Paving the Way for Reagan: The Influence of Conservative Media on US Foreign Policy 0813175844, 9780813175843

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Paving the Way for Reagan

Paving the Way for

Reagan The Influence of Conservative Media on US Foreign Policy

Laurence R. Jurdem

Due to variations in the technical specifications of different electronic reading devices, some elements of this ebook may not appear as they do in the print edition. Readers are encouraged to experiment with user settings for optimum results. Copyright © 2018 by The University Press of Kentucky Scholarly publisher for the Commonwealth, serving Bellarmine University, Berea College, Centre College of Kentucky, Eastern Kentucky University, The Filson Historical Society, Georgetown College, Kentucky Historical Society, Kentucky State University, Morehead State University, Murray State University, Northern Kentucky University, Transylvania University, University of Kentucky, University of Louisville, and Western Kentucky University. All rights reserved. Editorial and Sales Offices: The University Press of Kentucky 663 South Limestone Street, Lexington, Kentucky 40508-4008 www.kentuckypress.com Cataloging-in-Publication data is available from the Library of Congress. ISBN 978-0-8131-7584-3 (hardcover : alk. paper) ISBN 978-0-8131-7585-0 (epub) ISBN 978-0-8131-7586-7 (pdf) This book is printed on acid-free paper meeting the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence in Paper for Printed Library Materials. Manufactured in the United States of America. Member of the Association of University Presses

For my wonderful parents, who made it all possible.

Contents Introduction: Paving the Way for Reagan  1 1. An Erosion of Credibility: Vietnam, 1964–1975  21 2. The De-moralization of the Cold War: China, 1969–1978  45 3. An Illusion of Security: SALT, 1969–1980  65 4. A Symbol of Appeasement: The United Nations, 1964–1979  96 5. A Loss of National Pride: The Panama Canal, 1965–1979  115 6. Democratic Fantasies vs. Cold War Realities: Rhodesia,   1965–1980 131 7. The Pathology of Inaction: The Dilemma of Middle Eastern Oil and the   Iranian Hostage Crisis, 1973–1980  147 Conclusion: A Friend in the White House  169 Acknowledgments 185 Notes 189 Bibliography 233 Index 251 Illustrations follow page 130

Introduction

Paving the Way for Reagan In the first months of 1966, political consultant Stuart Spencer was traveling around California with his client Ronald Reagan. The former actor had announced at the beginning of the year that he planned to run for governor against the Democratic incumbent, Edmund G. Brown. Reagan, who had been a spokesman for General Electric for eight years, beginning in 1954, had come to political prominence following a speech he had delivered two years earlier during the latter stages of Senator Barry Goldwater’s failed campaign for president. The address, “A Time for Choosing,” was a powerful indictment of New Deal liberalism. While Reagan spoke primarily about excessive government regulations and high taxes that he said were draining the strength of the American people, he also commented on the expansion of Soviet influence that endangered freedom and democracy around the world.1 The address was well received by all the major analysts, reporters, and pundits in the media. But nowhere was Reagan’s speech celebrated more than within a small community of conservative columnists at a publication known as Human Events. Staffers of the Washington, DC–based weekly newspaper, founded in 1944, were so excited by Reagan’s comments that the editors published the speech in its entirety. In an analysis of Reagan’s political debut, the publication stated that the themes and ideas discussed would “provide inspiration and instruction to conservatives for years to come.” As Reagan had been reading the publication since his days with GE, the admiration was mutual.2 Stuart Spencer had never read Human Events until he began working with the former Hollywood actor. But in their conversations, he soon learned that Reagan was “an avid follower” who was passionate about the weekly conservative outlet.3 As they barnstormed across the state, Spencer often stood quietly in the background as he watched the former entertainer give the same speech over and over again. Spencer was a seasoned strategist and knew that repetition

2  Paving the Way for Reagan

and “staying on message” was a critical if mundane part of the campaign process. It wasn’t long before “I knew the speech like the back of my hand,” the consultant remembered. Soon Spencer could intuitively follow along as Reagan spoke, while he simultaneously read what the media was saying about issues that might affect the campaign. One day, as Reagan was delivering his usual monologue about the problems affecting California and how he planned to solve them, Spencer realized that Reagan had “suddenly gone off message and had clearly interjected something new into his speech.” As Reagan spoke, Spencer happened to glance at the article he had been reading in the most recent issue of Human Events and then, as he related in an interview more than forty-five years later, “I suddenly realized I knew where that son of a bitch got this from. He got it from Human Events.” As the speech concluded, Spencer went over to Reagan and asked if he had, indeed, used that particular article in his remarks. Reagan simply smiled and said he had. The candidate then asked his political adviser if he could get back to reading Human Events on a regular basis once the campaign really got going. Spencer chuckled and said, “I figured he had probably been reading it all along.”4

The Publications of Conservative Opinion and the Forging of the Reagan Foreign Policy During the sixteen years following the defeat of Barry Goldwater, Human Events, National Review, and Commentary were critical in assisting conservative members of the Republican Party to define or redefine their views on key issues that were shaping events at home as well as abroad. Writers for the three publications discussed in this book believed that American foreign policy was in a state of paralysis. In a powerful critique, commentators on the Right connected the crisis in US diplomacy to fundamental flaws they believed existed in the country’s domestic agenda that stemmed from the social and economic programs of presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and Carter. Right-wing pundits contended that the social disorder in the United States was the result of frustration and uncertainty over the war in Vietnam and over Lyndon B Johnson’s “Great Society,” which had undermined the confidence of the country. Between 1964 and 1980, by providing an ideological perspective on important national issues, the publications of conservative opinion played a fundamental role in reviving the political fortunes of the American Right, culminating in the election of Ronald Reagan. Advocating an alternative direction in foreign affairs, writers for these

Introduction 3

publications offered suggestions to conservative policy makers that called for a more confrontational approach to the Soviet Union and to the nations that sought to compromise the United States’ interests around the world. Human Events, National Review, and Commentary assisted right-wing decision makers by contributing arguments that recommended a shift in foreign policy to revive what they saw as a weak and indecisive United States, uncertain about its role in the world following the defeat in Vietnam. These three media outlets, confronting what they saw as the United States’ withdrawal from its global responsibilities, recommended a different direction, one that called for the restoration of national confidence and pride and a re-engagement of the United States with the international community. In their criticism of détente or the aggressiveness of the Third World within the United Nations, opinion makers on the Right offered conservative political leaders information and analysis that called for the return of American power in the face of an ever more confident Soviet Union. Writers for these publications claimed that the fortunes of the country were being subverted not only abroad, but also at home. Conservatives believed that government interference, as seen in Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “New Deal,” persisted in such initiatives as Lyndon Johnson’s “War on Poverty,” Richard Nixon’s price controls, the US Supreme Court’s decision on abortion, Gerald Ford’s support of the Equal Rights Amendment, and the Carter Administration’s advocacy for regulation of the energy industry; they claimed that these initiatives were counter to the natural order. The Right concluded that America was under attack by hostile forces, domestic and foreign, based on these examples of intervention by the state, the growing militancy of the civil rights movement, and the increasingly hostile portrayal of American values by the New Left.5 The publications analyzed in this book viewed the dominant foreign policy events of the 1960s and 1970s through a specific ideology that eventually came to define the activist agenda of the Reagan administration in regard to the Cold War. Writers such as National Review’s William F. Buckley Jr., Human Events’s Allan Ryskind, and Commentary’s Norman Podhoretz claimed that America’s “failure of nerve” was a product of an idealistic liberal mindset that was naive about the expansionist intentions of the Soviet Union and apprehensive about confronting evil around the globe.6 Conservatives believed that a once-active foreign policy that promoted democracy and freedom had been transformed by liberal elites into a policy of appeasement and self-doubt. They saw that, as Washington turned inward follow-

4  Paving the Way for Reagan

ing its defeat in Vietnam, a more emboldened Soviet Union emerged, determined to fill the global vacuum vacated by the United States’ withdrawal from the world.7 The editors and writers for Commentary, Human Events, and National Review favored a more confrontational strategy toward Moscow that they believed would prevent the USSR from continuing to undermine the United States. This call for a more active international role helped Reagan, senators Strom Thurmond and John Tower, and congressmen John Ashbrook and Philip Crane, among others, to crystallize their global opinions on issues of national security. That influence, in turn, gave editors Buckley, Ryskind, and Podhoretz the ability to apply pressure to leaders on the Right within the GOP who they believed were not being faithful to conservative principles. The process also worked in reverse. President Richard Nixon utilized the opinions in National Review and Human Events as an “early warning system” to measure the temperament of American conservative interests. “There was never a relationship that Nixon had where he didn’t seek to manipulate,” recalls foreign policy adviser and former National Review contributor Richard V. Allen. “I can remember the issues of National Review that pilloried the Eisenhower administration,” the former academic said in an interview with the author. “And who was part of the Eisenhower administration, but Richard Nixon. He knew and in many respects feared the influence of the conservative magazines.” His ambivalence about the Right led Nixon to direct speechwriter Pat Buchanan, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and others in his administration to remain in constant contact with Buckley, Ryskind, and other members of what Nixon saw as a political interest group vital to the administration’s success. Whereas Nixon used his relationship with journalists on the Right to monitor the political climate, Reagan relied on these opinion makers to give him “ammunition that informed and assisted him with his views.” Reagan so valued these three publications, that a number of members of their editorial teams went from writing about public issues to devising it as speechwriters and members of Reagan’s foreign and domestic policy staffs within his administration.8

Reagan, Goldwater, and a Forward Strategy against Communism Many writers for these publications, particularly Human Events and National Review, had been drawn to the conservative branch of the GOP as represented by Senator Barry Goldwater of Arizona. Goldwater became the

Introduction 5

leading politician on the Right following the death of Ohio senator Robert Taft in 1953. Goldwater supporters believed that President Dwight Eisenhower and his allies, who represented the moderate and liberal wing of the Republican Party, had displayed weakness toward the Soviet Union and the crisis of international communism. Commentators such as Buckley and Frank Meyer, as well as a number of conservative southern Democrats, such as Senator Strom Thurmond, also resented the former military commander’s lack of interest in rolling back the expansive bureaucratic policies of the New Deal. Many who served in Eisenhower’s cabinet as well as within the US Congress belonged to the moderate wing of the GOP. Some of those, such as Senator Prescott Bush, the father of future Reagan vice president George H. W. Bush, came from privileged Eastern families, who had achieved success in private industry or in the banks or boardrooms of law firms that dominated Wall Street. The Eastern wing embodied the philosophy of progressives such as Theodore Roosevelt, who believed that social and economic liberalism could benefit the nation at home and abroad. The Right of the GOP viewed government as hostile to markets and believed that it limited individual achievement. The men and women who wrote for the conservative publications saw themselves as the guardians of a conservative ideology that was critical in freeing the United States from the encroachment of government power and from vacillating foreign policy in order to return it to national greatness.9 At the heart of the conservative critique of US foreign policy was the liberal ideology epitomized by President Woodrow Wilson. The former head of Princeton University, Wilson embraced the idea of a new international order following the catastrophic results of World War I. In Wilson’s utopian outlook, the world’s great nations would dismiss their own interests in favor of standing behind the objective of collective security, by guaranteeing the “territorial integrity and political independence of all member states.” But the president’s dream of creating a unified international community was unrealistic. Wilson’s faith in human nature conflicted with the reality that these nations would prove unable to “transcend all the clashes of interests and values” that they had endured during the course of their history. Despite the failure of Wilson’s quest for an international organization to govern the postwar world, the idea was revived by Franklin Roosevelt as World War II reached its conclusion.10 President Roosevelt, who had been Wilson’s assistant secretary of the Navy, also envisioned a new international system, a global partnership of

6  Paving the Way for Reagan

the five nations that had defeated fascism, which would lead to a more stable world. FDR hoped that a global cooperation, in which each country would govern its sphere of influence, would result in each state respecting the governing institutions and national borders of its neighbors. However, Roosevelt’s hope that the Soviet Union would adhere to this plan proved unfounded. Those on the Right believed that Roosevelt’s lack of realism combined with his faith in Wilsonian idealism had led him to underestimate the aggressive intentions of the Soviet Union; they also blamed FDR’s foolish trust of Joseph Stalin for the fall of much of Eastern Europe into the hands of the Soviet Union.11 Those on the Right believed that Washington had underestimated Moscow’s aggressive intentions since the latter stages of World War II, when Roosevelt had been outwitted by Stalin at Yalta. FDR’s failure to recognize “Uncle Joe’s” true agenda had resulted in the West abandoning Eastern Europe to totalitarian interests. The Right’s critique was exacerbated by what it perceived as the US foreign policy establishment’s lack of assertiveness and its refusal to respond to the expansionist ambitions of the USSR and the People’s Republic of China around the world. National Review’s James Burnham and Frank Meyer, who had briefly experimented with the ideas of Marx and Trotsky, believed that policies like the Truman Doctrine had been studies in failure, as seen in the loss of China to Mao Zedong, the invasion of South Korea by its communist enemies to the North, and the incursion of Soviet troops into Hungary to quell democratic uprisings. The conservative wing of the Republican Party pointed to these victories by the enemies of democracy to argue that an alternative to the American policy of containment needed to be considered. Arguing that the international strategy had achieved little success, the Right saw it as another example of liberal internationalism composed of grand gestures and rhetoric that offered little viable strategy.12 Goldwater’s call for aggressive maneuvers against the USSR echoed what had been a key theme of the conservative media for years and led to his winning the Republican Party nomination in 1964. Many conservatives viewed the Soviet Union as evil incarnate and agreed with Human Events’s Thomas A. Lane or National Review’s James Burnham, who viewed the Cold War as a “struggle for the world.” In his bestselling books, Why Not Victory? and Conscience of a Conservative, Goldwater pointed to the danger of communist aggression that the Right believed had encircled the globe. They claimed that the Soviets used summits and nuclear arms agreements

Introduction 7

to give the American people a false sense of confidence that peace was at hand. Goldwater’s supporters also believed that Soviet promises were nothing more than ploys designed to give the USSR more time to enhance its nuclear and military defenses in order to continue its expansionist objectives. As international communism spread from Cuba to Vietnam, conservatives believed that the United States was losing the Cold War. Although Goldwater failed in his quest for the presidency, the foreign policy ideas he advocated were important in developing the ideology Reagan brought to the presidency sixteen years later. A former film actor and TV and radio personality, Reagan echoed Goldwater and Human Events and National Review in their concern over Washington’s complacency in its protracted conflict with global communism. In his famous speech delivered on October 27, 1964, the future governor of California expressed his frustration in comments that were designed to awaken what he believed was a sleeping public unaware of the challenges that lay ahead if the strategy for confronting the Soviet Union did not change. Reagan had personally experienced struggles with communist elements during his tenure as president of the Screen Actors Guild from 1947 to 1952, and, based on his regular reading of Human Events and National Review, he was also well acquainted with the Soviet Union’s activities around the world. Reagan had been familiar with these publications since the 1950s and was a fervent reader, as evidenced by a portion of a note he wrote to Buckley in 1962 that simply said “I’d be lost without National Review.” The future president also referred to these publications in the weekly radio commentaries he wrote and delivered between 1975 and 1979.13

The Three Publications under Discussion The three publications analyzed in this book represented a broad ideological perspective shared by many in the conservative wing of the GOP. Their ideas and opinions ranged from what could be called the Old Right, as represented by Human Events, to fusionism, as represented by National Review, and finally to neo-conservatism, as represented by Commentary. Human Events and National Review had argued for an interventionist foreign policy since the 1950s, and, by the 1970s, Commentary had joined them in advocating a change of direction in America’s dealings with the world.14 Journalists William Henry Chamberlin, Frank Hanighen, and Felix Morley, who were all unhappy with the New Deal and with America’s involvement in global affairs, created Human Events in early 1944.15 Cham-

8  Paving the Way for Reagan

berlain and his colleagues were representatives of what was known as the “Old Right,” a Republican philosophy that condemned the interventionist policies instituted by FDR and that found the United States’ growing involvement in international affairs to be problematic. Many of the Old Right embraced the policies of the man known as “Mr. Republican,” Ohio’s senator Robert Taft. Taft argued that the Roosevelt administration’s intervention in American industry and the extension of the federal government into the lives of citizens were in direct conflict with the country’s founding ideas as set out in the United States Constitution and the Declaration of Independence. Many of Taft’s supporters saw Roosevelt as an evil figure, whose use of government power to expand the influence of the state at home and abroad was a threat to liberty and individual freedom.16 Human Events’s audience was primarily in the Midwest and the Western part of the country; it began as a weekly newsletter, with a mere 127 subscribers. However, over the next few decades, shaped more and more by editors Allan H. Ryskind and Thomas S. Winter, it changed from a newsletter to a tabloid newspaper. In a clear shift from the publication’s early days, the new editors focused on a campaign to counteract what historian George H. Nash called “the continuous, implacable assault on the West by messianic revolutionary Communism.”17 The strong anticommunism focus of the periodical would certainly have pleased Allan Ryskind, who first arrived at the publication’s Washington offices in 1959. Ryskind had grown up in Los Angeles, the son of Hollywood screenwriter Morrie Ryskind, known for writing a number of films for the Marx Brothers. The elder Ryskind, a former antiwar socialist turned vocal GOP conservative, had an enormous influence on his son. Allan became a passionate advocate of his father’s beliefs regarding the issue of communist subversion in America, particularly within the Hollywood film community. At Pomona College and the Columbia School of Journalism, Ryskind was fascinated by anticommunism and free market economics, two subjects championed by Human Events. Ryskind remained at the conservative tabloid throughout his career and continues to contribute articles to the publication, for which he serves as editor-at-large.18 Ryskind’s colleague Thomas S. Winter arrived at Human Events in 1961 at the age of 24, following his graduation from Harvard Business School. Winter also remained at Human Events throughout his career; he and Ryskind purchased the publication in 1966.19 Under Ryskind and Winter, the newspaper’s front page often contained

Introduction 9

a bold, sensationalistic headline, followed by an editorial on the dominant issue of the day. Ryskind’s short, punchy sentences and occasionally strong language were designed to entertain, motivate, and educate the publication’s passionate right-wing activist audience. Since Ryskind’s comments on an issue such as détente were similar or repetitive from week to week, these could almost be seen as a series of talking points that politicians could employ to reinforce their opinions about a particular subject. While Thomas Winter viewed himself as “a conservative activist,” holding prominent positions in organizations like the American Conservative Union, Lee Edwards said that Ryskind was “really a reporter,” who was interested in “what was happening in Congress, [in] the conservative movement and presenting that information in clear and concise style that was not available anywhere else.” Jeffrey Bell, who interacted a great deal with the staff of Human Events, particularly when he served as the research director for Ronald Reagan’s 1976 Presidential campaign, said of Ryskind that “when [he] found something out he did not let it go.” The newspaper also published a number of syndicated columnists, who wrote on all matters of foreign and domestic policy. Many of those authors, such as Jeffrey Hart, Russell Kirk, and James J. Kilpatrick, were also consistent contributors to National Review. However, Ryskind and Winter were truly responsible for the editorial content and administration of the publication. “Human Events was not a collective activity,” recalled M. Stanton Evans, who wrote frequently for both media outlets. Evans, a significant figure within the conservative movement, brought the three key strands of conservatism together in 1960 when he drafted the “Sharon Statement,” which contained the principles for the organization “Young Americans for Freedom.” A gifted debater, provocateur, and political analyst (he graduated number one in his class at Yale), he also spent time as the editorial writer for the Indianapolis News and as head of the American Conservative Union.20 The weekly conservative publication differed in a number of ways from National Review. Human Events “was more newsy and fact based,” argued Evans, “while National Review was more theoretical.” The publication, based in Washington, DC, was entirely focused on national and international affairs. Ryskind and Winter spent much of their time speaking with conservative members of Congress, monitoring legislation, and updating their readers about the progress of GOP congressional campaigns. In addition to the handful of right-wing commentators who published columns, including Barry Goldwater and Ronald Reagan, Human Events also devot-

10  Paving the Way for Reagan

ed a portion of the publication to comments from prominent conservative legislators on a variety of issues. The newspaper frequently motivated and engaged conservative activists to call or write their representatives or even the White House if they believed their interests were being ignored. The conservative weekly displayed legislative vote counts, in order to, according to its advertising, “show you how your senators and congressman are behaving.”21 It was a publication designed to attract a very different audience from National Review. William F. Buckley Jr. created National Review in 1955, eleven years after the start of Human Events. Buckley, the scion of a wealthy oil family, had grown up in Connecticut and was educated at Yale University. Following the huge impact of his 1951 study God and Man at Yale, he considered creating a periodical that would be an amalgamation of news and ideas from a conservative perspective. As Buckley’s brother Senator James Buckley recalled, “Bill’s philosophy was to emulate what The Nation had done to create the New Deal.” In the senator’s opinion, his brother’s objective was “to throw out ideas and analysis that would then be picked up by commentators and be translated into public policy.” As he developed the magazine, Buckley retained the services of intellectuals who represented what were, at the time, three major branches of the conservative movement. These included libertarianism as represented by the eccentric Frank S. Meyer, traditional conservatism in the form of the academic historian Russell Kirk, and anticommunism as identified by the patrician James Burnham. These three philosophies, which had represented the different areas of American conservatism, became a more expansive version of a right-wing ideology that was labeled “fusionism.” The idea, developed by Buckley and National Review’s columnist and book editor Frank Meyer, was designed to unify these three philosophies under the banner of a more pragmatic version of conservatism.22 There is no doubt that Buckley was the face and leader of the magazine. However, the three men who represented the dominant intellectual branches of the conservative ideology each brought a unique perspective to the editorial process. Kirk was a brilliant but eccentric intellect who lived a sparse existence in rural Michigan, without the luxury of a radio or a turntable. An academic who had a doctorate in history, Kirk’s meteoric rise had followed the publication of his work The Conservative Mind in 1953. The book, one of the first to define conservative ideas and traditions, made Kirk an instant celebrity among members of the Right. Kirk’s view of conserva-

Introduction 11

tism was based on what he viewed as ideas that were fundamental to a person’s life, including love, community, learning, and beauty. Anything that glorified the individual, such as excessive materialism, or any measures that could imperil natural life were counter to Kirk’s view of the conservative intellectual tradition. Buckley also recruited a former high-ranking member of the Communist Party, Frank S. Meyer. Meyer, a brilliant writer, had studied at Princeton and Oxford Universities and had embraced both libertarianism and Catholicism late in life. However, like Kirk, he had his eccentricities, which included a work schedule that began at five o’clock in the afternoon and lasted late into the evening (and at times into the early morning). While he wrote essays on conservative ideology, Meyer also served as the magazine’s book editor and wrote a weekly column entitled “Principles & Heresies.” Meyer’s libertarian view was based on the power of the individual and the importance of an unregulated free market; any measures that ran contrary to that principle, such as a powerful government, were seen as an impediment to individual freedom.23 Whereas Meyer had been a devoted member of the Communist Party, James Burnham, a fellow alumnus of both Princeton and Oxford Universities, had briefly flirted with the ideology during the 1930s. Following his disenchantment with the communist movement, Burnham, a wealthy scion of a prominent Chicago family, became an outspoken opponent of Moscow’s activities around the globe. Although Burnham was a formidable intellect, it was his 1947 book The Struggle for the World, which called for an aggressive strategy of “rollback” by the United States against the Soviet Union, that made him a significant figure among those calling for a shift in the American policy of containment. An elegant and erudite figure, Burnham had a close relationship with Buckley; he often helped the conservative commentator be more measured and pragmatic in his views and also helped to keep the publication from becoming too ideological.24 While the two publications agreed on most issues of foreign and domestic policy, National Review differed from Human Events in a number of ways. Buckley and his colleagues were based in New York and published the magazine biweekly. In off weeks, National Review produced a brief newsletter of information and opinion entitled National Review Bulletin. National Review was also significantly broader in its subject matter; in addition to news and editorials on current events, it included commentary on religion, art, music, film, economics, literature, education, and conservative

12  Paving the Way for Reagan

philosophy, which gave the periodical a literary air. Also significant, National Review included different ideological viewpoints, and, thus, a subscriber was more likely to encounter intellectual debates on the issues at the center of the conservative movement. While Human Events used pugnacious language, National Review was more elegant and sophisticated in its view of the world, perhaps due to the different personalities who staffed the magazine and who often turned the editorial process into a complex and discordant ordeal. While Human Events and National Review shared a common conservative tradition, the same could not be said of Commentary. Despite its strong anticommunist attitudes, the magazine did not emerge from the same ideological strains as the other two publications. Commentary was founded in 1945 by members of the American Jewish Committee, who had aspirations similar to those of William F. Buckley Jr. at National Review. Their goal was to create a publication that had significant influence among the decision makers of the day. In order to achieve greater impact while enhancing circulation, the creators of the magazine presented its editorial content in a “non-Zionist” manner to appeal to a wider audience. Commentary still frequently devoted its pages to cultural issues and to public policy debates that reflected strong Jewish interests. However, that broader ideology, including greater diversity in its subject matter, also characterized many of those who wrote for the publication.25 As with the two other publications, Commentary did have strong anticommunist sympathies. Elliot Cohen, the magazine’s first editor until his untimely death in 1959, believed that the struggle against communism was a critical task that required the full use of America’s industrial and military power. Following Cohen’s passing, Norman Podhoretz, who served as editor of the magazine from 1960 until his retirement in 1995, took the publication in a decidedly different direction. The new editor in chief put his stamp on the magazine by immediately toning down much of the staunch anticommunism of his predecessor. Podhoretz shifted the publication’s editorial content to what author Nathan Abrams called “non Marxist radicalism,” a type of left-wing ideology that “did not depend on Marx and had no illusions about the Soviet Union.”26 In utilizing its editorial content to serve as a vehicle for social criticism, the periodical published a number of writers who were part of the social democratic Left who focused on critiquing many of the nation’s institutions.27 A focus on anticommunist philosophy reemerged during the latter part

Introduction 13

of the 1960s, as Podhoretz became frustrated with the growing radicalism, political correctness, and anti-Americanism that seemed prevalent in much of society. Although Commentary had not supported the Vietnam War, the editor and his colleagues had become increasingly disturbed by the lack of social order that seemed to permeate the New Left, including the emergence of black power and increasing student radicalism on university campuses across the country. The magazine’s editors’ move to the Right, particularly in the arena of foreign policy, sent a powerful signal to America’s intellectual elites that the once-vital center of the Democratic Party, symbolized by its passionate commitment to anticommunism, no longer existed. The magazine, which had previously embraced the containment policies of Harry Truman, now found kinship with publications like National Review and Human Events in what became known as neoconservatism; the ideological shift sent a shot across the bow of American liberalism. The views expressed by staffers at Commentary were representative of the growing voice of the neoconservative movement. Podhoretz and many of his colleagues, some of whom had once been entranced by the promise of communism, had become disenchanted with the leftward movement of the Democratic Party, frustrated, in part, by the counterculture’s attacks on the country’s values and institutions. Public policy intellectuals such as Irving Kristol and Nathan Glazer had come to believe that the economic theories at the foundation of Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society were counterproductive in solving the fiscal and social tensions that the nation was experiencing. The party’s dogmatic views of international affairs had disturbed Kristol and his colleagues as well. These views had been epitomized by the 1972 Democratic presidential nominee, Senator George McGovern, whose mantra, “come home America,” called for the United States to retreat from its position of global leadership, a disastrous change to the party that many of these intellectuals had spent their lives supporting.28 Many of those who had become disaffected with what they saw as the extreme nature of the Democratic Party at home and its inability to take seriously the threat of international communism abroad turned to Commentary and Kristol’s domestic policy magazine, The Public Interest, to articulate their concerns. The intellectuals in the neoconservative movement believed that the United States should not accept the idea of an America in decline and a belief that coexistence with the Soviet Union was inevitable. Although many still believed in the power of government to solve the country’s domestic problems, they agreed with the GOP’s, and especially Ronald

14  Paving the Way for Reagan

Reagan’s, call for a more muscular foreign policy to address the growing aggressiveness of the USSR. Kristol, Elliott Abrams, and Jeane Kirkpatrick mirrored the call of their fellow conservative colleagues at National Review and Human Events for increased defense spending, the marshaling of resources to confront growing totalitarianism around the world, and, most importantly, the renewal of America’s confidence and moral authority. The neoconservatives found a new home on the right of the ideological spectrum, as they advocated these ideas in Commentary and other conservative magazines.29 The three publications discussed in this narrative had differences in style and in editorial content. However, the dominant ideology that united them under the conservative banner was the battle against international totalitarianism. By the mid-1960s, those on the Right who wrote about foreign policy argued consistently that the United States had been too complacent in addressing the aggressive nature of the Soviet Union. Many who shared that opinion believed that the United States needed to stand firm against the rapid spread of global communism. As the Soviets and their allies continued their encroachment into the Third World, Washington decided to devote its full industrial and military power to confront Moscow in the small southeast Asian nation of Vietnam. At the time of Lyndon Johnson’s second inauguration in January 1965, there were 23,000 military advisers in South Vietnam to assist in the struggle against the communist insurgents in the northern part of the country. Following an attack by North Vietnamese torpedo boats on two US destroyers in August 1964 in the Gulf of Tonkin, the Johnson administration had sought a Congressional resolution that would permit it to respond to any armed aggression against US forces by the North Vietnamese. The decision by Congress to pass the “Gulf of Tonkin” resolution allowed Johnson to expand the number of military personnel in Vietnam and to begin a bombing campaign over the area in February 1965.30 By the end of the year, 184,000 members of the American military were involved in the conflict in Southeast Asia, a number that would steadily increase to 500,000 in 1968. The advantage that South Vietnam gained from US assistance was countered by the aggressive guerrilla tactics of the North Vietnamese and their insurgent allies in the south, the National Liberation Front, which gave the communists the advantage in personnel. The determining factor in the victory of Ho Chi Minh and his supporters was the overwhelming desire and will of the North to achieve victory as well as the

Introduction 15

support Hanoi received from the Soviet Union and China. Another factor in the North’s favor was the domestic dissension in the United States that had been created by the cost of the war.31 The publications of conservative opinion criticized that domestic dissension and America’s commitment to the war. Human Events and National Review blamed the country’s failure to achieve victory in Southeast Asia on an inherent weakness at the foundation of the nation’s foreign policy. Chapter 1 looks at these media outlets’ views of the war and the solutions they offered for success. Writers for the two publications argued that the war strategies of the Johnson and Nixon administrations were plagued by misdirection and uncertainty due to the divisiveness in the country over the ramifications of the civil rights movement and the Great Society. Conservative commentators believed that disunity among the nation’s citizenry, in combination with the lack of will displayed by the two administrations to do whatever was necessary to win the war, led the rest of the world to question the credibility of the United States and its attempt to achieve victory in the Cold War. At the same time that the American public was becoming increasingly disenchanted over the nation’s ongoing presence in Southeast Asia, the Nixon administration, in the hopes of creating a safer world, initiated a diplomatic strategy toward the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. Nixon, who early in his political career had been a passionate anticommunist, had begun to consider ways to bring China into the international community, a strategy that he believed had the potential to decrease the tensions that existed between the United States and the Soviet Union. This strategy, which was developed by Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, and was based on Kissinger’s realist view of international affairs, came to be known as détente. Kissinger believed that accepting the world as it was rather than trying to change it would allow a sense of order to exist between the dominant nations of the world. Chapter 2 looks at the reaction of the publications of conservative opinion to Nixon and Kissinger’s decision to offer an olive branch to the People’s Republic of China. Pundits on the Right believed that, in deemphasizing the conflict between international communism and democracy, Nixon was withdrawing America from its global responsibilities and, in doing so, was giving the communist world free reign to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy.32 Nixon’s policy of détente eventually led the United States and the Soviet Union to sign an arms agreement in Moscow in 1972, at what be-

16  Paving the Way for Reagan

came known as the first Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT I). Although the negotiations were considered symbolically significant, they did not do a great deal to limit the arms race. Nixon’s resignation two years later left the future of SALT in the hands of Vice President Gerald Ford, a former longtime congressman from Michigan. The treaty was scheduled to expire in 1974, and Ford was determined to make progress with the Soviet leader, Leonid Brezhnev. However, there were difficulties during the SALT II negotiations, and, after Ford’s abbreviated presidency, Jimmy Carter inherited the unfinished arms control negotiations when he took the oath of office in early 1977.33 As American and Soviet negotiators focused on finalizing the SALT II arms agreement, Commentary, National Review, and Human Events expressed their concerns about the ongoing debate between the two superpowers over nuclear and chemical weapons. That contentious public policy issue, the major topic of chapter 3, was not simply about arms control, but was symbolic of the state of American foreign policy itself. As the Soviet Union expanded its influence throughout Africa and the Middle East, the Right saw the United States as a nation that was pulling inward, uncertain about its international role. The attacks against the arms agreement launched by these three publications raised questions about the relevancy and usefulness of the policy of détente. Members of the Right saw Washington’s inability to mount a strong response to Moscow’s aggressive increase in nuclear weapons as an indication that the United States had lost the ability to dictate the course of international events and argued that the United States needed to establish an alternative strategy in its relationship with the USSR. That plan required not only that Moscow be vigorously confronted across the globe but also that there be a new outlook in the arms control process. A major concern of those who wrote for Commentary, National Review, and Human Events was the growth of leftist ideology in much of the newly independent Third World. Many of the activist leaders who led their nations’ independence movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America during the decades following World War II viewed the Soviet Union as an ally in their philosophical opposition to European imperialism. By the 1960s, as more of these states broke away from France, Great Britain, Spain, and Portugal, Washington was becoming concerned over the ideological direction of many of these new nations. These former colonial territories also possessed natural resources that had been critical to much of American indus-

Introduction 17

try; with these nations no longer under the protection of its European allies, the United States had lost relationships vital to its economy.34 These new states began to exert their influence in the General Assembly of the United Nations. Since the founding of the international organization in 1945, the United States had exerted a large amount of influence in its major decisions. However, with the addition of these new Third World members, the nation found itself in the minority in global issues. The newly independent states in the diplomatic chamber were determined to redress the economic injustices they believed had been committed against them by the West. Chapter 4 discusses the frustration expressed by writers for Commentary, National Review, and Human Events over the failure of American policy makers to stand up to rampant criticism of the United States and its democratic values, which they viewed as another example of the decline of US foreign policy.35 Along with the United States’ traditionally prominent role in the United Nations, the Panama Canal also represented America’s great historical legacy. And, as explored in chapter 5, many Americans believed that the international waterway symbolized much more. The Right saw President Jimmy Carter’s decision to return the canal in 1977 as another example of the decline of American power in the world. Conservatives were upset that the United States was acquiescing to the demands of another emerging Third World nation that, like those in the General Assembly, appeared unwilling to appreciate America’s past generosity. In the loss of the canal, the United States’ defeat in Vietnam seemed to reverberate. In the wake of the loss of American military prestige, conservatives were irate that a significant reminder of the country’s industrial greatness was now on the verge of being given away. The strain of Black nationalism in the United Nations also worried conservatives as they monitored the evolution of events in Southern Africa. In their intense desire to rid the world of communism, they either marginalized or ignored other issues such as race. Chapter 6 focuses on the attention the publications of conservative opinion devoted to the racially divided nation of Zimbabwe, formally known as Rhodesia. Human Events and National Review contrasted what they perceived as Rhodesia’s stable, anticommunist, biracial society with the militarism and lawlessness that they argued defined the 1960s and 1970s, in the process ignoring the suppression of an entire race of people. Meanwhile, Commentary primarily focused its attention on the Carter administration’s dismissive attitude about the dangers of

18  Paving the Way for Reagan

Soviet encroachment within the African hemisphere. Those on the Right argued that the Carter administration’s policy of détente and its refusal to endorse Rhodesia’s 1979 parliamentary elections because militant nationalist groups had not been represented sent a message of America’s weakness and its indifference to totalitarianism around the world. Concern about the future of American policy abroad was not the only issue that troubled William F. Buckley Jr. and his colleagues on the Right; chapter 7 looks at their belief that US foreign policy was being undercut due to flaws in its domestic agenda. Throughout the 1970s, Human Events, National Review, and Commentary drew connections between the nation’s growing dependence on foreign oil and the numerous regulations imposed on energy producers by the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations. These media outlets also concluded that it was a longstanding weakness at the heart of America’s worldview that left it unable to respond to the economic aggression of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). Finally, after the seizure of the US embassy in Iran in 1979 by Islamic fundamentalists, writers for these publications contended that in order for the United States to regain national greatness it must free itself from limitations imposed on it by hostile forces at home and abroad. That goal of national revival was a key theme that Ronald Reagan and his supporters at Human Events, National Review, and Commentary capitalized on as the country moved into the presidential election of 1980. There is no doubt that the focus and discipline of the message offered by these publications served conservatives well as they struggled to regain relevance and remain unified during their time in the political wilderness. However, while some in the GOP called for greater thoughtfulness and pragmatism following their defeat in 1964, writers for National Review, Human Events, and Commentary refused to return to what they believed were the failed policies of the past. From the defeat of Goldwater in 1964 to the victory of Reagan in 1980, these media outlets presented conservative elites with a clear ideological platform that allowed them to design their arguments and articulate their views. Human Events, National Review, and Commentary offered the leadership of the conservative movement the news and analyses that gave them the opportunity to sculpt the debate on foreign policy. Although politicians such as John Ashbrook, Philip Crane, John Tower, Strom Thurmond, and Ronald Reagan had clear conservative convictions, they were not necessarily clear about their stand on every issue. While these publications did not shape the ideology of conservative decision

Introduction 19

makers, they did offer them key insights on topics that helped inform and educate the decisions they made on the issues of the day. The publications discussed in this narrative argued that the United States, due to indecisive policies and poor leadership, had lost its way. They contended that the nation, still trying to get its bearings after a brutal defeat in Vietnam, found itself surrounded by enemies at home and abroad that sought to subvert its national and economic security. Conservatives believed that the foreign policies pursued by both Republican and Democratic administrations had undermined the public confidence and created a state of disorder throughout the country. Writers for Human Events, National Review, and Commentary criticized the country’s unwillingness to challenge the Soviet Union during the period of détente or to counter OPEC’s economic blackmail. Buckley, Podhoretz, Ryskind, and Winter were determined to put the United States on a different path, one that called not for a weak and vacillating foreign policy but for a muscular and decisive one, not for the retreat of the United States from the international community, but for an embrace of its responsibility as a source of security and freedom. While National Review, Human Events, and Commentary did not advocate a new ideology, they created a series of themes that ultimately came to forge what became the foundations of the foreign policy of the Reagan presidency.36

1

An Erosion of Credibility Vietnam, 1964–1975 On September 30, 1967, Human Events presented a highly favorable article chronicling Ronald Reagan’s first year as governor of California. At the bottom of the page, another piece gave excerpts of a recent press conference in which Governor Reagan addressed a variety of issues, one of them concerning his view of Vietnam. The weekly Washington-based conservative tabloid edited by Allan H. Ryskind and Thomas S. Winter had been monitoring the former Hollywood actor since he delivered his groundbreaking speech “A Time for Choosing,” during the latter stages of Goldwater’s failed 1964 presidential campaign.1 “I think that the way to end a war is to win it,” Reagan said adamantly, and continued, “and I don’t believe that a country of this size and its comparable power with North Viet Nam is turning the full resources of this nation behind the forces now over there to win a victory as quickly as possible. You make the enemy want to come to the negotiating table because it hurts too much not to.” Asked about the potential use of atomic weapons against North Vietnam, Reagan responded, “I don’t think anybody would cheerfully want to use them. The last person in the world that should know we wouldn’t use them is the enemy. He should go to bed every night being afraid that we might.”2 Reagan’s comments on the war were in line with those expressed in Human Events and the other prominent magazine of conservative opinion, National Review, edited principally by William F. Buckley Jr. Both publications had been pushing aggressively for the United States to use its full military capabilities in North Vietnam, as opposed to the strategy of gradual escalation, which conservatives believed had been ineffective.3 Reagan was only one of the prominent politicians on the Right whose views of the war reflected the ideas advocated by

22  Paving the Way for Reagan

these two publications. Many GOP conservatives in the Congress also believed that the administration of President Lyndon B. Johnson was not doing all that was necessary to defeat the communist North Vietnamese. These included figures such as Barry Goldwater, Strom Thurmond, and John Tower in the US Senate, and members of the House of Representatives such as John Ashbrook. From 1964 to 1975, Human Events and National Review frequently quoted these and other conservative political leaders on the vacillation, misdirection, and lack of clarity of Johnson and Nixon’s policies in Vietnam. Simultaneously, leaders such as Thurmond and Ashbrook inserted articles from these publications into the Congressional Record. Policy makers used these opinion pieces to defend their respective positions on the war and, indirectly, to maintain a consistency in their views so that they could be absorbed by their financial supporters and voter constituencies. These periodicals supplied the conservative wing of the GOP with insight and analysis that they could use as they made their argument to the Right about how victory could be achieved. Human Events and National Review influenced Republican foreign policy by strongly enunciating the opinion that a victory in Southeast Asia was essential to stem the tide of the ongoing wars of national liberation that were receiving support from the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China. These publications contended that America’s tentative policy in Vietnam was sending a dangerous message to its allies around the world about its capacity to defeat international communism. That view was reflected by conservative activist David Keene, who recalled visiting Vietnam in 1970. “The view was if you’re going to fight the war you fight the war to win,”4 Keene said in an interview more than forty years later. The Right contended that Johnson’s and Nixon’s pragmatic political instincts had led to the failure to achieve total victory and had jeopardized national security. Writers for Human Events and National Review claimed that the United States was failing in Vietnam and offered arguments for an alternative agenda, one in which America addressed totalitarian threats around the globe. Writers for these publications claimed that American foreign policy was plagued by an underlying weakness and viewed the military failure in Southeast Asia as evidence that the United States’ political leadership was unable to mobilize the national will necessary for it to achieve victory in the Cold War. During the 1970s, the editors of these publications used the conflict in

An Erosion of Credibility  23

Vietnam as a metaphor for America’s continuing withdrawal from its global responsibilities in the face of an increasingly aggressive Soviet Union.5

Lyndon’s No-Win Foreign Policy6 Conservatives saw the significance of the war in Vietnam in broader terms than just the protection of a small country from communist influence; they wanted to prevent a critically important region of the world from falling into communist hands. Human Events and National Review made the key argument that the Johnson and Nixon administrations had never correctly communicated the central reason for America’s involvement in Southeast Asia to the American public, which they firmly believed was that Vietnam was one battle in a much larger war. Foreign policy analysts James Burnham, Robert Strausz-Hupé, and Stefan Possony, who all wrote for these publications, viewed that battle as a “protracted conflict” or a global struggle that could have only one winner. These contributors, along with Thomas Lane and John Chamberlain, believed that the United States’ commitment to achieving victory in that global conflict was critical to international credibility, self-interest, and national security.7 The argument most frequently put forward by National Review and Human Events was the pointlessness of the use of limited warfare to stem the tide of communist encroachment in places such as Cuba and Vietnam. Conservatives argued for a more robust military response, stating that the strategy was part of a broader objective to eradicate international communism, thus offering the Right a simplified view of the conflict. The argument that Johnson’s national security team was tentative in how best to defeat the North Vietnamese gave the impression that the administration was unwilling to take the measures necessary to protect the nation’s national security.8 The fear of growing encroachment by international communism was a central theme put forward by Human Events and National Review in their call for a more aggressive military policy in Vietnam. William F. Buckley Jr.’s column of May 1964, “It’s Time to Strike at North Vietnam,” sought to explain why it was so critical for the United States to increase its offensive capabilities against the military forces in the northern part of the country: “the United States is committed for better or worse to help its allies stem the Communist world, in order to keep communism away from our own shores.” Buckley’s analysis clearly struck a chord with politicians whose hawkish views on communism had been a major part of their platform.9 One of them, Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina, called for

24  Paving the Way for Reagan

Buckley’s article to be entered in that day’s Congressional Record.10 This example shows how Buckley and others who wrote for these conservative publications offered a simplified image of the war as a conflict that could be won merely by unleashing as much military power as possible. Bypassing the more complex issues of corruption in the Saigon government or the ineptitude of the South Vietnamese army, Buckley and his colleagues fit their strategy into a narrow ideology of the struggle against communism, making it easier for conservative policy makers who read these publications to utilize key articles that continued to promote the war.11 The menace of communist encroachment was not only dominant in conservatives’ call for a more aggressive stance in Vietnam, it was also a dominant theme in the history of the conservative movement. Howard Kershner’s “Our War for Survival” and Ralph de Toledano’s “Will the Administration Choose Surrender in Viet Nam,” articles printed in Human Events in 1964, exemplified the stark tone used by those on the Right who claimed that America was losing its battle against the forces of totalitarianism around the world.12 Buckley’s call for an aggressive stance against North Vietnam was not lost on his longtime National Review colleague and in-house foreign policy expert James Burnham. In August 1964, Burnham wrote in his weekly column, “The Third World War,” of the potentially dangerous ramifications of a US failure to defeat communism in Southeast Asia: “But what does it matter if we are driven out of Asia and the Pacific?” He continued: “This is what matters: the first line of defense of our own country. If we give up in Laos—South Viet Nam and the neighboring dominoes begin falling, as inevitably they will, our defensive frontier—not at once, of course, but soon enough on the historic scale—must and will be drawn back to Hawaii.”13 Burnham was making the traditional argument for the domino theory through the prism of his own experience. Once a strong advocate of the socialist experiment, over time he had come to view socialism as a dangerous and destructive philosophy. Burnham had watched Washington fail in its many confrontations with Moscow and had seen the Soviet Union dominate Eastern Europe and gain influence in Cuba, Africa, and Asia. In hindsight, the fear that communist guerrillas would soon have been walking on the beaches of Maui drinking Mai Tais may seem unrealistic. However, policy makers across the political spectrum, including President Johnson, believed that each defeat the West suffered led the Soviet Union closer to global domination.14

An Erosion of Credibility  25

Burnham extended his views on the United States’ strategy in Vietnam in the magazine’s July 1964 special supplement, “Some Proposals to a Goldwater Administration.” In the section with recommendations should the senator from Arizona become president, Burnham wrote, “Abandonment of Southeast Asia threatens a catastrophic weakening of the world strategic position of the United States and the Western alliance.” Burnham went on to say that the United States could not defend the region on its own indefinitely and stated that, for a greater chance of success in the long run, the other nations in the region needed to contribute their resources as well.15 Politicians on the Right echoed Buckley’s and Burnham’s opinion. In August 1964, during the debate on the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution that would ultimately lead to the deployment of American ground forces to Vietnam, Congressman Melvin Laird of Wisconsin, who five years later would be tapped by President Richard Nixon to oversee the Pentagon, said, “We have to decide whether we have the will, whether we have the capacity, whether we have the determination to win this war in Southeast Asia. If we cannot now make this decision, then the time has come for us to pull out.”16 Similarly, as Ronald Reagan considered running for governor of California in 1966, he told the Los Angeles Press Club, “We’ve got to realize we’re in a war, and we’ve got to decide whether this is the best place to halt the enemy. If it is, we’ve got to throw everything into it. If it isn’t we’ve got to decide where we will draw the line.”17 For Laird and Reagan, as well as for those at National Review and Human Events, the question was quite simple: “have we the will to resist the advance of communism?”18 Those on the Right thought that the Johnson administration, by failure to communicate the effect a defeat in Vietnam could have on America’s geopolitical future, was not doing enough to mobilize the national will of the country. During Lyndon Johnson’s presidency, National Review and Human Events consistently stated that the White House lacked the commitment to protect the American people from an enemy intent on destroying their way of life. By making that argument, those who wrote for the publications repeatedly implied that the leadership of the Democratic Party lacked the ability to do what was necessary to win the Cold War.19 That question of commitment was one that had also been put forward by Anthony Harrigan, the editor of the Charleston News & Courier and occasional National Review contributor. Harrigan, who took a strong segregationist position during the civil rights movement, was also greatly concerned about the spread of international communism. In the early months of

26  Paving the Way for Reagan

1965, as President Johnson was debating the merits of increasing the number of American troops in Vietnam, National Review published an article by Harrigan entitled “We Can Win in Southeast Asia.” The article was an optimistic analysis of the current situation in the field and also reflected the positive outlook of those in the Pentagon. Harrigan’s article mirrored the comments of Laird and others, emphasizing that “if the United States has the right weapons, the proper strategy and the will to win, it will triumph in Asia as it has elsewhere on the globe.” Harrigan went on to mirror Burnham and others’ points of view that Vietnam was only one part of a much larger engagement that America was involved in.20 Although many conservative analysts viewed the Soviet Union as the great threat to the West, Harrigan and others on the Right saw China as America’s main nemesis in the war in Vietnam.21 But whether it was the Chinese or the Soviet Union, the risk of not fighting in Vietnam was the same. If America did not devote its full might to the conflict, Harrigan warned, “Chinese-led guerillas will be in Mexico’s Yucatan Peninsula or across the Rio Grande.”22 A few days before the article’s official publication, Strom Thurmond had Harrigan’s analysis inserted into the Congressional Record. While there is no way to be certain how Thurmond obtained the article, Thurmond biographers Jack Bass and Joseph Crespino believed that Harrigan and Thurmond were “political allies” and had a “close professional relationship.” Harrigan, who was also a contributor to Human Events, was clearly aware of Thurmond’s passionate anticommunist views and could have sent him the article before it was published.23 In his comments supporting the author’s position, Thurmond called the critique “a very interesting article” and “a report from a firsthand observer who found that Americans fighting in Southeast Asia do not agree with defeatists at home who say we must get out because we cannot win.”24 Regarding “defeatists,” Thurmond may have been referring to the growing dissension over the war, tensions best represented by violent clashes between students and police on the Berkeley campus in the fall of 1964.25 While neither Thurmond nor Harrigan advocated for additional troops, both men clearly believed that the communists in the North would be unable to sustain any kind of momentum against the industrial and military power of the United States.26 Conservatives saw Vietnam as one battle in a much larger war and were frustrated that the message was not being communicated with sufficient clarity.27 In his March 1965 column, Burnham again emphasized the larger

An Erosion of Credibility  27

geopolitical reality of the American presence in Vietnam, describing the conflict as “not merely local ‘civil wars’ but local campaigns in the struggle for the world that is the determining thread of our entire epoch.” The columnist labeled the administration’s explanation for the United States’ presence in Southeast Asia “inadequate and unconvincing,” as well as “silly, fraudulent and hypocritical.” Stressing that America’s objective in Vietnam should be to protect our “own security,” the former adviser to Leon Trotsky dismissed the idea that the conflict was actually an internal one within Vietnam. Burnham therefore argued that it was critical to resist the communist advance by whatever means necessary.28 A few months later, as the American air offensive over Vietnam began, and as the Johnson administration started introducing ground troops into the region, Burnham continued to amplify his position. His comments, published in National Review that June, emphasized the dangerous shift that would occur in the world if the United States did not do its utmost to succeed in Vietnam. Burnham saw the potential communist victory in the region as “a staggering defeat with immense, inescapable and cumulative global repercussions.” In Burnham’s pragmatic view, now that the United States was fully enmeshed in the conflict, it had no choice but to succeed.29 The column also reemphasized the need for American perseverance and discipline to see the battle through to the end. Burnham reiterated his view that the communist offensive in the North was an ongoing example of the wars of liberation that were becoming a global trend.30 Others at National Review followed Burnham’s lead. While Frank Meyer did not always see eye to eye with his cerebral colleague, they shared similar views in the larger debates among conservatives about how to address the communist threat.31 In comments in his weekly column “Principles & Heresies,” published in early 1966, Meyer expressed a positive outlook that the United States, following long-standing vacillation, was now confronting the communist menace. Meyer, longtime NR book editor, concurred with Burnham and others on the Right that the campaign in Vietnam was “one battle in the continuing war with Communism.” Meyer believed that success depended on America putting its full energies into the effort both militarily and diplomatically, especially in its relations with the USSR.32 In Meyer’s view, the United States could not roll back the totalitarian threat if it continued to negotiate with the Soviet Union. Those on the Right viewed Washington’s attempt to solve global problems in cooperation with Moscow as self-contradictory because the Soviets were supplying the North

28  Paving the Way for Reagan

Vietnamese with significant military aid. Meyer and others believed that trying to placate the Soviets only weakened the United States’ resolve to achieve victory.33 They believed that once the American people realized that Moscow and Peking were behind these wars of liberation, it would be possible to focus the full capabilities of the United States on combating the enemy. That the United States was negotiating with the Soviet Union and not aggressively confronting it in its attempt to foster its global revolution was an issue both publications frequently raised through the 1970s.34 As the war moved into 1966, National Review and Human Events continued to be unhappy with the way the war’s objectives were being communicated to the public. In an argument that right-wing policy makers could use with their constituents, James Burnham said that the administration needed to express an emotional message that went to the heart of all Americans’ devotion to the safety and well-being of the nation. “And there are many more citizens,” Burnham wrote at the conclusion of his column in the latter part of May, “in whose spirit there lurks enough patriotic feeling to move them, if it were appealed to, to support their country in a fight just because it is their country.”35 Burnham’s use of patriotism to increase public support for the war was another tactic to make the conflict seem less complex than it actually was. The American people had come together as a community to defeat totalitarianism during World War II, and now Burnham and others believed they had to do so again to prevent the threat of communist domination. In the minds of Burnham and Buckley, there was no question “that greatness was on the line in Vietnam.”36 Concern over the Johnson administration’s inability to convince the public that Vietnam was the right place for America to stake a claim in the struggle for the world led National Review publisher and conservative activist William Rusher to address the issue with the editors of the magazine. A graduate of Harvard Law School, the outspoken Rusher was a man of strong conservative views who was one of the key figures responsible for the “draft Goldwater” movement. He had come to the magazine in 1957, following a brief stint as counsel for a Senate internal security committee, and was committed to turning the publication into a viable business enterprise. In a memo in the summer of 1969, with more than 475,000 troops in Vietnam, Rusher used stark language that reflected the views of many members of the conservative movement about what a defeat in Southeast Asia would mean to the country’s future. The publisher stated that “the proposition that America’s determination (or failure of determination) to prevail in Viet Nam

An Erosion of Credibility  29

is very probably the crucial test for the future of the American society. If we pass it, we will have validated our national right (and will) to survive; if we fail it, we are probably through.”37 Rusher’s comments also alluded to the idea that if America’s objective to instill democracy in places like Vietnam failed, allies around the world might question whether the Cold War was truly worth fighting.

LBJ’s “Anti-Victory Policy”38 During the war in Vietnam, many conservatives were critical of what they saw as the United States’ vacillating military strategy.39 Human Events and National Review published many articles that criticized the United States’ reluctance to use the full force of its military capabilities to defeat the communists, arguing that forcing the American military to fight with its hands tied behind its back served no purpose. The editorial staffs of the publications advocated incursions into the North as well as into Laos and Cambodia, countries that the North Vietnamese were using as bases of operations for attacks into South Vietnam. Conservatives believed that if the United States extensively bombed North Vietnamese supply lines, mined Haiphong harbor, and invaded the North, the war could be won quite rapidly.40 That belief overestimated the effect that bombing would have on the enemy and underestimated the determination of the North Vietnamese.41 While Human Events and National Review contended that a massive bombing campaign of Hanoi, the northern capital, would cause the enemy to surrender, Johnson policy makers feared that it could lead to a nuclear confrontation with the Soviet Union.42 Although that confrontation never occurred, Johnson could not regard an escalation of conflict between Washington and Moscow lightly so soon after the Cuban missile crisis. National Review and Human Events’s criticism of what one analyst called “Johnson’s anti-victory policy” was also reflected in the comments of conservatives such as Senator Strom Thurmond,43 who said in the summer of 1965, “Our strategy has been like that of Joshua at Jericho.” He called US strategy “merely a parade of power without any effective use of it”44 and accused the Johnson administration of “bugle blowing,” arguing that the air campaign was ineffective in combating North Vietnam’s growing aggressiveness.45 These themes were also reflected in the comments of Barry Goldwater, who had returned to his syndicated column following his loss in the 1964 presidential election. Goldwater continued to believe that greater American initiative was all it would take to defeat the enemy.46 The former Arizona senator put forward

30  Paving the Way for Reagan

a number of strategies that would allow the United States to gain a greater military advantage, including the bombing of Hanoi, during which the United States should destroy as many of the enemy’s communication and supply lines as possible. Other conservative columnists at both publications were even more explicit, advocating the use of nuclear weapons to humble the enemy.47 Elaborating on America’s nuclear capability, James Burnham argued that the United States’ great success in past military engagements was due to its “ability to assemble overwhelming fire power and flatten the opposition.” Burnham went on to argue that the choice not to utilize its great industrial power “signified a decay of the West’s will to survive.” The author, who always questioned whether the United States and its allies possessed the fortitude to win the Cold War, believed that America needed to “exploit the most advanced equipment our technology can turn out.”48 Burnham’s argument for the use of weapons of mass destruction to bring the war to a rapid conclusion was echoed by a general editorial in National Review. The magazine argued in favor of using America’s nuclear arsenal offensively, either in a distant part of the North or near the border with China.49 The question many asked was whether, if the United States did use nuclear weapons to strike at North Vietnam, the Chinese would become involved in the war. Chesly Manly, Human Events contributor and longtime Washington correspondent for the conservative Chicago Tribune, dismissed fears of Chinese or Soviet involvement in response to the use of nuclear attack as unrealistic. He contended that the Soviets would not risk a nuclear war to save either the communist government of North Vietnam or their Chinese rivals.50 It was easy for Manly and others to speculate. In addition to its geographical proximity to Vietnam, Peking had become a nuclear power in 1964, and there was no way to know what the Chinese would do if the United States used nuclear weapons on the North. Short of responding with a nuclear attack against the United States, China could have attacked other nations in the Western Alliance, which could have led to a confrontation among the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), China, and the USSR.51 The frustration of conservative analysts with the seeming refusal of the administration to mount a more aggressive front against the enemy was also reflected in the opinions of conservative members of the House of Representatives. James Martin, a Republican congressman from Alabama, wondered on the House floor, “Why do we hold back and refuse to win this war

An Erosion of Credibility  31

as quickly as possible, or at least take such action as convince the enemy he cannot win and bring him to negotiations?”52 Ohio congressman John Ashbrook, who would run for president in 1972 on a platform that opposed the policies of Richard Nixon, advocated a greater use of force, as recommended by those at National Review and Human Events, saying, “Failure to use our superior military power and the subordination of the best interests of our troops to State Department political decisions are putting our boys in the position of sheer cannon fodder.”53 A constant criticism voiced by the Right was that the Johnson administration had handicapped its own troops by not giving them the offensive capabilities to succeed; this theme was frequently argued in Human Events and National Review during much of the 1960s. Articles critical of the current strategy appeared, such as “Should We Declare War on North Viet Nam?,” “Our Viet Nam Failure,” and “The Bit-by-Bit War.”54 Human Events ran interviews with highly distinguished retired members of the military, such as General Curtis LeMay, Admiral Arleigh Burke, and General Albert Wedemeyer, that criticized the lack of focus of the Johnson administration’s war policies. In their respective interviews and in columns with such titles as “How We Can Win in Viet Nam” and “We Must Intensify Our Campaign in Viet Nam,” LeMay and Burke, whose combat experience gave them credibility, gave the Right and its political representatives ammunition as they offered the public alternative approaches to achieve success on the ground in Southeast Asia.55 As the war continued to escalate, the country’s leading Republicans criticized Johnson’s policies, saying that they prevented the American military from fully confronting the enemy. At the time, America “had nearly half a million combat troops, it had dropped more bombs than in all theaters in World War II, and was spending more than two billion dollars per month on the war.”56 It is generally agreed that the Johnson administration’s bombing policy was not as strategically effective as it should have been, perhaps due to the president’s simultaneous use of diplomatic initiatives to contain the spread of communism. The Right wanted to push back totalitarian interests aggressively, and they used their rollback argument to portray Johnson, despite his escalation of the war, as weak, indecisive, and unwilling to develop a more coherent victory policy based on their advice.57 The aggressive military agenda advised by conservatives included invasion of sanctuaries in Laos or Cambodia or launching military incursions into North Vietnam. Through consistent criticism of the president and his national security

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advisers, the Right and the conservative media created an argument that the administration was not willing to do all that was necessary to win the war. At the same time, conservative pundits avoided certain realities, such as the belief of many policy leaders that an all-out military strike that involved chemical or nuclear weapons could easily lead to a military confrontation with the Chinese and the Soviet Union. On the floor of the House of Representatives in August 1967, minority leader Gerald R. Ford delivered a long, detailed critique of the government’s policies in Vietnam. The address, which appeared on the front of Human Events, highlighted arguments that had been made in Human Events and National Review and by conservatives on Capitol Hill. Ford characterized the administration’s slow process of escalation as a pointless exercise and hammered the administration for its failure to tell the public what progress was being made to actually win the war.58 “I believe the American people deserve to be told the truth about Viet Nam,” Ford said.59 Writers for Human Events and National Review addressed President Johnson directly during that year. The conservative newspaper’s military correspondent, retired Brigadier General Thomas Lane, was an outspoken critic of Johnson’s Vietnam policy and of the domestic turmoil he believed had been caused by the antiwar movement. Lane, an engineer who had served in the Pacific on the staff of General Douglas MacArthur, was known for voicing his opinions in Human Events and for his appearances before conservative organizations such as Young Americans For Freedom. In a front-page column, “An Open Letter to the President,” which appeared months before Ford’s, Lane kept up the Right’s attack, asking Johnson why he was not willing to utilize certain assets that could bring the war to a rapid conclusion. Lane also criticized the president and his advisers for not allowing American troops to engage and destroy enemy sanctuaries in neighboring Laos and Cambodia. “We find it intolerable that you as commanderin-chief, are allowing the enemy to strike across the border at our fighting men and are denying our men the clear right to strike back across the border and destroy the enemy,” the military analyst wrote.60 Lane, like others in the conservative press, used his columns as a platform to offer an alternative policy to achieve victory and also to indirectly send a message that the Democrats were weak when it came to doing what was necessary to win the war against communism.61 Ronald Reagan had made similar arguments a year earlier in his victorious campaign for governor of California. Reagan concurred with those

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on the Right who believed it was counterproductive to order Americans to serve in a war and then not give them the maximum assistance to allow them to defeat the enemy. At a news conference in Los Angeles in late 1966, Reagan said, “When you commit men to fight and die for a cause, it must be worth winning.” His elaboration that “I can’t say technically how you’d do it; I think you give those entrusted in fighting a war more authority in how it’s to be fought”62 was a criticism of Johnson’s micromanagement of the war effort, particularly of the bombing campaigns. The president was notorious for his controlling personality, which was seen as limiting the autonomy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in deciding how to properly proceed with the war.63 William Rusher argued in a memo to the editors in April 1967 that, as there continued to be a lack of progress in the war, “to be consistent with our past policy, wouldn’t it be our best course simply to call for an all-out escalation of the war?” Rusher believed that the United States had no choice but to use the full force of its power “even if this entails a further risk of war with Red China.”64 In the memo, the magazine’s publisher also mentioned withdrawal as an option, but Rusher’s biographer David B. Frisk commented that the idea was not really in the interest of the conservative publisher. “Given his [Rusher’s] continued hawkishness on Vietnam at least as late as 1969, and the sorts of things he was saying (in that year and probably previously) about how important this war was for U.S. prestige and power, I’d be surprised if he was even briefly interested in withdrawal,” Frisk wrote.65 Longtime National Review editor, and sister of William F. Buckley Jr., Priscilla Buckley said that the magazine would never have considered withdrawal as an option: “I heard Bill just once say that perhaps we should get out, as the protesters insisted, if we didn’t have the guts to go all-out and fight the war to win. It would have been too disheartening for the National Review troops, and if pressed I doubt the editors would have gone along.”66 Not only would the suggestion of withdrawal have demoralized those at National Review, it would also have alienated many in the conservative movement and severely hurt the magazine’s influence and credibility within it. As the United States’ effort in Vietnam continued to go poorly, many conservatives feared that America was losing credibility with other countries and that those who felt at risk from international communism had begun to lose faith in Washington’s ability and desire to come to their aid. This particularly concerned Thomas Lane when he lamented in a column in the summer of 1967, “Who among our allies can have confidence that the Unit-

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ed States could withstand a serious push from the Soviet Union when it is so baffled and bloodied by tiny North Viet Nam.”67 The feeling among conservatives in the House of Representatives was the same. In comments published in Human Events’s “Conservative Spotlight,” New Hampshire’s Louis Wyman echoed Lane, complaining, “In Viet Nam at this hour we have the capacity to end this war virtually overnight without the use of atomic weapons. How can we expect the world to respect such continuing abysmal failures of leadership?”68 There was passionate conservative support for the American war effort following the uproar over the March 1968 Tet Offensive. National Review and Human Events published optimistic editorials on the effort of American and South Vietnamese forces to repulse the combined attack by the North Vietnamese and the National Liberation Front, who had attempted to conquer major strategic points in the south. “The U.S. military in Vietnam and the fighting men of the host ally have together beaten back decisively the biggest Communist offensive of this war,” Colonel James W. Graham wrote in a lead editorial published in National Review nearly two months after the attack. In his commentary, Graham argued that the enemy offensive had been no surprise to the American commanders in the field. He said that the enemy’s strategy had played to the strengths of US troops by allowing them to employ offensive capabilities that were often limited by the guerrilla tactics regularly exercised by communist forces. Graham argued that whereas those who were critical of the war would believe that Tet had been a substantial victory for the enemy, he and his colleagues who were serving in the field knew better: “Far from an allied setback morally or materially, the Vietcong Tet offensive of 1968, as repulsed by the military and abominated by the citizens it was supposed to win over, constitutes possibly the longest step forward we have taken in the entire war.”69 Although American troops had been able to repel the North Vietnamese, the sight of the US Embassy in Saigon under attack sent a powerful signal to millions who were watching the events unfold on television: despite the awesome power of its military, the United States could be defeated.70 Conservatives in both houses of Congress shared National Review’s optimistic view of America’s performance in the Tet Offensive, although many on the Left saw the battle as a telling sign of America’s declining hopes for victory. Senator John Tower of Texas was particularly vocal, proclaiming on

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the Senate floor in early March 1968, “The implication has been made that we have suffered a series of very great defeats in South Viet Nam. I do not accept that thesis.” Like Graham, Tower dismissed claims that the enemy had achieved an offensive success: “He did not succeed in seizing a single city and holding it.”71 Throughout the conflict, the publications harshly criticized the antiwar movement, which they believed had severely damaged America’s hopes for military success. These articles about the antiwar movement and the turbulent protests around the country gave conservative policy makers additional arguments to use against the administration’s indecisive war strategy. Writers for National Review and Human Events were irritated by the growing protests on the nation’s campuses and were particularly enraged that many protesters seemed to favor a communist victory in Vietnam.72 However, as the conflict continued, these media outlets tried to give the most optimistic impression possible that the United States was making progress.73 In the summer of 1970, the right-wing newspaper published a lengthy article that argued that the United States was continuing to make military progress. The author was a young college student named David Keene, then the national chairman of Young Americans for Freedom. Keene would become a significant figure in the conservative movement, serving as adviser to Vice President Spiro Agnew and Senator James Buckley. The YAF leader had first gone to Vietnam for three months in the summer of 1966, in response to left-wing students’ visits to Hanoi. When the left-wing students returned to the United States, their accounts, which were often negative about the role of the United States, were given credibility by the media simply “because they had been there.” Keene believed that young conservatives who supported the war should gain firsthand experience of what was occurring in South Vietnam, which would help when activists on both sides engaged in debate.74 During his travels, Keene concluded that the United States was not using all the assets it had at its disposal to win the war in the most rapid manner possible, a situation that clearly frustrated him. “I came back convinced we were winning the war, but a little concerned about the fact that we seemed to be going about it in the most costly manner conceivable,” Keene wrote in August 1970.75 Conservatives believed that, as the antiwar movement grew across the country, it was eroding the desire of those at home to continue investing money and manpower in the conflict. The disorderly and, at times, violent behavior of students during university protests led James Burnham to call

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the activists “a bunch of marching morons and heedless dupes,” who wanted “Communist victory in Viet Nam and revolution in the United States.”76 Buckley and Burnham characterized the protests as a retreat from a vital responsibility, from what Buckley called “a painful commitment to a beleaguered people.” The conservative commentator, contrasting the concern of antiwar activists with programs to assist minorities and the poor with the struggle against global totalitarianism, viewed the former as trivial and as responsible for the increased violence that rocked America’s cities. The Right blamed these tensions on the uncoordinated Vietnam policy of an administration that had lost control of the war and lost the confidence of the country as well. Outrage over the disorder on college campuses was a frequent topic of the outlets of conservative opinion. The center of these domestic disturbances was the Berkeley campus of the University of California, located just outside San Francisco. The small community had been the epicenter of the protest movement since dissension over the war began in 1964. Antiwar activities had intensified when university officials tried to ban student political activity because protests were causing chaos. These protests against the war continued through the end of the sixties; students and even some members of the faculty marched, occupied buildings, and caused disturbances that led to numerous armed confrontations between protesters and police. National Review’s John Coyne wrote, as he described the riots that rocked the city of Berkeley in March 1970, “For the first time in half a decade, the silent majority stood up and spoke.” The author’s comment was another rallying cry to politicians on the Right who believed that the chaos that was terrifying the nation was the result of misguided social policies that needed to be dismantled.77 The outrage these magazines expressed at misbehavior in the world of higher learning was echoed in a speech Reagan delivered on July 4, 1968. “What America Stands For,” headlined in Human Events, was a series of Reagan’s observations about the unrest at college campuses in California and about the level of discontent in America. Reagan used rhetoric to draw a parallel between those who were set on hindering the war effort at home and the communists who were trying to subvert democracy abroad. “But their cause is not freedom. It is anarchy,” Reagan said of the militant groups who had taken over the state’s university campuses. “And their aim is not to build a nation of laws, but to create a condition of tyranny. Tyranny of the mob.”78 Whereas Buckley and others had condemned university administrations

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for lack of discipline and leadership, Reagan expanded that theme to include what he called “a responsibility gap.” In his famous televised address four years earlier, Reagan referred to the poor performance of the New Deal programs of the Johnson administration as well as to the overall lack of leadership in Washington. “Little minds and timid men do not build Great Societies, only a great people can do that, and we are a great people,” Reagan said.79 The governor concluded his remarks by harkening back to the declaration John F. Kennedy had made in his 1961 inaugural address, arguing that America had a responsibility to play an inspirational role in the world: “A young American not so many years ago said something about what our country stood for—something about Americans wanting the rest of the world to know that we were willing to pay any price, bear any burden to make what we stand for endure and prevail.”80 Reagan’s comments on that 4th of July argued that the present lack of leadership within the country was not only bankrupting America’s confidence at home, but was eroding it abroad as well. Those statements represented a central theme that National Review and Human Events would return to again and again as they supported Ronald Reagan’s run for the presidency in 1976 and his eventual victory in 1980.

