Peasants in power: Alexander Stamboliski and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, 1899-1923 9780691198422, 9780691075846, 9780691655444

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Peasants in Power

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Alexander Stamboliski and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, 1599-1923

JOHN D. BELL

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS Princeton, New Jersey

Copyright © 1977 by Princeton University Press Published by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, Guildford, Surrey All Rights Reserved

Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data will be found on the last printed page of this book Publication of this book has been aided by the Paul Mellon Fund of the Princeton University Press This book has been composed in VIP Times Roman Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey

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Contents

PREFACE IX ABBREVIATIONS XIV I Bulgaria at the End of the Nineteenth Century 3

{I The Birth of the Agrarian Union 22 JI] Alexander Stamboliski and the Theory

and Practice of A grarianism 55

IV The Agrarian Union and the Wars 85

V The Road to Power 122

VI The Agrarians in Power: Domestic Reforms 154

VII The Agrarians in Power: Foreign Policy 184 VUI The Overthrow of the Agrarian Government 208

AFTERMATH 242

INDEX 263

BIBLIOGRAPHY 247

Vil

Tables

1908 82 24, 1913 110

1. Land Distribution in Bulgaria in 1897 13 2. Elections for the XIV National Assembly, May 25,

3. Elections for the X VI National Assembly, November

17, 1919 143 1920 152

4. Elections for the X VIII National Assembly, August

5. Elections for the XIX National Assembly, March 28,

6. Sources of the State Land Fund 167 7. Composition of BANU Druzhbi in 1921 and 1922 215

Vill

Preface | SCHOLARS interested in the modern history of Eastern Europe

have traditionally focused on such problems as nationalism and | nationality conflicts, the breakdown of international relations, and the roots of East European Communism. Agrarianism—the rise of organized peasant movements—has received relatively little attention. To an extent this is understandable, since in none of the East European states did the Agrarians create viable and enduring institutions, and as E. H. Carr has written: “History is . . . a rec-

ord of what people did, not of what they failed to do.” Still, the Agrarians in their prime created mass political movements and were able to bid seriously for power and to propose a number of original solutions to the problems besetting their peoples before succumbing to domestic reaction, economic depression, war, and Sovietization. If the full dynamic of East European politics is to be understood, we should know the Agrarian contribution to it even if the Agrarians themselves were unable to overcome their rivals.

This book will explore in as much depth as the available sources permit the history of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union—the strongest of the East European organizations—from its founding to the overthrow of its government in 1923. I have attempted to find the causes for its appearance, to explain its ideology and program, and to evaluate its accomplishments and failures in both domestic and foreign policy. Inevitably, this has led me to concentrate on the career of Alexander Stamboliski, who guided and inspired the BANU during its rise to power. Thus, this book is a political biography of both a movement and a man. In January 1968 I rode a bus to the western outskirts of Sofia to visit the house in which Stamboliski had lived while Prime Minister, preserved now along with a small museum devoted to his life. Arriving before the guide, I encountered a peasant, short and thin, about sixty years old, whose “‘weathered”’ features as well as his 1X

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BES eR aaaeRoe eesarea eaeBeegSee aah Sgt ee te ag RC BS eee oSeeeee a oe ScaeRT a eae Be Ge Seaae rer nent Ree ae eeeee eRBS ge eeage Be ONES 8 Pe ae.em eR ae en ee Pie tee oe Seee a 3aSar eae ¢ ee Sey Oe eges RRS ig eg Same: eet” 53

Bae ee Toeseeeseoeeeteeeoo. Re A eergeen: i Bs pees ee B. Boev, “Vutreshen pregled,’’ SBID, 1v, No. 10 (1900), 701-705; B. Penev, Istoriia na novata bilgarska literatura, 1v, part one (Sofia, 1936), 182-204. * Quoted in V. Pinto, “The Narodnik Movement in Bulgarian Literature,”’ unpub. dissertation, University of London, 1952, pp. 101-102. 5 Ibid., p. 137.

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BULGARIA AT END OF NINETEENTH CENTURY

failure to achieve the hoped-for political and economic progress in her first two decades of independence. In the political sphere, these years were filled with dramatic and melodramatic events. The reign of Prince Alexander Battenberg (1879-1886) was marked by the great struggle between Liberals and Conservatives over the powers of the prince, the suspension and restoration of the constitution, union with Eastern Rumelia, and victorious war against Serbia. It concluded with the kidnapping and abdication of the prince himself. But beneath this turbu-

| lent surface a slow tide was running whose effect was to undermine Bulgaria’s paper democracy and widen the gap between haves and have-nots. In spite of the democratic form of government, power was al-

ways in the hands of a politically active elite composed of the

country’s few large landowners, merchants, chorbadzhis,° lawyers, clergy, officers, teachers, and those educated in Bulgarian communities abroad. After the Liberation these men took up the reins of government, staffing the civil service and officer corps of the new state. By the mid-1880s their number expanded beyond the capacity of the country to find useful work for them. The school system was geared to produce hundreds of educated and semi-educated “intellectuals” and lawyers each year who sought

and were fit only for careers in the civil and military bureaucracies.’ During the school year 1896-1897, the first for which data were collected, the university reported that there were 180 students in the faculty of history, only 81 in the faculties of science and mathematics, and 354 in the faculty of law.® This imbalance led to the expansion of the politically active class and so con6 The term chorbadzhi was derived from chorba, soup. Before the Liberation it denoted well-to-do peasants and townsmen who housed and fed passing Turkish officials. Often they acted as tax-collectors or as intermediaries between the Turks and the common people, and so acquired the reputation of being traitors or oppressors. After the Liberation the term came to be applied to political busses on the small town and village level. See Black, Establishment, pp. 10-11. ” Kniazhestvo Bulgariia—Direktsiia na statistikata, Statistika za srednite, spetsialnite, profesionalnite i visheto uchilishta v kniazhestvo Bulgariia prez uchebnata 1896-1897 godina (Sofia, 1905), pp. 8-9; T. Tchitchovsky, “Political and Social Aspects of Modern Bulgaria,” Slavonic and East European Review, Vii, No. 20 (1929), 276-77. 8 Statistika za .. . uchilishta, pp. 166-67.

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BULGARIA AT END OF NINETEENTH CENTURY

tributed to the breakdown of the two-party system and to the disappearance of principle from public life. It brought about an intensified struggle for the spoils of office, a proliferation of bureaucracy, and pervasive corruption. Even in the first years of independence the struggle between Liberals and Conservatives, which the Liberal press presented as a battle between democracy and oligarchy, was concerned chiefly with matters of protocol. Committed to democracy in the abstract, the Liberals demanded that the prince be addressed as “*His Excel-

lency” rather than “His Highness” and that he stand while addressing the Assembly. They had no greater comprehension of the real needs of the country than did the Conservatives.? The Liberal party suffered its first schism in 1884, when its conservative wing under Dragan Tsankov broke away to form the Progressive Liberal party. Two years later the party split again, this time between

the followers of Petko Karavelov and Stefan Stambolov. Repeated fission of the party eventually produced, besides the Progressive Liberals, the Democrats under Karavelov, the National

Liberals under Stambolov, the Young Liberals under Dimittr Tonchev, the Liberals under Vasil Radoslavov, and the Radical Democrats under Naicho Tsanov. The remnants of the Conserva-

tive party regrouped as the National party led by Constantine Stoilov.!° There were few or no differences in principle between these parties as their shifting blocs and alliances came to attest. The goal of each was to secure the power of patronage and access to the state treasury for the party “chief” and his supporters. They

became “partnerships for the exploitation of power.”*! On the small town and village level it was not uncommon for ambitious men to swear allegiance to two or more parties, jumping finally to the one that gained office.’* The peasantry, four-fifths of the popu® Black, Establishment, pp. 110-33; P. Zarev, “‘Politicheskite partii v Bulgariia

neposredstveno sled osvobozhdenieto,” /storicheski pregled, 1, No. 4 (1945),

6|

301-304. 10 Black, Establishment, pp. 254-55; N. Stanev, Nai-nova istoriia na Bilgariia

, (Sofia, 1925), pp. 119-22.

4D. Kazasov, Ulitsi, khora, subitiia (Sofia, 1959), p. 200. 12 J. S. Roucek, The Politics of the Balkans (New York, 1939), pp. 122-23; Tchitchovsky, p. 277; Moublier to Pichon (Plovdiv, April 30/May 13, 1908), AMAE, Bulgarie: politique intérieure: nouvelle série, M1, 188.

BULGARIA AT END OF NINETEENTH CENTURY

lation, lacked the education, organization, and experience to act as a brake on political degeneration. Its role in government was reduced to casting ballots in what were more and more frequently rigged or meaningless elections. By the close of the century most educated Bulgarians were aware that two societies had arisen: the urban “political intelligentsia’? and the common people, who were all but excluded from political life.'? After the abdication of Prince Alexander, power passed into the hands of Stefan Stambolov. A living link with the generation of revolutionary heroes, Rakovski, Botev, and Levski, Stambolov had participated in the “committees” that had fought against the Turks before the Liberation. He had been a delegate to the Turnovo Constitutional Convention and was one of the founders of the Liberal party. As President of the National Assembly, regent during the interregnum, and Prime Minister, he secured the unification of the country, found an occupant for Bulgaria’s vacant throne, and fought off heavy-handed Russian attempts to dominate the government. He acquired, in the process, an international reputation as one of Europe’s “‘strongmen.”’* Under his rule political life lost its comic-opera features, acquiring instead a considerably more sinister aspect. Establishing a virtual dictatorship, Stambolov executed, imprisoned, or exiled his political enemies and suspended freedom of the press. While he respected some forms of the constitution, his control of the army, police, and partisan civil authorities guaranteed him steady election majorities.

Although many of the repressive features of his regime were , ended after Stambolov was deposed in 1894, subsequent political standards did not rise even to the level that preceded him. The beneficiary of Stambolov’s legacy was Prince Ferdinand | of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, whose character and policies shaped Bulgarian and Balkan politics to the end of the First World War. The corpulent new monarch resembled Alexander I in his disregard for the principles of the constitution, but he lacked the fidelity to a personal code of honor and the battlefield courage that had inspired the people’s respect if not devotion for the former prince. 'S K. Kristev, “Bilgarskata intelligentsiia,” Misi, v1, No. 1 (1898), 9. 14 The brighter side of Stambolov’s career is presented in A. H. Beamon, Stambuloff (London, 1895).

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His title unrecognized by the Powers and his authority usurped by Stambolov, Prince Ferdinand remained in the background for the

first seven years of his reign, assuaging his immense vanity through a passion for etiquette and protocol. During this apprenticeship he mastered Bulgaria’s politics along with her language, and in 1894 he suddenly dismissed Stambolov. A year later his agents brutally assassinated the former Prime Minister.” Ferdinand possessed a high order of political cunning. By encouraging the fragmentation of the political parties and by cultivating the good will of the military, he extended his personal authority over the government, especially in the field of diplomacy where he was obsessed with the dream of making Bulgaria the dominant power in the Balkans. Through “‘his skill in calculating the psychological moment for driving each batch of swine from the trough of power,” he made the political parties pillars of his regime.!® During his reign, vast public corruption was added to the evils of Bulgarian political life. Repeated financial scandals

characterized his rule, and nearly every minister who served under him was later charged with filling his pockets at public expense.*”

Outside the capital, the decline in the standards of political life was reflected in the domination and exploitation of the village by state functionaries who owed their appointments to their ability to

“deliver” the votes in their region. Often these men were the moneylenders and merchants who already controlled the village economically.’® In the election of 1899 the journalist and scholar Vasil Kunchov decided to stand as a candidate for the National Assembly in the Vratsa District of north-central Bulgaria. After the campaign he published a dismal portrait of corrupted political life. Mayors, district officials, inspectors, and tax collectors intimidated the peasants of the district. The village of Chiren, a typical example, was bossed by a mayor who: . . . was always eager to welcome any sort of state official who 15 Beamon, pp. 234-40. 16 R, W. Seton- Watson, Europe in the Melting Pot (London, 1919), p. 358. 17 Tbid., pp. 356-63; G. Buchanan, My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memories, 1 (London, 1923), 50-75.

18 Tchitchovsky, p. 278. ,

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was seeking to plunder the village. He supported any party that was in power. He controlled the village branch of the Agricultural Bank and used all his influence against those who opposed him. He performed civil functions only for heads of families who would not send their sons to school, for the teachers were his enemies.’®

The famous satirist Aleko Konstantinov wrote that in any village a

squad of mounted police carried greater weight on election day than the most idealistic opposition speeches.”°

The degeneration of political life was unrelieved by any significant economic progress. On the contrary, economic stagnation

contributed to political decline for it meant that there were few careers open to educated men outside the party and state bureaucracies. To be sure, there is some justification for accepting the Marxist characterization of the period from 1878 to 1900 as that of the ‘development of capitalism.’?’ Many of the “prerequisites” for industrialization were achieved: “feudal” relations in the countryside were abolished, handicraft production declined, the right to private property was guaranteed, and the country gained full control of its tariff policies.2? But it is by no means apparent that these events were followed by the blooming of a capitalist economy. As Alexander Gerschenkron concluded from his study of the period: “all causes [for industrialization] were present, but the effects failed to materialize.”**? This pessimistic view had been expressed earlier by the influential Bulgarian Economic Society, founded in 1895 to study the country’s economic problems. According to the society, since the Liberation artisans had been impoverished without any new industries appearing to take their place, Bulgarian products could not compete on world 19'V. Kunchov, “Edna izbiratelna borba,”” Misul, 1x, No. 6 (1899), 620. 20 A. Konstantinov, Suchineniia, 1 (Sofia, 1957), 168-75. *1 Istoriia na Bulgariia, 1 (Sofia, 1955), 9.

22S. Sh. Grinberg, “Iz istorii razvitiia bolgarskoi promyshlennosti v kontse XIX v. (perekhod k politike proteksionizma i pooshchreniia krupnoi promyshlennosti),”” Uchenye zapiski Instituta slavianovedeniia, Xxx (1966), 136-52; 1. N. Chastukhin, “‘Razvitie kapitalizma v Bolgarii v kontse XIX veka,” Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta: seriia obshchestvennykh nauk, No. 7 (1953), 55-70. 23 A. Gerschenkron, Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (New York, 1962), p. 221.

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markets, and the peasant was being ruined by falling grain prices and rising taxes.**

Owing to the lack of accurate statistical data for the period before 1909, it is not possible to construct a detailed picture of Bul-

garian economic development in the first two decades of independence. Nevertheless, in his study of Bulgarian industrialization, Gerschenkron showed convincingly that before the Second World War the Bulgarian economy never achieved the rates of growth or structural changes associated with the triumph over backwardness. What growth there was was concentrated in “‘premodern” industries, such as textiles, and not in the ““new”’ metallurgical or chemical industries.”” According to the director of the

Statistical Institute of the University of Sofia, in 1936 Bulgaria possessed only about 40,000 industrial workers “‘in the true West European sense’’ as opposed to 134,392 artisans.”° The low level of economic progress was also reflected in the rural-urban population ratio. Between 1880 and 1910 the proportion of the popula-

tion in towns of over 2,000 inhabitants actually declined slightly.?7

There were manifold reasons for Bulgaria’s failure to industrialize. On the purely economic side, the loss of Ottoman markets, the unsuitability of the country’s agricultural products for industrial uses, and the lack of available capital largely offset the advantages gained by the Liberation.2® Moreover, Bulgaria’s political leaders were disinclined to adopt a policy of state support for industrialization. This was due in part to the fact that the doctrine of laissez-faire dominated their economic thinking,” but still

more to their preoccupation with foreign policy and their con24 “Nashata programa,” SBID, 1, No. 1 (1895), 1-2. “9 Gerschenkron, pp. 198-234; Gerschenkron’s evaluation has been supported in the recent work of John Lampe. See his ‘“‘ Varieties of Unsuccessful Industrialization: The Balkan States before 1914,” Journal of Economic History, XXXxv, No. 1 (March, 1975), 56-85. 2° QO. N. Anderson, Struktur und Konjunktur der bulgarischen Bolkswirtschaft (Jena, 1938), p. 13. 27 K. Popoff, La Bulgarie économique, 1879-1911 (Sofia, 1920), p. 11. 78 Gerschenkron, pp. 223, 232-33; T. Stoianovich, A Study in Balkan Civilization (New York, 1967), pp. 97-100. 9 Tchitchovsky, p. 276.

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comitant desire to have as large and powerful an army as possible.*°

It was not until 1894 that a Bulgarian government first passed legislation to encourage the growth of industry. Even then the aid provided—tax benefits, exemptions from customs payments on imported machinery, reduced rates for rail transportation, and preference in the awarding of government contracts—‘“‘was more notable for the multifariousness the ways in which it was profferred than for its magnitude.’’*! In the one area in which the state did take an interest, railroad construction, it relied on imported equipment and failed to promote related domestic industries. And even in railway construction its activities were modest. Of the eight major foreign loans negotiated by the government between 1888 and 1909, less than one-third of the proceeds were devoted to railroad construction, the rest going to debt management and military needs.*”

The military establishment was the largest single drain on the State’s resources, although by the end of the century it was closely rivaled by interest payments on the national debt, itself contracted largely for the importation of artillery, small arms, and munitions.

By the turn of the century these two items together accounted for | 44 percent of the state budget. This proportion remained approximately constant up to the eve of the First Balkan War, when mili-

tary preparations caused it to increase still further.?? Thus, the preoccupation of Prince Ferdinand and the country’s political leaders with building up the army and equipping it with the most advanced imported weapons diverted Bulgaria’s resources away from economic development. The inertia of the economy was obscured by the changes that

took place in the cities, especially the capital. At the turn of the century a Turkish visitor wrote in amazement of the new Sofia whose public buildings, gardens, museums, trams, and electric lights gave it a “glory and beauty” surpassing the major cities of 30 Gerschenkron, p. 230.

1 Ibid., p. 229; L. Pasvolsky, Bulgaria’s Economic Position (Washington, 1930), pp. 27-28.

2 Gerschenkron, p. 230; Popoff, pp. 492-93. , =3 Popoff, pp. 483-84.

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the Ottoman Empire.** This modernization, which impressed Bulgaria’s political leaders as much as it did foreign observers, was of a decorative rather than self-sustaining variety. The construction of attractive public buildings, the beautification of cities and towns, their electrification and the installation of telephones, which relied on the importation of both equipment and engineers, little benefited the national economy and still less the peasant who was required to pay for it and who still cultivated his fields with a primitive wooden plow.*? Many Bulgarians rejected this kind of progress, for it drove home the widening gulf between the urban

and rural populations. To the poet and philosopher Stoian Mikhailovski, who eventually became a supporter of the Agrarian Union, the new Sofia symbolized not progress but exploitation.

Do you see this pretty, coquettish Bulgarian capital? It is built

out of plunder and robbery! Now it shines, it attracts like a Parisienne. . . . Well, to me it is a thousand times filthier, filthy

in the purity of its atmosphere, foul in the cleanliness of its streets and courtyards, foul because it is a living proof that the history of the young Bulgaria has begun by spoilation.”° The peasantry had benefited economically from the Liberation to the extent that it had been given ownership of the land, for the Russian occupation authorities and subsequent Bulgarian governments confiscated the Turkish estates and sold them in small parcels.*’ Table 1, giving land distribution based on the census 34 Quoted in L. S. Stavrianos, “The Influence of the West on the Balkans,” in C. and B. Jelavich, eds., The Balkans in Transition (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1963), 212. °° P. Egorov, “Izpolzuvaneto na zemiata,” in Iu. G. Mollov, ed., Pogled vurkhu sotsialno-ikonomicheskata struktura na bilgarskoto zemedelsko stopanstvo, Trudove na Statisticheskiia institut za stopanski prouchvaniia pri Sofiskiia durzhaven universitet, No. 2-3 (1936), 93-94. 3° Quoted in G. C. Logio, Bulgaria: Past and Present (Manchester, 1936), p. 370.

37 On the Liberation as a land reform, see N. G. Levintov, “Agrarnye otnosheniia v Bolgarii nakanune osvobozhdeniia i agrarny perevorot 1877-1879 godov,” in Osvobozhdenie Bolgarii ot turetskogo iga, sbornik statei (Moscow, 1953), 186-99; G. D. Todorov, “Deinostta na vremennoto rusko upravlenie v Biulgariia po urezhdane na agrarniia 1 bezhanskiia vupros prez 1877-1879 gg.,” I[storicheski pregled, x1, No. 6 (1955), 27-59; Y. G.:Kovatcheff, “Agrarian Re-

12

BULGARIA AT END OF NINETEENTH CENTURY TABLE 1 LAND DISTRIBUTION IN BULGARIA IN 1897

Size of holding Number of Percent of Number of Percent

(in hectares) holdings holdings hectares of land

less than 0.5 166,765 21 41,651 1.0

0.5-1 90,508 11 67,300 1.7 ]—2 106,373 13 157,602 3.9

2-3 110,283 75,100 14 9 187,304 4.7 3-5 435,488 11.0 5-10 149,001 19 1,058,328 26.6 10-15 55,503 73672,053 16.9 15~20 22,095 379,173 9.5 20-30 358,66415.7 9.0 over 3014,911 9,049 l2620,896 Total 799 ,588 100 3,978,459 100.0

data of 1897, demonstrates that Bulgaria was a nation of independent peasant smallholders.*®

Despite its possession of the land, the peasantry languished in the general economic stagnation. Three long-term factors 1n particular underlay the difficulties of Bulgarian agriculture in the last quarter of the nineteenth century: the low level of productivity of peasant farms; the sharp, worldwide decline of grain prices: and the steady growth of population, unrelieved by industrialization and urbanization.®? To these were added the growing burdens of taxation and indebtedness. Although during the first four to five years of independence the peasants paid less in taxes than they had under the Turks, public building projects, the establishment of a civil bureaucracy, and form in Bulgaria,” Jnternational Review of Agriculture, xxv (1934), E441-50; L. Berov, “Agrarnoto dvizhenie v Istochna Rumeliia po vreme na osvobozhdenieto,” Istoricheski pregled, xu, No. 1 (1956), 3-35. 38 Statisticheski godishnik na bilgarskoto tsarstvo, godina purva, 1909 (Sofia, 1910), p. 183. The situation in Bulgaria may be compared to that in neighboring Rumania where latifundists, making up only 0.56% of the population, held 48.6% of the arable land in estates of over one hundred hectares each. D. Mitrany, The Land and Peasant in Rumania (New Haven, 1930), pp. 186-87. 39 St. Kosturkov, “‘Predi i sega, za 25 godishniia iubelei ot osvobozhdenieto na Bulgariia,” Misul, xi, No. 7 (1903), 410-11.

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the growth of the army increased the state’s demand for revenue.?? In 1887, after the union with Eastern Rumelia, the state budget was 48,200,000 leva, an expenditure of 15.31 leva for every man, woman, and child in the country. By 1900 the budget had risen to 109,700,000 leva, a per capita expenditure of 29.52

leva.

The government looked upon the peasantry simply as a source of revenue, and collected its steadily rising taxes with no corresponding regard for rural welfare. In 1882, because the price of grain was falling, the government replaced its tax in kind with a land tax that had to be paid in money. In 1889 new methods of

calculating this tax were introduced so that the rate rose still higher. Seven years later there was a general tax reform and the amount collected dropped slightly, but there was no significant redistribution of the tax burden. Finally, in 1899, the IvanchovRadoslavov government, which had campaigned on a program of tax relief for the peasantry, decided to restore the old Turkish “tithe” on agricultural products. This tax, which had to be paid in kind, was imposed at a time when crop failures had brought about near-famine conditions and forced grain prices to artificially high levels .*

Taxes, payments to the government for land taken from the Turks, and the absence of state credit facilities forced the peasants to borrow from local moneylenders who were often unscrupulous.

The practice of “Godless usury’’ was the most visible and frequently condemned evil in the rural life of Bulgaria. Complaints of the villagers against the moneylenders were echoed in almost every rural publication. “And so in 1891 Pavli Rachev took 4,000

grosh from a Greek factory owner to finish his work,” wrote a subscriber to the journal Seiach [The Sower] in 1897.

During 1892 he gave back 3,500 grosh, during 1896 he gave back 6,000, and now the Greek still wants 2,500 grosh: the Greek for 4,000 grosh takes 12,000 grosh. Between 1890 and

1896 Haji Dimittr took 1,420 grosh for 200 grosh. From “ON. Piperov, “Danittsite v Bulgariia,” Misul, x1, No. 3 (1901), 200. “4 Popoff, pp. 483-84. *2 Piperov, No. 3, p. 202; No. 5-6, pp. 334-50.

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another, for 120 half-bushels of groats he took 680 halfbushels.*°

Government studies of usury in the countryside indicate that interest rates as high as 800 percent were not unknown.** One of the worst and at the same time most prevalent forms of usury was the practice of selling “in the green.”’ The peasant, in need before harvest time, was forced to sell his crop for a very low price while it was still in the field. After the harvest the usurer could afford to store the crop until prices rose, perhaps even selling some back to the peasant at these higher prices. This practice

was specifically prohibited in 1880, but neither this law nor numerous others attempting to regulate usury were ever enforced

for the simple reason that the moneylenders were the same tavern-keepers, merchants, government officials, and chorbadzhis who controlled the countryside politically.* Whole villages as well as individuals fell victim to ambitious usurers. According to one study, in 1901 there were 301 villages in Bulgaria “‘completely ruined by usury”’ and 470 villages “very nearly ruined.” In this same year the amount of peasant indebted-

ness reported to the government totaled 45,000,000 leva and much more was doubtless unreported.*® In the last years of the nineteenth century Bulgarian agriculture

experienced a crisis. During April, May, and June 1897, torrential rains beat down the grain in the fields and caused widespread flooding. The summer months brought hot, dry winds. In some areas SO many weeds sprang up that the peasants were not able to mow the fields with their sickles. A large proportion of the grain

stalks produced no grain at all, and the rest yielded light and wrinkled kernels, so that the total harvest was both small, only 2,113,809 tons, and of poor quality. In the following year weather conditions were better and the amount of grain harvested rose

to 2,569,463 tons, most of it of good quality. The spring and * Seiach, 1, No.6-8 (1897), 225. A grosh was a coin equal to one-fifth of a ley.

44S. Khristov, “Likhvarstvoto v Berkovskata okoliia,’” SBID, 1v, No. 1 (1900), SO.

* N. Konstantinov, “Likhvarstvoto,” SBID, xix, No. 3-4 (1910), 164, 179; S. Khristov, p. 5; Tchitchovsky, p. 278. 4° N. Konstantinov, pp. 174-75.

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summer of 1899, however, brought severe drought resulting in a disastrous harvest of only 1,558,092 tons. Livestock also suffered, for an epidemic of distomiasis broke out in 1897, and in 1899 the shortage of hay forced the peasants either to slaughter their animals or to sell them for insignificant prices.*? The poor harvest of 1899 was long remembered by the peasants. In some areas of the country, grain stores were depleted. A peasant from the village of Khasurdzhik (Shipsko) in the Provadiia District wrote: ““Whole families . . . (very hardworking people) have gone hungry, some for two, some for three or more days without even a scrap of bread.’’*° Hunger was even worse in

the Kharmanli District of Stara Zagora Province. The people maintained themselves on bread that was “black and hard like charcoal,” which was made from roots, straw, and acorns.” Faced with deprivation, the peasants were forced to turn to the local moneylenders. In his report to the government, the Provincial Inspector of Agriculture in Varna wrote: The population, which lacked grain even for subsistence, was forced to [borrow] for seed. The storehouses were depleted with the exception of a few in the hands of private individuals who at once took advantage of the unfortunates without mercy, selling them a hectoliter for twenty gold leva. Here again begins a new cycle of debt.” The government was unresponsive to the crisis in the villages. Faced with its own financial difficulties, it took advantage of the scarcity-induced rise in the price of grain to impose the “‘tithe”’ on the peasantry. This tax was the first issue over which the newly formed Agrarian Union confronted the authorities. Many studies of peasant societies in transition have shown that political initiative is rarely taken by peasants acting alone.*! Bulgaria was not an exception. The Bulgarian Agrarian Union, while 47 V. Topalov, ““Stopanska kriza v Bulgariia prez 1897-1900 gg.,” Izvestiia na Instituta za istoriia, xu (1963), 49-50. 48 Letter from Iliia Stoianov to Zemledelska borba, 11, No. 8 (Feb. 9, 1900).

*9 Topalov, “Kriza,” p. 53. 5° Tbid., p. 52. °1 E.R. Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (New York, 1969), pp. 285-90; A. Stewart, “The Social Roots,” in G. Ionescu and E. Gellner, Populism: [ts Meaning and National Characteristics (New York, 1969), 180-95.

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it had broad peasant support, was founded by members of the intelligentsia.

The term intelligentsia did not have a generally recognized meaning in Bulgaria at the end of the nineteenth century, and it was used in both pejorative and lauditory senses. This mirrored the split that had appeared in educated society by the 1890s. On the one hand there was the intelligentsia of the state bureaucracy

and the political parties. Owing to the venality and corruption prevailing in its ranks, it became known as the “partisan intelligentsia” or even the “parasitic intelligentsia.’’°? Opposed to the political intelligentsia were a number of educated men who were farther removed from the centers of power.

They were usually teachers, writers, journalists, low-ranking civil-servants, doctors, priests, or specialists in some technical field.°? These men, especially those who worked in the villages, formed a bridge between traditional peasant society and the out-

side world. The country’s public-school teachers, numbering about 6,000 in the late 1890s,°* were the most influential segment of this branch of the intelligentsia. They were poorly paid, closely watched by the local authorities, and possessed very little job security. Most of them were confronted every day by the disparity between the reality of life and the idealism of their school days. Thus, it is not surprising that the leaders of Bulgaria’s radical parties and movements were drawn largely from their ranks. Todor Vlaikov, leader of the reformist wing of the Radical Democratic party, Dimittr Blagoev, Khristo Kabakchiev, and Ianko Sakuzov of the Social Democratic party, and nearly the entire leadership of the Agrarian Union began their careers as teachers in the public schools. By the 1890s this segment of educated society was aware that Bulgaria had not made the progress that had been so confidently expected ai the time of the Liberation. Political corruption, eco** Krustev, p. 9; B. M. Peselj, “Peasant Movements in Southeastern Europe,” unpub. dissertation, Georgetown University, 1950, pp. 163-64. °3 Tchitchovsky, pp. 277-78; Iu. Pekarev, Moite politiko-obshtestveni spomeni (Sofia, 1929), pp. 105-108; I. N. Chastukhin, “‘Krest’ianskoe dvizhenie v Bolgarii v 1899-1900 gg. i vozniknovenie Bolgarskogo zemledel’cheskogo soiuza,”’ Voprosy istorii, No. 9 (1956), 93.

°4K. Lambrev, Rabotnicheskoto i profesionalnoto dvizhenie v Bilgariia, 1891-1903 (Sofia, 1966), pp. 95-96.

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BULGARIA AT END OF NINETEENTH CENTURY

nomic stagnation, and the increasingly desperate situation of the peasantry were all profoundly disillusioning to those who had been nurtured on the dreams of the revolutionary generation. That existence under the Turks had been preferable was a common theme of contemporary journalists. Vasil Kunchov, the teacher and writer whose description of village politics was quoted earlier, expressed the prevailing feeling in the form of a dialogue between himself and a simple villager. ‘Was it better in Turkish times, bai Petur?”’ I asked. ‘It was,” replied the peasant, “as long as Bulgarians didn’t interfere with the Turkish authorities. When Bulgarians began to interfere, things got much worse. Instead of one tax we had to pay two, and it was carried to the point where we could not even pay the one.”’

These few words clearly reveal the peasants’ opinions of their former Bulgarian councillors. And their opinions of today’s officialdom is no better.

And the masses are right. With only a few exceptions they have not benefited at all from our new national intelligentsia. This intelligentsia seeks only to enrich itself and never gives a thought to. the impoverishment of the people. Travel expenses,

living allowances, huge monthly salaries, pensions, gifts, awards—all these things are the means by which a few who by

some lucky chance have forged a little ahead of the masses make a more opulent life for themselves.*°

A significant number of men like Ktnchov turned to radical or reformist movements, the most important of which reflected the

influence of populism or socialism. Many individuals whose focus was more narrow participated in the movement for tradeunion organization, particularly in the creation of the Bulgarian Teachers Union. All of these tendencies made significant contributions to the formation of the Agrarian Union. Populist ideas entered Bulgaria from Russia. Before the Liberation many Bulgarians who studied in Russian schools or who lived in the Bulgarian communities in Russia.absorbed the ideas °° 'V. Kunchov, “Iz Bulgariia,” Periodichesko spisanie na Bulgarskoto knizhovno druzhestvo, x1, No. 57 (1898), 67.

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BULGARIA AT END OF NINETEENTH CENTURY

of Herzen and sought to glorify the peasant and his traditional way of life. In the late 1880s Spiro Gulabchev, a teacher, formed the secret society Siromakhomilstvo (Pauperophilia), which copied the conspiratorial organization of the People’s Will. Advocating a form of primitive Christian communism, Siromakhomilstvo formed a number of study clubs, but never achieved a large following.°®

After Stambolov, the Bulgarian government was far less repressive than Russian tsarism, and the Bulgarian populists were not an elite “‘conscience-stricken nobility.”’ These two factors meant that the Bulgarian environment was particularly well suited to the evolutionary doctrines of Mikhailovski and Lavrov, and by the late 1890s they dominated the populist movement.*? Central to Bulgarian populism was the concept of the duty of

the intelligentsia to raise the intellectual and moral standards of the common people. The populists believed that the roots of Bulgaria’s political and economic failure lay in the ignorance and backwardness of the peasantry. Their goal was to make the peasant a more efficient and prosperous producer and to educate him to the duties of citizenship in a democratic state.°® To achieve this goal the populists most often turned to journalism, and the 1890s

saw the appearance of numerous journals directed toward the peasantry. Their program called for devotion to labor on the part of the peasant and the expansion of knowledge and education. Tselina (Virgin Soil), one of the first and most influential of the populist journals, stated its position simply: “Learning is light

and inactivity darkness, knowledge is strength and _ labor riches.””°?

Convinced that the life of the peasant could be bettered only through the moral and intellectual improvement of the peasant himself, the populists created no organized political movement, nor did they aim immediately to involve the peasantry in the political life of the nation. The founding of the Agrarian Union as an ‘educational-economic”’ and nonpolitical organization testifies to °6 Istoriia na Bulgariia, u, p. 129; M. Pundeff, “Marxism in Bulgaria before 1891,” Slavic Review, xxx, No. 3 (1971), 545-46.

°” Pinto, pp. 61-69, 100. °§ Ibid., pp. 137-38. °° Tselina,1, No. 1 (1892), 1.

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the strength of populist ideas on the early Agrarian movement. But when a majority in the Agrarian Union rejected the nonpolitical approach in favor of the belief that it was the political structure of the country that kept the peasant in darkness, many populists stood by their old faith and left the Union. Populism retained its original vitality only in literature. Nevertheless, the influence of populism on the development of the Agrarian movement should

not be underestimated. By calling attention to the problems of rural life and by involving the rural intelligentsia in efforts to improve the peasant’s lot, populism was the most important influence on the Agrarian Union at the time of its formation. Socialism, especially the Russian variety imbibed by Bulgarians who had come into contact with the revolutionary circles in Russian schools and universities, and which encompassed a wide range of radical ideas, had long played an important role in Bul-

! garia’s political and intellectual life. Commonly, not only members of the radical opposition but nearly all prominent statesmen, including the most conservative, passed through a period of infatuation with some form of socialism.® In the 1890s the introduction of “scientific’’ Marxism and the founding of the Social Democratic party narrowed the focus of socialist activity. Organized socialism concentrated on the problems of industry, the creation of a politically conscious working class, and the maintenance

of ideological purity among the intellectuals who made up the bulk of party membership. In 1903 Dimitir Blagoev, the leader of the “Narrow” faction, preferred to split the tiny Bulgarian Social Democratic party rather than dilute its class purity by encouraging the membership of peasants. Even Janko Saktzov, leader of the “Broad” faction, viewed nonproletarians only as auxiliaries to the workers’ movement and did not attempt to make their problems a prime subject of the party’s program.® In a country 80 percent of whose population was made up of peasants, and which possessed only a few thousand workers, the 6° J, Rothschild, The Communist Party of Bulgaria: Origins and Development, 1883-1936 (New York, 1959), p. 3; C. E. Black, “Russia and the Modernization of the Balkans,”’ in Jelavich, p. 155; Pundeff, “Marxism,” pp. 523-50.

*! Rothschild, pp. 31-32; Istoriia na Bulgarskata komunisticheska partiia (Sofia, 1972), pp. 70-73, 80-94.

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BULGARIA AT END OF NINETEENTH CENTURY

appeal of this doctrinaire form of socialism was obviously lim-

ited. The appearance of Marxism in Bulgaria did, however, stimulate and radicalize numerous educated men, most notably Tsanko Bakalov Tserkovski, who were to become prominent in the Agrarian Union. And while it is an exaggeration to maintain that “Socialism was the school in which the peasants learned to organize,’’® the efforts of the Social Democratic party on behalf of trade-union organization in general and the Bulgarian Teachers

Union in particular certainly helped to raise the question of the organization of the peasantry.

While the growth of socialism and populism in the 1890s created an intellectual climate favorable to the development of the Agrarian movement, it was the success of the Teachers’ Union that

provided the immediate stimulus for the formation of a peasant organization. The public-school teachers had made several attempts to organize in the 1880s, but they were unable to overcome

the hostility of the government. After the fall of Stambolov, trade-unionism revived, and in the beginning of 1895 the printers carried out the first mass strike the country had seen.®* In January 1895 the teachers of Varna Province published an “Open Letter to the Public-School Teachers of Bulgaria” calling for the formation of a national teachers union. In July such an organization was actually created by a teachers’ congress held in Sofia.®* Despite the fact that within two years the Teachers’ Union split over the question of involvement in politics, the same issue that would later vex the Agrarian Union, it achieved considerable improvements in salary and job security for its members and succeeded in drawing most of the country’s teachers into its ranks.® It was natural that those teachers in the village who were concerned with the problems of the peasantry would draw inspiration from it. Their attempts to extend the idea of organization to the peasantry led directly to the creation of the Agrarian Union. 62 P. Kiranov, Bulgarskoto zemedelsko dvizhenie: idei, razvitie i delo (Sofia, 1927), p. 18.

68 Tambrev, pp. 72-73, 80-89. 64 Tbid., pp. 96-98.

6 Ibid., p. 100; Zh. Atanasov, “Iz istoriia na narodnoto uchitelsko dvizhenie v Bulgariia v kraia na XIX vek,” Jstoricheski pregled, xi, No. 1 (1957), 92.

21

CHAPTER II

The Birth of the Agrarian Union

Having spent many years as a teacher in the villages, ] came to know in great detail what the peasant endured. | could not be separated from him or his children. I attended his feasts and was in his fields during the long summer vacation. —Jlurdan Pekarev’

THE Bulgarian Agrarian Union was not created by any one man or

group. Rather it came about through a coalescence of local movements inspired by men who shared no common ideology, program, or purpose save the belief that “‘organization”’ would benefit the peasantry. They were particularly divided by the question of involvement in politics, which was not finally settled until the Union’s third congress in 1901. The first organizer of the peasantry, and the foremost advocate of direct political action, was Iurdan Pekarev of Varna Province. Pekarev was the son of a baker in the southern Dobruja. He was

born in 1865 or 1866. After completing secondary school in Varna, he took an advanced course in agricultural science and settled in one of the province’s rural districts as a school teacher. He

was an energetic and imposing man with a thick, black beard, piercing eyes, a measure of fanaticism, and two measures of ambition. In 1893 he developed a taste for politics, helping to organize resistance to the Stambolov regime among the local teachers. After Stambolov’s fall, he was elected vice-president of the provincial teachers organization that initiated the formation of the Bulgarian Teachers’ Union.* Pekarev was fired because of his union work, but he was already planning to begin a political career as a spokesman for the ' Pekarev, Spomeni, p. 137. * Ibid., pp. 5-96; D. Kazasov, Sreshti, sluchki, razmisul (Varna, 1971), pp. 39-42; I am also indebted to Iurdan Pekarev, nephew of the lurdan Pekarev dealt with in the text, who discussed the family traditions concerning his uncle in an interview in Sofia in June, 1973.

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BIRTH OF AGRARIAN UNION

peasantry. In his memoirs he wrote that his experiences as a village teacher had awakened him to the hardships of peasant life and that he grew convinced that he had a “mission” to lead the peasantry out of its darkness. His zeal brought him to the attention of a populist circle of agronomists, officials, and landowners who had begun to discuss ways to advance peasant education and to disseminate information about modern agriculture. In the spring of 1896 they formed the First Bulgarian Agrarian Society to publish a journal, Seiach (The Sower), with Pekarev as editor. This project was short-lived because Pekarev would not accept the evo-

lutionary, nonpolitical program of his colleagues. His use of Seiach to criticize government policies and personalities led to quarrels with the rest of the society, and at the end of the year he resigned.®

He began to visit the major villages of the province to distribute

propaganda urging the creation of an “Agrarian Party.” His leaflets stressed the contributions the peasants made to the state and the few benefits they received in return. We, who fill the state treasury, receive the gendarme’s whip on

our bended backs for thanks; we, who feed and clothe the world, are hungry and naked; we, who fill the barracks to protect the lives and possessions of the tsar, the state, the lawyers, usurers, and chorbadzhis , have no one to protect us from them. And how long will this go on? As long as we are quiet, patient, and indifferent—as long as we do not unite and organize our forces in an organization of our own. There is no other way!*

Pekarev looked for support to his friends among the teachers. In January 1898, fifteen of them joined him to form the First Constituent Committee. They decided as a preliminary step to set up village druzhini (battalions) modeled on the village associations of the Liberal party, and by the end of the year they had established over sixty. In December Pekarev started a new journal, Nova borba (New Struggle), whose name was soon changed to 3 Pekarev, Spomeni, pp. 104-108. * Ju. Pekarev, Istoriia na zemedelskoto organizirano dvizhenie v Bilgariia, ii (Dobrich, 1945), 311. > Pekarev, Spomeni, pp. 139-40; M. I. Turlakov, /storiia, printsipi i taktika na Bulgarski zemedelski naroden suiuz (Stara Zagora, 1929), p. 52.

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BIRTH OF AGRARIAN UNION

Zemledelska borba (Agrarian Struggle). It bore the motto: “The moral and material improvement of the peasantry is the business of the peasants themselves,” and combined criticism of the government with appeals for peasant organization. It is considered

to be the first political journal of the Agrarian movement in Bulgaria.®

In January 1899, the government resigned, and new elections were set for April 25. Pekarev called for the village druzhini to

send delegates to consider a charter and program for the new party. The meeting, held on March 21 in the village of Baladzha, was attended by approximately 850 delegates, who supported the idea of creating a new party and elected a committee of twentysix, headed by Pekarev, to work out the details.’ One week later the committee accepted Pekavev’s draft program calling for reduced taxes and the introduction of a progressive income tax, a shortened term of military service, free administration of justice, free medical care, expanded free education, and a ceiling on the number of state officials. The committee also debated the question of restricting membership in the party to peasants or even to poor peasants exclusively. The formula adopted, however, stipulated

that anyone who supported the party program was eligible for membership, and that individual druzhini should make the final decision.®

On the eve of its first election campaign, the Agrarian party was

deprived of its leader. The meeting in Baladzha had brought Pekarev to the attention of the authorities who, using the excuse that he had abandoned teaching, took away his draft deferment. He was conscripted and confined to barracks until the elections were over. Without his leadership, many of the druzhini failed to make an intensive election effort and some fell under the influence of other parties. Nevertheless, the Agrarian party won in one district and made a good showing in the two others in which it had entered candidates.? If Pekarev had been free to follow up this 6D. P. Ivanchev, Bulgarski periodichen pechat, 1844-1944, 1 (Sofia, 1966), 65. ” Zemledelska borba, 1, No. 13 (March 24, 1899), 1. 8 Pekarev, Spomeni, pp. 164-68. 9 Ibid., p. 172; V. Topalov, “Osnovavane na Biulgarskiia zemedelski suiuz,”

[zvestiia na Instituta za istoriia, vit (1960), 174.

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success, his group would probably have been the first to form a national organization. Dimittr Dragiev of Stara Zagora was another advocate of polit-

ical involvement. The youngest of the peasant organizers, Dragiev was born in the village of Radnevo, twenty miles south-

east of Stara Zagora, in 1876. After completing his secondary education in the provincial capital, he returned to teach in Radnevo, where he met Petko Ralev, “an erudite Socialist,’’ who had also settled in the district as a village teacher. The two men became close friends, and their wide-ranging discussions helped to awaken Dragiev’s social conscience. He became a convert not to Marxism, however, but to evangelical Protestantism with a strong admixture of Tolstoyan ideas. Although the circumstances of his conversion are not known, his experience was not unique. At the end of the nineteenth century Protestantism gained many followers among educated Bulgarians, and frequently served as an intel-

lectual way station between traditional modes of thought and more radical social and political doctrines. The family of Georgi Dimitrov, the Communist leader, was Protestant as was Kiril Pavlov, Minister of Public Domains in the last Agrarian cabinet.'° With an arrogance born of new-found humility, Dragiev sought to accomplish both the economic and moral regeneration of the peasantry. In May 1899, he began to edit a journal, Spravedlivost (Justice). Bearing the motto “You must be born again!”’ it printed articles on scientific agriculture and the peasant’s moral and religious duties, and advocated the formation of local peasant associations to press for reform on the village level." Dragiev was outraged by the government’s intention to reintroduce the tithe. In Spravedlivost he urged the peasants to forget the old political parties and to organize to prevent the collection of the tax. Dragiev also wrote an inflammatory pamphlet, Must the ‘0 On the influence of Protestantism in Bulgaria see W. W. Hall, Puritans in the Balkans (Sofia, 1938).

TA. S. Penchev, Poznavate li purvoapostolite—zidari na BZNS? (Tirnovo, 1946), p. 28; M. Genovski, J v smurtta sa zhivi (Sofia, 1945), p. 33; K. D. Spissarevski, Zemledelskoto dvizhenie v Bulgariia: poteklo i razvitie (Sofia, 1923), pp.

25-29; T. G. Vlaikov, ‘“‘Bulgarskiiat zemledelski naroden stiuz,” Demokraticheski pregled, vil, No. 7 (1908), 709-10.

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Peasants Pay the Tithe?, that was widely circulated and made him well-known. In it he wrote that the tithe placed an unduly heavy burden on the peasantry, that it would require a new bureaucracy to collect it, and that it would actually take one-quarter to one-third of the peasant’s crop. He blamed this “heavy, unjust, criminal, Godless tax’’ on the politicians, “Turks in Bulgarian

caps,”’ who held a “‘partisan knife at the throat of true selfgovernment,” and he urged the peasantry to organize itself to put an end to these abuses.” A less political approach characterized the ‘“‘Pleven Group,” a

circle of teachers and agronomists centered around the State Model Farm in the Ruse District and the State Vinicultural Institute in Pleven. The leader of this group was Janko Zabunov, head of the Vinicultural Institute, who was to serve as president of the Agrarian Union during the first three years of its existence. Born into an impoverished peasant family in the village of Kuzu-klisa in southeastern Bulgaria in 1868, Zabunov ran away from home at the age of seven. He was taken in by the Church of St. Dimittr in Sliven, where the priests gave him room, board, and an elemen-

tary education. At fifteen he entered the agricultural school in Sliven, where his ability won him a scholarship from the district authorities. After finishing the three-year course, he taught in Iambol until 1890, when he received a government fellowship to study viniculture in Austria. Upon his return to Bulgaria, he was appointed head of the Vinicultural Institute in Sliven and made an editor of Oralo (The Plow), a state-supported journal of agricultural information. In 1896 he was appointed overseer of the royal vineyards at Evksinograd, but grew bored with this work and resigned. Moving to the State Vinicultural Institute in Pleven, he was soon appointed its director. Here his lectures on the necessity for peasant organization won over many of the students, including the young Alexander Stamboliski.*

In 1899 Zabunov held a number of secret meetings with 1D. Dragiev, Triabva li zemledeltsite da plashtat desiatik? (Stara Zagora, 1899), pp. 3-23; Zemledelska zashtita, 1, No. 8 (Nov. 10, 1899),: 1-4.

‘3 Penchev, pp. 14-16; P. Genov, Janko Zabunov: pirvoapostoliit na zemedelskoto sdruzhavane ( ?, 1948), pp. 5-8.

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teachers and agronomists from Pleven, Sadovo, and the Ruse ‘model farm to discuss the declining situation of the peasantry. The group decided to undertake the publication of a journal free from government influence and censorship. Although the teachers from Sadovo backed out at the last minute, on June 12 the rest signed an “‘agreement,” according to which the new journal was to have the following goals: a) to acquaint the peasant with his rights and duties to the end of

creating an agrarian current among us that will be free of all petty partisanship; b) to spread knowledge in all branches of ag-

riculture; c) to examine dispassionately all ideas for the improvement of agriculture no matter what their source; d) to review agricultural literature; e) to review in general all foreign political-agricultural events and problems touching our own

economic life. |

The signers of the “‘agreement”’ each promised to contribute 10

leva monthly for the support of the journal until it could be pub- , lished without loss. In the event that its editor lost his position, they also pledged to provide for his support. Zabunov was chosen to be the responsible editor, and the first issue of the new journal Zemledelska zashtita (Agrarian Defense) appeared on September

| 6.'* With relatively substantial resources to draw on, Zemledelska zashtita was published three times monthly and soon achieved a circulation of 2,500.'° By the term “‘agrarian current,”’ the Pleven Group had in mind the populist goals of education and gradual economic improvement. The first issue of Zemledelska zashtita warned the peasant that he could not find a quick solution to his problems through politics.*° Although one of Zabunov’s colleagues, Nikola Kormanov, a veterinarian at the Ruse model farm, favored working

with individual political figures who were sympathetic to the peasantry, even he believed that the principal effort had to be made in the fields of education and farming techniques. When, in ‘4 N. Kormanov, Zemledelskiiat stiuz: Osnovavane, demagogiia, deistvitelnost (Sofia, 1923), pp. 2-4; Zemledelska zashtita, 1, No. 36 (Aug. 25, 1900), 2-3. 15 Tvanchev, I, p. 317.

*6 Zemledelska zashtita, 1, No. 1 (Sept. 6, 1899), 1.

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the fifth issue of Zemledelska zashtita, the editors printed Tsanko Bakalov Tserkovski’s proposal for a congress to form a national peasant organization, they did not see this as the beginning of a political movement, and they even expressed the hope that such an organization would receive the support of the government.*” The intellectual odyssey of Tsanko Bakalov covered the entire

map of Bulgarian radicalism before ending in the camp of the Agrarian Union. Bakalov was born in 1869 in the village of Biala Cherkva in the Tirnovo District. His family was one of the most prosperous in the village, and his father possessed local fame for his part in the pre-Liberation struggle against the Turks. In his youth Tsanko was an indifferent student, although he read widely and managed to qualify as a teacher in 1891. By this time he had

fallen under the influence of Marxism and joined the newly formed Social Democratic party. Adopting the pseudonym ‘“Tserkovski,” by which he became generally known, he made his literary debut with a series of militant poems and songs.” From 1894 to 1897 Tserkovski taught school in the “Musina Republic,” a village near Turnovo widely known for the political and social radicalism of its teachers and other members of the in-

telligentsia. While in Musina he assisted the Socialist Geno Nedialkov, who edited the journal Selski vestnik (Village Herald). He became its editor-in-chief when Nedialkov was elected to the National Assembly in 1895.?° It was as a writer that Tserkovski first felt dissatisfaction with Marxism. Vaguely sensing that the doctrine conflicted with his own view of reality, he began to rethink his ideological assumptions. He contrasted Marx’s picture of society with his own sur-

roundings and concluded that Marxism, so overwhelmingly | concerned with the industrial proletariat, could not play an imme7 Ibid., 1, No. 5 (Oct. 10, 1899), 1-3. 18 Tserkovski’s own memoirs, written on the occasion of the celebration of his thirtieth year in literature, are included in N. Atanasov, Tsanko Tserkovski (Sofia, 1921). See also: K. Kozhukharov, Tsanko Tserkovski, biografichen ocherk (Sofia, 1956), 3-7; Zh. Tadzher, Nova Bulgariia (Sofia, 1922), pp. 580-85; Pinto, pp. 83-84. ‘9D. Dimov, Tsanko Bakalov Tserkovski (Sofia, 1968), pp. 30-32; N. Atanasov, p. 45.

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diately useful role in agricultural Bulgaria. Marxist theory postulated a long process through which the peasantry would be trans-

formed into a proletariat by the growth of industry. Although Tserkovski knew that this might bring about a working-class revolution in the distant future, he was coming to believe that the need for immediate reform in the village should not be ignored. It was

obvious to him that the peasants were already enemies of the existing society. He concluded: “‘The village is strength. It has every objective moral and material strength to become a mighty political and social factor.’’?° Still believing himself to be a Marxist, and finding support for

his ideas in the writings of “‘Kautsky, Bernstein, and Eduard David,” Tserkovski began to develop the idea of a “‘new course,”’ that of peasant organization, which was to be the next “inevitable

politico-economic step” in the evolution of Bulgarian society.” Although his “‘discovery” of the peasant evoked no sympathy from his Socialist comrades, he did not yet contemplate a break with the party. He did not believe that Marxism was wrong in the long run, only that the desperate situation of the peasantry demanded immediate attention. In his mind the “new course”’ involved the organization of the peasantry as a pressure group, analogous to a trade union or benevolent society, not as a political party that might compete with the Social Democrats. Even after

the formation of the Agrarian Union, he attended the 1900 Congress of the Social Democratic party as a delegate.”” Tserkovski limited his plans to the sphere of theory until 1897,

when he gave up teaching and returned to his native Biala Cherkva to farm and open a bookstore. During the winter he formed the Young People’s Educational Society, whose goals were: “education, economic progress, and political consciousness for the peasants of this village and for every peasant and artisan*? in Bulgaria.” The society presented musical and theatrical events and political discussions. At the latter Tserkovski presented ar70 N. Atanasov, p. 46. “1 Ibid., pp. 48, 59. #2, V. Mavrikov, Iz moiia zhivot (Sofia, 1955), p. 12. 3 Tserkovski included artisans in an unsuccessful attempt to avoid criticism from his Socialist colleagues. Mavrikov, p. 12.

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guments for the creation of a peasant organization and received an encouraging response.”4 Hoping to find a larger audience for his ideas of peasant organization, he began to compose an “Appeal to the Peasants of Bulgaria” in 1898. He rewrote the “Appeal” many times, searching for the peasant’s own idiom, so that it would be comprehensible to every villager.

A simple style and tone—clear ideas. I felt this to be vital in view of the minimal consciousness of the peasant masses with whom | sought to work. I considered it most necessary to avoid all troublesome questions in which party feeling would be aroused. . . . Forgiveness to all for time spent in this or that party group, and the fraternal hand in the name of our [common] occupational interests—that was what I wanted to achieve in the “Appeal.’’?°

Tserkovski began the “Appeal”? with a description of the backwardness of Bulgarian peasant agriculture, which contrasted so unfavorably with farming in America and Western Europe. He pointed out that the Bulgarian peasant still cultivated his fields

with *‘Adam’s wooden plow” while ever-increasing demands were being made on his income. He contrasted the present-day village with that existing only a few years earlier. Previously the village could scarcely support one tavern. It was now required to support “four or five taverns, grocers, cobblers, makers of boza,”°

tin smiths, a mayor, a clerk, four teachers, a priest, and several usurers.”” But, he continued, these people could not be eliminated, for they were the result of the new life coming into existence and they fulfilled real needs. The peasants had to realize that

in the new life they would not be able to reduce their expenses, they would have to find some way to increase their incomes. In the past, he wrote, self-centered politicians misled the peasants by convincing them that a political solution was possible— that if they would elect this or that party, all their problems would be solved. But after this torrent of “‘newspaper tears’”’ what did the *4N. Atanasov, pp. 55-56; Kozhukharov, Tserkovski, pp. 9-10. 7° N. Atanasov, p. 61. ® Boza is a beverage made from fermented grain and milk. It is much favored by the Turks and Balkan Slavs, and few others, as a breakfast drink.

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peasant receive? “Fighting, murder, prisons—and they, power.”’ The politicians were interested in the peasant only as a voter.

We are a ladder that those who weep for us and call us ‘brother’ climb to power. They need this ladder to go up and down and for much else besides. Yes, they have no other work,

no other occupation. Their occupation is to fill their pockets when they are in power and to cry to God before us peasants when they are driven from power. There is no doubt that people who have been in such a warm place will cry out when they are thrown into the cold, but what do we farmers have in common with people who have no other work than that? He argued that the peasants should unite in their own organization for the improvement of agriculture and leave politics to the professional politicians:

We must unite and help ourselves because however much others may weep for us, they weep with fat jobs and full bellies. Everyone knows that on someone else’s back a hundred blows are little. Only the hungry know what it is to be hungry; only the very sick know what a serious illness is. Only we farmers know how a field can be killed by hailstones or how vines can be withered by phylloxera. And only we, who know our situation, can improve it. Tserkovski went on to describe the successes of the Teachers’ Union and of other professional organizations that had recently been formed. Finally, he urged the peasants to elect village committees to send delegates to a congress to form a national peasant organization.?’

When he was satisfied with the “Appeal” Tserkovski visited the principal villages of the Turnovo District to spread his ideas and to seek support. Ivan Nedelchev, a teacher in the village of Emin, and Pop Petur, a priest in the village of Diskot, were especially enthusiastic and volunteered their help. They decided to call

an assembly of peasants of the district in Musina to discuss the question of inviting all the peasants of Bulgaria to unite in a na27 Zemledelska zashtita, 1, No. 5 (Oct. 10, 1899), 1-3; J. Bell, ‘““Tsanko Tserkovski’s ‘Appeal to the Peasants of Bulgaria,’ ” Southeastern Europe, 11, No. 2 (1975), 187-93.

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tional professional organization, and they wrote “countless letters” to friends and acquaintances in the district, enclosing copies of the “‘Appeal.’’?®

The assembly, held on April 28, 1899, was attended by “‘several hundred” peasants. Tserkovski’s plans were enthusiastically approved, and it was voted that a national congress of peasants be held in Pleven, “‘a central place whose public library contains a large auditorium.” Finally, a provisional committee, with Tserkovski as president, was elected to make preparations, and all of its members added their signatures to the “Appeal,’’ which was to be used to advertise the congress.”° Although the *“*Appeal”’ was endorsed by the Pleven Group, its

members were apprehensive of Tserkovski’s Socialist connections and reputation. They feared that the new peasant organization would fall under the influence of the Social Democratic party,

and to forestall this they decided to take the initiative in the organization of the congress. Because they would be acting as its

hosts, they could expect that their plans for its proceedings would be respected. On November 4, 1899, Zemledelska zashtita proposed that the

congress be held on the 28th, 29th, and 30th of December. The time of the winter holidays was selected because the peasants would be free from work in the fields and the teachers would be on vacation. The paper also proposed the following agenda. On the first day the congress would be opened by the “oldest and most worthy peasant in the hall,’’ and a bureau would be elected to administer the congress and prepare a draft charter for consideration by the delegates. Papers would then be read on the general condition of Bulgarian agriculture, agricultural credit, and cooperation. On the second day the congress would continue with papers on agricultural education and livestock, and take up any miscellaneous business. On the third day the Agrarian Union would formally be founded. Those invited to the congress were “‘repre-

sentatives from peasant druzhini, all peasants, village teachers, village priests, and agricultural specialists in close contact with

28 N. Atanasov, p. 61. 9 Ibid., pp. 62-64. 32

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peasant life.”’°*° The following issue warned that the Union would

not become a part of any political party, and that only real peasants, “employing hoe or pen,” would be allowed to participate. Delegates to the congress began to arrive in Pleven on December 26th and 27th. When the congress began its sessions, approximately eight hundred delegates from forty-five of Bulgaria’s seventy-one districts were present, the majority coming from Ple-

ven, Turnovo, and Varna Provinces. The group from Varna, which was the largest single delegation, was led by Pekarev, who had been discharged from the army after the National Assembly elections. In addition to the delegates, a large number of peasant observers, reporters, and representatives of the political parties

came to watch and, if possible, influence the congress. In all, | about 1,500 people were present, with the observers seated in the balconies above the hall and delegates below.*” The attitude of the Pleven authorities was “‘strict and correct,’”’ and the local population were asked to open their homes to those who had not been able to secure space in the hotels or find other accomodations.” The largest of the “foreign delegations” to attend the congress was that of the Social Democrats, about 150 persons led by Ianko Sakuzov and Nikola Gabrovski. The congress presented an 1mportant opportunity for Sakizov, who was at this time formulat-

ing a program calling for the unity of “all producing strata” around a democratic and reformist platform. The awakening of the peasantry demonstrated by the congress offered good prospects for the “broad” form of socialism to which he was committed.** The failure of Saktzov’s group to move the congress—and,

in a larger sense, the failure of socialism to provide the underpin- . nings of the Agrarian movement—may be attributed to the fact that to most peasants “socialism”? meant simply the abolition of private property. Moreover, the leaders of the congress were either hostile to socialism or desirous of a nonpolitical and purely 30 Zemledelska zashtita, 1, No. 11 (Nov. 4, 1899), 1. 31 Tbid., 1, No. 12 (Nov. 19, 1899), 1-2. 32 Spissarevski, p. 46; Topalov, ““Osnovavane,” p. 184.

33 Zemledelska zashtita, 1, No. 13-14 (Jan. 1, 1900), 1; Topalov, “Osnovavane,” p. 182. “4 Obshto delo, 1, No. 1 (Sept. 18, 1900), 2-4; Istoriia na BKP, pp. 80-83.

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peasant organization. Even Tserkovski, although he was accused of it, had no intention of trying to tie the Agrarian Union to the Social Democratic party. Thus, the Social Democrats shared the fate of the other party delegations to the congress, and the idea of worker-peasant-artisan unity remained dormant until revived in a new form by Stamboliski on the eve of the Balkan Wars. Although the agenda prepared by the Pleven Group focused on the economic problems of agriculture, the task of choosing the ‘oldest and most worthy peasant in the hall” thrust the question of politics on the congress even before it was properly under way. During the afternoon on the day before the congress, the Pleven Group held a preparatory meeting at the Vinicultural Institute. Their intention was to prevent control of the congress from falling into the hands of Tserkovski.* At the gathering, Kormanov and Zabunov invited Mikhalaki Georgiev to make the opening speech

as honorary “‘oldest and most worthy peasant.” In addition to being a close friend of Kormanov, Georgiev was a well-known populist writer, a deputy in the National Assembly, and a prominent member of the National party.°° Tserkovski, informed of this move, was incensed by the Pleven Group’s attempt to control the congress and impose their own people on the assembled peasants. With the help of his friends he decided to prepare an unpleasant welcome for the speaker.*‘ By nine o’clock on the morning of the 28th, the delegates and observers were gathered in the auditorium of the Pleven public library. On the stage were Tserkovski, and Zabunov and Kormanov

of the Pleven Group with Georgiev. Pekarev sat in the front row*® The congress was opened with a prayer, and Kormanov rose to welcome the delegates. After a few words on the importance of the congress, he gave the floor to Georgiev for the opening speech. When Georgiev reached the podium the delegates erupted. Tserkovski’s supporters had correctly gauged the mood of the congress. The peasant delegates were not willing to listen to

any politician, still less to accept him as the “oldest and most worthy” of their number. For several minutes Georgiev attempted to speak, but could not be heard above the uproar. Atanas Kraev, © Pekarev, Spomeni, pp. 193-94; N. Atanasov, p. 65.

