Pauline Slave Welfare in Historical Context: An Equality Analysis (Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen Zum Neuen Testament 2.reihe) 9783161612145, 9783161612152, 3161612140

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Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament · 2. Reihe Herausgeber / Editor Jörg Frey (Zürich)

Mitherausgeber/Associate Editors Markus Bockmuehl (Oxford) ∙ James A. Kelhoffer (Uppsala) Tobias Nicklas (Regensburg) ∙ Janet Spittler (Charlottesville, VA) J. Ross Wagner (Durham, NC)

570

W. H. Paul Thompson

Pauline Slave Welfare in Historical Context An Equality Analysis

Mohr Siebeck

W. H. Paul Thompson, born 1973; 2005 BA (Hons) from Middlesex University, through Oak Hill Theological College; 2014 MTh from University of Chester, through Wales Evangelical School of Theology; 2021 PhD from University of Chester, through Union School of Theology; currently Academic Dean and lecturer in New Testament and Theology for Equip Gospel Ministries in Malaysia, and adjunct lecturer for Seminari Theoloji Malaysia. orcid.org/0000-0001-5575-8503

ISBN 978-3-16-161214-5 / eISBN 978-3-16-161215-2 DOI 10.1628/978-3-16-161215-2 ISSN 0340-9570 / eISSN 2568-7484 (Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament, 2. Reihe) The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliographie; detailed bibliographic data are available at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2023  Mohr Siebeck Tübingen, Germany.  www.mohrsiebeck.com This book may not be reproduced, in whole or in part, in any form (beyond that permitted by copyright law) without the publisher’s written permission. This applies particularly to reproductions, translations and storage and processing in electronic systems. The book was printed on non-aging paper by Laupp & Göbel in Gomaringen, and bound by Buchbinderei Nädele in Nehren. Printed in Germany.

Acknowledgements This monograph is a revised version of my PhD thesis at Union School of Theology (UST, Bridgend) and awarded by the University of Chester. I am grateful to Prof. Jörg Frey and his associate editors for their willingness to include this in their WUNT II series, and to Elena Müller and her team for their editorial support. No research project, including this one, can be completed without the aid of others. In particular, I wish to express my appreciation to the wonderful resources of Tyndale House (Cambridge), British Library (London) and Pitts Theological Library (Atlanta, GA); without them, this monograph would not have materialised. Thanks also to UST’s librarian, the late Donald Mitchell, for tracking down multiple obscure references, and to Fulton County Library (GA), Columbia University (NY) and Harvard University (MA) for their willingness to lend or scan pages from rare items in their collections. I am in debt to my PhD supervisors, Dr Cornelis Bennema and Dr Tom Holland, for their sustained guidance and advice throughout. Likewise, to the leaders and members of Gunnersbury Baptist Church (Chiswick) for their longterm support and encouragement in multiple ways. While it is invidious to single anyone out, I cannot resist acknowledging the inspiration of the late Doreen Sharp. I thank Demi Hayes for all her diligent proof-reading of my thesis and M28 Church (Atlanta, GA) for their support during our Atlanta sojourn. Lastly, I also wish to thank my wife, Yuli, for her ongoing support, encouragement and much forbearance over the many years of this project. All errors and omissions remain my sole responsibility. In memoriam also to my father, who would have enjoyed debating its contents. 1 Cor 4:7. Soli Deo Gloria. October 2022

W. H. Paul Thompson

Table of Contents Acknowledgements ....................................................................................... V Acronyms and Abbreviations .................................................................... XIII

Chapter 1: Introduction .......................................................................... 1 A. Incongruous .............................................................................................. 1 B. Equality..................................................................................................... 2 I. II. III. IV. V.