The Great Retreat81 As the United States’ position in Vietnam weakened, the country searched for opportunities to achieve a peace agreement that would allow it to honorably remove itself from the conflict. Throughout the United States’ involvement in the war, the editors at National Review and Human Events had argued that lack of success on the battlefield would severely limit its ability to negotiate successfully with the communists in North Vietnam. During the years of negotiation that led to the end of American military involvement in 1973, conservatives were increasingly critical of Lyndon Johnson and his successor Richard Nixon for the inability to negotiate from a position of strength that allowed the North Vietnamese to take advantage of the United States. In the conservatives’ opinion, the only measures that amounted to positive results at the conference table involved the use of overwhelming power against a communist enemy. As the war continued into the 1970s, it became increasingly apparent to many conservatives, particularly James Burnham and Thomas Lane, that the country was not prepared to do what was necessary to win in Vietnam. Many on the Right believed that the United States was in a state of global

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retreat, unable or unwilling to stand up to the threat of international totalitarianism. Writers for the conservative publications believed that a US defeat in Vietnam would cause it to lose credibility as a country that could be counted on to stand against the specter of communism around the world. Many readers of these publications believed that a defeat would embolden the Soviet Union to take more aggressive action in parts of the world critical to America’s national security interests. An article that appeared in Human Events during the summer of 1968 was one of the first to connect the issue of the communists taking advantage of the United States during the peace process to the question of whether America was still capable of assisting nations to counter totalitarian encroachment. “Peace Talks Worry Our Latin Allies” was written by foreign policy analyst Paul Bethel, who had been head of the US Information Agency in Cuba and who was a passionate opponent of Fidel Castro. Bethel, a frequent contributor to both publications, wrote that nations throughout Latin America were concerned that the National Liberation Front was allowed to participate in the negotiations that were under way in Paris.82 Echoing the opinions of Burnham and Lane, Bethel quoted those in Latin America who saw the conflict in Vietnam as one front in a much larger battle. The author’s arguments were significant enough to be noted a few weeks later by Strom Thurmond. The senator from South Carolina believed that a weak US negotiating strategy could encourage guerrilla insurgencies around the world. “I have said again and again that if we do not win the war in Viet Nam that we will have to fight again in some other place on less favorable ground,” Thurmond said as he introduced Bethel’s article into the Congressional Record.83 Bethel’s concern, that the United States would give in when it negotiated a peace agreement with the enemy, was a consistent theme in both publications throughout the latter stages of the war. Human Events, in the summer of 1968, published articles by Thomas Lane and Walter Trohan, the longtime Washington bureau chief for the Chicago Tribune, that argued that the Johnson administration had gained nothing by halting military actions against North Vietnam and had, in fact, given the communists the advantage.84 Lane, the military affairs correspondent, argued that the negotiations were “a fraud upon the American people” and “a betrayal of our allies,” and he agreed with Trojan’s observation that “the president has given important advantage to the enemy” in his cessation of the bombing.85 Both authors argued that President Johnson had the capacity to end the

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war rapidly or to significantly damage the enemy’s resources by simply exercising an unrestricted use of American military power. In the opinion of the former brigadier general, the issue was uncomplicated. “Peace is the product of military victory. It is not a product of negotiation,” Lane wrote in July 1968.86 The Right was frustrated as negotiations gave the North Vietnamese time to reenergize its supply and armament networks, while the United States did nothing. As the war continued, conservatives argued that only by punishing the enemy militarily could the United States hope to succeed during the peace process. The point was echoed by figures such as John Tower in the Senate. “We must negotiate from a position of strength,” the senator from Texas argued in the spring of 1969. “The enemy knows he cannot defeat us militarily so long as we remain in Vietnam, but he hopes to prolong the war to the extent that he can collapse the will of the American people.”87 Strom Thurmond made an identical argument in a front-page article in Human Events during the fall of 1969, addressed to the new Nixon administration: “No diplomatic treaty can secure South Viet Nam as long as the sanctuaries remain untouched.”88 Critics in the conservative press believed that the United States’ lack of determination in the Paris negotiations was eroding its international credibility and creating a vacuum that would leave its allies at the mercy of those who disdained democracy. The long-term ramifications of the country’s failure in Vietnam were not lost on James Burnham, who wrote in the summer of 1968, “The meaning of defeat would be unmistakable to every foreign office: America lacks either the power or the will to make good on her commitments.” These and other comments of Burnham’s over the next few years expanded on the argument that America’s vacillation in Vietnam was a symptom of a much bigger problem. A loss in Vietnam, according to Burnham, also represented “the weakening of our global ties and influence.”89 During the next decade, Burnham frequently wrote about the continuing decline of America’s global position in the world. In his column “The Great Retreat,” published at the end of 1970, the analyst displayed a prescience that had been evidenced throughout the Vietnam experience. Burnham wrote that newly elected president Nixon’s Vietnam policies did nothing to prevent the country’s withdrawal from parts of the world vital to the nation’s national security. “In Southeast Asia it is called not ‘retreat’ but Vietnamization,” Burnham argued. “No one can dispute that we are moving out of (i.e., retreating from) Vietnam, not moving in (i.e., advancing).”90

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In Burnham’s mind, the withdrawal was not just in Vietnam but also on every front. “It is difficult to name a major sector of national activity— geographic, military, diplomatic, economic, social scientific, technical—on which we are holding,” he wrote, “not to speak of advancing: the great retreat is almost universal.” The argument that Vietnam was emblematic of America’s overall decline on all fronts was a theme that Burnham and his colleagues continued to emphasize as crises arose on the foreign and domestic fronts. Edmund Stillman echoed the argument in Commentary during the fall of 1971. Stillman, a foreign service officer, served as a professor of international relations at Johns Hopkins and wrote frequently about global political trends. He argued that America’s inability to succeed in Vietnam mirrored a foreign policy of indecisiveness and uncertainty.91 As the peace talks continued, conservatives found themselves in a state of flux over support of Nixon’s war policy. Frustrations about the conduct of the war took a toll on the friendship of William F. Buckley Jr. and his colleague and fellow devout Catholic Garry Wills. Wills was a twenty-threeyear-old graduate student at Xavier University when Buckley hired him as the magazine’s drama critic. The two developed a close friendship, which became strained as they disagreed over the manner in which the war was conducted. After ongoing arguments, in one of which Wills called Buckley’s longtime friend Henry Kissinger “a war criminal,” Wills finally broke ties with his mentor when Buckley refused to publish his essay that argued that the war was counter to conservative principles. Although Buckley continued to view Wills fondly, he was clearly disappointed by his former colleague’s positions on the war, writing in a letter to Wills in 1970, “My disappointment is keen. I do believe that from your own point of view, you have made a gross psychological miscalculation.” Buckley’s comments were in response to a note from Wills, who would go on to become a prominent religious scholar, that argued that “Nixon has to be stopped [and] the war has to be.” Buckley continued to believe that the campaign in Vietnam was connected to the larger struggle against communism, whereas Wills’s passionate opposition indicated his view that it was one more isolated conflict in which America was wasting its resources to try to instill an ideology in a people who had no interest in it.92 While many conservatives were happy to have a Republican back in the presidency, those on the Right were wary of Richard Nixon’s level of commitment to following their advice on Vietnam. That uncertainty also applied to the pragmatic behavior of Henry Kissinger. The point was em-

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phasized in a letter to Buckley from Human Events editor Allan Ryskind in late December 1969: “We’ve been catching some flack from our favorable article on Henry Kissinger.”93 The editor asked for evidence of the former Harvard professor’s stance on the war; despite favorable endorsements from conservative foreign policy experts, Ryskind had the impression that Kissinger “would generally like us to get out on almost any terms.” Buckley responded to Ryskind’s concerns with complete support for the incoming national security adviser. “I am at this moment especially convinced that Henry Kissinger is a great patriot, and that you will one day come to agree about that,” Buckley wrote. Suspicion about Kissinger’s pragmatic approach to US foreign policy became a staple of conservative criticism throughout the 1970s as the United States tried to use the policy of détente to improve its relationship with China and the Soviet Union.94 Conservative publications did appreciate that the president finally initiated military incursions into Laos and Cambodia.95 However, both Human Events and National Review continued to be critical of the administration, especially of America’s negotiated exit from Vietnam. As the settlement with the communists developed, the National Review expressed a similarly low opinion of the Kissinger–Nixon style of deal making. “If the North Vietnamese have any interest in negotiation, it is hard to figure what more they could ask for beyond what Mr. Nixon is ready to give,” the weekly newsletter National Review Bulletin argued in the middle of February 1972. Buckley and his editors contended that “the Communists are offered an open and easy road to the takeover of South Viet Nam,” clearly showing that Nixon wanted to end the war as soon as possible. Of the president’s position, the editorial said, “He has gone as far as could possibly be gone in search of ‘an honorable peace,’ and a good deal further some would argue.”96 When the draft of a settlement was announced in the last few days of October 1972, conservatives disapproved of the conditions that the United States had agreed to with communist North Vietnam. “What the Communists have desired all along, the conquest of Saigon and the rest of Indochina appears to have been greatly enhanced by the Kissinger–Le Duc Tho negotiations,” Human Events lamented on its front page in the second week of November.97 Buckley’s publication took a similar point of view in its position on the initial draft of the agreement, which was similar to the magazine’s view earlier in the year. In mid-November, Buckley and his colleagues again criticized the president and his national security adviser’s pragmatic policy making.98 Disappointed with the initial draft, both media outlets

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hoped that Nixon’s victory over Senator George McGovern in the presidential election of 1972 would now cause him to take another look at the peace agreement. Human Events wrote a particularly strong editorial a little more than a week after election day. “Thus knowledgeable diplomatic and military men in Washington are hoping that the President, secure in his expectantly large re-election victory, will decide to drive a far tougher bargain with Hanoi,” the right-wing newspaper said.99 Nixon’s stronger line in the final phase of the negotiations did not placate the conservative press, which viewed the conditions of the final agreement as only slightly improved. “The accords are by no means completely to our liking,” Human Events wrote in a lead editorial in which they analyzed the new agreement. Ryskind and his colleagues stated that the settlement continued to be advantageous to the North Vietnamese. Frustrated, the editors lectured the Nixon White House that having an agreement did not mean that the president and his inner circle could simply wash their hands of the entire affair: “If the administration views these documents as nothing more than a way to slip out of South Viet Nam with a dash of grace, the agreement will amount to nothing more than an American act of betrayal.”100 The view of the peace process from the New York offices of National Review closely paralleled the position taken by Human Events. The magazine offered its readers a lengthy editorial on the agreement as well as a column by James Burnham devoted to the accords. The magazine contended that the agreement was “not, in fact, an agreement to end the war and make a lasting peace in Indochina.” National Review believed that the settlement was certainly an improvement from what the doves had been advocating. Nixon had been able to get the North to agree to the continued existence of the Saigon government. Buckley and his colleagues were disappointed that the administration had been unable to remove Hanoi’s troops from areas in the South. Overall, though, the conservative magazine concluded, “If the Doves had had their way, South Vietnam and the very considerable strategic interests the United States has in the survival of a non-Communist South Vietnam, would have been liquidated some while ago. Under the agreement, South Vietnam has a fighting chance.”101 On Capitol Hill, newly elected senator Jesse Helms, from North Carolina, seemed to best articulate what the editors of the two publications thought of the peace agreement. “We have made a truce and called it peace,” Helms argued.102 The former television commentator also commented that

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the agreement was extremely delicate and relied on the Soviet Union, China, and Hanoi to make it succeed. “Let us bear this in mind before succumbing to euphoria at our success about ‘ending the war,’” Helms said on the floor of the Senate at the end of January in 1973.103 The North Carolinian further argued that communist troops remained in South Vietnam because the United States had not used its maximum military power to defeat the enemy on the field and that that lack of military success had led to the United States being taken advantage of during the negotiating sessions. Many conservatives hoped that if the North Vietnamese did not follow the accords after America withdrew its forces from Vietnam, Nixon would use military force against them. Although the Nixon administration had initially agreed to continue to economically support South Vietnam, public outcries against the war, the Watergate affair, and an increasingly recalcitrant and assertive Congress prevented the funds from being delivered.104 Many on the Right in Congress also felt pressure from their constituents to end the funding to South Vietnam. “Conservatives began to oppose additional aid for the South and military action against the North Vietnamese, primarily because they didn’t want to deal with any more POW issues,” Ryskind said.105 Following Nixon’s resignation, the new president, Gerald Ford, continued to advocate that Congress provide funding to assist a beleaguered South Vietnam. Human Events wrote passionately in its main editorial in February 1975 that Congress’s refusal to endorse additional funds “means the subjugation of 20 million people by an aggressive communist regime which has killed hundreds of thousands of its own people.”106 Despite the newspaper’s protests, Congress, in the latter part of March 1975, denied funds that Ford requested for South Vietnam. Ryskind’s angry editorial called the behavior “despicable,” saying that Congress’s refusal to aid Saigon was having disturbing ramifications throughout Asia and also in other parts of the world: “Thailand, interestingly enough, is expected to force a complete American withdrawal. President Marcos of the Philippines is reviewing his relationship with the United States. America’s Mideast diplomacy is also being seriously undermined as Secretary of State Kissinger suggested last week.”107 These sentiments were reflected in a letter from Ronald Reagan to a political supporter. “The dominos are beginning to fall,” Reagan wrote. “The Philippines, a nation that we created, now says, in effect, they can no longer depend on us… Henry Kissinger returns from the Middle East empty handed because suddenly no one there is sure they can trust us.”108

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These thoughts were reiterated in a National Review editorial, most likely written by Burnham, that repeated his 1970 argument that the United States was in a state of retreat. The editors stated that, despite American forces leaving Vietnam, “so long as the defenders are ready and willing to fight it is our duty to supply them with the weapons they need.” Burnham listed other recommendations that would allow America to revive its credibility internationally. Senator James Buckley was also angry about the decision of his colleagues. “The Congress of the United States was the one that let that part of the world down,” Buckley said in a 2012 interview. “I felt a deep sense of shame.” Despite pleas for America to continue to make an effort in Vietnam, the domestic tide against more involvement was far too strong. America’s role in Vietnam ended on April 30, 1975.109 Although conservatives were disappointed that their agenda had failed in Vietnam, the themes advanced by National Review and Human Events would be relevant in the years to come. “Conservatives, were shockingly good with regards to Vietnam,” Seth Offenbach argues. “There was a good number of times where they correctly laid out the problems with fighting the Vietnam War and the problems that would happen after we failed.”110 The main problem articulated by Burnham and others was that Americans were now uncertain about their country’s role in the world. During the decade following Vietnam, the United States found itself suffering from a crisis of confidence. At the same time, the nation seemed to be surrounded on all sides by hostile powers determined to take advantage of a country that appeared to be pulling inward. For example, Soviet negotiators seemed to consistently take advantage of American representatives during the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks, and the Arab states responded to American support of Israel with a brutal oil embargo. During the 1970s, Human Events, National Review, and Commentary did their utmost to express alternative ideas for a more muscular American foreign policy. Over the next decade, conservatives, most notably Ronald Reagan, used the themes and arguments articulated by these publications to advocate a foreign policy ideology that was based on the lessons America had failed to learn in Vietnam. Those lessons were that peace could only be secured through strength, or what Reagan in 1980 called “the determination to prevail.”111

2

The De-moralization of the Cold War China, 1969–1978 On July 15, 1971, William F. Buckley Jr. and his brother Senator James L. Buckley of New York were watching television in the living room of Governor Ronald Reagan’s home in Sacramento, California. The three most prominent figures of the conservative movement observed as President Richard Nixon appeared on screen and announced that he would visit the People’s Republic of China in the spring of the following year. At the conclusion of the president’s comments, Reagan turned the television off, and for a moment or two the three men sat in complete silence. Suddenly the telephone rang, and the governor was informed that there was a call from Nixon’s national security adviser, Henry Kissinger. The Harvard PhD was calling at the behest of Richard Nixon. The president believed it was critical to know what prominent members of the conservative movement were thinking, and there was no one more formidable in that arena than Ronald Reagan or his good friend Bill Buckley. As Reagan took the call, Buckley knew immediately what Kissinger would be asking the governor. “Did Richard Nixon say something he shouldn’t have said? Did he undertake a course of action he should not have undertaken?” The president had not consulted any prominent figures on the Right about his decision to travel to the PRC until after it had been announced. But Nixon’s desire to hear what Reagan thought of his outreach to China indicated how important he believed those on the Right, as represented by the publications of conservative opinion, were to the success of his administration.1 The shock among conservatives over President Nixon’s decision to begin diplomatic negotiations with the PRC was a measure of the growing dissat-

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isfaction of those on the Right with the administration’s policy of détente. To Buckley and James Burnham of National Review, Allan Ryskind of Human Events, and other conservative commentators, détente and its complex formula of power and interests represented a clear ideological betrayal of the anticommunist crusade. They believed that the global conflict between democracy and a totalitarian enemy out to dominate the world had lost its ideological clarity.2 Conservatives believed that the Nixon–Kissinger philosophy, which eliminated ideology from the conduct of international relations, otherwise known as “realpolitik,” was responsible for what former National Review Washington correspondent George Will called “the demoralization of the Cold War.” The Right was frustrated by détente and by continued troubles in Vietnam, which they saw as examples of the weakness in America’s foreign policy. The publishers of Human Events and National Review believed that America was under siege. Conservatives believed that President Nixon’s protracted removal of American forces from Southeast Asia, the administration’s decision to negotiate an arms control agreement with the Soviet Union, and diplomatic negotiations with the People’s Republic of China sent a discouraging message to those nations suffering under tyranny around the world. Commentators on the Right were increasingly frustrated by Washington’s apparent inability to maintain a strong position in negotiations with the USSR and by the Nixon administration’s refusal to strongly condemn or respond to Moscow’s acts of aggression throughout Eastern Europe and the Third World. America’s withdrawal from its global responsibilities, conservatives reasoned, enabled the Russians to pursue a more aggressive foreign policy. These arguments made by Human Events and National Review assisted conservative GOP politicians in clarifying their ideology and in espousing a more assertive foreign policy to deal with international communism. The news and analysis offered by these media outlets also assisted members of the GOP in clarifying their views on the Cold War. That view, argued by figures like Buckley or outlets like Human Events, was critical in developing the ideological foundation that Reagan used for his successful campaign in 1980 and for the foreign policy program he adopted as president.

“A Deal with China?”3 During the presidential campaign of 1968, when the Cold War was at its most critical point, Richard Nixon used his reputation as a lifelong anti-

The De-moralization of the Cold War  47

communist to prove to conservatives that he was the best candidate for the office. Despite his history of hawkish foreign policy views, Nixon, on the national GOP ticket for the fourth time since 1952, also mentioned his interest in creating overtures—with the goal of creating a mutual diplomatic relationship—to the People’s Republic of China. Study of the issue had led Nixon to believe that bringing the two nations closer could exploit the negative relationship that had developed between the PRC and the Soviet Union, with the goal of a more relaxed policy of containment, as formulated in a 1967 Foreign Affairs article written by the former vice president. Nixon’s central tenets were that “most Europeans no longer fear a Soviet threat” and that the continuing economic growth in Europe, Asia, and the United States illustrated that it was no longer a bipolar world.4 Nixon had concluded that verbal attack was not a realistic approach to dealing with China, a nation of more than seven hundred million people, but that dialogue with Asia’s largest country could add significantly to the development of global peace and stability.5 Nixon and his national security adviser, Henry Kissinger, believed that the United States no longer held the dominant advantage in the world. Kissinger, a specialist in theories of international relations, realized that Americans, disillusioned by the unpopular Vietnam War, no longer wanted to concentrate their nation’s resources on containing the spread of communism. Nixon and Kissinger also believed that if the Soviets suspected the United States was developing a rapprochement with the Chinese, Moscow might be induced to contain its expansionist agenda and to work with the United States on other important issues such as arms control and finding a solution to the war in Vietnam.6 Kissinger believed that the Soviet Union was under a variety of pressures, including the problematic Soviet economy, the fear of nuclear war with the West, and concern over tensions with the United States following the August 1968 invasion of Czechoslovakia. Kissinger believed that these international and domestic concerns could all be “linked” together to solve a wide variety of issues that would be of interest to both nations.7 While Kissinger and Nixon believed that working with these communist entities would enhance global and national security, conservatives disagreed. The Right viewed developing a relationship with the Chinese as unthinkable; it would not only give legitimacy to a society that the Right believed was morally evil, but would also continue to weaken the United States’ global geopolitical position. China had been a passionate subject for conservatives since the communists had defeated the nationalists, led

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by Chiang Kai-shek, at the end of 1949. The loss was shocking to social conservatives, particularly due to the long influence of American Protestant missionaries who had a high regard for the country. Those who had gone to China on evangelical missions had helped disseminate the concepts of modernization, bringing China, which many on the Right viewed as a backward country, into the modern world. After the communist victory, conservatives in the United States wondered how a country that had been exposed to Christian values for decades could be conquered by an atheistic ideology.8 M. Stanton Evans believed that China was part of a larger political debate over the spread of international communism. The China issue was prominent in the Right’s criticism of Secretary of State Dean Acheson during Harry Truman’s presidency. Conservatives believed the administration’s inability to support Chiang and the nationalists to victory had emboldened communist interests, which had then led to the Korean conflict.9 Despite arguments by Democrats to the contrary, the Right, including then congressman Richard Nixon, contended that liberals such as Alger Hiss (in the service of the Soviet Union) had undermined Chiang’s support and had vastly contributed to the communist victory in China. After World War II, the Right argued that the communist victory had been engineered through internal subversion and a Democratic attitude of appeasement—clearly indicating a failure of the policy of containment. Conservatives also argued that Democrats had become complacent. The Right believed that the Truman administration, in its focus on the postwar reconstruction of Europe, had not given enough support to Asia, which had allowed the communists to take advantage.10 The conservative campaign against the communists in China was never just about China, but was part of a larger strategy. GOP conservatives saw the nationalists’ defeat as yet another victory for the forces of international communism, with the Soviet Union at their center, and as proof that communism was rapidly spreading around the globe.11 As with Vietnam, the Right of the GOP found it easier to blame the loss of China on communist sympathizers than to accept the complexities of the daily struggle between the two factions fighting for China’s future. Mao’s forces exhibited strong and determined leadership, while Chiang’s followers suffered from poor leadership and morale despite receiving abundant aid and advice from the United States.12 The Right believed that Nixon’s campaign to bring China into the community of nations at the expense of Taiwan mirrored the decision that Hiss,

The De-moralization of the Cold War  49

Truman, and other members of the Roosevelt coalition had made when they abandoned China to the communists. National Review and Human Events had been staunch supporters of Taiwan from its inception. The publications considered Nixon’s decision to recognize China, like his decision to pull out of Vietnam, to be another example of the United States’ surrender in the protracted conflict of the Cold War. Conservative commentators also argued that Nixon’s “betrayal” of Taiwan damaged America’s credibility in Asia at a time when nations such as South Vietnam, Laos, and others were under assault by communist insurgencies. Nixon, who well understood the importance of Taiwan to the conservatives, asked Henry Kissinger, at the start of engagement with the Chinese, to study how to admit the PRC to the United Nations without alienating the island nation. Nixon understood that, because recently liberated African countries were not supporters of the West, it was virtually impossible to gain majority support to block the admission of a nation like the PRC to the UN.13 Conservative commentators soon noticed that the new president was making an effort to develop a channel of communication with Mao’s government, although, with the process cloaked in secrecy, they were unable to ascertain what the administration was doing. Indeed, Nixon’s actions appeared contradictory. On the one hand, he stated at a February 1969 press conference that there was to be no change in Chinese-American policy, while on the other, a February 1969 editorial in National Review hinted that the United States appeared to be investigating the idea of UN membership for the PRC.14 Nixon’s comments at that press conference did not resonate well with William F. Buckley Jr. or his editorial colleagues, who felt great trepidation about what would happen to Taiwan and the question of whether the two nations would remain in the international organization. Admission of China would confer legitimacy on what the Right viewed as one of the most brutal and repressive societies in history. If the United States did nothing to prevent China’s admission or Taiwan’s expulsion, what would happen to America’s credibility with its Asian allies? Could those allies count on Nixon to protect them against a more hegemonic China?15 Those who wrote on foreign policy for Human Events and National Review found it repugnant that the United States could support the PRC when Peking was doing its utmost to defeat American troops in Vietnam.16 They asked how the United States could develop a relationship with a nation that disdained democracy and smothered creativity, entrepreneurship,

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and religious freedom, values at the core of the United States’ global struggle against communist oppression. Kissinger’s statement in 1969 that “we have no permanent enemies” caused consternation among many conservatives.17 Despite the misgivings of those on the Right, the Nixon administration continued to engage in quiet diplomacy with the leaders of Romania and Pakistan throughout 1969 to ascertain the interest of Mao’s government in a dialogue with the United States. As the discussions with third parties continued, Nixon reduced restrictions on trade, making it easier for the United States to engage in business with Peking. Continued rumblings about a dialogue with China led to further commentary by National Review in December 1970, which was clearly disappointed in the path Nixon had chosen.18 The editors refused to believe that UN membership meant the expulsion of Taiwan; however, the fact that Nixon had considered the idea of UN admittance for the PRC was yet another example of the White House’s unwillingness to combat international communism through the necessary means, repeating the mistakes of previous administrations that had failed to successfully contain communism around the world.19 Even as secret conversations continued, in public, Nixon tried to put the Right at ease. In comments to the media in the second week of December, he displayed an unfavorable opinion toward admitting China to the UN. While Nixon admitted that he hoped for a relationship with Peking in the distant future, he did not want to alienate the Right during his 1972 reelection bid. The process of talks accelerated in the first weeks of January 1971, when the administration received a communication from the Chinese saying that the PRC government would welcome a visit by Nixon.20 A few days later, the president’s friend and biographer Ralph de Toledano, who had been a correspondent for Newsweek as well as a syndicated columnist, wrote an article in Human Events that strongly indicated that Nixon was prepared to open diplomatic relations with the Chinese. The author argued that the idea was highly disagreeable to conservatives and would play havoc with their support for Nixon’s reelection. De Toledano believed that Taiwan’s position in the UN was so secure that there was no possibility that the United States would approve of its expulsion, whether or not the PRC was admitted into the General Assembly. Nixon’s comments seemed to confirm the author’s point. In March 1970, the president stated that he had no intention of risking America’s relationship with Taiwan in favor of Peking. Human Events kept the pressure on when it published an article by foreign policy contributor DeWitt S. Copp, who asked what Nixon

The De-moralization of the Cold War  51

was prepared to do regarding America’s UN status if Taiwan was expelled and replaced with the PRC.21 The issue raised by Copp in his article caused Nixon concern. The United Nations was, after all, a powerful symbol. If the Right believed America was giving in to the communists by allowing China a powerful role within the international organization at the expense of Taiwan, it could prove disastrous to Nixon’s chances for reelection in 1972. The president’s opinion did not change when the Chinese invited the American Ping-Pong team to participate in an exhibition match in China. In its own commentary on Peking’s invitation, however, National Review argued that it was nothing but a propaganda ploy to put the PRC in the best light possible. To the magazine’s columnist Frank Meyer, Nixon’s foreign policy seemed like a pointless gesture, the exact opposite of what Meyer believed was necessary. Nixon’s policies enhanced the confidence of those totalitarian states when the United States should be doing everything possible to undermine them. Meyer was clearly aware of Nixon and Kissinger’s desire to use a relationship with China to pressure the Soviets into concessions over arms control and other issues. But Meyer (and other conservatives) believed that détente had been constructed on a policy of weakness that damaged America’s international credibility and gave it the appearance of retreating from the battle against worldwide communism. Conservatives also questioned Nixon’s and Kissinger’s individual credibility. Both men seemed to offer a different analysis of the geopolitical situation depending on which members of the GOP coalition they were speaking to. M. Stanton Evans said of Nixon’s national security adviser, “Kissinger had a message that was highly off-putting. He was very duplicitous. Kissinger would say, ‘I am with you conservatives but I have to deal with liberals and I have to deal with Congress.’ Bill [Buckley] would believe this, but I was disturbed by it.”22 Kissinger and Buckley had been friends since 1954, while Kissinger was still a professor at Harvard. During that period Buckley and James Burnham were invited to address Kissinger’s seminar on international relations. Over time, Buckley came to develop a high regard for Kissinger’s knowledge of foreign policy, as well as for the academic’s drive and ambition. In 1968 when Kissinger was an adviser to Nelson Rockefeller, Buckley arranged through his friend Frank Shakespeare to have Kissinger introduced to Richard Nixon. “You will never be able to say again that you have no contact inside the White House,” Kissinger wrote to Buckley when Nixon named him as his top foreign policy adviser following his election.23

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During his tenure in Washington, Buckley saw Kissinger about twenty times and spoke with him on the phone frequently. But the conservative commentator’s visits had little to do with Kissinger’s need for foreign policy advice. Kissinger wanted Buckley to use his influence with others on the Right to show that he was in favor of the administration’s initiatives. However, as M. Stanton Evans and David Keene both recalled, many of their colleagues were suspicious of Kissinger and thought he was taking advantage of National Review’s editor in chief. “Bill was very con-able, partly because he wanted to be in,” Keene said, “and Kissinger gave everybody that he talked to the sense that they were indeed in.” Allan Ryskind recalls showing Buckley an article published in Human Events about some compromises the administration was making concerning SALT I. Buckley read the article and then stated he was going to call Kissinger and “make mince meat out of him.” Time passed and Ryskind heard no more about it. In a discussion about the Buckley–Kissinger relationship, the magazine’s longtime editor Linda Bridges recalled a statement by James Burnham that “Kissinger had given up on the West and believed in trying to salvage what he could.” The man who dominated foreign policy during the Nixon–Ford period had “given up on the idea of pushing back the power of the Soviet Union.” Bridges also recalled Buckley stepping in when Burnham submitted a series of columns he intended to entitle “The Kissinger Doctrine.” Buckley, according to Bridges, “insisted they be changed to the “Sonnenfeldt Doctrine,” a term that was named for Kissinger’s deputy Helmut Sonnenfeldt, following comments he made at the end of 1975 in which he called for a “more natural and organic” relationship between the Soviet Union and its Eastern European satellite states. Buckley may not have confronted Kissinger on issues of foreign policy because he believed the relationship was too important to risk alienating him. Buckley, like Kissinger, clearly enjoyed the notoriety he had achieved and may not have wanted to do anything to jeopardize it.24 Despite Buckley’s friendship with Kissinger, National Review, as well as Human Events, consistently published editorials and articles in which they printed Nixon’s comments about the Soviet Union and China from throughout his career. The objective was to give ammunition to politicians on the Right who were against the president’s China policy. Conservative policy makers argued that the administration’s foreign policy agenda was a complete reversal from his earlier remarks.25 Buckley was irritated by Nixon’s outreach to the Chinese and its subsequent embrace by the public. Like Meyer, he saw, in this outreach, Chinese manipulation and Nixon’s valida-

The De-moralization of the Cold War  53

tion of the long history of communist genocide. The magazine’s founder believed that Nixon’s strategy of realpolitik toward China implied that there was no moral center to his dealings with foreign governments, that he considered principles of good or evil irrelevant, and that the power a nation exercised on the world stage was the only factor that mattered to him, regardless of its ideological frame. Nixon’s views violated one of the major intellectual tenets of conservatism, that of moral absolutes. That principle implies a devotion to a certain code of beliefs based on standards of right and wrong.26 In his commentary on the Ping-Pong competition, Buckley compared the betrayal of moral principles seen in Nixon’s actions to the betrayal that would have been felt had American forces played badminton with Hitler during the invasion of Europe. The parallel could also be made with playing Ping-Pong with China as it supplied the North Vietnamese with weapons that were being used to kill American troops. Buckley’s comments were clearly vitriolic. Well aware of the PRC’s history since 1949, he was outraged that so much of the public and the press had been so easily misled by the gesture. Buckley’s displeasure would continue to prevail, particularly in his dispatches during Nixon’s China visit.27 Nixon and Kissinger’s diplomacy finally began bearing fruit in the latter part of April 1970. A letter written by Premier Chou En-lai suggested a meeting between envoys from China and the United States to discuss a summit between the two nations’ leaders. Because he had not received a communication from Peking in quite some time, Nixon believed that the Chinese were feeling pressured by the progress in the SALT talks between US negotiators and the Soviets. Invitation in hand, the administration planned the president’s visit to Peking in the spring of 1972.28 Meanwhile, Human Events argued that a relationship with China gave the international community the impression that the United States had abandoned its role as the world’s defender of democracy. It also argued that Thailand and other Asian nations had begun to reach out to Peking because they no longer felt sure that the United States would aid them should they come under attack. Congressmen Philip Crane and John Ashbrook both entered the newspaper’s comments into the Congressional Record. Ashbrook, a favorite with the editors of Human Events, may have been given the piece ahead of publication to help him crystallize his arguments against Nixon’s policies as he prepared his run for president as a protest candidate in 1972. The damage to America’s international credibility was a major factor in the

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Right’s criticism of the growing United States–China relationship. The Right saw Nixon’s decision to ignore China’s history of communist ideas as counter to everything in which they believed.29 Following Kissinger’s reply accepting China’s invitation for Nixon to visit the country, the president sent his national security adviser to meet secretly with Chou En-lai during the first two weeks of June to discuss the summit in greater detail. Kissinger’s trip was publicly scheduled as a consultation with allies in Asia. At the end of June, shortly before Kissinger’s departure, James Burnham wrote a column in which he argued that if Taiwan was removed from the UN, the blame would be Nixon’s.30 Although it was more or less a foregone conclusion that the PRC was to be admitted to the international organization, the United States did have the power to prevent the removal of Taiwan. The United States was the major supporter of the UN, and nothing of any significance happened without its permission. If Taiwan were expelled, according to conservatives, the United States’ global credibility would be severely damaged. Conservatives argued that the loss of a free China in the UN would be an unprecedented retreat in the nation’s foreign policy. That development would raise considerable apprehension among allies around the world who counted on the United States to safeguard them from communist encroachment. While National Review and Human Events did not hold the UN in great esteem, the international community clearly did, and Taiwan’s removal would reveal just where the United States saw itself in terms of its global role.31 A few days after Nixon’s announcement that the United States would engage in formal diplomatic discussions with China, Buckley wrote a column in which he indicated his uncertainty about what would result from the presidential visit. The conservative commentator argued that Eisenhower’s 1959 meeting with the leader of the Soviet Union had legitimized the USSR in the eyes of the international community. Buckley did not conclude that the same would occur upon Nixon’s recognition of China, but that, arguably, Nixon’s pursuit of that dialogue (from the beginning of his presidency in 1969) had clearly removed China from what Buckley called “moral isolation.”32 The announcement of Nixon’s trip to China created a great deal of animosity among conservatives. In August, Kissinger met with a number of people close to Reagan who expressed their concern with the progress of the administration’s policies of détente. Kissinger explained that these policies were a perfect strategy to keep the Soviets in check. Despite a passionate

The De-moralization of the Cold War  55

argument by Kissinger, those assembled at the meeting were not convinced. One member of that group who had always been wary of the Nixon– Kissinger policy was New York senator James Buckley. Buckley said in a 2012 conversation, “Détente was a cooperation, [it] was the assumption that you could get the Soviets to loosen up immigration and that sort of thing which people who had read National Review in the preceding decade knew isn’t going to happen.”33 As the vote to admit the PRC to the General Assembly grew closer, conservatives continued to be severely critical of the Nixon administration. Many columnists believed that if Taiwan were expelled from the UN, it would be a terrible betrayal of a great ally. In the view of National Review, the issue was about American morality and will. Did Nixon possess the integrity to stand firm against the communists, or was he prepared to minimize Peking’s brutal history to achieve what he believed to be a safer world? The publication was not confident that the administration would do anything to prevent Taiwan’s expulsion, despite State Department comments to the contrary. The magazine also found the manner in which some of the media had distorted China’s barbarous history to be outrageous. That portrayal, as well as Nixon’s rhetoric, gave the impression that the United States had become complacent about the dangers of international communism.34 National Review addressed the philosophical question of how Nixon’s actions toward the Chinese would affect the underlying foundations of American conservatism. Human Events addressed the issue in terms of its impact on the overall geopolitical picture. The conservative newspaper viewed the United States’ actions with China as identical to its behavior in addressing the Soviet Union. The United States was making concessions, but where were the concessions from the Chinese? What were the Chinese prepared to give up in return for a relationship with the United States? The only change the publication saw in Peking’s behavior was its intensified propaganda campaign against the Nixon administration, the same administration that seemed to have no problem in capitulating to the nation responsible for the execution of millions of people.35 While the opinions of the two publications closely mirrored each other on the course of Nixon’s foreign policy, their literary styles and intellectual temperaments were very different. Human Events provocatively charged that allowing communist China any role in the international community was a moral betrayal of the promise America had made to fight communism wherever it existed. That passion was illustrated by a lengthy supplement

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published in September 1971, “The Case against Red China.” The insert was composed of columns from different commentators and experts that chronicled the Asian nation’s history of brutality. It was the kind of passionate rhetoric that the weekly publication was known for and that made it must-read material for so many conservative activists. In a contemporaneous editorial, National Review was more measured as it analytically pointed out the ramifications of China’s admission to the UN on different parts of the conservative movement, essentially concluding that all of them would be alienated by the expulsion of Taiwan. In the fall of 1971, as Henry Kissinger prepared to make his second visit to the Chinese capital, Nixon found himself frustrated by more criticism of the upcoming UN vote. In the third week of October, the White House was alerted to a column by senior National Review editor Jeffrey Hart. The article, critical of the administration’s outreach to the Chinese, was to appear on the front page of the October 16 edition of Human Events. Hart, a former speechwriter in the Nixon White House, had supported many of the president’s initiatives. But now, Hart had decided to break with the administration. While his commentary was no different from others about the potential ramifications of Taiwan’s expulsion, the criticism from someone of Hart’s stature surprised the White House chief of staff H. R. Haldeman, who mentioned the article during a meeting with the president. “Hart has been very much with us,” Haldeman said to Nixon in a recorded conversation on October 13. Haldeman implied that Hart’s comments in the newspaper would resonate strongly with the 10 percent of the GOP that read Human Events. Nixon responded angrily that its circulation was much lower than that. But Haldeman was clearly worried that the comments by Hart had alienated even more members of the Right. The chief of staff’s concern highlighted the weight that the Nixon White House gave to the opinions of the conservative publications and their portrayal in those publications.36 Nixon clearly resented the criticism of right-wing commentators. Much of the anger, in all probability, was out of frustration over the fact that journalists could write whatever they chose. As Nixon knew, politics is the art of the possible, and compromises and concessions are necessary to accomplish certain objectives. The president realized that he would be judged by history for what he accomplished, not for how successfully he placated the conservative element of the Republican Party. While Nixon’s foreign policy strategy may have been focused on long-term accomplishments, he was still

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concerned about the problems that that particular demographic could cause for his reelection in 1972. The UN vote in the latter part of October expelled Taiwan from the international body and gave China’s seats in the General Assembly and the Security Council to the PRC. Buckley and his colleagues shook their heads in resignation and argued that, although UN ambassador George H. W. Bush and Secretary of State William Rogers appeared to be frantically negotiating with delegates up to the last moment, the decision regarding Taiwan’s fate seemed to have already been made. The strongest indication of Nixon’s intentions was the symbolic absence of Henry Kissinger, who was then en route to Peking.37 Human Events reflected the conservative ire at Nixon’s deception by commenting on how skillfully he had managed the expulsion of America’s longtime ally.38 The reaction to the UN vote was just as strong among conservatives in Congress. Senator Paul Fannin of Arizona, echoing many commentators on the Right, argued that the UN was a stage for foreign propaganda and that the expulsion of Taiwan undermined America’s relations in Asia. Rep. John Rarick called the vote “the latest betrayal of another free world government,” and Rep. Robert Price compared the vote to Franklin Roosevelt’s recognition of the Soviet Union in 1933. In a lengthy speech on the UN vote, William F. Buckley Jr. argued that the event had been a massive symbolic humiliation for the United States in the eyes of the international community. Buckley proposed that the United States should use the UN simply as a forum for debate and not vote on any initiatives, which would lead to the organization being delegitimized, something that those on the Right had advocated for some time.39 “It was the wrong thing to do,” Senator James Buckley recalled, commenting on the expulsion of the island nation. “What bothered me most was throwing Taiwan to the wolves.” Buckley’s reaction reflected his brother’s outrage as well as that of his fellow conservatives in Congress.40 The conservative press continued to react to the UN vote as Nixon prepared for his groundbreaking visit to Peking. Commentators such as John Chamberlain wondered whether there was any respect for America left among its global allies, while the editors of National Review argued that unless something dramatic occurred during Nixon’s trip to China, the Right would see the initiative as a complete failure and the president could forget about their support in the 1972 election. However, the conservative movement had bigger issues with Nixon than this. Critical of Nixon’s attempts to

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secure a more balanced approach to foreign policy, conservatives believed that the flow of global events had changed and were now running against the United States, as seen in America’s continuing concessions to the Chinese and to the Soviet Union and in the breakdown in Vietnam. The right believed that these events gave the United States’ adversaries the impression that it lacked the will to confront communism around the world and that it was using the tactic of détente to try to balance the weakness of its defense and its lack of will to compensate for it.41 In March 1972, National Review published a picture of Mao Zedong’s Little Red Book on its cover. The caption below simply read “Thoughts on Chairman Nixon’s Visit.” William F. Buckley Jr. had been one of the eightyseven journalists who accompanied the president on his trip. Buckley’s disdain for Nixon was clearly illustrated in commentary that National Review’s Richard Brookhiser called some of the finest he had ever written.42 In his coverage of the China visit, Buckley charged that the great struggle against communism—a war that many believed was one of good against evil—had now evaporated. In Buckley’s view, Nixon’s embrace of Mao and other officials represented a complete lack of “moral toughness.” In the president’s decision to overlook the carnage that the PRC had inflicted on its enemies, conservatives saw a dismissal of what they believed had been America’s great mission in the world. In his commentary, Buckley insisted that Nixon’s enthusiastic toast to the Chinese leadership was as indefensible as if the prosecutor in the Nuremberg trials had embraced Nazi war criminals. The columnist also stated that the line that once separated good from evil had now vanished. The United States’ moral ascendancy was now, thanks to Nixon’s behavior, badly compromised. The fight to defeat international communism, so critical to conservatives’ definition of what was right and what was wrong, no longer existed.43 Human Events was critical of Nixon and ambivalent toward many conservative politicians who endorsed the visit, including Ronald Reagan. Reagan, an outspoken supporter of Taiwan, had been asked by the president to visit the island nation to “reassure Chiang Kai-shek” of the administration’s continued support. As Kissinger prepared to meet with the Chinese in 1971, Nixon could point to support for his China mission from one of the nation’s most popular conservatives, part of his strategy to keep the Right on his side. Although it is unclear why conservative senators Barry Goldwater and William Brock were in favor of the China mission, they, and Rea-

The De-moralization of the Cold War  59

gan, may have believed it necessary for party unity, with the 1972 election mere months away. Also, they may have supported Nixon because his China initiative was in part an attempt to constrain the Soviet Union and make it more cooperative with the United States, a goal shared by Goldwater and Reagan.44 Intellectuals who contributed to the conservative publications were deeply shocked by Nixon’s trip to China and his negotiations. In an op-ed in the New York Times soon after the president’s visit, William Rusher wondered whether conservatives would vote for Nixon in 1972. Rusher, like the editors of Human Events, had no problem—regardless of the consequences—in verbally punishing those who he believed were hurting the Right. But William F. Buckley Jr. possessed a more pragmatic attitude. There is no doubt that Buckley’s and Rusher’s natures were quite different. Rusher, who considered himself an outspoken political activist, believed that if the conservative members of the GOP stayed silent about Nixon’s liberal policies they did themselves a disservice. Buckley, who viewed himself as a member of the establishment, treasured relationships with people on both sides of the political spectrum. As one who enjoyed being a famous personality, Buckley was also wary of alienating figures in positions of power who could be of potential use to him and his magazine.45 Despite continuous complaints by intellectuals on the Right, Nixon and Kissinger forged ahead with their plans to create a more balanced approach to foreign policy. They believed that opening a dialogue with the People’s Republic of China would make the Soviet Union more amenable to reducing its nuclear weapons as well as its hegemonic appetites. However, conservatives were skeptical that negotiations would change the face of the nation they saw as “the focus of evil in the modern world.” In 1972, shortly after Nixon’s trip to China, Rusher wrote a memo to Buckley in which he described in detail the damage the president’s visit had done to the conservative cause: “I cannot recall when American conservatism has been in greater disarray. . . . If we do not provide better leadership for American conservatives than they are presently getting, others soon will—and ought to. The question that cries out for an answer is: where do you stand and what are you going to do?” At Human Events, editor Thomas Winter was dealing with his own frustrations over the Nixon administration’s foreign and domestic initiatives. “Believe me, nothing we say that is any way praiseworthy of Mr. Nixon is written with any enthusiasm,” the editor wrote in reply to a letter from an angry subscriber.46

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The mood of Rusher and Winter displayed, in microcosm, the great antipathy conservatives had toward Nixon. Many on the Right had supported Nixon for president against their better judgment, fervently hoping that he would support their foreign and domestic policies and would reverse what they believed had been a downward trend during the Kennedy and Johnson years. Despite their hopes, Nixon had embarked on a series of initiatives that many who wrote for the two media outlets viewed as anything but conservative. Those on the Right were pleased when Nixon was finally forced to resign due to his involvement with the Watergate affair. However, after Nixon’s departure, conservatives remained unhappy as Vice President Gerald R. Ford continued the Nixon–Kissinger policy of détente with the Chinese leadership.

“We Have Lost Much with No Gain”47 President Ford was a seasoned, well-respected politician who had served twelve terms in Congress. Though he stated that he was not as conservative as Barry Goldwater, Ford did strongly believe in the concepts of fiscal discipline and limited government. He possessed a strong knowledge of the legislative process, but Ford did not have the deep foreign policy experience of his predecessor.48 Although Ford had been suspicious of détente during his years in Congress, upon succeeding Nixon, he realized that it was important to continue to focus on stabilizing relations between the United States and the communist world. But the prospect for détente’s success were complicated. During his brief presidency, Ford was consistently under attack from conservatives in both parties over the United States’ inability to take a tough negotiating position with the Soviet Union on the issues of arms control and human rights.49 Choosing to follow Nixon’s foreign policy, Ford retained Henry Kissinger as secretary of state. The former Harvard professor and the president had been friends since 1964, and Ford relied on Kissinger’s advice throughout his administration. Kissinger believed that the United States needed to take advantage of the tensions between the PRC and the USSR to forge a more stable international system. However, the Chinese were unhappy with Kissinger, believing that he was not as tough with the USSR as he claimed. When Kissinger arrived in China following Ford’s summit with Soviet premier Brezhnev in Vladivostok, the Chinese leadership complained that the meeting had symbolized a growing closeness between the United States and the USSR. But as Kissinger realized, the Chinese understood their need to be

The De-moralization of the Cold War  61

a part of the global economy, and eventually it was arranged that President Ford should visit, December 1–5, 1975.50 While the presidency may have changed hands, conservatives continued to attack Ford and, especially, Kissinger for their outreach to the communist world. Buckley continued to believe that détente was a waste of time, while Human Events frequently used the phrase “The Menace of Henry Kissinger” to illustrate the Right’s unhappiness with the secretary of state and his continuing desire to cultivate a relationship with the Chinese at the expense of Taiwan. Conservative policy makers were also upset about Ford’s support of the policy of détente. One particular critic, Senator Jesse Helms from North Carolina, accused Ford and other US policy makers of making trips to China and the Soviet Union “with hats in hand,” stating that he was not surprised that “the United States was widely regarded as a paper tiger.” Helms and others on the Right were frustrated, believing that Ford resembled Nixon in his disregard of conservatives within the Republican Party who called for greater toughness in American foreign policy.51 During Ford’s trip to China in December, he encountered much of the tension that Kissinger had experienced. In Beijing, Mao expressed concern to the president about the United States’ growing relationship with the USSR. Ford recalled the moment in a conversation with his biographer and former chief of staff James Cannon: “He kept urging us to stand firm, to deny Soviet hegemony in the Pacific.” Ford told Mao that the United States was responding to Soviet aggression around the world and that he hoped that China could assist the United States, especially in Africa. In all probability, Ford was referring to the ongoing civil war in Angola, in which the Chinese were supporting the Western-backed National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA), while the Soviets supported the communist-backed Peoples Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA).52 Although no new agreements were developed, the Chinese expressed their continued interest in improving the relationship between the two countries. However, after Ford’s return from his trip to Asia, coverage by the Right focused on Peking’s criticism of the administration’s inability to appear tough with the Soviet Union. Human Events, characterizing Ford’s trip as a complete failure, argued that Kissinger and Ford’s naive view that the Chinese were now our allies “was considered a dangerous hallucination by many foreign affairs specialists.” The publication warned its readers not to forget that Peking had sent massive amounts of military resources to North

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Vietnam and had devoted resources to Marxist insurgencies throughout Asia, including Laos and Cambodia.53 After Nixon’s resignation in August 1974, Ford had little time to focus on the country’s foreign policy before he had to devote his attention to winning reelection. The political climate was made even more challenging by former California governor Ronald Reagan’s decision to contest Ford for the GOP nomination in 1976. Despite winning the nomination, Ford presided over a divided Republican Party and a country that, after the turmoil of Watergate, wanted little to do with a continuation of Nixon’s policies. Voters believed that they needed a political outsider who would take the country in a different direction. When Jimmy Carter was elected president in November 1976, the public hoped that the former governor of Georgia would usher in a new era of good feeling. The new president had been critical of détente throughout the campaign. But following his inauguration in January 1977, Carter continued to follow the strategy started by Nixon and Kissinger to achieve an official diplomatic relationship with the Chinese. Conservatives continued to fear that the new president was prepared to sacrifice the American security partnership with Taipei for the sake of a new relationship with Peking. The anger of the Right was expressed by M. Stanton Evans in Human Events during July 1977. Evans, a passionate supporter of Taiwan, was particularly irritated with the Carter White House. In his campaign for the presidency, the Georgia governor had frequently spoken of the importance of an independent Taiwan. However, as Carter’s time in the Oval Office progressed, his statements about “the protection of Free China,” wrote Evans, have “been slowly vanishing like a diplomatic Cheshire cat.” William F. Buckley Jr., another strong defender of the United States–Taiwan relationship, argued in a column earlier in the year that, by abandoning its relationship with the island nation, the United States would reveal “that weakness in character which would make us less estimable, strategically, in the eyes of the Chinese.” Evans’s and Buckley’s comments epitomized the opinion of the Right, that the United States appeared to lack the ability to take firm diplomatic positions against communist nations.54 Despite conservatives’ anger, Carter moved to initiate full diplomatic relations between the United States and the PRC; acceleration of the initiative was signaled when National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski flew to the Chinese capital in May 1978 for discussions. Despite Carter’s previous assertions that he valued the American relationship with Taiwan, the presi-

The De-moralization of the Cold War  63

dent was prepared to do whatever was necessary to officially bring the Chinese into the international community. The point was made clear by Carter’s direction to Brzezinski about how to communicate with the Chinese leadership: “you should state that the United States has made up its mind.” Conservatives, who believed that Carter’s comments, like Nixon’s, about preserving Taiwan from a Chinese attack had been nothing but talk, were disturbed by the visit. M. Stanton Evans crystallized those opinions in his July 1978 column titled “Selling out Taiwan.” In Evans’s view, the administration was so desperate to engage in relations with the Chinese that it was willing to forgo a partnership with an important Asian ally and agree to a friendship with a totalitarian nation based on conditions “they have dictated.” Evans also argued that Taiwan was a far better economic partner than China. Although much larger, China had a subsistence economy, with frequent food and power shortages, whereas Taiwan had developed into one of the richest economies in Asia. Evans’s observations were echoed by Ronald Reagan, who reported on his visit to Taiwan in May 1978. Reagan, who had first visited China in the early 1970s at the request of President Nixon, drew a sharp comparison between the two nations during one of his frequent radio commentaries: “Some of those Americans who visit the mainland and return with glowing reports of how much better off the people are under their communist rulers should visit Taiwan,” the former governor said.55 As conservative opinion publications continued to criticize the Carter administration over its conduct of American foreign policy, the White House announced in late December that the United States had officially established diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China. Those on the Right who had been following the progress of the discussions were not surprised. However, the announcement, combined with the news that Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping would be visiting Washington, just made the situation all the more discouraging. Following Carter’s announcement about the success of the diplomatic initiative on January 1, 1979, National Review quoted George H. W. Bush, who had been envoy to China under President Ford: “We gave all and got nothing.” Bush, who had recently announced his intention to run for the 1980 GOP presidential nomination, also argued that in dismissing the friendship of another longstanding ally, “we are simply diminishing U.S. credibility around the world.” Human Events characterized the situation even more emphatically. In a front-page article, the newspaper declared that the Carter policy “Leaves Taiwan on Edge of Forced Surren-

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der.” The conservative publication accused the president of launching “a sneak attack” against the people of Taiwan. Its contributors, including M. Stanton Evans, had been passionate supporters of Taipei for decades; they contended that the Carter policy was a great betrayal of a devoted and important global ally. “In the name of God, why,” commented an outraged Pat Buchanan, former speechwriter for President Nixon, writing about Taiwan’s support of the United States’ activities in Asia over the decades. In an argument that would be repeated by many on the Right, Buchanan said that betrayal of such a devoted international partner would leave the United States with little credibility with other nations that looked to it to protect them against the encroachment of international communism. Policy makers who had been staunch supporters of Taiwan were also very upset; Barry Goldwater called the decision to embrace Peking while dismissing Taipei “a cowardly act.” In an interview with Human Events, Ronald Reagan, who would soon declare his intention to run for the Republican nomination, referred to Carter’s announcement as “a betrayal of Taiwan.”56 Conservatives were disillusioned. They had hoped that Richard Nixon, who had campaigned as a passionate enemy of communism, would focus his energies on rolling back the global power of the Soviets and the Chinese. But the opposite had occurred. Although the Right knew that Carter was a Democrat, the former Georgia governor had positioned himself as a critic of the Nixon–Kissinger policy of détente. After brief speculation that Carter might take a tough stance with the leaders of Moscow and Beijing, William F. Buckley Jr. and his colleagues were to be disappointed. Carter had decided to follow Nixon’s path, bringing the United States closer to China to try to give it a better bargaining position in negotiating with the USSR on arms reduction. Although Nixon, Ford, and Carter had all promised that their foreign policy would make the world more secure, conservative writers believed that the opposite was true. Contemplating the course of recent events, writers for National Review and Human Events concluded that the defeat in Vietnam, combined with Carter’s China initiative, had eroded Washington’s credibility with its allies. Conservatives claimed that there was a theme of surrender in America’s struggle to combat international communism and in Washington’s continuing chess game with Moscow over the critical subject of arms control.