© Pinto, pp. 100-102. 37 N. Atanasov, p. 65. 8 Pekarev, Spomeni, p. 194.

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another political figure, came forward to quiet the delegates, but his intervention only increased the disturbance.*? The delegates then began to chant: “We want the ‘Appeal!’ ” This, of course, was a call for Tserkovski, who came forward and managed to quiet the assembly, thus gaining an impressive personal victory.*° This demonstration settled for the duration of the congress the question of the Agrarian Union’s relation to politics. The outburst genuinely reflected the peasants’ deep hatred and distrust of party

politics. As Dragiev wrote in his account of the congress, the peasants’ shouts were not against Georgiev personally, for he was

widely known to be a defender of the peasants’ interests, but against him as a symbol of the system that repeatedly promised so

much yet did so little.44 This mood of the congress continued throughout its sessions, as speaker after speaker rose to denounce the political system and the party representatives in the galleries. Under these circumstances it was impossible to advocate that the Union itself engage in politics. It was even decided to change the name of the village unit of the Union from druzhina to druzhba because the former term was associated with political parties.*”

Tserkovski resolved the “oldest and most worthy peasant” question by calling on “Uncle” Kostadin of the village of Karaarnaut (Goliam Izvor), Razgrad District in northeastern Bulgaria.

“Uncle” Kostadin was certainly one of the oldest, if not most worthy, peasants at the congress, and he was acceptable to the delegates. He improvised a “‘good village speech” comparing the

present situation of the peasantry to life under the Turks. He stated that taxes had been lower in Turkish times, and that for all practical purposes the peasants were still enslaved. In conclusion, he expressed the hope that the congress would find a way to improve matters. The speech was punctuated by applause and shouts of ““That’s right!’’*° 89 Kraev was a member of the Liberal party and had been Vice-President of the National Assembly. He had come to the congress hoping to be named president of the new organization. Topalov, “Osnovavane,” p. 185.

4° Pekarev, Spomeni, p. 194; N. Atanasov, pp. 65-66; Topalov, “Osnovavane,”’ pp. 183-85. 41 Spravedlivost, 1, No. 34 (Jan. 17, 1900), 1-2. *” Turlakov, Istoriia, p. 52. *8 Zemledelska zashtita, 1, No. 13-14 (Jan. 1, 1900), 2; Pekarev, Spomeni, p. 194,

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The next order of business, the election of a bureau to administer the congress and draft a charter, immediately revived the con-

test between Tserkovski and the Pleven Group. Kormanov proposed that the bureau consist of all those who had initiated the

congress. This proposal, which would have given the Pleven : Group a majority, was voted down, and the congress turned to the election of individuals to the bureau. Tserkovski was nominated and elected unanimously. On his recommendation Pekarev was also elected. Then Ianko Zabunov was nominated and rejected, after which Ivan Nedelchev, another of Tserkovski’s associates, was elected. Kormanov then rose and criticized the delegates for

not appreciating the work of the Pleven Group. He pointedly warned that without the support of Zemledelska zashtita the Union would forfeit much of its influence. The delegates were moved by his arguments and elected him, Zabunov, and Todor Dinov, also

of the Group, to the bureau. Finally, Ivan Voivodov of Tatar Pazardzhik was elected to give representation to the delegates from southern Bulgaria.**

At about eleven o’clock Constantine Malkov, a teacher in the State Practical Agricultural School in the Ruse District, and one of the original members of the Pleven Group, rose to read the first paper on the condition of agriculture in Bulgaria. He blamed the prevailing hard times on three factors: the declining world market price of grain, caused by cheap American, Argentine, and Australian wheat; the inequitable taxation policies of the government; and “Godless usury.’’*° When the delegates returned from the dinner recess, it became obvious that they were in no mood to listen to reports on technical agricultural subjects. Malkov’s report continued to be discussed as delegate after delegate took the floor to provide examples and to denounce the government, the practice of usury, and the political parties, including those party representatives who were at the congress as observers. It was decided to abandon the other papers that had been prepared, and the first day’s meeting was adjourned without further progress. 44 Zemledelska zashtita, 1, No. 13-14 (Jan. 1, 1900), 1-2. 4° Malkov’s paper was published in Zemledelska zashtita, 1, Nos. 15, 16, 17 (Jan. 20, Feb. 1, 10, 1900).

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_ On the second day, the congress continued to witness stormy debates and demonstrations. Little order was maintained as one orator after another strove to capture or express the feelings of the delegates. Most successful was Dragiev, who made an “evangelical” speech urging peasant unity and noncooperation with the political parties. He furiously denounced the party representatives in the galleries: You, gentlemen, representatives of the blood-sucking parties, and you, Socialists, who deny the right of private property, you have come as uninvited guests to take over the organization whose representatives have gathered here to judge their own situation and their own great destiny. Before coming here you should fall on your knees as if you were entering a church so that you might not profane this sacred hall where the agrarian people conduct their holy proceedings.*°

The issue that dominated the day’s meeting was the government’s intention to replace the land tax with the tithe. The speakers condemned this measure and demanded that the Union take steps to prevent its application.*’ On the morning of the 30th, the bureau presented the congress with a provisional charter that was to remain in force until the next

congress one year hence. The draft reflected the antipolitical orientation of most of the delegates and was accepted with almost

no debate. According to the charter, the Bulgarian Agrarian Union was to have as its goals “the intellectual and moral betterment of the peasant and the improvement of agriculture 1n all its branches.”’ The means chosen to achieve these goals were:

a. To study all aspects of the peasant’s situation. b. To spread knowledge among the peasants by lectures, discussions, meetings, newspapers, journals, etc. c. To work for the establishment of mutual savings banks and the expansion of markets for agricultural products. d. To work for the creation of easily available, cheap credit from the government. e. To promote the creation of cooperative. granaries as a means of credit. 46 Chastukhin, ‘“‘Krest’ianskoe dvizhenie,” p. 95. 47 N. Atanasov, pp. 67-70.

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f. To comment on questions of a legislative character that affect the interests of the peasants and relate to their property. g. To promote the amalgamation of parcelized holdings. h. To work for the peaceful resolution of disputes between members of the Union. i. To promote the introduction of professional education.

j. To urge that cooperative labor and capital be devoted to building greenhouses, populating unsettled areas, providing farm tools, etc.

k. To act for the creation of Agrarian druzhbi where there is now none.*®

The journal Zemledelska zashtita was selected to be the Union’s official organ. The basic unit of the Agrarian Union was to be the village druzhba. The important question of who might belong to the Union was left open. It was decided that *“Members . . . are to be peasants, teachers, priests, and other persons that the druzhba desires to admit.”’*? When the charter had been adopted, the delegates turned to the

election of a committee to administer the Union until the next congress. The members of the Pleven Group had campaigned against the “Socialists” of Tserkovski, and they were fortunate in

that most of the delegates from Varna Province were forced to board their train before the balloting began. They also succeeded in having the vote take place by districts rather than by individuals. As a result, Zabunov, Kormanov, and K. Iliev of the Pleven

Group were elected easily. They were joined by Pekarev and Nikola Kholevich of Varna, Tserkovski, Dragiev, and Ivan Voivodov. The committee thus included the leaders of all the precongress agrarian organizations.”° The Union’s first act was to draft a resolution presenting the demands of the peasants to the President of the National Assembly:

The first Agrarian Congress, gathered in the town of Pleven on the 28th, 29th, and 30th of December 1899, realizing that the 48 Zemledelska zashtita, 1, No. 13-14 (Jan. 1, 1900), 3-4. 49 Ibid., p. 2. 50 Ibid., p. 4.

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economic situation of the Bulgarian peasant is worse than intolerable, and that the principal causes of this situation are:

1) the bad tax system by which not only the income of the peasant is taken, but his capital as well; 2) the absence of easily available, cheap credit that could eliminate the existing scarcity of capital for agricultural production and Godless usury at the same time; 3) the absence of well-ordered, professional education that could raise the productivity of agricultural labor; Resolves:

1) to protest most energetically against the tithe and to seek a lowering of the existing land tax; 2) to seek the creation of cheap and easily available credit; 3) to seek the creation of a well-ordered school system for the spreading of knowledge in all important branches of agricultural economy.°*

After the adoption of this resolution, the first congress of the Bulgarian Agrarian Union adjourned.

The program of the Union’s charter was evolutionary and populist, reflecting the views of the majority of its creators. A situation was developing in the country, however, that they had not foreseen. Twenty-three days after the founding of the Union, the bill establishing the tithe received its final reading in the National Assembly and became law. The elemental storm of peasant outrage this act produced passed beyond the control of the Agrarian leaders, forcing them to reexamine their basic political assumptions, and opening a new chapter in the development of the organized Agrarian movement. Although some protests against the tithe occurred in all parts of the country, they were most numerous and violent in northeastern Bulgaria. In part this was because the Agrarian Union was best organized in this region.” It was also true that in the south, where agriculture was less developed, many peasants owned land that was not under cultivation, so that they preferred the tithe to a tax 51 Tbid., pp. 2-3.

2 Zemledelska zashtita,1, No. 29 (June 14, 1900), 3-4.

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on land.®? Only in Khaskovo Province, which suffered severely from the poor harvest of 1899, did a violent anti-tithe demonstration take place in southern Bulgaria. The anti-tithe strategy of the Agrarian leaders was to mobilize the peasants throughout the country by means of peaceful meetings and demonstrations. An overwhelming expression of peasant disapproval would, they hoped, result in the withdrawal or mod-

ification of the law. Typically, in any given village the local Agrarian druzhba would hold a meeting of the villagers to draft a

telegram to the prince similar to the one set by the Union congress. The Zemledelska zashtita carried reports of several hundred such meetings in which anywhere from ten to three hundred peasants participated. The Agrarian leaders also sought to impress the government by holding a series of very large demonstrations, the first of which

took place in Ruse on February 10, 1900. It was organized by Nikola Kormanov who, along with the students and teachers at the State Model Farm, campaigned all over the province to bring the peasants “‘to hear orators describe the evil aspects of the law on the tithe, so ruinous for us, and to implore His ROYAL HIGHNESS THE PRINCE OF AGRICULTURAL BULGARIA to rescind or

modify the law.”°* On the appointed day nearly ten thousand peasants gathered at the meeting ground on the outskirts of the city. They came with homemade banners condemning the tithe, and they listened to the

music of an improvised peasant band. Some of the peasants wished to march into the city to meet in front of the offices of the provincial authorities, but Kormanov dissuaded them. While con-

demning the tithe and hailing the unity of the peasantry, he warned them that they should not look upon their newly revealed strength as a license to go beyond the bounds of law and order. They

could best hope to overturn the tithe, he maintained, by a massive and peaceful expression of their will. Kormanov was followed on

the speaker’s stand by [lia Bratoev, vice-president of the Ruse District agrarian druzhba: Marin Vulkanov president of the Village druzhba in Shtriklevo; and Beni Krustev, president of the 53 McGregor to Elliot (Plovdiv, March 10/23, 1900), FO 78/5079. 54 Zemledelska zashtita, 1, No. 18 (Feb. 20, 1900), 1-2.

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village druzhba in Pirgos—all “pure peasants.’ Their speeches

were similar in tone to Kormanov’s, and all were warmly applauded for they “said what the peasants themselves felt in their hearts.”°° After the speeches, the following resolution was read, approved, and telegraphed to the Prince:

Sofia, His Royal Highness Today, on February 10, we, the peasants from villages in the

Ruse District, gathered in a district meeting in the town of Ruse, and in number nearly ten thousand, having listened to our orators and having judged that the newly approved law for the tithe is extremely ruinous for us, have decided to protest most energetically against the law and to implore most humbly

His Royal Highness, the Prince of agricultural Bulgaria, to change this law which is so fatal for us.°®

After cheering this resolution, the peasants dispersed peacefully.

On the same day a similar mass demonstration, also involving nearly ten thousand peasants, was held forty miles southeast in Razgrad.°’ The Liberal authorities in Ruse were disturbed and embarrassed by the anti-tithe meeting. They decided to hold a countermeeting one week later to demonstrate support for the government. Peas-

ants in the district were invited to gather in the public square in front of the provincial government building to hear Liberal orators explain the work of the National Assembly. As part of the preparations for this meeting, the authorities arrested Kormanov, spirited him out of the province, and held him incommunicado. They were not able to keep this action secret, however, and the whole district was soon aware that a leader in the fight against the tithe had been arrested.°® Early in the morning of the 18th, the public square began to fill

with peasants, their number estimated at between fifteen and twenty thousand.*? At 10:30 a ragged Liberal parade, led by ban-

55 Ibid., p. 2. 56 Tbid. *” Ibid., pp. 1-2; K. Sharova, “Selskite viilneniia protiv desiatika v rusensko prez 1900 g.,” Istoricheski pregled, xi, No. 4 (1957), 5-11. 58 Zemledelska zashtita, 1, No. 19 (March 1, 1900), 2; Kormanov, pp. 7-8. 59 Sharova, p. 12; Kormanov, p. 8.

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ners and a brass band, marched into the square. The national anthem was played, and the demonstrators raised a cheer for the government. They were answered by a storm of verbal abuse, after which they struck up another march, left the square, and disappeared from the streets. Beni Krustev addressed the angry peasants, persuading them to elect a delegation to call on the Provincial Governor to inquire when they might hear the Liberals’ “‘explanations”’ and when they might expect Kormanov to be released. The first request was facetious, but the second raised the specter of a serious confrontation.

The Governor twice refused to meet with the peasants’ delegation. He also telephoned to the district military commander, Colonel Drandarevski, to request that troops be called out. Drandarevski refused and instead went personally to the demonstration. He spoke to the peasants, telling them that their assembly was a peaceful one and that they should be careful to maintain order. Iliia Bratoev read a resolution to be sent to the Prince, condemning the arbitrary arrest of Kormanov and then urged the peasants to return to their homes. Most were unwilling to leave, but Drandarevski spoke again, promising that Kormanov would be released within twenty-four hours. He received a cheer from the peasants, who began to disperse. His coolheadedness almost certainly prevented bloodshed.®°

Drandarevski was not able to keep his word. As soon as the government learned of the events of the 18th, Vasil Radoslavov, the Liberal Minister of the Interior, ordered the Ruse authorities to arrest all the leaders of the anti-tithe movement. Prince Ferdinand himself demanded that the authorities “take the strongest measures against those who disturb law and order.” Police and military

forces in the province were strengthened, and in the following week most of the Agrarian leaders were jailed. Temporarily the situation in the province was quieted.® The government was better prepared for the next mass demonstration, which was organized by Pekarev and took place in Varna

on March 5. The authorities stationed troops on the outskirts of °° Laforge to Delcassé (Varna, March 1/14, 1900), AMAE, Bulgarie: politique intérieure, nouvelle série, 11, 9; Zemledelska zashtita, 1, No. 19 (March 1, 1900), 2-3; Sharova, pp. 11-13. 61 Sharova, pp. 13-15.

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the city to keep the peasants from reaching the center. Approxi: mately ten thousand were stopped on the roads, and Pekarev, who was to be the principal speaker, was arrested and jailed in a village near the city. In spite of the troops, about two thousand peasants managed to penetrate to the center of Varna, gathering near the city’s principal church, where they were addressed by “‘several peasants and school teachers,’’ headed by Nikola Kholevich, Pekarev’s closest friend.®* Several representatives of the opposition political parties tried to speak to the crowd, but the peasants refused to listen. After a resolution condemning the tithe was read and approved, the meeting was officially closed at noon. Despite the urging of their leaders, the peasants refused to disperse. They walked en masse to police headquarters, where they demanded the release of Pekarev. The police commandant replied that Pekarev was not being held in Varna and that in any case he

would soon be released. The peasants then began to parade through the town shouting slogans against the tithe and the government. At some point in their march, the rumor began to circulate that Pekarev actually was in the police headquarters and that he was being beaten. Inflamed by this rumor, the crowd returned and demanded to search the building. The commandant, however, had posted a company of infantry with fixed bayonets under orders to keep the crowd back. Some peasants, shouting that the soldiers would never fire at their fathers, began to throw rocks at

the windows of the building. Rocks were also thrown at the troops. The officer in command warned that he would open fire if the crowd did not disperse at once. He was answered with cries of ‘We are prepared to die!”’ as several peasants ran toward the door of the headquarters. At the command of their officer the soldiers fired two volleys into the massed peasants. Two were killed immediately, two died within hours, and five others were critically wounded. Many more received less serious wounds. The crowd fled in panic, some vowing to return the next day with arms.® 6&2 Laforge to Delcassé (Varna, March 6/19, 1900), AMAE, Bulgarie: politique

intérieure, nouvelle série, 11, 13; Zemledelska zashtita, 1, No. 20 (March .10, 1900), 2.

63 Laforge to Delcassé (Varna, March 6/19, 11/24, 1900), AMAE, Bulgarie: politique intérieure, nouvelle série, 1, pp. 12-22; Zemledelska zashtita, 1, No. 20 (March 10, 1900), 2-3.

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During the night the police troops were reinforced by a force of three hundred cavalry and in the morning by a regiment of infan-

try. Varna and its environs were put under martial law, and forty-five of the most active demonstrators were jailed. Radoslavov himself came to the city and succeeded in imposing a temporary order. Not wishing to antagonize the aroused countryside further, the authorities treated the arrested leaders of the peasants leniently. After two weeks of confinement they were released on

parole. The government’s decision to suppress the anti-tithe demonstrations led inexorably to more serious confrontations. On March 23, the Ruse District Administrator, Aleksiev, accompanied by a few gendarmes, began to visit the surrounding villages to arrest

the organizers of the protest meetings. He succeeded in Pirgos, the first village on his list, but when he moved on to Krasen he found a large group of angry peasants waiting for him. The village church bell had called out the villagers, who threatened Aleksiev with violence if he did not leave. He withdrew, but four days later

he returned with thirty-two gendarmes. Again the village was prepared for him. A sizable force of peasants, some with rifles, surrounded and disarmed the police. The unfortunate Aleksiev was beaten up and thrown out of the village. During the night messengers from Krasen, including Iliia Bratoev, Beni Krustev, and Marin Vulkanov of the Agrarian Union, aroused the surrounding countryside. By morning an estimated five thousand peasants were gathered in Krasen. When government troops neared the village, they were fired on. For two-and-one-half hours

the two sides exchanged shots, neither suffering any serious casualties. At last the peasants agreed to give up their arms and return to their homes. During the following week their leaders

were arrested. The battle of Trustenik, also in the Ruse District, began in a manner similar to that of Krasen. On April 27, the new District Administrator, Marin Petkov (Aleksiev having been dismissed for

incompetence), appeared in the village and began to arrest the local leaders of the anti-tithe movement. The village churchbell ** Laforge to Delcassé (Varna, March 6/19, 11/24, 15/28, 17/30, 1900), AMAE, Bulgarie: politique intérieure, nouvelle série, 11, 15-29. 6° Sharova, pp. 16-19.

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announced his arrival, and before Petkov could complete his work, the village was surrounded by armed peasants. Petkov tele-

phoned for troops, but the peasants closed in before reinforcements could arrive. After a brief skirmish in which one gendarme was killed, the peasants disarmed the guards and captured Petkov

and the village officials. During the night about twenty-five hundred peasants came to Trustenik from surrounding villages. The next morning troops neared the village, and negotiations began. The peasants offered to give up their weapons and release their prisoners in return for a guarantee that their leaders would not be arrested. The commander of the troops would accept nothing less than unconditional surrender, but he lacked enough men to attack the peasants, who were being reinforced all through the day by new arrivals. By dawn of the following day, the balance of forces had so shifted that the peasants decided to challenge the troops by marching to Ruse. When they approached the troops the commander gave the order to open fire. The soldiers, however, refused to shoot into the peasants and fired two volleys into the

air. The commander himself drew his revolver and fired at the peasants, who rushed at him and made him prisoner. Some of the soldiers allowed their weapons to be taken and the rest retreated. At this point a much larger force from the Turnovo garrison ar-

rived and negotiations began again. By the next day about one thousand soldiers and gendarmes surrounded the peasants, who at last agreed to disperse. The five districts in the region were placed under martial law, and over five hundred peasants were arrested and confined in pens built especially for this purpose.°° The bloodiest confrontation between peasants and government forces was the battle of Shabla-Durankulak. On May 22, the Dis-

trict Administrator of Dobrich began to tour the district with a company of gendarmes to make a preliminary estimate of the amount to be collected by the tithe. In Durankulak he was met by a hostile crowd, led by the village mayor, who demanded that he

leave. He attempted to arrest the mayor, but was forced by the peasants to leave empty handed. On June 1, the District Administrator, escorted by a squadron 6° Laforge to Delcassé (Sofia, April 27/May 10, June 4/17, AMAE, Bulgarie. politique intérieure, nouvelle série, 1, 33, 36-37; Zemledelska zashtita, 1, No. 25 (May 1, 1900), 1-2; Sharova, pp. 22-35.

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of cavalry and several police detachments, again set out from Dobrich. Anticipating his return, peasants from the whole region had come to Durankulak and nearby Shabla to defend the villages. When the cavalry charged the peasant lines, it was met by a volley that killed two officers and several soldiers. The enraged troops executed a second charge that broke the peasant lines. During the next five hours they raged out of control, brutally pursuing, shooting, and beating the peasants, who were trying to flee from the

area. Ninety peasants were killed, over four hundred were wounded, and eight hundred more, including Pekarev, fled across the Danube to escape arrest. The entire region was placed under martial law, and hundreds of peasants were arrested.®’ The violent resistance to the tithe posed serious problems for the Agrarian Union and divided its leadership. On the local level, many peasants and teachers viewed the Union simply as a militant anti-tithe organization. They supported and participated in the re-

sistance to the authorities.°* On the other hand, many local druzhbi were infiltrated or taken over by members of various opposition parties who were now joining the anti-tithe struggle in order to topple the Liberal regime. A number of druzhbi became no more than auxiliaries of existing village political organizations and lost contact with the Agrarian leadership.®? The attitude of the Union’s Central Committee toward these developments was ambivalent. In general its members opposed violent resistance to the tithe, although the Zemledelska zashtita came close to endorsing it after the events at Trustenik. The leadership also wavered between a policy of independent action and an alliance with anti-tithe opposition parties. Nikola Kormanov favored such an alliance, but his colleagues either opposed it or were undecided. Only the call for continuing peaceful demonstrations received their unanimous support, but even here they de-

spairingly admitted that these seemed to have no effect on the government.” 67 Pisson to Delcassé (Varna, June 6/19, 1900), AMAE, Bulgarie; politique intérieure, nouvelle série, 11, 39-42; Iu. Pekarev, Shabla-Durankulak: simvol na pobedniia borcheski dukh na zdruzhenite zemedeltsi v Bulgariia (Dobrich, 1946), pp. 55-56.

°° Sharova, p. 41. °° Turlakov, /storiia, pp. 50-55. 70 Zemledelska zashtita, 1, No. 29 (June 14, 1900), 1-2.

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By the fall, when preparations for the second congress of the Union were under way, three positions had crystallized among the

members of the Central Committee. The erstwhile rivals Tserkovski and Zabunov supported the original ideals of the Union charter. They wanted the Union to concentrate its efforts in the areas of education and economic life. Kormanov wanted the Union to support friendly opposition parties. Dragiev advocated that the Union enter politics as an independent party. Pekarev, who supported Dragiev, was still in exile in Rumania. The other members of the committee were undecided. The second Agrarian congress was scheduled to begin on Octo-

ber 29, 1900, in Pleven. Only days before this date, the city authorities banned the meeting, ostensibly because of an outbreak of

scarlet fever. Peasant delegates who still tried to come were removed from their trains and sent home. The Union’s Central Committee protested and published the directive of the medical authorities that only gatherings of children be prohibited. It decided to retaliate by rescheduling the congress for December 3-5 in Sofia, the heart of the government camp.” The congress took place without any interference, for on November 27 the Radoslavov government was forced to resign because of financial scandals involving most of the ministers. A moderate caretaker government took its place. Four-hundred-and-ninety delegates assembled in the Hotel Odessa for the congress, which was under the chairmanship of

Zabunov.’ The first order of business was the adoption of a Union program, the draft of which was presented by Zabunov, Kormanov, and A. Gechev of Pleven. Its principal demands were for improved rural schools, a larger number of experimental farms, cheap and accessible credit, state-supported medical assistance, strict adherence to the constitution by government officials, and, of course, the elimination of the tithe and its replacement by a progressive income tax.” The congress also made changes in the Union’s administrative 1 Zemledelska zashtita, 1, Nos. 8, 9 (Nov. 3, 15, 1900). 7” —D. Dimitrov, “Otvarianeto na zemedelski kongres,”’ Novo vreme, Iv, No. 11-12 (1900), 1296-98. 3S. S. Bobchev, “‘Zemledelcheskiiat kongres i iskaniiata mu po pravostdnoto zakonodatelstvo,”’ Juridicheski pregled, 1x, No. 2 (1901), 74-75.

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structure. The Central Committee was replaced by a Governing Council of sixteen, elected by the congress. The Council then

chose from its own ranks a president, vice-president, and secretary-treasurer, who would form a standing committee to handle the Union’s day-to-day affairs and to edit the Zemledelska

zashtita. The men elected to these posts after the congress were Zabunov, Kormanov, and K. Iliev, all from Pleven.“ Elections for a new National Assembly were less than two months away, and it was imperative that the congress decide whether and how to participate in them. The debate began with a motion to amend the Union’s charter to include “‘the political development of the peasantry”’ among its goals. This was opposed by those who wished to keep the Union out of politics altogether

and by those who supported any of the various opposition par-

ties.” Ivan Voivodov made the principal speech against the

| amendment. He spoke “wisely and without stooping to demagoguery,” but the shouts of the delegates prevented his words from reaching the observers in the balconies, so that his arguments went unrecorded.’ Dragiev defended the motion. He tried to make the delegates recognize a distinction between “‘partisanship,”’ the struggle for power in the name of self-interest, and “‘politics,”’ the struggle for a worthy cause. He agreed that the Union should never engage in partisanship, but insisted that if it failed to turn to politics it would

abandon the struggle for justice and betray those who died at Varna and Shabla-Durankulak.”

Although Dragiev’s speech carried the motion by a small majority, Zabunov threatened to resign unless the congress reconsidered. Stormy debate continued. Representatives of the political parties sought the floor, but were refused. A group of Saktizov’s

followers passed out leaflets calling for a general workerpeasant-artisan alliance, but could make no headway against the “general hostility to socialism.’’’* Several more votes were taken, * Turlakov, Istoriia, p. 54. —D. Dragiev, Zemledelski suiuz i politikata (Plovdiv, 1901), pp. 3-4. 76 T). Dimitrov, “‘Zadachite na Bulgarskiia zemledelski stiuz,”” SBID, v, No. 8 (1901), 512.

” Dragiev, Politikata, pp. 8-21. 78 Obshto delo, 1, No. 1 (Dec. 15, 1900), pp. 103-105.

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with the motion narrowly defeated each time. As a compromise, Article Two of the charter was finally amended to read: “The Bulgarian Agrarian Union has as its goal the improvement of agriculture and its branches, the moral and material improvement of the peasant, and the general defense of the peasants’ interest in all places and at all times.” It was soon obvious that the second congress had not settled the question of the Union’s relationship to politics. The elections for

the XI National Assembly were to take place on January 28, 1901. In the weeks before this date candidates appeared in several districts who called themselves “Agrarians” although they had little or no connection with the Union. Moreover, in many villages, druzhbi endorsed and began to campaign for candidates who were in fact members of the various opposition parties.” This not only

galled the members of the Union’s Governing Council, it threatened their leadership and the unity of the entire Agrarian movement. Responding to the new situation, the Council resolved to over-

rule the decision of the second congress. On January 17, Zemledelska zashtita published an “‘Appeal to the Peasants of Bulgaria,’ explaining the Union’s change of course. It stated that in Bulgaria’s twenty-two years of independence the situation of the

peasantry had gone from bad to worse owing to the shortsightedness of the country’s political leadership. Politicians and bureaucrats lived at the people’s expense while doing nothing to further the development of the country. Moreover, they would do nothing to meet the demands of the peasant “if we remain quiet.” The Agrarian Union did not seek to control the state or to make its own leaders ministers, the ““Appeal”’ continued, but it was absolutely necessary that the peasants have someone to state their case in the National Assembly. The statement concluded by endorsing twenty-four candidates, all from northeastern Bulgaria, including Zabunov, Kormanov, Tserkovski, Pekarev, and Dragiev of the Union’s Governing Council. Several of the candidates, however, were associated with other parties.®°

The caretaker government that succeeded the Liberal regime "9 Zemledelska zashtita, 11, No. 6 (Oct. 24, 1901), 1. 80 Zemledelska zashtita, 1, No. 14 (Jan. 17, 1901), 1-2.

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made no attempt to influence the outcome of the elections, so that for the first time in many years voting took place free from sig-

nificant official intervention. When the elections were over, twenty-three candidates claiming ties with the Union, including fifteen who had received the Union endorsement, were elected. Zabunov, Kormanov, and Tserkovski were among them.*! Owing to the absence of the government’s usual pressure on the electorate, no party had been able to win a majority. During the struggles and intrigues that accompanied Petko Karavelov’s formation of a coalition government, all but seven of the “Agrarian” representatives joined other parties. In the XI National Assembly, the Democrats and their allies repealed the tithe, a step to which they had already been committed, but they paid no attention to any of the other Agrarian demands.°*”

The betrayal of the Union by sixteen of the twenty-three ‘Agrarian’ deputies chagrined most of the Union’s leaders and convinced them that, if the Union was to participate in politics at all, it had to do so wholeheartedly. Zabunov, who headed the Agrarian parliamentary group, abandoned his original hostility to politics and joined Dragiev in support of a political role for the Union.®

In their preparations for the third congress Zabunov and Dragiev labored to diminish the influence of other parties on the Union. They prevailed upon the Governing Council to adopt a rule permitting only those druzhbi that paid dues and maintained regular ties with the Union leadership to send voting delegates. To forestall a practice that had allowed numerous political partisans to infiltrate the second congress, it was also stipulated that no delegate who came from a druzhba formed within three months of the congress would be admitted .*4

The third Union congress opened in the hall of the Slavianska beseda Hotel in Sofia on October 12, 1901, in a spirit of dissen8! Three Union candidates were elected in both the Razgrad and Svishtov Districts; two each in the Lovech, Popovo, Nikopol, Ruse, Turnovo, and Preslav Districts; and one each in the Pleven, Provadiia, Balbunar, Panagiurishte, and Shumen Districts. Zemledelska zashtita, 11, No. 15 (Feb. 3, 1901), 2. 82 Zemledelska zashtita, 1, No. 6 (Oct. 24, 1901), 1; Turlakov, Istoriia, p. 55. 83 Zemledelska zashtita, 1, No. 8 (Nov. 7, 1901), 1. 84 Zemledelska zashtita, wi, No. 1 (Sept. 6, 1901), 1.

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sion. Tsanko Tserkovski refused to read his scheduled report on the National Assembly. Instead he contended that the Union was not, and should not become, permanently involved in politics. Its participation in the XI National Assembly elections was a measure brought about only by exceptional circumstances. Now that the tithe was repealed, he argued, the Union should forget about the National Assembly and politics altogether.® Tserkovski was answered by Zabunov who spoke in both sorrow and anger of the deputies who had been elected with peasant Support, but who then sold themselves to the political parties. He criticized Iurdan Pekarev, who upon his return from Rumania deserted the Union to accept a government post, and the deputies Nikola Kormanov, Geno Nedialkov, and Angel Angelov, who were among the deputies that supported other parties, and who were present at the congress. These three replied furiously, cursing Zabunov in “vulgar language that is associated with people of quite a different sort.” In the ensuing uproar, Dragiev made a “brilliant’’ speech defending Zabunov and a political role for the Union. He and Zabunov carried the majority, and they moved to turn the Union into an overtly political organization. The name of the Union was changed to Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU), and its goals were to be the ‘“‘improvement of agriculture and its branches, and the moral, political, and material improvement of the peasant and of the whole people.” The charter’s section on means was amended to include “participation in all local, provincial, and national elections.”” A new Governing Council was elected, and it proceeded to name Zabunov Union Presi-

dent, Dragiev Vice-President, and Ivan Nikolov of Pleven Secretary-Treasurer .°” 85 Zemledelska zashtita, 11, No. 6 (Oct. 24, 1901), 1-2. 86 | have preferred to translate “naroden”’ in “Bulgarski zemledelski naroden

suiuz” as “national” rather than “popular,” although the latter is occasionally used and is justifiable on linguistic grounds, because it gives a more accurate picture of what the Union actually became: a nationwide organization of peasants. Artisans and industrial workers were always considered by the Agrarian leaders to

be “of the people,” but they were encouraged to join their own organizations rather than the BANU. 87 Zemledelska zashtita, 11, No. 6 (Oct. 24, 1901), 1-2.

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After the third congress Tserkovski left the Union to carry on his ‘“‘educational-economic” program independently .°®> Kormanov

and several other prominent Union activists also deserted to various parties, and their departure was accompanied by those of — lesser figures at all levels of the Union’s structure.°? The Union was now a political organization, but the transformation was accomplished only at the cost of the defection of a major portion of its supporters.

Although the Agrarian movement had made considerable strides since the first local attempts to organize the peasantry, its leaders had not built its intellectual foundation. Groups seeking political power almost always have a doctrine, which Barrington Moore has called their “charter myth,” that “provides an explanation of what is wrong with the current state of affairs and what

should be done to correct that state.”°° Most of the remaining Agrarian leaders agreed that the wretched condition of the peasantry was due primarily to the incompetence and venality of the country’s political leaders and that only “peasant organization” could overcome this. But they had no explanation for the low quality of Bulgaria’s political leadership and were divided on the form their own activity should take. This had not been a hindrance during the struggle against the tithe, when Agrarian leaders easily aroused the peasants and directed them into political action. But beyond demanding the resignation of the government and the relief of the most severe hardships of rural life, they put forward no consistent alternatives to the existing political, social, and economic structure of the country. Even the victory of the advocates of political action at the third congress did not result in the formulation of a specifically Agrarian critique of society or in a specifically Agrarian program for the future. Now that the Union was in

politics, what were its candidates to promise? There were the longstanding grievances of high taxes and lack of credit, but the

Karavelov and Danev governments, which followed the Ivanchov-Radoslavov regime, alleviated these problems, al89 Turlakov, /storiia, pp. 58-59. 88 Kozhukharov, Tserkovski, p. 16. 2° B. Moore, Political Power and Social Theory (Cambridge, Mass., 1958), p. 10.

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though they did not eliminate them entirely.2' Moreover, improved harvests and the temporary return of prosperity reduced the sense of emergency that had prevailed during the tithe struggle.%?

The lack of a “charter myth” that could retain the commitment of the BANU’s erstwhile supporters led to declining membership, inability to raise funds, and defeat at the polls. In the February 1902 elections for the XII National Assembly, the Union’s Governing Council was able to sponsor only a single speaking tour by Zabunov. The number of successful candidates endorsed by the

Union fell from twenty-three to fourteen, and the majority of these, once elected, again jumped to other parties.’® In the elections for the XIII National Assembly, held in October 1903, the government of General Racho Petrov engaged in extensive intimidation of the electorate and opposition candidates. Moreover, the chronic disease of the Union, the infiltration of its druzhbi by supporters of the various parties, reappeared to bear witness to its lack of firm organizational ties and disciplined membership. Not a single Agrarian candidate was returned to the National Assembly.%4

At the IV congress of the Union, held in Shumen on October 5-8, 1902, Dragiev reported that, of the more than four hundred

druzhbi created during the tithe struggle, only about forty remained active.?? Zabunov, in poor health and faced with overwhelming personal financial problems, resigned as president of the Union, and his place was taken by Dragiev, the last of the original Agrarian leaders still active. Dragiev’s dedication was unquestioned and on occasion he could provide inspiring orations, but he lacked complete self-confidence and was overly concerned 91 A survey of the Agrarian parliamentary delegation’s stands in the XI and XII Assemblies may be found in F. Chary, “The Bulgarian Agrarian Popular Union’s Parliamentary Program, 1902-15,” paper presented at the 1971 Congress of the American Historical Association, Chicago, IIl., pp. 5-8. °2 Kiranov, pp. 27-30. 93 Zemledelska zashtita, 1, Nos. 16, 20 (Jan. 16, Feb. 27, 1902); Turlakov, pp. 58-59. 94 Zemledelsko zname,1, Nos. 41, 42 (Oct. 30, Nov. 11, 1903). % D. Dragiev, Porazhdenie, tsel i razvoi na Zemledelcheskiia sitiuz v Bulgariia (Stara Zagora, 1902), p. 21.

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BIRTH OF AGRARIAN UNION

with his own prestige. Nor was he an original thinker. His Must the Peasants Pay the Sheep and Goat Tax? , published at the end of 1902, attempted to duplicate the success of his tract against the tithe but had no comparable impact. When he assumed the presidency of the Union, he insisted that its headquarters be moved from centrally located Pleven to his native Stara Zagora in the southern foothills of the Balkan range. The Zemledelska zashtita was combined with his own Spravedlivost to become Zemledelsko zname (Agrarian Banner), the new official organ. Dragiev seemed to be leading the Union into a long period of retrenchment.°°

The BANU reached its nadir at its fifth congress in Stara Zagora a year later. In his address to the few delegates who attended, Dragiev spoke of the almost total disappearance of the Union’s druzhbi, and he described the desperate financial situation that led to the irregular appearance of the Union’s newspaper. His speech seemed an obituary for the organized Agrarian movement. The BANU did not perish. It was rescued by Alexander Stamboliski, who was appointed to the editorial board of Zemledelsko

zname at the fifth congress. The twenty-four-year-old Stamboliski, whose forceful personality and prolific pen made him the effective editor of Zemledelsko zname (he became editor in fact in

1906), used its pages to introduce his new concepts of Agrarianism. He provided the BANU with a charter myth that both appealed to the peasant masses and strengthened the dedication of its core members. His ideas soon permeated the Union and led to the rebuilding of its organization and to the creation of a comprehensive program of political, social, and economic reform. As early as 1908 one of the BANU’s political opponents, Todor Vlaikov of

the Radical Democratic party, observed that Stamboliski’s ideological contribution converted the Agrarian Union from an almost moribund organization into a crusading force commanding the allegiance of a large and growing segment of the peasantry.*” %® Zemledelsko zname,1, No. 7 (Dec. 8, 1902), 3. 9” Viaikov, pp. 716-22.

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CHAPTER III Alexander Stamboliski and the Theory and Practice of Agrarianism

Happy New Year to all! And may God bring: To peasants not in the Union Brains for their heads, Druzhbi for their villages. —Tsanko Tserkovski’

THE village of Slavovitsa is located about twenty miles northwest of the market town of Pazardzhik. It is the center of a fertile region where the grain and grape economy of the north merges with

the tobacco culture of the south. Alexander Stoimenov Stamboliski was born there on March 1, 1879, in a hut on a hill overlooking the village square. Because the Turnovo Constitution creating the new state was ratified just fifteen days before his birth, he may be considered a child of the new Bulgaria. Stoimen Stamboliski was not a rich peasant, although his ten hectares of land insured an adequate living. His house, preserved today as a national monument, had a dirt floor and three rooms: one where the family lived and slept, one filled by a loom, and a kitchen. He was not popular in the village because of a reputation for collaboration with the Turkish authorities before the Liberation. The family name “Stamboliski’’ was given to him because he made several trips to the Turkish capital. His wife died soon after giving birth to Alexander, and he married a widow with two children of her own. She was not a loving stepmother, and the boy grew up with little warmth or sympathy.” Although Alexander won the praise of his teachers in the vil1 From a New Year’s poem, Zemledelsko zname, v1, No. 6 (Dec. 18, 1907), 5. 2K. Kozhukharov, Aleksandur Stamboliski: biografichen ocherk (Sofia, 1955), p. 3; N. Petkov, Aleksandur Stamboliski: lichnost i idei (Sofia, 1946), p. 9.

55

. ALEXANDER STAMBOLISKI lage school, his parents opposed his further education, preferring that he work on the land. Having no desire to remain at home, however, Alexander set out on his own to the large village of Ikhtiman, where he entered the secondary school. He completed the course successfully and won admission to the agricultural school

at Sadovo. There, he was expelled for taking part in a student demonstration and moved to the State Vinicultural Institute in Pleven, where he met Ianko Zabunov. Zabunov’s lectures on the need for peasant organization fascinated him, and Zabunov was quick to recognize Stamboliski’s talents. Probably the older man felt a bond of sympathy for the young runaway whose life resembled his own. A close friendship grew up between the two, and Zabunov made him an editorial assistant on the journal Oralo. They remained in correspondence after Stamboliski left the insti-

tute in 1898 to become a teacher in Vetren near his native Slavovitsa.°®

Stamboliski was a delegate to the founding congress of the Agrarian Union but played no special role because of his youth. Nor was he active in the struggle against the tithe, which did not reach significant proportions in his region. He did show concern at that time that the peasantry might be misled by the promises of the political parties. In his first article in Zemledelska zashtita, “Irrational Partisanship Is Fatal to the Peasant,” he wrote that the only goal of political parties was power, and that the peasantry had nothing to gain from participating in party struggles. “The peasants,” he wrote, “form the agrarian estate whose members have common duties toward society and also common interests. They must see that these [interests] are not trampled upon by other estates, and if this occurs they must take appropriate measures.’”* His elaboration of these ideas over the next two decades provided the basis for the Agrarian ideology and program. Shortly after his first article appeared, Stamboliski wrote a second, more extensive one, ““ Voice from the Peasant Milieu,” deal-

56

ing in general terms with Bulgaria’s economic development. 5 Kozhukharov, Stamboliski, p. 9; N. Petkov, p. 9; P. Dumanov, ed., Galeriia ubiti durzhavni muzhe: Stamboliski: Lichnost, delo, epokha (Pleven, 1929), pp. 40-41; B. Peshev, Aleksandur Stamboliski (Sofia, 1946), p. 5. * Zemledelska zashtita, 1, No. 25 (May 1, 1900), 3.

ALEXANDER STAMBOLISKI

Written in the form of a dialogue between the author and “Bat Koliu,” an elderly peasant, it criticized the government’s concern with the outward show rather than the substance of progress. Bai Koliu argued that the obsession of the country’s leaders with diplomacy and the aping of foreign customs had created large civil and military bureaucracies that served only to impoverish the peasantry. Stamboliski maintained that the government should concentrate on economic development, for “without economic progress, no other advances are possible.’ In the summer of 1900 Stamboliski married Milena Daskalova,

who was also a teacher in Vetren. Her dowry enabled him to travel to Halle, where he enrolled in the faculty of agronomy in September 1901. While at the university most of his time was devoted to the study of German, which he never learned properly, and to reading in philosophy and politics. He was planning to transfer to Munich, but an inadequate diet combined with an unheated room caused him to come down with tuberculosis, and in February 1902, he returned to Bulgaria. Together with Milena he moved to a small village in the Rhodope Mountains. In this i1solated spot, following a traditional peasant remedy, he lived on cheese, yoghurt, and whey, exercised, and practiced deep breathing. The treatment was successful, and by fall he had completely recovered. Photographs taken soon afterward show that it was at this time that he began to develop the barrel chest that became his trademark in later years.° Before leaving for Germany, Stamboliski had begun a long treatise on aspects of Bulgaria’s economic development. He completed it in Halle and sent it to Zabunov, who published it as a series of articles in Zemledelska zashtita.’ The series dealt with two groups of functionaries—town and village officials and the clergy—and their role in promoting or hindering economic prog5 Zemledelska zashtita, 11, Nos. 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 (Sept. 6, 13, 24, Oct. 12, 19, 1900).

6 Kozhukharov, Stamboliski, pp. 4-5; Dumanov, p. 42; Genovski, / v smurtta sa zhivi, p. 10; Asen Stamboliski, Aleksandur Stamboliski: snimki iz edin zhivot ot negoviia sin (Sofia, 1934), pp. 14-18. 7 “S}uzhbashite kato spomoshtnitsi za ekonomicheski napredtk,” Zemledelska zashtita, Wi, Nos. 1, 3, 5,9, 11, 12, 21, 24, 25 (Sept. 6, 20, Oct. 6, Nov. 14, 28, Dec. 5, 1901, March 20, May 1, July 13, 1902).

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ress. Stamboliski accused the officials of failing to use their authority to improve conditions in local transportation, education, and public health. Unfortunately, he continued, these positions were not filled by honest and able men owing to “the ignorance of the people and the unprincipledness of their leaders.’’ He expressed the hope that the progress of the Agrarian Union would soon lead to the election of its members to these posts.® Stamboliski’s attitude toward the clergy reflected the influence of Renan, whose works he was reading at the time.’ Although the clergy had been a progressive force during the national awakening, he wrote, it was now holding the country back. In the village, the chief sin of the priest was that he undermined the authority of the teacher and so played into the hands of the usurers and politicians who kept the village in economic and political bondage. The clergy’s task, he concluded, was to work for an earthly as well as heavenly paradise. “It is also a duty of these functionaries, who are a burden on the people, to abandon the useless way of life they have led up to now, and to set out on the course that modern life demands.’’!®

As a Statement of Agrarian doctrine, this article was quite unsophisticated. Stamboliski called for the individual to change his way of life without reference to the forces that shaped it. He assumed that if officials and priests could be shown how to improve the economy, they would automatically act to do so. Moreover, he failed to make clear what was entailed in “‘the course that mod-

ern life demands.” By analogy to the development of socialist doctrines, the ideas he expressed represented “utopian” rather than “scientific’’ Agrarianism. But the scientific phase was soon to come. When Stamboliski took up his duties as editorial assistant on the Zemledelsko zname in 1903, he was concerned with the de-

clining fortunes of the BANU, the defection of those who objected to its political activity, and the charge that it was becoming

simply one more political party. He advanced the idea that the 8 Zemledelska zashtita, 11, No. 1 (Sept. 6, 1901), 2. ° M. Genovski, Aleksandir Stamboliski: zhivot, idei, borbi (Sofia, 1947), p. 25.

10 Zemledelska zashtita, 11, No. 25 (July 13, 1902), 3.

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Agrarian Union was a new social-political form, an “‘estatist organization,”’ whose political activity differed qualitatively from that of the established political parties. He first stated this theory in an article in Zemledelsko zname in the spring of 1904,"' and

then developed it during 1905 in a series of eighteen articles commemorating the founding of the International Institute for Ag-

riculture in Rome.” In 1909, after deepening and refining his ideas and testing them in the crucible of village organization, he published Political Parties or Estatist Organizations? which became the systematic statement of the new charter myth of the Agrarian movement. Stamboliski was “‘scientific’’ in the same sense that Marx was. He was a materialist and based his ideas on the theories about man and his society that were current in the natural and social sciences. Although his sources cannot be determined with full accuracy, it can be said that in a general sense he was a Darwinist, believing that conflict, competition, and struggle were natural and led to the

superseding of lower forms by higher ones.’® His concept of ~ human progression through the stages of “savagery, barbarism, and civilization,” each with its characteristic mode of production, was taken from the American anthropologist Louis Henry Morgan, whose Ancient Society was published in Bulgarian translation in 1897.'* The idea that instincts underlie human behavior and that private property has a basis in instinct can be found in William James’s Principles of Psychology as well as in the fourth chapter of Darwin’s Descent of Man, which were published in Bulgarian in 1902 and 1896, respectively.'® 11 “Politiko-obshtestvenite osnovi na zemledelskite organizatsii,”” Zemledelsko zname, 11, No. 12 (March 22, 1904), 3.

12 “Nachaloto na edin mezhdunaroden zemledelski stiuz,” Zemledelsko zname, I, Nos. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 38 (March 15-Sept. 16, 1905). 13. N. Petkov, pp. 21-26, 119-21. 14 A. Teodorov-Balan, Bulgarski knigopis za sto godini, 1806-1905 (Sofia, 1909), p. 670. 5 Ibid., pp. 268, 284. In his analysis of the origins of modern society Stamboliski frequently referred to the works of George Grote, Barthold Neibuhr, Emest Renan, Fustel de Coulanges, and Theodore Mommsen. Morgan had also quoted

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ALEXANDER STAMBOLISKI

The most influential element in Stamboliski’s concept of Agrarianism—the assertion that the conditions of modern life demanded the supplanting of political parties by corporative or “‘es-

tatist” organizations that would group the major occupational

formations in the country in a system of functional representation—had been implicit in the Agrarian movement from its beginning. Tsanko Tserkovski in his “‘Appeal”’ had spoken of the inability of the political parties to deal with contemporary eco-

nomic problems and had urged the creation of an independent peasant organization on the order of the Teachers Union. At the Agrarian Union’s second congress, Dragiev, with his distinction between “partisanship” and “politics,” had called for a new kind of political activity. On the eve of the elections for the XI National Assembly in 1901 the Zemledelska zashtita had proclaimed

that the Union was ‘‘conducting an estatist struggle (suslovna borba)” in the interests of the peasantry, which was not represented by the political parties.*®

What was new in Stamboliski’s treatment of this idea was his exploration of ramifications that had not been considered previously and his placement of it in a broad theory of historical devel-

opment. He sought to demonstrate that political parties had become retrogressive not because of particular mistakes or the influence of a few bad leaders, but because their very nature made them unfit to cope with the process of modernization and so drove

them into opposition to progress. He went on to argue that corporative, estatist organizations were better suited to the conditions of modern life and that their supplanting of political parties was the next inevitable step in the evolution of society. Armed with Stamboliski’s ideology, Agrarians, like the socialists, could claim that they were on the side of history. Stamboliski began his statement of Agrarian doctrine by contheir works extensively, and it is likely that Stamboliski acquired his knowledge of them from Ancient Society. Stamboliski also quoted numerous sources, including Mark Twain, for examples of political corruption. These, however, were used solely for illustration and did not shape his analysis of the causes of the degenera-

tion of political parties. Stamboliski also showed familiarity with the ideas of Marx, Eduard Bermstein, Eduard David, and Bulgaria’s own socialists. 16 Zemledelska zashtita, 1, No. 14 (Jan. 17, 1901), 1.

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trasting the importance of agriculture, which supplied humanity’s

basic needs, with the wretched condition of the peasantry. He maintained that the causes of this discrepancy were political and that their roots extended into prehistoric times. In the earliest stage of humanity’s development, corresponding to the stage of “savagery” in Morgan’s Ancient Society, mankind lived by hunting and gathering. There was very little social or political differentiation, although by the close of the era the division of labor between man and woman appeared in a rudimentary form. Human groups were democratic and equalitarian.'” The domestication of plants and animals ushered in a new stage of history. This was Morgan’s “barbarism,” based on sedentary agriculture, which gave rise to private property and increasing

social differentiation. Previously man’s struggle with the environment had totally determined his behavior, outlook, and institutions. Now “‘politics,” the struggle between man and man, predominated.

At that time the economy, which was still in its infancy in the newly formed society [based on agriculture], ceased to be the actual determiner of events and yielded this place to the political struggle in which over the course of time religion played an important role. To be sure, material need—the need to fill one’s stomach—remained the strongest factor in human nature; when viewed uncritically it appears that the economy continued to shape the broad social condition of humanity. But its power was like that of a strictly limited monarch, who “reigns, but does not rule.”*®

Stamboliski believed that material needs had to be satisfied, but as

the productive capacity of society increased these could be satisfied in various ways or through various forms of social organization, the number of alternatives growing directly with the 17 A. Stamboliski, Politicheski partii ili suslovni organizatsii? (Sofia, 1945), p. 10. The original (1909) edition of Stamboliski’s book is all but impossible to find today. Even the National Library in Sofia does not possess a copy. The edition of 1945, with an introduction by Nikola Petkov, is an exact reproduction of the original text. 8 Zemledelsko zname, \11, No. 14 (March 15, 1905), 1; Partii, p. 38.

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increase in the wealth of society. The form of political and social organization prevailing at any given time, whether based on slav-

ery, serfdom, or free landholding, was determined not by the economy but by the group in control of the instruments of political power. It was the “warrior caste,”’ he wrote, that used its military power to extend its control over the rest of the population and to

secure the principal sources of wealth for itself. This “‘usurpation” was institutionalized in the military-bureaucratic governments that evolved over time into absolutist states. Society came to consist of a secular and religious aristocracy supported by

taxes, the modern form of military tribute, exacted from the common people.!®

Stamboliski believed that a turning point in history was reached when the ideas of civil and political rights, which had grown out of the conflicts between monarch and aristocracy and church and state, began to spread to the “new social groups”’ created by the

scientific and economic progress of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The new social groups adopted these ideas and turned them against the traditional social order. Gradually all the people were drawn into the struggle to replace monarchic absolutism with government that would guarantee civil and political rights. This process occurred first in England, the most advanced country in Europe, and soon spread to France, where the old re-

gime was more firmly entrenched. The French Revolution sounded the death knell of absolutism everywhere; under its influ-

ence revolutionary movements struck blows for national independence and a new order of society in all parts of Europe. In Bulgaria the revolutionary heroes, Khristo Botev, Vasil Levski, Georgi Rakovski and others, had led the fight against Turkish domination while the whole population supported the struggle for freedom either actively or passively.”

As men groped to create a new political order, the unity that had characterized the fight against absolutism broke down. Three divergent tendencies—conservative, liberal, and democratic— appeared and were embodied in political parties. Conservative 9 Zemledelsko zname, 111, Nos. 14, 15 (March 15, 21, 1905); Partii, pp. 35-48. *° Zemledelsko zname, 111, Nos. 15, 16 (March 21, 28, 1905); Partii, pp. 95-99,

: 281-82. 62

ALEXANDER STAMBOLISKI

parties, comprising the remnants of the old regime, fought to prevent the extension of civil and political rights. Liberal parties, the vehicle for the rising middle class, embraced the cause of freedom in personal and economic life. Peasants, poor artisans, and workers entered democratic parties that sought a more equitable distribution of wealth and full equality in civil and political rights. The precise form and tempo of the struggle between these parties depended on the strength and level of development of each one. But

their conflict was a vital, healthy one whose end result was the achievement of constitutional government with substantial equality in civil and political rights. Bulgaria had seen this struggle during the reign of her first prince. The great Liberal party rallied the

middle class and the peasants, artisans, and workers under a single banner against the absolutist ambitions of Alexander Battenberg and secured the benefits of the progressive Turnovo Constitution.” Limited monarchy, constitutional government, civil and politi-

cal rights—these, according to Stamboliski, were the great achievements of the struggles between political parties. But his-

tory did not stand still. To maintain the achievements of the triumph over absolutism, the constitutional state had to proceed with both political and economic reforms. In the political sphere it had to adapt the instruments of power, the police, judiciary, and military, to the principles of constitutional government. Central to this process was disarmament, which would have the twofold benefit of destroying the militarism and imperialism on which the absolutist state had rested and of freeing resources needed for economic development. In the economic sphere the new state had to improve its human resources by taking on the functions of uni-

versal education and public health. It also had to stimulate economic growth directly by enacting an appropriate system of taxation and finance, building a network of transportation and communications, sponsoring productive enterprises, and encouraging the rational exploitation of the country’s resources.” Stamboliski was convinced that the political parties could not 21 Zemledelsko zname, Wi, No. 16 (March 28, 1905), 1; Partii, pp. 117-28, 281-84. 22 Zemledelsko zname, i, No. 17 (April 4, 1905), 1-2; Partii, pp. 130-31.

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carry out this economic program and, because of this, that they would also fail to carry out the political reforms. Stamboliski believed that the emergence of economic policy as the new focus of national life created insurmountable problems

for the political parties. The constitutional struggle had bred a highly specialized kind of man, the professional politician. The leaders of all the political parties came from the same narrow social base. They were members of the intelligentsia, lawyers, professors, businessmen, or journalists who had expertise in political affairs. Now, while a democratic-minded lawyer might honestly, even heroically, stand in defense of the political aspirations of the vast majority of peasants, workers, and artisans, his economic interests had nothing in common with theirs. This was the key to Stamboliski’s diagnosis of the ills of contemporary society. In an era increasingly conscious of economic policy, the economic interests of the various occupational groups, or estates, threatened to intrude into political life. Stamboliski defined an “estate” as a group of people with the same occupation and with common economic interests. He believed that the principal estates in Bulgaria were the agrarian, artisan, wage-laborer, entrepreneurial, commercial, and bureaucratic—although, he wrote, the more highly developed the economy, the more estates that come into existence.”* And these estates had not only differing, but opposed economic interests. Peasants and workers might be united in seeking equal civil and political rights, but peasants wanted high prices for

their crops and low-cost manufactured goods while workers wanted the reverse. Bankers wanted high interest rates, entrepre-

neurs low ones. Officers wanted more soldiers and weapons, peasants more tools and fewer taxes. Ideally, Stamboliski contended, economic differences should become the subject of open political debate. Every estate should fight for its interests, and out of their struggle the best course for Bulgaria’s economic development would evolve.”4 But this had not happened. Faced with the possibility of alienating segments of 3 Zemledelsko zname, 11, No. 28 (June 27, 1905), 1; Partii, pp. 183-86. *4 Zemledelsko zname, 11, Nos. 24, 28, 29, 30 (May 30, June 27, July 4, 11, 1905); Partii, pp. 191-94.

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their constituencies, the leaders of the political parties avoided the

chalienge of formulating clearly expressed economic policies. _Taking refuge behind the doctrine of laissez-faire, they refused to lead or even allow an open debate over economic priorities. While

laissez-faire permitted a measure of economic growth, it proceeded irrationally, inefficiently, and with great social cost. Economic liberalism led to the accumulation of great wealth in a few hands and to the exploitation of the laboring people, while ignoring the state’s potential as a stimulator of economic growth.” Still worse, the political parties sought to distract the people from economic concerns by promoting hatred toward the country’s neighbors. This created a sense of national unity at the cost of poisoned international relations and rampant militarism.*° Because they no longer spoke for the real interests of the people they claimed to represent, the parties found it increasingly difhcult to govern democratically. Having lost their sense of mission, they began tc undermine the very constitutional structure it had been their great work to create. The single most important fact of contemporary history, Stamboliski wrote, was that the political parties had turned away from the people and effected a “shameful compromise” with the resi-

. due of the old regime, the monarchy. This compromise turned all the parties into “‘court parties.”’ In return for the right to feed at the public trough, they allowed the monarch to extend his per-

sonal authority over the state and to pursue his own ends in foreign affairs. According to Stamboliski, this not only blocked economic progress, it undermined the liberties that had already been won. Instead of developing the political life of the country on democratic principles, the parties and their royal ally governed through fraud and intimidation. Instead of fighting militarism and

imperialism, they promoted them, inspiring the people with hatred for their neighbors. Instead of increasing the country’s prosperity, they squandered valuable resources on unproductive political and military bureaucracies. The court, bureaucrats, officers, and professional politicians monopolized state power and 25 Zemledelsko zname, 1, No. 19 (April 26, 1905), 1-2; Partii, p. 74. 26 Zemledelsko zname, i, No. 19 (April 26, 1905), 1; Partii, pp. 164-65.

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used it to advance their own interests. The peasants, workers, and artisans, farthest removed from political power, were reduced to beasts of burden for the new privileged class.*” Stamboliski’s prescription for this state of affairs was the replacement of political parties by groups better suited to the conditions of the new era. Since the primary concerns of society were economic, the new organizations should reflect the economic as-

pirations of their constituencies. To him it seemed obvious that political parties should yield their position to organized economic interest groups, “estatist organizations,” growing out of the country’s principal occupational groups.”°

Stamboliski believed that estatist organizations were already beginning to develop rapidly. The regime of the political parties, by its economic mismanagement, had sown the seeds of its own destruction. As he surveyed contemporary society, he observed that Bulgaria’s wage-laborers had created a significant tradeunion movement and, through the Social Democratic parties,” were reaching out for political influence. Bulgaria’s artisans were reviving long-dormant guild organizations. In agriculture the peasants were spontaneously creating a cooperative movement to cope

with their desperate economic situation. In the beginning, the wage-laborer, artisan, and peasant cooperative organizations were created to promote the economic welfare of their members. They were now awakening to the fact that to achieve any but the most insignificant results they would have to acquire political power.

The existence of the Social Democratic parties and the BANU were signs of the rising consciousness of workers and peasants.*° For Stamboliski, the development of these and other such embryonic growths into full-fledged estatist organizations, representing their members in political as well as economic life, constituted

the next stage of social evolution. An economic parliament in which all of the country’s major occupational groups would be 27 Zemledelsko zname, 11, No. 19 (April 26, 1905), 1; Partii, pp. 151-65. 8 Zemledelsko zname, 111, No. 24 (May 30, 1905), 1-2; Partii, pp. 183-86. 9 In Stamboliski’s analysis the Social Democrats were an “‘estatist organization” rather than a “political party.” 30 Zemledelsko zname, i, No. 24 (May 30, 1905), 1; Partii, pp. 186-94, 29196.

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represented according to their size would make it possible to confront the problems of economic development openly and to channel the resources of the country into a consistent program of economic development, one that would distribute the benefits and the

burdens more fairly.21 Eventually, Stamboliski wrote, estatist organizations would cross national borders. This had already happened in the case of the Socialists, and the BANU was not the only agrarian organization in Europe. The Danish Peasant Union had created an extensive cooperative movement and had elected several deputies to parliament. In Germany, the Bund der Landwirte, founded in

1892, had acquired over 300,000 members. Czech, German, Hungarian, Polish, and Croatian peasant organizations had been formed in Austria-Hungary. Stamboliski hoped that the International Institute for Agriculture, established in Rome in 1905 to exchange information among the various agricultural organizations, would be the nucleus of a ““Green International’’ that would

promote international economic cooperation and international peace.*”

This, then, was his answer to those in the Agrarian movement who opposed the BANU’s invoivement in politics. The Agrarian

Union was not to be just another political party, but an educational-economic organization that engaged in politics to bring about a new, more advanced form of society. Its educational

and economic activity was to be directed toward preparing the peasantry for an expanded role in the whole life of the nation and so could not be divorced from political struggle. Stamboliski later summarized the contrast between political parties and the Agrarian Union: They differed first in constituencies. While the BANU was made up only of those whose interests were in agriculture, the parties drew their members from all walks of life, making them a “political tower of Babel.”’ This led to a difference in capabilities; the BANU could be forceful and consistent, while the parties had to placate all their varied constituent interest groups. Moreover, the BANU was led by peasants them31 Zemledelsko zname, 11, Nos. 28, 29, 30 (June 27, July 4, 11, 1905); Partii,

pp. 195-216. 32 Zemledelsko zname, 111, No. 38 (Sept. 16, 1905), 1; Partii, pp. 273-80.

