Peasants in Power: Alexander Stamboliski and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, 1899-1923 9780691198422

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Peasants in Power

Peasants in Power Alexander Stamboliski and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, 1899-1923

JOHN D. BELL

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS Princeton, New Jersey

Copyright © 1977 by Princeton University Press Published by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, Guildford, Surrey All Rights Reserved Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data will be found on the last printed page of this book Publication of this book has been aided by the Paul Mellon Fund of the Princeton University Press This book has been composed in VIP Times Roman Printed in the United States of America by Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey

Princeton Legacy Library edition 2019 Paperback ISBN: 978-0-691-65544-4 Hardcover ISBN: 978-0-691-65686-1

FOR SUSAN

Content s

PREFAC E ABBREVIATION S

I Bulgaria at the End of the Nineteent h Centur y II The Birth of the Agrarian Unio n

ίχ XIV

3 22

II I Alexander Stambolisk i and the Theor y and Practic e of Agrarianism IV The Agrarian Unio n and the Wars V The Roa d to Power VI The Agrarians in Power : Domesti c Reform s VII The Agrarians in Power : Foreig n Polic y VIII The Overthro w of the Agrarian Governmen t

55 85 122 154 184 208

AFTERMAT H

242

BIBLIOGRAPH Y

24 7

INDE X

263

Vll

Tables

1. Land Distribution in Bulgaria in 1897 2. Elections for the XIV National Assembly, May 25, 1908 3. Elections for the XVI National Assembly, November 24,1913 4. Elections for the XVIII National Assembly, August 17, 1919 5. Elections for the XIX National Assembly, March 28, 1920 6. Sources of the State Land Fund 7. Composition of BANUDruzhbi in 1921 and 1922

vni

13 82 110 143 152 167 215

Preface

interested in the modern history of Eastern Europe have traditionally focused on such problems as nationalism and nationality conflicts, the breakdown of international relations, and the roots of East European Communism. Agrarianism—the rise of organized peasant movements—has received relatively little attention. To an extent this is understandable, since in none of the East European states did the Agrarians create viable and enduring institutions, and as E. H. Carr has written: "History is . . . a record of what people did, not of what they failed to do." Still, the Agrarians in their prime created mass political movements and were able to bid seriously for power and to propose a number of original solutions to the problems besetting their peoples before succumbing to domestic reaction, economic depression, war, and Sovietization. If the full dynamic of East European politics is to be understood, we should know the Agrarian contribution to it even if the Agrarians themselves were unable to overcome their rivals. This book will explore in as much depth as the available sources permit the history of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union—the strongest of the East European organizations—from its founding to the overthrow of its government in 1923. I have attempted to find the causes for its appearance, to explain its ideology and program, and to evaluate its accomplishments and failures in both domestic and foreign policy. Inevitably, this has led me to concentrate on the career of Alexander Stamboliski, who guided and inspired the BANU during its rise to power. Thus, this book is a political biography of both a movement and a man. In January 1968 I rode a bus to the western outskirts of Sofia to visit the house in which Stamboliski had lived while Prime Minister, preserved now along with a small museum devoted to his life. Arriving before the guide, I encountered a peasant, short and thin, about sixty years old, whose "weathered" features as well as his

SCHOLARS

IX

Alexander Stamboliski and his father, 1921. From Album Alexandre StamboU'iski, photographies et facsimiles (Sofia, 1964; Fbtoizdat).

PREFACE

sheepskin coat and hat I later found to be typical of the Bulgarian village. He was taciturn and suspicious, and when the guide arrived he refused to sign the visitor's book or even to tour the museum, preferring to wait on a bench in the courtyard. He came with us through Stamboliski's house, however, breaking his silence only at the end to comment: "Well, it's a very modest house, isn't it?" He refused the guide's invitation to a cup of coffee and remained standing for a while in the courtyard. Before turning to tramp away through the snow, he sighed in a way that clearly expressed a deep sense of loss and of longing for "what might have been." It convinced me, as much as any other, more academic consideration, that Stamboliski was worth a biography. I am happy to express my gratitude to the Fulbright-Hayes Commission, which supported a year of research in Paris, London, and Sofia during 1967-1968, and to the International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX) and the University of Maryland, Baltimore County, for grants that enabled me to return to Sofia for further study during the summer of 1973. Material on the Agrarians is widely scattered, and I should like to acknowledge with thanks the assistance I received from the staffs of the following institutions: the Narodna biblioteka, the Biblioteka pri Bulgarska akademiia na naukite, and the Tsentralen durzhaven istoricheski arkhiv in Sofia; the Bibliotheque nationale, the Bibliotheque de Vlnstitut d'etudes slaves, the Bibliotheque de I'Ecole nationale des langues orientales vivantes, the Bibliotheque de documentation Internationale et contemporaine, the Bibliotheque slave, and the archival section of the Ministere des affaires etrangeres in Paris; the Public Records Office in London; the New York Public Library, and the Library of Congress in Washington. I would also like to thank Mrs. Ivan Standoff for allowing me the use of her family archives and library and for sharing with me her vivid memories of some of the personalities who appear in this book. This book began as a doctoral dissertation in the Department of History at Princeton University. I owe an immeasurable debt of gratitude to my adviser, Cyril E. Black, whose advice, aid, and encouragement have been constant. At various stages in the prepXI

PREFAC E

aratio n of this manuscrip t I have also benefite d from the advice, comments , and suggestions of Jerom e Blum, Arno Mayer , and Zdeni k David of Princeton ; Ivo Lederer , now of Stanfor d Univer sity; Georg e Haup t of the Ecole pratique des hautes etudes: sixieme section in Paris; Mari n Pundef f of the Californi a Stat e Universit y at Northridge ; David Joravsky of Northwester n Uni versity; Charle s Mose r of The Georg e Washington University ; Alexander Velev, my host at xhelnstitut za istoriia in Sofia, and my colleague s in the Departmen t of Histor y at UMBC , who ventured into the labyrint h of Bulgarian histor y in departmenta l seminars devoted to Chapter s II I and VI. Fina l responsibilit y for the style and conten t of this book is, of course , my own. Special thank s are due my wife, Susan , who mad e a cheerfu l transitio n to life in a less modernize d society, and who cam e to love Bulgaria and its people . He r patience , understanding , and encouragemen t greatly facilitate d the writing of this book. ALPHABETS , DATES , AND PLACE S

In transliteratin g the Bulgarian alphabet , I have rendere d the majorit y of letter s by thei r closest English equivalent . With letter s for which no direct English equivalen t exists, the following corre spondence s are used: X — ZH H — omitte d after I, after othe r vowels — I

y —υ

X U Η ΙΠ

m

— — — —

Kh TS CH SH — SHT

T> — ϋ

Κ) — IU Ά — ΙΑ The same system is used in transliteratin g the Russian alphabe t with the following exception s and additions . Xll

PREFAC E

m — SHC H W— Υ L·- ' The Julian calenda r was in use in Bulgaria throug h Marc h 31, 1916. In the nineteent h centur y it was twelve days behin d the Gregoria n calendar , in the twentieth , thirteen . Where necessar y the date of an event is given in both systems in the following form: Jun e 20/Jul y 3, 1910. In cases where localitie s have undergon e a chang e of name , the moder n name , in parentheses , follows the original, e.g. Shume n (Kolarovgrad) . The Bulgarian administrativ e regions "okrug" and "okoliia" are rendere d here as "province " and "district. "

X l ll

Abbreviations

The following abbreviations appear in the footnotes: AMAE FO SBID CSHA

xiv

Archives de la Ministere des affaires etrangeres British Foreign Office Documents Spisanie na Bulgarskoto ikonomichesko druzhestvo Tsentralen durzhaven istoricheski arkhiv (Central State Historical Archive)

Peasants in Power

CHAPTER I

Bulgaria at the End of the Nineteenth Century Consider any of the ruin that the government has brought about in this country and you will see that nothing here conforms to the needs and interests of our people. . . . Every [school] . . . is a factory turning out officials, and every one of those officials shuns labor. Thus we see why every peasant's son uses his father's wooden plow and why every artisan's son follows his father's trade. This is why we have neither the factories of England and Germany nor the culture of France. — Zemledelska zashtita1 THIS chapter is not a comprehensive history of Bulgaria's first two decades of independence. It focuses selectively on the elements in the Bulgarian environment that gave rise to the Agrarian movement. Briefly stated, its argument is that Bulgaria's failure to modernize after the Liberation of 1878-1879 profoundly disturbed many educated Bulgarians who could not understand why their country's development did not follow the path of the advanced Western nations. Today, of course, it may still occasion disappointment that an underdeveloped country fails to achieve economic progress or political democracy, but it can no longer cause surprise. Bulgaria, however, won her independence at the time when the distance between the "West" and the rest of the world was at its greatest, and when the experiences of Italian and German unification as well as the development of North America and Australia seemed to prove that the path of Western development was open to all. In seeking a diagnosis and cure for their country's continuing backwardness, members of Bulgaria's young intelligentsia found their understanding shaped by the prevailing intellectual milieu, which reflected the influence of contemporary Russian populism and various forms of socialism. One of the directions, but by no means the only one, in which this led them was toward peasant organization. 1

11, No. 14 (Jan. 17, 1901), 1.

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BULGARIA AT END OF NINETEENTH CENTURY

From its beginnings, the Agrarian movement was deeply concerned with the problem of overcoming backwardness. However much this may have been obscured by its involvement with seemingly unrelated issues—the "tithe," the powers of the prince, or the Balkan Wars—the Agrarian Union continued to search for a path to modernization. The changes that took place in its ideas and conduct over the twenty-four years between its founding and the coup d'etat against its government only strengthened its commitment to that goal and deepened its understanding of how the goal could be achieved. The Liberation of 1878-1879 brought fundamental political, social, and economic changes to Bulgaria. National independence was achieved. The Turnovo Constitution guaranteed the freedoms of speech, assembly, the press, and religion. The authority of the monarch was strictly limited, and the voice of the people was given an outlet in the National Assembly elected on the basis of universal male suffrage.2 Turkish landowners fled or were driven from the country, and their estates were broken up for distribution to the peasantry. It seemed that the dreams of the national awakening were about to be realized, that Bulgaria would emerge from the long night of Ottoman domination to find her place in the mainstream of European civilization.3 Less than two decades later, the populist writer and political reformer Mikhalaki Georgiev looked back on those dreams. "We strained like eagles high above the clouds," he wrote, "and now we roll in the dust, in the swamp . . . ! If this is the life a free people leads, then such freedom is in vain. We sowed roses, but only thorns have come forth."4 Georgiev's outcry had its echo among the common people in the popular saying: "Ot tursko, polosho" (Worse than the Turkish).5 This disappointment, on both the intellectual and popular levels, was the response to Bulgaria's 2

The text of the relevant portions of the Turnovo Constitution may be found in C. E. Black, The Establishment of Constitutional Government in Bulgaria (Princeton, 1943), pp. 291-309 3 B. Boev, "Vutreshen pregled," SBID, iv, No. 10 (1900). 701-705, B. Penev, Istoriia na novata biilgarska literatura, iv, part one (Sofia, 1936), 182-204. 4 Quoted in V. Pinto, "The Narodnik Movement in Bulgarian Literature," unpub. dissertation, University of London, 1952, pp. 101-102. 5 Ibid., p. 137.

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failure to achieve the hoped-fo r politica l and economi c progress in her first two decade s of independence . In the politica l sphere , these years were filled with dramati c and melodramati c events. The reign of Princ e Alexander Battenber g (1879-1886 ) was marke d by the great struggle between Liberals and Conservative s over the powers of the prince , the suspension and restoratio n of the constitution , unio n with Easter n Rumelia , and victoriou s war against Serbia. It conclude d with the kidnap ping and abdicatio n of the princ e himself. But beneat h this turbu lent surface a slow tide was runnin g whose effect was to under min e Bulgaria's pape r democrac y and widen the gap between haves and have-nots . In spite of the democrati c form of government , power was always in the hand s of a politicall y active elite compose d of the country' s few large landowners , merchants , chorbadzhis, 6 lawyers, clergy, officers, teachers , and those educate d in Bulgarian communitie s abroad . After the Liberatio n these men took up the reins of government , staffing the civil service and officer corp s of the new state. By the mid-1880 s their numbe r expande d beyond the capacit y of the countr y to find useful work for them . The schoo l system was geared to produc e hundred s of educate d and semi-educate d "intellectuals"an d lawyers each year who sought and were fit only for career s in the civil and militar y bureau cracies. 7 Durin g the schoo l year 1896-1897, the first for which data were collected , the university reporte d that ther e were 180 student s in the faculty of history, only 81 in the faculties of sci8 ence and mathematics , and 354 in the faculty of law. This imbalance led to the expansio n of the politicall y active class and so con The term chorbadzhi was derived from chorba, soup. Before the Liberatio n it denote d well-to-d o peasant s and townsme n who house d and fed passing Turkish officials. Often they acted as tax-collector s or as intermediarie s between the Turks and the commo n people , and so acquire d the reputatio n of being traitor s or oppres sors. After the Liberatio n the term cam e to be applied to politica l bosses on the small town and village level. See Black, Establishment, pp. 10-11. 7 Kniazhestv o Bulgariia—Direktsii a na statistikata , Statistika za sredmte, spetsialnite, profesionalnite i visheto uchilishta ν kniazhestvo Bulgariia prez uchebnata 1896-1897 godina (Sofia, 1905), pp. 8-9; T. Tchitchovsky , "Politica l and Social Aspects of Moder n Bulgaria, " Slavonic and East European Review, vii, N o 20(1929),276-77 . 8 Statistika za . . uchilishta, pp. 166-67. 6

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BULGARIA AT END OF NINETEENTH

CENTURY

tribute d to the breakdown of the two-part y system and to the disappearanc e of principl e from public life. It brough t about an intensifie d struggle for the spoils of oifice, a proliferatio n of bureaucracy , and pervasive corruption . Even in the first years of independenc e the struggle between Liberals and Conservatives , which the Liberal press presente d as a battle between democrac y and oligarchy, was concerne d chiefly with matter s of protocol . Committe d to democrac y in the abstract , the Liberals demande d that the princ e be addressed as "Hi s Excellency" rathe r than "Hi s Highness " and that he stand while addressing the Assembly. The y had no greater comprehensio n of the real need s of the countr y than did the Conservatives. 9 The Liberal part y suffered its first schism in 1884, when its conservativ e wing unde r Draga n Tsanko v broke away to form the Progressive Liberal party. Two years later the part y split again, this time between the followers of Petk o Karavelo v and Stefan Stambolov . Repeate d fission of the part y eventuall y produced , besides the Pro gressive Liberals, the Democrat s unde r Karavelov, the Nationa l Liberals unde r Stambolov , the Young Liberals unde r Dimitu r Tonchev , the Liberals unde r Vasil Radoslavov, and the Radica l Democrat s unde r Naich o Tsanov. The remnant s of the Conserva tive part y regroupe d as the Nationa l part y led by Constantin e Stoilov. 10 Ther e were few or no difference s in principl e between these partie s as thei r shifting blocs and alliance s cam e to attest . The goal of each was to secure the power of patronag e and access to the state treasur y for the party "chief" and his supporters . They becam e "partnership s for the exploitatio n of power." 11 On the small town and village level it was not uncommo n for ambitiou s men to swear allegiance to two or mor e parties , jumpin g finally to the one that gained office. 12 The peasantry , four-fifth s of the popu Black, Establishment, pp. 110-33; P. Zarev, "Politicheskit e part n ν Bulgarn a neposredstven o sled osvobozhdenieto, " Istoricheski pregled, l, No . 4 (1945), 301-304. 10 Black, Establishment, pp. 254-55; Ν Stanev , Nai-nova istorua na Biilgarua (Sofia, 1925), pp. 119-22. 11 D . Kazasov, Ulitsi, khora, subitiia (Sofia, 1959), ρ 200. 12 J. S. Roucek , The Politics of the Balkans (Ne w York, 1939), pp. 122-23; Tchitchovsky , p. 277; Moublie r to Picho n (Plovdiv, April 30/Ma y 13, 1908), AMAE, Bulgarie:politique interieure: nouvelle serie, in, 188. 9

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lation, lacked the education, organization, and experience to act as a brake on political degeneration. Its role in government was reduced to casting ballots in what were more and more frequently rigged or meaningless elections. By the close of the century most educated Bulgarians were aware that two societies had arisen: the urban "political intelligentsia" and the common people, who were all but excluded from political life.13 After the abdication of Prince Alexander, power passed into the hands of Stefan Stambolov. A living link with the generation of revolutionary heroes, Rakovski, Botev, and Levski, Stambolov had participated in the "committees" that had fought against the Turks before the Liberation. He had been a delegate to the Turnovo Constitutional Convention and was one of the founders of the Liberal party. As President of the National Assembly, regent during the interregnum, and Prime Minister, he secured the unification of the country, found an occupant for Bulgaria's vacant throne, and fought off heavy-handed Russian attempts to dominate the government. He acquired, in the process, an international reputation as one of Europe's "strongmen."14 Under his rule political life lost its comic-opera features, acquiring instead a considerably more sinister aspect. Establishing a virtual dictatorship, Stambolov executed, imprisoned, or exiled his political enemies and suspended freedom of the press. While he respected some forms of the constitution, his control of the army, police, and partisan civil authorities guaranteed him steady election majorities. Although many of the repressive features of his regime were ended after Stambolov was deposed in 1894, subsequent political standards did not rise even to the level that preceded him. The beneficiary of Stambolov's legacy was Prince Ferdinand I of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, whose character and policies shaped Bulgarian and Balkan politics to the end of the First World War. The corpulent new monarch resembled Alexander I in his disregard for the principles of the constitution, but he lacked the fidelity to a personal code of honor and the battlefield courage that had inspired the people's respect if not devotion for the former prince. 13

K. Krustev, "Bulgarskata intelligentsiia," Misul, vm, No. 1 (1898), 9. The brighter side of Stambolov's career is presented in A. H. Beamon, Stambuloff (London, 1895). 14

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His title unrecognize d by the Power s and his authorit y usurpe d by Stambolov , Princ e Ferdinan d remaine d in the backgroun d for the first seven years of his reign, assuaging his immens e vanity throug h a passion for etiquett e and protocol . Durin g this appren ticeshi p he mastere d Bulgaria's politic s along with her language, and in 1894 he suddenl y dismissed Stambolov . A year later his agents brutall y assassinated the former Prim e Minister. 15 Ferdinan d possessed a high orde r of politica l cunning . By encouragin g the fragmentatio n of the politica l partie s and by cultivatin g the good will of the military , he extende d his persona l authorit y over the government , especially in the field of diplomac y where he was obsessed with the dream of makin g Bulgaria the dominan t power in the Balkans. Throug h "his skill in calculatin g the psychologica l momen t for driving each batch of swine from the trough of power, " he mad e the politica l partie s pillars of his regime. 16 Durin g his reign, vast public corruptio n was added to the evils of Bulgarian politica l life. Repeate d financia l scandal s characterize d his rule, and nearl y every ministe r who served unde r him was later charged with filling his pocket s at public expense. 17 Outsid e the capital , the declin e in the standard s of politica l life was reflected in the dominatio n and exploitatio n of the village by state functionarie s who owed their appointment s to thei r ability to "deliver" the votes in their region. Often these men were the moneylender s and merchant s who alread y controlle d the village economically. 18 In the electio n of 1899 the journalis t and scholar Vasil Kuncho v decide d to stand as a candidat e for the Nationa l Assembly in the Vratsa Distric t of north-centra l Bulgaria. After the campaig n he publishe d a dismal portrai t of corrupte d politica l life. Mayors , district officials, inspectors , and tax collector s intimidate d the peasant s of the district . The village of Chiren , a typical example , was bossed by a mayor who: . . . was always eager to welcome any sort of state official who Beamon , pp. 234-40. R. W Seton-Watson , Europe in the Melting Pot (London , 1919), p. 358. 17 Ibid. , pp. 356-63; G . Buchanan , My Mission to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memories, ι (London , 1923), 50-75. 18 Tchitchovsky , p. 278. 15 16

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was seeking to plunde r the village. He supporte d any part y that was in power. He controlle d the village branc h of the Agricultural Bank and used all his influenc e against those who oppose d him . He performe d civil function s only for head s of families who would not send their sons to school , for the teacher s were his enemies. 19 The famou s satirist Aleko Konstantino v wrote that in any village a squad of mounte d police carrie d greater weight on electio n day than the most idealistic oppositio n speeches. 20 The degeneratio n of politica l life was unrelieve d by any significan t economi c progress. On the contrary , economi c stagnatio n contribute d to politica l declin e for it mean t that ther e were few career s open to educate d men outsid e the part y and state bureau cracies. To be sure, ther e is some justification for acceptin g the Marxist characterizatio n of the period from 1878 to 1900 as that of the "developmen t of capitalism." 21 Man y of the "prerequi sites" for industrializatio n were achieved : "feudal" relation s in the countrysid e were abolished , handicraf t productio n declined , the right to private propert y was guaranteed, and the countr y gained full contro l of its tariff policies. 22 But it is by no mean s apparen t that these events were followed by the bloomin g of a capitalis t economy . As Alexander Gerschenkro n conclude d from his study of the period : "all causes [for industrialization ] were present , but the effects failed to materialize." 23 This pessimistic view had been expressed earlier by the influentia l Bulgarian Economi c Society, founde d in 1895 to study the country' s economi c problems . Accordin g to the society, since the Liberatio n artisan s had been impoverishe d withou t any new industrie s appearin g to take their place, Bulgarian product s could not compet e on world V. Kunchov , "Edn a izbirateln a borba, " Misitl, ix, No . 6 (1899), 620. A. Konstantinov , Suchineniia, ι (Sofia, 1957), 168-75 21 Istorua na Bulgariia, n (Sofia, 1955), 9. 22 S. Sh. Gnnberg , "Iz istorii razvitiia bolgarskoi promyshlennost i ν kontse XIX v. (perekho d k politike proteksionizm a i pooshchrenii a krupno i promyshlen nosti), " Uchenye zapiski Institute slavianovedeniia, xxx (1966), 136-52; I. N . Chastukhin , "Razvitie kapitalizm a ν Bolgarii ν konts e XIX veka," Vestmk Moskovskogo universiteta: serha obshchestvennykh nauk, No . 7 (1953), 55-70. 23 A. Gerschenkron , Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective (Ne w York, 1962), p. 221. 19

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markets , and the peasan t was being ruine d by falling grain prices 24 and rising taxes. Owing to the lack of accurat e statistica l data for the perio d before 1909, it is not possible to construc t a detaile d pictur e of Bulgarian economi c developmen t in the first two decade s of independence . Nevertheless , in his study of Bulgarian industrializa tion , Gerschenkro n showed convincingl y tha t before the Secon d World War the Bulgarian econom y never achieved the rates of growth or structura l change s associate d with the triump h over backwardness . What growth ther e was was concentrate d in "premodern " industries , such as textiles, and not in the "new" metal lurgical or chemica l industries. 25 Accordin g to the directo r of the Statistica l Institut e of the Universit y of Sofia, in 1936 Bulgaria possessed only about 40,000 industria l workers "in the true West Europea n sense" as oppose d to 134,392 artisans. 26 The low level of economi c progress was also reflected in the rural-urba n popula tion ratio . Between 1880 and 1910 the proportio n of the popula tion in towns of over 2,000 inhabitant s actuall y decline d slightly.27 Ther e were manifol d reason s for Bulgaria's failure to industrialize . On the purely economi c side, the loss of Ottoma n markets, the unsuitabilit y of the country' s agricultura l product s for industria l uses, and the lack of available capita l largely offset the advantage s gained by the Liberation. 28 Moreover , Bulgaria's politica l leader s were disincline d to adop t a policy of state suppor t for industrialization . This was due in part to the fact that the doctrin e of laissez-faire dominate d thei r economi c thinking, 29 but still mor e to thei r preoccupatio n with foreign policy and their con "Nashataprograma, " SBID , 1, No . 1 (1895), 1-2. Gerschenkron , pp. 198-234; Gerschenkron' s evaluatio n has been supporte d in the recen t work of John Lampe . See his "Varieties of Unsuccessfu l Industrial ization . Th e Balkan State s before 1914," Journal of Economic History, xxxv, No . 1 (March , 1975), 56-85. 26 O. N . Anderson , Struktur und Konjunktur der bulgarischen Bolkswirtschaft (Jena , 1938), p. 13. 27 K. Popoff, La Bulgane economique, 1879-1911 (Sofia, 1920), ρ 11 28 Gerschenkron , pp. 223, 232-33; T. Stoianovich,/ 4 Study in Balkan Civilization (Ne w York, 1967), pp. 97-100 29 Tchitchovsky , p. 276 24

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comitant desire to have as large and powerful an army as possible.30 It was not until 1894 that a Bulgarian government first passed legislation to encourage the growth of industry. Even then the aid provided—tax benefits, exemptions from customs payments on imported machinery, reduced rates for rail transportation, and preference in the awarding of government contracts—"was more notable for the multifariousness the ways in which it was profferred than for its magnitude."31 In the one area in which the state did take an interest, railroad construction, it relied on imported equipment and failed to promote related domestic industries. And even in railway construction its activities were modest. Of the eight major foreign loans negotiated by the government between 1888 and 1909, less than one-third of the proceeds were devoted to railroad construction, the rest going to debt management and military needs.32 The military establishment was the largest single drain on the state's resources, although by the end of the century it was closely rivaled by interest payments on the national debt, itself contracted largely for the importation of artillery, small arms, and munitions. By the turn of the century these two items together accounted for 44 percent of the state budget. This proportion remained approximately constant up to the eve of the First Balkan War, when military preparations caused it to increase still further.33 Thus, the preoccupation of Prince Ferdinand and the country's political leaders with building up the army and equipping it with the most advanced imported weapons diverted Bulgaria's resources away from economic development. The inertia of the economy was obscured by the changes that took place in the cities, especially the capital. At the turn of the century a Turkish visitor wrote in amazement of the new Sofia whose public buildings, gardens, museums, trams, and electric lights gave it a "glory and beauty" surpassing the major cities of 30

Gerschenkron, p. 230. Ibid., p. 229; L. Pasvolsky, Bulgaria's Economic Position (Washington, 1930), pp. 27-28 32 Gerschenkron, p. 230; Popoff, pp 492-93. 33 Popoff, pp. 483-84. 31

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BULGARIA AT END OF NINETEENTH CENTURY

the Ottoma n Empire. This modernization , which impressed Bulgaria's politica l leader s as muc h as it did foreign observers, was of a decorativ e rathe r than self-sustainin g variety. The con structio n of attractiv e public buildings, the beautificatio n of cities and towns, their electrificatio n and the installatio n of telephones , which relied on the importatio n of both equipmen t and engineers , little benefite d the nationa l econom y and still less the peasan t who was require d to pay for it and who still cultivate d his fields with a primitiv e wooden plow. 35 Man y Bulgarian s rejected this kind of progress, for it drove hom e the widenin g gulf between the urban and rura l populations . To the poet and philosophe r Stoian Mikhailovski , who eventuall y becam e a supporte r of the Agrarian Union , the new Sofia symbolized not progress but exploitation . 34

D o you see this pretty , coquettis h Bulgarian capital ? It is built out of plunde r and robbery! No w it shines, it attract s like a Parisienne . . . . Well, to me it is a thousan d time s filthier, filthy in the purit y of its atmosphere , foul in the cleanlines s of its streets and courtyards , foul because it is a living proo f that the histor y of the young Bulgaria has begun by spoliation. 36 The peasantr y had benefite d economicall y from the Liberatio n to the extent that it had been given ownershi p of the land , for the Russian occupatio n authoritie s and subsequen t Bulgarian government s confiscate d the Turkish estate s and sold them in small parcels. 37 Table 1, giving land distributio n based on the censu s 34 Quote d in L. S. Stavrianos , "The Influenc e of the West on the Balkans, " in C. and B. Jelavich, eds., The Balkans in Transition (Berkele y and Los Angeles, 1963),212 . 35 Ρ Egorov, "lzpolzuvanet o na zemiata, " m lu. G . Mollov , ed. , Pogled vurkhu sotsialno-ikonomicheskata struktura na bulgarskoto zemedelsko stopanstvo, Trudove na Statisticheskiia institut za stopanski prouchvanua pri Sofiskua durzhaven universitet, No . 2-3 (1936), 93-94 36 Quote d in G . C. Logio, Bulgaria: Past and Present (Manchester , 1936), ρ 370 37 On the Liberatio n as a land reform , see N . G . Levmtov, "Agrarnye otnoshenn a ν Bolgarii nakanun e osvobozhdenii a ι agrarn y perevoro t 1877-1879 godov, " in Osvobozhdenie Bolgarii ot turetskogo iga, sbornik statei (Moscow , 1953), 186-99; G . D . Todorov , "Deinostt a na vremennot o rusko upravleni e ν Bulgariia po urezhdan e na agrarnii a ι bezhanskn a vupros prez 1877-1879 gg , " lstoricheski pregled, xi, No . 6 (1955), 27-59; Y. G . Kovatcheff , "Agrarian Re-

12

BULGARIA AT END OF NINETEENTH CENTURY TABLE 1 LAN D DISTRIBUTIO N IN BULGARI A IN

Size of holding (in hectares)

Number of holdings

less than 0.5 0.5- 1 1-2 2-3 3-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 20-3 0 over 30

166,765 90,508 106,373 75,100 110,283 149,001 55,503 22,095 14,911 9,049

Tota l

799,588

Percent of holdings

1897

Number of hectares

Percent of land

21 11 13 9 14 19 7 3 2 1

41,651 67,300 157,602 187,304 435,488 1,058,32 8 672,053 379,173 358,664 620,896

1.0 1.7 3.9 4.7 11.0 26.6 16.9 9.5 9.0 15.7

100

3,978,45 9

100.0

data of 1897, demonstrate s tha t Bulgaria was a natio n of independen t peasan t smallholders. 38 Despit e its possession of the land , the peasantr y languishe d in the general economi c stagnation . Thre e long-ter m factor s in particula r underla y the difficulties of Bulgarian agricultur e in the last quarte r of the nineteent h century : the low level of productivit y of peasan t farms; the sharp , worldwide declin e of grain prices: and the steady growth of population , unrelieve d by industrializatio n and urbanization. 39 To these were added the growing burden s of taxatio n and indebtedness . Although durin g the first four to five years of independenc e the peasant s paid less in taxes than they had unde r the Turks, public buildin g projects , the establishmen t of a civil bureaucracy , and form in Bulgaria, " International Review of Agriculture, xxv (1934), E441-50 ; L. Berov, "Agrarnoto dvizheni e ν Istochn a Rumeln a po vreme na osvobozhden ieto, " lstoncheski pregled, xn, No . 1 (1956), 3-35. 38 Statistichesh godishnik na bulgarskoto tsarstvo, godtna purva, 1909 (Sofia, 1910), p. 183. The situatio n in Bulgaria may be compare d to that in neighborin g Rumani a where latifundists , makin g up only 0.56% of the population , held 48.6% of the arable land in estate s of over one hundre d hectare s each D . Mitrany , The Land and Peasant in Rumania (Ne w Haven , 1930), pp. 186-87 39 St. Kosturkov , "Pred i ι sega, za 25 godishnii a lubelei ot osvobozhdeniet o na Bulgarna, " Misul, xm, No . 7 (1903), 410-11.

13

BULGARI A AT EN D O F NINETEENT H CENTUR Y

the growth of the army increase d the state' s deman d for revenue. 40 In 1887, after the unio n with Easter n Rumelia , the state budget was 48,200,00 0 leva, an expenditur e of 15.31 leva for every man , woman , and child in the country . By 1900 the budget had risen to 109,700,00 0 leva, a per capit a expenditur e of 29.52 leva.41 The governmen t looked upon the peasantr y simply as a source of revenue , and collecte d its steadily rising taxes with no corre spondin g regard for rural welfare. In 1882, because the price of grain was falling, the governmen t replace d its tax in kind with a land tax tha t had to be paid in money . In 1889 new method s of calculatin g this tax were introduce d so that the rate rose still higher . Seven years later ther e was a general tax reform and the amoun t collecte d droppe d slightly, but ther e was no significant redistributio n of the tax burden . Finally , in 1899, the Ivanchov Radoslavo v government , which had campaigne d on a program of tax relief for the peasantry , decide d to restor e the old Turkish "tithe " on agricultura l products . This tax, which had to be paid in kind, was impose d at a time when crop failures had brough t about near-famin e condition s and forced grain prices to artificially high levels.42 Taxes, payment s to the governmen t for land taken from the Turks, and the absenc e of state credit facilities forced the peasant s to borro w from local moneylender s who were often unscrupulous . The practic e of "Godles s usury" was the most visible and frequentl y condemne d evil in the rural life of Bulgaria. Complaint s of the villagers against the moneylender s were echoe d in almost every rural publication . "And so in 1891 Pavli Rache v took 4,000 grosh from a Gree k factory owner to finish his work, " wrote a subscriber to the journa l Seiach [The Sower] in 1897. Durin g 1892 he gave back 3,500 grosh, durin g 1896 he gave back 6,000, and now the Gree k still wants 2,500 grosh: the Gree k for 4,000grosh takes 12,000grosh. Between 1890 and 1896 Haji Dimitu r took 1,420 grosh for 200 grosh. Fro m 40 41 42

14

N . Piperov , "Danutsit e ν Bulgania, " Misiil, xi, No . 3 (1901), 200. Popoff, pp 483-84 Piperov , No . 3, p. 202; No . 5-6, pp 334-50

BULGARIA AT END OF NINETEENTH CENTURY

another , for 120 half-bushel s of groats he took 680 halfbushels. 43 Governmen t studies of usury in the countrysid e indicat e that interest rate s as high as 800 percen t were not unknown. 44 One of the worst and at the same time most prevalen t forms of usury was the practic e of selling "in the green. " The peasant , in need before harvest time , was forced to sell his crop for a very low price while it was still in the field. After the harvest the usurer could afford to store the crop unti l prices rose, perhap s even selling some back to the peasan t at these higher prices. This practic e was specifically prohibite d in 1880, but neithe r this law nor numerou s other s attemptin g to regulate usury were ever enforce d for the simple reason that the moneylender s were the same tavern-keepers , merchants , governmen t officials, and chorbadzhis who controlle d the countrysid e politically. 45 Whole villages as well as individual s fell victim to ambitiou s usurers. Accordin g to one study, in 1901 ther e were 301 villages in Bulgaria "completel y ruine d by usury" and 470 villages "very nearl y ruined. " In this same year the amoun t of peasan t indebted ness reporte d to the governmen t totale d 45,000,00 0 leva and muc h mor e was doubtles s unreported. 46 In the last years of the nineteent h centur y Bulgarian agricultur e experience d a crisis. Durin g April, May, and Jun e 1897, torren tial rain s beat down the grain in the fields and caused widespread flooding. The summe r month s brough t hot , dry winds. In some areas so man y weeds sprang up tha t the peasant s were not able to mow the fields with their sickles. A large proportio n of the grain stalks produce d no grain at all, and the rest yielded light and wrinkled kernels, so that the tota l harvest was both small, only 2,113,80 9 tons , and of poor quality. In the following year weather condition s were bette r and the amoun t of grain harvested rose to 2,569,46 3 tons , most of it of good quality. The spring and Seiach, π , No.6- 8 (1897), 225 A grosh was a coin equal to one-fiftho f a lev. S. Khristov , "Likhvarstvoto ν Berkovskata okolna, " SBID , iv, No 1 (1900),50 . 45 N . Konstantmov , "Likhvarstvoto, " SBID , xix, No . 3-4 (1910), 164, 179; S. Khristov , p. 5; Tchitchovsky , p. 278. 46 N . Konstantmov , pp. 174-75. 43

44

15

BULGARIA AT END OF NINETEENTH CENTURY

summe r of 1899, however, brough t severe drough t resultin g in a disastrou s harvest of only 1,558,09 2 tons . Livestock also suffered, for an epidemi c of distomiasi s broke out in 1897, and in 1899 the shortage of hay forced the peasant s eithe r to slaughter thei r animal s or to sell them for insignifican t prices. 47 The poor harvest of 1899 was long remembere d by the peasants. In some areas of the country , grain stores were depleted. A peasan t from the village of Khasurdzhi k (Shipsko ) in the Pro vadiia Distric t wrote: "Whole families . . . (very hardworkin g people ) have gone hungry , some for two, some for thre e or mor e days withou t even a scrap of bread." 4 8 Hunge r was even worse in the Kharmanl i Distric t of Stara Zagor a Province . The peopl e maintaine d themselve s on bread tha t was "black and hard like charcoal, " which was mad e from roots , straw, and acorns. 49 Face d with deprivation , the peasant s were forced to turn to the local moneylenders . In his repor t to the government , the Provin cial Inspecto r of Agriculture in Varna wrote: The population , which lacked grain even for subsistence , was forced to [borrow] for seed. Th e storehouse s were deplete d with the exceptio n of a few in the hand s of private individual s who at onc e took advantag e of the unfortunate s withou t mercy , selling them a hectolite r for twent y gold leva. Her e again begins a new cycle of debt. 50 The governmen t was unresponsiv e to the crisis in the villages. Face d with its own financial difficulties, it took advantag e of the scarcity-induce d rise in the price of grain to impose the "tithe " on the peasantry . This tax was the first issue over which the newly formed Agrarian Unio n confronte d the authorities . Man y studies of peasan t societie s in transitio n have shown tha t politica l initiativ e is rarely taken by peasant s actin g alone. 51 Bulgaria was not an exception . The Bulgarian Agrarian Union , while 47 V. Topalov , "Stopansk a kriza ν Bulgania prez 1897-1900 g g , " lzvestiia na Instituta za istorna, xn (1963), 49-50. 48 Lette r from Iliia Stoiano v toZemledelska borba, n , No . 8 (Feb . 9, 1900). 49 50 Topalov , "Kriza, " p. 53. I b i d . , p 52. sl E. R Wolf, Peasant Wars of the Twentieth Century (Ne w York, 1969), pp. 285-90; A. Stewart , "Th e Social Roots, " in G lonesc u and E. Gettner, Populism • Its Meaning and National Characteristics (Ne w York, 1969), 180-95

16

BULGARI A AT EN D O F NINETEENT H CENTUR Y

it had broad peasan t support , was founde d by member s of the intelligentsia . The term intelligentsia did not have a generally recognize d meanin g in Bulgaria at the end of the nineteent h century , and it was used in both pejorative and lauditor y senses. This mirrore d the split tha t had appeare d in educate d society by the 1890s. On the one han d ther e was the intelligentsi a of the state bureaucrac y and the politica l parties . Owing to the venality and corruptio n prevailin g in its ranks, it becam e known as the "partisan intelligentsia" or even the "parasitic intelligentsia." 52 Oppose d to the politica l intelligentsi a were a numbe r of educated men who were farthe r remove d from the center s of power. The y were usually teachers , writers, journalists , low-rankin g civil-servants , doctors , priests, or specialists in some technica l field. 53 These men , especially those who worked in the villages, formed a bridge between traditiona l peasan t society and the outside world. The country' s public-schoo l teachers , numberin g about 6,000 in the late 1890s, 54 were the most influentia l segment of this branc h of the intelligentsia . They were poorl y paid, closely watche d by the local authorities , and possessed very little job security . Most of them were confronte d every day by the disparit y between the reality of life and the idealism of their schoo l days. Thus , it is not surprisin g that the leader s of Bulgaria's radica l parties and movement s were drawn largely from thei r ranks. Todo r Vlaikov, leader of the reformist wing of the Radica l Democrati c party, Dimitu r Blagoev, Khrist o Kabakchiev , and Iank o Sakuzo v of the Social Democrati c party, and nearly the entir e leadershi p of the Agrarian Unio n began thei r career s as teacher s in the public schools. By the 1890s this segment of educate d society was aware that Bulgaria had not mad e the progress tha t had been so confidentl y expecte d at the time of the Liberation . Politica l corruption , ecoKrustev, p. 9; Β. M. Peselj, "Peasan t Movement s in Southeaster n Europe, " unpub . dissertation, Georgetow n University , 1950, pp. 163-64. 53 Tchitchovsky , pp . 277-78; Iu . Pekarev , Moitepolitiko-obshtestveni spomeni (Sofia, 1929), pp. 105-108; I. N . Chastukhin , "Krest'iansko e dvizheni e ν Bolgarii ν 1899-1900 gg. i vozniknoveni e Bolgarskogo zemledel'cheskog o soiuza, " Voprosy istorii, No . 9 (1956), 93. 54 K. Lambrev , Rabotnicheskoto ι profesionalnoto dvizhenie ν Biilgariia, 1891-1903 (Sofia, 1966), pp. 95-96. 52

17

BULGARIA AT END OF NINETEENTH CENTURY

nomic stagnation, and the increasingly desperate situation of the peasantry were all profoundly disillusioning to those who had been nurtured on the dreams of the revolutionary generation. That existence under the Turks had been preferable was a common theme of contemporary journalists. Vasil Kunchov, the teacher and writer whose description of village politics was quoted earlier, expressed the prevailing feeling in the form of a dialogue between himself and a simple villager. "Was it better in Turkish times, bai Petur?" I asked. "It was," replied the peasant, "as long as Bulgarians didn't interfere with the Turkish authorities. When Bulgarians began to interfere, things got much worse. Instead of one tax we had to pay two, and it was carried to the point where we could not even pay the one." These few words clearly reveal the peasants' opinions of their former Bulgarian councillors. And their opinions of today's officialdom is no better. And the masses are right. With only a few exceptions they have not benefited at all from our new national intelligentsia. This intelligentsia seeks only to enrich itself and never gives a thought to the impoverishment of the people. Travel expenses, living allowances, huge monthly salaries, pensions, gifts, awards—all these things are the means by which a few who by some lucky chance have forged a little ahead of the masses make a more opulent life for themselves.55 A significant number of men like Kunchov turned to radical or reformist movements, the most important of which reflected the influence of populism or socialism. Many individuals whose focus was more narrow participated in the movement for tradeunion organization, particularly in the creation of the Bulgarian Teachers Union. All of these tendencies made significant contributions to the formation of the Agrarian Union. Populist ideas entered Bulgaria from Russia. Before the Liberation many Bulgarians who studied in Russian schools or who lived in the Bulgarian communities in Russia absorbed the ideas 55 V. Kunchov, "Iz Bulgania," Periodwhesko spisanie na Bulgarskoto kmzhovno druzhestvo, xi, No. 57 (1898), 67.