Definitions ........................................................................................ 2 Classification .................................................................................... 3 Associated Terminology ................................................................... 6 Method ............................................................................................. 7 The Rise of Equality in Contemporary Discourse ............................10

C. Pauline Slavery and Slave Welfare ..........................................................11 I. Pauline Authorship and Ethical Development ..................................11 II. Literal not Metaphorical Slavery .....................................................12 III. Antebellum Chattel Slavery .............................................................13 IV. Slavery Definitions ..........................................................................15 V. Why Slave Welfare..........................................................................16 VI. Relationship to Poverty ...................................................................18 VII. Paul and Manumission (1 Cor 7:21–24) ...........................................18 VIII. Contemporary Ethics .......................................................................19 D. Pauline Ethics..........................................................................................19 I. II. III. IV. V.

Ethics not Theology .........................................................................19 Equality and Paul’s Unification Formulae .......................................20 Epistolary Analysis of Ethics ...........................................................20 Imitation Ethics ...............................................................................22 Ethical Sources ................................................................................23

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E. Monograph Statement .............................................................................. 27 F. Monograph Outline .................................................................................. 27

Chapter 2: Pauline Scholarship on Slave Welfare .......................... 29 A. Introduction ............................................................................................. 29 B. Haustafeln Historical Criticism ............................................................... 30 I. II. III. IV. V. VI.

From Dibelius to Galatians 3:28 ...................................................... 30 Schroeder: Ethical Mutuality and Slavery Golden Age .................... 32 Crouch and Hellenistic Judaism ....................................................... 33 Balch and Household Management.................................................. 34 Hering: Epistolary Integration and Metaphorical Slavery ................ 36 Evaluation ....................................................................................... 37

C. Colossians 4:1 ......................................................................................... 38 I. II. III. IV.

ʄûĻüòÏ as “Equity” or “Fairness” ................................................... 38 ʄûĻüòÏ as “Equality” ...................................................................... 46 ʄûĻüòÏ as “Revolutionary Change” ................................................ 49 Evaluation ....................................................................................... 49

D. Ephesians 6:9 .......................................................................................... 50 I. II. III. IV.

Referent of üąëŻüĄ ........................................................................ 50 Bassler: Divine Impartiality and Imitation Ethics ............................ 52 Ethical Precedent ............................................................................. 53 Evaluation ....................................................................................... 53

E. Philemon .................................................................................................. 54 I. Historical Occasion ......................................................................... 54 II. Implied Ethics ................................................................................. 58 III. Evaluation ....................................................................................... 64 F. Galatians 3:28 and Slavery ...................................................................... 64 G. The Revisionist School ............................................................................. 65 I.

From Mild to Cruel Roman Slavery ................................................. 65

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II. Glancy: From Fairness to Unfairness ...............................................69 III. Jewish Slavery Ethics and Ethos as Greco-Roman Ethics and Ethos 74 IV. Evaluation .......................................................................................75 H. Conclusion ...............................................................................................76

Chapter 3: Slave Welfare in Greco-Roman Antiquity ...................77 A. Introduction .............................................................................................77 B. Greek Slavery: Aristotle’s Historical Context ..........................................78 I. Classical Athens ..............................................................................78 II. Sparta ..............................................................................................83 III. Kinds of Slavery Elsewhere .............................................................83 C. Aristotle: Natural and Conquest Slavery ..................................................85 I. Natural Slavery Definition ...............................................................85 II. Implied Ethics .................................................................................87 III. Aristotle’s Alleged Critics on Conquest Slavery: His Philosophical Context ............................................................................................90 IV. Equality and Friendship ...................................................................91 V. Other Alleged Critics of Natural Slavery .........................................93 VI. Summary: Aristotelian Equality Ethics on Slave Welfare ................94 D. Between Athens and Hellenism: Stoicism and Rome ................................95 E. Roman Slavery: Seneca’s Historical Context ...........................................98 I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII.