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selves, while the parties were in the hands of professional politi-

cians. In methods, the BANU sought to create the basis for genuine democracy through its support of education and the cooperative movement and through its opposition to the personal rule of the prince, while the parties relied on the prince to keep them in power. Finally, the BANU sought power not for its own sake, but to transform the country by creating a genuine constitu-

tional government and by bringing about the conditions that would allow both political and economic progress.** As the BANU began to revive under Stamboliski’s influence, its opponents sought to refute his ideas. He defended them in the

pages of Zemledelsko zname and in Political Parties or Estatist Organizations? One frequently raised objection was that the BANU, by striving to be an exclusively peasant organization, rejected the intelligentsia, the most experienced and educated men in Bulgaria, and so could not hope to govern effectively. Stamboliski admitted that there were few members of the intelligentsia in the BANU, but he argued that experience and education were not the only qualities necessary for enlightened leadership. To the peasants it was more important that their leaders shared their in-

terests. In the world of nations, he continued, the British, Ger-

mans, and Americans were clearly among the best educated peoples. But education did not keep the British from exploiting their colonies, the Germans from behaving with barbarity in Africa, or the Americans from oppressing their Negro citizens. Nor in the past had their superior experience and education kept members of the Bulgarian intelligentsia from using Agrarian druzhbi for their own purposes. To allow men who did not share the interests of the peasantry to lead the BANU would invite the divisiveness and partisanship that plagued the political parties. Over time, he maintained, as education was further extended to the peasantry

and as the BANU’s cadres acquired political experience, the agrarian estate would generate its own intelligentsia.** Stamboliski was also eager to answer the charge that in an economic parliament, chosen on the basis of one man—one vote, the 33 N. Petkov, pp. 213-23. 34 Partii, pp. 243-45, 305-07; see also Stamboliski’s article “‘Inteligentnite sili v zemledelskiia stiuz 1 partiite,” in N. Petkov, pp. 215-25.

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interests of the numerically smaller estates, such as the commercial or entrepreneurial, would have insufficient representation. He argued first that these smaller estates could form alliances to increase their voting strength. He believed this actually happened after the First World War when the old parties united in a bloc to oppose the BANU and the Communist party.?° He further argued that the danger of the majority oppressing the minority was always present in a democracy, and if it occurred it was still preferable to the oppression of the majority by the minority. Finally,

speaking as a practical politician rather than a philosopher, he Stated that the Agrarian leaders were wise enough to understand that the peasantry would not long prosper by exploiting the other

estates. The BANU did not seek to trample on the interests of others, but to gain for the peasantry its own rightful influence. Moreover, in a society aiming at economic development all productive estates could expect to benefit.*©

Bulgaria’s Socialists maintained that Stamboliski’s estatist theories ignored class struggle and overlooked the fact that the peasantry, being divided into rich, middle, and poor strata, could

not really have common interests. Stamboliski replied first by questioning the value of the idea of “class struggle” as a tool to analyze modern social and political life. He asserted that antagonism between occupational groups was much more important

in contemporary society than antagonism between classes. Whereas the Marxists saw the structure of society simplifying to the point where bourgeoisie and proletariat would face each other across the barricades, he saw it becoming more complex. As society advanced, the more multifarious became its economic interest groups and the more estatist organizations were needed to represent each group.°*"

To the Marxist argument that the Bulgarian peasantry was itself shot through with class antagonisms, Stamboliski responded tha: there were 618 landowners in the country who held more than one hundred hectares each—this equaled 4 percent of the arable land in Bulgaria—and 546,560 who held less than one hundred. Even if there were serious general conflicts of interest between rich and

35 Zemledelsko zname, xvul, No. 77 (June 22, 1922), 1. , 86 Partii, pp. 247-50, 311-12. 37 Tbid., pp. 224-26.

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poor peasants, a point he was by no means willing to concede, the peasantry in Bulgaria was homogeneous.*® He also pointed out

that Bulgaria’s Socialist parties, which self-righteously decried

the absence of solidarity in the agrarian estate, were led by lawyers, teachers, and other intellectuals, and he maliciously expressed the hope that the proletariat would follow the example of the peasantry and develop its own leaders.*? With regard to relations between estates, particularly between

the agrarian and proletarian estates, Stamboliski advanced the idea of “similar and opposed interests.”’ While peasants and workers might be divided over many questions of economic policy, there were others on which they could unite or at least cooperate. Both had an interest in maintaining peace, reducing military expenditures, and limiting the power of the monarch.*® In 1911, at the V Grand National Assembly Stamboliski led a coalition of Agrarians and Socialists with just such a program. It was this consideration that also prompted him to look first toward the Communist and Socialist parties as potential partners in his coalition government after the World War. Although Stamboliski engaged in frequent polemics with the

Social Democratic parties, he never delivered a systematic critique of Marxism from his own Agrarian standpoint. Had he studied the tortuous reasoning employed by Marxist theoreticians to find a place for the peasantry in their analysis of society, and had he lived to see Lenin’s worker-peasant alliance give way to

Stalin’s brutalization of the Russian peasantry, he would undoubtedly have held all the more firmly to his own understanding of the nature of social change. Criticism of political parties and the prediction that they would be superseded by estatist organizations formed the heart of Stamboliski’s ideology as he first developed it in Zemledelsko zname

from 1904 to 1906. When he published Political Parties or Estatist Organizations? in 1909, he added a new element, the as38 Ibid., pp. 307-11. °° Ibid., pp. 106-107, 270-71; see also Stamboliski’s ‘“Nashite razbiraniia v lagera na naemno-rabotnicheskite organizatsii,”” Zemledelsko zname, vil, No. 73 (July 29, 1909), 1-2. 40 Partii, pp. 184-88.

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sertion that the instincts of self-preservation, reproduction, and acquisition underlay human behavior. He argued that these three instincts found their expression in human society in the institu-

tions of the state, the family, and private property, respectively, : and that while these institutions might possess many different forms, no society could be without them.*! Since the despised political parties did not advocate the abolition of the state, family,

or private property, it may be assumed that he selected this weapon to use against the Socialists. And in fact outside Political Parties or Estatist Organizations? he rarely mentioned the three

instincts except when condemning the Marxists for seeking to abolish private property. During Stamboliski’s lifetime the three-instinct theory was not greatly emphasized. The principal enemies of the BANU were not the Socialists but the old parties and Tsars Ferdinand and Boris.

After the Second World War, however, when the BANU was suppressed by the Communists, the theory was revived and given the premier place in the Union’s ideological statements.”

What did Stamboliski consider to be the estatist aspirations of the Bulgarian peasantry, and what was his program for the development of Bulgarian society? He was convinced that peasant farming was not destined to be replaced by large-scale, mechanized agriculture. On this point he quoted Eduard Bernstein on the German peasants’ obstinate refusal to disappear.** He did not believe, however, that peasant farming had to remain backward and unproductive, for a variety of means existed to increase the prosperity of small-scale peasant agriculture. The growth of the cooperative movement, for example, would permit the mechanization of agriculture without sacrificing the individual nature of peasant farming. The government could also encourage the peasant to overcome his backwardness by lightening the tax burden, by providing cheap credit, and by expanding rural education.** Stamboliski proposed increased government expenditures for 41 Tbid., pp. 9-11, 76.

* See G. M. Dimitrov, “Agrarianism,” in F. Gross, ed., European Ideologies (New York, 1948), 396-451.

* Partii, pp. 55-57. * Ibid., pp. 18, 58-71.

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rural welfare while calling for a reduction of the tax burden.This did not represent a contradiction to him, for he was convinced that under the existing regime the peasant was heavily taxed to support both a corrupt, patronage-ridden bureaucracy and a monstrously swollen military establishment, neither of which brought any real

benefit to the country. He called for a redistribution of the tax burden, specifically for a progressive income tax to replace the existing land tax, and for the diversion of the state’s resources out of the civil and military bureaucracies and into programs to expand cooperation, education, communications, and other projects needed for economic development.*°

Stamboliski’s program for the reallocation of Bulgaria’s national resources is particularly interesting in light of subsequent theories of modernization. Ever since Alexander Gerschenkron discovered the “secret” of the Russian pattern of industrialization, social scientists have tended to assume that the rural sector

, must be squeezed to generate the investment capital necessary to overcome backwardness. Gerschenkron himself directly attributed Bulgaria’s failure to industrialize to the fact that its government was more democratic than Russia’s and lacked the authoritarian tools necessary to squeeze the peasantry hard enough.*® As a corrective to this view it should be remembered that the choice was never simply between rural welfare or industrialization. In both Russia and Bulgaria, military or military-related expendi-

tures accounted for roughly one-third of the peace-time state budget. If the maintenance of Russia’s Great Power status was politically and psychologically necessary for her regime, then we may take its military expenditures as “given” and assume that it had no choice but to squeeze the peasants for the capital to generate industrialization.*” But Bulgaria was not a Great Power, andit

is difficult to see what benefit heavy military spending ever brought the country. According to Stamboliski, Bulgaria’s real * Tbid., pp. 131, 191-94, 289-91; see also his articles analyzing various forms of taxation in Zemledelsko zname, vu, Nos. 80, 81, 82, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 92, 93, 94 (Aug. 22-Oct. 14, 1909). *6 Gerschenkron, p. 226. *7 This point was forcefully made by T. H. Von Laue in Why Lenin? Why Stalin? (New York, 1964).

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choice lay not between peasant welfare and industrialization, but between industrialization and an aggressive foreign policy with its concomitant military build-up. Even before the Balkan Wars, he maintained that most of Bulgaria’s military spending was unproductive and could be dispensed with.* In short, the peasantry was not inimical to industrialization, he argued, but only to industrialization that was brought about by depressing rural living standards. The fundamental aspiration of the agrarian estate as he saw it was the reallocation of Bulgaria’s resources away from the military and into economic development.

In Political Parties or Estatist Organizations? Stamboliski asserted that the simple expression of new ideas was not sufficient to

make them reality; the degree of their success depended on the forces willing and able to fight for them.*® Between 1903 and 1908 he worked vigorously to revive the BANU and to shape its development to conform to his ideas of what an estatist organization should be. In these years nearly every issue of the Zem-

ledelsko zname contained at least one article by “Stambol,” “Sando,” “Sans doute,” and “A. S.,” setting forth his ideas of Agrarianism or applying them to current problems. The decline of the Agrarian Union after the struggle against the tithe and the withdrawal of most of its early leaders created opportunities for younger dedicated men. Stamboliski, of course, was one of these, and when he was appointed to the editorial board of Zemledelsko zname he was joined by two others, Marko Turlakov and Alexander Dimitrov. Turlakov, who would later challenge Stamboliski for the leadership of the BANU, was a close friend of Dragiev. He had been a

teacher in Stara Zagora since 1890 and he studied for a law degree that he eventually received from Sofia University in 1910.

In addition to his other work for the Union, he became its specialist on questions of taxation and finance.°° 48 See his comments on the military budget in Zemledelsko zname, vil, Nos. 16,

17 (Jan. 10, 14, 1909) and vit, Nos. 4, 10, 13, 26 (Dec. 5, 29, 1909, Jan. 13, Feb. 27, 1910). * Partii, p. 100. °° Tadzher, pp. 291-92; Zemledelsko zname, xv, No. 24-25 (Oct. 13, 1919), 3.

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Alexander Dimitrov had been a twenty-one-year-old teacher in the village of Gorna Koznitsa in the Kiustendil District when he first read Tsanko Tserkovski’s “Appeal”’ in Zemledelska zashtita. He corresponded with Zabunov and formed a number of village druzhbi in his region. On the strength of his occasional articles in the Union paper and his success as an organizer, he was elected to the Governing Council of the Union at its fourth congress and invited to become a member of the editorial board of Zemledelsko

zname. Dimitrov devoted himself to the organization of local druzhbi, so much so that he was nicknamed “The Apostle” of Agrarianism.°!

Stamboliski, Turlakov, and Dimitrov worked with Dragiev to reshape the organization and program of the BANU to correspond to its new ideology. They began with the village druzhbi. At the V Agrarian congress, held in the wake of the BANU’s complete failure in the elections for the XIII National Assembly, Dragiev, Stamboliski, and Dimitrov presented a “Code for the Participation of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union 1n Legislative Elec-

tions,” which was incorporated into the Union’s charter. It consisted of twenty-six articles designed to regulate the nomination of Agrarian candidates, the conduct of election campaigns, and the obligations of candidates and elected Agrarian representatives.*? Article One of the code stated unequivocally: “The Bulgarian Agrarian National Union participates independently in elections in every district in Bulgaria where its druzhbi are located.’’ On the second Sunday after the announcement of elections, all village druzhbi were required to send representatives (one for every ten

members) to a district assembly to nominate candidates. The Governing Council of the Union was given the right to reject any of the candidates nominated by the assemblies and also to name one candidate in any district if in its judgment this would serve the Union’s interests. To keep supporters of the political parties from gaining an Agrarian endorsement, both the district assemblies and the Governing Council were forbidden to nominate any person who had not been a member of the Union for at least two years.

At the XIII Agrarian congress in 1911, this provision was 51 B. Peshev, pp. 6-8; Zemledelsko zname, xv, No. 24-25 (Oct. 13, 1919), 2. 52 Zemledelsko zname, 1, No. 1 (Dec. 15, 1903), 3-4.

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strengthened to require five years’ prior membership for nomination to the National Assembly, four years’ for provincial or district office, and three years’ for local office.®* Before receiving the BANU’s endorsement, all nominees for the National Assembly were required to sign a pledge binding them to support the Union if elected and, upon the completion of each legislative session, to report on the activity of the Assembly and their own conduct in it

to a district meeting of Union members. Representatives who failed to do this or who in the opinion of the members failed to support the Union were to be expelled.°* During an election campaign, the druzhbi were to furnish agitators for their district and to bring all Union members to the polls in a single group. All Agrarians were to “avoid scandals” during the campaign, and Agrarian candidates and agitators were forbidden to “lie or mislead the people.”’ The V Agrarian congress also voted to establish a “library of the Agrarian Union” to publish material of an agitational character and to make it available to the druzhbi at low

cost.” The next annual congress, held in Varna on November 8-10, 1904, voted to establish a category of “regular” druzhbi that alone would have the right to send participating delegates to the congresses. To achieve this status a druzhba was required to collect dues from its members, to forward the appropriate sum to the BANU treasury (dues were set at one /ev annually, of which sixty stotinki®® went to the Governing Council), and to take out a certain number of subscriptions to the Zemledelsko zname, depending on the size of the membership: druzhbi with ten to twenty members were required to hold five subscriptions; those with twenty to thirty members, eight subscriptions; and those with over thirty members, at least ten subscriptions. The BANU’s Governing Council was enlarged from sixteen members to thirty in the 53 Zemledelsko zname, 1X, No. 96-97 (Nov. 17, 1911), 2; Turlakov, Istoriia, p. 104.

°4 Stamboliski took this requirement very seriously. On March 4, 1909, Zemledelsko zname reported that he had nearly drowned in an attempt to cross a flood-

swollen river to deliver such a report. In April 1910, he spoke at eighteen such meetings before growing too hoarse to continue. 55 Zemledelsko zname, \1, No: 1 (Dec. 15, 1903), 1-2. °° One hundred stotinki = one lev.

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ALEXANDER STAMBOLISKI

hope that they would play a more active role in the organization of druzhbi. Stamboliski was elected to the Governing Council for the first time at this congress. At its first meeting the Council made

him vice-president of the Union and a member of its Standing Committee.°’ This congress also saw the return of Tsanko Tserkovski to active membership in the Union. In a speech to the delegates he announced his conversion to belief in the necessity of a political role for the BANU,°® and he supported this policy until his death in 1926. The spread of an Agrarian consciousness and the implementation of the reforms voted by the congresses proceeded slowly but with discernable progress. During 1905 the Zemledelsko zname reported on the organization of twenty-seven new druzhbi. The character of the druzhbi, too, was changing. Some now required their members to sign pledges promising that they would not join any party.°? Others expelled members who continued to belong to

other parties. The following report is an example of the slow transformation of the BANU into an effective political organization.

Today on the fourteenth of September 1905, the members of the Agrarian druzhba in the village of Salamanovo, Preslav District, assembled to discuss the question of the expulsion of the secretary of the druzhba, Docho lordanov, and members Anton Mokev, Vasil Todorov, Vilcho Kirev, Marin Zhelezov, lorgo Bochev, and Ar. Makev. After a long discussion of the question, in which it was established that the above-named individuals have worked and are working against the interests of the druzhba and that they have openly campaigned against the candidates for the provincial council named by the district Agrarian druzhba, in accordance with Article 32 of the Union

charter it was decided: 1) to expel [all of them] from the druzhba and to consider them its enemies. °” Turlakov, Istoriia, pp. 63-64. °° Kozhukharov, Tserkovski, p. 18. 9 Zemledelsko zname, 11, No. 11 (Feb. 20, 1905), 3-4. 6° Zemledelsko zname, 1, No. 41 (Oct. 25, 1905), 4.

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During the year similar action was taken in four other druzhbi, one of which expelled forty-seven of its members.®! By the time of the VII Agrarian congress, held in Turnovo on

November 8-10, 1905, the number of the BANU’s druzhbi had

grown to ninety-five, thirty-eight of which were “regular.” They contributed 4,378.25 leva to the Union’s treasury, which was barely enough to pay for operating expenses.®°

During the summer preceding the VII congress, an informal committee, consisting of Dragiev, Stamboliski, Dimitrov, Turlakov, and Stancho Momchev, a protégé of Dragiev, began to discuss measures for further strengthening the BANU’s organization.®* At the congress they made several proposals that were incorporated in the Union charter. According to these new provi-

sions, a minimum of ten members was required to form a druzhba. The druzhbi were required to elect officers on November

21 each year, and to hold weekly meetings from September to April and monthly meetings during the rest of the year to discuss Union affairs and questions of general interest to the peasantry.

They were urged to form cooperative societies, to establish reading-rooms where Agrarian literature would be available, and to form new druzhbi in neighboring villages. Although the congress also voted to employ a full-time agitator to organize druzhbi

throughout the country, lack of funds kept this decision from being implemented until the following year when Turlakov assumed the post.” At the VIII congress, held in Pleven on November 8-10, 1906, Dragiev reported that the number of druzhbi had grown to 139. To

| 77

61 Zemledelsko zname, iii, Nos. 14, 27, 30, 35 (March 15, June 9, July 11, Aug. 22, 1905). 62 Fifty-three of them were located in the five north-central and northeastern

provinces (Pleven, Ttrnovo, Ruse, Shumen, and Varna) where the Agrarian movement had begun. The rest were in three provinces (Stara Zagora, Plovdiv, and Khaskovo) south of the Balkan Range where the BANU now had its headquarters.

63 Zemledelsko zname, i, No. 42 (Nov. 24, 1905), 2-3. 6¢ Turlakov, Istoriia, p. 65. 65 Zemledelsko zname, Wi, Nos. 2, 5, 6 (Dec. 5, 21, 24, 1905); Turlakov, /storiia, pp. 65-66.

ALEXANDER STAMBOLISKI

create a greater cohesiveness in the Union it was decided to create a life-insurance fund in which all druzhbi would participate. The druzhbi were required to contribute one /ev annually for each of

their members who had belonged to the Union for one year or longer. After the death of a member, his family received twenty stotinki for every member of the fund.®° Life insurance was just one of the ‘“‘educational-economic’”’ functions that the BANU performed. Of greater significance was

its support of the cooperative movement. Under Stambolisk1’s editorship Zemledelsko zname frequently published material on different types of cooperatives, instructions on how to establish them, representative charters of cooperative societies, and descriptions of cooperative organizations in other countries. At the Union’s X congress in 1908 it was decided to establish a “National Store” as a nationwide cooperative. It was intended to “provide members with agricultural tools, seeds, fertilizers, and other necessities at the lowest prices, to encourage the formation of various cooperatives . . . and so on.’’®” K. Iliev, a longtime Union activist, was made director of the National Store, which began to issue shares to BANU members at ten /eva each. To prevent wealthy peasants from gaining control of the store, no individual was permitted to hold more than ten shares.®® Although Iliev toured the country to explain the National Store to the peas-

ants,’ its operations remained limited until Raiko Daskalov became its director in 1914. The growth of the BANU was indirectly aided by the government, which, while carrying a large burden of foreign debt, was beginning a new military build-up financed by increased taxes on

salt, sugar, tobacco, spirits, and other products needed by the peasantry. Between 1900 and 1905 the amount of revenue raised

by these taxes each year grew from 22,600,000 leva to 43,000,000, and by 1911 reached 83,600,000. Moreover, the harvests between 1907 and 1909 were below average, and large °° Zemledelsko zname, 1v, No. 7 (Dec. 22, 1907), 3; Turlakov, Istoriia, pp.

66-67. .

°” Zemledelsko zname, vil, No. 1 (Nov. 18, 1908), 3. 8° Zemledelsko zname, vil, No. 26 (Feb. 14, 1909), 1-2. 69° Zemledelsko zname, Vil, No. 33 (March 11, 1909), 4.

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numbers of peasants lost their land to the State Agricultural Bank or to private usurers.’° It was at about this time that the BANU reached the point at which its financial situation permitted it to

devote a larger portion of its energy to expansion. At its VIII congress in 1906, the Union planned its year’s activities to correspond to a predicted income of 14,670 leva. Only seven hundred

leva of this sum was allocated to organizational campaigning. During the year the Union treasury actually received 22,439.87 leva and was able to spend 1,200 /eva for tours through the provinces by Agrarian leaders.” At the IX congress of the Union, held in Plovdiv on November

8-10, 1907, Dragiev reported that since the last congress the number of druzhbi had grown from 139 to 411 and that the number of dues-paying members had grown from 2,002 to 7,791. The number of subscriptions to Zemledelsko zname had also increased from 705 to 2,630. In the weeks before the congress the

BANU’s standing committee sent a questionnaire to every druzhba requesting a report on its activities during the past year. Answers were received from 214 druzhbi, who reported that in all they had held 2,208 village meetings, 582 meetings in district capitals, and 108 assemblies of district druzhba leaders. They had also established eighty-one reading rooms and created forty-six

consumer-producer cooperatives. The report of the BANU’s Governing Council stated that members of this body had organized 407 meetings at which they made a total of 545 speeches.” While these figures show that few druzhbi were living up to the

high standards set at the VII congress, they do indicate that the BANU was in the process of creating a more disciplined and

politically conscious membership. The composition of the IX

| congress itself demonstrated this. When Stamboliski gave the opening speech on “The Death of Political Parties,’’ 237 delegates from 174 “regular” druzhbi were there to hear him. They represented every agricultural district in the country with the ex® Popoff, pp. 477, 483-84; Ts. Todorova, “Kim istoriiata na Bulgarskiia zemedelski naroden stiuz v navecherieto na voinite,”’ Istoricheski pregled, x1, No. 5 (1955), 32-40. ™ Zemledelsko zname, vi, No. 1 (Nov. 16, 1907), 4; Turlakov, Istoriia, p. 67. ” Zemledelsko zname, v1, No. 1 (Nov. 16, 1907), 2.

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ception of those in the two northwestern provinces of Vratsa and Viden.”?

Like most robust eight-year-olds, the BANU suffered growing pains, and the [IX congress revealed the first public signs of the rift developing between Dragiev and the younger Agrarian leaders. During the preceding summer the informal committee of Dragiev, Stamboliski, Turlakov, Dimitrov, and Momchev had debated the question of moving the BANU’s headquarters from isolated Stara Zagora to Sofia. The government of Dimittr Petkov had been in power for four years and would soon be forced to hold elections. Stamboliski argued that the Union’s prestige would be increased if its headquarters were in the capital and that the Agrarian leaders should be near “the pulse of politics.”’ Dragiev, who had spent his life in Stara Zagora, did not want to make the move and argued that it would put the Union in the path of temptation to associate with the political parties. Although Dragiev was outvoted fourto-one on the committee, he refused to accept its decision and carried his opposition to the floor of the congress.”* After a “‘spirited debate,”’ the decision to move was approved by a vote of 139 to

84.7 Dragiev suffered another defeat when Stamboliski persuaded the congress to reorganize the BANU’s standing committee. In the past this body had consisted of the president, vice-president, and secretary-treasurer of the Union, who were all elected by the Governing Council. Most of the actual power rested in the presidency, which Dragiev had held since Zabunov’s resignation in 1902. A fight to remove Dragiev from this office would probably have crippled the Union, so the younger Agrarian leaders decided to remove the office from the man. On the floor of the congress

Stamboliski argued that the present situation could lead to the ‘“chiefism” displayed by the political parties, ana he urged that the standing committee be composed of the editor of Zemledelsko zname and his assistants, the editors of other Union publications and their assistants, and the Union’s full-time agitators. Dragiev opposed this motion, but it was carried by a large major-

ity. The new standing committee consisted of Stamboliski, Dimitrov, Turlakov, Tserkovski, Dragiev, and two lesser-known

“3 Tbid. 4 Turlakov, Istoriia, pp. 67-68. > Zemledelsko zname, Vi, No. 1 (Nov. 16, 1907), 1-2.

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figures. On almost any issue Stamboliski and his allies could now command a clear majority.”®

Two months after the BANU’s IX congress, on January 16, 1908, the Stambolovist cabinet of Dimittr Petkov fell. Prince Ferdinand put the government in the hands of the Democratic

| party under Alexander Malinov, and elections for the XIV National Assembly were scheduled for May 25.

The BANU had been fortunate in that for nearly five years it had been able to concentrate on internal development free from the turmoil of a national election. The Agrarian leaders now began a spirited campaign, speaking before peasant meetings in all parts of the country. The official program of the BANU, published in Zemledelsko zname on May 10, condemned government by political parties and stressed the differences between the parties and the BANU. It also contained a list of measures that the Union pledged to support. These included demands for expansion of the rural school system and at least six years of free, compulsory edu-

cation, the creation of a state insurance system, the abolition of private usury, a lowering of indirect taxes and the introduction of a progressive income tax as the primary source of state revenue, the lowering of government salaries and pensions, reduction of the size of the army and a shorter term of military service, and the introduction of proportional representation.”

The elections were a great success for the BANU, which emerged as the largest opposition political organization in the

country, electing twenty-three candidates and polling over 100,000 votes. The complete results are shown in Table 2.8 Among the successful Agrarian candidates were Stamboliski, Dragiev, Dimitrov, and Tserkovski. The BANU won three seats

in the districts of Svishtov, Nikopol, and Provadiia, and two in the districts of Preslav, Sevlievo, Varna (rural), Lovech, Novi Pazar, Turnovo (rural), and Silistra.”? The bulk of the Union’s support was still concentrated in the agricultural districts of the north and northeast. Nothing demonstrated the influence of Stamboliski’s ideas on ® Ibid.; Turlakov, /storiia, p. 71. T Zemledelsko zname, Vi, No. 54-55 (May 10, 1908), 1-2. *8 Data for Table 2 from Zemledelsko zname , 1x, No. 32-33 (April 9, 1911), 2. 9 Zemledelsko zname, v1, No. 59 (May 28, 1908), 1.

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ALEXANDER STAMBOLISKI TABLE 2 ELECTIONS FOR THE XIV NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, May 25, 1908

Deputies % of Party elected Votes votes

Democratic 586,35211.2 62.2 BANU 23166 105,979

Liberal 5 46,431 4.9 National 4 79,530 8.4

Progressive Liberal1237,440 53,631 4.0 5.7 National Liberal RadicalDemocratic Democratic 00 13,787 1.5 Social 8,101 0.9 Young Liberal O 6,545 0.7

Independents 2 5,111 0.5 Total 203 942,907 100.0 the development of the BANU more clearly than the contrast between the Agrarian performances in the XI and the XIV National Assemblies. When Agrarian deputies first entered parliament in 1901 they were divided and had no clear program. Some of the deputies elected with the support of the Union denied that any one

organization could represent the peasantry.2° When Ianko Zabunov claimed to speak for the peasant estate on a question of taxation he provoked a tongue-lashing from Prime Minister Petko Karavelov, who declared that members of the National Assembly were elected to represent the whole people, not a single group or

region. Conversely, he maintained, he and other party leaders were as deeply concerned with the problems of the peasantry as anyone in the country. ““To be sure,”’ he continued, “I know that

there is one party in Europe that speaks of class interests, but I have been brought up in a different school, one that will not allow

this as a moral or political principle.”’’! Zabunov and his colleagues made no rejoinder to Karavelov’s denial of their claim to speak for the peasantry. Nor from that time on did they make any significant effort to assert themselves. This state of affairs no longer prevailed in 1908. At the first ses*° Dnevnitsi (stenografski) na XI Obiknoveno narodno sibranie, purva izviinredovna sesiia, 1 (Sofia, 1901), p. 1027. 81 Tbid., p. 1074.

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sion of the National Assembly, the Agrarian representatives refused to applaud Prince Ferdinand’s speech from the throne.®? Before the minutes could be read at the second session, Stambolisk1

was on his feet to denounce the prince’s speech. When finally recognized, he declared that the representatives of the peasantry would tolerate no violation of the constitution by either prince or party.®> His speech was punctuated by shouts and furious ex-

changes of epithets between the Agrarian and government benches, an occurrence that set the tone for the BANU’s subsequent parliamentary career.®4 In the National Assembly’s third and fourth sessions, the depu-

ties were introduced to Agrarian doctrine by Dragiev, who informed the representatives of the parties at length that they must inevitably give way before the new “‘political-social estatist organizations.” ®> The BANU’s deputies did not, of course, believe

’ that they could have much influence on government policies. Convinced that time was now on their side, they intended to build as strong a record as possible for use in future elections. The new, exuberant mood of the BANU was fully displayed at

its tenth congress, held in Sofia on November 8-11, 1908. All peasants were urged to come to the capital to join in the celebration of the Union’s jubilee congress. By the afternoon of November 8 a crowd estimated at between 8,000 and 10,000 people was gathered near the hall “Nova Amerika,” the largest meeting place in the city. Inside, the delegates heard speeches by Pettr Baev, Dragiev, and Stamboliski, after which the meeting was adjourned so that all the delegates could participate in a victory parade. The Union members marched with banners and brass bands up the yellow-brick streets of the capital to National Assembly Square,

where they were addressed by Union leaders standing on the monument to Alexander II and the Russian liberators of Bulgaria. They then marched past the university to the Levski Monument 82 Zemledelsko zname, V1, No. 98 (Oct. 22, 1908), 3. 83 The Agrarian deputies denied that the constitution gave the prince the right to open the National Assembly. They also objected to his wearing the royal crown and remaining seated while the deputies stood bare-headed. 84 Dnevnitsi . . . na XIV ONS, purva redovna sesiia, 1 (Sofia, 1908), pp. 5-6. 85 Ibid., pp. 20-30.

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for more speeches and music, and concluded the day with a march

to the Sofia headquarters of the BANU, where they dispersed. : ‘““We had to note,”’ wrote Stamboliski later, “that this demonstra- _ tion of peasant power, the like of which had never before been seen in Sofia, attracted the most lively interest on the part of the inhabitants of the capital. On every street, the windows and balconies by which it passed were crowded with those eager to see the representatives of the awakened peasantry.’’®°

On the following day Dragiev reported that the BANU now possessed 1,123 druzhbi, of which 571 were “‘regular,” 459 had fulfilled part of their obligations, and 93 had fulfilled none. There were 17,200 dues-paying members, and the Zemledelsko zname was now supported by 5,881 subscriptions. In all, the Union’s income had risen to over 50,000 /eva annually. At this congress the National Store was founded, and it was decided to employ twelve full-time agitators to campaign for Agrarian organization during the summer months.** Although the Agrarian Union looked toward its second decade with considerable confidence, it was soon to confront greater chal-

lenges than any it had met before. Just as the violent struggle against the tithe had wrenched the Union from its “‘educationaleconomic” moorings, so the Balkan Wars and First World War were to test its commitment to Stamboliski’s ideology and ulti-

mately to give it the opportunity to transform Bulgaria into a model Agrarian state. 86 Zemledelsko zname, Vil, No. 1 (Nov. 18, 1908), 1-2. 87 Zemledelsko zname, Vil, Nos. 1, 2, 3 (Nov. 18, 22, 26, 1908).

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We will throw down the gauntlet to adventurists, no matter where they come from, and we will suffer to protect Bulgaria from this terrible danger. And if we fall in this battle we will be content, for we will not live to see the shame and doom of Bulgaria, and we know that the generation you wish to sacrifice in your adventures will surely pay you back, that it will repay you severely and justly for your policy of in-

sanity... . — Alexander Stamboliski!

IN his statement of Agrarian doctrine, Stamboliski had written that, before the growth of estatist organizations could bring about a higher form of political and economic life, society could expect to see the ruling political parties become more dependent on the throne and, along with the resurgence of monarchism, the con-

comitant rise of militarism and imperialism. The next decade was | to confirm his prediction. Four months before the BANU’s jubilee congress, seventeen days after its successful campaign in the elec-

tions to the XIV National Assembly, the revolt of the Young Turks upset the precarious balance of forces in the Near East and set in motion a chain of events that was to involve Bulgaria in three major wars. Before the Young Turk revolt, neither Stamboliski nor any other Agrarian leader had concerned himself directly with issues of foreign policy.” But from this time on, as the question of Bulgaria’s role in the Balkans loomed steadily larger in national politics, it perforce came to occupy a central position in the deliberations of the Agrarian leaders.

To the Bulgarians, as to the Serbs and to a lesser extent the Greeks, the “Eastern Question” presented itself primarily as the " From Stamboliski’s reply to Tsar Ferdinand’s speech from the throne in 1914. N. Petkov, pp. 273-74. * The official program of the BANU, published on the eve of the elections to the XIV National Assembly, did not contain a single reference to Bulgaria’s foreign policy. Zemledelsko zname, v1, No. 54-55 (May 10, 1908), 1-2.

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problem of the future of Macedonia. This wild land of lakes, mountains, forests, and impassable marshes lacked natural, his-

toric, or legal borders. It consisted approximately of the area bounded by the lakes Okhrid and Prespa in the west, the Sar Mountains in the north, the Rila and Rhodope Mountains in the northeast, the river Mesta in the east, and the Aegean, Mt. Olympus and the Pindus Mountains to the south and southwest. Under Ottoman administration it was included in the vilayets of Thes-

| saloniki (Salonika), Monastir (Bitolj), and Uskub (Skoplje). Of little economic value, it was strategically the linchpin of the Balkans, for it was traversed by a natural route connecting central Europe and the Aegean along the Morava and Vardar river valleys. Its conquest by the Bulgarians under Simeon (893-927) and

Ivan Asen II (1218-1241) and the Serbs under Stefan DuSan (1331-1355) created the medieval Balkan empires on which many modern national claims were based. Its subjugation by the Turks

. in the fourteenth century made possible the invasions of Suleiman. In the nineteenth century the decay of the Ottoman Empire reawakened the great powers to the strategic significance of Macedonia. Their attempts to dominate the region directly or through the agency of a Balkan client contributed significantly to the complexity of Balkan politics.° The emergence of national consciousness in the Balkans fostered the growth of rival claims on Macedonia by its neighbors. Serbs, Bulgarians, and Greeks all sought the liberation of their Macedonian “brethren” and their inclusion in the parent state. No judgment on the relative merit of these claims will be made here; one can only say that none was completely without justification and that all touched the emotions of a large segment of the peoples involved.* Macedonia’s location between Greece, Montenegro, ° For the geographical and historical background of the Macedonian question, see H. R. Wilkinson, Maps and Politics: A Review of the Ethnographic Cartography of Macedonia (Liverpool, 1951), pp. 1-5; E. Barker, Macedonia, Its Place in Balkan Power Politics (London, 1950), pp. 7-10; D. Dakin, The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 1897-1913 (Salonika, 1966), pp. 1-11. * Perhaps as much ink as blood has been spilled in the struggle for Macedonia. For an introduction to the literature representing the various national positions, see the bibliographies of Dakin and Wilkinson. The history of European opinions on the ethnic composition of Macedonia is thoroughly explored in Wilkinson’s Maps and Politics.

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Serbia, Bulgaria, Turkey, and the land of the Albanians and its role as a route gave rise to a highly complex ethnographic mosaic

that has never been deciphered to the satisfaction of everyone. The British geographer H. R. Wilkinson, who surveyed the history of ethnographic studies of the region over a two-hundredyear period, wrote of the area:

It is a zone where the Albanian, Greek, Bulgarian and Serbian linguistic provinces meet and overlap, and where in addition exclaves of Romanian and Turkish speech are found; it is a region where the concept of national sentiment, associated with language, exists side by side with the perhaps older concept of

community based on religious affinity; it is a region where many influences, economic, cultural and political, emanating from different parts of Europe, Asia and Africa, meet and mingle but where the process of fusion has not always taken place. The traditional incapacity of this region to absorb and to transform might be correlated with its physical diversity and

with its function as a through-route between the new world north of the Alps and the old world of the Eastern Mediterranean and the Near East. In the 1870s the Bulgarians, through the expansion of their newly won exarchate, were the first to bring a large portion of Macedonia under their influence. Bulgarian bishoprics were established in Nis, Pirot, Skoplje, Strumitsa, Veles, Debar, Okhrid,

Bitolj, and Nevrokop, all of which were included within Bulgaria’s boundaries in the Treaty of San Stefano.® Although restored to the Turks by the Treaty of Berlin, Macedonia continued to be regarded as Bulgaria irredenta by Bulgarian statesmen, who claimed the borders of San Stefano as part of the national heritage. Alarmed by the near inclusion of Macedonia in Bulgaria, Serbs and Greeks began to assert their own claims to the region. The Serbs founded the Society of St. Sava in 1886 to combat the Bulgarian exarchate and to distribute Serbian books and schools in Macedonia.’ In 1894 the Ethnike Hetairia, or National Society,

> Wilkinson, p. 3. ® Tbid., pp. 58-62. *M. S. Anderson, The Eastern Question, 1774-1923 (New York, 1966), pp. 269-70.

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was formed in Athens primarily to resist the “bulgarization” of Macedonia. By the end of the century the Greeks were spending more on education per person in their “unredeemed territories” than they did in their homeland.® Moreover, the Greeks and Serbians attempted to come to an understanding to exclude Bulgaria from Macedonia, but the two peoples found that their own overlapping claims precluded cooperation. The Macedonians actively contributed to the complicated international situation surrounding their homeland. In 1893 a group of Bulgarian Macedonians, led by the schoolmaster Damian Gruev and Dr. Khristo Tatarchev, formed the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization (or IMRO). The purpose of IMRO was to

prepare for an armed insurrection against the Turks to achieve “Macedonia for the Macedonians.” Although the majority in IMRO, at least at its inception, opposed the partition of the region and supported the idea of South-Slav federation, considerable aid was given to the organization by Bulgarians, who assumed that an

autonomous Macedonia would inevitably be absorbed by Bulgaria. Between 1895 and 1903, relying as much on terror as on the sentiment of national solidarity, IMRO created an “*infrastruc-

ture”’ to organize the population in its support. A rudimentary IMRO administrative and tax-collecting network was established,

armed bands harassed the Turks and recalcitrant Macedonians, and caches of weapons were concealed in preparation for the great planned uprising.® The IMRO state-within-a-state extended from Macedonia into Bulgaria. In the first years of the twentieth century there were at least 35,000 Bulgarian citizens who had been born in Macedonia,

10,000 of whom made their homes in Sofia. Many more Macedonians and IMRO partisans made Bulgaria a second home while on the run from the Turks. The total number of Macedonians in Bulgaria was estimated to be over 100,000, and in Sofia over 20,000, or nearly one-third the population of the capital.” 5 Dakin, pp. 139-42, 178-83, 202. °C. Anastasoff, The Tragic Peninsula (St. Louis, 1938), pp. 22-23, 41-45; V. Peskov, “‘Vutreshna makedonska organizatsiia: nachalo i razvoi,’”’ Makedonski pregled,1i, No. 1 (1924), 78-79. 10 Statisticheski godishnik na Bilgarskoto tsarstvo: godina purva, 1909 (Sofia, 1910), pp. 30, 36. 11 Dakin, pp. 48-49.

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Many of them found careers in the Bulgarian army, where they constituted one-third of the officer corps, or in the civil service, where they made up an even larger proportion of the government bureaucracy.** Many others, however, simply lived from day to

day on the charity of native citizens. In 1895 the numerous Macedonian societies in Bulgaria united in the Supreme Macedo-

nian Committee to organize aid for IMRO and to pressure the government to support the Macedonian cause. They maintained their own press, openly solicited funds to buy arms, and formed ‘Rifle Clubs” to train members of the guerrilla bands.’* They were also well-represented in the National Assembly, and they were not unwilling to use terror against the few political figures who opposed them. Fear of assassination by IMRO may even have caused Ferdinand and his generals to plunge Bulgaria into the hopeless Second Balkan War rather than seek a compromise with Greece and Serbia.** IMRO received a temporary setback in 1903 when its uprising

on Ilinden (St. Elias’s Day, July 20/Aug. 2) was crushed by the Turks. Even in failure, however, IMRO focused world opinion on Turkish misrule in Macedonia. The inability of the Porte to put into practice the reforms it regularly and freely promised continued to gain sympathy for the organization.'® The Ilinden crisis was a squall on a relatively peaceful ocean. For the most part, the attention of Serbia was fixed on BosniaHerzegovina to the north; that of Greece on Crete to the south; and

Stambolov and his successors preferred peaceful penetration of Macedonia to an open break with the Porte.‘® While these conditions prevailed, Bulgaria gradually settled into the international system, gaining recognition for both her new borders and her new prince. The revolt of the Young Turks upset the equilibrium in the Balkans and provided the enemies of the Porte with the opportunity to 2 Tbid., p. 49; P. D. Krisev, ‘‘Nachaloto na makedonskiia vupros v Bulgariia. Blagotvoritelnite komiteti ‘edinstvo,’ ’ Makedonski pregled, xu, No. 3 (1940), 83-84. 13 Dakin, pp. 47-49.

‘4 E. C. Helmreich, The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars (Cambridge, Mass., 1938), p. 365. 15 Anastasoff, pp. 89-96; Dakin, pp. 147-48; M. S. Anderson, pp. 270-71. 16 M.S. Anderson, pp. 222, 269.

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fish in troubled waters. Prince Ferdinand, who had long cherished the dream of throwing off the humiliating Turkish suzerainty, was

among the first to take advantage of the Empire’s disorganized state. On September 22/October 5, 1908, in conjunction with the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, he proclaimed the complete independence of Bulgaria and assumed the title “tsar.” This move had a practical as well as symbolic significance, for Ferdinand refused to compensate the Porte for the tribute Bulgaria had been accustomed to pay. Both sides prepared for war, but at the critical moment Russian diplomacy negotiated a compromise.

Bulgaria paid £5,000,000 to the Empire for her independence, £1,720,000 of which was contributed by Russia. On April 3/16, 1909, the Turkish parliament recognized Bulgaria’s full independence and the war scare ended.” When news of the Young Turk revolution reached Sofia, Stamboliski welcomed it. Linking it to the Russian revolution of 1905, he rejoiced that the anachronism of absolute monarchy had been

struck down in its last remaining strongholds. The two revolutions, he added, strengthened constitutional government throughout Europe.’® But Ferdinand’s assumption of the tsarist title, the unity of the political parties behind this move, and the willingness

of the country’s political and military leaders to go to war confirmed his belief that the alliance between monarch and political parties that he had first described in 1904 had borne its fruit. The parties, in return for the spoils of office, had become merely a rubber stamp for Ferdinand’s policies. Bulgaria, Stamboliski believed, was becoming the royal-military regime, symbolized by Ferdinand’s assumption of his new title. In consequence, he became convinced that the destruction of the monarchy must be the immediate goal of the Agrarian Union, for Ferdinand and his imperialist ambitions would block further social and economic prog-

ress. In the years after the proclamation of independence, Ferdinand’s power increased at home and on the international stage, 7 V. A. Zhebokritski, Bolgariia nakanune balkanskikh voin (Kiev, 1960), pp. 122-27; J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question: An Historical Study in European Diplomacy (Oxford, 1947), pp. 420-21. 18 Zemledelsko zname, vi, Nos. 74, 77 (July 19, 30, 1908).

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and he nearly achieved his dream of dominating the Balkans. Stamboliski, challenging, provoking, and defying him, came to represent the spirit of antimonarchism and antimilitarism. Their two face-to-face meetings, when Bulgaria entered and left the First World War, seemed themselves to decide the destiny of the nation. Not all the Agrarian leaders were immediately aware of the significance of Ferdinand’s move. Stating the position of the BANU on the independence proclamation in the Zemledelsko zname, A\lexander Dimitrov wrote: ““This act is met with complete satisfaction on the part of the Bulgarian people, for the people themselves have desired it.”’ He pointed out, however, that the BANU saw no need to change Ferdinand’s title, and he added with considerable prescience that when a Grand National Assembly convened to

ratify the change, it might be called on to make other, more damaging, alterations in the constitution.*® When the full cost of independence was revealed, Stamboliski disassociated the BANU from any part of it. He wrote that de jure recognition of the de facto independence Bulgaria already enjoyed

could not compensate for the huge indemnity she would have to pay or for the loss of the privileged position of the exarchate in Ottoman territory, favored status vis-a-vis Ottoman customs, and access to Ottoman markets. This new independence was tainted by association with Ferdinand and his political lackeys, for it might well be used to “‘ensnare the country in a net of some kind of tsarism.’’”° On October 15, 1908, at the opening of the first regular session of the XIV National Assembly, the Agrarian parliamentary group

refused to applaud Ferdinand’s speech from the throne in which he formally announced Bulgaria’s independence.”! Two days later, when the Assembly reconvened, Stamboliski read a protest signed by the Agrarian deputies, stating that the events of September 22 were in violation of the constitution, specifically of those articles naming the Bulgarian head-of-state “prince” and 19 Zemledelsko zname, Vi, No. 93 (Sept. 26, 1908), 1. 20 Zemledelsko zname, Vi, No. 99 (Oct. 25, 1908), l. 21 Zemledelsko zname, Vi, No. 98 (Oct. 22, 1908), 3.

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requiring the approval of a Grand National Assembly to amend the constitution.?” Moreover, the leaders of the BANU, in parliament and in the press, continued to use “‘prince” when referring to Ferdinand, although “tsar’’ had been adopted by all the promonarchist political parties. Stamboliski had expressed republican sentiments ever since he

had begun to write for the Union press. After Ferdinand proclaimed himself tsar, he spared no effort to discredit the new independence, the institution of monarchy, and Ferdinand himself. Rather than bringing Bulgaria true independence, he wrote, Ferdinand’s proclamation: “. . . in essence underlines [Bulgaria’s] servile position under the rule of the personal regime, and it has placed the country in a more shameful position than even the most backward African province, that is, in complete guardianship, since its foreign policy and financial affairs have been turned over

to Russia and Turkey.””°

Commenting on the April 1909 counterrevolution in Constantinople, he pointedly argued that when the opportunity to do so presented itself, as it had to the Young Turks, the institution of monarchy should be destroyed root and branch.”* Soon after this, he wrote, in an article called ‘‘Even the Crimes of Crowned Heads Bring Benefits,” that the cruelest royal dynasty known to history was that of the Bourbons, “from which our own prince comes.” “But the fact must be acknowledged,”’ he continued, “that the rule, the tsardom, of the Bourbons has prepared the way for and inspired a republican movement in every country where they have set foot.””° Stamboliski was repeatedly criticized for the intemperateness

of his attacks on Ferdinand. But he genuinely feared that the prince, who had so corrupted the political parties that he now dominated the government of the country anc who lusted after greater prestige through greater conquests, would ultimately plunge Bulgaria into war to satisfy the drive of his monstrous vanity. The intemperateness of Stamboliski’s language, which made 2 Dnevnitsi .. .na XIV ONS, pirva redovna sesiia, pp. 5-6. *° Zemledelsko zname, vil, No. 36 (March 21, 1909), 1. *4 Zemledelsko zname, vit, No. 42 (April 7, 1909), 1. 5 Zemledelsko zname, vil, No. 62 (June 18, 1909), 1.

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him vulnerable to the charge of demagoguery, must be balanced against the accuracy of his assessment of Ferdinand’s character and intentions. According to Stamboliski’s conception of historical development, the chief supporter of monarchy, both in the original period of absolute monarchy and in the period of its modern resurgence, was the “military caste.”’ Fearing that Ferdinand would follow the path of military adventure to strengthen himself at home and to make himself tsar not just of Bulgaria but of the Balkans, Stamboliski opposed the further expansion of the country’s army and officer corps. He frequently cited statistics to show that, on the basis of military expenditures per person, the size of the army, and the size of the officer corps, Bulgaria was already one of the most thoroughly militarized countries in the world.2® Moreover, he argued, the army should reflect the needs of a peaceful, democratic state, not those of a tsarist empire. Speaking in the National Assembly on the military budget for 1911, he stated that the constitution limited the standing army during peacetime to one percent of the population, or about 40,000 men under arms. Yet the Bulgarian army already numbered 58,000 men and was still growing (on the eve of the Balkan Wars it numbered 87,150).?’ To make this development even worse, the officer corps was steadily growing apart from the rest of society. It was turning into an elite caste convinced that the population existed only to serve its ambitions. To reverse the growing militarization of Bulgarian society, Stamboliski urged that the size of the army be reduced immediately. To reintegrate the officer corps into society, he proposed that the salaries and pensions of officers be lowered, that officers be tried in civil courts for the commission of civil crimes, that batmen be eliminated, that excessive ornamentation be removed from officers’ uniforms, and that the relations between officers and men be democratized. He argued further that the Ministry of War should always have a civilian head and that a parliamentary commission should be established to oversee its expenditures.”®

Jan. 13, 1910).

26 Zemledelsko zname, vil, No. 16, vil, Nos. 10, 13 (Jan. 10, Dec. 29, 1909,

27 Statisticheski godishnik na bulgarskoto tsarstvo, godina chetvurta, 1912 (Sofia, 1915), p. 415. 8 Dnevnitsi .. . na XIV ONS, treta redovna sesiia, pp. 1538-39.

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Stamboliski’s remarks on the various financial scandals that had occurred in the Ministry of War so provoked a group of officers that they challenged him to duel one of their number. The quarrel, however, was resolved without an exchange of shots.”° Understanding the intimate connection that exists between an imperialist foreign policy and regressive domestic policies, Stam-

boliski and the other Agrarian leaders opposed the designs on Macedonia held by Ferdinand, the military, and the government. Tsanko Tserkovski, for example, denounced the “patriots”’ in the country who were inflaming national passions against the Turks:

Bulgaria has only just begun her economic development, and her forces day by day must be devoted exclusively to this economic advance, which alone is the source of national wellbeing and of political and civil freedom. By trifling with the Macedonian question, our “patented patriots” misdirect society’s attention and divert the productive forces of the country from their proper channel. A burdensome military budget will

| again drain our state treasury, and an army of many thousands maintained on a war footing will again have to be supported.*°

Commenting on the events of 1908-1909, Stamboliski wrote that of the three traditional aims of Bulgarian foreign policy— gaining full independence, making the prince a tsar, and liberating the Bulgarian Macedonians from Turkish oppression—two had now been achieved without a war. As for the third, he believed that the establishment of a constitutional government by the Young Turks would put an end to the racial and religious oppres-

sion practiced by the Ottoman government. There would no longer be any need to “liberate” Macedonia. In reality, he continued, in a perceptive critique of Ferdinand’s foreign policy, the

program to liberate Macedonia was making Bulgaria herself a vassal of the foreign banks and governments that advanced the capital for her militarization. Like Tserkovski, he concluded that the only genuine independence was that achieved through economic growth.*’ Uitimately, he maintained, the ideal solution to 29 Zemledelsko zname, 1X, No. 1 (Dec. 11, 1910), 1. 8° Zemledelsko zname, vil, No. 23 (Feb. 17, 1910), 1. #1 Zemledelsko zname, vil, No. 42-43 (April 27, 1910), 1.

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the problems of Balkan politics would be a federation of all the Balkan states.*”

Early in 1911 the Malinov government dissolved the XIV Na-

tional Assembly and announced that elections for the longawaited V Grand National Assembly*? would be held on June 5. The suspicions of the Agrarian leaders were confirmed when the proposed constitutional amendments were made public. In addition to changing the words “‘prince”’ and “principality” to “tsar” and “tsardom” wherever necessary, they provided for increasing the civil list and, above all, changing Article Seventeen to allow the tsar to conclude secret treaties without the knowledge or approval of the National Assembly. The contempt of the Agrarian leaders for the political parties, their loathing for Ferdinand, and their fear of the militarization of the country came to a head in their campaign against the proposed

constitutional amendments. Depicting the election as a battle, perhaps a decisive battle, between monarchism and democracy, they reviled Ferdinand in terms that no previous campaign had seen.** On the very eve of the balloting, the Zemledelsko zname published a cartoon, “A Fateful Political Operation,” in which the frock-coated leaders of the political parties, directed by Ferdinand, were shown cutting the heart from a young girl labeled “constitution.” An angry peasant, one hand raised in a fist labeled

“BANU” watched through the doorway. The accompanying ‘‘Appeal to the Bulgarian Voters”’ warned the peasants that a vote

for the political parties favoring the changes in the constitution would be a betrayal of the Bulgarian and Russian heroes who fell 82 Zemledelsko zname, vill, No. 50 (May 22, 1910), 1. 33 According to the constitution a Grand National Assembly was required to elect the monarch and to approve any alteration of the country’s borders or modification of the constitution. It differed from an Ordinary National Assembly in that it was twice as large and met at Tumovo. Previous Grand National Assemblies had been held in 1879 to elect Alexander Battenberg to the throne, in 1881 to suspend the constitution, in 1887 to elect Ferdinand, and in 1893 to correct some minor inconsistencies in the wording of some constitutional provisions and to formulate religious requirements for the heir to the throne. L. Lamouche, La Bulgarie (Paris, 1923), p. 47. 34 Zemledelsko zname, 1x, Nos. 45-46, 47 (May 18, 22, 1911).

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in the struggle for Bulgaria’s freedom. It concluded with a ringing ‘“DOWN WITH MONARCHISM, LONG LivE DEMocRACY!’’®

Appeals to love of democracy, however, rarely overcome appeals to nationalism, at least until the full consequences of the latter are apparent. Such was the case in this campaign. The BANU failed to increase the proportion of the vote it received in the preceding legislative elections.*® Fifty-five Agrarians were elected and, combined with approximately twenty Social Democrats and Radical Democrats,®” they made up a bloc of about seventy-five Opposition votes from a total of 463.*° Although the election of the fifty-five Agrarian deputies meant that “‘Once Again the Honor of Bulgaria Is Saved,” as the head-

line in Zemledelsko zname expressed it, it was obvious that the approval -of the proposed constitutional amendments by a large majority was a foregone conclusion. Stamboliski and the other

Agrarian leaders, however, were not prepared to accept Ferdinand’s victory passively. On June 8, the day before the conven-

ing of the Grand National Assembly, the Agrarian deputies gathered in Turnovo to plan their strategy. By the time they came together, the Social Democratic factions and the Radical Democrats had already suggested that all deputies opposed to the constitutional changes submit a formal protest to the government and remain silent during Ferdinand’s opening speech. This course of action seemed too passive to Stamboliski, who was against following the lead of the smaller Socialist and Radical Democratic groups in any case. Wishing to make the BANU’s opposition as 35 Zemledelsko zname, 1x, No. 50 (June 1, 1911), 1-2. °® Statisticheski godishnik na bilgarskoto tsarstvo, godina chetvirta, pp. 38889,

°7 The Radical Democrats, led by Naicho Tsanov, were a small splinter party composed mainly of intellectuals who broke away from the Democratic party in 1905. They represented the “loyal intelligentsia opposition” in the country, being opposed to corruption and generally on the side of democratic government. The populist writer Todor Vlaikov was one of the leaders of the party. 38 Zemledelsko zname, 1x, No. 51 (June 9, 1911), 1; Genennerisey to Cruppi (Sofia, June 10/23, 1911), AMAE, Bulgarie: politique intérieure, nouvelle série, iv, 113. Because several candidates were elected in more than one district, the final count of deputies was smaller. The Dnevnitsi of the Assembly reported a total of 426, of which 71 belonged to the opposition.

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dramatic as possible and, at the very least, to embarrass Ferdinand on his day of triumph, Stamboliski decided that nothing less than the disruption of the opening session would suffice. After planning an appropriate demonstration, the Agrarian group selected a

commission, led by Tserkovski, to invite the Social Democrats and Radical Democrats to join the protest.*? Tserkovski also went to Ivan Geshov, whose National Liberal party in coalition with the Progressive Liberals had the majority of the deputies, to inform him that the BANU did not acknowledge the right of the prince to open the Assembly and that if he were allowed to do so the gov-

ernment would bear full responsibility for the consequences. Geshov, of course, did not cancel the ceremony, but he did issue instructions to his majority not to be silent in its support for Ferdinand.*°

The V Grand National Assembly met in the hall of the public library, “‘Nadezhda.”’ By 8:30 on the morning of June 9, the Agrarian deputies had taken their seats on the left. They were joined by the Broad and Narrow Socialists and the Radical Democrats. At 9:45 the echoes of a twenty-one gun salute announced that Ferdinand and his entourage had left the royal residence, and

at 10:30 a second salute announced their arrival before the Assembly. Ferdinand, accompanied by two of his children, was met at the entrance of the hall by the Council of Ministers. After exchanging a few words with the prince, Geshov turned to the deputies to proclaim: ““The Tsar of Bulgaria enters!”’*! As Ferdinand

proceeded to the rostrum, the majority stood, applauded, and cheered, while the Agrarians, Socialists, and Radicals remained in their seats, ignoring the entrance. As soon as Ferdinand began to address the Assembly, Stamboliski rose and in a “‘sharp, clear tone” interrupted: “Deputies, according to the constitution the prince does not have the right to open the Grand National Assem-

bly. . . .” Before he could finish, Geshov made a sign to the majority, which came to its feet, applauding and cheering Ferdinand. While Stamboliski remained standing, the opposition 39 Zemledelsko zname, 1X, No. 52 (June 2, 1911), 3. 40 Zemledelsko zname, 1x, Nos. 52, 53 (June 12, 15, 1911).

*. The ceremony is described in Dnevnitsi (stenografski) na petoto veliko narodno subranie, pp. 1-2.

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deputies pounded on the tables and chanted “Down with the toadies!”” Ferdinand turned pale and his son and daughter were visibly frightened. When the uproar subsided, Stamboliski began again: “This is usurpation. . . .”. Once more the majority broke into cheers and applause, while the opposition shouted and banged the floor with their chairs. When silence returned for the third time, Stamboliski concluded his statement: “In the name of representative govern-

ment and in the name of the Agrarian, Socialist, and Radical groups, we protest most strongly.’ Returning to their seats, the opposition deputies opened newspapers and conversed audibly, while Ferdinand struggled through his speech, reading it rapidly and in a shaking voice. During the recessional, the opposition deputies again remained seated, ignoring the ceremony. As soon as Ferdinand had departed, a furious shouting match

broke out between the majority and the opposition. Cries of “Traitors!”’ and “‘Unpatriotic!”’ alternated with “Long live the republic!” and “‘Down with the violators of the constitution!”’ Even

the closing prayer did not bring peace between the two sides. When the priest mentioned the “Tsar of Bulgaria” in his benediction, the opposition shouted: “Prince, prince, he’s still a prince!” On that bitter note the first session of the V Grand National Assembly came to an end.” During the course of the Assembly, the Agrarian deputies fol-

lowed their demonstration with well-reasoned criticism of the proposed constitutional changes. But it was the ‘‘Stamboliski scandal”’ that captured the attention of the public. The reaction was not at first favorable, for the Agrarian Union was immediately branded as extremist and disloyal.*® In the elections for the XV National Assembly that were held on September 4, 1911, the number of votes received by the BANU fell to 72,905, a drop of nearly 30 percent.** Moreover, perhaps to avenge the injured dig42 Zemledelsko zname, 1x, No. 52 (June 12, 1911), 1; 1. Fichev, Balkanskata voina, 1912-1913: prezhivelitsi, belizhki i documenti (Sofia, 1940), pp. 33-34; Genennerisey to Cruppi (Sofia, June 10/23, 1911), AMAE, Bulgarie, politique intérieure, nouvelle série, 1v, 113. 48 Fichev, p. 34; Turlakov, /storiia, p. 101. “4 Statisticheski godishnik na bilgarskoto tsarstvo, godina chetvirta, p. 391.

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nity of Tsar Ferdinand, government authorities engaged in much more fraud and intimidation of voters than had been practiced in recent elections. Stamboliski himself was disqualified when an

“irregularity” was found in his registration of candidacy.* Only four Agrarian deputies, Dragiev, Tserkovski, Dimittr Strashimirov, and Stefan Drenkov, the last two from Ttrnovo District, were returned. Of the other opposition groups in the V Grand National Assembly, only four Broad Socialists won, while not a single Narrow Socialist or Radical was elected. It seemed that the strategy of the Agrarian Union had been repudiated, while Tsar Ferdinand and his allies had scored a great victory.*® This conclusion, however, failed to comprehend the full significance of the BANU’s conduct. No amount of “responsible”’ opposition could have blocked the passage of the proposed constitutional changes. Convinced that Ferdinand and the political parties were set on a course of absolutism at home and imperialism in foreign

policy that would lead to disaster, Stamboliski and the other Agrarian leaders chose to present their opposition dramatically through an act of political theater. Events demonstrated the soundness of their judgment. When the Second Balkan War ended, Stamboliski’s protest was vividly remembered. On September 16/29, 1911, twelve days after the elections in Bulgaria, Italy declared war on the Ottoman Empire. This war, which dragged on for over a year, encouraged Balkan statesmen to seek an immediate solution to the problem of Macedonia. The new Bulgarian government, a coalition led by Ivan Geshov of the National party and Stoian Danev of the Progressive Liberal party,

made contact with Belgrade. In October, negotiations for a Serbian-Bulgarian alliance began in Sofia. Russian diplomacy ‘aided the negotiations, and on February 29/March 13, 1912, an alliance was signed. It obliged each country to come to the other’s aid in the event of war with Austria-Hungary, Rumania, or Tur-

key. More importantly, it established a tentative division of the 45 Zemledelsko zname, 1x, No. 79-80 (Sept. 8, 1911), 3; Turlakov, /storiia, pp. 102-103.

46 Zemledelsko zname, 1x, Nos. 79-80, 82 (Sept. 8, 15, 1911); Paléologue to Selves (Sofia, Sept. 6/19, 1911), AMAE, Bulgarie: politique intérieure, nouvelle série, 1v, 122.

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spouls in Macedonia. Should Ottoman rule there be brought to an

end, Bulgaria was to have possession of all territory south and east of a line running from Mt. Goliam on the Bulgarian frontier to the northern tip of Lake Okhrid. Serbia was to receive all Ottoman territory north and east of the Sar Mountains. The area lying between these two regions remained a “contested zone,” whose fate was to be left to the arbitration of the Russian Emperor.*?

While negotiations with Serbia were in progress, Geshov put out feelers toward Greece. Discussions between the two countries began in Sofia in February and were concluded in April. They re-

sulted in an alliance, defensive in form, offensive in intent, directed against Turkey. No provision was made, however, for a future division of territory. In June, the adherence of Montenegro completed the formation of the Balkan League.* While the Balkan states were concluding their alliances and during the rest of 1912 while their general staffs discussed the accompanying military conventions, the situation in Macedonia was becoming more unsettled. Contrary to the expectations of Stamboliski and of the Porte’s friends among the western powers, the Young Turk government proved to be even less tolerant of non-

Turkish minorities than the regime of Abdul Hamid had been. It followed a policy of rigid centralization and Turkification that both touched off a wave of revolt within the Empire and fueled the

fires of national sentiment in the surrounding countries.* In November 1911 the Turks in the Macedonian town of Shtip, with the tacit cooperation of the local authorities, carried out a pogrom against the Bulgarian community, killing and wounding over two hundred.°° In the Bulgarian press the Shtip massacre provoked a campaign for war which was fervently supported by the Macedo-

nian societies. In response, the National Assembly hurriedly " *” Helmreich, pp. 47-56; Marriott, pp. 446-47; E. C. Thaden, Russia and the Balkan Alliance of 1912 (University Park, Penn., 1965), p. 78. *® Helmreich, pp. 67-88; Dakin, pp. 436-40. * L. S. Stavrianos, “Balkan Federation. A History of the Movement toward Balkan Unity in Modern Times,” Smith College Studies in History, xxvu, No. 1-4 (Oct. 1941-July 1942), 158-59. °° Zhebokritski, Nakanune, p. 187; Anastasoff, pp. 170-71.