18

BULGARIA AT END OF NINETEENTH CENTURY

of Herze n and sought to glorify the peasan t and his traditiona l way of life. In the late 1880s Spiro Gulabchev , a teacher , formed the secret society Siromakhomilstvo (Pauperophilia) , which copie d the conspiratoria l organizatio n of the People' s Will. Advocatin g a form of primitiv e Christia n communism , Siromakhomilstvo formed a numbe r of study clubs, but never achieved a large following. 56 After Stambolov , the Bulgarian governmen t was far less repressive than Russian tsarism, and the Bulgarian populist s were not an elite "conscience-stricke n nobility. " These two factor s mean t that the Bulgarian environmen t was particularl y well suited to the evolutionar y doctrine s of Mikhailovsk i and Lavrov, and by the late 1890s they dominate d the populist movement. 57 Centra l to Bulgarian populism was the concep t of the duty of the intelligentsi a to raise the intellectua l and mora l standard s of the commo n people . The populist s believed tha t the root s of Bulgaria's politica l and economi c failure lay in the ignoranc e and backwardnes s of the peasantry . Thei r goal was to make the peasant a mor e efficient and prosperou s produce r and to educat e him to the dutie s of citizenshi p in a democrati c state. 58 To achieve this goal the populist s most often turne d to journalism , and the 1890s saw the appearanc e of numerou s journal s directe d toward the peasantry . Their program called for devotio n to labor on the part of the peasan t and the expansio n of knowledge and education . Tselina (Virgin Soil), one of the first and most influentia l of the populist journals , stated its positio n simply: "Learnin g is light and inactivit y darkness , knowledge is strength and labor riches." 5 9 Convince d that the life of the peasan t could be bettere d only throug h the mora l and intellectua l improvemen t of the peasan t himself, the populist s create d no organize d politica l movement , nor did they aim immediatel y to involve the peasantr y in the political life of the nation . The foundin g of the Agrarian Unio n as an "educational-economic " and nonpolitica l organizatio n testifies to Istoriia na Bulgarna, 11, p. 129; M. Pundeff , "Marxism in Bulgaria before 1891," Slavic Review, xxx, N o 3 (1971), 545-46. 57 58 Pinto , pp. 61-69, 100. Ibid. , pp. 137-38. "Tselina, ι. No. 1 (1892), 1. 56

19

BULGARIA AT END OF NINETEENTH CENTURY

the strength of populist ideas on the early Agrarian movement. But when a majority in the Agrarian Union rejected the nonpolitical approach in favor of the belief that it was the political structure of the country that kept the peasant in darkness, many populists stood by their old faith and left the Union. Populism retained its original vitality only in literature. Nevertheless, the influence of populism on the development of the Agrarian movement should not be underestimated. By calling attention to the problems of rural life and by involving the rural intelligentsia in efforts to improve the peasant's lot, populism was the most important influence on the Agrarian Union at the time of its formation. Socialism, especially the Russian variety imbibed by Bulgarians who had come into contact with the revolutionary circles in Russian schools and universities, and which encompassed a wide range of radical ideas, had long played an important role in Bulgaria's political and intellectual life. Commonly, not only members of the radical opposition but nearly all prominent statesmen, including the most conservative, passed through a period of infatuation with some form of socialism.60 In the 1890s the introduction of "scientific" Marxism and the founding of the Social Democratic party narrowed the focus of socialist activity. Organized socialism concentrated on the problems of industry, the creation of a politically conscious working class, and the maintenance of ideological purity among the intellectuals who made up the bulk of party membership. In 1903 Dimitur Blagoev, the leader of the "Narrow" faction, preferred to split the tiny Bulgarian Social Democratic party rather than dilute its class purity by encouraging the membership of peasants. Even lanko Sakuzov, leader of the "Broad" faction, viewed nonproletarians only as auxiliaries to the workers' movement and did not attempt to make their problems a prime subject of the party's program.61 In a country 80 percent of whose population was made up of peasants, and which possessed only a few thousand workers, the 60 J. Rothschild, The Communist Party of Bulgaria: Origins and Development, 1883-1936 (New York, 1959), p. 3; C. E. Black, "Russia and the Modernization of the Balkans," in Jelavich, p. 155; Pundeff, "Marxism," pp. 523-50. 61 Rothschild, pp 31-32; lstorha na Bulgarskata komunisticheska partiia (Sofia, 1972), pp. 70-73, 80-94.

20

BULGARIA AT END OF NINETEENTH CENTURY

appea l of this doctrinair e form of socialism was obviously limited. The appearanc e of Marxism in Bulgaria did, however, stimulat e and radicaliz e numerou s educate d men , most notabl y Tsanko Bakalov Tserkovski, who were to becom e prominen t in the Agrarian Union . And while it is an exaggeration to maintai n that "Socialism was the schoo l in which the peasant s learne d to organize," 62 the efforts of the Social Democrati c part y on behalf of trade-unio n organizatio n in general and the Bulgarian Teacher s Unio n in particula r certainl y helped to raise the questio n of the organizatio n of the peasantry . While the growth of socialism and populism in the 1890s create d an intellectua l climat e favorable to the developmen t of the Agrarian movement , it was the success of the Teachers'Unio n that provided the immediat e stimulu s for the formatio n of a peasan t organization . The public-schoo l teacher s had mad e several attempt s to organiz e in the 1880s, but they were unabl e to overcom e the hostilit y of the government . After the fall of Stambolov , trade-unionis m revived, and in the beginnin g of 1895 the printer s carrie d out the first mass strike the countr y had seen. 63 In Januar y 1895 the teacher s of Varna Provinc e publishe d an "Open Lette r to the Public-Schoo l Teacher s of Bulgaria" calling for the formatio n of a nationa l teacher s union . In July such an organizatio n was actually create d by a teachers ' congress held in Sofia. 64 Despit e the fact that within two years the Teachers ' Unio n split over the question of involvemen t in politics , the same issue that would later vex the Agrarian Union , it achieved considerabl e improvement s in salary and job securit y for its member s and succeede d in drawing most of the country' s teacher s into its ranks. 65 It was natura l that those teacher s in the village who were concerne d with the problems of the peasantr y would draw inspiratio n from it. Thei r attempt s to extend the idea of organizatio n to the peasantr y led directly to the creatio n of the Agrarian Union . 62 P. Kiranov , Bitlgarskolo zemedelsko dvizhenie: idei, razvitie i delo (Sofia, 1927), p. 18. 63 Lambrev , pp. 72-73, 80-89. 64 Ibid. , pp 96-98. 65 Ibid , p. 100; Zh . Atanasov, "Iz istoriia na narodnot o uchitelsk o dvizheni e ν Bulgariia ν kraia na XIX vek," Istoricheskipregled, xm, No 1 (1957), 92.

21

CHAPTER

II

The Birth of the Agrarian Union Having spent many years as a teacher in the villages, I came to know in great detail what the peasant endured. 1 could not be separated from him or his children. I attended his feasts and was in hisfieldsduring the long summer vacation. —lurdan Pekarev1 THE Bulgarian Agrarian Union was not created by any one man or group. Rather it came about through a coalescence of local movements inspired by men who shared no common ideology, program, or purpose save the belief that "organization" would benefit the peasantry. They were particularly divided by the question of involvement in politics, which was not finally settled until the Union's third congress in 1901. The first organizer of the peasantry, and the foremost advocate of direct political action, was lurdan Pekarev of Varna Province. Pekarev was the son of a baker in the southern Dobruja. He was born in 1865 or 1866. After completing secondary school in Varna, he took an advanced course in agricultural science and settled in one of the province's rural districts as a school teacher. He was an energetic and imposing man with a thick, black beard, piercing eyes, a measure of fanaticism, and two measures of ambition. In 1893 he developed a taste for politics, helping to organize resistance to the Stambolov regime among the local teachers. After Stambolov's fall, he was elected vice-president of the provincial teachers organization that initiated the formation of the Bulgarian Teachers' Union.2 Pekarev was fired because of his union work, but he was already planning to begin a political career as a spokesman for the 1

Pekarev, Spomeni, p. 137. Ibid., pp. 5-96; D. Kazasov, Sreshti, sluchki, razmisul (Varna, 1971), pp. 39-42; I am also indebted to lurdan Pekarev, nephew of the lurdan Pekarev dealt with in the text, who discussed the family traditions concerning his uncle in an interview in Sofia in June, 1973 2

22

BIRTH OF AGRARIAN UNIO N

peasantry . In his memoir s he wrote that his experience s as a village teache r had awakened him to the hardship s of peasan t life and that he grew convince d that he had a "mission " to lead the peasantr y out of its darkness . Hi s zeal brough t him to the attentio n of a populist circle of agronomists , officials, and landowner s who had begun to discuss ways to advanc e peasan t educatio n and to disseminat e informatio n about moder n agriculture . In the spring of 1896 they formed the First Bulgarian Agrarian Societ y to publish a journal , Seiach (Th e Sower), with Pekare v as editor . This project was short-live d because Pekare v would not accep t the evolutionary , nonpolitica l program of his colleagues. His use of Seiach to criticiz e governmen t policies and personalitie s led to quarrel s with the rest of the society, and at the end of the year he resigned. 3 He began to visit the major villages of the provinc e to distribut e propagand a urging the creatio n of an "Agrarian Party. " His leaflets stressed the contribution s the peasant s mad e to the state and the few benefits they received in return . We, who fill the state treasury , receive the gendarme' s whip on our bende d backs for thanks ; we, who feed and cloth e the world, are hungr y and naked ; we, who fill the barrack s to protect the lives and possessions of the tsar, the state, the lawyers, usurers, and chorbadzhis, have no one to protec t us from them . And how long will this go on? As long as we are quiet , patient , and indifferent—as long as we do not unit e and organiz e our forces in an organizatio n of our own. Ther e is no othe r way!4 Pekare v looked for suppor t to his friends amon g the teachers . In Januar y 1898, fifteen of them joined him to form the First Con stituen t Committee . They decide d as a preliminar y step to set up village druzhini (battalions ) modele d on the village association s of the Liberal party, and by the end of the year they had estab5 lished over sixty. In Decembe r Pekare v started a new journal , Nova borba (Ne w Struggle), whose nam e was soon change d to Pekarev , Spomeni, pp. 104-108. lu. Pekarev , Isloriia na zemedelskolo orgamzirano dvizhenie ν Bulgarua, n (Dobnch , 1945),311 . 5 Pekarev , Spomeni, pp . 139-40; M. 1. Turlakov , /stoma, printsipi ι taktika na BMgarski zemedelski naroden siauz (Star a Zagora , 1929), ρ 52 3

4

23

BIRTH OF AGRARIAN UNION

Zemledelska borba (Agrarian Struggle). It bore the motto: "The moral and material improvement of the peasantry is the business of the peasants themselves," and combined criticism of the government with appeals for peasant organization. It is considered to be the first political journal of the Agrarian movement in Bulgaria.6 In January 1899, the government resigned, and new elections were set for April 25. Pekarev called for the village druzhini to send delegates to consider a charter and program for the new party. The meeting, held on March 21 in the village of Baladzha, was attended by approximately 850 delegates, who supported the idea of creating a new party and elected a committee of twentysix, headed by Pekarev, to work out the details.7 One week later the committee accepted Pekavev's draft program calling for reduced taxes and the introduction of a progressive income tax, a shortened term of military service, free administration of justice, free medical care, expanded free education, and a ceiling on the number of state officials. The committee also debated the question of restricting membership in the party to peasants or even to poor peasants exclusively. The formula adopted, however, stipulated that anyone who supported the party program was eligible for membership, and that individual druzhini should make the final decision.8 On the eve of its first election campaign, the Agrarian party was deprived of its leader. The meeting in Baladzha had brought Pekarev to the attention of the authorities who, using the excuse that he had abandoned teaching, took away his draft deferment. He was conscripted and confined to barracks until the elections were over. Without his leadership, many of the druzhini failed to make an intensive election effort and some fell under the influence of other parties. Nevertheless, the Agrarian party won in one district and made a good showing in the two others in which it had entered candidates.9 If Pekarev had been free to follow up this 6

65. 7

D. P. Ivanchev, BMgarski periodichen pechat, 1844-1944, n (Sofia, 1966),

Zemledelska borba, l, No 13 (March 24, 1899), 1. Pekarev, Spomeni, pp 164-68. 9 Ibid., p. 172; V. Topalov, "Osnovavane na Bulgarskiia zemedelski suiuz," Izvestna na Instituta za istorua, vm (1960), 174. 8

24

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success, his group would probabl y have been the first to form a nationa l organization . Dimitu r Dragie v of Stara Zagor a was anothe r advocat e of political involvement . The youngest of the peasan t organizers , Dragie v was born in the village of Radnevo , twenty miles south east of Stara Zagora , in 1876. After completin g his secondar y educatio n in the provincia l capital , he returne d to teach in Radnevo, where he met Petk o Ralev, "an erudit e Socialist, " who had also settled in the district as a village teacher . The two men becam e close friends, and thei r wide-rangin g discussion s helpe d to awaken Dragiev' s social conscience . He becam e a conver t not to Marxism , however, but to evangelical Protestantis m with a stron g admixtur e of Tolstoya n ideas. Although the circumstance s of his conversio n are not known , his experienc e was not unique . At the end of the nineteent h centur y Protestantis m gained man y followers amon g educate d Bulgarians , and frequentl y served as an intellectua l way station between traditiona l mode s of though t and mor e radica l social and politica l doctrines . The family of Georg i Dimitrov , the Communis t leader , was Protestan t as was Kiril Pavlov, Ministe r of Public Domains in the last Agrarian cabinet. 10 With an arroganc e born of new-foun d humility , Dragie v sought to accomplis h both the economi c and mora l regeneratio n of the peasantry . In May 1899, he began to edit a journal , Spravedlivost (Justice) . Bearin g the mott o "You must be born again!" it printe d article s on scientific agricultur e and the peasant' s mora l and religious duties , and advocate d the formatio n of local peasan t associ11 ation s to press for reform on the village level. Dragie v was outrage d by the government' s intentio n to reintroduc e the tithe . In Spravedlivost he urged the peasant s to forget the old politica l partie s and to organiz e to prevent the collectio n of the tax. Dragie v also wrote an inflammator y pamphlet , Must the On the influenc e of Protestantis m in Bulgaria see W. W. Hall , Puritans in the Balkans (Sofia, 1938). 11 A S. Penchev , Poznavate h pitrvoapostolite—zidari na BZNS? (Turnovo , 1946), p. 28; M. Genovski , / ν smiirtta sa zhivi (Sofia, 1945), p. 33; K. D . Spissare\sk\,Zemledelskoto dvizhenie ν Bulgarua:poteklo ι razvitie (Sofia, 1923), pp. 25-29; T. G . Vlaikov, "Bulgarskiiat zemledelsk i narode n suiuz, " Demokraticheskipregled, vn, No . 7 (1908), 709-10. 10

25

BIRTH OF AGRARIAN UNIO N

Peasants Pay the Tithe?, tha t was widely circulate d and mad e him well-known . In it he wrote that the tith e placed an undul y heavy burde n on the peasantry , tha t it would requir e a new bureaucrac y to collect it, and that it would actuall y take one-quarte r to one-thir d of the peasant' s crop . He blamed this "heavy, unjust, criminal , Godles s tax" on the politicians , "Turks in Bulgarian caps, " who held a "partisan knife at the throa t of true selfgovernment, " and he urged the peasantr y to organiz e itself to put an end to these abuses. 12 A less politica l approac h characterize d the "Pleven Group, " a circle of teacher s and agronomist s centere d aroun d the Stat e Mode l Far m in the Ruse Distric t and the State Vinicultura l Insti tute in Pleven. The leader of this group was lanko Zabunov , head of the Vinicultura l Institute , who was to serve as presiden t of the Agrarian Unio n durin g the first thre e years of its existence . Born into an impoverishe d peasan t family in the village of Kuzu-klis a in southeaster n Bulgaria in 1868, Zabuno v ran away from hom e at the age of seven. He was taken in by the Churc h of St. Dimitu r in Sliven, where the priests gave him room , board , and an elemen tary education . At fifteen he entere d the agricultura l schoo l in Sliven, where his ability won him a scholarshi p from the district authorities . After finishing the three-yea r course , he taugh t in Iambo l unti l 1890, when he received a governmen t fellowship to study vinicultur e in Austria. Upo n his retur n to Bulgaria, he was appointe d head of the Vinicultura l Institut e in Sliven and mad e an edito r of Ora/ o (Th e Plow) , a state-supporte d journa l of agricultura l information . In 1896 he was appointe d overseer of the royal vineyards at Evksinograd , but grew bored with this work and resigned. Movin g to the State Vinicultura l Institut e in Pleven , he was soon appointe d its director . Her e his lecture s on the necessity for peasan t organizatio n won over man y of the students , includin g 13 the young Alexander Stamboliski. In 1899 Zabuno v held a numbe r of secret meeting s with D . Dragiev, Triabva h zemledeltsite da plashtat desiatuk 7 (Star a Zagora , 1899), pp. 3-23; Zemledehka zashnta, i, No . 8 (Nov . 10, 1899), 1-4. 13 Penchev , pp. 14-16; Ρ Genov , lanko Zabunov pitrvoapostolul na zemedelskoto sdruzhavane ( ?, 1948), pp. 5-8. 12

26

BIRTH OF AGRARIAN UNIO N

teacher s and agronomist s from Pleven , Sadovo , and the Ruse mode l farm to discuss the declinin g situatio n of the peasantry . The group decide d to undertak e the publicatio n of a journa l free from governmen t influenc e and censorship . Although the teacher s from Sadovo backed out at the last minute , on Jun e 12 the rest signed an "agreement, " accordin g to which the new journa l was to have the following goals: a) to acquain t the peasan t with his rights and dutie s to the end of creatin g an agrarian curren t amon g us tha t will be free of all pett y partisanship ; b) to spread knowledge in all branche s of agriculture ; c) to examin e dispassionatel y all ideas for the improvemen t of agricultur e no matte r what thei r source ; d) to review agricultura l literature ; e) to review in genera l all foreign political-agricultura l events and problem s touchin g our own economi c life. The signers of the "agreement " each promise d to contribut e 10 leva monthl y for the suppor t of the journa l unti l it could be published withou t loss. In the event tha t its edito r lost his position , they also pledged to provide for his support . Zabuno v was chosen to be the responsibl e editor , and the first issue of the new journa l Zemledelska zashtita (Agrarian Defense ) appeare d on Septembe r 6. 14 With relatively substantia l resource s to draw on, Zemledelska zashtita was publishe d thre e time s mpnthl y and soon achieved a circulatio n of 2,500. 15 By the term "agrarian current, " the Pleven Grou p had in min d the populist goals of educatio n and gradual economi c improve ment . The first issue of Zemledelska zashtita warned the peasan t tha t he could not find a quick solutio n to his problem s throug h 16 politics. Although one of Zabunov' s colleagues, Nikol a Kormanov , a veterinaria n at the Ruse mode l farm, favored working with individua l politica l figures who were sympatheti c to the peasantry , even he believed that the principa l effort had to be mad e in the fields of educatio n and farmin g techniques . When, in N . Kormanov, Zemledelskuat smuz: Osnovavane, demagogiia, deistvitelnost (Sofia, 1923), pp . 2-4; Zemledelska zashtita, ι, No . 36 (Aug. 25, 1900), 2-3 15 Ivanchev , i, p. 317 16 Zemledelska zashtita, i, No . 1 (Sept . 6, 1899), 1. 14

27

BIRTH OF AGRARIAN UNION

the fifth issue of Zemledelska zashtita, the editors printed Tsanko Bakalov Tserkovski's proposal for a congress to form a national peasant organization, they did not see this as the beginning of a political movement, and they even expressed the hope that such an organization would receive the support of the government.17 The intellectual odyssey of Tsanko Bakalov covered the entire map of Bulgarian radicalism before ending in the camp of the Agrarian Union. Bakalov was born in 1869 in the village of Biala Cherkva in the Turnovo District. His family was one of the most prosperous in the village, and his father possessed local fame for his part in the pre-Liberation struggle against the Turks. In his youth Tsanko was an indifferent student, although he read widely and managed to qualify as a teacher in 1891. By this time he had fallen under the influence of Marxism and joined the newly formed Social Democratic party. Adopting the pseudonym "Tserkovski," by which he became generally known, he made his literary debut with a series of militant poems and songs.18 From 1894 to 1897 Tserkovski taught school in the "Musina Republic," a village near Turnovo widely known for the political and social radicalism of its teachers and other members of the intelligentsia. While in Musina he assisted the Socialist Geno Nedialkov, who edited the journal Selski vestnik (Village Herald). He became its editor-in-chief when Nedialkov was elected to the National Assembly in 1895.19 It was as a writer that Tserkovski first felt dissatisfaction with Marxism. Vaguely sensing that the doctrine conflicted with his own view of reality, he began to rethink his ideological assumptions. He contrasted Marx's picture of society with his own surroundings and concluded that Marxism, so overwhelmingly concerned with the industrial proletariat, could not play an imme17

Ibid., i, No. 5 (Oct. 10, 1899), 1-3. Tserkovski's own memoirs, written on the occasion of the celebration of his thirtieth year in literature, are included in N. Atanasov, Tsanko Tserkovski (Sofia, 1921) See also: K. Kozhukharov, Tsanko Tserkovski, biografichen ocherk (Sofia, 1956), 3-7; Zh. Tadzher, Nova Biilgariia (Sofia, 1922), pp. 580-85; Pinto, pp. 83-84. 19 D. Dimov, Tsanko Bakalov Tserkovski (Sofia, 1968), pp. 30-32; N. Atanasov, p. 45. 18

28

BIRTH OF AGRARIAN UNION

diately useful role in agricultural Bulgaria. Marxist theory postulated a long process through which the peasantry would be transformed into a proletariat by the growth of industry. Although Tserkovski knew that this might bring about a working-class revolution in the distant future, he was coming to believe that the need for immediate reform in the village should not be ignored. It was obvious to him that the peasants were already enemies of the existing society. He concluded: "The village is strength. It has every objective moral and material strength to become a mighty political and social factor. " 20 Still believing himself to be a Marxist, and finding support for his ideas in the writings of "Kautsky, Bernstein, and Eduard David," Tserkovski began to develop the idea of a "new course," that of peasant organization, which was to be the next "inevitable politico-economic step" in the evolution of Bulgarian society.21 Although his "discovery" of the peasant evoked no sympathy from his Socialist comrades, he did not yet contemplate a break with the party. He did not believe that Marxism was wrong in the long run, only that the desperate situation of the peasantry demanded immediate attention. In his mind the "new course" involved the organization of the peasantry as a pressure group, analogous to a trade union or benevolent society, not as a political party that might compete with the Social Democrats. Even after the formation of the Agrarian Union, he attended the 1900 Congress of the Social Democratic party as a delegate.22 Tserkovski limited his plans to the sphere of theory until 1897, when he gave up teaching and returned to his native Biala Cherkva to farm and open a bookstore. During the winter he formed the Young People's Educational Society, whose goals were: "education, economic progress, and political consciousness for the peasants of this village and for every peasant and artisan23 in Bulgaria." The society presented musical and theatrical events and political discussions. At the latter Tserkovski presented ar20

N. Atanasov, p. 46. Ibid.,pp 48,59. 22 V. Mavrikov, Iz moiia zhivot (Sofia, 1955), p. 12. 23 Tserkovski included artisans in an unsuccessful attempt to avoid criticism from his Socialist colleagues Mavrikov, p. 12. 21

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guments for the creation of a peasant organization and received an encouraging response.24 Hoping to find a larger audience for his ideas of peasant organization, he began to compose an "Appeal to the Peasants of Bulgaria" in 1898. He rewrote the "Appeal" many times, searching for the peasant's own idiom, so that it would be comprehensible to every villager. A simple style and tone—clear ideas. I felt this to be vital in view of the minimal consciousness of the peasant masses with whom 1 sought to work. I considered it most necessary to avoid all troublesome questions in which party feeling would be aroused. . . . Forgiveness to all for time spent in this or that party group, and the fraternal hand in the name of our [common] occupational interests—that was what I wanted to achieve in the "Appeal." 25 Tserkovski began the "Appeal" with a description of the backwardness of Bulgarian peasant agriculture, which contrasted so unfavorably with farming in America and Western Europe. He pointed out that the Bulgarian peasant still cultivated his fields with "Adam's wooden plow" while ever-increasing demands were being made on his income. He contrasted the present-day village with that existing only a few years earlier. Previously the village could scarcely support one tavern. It was now required to support "four or five taverns, grocers, cobblers, makers of boza,26 tin smiths, a mayor, a clerk, four teachers, a priest, and several usurers." But, he continued, these people could not be eliminated, for they were the result of the new life coming into existence and they fulfilled real needs. The peasants had to realize that in the new life they would not be able to reduce their expenses, they would have to find some way to increase their incomes. In the past, he wrote, self-centered politicians misled the peasants by convincing them that a political solution was possible— that if they would elect this or that party, all their problems would be solved. But after this torrent of "newspaper tears" what did the 24

N. Atanasov, pp. 55-56; Kozhukharov, Tserkovski, pp. 9-10 N. Atanasov, p. 61. 26 Boza is a beverage made from fermented grain and milk It is much favored by the Turks and Balkan Slavs, and few others, as a breakfast drink. 25

30

BIRTH OF AGRARIAN UNION

peasant receive? "Fighting, murder, prisons—and they, power." The politicians were interested in the peasant only as a voter. We are a ladder that those who weep for us and call us "brother" climb to power. They need this ladder to go up and down and for much else besides. Yes, they have no other work, no other occupation. Their occupation is to fill their pockets when they are in power and to cry to God before us peasants when they are driven from power. There is no doubt that people who have been in such a warm place will cry out when they are thrown into the cold, but what do we farmers have in common with people who have no other work than that? He argued that the peasants should unite in their own organization for the improvement of agriculture and leave politics to the professional politicians: We must unite and help ourselves because however much others may weep for us, they weep with fat jobs and full bellies. Everyone knows that on someone else's back a hundred blows are little. Only the hungry know what it is to be hungry; only the very sick know what a serious illness is. Only we farmers know how a field can be killed by hailstones or how vines can be withered by phylloxera. And only we, who know our situation, can improve it. Tserkovski went on to describe the successes of the Teachers' Union and of other professional organizations that had recently been formed. Finally, he urged the peasants to elect village committees to send delegates to a congress to form a national peasant organization.27 When he was satisfied with the "Appeal" Tserkovski visited the principal villages of the Turnovo District to spread his ideas and to seek support. Ivan Nedelchev, a teacher in the village of Emin, and Pop Petur, a priest in the village of Duskot, were especially enthusiastic and volunteered their help. They decided to call an assembly of peasants of the district in Musina to discuss the question of inviting all the peasants of Bulgaria to unite in a na27 Zemledelska zashtita, i, No. 5 (Oct. 10, 1899), 1-3; J. Bell, "Tsanko Tserkovski's 'Appeal to the Peasants of Bulgaria,' " Southeastern Europe, n, No 2 (1975), 187-93.

31

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tional professional organization, and they wrote "countless letters" to friends and acquaintances in the district, enclosing copies of the "Appeal." 28 The assembly, held on April 28, 1899, was attended by "several hundred" peasants. Tserkovski's plans were enthusiastically approved, and it was voted that a national congress of peasants be held in Pleven, "a central place whose public library contains a large auditorium." Finally, a provisional committee, with Tserkovski as president, was elected to make preparations, and all of its members added their signatures to the "Appeal," which was to be used to advertise the congress.29 Although the "Appeal" was endorsed by the Pleven Group, its members were apprehensive of Tserkovski's Socialist connections and reputation. They feared that the new peasant organization would fall under the influence of the Social Democratic party, and to forestall this they decided to take the initiative in the organization of the congress. Because they would be acting as its hosts, they could expect that their plans for its proceedings would be respected. On November 4, 1899, Zemledelska zashtita proposed that the congress be held on the 28th, 29th, and 30th of December. The time of the winter holidays was selected because the peasants would be free from work in the fields and the teachers would be on vacation. The paper also proposed the following agenda. On the first day the congress would be opened by the "oldest and most worthy peasant in the hall," and a bureau would be elected to administer the congress and prepare a draft charter for consideration by the delegates. Papers would then be read on the general condition of Bulgarian agriculture, agricultural credit, and cooperation. On the second day the congress would continue with papers on agricultural education and livestock, and take up any miscellaneous business. On the third day the Agrarian Union would formally be founded. Those invited to the congress were "representatives from peasant druzhini, all peasants, village teachers, village priests, and agricultural specialists in close contact with 28

32

N. Atanasov, p. 61.

M

Ibid , pp. 62-64.

BIRTH OF AGRARIAN UNION

peasant life."30 The following issue warned that the Union would not become a part of any political party, and that only real peasants, "employing hoe or pen," would be allowed to participate.31 Delegates to the congress began to arrive in Pleven on December 26th and 27th. When the congress began its sessions, approximately eight hundred delegates from forty-five of Bulgaria's seventy-one districts were present, the majority coming from Pleven, Turnovo, and Varna Provinces. The group from Varna, which was the largest single delegation, was led by Pekarev, who had been discharged from the army after the National Assembly elections. In addition to the delegates, a large number of peasant observers, reporters, and representatives of the political parties came to watch and, if possible, influence the congress. In all, about 1,500 people were present, with the observers seated in the balconies above the hall and delegates below.32 The attitude of the Pleven authorities was "strict and correct," and the local population were asked to open their homes to those who had not been able to secure space in the hotels or find other accomodations.33 The largest of the "foreign delegations" to attend the congress was that of the Social Democrats, about 150 persons led by Ianko Sakiazov and Nikola Gabrovski. The congress presented an important opportunity for Sakuzov, who was at this time formulating a program calling for the unity of "all producing strata" around a democratic and reformist platform. The awakening of the peasantry demonstrated by the congress offered good prospects for the "broad" form of socialism to which he was committed.34 The failure of Sakuzov's group to move the congress—and, in a larger sense, the failure of socialism to provide the underpinnings of the Agrarian movement—may be attributed to the fact that to most peasants "socialism" meant simply the abolition of private property. Moreover, the leaders of the congress were either hostile to socialism or desirous of a nonpolitical and purely 30

Zemledelska zashtita, l, No. 11 (Nov. 4, 1899), 1. Ibid., i, No. 12 (Nov. 19, 1899), 1-2. 32 Spissarevski, p. 46; Topalov, "Osnovavane," p. 184. 33 Zemledelska zashtita, I, No. 13-14 (Jan. 1, 1900), 1; Topalov, "Osnovavane," p. 182. 34 Obshto delo, i, No. 1 (Sept. 18, 1900), 2-4; Istoriia na BKP, pp. 80-83. 31

33

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peasant organization. Even Tserkovski, although he was accused of it, had no intention of trying to tie the Agrarian Union to the Social Democratic party. Thus, the Social Democrats shared the fate of the other party delegations to the congress, and the idea of worker-peasant-artisan unity remained dormant until revived in a new form by Stamboliski on the eve of the Balkan Wars. Although the agenda prepared by the Pleven Group focused on the economic problems of agriculture, the task of choosing the "oldest and most worthy peasant in the hall" thrust the question of politics on the congress even before it was properly under way. During the afternoon on the day before the congress, the Pleven Group held a preparatory meeting at the Vinicultural Institute. Their intention was to prevent control of the congress from falling into the hands of Tserkovski.35 At the gathering, Kormanov and Zabunov invited Mikhalaki Georgiev to make the opening speech as honorary "oldest and most worthy peasant." In addition to being a close friend of Kormanov, Georgiev was a well-known populist writer, a deputy in the National Assembly, and a prominent member of the National party.36 Tserkovski, informed of this move, was incensed by the Pleven Group's attempt to control the congress and impose their own people on the assembled peasants. With the help of his friends he decided to prepare an unpleasant welcome for the speaker.37 By nine o'clock on the morning of the 28th, the delegates and observers were gathered in the auditorium of the Pleven public library. On the stage were Tserkovski, and Zabunov and Kormanov of the Pleven Group with Georgiev. Pekarev sat in the front row38 The congress was opened with a prayer, and Kormanov rose to welcome the delegates. After a few words on the importance of the congress, he gave the floor to Georgiev for the opening speech. When Georgiev reached the podium the delegates erupted. Tserkovski's supporters had correctly gauged the mood of the congress. The peasant delegates were not willing to listen to any politician, still less to accept him as the "oldest and most worthy" of their number. For several minutes Georgiev attempted to speak, but could not be heard above the uproar. Atanas Kraev, 35 36 38

34

Pekarev, Spomeni, pp. 193-94, N. Atanasov, p. 65. 37 Pinto, pp. 100-102. N. Atanasov, p. 65. Pekarev,Spomeni, p. 194.

BIRTH OF AGRARIAN UNIO N

anothe r politica l figure, cam e forward to quiet the delegates, but his interventio n only increase d the disturbance. 39 The delegate s then began to chant : "We want the 'Appeal!' " This, of course , was a call for Tserkovski, who cam e forward and manage d to quiet the assembly, thu s gaining an impressive persona l victory. 40 This demonstratio n settled for the duratio n of the congres s the questio n of the Agrarian Union' s relatio n to politics . The outburs t genuinel y reflected the peasants ' deep hatre d and distrust of part y politics . As Dragie v wrote in his accoun t of the congress, the peasants ' shout s were not against Georgie v personally , for he was widely known to be a defende r of the peasants ' interests , but against him as a symbol of the system tha t repeatedl y promise d so muc h yet did so little. 41 This moo d of the congress continue d throughou t its sessions, as speaker after speaker rose to denounc e the politica l system and the part y representative s in the galleries. Unde r these circumstance s it was impossible to advocat e tha t the Unio n itself engage in politics . It was even decide d to chang e the nam e of the village unit of the Unio n from druzhina to druzhba because the former term was associate d with politica l parties. 42 Tserkovski resolved the "oldest and most worth y peasant " questio n by calling on "Uncle " Kostadi n of the village of Karaar naut (Golia m Izvor) , Razgrad Distric t in northeaster n Bulgaria. "Uncle " Kostadi n was certainl y one of the oldest, if not most worthy, peasant s at the congress, and he was acceptabl e to the delegates. He improvised a "good village speech " comparin g the presen t situatio n of the peasantr y to life unde r the Turks. H e stated that taxes had been lower in Turkish times , and tha t for all practica l purpose s the peasant s were still enslaved. In conclusion , he expressed the hop e that the congress would find a way to improve matters . The speech was punctuate d by applaus e and shout s of "That' s right!"4 3 39 Kraev was a membe r of the Liberal party and had been Vice-Presiden t of the Nationa l Assembly He had com e to the congress hopin g to be name d presiden t of the new organization . Topalov , "Osnovavane, " p. 185. 40 Pekarev , Spomem, p. 194; N . Atanasov, pp. 65-66; Topalov , "Osnovavane, " pp. 183-85 41 Spravedhvost, i, No . 34 (Jan . 17, 1900), 1-2. 42 Turlakov , /stoma, p. 52 43 Zemledelska zashnta, ι, No . 13-14 (Jan . 1, 1900), 2; Pekarev , Spomem, p. 194.

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The next order of business, the election of a bureau to administer the congress and draft a charter, immediately revived the contest between Tserkovski and the Pleven Group. Kormanov proposed that the bureau consist of all those who had initiated the congress. This proposal, which would have given the Pleven Group a majority, was voted down, and the congress turned to the election of individuals to the bureau. Tserkovski was nominated and elected unanimously. On his recommendation Pekarev was also elected. Then Ianko Zabunov was nominated and rejected, after which Ivan Nedelchev, another of Tserkovski's associates, was elected. Kormanov then rose and criticized the delegates for not appreciating the work of the Pleven Group. He pointedly warned that without the support of Zemledelska zashtita the Union would forfeit much of its influence. The delegates were moved by his arguments and elected him, Zabunov, and Todor Dinov, also of the Group, to the bureau. Finally, Ivan Voivodov of Tatar Pazardzhik was elected to give representation to the delegates from southern Bulgaria.44 At about eleven o'clock Constantine Malkov, a teacher in the State Practical Agricultural School in the Ruse District, and one of the original members of the Pleven Group, rose to read the first paper on the condition of agriculture in Bulgaria. He blamed the prevailing hard times on three factors: the declining world market price of grain, caused by cheap American, Argentine, and Australian wheat; the inequitable taxation policies of the government; and "Godless usury."45 When the delegates returned from the dinner recess, it became obvious that they were in no mood to listen to reports on technical agricultural subjects. Malkov's report continued to be discussed as delegate after delegate took the floor to provide examples and to denounce the government, the practice of usury, and the political parties, including those party representatives who were at the congress as observers. It was decided to abandon the other papers that had been prepared, and the first day's meeting was adjourned without further progress. 44

Zemledelska zashtita, I, No. 13-14 (Jan. 1, 1900), 1-2. Malkov's paper was published in Zemledelska zashtita, l, Nos. 15, 16, 17 (Jan. 20, Feb. 1, 10, 1900). 45

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On the second day, the congress continued to witness stormy debates and demonstrations. Little order was maintained as one orator after another strove to capture or express the feelings of the delegates. Most successful was Dragiev, who made an "evangelical" speech urging peasant unity and noncooperation with the political parties. He furiously denounced the party representatives in the galleries: You, gentlemen, representatives of the blood-sucking parties, and you, Socialists, who deny the right of private property, you have come as uninvited guests to take over the organization whose representatives have gathered here to judge their own situation and their own great destiny. Before coming here you should fall on your knees as if you were entering a church so that you might not profane this sacred hall where the agrarian people conduct their holy proceedings .46 The issue that dominated the day's meeting was the government's intention to replace the land tax with the tithe.The speakers condemned this measure and demanded that the Union take steps to prevent its application.47 On the morning of the 30th, the bureau presented the congress with a provisional charter that was to remain in force until the next congress one year hence. The draft reflected the antipolitical orientation of most of the delegates and was accepted with almost no debate. According to the charter, the Bulgarian Agrarian Union was to have as its goals "the intellectual and moral betterment of the peasant and the improvement of agriculture in all its branches." The means chosen to achieve these goals were: a. To study all aspects of the peasant's situation. b. To spread knowledge among the peasants by lectures, discussions, meetings, newspapers, journals, etc. c. To work for the establishment of mutual savings banks and the expansion of markets for agricultural products. d. To work for the creation of easily available, cheap credit from the government. e. To promote the creation of cooperative granaries as a means of credit. 46 47

Chastukhin, "Krest'ianskoe dvizhenie," p. 95. N. Atanasov, pp 67-70.