Origins and Kinds of Slavery ...........................................................98 Slave Supply....................................................................................99 Conquest not Natural Slavery ........................................................ 100 Slave Welfare ................................................................................ 102 Unequal Rome ............................................................................... 110 Slaves and Sons ............................................................................. 116 Summary: Roman Equality Ethics on Slave Welfare ..................... 127

F. Seneca the Younger on Slave Welfare .................................................... 129 I. II.

Clementia and Secundus ................................................................ 129 De Beneficiis ................................................................................. 130

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III. Epistulae morales 47 ..................................................................... 133 IV. Summary: Seneca Equality Ethics on Slave Welfare ..................... 135 G. Conclusion............................................................................................. 136

Chapter 4: Slave Welfare in Jewish Antiquity .............................. 138 A. Introduction ........................................................................................... 138 B. Exodus ................................................................................................... 142 I. II. III. IV. V.

Consistency (21:20–21; cf. 21:26–27) ........................................... 142 How Much: The Goring Ox Law (21:28–32) ................................. 153 Concubine or Wife (21:7–11) ........................................................ 158 Debt Slavery, Slave Breeding and Family Breakup (21:2–6) ......... 163 Summary: Equality and the Covenant Code................................... 167

C. Deuteronomy ......................................................................................... 168 I. Justice and Impartiality, Yahweh and Brotherhood ........................ 169 II. Poverty Relief and Generosity ....................................................... 171 III. The Sabbath Commandment (5:12–15).......................................... 172 IV. Female War Captives (21:10–17) .................................................. 172 V. Debt Slavery (15:12–18)................................................................ 175 VI. Job, Deuteronomy and Slavery ...................................................... 180 VII. Kidnapping into Slavery (Deut 24:7) ............................................. 182 VIII. Slave Asylum (Deut 23:15–16[16–17]) ......................................... 182 IX. Summary: Equality and the Deuteronomist.................................... 183 D. Leviticus ................................................................................................ 183 I. Slavery and Sex (19:20–22) ........................................................... 184 II. Redemption and Jubilee (Lev 25) .................................................. 188 III. Summary: Equality and Leviticus .................................................. 196 E. Philo ...................................................................................................... 197 F. Glancy on the Jewish Sexual Use of Slaves ............................................ 199 G. Conclusion............................................................................................. 202

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Chapter 5: Pauline Corpus .................................................................. 204 A. Introduction ........................................................................................... 204 B. 2 Corinthians ......................................................................................... 205 I. II. III. IV.

The Jerusalem Collection (8:13–15) .............................................. 205 Equality as Ground (8:13c) ............................................................ 206 Equality as Goal (8:14–15) ............................................................ 207 Summary: Equality and the Jerusalem Collection .......................... 209

C. 1 Corinthians ......................................................................................... 210 I. II. III. IV.

Paul versus Apollos (3:1–4:13) ...................................................... 210 The Haves versus the Have Nots (11:17–34) ................................. 211 Spiritual Gifts and the Body (12:1–31) .......................................... 213 Summary: Equality and 1 Corinthians ........................................... 217

D. Galatians ............................................................................................... 217 I. II. III. IV. V. VI.

Imitation of Divine Impartiality (2:1–4:7) ..................................... 219 Why the Three Pairs of 3:28? ........................................................ 226 Summary: Unity, Equality and 3:28 ............................................... 229 Paraenesis (5:13–6:10): Inclusive of Slave and Free ...................... 229 Sexuality and Slavery .................................................................... 231 Summary: Equality and Galatians .................................................. 232

E. Colossians .............................................................................................. 233 I. II. III. IV. V. VI.

Use of Old Testament .................................................................... 233 Imitation Ethics ............................................................................. 235 Inclusion, Unity and Equality (3:11) .............................................. 235 Slave Obedience (3:22–25) ............................................................ 237 Slave Welfare (4:1)........................................................................ 245 Summary: Equality and Slave Welfare in Colossians..................... 249

F. Ephesians ............................................................................................... 249 I. II. III. IV. V.

Use of Old Testament .................................................................... 250 Imitation Ethics ............................................................................. 251 Slave Obedience (6:5–8)................................................................ 253 Slave Welfare (6:9)........................................................................ 258 Summary: Equality and Slave Welfare in Ephesians...................... 262

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G. Philemon ............................................................................................... 263 I. II. III. IV. V. VI.

