boethus 20

Bourke, Vernon J. 125 n.41 Braslavy, Sara K. 120 n.5 Broadie, Sarah 12 n.3, 146 n.23 Buffon, Valeria 94 n.10 Burgundio of Pisa 85, 94 n.9 Burnet, John 11. n.3 Burnyeat, Myles 136 Bywater, Ingram 11, 145 n.11 Callus, Daniel A. 120 n.7 Camillo Zanetti 66 Castille 104 Celano, Anthony J. 94 n.10 Charles, David 127, 144 n.2, 145 n.13 Chiesa, Bruno 118 n.2 Cohen, Hermann 118 n.1 Cooper, John M. 12 n.7 Corcilius, Klaus 16, 30 n.1, 31 n.3, 127, 144 n.6, 144 n.8, 146 n.17 Costa, Iacopo 9, 120 n.7, 122 n.18, 124 n.41, 147 n.23 Crawford, Stuart F. 64 n.55 Davidson, Herbert 118 n.1 Dirlmeier, Franz 12 n.3 Doig, James C. 124 n.40, 124 n.41 Donini, Pierluigi 35 n.31 Don Meir Alguades 72, 103, 104–5, 114, 115, 120 n.8, 121 n.15, 122 n.19 Dorandi, Tiziano 68 Dow, Jamie 12 n.8 Dunlop, Douglas D. 37, 57 n.8 Engberg-Pedersen, Troels 12 n.7 Euclid 143 Eustathius 38, 56, 119 n.4 Eustratius of Nicaea 66–75, 95 n.17, 122 n.21 Falcon, Andrea 33 n.16 Fez 37, 39

Index Nominum Fidora, Alexander 37, 57 n.8 Fink, Jakob 2, 122 n.20 Frede, Dorothea 145 n.12 Frede, Michael 34 n.30, 35 n.40 Gallop, David 144 n.5 Gauthier, René A. 11 n.2, 12 n.3, 57 n.8, 75, 94 n.2, 94 n.8, 94 n.9, 94 n.10, 101 n.37, 125 n.41, 146 n.23 Geoffroy, Marc 52 George Pachymeres 66, 67 George Scholarius 67 Gersonides 119 n.5 Godfrey of Fontaines 90 Golitsis, Pantelis 75 n.4, 75 n.6 Grant, Alexander 12 n.3 Greenwood, Leonard H. G. 12 n.3, 146 n.23 Gregory the Great 88, 89 Gregory the Theologian 70 Grönroos, Gösta 147 n.24 Guiral Ot 85 Gutas, Dimitri 40 Haas, Frans A. J. de 8, 31 n.3, 31 n.6, 130, 137, 147 n.24 Hansberger, Rotraud 64 n.54, 124 n.39 Harvey, Steven 59 n.18, 59 n.22, 60 n.25, 61 n.27, 117 n.1, 118 n.2, 119 n.4, 119 n.5, 124 n.39 Hayes, Josh 57 n.8 Heliodorus of Prusa 67 Hermann the German 39, 40, 48, 56, 85, 107 Hoffmann, Tobias 96 n.20, 124 n.40 Ibn al-Nadīm 38 Ibn Bāğğa 39 Inglis, John 124 n.40 Inwood, Brad 33 n.16 Irwin, Terence 12 n.3, 146 n.23 Isaac Abarbanel 105 Isaac ‘Arama, Rabbi 103, 105, 110, 112–14 Isaiah 113 Iṣhāq Ibn Ḥunayn 38, 56, 57 n.7, 119 n.4 Ivry, Alfred 64 n.55 Jaffa, Harry V. 124 n.40 Joachim, Harold H. 12 n.3