37

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f. To commen t on question s of a legislative characte r that affect the interest s of the peasant s and relate to their property . g. To promot e the amalgamatio n of parcelize d holdings . h. To work for the peaceful resolutio n of dispute s between member s of the Union . i. To promot e the introductio n of professiona l education . j . To urge that cooperativ e labor and capita l be devoted to buildin g greenhouses , populatin g unsettle d areas, providin g farm tools, etc. k. To act for the creatio n of Agrarian druzhbi where ther e is now none. 48 The journa l Zemledelska zashtita was selected to be the Union' s official organ . The basic unit of the Agrarian Unio n was to be the village druzhba. The importan t questio n of who might belon g to the Unio n was left open . It was decide d that "Member s . . . are to be peasants , teachers , priests, and othe r person s tha t the druzhba desires to admit." 4 9 When the charte r had been adopted, the delegates turne d to the electio n of a committe e to administe r the Unio n unti l the next congress. The member s of the Pleven Grou p had campaigne d against the "Socialists" of Tserkovski, and they were fortunat e in that most of the delegate s from Varna Provinc e were forced to board their train before the ballotin g began. They also succeede d in having the vote take place by district s rathe r than by individuals. As a result, Zabunov , Kormanov , and K. Iliev of the Pleven Grou p were elected easily. They were joined by Pekare v and Nikol a Kholevic h of Varna, Tserkovski, Dragiev, and Ivan Voivodov. The committe e thu s include d the leader s of all the precongress agrarian organizations. 50 The Union' s first act was to draft a resolutio n presentin g the demand s of the peasant s to the Presiden t of the Nationa l Assembly: The first Agrarian Congress , gathere d in the town of Pleven on the 28th, 29th, and 30th of Decembe r 1899, realizin g tha t the 48 49 50

38

Zemledelska zashtita, ι, N o 13-14 (Jan . 1, 1900), 3-4. Ibid. , p. 2. Ibid. , p. 4.

BIRTH OF AGRARIAN UNION

economic situation of the Bulgarian peasant is worse than intolerable, and that the principal causes of this situation are: 1) the bad tax system by which not only the income of the peasant is taken, but his capital as well; 2) the absence of easily available, cheap credit that could eliminate the existing scarcity of capital for agricultural production and Godless usury at the same time; 3) the absence of well-ordered, professional education that could raise the productivity of agricultural labor; Resolves: 1) to protest most energetically against the tithe and to seek a lowering of the existing land tax; 2) to seek the creation of cheap and easily available credit; 3) to seek the creation of a well-ordered school system for the spreading of knowledge in all important branches of agricultural economy.51 After the adoption of this resolution, the first congress of the Bulgarian Agrarian Union adjourned. The program of the Union's charter was evolutionary and populist, reflecting the views of the majority of its creators. A situation was developing in the country, however, that they had not foreseen. Twenty-three days after the founding of the Union, the bill establishing the tithe received its final reading in the National Assembly and became law. The elemental storm of peasant outrage this act produced passed beyond the control of the Agrarian leaders, forcing them to reexamine their basic political assumptions, and opening a new chapter in the development of the organized Agrarian movement. Although some protests against the tithe occurred in all parts of the country, they were most numerous and violent in northeastern Bulgaria. In part this was because the Agrarian Union was best organized in this region.52 It was also true that in the south, where agriculture was less developed, many peasants owned land that was not under cultivation, so that they preferred the tithe to a tax 51 52

Ibid., pp. 2-3. Zemledelska zashhta,\, No. 29 (June 14, 1900), 3-4.

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on land.53 Only in Khaskovo Province, which suffered severely from the poor harvest of 1899, did a violent anti-tithe demonstration take place in southern Bulgaria. The anti-tithe strategy of the Agrarian leaders was to mobilize the peasants throughout the country by means of peaceful meetings and demonstrations. An overwhelming expression of peasant disapproval would, they hoped, result in the withdrawal or modification of the law. Typically, in any given village the local Agrarian druzhba would hold a meeting of the villagers to draft a telegram to the prince similar to the one set by the Union congress. The Zemledelska zashtita carried reports of several hundred such meetings in which anywhere from ten to three hundred peasants participated. The Agrarian leaders also sought to impress the government by holding a series of very large demonstrations, the first of which took place in Ruse on February 10, 1900. It was organized by Nikola Kormanov who, along with the students and teachers at the State Model Farm, campaigned all over the province to bring the peasants "to hear orators describe the evil aspects of the law on the tithe, so ruinous for us, and to implore His ROYAL HIGH-

to rescind or modify the law."54 On the appointed day nearly ten thousand peasants gathered at the meeting ground on the outskirts of the city. They came with homemade banners condemning the tithe, and they listened to the music of an improvised peasant band. Some of the peasants wished to march into the city to meet in front of the offices of the provincial authorities, but Kormanov dissuaded them. While condemning the tithe and hailing the unity of the peasantry, he warned them that they should not look upon their newly revealed strength as a license to go beyond the bounds of law and order. They could best hope to overturn the tithe, he maintained, by a massive and peaceful expression of their will. Kormanov was followed on the speaker's stand by Iliia Bratoev, vice-president of the Ruse District agrarian druzhba: Marin Vulkanov president of the village druzhba in Shtruklevo; and Beni Krustev, president of the

NESS THE PRINCE OF AGRICULTURAL BULGARIA

53 54

40

McGregor to Elliot (Plovdiv, March 10/23, 1900), FO 78/5079. Zemledelska zashtita, i, No. 18 (Feb. 20, 1900), 1-2.

BIRT H OF AGRARIA N UNIO N

village druzhba in Pirgos—all "pure peasants. " Thei r speeche s were similar in ton e to Kormanov's , and all were warmly applaude d for they "said what the peasant s themselve s felt in their hearts." 55 After the speeches , the following resolutio n was read , approved , and telegraphe d to the Prince : Sofia, Hi s Royal Highnes s Today , on Februar y 10, we, the peasant s from villages in the Ruse District , gathere d in a district meetin g in the town of Ruse, and in numbe r nearl y ten thousand , having listened to our orator s and having judged that the newly approve d law for the tith e is extremel y ruinou s for us, have decide d to protes t most energeticall y against the law and to implor e most humbl y His Royal Highness , the Princ e of agricultura l Bulgaria, to chang e this law which is so fatal for us. 5 6 After cheerin g this resolution , the peasant s dispersed peacefully. On the same day a similar mass demonstration , also involving nearl y ten thousan d peasants , was held forty miles southeas t in Razgrad. 57 The Liberal authoritie s in Ruse were disturbe d and embarrasse d by the anti-tith e meeting . They decide d to hold a countermeetin g one week later to demonstrat e suppor t for the government . Peasant s in the district were invited to gather in the public square in front of the provincia l governmen t buildin g to hear Liberal orator s explain the work of the Nationa l Assembly. As part of the prepa ration s for this meeting , the authoritie s arreste d Kormanov , spirited him out of the province , and held him incommunicado . The y were not able to keep this actio n secret, however, and the whole district was soon aware tha t a leader in the fight against the tith e 58 had been arrested. Early in the mornin g of the 18th, the public square began to fill with peasants , thei r numbe r estimate d at between fifteen and 59 twent y thousand. At 10:30 a ragged Liberal parade , led by ban56 Ibid. , p. 2. Ibid. Ibid. , pp. 1-2; K. Sharova , "Selskite vulnenii a proti v desiatuk a ν rusensko prez 1900 g.," htoricheshpregled, xm, No . 4 (1957), 5-11. 58 Zemledelska zashtita, I, No . 19 (Marc h 1, 1900), 2; Kormanov , pp. 7-8. 59 Sharova , p. 12; Kormanov , ρ 8. 55

57

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ners and a brass band, marched into the square. The national anthem was played, and the demonstrators raised a cheer for the government. They were answered by a storm of verbal abuse, after which they struck up another march, left the square, and disappeared from the streets. Beni Krustev addressed the angry peasants, persuading them to elect a delegation to call on the Provincial Governor to inquire when they might hear the Liberals' "explanations" and when they might expect Kormanov to be released. The first request was facetious, but the second raised the specter of a serious confrontation. The Governor twice refused to meet with the peasants' delegation. He also telephoned to the district military commander, Colonel Drandarevski, to request that troops be called out. Drandarevski refused and instead went personally to the demonstration. He spoke to the peasants, telling them that their assembly was a peaceful one and that they should be careful to maintain order. Iliia Bratoev read a resolution to be sent to the Prince, condemning the arbitrary arrest of Kormanov and then urged the peasants to return to their homes. Most were unwilling to leave, but Drandarevski spoke again, promising that Kormanov would be released within twenty-four hours. He received a cheer from the peasants, who began to disperse. His coolheadedness almost certainly prevented bloodshed.60 Drandarevski was not able to keep his word. As soon as the government learned of the events of the 18th, Vasil Radoslavov, the Liberal Minister of the Interior, ordered the Ruse authorities to arrest all the leaders of the anti-tithe movement. Prince Ferdinand himself demanded that the authorities "take the strongest measures against those who disturb law and order." Police and military forces in the province were strengthened, and in the following week most of the Agrarian leaders were jailed. Temporarily the situation in the province was quieted.61 The government was better prepared for the next mass demonstration, which was organized by Pekarev and took place in Varna on March 5. The authorities stationed troops on the outskirts of 60 Laforge to Delcasse (Varna, March 1/14, 1900), AMAE, Bulgar'wpolitique inteneure, nouvelle serie, 11,9,Zemledelska zashtita,\, No. 19 (March 1, 1900), 2-3; Sharova, pp. 11-13. 61 Sharova, pp. 13-15.

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the city to keep the peasants from reaching the center. Approximately ten thousand were stopped on the roads, and Pekarev, who was to be the principal speaker, was arrested and jailed in a village near the city. In spite of the troops, about two thousand peasants managed to penetrate to the center of Varna, gathering near the city's principal church, where they were addressed by "several peasants and school teachers," headed by Nikola Kholevich, Pekarev's closest friend.62 Several representatives of the opposition political parties tried to speak to the crowd, but the peasants refused to listen. After a resolution condemning the tithe was read and approved, the meeting was officially closed at noon. Despite the urging of their leaders, the peasants refused to disperse. They walked en masse to police headquarters, where they demanded the release of Pekarev. The police commandant replied that Pekarev was not being held in Varna and that in any case he would soon be released. The peasants then began to parade through the town shouting slogans against the tithe and the government. At some point in their march, the rumor began to circulate that Pekarev actually was in the police headquarters and that he was being beaten. Inflamed by this rumor, the crowd returned and demanded to search the building. The commandant, however, had posted a company of infantry with fixed bayonets under orders to keep the crowd back. Some peasants, shouting that the soldiers would never fire at their fathers, began to throw rocks at the windows of the building. Rocks were also thrown at the troops. The officer in command warned that he would open fire if the crowd did not disperse at once. He was answered with cries of "We are prepared to die!" as several peasants ran toward the door of the headquarters. At the command of their officer the soldiers fired two volleys into the massed peasants. Two were killed immediately, two died within hours, and five others were critically wounded. Many more received less serious wounds. The crowd fled in panic, some vowing to return the next day with arms.63 82

Laforge to Delcasse (Varna, March 6/19, 1900), AMAE, Bulgane: politique interieure, nouvelle serie, n, 13; Zemledelska zashtita, i, No. 20 (March 10, 1900), 2 63 Laforge to Delcasse (Vama, March 6/19, 11/24, 1900), AMAE, Bulgarie: politique mterieure, nouvelle serie, II, pp. 12-22; Zemledelska zashtita, i, No. 20 (March 10, 1900), 2-3.

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BIRTH OF AGRARIAN UNION

During the night the police troops were reinforced by a force of three hundred cavalry and in the morning by a regiment of infantry. Varna and its environs were put under martial law, and forty-five of the most active demonstrators were jailed. Radoslavov himself came to the city and succeeded in imposing a temporary order. Not wishing to antagonize the aroused countryside further, the authorities treated the arrested leaders of the peasants leniently. After two weeks of confinement they were released on parole.64 The government's decision to suppress the anti-tithe demonstrations led inexorably to more serious confrontations. On March 23, the Ruse District Administrator, Aleksiev, accompanied by a few gendarmes, began to visit the surrounding villages to arrest the organizers of the protest meetings. He succeeded in Pirgos, the first village on his list, but when he moved on to Krasen he found a large group of angry peasants waiting for him. The village church bell had called out the villagers, who threatened Aleksiev with violence if he did not leave. He withdrew, but four days later he returned with thirty-two gendarmes. Again the village was prepared for him. A sizable force of peasants, some with rifles, surrounded and disarmed the police. The unfortunate Aleksiev was beaten up and thrown out of the village. During the night messengers from Krasen, including lliia Bratoev, Beni Krustev, and Marin Vulkanov of the Agrarian Union, aroused the surrounding countryside. By morning an estimated five thousand peasants were gathered in Krasen. When government troops neared the village, they were fired on. For two-and-one-half hours the two sides exchanged shots, neither suffering any serious casualties. At last the peasants agreed to give up their arms and return to their homes. During the following week their leaders were arrested.65 The battle of Trustenik, also in the Ruse District, began in a manner similar to that of Krasen. On April 27, the new District Administrator, Marin Petkov (Aleksiev having been dismissed for incompetence), appeared in the village and began to arrest the local leaders of the anti-tithe movement. The village churchbell 64 Laforge to Delcasse (Varna, March 6/19, 11/24, 15/28, 17/30, 1900), AMAE, Bulgane:politique interieure, nouvelle serie, II, 15-29. 65 Sharova, pp. 16-19.

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announced his arrival, and before Petkov could complete his work, the village was surrounded by armed peasants. Petkov telephoned for troops, but the peasants closed in before reinforcements could arrive. After a brief skirmish in which one gendarme was killed, the peasants disarmed the guards and captured Petkov and the village officials. During the night about twenty-five hundred peasants came to Trustenik from surrounding villages. The next morning troops neared the village, and negotiations began. The peasants offered to give up their weapons and release their prisoners in return for a guarantee that their leaders would not be arrested. The commander of the troops would accept nothing less than unconditional surrender, but he lacked enough men to attack the peasants, who were being reinforced all through the day by new arrivals. By dawn of the following day, the balance of forces had so shifted that the peasants decided to challenge the troops by marching to Ruse. When they approached the troops the commander gave the order to open fire. The soldiers, however, refused to shoot into the peasants and fired two volleys into the air. The commander himself drew his revolver and fired at the peasants, who rushed at him and made him prisoner. Some of the soldiers allowed their weapons to be taken and the rest retreated. At this point a much larger force from the Turnovo garrison arrived and negotiations began again. By the next day about one thousand soldiers and gendarmes surrounded the peasants, who at last agreed to disperse. The five districts in the region were placed under martial law, and over five hundred peasants were arrested and confined in pens built especially for this purpose.66 The bloodiest confrontation between peasants and government forces was the battle of Shabla-Durankulak. On May 22, the District Administrator of Dobrich began to tour the district with a company of gendarmes to make a preliminary estimate of the amount to be collected by the tithe. In Durankulak he was met by a hostile crowd, led by the village mayor, who demanded that he leave. He attempted to arrest the mayor, but was forced by the peasants to leave empty handed. On June 1, the District Administrator, escorted by a squadron 66

Laforge to Delcasse (Sofia, April 27/May 10, June 4/17, AMAE, Bulgarie: politique mterieure, nouvelle serie, n, 33, 36-37; Zemledelska zashtita, I, No. 25 (May 1, 1900), 1-2; Sharova, pp. 22-35.

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of cavalry and several police detachments , again set out from Dobrich . Anticipatin g his return , peasant s from the whole region had com e to Durankula k and nearb y Shabla to defend the villages. When the cavalry charged the peasan t lines, it was met by a volley that killed two officers and several soldiers. The enraged troop s execute d a second charge tha t broke the peasan t lines. Durin g the next five hour s they raged out of control , brutall y pursuing , shoot ing, and beatin g the peasants , who were trying to flee from the area. Ninet y peasant s were killed, over four hundre d were wounded , and eight hundre d more , includin g Pekarev , fled across the Danub e to escape arrest. The entir e region was placed unde r martia l law, and hundred s of peasant s were arrested. 67 The violent resistanc e to the tith e posed serious problem s for the Agrarian Unio n and divided its leadership . On the local level, man y peasant s and teacher s viewed the Unio n simply as a militan t anti-tith e organization . They supporte d and participate d in the resistance to the authorities. 68 On the othe r hand , man y local druzhbi were infiltrate d or taken over by member s of various oppositio n partie s who were now joinin g the anti-tith e struggle in orde r to toppl e the Liberal regime. A numbe r of druzhbi becam e no mor e than auxiliaries of existing village politica l organization s and lost contac t with the Agrarian leadership. 69 The attitud e of the Union' s Centra l Committe e toward these development s was ambivalent . In general its member s oppose d violent resistanc e to the tithe , althoug h the Zemledelska zashtita cam e close to endorsin g it after the events at Trustenik . The leadership also wavered between a policy of independen t actio n and an allianc e with anti-tith e oppositio n parties . Nikol a Kormano v favored such an alliance , but his colleague s eithe r oppose d it or were undecided . Only the call for continuin g peacefu l demonstra tion s received their unanimou s support , but even here they despairingly admitte d tha t these seemed to have no effect on the government. 70 67 Pisson to Delcass e (Varna, Jun e 6/19 , 1900), AMAE, Bulgane; politique interieure, nouvelle serie, II , 39-42; lu. Pekarev , Shabla-Durankulak: simvol na pobednua borchesh dukh na zdruzhenite zemedeltsi ν Bulgariia (Dobrich , 1946), pp. 55-56. 68 69 Sharova , p. 41. Turlakov , Istonia, pp. 50-55. 70 Zemledelska zashtita, I, No . 29 (Jun e 14, 1900), 1-2.

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BIRTH OF AGRARIAN UNION

By the fall, when preparations for the second congress of the Union were under way, three positions had crystallized among the members of the Central Committee. The erstwhile rivals Tserkovski and Zabunov supported the original ideals of the Union charter. They wanted the Union to concentrate its efforts in the areas of education and economic life. Kormanov wanted the Union to support friendly opposition parties. Dragiev advocated that the Union enter politics as an independent party. Pekarev, who supported Dragiev, was still in exile in Rumania. The other members of the committee were undecided. The second Agrarian congress was scheduled to begin on October 29, 1900, in Pleven. Only days before this date, the city authorities banned the meeting, ostensibly because of an outbreak of scarlet fever. Peasant delegates who still tried to come were removed from their trains and sent home. The Union's Central Committee protested and published the directive of the medical authorities that only gatherings of children be prohibited. It decided to retaliate by rescheduling the congress for December 3-5 in Sofia, the heart of the government camp.71 The congress took place without any interference, for on November 27 the Radoslavov government was forced to resign because of financial scandals involving most of the ministers. A moderate caretaker government took its place. Four-hundred-and-ninety delegates assembled in the Hotel Odessa for the congress, which was under the chairmanship of Zabunov.72 The first order of business was the adoption of a Union program, the draft of which was presented by Zabunov, Kormanov, and A. Gechev of Pleven. Its principal demands were for improved rural schools, a larger number of experimental farms, cheap and accessible credit, state-supported medical assistance, strict adherence to the constitution by government officials, and, of course, the elimination of the tithe and its replacement by a progressive income tax.73 The congress also made changes in the Union's administrative 71

Zemledelska zashtita, n, Nos. 8, 9 (Nov. 3, 15, 1900). D. Dimitrov, "Otvarianeto na zemedelski kongres," Novo vreme, iv, No. 11-12(1900), 1296-98. 73 S. S. Bobchev, "Zemledelcheskiiat kongres i iskaniiata mu po pravosudnoto zakonodatelstvo," luridicheskipregled, ix, No. 2 (1901), 74-75. 72

47

BIRT H O F AGRARIA N UNIO N

structure . The Centra l Committe e was replace d by a Governin g Counci l of sixteen, electe d by the congress. The Counci l then chose from its own rank s a president , vice-president , and secretary-treasurer , who would form a standin g committe e to handl e the Union' s day-to-da y affairs and to edit the Zemledelska zashtita. The men electe d to these posts after the congress were Zabunov , Kormanov , and K. Iliev, all from Pleven. 74 Election s for a new Nationa l Assembly were less than two month s away, and it was imperativ e that the congress decid e whethe r and how to participat e in them . The debat e began with a motio n to amen d the Union' s charte r to includ e "the politica l developmen t of the peasantry " amon g its goals. This was oppose d by those who wished to keep the Unio n out of politic s altogethe r and by those who supporte d any of the various oppositio n parties. 75 Ivan Voivodov mad e the principa l speech against the amendment . H e spoke "wisely and withou t stoopin g to demagoguery, " but the shout s of the delegates prevente d his words from reachin g the observers in the balconies , so tha t his argument s went unrecorded. 76 Dragie v defende d the motion . He tried to make the delegates recogniz e a distinctio n between "partisanship, " the struggle for power in the nam e of self-interest , and "politics, " the struggle for a worthy cause. He agreed that the Unio n should never engage in partisanship , but insisted tha t if it failed to turn to politic s it would abando n the struggle for justice and betra y those who died at Varna and Shabla-Durankulak. 77 Although Dragiev' s speech carrie d the motio n by a small majority , Zabuno v threatene d to resign unless the congress recon sidered. Storm y debat e continued . Representative s of the politica l partie s sought the floor, but were refused. A group of Sakuzov' s followers passed out leaflets calling for a general workerpeasant-artisa n alliance , but could make no headwa y against the 78 "general hostilit y to socialism." Several mor e votes were taken , Turlakov./iiorna , p. 54. D . Dragiev, Zemledelski smuz ι polinkata (Plovdiv, 1901), pp. 3-4. 76 D . Dimitrov , "Zadachit e na Bulgarskiia zemledelsk i siiiuz," SB1D, v, No . 8 (1901),512 . 77 Dragiev, Polnikata, pp. 8-21. 78 Obshto delo, I, No . 1 (Dec . 15, 1900), pp. 103-105. 74

75

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with the motion narrowly defeated each time. As a compromise, Article Two of the charter was finally amended to read: "The Bulgarian Agrarian Union has as its goal the improvement of agriculture and its branches, the moral and material improvement of the peasant, and the general defense of the peasants' interest in all places and at all times." It was soon obvious that the second congress had not settled the question of the Union's relationship to politics. The elections for the XI National Assembly were to take place on January 28, 1901. In the weeks before this date candidates appeared in several districts who called themselves "Agrarians" although they had little or no connection with the Union. Moreover, in many villages, druzhbi endorsed and began to campaign for candidates who were in fact members of the various opposition parties.79 This not only galled the members of the Union's Governing Council, it threatened their leadership and the unity of the entire Agrarian movement. Responding to the new situation, the Council resolved to overrule the decision of the second congress. On January 17, Zemledelska zashtita published an "Appeal to the Peasants of Bulgaria," explaining the Union's change of course. It stated that in Bulgaria's twenty-two years of independence the situation of the peasantry had gone from bad to worse owing to the shortsightedness of the country's political leadership. Politicians and bureaucrats lived at the people's expense while doing nothing to further the development of the country. Moreover, they would do nothing to meet the demands of the peasant "if we remain quiet." The Agrarian Union did not seek to control the state or to make its own leaders ministers, the "Appeal" continued, but it was absolutely necessary that the peasants have someone to state their case in the National Assembly. The statement concluded by endorsing twenty-four candidates, all from northeastern Bulgaria, including Zabunov, Kormanov, Tserkovski, Pekarev, and Dragiev of the Union's Governing Council. Several of the candidates, however, were associated with other parties.80 The caretaker government that succeeded the Liberal regime 79 80

Zemledelska zashtita, m, No. 6 (Oct. 24, 1901), 1. Zemledelska zashtita, n, No. 14 (Jan. 17, 1901), 1-2.

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mad e no attemp t to influenc e the outcom e of the elections , so tha t for the first time in man y years voting took place free from significan t official intervention . When the election s were over, twenty-thre e candidate s claimin g ties with the Union , includin g fifteen who had received the Unio n endorsement , were elected . Zabunov , Kormanov , and Tserkovski were amon g them. 81 Owing to the absenc e of the government' s usual pressure on the electorate , no part y had been able to win a majority . Durin g the struggles and intrigue s tha t accompanie d Petk o Karavelov' s formatio n of a coalitio n government , all but seven of the "Agrarian" representative s joined othe r parties . In the XI Nationa l Assembly, the Democrat s and their allies repeale d the tithe , a step to which they had alread y been committed , but they paid no attentio n to any of the othe r Agrarian demands. 82 Th e betrayal of the Unio n by sixteen of the twenty-thre e "Agrarian" deputie s chagrine d most of the Union' s leader s and convince d them that , if the Unio n was to participat e in politic s at all, it had to do so wholeheartedly . Zabunov , who heade d the Agrarian parliamentar y group, abandone d his origina l hostilit y to politic s and joined Dragie v in suppor t of a politica l role for the Union. 83 In their preparation s for the thir d congress Zabuno v and Dragie v labored to diminis h the influenc e of othe r partie s on the Union . The y prevailed upon the Governin g Counci l to adop t a rule permittin g only those druzhbi tha t paid dues and maintaine d regular ties with the Unio n leadershi p to send voting delegates. To forestall a practic e tha t had allowed numerou s politica l partisan s to infiltrat e the secon d congress, it was also stipulate d tha t no delegate who cam e from a druzhba formed within thre e month s of the congress would be admitted. 84 The thir d Unio n congress opene d in the hall of the Slavianska beseda Hote l in Sofia on Octobe r 12, 1901, in a spirit of dissenThre e Unio n candidate s were electe d in both the Razgrad and Svishtov Districts; two each in the Lovech , Popovo , Nikopol , Ruse, Turnovo , and Preslav Districts; and one each in the Pleven , Provadiia , Balbunar , Panagiurishte , and Shumen Districts . Zemledelska zashtita, n, No . 15 (Feb . 3, 1901), 2. 82 Zemledelska zashtita, HI , No . 6 (Oct . 24, 1901), 1; Tur\ako\, Istorua, ρ 55. 83 Zemledelska zashtita, in, No . 8 (No v 7, 1901), 1. 84 Zemledelska zashtita, m, No . 1 (Sept . 6, 1901), 1. 81

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sion. Tsanko Tserkovski refused to read his scheduled report on the National Assembly. Instead he contended that the Union was not, and should not become, permanently involved in politics. Its participation in the XI National Assembly elections was a measure brought about only by exceptional circumstances. Now that the tithe was repealed, he argued, the Union should forget about the National Assembly and politics altogether.85 Tserkovski was answered by Zabunov who spoke in both sorrow and anger of the deputies who had been elected with peasant support, but who then sold themselves to the political parties. He criticized Iurdan Pekarev, who upon his return from Rumania deserted the Union to accept a government post, and the deputies Nikola Kormanov, Geno Nedialkov, and Angel Angelov, who were among the deputies that supported other parties, and who were present at the congress. These three replied furiously, cursing Zabunov in "vulgar language that is associated with people of quite a different sort." In the ensuing uproar, Dragiev made a "brilliant" speech defending Zabunov and a political role for the Union. He and Zabunov carried the majority, and they moved to turn the Union into an overtly political organization. The name of the Union was changed to Bulgarian Agrarian National Union (BANU),86 and its goals were to be the "improvement of agriculture and its branches, and the moral, political, and material improvement of the peasant and of the whole people." The charter's section on means was amended to include "participation in all local, provincial, and national elections." A new Governing Council was elected, and it proceeded to name Zabunov Union President, Dragiev Vice-President, and Ivan Nikolov of Pleven Secretary-Treasurer.87 85

Zemledelska zashtita, in, No. 6 (Oct 24, 1901), 1-2 I have preferred to translate "naroden" in "Bulgarski zemledelski naroden suiuz" as "national" rather than "popular," although the latter is occasionally used and is justifiable on linguistic grounds, because it gives a more accurate picture of what the Union actually became: a nationwide organization of peasants. Artisans and industrial workers were always considered by the Agrarian leaders to be "of the people," but they were encouraged to join their own organizations rather than the BANU. 87 Zemledelska zashtita, m, No. 6 (Oct. 24, 1901), 1-2. 86

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BIRT H O F AGRARIA N UNIO N

After the third congress Tserkovski left the Unio n to carry on 88 his "educational-economic " program independently. Kormano v and several othe r prominen t Unio n activists also deserte d to various parties , and their departur e was accompanie d by those of lesser figures at all levels of the Union' s structure. 89 The Unio n was now a politica l organization , but the transformatio n was accomplishe d only at the cost of the defectio n of a major portio n of its supporters . Although the Agrarian movemen t had mad e considerabl e strides since the first local attempt s to organiz e the peasantry , its leader s had not built its intellectua l foundation . Group s seeking politica l power almost always have a doctrine , which Barringto n Moor e has called their "charte r myth, " that "provides an explanatio n of what is wrong with the curren t state of affairs and what should be don e to correc t that state." 9 0 Most of the remainin g Agrarian leaders agreed that the wretche d conditio n of the peasantr y was due primaril y to the incompetenc e and venality of the country' s politica l leaders and that only "peasan t organization " could overcom e this. But they had no explanatio n for the low quality of Bulgaria's politica l leadershi p and were divided on the form their own activity should take. This had not been a hindranc e durin g the struggle against the tithe , when Agrarian leaders easily aroused the peasant s and directe d them into politica l action . But beyond demandin g the resignatio n of the governmen t and the relief of the most severe hardship s of rural life, they put forward no consisten t alternative s to the existing political , social, and economi c structur e of the country . Even the victory of the advocate s of politica l actio n at the third congress did not result in the formulation of a specifically Agrarian critiqu e of society or in a specifically Agrarian program for the future . No w that the Unio n was in politics , what were its candidate s to promise ? Ther e were the longstandin g grievances of high taxes and lack of credit , but the Karavelo v and Dan e ν governments , which followed the Ivanchov-Radoslavo v regime, alleviated these problems , al89 90

10.

52

8S Turlakov , Istorna, pp. 58-59. Kozhukharov , Tserkovski, p. 16. B. Moore , Political Power and Social Theory (Cambridge , Mass., 1958), ρ

BIRT H OF AGRARIA N UNIO N

thoug h they did not eliminat e them entirely. 91 Moreover , improved harvests and the temporar y retur n of prosperit y reduce d the sense of emergenc y that had prevailed durin g the tith e struggle. 92 The lack of a "charte r myth " that could retain the commitmen t of the BANU' s erstwhile supporter s led to declinin g membership , inabilit y to raise funds, and defeat at the polls. In the Februar y 1902 election s for the XII Nationa l Assembly, the Union' s Governin g Counci l was able to sponso r only a single speaking tour by Zabunov . The numbe r of successful candidate s endorse d by the Unio n fell from twenty-thre e to fourteen , and the majorit y of these, onc e elected , again jumpe d to othe r parties. 93 In the election s for the XIII Nationa l Assembly, held in Octobe r 1903, the governmen t of Genera l Rach o Petro v engaged in extensive intimidatio n of the electorat e and oppositio n candidates . Moreover , the chroni c disease of the Union , the infiltratio n of its druzhbi by supporter s of the various parties , reappeare d to bear witness to its lack of firm organizationa l ties and discipline d membership . No t a single Agrarian candidat e was returne d to the Nationa l Assembly.94 At the IV congress of the Union , held in Shume n on Octobe r 5-8 , 1902, Dragie v reporte d that , of the mor e than four hundre d druzhbi create d durin g the tith e struggle, only about forty remaine d active. 95 Zabunov , in poor healt h and faced with overwhelmin g persona l financial problems , resigned as presiden t of the Union , and his place was taken by Dragiev, the last of the original Agrarian leaders still active. Dragiev' s dedicatio n was unquestione d and on occasio n he could provide inspirin g orations , but he lacked complet e self-confidenc e and was overly concerne d 91 A survey of the Agrarian parliamentar y delegation' s stand s in the XI and XII Assemblies may be found in F. Chary , "The Bulgarian Agrarian Popula r Union' s Parliamentar y Program , 1902-15, " paper presente d at the 1971 Congres s of the American Historica l Association , Chicago , 111., pp. 5-8. 92 Kiranov.p p 27-30. 93 Zemledelskazashnta, in, Nos . 16,20(Jan . 16,Feb.27 , 1902); Turlakov , pp 58-59. 94 Zemledelsko zname, i, Nos . 41, 42 (Oct 30, Nov . 11, 1903). 95 D . Dragiev, Porazhdeme, tsel ι razvoi na Zemledelchesktta sitiuz ν Bitlgarua (Star a Zagora , 1902), p. 21.

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with his own prestige. Nor was he an original thinker. His Must the Peasants Pay the Sheep and Goat Tax?, published at the end of 1902, attempted to duplicate the success of his tract against the tithe but had no comparable impact. When he assumed the presidency of the Union, he insisted that its headquarters be moved from centrally located Pleven to his native Stara Zagora in the southern foothills of the Balkan range. The Zemledelska zashtita was combined with his own Spravedlivost to become Zemledelsko zname (Agrarian Banner), the new official organ. Dragiev seemed to be leading the Union into a long period of retrenchment.96 The BANU reached its nadir at its fifth congress in Stara Zagora a year later. In his address to the few delegates who attended, Dragiev spoke of the almost total disappearance of the Union's druzhbi, and he described the desperate financial situation that led to the irregular appearance of the Union's newspaper. His speech seemed an obituary for the organized Agrarian movement. The BANU did not perish. It was rescued by Alexander Stamboliski, who was appointed to the editorial board of Zemledelsko zname at the fifth congress. The twenty-four-year-old Stamboliski, whose forceful personality and prolific pen made him the effective editor of Zemledelsko zname (he became editor in fact in 1906), used its pages to introduce his new concepts of Agrarianism. He provided the BANU with a charter myth that both appealed to the peasant masses and strengthened the dedication of its core members. His ideas soon permeated the Union and led to the rebuilding of its organization and to the creation of a comprehensive program of political, social, and economic reform. As early as 1908 one of the BANU's political opponents, Todor Vlaikov of the Radical Democratic party, observed that Stamboliski's ideological contribution converted the Agrarian Union from an almost moribund organization into a crusading force commanding the allegiance of a large and growing segment of the peasantry.97 96 97

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Zemledelsko zname, I, No. 7 (Dec. 8, 1902), 3. Vlaikov, pp. 716-22.

C H A P T E R

II I

Alexander Stambolisk i and the Theor y and Practic e of Agrarianism

Happ y New Year to all! And may God bring: To peasant s not in the Unio n Brains for their heads, Druzhbi for their villages. —Tsanko Tserkovski1 TH E village of Slavovitsa is locate d about twent y miles northwes t of the marke t town of Pazardzhik . It is the cente r of a fertile region where the grain and grape econom y of the nort h merges with the tobacc o cultur e of the south . Alexander Stoimeno v Stam boliski was born ther e on Marc h 1, 1879, in a hut on a hill overlookin g the village square. Because the Turnov o Constitutio n creatin g the new state was ratified just fifteen days before his birth , he may be considere d a child of the new Bulgaria. Stoime n Stambolisk i was not a rich peasant , althoug h his ten hectare s of land insured an adequat e living. Hi s house , preserved toda y as a nationa l monument , had a dirt floor and thre e rooms : one where the family lived and slept, one filled by a loom , and a kitchen . He was not popula r in the village because of a reputatio n for collaboratio n with the Turkish authoritie s before the Liberation . The family nam e "Stamboliski " was given to him because he made several trips to the Turkish capital . His wife died soon after giving birth to Alexander, and he marrie d a widow with two childre n of her own. She was not a loving stepmother , and the boy grew up with little warmth or sympathy. 2 Although Alexander won the praise of his teacher s in the vilFro m a NewYear'spoem , Zemledelsko zname, vi, No . 6 (Dec . 18, 1907), 5. K. Kozhukharov , Aleksandur Stamboliski• bwgrafichen ocherk (Sofia, 1955), ρ 3; Ν . Petkov , Aleksandur Stamboliski: lichnost i idei (Sofia, 1946), p. 9. 1

2

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lage school , his parent s oppose d his furthe r education , preferrin g that he work on the land . Havin g no desire to remai n at home , however, Alexander set out on his own to the large village of Ikhtiman , where he entere d the secondar y school . He complete d the course successfully and won admission to the agricultura l schoo l at Sadovo . There , he was expelled for takin g part in a studen t demonstratio n and moved to the Stat e Vinicultura l Institut e in Pleven , where he met lanko Zabunov . Zabunov' s lecture s on the need for peasan t organizatio n fascinate d him , and Zabuno v was quick to recogniz e Stamboliski' s talents . Probabl y the older man felt a bond of sympath y for the young runawa y whose life resembled his own. A close friendshi p grew up between the two, and Zabuno v mad e him an editoria l assistant on the journa l Oralo. They remaine d in correspondenc e after Stambolisk i left the institute in 1898 to becom e a teache r in Vetren near his native Slavovitsa. 3 Stambolisk i was a delegate to the foundin g congress of the Agrarian Unio n but played no special role because of his youth . No r was he active in the struggle against the tithe , which did not reach significant proportion s in his region . He did show concer n at that time that the peasantr y might be misled by the promises of the politica l parties . In his first article in Zemledelska zashtita, "Irrationa l Partisanshi p Is Fata l to the Peasant, " he wrote tha t the only goal of politica l partie s was power, and that the peasantr y had nothin g to gain from participatin g in party struggles. "The peasants, " he wrote, "form the agrarian estate whose member s have commo n dutie s toward society and also commo n interests . The y must see that these [interests ] are not trample d upon by othe r 4 estates, and if this occur s they must take appropriat e measures." Hi s elaboratio n of these ideas over the next two decade s provided the basis for the Agrarian ideology and program . Shortl y after his first article appeared , Stambolisk i wrote a second , mor e extensive one , "Voice from the Peasan t Milieu, " dealing in general term s with Bulgaria's economi c development . 3 Kozhukharov , Stamboliski, p. 9; N . Petkov , p. 9; P. Dumanov , ed., Galerua ubili ditrzhavm miizhe: Stamboliski: Lichnost, delo, epokha (Pleven , 1929), pp. 40-41; B. Peshev, Aleksanditr Stamboliski (Sofia, 1946), ρ 5. 4 Zemledelska zashtita, l. No . 25 (Ma y 1, 1900), 3.

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Written in the form of a dialogue between the autho r and "Bai Koliu, " an elderly peasant , it criticize d the government' s concer n with the outwar d show rathe r than the substanc e of progress. Bai Koliu argued tha t the obsession of the country' s leaders with diplomac y and the aping of foreign custom s had create d large civil and militar y bureaucracie s that served only to impoverish the peasantry . Stambolisk i maintaine d tha t the governmen t should concentrat e on economi c development , for "without economi c progress, no othe r advance s are possible." 5 In the summe r of 1900 Stambolisk i marrie d Milen a Daskalova , who was also a teache r in Vetren. He r dowry enable d him to travel to Halle , where he enrolle d in the faculty of agronom y in Septembe r 1901. While at the university most of his time was devoted to the study of German , which he never learne d properly , and to readin g in philosoph y and politics . He was plannin g to transfer to Munich , but an inadequat e diet combine d with an unheate d room caused him to com e down with tuberculosis , and in Februar y 1902, he returne d to Bulgaria. Togethe r with Milen a he moved to a small village in the Rhodop e Mountains . In this isolated spot, following a traditiona l peasan t remedy , he lived on cheese , yoghurt , and whey, exercised, and practice d deep breath ing. The treatmen t was successful, and by fall he had completel y recovered . Photograph s taken soon afterward show that it was at this time that he began to develop the barrel chest that becam e his 6 trademar k in later years. Before leaving for Germany , Stambolisk i had begun a long treatis e on aspect s of Bulgaria's economi c development . He completed it in Hall e and sent it to Zabunov , who publishe d it as a 7 series of article s in Zemledelska zashtita. The series dealt with two groups of functionaries—tow n and village ofiicials and the clergy—and their role in promotin g or hinderin g economi c progZemledelska zashtita, n, Nos . 1, 2, 3, 6, 7 (Sept. 6, 13, 24, Oct. 12, 19, 1900) 6 Kozhukharov , Stamboliski, pp. 4-5; Dumanov , p. 42; Genovski , I ν smitrtta sa zhivi, ρ 10; Asen Stamboliski , Aleksandur Stamboliski. snimki iz edin zhivot ot negovua sin (Sofia, 1934), pp. 14-18 7 "Sluzhbashit e kato spomoshtmts i za ekonomichesk i napreduk, " Zemledelska zashtita, m, No s 1, 3, 5, 9, 11, 12, 21, 24, 25 (Sept . 6, 20, Oct 6, No v 14,28, Dec 5, 1901, Marc h 20, May 1, July 13, 1902) 5

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ress. Stamboliski accused the officials of failing to use their authority to improve conditions in local transportation, education, and public health. Unfortunately, he continued, these positions were not filled by honest and able men owing to "the ignorance of the people and the unprincipledness of their leaders." He expressed the hope that the progress of the Agrarian Union would soon lead to the election of its members to these posts.8 Stamboliski's attitude toward the clergy reflected the influence of Renan, whose works he was reading at the time.9 Although the clergy had been a progressive force during the national awakening, he wrote, it was now holding the country back. In the village, the chief sin of the priest was that he undermined the authority of the teacher and so played into the hands of the usurers and politicians who kept the village in economic and political bondage. The clergy's task, he concluded, was to work for an earthly as well as heavenly paradise. "It is also a duty of these functionaries, who are a burden on the people, to abandon the useless way of life they have led up to now, and to set out on the course that modern life demands."10 As a statement of Agrarian doctrine, this article was quite unsophisticated. Stamboliski called for the individual to change his way of life without reference to the forces that shaped it. He assumed that if officials and priests could be shown how to improve the economy, they would automatically act to do so. Moreover, he failed to make clear what was entailed in "the course that modern life demands." By analogy to the development of socialist doctrines, the ideas he expressed represented "Utopian" rather than "scientific" Agrarianism. But the scientific phase was soon to come. When Stamboliski took up his duties as editorial assistant on the Zemledelsko zname in 1903, he was concerned with the declining fortunes of the BANU, the defection of those who objected to its political activity, and the charge that it was becoming simply one more political party. He advanced the idea that the 8 9

25.