3

An Illusion of Security SALT, 1969–1980 In early November 1978, Ronald Reagan composed a short letter to the scholar Eugene Rostow. A former dean of Yale Law School and an adviser to President Lyndon Johnson, Rostow served as the executive director for the hawkish Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), an organization focused on foreign policy and national security issues. Reagan complimented Rostow on a recent speech that was highly critical of the Carter administration’s negotiation of the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) with the Soviet Union. Reagan, who became a member of the CPD in 1977, informed Rostow that he was so impressed with his remarks that he intended to devote a number of his syndicated radio broadcasts to them. Flattered, Rostow, who later expanded his comments in an article for Commentary in February 1979, responded that he believed Reagan’s commentaries “constitute[d] a public service of high order.” SALT II was a frequent target of Reagan’s attacks during his radio broadcasts and in his national newspaper columns, many of which were published in Human Events.1 The debates over SALT II and its predecessor SALT I were among the most important ideological battles of the 1970s. The treaties galvanized conservatives within both political parties and became the subject of frequent detailed analysis in National Review, Human Events, and Commentary. Criticism of the agreement by prominent voices such as William F. Buckley Jr., James Burnham, M. Stanton Evans, and Norman Podhoretz was part of the Right’s continuing critique of the American policy of détente. Conservatives viewed the SALT process—established by President Nixon’s visit to Moscow in 1972 and concluded by Jimmy Carter in Vienna, Austria, in 1979—as another instance in which the USSR appeared to gain a military

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advantage over the United States. As the Russians continued to expand their nuclear arsenal, conservatives were worried by the United States’ apparent ambivalence toward enhancing its own military security.2 The Republican Right believed that the debate over SALT was not simply about arms control but about the state of American foreign policy itself. As the Soviet Union expanded its influence throughout Africa and the Middle East, Commentary’s editor in chief Norman Podhoretz, among others, described the United States as pulling inward, uncertain about its international role. Ronald Reagan viewed SALT as proof that the United States was “just drifting along with events.”3 The Right agreed with Reagan’s language and believed that a more aggressive strategy against the Soviet Union was needed. The attacks against the arms agreement launched by Reagan and by Commentary and other conservative publications raised questions about the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations’ use of the strategy of détente. The Right believed that Moscow was taking advantage of détente to expand its influence within Eastern Europe and the Third World, and they worried about the Soviets’ aggressive nuclear arms buildup without any strong response from Washington. Conservatives believed the United States needed to vigorously confront Moscow across the globe and to develop a new outlook in the arms control process. Conservative intellectuals believed that American negotiators needed to pressure their Soviet counterparts to make concessions by emphasizing that the United States had key advantages in nuclear weapons technology. The conservative publications contended that only by continued pressure throughout the bargaining process would the United States gain an advantage over the Soviet Union in the Cold War.4

“The Military Weakness of the West”5 During the 1960s, the United States had a decisive advantage over the Soviet Union in nuclear weapons. But, after the very public embarrassment of the Cuban missile crisis, Moscow focused all its resources on enhancing its weapons systems to match those of the United States. As the Soviets built intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and other weapons to compensate for their defensive insufficiency, the United States began to lose its nuclear advantage.6 To slow the Russians’ newfound edge, President Richard Nixon was in favor of building an antiballistic missile system (ABM), an idea that had been raised during the Johnson administration. Nixon also endorsed development of missiles that contained numerous bombs aimed at a variety

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of targets, otherwise known as multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs). Nixon envisioned ABM technology as a way to protect the nation’s missile sites, rather than large metropolitan areas, thus creating what was called a “stable deterrence.” Despite the lack of parity with the Soviet Union, the ABM system would protect American missiles from destruction during a first strike, which would allow the United States to launch them following a Soviet attack.7 Critics argued that the Soviets would be provoked to accelerate their arms development as the United States progressed with its ABM program. ABM technology was a critical component in the first SALT talks, which were the occasion of Nixon’s first encounter with Leonid Brezhnev. The encounter was critical from a substantive point of view but also symbolically. To counter public perception that the United States was being overwhelmed in Vietnam and was on the defensive in the rest of the world, newly elected president Nixon wanted to present himself as a confident and strong leader who was not weak in the face of the communist superpower. This exactly described the kind of leader conservatives had hoped for when they supported Nixon in the 1968 election.8 The Right was in favor of the ABM system, and articles in Human Events and National Review stressed the importance of the project. ABM technology was vital to American defense; without it, the Russian advantage in nuclear missiles left the country vulnerable. In 1969, National Review labeled opponents of the ABM system irresponsible and reckless; William F. Buckley Jr. wrote that such people didn’t believe that the Soviet Union posed a threat to the United States. President Nixon appreciated Buckley’s support of the ABM, writing a few months after he took office: “This is just a note to tell you how impressed I was by the perceptive analysis in your column.”9 The letter was one of a number they exchanged throughout his tenure in the Oval Office; it showed that Nixon was not above trying to use charm to convince Buckley to make a favorable argument toward the administration policies.10 When Nixon began the SALT talks with the Soviet Union in late 1969, the initial arms negotiations were immediately harshly criticized by the conservative press. In Human Events that fall, Pulitzer Prize–winning foreign correspondent Edgar Ansel Mowrer raised the question: “Does Nixon believe the great Western myth?” The author implied that Nixon concluded that the leadership of the Soviet Union, like that of the United States, want-

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ed to create a more secure environment.11 Although Mowrer may not have opposed the idea of talks, he was extremely critical of how the United States conducted itself in the negotiations. Similarly, Allan Ryskind, editor for Human Events, said, “I can’t recall being against any negotiations with the Russians on principle”; however, Ryskind, among others on the Right, was irritated that the Soviet Union always seemed to negotiate from a tough ideological position, from which it did not deviate. Nixon speechwriter Pat Buchanan was concerned about the effect the president’s strategy would have on the right wing of the GOP. “The conservatives were devoted to missile defense, not Mutual Assured Destruction,” Buchanan said. “National Review, especially Rusher the publisher, was alarmed at what they saw RNHAK doing.”12  The lack of toughness displayed by American negotiators also created apprehension among Western allies, who questioned America’s commitment to winning the Cold War. One critic of American–Soviet negotiations was Commentary’s Edward Luttwak. The author of numerous articles on arms control, who had begun his career as an aide to former secretary of state Dean Acheson, believed that the United States should not even consider talks with the Soviet Union because meeting with the USSR enhanced its authority and legitimized its policies and conduct. Another critic was Commentary’s Walter Laqueur, a European historian who had written dozens of articles for the publication beginning in the 1950s. Laqueur, who had left Germany in 1938, did not believe the Soviet Union was out to conquer the world, but he did believe the Nixon and Kissinger strategy contributed little toward creating a more secure environment. In a 2012 interview, Laqueur reflected on the international scene at that time: “There were illusions, not only in the media but, among the experts, the idea that the Soviet Union had changed and that we could learn a lot from them, I did not think it was right. Détente and the Cold War were two sides of the same coin. Whenever there was an opportunity anywhere in the world the Russians tried to make a move on it.”13 The views expressed by Laqueur, Luttwak, and others who wrote for Commentary were representative of what author Justin Vaïsse labels “the second age of Neo-Conservatism.” Many writers for the magazine believed that the Soviet Union simply needed to be contained and could not be trusted to engage in fair negotiations. Sharing that belief, the conservative wing of the Democratic Party, best represented by Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson, argued that little in foreign policy separated them from the conservative wing of the GOP.14

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Many on the Right believed that the fault did not lie only in an overly idealistic State Department that had failed to take the offensive in its dealings with the Soviets. The problem was much greater, according to James Burnham. The author condemned the liberal establishment for placing the United States in a weakened position before the talks had even begun. Burnham’s column, “The Great Retreat,” asserted that the nation’s failure in Vietnam showed its inability to challenge the communists in their expansionist drive for global supremacy. Conservatives expected Nixon to address these issues, not to pursue a foreign policy of placating their totalitarian opponent.15 There was considerable debate over the ABM issue; although the project succeeded easily in the House of Representatives, the initiative only passed in the Senate when Vice President Spiro Agnew broke the tie to authorize the program. The narrow vote showed Nixon that the program’s political support was weak. Regardless, Nixon and Kissinger still saw the initiative as a possible bargaining chip with the Soviets.16 As the SALT talks began in Helsinki, Finland, in November 1969, William F. Buckley Jr., echoing Burnham’s charge of a lack of fortitude, commented critically on the progress of the negotiations. His criticism was based on Nixon and Kissinger’s hope to solve international issues while negotiating an arms control agreement. A key area they hoped to address was ending the war in Vietnam.17 That strategy appeared illusory as the Soviets did nothing to pressure the North Vietnamese, and, to the contrary, gave them military and economic support. Buckley believed that Nixon and Kissinger were unwilling to antagonize the Soviet Union for fear that the entire relationship between the two nations would collapse. Buckley also stated that, while Kissinger and Nixon believed that the USSR and the United States shared a common interest in reaching an agreement on strategic arms, the Russians used détente to pursue their own foreign policy objectives.18 Buckley’s perspective was insightful: the Soviet Union viewed the United States’ new foreign policy initiative differently than did Nixon and Kissinger. Conservatives argued that the Russians believed that the United States had developed détente out of concern about Soviet nuclear weapons growth, hoping to use the policy as a defensive measure to decelerate Moscow’s progress. They believed that the Soviets, even as they agreed to détente with the United States, would not let the concept of peaceful coexistence inhibit them from continuing their agenda of class warfare through wars of national liberation. The defensive posture they perceived in the United States’

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negotiating position only emboldened the Kremlin leaders to continue their hegemonic agenda. In his column, Buckley compared the United States’ reasons for arming itself for the purposes of maintaining security to the Soviets’ motivation, which was to intimidate its Western opponents.19 The Soviets advocated a limitation on the use of ABM technology. The Nixon administration knew that Moscow was aware of the successful ABM tests Washington had conducted and hoped that, because the Soviets were far behind in ABM development, negotiations would lead to limitations on the technology on both sides. If the ABM issue was addressed, the Russians argued, the issue of MIRVs could easily be eliminated. Should these conditions be agreed to, the Soviet delegation stated that they were amenable to discussing the reduction of offensive missiles along with their launching mechanisms. The talks were then adjourned, with the next round scheduled for April 1970.20 Despite what appeared to be some progress on nuclear issues, the conservative media was not impressed. Human Events reiterated that the United States had been taken advantage of by the Soviets yet again and argued that the willingness of American negotiators to do anything necessary to keep the dialogue going was playing into Moscow’s strategy.21 National Review continued to exhibit frustration over Nixon’s belief that there were mainstream influences within the Soviet leadership that had the capacity to sway negotiations.22 Conservatives found it ridiculous to believe that the Soviets had somehow become more civilized. What they found even worse was the United States’ reluctance to take the initiative in negotiations while, in contrast, it simply accepted any “positive” movement on the part of the Soviet Union.23 As conservatives continued to be frustrated that the president and his national security adviser did not understand the dangers they faced by not seriously addressing the ever-widening gap between the two nations’ nuclear capabilities, National Review decided to take the initiative. In March 1971, the magazine published a lengthy essay by physicist and ballistic missile expert Carl Benson—writing under the name Charles Benson—on the state of American defense in comparison to that of the Soviet Union. The article’s key message held that the country’s lead in nuclear weapons had so eroded that, if the Soviets continued to progress in their defense spending, they would achieve nuclear superiority. The article, which insisted that the SALT talks were hurting rather than helping the United States, supplied more ammunition for the Right’s charges that the many concessions made by American diplomats had resulted in a crisis for the nation’s defense.

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The article, according to William F. Buckley Jr., was read by a number of prominent political figures on the Right, including Governor Ronald Reagan, who was told of the piece by his former speechwriter Jeffrey Hart. In a note to Hart, Reagan described the article as “frightening” and mentioned that he had discussed Benson’s arguments during a conversation with the president and that Nixon was “aware and in agreement with the views expressed.”24 Reagan continued to study and comment on the state of American defense throughout the 1970s. In late May of 1971, Nixon announced a “breakthrough” in the development of a separate ABM treaty with the USSR, with the conditions that the United States would concur with the separate agreement as long as the Soviets agreed to continue to negotiate a reduction in nuclear arms, while both sides guaranteed that, during the negotiation period, no new landbased missiles would be developed. The Soviets were in favor of allowing only one site for the protection of each national capital, and they refused to budge, despite different positions put forward by the United States. As the negotiations continued, National Review published an editorial critical of the United States’ position, which argued that if only one ABM site were allowed around Moscow and Washington, the United States would not be able to post a system around its own missile sites, which would leave them vulnerable to Russian attack. The one-site allowance gave the Russians the advantage, as they already had a large number of launchers to protect Moscow. Buckley and his colleagues believed that the Soviets had gained the upper hand by convincing the United States to accept a concession in a flawed agreement that prevented it from moving ahead with its ABM system.25 The conservative press was unhappy with Nixon’s announcement of a separate ABM agreement. They were extremely suspicious and accused Nixon of having made concessions to the Soviets merely to conclude a deal and elevate public opinion. The president seemed unconcerned that the United States’ defense position was rapidly falling behind that of the Russians. Editors of Human Events went so far as to accuse him of appeasement, clearly indicating that they had lost faith in his credibility as one who stood firm against any compromise to national security. In a particularly harsh column, Frank Meyer voiced conservative disappointment with Nixon’s programs and noted in frustration that public fears of communist threats seemed to have declined. Wondering if the nation actually felt it was possible to engage in rational negotiations with the Soviet Union, Meyer called it a foolish assumption and blamed Nixon and the mainstream media for instilling it in

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the minds of the American people.26 Meyer clearly resented Nixon’s seemingly positive view of the Soviets. Conservatives believed that that positive view, combined with the seeming euphoria over the recent Ping-Pong exhibition match between China and the United States, had created a complacent perception that the threat of international communism had declined. William F. Buckley Jr. was so angered by Nixon’s outreach to the communist world that he composed a column in 1971 entitled “Good Bye Mr. Nixon.” In a fifth draft, Buckley concluded that Nixon had “betrayed seriatim almost every other major principle for which American conservatism has stood since the end of the Second World War.” Following a list of the administration’s disappointing policies, Buckley stated in the column’s latter half that “I myself do not intend to vote for Richard Nixon this November: I believe that conservatism, and therefore America, would be better off.” Buckley seemed to have struggled with whether to have his comments printed or not—according to Linda Bridges, it was rare for him to compose so many drafts. Why he chose not to publish his criticisms of the administration is unknown; however, one may speculate that Buckley, who loved being at the center of power, was concerned that he would be banished from the Nixon White House. It is also possible that Henry Kissinger, with whom he spoke frequently, talked him out of it. Given the decision by prominent members of the conservative movement to withdraw their support of the president for the 1972 GOP nomination, Buckley may have thought this a strong enough message that an independent column or editorial from the magazine was not necessary.27 Kissinger’s relationship with Buckley served the administration well, particularly when the White House found an article in National Review disconcerting, as, for example, an editorial on SALT in early summer 1971. In the “President’s Daily News Summary,” the White House press office sampled commentary and analysis on all aspects of the Nixon administration from major media outlets around the nation; according to the summary, the National Review editorial said that “RN has acted more out of election concern than anything else.” Nixon believed this to be a clear criticism of his policy and wrote “K—talk to Buckley soonest” on the article synopsis. Shortly after Nixon’s comments were disseminated to the White House staff, Kissinger received a note from White House staff member John M. Huntsman Sr. that asked him to meet with the conservative commentator and “encourage him to set the record straight with National Review.” Despite Nixon’s best attempts to placate the conservative publications and re-

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duce their anger regarding his outreach to China and the Soviet Union, conservatives believed it was time for them to initiate an action that would force the White House to take notice.28 Two months later, during the first week of August, both Human Events and National Review officially announced that they had suspended their support of Nixon for the 1972 campaign.29 The president became aware of the decision in the latter part of July, and his resultant anger can be heard in a recorded Oval Office conversation between Nixon and H. R. Haldeman. “They are so short sighted,” Nixon says regarding the announcement, and then, “You better tell Henry he’s got to get on the Bill Buckley thing right away . . . they must understand—Buckley must understand—let Henry talk to him. Henry has got to get up off his ass and talk to him—I’ve told him several times and what has he done about it?”30 Two days later, Nixon actually talked to Kissinger about his frustration with National Review and Human Events. Nixon, well aware of his foreign policy adviser’s strong connection with Buckley, told Kissinger to see “some of the gurus of the bunch. See Burnham.” Kissinger responded with a plan to meet with James Burnham and then gave the president his assessment of Frank Meyer, the magazine’s book editor: “I will have Burnham down for lunch, that will flatter him, Meyer is a little wacky but a very bright fellow.” Despite Kissinger’s attempt to calm his boss, Nixon was livid over what he viewed as a clear sign of disrespect from the editors on the Right. “They are so goddamn dumb,” the president fumed. Kissinger, not wanting to raise Nixon’s temper, quickly agreed and, at the same time, commended the president for the toughness he had displayed in his dealings with the Soviets and the North Vietnamese. “They are so unimaginative,” Kissinger told the president. “I told them why is Hanoi screaming so much, why is Moscow screaming so much.” The NSC adviser was making the argument that Nixon’s diplomatic decisions had made a significant difference in global affairs. Although Nixon’s speechwriter Pat Buchanan argued that the president “respected the conservative movement,” it seemed difficult to believe as Nixon continued to display irritation about his inability to placate the publications of conservative opinion. He believed that writers for those media outlets didn’t understand the compromises that had to be made to achieve significant policy accomplishments:31 “They were not at all enthusiastic for me in ’60, in ’68 they weren’t very damn good—in ’62 they defeated me in California. Where the hell were they? Whining and bitching about every goddamned thing, why the Christ can’t they say something good about what we

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have done here and there—but they put that in the last paragraph. Have you ever read National Review?”32 One can hear Nixon’s deep frustration over his struggle to gain credibility with the Right throughout his political career. Still, Kissinger knew that Nixon respected William F. Buckley Jr. “Bill Buckley is the only name on there,” Nixon said as he perused the statement of conservatives who had decided to suspend their support.33 Kissinger agreed. Whereas the former Harvard academic viewed writers for publications like Human Events as “ignorant provincials,” he had a high regard for Buckley and believed him to be the true leader of those on the Right.34 Despite anger from the conservatives, Nixon continued to push forward negotiations with the Soviets and, in September, he announced that a summit between the two countries was planned for March 1972 in Moscow. The publications viewed the announced meeting as more about the president’s reelection than as an actual foreign policy accomplishment.35 Nevertheless, National Review was not completely negative about the upcoming meeting between Nixon and Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev. Buckley and Burnham understood the administration’s overall foreign policy with the Soviet Union, that Nixon was trying use the “China card” to play the two communist nations against one another. While Nixon presented the upcoming summit as a great victory for American foreign policy, Human Events was unimpressed and injected its cynicism into the conversation: it expected nothing positive to emerge from the talks, the President was being intellectually dishonest, and the Russians had done nothing to show that they were prepared to reduce their armaments or curb their wars of liberation.36 The president and Kissinger arrived in Moscow in the latter part of May 1972. In discussions with Brezhnev, Nixon stated that he wanted to create an agreement that would prevent those in the two countries who opposed the negotiations from claiming that one side or the other had given too much away. At the conclusion of the first SALT negotiations, the United States and the Soviet Union signed two separate agreements. The first created a temporary five-year freeze on land- and submarine-based nuclear weapons. There was also an agreement on the ABM issue, in which each side agreed that the technology would be tightly limited in terms of its defensive capability. The treaty gave the Soviets an advantage over the United States in long-range missiles, regarding ICBMs and SLBMs. However, that advantage was balanced by the United States’ edge in terms of the advance-

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ment to its MIRV system. There was also a statement of basic principles, in which both sides endorsed the idea of peaceful coexistence.37 Highly critical of the summit, Human Events essentially called the treaty a disaster, while National Review reiterated Buckley’s point from three years earlier, that the Soviets viewed détente from a different perspective than the United States and that “peace” for the Soviets was whatever allowed them to continue their policies of global expansion. They argued that concessions made by American negotiators gave the Russians the potential for strategic superiority and showed the world that the United States was willing to forsake its credibility with its allies regarding Europe’s defense.38 Although many analysts viewed the agreement as inconsistent, the summit was still seen by much of the general public as a unique success, in which two sides with opposing ideologies united on one of the significant issues of the day. Although the treaty did little to slow the arms race, it gave Nixon the appearance of being a supreme diplomat, a key factor in his victory in the 1972 election. Despite his triumph, the agreement caused a great deal of antipathy from the conservatives within his own party. Many on the Right of the GOP agreed with the conservative publications that Nixon was no different from many liberals in negotiating with the Russians. The idea of a weakened American defense policy would be used to advantage by Ronald Reagan when he contested the GOP nomination in 1976 and 1980.39 The conservative publications’ views about détente continued to fuel the Right as it contended that the United States was more interested in losing the fight against global communism than winning it. As Richard Nixon drank toasts with Brezhnev, American conservatives contemplated whether or not that toast signaled the United States’ retirement from the global struggle to defeat communism. Although the Watergate scandal finally brought the Right’s painful relationship with Nixon to an end in the summer of 1974, conservatives continued to be unhappy with the foreign policy direction of his successor, Gerald R. Ford. It was a course that many believed was pulling the United States away from its obligation to protect Europe and the broader world from communism.

SALT II—The Background Secretary of State Henry Kissinger believed that, as the arms race intensified, negotiating with the Soviets over SALT II was the Ford administration’s highest priority.40 Initially, the increase in nuclear armaments had been measured by how many launchers each side had. However, when President Ger-

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ald Ford took office in 1974, arms control was no longer simply about the quantity of missiles, but also about the quality of missiles in each nation’s arsenal. The USSR had nuclear weapons that were land based, and they had more of them and larger ones than the United States had. The American nuclear stockpiles were smaller sized and more accurate and were not confined to land. The United States was ahead in the quantity of warheads, while the Soviets had the advantage in missile delivery vehicles.41 Because each side now had weapons of different quality, it was no longer a straightforward exercise of negotiations based on the numbers. The situation was made more difficult because Ford and Kissinger were under pressure from conservative Democratic senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson of Washington State, who had successfully sponsored a 1972 resolution that bore his name and that would affect any future SALT agreements. The Jackson amendment stated that the United States should not sign any accord that would place the country in a position of strategic inferiority to the USSR. Although not binding, the amendment played a significant role in the negotiations, and Jackson himself proved a formidable adversary when SALT II was up for approval before the Senate in 1979.42 During Ford and Kissinger’s meeting with Soviet Premier Brezhnev in the Russian port city of Vladivostok at the end of November 1974, the American delegation hoped to make the idea of “symmetrical parity” a key part of its agenda. The major points of the agreement were outlined on the first day. They allowed each side an equal number of 2,400 launchers and heavy bombers over a period of ten years. Among those launchers, each side would also have an equal number of MIRVs, with the idea that the more explosive material, the more lethal the missile.43 A number of conditions from the SALT I accords would be maintained in the new agreement. Ford was “euphoric” at the result of the dialogue and believed the two sides could convert the agreed-to outline at Vladivostok into a SALT II treaty in 1975. However, the situation took an unexpected turn as a critical issue arose. Both sides were concerned about the verification process for inclusion of the American cruise missile and the Soviet Backfire bomber in SALT II. The central question on the part of both delegations was how would the limits on each device be verified? The question stalled the talks, and the impasse continued through 1976 and the conclusion of the Ford administration.44 When Jimmy Carter took office in 1977, he was determined to make his own impact on the arms control process. Carter did not think much of the

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Vladivostok accords, believing that the “understanding” between the United States and the USSR did nothing but continue the arms race. The president viewed the conditions as simply one small step on the road to a much broader arms agreement. However, shortly after having alerted the Soviet Union that he intended to follow the conditions that had been set at Vladivostok, Carter shifted his position and decided to focus his energies on a sharp reduction in both nations’ nuclear forces.45 While Carter may have believed he was moving the United States beyond the status quo in the area of arms control, the Russians stated that they would have no more discussions about potential reductions until the Vladivostok conditions were settled.46 Despite Brezhnev’s refusal to change his position, Carter subsequently had his team present a proposal to the Soviets that asked them to make reductions that were disproportionate to those of the United States. Carter’s suggestions reduced the number of strategic force levels from the 2,400 launchers agreed to by Ford to a level of 1,800 to 2,000. Thus, the Soviets would have to reduce their heavy missiles from 308 to 150 and would have to eliminate conversion of their Backfire bomber into one that possessed strategic capabilities. The Soviets, as many members of Carter’s foreign policy team had predicted, immediately rejected the American proposal.47 After a six-week hiatus, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance presented another proposal, one that contained a variety of elements already discussed with the president and his arms negotiators. The new conditions also included a number of previous positions put forward by the Soviets. Vance’s new initiative was composed of three levels of issues—what became known as the “three-tier proposal.” The negotiation strategy allowed the two parties to divide previously unresolvable issues into three categories. Each category would be taken separately, so as to avoid getting bogged down in multifaceted disagreements that had the potential to jeopardize the entire treaty.48 The first tier was for a treaty ending in 1985. The conditions, as discussed in the Vladivostok agreement, set a limit to each nation’s nuclear weapons. Next, both parties discussed a supplementary three-year agreement explicating conditions on weapons such as the Russian’s Backfire bomber and the United States’ cruise missiles—two obstacles that had prevented an agreement during the Ford administration. The final portion of the treaty was a “Declaration of Principles” that outlined future arms control objectives upon the treaty’s expiration in eight years’ time.49 The negotiations culminated in a summit between Carter and Brezhnev in Vienna, Austria, in June 1979. Arms negotiator Paul Nitze, an opponent

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of the treaty, believed that the administration’s emphasis on lowering the number of strategic launchers was a poor tactical decision. Nitze believed that, rather than the number of launchers, the emphasis should have been on limiting the number of weapons that each side’s missiles could carry. Although both parties agreed to a subceiling of intercontinental ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles that could be turned into multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles, the Soviets gained the advantage due to their larger missiles.50 Despite the administration’s attempts to promote the positive nature of the treaty’s conditions, conservatives were still successful in making the treaty unpopular. One reason was the length and timing of the negotiations. If Carter had been able to get an agreement at the beginning of his administration, it would have significantly strengthened his presidency and given the former farmer from Plains, Georgia, an image as a statesman. By the time the treaty was sent to the Senate for ratification in 1979, Carter’s presidency was under siege due to international crises, including the public announcement of a growing presence of Soviet troops in Cuba, the seizure of the American hostages in Iran, and the USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan. The length of the negotiations allowed time for the media outlets on the Right to create a public relations campaign against the treaty, with a large number of negative articles about the negotiations and the conditions under discussion. The other major factor was that many conservative members of both parties simply did not trust the Soviet Union. Many US policy makers no longer viewed the strategy of détente as credible. The USSR had done nothing to persuade political leaders that it had changed its disposition, and events in Afghanistan and Cuba only confirmed their opinion.51 Carter believed he had achieved good results in Vienna, but Nitze, Jackson, and others who held conservative views on national security disagreed. SALT II failed to achieve the principle of strategic equality that the Jackson amendment had recommended. Rather, in the conservative view, the agreement once again gave the Soviet Union a clear advantage in the event of a nuclear strike against the United States. While the president hoped that the summit would boost his 30 percent approval rating with the American public, he knew that a mixed reception awaited him upon his return to Washington.

Détente on Trial One of the Right’s central accusations was that the SALT agreement gave the Soviets the advantage by increasing the disparity between their nuclear

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arsenal and that of the United States. Conservative GOP politicians, such as New York senator James Buckley, were also worried that the Russians were increasing their defense budget while that of the United States remained static. In Buckley’s opinion, that trend sent America’s allies the message that the world’s leading democracy was not committed to combating the Soviet threat. Buckley, in a lengthy piece in National Review in March 1974, had argued that point during the early part of the Nixon administration’s SALT II negotiations. Buckley contended that SALT I had allowed the Soviets to achieve “overwhelming quantitative superiority” in the area of “throw weight” or the weight of the warheads and the vehicles they were housed in. The senator argued that, due to the large size of these warheads (compared to US missiles), the numerical advantage was four to one in favor of the Russians. Buckley called for the United States to speed up its research and development to prevent the Soviets from gaining an unmatchable advantage.52 Buckley had raised the question of whether the United States had the will to enhance its nuclear stockpiles or even the desire to build the best defense system possible. Senator Buckley’s comments were reflective of the criticism from others on the Right that America was pulling back from all areas of global involvement. Some wondered if that retreat was also evident in America’s arms negotiation strategy. Clearly, Buckley thought so. His concerns appear to be validated by historian Patrick Glynn’s argument that, just months after the conclusion of SALT I, the Soviets began a massive overhaul of their land-based nuclear stockpiles.53 In an analysis of Buckley’s comments, Daniel Oliver used the phrase “Soviet duplicity or American gullibility,” alluding to the fact that, depending on how the United States responded to Buckley’s charges, negotiations could go two ways. If the United States did not respond in a more assertive manner, the Soviets could continue to abuse the process and the United States would lose further credibility in the eyes of its European allies. The other option was for the United States to finally get tough with the Russians and recapture its eroding international respect. Oliver’s use of the term “gullibility” was an even broader criticism of détente. Even as the Nixon administration had been arguing that the negotiations had made the world a safer place, the Soviets had been in the midst of an arms buildup. The development opened the door for the Right to argue that the Nixon administration’s praise of détente was simply an elaborate public relations ploy to give the American public an illusion of security.54 In an editorial in May 1974, National Review endorsed James Buckley’s

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comments, stating that SALT I had been “a disaster” for the United States. The loopholes in the agreement had allowed the Soviets to continue their massive buildup. The publication argued that the two nations were now in a position of nuclear parity, with the Soviets rapidly gaining superiority. The magazine’s editorial also asserted that the United States had reached a critical decision point: it could either enter a dangerous state of weakness or realize its lack of preparedness and engage in a rapid military expansion. The magazine viewed it as unrealistic to suppose that the Soviet Union would abide by any agreement unless it could take advantage of the situation. The Right believed that the public was naive to believe that any agreement made with the Soviet Union was an indication of a more secure world.55 Conservatives certainly did not believe that the world was more secure following the two countries’ agreement on an outline for the next phase of the SALT negotiations. In a lengthy front-page editorial condemning the events at Vladivostok, Human Events opined that the agreement was extremely flawed. The lack of limits on issues like payloads and throw weights translated into a military advantage for the Soviet Union, whose larger missiles trumped those of the United States. The lack of an agreement regarding onsite inspections prevented the United States from ensuring that the Soviets were abiding by the conditions of the agreement. Verification was particularly important from the United States’ perspective, as the lack of transparency of the USSR made it impossible to discover what new Soviet defensive mechanisms were being built.56 Those who took a hard line on national security issues, such as Senators Barry Goldwater and Henry “Scoop” Jackson, condemned the agreement. The two believed that Ford’s decisions had put the United States in a position of military weakness. Ronald Reagan devoted two of his syndicated columns, which were published in Human Events, to his concerns regarding what he believed were poor choices made by American negotiators. Other conservatives concluded that the policy of détente had prevented the United States from dealing aggressively with the USSR.57 Despite complaints from the Right, Ford was optimistic about the progress of the SALT talks. At a press conference in June 1975, the president announced plans to convene a summit with Soviet leader Brezhnev in the latter part of the year, where he hoped a new agreement would be signed. Just a week later, Human Events published a cover editorial stating that while Ford believed the Vladivostok agreement represented the best possible security for the United States, many others did not. From their reading of the

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agreement, the editors argued that it gave the Soviets an advantage, allowing them to develop missiles that contained more warheads than those of the United States. Indeed, the article argued that while the current throw weight imbalance was four to one in favor of the Russians, once their next level of ballistic missile was implemented, the Soviet advantage would be even greater.58 Analysts such as James Burnham had been arguing for decades that, unless America focused seriously on the communist threat, the Soviet Union had the potential to enslave the entire globe. Many on the Right still found Burnham’s 1947 book, The Struggle for the World, relevant. The influence of a liberal Congress, the disaster of Vietnam, and the American public’s desire to focus the nation’s energies at home rather than abroad all pointed to disinterest in confronting what the Right saw as a worsening Soviet threat. The weakness of the Vladivostok agreements, Human Events concluded, had allowed “the Soviets to out negotiate us once more.” The conservative publication accused the Ford administration of being in complete oblivion to the dangers of an enhanced Soviet military and accused détente of failing to enhance America’s national security.59 Foreign policy columnist James Burnham believed that détente with the Soviets merely masked the United States’ retreat from the world. He and other conservatives believed that détente had given the Soviets freedom to pursue their wars of liberation. Burnham argued that America’s weakness naturally translated to its negotiating strategy. Burnham viewed détente as the result of a disorganized American global view; he also believed it showed the United States’ lack of courage, as evidenced by the American public’s unwillingness to confront a global hegemonic threat. Burnham’s dark view of détente typified his longtime cynicism about the ideological battle between the United States and the Soviet Union. During the course of his career, the author had continued to doubt the will of the United States to persevere in what he referred to as “the protracted conflict.”60 Burnham’s warnings about the precarious nature of the SALT negotiations found a welcome recipient in Ronald Reagan. He reiterated Burnham’s warnings in one of his first major foreign policy addresses, at Phillips Exeter Academy, during his campaign for the 1976 GOP presidential nomination. At the elite preparatory school, Reagan argued that it was critical that the United States have the most potent defense possible, as well as the ability to negotiate from a position of confidence and strength. The candidate agreed with Burnham that the nation’s current foreign policy lacked the consistency

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necessary for success. However, while Burnham believed that the public did not have the collective conviction necessary to triumph against international communism, Reagan blamed the current administration for its lack of fortitude to take a leading role in the world.61 Reagan had read Burnham’s column as he traveled the country for General Electric in the 1950s, and he continued to utilize the columnist’s language throughout the 1976 campaign. In a speech in which he discussed the disparities in armaments between the United States and the Soviet Union, Reagan stated, “Their strategic nuclear missiles are larger, more powerful and more numerous than ours. The evidence mounts that we are number 2 in a world where it is dangerous, if not fatal, to be second best.” Reagan also continued to emphasize Burnham’s theme of retreat as he criticized the manner in which Ford and Kissinger ran the nation’s foreign policy. “Peace does not come from weakness or from retreat. It comes from restoration of American military superiority,” he told the public.62 A few days later, William F. Buckley Jr. offered a positive review of the comments Reagan had made at Exeter. While Buckley thought Reagan’s detailed comments about the ICBM were admirable and certainly critical to the forthcoming campaign, he said, “one reasonably concludes that he got his information on the cruise missile from someone who is more minutely instructed than Reagan could possibly be expected to be in its strategic significance.” This was not the first time Buckley had expressed concerns about Reagan’s knowledge of foreign policy. In a letter to Reagan entitled “confidential” in October 1973, Buckley had written, “I heard it said about you—by a well wisher—that it will have to be Rockefeller in 1976 ‘because you refuse to wrap your mind around foreign policy.’ You must prove such skeptics wrong, and it is not too early to start.” Buckley suggested Reagan hire a full-time expert and suggested someone on the staff of Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson. The missive from Buckley was a clear example of his conviction that Reagan had the opportunity to be president at some point, as well as his belief in the potential influence Buckley and National Review could have in helping the former California governor achieve that goal.63 As Buckley’s magazine continued its attack on the SALT process, the editors followed Reagan’s lead in criticizing what they lamented as the Ford administration’s concessionary negotiation strategy. In the early part of September 1976, Buckley and his colleagues wrote about the possibility that the nuclear advantage had so shifted in favor of the Soviet Union that “the U.S. could be in actual danger.” The publication indicated that the United

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States’ nuclear defenses were in such a weakened position that, in the very near future, the Soviets could essentially win a nuclear war. The magazine was outraged that, although a variety of arms experts had made the same argument, the administration had given the public an illusion that the Russians were entering an agreement in order to improve their relations with the American people.64 The fear that the Soviet Union was indeed close to being able to win a nuclear confrontation gained further credibility when Russian historian and Harvard professor Richard Pipes wrote a lengthy piece for Commentary in the summer of 1977. Pipes’s article emerged as a result of a 1976 CIA investigation launched by the Central Intelligence Agency director, George H. W. Bush, to determine whether the Pentagon had underestimated the nuclear capabilities of the Soviet Union. Pipes was a member of what became known as the “Team B” intelligence group, charged with analyzing data outside the confines of the CIA. The report, highly criticized by many intelligence officials, painted a much more formidable picture of the Soviet nuclear arsenal than had previously been portrayed.65 Although the investigation was supposed to be secret, a number of findings had been leaked to the media. Front-page articles in the Boston Globe and the New York Times in late 1976 led to hearings in the US Senate. Pipes, chairman of the Team B committee, had not been asked to testify. In an essay in Commentary that related his experience, Pipes expressed his frustration that the only testimony the Senate had requested was from the CIA.66 Not allowing Pipes to express his views sent the impression that Congress and the Ford White House were unwilling to disclose to the public how far behind the United States actually was in the arms race. Such a revelation from a formidable intellect like Pipes would have shown that the critics of détente had been correct all along. Although Pipes may not have been allowed to share his opinion about what he and others believed was a new national security crisis, the Harvard academic was more than happy to accept an offer from Norman Podhoretz to write an article for his magazine about the issue.67 The resulting piece, “Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War,” analyzed the disparities in nuclear stockpiles between the United States and the USSR. The essay was also a powerful attack on the Carter administration’s plan to conduct arms negotiations with the Soviet Union. The essay was in agreement with the neoconservative publication’s beliefs that SALT II would play to the Soviets’ desire to achieve complete military superiority over the United States.68

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Pipes’s critique rested partially on the argument that the new Carter foreign policy team was influenced by “the new morality,” the idea that America’s attempt to shape events abroad had significantly damaged its global reputation. The term was coined by Senator Frank Church in 1976, after his congressional committee investigated numerous illegalities committed by US intelligence agencies in the postwar era. The committee publicly disclosed extensive abuses of power committed at home and abroad by the CIA and the FBI.69 That critique of American influence and power, following the country’s defeat in Vietnam, conflicted with the traditional anticommunist outlook of the Democratic Party, which had prevailed since the beginning of the Cold War. Advocates of containment, such as Senator Henry Jackson and Jeane Kirkpatrick, believed that the use of American power abroad was critical in the struggle to maintain freedom around the world; whereas new moralists, such as Carter’s arms negotiator Paul Warnke, distrusted the military and military force. The new moralists did not believe the main goal of the arms negotiation process was to restrict the power of the Soviet Union but rather to improve cooperation between the two countries. Those who held to the old morality, on the other hand, believed it was critical to use the negotiation process as a means of weakening Soviet power.70 The new moralists viewed the use of military power as counterproductive to America’s political goals of peace and stability through negotiation. Pipes, by contrast, argued that the Soviets saw the use of force as critical to the attainment of their national objectives and that military power was one of the foundations of Soviet doctrine. Because building up their nuclear arsenal was another way to gain greater control over the world situation, the Soviets had no interest in decreasing their nuclear stockpiles and saw the reduction of military strength as a sign of weakness. Moscow viewed its bombers and warheads not as “deterrents,” but as components in a much larger formula. By using their nuclear forces as a “compellent,” the Soviets had added another element to their strategic objective of global expansion.71 Pipes’s article generated more reaction than anything he had published previously, much of it negative due to its focus on Team B’s motivations rather than its conclusions. One of the few positive comments, from a National Review editorial soon after Pipes’s essay was published, referred directly to his article to support its argument that the United States must give up the idea that nuclear weapons could be “divorced from a political, moral or strategic statement of our own objectives.” It was critical, the editorial continued, that the Carter administration

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bring clarity to America’s mission in the world and develop nuclear weapons that best fit that vision. There was further conservative reaction to Pipes’s article in Congress. Just days before the magazine appeared on the newsstands, California Republican representative Robert Dornan praised the essay, saying that it confirmed right-wing concerns that the Soviets were completely uninterested in deterrence and were focused on using their nuclear arsenal to achieve “total victory over the United States.”72 The Senate confirmed former Pentagon official Paul Warnke by a narrow margin, despite formidable opposition from “Scoop” Jackson. Given Jackson’s power in the arms control process, the Carter White House decided to include the longtime senator from Washington in discussions of the issues. As a result of conversations between Jackson and the president, a number of the conservative Democrat’s positions were included in the proposal that Secretary of State Cyrus Vance presented to the Soviets in March 1977. The American position contained the reductions that had been discussed by Ford and Brezhnev and limitations on the modernization of large ICBMs, among other reductions that were far more extensive than those the two sides had agreed to at Vladivostok. The Soviets flatly rejected those conditions, but many on the Right applauded Carter for being more assertive than Ford and Kissinger had been.73 In an editorial that analyzed Carter’s next arms proposal, Human Events was surprisingly complimentary of the administration’s initial encounter with the Kremlin. Despite disagreements with the President’s worldview, the editors appreciated Carter’s desire to stand firm and not “be trifled with.” The publication admired Carter’s attitude and praised him for not backing down, despite the Soviet leadership’s rejection of the proposals. However, the newspaper viewed Carter’s future strategy as uncertain; specifically, the editors wanted to know whether he would be stern with Moscow or would rush to complete an agreement before the SALT I treaty expired in the fall of 1977. Representative Jack Kemp of New York, who placed the article in the Congressional Record, echoed the conservative publication’s opinion with optimistic comments of his own. Kemp complimented Carter on his deep understanding of the long-term strategy and motivations of the Soviet Union.74 Kemp and Human Events were to be disappointed. In May, the President eliminated the dramatic cuts that had been rejected by the Soviets in favor of Vance’s three-pronged proposal that contained ceilings on nuclear weapons systems significantly higher than the conditions Jackson and the

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president had discussed. After a highly unproductive July meeting between Carter and Jackson and other members of the Committee on the Present Danger, including Eugene Rostow and Jeane Kirkpatrick, the CPD began an attack against Carter’s SALT II strategy. As the CPD launched their offensive, Human Events published an article that accused Carter of “making a significant retreat” that they believed was evident in the concessions to the Soviets. Jack Kemp also reversed his earlier praise of the president’s strategy and delivered an argument that echoed Human Events’s commentary. The congressman from Buffalo, New York, stated that the administration’s concessions, as evidenced in the new proposals, caused him to be “appalled at the unilateral retreat by our SALT negotiators.”75 National Review also characterized Carter as a president in retreat because of what it saw as the administration’s decision to make whatever concessions necessary in order to achieve an agreement. The magazine’s editors viewed Carter’s disturbing conciliatory shift toward the USSR on arms control as near “suicide.” Saying that the concessions indicated that the president and his national security team were oblivious to the Kremlin’s actual intentions, the publication continued to attack SALT, noting that hawkish politicians such as Senator Jackson were concerned that the conditions being negotiated between the two countries left the United States at a disadvantage. One of the conservatives’ greatest concerns about the treaty was the issue of verification, because the opaque Soviet society made it virtually impossible for the United States to determine whether or not the Soviets were following the treaty’s protocols.76 James Burnham made the conservative case against SALT II in his column in early 1978. Burnham believed that without strict rules of verification the treaty was “useless—an absurdity.” While the author concluded that it was critical to establish verification conditions, he questioned whether the administration had the will to do so. Burnham believed that the White House was covering up what it knew about blatant Soviet cheating on the terms established in SALT I. The author was resentful that the current “sunshine President” continued to present the illusion that the relationship between America and the Soviet Union was improving, when in reality it was deteriorating. Burnham had plenty of evidence to support his argument. In the previous year, Russia had developed the more advanced SS-20 ballistic missile, which could significantly damage targets throughout Western Europe. The Soviets also continued to support Marxist liberation movements around the world, including insurgencies in the African nations of Angola and Eritrea.77

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Burnham believed that, unless each side had good information about the other’s nuclear capabilities, arms control was useless. Commentary’s Edward Luttwak agreed, writing about the failure of the arms negotiating process in early 1978. In addition to writing for Commentary and other publications, Romanian émigré Luttwak, who had a doctorate from Johns Hopkins, had worked as a consultant for Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, who hired him after he read Luttwak’s “The Defense Budget and Israel” in the August 1975 issue of Commentary. An opponent of the SALT process, Luttwak believed that negotiation gave legitimacy to the Soviet Union and to its conduct around the world.78 Luttwak thought that the United States was mistaken in its expectation that the Soviets would follow typical diplomatic conventions, according to which each side must be prepared to make concessions. In his contention that the Russians had no interest in typical diplomacy, Luttwak’s position shared similarities with that of Pipes, who contended that America was ignoring the fact that strategic conflict was a core ideology of the USSR. Luttwak believed that to engage in arms control negotiation with Moscow was “a fool’s errand.” He believed the process did nothing to change Soviet behavior, as was evidenced a year later by Moscow’s invasion of Afghanistan at the very moment the US Senate was in the process of voting in favor of the treaty.79 While Luttwak concurred with Burnham and others that the Russians had, on occasion, violated arms agreements, he asserted that these transgressions occurred because the United States allowed them to. The Soviets, he argued, would only follow conditions that were specifically spelled out in the agreement and did not take seriously symbolic ideas like “the spirit of cooperation.” In fact, such an unsubstantial phrase only gave them more of an excuse to circumvent the treaty process. Luttwak’s article was more detailed, but its themes were similar to those put forward by Human Events and National Review. These included the American lack of understanding of Soviet intentions and the necessity of appearing strong if the United States was to be successful in arms control. If Luttwak was correct, then America’s failure to confront the Russians effectively over their past treaty violations had caused substantial damage to Washington’s credibility.80 Many on the Right of both the GOP and the Democratic Party believed that SALT and détente only gave an illusion of a more secure world; some also argued that Luttwak’s analysis illuminated a much larger trend of appeasement on the part of US policy makers. That point was emphasized by

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historian Walter Laqueur in a letter to Norman Podhoretz in the summer of 1978. Laqueur believed the causes of America’s progressive drift toward appeasement included “the Vietnam trauma, mistaken notions and wishful thinking about détente and the Soviet Union” and “a genuine naïveté of Americans in world affairs.”81 Laqueur elaborated on that argument in his article “The Psychology of Appeasement,” published in the fall of 1978. The author wrote that, although many had argued that détente had made for a safer world, the reality was the opposite. The Soviets’ increased defense budget and increased military activity in Africa and the Middle East showed that they had no interest in cooperating with the United States. Laqueur believed that the Soviets probably favored détente because it provided the deceptive appearance of working to solve global conflicts when in actuality they were precipitating them. Many believed that America’s placation of the Soviet Union and withdrawal from its responsibilities as “global policeman” was a more practical strategy than becoming involved in another costly Vietnam scenario.82 Laqueur’s article also targeted the belief of liberal Democrats that the Soviet Union was a victim of an American cultural misunderstanding, one which could be better resolved through the negotiation process than by military conflict. Laqueur also mirrored Edward Luttwak’s earlier argument about the dangerous complacency of the American public regarding the disparity between the two nations’ nuclear stockpiles. However, those on the Left believed it was imperative to complete an arms agreement rather than risk a nuclear confrontation.83 Laqueur argued that an exhausted American public was more willing to engage in a policy of surrender than become entrenched in another extended, bloody conflict. The titanic loss of life suffered in World War I had left Britain and France ambivalent about confronting Germany again between the end of World War I and the beginning of World War II. Despite many warning signs, Hitler’s threat was not fully recognized until it was too late. Laqueur compared the events of the 1930s with those of the 1970s, as Podhoretz had done in an essay a year earlier. The argument that the policies of the Carter administration had led the United States to become militarily vulnerable was used by many on the Right to warn the public of another impending world crisis.84 As the Carter administration prepared to bring the SALT II treaty before the nation, the conservative press did their best to alert their readers to the strategy of the president and his advisers to achieve the treaty’s success.

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Human Events fired the first salvo with an editorial in the latter part of November 1978 that reported that, to gain favor with conservative members of both parties, the administration had proposed a series of new defense programs to smooth passage of the agreement through Congress. As Carter’s foreign policy makers sought to present the president in a more hawkish light, the administration’s public relations team launched a publicity offensive to give the public a favorable view of SALT II.85 To gain the broadest public appeal, Carter’s State Department organized a series of media appearances and speaking opportunities by prominent treaty advocates. The strategy was reminiscent of the campaign to raise the profile of the Panama Canal treaty before its ratification by the US Senate in 1977. Human Events argued that, regardless of how many prominent names the administration wheeled out, the treaty jeopardized the United States’ security. Ronald Reagan appeared to reflect the thinking of the publication when he informed his many listeners about Carter’s public relations offensive in a broadcast recorded two weeks later. In the second week of December, Reagan mentioned special briefings prepared by the Carter administration for prominent members of the political, religious, and business communities and implied that the agreement itself was “dangerously unbalanced.” Assertions that the Carter White House was being dishonest with the public on a critical question of national security, voiced by the most prominent member of the conservative movement, resonated with those on the Right.86 As SALT negotiations continued into 1979, conservatives were hopeful that their views were having an impact on public opinion. In a letter to James Burnham in March, William Rusher argued that the tide had finally begun to turn. Rusher, an astute analyst of politics and public opinion, concluded that Cold War liberals had become unnerved by those on the far left of the Democratic Party who argued for a significant constraint of American power. He told Burnham that that strategy had succeeded only in emboldening the Soviets in different parts of the world. Commentary’s Norman Podhoretz concurred with the National Review publisher. Throughout the Carter administration, the three publications had expressed increasing discouragement as the United States continued to retreat from the world, allowing the Soviets to fill the void. Expanding Russian aggressiveness combined with the growth of Moscow’s nuclear forces led Podhoretz to conclude that Carter’s foreign policy was weak and lacked focus. Podhoretz believed that SALT II exemplified that underlying weakness, an argument

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he believed was best expressed in print by Eugene Rostow, chairman of the Committee on the Present Danger.87 Rostow’s article echoed what the publications of opinion had been arguing throughout the arms control process. “The Case against SALT II,” published in February 1979, condemned “American acquiescence in the Soviet drive for overwhelming military superiority.” The essay was a compilation of arguments made by his colleagues at Commentary as well as other conservative media figures. Many of Rostow’s observations were similar to those of Walter Laqueur, who had argued a year earlier that American foreign policy was mired in appeasement and that the naïveté of Carter’s policy makers harkened to the days before World War II when Europe believed it could create a peaceful relationship with Nazi Germany.88 Rostow viewed the Soviet expansionist agenda as similar to that of the German state under Hitler. He believed it was impossible for two such ideologically different states as the United States and the USSR to develop a successful diplomatic relationship. As with other critics of détente, Rostow believed the policy had done more to raise the level of global anxiety than to reduce it. The treaties that had been negotiated with the Soviets had allowed them to continue to pursue their objectives; as America fell into a state of complacency, the Soviets were achieving nuclear supremacy. Rostow brought up another key issue that had been written about frequently: Europe’s faith that it could depend on help from America should it face attack from the Soviet Union. The author believed that the United States’ credibility, like its lead in nuclear weapons, had dramatically dissipated.89 Rostow, using arguments that had been made by Richard Pipes and M. Stanton Evans, contended that the disparity between the two countries’ nuclear forces left the United States with insufficient weapons to engage in a successful first nuclear strike, a dilemma that, in his view, left the United States vulnerable to political blackmail. The lack of a strong US response to Russia’s continuing improvement of its nuclear arsenal confirmed what Commentary called “a failure of nerve” on the part of the American leadership.90 Shortly before the article’s publication, Rostow wrote to Podhoretz to thank him for his assistance regarding a question Podhoretz had raised about “brandishing nuclear weapons.” Rostow responded that he believed nuclear stalemate was not enough of a deterrent if it became “a license for expanding the Soviet imperium.” The chairman of the CPD believed that nuclear equality meant nothing to the Soviet Union, who would simply use

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the idea as an incentive to expand its forces. Further, Rostow wrote Podhoretz, “When such events occur, the second objective of our nuclear arsenal comes into play. It is to supplement our political influence and conventional arms in deterring or stopping Soviet-sponsored aggression.” This shows Rostow’s concern that, if there were a nuclear confrontation with the United States, the Soviets would believe they had the advantage due to what conservatives saw as signs of American retreat around the world.91 The article received significant notice in both Human Events and National Review. It was also placed in the Congressional Record by a number of figures on Capitol Hill. Senator Jake Garn commented, “It is time that the utter bankruptcy of this administration’s policy on SALT be made clear.” Senator Jesse Helms agreed with Rostow that the Soviet Union had a different set of intentions than the United States in regard to SALT. “If the Soviets do not share our President’s vision, if they do not believe that SALT II is an instrument for securing peace, then SALT II will inevitably lead to the further decline of our influence and become an invitation to war,” Helms stated on the Senate floor.92 As the message of Soviet global intimidation circulated within the conservative press, authors pointed out the difficulties in making an arms agreement due to the opposing ideologies of the USSR and the United States. In National Review in late June 1979, Norman Hannah wrote that the Soviets saw SALT II as part of their overall strategic plan for geopolitical success, but that there was no grand strategy on the part of the United States. Hannah used SALT I to argue that the Soviets never intended to abide by the agreement and therefore were happy to accept American conditions, and also that significant verification of Soviet compliance was prevented by the USSR being a closed society. Hannah agreed with Walter Laqueur that Moscow viewed détente as an alternative opportunity to win the Cold War.93 In June 1979, Carter and Brezhnev signed the SALT II treaty in Vienna. The White House believed they had public approval because opinion polls showed that voters favored the agreement by a margin of 2 to 1. In comments about the summit, Human Events said that Carter’s statement claiming that both sides retained equivalent nuclear arsenals was simply “an untruth,” that, in actuality, the United States had locked itself into strategic inferiority for years to come. The publication accused Carter of “misleading the American people” and stated that the agreement actually gave the USSR “licenses” and “invite[d]” the Soviets to increase their nuclear stockpile. The newspaper concluded that there was no reason why the US Senate

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should ever ratify such a treaty. But conservatives did not stop there. Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson used the conservative argument when he compared the American political situation to that of the British in the 1930s and went on to call the agreement “appeasement in its purest form.” Liberals struck back by portraying those on the Right as reviving an era of isolationism reminiscent of the GOP’s rejection of the League of Nations in 1919.94 Conservatives disagreed with the accusation, claiming that they were neither isolationists nor warmongers. William F. Buckley Jr. observed that conservative opposition to a strategically unsound treaty did not mean that they favored war with the Soviet Union. Buckley disagreed with President Carter’s argument that if the Senate rejected SALT II, America’s peace-loving credibility would be questioned by nations around the world. A month later, Barry Goldwater concurred with Buckley’s comments and added to them, calling Carter’s comments “ridiculous, outrageous and [a] damaging statement about our Nation.”95 In the latter part of June, hearings on the treaty began in the Senate. Conservatives argued against ratification, stating that the agreement was detrimental to the country’s national security. In comments on the hearings published on the front page of Human Events, Republican Howard Baker argued, “The treaty does not improve, but in fact worsens, the strategic balance between the United States and the Soviet Union.” Baker’s comments came during his vigorous questioning of Carter’s Secretary of Defense Harold Brown. The newspaper complimented the senator from Tennessee who, despite Brown’s attempt to avoid giving specific answers, “kept boring in.” Baker was confident in matters of public policy, and he appeared extremely proficient about the detailed and highly technical issues of arms control.96 During the hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Baker was assisted by Edward Luttwak, who had returned to his role as a defense consultant. Although Luttwak could not be certain, he believed that it may have been his 1978 article, “Why Arms Control Has Failed,” that brought his analysis to Baker’s attention. Luttwak believed he was valuable to Baker because, unlike a journalist, he had the expertise to evaluate the two nations’ weapons systems and to effectively analyze the two nations’ proposals. Luttwak was a harsh critic of SALT II, which he believed exemplified the concept of the possibility of coexistence between the two nations. Luttwak had advocated for the collapse of the Soviet Union throughout his career; he believed that the SALT agreement was counterproductive to that objective because it strengthened the Soviet Union in its global agenda. Extremely

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passionate about the issue, Luttwak recalled, “I would have opposed SALT even if it had favored the United States, because it makes no difference. The whole purpose was to put pressure on the Soviet Union; I felt that there was no military use for these weapons but they could be very useful strategically.” During the SALT II hearings, Luttwak served as an adviser to Baker; he frequently attended the proceedings on Capitol Hill, where he sat right behind the senator, who was then the Senate minority leader. Luttwak strongly believed that continuing the arms race would put tremendous pressure on the Soviet Union, an idea also advocated by Richard Pipes and Ronald Reagan.97 As Edward Luttwak viewed the SALT proceedings from his perch in the Senate, Commentary continued to characterize the agreement as one that undermined American security by enhancing the military strength of the Soviet Union. The point was emphasized by Leopold Labedz in “The Illusion of SALT,” published in September 1979. The author, an expert in Soviet affairs, had been captured by the Red Army in Poland and deported to Siberia in the days leading up to World War II. Labedz, mirroring the opinions of Pipes, Luttwak, and Rostow, argued that the advantage the Russians had achieved over the United States in the size and capability of their nuclear stockpiles allowed them to intimidate key areas of the world that were vulnerable to Soviet influence.98 Labedz contended that many in the West had the impression that, because the Soviets and the United States had achieved nuclear parity at the time of SALT I, the two countries had embarked on a new spirit of cooperation thanks to the strategy of mutually assured destruction. Labedz viewed that idea as “blatantly unrealistic nonsense” and repeated the claims of many on the Right that the Soviets had not changed their behavior in the least. To the Soviets, there was no separation of “political and military factors.” The Kremlin used its relentless nuclear buildup to capitalize on its growing strategic advantage to gain footholds around the world.99 As the SALT hearings progressed, many conservatives in the US Senate expressed their disapproval of the treaty. In September, the Foreign Relations committee member from North Carolina, Jesse Helms, referred to SALT II as “not an arms reduction treaty,” but an “arms escalation treaty.” John Tower, a member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, added, “As I have said many times, the present SALT II Treaty is unequal and flawed.” Human Events agreed with the two GOP policy makers in a September 1979 editorial “SALT Deserves Defeat.” The conservative weekly viewed

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the treaty as an intentional decline of American power; they believed that the treaty needed to be renegotiated and the Soviets served notice that the United States would not stand by and allow itself to be intimidated.100 Many on the Left believed that these warnings of a growing Soviet threat were unrealistic, but those concerns suddenly became reality when the White House announced the presence of Russian troops in Cuba. In a column on the Carter administration’s response, William F. Buckley Jr. argued that the crisis showed again that Moscow believed it was free to pursue whatever actions it wished. Buckley believed that, with SALT II, America was again in denial regarding Moscow’s global intentions. Despite conservative outrage over events in Cuba, that November, the Foreign Relations Committee approved SALT II by a margin of 9 to 6. However, on December 20, Henry Jackson’s Armed Services Committee voted 10 to 0 (with 7 abstentions) to report that the treaty was not in America’s national security interest. That was followed a week later by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and soon after that Carter authorized the Senate to delay action on the treaty.101 The USSR’s incursion into Afghanistan confirmed the belief of many in the conservative press that the United States was no longer able to stand up to its Soviet adversaries. In 1978, the neutral government in Kabul had been overthrown by forces loyal to the Marxist wing of the People’s Democratic Party. To consolidate power, the new government executed and terrorized thousands of its fellow countrymen. However, Moscow was concerned about the puppet regime’s inability to crush an uprising by members of the nation’s Muslim populace, despite the presence of 5,000 Russian military advisers. When government leaders refused to follow a new strategy demanded by the leaders in the Kremlin, this triggered the invasion.102 In Human Events, a few weeks after the Red Army moved into Afghanistan, journalist Smith Hempstone expressed frustration with the Carter administration: “Will President Carter strike back at the Russians in Angola? One rather doubts it.” William F. Buckley Jr. was in a similar frame of mind. In the first week of January, Buckley wrote a column “What Now,” in which he asked a question most of the nation seemed to be pondering. Buckley blamed not only the USSR for its aggression, but also the United States for enabling the situation to occur. In its attempts to entice the Soviets to pursue good behavior, Washington had supplied credit, contributing to the building of a plant that subsequently produced trucks used in the invasion. “That plant is the fruit of American technology,” Buckley wrote. He

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contended that the Carter policy, which offered the Soviets incentives in the hopes it would cause them to restrict their hegemonic activities, had been a failure and that the Russian invasion was the end of the policy of détente.103 In a Commentary essay “After Afghanistan, What?” that was published in March 1980, Edward Luttwak wrote that the Soviet invasion was no surprise. The author blamed the “paralysis and confusion” of American policy makers for this international crisis. Luttwak, agreeing with the majority opinion within the conservative press, blamed the policy of détente for the United States’ delay in increasing its military infrastructure, while the Soviets did the opposite. Luttwak’s essay presented the situation in Afghanistan as the result of a series of actions that occurred due to the naive belief of many in the American political establishment that “the Kremlin leaders were moderate men, essentially peaceful.” Luttwak concluded that those who had advocated an American policy of passivity and withdrawal from global affairs now had to face the reality of “a Soviet military empire once again on the move.” He believed that, although the situation could easily have been avoided, due to errors in judgment the United States now faced a dire situation not seen in quite some time.104 In an editorial more than a week later, Human Events announced that America’s foreign policy was in a state of retreat and that Carter was no longer taken seriously, as his policy of what the editors called “a reverse graduated response” seemed unable to prevent Soviet aggression. The editors of the three conservative outlets agreed that the United States was paralyzed by what Commentary had labeled “a psychology of fear.” America had seen its military humbled in Vietnam and its credibility badly damaged abroad by its failure to contain Soviet aggression. However, it was not only questions about the nation’s global commitments that were being expressed, but the value of the very democratic ideas on which the nation was based. As the United States continued to find itself in a state of paralysis, many foreign policy experts pointed to the United Nations as an arena where Washington needed to take a stand against the totalitarian ambitions of the communist world.105

4

A Symbol of Appeasement The United Nations, 1964–1979 On a warm day in early July 1977, former governor of California Ronald Reagan stepped into a southern California recording studio to deliver a radio address simply entitled “Property Rights.” The broadcast was one of more than a thousand radio commentaries Reagan delivered between 1975 and 1979. They encompassed a wide variety of subjects within domestic and foreign policy. Reagan’s focus that day was on a frequent target of the conservative movement over the past few years, the United Nations. In particular, Reagan spoke out that day against a resolution that was popular among UN diplomats and members of the Carter White House. Based on his text, the former governor seemed to have gathered the material from a lengthy article written by syndicated columnist and UN critic Alice Widener, entitled “United Nations Bars Private Property as a Human Right.” The piece had been published in Human Events on June 25, just eleven days before Reagan’s address.1 Reagan used his broadcast to illustrate the growing power of the many militant Third World nations that had established a powerful voting bloc within the international organization. That coalition had recently amended the Universal Declaration of Human Rights with a new regulation that stated that owners would not be compensated for property that was seized by the state for public use. Reagan argued that the revision was contrary to the original 1948 declaration, which stated that “everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in association with others. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.” President Jimmy Carter hoped to gain the permission of Congress to sign the resolution, known as the “U.N. Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,” along with its counterpart,

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the “Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.” Reagan and other conservatives believed that the president’s signature on the UN documents, whether binding or not, would send a powerful message around the world that America was willing to defer to an international organization whose agenda was being dictated by totalitarian interests.2 Reagan’s broadcast comments on America’s growing impotence in world affairs, as represented by its behavior at the United Nations, strongly resonated with writers for National Review, Human Events, and Commentary, who saw the UN as a powerful symbol of the continuing decline of American foreign policy. The UN had once been a symbol of America’s diplomatic power; however, during the 1960s and 1970s, the United States was confronted by an emboldened coalition of Third World nations determined to redress the economic injustices of the past. Nations that had once been part of European empires now called for a redistribution of the global economy. The Right argued that the United States’ inability to address the onslaught of criticism of American values and traditions within the UN was emblematic of the country’s retreat from its once-dominant position in the world. Between 1964 and 1981, writers for the publications of opinion on the Right saw two diametrically opposed ideologies represented in the UN, which conservatives believed were emblematic of the conflict at the core of American foreign policy. Conservatives embraced the arguments made by Daniel Patrick Moynihan and Jeane Kirkpatrick in their articles “The U.S. in Opposition” and “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” published by Commentary in 1975 and 1979, respectively. The two future UN ambassadors called for a restoration of American principles, in conjunction with a more activist approach in addressing the conflict with the Soviet Union. In President Carter’s appointment of Andrew Young, a former civil rights leader, to the UN in 1977, conservatives perceived a shift toward the liberal belief in the de-moralization of the Cold War and confirmation that the West’s struggle against international communism was no longer the number one priority of US foreign policy. Over time, Commentary, National Review, and Human Events were fundamental in helping conservatives develop an alternative foreign policy formula, one that directly contributed to Ronald Reagan’s victory in 1980.

The Dilemma of the Double Standard The conservative movement disapproved of the United Nations almost from the moment of its creation. Members of the liberal establishment praised the

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international organization as a coalition of nations uniting to promote the cause of peace and international stability following the chaos of World War II. However, those on the Right had nothing but suspicion of the new venture. Many conservatives believed that the attempt to engineer a utopian mechanism to ensure global harmony ran contrary to Russell Kirk’s argument that there was no such thing as perfection. Kirk believed that mankind was inherently restless and unpredictable and that trying to restrain those qualities through the creation of another large government bureaucracy was unrealistic. Opponents of the Left argued that Democrats had had the same aspirations during the creation of the League of Nations, an initiative that had resulted in disaster. Publications such as Human Events believed that for the UN to be successful, all sides would have to be willing to work together to accomplish its objective. The newspaper contended that successful mediation of international disagreements was impossible because the Soviet Union’s communist ideology thrived in the midst of global disorder. National Review’s Gerhart Niemeyer, an academic who had focused on the UN as a member of the State Department in the 1950s, viewed the organization as part of an “illusionary world that took shape in the elaboration of Liberal ideas.”3 Conservative activists argued that the UN was another example of collectivism, in which values such as privacy and individualism were under threat. They saw the UN as a bureaucratic leviathan, whose objective, like that of the Soviet Union, was to remove key rights that fostered individual freedom in the governing of family and community.4 While American conservatives believed that the UN represented unrestricted centralization of government power, the designers of the United Nations system believed the opposite. Those who convened in San Francisco to sign the UN charter in 1945 envisioned an organization whose collective influence would foster incentives for mutual cooperation and global stability. They believed that the UN, supported by great powers like the Soviet Union and the United States, would lead nations to “settle disputes without recourse to the sword or the bomb.”5 However, during the 1950s and 1960s, nearly one hundred new members were admitted to the General Assembly, many of them from areas that were poor and economically deprived. The United States saw the climate within the organization it had helped create change considerably.6 Delegates from the new member nations arrived in New York with the belief that throughout their histories they had been economically exploited by the great Western powers. This worldview motivated many of these

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nations to focus their attention in the General Assembly not on issues of national security but on “articulating the rights of the global underclass against the entrenched balance of political and economic power.”7 These new nations, after years of being seen as subservient to the West, believed the global economic scales needed to be balanced, a point reflected in a statement by Congo’s Patrice Lumumba in 1960: “We are going to institute social justice together and ensure everyone just remunerations for his labor.” This view was representative of the mood that existed in much of Africa and other parts of the Third World.8 During the era discussed in this narrative, conservatives saw a “double standard” displayed in the United Nations’ treatment of nations that violated citizens’ human rights. Conservatives believed that the United Nations frequently turned a blind eye to states within the Soviet sphere of influence, which frequently showed disregard for the natural rights of the individual. Included in that category were the recently decolonized states within black Africa, which often leaned toward a socialist point of view. However, UN criticism of similar violations of human rights by nations that were allies of the United States was much more stringent.9 In early January 1964, Jenkin Lloyd Jones, publisher of the Tulsa Tribune and syndicated columnist for Human Events, also argued that there was a double standard, commenting that “race prejudice [was not] exclusively a white man’s disease.” Jones said it was contradictory to condemn anticommunist South Africa for its apartheid society while the General Assembly welcomed Kenya’s brutal nationalist leader Jomo Kenyatta as a hero. Jones believed that the UN was automatically more critical of a nation whose political leadership was primarily white and anticommunist than of a nation under black leadership and authoritarian rule. Jones also saw a racial double standard in what he called the UN’s “angry questions about the use of police dogs on Birmingham mobs.” This was an example of the Right’s attempt to link the disorder associated with the civil rights movement in America’s cities to what Jones and his colleagues perceived as uncivilized behavior among Third World delegations at the UN. Jones’s article echoed conservative criticisms of the dilemmas that plagued America at home and abroad. Jones criticized the use of race and poverty as excuses for an individual to act like a “juvenile delinquent,” in an indirect criticism of the pervasiveness of the welfare state.10 Jones also condemned the Third World’s use of guilt as a political weapon against the West. Jones argued that many of those new members of the

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General Assembly had used the language of economic victimization to obtain their independence. The Right resented the United States’ belief that it was guilty of exploiting the economic hardships suffered by these former European colonial states and resented that Liberal elites believed it was acceptable to condemn America for its successes as a society. Many of the new states recently added to the UN were anti-Western and remained so for decades. Members of the GOP foreign policy establishment argued that it was counterproductive for the United States to try to embrace nations that wanted nothing to do with it, while simultaneously endangering relationships with countries that were helpful in the prosecution of the Cold War. As the 1960s continued, conservatives focused their crosshairs on U Thant, a Burmese diplomat and the UN’s secretary general. Many on the Right criticized Thant’s fiscal and bureaucratic mismanagement; they contended that Thant was responsible for all the administrative and institutional troubles at the UN and that he was consistently against the interests of the West. They accused the secretary general of attempting to interfere in American foreign policy, while he simultaneously ignored the treatment of dissidents behind the Iron Curtain.11 In early 1966, former Wall Street Journal editorial writer John Chamberlain discussed the double standard argument in Human Events. Commenting on a conference the United Nations planned to convene in Budapest, Hungary, on the issue of human rights, Chamberlain used the apocalyptic writings of George Orwell to illustrate that the Burmese diplomat seemed to believe there was a different reality within the Soviet sphere of influence. By agreeing to attend the human rights forum in Hungary, a nation that had been brutally suppressed during the fall of 1956, Thant was dismissing the culture of fear that was a factor of daily life there. It was another example of a consistent policy of not wanting to risk alienating the Soviets over their totalitarian policies.12

An Aggressive Response to the Critics of Democracy During the period analyzed in this narrative, the United States lost the voting majority it had maintained in the General Assembly since the UN was founded in 1945. The coalition of Third World nations consistently attacked America for its imperfect democratic system, while the United States declined to respond. Many right-wing scholars saw the lack of response as symbolic of the United States’ lack of confidence following the end of the war in Vietnam and the ordeal of Watergate. The lack of response by a number of Western nations, including the United States, can also be seen as

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a symbol of “white guilt.” White liberals, disillusioned with imperialist actions by the United States in Vietnam and elsewhere, agreed with members of the Third World who believed it was time “to overturn the world system of economic and racial hierarchy over which the United States presided.”13 Those on the Right were consistently critical, believing the inability of America to defend its institutions gave the impression of weakness to its allies fighting the Cold War around the world. Conservatives were even more frustrated by Washington’s attempt to placate Third World interests by sending them large amounts of foreign aid. The strategy was perceived as another sign of American weakness in the face of an ever-growing and constantly aggressive coalition of collectivist interests. The United States’ attempt to gain favor with these new nations gave the impression of appeasement toward these African states and of continuing retreat from the Soviet Union.14 As conservatives lashed out at the lack of American influence within the United Nations, Senator Barry Goldwater decried the imbalance of US power in the General Assembly as well as the large payment the nation was forced to make on an annual basis. In his column in Human Events at the beginning of 1965, former GOP nominee Goldwater condemned Moscow for not fulfilling its financial obligations to the international organization, saying, “It amounts to a Soviet nose-thumbing at the United States.” The Soviet debt issue represented a larger problem with American foreign policy. The senator’s use of the words “respect” and “firm” showed the rightful belief of many of Goldwater’s colleagues and supporters that America was losing ground to the Soviets and the states that supported them.15 Goldwater’s language can also be interpreted as a criticism of the Johnson administration’s lack of courage and strength in confronting the enemy in Vietnam. Many conservative policy makers saw America’s “Western manliness” being undercut if the United States could be overwhelmed at the UN and in Vietnam by people they viewed as “backward.”16 Goldwater described the lack of an effective US response to the communist world as “appeasement,” as a message to the nation’s allies that the image of the gunslinger emerging from the American West to rescue the world from totalitarianism—an image later embodied by Ronald Reagan—was beginning to fade. Senator Goldwater was not the only conservative member of Congress to argue that the United States’ inability to stand up to communist interests in the United Nations showed the weak state of American foreign policy. During that year, US senators James B. Pearson of Kansas and Karl

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Mundt of South Dakota described American foreign policy using phrases like “back down” and “appeasement” and spoke frequently of a lack of will and resolve.17 James Burnham continued the Right’s argument that America was disrespected in the halls of the UN. Burnham, who had little patience for the international body, calling it a “hot bed of anti-Western neutralism and worse,” became more and more frustrated about its voting structure and its financial excesses. In a 1967 book, The War We Are In, the columnist used blunt language to describe the newly independent African nations: “Why in the world should any sensible person give a damn what some spokesman for cannibalistic tribes or slave-holding nomads thinks about nuclear tests?”18 Throughout his tenure at National Review, Burnham protested the treatment the United States received in the UN. In his column “Why Do We Take It?” written at the beginning of 1965, Burnham reflected the frustrations expressed by Goldwater and other conservatives about the anti-Western element that had taken over the organization, stating that these nations seemed to have forgotten that they were on American soil and that without US funding “the U.N. wouldn’t amount to a damn.” This language portrayed the new occupants of the General Assembly as selfish, self-centered bureaucrats, who should be grateful to the United States and the other Western powers for making the UN possible.19 As media outlets on the Right and their conservative readership attempted to ignite a revival of American confidence, the Soviet Union and its allies continued to belittle the country and its traditions at UN meetings in New York and around the world. During much of the 1960s and into the 1970s, the Right criticized the United States’ inability to stand firm against the criticisms of anti-Western nations. The call for a US response was answered in the brief but eventful tenure of Daniel Patrick Moynihan as America’s UN representative between the summer of 1975 and the winter of 1976. Moynihan was not a conservative. But in his essays for Commentary, he articulated views on the inability of the United States to stand up to the enemies of democracy that mirrored what many of his friends on the Right would convey in their own writings over the next few years.