167

Joel ibn Shueib 105 John Buridan 85 John Kantakouzenos, ex-emperor 67 Jolif, Jean Y. 11 n.2, 12 n.3, 57 n.8, 75, 94 n.2, 94 n.8, 146 n.23 Jordan, Mark 124 n.40 Joseph Albo 105 Joseph b. Shem-Ṭob 1, 103, 105, 108–17 Joseph Hayyun 105 Kaczor, Christopher 124 n.40 Kellner, Menahem 118 n.2 Konstan, David 22, 33 n.17, 33 n.21 Korolec, Jerzy B. 59 n.16, 60 n.24 Kraye, Jill 125 n.41, 125 n.42 Labarrière, Jean-Louis 144 n.1, 145 n.8 Laras, Giuseppe 123 n.34 Lennox, James G. 144 n.1 Lines, David 75 n.1 Linos, Benakis G. 75 n.2 Madigan, Arthur SJ 33 n.18 Maimonides 104, 113, 117 n.1 Mercken, H. P. F. 75 n.3 Michael of Ephesus 66 Miller, Jon 11 n.1 Mioni, Elpidio 66 Miskawayh 39 Mondrain, Brigitte 75 n.7 Monfasani, John 125 n.42 Moses Argal 105 Moses Ibn Tibbon 124 n.39 Moss, Jessica 4, 12 n.7, 13 n.8, 13 n.9, 94 n.5, 127, 144 n.3, 145 n.10, 145 n.13 Müller, Jörn 124 n.40 Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī 39 Natali, Carlo 80 Neria, Chaim Meir 9, 58 n.10, 72, 120 n.6 Nieuwenburg, Paul 13 n.8 Nogales, Salvador Gómez 64 n.55 Novo, Violeta Cervera 95 n.10 Nussbaum, Martha C. 13 n.8 Olympiodorus 67 Pericles 42, 81 Perkams, Matthias 124 n.40

168

Index Nominum

Peter Lombard 90 Peter of Auvergne 85 Pines, Shlomo 124 n.39 Polansky, Ronald 94 n.2, 145 n.11 Porphyry 39 pseudo-Peckham 85, 94 n.10 Radulphus Brito 80, 85, 90–3 Rashed, Marwan 94 n.9 Ravitzky, Aviezer 124 n.39 Reeve, David 12 n.3 Richardson, Henry S. 145 n.10 Robert Grosseteste 71–2, 85, 107, 147 n.23 Robert Kilwardby 85, 94 n.10 Robinson, James T. 118 n.2 Ross, David 145 n.11 Rowe, Christopher 12 n.3, 146 n.23 Salman, Dominique 58 n.10 Samuel ben Judah of Marseilles 40, 48, 103–5, 121 n.11 Samuel Ibn Tibbon 118 n.2 Samuelson, Hava T. 119 n.5 Saperstein, Marc 113 Sauvé Meyer, Susan 19 Scheiter, Krisana 144 n.3, 144 n.5 Schmidt, Ernst 56, 57 n.4, 64 n.56 Sedley, David 145 n.14 Septimus, Bernard 123 n.30 Sharples, Robert 26, 27, 29, 32 n.16, 33 n.17, 33 n.18, 35 n.32, 35 n.35 Shem-Tob b. Joseph Shem-Tob 105 Shem Tov Ibn Falaquera 118 n.2 Sherman, Nancy 146 n.18 Shields, Christopher 144 n.3

Simplicius 21, 33 n.19 Socrates 18, 20, 24, 30 Sorabji, Richard 33 n.16 Taylor, Richard C. 64 n.55 Thomas Aquinas 75, 80, 85, 86, 87–90, 91, 96 n.20, 104, 109, 116, 120 n.6 Toledo 39 Tracey, Martin J. 95 n.10 Tricot, Jules 64 n.52 Trizio, Michele 9, 75 n.8, 76 n.14, 76 n.15, 95 n.17, 122 n.21 Ullmann, Manfred 37, 56, 57 n.7, 64 n.56 Vuillemin-Diem, Gudrun 94 n.9 Walfish, Barry 125 n.43 Walter Burley 85 Weiss, Raymond L. 118 n.1 Whiting, Jennifer 143 n.1 Wieland, Georg 94 n.10 Wilensky, Sara H. 123 n.30 William of Moerbeke 85, 120 n.7 Woerther, Frédérique 8, 58 n.10, 58 n.12, 59 n.18, 59 n.20, 59 n.21, 60 n.24, 64 n.57, 95 n.11, 105, 106, 114, 118 n.1, 119 n.4, 120 n.9, 123 n.35 Yosef Kaspi, Rabbi 125 n.43 Zavaterro, Irene 94 n.10 Zerahiah ha-Levi Saladin 105 Zonta, Mauro 57 n.6