Equality Analysis .......................................................................... 263 Onesimus Resumptive .................................................................... 265 Legalities and Occasion ................................................................. 266 Manumission ................................................................................. 267 Why Reticence .............................................................................. 268 Summary: Equality and Slave Welfare in Philemon ...................... 268

H. Slave Welfare beyond Paul .................................................................... 269 I. II. III. IV. V.

Intra-Pauline Ethical Development ................................................ 269 A Comprehensive Equality Ethic ................................................... 270 Glancy and Slave-masters’ Sexual Use of Their Own Slaves ......... 270 Further Post-Pauline Ethical Development .................................... 271 Summary ....................................................................................... 272

I. Equal Treatment beyond Slavery ............................................................. 273 J. Conclusion .............................................................................................. 274

Conclusion .............................................................................................. 276 Bibliography .............................................................................................. 279 Index of References .................................................................................... 315 Index of Names .......................................................................................... 337 Subject Index.............................................................................................. 347

Acronyms and Abbreviations This monograph follows the standards of SBLHS. Additional acronyms and abbreviations either follow IATG3 or are as follows: AltS AMW

ANE ARJ ASSt AWCH BCBC BCS BHGNT BPhil BRWTSJ CC CCEL CICA ComB DGRA

DK

DSBOT EGGNT ESV EWNT

Alttestamentliche Studien The Ancient Mediterranean World, ed. Keith R. Bradley and Paul Cartledge, vol. 1 of The Cambridge World History of Slavery, 4 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011) Ancient Near East Annual of Rabbinic Judaism All Souls Studies The Ancient World: Comparative Histories Believers Church Bible Commentary Blackwell’s Classical Studies Baylor Handbook on the Greek New Testament Behavior and Philosophy Black Religion/Womanist Thought/Social Justice Covenant Code (Exod 21:1–23:19) Christian Classics Ethereal Library Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority (UK) Commentaires Bibliques A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities, ed. William Smith, William Wayte and G. E. Marindin, 3rd ed. (London. John Murray. 1890) Danker, Frederick W. and Kathryn Krug, The Concise Greek– English Lexicon of the New Testament (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009) Daily Study Bible – Old Testament Exegetical Guide to the Greek New Testament English Standard Verson, Text ed., 2016 Balz, Horst and Gerhard Schneider, eds., Exegetisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, 3rd ed. (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2011)

XIV Friberg

GNHE

GLHBANE

HPT HRRH IATG3

IndRev IVPNTC JBusE JEconH JHMAS JLAnt JMT JOP JPE LabH LE

LH LL Louw-Nida

LU MAPS

Acronyms and Abbreviations

Friberg, Timothy, Barbara Friberg and Neva F. Millar, Analytical Lexicon of the Greek New Testament, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2000) Gregory of Nyssa. Homilies on Ecclesiastes. An English Version with Supporting Studies: Proceedings of the Seventh International Colloquium on Gregory of Nyssa (St. Andrews, 5– 10 September 1990), ed. Stuart G. Hall (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1993) Gender and Law in the Hebrew Bible and the Ancient Near East, ed. Victor H. Matthews, Bernard M. Levinson, and Tikva S. Frymer-Kensky, JSOTSup 262 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1998) History of Political Thought Historical Reflections / Réflexions Historiques Schwertner, Siegfried M., ed., Internationales Abkürzungsverzeichnis für Theologie und Grenzgebiete, 3rd ed. (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2014) Independent Review IVP New Testament Commentary Journal of Business Ethics Journal of Economic History Journal of the History of Medicine and Allied Sciences Journal of Late Antiquity Journal of Moral Theology Journal of Politics Journal of Political Economy Labor History Law of Eshnunna (Roth, Martha T. and Harry A. Hoffner, Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor, ed. Piotr Michalowski, WAW 6 [Atlanta: Scholars, 1995], 57–70) Law of Hammurabi (Roth and Hoffner, Law Collections, 71– 142) Laws of Lipit-Ishtar (Roth and Hoffner, Law Collections, 23– 35) Louw, Johannes P. and Eugene A. Nida, Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament: Based on Semantic Domains, 2nd ed. (New York: United Bible Societies, 1988) Laws of Ur-Namma (Roth and Hoffner, Law Collections, 13– 22) Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society