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passed a resolution approving in advance any steps the government might choose to take against the Turks. The Agrarian depu-

ties put forward a milder alternative resolution, but it was rejected.*! Near the end of July, in the small town of Kochana, two IMRO

bombs exploded in the marketplace, killing several Turks. In retaliation the Turks subjected the Christian population to a pogrom in which Turkish soldiers and irregulars openly took part.®? This massacre provoked hundreds of mass meetings and demonstrations in Bulgaria. By coincidence Bulgaria’s most patriotic holiday, the anniversary of the battle for Shipka Pass, was celebrated at the height of the campaign for war. The Russian ambassador, Nekliudov, was amazed at the martial spirit displayed by the normally phlegmatic Bulgarians on this occasion, and he concluded at once that war was inevitable.°* Ferdinand and the Bulgarian government were as eager for war as was “public opinion,” but they were not to be pushed into pre-

Cipitate action. The planning of military operations continued quietly until September 15/28, when the all-important military conventions between Serbia and Bulgaria were finally agreed upon. On the same day the Balkan states announced the beginning of “‘maneuvers.” This was followed two days later by full mobili-

zation. On September 25/October 8, in accordance with the Bulgarian-Montenegran treaty, King Nikita of Montenegro opened hostilities against the Porte.* The negotiations between the Balkan states were, of course, completely secret. Nevertheless, the growing war sentiment in the

press, tacitly encouraged by the government, and the rapid build-up of the army made it obvious that war with Turkey was on

the minds of the country’s leaders. At the XIII Congress of the BANU, held in Sofia on November 8-11, 1911, the nearly four thousand delegates overwhelmingly approved the conduct of the Agrarian deputies in the V Grand National Assembly and urged the Governing Council to state fully the Union’s position on the °! Zhebokritski, Nakanune, pp. 187-88.

2 Ibid., p. 198. 53 A. Nekliudoff, Diplomatic Reminiscences (New York, 1920), pp. 101-103. °4 Helmreich, pp. 105-34.

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Macedonian question in the Zemledelsko zname. The task of carrying out this request was assigned to Stoian Omarchevski.”” In a matter that was to prove not unrelated, the XIII Congress also witnessed a debate over the question of the BANU’s relations

with the intelligentsia. Noting that many members of the intelligentsia had supported the Agrarian position in the V Grand National Assembly, some of the delegates proposed that they be allowed to join the Union and to play an active role in its affairs. Both Stamboliski and Dragiev spoke against this proposal, warning that, however much members of the intelligentsia might agree with the BANU on particular issues, their permanent estate interests were not those of the peasantry. They put forward a counterproposal requiring five years prior membership in the Union for every individual who sought national office as an Agrarian. It was approved by a large majority.”® The debate and vote on the question of intelligentsia membership underlined the importance Stamboliski placed on maintaining

the purity of the BANU, the dedication of its members to the peasant estate. Unfortunately the action came too late. Dimittr Strashimirov, one of the four Agrarian deputies elected to the XV National Assembly, almost immediately demonstrated the soundness of Stamboliski’s judgment. Strashimirov was a journalist and historian, whose volumes on the Bulgarian uprising of 1876 are still considered valuable. Although he was born in Varna, his researches into Macedonian history had made him a passionate ad-

vocate of the Macedonian cause. It is not clear how he came to 5° Zemledelsko zname, 1X, No. 96-97 (Nov. 17, 1911), 1-3; x, No. 2 (Dec. 8, 1911), 2. At the age of sixteen, Omarchevski founded the first Agrarian druzhba in Nova Zagora, his native town. Becoming the BANU’s principal link with student

radicals, he continued to form druzhbi in the schools he attended. These were numerous, for he was frequently expelled, and in 1907 he had to flee the country after leading a demonstration of Sofia University students against Ferdinand. He spent two years, first in Belgrade then in Zagreb, as a student of philosophy, returning to Bulgaria in 1909 to become the BANU’s specialist on education. He contributed many articles on this subject to the Zemledelsko zname and later wrote two books on the place of education in Agrarian theory. He served as Minister of Education in Stamboliski’s cabinet. 56 Zemledelsko zname, 1x, No. 96-97 (Nov. 17, 1911), 1-2.

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join the BANU, but it was probably because of the Union’s opposition to monarchism.°’ In any case, he was one of the most prominent Agrarian deputies in the V Grand National Assembly and,

ironically, was chosen to deliver the BANU’s principal speech against allowing Ferdinand to conclude secret treaties. After the Shtip massacre, however, his Macedonian patriotism began to take precedence over his commitment to Union discipline. In the National Assembly, in the press, and at the “nonpartisan” demonstrations that were held to protest the massacre, he called on the government to “‘stand on its feet” in Macedonia. Both Stamboliski and Omarchevski opposed the campaign for war. Stamboliski acknowledged the right of individuals to speak in favor of war, but he warned the government that it would be a

mistake to give in to their demands. “Unfortunate incidents,” such as the Shtip massacre, he wrote, should not be allowed to threaten peace or to destroy Bulgaria’s friendly relations with Turkey.°? Although he believed that they should do more to prevent such occurrences, Omarchevski refused to hold the Young Turks responsible for the Shtip outrage. In any case, he wrote, those who sought war against the exploiters of Bulgarians should

| begin in Bulgaria. The solution to the problem of Balkan politics, he maintained, lay in the spread of estatist ideas and organizations throughout the region. Ultimately, this would put an end to imperialism and lead to a federation of all the Balkan states includ-

ing Turkey.

Strashimirov dissented from the position of Stamboliski and , Omarchevski, arguing that the Young Turk government was not

interested in protecting minorities and that the great powers lacked the will to force it to do so. While he was not for immediate war, neither was he for peace at any price. He warned simply that Bulgaria must not tolerate such outrages as the massacre at Shtip.® °? S. Drenkov, Andabata D. T. Strashimirov, published as an insert in Zemledelsko zname, x1, No. 51 (Feb. 27, 1914), p. 7. °8 Zhebokritski, Nakanune, p. 187. °° Zemledelsko zname, x, Nos. 5, 7 (Dec. 19, 25, 1911). 60 Zemledelsko zname, X, Nos. 2, 3, 6 (Dec. 8, 12, 22, 1911). 51 Zemledelsko zname, x, No. 11-12 (Jan. 12, 1912), 3.

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Strashimirov’s belligerent tone drew protests from several druzhbi, and in February 1912 a meeting of the Governing Council was held to discuss his conduct. The council criticized the intemperateness of some of his speeches and articles but decided to leave the final judgment on his conduct to the next annual congress. In the meantime, the furor over the Shtip massacre having abated, the Council recommended that the Zemledelsko zname close its pages to debate on the Macedonian question.” The compromise imposed by the Governing Council remained in effect until the end of July, when the massacre at Kochana took place. Caught up in the rising war sentiment, Strashimirov added

his voice to those calling for the immediate liberation of Macedonia. While he participated in nearly all the pro-war public demonstrations in the capital, the Zemledelsko zname hastened to assure its readers that he acted as an individual and in no way represented the BANU’s position or committed it to any course of action.®?

Stamboliski and Omarchevski began openly to restate their op-

position to war with Turkey. Omarchevski argued that the nationalist furor over Macedonia was being used by Ferdinand and the political parties to distract the people from the obvious need for domestic social reforms. The leaders of the political parties, who were now calling for revenge against the shedding of Bulgarian blood, themselves had shed the blood of Bulgarians at Krasen, Trustenik, and Shabla-Durankulak. The real enemies of the Bulgarian people, he continued, were absolutism, reactionary social policies, and blind nationalism, against which all peoples, Bulgarians, Turks, Serbs, and Greeks, should unite.®* Stamboliski denounced the criticism of the Turks as fraudulent, for the massacre at Kochana, as well as other Turkish outrages, were in fact provoked by IMRO terrorism. If Bulgaria had a genuine grievance against Turkey, he continued, the proper course would be to seek the mediation of the great powers. And he repeated the timeworn 62 Zemledelsko zname, X, No. 21 (Feb. 13, 1912), 3-4. 63 Zhebokritski, Nakanune, pp. 198-205; Zemledelsko zname, x, Nos. 69, 74 (Aug. 8, 27, 1912). 64 Zemledelsko zname, X, Nos. 69, 74 (Aug. 8, 27, 1912).

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argument, as true as it is unavailing, that the men who led Bulgaria to war would not be the ones to die in it. On the day that mobilization was decreed, Stamboliski reprinted excerpts from previous antiwar articles and asked the people to reject the “warlovers.”®> With mobilization, however, came the imposition of military censorship, and Zemledelsko zname was forced to cease publication. In the National Assembly, in an atmosphere of near-hysteria, Geshov promised the deputies that war would bring peace, prog-

ress, and culture to the Balkans.®° To thunderous applause, Strashimirov gave the support of “our parliamentary group” to the government.®’ Dragiev and Tserkovski, who had refused their

consent to Strashimirov’s act, decided that it was pointless to speak out in the Assembly.®* They had worked for years to prevent war; now it was clear that war could not be prevented. The Balkan League was an admirably designed instrument for driving the Turks from Europe but not for securing the fruits of victory for Bulgaria. Despite the painstaking efforts Bulgarian statesmen lavished on the formation of the League, they had been unable to reach a complete and mutually satisfactory agreement with Serbia on a future territorial settkement. With Greece they had no agreement at all. Moreover, geography dictated that Bulgaria’s armies advance against the Turks in Thrace, while her true objective, the liberation of Macedonia, had to be left to her allies.

Thus the preparations for the First Balkan War also laid the groundwork for the second, interallied conflict.

When war began, however, Bulgarian statesmen lost sight of the shortcomings of the Balkan League as far as their own national interests were concerned. Bulgaria’s magnificent victories, and those of her allies, in the first weeks of the war, seemed to justify all the risks. On October 5/18, the day after war was formally declared, the main forces of the Buigarian army crossed the

frontier and attacked the strong Turkish positions at Lozengrad 6° Zemledelsko zname, x, Nos. 70, 71, 80 (Aug. 11, 16, Sept. 7, 1912). °° Dnevnitsi na XV ONS, purva redovna sesiia, p. 6. 67 Tbid., p. 12. 68 Zemledelsko zname, Xi, No. 27 (Dec. 24, 1913), 1-2.

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(Kirk Kilisse), northeast of Adrianople. After two days of hard fighting, the Turkish forces were overwhelmed and fled in panic. The Bulgarians pursued them to Lule-Burgas, where a week-long battle took place. At the end of it, the Turks were once again in disorganized retreat. The remnants of their army fell back to the Chatalja line, the last fortified defense of Constantinople. By the beginning of November, one Bulgarian army stood in front of that line while another invested the Turkish fortress at Adrianople. At this point the Turks appealed for mediation and approached the Bulgarians with offers of a truce.

Meanwhile, in Macedonia, the Serbs and Greeks met with

equal success. After defeating the main Turkish forces at Kumanovo on October 9/22, the Serbs pushed on to Prilep and Bitolj, driving the Turks back upon the guns of the advancing

Greeks. Early in November the Serbs occupied Okhrid, the medieval capital of Macedonia. The Greeks gained their principal objective, Salonika, on October 26/November 8, arriving barely ahead of a Bulgarian force that was also hurrying toward the city.

Only the Montenegrans, besieging the fortress of Scutari, were unable to claim a major victory. Thus, in just over three weeks the

Turks were driven out of Europe to their last line of defense around Constantinople. Turkey-in-Europe was reduced to the three remaining strongholds—Scutari, Ianina, and Adrianople— all under siege by the Allies. The war could, and should, have ended soon after the victory of the Bulgarians at Lule-Burgas. Indeed, the Bulgarian General Staff advised the tsar to grant the Turkish request for an armistice, for all the military objectives except the capture of Adrianople had been achieved.® As the extent of the Turkish defeat in Thrace became apparent, however, Ferdinand’s ambition grew. Not since the days of Tsar Simeon had Bulgarian troops stood at the walls of Constantinople. Perhaps Bulgaria’s new tsar could succeed where that medieval monarch had failed. Ferdinand actually convinced himself that since the Turks had proved to be hopelessly weak, the Great Powers would welcome Bulgaria’s control over the Straits as an alternative to the expansion of Russian influence there. He 69 Fichev, pp. 200-201.

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even began to dream of reconciling Orthodox and Catholic Christendom at a solemn mass of his own devising in Hagia Sophia.”° Consequently, he ignored the Turkish request for an armistice and

ordered the army to take the Ottoman capital. Unfortunately, heavy autumn rains made transportation and communications in Thrace all but impossible. Only slowly and with great hardship could the army facing the Chatalja line be reinforced, supplied, and organized for an assault. In the meantime, the Turks were able to prepare an adequate defense. The Bulgarian advance, when it finally came, was repulsed at a cost to the attackers of ten to fifteen thousand men. Tsar Ferdinand, with his army now weakened and his earlier victories somewhat tarnished, agreed to an armistice on November 20/December 3.7!

Peace negotiations between Turkey and the Balkan League began in December and continued until January 9/22, 1913, when the Turks at last agreed to relinquish all their claims to territory in Europe. This concession led to a coup d’ état in Constantinople, and Enver Bey, leader of the extreme nationalists came to power. Hostilities between Turkey and the League were at once resumed. No further attempt was made on the Chatalja line, but on February

21/March 6 the Greeks captured Ianina, and twenty days later Adrianople surrendered to the Bulgarians. Finally, on April 10/23, the Montenegran and Serbian siege of Scutari at last suc-

ceeded, although the town was immediately turned over to an international force supplied by the Great Powers. Peace negotiations were resumed on May 7/20, and ten days later the Treaty of London was signed, ending the war. The surrender of Turkey hastened the break-up of the Balkan

League. At the beginning of the war, Serbia had expected to extend her borders to the Adriatic. Italy and Austria-Hungary blocked Serbia’s westward expansion by insisting upon the crea-

tion of an independent Albanian state. Serbia thereupon demanded compensation in Macedonia, claiming the whole of the “contested zone”’ and territory that previously had been defini70 Nekliudoff, pp. 116-20; Helmreich, p. 201. 7 Helmreich, pp. 201-203; Fichev, pp. 202-204; V. A. Zhebokritski, Bolgariia v period balkanskikh voin, 1912-1913 (Kiev, 1961), pp. 76-78.

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tively assigned to Bulgaria. Greece, too, adopted an uncompromising attitude. Greek statesmen only with reluctance had permitted a token Bulgarian force to share in the occupation of Salonika, and they now refused to consider the Bulgarian claims to the city. Moreover, Rumania came forward to demand compensation for her neutrality. On April 25/May 8, an arbitration commission awarded Rumania part of the Dobruja, including the city of Silistra, but this served only to whet the appetites of that

country’s leaders.” During May, Serbia and Greece came to terms on a new division of Macedonia, based on the principle of effective occupation, and agreed to present a united front to Bulgaria and to seek the cooperation of Rumania.” Sensing the impending dissolution of the league and faced at home with a nationalist outcry against any concessions to the “‘allies,” Geshov resigned. He was replaced by the uncompromising Danev, who refused to consider any modification of Bulgaria’s demands. To the remonstrances of Serbia and Greece he replied, truthfully but not tactfully, that Bulgaria had borne the brunt of the fighting, suffered the greatest losses, and should therefore make the greatest gains. Relations between Bulgaria and the allies grew increasingly tense as both sides hastened to strengthen their forces in Macedonia. Public opinion in each country called for war, and the Bulgarian General Staff, concerned about unrest

among the troops, insisted that Bulgaria either fight or demobilize. When the Russian foreign ministry rejected Bulgaria’s request to render a judgment on Macedonia within seven days, Danev and Tsar Ferdinand ordered the army to attack the Serbian and Greek positions.” The surprise attack failed. Serbia and Greece opened full-scale

hostilities and were quickly joined by Montenegro. Rumania mobilized and demanded further concessions in return for continued neutrality. Receiving no reply from Danev, she sent her army across the frontier, beginning an unopposed march toward Sofia. Two days later, the Turks attacked the Bulgarian forces that remained in Thrace, recapturing Adrianople. Faced with overwhelming odds, Bulgaria accepted armistice terms on July 18/31. ” Helmreich, pp. 300-307, 341-51. 73 Dakin, pp. 459-60. “™ Helmreich, pp. 354-63; Zhebokritski, Period, pp. 183-89.

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Ten days later the Treaty of Bucharest was signed, stripping Bul-

garia of nearly all her gains. Only a small portion of eastern Macedonia was left to her, while Rumania took all of the Dobruja. The Danev government resigned in disgrace, and a Liberal coalition under Vasil Radoslavov took its place. In a later settlement with Turkey, Bulgaria relinquished the greater part of Thrace, including Adrianople and Lozengrad.” After the treaty with Turkey was signed, Radoslavov dissolved parliament and scheduled elections for the X VI National Assembly for November 24.

The Balkan Wars disrupted the organization of the Agrarian Union. Many of its members were in uniform, and censorship made publication of the Zemledelsko zname impossible. Insofar as they were able, the Agrarian leaders visited the druzhbi to encour-

age the peasants to retain at least a skeleton organization in the village. On the other hand, many Union members formed secret

druzhbi within the army, which disturbed the military authorities.“© With the end of the war, demobilization, and the lifting of censorship, political activity again became possible. The Zemledelsko zname resumed publication on August 23, urging the druzhbi to reorganize and to send dues to the Union headquarters. The peasants were also informed that Strashimirov had been expelled from the Agrarian parliamentary group.” If the wars temporarily disorganized the BANU, they permanently discredited the parties of Geshov and Danev and weakened the hold of all the established parties on the country. In the postwar election campaign, the Agrarian leaders laid the blame for Bulgaria’s catastrophe squarely on Tsar Ferdinand and the political parties. The governing Liberals, however, attempted to place the full burden of guilt on Geshov and Danev alone. Moreover, they claimed that the antiwar position of the BANU contributed to Bulgaria’s defeat. Agrarian “‘traitors,”’ they maintained, were not fit to sit in the National Assembly.” The election was a vindication of the Agrarian Union’s posi° Helmreich, pp. 380-410; Zhebokritski, Period, pp. 226-50. 76 Zhebokritski, Period, p. 200. Zemledelsko zname, x, No. 81 (Aug. 23, 1913), 1-4. 78 Zemledelsko zname, X1, Nos. 1, 13, 15 (Oct. 1, Nov. 7, 14, 1913).

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tion. Despite the fact that the Dobruja, formerly an Agrarian stronghold, had been lost to Rumania, the Union received over 100,000 votes. Together, the BANU, the two socialist parties, and the Radical Democrats—the four groups that had resisted Ferdinand in the V Grand National Assembly—outpolled the Liberals, winning 45.5 percent of the vote. This swing of the Bulgarian electorate away from the established parties, a movement that

Bulgaria’s defeat in the First World War was to complete, is shown in Table 3.” TABLE 3 ELECTIONS FOR THE X VI NATIONAL ASSEMBLY,

NOVEMBER 24, 1913

Deputies % of Party elected Votes votes Liberal Coalition 95 207,763 38.2

BANU 48 113,761 20.9 Broad Socialist 17 55,171 10.2

Narrow Socialist 18 54,217 10.0 Democratic 15 42,971 7.9 National (Geshovist) , 5 24,344 . 4.5 Radical Democratic 5 24,007 4.4

Others 0 9,333 1.6 Total 204 543,430 100.0

Progressive Liberal (Danevist) l 11,863 2.2

Twelve days after the elections, the XIV congress of the BANU convened in Sofia. It was faced with two major tasks, both related

to Union discipline. The first was to sit in judgment on Strashimirov and three other, less important Union members who had broken with the Union’s antiwar position. The second was to

determine the course of action that the Agrarian parliamentary group would follow in the XVI National Assembly. Strashimirov defended himself by recalling the crimes against the Bulgarian Macedonians. Turkish misrule, he argued, fully justified the war for the liberation of Macedonia. He disclaimed any responsibility for the decision of Ferdinand and Danev to attack "9 Statisticheski godishnik na bilgarskoto tsarstvo: godini X-XIV, 1913-1922 (Sofia, 1924), section xm, p. 57; Zhebokritski, Period, p. 274.

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the allies, for he had never supported that decision. If, he concluded, his views on the war differed from those of the majority in the BANU, it was still his right as a free man and citizen to hold to his own position. Strashimirov’s address was answered by Stamboliski and Alexander Dimitrov, both of whom pointed out that they did not chal-

lenge Strashimirov’s rights as a free man and citizen, but as a member of the Agrarian Union. His support of the governnent’s war policy, they maintained, misrepresented the position of the Union at a critical time, causing the peasantry to doubt the sincerity of the BANU’s opposition to the war. Moreover, Strashimirov flouted Union discipline by campaigning for war in defiance of the directive of the Governing Council. Concurring with Stamboliski and Dimitrov, the delegates voted to expel Strashimirov from the Union forever.®° The three lesser Union members who had pub-

licly supported the war were put on probation and forbidden to seek office as Agrarians. Several delegates also wanted to punish Dragiev and Tserkovski for not speaking out against the war in the National Assembly. The two men admitted that they had made an

error in judgment, but reminded the delegates that, considering the confused, almost hysterical, state of the Assembly on the eve of the war, their protest would have carried no weight. The congress voted to exonerate them.®?

In the elections to the XVI National Assembly, no party had been able to win a majority.8? Alexander Malinov, leader of the Democratic party ,®* had already approached Stamboliski with the suggestion that the BANU join with the Democrats, Socialists, and

Radical Democrats to form an anti-Liberal governing coalition. 80 Zemledelsko zname, xi, No. 26 (Dec. 19, 1913), 1-2. 81 Zemledelsko zname, x1, No. 29 (Dec. 21, 1913), 2. 82 These elections were the first in Bulgaria to be held under a system of proportional representation within each province. This change in the electoral law naturally favored minority parties. Yet it is doubtful that with only 38.2% of the vote the Liberal coalition could have had a parliamentary majority even under the old system. 83 The Democratic party was considered by a majority of foreign observers to be the most honorable of Bulgaria’s established political parties. Even Stamboliski characterized it as “a little bit cleaner than the other parties.’’ Dnevnitsi na XIV ONS, vtora redovna sesiia, p. 29.

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Stamboliski urged the congress to reject this proposal. He argued that even though the BANU would be the largest single member of the coalition, it could not participate without compromising its principles. Compromise and the betrayal of ideals in return for

power, he said, was a characteristic of political parties. The Agrarian Union, as an estatist organization, could not remain true to itself while moderating its program in order to make its leaders ministers. The Agrarian Union would govern Bulgaria, he continued, but only when it commanded a majority of its own in the National Assembly. The congress responded to this affirmation of the Union’s estatist ideology by unanimously passing a resolution forbidding the Agrarian deputies to participate in any coalition.**

The conduct of the Agrarian parliamentary group in the XVI National Assembly contrasted significantly with the performance of the Union’s first parliamentary delegation in 1901. Then, most of the “Agrarian” deputies were drawn into one or another party by promises of patronage. The fact that not a single Agrarian deputy violated the resolution of the XIV congress testified to the discipline the BANU had developed under the personal and ideological leadership of Stamboliski. Unable to form a governing majority, Radoslavov dissolved the Assembly on December 31, after a session of only twelve days. New elections were scheduled for February 23, 1914. This time Bulgaria’s new territories, organized into the provinces of Giur-

miurdzhina in Thrace and Strumitsa in Macedonia, were included. They added forty-one seats to the Assembly, most of which, since the provinces were still under military administra-

tion, went to the governing Liberals. The BANU, which had

neither organization nor candidates in the new provinces, nevertheless increased its total vote from 113,761 to 147,143 and gained three additional seats. Leaving aside the two new prov-

inces, its percentage of the vote increased from 20.9 to 25.0. Radoslavov now had a narrow—128 seats out of 245—but sufficient majority, and he proceeded to form a Liberal cabinet.®° 84 Zemledelsko zname, Xi, Nos. 21, 23 (Dec. 5, 13, 1913); Turlakov, Istoriia, pp. 110-11. 85 Statisticheski godishnik, 1913-1922, p. 58; Zemledeisko zname, x1, No. 51 (Feb. 27, 1914), 1.

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When the National Assembly convened in March, the Agrarian

deputies followed their by now traditional practice of ignoring Ferdinand’s speech from the throne. To demonstrate their strength they also nominated Dragiev for the presidency of the Assembly. Outside parliament, the Agrarian leaders continued to denounce Ferdinand and the political parties for bringing on the catastrophe of the Balkan Wars. On June 16, 1914, the first anniversary of the

Bulgarian attack on the allies in Macedonia, Stamboliski addressed a student demonstration in National Assembly Square. Standing at the base of the equestrian statue of Alexander II, he suggested that a proper use for the monument would be as a gallows for Tsar Ferdinand. This statement was seized upon by the government to create a political scandal, and Stamboliski was threatened with prosecution for /ése majesté.°° This incident, along with all other aspects of Bulgaria’s normal political life, was soon overshadowed by the assassination at Sarajevo and the outbreak of the First World War.

Stamboliski naturally feared a repetition of the events of 1912-1913. Writing two days after the German declaration of war on France, he put forward the policy the BANU was to follow for the next fourteen months. No one could predict what the outcome

of the war would be, he wrote. The only way that the welfare, even the survival, of Bulgaria could be assured was if the country preserved strict neutrality. The past conduct of Ferdinand and the political parties proved that they were willing to resort to war to gain Bulgaria’s “national goals.’ The Agrarian Union, therefore, would devote all its resources, both in parliament and among the

people, to the preservation of peace. The same issue of Zemledelsko zname carried a sympathetic obituary of Jaurés, “a man who was for peace,’’ and condemned the German and Hungarian Socialists for their support of their countries’ war policies.*’ The Agrarian parliamentary group began to meet every day to discuss the war and the political situation in the country. At its first meeting, it passed a formal resolution placing it on record 86 Zemledelsko zname, X1, No. 82 (June 24, 1914), 1; xu, No. 39 (Jan. 17, 1915), 4. 87 Zemledelsko zname, Xi, No. 86 (July 23, 1914), 1, 4.

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against intervention. Besides calling for the preservation of neutrality, the resolution opposed mobilization and demanded that the government do nothing to indicate either to the Central Powers or the Allies that it might abandon neutrality. Moreover, if for some reason Bulgaria did become involved in the war, a new cabinet, representative of all the people, should be created. Finally, the resolution called upon the parliamentary group to devote every effort to informing the people of its position on the war.®® At Stamboliski’s suggestion the Agrarian parliamentary group also sent representatives to the meetings of the opposition and government deputies. In the Zemledelsko zname Stamboliski informed the peasantry that neither he nor any other Agrarian leader

was happy that such contacts between the BANU and the “exploiters of the people” were taking place. But, he warned, the parties now held the fate of Bulgaria in their hands and the Agrarian Union had to do all in its power to make its influence felt. At the end of August the BANU joined the Democratic, Social Democratic, National, Radical Democratic and Progressive Liberal parties in a united call for the preservation of neutrality.®? Although opposing Bulgaria’s participation in the war, Stamboliski made it clear that the BANU did not object to acquiring Macedonia or regaining the Dobruja from Rumania if it could be

done peacefully. Indeed, he maintained, if perfect justice prevailed in the world these lands would undoubtedly already belong to Bulgaria. Should the warring powers offer concessions in these areas in return for Bulgaria’s continued neutrality, there would be nothing immoral in accepting. However, too much blood had already been shed in attempts to take them by force, and they were certainly not worth another war.°°

When the National Assembly opened in November, Stamboliski made a long speech analyzing the situation in the country and reiterating the BANU’s program. Since the beginning of the war, he said, four conflicting positions had emerged. Tsar Ferdinand and the governing Liberal parties were traditionally Germanophile, favored the victory of the Central Powers, and might 88 Zemledelsko zname, Xi, No. 87 (July 26, 1914), 1. *9 Zemledelsko zname, x1, Nos. 89, 95 (July 28, Aug. 26, 1914). 9° Zemledelsko zname, xi, No. 1 (Sept. 20, 1914), 1.

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be persuaded to intervene on that side. They were supported by the IMRO and the Macedonian societies that sought to punish Serbia. On the other hand, the established parties now in opposition, led by the Democrats, were traditionally Russophile and favored the victory of the Allies. Third, the Narrow Socialists had come forward with a program calling for a “democratic federation

of the Balkan states.” Finally, the BANU and the Broad Socialists supported a policy of strict neutrality. Stamboliski pointed out that the BANU had long favored the idea of Balkan federation, now adopted by the Narrow Socialists, but he saw no way, given Serbia’s involvement in the war, that the policy could be implemented. Turning to the government, he condemned the influence of the Macedonians on Bulgarian politics and, to the applause of the Agrarian deputies, he warned that the BANU would never give up its opposition to war: “If the Bulgarian government has already allied itself with the side that urges Bulgaria on to adventurism, that seeks the occupation of Macedonia by Bulgaria . . . it is our deep conviction that this adventurism will lead Bulgaria to the grave. We can assure that if you ally yourself with this adventurism or if you adopt this adventurism as your own policy in the future, then before you can complete that adventure you will have to pass over our dead bodies.’’?! Tsar Ferdinand and Radoslavov were too shrewd to make a precipitate grab for Macedonia and the other territories they desired. They were well aware that if the war continued they would be able to command a high price for Bulgaria’s intervention or perhaps even for her continued neutrality. Thus, when war broke out, the Radoslavov government proclaimed its neutrality and sat back to await developments. The value of Bulgarian aid to either side was very great. Lying athwart the lines of communication between Germany and Turkey, Bulgaria was the key to continued Ottoman participation in

the war. Moreover, Bulgaria’s sizable, well-equipped army, much of which had seen service in the Balkan Wars, was a dagger

that could be plunged into the back of either Serbia or Turkey. When it became clear that Austria alone could not defeat Serbia and that the Allies alone had no chance of forcing the Straits with91 Zemledelsko zname, xii, Nos. 15, 16 (Nov. 11, 14, 1914).

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out a protracted and bloody campaign, both sides raised their bids for Bulgaria’s help. In this contest the Central Powers had a decided advantage. They could offer territory in Serbia, Rumania, and Greece, while the Allies could be free only with the possessions of Turkey. Even with regard to Turkey, the Germans were able to persuade the Porte to consent to a rectification of its border with Bulgaria. When Bulgaria formally joined the Central Powers on August 24/September 6, 1915, it was with the understanding that she would receive from Serbia all of Macedonia that had be-

longed to the Bulgarian exarchate in 1878. If Greece and Rumania entered the war on the Allied side, Bulgaria was to get all the terntory she had lost to these countries in the Treaty of

Bucharest. In addition, the Central Powers were to supply materiel for the Bulgarian army and to provide 200,000,000 gold francs for additional war expenses.?” Even this largesse would not have brought Bulgaria into the war had not the overall military situation turned in favor of the

Central Powers. After the Serbian victory at Kolubara and the launching of the Allied attack in the Dardanelles, Radoslavov refused to discuss anything except continued neutrality. By June 1915, however, the Turks were clearly holding their own while the Germans under Mackensen were rolling back the Russians in Galicia. The German victories ended any possible Russian military threat against Bulgaria, clearing the way for a definite commitment from Ferdinand and Radoslavov. Unable to compete with the Central Powers in promising territory, the Allies turned to less straightforward methods of influenc-

ing Bulgarian foreign policy. Their efforts led to what became known as the ““DesClosieres Affair,” a political scandal that discredited numerous Bulgarian politicians including several Agrarian members of parliament. Fernand DesClosiéres was an assistant to the principal repre*2 The diplomatic negotiations between the Allies and the Bulgarian government are dealt with in C. J. Smith, Jr., The Russian Struggle for Power, 1914—-

, 1917 (New York, 1956), pp. 135-58, 273-335; for the negotiations between the Central Powers and Bulgaria, see G. E. Silberstein, “The Serbian Campaign of 1915: Its Diplomatic Background,” American Historical Review, Lxx1, No. 1 (1967), 51-69, and W. Gottlieb, “Bulgariia v mezhdunarodnata politika (1914 1915),” [zvestiia na Instituta za istoriia, xx (1974), 13-101.

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sentative of the French holders of Bulgarian bonds. He had lived in Sofia since 1902 and had many contacts in the government and in society. During the summer of 1915, the Westminster Bank of London and the Crédit Lyonnaise furnished him with £400,000 and 10,000,000 francs (a total equal to 20,000,000 leva), ostensibly for the purpose of buying the Bulgarian harvest. To carry out this

transaction, DesClosiéres enlisted the services of Nikola Genadiev, the disreputable leader of the National Liberal party, a member of the governing coalition. Genadiev’s task was to engage Agrarian deputies, as well as members of his own parliamentary faction, as agents in making the grain purchases. Several

Agrarian deputies, including Marko Turlakov and Raiko Daskalov, were given large commissions and advances, only a part of which went toward the purchase of wheat. When Bulgaria entered the war, the political figures involved in the affair were arrested, and it was revealed that DesClosiéres’s actual purpose had been to influence members of the National Assembly in favor of the Allies 9°

Although a military court convicted the Agrarian deputies involved in the DesClosiéres affair, there is substantial doubt of their actual guilt. Some of them, particularly Turlakov and Daskalov, were drawn into the affair only because they were officers in the BANU’s National Store, which purchased foodstuffs from

the peasantry for sale to DesClosiéres. Furthermore, neither Stamboliski nor Dragiev, the two most prominent Agrarians, was ever accused of any wrongdoing in connection with the affair. Evidence brought out after the war indicated that many, if not all, of the Agrarian deputies involved may well have believed that they were doing nothing more than taking advantage of the war situation to sell agricultural products at high prices. Throughout the month of August, the Zemledelsko zname announced that the National Store was purchasing foodstuffs at prices very favorable to the producers. This suggests that the ultimate recipient of Des93 Dnevnitsi na XXII ONS, purva izviunredovna sesiia, 11, 590-680; P. Peshev, Istoricheskite subitiia i deiateli (Sofia, 1929), pp. 489-91; Turlakov, /storiia, pp. 118-19. The evolution of this covert operation may be followed in vols. vil, part 2, and vill of Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia v epokhu imperializma. The relevant documents are indexed under the heading ‘“Podkup bolgarskikh politicheskikh deiatelei’’ under the section on Bulgaria.

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Closiéres’s money was the Bulgarian peasant. It was the opinion of Nekliudoff, the former Russian ambassador, that DesClosiéres succeeded in buying nothing but grain.” The most persuasive proof that DesClosieres failed in his purpose, at least as far as the Agrarians were concerned, was that the BANU made no shift in its policy. From the beginning of the war

to Bulgaria’s intervention, the Agrarian leaders maintained an unwavering commitment to continued neutrality. In their public discussion of the war they also strove for impartiality. This was not because they were indifferent to the war’s outcome, but because they feared that open support for one side would be taken as

a sign that they favored intervention. Stamboliski, who wrote most of the war coverage for the Zemledelsko zname, admitted that he had a natural bias in favor of the underdog, Serbia.” And when a Bulgarian politician was quoted in the German and Austrian press to the effect that the Bulgarian people wanted the Central Powers to win, he denied it, stating that the vast majority obviously hoped for the victory of their liberator, Russia, and her allies.9® Still, in March 1915 after the Austrians had been defeated in Serbia and Galicia and the Allies had launched their attack on the Straits, he warned that the danger to Bulgaria now came from

those who would involve her on the side of the Allies, and he urged the government to resist this pressure.° At no point after this did the BANU abandon its position to move closer to the pro-Allied opposition parties. The treaty that Ferdinand and Radoslavov had signed with the Central Powers on August 24/September 6 obligated Bulgaria to

enter the war within thirty-five days. Although the treaty itself was kept secret, the extensive military preparations could not be completely hidden, and it soon became apparent that the government was contemplating some sort of action. On August 28, Stamboliski, Dragiev, and Dimitrov met with Radoslavov to discuss the rumors of impending war that were circulating in the capital. Radoslavov listened to their arguments in support of neu%* P. Peshev, pp. 490-91; Turlakov, /storiia, p. 119; Nekliudoff, pp. 392-93. %° Zemledelsko zname, xl, No. 22 (Dec. 2, 1914), 4. °° Zemledelsko zname, Xl, No. 35 (Jan. 7, 1915), 1. 97 Zemledelsko zname, xul, No. 62-63 (March 18, 1915), 1-2.

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trality, but remained noncomittal. His reticence indicated to Stamboliski that Bulgaria was already in the hands of the Central

Powers.°®> The atmosphere of apprehension in Sofia was heightened on the next day, when the opposition parties were asked to send representatives to an audience with Tsar Ferdinand.

Apparently intended to keep the opposition parties off balance while preparations for war went forward, the audience actually became the scene of the penultimate confrontation between the tsar and Stamboliski.

At 4:00 in the afternoon of September 4, the leaders of the pro-Allied opposition parties—Malinov of the Democrats, Geshov of the Nationalists, Danev of the Progressive Liberals, Tsanov of the Radical Democrats, and Stamboliski??9—were ushered into the Red Salon of the Royal Palace, where Ferdinand,

his personal secretary, and Crown Prince Boris were waiting. Malinov spoke first, telling the tsar of his concern about the rumors that Bulgaria was already committed to the Central Powers, to which Ferdinand replied evasively. Stamboliski then began to speak for the BANU, repeating the Union’s arguments against intervention. As he enumerated the reasons for continued neutrality, he included those that related to the ability and character of Ferdinand himself. ““And above all,” he said, “‘the people’s faith in you, Your Highness, has been shaken and destroyed. In their eyes, the eyes of the people, you have lost your reputation as a skilled diplomatist.’’ He warned Ferdinand that he had been for-

tunate to escape punishment for his part in the Balkan Wars. “Remember,” he continued, “‘that if this criminal act is repeated tomorrow, we, the members of the Agrarian Union, will not stand between you and the people’s wrath. We will become its instrument to execute its severe but just decision.” Growing steadily more agitated, Ferdinand challenged Stamboliski to prove that he had put Bulgaria in the service of the Central Powers. Stamboliski refused to discuss the sources of his in-

formation, and the exchange between the two men grew more heated.

“You, Mr. Stamboliski,”’ said Ferdinand, “‘threaten me with % Zemledelsko zname, Xu, No. 97 (Sept. 2, 1915), 1. 9° The Social Democrats declined to send a representative.

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revolts and uprisings. You tell me that no one has any faith in my ability and that some day I will be brought to trial.” “Yes.” “You should know that I have a fixed course, a clearly de-

termined policy, and that I will follow that course bravely without fear of your warnings. And as I follow that course I believe I am serving the people much better than you.”

‘That is a question... .” ‘Your service to the people at this moment seems questionable, very questionable.”’ “You try to hurl insults, Your Highness. And at a time when you need the support of everyone. Good! Your insults cannot harm me. I am happy that I heard from your lips that which the whole people fears, that which we will challenge. You intend to follow your course. Follow it, and I will follow mine.”

‘“T will follow it. Because my course, not yours, is in the service of Bulgaria.” ‘“My course has never led to disaster as did yours. And now, if you choose to follow your course, you should think first of your head.” ‘Don’t worry about my head. I am old. Think of your own which is still young.”

With this final warning Ferdinand broke off the audience and left the room.*”°

Convinced that war was now only days away, Stamboliski hurried back to the quarters he shared with Turlakov to discuss meas-

ures that the BANU might take. He was determined that his threats against Ferdinand not be empty words. Working through the night, he prepared a pamphlet describing the audience with Ferdinand and calling on the people, especially the soldiers, to refuse to take part in the war. Turlakov tried to dissuade him from publishing it, warning him that it would only lead to his imprisonment or worse. This was also the opinion of the full parliamentary group, which met on September 9. The group, however, 100 N. Petkov, pp. 12-15; Kozhukharov, Stamboliski, pp. 19-20. Stamboliski published this account immediately after the meeting. His description of what took place and what was said was never challenged by the others who were present.

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could produce no positive suggestions, and Stamboliski, who had already had the pamphlet printed, refused to stop its distribution.

On the next day, the government announced the beginning of mobilization. The military police raided the Agrarian press, seized the remaining copies of Stamboliski’s pamphlet, and arrested Stamboliski. Although a military court found him guilty of treason and sentenced him to death, Ferdinand was impressed by the protests of the opposition political leaders and commuted the sentence to life imprisonment.1°! This blow threw the BANU into disarray. Stamboliski’s direction was eliminated, and Dragiev foundered in indecision. The Agrarian parliamentary group debated its course of action for two days. Meanwhile the government threatened prosecution of all

those connected with the DesClosieres affair. This threat, perhaps, swayed the group. Alexander Dimitrov addressed the National Assembly on behalf of the BANU and pledged to vote for war credits. Bulgaria was at war, he said, and her troops must be given the wherewithal to defend themselves.'°? This acquiescence, however, did not ward off further prosecution. During the spring of 1916 the government moved against the Agrarian deputies involved in the DesClosieéres affair, sentencing five of them to from one-and-one-half to five years in prison.?°? Outside parliament, the Union’s standing committee withdrew the Zemledelsko zname from publication and ended practically all political activity. Local druzhbi, deprived of central leadership, in large part ceased to function. The BANU temporarily lost all influence over the future course of events. 91 Turlakov, [storiia, pp. 117-18; N. Petkov, p. 15.

102 Dnevnitsi na XVII ONS, vtora redovna sesiia, p. 12. .

103 Turlakov, /storiia, pp. 118-19. Besides Turlakov the Agrarian deputies convicted were Grigor Boiadzhiev of Pleven, Andrei Sharenkov of Provadiia, Naiden

Komanov of Plovdiv, and Nedelcho Georgiev of Nikopol. Dnevnitsi na XXI ONS, purva izvunredovna sesiia, 1, 591.

12]

CHAPTER V

The Road to Power

Power in and of itself is not criminal, criminal are the abuses of power. Striving for power is striving toward self-completion, toward a manifestation of life, of will. Struggle for power is struggle for life, and this 1s the most basic law of nature. It is what produces progress. —Alexander Stamboliski!

Ir Germany and her allies had won the quick victory that Ferdinand and Radoslavov expected, the fate of the BANU would have been very different. As it was, in Bulgaria as in the rest of Eastern Europe, prolonged war tore society loose from its traditional moorings, and defeat brought the collapse of the old regime. Even so, the Agrarian Union’s road to power was not an easy one. The Agrarian leaders were involved in a premature, abortive revolution, a divisive internal conflict, and a major confrontation with the Communists before gaining control of the instruments of government.

The costs of modern war were much greater than Bulgaria could bear. By the end of 1918 approximately 900,000 men, nearly 40 percent of the male population, had been conscripted. The army suffered 300,000 casualties, including 100,000 killed, the most severe losses on a per capita basis of any country involved in the war.” During 1917 and 1918 the distribution of military supplies broke down almost entirely. Troops at the front received only the most meager rations. Clothing, especially boots, could not be replaced. Nor could the army furnish its men with adequate medical supplies or ammunition. The impact of these * A. Stamboliski, Vlast, bezvlastie i narodoviastie (Sofia, 1919), p. 16. 2 These losses followed the 58,000 killed and 105,000 wounded in the Balkan Wars. A. Ts. Tsankov, “Bulgariia prez voinata i sled neia,” SBID, xx, No. 1-2-3 (1921), 38; G. T. Danaillow, Les effets de la guerre en Bulgarie (Fontenay-auxRoses, 1932), p. 603.

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shortcomings on morale was compounded by the fact that the ordinary Bulgarian had a sense of kinship with Russia and no feeling at all for the German cause. The conduct of German soldiers, who took advantage of their privileged position to loot the country, did nothing to change his mind.® The deterioration at the front was accompanied and in part provoked by an economic crisis in the interior. Farm labor had to be performed by women, children, the aged, and the infirm, with the result that the amount of land under cultivation fell by about 12

percent while the grain harvest declined by 47 percent, from 2,678,558 tons in 1915 to 1,435,083 tons in 1918. Government requisitions and the shortage of fodder took a heavy toll of livestock .*

Resorting to requisitions and setting of artificially low prices for agricultural products, the Radoslavov regime imposed severe

hardships on the rural population and discouraged peasant families from producing for sale.° In the cities and towns the gov-

ernment succeeded in holding down wages, but totally lost the battle against inflation. Using 1910 as a base year (= 100), the price index in Bulgaria at the end of 1918 stood at 1,132. This compares with 217 for Germany, 392 for France, 272 for England, and 220 for the United States.®

The suffering and deprivation endured by the troops, the peasantry, and the poor of the cities and towns sharply contrasted

with the epidemic of speculation that swept through the upper class and included many members of the government. Rumors, some substantiated and others not, of fortunes made overnight by speculation in vital commodities were a prime stimulus of social discontent. They fueled the outbreak of antigovernment demonstrations, the ““women’s riots” for food, that began early in 1917 * Danaillow, pp. 327-28; M. A. Birman, Revoliutsionnata situatsiia v Bolgarii v 1915-1919 gg. (Moscow, 1957), p. 18. * Kh. Khristov, Revoliutsionnata kriza v Biulgariia prez 1918-1919 (Sofia, 1957), p. 17; “Khronika,” SBID, xx, No. 6-7 (1921), 256-57. > Danaillow, pp. 328-29; Ia. Mollov, “Zemledelskoto proizvodstvo i voinata,”’ SBID, xix, No. 1-2 (1919), 58-59. ° Kh. Khristov, Revoliutsionnata, p. 28; ‘““Khronika,” SBID, xix, No. 9-10 (1920), 551.

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and continued until the end of the war. Milena Stamboliska was arrested for fomenting one such demonstration in Slavovitsa in February 1917.‘ Stamboliski, although sentenced to strict confinement for life, found that the regime in Sofia’s Central Prison was not severe. Political prisoners were allowed to roam their section freely, to write, to entertain “relatives,”” and even to leave the prison for short periods for “‘medical or dental reasons.” They were able to receive provisions from outside, and the BANU’s peasant supporters regularly supplied so much food that it was distributed to the other prisoners and even to the guards. Although it is possible that this treatment was brought about by bribery, it is likely that Ferdinand himself approved of it. He was skilled enough in Bulgarian politics not to burn all his bridges behind him.® Outside prison, Dimittr Dragiev’s desire to reassert himself as the BANU’s leader provoked a split in the parliamentary group. At first a matter of personalities rather than principles, the struggle grew between Dragiev and Alexander Dimitrov for the right to speak for the group. The enmity between the two men came into the open after Dimitrov was arrested for taking. part in the DesClosieres affair. Although the government could prove no wrong-

doing and was forced to acquit him, the police confiscated his diary and released parts of it to friendly newspapers. It contained

comments critical of all the Agrarian leaders including Stamboliski, who was described as an egoist, and was especially severe on Dragiev. Claiming that the diary proved Dimitrov unfit for leadership and accusing him of speculation, Dragiev demanded that he be expelled from the parliamentary group.? Stamboliski intervened in the dispute, sending a letter to the group that, while ostensibly neutral, was aimed against Dragiev. He wrote that Dimitrov should not be condemned for what he had put down in his personal diary since he was not responsible for its “K. Todorov, Balkan Firebrand (New York, 1943), p. 96; S. S. Arabadzhiev, “Selski zhenski buntove viv velikottrmovsko prez 1918 g.,” Istoricheski pregled, XXII, No. 5 (1966), 73-80; N. Petkov, p. 17.

°K. Todorov, pp. 92-97. ° Turlakov, /storiia, pp. 121-22. 124

THE ROAD TO POWER

appearance in the newspapers, and that for his part he had already forgiven Dimitrov for what was written about himself. Moreover, he continued, he had examined the charges of speculation against Dimitrov and found them groundless. He urged both sides to put

aside the dispute until after the war when an Agrarian congress would render a final judgment. In the meantime, he concluded, all the Agrarian deputies should give priority to maintaining the unity of the group.*®

Dragiev was not mollified, and he decided to bring the dispute

to a head. Since he could not command a majority, he and his

followers broke off to form a separate, “pure,” group of seventeen deputies that included besides Dragiev Stancho Momchev, who had been a prominent Union activist almost from the BANU’s inception. The Dimitrov faction numbered twenty-eight and included Tserkovski and Omarchevski. It was supported from prison by Turlakov and Raiko Daskalov as well as Stamboliski."* Stamboliski was not fully satisfied with the conduct of either _ Agrarian faction, and he sought to spur them both into taking a stronger position against the government. He wrote to the whole group that he “‘would never have agreed to vote a single centime

to the present vicious, boneheaded government,”’ and that he could not understand or approve its votes for the war budgets."* The divided group did little to respond, however, until the February Revolution in Russia and the intervention of the United States opened a new chapter in the war. Convinced that Germany could not now win, and reacting to the upsurge in discontent that wartime deprivations were beginning to produce, the Agrarian leaders dissociated themselves from all support for the government and began to revive their own organization. In August 1917 the two factions of the parliamentary group agreed to resume publication

of the Zemledelsko zname. Although the editor, Tsanko Tserkovski, and his assistants, Omarchevski and Spas Duparinov, were all supporters of Dimitrov, they pledged to print nothing © A. Stamboliski, Pismata mi ot zatvora (Sofia, 1919), pp. 1-7. "t Turlakov, Istoriia, pp. 121-22; Memorandum on the Change of Government in Bulgaria (Sofia, July 23, 1918), FO 371/3158/131780. "2 Stamboliski, Pismata, p. 3.

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about the division in the group and to give the minority its fair share of space.!® The new Zemledelsko zname , although subjected

to strict government censorship and proscribed at the front, symbolized the Union’s reviving spirit. The Agrarian leaders made their immediate goal the replace-

ment of the Radoslavov government by one that would open peace negotiations with the Allies. To explore this possibility they opened discussions with the leaders of the opposition parties, particularly with Alexander Malinov of the Democrats.'*

The Agrarians also attempted to gain the support of the commander-in-chief of the army, General Nikola Zhekov. During

June 1917 Tserkovski had represented the BANU in a parliamentary inspection of the front during which he met Zhekov, whom he decided was sympathetic. Tserkovski arranged a meeting to be held on September 12 between Zhekov, himself, and Alexander Dimitrov, Nedelko Atanasov, Stoian Omarchevski, and Ivan Zhelev of the majority fraction. Owing to a sudden illness, Tserkovski did not take part, but the other deputies tried to persuade Zhekov that continued slavish adherence to the German alliance would be disastrous.’° Zhekov expressed interest and asked for a written proposal, which was delivered to him on September 22. Coincidentally, on the same day Tserkovski and Atanasov joined the leaders of the opposition parties in a public demand for Radoslavov’s resignation and the reconvening of the National Assembly .?°

In their written proposal to Zhekov, the Agrarian leaders stated

that the Radoslavov government’s war policy had brought the complete demoralization of the people and had robbed Bulgaria

of all freedom of action. They counseled Zhekov that as commander-in-chief he could not be indifferent to the political situation in the country. Specifically, they suggested a coalition

led by Malinov and supported by the Democratic, Broad Socialist, and Agrarian forces in parliament. The proposal went 13 Tbid., p. 19; Kh. Khristov, Revoliutsionnata, pp. 116-17. 14 Ybid., p. 94.

15 §. Omarchevski, Bulgarskite upravnitsi prez -svetovnata voina: fakti i dokumenti (Sofia, 1921), pp. 42-43. 16 Tbid., p. 73.

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on carefully to point out that the BANU was not advocating that Bulgaria abandon the war or betray the German alliance, a necessary qualification in view of the fact that the document might appear as evidence in a trial for treason. Rather, it stated, a new government was needed to “‘reassure the people and the army. It will raise Bulgaria in the eyes of her allies and improve her image in the eyes of her enemies. With all its strength it will work for a rapid peace.”’ The Agrarians asked only that in return for their participation in a new government the imprisoned members of the Union be released.*’ Zhekov, who had probably been acting as a Trojan horse during the entire affair, passed the Agrarian proposal on to Radoslavov, who retaliated by removing the imprisoned Agrarian leaders from Central Prison in Sofia and distributing them among more isolated prisons around the country. Stamboliski was transferred to a fortress in Vidin where he was kept in isolation.'® Neither faction of the BANU’s parliamentary leadership looked

beyond the replacement of Radoslavov by a government that would extricate Bulgaria from the war. Dragiev took the position

that simple patriotism demanded that the BANU forget its old enmity toward the opposition parties and do all in its power to support them. It was anathema to him that at such a critical time the BANU should seek power for itself; that 1t should do so by encouraging revolution he believed to be treasonous. Nor did the Dimitrov faction differ with him on this point.’® Only Stamboliski sensed that the war would sweep away the old regime. Particularly after the February Revolution in Russia he began to look beyond the war and to prepare the BANU for the task of taking power. A significant indication of his thinking at

this time is his essay on “Power, Anarchy, and Democracy,” which he completed during June 1917. While ostensibly an abstract political analysis directed against anarchism, it was in

fact meant to remind the Agrarians that their goal was the 1” Tbid., pp. 44-76; L. Maleev, Prinos kum istinata za katastrofata na Bilgariia prez septemvri 1918 godina (Sofia, 1921), pp. 5-14; P. Peshev, pp. 540-46. 18 N. Petkov, pp. 16-17. 19 Omarchevski, Upravnitsi, pp. 153-68; D. Dragiev, Edna politicheska izpoved (Sofia, 1919), pp. 5, 32-43.

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achievement of power. The short treatise argued that anarchy (significantly Stamboliski used the term “‘bezvilastie ,”’ powerless-

ness, rather than anarkhiia) was an unattainable condition. Human inequalities and the complexity of society made it necessary that some men have power over others. The crucial problems

were how power was to be wielded and for what ends. Stamboliski repeated some of his old arguments against monarchism, which “is breaking up and disappearing,” and he went on to state

that individuals, groups, or organizations that shunned power gave rise to and perpetuated monarchism. The desire for power, he maintained, was a sign of health in any political organization. It was “a striving toward self-completion, toward a manifestation of life, of will.”” The aim, he concluded, was democracy, which would be a tool of progress allowing the resources of society to be mobilized for the goals set by society itself. ““Power wielded by

the people can undo the evil that has been caused by power wielded by monarchs and oligarchies.’’”° At the same time he began to encourage Agrarians in the army

to organize and to prepare for a possible coup d’ état. The discovery of this conspiracy may have been one of the reasons that prompted Radoslavov to break up the Agrarian “general staff” in Central Prison.”?

Stamboliski’s sojourn in Vidin was not long. The Radoslavov government was brought down by the growing discontent in the country—now taking the form of large-scale ““women’s riots”’ in the interior and mutiny at the front??—the failure of the German assault on Verdun, which revealed the exhaustion of the German war effort, and by the hope for peace on American terms. In the spring of 1918 the parliamentary forces of the BANU, Democrats, Broad Socialists, Radicals, Nationals, and Progressive Liberals joined to form the Opposition Bloc against the government. Zhekov, too, turned against the Prime Minister and warned Ferdinand that the army could not continue in its present condition

much longer. The final blow came when the German and 2° Stamboliski, Viast, pp. 4-31. 71 K. Todorov, p. 97. *? A description of a mass meeting of soldiers organized by Agrarians in June 1918 can be found in P. Peshev, pp. 587-88; see also Kh. Khristov, Revoliutsionnata, pp. 209-10.

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Austro-Hungarian governments refused to turn the Dobruja over to Bulgaria. Some of Radoslavov’s own ministers rebelled, and the Tsar was compelled to ask for the Prime Minister’s resignation. On May 18, 1918, he asked Alexander Malinov to form a new government.”? Malinov hoped to lead a broad coalition, but this proved impossible. Foreseeing the fall of Radoslavov, Stamboliski had written earlier that it would be a “scandal of scandals” for some Agrar-

ians to join the government while others remained in prison.” Both Agrarian factions refused to join the cabinet unless their im-

prisoned comrades were released. Malinov, who was willing to cooperate, could not persuade Ferdinand to agree, and the Agrarlans remained outside the government. The Broad Socialists, wishing to preserve themselves as a “political reserve” in the event that Malinov could not cope with the approaching disaster, also declined to accept any ministries. In the absence of a general

| coalition, the two small conservative parties, the National and the Progressive Liberal, also declined to assume responsibility for governing. Malinov’s cabinet, formed on June 21, 1918, was composed of eight Democrats and two Radicals, Stoian Kosturkov and Joseph Fadenkhekht, who took the ministries of education and justice.”° The remaining parties of the Opposition Bloc pledged their support to the new government, which in any case never called the National Assembly into session to legalize its acts. As a gesture of good will to the BANU, Malinov returned Stamboliski and his imprisoned comrades to Sofia’s Central Prison, where they were kept under only nominal confinement.*° Immediately upon his return to Sofia, Stamboliski resumed his effort to prepare the BANU to take power. In a series of unsigned articles in the Zemledelsko zname he rejected Dragiev’s call for Agrarian participation in a broad “government of national unity,” arguing that the war had created a situation in which the BANU would have power thrust upon it by the people, who looked to it 23 Kh. Khristov, Revoliutsionnata, pp. 233-37. 24 Stamboliski, Pismata, p. 19. 25 Kh. Khristov, Revoliutsionnata, pp. 237-38; Zemledelsko zname, xiii, No. 74 (June 20, 1918), 1. 26 K. Todorov, pp. 98-102.

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precisely because it was an enemy of the old parties. To draw back would show a lack of courage. To go on with its program for a new Bulgaria would be a great challenge that would lead not to

social peace, but to “something like war with the world around us.”” Nevertheless, it was precisely this road that Agrarians, if they believed in their ideals, would have to follow.”’ Stamboliski also resumed his contacts with Agrarians in the army. Agrarian propaganda among the troops was widespread by this time, and Stamboliski’s prestige as the man who had stood up against the war had risen to a great height among the soldiers.”® With regard to Malinov, Stamboliski kept his distance. He offered to enter the cabinet only if the Prime Minister would agree

to an immediate armistice. Malinov, however, could not bring himself to defy the Tsar, who was still determined to stand by the

German alliance. In August he attempted to intimidate Stamboliski by restoring a strict regime in the prison. Fadenkhekht, the

Radical Minister of Justice, threatened to bring him to trial for treason, but these measures came too late to do any good.””

On September 14, 1918, General Franchet d’Espérey’s Allied

Expeditionary Force began a long-prepared offensive on the Macedonian front. After subjecting the demoralized Bulgarian troops to a withering artillery barrage, the Allies achieved a quick and decisive breakthrough at Dobro Pole. Discipline crumbled as the Bulgarian army ceased to exist as an organized military force. Troops fell back into disorder, many deserting to return to their homes, and many more possessed with a growing determination to march on Sofia to punish Ferdinand and the politicians who had

brought on the war. By September 24 the critical rail center of Kiustendil was in the hands of the rebels. Provisions from the nearby General Staff Headquarters were confiscated by several hundred soldiers.*° 27 “Zemledelskiiat stiuz i vlastta,”” Zemledelsko zname, x11, Nos. 70, 71, 75, 76, 77 (June 12, 15, 29, July 3, 6, 1918). 28 Kh. Khristov, Revoliutsionnata, pp. 209-10. 79 K. Todorov, pp. 99-100; Omarchevski, Upravnitsi, pp. 188-89. °° Kh. Khristov, Revoliutsionnata, pp. 260-76; K. A. Ilankov, Dobro pole i probivut na fronta (Sofia, 1919), pp. 116-18.

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On the morning of the 25th Stamboliski was released from Central Prison and taken to a meeting of the leaders of the Opposition

Bloc. There, Malinov, who could still not fathom the full extent of the catastrophe at the front, offered the resignation of the cabinet and proposed the formation of a broad coalition government to restore stability and to begin negotiations with the Allies. Stamboliski ridiculed this idea, maintaining that it was already too late for political maneuvers and for peace negotiations. Let the government remain, he said, but let it sue for an immediate armistice under whatever terms were possible.*! In the afternoon Stamboliski was taken to see Ferdinand. Their second encounter was not much more cordial than their first in

1915. The Tsar blamed Agrarian propaganda for weakening the front, and he accused Stamboliski of working for Bulgaria’s defeat. Stamboliski replied that the defeat was the inevitable outcome of Ferdinand’s foreign policy. Abandoning this theme, Ferdinand asked Stamboliski to use his influence to calm the rebellious troops and to restore some measure of order and discipline to the army. Stamboliski agreed, but on two conditions. Ferdinand must seek an immediate armistice and he must release all remaining political prisoners. The Tsar agreed at last to leave the war, but he feared assassination and refused to release all the prisoners. The two finally compromised on a partial prisoner release.** At

9:15 pm, Andrei Liapchev, the Minister of Finance, Simeon Radev, Minister Plenipotentiary, and M. Vasilev, a distinguished

lawyer, accompanied by the American Consul General, D. I. Murphy, and his assistant, set out to seek armistice terms from the

Allies." After the departure of the mission, Stamboliski announced his readiness to proceed to the front to pacify the troops. The ensuing attempt by Stamboliski and Raiko Daskalov to assume the leadership of the troops and to take Sofia by force has been called the ““Radomir Rebellion,” after the small town where

the new “republic” was first proclaimed, and has long been the 31 D. Kazasov, Burni godini (Sofia, 1949), pp. 10-11; Kh. Khristov, Revoliutsionnata, p. 277. 82 N. Petkov, pp. 274-85. °° Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Supplement 1, vol. 1 (Washington, D. C., 1933), 476-80.

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subject of historical controversy. In a speech to the National Assembly in 1919 Stamboliski stated that he went to the front with a fully matured plan for the rebellion because he did not believe Ferdinand was sincere in his promise to appeal for an armistice. Fearing that the Tsar would seek German aid to continue the war, he decided that the overthrow of the dynasty was an immediate necessity.** By the time that Stamboliski gave this explanation of his conduct, however, the rebellion was well on its way toward becoming one of the heroic myths of the BANU’s fight against the old regime. Moreover, the question had a current political significance. An admission by Stamboliski that the rebellion was less than a great expression of Agrarian will would have been a concession to Dragiev, who had opposed it, and a condemnation of his allies who had supported it. Some Bulgarian and all Soviet Communist historians, on the other hand, deny that the Agrarian leaders had any genuine revolutionary intentions. They argue that Stamboliski feared a Communist revolution and that during the rebellion he was a captive of the revolutionary energy of the people.*° The Bulgarian historian Khristo Khristov, in his monumental work on the rebellion, probably came closest to the truth when he wrote that Stamboliski went to Radomir without any preconceived plan of action. He was no more committed to making a revolution

than he was to calming the troops, but he was prepared to do either depending on circumstances.*®

One factor that deserves greater weight in the historiography of the rebellion than it has received is the influence of Raiko Daskalov, who accompanied Stamboliski to Radomir and who actually proclaimed the new republic. Before the war Daskalov was not a major figure in the BANU. Born in Biala Cherkva in 1886, the son of a teacher, he had graduated from the Commercial Gymnasium in Svishtov, worked as a reporter on the Sofia news54 Dnevnitsi na XVIII ONS, purva redovna sesiia, 1, 528. This explanation was seconded by Raiko Daskalov (Zemledelsko zname, xv, No. 16 [Sept. 27, 1919], 1-4) and by Kosta Todorov (Balkan Firebrand, pp. 100-101). 3° A. N. Kirshevskaia and L. Valev, “Zhurnal bolgarskikh istorikov,” Voprosy istoril, No. 1 (1951), 122-23; Birman, p. 142. 36 Kh. Khristov, Revoliutsionnata, p. 279.

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paper Balkanska tribuna, and served a short prison term for a series of antigovernment articles. In 1907 he went to Berlin, where he earned a doctorate from a German commercial institute. After working for a German firm he returned to Bulgaria in 1914.