Daniel Patrick Moynihan and “The United States in Opposition”20 Moynihan’s “The United States in Opposition,” published in Commentary in the winter of 1975, was a direct response to Goldwater and others on the

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Right regarding the complacency of American leadership at the UN. The growing surge of criticism by Third World nations and the inability of the West to respond forcefully had initially caught the eye of Paul Seabury, a professor of political science at Berkeley. Seabury suggested this interesting phenomenon as a subject for a potential article in a letter to Norman Podhoretz in November 1974. “What is it that accounts for the powerful upsurge of the so-called Afro-Arab-Asian-Communist bloc,” Seabury wrote, “and the passivity of so many Western countries from responding to it?” Seabury believed that if something was not done to address the issue it could result in “the death of the United Nations.” Podhoretz, Commentary’s editor in chief, enclosed the academic’s observations in a letter to Moynihan and asked the former Harvard professor and US ambassador to New Delhi what he thought of the concept.21 Moynihan found the idea fascinating as well. During his time in India, the former domestic policy adviser to Presidents Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon had focused his attention on the UN and, over time, “had become more and more absorbed by the seeming inability of American representatives to deal with the ideological argument, or even recognize it.” Moynihan and Podhoretz thought an exploration of the growing dilemma was a good subject for an essay.22 Moynihan began researching the piece while still in India. In late December, he sent a telegram to Podhoretz to inform him that the project was going well. Moynihan concluded that, whereas many within the General Assembly saw the statements made by these Third World states as a series of disconnected outbursts, he believed the opposite. “What I think we have lacked is that there is an ideological coherence,” Moynihan said, believing he had discovered the rationale underlying the behavior of these delegations. Moynihan had spent much of his career immersed in social scientific research, and he concluded that foreign policy analysts were wrong to suppose that, having achieved independence, Third World states would embrace either American or Soviet ideologies. “They already had one of their own,” Moynihan stated in his telegram, arguing that the ideology was based on a form of British socialism that advocated the expansion of the welfare state that translated into a managed economy. Moynihan concluded that the ideology represented a form of “collectivist politics” driven by the belief that citizens of these Third World nations had been discriminated against as their economic resources had been exploited by the West.23 Podhoretz appreciated the argument. Over time, he had grown frustrated by the hostile rhetoric of Third World states in the General Assembly,

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who believed that their people and resources had been economically exploited so that the West could achieve economic success.24 This belief explained the joy these nations expressed every time the American delegation was defeated in the General Assembly, and it clarified the veneration members of the Third World displayed toward the Arab states that carried out the oil embargo against the United States following its support of Israel during the Six Day War.25 Podhoretz saw America as surrounded by enemies and, mysteriously, unwilling to address the situation; the United States seemed hesitant to strike back physically at OPEC, and, what was even more curious, responded passively to Third World criticism in the UN. The editor saw many of these Third World states as hypocritical and believed their slander against the United States should be aggressively addressed.26 “The U.S. in Opposition” was initially sent to Podhoretz as a “huge manuscript that must have been easily sixty pages, maybe more,” the editor recalled in a conversation with author Gil Troy. While portions of the essay appeared disorganized, Podhoretz realized it contained a powerful analysis. “His [Moynihan’s] organization wasn’t necessarily all that good and sometimes points were not made sufficiently clear,” Podhoretz remembered.27 Moynihan knew that if anyone could assist him in giving the article greater organization and clarity it was Podhoretz. Since he began writing articles for Commentary in 1961, Moynihan had come to the conclusion that the Cambridge-educated Podhoretz was “very simply the finest literary-intellectual editor of this age.”28 Podhoretz knew the article had the potential to be extremely significant. In his ongoing effort to raise the magazine’s profile, the editor decided to hold a press conference to announce the essay’s publication. The argument made in the article received extensive analysis in the New York Times and other major media outlets, including a translation by the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party of the Soviet Union. The article’s reception so stunned Moynihan that he told White House Chief of Staff Donald Rumsfeld “that [he] had never triggered such a response in all [his] scribbling.” The key message from all the positive comments Moynihan’s essay generated was that Americans had grown tired of being attacked for their principles and needed to confront these adversaries and fight back or, as Moynihan wrote, “raise hell.”29 Moynihan’s views, as expressed in his essay, agreed with Podhoretz’s perception that the United States and democracy were being attacked, and they reaffirmed the editor’s passionate belief in the importance of American values and the need to defend those principles in the world.30 The heavy

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publicity the article received was key to its ending up in the briefcase of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. When Kissinger finally read it, he called Moynihan with nothing but superlatives, the highest of which was “I wish I’d written it myself.”31 The article’s timely argument, its publication in one of the most significant public affairs magazines of the day, and the fact that it was read by prominent members of the nation’s power structure all contributed to Moynihan’s appointment as ambassador to the United Nations by President Ford in early 1975. Moynihan argued that much of the Third World’s apparent power at the UN was due to what he called “the blindness of American diplomacy.” His themes and language were often reflective of previous arguments made by writers from the conservative press as well as by members of Congress who were critical about American presence in the UN. Moynihan used the word “complacency” to describe the surrender mentality of the United States in complying with everything these new nations demanded. Moynihan found it ironic that many of the conferences organized during the 1970s to discuss the global issues of human environment or population had been initiated by the United States. Subsequently, the agendas had become radicalized due to the power of Third World coalitions that were composed not just of nations in Africa but of states in Asia and Latin America as well.32 These communist states often took control of the program, particularly when, for example, the world population conferences took place in Bucharest, Romania, one of the most brutal Communist satellites in Eastern Europe. Using that example, Moynihan referred to the “double standard” argument that had been made by Jenkin Lloyd Jones in his article for Human Events more than a decade earlier. To counter the criticism and the barrage of negative language, Moynihan said the United States must “go into opposition.” In his conclusion, Moynihan criticized the United States for doing “little or nothing,” and “going about dazed,” hoping “that if we are more reasonable perhaps ‘they’ will be.” The former ambassador used the terms “appeasement” and “passivity” to describe a culture that seemed to have consumed US legations around the world. “Delegations to international conferences return from devastating defeats proclaiming victory,” Moynihan wrote. He also believed that the United States needed to be more aggressive and outspoken on issues of civil and political liberty. Developing the theme of the double standard, Moynihan pointed out that while the coalitions of less-developed nations criticized the negative aspects of American society, the social conditions in their nations were far

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worse than those in the United States. “We should resist the temptation to designate agreeable policies . . . merely on grounds of agreeableness,” Moynihan argued, echoing conservatives who had berated the US delegation to the UN for being too polite and nonconfrontational.33 The critical point of the essay was that the United States needed to stop being apologetic for the kind of society it was and respond aggressively to the criticisms that were being lodged against it. Moynihan’s article was one of a number published by Commentary during the 1970s that galvanized conservatives within both political parties.

A Policy of Confrontation: The Third World and the New International Economic Order34 One of the key points of Moynihan’s article concerned the economic conditions of the Third World. Many of the prescriptions to solve the ills that plagued poor African nations emerged at international conferences sponsored by the UN. These former colonial states called for the West to take steps to revive their depressed economies in an agenda that emerged as the New International Economic Order (NIEO). The objective of the Third World coalition in the General Assembly was “to use its majority at the United Nations to dominate and transform the international agenda.”35 Their motivation was not so much to achieve specific agreements as to exercise pressure that would cause the West to conclude that these states were a force to be reckoned with on certain issues.36 Moynihan argued that the coalition of Third World nations was able to use international conferences as vehicles to illustrate the “economic and political exploitation and injustice which could only be resolved by the most profound transformation: to expropriate the expropriators.”37 Any discussion about the redistribution of wealth automatically alarmed conservatives, who believed that the UN was already wasting American financial resources and was being used by the Soviet Union and its allies as their own private propaganda office. A key development that allowed the NIEO to take shape was the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD). In 1972, President Luis Echeverria of Mexico proclaimed “a code of economic conduct,” which developed into a challenge to the world economic order. That international code of conduct included a variety of arguments made by less-developed states against the wealthy nations of the West. Many of these claims were about access to loans and capital, the elimination of trade barriers, and the easing or complete elimination of debt that many of these

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nations owed the West. They also hoped that the developed states would share some of their intellectual capital, such as allowing them greater access to technology and other achievements that had resulted from the great economic and social resources the Western nations had used to build their societies.38 There is debate about how beneficial these measures were and how much they improved the lives of the citizens of these economically impoverished states. What was important about the NIEO formal platform was that it “established Third World solidarity as a galvanizing political principle and provided it with its sacred texts.”39 These principles not only motivated the world’s less fortunate to focus their energies on an activist agenda, but also energized conservatives, who continued their campaign to marginalize America’s involvement in the United Nations. Phrases like “redistribution,” “concessions,” and “transfers of resources” were all catchphrases for what the Right believed was a design for world government that would be run through the international organization.40 The NIEO alarmed the three conservative publications. William F. Buckley Jr. described the initiative announced by the Mexican president as “calling on all nations of the world to do everything in their power to make economic matters worse,” and Alice Widener called the idea no less than a “plan to create a Socialist World Welfare State for the poor nations at the expense of the rich ones, meaning mostly the United States.”41 In Commentary’s view, the United States appeased these nations because they held critical positions due to heightened tensions in the Cold War. In an article for Commentary on the NIEO in 1975, Robert Tucker, a professor at Johns Hopkins, argued, “It was this prospect of a diminishing influence that led to the vision (or nightmare) . . . of an America beleaguered in a hostile world that had chosen the example of Communism.”42 Tucker portrayed the United States as unwilling to stand up for itself against the bullying hypocrites of the Third World because it feared being a lone island of democracy surrounded by a sea of hostile forces. The theme resonated with many who had read Moynihan’s pieces. Moynihan’s prescription that the United States move into opposition against those who criticized the foundations of its democracy was given when the country seemed to be at a nadir in the eyes of the international community. The outrage of many Americans at the condemnation of Israel caused widespread disfavor toward the United Nations and inclined public opinion toward “a more aggressive foreign policy.”

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Moynihan’s recommendation that the United States confront those nations who sought to undermine the ideas of democracy came to the fore in the confrontation between America and the Soviet Union. Moynihan also continued to confront those states who had criticized America for its supposed lack of human rights, as they attempted to parlay a double standard into artificial credibility for themselves in the eyes of the international community.43 Moynihan’s activist stance at the UN was dramatically different from the actions of Andrew Young, who followed him two years later as America’s ambassador.

“The World according to Andrew Young”44 A month after the inauguration of President Jimmy Carter in 1977, a small, unsigned article appeared in Human Events with the ominous title “Would Young Destroy Western Civilization?” The question referred to former civil rights leader Andrew Young, who had been nominated to serve as the Carter administration’s representative to the United Nations. The new ambassador had come under fire for comments he had made in a 1970 television appearance, when he stated that the West, through its technology and military capability, had prevented freedom in such regions as Asia and Latin America. The article quoted Young as saying that he favored the destruction of Western civilization if that would enhance the opportunity for freedom in those parts of the world. Those comments caused the Right and many on the Left to criticize Young during his brief tenure at the UN, from the winter of 1977 until his resignation in the summer of 1979. President Carter hoped to focus his administration’s foreign policy less on the conflict with the Soviet Union and more on the problems that affected nations in the developing world. Carter thought that a more focused policy on issues in Africa fit perfectly with his overall foreign policy agenda of raising the profile of international human rights.45 One reason Carter appointed Young to the UN was that he hoped to make use of the former civil rights leader’s credibility in his work for racial equality. Carter believed Young’s experience would enhance the country’s relationship with the Third World.46 Conservatives argued that Carter’s strategy underestimated the expansionist objectives of the Soviet Union.47 Young may have believed it was his duty to vocalize problems of racial prejudice and injustice regardless of where they existed. However, almost from the beginning of his tenure, he was viewed as “defending governments

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hostile to the United States.”48 Comments about Cuban troops “bringing a certain stability and order in Angola,” or Young’s claim that there were “hundreds, perhaps thousands, of political prisoners in the United States,” allowed those on the Right to argue that Young was part of what Commentary’s Carl Gershman called “The New Foreign Policy Establishment” in the administration.49 Gershman said that those who controlled US foreign policy in the Carter White House were entirely “unsympathetic to affirming American values” and claimed that those intellectuals believed that a vigorous defense of democratic principles, along with a passionate anticommunist attitude, had laid the foundation for America’s failure in Vietnam. Critics of the administration’s foreign policy strategy saw Young as representative of a myopic leftist view that had come to fruition following the 1972 presidential nomination of Senator George McGovern.50 Young’s inflammatory comments as ambassador over the next two years gave plenty of ammunition to those opposed to him on the Right and did him little good with the Southern conservative and the neoconservative wings of the Democratic Party. Gershman’s next article, “The World according to Andrew Young,” was a frequent topic of conversation among both liberals and conservatives when it was published in Commentary in 1978. The piece claimed that Young viewed the Soviet Union as more of a progressive entity than a hostile one. Congressman John Ashbrook used Gershman’s article to substantiate his claim that Young was “a foreign policy disaster.” Articles such as “Andrew Young: Our Foot-in-the-Mouth Ambassador” or “The Andy Young Conundrum,” published in Human Events and National Review during 1977, made Young a symbol of the incompetence and indecision that many on the Right believed symbolized the Carter administration.51 Young’s verbal blunders were popular targets for the conservative wing of the GOP in the halls of the US Capitol. “Should Ambassador Andrew Young take a summer vacation, I respectfully suggest the president name Las Vegas comedian Don Rickles to fill in for him,” said conservative GOP congressman Henry Hyde of Illinois. Other conservatives in the House of Representatives such as John Ashbrook and Philip Crane believed Young’s comments so outrageous that they merited impeachment. “It is apparent that he [Young] does not represent America or American interests at the United Nations,” Ashbrook said, as he endorsed a resolution that called for Young to be removed from his position.”52 Ashbrook’s comments mirrored others, such as those of M. Stanton Ev-

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ans, who wrote in the fall of 1978 that “the problem with Andy Young is not that he needs to be quiet; it is that he needs to be removed from office.”53 Evans and others charged Carter with a strong streak of political radicalism. That theme continued in the November 1978 Human Events special supplement “A Close Look at Carter’s Radical Fringe,” which profiled a number of Carter’s foreign policy representatives who were critical of American nationalism and anticommunism. The lead article by Allan C. Brownfield argued that Andrew Young was “an apologist for communist aggression in Africa and elsewhere [that] has by now become well known.” Brownfield, quoting extensively from Gershman’s piece on Young, wrote, “He simply does not believe that the Soviet Union and its allies pose a military or strategic threat to the United States.” The arguments the three publications made against Young clearly resonated with those on the Right, as evidenced by Edwin Meese’s decision to save a copy of Brownfield’s article to use as ammunition against the Carter administration when Ronald Reagan announced his run for president in 1979.54 Young’s resignation in the summer of 1979, after an unauthorized conversation with a member of the Palestine Liberation Organization, reaffirmed conservative belief that he, as Human Events argued, was “a spearcarrier for the oppressor” and “a crusader for leftist tyranny.” National Review, mirroring this criticism, stated that Young “had sided not with the oppressed but with their oppressors, some of the most savage and despicable tyrants on the face of the earth.” But, in its comments, National Review also stepped back and gave its readers a broader, or more philosophical, view of the Young resignation. It framed the debate over Young’s behavior at the UN as symbolic of a conflict between those who favored a greater role for the United States in its conflict with the Soviet Union and those who hoped to focus America’s energies on improving lives in the developing world. “The struggle between them will presumably go on into the future and grow more ferocious,” the magazine wrote in September 1979.55 Buckley and his colleagues’ concept of opposing ideologies was seen in the two distinctive views of American foreign policy reflected during the UN tenures of Moynihan and Young. During Moynihan’s period, the adviser to three presidents reaffirmed values that in the past had given America and its allies confidence in their struggle against international communism. Young’s criticism of those traditions caused many on the Right to wonder whether the values represented by the United States still resonated with the rest of the world. As the Carter administration found itself buffeted from one in-

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ternational crisis to the next, conservative critics were frustrated by the expansion of totalitarian interests around the world and the belief that the administration was not responding to it with the urgency that was necessary.

“Dictatorships and Double Standards” During the late 1970s, conservatives were discouraged by what they believed to be the Carter administration’s lackluster foreign policy. In the latter part of 1979, an article in Commentary clarified and informed all the arguments of those who had been critical of the administration’s global strategy over the past two years. “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” written for the November issue by Jeane Kirkpatrick, then a professor of government at Georgetown University, soon became a foundation of the Reagan administration’s foreign policy. Kirkpatrick, who had grown up in Oklahoma, had previously worked as an intelligence analyst in the State Department. A member of the Democratic Party and a strong supporter of Senator Hubert Humphrey, she had become disillusioned with the party’s liberal drift as well as what she saw as the failures of Carter’s vision of America’s role in the world. Kirkpatrick vehemently disagreed with the idea that the Soviet Union was no longer a threat and worried that American power was in decline.56 Kirkpatrick’s article focused on regime changes in 1979. These occurred in the Middle East and Latin America. In Nicaragua, the Soviet-supported Sandinista National Liberation Front, under the command of Daniel Ortega, toppled the presidency of longtime US ally Anastasio Somoza Debayle, whose family had ruled the country since the 1930s. In Iran, Muslim fundamentalists, led by the Ayatollah Khomeini, upended the government of Mohammad Reza, otherwise known as the Shah, whom the United States had supported since the 1950s. Kirkpatrick was disturbed by the optimistic language used by the Carter White House to describe these new regimes. Andrew Young had referred to the Ayatollah “as some sort of saint,” while Deputy Secretary of State Warren Christopher described the new Sandinista regime as “the promise of a new Nicaragua.”57 Concerns over foreign policy objectives were based directly on statements by President Carter. During a 1977 commencement address at the University of Notre Dame, Carter exclaimed, “Being confident of our own future we are now free of that inordinate fear of communism which once led us to embrace any dictator who joined us in that fear.” This dismissal of the Soviet Union as no longer a formidable adversary led William F. Buckley

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Jr. to pose the question “Can Mr. Carter Really Mean What He Says?”58 In November 1979, Kirkpatrick wrote about the problem of continued Soviet expansion, which addressed much of the conservatives’ criticism of Carter’s foreign policy: “There has occurred a dramatic Soviet military build up, matched by a stagnation of American armed forces, and a dramatic extension of Soviet influence in the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, Southern Africa and the Caribbean, matched by a declining American position in all these areas.”59 Kirkpatrick believed that US policy was so misdirected that it could not distinguish between authoritarian and totalitarian regimes. This description of the United States’ defensive posture in foreign affairs reflected James Burnham’s views during the latter years of the Vietnam War, when he characterized the United States as a nation in retreat. Kirkpatrick’s article argued that Carter had abandoned the principle of doing what was in the best national interest of the United States. Although Washington had supported nations of questionable morality, Iran and Nicaragua had been anticommunist and friendly to the United States. By allowing Managua and Tehran to be overthrown by unfriendly factions, the administration had followed its belief that these movements represented an improvement on the previous regimes. However, Kirkpatrick believed that those liberal visions had caused the administration to lose touch with the reality that a friendly Nicaragua and Iran had played a vital role in the overall picture of American international security. Kirkpatrick took a realist position. While there were negatives in both authoritarian and totalitarian societies, authoritarian societies had a capacity for democratic change. “Traditional autocrats,” she wrote, “do not disturb the habitual rhythms of work and leisure, habitual places of residence, habitual patterns of family and personal relations . . . precisely the opposite is true of revolutionary Communist regimes.”60 In allowing Somoza and the Shah to be toppled, the administration had assumed that “one can easily locate and impose democratic alternatives to incumbent autocracies.”61 Kirkpatrick believed that idea was a great mistake; she argued that whereas autocracies had the capacity for change, societies under the totalitarian system could not alter themselves, as it was not the rulers but the principles of communism that held control. The article appeared in late 1979, having been “heavily edited” by Podhoretz, according to Kirkpatrick. A number of policy institutes, including the Heritage Foundation and the American Enterprise Institute, sent copies to numerous public policy experts and political leaders. One political figure

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who received it was former presidential candidate Ronald Reagan. The article had first been read by Reagan’s foreign policy adviser Richard Allen as well as by strategist Peter Hannaford, who had worked with Reagan since 1974. As Hannaford recalls, “Dick Allen and I read it and immediately sent a copy to RR who then called Jeane to ask for a meeting.”62 Reagan was extremely impressed with the essay and told Kirkpatrick so in a letter he wrote in mid-December 1979. “I found myself reexamining a number of the premises and views which have governed my own thinking in recent years. There is so much food for thought in the article that one hardly knows where to begin to compliment you on your keen insight.”63 According to Kirkpatrick, he then proposed a meeting. Hannaford was well aware of the impact the article had had on his boss: “The Kirkpatrick article in Commentary had a major effect on his [Reagan’s] thinking about foreign policy, refining and sharpening his views on dealing with various governments. Specifically, it led Dick [Allen] to arrange for several members of the Committee on the Present Danger to meet with RR [Ronald Reagan] in Washington. Many were hawkish Democrats and many signed on to help him in his 1980 campaign.”64 In the ensuing conversations with Kirkpatrick, Reagan reiterated the impactful nature of the author’s comments. They allowed him to get a clearer idea of how much more complicated it was to remove left-wing autocracies than right-wing ones, as the leftist principles were so deeply ingrained within the society. But Kirkpatrick made clear in the same conversations that she was not an ideologue. As Richard Allen reminisced in a New York Times op-ed in 2006 about Kirkpatrick’s early encounters with Reagan, she made it clear to the former governor that there were exceptions to her argument: “Noting that unspeakable atrocities had occurred under rightist regimes in Spain and Germany, Ms. Kirkpatrick warned him not to read too much into that belief.”65 Reagan’s willingness to absorb the ideas expressed by conservative Democrats such as Kirkpatrick gave him an image of substance and credibility, not only with conservatives within the GOP, but also with those in the growing neoconservative wing of the Democratic Party. Reagan had once been viewed as a former actor who had the capacity to deliver a good speech. By 1980, the former governor was seen by many as a substantive national figure with a strong interest in the policies of international security. As both Hannaford and Allen made clear, Kirkpatrick and her article contributed to that shift in the public perception of Reagan. Kirkpatrick’s fa-

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vorable view of Reagan’s policy outlook led a number of neoconservatives to support him at the end of the 1970s. During the latter part of the twentieth century, many of those on the Right viewed the United Nations as a symbol of liberalism that had lost its way. The excessive spending and inflated bureaucracy, all with the objective of achieving a type of global utopia, contributed to the alienation of conservatives from the international organization. Many writers for conservative opinion publications believed American weakness was seen in its inability to curtail the turbulence created by members of the Third World within the General Assembly. But the United Nations was not the only issue that caused the Right to critique the Carter presidency. In the fall of 1977, conservatives condemned Carter’s decision to return control of the Panama Canal to the nation of Panama. To the Right, the Panama Canal was a symbol of American industrial might, and they saw the decision to return it as a betrayal and as a powerful message that the Carter administration put catering to a Third World country ahead of America’s nationalist tradition.

5

A Loss of National Pride The Panama Canal, 1965–1979 During early fall 1977, Ronald Reagan wrote a letter to his friend William F. Buckley Jr. The subject was Reagan’s opposition to the Panama Canal treaties, an issue that had served the former governor well in his campaign for the 1976 Republican presidential nomination. Although the two prominent conservatives rarely disagreed on matters of public policy, Buckley had recently changed his view to favor the shift of canal ownership from the United States to the citizens of Panama, a change that followed his trip to Panama in fall 1976. Buckley realized that many conservatives saw, in the loss of the canal, another instance of the United States being unwilling to defend itself against the aggressiveness of yet another Third World nation. However, National Review’s editor in chief did not view the potential loss of the canal as equivalent to the United States’ failure in Vietnam or its inability to respond to an ever more aggressive Soviet Union. Based on his time in Panama, Buckley believed that the Panamanians valued the canal as a symbol of their national identity and a major foundation of their national economy and, thus, were unlikely to allow it to fall into enemy hands.1 Reagan believed the opposite. The former governor and his supporters argued that the apparent giveaway of the Central American waterway was symbolic of the decline of the influence of American power in the world, an opinion shared by the majority of writers for the publications of conservative opinion. Commentators M. Stanton Evans and William Rusher said that the apparent giveaway of the canal constituted an important loss to American industry and national pride and was part of the continuing aggressiveness against the West by the newly empowered nations of the Third World. During the 1960s and 1970s, Human Events, National Review, and

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those conservative policy makers who read them used the issue of the canal to draw attention to the continuing retreat of the forces of democracy from the encroaching shadows of international communism.2 The United States’ inability to respond aggressively to the Third World in the United Nations gave the impression that the United States had grown weak and uncertain of its role in the international arena. Debate over the return of the Panama Canal to the Panamanians dominated conservative circles during the 1970s; the Right believed the return would be a clear abdication of the nation’s global responsibilities. “I know I believed it would be a sign of American weakness to surrender the Canal to a tin pot dictator in Panama,” said Allan Ryskind, the longtime editor of Human Events.3 Conservative anger was partly focused on the United States’ acquiescence to the demands of an emerging Third World nation that, like those within the General Assembly, did not seem to appreciate all that America had done to help it in the past.4 The United States’ defeat in Vietnam was another factor in that anger. In the wake of the loss of American military prestige, conservatives were irate that one of the symbols of the country’s industrial greatness was now on the verge not just of being lost, but actually given away.

The Contentious History behind the Panama Canal Treaty While many thought of the Canal as “the greatest engineering work in the history of the world,” there had been underlying tensions between the United States and Panama since its creation at the turn of the century, primarily due to the favorable terms the United States had received. When it signed what was known as the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Convention in 1903, the United States was given ten miles of land and sea to be owned in perpetuity, which effectively granted it sovereignty over that portion of Panamanian territory. The agreement gave the United States the right to “apply and enforce laws within a twenty-mile wide zone around the canal.” Because the canal was important to its economy, the United States intervened frequently in Panamanian affairs, a situation that was equivalent to “another nation operating the Mississippi River and a few miles of land on either side.”5 Panamanian resentment of America’s imperialistic behavior had led to decades of tension between the two countries and to frequent acts of violence that had to be dealt with by American authorities. Significant disorder during the latter stages of the Eisenhower administration reflected Panamanian frustration over their lack of control over their own affairs.6

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Conservative publications were dismissive of the plight of the Panamanians.7 “The Republic of Panama was created by the U.S.,” National Review’s Edwin McDowell, a reporter for the Arizona Republic and a biographer of Barry Goldwater, wrote in early 1964. “It survives today because of the benefits derived from its treaty with the U.S.”8 At the time of McDowell’s comments, the Cold War dominated the news of the day. National Review believed that American retreat in any area of the world, including Panama, would send a message of American vacillation to the communist leadership in Moscow. “For the Panama Canal, no less than Berlin or Taiwan, is considered a barometer for measuring U.S. resolution,” McDowell wrote.9 This mention of areas throughout the world believed to be in jeopardy gives evidence of the power of the domino theory, which was the idea that a communist incursion anywhere would lead to communist takeovers in other areas of the globe if the United States wavered in its response. When Lyndon Johnson became president, the Panama Canal was not the dominant issue on his agenda. Growing problems in Vietnam, a massive antipoverty program, and groundbreaking civil rights legislation were the issues at the forefront of Johnson’s mind. However, LBJ was forced to confront the canal issue when violence broke out between Panamanian and US students in January 1964. The clash occurred near Balboa High School, which was attended by students whose parents served in the American Canal Zone. In a show of Panamanian solidarity, students from Panama’s Instituto Nacional sought to hang their national flag in Balboa’s front yard. However, the flag was immediately torn by American students who then attempted to put “Old Glory” in its place. The ensuing massive riot led Panama’s president, Roberto Chiari, to sever diplomatic relations with the United States, a move also aimed at encouraging the United States to negotiate a new treaty. LBJ, though not a reader of National Review, inherently shared Edwin McDowell’s concern that failure to stand firm in Panama would damage global perception of America’s credibility in the Cold War. Any perception that Johnson was surrendering to another developing Third World nation, as US involvement in Vietnam grew, could prove hazardous when LBJ ran for president in his own right in November 1964. In addition to perceptions of American weakness, Johnson worried that turmoil in Panama might embolden Cuba’s leader, Fidel Castro, and lead to instability throughout the region.10 Hoping to dissipate the tension and chaos in Panama, Johnson announced in March 1964 that the two countries would hold extensive dis-

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cussions over their differences. In late December that year, the administration announced that new treaties should take Panama’s sovereignty into account.11 However, Johnson’s plans never reached fruition. Although the chief executives of the United States and Panama were in agreement, political opposition in Panama City and vocal Republican criticism in Washington derailed Johnson’s plans.12 Conservative discontent over Johnson’s decision to negotiate with Panama was fueled by the belief that it would damage the United States’ international credibility and interests by giving its allies the impression that it was not a dependable partner in the Cold War. In an article in Human Events in late 1968, “The Case for Keeping the Panama Canal,” former ambassador to the Dominican Republic Ellis O. Briggs argued that US concessions to Panamanian demands were detrimental to American interests. Briggs called the decision “a sell-out” and those who favored the loss of the canal “appeasers” and “give-away patriots.” The former diplomat also said that they had not only aided and abetted hostile forces, but had undermined the United States at home. Briggs’s accusations were not uncommon. In 1968, many in the conservative press believed members of the Left had caused dissension on the home front to prevent the United States from enhancing its offensive capabilities in Vietnam. The former ambassador’s criticism that US leaders were bowing to the pressure of an aggressive Panamanian government was almost identical to the argument conservatives made against those Third World nations who believed they deserved a significant share of Western profits after years of exploitation. “For over 50 years Panama has lived off the canal, and off the fruits of demagogically inspired anti-Americanism,” Briggs wrote.13 He argued that the rights to the canal were purchased with American funds and that there was no obligation to renegotiate any treaty. This language, popularized by Briggs and other conservative commentators, was picked up by Reagan during his 1976 effort to seize the GOP nomination from President Gerald Ford. As Reagan traveled the country, his mantra about the canal “we bought it, we paid for it, it’s ours and we’re going to keep it” resonated with many voters in the GOP primary. Reagan’s tone mirrored that in Briggs’s article from nearly eight years earlier, which showed that conservative arguments had remained static into the mid-1970s.14 Despite the treaty process’s failure under Johnson, many wondered if his successor, Richard Nixon, would continue to focus on the canal issue. Even

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as the new administration was immersed in a multitude of complex problems, from the crisis in Vietnam to the nuclear arms issue with the Soviet Union, conservatives remained concerned about the future of the canal. A year after Nixon’s 1969 inauguration, Donald Dozer, Latin America specialist and professor at the University of California, Santa Barbara, wrote an article for Human Events, “Will Nixon Give Up Control of the Panama Canal?” Speculating about whether Nixon was preparing to follow the same path as his Democratic predecessors in abandoning the international waterway, Dozer commented, “President Nixon’s silence on the crucial Panama issue suggests either an apathy on this question in White House councils or secret preparations yet to be unveiled for surrender of the Panama Canal.” Dozer expressed concern that the new administration would restart negotiations with Panama over the status of the canal and spoke of wide opposition to the plan within the US Congress.15 Strom Thurmond, calling Dozer “an eminent authority in Latin American affairs,” read a number of paragraphs from the article into the Congressional Record, and he added his own concern that Nixon was preparing “for the renegotiation of the discredited Johnson draft treaties on the Panama Canal.”16 Thurmond’s own commentary on the issue appeared in Human Events just as talks were to resume in 1971. The senator from South Carolina was critical of the United States’ inability to stand firm against Panamanian criticism and insistence on renegotiating the treaties. Writing that the United States seemed ready to accede to Panama’s demands in response to its random acts of violence and incendiary language, Thurmond stated, “We have fed the fires of this radicalism.”17 Thurmond may also have been alluding to the continuing opposition to the war in Vietnam and to the violence in US metropolitan areas sparked by lack of progress over minority rights and the failure of housing and employment programs associated with the Great Society. Over the next few years, the United States and Panama made little progress toward a new treaty. Finally, in the spring of 1973, President Nixon called for a new relationship between the two countries.18 Months before Nixon’s announcement, Dozer wrote again, examining the sovereignty issue raised by America’s presence in the Canal Zone. In March 1973, a month after the issue was discussed at a UN Security Council meeting in Panama City, Dozer claimed that the Panamanian leaders were running a propaganda campaign filled with misinformation about the details and history of the canal. He also argued that the campaign created

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within the American people “an unjustified sense of guilt, for which recent presidents and secretaries of state seem willing to commit any form of penance.” The claim that wealthy nations such as the United States had economically exploited poor or underdeveloped nations such as Panama was a particularly popular theme in the 1970s; the New International Economic Order, proposals that called for a redistribution of wealth among the rich and poor countries of the world, had been put forward at the UN.19 Dozer’s article was well received, particularly by Representative Philip Crane of Illinois, who called it “excellent.”20 Although conservatives opposed a new set of treaties, in early February 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger signed a series of principles with Panamanian foreign minister Juan Antonio Tuck that called for an end to American control of the canal. Among the list of objectives was the proviso that “the condition of perpetuity would be eliminated.”21 Not quite a month after the parameters for a new agreement had been unveiled, James Kilpatrick, in a column in Human Events, lamented that the measures held no advantage for the United States. “These are principles—for what?” Kilpatrick wrote. “They spell sellout and surrender.” These comments encapsulated two critical weaknesses that right-wing publications saw in the country’s leadership. Conservatives believed that Richard Nixon’s national security policy of realpolitik weakened the foundation of American foreign policy and that the United States had allowed itself to be browbeaten by the UN and by the Left over its neocolonial relationship with Panama. Kilpatrick took great exception to the second point, as reflected in his commentary on the issue “The Panama Canal: Stop the Sellout.”22 As 1975 began, the big question about the treaties remained to be addressed. President Ford’s secretary of defense, James Schlesinger (who was removed from his position near the end of the administration) commented that the canal’s loss would have dangerous ramifications in terms of the way the United States was perceived by hostile nations: “When the U.S. shows strength and determination, it receives respect. When it recedes from its position, it whets appetites. If we are tough in the canal they will yield. In recent years the U.S. has not shown enough of this quality.”23 Schlesinger’s comments were echoed by M. Stanton Evans, who wrote in summer 1975 that Ford’s desire to return the canal to Panama was a retreat by his administration in yet another part of the world. The columnist believed that loss of the canal would dangerously undermine American security and argued that this was part of the Ford administration’s wider agenda to weaken America’s pres-

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ence around the globe.24 Resistance also came from the members of the Department of Defense who were frustrated by Panama’s unwillingness to extend the leases on US military bases in the country over the next fifty years.25 Writers for Human Events and National Review used similar rhetorical tactics in their discussions of the canal issue. Pundits on the Right portrayed the potential loss of the canal as a lack of American resolve in responding to the aggressive behavior of elements of the Third World. Evans, Kilpatrick, and Buckley, among others, saw in the new negotiations between the United States and Panama another instance of American retreat in the face of pressure from nations with disreputable principles. Disgruntled conservatives hoped that former governor Ronald Reagan would challenge Ford for the nomination in 1976, with the goal of reviving the nation’s confidence in the face of growing global isolation. Although Reagan did not officially declare his candidacy for the presidency until late November 1975, the Panama Canal issue had constantly been on his mind as far back as 1967. That year, Reagan, who had just been elected governor of California, wrote Donald Dozer to express his strong agreement that America must maintain control of the canal. In his comments, Reagan used the terminology that America had “followed the false flag of appeasement,” which was frequently used by conservatives in the media to criticize weak leadership and policy makers who endangered national security.26 Five months before he announced his presidential ambitions, Reagan gave a speech about the state of America in the world, which was published in Human Events as “World Cries Out for Strong U.S. Leadership.” Reagan, agreeing with foreign policy positions that the conservative press had taken over the last two decades, blamed the United States’ problems in Vietnam and in relations with the Soviet Union on indecisiveness. Reagan included the canal as an additional example of the United States’ vacillation. “In between we were conditioned by indecision,” Reagan said, addressing a crowd in Atlantic City, New Jersey. Reagan mentioned occasions when the United States had behaved in a weak, uncertain manner, including Vietnam, the Berlin Wall, the Bay of Pigs, and “our seeming willingness to give away the Panama Canal.”27 When Reagan called for a “re-birth of faith, and pride,” many on the Right believed he was referring to the same spirit that had built the international waterway.28 Although National Review had not commented about the canal issue as frequently as Human Events, when Buckley and his fellow editors did write

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about it, the opinions they expressed were almost identical. The similarity in language is seen in an editorial from late summer 1975 that concurred with comments that had been made in Human Events: that Panamanian leader General Omar Torrijos was being “egged on by the Soviets and the Third World.” The article claimed that Panama was manipulating the issue to portray it as their struggle to achieve autonomy from American imperialism. The publication also argued that the real contest for control of the canal was not between the United States and Panama, but between the United States and the Soviet Union, implying that the Panamanian government was unstable and leaned on Moscow for support. Here again the Right was using the canal as a symbol to alert readers that instability in Panama would lead to more communist incursions within Latin America if the United States lost control of the canal.29 Articles in the two conservative publications and Reagan’s campaign rhetoric reiterated the themes of American weakness and retreat represented by the loss of the canal. That theme resonated with Reagan campaign official David Keene, who argued, “The Panama Canal issue had nothing to do with the canal. It said more about the American people’s feelings about where the country was, and what it was powerless to do.” Although Keene’s observation may have represented right-wing opinion, most of the public seemed oblivious to the issue.30 A poll taken in 1975 showed that 44 percent of Americans did not even know who owned the canal. But to conservatives, the loss symbolized the collective anxiety people felt about the potential loss of America’s security around the world. Those apprehensions allowed Reagan to win numerous primary victories throughout the South and the Midwest. Although he ultimately lost the nomination, the canal issue allowed Reagan to clarify the themes that ultimately proved successful in his next campaign for the presidency four years later.31

Dissension in the Ranks: Reagan vs. Buckley The canal issue did not disappear with Ford’s loss to Jimmy Carter in November 1976. Carter brought the issue to the forefront of his agenda when he began his administration the following year. The new president believed settling a new treaty with Panama would benefit the United States for a number of reasons. Tension over the issue had become a consistent problem in America’s relations with Panama. Carter believed, like LBJ before him, that the potential for violence could only be abated if the issue was settled. The new president also believed that signing a new treaty would improve

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the overall climate between Latin America and the United States.32 Based on the information given to him by military advisers, the president had concluded that the loss of the canal would not hurt the United States economically or militarily. Carter later admitted that he had not realized that, in making the canal the first issue of his administration, he had created antipathy in those who believed he was oblivious to the ramifications that loss of the canal had for America’s security. Conservatives such as Donald Dozer criticized Carter’s goal of returning the canal, emphasizing that the loss of the canal was counter to American national interest and made the country vulnerable to a Soviet military strike. In an article in late summer 1977, Dozer argued that although the surrender of the canal placated the Panamanians, it was another loss of American power and prestige.33 Two weeks later, Human Events reiterated Dozer’s position. In a blistering lead editorial, Allan Ryskind wrote, “The United States, supposedly the most powerful nation in the world, is going to surrender effective control of the Panama Canal still essential to U.S. interests, we find this an unbelievable situation.” The conservative weekly was consistently critical of the administration’s handling of the situation: as in Vietnam, the United States was allowing itself to be dictated to by the international community, by nations many of whom begrudged its economic success along with its global power.34 While Human Events continued to castigate Carter for his decision to follow his predecessors on plans to return the canal, William F. Buckley Jr. had second thoughts. Since 1964, Buckley had stood with his colleagues in opposition to the United States giving up the canal. However, during the spring of 1976, he had received letters from Henry Kissinger as well as Barry Goldwater about the merits of a new canal treaty.35 Although Buckley may have doubted the strategic relevance of the canal, he believed that it represented the greatness of the United States. To abandon it to a nation whose political ideology was contrary to American ideals sent a dangerous message to the country’s opponents around the world. In reply to Goldwater, Buckley said, “We are deeply involved in an age in which symbols tend to mean almost everything. It would behoove a great power to give away the Panama Canal, were we to find ourselves in such a mood. To be intimidated into giving it away is I think something else.”36 Buckley seemed to believe that while the canal itself might not have been of great importance, the United States was setting a dangerous precedent by allowing a small Third World nation to bully it into giving up a symbol of its industrial heritage.

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Buckley knew that the canal was a formidable subject for the Right, one so powerful that it had nearly carried his good friend Ronald Reagan to the GOP nomination. Taking that into account, as well as Kissinger’s and James Burnham’s arguments in favor of a more equitable treaty, Buckley decided to investigate the matter by traveling to Panama in fall 1976.37 In a column written from Panama City in the second week of October, Buckley concluded that the Panamanians were unlikely to do anything that might harm the canal, because of the large economic benefits they derived from it. Arguing that “it is plausible to assume that Panama would side with the United States in defending the Panama Canal against, say, the Soviet Union,” Buckley claimed that it was in the interest of Panama to maintain a good relationship with the United States in order to prevent the canal from being appropriated by a hostile nation such as the USSR.38 Burnham’s attitude was similar to that of his National Review colleague. The magazine’s foreign policy analyst believed that the canal would not be less safe just because it was no longer under American control. But Burnham, agreeing with his longtime friend that symbols were extremely powerful, argued that the appearance that the United States was bowing to the demands of a small Latin American nation sent a strong statement to the world that the United States was in decline.39 Other than Buckley, Priscilla Buckley, and Burnham, everyone else at the magazine was very much against the revision of the treaties, including associate editor Richard Brookhiser. “I think the canal was part of our history,” he said, continuing, “If you ever saw it you saw what an engineering marvel it was, and we are supposed to give it to this tin pot guy. It touched a button—it was yet one more American retreat, it [the canal] was part of the United States! Bill just ran into this headwind and made no progress.”40 William Rusher was also against returning the canal. The conservative activist’s opinion mirrored that of Brookhiser and others who resented what was widely regarded as a technological jewel being given away to a socialist dictator. “What is really at stake here is the credibility of the United States as a major power,” Rusher wrote in his column. “A great many Americans sense this and it accounts for the intense resistance these treaties are encountering.”41 It is difficult to know what caused Buckley to change his mind. Brookhiser said that at times Buckley enjoyed courting controversy even if it came from his own side. But longtime editor Linda Bridges believed that Buckley’s decision to support the treaties was influenced by sentimental memories of his youthful experience in Mexico and his fondness for Latin Amer-

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ica. Bridges’s comments have some validity. In 2008, Buckley wrote of “the reintegration of the Canal Zone as something of a magical restoration of the nation’s [Panama’s] dignity: the elimination of an ugly birthmark that now condemns Panama to wander around the world conspicuously sullied.”42 Buckley may have believed that Panama’s reputation as a puppet of the United States was demeaning to the Panamanian people and that a new treaty and the return of the canal to Panama would remove that stigma.43 In the first week of September 1977, National Review published a lengthy editorial that analyzed the outline of the forthcoming treaties. Buckley, declining to write the main editorial, gave the task instead to foreign policy specialist Norman B. Hannah, one of the many experts the publication occasionally employed. Buckley edited the text before publication. The editorial favored the return of the canal, but it acknowledged that the canal was a source of national pride for the United States and that its loss was a source of frustration for conservatives.44 Hannah took issue with the common right-wing view that the treaties were part of a dangerous trend of American disinterest in global involvement. “There is a danger here,” the author wrote, “the danger of confusing a temporary mood with a longrange retreat. We are experiencing a transitional indisposition, not a longterm malignancy.” The point was almost identical to Buckley’s observation to Barry Goldwater a year earlier. The argument that the loss of the canal demonstrated that the nation’s best days were behind it was an exaggeration that neither Hannah nor Buckley agreed with.45 Hannah argued that America would continue to defend the canal and that, by working in partnership with Panama, it would be better able to secure the waterway successfully against attack by a foreign power.46 Finally, the editorial advocated a realistic position that Hannah believed reflected current public opinion. The American people were not in the mood, so shortly after Vietnam, to engage in another guerrilla war over the future of the canal or, for that matter, to aggressively advocate its position against the UN and other international organizations that were frequently dominated by the Third World. As support for that observation, Hannah quoted Goldwater: “I would have said that we should fight for the canal, if necessary. But the Vietnam years have taught me that we wouldn’t.” Goldwater’s comments reflected the lack of popular will to use military confrontation to hold on to the canal.47 Despite the editorial, William Rusher continued to express his dismay with the publication’s position. In a lengthy September 1977 memo to the

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editors on the subject of the canal, the publisher focused on the promise President Carter had made that “the treaties would assure the permanent right to defend the neutrality of the canal from any threat, for an indefinite period.” Rusher wrote that he was shocked to discover that the treaty “nowhere contained an assertion of any such right on the part of the United States.” Rusher stated that when he asked the editors to examine the problematic nature of the issue, their reaction was “what I can only describe as a cast-iron reticence to give the question that careful examination we had declared it would require.” Rusher cited Henry Kissinger’s concern with the defense of the neutrality of the canal and questioned why the former secretary of state’s concerns were not taken more seriously, especially since Buckley viewed Kissinger as such a valuable adviser on foreign policy. “At a minimum, shouldn’t somebody phone Kissinger? Do we love him in September as we did in August? Or are we to go on loving the August Kissinger and his treaties, and let the September Kissinger and his reservations go hang?”48 Rusher, a committed conservative activist like his friends at Human Events, was not one to compromise on an issue he believed to be vitally important to the security of the United States. Many readers were irate with the editorial and the publication’s endorsement of the return of the international waterway. “Either we have been publishing provocative articles or autumn brings out the loonies,” a memo to the editors began in September 1977. The summary of the letters received by the magazine stated: “Our Panama Canal Treaty position has come in for the most criticism, of course, with letters running about 9 or 10 to 1 against.” A note at the top of the page informed Buckley that the response from the publication’s readership was “the best we’ve had in ages.” One response to the magazine’s editorial labeled it as “weakness and appeasement masquerading as reason and maturity.”49 While Buckley believed the magazine made a well-documented and articulate argument, it appeared that those readers, a number of whom canceled or threatened to cancel their subscriptions, did not agree.50 One of those who offered a contrary opinion was Buckley’s good friend Ronald Reagan. “I must confess that we are still disagreeing on the matter of the canal,” Reagan wrote Buckley that September. “I am concerned about the seeming weakness in which we did not negotiate, we simply made concessions.” Ironically, Reagan’s point was similar to the one that Buckley had made to Goldwater shortly before his journey to Panama, where he changed his opinion.51 Three days after Reagan’s letter, Buckley responded in a column entitled

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“Panama Si,” in which he characterized Reagan’s concern, that America was being pressured to concede certain points in the agreement’s language, as the only argument against the treaties’ confirmation with any significant merit. However, throughout the column, Buckley reiterated that times change and that the military and economic benefits that had once come from the United States’ presence in the Canal Zone were no longer relevant. He concluded, “We should be large enough, as we were in the Philippines, to walk out with true self-confidence.”52 Buckley’s disagreement with his colleagues showed his pragmatic side; however, Buckley would have agreed with conservatives like those at Human Events if he had believed that the loss of the canal represented a clear danger to the United States and not just his colleagues’ frustrations with the course of US foreign policy. Carter and Torrijos signed the treaties in front of the Organization of American States headquarters in Washington in the middle of September 1977. The agreements allowed each nation to achieve most of its respective objectives. Experts on the subject contend that, although critics argued that Panama was taking advantage of the United States, the final agreement actually favored Washington. One of the conditions agreed to was that after control of the canal was transferred to Panama in 1999, the United States would have unilateral authority to use its military to keep the canal open if it was attacked by a foreign power. Other aspects of the treaty specified that the funds from the Panama Canal Commission were to be deposited in the US treasury and that the Canal Zone itself was to be eliminated.53 Reagan and Buckley made their disagreement public in a strongly argued debate at the University of South Carolina in the middle of January 1978. Although Buckley was confident in his position and in his debating ability, it was perhaps the only time in the thirty-three-year history of the television program Firing Line when he was the underdog. The campus audience clearly preferred the Reagan position.54 Despite his support of the canal treaties, Buckley was, nonetheless, able to articulate why Reagan’s negativity toward the treaties resonated with so many of those on the Right. “I think that Governor Reagan put his finger on it when he said the reason this treaty is unpopular is because we’re tired of being pushed around,” Buckley said. He elaborated on that theme, touching on Vietnam and America’s betrayal of Taiwan, which had culminated in recognition of the People’s Republic of China. Buckley also spoke about the United States’ apparent surrender to the nations of the Middle East who controlled the world’s oil

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supply, “because,” as Buckley said, “we don’t have a diplomacy that’s firm enough to do something about it.”55 Buckley may not have viewed the canal treaties as part of an ongoing trend of American retreat, but many conservatives who read National Review disagreed. An interoffice memo written a few weeks following the debate informed the editors that of the 32 letters received, 31 were opposed to Buckley’s position. One outraged reader stated, “The quality of his argument, it’s just un-Buckleyan. . . . His final argument is appalling.” Another observed, “Mr. Buckley trotted out—could you believe it—those ever present objects of democratic concern, the little people!”56 Although Buckley’s arguments in the debate had left many of the magazine’s readers unmoved, they did cause William Rusher to reconsider some of his opinions about the treaty. The publisher continued to disagree with the return of the canal, but, in a memo to Buckley, he admitted that “I have refined my original position in various ways.” One group that would benefit by the treaty included members of the financial services industry who had assets in Panama. “A number of U.S. banks do indeed, whether you consider it relevant or not, stand to lose very substantial sums of money if the treaties are not ratified,” Rusher wrote to Buckley in the spring of 1978. But it also seemed that Rusher hoped the agreement would not be ratified because, in the same memo, he commented about the public’s great discontent over the treaties and how their concerns were being ignored: “What remains unexplained is the genesis of the impressive pressures that have induced a U.S. President and two-thirds of the Senate to disregard as thoroughly as they are doing, the clear wishes of the American people in an important and well-publicized matter the merits of which are just not all that lopsided.”57 Throughout 1978, Human Events continued its assault against the passage of the treaties. In early January, the publication highlighted what conservatives called “the truth squad.” The term described a decorated consortium of military figures along with a number of conservative legislators who opposed the treaties. The group traveled around the country, conducting rallies that galvanized support for the anti-treaty forces. The newspaper announced these efforts on its front page and also published a number of articles that reported significant drug trafficking among those close to the Torrijos government. It also spotlighted conservative concerns that the canal was being turned over to a government “which is friendly to both the Soviets and the Cubans and which is heavily infiltrated by Marxists and Marxist sympathizers.”58 Unlike Buckley, Human Events continued the theme that

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the United States was being forced to make concessions to a provincial regime that had no real capacity to cause it harm. Conservatives contended that the United States’ actions in Panama were part of a larger pattern of retreat internationally, and they claimed that making concessions served no purpose except to give greater confidence to America’s adversaries. Human Events was prepared to do what it could to turn the tide against what the Right believed was another strategic surrender. During the first months of 1978, as more members of Congress came out for the treaties, the Right came to believe that the battle was lost. The first treaty, passed in March, declared the neutrality of the canal after America departed in 2000. Human Events continued its barrage of criticism. While the loss of the canal was bitterly disappointing, the editors found it even more infuriating that not only had America been chased out of Asia and other parts of the world by communist aggression but that the current defeat had occurred within “our own hemisphere.” Ryskind and his colleagues continued the charge that the canal treaties were merely one aspect of Carter’s overall weakening of America’s foreign policy.59 Despite the Senate’s vote of 68–32 in favor of the second treaty, the newspaper continued to try to rally support to stop the transfer of the canal, arguing that Torrijos was a ruthless dictator who was not to be trusted to manage the canal effectively.60 As the anti-treaty advocates still smoldered from their great disappointment, William F. Buckley Jr. happily played his traditional role as the optimistic face of the conservative movement. One of the leading voices for his cause, Buckley encouraged the Right to look beyond their disagreements, put a highly divisive issue behind them, and focus again on issues such as the growing military power of the Soviet Union, which represented a mortal danger and global threat. To an extent, Ronald Reagan paralleled his friend’s pragmatism in moving away from the canal issue. Following the treaties’ passage in the Senate, Reagan occasionally spoke on the issue but devoted most of his columns and radio commentaries to subjects such as SALT II and other matters that pertained to national security. However, there was no question Reagan was disappointed about the passage of the treaties. “He took it hard. He may have said ‘Damn,’ which was strong for Reagan,” Richard Allen, Reagan’s foreign policy adviser recalls. Despite the resolution of the issue, Reagan did occasionally comment about it in press briefings, following the line expressed in Human Events, particularly the suggestion that the friendship be-

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tween Torrijos and Cuba’s Fidel Castro might lead to something highly distasteful for the United States.61 National Review and Human Events viewed the events surrounding the debate over the Panama Canal treaties as indications of weakness at the core of US foreign policy. Writers for these publications described the inability of the United States to respond to the aggression of an emerging Third World as emblematic of the larger dilemma of the nation’s inability to confront the Soviet Union in the Cold War. As concerns grew about states within the Third World falling under Soviet influence, these publications viewed Rhodesia, in Southern Africa, as the next opportunity for the United States to confront the USSR and its allies.

William F. Buckley Jr. and California governor Ronald Reagan following the July 6, 1967, broadcast of Firing Line. (National Review)

President Ronald Reagan and Allan Ryskind of Human Events during a February 14, 1983, interview. (Ronald Reagan Library)

President Richard Nixon meeting with William F. Buckley Jr., Frank Shakespeare, and Henry Kissinger in 1970, when Buckley was on the US Information Agency Advisory Commission. (Richard Nixon Presidential Library and Museum)

Rhodesian prime minister Ian Douglas Smith (right) on Firing Line on March 15, 1974. (Firing Line Broadcast Records, box 109, folder 1, Hoover Institution Archives.)