Acronyms and Abbreviations

NIV NIVAC NSCl NTER ONS OTEo ÖTKNT PAST PentC PopPS PtW RSAW ReadNT Rebellion Record RER SBLHS SENT SEP SGB SlavAbol ThKNT TTH UK US Òà ZECNT

XV

New International Version, 2011 ed. New International Version Application Commentary New Surveys in the Classics New Testament for English Readers Office of National Statistics (UK) Old Testament for Everyone Ökumenischer Taschenbuchkommentar zum Neuen Testament Pauline Studies Pentecostal Commentary Popular Patristics Series Preaching the Word Routledge Sourcebooks for the Ancient World Reading the New Testament The Rebellion Record: A Diary of American Events with Documents, Narratives, Illustrative Incidents, Poetry, etc. Review of Educational Research Billy J. Collins, Bob Buller and John F. Kutsko, eds., The SBL Handbook of Style, 2nd ed. (Atlanta: SBL, 2014) Schlatter Erläuterungen zum Neuen Testament Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. Edward N. Zalta, https://plato.stanford.edu/ Scriptorum Graecorum Bibliotheca Slavery and Abolition Theologischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament Translated Texts for Historians United Kingdom United States Chi Rho Commentary Zondervan Exegetical Commentary on the New Testament

Equality is a contested subject: people who praise it or disparage it disagree about what they are praising or disparaging.1

There is no such thing as pure equality, equality per se. All the interesting theories focus on identifying the right property [or attribute], answering the question, “Equal what?”… [Until substantivised, pure equality is] innocuous … [for] it is a principle of consistency accepted by every moral theory. Indeed, every rule-governed system incorporates the principle, for it is implied in the very idea of rule that it be followed in relevantly similar cases.2

“Equality” and “equal” are incomplete predicates that necessarily generate one question: equal in what respect? … When two persons have equal status in at least one normatively relevant respect, they must be treated equally with regard to this respect.3

1

Ronald M. Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue: The Theory and Practice of Equality (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002), 2 (emphasis additional). 2 Louis P. Pojman, “Theories of Equality: A Critical Analysis,” BPhil 23 (1995): 1, 4, 3. 3 Sefan Gosepath, “Equality,” SEP (Spring 2011): §1, 2.1 (emphasis additional).

Chapter 1

Introduction A. Incongruous The title of this monograph may appear incongruous: in this contemporary era equality is intuitively laudable,1 but slavery despicable. Indeed, to the modern (Western) reader, ‘slavery’ evokes the horrors of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries with the trans-Atlantic slave trade and abuses in the British Caribbean and in the US antebellum South (hereafter, antebellum chattel slavery).2 Are they not therefore opposites? Slavery’s abolition in the nineteenth century was surely (Western) society’s correct moral response to slaves’ demand for equality and justice. Yet we will observe in his monograph that equality and justice are rarely defined. Today nearly everyone condemns slavery as a morally repugnant practice from which humanity has finally graduated. Therefore, many might evaluate a priori any moral response to slavery other than abolition to have been inadequate. However, intuitive moral outrage can sometimes hinder good scholarship, especially when those under investigation may not share that same sense of moral outrage.3 This monograph suspends moral judgements to focus upon slavery in antiquity when it was unquestioned. Our focus in this monograph is on slave welfare: how slave-masters in antiquity should treat their slaves including, but not limited to, voluntary slave manumission. Our focus is not on slavery’s abolition (a universal slave