Index Rerum abstention sexual 107 acknowledgement 134 action 43, 91, 132. See also moral, agency bad 132 broad account of 132 on causal basis of the hexis 133 from disposition 132, 133, 142 human 132 and knowledge 138 sudden 88, 132, 142 vicious voluntary 18 virtuous voluntary 18 activity 134 of thinking 16 unimpeded 131 affection. See emotion agent corrupted (see vicious) Aggadah 111 aim. See end aisthêsis. See perception animal 16, 27, 50, 83 movement 132 non-human 5 no deliberation 133 appear 3–7, 19 being sense perceptually aware 142 commital, non-commital 3, 4 the end 4 good to someone in a natural state 23 and grasping principles 72 immediately 141–2 intellectually 4 moral facts 139 not purely epistemological 84 quasi-perceptually 4 as seeing 72 the truth 4 the way the world a. to us 20

appearance. See also phantasia kataleptic 25, 35 n.30 responsible for action 27 archê. See Starting point argument 51 aristotelian. See peripatetic assent 25 avoid same thing as desire 16 bad 16. See also vice; vicious action 132 and harmful 16 and natural condition 130, 132 not intellectually perceived 132 beneficial 138 Bible 107, 111, 113 black bile 52–3 blindness of mind 89 of reason 86 of spirit 88 body 70 boulêsis. See wish boulêton. See under wish brain 52 bravery 134, 138 bribe 111 Byzantine curriculum 65 calculation (logismos) 133 capacity 26 natural 28 carelessness 18 causality efficient (moral virtue) 82 formal (phronêsis) 82 cause efficient 129, 135 final 15, 20, 68, 73, 135, 138 (see also deliberation; end) part-cause (sunaitios) 19, 24

170

Index Rerum

cervical lobes 52 character 19 bad 5 controls phantasia 137 and co-responsibility 20, 136–7 determined by nature or habit? 22 formation of 20, 134 (see also habituation) full-blown 138 and grasp of starting point 5 habit 136 provides the end 139 and stable phantasia 136 child 28, 69 childhood 28 chilling 130 choice 127 and circumstances 27 free 30 three c. of life 27 Christian 70, 104, 113, 116 circumstances 71 and choice 27 cleverness. See deinotês commandments 110 commentary Aspasius in EN 21–2 first extant 21 Averroes McNE 39–41 Hebraic version 44, 104 middle commentary (talḫīṣ) 40 not extant in Arabic 39 conclusion 85. See also syllogism and action 51 conscience 91 continence 90, 107 contraries 130 co-responsible. See under cause, partcause corporeal 52 criterion of truth 25 daughters of lust 89 deinotês 68, 71 evolving into phronêsis 70, 71, 72–3 non-moral 83 deliberation 68, 88, 137 concerns the means 82