Barry Goldwater, Ronald Reagan, and William F. Buckley Jr. at the National Review twentieth anniversary celebration on November 17, 1975. (National Review)

Commentary’s Robert W. Tucker (right) appearing on Firing Line on January 13, 1975, following the publication of his article, “Oil: The Issue of American Intervention.” (Firing Line Broadcast Records, box 110, folder 1, Hoover Institution Archives)

Commentary’s Edward Luttwak in China in 1976. (Courtesy of Edward Luttwak)

Left to right: Leonard Garment, lecture agent Harry Walker, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Maura Moynihan (his daughter), and Norman Podhoretz, 1976. (Courtesy of Norman Podhoretz)

William F. Buckley Jr. and Governor Ronald Reagan on the set of Firing Line, July 15, 1971. (National Review)

National Review’s Frank Meyer. (National Review)

National Review’s Jeffrey Hart (National Review)

President Ronald Reagan and William F. Buckley Jr. celebrating the opening of National Review’s Washington office on February 21, 1983. (Ronald Reagan Library)

President Ronald Reagan presents the Presidential Medal of Freedom to National Review’s James Burnham on February 23, 1983. (Ronald Reagan Library)

President Ronald Reagan meeting with his speechwriting staff in 1983. (Ronald Reagan Library)

UN ambassador and Commentary contributor Jeane Kirkpatrick and President Ronald Reagan during a light moment in 1983. (Ronald Reagan Library)

National Review publisher William Rusher interviews President Ronald Reagan on May 23, 1986, for a PBS special entitled “A Turn to the Right.” (Ronald Reagan Library)

Norman Podhoretz greeting Edwin Feulner (center), president of the Heritage Foundation, while President Ronald Reagan looks on at an event in 1986. (Heritage Foundation)

M. Stanton Evans as head editorial writer for the Indianapolis News in the 1960s. (The Philadelphia Society)

6

Democratic Fantasies vs. Cold War Realities Rhodesia, 1965–1980 In the first week of June 1977, a year after losing the GOP nomination to President Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan addressed the Foreign Policy Association in the ballroom of New York’s Waldorf Astoria. The speech, developed by Reagan political adviser Peter Hannaford, was anticipated as an early opportunity for the former California governor to reveal his view of America’s role in the world.1 The remarks, printed a number of weeks later in Human Events, attacked the administration of Jimmy Carter for practicing what Reagan called a double standard in the conduct of American foreign policy. Reagan focused his critique of Carter’s foreign affairs agenda on an area that he saw as a weakness in its global program: the quest to improve human rights around the world. Interestingly, Reagan and his conservative supporters at Human Events, as well as at National Review and Commentary, had initially favored that policy goal. However, their approval had quickly dissipated when Carter not only retreated from denouncing states such as the Soviet Union, but also focused his criticism on violations of human rights in nations that had positive relationships with the United States. Reagan found it puzzling that the United States would recognize Cambodia, whose leadership had systematically executed a third of its population, while at the same time it would ostracize the Southern African state of Rhodesia from the world community. Although Rhodesia’s political system, in which a white minority governed a black majority, provided grounds for criticism, many on the Right believed that the country was gradually mov-

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ing toward becoming a well-functioning democracy. They saw Rhodesia as a peaceful, pro-Western nation surrounded by totalitarian African states allied with the Soviet Union. One strong supporter of the African state, Human Events editor Allan Ryskind, discussed its role in the international climate during the Cold War: “We felt all of southern Africa was critical, including South Africa and Rhodesia.” Ryskind recalled, “They were productive, they were pro-US, [and] they had vital strategic materials, including chrome and oil.” Ryskind and his colleagues who wrote for the other conservative publications of opinion were also concerned that the Carter administration seemed willing to negotiate with militant groups within Rhodesia that were being supported by Cuba and the Soviet Union.2 Reagan’s arguments echoed themes mentioned frequently in National Review, Human Events, and Commentary: the continuing decline in American power and the differing standards of treatment for America’s allies and its adversaries. These media outlets had frequently raised those issues in connection with the United Nations and had lamented the inability of the United States to restrain Russia’s aggressiveness through the policy of détente; they also tried to direct attention to the daily battles of the Cold War. The Right of the Republican Party believed that the United States’ policies toward Rhodesia demonstrated the contradictions and inconsistencies of a foreign policy that was leading the country down the road to defeat.3 Syndicated columnist M. Stanton Evans recalled, “There were certain countries that were clearly under assault from the Left for various reasons. In every one of those cases there were pro-Soviet groups that were trying to take over.”4 The conservative view during the Cold War, that Marxist elements were destabilizing governments around the globe, was a perspective that had its limits. A strategy that was entirely focused on victory over communism either marginalized or ignored other issues, such as race. The Right, in its commitment to an anticommunist victory, supported the racially divisive policies of Rhodesia’s Prime Minister Ian Smith and directly condoned the suppression of the individual freedoms of an entire race of people. During the mid-twentieth century, the struggle of blacks in Africa for political autonomy strengthened the American civil rights movement.5 However, in its coverage of the campaign for racial equality, National Review and Human Events often reversed that argument, intimating that the Black Nationalist campaign for liberation in Africa was indirectly responsible for introducing radical elements like the Black Panther Party into the American campaign for minority rights. Conservatives were convinced that

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the increasing militancy of the American civil rights movement would lead to an eventual breakdown of society and the loss of law and order. In 1961, dismissing a suggestion by some that minority rights might be getting short shrift in the focus on winning the Cold War, William Rusher wrote to a friend, “I suggest to you that it takes a special kind of blindness for Americans to concentrate so furiously and so emotionally on the delicate social problem which is gradually working itself out in the southern United States, while tolerating amiably the infinitely more brutal despotism that is the daily bread of people behind the Iron Curtain.”6

Rhodesia: A Unilateral Declaration of Independence As nations throughout Africa achieved independence during the 1950s and 1960s, states that were governed by a white minority, such as Rhodesia, were apprehensive. The turbulence that was occurring in the region, notably in the Congo, caused the authorities in the capital, Salisbury, to worry about the security of their own province. As fear grew that other nations in Africa would become the victims of leftist liberation movements, the government outlawed the activities of African nationalist groups.7 Despite this crackdown on those who favored greater freedom, resistance against government restrictions continued. In 1960, activists created the National Democratic Party (NDP), whose leader, Joshua Nkomo, was invited a year later to participate in a conference to develop a new Rhodesian constitution. The white constituency that attended hoped to attain complete independence from Great Britain, while the nationalists hoped for majority rule. As part of the constitutional reforms, the size of the parliament was enlarged from 30 to 65; however, blacks were given only 15 seats, a division that ensured that it would be nearly impossible for black citizens to achieve a majority. The violent reaction of the black community to the new seating distributions provided the state with a rationale to ban the NDP from political participation. That did not stop Nkomo, who created another nationalist organization, the Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU). However, shortly after its creation in the fall of 1962, that party was also banned, following charges that Nkomo was inspiring violent activity and accepting aid from the Soviet Union.8 The new constitution was unpopular with white laborers, who feared black political autonomy; they worried they would lose their positions due to the appeal of cheap black labor. White laborers joined with white farmers to support the new, hardline Rhodesian Front (RF) party. The RF was

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victorious in 1962, with a platform that promised to restrain the instability that plagued society. The leadership of the new government blamed communism for the violence affecting the country and was “attracted to the ideology of the American radical right, with its emphasis on conspiracy theories.”9 Members of the Rhodesian Front held views similar to those of the John Birch Society. The RF’s powerful strain of anticommunism would also have been attractive to writers for the conservative publications of opinion, who believed that prevention of communist encroachment in Southern Africa was more important than greater political involvement for the black majority.10 The Rhodesian leadership in Salisbury became increasingly concerned as the British made more concessions to predominately black states in other parts of Africa, fearing that eventually the white interest in Rhodesia would become irrelevant. This fear led the government to pressure London to immediately release it from its protective status, arguing that Rhodesia had been governing itself for nearly forty years.11 As members of the Rhodesian Front called for the state to declare its independence from London, tensions within the party caused Prime Minister Winston Field to resign. Ian Smith, a former Royal Air Force pilot who had been Field’s deputy, stepped in as prime minister in April 1964.12 After a brief attempt to negotiate for independence with British authorities, Smith focused his energies on convincing white voters that a Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) from Great Britain was critical to continue white Rhodesians’ way of life. Smith’s campaign was designed to terrify voters and convince them that a black majority meant the destruction of Rhodesian society. In May 1965, Smith’s campaign for more authority to pursue the UDI won resoundingly as he swept all 50 seats that had been allotted for white representation.13

Rhodesia and the Conservative Publications of Opinion’s Anti–Civil Rights Campaign National Review’s critical stance toward the civil rights movement translated to its coverage of black Rhodesians’ struggle for racial equality. In November 1965, a week before Smith declared the state’s independence from London, historian and political philosopher Thomas Molnar argued that Smith and the Rhodesian Front had the right to sever their relationship with Britain and that declaring independence was their only possible course of action. Molnar believed that if Rhodesia remained politically stable and economically viable, the West could do little to shift its current course. During

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a visit to Rhodesia, Molnar wrote that “on their shoulders rests the entire white community,”14 an implication that black majority rule would lead to the irrelevancy of white citizens and the destruction of the country through the surge of Black Nationalism. This thought was reiterated in a National Review column by Buckley five days after Rhodesia’s UDI from Great Britain.15 To Buckley, the issue was not about voting equality, but about perceived dangers of disorder within the African state if that equality were granted. Buckley may also have feared that the sight of black power sweeping through Africa would increase tensions between whites and blacks in the United States, due to the frustration of African Americans over a lack of progress in the struggle for racial equality. Buckley encountered those fears firsthand when he ran for mayor of New York in 1965; many of the supporters who flocked to his campaign were immigrants and second-generation Americans who resented the growing black militancy of the civil rights movement, which they believed was responsible for the rising crime rate.16 National Review was one of the few public voices that had defended Rhodesia’s decision to terminate its relationship with the United Kingdom. Conservative commentator James J. Kilpatrick and Senator Barry Goldwater were frustrated that the American body politic seemed to be susceptible to pressure from the Left, regardless of whether the position served US national interests. Kilpatrick also followed the conservative argument that no outside entity, such as the UN, should have a say in the internal affairs of an independent state such as Rhodesia. The columnist argued in 1965 in a column in Human Events that those who were pushing a one-man one-vote policy on Rhodesia were oblivious to reality: “They fancy that all men are equal. It is not so; it has never been so. . . . Where, then, does the notion arise that the untutored blacks of Rhodesia are prepared for the heavy responsibilities it is proposed to put upon them?”17 Although Kilpatrick and Goldwater understood that many liberals in the Democratic and Republican parties found Rhodesia’s actions morally repugnant, they believed that when the United States penalized a “friendly” nation, it sent communist states the message that supporting its close ally Great Britain was more important than taking a strong position in the Cold War. Because London traded with North Vietnam and with others who traded with Cuba and China, Goldwater and Kilpatrick thought that, by marching in step with the United Kingdom, the United States was damaging its own interests. “When Great Britain said jump, we just asked how

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high?” Goldwater wrote in a column in Human Events. But in making the struggle against communism the foundation of their global view, conservatives were turning their eyes away from the issue of race, the key factor responsible for the growing turbulence in Rhodesia.18 Buckley and others on the Right resented the inconsistencies of Johnson’s foreign policy, which appeared to view the ongoing war against totalitarianism as a secondary priority. The conservative commentator viewed the penalization of Rhodesia as “petty harassments on the grounds that we must at all costs gear our policies around the world to synchronize with those of our allies.”19 Buckley also resented the intense criticism of the West coming from the newly independent nations of the Third World. That campaign of criticism, combined with the pressure being applied to Lyndon Johnson by civil rights leaders at home, was far more potent than the persuasion Buckley and those on the Right could supply in defending Rhodesia.20 National Review continued to take the narrow view that preventing Rhodesia from becoming another client of the Soviet Union superseded any major shift to majority rule. Foreign policy analyst James Burnham also resented the heavy hand of the United Nations in Rhodesian affairs and found the worldview of American liberals such as UN Ambassador Arthur Goldberg “stupefying.” Burnham stated that, whereas the United States had said it would not support a minority government in the region, Rhodesia and South Africa were the only two governments in Africa that had actually been elected by a portion of the population. The columnist observed that many nations throughout the world, including those behind the Iron Curtain, did not hold democratic elections. “Messrs. Wilson and Goldberg object to Ian Smith’s government not because it is minority but because it is white,” Burnham wrote in the fall of 1966, referring to British Prime Minister Harold Wilson. “If the Rhodesian government were an unmixed dictatorship and at the same time black, Goldberg and Wilson would recognize it quicker than you could say ‘uhuru’ [the Swahili word for freedom].” The remark, aimed at the shifting culture created by the events of the time, underscored the idea that the Western position was largely informed by an underlying guilt, felt especially by the British, for many years of exploitation of blacks in these nations.21 Other conservative writers, such as Ralph de Toledano, agreed that Rhodesia’s UDI should be accepted by the international community, and he characterized the nation as slowly but surely progressing toward full integration. De Toledano, Thomas Lane, William Rusher, and Congressman

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John Ashbrook had traveled to Salisbury, on a visit sponsored by the American African Affairs Association, an organization designed to enhance public support for Rhodesia’s government. In a report filed from Salisbury, de Toledano described its peace and tranquility and argued that it was a far cry from the disorder that characterized cities like New York and Washington, in a criticism of the instability due to the civil rights movement.22 Many public figures who supported segregation in the South, such as Ashbrook and Senator Strom Thurmond, both frequent readers of Human Events, used de Toledano’s reports and other favorable commentary coming out of Rhodesia to motivate their supporters to keep up the fight against the government’s attempts to enact civil rights legislation. When Ashbrook returned to the House of Representatives, the congressman from Ohio had his extensive remarks about his visit to Rhodesia placed in the Congressional Record. Historian Thomas Borstelmann argued that many of those on the Right who supported Rhodesia believed that it “represented a successful Western version of how the otherwise chaotic Third World ought to be run.”23 De Toledano continued his double standard argument in his next column from Rhodesia, saying that, if the nation were destroyed, it would be because the United States was pandering to the Third World. De Toledano emphasized the congeniality that existed between blacks and whites and questioned whether the same could be said of the racial climate in the United States, claiming that the civil rights movement had uprooted society and caused changes in the behavior of men and women, while bringing nothing positive to the American socioeconomic order. De Toledano saw Rhodesia’s climate, with its static racial hierarchy, as preferable to the turbulence and instability that American liberalism had brought on by judicial intervention and government enforcement. The argument was a clear indication of the fear that writers for the conservative publications had of change and the unknowns that came with it.24 In May 1967, National Review’s readers were greeted by a portrait of Rhodesia’s prime minister Ian Smith and the headline “How the U.S. Is Helping to Bring Down Rhodesia’s George Washington” emblazoned on its cover. The article, in what appeared to be a partnership with the American African Affairs Association, was a lengthy and highly favorable analysis of the current situation in Rhodesia written by James J. Kilpatrick. Kilpatrick, the longtime editor of the Richmond News Leader’s opinion page, was a passionate opponent of the civil rights movement. Revisiting many of the

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same arguments conservative commentators had made since Rhodesia had declared its independence from Britain less than two years earlier, Kilpatrick described how smoothly things were going in that country compared to current events in the United States.25 Kilpatrick praised Rhodesia’s political and economic stability, comparing it to the disorder that would ensue if the leadership in Salisbury were to pursue racial equality in a manner similar to that in the United States. “But it is not merely the atmosphere of a peaceful law and order that astounds the visitor fresh from Washington or New York,” Kilpatrick wrote in his continuing praise of Rhodesian society.26 In the essay, Kilpatrick also criticized the United Nations as an example of an outside authority interfering with the internal affairs of an independent state. Kilpatrick mocked the UN’s classification of Rhodesia as “a threat to international peace and security,” calling the African nation’s climate instead “one of utter calm” and “an astonishingly peaceful land.”27 Kilpatrick emphasized that the nation was making consistent progress toward developing into a multiracial society. When Kilpatrick did make a negative observation about the administration of the country, he made sure to reference a parallel scenario in the United States. Such examples included “the perceptive American visitor, familiar with the uneasy vibrations of our own urban life, knows that racial tensions can be sensed; but he senses none of these tensions here,” or “housing is segregated in the cities of Rhodesia (as it is within every city in the United States).”28 Kilpatrick, touching on the common theme of the double standard, criticized the inconsistency of American foreign policy: while the United States continued to trade with the Soviet Union, a nation with the goal of annihilating it, the Johnson administration boycotted Rhodesia, a nation that was not only friendly to the United States but that was anticommunist as well.29 Kilpatrick’s profile of Rhodesia was an example of the Right’s ability to overlook those details that interfered with their ideal vision of what he referred to as a “prosperous and enlightened multiracial society under construction.”30 William F. Buckley Jr. was effusive in his praise of Kilpatrick’s overwhelmingly positive analysis. In a note to the newspaper man in April 1967, Buckley referred to the piece as “an absolute sensation,” praising it as representing the author at his “absolute best . . . as an observer, an analyst, a psychologist, a theorist, a teacher. You have hit a tremendous stride and I am proud to publish you and honored to be associated with you.”31 There was praise from conservative policy makers as well. Congressman John Rar-

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ick entered the article into the Congressional Record and called Kilpatrick’s analysis “an enlightening account.” However, some disagreed with Kilpatrick’s “enlightened multiracial society” analysis. In an examination of Rhodesia published in the Journal of International Law in 1968, Myres McDougal and Michael Reisman of the Yale Law School called the Rhodesian government’s policy on political participation one of “highly discriminatory restrictiveness.” The authors concluded that the white population, which composed six percent of the country, controlled every aspect of “internal public order.”32 There were also increased clashes between liberation troops and Rhodesian security forces in August 1967, three months after Kilpatrick’s article was published. Despite censorship of the Rhodesian media’s coverage of the battles, the South African press wrote about the conflict extensively. One periodical described the intensity of the battle as “on a scale that hadn’t been known for more than seventy years.”33 The fighting lasted more than three weeks before the rebels were defeated. The armed conflicts in Rhodesia grew in the first months of 1968. The guerrillas continuously confronted Rhodesian troops as they moved back and forth across the border.34 Although the rebels were committed, Smith’s forces were able to contain the nationalist violence as he and the British continued to negotiate over greater political involvement for the country’s black population. In 1969, Smith announced that he would introduce a new constitution that he believed would satisfy the debate over majority rule. Unfortunately, Smith did nothing of the kind. In what one historian calls “a political gimmick,” the government made a pretense of integrating these groups into the foundation of the government but, in reality, gave them no authority to influence policy.35 As conditions remained static for Rhodesians of color, Smith won the 1970 election, in which all fifty seats available to white voters went to the Rhodesian Front. In the United States, conservatives were hopeful that Richard Nixon’s election would restore the country’s friendly relationship with the African nation. However, as the United States continued to flounder in Vietnam, Nixon and his national security adviser Henry Kissinger were absorbed in attempts to end the war and to improve relations with the Soviet Union through their policy of détente.36 The White House followed the situation in Rhodesia closely; although Nixon did not publicly support the regime in Salisbury, he encouraged GOP conservatives to keep Rhodesia in the national spotlight because he feared the spread of communism.

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The Right found it ridiculous that Nixon was turning his back on a staunch anticommunist ally while he was still willing to trade and negotiate with the USSR.37 National Review’s Elspeth Huxley, who had grown up on a five-hundred-acre coffee farm in colonial Kenya and who wrote frequently on African issues, emphasized the Right’s double standard argument in her appearance on Firing Line in 1970. Huxley connected the racial turbulence in the United States with US policy on Rhodesia: “[The United States] does not want to offend an enormous number of independent African nations in the United Nations. It is also because you have your terrible racial problem at home—which is tied up. Therefore, you do not want to affront African opinion.”38 As events were slowly coming to a head in the African nation, many members of Congress were angry that America refused to purchase chrome, a mineral critical in steel making, from Rhodesia, which they believed to be a peaceful anticommunist country, and was instead purchasing the product from the Soviet Union at a higher price. In 1971, however, Virginia senator Harry Byrd Jr. intervened, encouraging conservative members in Congress to pass an amendment that would allow Rhodesia to export chrome to American businesses.39 The legislation, signed into law by President Nixon in November, was an attempt by the Right to restore some credibility to what many of them saw as a hypocritical American foreign policy. The amendment coincided with Nixon and Kissinger’s attempt to open a diplomatic relationship with the People’s Republic of China—a nation many argued was a central backer of the communist movements causing turmoil in Africa. By renewing shipments of chrome to the United States, conservatives believed that they were sending a message that Washington had not given up on a friendly African nation that was in the midst of the struggle against communist insurgency. The Byrd Amendment was also a means for the Right to show its displeasure with the United Nations. Commentary in National Review suggested that the large bloc of Third World dictatorships had been using the General Assembly as a bully pulpit to elevate the negative commentary against Rhodesia by the international community.40 In the spring of 1974, Buckley went to Salisbury to interview Prime Minister Ian Smith for an episode of Firing Line. He asked Smith about the growing terrorist activity and Rhodesia’s ability to contain it. Smith, a man of formal military bearing, who had appeared on television only once before, was highly optimistic, arguing that the terrorist effort was failing because the nationalists were unable to obtain any significant support from

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the black population and the majority of the country was supportive of the government. However, Buckley did not share Smith’s optimism.41 In a column written a week after the interview, Buckley commented that the Soviets and the Chinese were increasing their input of military supplies to the rebels. While he agreed with Smith that the black population had not embraced Rhodesian guerrilla movements, Buckley believed that was because they saw little difference between Smith’s white minority government and a black government potentially under the control of Moscow or Peking. Buckley did not characterize Smith as a white supremacist, but as one who believed, as he did, that the current leadership was the more likely of the two groups to keep Rhodesia stable. On the issue of immediate majority rule, Buckley had not changed his position. However, he was pragmatic enough to realize that Smith needed to take immediate action to improve the political climate in the country or risk disaster.42 The antigovernment forces continued to be successful, and, following Nixon’s resignation in 1974, Kissinger and President Gerald Ford were concerned that Rhodesia would be the next country to fall to communism. Kissinger believed that, because the United States represented freedom and democracy around the world, persuading black Africans that America sided with them in their desire for greater political participation would help turn the tide in a region where many were favorable toward the Soviet Union. Believing that the policy needed to be personalized, Kissinger arranged a tour of Africa in April 1976. The secretary of state believed that a clear statement of US objectives was the best way to prove that America was serious about achieving majority rule in Africa, as well as to prevent Russia from gaining a greater foothold on the continent.43 In a speech delivered on April 27, 1976, while visiting Zambia’s capital, Lusaka, Kissinger spoke of America’s belief in racial justice and the importance of cooperation among all parties within Rhodesia. A week later, Human Events devoted its front page to an attack on the Ford administration’s policy toward Rhodesia and took Kissinger to task for his recent comments. The publication claimed that the administration’s objective was to cripple the Smith government, as evidenced by Kissinger’s promise of funds to Mozambique—currently a training ground for the leftist Zimbabwe African National Union’s rebel forces. In its comments, the newspaper bluntly stated that Kissinger’s strategy was to enhance America’s relationship with African nations by promoting majority rule in Rhodesia, at the expense of a government that was committed to fighting communism in the region.

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Conservatives argued that Kissinger’s position was hypocritical. Most of the states under black leadership that surrounded Rhodesia were dictatorial regimes. The editors at Human Events, though in favor of individual freedom, felt that history proved that majority rule in Africa inevitably led to chaos and Soviet-controlled governments. Representative Philip Crane of Illinois, who placed Human Events’s comments into the Congressional Record, made it clear that he was troubled by Kissinger’s comments. “How Western interests can be advanced by encouraging the destruction of proWestern, anti-communist governments is impossible to understand,” Crane stated on the floor of the House of Representatives in May 1976.44 While Kissinger’s speech was reviewed positively by many black Americans, conservatives had the opposite reaction. In a column published soon after Kissinger’s return, William F. Buckley Jr. wrote that America’s sudden interest in Rhodesian majority rule had nothing to do with racial justice or greater voter involvement by the nation’s black citizens. The real issue was to prevent Cuba (and with it, the Soviet Union) from gaining further power in the region, following leftist victories in Mozambique and Angola.45 Buckley and his colleagues viewed the Rhodesian crisis through a narrow prism. The Right believed that if voting equality was given to the black population, a Soviet-style government would emerge within the country. However, Rhodesia’s black citizens, who had struggled to forge their own political path, had no interest in becoming a superpower satellite. Smith’s continued attacks against the country’s nationalist forces made the country’s liberation movements amenable to receiving military aid from the Soviet Union and Cuba.46 As 1976 continued, nationalist guerrilla incursions into Rhodesia increased. Two years earlier, Prime Minister Smith had begun to pursue negotiations with the country’s major liberation movements, following pressure by Kissinger as well as African leaders who were concerned by growing agitation within the black community. However, negotiations between Smith and the nationalist leaders remained at a standstill, with the prime minister refusing to agree to majority rule. Meanwhile, turbulence among the insurgency discredited their unity. ZANU and the socialist Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU) quarreled over leadership. Both groups dismissed the African National Congress (ANC), represented by Methodist Bishop Abel Muzorewa, as simply a talking head with no influence. In the latter part of 1976, ZANU and ZAPU grudgingly agreed to develop a joint relationship called the Patriotic Front.47

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Kissinger met with Smith again in the fall of 1976 to discuss terms regarding a settlement for Rhodesia. One of the conditions called for majority rule over a two-year period. In response, Smith said that agreeing to Kissinger’s conditions would be the equivalent of signing his own suicide note. James Burnham did not think much of the terms either. In a column that October, he argued that the Ford administration had once again “abandoned an ally” to totalitarianism. The Right believed that America’s demands had no real credibility. In fact, the US Congress had prevented President Ford from intervening in the leftist takeover of Angola, due to fear of another Vietnam-type debacle. In the Kissinger–Smith negotiations, Burnham saw the nation’s chief diplomat bowing to the pressures of nationalist demands in the hopes of preventing another crisis similar to that in Angola.48 Human Events and National Review focused so much on the dangers of communism that they ignored the important issue of racial equality in Africa. However, Commentary’s Carl Gershman and Bayard Rustin offered a different perspective in fall 1977. The two authors believed that President Carter’s passion for human rights had led him to grossly underestimate the threat of international communism in the region. They believed that Smith and his supporters possessed “a suicidal stubbornness.” They also believed that Carter’s objectives of achieving majority rule for nations such as Rhodesia reflected his desire to appease black interests abroad and at home.49 Although the authors contended that any political system should allow majority rule, while also protecting the minority, Gershman and Rustin were emphatic that Carter must “be against elements that seek to exploit the issue to advance Soviet goals.” The authors believed that by viewing the crisis through the lens of the civil rights movement, the president had overlooked the fact that the hostile nationalist forces were receiving military support from Moscow and Havana.50 As Rhodesia’s economy continued to suffer due to the international boycott and the growing cost of its war against the nationalists, Ian Smith again tried to appease his critics. In 1978, after a lengthy negotiation, an internal settlement was reached in which Smith constructed a coalition government that involved a number of moderate black leaders, including the ANC’s Abel Muzorewa. One of the key elements Muzorewa and the other black Rhodesian representatives had in common was their dislike for the Patriotic Front. National Review was pleased when it wrote about the prospect of a settlement in the spring of that year. But the magazine remained critical of Andrew Young, who it be-

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lieved was oblivious to the threats posed by Patriotic Front leaders Robert Mugabe and Joshua Nkomo. Buckley and his colleagues viewed the settlement as unique. From their perspective, Rhodesia was becoming an integrated government without the support of surrounding states. After monitoring negotiations, American policy makers eventually sided with Young, opposing the interim settlement because it gave too much power to the white community and because anything but true majority rule was unacceptable. National Review argued that, having supported the Patriotic Front, Carter would be responsible if Mugabe and Nkomo came to power. Conservatives were livid with Carter’s decision. Human Events believed that Carter and his foreign policy advisers were focused on achieving a narrow interest: appeasement of those African states that they believed had been exploited throughout history. While that strategy may well have strengthened their support in the African American community, Carter and his colleagues had chosen to ignore the financial and military support the Patriotic Front received from the Eastern Bloc. James Burnham agreed and observed that American foreign policy continued to be in an uncertain position following the disaster in Vietnam. The columnist argued that not confronting the Soviet Union only weakened US interests in Africa, as seen in Soviet successes in Angola and Mozambique.51 As war casualties mounted, Smith called another election in the spring of 1979 to try to enhance the legitimization of the government crafted by the internal settlement. A number of commentators and academics served as international observers of the election process, including conservative columnist M. Stanton Evans, who viewed the Rhodesian situation as an ideological issue as opposed to a racial one.52 Evans perceived the nation’s troubles through the lens of the Cold War and believed that the major objective was to prevent communist elements from gaining a greater foothold in Africa. Another observer was the African American political activist and writer Bayard Rustin, who wrote a lengthy article for Commentary in May of that year to document his experiences. Although Muzorewa had been unequivocally elected prime minister, the Carter administration did not view the election as legitimate. Rustin’s article raised themes similar to those already discussed in Human Events and National Review. One of his key points was that while the election may have been fair, the Carter administration’s main concern was to placate blacks in Africa and those in the United States who had been critical to Carter’s election. Rustin’s argument was ironic because, as one of the

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major organizers of the 1963 March on Washington, he might have been on the side of the Carter administration. However, Rustin, a passionate anticommunist, was concerned about greater incursion of the Soviet Union into Africa. The administration, in its desire for credibility with African leaders, focused primarily on the right of every person to be represented at the polls, with concern about the dangers of communism as an afterthought. Rustin believed the United States had little confidence in its ability to shape events. The experience in Vietnam had caused the American public to doubt itself and had caused its leaders to believe that the Soviet Union was more formidable and confident than it actually was.53 In agreement with Rustin, National Review said there was no upside to the Carter administration’s characterization of the election as illegitimate. The magazine bluntly called the administration’s continued support of the Patriotic Front “morally and politically bankrupt” and concluded by referring to the American policy as “evil.” The conservative outlet called the administration’s belief that Nkomo, Mugabe, and their colleagues were interested in participating in the democratic process a fantasy.54 Carter’s decision was influenced by concern about the reaction of Cuba and the Soviet Union to the internal settlement. Cuba had informed the United States at the end of 1978 that, if a fair settlement was not reached in Rhodesia, Havana might be forced to take action.55 Another potential factor in Carter’s decision was the need to protect Nigeria, a critical supplier of oil to the United States. The role these factors played showed that Carter was a political realist.56 Carter’s decision was critical to a ceasefire agreement signed at the end of December 1979; it established a British administrator and a team of officials charged with preparing for another election. At that point, the Patriotic Front disintegrated, as Mugabe and Nkomo’s parties ran in the election as separate entities. British observers accused Mugabe’s followers of violence and intimidation; but, when all the ballots had been counted, Mugabe emerged as the first prime minister of the nation, which now returned to its original name, Zimbabwe, in April 1980.57 The Rhodesian election results were a move toward Soviet influence. Writers for Human Events, National Review, and Commentary expressed frustration and a feeling of helplessness. William F. Buckley Jr. argued that Mugabe had accepted aid from the USSR and was, thus, yet another puppet in debt to the Soviets for his electoral success; he and others believed it was just a matter of time before the Kremlin began collecting payment on their investment. Buckley’s commentary called the loss of the anticommunist gov-

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ernment in Rhodesia another defeat for American credibility. Conservatives argued that Washington, to appease an ethnic population abroad and at home, had imposed its will on a nonbelligerent, anticommunist government that had been making progress, slowly, toward democracy and had, in the process, enabled another victory by the forces of totalitarianism in the Third World and destroyed US credibility with its allies.58 Commentator M. Stanton Evans, recalling those events in a 2013 interview, said, “Mugabe was the favorite of our State Department, he was the favorite of the British Foreign Office, he was a known Marxist, a known dictator in waiting. He is there still, because of us.”59 The crisis in Rhodesia served the agenda of the publications of conservative opinion and their constituencies in a number of ways. Human Events and National Review were able to present an alternative vision of how race relations should be conducted. Their portrayal of a semblance of order within Rhodesian society, while setting aside the racial hierarchy and marginalization of black citizens, gave conservative policy makers a powerful tool. The right wing of the GOP contrasted the situation in Rhodesia, as presented in the publications, with the disorder that they viewed as a result of the civil rights movement in the United States. Editors for publications such as Commentary also used their criticism of US relations with Rhodesia to criticize an American foreign policy that they saw in retreat around the world. Dilemmas abroad were not the only issues of concern for publications on the Right. As Ronald Reagan began his presidential campaign with hopes of rescuing America from its economic troubles at home and foreign policy dilemmas abroad, the national anxiety about the future seemed only to grow. Amid frustration over rising gasoline prices due to a dangerous oil shortage, in September 1979 the United States suddenly found itself literally held hostage by the newly created Islamic Republic of Iran, a country that had historically been one of America’s staunchest allies in the Middle East.

7

The Pathology of Inaction The Dilemma of Middle Eastern Oil and the Iranian Hostage Crisis, 1973–1980 In early January 1980, Ronald Reagan was the featured guest on Firing Line, hosted by his good friend William F. Buckley Jr.1 Reagan had announced two months earlier that he would compete for that year’s GOP presidential nomination, and Buckley conducted his interview as though Reagan were already president. Early in the conversation, the conservative commentator asked “President” Reagan how he would address the problem of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the recent announcement that it had chosen to raise the price of oil to fifty dollars a barrel. Reagan believed that much of “the energy crisis” was of America’s own making.2 However, Buckley wondered if more aggressive actions needed to be considered. Publications, such as Commentary, had raised the idea of the United States using force against OPEC to prevent interference with its supply of oil. Reagan was not passionate about the idea of what he called “a return to the old imperial days.” However, the presidential candidate believed that the United States’ inability to respond to the economic aggression of OPEC was another example of the weakness that had been at the heart of American foreign policy for decades. The energy crisis that critically affected the United States during the 1970s was seen by writers for the conservative press as another instance of America’s inability to respond to Third World aggressions. Conservatives contended that Third World states manipulated resources in order to gain greater power in their relationships with the United States and the Soviet Union. Human Events and National Review argued that the nation’s depen-

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dence on foreign oil continued to grow because of numerous regulations imposed on energy producers by the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations. And, as they had done for years, representatives of the conservative press implied that America’s foreign policy was being increasingly undercut due to flaws in its domestic agenda. Conservatives contended that, as the United States struggled to revive its fortunes in a post-Vietnam world, it had to free itself from hostile forces at home and abroad in order to regain national greatness. Reagan and his supporters at Human Events, National Review, and Commentary capitalized on the theme of national revival in the areas of economic and foreign policy as the country moved into the presidential election of 1980.3

Background Information on the Oil Crisis of the 1970s As America entered the 1970s, the issue of foreign oil was such a low national security priority for the United States that Henry Kissinger knew virtually nothing about the subject. Kissinger’s boss, President Richard Nixon, also seemed uninterested; six months before the oil embargo cut the United States off from its oil supply, he told his chief of staff, H. R. Haldeman, that the topic was “escapist” and that he needed to focus on “the big game.” But soon the issue of foreign oil would become one of the biggest foreign policy crises the administration would face.4 Kissinger later recalled that when Nixon first came into office the nation’s oil supply was plentiful and the price was low. At the end of the 1960s America was importing only 20 percent of its oil. Many energy experts believed that the nation had sources of oil that would last indefinitely. As Kissinger described the situation, the government chose to keep production below maximum capacity in order to set the price slightly higher than the global rate. At the time, the administration continued to give members of the oil industry the incentive to explore new sources of production. The higher price had been combined with a strict quota system that had been in place since the Eisenhower administration in 1959. That program limited the amount of foreign oil that could be imported into the United States, thus giving American oil interests even more of an incentive to enhance America’s oil supply.5 OPEC, the cartel that administered the price and production of the world’s oil, had little power. That point was illustrated when a coalition of Arab states ordered an embargo of its oil to the United States following the Johnson administration’s support of Israel during the Middle Eastern con-

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flict of 1967. That embargo was a failure. America’s domestic supply and assistance from the Shah of Iran easily countered the Arab attempt to use their oil as a weapon to compel the United States to desert its new ally, Israel. The failure of the Arab embargo was such a strong symbolic victory for the American oil industry that US energy interests became overconfident. Additionally, although the nation’s use of energy increased by 50 percent during the 1960s, the public continued to believe it had an infinite supply.6 That complacency led American officials to take other potential natural energy sources for granted. While the supply of oil may not have been as abundant as it once was, the country had plenty of other avenues to supplement its energy supply, including coal and natural gas as well as other sources of oil. However, Democrats enacted legislation to strengthen environmental laws, and these new regulations made it difficult for energy producers to gain easy access to petroleum and other sources of energy.7 While conservatives had expected Nixon’s domestic agenda to be about cutting regulations, the administration appeared to do the exact opposite. The Right believed that the president’s decision to sign legislation that created the Environmental Protection Agency and his support of the Clean Air Act handicapped the ability of the oil industry to drill for new sources of crude. In a further blow to energy interests, the administration reduced the oil depletion allowance, a series of large tax breaks that oil, gas, and other energy producers had been enjoying since the 1920s.8 That move irritated oil company executives, as did Nixon’s decision to impose price controls as part of his economic plan to curb inflation in the summer of 1971. As the price of oil remained static at home, the global price began to rise. As business interests searched for new oil opportunities, they were hampered by an environmental lobby that waged a powerful campaign to prevent oil exploration in Alaska and California and on the continental shelf.9 The success of these and other environmental legislative efforts made it more challenging for the energy industry to gain access to land that contained these domestic energy resources. Due to the decline in US oil production, the inability of the energy industry to utilize key natural resources, and increased energy usage by the public, the nation relied more and more on imports of foreign oil. By 1973 the country was importing 6.2 million barrels per day, compared to 3.2 million in 1970.10 The oil situation began to affect events internationally as well. In 1968, Great Britain, whose eight thousand troops had served as a buffer that prevented the Soviet Union from establishing a position in the Persian Gulf,

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announced that it was withdrawing its forces from the region by the end of 1971. Thus, London would no longer offer protection to those Arab nations that contained large portions of the world’s oil. At the time, the United States remained bogged down in Vietnam and was unable to fill the geopolitical vacuum left by the British. However, when the Soviet Navy increased its forces in the Indian Ocean, the Nixon administration worried that the Soviet military presence in the area might block the United States’ access to oil. But Moscow’s decision to move its forces into the area had been motivated more by “its desire to counter the influence of China” than by a wish to confront the United States over the region’s oil supply.11 There were tensions in the Middle East over the United States’ continued support of Israel. The instability in the area increased in the fall of 1969, when Libya came under the control of Muammar Qaddafi. Before Qaddafi, Libya had been a rare source of oil to the United States outside the Persian Gulf, but it now joined Iraq, South Yemen, and Syria in friendship with the Soviet Union. In years past, the United States would have been happy to cut its ties with Libya. However, with the United States’ oil surplus nearly depleted, Kissinger and Nixon concluded that it was more important to “seek to establish satisfactory relations with the new regime.”12 By 1970, the United States saw its sources of oil rapidly dissipating. Libya was the first among a number of nations in the region that decided to raise the price of crude. Qaddafi first decided to increase the rate of taxation by 55 percent on the companies that purchased its oil. Eventually, OPEC declared that rate to be standard for the members of the cartel and announced that they would engage in an embargo against any company that did not agree to that percentage. The following year, Libya initiated the rise of oil prices again; Qaddafi and a number of other Arab leaders informed the major European oil companies that the cost had risen from $2.55 a barrel to $3.45. As if that increase was not enough, Europeans also agreed to the Arab nations’ demand for an additional tax increase of 60 percent.13 Near the end of that year, Libya and Iraq nationalized concessions that had been held by American and European oil companies. OPEC soon followed suit, announcing that Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and a number of other Arab states would henceforth own 25 percent interest in all Western oil companies that operated in their countries, with that interest to rise to 51 percent in twelve years. Over the next two years the nationalization of interests held by the Western oil conglomerates continued. In September 1973 Qaddafi seized 50 percent of interests held by a num-

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ber of other Western oil companies, including Mobil and Shell.14 The aggressive tactics used by the Libyan leader and a number of his colleagues to take advantage of Western business interests soon caught the eye of members of the conservative press.

“The Fight for Oil”15 National Review mentioned Qaddafi’s economic aggression in its weekly newsletter during fall 1973. The brief article said that while Qaddafi had failed to enhance his power within the Arab world, he had succeeded in using oil as a weapon against the United States.16 The magazine also reported that other nations in the region, such as Saudi Arabia and Yemen, were using oil as a means to pressure the Nixon administration to be less supportive of Israel. In keeping with its laissez-faire philosophy, the conservative outlet acknowledged that because oil was in high demand and those countries possessed a large supply, it would have been economically foolish for them not to try to obtain the highest price possible. The conservative press believed that America and its European allies needed to find sources of energy elsewhere so they would not be the victims of economic blackmail by Libya and other Arab nations.17 The argument would be one that National Review and Human Events frequently made throughout the decade. The publications criticized US public policy for restricting the energy industry’s access to key domestic sources of natural gas, coal, and oil. The Right believed that lifting these environmental regulations could end the nation’s reliance on Middle Eastern crude. For the Arab world, oil was no longer just a source of economic power, but also one that could be leveraged to gain political power. Conservatives on Capitol Hill agreed with the conservative publications that the United States was following a dangerous path by becoming so dependent on oil from the OPEC states. Senator Dewey Bartlett of Oklahoma criticized administration policy, saying that the White House and Congress “refuse to face up to the fact that foreign nations are beginning to push us around.” The congressman urged his colleagues “to increase our domestic supplies of conventional fuels.” In Bartlett’s opinion that also meant removing price controls that he believed had severely hurt American industry. Bartlett’s statements were echoed by Senator Paul Fannin of Arizona, who commented in early September, “If we do not act soon, we will be totally at the mercy of these nations.”18 In the midst of these events, Walter Laqueur and Edward Luttwak de-

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cided to coauthor an article in Commentary about the activities of the Arab world and its strategy to use oil as a political weapon against the United States and other nations. The article was to be called “Oil,” and Laqueur contended he had “no doubt it will be widely quoted and possibly reprinted because it discusses the economic and political implications of the oil crisis in a way that has not been done before and in the end we still come out on the side of the angels.”19 In a reply to Laqueur a few days later, Norman Podhoretz commented that while he was not unhappy with the article’s premise, there was a fine line between a piece that was “an overly technical article” and “one such as appears every day in the press. This is after all, an article for Commentary, which means that it needs to be accessible to the general reader as well as accessible to ‘people in the know.’” While the editor in chief hoped his publication would influence public policy, he sought to expand the appeal of the magazine to reach as broad a readership as possible.20 Laqueur and Luttwak’s essay, published in October 1973, reported that, from an economic point of view, Arab oil suppliers had the upper hand and there appeared to be little hope of change. While the situation might change if the United States chose to distance itself from Israel, the oil-producing states were so wealthy that they had no incentive to change the rate they charged the West. The authors quoted an expert on the oil industry who believed that the State Department was “responsible for the present crisis.”21 Laqueur and Luttwak wrote that although some hoped that the United States would push back against OPEC through sanctions, the idea was not realistic because “the people who were supposed to be watching that side of the world were on the pay roll.”22 While there is no way to ascertain the accuracy of Luttwak’s statements, the high global demand for oil suggested that attempts to placate the Middle Eastern oil interests were not about to stop. The Right argued that the only way to counter what they viewed as economic blackmail was for the West to unite in some kind of forceful response.”23 Laqueur and Luttwak believed, as did those at National Review, that it was critical that the United States find a substitute for foreign oil. They also thought that Washington should make a symbolic show of “soft power” in the area of the Gulf states to advise them that a deliberate slowdown in production was not advisable. While neither Laqueur nor Luttwak believed that an embargo was likely, they concluded that a stronger statement from the West was needed, contending that the United States was allowing itself

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to be intimidated by a group of nations that did not come close to it in either military or industrial might.24 While Nixon tried to solve the dilemma of how to make the country less dependent on Middle Eastern oil, international events intervened. On October 6, 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a sudden attack on Israel during Yom Kippur. When the United States offered Israel support, OPEC cut its supply of oil, which caused the US supply to drop by 10 percent. The embargo had a strong impact on the nation’s economy: oil prices soared and Americans waited in long gas lines.25 Historian Meg Jacobs argues that the public saw high gas prices as signs of “the nation’s imminent decay.” Some members of the public believed that OPEC and the oil companies were to blame for the crisis. Others believed that the government had moved too slowly either to prepare the country or alert it that such a situation could occur.26 National Review, pessimistic about the nation’s prognosis, was not particularly sympathetic toward the public. “Americans can’t claim that nobody warned us about the energy outlook,” the editors wrote in late 1973. “The warnings have been coming so thick and heavy that they drowned each other out.” The conservative publication believed that the West had simply become too dependent on OPEC and the cartel had finally decided to capitalize on the situation. The magazine described the United States as “feckless” because it had allowed itself to become “so dependent on a handful of men of alien culture and habit.” The magazine’s dismissive rhetoric reflected the shortsighted conservative view that any nonwhite or non-Christian group of people was ignorant and inferior.27 However, while the editors criticized the Arab world, they believed that the “energy crisis”—which they called “an overly used name”—was of America’s own making, a result of an extensive period of reliance on resources from abroad. Advocates of the free market believed a positive climate needed to be created, which would include a lessening of government regulations, which, in turn, would allow the energy industry to prosper and enable the country to rely on its own natural resources. National Review’s language may have been particularly hostile because of its opposition to the Nixon administration’s attempt to pass the National Emergency Energy Act. The bill, which was never signed into law, would have given Nixon wide executive power that he believed would have dramatically helped the country restore its energy self-sufficiency.28 National Review had focused on the problems of Richard Nixon’s domestic agenda but had said little about the Middle Eastern conflict and its geopolitical impact on the United States. James Burnham explored that issue

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in greater depth in late 1973. In his column, Burnham blamed the administration’s “amorphous” policy of détente, which had been unable to prevent the Soviet Union from causing instability around the world. Egypt and Syria were the protagonists in the conflict with Israel, but Burnham said that the USSR was just as much to blame because it had supplied arms to the two Arab countries and was well aware of their agenda. Moscow had pressured other states in the region to join the offensive, which Burnham said proved to the Right that détente was a mirage.29 In National Review’s criticism of détente and America’s unpreparedness for an oil shortage, the publication was criticizing in a broader sense what it perceived as the country’s weakened state during the early 1970s.30 The magazine’s commentary also reflected the Right’s belief that the country lacked the will to overcome the challenges that it was encountering from an empowered Arab world and an aggressive Soviet Union.31 As the oil crisis continued into 1974, James Burnham reflected on Laqueur and Luttwak’s assessment of the potential of military intervention by the West should the oil crisis worsen. Burnham critiqued détente, arguing that the Soviet Union had aggressively contributed to the Middle Eastern conflict by supplying weapons to Arab countries and by broadcasting propaganda against the United States and Israel through its radio communication facilities in the Third World. Although the Soviets did not directly cause the US oil crisis, Moscow did indirectly benefit from it by increasing its share of the oil market. Due to its abundant reserves in Siberia, by 1974 the Soviets had passed the United States as the world’s leading producer of oil.32 While Burnham had written only briefly about the Soviet Union’s involvement in the oil embargo, a month later Human Events’s foreign affairs contributor DeWitt S. Copp discussed the subject in greater detail.33 Copp, who had been a pilot in the Army Air Corps during World War II, wrote frequently about Cold War issues. He believed that the policy of détente was to blame for continuing instances of international turbulence, including the ongoing embargo. The article, which reflected the anger of much of the public, claimed that the Soviet Union had initiated the Arab attack on Israel by supplying them with arms and other supplies, citing evidence similar to that used by Burnham. Copp gave extensive examples of Soviet broadcast and print propaganda to argue that Moscow was not only behind the new conflict in the Middle East, but that it had used its media to inspire the Arab states to continue their oil boycott against the United States. The Right believed that the Soviets had an incentive to cut the United States’ oil supply:

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to attempt to cripple US military infrastructure and allow the Soviets to take advantage of key geopolitical positions around the world.34 The embargo crisis subsided when seven of the nine nations that had initiated the action against the United States decided to bring it to an end. Many in the media wrote positively of Henry Kissinger’s diplomatic abilities in solving the crisis, but Human Events was unimpressed; a front-page editorial in late March 1974 argued that, whereas Kissinger may have publicly praised Moscow for its assistance in arranging for the Arabs to lift the embargo, the image did not fit reality. Human Events, which contended that Kissinger had weakened US foreign policy, criticized the secretary of state for not being honest with the American public. The editors argued that the Russians had done nothing to help end the embargo and, in fact, had done everything possible to keep it going. While the conservative newspaper may have been correct in its argument that the United States had been able to survive the embargo by receiving oil from other producers, such as Iran, it was also true that the Arab states had successfully used “oil as an instrument of international relations to achieve Arab objectives.”35 Edward Luttwak agreed with Burnham and others on the Right that the Arab states must be confronted over their economic blackmail of the West. In his article “Farewell to Oil?” written in the spring of 1974, Luttwak asked whether Western nations were prepared to allow a small community to control a vital resource. Although many commentators believed that the United States lacked the will to engage in what could only be described as an old-style imperialistic campaign, in early January 1974, Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger had “publically warned of the possibility of reprisals against oil producers.” Schlesinger’s comments expressed the frustration among those on the Right. Their belief that the United States had become trapped in a state of “stoicism and passivity” had led a number of commentators to argue for some kind of military offensive to restore American credibility around the world. Many conservatives appeared to believe that a successful military action in the Persian Gulf might heal the paralysis they believed had crippled American foreign policy.36 Human Events contributor and military analyst Colonel Robert Heinl Jr. had been an artillery officer at Pearl Harbor during the Japanese attack and had also been a member of the battalion that landed at Inchon during the Korean conflict; he continued to raise the possibility of military action against OPEC in the latter part of 1974. In his column entitled “Thinking the Unthinkable,” Heinl suggested steps that the United States should take

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if there was another embargo by OPEC. Contradicting those who said an attack on a series of autonomous states would be unjustified, Heinl argued that in a possible scenario of “capitulation to foreigners as the price for survival,” a military response should be considered. Heinl sketched out a geographic strategy that would allow America to use its military resources to seize oil fields in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and other areas. However, the author believed the United States lacked the political will for such an initiative. He argued, as had Burnham, that the inability of the public to come to terms with the nation’s desperate situation led to the country’s inability to defend its national interests in the face of international aggression.37 In the same issue, Jeffrey Hart paralleled Heinl’s argument, criticizing the United States’ weakness that resulted in it being manipulated by “mini states.” Hart concluded that, if the United States was unable to harness its great industrial and military power to solve its problems with OPEC, then “we deserve to go down.” Both authors contended that the United States had been at the height of military and economic power at the end of World War II but was now at a low point at home and abroad.38 While the articles in Human Events and National Review intimated that a show of force against the oil cartel was something to be seriously considered, the concept took center stage in early 1975 in a series of lengthy pieces on oil and American power by Johns Hopkins academic Robert W. Tucker. In his article in Commentary, “Oil: The Issue of U.S. Intervention,” Tucker advocated that the United States secure oil in the Persian Gulf to prevent itself from being held hostage by the OPEC nations. Tucker’s article reflected the belief of many of the publication’s editors that America’s foreign policy was no longer in line with the country’s national interests and that an alternative strategy was required. Tucker’s embrace of American power was ironic; he had originally believed that the United States’ broad use of the military, including its involvement in Vietnam, had been a waste of time, energy, and valuable resources.39 However, Tucker believed that the oil crisis had changed the geopolitical climate. “We were very dependent on foreign oil at this time and in the context of the Cold War. The Russians had an edge over us since they had their own oil,” Tucker recalled in 2014.40 Seeing the crisis as a “huge change in international relations,” Tucker intended to submit an article to Foreign Affairs. When his essay was rejected, Tucker sent it to Commentary in late 1974, at the suggestion of his former student Edward Luttwak.41 Tucker’s essay began by echoing the opinions of the conservative press. The author

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claimed that the American public could no longer rely on an indefinite supply of oil, a statement that, as Tucker later recalled, “turned out to be massively exaggerated.” The scholar found it odd that the crisis had provoked no significant talk of force. In the past, if a vital interest of a great power had been under threat, a military response would have been undertaken. Tucker saw the shadow of Vietnam as a major factor in the United States’ decision not to use force to deal with the Arab states. The author understood that a decision to use force would meet with great displeasure at home as well as around the world. However, he criticized the policy that allowed the United States to sell weapons to a nation such as Saudi Arabia, which had also participated in the oil embargo, a contradictory policy that he claimed was hypocritical and damaging to America’s international credibility. In a similar argument to that of Colonel Robert Heinl Jr., Tucker outlined key positions in the Persian Gulf that would give the US military the opportunity to secure oil for American needs, saying that if such an offensive would prove to be unsuccessful, it would be due not to the military power of the Arab world but to the inadequate preparation of the United States.42 Tucker’s criticism was similar to the Right’s criticism of détente; he seemed to agree with conservative critics that part of the world wanted to humble the United States as a kind of revenge for the many decades of Western exploitation. The success of the Arab nations empowered the Third World, helping it to create a formidable coalition in the United Nations. Tucker implied that the empowerment of these states in Asia, Africa, and Latin America indicated that the United States no longer possessed the same power it once had in international affairs.43 In his article, Tucker seemed to concur with Podhoretz and others at Commentary that America was suffering from “a failure of nerve.” However, in a 2014 interview, Tucker disagreed with that assertion. He stated that, while he was certainly conservative when it came to foreign policy, he did not share the commitment to what he called the “adventurism” or “crusade for democracy” of many members of the conservative press.44 Reflecting on his strong critique of US foreign policy during the 1970s, Tucker said, “We didn’t respond to events the way I thought we should have.”45 However, despite his seeming call for aggressive US military action, Tucker stated that his conservatism continued to reflect his reservations about US intervention in areas not critical to national interests, a concern seen in the author’s doubts about US intervention in Vietnam. The article caused controversy as soon as it was released. Tucker’s anal-

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ysis received coverage by Tom Wicker in the New York Times. The Wall Street Journal was “sympathetic” to Tucker’s position and claimed that if OPEC continued on its current path “we are indeed likely to see what Mr. Tucker fears: international chaos.”46 Although Tucker had expected the article to get some attention, he was stunned at all the interest it generated, including an appearance on William F. Buckley Jr.’s program Firing Line. Podhoretz was so surprised by the reaction that he insisted Tucker write a sequel. The follow-up, “Further Reflections on Oil and Force,” published in March 1975, clarified Tucker’s previous observations and responded to criticism of his position. The author said that those who refused to admit that force might be necessary were oblivious to the state of the world.47 However, nearly forty years later, Tucker reflected that while he certainly had had a “gloomy view of American foreign policy during the 1970s” and while “it was one that fit in with much of conservative thought,” he had not believed as intensely as had Buckley, Burnham, or Podhoretz that the nation was in retreat. “It was all a matter of degree,” Tucker said.48 Following Tucker’s essay, little discussion appeared in either Human Events or National Review about how to deal with the dilemma of American access to foreign oil. The Middle East was far too critical to the nation’s survival to risk a deadly confrontation that could make the situation worse, and the Right realized that the United States could do little to gain an advantage over the oil-producing nations without making some kind of distasteful deal with the Soviet Union. Walter Laqueur, however, argued in August 1975 that America was in denial about an oil crisis, another instance of “the period of illusion” in which the country found itself.49 Although the embargo continued through early March 1974, many in the conservative press ignored the subject of US intervention in the Middle East and focused on the argument that excessive government regulation was responsible for the current “energy crisis.” Human Events’s comments were often the most combative. In early 1974, the newspaper took Capitol Hill to task for blaming the crisis on the oil companies. In a front-page editorial in early February 1974, the editors chastised Democratic Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson for leading a “senatorial lynch-mob” that accused the major oil corporations of creating the massive demand for oil in order to enlarge their profits. Jackson was able to tap into public anger, which enhanced his national profile and helped him pass legislation to create the Federal Energy Office, which placed extensive regulations on the oil industry. Human Events claimed that these regulations prevented the energy sec-

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tor from finding new sources of oil and natural gas. The staff of National Review, which prided itself on its sense of humor, argued that the regulations were so extreme that oil corporations should move their operations to a nation that had a more favorable business environment “like the Soviet Union.” These articles expressed the belief that, while weakness in US foreign policy was allowing the Soviets to win the Cold War abroad, America was also losing its battle for continuing economic independence and industrial creativity at home.50 Constantly searching for ways to increase Commentary’s audience, Norman Podhoretz asked Robert Tucker to write an article every few years that analyzed the climate of the oil crisis and the United States’ response. The first installment, “Oil and American Power—Three Years Later” appeared in January 1977. The piece contended that the United States’ failure in Vietnam correlated directly with its inability to utilize force in the Persian Gulf. Tucker claimed that the United States’ continuing passivity empowered OPEC and its partners in the Third World and that if a group of small, militarily undeveloped nations were allowed to gain an economic and political victory over the United States, then that would give legitimacy to many other nations that believed their resources had been exploited throughout history. Tucker portrayed the United States as “impotent” in its attempts to reestablish its credibility as a force in the world.51 As Tucker wrote about the country’s growing loss of autonomy, Jimmy Carter announced his plan to combat the energy crisis in April 1977. During the 1976 campaign, candidate Carter had favored some deregulation, but the plan he put forward as president was quite different. Telling the American people that the domestic situation was dire and would require a great deal of sacrifice, Carter unveiled a series of initiatives that would raise the price of energy through a series “of government mandated price increases and higher taxes.” While conservatives had been pleased with Carter’s aggressive human rights agenda, his plans to confront the energy problems were viewed dubiously.52 Human Events labeled Carter’s initiative as an “anti-energy package” and referred to the proposed cabinet-level energy department as “an engine for socialism.” This reflected no change in the paper’s ideology; the editors had reacted negatively to President Nixon’s plan to solve the energy dilemma years earlier. The conservative weekly described the plan as full of taxes and regulations that did nothing to stimulate the nation’s energy supply or assist those who hoped to find new resources of oil and natural gas. Ronald

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Reagan chimed in, stating in the summer of 1977 that “govt. controls have reduced our production of petroleum and interfered with exploration leading to development of new producing oil fields.”53 Overall, the plan was greeted by the Right as “a technocratic plan beyond the wildest imagination of the frothiest New Dealer.” Human Events attacked the plan with a piece entitled “How Liberals Caused the Energy Crisis,” which claimed that extensive government intervention had hurt the oil industry and, thus, created the conditions that the country now faced. It was not only those on the Right who disliked Carter’s plan. In one poll, 80 percent of voters believed that Carter’s proposals would cause them financial hardship and resented the president for blaming them for the nation’s troubles. Among those unhappy with the president’s plan, Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill commented, “I took one look at it and groaned.” Carter had little experience with the workings of Congress and was uninterested in strong-arming his colleagues on Capitol Hill; his plan divided the Democratic Party. Although the bill successfully moved through the House of Representatives, it had much less success in the Senate, where it was significantly watered down. The president finally signed it more than a year after it had been announced. Conservatives were opposed to excessive regulatory measures that restricted free markets and economic growth. Presidents Nixon, Ford, and Carter had all spoken about the necessity of ending America’s dependence on foreign oil, yet each had imposed regulations that did nothing to open new markets or encourage American business to search for alternative sources of energy. But as the president struggled to find a solution for the energy crisis at home, Mohammad Reza, the Shah of Iran, one of America’s few allies in the region as well as one of its only consistent oil suppliers in the Arab world, was on the verge of being overthrown.54

“Handcuffed in Iran”55 When the British decided to vacate the Persian Gulf in 1968, many in the Arab world, including the Shah of Iran, were concerned about who would fill the vacuum. Due to its massive oil holdings, Iran had been prospering, and the Shah believed it was critical to enhance his military power and to take a larger role in the affairs of the region. To that end, Iran purchased large numbers of weapons from the United States. As Iran’s economic fortunes continued to improve, with its oil earnings increasing from $1.1 billion in 1970 to $2.4 billion in 1972, Richard Nixon allowed the Shah to purchase even more weapons from American manufacturers. When

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the Shah decided not to participate in the 1973 oil embargo, the United States and Iran grew even closer, and Iran spent $11.9 billion with numerous American companies in 1974. The United States assisted the Shah and his administration economically and militarily in return for Iran’s promise to stabilize the Persian Gulf and prevent Soviet encroachment.56 Iran’s decision not to participate in the oil embargo received positive publicity in the conservative press. In the summer of 1974, Eric Brodin wrote in Human Events that Iran was in the midst of a “social and economic revolution.” The author gave a glowing description of the country’s administration as it embraced modern techniques in the areas of farming, education, and medicine. Brodin also praised Iran’s efforts to improve the economy of the Third World by creating partnerships with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. While many in that region thought the West was in decline, Brodin argued that the Shah’s investment efforts were emblematic of his confidence in Western institutions and, indeed, the West itself.57 A year later, National Review’s Erik Kuehnelt-Leddihn also wrote a flattering column about Iran’s rapid industrialization efforts and called the Shah a “formidable monarch.” Conservative policy makers were quite fond of the Shah as well. Barry Goldwater had visited Tehran in 1973 and described the Iranian leader’s efforts to improve the lives of the people and solve the problems of the nation as spectacular. The Shah’s popularity among the American political establishment, and among conservatives in particular, was understandable. The monarch was an anticommunist and backed up his beliefs by his efforts to keep the Soviet Union out of the Persian Gulf. He was also sympathetic toward Western ideas, which made Washington enthusiastic about the possibility of a strong relationship.58 However, the Right had not written or spoken about the level of disenchantment that was growing among the Iranian population. The country, known for its burgeoning economy, had also gained a reputation for political repression. By 1974, when Human Events published its article on Iran, the Shah had authorized construction of a number of new prisons to house the multiplying number of people arrested and brutally tortured for crimes against the state. Growing opposition to his regime finally caused the Shah to initiate a number of democratic reforms in 1976.59 When Jimmy Carter took office in 1977, the rumblings of discontent over the Shah had increased, and the decline in oil revenues had brought the nation’s economy to a standstill. A depression in agriculture led to a large

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migration of people to Iran’s cities in search of work. At the same time, those in urban areas began to see their jobs disappear. Corruption within the government, along with the alienation of the business community due to a flawed plan to fight inflation, strained the country’s social fabric.60 In the latter part of the year, when President Carter met the Shah in Washington at the presidential park known as the Ellipse, the leaders were greeted by a mob of angry Iranians who were studying in the United States. In its coverage, National Review chastised the protesters for their excessive sense of entitlement, saying that they were shortsighted and lacked appreciation for the opportunities they had been given.61 Ronald Reagan did not understand the reasons for the protest either. In a May 1978 broadcast, he described his recent visit to Iran, praising the Shah’s efforts to modernize the society and criticizing the Western media for not giving more positive coverage of the Persian nation’s progress. Reagan also complimented the Iranian leader for his strategic help that had prevented the Soviet Union from impeding Western interests in the Persian Gulf. Reagan and National Review, arguing to their conservative base, claimed that the disorder that was occurring abroad was directly related to the evercontinuing drift of the United States away from its commitment to global security.62 The magazine said that the Iranian students’ behavior was symbolic of the growing disorder in Iranian society. President Carter appeared oblivious to the situation when he visited Iran at the end of 1978 and declared it to be “an island of stability in one of the more troubled areas of the world.” While Carter may have been impressed with the country’s industrialization, his administration was unaware of the depth of the crisis in Iran. Lacking information about the dynamics of Iranian history and culture, Carter’s foreign policy team reacted too slowly to address the crisis effectively.63 Buckley and his colleagues characterized the Iranian students as hypocrites who, despite labeling the United States as evil incarnate, took advantage of such fruits of the West as drinking liquor, gambling, and wearing Western clothes. The editors also critiqued Carter mildly for focusing on the upcoming Camp David Accords rather than on the instability in Iran. The Right contended that the Soviet Union would see the instability in Iran as an opportunity to strengthen its position in the Persian Gulf. James Burnham agreed, stating that if Iran did collapse, the Soviets would be able to gain a foothold in the area that controlled the flow of oil to the West. Carter’s national security adviser, Zbigniew Brzezinski, seemed to concur, commenting that the loss of Iran as an ally “would be the most massive American defeat

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since the beginning of the Cold War.”64 However, due to pressing issues such as the Camp David Accords and the second SALT agreement, the Carter administration was unable to intervene on behalf of the Shah’s regime until it was too late.65 William F. Buckley Jr. claimed that keeping the Shah on the throne was critical to “the national interest” of the United States, even if the Iranian leader’s powers were limited. Appearing to agree, Carter’s national security team in Washington called on the Shah to make a show of force against what had become an unruly populace.66 During 1978, the Iranian leader did the opposite, initiating a series of reforms that he hoped would stabilize the regime. A large number of political prisoners were freed, and the Shah also raised the possibility of holding democratic elections the following year. Despite those reforms, the Shah was toppled in a violent revolution at the beginning of 1979.67 National Review blamed the Carter State Department’s poor understanding of Islamic fundamentalism, which had played a powerful role in the downfall of the regime. However, the opponents of the Carter administration also underestimated the power of the Shah’s opponents, including the followers of Ayatollah Khomeini, who sought to overthrow the regime. Laqueur and Luttwak’s 1973 article “Oil” had mentioned that, while Iran’s program of modernization was moving rapidly, the Shah appeared oblivious to the considerable opposition the initiative had received across the political spectrum.68 This lack of core support for the monarchy led the analysts to expect a destabilization of the country; however, when asked years later if he had thought that the Shah might be toppled by some kind of social movement, Luttwak recalled, “I absolutely did not anticipate Khomeini.”69 Still, the former oil analyst had been right about the Shah being out of touch with the reality of his own situation. During a meeting with European leaders in early 1979, British Prime Minister James Callahan commented that “nobody has been willing to tell the Shah the truth. We haven’t told him the truth about the disintegrating situation in ten years.” The Iranian oil workers’ strike in the latter part of 1978 continued the turbulence and caused oil production in the country to drop from 5.8 million to 1.1 million barrels per day. Soon, Iran stopped exporting oil completely.70 In the middle of January 1979, the Shah finally left Iran and came to the United States. As the Carter administration attempted to ascertain what was taking place, Ayatollah Khomeini, who had left Iraq to take up residence in Paris the year before, returned in February to Tehran to take power. An edi-

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torial in National Review referred to the religious leader as a “puritanical zealot”; the editors believed that the instability created by the new regime was the perfect opportunity for the Soviet Union, which, it was rumored, would soon have an oil shortage of its own, to gain a solid foothold in the Persian Gulf.71 Buckley and his colleagues continued their criticism of the “lack of will” of the Carter administration, claiming that the president and his advisers had not focused enough on the situation in Iran and the possible consequences should the Shah tumble from his throne.72 In the magazine’s weekly newsletter, the editors emphasized the weakness of the United States in the region due to conditions created by Congress, noting that politicians such as Frank Church had constrained the national intelligence community and that Carter’s energy plan had maintained the nation’s dependence on foreign oil.73 As conservative writers blamed the president and the Congress for the current situation in Iran, a front-page editorial appeared in Human Events a few days before the Shah fled Iran. It criticized the American media’s positive depiction of the Ayatollah and called the mainstream press’s portrayal of Khomeini as a freedom-loving dissident “one of the great con jobs perpetrated on (and in) the mass media.” The conservative outlet claimed that mainstream publications were giving the impression that Khomeini favored a type of parliamentary democracy, whereas, in reality, he aimed to turn Iran against the West. In similar comments, William F. Buckley Jr. argued that creation of a republic similar to that envisioned by America’s Founding Fathers was “far from what [was] in the mind of the Ayatollah, however inscrutable his pronouncements.”74 Although the Shah had been a brutal dictator, he had begun to enact reforms, and the Right believed such reforms would never occur under a Khomeini regime. Dismissing the Ayatollah’s popularity among the Iranian people, the Right perceived him as an extremist and claimed that many of his deputies were sympathetic toward the Soviet Union. Writers for the conservative press claimed that the Washington Post and the New York Times were mistaken in their view of the Shah’s departure as simply the downfall of another dictator. Conservatives viewed the situation in Iran in the geopolitical context of the Cold War: the United States had had a powerful ally in the Shah. He had kept the Soviet Union out of the Persian Gulf, maintained relative stability within the region, and kept the critical commodity of oil flowing without much interruption to the West. Khomeini’s emergence placed all this at risk. Following the logic of Jeane Kirkpatrick, in her “Dic-

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tatorships and Double Standards,” those on the Right saw evidence that the Shah’s authoritarian regime had the capacity for change, whereas Khomeini, whom they saw as a Marxist-inspired fundamentalist, had no capacity for democratic reform. Many writers analyzed the reasons for the fall of the Shah. Edward Luttwak, for one, was not surprised that the Iranian monarchy had finally collapsed. In an interview in 2014, Luttwak described the Iranian leader as “having become more and more unrealistic, a megalomaniac and one who appeared to have delusions of grandeur.” After reading an extensive interview with the Shah in Newsweek, “in which [the Persian monarch] expressed opinions on all kinds of stuff,” Luttwak concluded that the Shah was in great trouble. The Shah “had become completely unrealistic. [To be a] dictatorial ruler and to be this unrealistic put him in a very precarious position. . . . The guy was completely off his rocker,” Luttwak said.75 Luttwak’s colleague Walter Laqueur drew similar conclusions, arguing in an essay in Commentary in March 1979 that the Shah’s complete isolation had been one reason for his regime’s fall. The Iranian leader was surrounded by a small cadre of advisers who were unwilling to speak the truth and an expanding middle class that had become tired of the monarchy. In his criticism of the Iranian leader, Laqueur was just as harsh about the United States’ reaction to the crisis, arguing that the lack of an American response was indicative of the country’s “diminished stature in world affairs.” Weeks after Laqueur’s article was published, M. Stanton Evans argued in a front-page column in Human Events that détente had not only failed to make the world more stable, but had actually emboldened the enemies of democracy. In “Is Détente Dead?” Evans echoed Laqueur’s comments that America’s failure to respond to the Iranian crisis had weakened its credibility with its allies and had placed a region vital to the West in jeopardy.76 Evans’s and Laqueur’s concerns about American credibility with its allies were prescient. In early March, Brzezinski sent Carter a memo to notify him that American allies with interests in the Persian Gulf were concerned that the United States would be unwilling to use its power to protect their interests and that the Soviet Union was, indeed, trying to take advantage of the turmoil to expand its influence in the region. Human Events had no doubt that the Soviets were preparing to enhance their power in the area, claiming that Carter’s indecisive leadership had allowed the Russians to move freely around the region “picking up a country here, stealing one there,” as the editors wrote. The newspaper criticized the administration’s

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vacillation, which had prevented it from giving aid to what the publication termed “pro-western forces”; this echoed National Security Council recommendations in a study of the area submitted to the president at the end of March.77 As conservatives pummeled the White House for its indecisive leadership in dealing with the oil crisis and Iran, there was little the Carter administration could do. The situation in Iran was moving so quickly that not even Khomeini had any real sense of what was occurring. There was great resentment in Iran toward the United States; the Shah was seen as a puppet of the US State Department who had been responsible for causing much of the misery the population had suffered. As far as the oil situation, William Rusher, in a column in Human Events in early September 1979, agreed with Robert Tucker and others that the erosion of American power combined with the nation’s dependence on Arab oil had made it all but impossible for the United States to control events in the Middle East. Rusher was not as confident as Tucker that there was minimal chance of Soviet interference should America choose to militarily intervene against OPEC. Also, Rusher believed that the American public would not tolerate another significant military action so soon after Vietnam.78 On November 4, three thousand Iranian militants stormed the US embassy in Tehran and took ninety hostages, including sixty-six Americans; the number of hostages was eventually reduced to fifty-two. In exchange for the hostages, the captors demanded that the Shah—who had been receiving treatment for cancer at a hospital in New York—be returned to Iran to face trial. The Iranians also wanted the Carter administration to apologize for accepting the Shah into the United States and return money that many in Tehran believed the Iranian royal family was hiding in American banks. Human Events viewed the hostage crisis as a national embarrassment and more evidence of American paralysis. The front-page editorial mirrored much of conservative opinion in its argument that the United States had been defeated by a “third rate country” due to its underlying weakness in contending with despotism around the world. The newspaper quoted Senator Bob Dole, who argued that American influence and power in the world was so eroded that it appeared powerless to deal with Iran.79 A week after the crisis began, William F. Buckley Jr. concurred with Dole and others, arguing in his column that the decline of American prestige and respect was directly responsible for the events in Iran. “Nobody ever seized a Soviet embassy,” he wrote with sarcasm, criticizing America’s inability to

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stand up for its people and interests in the world. The Right dearly wished that the United States would adopt an aggressive foreign policy, as opposed to one that seemed to tolerate Marxist encroachment around the globe.80 The president announced the so-called “Carter Doctrine” during his January State of the Union address. The doctrine was designed to send a strong warning to the Soviet Union, meant to dissuade Moscow from asserting its power in the Persian Gulf following the instability in Iran. The president’s comments, although not the strong ultimatum conservatives had hoped for, were a more aggressive statement of American policy than the administration had previously articulated. National Review, while not commenting on the policy, showed a lack of faith in the president shared by many on the Right by stating, “One of [Carter’s] main traits is a propensity for believing that something is made so by being stated.” The magazine concluded that regardless of what pronouncements were made, those around the country and around the world had essentially stopped listening to Jimmy Carter. Ronald Reagan seemed to channel the frustration of the Right when he was nominated for president in July 1980. In Joe Louis Arena in Detroit, Reagan, addressing citizens who believed that the United States was resigned to its inability to make a difference in the world, stated, “When the question in any discussion of foreign policy is no longer should we do something, but do we have the capacity to do anything?” Reagan’s question echoed Robert Tucker’s thoughts and those of other writers for the conservative publications of opinion, who believed that weakness and vacillation had been at the heart of the country’s national security agenda for decades.81 In final comments to the American public in a television address on the eve of the 1980 election, Reagan advocated many of the same positions that had been present in his famous “Time for Choosing” address in 1964. The nation that was about to vote, according to the Right, had lost its respect and its position as a beacon of strength in the world. The Carter administration’s vacillating foreign policy had allowed states of little industrial and military distinction to paralyze a country that had once been a dominant military and economic force. Reagan asked the audience whether they were confident in their nation’s security and whether they believed the world itself was more secure.82 William F. Buckley Jr., Norman Podhoretz, and the editors of Human Events believed the answer was no. The members of the conservative press believed that the United States had grown dangerously weak as years of poor leadership under Johnson, Nixon, Ford, and Carter had allowed American

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defenses to erode while those of the Soviet Union grew. Under weak and complacent leadership, the nation had retreated from the world while the influence and power of totalitarian states had expanded and grown bolder. Conservatives watching Ronald Reagan on the evening of November 3 believed that they saw the right man to deliver the script that could revive the fortunes of the nation. It was a script they knew well, because they had written it.83

Conclusion

A Friend in the White House On October 23, 1980, William F. Buckley Jr. wrote a confidential note to the Republican presidential nominee, Ronald Reagan. The letter was to be mailed on November 3, the final day of a campaign that Buckley and other conservatives believed would end with Reagan becoming the fortieth president of the United States. Buckley had instructed his office to post the letter only on the condition that Reagan was elected. In his note to the candidate, the founder of National Review wrote that in 1964 he had “teased” Reagan by introducing the former actor to an audience as governor, unaware that the fictional title would soon become a reality. “Obviously you didn’t know when to stop,” Buckley mused to his friend, who was now on the verge of becoming the first representative of the conservative movement to occupy the White House.1 Buckley then turned to the business at hand, which was to discuss the important subject of presidential appointments. The conservative commentator was not one who gave political advice easily. That may have been partially due to his negative experience during the 1964 Goldwater campaign. Buckley had been badly treated by some of Goldwater’s advisers, who had leaked to the New York Times that the conservative commentator and his colleagues from “the far right” were trying to bully their way into the campaign.2 The other issue, according to the magazine’s longtime editor Linda Bridges, was that Buckley did not feel he “had a grasp of political strategy” and that he was also “surprisingly shy.” But Buckley, who was scheduled to be in Brazil on the day of the election, believed that it was important to give Reagan his input about the type of individuals the new president should appoint to his administration. In his note, Buckley advised Reagan to “take special caution to get help in selecting critical members of this new administration.” Buckley went on to say, “What you need, obviously, isn’t men who are seeking government jobs, but men who might be persuaded to take them.”