1

Felix Oppenheim, “Egalitarianism as a Descriptive Concept,” APQ 7 (1970): 143; Pojman, “Theories of Equality,” 23. 2 Cf. Suzanne Miers, “Slavery: A Question of Definition,” SlavAbol 24 (2003): 11. 3 Anthony C. Thiselton (New Horizons in Hermeneutics: The Theory and Practice of Transforming Biblical Reading [London: Marshall Pickering; Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992], 46) warns of the increasing likelihood of closed minds distorting exegesis when there is a conceptual gap between contemporary and ancient presuppositions: “Our finite situatedness in time, history, and culture defines the present (though always expanding) limits of our ‘world’, or more strictly the limits of what we can ‘see’.… It is likely that horizontal factors will play some part in interpretation.”

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emancipation)4 nor on any ethical injunction to slaves (e.g., obey your slavemaster). Although it may appear incongruous to analyse a slave’s welfare for equality while still enslaved, this monograph will demonstrate the value of equality analysis once equality is rigorously defined and classified, and the reasons behind its historical rise to contemporary prominence are appreciated.

B. Equality I. Definitions To equality theorists, equality between two persons (or objects) asserts neither their identity nor their approximate correspondence. Instead, equality quantifies their similarity by asserting that both persons possess the same attribute or property (the equality attribute) while acknowledging that both are also distinguishable through other attribute(s). Strictly speaking, no two objects can ever be wholly identical for they will at least differ in their spatiotemporal location attribute.5 Typically, an argument’s equality rhetoric signifies the relevance of only the persons’ common equality attribute and the irrelevancy of those distinguishing attribute(s). That common equality attribute should be identified; for example, moral equality concerns the mental reasoning capacity of persons and their accountability for their ensuing actions, and social equality is concerned with the income and/or status disparity between rich and poor free persons. Where the equality attribute is indivisible such that any person cannot possess it to a degree (e.g., citizenship), the relationship is said to be numerically equal; otherwise, where the equality attribute is divisible (e.g., human merit), the relationship is said to be proportionally equal. Considered formally, numerical equality is a subcase of proportional equality. However, Plato and Aristotle, the best-known definers of equality in classical literature, contrast proportional and numerical equality as they discuss oligarchy versus democracy, deliberate on political honours and human merit, and debate whether each 4 The two terms are frequently treated as near synonyms. However, this monograph distinguishes between emancipation to denote a slave-master’s involuntary redeeming act under compulsion from a higher authority and manumission to denote a slave-master’s voluntary act of slave redemption (J. Albert Harrill, The Manumission of Slaves in Early Christianity, HUT 32 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1995], 4). 5 Not even identical twins, but such precision in equality discourse is rare (Gosepath, “Equality,” §1–2.2). On equality’s definition, see further Louis P. Pojman and Robert Westmoreland, eds., “Introduction: The Nature and Value of Equality,” in Equality: Selected Readings (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 1–3.

B. Equality

3

citizen’s political influence should be either numerically equal to each other because citizenship is indivisible or weighed in proportion to each citizen’s variable merit.6 In other words, they debate which equality attribute is the most appropriate. Asserting equality between persons remains incomplete until the shared equality attribute is defined.7 Dworkin observes the frequency with which political rhetoric confuses by failing to define explicitly which equality is being asserted.8 We will demonstrate the same confusion in modern scholarship on Pauline slave welfare. Scholarship too needs to move beyond the mere identification of equality terminology to analyse the kind of equality being implied. The monograph deploys the terms egalitarian and egalitarianism to refer to a development advancing greater human equality by reducing, minimising, eliminating or treating as irrelevant to the context a specific a priori distinction between persons. The following examples of equality reasoning demonstrate how an equality proposition may not be an egalitarian development; indeed, an equality of treatment proposition is expressly neither egalitarian nor inegalitarian. II. Classification Oppenheim classifies equality propositions into three: (i) equal personal attributes, (ii) equal distribution and (iii) equal treatment.9 We discuss examples of each and their implications for this monograph. 1. Equal Personal Attributes Human beings differ in many attributes, yet traditional Christian theology asserts their numerical equality because all are created in the image of God (the equality attribute). More common in antiquity is a proportional equality between human beings according to individual merit due to, for example, their ancestry or wealth. Alternatively, some in antiquity emphasise human inequality. For example, Aristotle justifies slavery on the moral inequality between slaves and free – we will examine his definition in chapter three – whereas Enlightenment philosopher Hobbes rejects slavery because of numerical 6