Zemledelska zashtita, in, No. 1 (Sept. 6, 1901), 2. M. Genovski, Aleksandiir Stamboliski: zhivot, idei, borbi (Sofia, 1947), p.

10

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Zemledelska zashtita, m, No. 25 (July 13, 1902), 3.

ALEXANDER STAMBOLISKI

Agrarian Union was a new social-political form, an "estatist organization," whose political activity differed qualitatively from that of the established political parties. He first stated this theory in an article in Zemledelsko zname in the spring of 1904,11 and then developed it during 1905 in a series of eighteen articles commemorating the founding of the International Institute for Agriculture in Rome.12 In 1909, after deepening and refining his ideas and testing them in the crucible of village organization, he published Political Parties or Estatist Organizations? which became the systematic statement of the new charter myth of the Agrarian movement. Stamboliski was "scientific" in the same sense that Marx was. He was a materialist and based his ideas on the theories about man and his society that were current in the natural and social sciences. Although his sources cannot be determined with full accuracy, it can be said that in a general sense he was a Darwinist, believing that conflict, competition, and struggle were natural and led to the superseding of lower forms by higher ones.13 His concept of human progression through the stages of "savagery, barbarism, and civilization," each with its characteristic mode of production, was taken from the American anthropologist Louis Henry Morgan, whose Ancient Society was published in Bulgarian translation in 1897.14 The idea that instincts underlie human behavior and that private property has a basis in instinct can be found in William James's Principles of Psychology as well as in the fourth chapter of Darwin's Descent of Man, which were published in Bulgarian in 1902 and 1896, respectively.15 11 "Politiko-obshtestvenite osnovi na zemledelskite organizatsii," Zemledelsko zname, n, No. 12 (March 22, 1904), 3. 12 "Nachaloto na edm mezhdunaroden zemledelski suiuz," Zemledelsko zname, m, Nos. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 34, 35, 38 (March 15-Sept. 16, 1905). 13 N. Petkov, pp. 21-26, 119-21 14 A. Teodorov-Balan, Bulgarski knigopis za sto godmi, 1806-1905 (Sofia, 1909), p. 670. 15 Ibid., pp. 268, 284. In his analysis of the origins of modern society Stamboliski frequently referred to the works of George Grote, Barthold Neibuhr, Ernest Renan, Fustel de Coulanges, and Theodore Mommsen Morgan had also quoted

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The most influential element in Stamboliski's concept of Agrarianism—the assertion that the conditions of modern life demanded the supplanting of political parties by corporative or "estatist" organizations that would group the major occupational formations in the country in a system of functional representation—had been implicit in the Agrarian movement from its beginning. Tsanko Tserkovski in his "Appeal" had spoken of the inability of the political parties to deal with contemporary economic problems and had urged the creation of an independent peasant organization on the order of the Teachers Union. At the Agrarian Union's second congress, Dragiev, with his distinction between "partisanship" and "politics," had called for a new kind of political activity. On the eve of the elections for the XI National Assembly in 1901 theZemledelska zashtita had proclaimed that the Union was "conducting an estatist struggle (suslovna borba)" in the interests of the peasantry, which was not represented by the political parties.18 What was new in Stamboliski's treatment of this idea was his exploration of ramifications that had not been considered previously and his placement of it in a broad theory of historical development. He sought to demonstrate that political parties had become retrogressive not because of particular mistakes or the influence of a few bad leaders, but because their very nature made them unfit to cope with the process of modernization and so drove them into opposition to progress. He went on to argue that corporative, estatist organizations were better suited to the conditions of modern life and that their supplanting of political parties was the next inevitable step in the evolution of society. Armed with Stamboliski's ideology, Agrarians, like the socialists, could claim that they were on the side of history. Stamboliski began his statement of Agrarian doctrine by contheir works extensively, and it is likely that Stamboliski acquired his knowledge of them from Ancient Society Stamboliski also quoted numerous sources, including Mark Twain, for examples of political corruption. These, however, were used solely for illustration and did not shape his analysis of the causes of the degeneration of political parties. Stamboliski also showed familiarity with the ideas of Marx, Eduard Bernstein, Eduard David, and Bulgaria's own socialists. 16 Zemledelska zashtita, n, No. 14 (Jan. 17, 1901), 1.

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trasting the importance of agriculture, which supplied humanity's basic needs, with the wretched condition of the peasantry. He maintained that the causes of this discrepancy were political and that their roots extended into prehistoric times. In the earliest stage of humanity's development, corresponding to the stage of "savagery" in Morgan's Ancient Society, mankind lived by hunting and gathering. There was very little social or political differentiation, although by the close of the era the division of labor between man and woman appeared in a rudimentary form. Human groups were democratic and equalitarian.17 The domestication of plants and animals ushered in a new stage of history. This was Morgan's "barbarism," based on sedentary agriculture, which gave rise to private property and increasing social differentiation. Previously man's struggle with the environment had totally determined his behavior, outlook, and institutions. Now "politics," the struggle between man and man, predominated. At that time the economy, which was still in its infancy in the newly formed society [based on agriculture], ceased to be the actual determiner of events and yielded this place to the political struggle in which over the course of time religion played an important role. To be sure, material need—the need to fill one's stomach—remained the strongest factor in human nature; when viewed uncritically it appears that the economy continued to shape the broad social condition of humanity. But its power was like that of a strictly limited monarch, who "reigns, but does not rule." 18 Stamboliski believed that material needs had to be satisfied, but as the productive capacity of society increased these could be satisfied in various ways or through various forms of social organization, the number of alternatives growing directly with the 17 A Stamboliski, Politicheskiparln ill siislovm orgamzatsu? (Sofia, 1945), p. 10. The original (1909) edition of Stambohski's book is all but impossible to find today. Even the National Library in Sofia does not possess a copy The edition of 1945, with an introduction by Nikola Petkov, is an exact reproduction of the original text. 18 Zemledehko zname, in, No. 14 (March 15, 1905), \\Partii, p. 38

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increase in the wealth of society. The form of political and social organization prevailing at any given time, whether based on slavery, serfdom, or free landholding, was determined not by the economy but by the group in control of the instruments of political power. It was the "warrior caste," he wrote, that used its military power to extend its control over the rest of the population and to secure the principal sources of wealth for itself. This "usurpation" was institutionalized in the military-bureaucratic governments that evolved over time into absolutist states. Society came to consist of a secular and religious aristocracy supported by taxes, the modern form of military tribute, exacted from the common people.19 Stamboliski believed that a turning point in history was reached when the ideas of civil and political rights, which had grown out of the conflicts between monarch and aristocracy and church and state, began to spread to the "new social groups" created by the scientific and economic progress of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The new social groups adopted these ideas and turned them against the traditional social order. Gradually all the people were drawn into the struggle to replace monarchic absolutism with government that would guarantee civil and political rights. This process occurred first in England, the most advanced country in Europe, and soon spread to France, where the old regime was more firmly entrenched. The French Revolution sounded the death knell of absolutism everywhere; under its influence revolutionary movements struck blows for national independence and a new order of society in all parts of Europe. In Bulgaria the revolutionary heroes, Khristo Botev, Vasil Levski, Georgi Rakovski and others, had led the fight against Turkish domination while the whole population supported the struggle for freedom either actively or passively.20 As men groped to create a new political order, the unity that had characterized the fight against absolutism broke down. Three divergent tendencies—conservative, liberal, and democratic— appeared and were embodied in political parties. Conservative 19

Zemledelsko zname, m, Nos 14, 15 (March 15,21, 1905); Parm, pp. 35-48. Zemledelsko zname, m,Nos. 15, 16 (March 21, 28, 1905);Parm, pp. 95-99, 281-82. 20

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parties, comprising the remnants of the old regime, fought to prevent the extension of civil and political rights. Liberal parties, the vehicle for the rising middle class, embraced the cause of freedom in personal and economic life. Peasants, poor artisans, and workers entered democratic parties that sought a more equitable distribution of wealth and full equality in civil and political rights. The precise form and tempo of the struggle between these parties depended on the strength and level of development of each one. But their conflict was a vital, healthy one whose end result was the achievement of constitutional government with substantial equality in civil and political rights. Bulgaria had seen this struggle during the reign of her first prince. The great Liberal party rallied the middle class and the peasants, artisans, and workers under a single banner against the absolutist ambitions of Alexander Battenberg and secured the benefits of the progressive Turnovo Constitution.21 Limited monarchy, constitutional government, civil and political rights—these, according to Stamboliski, were the great achievements of the struggles between political parties. But history did not stand still. To maintain the achievements of the triumph over absolutism, the constitutional state had to proceed with both political and economic reforms. In the political sphere it had to adapt the instruments of power, the police, judiciary, and military, to the principles of constitutional government. Central to this process was disarmament, which would have the twofold benefit of destroying the militarism and imperialism on which the absolutist state had rested and of freeing resources needed for economic development. In the economic sphere the new state had to improve its human resources by taking on the functions of universal education and public health. It also had to stimulate economic growth directly by enacting an appropriate system of taxation and finance, building a network of transportation and communications, sponsoring productive enterprises, and encouraging the rational exploitation of the country's resources.22 Stamboliski was convinced that the political parties could not 21 Zemledelsko zname, m, No. 16 (March 28, 1905), 1; Partu, pp. 117-28, 281-84 22 Zemledelsko zname, m, No. 17 (April 4, 1905), 1-2; Partu, pp. 130-31.

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carry out this economic program and, because of this, that they would also fail to carry out the political reforms. Stamboliski believed that the emergence of economic policy as the new focus of national life created insurmountable problems for the political parties. The constitutional struggle had bred a highly specialized kind of man, the professional politician. The leaders of all the political parties came from the same narrow social base. They were members of the intelligentsia, lawyers, professors, businessmen, or journalists who had expertise in political affairs. Now, while a democratic-minded lawyer might honestly, even heroically, stand in defense of the political aspirations of the vast majority of peasants, workers, and artisans, his economic interests had nothing in common with theirs. This was the key to Stamboliski's diagnosis of the ills of contemporary society. In an era increasingly conscious of economic policy, the economic interests of the various occupational groups, or estates, threatened to intrude into political life. Stamboliski defined an "estate" as a group of people with the same occupation and with common economic interests. He believed that the principal estates in Bulgaria were the agrarian, artisan, wage-laborer, entrepreneurial, commercial, and bureaucratic—although, he wrote, the more highly developed the economy, the more estates that come into existence.23 And these estates had not only differing, but opposed economic interests. Peasants and workers might be united in seeking equal civil and political rights, but peasants wanted high prices for their crops and low-cost manufactured goods while workers wanted the reverse. Bankers wanted high interest rates, entrepreneurs low ones. Officers wanted more soldiers and weapons, peasants more tools and fewer taxes. Ideally, Stamboliski contended, economic differences should become the subject of open political debate. Every estate should fight for its interests, and out of their struggle the best course for Bulgaria's economic development would evolve.24 But this had not happened. Faced with the possibility of alienating segments of 23

Zemledelsko zname, m, No. 28 (June 27, 1905), 1,Partu, pp. 183-86 Zemledelsko zname, in, Nos 24, 28, 29, 30 (May 30, June 27, July 4, 11, 1905); Partu, pp. 191-94 24

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their constituencies, the leaders of the political parties avoided the challenge of formulating clearly expressed economic policies. Taking refuge behind the doctrine of laissez-faire, they refused to lead or even allow an open debate over economic priorities. While laissez-faire permitted a measure of economic growth, it proceeded irrationally, inefficiently, and with great social cost. Economic liberalism led to the accumulation of great wealth in a few hands and to the exploitation of the laboring people, while ignoring the state's potential as a stimulator of economic growth.25 Still worse, the political parties sought to distract the people from economic concerns by promoting hatred toward the country's neighbors. This created a sense of national unity at the cost of poisoned international relations and rampant militarism.26 Because they no longer spoke for the real interests of the people they claimed to represent, the parties found it increasingly difficult to govern democratically. Having lost their sense of mission, they began to undermine the very constitutional structure it had been their great work to create. The single most important fact of contemporary history, Stamboliski wrote, was that the political parties had turned away from the people and effected a "shameful compromise" with the residue of the old regime, the monarchy. This compromise turned all the parties into "court parties." In return for the right to feed at the public trough, they allowed the monarch to extend his personal authority over the state and to pursue his own ends in foreign affairs. According to Stamboliski, this not only blocked economic progress, it undermined the liberties that had already been won. Instead of developing the political life of the country on democratic principles, the parties and their royal ally governed through fraud and intimidation. Instead of fighting militarism and imperialism, they promoted them, inspiring the people with hatred for their neighbors. Instead of increasing the country's prosperity, they squandered valuable resources on unproductive political and military bureaucracies. The court, bureaucrats, officers, and professional politicians monopolized state power and 25 26

Zemledelsko zname, m, No. 19 (April 26, 1905), 1-2; Porta, p. 74 Zemledelsko zname, m, No. 19 (April 26, 1905), \,Partu, pp. 164-65

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used it to advance their own interests. The peasants, workers, and artisans, farthest removed from political power, were reduced to beasts of burden for the new privileged class.27 Stamboliski's prescription for this state of affairs was the replacement of political parties by groups better suited to the conditions of the new era. Since the primary concerns of society were economic, the new organizations should reflect the economic aspirations of their constituencies. To him it seemed obvious that political parties should yield their position to organized economic interest groups, "estatist organizations," growing out of the country's principal occupational groups.28 Stamboliski believed that estatist organizations were already beginning to develop rapidly. The regime of the political parties, by its economic mismanagement, had sown the seeds of its own destruction. As he surveyed contemporary society, he observed that Bulgaria's wage-laborers had created a significant tradeunion movement and, through the Social Democratic parties,29 were reaching out for political influence. Bulgaria's artisans were reviving long-dormant guild organizations. In agriculture the peasants were spontaneously creating a cooperative movement to cope with their desperate economic situation. In the beginning, the wage-laborer, artisan, and peasant cooperative organizations were created to promote the economic welfare of their members. They were now awakening to the fact that to achieve any but the most insignificant results they would have to acquire political power. The existence of the Social Democratic parties and the BANU were signs of the rising consciousness of workers and peasants.30 For Stamboliski, the development of these and other such embryonic growths into full-fledged estatist organizations, representing their members in political as well as economic life, constituted the next stage of social evolution. An economic parliament in which all of the country's major occupational groups would be 27

Zemledelsko zname, m, No. 19 (April 26, 1905), 1; Pari», pp. 151-65. Zemledelsko zname, m, No 24 (May 30, 1905), 1-2; Parm, pp. 183-86 29 In Stamboliski's analysis the Social Democrats were an "estatist organization" rather than a "political party." 30 Zemledelsko zname, m, No 24 (May 30, 1905), l;Parrii, pp. 186-94, 29196. 28

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represented according to their size would make it possible to confront the problems of economic development openly and to channel the resources of the country into a consistent program of economic development, one that would distribute the benefits and the burdens more fairly.31 Eventually, Stamboliski wrote, estatist organizations would cross national borders. This had already happened in the case of the Socialists, and the BANU was not the only agrarian organization in Europe. The Danish Peasant Union had created an extensive cooperative movement and had elected several deputies to parliament. In Germany, the Bund der Landwirte, founded in 1892, had acquired over 300,000 members. Czech, German, Hungarian, Polish, and Croatian peasant organizations had been formed in Austria-Hungary. Stamboliski hoped that the International Institute for Agriculture, established in Rome in 1905 to exchange information among the various agricultural organizations, would be the nucleus of a "Green International" that would promote international economic cooperation and international peace.32 This, then, was his answer to those in the Agrarian movement who opposed the BANU's involvement in politics. The Agrarian Union was not to be just another political party, but an educational-economic organization that engaged in politics to bring about a new, more advanced form of society. Its educational and economic activity was to be directed toward preparing the peasantry for an expanded role in the whole life of the nation and so could not be divorced from political struggle. Stamboliski later summarized the contrast between political parties and the Agrarian Union: They differed first in constituencies. While the BANU was made up only of those whose interests were in agriculture, the parties drew their members from all walks of life, making them a "political tower of Babel." This led to a difference in capabilities; the BANU could be forceful and consistent, while the parties had to placate all their varied constituent interest groups. Moreover, the BANU was led by peasants them31

Zemledelsko zname, m, Nos. 28, 29, 30 (June 27, July 4, 11, 1905); Partii, pp. 195-216. 32 Zemledelsko zname, in, No. 38 (Sept. 16, 1905), \\Partn, pp. 273-80.

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selves, while the partie s were in the hand s of professiona l politicians. In methods , the BANU sought to creat e the basis for genuin e democrac y throug h its suppor t of educatio n and the cooperativ e movemen t and throug h its oppositio n to the persona l rule of the prince , while the partie s relied on the princ e to keep them in power. Finally , the BANU sought power not for its own sake, but to transfor m the countr y by creatin g a genuin e constitu tiona l governmen t and by bringin g about the condition s that would allow both politica l and economi c progress. 33 As the BANU began to revive unde r Stamboliski' s influence , its opponent s sought to refute his ideas. He defende d them in the pages of Zemledelsko zname and in Political Parties or Estatist Organizations? One frequentl y raised objectio n was that the BANU , by striving to be an exclusively peasan t organization , rejected the intelligentsia , the most experience d and educate d men in Bulgaria, and so could not hop e to govern effectively. Stam boliski admitte d that ther e were few member s of the intelligentsi a in the BANU , but he argued tha t experienc e and educatio n were not the only qualitie s necessar y for enlightene d leadership . To the peasant s it was more importan t tha t thei r leaders shared thei r interests. In the world of nations , he continued , the British, Ger mans , and American s were clearly amon g the best educate d peoples . But educatio n did not keep the British from exploitin g thei r colonies , the German s from behavin g with barbarit y in Africa, or the American s from oppressin g their Negr o citizens . No r in the past had their superio r experienc e and educatio n kept mem bers of the Bulgarian intelligentsi a from using Agrarian druzhbi for thei r own purposes . To allow men who did not share the inter ests of the peasantr y to lead the BANU would invite the divisiveness and partisanshi p that plagued the politica l parties . Over time , he maintained , as educatio n was furthe r extende d to the peasantr y and as the BANU' s cadre s acquire d politica l experience , the 34 agrarian estate would generat e its own intelligentsia. Stambolisk i was also eager to answer the charge tha t in an economi c parliament , chosen on the basis of one man-on e vote, the N . Petkov , pp. 213-23. Partii, pp. 243-45 , 305-07; see also Stamboliski' s article "Inteligentmt e sill ν zemledelskii a suiuz ι partute, " in N . Petkov , pp. 215-25. 33

34

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ALEXANDER STAMBOLISKI

interests of the numerically smaller estates, such as the commercial or entrepreneurial, would have insufficient representation. He argued first that these smaller estates could form alliances to increase their voting strength. He believed this actually happened after the First World War when the old parties united in a bloc to oppose the BANU and the Communist party.35 He further argued that the danger of the majority oppressing the minority was always present in a democracy, and if it occurred it was still preferable to the oppression of the majority by the minority. Finally, speaking as a practical politician rather than a philosopher, he stated that the Agrarian leaders were wise enough to understand that the peasantry would not long prosper by exploiting the other estates. The BANU did not seek to trample on the interests of others, but to gain for the peasantry its own rightful influence. Moreover, in a society aiming at economic development all productive estates could expect to benefit.36 Bulgaria's Socialists maintained that Stamboliski's estatist theories ignored class struggle and overlooked the fact that the peasantry, being divided into rich, middle, and poor strata, could not really have common interests. Stamboliski replied first by questioning the value of the idea of "class struggle" as a tool to analyze modern social and political life. He asserted that antagonism between occupational groups was much more important in contemporary society than antagonism between classes. Whereas the Marxists saw the structure of society simplifying to the point where bourgeoisie and proletariat would face each other across the barricades, he saw it becoming more complex. As society advanced, the more multifarious became its economic interest groups and the more estatist organizations were needed to represent each group.37 To the Marxist argument that the Bulgarian peasantry was itself shot through with class antagonisms, Stamboliski responded tha: there were 618 landowners in the country who held more than one hundred hectares each—this equaled 4 percent of the arable land in Bulgaria—and 546,560 who held less than one hundred. Even if there were serious general conflicts of interest between rich and 35 36

Zemledelsko zname, xvm, No. 77 (June 22, 1922), 1. 37 Parti,, pp. 247-50, 311-12 Ibid., pp. 224-26

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poor peasants , a poin t he was by no mean s willing to concede , the peasantr y in Bulgaria was homogeneous. 38 He also pointe d out that Bulgaria's Socialist parties , which self-righteousl y decrie d the absenc e of solidarit y in the agrarian estate , were led by lawyers, teachers , and othe r intellectuals, and he maliciousl y expressed the hop e that the proletaria t would follow the example of the peasantr y and develop its own leaders. 39 With regard to relation s between estates, particularl y between the agrarian and proletaria n estates, Stambolisk i advance d the idea of "similar and oppose d interests. " While peasant s and workers might be divided over man y question s of economi c policy, ther e were other s on which they could unit e or at least coop erate . Both had an interes t in maintainin g peace , reducin g militar y expenditures , and limitin g the power of the monarch. 40 In 1911, at the V Gran d Nationa l Assembly Stambolisk i led a coalitio n of Agrarians and Socialists with just such a program . It was this consideratio n tha t also prompte d him to look first toward the Com munis t and Socialist partie s as potentia l partner s in his coalitio n governmen t after the World War. Although Stambolisk i engaged in frequen t polemic s with the Social Democrati c parties , he never delivered a systematic critiqu e of Marxism from his own Agrarian standpoint . Ha d he studied the tortuou s reasonin g employe d by Marxist theoretician s to find a place for the peasantr y in thei r analysis of society, and had he lived to see Lenin' s worker-peasan t allianc e give way to Stalin' s brutalizatio n of the Russian peasantry , he would undoubtedl y have held all the more firmly to his own understandin g of the natur e of social change . Criticis m of politica l partie s and the predictio n tha t they would be supersede d by estatist organization s formed the hear t of Stam boliski's ideology as he first developed it in Zemledelsko zname from 1904 to 1906. When he publishe d Political Parties or Estatist Organizations? in 1909, he added a new element, the asIbid ,pp . 307-11. Ibid. , pp. 106-107, 270-71; see also Stamboliski' s "Nashit e razbirann a ν lagera na naemno-rabotnicheskit e orgamzatsu, " Zemledelsko zname, vu, No . 73 (July 29, 1909), 1-2. 40 Partii, pp. 184-88. 38

39

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sertion that the instincts of self-preservation, reproduction, and acquisition underlay human behavior. He argued that these three instincts found their expression in human society in the institutions of the state, the family, and private property, respectively, and that while these institutions might possess many different forms, no society could be without them.41 Since the despised political parties did not advocate the abolition of the state, family, or private property, it may be assumed that he selected this weapon to use against the Socialists. And in fact outside Political Parties or Estatist Organizations? he rarely mentioned the three instincts except when condemning the Marxists for seeking to abolish private property. During Stamboliski's lifetime the three-instinct theory was not greatly emphasized. The principal enemies of the BANU were not the Socialists but the old parties and Tsars Ferdinand and Boris. After the Second World War, however, when the BANU was suppressed by the Communists, the theory was revived and given the premier place in the Union's ideological statements.42 What did Stamboliski consider to be the estatist aspirations of the Bulgarian peasantry, and what was his program for the development of Bulgarian society? He was convinced that peasant farming was not destined to be replaced by large-scale, mechanized agriculture. On this point he quoted Eduard Bernstein on the German peasants' obstinate refusal to disappear.43 He did not believe, however, that peasant farming had to remain backward and unproductive, for a variety of means existed to increase the prosperity of small-scale peasant agriculture. The growth of the cooperative movement, for example, would permit the mechanization of agriculture without sacrificing the individual nature of peasant farming. The government could also encourage the peasant to overcome his backwardness by lightening the tax burden, by providing cheap credit, and by expanding rural education.44 Stamboliski proposed increased government expenditures for 41

Ibid., pp. 9-11,76. See G. M. Dimitrov, "Agrarianism," in F. Gross, ed., European Ideologies (New York, 1948), 396-451. 43 44 Partii, pp. 55-57 Ibid., pp. 18, 58-71. 42

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rural welfare while calling for a reductio n of the tax burden.Thi s did not represen t a contradictio n to him , for he was convince d tha t unde r the existing regime the peasan t was heavily taxed to suppor t both a corrupt , patronage-ridde n bureaucrac y and a monstrousl y swollen militar y establishment , neithe r of which brough t any real benefit to the country . He called for a redistributio n of the tax burden , specifically for a progressive incom e tax to replac e the existing land tax, and for the diversion of the state' s resource s out of the civil and militar y bureaucracie s and into program s to expan d cooperation , education , communications , and othe r project s neede d for economi c development. 45 Stamboliski' s program for the reallocatio n of Bulgaria's nationa l resource s is particularl y interestin g in light of subsequen t theorie s of modernization . Ever since Alexander Gerschenkro n discovered the "secret" of the Russian patter n of industrializa tion , social scientist s have tende d to assume that the rural sector must be squeezed to generat e the investmen t capita l necessar y to overcom e backwardness . Gerschenkro n himself directl y attrib uted Bulgaria's failure to industrializ e to the fact that its governmen t was mor e democrati c than Russia's and lacked the authori tarian tools necessar y to squeeze the peasantr y hard enough. 46 As a correctiv e to this view it should be remembere d that the choic e was never simply between rural welfare or industrialization . In both Russia and Bulgaria, militar y or military-relate d expendi ture s accounte d for roughly one-thir d of the peace-tim e state budget. If the maintenanc e of Russia's Grea t Power status was politicall y and psychologicall y necessar y for her regime, then we may take its militar y expenditure s as "given" and assume that it had no choic e but to squeeze the peasant s for the capita l to generate industrialization. 47 But Bulgaria was not a Grea t Power , and it is difficult to see what benefit heavy militar y spendin g ever brough t the country . Accordin g to Stamboliski , Bulgaria's real 45 Ibid. , pp 131, 191-94, 289-91; see also his article s analyzin g various forms of taxatio n mZemledelsko zname, vn, Nos . 80, 81, 82, 85, 86, 87, 88, 90, 92, 93, 94 (Aug 22-Oct . 14, 1909). 46 Gerschenkron , p. 226. 47 This poin t was forcefully mad e by Τ. H. Von Laue in Why Lenin? Why Stalin? (Ne w York, 1964).

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choice lay not between peasant welfare and industrialization, but between industrialization and an aggressive foreign policy with its concomitant military build-up. Even before the Balkan Wars, he maintained that most of Bulgaria's military spending was unproductive and could be dispensed with.48 In short, the peasantry was not inimical to industrialization, he argued, but only to industrialization that was brought about by depressing rural living standards. The fundamental aspiration of the agrarian estate as he saw it was the reallocation of Bulgaria's resources away from the military and into economic development. In Political Parties or Estatist Organizations? Stamboliski asserted that the simple expression of new ideas was not sufficient to make them reality; the degree of their success depended on the forces willing and able to fight for them.49 Between 1903 and 1908 he worked vigorously to revive the BANU and to shape its development to conform to his ideas of what an estatist organization should be. In these years nearly every issue of the Zemledelsko zname contained at least one article by "Stambol," "Sando," "Sans doute," and "A. S.," setting forth his ideas of Agrarianism or applying them to current problems. The decline of the Agrarian Union after the struggle against the tithe and the withdrawal of most of its early leaders created opportunities for younger dedicated men. Stamboliski, of course, was one of these, and when he was appointed to the editorial board of Zemledelsko zname he was joined by two others, Marko Turlakov and Alexander Dimitrov. Turlakov, who would later challenge Stamboliski for the leadership of the BANU, was a close friend of Dragiev. He had been a teacher in Stara Zagora since 1890 and he studied for a law degree that he eventually received from Sofia University in 1910. In addition to his other work for the Union, he became its specialist on questions of taxation and finance.50 48

See his comments on the military budget mZemledelsko zname, vn, Nos 16, 17 (Jan 10, 14, 1909) and vm, Nos. 4, 10, 13, 26 (Dec 5, 29. 1909, Jan. 13, Feb. 27, 1910). 49 Pari», p. 100. 50 Tadzher, pp. 29\-92;Zemledelsko zname, xv, No. 24-25 (Oct 13, 1919), 3

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Alexander Dimitrov had been a twenty-one-year-old teacher in the village of Gorna Koznitsa in the Kiustendil District when he first read Tsanko Tserkovski's "Appeal" in Zemledelska zashtita. He corresponded with Zabunov and formed a number of village druzhbi in his region. On the strength of his occasional articles in the Union paper and his success as an organizer, he was elected to the Governing Council of the Union at its fourth congress and invited to become a member of the editorial board of Zemledelsko zname. Dimitrov devoted himself to the organization of local druzhbi, so much so that he was nicknamed "The Apostle" of Agrarianism.51 Stamboliski, Turlakov, and Dimitrov worked with Dragiev to reshape the organization and program of the BANU to correspond to its new ideology. They began with the village druzhbi. At the V Agrarian congress, held in the wake of the BANU's complete failure in the elections for the XIII National Assembly, Dragiev, Stamboliski, and Dimitrov presented a "Code for the Participation of the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union in Legislative Elections," which was incorporated into the Union's charter. It consisted of twenty-six articles designed to regulate the nomination of Agrarian candidates, the conduct of election campaigns, and the obligations of candidates and elected Agrarian representatives.52 Article One of the code stated unequivocally: "The Bulgarian Agrarian National Union participates independently in elections in every district in Bulgaria where its druzhbi are located." On the second Sunday after the announcement of elections, all village druzhbi were required to send representatives (one for every ten members) to a district assembly to nominate candidates. The Governing Council of the Union was given the right to reject any of the candidates nominated by the assemblies and also to name one candidate in any district if in its judgment this would serve the Union's interests. To keep supporters of the political parties from gaining an Agrarian endorsement, both the district assemblies and the Governing Council were forbidden to nominate any person who had not been a member of the Union for at least two years. At the XIII Agrarian congress in 1911, this provision was 51 52

74

B. Peshev, pp. 6-8; Zemledelsko zname, xv, No. 24-25 (Oct 13, 1919), 2. Zemledelsko zname, n, No 1 (Dec. 15, 1903), 3-4.

ALEXANDER STAMBOLISKI

strengthened to require five years' prior membership for nomination to the National Assembly, four years' for provincial or district office, and three years' for local office.53 Before receiving the BANU's endorsement, all nominees for the National Assembly were required to sign a pledge binding them to support the Union if elected and, upon the completion of each legislative session, to report on the activity of the Assembly and their own conduct in it to a district meeting of Union members. Representatives who failed to do this or who in the opinion of the members failed to support the Union were to be expelled.54 During an election campaign, the druzhbi were to furnish agitators for their district and to bring all Union members to the polls in a single group. All Agrarians were to "avoid scandals" during the campaign, and Agrarian candidates and agitators were forbidden to "lie or mislead the people." The V Agrarian congress also voted to establish a "library of the Agrarian Union" to publish material of an agitational character and to make it available to the druzhbi at low cost.55 The next annual congress, held in Varna on November 8-10, 1904, voted to establish a category of "regular" druzhbi that alone would have the right to send participating delegates to the congresses. To achieve this status adruzhba was required to collect dues from its members, to forward the appropriate sum to the BANU treasury (dues were set at one lev annually, of which sixty stotinki66 went to the Governing Council), and to take out a certain number of subscriptions to the Zemledelsko zname, depending on the size of the membership: druzhbi with ten to twenty members were required to hold five subscriptions; those with twenty to thirty members, eight subscriptions; and those with over thirty members, at least ten subscriptions. The BANU's Governing Council was enlarged from sixteen members to thirty in the 53

104.

Zemledelsko zname, ix, No. 96-97 (Nov. 17, 1911), 2; Turlakov, Istorna, p.

54

Stamboliski took this requirement very seriously. On March 4, 1909, Zemledelsko zname reported that he had nearly drowned in an attempt to cross a floodswollen river to deliver such a report. In April 1910, he spoke at eighteen such meetings before growing too hoarse to continue. 55 Zemledelsko zname, n, No. 1 (Dec. 15, 1903), 1-2. 56 One hundred stotinki = one lev

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hope that they would play a mor e active role in the organizatio n of druzhbi. Stambolisk i was electe d to the Governin g Counci l for the first time at this congress. At its first meetin g the Counci l mad e him vice-presiden t of the Unio n and a membe r of its Standin g Committee. 57 This congress also saw the retur n of Tsanko Tserkovski to active membershi p in the Union . In a speech to the delegates he announce d his conversio n to belief in the necessity of a politica l role for the BANU, 58 and he supporte d this policy unti l his deat h in 1926. The spread of an Agrarian consciousnes s and the implementa tion of the reform s voted by the congresses proceede d slowly but with discernabl e progress. Durin g 1905 the Zemledelsko zname reporte d on the organizatio n of twenty-seve n new druzhbi. The characte r of the druzhbi, too , was changing . Some now require d their member s to sign pledges promisin g that they would not join any party. 59 Other s expelled member s who continue d to belon g to othe r parties . The following repor t is an example of the slow transformatio n of the BANU into an effective politica l organiza tion . Toda y on the fourteent h of Septembe r 1905, the member s of the Agrarian druzhba in the village of Salamanovo , Preslav District , assembled to discuss the questio n of the expulsion of the secretar y of the druzhba, Doch o Iordanov , and member s Anton Mokev, Vasil Todorov , Vulcho Kirev, Mari n Zhelezov , lorgo Bochev, and Ar. Makev. After a long discussion of the question , in which it was established that the above-name d individuals have worked and are working against the interest s of the druzhba and that they have openl y campaigne d against the candidate s for the provincia l counci l name d by the district Agrarian druzhba, in accordanc e with Article 32 of the Unio n charte r it was decided : 1) to expel [all of them ] from the druzhba and to conside r them its enemies. 60 57 58 59 60

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Turlakov , lstorua, pp 63-64. Kozhukharov , Tserkovski, ρ 18. Zemledelsko zname, m , No . 11 (Feb . 20, 1905), 3-4. Zemledelsko zname, m , No . 41 (Oct . 25, 1905), 4.

ALEXANDER STAMBOLISKI

During the year similar action was taken in four other druzhbi, one of which expelled forty-seven of its members.61 By the time of the VII Agrarian congress, held in Turnovo on November 8-10, 1905, the number of the BANU's druzhbi had grown to ninety-five, thirty-eight of which were "regular."62 They contributed 4,378.25 leva to the Union's treasury, which was barely enough to pay for operating expenses.63 During the summer preceding the VII congress, an informal committee, consisting of Dragiev, Stamboliski, Dimitrov, Turlakov, and Stancho Momchev, a protege of Dragiev, began to discuss measures for further strengthening the BANU's organization.64 At the congress they made several proposals that were incorporated in the Union charter. According to these new provisions, a minimum of ten members was required to form a druzhba. The druzhbi were required to elect officers on November 21 each year, and to hold weekly meetings from September to April and monthly meetings during the rest of the year to discuss Union affairs and questions of general interest to the peasantry. They were urged to form cooperative societies, to establish reading-rooms where Agrarian literature would be available, and to form new druzhbi in neighboring villages. Although the congress also voted to employ a full-time agitator to organize druzhbi throughout the country, lack of funds kept this decision from being implemented until the following year when Turlakov assumed the post.65 At the VIII congress, held in Pleven on November 8-10, 1906, Dragiev reported that the number of druzhbi had grown to 139. To 61 Zemledelsko zname, III, Nos 14, 27, 30, 35 (March 15, June 9, July 11, Aug. 22, 1905). 62 Fifty-three of them were located in the five north-central and northeastern provinces (Pleven, Turnovo, Ruse, Shumen, and Varna) where the Agrarian movement had begun. The rest were in three provinces (Stara Zagora, Plovdiv, and Khaskovo) south of the Balkan Range where the BANU now had its headquarters 63 Zemledelsko zname, m, No. 42 (Nov 24, 1905), 2-3 64 Turlakov, Istorua, p. 65. 65 Zemledelsko zname, in, Nos 2, 5, 6 (Dec. 5, 21, 24, 1905); Turlakov, Isloriia, pp. 65-66.

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create a greater cohesiveness in the Union it was decided to create a life-insurance fund in which all druzhbi would participate. The druzhbi were required to contribute one lev annually for each of their members who had belonged to the Union for one year or longer. After the death of a member, his family received twenty stotinki for every member of the fund.66 Life insurance was just one of the "educational-economic" functions that the BANU performed. Of greater significance was its support of the cooperative movement. Under Stamboliski's editorship Zemledelsko zname frequently published material on different types of cooperatives, instructions on how to establish them, representative charters of cooperative societies, and descriptions of cooperative organizations in other countries. At the Union's X congress in 1908 it was decided to establish a "National Store" as a nationwide cooperative. It was intended to "provide members with agricultural tools, seeds, fertilizers, and other necessities at the lowest prices, to encourage the formation of various cooperatives . . . and so on." 67 K. Iliev, a longtime Union activist, was made director of the National Store, which began to issue shares to BANU members at ten leva each. To prevent wealthy peasants from gaining control of the store, no individual was permitted to hold more than ten shares.68 Although Iliev toured the country to explain the National Store to the peasants,69 its operations remained limited until Raiko Daskalov became its director in 1914. The growth of the BANU was indirectly aided by the government, which, while carrying a large burden of foreign debt, was beginning a new military build-up financed by increased taxes on salt, sugar, tobacco, spirits, and other products needed by the peasantry. Between 1900 and 1905 the amount of revenue raised by these taxes each year grew from 22,600,000 leva to 43,000,000, and by 1911 reached 83,600,000. Moreover, the harvests between 1907 and 1909 were below average, and large 66

Zemledelsko zname, 66-67. 67 Zemledelsko zname, m Zemledelsko zname, 69 Zemledelsko zname,

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iv, No. 7 (Dec. 22, 1907), 3; Turlakov, htoriia, pp. vn, No. 1 (Nov. 18, 1908), 3. vn, No 26 (Feb. 14, 1909), 1-2. vn, No. 33 (March 11, 1909), 4.

ALEXANDE R STAMBOLISK I

number s of peasant s lost their land to the State Agricultura l Bank or to private usurers. 70 It was at about this time that the BANU reache d the poin t at which its financial situatio n permitte d it to devote a larger portio n of its energy to expansion . At its VIII congress in 1906, the Unio n planne d its year's activities to corre spond to a predicte d incom e of 14,670 leva. Only seven hundre d leva of this sum was allocate d to organizationa l campaigning . Durin g the year the Unio n treasur y actuall y received 22,439.87 leva and was able to spend 1,200 leva for tour s throug h the provinces by Agrarian leaders. 71 At the IX congress of the Union , held in Plovdiv on Novembe r 8-10, 1907, Dragie v reporte d that since the last congress the numbe r of druzhbi had grown from 139 to 411 and tha t the numbe r of dues-payin g member s had grown from 2,002 to 7,791. The numbe r of subscription s to Zemledelsko zname had also increased from 705 to 2,630. In the weeks before the congress the BANU' s standin g committe e sent a questionnair e to every druzhba requestin g a repor t on its activities durin g the past year. Answers were received from 214druzhbi, who reporte d that in all they had held 2,208 village meetings , 582 meeting s in district capitals , and 108 assemblies of district druzhba leaders. The y had also established eighty-on e readin g room s and create d forty-six consumer-produce r cooperatives . The repor t of the BANU' s Governin g Counci l stated tha t member s of this body had organ72 ized 407 meeting s at which they mad e a tota l of 545 speeches. While these figures show that few druzhbi were living up to the high standard s set at the VII congress, they do indicat e tha t the BANU was in the proces s of creatin g a mor e discipline d and politicall y consciou s membership . The compositio n of the IX congress itself demonstrate d this. When Stambolisk i gave the openin g speech on "The Deat h of Politica l Parties, " 237 delegates from 174 "regular" druzhbi were ther e to hear him . They represente d every agricultura l district in the countr y with the ex70 Popoff, pp. 477, 483-84, Ts. Todorova , "Kum istoriiat a na Bulgarskna zemedelsk i narode n suiuz ν navecheriet o na voinite, " lstoricheski pregled, xi, No . 5(1955) , 32-40. 71 Zemledelsko zname, vi, No . 1 (No v 16, 1907), 4; Turlakov,/j/on'ia , p. 67. 72 Zemledelsko zname, vi, No 1 (Nov . 16, 1907), 2.