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Buckley argued that it was important to retain figures who were independently prominent or successful enough that they were not the type who were searching Washington for positions in government. “You know the difference from your experience in California,” Buckley wrote. The columnist mentioned a few of the people he believed fit those guidelines. One was his roommate from Yale, lawyer Evan Galbraith, who would eventually be named by Reagan as the US ambassador to France. The other was Pulitzer Prize–winning reporter and National Review contributor Anthony Dolan, who would play a significant role in crafting some of the president’s most ideological speeches. Other notable National Review contributors who would go on to serve the administration included head speechwriter Aram Bakshian Jr., general counsel at the Department of Education Daniel Oliver, and Mona Charen, who became a speechwriter for Nancy Reagan.3 Buckley’s colleague William Rusher had written a similar letter with a similar objective a little more than a week before to the future First Lady, Nancy Reagan. While it was critical to Rusher that the people Mrs. Reagan’s husband appointed were qualified, he also made it clear that ideology should play a key role as well. “Unless some conscious attention is given to a substantial share of these from the conservative movement, who are fully in accord with his principles,” Rusher wrote to Mrs. Reagan on October 31, “there is a real danger that the Reagan administration will be taken over by the sort of people who are found in every campaign: political operators with various talents, but without any serious commitment to his conservative principles.” The conservative publisher was also blunt in his opinion that those he referred to as “routine time-servers” needed to be kept out and that “affirmative steps” needed to be “taken now—to find and bring forward Ron’s true allies.” Rusher’s meaning was clear—those at National Review as well as Human Events and Commentary did not want a repeat of the inconsistencies in policy that had occurred under the administrations of Richard Nixon or Gerald Ford. Reagan was the man those on the Right believed should be in the White House. The GOP nominee had articulated a clear agenda for what he wanted to accomplish, and those within the publications of conservative opinion did not want him to waver from that course.4

From Outsiders to Insiders President-elect Reagan responded to Buckley’s letter in the latter part of November. His brief reply included the satirical suggestion that he was going to make the conservative commentator ambassador to Afghanistan. Reagan

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made it clear that he understood Buckley’s message: “Rest assured, I want people of the type you mentioned and whose philosophy is akin to ours.” Figures who knew or worked with Reagan, such as columnist M. Stanton Evans, downplayed the notion that Buckley’s advice was especially important or that Buckley had significant influence in the Reagan White House: “All of us were saying what Buckley was saying. And Reagan was getting tons of advice from all members of the conservative movement. We were concerned about how the system worked in Washington [and] we constantly urged that certain appointments be made.”5 However, while Evans and others might disagree, Buckley’s impact within the administration was very much felt. In a letter to Buckley in 1982, Reagan speechwriter Anthony Dolan praised the conservative commentator for his critical role in shaping the ideology of the new administration. That praise validated the very reasons Buckley had established National Review: to use the magazine as a platform to propose conservative solutions to national and international issues that could then be used by conservatives within the GOP and applied to the creation of public policy. It was an achievement that Dolan believed Buckley should be proud of. “The number of your people one encounters in a single week who have been deeply influenced by you and National Review and who are, in fact, conservatives because of that joint influence,” Dolan wrote. “I have a funny feeling that we may just take over the bureaucracy.” Dolan then reminded Buckley that more than a decade earlier he had predicted that one day the conservative commentator’s aspirations would be realized, with National Review being to the Reagan White House what the Nation had been to the New Deal. Dolan wrote, “You may remember when I confidently predicted to you in the Eden Rock that Reagan would win the nomination in 1968 and bring to Washington a sort of Roosevelt-like change, you shook your head and said no and asked the question, ‘Where are the assistant professors?’ Well, you were right. But now at least the assistant professors are here. My God, how they are here.”6 There is no question that Reagan valued Buckley’s friendship and was a faithful reader of his magazine. Richard V. Allen, national security adviser to the president, and Martin Anderson, economist and policy analyst, “were the principal source[s]” of the intellectual content that Reagan received. Allen said, “Bill Buckley had to be among the most significant influencers of Ronald Reagan of his entire lifetime.” While historian Lee Edwards makes the argument that the relationship was primarily a social one that was “rein-

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forced by the fact that Nancy Reagan and Pat Buckley got along very well,” author Alvin Felzenberg not only argues that Buckley became “an unofficial participant in the administration’s inner sanctum,” but that Buckley’s impact on Reagan’s political career “both through his writings and through his personal intercession on Reagan’s behalf, cannot be overstated.” Reagan’s longtime political adviser Stuart Spencer said that “Buckley was very articulate and that impressed a guy like Reagan.” Spencer also believed that because of their friendship, Reagan took seriously any staff recommendations that Buckley made. However, Reagan was pragmatic, and he also got input from others.7 National Review was not the only publication whose authors chose to put down their pens to take up residency within the Reagan White House. The president also retained the services of a number of intellectuals who had written important articles for Commentary. As discussed earlier, Reagan had been greatly impressed by Jeane Kirkpatrick’s “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” and the article contributed greatly to the former Georgetown professor being named ambassador to the United Nations. Other contributors to the magazine who served in the administration included Carl Gershman, who Kirkpatrick appointed as her chief political counsel, and Michael Novak, who served as ambassador to the Human Rights Commission in Geneva, Switzerland. There was also Elliott Abrams, who was named an assistant secretary of state and whose portfolio included experience in human rights, the UN, and Latin America, and Richard Pipes, who was the director of Eastern European and Soviet affairs on the National Security Council. All of these figures would make significant contributions to the implementation of policy ideas that they had previously only written about. While members of National Review and Commentary occupied policy making positions, neither Allan Ryskind nor Tom Winter wanted positions in the administration.8 However, Reagan continued to rely on Human Events as a major source of information. M. Stanton Evans recalled attorney general and longtime Reagan associate Edwin Meese saying, “Reagan put more credence in Human Events than he did in the New York Times.” Not everyone in the president’s inner circle was a fan of Human Events. It was well known in conservative circles that a number of Reagan advisers tried to prevent the president from receiving the newspaper. Human Events was suspicious of the moderate Republicans around the president, who William Rusher said had “Ivy League degrees and names like J. Parmalee Butterthorpe III—or James Addison Baker III.” Historian Lee Edwards recalled

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that Reagan was not amused: “When he discovered White House aides were blocking its delivery, President Reagan arranged for multiple copies of Human Events to be sent to the White House residence every weekend.”9 White House advisers such as Baker and communications director David Gergen may have been suspicious of the publication because its articles often had a conspiratorial tone, with headlines such as “State Department Spreading Marxism in Central America.” Some in the Reagan White House may not have been great fans of National Review either: when Rusher and Buckley invited the president to the opening of the magazine’s Washington office at the beginning of 1983, Reagan’s director of appointments and scheduling, William Sadleir, recommended that he decline. Sadleir was overruled by David Gergen; on the form that Sadleir submitted, a member of Gergen’s staff wrote, “Gergen recommends he do it—helps to keep in touch with our base.” In addition to Reagan’s close relationship with the magazine’s publisher and editor in chief, those around the president knew the importance that the magazine carried with the administration’s conservative supporters.10 Despite those who tried to dissuade Reagan from reading these publications or spending time with those who wrote for or supported them, the president viewed Human Events and National Review as an important connection between him and the conservative movement. Any show of disapproval of administration policy by these media outlets had an impact on Reagan. Communications director Pat Buchanan recalls the president “denouncing Human Events” when it disapproved of his meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland, in 1986. Other articles by those on the Right, such as M. Stanton Evans’s “Pragmatic Personnel Eroding Reagan Mandate,”11 could be very harsh in their criticism of the president and “that would really come home to Ronald Reagan,” Buchanan said.12

Disseminating the Ideology Reagan clipped articles from Human Events and gave them to certain likeminded advisers in the White House; the influence of the three publications could also be seen in the speechwriting that disseminated the president’s conservative philosophy. Speechwriters such as Anthony Dolan or Aram Bakshian Jr. had, like Reagan, been reading National Review for years and were inculcated with an ideology that produced a unique tone in the remarks they crafted for the president. “[It was] a style and a way of thinking that had been shaped by National Review that came to us naturally,”

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recalls Bakshian, who served as the director of the president’s speechwriting staff from 1981 to 1983. “The influence was there and it was felt and it was palpable even if it did not have a paper trail.” Bakshian and Dolan, who wrote speeches for Reagan throughout his term, agreed that Reagan was a man of ideas or, as Richard Brookhiser said, “the author of his own success.” Reagan had often written his own speeches, including many of those that he gave during his first campaign for governor of California. “He had a remarkable memory and drew on it from things that he had read years before,” Bakshian recalled. For Reagan, the rhetoric and ideas he employed were more than just memory, they formed a certain conviction that at its heart concluded that the Soviet Union and its hegemonic desires to expand communism throughout the world could be defeated. “It was clear from the top down that Reagan viewed what was going on as an ideological struggle—a struggle for the ages against what was the quintessential totalitarian system,” Bakshian said.13 Bakshian’s description of Reagan’s view of the Cold War mirrored the language consistently employed by James Burnham, whose ideas were seen as critical to Reagan’s success in America’s defeat of the Soviet Union. In the July–August 2014 edition of the National Interest, author Robert W. Merry wrote that when Reagan awarded Burnham the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1983, he admitted that the foreign policy analyst had assisted him a great deal in the views he articulated. As he prepared to give Burnham the award, Reagan commented, “Throughout the years traveling on the mashed potato circuit I have quoted you widely.” Merry argues that it was no surprise that Reagan chose to bestow on the National Review columnist the highest civilian award that an American could receive. “If the Gipper was key to winning the Cold War,” he wrote, “then Burnham laid the intellectual blueprint for him.” George Nash agreed with Merry in his seminal study, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America since 1945, saying that Burnham, “more than any other single person, supplied the conservative intellectual movement with the rhetorical formulation for victory in the Cold War.” Reagan’s desire that the United States win that struggle was one of the ideological foundations that defined his administration.14

“The Ambassador from Commentary”15 Many issues that the conservative publications had addressed during the 1960s and 1970s continued to be of relevance to the new administration. The first of those was the United Nations. Reagan had been frustrated by

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the inability of US diplomats to assertively defend American values in the face of repeated insults from the Eastern Bloc and the Third World. Reagan was passionate about the topic: “No longer do we apologize to tyrants about the American way of life or apologize to those domestic critics who always blame America first.” Although Reagan made those comments in 1984, they described the attitude Reagan hoped his new ambassador appointee would bring to her position. Jeane Kirkpatrick’s mantra of “diplomacy without apology” very much mirrored the president’s key objectives for her tenure. Reagan believed that Ambassador Kirkpatrick should, in the words of her political deputy Carl Gershman, undertake “a real political campaign within the U.N. on behalf of democratic values and defense of America.” These were ideas that both Gershman and Kirkpatrick had used in their articles published in Commentary, which had strongly criticized Soviet expansionism around the world.16 Kirkpatrick’s service as ambassador was very similar to that of her former Commentary colleague and ambassadorial predecessor, Daniel Patrick Moynihan. The former Harvard professor, who at the time was serving as senator from New York, shared Kirkpatrick’s belief that nations in the UN should no longer be able to attack the United States without some kind of response. The UN was an arena “where words count,” Gershman said, and Kirkpatrick was determined to no longer make excuses when member nations would “blow off steam.” The former foreign policy professor made it clear that if diplomats representing the developing world launched a tirade of abuse against the United States, that behavior would be addressed, not only by verbal challenges to those anti-American sentiments but also in consequences regarding the foreign aid these nations received from Congress.17 In his position as political counselor, Gershman successfully responded to the arguments that the USSR made regarding international human rights and their continued expansionist behavior. A former activist with the Young People’s Socialist League, Gershman was very familiar with Marxist rhetoric and was able to “drive the Soviets crazy with his detailed familiarity of their texts and intentions.” The United Nations was a perfect vehicle for Gershman, who was able to engage in much of the same ideological combat as when he had written for Commentary. This was demonstrated when Gershman challenged the Soviet Union in the UN’s Third Committee, whose function was to focus on human rights issues. Kirkpatrick applauded Gershman’s encounters with Moscow, in which her deputy would refer to the

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USSR as “the last remaining empire on earth,” and she encouraged Gershman to continue to engage in that type of rhetoric.18 National Review embraced the new ambassador and trumpeted Kirkpatrick’s accomplishments. William F. Buckley Jr. referred to her in his columns as “St. Jeane of the U.N.,” and in a lengthy, positive profile, the publication’s Mary Schwarz labeled her “America’s Macho Ambassador.” Buckley continued to offer Kirkpatrick advice outside his purview as the magazine’s editor in chief, which included suggesting themes and phrases that Kirkpatrick utilized when she gave the keynote address at the 1984 Republican convention. That the United States continued to lose a large majority of votes in the UN General Assembly made little difference to Kirkpatrick. The fact that the American delegation was no longer mired in the state of passivity that had existed during the Carter administration was enough for the Reagan White House to consider her tenure a success. Frequently speaking up for democracy and human freedom around the world, Kirkpatrick’s delegation became a strong symbol of the activist policies of the Reagan administration, as represented by democratic insurgency campaigns in Central America and Eastern Europe.19 Kirkpatrick’s “Dictatorships and Double Standards” had made such a strong impact on Reagan that he required each one of his foreign affairs advisers to read it. The article so resonated with the president that he made the essay the foundation of his administration’s policy on international human rights. The administration focused its economic and political resources on improving the situations of nations controlled by totalitarian forces and on reestablishing friendly relations with states governed by authoritarian rulers. Kirkpatrick, who had been labeled “the Ambassador from Commentary,” was an appropriate choice to promote the administration’s message of human freedom around the world. The former academic’s arguments about the evils of communism represented the views of Commentary, under the leadership of Norman Podhoretz.20

Reagan at Westminster: The Re-moralization of the Cold War One of the first signals to the world that the United States had set its foreign policy on a new course occurred in one of Reagan’s most ideological speeches about the illegitimacy of the Soviet Union during his address to the British House of Commons in the summer of 1982. Reagan believed it “was one of the most important speeches [he] gave as president,” and many in the administration viewed it as a touchstone for a series of policies that

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were critical in turning the Cold War in favor of the United States. Reagan’s comments displayed his optimistic belief in the power of democracy and the effect it could have in creating a better world. Notably, Aram Bakshian Jr., Anthony Dolan, George Will, and Richard Pipes all participated in the development of the speech.21 These conservative writers helped Reagan create the powerful themes he delivered that June on the floor of the British Parliament. Dolan and Pipes were responsible for shaping the majority of Reagan’s address. Pipes, a former Harvard professor, had submitted a memo in the spring of 1981 that emphasized that the “Soviet Union was inherently expansionist: its expansionism will subside only when the system collapses . . . or is thoroughly reformed.” Pipes believed that the Soviet Union had economically overextended itself and encouraged the United States to continue to pressure Moscow. His view of the Soviet Union as economically fragile coincided with ideas Reagan had also held for some time.22 The ideas that Pipes had submitted to Reagan had been discussed in his April 1980 essay for Commentary, “Soviet Global Strategy.” Reagan had read Pipes’s analysis and was so impressed with the piece that he underlined significant portions of it and forwarded it to Ed Meese, chief of staff for the 1980 presidential campaign. In a note to his longtime adviser, Reagan expressed his interest in Pipes as a potential asset for the development of the campaign’s position on foreign policy: “This is fascinating. I’m glad he is available to us.” The article’s extensive discussion of the USSR’s expansionist ideology aligned with Reagan’s views of the motivations of the Soviet Union.23 Pipes had also supplied one of the key passages of the Westminster speech, in which Reagan, in a clever reference to Marx, criticized the USSR’s economically weakened condition. “In an ironic sense Karl Marx was right,” the president said. “We are witnessing today a great revolutionary crisis, a crisis where the demands of the economic order are conflicting with those of the political order.” Pipes’s themes were integrated into an address that Dolan had been working on for a long time. Its many drafts were filled with highly moralistic language about the great evil that the Soviet Union represented. As Dolan recalled, “The reason Reagan had warmed to my draft was it was all the stuff he’d been saying for thirty years.” Dolan’s version included a phrase that named “the supremacy of the state” as “the focus of evil,” which was a brief reference to Witness, the autobiography of the anticommunist Whittaker Chambers. Chambers, a former communist

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who converted to conservatism, was a favorite of Dolan and Reagan as well as a great influence on their mutual friend William F. Buckley Jr.24 Reagan’s speech reflected many of the attitudes that the Right believed the president should take in his relationship with the Soviet Union. Other presidents had attempted to use détente and other forms of diplomacy to convince Moscow to do business with the United States, but Reagan believed that that strategy had accomplished nothing. “Must freedom wither in a quiet, deadening accommodation with totalitarian evil?” the president asked, in a clear criticism of the Nixon-Kissinger policies of the 1970s. It was the kind of speech that the conservative press craved after decades of American uncertainty about its global future. In his remarks, Reagan championed democratic values and advocated the establishment of a powerful national defense. Reagan informed Moscow that the United States was happy to engage in arms reduction talks with them, but that, as he had said in a speech the previous November, America would not be bullied nor taken advantage of as it had been in previous negotiations sessions with the USSR.25 In the address, Reagan made an argument that Richard Pipes believed had not been made by any previous president. Reagan “challenged the underlying philosophy of the Soviet Union,” portraying the USSR as fundamentally immoral. Pipes believed that the Soviet system was anathematic to “all that was natural to human beings.” Reagan, in Pipes’s opinion, believed that any ideology that prevented man’s natural evolution in the free development of creativity or entrepreneurship would not be able to survive. Reagan, in his open criticism of the USSR, was doing the same work that Jeane Kirkpatrick and Carl Gershman were doing for him at the United Nations. As mentioned earlier, Gershman used Marxist-Leninist theory to challenge the ideological core of the Soviet system. That method of argument had been employed by James Burnham in his intellectual conflict with Leon Trotsky during the 1930s, a disagreement that eventually led Burnham to jettison communism and move to the Right.26 The speech, as one might expect, was well received by conservative media outlets. In an unsigned editorial, National Review compared Reagan’s remarks to Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” speech thirty years earlier. The editorial said that both addresses had made the case “with bracing clarity of the struggle we are in.” The publication quoted significant passages from the president’s remarks and affirmed his belief that, as totalitarian interests moved freely throughout the world, democratic ideas were the West’s greatest asset to de-

Conclusion 179

feat them. In his column in late June 1982, William F. Buckley Jr. praised the president’s strong criticisms of the Soviet Union. Buckley, like many of his colleagues, had agonized for years about what he called “the slovenly nothingness of most diplomatic effusions,” referring to the foreign policy of previous administrations that had allowed Moscow to act as it liked without fear of reprisal. That lack of reprisal had translated into a loss of credibility and had given the Soviets the impression that they no longer had to take the United States seriously. Reagan’s blunt yet optimistic language that day in London began to change the conversation between the United States and the Soviet Union and, in turn, shifted the direction of the Cold War.27

Implementation of Reagan’s Foreign Policy The central goal of President Reagan’s foreign policy was to do everything possible to reduce the power of the Soviet Union. To achieve that objective, Reagan focused on the criticisms of previous administrations’ foreign and defense policies that had appeared in the conservative publications of opinion. The Right had been calling for the revitalization of the nation’s defenses; for years, the Soviet Union had been rapidly increasing its nuclear stockpile while the United States had been doing the opposite. Reagan’s decision to revive America’s military infrastructure included updating a variety of weapon programs, including the MX missile, the Trident, and the B-2 bomber. Reagan believed that such an expansion sent a message of reassurance to the nation’s allies, who had long questioned the United States’ commitment to the Cold War.28 Infrastructure revival also included a rapid increase in nuclear arms, which the president believed would cripple the Soviet Union economically if they sought to compete with the United States. Reagan believed that the stress placed on the Soviet economy would be so great that eventually they would be forced to agree to arms reductions.29 Continuing to increase the pressure on the Soviet Union, Reagan advocated construction of a missile defense plan, known as the Strategic Defense Initiative, designed to protect the American people from nuclear attack. Reagan’s next significant decision was to confront Soviet global expansionism by supplying military aid to those fighting communist insurgencies throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These areas, including Afghanistan, Angola, and Nicaragua, had been featured extensively in Human Events, National Review, and Commentary as countries that needed assistance to withstand the Soviet Union’s wars of liberation, as part of a larger

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strategy to “compel Soviet leaders to change the system from within.”30 The objective of what became known as the “Reagan Doctrine” was to confront global communism and try to eradicate it from areas where it had taken root; this strategy had been consistently advocated by the publications of conservative opinion, who argued that containment of communism was not enough. While conservative journalists hoped that Reagan’s strategy was the rollback solution they had been advocating for decades, Reagan’s secretary of state George Schultz positioned the strategy more broadly to promote democratic change not just in communist regimes but also in those that were authoritarian.31 In Reagan’s Westminster speech, the president spoke optimistically about reviving democracy around the world and the power of democratic institutions to improve the lives of people everywhere. While he had no interest in instigating a nuclear conflict with the Soviets, Reagan fervently believed that the Soviet Union was in decline and that eventually democracy would prevail.32 During the 1970s, publications on the Right had criticized what they believed to be US economic support of the Soviet Union. Reagan agreed that the trade and technological hardware the United States sent to the USSR aided their economy. Arguing that it was necessary to do everything possible “to lean on the Soviets until they go broke,” Reagan wanted to cut off as much Western trade to the Eastern Bloc as possible. Conservatives favored Reagan’s course, but the pragmatic manner in which the policies were executed was not always to their taste. Although Reagan agreed with the ideology that emerged from these publications, he fused it with a broad worldview that was critical to political success. The former writers from outlets such as Commentary who went to work for the administration were also “politicians as much as, or more than, they were intellectuals.” Those such as Jeane Kirkpatrick or Elliott Abrams had gone to Washington wanting to create policy that could stand the test of time. Aware of the differing interests that existed in government, they knew that some compromise was necessary to achieve any long-standing success. However, those who remained outside the administration, like Norman Podhoretz or Allan Ryskind, rarely changed their positions on key foreign policy issues, believing that “anything less than victory was tantamount to defeat.” Throughout Reagan’s administration, neither of these authors hesitated to criticize him when they believed he was wrong. While William F. Buckley Jr. frequently defended the president, the conservative commentator, like his colleagues at Commentary and Human

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Events, continued to oppose the idea of a nuclear arms agreement with the Soviet Union.33 While these publications did not have a large circulation, that was never their objective. Their respective editors focused on key policy makers and activists and, thereby, created a platform to influence the development of public policy and gain a certain amount of political power. They used that power to keep policy makers on the Right from deviating from conservative principles. Despite their support for Reagan’s presidential campaign in 1980, Human Events, Commentary, and National Review were often critical of Reagan throughout his presidency, particularly of his negotiations with the USSR.34 During his presidency, Ronald Reagan never forgot his debt to the publications of conservative opinion for the ideas they had championed, which became the foundation of his administration. Three months after being sworn into office, Reagan spoke at a reception held by the Conservative Political Action Conference, an organization whose events he had been attending since 1974. Reagan praised Human Events as “must reading not only for Capitol Hill insiders but for all of those in public life.” The president also mentioned National Review and its columnist James Burnham as “intellectual leaders [who] . . . shaped so much of our thoughts.” This was another acknowledgment of the role Burnham’s writings had played in the development of Reagan’s intellectual compass. At an event for Human Events held at the White House in July 1987, Reagan said, “In the pages of Human Events, one gets a picture of the world as it really is,” to the delight of Allan Ryskind and Thomas Winter. In this praise of the publication, Reagan may have also been reproving the advisers within his administration who had tried to prevent him from receiving one of his favorite newspapers. Reagan’s former national security adviser Richard V. Allen also knew how much the president enjoyed and relied on the conservative publication. Allen had been a fan of the newspaper since his college days at the University of Notre Dame. A former academic, who had been advising Reagan since the 1970s, Allen knew that while the newspaper “reinforced [Reagan’s] views and served as sources of new information,” it also irritated many establishment Republicans who had been with Reagan since the 1980 race for the White House. “Many on the campaign looked with huge disdain upon him opening up a copy of Human Events on say the campaign plane or bus,” Allen recalled. “When he opened his briefcase and pulled out briefing papers, he pulled out Human Events and held it up so everyone could

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see it. He took a certain pleasure in annoying the people who thought it was creepy,” Allen recalled gleefully. “I thought it was wonderful. I thought it was the greatest thing going.”35 Throughout his administration, Reagan also praised National Review. In a 1983 celebration of the opening of the magazine’s Washington, DC, office, Reagan joked about the important role the publication had played in supplying personnel to his administration. “I think you know that National Review is my favorite magazine,” Reagan said, in remarks scripted by Bakshian, “I’ve even paid the ultimate compliment of commandeering two of your longtime contributors, Aram Bakshian and Tony Dolan, on our White House staff.”36 At a December 1985 event to celebrate the thirtieth anniversary of the conservative magazine, the president said that William F. Buckley Jr. had “changed our country, indeed our century.” Reagan made it clear that the magazine that Buckley had founded in 1955 was required reading in his administration. “I can assure you: National Review is to the offices of the West Wing of the White House what People Magazine is to your dentist’s waiting room,” the president said, as a grinning Buckley looked on.37 In addition to the magazine’s importance to many who had grown up in the conservative movement, Reagan emphasized what he believed was the publication’s greatest contribution: that, despite the ongoing Cold War, National Review had prosecuted what Reagan concluded had thus far been a successful campaign against international totalitarianism. “You didn’t just part the Red Sea,” the president said, “you rolled it back, dried it up and left it exposed for all the world to see the naked desert that is statism.” Many could also argue that while National Review played a critical role in assisting the United States in winning the Cold War, Buckley and his magazine also “made the very idea of a Reagan presidency possible.”38 In this praise of National Review’s victory in the war of ideas, Reagan might as well have been speaking to the staffs of Commentary and Human Events as well. In 1994, six years after he had left the presidency, a decidedly frail Ronald Reagan delivered a video address to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of his favorite newspaper. Celebrating Human Events’s fifth decade, Reagan said, “With your help we won the war with the evil empire and the Berlin Wall came crumbling down.” Reagan, despite his declining health, was not willing to forgo showing his appreciation to the publication that had praised his political debut thirty years before. Reagan also never forgot the debt he owed William F. Buckley Jr. and his magazine of conservative opinion. In 1991, shortly after he left the White House, Reagan, un-

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able to attend the thirty-fifth anniversary gala for National Review, subtly expressed to his old friend the impact he and his publication had had on the former actor who had once been a Democrat. “I now see you played a part in my becoming a Republican. Again, thank you,” Reagan wrote.39 Articles from the three publications discussed in this book offer a window into the conservative view of events during the 1960s and 1970s, which played a defining role in shaping the foreign policy agenda of the Reagan administration. In the wake of Vietnam and throughout the process of détente, writers for the three publications described a United States that had grown weak and uncertain about its position in the world and advocated a more aggressive foreign policy. National Review, Human Events, and Commentary offered the Right of the Republican Party information and analysis from an ideological perspective that equipped policy makers to formulate substantive solutions to the issues of the day that were contrary to those proposed by their more liberal colleagues. Although these media outlets cannot be credited with either the victories or defeats of the Reagan administration’s foreign policy, the ideological consistency with which these publications presented their arguments played a critical role in the development of the 1980 GOP agenda.

Acknowledgments This book was a team effort from beginning to end. First and foremost, I would never have been able to embark on this project without the incredible support of my friends and family. Besides my parents, Ann and Arnold Jurdem, as well as my sister Deanne, I would like to thank my wife, Jorie Marshall Waterman, for her continuous love and support in what has been a long but fulfilling journey. I would also like to express my appreciation to Dr. Michael Latham, formerly of Fordham University, and Dr. Daniel Soyer of Fordham University’s History Department. Dr. Latham and Dr. Soyer were both instrumental in the development of this project, and I very much appreciate all the time and effort they spent in guiding me through the process of developing this manuscript. My thanks to Dr. Vincent J. Cannato of the University of Massachusetts–Boston as well as Dr. Christopher Dietrich and Dr. Kirsten Swinth, both of Fordham University, for their kindness in reading my chapters and for giving me valuable advice and input that without question improved the quality of the manuscript. I also want to express my profound gratitude to Leila Salisbury and the entire University Press of Kentucky organization for their great enthusiasm and assistance in bringing my book to fruition. Special thanks to Allison Webster, who was the first member of the UPK team to embrace my project and who gave me valuable advice. Following Allison’s retirement from the press, I have been honored to have the opportunity to work with the terrific Melissa Hammer, who has been an enormous help in guiding me through the editing and production process. In regard to the help I received from the various archives I visited, the study could not have been completed without the help of William (Bill) Massa and the staff of the Sterling Memorial Library Manuscript Division at Yale University. The William F. Buckley Jr. Papers are a highly complex collection; the finding aid is not available online. Bill and his staff were incredibly helpful in locating important pieces of correspondence that were critical to this project. I would also like to thank Christopher Buckley for allowing me to study his father’s papers. I would also like to thank the archi-

186 Acknowledgments

vists at the Library of Congress for their assistance with the William Rusher Papers and the Daniel Patrick Moynihan Papers. My thanks as well to the archivists at the Hoover Institution, which houses some of the most important collections on the history of American Conservatism, including the papers of National Review’s James Burnham, Brian Crozier, Jeffrey Hart, and Frank Meyer, as well as Human Events’s John Chamberlain, Ralph de Toledano, John Davenport, and Thomas Lane. I am also grateful for the help of James D’Arc at the Harold B. Lee Library at Brigham Young University, which houses the Human Events Papers, and the staff of the Harry Ransom Center at the University of Texas at Austin, which holds the papers of Commentary magazine. I would like to give my sincere appreciation to Jennifer Mandel and the entire staff of the Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum. Jennifer was phenomenally helpful in assisting me in my research to find articles from Human Events, National Review, and Commentary that President Reagan read and annotated. Thanks as well to Sara Saunders at the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library and Museum for supplying me with the interviews conducted by Adam Clymer for his book on the role of conservatives in the Panama Canal debate. I would like to extend my appreciation to the Fordham University Graduate Student Association for supplying me with a travel grant that allowed me to travel to a number of different archives. My deepest thanks to Dominick Rubino, Alicia Fernandez, America Granados Reichel, and Jonathan Stanley for their assistance in helping me research a number of different collections, which greatly helped with the completion of this project. Oral history was a critical part of this narrative. Due to the lack of archival material, I am deeply grateful to the many members of National Review, Human Events, and Commentary for taking their valuable time to speak with me about their experiences as well as the events and personalities they wrote about, encountered, and worked with during the years this narrative chronicles. The late Linda Bridges, who had been at National Review for over four decades, was invaluable in giving me her thoughts and reminiscences of William F. Buckley Jr., William Rusher, James Burnham, and Frank Meyer. Linda’s knowledge about the magazine’s history and editorial process, combined with her kindness in giving me the names of former National Review staffers to interview, as well as her willingness to search back issues of the publication to discern who wrote a particular editorial was wonderfully kind and helpful. Other former members of National Re-

Acknowledgments 187

view, some of whom went on to serve in the Reagan administration, who were kind enough to speak with me include Aram Bakshian Jr., Richard Brookhiser, John Coyne Jr., Anthony Dolan, Neil Freeman, Jeffrey Hart, Kevin Lynch, and George F. Will. Because the Human Events records are limited, I am very grateful to Allan H. Ryskind and Thomas S. Winter for taking the time to speak with me about the publication they have been affiliated with for more than half a century. I also appreciate their kindness for introducing me to the late M. Stanton Evans. Stan was one of the few people I was able to speak with who contributed extensively to both National Review and Human Events. His knowledge about how both magazines operated and the distinct differences between them was critical in the development of this manuscript. The knowledge and information Stan gave me about the issues and personalities that shaped the Nixon and Reagan administrations, as well as his insights on the history of American conservatism, were wonderfully helpful, and I am glad he was able to be a participant in this project. Others who helped me get a greater sense of understanding of the conservative newspaper included Jeffrey Bell, Allan C. Brownfield, Robert Cleaves, and David Keene. While the Commentary papers were not as comprehensive as I would have liked, I want to acknowledge the help of a number of former members of the magazine who were kind enough to speak with me about the themes and events they wrote about during their tenure with the publication. These include Francis Fukuyama, Carl Gershman, Walter Laqueur, Edward Luttwak, Daniel Pipes, Richard Pipes, and Robert W. Tucker. Presidents Nixon and Reagan play prominent roles in this analysis. Having the opportunity to speak with people who knew them well and hear their thoughts about what the two chief executives thought about these publications and how they used them has been invaluable. These individuals include Richard V. Allen, Pat Buchanan, Ambassador John Gavin, the late Peter Hannaford, Kenneth Khachigian, Karen Spencer, Stuart Spencer, Peter Robinson, and John Sears. Others I would like to thank for their insights into the issues that are discussed in this study include Nathan Abrams, Senator James Buckley, Adam Clymer, Lee Edwards, David B. Frisk, Meg Jacobs, Sarah Mergel, George H. Nash, and Seth Offenbach. Finally, my thanks to a number of people who were personally helpful in different areas surrounding the completion of this book. They include Michael Butler, my mother-in-law, Wendy Dunaway, and her husband, Mike

188 Acknowledgments

McGonagall, Mallory Factor, Chris Gottscho, and Todd and Marjolaine Greentree. I also want to express my special thanks to Dr. Thomas Mackey of the University of Louisville for encouraging me to pursue a doctorate in American History and for always urging me to press on!

Notes Introduction 1. Matthew Dallek, The Right Moment: Ronald Reagan’s First Victory and the Decisive Turing Point in American Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 67. 2. Rick Perlstein, The Invisible Bridge: The Fall of Nixon and the Rise of Reagan (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2014), 294. Craig Shirley, Reagan’s Revolution: The Untold Story of the Campaign That Started It All (Nashville, TN: Thomas Nelson, 2005), 337. 3. Dallek, The Right Moment, 68. Ronald Reagan, Oval Office interview with William Rusher, May 23, 1986. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA. Ronald Reagan, “A Time for Choosing,” Human Events, November 28, 1964, 8. PAO Collection 2, New York Public Library. 4. Stuart Spencer, phone interview, June 15, 2013. 5. Steve Fraser and Gary Gerstle, eds., The Rise and Fall of the New Deal Order 1930–1980 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), xii–xiii. Donald T. Critchlow, The Conservative Ascendancy: How the GOP Right Made Political History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 2. Russell Kirk, “Ten Conservative Principles,” The Russell Kirk Center for Cultural Renewal. http://www.kirkcenter.org/detail/ten-conservative-principles/. “New Phase: Urban Terror,” National Review Bulletin, March 31, 1970, B41. 6. “A Symposium—America Now: A Failure of Nerve?,” Commentary, July 1975, 16. Pro Quest, New York Public Library. Daniel Kelly, Living on Fire: The Life of L. Brent Bozell, Jr. (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2014), 40. 7. Edward D. Berkowitz, ed., Something Happened: A Political and Cultural Overview of the Seventies (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), 2. 8. Jeffrey Bell, phone interview, May 10, 2013. Lee Edwards, phone interview, August 2, 2013. M. Stanton Evans, phone interview, September 28, 2012. Allan H. Ryskind and Thomas S. Winter, interview, Washington, DC, September 25, 2012. Richard V. Allen, phone interview, September 12, 2017. 9. Mary C. Brennan, Turning Right in the Sixties: The Conservative Capture of the GOP (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 7–8. 10. Colin Dueck, “Hegemony on the Cheap: Liberal Internationalism from Wilson to Bush,” World Policy Journal, 20, no. 4 (Winter 2003–2004). http:// www.worldpolicy.org/journal/articles/wpj03-4/dueck.html. August 15, 2017. Walter McDougall, Promised Land, Crusader State: The American Encounter

190 Notes to Pages 6–9 with the World since 1776 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1997), 147. David Woolner, Warren F. Kimball, and David Reynolds, FDR’s World: War, Peace, and Legacies (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2008), 119. 11. Dueck, “Hegemony on the Cheap.” 12. George H. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America since 1945 (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 1996), 78–79. James T. Patterson, Grand Expectations: The United States, 1945–1974. Oxford History of the United States (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 193. Dueck, “Hegemony on the Cheap.” 13. Ronald Reagan, “A Time for Choosing,” October 27, 1964. https://www .google.com/search?client=safari&rls=en&q=ronald+reagan+a+time+for+choosi ng&ie=UTF-8&oe=UTF-8. October 21, 2014. Wayne Federman, “What Reagan Did for Hollywood,” Atlantic, November 14, 2011, 1. https://www.theatlantic .com/entertainment/archive/2011/11/what-reagan-did-for-hollywood/248391/. February 8, 2015. Edward M. Yager, Ronald Reagan’s Journey: Democrat to Republican (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2006), 96. https://books.google. com/books?id=U2cs7IHERBwC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Edward+M.+Yager+ and+Reagan&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjU6urlxNDXAhVh0FQKHeQGAP AQ6AEIKDAA#v=onepage&q=96&f=false. October 21, 2014. Lee Edwards interview. Ronald Reagan to William F. Buckley Jr., June 16, 1962. Kiron Skinner, Annelise Anderson, and Martin Anderson, eds., Reagan: A Life in Letters (New York: Free Press, 2003), 281. Peter Hannaford, e-mail, June 2, 2013. Dr. Joe Foote and Kevin Curran, “Ronald Reagan Radio Broadcasts, 1976–1979.” Added to the National Registry: 2007. https://www.loc.gov/programs/static/nationalrecording-preservation-board/documents/ReaganOnRadio.pdf. 14. Justin Vaïsse, Neoconservatism: The Biography of a Movement (Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 75. 15. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America since 1945, 75, 110–111. 16. Laura Kalman, Right Star Rising: A New Politics, 1974–1980 (New York: W.W. Norton, 2010), 21. 17. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America since 1945, 239. 18. Allan H. Ryskind, Hollywood Traitors: Blacklisted Screenwriters: Agents of Stalin, Allies of Hitler (Washington, DC: Regnery History, 2015), iv–iviii. Google Books. https://books.google.com/books?id=pJ71AwAAQBAJ&printsec= frontcover&dq=hollywood+traitors+blacklisted+screenwriters&hl=en&sa=X&ei =yAX2. March 4, 2015. 19. Biography of Thomas S. Winter, Human Events. http://humanevents. com/2006/12/18/thomas-s-winter/. March 4, 2015. 20. Lee Edwards interview, August 8, 2013. Thomas J. Ferris, “Human Events,” in The Conservative Press in Twentieth-Century America, ed. Ronald Lora and William Henry Longton. Historical Guides to the World’s Periodicals and Newspapers (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1999), 450–451. Jeffrey Bell inter-

Notes to Pages 10–21  191 view. Allan Ryskind and Thomas S. Winter interview. M. Stanton Evans interview, September 28, 2012. Adam Clymer, “M. Stanton Evans Who Helped Shape Conservative Movement is Dead at 80” New York Times, March 3, 2015. https:// www.nytimes.com/2015/03/04/us/m-stanton-evans-pioneer-of-conservativemovement-dies-at-80.html. 21. M. Stanton Evans interview, September 28, 2012. U.S. News and World Report, vol. 76, 1974. Stanford Libraries. https://searchworks.stanford.edu/view /2790586. 22. Brian M. Glenn and Steven M. Teles, eds., Conservatism and American Political Development (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 13. 23. Carl T. Bogus, Buckley: William F. Buckley Jr. and the Rise of American Conservatism (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2011), 16–17. 24. Bogus, Buckley, 14–15, 17–19. 25. Benjamin Balint, Running Commentary: The Contentious Magazine That Transformed the Jewish Left into the Neo-Conservative Right (New York: Public Affairs, 2010), 17–18. Nathan Abrams, Commentary Magazine, 1945–1959: “A Journal of Significant Thought and Opinion” (London: Vallentine Mitchell, 2007), xiii. 26. Balint, Running Commentary, 87. 27. Balint, Running Commentary, 66–67. Nathan Abrams, Norman Podhoretz and Commentary Magazine: The Rise and Fall of the Neocons (New York: Continuum, 2010), 25, 55. 28. Irving Kristol, Neo-conservatism: The Autobiography of an Idea: Selected Essays 1949–1995 (New York: Free Press, 1995), x–xi. 29. John Ehrman, The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs, 1945–1994 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), 34–36. William Kristol and Robert Kagan, “Towards a Neo-Reaganite Foreign Policy,” Foreign Affairs 75, no. 4 (July–August 1996): 19. 30. Michael A. Genovese, The Encyclopedia of the American Presidency (New York: Facts on File, 2010), 224. 31. Patterson, Grand Expectations, 593, 595–597. 32. Patterson, Grand Expectations, 743–744. 33. Sean Wilentz, The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974–2008 (New York: Harper, 2008), 52–53. 34. Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 131. 35. Westad, The Global Cold War, 136. 36. George H. Nash, “Joining the Ranks: Commentary and American Conservatism,” in Commentary in American Life, ed. Murray Friedman (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2005), 152. Balint, Running Commentary, 95.

1. An Erosion of Credibility 1. Ronald Reagan, “A Time for Choosing,” Human Events, November 28, 1964, 8.

192 Notes to Pages 21–25 2. “Governor Reagan Meets the Press,” Human Events, September 30, 1967, 9. PAO Collection 2, New York Public Library (hereafter PAO 2 NYPL). 3. “Governor Reagan Meets the Press,” Human Events, September 30, 1967, 8. 4. David Keene, phone interview, December 4, 2012. 5. Sandra Scanlon, The Pro-War Movement: Domestic Support for the Vietnam War and the Making of Modern American Conservatism (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2013), 6. 6. “Lyndon’s No-Win Foreign Policy,” Human Events, July 11, 1964, 19. PAO 2 NYPL. 7. Fredrik Logevall, The Origins of the Vietnam War (New York: Routledge, 2001), 46. 8. Scanlon, The Pro-War Movement, 19. 9. Senator Thurmond (SC). Citing William F. Buckley Jr., “It’s Time to Strike at North Vietnam,” Charleston News and Courier, May 17, 1964. “U.S. Policy on Vietnam.” 110, part 9 Cong. Rec. S1503 (May 20, 1964). Hein Online. March 7, 2012. 10. Senator Thurmond (SC). Citing William F. Buckley, Jr., “It’s Time to Strike at North Vietnam.” 11. Andrew A. Wiest, The Vietnam War, 1956–1975 (New York: Rosen, 2008), 78. 12. Howard Kershner, “Our War for Survival,” Human Events, August 29, 1964, 12. PAO 2 NYPL. Ralph de Toledano, “Will the Administration Choose Surrender in Viet Nam,” Human Events, November 28, 1964, 10. PAO 2 NYPL. 13. James Burnham, “Crumbling Line,” The Third World War (hereafter TWW), National Review, June 16, 1964, 493. EBSCO Host, Elmer Holmes Bobst Library, New York University (hereafter Bobst NYU). Scanlon, The Pro-War Movement, 30. 14. Frank Ninkovich, Modernity and Power: A History of the Domino Theory in the Twentieth Century (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), 272. 15. James Burnham, “Some Proposals to a Goldwater Administration concerning Foreign Affairs,” National Review, July 14, 1964, 592. Bobst NYU. William F. Buckley Jr. to all concerned, June 9, 1964, box 30, part 1, interoffice memorandum, William F. Buckley Jr. Papers (MS 576). Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University Library (hereafter cited as WFB Papers). Lloyd C. Gardner, Pay Any Price: Lyndon Johnson and the Wars for Vietnam (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 1995), 129. 16. Representative Laird (WI). “U.S. Destroyer Maddox.” 110, part 14 Cong. Rec. H17888 (August 4, 1964). Hein Online. March 8, 2013. Dale Van Atta, With Honor: Melvin Laird in War, Peace and Politics (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2008), 105. 17. Richard Bergholz, “Reagan to Decide Soon on Running for Office,” Los Angeles Times, January 22, 1965, 22. Pro Quest, Historical New York Times, Fordham University.

Notes to Pages 25–28  193 18. Daniel Kelly, James Burnham and the Struggle for the World: A Life (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2002), 313. Andrew L. Johns, Vietnam’s Second Front: Domestic Politics, the Republican Party, and the War (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2012), 70. James Burnham, “Does Johnson Have a Foreign Policy?,” TWW, National Review, March 10, 1964, 190. Bobst NYU. 19. Harry G. Summers Jr., American Strategy in Vietnam: A Critical Analysis (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2007), 7. Michael Lind, Vietnam: The Necessary War: A Reinterpretation of America’s Most Disastrous Military Conflict (New York: Free Press, 1999), 34. 20. Anthony Harrigan, “We Can Win in Southeast Asia,” National Review, March 9, 1965, 187. Bobst NYU. 21. Seth Offenbach, “Defending Freedom in Vietnam: A Conservative Dilemma,” in The Right Side of the Sixties: Reexamining Conservatism’s Decade of Transformation, ed. Laura Jane Gifford and Daniel K. Williams (New York: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2012), 201–202. 22. Harrigan, “We Can Win in Southeast Asia.” Chen Jian, Mao’s China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2001), 221. 23. Dr. Jack Bass, e-mail, December 18, 2014. Dr. Joseph Crespino, e-mail, December 18, 2014. 24. Senator Thurmond (SC). Citing Harrigan, “We Can Win in Southeast Asia.” 111, part 3 Cong. Rec. A960 (March 4, 1965). Hein Online. March 7, 2012. 25. Sen. Thurmond (SC). Citing Anthony Harrigan, “We Can Win in Southeast Asia.” 26. Ralph de Toledano, “Red Strategy for Conquering All Southeast Asia,” Human Events, April 10, 1965, 8. PAO 2 NYPL. Van Atta, With Honor, 105. 27. George C. Herring, America’s Longest War: The United States and Vietnam, 1950–1975, 3rd ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1996), 145. Joseph A. Califano Jr., The Triumph and Tragedy of Lyndon Johnson: The White House Years (New York: Touchstone, 1991), 339. 28. James Burnham, “What Are We Doing in Vietnam?,” TWW, National Review, March 23, 1965, 232. Bobst NYU. Bogus, Buckley, 313. 29. Gardner, Pay Any Price, 231. 30. James Burnham, “The Weakest Front,” TWW, National Review, June 15, 1965, 499. Bobst NYU. 31. Kelly, James Burnham and the Struggle for the World, 273. 32. Frank S. Meyer, “Reflections on Viet Nam,” Principles & Heresies (hereafter P&H), National Review, February 22, 1966, 162. 33. Herring, America’s Longest War, 248–249. 34. Frank S. Meyer, “Reflections on Viet Nam.” 35. James Burnham, “Ground Slipping,” TWW, National Review, May 31, 1966, 509. Bobst NYU. John Spiller, Tim Clancy, Stephen Young, and Simon Mosley, The United States, 1763–2001 (Abingdon, UK: Routledge, 2004), 246.

194 Notes to Pages 28–31 36. Seth Offenbach, “The Other Side of Vietnam: The Conservative Movement and the Vietnam War” (PhD diss., University of Stonybrook, 2010), 50. 37. William A. Rusher to the editors, June 3, 1969, interoffice memorandum, box 122, William A. Rusher Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC (hereafter WAR Papers). 38. Chesly Manly, “Johnson Anti-Victory Policy Rules Out Hope of Solution to Vietnamese Conflict,” Human Events, August 28, 1965, 8. PAO 2 NYPL. 39. Gardner, Pay Any Price, 166. 40. Gardner, Pay Any Price, 414. 41. Lien Hang T. Nguyen, Hanoi’s War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 76–77. 42. C. Dale Walton, The Myth of Inevitable U.S. Defeat in Vietnam (New York: Frank Cass, 2002), 93. 43. Manly, “Johnson Anti-Victory Policy Rules Out Hope of Solution to Vietnamese Conflict.” 44. Senator Thurmond (SC). Citing William F. Buckley Jr., “It’s Time to Strike at North Vietnam.” 45. Joseph Crespino, Strom Thurmond’s America (New York: Hill and Wang, 2012), 201. 46. Barry Goldwater, “Administration Ignores Experts Advice,” Human Events, December 4, 1965, 9. 47. Johns, Vietnam’s Second Front, 83. 48. James Burnham, “Knots of Our Own Tying,” TWW, National Review, September 7, 1965, 762. 49. “Vietnam Potpourri,” National Review, January 25, 1966, 56–57. Bobst NYU. 50. Manly, “Johnson Anti-Victory Policy Rules Out Hope of Solution to Vietnamese Conflict,” 8–9. “Chesly Manly Vet Tribune Reporter Dies,” Chicago Tribune, June 10, 1970, section 1, p. 3. PAO 2 NYPL. 51. James R. Arnold and Roberta Wiener, eds., “The Cold War: The Essential Reference Guide (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2012), 295. Nina Tannenwald, The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons since 1945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 191. 52. Representative Martin (AL). “What is the Explanation Mr. McNamara?” 112, part 4 Cong. Rec. H4476–4477 (March 1, 1966). Hein Online. March 14, 2013. 53. Representative Ashbrook (OH). “On Believing the President.” 113, part 11 Cong. Rec. H14299 (May 31, 1967). Hein Online. March 14, 2013. Johns, Vietnam’s Second Front. 54. “Should We Declare War on Viet Nam?,” Ted Lewis, Human Events, May 14, 1966, 10. PAO 2 NYPL. “Our Vietnam Failure,” Human Events, August 12, 1967, 499. PAO 2 NYPL. J. Bernard Burnham, “The Bit-by-Bit War,” National Review, January 10, 1967, 35–37. Bobst NYU.

Notes to Pages 31–35  195 55. “How We Can Win in Viet Nam: An Exclusive Interview with General Curtis E. Le May,” Human Events, January 28, 1967, 8. Admiral Arleigh Burke, “Why We Must Intensify Our Campaign in Viet Nam,” Human Events, March 12, 1966, 3. PAO 2 NYU. 56. Herring, America’s Longest War, 146. 57. Herbert Y. Schandler, America in Vietnam: The War That Couldn’t Be Won (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009), 73. 58. “More Men or New Thinking,” National Review, July 25, 1967, 779. Bobst NYU. 59. Gerald R. Ford, “Why More Troops If There’s No Victory Plan?,” Human Events, August 12, 1967, 15. PAO 2 NYPL. Barry Goldwater, “Truth about South Viet Nam Being Held Back from U.S. Public,” Human Events, January 16, 1965, 3. PAO 2 NYPL. Johns, Vietnam’s Second Front, 62. 60. Thomas A. Lane, “An Open Letter to the President,” Human Events, April 1, 1967, 1. PAO 2 NYPL. 61. Thomas A. Lane, “Peace through Victory in Vietnam.” Speech, Young Americans for Freedom, St. Louis, MO, January 8, 1966. Thomas A. Lane Papers, box 10, Hoover Institution, Stanford University. 62. “Reagan Ties Peace to Vietnam Victory,” New York Times, August 19, 1967, 8. Pro Quest, Historical New York Times, Fordham University. 63. Mitchell B. Lerner, ed., A Companion to Lyndon B. Johnson. Blackwell Companions to American History (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2012), 84. 64. William A. Rusher to the editors, August 22, 1967, interoffice memorandum, box 43, part 1, WFB Papers. David B. Frisk, If Not Us Who? William Rusher, National Review and the Conservative Movement (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2011), 246. 65. David B. Frisk, e-mail, March 20, 2013. 66. Kevin J. Smant, Principles and Heresies: Frank S. Meyer and the Shaping of the American Conservative Movement (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 2002), 223. 67. Thomas A. Lane, “Unless Policies Change: U.S. Will Need One Million Troops in Viet Nam,” Human Events, June 3, 1967, 7. PAO 2 NYPL. 68. Representative Louis Wyman, “Leadership Gap,” Human Events, May 6, 1967, 15. PAO 2 NYPL. 69. Colonel James W. Graham, “The Score for the Tet Match,” National Review, March 12, 1968, 226. “Hold On,” National Review, August 13, 1968, 788. Bobst NYU. 70. Stanley Karnow, Vietnam: A History, 2nd ed. (New York: Penguin, 1997), 549. Jonathan Colman, The Foreign Policy of Lyndon B. Johnson: The United States and the World, 1963–1969 (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2010), 64. Nguyen, Hanoi’s War, 148. 71. Senator Tower (TX). “Buildup of American Forces in Viet Nam.” 114, part 5 Cong. Rec. S5648 (March 7, 1968). Hein Online. March 16, 2013.

196 Notes to Pages 35–38 72. Smant, Principles and Heresies, 220. Timothy J. Wheeler, “The Day the Vietcong Attacked the United States,” National Review, December 14, 1965, 1158. Bobst NYU. 73. Some of the articles published included Henry J. Taylor, “Military Campaign Going Better in Viet Nam,” Human Events, May 28, 1965, 9, PAO 2 NYPL; Anthony Harrigan, “Letter from Vietnam: A Week with Squadron 365,” National Review, January 26, 1965, 59; E. von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, “Letter from Southeast Asia: The American Army in Viet Nam,” National Review, April 19, 1966, 359; “They Also Serve,” National Review, November 28, 1967, 1327–1331. Bobst NYU. 74. David Keene interview. 75. David A. Keene, “How Are We Doing in Viet Nam?,” Human Events, August 1, 1970, 11. 76. Gregory L. Schneider, Cadres for Conservatism: Young Americans for Freedom and the Rise of the Contemporary Right (New York: New York University Press, 1998), 94. 77. Kelly, James Burnham and the Struggle for the World, 314–316. John Judis, William F. Buckley, Jr.: Patron Saint of the Conservatives (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), 264–265. Mark D. Popowski, The Rise and Fall of Triumph: The History of a Radical Roman Catholic Magazine, 1966–1976 (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2011), 136. John R. Coyne Jr., “Letter from Berkeley: It’s Still There—But Maybe Not Much Longer,” National Review, March 24, 1970, 305. Bobst NYU. Jeremi Suri, Power and Protest: Global Revolution and the Rise of Détente (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2005), 167. 78. Ronald Reagan, “What America Stands For: Let’s Close the Responsibility Gap,” Human Events, July 20, 1968, 6. PAO 2 NYPL. 79. Reagan, “What America Stands For,” 6. 80. Reagan, “What America Stands For,” 6. 81. James Burnham, “The Great Retreat,” The Protracted Conflict (hereafter TPC), National Review, December 15, 1970, 1339. Bobst NYU. 82. Paul D. Bethel, “Paris Talks Worry Our Latin Allies,” Human Events, June 29, 1968, 8. PAO 2 NYPL. 83. Senator Thurmond (SC). Citing Bethel, “Paris Talks Worry Our Latin Allies.”114, part 16 Cong. Rec. S21076 (July 12, 1968). Hein Online. March 27, 2013. Paul Bethel, American History, Spartacus Educational, http://spartacuseducational.com/JFKbethelP.htm. 84. Walter Trojan, “What Does U.S. Gain from Paris Talks?,” Human Events, July 20, 1968, 14. PAO 2 NYPL. 85. Thomas A. Lane, “The Peace Talks Are Immoral,” Human Events, July 6, 1968, 14. PAO 2 NYPL. Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994). Google Books https://books.google.com/books?id=HhfceQZ3pm oC&printsec=frontcover&dq=henry+kissinger+and+diplomacy&hl=en&sa=X& ved=0ahUKEwj3_cjQms7XAhVQwmMKHYjRDlUQuwUIKzAA#v=onepage&q =vietnam peace agreement&f=false. March 8, 2015.

Notes to Pages 39–43  197 86. Lane, “The Peace Talks Are Immoral.” Larry Berman, Lyndon Johnson’s War: The Road to Stalemate in Vietnam (New York: W.W. Norton, 1989), 189. 87. Senator Tower (TX). “Military Decisions in Viet Nam.” 115, part 10 Cong. Rec. S213661 (May 26, 1969). Hein Online. March 29, 2013. Glenn Elsasser, “Walter Trohan, 100,” Chicago Tribune, October 31, 2003. http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2003-10-31/news/0310310172_1_mr-trohan-walter-trohan-tribune. 88. Senator Strom Thurmond, “Turning Point in Viet Nam?,” Human Events, October 11, 1969, 1. PAO 2 NYPL. 89. James Burnham, “Just Shut Your Eyes,” TWW, National Review, May 21, 1968, 487. Bobst NYU. 90. James Burnham, “The Great Retreat,” TPC, National Review, December 15, 1970, 1339. Bobst NYU. 91. Thomas Borstelmann, The 1970s: A New Global History from Civil Rights to Economic Inequality (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 2. Edward Stillman, “America after Vietnam,” Commentary, October 1, 1971, PAO 2 NYPL. “Edmund O. Stillman, Political Trend Analyst,” New York Times, November 17, 1983. http://www.nytimes.com/1983/11/17/obituaries/edmundo-stillman-political-trend-analyst.html. 92. Garry Wills, Outside Looking In: Adventures of an Observer (New York: Viking, 2010), 164. Judis, William F. Buckley, Jr., 157. William F. Buckley Jr. to Garry Wills, June 8, 1970, box 279, part 2, WFB Papers. Garry Wills to William F. Buckley Jr., May 18, 1970, box 279, part 2, WFB Papers. 93. Scanlon, The Pro-War Movement, 101. 94. Allan Ryskind to William F. Buckley Jr., December 10, 1968, box 65, part 1, WFB Papers. Scanlon, The Pro-War Movement, 146. 95. Scanlon, The Pro-War Movement, 140. Ralph de Toledano to William F. Buckley Jr., August 26, 1970, box 126, part 2, WFB Papers. Nguyen, Hanoi’s War, 173. 96. “Settlement or Surrender,” National Review Bulletin, February 11, 1972, B17. 97. “Multiple Dangers in Viet Nam Peace Pact,” Human Events, November 4, 1972, 1. PAO 2 NYPL. 98. “Peace Troubles,” National Review Bulletin, November 17, 1972, B177. 99. “In Wake of Election: Nixon Should Try for Tougher Peace Deal,” Human Events, November 11, 1972, 1. PAO 2 NYPL. 100. “Only Nixon Resolve Can Make Pact Work,” Human Events, February 3, 1973, 1. PAO 2 NYPL. 101. “Let the Record Show . . . ,” National Review, February 16, 1973, 191. Bobst NYU. 102. Larry Berman, No Peace, No Honor: Nixon, Kissinger and Betrayal in Vietnam (New York: Free Press, 2001), 9. 103. Senator Helms (NC). “The Vietnam Settlement.” 119, part 3 Cong. Rec. S2732 (January 31, 1973). Hein Online. April 4, 2013.

198 Notes to Pages 43–47 104. Johns, Vietnam’s Second Front, 321. 105. Allan Ryskind, e-mail, February 19, 2013. 106. “Ford Must Go to Mat on South Vietnam Aid,” Human Events, February 8, 1975, 1. PAO 2 NYPL. 107. “Congress Dishonored by Brutal Viet Aid Cutoff,” Human Events, March 29, 1975, 1. PAO 2 NYPL. 108. Skinner, Anderson, and Anderson, eds., Reagan: A Life in Letters, 26. 109. James Buckley, interview, Sharon, CT, December 15, 2012. “Next Round.” National Review, April 25, 1975, 433. 110. Seth Offenbach, e-mail, March 11, 2013. 111. Ronald Reagan, “Peace: Restoring the Margin of Safety,” speech before the Veterans of Foreign Wars Convention, Chicago, IL, August 18, 1980. http:// www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=85202. Accessed May 19, 2015.

2. The De-moralization of the Cold War 1. William F. Buckley Jr., The Reagan I Knew (New York: Basic Books, 2008), 52. 2. George F. Will, phone interview, December 12, 2012. Julian E. Zelizer, “Détente and Domestic Politics,” Diplomatic History 33, no. 4 (September 2009): 653. Chris Tudda, A Cold War Turning Point: Nixon and China, 1969–1972 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2012), Google Books. https://books .google.com/books?id=RLUsN8A74OwC&printsec=frontcover&dq=cold+war+t urning+point+nixon+and+china&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjr1ajCnM7XAh XJKWMKHRcnCN8Q6AEIKDAA#v=onepage&q=Reagan&f=false. January 10, 2015. 3. John Chamberlain, “A Deal with China,” Human Events, February 5, 1972, 10. PAO 2 NYPL. 4. Robert D. Schulzinger, “Détente in the Nixon-Ford Years, 1969–1976,” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Vol. 2, Crises and Détente, ed. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 374. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), 280. Chris Connolly, “The American Factor: Sino-American Rapprochement and Chinese Attitudes to the Vietnam War, 1968–1972,” Cold War History 5, no. 4 (November 2005): 507. 5. Robert Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger: Partners in Power (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 105. Melvin Small, The Presidency of Richard Nixon (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1999), 23. Margaret MacMillan, “Nixon, Kissinger and the Opening to China,” in Nixon in the World: American Foreign Relations: 1969–1977, ed. Fredrik Logevall and Andrew Preston (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 108. 6. David Tal, “‘Absolutes’ and ‘Stages’ in the Application and Making of Nixon’s SALT Policy,” Diplomatic History 37, no. 5 (April 2013): 1096.