Plato, Leg. 6.757B–C; Aristotle, Eth. nic. 5 (1129a–38b15); Pol. 3.5–7 (1279a25– 84a4); see further F. David Harvey, “Two Kinds of Equality,” CM 26 (1965): 101–46. For equality in other Greek writings, see Laurence L. Welborn, “Paul’s Place in a First-Century Revival of the Discourse of ‘Equality’,” HTR 110 (2017): 542–53. 7 Gosepath, “Equality,” §1, 2.1. 8 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, 2. 9 Oppenheim, “Egalitarianism,” 143–44.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

equality between all persons who alike possess a sufficient combination of mental reasoning and bodily strength. Indeed, Hobbes argues that everyone can claim an equal entitlement to what another had previously claimed and that everyone, even the weakest, can either kill or plot with others to kill anyone, even the strongest.10 This descriptive monograph analyses which personal attributes are considered to be equal or unequal and explores the offered rationales. It refrains from evaluating philosophically and empirically any underlying claim regarding pertinent equal personal attributes.11 2. Equal Distribution Both ancient and contemporary political philosophers typically deploy equality rhetoric to advocate an equal distribution scheme whereby a specified good must be distributed in proportion to the quantity of the defined equality attribute of each person. For example, we will discuss in chapter two a debate in Xenophon over whether the plunder should be distributed among the victorious soldiers numerically equally (each receives an identical amount) or proportionally according to a variable assessment of individual merit. We will also identify a forerunner of modern-day profit sharing (chapter four). Aristotle’s Politics also includes the concept of reciprocal equality that achieves an equality of outcome over time, not by subdividing a good between persons, but by subdividing the time for which each person in turn benefits from that good.12 In chapter five, we will distinguish this reciprocal equality from reciprocity of action; the latter does not guarantee the former. The contemporary political debate over which socially egalitarian distribution scheme is preferable is extensive and revolves around which equality attribute is most appropriate and when it should be measured (e.g., equality of opportunity, outcome, welfare, resources etc.),13 but we do not identify any contemporary equal distribution arguments in this monograph. 10

Thomas Hobbes, Equality in the State of Nature (repr. as pages 26–36 in Equality: Selected Readings, ed. Louis P. Pojman and Robert Westmoreland [New York: Oxford University Press, 1997]), 30. 11 For the complexity of such evaluations, see Louis P. Pojman, “On Equal Human Worth: A Critique of Contemporary Egalitarianism,” in Equality: Selected Readings, ed. Louis P. Pojman and Robert Westmoreland (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 282–99. 12 Aristotle, Pol. 2.1.5–6 (1261a32–61b5). 13 For the concepts, see Oppenheim, “Egalitarianism,” 143–52; Pojman, “Theories of Equality,” 1–27. For extended coverage, see the anthology in Louis P. Pojman and Robert Westmoreland, eds., Equality: Selected Readings (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997).