79

ALEXANDER STAMBOLISKI

ception of those in the two northwestern provinces of Vratsa and Viden.73 Like most robust eight-year-olds, the BANU suffered growing pains, and the IX congress revealed the first public signs of the rift developing between Dragiev and the younger Agrarian leaders. During the preceding summer the informal committee of Dragiev, Stamboliski, Turlakov, Dimitrov, and Momchev had debated the question of moving the BANU's headquarters from isolated Stara Zagora to Sofia. The government of Dimitur Petkov had been in power for four years and would soon be forced to hold elections. Stamboliski argued that the Union's prestige would be increased if its headquarters were in the capital and that the Agrarian leaders should be near "the pulse of politics." Dragiev, who had spent his life in Stara Zagora, did not want to make the move and argued that it would put the Union in the path of temptation to associate with the political parties. Although Dragiev was outvoted fourto-one on the committee, he refused to accept its decision and carried his opposition to the floor of the congress.74 After a "spirited debate," the decision to move was approved by a vote of 139 to 84.75 Dragiev suffered another defeat when Stamboliski persuaded the congress to reorganize the BANU's standing committee. In the past this body had consisted of the president, vice-president, and secretary-treasurer of the Union, who were all elected by the Governing Council. Most of the actual power rested in the presidency, which Dragiev had held since Zabunov's resignation in 1902. A fight to remove Dragiev from this office would probably have crippled the Union, so the younger Agrarian leaders decided to remove the office from the man. On the floor of the congress Stamboliski argued that the present situation could lead to the "chiefism" displayed by the political parties, and he urged that the standing committee be composed of the editor of Zemledelsko zname and his assistants, the editors of other Union publications and their assistants, and the Union's full-time agitators. Dragiev opposed this motion, but it was carried by a large majority. The new standing committee consisted of Stamboliski, Dimitrov, Turlakov, Tserkovski, Dragiev, and two lesser-known 73 75

80

74 Ibid. Turlakov, Istortia, pp. 67-68 Zemledelsko zname, vi, No. 1 (Nov. 16, 1907), 1-2.

ALEXANDER STAMBOLISKI

figures. On almost any issue Stambolisk i and his allies could now comman d a clear majority. 76 Two month s after the BANU' s IX congress, on Januar y 16, 1908, the Stambolovis t cabine t of Dimitu r Petko v fell. Princ e Ferdinan d put the governmen t in the hand s of the Democrati c part y unde r Alexander Malinov , and election s for the XIV Na tiona l Assembly were schedule d for May 25. The BANU had been fortunat e in tha t for nearly five years it had been able to concentrat e on interna l developmen t free from the turmoi l of a nationa l election . The Agrarian leader s now began a spirited campaign , speakin g before peasan t meeting s in all part s of the country . The official program of the BANU , published \Ώ Zemledelsko zname on May 10, condemne d governmen t by politica l partie s and stressed the difference s between the partie s and the BANU . It also containe d a list of measure s that the Unio n pledged to support . These include d demand s for expansio n of the rural schoo l system and at least six years of free, compulsor y education , the creatio n of a state insuranc e system, the abolitio n of private usury, a lowering of indirec t taxes and the introductio n of a progressive incom e tax as the primar y source of state revenue , the lowering of governmen t salaries and pensions , reductio n of the size of the army and a shorte r term of militar y service, and the introductio n of proportiona l representation. 77 The election s were a great success for the BANU , which emerged as the largest oppositio n politica l organizatio n in the country , electin g twenty-thre e candidate s and pollin g over 78 100,000 votes. The complet e results are shown in Table 2. Amon g the successful Agrarian candidate s were Stamboliski , Dragiev, Dimitrov , and Tserkovski. The BANU won thre e seats in the district s of Svishtov, Nikopol , and Provadiia , and two in the district s of Preslav, Sevlievo, Varna (rural) , Lovech , Novi 79 Pazar , Turnov o (rural) , and Silistra. The bulk of the Union' s suppor t was still concentrate d in the agricultura l district s of the nort h and northeast . Nothin g demonstrate d the influenc e of Stamboliski' s ideas on 76 77 78 79

Ibid. , Turlakov , Istorua, p. 71 Zemledelsko zname, vi, N o 54-55 (Ma y 10, 1908), 1-2. DataforJab\e2fmmZemledelskozname,ix,No 32-33(Apnl9 , 1911),2 Zemledelsko zname, VI, No . 59 (Ma y 28, 1908), 1

81

ALEXANDER STAMBOLISKI TABLE 2 ELECTION S FOR TH E XIV NATIONA L ASSEMBLY, MAY 25,

1908

%of

Deputies elected

Votes

votes

Democrati c BANU Liberal Nationa l Progressive Liberal Nationa l Liberal Radica l Democrati c Social Democrati c Young Liberal Independent s

166 23 5 4 2 1 0 0 0 2

586,352 105,979 46,431 79,530 53,631 37,440 13,787 8,101 6,545 5,111

62.2 11.2 49 8.4 5.7 4.0 1.5 0.9 0.7 0.5

Tota l

203

942,907

100.0

Party

the developmen t of the BANU mor e clearly than the contras t between the Agrarian performance s in the XI and the XIV Nationa l Assemblies. When Agrarian deputie s first entere d parliamen t in 1901 they were divided and had no clear program . Some of the deputie s electe d with the suppor t of the Unio n denie d that any one organizatio n could represen t the peasantry. 80 When Iank o Zabuno v claime d to speak for the peasan t estate on a questio n of taxatio n he provoked a tongue-lashin g from Prim e Ministe r Petk o Karavelov, who declare d that member s of the Nationa l Assembly were elected to represen t the whole people , not a single group or region. Conversely , he maintained , he and othe r party leader s were as deeply concerne d with the problem s of the peasantr y as anyon e in the country . "To be sure, " he continued , "I know that ther e is one party in Europ e that speaks of class interests , but I have been brough t up in a different school , one that will not allow this as a mora l or politica l principle." 81 Zabuno v and his colleagues mad e no rejoinde r to Karavelov' s denia l of their claim to speak for the peasantry . No r from that time on did they make any significant effort to assert themselves . This state of affairs no longer prevailed in 1908. At the first ses80 Dnevnitsi (stenografski) na XI Obiknoveno narodno sitbranie, purva izvunredovna sesna, ι (Sofia, 1901), p. 1027. 81 Ibid. , ρ 1074.

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ALEXANDER STAMBOLISKI

sion of the Nationa l Assembly, the Agrarian representative s re82 fused to applau d Princ e Ferdinand' s speech from the throne. Before the minute s could be read at the second session, Stambolisk i was on his feet to denounc e the prince' s speech . When finally recognized , he declare d that the representative s of the peasantr y would tolerat e no violation of the constitutio n by eithe r princ e or party. 83 His speech was punctuate d by shout s and furious exchange s of epithet s between the Agrarian and governmen t benches , an occurrenc e that set the ton e for the BANU' s subsequen t parliamentar y career. 84 In the Nationa l Assembly's thir d and fourth sessions, the deputies were introduce d to Agrarian doctrin e by Dragiev, who informed the representative s of the partie s at length that they must inevitably give way before the new "political-socia l estatist organizations." 85 The BANU' s deputie s did not , of course , believe that they could have muc h influenc e on governmen t policies. Convince d that time was now on their side, they intende d to build as stron g a recor d as possible for use in future elections . The new, exuberan t moo d of the BANU was fully displayed at its tent h congress, held in Sofia on Novembe r 8-11 , 1908. All peasant s were urged to com e to the capita l to join in the celebration of the Union' s jubilee congress. By the afternoo n of Novem ber 8 a crowd estimate d at between 8,000 and 10,000 peopl e was gathere d near the hall "Nova Amerika, " the largest meetin g place in the city. Inside , the delegates hear d speeche s by Petu r Baev, Dragiev, and Stamboliski , after which the meetin g was adjourne d so that all the delegates could participat e in a victory parade . The Unio n member s marche d with banner s and brass band s up the yellow-bric k streets of the capita l to Nationa l Assembly Square , where they were addressed by Unio n leader s standin g on the monumen t to Alexander II and the Russian liberator s of Bulgaria. The y then marche d past the university to the Levski Monumen t Zemledelsko zname, vi, No . 98 (Oct . 22, 1908), 3. The Agrarian deputie s denie d that the constitutio n gave the princ e the right to open the Nationa l Assembly. They also objected to his wearing the royal crown and remainin g seated while the deputie s stood bare-headed . 84 Dnevmtsi . . . na XIV ONS, pitrva redovna sesiia, ι (Sofia, 1908), pp. 5-6. 85 Ibid.,p p 20-30. 82

83

83

ALEXANDER STAMBOLISKI

for more speeches and music, and concluded the day with a march to the Sofia headquarters of the BANU, where they dispersed. "We had to note," wrote Stamboliski later, "that this demonstration of peasant power, the like of which had never before been seen in Sofia, attracted the most lively interest on the part of the inhabitants of the capital. On every street, the windows and balconies by which it passed were crowded with those eager to see the representatives of the awakened peasantry."86 On the following day Dragiev reported that the BANU now possessed 1,123 druzhbi, of which 571 were "regular," 459 had fulfilled part of their obligations, and 93 had fulfilled none. There were 17,200 dues-paying members, and the Zemledelsko zname was now supported by 5,881 subscriptions. In all, the Union's income had risen to over 50,000 leva annually. At this congress the National Store was founded, and it was decided to employ twelve full-time agitators to campaign for Agrarian organization during the summer months.87 Although the Agrarian Union looked toward its second decade with considerable confidence, it was soon to confront greater challenges than any it had met before. Just as the violent struggle against the tithe had wrenched the Union from its "educationaleconomic" moorings, so the Balkan Wars and First World War were to test its commitment to Stamboliski's ideology and ultimately to give it the opportunity to transform Bulgaria into a model Agrarian state. 86 87

84

Zemledelsko zname, VII, No. 1 (Nov 18, 1908), 1-2. Zemledelsko zname, vii, Nos. 1,2,3 (Nov. 18, 22, 26, 1908)

CHAPTER

IV

The Agrarian Union and the Wars We will throw down the gauntlet to adventurists, no matter where they come from, and we will suffer to protect Bulgaria from this terrible danger. And if we fall in this battle we will be content, for we will not live to see the shame and doom of Bulgaria, and we know that the generation you wish to sacrifice in your adventures will surely pay you back, that it will repay you severely and justly for your policy of insanity. . . . —Alexander Stamboliski1 IN his statement of Agrarian doctrine, Stamboliski had written that, before the growth of estatist organizations could bring about a higher form of political and economic life, society could expect to see the ruling political parties become more dependent on the throne and, along with the resurgence of monarchism, the concomitant rise of militarism and imperialism. The next decade was to confirm his prediction. Four months before the BANU's jubilee congress, seventeen days after its successful campaign in the elections to the XIV National Assembly, the revolt of the Young Turks upset the precarious balance of forces in the Near East and set in motion a chain of events that was to involve Bulgaria in three major wars. Before the Young Turk revolt, neither Stamboliski nor any other Agrarian leader had concerned himself directly with issues of foreign policy.2 But from this time on, as the question of Bulgaria's role in the Balkans loomed steadily larger in national politics, it perforce came to occupy a central position in the deliberations of the Agrarian leaders. To the Bulgarians, as to the Serbs and to a lesser extent the Greeks, the "Eastern Question" presented itself primarily as the 1 From Stamboliski's reply to Tsar Ferdinand's speech from the throne in 1914. N. Petkov. pp. 273-74. 2 The official program of the BANU, published on the eve of the elections to the XIV National Assembly, did not contain a single reference to Bulgaria's foreign policy. Zemledelsko zname, vi, No. 54-55 (May 10, 1908), 1-2.

85

AGRARIAN UNION AND THE WARS

problem of the future of Macedonia. This wild land of lakes, mountains, forests, and impassable marshes lacked natural, historic, or legal borders. It consisted approximately of the area bounded by the lakes Okhrid and Prespa in the west, the Sar Mountains in the north, the Rila and Rhodope Mountains in the northeast, the river Mesta in the east, and the Aegean, Mt. Olympus and the Pindus Mountains to the south and southwest. Under Ottoman administration it was included in the vilayets of Thessaloniki (Salonika), Monastir (Bitolj), and Uskub (Skoplje). Of little economic value, it was strategically the linchpin of the Balkans, for it was traversed by a natural route connecting central Europe and the Aegean along the Morava and Vardar river valleys. Its conquest by the Bulgarians under Simeon (893-927) and Ivan Asen II (1218-1241) and the Serbs under Stefan Dusan (1331-1355) created the medieval Balkan empires on which many modern national claims were based. Its subjugation by the Turks in the fourteenth century made possible the invasions of Suleiman. In the nineteenth century the decay of the Ottoman Empire reawakened the great powers to the strategic significance of Macedonia. Their attempts to dominate the region directly or through the agency of a Balkan client contributed significantly to the complexity of Balkan politics.3 The emergence of national consciousness in the Balkans fostered the growth of rival claims on Macedonia by its neighbors. Serbs, Bulgarians, and Greeks all sought the liberation of their Macedonian "brethren" and their inclusion in the parent state. No judgment on the relative merit of these claims will be made here; one can only say that none was completely without justification and that all touched the emotions of a large segment of the peoples involved.4 Macedonia's location between Greece, Montenegro, 3 For the geographical and historical background of the Macedonian question, see H. R. Wilkinson, Maps and Politics: A Review of the Ethnographic Cartography of Macedonia (Liverpool, 1951), pp. 1-5; E. Barker, Macedonia, Its Place in Balkan Power Politics (London, 1950), pp 7-10; D. Dakin, The Greek Struggle in Macedonia, 1897-1913 (Salonika, 1966), pp. 1-11 4 Perhaps as much ink as blood has been spilled in the struggle for Macedonia. For an introduction to the literature representing the various national positions, see the bibliographies of Dakin and Wilkinson. The history of European opinions on the ethnic composition of Macedonia is thoroughly explored in Wilkinson'sMaps and Politics.

86

AGRARIA N UNIO N AN D TH E WARS

Serbia, Bulgaria, Turkey, and the land of the Albanian s and its role as a rout e gave rise to a highly comple x ethnographi c mosaic that has never been deciphere d to the satisfaction of everyone . The British geographe r H . R. Wilkinson, who surveyed the history of ethnographi c studies of the region over a two-hundred year period , wrote of the area: It is a zone where the Albanian , Greek , Bulgarian and Serbian linguistic province s meet and overlap, and where in additio n exclaves of Romania n and Turkish speech are found ; it is a region where the concep t of nationa l sentiment , associate d with language, exists side by side with the perhap s older concep t of communit y based on religious affinity; it is a region where man y influences , economic , cultura l and political , emanatin g from different part s of Europe , Asia and Africa, meet and mingle but where the proces s of fusion has not always taken place . The traditiona l incapacit y of this region to absorb and to transfor m might be correlate d with its physical diversity and with its functio n as a through-rout e between the new world nort h of the Alps and the old world of the Easter n Mediterra nean and the Nea r East. 5 In the 1870s the Bulgarians , throug h the expansio n of their newly won exarchate , were the first to bring a large portio n of Macedoni a unde r thei r influence . Bulgarian bishopric s were established in Nis , Pirot , Skoplje, Strumitsa , Veles, Debar , Okhrid , Bitolj, and Nevrokop , all of which were include d within Bul6 garia's boundarie s in the Treat y of San Stefano. Although restored to the Turks by the Treat y of Berlin , Macedoni a continue d to be regarded as Bulgaria irredenta by Bulgarian statesmen , who claime d the border s of San Stefan o as part of the nationa l heritage. Alarmed by the near inclusio n of Macedoni a in Bulgaria, Serbs and Greek s began to assert thei r own claim s to the region . The Serbs founde d the Societ y of St. Sava in 1886 to comba t the Bulgarian exarchat e and to distribut e Serbian books and school s in Macedonia. 7 In 1894 the Ethnike Hetairia, or Nationa l Society, 6 Wilkinson, ρ 3. Ibid. , pp. 58-62. M. S. Anderson , The Eastern Question, 1774-1923 (Ne w York, 1966), pp. 269-70. 5

7

87

AGRARIAN UNIO N AND THE WARS

was formed in Athen s primaril y to resist the "bulgarization " of Macedonia . By the end of the centur y the Greek s were spendin g mor e on educatio n per person in their "unredeeme d territories " than they did in their homeland. 8 Moreover , the Greek s and Serbians attempte d to com e to an understandin g to exclude Bulgaria from Macedonia, but the two people s found that their own overlappin g claims preclude d cooperation . The Macedonian s actively contribute d to the complicate d inter nationa l situatio n surroundin g their homeland . In 1893 a group of Bulgarian Macedonians , led by the schoolmaste r Damia n Grue v and Dr . Khrist o Tatarchev , formed the Interna l Macedonia n Revolutionar y Organizatio n (or IMRO) . The purpos e of IMR O was to prepar e for an arme d insurrectio n against the Turks to achieve "Macedoni a for the Macedonians. " Although the majorit y in IMRO , at least at its inception , oppose d the partitio n of the region and supporte d the idea of South-Sla v federation , considerabl e aid was given to the organizatio n by Bulgarians , who assumed that an autonomou s Macedoni a would inevitably be absorbed by Bulgaria. Between 1895 and 1903, relying as muc h on terro r as on the sentimen t of nationa l solidarity, IMR O create d an "infrastruc ture " to organize the populatio n in its support . A rudimentar y IMR O administrativ e and tax-collectin g networ k was established , arme d band s harassed the Turks and recalcitran t Macedonians , and cache s of weapon s were conceale d in preparatio n for the great planne d uprising. 9 The IMR O state-within-a-stat e extende d from Macedoni a into Bulgaria. In the first years of the twentiet h centur y ther e were at least 35,000 Bulgarian citizen s who had been born in Macedonia, 10,000 of whom mad e their home s in Sofia. 10 Man y mor e Macedonian s and IMR O partisan s mad e Bulgaria a second hom e while on the run from the Turks. The tota l numbe r of Macedo nian s in Bulgaria was estimate d to be over 100,000, and in Sofia over 20,000, or nearl y one-thir d the populatio n of the capital. 11 Dakin , pp. 139-42, 178-83, 202. C. Anastasoff, The Tragic Peninsula (St. Louis, 1938), pp. 22-23, 41-45; V. Peskov, " Vutreshna makedonsk a organizatsiia : nachal o ι razvoi, " Makedonsh pregled, l, No . 1 (1924), 78-79. 10 Statisticheski godishmk na Bidgarskoto /sarstvo: godina puna, 1909 (Sofia, 1910), pp. 30, 36. 11 Dakin , pp. 48-49. 8

9

88

AGRARIAN UNIO N AND THE WARS

Man y of them found career s in the Bulgarian army, where they constitute d one-thir d of the officer corps, or in the civil service, where they mad e up an even larger proportio n of the governmen t bureaucracy. 12 Man y others , however, simply lived from day to day on the charit y of native citizens . In 1895 the numerou s Macedonia n societies in Bulgaria unite d in the Suprem e Macedo nian Committe e to organize aid for IMR O and to pressure the governmen t to suppor t the Macedonia n cause. They maintaine d their own press, openl y solicited funds to buy arms, and formed "Rifle Clubs " to train member s of the guerrilla bands. 13 The y were also well-represente d in the Nationa l Assembly, and they were not unwilling to use terro r against the few politica l figures who oppose d them . Fea r of assassination by IMR O may even have caused Ferdinan d and his generals to plunge Bulgaria into the hopeles s Secon d Balkan War rathe r tha n seek a compromis e with Greec e and Serbia. 14 IMR O received a temporar y setback in 1903 when its uprisin g on Ilinde n (St. Elias's Day, July 20/Aug. 2) was crushe d by the Turks. Even in failure, however, IMR O focused world opinio n on Turkish misrule in Macedonia . The inabilit y of the Port e to put into practic e the reform s it regularly and freely promise d continue d to gain sympath y for the organization. 15 The Ilinde n crisis was a squall on a relatively peaceful ocean . For the most part , the attentio n of Serbia was fixed on BosniaHerzegovin a to the north ; that of Greec e on Cret e to the south ; and Stambolo v and his successors preferre d peacefu l penetratio n of Macedoni a to an open break with the Porte. 16 While these condi tion s prevailed, Bulgaria gradually settled into the internationa l system, gaining recognitio n for both her new border s and her new prince . The revolt of the Young Turks upset the equilibriu m in the Balkans and provided the enemie s of the Port e with the opportunit y to Ibid. , p. 49; P. D . Krusev, "Nachalot o na makedonskii a vupros ν Bulgarna . Blagotvontelnit e komitet i 'edinstvo, ' " Makedonski pregled, xn, No . 3 (1940), 83-84. 13 Dakin , pp. 47-49 14 E. C. Helmreich , The Diplomacy of the Balkan Wars (Cambridge , Mass. , 1938), p. 365. 15 Anastasoff, pp. 89-96; Dakin , pp. 147-48; M. S. Anderson , pp. 270-71. 1β Μ S. Anderson , pp 222, 269. 12

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AGRARIAN UNION AND THE WARS

fish in troubled waters. Prince Ferdinand, who had long cherished the dream of throwing off the humiliating Turkish suzerainty, was among the first to take advantage of the Empire's disorganized state. On September 22/October 5, 1908, in conjunction with the Austrian annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, he proclaimed the complete independence of Bulgaria and assumed the title "tsar." This move had a practical as well as symbolic significance, for Ferdinand refused to compensate the Porte for the tribute Bulgaria had been accustomed to pay. Both sides prepared for war, but at the critical moment Russian diplomacy negotiated a compromise. Bulgaria paid £5,000,000 to the Empire for her independence, £1,720,000 of which was contributed by Russia. On April 3/16, 1909, the Turkish parliament recognized Bulgaria's full independence and the war scare ended.17 When news of the Young Turk revolution reached Sofia, Stamboliski welcomed it. Linking it to the Russian revolution of 1905, he rejoiced that the anachronism of absolute monarchy had been struck down in its last remaining strongholds. The two revolutions, he added, strengthened constitutional government throughout Europe.18 But Ferdinand's assumption of the tsarist title, the unity of the political parties behind this move, and the willingness of the country's political and military leaders to go to war confirmed his belief that the alliance between monarch and political parties that he had first described in 1904 had borne its fruit. The parties, in return for the spoils of office, had become merely a rubber stamp for Ferdinand's policies. Bulgaria, Stamboliski believed, was becoming the royal-military regime, symbolized by Ferdinand's assumption of his new title. In consequence, he became convinced that the destruction of the monarchy must be the immediate goal of the Agrarian Union, for Ferdinand and his imperialist ambitions would block further social and economic progress. In the years after the proclamation of independence, Ferdinand's power increased at home and on the international stage, 17 V. A. Zhebokntski, Bolgania nakanune balkanskikh vom (Kiev, 1960), pp. 122-27; J. A. R. Marriott, The Eastern Question: An Historical Study in European Diplomacy (Oxford, 1947), pp. 420-21. 18 Zemledelsko zname, vi, Nos. 74, 77 (July 19, 30, 1908).

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AGRARIAN UNION AND THE WARS

and he nearly achieved his dream of dominating the Balkans. Stamboliski, challenging, provoking, and defying him, came to represent the spirit of antimonarchism and antimilitarism. Their two face-to-face meetings, when Bulgaria entered and left the First World War, seemed themselves to decide the destiny of the nation. Not all the Agrarian leaders were immediately aware of the significance of Ferdinand's move. Stating the position of the BANU on the independence proclamation in the Zemledelsko zname, Alexander Dimitrov wrote: "This act is met with complete satisfaction on the part of the Bulgarian people, for the people themselves have desired it." He pointed out, however, that the BANU saw no need to change Ferdinand's title, and he added with considerable prescience that when a Grand National Assembly convened to ratify the change, it might be called on to make other, more damaging, alterations in the constitution.19 When the full cost of independence was revealed, Stamboliski disassociated the BANU from any part of it. He wrote that de jure recognition of the de facto independence Bulgaria already enjoyed could not compensate for the huge indemnity she would have to pay or for the loss of the privileged position of the exarchate in Ottoman territory, favored status vis-a-vis Ottoman customs, and access to Ottoman markets. This new independence was tainted by association with Ferdinand and his political lackeys, for it might well be used to "ensnare the country in a net of some kind of tsarism."20 On October 15, 1908, at the opening of the first regular session of the XIV National Assembly, the Agrarian parliamentary group refused to applaud Ferdinand's speech from the throne in which he formally announced Bulgaria's independence.21 Two days later, when the Assembly reconvened, Stamboliski read a protest signed by the Agrarian deputies, stating that the events of September 22 were in violation of the constitution, specifically of those articles naming the Bulgarian head-of-state "prince" and 19

Zemledelsko zname, vi, No. 93 (Sept. 26, 1908), 1. Zemledelsko zname, vi, No. 99 (Oct. 25, 1908), 1,. 21 Zemledelsko zname, vi, No. 98 (Oct. 22, 1908), 3. 20

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requiring the approval of a Grand National Assembly to amend the constitution.22 Moreover, the leaders of the BANU, in parliament and in the press, continued to use "prince" when referring to Ferdinand, although "tsar" had been adopted by all the promonarchist political parties. Stamboliski had expressed republican sentiments ever since he had begun to write for the Union press. After Ferdinand proclaimed himself tsar, he spared no effort to discredit the new independence, the institution of monarchy, and Ferdinand himself. Rather than bringing Bulgaria true independence, he wrote, Ferdinand's proclamation: ". . . in essence underlines [Bulgaria's] servile position under the rule of the personal regime, and it has placed the country in a more shameful position than even the most backward African province, that is, in complete guardianship, since its foreign policy and financial affairs have been turned over to Russia and Turkey."23 Commenting on the April 1909 counterrevolution in Constantinople, he pointedly argued that when the opportunity to do so presented itself, as it had to the Young Turks, the institution of monarchy should be destroyed root and branch.24 Soon after this, he wrote, in an article called "Even the Crimes of Crowned Heads Bring Benefits," that the crudest royal dynasty known to history was that of the Bourbons, "from which our own prince comes." "But the fact must be acknowledged," he continued, "that the rule, the tsardom, of the Bourbons has prepared the way for and inspired a republican movement in every country where they have set foot."25 Stamboliski was repeatedly criticized for the intemperateness of his attacks on Ferdinand. But he genuinely feared that the prince, who had so corrupted the political parties that he now dominated the government of the country and who lusted after greater prestige through greater conquests, would ultimately plunge Bulgaria into war to satisfy the drive of his monstrous vanity. The intemperateness of Stamboliski's language, which made 22

Dnevnitsi . Zemledelsko 24 Zemledelsko 25 Zemledelsko 23

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. na XIV ONS, purva redovna sesiia, pp. 5-6. zname, vii, No. 36 (March 21, 1909), 1. zname, VII, No. 42 (April 7, 1909), 1. zname, vn, No. 62 (June 18, 1909), 1.

AGRARIAN UNION AND THE WARS

him vulnerable to the charge of demagoguery, must be balanced against the accuracy of his assessment of Ferdinand's character and intentions. According to Stamboliski's conception of historical development, the chief supporter of monarchy, both in the original period of absolute monarchy and in the period of its modern resurgence, was the "military caste." Fearing that Ferdinand would follow the path of military adventure to strengthen himself at home and to make himself tsar not just of Bulgaria but of the Balkans, Stamboliski opposed the further expansion of the country's army and officer corps. He frequently cited statistics to show that, on the basis of military expenditures per person, the size of the army, and the size of the officer corps, Bulgaria was already one of the most thoroughly militarized countries in the world.26 Moreover, he argued, the army should reflect the needs of a peaceful, democratic state, not those of a tsarist empire. Speaking in the National Assembly on the military budget for 1911, he stated that the constitution limited the standing army during peacetime to one percent of the population, or about 40,000 men under arms. Yet the Bulgarian army already numbered 58,000 men and was still growing (on the eve of the Balkan Wars it numbered 87,150).27 To make this development even worse, the officer corps was steadily growing apart from the rest of society. It was turning into an elite caste convinced that the population existed only to serve its ambitions. To reverse the growing militarization of Bulgarian society, Stamboliski urged that the size of the army be reduced immediately. To reintegrate the officer corps into society, he proposed that the salaries and pensions of officers be lowered, that officers be tried in civil courts for the commission of civil crimes, that batmen be eliminated, that excessive ornamentation be removed from officers' uniforms, and that the relations between officers and men be democratized. He argued further that the Ministry of War should always have a civilian head and that a parliamentary commission should be established to oversee its expenditures.28 26 Zemledelsko zname, vn, No 16, vm, Nos 10, 13 (Jan. 10, Dec. 29, 1909, Jan. 13, 1910). 27 Statisticheski godishmk na biilgarskolo tsarstvo, godina chetvurta, 1912 (Sofia, 1915), p. 415. 28 Dnevnitsi . . . na XIV ONS, treta redovna sesiia, pp. 1538-39

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Stamboliski's remarks on the various financial scandals that had occurred in the Ministry of War so provoked a group of officers that they challenged him to duel one of their number. The quarrel, however, was resolved without an exchange of shots.29 Understanding the intimate connection that exists between an imperialist foreign policy and regressive domestic policies, Stamboliski and the other Agrarian leaders opposed the designs on Macedonia held by Ferdinand, the military, and the government. Tsanko Tserkovski, for example, denounced the "patriots" in the country who were inflaming national passions against the Turks: Bulgaria has only just begun her economic development, and her forces day by day must be devoted exclusively to this economic advance, which alone is the source of national wellbeing and of political and civil freedom. By trifling with the Macedonian question, our "patented patriots" misdirect society's attention and divert the productive forces of the country from their proper channel. A burdensome military budget will again drain our state treasury, and an army of many thousands maintained on a war footing will again have to be supported.30 Commenting on the events of 1908-1909, Stamboliski wrote that of the three traditional aims of Bulgarian foreign policy— gaining full independence, making the prince a tsar, and liberating the Bulgarian Macedonians from Turkish oppression—two had now been achieved without a war. As for the third, he believed that the establishment of a constitutional government by the Young Turks would put an end to the racial and religious oppression practiced by the Ottoman government. There would no longer be any need to "liberate" Macedonia. In reality, he continued, in a perceptive critique of Ferdinand's foreign policy, the program to liberate Macedonia was making Bulgaria herself a vassal of the foreign banks and governments that advanced the capital for her militarization. Like Tserkovski, he concluded that the only genuine independence was that achieved through economic growth.31 Ultimately, he maintained, the ideal solution to 29

Zemledelsko zname, ix, No. 1 (Dec. 11, 1910), 1. Zemledelsko zname, vni, No. 23 (Feb. 17, 1910), 1. 31 Zemledelsko zname, vm, No. 42-43 (April 27, 1910), 1.

30

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the problems of Balkan politics would be a federation of all the Balkan states.32 Early in 1911 the Malinov government dissolved the XIV National Assembly and announced that elections for the longawaited V Grand National Assembly33 would be held on June 5. The suspicions of the Agrarian leaders were confirmed when the proposed constitutional amendments were made public. In addition to changing the words "prince" and "principality" to "tsar" and "tsardom" wherever necessary, they provided for increasing the civil list and, above all, changing Article Seventeen to allow the tsar to conclude secret treaties without the knowledge or approval of the National Assembly. The contempt of the Agrarian leaders for the political parties, their loathing for Ferdinand, and their fear of the militarization of the country came to a head in their campaign against the proposed constitutional amendments. Depicting the election as a battle, perhaps a decisive battle, between monarchism and democracy, they reviled Ferdinand in terms that no previous campaign had seen.34 On the very eve of the balloting, the Zemledelsko zname published a cartoon, "A Fateful Political Operation," in which the frock-coated leaders of the political parties, directed by Ferdinand, were shown cutting the heart from a young girl labeled "constitution." An angry peasant, one hand raised in a fist labeled "BANU" watched through the doorway. The accompanying "Appeal to the Bulgarian Voters" warned the peasants that a vote for the political parties favoring the changes in the constitution would be a betrayal of the Bulgarian and Russian heroes who fell 32

Zemledelsko zname, vm, No 50 (May 22, 1910), 1. According to the constitution a Grand National Assembly was required to elect the monarch and to approve any alteration of the country's borders or modification of the constitution. It differed from an Ordinary National Assembly in that it was twice as large and met at Turnovo Previous Grand National Assemblies had been held in 1879 to elect Alexander Battenberg to the throne, in 1881 to suspend the constitution, in 1887 to elect Ferdinand, and in 1893 to correct some minor inconsistencies in the wording of some constitutional provisions and to formulate religious requirements for the heir to the throne. L. Lamouche, La Bulgarie (Paris, 1923), p. 47. 34 Zemledelsko zname, ix, Nos. 45-46, 47 (May 18, 22, 1911). 33

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in the struggle for Bulgaria's freedom. It concluded with a ringing "DOWN WITH MONARCHISM, LONG LIVE DEMOCRACY!" 35

Appeals to love of democracy, however, rarely overcome appeals to nationalism, at least until the full consequences of the latter are apparent. Such was the case in this campaign. The BANU failed to increase the proportion of the vote it received in the preceding legislative elections.36 Fifty-five Agrarians were elected and, combined with approximately twenty Social Democrats and Radical Democrats,37 they made up a bloc of about seventy-five opposition votes from a total of 463. 38 Although the election of the fifty-five Agrarian deputies meant that "Once Again the Honor of Bulgaria Is Saved," as the headline in Zemledelsko zname expressed it, it was obvious that the approval of the proposed constitutional amendments by a large majority was a foregone conclusion. Stamboliski and the other Agrarian leaders, however, were not prepared to accept Ferdinand's victory passively. On June 8, the day before the convening of the Grand National Assembly, the Agrarian deputies gathered in Turnovo to plan their strategy. By the time they came together, the Social Democratic factions and the Radical Democrats had already suggested that all deputies opposed to the constitutional changes submit a formal protest to the government and remain silent during Ferdinand's opening speech. This course of action seemed too passive to Stamboliski, who was against following the lead of the smaller Socialist and Radical Democratic groups in any case. Wishing to make the BANU's opposition as 35 36

89.

37

Zemledelsko zname, ix, No. 50 (June 1, 1911), 1-2. Statisticheski godishnik na bulgarskoto tsarstvo, godina chetviirta, pp. 388-

The Radical Democrats, led by Naicho Tsanov, were a small splinter party composed mainly of intellectuals who broke away from the Democratic party in 1905. They represented the "loyal intelligentsia opposition" in the country, being opposed to corruption and generally on the side of democratic government. The populist writer Todor Vlaikov was one of the leaders of the party. 38 Zemledelsko zname, ix, No. 51 (June 9, 1911), 1; Genennerisey to Cruppi (Sofia, June 10/23, 1911), AMAE, Bulgarie. politique interieure, nouvelle serie, iv, 113. Because several candidates were elected in more than one district, the final count of deputies was smaller TheDnevmtsi of the Assembly reported a total of 426, of which 71 belonged to the opposition.

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dramati c as possible and , at the very least, to embarras s Ferdinan d on his day of triumph , Stambolisk i decide d that nothin g less than the disruptio n of the openin g session would suifice. After plannin g an appropriat e demonstration , the Agrarian group selected a commission , led by Tserkovski, to invite the Social Democrat s and Radica l Democrat s to join the protest. 39 Tserkovski also went to Ivan Geshov , whose Nationa l Liberal part y in coalitio n with the Progressive Liberals had the majorit y of the deputies , to inform him that the Β ANU did not acknowledg e the right of the princ e to open the Assembly and that if he were allowed to do so the governmen t would bear full responsibilit y for the consequences . Geshov , of course , did not cance l the ceremony , but he did issue instruction s to his majorit y not to be silent in its suppor t for Fer dinand. 40 The V Gran d Nationa l Assembly met in the hall of the public library, "Nadezhda. " By 8:30 on the mornin g of Jun e 9, the Agrarian deputie s had taken their seats on the left. The y were joined by the Broad and Narro w Socialists and the Radica l Demo crats. At 9:45 the echoe s of a twenty-on e gun salute announce d that Ferdinan d and his entourag e had left the royal residence , and at 10:30 a second salute announce d thei r arrival before the Assembly. Ferdinand , accompanie d by two of his children , was met at the entranc e of the hall by the Counci l of Ministers . After exchangin g a few words with the prince , Gesho v turne d to the deputies to proclaim : "The Tsar of Bulgaria enters!" 4 1 As Ferdinan d proceede d to the rostrum , the majorit y stood , applauded , and cheered , while the Agrarians, Socialists, and Radical s remaine d in thei r seats, ignorin g the entrance . As soon as Ferdinan d began to address the Assembly, Stambolisk i rose and in a "sharp , clear tone " interrupted : "Deputies , accordin g to the constitutio n the princ e does not have the right to open the Gran d Nationa l Assembly. . . . " Before he could finish, Gesho v mad e a sign to the majority , which cam e to its feet, applaudin g and cheerin g Fer dinand . While Stambolisk i remaine d standing , the oppositio n Zemledelsko zname, lx, No. 52 (June 2, 1911),3 . Zemledelsko zname, ix, Nos . 52, 53 (June 12, 15, 1911). 41 The ceremony is described in Dnevnitsi (stenografski) na peroto veliko narodno siibrame, pp. 1-2. 39

40

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deputie s pounde d on the tables and chante d "Down with the toadies!" Ferdinan d turne d pale and his son and daughte r were visibly frightened . When the uproa r subsided, Stambolisk i began again: "This is usurpation . . . . " Onc e mor e the majorit y broke into cheer s and applause , while the oppositio n shoute d and banged the floor with their chairs . When silence returne d for the thir d time , Stambolisk i conclude d his statement : "In the nam e of representativ e governmen t and in the nam e of the Agrarian, Socialist , and Radica l groups, we protes t most strongly." Returnin g to thei r seats, the oppositio n deputie s opene d newspaper s and converse d audibly, while Ferdinan d struggled throug h his speech , readin g it rapidly and in a shakin g voice. Durin g the recessional , the oppositio n deputie s again remaine d seated, ignorin g the ceremony . As soon as Ferdinan d had departed , a furious shoutin g matc h broke out between the majorit y and the opposition . Cries of "Traitors!" and "Unpatriotic! " alternate d with "Lon g live the republic!" and "Down with the violator s of the constitution! " Even the closing prayer did not bring peace between the two sides. When the priest mentione d the "Tsar of Bulgaria" in his benedic tion , the oppositio n shouted : "Prince , prince , he' s still a prince! " On that bitter not e the first session of the V Gran d Nationa l Assembly cam e to an end. 42 Durin g the course of the Assembly, the Agrarian deputie s followed thei r demonstratio n with well-reasone d criticism of the propose d constitutiona l changes . But it was the "Stambolisk i scandal " tha t capture d the attentio n of the public . The reactio n was not at first favorable, for the Agrarian Unio n was immedi ately brande d as extremist and disloyal. 43 In the election s for the XV Nationa l Assembly that were held on Septembe r 4, 1911, the numbe r of votes received by the BANU fell to 72,905, a drop of nearl y 30 percent. 44 Moreover , perhap s to avenge the injured digZemledelsko zname, ix, No . 52 (Jun e 12, 1911), 1; I. Fichev , Balkanskata voina, 1912-1913: prezhivehtsi, belizhh ι documenti (Sofia, 1940), pp. 33-34; Genennense y to Crupp i (Sofia, Jun e 10/23 , 1911), AMAE, Bulgane, politique interieure, nouvelle sine, iv, 113. 43 Fichev , p. 34; Turlakov , Istoriia, ρ 101. 44 Statislicheski godishnik na bulgarskoto tsarstvo, godina chetviirta, p. 391 42

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nity of Tsar Ferdinand , governmen t authoritie s engaged in muc h mor e fraud and intimidatio n of voters than had been practice d in recen t elections . Stambolisk i himself was disqualified when an "irregularity" was found in his registratio n of candidacy. 45 Only four Agrarian deputies , Dragiev, Tserkovski, Dimitu r Strashimirov , and Stefan Drenkov , the last two from Turnov o District , were returned . Of the othe r oppositio n groups in the V Gran d Nationa l Assembly, only four Broad Socialists won, while not a single Narro w Socialist or Radica l was elected . It seemed that the strategy of the Agrarian Unio n had been repudiated , while Tsar Ferdinan d and his allies had scored a great victory. 46 This conclusion , however, failed to comprehen d the full significance of the BANU' s conduct . N o amoun t of "responsible " oppositio n could have blocked the passage of the propose d constitutiona l changes . Convince d that Ferdinan d and the politica l partie s were set on a course of absolutism at hom e and imperialis m in foreign policy that would lead to disaster, Stambolisk i and the othe r Agrarian leader s chose to presen t their oppositio n dramaticall y throug h an act of politica l theater . Event s demonstrate d the soundnes s of thei r judgment . When the Secon d Balkan War ended , Stamboliski' s protes t was vividly remembered . On Septembe r 16/29 , 1911, twelve days after the election s in Bulgaria, Italy declare d war on the Ottoma n Empire . This war, which dragged on for over a year, encourage d Balkan statesme n to seek an immediat e solution to the proble m of Macedonia . The new Bulgarian government , a coalitio n led by Ivan Gesho v of the Nationa l part y and Stoian Dane v of the Progressive Liberal party, mad e contac t with Belgrade. In October , negotiation s for a Serbian-Bulgaria n allianc e began in Sofia. Russian diplomac y aided the negotiations , and on Februar y 29/Marc h 13, 1912, an allianc e was signed. It obliged each countr y to com e to the other' s aid in the event of war with Austria-Hungary , Rumania , or Turkey. Mor e importantly , it established a tentativ e division of the Zemledelsko zname, ix, No . 79-80 (Sept . 8, 1911), 3; Turlakov , Istoriia, pp. 102-103. 46 Zemledelsko zname, ix, No s 79-80, 82 (Sept . 8, 15, 1911); Paleologu e to Selves (Sofia, Sept. 6/19 , 1911), AMAE, Bulgane: politique inteneure, nouvelle serie, ιν , 122. 45

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spoils in Macedonia. Should Ottoman rule there be brought to an end, Bulgaria was to have possession of all territory south and east of a line running from Mt. Goliam on the Bulgarian frontier to the northern tip of Lake Okhrid. Serbia was to receive all Ottoman territory north and east of the Sar Mountains. The area lying between these two regions remained a "contested zone," whose fate was to be left to the arbitration of the Russian Emperor.47 While negotiations with Serbia were in progress, Geshov put out feelers toward Greece. Discussions between the two countries began in Sofia in February and were concluded in April. They resulted in an alliance, defensive in form, offensive in intent, directed against Turkey. No provision was made, however, for a future division of territory. In June, the adherence of Montenegro completed the formation of the Balkan League.48 While the Balkan states were concluding their alliances and during the rest of 1912 while their general staffs discussed the accompanying military conventions, the situation in Macedonia was becoming more unsettled. Contrary to the expectations of Stamboliski and of the Porte's friends among the western powers, the Young Turk government proved to be even less tolerant of nonTurkish minorities than the regime of Abdul Hamid had been. It followed a policy of rigid centralization and Turkification that both touched off a wave of revolt within the Empire and fueled the fires of national sentiment in the surrounding countries.49 In November 1911 the Turks in the Macedonian town of Shtip, with the tacit cooperation of the local authorities, carried out a pogrom against the Bulgarian community, killing and wounding over two hundred.50 In the Bulgarian press the Shtip massacre provoked a campaign for war which was fervently supported by the Macedonian societies. In response, the National Assembly hurriedly 47

Helmreich, pp. 47-56; Marriott, pp. 446-47; E. C. Thaden, Russia and the Balkan Alliance of 19]2 (University Park, Penn., 1965), p. 78 48 Helmreich, pp. 67-88; Dakin, pp. 436-40. 49 L. S. Stavnanos, "Balkan Federation. A History of the Movement toward Balkan Unity in Modern Times," Smith College Studies in History, XXVII, No. 1-4 (Oct. 1941-July 1942), 158-59. 50 Zhebokritski, Nakanune, p. 187; Anastasoff, pp. 170-71.