Notes to Pages 47–52  199 7. Henry Kissinger, White House Years (Boston: Little Brown, 1979), 127, 129. Kuisong Yang and Yafeng Xia, “Vacillating between Revolution and Détente: Mao’s Changing Psyche and Policy toward the United States, 1969–1976,” Diplomatic History 34, no. 2 (April 2010): 397. Connolly, “The American Factor,” 503. 8. Robert Mann, A Grand Delusion: America’s Descent into Vietnam (New York: Basic Books, 2002). Google Books. https://www.amazon.com/Grand-DelusionAmericas-Descent-Vietnam/dp/0465043704. February 8, 2015. 9. M. Stanton Evans interview, December 27, 2013. 10. Joyce Mao, “The Specter of Yalta: Asia Firsters and the Development of Conservative Internationalism,” Journal of American East Asian Relations 19, no. 2 (2012): 134, 136. 11. Mao, “The Specter of Yalta,” 136. 12. Robert G. Sutter, U.S.–Chinese Relations: Perilous Past, Pragmatic Present, 2nd ed. (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2013), 44. 13. Richard M. Nixon, RN: The Memoirs of Richard Nixon (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1978), 546. Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 265. 14. “Thinking of Chairman Mao,” National Review, February 11, 1969, 108. Bobst NYU. 15. “Thinking of Chairman Mao,” National Review. 16. Connolly, “The American Factor,” 513. 17. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 284. 18. Eric Ladley, Balancing Act: How Nixon Went to China and Remained a Conservative (Lincoln, NE: iUniverse Books, 2007), 61. 19. Nixon, Memoirs, 548. “Peking Duck,” National Review, December 1, 1970, 1252–1253. Bobst NYU. 20. Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 266. 21. Ralph de Toledano, “Is Nixon Administration Going to Recognize Red China?,” Human Events, January 16, 1971, 19. PAO 2 NYPL. Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 267. DeWitt S. Copp, “Top Level Secret Parley Maps Two China Strategy,” Human Events, March 27, 1971, 1. PAO 2 NYPL. Joe Holley, “Ralph de Toledano, 90, prolific author and ‘non-conformist conservative,’” Los Angeles Times, February 10, 2007, http://articles.latimes.com/2007/feb/10/local/ me-toledano10. 22. M. Stanton Evans interview, September 28, 2012. Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1992), 191. Linda Bridges, interview, New York, October 25, 2012. 23. Allan Ryskind and Thomas Winter interview. Judis, William F. Buckley, Jr., 302. William F. Buckley Jr., United Nations Journal: A Delegate’s Odyssey (New York: Putnam, 1974), 54, 56. 24. Judis, William F. Buckley, Jr., 302. Allan Ryskind and Thomas Winter interview. Scanlon, The Pro-War Movement, 147. Linda Bridges interview. 25. Frank Meyer, “Let A Hundred Flowers Bloom,” P&H, National Review,

200 Notes to Pages 53–55 May 4, 1971, 482. Bobst NYU. “Great Moments from the Past: Richard Nixon and the GOP: This is Your Life,” National Review, September 1, 1972, 943. Bobst NYU. Smant, Principles and Heresies, 311. “Dangers in China’s Ping-Pong Diplomacy,” Human Events, April 24, 1971, 3. “A Hard Look at Nixon’s Performance,” Human Events, July 17, 1971, 1. PAO 2 NYPL. Wayne Karol, Across the Great Divide: Nixon, Clinton and the War of the Sixties (Bloomington, IN: iUniverse Books, 2004). Google Books. https://books.google.com/books?id=CA6hNnAwfQC&printsec=frontcover&dq=moral+absolutism+and+nixon&hl=en&sa= X&ved=0ahUKEwj7vu7Pos7XAhVLlVQKHR6bBusQ6AEINDAC#v=onepage &q=moral absolutism &f=false 26. Basics of Philosophy. http://www.philosophybasics.com/. April 5, 2015. 27. William F. Buckley Jr., “The New China,” On the Right, April 17, 1971, Buckley Online, Hillsdale College. https://cumulus.hillsdale.edu/Buckley/index2 .html#1511311477088_5. January 2, 2014. Brian R. Farmer, American Conservatism: History, Theory and Practice (Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2005), 52. 28. Connolly, “The American Factor,” 517. 29. “Nixon’s Peking Diplomacy Imperils Southeast Asia,” Human Events, May 8, 1971, 1. PAO 2 NYPL. “Thai Radio Attacks on China Are Halted,” New York Times, May 15, 1971, 36. Pro Quest Historical New York Times, Fordham University. Representative Ashbrook (OH). Citing “Nixon’s Peking Diplomacy Imperils Southeast Asia.” “The Unity of Free Nations in Southeast Asia.” 117, part 10 Cong. Rec. H.13475–13476 (May 5, 1971). Hein Online. January 2, 2014. Allan Ryskind, e-mail, January 2, 2014. Hon. Phillip M. Crane (IL). Citing “Nixon’s Peking Diplomacy Imperils Southeast Asia.” “Dialog with Peking.” 117, part 13 Cong. Rec. H.17296 (May 27, 1971). Hein Online. January 2, 2014. 30. Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 291. 31. James Burnham, “How to Solve the China Problem,” TPC, National Review, June 29, 1971, 693. Bobst NYU. 32. Buckley, The Reagan I Knew, 52–53. William F. Buckley Jr., “Notes on the China Visit,” On the Right, July 20, 1971, Buckley Online, Hillsdale College. https://cumulus.hillsdale.edu/Buckley/index2.html#1511311989180_6. January 3, 2014. Telephone conversation between Henry Kissinger and James Buckley, July 17, 1971. 1:40 p.m. National Security Files, Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library, Yorba Linda, CA. Thomas Lane, “Red China Issue Is Power, Not Trade,” Human Events, July 24, 1971, 10. Bobst NYU. “Chinese Checkers,” National Review Bulletin, October 1, 1971, B148. 33. Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 303. James Buckley interview. 34. “Peking In. Taiwan Out?,” National Review, August 24, 1971, 912. “Nixon Questions,” National Review, August 24, 1971, 1042. Bobst NYU. “The Case against Red China,” Human Events, September 4, 1971, 1. PAO 2 NYPL. “Red China to the UN,” National Review, October 8, 1971, 1097. Bobst NYU.

Notes to Pages 55–59  201 35. “Will Mao Tse Tung Throw Nixon a Bone?,” Human Events, August 14, 1971, 1. PAO 2 NYPL. 36. Nixon Tapes, Oval Office, October 13, 1971, conversation 590-2. Nixontapes.org. Jeffrey Hart, “Taiwan Expulsion Could Be Conservative Last Straw,” Human Events, October 16, 1971, 1. PAO 2 NYPL. 37. “Taiwan: The Crunch,” National Review, November 5, 1971, 1216–1217. Bobst NYU. Sarah Katherine Mergel, Conservative Intellectuals and Richard Nixon: Rethinking the Rise of the Right (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 68. 38. “Teddy’s Realpolitik,” On the Right, March 29, 1969, Buckley Online, Hillsdale College. https://cumulus.hillsdale.edu/Buckley/index2 .html#1511313063599_5. January 5, 2014. “Nixon Responsible for Taiwan Ouster,” Human Events, November 6, 1971, 1. PAO 2 NYPL. 39. Buckley, United Nations Journal, 254–255. 40. Senator Fannin (AZ). “Expulsion of Nationalist China from United Nations.” 117, part 29 Cong. Rec. S37518 (October 26, 1971). Hein Online. January 5, 2014. Representative Rarick (LA). “Another Communist Victory in the U.N.” 117, part 29 Cong. Rec. H37459 (October 26, 1971). Hein Online. January 5, 2014. Representative Price (TX). “Denunciation of U.N. China Ouster.” 117, part 29 Cong. Rec. H37614 (October 26, 1971). Hein Online. January 5, 2014. William F. Buckley Jr., “The End of the United Nations?,” National Review, November 19, 1971, 1317. Bobst NYU. “Congress Reacts to Taiwan Ouster,” Human Events, November 6, 1971, 12. PAO 2 NYPL. James Buckley interview. Buckley, United Nations Journal, 254. 41. John Chamberlain, “U.S. Loss of Face: Did Nixon Walk into Mao’s Trap?,” Human Events, November 13, 1971, 10. PAO 2 NYPL. “Trail of the Dragon,” National Review, November 19, 1971, 1282–1283. Bobst NYU. Frank Johnson, “The Balance of Power May Shift to Peking,” Human Events, February 19, 1971, 11. PAO 2 NYPL. 42. “Thoughts on Chairman Nixon’s Visit,” National Review, March 2, 1972. Bobst NYU. Richard Brookhiser, Right Time Right Place: Coming of Age with William F. Buckley, Jr. and the Conservative Movement (New York: Basic Books 2009), 26. 43. William F. Buckley Jr., “Veni, Vidi, Victus,” National Review, March 17, 1972, 258–262; William F. Buckley Jr., “Richard Nixon’s Long March,” National Review, March 17, 1972, 264–269. Bobst NYU. “Nixon China Trip Still Shakes Up Allies,” Human Events, March 4, 1972, 1. PAO 2 NYPL. 44. “The Stark Facts of the Taiwan Betrayal,” Human Events, March 11, 1972, 1. PAO 2 NYPL. David B. Frisk, e-mail, January 6, 2014. “Conservative Senator Views China Trip as Disastrous,” Human Events, March 11, 1972, 3. Reagan described his mission for Nixon in a letter to an unknown legislator in 1980. Skinner, Anderson, and Anderson, eds., Reagan: A Life in Letters, 206–207. 45. William A. Rusher, “Day of Reckoning for Conservatives,” New York

202 Notes to Pages 59–65 Times, March 2, 1972, 39. Pro Quest, Historical New York Times, Fordham University. Frisk, If Not Us Who?, 277–279. 46. William A. Rusher to William F. Buckley Jr., March 9, 1972, p. 3, interoffice memorandum, box 165, part 2, WFB Papers. Thomas S. Winter to Sidney Mann. September 13, 1972, box 3, Human Events Records, L. Tom Perry Special Collections, Brigham Young University, Provo, UT. 47. Smith Hempstone, “We Have Lost Much with No Gain,” Human Events, June 8, 1978, 14. PAO 2 NYPL. 48. James Cannon, Gerald R. Ford: An Honorable Life (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2013), 82. 49. James T. Patterson, Restless Giant: The United States from Watergate to Bush v. Gore (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 102. Yanek Mieczkowski, Gerald Ford and the Challenges of the 1970s (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2005), 282. 50. Cannon, Gerald R. Ford: An Honorable Life, 159. Henry Kissinger, On China (New York: Penguin Press, 2011), 304. 51. Kalman, Right Star Rising, 96. William A. Link, Righteous Warrior: Jesse Helms and the Rise of Modern Conservatism (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2008), 143. Shirley, Reagan’s Revolution, xxviii. 52. Cannon, Gerald R. Ford: An Honorable Life, 405. Kissinger, On China, 316. 53. Kalman, Right Star Rising, 130. “How Red China Woos the U.S.,” Human Events, December 13, 1975, 4. PAO 2 NYPL. 54. Kalman, Right Star Rising, 295. M. Stanton Evans, “‘Normalization’ with Red China Will Mean Abandonment of Taiwan,” Human Events, July 30, 1977, 7. PAO 2 NYPL. William F. Buckley Jr. “Toughing it Out in Taiwan,” National Review, January 7, 1977, 48–49. Bobst NYU. 55. Kalman, Right Star Rising, 295–296. M. Stanton Evans, “Selling Out Taiwan: The Fix is In on China,” Human Events, July 1, 1978, 17. PAO 2 NYPL. Kiron K. Skinner, Annelise Anderson, and Martin Anderson, Reagan in His Own Hand: The Writings of Ronald Reagan That Reveal his Revolutionary Vison for America (New York: Free Press, 2001), 44. 56. Kalman, Right Star Rising, 312–313. “The China Card,” National Review, January 5, 1979, 13. Bobst NYU. “Carter Policy Leaves Taiwan on Edge of Forced Surrender,” Human Events, December 30, 1978, 1. PAO 2 NYPL. Patrick J. Buchanan, “The Betrayal of Taiwan: Secret Negotiations Sever Free China Pact,” Human Events, January 6, 1979, 11. “Exclusive Interview: Reagan Calls China Policy ‘A Betrayal of Taiwan,’” Human Events, January 6, 1979, 3. PAO 2 NYPL.

3. An Illusion of Security 1. Ronald Reagan to Eugene V. Rostow, November 6, 1978, Committee on The Present Danger Records, box 118, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University, Palo Alto, CA. Rostow to Reagan, November 14, 1978. The Committee on The Present Danger Records, box 118, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University. Wilentz, The Age of Reagan, 153. Skinner, Anderson, and

Notes to Pages 66–69  203 Anderson, eds., Reagan, In His Own Hand, 92–99. Martin Weil, “Eugene Rostow Dies,” Washington Post, November 26, 2002. https://www.washingtonpost .com/archive/local/2002/11/26/eugene-rostow-dies/6650303f-db48-49a1bfe5-b7c3cfde9760/?utm_term=.2460c7d13f4a. Nicholas Blackbourn, “The Sum of Their Fears: The Committee on the Present Danger, the Demise of Détente, and Threat Inflation, 1976–1980” (PhD diss., University of St. Andrews, 2016), 92. https:// research-repository.st-Andrews.ac.uk/bitstream/handle/10023/8243/Nicholas BlackbournPhDThesis.pdf?sequence=3&isAllowed=y. 2. Patrick Glynn, Closing Pandora’s Box: Arms Races, Arms Control, and the History of the Cold War (New York: Basic Books, 1992), 289. 3. Paul Lettow, Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (New York: Random House, 2006), 52. 4. Wilentz, The Age of Reagan, 106. Lettow, Ronald Reagan, 44. 5. Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, “The Military Weakness of the West,” Letter from the Continent, National Review, February 4, 1972, 103. Bobst NYU. 6. Vladislav Zubok, “The Soviet Union and Détente of the 1970s,” Cold War History 8, no. 4 (November 2008): 431. 7. Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 136–137. 8. Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 138. 9. Paul Scott, “Why U.S. Needs an ABM System,” Human Events, March 15, 1969, 1. PAO 2 NYPL. “Load Your Missiles, Men,” National Review, May 6, 1969, 426. William F. Buckley Jr., “The ABCs of ABM,” On the Right, April 12, 1969, Buckley Online, Hillsdale College. https://cumulus.hillsdale.edu/Buckley/ index2.html#1511404726447_5. November 15, 2013. Mergel, Conservative Intellectuals and Richard Nixon, 73. 10. Richard M. Nixon to William F. Buckley Jr., April 15, 1969, box 67, part 1, WFB Papers. 11. Vladislav Zubok, “The Soviet Union and Détente of the 1970s,” 431. 12. Patrick J. Buchanan, e-mail, July 13, 2013. 13. Edgar Ansel Mowrer, “Does Nixon Believe the Great Western Myth?,” Human Events, October 25, 1969, 12. PAO 2 NYPL. Walter Laqueur, interview, Washington, DC, September 24, 2012. “Walter Laqueur, Historian and Political Commentator,” The American Academy in Berlin. http://www.americanacademy .de/person/walter-laqueur/. “Edgar Ansel Mowrer Dies at 84; Won Pulitzer for Reports on Hitler,” Special to the New York Times, March 4, 1977. http://www .nytimes.com/1977/03/04/archives/edgar-ansel-mowrer-dies-at-84-won-pulitzerfor-reports-on-hitler.html. Allan Ryskind, e-mail, September 15, 2013. Edward N. Luttwak, phone interview, October 4, 2013. 14. Vaïsse, Neoconservatism, 9. 15. James Burnham, “Games Nations Play,” TWW, National Review, December 2, 1969, 1219. Bobst NYU. 16. Raymond Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1985), 131.

204 Notes to Pages 69–73 17. Tal, “‘Absolutes’ and ‘Stages,’” 1091. 18. William F. Buckley Jr., “Helsinki,” On the Right, November 22, 1969, Buckley Online, Hillsdale College. https://cumulus.hillsdale.edu/Buckley/index2 .html#1511405276022_5. November 14, 2013. 19. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 36, 42. William F. Buckley Jr., “Helsinki,” On the Right. 20. William P. Bundy, A Tangled Web: The Making of Foreign Policy in the Nixon Administration (New York: Hill and Wang, 1998). Google Books. https:// books.google.com/books?id=TeBaZtj7PDMC&printsec=frontcover&dq=foreign +policy+in+the+nixon+administration+william+bundy&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ah UKEwiHqPf92NPXAhWtYd8KHbWBBvwQ6AEIKDAA#v=onepage&q=SALT I and ABM 1970&f=false. January 4, 2015. Scott Ritter, Dangerous Ground: America’s Failed Arms Control Policy, from FDR to Obama (New York: Nation Books, 2010), 179–180. 21. “Numerous Dangers Lurk in SALT Talks,” Human Events, August 29, 1970, 1. PAO 2 NYPL. 22. Zubok, “The Soviet Union and Détente,” 429. 23. Anthony Harrigan, “At Vienna: The SALT Talks Round Two,” National Review, April 7, 1970, 360. Bobst NYU. John Ligonier, “The Soviets and the Era of Negotiation,” Human Events, November 4, 1970, 16. PAO 2 NYPL. 24. Charles Benson, “Deterrence through Defense,” National Review, March 9, 1971, 251–259. Bobst NYU. “Not What They Say but What They Do,” National Review, April 6, 1971, 356–357. Bobst NYU. William F. Buckley Jr., “Who Was Charles Benson?,” On the Right, San Francisco Examiner, January 13, 1972. http://jfk.hood. edu/Collection/White Materials/White Assassination Clippings Folders/Security Folders/Security-CIA-II/CIA II 194.pdf. January 12, 2015. Mergel, Conservative Intellectuals and Richard Nixon, 73. Ronald Reagan to Jeffrey Hart, April 13, 1971, box 1, Jeffrey Hart Papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford University, Palo, Alto, CA. 25. Scott Ritter, Dangerous Ground, 185. “The Old One-Two at Vienna,” National Review, June 29, 1971, 685. Senator Strom Thurmond, “The SALT Trap,” Human Events, June 12, 1971, 13. 26. Tal, “‘Absolutes’ and ‘Stages,’” 1108. 27. “SALT Moves May Imperil U.S. Defenses,” Human Events, June 5, 1971, 1. “Nixon Creating Missile Gap Issue for Democrats,” Human Events, June 12, 1971, 1. Frank Meyer, “Uneasy Doubts about Nixon,” P&H, National Review, June 29, 1971, 706. William F. Buckley Jr., “The Patience of Mr. Nixon,” On the Right, National Review, June 15, 1971, 669. Linda Bridges, e-mail, January 6, 2014. William F. Buckley Jr., “Goodbye Mr. Nixon,” undated Interoffice Memorandum 1971, box 165, part 2, WFB Papers. Sen. James L. Buckley, “The Continuing Erosion of U.S. Military Strength,” Human Events, July 24, 1971, 1. 28. Annotated News Summaries, April 1971 to October 15, 1971, box 33, President’s Office Files, Nixon’s Presidential Materials Project, Richard M. Nixon Presidential Library, Yorba Linda, CA.

Notes to Pages 73–77  205 29. “Leading Conservatives Suspend Support of Nixon,” Human Events, August 7, 1971, 1. “A Declaration,” National Review, August 10, 1971, 842. 30. Nixon White House Tapes, July 28, 1971, Oval Office conversation #54913. Nixontapes.org. 31. Patrick J. Buchanan, phone interview, December 4, 2012. 32. Nixon White House Tapes, July 30, 1971, Oval Office conversation # 552-13. Nixontapes.org. 33. Nixon White House Tapes, July 28, 1971, Oval Office conversation #5493. Nixontapes.org. 34. Judis, William F. Buckley, Jr., 302. 35. Tal, “‘Absolutes’ and ‘Stages,’” 1108. 36. Summitry,” National Review, November 5, 1971, 1215–1216. “Soviets Trapping Nixon in SALT Talks,” Human Events, January 29, 1972, 3. 37. Mario Del Pero, The Eccentric Realist: Henry Kissinger and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2009), 100–101. Daniel J. Sargent, A World Transformed: The Re-making of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 214, 264. Dallek, Nixon and Kissinger, 398–399, 394. 38. “SALT Plan Threatens U.S.,” Human Events, May 27, 1972, 1. “What Hath SALT Wrought,” National Review, June 23, 1972, 629. Donald G. Brennan, “When the SALT Hit the Fan,” National Review, June 23, 1972, 685–692. 39. Rep. John Ashbrook, “Ashbrook Analyzes Nixon SALT Pact,” Human Events, June 3, 1972, 1. “Nixon Fails to Convince SALT Skeptics,” Human Events, June 24, 1972, 3. Rep. Rarick (LA) “The Russians Came.” 118, part 25 Cong. Rec. H32631 (September 27, 1972). Hein Online. December 24, 2013. 40. Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1999), 252. 41. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 252. 42. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 253. Olav Njølstad, “Key of Keys? SALT II and the Breakdown of Détente,” in The Fall of Détente: Soviet-American Relations during the Carter Years, ed. Odd Arne Westad (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997), 36. 43. Eryn MacDonald, “The End of MIRVs for U.S. ICBMs.” All Things Nuclear. Union of Concerned Scientists. allthingsnuclear.org/emacdonald/the-end-ofmirvs-for-u-s-icbms. February 19, 2015. 44. Njølstad, “Key Of Keys?,” 36. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 445. Gaddis, Strategies of Containment, 327. 45. Njølstad, “Key Of Keys?,” 37. 46. Njølstad, “Key Of Keys?,” 39. 47. Njølstad, “Key Of Keys?,” 39. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 802–803, 806. 48. Njølstad, “Key Of Keys?,” 40. 49. Njølstad, “Key Of Keys?,” 40.

206 Notes to Pages 78–83 50. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 811–820. Njølstad, “Key Of Keys?,” 40. Paul H. Nitze with Ann M. Smith and Steven L. Rearden, From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision—A Memoir (New York: Grove, 1989), 362. 51. Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation, 822. 52. James L. Buckley, “Racing against the Arms Race: James L. Buckley on SALT II,” National Review, March 15, 1974, 312–317. “What is Throw Weight?,” New York Times, July 15, 1991. http://www.nytimes.com/1991/07/15/ world/what-is-throw-weight.html. June 2, 2014. 53. Glynn, Closing Pandora’s Box, 260. 54. Daniel Oliver, “Are the Russians Cheating on SALT?,” National Review Bulletin, November 29, 1974, B182. William F. Buckley Jr., “What Are the Russians Up To?,” On the Right, National Review, November 22, 1974, 1372. Buckley Online, December 12, 2014. “Proposed Arms Pact Needs Careful Scrutiny,” Human Events, December 7, 1974, 1. 55. “Bitter SALT,” National Review, May 10, 1974, 515–516. 56. “Proposed Arms Pact Needs Careful Scrutiny,” Human Events, December 7, 1974, 1. Ronald Reagan, “Vladivostok Pact on Missiles Contains Dangerous Inequalities,” Human Events, March 15, 1975, 15. Ronald Reagan, “Throw Weight Parity Must Be Reassured in SALT II,” Human Events, August 2, 1975, 15. Barry Goldwater, “Why the Soviet Acclaim for SALT II?,” Human Events, June 18, 1975, 3. 57. Wilentz, The Age of Reagan, 53. 58. “Kissinger Concessions Readied at SALT II,” Human Events, June 21, 1975, 1. 59. “Kissinger Concessions Readied at SALT II,” Human Events, June 21, 1975, 1. M. Stanton Evans, “The Wages of Détente,” Human Events, June 28, 1975, 7. 60. James Burnham, “The Dialectics of Détente,” TPC, National Review, August 29, 1975, 928. Kelly, James Burnham, 365. 61. Ronald Reagan, “The People vs. the Washington Establishment,” Human Events, April 10, 1976, 6. 62. “Reagan Opens Fire on Kissinger’s Détente Policy,” Human Events, February 21, 1976, 1. “Ronald Reagan Remarks at the Presentation Ceremony for the Presidential Medal of Freedom,” February 23, 1983. The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=40963. 63. William F. Buckley Jr., “Opening Up Détente,” On the Right, National Review, February 19, 1976, 290. Buckley Online, Hillsdale College. https://cumulus .hillsdale.edu/Buckley/index2.html#1511404726447_5. March 12, 2015. William F. Buckley Jr. to Ronald Reagan, October 24, 1973, box 227, part 2, WFB Papers. 64. “More Strategic Concessions to the Soviets,” National Review, September 3, 1976, 940–941. 65. Wilentz, The Age of Reagan, 153. “Historian Richard Pipes,” Alpha History. http://alphahistory.com/russianrevolution/historian-richard-pipes/.

Notes to Pages 83–87  207 66. Richard Pipes, “Team B: The Reality behind the Myth,” Commentary, October, 1, 1986, 6. 67. Richard Pipes, e-mail, May 27, 2014. 68. Richard Pipes, e-mail, May 27, 2014. Nathan Abrams, Norman Podhoretz and Commentary Magazine, 149. 69. David F. Schmitz, “Senator Frank Church, the Ford Administration, and the Challenges of Post-Vietnam Foreign Policy,” Peace and Change 21, no. 4 (October 1996): 456–457. 70. Glynn, Closing Pandora’s Box, 276. 71. Edward N. Luttwak, “Nuclear Strategy: The New Debate,” Commentary, April 1974, 57–58. Richard Pipes, “Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War,” Commentary, July 1977, 21–34. Richard Pipes, e-mail, June 17, 2014. 72. “Of Weapons and Strategy,” National Review, July 22, 1977, 815–816. Richard Pipes, e-mail, May 27, 2014. Richard Pipes, Vixi: Memoirs of a Non-Belonger (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2003), 138. Representative Dornan (CA). “The Soviet Strategic Nuclear Plan.” 123, part 17 Cong. Rec. H21105 (June 27, 1977). Hein Online. June 11, 2014. “Beyond MAD,” National Review, September 2, 1977, 984–985. 73. Robert G. Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson: A Life in Politics (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2000), 361–364. John Spanier and Joseph Nogee, eds., Congress, the Presidency and American Foreign Policy (Elmsford, NY: Pergamon Policy Studies, 1982), 59. 74. “Carter Deserves Support in First Major Soviet Encounter,” Human Events, April 9, 1977, 1. “Carter’s SALT Package Still Leaves U.S. Vulnerable,” Human Events, April 16, 1977, 1. Representative Kemp (NY). Citing “Carter Deserves Support in First Major Soviet Encounter.” 123, part 9 Cong. Rec. H10452 (April 5, 1977). Hein Online. June 11, 2014. 75. “Carter Cave-In on SALT Confirmed,” Human Events, October 22, 1977, 3. Representative Kemp (NY). “The Administration’s SALT Posture Is Inviting a Crisis.” 123, part 28 Cong. Rec. H36419 (November 1, 1977). Hein Online. June 10, 2014. Representative Ashbrook (OH). “Soviet Slickers Take Carter’s Softball SALT Team.” 123, part 27 Cong. Rec. H34796 (October 21, 1977). Hein Online. June 11, 2014. Senator Hayakawa (CA). “SALT Negotiations.” 123, part 27 Cong. Rec. S34960 (October 25, 1977). Hein Online. June 11, 2014. 76. “SALT Disaster Coming,” National Review, November 11, 1977, 1283. “Verification Please,” National Review, November 25, 1977, 1344. 77. James Burnham, “SALT-Verifiability=0,” TPC, National Review, January 6, 1978, 22. Wilentz, The Age of Reagan, 107. Skinner, Anderson, and Anderson, eds., Reagan, In His Own Hand, 78. 78. Edward Luttwak, phone interview, October 13, 2013. 79. Edward N. Luttwak, “Why Arms Control Has Failed,” Commentary, January 1978, 23.

208 Notes to Pages 87–91 80. Representative Cunningham (WA). Citing Edward N. Luttwak, “Why Arms Control Has Failed.” 124, part 2 Cong. Rec. 1690 (January 31, 1978). Hein Online. June 13, 2014. M. Stanton Evans, “What Strategic Superiority Is,” Human Events, December 30, 1978, 8. 81. Walter Laqueur interview. 82. Walter Laqueur, “The Psychology of Appeasement,” Commentary, October 1978, 46–47. Walter Laqueur to Norman Podhoretz, July 18, 1978, series I, box 47.1–2, Commentary Magazine Archive, Harry Ransom Center, University of Texas, Austin, TX. (Hereafter, Commentary Magazine Archive.) Walter Laqueur to Neil Kozodoy, August 4, 1978, series I, box 47.1–2, Commentary Magazine Archive. 83. Walter Laqueur, “The Psychology of Appeasement,” Commentary, October 1978, 48. 84. Laqueur, “The Psychology of Appeasement,” Commentary, October, 1978, 48, 44–50. “For the Record,” National Review, March 16, 1979, 33. Steven F. Hayward, The Age of Reagan: The Fall of the Old Liberal Order, 1964– 1980 (Roseville, CA: Forum/Prima, 2001), 593. 85. “SALT II Showdown Nears,” Human Events, November 25, 1978, 1. 86. “SALT II Showdown Nears,” Human Events, November 25, 1978, 1. Skinner, Anderson, and Anderson, eds., Reagan, In His Own Hand, 86–87. 87. William A. Rusher to James Burnham, March 27, 1979, box 13, WAR Papers. Balint, Running Commentary, 157. 88. Eugene V. Rostow, “The Case against SALT II,” Commentary, February 1979, 23. 89. Eugene V. Rostow, “The Case against SALT II,” Commentary, February 1979, 25, 28. 90. Eugene V. Rostow, “The Case against SALT II,” Commentary, February 1979, 25, 28. 91. Eugene V. Rostow, “The Case against SALT II,” Commentary, February 1979, 28, 30, 32. Eugene Rostow to Norman Podhoretz, January 29, 1979, section I, box 56.1, Commentary Magazine Archive. William F. Buckley Jr., “Movement on SALT,” On the Right, March 8, 1979. https://www.commentarymagazine .com/articles/the-case-against-salt-ii/. June 17, 2014. “Quest for Peace: A World of Clear and Present Danger.” Interview with Eugene V. Rostow, 1985. https:// www.youtube.com/watch?v=z9gji4DnmzA. June 17, 2014. Human Events quoted the article extensively. “Has SALT Promoted Détente?,” Human Events, June 30, 1979, 3. 92. Senator Garn (UT). “SALT II: No Sale.” 125, part 2 Cong. Rec. S1813 (February 5, 1979). Hein Online. June 15, 2014. Senator Goldwater (AZ). “The Case against SALT II.” 125, part 3 Cong. Rec. S3624 (March 1, 1979). Hein Online. June 19, 2014. Senator Helms (NC). “The Real Soviet View of SALT II.” 125, part 12 Cong. Rec. S15480 (June 19, 1979). Hein Online. June 17, 2014. 93. Norman B. Hannah, “SALT II: No Meeting of the Minds,” National Re-

Notes to Pages 92–95  209 view, June 22, 1979, 795–803. “No SALT,” National Review, April 27, 1979, 523–524. 94. Wilentz, The Age of Reagan, 108–109. Hayward, The Age of Reagan: The Fall of the Old Liberal Order, 593. “SALT II Gives Soviets First Strike Capability,” Human Events, June 30, 1979, 1. 95. William F. Buckley Jr., “Let Us Reason Together,” On the Right, May 1, 1979, Buckley Online, Hillsdale College. https://cumulus.hillsdale.edu/Buckley /index2.html#1511404726447_5, February 12, 2015. The Treaty,” National Review Bulletin, June 1, 1979, 73. Senator Goldwater (AZ). “Salt II Rejection Would Not Brand U.S. as Warmonger.” 125, part 11 Cong. Rec. S3797 (June 6, 1979). Hein Online. June 19, 2014. 96. “SALT II Will Codify U.S. Strategic Inferiority,” Human Events, July 21, 1979, 1. 97. Edward N. Luttwak, phone interview, October 15, 2013. Edward N. Luttwak, “Ten Questions about SALT II,” Commentary, August 1979, 21–32. 98. Leopold Labedz, “The Illusions of SALT,” Commentary, September 1979, 55–56. Adam Zamoyski, “Obituary: Leopold Labedz,” The Independent, March 27, 1993. http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-leopoldlabedz-1500191.html. 99. Labedz, “The Illusions of SALT,” Commentary, September 1979, 55–56. 100. Senator Helms (NC). “Wall Street Journal Asks for Arms Reductions Now.” 125, part 18 Cong. Rec. S24010 (September 11, 1979). Hein Online. June 17, 2014. Senator Tower (TX). “Reject SALT Now.” 125, part 18 Cong. Rec. 24009 (September 11, 1979). Hein Online. June 17, 2014. “SALT II Deserves Defeat,” Human Events, September 8, 1979, 1. Dr. Edward Teller interviewed by William F. Buckley Jr., Firing Line, “Is SALT II a Disaster?,” September 16, 1979, 9. Hoover Institution archives, Stanford University, June 20, 2014, https:// digitalcollections.hoover.org/images/Collections/80040/80040_s0383_trans.pdf. 101. William F. Buckley Jr., “Understanding Carter,” On the Right, National Review, October 6, 1979. Buckley Online. Hillsdale College. https://cumulus.hillsdale .edu/Buckley/index2.html#1511404726447_5. January 4, 2015. William F. Buckley Jr., “On Lowering One’s Voice,” On the Right, National Review, October 12, 1979, 1318. Kaufman, Henry M. Jackson, 388–389. 102. Smith Hempstone, “Russians Show Ruthlessness in Afghanistan,” Human Events, January 19, 1980, 54. 103. Smith Hempstone, “Russians Show Ruthlessness in Afghanistan.” William F. Buckley Jr., “What Now?,” On the Right, January 8, 1980. Buckley Online. Hillsdale College. https://cumulus.hillsdale.edu/Buckley/index2 .html#1511404726447_5. 104. Edward Luttwak, “After Afghanistan, What?,” Commentary, April 1, 1980. https://www.commentarymagazine.com/articles/after-afghanistan-what/. 105. “Carter Meets Soviet Threat with More Foot Dragging,” Human Events, January 12, 1980, 1.

210 Notes to Pages 96–98

4. A Symbol of Appeasement Originally published in slightly different form as “‘That mad hatters tea party on the East River’: Conservative Journals of Opinion and the United Nations, 1964– 1981,” Cold War History 17, no. 1 (2017): 39–59. Reprinted with permission. 1. Alice Widener, “United Nations Bars Private Property as a Human Right,” Human Events, June 25, 1977, 10. 2. Skinner, Anderson, and Anderson, eds., Reagan, In His Own Hand, 167. Reagan wrote the majority of those broadcasts following his loss of the presidential nomination in 1976. Prior to that campaign Peter Hannaford wrote most of them and forwarded them to Reagan for his approval. Peter Hannaford, e-mail, June 2, 2013. 3. Gerhart Niemeyer, “The Collapsing UN,” National Review, April 21, 1964, 314. Wolfgang Saxon, “Gerhart Niemeyer, Scholar of Political Philosophy, 90,” New York Times, June 29, 1997. http://www.nytimes.com/1997/06/29/us/ gerhart-niemeyer-scholar-of-political-philosophy-90.html. 4. Bruce Frohen, Jeremy Beer, and Nelson O. Jeffrey, eds., American Conservatism: An Encyclopedia (Wilmington: ISI Books, 2006), Google Books. https:// books.google.com/books?id=T1yOAwAAQBAJ&printsec=frontcover&dq=the+c onservative+encyclopedia&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwinwcfMtNXXAhWkR N8KHabPBSUQ6AEIKDAA#v=onepage&q=United Nations&f=false. March 12, 2015. Russell Kirk, “Ten Conservative Principles.” The Russell Kirk Center. http:// www.kirkcenter.org/detail/ten-conservative-principles/. January 26, 2015. Ronald Lora and William Henry Longton, eds., The Conservative Press in Twentieth-Century America (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1999), 450. Lisa McGirr argues that many believed that the UN possessed traits of a communist ideology, which stood at the core of what conservatives distrusted about New Deal liberalism. “It represented a form of government centralization where decisions were made by distant powerful elites; it included among its members communist and socialist countries; and it celebrated cultural and moral relativism, with its emphasis on international understanding.” Lisa McGirr, Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001), 176. Ernest Van den Haag, a professor of sociology who wrote frequently for National Review, was a harsh critic of the organization; he used words like “vegetate and atrophy” to describe how the United States should treat the world body. George H. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America since 1945 (Wilmington, DE: ISI Books, 1996), 247. “The U.N. is, in other words, an elaborate consummation of everything the Liberal believes,” wrote conservative journalist and activist M. Stanton Evans in 1966, “a laboratory experiment in the workability of liberal doctrine, with all the favorite shibboleths set up, staffed by secretaries, committees and bureaucracies, lavishly financed by the American tax payer.” M. Stanton Evans, The Politics of Surrender (New York: Devin-Adair, 1966), 137. Heather Cox Richardson, To Make Men Free: A History of the Republican Party (New York: Basic Books, 2014), 241. Michelle M. Nickerson, Mothers of Conservatism: Women and the Post War Right (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2012), 28.

Notes to Pages 98–102  211 5. Paul Kennedy, The Parliament of Man: The Past, Present, and Future of the United Nations (New York: Random House, 2006), 30. 6. Kennedy, The Parliament of Man, 121. 7. Rosemary Righter, Utopia Lost: The United Nations and World Order (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1995), 93. 8. Westad, The Global Cold War, 137. 9. “The UN was a place that was not friendly to liberal democratic values and they [the Third World] pushed an agenda within the U.N. system very aggressively that was unfriendly to what the United States stood for in the world.” Carl Gershman, phone interview, December 12, 2012. 10. Jenkin Lloyd Jones, “The Irresponsible Weak in the United Nations,” Human Events, January 11, 1964, 13. Clayton Bellamy, “Editor Jenkin Lloyd Jones, Sr. Dies,” Washington Post, February 24, 2004. http://www.washingtonpost.com/ wp-dyn/articles/A2409-2004Feb24.html?sections=http://www.washingtonpost .com/wp-dyn/nation/index. 11. “Secularization of the U.N.,” National Review, January 21, 1972, 23. 12. John Chamberlain, “U-Thant’s Hypocrisy on ‘Human Rights’ in Hungary,” Human Events, April 2, 1966, 7. “John Chamberlain, Columnist, Dies at 91,” April 13, 1995, New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/1995/04/13/obituaries/ john-chamberlain-columnist-dies-at-91.html. 13. Douglas C. Rossinow, The Politics of Authenticity: Liberalism, Christianity and the New Left in America (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 199. 14. Hans Sennholz, “Ominous Change in U.N. Membership,” Human Events, March 28, 1964, 1. 15. Barry Goldwater, “Will U.S. Make Russia Pay Her U.N. Bills?,” Human Events, January 30, 1965, 1. 16. Douglas Little, American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East since 1945 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008), 3. Suzanne Clark, Cold Warriors: Manliness on Trial in the Rhetoric of the West (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 2000), 1. Goldwater used a type of rhetoric to describe the United States’ refusal to push back against the aggression that historian Natasha Zaretsky calls “a crisis of masculine authority.” Natasha Zaretsky, “Restraint or Retreat? The Debate over the Panama Canal Treaties and U.S. Nationalism after Vietnam,” Diplomatic History 35, no. 3 (June 2011): 550. Many on the Right contended that the United Nations had “foisted freedom on largely primitive and unprepared African tribes and had produced chaos, communism and neo colonialism.” Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America since 1945, 246. 17. Barry Goldwater, “Will U.S. Make Russia Pay Her U.N. Bills?” Representative Pearson (KS). “Non Payment of United Nations Dues.” 111, part 15 Cong. Rec. S20608 (August 15, 1965). Hein Online. June 14, 2013. Senator Mundt (SD). “U.S. Capitulation at The United Nations.” 111, part 15 Cong. Rec. S20625 (August 17, 1965). Hein Online. June 14, 2013. 18. Kelly, James Burnham and the Struggle for the World, 264. James Burn-

212 Notes to Pages 102–105 ham, The War We Are In: The Last Decade and The Next (New Rochelle, NY: Arlington House, 1967), 303. 19. James Burnham, “Why Do We Take It?,” TWW, National Review, January 12, 1965, 20. In comments from 1968, National Review referred to the UN as “impotent, a crumbling monument to the internationalist aspirations of liberalism, a gathering place for Afro-Asian minipowers to rally against the remnants of nineteenth century European colonialism while twentieth century Soviet colonialism consolidates its grip on Europe itself.” Michael W. Flamm and David Steigerwald, Debating the 1960s: Liberal, Conservative, and Radical Perspectives (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2007), 116. 20. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, “The United States in Opposition,” Commentary, March 1975. 21. Gil Troy, Moynihan’s Moment: America’s Fight against Zionism as Racism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 56. Paul Seabury to Norman Podhoretz, November 24, 1974, box 330, part 1, Daniel P. Moynihan Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC. 22. John Ehrman, The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Policy, 1945–1994 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), 80. 23. Daniel P. Moynihan to Norman Podhoretz, December 27, 1974, box 330, part 1, Moynihan Papers. 24. Thomas Borstelmann said that the drive for independence in Africa and the battle for civil rights in America inspired both to continue to maintain their focus and determination. Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2001), Google Books. https://books.google.com/books?id=HWqjxBEPPlE C&printsec=frontcover&dq=cold+war+and+the+color+line&hl=en&sa=X&ved =0ahUKEwiiyLDcuNXXAhWxUN8KHdu3AYIQ6AEIKDAA#v=onepage&q=e conomic exploitation&f=false. March 9, 2015. 25. The issue of foreign oil also played a prominent role in the debate between North and South. Libya’s successful demand for larger royalties from its foreign clients set an example for nations within the Arab region as well as those in Africa and other disadvantaged areas, demonstrating that the Western idea of the fairness of free markets was a false premise. Righter, Utopia Lost, 106. 26. Norman Podhoretz, Breaking Ranks: A Political Memoir (New York: Harper and Row Publishing, 1979), 345. 27. Troy, Moynihan’s Moment, 57. 28. Balint, Running Commentary, 155. 29. Troy, Moynihan’s Moment, 57. Daniel Patrick Moynihan with Suzanne Weaver, A Dangerous Place (Boston: Little Brown, 1978), 55. 30. Carl Gershman, phone interview, December 4, 2012. 31. Godfrey Hodgson, The Gentleman from New York: Daniel Patrick Moynihan: A Biography (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2000), 221. 32. Moynihan, “The United States in Opposition.”

Notes to Pages 106–107  213 33. Moynihan, “The United States in Opposition.” 34. Historian Gil Troy describes the climate of the UN during the 1970s: “the rhetoric was of neocolonialism and racial discrimination, of developing countries pitted against developed countries and multinationals. The language shifted from individual rights to national grievances, from aspirational to confrontational.” Troy, Moynihan’s Moment, 31. 35. Righter, Utopia Lost, 93. 36. Historian Jennifer Bair writes, “At its core, the NIEO was a plan to transform what was, from the perspective of this coalition, a profoundly inequitable international economy biased against the global south. This program of structural reform and global redistribution was presented as a precondition for meaningful development in the Third World but also as a natural and necessary extension of the anticolonial project more broadly, since sovereign equality among states required economic as well as political self-determination.” Jennifer Bair, “Corporations at the United Nations: Echoes of the New International Economic Order?” Humanity 6, no. 1 (Spring 2015): 159. 37. Moynihan, “The United States in Opposition.” 38. Bernard D. Nossiter, The Global Struggle for More: Third World Conflicts with Rich Nations (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), 60–61. 39. Righter, Utopia Lost, 108. 40. Human Events and National Review took different positions when it came to America’s role at the UN. While a number of Human Events columnists argued for the United States’ withdrawal from the UN, those such as Buckley and Burnham at National Review felt that the country should remain. Burnham believed that “it was time to deflate the pretentions” of the world organization. In order to achieve that objective, the United States should “no longer vote on substantive matters in the U.N.” Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America since 1945, 248. The debate over the success or failure of the NIEO continues even in the most recent scholarship. Nils Gilman argues, “In fact, as several essays . . . demonstrate, the failure of the NIEO was the result of a deliberate and concerted strategy on the part of leaders in the North, compounded by strategic choices on the part of the South.” However, Gilman points out a positive legacy as well: “a key underlying economic objective of the NIEO, namely, to improve the South’s economic position in the global economy, has in fact been realized, albeit unevenly.” Nils Gilman, “The New International Economic Order, A Reintroduction,” Humanity 6, no. 1 (Spring 2015): 10. 41. William F. Buckley Jr., “The Breakdown,” On the Right, December 17, 1974, Buckley Online, Hillsdale College. https://cumulus.hillsdale.edu/Buckley/ index2.html#1511466033248_5. April 3, 2015. Alice Widener, “U.N. Plans World Economic Order,” Human Events, November 1, 1975, 13. 42. Robert W. Tucker, “A New International Economic Order?,” Commentary, February 1975, 39. Podhoretz’s objections to economic redistribution were reflected by economists P. T. Bauer and B. S. Yamey in “Against the New Econom-

214 Notes to Pages 108–109 ic Order,” published in the magazine in the spring of 1977. The argument stated that Third World development was actually retarded by “foreign aid to poor countries by rewarding the policies that caused impoverishment.” Balint, Running Commentary, 145. 43. Troy, Moynihan’s Moment, 133. As Norman Podhoretz said of Moynihan during that period in 1975, “Americans loved him because he was the first public figure in a long time to assert, in language that was simultaneously blunt, eloquent and credible, that the United States, as leader of the ‘liberty party’ stood for something precious in the world.” Podhoretz, Breaking Ranks, 352. 44. Carl Gershman, “The World according to Andrew Young,” Commentary, August 1978. 45. Carter viewed the extension of America’s hand to the Third World as a new and different type of American foreign policy. “I tried to speak in a clear voice,” Carter wrote in his memoirs, “and let our influence be felt in regions where our country had long ignored the cries for an end to racial prejudice.” Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (New York: Bantam Books, 1982), 154. As part of his foreign policy objectives, Carter sought to “deemphasize Third World conflict and competition and implement a regionalist approach where Third World nations in particular, would be considered outside of the framework of East-West relations.” Donna R. Jackson, Jimmy Carter and the Horn of Africa: Cold War Policy in Ethiopia and Somalia (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 2008), 28. 46. Gaddis Smith, Morality, Reason and Power: American Diplomacy in the Carter Years (New York: Hill and Wang, 1986), 7. 47. “Would Young Destroy Western Civilization?,” Human Events, February 12, 1977, 6. “Andrew Young was awful at the U.N. He was music to Soviet and radical revolutionary ears,” Human Events editor Allan Ryskind said. Allan Ryskind, e-mail, June 28, 2013. 48. Joshua Muravchik, The Uncertain Crusade: Jimmy Carter and the Dilemma of Human Rights Policy (Blue Ridge Summit, PA: University Press of America, 1986), 14. 49. Andrew J. DeRoche, Andrew Young: Civil Rights Ambassador (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources, 2003), 77, 102. 50. Carl Gershman, phone interview, December 4, 2012. Carl Gershman, “The Rise and Fall of the New Foreign Policy Establishment,” Commentary, July 1980. Zaretsky, “Restraint or Retreat?,” 538. 51. Nick Thimmesch, “Andrew Young: Our Foot-in-the-Mouth Ambassador,” Human Events, March 12, 1977, 10. “The Andy Young Conundrum,” National Review, April 29, 1977, 481. 52. Representative Hyde (IL). “U.N. Ambassador Young.” 123, part 15 Cong. Rec. H17699 (June 7, 1977). Hein Online. June 28, 2013. Representative Ashbrook (OH) “Impeach Andrew Young.” 123, part 29 Cong. Rec. H37393 (November 4, 1977). Hein Online. June 28, 2013. Representative Ashbrook (OH).

Notes to Pages 110–113  215 Cited Carl Gershman, “The World according to Andrew Young.” 124, part 21 Cong. Rec. H29040 (September 12, 1978). Hein Online. June 28, 2013. 53. M. Stanton Evans, “Andrew Young—Apologist for Marxist Repression,” Human Events, September 2, 1978, 9. 54. Allan C. Brownfield, “A Close Look at Carter’s Radical Fringe,” Human Events, November 11, 1978, 1. 55. “Andy Young’s Legacy,” Human Events, August 25, 1979, 1. “Young in Perspective,” National Review, September 14, 1979, 1135. Brownfield, “A Close Look at Carter’s Radical Fringe,” series 3, box 108, Ed Meese Files, Campaign Operations, 1980 Campaign, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA. 56. Peter Collier, Political Woman: The Big Little Life of Jeane Kirkpatrick (New York: Encounter Books, 2012), 99. Harold Jackson, “Jeane Kirkpatrick,” The Guardian, December 9, 2006. https://www.theguardian.com/news/2006/ dec/09/guardianobituaries.usa. 57. Collier, Political Woman, 99. Bartlett C. Jones, Flawed Triumphs: Andy Young at the United Nations (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1996), 124. 58. William F. Buckley Jr., “Can Mr. Carter Really Mean What He Says?,” May 27, 1977, Daily Telegraph. Buckley Online. Hillsdale College. https://cumulus .hillsdale.edu/Buckley/index2.html#1511472766038_5. June 14, 2013. Buckley also clearly saw the double standard argument in Carter’s foreign policy as it disturbed him that Carter was willing to “invoke sanctions against Ian Smith’s white Rhodesian regime and Pinochet’s Chile but not against the Soviet Union.” Judis, William F. Buckley, Jr., 396. 59. Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorships and Double Standards,” Commentary, November, 1979, 34. 60. Collier, Political Woman, 102. 61. Jeane Kirkpatrick, “Dictatorships and Double Standards.” 62. Peter Hannaford, e-mail, June 2, 2013. According to Kirkpatrick, “Reagan had been in Washington and Dick was driving him to the airport to go home. When he got out of the car, Dick gave him the article and said: ‘I think you’re going to like this.’ Reagan called him from a stopover and said, ‘it’s a terrific article.’” Collier, Political Woman, 105. According to Allen’s memory of the event, “Reagan called me immediately upon reaching home. ‘What you gave me to read was extraordinary!’ he said. ‘Who is this guy Jeane Kirkpatrick?’” Richard V. Allen, “Jeane Kirkpatrick and the Great Democratic Defection,” New York Times, December 16, 2006, A17. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/16/opinion/16allen. html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=7B146E12DA0335383346DD8062009B1 4&gwt=pay&assetType=opinion. 63. Collier, Political Woman, 105. 64. Peter Hannaford, e-mail, June 2, 2013. 65. Richard Allen, “Jeane Kirkpatrick and the Great Democratic Defection.”

216 Notes to Pages 115–119

5. A Loss of National Pride 1. Firing Line, “Debate on Ratification of the Panama Canal Treaties,” January 13, 1978. C-Span https://www.c-span.org/video/?154034-1/firing-line-panamacanal-treaties. William F. Buckley Jr., “And Finally on Panama,” On the Right, October 16–17, 1976, Buckley Online. Hillsdale College. https://cumulus.hillsdale .edu/Buckley/index2.html#1511488704272_11. 2. Buckley, The Reagan I Knew, 96. 3. Allan Ryskind, e-mail, July 19, 2013. 4. Adam Clymer, Drawing the Line at the Big Ditch: The Panama Canal Treaties and the Rise of the Right (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2008), 3. 5. Borstelmann, The 1970s, 205. 6. Noel Maurer and Carlos Yu, The Big Ditch: How America Took, Built, Ran, and Ultimately Gave Away the Panama Canal (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011), 84. Giancarlo Soler Torrijos, In the Shadow of the United States: Democracy and Regional Order in the Latin Caribbean (Boca Raton, FL: Brown Walker, 2008), 126. Clymer, Drawing the Line at the Big Ditch, 4. 7. Michael E. Latham, “Imperial Legacy and Cold War Credibility: Lyndon Johnson and the Panama Crisis,” Peace and Change 27, no. 4 (October 2002): 502. 8. Edwin McDowell, “Will We Lose the Canal?,” National Review, February 11, 1964, 107. 9. Edwin McDowell, “Will We Lose the Canal?,” 108. “Edwin McDowell, 72, Reporter at the Times Dies,” New York Times, July 13, 2007. http://www.nytimes .com/2007/07/13/nyregion/13mcdowell.html?mtrref=www.google.com&gwh=6F 9DA695B27715FF1796C6C8014D7677&gwt=pay. 10. Latham, “Imperial Legacy and Cold War Credibility,” 512, 507–508. Alan McPherson, “50 Years Ago: Lyndon Johnson’s First Foreign Crisis,” Globalist, January 9, 2014. https://www.theglobalist.com/panama-50-years-agolyndon-johnsons-first-foreign-crisis/. 11. Clymer, Drawing the Line at the Big Ditch, 7. 12. Clymer, Drawing the Line at the Big Ditch, 7. 13. Ellis O. Briggs, “The Case for Keeping the Panama Canal,” Human Events, November 23, 1968, 8. 14. Ellis O. Briggs, “The Case for Keeping the Panama Canal.” Lou Cannon, President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 296. Google Books. https://books.google.com/books?id=I5Yoz3dWP28C&pg=PA 296&lpg=PA296&dq=we+bought+it+we+paid+for+it+it’s+ours+and+we+are+go ing+to+keep+it&source=bl&ots=fyzdfZ0UDM&sig=O4BqGd7IZuMH3s23RAE MB2CwEDs&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwiEwsX-vrzYAhWrjlQKHep2BvYQ6 AEIQTAD#v=onepage&q=we bought it we paid for it it’s ours and we are going to keep it&f=false. 15. Donald Dozer, “Will Nixon Give Up Control of Panama Canal?,” Human Events, July 11, 1970, 8. “Donald M. Dozer, Expert on Latin America,”

Notes to Pages 119–123  217 Washington Post, August 16, 1980. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/ local/1980/08/16/donald-m-dozer-professor-expert-on-latin-america/4ed6f37ca45b-490d-a713-322fb000c383/?utm_term=.941256bf417a. 16. Senator Thurmond (SC). Citing Donald Dozer, “Will Nixon Give Up Control of Panama Canal?” “Dozer’s Article on Panama Canal.” 116, part 18 Cong. Rec. S23409 (July 9, 1970). Hein Online. August 8, 2013. 17. Senator Strom Thurmond, “As Panama Talks Re-open,” Human Events, April 24, 1971, 9. 18. Zaretsky, “Restraint or Retreat?,” 552. 19. Zaretsky, “Restraint or Retreat?,” 551. 20. Donald M. Dozer, “The United States and the Panama Canal,” Human Events, April 28, 1973, 13. Representative Crane (IL). Citing Donald M. Dozer, “The United States and the Panama Canal.” 119, part 14 Cong. Rec. H18431 (June 6, 1973) H18431. Hein Online. August 15, 2013. Representative Crane (IL). Citing Donald M. Dozer, “Panama Canal: A Study in Sovereignty,” Human Events, November 4, 1972, 12. “Panama Canal: A Study in Sovereignty.” 119, part 7 Cong. Rec. H8275 (March 15, 1973). Hein Online. August 15, 2013. 21. Clymer, Drawing the Line at the Big Ditch, 9. 22. James J. Kilpatrick, “The Panama Canal: Stop the Sellout,” Human Events, March 2, 1974, 10. 23. Clymer, Drawing the Line at the Big Ditch, 13. 24. M. Stanton Evans, “Giving Up Panama,” Human Events, August 30, 1975, 18. 25. Maurer and Yu, The Big Ditch, 258. 26. Clymer, Drawing the Line at the Big Ditch, 21. 27. Ronald Reagan, “World Cries Out for Strong U.S. Leadership,” Human Events, July 19, 1975, 10. “Helms Warns against Panama Canal Giveaway,” Human Events, April 26, 1975, 6. Clymer, Drawing the Line at the Big Ditch, 22. Reagan appears to have made those comments in May 1975. Skinner, Anderson, and Anderson, eds., Reagan, In His Own Hand, 506. 28. Reagan, “World Cries Out for Strong U.S. Leadership.” 29. “Panama Canal Collision,” National Review Bulletin, August 8, 1975, 115. Zaretsky, “Restraint or Retreat?,” 555. 30. Borstelmann, The 1970s, 206. 31. Borstelmann, The 1970s, 206. 32. Zaretsky, “Restraint or Retreat?,” 540. 33. Donald M. Dozer, “State Department Determined to Give Away Panama Canal,” Human Events, August 13, 1977, 14. 34. “Carter Busy Selling Mystery Canal Treaties,” Human Events, August 27, 1977, 1. Representative Ashbrook (OH). “United States Should Keep Panama Canal.” 123, part 22 Cong. Rec. H28349 (September 8, 1977). Hein Online. March 12, 2014. Natasha Zaretsky, “Restraint or Retreat?,” 549. 35. Judis, William F. Buckley, Jr., 397.

218 Notes to Pages 123–128 36. Judis, William F. Buckley, Jr., 397. 37. Judis, William F. Buckley, Jr., 397. 38. William F. Buckley Jr., “And Finally on Panama,” National Review, On the Right, November 12, 1976, 1252. 39. James Burnham, “Panama or Taiwan,” TPC, National Review, September 16, 1977, 1043. 40. Richard Brookhiser, interview, New York, January 9, 2013. Richard Brookhiser, e-mail, July 30, 2013. Linda Bridges, interview, New York, October 25, 2012. Judis, William F. Buckley, Jr., 398. 41. Frisk, If Not Us, Who?, 342. William A. Rusher, The Rise of the Right (New York: William Morrow, 1984), 299. 42. William F. Buckley Jr., “United in the Faith, Differing on a Particular,” National Review, October 20, 2008, 48. 43. William F. Buckley Jr., “United in the Faith, Differing on a Particular.” 44. Linda Bridges, e-mail, August 22, 2013. 45. “The Proposed Treaty: Preliminary Thoughts,” National Review, September 2, 1977, 982. 46. “The Proposed Treaty: Preliminary Thoughts.” 47. “The Proposed Treaty: Preliminary Thoughts.” 48. William A. Rusher to the editors, September 30, 1977, interoffice memo, box 124, WAR Papers. 49. Re: “Letters to The Editor,” September 30, 1977, interoffice memo, box 168, part 2, WFB Papers. Senator Bayh (IN). Citing William F. Buckley Jr., “The Case for the Panama Treaty,” Washington Star, August 16, 1977. “The Canal Treaties: Other Conservative Views and Voices.” 123, part 29 Cong. Rec. S36853 (November 11, 1977). Hein Online. August 20, 2013. 50. Richard Brookhiser, interview, New York, January 9, 2013. 51. Buckley, The Reagan I Knew, 96. Google Books. https://books.google. com/books?id=lk3DJUStiX8C&printsec=frontcover&dq=the+reagan+i+knew&h l=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwit7K2mpNbXAhVKYt8KHUXKBu8Q6AEIKDAA# v=snippet&q=I must confess&f=false. 52. William F. Buckley Jr., “Panama Si.” On the Right, National Review, September 30, 1977, 1132. 53. Maurer and Yu, The Big Ditch, 260. 54. Judis, William F. Buckley, Jr., 398. 55. William F. Buckley Jr., “United in the Faith, Differing on a Particular,” 51. 56. Interoffice memo, March 6, 1978, part 2, box 168, WFB Papers. “Now the Senate’s Turn,” National Review, February 17, 1978, 196. 57. William A. Rusher to William F. Buckley Jr., interoffice memo, April 13, 1978, part 2, box 168, WFB Papers. 58. “Truth Squad Battles Carter on Canal Treaties,” Human Events, January 21, 1978, 1. “Is Gen. Torrijos Involved in Drug Trafficking?,” Human Events, October 29, 1977, 3. M. Stanton Evans, “Torrijos Drug Links Should Be Probed by

Notes to Pages 129–135  219 Congress,” Human Events, November 5, 1977, 13. Clymer, Drawing the Line at the Big Ditch, 62. 59. “Senate Vote Signals U.S. Global Retreat,” Human Events, March 25, 1978, 1. 60. “Torrijos Vows to Defy DeConcini Resolution,” Human Events, April 29, 1978, 1. 61. Clymer, Drawing the Line at the Big Ditch, 167, 168. Skinner, Anderson, and Anderson, eds., Reagan, In His Own Hand, 505–525.

6. Democratic Fantasies vs. Cold War Realities 1. Joseph B. Treaster, “Reagan Is Critical of Carter on Rights,” New York Times, June 10, 1977, A5. Historical New York Times, Fordham University. Peter Hannaford, e-mail, January 30, 2014. 2. Michael Haas, Cambodia, Pol Pot and the United States: The Faustian Pact (New York: Praeger, 1991), 12. Allan Ryskind, e-mail, January 8, 2014. 3. Ronald Reagan, “Free World Idealism Faces Soviet Realities,” Human Events, July 2, 1977, 9. 4. M. Stanton Evans, phone interview, August 14, 2013. 5. Thomas Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line, 5. 6. Smant, Principles and Heresies, 207, 218, 209. Robert Bailey, “Who are the Panthers?,” Human Events, September 7, 1968, 7–10. John A. Andrew III, The Other Side of the Sixties: Young Americans for Freedom and the Rise of Conservative Politics (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1997), 132. 7. Martin Meredith, The Fate of Africa: From the Hopes of Freedom to the Heart of Despair: A History of 50 Years of Independence (New York: Public Affairs Books, 2005), 116–117. Donal Lowry, “The Impact of Anti-communism on White Rhodesian Political Culture, ca. 1920s to 1980,” Cold War History 7, no. 2 (May 2007): 176. 8. Meredith, The Fate of Africa, 130. Brian Raftopoulos and Alois Mlambo, eds. Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Pre-Colonial Period to 2008 (Johannesburg, South Africa: Weaver, 2009), 109. Meredith, The Fate of Africa, 130. 9. Lowry, “The Impact of Anti-communism,” 178. Sue Onslow, ed., Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation (New York: Routledge, 2009), 2. 10. Meredith, The Fate of Africa, 130. Raftopoulos and Mlambo, Becoming Zimbabwe, 110. Lowry, “The Impact of Anti-communism,” 178. 11. Meredith, The Fate of Africa, 132. Raftopoulos and Mlambo, Becoming Zimbabwe, 110. 12. Meredith, The Fate of Africa, 132. 13. Meredith, The Fate of Africa, 133. 14. Thomas Molnar, “Rhodesia at the Crossroads,” National Review, November 2, 1965, 972. Anthony Lejeune, “Can Britain Stop Rhodesia?,” National Review, January 11, 1966, 23. 15. William F. Buckley Jr., “Dilemma in Rhodesia,” On the Right, November 16, 1965. Buckley Online, Hillsdale College. https://cumulus.hillsdale.edu/Buckley/ index2.html#1515795496952_8. 

220 Notes to Pages 135–138 16. Geoffrey Kabaservice, Rule and Ruin: The Downfall of Moderation and the Destruction of the Republican Party from Eisenhower to the Tea Party (New York: Oxford University Press, 2012), 152. “Memoriam: Thomas Molnar 1921– 2010,” The Society of St. Hugh of Cluny, July 22, 2010. http://sthughofcluny. org/2010/07/professor-thomas-molnar-in-memoriam.html. 17. James J. Kilpatrick, “The Campaign against Rhodesia,” Human Events, December 11, 1965, 3. 18. Barry Goldwater, “Rhodesian Boycott Illustrates U.S. Foreign Policy Failures,” Human Events, December 18, 1965, 2. Chris Saunders and Sue Onslow, “The Cold War and Southern Africa, 1976–1990” in The Cambridge History of the Cold War. Vol. 3, Endings (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 222. 19. William F. Buckley Jr., “Pas D’ennemi a Gauche,” On the Right, December 18, 1965. Buckley Online. Hillsdale College. https://cumulus.hillsdale.edu/ Buckley/index2.html#1511525385572_8. February 17, 2015. 20. “Down with Independence,” National Review Bulletin, October 26, 1965, 1. Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line, 198. 21. James Burnham, “Global Apartheid,” TWW, National Review, October 18, 1966, 1036. Elspeth Huxley, “Seven Days of Humiliation,” African Affairs, National Review, October 4, 1966, 989. 22. Ralph de Toledano, “How the Smith Government is Faring in Rhodesia,” Human Events, February 19, 1966, 12. 23. Representative Ashbrook (OH). “Give Rhodesia a Fair Break.” 112, part 4 Cong. Rec. H5338–5340 (March 8, 1966). Hein Online. March 18, 2014. Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line, 199. 24. Ralph de Toledano, “Is Race the Issue in Rhodesia?,” Human Events, February 26, 1966, 14. William F. Buckley Jr., “Rhodesia as World Threat,” On the Right, March 10, 1966. Buckley Online. Hillsdale College. https://cumulus.hillsdale .edu/Buckley/index2.html#1511525610096_5. March 22, 2014. 25. James Jackson Kilpatrick, Rene Albert Wormser, and Walter Darnell Jacobs, “Rhodesia: A Case History,” National Review, May 16, 1967, 512–526. Representative Rarick (LA). Citing Kilpatrick, Wormser, and Jacobs, “Rhodesia: A Case History.” “Rhodesia.” 113, part 25 Cong. Rec. H34433 (November 30, 1967). Hein Online. March 18, 2014. James Jackson Kilpatrick, “Visitor Has Trouble Finding Rebellion in Rhodesia,” Human Events, March 18, 1967, 6. Elspeth Huxley, “To Crush a Mouse,” Letter from Rhodesia, National Review, April 9, 1968, 335. Ralph de Toledano, “Russia, Si; Rhodesia, No,” Human Events, June 3, 1967, 6. Bogus, Buckley, 165. 26. Kilpatrick, Wormser, and Jacobs, “Rhodesia,” 514. 27. Kilpatrick, Wormser, and Jacobs, “Rhodesia,” 514. 28. Kilpatrick, Wormser, and Jacobs, “Rhodesia,” 514. 29. Kilpatrick, Wormser, and Jacobs, “Rhodesia,” 512–526. Representative John Rarick (LA). “Rhodesian Report.” 114, part 5 Cong. Rec. H6620–6622 (March 14, 1968). Hein Online. March 18, 2014.