He had known Tsanko Tserkovski from his youth in Biala Cherkva, and the Agrarian poet persuaded him to join the BANU to take over the management of its foundering National Store.

This position made him the central target of the government’s prosecution of the DesClosiéres affair.*” Daskalov has fared extremely well at the hands of Communist historians, who portray him as “the Revolutionary,” the leader of the BANU’s left wing, and the spokesman for the militant desires

of the oppressed peasant. His assassination by right-wing terrorists in 1923 also elevated him in Communist eyes and saved his

reputation from any damage that might have come to it in the BANU’s later factional struggles. One biographer went so far as to assert that Stamboliski was preparing to yield him the premiership on the eve of the June coup d’ état .°® This adulatory view demands qualification. While Daskalov was a useful ally to Stamboliski in ousting the Dragiev faction and on occasion proved an

effective lieutenant, his influence was not entirely healthy. He was an impulsive man whose actions were not based upon any depth of thought. Although he presented himself as an Agrarian theorist, his writings were meager and shallow. His major work, The Struggle for the Land, tracing agrarian struggles in ancient Rome, which he claimed was conceived in prison along with the plan for the BANU’s land reform is notable only for its rather artificial show of erudition.*° While in prison, Daskalov impressed himself on Stamboliski by the force of his personality and also, perhaps, by his German doctorate. Stamboliski, always self-conscious about his lack of formal education, seems to have been overawed by Daskalov’s academic credentials, which Daskalov sensed and which caused °“ K. Kozhukharov, Raiko Daskalov: biografichen ocherk (Sofia, 1956), pp. 3-8; Tadzher, pp. 51-52. 38 B. Peshev, in his introduction to R. Daskalov: Izbrani statii i rechi (Sofia, 1947), 7. 79 R. Daskalov, Borba za zemia (Sofia, 1923), pp. 9-65.

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him to project himself almost as Stamboliski’s equal. The Radomir Rebellion was the first, but by no means the last, example of his tugging at the reins. Stamboliski and Daskalov began their journey toward the front

on the morning of September 26. They were accompanied by members of parliament from the Democratic, Broad Socialist, and Radical parties as well as by the Minister of War, General Sava

Savov.* It took the group nearly the full day to travel the thirty miles to the village of Radomir, the closest encampment of the rebellious soldiers, located midway between Sofia and the Staff Headquarters in Kiustendil. Arriving at about 8:00 pm, Stamboliski met with Sergeant-Major Georgi Damianov, an Agrarian

sympathiser though not a member of the BANU, who commanded the largest battalion encamped at Radomir.*’ Damianov asked the parliamentary delegation to sleep in the village and to address the troops at dawn. That morning at 9:00 aM the group entered the soldiers’ camp, where Stamboliski made the first address. He pleaded with the troops to maintain order until the peace delegation settled armistice terms. Reminding them that they had not listened to him in 1915 when he told them not to take up arms, he begged them to heed him now and to defend the country until the Allies granted an armistice.** Dr. Nikola Sakarov of the Broad Socialists seconded Stamboliski’s speech, but neither made much of an impression. The troops clearly wanted to continue their march to Sofia. Finally, the Minister of War told them that if they would not return to the front, they should at least lay down their arms and go home. There was some sympathy for this course of action, but the majority remained fixed on revenge.*°

The delegation decided to push on to Kiustendil to view the situation there and to visit Staff Headquarters to see what could be ‘0 The sources do not agree on the exact composition of the group. Some indicate that Stancho Momchev of the Dragiev faction was present. “1 Damianov joined the BANU after the rebellion. He was a member of parliament from 1918 to 1923 and was murdered after taking part in the September 1923 uprising.

“2G. Damianov, Istinata na septemvriskata revoliutsiia v Bulgariia (Sofia, 1921), pp. 33-34. * Tbid.; Kh. Khristov, Revoliutsionnata, pp. 280-81.

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learned of the peace mission. They arrived about noon and were welcomed by what remained of the General Staff. Since nothing had yet been heard from the peace mission, Stamboliski made his way to the rebel-controlled railroad station to speak to the troops. Before he could finish, he was summoned to the telegraph office. The message he received was from Daskalov, who had returned to Radomir. Daskalov informed him that over 15,000 troops were now concentrated in Radomir and that they had accumulated a sufficient number of locomotives and cars to carry out a quick descent on Sofia. Daskalov read the draft of a proclamation of a provisional government that he had prepared and asked Stamboliski

to signal his approval. Stamboliski hesitated, questioning the timeliness of this move, but Daskalov stressed the size and readiness of the forces at his disposal. The exact nature of Stamboliski’s final reply is not known. He apparently gave some sort of approval, but from his later conduct it seems clear that it was neither enthusiastic nor unconditional. It was, perhaps, an instruction to do no more than test the waters.** Whatever reply Stamboliski made, Daskalov proceeded to take command of the situation in Radomir. In an address to the troops, he read the following proclamation:

Today, September 27, 1918, the Bulgarian people break the chains of slavery, throw down the despotic regime of Ferdinand and his henchmen, proclaim them enemies of the people, proclaim themselves a free people with a republican form of government, and hold out the hand of peace and understanding to

the peoples of Europe. From this day Tsar Ferdinand and his dynasty and the former government are fallen. All provincial administrators, district officials, police commandants, mayors, and military officers will carry out the orders of the provisional government of the republic. President: Al. Stamboliski Commander-in-Chief: Raiko Daskalov

This proclamation having been enthusiastically received by the soldiers, Daskalov drafted a telegram to be sent to all military and 44K. Nikolov, ‘“‘Radomirskata ‘republika’: vladaiskite sibitiia prez septemvri 1918 g.,” Mir, No. 11,479 (Nov. 3, 1938), 3.

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administrative centers in the country stating that Tsar Ferdinand and the Malinov government were now deposed. He directed all officers and officials to obey the provisional government, “before which they will be responsible for the maintenance of order in the

country.” Even as Daskalov began to organize his forces for the march on Sofia, he seemed to feel the need to justify himself to Stambolisk1.

During the afternoon he sent a letter to Kiustendil by train in which he wrote that he had been driven to proclaim the provisional government by the dangerous position in which Bulgaria now stood. The enemy would not wait for Bulgaria’s politicians, he maintained. Only a republican “‘people’s government”’ could save the country from the foreign enemy and from internal disorder. Moreover, it had the opportunity to construct a new economic life so that millionaires and parasites would yield their places to honest laborers. He went on to write: “I made use of your name, for I made you the president of the provisional gov-

ernment. This was the desire—the unanimous desire—of the people and of the troops. If you do not wish to lead the provisional

government, then my only prayer is that you do not condemn it now.” The “Commander-in-Chief” concluded that he had sufhcient troops at his disposal to force Sofia to recognize the provisional government, and that he did not believe that the capital would offer resistance. It is not known whether or not this letter reached Stamboliski.*°

After his telegraph conversation with Daskalov, Stamboliski made no attempt to assume leadership of the rebellious troops in Kiustendil. Instead he returned to General Staff Headquarters and informed his companions that he had decided to go to Dupnitsa, a garrison town about fifty miles to the south, to try to bring order to

the troops there. He apparently wanted to assess the situation there and to view the mood of the troops closer to the front. He was in Dupnitsa by evening when he wired headquarters that a shortage of gasoline had left him stranded so that he could not rejoin their party. He did not, however, appear before the troops in his new capacity as president of the provisional government. * Kh. Khristov, Revoliutsionnata, pp. 284-85. *° K. Kozhukharov, Radomirskata republika (Sofia, 1948), pp. 283-84.

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Daskalov used the rest of the day to impose a rough order on the troops in Radomir. He named Georgi Damianov Chief-ofStaff and organized eight infantry batallions with two machinegun companies. Here, Daskalov committed the first of several critical tactical mistakes. Believing that the capital would not be willing or able to offer serious resistance, he made no effort to organize artillery units. At 9:00 pm he telegraphed Sofia that if it did not recognize the provisional government he would advance against it in the morning.*’ Stamboliski arrived at Radomir in the morning. His conversation with Daskalov was not amiable, for he apparently berated his commander-in-chief for his hastiness. In a later letter describing this meeting Daskalov wrote that instead of support he received ~ “reproaches and complaints.”4® The two men parted after only half-an-hour, Stamboliski for the capital and Daskalov to accompany the troops to Pernik, the staging ground for the assault on Sofia.

Returning to Sofia, Stamboliski found the capital relatively calm. He went directly to the Council of Ministers, where he de-

nied having any part in the Radomir Rebellion, claiming that whatever he and Daskalov had done, it was because they had been

“prisoners” of the troops. The council did not believe him, and after he left it voted to issue an order for his arrest. Stamboliski went into hiding and sought to organize an internal uprising in the capital to support Daskalov’s assault. His effort was not successful. The Agrarian parliamentary group refused to approve the re-

bellion; Dragiev declared it to be a fraud in a proclamation to which he affixed not only his own name but those of Stamboliski and Tserkovski as well. Copies were printed in the Sofia newspapers and later dropped on the troops from airplanes. Both factions of the parliamentary group, viewing the rebellion as the work of Daskalov alone, voted to condemn it and to pledge support to the government in its effort to secure an armistice.”

Finding no support from his own colleagues, Stamboliski 47 Kh. Khristov, Revoliutsionnata, pp. 290-91. 48 Ibid., p. 293. 49 Tbid., pp. 293-95; Mir, Nos. 5518, 5520 (Sept. 27, 30, 1918); Dragiev, /zpoved, pp. 5, 32-43.

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turned to Dimittr Blagoev, leader of the Narrow Socialists. In a secret visit to Blagoev’s home he argued that the Narrows were powerful in the cities, the BANU in the countryside. Together they could take power. According to Blagoev’s account, Stamboliski promised that he was ready to accept the Narrows’ “whole program” with the exception of its stand on private property for peasants. In spite of this generous offer, Blagoev refused to cooperate. He could not overcome his ideological blinders with regard to the Agrarians. To him the peasantry was bourgeois and he did not want the Narrow party to involve itself in what he saw as an internal bourgeois conflict. He also realized that at that moment the BANU was far larger and stronger than his own party and that Stamboliski was a more popular, charismatic leader than himself. Convinced that Bulgaria was on the same road that had led to the October Revolution in Russia, he was not now prepared to settle for second place.*° Even without the help of an internal uprising, Daskalov might

have succeeded if he had not continued to make serious tactical errors. His forces made no effort to cut Sofia’s communications, allowing the government to appeal to the Germans for aid. Furthermore, the republican army moved slowly, concentrating in Vladaia, six miles outside the capital. At 9:00 Am on September 29, Daskalov sent another telegram to the government announcing that if the “former authorities” did not recognize the provisional government within the next six hours, he would begin his advance. Although the only reply to this ultimatum was an aerial bombardment, he was not able to begin the attack until 4:00 in the afternoon.

Daskalov divided his troops into three columns, whose objectives were the villages of Boiana, Kniazhevo, and Gorna Bania on the southwestern outskirts of the capital. The principal defenders of the city were the loyalist Macedonian units of General Alexander Protogerov which put up a fierce resistance, especially to the central column commanded by Daskalov. They subjected this

column to heavy artillery fire that left both Daskalov and Danianov wounded. Nevertheless, by nightfall the republican °° Rothschild, pp. 81-83; Rabotnichiski vestnik, xxi, No. 274 (Tune 6, 1919), 1-2.

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army had captured its immediate objectives and was poised to enter the city. At this point Daskalov committed his last and most serious mistake. Forgetting the most fundamental rule of warfare, he waited until daylight to launch the final assault. His motive was

to avoid looting and unnecessary bloodshed, which he feared would occur if the capital fell to the angry troops during the night. This respite permitted the city’s defenders to regroup and to gain reinforcements from the German 217th Division, transferred from

the Crimea to the Balkan front, which was well equipped with machine guns and artillery. The military balance now swung deci-

sively in favor of the government. Moreover, at this time news reached the capital and the rebels that an armistice had been signed at Salonika. The war was over for Bulgaria, and the country would submit to Allied occupation. The arrival of this news caused large-scale desertion among the republican troops. When Daskalov ordered the final assault at 5:00 AM on the 30th, only six to seven thousand soldiers remained. They were overwhelmed by the German and Macedonian defenders, who counterattacked and

shattered Daskalov’s forces. In two days Radomir itself was re-

captured.°! | Daskalov was hidden by Agrarian sympathisers in a village

near Radomir, and was later rescued by Alexander Dimitrov, who

took him to Salonika, where he was placed in the hands of the French authorities. Stamboliski was likewise concealed by friends

in Sofia. Leaders of the BANU approached the occupation authorities with a request that the two men be allowed to go to France to escape the charges of treason that the government had lodged against them. The French authorities, however, not wishing to encourage uprisings and disorders, refused.”

Although the defeat of the Radomir Rebellion slowed the crumbling of the old regime, it could not prevent it. The Allies, while willing to accept the Coburg dynasty, compelled the abdication of Tsar Ferdinand, who left the throne to his son Boris on 51 The military aspects of the rebellion were described in detail by Kosta Nikolov, the commander of the Sofia garrison, in a series of articles under the title “Radomirskata ‘republika’: Vladaiskite stbitiia prez septemvri 1918 g.” in the newspaper Mir, No. 11,479-11,510 (Nov. 3—Dec. 10, 1938). See also A. Palmer, The Gardeners of Salonika (New York, 1965), pp. 225-26. °2 Kh. Khristov, Revoliutsionnata, pp. 314-15.

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October 3. Fifteen days later Malinov reorganized the cabinet, giving places to Janko Saktzov of the Broad Socialists, Todor Todorov of the Nationals, and Tsanko Tserkovski of the BANU. The Agrarian participation in the new government was not enthusiastic and was undertaken only when Malinov promised to grant an amnesty for political crimes. The prime minister, however, dragged his feet on introducing amnesty legislation, and in fact resigned in less than a month when the Allies turned the Dob-

ruja over to Rumania. Todor Todorov was given a mandate to form a new government of national unity. His cabinet, formed on

November 28, included two Nationals, two Democrats, two Broad Socialists, and two Agrarians, Tsanko Tserkovski as Minis-

ter of Rails, Posts, and Telegraphs, and Dragiev as Minister of Agriculture. The Ministry of Public Domains was left vacant for Stamboliski. A bill on amnesty was hastily enacted, and Stamboliski came out of hiding to join the government on January 3.°° Dragiev and Stamboliski followed opposite courses in the government, for Dragiev sincerely believed in the coalition and hoped that Agrarian participation in such governments would become a

permanent fixture of Bulgaria’s future political life. As Minister of Agriculture he urged the peasants to turn over their crops to the state’s economic administration so that an increased supply of food could restore political stability.°* Stamboliski, on the other hand, even though he belonged to the government, took no part in it. He denounced it for governing illegally,” for retaining censorship, and for failing to enact social reforms, and he demanded that it set a date for the new elections.*® This brought the longstanding conflict between Stamboliski and Dragiev into the open and made

a final collision inevitable. The two men agreed to submit their differences to a BANU congress to be held in April. In the meantime, they agreed to nominate a commission of twenty-five members to study the dispute, the split in the parliamentary group, and the conduct of individual members of the Union, and to submit a repori to the congress.°’ °° Kazasov, Burni godini, pp. 16-30. °4 Turlakov, /storiia, p. 131. °° On the grounds that no National Assembly elections had been held within the five-year period mandated by the constitution. °° Zemledelsko zname, xiv, No. 43 (Feb. 20, 1919), 1. °7 Zemledelsko zname, xiv, Nos. 50, 55, 61 (March 8, 21, April 5, 1919).

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Expecting victory at the congress, Stamboliski pressed Dragiev and his followers to pledge in advance to abide by its decisions. Dragiev demurred, and in March Nikola Mushanov, the Democratic Minister of the Interior, banned the congress. He may have

| been acting from the fear that the unsettled situation in the country provided a dangerous environment for mass political meetings. It was also true that in the countryside Stamboliski’s followers were conducting a strident campaign against the government. But it is

| quite likely, if unproven, that he was cooperating with Dragiev. After the banning of the congress, Stamboliski and Tserkovski submitted their resignations, but Dragiev did not. Todorov backed away from this confrontation, and the two Democratic members of the cabinet were forced to resign. The congress was rescheduled for June 1.°° It began inauspiciously for Dragiev. Stamboliski nominated the

“hero of Radomir” to preside, and Daskalov was given a prolonged ovation by the delegates. The congress also voted overwhelmingly to approve the “courageous acts” of Stamboliski in defying Ferdinand and enduring prison. On the second day, Spas

Duparinov, a young fire-eater, called Dragiev an ‘“‘old man, whom time has passed by,” at which the Agrarian moralist left the congress, refusing to return until Duparinov was persuaded to

apologize. When the commission presented its report on factionalism in the Union, its verdict went mainly against Dragiev.

Although some members of the Dimitrov faction were found guilty of wartime speculation, the same charges applied to many

of Dragiev’s followers as well. Moreover, the commission attached most of the blame for the split in the parliamentary group to Dragiev.°®

Dragiev took the floor in his own defense, and his speech occupied the entire third day of the congress. He later published it with some additional remarks as his “political confession.’’ He began by recounting his long years of service to the Agrarian Union and then went to the core of his differences with Stamboliski. He believed in gradual, evolutionary change, he said, while Stamboliski was a revolutionary. He believed in humility °° Kh. Khristov, Revoliutsionnata, pp. 406-407. °° Zemledelsko zname, xiv, Nos. 77, 79, 80 (June 8, 14, 18, 1919).

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and tolerance, Stamboliski in might makes right. Above all, Dragiev pleaded, he was a Christian, a deeply religious man whose life was guided by the sermon on the mount. Stamboliski was a materialist.

For me there is another world and my works may proceed slowly. For Stamboliski, as a materialist, the world is here and he is quick, he wants everything that will be done to be done in a few years—he will not wait. I am for gradual progress, he is for rapid progress. He 1s a revolutionary, I am not.®°

Stamboliski did not deny these charges. Rather he confirmed them in a short, almost perfunctory speech. The congress voted overwhelmingly to confirm the commission’s report and recommendations. Dragiev himself was not censured, but a number of his supporters were removed from their posts and some were suspended from membership in the Union. The newly elected Governing Council was dominated by Stamboliski’s supporters. At the conclusion of the congress, when it met to elect a Standing Committee, all of Dragiev’s nominees and Dragiev himself were defeated. Dragiev walked out of the meeting and later, when he entered an independent slate of candidates in the elections for the XVIII National Assembly, he was formally expelled from the Union. Tsanko Tserkovski wrote his political obituary, stressing Dragiev’s desire for personal recognition and his resentment of the more talented and dynamic Stamboliski.°' A Radical journalist accurately summed up the difference between the two men when he wrote: “Mr. Dragiev lacks that belief in his star, that self-assurance, that Mr. Stamboliski holds in such large measure,’’° After his success at the congress, Stamboliski went to Paris as a

member of Bulgaria’s peace delegation. While he was abroad, elections were held for a new National Assembly. Their result, shown in Table 4, demonstrates the continuing erosion of the old °° Dragiev, Izpoved, p. 8. 1 Zemledelsko zname, xiv, Nos. 81, 94 (June 20, Aug. 7, 1919). 62 Radikal, xv, No. 124 (June 10, 1919), 1.

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parties and significant gains for both the BANU and the Communists.®* The three parties of change captured 59 percent of the vote and 71 percent of the seats in the National Assembly. TABLE 4 ELECTIONS FOR THE XVIII NATIONAL ASSEMBLY,

AucGustT 17, 1919

Deputies |votes % of Party elected Votes BANU 85 180,648 28

BCP 47 118,671 18 Broad Socialists 36 82,826 13

Democrats 28 65,267 Nationals 19 54,556108

Progressive Liberals 8 52,722 8

Liberals 28 42,024 6 Radicals 33,343 5 Dragiev Agrarians 0 17,796 3

Others 0 8,462 l Total 233 656,315 100

Stamboliski returned to Bulgaria on September 19, and received Boris’s mandate to form a new government. Since the BANU was thirty-four seats short of a majority, a partner was needed for a coalition. Participation in coalition governments violated a longstanding Union tradition. During the war Stamboliski had written from prison against diluting the Union’s program by

compromise with the political parties.°* He had approved the BANU’s entry into the Malinov and Todorov governments only because of the desperate situation in which the country found itself. Now he was prepared to continue in a coalition, but only be-

cause he believed that a strong tide was running in favor of the BANU. To withdraw from responsibility now would break the Union’s momentum and leave the field to the Communists. A short period of coalition, new elections, and an Agrarian majority were what he expected. Stamboliski first approached the Communists with an offer of 83 Birman, p. 265; Turlakov, Jstoriia, p. 135; Statisticheski godishnik na bilgarskoto tsarstvo, godini V-XIV (1913-1922), p. C59. 64 N. Petkov, pp. 182-83.

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partnership, but the BCP® had visions of its own. Its strength had

grown faster than any other party’s, and its leaders viewed the Bulgarian situation through the prism of Russian experience. To them Stamboliski was a Bulgarian Kerensky to be brushed aside at the appropriate moment. Blagoev rejected the Agrarian offer out of hand, stating that the BCP would not join hands with the petit bourgeoisie.®* This response had, of course, been expected. Stamboliski knew that the Allies would never permit an even par-

tially “bolshevik” regime in Bulgaria, and his experience with Blagoev during the Radomir Rebellion made it obvious that he would get no cooperation from that quarter. Nevertheless, it served his purposes to have made the offer. The BANU could now

accuse the BCP of cowardice and fear of responsibility. If this would not shake the Communists in their factory strongholds, it would still carry weight in the villages. On the other hand, by raising the spectre of an Agrarian-Communist alliance, Stamboliski could intimidate the right, forcing it to accept the Agrarian program. Having executed this maneuver, Stamboliski turned to the party he really wanted, the Broad Socialists. The Broad Socialists at this time, however, were beset by great fear and great ambition. Their fear, and it was a real one, was of

losing their following in the working class to the Communists. The Socialists were aware that, although they had captured a solid

13 percent of the vote in the August elections, against this had to be balanced the fact that they had controlled the Ministry of the Interior, always a large advantage in any Bulgarian election. During the summer, Krutstiu Pastukhov had turned the police loose against the Communists and had tried, unsuccessfully, to secure Socialist control of the trade unions with police power. The Communists had succeeded in pinning the label “Police Socialists” on the party in the elections. The Socialists must have been aware that, although they retained a following among the country’s white-collar and skilled workers, their strength among the proletariat was vanishing. But if they feared any contest of 6° The Narrow Socialists had adopted the title “Bulgarian Communist Party” at their congress in May 1919.

°° Rothschild, pp. 94-97; Istoriia na Bilgarskata komunisticheska partiia (Sofia, 1972), p. 227.

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numbers with either the BANU or the BCP, the Socialists knew that they had other strengths. They had a stronghold in the government bureaucracy and among the railroad workers, two vital strategic points. Moreover, Pastukhov had seen the uses of political power. Under the right circumstances his party might still win all.

The Broad Socialists agreed to form a government with the BANU, but as the price of participation they demanded the Ministries of the Interior, War, Commerce, and Rails, Posts and Tele-

graphs. In effect, this was a request for control of the army, the police, and a critical segment of the working class. Alexander Obbov, who with Stamboliski, Daskalov, and Turlakov com-

posed the BANU’s negotiating committee, directly accused Pastukhov of planning a coup. The same conclusion was reached in the press of the Radical party, which had always been close to

the Broad Socialists and which expected to find a place in an Agrarian-Broad coalition.®” The BANU made a counter offer of three ministries, including those of war, commerce, and finance, but Pastukhov remained adamant and the BANU was forced to turn elsewhere.®®

The failure of the Agrarians and the Socialists to come to terms was a great misfortune for them both, and for the country as well.

Such an alliance could have restored political stability, and it would have had the support of the bureaucrats with the training and skill to administer the government.®’ The decision of the Socialists to oppose the BANU created tremendous difficulties for the Agrarians, who now had to develop their own machinery to implement their program and to rely on poorly trained and inexperienced cadres. It was doubly unfortunate since the whole tradition of Broad Socialism had been to reach out to the countryside for allies. Unhappily, the Socialists had always seen themselves 68” Radikal, xv, Nos. 221, 223 (Oct. 6, 8, 1919). The Radikal editors placed the blame for the BANU’s turn to the right squarely on the Broad Socialists. 68 Zemledelsko zname, xv, No. 24-25 (Oct. 3, 1919), 3; Turlakov, /storiia, p. 136. These accounts have been supplemented with the testimony of Dimo Kazasov and Alexander Obbov, who were interviewed by the author in June and July 1973. ° D. Kazasov, Burni godini, p. 36. Kazasov reiterated this point to the author in June 1973. He laid the blame for the party’s intransigence on the ambition and closed-mindedness of Pastukhov.

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directing such a partnership. They could not bring themselves to take part if it meant a subordinate position. True, they paid for their decision with the nearly complete erosion of their following. But they dealt a crippling blow to the Agrarian Union in the process. Unable to reach an agreement with any of the left parties—the Radical group by itself was too small to bother with—the BANU

turned to the right. The National and Progressive Liberal parties jumped at the chance to hold office, and on October 6 the new government was formed. Two Nationals, Mikhail Madzharov and Atanas Burov, held the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Commerce, while Stoian Danev, the Progressive Liberal leader, took

the Finance Ministry. The remaining posts were occupied by Agrarians. Stamboliski became Prime Minister and held the Ministries of War and Public Domains as well. Raiko Daskalov became Minister of Agriculture, Tsanko Tserkovski Minister of

Education, Alexander Dimitrov Minister of the Interior, and Marko Turlakov Minister of Rails, Posts and Telegraphs and acting Minister of Justice. The extra ministries held by Stamboliski

and Turlakov were purposely left vacant in case the Broad Socialists abandoned their hostility to a coalition. The government commanded only 112 of the 233 seats in the National Assembly, but Stamboliski, doubting that his opponents on the right and left could come together, was sure that he had enough votes to govern during the next crucial months.” The first major act of the government was to arrest those members of the Radoslavov cabinet who were still in the country. Also

arrested were a number of deputies and journalists who had ardently supported the war as well as officers and officials charged with crimes in occupied territories. The last category included the

leaders of the Macedonian organizations. At the same time a “Law for the Judgment and Punishment of Those Responsible for the National Catastrophe” was introduced in the National Assembly. This measure was first decided on by the Union’s Governing Council, which was motivated by the desire to impress the Allies with Bulgaria’s break with the past and by considerations of sim” D. Kazasov, Burni godini, p. 41; Zemledelsko zname, xv, No. 22 (Oct. 8, 1919), 1.

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ple justice. The law was also expected to have broad popular support. Before he returned to Paris, Stamboliski toyed with the idea

of creating a “People’s Court” to try the accused. The Communists, in fact, demanded this. The BANU’s partners on the right, however, were able to secure the deletion of this provision, and the legislation, passed on November 22, provided for trial in the civil courts.” Although the BANU had presented an outline of its reform program at the opening of the National Assembly,” it hesitated to press for its legislative enactment. Its parliamentary foundation was shaky and Stamboliski was abroad—he signed the Treaty of Neuilly on November 27. Moreover, there were clear signs that a major confrontation with the left was approaching. The primary causes of the great winter strike were the ambition of the Communists, the Socialists’ fear of being left behind, and

the very real deprivations suffered by the urban working class. The plight of the working class was indeed serious, for inflation had far outrun wages and many basic commodities including food and fuel were difficult to acquire for any amount of money.”

At the Narrow Socialist congress in May 1919, at which the Narrow Socialists became the Bulgarian Communist party and joined the Comintern, the party leaders rejected “bourgeois parliamentarism,” condemned the “‘left’’ parties, the BANU, Radical Democrats, and Broad Socialists, as “‘agents of the bourgeoi“1 Zemledelsko zname, xv, No. 38 (Nov. 8, 1919), 1. According to Petir Peshev, one of those arrested, those incarcerated in Central Prison included 9 former ministers; the Vice-President of the XVII National Assembly; 19 former

deputies; 6 journalists; 4 former military judges; General Savov, the former Commander-in-Chief; 5 Macedonian leaders, including General Protogerov and Todor Alexandrov; and 10 high officials. In later months an indeterminate additional number were arrested in Sofia and the provinces. For many of them this proved to be a blessing in disguise since it prevented their extradition for trial in Rumania, Yugoslavia, or Greece. Radoslavov himself had fled with the Germans, but he was tried in absentia. The Agrarian government approached the Germans on the question of extraditing both Radoslavov and former Tsar Ferdinand, but without result. 7 Dnevnitsi na XVIII ONS, purva izvunredovna sesiia, 1, 6-7. *8 Birman, p. 347; N. Penev, “Zhivotit potvirdi nasheto delo” in N. Goranov and S. Zhelev, eds., Transportnata stachka, 1919-1920 (Sofia, 1964), 12.

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THE ROAD TO POWER | sie,” and called for the formation of workers’, soldiers’, and peasants’ soviets.’* Although they had suffered a setback in July when their attempt to take control of the streets of Sofia was put down by Pastukhov, the August elections revealed that they stood second only to the BANU in popular support. Early in November they began to organize mass meetings and demonstrations against Stamboliski’s coalition. Rabotnicheski vestnik , the party newspaper, was published on red newsprint, a practice that continued to the end of the strike. In the elections for town and village councils on December 7 the party received still more encouragement, gaining 140,000 votes, 20,000 more than in August’s parliamentary elections. Although the BANU swept the rural localities, the BCP ran very well in the towns, winning majorities in Plovdiv, Varna, Ruse, Shumen, Pleven, Sliven, Burgas, and Dupnitsa.”

For its part, the BANU was willing to meet the Communist challenge, and it had already begun to prepare to deal with the working class and its parties. When their negotiations for a coali-

tion with the BANU broke down, the Broad Socialists had threatened the Agrarian leaders with a strike. On October 8, two days after the formation of the Agrarian coalition, representatives of the Socialist-dominated transport, postal, and telegraph unions

presented the government with a demand for large wage increases. At the same time, the unions issued an appeal to their members, telling them to prepare for a strike, and published a handbook with instructions for setting up a nationwide network of strike committees. The task of negotiating with the unions fell to Marko Turlakov, the Minister of Rails, Posts and Telegraphs, and

/ to Alexander Dimitrov, the Minister of the Interior and Acting Prime Minister while Stamboliski was in Paris. The two men rejected the unions’ demands on October 15, but sweetened the pill by announcing that the government would seek an emergency appropriation of 80,000,000 leva for the relief of state-employed workers.’° Although this measure averted an immediate crisis, the Agrar“* Bulgarskata komunisticheska partiia v rezoliutsii i resheniia na kongresite, konferentsite i plenumite na Ts. K., 1 (Sofia, 1951), 14-19. ” Birman, p. 348; Zemledelsko zname, xv, No. 54 (Dec. 13, 1919), 1. © Kh. Khristov, Revoliutsionnata, pp. 514-16.

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ian leaders appealed to the druzhbi to prepare to fight for the government. Turlakov and Dimitrov toured the provinces to organize the Orange Guard, a paramilitary Agrarian defense force consist-

ing of able-bodied peasants, armed generally with clubs (the tsepinitsa), under the command of local druzhba leaders. The Guard was ordered to take over the towns in the event of an attack on the government.” If the creation of the Guard seemed to set an example of extralegality and brownshirtism, it should be remembered that by the terms of the Treaty of Neuilly the government

was left practically no armed forces for self-defense, while the

Socialists and Communists already possessed disciplined “troops.’’ As Stamboliski later said in the National Assembly, when accused by a Communist deputy of using the Guard as a state institution:

Are your proletarian and bureaucratic unions state institutions? Are your clubs, your “peoples halls,’’ your groups state institutions? Who gave them the right to conceal weapons, to march

with weapons, to demolish bridges, to throw bombs, to terrorize government workers? Who gave them that right? Against your organization the Agrarian Union will oppose its own, and

the government will do its duty because it has sufficient strength to crush those who disturb [civil] order.”®

Because of the measures that Dimitrov and Turlakov took, and because of their hard line against the unions, Communist historians have charged that they represented a right-wing faction in the BANU that stood for the interests of large landowners who were joining the Union now that it was in power.’® They argue, by implication, that 1f Stamboliski had been on the scene, relations with the working-class parties would have developed differently. There is no evidence to support this position. Stamboliski never | gave less than full approval to the measures taken by his minis-

ters, and he personally instituted the most severe repression against the strikers after his return from Paris. Even Raiko Daskalov, whom Communist historians nominate as leader of the ’ Birman, pp. 352, 364-65. * Zemledelsko zname, xv, No. 76 (March 7, 1920), 1. 79 Kh. Khristov, Revoliutsionnata, p. 559; Birman, pp. 314-15, 363-64.

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“left” faction, rejoiced in the crushing defeat suffered by the BCP and its allies.°° Conflict between the Agrarians and Communists was not the product of a right-wing Agrarian cabal, it was the natural outcome of political developments since the end of the war.

The two militant and exuberant organizations were inevitably headed for a showdown to decide which of them would inherit Bulgaria.

The BCP decided to test its strength by holding massive demonstrations around the country to coincide with the opening of the National Assembly on December 24. The government proclaimed martial law and prohibited all gatherings. Orange Guards were brought to the towns; as many as 10,000 assembled in Sofia. Although a few small Communist demonstrations were held, most of the workers were afraid to come into the streets.*! The next

day, however, a wildcat strike broke out among the transport workers. It seems to have taken by surprise the leadership of the unions as well as of the Socialist and Communist parties, but the BCP seized the chance to provoke a confrontation between the government and the workers. Its leadership called for a general strike, and the Broad Socialists, frightened of losing their radical reputation, joined in.” On December 26 representatives of the transport unions presented a new list of demands to Stamboliski, who had just re-

turned from Paris. When he rejected these, the Socialists and Communists formed a joint strike committee. The general strike began at noon on December 28. Stamboliski was convinced that the strike had been called for political reasons and, although aware of the deprivations suffered by the urban workers, was determined not to make any concessions. The Orange Guard was mobilized to defend state property, and peasants who had served in transport battalions during the war

ment.®° | were put to work on the railroads. The Allied occupation au-

thorities lent troops, expertise, and moral support to the govern-

Stamboliski decided to challenge the Communists in their own

°° Dnevnitsi na XVIII ONS, purva redovna sesiia, 11, 1,182. $1 Kh. Khristov, Revoliutsionnata, pp. 526-32.

82 Ibid., p. 533; Rothschild, p. 98. 83 Rothschild, p. 98.

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stronghold, the Pernik coal mines, whose workers had a long history of militancy. Alexander Dimitrov led half of the Sofia garrison, reinforced with cavalry units, to the mines and carried out mass arrests of strikers. Orange Guards were used to bring the mines back into production.** On December 31, the government militarized the transport and communications industries. Workers were mobilized, and those who failed to report were evicted from their state-owned apartments, deprived of their food ration cards, and threatened with military courts. Several Communist party leaders were arrested, and the rest were driven underground.® In the face of this decisive Agrarian counterattack, the BCP’s leadership faltered and broke. It called an end to the general strike on January 5. The transport and communications workers and the Pernik miners continued to hold out, but on February 19 the entire strike effort collapsed.*®

Stamboliski wished to defeat the Communists, not crush them.

He still looked on the BCP as an estatist organization, and he maintained that as soon as the workers replaced the lawyers and intellectuals in their leadership with men from their own ranks, they would find an accommodation with the BANU. He also knew that the time had come to proceed with his own programs, and that fear of the Communists would drive the rightist parties to acquiesce in the Agrarian plans for reform.®’ With the formal end of the strike, the government dropped its repressive measures. Stamboliski dissolved the National Assembly and scheduled new elections for March 28. Their results (Table 5)®° brought an increase in Agrarian support and bore witness to the new political configuration that had arisen since the war.

The elections left the BANU five seats short of an absolute majority. Rather than form another coalition, Stamboliski moved 8* Kh. Mashkov, “‘Uchastieto na pernishkite (dimitrovskite) rudnichari v trans-

portnata stachka prez 1919/1920 g.,” Istoricheski pregled, xu, No. 2 (1956), 65-71.

8° Birman, pp. 354-63. 86 Kh. Khristov, Revoliutsionnata, pp. 564-66. 87 Dnevnitsi na XVIII ONS, piurva izvunredovna sesiia, 1, 48.

88 Ta. Iotsov, “Upravlenieto na Zemedelskiia stiuz (1919-1923 g.),” Istoricheski pregled, v1, No. 3 (1950), 324; vu, No. 3 (1951), 249; Statisticheski godishnik .. . (1913-1922), p. C60.

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THE ROAD TO POWER TABLE 5 ELECTIONS FOR THE XIX NATIONAL ASSEMBLY,

Marcu 28, 1920

Deputiesvotes % of Party elected Votes BANU 110 349,21220.2 38.2 BCP 51 184,616 Democrats 15 23 91,177 Nationals 61,64710.0 6.7

Broad Socialists 7 55,542 6.1 Progressive Liberals 9 46,930 5.1 Radical 41,930 4.2 4.6 NationalDemocrats Liberals 6839,537 Various Liberal and Liberal-

Democratic Coalitions — 35,522 3.9 Others 0 9,059 1.0 Totals 229 915,172 100.0 to quash the election of thirteen deputies, including nine Communists, three Democrats, and one Progressive Liberal. The case for invalidating these mandates rested on a strict interpretation of the election laws, particularly a usually unenforced prohibition against local officeholders running in national elections.’ The BANU now held a narrow majority of four votes. The new Agrarian cabinet, formed on May 20, 1920, had the following composition:

Alexander Stamboliski, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Acting Minister of War Alexander Dimitrov, Minister of the Interior Tsanko Tserkovski, Minister of Public Domains Marko Turlakov, Minister of Finance Raiko Daskalov, Minister of Commerce Alexander Radolov,®® Minister of Justice *° Zemledelsko zname, xv, Nos. 94, 95 (May 5, 8, 1920). This was, of course, by no means unprecedented. Stamboliski had had his own candidacy invalidated on a technicality in the elections for the XV National Assembly in 1911. 9° Alexander Radolov, who was born in 1883 in Ferdinandsko near Karnobat, had been an active BANU organizer since 1909, when he returned from studying law in Geneva. He was particularly forceful in advocating the establishment of cooperatives, and he authored a number of tracts and articles on economic cooper-

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Stoian Omarchevski, Minister of Education Alexander Obbov,”! Minister of Agriculture Nedelko Atanasov,” Minister of Rails, Posts and Telegraphs Tserkovski and Turlakov were the ‘“‘old men’”’ of the cabinet at

ages fifty and forty-eight, respectively. Stamboliski had just passed his forty-first birthday, Dimitrov was awaiting his fortysecond. The remaining five ministers were in their thirties. Despite their relative youth, the members of the Agrarian cabinet were veterans of the BANU’s past political struggles. They had achieved power and were prepared for the far more difficult task of using that power to transform Bulgaria. ation. He was elected to the National Assembly in 1913. During the period of Agrarian coalition, Stamboliski appointed him a State Prosecutor for the trial of Radoslavov’s cabinet. Tadzher, pp. 451-54; Kabineta na G-n Al. Stamboliski, 1920-1921 g. (Sofia, 1921), p. 16. 91 Alexander Obbov was born in Pleven in 1887. Although he studied law and philosophy for three years in Sofia University, he specialized in agriculture, taking courses at the Pleven Vinicultural and Fruit Institutes and working on a state model farm. His career in the BANU was highly successful. At Zabunov’s urging he became an assistant editor of Zemledelsko zname. He was also chief of the Union’s agitators, and served for several years as Secretary of the Union. Elected to parliament for the first time in 1919, he was chosen to be one of the Vice Presidents of the Assembly and was recommended by his colleagues for a place in the cabinet. Tadzher, pp. 515-16; Kabineta, p. 13. 92 Nedelko Atanasov had been an Agrarian activist from the first days of the Union. Born in the village of Slomer in the Turnovo District, he studied for two _ years at Sofia University before returning to the Tumovo area as a teacher. During the struggle against the tithe he organized one of the largest of the Agrarian demonstrations. This cost him his teaching position and he devoted himself full-time to

the BANU as an agitator and writer. He also headed one of the branches of the National Store. He was elected to the V Grand National Assembly in 1911 and later became a leading deputy in the Agrarian parliamentary group. Tadzher, pp. 675-76.

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CHAPTER VI

The Agrarians in Power: Domestic Reforms

We must never govern just for the love of the art. —Alexander Stamboliski!

HISTORICAL scholarship has taken a generally negative view of the BANU’s accomplishments during the years it held power. In the West, Paul Gentizon’s Le drame bulgare,* the only substantial account of the Agrarian government in a Western language, has had an enduring influence. Gentizon, who was the Balkan corre-

spondent for Le Temps, was no friend of the Agrarians, and he described Stamboliski as a corrupt, ignorant demagogue, whose ideas were limited to a hatred of towns and their inhabitants, the politicians, businessmen, and intellectuals, whom he wished to destroy. He held the Agrarians in general to be arrogant, halfcivilized barbarians, enemies of the modern world.? Since his portrait confirms the impression of peasants and peasant movements held by a majority of social scientists, it has become almost standard in Western scholarship .* Communist historians, on the other hand, now accord greater

respect to the Agrarians than did their predecessors who had to deal with them in the flesh. Contemporary Soviet and Bulgarian historians now present Stamboliski as a progressive who voiced the real aspirations of the peasantry, and as an early martyr to fasStamboliski, Pismata, p. 19. 2 P. Gentizon, Le Drame bulgare (de Ferdinand de Bulgarie a Stamboulisky) (Paris, 1924). 3 Ibid., pp. 136-63. * Joseph Rothschild’s interpretation of Stamboliski and the BANU follows Gen-

tizon’s almost exactly and cites Le Drame bulgare more often than any other source. See The Communist Party of Bulgaria, pp. 85-94. George Jackson, Jr., in Comintern and Peasant in East Europe, 1919-1930 (New York, 1966), although he does not cite Gentizon in either his text or bibliography, follows Rothschild. See also R. L. Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time (New York, 1967), pp. 106-107.

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cism. Nevertheless, in their eyes he was doomed from the beginning, his tragic flaw being his belief that capitalist society could be reformed without being destroyed, that “‘the wolves could be full and the sheep whole.” Rejecting the leadership of the working class and its party in favor of his estatist ideology that abjured

class struggle, he inevitably saw his reforms perverted by the bourgeoisie and his government collapse.®

While both of these conclusions are wide of the mark, they raise important questions of interpretation and evaluation that should be dealt with before turning to the individual Agrarian reforms. The charge that Stamboliski hated industry and urban life is an exaggeration based on a few of his more flamboyant campaign speeches. There is little doubt, of course, that he preferred the village to the city, and even less doubt that he could say so in strong, even violent terms. He frequently denounced the “*parasites”” who inhabited the cities, and in 1920 he threatened to bring down fire

and brimstone on the “Sodom and Gomorrah” of Sofia.® As Prime Minister he built his small, official residence in the fields outside the capital rather than live in its heart, and whenever possible he returned to his native Slavovitsa, where he built a villa. Still, it is not true that he was a “‘blind hater’”’ of urban life. Even when he was most critical of the exploitation of the countryside by the city he called only for a more equitable distribution of wealth, not for the depopulation of urban centers. His description of Sofia

as a “Sodom and Gomorrah” became a standard political joke bobbing through three years of parliamentary banter. His denunciations of lawyers, businessmen, and members of the intelligentsia were tempered by the acknowledgment that there were many honest and generous members of these professions who were a ° A.N. Kirshevskaia, “Reformy pravitel’stva zemledel’cheskogo soiuza v Bolgaril i ikh krakh,’’ Uchenye zapiski Instituta slavianovedeniia, x (1954), 5-71, and the same author’s “Padenie pravitel’stva zemledel’cheskogo soiuza v Bolgarii,”’ Uchenye zapiski Instituta slavianovedeniia, x1 (1955), 63-118; I. N. Chastukhin, ‘“Ideologicheskie i politicheskie vzgliady Aleksandra Stamboliskogo,” Novaia i

noveishaia istoriia, V1 (1959), 37-53; Istoriia na Biulgariia, i, pp. 412-33; P, Stoichev, “‘Aleksandur Stamboliski—ideolog na drebnoselskata demokratsiia,”’ Istoricheski pregled, xxx1, No. 1 (1975), 3-30. 6 A. Stamboliski, Zemledelsko upravlenie: purva godina (Sofia, 1921), p. 43.

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credit and a benefit to Bulgaria.’ If he preferred the countryside to Sofia, so have recent American presidents preferred Camp David to Washington. Stamboliski’s contemporary critics also charged him with sexual immorality, specifically of being involved in frequent **scandals” with various women.® Although it is impossible to docu-

ment this part of his life in any detail, this accusation seems to

have had a kernel of truth. He had a reputation as a “womanizer.”® His wife, Milena, was older than he by several years, and the always-dubious charms of her person faded after the birth of their children in 1902 and 1904. During much of the time her husband was in power, she and her son and daughter traveled or lived abroad.?® Perhaps Stamboliski revealed something of this side of his life in his pamphlet on “Power, Anarchy, and Democracy,” when, in discussing various forms of power, he

arrived at that of sex: :

As a rule the more loving and passionate individual becomes subject to the less loving and passionate one. Usually the man becomes subject because he is more impulsive. The woman, although weaker physically and intellectually, knows her heart and thus can wield power. . . . No important political event

ever takes place without a woman. They bend even strong statesmen to their will."

We do not know to what or to whom he was referring, but he seems to have been involved with several women during his years

as Prime Minister. This does not, of course, make him unique among statesmen, and there is no evidence that it diverted the course of either his domestic or foreign policies. It may, in fact, have helped him to establish rapport with Lloyd-George.

: The accusations of corruption raised against Stamboliski and his government are more serious and equally difficult to evaluate.

Allegedly, substantial sums of money were found concealed in “ Dnevnitsi na XIX ONS, pirva redovna sesiia, 11, 1973; N. Petkov, pp. 22632, 299-300. 8 Druzhbashkiia rezhim: Dokumenti, 1 (Sofia, 1923), 9-22. ’ K. Todorov, p. 169. 10 Radikal, xvii, No. 184 (Aug. 19, 1922), 1. 11 Stamboliski, Vast, pp. 7-8.

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| DOMESTIC REFORMS Stamboliski’s belongings after the June 9 coup d’état.'* The source of this information, however, is the same that reported Stamboliski “shot while trying to escape,” so that it cannot be accepted as disinterested evidence. Most descriptions of Stamboliski’s style of life emanating from those who knew him, including those who were not his supporters, indicate that he did not have a great love of luxury, and he had endured a Spartan existence in the years before the BANU came to power. The memoirs of Nedezhda Stanchova,’® who accompanied him

on his diplomatic trips as translator, and who “abhorred’’ his domestic policies, describe a man satisfied with relatively simple material pleasures. Neither his house outside Sofia nor his villa, both now restored and preserved as museums, was particularly opulent, even by Bulgarian standards. If Stamboliski can by and large be absolved of the charge of

personal corruption, the same is not true for many of his colleagues. Alexander Botev, for example, who served from June to

October 1921 as Minister of Rails, Posts and Telegraphs, was forced to resign for misappropriating building materials, and he was later sentenced to three years in prison for graft.‘* Otto Nekhelis, the Director of the BANU’s National Store, embezzled large sums and was forced to resign in a scandal that also caused

Interior Minister Nedelko Atanasov to leave office under a cloud.‘® Marko Turlakov accumulated a considerable fortune as Minister of Finance, apparently from speculation and kickbacks on government contracts.'® Worse still was the example of Anton Prudkin, a poet of “demonic” tendencies whose weakness was power rather than money. During the war he had shared a cell in

Vidin Prison with Stamboliski, who appointed him Chief of Police of Sofia in 1919. During the March 1920 election campaign Prudkin was responsible for two major bomb explosions and two assassinations, which he used as pretexts to curb opposi12 Druzhbashkiia rezhim: dokumenti, 11 (Sofia, 1923), 30-31. 13, N. Muir, Dimitri Stancioff: Patriot and Cosmopolitan, 1864-1940 (London, 1957).

14 x Radolov, Prevrata na 9-i iuni i prestupnoto nekhaistvo (Sofia, 1931), p. 127; Zemledelsko zname, xvii, No. 86 (Oct. 10, 1921), 1.

15 Radolov, pp. 125-26. 16 Ihid., p. 132. 157

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tion political activity. Although his crimes were discovered and led to his arrest, they brought lasting discredit to the government and tended to substantiate the charge that the Agrarians used dictatorial methods.*” It should be pointed out that the examples of corruption and malfeasance cited here were brought to light by the Agrarians themselves. At the same time it is almost certainly true that many more examples went unreported and unpunished, particularly at the provincial and local levels. Examples of corruption among Agrarian officials point to a larger problem, the BANU’s “lack of cadres.’’ Much of the cor-

ruption and inefficiency of the Agrarian government may be attributed to its lack of a sufficient number of trained and experienced men. Stamboliski was aware of this problem, and he frequently stated that the BANU had had power thrust upon it before it was ready to govern. Another decade in opposition, he maintained, would have given the Union time to develop a corps of officials experienced in local government and Union affairs who would have been ready to administer the national bureaucracy.'®

Since the BANU did not have such men available in 1919, he was prepared to accept the consequences. He attempted first to form a coalition with the Broad Socialists. Then, when the National Assembly convened after the March 1920 elections the Agrarian deputies voted for Radical leader Naicho Tsanov as Assembly President in an attempt to bring that party into some form of partnership. Tsanov, however, turned down the office, and the Radicals declined to take part in or support the government.” At the same time, Stamboliski offered high diplomatic and adminis-

trative posts to Alexander Malinov and the leadership of the Democratic party and to a number of professionals who had served in previous governments. A few, such as Dimittr Stanchov, Mikhail Savov, and Professor Stefan Balamezov, appointed

ambassadors to England, France, and Czechoslovakia, respectively, accepted and served with distinction, but most refused.?° ‘7 Tbid., pp. 86-87; K. Todorov, p. 130; P. Peshev, pp. 774-77; Dnevnitsi na XIX ONS, purva redovna sesiia, Iv, p. 2849. *® Stamboliski, Zemledelsko upravlenie, pp. 12-14. ‘° Dnevnitsi na XVII ONS, purva izviinredovna sesiia, pp. 4-5. *° Radolov, p. 25.

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This lack of cooperation from the old parties, who would not take second place to the Agrarians or assume any responsibility for the implementation of their policies, forced the Agrarian government to appoint less-than-qualified personnel. Moreover, many unprincipled bureaucrats sought to join the BANU as soon as it came to power. The Union tried to screen them out, but many were able to become Agrarians and to discredit the BANU with their dishonesty as they had done to other parties before.”!

There remains the question of the Agrarian government’s commitment to the rule of law. Its critics on the right accused it of ignoring the constitution and traditional legal procedures in favor of “‘bolshevik methods.’’ On the other hand, the Communists berated the BANU for failing to develop and use a “revolutionary legality” to drive the bourgeoisie from its entrenched positions of

power. The Agrarians were committed to bringing about funda- | mental changes in the structure of Bulgarian society. At the same time, much of the professional bureaucracy and the judiciary were opposed to Agrarian values in general and to much if not all of the Agrarian reform program. In such a situation there is no formula that can guide statesmen to certain success. Total adherence to the letter of the law might easily have emasculated the Agrarian reforms and provided the opposition with a shield behind which it

could work to topple the government “‘by legal means.” The fate / of the Weimar Republic provides an instructive example of the fetish of legality and its possible consequences.”? On the other hand, ignoring legality altogether in order to force change at any cost might well have destroyed the very idea of law, opening the way to the unrestrained rule of force. The experience of the Soviet Union may be taken as a case in point.”* The following examina21 Zemledelsko zname, xiv, No. 40 (Feb. 13, 1919), 1; xvi, No. 69 (Nov. 26, 1920), 1; Turlakov, Istoriia, pp. 199-202. 22 F. Neumann, Behemoth: The Structure and Practice of National Socialism (New York, 1944), pp. 8-34. See also Lenin’s comments on parliamentarism and the nature of the state in State and Revolution (New York, 1932), especially pp. 7-20, 39-44. 3 Solzhenitsyn’s Gulag Archipelago is a powerful indictment of the idea that the growth of economic and military power justifies the measures employed to achieve it by Lenin’s and Stalin’s regimes. The chapters on the evolution of Soviet

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tion of the Agrarian reforms and their implementation will show that the critics of both left and right persuasions were correct. The Agrarians did not go to either extreme. Although they refused to play the game with their enemies’ rules, they did not reject the concept of “‘rules” altogether. In the spring of 1922, Stamboliski mused editorially about Bulgaria’s next twenty years under Agrarian government.”* Although

it is not a rigorous description of his program, the article offers some insight into the Agrarian leader’s expectations. In twenty years, he predicted, Bulgaria would be a “model agricultural state,”» whose towns and villages would be free of both muddy, crooked streets and human bloodsuckers. They would be furnished with healthy, drinkable water, wooded parks, modern fertilizers, the telegraph and telephone, and electric lights. They would also have highly developed cooperative organizations, and there. would be an extensive rail network with every station having storage facilities for grain and tobacco. Every village would have

a “Home of Agrarian Democracy,” where lectures, plays, and films would be presented, and where peasants could hear recordings of “the best speeches of the best orators.’’ There also would local officials deliberate and “the most modern local courts” settle disputes without any interference from lawyers. Politically, Bulgaria would see the demise of the old parties. Their place would be taken by a coalition made up of the Agrarian Union, uniting all peasants in the country’s largest political group-

ing, an organization of proletarians, freed from the control of lawyers and other intellectuals, and an artisans’ organization. Together, they would deal with Bulgaria’s economic problems and develop an honest, well-run, democratic political system. Women would gain the vote and earn a place for themselves in political life. Although Stamboliski’s ideology inspired such daydreams, and

underlay the Agrarian program of reform, it was not the only factor that shaped the program. The Treaty of Neuilly, subordination law and legal practice trace the demise of all traditional protections of the citizen against the naked power of the state. 24 Zemledelsko zname, xvii, No. 43 (March 6, 1922), 1.

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to the Inter-Allied commissions on disarmament and reparations, and the need to find immediate solutions to such problems as the resettlement of thousands of refugees, a housing crisis and many more, dictated a substantial portion of the program. The competi-

tion for votes with the traditional parties and the Communists shaped another part. The Agrarian program in practice demonstrated the fascinating mixture of ideology, necessity, and politics, with creative breakthroughs and unexpected setbacks, that commonly appears when “ideological men” come in from the cold of opposition to build a new world from the materials of the old.

The Agrarian government moved immediately to implement the BANU’s stand on militarism. To be sure, disarmament was demanded by the Treaty of Neuilly, but the Agrarians enthusiastically concurred in it as the fulfillment of one of their own major goals. Even before he signed the treaty, Stamboliski addressed an

assembly of officers from the Sofia garrison to explain his policies. He congratulated them for the skill, courage, and sense of duty that they displayed during the war, and he assured them that he did not hold them responsible for Bulgaria’s defeat. At the same time, he told them that Bulgaria would have a new, pacific foreign policy and that the place of the military in the government and in society could not remain unchanged. Asking for time to prove himself and his program, he requested the officers to maintain a political neutrality.*° In the National Assembly the Agrarlans removed the armed forces from the control of the tsar and subordinated them to the government. A number of administrative posts, particularly in the Ministry of War, that were traditionally

held by officers were turned over to civilians, and court functionaries lost their military status. During its years in power, the Agrarian government did not maintain the army at even the level permitted by the peace treaty.”® With regard to the monarchy itself, Stamboliski made no secret 2° Zemledelsko zname, xv, Nos. 26, 27 (Oct. 15, 16, 1919); Dering to Curzon (Sofia, Sept. 28, 1920), FO 371/328/4675/C8174.

28 Dnevnitsi na XIX ONS, treta redovna sesiia, 1, p. 1083; Peel to Curzon (Sofia, Nov. 22, 1920), FO 371/4679/C12663; Erskine to Curzon (Sofia, April 15, 1923), FO 371/8568/C7224, p. 32.

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of the fact that he would prefer a republic. Bulgaria’s situation, however, made this a “practical question,”’ one in which the feelings of the Allies would have to be considered. Under these circumstances he was prepared to accept Boris III, provided that the young tsar remained content with his role as figurehead. Stamboliski told the XVI Agrarian Congress that Boris had learned from his father’s mistakes, and that without the political parties to rely on he would not be able to build a personal regime even if he

wanted to. But he added that all monarchs were “poisonous snakes,” and that if Bulgaria’s tried to bite, the BANU had the means to pull his fangs.?” Although demilitarization and an end to the personal regime in

politics represented the achievement of a major part of the BANU’s prewar program, these measures were now only preconditions to a more extensive series of reforms. To overcome Bulgaria’s backwardness and to implement their concepts of social justice the Agrarians relied on tools derived from their ideology and their experience. The most important of these were the concept of “labor property,’’ cooperation, Compulsory Labor Service, and education. On these four pillars the Agrarian reform program rested. Just as “private property” and “social or communal property” are ideas fundamental to capitalism and to socialism, so the idea of “labor property” [trudova sobstvennost| became a cornerstone of Agrarian policy and contributed to the shaping of several of the BANU’s reforms. In a small book published in 1923, after he had left the cabinet, Raiko Daskalov claimed to have worked out the basic principle in prison in 1916 and 1917. It came to him, he

wrote, as he contemplated the decline of the Roman Empire. Rome fell, he believed, because property became concentrated in the hands of the rich. Great estates squeezed out the independent farmer, robbing the Empire of its best source of vigorous blood. Bulgaria, he continued, was like ancient Rome with the old par-

ties in the role of the patricians and the BANU defending the plebeian cause. To prevent a repetition of the Roman experience, Daskalov proposed that Bulgaria adopt the principle: “The land belongs to those who till it.”” ““No one must have more land than 2” Stamboliski, Zemledelsko upravlenie, pp. 108-16.

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he and his family can work. Everyone must have enough land to provide work for-his family and to be self-supporting.”’”®

Daskalov’s claim to have discovered this principle probably contains a grain of truth—the concept of labor property and the land reform that grew out of it were almost certainly born in the continuous discussions of the imprisoned Agrarian leaders. The Agrarians defined “labor property” as property directly utilized by its owner to provide for himself and his family. A peasant’s farm, an artisan’s shop and tools, an intellectual’s books all were labor property. An estate farmed by hired hands, a banker’s capital, an investor’s stock were not.” Attempts have been made to find the antecedents of labor property in the Russian peasant commune, with its periodic redistribution of land depending on a family’s gain or loss of manpower, or in the Soviet Decree on Land.* In fact, the idea was not new or even unusual, since it has frequently appeared in pre-industrial societies. We have grown used to so many complex forms of property that we stand in danger of forgetting that the “labor principle”’ has played a part in our own past.*?

The Agrarian government’s use of the idea of labor property can best be seen in its land reform. Although Bulgaria was not burdened by a landed aristocracy, the steady growth of population 8 Daskalov, pp. 3-65. 29 Zemledelsko zname, Xvi, No. 58 (Oct. 27, 1920), 1. 30 A. Velev, “Agrarnaia reforma pravitel’stva zemledel’cheskogo soiuza,”

Actes du premier congrés international des études balkaniques et sud-est européennes, V (Sofia, 1970), 118. 31 The Agrarian concept of labor property would have been perfectly acceptable to John Locke. Compare: “Though the earth and all inferior creatures be common to all men, yet every man has a property in his own person; this nobody has any right to but himself. The labor of his body and the work of his hands as we may say are properly his. Whatsoever, then, he removes out of the state that nature hath provided and left it in, he hath mixed his labour with, and joined it to something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.”’ ‘“As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life before it spoils, so much he may by his labour fix a property in; whatever is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others.” ‘“As much land as a man tills, plants, improves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is his property.” Treatise on Civil Government (New York, 1937), pp. 19, 21, 22. See also E. H. Tuma, Twenty-six Centuries of Agrarian Reform (Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1965), pp. 221-39.

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in the years before the war had created a class of landless peasants and a substantial number of dwarfholdings. At the other extreme,

wartime profits from speculation and influence-peddling had created large estates for successful businessmen and politicians. The influx of 450,000 refugees from territories turned over to Greece and Yugoslavia made the need for some sort of land redistribution even more pressing.” Even an Agrarian government, however, was cautious of injecting itself into the relationship between the land and its owner. It therefore moved slowly and marshaled general peasant support before each step. The principles of the reform were first presented to the XV Agrarian Congress in June 1919 and were approved by a large majority. The BANU’s druzhbi were then invited to hold meetings to discuss the reform. After the peasant assemblies pronounced in favor of the reform, the BANU published its draft legislation on February 17, 1920, and moved for its adoption and implementation over the next ten months.** The reform proceeded in two stages. The first was the establishment of a state land fund for distribution to landless peasants and dwarfholders.** The government hurried with this stage because the publication of its draft legislation caused large landowners to begin selling off their property. In June the Agrarians passed through the National Assembly a law halting the private sale of certain categories of land. Invoking the principle of labor property, the reform decreed all land over four hectares held by absentee owners subject to confiscation. In addition the law established a maximum holding of thirty hectares of arable land per household, this amount being deemed more than adequate to provide for any family’s needs. Maximum amounts were also established for wooded and pasture lands. These ranged from a low of twenty hectares in the plains and valleys to fifty hectares in mountainous areas. An owner could preserve his holding only by giving 32M. Grigoroff, “La réforme agraire en Bulgarie,” Revue du Ministére de I’ agriculture, No. 71 (June 1952), 137; Velev, “Agrarnaia reforma,” p. 118. 33 A. Velev, “Reformatorska deinost na zemedelskoto pravitelstvo,” Izvestiia na Vishata partina shkola pri BKP, No. 10 (1961), 119-20. 34 Sbornik na zakonite glasuvani prez XIX ONS i na pravilnitsite kum tiakh, \ (Sofia, 1920), 349-71.

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evidence that he would convert it within three years to fruit and vegetable production or use it as the site of a manufacturing enterprise. This exception to the general thrust of the reform is significant because it indicates that the Agrarians’ vision of equality did not blind them to the need for more efficient agriculture and industrial growth. Compensation was paid on a sliding scale. For the first ten hectares of confiscated land the government paid the average market price that prevailed in the region between 1905 and 1915. For the

next twenty hectares the government paid 90 percent of the 1905-1915 value, for the next twenty, 80 percent, for the next fifty, 70 percent, for the next one-hundred, 60 percent, and for each hectare over two hundred, 50 percent. Thus, the reform involved the partial expropriation of the old landowners’ property. Responsibility for the administration of this law was first given to local authorities and a special commission under the Ministry of Agriculture. This arrangement proved unsatisfactory, particularly in areas in which the machinery of local government was not in Agrarian hands. Well-to-do landowners were frequently able to

bribe local officials to overlook their estates, or to allow title to them to be divided among family members, or to grant them exemptions.*° The failure of the existing bureaucracy to enforce the law strictly caused the Agrarians to set up new enforcement machinery in the second stage of the reform. This was embodied in the “Law for Labor Property in Land,” which passed its final reading in the National Assembly on April 25, 1921.°° This law, the final enactment of the BANU’s land reform, opened new sources of land for distribution. Land owned by monasteries, but not farmed by monks, was made subject to confiscation. Land held by the National and Agricultural Banks and all state-owned arable land not under cultivation were added to the state land fund. Landless peasants and dwarfholders were allowed to purchase land from the fund at 20 percent above the 1905-1915 price. This amount was to be paid over a twenty-year period, dur-

ing which the land could not be resold, and if the land was not 3° Kirshevskaia, ““Reformy,” pp. 34-35. 6 Velev, “Agrarnaia reforma,” p. 121; Sbornik na zakonite, i, pp. 785-800.