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passed a resolution approving in advance any steps the government might choose to take against the Turks. The Agrarian deputies put forward a milder alternative resolution, but it was rejected.51 Near the end of July, in the small town of Kochana, two 1MRO bombs exploded in the marketplace, killing several Turks. In retaliation the Turks subjected the Christian population to a pogrom in which Turkish soldiers and irregulars openly took part.52 This massacre provoked hundreds of mass meetings and demonstrations in Bulgaria. By coincidence Bulgaria's most patriotic holiday, the anniversary of the battle for Shipka Pass, was celebrated at the height of the campaign for war. The Russian ambassador, Nekliudov, was amazed at the martial spirit displayed by the normally phlegmatic Bulgarians on this occasion, and he concluded at once that war was inevitable.53 Ferdinand and the Bulgarian government were as eager for war as was "public opinion," but they were not to be pushed into precipitate action. The planning of military operations continued quietly until September 15/28, when the all-important military conventions between Serbia and Bulgaria were finally agreed upon. On the same day the Balkan states announced the beginning of "maneuvers." This was followed two days later by full mobilization. On September 25/October 8, in accordance with the Bulgarian-Montenegran treaty, King Nikita of Montenegro opened hostilities against the Porte.54 The negotiations between the Balkan states were, of course, completely secret. Nevertheless, the growing war sentiment in the press, tacitly encouraged by the government, and the rapid build-up of the army made it obvious that war with Turkey was on the minds of the country's leaders. At the XIII Congress of the BANU, held in Sofia on November 8-11, 1911, the nearly four thousand delegates overwhelmingly approved the conduct of the Agrarian deputies in the V Grand National Assembly and urged the Governing Council to state fully the Union's position on the 51 52 53 54

Zhebokritski,iViiton«ne,pp. 187-88 Ibid., p. 198. A. Nekliudoff, Diplomatic Reminiscences (New York, 1920), pp. 101-103. Helmreich, pp. 105-34.

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Macedonian question in the Zemledelsko zname. The task of carrying out this request was assigned to Stoian Omarchevski.55 In a matter that was to prove not unrelated, the XIII Congress also witnessed a debate over the question of the BANU's relations with the intelligentsia. Noting that many members of the intelligentsia had supported the Agrarian position in the V Grand National Assembly, some of the delegates proposed that they be allowed to join the Union and to play an active role in its affairs. Both Stamboliski and Dragiev spoke against this proposal, warning that, however much members of the intelligentsia might agree with the BANU on particular issues, their permanent estate interests were not those of the peasantry. They put forward a counterproposal requiring five years prior membership in the Union for every individual who sought national office as an Agrarian. It was approved by a large majority.56 The debate and vote on the question of intelligentsia membership underlined the importance Stamboliski placed on maintaining the purity of the BANU, the dedication of its members to the peasant estate. Unfortunately the action came too late. Dimitur Strashimirov, one of the four Agrarian deputies elected to the XV National Assembly, almost immediately demonstrated the soundness of Stamboliski's judgment. Strashimirov was a journalist and historian, whose volumes on the Bulgarian uprising of 1876 are still considered valuable. Although he was born in Varna, his researches into Macedonian history had made him a passionate advocate of the Macedonian cause. It is not clear how he came to 55 Zemledelsko zname, ix, No. 96-97 (Nov. 17, 1911), 1-3; x, No. 2 (Dec. 8, 1911), 2. At the age of sixteen, Omarchevski founded the first Agrarian druzhba in Nova Zagora, his native town. Becoming the BANU's principal link with student radicals, he continued to form druzhbi in the schools he attended. These were numerous, for he was frequently expelled, and in 1907 he had to flee the country after leading a demonstration of Sofia University students against Ferdinand He spent two years, first in Belgrade then in Zagreb, as a student of philosophy, returning to Bulgaria in 1909 to become the BANU's specialist on education. He contributed many articles on this subject to the Zemledelsko zname and later wrote two books on the place of education in Agrarian theory. He served as Minister of Education in Stamboliski's cabinet. 56 Zemledelsko zname, ix, No. 96-97 (Nov. 17, 1911), 1-2.

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join the BANU, but it was probably because of the Union's opposition to monarchism.57 In any case, he was one of the most prominent Agrarian deputies in the V Grand National Assembly and, ironically, was chosen to deliver the BANU's principal speech against allowing Ferdinand to conclude secret treaties. After the Shtip massacre, however, his Macedonian patriotism began to take precedence over his commitment to Union discipline. In the National Assembly, in the press, and at the "nonpartisan" demonstrations that were held to protest the massacre, he called on the government to "stand on its feet" in Macedonia.58 Both Stamboliski and Omarchevski opposed the campaign for war. Stamboliski acknowledged the right of individuals to speak in favor of war, but he warned the government that it would be a mistake to give in to their demands. "Unfortunate incidents," such as the Shtip massacre, he wrote, should not be allowed to threaten peace or to destroy Bulgaria's friendly relations with Turkey.59 Although he believed that they should do more to prevent such occurrences, Omarchevski refused to hold the Young Turks responsible for the Shtip outrage. In any case, he wrote, those who sought war against the exploiters of Bulgarians should begin in Bulgaria. The solution to the problem of Balkan politics, he maintained, lay in the spread of estatist ideas and organizations throughout the region. Ultimately, this would put an end to imperialism and lead to a federation of all the Balkan states including Turkey.60 Strashimirov dissented from the position of Stamboliski and Omarchevski, arguing that the Young Turk government was not interested in protecting minorities and that the great powers lacked the will to force it to do so. While he was not for immediate war, neither was he for peace at any price. He warned simply that Bulgaria must not tolerate such outrages as the massacre at Shtip.61 57

S. Drenkov, Andabata D. T. Strashimirov, published as an insert in Zemledelsko zname, xi, No. 51 (Feb. 27, 1914), p. 7. 58 Zhebokritski, Nakanune, p. 187. 59 Zemledelsko zname, x, Nos. 5, 7 (Dec. 19, 25, 1911). 60 Zemledelsko zname, x, Nos. 2, 3, 6 (Dec. 8, 12, 22, 1911) 61 Zemledelsko zname, x, No. 11-12 (Jan. 12, 1912), 3.

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Strashimirov's belligerent tone drew protests from several druzhbi, and in February 1912 a meeting of the Governing Council was held to discuss his conduct. The council criticized the intemperateness of some of his speeches and articles but decided to leave the final judgment on his conduct to the next annual congress. In the meantime, the furor over the Shtip massacre having abated, the Council recommended that the Zemledelsko zname close its pages to debate on the Macedonian question.62 The compromise imposed by the Governing Council remained in effect until the end of July, when the massacre at Kochana took place. Caught up in the rising war sentiment, Strashimirov added his voice to those calling for the immediate liberation of Macedonia. While he participated in nearly all the pro-war public demonstrations in the capital, the Zemledelsko zname hastened to assure its readers that he acted as an individual and in no way represented the BANU's position or committed it to any course of action.63 Stamboliski and Omarchevski began openly to restate their opposition to war with Turkey. Omarchevski argued that the nationalist furor over Macedonia was being used by Ferdinand and the political parties to distract the people from the obvious need for domestic social reforms. The leaders of the political parties, who were now calling for revenge against the shedding of Bulgarian blood, themselves had shed the blood of Bulgarians at Krasen, Trustenik, and Shabla-Durankulak. The real enemies of the Bulgarian people, he continued, were absolutism, reactionary social policies, and blind nationalism, against which all peoples, Bulgarians, Turks, Serbs, and Greeks, should unite.64 Stamboliski denounced the criticism of the Turks as fraudulent, for the massacre at Kochana, as well as other Turkish outrages, were in fact provoked by IMRO terrorism. If Bulgaria had a genuine grievance against Turkey, he continued, the proper course would be to seek the mediation of the great powers. And he repeated the timeworn 62

Zemledelsko zname, x, No. 21 (Feb. 13, 1912), 3-4. Zhebokritski, Nakanune, pp. 198-205; Zemledelsko zname, x, Nos 69, 74 (Aug. 8,27, 1912). 64 Zemledelsko zname, x, Nos. 69, 74 (Aug. 8, 27, 1912). 63

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argument, as true as it is unavailing, that the men who led Bulgaria to war would not be the ones to die in it. On the day that mobilization was decreed, Stamboliski reprinted excerpts from previous antiwar articles and asked the people to reject the "warlovers."65 With mobilization, however, came the imposition of military censorship, and Zemledelsko zname was forced to cease publication. In the National Assembly, in an atmosphere of near-hysteria, Geshov promised the deputies that war would bring peace, progress, and culture to the Balkans.66 To thunderous applause, Strashimirov gave the support of "our parliamentary group" to the government.67 Dragiev and Tserkovski, who had refused their consent to Strashimirov's act, decided that it was pointless to speak out in the Assembly.68 They had worked for years to prevent war; now it was clear that war could not be prevented. The Balkan League was an admirably designed instrument for driving the Turks from Europe but not for securing the fruits of victory for Bulgaria. Despite the painstaking efforts Bulgarian statesmen lavished on the formation of the League, they had been unable to reach a complete and mutually satisfactory agreement with Serbia on a future territorial settlement. With Greece they had no agreement at all. Moreover, geography dictated that Bulgaria's armies advance against the Turks in Thrace, while her true objective, the liberation of Macedonia, had to be left to her allies. Thus the preparations for the First Balkan War also laid the groundwork for the second, interallied conflict. When war began, however, Bulgarian statesmen lost sight of the shortcomings of the Balkan League as far as their own national interests were concerned. Bulgaria's magnificent victories, and those of her allies, in the first weeks of the war, seemed to justify all the risks. On October 5/18, the day after war was formally declared, the main forces of the Bulgarian army crossed the frontier and attacked the strong Turkish positions at Lozengrad 65

Zemledelsko zname, x.Nos 70, 71,80(Aug 11,16, Sept 7,1912). Dnevnitsi na XV ONS, pitrva redovna sesiia, p. 6. 67 Ibid., p. 12 68 Zemledelsko zname, xi, No. 27 (Dec. 24, 1913), 1-2. 66

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(Kirk Kilisse), northeast of Adrianople. After two days of hard fighting, the Turkish forces were overwhelmed and fled in panic. The Bulgarians pursued them to Lule-Burgas, where a week-long battle took place. At the end of it, the Turks were once again in disorganized retreat. The remnants of their army fell back to the Chatalja line, the last fortified defense of Constantinople. By the beginning of November, one Bulgarian army stood in front of that line while another invested the Turkish fortress at Adrianople. At this point the Turks appealed for mediation and approached the Bulgarians with offers of a truce. Meanwhile, in Macedonia, the Serbs and Greeks met with equal success. After defeating the main Turkish forces at Kumanovo on October 9/22, the Serbs pushed on to Prilep and Bitolj, driving the Turks back upon the guns of the advancing Greeks. Early in November the Serbs occupied Okhrid, the medieval capital of Macedonia. The Greeks gained their principal objective, Salonika, on October 26/November 8, arriving barely ahead of a Bulgarian force that was also hurrying toward the city. Only the Montenegrans, besieging the fortress of Scutari, were unable to claim a major victory. Thus, in just over three weeks the Turks were driven out of Europe to their last line of defense around Constantinople. Turkey-in-Europe was reduced to the three remaining strongholds—Scutari, Ianina, and Adrianople— all under siege by the Allies. The war could, and should, have ended soon after the victory of the Bulgarians at Lule-Burgas. Indeed, the Bulgarian General Staff advised the tsar to grant the Turkish request for an armistice, for all the military objectives except the capture of Adrianople had been achieved.69 As the extent of the Turkish defeat in Thrace became apparent, however, Ferdinand's ambition grew. Not since the days of Tsar Simeon had Bulgarian troops stood at the walls of Constantinople. Perhaps Bulgaria's new tsar could succeed where that medieval monarch had failed. Ferdinand actually convinced himself that since the Turks had proved to be hopelessly weak, the Great Powers would welcome Bulgaria's control over the Straits as an alternative to the expansion of Russian influence there. He 69

Fichev, pp. 200-201.

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even began to dream of reconcilin g Orthodo x and Catholi c Christendo m at a solemn mass of his own devising in Hagia Sophia. 70 Consequently , he ignored the Turkish request for an armistic e and ordere d the army to take the Ottoma n capital . Unfortunately , heavy autum n rain s mad e transportatio n and communications in Thrac e all but impossible. Only slowly and with great hardshi p could the army facing the Chatalj a line be reinforced , supplied , and organize d for an assault. In the meantime , the Turk s were able to prepar e an adequat e defense. The Bulgarian advance , when it finally came , was repulsed at a cost to the attacker s of ten to fifteen thousan d men . Tsar Ferdinand , with his army now weakened and his earlier victories somewha t tarnished , agreed to an armistic e on Novembe r 20/Decembe r 3. 7 1 Peac e negotiation s between Turke y and the Balkan League began in Decembe r and continue d unti l Januar y 9/22 , 1913, when the Turks at last agreed to relinquis h all thei r claims to territor y in Europe . This concessio n led to a coup d'etat in Constantinople , and Enver Bey, leader of the extrem e nationalist s cam e to power. Hostilitie s between Turke y and the League were at onc e resumed . N o furthe r attemp t was mad e on the Chatalj a line, but on Februar y 21/Marc h 6 the Greek s capture d Ianina , and twent y days later Adrianopl e surrendere d to the Bulgarians . Finally , on April 10/23 , the Montenegra n and Serbian siege of Scutar i at last succeeded , althoug h the town was immediatel y turne d over to an internationa l force supplied by the Grea t Powers. Peac e negotia tion s were resume d on May 7/20 , and ten days later the Treat y of Londo n was signed, endin g the war. The surrende r of Turke y hastene d the break-u p of the Balkan League. At the beginnin g of the war, Serbia had expecte d to extend her border s to the Adriatic . Ital y and Austria-Hungar y blocked Serbia' s westward expansio n by insisting upon the creation of an independen t Albanian state. Serbia thereupo n demande d compensatio n in Macedonia , claimin g the whole of the "conteste d zone " and territor y tha t previously had been definiNekhudoff , pp. 116-20; Helmreich , p. 201. Helmreich , pp. 201-203; Fichev , pp. 202-204; V. A. Zhebokritski , Bolgariia ν period balkanskikh win, 1912-1913 (Kiev, 1961), pp. 76-78. 70

71

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tively assigned to Bulgaria. Greece, too, adopted an uncompromising attitude. Greek statesmen only with reluctance had permitted a token Bulgarian force to share in the occupation of Salonika, and they now refused to consider the Bulgarian claims to the city. Moreover, Rumania came forward to demand compensation for her neutrality. On April 25/May 8, an arbitration commission awarded Rumania part of the Dobruja, including the city of Silistra, but this served only to whet the appetites of that country's leaders.72 During May, Serbia and Greece came to terms on a new division of Macedonia, based on the principle of effective occupation, and agreed to present a united front to Bulgaria and to seek the cooperation of Rumania.73 Sensing the impending dissolution of the league and faced at home with a nationalist outcry against any concessions to the "allies," Geshov resigned. He was replaced by the uncompromising Danev, who refused to consider any modification of Bulgaria's demands. To the remonstrances of Serbia and Greece he replied, truthfully but not tactfully, that Bulgaria had borne the brunt of the fighting, suffered the greatest losses, and should therefore make the greatest gains. Relations between Bulgaria and the allies grew increasingly tense as both sides hastened to strengthen their forces in Macedonia. Public opinion in each country called for war, and the Bulgarian General Staff, concerned about unrest among the troops, insisted that Bulgaria either fight or demobilize. When the Russian foreign ministry rejected Bulgaria's request to render a judgment on Macedonia within seven days, Danev and Tsar Ferdinand ordered the army to attack the Serbian and Greek positions.74 The surprise attack failed. Serbia and Greece opened full-scale hostilities and were quickly joined by Montenegro. Rumania mobilized and demanded further concessions in return for continued neutrality. Receiving no reply from Danev, she sent her army across the frontier, beginning an unopposed march toward Sofia. Two days later, the Turks attacked the Bulgarian forces that remained in Thrace, recapturing Adrianople. Faced with overwhelming odds, Bulgaria accepted armistice terms on July 18/31. 72 74

108

Helmreich, pp. 300-307, 341-51 ra Dakin, pp. 459-60. Helmreich, pp. 354-63; Zhebokritski, Period, pp. 183-89.

AGRARIAN UNIO N AND THE WARS

Ten days later the Treat y of Buchares t was signed, strippin g Bulgaria of nearl y all her gains. Only a small portio n of eastern Macedoni a was left to her, while Rumani a took all of the Dob ruja. The Dane v governmen t resigned in disgrace, and a Liberal coalitio n unde r Vasil Radoslavo v took its place. In a later settlemen t with Turkey, Bulgaria relinquishe d the greater part of Thrace , includin g Adrianopl e and Lozengrad. 75 After the treat y with Turke y was signed, Radoslavo v dissolved parliamen t and schedule d election s for the XVI Nationa l Assembly for Novembe r 24. The Balkan Wars disrupte d the organizatio n of the Agrarian Union . Man y of its member s were in uniform , and censorshi p mad e publicatio n of the Zemledelsko zname impossible. Insofa r as they were able, the Agrarian leader s visited the druzhbi to encour age the peasant s to retain at least a skeleton organizatio n in the village. On the othe r hand , man y Unio n member s formed secret druzhbi within the army, which disturbe d the militar y authorities. 76 With the end of the war, demobilization , and the lifting of censorship , politica l activity again becam e possible. The Zemledelsko zname resume d publicatio n on August 23, urging the druzhbi to reorganiz e and to send dues to the Unio n headquarters . The peasant s were also informe d tha t Strashimiro v had been expelled from the Agrarian parliamentar y group. 77 If the wars temporaril y disorganize d the BANU , they perma nentl y discredite d the partie s of Gesho v and Dane v and weakened the hold of all the established partie s on the country . In the postwar electio n campaign , the Agrarian leader s laid the blame for Bulgaria's catastroph e squarely on Tsar Ferdinan d and the political parties . The governin g Liberals, however, attempte d to place the full burde n of guilt on Gesho v and Dane v alone . Moreover , they claime d that the antiwar positio n of the BANU contribute d to Bulgaria's defeat. Agrarian "traitors, " they maintained , were not fit to sit in the Nationa l Assembly.78 The electio n was a vindicatio n of the Agrarian Union' s posi75 76 77 78

Helmreich , pp. 380-410; Zhebokntski , Period, pp. 226-50. Zhebokntski , Period, p. 200. Zemledelsko zname, x, No . 81 (Aug. 23, 1913), 1-4. Zemledelsko zname, xi, Nos . 1, 13, 15 (Oct . Ι,Νον . 7, 14, 1913).

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tion. Despite the fact that the Dobruja, formerly an Agrarian stronghold, had been lost to Rumania, the Union received over 100,000 votes. Together, the BANU, the two socialist parties, and the Radical Democrats—the four groups that had resisted Ferdinand in the V Grand National Assembly—outpolled the Liberals, winning 45.5 percent of the vote. This swing of the Bulgarian electorate away from the established parties, a movement that Bulgaria's defeat in the First World War was to complete, is shown in Table 3. 79 TABLE 3 ELECTIONS FOR THE XVI NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, NOVEMBER 24,

Party Liberal Coalition BANU Broad Socialist Narrow Socialist Democratic National (Geshovist) Radical Democratic Progressive Liberal (Danevist) Others Total

1913

%of

Deputies elected

Votes

votes

95 48 17 18 15 5 5 1 0 204

207,763 113,761 55,171 54,217 42,971 24,344 24,007 11,863 9,333 543,430

38.2 20.9 10.2 10.0 7.9 4.5 4.4 2.2 1.6 100.0

Twelve days after the elections, the XIV congress of the BANU convened in Sofia. It was faced with two major tasks, both related to Union discipline. The first was to sit in judgment on Strashimirov and three other, less important Union members who had broken with the Union's antiwar position. The second was to determine the course of action that the Agrarian parliamentary group would follow in the XVI National Assembly. Strashimirov defended himself by recalling the crimes against the Bulgarian Macedonians. Turkish misrule, he argued, fully justified the war for the liberation of Macedonia. He disclaimed any responsibility for the decision of Ferdinand and Danev to attack 79 Statistwheski godishnik na bulgarskoto tsarstvo: godim X-XIV, 1913-1922 (Sofia, 1924), section xm, p. 57; Zhebokritski, Period, p. 274.

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the allies, for he had never supported that decision. If, he concluded, his views on the war differed from those of the majority in the BANU, it was still his right as a free man and citizen to hold to his own position. Strashimirov's address was answered by Stamboliski and Alexander Dimitrov, both of whom pointed out that they did not challenge Strashimirov's rights as a free man and citizen, but as a member of the Agrarian Union. His support of the governnent's war policy, they maintained, misrepresented the position of the Union at a critical time, causing the peasantry to doubt the sincerity of the BANU's opposition to the war. Moreover, Strashimirov flouted Union discipline by campaigning for war in defiance of the directive of the Governing Council. Concurring with Stamboliski and Dimitrov, the delegates voted to expel Strashimirov from the Union forever.80 The three lesser Union members who had publicly supported the war were put on probation and forbidden to seek office as Agrarians. Several delegates also wanted to punish Dragiev and Tserkovski for not speaking out against the war in the National Assembly. The two men admitted that they had made an error in judgment, but reminded the delegates that, considering the confused, almost hysterical, state of the Assembly on the eve of the war, their protest would have carried no weight. The congress voted to exonerate them.81 In the elections to the XVI National Assembly, no party had been able to win a majority.82 Alexander Malinov, leader of the Democratic party,83 had already approached Stamboliski with the suggestion that the BANU join with the Democrats, Socialists, and Radical Democrats to form an anti-Liberal governing coalition. 80

Zemledelsko zname, xi, No. 26 (Dec. 19, 1913), 1-2. Zemledelsko zname, xi, No. 29 (Dec. 21, 1913), 2. 82 These elections were the first in Bulgaria to be held under a system of proportional representation within each province This change in the electoral law naturally favored minority parties. Yet it is doubtful that with only 38.2% of the vote the Liberal coalition could have had a parliamentary majority even under the old system. 83 The Democratic party was considered by a majority of foreign observers to be the most honorable of Bulgaria's established political parties. Even Stamboliski characterized it as "a little bit cleaner than the other parties." Dnevmtsi na XIV ONS, vtora redovna sesiia, p. 29. 81

Ill

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Stamboliski urged the congress to reject this proposal. He argued that even though the BANU would be the largest single member of the coalition, it could not participate without compromising its principles. Compromise and the betrayal of ideals in return for power, he said, was a characteristic of political parties. The Agrarian Union, as an estatist organization, could not remain true to itself while moderating its program in order to make its leaders ministers. The Agrarian Union would govern Bulgaria, he continued, but only when it commanded a majority of its own in the National Assembly. The congress responded to this affirmation of the Union's estatist ideology by unanimously passing a resolution forbidding the Agrarian deputies to participate in any coalition.84 The conduct of the Agrarian parliamentary group in the XVI National Assembly contrasted significantly with the performance of the Union's first parliamentary delegation in 1901. Then, most of the "Agrarian" deputies were drawn into one or another party by promises of patronage. The fact that not a single Agrarian deputy violated the resolution of the XIV congress testified to the discipline the BANU had developed under the personal and ideological leadership of Stamboliski. Unable to form a governing majority, Radoslavov dissolved the Assembly on December 31, after a session of only twelve days. New elections were scheduled for February 23, 1914. This time Bulgaria's new territories, organized into the provinces of Giurmiurdzhina in Thrace and Strumitsa in Macedonia, were included. They added forty-one seats to the Assembly, most of which, since the provinces were still under military administration, went to the governing Liberals. The BANU, which had neither organization nor candidates in the new provinces, nevertheless increased its total vote from 113,761 to 147,143 and gained three additional seats. Leaving aside the two new provinces, its percentage of the vote increased from 20.9 to 25.0. Radoslavov now had a narrow—128 seats out of 245—but sufficient majority, and he proceeded to form a Liberal cabinet.85 84 Zemledelsko zname, xi, Nos. 21, 23 (Dec. 5, 13, 1913); Turlakov, Istorha, pp. 110-11. 85 Statisticheski godishnik, 1913-1922, p. 58; Zemledelsko zname, xi, No. 51 (Feb. 27, 1914), 1.

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When the National Assembly convened in March, the Agrarian deputies followed their by now traditional practice of ignoring Ferdinand's speech from the throne. To demonstrate their strength they also nominated Dragiev for the presidency of the Assembly. Outside parliament, the Agrarian leaders continued to denounce Ferdinand and the political parties for bringing on the catastrophe of the Balkan Wars. On June 16, 1914, the first anniversary of the Bulgarian attack on the allies in Macedonia, Stamboliski addressed a student demonstration in National Assembly Square. Standing at the base of the equestrian statue of Alexander II, he suggested that a proper use for the monument would be as a gallows for Tsar Ferdinand. This statement was seized upon by the government to create a political scandal, and Stamboliski was threatened with prosecution for lese majeste.86 This incident, along with all other aspects of Bulgaria's normal political life, was soon overshadowed by the assassination at Sarajevo and the outbreak of the First World War. Stamboliski naturally feared a repetition of the events of 1912-1913. Writing two days after the German declaration of war on France, he put forward the policy the BANU was to follow for the next fourteen months. No one could predict what the outcome of the war would be, he wrote. The only way that the welfare, even the survival, of Bulgaria could be assured was if the country preserved strict neutrality. The past conduct of Ferdinand and the political parties proved that they were willing to resort to war to gain Bulgaria's "national goals." The Agrarian Union, therefore, would devote all its resources, both in parliament and among the people, to the preservation of peace. The same issue of Zemledelsko zname carried a sympathetic obituary of Jaures, "a man who was for peace," and condemned the German and Hungarian Socialists for their support of their countries' war policies.87 The Agrarian parliamentary group began to meet every day to discuss the war and the political situation in the country. At its first meeting, it passed a formal resolution placing it on record 86 Zemledehko zname, xi, No. 82 (June 24, 1914), 1; xn, No 39 (Jan 17, 1915),4 87 Zemledehko zname, xi, No. 86 (July 23, 1914), 1, 4

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against intervention. Besides calling for the preservation of neutrality, the resolution opposed mobilization and demanded that the government do nothing to indicate either to the Central Powers or the Allies that it might abandon neutrality. Moreover, if for some reason Bulgaria did become involved in the war, a new cabinet, representative of all the people, should be created. Finally, the resolution called upon the parliamentary group to devote every effort to informing the people of its position on the war.88 At Stamboliski's suggestion the Agrarian parliamentary group also sent representatives to the meetings of the opposition and government deputies. In the Zemledelsko zname Stamboliski informed the peasantry that neither he nor any other Agrarian leader was happy that such contacts between the BANU and the "exploiters of the people" were taking place. But, he warned, the parties now held the fate of Bulgaria in their hands and the Agrarian Union had to do all in its power to make its influence felt. At the end of August the BANU joined the Democratic, Social Democratic, National, Radical Democratic and Progressive Liberal parties in a united call for the preservation of neutrality.89 Although opposing Bulgaria's participation in the war, Stamboliski made it clear that the BANU did not object to acquiring Macedonia or regaining the Dobruja from Rumania if it could be done peacefully. Indeed, he maintained, if perfect justice prevailed in the world these lands would undoubtedly already belong to Bulgaria. Should the warring powers offer concessions in these areas in return for Bulgaria's continued neutrality, there would be nothing immoral in accepting. However, too much blood had already been shed in attempts to take them by force, and they were certainly not worth another war.90 When the National Assembly opened in November, Stamboliski made a long speech analyzing the situation in the country and reiterating the BANU's program. Since the beginning of the war, he said, four conflicting positions had emerged. Tsar Ferdinand and the governing Liberal parties were traditionally Germanophile, favored the victory of the Central Powers, and might 88

Zemledelsko zname, xi, No. 87 (July 26, 1914), 1. Zemledelsko zname, xi, Nos. 89, 95 (July 28, Aug. 26, 1914). 90 Zemledelsko zname, xn, No. 1 (Sept. 20, 1914), 1.

89

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be persuaded to intervene on that side. They were supported by the IMRO and the Macedonian societies that sought to punish Serbia. On the other hand, the established parties now in opposition, led by the Democrats, were traditionally Russophile and favored the victory of the Allies. Third, the Narrow Socialists had come forward with a program calling for a "democratic federation of the Balkan states." Finally, the BANU and the Broad Socialists supported a policy of strict neutrality. Stamboliski pointed out that the BANU had long favored the idea of Balkan federation, now adopted by the Narrow Socialists, but he saw no way, given Serbia's involvement in the war, that the policy could be implemented. Turning to the government, he condemned the influence of the Macedonians on Bulgarian politics and, to the applause of the Agrarian deputies, he warned that the BANU would never give up its opposition to war: "If the Bulgarian government has already allied itself with the side that urges Bulgaria on to adventurism, that seeks the occupation of Macedonia by Bulgaria . . . it is our deep conviction that this adventurism will lead Bulgaria to the grave. We can assure that if you ally yourself with this adventurism or if you adopt this adventurism as your own policy in the future, then before you can complete that adventure you will have to pass over our dead bodies."91 Tsar Ferdinand and Radoslavov were too shrewd to make a precipitate grab for Macedonia and the other territories they desired. They were well aware that if the war continued they would be able to command a high price for Bulgaria's intervention or perhaps even for her continued neutrality. Thus, when war broke out, the Radoslavov government proclaimed its neutrality and sat back to await developments. The value of Bulgarian aid to either side was very great. Lying athwart the lines of communication between Germany and Turkey, Bulgaria was the key to continued Ottoman participation in the war. Moreover, Bulgaria's sizable, well-equipped army, much of which had seen service in the Balkan Wars, was a dagger that could be plunged into the back of either Serbia or Turkey. When it became clear that Austria alone could not defeat Serbia and that the Allies alone had no chance of forcing the Straits with91

Zemledelsko zname, xn, Nos. 15, 16 (Nov. 11, 14, 1914).,

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out a protracte d and bloody campaign , both sides raised their bids for Bulgaria's help . In this contes t the Centra l Power s had a decided advantage . They could offer territor y in Serbia, Rumania , and Greece , while the Allies could be free only with the possessions of Turkey. Even with regard to Turkey, the German s were able to persuad e the Port e to consen t to a rectificatio n of its borde r with Bulgaria. When Bulgaria formally joined the Centra l Power s on August 24/Septembe r 6, 1915, it was with the understandin g that she would receive from Serbia all of Macedoni a that had belonged to the Bulgarian exarchat e in 1878. If Greec e and Rumani a entere d the war on the Allied side, Bulgaria was to get all the territor y she had lost to these countrie s in the Treat y of Bucharest . In addition , the Centra l Power s were to supply materie l for the Bulgarian army and to provide 200,000,00 0 gold francs for additiona l war expenses. 92 Even this largesse would not have brough t Bulgaria into the war had not the overall militar y situatio n turne d in favor of the Centra l Powers. After the Serbian victory at Kolubar a and the launchin g of the Allied attac k in the Dardanelles , Radoslavo v refused to discuss anythin g except continue d neutrality . By Jun e 1915, however, the Turk s were clearly holdin g thei r own while the German s unde r Mackense n were rolling back the Russian s in Galicia . The Germa n victories ende d any possible Russian military threa t against Bulgaria, clearin g the way for a definite com mitmen t from Ferdinan d and Radoslavov. Unabl e to compet e with the Centra l Power s in promisin g territory, the Allies turne d to less straightforwar d method s of influenc ing Bulgarian foreign policy. Thei r efforts led to what becam e known as the "DesClosiere s Affair," a politica l scanda l tha t discredite d numerou s Bulgarian politician s includin g several Agrarian member s of parliament . Fernan d DesClosiere s was an assistant to the principa l repre92 The diplomati c negotiation s between the Allies and the Bulgarian governmen t are dealt with in C. J. Smith , Jr. , The Russian Struggle for Power, 19141917 (Ne w York, 1956), pp. 135-58, 273-335; for the negotiation s between the Centra l Powers and Bulgaria, see G E. Silberstein , "The Serbian Campaig n of 1915: Its Diplomati c Background, " American Historical Review, Lxxi, No 1 (1967), 51-69, and W. Gottlieb , "Bulgarna ν mezhdunarodnat a politika (19141915)," Izvestiia na Instituta za istorua, xxm (1974), 13-101.

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sentativ e of the Frenc h holder s of Bulgarian bonds . He had lived in Sofia since 1902 and had man y contact s in the governmen t and in society. Durin g the summe r of 1915, the Westminste r Bank of Londo n and the Credit Lyonnaise furnishe d him with £400,00 0 and 10,000,00 0 francs (a tota l equal to 20,000,00 0 leva), ostensibly for the purpos e of buying the Bulgarian harvest. To carry out this transaction , DesClosiere s enlisted the services of Nikol a Genadiev , the disreputabl e leader of the Nationa l Liberal party, a membe r of the governin g coalition . Genadiev' s task was to engage Agrarian deputies , as well as member s of his own parliamentar y faction , as agents in makin g the grain purchases . Several Agrarian deputies , includin g Mark o Turlako v and Raiko Daskalov, were given large commission s and advances , only a part of which went toward the purchas e of wheat. When Bulgaria entere d the war, the politica l figures involved in the affair were arrested , and it was revealed that DesClosieres' s actua l purpos e had been to influenc e member s of the Nationa l Assembly in favor of the Allies. 93 Although a militar y cour t convicte d the Agrarian deputie s involved in the DesClosiere s affair, ther e is substantia l doub t of thei r actua l guilt. Some of them , particularl y Turlako v and Daskalov, were drawn into the affair only because they were officers in the BANU' s Nationa l Store , which purchase d foodstuffs from the peasantr y for sale to DesClosieres . Furthermore , neithe r Stambolisk i nor Dragiev, the two most prominen t Agrarians, was ever accused of any wrongdoin g in connectio n with the affair. Evidenc e brough t out after the war indicate d tha t many , if not all, of the Agrarian deputie s involved may well have believed that they were doin g nothin g mor e than takin g advantag e of the war situatio n to sell agricultura l product s at high prices. Throughou t the mont h of August, the Zemledelsko zname announce d tha t the Nationa l Store was purchasin g foodstuffs at prices very favorable to the producers . This suggests that the ultimat e recipien t of Des93 Dnevnitsi na XXII ONS, piirva izvunredovna sesua, II , 590-680, Ρ Peshev, Istoricheskite siibitiia i deiateh (Sofia, 1929), pp. 489-91; Turlakov , Istoriia, pp 118-19. The evolutio n of this covert operatio n may be followed in vols vn, part 2, and vm of Mezhdunarodnye olnoshemia ν epokhu impenalizma The relevant document s are indexed unde r the headin g "Podkup bolgarskikh politicheskikh deiatelei" unde r the section on Bulgaria.

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Closieres' s mone y was the Bulgarian peasant . It was the opinio n of Nekliudoff , the former Russian ambassador , that DesClosiere s succeede d in buying nothin g but grain. 94 The most persuasive proo f tha t DesClosiere s failed in his purpose, at least as far as the Agrarians were concerned , was that the BANU mad e no shift in its policy. Fro m the beginnin g of the war to Bulgaria's intervention , the Agrarian leader s maintaine d an unwaverin g commitmen t to continue d neutrality . In thei r public discussion of the war they also strove for impartiality . This was not because they were indifferen t to the war's outcome , but because they feared that open suppor t for one side would be taken as a sign that they favored intervention . Stamboliski , who wrote most of the war coverage for the Zemledelsko zname, admitte d that he had a natura l bias in favor of the underdog , Serbia. 95 And when a Bulgarian politicia n was quote d in the Germa n and Austrian press to the effect that the Bulgarian peopl e wanted the Cen tral Power s to win, he denie d it, statin g that the vast majorit y obviously hope d for the victory of thei r liberator , Russia, and her allies. 96 Still, in Marc h 1915 after the Austrian s had been defeate d in Serbia and Galici a and the Allies had launche d thei r attac k on the Straits , he warned that the danger to Bulgaria now cam e from those who would involve her on the side of the Allies, and he urged the governmen t to resist this pressure. 97 At no poin t after this did the BANU abando n its positio n to move closer to the pro-Allie d oppositio n parties . The treat y that Ferdinan d and Radoslavo v had signed with the Centra l Power s on August 24/Septembe r 6 obligated Bulgaria to ente r the war within thirty-fiv e days. Although the treat y itself was kept secret, the extensive militar y preparation s could not be completel y hidden , and it soon becam e apparen t tha t the governmen t was contemplatin g some sort of action . On August 28, Stamboliski , Dragiev, and Dimitro v met with Radoslavo v to discuss the rumor s of impendin g war that were circulatin g in the capital . Radoslavo v listened to their argument s in suppor t of neu94 95 96 97

118

P. Peshev.pp . 490-91 ; Turlakov , Λ-ίοπϊα , p. 119; Nekliudoff , pp. 392-93. Zemledelsko zname, xu, No . 22 (De c 2, 1914), 4 Zemledelsko zname, xu, N o 35 (Jan 7, 1915), 1 Zemledelsko zname, xu. N o 62-63 (Marc h 18, 1915), 1-2.