final cause obscured in 69 in mankind 70 morally correct 133 neutral 133 object of 42, 74 wicked 133 desire 46, 88, 132 belongs to appetitive faculty 80 and deliberative phantasia 135 for the good 70 not cognitive 81 diastrephei. See pervert dimyon. See phantasma diôkein. See pursue disappearance logical 86 psychological 86 discriminate 130, 131 disposition. See state distort. See pervert divine substances 70 dokoun, to 23, 33 n.20. See also good, supposed dream 48, 114–15, 143 dunamis. See capacity emotion 52 effect on identifying the final cause 73 intellectual interpretation of 5 and knowledge 92 phantastic interpretation of 5 uncontrolled 53 violent 87 end 4, 15, 19, 135, 137. See also cause, final destroyed by vice 139 disappears 86 imperative strength of 84 and means 81 moral virtue does not know the e. 81 moral virtue provides the e. 139 seeing the e. as imperative 83 enkrateia. See continence epileptic 141 Ethics (Aristotle’s) 3. See also Nicomachean Ethics general reception of 2 three versions of 7 euboulia 82

Index Rerum Euphuia. See natural endowment existimatio. See hupolêpsis exousia (Alexander) 29 experience 71 eye of the discerning 111 as an inborn capacity for discerning 19–20, 26, 27, 49 of the soul 32 n.14, 68–9, 72 dianoia 70 intellect (practical) 71 intellect (whole) 70, 71 faculty. See also soul appetitive 80, 88 cognitive 80 deliberative 133 imaginative (ha-medummeh) 54 intellectual 114 nutritive 114 of the soul 56 fear 138 of sin (see temperance, translated to Hebrew) flight. See avoid focal meaning 34 n.25 freedom 29 Galenic 39 GDP. See goal disappearance passage goal. See end goal disappearance passage 80–4 and incontinence 86–7 good 4, 15, 137 apparent (phainomenon) 4, 17, 19, 20, 24, 48–9, 133, 137 and beneficial 16 as final cause 20, 87 the human 81 and natural condition 130, 132 naturally 24 not intellectually perceived 132 subjective 87 supposed (dokoun) 69 the truly 19 the good person. See virtuous person grief. See pain gut reaction 133, 142. See also action, from disposition

171

habit 136 bad 28, 109 most depend on us 28 and unstable phantasia 136 habituation 134, 135. See also character, formation of and moral starting points 6 personal responsibility for 24 and phantasia 136 Halakhic 111 happiness heavenly 104 worldly 104 haś-kēl. See phronêsis healthy 23 heating 130 hedonism motivational 135 psychological 135 hexis. See state histappkut. See temperance, translated to Hebrew (sufficiency) homiletical literature jewish 105, 113 human 16, 70 different from other animals 27 inherently corrupt 113 hupolêpsis 42, 80 phronêsis is a true h. 81 translated to Latin (existimatio) 87 universal 50 ignorance 18, 70 of the end 49 image. See phantasma misleading translation of phantasma 129 imagination 16, 47–53, 93, 114. See also phantasia incontinence 50, 86, 90, 141 preserves the principle 84, 141 in respect of anger 51 and will 91 incorporeal 52 induction 7 inexperience 69 intellect 7, 52, 88, 132. See also eye, of the soul active 116 deliberates 91

172

Index Rerum

practical 70, 71, 72–3, 81–2, 90, 128, 132 one state 128 two-component model 127 theoretical 71, 73 intellectual interpretation of phantasia 3, 127 intuition 5 knowledge 80 intelligence practical (see intellect, practical) intemperance 52 intuitive knowledge 71 Jewish ethics 117 philosophy and history 111 joy. See pleasure judaization 105, 107, 108, 110–11 judgement correct 71, 82 of moral principles 5 rational 16, 88 knowledge 80 belongs to cognitive faculty 80 particular 90 prophetic 116 speculative 90, 116 universal 90 law 18, 112, 113 Jewish 110 logismos. See calculation logos 52. See also argument lust. See pleasure mathematical apprehension 54 sciences 74, 90 mean (psychological) intellectual 16, 20 perceptual 16, 20, 130 mean (to an end) 81, 88, 139 and deliberation 82 memory 50 metriopatheia 43 moral agency 68, 70 blindness 2