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used for agricultural purposes, the government reserved the right to reclaim it. To promote the consolidation of parcelized holdings, dwarfholders were required to give up their separated strips in return for the new land. Similarly, dwarfholders in overpopulated areas were encouraged to exchange their land for a larger, consolidated farm in an unsettled region.

To administer the new law, the government created a “Directorate of Labor Property in Land” under the Ministry of Agriculture. This body established district branches to survey the land, decide on confiscation, fix prices for compensation, and resell the land to poor peasants independently of existing local authorities. Its acts could be appealed to a Provincial Commission of the Directorate, whose decisions were final; they could not be appealed to the courts.*”

Although the Directorate operated more efficiently than the previous reform machinery, it did not achieve all that had been hoped for. It was expected that the state land fund would acquire approximately 230,000 hectares. By the time the government was

overthrown in June 1923, it had accumulated less than 82,000 hectares. The sources of the land are shown in Table 6.°*° When the Agrarian government was toppled, the files of the Directorate contained appeals from 28,325 landless peasant house-

holds, 74,420 dwarfholders, and 7,500 rural laborers. Of those, the Directorate had dealt with the requests of 17,127 landless peasants, 54,471 dwarfholders, and 4,407 rural laborers. An addi-

tional 18,000 peasant families had been settled on state lands through direct administrative process. Most of the peasants who had been dealt with were still considered renters, only 285 having

paid the full price of the land and converting it to their private °7 1. Dermendzhiev, ‘“‘Razvitie na dtirzhavniia aparat v Bulgariia po vreme na upravlenieto na Bulgarskiiat zemedelski naroden stiiuz,’’ Godishnik na Sofiskiia universitet, LV (1964), 324-26. 38 M. Tz. Bouroff, La Réforme agraire en Bulgarie (Paris, 1924), p. 102. The following table (Bouroff, p. 103) shows the sources of land taken from private landowners: 171 owners of over 100 ha gave up 28,482.4 ha

146 " " 60-100 ha ” ”" 5,886.9 ha

427 " ” 30-60 ha ” " 8,225.6 ha 675 " " 10-30 ha ” " 5,975.6 ha

288 " " 4-10 ha ” " 661.8 ha

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Land expropriated from private landowners 48 982.4 ha Land expropriated from village governments 20,252.7 ha

Land expropriated from monasteries 2,397.6 ha

State-owned lands 8,286.8 ha Lands in litigation between village governments 1,020.3 ha

governments 106.4 ha Total 81,046.2 ha

Forest land owned by the state or village

property. After the June 9 coup, the rest had to pay much more for the land they acquired.* The government also used the idea of labor property to alleviate a desperate housing shortage in the towns. Just as with the land reform, it set norms above which there was no absolute right to

property. Urban housing commissions, functioning under the Ministry of the Interior, allowed one room per renter, two rooms and a kitchen for families, with one additional room for every two

children over fourteen. They were empowered to evict renters who had more than this amount and turn the space over to homeless city-dwellers. Interestingly, the commissions were also em-

powered to move against government agencies occupying too much space. This measure won the Agrarians no new friends in the bureaucracy.*° The belief that property and labor should be closely related was

also reflected in Article Four of the “Law to Punish Those Responsible for the National Catastrophes,” which provided for the confiscation of property acquired during the war by speculation and profiteering. Although the government instituted proceedings under this article against more than a hundred alleged speculators,

they and their friends found support in the Inter-Allied Control Commission on Reparations, which protested that the prosecutions disrupted Bulgaria’s economic life. Ultimately, only fortyone speculators were brought to trial, of whom thirty-seven were convicted .*? °° Dermendzhiev, “Aparat,” p. 327; Velev, “‘Agrarnaia reforma,” p. 124. * Sbornik na zakonite, 1, pp. 276-81; Dermendzhiev, “Aparat,” p. 327. 4 Kirshevskaia, ““Reformy,” pp. 18-19.

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In its fiscal legislation the Agrarian government sought to shift the tax burden away from labor property and onto other kinds. Bulgaria had been accustomed to gather the bulk of her revenue from a tax on land. The Agrarians introduced a progressive in-

come tax that took, at the highest level, 35 percent of income. Corporations, too, including banks, insurance companies, and commercial institutions, were taxed at a rate reaching 25 percent.

This reform significantly lightened the burden of the average peasant family, whose obligations to the government fell to about one-half their prewar level.*” The shifting of a heavier proportion of the tax burden to the bourgeoisie brought loud protests from

that part of society and even from the diplomatic community, which complained that the Agrarians’ tax system would hurt the country’s productivity. The British ambassador, however, later reported that the tax reform merely brought Bulgaria into line with her neighbors.* Believing it unjust that workers had no share in the factories in which they toiled, the Agrarians contemplated extending the labor principle to industry. This theme was increasingly the subject of Agrarian discussions in 1922 and 1923. Legend has it that Stamboliski was at his villa preparing legislation to this end when his government was overthrown.*4 As their land reform showed, the Agrarians believed in the viability of the small and medium-sized peasant farm. At the same

time, they knew that such farms by themselves could not make Bulgarian agriculture competitive on the world market, still less could they generate the capital necessary for the modernization of the country. A large part of the Agrarians’ solution to this problem lay in the second pillar of their program, cooperation. They were convinced that the spread of consumer, producer, and credit cooperatives would allow the Bulgarian smallholders to take ad* Sbornik na zakonite, 1, pp. 296-306; Velev, “Reformatorska deinost,” pp. 111-13.

*8 Erskine to Curzon (Sofia, April 15, 1923), FO 371/8568/C7224, p. 2. 44 Zemledelsko zname, X1x, No. 90 (April 27, 1923), 1; I. Mitev, Fashistskiiat

prevrat na deveti iuni 1923 godina i iunskoto antifashistsko vustanie (Sofia, 1956), pp. 132-33.

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vantage of the technology, knowledge of the market, and the economies of scale available to large capitalist farmers.” In the past the BANU’s druzhbi had been urged to undertake the formation of cooperatives, and the National Store had been created to give this movement central direction. Lacking government encouragement, however, cooperatives were difficult to organize and maintain, and the druzhbi focused on the development of peasant political consciousness to the near exclusion of their economic functions. The Agrarian government now aroused the druzhbi to renew their efforts at cooperation. Stamboliski wrote that the political and economic activities of the druzhbi should be

as brother and sister,*° and the BANU’s Governing Council adopted new regulations to foster cooperation. Every Agrarian, it

ruled, must belong to a cooperative. The cooperatives themselves, however, would be open to all peasants in the village and have no political functions. The council’s goal was to unite all Bulgarian peasants in a national cooperative network.* The government sought to advance the cooperative movement in a variety of ways. Rural officials were instructed to aid in the formation of cooperatives; the National, Agricultural, and Cooperative Banks were directed to ease the terms of credit to them; and the government attempted to set up a national cooperative for the marketing of grain. The last measure, the creation of

the so-called Grain Consortium, which began operation in November 1919, was the government’s most ambitious cooperative project. Intended to raise and stabilize the price of grain, the consortium was formed by the National, Agricultural, and Cooperative Banks, and capitalized at 200,000,000 leva. It was given a monopoly on the export of grain, and it quickly established collec-

tion points, or “centrals,” to purchase and store the peasants’ * Zh. Natan, K. Grigorov, L. Berov, S. Machev, and T. Trendafilov, /storiia na ikonomicheskata misul v Bulgariia, 11 (Sofia, 1973), 278-86; B. Mateev, Dvizhenieto za kooperativno zemedelie v Bulgariia pre usloviiata na kapitalizma (Sofia, 1967), pp. 32-34; G. Kisel, ““Vurkhu stopanskata politika na oranzhevoto pravitelstvo,”’ Zemledelska probuda, 1, No. 1 (Jan. 1921), 6-7. 46 Zemledelsko zname, xvi, No. 6 (June 7, 1920), 1. 47 Zemledelski kooperator,1, Nos. 1-2, 7-8 (Dec. 10, 1921, Jan. 7, 1922).

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grain crops. In the fall of 1920, private trade in grain was prohibited in areas where centrals were functioning. A peasant could sell his grain to the consortium for a set price, higher than that offered

by private traders. The consortium then held the grain until it could be sold at the most favorable price. Initially, the consortium’s profits were divided between the participating banks, which received 10 percent, and a “Fund for the Improvement of Agriculture,” which received 90 percent and was devoted mainly to the construction of grain storage facilities. When the consortium legislation was revised in the fall of 1920, the original seller was given the major share of the consortium’s profits. He received 60 percent, the Fund 30 percent, and the banks 10 percent. At the

same time, the agents of the consortium were directed to give priority to cooperatives .*®

The consortium established higher, more firm prices for grain and ended the rampant speculation that had become prevalent during the war. Its success prompted private grain dealers to seek the aid of the Reparations Commission, which ordered the disbanding of the consortium in 1921 on the grounds that it set Bulgaria’s export prices at artificially high levels. Although the Grain Consortium had to be dissolved, the government formed a similar organization for the marketing of tobacco. It functioned effectively until the June coup d’ état .*°

The Agrarians believed that the cooperative principle could be applied to areas of the economy other than agriculture, and they successfully introduced it in fishing and forestry. Bulgarian commercial fishing had been in the hands of a few entrepreneurs who purchased fishing rights in inland and territorial waters from the government and hired fishermen to do the actual work. The Agrarian government encouraged the formation of fishermen’s cooperatives, gave them preference in the sale of fishing rights, and aided

them with long-term loans for the purchase of equipment. In forestry, lumbermen’s cooperatives received preference in the sale of concessions on state forests, and they were also aided by government credits. The fishing and forestry cooperatives, while 48 Sbornik na zakonite , 1, pp. 540-76; ‘“‘The Cooperative Sale of Grain,” International Review of Agricultural Economics, No. 11 (Nov. 1921), 567-68. #9 Velev, “Reformatorska deinost,” pp. 113-15, 131; Radolov, pp. 28-30.

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of minor importance to the total economy, were highly successful and profitable. They demonstrated that cooperatives could be employed in a variety of enterprises.”° At the end of 1920 the Agrarian government launched a major

project for the development of Bulgaria’s water resources. Designed as an experiment in partnership between the state and local

cooperatives, the plan called for the state to undertake comprehensive planning and major building projects, while smaller ones would be carried out by regional “syndicates” aided by credits, grants of land, and reduced rates on government-supplied materials and transportation. Although twenty-six syndicates had been formed by the end of 1922, their undertakings had barely begun by the time of the June 9 coup.°? The blending of the Agrarians’ sense of social justice with their

desire to promote economic development inspired the most famous of their reforms, Compulsory Labor Service. The motivation for this reform, which attracted considerable attention abroad and which the Agrarians saw as their proudest and most original achievement, included the desire to inculcate a sense of duty in the youth and to replace the nationalistic indoctrination received

in military service with practical education, to break down the barriers between town and country by having young men from the

cities and villages serve side-by-side in labor battalions, and to mobilize labor for work on projects of national development.*”

The Law for Compulsory Labor Service went into effect on June 14, 1920. In its original form, it made every male upon reaching the age of twenty and every female upon reaching the age of sixteen subject to conscription for labor service. For men the term of service was to be one year; for women, six months. No one was permitted to purchase an exemption or to send a sub-

stitute to serve in his place. To run the new institution, the law °° Velev, “Reformatorska deinost,” p. 117. °! Sbornik na zakonite, 1, pp. 434-527; Radolov, pp. 43-44; Velev, “Reformatorska deinost,” pp. 117-19. 52 Dnevnitsi na XIX ONS, purva izvinredovna sesiia, 1, p. 676; Kh. Stoianov,

Trudovata povinnost v Bulgariia (Sofia, 1921), pp. 3-4; N. P. Nicolaev, Le Travail obligatoire en Bulgarie (Paris, 1923), pp. 39-40.

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established a General Directorate of Compulsory Labor Service under the Ministry of Public Domains, whose agencies were responsible for preparing a system of conscription, transporting laborers to their projects, and providing them with supplies. In addition a “Higher Labor Council,” consisting of the director and the principal secretaries of the ministry, was empowered to select projects for the service.**

The initial operations of the Compulsory Labor Service—the system of conscription, the division of the country into six regions, each of which possessed four labor battalions and a supply unit, and the names of the labor units, “battalion,” “company,” ‘“platoon’”’—were all derived from the practices of military service. This created the suspicion abroad that Bulgaria was seeking to use Compulsory Labor Service as a means of circumventing the disarmament provisions of the Treaty of Neuilly, an impression that was reinforced by the appointment of General Ivan Rusev as the first director of the service. Prominent Bulgarians, appalled at the prospect of their children performing physical labor alongside the common people, also appealed to the Inter-Allied Control Commission on Disarmament to prevent the application of the law.°* In December, General Fourtou, President of the Control Commission, informed the government that the commission had found Compulsory Labor Service to be a violation of the articles of disarmament in the Treaty of Neuilly. It therefore ordered that the law be abrogated and that existing CLS units be disbanded.*° The Council of Ambassadors in Paris, to which Stamboliski appealed, refused to overrule the commisssion.*® Protracted negotiations eventually led to a compromise resulting in a major revision

of the CLS legislation in November 1921. The most important changes were a reduction in the size of the “labor army,” allowance of the purchase of exemptions, and the replacement of the original centralized bureaucracy by provincial labor bureaus that °3 Sbornik na zakonite, 1, pp. 3-24; I. Dermendzhiev, “Organizatsiia na trudovata povinnost v Bulgariia 1920-1934,” Godishnik na Sofiskiia universitet, iuridicheski fakultet, Lit, part 1 (1961), 370-71, 399-406. °* Dermendzhiev, “Trudovata povinnost,” pp. 370-72. °° CSHA, fond 176, tv, 1384, pp. 5-6. © Savov to Stamboliski (Paris, Dec. 13, 1920), CSHA, fond 176, iv, 1384, pp. 2-3.

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took over responsibility for economic planning. The commission was further appeased by the replacement of General Rusev as director by Khristo Stoianov, a long-time Union activist and past member of the National Assembly. Stamboliski also invited the League of Nations to inspect the operation of CLS during 1922, a

task carried out by the French labor expert, Professor Max Lazard.°’

The first call-up of trudovaks, as the members of the labor army were called, took place in November 1921. Forty thousand were summoned, of whom thirty thousand actually served; the rest purchased exemptions, were excused for health reasons, or

simply failed to appear. To direct their work, the CLS permanently employed a substantial number of “‘specialists,”” agrono-

mists, engineers, and other technical supervisors, and officers trained in the CLS School in Sofia. Many former military officers

took this course and were employed as commanders of labor platoons.°® The trudovaks were given uniforms consisting of boots, a tunic and breeches with puttees, a cap and overcoat in winter, a straw hat and linen suit in summer. On their breasts they wore a medal bearing the motto “By Labor for Bulgaria.” Former army barracks provided housing while they went through

a program of orientation and training. When employed on projects, they lived in tents. Food was supplied largely by the

CLS itself from its large-scale model farms near Shumen, Pazardzhik, and Plovdiv, and by CLS fisheries at Oriakhovo and

Varna. Each CLS district office was staffed with a physician, medical aide, and infirmary, and four medical aides were permanently assigned to each labor regiment. Lectures on health and

hygiene were part of the trudovaks’ training program, and the CLS administration also prepared tracts on particular health prob-

lems for distribution to the men. During the first half of 1922 these dealt with tuberculosis, venereal diseases, and the preservation of sight.°° 57 CSHA, fond 176, 1v, 1384, pp. 9-10, 21, 29, 32-34, 41-43, 52-53, 135-36, 287; Dermendzhiev, ““Trudovata povinnost,” pp. 372, 382-83. °° Dermendzhiev, “Trudovata povinnost,” pp. 418-23; M. Lazard, Compulsory Labor Service in Bulgaria (Geneva, 1922), pp. 54-55.

°9 Lazard, pp. 51-55, 58-59. | 173

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After completing their orientation, the trudovaks were employed on a variety of projects. Small groups were often assigned

to town and village authorities who contracted for them with the provincial CLS boards. They would generally perform such duties as the clearing of streets and the maintenance of public buildings and grounds. Larger groups were employed in farming state-owned lands and in exploiting state forests, but the single most important economic function of CLS was road construction. During 1922 gangs of trudovaks leveled roadways, broke and moved rock, and laid the cobblestones that challenge the shock absorbers and fillings of today’s motorists on over two hundred kilometers of road; they enlarged and repaired two hundred more kilometers, and cleared the way for a further five hundred. CLS also prepared the bed for over one hundred and eighty kilometers of railroad track.®°

Although these projects called only for labor of the crudest sort, CLS also intended to develop manufacturing enterprises. According to the Agrarian plan, these would first supply the CLS itself

and then, if feasible, enter the general market. One successful example was the CLS brick factory in Sofia, which became one of the largest in the country. Most of the initial CLS manufactures were devoted to the production of boots and uniforms, the centers

for which were Radomir, Gorna Bania, Shumen, and Gorna Oriakhovitsa. Max Lazard, who visited the sewing center in Shumen, found 120 trudovaks working under the direction of sixteen experts. He noted that the service provided a useful apprenticeship. CLS also opened and operated a school for tractor mechanics and an automotive garage in Sofia.® During 1922 Stamboliski opened negotiations with the French government with a view to sending selected groups of trudovaks to work on farms in France. The government volunteered to pay their travel expenses so that young Bulgarians could study moderm, Western agricultural techniques. No agreement was reached, however, before the overthrow of the Agrarian regime. 6° Tbid., pp. 60-68; Glavna direktsiia na statistikata, Le Service obligatoire du travail en Bulgarie (1922-1925) (Sofia, 1926), p. 20. ®t Lazard, pp. 54-56; Dermendzhiev, “Trudovata povinnost,” pp. 415-16. 62 Lazard, p. 57.

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In his study of CLS, Lazard attempted to assess the value and cost of the reform to Bulgaria. The CLS budget for 1922-1923 called for expenditures of 185,747,653 leva for salaries for permanent employees, food, tools, uniforms, and supplies. Lazard

estimated that CLS would perform work equal in value to 170,000,000 leva. The cost to the state, however, would be more than overbalanced by some 80,000,000 leva to be paid by those purchasing exemptions. Lazard did not attempt to assign a value to the social benefits of CLS. If the skills, discipline, and experience gained by thousands of young men were included, the value of CLS to Bulgaria would seem to be much greater. The preceding discussion has dealt only with labor service for men. CLS for women, although mandated by the law, was implemented only to a limited extent. The place of women in Bulgarian society, particularly in the countryside, still reflected the legacy of the country’s Ottoman past. The government was committed to enlarging the role of women in the national life, in part through CLS, but realized that the deep changes in values and customs this would entail would be the work of many years. Oppo-

nents of the CLS legislation were sure that labor service for women would “divert young girls away from their usual occupations and lead them toward a thoughtless, self-indulgent, and depraved life that is foreign to the immense role of the woman in homemaking,” and many Bulgarian parents, Agrarian or otherwise, agreed.®* Consequently CLS for women was not intended for economic benefits, but almost entirely as a means of education.®> Married women were exempted from it entirely as were Moslem women, although the latter could serve if they desired, and mothers were permitted to accompany their daughters who were enrolled in CLS. Training and work for women were designed to impart skills in cooking, laundering, ironing, and other housekeeping duties, personal, public, and family hygiene, typing, accounting, telephone and telegraph operation, fruit and vegetable gardening, and tending silkworms, bees, and vineyards.™

The contemporary feminist will hardly consider such training 63 Ibid., p. 75. 64 Dermendzhiev, “Trudovata povinnost,” p. 395. 6 Stoianov, pp. 41-42. °° Dermendzhiev, “Trudovata povinnost,” pp. 393-94.

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“liberating,” but in the context of the time, it marked a sharp break with Bulgarian custom. The first experimental groups of women’s CLS were formed in

Sofia and Turnovo at the end of 1921. They were housed in schools and convents and employed in textile mills, experimental

farms, hospitals, and schools. In Sofia the CLS also called up educated girls to work in government ministries. Thus, to a limited extent, CLS for women helped the Agrarian government to overcome its lack of professional personnel. Outside of Turnovo and Sofia only a handful of projects for women’s CLS were undertaken by the government. After the overthrow of the regime, CLS for women was repealed.®’ Education is the tool one generation uses to shape the next. The Agrarians had an almost eighteenth-century faith in the power of education to change society, and their educational program, even

more clearly than their other reforms, reveals how they wanted Bulgaria to develop.

Since the BANU’s founding, the Agrarians had complained about Bulgaria’s educational system. Rural schools were insufficient in number, of poor quality, and their curriculum was alien to peasant life, more suited to training clerks than farmers. The socalled professional schools were mainly a door giving entrance to the state bureaucracy. When introducing legislation on school re-

form, Stoian Omarchevski cited the example of the Kniazhevo Vinicultural Institute, of whose 200 graduates, 190 became civil servants.°® Sofia University was devoted primarily to law, literature, and history, and its graduates only joined the competition for government jobs or the ranks of the “intellectual unemployed.” In the Agrarians’ eyes, the schools were also guilty of contributing to Bulgaria’s disastrous wars, for they had indoctrinated their

students with jingoistic nationalism and hatred for Bulgaria’s neighbors.®? The Agrarians were also disturbed by the fact that a ° Ibid., pp. 397-99; Lazard, pp. 94-95. °° S. Omarchevski, Prosvetna politika na Bilgariia (Sofia, 1921), p. 47. °° Complaints against the school system were a staple in the BANU press. A summary of the Agrarian grievances can be found in Omarchevski’s Prosvetna politika, pp. 3-47, and in the same author’s Zemledelskiia siiuz i uchilishteto (Sofia, 1920), pp. 3-13.

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considerable portion of the corps of teachers were Communists, who used the classroom to propagandize for their party.” In reforming the schools, the Agrarians sought first to make education more accessible, particularly to rural youth. In addition

to the traditional four years of compulsory, free, elementary schooling, their legislation called for three years of further study in a progimnaziia, and for the building of progimnazii in every locality with twenty or more school-age children. This program naturally called for a vast increase in school construction and in the number of teachers, and the Agrarians increased the fund for loans for school buildings from 20,000,000 to 120,000,000 leva. Villages were urged to form cooperatives to erect buildings and to purchase textbooks and other materials, and local officials were permitted to request trudovaks from CLS to work on school construction projects. Five new institutes for the training of teachers were opened, three of them, in Ikhtiman, Stara Zagora, and Biala

Cherkva, outside Bulgaria’s urban centers. In physical terms alone, the Agrarian educational achievement was impressive. During their time in power, the Agrarians opened 311 new elementary schools and over eight hundred progimnazii.” The Agrarians were convinced that the right sort of educational system could speed the development of the national economy. Better educated farmers, artisans, engineers, and other professionals would make Bulgaria more productive.’” Consequently,

the Agrarians changed the school curricula to devote a greater proportion of time to practical subjects, including agriculture and applied science. This reform reached into the elementary schools

and progimnazii, but was especially marked at the gimnaziia level. The traditional gimnaziia had a five-year program that prepared its students for entry into the university or for careers in 70S. Omarchevski, Otchet na ministera na narodnoto prosveshtenie za deinostta ot 20 mai 1920 god. do I april 1921 god. (Sofia, 1921), pp. 3-11. 1D. Tsonkov, Materiiali za izchuvane na uchebnoto delo v Bilgariia (Sofia, 1928), pp. 134, 158; B. Ivanov, “‘Problemata za trudovoto i politekhnicheskoto obuchenie u nas,”’ Godishnik na Sofiskiia universitet, LY (1958), 311; O. Obreshkov, T. Tsingilev, N. Chakurov, I. Velichkov, and 1. Grigorov, Podgotovka na uchitelski kadri u nas v minaloto (Sofia, 1967), pp. 186-87. “ Omarchevski, Uchilishteto, pp. 27-29; D. Gavriski, Profesionalnoto obrazovanie v Bulgariia (Sofia, 1923), p. 7.

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government service. The Agrarians divided this program into two parts, the first of which was a three-year realka that stressed prac-

tical, work-related education, adapted to the needs of the local population. The realki emphasized agricultural subjects in rural areas, handicrafts and industrial arts in the towns, forestry in wooded regions, fishing in the seaports, and so on. Graduates of the realki could go on to the final two years of the gimnaziia with its traditional subjects or enter professional schools and institutes.” Stoian Omarchevski, who took over the Ministry of Education from Tserkovski in May 1920, had devoted considerable study to the systems and theories of education current in Great Britain, France, Germany, and the United States. He was particularly impressed by the ideas of John Dewey, whose works, he believed, should be read by all Bulgarian teachers. He echoed Dewey’s criticism of rote learning and his call for greater student participation in the educational process, and he wrote that walks through the countryside, demonstrations of scientific experiments, films,

work on state experimental farms, all should supplement the textbook and the classroom.’* Consequently, he introduced the practice of requiring students at all levels below the university to participate in two “labor weeks” during each school year and in a “labor half-day” once a week. During these labor periods students undertook projects ranging from the cleaning of school grounds to, for the older ones, working alongside the CLS battalions.

In line with its commitment to more practical education, the government added faculties of medicine, veterinary medicine, and agronomy to the university and opened two “higher academies” in forestry and commerce.” Existing professional schools and institutes were directed to reduce the proportion of their curricula devoted to literature and religion in favor of more extensive training in foreign languages, natural science, bookkeeping, and their special subjects.” 3 Tadzher, pp. 360-88; Omarchevski, Otchet, pp. 209-10; Ivanov, pp. 310-11; Ministerstvo na narodnoto prosveshtenie, Programa i pravilnik za narodnite, osnovni uchilishta (detski, purvonachalni i progimnazii) (Sofia, 1922), p. 5. “4 Omarchevski, Uchilishteto, pp. 7-13, 78-92; Ivanov, pp. 312-15.

® Tadzher, pp. 283-84. *® Gavriski, pp. 7-17. 178

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Omarchevski’s answer to the problem of Communist influence

among the teachers was direct ministerial pressure and close supervision of the schools by the local populace. Immediately after he assumed the ministry he was involved in a test of strength with the Communist teachers. May 24 was traditionally a national holiday celebrating St. Cyril and St. Methodius, whose work as teachers of the Slavs endeared them especially to Bulgaria’s edu-

cators. Still flushed with its postwar gains, the Bulgarian Communist party instructed teachers to ignore this “bourgeois”’ holi-

day. Similarly, they chose to ignore the celebration of Ivan Vazov’s fifty years of literary work on October 24, 1920. On the

other hand, they sought to turn “Red Week” and International Youth Day into school holidays. Omarchevski’s response was de-

cisive. Supported by the Council of Ministers, he ordered the | dismissal of all personnel who used the schools for unauthorized demonstrations or who refused to carry out the directives of the

ministry. At the same time, he banned all Communist schoolbooks and materials from the classroom and threatened all who used them with dismissal. These draconian measures reestablished the authority of the ministry over the teaching corps and won the praise of Stamboliski, who singled out Omarchevski at the BANU’s XVI Congress for having “mastered”’ Bulgaria’s unruly teachers.”” As a more permanent solution, Omarchevski moved to put the teachers under close local control. His principal innovation was to require that teachers be confirmed in their jobs every four years by

a plebescite of the local population. Although he argued that community control of education had proved an effective tool in America, England, Belgium, Denmark, and Norway, his motivation was clearly to give the Agrarian druzhbi control of the village school. When he introduced this legislation in the National Assembly, he made no secret of his expectation that it would drive the Communist teachers out of the classrooms.” In general, relations between the Agrarian government and Bulgaria’s institutions of higher learning—the Academy of Sciences and Sofia University—were far from cordial. The difficulty “ Omarchevski, Ofchet, pp. 12-17; Stamboliski, Zemledelsko upravlenie, p. 71.

78 Omarchevski, Prosvetna politika, pp. 62-96.

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was rooted in two Agrarian measures: an attempt to purge politicians from the university faculty and a spelling reform. With regard to the first, many of Bulgaria’s prominent statesmen held positions in the unversity although they performed few or no teaching duties. Viewing this as a waste of resources and arguing that “the title of ‘professor’ is a beautiful ornament to a politician; the reverse 1s not the case,” the government passed legislation prohibiting officeholders from belonging to the university faculty and instituted dismissal proceedings against several professors.” The members of the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, and its predecessor the Bulgarian Literary Society, had long wrangled over the complexities of Bulgarian orthography without settling on a definitive system. Omarchevski, who had his own ideas on this subject, attempted to legislate a solution. His spelling reform, adopted by the National Assembly, eliminated the letters ‘6 and A altogether, and "b and b at the end of a word. This eminently

reasonable orthographic simplification, carried through by the Communists after 1944, was attacked by intellectuals as an assault on Bulgaria’s historic language and culture. When the Academy protested and continued to issue its publications in the traditional orthography, the irascible Omarchevski suspended its

subsidy and threatened to expropriate its property. Moreover, when Professor Liubomir Miletich, Rector of the University, also defied the law by publishing an obituary in the old style, the Education Minister sought to make an example of him by suspending him for three months and fining him one-fourth of his salary.°°

The purge of the faculty and the punishment of Miletich inspired a strike in defense of “university autonomy” by faculty and students that closed the university from March 1922 to the end of the term.®! In this case, Stamboliski chose not to back his minister fully. In June he named him Bulgaria’s representative to the cele” Radolov, pp. 67-68; Omarchevski, Otchet, pp. 71-73. *° Zemledelsko zname, xvii, No. 42 (March 4, 1922), 1-2; M. Pundeff, “‘The University of Sofia at Eighty,” Slavic Review, xxvil, No. 3 (1968), 442; M. Pundeff, “The Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (On the Occasion of Its Centennial),” East European Quarterly, 11, No. 3 (1969), 378; L. Beaulieux, “Les Origines de la réforme orthographique bulgare,” Revue des études slaves, v (1925), 58-81. 5! Radikal, xvi, No. 56 (March 13, 1922), 1; Radolov, pp. 66-67.

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bration of Brazil’s one hundredth anniversary of independence. While Omarchevski consoled himself in Rio, Stamboliski quietly ended the strike by conceding on both issues.*? The Agrarian reforms were met with hostility by powerful elements in Bulgarian society. In the National Assembly the parties of tradition condemned the land reform as an assault on “the sacred rights of property.”’ After it was enacted, the old bureaucracy did all in its power to prevent its spirit from being carried out. For their part, the Communists denounced the reform as a fraud that would perpetuate class division in the countryside, and they told their rural followers to ignore it.’ Compulsory Labor Service was

deprecated by the right as a peasant attempt to humiliate Bulgaria’s well-to-do, more cultured citizens. The Communists characterized it as a return to Turkish feudalism, and they urged their supporters to shirk their obligations.®* Both left and right saw the Agrarian educational reforms as evidence of the peasants’ “lack of culture.” The opposition to Stamboliski’s foreign policy was equally intense. Neither the army nor the gendarmerie could be

entirely depended upon, while on the left the Communist and Socialist trade unions and “workers clubs” were a constant threat.

In these circumstances the Agrarians were aware that if they were to survive, let alone transform Bulgaria, they would have to develop their own instruments of power. The process of doing this began immediately after the formation of the first Agrarian government, and it proceeded on two fronts. First, the BANU began to substitute its own machinery for parliament and the government bureaucracy. Second, the Agrarians moved against the restraints that existed on executive authority, diminishing the role of Bulgaria’s traditional “checks and balances” in favor of the principle of “the unity of state power.’’®

As leaders of a minority government from October 1919 to 82 Erskine to Curzon (Sofia, April 15, 1923), FO 371/8568/C7224, p. 19. 83 Dnevnitsi na XIX ONS, pirva izvinredovna sesiia, 1, p. 1050; Rabotnicheski vestnik, xxiv, Nos. 150, 151 (Jan. 5, 6, 1921). 84 Velev, “Reformatorska deinost,” p. 110; Rabotnicheski vestnik, xxiv, No.

234 (April 19, 1921), 1; A. Velev, “Trudovata povinnost na zemedeiskoto pravitelstvo 1 politicheskite partii,” /storicheski pregled, xxx, No. 1 (1974), 8-35. 8° Dermendzhiev, “Aparat,”’ pp. 291-95; A. Omelianov, “A Bulgarian Exper-

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March 1920, and then with a majority of only four votes in the National Assembly, the Agrarians knew that they could not afford the luxury of extensive parliamentary struggle or allow any looseness in their own ranks. At first they attempted to devise and debate their legislative program at the BANU’s annual congresses.

When this proved too unwieldy, the Union’s XVI Congress, in 1921, voted to establish a “Supreme Union Council,”’ made up of the BANU’s national officers, the Council of Ministers, and one

elected representative from each district in the country. It convened during the week preceding the BANU’s full congresses and, in effect, functioned as a substitute parliament, since its decisions were binding on all Agrarian deputies in the National Assembly .®

The Agrarians also attempted to bypass the bureaucracy in the implementation of some of their reforms. An example was the appointment of authorities independent of existing local governments to carry out the land reform. The law for the local supervision of schools and the encouragement given to cooperatives were also instances of the Agrarian effort to create responsive administrative institutions. The formation of the Orange Guard showed an Agrarian attempt to find a substitute for the unreliable police and military forces at their disposal. With regard to the judicial branch of government, the Agrarians sought to reduce its power and make it more responsive to the needs of the peasantry. Most ministries and their major subdivisions, such as Compulsory Labor Service, established internal machinery to arbitrate disputes in order to avoid involvement in the courts.” Seeking to make justice cheaper, more accessible, and less mysterious to the peasant, the Agrarians also undertook a

major reform of the lower court system. Since they were convinced that most professional lawyers were parasites at best and dangerous enemies at worst, a major thrust of their reform was to

limit the lawyer’s right to appear before certain courts. Petur iment,” in P. A. Sorokin, C. J. Galpin, and C. C. Zimmerman, eds., A Systematic Sourcebook in Rural Sociology, 11 (Minneapolis, 1931), 645. 8° Turlakov, Istoriia, pp. 219-22. 87 Dermendzhiev, “Aparat,” pp. 302-303.

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lanev, who became Minister of Justice in November 1921, was responsible for creating rural district courts with judges elected by the local population. Lawyers were barred from pleading in these

courts, and the peasants represented themselves. These courts held purview over civil cases involving less than one thousand leva, and their decisions, in matters of less than one hundred leva, could not be appealed.

Boundary disputes and inheritance were the main subjects of peasant litigation. The Agrarian government created circuit justices of the peace, whose courts had jurisdiction over these areas. As in the case of rural district courts, professional lawyers were excluded from their proceedings. Agrarian hostility to the legal profession was further reflected in a law prohibiting a lawyer from

holding public office and maintaining a private practice at the same time.®®

Labor property, Compulsory Labor Service, cooperation, new forms of education and administration—these were the tools the Agrarians employed in their struggle to transform Bulgaria. The Agrarians were in power for too short a time to enable the histo-

rian to pronounce a decisive judgment on the results of their domestic program. Had they retained their hold on power longer, they would, of course, have witnessed world depression and the breakdown of order in Europe. Given this international environment, it is difficult to conclude that any government could have

significantly changed Bulgaria’s destiny. Still, the Agrarians ought to be given credit for the originality of the solutions they proposed to Bulgaria’s traditional problems. At the very least, the historian must agree with Stamboliski’s own judgment that, of all

the governments of postwar Europe, only his own and Lenin’s were seeking original means to carry on the age-old struggle against national poverty and social injustice. 88 Ibid., pp. 335-36; Sbornik na zakonite , 1, pp. 326-28, 11, p. 587; Velev, ““Reformatorska deinost,” pp. 125-27; Tadzher, pp. 405-12.

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CHAPTER VII

The Agrarians in Power: Foreign Policy

Stambuliski, although he knew in a general way my ideas, was struck with surprise at my ungarnished frankness, and exclaimed:

‘You are the first Italian not to be terrified by the idea of a Yugoslav | union.” And I: “And you are the first politician from the Balkans that I have met, who thinks of the good of his country otherwise than in terms of war and annexations.”’ —Carlo Sforza’

From the Treaty of Berlin to the end of the First World War Bulgarian statesmen had devoted themselves to the task of including the entire “Bulgarian tribe” within their country’s borders. Although they had often disagreed on the means to accomplish this, they had never questioned the end itself. Since Bulgaria’s neighbors were collectively more than a match for her, her leaders had been forced to seek a “patron” among the great powers and, of course, to pay a price for its support. During forty years of Balkan turmoil many Bulgarian statesmen acquired reputations as adroit and clever maneuverers, but the result of their work was disappointing. Bulgaria was left without a single friendly neighbor. Vast sums had been spent to build and maintain an army that, in the end, went down to defeat. Russia and Germany both had used her as a servant. At the end of the war, the goal of unifying all Bulgarians was more distant than ever. Stamboliski’s solution to the traditional problems of Bulgarian foreign policy was to transcend them, for he knew that a continuation of past diplomacy not only would be fruitless, it would also prevent him from carrying out his plans for the domestic transformation of the country. By renouncing the traditional aspirations of Bulgarian nationalism and by accepting the postwar ter-

ritorial settlement, he aimed at establishing amicable relations with the surrounding states, thus lifting the curse of militarism 1 C. Sforza, Makers of Modern Europe (New York, 1930), p. 285.

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and liberating Bulgaria from dependence on a foreign power. UItimately, he hoped that the common sense of peasants in Eastern Europe combined with their growing political importance would lead to regional cooperation that would bring true economic and political independence to them all. Even before the war ended, he reaffirmed the basic ideas of his foreign policy that he had arrived at during the previous decade, In a pamphlet, The Principles of the BANU, completed in prison, he wrote:

The Agrarian Union is for lasting, peaceful, neighborly relations between Bulgaria and the surrounding states. It is against any provocation on [Bulgaria’s] part tending toward armed conflict. Its efforts are directed at strengthening good relations by the union of Bulgaria with the other Balkan states on a federative basis.”

He restated this principle at the XV Agrarian Congress, which voted to confirm Balkan federation as the major goal of Bulgarian diplomacy.° Two conditions were necessary for Stamboliski’s foreign policy to succeed. Bulgaria’s neighbors had to respond favorably to his overtures, and the internal forces of fanatical nationalism had

to be subdued. To the struggle to establish these conditions, Stamboliski brought determination, perseverance, and great moral and physical courage. He achieved the first, but the second proved beyond his reach.*

Although he had written about Bulgaria’s foreign policy for over a decade, Stamboliski’s first experience as a practicing diplomat came in July 1919, when, as Minister of Public Domains in 2 A. Stamboliski, Printsipite na Bulgarskiia zemedelski naroden sitiuz (Sofia, 1945), p. 15; A. Velev, “Bolgarski zemledel’cheski narodny soiuz i ideia balkanskoi federatsii (1908-1919 gg.),” Etudes historiques, vi (1973), 313. 3 Zemledelsko zname, xiv, No. 77 (June 8, 1919), 2. * There is as yet no comprehensive study of Stamboliski’s foreign policy. The best statement of its general principles, along with a comparison of it with other Bulgarian diplomatic strategies, may be found in N. Oren, Revolution Administered: Agrarianism and Communism in Bulgaria (Baltimore, 1973), pp. 45-50, 172-76, although I believe that the author understates Stamboliski’s achievements and fails to note the interdependence of the Agrarians’ foreign and domestic policies.

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the coalition government of Todor Todorov, he was included in the delegation to the Paris Peace Conference. On the long journey west, he mixed little with his colleagues, preferring to gaze from his coach windows for hours at the passing fields, making notes on the various forms of cultivation and observing the destruction

wrought by the war.° .

The delegation, like the coalition it represented, contained men of widely diverging points of view. Prime Minister Todorov and Mikhail Sarafov were conservative, Russophile politicians. The

latter, according to the evidence of his diary, regarded Stamboliski as a.‘‘rebel” and a “‘traitor.”® Mikhail Ganev, a Radical, Janko Sakuzov, of the Broad Socialists, and Stamboliski were already bitterly divided by the struggle for power shaping up at home. The delegation’s chief diplomatic adviser, Dimittr Stanchov, was an urbane career diplomat whose appearance and man-

ners resembled those of an English gentleman rather than a Bulgarian.‘

However great their differences in politics and backgrounds, the delegates had no occasion to disagree, for they had no voice at all in the preparation of the treaty. As soon as its members arrived

in Paris they were taken to the Chateau de Madrid, erected for Francis I, in the suburb of Neuilly-sur-Seine. There they remained under guard, forbidden to leave without the company of a detec> Muir, p. 208. ® Kh. Nestorov, “Bulgarskiiat narod v borba protiv imperializma i v podkrepa na stivetskata strana (1918—1923),” in Oktomvriskata revoliutsiia i Bulgarosuvetskata druzhba (Sofia, 1967), 122. 7 Stanchov, married to the Countess d’ Armand of Savoy, was at home in most of the capitals of Western Europe. His three children found spouses in the Scottish, French, and American upper classes. I am indebted to Mrs. Marianne Stanchov for making available to me the private papers of her father-in-law, which are a valuable source for this chapter. These papers, which cover Dimittr Stanchov’s long diplomatic career, have not been systematically organized and catalogued. The materials used here will be classified as follows: nine volumes of correspondence from the period October 1920-December 1922, dealing with Stanchov’s work as ambassador to Great Britain, will be referred to as Stanchov Archives, I-Ix; another volume, containing materials related to Stamboliski’s one-hundredday European tour, will be labeled Stanchov Archives (100-day tour); materials devoted to specific questions and located in separate folders will be referred to by their subject matter, e.g. Stanchov Archives (Lausanne Conference).

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tive or to correspond without a censor. For two months Stamboliski waited with the delegation, the tedium relieved only by clandestine meetings with Kosta Todorov, his former prison-mate

and now chief of Bulgarian propaganda, in boats on the lake of the Bois de Boulogne or at services in the Russian church.® On October 19, the Bulgarian delegates were summoned to the Quai d’Orsay to receive the Allied terms. As they entered the ornate Salon de l’Horloge, a supremely contemptuous Clemenceau turned to a colleague to ask in a stage whisper: “Bulgarie, est-ce

un Royaume ou une République?”® Todor Todorov’s speech, which pled for a peace based on Wilson’s Fourteen Points, was met with silence. The delegates were presented with copies of the draft treaty and informed that they had twenty-five days to formulate a reply. The delegation returned to Sofia to face a new political situation brought about by the elections in which the BANU had received a plurality. The new, Agrarian-led coalition, however, included the

National Party of Todor Todorov, who remained head of the peace delegation and returned to Paris to present the Bulgarian reply. When ali but the most minor counterproposals were rejected by the Allies, Todorov refused to take responsibility for signing

the treaty, resigned, and left the Conference. Stamboliski then announced that he would go to Paris himself, and stated that Bulgaria must make a clean break with the past. On his arrival, he drafted letters to Clemenceau and the heads of the Serbian, Greek,

and Rumanian delegations in which he recounted his own opposi- | tion to the war and explained the principles that would guide his ) foreign policy. Pleading that the Bulgarian people ought not to suffer for the sins of their former leaders, he asked each government to consider the principle of national self-determination before pressing its demands. He reminded them that their generosity 8 Muir, pp. 210-11; Todorov, pp. 116-18. Todorov had enlisted in the French Foreign Legion at the beginning of the war. In 1916 he carried a proposal for a separate peace from General Sarrail into Bulgaria where he was imprisoned. During his confinement he joined the Agrarian circle of prisoners and won Stamboliski’s confidence. Owing to his connections in France, he was an obvious choice to promote the Bulgarian cause in Paris, and he was appointed chief of propaganda by Todor Todorov in June 1919. ® Muir, p. 211.

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now could become the foundation for a lasting Balkan peace in the future.!° On November 27, after these letters were rejected, Stamboliski entered the Town Hall of Neuilly where, under the baleful glare of Clemenceau, he signed the treaty of peace.” As did the other treaties of the Paris Peace Conference, the

Treaty of Neuilly ignored Wilsonian principles and imposed heavy penalties on the defeated state. Bulgaria was obliged to cede to the newly formed Serb-Croat-Slovene kingdom a strip of territory along her western frontier, containing some 92,000 inhabitants and the towns of Bosiljgrad, Tsaribrod, and Strumitsa. Rumania’s possession of the fertile Dobruja was confirmed. Most serious of all, western Thrace was ceded to Great Britain, France, and Italy for later award to Greece. Bulgaria was thus cut off from the Aegean, although the treaty did state that some form of access would be provided “‘at a later date.” Bulgaria was also required to pay 2% billion gold francs over a thirty-seven-year period and to turn over to her neighbors 13,500 cows, 125 bulls, 12,500 horses, 2,500 mules, 9,200 oxen, 33,000 sheep, and 250,000 tons of coal. To insure that payments would be made, an Inter-Allied Commission on Reparations was given wide powers over the Bulgarian economy. Like the other defeated states, Bulgaria was disarmed. Her mil-

itary strength was limited to 10,000 gendarmes, 3,000 border guards, and an army of 20,000 long-service volunteers. Conscription was prohibited, and an Inter-Allied Control Commission was sent to Bulgaria to see that these provisions were carried out.”

On his return to Sofia, Stamboliski told his people that, although the treaty was harsh, he had signed it because he was convinced that it would not remain in force longer than three years. The Allies themselves, he argued, would recognize its injustices and correct them. In the meantime, it would be Bulgaria’s task to live up to the letter of the treaty and to demonstrate to the Allies that she had broken with the past, that she was dedicated to peace, 1. N. Petkov, pp. 68-72; CSHA, fond 176, Iv, 898, pp. 6-12.

, 1 Muir, pp. 213-14.

12 For the terms of the Treaty of Neuilly, see /storiia na Bulgariia, 11, pp. 41415.

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and that she was worthy of taking part in the international life of Europe on a position of equality with her neighbors.®

For a year after the signing of the treaty Bulgaria remained a pariah, her one achievement being the return of her prisoners of war held in the neighboring states and in France.* By the fall of 1920 the Agrarian government was secure in power, and Stamboliski decided that the time had come for a new diplomatic initia-

tive. He planned a 100-day tour to take him to London, Paris, Brussels, Prague, Warsaw, Bucharest, and Belgrade. In Western Europe he hoped to bring an end to Bulgaria’s diplomatic isolation, to press the Allies to implement Article 48 of the Treaty, which provided for Bulgarian access to the Aegean, and to defend the Agrarian government and its reforms against recent charges of bolshevism. In the east he aimed to reopen lines of communication and to suggest the formation of a Green International to other

peasant leaders. He wished as well to “school himself in diplomacy,” and to confound the BANU’s domestic critics who complained that peasants were incapable of handling foreign pol-

icy. Stamboliski was particularly concerned about the future of rela-

tions between Sofia and Belgrade, and he deliberately omitted Rome from his itinerary so as not to offend the Yugoslavs, who were on bad terms with Italy. For this reason it came as a bitter blow when Nikola Pasi¢é stated that because Bulgaria had as yet done nothing to earn the trust of Yugoslavia a visit by her Prime Minister would not be welcome.’®

In spite of this setback, Stamboliski’s tour went well. In Eng-

land his unofficial host was James Bouchier, a journalist and longtime friend of Bulgaria who was to die in that country the fol-

lowing year and receive a state burial at the Rila Monastery. Bouchier arranged for Stamboliski to be a week-end guest at the estate of Lord Carnarvon, whose expedition to Egypt was soon to 13 Zemledelsko zname, xv, No. 52 (Dec. 10, 1919), 1. 14 Todorov, pp. 123-25. *® Stamboliski, Zemledelsko upravlenie, pp. 134-35. *® Stamboliski later said that Pasi¢ rejected the proposed visit because he feared that the Croatian Peasant party would attempt to deal with him independently of

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announce the discovery of the tomb of Tutankhamen, and to visit Cambridge University and the industrial cities of Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, Glasgow, and Edinburgh.'” It was during the Scottish portion of this tour that Stamboliski discovered that the bagpipe was not a uniquely Bulgarian instrument. He was fascinated by what he saw of the British way of life, which he believed to have little in common with the rest of Europe, and he was particularly interested in Letchworth, a planned garden-city, that he thought might be a useful model for Bulgaria.1® Having become a connoisseur of prisons during the war, he asked to be shown an English example and concluded that Wandsworth Gaol was much cleaner and better run than Central Prison in Sofia.’ Although he was impressed by the factories of the industrial cities of England and Scotland, he found the monotonous routine of the workers depressing.”° Stamboliski’s first official meeting was with Lord Curzon on October 11. Knowing that the Foreign Secretary had strong proGreek feelings, he prepared an aggressive statement of Bulgaria’s position. He began by reminding Curzon that Greece had not been an entirely willing ally during the war, and he argued that Britain bore a certain responsibility for allowing Ferdinand to push Bulgaria into the German alliance. If Britain and France had landed troops at Dedeagatch or Burgas, as they did at Salonika, then Ferdinand, like King Constantine, would have been unable to carry out a pro-German policy. He went on to press Bulgaria’s claim for

territorial access to the Aegean, rejecting as inadequate the British-backed Greek suggestion that Bulgaria be allowed to “use” the port of Dedeagatch. ““We believe in England, in the great powers,” he said, ““but we cannot have faith in the Greeks. A Bulgarian outlet to the sea cannot pass through Greek territory.”” Curzon, who had not expected this vigorous statement of Bulgarian claims, coldly terminated the interview.”? Belgrade (Zemledelsko upravlenie, p. 136). It is likely, however, that this explanation was merely an attempt to lessen the significance attached to this humiliating diplomatic snub.

7 Stanchov Archives (100-day tour), pp. 10-24. 18 Muir, pp. 219-29.

9 CSHA, fond 176, iv, 1380, p. 86. 20 Todorov, pp. 142-44. 71 CSHA, fond 176, 1v, 1380, p. 41; Stanchov Archives (100-day tour), pp. 5-9.

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On October 26, Stamboliski made a similar presentation to Winston Churchill, Secretary of War, who still resented Bulgaria’s failure to cooperate with the expeditionary force he had sent to the Dardanelles in 1915. Churchill advised Stamboliski to negotiate directly with Prime Minister Venizelos, for whom he

expressed great respect.” Stamboliski was noncommittal, although in private he referred to Venizelos as a “great lar. . . [who] dictates to the Allies.”** The fall of the Greek leader less than three weeks later ended temporarily any possibility of a meeting.

Stamboliski received his greatest satisfaction from his meeting with Lloyd-George on October 27. Although the two men came

from opposite corners of Europe, they had much in common. Both had risen from humble beginnings; both felt as well as comprehended intellectually the need for social justice; and both had risked their careers and personal safety by campaigning against a popular war. A friendship sprang up at once between the two men and was renewed at the Genoa Conference in 1922. Over dinner Stamboliski urged Lloyd-George to support the protection of the Bulgarian minority in Macedonia by the League of Nations. He

humorously suggested that since Britain already had so many commitments around the world, she would perhaps be willing to assume a mandate over Macedonia. Lloyd-George replied that he was ready to do so only if Bulgaria would assume one over Ireland. Although this meeting produced little of substance, LloydGeorge did agree to support Bulgaria’s application for membership in the League of Nations.*4 During his stay in England Stamboliski also addressed the London Chamber of Commerce, stressing Bulgaria’s need for foreign investment.”° After laying a wreath on the tomb of Gladstone, he left London on October 31. Stamboliski’s reception in France, while correct, was less cordial. His meetings with French officials were formal exchanges of 22 CSHA, fond 176, 1v, 1380, p. 71; Stanchov Archives (100-day tour), pp. 24-25. 23 CSHA, fond 176, 1v, 1380, p. 78.

pp. 25-27. .

24 CSHA, fond 176, Iv, 1380, pp. 73-77; Stanchov Archives (100-day tour),

25 Stanchov Archives, 1, pp. 81-82.

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courtesies devoid of real content, and he was pleased to escape from them to visit his son and daughter, who were attending schools in Paris. As in Britain, a tour was arranged that took him to farms, factories, and schools as far as Marseilles.”° In his brief visit to Belgium Stamboliski was received by King Albert, and he held an informal talk with Socialist leader Emile Vandervelde, who expressed great interest in the Agrarian reform

program.?” He left Western Europe convinced that “the clouds were beginning to disperse,” and that Bulgaria was gaining a new reputation as an honest and peaceful state. The new image that he projected bore fruit during the following year, when Bulgaria was admitted to the League of Nations, the first of the defeated states to be accepted. Czechoslovakia occupied an important place in Stambolisk1’s diplomatic strategy. He hoped that Prague would support his ef-

forts at rapprochement with the Yugoslavs and act as intermediary between Belgrade and Sofia. Even before Stamboliski’s visit to Prague, Masaryk had written a personal letter to King Alexander urging a normalization of relations between Belgrade and Sofia in order to secure Yugoslavia’s eastern border and to draw Bulgaria into “the sphere of Slavic-based interests.” Czechoslo-

vakia also possessed a large and powerful peasant party, the Czechoslovak Republican Party of Farmers and Small Peasants, led by the future Prime Minister, Antonin Svehla, with whom Stamboliski wished to discuss the formation of an international agrarian organization. He received a sympathetic hearing from Masaryk and Benes, who agreed to second his efforts to improve Bulgaria’s relations with the other East European states, and he was enthusiastically received by Svehla. The two Agrarian lead-

ers agreed that their peasant movements were saving Eastern Europe from Bolshevism and that they should aim at wider cooperation. Svehla pledged to support a policy of friendship toward Bulgaria and to cooperate in establishing the Green International, which would have its headquarters in Prague.”®

In Warsaw Stamboliski was warmly greeted by Wincenty Witos, Premier and leader of the Polish Peasant party. Witos also 6 Stanchov Archives (100-day tour), pp. 48-81. 27 Muir, pp. 229-30. 78 V. A. Vasilev, “Bulgaro-Chekhoslovashkite otnosheniia pri fashistkoto pravitelstvo na Al. Tsankov (9 iuni 1923-4 ianuari 1926 g.),” Izvestiia na Instituta

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approved the idea of a Green International, although he probably viewed it as a potential East European bloc directed against the Soviet Union.*?

Although his final visit, to Rumania, with which Bulgaria had differences over the treatment of the population in the Dobruja, was cool and formal,°° Stamboliski returned home with the belief that he had made a successful beginning to Bulgaria’s diplomatic recovery. In both Eastern and Western Europe, he told several mass meetings of peasants along the route from Ruse to Sofia, perceptions of Bulgaria were changing as the peaceful nature of the Agrarian government was recognized.*! After his return, Stamboliski pressed for rapid progress on the Green International, sending Alexander Dimitrov on a mission to

Warsaw and Prague in the spring of 1921. Dimitrov spent 300,000 leva on Agrarian propaganda in Poland and gained a renewed pledge of cooperation from Witos. In Prague, Svehla con-

tinued to look with favor on the idea. It was agreed that the “International Agrarian Bureau”’ would invite the membership of the Czechoslovak, Serbian, Polish, and Bulgarian peasant organizations,®2 and Stamboliski announced the formation of the International at the BANU’s XVI Congress.

Despite its hopeful beginning, the Green Iniernational remained weak and loosely organized, for its members did not have a common program. Svehla saw it principally as an instrument of

Pan-Slavism; Witos as a bastion against Soviet expansion. The Rumanian Peasant party feared its predominantly Slavic character, and the powerful Croatian Peasant party of Stjepan Radic rejected it because it did not endorse the cause of Croatian independence. Ironically, it was the overthrow of Stamboliski’s government that awakened the other East European peasant leaders to the need for more effective cooperation.” za istoriia, XX (1972), 93-119; CSHA, fond 176, 1v, 1380, p. 172; Muir, pp. 231-32; Todorov, p. 142.

29 Muir, pp. 232-34. 30 Ibid., pp. 234-36.

31 Dnevnitsi na XIX ONS, purva redovna sesiia, i, p. 1973. 82 CSHA, fond 176, 1v, 2026, pp. 20-21. 33 M.M. Goranovich, Krakh zelionogo internatsionala (1921-1938) (Moscow, 1967), pp. 58-70; Jackson, pp. 142-44; R. G. Livingstone, ‘‘Stjepan Radi¢ and the Croatian Peasant Party, 1904—1929,” unpublished dissertation, Harvard, 1959, p. 481.

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Bulgaria’s most serious difference with the Western Powers arose over the problem of reparations. Although Bulgaria met the demand for the transfer of coal and livestock to her neighbors, the full reparations bill, 2% billion gold francs, represented almost a

quarter of her entire national wealth, and the proposed annual payments, 105 million gold francs, equaled 55 percent of her state budget.** Stamboliski’s appeal for a postponement was rejected by the Reparations Commission, which ruled that the payments were within Bulgaria’s means. Only by agreeing to a plan to resume immediate payments of Bulgaria’s prewar debts was Stamboliski able to gain a reparations moratorium until June 1922 from the Allied Commission in Paris.*° Having encountered a total lack of sympathy from “‘his’”’ Reparations Commission, Stamboliski was astonished when the commission in Austria ruled that that country was unable to pay. Seeking to fathom the mystery of Austria’s good fortune, he sent Kosta

Todorov and Alexander Obbov to Vienna to investigate. They found that the Austrians had provided the members of their commission with large cash bribes, valuable art works, and other amenities.2° Somewhat surprised that this part of his “schooling

in diplomacy” consisted of a lesson long familiar to Balkan politicians, Stamboliski decided to test it at home. The commission looked with favor on these new arguments and submitted a report that led to Bulgaria’s receiving a further postponement to the spring of 1923.°”

Stamboliski had hoped that a broader solution to the reparations

question would be reached at the Genoa Conference, which he and Marko Turlakov attended in April and May 1922. Although disappointing in this respect, the conference did enable him to meet for the first time with representatives of the USSR. During 1919 and 1920 he had been a harsh critic of the Soviet Union. He

abhored the violent measures directed at the Russian peasantry during the period of War Communism, which coincided with the 34 Pasvolsky, pp. 65-67. *° Todorov, pp. 152-55; Stanchov Archives, 0, p. 294. 6 Todorov, p. 140. This mission was also discussed by Obbov in an interview in July 1973. 5” Todorov, p. 169.

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BCP’s drive to topple his own government, and he pronounced himself an enemy of “the methods of Lenin and Trotsky” wherever they appeared.?® During 1921, with conditions stabilizing in

both Bulgaria and the Soviet Union, he moderated his attitude. The BCP was no longer a threat, and he could joke that “his” Communists had become a “tame bear”’ that he could bring out to frighten the bourgeoisie should it try to thwart his reforms. Len-

in’s New Economic Policy also caused him to reevaluate his attitude toward the USSR, and in a parliamentary speech in No-

vember 1921 he said: “We have fought fiercely against Bolshevism, that is, Bolshevism in the form in which it first appeared in Russia. I do not speak of today’s Bolshevism, which is changing its aspect and taking a more democratic form.’’*? The Agrarian government contributed in a limited way to the international effort to relieve starvation in the Volga region, providing a small quantity of food, and allowing a mission from the Soviet Red Cross to enter Bulgaria to coordinate the more extensive relief campaign organized by the BCP.*° A more pressing reason for Stamboliski’s desire to improve relations with the USSR was the problem of the refugees from the Russian White Armies who were being settled in Bulgaria by the

Allies. When the remnants of Baron Wrangel’s forces were evacuated from the Crimea, the men and their families were temporarily maintained on the Gallipoli Peninsula and on the island of Lemnos. By 1921, when it was apparent that the Russian Civil War was over, the Allies decided to resettle the refugees in the Balkans. Bulgaria was persuaded to admit some 36,000, of whom 15,000 were soldiers who retained their arms and remained a part of Wrangel’s military organization. In consenting to accept them,

Stamboliski was bowing to the will of the Allies and to some members of his own cabinet who believed that the Whites would

provide security against another Communist attempt to seize power.*! The flaw in this reasoning was that few of the White 38 Zemledelsko zname, xv, Nos. 70, 71, 72, 73 (Feb. 14, 19, 21, 26, 1920). 39 Zemledelsko zname, xviu, No. 1 (Nov. 16, 1921), 1. *° Ta. Iotsov, “Sivetska Rusiia i Bulgariia (1920-1923),” in Oktomvriskata revoliutsiia i Bulgaro-suvetskata druzhba (Sofia, 1967), 147-48. “1G. I. Cherniaevski and D. Daskalov, Borbata na BKP protiv vrangelistkiia zagovor (Sofia, 1964), pp. 15-37.

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officers saw much difference between Bolshevism aad the policies of the Agrarian Union. Many of the refugees were veterans of past Balkan campaigns and had established friendships with Bulgaria’s former military and political leaders. It also seems to have been the case that some

members of Bulgaria’s conservative parties suggested a move against the Agrarians to the White leaders, whose 15,000 armed men might well decide the fate of disarmed Bulgaria.** The situation was further complicated by the BCP’s campaign to disarm the

Whites and expel their officers, while the Soviet and Ukrainian Foreign Offices protested the maintenance of armed White forces on Bulgarian soil.*

At the Genoa Conference the Soviet delegates, particularly Christian Rakovski, a Bulgarian by birth, pressed Stamboliski to disarm the Whites and to allow Soviet agents to attempt to repa-

triate them. Meanwhile, ii Bulgaria events were occuring that were to persuade Stamboliski to grant these requests. On May 8, Colonel Samokhvalov, one of Wrangel’s commanders, was ar-

rested in Sofia while carrying several files of intelligence archives. These included extensive information on the Bulgarian police and military, and records of meetings between the leaders

of Bulgaria’s conservative parties and White Guard commanders.** Although no plan for an immiment move against the government was discovered, the situation was deemed serious enough to demand immediate action. The government ordered the arrest of several prominent White officers and canceled a planned visit of Baron Wrangel. The Baron angrily sent a threatening telegram to the government that concluded:

Surrounded by scorn and slander, the Russian soldiers see the moment approaching when they will be forced to rally to their colors. . . . The terrible spectre of a fratricidal struggle appears once again. God is our witness that we are not the cause of it.* 2 Tbid., pp. 79-85. *8 lotsov, ““Stivetskata strana i Bilgariia,” pp. 148-50. 44 Pobeda, 1, Nos. 79, 80 (May 9, 10, 1922); Zemledelsko zname, xvi, No. 70 (May 18, 1922), 1; Cherniaevski and Daskalov, pp. 143-45. Kosta Todorov believed that the evidence had been planted by Soviet agents, Todorov, pp. 184-85. * Nestorov, p. 127.

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In response Stamboliski ordered the immediate deportation of some 150 White officers and the disarming of their troops. The latter were scattered in small groups throughout the country. In the aftermath Stamboliski permitted the Soviet Union to organize a “Union for Return to the Homeland” in Bulgaria and to send agents to campaign among the refugees. Many were recruited for the Red Army, and several thousand were repatriated. The BANU established a special Russian section to turn those who remained into Agrarians.*®

The disarming of the White Guards brought renewed accusations abroad, in part inspired by the conservative Bulgarian press, that the Agrarian government was “‘pro-Bolshevist.”’ Stambolisk1 directed Bulgarian diplomats abroad to deny the existence of any

link between the Bulgarian and Soviet governments or between the BANU and Communist ideology. He added that if it was Bolshevism not to suppress the BCP or to allow Bulgaria to become a base for the White Guards, he would have to plead guilty.*’ The improvement in relations between Bulgaria and the USSR continued at the Lausanne Conference that began in November 1922. The Soviet delegates supported Stamboliski’s plan to resolve the problem of a Bulgarian outlet on the Aegean by creating an autonomous Western Thrace, although the rest of the conference ignored the plan. Moreover, the Bulgarian leader agreed to a resumption of trade relations modeled on the recently negotiated Soviet-Norwegian agreement, and he pledged to send a delegation to Moscow during the following year.* The Soviet diplomats renewed the request for Bulgarian recognition that they had first made at Genoa. Stamboliski repeated his initial reply that, while he personally favored recognition, Bulgaria could not take such a step without the approval of the Allies. As soon as the Allies recognized the Soviet government, he promised, nothing would stop him from following their example.*” The key to the success or failure of Stamboliski’s foreign policy lay in Bulgaria’s relationship with Yugoslavia. Rumania, preoc*© Ibid., pp. 127-28; Erskine to Curzon (Sofia, April 15, 1923), FO 371/8568/ C7224, p. 14. 47 Stanchov Archives, vu, letter of Sept. 23, 1922, unpaged. * Totsov, “Suvetskata strana i Bulgariia,” pp. 164-65. 49 Tbid.; Todorov, p. 158.