AGRARIAN UNION AND THE WARS

trality, but remained noncomittal. His reticence indicated to Stamboliski that Bulgaria was already in the hands of the Central Powers.98 The atmosphere of apprehension in Sofia was heightened on the next day, when the opposition parties were asked to send representatives to an audience with Tsar Ferdinand. Apparently intended to keep the opposition parties off balance while preparations for war went forward, the audience actually became the scene of the penultimate confrontation between the tsar and Stamboliski. At 4:00 in the afternoon of September 4, the leaders of the pro-Allied opposition parties—Malinov of the Democrats, Geshov of the Nationalists, Danev of the Progressive Liberals, Tsanov of the Radical Democrats, and Stamboliski"—were ushered into the Red Salon of the Royal Palace, where Ferdinand, his persona] secretary, and Crown Prince Boris were waiting. Malinov spoke first, telling the tsar of his concern about the rumors that Bulgaria was already committed to the Central Powers, to which Ferdinand replied evasively. Stamboliski then began to speak for the BANU, repeating the Union's arguments against intervention. As he enumerated the reasons for continued neutrality, he included those that related to the ability and character of Ferdinand himself. "And above all," he said, "the people's faith in you, Your Highness, has been shaken and destroyed. In their eyes, the eyes of the people, you have lost your reputation as a skilled diplomatist." He warned Ferdinand that he had been fortunate to escape punishment for his part in the Balkan Wars. "Remember," he continued, "that if this criminal act is repeated tomorrow, we, the members of the Agrarian Union, will not stand between you and the people's wrath. We will become its instrument to execute its severe but just decision." Growing steadily more agitated, Ferdinand challenged Stamboliski to prove that he had put Bulgaria in the service of the Central Powers. Stamboliski refused to discuss the sources of his information, and the exchange between the two men grew more heated. "You, Mr. Stamboliski," said Ferdinand, "threaten me with 98 99

Zemledelsko zname, xn, No. 97 (Sept. 2, 1915), 1. The Social Democrats declined to send a representative.

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revolts and uprisings. You tell me that no one has any faith in my ability and that some day I will be brough t to trial. " "Yes." "You should know that I have a fixed course , a clearly determine d policy, and that 1 will follow that course bravely withou t fear of your warnings. And as 1 follow that course I believe I am serving the people muc h bette r than you. " "Tha t is a question . . . . " "Your service to the peopl e at this momen t seems questiona ble, very questionable. " "You try to hurl insults, Your Highness . And at a time when you need the suppor t of everyone . Good ! Your insults canno t harm me. I am happ y that I hear d from your lips that which the whole peopl e fears, that which we will challenge . You inten d to follow your course . Follo w it, and I will follow mine. " "I will follow it. Because my course , not yours, is in the service of Bulgaria. " "My course has never led to disaster as did yours. And now, if you choos e to follow your course , you should thin k first of your head. " "Don' t worry about my head . I am old. Thin k of your own which is still young. " With this final warnin g Ferdinan d broke off the audienc e and left the room. 100 Convince d that war was now only days away, Stambolisk i hurried back to the quarter s he shared with Turlako v to discuss measures that the BANU might take. He was determine d that his threat s against Ferdinan d not be empt y words. Working throug h the night , he prepare d a pamphle t describin g the audienc e with Ferdinan d and calling on the people , especially the soldiers, to refuse to take part in the war. Turlako v tried to dissuade him from publishin g it, warnin g him that it would only lead to his imprisonmen t or worse. This was also the opinio n of the full parliamentar y group, which met on Septembe r 9. The group, however, 100 Ν Petkov , pp. 12-15; Kozhukharov , Stamboliski, pp. 19-20 Stambolisk i publishe d this accoun t immediatel y after the meeting . His descriptio n of what took place and what was said was never challenge d by the other s who were present .

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could produce no positive suggestions, and Stamboliski, who had already had the pamphlet printed, refused to stop its distribution. On the next day, the government announced the beginning of mobilization. The military police raided the Agrarian press, seized the remaining copies of Stamboliski's pamphlet, and arrested Stamboliski. Although a military court found him guilty of treason and sentenced him to death, Ferdinand was impressed by the protests of the opposition political leaders and commuted the sentence to life imprisonment.101 This blow threw the BANU into disarray. Stamboliski's direction was eliminated, and Dragiev foundered in indecision. The Agrarian parliamentary group debated its course of action for two days. Meanwhile the government threatened prosecution of all those connected with the DesClosieres affair. This threat, perhaps, swayed the group. Alexander Dimitrov addressed the National Assembly on behalf of the BANU and pledged to vote for war credits. Bulgaria was at war, he said, and her troops must be given the wherewithal to defend themselves.102 This acquiescence, however, did not ward off further prosecution. During the spring of 1916 the government moved against the Agrarian deputies involved in the DesClosieres affair, sentencing five of them to from one-and-one-half to five years in prison.103 Outside parliament, the Union's standing committee withdrew the Zemledelsko zname from publication and ended practically all political activity. Local druzhbi, deprived of central leadership, in large part ceased to function. The BANU temporarily lost all influence over the future course of events. 101

Turlakov, Istonia, pp 117-18; N. Petkov, p. 15. Dnevmtsi na XVII ONS, vtora redovna sesua, p. 12. 103 Turlakov, Istorua, pp. 118-19. Besides Turlakov the Agrarian deputies convicted were Gngor Boiadzhiev of Pleven, Andrei Sharenkov of Provadiia, Naiden Komanov of Plovdiv, and Nedelcho Georgiev of Nikopol. Dnevnitst na XXII ONS, purva izvunredovna sesiia, n, 591 102

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C H A P T E R

V

The Roa d to Power

Power in and of itself is not criminal , crimina l are the abuses of power. Striving for power is striving toward self-completion , toward a manifestation of life, of will. Struggle for power is struggle for life, and this is the most basic law of nature . It is what produce s progress. —Alexander Stamboliski 1 IF German y and her allies had won the quick victory that Fer dinan d and Radoslavo v expected , the fate of the BANU would have been very different . As it was, in Bulgaria as in the rest of Easter n Europe , prolonge d war tore society loose from its tradi tiona l moorings , and defeat brough t the collapse of the old regime. Even so, the Agrarian Union' s road to power was not an easy one . The Agrarian leaders were involved in a premature , abortive revolution , a divisive interna l conflict , and a major confrontatio n with the Communist s before gainin g contro l of the instrument s of government . The costs of moder n war were muc h greater than Bulgaria could bear. By the end of 1918 approximatel y 900,000 men , nearl y 40 percen t of the male population , had been conscripted . The army suffered 300,000 casualties , includin g 100,000 killed, the most severe losses on a per capit a basis of any countr y involved in the war. 2 Durin g 1917 and 1918 the distributio n of military supplies broke down almost entirely . Troop s at the front received only the most meager rations . Clothing , especially boots, could not be replaced. No r could the army furnish its men with adequat e medica l supplies or ammunition . The impac t of these A. Stamboliski , Vlast, bezvlastie ι narodovlastie (Sofia, 1919), p. 16 These losses followed the 58,000 killed and 105,000 wounde d in the Balkan Wars. A. Ts. Tsankov, "Bulgania prez voinat a ι sled neia, " SBID , xx, No . 1-2-3 (1921), 38; G . T. Danaillow , Les effets de la guerre en Bulgarie (Fontenay-aux Roses, 1932), p. 603. 1

2

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TH E ROAD TO POWE R

shortcoming s on moral e was compounde d by the fact that the ordinar y Bulgarian had a sense of kinship with Russia and no feeling at all for the Germa n cause. The conduc t of Germa n soldiers, who took advantag e of thei r privileged positio n to loot the coun try, did nothin g to chang e his mind. 3 The deterioratio n at the front was accompanie d and in part provoked by an economi c crisis in the interior . Far m labor had to be performe d by women , children , the aged, and the infirm, with the result that the amoun t of land unde r cultivatio n fell by about 12 percen t while the grain harvest decline d by 47 percent , from 2,678,55 8 ton s in 1915 to 1,435,08 3 tons in 1918. Governmen t requisition s and the shortage of fodder took a heavy toll of livestock. 4 Resortin g to requisition s and settin g of artificially low prices for agricultura l products , the Radoslavo v regime impose d severe hardship s on the rural populatio n and discourage d peasan t families from producin g for sale. 5 In the cities and towns the governmen t succeede d in holdin g down wages, but totall y lost the battle against inflation . Usin g 1910 as a base year ( = 100), the price index in Bulgaria at the end of 1918 stood at 1,132. This compare s with 217 for Germany , 392 for France , 272 for England , and 220 for the Unite d States. 6 The suffering and deprivatio n endure d by the troops , the peasantry , and the poor of the cities and towns sharply contraste d with the epidemi c of speculatio n that swept throug h the uppe r class and include d man y member s of the government . Rumors , some substantiate d and other s not , of fortune s mad e overnigh t by speculatio n in vital commoditie s were a prim e stimulu s of social discontent . The y fueled the outbrea k of antigovernmen t demon strations , the "women' s riots " for food, that began early in 1917 3 Danaillow , pp. 327-28; M. A. Birman , Revoliutsionnata situatsiia ν Bolgarii ν 1918-1919 gg. (Moscow , 1957), p. 18. 4 Kh. Khristov , Revoliutsionnata kriza γ Bulgarua prez 1918-1919 (Sofia, 1957), ρ 17; "Khronika, " SB1D, xx, No . 6-7 (1921), 256-57. 5 Danaillow , pp. 328-29; la. Mollov, "Zemledelskot o proizvodstvo i voinata, " SBID , xix, No . 1-2 (1919), 58-59. 6 Kh. Khristov , Revoliutsionnata, p. 28; "Khronika, " SBID , xix, No . 9-10 (1920),551 .

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and continued until the end of the war. Milena Stamboliska was arrested for fomenting one such demonstration in Slavovitsa in February 1917.7 Stamboliski, although sentenced to strict confinement for life, found that the regime in Sofia's Central Prison was not severe. Political prisoners were allowed to roam their section freely, to write, to entertain "relatives," and even to leave the prison for short periods for "medical or dental reasons." They were able to receive provisions from outside, and the BANU's peasant supporters regularly supplied so much food that it was distributed to the other prisoners and even to the guards. Although it is possible that this treatment was brought about by bribery, it is likely that Ferdinand himself approved of it. He was skilled enough in Bulgarian politics not to burn all his bridges behind him.8 Outside prison, Dimitur Dragiev's desire to reassert himself as the BANU's leader provoked a split in the parliamentary group. At first a matter of personalities rather than principles, the struggle grew between Dragiev and Alexander Dimitrov for the right to speak for the group. The enmity between the two men came into the open after Dimitrov was arrested for taking part in the DesClosieres affair. Although the government could prove no wrongdoing and was forced to acquit him, the police confiscated his diary and released parts of it to friendly newspapers. It contained comments critical of all the Agrarian leaders including Stamboliski, who was described as an egoist, and was especially severe on Dragiev. Claiming that the diary proved Dimitrov unfit for leadership and accusing him of speculation, Dragiev demanded that he be expelled from the parliamentary group.9 Stamboliski intervened in the dispute, sending a letter to the group that, while ostensibly neutral, was aimed against Dragiev. He wrote that Dimitrov should not be condemned for what he had put down in his personal diary since he was not responsible for its 7 K. Todorov, Balkan Firebrand (New York, 1943), p. 96; S. S. Arabadzhiev, "Selski zhenski buntove vuv velikotumovsko prez 1918 g.,"Istoncheskipregled, xxn, No. 5 (1966), 73-80; N. Petkov, p. 17. 8 9 K. Todorov, pp. 92-97. Turlakov, lstoriia, pp. 121-22.

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appearance in the newspapers, and that for his part he had already forgiven Dimitrov for what was written about himself. Moreover, he continued, he had examined the charges of speculation against Dimitrov and found them groundless. He urged both sides to put aside the dispute until after the war when an Agrarian congress would render a final judgment. In the meantime, he concluded, all the Agrarian deputies should give priority to maintaining the unity of the group.10 Dragiev was not mollified, and he decided to bring the dispute to a head. Since he could not command a majority, he and his followers broke off to form a separate, "pure," group of seventeen deputies that included besides Dragiev Stancho Momchev, who had been a prominent Union activist almost from the BANU's inception. The Dimitrov faction numbered twenty-eight and included Tserkovski and Omarchevski. It was supported from prison by Turlakov and Raiko Daskalov as well as Stamboliski.11 Stamboliski was not fully satisfied with the conduct of either Agrarian faction, and he sought to spur them both into taking a stronger position against the government. He wrote to the whole group that he "would never have agreed to vote a single centime to the present vicious, boneheaded government," and that he could not understand or approve its votes for the war budgets.12 The divided group did little to respond, however, until the February Revolution in Russia and the intervention of the United States opened a new chapter in the war. Convinced that Germany could not now win, and reacting to the upsurge in discontent that wartime deprivations were beginning to produce, the Agrarian leaders dissociated themselves from all support for the government and began to revive their own organization. In August 1917 the two factions of the parliamentary group agreed to resume publication of the Zemledelsko zname. Although the editor, Tsanko Tserkovski, and his assistants, Omarchevski and Spas Duparinov, were all supporters of Dimitrov, they pledged to print nothing 10

A. Stamboliski, Pismata mi ot zatvora (Sofia, 1919), pp. 1-7 Turlakov, /stoma, pp. 121-22; Memorandum on the Change of Government in Bulgaria (Sofia, July 23, 1918), FO 371/3158/131780. 12 Stamboliski, Pismata, p. 3 11

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about the division in the group and to give the minorit y its fair share of space. 13 The newZemledelsko zname, althoug h subjected to strict governmen t censorshi p and proscribe d at the front , symbolized the Union' s reviving spirit. The Agrarian leader s mad e thei r immediat e goal the replace men t of the Radoslavo v governmen t by one tha t would open peace negotiation s with the Allies. To explore this possibility they opene d discussion s with the leader s of the oppositio n parties , particularl y with Alexander Malino v of the Democrats. 14 The Agrarians also attempte d to gain the suppor t of the commander-in-chie f of the army, Genera l Nikol a Zhekov . Durin g Jun e 1917 Tserkovski had represente d the BANU in a parliamentar y inspectio n of the front durin g which he met Zhekov , whom he decide d was sympathetic . Tserkovski arrange d a meet ing to be held on Septembe r 12 between Zhekov , himself, and Alexande r Dimitrov , Nedelk o Atanasov, Stoian Omarchevski , and Ivan Zhele v of the majorit y fraction . Owing to a sudden illness, Tserkovski did not take part , but the othe r deputie s tried to persuade Zheko v that continue d slavish adherenc e to the Germa n alliance would be disastrous. 15 Zheko v expressed interes t and asked for a written proposal , which was delivered to him on Septembe r 22. Coincidentally , on the same day Tserkovski and Atanasov joined the leaders of the oppositio n partie s in a public deman d for Radoslavov' s resignatio n and the reconvenin g of the Nationa l Assembly. 16 In their written proposa l to Zhekov , the Agrarian leader s stated that the Radoslavo v government' s war policy had brough t the complet e demoralizatio n of the peopl e and had robbed Bulgaria of all freedom of action . The y counsele d Zheko v tha t as commander-in-chie f he could not be indifferen t to the politica l situatio n in the country . Specifically, they suggested a coalitio n led by Malino v and supporte d by the Democratic , Broad Socialist, and Agrarian forces in parliament . The proposa l went Ibid. , p. 19; Kh Khnstov,R(?vo/(«/iion/!aia , pp. 116-17 Ibid. , p. 94 15 S. Omarchevski , BMgarskite upravnitsi prez svetovnata voina: fakti ι dokumenti (Sofia, 1921), pp. 42-43 . 16 Ibid. , p. 73. 13

14

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THE ROAD TO POWER

on carefully to point out that the BANU was not advocating that Bulgaria abandon the war or betray the German alliance, a necessary qualification in view of the fact that the document might appear as evidence in a trial for treason. Rather, it stated, a new government was needed to "reassure the people and the army. It will raise Bulgaria in the eyes of her allies and improve her image in the eyes of her enemies. With all its strength it will work for a rapid peace." The Agrarians asked only that in return for their participation in a new government the imprisoned members of the Union be released.17 Zhekov, who had probably been acting as a Trojan horse during the entire affair, passed the Agrarian proposal on to Radoslavov, who retaliated by removing the imprisoned Agrarian leaders from Central Prison in Sofia and distributing them among more isolated prisons around the country. Stamboliski was transferred to a fortress in Vidin where he was kept in isolation.18 Neither faction of the BANU's parliamentary leadership looked beyond the replacement of Radoslavov by a government that would extricate Bulgaria from the war. Dragiev took the position that simple patriotism demanded that the BANU forget its old enmity toward the opposition parties and do all in its power to support them. It was anathema to him that at such a critical time the BANU should seek power for itself; that it should do so by encouraging revolution he believed to be treasonous. Nor did the Dimitrov faction differ with him on this point.19 Only Stamboliski sensed that the war would sweep away the old regime. Particularly after the February Revolution in Russia he began to look beyond the war and to prepare the BANU for the task of taking power. A significant indication of his thinking at this time is his essay on "Power, Anarchy, and Democracy," which he completed during June 1917. While ostensibly an abstract political analysis directed against anarchism, it was in fact meant to remind the Agrarians that their goal was the 17 Ibid., pp. 44-76, L. Maleev,Prinos kiim istinala za katastrofata na Bitlgarua prez septemvri 1918 godina (Sofia, 1921), pp. 5-14; P. Peshev, pp. 540-46. 18 N. Petkov.pp. 16-17 19 Omarchevski, Upravmtsi, pp. 153-68; D. Dragiev, Edna pohticheska izpoved (Sofia, 1919), pp. 5, 32-43.

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achievement of power. The short treatise argued that anarchy (significantly Stamboliski used the term "bezvlastie," powerlessness, rather than anarkhiia) was an unattainable condition. Human inequalities and the complexity of society made it necessary that some men have power over others. The crucial problems were how power was to be wielded and for what ends. Stamboliski repeated some of his old arguments against monarchism, which "is breaking up and disappearing," and he went on to state that individuals, groups, or organizations that shunned power gave rise to and perpetuated monarchism. The desire for power, he maintained, was a sign of health in any political organization. It was "a striving toward self-completion, toward a manifestation of life, of will." The aim, he concluded, was democracy, which would be a tool of progress allowing the resources of society to be mobilized for the goals set by society itself. "Power wielded by the people can undo the evil that has been caused by power wielded by monarchs and oligarchies."20 At the same time he began to encourage Agrarians in the army to organize and to prepare for a possible coup d'etat. The discovery of this conspiracy may have been one of the reasons that prompted Radoslavov to break up the Agrarian "general staff" in Central Prison.21 Stamboliski's sojourn in Vidin was not long. The Radoslavov government was brought down by the growing discontent in the country—now taking the form of large-scale "women's riots" in the interior and mutiny at the front22—the failure of the German assault on Verdun, which revealed the exhaustion of the German war effort, and by the hope for peace on American terms. In the spring of 1918 the parliamentary forces of the BANU, Democrats, Broad Socialists, Radicals, Nationals, and Progressive Liberals joined to form the Opposition Bloc against the government. Zhekov, too, turned against the Prime Minister and warned Ferdinand that the army could not continue in its present condition much longer. The final blow came when the German and 20

21 Stamboliski, Vlast, pp. 4-31. K. Todorov, p. 97. A description of a mass meeting of soldiers organized by Agrarians in June 1918 can be found in P. Peshev, pp 587-88; see also Kh. Khristov, Revohutsionnata, pp 209-10. 22

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Austro-Hungaria n government s refused to turn the Dobruj a over to Bulgaria. Some of Radoslavov' s own minister s rebelled , and the Tsar was compelle d to ask for the Prim e Minister' s resignation . On May 18, 1918, he asked Alexander Malino v to form a new government. 23 Malino v hope d to lead a broad coalition , but this proved impossible. Foreseein g the fall of Radoslavov, Stambolisk i had written earlier that it would be a "scanda l of scandals " for some Agrarians to join the governmen t while other s remaine d in prison. 24 Both Agrarian faction s refused to join the cabine t unless their imprisone d comrade s were released . Malinov , who was willing to cooperate , could not persuad e Ferdinan d to agree, and the Agrarians remaine d outsid e the government . The Broad Socialists, wishing to preserve themselve s as a "politica l reserve" in the event that Malino v could not cope with the approachin g disaster, also decline d to accep t any ministries . In the absenc e of a general coalition , the two small conservativ e parties , the Nationa l and the Progressive Liberal , also decline d to assume responsibilit y for governing. Malinov' s cabinet , formed on Jun e 21, 1918, was compose d of eight Democrat s and two Radicals , Stoian Kostur kov and Joseph Fadenkhekht , who took the ministrie s of educa tion and justice. 25 The remainin g partie s of the Oppositio n Bloc pledged thei r suppor t to the new government , which in any case never called the Nationa l Assembly into session to legalize its acts. As a gesture of good will to the BANU , Malino v returne d Stambolisk i and his imprisone d comrade s ίο Sofia's Centra l 26 Prison , where they were kept unde r only nomina l confinement. Immediatel y upon his retur n to Sofia, Stambolisk i resume d his effort to prepar e the BANU to take power. In a series of unsigned article s in the Zemledelsko zname he rejected Dragiev' s call for Agrarian participatio n in a broad "governmen t of nationa l unity, " arguing tha t the war had create d a situatio n in which the BANU would have power thrus t upon it by the people , who looked to it Kh . Khnsto\, Revoliutsionnata, pp. 233-37. Stamboliski , Pismata, p. 19. 25 Kh. Khristov , Revoliutsionnala, pp. 237-38; Zemledelsko zname, xm, No . 74 (Jun e 20, 1918), 1. 26 K. Todorov , pp 98-102. 23

24

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THE ROAD TO POWER

precisely because it was an enem y of the old parties . To draw back would show a lack of courage . To go on with its program for a new Bulgaria would be a great challeng e tha t would lead not to social peace , but to "somethin g like war with the world aroun d us." Nevertheless , it was precisely this road that Agrarians, if they believed in their ideals, would have to follow.27 Stambolisk i also resume d his contact s with Agrarians in the army. Agrarian propagand a amon g the troop s was widespread by this time , and Stamboliski' s prestige as the man who had stood up against the war had risen to a great height amon g the soldiers. 28 With regard to Malinov , Stambolisk i kept his distance . He offered to ente r the cabine t only if the Prim e Ministe r would agree to an immediat e armistice . Malinov , however, could not bring himself to defy the Tsar, who was still determine d to stand by the Germa n alliance . In August he attempte d to intimidat e Stam boliski by restorin g a strict regime in the prison . Fadenkhekht , the Radica l Ministe r of Justice , threatene d to bring him to trial for treason , but these measure s cam e too late to do any good. 29 On Septembe r 14, 1918, Genera l Franche t d'Esperey' s Allied Expeditionar y Forc e began a long-prepare d offensive on the Macedonia n front . After subjectin g the demoralize d Bulgarian troop s to a witherin g artillery barrage, the Allies achieved a quick and decisive breakthroug h at Dobr o Pole . Disciplin e crumble d as the Bulgarian army ceased to exist as an organize d militar y force. Troop s fell back into disorder , man y desertin g to retur n to thei r homes , and man y mor e possessed with a growing determinatio n to marc h on Sofia to punish Ferdinan d and the politician s who had brough t on the war. By Septembe r 24 the critica l rail cente r of Kiustendi l was in the hand s of the rebels. Provision s from the nearb y Genera l Staff Headquarter s were confiscate d by several hundre d soldiers. 30 27 "Zemledelskiia t suiuz ι vlastta, " Zemledelsko zname, xm, Nos . 70, 71, 75, 76, 77 (Jun e 12, 15, 29, July 3, 6, 1918). 28 Kh. Khristov , Revoliutsionnata, pp 209-10. 29 K. Todorov , pp. 99-100; Omarchevski , Vpravnitsi, pp. 188-89. 30 Kh. Khristov , Revoliutsionnata, pp. 260-76; K. A. Iankov , Dobro pole i probivut na fronta (Sofia, 1919), pp. 116-18

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On the mornin g of the 25th Stambolisk i was released from Cen tral Prison and taken to a meetin g of the leader s of the Oppositio n Bloc. There , Malinov , who could still not fathom the full extent of the catastroph e at the front , offered the resignatio n of the cabinet and propose d the formatio n of a broad coalitio n governmen t to restor e stability and to begin negotiation s with the Allies. Stam boliski ridicule d this idea, maintainin g that it was alread y too late for politica l maneuver s and for peace negotiations . Let the governmen t remain , he said, but let it sue for an immediat e armistic e unde r whatever term s were possible. 31 In the afternoo n Stambolisk i was taken to see Ferdinand . Thei r second encounte r was not muc h mor e cordia l than thei r first in 1915. The Tsar blamed Agrarian propagand a for weakenin g the front , and he accused Stambolisk i of working for Bulgaria's defeat. Stambolisk i replied that the defeat was the inevitable outcom e of Ferdinand' s foreign policy. Abandonin g this theme , Fer dinan d asked Stambolisk i to use his influenc e to calm the rebellious troop s and to restor e some measur e of orde r and disciplin e to the army. Stambolisk i agreed, but on two conditions . Ferdinan d must seek an immediat e armistic e and he must release all remain ing politica l prisoners . The Tsar agreed at last to leave the war, but he feared assassination and refused to release all the prisoners . The two finally compromise d on a partia l prisone r release. 32 At 9:15 PM , Andrei Liapchev , the Ministe r of Finance , Simeo n Radev, Ministe r Plenipotentiary , and M. Vasilev, a distinguishe d lawyer, accompanie d by the America n Consu l General , D . I. Murphy , and his assistant, set out to seek armistic e term s from the Allies.33 After the departur e of the mission , Stambolisk i announce d his readines s to procee d to the front to pacify the troops . The ensuin g attemp t by Stambolisk i and Raiko Daskalo v to assume the leadershi p of the troop s and to take Sofia by force has been called the "Radomi r Rebellion, " after the small town where the new "republic " was first proclaimed , and has long been the 31 D . Kazasov, Burnt godim (Sofia, 1949), pp. 10-11; Kh. Khristov , Revoliutsionnata, p. 277. 32 N . Petkov , pp. 274-85. 33 Foreign Relations of the United States, 1918, Supplemen t I, vol. ι (Washington , D C , 1933), 476-80.

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subject of historical controversy. In a speech to the National Assembly in 1919 Stamboliski stated that he went to the front with a fully matured plan for the rebellion because he did not believe Ferdinand was sincere in his promise to appeal for an armistice. Fearing that the Tsar would seek German aid to continue the war, he decided that the overthrow of the dynasty was an immediate necessity.34 By the time that Stamboliski gave this explanation of his conduct, however, the rebellion was well on its way toward becoming one of the heroic myths of the BANU's fight against the old regime. Moreover, the question had a current political significance. An admission by Stamboliski that the rebellion was less than a great expression of Agrarian will would have been a concession to Dragiev, who had opposed it, and a condemnation of his allies who had supported it. Some Bulgarian and all Soviet Communist historians, on the other hand, deny that the Agrarian leaders had any genuine revolutionary intentions. They argue that Stamboliski feared a Communist revolution and that during the rebellion he was a captive of the revolutionary energy of the people.35 The Bulgarian historian Khristo Khristov, in his monumental work on the rebellion, probably came closest to the truth when he wrote that Stamboliski went to Radomir without any preconceived plan of action. He was no more committed to making a revolution than he was to calming the troops, but he was prepared to do either depending on circumstances.36 One factor that deserves greater weight in the historiography of the rebellion than it has received is the influence of Raiko Daskalov, who accompanied Stamboliski to Radomir and who actually proclaimed the new republic. Before the war Daskalov was not a major figure in the BANU. Born in Biala Cherkva in 1886, the son of a teacher, he had graduated from the Commercial Gymnasium in Svishtov, worked as a reporter on the Sofia news34 Dnevmtsi na XVIIIONS, purva redovna sesua, I, 528 This explanation was seconded by Raiko Daskalov (Zemledelsko zname, xv, No. 16 [Sept. 27, 1919], 1-4) and by Kosta Todorov (Balkan Firebrand, pp. 100-101). 35 A. N. Kirshevskaia and L. Valev, "Zhurnal bolgarskikh istorikov," Voprosy istoni, No. 1 (1951), 122-23; Birman, p. 142. 36 Kh. Khristov, Revoliutsionnata, p. 279.

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paper Balkanska tribuna, and served a short prison term for a series of antigovernmen t articles. In 1907 he went to Berlin, where he earne d a doctorat e from a Germa n commercia l institute . After working for a Germa n firm he returne d to Bulgaria in 1914. He had known Tsanko Tserkovski from his youth in Biala Cherkva , and the Agrarian poet persuade d him to join the BANU to take over the managemen t of its founderin g Nationa l Store . This positio n mad e him the centra l target of the government' s prosecutio n of the DesClosiere s affair.37 Daskalo v has fared extremel y well at the hand s of Communis t historians , who portra y him as "the Revolutionary, " the leader of the BANU' s left wing, and the spokesma n for the militan t desires of the oppressed peasant . Hi s assassination by right-win g terrorists in 1923 also elevated him in Communis t eyes and saved his reputatio n from any damag e that might have com e to it in the BANU' s later factiona l struggles. On e biographe r went so far as to assert that Stambolisk i was preparin g to yield him the premier ship on the eve of the Jun e coup d'etat.38 This adulator y view demand s qualification . While Daskalo v was a useful ally to Stam boliski in oustin g the Dragie v faction and on occasio n proved an effective lieutenant , his influenc e was not entirel y healthy . He was an impulsive man whose action s were not based upon any dept h of thought . Although he presente d himself as an Agrarian theorist , his writings were meager and shallow. His major work, The Struggle for the Land, tracin g agrarian struggles in ancien t Rome , which he claime d was conceive d in prison alon g with the plan for the BANU' s land reform is notabl e only for its rathe r ar39 tificial show of erudition. While in prison , Daskalo v impressed himself on Stambolisk i by the force of his personalit y and also, perhaps , by his Germa n doctorate . Stamboliski , always self-consciou s about his lack of formal education , seems to have been overawed by Daskalov' s academi c credentials , which Daskalo v sensed and which caused 37 K. Kozhukharov , Raiko Daskalov. biografichen ocherk (Sofia, 1956), pp. 3-8; Tadzher , pp. 51-52. 38 B. Peshev, in his introductio n to/? . Daskalov: Izbrani statu ι rechi (Sofia, 1947), 7. 39 R. Daskalov , Borba za zemia (Sofia, 1923), pp. 9-65.

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him to project himself almost as Stamboliski' s equal. The Radomi r Rebellio n was the first, but by no mean s the last, example of his tugging at the reins. Stambolisk i and Daskalo v began their journe y toward the front on the mornin g of Septembe r 26. They were accompanie d by member s of parliamen t from the Democratic , Broad Socialist, and Radica l partie s as well as by the Ministe r of War, Genera l Sava Savov.40 It took the group nearl y the full day to travel the thirt y miles to the village of Radomir , the closest encampmen t of the rebelliou s soldiers, locate d midway between Sofia and the Staff Headquarter s in Kiustendil . Arriving at about 8:00 PM , Stam boliski met with Sergeant-Majo r Georg i Damianov , an Agrarian sympathise r thoug h not a membe r of the BANU , who com mande d the largest battalio n encampe d at Radomir. 41 Damiano v asked the parliamentar y delegatio n to sleep in the village and to address the troop s at dawn. Tha t mornin g at 9:00 AM the group entere d the soldiers' camp , where Stambolisk i mad e the first address. He pleade d with the troop s to maintai n orde r unti l the peace delegatio n settled armistice terms . Remindin g them tha t they had not listened to him in 1915 when he told them not to take up arms, he begged them to heed him now and to defend the countr y unti l the Allies grante d an armistice. 42 Dr . Nikol a Sakaro v of the Broad Socialists seconde d Stamboliski' s speech , but neithe r mad e muc h of an impression. The troop s clearly wanted to continu e their marc h to Sofia. Finally , the Ministe r of War told them that if they would not return to the front , they should at least lay down their arms and go home . Ther e was some sympath y for this course of action , but the majorit y remaine d fixed on revenge. 43 The delegatio n decide d to push on to Kiustendi l to view the situatio n ther e and to visit Staff Headquarter s to see what could be The source s do not agree on the exact compositio n of the group . Some indicate tha t Stanch o Momche v of the Dragie v faction was present . 41 Damiano v joined the BANU after the rebellion . H e was a membe r of parliamen t from 1918 to 1923 and was murdere d after takin g part in the Septembe r 1923 uprising. 42 G . Damianov , Istinata na seplemvriskata revoliutsiia ν Bulgariia (Sofia, 1921), pp. 33-34. 43 Ibid ; Kh . Khristov , Revohutsionnata, pp. 280-81. 40

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learned of the peace mission. They arrived about noon and were welcomed by what remained of the General Staff. Since nothing had yet been heard from the peace mission, Stamboliski made his way to the rebel-controlled railroad station to speak to the troops. Before he could finish, he was summoned to the telegraph office. The message he received was from Daskalov, who had returned to Radomir. Daskalov informed him that over 15,000 troops were now concentrated in Radomir and that they had accumulated a sufficient number of locomotives and cars to carry out a quick descent on Sofia. Daskalov read the draft of a proclamation of a provisional government that he had prepared and asked Stamboliski to signal his approval. Stamboliski hesitated, questioning the timeliness of this move, but Daskalov stressed the size and readiness of the forces at his disposal. The exact nature of Stamboliski's final reply is not known. He apparently gave some sort of approval, but from his later conduct it seems clear that it was neither enthusiastic nor unconditional. It was, perhaps, an instruction to do no more than test the waters.44 Whatever reply Stamboliski made, Daskalov proceeded to take command of the situation in Radomir. In an address to the troops, he read the following proclamation: Today, September 27, 1918, the Bulgarian people break the chains of slavery, throw down the despotic regime of Ferdinand and his henchmen, proclaim them enemies of the people, proclaim themselves a free people with a republican form of government, and hold out the hand of peace and understanding to the peoples of Europe. From this day Tsar Ferdinand and his dynasty and the former government are fallen. All provincial administrators, district officials, police commandants, mayors, and military officers will carry out the orders of the provisional government of the republic. President: Al. Stamboliski Commander-in-Chief: Raiko Daskalov This proclamation having been enthusiastically received by the soldiers, Daskalov drafted a telegram to be sent to all military and 44 K. Nikolov, "Radomirskata 'republika': vladaiskite subitiia prez septemvri 1918 g.," Mir, No. 11,479 (Nov. 3, 1938),3.

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administrative centers in the country stating that Tsar Ferdinand and the Malinov government were now deposed. He directed all officers and officials to obey the provisional government, "before which they will be responsible for the maintenance of order in the country."45 Even as Daskalov began to organize his forces for the march on Sofia, he seemed to feel the need to justify himself to Stamboliski. During the afternoon he sent a letter to Kiustendil by train in which he wrote that he had been driven to proclaim the provisional government by the dangerous position in which Bulgaria now stood. The enemy would not wait for Bulgaria's politicians, he maintained. Only a republican "people's government" could save the country from the foreign enemy and from internal disorder. Moreover, it had the opportunity to construct a new economic life so that millionaires and parasites would yield their places to honest laborers. He went on to write: "I made use of your name, for I made you the president of the provisional government. This was the desire—the unanimous desire—of the people and of the troops. If you do not wish to lead the provisional government, then my only prayer is that you do not condemn it now." The "Commander-in-Chief" concluded that he had sufficient troops at his disposal to force Sofia to recognize the provisional government, and that he did not believe that the capital would offer resistance. It is not known whether or not this letter reached Stamboliski.46 After his telegraph conversation with Daskalov, Stamboliski made no attempt to assume leadership of the rebellious troops in Kiustendil. Instead he returned to General Staff Headquarters and informed his companions that he had decided to go to Dupnitsa, a garrison town about fifty miles to the south, to try to bring order to the troops there. He apparently wanted to assess the situation there and to view the mood of the troops closer to the front. He was in Dupnitsa by evening when he wired headquarters that a shortage of gasoline had left him stranded so that he could not rejoin their party. He did not, however, appear before the troops in his new capacity as president of the provisional government. 45 46

136

Kh. Khnstov, Revohutsionnata, pp. 284-85. K. Kozhukharov, Radomirskata republika (Sofia, 1948), pp. 283-84.

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Daskalov used the rest of the day to impose a rough order on the troops in Radomir. He named Georgi Damianov Chief-ofStaff and organized eight infantry batallions with two machinegun companies. Here, Daskalov committed the first of several critical tactical mistakes. Believing that the capital would not be willing or able to offer serious resistance, he made no effort to organize artillery units. At 9:00 PM he telegraphed Sofia that if it did not recognize the provisional government he would advance against it in the morning.47 Stamboliski arrived at Radomir in the morning. His conversation with Daskalov was not amiable, for he apparently berated his commander-in-chief for his hastiness. In a later letter describing this meeting Daskalov wrote that instead of support he received "reproaches and complaints."48 The two men parted after only half-an-hour, Stamboliski for the capital and Daskalov to accompany the troops to Pernik, the staging ground for the assault on Sofia. Returning to Sofia, Stamboliski found the capital relatively calm. He went directly to the Council of Ministers, where he denied having any part in the Radomir Rebellion, claiming that whatever he and Daskalov had done, it was because they had been "prisoners" of the troops. The council did not believe him, and after he left it voted to issue an order for his arrest. Stamboliski went into hiding and sought to organize an internal uprising in the capital to support Daskalov's assault. His effort was not successful. The Agrarian parliamentary group refused to approve the rebellion; Dragiev declared it to be a fraud in a proclamation to which he affixed not only his own name but those of Stamboliski and Tserkovski as well. Copies were printed in the Sofia newspapers and later dropped on the troops from airplanes. Both factions of the parliamentary group, viewing the rebellion as the work of Daskalov alone, voted to condemn it and to pledge support to the government in its effort to secure an armistice.49 Finding no support from his own colleagues, Stamboliski 47

Kh. Khnstov, Revoliutsionnala, pp 290-91 Ibid., p. 293. 49 Ibid., pp. 293-95; Mir, Nos. 5518, 5520 (Sept. 27, 30, 1918); Dragiev, lzpoved, pp. 5, 32-43. 48

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turned to Dimitur Blagoev, leader of the Narrow Socialists. In a secret visit to Blagoev's home he argued that the Narrows were powerful in the cities, the BANU in the countryside. Together they could take power. According to Blagoev's account, Stamboliski promised that he was ready to accept the Narrows' "whole program" with the exception of its stand on private property for peasants. In spite of this generous offer, Blagoev refused to cooperate. He could not overcome his ideological blinders with regard to the Agrarians. To him the peasantry was bourgeois and he did not want the Narrow party to involve itself in what he saw as an internal bourgeois conflict. He also realized that at that moment the BANU was far larger and stronger than his own party and that Stamboliski was a more popular, charismatic leader than himself. Convinced that Bulgaria was on the same road that had led to the October Revolution in Russia, he was not now prepared to settle for second place.50 Even without the help of an internal uprising, Daskalov might have succeeded if he had not continued to make serious tactical errors. His forces made no effort to cut Sofia's communications, allowing the government to appeal to the Germans for aid. Furthermore, the republican army moved slowly, concentrating in Vladaia, six miles outside the capital. At 9:00 AM on September 29, Daskalov sent another telegram to the government announcing that if the "former authorities" did not recognize the provisional government within the next six hours, he would begin his advance. Although the only reply to this ultimatum was an aerial bombardment, he was not able to begin the attack until 4:00 in the afternoon. Daskalov divided his troops into three columns, whose objectives were the villages of Boiana, Kniazhevo, and Gorna Bania on the southwestern outskirts of the capital. The principal defenders of the city were the loyalist Macedonian units of General Alexander Protogerov which put up a fierce resistance, especially to the central column commanded by Daskalov. They subjected this column to heavy artillery fire that left both Daskalov and Danianov wounded. Nevertheless, by nightfall the republican 50

1-2.