Notes to Pages 138–141  221 30. Kilpatrick, Wormser, and Jacobs, “Rhodesia,” 516. 31. William F. Buckley Jr. to James Jackson Kilpatrick, April 7, 1967, part 1, box 44, WFB Papers. 32. Myres S. McDougal and W. Michael Reisman, “Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of International Concern,” American Journal of International Law 62, no. 1 (1968): 2. 33. Robert C. Good, U.D.I.: The International Politics of the Rhodesian Rebellion (London: Faber and Faber, 1973), 236. 34. Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line, 212–213. James Burnham, “A New Front Opens,” TWW, National Review, August 27, 1968, 844. 35. Meredith, The Fate of Africa, 320. Raftopoulos and Mlambo, Becoming Zimbabwe, 123. 36. John Phillips, “How Goes It in Rhodesia,” National Review, August 25, 1970, 894. 37. Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line, 235. Henry Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 283. Representative Thomas Pelly, “Inconsistencies Abound in U.S. Ban on Rhodesian Trade,” Human Events, October 18, 1969, 14. Representative Price (TX). “Recognition of Rhodesia.” 116, part 5 Cong. Rec. H6830 (March 11, 1970). Hein Online. March 12, 2014. Representative Edwards (AL). “We Should Recognize Rhodesia.” 116, part 5 Cong. Rec. H6696 (March 10, 1970). Hein Online. March 20, 2014. 38. Elspeth Huxley interviewed by William F. Buckley Jr., Firing Line, October 20, 1970, “Africa and Colonialism,” Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University. https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/6155/africa-andcolonialism?ctx=0afaaeb0-890e-46ab-afdf-6658c972b6d1&idx=1. July 1, 2015. Sarah Lyall, “Elspeth Huxley, 89, Chronicler of Colonial Kenya, Dies,” New York Times, January 18, 1997. http://www.nytimes.com/1997/01/18/arts/elspeth-huxley89-chronicler-of-colonial-kenya-dies.html. 39. Ralph de Toledano, Human Events, “Administrations Policy Aids USSR,” November 9, 1968, 7. “Do Soviet Chrome Shipments to U.S. Actually Originate in Rhodesia?,” Human Events, September 25, 1971, 10. Representative Philip Crane, “Rhodesian Chrome,” Human Events, May 8, 1971, 15. Representative Collins (TX). “Congress Must End Russian Monopoly of World Chrome Market.” 117, part 3 Cong. Rec. H3383 (February 22, 1971). Hein Online. March 23, 2014. 40. Elspeth Huxley, “Red China’s Year in Africa,” African Affairs, National Review, February 9, 1965, 95–96, 121. Jack Penn, “Red China Gaining Influence in Africa,” Human Events, October 28, 1972, 12–13. Robert D. Schulzinger, ed., A Companion to American Foreign Relations. Blackwell Companions to American History (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2003), 114. Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line, 235. “Corpse at Turtle Bay,” National Review, January 5, 1973, 12. 41. Ian Duncan Smith, interviewed by William F. Buckley Jr., Firing Line, “The Question of Rhodesia,” April 23, 1974, 9. Hoover Institution Archives,

222 Notes to Pages 141–144 Stanford University. http://www.oac.cdlib.org/findaid/ark:/13030/kt6m3nc88c/ dsc/?query=The question of Rhodesia;dsc.position=1#hitNum1. William F. Buckley Jr., On the Firing Line: The Public Life of our Public Figures (New York: Random House, 1989), 283. 42. William F. Buckley Jr., “At the Edge in Rhodesia,” On the Right, March 23, 1974. Buckley Online. Hillsdale College. https://cumulus.hillsdale.edu/Buckley/ index2.html#1511527879278_7. January 2, 2015. 43. Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line, 237. Kissinger, Years of Renewal, 915. 44. “Kissinger Outlines Plan to Crush Rhodesia,” Human Events, May 18, 1976, 1. “Excerpts from Kissinger’s Lusaka Declaration,” Human Events, May 18, 1976. “Four More Years of Kissinger,” Human Events, August 21, 1976, 1. Representative Crane (IL). Cites “Kissinger Outlines Plan to Crush Rhodesia.” “Kissinger’s Dangerous Plan to Crush Rhodesia.” 122, part 10 Cong. Rec. H12730 (May 5, 1976). Hein Online. March 26, 2014. 45. Borstelmann, The Cold War and the Color Line, 238. Bayard Rustin and Carl Gershman, “Africa, Soviet Imperialism and the Retreat of American Power,” Commentary, October 1977, 33. Skinner, Anderson, and Anderson, eds., Reagan: A Life in Letters, 516–517. William F. Buckley Jr., “Reagan and Rhodesia,” On the Right, June 17, 1976. Buckley Online. Hillsdale College. https://cumulus.hillsdale. edu/Buckley/index2.html#1511532616018_6. March 2, 2014. William F. Buckley Jr., “Rhodesian Briefing,” On the Right, May 10, 1976. Buckley Online. Hillsdale College. https://cumulus.hillsdale.edu/Buckley/index2.html#1511532710163_5. March 18, 2014. Roger A. Freeman, “Why Does the U.S. Government Want to Destroy Rhodesia?,” Human Events, June 26, 1976, 8. Jeffrey Hart, “Will There Really Be Majority Rule In Rhodesia?,” Human Events, April 10, 1976, 13. 46. Onslow, Cold War in Southern Africa, 14. 47. Raftopoulos and Mlambo, Becoming Zimbabwe, 146–147. Meredith, The Fate of Africa, 322. 48. James Burnham, “Last Act in Rhodesia,” TPC, National Review, October 29, 1976, 1170. Meredith, The Fate of Africa, 324. 49. Bayard Rustin and Carl Gershman, “Africa, Soviet Imperialism and the Retreat of American Power,” Commentary, October 1977, 40. 50. Rustin and Gershman, “Africa, Soviet Imperialism and the Retreat of American Power,” 42. 51. “U.S. Brands Rhodesian Solution as ‘Illegal,’” Human Events, April 8, 1978, 1. James Burnham, “Black, White, Gray,” TPC, National Review, March 31, 1978, 393. Representative Sikes (FL). “Time for a Realistic Approach to Rhodesian Problems.” 124, part 7 Cong. Rec. H8495 (April 3, 1978). Hein Online. March 31, 2014. Representative Lagomarsino (CA). “Our Rhodesia Policy.” 124, part 13 Cong. Rec. H20864 (July 13, 1978). Hein Online. March 30, 2014. Senator Dole (KS). “Carter in Africa: A Sorry Safari.” 124, part 7 Cong. Rec. S8717 (April 5, 1978). Hein Online.

Notes to Pages 144–148  223 52. M. Stanton Evans, phone interview, August 14, 2013. 53. Bayard Rustin, “The War against Zimbabwe,” Commentary, July 1, 1979, 31. M. Stanton Evans, “Eyewitness Report on the Rhodesian Elections,” Human Events, May 5, 1979, 5. “Will U.S. Lift Rhodesian Sanctions Now?,” Human Events, April 28, 1979, 1. Cathy Young, “What Tributes to Bayard Rustin Leave Out,” Real Clear Politics, September 3, 2013. 54. Brian Crozier, “The Rhodesian Decision,” TPC, National Review, June 22, 1979, 786. “Rhodesia: Short Editorial,” National Review, May 25, 1979, 660. “Rhodesian Realpolitik,” National Review Bulletin, June 29, 1979, B89. 55. Piero Gleijeses, Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976–1991 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2013), 141. 56. Nancy Mitchell, “Tropes of the Cold War: Jimmy Carter and Rhodesia,” Cold War History 7, no. 2 (May 2007): 265. Smith, Morality, Reason and Power, 141. “The Sore Loser,” National Review Bulletin, March 16, 1978, 25. “Rhodesia: The Clock’s Ticking Fast,” National Review Bulletin, July 28, 1978, 105. Raftopoulos and Mlambo, Becoming Zimbabwe, 162–163. 57. Raftopoulos and Mlambo, Becoming Zimbabwe, 165–166. Meredith, The Fate of Africa, 327. “Rhodesia: One Last Game,” National Review, August 31, 1979, 1074. “Thatcher Rhodesia Plan: A Plus for the West,” Human Events, December 29, 1979, 3. “Rhodesia,” National Review, October 12, 1979, 1278. Raftopoulos and Mlambo, Becoming Zimbabwe, 165–166, Meredith, The Fate of Africa, 327. 58. William F. Buckley Jr., “Rhodesian Envoi,” On the Right, National Review, April 4, 1980, 432–433. “Mugabe’s Victory Imperils Rhodesia,” Human Events, March 15, 1980, 6. “How Trustworthy Is Zimbabwe’s P.M?,” Human Events, September 6, 1980, 4. 59. M. Stanton Evans, phone interview, August 14, 2013.

7. The Pathology of Inaction 1. Robert W. Tucker, “Oil: The Issue of American Intervention,” Commentary, January 1975, 30. 2. Ronald Reagan interviewed by William F. Buckley Jr., Firing Line, “Presidential Hopeful Ronald Reagan,” January 14, 1980, 7. Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University. https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/objects/6578/ presidential-hopeful-ronald-reagan?ctx=8124c781-206a-49cf-aebd916869f39371&idx=2. 3. David S. Painter, “Oil and the American Century,” Journal of American History 99, no. 1 (June 2012): 35. 4. Daniel Yergin, The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money, and Power (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 613. Tore T. Petersen, Richard Nixon, Great Britain and the Anglo-American Alignment in the Persian Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula: Making Allies out of Clients (Eastbourne, UK: Sussex Academic

224 Notes to Pages 148–152 Press, 2009), 30–31. Allen J. Matusow, Nixon’s Economy: Booms, Busts, Dollars, and Votes (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1998), 241. Henry Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (Boston: Little Brown, 1982), 854. 5. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 855. 6. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 855. 7. Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, 242. Paul Sabin, “Crisis and Continuity in U.S. Oil Politics, 1965–1980,” Journal of American History 99, no. 1 (June 2012): 178. 8. Sabin, “Crisis and Continuity,” 179. Meg Jacobs, “The Conservative Struggle and the Energy Crisis,” in Rightward Bound: Making America Conservative in the 1970s, ed. Bruce J. Schulman and Julian E. Zelizer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 195–196. 9. Mergel, Conservative Intellectuals and Richard Nixon, 99. Nigel Bowles, Nixon’s Business: Authority and Power in Presidential Politics (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2006), 140. 10. Jacobs, “The Conservative Struggle and the Energy Crisis,” 196. Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, 244. Yergin, The Prize, 591. 11. David S. Painter, “From the Nixon Doctrine to the Carter Doctrine: Iran and the Geopolitics of Oil in the 1970s,” in American Energy Policy in the 1970s, ed. Robert Lifset (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2014), 63–64. Selig S. Harrison and K. Subrahmanyam, Superpower Rivalry in the Indian Ocean: Indian and American Perspectives (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 51. 12. Painter, “From the Nixon Doctrine to the Carter Doctrine,” 65. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 860. 13. Stephen J. Randall, United States Foreign Oil Policy since World War I: For Profits and Security, 2nd ed. (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2005), 286–287. 14. Randall, United States Foreign Oil Policy since World War I, 287. 15. “The Fight for Oil,” National Review Bulletin, January 25, 1974, B1. 16. Sabin, “Crisis and Continuity in U.S. Oil Politics,” 182. 17. “Politics and Oil,” National Review Bulletin, September 21, 1973, B141. 18. Representative Bartlett (OK). “OPEC.” 119, part 24 Cong. Rec. H31070– 31071 (September 24, 1973). Hein Online. September 9, 2014. Senator Fannin (AZ). “The Oil Crisis.” 119, part 22 Cong. Rec. S28873–28874 (September 7, 1973). Hein Online. September 9, 2014. 19. Walter Laqueur to Norman Podhoretz, August 14, 1973, series 1, container 30.16, Commentary Magazine Archive. 20. Norman Podhoretz to Walter Laqueur, August 17, 1973, series 1, container 30.16, Commentary Magazine Archive. 21. Walter Laqueur and Edward N. Luttwak, “Oil,” Commentary, October 1973, 38. Luttwak, who had been a consultant to the oil industry in the mid1960s, held similar suspicions of a conspiracy, one that he elaborated on in greater detail during an interview with the author in 2014. Edward N. Luttwak, phone interview, July 3, 2014.

Notes to Pages 152–156  225 22. Laqueur and Luttwak, “Oil,” 38. Edward N. Luttwak, phone interview, July 3, 2014. 23. Laqueur and Luttwak, “Oil,” 40. Edward N. Luttwak, phone interview, July 3, 2014. 24. Laqueur and Luttwak, “Oil,” 43. 25. Alistair Horne, Kissinger 1973: The Crucial Year (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2009), 349. 26. Jacobs, “The Conservative Struggle and the Energy Crisis,” 197, 193. “Business,” National Review Bulletin, October 19, 1973, B160. 27. Farmer, American Conservatism, 85. 28. “The President—and the Energy Crisis,” National Review Bulletin, December 14, 1973, B185. Matusow, Nixon’s Economy, 262–263. “Sweeping Energy Act Fails to Meet Fuel Crisis,” Human Events, December 12, 1973, 1. Jacobs, “The Conservative Struggle and the Energy Crisis,” 199. 29. James Burnham, “War, Arms, Détente, NATO, Oil,” TPC, National Review, November 23, 1973, 1291. 30. Borstelmann, The 1970s, 27. Jeremi Suri, “Détente and Its Discontents,” in Rightward Bound: Making America Conservative in the 1970s, ed. Bruce J. Schulman and Julian E. Zelizer (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2008), 254. 31. “Mid East War Round Four,” National Review Bulletin, November 2, 1973, B164. Borstelmann, The 1970s, 63. 32. Painter, “From the Nixon Doctrine to the Carter Doctrine,” 84. 33. James Burnham, “The Mideast Emulation,” TPC, National Review, January 18, 1974, 83. 34. DeWitt S. Copp, “The Soviet Role in Fanning Oil Embargo,” Human Events, February 23, 1974, 13–14. “DeWitt Samuel Copp, 80; Wrote about the Cold War,” New York Times, December 27, 1999. http://www.nytimes. com/1999/12/27/arts/dewitt-samuel-copp-80-wrote-about-the-cold-war.html. 35. “Oil Embargo Lifted in Spite of Soviets,” Human Events, March 23, 1974, 1. Fiona Venn, The Oil Crisis (London: Longman, 2002), 20. Rudiger Graf, “Making Use of the ‘Oil Weapon’: Western Industrialized Countries and Arab Petropolitics in 1973–1974,” Diplomatic History 36, no. 1 (January 2012): 188. 36. Edward N. Luttwak, “Farewell to Oil?” Commentary, May 1974, 38–39. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval, 891–892. 37. Col. Robert D. Heinl Jr., “Thinking the Unthinkable on Military Takeover of Arab Oil Fields,” Human Events, November 23, 1974, 12. “Historian and Journalist Col. Robert D. Heinl Dies,” Washington Post, May 7, 1979. https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1979/05/07/historianand-journalist-col-roert-d-heinl-dies/aa986ac7-309a-4047-a2a3-0f2468852da7 /?utm_term=.7e4018b23f0a. 38. Jeffrey Hart, “Should Mini States Be Allowed to Wreck Western Economies?,” Human Events, November 23, 1974, 12. Malcolm Muggeridge interviewed by

226 Notes to Pages 156–161 William F. Buckley Jr., Firing Line, “Has America Had It?,” September 16, 1973, Hoover Institution Archives, Stanford University. https://digitalcollections.hoover.org/ objects/6281/has-america-had-it?ctx=37287d38-054b-46ff-b659017efeccf79a&idx=0. 39. Abrams, Norman Podhoretz and Commentary Magazine, 137. “Interview with Robert W. Tucker,” SAIS Review no 1. (Winter 1981): 83. 40. Robert W. Tucker, interview, Santa Fe, NM, December 29, 2014. 41. Robert W. Tucker interview. 42. Robert W. Tucker, “Oil: The Issue of American Intervention,” Commentary, January 1975, 22, 25. 43. Tucker, “Oil: The Issue of American Intervention,” 23. 44. Robert W. Tucker interview. 45. Robert W. Tucker interview. 46. “Oil and Force,” Review and Outlook, Wall Street Journal, January 10, 1975, 10. Tom Wicker, “Stating the Obvious,” New York Times, January 12, 1975, 189. 47. Robert W. Tucker, “Further Reflections on Oil and Force,” Commentary, March 1975, 45. 48. Robert W. Tucker interview. 49. Walter Laqueur, “The West in Retreat,” Commentary, August 1975, 44–45. 50. “Oil Companies Scapegoats in Fuel Crisis,” Human Events, February 2, 1974, 1. Jacobs, “The Conservative Struggle and the Energy Crisis,” 201–202. “Whodunit,” National Review, January 18, 1974, 70. 51. Robert W. Tucker, “Oil and American Power—Three Years Later,” Commentary, January 1, 1977, 29, 31–32, 36. 52. Wilentz, The Age of Reagan, 79–80. Warren T. Brooks, “A Rebuttal to Mr. Carter on Energy,” Human Events, November 19, 1977, 8. Meg Jacobs, Panic at the Pump: The Energy Crisis and the Transformation of American Politics in the 1970s (New York: Hill and Wang, 2016), 172–173, 178. 53. “Carter’s Anti-Energy Package,” Human Events, April 30, 1977, 1. Kiron K. Skinner, Annelise Anderson, and Martin Anderson, eds., Reagan’s Path to Victory: The Shaping of Ronald Reagan’s Vision: Selected Writings (New York: Free Press, 2004), 166–167. Jacobs, Panic at the Pump, 175. 54. Hayward, The Age of Reagan, 521–522. Jacobs, Panic at the Pump, 174. Alice Widener, “How Liberals Caused the Energy Crisis,” Human Events, May 14, 1977, 8. 55. “Handcuffed in Iran,” National Review Bulletin, January 26, 1979, 4. 56. Painter, “From the Nixon Doctrine to the Carter Doctrine,” 66, 70, 74. Toby Craig Jones, “America, Oil and War in the Middle East,” Journal of American History 99, no. 1 (June 2012): 212. 57. Eric Brodin, “Iran: New World Power?,” Human Events, June 29, 1974, 15.

Notes to Pages 161–165  227 58. Erik von Kuehnelt-Leddihn, “Iran Ascendant,” From the Continent, National Review, March 14, 1975, 287. James A. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988), 199, 213, 236–237. 59. Kuehnelt-Leddihn, “Iran Ascendant,” 287. 60. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, 217–218. Painter, “Oil and the American Century,” 34. 61. “Iran a Quarter-Century Back,” National Review, December 23, 1977, 1478. 62. Skinner, Anderson, and Anderson, eds., Reagan, In His Own Hand, 113–114. 63. Smith, Morality, Reason and Power, 187. David Farber, Taken Hostage: The Iran Hostage Crisis and America’s First Encounter with Radical Islam (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 5. 64. “Iran: The Re-Entry Problem,” September 29, 1978, 1190. James Burnham, “Will Iran Collapse?,” TPC, National Review, October 13, 1978, 1267. 65. Painter, “From the Nixon Doctrine to the Carter Doctrine,” 75–76. 66. Smith, Morality, Reason and Power, 188–189. 67. William F. Buckley Jr., “What About the National Interest,” On the Right, November 18–19, 1978. Buckley Online. Hillsdale College. https://cumulus.hillsdale .edu/Buckley/index2.html#1515801287953_5. June 7, 2014. Smith, “Morality, Reason and Power, 188–189. 68. Linda Bridges and John R. Coyne Jr., Strictly Right: William F. Buckley Jr. and the American Conservative Movement (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley, 2007), 204. 69. “Iran: Culture and Perception,” National Review, January 5, 1979, 16. Laqueur and Luttwak, “Oil,” 40–41. Edward N. Luttwak, phone interview, July 3, 2014. 70. Smith, Morality, Reason and Power, 192. Painter, “From the Nixon Doctrine to the Carter Doctrine,” 76. Skinner, Anderson, and Anderson, eds., Reagan, In His Own Hand, 321–322. 71. Gerald K. Haines and Robert E. Leggett, eds., Watching the Bear: Essays on CIA Analysis of the Soviet Union (Langley, VA: Center for the Study of Intelligence, 2003), 208. 72. “Here Comes the Ayatollah,” National Review, February 16, 1979, 217. 73. “Handcuffed in Iran,” National Review Bulletin, January 26, 1979, 4. Painter, “From the Nixon Doctrine to the Carter Doctrine,” 77. 74. “Shah’s Chief Antagonist Desires New Dictatorship,” Human Events, January 13, 1979, 1. William F. Buckley Jr., “Reflections on the Departure of the Shah,” On the Right, January 27, 1979. Buckley Online. Hillsdale College. https:// cumulus.hillsdale.edu/Buckley/index2.html#1511535658301_6. August 8, 2014. 75. Edward N. Luttwak, phone interview, July 3, 2014. 76. Walter Laqueur, “Why the Shah Fell,” Commentary, March 1979, 47, 55. M. Stanton Evans, “Is Détente Dead?,” Human Events, February 24, 1979, 1.

228 Notes to Pages 166–172 77. Painter, “From the Nixon Doctrine to the Carter Doctrine,” 78. “Carter’s Indecision Now Imperils Saudi Arabia,” Human Events, March 17, 1979, 1. 78. Bill, The Eagle and the Lion, 276–277. William A. Rusher, “Some Hard Facts about the Middle East,” Human Events, September 1, 1979, 15. 79. Wilentz, The Age of Reagan, 115–116. “Enfeebled U.S. Stance Encourages Foreign Outrages,” Human Events, November 17, 1979, 1. 80. “Enfeebled U.S. Stance Encourages Foreign Outrages.” William F. Buckley Jr., “Bring in the Holy Man,” On the Right, November 10, 1979. Buckley Online. Hillsdale College. https://cumulus.hillsdale.edu/Buckley/index2. html#1511535935740_5. August 10, 2014. “Iran Hostage Crisis Fast Facts.” CNN. http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/15/world/meast/iran-hostage-crisis-fastfacts/index.html. October 29, 2016. 81. Painter, “From the Nixon Doctrine to the Carter Doctrine,” 79–80. “Ten Days That Shook the World of Jimmy Carter,” National Review, January 25, 1980, 76. Andrew J. Bacevich, “The Carter Doctrine at 30,” World Affairs, April 30, 2010. Ronald Reagan, Address Accepting the Presidential Nomination at the Republican National Convention in Detroit, July 17, 1980. The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=25970. October 11, 2014. 82. W. Carl Biven, Jimmy Carter’s Economy: Policy in the Age of Limits (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 3. 83. Ronald Reagan, “A Vision for America,” televised election eve address, November 3, 1980. Ronald Reagan’s Major Speeches 1964–1989. Reagan Presidential Library and Museum. https://www.reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/ speeches/major.html. October 12, 2014.

Conclusion Originally published in slightly different form as “Reagan and His Favorite Magazine,” National Review, December 5, 2015. Reprinted with permission. 1. William F. Buckley Jr. to Ronald Reagan, November 3, 1980, part 3, box 70, WFB Papers. 2. Judis, William F. Buckley, Jr., 222. 3. William F. Buckley Jr. to Ronald Reagan, November 3, 1980, part 3, box 70, WFB Papers. Linda Bridges interview. Ronald Reagan, Remarks at a Reception Honoring the National Review, February 21, 1983. The American Presidency Project. http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=40951. November 7, 2014. Linda Bridges and John R. Coyne Jr., Strictly Right, 226. 4. William A. Rusher to Nancy Reagan, October 31, 1980, box 76, WAR Papers. 5. Ronald Reagan to William F. Buckley Jr., November 24, 1980, part 3, box 70, WFB Papers. M. Stanton Evans, phone interview, February 8, 2013. 6. Anthony Dolan to William F. Buckley Jr., July 16, 1982, part 3, box 20, WFB Papers. 7. Lee Edwards phone interview. Stuart Spencer phone interview. Richard V.

Notes to Pages 172–177  229 Allen phone interview. Alvin S. Felzenberg, A Man and His Presidents: The Political Odyssey of William F. Buckley Jr. (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2017), xvi, 229. 8. Allan Ryskind and Thomas Winter interview. 9. Richard Reeves, President Reagan: The Triumph of Imagination (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2005), 24. 10. White House Staff Member and Office Files, box 82, Speechwriting White House Office of Research, 1981–1989, Files, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA. 11. M. Stanton Evans, “Pragmatic Personnel Eroding Reagan Mandate,” Human Events, December 12, 1981, 15. 12. Patrick J. Buchanan, phone interview. 13. Aram Bakshian Jr., phone interview, December 4, 2012. Richard Brookhiser interview. Anthony Dolan, phone interview, January 3, 2013. 14. Robert W. Merry, “James Burnham: Reagan’s Geopolitical Genius,” National Interest, July–August 2014, 56. http://nationalinterest.org/feature/jamesburnham-reagans-geopolitical-genius-10741. Aram Bakshian Jr. Files, 1982– 1983, series 2, box 5, Presidential Medals Award Ceremony, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA. 15. James Conaway, “Jeane Kirkpatrick: The Ambassador from Commentary Magazine,” Washington Post Magazine, July 11, 1981. 16. “Ronald Reagan and the United Nations: Diplomacy without Apology,” Reagan’s Country, the Ronald Reagan Presidential Foundation Member Newsletter, 2. http://home.reaganfoundation.org/site/PageServer?pagename=NewsletterA rchive. November 3, 2014. Carl Gershman, phone interview, December 4, 2012. 17. Collier, Political Woman, 127. 18. Collier, Political Woman, 122–123. Carl Gershman, phone interview. 19. William F. Buckley Jr., “St. Jeane of the U.N., Pt. I and II,” January 27, 1984, National Review Online, December 8, 2006. http://www.nationalreview.com/article/ 219457/st-jeane-un-williumrex. Mary Schwarz, “Jeane Kirkpatrick: Our Macho Ambassador,” National Review, January 21, 1983, 46–52. John Ehrman, The Rise of Neoconservatism, 152. Felzenberg, A Man and His Presidents, 271. 20. Abrams, Norman Podhoretz and Commentary Magazine, 171. Balint, Running Commentary, 161. Kathryn Sikkink, Mixed Signals: U.S. Human Rights Policy in Latin America (Washington, DC: Century Foundation, 2004), 148. 21. Robert C. Rowland and John M. Jones, Reagan at Westminster: Foreshadowing the End of the Cold War (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2010), 15. 22. Lettow, Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, 9. 23. Ronald Reagan annotations, box 165, series 3, Ed Meese Clipping Files, Ronald Reagan 1980 Campaign Papers, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA. Richard Pipes, “Soviet Global Strategy,” Commentary, April 1980, 31–39.

230 Notes to Pages 178–182 24. Rowland and Jones, Reagan at Westminster, 45. Robert Schlesinger, White House Ghosts: Presidents and Their Speechwriters: From FDR to George W. Bush (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008), 317, 324–326. Anthony Dolan to William F. Buckley Jr., “Address to British Parliament Speech,” May 19, 1982, part 3, box 20, WFB Papers. Anthony Dolan to William F. Buckley Jr., July 16, 1982, part 3, box 20, WFB Papers. Anthony Dolan Files 1981–1989, series 1, box 32, Speech Drafts 1981–1989. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA. Schlesinger, White House Ghosts, 325. 25. Ronald Reagan, “Address to the Members of the British Parliament,” June 8, 1982. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library and Museum. https://reaganlibrary. gov/major-speeches-index/30-archives/speeches/1982/1349-. November 5, 2014. Presidential Handwriting File, series 3, box 5, Presidential Speeches, “Address to the Parliament Westminster, London, England, Tuesday, June 8, 1982,” 1, 5, 8, 11, 14. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA. Carl Gershman, “Surviving the Democracy Backlash,” Washington Post, June 8, 2007, A19. Rowland and Jones, Reagan at Westminster, 19. 26. “The Ash Heap of History: President Reagan’s Westminster Address 20 Years Later,” The Heritage Foundation. C-Span, June 3, 2002. 60882a. http:// www.heritage.org/europe/report/20-years-later-reagans-westminster-speech https://www.c-span.org/video/?170366-2/president-reagans-westminster-address. November 5, 2014. Kelly, James Burnham and the Struggle for the World, 82–83. 27. “Return to Westminster,” National Review, June 25, 1982, 739–740. William F. Buckley Jr., “Home Truths. Beautiful,” On the Right, June 22, 1982. Buckley Online. Hillsdale College. https://cumulus.hillsdale.edu/Buckley/index2. html#1511537593638_5. November 5, 2014. 28. Colin Dueck, Hard Line: The Republican Party and U.S. Foreign Policy since World War II (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2010), 189, 208. Jonathan Reed Winkler, “Reagan and the Military,” in A Companion to Ronald Reagan, ed. Andrew L. Johns (Malden, MA: John Wiley and Sons, 2015), 167. 29. Lettow, Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, 44. 30. Lettow, Ronald Reagan and His Quest to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, 448. 31. Dustin Walcher, “The Reagan Doctrine,” in A Companion to Ronald Reagan, ed. Andrew L. Johns (Malden, MA: John Wiley and Sons, 2015), 340. 32. Rowland and Jones, Reagan at Westminster, 69, 71. 33. Rowland and Jones, Reagan at Westminster, 40–41. Ehrman, The Rise of Neoconservatism, 138. Felzenberg, A Man and His Presidents, 259. 34. Bridges and Coyne, Strictly Right, 257. Abrams, Norman Podhoretz and Commentary Magazine, 225. Steven F. Hayward, The Age of Reagan: The Conservative Counterrevolution, 1980–1989 (New York: Crown Forum, 2009), 600. 35. “CPAC over 30 Years: Conservatives Have Come a Long Way,” Human Events, February 3, 2003. http://humanevents.com/2003/02/03/cpac-over30-yearsbrconservatives-have-come-a-long-way/. November 7, 2014. Ronald Reagan, “Remarks at the Conservative Political Action Conference Dinner.”

Notes to Pages 182–183  231 March 20, 1981. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library Archives. https://www .reaganlibrary.archives.gov/archives/speeches/1981/32081b.htm. November 7, 2014. “Reception for Human Events and Radio America.” July 2, 1987. Presidential Handwriting File, Presidential Speeches, series 3, box 28, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA. Richard V. Allen, phone interview. 36. “National Review Reception,” February 21, 1983. Presidential Handwriting File, Presidential Speeches, series 3, box 8. Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA. 37. Presidential Remarks: “National Review Anniversary Dinner.” New York, NY. Thursday, December 5, 1985. Presidential Handwriting File, Presidential Speeches, series 3, box 22, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA. Ronald Reagan, “Remarks on the 30th Anniversary of National Review,” National Review, December 31, 1985, 127–129. 38. Presidential Remarks: “National Review Anniversary Dinner.” New York, NY. Thursday, December 5, 1985. Presidential Handwriting File, Presidential Speeches, series 3, box 22, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA. Felzenberg, A Man and His Presidents, 288. Buckley, The Reagan I Knew, 230. 39. Ronald Reagan, “Remarks on the 30th Anniversary of National Review,” 127–129. “Ronald Reagan on Human Events.” Online video clip. YouTube, January 26, 2007. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s3FHiscIDeU. November 7, 2014.

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Index Abrams, Elliott, 14, 172, 180 Abrams, Nathan, 12 Acheson, Dean, 48, 68 Afghanistan, 78, 87, 94–95 Africa, 102, 110, 140, 141, 142; Soviet Union and, 61, 86, 99, 132, 133, 144, 145. See also Rhodesia African National Congress (ANC), 142, 143 Agnew, Spiro, 35, 69 Allen, Richard V., 4, 113, 129, 171, 181–182 American African Affairs Association, 137 American Conservative Union, 9 American Jewish Committee, 12 Anderson, Martin, 171 Angola, 61, 86, 142, 143, 144 antiballistic missile system (ABM), 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 74 appeasement, 48, 71, 88, 90, 92, 101, 102, 105, 107, 121 Arizona Republic, 117 Ashbrook, John, 4, 18, 22, 31, 53, 109, 136–137 Baker, Howard, 92, 93, 173 Bakshian, Aram, Jr., 170, 173–174, 177, 182 Bartlett, Dewey, 151 Bass, Jack, 26 Bell, Jeffrey, 9 Benson, Carl, 70, 71 Bethel, Paul, 38 Borstelmann, Thomas, 137 Boston Globe, 83

Brezhnev, Leonid, 16, 60, 67, 74–77, 80, 85, 91 Bridges, Linda, 52, 72, 124–125, 169 Briggs, Ellis O., 118 Brock, William, 58–59 Brodin, Eric, 161 Brookhiser, Richard, 58, 124, 174 Brown, Edmund G., 1 Brown, Harold, 92 Brownfield, Allan C., 110 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 62–63, 162– 163, 165 Buchanan, Pat, 4, 64, 68, 73, 173 Buckley, James L., 10, 35, 44, 45, 55, 57, 79–80 Buckley, Pat, 172 Buckley, Priscilla, 33, 124 Buckley, William F., Jr., 4, 5, 59; anticommunism and, 46, 72; China and, 49, 52–53, 54, 57, 58, 62, 64, 127; détente and, 61, 75; founding of National Review, 10, 11, 12; Iran and, 162, 163, 164, 166–167; Kissinger and, 40, 41, 51–52, 72, 73, 74; oil and, 127– 128, 147, 158; Panama Canal and, 115, 121–129; Reagan and, 7, 45, 82, 115, 126–128, 147, 169–172, 173, 178, 179, 180– 183; Rhodesia and, 135, 136, 138, 140–141, 142, 144–146; Soviet arms agreements and, 65, 92, 94, 180–181; Soviet arms negotiations and, 67, 69, 70, 71, 74, 82; Soviet Union and, 82, 92, 94–95, 111–112, 129, 180–181;

252 Index

Buckley, William F., Jr. (cont.) United Nations and, 107, 176; US foreign policy and, 3, 18, 19, 110, 111–112, 136, 167; Vietnam War and, 21, 23–24, 25, 28, 33, 36, 40, 41, 42. See also National Review Burke, Arleigh, 31 Burnham, James, 10, 65, 73, 124, 162, 178; oil embargo and, 154, 155, 156; Reagan and, 174, 181; Rhodesia and, 136, 143, 144; Soviet arms negotiations and, 69, 74, 81, 86–87, 89; United Nations and, 54, 102, 136; US foreign policy and, 6, 11, 46, 51, 52, 81– 82, 153–154, 158; Vietnam War and, 23–28, 30, 35–40, 42, 44, 112 Bush, George H. W., 5, 57, 63, 83 Bush, Prescott, 5 Byrd, Harry, Jr., 140 Callahan, James, 163 Camp David Accords, 162, 163 Cannon, James, 61 Carter, Jimmy: China and, 62–64; détente and, 18, 62, 64, 66, 95; Iran and, 161–164, 165–166, 167; oil and, 3, 18, 145, 148, 164; oil crisis and, 159–160, 166; Panama Canal and, 17, 114, 122–123, 126, 127, 129; Rhodesia and, 17–18, 143, 144–145; Soviet arms agreements and, 65, 78, 88–95; Soviet arms negotiations and, 16, 65, 76–79, 83, 84–86; United Nations and, 96–97, 108, 110– 111, 176; US foreign policy and, 109–112, 129, 131 Carter Doctrine, 167 Castro, Fidel, 38, 117, 130 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 83, 84

Chamberlain, John, 23, 57, 100 Chamberlain, William Henry, 7–8 Chambers, Whittaker, 177–178 Charen, Mona, 170 Chiang Kai-shek, 48 Chiari, Roberto, 117 Chicago Tribune, 30, 38 China. See People’s Republic of China Chou En-lai, 53, 54 Christian missionaries, 48 Christopher, Warren, 111 chrome, 132, 140 Church, Frank, 84, 164 civil rights movement, 3, 25, 132– 133, 135, 136, 137, 146 Clean Air Act, 149 Cohen, Elliot, 12 Cold War: conservative media and, 6, 7, 15, 22, 46, 97, 101, 107, 130, 164; détente and, 68, 91, 132, 154; oil and, 154, 159; Panama Canal and, 117, 118; Reagan and, 174, 176–179, 182; Rhodesia and, 132, 133, 135, 144; Soviet arms negotiations and, 66, 84, 89, 91; Vietnam War and, 25, 29, 49 Commentary, 18–19, 40, 183; anticommunism and, 12–13; Iran and, 165; neoconservatism and, 13, 14, 83; oil and, 151–153; oil embargo and, 147, 156–158, 159; Reagan and, 4, 7, 170, 172, 176, 177, 180, 182; Rhodesia and, 144–145, 146; Soviet arms agreements and, 65, 66, 89– 90, 93, 180–181; Soviet arms negotiations and, 68, 83, 87, 88; Soviet Union and, 3, 4, 83, 87, 89, 90, 95, 177, 179, 180–181; United Nations and, 97, 102–106, 107, 109, 175, 176; US foreign policy and, 2, 3, 7, 16–18, 44, 66, 97, 111–113, 131, 132, 146, 148

Index 253

Committee on the Present Danger (CPD), 65, 86, 90, 113 communism, 6, 11, 97; anticommunism, 8, 10, 12–13, 15, 26, 46–47, 84, 110, 134, 145, 161; China and, 48–51, 55, 58, 64; Reagan and, 7, 81–82, 101, 180; Rhodesia and, 135–136, 139, 140, 141, 143, 145–146; Soviet Union and, 64, 81–82, 98, 117, 174; the Third World and, 112, 115–116, 132; United Nations and, 95, 101–102; Vietnam War and, 14, 22–28, 38, 41 Congressional Record, 22, 24, 26, 38, 53, 85, 91, 119, 137, 139, 142 Conscience of a Conservative, The (Goldwater), 6 Conservative Intellectual Movement in America since 1945, The (Nash), 174 Conservative Mind, The (Kirk), 10 Copp, DeWitt S., 50–51, 154 Coyne, John, 36 Crane, Philip, 4, 18, 53, 109, 120, 142 Crespino, Joseph, 26 Cuba, 7, 38; Panama Canal and, 117, 130; Rhodesia and, 132, 142, 145; Soviet Union and, 78, 94 Cuban missile crisis, 29, 66 Czechoslovakia, 47

9, 18, 46, 58, 61, 64, 68, 75, 154, 157, 165, 183; Kissinger and, 15, 41, 54, 60, 139; Nixon and, 15– 16, 46, 66, 79, 154; Soviet arms negotiations and, 51, 60, 66, 69, 79, 80, 81, 83, 87, 90, 91; Soviet Union and, 15–16, 19, 41, 55, 64, 68, 69, 75, 78, 88, 90, 95, 132, 139, 178 de Toledano, Ralph, 24, 50, 136–137 Dolan, Anthony, 170, 171, 173, 174, 177, 178, 182 Dole, Bob, 166 domino theory, 24, 43, 117 Dornan, Robert, 85 Dozer, Donald, 119–120, 121, 123

Democratic Party, 13, 48, 84, 111, 113, 160; conservative wing of, 68, 109; Soviet arms negotiations and, 87, 88, 89 Deng Xiaoping, 63 détente: Carter and, 18, 62, 64, 66, 95; China and, 15, 41, 46, 51, 61, 62; Cold War, 68, 91, 132, 154; conservative media and, 3,

Fannin, Paul, 57, 151 Federal Energy Office, 158 Felzenberg, Alvin, 172 Field, Winston, 134 Firing Line (TV program), 127–128, 140–141, 147, 158 Ford, Gerald R., 3, 64, 66, 105; 1976 presidential campaign and, 62, 118, 122, 131; China and, 60,

Eastern Europe, 6, 47, 52, 66, 100, 105, 176 Echeverria, Luis, 106 Edwards, Lee, 9, 171–173 Eisenhower, Dwight D., 4, 5, 54, 116, 148 Environmental Protection Agency, 149 Evans, M. Stanton, 9, 51, 52; China and, 48, 62, 63, 64; Iran and, 165; Panama Canal and, 115, 120–121; Reagan and, 171, 172, 173; Rhodesia and, 132, 144, 146; Soviet arms agreements and, 65, 90; United Nations and, 109–110

254 Index

Ford, Gerald R (cont.) 61–62, 63; oil and, 18, 148, 160; Panama Canal and, 120–121; Rhodesia and, 141, 143; Soviet arms agreements and, 77, 80–81; Soviet arms negotiations and, 16, 75–76, 82–83, 85; Soviet Union and, 60, 61; Vietnam War and, 32, 43 Foreign Affairs, 47, 156 Frisk, David B., 33 Galbraith, Evan, 170 Garn, Jake, 91 General Electric, 1, 82 Gergen, David, 173 Gershman, Carl, 109, 110, 143, 172, 175–176, 178 Glazer, Nathan, 13 Glynn, Patrick, 79 God and Man at Yale (Buckley), 10 Goldberg, Arthur, 136 Goldwater, Barry, 4–5, 9, 28, 60; 1964 defeat and, 1, 2, 18, 21, 29, 169; China and, 58–59, 64; Iran and, 161; Panama Canal and, 117, 123, 125, 126; Rhodesia and, 135–136; Soviet arms agreements and, 80, 92; Soviet Union and, 6–7, 59; United Nations and, 101, 102; Vietnam War and, 22, 25, 29–30, 125 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 173 Graham, James W., 34, 35 Great Britain, 176–177; Persian Gulf and, 149–150, 160, 163; Rhodesia and, 133, 134, 135– 136, 138, 139, 145, 146 “Great Society,” 2, 13, 15, 119 Gulf of Tonkin Resolution, 14, 25 Haldeman, H. R., 56, 73, 148 Hanighen, Frank, 7 Hannaford, Peter, 113, 131

Hannah, Norman B., 91, 125 Harrigan, Anthony, 25–26 Hart, Jeffrey, 9, 56, 71, 156 Hay-Bunau-Varilla Convention of 1903, 116 Heinl, Robert, Jr., 155–156, 157 Helms, Jesse, 42–43, 61, 91, 93 Hempstone, Smith, 94 Hiss, Alger, 48–49 Human Events, 13, 26, 73, 137, 183; China and, 49–51, 52–54, 55–56, 57, 58, 61–62, 63–64; conservative commentary, 9–10, 18–19; founding of, 7–9; Iran and, 161, 164, 165, 166; vs. National Review, 9–10, 11, 12; oil and, 151, 158–159, 160, 166; oil embargo and, 147–148, 154, 155, 156; Panama Canal and, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120, 121–122, 123, 126, 127, 128–129, 130; Reagan and, 1, 2, 4, 7, 9, 21, 37, 170, 172– 173, 181–182; Rhodesia and, 132, 135–136, 141, 142, 143, 144, 146; Soviet arms agreements and, 52, 65, 75, 80–81, 89, 91–92, 93–94, 180–181; Soviet arms negotiations and, 67–68, 70, 71–72, 74, 85–86, 87; Soviet Union and, 4, 6, 38, 179; United Nations and, 96, 97, 98, 99–100, 101, 105, 108, 109; US foreign policy and, 3, 7, 14, 16–18, 44, 46, 59, 95, 97, 110, 131, 132, 167; Vietnam War and, 15, 21–25, 28–35, 37–44 Human Rights Commission, 172 Humphrey, Hubert, 111 Huntsman, John M., Sr., 72 Huxley, Elspeth, 140 Hyde, Henry, 109 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 66, 74, 78, 82, 85

Index 255

International Monetary Fund, 161 Iran, 111, 112, 149, 155, 160–167; Buckley and, 162, 163, 164, 166– 167; Carter and, 161–167; Nixon and, 160–161; oil and, 160, 161, 163; Reagan and, 162. See also Human Events; National Review Iran hostage situation, 18, 78, 146, 166–167 Iraq, 150 Israel, 44, 104, 107, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154 Jackson, Henry “Scoop,” 68, 82, 84, 158; Soviet arms agreements and, 76, 78, 80, 92, 94; Soviet arms negotiations and, 76, 85–86 Jacobs, Meg, 153 John Birch Society, 134 Johnson, Lyndon B., 2, 3, 13, 60, 65, 66, 136, 138; oil and, 148–149; Panama Canal and, 117–118, 119, 122; Vietnam War and, 14, 15, 22–33, 37–39, 101 Jones, Jenkin Lloyd, 99–100, 105 Journal of International Law, 139 Keene, David, 22, 35, 52, 122 Kemp, Jack, 85, 86 Kennedy, John F., 37, 60 Kenyatta, Jomo, 99 Kershner, Howard, 24 Khomeini, Ayatollah, 111, 163–165, 166 Kilpatrick, James J., 9, 120, 121, 135, 137–139 Kirk, Russell, 9, 10–11, 98 Kirkpatrick, Jeane, 14, 84, 86, 97, 111, 112–114, 164–165, 172, 175–176, 178, 180 Kissinger, Henry, 4, 105; Buckley and, 40, 41, 51–52, 72, 73, 74; China and, 15, 45, 47, 49–51,

53–61, 140; détente and, 15, 41, 54, 60, 139; oil and, 148, 150, 155; Panama Canal and, 120, 123, 124, 126; Rhodesia and, 141, 142, 143; Soviet arms negotiations and, 59, 68, 69, 74, 75, 76, 82, 85; Vietnam War and, 40–41, 47, 139 Kristol, Irving, 13, 14 Kuehnelt-Leddihn, Erik, 161 Labedz, Leopold, 93 Laird, Melvin, 25, 26 Lane, Thomas A., 6, 23, 32, 33–34, 37, 38–39, 136–137 Laqueur, Walter, 68, 88, 90, 91, 151– 153, 154, 158, 163, 165 League of Nations, 92, 98 LeMay, Curtis, 31 Libya, 150–151 Lumumba, Patrice, 99 Luttwak, Edward, 68, 87, 88, 92–93, 95, 151–156, 163, 165 Manly, Chesly, 30 Mao Zedong, 6, 48, 49, 50, 58, 61 March on Washington, 145 Martin, James, 30–31 Marx, Karl, 6, 177 MacArthur, Douglas, 32 McDougal, Myres, 139 McDowell, Edwin, 117 McGovern, George, 13, 42, 109 Meese, Edwin, 110, 172, 177 Merry, Robert W., 174 Meyer, Frank S., 5, 6, 10, 11, 27–28, 51, 52, 71–72, 73 Middle East, 127–128, 148–149, 150 Molnar, Thomas, 134–135 Morley, Felix, 7 Mowrer, Edgar Ansel, 67–68 Moynihan, Daniel Patrick, 97, 102– 108, 110, 175

256 Index

Mugabe, Robert, 144, 145, 146 multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs), 67, 70, 75, 76, 78 Mundt, Karl, 101–102 Muzorewa, Abel, 142, 143, 144 Nash, George H., 8, 174 Nation, The, 10, 171 National Democratic Party (NDP) (Rhodesia), 133 National Emergency Energy Act, 153 National Interest, 174 National Review, 2, 13, 52; China and, 49–58, 63, 64; civil rights movement and, 132–133; conservative commentary and, 10–12, 18–19; founding of, 10, 11, 12; vs. Human Events, 9–10, 11, 12; Iran and, 161, 162, 163, 164; Nixon and, 4, 73–74; oil and, 151, 152, 159; oil embargo and, 147–148, 153, 156, 158; Panama Canal and, 115, 117, 121–122, 124, 125, 128, 130; Reagan and, 4, 7, 37, 82, 169– 174, 178–179, 181, 182–83; Rhodesia and, 134–140, 143– 146; Soviet arms agreements and, 65, 75, 79–80, 91; Soviet arms negotiations and, 67, 68, 70–71, 72, 74, 82–83, 86, 87; Soviet nuclear weapons and, 84–85, 89, 91–92; Soviet Union and, 4, 6, 178–79; United Nations and, 97, 98, 102, 109, 110, 140, 176; US foreign policy and, 3, 7, 14, 16–18, 44, 46, 97, 131, 153–154, 167; Vietnam War and, 15, 21– 42, 44 National Review Bulletin, 11, 41 neoconservatism, 13–14, 83 New Deal, 3, 5, 7, 10, 37

New International Economic Order (NIEO), 106, 107, 120 New Left, 3, 13 new morality, 84 Newsweek, 50, 165 New York Times, 59, 83, 104, 113, 158, 164, 169, 172 Nicaragua, 111, 112 Niemeyer, Gerhart, 98 Nigeria, 145 Nitze, Paul, 77–78 Nixon, Richard, 3, 25; 1968 presidential campaign, 46–47, 67; 1972 presidential campaign, 31, 42, 50, 51, 53, 56–57, 59, 72, 73, 74, 75; China and, 15, 45, 46, 47, 48–51, 52–54, 55, 56, 57–59, 60, 63, 64, 72, 140; conservative media and, 4, 59–60, 61, 72–74, 75; détente and, 15–16, 46, 66, 79, 154; Iran and, 160–161; oil and, 18, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153, 159, 160; Panama Canal and, 118–120; resignation, 16, 43, 60, 62, 75, 141; Rhodesia and, 139, 140; Soviet arms agreements and, 15–16, 65, 67, 74–75; Soviet arms negotiations and, 46, 67–68, 69– 70, 71–72; Vietnam War and, 15, 22, 23, 37, 39, 40–42, 43, 46, 49, 58 Nkomo, Joshua, 133, 144, 145 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 30 Novak, Michael, 172 nuclear weapons: arms negotiations, 16, 71, 74, 75–76, 77, 78–81, 82– 83, 88, 93; Soviet Union and, 59, 66, 69–70, 71, 74, 77–93, 179; Vietnam War and, 21, 30, 32 Offenbach, Seth, 44 oil, 127–128; Carter and, 3, 18, 145,

Index 257

148, 159–160, 164, 166; Ford and, 18, 148, 160; Iran and, 160, 161, 163; Kissinger and, 148, 150, 155; Nixon and, 18, 148, 149, 150, 151, 153, 159, 160; oil embargo, 104, 146, 147–151, 153–156, 161; Reagan and, 147, 159–160; Soviet Union and, 149– 150, 154–155, 156, 158, 164; the Third World and, 147–148, 159. See also Buckley, William F., Jr.; Commentary; Human Events; National Review; Podhoretz, Norman Oliver, Daniel, 79, 170 O’Neill, Tip, 160 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 18, 19, 147, 148, 150, 151, 152, 153, 159; possible military action against, 104, 155–157, 158, 166 Ortega, Daniel, 111 Palestine Liberation Organization, 110 Panama Canal, 89; Carter and, 17, 114, 122–123, 126, 127, 129; conservative media and, 115–116, 117, 119–130; Ford and, 120– 21; Johnson and, 117–118, 119, 122; Kissinger and, 120, 123, 124, 126; Nixon and, 118–120; Reagan and, 115, 118, 121–122, 124, 126–130; Soviet Union and, 124, 128 Pearson, James B., 101–102 People’s Republic of China, 6, 59–61; conservative media and, 45–56, 63–64; détente and, 15, 41, 46, 51, 61, 62; diplomatic relations with the United States, 47, 50, 62, 63, 140; Nixon and, 15, 45–60, 63, 64, 72, 140; Rhodesia and,

141; Soviet Union and, 47, 61; Taiwan and, 48–49, 61, 63–64, 127; United Nations and, 49, 50, 51, 54, 55, 56, 57; Vietnam War and, 15, 22, 26, 28, 30, 32, 49, 53, 61–62. See also Buckley, William F., Jr.; communism; Ford, Gerald R.; Human Events; Kissinger, Henry; National Review; Reagan, Ronald; Republican Party Pipes, Richard, 83, 84, 85, 87, 90, 93, 172, 177, 178 Podhoretz, Norman, 4, 88; founding of Commentary, 12, 13; oil and, 104, 152, 158, 159; Soviet arms agreements and, 65, 83, 89, 90– 91; United Nations and, 103–104, 176; US foreign policy and, 3, 19, 66, 112, 157, 167, 180 Possony, Stefan, 23 Price, Robert, 57 “Principles and Heresies” (column, Meyer), 11, 27 Public Interest, The, 13 Qaddafi, Muammar, 150–151 racial equality, 108, 132, 134, 135, 136, 138, 142, 143, 144, 146 Rarick, John, 57, 138–139 Reagan, Nancy, 170, 172 Reagan, Ronald, 36–37; 1976 presidential campaign, 9, 37, 62, 75, 81–82, 115, 118, 121, 122, 124, 131; 1980 presidential campaign, 18, 46, 64, 75, 110, 113, 122, 146, 147, 148, 167, 169, 177, 181, 183; Buckley and, 7, 45, 82, 115, 126–128, 147, 169–172, 173, 178, 179, 180–181, 182–183; as California governor, 21–22, 45, 121;

258 Index

Reagan, Ronald (cont.) campaign for governor, 1–2, 7, 25, 32, 174; China and, 45, 58– 59, 63, 64; Commentary and, 4, 7, 170, 172, 176, 177, 180, 182; communism and, 7, 81–82, 101, 180; elected president, 2, 7, 37, 97, 168, 169–171; Human Events and, 1, 2, 4, 7, 9, 21, 37, 170, 172–173, 181–182; Iran and, 162; National Review and, 4, 7, 37, 82, 169–174, 178–179, 181–183; nuclear weapons and, 21, 82, 179; oil crisis and, 147, 159–160; Panama Canal and, 115, 118, 121–122, 124, 126– 128, 129–130; as president, 5, 19, 172–182; Soviet arms agreements and, 66, 80, 82, 89, 93; Soviet arms negotiations and, 65, 71; Soviet Union and, 1, 7, 13–14, 174, 176–181; United Nations and, 96–97, 174–175, 176, 178; US foreign policy, 19, 44, 46, 75, 81–82, 97, 111, 113–114, 131, 132, 147, 167, 183; Vietnam War and, 21–22, 25, 32–33, 43 Reagan Doctrine, 180 Reisman, Michael, 139 Republican Party, 18; China and, 48–49, 56, 57, 58–59, 61; conservative wing of, 4–5, 6, 7, 8, 22, 46, 48, 68, 75, 109, 113, 146, 171; Rhodesia and, 132, 139, 146; Soviet arms agreements and, 87, 92, 93; Soviet arms negotiations and, 68, 75, 87; Soviet Union and, 5, 6, 7, 14; United Nations and, 100, 101– 102, 109–110; US foreign policy and, 13–14, 46, 61, 132, 183; Vietnam War and, 22, 30–31. See also Goldwater, Barry

Reza, Mohammad, 111, 112, 160– 166. See also Iran Rhodesia: armed conflicts, 139–144; Carter and, 17–18, 143, 144– 145; Cold War and, 132, 133, 135, 144; conservative media and, 130, 131–132, 134–139, 143–145, 146; Cuba and, 132, 142, 145; Ford and, 141, 143; Kissinger and, 141, 142, 143; Nixon and, 139, 140; Rhodesian Front (RF) party, 133–134, 139; settlement, 145– 146; Soviet Union and, 133, 136, 138, 140, 141, 142, 143, 145–146; United Nations and, 136, 138, 140. See also Buckley, William F., Jr.; communism; Goldwater, Barry; Great Britain; Human Events; National Review; Zimbabwe Richmond News Leader, 137 Rockefeller, Nelson, 51 Rogers, William, 57 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 3, 5–6, 8, 57 Roosevelt, Theodore, 5 Rostow, Eugene, 65, 86, 90–91, 93 Rumsfeld, Donald, 104 Rusher, William, 60, 133, 166; China and, 59; Panama Canal and, 115, 124, 125–126, 128; Reagan and, 170, 172, 173; Rhodesia and, 136–137; Soviet arms negotiations and, 68, 89; Vietnam War and, 28–29, 33 Rustin, Bayard, 143, 144–145 Ryskind, Allan H., 4, 8–9, 52, 68, 132; Panama Canal and, 116, 123, 129; Reagan and, 21, 172, 180, 181; US foreign policy, 3, 19, 41, 180; Vietnam War and, 42, 43 Ryskind, Morrie, 8 Sadleir, William, 173 SALT I, 76, 85; conservative media

Index 259

and, 52, 65, 67–70, 72, 79–80; Nixon and, 16, 53, 65, 67–68, 69, 70, 71–72, 74–75; Soviet Union and, 44, 86, 91, 93 SALT II: Carter and, 16, 65, 76–79, 85–86, 88–90, 163; conservative media and, 65, 82–83, 86–87, 89– 91, 92–94; Ford and, 16, 75–76, 80–81, 82; Reagan and, 65, 81– 82, 129; Soviet Union and, 66, 91 Sandinista National Liberation Front, 111 Saudi Arabia, 150, 151, 156, 157 Schlesinger, James, 87, 120, 155 Schultz, George, 180 Schwarz, Mary, 176 Seabury, Paul, 103 segregation, 25, 137, 138 Shah of Iran. See Reza, Mohammad Shakespeare, Frank, 51 Smith, Ian, 132, 134, 137, 139, 140–141, 142, 143, 144. See also Rhodesia Somoza Debayle, Anastasio, 111, 112 Sonnenfeldt, Helmut, 52 South Africa, 99, 136, 139 Soviet Union, 54, 57, 58, 104; Afghanistan and, 78, 87, 94– 95; African nations and, 61, 86, 99, 132, 133, 144, 145; arms agreements, 15–16, 51, 60, 65– 66, 74–75, 78, 87, 88–95, 180– 181; arms negotiations, 44, 46, 53, 59, 64, 67–72, 75–81, 85, 86, 88, 91; China and, 47, 59, 60, 61; conservative media and, 3–4, 5, 6–7, 11, 13, 26, 27–28, 129; détente and, 15–16, 19, 41, 55, 64, 68, 69, 75, 78, 88, 90, 95, 132, 139, 178; expansionism and, 1, 3–4, 5, 6–7, 13–14, 16, 23, 38, 47, 52, 59, 61, 66, 90, 100, 112, 168, 174, 175; nuclear weapons and, 59, 66, 69–70, 71, 74, 77–93,

179; oil and, 149–150, 154–155, 156, 158, 164; Panama Canal and, 124, 128; Persian Gulf and, 149–150, 161–167; Republican Party and, 5, 6, 7, 14, 68, 75, 87, 92, 93; Rhodesia and, 133, 136, 138, 140–146; the Third World and, 14, 16–18, 61, 66, 86, 99, 111, 112, 122, 130, 154, 179–180; United Nations and, 97, 98, 100, 101, 102, 106, 108, 109, 175–176; Vietnam War and, 15, 22, 24, 26, 27–28, 29, 30, 32, 69. See also Buckley, William F., Jr.; Carter, Jimmy; Cold War; Commentary; communism; Ford, Gerald R.; Human Events; Kissinger, Henry; National Review; Nixon, Richard; Reagan, Ronald; SALT I; SALT II Spencer, Stuart, 1–2, 172 Stillman, Edmund, 40 Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). See SALT I; SALT II Strategic Defense Initiative, 179 Strausz-Hupé, Robert, 23 Struggle for the World, The (Burnham), 11, 81 Taft, Robert, 5, 8 Taiwan, 58, 62; China and, 48–49, 61, 63–64, 127; United Nations and, 50, 51, 54, 55, 56, 57 Team B intelligence group, 83, 84 Thurmond, Strom, 4, 5, 18, 22, 23– 24, 26, 29, 38, 39, 119, 137 “Time for Choosing, A” (Reagan address), 1, 21, 167 Torrijos, Omar, 122, 127, 128, 129, 130 Tower, John, 4, 18, 22, 34–35, 39, 93 Trohan, Walter, 38–39 Trotsky, Leon, 6, 27, 178 Troy, Gil, 104 Truman, Harry, 13, 48, 49

260 Index

Truman Doctrine, 6 Tuck, Juan Antonio, 120 Tucker, Robert W., 107, 156–158, 159, 166, 167 Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) (Rhodesia), 133, 134, 135 United Nations, 132; Carter and, 96–97, 108, 110–111, 176; China and, 49, 50, 51, 54, 55, 56, 57; communism and, 95, 101–102; conservative media and, 97–98, 99–101, 102–108, 114; Panama Canal and, 119; Reagan and, 172, 174–175, 178; Rhodesia and, 136, 138, 140; Soviet Union and, 97, 98, 100, 101, 102, 106, 108, 109, 175–176; Taiwan and, 50, 51, 54, 55, 56, 57; the Third World and, 3, 17, 96–109, 114, 116, 120, 125, 140, 157, 175. See also Burnham, James; Commentary; Human Events; National Review United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 106 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 96 University of California, Berkeley, 26, 36 U Thant, 100 Vaïsse, Justin, 68 Vance, Cyrus, 77, 85 Vietnam War, 2, 47, 58, 67, 101, 112, 125; antiwar movement, 15, 26, 35–36, 118, 119; bombing, 14, 29, 30, 31, 38; China and, 15, 22, 26, 28, 30, 32, 49, 53, 61–62; conservative media and, 13, 21–32, 37–38, 41–42, 157; escalation of, 27, 31; nuclear weapons and, 21, 30, 32; peace negotiations, 42–43,

139; Reagan and, 21–22, 25, 32– 33, 43; Republican Party and, 22, 30–31; Soviet Union and, 15, 22, 24, 26, 27–28, 29, 30, 32, 69; Tet Offensive, 34–35; US defeat, 3, 4, 14–15, 17, 19, 64, 69, 84, 95, 109, 116, 159; US support for South Vietnam, 43–44. See also Buckley, William F., Jr.; communism; Human Events; Johnson, Lyndon B.; Kissinger, Henry; National Review; Nixon, Richard Wall Street Journal, 100, 158 Warnke, Paul, 84, 85 “War on Poverty,” 3 War We Are In, The (Burnham), 102 Washington Post, 164 Watergate, 43, 60, 62, 75 Why Not Victory? (Goldwater), 6 Wicker, Tom, 158 Widener, Alice, 96, 107 Will, George, 46, 177 Wills, Garry, 40 Wilson, Harold, 136 Wilson, Woodrow, 5 Winter, Thomas S., 8–9, 19, 21, 59, 60, 172, 181 Witness (Chambers), 177 World Bank, 161 World War I, 5, 88 World War II, 5–6, 88, 90 Wyman, Louis, 34 Young, Andrew, 97, 108–110, 111, 143–144 Young Americans for Freedom, 9, 32, 35 Young People’s Socialist League, 175 Zimbabwe, 17–18, 145. See also Rhodesia Zimbabwe African Peoples Union (ZAPU), 133, 141, 142

Studies in Conflict, Diplomacy, and Peace Series Editors: George C. Herring, Andrew L. Johns, and Kathryn C. Statler This series focuses on key moments of conflict, diplomacy, and peace from the eighteenth century to the present to explore their wider significance in the development of U.S. foreign relations. The series editors welcome new research in the form of original monographs, interpretive studies, biographies, and anthologies from historians, political scientists, journalists, and policymakers. A primary goal of the series is to examine the United States’ engagement with the world, its evolving role in the international arena, and the ways in which the state, nonstate actors, individuals, and ideas have shaped and continue to influence history, both at home and abroad. Advisory Board Members David Anderson, California State University, Monterey Bay Laura Belmonte, Oklahoma State University Robert Brigham, Vassar College Paul Chamberlin, University of Kentucky Jessica Chapman, Williams College Frank Costigliola, University of Connecticut Michael C. Desch, University of Notre Dame Kurk Dorsey, University of New Hampshire John Ernst, Morehead State University Joseph A. Fry, University of Nevada, Las Vegas Ann Heiss, Kent State University Sheyda Jahanbani, University of Kansas Mark Lawrence, University of Texas Mitchell Lerner, Ohio State University Kyle Longley, Arizona State University Robert McMahon, Ohio State University Michaela Hoenicke Moore, University of Iowa Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, University of Kentucky Jason Parker, Texas A&M University Andrew Preston, Cambridge University Thomas Schwartz, Vanderbilt University Salim Yaqub, University of California, Santa Barbara Books in the Series Thomas C. Mann: President Johnson, the Cold War, and the Restructuring of Latin American Foreign Policy Thomas Tunstall Allcock Truman, Congress, and Korea: The Politics of America’s First Undeclared War Larry Blomstedt

The Gulf: The Bush Presidencies and the Middle East Michael F. Cairo Reagan and the World: Leadership and National Security, 1981–1989 Edited by Bradley Lynn Coleman and Kyle Longley American Justice in Taiwan: The 1957 Riots and Cold War Foreign Policy Stephen G. Craft Diplomatic Games: Sport, Statecraft, and International Relations since 1945 Edited by Heather L. Dichter and Andrew L. Johns Nothing Less Than War: A New History of America’s Entry into World War I Justus D. Doenecke Aid under Fire: Nation Building and the Vietnam War Jessica Elkind Enemies to Allies: Cold War Germany and American Memory Brian C. Etheridge Grounded: The Case for Abolishing the United States Air Force Robert M. Farley The American South and the Vietnam War: Belligerence, Protest, and Agony in Dixie Joseph A. Fry Obama at War: Congress and the Imperial Presidency Ryan C. Hendrickson The Cold War at Home and Abroad: Domestic Politics and US Foreign Policy since 1945 Edited by Andrew L. Johns and Mitchell B. Lerner US Presidential Elections and Foreign Policy: Candidates, Campaigns, and Global Politics from FDR to Bill Clinton Edited by Andrew Johnstone and Andrew Priest Paving the Way for Reagan: The Influence of Conservative Media on US Foreign Policy Laurence R. Jurdem The Conversion of Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg: From Isolation to International Engagement Lawrence S. Kaplan

Harold Stassen: Eisenhower, the Cold War, and the Pursuit of Nuclear Disarmament Lawrence S. Kaplan Nixon’s Back Channel to Moscow: Confidential Diplomacy and Détente Richard A. Moss Peacemakers: American Leadership and the End of Genocide in the Balkans James W. Pardew The Currents of War: A New History of American-Japanese Relations, 1899–1941 Sidney Pash Eisenhower and Cambodia: Diplomacy, Covert Action, and the Origins of the Second Indochina War William J. Rust So Much to Lose: John F. Kennedy and American Policy in Laos William J. Rust Foreign Policy at the Periphery: The Shifting Margins of US International Relations since World War II Edited by Bevan Sewell and Maria Ryan Lincoln Gordon: Architect of Cold War Foreign Policy Bruce L. R. Smith