cognition 5 epistemology 4, 5 perception 2, 142 phantasia 2 psychology 2, 3, 4, 5 reasoning 5, 88 motivation 138 natural condition and the bad 130, 132 and the good 130, 132 natural endowment (euphuia) 19, 24, 27 and acquisition of virtue 26 nature in accord with 23 people’s 24 Neoplatonic 70 Nicomachean Ethics. See also Ethics (Aristotle’s) Arabic version 37–9 Byzantine commentaries on 65–7 Hebrew translations of based on Grosseteste’s Latin trans 104 earliest (1321) 104 judaization of 105, 108, 110 Latin commentaries on 65, 85, 116 Latin translations of Ethica nova 85 Ethica vetus 85 Translatio lincolniensis 85 privileged position of 7–8 noble 138 nous 132, 133. See also intellect as a primitive grasp 134 oikeiôsis 21 old age 71 pain definition of 15 as efficient cause 135 modifying practical judgement 42 not a criterion of good and bad 17 opinion destroyed by 44 physiological account of 130–2 supervening on action and activity 17 paraphrasis Lat. translation of talḫīṣ 40

Index Rerum part-cause. See under cause particular. See also under perception ultimate 54 passion. See emotion perceiving something as pleasant 16 perception 16, 54 background information for 134 of common sensibles 55 mathematical 54 and the objects of phronêsis 74 and particular premise 51 and particulars 53, 74, 134 physiological 80 tactile 129, 131 and value properties 7, 142 (see also sense) peripatetic 21, 25, 30 pervert 28, 139 and pleasure 87 phainesthai. See appear phantasia and character 137, 139 deliberative 128, 132–5 comprehensive 134 and desire 135 as general perception 134 different from perception 130 and grasp of principles 47 and habituation 136 instinctive 142 intellectualist interpretation of 3, 127 and logos 52 of means 146 n.16 of a moral situation 146 n.16 of particulars 51 and perception of common sensibles 54–5 perceptual 133, 134 prepares desire 135 psychological account of 4–5, 128–30 rational 132 and rational choice 50 and rational element 51 responsibility for 137 theoretical 54 translated to Arabic (taḫayyul) 48 translated to Hebrew (dimyon) 50 translated to Latin (visio) 50 transliterated in Latin (phantasia) 50

173

phantasma 16, 91, 129 and action 134 and attraction 134 causal power of 129 and common perception 55 general 135 making one out of many 133 as a principle that (hoti) 135 in sleep 48 translated to Hebrew (dimyon) 48 phronêsis 17, 42, 53 affirms 83 blind without character virtue 139 cannot be forgotten 127, 143 and the common sense 74 and conception of the good life 133, 139 discovers means 82 as formal causality 82 identical to knowledge of the end 81 imperative 81–2, 85 and integration of the principle 139 intellectual perception 54 and knowledge 80 knows the end 81 and means 139 and moral virtue 81, 82–3, 138–9, 142–3 not just a rational state 127, 143 not speculative 81 object of 80, 81 and perception 74 and perception of the end 73 perfection of the calculative part 83 translated to Hebrew (haś-kēl) 106 translated to Latin (prudentia) 85 a true hupolêpsis 81, 140, 143 and ultimate particular 54, 74 union of moral excellence and reason 46–7, 82–3, 139, 142–3 phronimos 42, 81, 139, 142–3 phugein. See avoid physiological processes 128 Platonic 39, 68, 70 Platonist 21 pleasure condition of vicious act 88–9 definition of 15 destroys knowledge 79 distorts perception of the good 87 as efficient cause 135, 138