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cupied with digesting her postwar gains and fearful of Soviet designs on Bessarabia, had no grievance against Bulgaria so long as the issue of the Dobruja remained closed. The thorny problem of Bulgaria’s access to the Aegean prohibited friendly relations with Greece, but that country was too absorbed in her adventures in Asia Minor to menace Bulgaria by herself. So Yugoslavia, now the leading Balkan power, was the vital factor in Stamboliski’s ambition to “solve the local equation.”’ As the initial stage of the

relations between the two countries demonstrated, a hostile Yugoslavia could keep Bulgaria in isolation, persecute her over reparations, and confront her with a constant military threat. It was Stamboliski’s hope that a friendly Yugoslavia would guarantee peace in the Balkans and help Bulgaria resolve her other diplomatic problems. At the time the Agrarians came to power, however, the road from Sofia to Belgrade was blocked by many obstacles. YugosJavia’s statesmen were flushed with their victories in the war and at the Paris Peace Conference. Their attitude toward their defeated neighbor was shaped by the past decades of Bulgarian-Serbian rivalry, by the memories of the “stabs in the back” in 1913 and 1915, and by the atrocities committed by Bulgarian occupation troops on Serbian soil. They were no more prepared to effect an immediate reconciliation with Bulgaria than were the French with the Germans. At the time of the SkupStina’s ratification of the Treaty of Neuilly, one deputy demanded that Bulgaria’s ambassador be shot down in the street, and he echoed the sentiments of most of his countrymen.”° Time, perhaps, might have caused these passions to fade had not a recurrence of Macedonian terrorism exacerbated them. After the Second Balkan War, when the bulk of Macedonia was won by

Serbia, Belgrade attempted to stamp out all traces of proBulgarian or Macedonian national sentiment. During the World War it was Bulgaria’s turn to impose its version of “liberation” on the Macedonians. The military forces of the IMRO, organized under the Bulgarian command, compiled a particularly distasteful record of war crimes against the Serbian element of the population. With Bulgaria’s defeat, Belgrade was more determined than °° Todorov, p. 140.

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ever to impose a policy of Serbification on the Macedonian people. Thousands fled to Bulgaria, where they were organized

into a new IMRO by Todor Alexandrov and Alexander Protogerov. These IMRO leaders, who had been arrested by the Agrarian government, charged with war crimes, and allowed to escape by sympathetic Bulgarian officers, established a stronghold in the Petrich District, the Bulgarian portion of Macedonia, which they ran as a practically independent state. They were supported by “‘taxes’”’ imposed on the local population and by funds supplied by the Italian government, which saw IMRO as a useful weapon against Yugoslavia.°’ Sympathetic Bulgarian officers and border guards closed their eyes while IMRO launched brutal raids into Yugoslav Macedonia. Stamboliski was powerless to stop the raids since Bulgaria lacked the necessary military force and, in any case, her army could not be relied on to fight the IMRO. Moreover, IMRO’s will-

ingness to use terror against any politician opposed to the Macedonian cause made such a course extremely risky. Stamboliski was in much the same position as today’s Lebanese govemment, unwilling host to an element dangerous both to internal politics and to regional peace.

Stamboliski was determined to reach an understanding with Yugoslavia no matter what the risks. In October 1920, when dip-

lomatic relations between the two countries were renewed, he named Kosta Todorov as ambassador, instructing him to spare no effort to convince the Yugoslavs that Bulgaria was entirely committed to a policy of friendship. Todorov’s overtures were rebuffed and the visit that Stamboliski hoped to make to Belgrade had to be canceled.** During the following year Yugoslavia helped to

form the Little Entente, the system of alliances linking Yugoslavia, Rumania, and Czechoslovakia, aimed in part at keeping Bulgaria in isolation.®®

Stamboliski knew that he could count on the Czechoslovak leaders to keep the Little Entente from being used aggressively against Bulgaria, but he also knew that an understanding with Yugoslavia could never be reached as long as IMRO terrorism 1 Ibid., pp. 141, 151; Roucek, p. 143. °2 Todorov, pp. 140-44. 53 Wolff, p. 157.

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continued. Deciding to challenge the Macedonian societies, he

turned to Alexander Dimitrov, who had shown his mettle as Minister of the Interior by effectively crushing the Communist general strike. Since the establishment of the Agrarian govern-

ment, the forceful and honest Dimitrov had emerged as the BANU’s second-in-command and had been named Acting Prime Minister during Stamboliski’s trips abroad. In May 1921 he went to Belgrade, where he tried to convince Pasi¢é that the Bulgarian government was not involved in terrorism, and promised to take strong measures against IMRO as a sign of Bulgaria’s good faith.

Returning to Bulgaria, he took over the Ministry of War, appointed his most trusted aide, Colonel Koslovski, to command the

gendarmerie in the Petrich District, and began to purge known IMRO sympathizers from the army and frontier guards.°* Although he ordered the arrest of the IMRO leaders, Dimitrov had little faith in the ability of the police to bring them to justice. Hoping to turn the terrorists against each other, he helped to set up

a rival organization of “federalists,” and encouraged it to try to take over the entire IMRO. He also let it be known that the government would pay substantial rewards for the death or capture of IMRO leaders.®> While, perhaps, not up to the standards of civil

libertarians, these measures did put IMRO on the defensive. Alexandrov and Protogerov went underground, and raids into Yugoslavia declined. One voivoda, Simeon Georgiev Kochanski,

was captured by police, turned over to a federalist band, and killed.°° IMRO countered by assassinating Koslovski and putting Dimi-

trov himself under a death sentence. On October 22, while on a tour of inspection near Kiustendil, the War Minister was ambushed by a dozen men from the bands of Pancho Mikhailov and Burliu voivoda. Dimitrov, his driver, and one companion were all shot and their bodies hacked with bayonets.°‘ The loss of Dimitrov was a blow both to the Agrarian government, to which he had contributed an example of incorruptibility >4 Todorov, pp. 151-52.

°° Pravitelstvo na Stamboliski i makedonskoto osvoboditelno dvizhenie ( ?, 1923), pp. 12-18. 56 Radolov, p. 106. °” Zemledelsko mame, xvi, No. 93 (Oct. 24, 1921), 1.

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and a dogged sense of realism, and to the effort to conciliate Yugoslavia. Renewed IMRO attacks increased Pasic’s anger toward his neighbor. Early in 1922 he said that Bulgaria would have to do penance for a generation before rejoining civilized European society.°®

At the end of 1920 the Yugoslav government negotiated a settlement of its Adriatic disputes with Italy. The significance of this agreement, formalized in the Treaty of Rapallo, for Bulgaria was that Yugoslavia now had a free hand to deal with the Macedonian problem.*® In the beginning of 1922, when a dozen Yugoslav soldiers were killed in an IMRO ambush, Belgrade warned that its patience had run out. To forestall a Yugoslav occupation of Bulgarian territory—which would undoubtedly have forced him to r2sign—Stamboliski proposed to Belgrade that the two countries collaborate on a plan for the joint supervision of the frontier.®° The Yugoslavs were in no mood for collaboration. At his wedding reception, King Alexander broke protocol to denounce the

IMRO raids to the Bulgarian ambassador.®* Meanwhile the Yugoslav Foreign Minister approached his Greek and Rumanian counterparts to urge them to join in issuing a collective ultimatum to Bulgaria. This effort to revive the alliance of the Second Balkan War was successful, and in the middle of June Stamboliski was

given a note signed by the three governments demanding that Bulgaria destroy all organizations whose conduct threatened the security of her neighbors. It warned that if the Bulgarian government did not demonstrate that 1t was master in its own house by

taking satisfactory measures against terrorist groups, then the three states would undertake to restore order in Bulgaria them-

selves. Stamboliski’s response to this threat of intervention was to appeal immediately to the League of Nations, asking for a full investigation of the Macedonian situation.®°? The League scheduled a °8 Erskine to Curzon (Sofia, April 15, 1923), FO 371/8568/C7224, p. 5. °° Todorov, pp. 162-63.

6 Ibid., p. 166. 61 Ibid., pp. 166-67.

® Ibid., p. 168; Erskine to Curzon (Sofia, April 15, 1923), FO 371/8568/ C7224, p. 5. 63 Stanchov Archives (Thrace-Macedonia, 1921-1922), letter of June 22, 1922, unpaged.

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meeting of its Council for mid-July and ruled that any party to the dispute who initiated conflict before that time would be in violation of the Covenant. By pledging in advance to abide by any decisions of the League Council, Stamboliski placed his opponents in an uncomfortable position. Neither Greece nor Yugoslavia wanted a full investiga-

tion of the situation in Macedonia since it would reveal their shortcomings in the treatment of minorities; Rumania was apprehensive that the Dobruja issue would again be raised. Consequently, when the meeting of the Council began in London under the chairmanship of Lord Balfour, the three countries were prepared to compromise. For his part, Stamboliski had no desire to stir up the Macedonian problem, and he instructed his representative not to insist on an investigation. In what amounted to a vindication for Bulgaria, the Council ruled that the dispute could best be settled by direct negotiations, and recommended that dis-

cussions be held based on Stamboliski’s earlier note to Yugoslavia on joint protection of the frontier.®

Bulgaria had won a diplomatic skirmish, but this was small consolation to Stamboliski. Although the League had saved Bulgaria from occupation, the collective action of her three neighbors had demonstrated the precariousness of her international situation. In a renewed effort to break through to Yugoslavia, he ap-

pealed to Benes, the great exponent of cooperation among the Slavic peoples. In a visit to Prague he pleaded with Benes to present Bulgaria’s case to Czechoslovakia’s partners in the Little Entente and to act as intermediary between Sofia and Belgrade.™ In October 1922 the entire diplomatic situation in the Balkans

was altered by the establishment of the Fascist government in Italy. Mussolini did not attempt to conceal his aggressive designs on the Dalmatian coast, and he immediately repudiated the Treaty of Rapallo. The revived danger of Italian expansionism forced the Yugoslavs to look more favorably on Stamboliski’s plea for improved relations. The initial sign of a change in the direction of Yugoslav policy came almost at once, when Belgrade assured the 6* Todorov, pp. 169-70; Erskine to Curzon (Sofia, April 15, 1923), FO 371/ 8568/C7224, pp. 5-6. > Erskine to Curzon (Sofia, April 15, 1923), FO 371/8568/C7224, p. 10.

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Bulgarian ambassador that it would have no objection to Stamboliski’s raising the question of access to the Aegean at the upcoming Lausanne Conference. Correctly interpreting this signal, Stamboliski pressed for direct meetings with the Yugoslav lead-

Belgrade. |

ers, and it was quickly agreed that he should pay an official visit to

Stamboliski’s appearance in the Yugoslav capital marked the beginning of a new stage in his diplomacy. He was at last able to

present his views directly to the Yugoslav leaders and to the Yugoslav people, and he made the most of his opportunity. Addressing an assembly of Belgrade journalists, he stated that Bulgaria abandoned all claim to Macedonia, that he had never sup-

ported Macedonian terrorists, and that in fact he held them responsible for countless political crimes and for pushing Bulgaria into the Second Balkan War and the World War. He expressed the

hope that Belgrade would succeed in turning the Macedonians into good Yugoslav citizens.°” He made a similar presentation to Pasi¢, Foreign Minister Ninci¢é, and to King Alexander, all of whom responded favorably. They agreed to establish a joint commission to study ways of dealing with Macedonian terrorism,

and the Yugoslavs promised to support Bulgaria’s demand at Lausanne for an Aegean outlet. Moreover, they agreed that an actual Bulgarian- Yugoslav alliance was possible in the immediate future .©

Stamboliski’s visit to Belgrade and his public comments on the Macedonian question enraged the IMRO. In December it undertook a demonstration of force by occupying the town of Kiusten-

dil and holding it for three days. This provocation persuaded Stamboliski to seek Yugoslav help, and on March 23, 1923, the two countries signed the Treaty of Nis, aimed at stopping IMRO terrorism. The treaty provided that each country would clear an

area one hundred meters in depth along its side of the entire Macedonian frontier. Bulgarian and Yugoslav border guards would cooperate in patrolling the frontier, and both would be allowed to cross it in pursuit of guerrillas and to make use of springs 6° CSHA, fond 176, Iv, 2655, p. 9. 67 Erskine to Curzon (Sofia, April 15, 1923), FO 371/8568/C7224, p. 6. 68 Ibid.; Todorov, pp. 172-73; CSHA, fond 176, 1v, 2655, p. 22.

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and supply points. Further, Bulgaria promised tc remove civil and

military officials in the Petrich District who were found to be cooperating with the terrorists and to extradite anyone accused of crimes on Yugoslav territory.’ Although Stamboliski and the members of his cabinet received death threats from Todor Alexandrov, the government launched a new campaign against IMRO. After the April elections for the

National Assembly, the Council of Ministers announced that Macedonian terrorists would be rounded up and sent to special camps in eastern Bulgaria. All terrorist organizations were declared illegal and their publications banned. The government also began training a special police force for operations against IMRO strongholds in the Petrich District.’° These measures cleared the way for a complete Yugoslav-Bulgarian alliance, the negotiations for which began at the end of April.” The rapprochement between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia permitted Stamboliski to make immediate progress on two other outstanding problems: reparations and the question of an outlet on the

Aegean. ,

Mussolini, of course, opposed the improved relations between Sofia and Belgrade, and chose to use Italy’s influence on the Bulgarian Reparations Commission to force Stamboliski to change his policy. The moratorium on Bulgarian reparations payments was scheduled to end in March 1923. In January, the Italian ambassador informed Stamboliski that because of Bulgaria’s antiItalian (i.e. pro- Yugoslav) foreign policy, Italy would insist on

| the resumption of full payments. When the Reparations Commission began its meetings, it was against the background of the French occupation of the Ruhr. The Italians were responsible for 40 percent of Bulgaria’s reparations and the French for 20 per-

cent. Together, the Italian and French delegates voted not to renew the moratorium and threatened to invoke sanctions should * R.A. Reiss, The Comitadji Question in Southern Serbia (London, 1924), pp. 37-38.

© Zemledelsko zname, x1X, No. 94 (May 9, 1923), 1; Stamboliski i makedonskoto . . . dvizhenie, pp. 37-43. ” Todorov, p. 187.

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Bulgaria refuse to pay. Such a move would have forced the Agrarian government from office, but Stamboliski’s efforts to improve relations with his immediate neighbors now bore fruit. According

to the Treaty of Neuilly, sanctions against Bulgaria were to be imposed by the surrounding states. When, in March, the Bulgarian government announced that it could not pay, the Reparations Commission authorized the Yugoslav, Greek, and Rumanian governments to seize her customs and to occupy the coal mines at Pernik. Yugoslavia, however, refused to take part, stating that she would not jeopardize her new relationship with Bulgaria. Greece and Rumania followed the lead of Belgrade. Stamboliski’s delegate to the commission stated that any attempt by Italy unilaterally to seize Bulgarian customs would be resisted.” Bulgaria’s successful defiance of the commission and the support she had received from her neighbors permitted a renegotiation of the entire reparations agreement. On March 21, a new protocol was signed by Bulgaria and the commission that divided the

debt into two parts. The first, consisting of 550,000,000 gold francs, was to be paid over a sixty-year period during which it would draw 5 percent interest. The initial year’s payment would be 5,000,000 gold francs (as opposed to the 105,000,000 originally demanded), the annual amount then increasing slowly each year until the liquidation of the debt in 1983. The remaining por-

tion, amounting to 1,700,000,000 gold francs, would remain un- | touched until 1953, at which time Bulgaria would begin to pay it off. Until then it would draw no interest.” Until 1923 the Greek government had resisted all Bulgarian demands for a corridor to the Aegean. During the first stage of the Lausanne Conference, from November 1922 to February 1923, Venizelos offered only transit rights over Greek territory and a perpetual lease to the port of Dedeagatch or, alternatively, the es-

tablishment of a Bulgarian “‘zone”’ in Salonika.” | By the time the second stage of the conference began, on April

? Ibid., pp. 182-84. “3 CSHA, fond 176, Iv, 2302, pp. 297-98; J. P. Koszul, Les efforts de restauration financiére de la Bulgarie (1922-1931) (Paris, 1932), p. 47. “* Todorov, pp. 174-75; Stanchov Archives (Lausanne), report of meeting of Jan. 26, 1923, unpaged.

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22, the new relationship between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia was apparent. According to Kosta Todorov, Bulgaria’s chief delegate to the second stage of the conference, Venizelos was frightened that his northern neighbors might take advantage of Greece’s weakened state, following the collapse of her armies in Asia Minor, to push southward—the Yugoslavs to Salonika, the Bulgarians into western Thrace. He was also apprehensive of the aggressive spirit shown by Mussolini. Todorov wrote that Venizelos

approached him with a plan for a new compromise, one that would cede a strip of territory linking Bulgaria with Dedeagatch in return for an equal amount of Bulgarian territory farther west. According to Todorov, this plan was under consideration when Stamboliski was overthrown.” Unfortunately, the Bulgarian government has never fully opened its archives so that Todorov’s account might be confirmed or refuted by other sources. If it is true, then it was a major advance in Stamboliski’s policy of settling

outstanding Balkan disputes. , Stamboliski’s political opponents were highly critical of his foreign policy, which, they maintained, brought no genuine gains to Bulgaria. In a sense they were correct, for they believed the sole purpose of Bulgaria’s foreign policy was to acquire the Dobruja, Macedonia, and western Thrace from her neighbors. Membership in the League of Nations and adherence to its Covenant, improved relations with Yugoslavia, resistance to Italian promises of a new order in the Balkans—all these were either meaningless or inimical to Bulgaria’s national goals as the traditional parties

| understood them. Opposition to Stamboliski’s foreign policy was the one element around which every element hostile to the Agrarian government was able to unite. In Stamboliski’s eyes, by 1923 his foreign policy had been productive. Bulgaria was not the servant of any of the great powers, there was no prospect of a Balkan conflict, and the new spirit of Balkan unity had allowed Bulgaria to resist Italian dictation of her foreign policy. It is impossible to say what the future of Balkan ® Todorov, pp. 180-81.

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diplomacy would have been if Stamboliski had stayed in power. One can only say that the return to a traditional foreign policy that followed the June coup d’ état weakened the whole Balkan peninsula and opened it to foreign penetration, and that once again her leaders made Bulgaria a handmaiden of German imperialism. It is

hard to believe that Stamboliski’s “anti-national” diplomacy could have led to a worse result.

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CHAPTER VIII

The Overthrow of the Agrarian Government

Stambolov, with his mind, prestige, and practical ability, would have performed great service had he not been murdered; and Petkov would have performed great service; and so would Takev and many other statesmen who were assassinated. ——Alexander Stamboliski'

WHILE Stamboliski’s domestic reforms and foreign policy received broad peasant support, the Agrarian government had pow-

erful enemies. Potentially the most dangerous of them was the officer corps. Long accustomed to prestige and command, Bulgaria’s officers could not easily reconcile themselves to the Agrarian regime. Many of them were convinced that Stamboliski had committed treason by opposing Bulgaria’s part in the World War and by leading the Radomir Rebellion. In January 1919, the very

month in which Stamboliski was amnestied and joined the Todorov government, a group of young officers who feared the radical trend in the country formed the secret Military League to be

“above politics” and to preserve military values. Although its immediate task was the concealment of weapons from the Allies, it rapidly evolved into an “‘officers union,”’ which included all but two hundred of Bulgaria’s active-duty officers. Its influence over ' the military bureaucracy was so strong that the government found it impossible to impose its will on the army or even to remove individual officers against whom it had a grievance.’ The approximately 6,500 officers who left the army in 1919 and 1920, either because they would not serve under the Agrarians or because of the reduction in the size of the army required by the

Treaty of Neuilly, swelled the ranks of the Union of Reserve * Dnevnitsi na XIX ONS, vtora redovna sesiia, 1, p. 130. Stamboliski was commenting on a bill to establish memorials to assassinated Bulgarian statesmen. 2 Mitev, pp. 74-78; S. Vasilev, 9-i iuni i subitiiata okoto T.-Pazardzhik (Plovdiv, 1924), pp. 7-10.

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Officers, which became a branch of the Military League. Although the government tried to find places for the retired officers in the bureaucracy or to provide them with some material assistance, it could offer them nothing to equal the psychic and financial rewards of military command, and many in fact fell into extreme poverty.® The butchers, carters, servants, errand-boys, and doorkeepers,* who had lately been the pride of the nation, were the most disaffected element in society. Slaveiko Vasilev, a leader in both the Military League and the Union of Reserve Officers, was approached as early as October 1920 by Alexander Tsankov and two other professors from Sofia University’s legal faculty to discuss the possiblity of organizing a coup against the Agrarians. “‘At that time,’ Vasilev wrote:

the officer corps was totally prepared to smash the Agrarians with one blow and so save Bulgaria. The only ones who were not ready were the leaders of the political parties, who did not wish or were unable to see the evil in its full scope.°

Vasilev’s statement highlights the principal weakness of the officer corps. Although disaffected, it lacked the capacity for independent political action and, momentarily at any rate, neither the Court nor the old parties were able to provide it. Tsar Boris, although despising the Agrarians, who constantly told him that he reigned only by their sufferance, was enough of a realist to know that they were correct. He declined to involve himself in any discussions of a coup d’ état, preferring to remain in the background and quietly to cultivate pro-monarchist elements in the army and the political parties.° Through 1920 and most of 1921 the leaders of the old parties were divided by mutual jealousies and incapable of any coordinated action. Still, the Agrarian reforms and the regulation of the professional conduct of lawyers and teachers began to push the parties closer together. The Fall of 1921 marked a watershed in the relations between the BANU and its enemies. After the assassination of Alexander 3 Dnevnitsi na XIX ONS, purva izviinredovna sesiia, 11, pp. 1548-49; Mitev, pp. 79-82.

* Vasilev, p. 14. > Ibid., p. 19.

° Erskine to Curzon (Sofia, April 15, 1923), FO 371/6568/C7224, p. 13.

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THE OVERTHROW

Dimitrov in October, Stamboliski realized that he would have to undertake an exhausting struggle against IMRO if his foreign policy was to succeed, and he decided to try to make peace with his adversaries on the domestic front. On November 11 he went before the National Assembly to announce a partial reconstruction of the cabinet and to appeal for a relaxation of partisan strife. Up to that point, he said, the BANU had been absorbed in the battle to enact its reform program. Now that this had been achieved, Bulgaria should enjoy a period of calm. He assured the Assembly that the government would not introduce any new, more radical reforms, but would strive to provide a stable political and economic environment to encourage foreign and domestic investors. An influx of foreign capital, be declared, would bring financial stability, new technology and culture, and would help Bulgaria to gain good will abroad. “Our own capitalists should calm down ..., he added, “and put their capital into productive investments rather than speculation.”’ He also had a good word for the Communists, praising the decline of extremism in the Soviet Union.’

As a sign of his desire to diminish political tensions, Stamboliski increased the strength of the moderates in his cabinet. Constantine Tomov was named Minister of War; Alexander Radolov moved from Justice to the Ministry of the Interior; Petur Ianev became Minister of Justice; and Khristo Manolov Minister of Rails, Posts and Telegraphs. Only Ianev, who had been chief prosecutor in the trial of the Radoslavov government, could be

counted a “radical.”’ Radolov was a man of the golden mean, while Tomov and Manolov had in the past expressed misgivings about the rapidity and thoroughness of the government’s reform program.®

The opponents of the Agrarian government did not take up Stamboliski’s olive branch. Interpreting it as a sign of weakness, they were spurred to intensify their own unity. At the end of the year the three major opposition parties on the right—the National Progressives, formed by the merger of the National and Progress-

ive Liberal parties in 1920, the Democrats, and the Radical ” Dnevnitsi na XIX ONS, vtora redovna sesiia, 1, pp. 127-34. 8 Zemledelsko zname, xvill, No. 8 (Dec. 3, 1921), 1; Erskine to Curzon (Sofia, April 15, 1923), FO 371/8568/C7224, p. 12.

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THE OVERTHROW

Democrats—agreed to present a common slate in the elections for

town and village councils set for February 11, 1922. Forming what became generally known as the “Bourgeois Bloc,” they sought to make these elections a test of strength between themselves and the Agrarian Union. The campaign was extremely bit-

ter and not at all discouraging to the Bloc, which captured 277,833 votes, about 33 percent of the total, compared to the BANU’s 334,229 votes, or 45 percent, and the BCP’s 98,600, or 13 percent. The rest went to the Broad Socialists, who received 28,000 votes, and to various smaller groups.° The failure of the BANU to gain a clear majority encouraged the Bloc leaders to begin discussions with the White Guards. On March 28, Andrei Liapchev, Dr. Dimittr Orakhovats, and Pro-

fessor Vladimir Mollov of the Democrats, Todor Todorov, Mikhail Madzharov, G. Z. Gruev, Khristo Silianov, and Stefan Bobchev of the National Progressives, Professor Petko Stoianov of the Radicals, and the “independent” Professor T. Kulev met in the offices of the White Russian newspaper Svobodnaia rech’ to discuss the removal of the Agrarian government with White Guard leaders.'° When the government disarmed the Guards and

deported their commanders, the old parties charged that the Agrarians had yielded to the Communists, and that ‘““Stamboliski is sailing the Bulgarian ship into bolshevik waters.’’!?

Early in 1922 a new danger to the Agrarian government appeared with the formation of Naroden sgovor [National Alliance]. Naroden sgovor represented itself as a “nonpartisan”’ organization of citizens, whose membership came from commercial, industrial, and military circles. Its founders and leaders— Alexander Grekov, a jurist and diplomat; Alexander Tsankov, a professor of

law with close ties to the Military League; and Professor Kulev—were all admirers of Italian fascism, whose successes they hoped to duplicate in Bulgaria. The Sgovor even sent a delegate to observe Mussolini’s methods of organization and agita-

tion.” 9 Zemledelsko zname, Xvi, No. 39 (Feb. 25, 1922), 4. 10 Pobeda, No. 79 (May 9, 1922), 2. ‘t Cherniaevski and Daskalov, p. 179. 12 Mitev, pp. 84-85; Kazasov, Burni godini, pp. 96-97; Aleksandur Grekov, 1884-1922 (Sofia, 1924), pp. 3-5.

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THE OVERTHROW , Insofar as the Sgovor possessed a coherent ideology, it could be

said to be against the “divisive” ideas of Agrarianism with its estatist conflict and Marxism with its class conflict, and in favor of “social harmony.” In April it began to publish its own newspaper, Slovo [Word], which provided a forum for every rightwing critic of the Agrarian government. Tsankov, destined to become Bulgaria’s ideologist of fascism,’* used its columns to repeat his message that the Agrarians and Communists were one in the same, or alternatively, that they were joined in a “silent alliance.”” This necessitated a united front of Bulgaria’s “parties of

order,’’ and toward that end Tsankov hoped that the Naroden sgovor would serve as a catalyst.** When Alexander Grekov was

shot and killed in May—the Agrarians were not implicated— Tsankov became the editor of Slovo and the chief figure in the Sgovor.

Although a number of political figures, including Atanas Burov, Andrei Liapchev, Petko Stainev, and Petko Stoianov, immediately associated themselves with Naroden sgovor, a united front on the right was not easily achieved, the chief obstacle being the conflicting ambitions of the various party leaders. In May the first step toward unity was taken when the Democratic and National Progressive parties negotiated a merger. After two months of holding out for better terms, the Radical party decided “‘to do

its duty,” and joined the grouping in mid-July. The “Constitutional Bloc,” as the three parties now styled themselves, formed a shadow government with the Democrats holding four ministries, including the Premiership and Foreign Affairs, the National Progressives four, and the Radicals two.’ The Bloc leaders also hoped to gain the support of the Broad Socialists. Although Pastukhov hated the Agrarians—he told the London Times correspondent: “With the devil I can be friends, but the Peasant Government must be destroyed’’'®—he preferred 8 A short account of the later evolution of Tsankov’s ideas and his “movement”? may be found in Oren, pp. 18-19. 14 Slovo, Nos. 8, 9, 41, 57 (April 19, 20, June 1, 22, 1922). '® Erskine to Curzon (Sofia, April 15, 1923), FO 371/8568/C7224, pp. 14-15;

Radikal, xvi, No. 148 (July 7, 1922), 1. 16 J. Swire, Bulgarian Conspiracy (London, 1939), p. 156.

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to keep his party independent. The Broad Socialists did, however,

express sympathy for the Bloc, and the party introduced a new journal, Epokha, that differed little from S/ovo in its castigation of the Agrarians.*

The general consolidation of the right had the support of the Bulgarian clergy, which, although normally nonpolitical, intensely disliked the free-thinking Stamboliski, who did not bother to pay even lip service to religion. The Holy Synod, outraged by the government’s confiscation of monastery lands, by the reduction in religious training in the schools, and by the removal of the Orthodox Seminary to the Rila Monastery so that its Sofia headquarters could be turned into an agricultural school,’® published a manifesto denouncing these measures and threatening to break the tie between church and state. Although Stamboliski was able to pacify the synod, its relations with the government remained very

cool, and several leading church figures associated themselves with the Constitutional Bloc.!? The University, too, on strike from March to June, gave its moral support to the right.”° Spurred on by Naroden sgovor, the parties of the Bloc began to emulate the tactics of Mussolini’s fascists by organizing “sporting clubs” and “‘youth organizations” that were intended for political violence. Todor Todorov told the delegates to the youth congress of the National Progressive party that they should be proud to call themselves fascists, and that they should prepare themselves for

the “final struggle” against the government.” Naroden sgovor organized its own militant club, called Kubrat, which was composed mainly of reserve officers.

In an address to the annual congress of the National Progressives at the end of August, Atanas Burov proclaimed that the time of preparation had ended and the time for action had begun. Advocating the tactics that were then bringing the blackshirts to ‘7 Kirshevskaia, “Padenie,” p. 65. 18 In dispossessing the synod of its Sofia headquarters, Stamboliski told the church leaders that it would do them good to “get closer to God” in the Rila Mountains. C. a C. Repington, After the War (London, 1922), p. 387. 19 Radolov, pp. 64-65; Erskine to Curzon (April 15, 1923), FO 371/8568/ C7224, p. 20; Turlakov, [storiia, pp. 206-207. 20 Zemledelsko zname, Xvill, No. 42 (March 4, 1922), 1-2; Radolov, pp. 66-68. 21 Mir, No. 6,670 (Aug. 31, 1922), 1.

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power in Italy, he announced that the Bloc would hold three mass

meetings beginning in Turnovo, September 17, continuing in Plovdiv, November 1, and culminating in a great march on Sofia, November 15. These blows, Burov concluded, would drive from power “that garbage from the Bulgarian village.’ The press of the

Bloc parties echoed Burov’s sentiments, arguing that Agrarian violations of the constitution justified the adoption of extralegal means of struggle, and calling for the beginning of a “decisive battle’ against the government in Tirnovo on September 17.” While the right gradually moved toward unity, the solidarity of

: the government diminished, for the ghost of Agrarian factionalism had not been laid to rest by the expulsion of Dragiev. A

new division appeared between a “conservative” group led by Marko Turlakov and a “‘radical”’ one represented in the cabinet by

Raiko Daskalov. Soviet and postwar Bulgarian historians interpreted this split as a reflection of the changing class composition of the BANU. According to this hypothesis, Turlakov and his allies represented that part of the peasantry that had done well during the war and emerged as a new rural bourgeoisie, while the faction led by the “hero of Radomir” continued to express the aspirations of the poor peasantry.” This theory has little to recommend it to those who do not accept a priori the tenets of Marxist-

Leninist scholarship. Moreover, it is contradicted by data collected for the XVI and XVII Agrarian congresses, which gave

no evidence of the appearance of a “rural bourgeoisie” among BANU members. Table 7 shows that small peasant farmers continued to make up the near totality of the Union’s membership.** The roots of resurgent factionalism in the BANU seem rather to have lain in the personal ambitions of individual Union leaders and in a generational conflict. Turlakov’s support came primarily 2 Mir, No. 6,668 (Aug. 29, 1922), 1; Mitev, pp. 96-97; Erskine to Curzon (Sofia, April 15, 1923), FO 371/8568/C7224, p. 15. 73 1. Berov, ‘‘Sotsialna osnova na rezhima na BZNS prez 1918-1923,” Istoricheski pregled, xxvii, No. 4 (1972), 45-58; Istoriia na Bilgariia, 1, pp. 423-24; Kirshevskaia, ““Padenie,” p. 82. 4 Turlakov, Istoriia, pp. 221, 223. The Istoriia na Bulgariia and Berov cite the figures for 1921 as proof of considerable class differentiation in the countryside. Beauty is in the eye of the beholder.

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______ COMPOSITION OF BANU Druzhbi IN 1921 AND 1922 0

Year 1921 %o 1922 % Number of druzhbi 3,014 3,439

Number of members for

which data was furnished 87,068 105,976

Landless peasants 2,475 2.8 3,263 3.1

Owners of 0.1— 2 ha 15,648 18.0 14,015 13.2

2—- 5 ha 37,613 43.2 57,583 54.4

5-10 ha 23,999 27.6 27,176 25.6

10-20 ha 6,552 7.5. 3,422 3.2 20-50 ha 727 0.8 363 0.3 30-50 ha 27 — 48 —

over 50 ha 27 — 6 —

from members of the parliamentary group and the cabinet. The more radical wing was drawn from younger Union members who had not yet achieved high political office, but who had risen in the ranks of the Union itself. The rivalry first appeared after the March 1920 elections when the Agrarian parliamentary group and the Union leadership met to assign posts in the new cabinet. Daskalov, whose headstrong behavior during the Radomir Rebellion received little approval behind the scenes, was assigned the relatively unimportant Ministry of Commerce. Turlakov sought the Ministry of the Interior, but Stamboliski supported Alexander Dimitrov for this post, and Turlakov had to be content with the Ministry of Finance.”° In the Spring of 1921, after his return from his 100-day diplomatic tour, Stamboliski became seriously ill. Although the Zem-

ledelsko zname reported simply that he was suffering from “‘a small boil,’’*® the illness was apparently more severe for he was confined to bed for several weeks. Turlakov chose this moment to

recommend to the Council of Ministers that it name him Prime Minister in Stamboliski’s place. The Council refused, and after Stamboliski’s recovery relations between the two men deteriorated.?" 2° Zemledelsko zname, xv1, No. 1 (May 25, 1920), 2; Radikal, xvi, No. 109 (May 20, 1900), 2. 26 Zemledelsko zname, xvii, No. 18 (April 11, 1921), 3.

2” Radolov, p. 130. .

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To justify his opposition to Stamboliski, Turlakov elaborated a political philosophy of his own, one that called for rapprochement with the old parties. He wrote that democracy and parliamentary government were the highest achievements of political man and that the essence of effective parliamentary government was compromise between opposing ideologies and programs. He argued that, although it was proper for the BANU to be an estatist organization, representing a single interest group, the government ought to have a broader composition. Later, like Dragiev, he claimed that Stamboliski was a man of quick, brutal action, while he himself was for legality and gradualness. And, again like Dragiev, he accused Stamboliski of seeking dictatorship over the country .”°

Within the cabinet Turlakov was supported by Constantine Tomov, who may have entered into secret negotiations with the BANU’s enemies with a view toward replacing Stamboliski’s government with a coalition.”? Alexander Radolov also favored a policy of greater moderation, although he took part in no covert plots against the Prime Minister. In November 1921, when Stamboliski followed advice to conciliate the BANU’s opponents, he added Khristo Manolov, another Turlakov supporter, to the cabi-

net.°° :

The failure of the old parties to respond to his overtures and the formation of the “Bourgeois Bloc”’ at the end of 1921 prompted Stamboliski to abandon his brief effort at conciliation and to turn increasingly to the BANU’s left. In January 1922, in preparation

for the town and village council elections, he required Radolov and Daskalov to exchange ministries, Radolov taking Commerce and Daskalov Interior. Although the Zemledelsko zname reported that this change had “‘the full agreement of both men,” Radolov and the Turlakov faction saw it as a blow to their position.*!

In March Turlakov gained a new supporter when a quarrel 8 Turlakov’s philosophy is presented in his Demokratsiia i parlamentarizm (Stara Zagora, 1929), Koi i zashto me izkliuchi ot BZNS? (Sofia, 1923), and in chapters X1, XIU, xIV, and xv of his /storiia. See also the analysis of his position in Radikal, xvm, No. 113 (May 26, 1922), 1. 79 Todorov, pp. 155-56. °° Radolov, p. 127; Kazasov, Burni godini, pp. 117-18. 31 Zemledelsko zname, xvin, No. 21 (Jan. 12, 1922), 3; Erskine to Curzon (Sofia, April 15, 1923), FO 371/8568/C7224, p. 12.

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broke out between Stamboliski and Omarchevski. The issue was

the spelling reform, which had become an obsession with the Minister of Education, so much so that he wanted to impose heavy penalties on publishers, journals, and newspapers that continued to use the old orthography. When the spelling bill was de-

bated in the National Assembly, Stamboliski took the floor to oppose the section on penalties, and it was deleted. Omarchevski and Turlakov, who had taken his side, walked out of the Assem-

bly. In a caucus of the entire parliamentary group, Turlakov called for the Prime Minister’s resignation. Although Stamboliski apologized for not having consulted his minister in advance and

the caucus adjured the cabinet to place Agrarian unity ahead of personal feeling, the fiery Omarchevski continued to resent what he regarded as a betrayal and a humiliation.*” Stamboliski could not resolve the growing discord in the cabinet by a purge. The individual members would not resign, and he feared that, if he submitted the resignation of the entire cabinet,

Boris might turn to the Bloc to form a new government. Moreover, with a bare four-vote majority in the National Assembly, he had to avoid alienating any substantial segment of the parliamentary group.*° Turlakov decided to mount a new challenge to Stamboliski at the BANU’s XVII Congress held in May 1922. This proved to be a miscalculation, for it showed that his entire strength lay in the cabinet and parliamentary group and that he had no base of support in the BANU’s rank and file. Turlakov began his campaign

with an address to the “little congress” of the Supreme Union Council, made up cf the parliamentary group, the BANU’s Governing Council, and representatives of the provincial and district Agrarian druzhbi, which assembled two days before the full congress. While Radolov tried to act as peacemaker, Turlakov and Manolov accused Stamboliski of seeking to establish a personal regime and of ignoring Union democracy. Stamboliski cited their own breeches of Union discipline and called on them to leave the cabinet if they could not accept the majority’s will.** 32 Radolov, pp. 127-29; Pobeda, Nos. 42, 44 (March 22, 24, 1922). 33 Radikal, xvii, No. 123 (June 8, 1922), 1. 34 Radikal, xvi, No. 115 (May 29, 1922), 2.

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If Turlakov’s faction intended to pursue its attack before the full congress, 1t was quickly persuaded to change its mind. The enthusiasm of the fifteen thousand delegates who assembled in Sofia immediately revealed that the ordinary peasant’s reverence for Stamboliski had not waned. On his nomination, the congress acclaimed Daskalov as presiding officer. Stamboliski also asked the congress to name the Interior Minister as his successor and replacement when he was abroad or incapacitated. The Turlakov group kept silent during the congress, but during the elections for the BANU’s Governing Council Stamboliski challenged his opponents. Responding to the nomination of Khristo Manolov, Stamboliski accused his minister of having tried to provoke a schism and demanded that he be punished by exclusion from the Council. A large majority approved, and the newly elected Governing Council was filled with younger, more radical delegates. It proceeded to elect a standing committee that included not a single

representative of the Turlakov faction. After this chastisement, Turlakov and his supporters realized that any attempt to mount a frontal assault on Stamboliski would be hopeless.*°

While the radical wing of the Agrarian Union was represented

in the cabinet by Daskalov, Tserkovski, and Justice Minister Ianev, its greatest strength derived from a group of younger ac-

tivists that included Spas Duparinov, Krum Popov, Stoian Kaltchev, Miko Petkov, Tsviatko Abramov, and Dimitir Kemalov. Duparinov, who was born in 1892, joined the BANU in 1908 after hearing Stamboliski speak. After being wounded in the World War, he became one of the editors of Zemledelsko zname. He went into hiding at the time of the Radomir Rebellion and later organized the escape of the wounded Daskalov to Salonika. At the

BANU’s XV Congress he was one of the chief antagonists of Dragiev, and he later served as Ianev’s assistant in the prosecution of the Radoslavov Cabinet, becoming Chief Prosecutor himself when lanev was named Minister of Justice.°* Krum Popov, also

born in 1892, joined the BANU during the war. Becoming a °° Ibid., pp. 1-2; Pobeda, No. 96 (May 31, 1922), 2; Turlakov, Jstoriia, pp. 224-25. 3° Genovski, J v smurtta sa zhivi, pp. 99-102.

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Union agitator, he returned to his native Pleven, where he was elected president of the district druzhba. Alexander Dimitrov brought him to Sofia as his assistant in the Ministry of the Interior,

and Stamboliski, who nicknamed him the “‘Union’s machinegun” after hearing him speak, appointed him to the editorial

board of the Zemledelsko zname and made him head of the Union’s corps of agitators. At the end of 1921 Popov organized the founding congress of the Youth Agrarian Union, which be-

came one of the strongholds of the Agrarian left.?’ Stoian Kaluchev became a Union member at the time of the Radomir Rebellion and fought in the “republican army.”’ After the war he became Stamboliski’s private secretary, a Union agitator, and an

editor of the Zemledelsko zname.*® Petkov, Abramov, and Kemalov were also wartime converts to Agrarianism and effective Union agitators after the war. Petkov became president of the Ple-

ven Provincial Council, Abramov, editor of Mladezhko zname [Youth Banner], the journal of the Youth Agrarian Union, and Kemalov, a Union secretary.*? In January 1922, when Daskalov was transfered to the Ministry

of the Interior, Popov, Kaltchev, Petkov, Abramov, and Kemalov received Stamboliski’s permission to begin publishing their own newspaper, Pobeda [Victory]. Pobeda, which was also joined by Kosta Todorov, began to appear at the end of January and took strong positions against the old parties and against the Turlakov faction.*°

At the urging of these younger Union leaders, the BANU’s XVII Congress overwhelmingly approved a resolution calling for the establishment of a “peasant dictatorship” should there be any attempt to overthrow the government or to assassinate its leaders. The congress also elected these men to its Governing Council, and Kaltchev, Petkov, and Kemalov were named to the BANU’s

Standing Committee along with Stamboliski, Daskalov, and lanev.*? 37 Tbid., pp. 87-91; G. I. Cherniaevski, “Vozniknoveniie i razvitie proletarskogo molodezhnogo dvizheniia v Bolgarii (1903—1932),”” Uchenye zapiski Instituta slavianovedeniia, No. 15 (1957), pp. 61-62.

38 Genovski, / v smurtta sa zhivi, pp. 118-19. 39 Tbid., pp. 134-40.

* Mitev, p. 116; Todorov, p. 149. 4 Turlakov, Jstoriia, p. 224.

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In response to the growing threat from the old parties and in order to carry out the resolution on “dictatorship,” the younger members of the Standing Committee proposed the formation of a

| “Committee on Peasant Dictatorship” to prepare the BANU for defense against any attack from the right. Stamboliski agreed to this proposal, and the secret committee was formed. During 1922 it strengthened the Orange Guard and organized squadrons of rellable peasants to do battle against the “‘youth groups”’ and “‘sport-

ing clubs” of the old parties.” For a long time Stamboliski had predicted that the rise of estatist organizations would force the political parties to coalesce. Rather than causing apprehension, the formation of the Constitutional Bloc seemed to him a confirmation of his theory of histori-

cal development. When the Bloc announced its intention of launching “hammer blows” against the government beginning in Turnovo on September 17, he and the Agrarian left saw it as an opportunity to help history along by dealing with the old parties once and for all. In the beginning of September Turlakov, Tomov, and Manolov again called for a policy of conciliation, but Stamboliski, Daskalov, and the rest of the cabinet supported a policy of

confrontation.*®

In judging the “anticonstitutional’’** character of the BANU’s treatment of the old parties, one should remember that the Bloc made no secret of its intention of toppling the government by force. Its leaders repeatedly stated that the time for legal struggle had passed and that they would “wade through blood to power.” This was not an idle threat, for the Union of Reserve Officers pledged to participate in the Bloc’s demonstrations, and a secret report to Stamboliski indicated that barely one-quarter of the army could be relied on to defend the government.* On September 6 the Zemledelsko zname announced that a congress of sugar-beet growers would be held in Turnovo on September 16-18. All peasants were urged to attend and were promised a 50 percent reduction in rail fare to the city. The same issue carried an announcement of Agrarian assemblies to be held in the

® Mitev, pp. 116-17. 43 Turlakov, Istoriia, pp. 228-29.

“4 Gentizon, p. 120. 45 Mitev, p. 120. 220

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district capitals in Turnovo, Shumen, Ruse, and Pleven Provinces on September 10 with the agenda:

Il 2. o

II {] Only “loyal and true’’ members of the BANU were to be permitted to attend these meetings.*® This notice was undoubtedly a coded message from the Committee on Peasant Dictatorship to the local squadrons of the Orange Guard. During the next two weeks, the committee sent out a volley of communiqués to the villages exhorting them to prepare for the ‘‘decisive struggle.’’*’ On the eve of the Tuirnovo demonstration, both Pobeda and Zemledelsko zname accused the Bloc of preparing a coup d état .* Tserkovski quoted Todor Todorov, who had said, “Either we will

smash our enemies or they will walk over our corpses,” and called upon the peasants to remember those two alternatives. Zem-

ledelsko zname also suggested that the druzhbi keep a record of those in their localities who attended the Bloc’s meeting “‘and their material situation.’’*? On September 14 it published a manifesto from the Standing Committee of the BANU’s Governing Council warning that the government was in danger and calling all peasants to come to its defense. It concluded: “Todor Todorov thinks this is Italy and that his ‘fascists’ can do here what they do

there. We will show him that the Bulgarian peasant is no Italian Communist or Socialist. If they try to provoke or challenge us they will get such a beating from the raw-boned peasant fist that they will never forget it.’’° The Union’s exhortations produced a strong reaction in the provinces. In Varna the local Agrarian paper called for total war against “the representatives of Bulgarian oligarchy, the inspirers *© Zemledelsko zname, xix, No. 3 (Sept. 6, 1922), 3. 47 Mitev, pp. 118-20. * Pobeda, No. 183 (Sept. 13, 1922), 1; Zemledelsko zname, xix, No. 5 (Sept. 10, 1922), 1. * Zemledelsko zname, x1x, No. 4 (Sept. 8, 1922), 1, 3. °° Zemledelsko zname, x1x, No. 6 (Sept. 14, 1922), 3-4.

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of Bulgarian fascism, the pillagers and murderers who have rob-

bed and tormented the Bulgarian people for nearly half a century.”°! The Pleven Zemledelska zashtita said that not one Agrarian should remain at home on the seventeenth, and that all should be prepared to die to defend their government.” In Turnovo itself the Agrarian druzhba proclaimed ‘“‘a new constitution with only two articles: 1) death to the betrayers of the people . . ., and 2) the toiling people will be masters of their labor, their lives, and their state.”’>?

On Thursday, September 14, Stamboliski left Bulgaria to attend the opening of a new session of the League of Nations. Daskalov, who became Acting Prime Minister, announced that he would appear in Turnovo himself to address the sugar-beet grow-

ers’ congress.” On the evening of September 16, a jubilant Bloc demonstration

took place at Central Station in Sofia. Todor Todorov, Stoian Danev, Andrei Liapchev, Alexander Malinov, Mikhail Madzharov, and Naicho Tsanov, accompanied by five to six hundred

supporters, boarded the train for Turnovo. More well-wishers lined the tracks, displaying banners and singing patriotic songs. Before the departure two cars carrying Daskalov and several members of the Committee on Peasant Dictatorship with their bodyguards were added to the train. According to the account in Pobeda, members of the Bloc shouted insults at the Minister’s car and made threatening gestures. As the train proceeded slowly toward Bulgaria’s ancient capital, Agrarians began to board it at stations along the way. When it

reached the small station at Dolni Dtbnik, about fifteen miles west of Pleven, the cars carrying the members of the Bloc were surrounded by a vast number of peasants who had gathered during the night. The peasant leaders forced the members of the Bloc to disembark, took away their weapons, marched them into the village, and eventually released them. The Bloc leaders, however, °t Zemledelets (Varna), 111, No. 48 (Sept. 16, 1922), 1. °? Zemledelska zashtita (Pleven), 11, No. 86 (Sept. 16, 1922), 1. °° Zemledelska tribuna (Tirnovo), 1, No. 65 (Sept. 15, 1922), 1. 54 Zemledelsko zname, x1x, No. 7 (Sept. 16, 1922), 3.

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were held, taunted by the peasants, and forced to submit to having their beards and mustaches cut off. At this time, Daskalov, who

supposedly had been asleep, emerged to save them from worse indignities. He proposed to take them on to Turnovo, where the people would decide their fate. During the remaining progress of the train, the humiliated Bloc leaders were exhibited to jeering peasant crowds along the route. Mussoiini watched the March on Rome from the vantage point of Milan. Atanas Burov was somewhat closer, having gathered a force of armed supporters in Gorna Oriakhovitsa, five miles north or Turnovo. When news reached him by telegraph of the fate of his colleagues, he abandoned his ““hammer blow” and fled toward the Rumanian border. In Turnovo itself there was some skirmishing between the Orange Guard and the Bloc, but by the morning of the seventeenth the city was in the hands of the Agrarians.°®

The captive Bloc leaders came perilously close to summary execution. Krum Popov and Stoian Kaltchev advocated finishing

them off at once, and this appealed to the vast majority of the thousands of peasants who had come to Turnovo with just this in mind. The principal difference of opinion was between those who

wanted to drop them into the Iantra from the high Stambolov Bridge and those who favored casting them from the walls of the Tsarevets Fortress, a fate that had been meted out to the captives of the Second Bulgarian Empire. Surprisingly, Daskalov emerged as the voice of moderation. Advocating a plan that had previously

been discussed by the Committee on Peasant Dictatorship, he proposed to bring before a “People’s Court” all of the former ministers of the Geshov, Danev, and Malinov-Kosturkov cabtnets, a group that included nearly every major figure in the old parties. During the day Tserkovski telegraphed from Sofia his own objections to “extreme measures” and reported that Stamboliski was afraid that they would tarnish Bulgaria’s image abroad. Daskalov’s oratory successfully cooled the emotions of 5° Mitev, pp. 120-21; Gentizon, pp. 118-19; Zemledeisko zname, x1x, No. 8 (Sept. 21, 1922), 1-2; Pobeda, No. 187 (Sept. 18, 1922), 1; Radikal, xvi, No. 208 (Sept. 18, 1922), 1; Slovo, 1, No. 131 (Sept. 18, 1922), 1. 56 P. Peshev, pp. 770-71.

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the crowd, and the Bloc leaders were returned to Sofia under guard.°’ Despite the opposition of Turlakov, Tomov, and Manolov, the

Council of Ministers voted to place the former members of the Geshov, Danev, and first Malinov-Kosturkov cabinets under formal arrest. The members of the first two cabinets were charged with involving Bulgaria in the Balkan Wars, and the members of the third with failing to extricate her from the First World War. Although this move was of questionable legality, a precedent existed in the arrest of the Radoslavov cabinet in 1919, which had been ratified by three of those presently accused—Atanas Burov, Stoian Danev, and Mikhail Madzharov—when they were mem-

bers of Stamboliski’s coalition. On September 24, seventeen of the twenty-two former ministers were arrested. Ivan Geshov and Vladimir Mollov were abroad as was Burov, who had succeeded in crossing the border. Two others, Dimittr Khristov and Rasho Madzharov, eluded capture and went into hiding.*®

According to some accounts, Stamboliski wired from Geneva his opposition to the arrests.*® If true, his objection was almost certainly entirely for foreign consumption. When he returned to Sofia in October, he hailed September 17 as a glorious day in Bulgaria’s history and denounced the former ministers. At his proposal the National Assembly voted to submit the question of putting them on trial before a People’s Court to a national referen-

dum. During the campaign the Communists supported the Agrar- | lan position, while the Broad Socialists advocated a blank ballot. On November 19, 647,313 votes were cast in favor of the trial, 223,584 against, and 55,593 were blank.®° Stamboliski intended the People’s Court to consist of representatives elected by the District Councils, which would insure its domination by Agrarians.

According to Alexander Radolov, Stamboliski did not plan to have the former ministers executed or sentenced to long prison >? Mitev, pp. 121-23; Slovo, 1, No. 131 (Sept. 18, 1922), 1.

°8 P. Peshev, pp. 771-72; Mitev, p. 123; Zemledelsko zname, xix, No. 75 (March 13, 1923), 1; Pobeda, No. 193 (Sept. 25, 1922), 2. °° Todorov, p. 172; Erskine to Curzon (Sofia, April 15, 1923), FO 371/8568/ C7224, p. 16. °° Zemledelsko zname, x1x, No. 31 (Nov. 24, 1922), 1.

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terms, but expected to pardon them once their conduct had been exposed in a public trial.

Although the Turnovo events and the arrest of the former ministers crippled the Constitutional Bloc, they did not eliminate all of the government’s enemies or heal its internal divisions. On the contrary, the failure of the Bloc’s campaign convinced the leaders of Naroden sgovor, the Military League, and the IMRO that only violent methods stood a chance against the Agrarians.™ The Military League decided to prepare for an armed seizure of

power, setting mid-January as a target date. Tsar Boris, who maintained contact with the League through his military aide, Colonel Khristo Kalfov, informed its leaders that he could do nothing against Stamboliski by himself and gave tentative approval to their plans.® On December 4, shortly after Stamboliski’s visit to Belgrade, a

band of two thousand IMRO irregulars under the command of Pancho Mikhailov occupied the town of Kiustendil, one hundred miles west of Sofia, the local garrison offering no resistance. Although the purpose of this raid may have been simply to show defiance to Stamboliski’s pro- Yugoslav policy, it was also probably a feint to test the BANU’s ability to defend itself. Stamboliski was at the Lausanne Conference when the raid occurred, and the

panic-stricken Daskalov ordered a mobilization of the Orange Guard and dispatched War Minister Tomov to liberate the city. Tomov made no move to dislodge IMRO by force. Instead he had

himself photographed with its leaders and listened as they read death sentences against Stamboliski, Daskalov, and other members of the cabinet who favored rapprochement with Yugoslavia.

After three days they left voluntarily. In Sofia, some fifteen thousand Orange Guards were inspired by Daskalov to vent their anger against the newspapers and headquarters of the old parties, a needless bit of violence that reportedly infuriated Stamboliski.% On December 15, two bombs were thrown at Daskalov as he °! Radolov, pp. 108-13. 62 Vasilev, p. 19; D. Kazasov, V tumninite na zagovora (Sofia, 1925), p. 10. ®3 Mitev, pp. 130-31; Kazasov, V tumninite, p. 44. 64 Radolov, pp. 108-13; Erskine to Curzon (Sofia, April 15, 1923), FO 371/ 8568/C7224, pp. 17-18; Erskine to Curzon (Sofia, Jan. 16, 1923), FO 371/8558/ C1375.

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was leaving the National Assembly. One failed to explode, and his automobile sheltered the minister from the blast of the other. Although IMRO was probably responsible for this assault, it was widely believed that Daskalov had arranged it himself to revive his somewhat tarnished reputation. On his return to Bulgaria, Stamboliski was informed of rumors of an impending coup. He ordered a shake-up of the military, transferring garrison commanders to new posts, which caused the Military League to postpone its plans for a January action. ~ On February 1, 1923, shots were fired at a neighbor of Tserkovski who was in the minister’s yard after dark.®” Three days la-

ter, Stamboliski, Tserkovski, Obbov, and Janev were in the ministerial box in Sofia’s National Theatre to celebrate the sixtyfifth anniversary of Bulgarian drama. Contrary to custom, Turlakov, Tomov, and Manolov, who were also present, did not join their colleagues, but sat on the opposite side of the hall. During the climax of “Mikhalaki the Chorbadzhi,’’ a bomb was thrown

into the ministers’ box. Fortunately, an observer’s warning scream alerted the ministers to jump to safety seconds before the explosion. The would-be assassin, Asen Daskalov, was captured, but permitted to escape by the police.®®

This abortive assassination provoked Stamboliski to purge the BANU’s leadership. He demanded the resignations of his dissident ministers. When they refused, he summoned the Supreme

Union Council into session. Charging Turlakov, Tomov, and Manolov with peculation, promoting a schism, and working against the BANU’s interests, he submitted the resignation of the entire cabinet and requested the Council’s mandate to form a new one. Alexander Radolov, who sympathized with the three accused ministers, believed that they were given a fair hearing, and that in the circumstances the Council had no choice. Turlakov, Tomov, and Manolov were expelled from the BANU. During the course 65 Zemledelsko zname, No. 39:(Dec. 7, 1922), 1; Erskine to Curzon (Sofia, April 15, 1923), FO 371/8568/C7224, p. 18. 86 Mitev, p. 131. 87 Zemledelsko zname, X1x, No. 57 (Feb. 3, 1923), 2-3. 88 Zemledelsko zname, xix, No. 59 (Feb. 7, 1923), 1; Kazasov, Burni godini, pp. 119-20.

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of the debate before the Council, Daskalov announced his inten-

tion of also resigning from the cabinet. His motivation is not clear, but he was probably embarrassed by attacks on his handling

of the Turnovo and Kiustendil events. Having purged the cabinet, Stamboliski decided to dissolve the

National Assembly and hold new elections. Before doing so, however, he introduced legislation to replace the system of proportional representation with a return to the single-member constituencies that had been used until 1908. As soon as this legislation was adopted, the cabinet resigned and new elections were set

for April 27. Since the leaders of the old parties were in prison, Tsar Boris had no alternative but to leave the government in Agrarian hands during the election campaign. After receiving a new mandate, Stamboliski announced a reorganization of the cabinet. Radolov and Tserkovski both left the government, the former owing to his unhappiness with the Prime Minister’s “extremism,” the latter to devote himself to writing.’ Omarchevski and Obbov kept their old jobs in Education and Agriculture, and Pettr Ianev moved from Justice to the Finance Ministry. The additions to the cabinet were nearly all very young men. Khristo Stoianov, thirty-one, who had been Director of Compulsory Labor Service, became Minister of the Interior. Spas Duparinov, thirty-one, succeeded Janev as Minister of Justice. Stamboliski made his nephew, Constantine Muraviev, thirty, Minister of War. Muraviev had a distinguished war record and had been ambassador to Holland and to

Turkey. Kinl Pavlov, thirty-one, who replaced Tserkovski as Minister of Public Domains, was the son of one of the BANU’s founders and was a leader in the cooperative movement. Nedelko Atanasov, at forty-two the oldest after Stamboliski, returned to the cabinet as Minister of Rails, Posts and Telegraphs. The Ministry of Commerce was not filled.” 6° Radolov, p. 132; Zemledelsko zname, xix, No. 61 (Feb. 14, 1923), 1-2; Pobeda, No. 302, 304 (Feb. 10, 14, 1923). ” Pobeda, Nos. 318, 328 (Feb. 23, March 13, 1923). ™ Radolov, pp. 133-36. 2 Zemledelsko zname, XIX, Nos. 73, 74 (March 14, 16, 1923); Genovski, J v smurtta sa zhivi, pp. 80-85.

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In preparation for the election campaign, Stamboliski also car-

ried out a purge of the parliamentary group. At his urging, the Supreme Union Council refused to renominate over half the old deputies, replacing them with men chosen from the ranks of local Agrarian officials.” The elections were a “‘brilliant triumph” for the BANU, which

received 569,139 votes to 203,972 for the BCP, 198,647 for the Bloc, 55,963 for the National Liberals (Radoslavists), and 27,816 for the Broad Socialists. Owing to the change in the system of representation, this result translated into a National As-

sembly of 212 Agrarians, 16 Communists, 15 from the Bloc, and 2 Socialists.” The spring of 1923 brought Stamboliski many reasons to be confident. His opponents had apparently been routed, and for the first time the cabinet and the National Assembly were fully united behind him. The Treaty of NiS and the new agreement on reparations had solved the most serious of his foreign problems. He had even dealt with the popular but inept Daskalov by sending him as minister to Prague.’> Rumors circulated to the effect that he would call for a new round of social and political reforms—perhaps in-

cluding the abolition of the monarchy and a major redistribution of wealth—at the BANU’s XVIII Congress in the summer.’® During May over 300,000 Agrarians at district assemblies throughout the country took an oath to defend the BANU and its government

with their lives.‘7 Reviewing a parade of one thousand Orange

Guard horsemen marching to celebrate the opening of the Khaskovo-Rakovski railway line, Stamboliski told the crowd that the old parties were dead. “‘Do not think that the government will

fall,” he said, “but believe that Agrarian rule will continue for twenty-five years. Who can overthrow us?’’® 3 Erskine to Curzon (Sofia, March 19, 1923), FO 371/8558/C5589. “* Statisticheski godishnik na bilgarskoto tsarstvo: godini XV-XVI, pp. C49-50;

lotsov, 1, p. 275. ”° Zemledelsko zname, x1x, No. 93 (May 5, 1923), 3. © Mitev, pp. 132-33. 7 Zemledelsko zname, X1x, No. 98 (May 20, 1923), 1. *® Kazasov, Burni godini, p. 133.

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Following the April elections, however, preparations for a coup

gained momentum. The enemies of the Agrarian government were inspired by a sense of urgency to strike before Stamboliski could make use of his victory. The scenario for the actual seizure of power had already largely been worked out by the leaders of the Military League, Colonel Ivan Vuilkov and General Velizar Lazarov. During May they took into their confidence the com-

manders of the most important garrisons and drew up detailed plans for the occupation of the major cities and for the neutralization of the Orange Guard.”

While military planning went forward smoothly and simply, political preparations for the coup were more difficult. Seeking to present themselves as defenders of democracy and the constitution, the leaders of the League and Naroden sgovor wished to have at least the appearance of broad political backing. The support of the Bloc parties was easily obtained. Pettr Todorov of the

Radicals, Ianko Stoenchov of the Democrats, and Tsviatko Boboshevski of the National Progressives actively participated in

the conspiracy, as did Boian Smilov of the National Liberal party.®° Naroden sgovor also approached Dimittr Dragiev, offering him a place in the government in return for the support of his dissident Agrarians. Although Dragiev replied that “‘ethical con-

siderations’ would not permit him to join the conspiracy, he made no effort to inform the government of its existence.®! Discussions were also held with Turlakov, Tomov, and Manolov, but those three apparently wanted more than a symbolic role in the new government, and no agreement was reached.*?

The conspirators placed their greatest hopes for “popular” backing on the Broad Socialists. Alexander Tsankov’s brother, Asen, was a member of that party, and the Sgovor even con-

templated offering the post of Prime Minister to Krustiu Pastukhov. The Socialist leader, however much he hated the Agrarians, declined to take part in a violent attack on the government or to associate his party with the extreme right. Following 9 Vasilev, pp. 19-20; Mitev, pp. 139-40.