138

Rothschild, pp. 81-83; Rabotmchiski veslnik, XXJI, No 274 ('une 6, 1919),

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army had captured its immediate objectives and was poised to enter the city. At this point Daskalov committed his last and most serious mistake. Forgetting the most fundamental rule of warfare, he waited until daylight to launch the final assault. His motive was to avoid looting and unnecessary bloodshed, which he feared would occur if the capital fell to the angry troops during the night. This respite permitted the city's defenders to regroup and to gain reinforcements from the German 217th Division, transferred from the Crimea to the Balkan front, which was well equipped with machine guns and artillery. The military balance now swung decisively in favor of the government. Moreover, at this time news reached the capital and the rebels that an armistice had been signed at Salonika. The war was over for Bulgaria, and the country would submit to Allied occupation. The arrival of this news caused large-scale desertion among the republican troops. When Daskalov ordered the final assault at 5:00 AM on the 30th, only six to seven thousand soldiers remained. They were overwhelmed by the German and Macedonian defenders, who counterattacked and shattered Daskalov's forces. In two days Radomir itself was recaptured.51 Daskalov was hidden by Agrarian sympathisers in a village near Radomir, and was later rescued by Alexander Dimitrov, who took him to Salonika, where he was placed in the hands of the French authorities. Stamboliski was likewise concealed by friends in Sofia. Leaders of the BANU approached the occupation authorities with a request that the two men be allowed to go to France to escape the charges of treason that the government had lodged against them. The French authorities, however, not wishing to encourage uprisings and disorders, refused.52 Although the defeat of the Radomir Rebellion slowed the crumbling of the old regime, it could not prevent it. The Allies, while willing to accept the Coburg dynasty, compelled the abdication of Tsar Ferdinand, who left the throne to his son Boris on 51

The military aspects of the rebellion were described in detail by Kosta Nikolov, the commander of the Sofia garrison, in a series of articles under the title "Radomirskata 'republika': Vladaiskite subitiia prez septemvri 1918 g." in the newspaper M r , No. 11,479-11,510 (Nov. 3-Dec. 10, 1938). See also A. Palmer, The Gardeners of Salonika (New York, 1965), pp. 225-26. 52 Kh. Khristov, Revohutsionnata, pp 314-15.

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October 3. Fifteen days later Malinov reorganized the cabinet, giving places to Ianko Sakuzov of the Broad Socialists, Todor Todorov of the Nationals, and Tsanko Tserkovski of the BANU. The Agrarian participation in the new government was not enthusiastic and was undertaken only when Malinov promised to grant an amnesty for political crimes. The prime minister, however, dragged his feet on introducing amnesty legislation, and in fact resigned in less than a month when the Allies turned the Dobruja over to Rumania. Todor Todorov was given a mandate to form a new government of national unity. His cabinet, formed on November 28, included two Nationals, two Democrats, two Broad Socialists, and two Agrarians, Tsanko Tserkovski as Minister of Rails, Posts, and Telegraphs, and Dragiev as Minister of Agriculture. The Ministry of Public Domains was left vacant for Stamboliski. A bill on amnesty was hastily enacted, and Stamboliski came out of hiding to join the government on January 3. 53 Dragiev and Stamboliski followed opposite courses in the government, for Dragiev sincerely believed in the coalition and hoped that Agrarian participation in such governments would become a permanent fixture of Bulgaria's future political life. As Minister of Agriculture he urged the peasants to turn over their crops to the state's economic administration so that an increased supply of food could restore political stability.54 Stamboliski, on the other hand, even though he belonged to the government, took no part in it. He denounced it for governing illegally,55 for retaining censorship, and for failing to enact social reforms, and he demanded that it set a date for the new elections.56 This brought the longstanding conflict between Stamboliski and Dragiev into the open and made a final collision inevitable. The two men agreed to submit their differences to a BANU congress to be held in April. In the meantime, they agreed to nominate a commission of twenty-five members to study the dispute, the split in the parliamentary group, and the conduct of individual members of the Union, and to submit a report to the congress.57 53

54 Kazasov, Burnt godim, pp. 16-30. Turlakov, Istonia, p. 131. On the grounds that no National Assembly elections had been held within the five-year period mandated by the constitution. 56 Zemledelsko zname, xiv, No. 43 (Feb. 20, 1919), 1 57 Zemledelsko zname, xiv, Nos. 50, 55, 61 (March 8, 21, April 5, 1919). 55

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Expecting victory at the congress, Stamboliski pressed Dragiev and his followers to pledge in advance to abide by its decisions. Dragiev demurred, and in March Nikola Mushanov, the Democratic Minister of the Interior, banned the congress. He may have been acting from the fear that the unsettled situation in the country provided a dangerous environment for mass political meetings. It was also true that in the countryside Stamboliski's followers were conducting a strident campaign against the government. But it is quite likely, if unproven, that he was cooperating with Dragiev. After the banning of the congress, Stamboliski and Tserkovski submitted their resignations, but Dragiev did not. Todorov backed away from this confrontation, and the two Democratic members of the cabinet were forced to resign. The congress was rescheduled for June 1.58 It began inauspiciously for Dragiev. Stamboliski nominated the "hero of Radomir" to preside, and Daskalov was given a prolonged ovation by the delegates. The congress also voted overwhelmingly to approve the "courageous acts" of Stamboliski in defying Ferdinand and enduring prison. On the second day, Spas Duparinov, a young fire-eater, called Dragiev an "old man, whom time has passed by," at which the Agrarian moralist left the congress, refusing to return until Duparinov was persuaded to apologize. When the commission presented its report on factionalism in the Union, its verdict went mainly against Dragiev. Although some members of the Dimitrov faction were found guilty of wartime speculation, the same charges applied to many of Dragiev's followers as well. Moreover, the commission attached most of the blame for the split in the parliamentary group to Dragiev.59 Dragiev took the floor in his own defense, and his speech occupied the entire third day of the congress. He later published it with some additional remarks as his "political confession." He began by recounting his long years of service to the Agrarian Union and then went to the core of his differences with Stamboliski. He believed in gradual, evolutionary change, he said, while Stamboliski was a revolutionary. He believed in humility 58 59

Kh. Khristov, Revohutsionnata, pp. 406-407. Zemledelsko zname, xiv, Nos. 77, 79, 80 (June 8, 14, 18, 1919).

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and tolerance, Stamboliski in might makes right. Above all, Dragiev pleaded, he was a Christian, a deeply religious man whose life was guided by the sermon on the mount. Stamboliski was a materialist. For me there is another world and my works may proceed slowly. For Stamboliski, as a materialist, the world is here and he is quick, he wants everything that will be done to be done in a few years—he will not wait. I am for gradual progress, he is for rapid progress. He is a revolutionary, I am not.60 Stamboliski did not deny these charges. Rather he confirmed them in a short, almost perfunctory speech. The congress voted overwhelmingly to confirm the commission's report and recommendations. Dragiev himself was not censured, but a number of his supporters were removed from their posts and some were suspended from membership in the Union. The newly elected Governing Council was dominated by Stamboliski's supporters. At the conclusion of the congress, when it met to elect a Standing Committee, all of Dragiev's nominees and Dragiev himself were defeated. Dragiev walked out of the meeting and later, when he entered an independent slate of candidates in the elections for the XVIII National Assembly, he was formally expelled from the Union. Tsanko Tserkovski wrote his political obituary, stressing Dragiev's desire for personal recognition and his resentment of the more talented and dynamic Stamboliski.61 A Radical journalist accurately summed up the difference between the two men when he wrote: "Mr. Dragiev lacks that belief in his star, that self-assurance, that Mr. Stamboliski holds in such large measure." 62 After his success at the congress, Stamboliski went to Paris as a member of Bulgaria's peace delegation. While he was abroad, elections were held for a new National Assembly. Their result, shown in Table 4, demonstrates the continuing erosion of the old 60

Dragiev, Izpoved, p. 8. Zemledelsko zname, xiv, Nos. 81, 94 (June 20, Aug. 7, 1919). 62 Radikal, xv, No 124 (June 10, 1919), 1.

61

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parties and significant gains for both the BANU and the Communists.63 The three parties of change captured 59 percent of the vote and 71 percent of the seats in the National Assembly. TABLE 4 ELECTIONS FOR THE XVIII NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, AUGUST 17,

Party BANU BCP Broad Socialists Democrats Nationals Progressive Liberals Liberals Radicals Dragiev Agrarians Others Total

1919

%of

Deputies elected

Votes

votes

85 47 36 28 19 8 2 8 0 0 233

180,648 118,671 82,826 65,267 54,556 52,722 42,024 33,343 17,796 8,462 656,315

28 18 13 10 8 8 6 5 3 1 100

Stamboliski returned to Bulgaria on September 19, and received Boris's mandate to form a new government. Since the BANU was thirty-four seats short of a majority, a partner was needed for a coalition. Participation in coalition governments violated a longstanding Union tradition. During the war Stamboliski had written from prison against diluting the Union's program by compromise with the political parties.64 He had approved the BANU's entry into the Malinov and Todorov governments only because of the desperate situation in which the country found itself. Now he was prepared to continue in a coalition, but only because he believed that a strong tide was running in favor of the BANU. To withdraw from responsibility now would break the Union's momentum and leave the field to the Communists. A short period of coalition, new elections, and an Agrarian majority were what he expected. Stamboliski first approached the Communists with an offer of 63 Birman, p. 265; Turlakov, htoriia, p. 135; Statisticheski godishnik na bitlgarskoto tsarstvo, godini V-X1V (1913-1922), p. C59. 64 N. Petkov.pp. 182-83.

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partnership, but the BCP65 had visions of its own. Its strength had grown faster than any other party's, and its leaders viewed the Bulgarian situation through the prism of Russian experience. To them Stamboliski was a Bulgarian Kerensky to be brushed aside at the appropriate moment. Blagoev rejected the Agrarian offer out of hand, stating that the BCP would not join hands with the petit bourgeoisie.66 This response had, of course, been expected. Stamboliski knew that the Allies would never permit an even partially "bolshevik" regime in Bulgaria, and his experience with Blagoev during the Radomir Rebellion made it obvious that he would get no cooperation from that quarter. Nevertheless, it served his purposes to have made the offer. The BANU could now accuse the BCP of cowardice and fear of responsibility. If this would not shake the Communists in their factory strongholds, it would still carry weight in the villages. On the other hand, by raising the spectre of an Agrarian-Communist alliance, Stamboliski could intimidate the right, forcing it to accept the Agrarian program. Having executed this maneuver, Stamboliski turned to the party he really wanted, the Broad Socialists. The Broad Socialists at this time, however, were beset by great fear and great ambition. Their fear, and it was a real one, was of losing their following in the working class to the Communists. The Socialists were aware that, although they had captured a solid 13 percent of the vote in the August elections, against this had to be balanced the fact that they had controlled the Ministry of the Interior, always a large advantage in any Bulgarian election. During the summer, Krustiu Pastukhov had turned the police loose against the Communists and had tried, unsuccessfully, to secure Socialist control of the trade unions with police power. The Communists had succeeded in pinning the label "Police Socialists" on the party in the elections. The Socialists must have been aware that, although they retained a following among the country's white-collar and skilled workers, their strength among the proletariat was vanishing. But if they feared any contest of 65 The Narrow Socialists had adopted the title "Bulgarian Communist Party" at their congress in May 1919. 66 Rothschild, pp. 94-97; /stoma na Bulgarskata komunistwheska partita (Sofia, 1972), p. 227.

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numbers with either the BANU or the BCP, the Socialists knew that they had other strengths. They had a stronghold in the government bureaucracy and among the railroad workers, two vital strategic points. Moreover, Pastukhov had seen the uses of political power. Under the right circumstances his party might still win all. The Broad Socialists agreed to form a government with the BANU, but as the price of participation they demanded the Ministries of the Interior, War, Commerce, and Rails, Posts and Telegraphs. In effect, this was a request for control of the army, the police, and a critical segment of the working class. Alexander Obbov, who with Stamboliski, Daskalov, and Turlakov composed the BANU's negotiating committee, directly accused Pastukhov of planning a coup. The same conclusion was reached in the press of the Radical party, which had always been close to the Broad Socialists and which expected to find a place in an Agrarian-Broad coalition.67 The BANU made a counter offer of three ministries, including those of war, commerce, and finance, but Pastukhov remained adamant and the BANU was forced to turn elsewhere.68 The failure of the Agrarians and the Socialists to come to terms was a great misfortune for them both, and for the country as well. Such an alliance could have restored political stability, and it would have had the support of the bureaucrats with the training and skill to administer the government.69 The decision of the Socialists to oppose the BANU created tremendous difficulties for the Agrarians, who now had to develop their own machinery to implement their program and to rely on poorly trained and inexperienced cadres. It was doubly unfortunate since the whole tradition of Broad Socialism had been to reach out to the countryside for allies. Unhappily, the Socialists had always seen themselves 67 Radikal, xv, Nos. 221, 223 (Oct 6, 8, 1919). TheRadikal editors placed the blame for the BANU's turn to the right squarely on the Broad Socialists. 68 Zemledelsko zname, xv, No. 24-25 (Oct. 3, 1919), 3; Turlakov, Istorua, p. 136. These accounts have been supplemented with the testimony of Dimo Kazasov and Alexander Obbov, who were interviewed by the author in June and July 1973. 69 D. Kazasov, Burnt godini, p. 36. Kazasov reiterated this point to the author in June 1973 He laid the blame for the party's intransigence on the ambition and closed-mindedness of Pastukhov.

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directing such a partnership. They could not bring themselves to take part if it meant a subordinate position. True, they paid for their decision with the nearly complete erosion of their following. But they dealt a crippling blow to the Agrarian Union in the process. Unable to reach an agreement with any of the left parties—the Radical group by itself was too small to bother with—the BANU turned to the right. The National and Progressive Liberal parties jumped at the chance to hold office, and on October 6 the new government was formed. Two Nationals, Mikhail Madzharov and Atanas Burov, held the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Commerce, while Stoian Danev, the Progressive Liberal leader, took the Finance Ministry. The remaining posts were occupied by Agrarians. Stamboliski became Prime Minister and held the Ministries of War and Public Domains as well. Raiko Daskalov became Minister of Agriculture, Tsanko Tserkovski Minister of Education, Alexander Dimitrov Minister of the Interior, and Marko Turlakov Minister of Rails, Posts and Telegraphs and acting Minister of Justice. The extra ministries held by Stamboliski and Turlakov were purposely left vacant in case the Broad Socialists abandoned their hostility to a coalition. The government commanded only 112 of the 233 seats in the National Assembly, but Stamboliski, doubting that his opponents on the right and left could come together, was sure that he had enough votes to govern during the next crucial months.70 The first major act of the government was to arrest those members of the Radoslavov cabinet who were still in the country. Also arrested were a number of deputies and journalists who had ardently supported the war as well as officers and officials charged with crimes in occupied territories. The last category included the leaders of the Macedonian organizations. At the same time a "Law for the Judgment and Punishment of Those Responsible for the National Catastrophe" was introduced in the National Assembly. This measure was first decided on by the Union's Governing Council, which was motivated by the desire to impress the Allies with Bulgaria's break with the past and by considerations of sim70 D. Kazasov, Burnt godini, p. A\\Zemledelsko zname, xv, No. 22 (Oct. 8, 1919), 1.

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THE ROAD TO POWER

pie justice. The law was also expected to have broad popular support. Before he returned to Paris, Stamboliski toyed with the idea of creating a "People's Court" to try the accused. The Communists, in fact, demanded this. The BANU's partners on the right, however, were able to secure the deletion of this provision, and the legislation, passed on November 22, provided for trial in the civil courts.71 Although the BANU had presented an outline of its reform program at the opening of the National Assembly,72 it hesitated to press for its legislative enactment. Its parliamentary foundation was shaky and Stamboliski was abroad—he signed the Treaty of Neuilly on November 27. Moreover, there were clear signs that a major confrontation with the left was approaching. The primary causes of the great winter strike were the ambition of the Communists, the Socialists' fear of being left behind, and the very real deprivations suffered by the urban working class. The plight of the working class was indeed serious, for inflation had far outrun wages and many basic commodities including food and fuel were difficult to acquire for any amount of money.73 At the Narrow Socialist congress in May 1919, at which the Narrow Socialists became the Bulgarian Communist party and joined the Comintern, the party leaders rejected "bourgeois parliamentarism," condemned the "left" parties, the BANU, Radical Democrats, and Broad Socialists, as "agents of the bourgeoi71

Zemledelsko zname, xv, No. 38 (Nov. 8, 1919), 1. According to Petur Peshev, one of those arrested, those incarcerated in Central Prison included 9 former ministers; the Vice-President of the XVII National Assembly; 19 former deputies; 6 journalists; 4 former military judges; General Savov, the former Commander-in-Chief; 5 Macedonian leaders, including General Protogerov and Todor Alexandrov; and 10 high officials. In later months an indeterminate additional number were arrested in Sofia and the provinces. For many of them this proved to be a blessing in disguise since it prevented their extradition for trial in Rumania, Yugoslavia, or Greece. Radoslavov himself had fled with the Germans, but he was tried in absentia. The Agrarian government approached the Germans on the question of extraditing both Radoslavov and former Tsar Ferdinand, but without result. 72 Dnevnitsi na XVI11ONS, purva izviinredovna sesua, i, 6-7. 73 Bitman, p. 347; N. Penev, "Zhivotut potvurdi nasheto delo" m N. Goranov and S. Zhelev, eds., Transportnata stachka, 1919-1920 (Sofia, 1964), 12.

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sie," and called for the formatio n of workers', soldiers', and peasants ' Soviets. 74 Although they had suffered a setback in July when their attemp t to take contro l of the streets of Sofia was put down by Pastukhov , the August election s revealed that they stood second only to the BANU in popula r support . Early in Novembe r they began to organiz e mass meeting s and demonstration s against Stamboliski' s coalition . Rabotnicheski vestnik, the part y newspaper, was publishe d on red newsprint , a practic e that continue d to the end of the strike. In the election s for town and village council s on Decembe r 7 the part y received still mor e encouragement , gaining 140,000 votes, 20,000 mor e tha n in August's parliamentar y elections . Although the BANU swept the rural localities , the BCP ran very well in the towns, winnin g majoritie s in Plovdiv, Varna, Ruse, Shumen , Pleven , Sliven, Burgas, and Dupnitsa. 75 Fo r its part , the BANU was willing to meet the Communis t challenge , and it had alread y begun to prepar e to deal with the working class and its parties . When thei r negotiation s for a coalition with the BANU broke down, the Broad Socialists had threatene d the Agrarian leader s with a strike. On Octobe r 8, two days after the formatio n of the Agrarian coalition , representative s of the Socialist-dominate d transport , postal, and telegraph union s presente d the governmen t with a deman d for large wage increases. At the same time , the union s issued an appea l to thei r members , telling them to prepar e for a strike, and publishe d a handboo k with instruction s for settin g up a nationwid e networ k of strike committees . The task of negotiatin g with the union s fell to Mark o Turlakov , the Ministe r of Rails, Post s and Telegraphs , and to Alexander Dimitrov , the Ministe r of the Interio r and Acting Prim e Ministe r while Stambolisk i was in Paris. The two men rejected the unions ' demand s on Octobe r 15, but sweetened the pill by announcin g that the governmen t would seek an emergenc y appropriatio n of 80,000,00 0 leva for the relief of state-employe d workers. 76 Although this measur e averted an immediat e crisis, the Agrar74 Bulgarskata komunisticheska partita ν rezoliutsii i reshenna na kongresite, konferentsite ι plenumite na Ts. Κ., 11 (Sofia, 1951), 14-19. 75 Birman , p. 348;Zemledelsko zname, xv, No . 54 (Dec . 13, 1919), 1. 76 Kh . Khnstov , Revoliutswnnata, pp. 514-16.

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ian leaders appealed to the druzhbi to prepare to fight for the government. Turlakov and Dimitrov toured the provinces to organize the Orange Guard, a paramilitary Agrarian defense force consisting of able-bodied peasants, armed generally with clubs (the tsepinitsa), under the command of local druzhba leaders. The Guard was ordered to take over the towns in the event of an attack on the government.77 If the creation of the Guard seemed to set an example of extralegality and brownshirtism, it should be remembered that by the terms of the Treaty of Neuilly the government was left practically no armed forces for self-defense, while the Socialists and Communists already possessed disciplined "troops." As Stamboliski later said in the National Assembly, when accused by a Communist deputy of using the Guard as a state institution: Are your proletarian and bureaucratic unions state institutions? Are your clubs, your "peoples halls," your groups state institutions? Who gave them the right to conceal weapons, to march with weapons, to demolish bridges, to throw bombs, to terrorize government workers? Who gave them that right? Against your organization the Agrarian Union will oppose its own, and the government will do its duty because it has sufficient strength to crush those who disturb [civil] order.78 Because of the measures that Dimitrov and Turlakov took, and because of their hard line against the unions, Communist historians have charged that they represented a right-wing faction in the BANU that stood for the interests of large landowners who were joining the Union now that it was in power.79 They argue, by implication, that if Stamboliski had been on the scene, relations with the working-class parties would have developed differently. There is no evidence to support this position. Stamboliski never gave less than full approval to the measures taken by his ministers, and he personally instituted the most severe repression against the strikers after his return from Paris. Even Raiko Daskalov, whom Communist historians nominate as leader of the 77

Birman, pp. 352, 364-65. Zemledelsko zname, xv, No. 76 (March 7, 1920), 1. 79 Kh. Khnstov, Revoliutsionnata, p. 559; Birman, pp. 314-15, 363-64.

78

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THE ROAD TO POWER

"left" faction, rejoiced in the crushing defeat suffered by the BCP and its allies.80 Conflict between the Agrarians and Communists was not the product of a right-wing Agrarian cabal, it was the natural outcome of political developments since the end of the war. The two militant and exuberant organizations were inevitably headed for a showdown to decide which of them would inherit Bulgaria. The BCP decided to test its strength by holding massive demonstrations around the country to coincide with the opening of the National Assembly on December 24. The government proclaimed martial law and prohibited all gatherings. Orange Guards were brought to the towns; as many as 10,000 assembled in Sofia. Although a few small Communist demonstrations were held, most of the workers were afraid to come into the streets.81 The next day, however, a wildcat strike broke out among the transport workers. It seems to have taken by surprise the leadership of the unions as well as of the Socialist and Communist parties, but the BCP seized the chance to provoke a confrontation between the government and the workers. Its leadership called for a general strike, and the Broad Socialists, frightened of losing their radical reputation, joined in.82 On December 26 representatives of the transport unions presented a new list of demands to Stamboliski, who had just returned from Paris. When he rejected these, the Socialists and Communists formed a joint strike committee. The general strike began at noon on December 28. Stamboliski was convinced that the strike had been called for political reasons and, although aware of the deprivations suffered by the urban workers, was determined not to make any concessions. The Orange Guard was mobilized to defend state property, and peasants who had served in transport battalions during the war were put to work on the railroads. The Allied occupation authorities lent troops, expertise, and moral support to the government.83 Stamboliski decided to challenge the Communists in their own 80 81 82

Dnevnitsi na XVIII ONS, puma redovna sesiia, n, 1,182-. Kh. Khnstov, Revohutsionnata, pp. 526-32. 83 Ibid., p. 533; Rothschild, p. 98. Rothschild, p. 98.

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stronghold , the Perni k coal mines , whose workers had a long history of militancy . Alexander Dimitro v led half of the Sofia garrison, reinforce d with cavalry units , to the mine s and carrie d out mass arrests of strikers. Orang e Guard s were used to bring the mine s back into production. 84 On Decembe r 31, the governmen t militarize d the transpor t and communication s industries . Workers were mobilized, and those who failed to repor t were evicted from thei r state-owne d apart ments , deprived of their food ratio n cards, and threatene d with militar y courts . Several Communis t party leader s were arrested , and the rest were driven underground. 85 In the face of this decisive Agrarian counterattack , the BCP' s leadershi p faltered and broke. It called an end to the general strike on Januar y 5. The transpor t and communications workers and the Perni k miner s continue d to hold out , but on Februar y 19 the entir e strike effort collapsed. 86 Stambolisk i wished to defeat the Communists , not crush them . H e still looked on the BCP as an estatist organization , and he maintaine d tha t as soon as the workers replace d the lawyers and intellectual s in their leadershi p with men from their own ranks, they would find an accommodatio n with the BANU . He also knew that the time had com e to proceed with his own programs , and that fear of the Communist s would drive the rightist partie s to acquiesc e in the Agrarian plans for reform. 87 With the formal end of the strike, the governmen t droppe d its repressive measures . Stambolisk i dissolved the Nationa l Assembly and schedule d new election s for Marc h 28. Thei r results (Table 5) 8 8 brough t an increas e in Agrarian suppor t and bore witness to the new politica l configuratio n that had arisen since the war. The election s left the BANU five seats short of an absolute majority . Rathe r than form anothe r coalition , Stambolisk i moved 84 Kh . Mashkov , "Uchastiet o na pernishkit e (dimitrovskite ) rudnichar i ν trans portnat a stachk a prez 1919/192 0 g., " lstoricheski pregled, xn, No . 2 (1956), 65-71. 85 86 Birman , pp. 354-63 . Kh. Khristov , Revohutsionnata, pp. 564-66. 87 Dnevnitsi na XVIII ONS, purva izvunredovna sesna, I, 48. 88 la. lotsov, "Upravleniet o na Zemedelskii a siiiuz (1919-192 3 g.), " lstoricheski pregled, vi, No . 3 (1950), 324; vii, No . 3 (1951), 249: Statisticheski godishnik . . . (1913-1922), p. C60.

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THE ROAD TO POWER TABLE 5 ELECTIONS FOR THE XIX NATIONAL ASSEMBLY, MARCH 28,

Party BANU BCP Democrats Nationals Broad Socialists Progressive Liberals Radical Democrats National Liberals Various Liberal and LiberalDemocratic Coalitions Others Totals

1920

%of

Deputies elected

Votes

110 51 23 15 7 9 8 6

349,212 184,616 91,177 61,647 55,542 46,930 41,930 39,537

38.2 20.2 10.0 6.7 6.1 5.1 4.6 4.2

—

35,522 9,059 915,172

3.9 10 100.0

0 229

votes

to quash the election of thirteen deputies, including nine Communists, three Democrats, and one Progressive Liberal. The case for invalidating these mandates rested on a strict interpretation of the election laws, particularly a usually unenforced prohibition against local officeholders running in national elections.89 The BANU now held a narrow majority of four votes. The new Agrarian cabinet, formed on May 20, 1920, had the following composition: Alexander Stamboliski, Prime Minister, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Acting Minister of War Alexander Dimitrov, Minister of the Interior Tsanko Tserkovski, Minister of Public Domains Marko Turlakov, Minister of Finance Raiko Daskalov, Minister of Commerce Alexander Radolov,90 Minister of Justice 89

Zemledelsko zname, xv, Nos 94, 95 (May 5, 8, 1920). This was, of course, by no means unprecedented. Stamboliski had had his own candidacy invalidated on a technicality in the elections for the XV National Assembly in 1911 90 Alexander Radolov, who was bom in 1883 in Ferdinandsko near Karnobat, had been an active BANU organizer since 1909, when he returned from studying law in Geneva. He was particularly forceful in advocating the establishment of cooperatives, and he authored a number of tracts and articles on economic cooper-

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Stoian Omarchevski, Minister of Education Alexander Obbov,91 Minister of Agriculture Nedelko Atanasov,92 Minister of Rails, Posts and Telegraphs Tserkovski and Turlakov were the "old men" of the cabinet at ages fifty and forty-eight, respectively. Stamboliski had just passed his forty-first birthday, Dimitrov was awaiting his fortysecond. The remaining five ministers were in their thirties. Despite their relative youth, the members of the Agrarian cabinet were veterans of the BANU's past political struggles. They had achieved power and were prepared for the far more difficult task of using that power to transform Bulgaria. ation. He was elected to the National Assembly in 1913. During the period of Agrarian coalition, Stamboliski appointed him a State Prosecutor for the trial of Radoslavov's cabinet. Tadzher, pp. 451-54; Kabineta na G-n Al. Stamboliski, 1920-1921 g. (Sofia, 1921), p. 16. 91 Alexander Obbov was born in Pleven in 1887. Although he studied law and philosophy for three years in Sofia University, he specialized in agriculture, taking courses at the Pleven Vinicultural and Fruit Institutes and working on a state model farm. His career in the BANU was highly successful At Zabunov's urging he became an assistant editor of Zemledelsko zname. He was also chief of the Union's agitators, and served for several years as Secretary of the Union. Elected to parliament for the first time in 1919, he was chosen to be one of the Vice Presidents of the Assembly and was recommended by his colleagues for a place in the cabinet. Tadzher, pp. 515-16; Kabineta, p. 13. 92 Nedelko Atanasov had been an Agrarian activist from the first days of the Union. Born in the village of Slomer in the Turnovo District, he studied for two years at Sofia University before returning to the Tumovo area as a teacher. During the struggle against the tithe he organized one of the largest of the Agrarian demonstrations. This cost him his teaching position and he devoted himself full-time to the BANU as an agitator and writer. He also headed one of the branches of the National Store He was elected to the V Grand National Assembly in 1911 and later became a leading deputy in the Agrarian parliamentary group. Tadzher, pp. 675-76.

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CHAPTER

VI

The Agrarians in Power: Domestic Reforms We must never govern just for the love of the art. —Alexander Stamboliski1 scholarship has taken a generally negative view of the BANU's accomplishments during the years it held power. In the West, Paul Gentizon'sLe drame bulgare,2 the only substantial account of the Agrarian government in a Western language, has had an enduring influence. Gentizon, who was the Balkan correspondent for Le Temps, was no friend of the Agrarians, and he described Stamboliski as a corrupt, ignorant demagogue, whose ideas were limited to a hatred of towns and their inhabitants, the politicians, businessmen, and intellectuals, whom he wished to destroy. He held the Agrarians in general to be arrogant, halfcivilized barbarians, enemies of the modern world.3 Since his portrait confirms the impression of peasants and peasant movements held by a majority of social scientists, it has become almost standard in Western scholarship.4 Communist historians, on the other hand, now accord greater respect to the Agrarians than did their predecessors who had to deal with them in the flesh. Contemporary Soviet and Bulgarian historians now present Stamboliski as a progressive who voiced the real aspirations of the peasantry, and as an early martyr to fasHISTORICAL

1

Stamboliski, Pismata, p. 19 P. Gentizon, Le Drame bulgare (de Ferdinand de Bulgarie a Stamboulisky) (Paris, 1924). 3 Ibid., pp. 136-63. 4 Joseph Rothschild's interpretation of Stamboliski and the BANU follows Gentizon's almost exactly and cites Le Drame bulgare more often than any other source. SeeThe Communist Party of Bulgaria, pp. 85-94. George Jackson, Jr., in Comintern and Peasant in East Europe, 1919-1930 (New York, 1966), although he does not cite Gentizon in either his text or bibliography, follows Rothschild See also R L. Wolff, The Balkans in Our Time (New York, 1967), pp. 106-107. 2

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DOMESTI C REFORM S

cism. Nevertheless , in their eyes he was doome d from the beginning, his tragic flaw being his belief tha t capitalis t society could be reforme d withou t being destroyed , tha t "the wolves could be full and the sheep whole. " Rejectin g the leadershi p of the working class and its part y in favor of his estatist ideology tha t abjured class struggle, he inevitably saw his reform s perverte d by the bourgeoisie and his governmen t collapse. 5 While both of these conclusion s are wide of the mark , they raise importan t question s of interpretatio n and evaluatio n that should be dealt with before turnin g to the individua l Agrarian reforms. The charge that Stambolisk i hate d industr y and urban life is an exaggeration based on a few of his mor e flamboyant campaig n speeches . Ther e is little doubt , of course , that he preferre d the village to the city, and even less doub t tha t he could say so in strong, even violent terms . He frequentl y denounce d the "parasites" who inhabite d the cities, and in 1920 he threatene d to bring down fire and brimston e on the "Sodom and Gomorrah " of Sofia. 6 As Prim e Ministe r he built his small, official residenc e in the fields outsid e the capita l rathe r than live in its heart , and whenever possible he returne d to his native Slavovitsa, where he built a villa. Still, it is not true that he was a "blind hater " of urban life. Even when he was most critica l of the exploitatio n of the countrysid e by the city he called only for a mor e equitabl e distributio n of wealth, not for the depopulatio n of urban centers . His descriptio n of Sofia as a "Sodom and Gomorrah " becam e a standar d politica l joke bobbin g throug h thre e years of parliamentar y banter . Hi s denun ciation s of lawyers, businessmen , and member s of the intelligent sia were tempere d by the acknowledgmen t that ther e were man y hones t and generou s member s of these profession s who were a 5 A. N. Kirshevskaia, "Reform y pravitel'stva zemledel'cheskog o soiuza ν Bolgarn ι ikh krakh, " Uchenye zapiski Instituta slavianovedemia, χ (1954), 5-71, and the same author' s "Padeni e pravitel'stva zemledel'cheskog o soiuza ν Bolgarii, " Uchenye zapiski Instituta slavianovedemia, xi (1955), 63-118; 1 N . Chastukhin , "Ideologicheski e ι politicheski e vzghady Aleksandra Stambohskogo, " Νοναια ι noveishaia istonia, vi (1959), 37-53; lstoriia na Bulgariia, n, pp 412-33; P. Stoichev , "Aleksandur Stamboliski—ideolo g na drebnoselskat a demokratsiia, " Istoricheskipregled, xxxi, No . 1 (1975), 3-30. 6 A Stamboliski , Zemledelsko upravleme: purva godina (Sofia, 1921), p. 43.

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DOMESTI C REFORMS

credit and a benefit to Bulgaria. If he preferre d the countrysid e to Sofia, so have recen t America n president s preferre d Cam p David to Washington . Stamboliski' s contemporar y critic s also charged him with sexual immorality , specifically of being involved in frequen t "scandals" with various women. 8 Although it is impossible to docu men t this part of his life in any detail , this accusatio n seems to have had a kerne l of truth . He had a reputatio n as a "womanizer." 9 Hi s wife, Milena , was older than he by several years, and the always-dubiou s charm s of her person faded after the birth of their childre n in 1902 and 1904. Durin g muc h of the time her husban d was in power, she and her son and daughte r traveled or lived abroad. 10 Perhap s Stambolisk i revealed somethin g of this side of his life in his pamphle t on "Power , Anarchy , and Democracy, " when, in discussing various forms of power, he arrived at that of sex: 7

As a rule the mor e loving and passionat e individua l become s subject to the less loving and passionat e one . Usuall y the man become s subject because he is mor e impulsive. The woman , althoug h weaker physically and intellectually , knows her hear t and thu s can wield power. . . . N o importan t politica l event ever takes place withou t a woman . They bend even stron g statesme n to their will.11 We do not know to what or to whom he was referring, but he seems to have been involved with several women durin g his years as Prim e Minister . This does not , of course , make him uniqu e amon g statesmen , and ther e is no evidenc e that it diverted the course of eithe r his domesti c or foreign policies. It may, in fact, have helpe d him to establish rappor t with Lloyd-George . The accusation s of corruptio n raised against Stambolisk i and his governmen t are mor e serious and equally difficult to evaluate . Allegedly, substantia l sums of mone y were found conceale d in Dnevnitsi na XIX ONS, purva redovna sesiia, in, 1973; N . Petkov , pp. 22632, 299-300. 8 Druzhbashkiia rezhim: Dokumenti, ι (Sofia, 1923), 9-22. 9 K. Todorov , p. 169. 10 Radikal, xvm, No . 184 (Aug. 19, 1922), 1. 11 Stamboliski , Vlast, pp. 7-8. 7

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DOMESTI C REFORMS

Stamboliski' s belongings after the Jun e 9 coup d'etat.12 The source of this information , however, is the same tha t reporte d Stambolisk i "shot while trying to escape, " so that it canno t be accepte d as disintereste d evidence . Most description s of Stam boliski's style of life emanatin g from those who knew him , includin g those who were not his supporters , indicat e that he did not have a great love of luxury, and he had endure d a Sparta n existence in the years before the BANU cam e to power. The memoir s of Nedezhd a Stanchova, 13 who accompanie d him on his diplomati c trips as translator , and who "abhorred " his domesti c policies, describe a man satisfied with relatively simple materia l pleasures. Neithe r his house outsid e Sofia nor his villa, both now restore d and preserved as museums , was particularl y opulent , even by Bulgarian standards . If Stambolisk i can by and large be absolved of the charge of persona l corruption , the same is not true for man y of his colleagues. Alexander Bote ν, for example , who served from Jun e to Octobe r 1921 as Ministe r of Rails, Post s and Telegraphs , was forced to resign for misappropriatin g buildin g materials , and he was later sentence d to thre e years in prison for graft. 14 Ott o Nekhelis , the Directo r of the BANU' s Nationa l Store , embezzle d large sums and was forced to resign in a scanda l tha t also caused Interio r Ministe r Nedelk o Atanasov to leave office unde r a cloud. 15 Mark o Turlako v accumulate d a considerabl e fortun e as Ministe r of Finance , apparentl y from speculatio n and kickbacks on governmen t contracts. 16 Worse still was the example of Anton Prudkin , a poet of "demonic " tendencie s whose weakness was power rathe r than money . Durin g the war he had shared a cell in Vidin Prison with Stamboliski , who appointe d him Chie f of Polic e of Sofia in 1919. Durin g the Marc h 1920 electio n campaign Prudki n was responsibl e for two major bomb explosion s and two assassinations , which he used as pretext s to curb opposiDruzhbashkiia rezhim. dokumenti, n (Sofia, 1923), 30-31 N . Muir , Dimitn Stanaoff: Patriot and Cosmopolitan, 1864-1940 (London , 1957). 14 A. Radolov , Prevrata na 9-i iuni ι prestiipnolo nekhaistvo (Sofia, 1931), p. \21;Zemledelsko zname, xvn, No . 86 (Oct . 10, 1921), 1. 15 16 Radolov , pp. 125-26. Ibid. , p. 132. 12

13

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DOMESTIC REFORMS

tion political activity. Although his crimes were discovered and led to his arrest, they brought lasting discredit to the government and tended to substantiate the charge that the Agrarians used dictatorial methods.17 It should be pointed out that the examples of corruption and malfeasance cited here were brought to light by the Agrarians themselves. At the same time it is almost certainly true that many more examples went unreported and unpunished, particularly at the provincial and local levels. Examples of corruption among Agrarian officials point to a larger problem, the BANU's "lack of cadres." Much of the corruption and inefficiency of the Agrarian government may be attributed to its lack of a sufficient number of trained and experienced men. Stamboliski was aware of this problem, and he frequently stated that the BANU had had power thrust upon it before it was ready to govern. Another decade in opposition, he maintained, would have given the Union time to develop a corps of officials experienced in local government and Union affairs who would have been ready to administer the national bureaucracy.18 Since the BANU did not have such men available in 1919, he was prepared to accept the consequences. He attempted first to form a coalition with the Broad Socialists. Then, when the National Assembly convened after the March 1920 elections the Agrarian deputies voted for Radical leader Naicho Tsanov as Assembly President in an attempt to bring that party into some form of partnership. Tsanov, however, turned down the office, and the Radicals declined to take part in or support the government.19 At the same time, Stamboliski offered high diplomatic and administrative posts to Alexander Malinov and the leadership of the Democratic party and to a number of professionals who had served in previous governments. A few, such as Dimitur Stanchov, Mikhail Savov, and Professor Stefan Balamezov, appointed ambassadors to England, France, and Czechoslovakia, respectively, accepted and served with distinction, but most refused.20 17

Ibid., pp. 86-87; K. Todorov, p. 130; P. Peshev, pp. 774-77; Dnevmtsi na XIX ONS, purva redovna sesiia, iv, p. 2849. 18 Stamboliski, Zemledelsko upravlenie,.pp. 12-14. 19 Dnevmtsi na XVIII ONS, purva izvunredovna sesiia, pp. 4-5. 20 Radolov, p. 25.

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DOMESTIC REFORMS

This lack of cooperation from the old parties, who would not take second place to the Agrarians or assume any responsibility for the implementation of their policies, forced the Agrarian government to appoint less-than-qualified personnel. Moreover, many unprincipled bureaucrats sought to join the BANU as soon as it came to power. The Union tried to screen them out, but many were able to become Agrarians and to discredit the BANU with their dishonesty as they had done to other parties before.21 There remains the question of the Agrarian government's commitment to the rule of law. Its critics on the right accused it of ignoring the constitution and traditional legal procedures in favor of "bolshevik methods." On the other hand, the Communists berated the BANU for failing to develop and use a "revolutionary legality" to drive the bourgeoisie from its entrenched positions of power. The Agrarians were committed to bringing about fundamental changes in the structure of Bulgarian society. At the same time, much of the professional bureaucracy and the judiciary were opposed to Agrarian values in general and to much if not all of the Agrarian reform program. In such a situation there is no formula that can guide statesmen to certain success. Total adherence to the letter of the law might easily have emasculated the Agrarian reforms and provided the opposition with a shield behind which it could work to topple the government "by legal means." The fate of the Weimar Republic provides an instructive example of the fetish of legality and its possible consequences.22 On the other hand, ignoring legality altogether in order to force change at any cost might well have destroyed the very idea of law, opening the way to the unrestrained rule of force. The experience of the Soviet Union may be taken as a case in point.23 The following examina21

Zemledelsko zname, xiv, No. 40 (Feb. 13, 1919), 1, xvi, No. 69 (Nov. 26, 1920), l;Turlakov,/stori