174

Index Rerum

and the end 138 foreign 131 learning to take p. in 134 love of 111 modifying practical judgement 42 no effect on universal knowledge 86 not a criterion of good and bad 17 offers a corrupted proposition 86 opinion destroyed by 44 physical 79, 131 physiological account of 130–2 and practical syllogism 86 partly destroys the minor 86 totally destroys the conclusion 86 sexual 88 supervening on action and activity 17 of thought 131 pneuma 52 power. See faculty practical syllogism. See under syllogism practical thought 132, 133. See also intellect, practical practical wisdom. See phronêsis precept 88 premise. See also conclusion major 85 disappears 86 minor 71, 85, 91 particular 51 and perception 51 universal 51 principle. See starting point prophecy 115–16 prudence. See phronêsis prudentia. See phronêsis psychology intellectualist 91 punishment 18 pursue 83 Qur’ān 38 Rabbi 110 reason 69, 70. See also logos imperative of 88 practical 88 relativism Protagorean 31 n.9

representation 6, 55. See also phantasma responsibility 18, 19 agent 28 and appearance 27 character and co-responsibility 20 reward 18 right reason 20 sadness. See pain sceptic 25 scholastic 104 secularizing 107 self-control. See temperance sense 131 the common 16, 54, 74 impressions 16 sense perception. See perception sensible common 54 separate substance 70 Sephardic rabbinic thought 105 Shivvui. See temperance, translated to Hebrew (even minded) sick 23 sin 106 capital 88–90 consciously 91 sleep 47–8, 114–15 Socratic 19, 26, 27 sôphrosunê. See temperance soul. See also faculty concerned with opinion 133 discursive 16, 70 embodiment of 70 irrational part 68 nutritive 47, 114 rational part 68 two r. parts 81 thinking 16 species 16 spirit 88 spoudaios. See phronimos starting point. See also cause, final; end conclusion of practical syllogism 43 destruction of 46, 79 false 139 grasp of 70, 72 intellectual grasp of 3

Index Rerum internalized 143 knowing the s. p. 81 natural 140 and phronêsis 139 practical 4 rational 46 that (hoti) 135, 136, 139 turning away from 91 universal 90 why (dioti) 136 state (psychological) dianoetic and ethical 43 natural 23, 28 vicious 44 is voluntary 18 stoic 21, 25, 30, 137 determinism 29 epistemology 25 vocabulary in Aspasius 23 sunaitioi. See under cause sunesis 82 syllogism 133. See also premise practical 3, 43, 51, 70, 72, 85, 91, 127 imperative 85 and pleasure 86 taḫayyul. See phantasia talḫīṣ. See under commentary, (Averroes), middle commentary ta prakta. See action telos. See end temperance condition of virtuous act 88 preserves phronêsis 42, 69, 79, 89, 108, 140 prevents destruction of right belief 87 and touch 132, 140 translated to Hebrew (fear of sin) 106–7 translated to Hebrew (even minded) 107 translated to Hebrew (sufficiency) 107 theoretical judgement 42 reasoning 116 to-be-wished-for. See under wish Torah 104, 112, 113, 114 touch 131–2. See also perception, tactile and temperance 132 triangle 42, 53, 54, 74–5, 90

175

tristitia. See pain two-component model 128 unmoved mover 130–1 ‘up to us’. See voluntary vice. See also state destroys principle 43, 79, 87, 139 destroys right belief 87 vicious 141 distinct from incontinent 141 no one voluntarily 18 virtue. See also state cardinal 88 of character 80 aligning perceptual and intellectual mean 17 as efficient causality 82 the energy of 82 a form of desire 81 as a mean for discerning good and bad 17 perfection of desire 83 full 83, 138–9 of intellect 127 natural 83 virtuous person 4, 139, 142, 143 a competent judge 18 norm of what appears 25 unfailing phantasia of 143 voluntary 18, 27, 91 wicked (no one) 18 ‘what depends on us’. See voluntary wicked. See vicious will 29, 88, 91 free 91 wise person 29 wish 4, 17, 127 and the apparent good 17 the goal of 22 to-be-wished-for (boulêton) 22 wrongdoing not voluntary 18 yirʾaṯ ḥēṭ. See temperance, translated to Hebrew (fear of sin) youth. See child