8° Kazasov, Burni godini, p. 138. 81 Mitev, p. 137. 82 Ibid.; Pekarev, Spomeni, pp. 428-29, 440-43.

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Pastukhov’s refusal, Alexander Tsankov approached Dimo Kazasov, a young Socialist journalist, who agreed to take part as an individual. The Broad Socialist leadership was so divided over the question of supporting the coup that it would not repudiate Kazasov’s participation.®° Although IMRO was expected to play a major part in the actual

seizure of power, since its bands could commit acts of terror that the conspirators did not wish to sanction officially, fear of adverse foreign reaction, including the possibility of Yugoslav intervention, caused the League and the Sgovor to avoid direct, open contacts with its leaders. General Protogerov and Todor Alexandrov coordinated their preparations with representatives of the Military League but did not take part in the political discussions, nor were they offered posts in the new government.™ The question of Tsar Boris’s role in the preparation of the coup has long been controversial. The Agrarians were convinced that he played a key part, although they were unable to produce any clear evidence to support their belief.® In a parliamentary debate in 1938, Tsankov hinted that Boris had been a member of the conspiracy, but refused to make a definitive statement,®® and at his show-trial in 1954 Ivan Vulkov testified that he received the tsar’s approval in several secret meetings in April and May.®’ The evidence from such a trial, however, cannot be considered conclusive. In spite of the absence of decisive proof linking Boris to the conspiracy, it is highly likely that the tsar was at least aware of what was taking place. Dimo Kazasov, who has given contradictory evidence on this question, pointed out that the majority of the officers who carried out the coup were strongly monarchist, and would probably not have been willing to take such risks without assurance that the tsar approved their actions. The confidence of the conspirators was raised by the knowledge °° Kazasov, V tumninite, pp. 9-13; G. Chesmedzhiev, Snop lichi v tumninite

na zagovora (Sofia, 1925), pp. 48-51, 63-72; Kh. Khristov, Mizeriite okolo “Tumninite na zagovora”’ (Sofia, 1926), pp. 9-10; D. Kazasov, Bez put i bez idei (Sofia, 1926), pp. 9-11.

84 Mitev, p. 138. 8° Todorov, pp. 192-93.

86 H. Seton-Watson, Eastern Europe between the Wars, 1918-1941 (New York, 1967), p. 245. 87 Mitev, pp. 133-34.

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that the Communists were unlikely to offer resistance to a coup. Temporarily relations between the BCP and the BANU had been relatively cordial. The Agrarian government’s disarming of the White Guards and its contribution to famine relief in the USSR dissipated much of the enmity that dated from the transport strike. In April 1922, at the height of the White Guard crisis, the BCP’s Party Council adopted a secret resolution pledging to defend the government with arms in the event of a bourgeois putsch.*® This spirit, however, was short-lived, for the Communists soon concluded that no serious threat from the right existed and that Stamboliski remained the last obstacle between themselves and power. Shortly after the Bloc’s Turnovo demonstration, General Secretary Vasil Kolarov approached Daskalov with a request that the Communists be armed to defend the government against the right. The Agrarian minister was amused at this transparent attempt to repeat the experience of the Kornilov Affair, and he dismissed the request by saying that if the government ever needed help from the Communists, he would notify them fifteen minutes in advance.®?

Both Agrarians and Communists assumed that the right had been crushed by the debacle at Turnovo and by the arrest of the former ministers, and they concentrated their fire on each other in the town and village council elections in February and in the Na-

tional Assembly elections in April. The BCP returned to the “line” it had proclaimed during the Radomir Rebellion, maintain-

ing that the differences between the BANU and the right-wing parties were simply a quarrel between the rural and urban bourgeoisie in which the BCP and its supporters had no interest.*° At

the Party Council meeting of January 21-22, 1923, Khristo Kabakchiev interpreted the Comintern’s new “united front” policy as calling for greater efforts to win the peasantry away from the BANU, which: “. . . defends the interests and carries out the policies of the rural bourgeoisie, especially of those coming from the enriched middle strata which stand at the head of the Union and play a leading role in it, while keeping the great mass of im88 BKP vy rezoliutsii i resheniia, 11, p. 159; Rothschild, p. 104. 89 Rothschild, p. 93; lotsov, u, pp. 266-67. © Rothschild, p. 109; /storiia na BKP, pp. 262-63.

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poverished and poor peasants in its power through demagogy, cheap half-measures, and the force of [state] authority.” Following the National Assembly elections, the Party Council declared that the Agrarian government now “stood unmasked” as a bourgeois dictatorship and that it no longer possessed any claim

to be called “democratic.”®? The party even took the side of IMRO against the Agrarians, calling Stamboliski’s plans to dis-

arm the terrorists “extreme” and “a blow to constitutional freedom.”®? In early May, when a Soviet ship was intercepted running guns between Odessa and Varna, Stamboliski ordered the arrest of the BCP leadership, which went into hiding. In these cir-

cumstances, there was little chance that the Communists would rush to Stamboliski’s defense in the event of a coup, and in fact at the critical moment the BCP proclaimed its complete neutrality and even welcomed the coup “with a certain amount of relief.”’°*

The time of the coup was set for the early morning of June 9. As the preparations went forward, numerous warnings reached the government, all of which were disregarded. Khristo Stoianov, the Minister of the Interior, and Constantine Muraviev, the Minis-

ter of War, were both men of limited ability and experience. Neither believed that a powerful military move against the government was possible. When Kosta Todorov told Muraviev of warnings he had received from sources in the military, the minister dismissed them as intrigues among the officers, and spoke with such confidence that Todorov was convinced there was no cause for concern.®’ Muraviev and Stoianov even agreed to a military suggestion that, owing to the threat of IMRO terrorism, the police stations in Sofia be reinforced with soldiers, a measure that facilitated the Military League’s occupation of the capital.°° Stamboliski himself, although apprised of the rumors of an 1mpending coup, also discounted them. He was convinced that the right had been broken, and that the threat of Orange Guard retalia-

°! BKP v rezoliutsii i resheniia, 1, p. 245. % Ibid., pp. 256-60. 93 Rabotnicheski vestnik, xxv1, No. 266 (May 9, 1923), 1.

°4 Rothschild, pp. 120-21; Rabotnicheski vestnik, xxvu, No. 13 (June 18, 1923), 1.

® Todorov, p. 186. % Mitev, p. 141.

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tion was more than sufficient to cow his enemies. He was also constantly reassured by Muraviev and Stoianov, who reported to him as late as June 8 that the government was in full command of the situation in the country. He was probably unaware that during

the previous week Muraviev had received a military report that the rifles of the Orange Guard were in poor condition and had ordered the Guards to turn in their arms to military arsenals for cleaning and repair.’ On June 7, Tsar Boris, who was returning to Sofia from his estate at Evksinograd on the Black Sea, stopped to visit Stamboliski at his villa in Slavovitsa. He was very cordial to the Prime Minister, presenting him with fruits from the royal orchards. On June 9, however, it was discovered that members of the tsar’s entourage

had sabotaged the villa’s radio apparatus and replaced crates of ammunition stored there with crates of sand.%° At 8:30 Pm on June 8, the leaders of the conspiracy assembled

in the home of General Ivan Rusev, a leader of the Military League who had briefly been the Director of Compulsory Labor Service under the Agrarians. Colonel Vulkov reported that he had sent out his final directive to the provinces and that all was in read-

iness. The group then turned to the selection of a new coalition cabinet. Tsankov was named Prime Minister and temporary holder of the Ministries of War and Foreign Affairs. Another leader of

Naroden sgovor, Professor Ianaki Mollov, became Minister of Agriculture and Acting Minister of Education. The Military League took only the Ministry of the Interior, assigned to General

Rusev, but claimed the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and War once the coup was completed. On June 11 these posts were occupied by Khristo Kalfov and Ivan Vulkov. The Constitutional Bloc divided three ministries. Pettr Todorov became Minister of Finance, Ianko Stoenchov Minister of Public Domains, and Tsviatko Boboshevski Minister of Commerce. National Liberal Boian Smilov gained the Ministry of Justice, a decision that meant freedom for the former members of the Radoslavov cabinet, and Dimo Kazasov was assigned the Ministry of Rails, Posts,

and Telegraphs. After the distribution of the cabinet posts, the group prepared a manifesto proclaiming the downfall of Stam97 Tbid., p. 143; Radolov, p. 148. 9 Mitev, pp. 142-43.

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boliski’s “arbitrary regime” and its replacement by a government dedicated to “‘peace and order.”’”? At 3:00 aM troops led by League officers left their barracks and

began to move toward the key points in the capital. They were joined by IMRO members and by “volunteers” from various ‘‘sporting clubs,” who had been furnished with military uniforms

and weapons.'°° The telephone and telegraph exchange, ministries, railroad stations, most police stations, and the main streets were quickly occupied without resistance. A few police units put up a struggle as did Orange Guards stationed in two barracks near the city, but they were easily overcome. Sofia fell to the coup in

less than an hour. The Agrarian ministers, members of parliament, and Union leaders who were present in the capital were arrested and placed under guard in one of the captured police sta-

tions.‘

Tsankov and his colleagues arrived at the Ministry of War, which they made their temporary headquarters, at 4:00 AM to re-

ceive reports on the situation in the provinces. Hearing no discouraging news during the next three hours, Tsankov, Smilov, and Kazasov set out for “Vrania,”’ the tsar’s villa outside the city, to present themselves to Boris and “inform” him that Stamboliski’s regime had been overthrown. Boris refused to receive them for several hours, either because the coup had taken him by sur-

prise or, more likely, because he was waiting for further assurances of its success. When he did at last appear, it was to express his “complete surprise” at the course of events. His surprise, however, did not keep him from signing an edict recognizing Tsankov’s government.! The conspirators had placed great importance on the rapid capture of Stamboliski, for they feared that he could serve as a powerful rallying point for domestic resistance and even foreign inter-

vention. Retired Colonel Slaveiko Vasilev, who lived in Pazardzhik, was given the task of “catching the bird in his nest”’ at Slavovitsa. As soon as Pazardzhik itself was secured, Vasilev set out with a force of between fifty and sixty soldiers from the local garrison. Their plan was to gain admittance to Stamboliski’s °° Kazasov, V tumninite, pp. 100-108. 100 Mitev, pp. 154-55. 101 Ibid., pp. 154-56; Radolov, pp. 164-68. 102 Kazasov, V tumninite, pp. 122-33.

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villa by posing as “‘reinforcements”’ sent for the Prime Minister’s protection. Stamboliski’s bodyguards, however, were not fooled and opened fire, forcing Vasilev’s troops to withdraw./°° At first Stamboliski hoped that the assault on his villa was an isolated act of IMRO terrorism. During the day, however, news reached him that indicated a full-scale coup was in progress, and he ordered a mobilization of the countryside. The church bells in Slavovitsa rang their warning, bringing several hundred peasants

from surrounding villages, along with his brother, Vasil. Although few of the peasants had rifles, most carrying only pitchforks or clubs, his own bodyguards possessed two machine-guns, and during the day he was joined by a loyal detachment of mountain troops commanded by Captain Khristo Ionovski. Under the captain’s direction, several lines of defense were set up around the villa, and by the evening nearly 1,500 peasants had rallied to the Prime Minister’s aid.1°4

Meanwhile in Pazardzhik, the failure of Vasilev’s mission caused considerable alarm. The mayor of the town, Popov, took command of the remaining troops and civilian volunteers, and re-

quested immediate reinforcements from the large garrison at Plovdiv. During the evening Popov dispatched a member of the BANU with a letter to Stamboliski, asking him to put down his arms and surrender without causing further bloodshed. Stamboliski sent the following reply: Mister Mayor, I am the Prime Minister of Bulgaria and of the Bulgarian people. In their name and in the name of the high interests of the fatherland I order you to return where you came from and wait for pardon. Renounce the stupidity that has taken

hold of you because the time when a handful of fanatical — hotheads can trample and torment the Bulgarian people is past. Wars and heavy sufferings have taught this people how to guard their rights and freedoms. Once again I order you: as fast as you can go back where you came from or you will never find a re-

fuge °° 103 Vasilev, pp. 23-25; Ubietsut na Aleksandur Stamboliski govori (Sofia, 1945), pp. 10-14. This book was compiled from testimony given at the trial of Ivan Kharlakov, who carried out Stamboliski’s execution, in 1945.

104 Mitev, pp. 170-73. 105 Ubietsiit, pp. 14-16. 235

THE OVERTHROW

Stamboliski, his brother, Captain Ionovski, and SergeantMajor Stoianov, commander of Stamboliski’s bodyguards, formed a council of war and decided during the night to attempt the capture of Pazardzhik on the next day. In the morning, Stamboliski addressed the peasants, thanking them for their aid and telling those who were without arms to return to their homes. Only a handful actually departed. The rest made rapid progress along the road to Pazardzhik. By dusk they had overcome all resistance, and had taken up strong positions near the town. Instead of ordering an immediate assault, Stamboliski decided to wait until morning. The reason for this delay was, apparently, that he

expected to be joined by a substantial force of armed Communists. Several local BCP officials had ordered their followers to

oppose the coup. In the nearby village of Tserovo some eight hundred armed party members were assembled under the command of District Secretary Anastas Burzakov, who was prepared to join in the attack on Pazardzhik. The proclamation of “strict neutrality” from the party leaders in Sofia, however, caused this support to melt away.’°* By the morning of the eleventh, opposition reinforcements including cavalry and artillery units arrived in Pazardzhik from Plovdiv. They easily repulsed Stamboliski’s assault and scattered his peasant followers.’°” Stamboliski was now in a desperate position. Captain Ionovski advised him to try to make his way to Panagiurishte to surrender to the local commander, with whom he was acquainted. Others advised him to try to escape abroad. He rejected both suggestions and decided to go into hiding in the mountains. Accompanied by his brother, by Angel Gurev, an Agrarian member of parliament,

and by Stefan Zdravkov, a local Agrarian official, he set off northward along the river Topolnitsa.°° In Sofia the new government and Tsar Boris were extremely disturbed by the news that Stamboliski had escaped. They ordered

the formation of a special detachment of infantry and artillery under the command of Captain Ivan Kharlakov, who was given *08 Mitev, pp. 174-75; M. Shishiniova, Z. Litsova, and E. Stoianov, Vritzki i edinodeistvie na BKP i BZNS v Pazardzhiski okriig v perioda 1894-1925 g. (Paxardzhik, 1973), pp. 103-104.

107 Mitev, pp. 175-76. 8 Ubietsut, pp. 22-23. 236

THE OVERTHROW

orders by Vulkov that Stamboliski be allowed neither to escape nor to return alive to Sofia. IMRO also dispatched a sizable force to join the hunt for the former Prime Minister. Kharlakov made his headquarters in Slavovitsa, which he subjected to a reign of terror, and organized a search to cover the entire district.1° Alexander and Vasil Stamboliski left their companions, and on the evening of the thirteenth the two brothers separated to seek | concealment with friends. Vasil was captured a few hours later by a military search party. Stamboliski walked through the night to the village of Golak near Ikhtiman, where he hoped to find refuge. He had been without food for two days and was soaked by a stead-

ily falling rain. As he approached the village, he was spotted by local authorities who placed him under arrest. He was held in Vet-

ren, the village in which he had begun his career as a school teacher and had met his wife twenty-four years before.*’°

Slaveiko Vasilev was sent to bring the prisoner back to Pazardzhik. Along the way Stamboliski asked for news of his friends. He was pleased to hear that Dragiev had not taken part in the coup, and he protested against the arrest of Tserkovski, who he said was a poet, not a politician. On their arrival in Pazardzhik Vasilev quarreled with Kharlakov over who had “rights” to the prisoner. Vasilev wanted the honor of taking him to Sofia, but a

Kharlakov.""! telegram from Vilkov ordered him to “entrust” Stamboliski to

Captain Kharlakov returned Stamboliski to the stable of his villa in Slavovitsa, where he was subjected to prolonged torture by several officers and a representative of IMRO, Voivoda Velichko Skopski. He was stabbed nearly sixty times. His right hand, the one that had signed the Treaty of Nis, was severed at the wrist by Skopski, and the fingers of his left hand were also cut off. In

his final moments of consciousness, he used his own blood to

write on the wall of the stable: “A. S. 14 June 1923.” Vasil Stamboliski was also tortured to death at the villa.1!” 109 Mitev, pp. 177-78. 110 PD. Kazasov, Vidiano i prezhiviano: 1891-1944 (Sofia, 1969), pp. 290-91; Vasilev, pp. 38-42. "1 Vasilev, pp. 42-51.

1? Ubietsut, pp. 32-43; S. Nedelchev, Politicheskoto ubistvo na Aleksandur Stamboliski (Plovdiv, 1932), pp. 44-46.

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To conceal the circumstances of the murder, Slaveiko Vasilev was instructed to sign a report stating that after being brought to Pazardzhik Stamboliski asked to return to Slavovitsa for fresh clothes. On the way to his villa, a band of peasants attempted to

liberate him, and he was killed in the ensuing skirmish. This account of Stamboliski’s death was also given to foreign news services ,!}9

Before the burial of the two brothers, their heads were severed from their bodies. It was popularly believed that they were taken as trophies by Skopski, who wished to present them to Tsar Boris. Whatever the case, they were never recovered.'!4 Attempts to mobilize peasant resistance to the coup elsewhere in Bulgaria failed. Justice Minister Spas Duparinov, who was in Plovdiv on June 9, tried to rally the peasants in surrounding vil-

lages, but his poorly armed forces were easily defeated by the army. Duparinov himself attempted to escape to Turkey, but was captured and placed under arrest. Alexander Obbov raised a force

of nearly 17,000 peasants that he led in an assault on Pleven. After its defeat he managed to cross the Danube to safety in Rumania. Georgi Damianov, who had been Daskalov’s Chiefof-Staff during the Radomir Rebellion, mobilized the Orange Guard around Orkhanie (Botevgrad), but there, too, lack of arms led to speedy defeat. Although Damianov managed to conceal himself, he was arrested within a few months. Small-scale uprisings were widespread throughout the country as local Agrarian leaders and Orange Guards tried to carry out the BANU’s plans for “peasant dictatorship.” Although in many cases local Com-

munists instinctively supported Agrarian resisters, even their combined strengths could not overcome their lack of coordination and weapons. The country was pacified within a week.'!®

Foreign reaction to the June 9 coup was strongest in Yugoslavia. The Pasi¢ government correctly realized that Stamboliski’s

overthrow represented a victory for IMRO and for Bulgarian politicians opposed to his pro- Yugoslav policy. Foreign Minister Nincié warned the Bulgarian minister in Paris that Yugoslavia was 113 Vasilev, p. 55; Mitev, p. 182. 4 Ubietsut, pp. 48-50. 115 Radolov, pp. 166-70; Mitev, pp. 184-286.

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prepared to use “all means” to defend her Macedonian possessions, and the government began to concentrate troops along the Bulgarian frontier.“’® In the Skupstina, Democratic and Agrarian party leaders spoke in favor of armed intervention.'!’ But whatever plans the Belgrade government had for military or diplomatic

action were frustrated by lack of support from any of the great powers or from Yugoslavia’s allies in the Little Entente.

In Great Britain the news of the coup was received with equanimity. Lloyd-George had been forced from office in October 1922, and the new Conservative government of Stanley Baldwin was not well-inclined toward the Agrarians. Jt viewed Stamboliski’s rapprochement with Yugoslavia as a strengthening of French influence, and saw in Tsankov an opportunity to reassert British interest in the Balkans.'’® Consequently, the British government directed its ambassador to cooperate with Tsankov and to treat his

regime as “legal” since it had the tsar’s mandate. According to the Rumanian minister in Belgrade, the British ambassador also urged the Yugoslavs to take no precipitate action against Bulgaria.119

The government of France, while it had come to look with favor on Stamboliski’s diplomacy, was preoccupied with the Ruhr crisis and had no intention of coming to the active defense of the former Agrarian government. Moreover, Ambassador Picot had been a bitter opponent of Stamboliski’s domestic program, condemning it as ““Bolshevist,’’ and had friendly relations with the Tsankov group. He later boasted that he had known of the plans

for the coup from the beginning and had aided the conspirators "6 TD. Kosev, Mezhdunarodnoto znachenie na septemvriskoto vustanie prez 1923 (Sofia, 1964), pp. 55-57. 117 Rothschild, p. 119.

18 Kosev, Mezhdunarodnoto znachenie, pp. 34-35, 41-42; I. Mitev, “Fashistski perevorot v Bolgarii v 1923 godu i zapadnye derzhavy,” Novaia i noveishaia istoriia, No. 4 (1960), 95; The Daily Herald (June 11, 1923), 1. The American press reaction to the coup is surveyed by the American scholar Philip Shashko in “*Aleksandtr Stamboliski i dtrzhavniiat prevrat ot iuni 1923 g. spored amerikanski pechat,” V chest na Akademik Dimitur Kosev: Izsledvaniia po sluchai 70 godini ot rozhdenieto mu (Sofia, 1974), 433-47. 119 Mitev, “Fashistski perevorot,”’ p. 99; Kosev, Mezhdunarodnoto znachenie, pp. 34-35. Kosev’s source was the archives of the Rumanian foreign office.

239

THE OVERTHROW

with his advice.!?° Tsankov hastened to give assurances that Bulgaria’s new regime would honor the Treaty of Neuilly and the Nis agreement with Yugoslavia, dispatching Grigor Vasilev to Paris

for face-to-face meetings with French officials. On the whole, French reaction to the coup was hostile, but not to the point of advocating intervention. The Journal des débats , the semi-official

voice of the foreign ministry, adopted the position that the new Bulgarian government should be given time to prove its good intentions./7?

Mussolini’s government, which had been giving aid to IMRO, of course welcomed the coup and extended instant recognition to Tsankov. The Italian foreign office also published a belligerent

warning to Yugoslavia to avoid any interference in Bulgaria’s internal affairs.**?

The attitude of Bucharest was particularly disappointing to Yugoslavia and to those Bulgarian Agrarians who hoped for support from the Little Entente. The pro-Tsankov position adopted by the Rumanian government seems to have been motivated by its

fear of Soviet designs on Bessarabia, leading it to welcome a militantly anticommunist regime in Sofia, and by a concern that the Agrarian domestic reforms were having an unsettling effect on the Rumanian peasantry.’?? Consequently, it extended recognition to Tsankov and even ordered the Agrarian refugee Alexander Obbov to leave the country. King Ferdinand sent a personal message to his “brother,” King Alexander, urging Yugoslavia to act with moderation.’**

Czechoslovakia, the third member of the Little Entente, also urged a moderate policy on Belgrade. Prime Minister Svehla, personally strongly opposed to the coup, supplied Raiko Daskalov with Agrarian party funds to enable him to establish an exile cen-

ter in Prague. But the coalition Svehla led was not prepared to support intervention. Foreign Minister Benes advised the Yugo120 Erskine to Curzon (Sofia, June 18, 1923), FO 371/8569/C10563. 121 Kosev, Mezhdunarodnoto znachenie, pp. 43-45; Journal des débats (June 12, 1923), 1. 22 Kosev, Mezhdunarodnoto znachenie, pp. 50-51; Mitev, ‘‘Fashistski perevorot,” p. 98.

23 Kosev, Mezhdunarodnoto znachenie, p. 59. 124 Tbid., pp. 62-63.

240

THE OVERTHROW

slavs to adopt a policy of cautious waiting, and he assured the Tsankov government that Czechoslovakia had no desire to participate in “‘Balkan intrigues.’’!”° Having received support only from the government of Greece, Pasi¢ bowed to the inevitable and extended recognition to the new Bulgarian government on July 16.’*° A stable international position for the Tsankov regime was now assured. Belgrade did, however, allow the formation on its soil of an organization of Agrar-

ian exiles led by Kosta Todorov. Plagued by factionalism, the organization managed gradually to accumulate weapons in preparation for an uprising. Following the Communist attempt on the life of Tsar Boris in April 1925, however, the Yugoslav government ordered it to be dispersed and confiscated its arms.’*” Dimittr Kosev, the Bulgarian scholar whose valuable survey of the European reaction to the June coup has been used extensively here, concluded that the generally favorable attitude toward the Tsankov regime was due to a dislike of both Stamboliski’s foreign policy, because it was not strongly anti-Soviet, and his domestic reforms, which struck at the interests of “‘big capital.’’!2° While it is true that much of the foreign press tended to regard the Agrarlans as “extremists,”’ sympathetic to Bolshevism, Kosev certainly overstated the significance of this factor. Of much greater importance was the simple fact that the coup achieved rapid and thorough success inside Bulgaria, so that the foreign powers, like the Bulgarian people themselves, were presented with a fait accompli. Given the quick collapse of Agrarian resistance and the death of Stamboliski, there was no realistic alternative to the general recognition of the new regime.

125 Tbhid., pp. 66-70. 126 Ibid., p. 71. 27 Todorov, pp. 218-24. 128 Kosev, Mezhdunarodnoto znachenie, pp. 27-33.

241

Aftermath

THE June 9 coup took a heavy toll of the BANU’s radical wing. Spas Duparinov was tortured after his capture near Plovdiv, and

his body thrown from a speeding train.’ Krum Popov, Stoian Kaltchev, and Dimittr Kemalov, who had inspired the Committee on Peasant Dictatorship, were shot in the cellars of police headquarters in Sofia.* Approximately twenty Agrarian parliamentary deputies met a similar fate.* In succeeding months the Tsankov government, bowing to international pressure, began to amnesty those prisoners who had survived. Agrarian unity, which had in the past been only precariously maintained by the authority and prestige of Stamboliski, vanished after his death. Turlakov, Tomov, and Manolov presented themselves as Agrarian “moderates,’’ willing to work with the new regime, as did Dragiev, who came forward independently as the BANU’s elder statesman. A centrist group seeking to maintain an independent position rallied around Tsanko Tserkovski, Petur Ianev, and Petko Petkov. The left, represented within Bulgaria by Dimittr Grtincharov, an Agrarian lawyer who undertook the defense of several imprisoned Union members, advocated an alliance with the Communists. This was also the position of Raiko

Daskalov, now titular head of the Union, who established an Agrarian center in Prague. Immediately after the coup he telegraphed Soviet Foreign Minister Chicherin, demanding that the Comintern order the BCP to resist Tsankov. In August, however, he was murdered in Prague by an IMRO agent.* 1 Genovski, / v smurtta sa zhivi, pp. 102-103. 2G. Mishkov, E. Peovska, I. Draev, and P. Panaiotov, Septemvriskoto vustanie 1923: Entsiklopediia (Sofia, 1973), p. 111. 3 Todorov, p. 193. 4 N. Nedev, Za kharakhtera na Septemvriskoto vustanie 1923 g. (Sofia, 1973), pp. 44-53; L. N. Aleksandri, God uzhasov belogo terrora v Bolgarii (Moscow, 1924), pp. 26-30; Todorov,- pp. 194-98; Genovski, / v smurtta sa zhivi, p. 42; Gentizon, p. 165.

242

AFTERMATH

The Comintern was, in fact, sympathetic to the Agrarian cause. Addressing the Third Enlarged Plenum of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI) on June 12, Zinoviev, in ignorance of the BCP’s neutralist tactics, compared the situation in Bulgaria to that which had existed in Russia at the time of the Kornilov putsch, and he reminded the delegates of the importance of Lenin’s teachings on the alliance between proletariat and

peasantry.” Two days later Vasil Kolarov, who was present in Moscow, denounced the BCP’s conduct during the coup, describing it as a serious blunder. On the 23rd, Karl Radek delivered a

special report scathingly criticizing the BCP. Holding that the BANU government “was the one foreign organism among the bourgeois governments of the Balkans,” he stated that the June coup represented “the greatest defeat ever suffered by a Communist Party,’’ and that it demonstrated the need for a thorough reorganization of the BCP. The Plenum adopted a resolution calling for the BCP to join with the Agrarian Union in a battle against the Tsankov regime.®

Despite the ECCI resolution and Kolarov’s echoing of the Comintern line, the leadership of the BCP inside Bulgaria was unwilling to change course. Khristo Kabakchiev was assigned the task of defending the party’s conduct, which he did in a long article published in the Comintern journal. Repeating the old arguments that the BANU represented only the upper stratum of the

peasantry and that it was strongly anticommunist, Kabakchiev denied the validity of the Kornilov analogy. Since no revolutionary situation existed, and since there was no landlord class to

be overthrown, he argued, the two cases were not parallel. Moreover, he concluded, with Stamboliski overthrown, the Bulgarian peasantry would perforce have to turn to the BCP, so that in fact the party was in a stronger position than it had been in before the coup. These arguments only provoked a fresh outburst of scom from Soviet and other Communist party leaders.’ ° Rothschild, p. 121; Jackson, p. 173.

® Rothschild, pp. 121-23. |

’ The debate may be followed in the Comintern journal Kommunisticheski internatsional. See: Kh. Kabakchiev, “Pered perevorotom v Bolgarii,” No. 26-27

243

AFTERMATH

At the end of June the Comintern dispatched Kolarov to “correct” the Bulgarian party’s “line.’’® His purge of the party leadership is considered to be a landmark in the Bolshevization of the BCP, i.e., its complete subordination to Soviet directives.? Although Kolarov was ordered to prepare a ““workers and peas-

ants” uprising, he was unable to secure the cooperation of any prominent Agrarian except Grtncharov. Nevertheless, when the ill-planned and premature September Uprising broke out, it was primarily the peasantry that responded to the call for rebellion.” The uprising succeeded only in gaining the BCP a bloody expiation for its previous conduct. It was easily put down by the government, which carried out mass arrests of both Agrarians and Communists. In November, police-supervised elections returned only thirty-one Agrarians to the National Assembly. On the first anniversary of Stamboliski’s death, the leader of the Agrarian forces in parliament, Petko Petkov, was shot down in the streets of Sofia by an IMRO terrorist." Following the Communist attempt to assassinate Tsar Boris, in April 1925, by blowing up Sveta Nedelia Cathedral during services, the government launched a new, more severe, reign of terror that saw hundreds of official executions and even more carried out

clandestinely. Dimittir Grtncharov, Georgi Damianov, Nikolai Petrini, and Tsviatko Abramov were murdered at this time as was former Justice and Finance Minister Petir Ianev.’? Tsanko Tserkovski, whose health was broken by prison conditions, died one month after his release in 1926.!° Emile Vandervelde, who investigated the situation in Bulgaria, estimated that approximately six(1923), 7295-7328; “Posle perevorota” and “Kriticheskie zametki,”’ No. 28-29 (1923), 7680-7740, 7741-7764; K. Radek, “Perevorot v Bolgarii 1 kommunisticheskaia partiia,”’” No. 26-27 (1923), 7327-7342; G. Zinoviev, ‘‘Uroki bolgarskogo perevorota,” No. 26-27 (1923), 7341-7354; V. Kolarov, ‘‘Taktika bolgarskoi kommunisticheskoi partii v sveta sobyti,” No. 1 (1924), 581-628.

8 Rothschild, p. 133. ° Istoriia na BKP, pp. 280-83. © Rothschild, pp. 145-47. The immense literature on the September Uprising begins with D. Kosev, Septemvriskoto vistanie 1923 g. (Sofia, 1954). ™ Mishkov et al., pp. 223-24; Genovski, / v smurtta sa zhivi, pp. 50-52. 12 Mishkov et al., p. 310; Genovski, J v smurtta sa zhivi, p. 97. 13 Mishkov et al., p. 293.

244

AFTERMATH

teen thousand Agrarians and Communists were killed between 1923 and 1925.'4 In succeeding years the Agrarians produced a plethora of fac-

tions, “left wings, right wings, and feathers,” of which the two

most important were “BANU-Vrabcha 1” and “BANUAlexander Stamboliski.”’ The first, whose name came from the address of the Union headquarters at 1 Vrabcha Street, was led by Dimittr Gichev, first elected to parliament as an Agrarian in April 1923, and by former War Minister Constantine Muraviev.

Gichev was a powerful orator and skilled organizer who was largely responsible for the victory of the People’s Bloc, a coalition of the BANU, the Democratic, National Liberal, and Radical parties, in 1931.1° He was not, however, a man of strong ideological convictions, and he preferred a policy of accomodation with Bulgaria’s liberal parties. Under his leadership, BANU-—Vrabcha 1 came to resemble the other parties whose principal goal was the gaining of office. In the 1930s the influence of his faction declined, although Muraviev reemerged in September 1944 to serve as Prime Minister for seven days in Bulgaria’s last “bourgeois”’ government.'® The BANU-—Alexander Stamboliski group, better known by the

name of its newspaper, Pladne (Noon), was organized by Georgi Vulkov and Dr. Georgi M. Dimitrov, and was closely associated with the exiles Alexander Obbov and Kosta Todorov. Committed

to Stamboliski’s original goals in both foreign and domestic ‘4 E. Vandervelde, Les Balkans et la paix (Brussels, 1925), p. 53. See also La Bulgarie sous le régime de I assassinat (Paris, 1925). 15 In these elections the Bloc received 152 of 272 seats. Of these, 69 were won by Agrarians, 43 by Democrats, 32 by National Liberals, and 8 by Radicals. Although the BANU was the largest member of the coalition, its leaders deferred to Malinov and the Democrats. Gichev became Minister of Agriculture, Muraviev Minister of Education, and Georgi lordanov Minister of Public Domains. The policies of Gichev and his allies had little in common with Stamboliski’s Agrarian ideology. Muraviev even appointed Alexander Tsankov to a position in the University. In May 1934 the People’s Bloc government was toppled by the military, which established a “nonparty” regime. 16 On Agrarian politics in the 1920s and 1930s, see Nissan Oren, Bulgarian Communism: The Road to Power (New York, 1971), pp. 16-26, and the same author’s Revolution Administered, pp. 5-42.

245

AFTERMATH

policies, Pladne supplanted Gichev’s faction among the peasantry during the 1930s and emerged after the Second World War as the major popular opposition to the communization of the country. The escape abroad and exile of Dr. Dimitrov.and the execution of his successor, Nikola Petkov in 1947, marked the defeat of Bulgarian resistance to Communism.*"

The continuing strength of Agrarianism, enduring despite repression from above and factionalism among the BANU’s leaders, was eloquent testimony to the faith that Stamboliski’s career and vision inspired among Bulgaria’s peasant masses. Even today

the Communist government prefers to appropriate his legend rather than confront it.1° Stamboliski Boulevard is one of the main

streets of Sofia, and a huge statue of the former Prime Minister stands on Rakovski Street in front of the headquarters of the present-day BANU, now a faithful servant of the BCP. The modern world has not been kind to peasants. They have rarely shared fully in the material progress enjoyed by their fellow

citizens. More often they have been the victims of impersonal economic forces or of social planners who consign them to history’s dust bin. The Bulgarian villager sensed, even if he did not fully comprehend, that Stamboliski sought to bring him into the future at a much lower cost than peasants have normally had to pay. For this reason his vision did not perish with his death. ™ The best study of the Pladne Agrarians is Charles Moser’s forthcoming biography of Dr. G. M. Dimitrov, Dimitrov of Bulgaria. *8 Stamboliski is officially regarded today as a legitimate spokesman of the poor peasantry, a martyr to fascism, and a precursor of popular democracy.

246

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Index

Abramov, Tsviatko, 218-19, 244 of, 11, 13, 72-73, 78, 93-94; role in Academy of Sciences, see Bulgarian politics, 7-8, 208-209, 220. See

Academy of Sciences also, June coup, militarism Adrianople, 106-107, 109 artisans, 9-10, 29, 51n, 66, 160, 163, Aegean Sea, Bulgarian access to, 177 188-90, 197-98, 203-206 Atanasov, Nedelko, 126, 153, 227 Agrarian government, foreign policy Australia, 3, 36 of, 184-208, 210, 241; formation of, Austria, 194 122,142-53; overthrow of, see June Austria-Hungary, 67, 99, 107, 115, coup; reforms of, 154-55, 159, 210: 129 compulsory labor service, 162,

171-76, 181-83 Baev, Petur, 83

cooperation, 162, 168-71, 182-83 Bakalov, Tsanko, see Tserkovski,

education, 162, 176-81 Tsanko Bakalov

grain consortium, 169-70 Balamezov, Stefan, 158

housing , 167 Baldwin, Stanley, 239

judiciary, 182-83 Balkan federation, 103, 115, 185

land, 162-67, 181-82 Balkan League, 100, 105, 107-108 orthography, 180-81, 217 Balkanska tribuna (Balkan Tribune),

taxation, 168 133

245n 224

Agrarian ideology, 52, 54, 56, 58-73, Balkan Wars, 11, 73, 84, 89, 93, 99, 90, 112, 127-28, 141, 160-62, 220, 101, 105-109, 122n, 198, 201, 203,

Agrarian party, 23-24 BANU, see Bulgarian Agrarian Na-

Albania, 87, 107 tional Union

Albert, King of Belgium, 192 Belgium, 179, 189, 192 Alexander, King of Yugoslavia, 192, Benes, Eduard, 192, 202, 240

201, 203, 240 Berlin, Treaty of, 87, 184

Alexander I, Prince, 5, 7, 63, 95 Bernstem, Eduard, 29, 60, 71 Alexander II, Tsar of Russia, 83 Bessarabia, 198, 240 Alexandrov, Todor, 147n, 199-200, Blagoev, Dimitur, 17, 20, 138, 144

204, 230 Bobchev, Stefan, 211

America, United States of, 36, 68, Boboshevski, Tsviatko, 229, 233

125, 128, 178-79 Boiadzhiev, Grigor, 121 anarchism, 127-28 Boris III, Tsar, 71, 119, 139, 143, Angelov, Angel, 51 162, 209, 217, 225, 227, 230, 233Appeal to the Peasants of Bulgaria, see 34, 236, 238, 241, 244

Tserkovski, Tsanko Bakalov Botev, Alexander, 157

Argentina, 36 Bouchier, James, 189 army, 122-23, 161, 208-209, 220; cost Bourgeois Bloc, 216

263

INDEX

Bratoev, Iliia, 40, 42, 44 Bulgarian Agrarian Union, see Bul-

Brazil, 180-81 garian Agrarian National Union

Broad Socialist party, 33, 99, 115, Bulgarian Economic Society, 9 126, 128-29, 134, 140, 144-50, Bulgarian Literary Society, see Bul158, 186, 211-13, 224, 228-30. See garian Academy of Sciences also Social Democratic parties Bulgarian Teachers Union, 18, 21-22,

Bucharest, Treaty of, 109, 116 31

Bulgaria, and Balkan Wars, 99-101, Bund der Landwirte, 67 106-109; economic development of, bureaucracy, 5-6, 9, 17, 57, 65, 72,

9-11, 56-57, 64-65, 72-73, 171, 158-59, 167, 176, 181-82, 209 177; failure to modernize, 3-4, 9-12; Burliu, voivoda, 200

foreign policy of, 85-87, 90-91, Burov, Atanas, 146, 212, 214, 223-24 184, 206-207; and World War I, Burzakov, Anastas, 236 115-16, 122-25, 128-29; see also

Agrarian government Carnarvon, Lord, 189-90 Bulgarian Academy of Sciences, Chatalja line, 106-107

179-80 Chicherin, Georgi V., 242

Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, Churchill, Winston, 191 17, 96, 98-99, 110; after June coup, Clemenceau, Georges, 187-88 242-46; and Balkan Wars, 101-105, Comintern, 147, 231, 242-44 109; and Bulgarian Communist Committee on Peasant Dictatorship, party, 150, 230-32; comes to power, 220-23, 242 122, 143-46; congresses, 32-39, communism, 132, 197, 246. See also 47-51, 53-54, 74-76, 79-80, 83-84, Communist party of Bulgaria, Marx101-102, 110-12, 140-42, 162, 164, ism, socialism 179, 182, 185, 193, 214-19; and Communist International, see Comin-

corruption, 157-59; and Des- tern Closiéres affair, 117; and Fifth Communist party of Bulgaria, 69-71, Grand National Assembly, 96-98; 122, 143-45, 152, 159, 161, 195factions in, 214-19, 226; lack of 96, 210-12, 228, 241; and Agrarian cadres, 158-59; membership of, reforms, 176-77, 179-81, 224, 52-54, 76-80, 83-84, 214-15; ori- 231-32; and general strike, 147-51; gins of, 18, 21-39; in postwar coali- and June coup, 236, 238, 242-45. tion, 140; program of, 4, 37-39, See also Narrow Socialist party 47-49, 51, 74-75, 77-78, 81, 147; compulsory labor service, 162, 171and Radomir Rebellion, 137-39; re- 78, 181-83, 227, 233 vival of, 73-84; and Shtip massacre, | Conservative party, 5-6 101; structure of, 38-39, 49, 77-81, Constantine, King of Greece, 190 182, 217; and World War I, 113-15, Constitutional Bloc, 212-14, 217,

118-19, 121, 124-30. See also 220-25, 228-29, 231-33

Agrarian government constitution of Bulgaria, 4-5, 7, 63, Bulgarian Agrarian National 91-93, 214, 220; alterations of 1911, Union—Alexander Stamboliski, 245 96-99, 103. See also Fifth Grand

Bulgarian Agrarian National National Assembly Union—Vrabcha 1, 245 cooperative movement, 66-68, 71-72,

264

INDEX

78-79, 152n, 160, 162, 168-71, Dimitrov, Georgi, 25

182-83, 227 Dimitrov, Dr. Georgi M., 245-46

corporate state, 66-69. See also Agrar- Dinov, Todor, 36

ian ideology disarmament, 63, 161-62, 172, 188

corruption, 6, 17-18, 156-59 Disarmament Commission, 161,

Coulanges, Fustel de, 59n 172-73

Croatian Peasant party, 189, 193 Dobro Pole, battle of, 130

Curzon, Lord, 190 Dobruja, 22, 108-10, 114, 129, 140,

Czechoslovakia, 158, 189, 192-93, 188, 193, 202, 206

199, 202, 228, 240-42 Dragiev, Dimitur, 49, 60, 73-74, 79, Czechoslovak Republican Party of 81, 83-84, 99, 102, 105, 111, 113, Farmers and Small Peasants, 192 117-18, 121, 124-25, 127, 129, 132-33, 134n, 137, 214, 216, 218,

Damianov, Georgi, 134, 137-38, 238, 229, 237, 242; character of, 25, 142;

244 conflict with Stamboliski, 80-81,

Danev, Stoian, 52, 99, 108-110, 119, 140-42; and formation of BANU,

146, 222-24 25-26, 35, 37-38, 47-48, 50-51,

Danish Peasant Union, 59 53-54 Darwin, Charles, 59 Drandarevski, Col., 42 Daskalov, Asen, 226 Drenkov, Stefan, 99

Daskalov, Raiko, 78, 117, 125, 141, Duparinov, Spas, 125, 141, 218, 227,

145-46, 149-50, 152, 162-63, 214- 238, 242 16, 218, 220, 225-28, 231, 238, 240; character of, 132-34; death of, Eastern question, see Balkan Wars;

242; and Radomir Rebellion, 131, Bulgaria, foreign policy of;

134-39, 215; The Struggle for the Macedonia Land, 133, 162-63; and Tuimovo education, 5, 68, 72, 81, 162, 174-75,

demonstration, 222-24 178-83

Daskalova, Milena, see Stamboliska, elections, 7, 24, 49-51, 81-82, 95-96,

Milena Daskalova 98-99, 109, 112, 142-43, 148,

David, Eduard, 29, 60 151-52, 157, 211, 215-16, 227-29, Dedeagatch, 190, 205-206. See also 231, 244, 245n Aegean Sea, Bulgarian access to Enver Bey, 107 Democratic party, 6, 81, 96n, 111, Epokha (Epoch), 213 114-15, 119, 126, 128-29, 134, d’Espérey, Gen. Franchet, 130 140-41, 152, 158, 210-12, 229, 245 __ estatist organizations, see Agrarian

Denmark, 179 ideology

DesClosiéres, Fernand, 116-17 Ethnike hetaira, 87 DesClosieres affair, 116-17, 121,124, | exarchate, 87,91, 116 133

Dewey, John, 178 Fadenkhekht, Joseph, 129-30 Dimitrov, Alexander, 73-74, 77, fascism, in Bulgaria, 211-12, 221-23, 80-81, 91, 111, 118, 121, 124-27, 246n; in Italy, 202, 211, 213, 221 139, 141, 146, 148-49, 151-52, federalists, in IMRO, 200 193, 200-201, 209-10, 215, 219 Ferdinand, King of Rumania, 240

265

INDEX

Ferdinand I, Tsar, 11, 42, 71, 81, 83, Grote, George, 59n 90, 99, 103-104, 110, 113, 132, Gruev, Damian, 88 135-36, 139, 147n, 190; and Balkan Gruev, G. Z., 211 Wars, 89, 101, 106-109; character Gruncharov, Dimitur, 242-43 of, 7-8, 91-92; and Stamboliski, Gulabshev, Spiro, 19 90-98, 119-21, 124, 131, 141; and Gurev, Angel, 236 World War I, 114-16, 118-19, 122,

28300 Hamid, Abdul, 100

Fifth Grand National Assembly, 70, Herxen, Alexander, 18

Ot, 96-103, 110, 153n . Holy Synod, 213 First Bulgarian Agrarian Society, 23 housing, 161, 167 fishing, 170-71, 173, 178 forestry, 170-71, 178

Fourtou, Gen., 172 Janev, Petur, 182-83, 210, 218-19, France, 3, 139, 158, 174, 178, 188-92, 226-27, 242, 244

204, 239-40 Ihev, K., 38, 48, 78 Ilinden uprising, 89

Gabrovski, Nikola, 33 IMRO, see Internal Macedonian Revo-

Ganev, Mikhail, 186 lutionary Organization Gechev, A., 47 industrialization, see Bulgaria, ecoGenadiev, Nikola, 117 nomic development of

general strike, 147, 150-51, 200, 231 industrial workers, 10, 20, 51n, 64,

Genoa conference, 191, 194, 196-97 70, 123, 147-51, 190

Gentizon, Paul, 154 inflation, 123, 147

Georgiev, Mikhalaki, 4, 34-35 instincts, 70-71 Georgiev, Nedelcho, 121 intelligentsia, 3, 7, 17-18, 20, 64; and

Germany, 3, 57, 67-68, 115, 123, BANU, 68, 102, 155-56 : 127-30, 132, 138-39, 147n, 159, Inter- Allied Commission of Control,

178, 184, 191 see Disarmament Commission

Gerschenkron, Alexander, 9-10, 72 Inter- Allied Commission on ReparaGeshov, Ivan, 97, 99-100, 105, 108- tions, see Reparations Commission

109, 119, 223-34 Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Gichev, Dimitur, 245-46 Organization (IMRO), 88-89, 101, Gladstone, William, 191 104, 115, 198-204, 210, 225-26, grain consortium, 169-70 230, 232, 234-35, 237-38, 240, Grand National Assembly, see Fifth 242, 244 Grand National Assembly International Agrarian Bureau, see Great Britain, 3, 68, 158, 168, 178-79, Green International

188-92, 239 International Institute for Agriculture, Greece, 85-86, 88-89, 100, 105-106, 59, 67 108, 116, 147n, 164, 187-88, 190- Ionovski, Khristo, 235-36

91, 198-202, 205-206, 241 Iordanov, Georgi, 245n Greek- Bulgarian alliance, 100 Ireland, 191 Green International, 67, 189, 192-93 Italy, 3, 99, 107, 188-89, 199, 201-

Grekov, Alexander, 211-12 202, 204-205, 214, 221, 240 266

INDEX Ivanchov-Radoslavov government, 14, | Lazard, Max, 173-75

52 Lazarov, Gen. Velizar, 229 League of Nations, 173, 191-92, 201-

James, William, 59 202, 206, 222

Jaurés, Jean, 113 Lenin, Vladimir I., 70, 195, 243 judiciary, 182-83 Liapchev, Andrei, 131, 211-12, 222 June coup, 157, 166-67, 170-71, 207, Liberal coalition, 110-12, 114 232-43; background, 208-14, 220- Liberal party, 5-7, 23, 35n, 41-42, 63,

25; preparation, 229-31 109

liberation of 1878-79, 3-4, 12, 62

Kabakchiev, Khristo, 17, 231, 243 Little Entente, 199, 202, 239-40 Kalfov, Col. Khristo, 225, 233 Lloyd-George, David, 156, 191, 239 Kaluchev, Stoian, 218-19, 223, 242 Locke, John, 163n

Karavelov, Petko, 6, 50, 52, 82 London, Treaty of, 107

Kautski, Karl, 29 Lozengrad, battle of, 105-106, 109 Kazasov, Dimo, 145n, 230, 233-34 Lule-Burgas, battle of, 106 Kemalov, Dimitur, 218-19, 242

Kerensky, Alexander, 144 Macedonia, 86-89, 94, 99-1 10, 112, Kharlakov, Capt. Ivan, 235n, 236-37 114-16, 130, 146, 191, 198-206,

Kholevich, Nikola, 38, 43 239. See also Internal Macedonian

Khristov, Dimittr, 224 Revolutionary Organization Khristov, Khristo, 132 Madzharov, Mikhail, 146, 211, | Kochana massacre, 101, 104 222-23

Kochanski, Simeon G., 200 Madzharov, Rasho, 224 Kolarov, Vasil, 231, 243-44 Malinov, Alexander, 81, 111, 119,

Komanov, Naiden, 121 126, 129-31, 136, 140, 143, 158,

Konstantinov, Aleko, 9 222-24, 245n

Kormanov, Nikola, 27, 34, 36, 38, Malkov, Constantine, 36

40-42, 46-52 Manolov, Khristo, 210, 216-18, 220,

Kosev, Dimitur, 241 224, 226,229,242 — Koslovski, Col., 200 Marx, Karl, see Marxism

Kosturkov, Stoian, 129, 223-24 Marxism, 20-21, 28-29, 59, 60n,

Kraev, Atanas, 34-35 69-70, 154-55, 212. See also ComKrasen, battle of, 104 munist party of Bulgaria; Narrow Krustev, Beni, 40, 42, 44 Socialist party; socialism

Kubrat, 213 Masaryk, Thomas, 192

Kulev, T., 211 Mikhailov, Pancho, 200, 225

Ktnchov, Vasil, 8, 18 Mikhailovski, Nikolai, K., 19 Mikhailovski, Stoian, 12

labor property, 162-68, 183 Miletich, Liubomir, 180 land reform, 12-13. See also Agrarian militarism, 10-11, 63, 65, 70, 85, 93,

government, reforms 161, 184

Lausanne conference, 197, 203, 205, Military League, 208-209, 211, 225-

225 26, 229-30, 232-34 Lavrov, Peter, 19 Mladezhko zname (Youth Banner), 219 267

INDEX

Mollov, Janaki, 233 Ninci¢, Mom¢cilo, 203, 238 Mollov, Vladimir, 211, 224 Nis, Treaty of, 203-204, 228, 237, 240 Momchev, Stancho, 77, 80, 125, 134 Norway, 179

Mommsen, Theodore, 59n Nova borba (New Struggle), 23 Montenegran- Bulgarian alliance, 101

Montenegro, 86, 100-101, 106-108 Obbov, Alexander, 145, 153, 194,

Moore, Barrington, 52 226-27, 238, 240, 245

Morgan, Lewis Henry, 59, 61 Omarchevski, Stoian, 102-104, 125Muraviev, Constantine, 27, 232-33, 26, 153, 176, 178-81, 217, 227

245 Opposition Bloc, 128-29, 131

Murphy, D. I., 131 Orakhovats, Dr. Dimittr, 211 Mushanov, Nikola, 141 Oralo (The Plow), 26, 56

Musina Republic, 28, 31 Orange Guard, 149-51, 182, 220-21, Mussolini, Benito, 202, 204, 206, 223, 225, 228-29, 232-34, 238

211, 213, 223, 240 orthographic reform, 217 Ottoman Empire, 11-12, 86-92, 94,

Naroden sgovor (National Alliance), 99-100, 103-104, 107-109, 115-16 211-13, 225, 229-30, 233

Narrow Socialist party, 99, 115, 138. Paris Peace Conference, 142, 185-88,

See also Communist party of Bul- 198. See also Neuilly, Treaty of garia; Social Democratic parties Pasi¢, Nikola, 189, 200-201, 203, 238, National Alliance, see Naroden sgovor 241 National Assembly, 4, 8, 35n, 39, 50, Pastukhov, Krustiu, 144-45, 212-13,

74-75, 100-101, 142-43, 151-52, 229-30 228; Agrarians in, 82-83, 91-92, Pavlov, Kiril, 25, 227 105, 111-14, 121, 124-29, 137, peasantry, 4, 6-9, 12-21, 123, 165-68,

149, 158, 182, 210-11. See also 194, 214, 244 Fifth Grand National Assembly Pekarev, Iurdan, 22-25, 33-34, 36, 38,

National Liberal party, 6, 97, 117, 42-43, 46-47, 49, 51

228-29, 233, 245 People’s Bloc, 245

National party, 6, 34, 99, 114, 119, People’s Court, 223-25

128-29, 140, 146, 210 Pernik coal mines, 151, 205 National Progressive party, 210-13, Peshev, Petur, 147n

229 Petkov, Dimitur, 80-81

National Store, 78, 84, 117, 133, Petkov, Marin, 44-45

153n, 157, 169 Petkov, Miko, 218-19

Nedelchev, Ivan, 31-36 Petkov, Nikola, 61n, 246 Nedialkov, Geno, 28, 51 Petkov, Petko, 242, 244

Nekhelis, Otto, 157 Petrich District, 200, 204

Nekliudoff, A., 101, 118 Petrini, Nikolai, 244

_ Neuilly, Treaty of, 147, 149, 160-61, Petrov, Gen. Racho, 53

172, 188, 198, 205, 208, 240 Picot, Georges, 241

New Economic Policy, 195 Pladne (Noon), 245-46 Niebuhr, Barthold, 59n Pleven Group, 26-27, 32, 34, 36 Nikita, King of Montenegro, 101 Pobeda (Victory), 219, 221-22

Nikolov, Ivan, 51 Poland, 189, 192-93 268

INDEX

Polish Peasant party, 192 Russian revolution, 125, 127, 138 political parties, 6, 8, 62-69, 79, 95, 209, 228, see also individual parties Sakarov, Dr. Nikola, 134

Popov, Krum, 218-19, 223, 242 Sakuzov, Ianko, 17, 20, 33, 48, 140,

Popov, Mayor of Pazardzhik, 235 186 populism, 3, 18-20, 23, 96n Salonika, 106, 108, 205-206, 218 Progressive Liberal party, 6, 97, 99, Samokhvalov, Col., 196 114, 119, 128-29, 146, 152, 210 San Stefano, Treaty of, 87

protestantism, 25 Sarafov, Mikhail, 186 Protogerov, Gen. Alexander, 138, Sarrail, Gen., 187

147n, 199-200, 230 Savov, Mikhail, 158

Prudkin, Anton, 157-58 Savov, Gen. Sava, 134, 147n Scutari, 106-107

Rabotnicheski vestnik (Workers’ Seiach (The Sower), 14, 23

Herald), 148 Selski vestnik (Village Herald), 28 Radek, Karl, 243 September uprising, 244

Radev, Simeon, 131 Serbia, 5, 85-89, 99-101, 105-108, Radi¢, Stjepan, 193 115-16, 118, 187. See also Yugo-

Radical Democratic party, 6, 17, 54, slavia 96-99, 110-11, 114, 119, 128-30, Serbian- Bulgarian alliance, 99-101 134, 142, 145-47, 158, 186, 210- Serbian-Greek alliance, 108

12, 229, 245 Shabla-Durankulak, battle of, 45-46,

Radolov, Alexander, 152, 210, 216- 48, 104

17, 224, 226-27 Sharenkov, Andrei, 121

Radomir Rebellion, 131-39, 144, 208, Shtip massacre, 100-101, 103-104

215, 218-19, 231, 238 Silianov, Khristo, 211 Radoslavov, Vasil, 6, 42, 44, 47, 109, Siromakhomilstvo (Pauperophilia), 19 112, 115-16, 118, 122-23, 126-29, Skopski, Velichko, 237-38

146, 147n, 210, 218, 224, 233 Slovo (Word), 212-13

railroads, 11, 174, 228 Smilov, Boian, 229, 233-34 Rakovski, Christian, 196 Social Democratic parties, 17, 20-21,

Ralev, Petko, 25 33-34, 66-67, 69, 71, 96-98, 110,

Rapallo, Treaty of, 201-202 114, 119. See also Broad Socialist

refugees, 161, 164, 196 party; Narrow Socialist party Renan, Ernest, 58-59 socialism, 3, 18, 20-21, 28-29, 32-34. reparations, 188, 194, 204-205, 228 See also Broad Socialist party; Reparations Commission, 161, 167, Communist party of Bulgaria; Marx-

170, 188, 194, 204-205 ism; Narrow Socialist party; Social Rumania, 99, 108-10, 114, 116, 140, Democratic parties 147n, 187-89, 193, 197, 199, 201- Society of St. Sava, 87

202, 205, 223, 239-40 Soviet Red Cross, 195

Rumanian Peasant party, 193 Soviet Union, 194-98, 210, 231-32,

Rusev, Gen. Ivan, 172-73, 233 240, 242-44 Russia, 7, 12, 18-20, 72, 90, 92, 99- Spravedlivost (Justice), 25, 54 101, 108, 116, 118, 123, 184. See Stainov, Petko, 212

also Soviet Union Stalin, Joseph, 70

— 269

INDEX

Stamboliska, Milena Daskalova, 57, Stanchova, Nadezhda, 157

124, 156 Stoenchov, Janko, 229, 233

Stamboliski, Alexander, and Agrarian Stoianov, Petko, 211-12 ideology, 59-73; and Balkan federa- Stoianov, Khristo, 173, 227, 232-33 tion, 94-95, 115, 185; and Balkan Stoilov, Constantine, 6 Wars, 105, 111, 113; and Boris IT, Strashimirov, Dimitur, 99, 102-105,

161-62, 230, 233-34; conflict with 109-11 Dragiev, 80, 140-42; and corrup- Supreme Macedonian Committee, 89 tion, 156-57; death of, 237-38; and Svehla, Antonin, 192-93, 240 domestic reforms, 154-55, 160-62,

169, 174, 179-81, 208, 224-25; Tatarchev, Dr. Khristo, 88 early career of, 26, 54, 58-84; on taxation, 10, 13-14, 36, 72-73, 78, 81,

economic development, 56-58, 168. See also tithe 63-67, 70-71, 94, 160, 246; and fac- Teachers Union, see Bulgarian

tions in BANU, 216-20, 226, 228; Teachers Union and Ferdinand, 91-93, 113, 119-20; Le Temps, 154 in Fifth Grand National Assembly, terrorism, 88-89, 104, 198-201, 20396-99; foreign policy of, 173, 184- 204, 230, 232, 235, 237, 242,

208, 210, 241; forms Agrarian gov- 244-45 ernment, 140, 143-47, 152-53, 158; Thrace, 105-109, 112, 188, 197, 206. and general strike, 148-51; on intel- See also Aegean Sea, Bulgarian ac-

ligentsia, 64, 68, 102; and June cess to coup, 232-37; on Macedonia, 94, Times (London), 212 103-104, 114, 198-204; and Marxist tithe, 4, 14, 25-26, 37, 39-47 parties, 34, 70-71, 96-97, 137-38, Todorov, Kosta, 187, 194, 196n, 199, 143-51, 195, 230-33; on militarism, 206, 219, 232, 241, 245 65-66, 72, 93; on monarchism, 63, Todorov, Petur, 229, 233 65-66, 70, 90-93, 161-62; Political Todorov, Todor, 140-41, 143, 185-87, Parties or Estatist Organizations? , 211, 213, 221-22 59-73; Power, Anarchy, and De- Tomov, Constantine, 210, 216, 220, mocracy, 156, 127-28; Principles of 224-26, 229, 242 the BANU ,, 185; and Radomir Rebel- Tonchev, Dimitur, 6 lion, 131-39; on religion, 58, 61-62, trade unions, 18, 21, 29, 148-51

213; in Todorov government, 185- Trotsky, Leon, 195 87, 208; and Turnovo demonstra- Trustenik, battle of, 44-46, 104 tion, 222-23; and women, 156, 160; Tsankov, Alexander, 209, 211-12, and World War I, 112-15, 117-18, 229-30, 233-34, 239-43, 245n 120-21, 124-25, 127-29, 130-31; on Tsankov, Asen, 229 Young Turks, 90, 92, 100: youth, Tsankov, Dragan, 6

55-57 Tsanov, Naicho, 6, 96n, 119, 158, 222

Stamboliski, Stomen, 55 Tselina (Virgin Soil), 19

Stamboliski, Vasil, 235-37 Tserkovski, Tsanko Bakalov, 76, Stambolov, Stefan, 6-8, 19, 21-22, 80-81, 97, 99, 105, 111, 125-26,

89 133, 137, 140-42, 146, 152, 178,

Stanchov, Dimittr, 158, 186 218, 221, 223, 226-27, 237, 242,

270

INDEX

244; and Appeal to the Peasants of Vulkov, Georgi, 245 Bulgaria, 30-32, 35, 60, 74; and Vulkov, Ivan, 229-30, 233, 237 formation of BANU, 21, 28-32,

34-36, 38, 47, 49-52 Weimar Republic, 159 Turlakov, Marko, 73-74, 77, 80, 117, White Guards, 195-97, 211, 231

120, 125, 145-46, 148-49, 152, Wilkonson, H. R., 87 157, 194, 214-20, 224, 226, 229, Witos, Wincenty, 192-93

242 women, 156, 160, 171, 175-76 Turnovo constitution, see constitution women’s riots, 123-24, 128

of Bulgaria World War I, 84, 91, 110, 113-17,

Turnovo demonstration, 214, 220-25, 184, 198, 203, 208, 224; Bulgarian

227, 231 intervention in, 118-21; impact on

Twain, Mark, 60n Bulgaria, 122-23, 128-29

Wrangel, Baron Peter, 195-96

Union of Reserve Officers, 208-209, Young Liberal party, 6

220 a | Young Turks, 85, 89-90, 92, 100, 103

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Youth Agrarian Union, 219

see Soviet Union Yugoslavia, 147n, 164, 188-89, 192, united front, 231 oo 197-206, 225, 230, 238-41. See also United States, see America, United Serbia States of

university, 5, 178-81, 209, 213, 245n Zabunov, Ianko, 26-27, 34, 36, 38,

usury, 14-16, 36, 81 47-51, 53, 56-57, 74, 80, 82, 153n Zdravkov, Stefan, 236

Vandervelde, Emile, 192, 244 Zemledelska borba (Agrarian Strug-

Vasilev, Grigor, 240 gle), 24

Vasilev, M., 131 Zemledelska zashtita (Agrarian De-

Vasilev, Slaveiko, 209, 234-35, fense), 27, 38, 48, 54

237-38 Zemledelsko zname (Agrarian Banner),

Vazov, Ivan, 179 54, 68, 73, 78-80, 84, 104-105, Venizelos, Eleutherios, 191, 205-206 109, 121, 125-26, 218-19, 221

Vlaikov, Todor, 17, 54, 96 Zhekov, Gen. Nikola, 126-28

Voivodov, Ivan, 36, 38, 40 Zhelev, Ivan, 126 Vulkanov, Marin, 40, 44 Zinoviev, Gregori, 243

271

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Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data

Bell, John D. 1942-

Peasants in power. }

Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. Stamboliiski, Aleksandtr S., 1879-1923. 2. Bulgarski zemedelski naroden suiuz. 3. Peasantry—Bulgaria—Political activity—History.

4. Bulgaria—Politics and government. I. Title.

HD8 15.S74B44 322.4'4'0924 [B] 76-45889 ISBN 0-691-07584-0

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