B. Equality

5

3. Equal Treatment Equal treatment, or legal equality, requires persons A and B, who both break law L which prescribes penalty P, to pay the same penalty P.14 In other words, numerically equal treatment between two persons implies that both receive identical (or the same) treatment because of their shared equality attribute despite other differences between them. Gosepath insists that equal treatment and human equality are inseparable: numerically equal treatment presumes numerical human equality and vice versa.15 We will also discuss in this monograph judicial and divine impartiality, how a judge and God treat defendants identically, as numerical equals, regardless of, for example, their differences in wealth. However, today some question a law against theft that treats the rich and starving poor as numerical equals,16 and prefer a proportionate scheme where, for example, ‘unit fines’ are calculated proportionately to the culprit’s income and/or wealth.17 Such proportionate equal treatment, however, results in people being treated variably, whereas applying the identical penalty to all treats culprits identically or as numerical equals. Such numerically equal treatment is arguably preferable to laws in antiquity that penalise rich culprits less than poor culprits of the same crime. Numerically equal treatment may also be preferable to laws that treat people differently, as unequals; for example, one rule for citizens versus a different rule for foreigners or one rule for free persons versus a different rule for slaves. Therefore, we will be explicit in this monograph on the kind of equal treatment: whether numerically equal (all are treated identically) or proportionately equal (all are treated variably in proportion to an identified personal attribute). We will also be explicit on the scope of equal treatment because, as both Oppenheim and Pojman highlight, equal treatment – their example is on suffrage – could permit the equal treatment of whites in allowing all of them to vote and equal treatment of blacks in preventing all of them from voting.18 The monograph, however, is focused on the equal treatment of all persons; for example, were suffrage relevant to this monograph, equal treatment between white and black. In terms of this monograph’s focus on slavery, we focus on

14

Ignoring differential mitigating circumstances. Gosepath, “Equality,” §1, 2.1. 16 Cf. the quip by Anatole France (The Red Lily, trans. Winifred Stevens [London: Consul, 1961], 69): “The majestic equality of the laws, which forbid the rich and poor alike to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread.” 17 As in Finland and as trialled in the UK (1992–1993) and in Staten Island, US (1988). 18 Oppenheim, “Egalitarianism,” 144; Pojman, “Theories of Equality,” 6. 15

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Chapter 1: Introduction

equal treatment between slave and free rather than equal treatment between slaves.19 Numerically equal treatment does not attempt to reduce differences between people; rather, it acknowledges difference to argue for its irrelevancy to the ethical situation. Such an ethic might be an egalitarian development relative to the practices it seeks to reform, but the ethic itself is neither egalitarian nor discriminatory. While we will review scholarship that debates ‘egalitarianism,’ and often assumes that it is the only valid kind of equality, this monograph will argue for the centrality of this numerically equal treatment concept between rich and poor and between slave and free in both Jewish and Pauline ethical thought. III. Associated Terminology Since at least the days of Plato and Aristotle, justice (often îŤôëóøÏ in Greek) has been closely related to equality. To Aristotle, justice is consistency in that equals are treated as if identical (or alike) and unequals as if different (unlike), and he acknowledges the challenge of justifying the appropriate equality attribute.20 To equality theorists, debates about justice are debates as to the most appropriate equality attribute: All debates over the proper conception of justice, i.e., over who is due what, can be understood as controversies over the question of which cases are equal and which unequal.… For this reason, equality theorists are correct in stressing that the claim that persons are owed equality becomes informative only when one is told – what kind of equality they are owed. Actually, every normative theory implies a certain notion of equality.21

Typically, justice rhetoric conveys moral approval upon the stated arrangement. It is often accompanied by an explicit or implicit appeal to some authoritative ethical standard: perhaps either to an external source or to the orator’s own subjective opinion. This monograph argues that justice terminology should also be analysed for that standard. Terms such as equity, equitable and fairness are ambiguous because they are typically deployed in three distinct senses: (i) in contrast to equality, which might imply a proportionate equality in contrast to a numerical equality; (ii) as synonyms for justice expressing moral approval; or (iii) as per Aristotle on ĠóïóôĤÏ justice, to denote the law’s further refinement when unforeseen circumstances reveal the need for a new exception to the existing law’s

19

For examples of the latter, see the second chapter’s literature review into Col 4:1. Aristotle, Pol. 3.7.1 (1282b14–24). 21 Gosepath, “Equality,” §2.2 (emphasis original); cf. Pojman, “Theories of Equality,” 3. 20

B. Equality

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generalities (hereafter, arbitrative justice).22 Such ambiguous terminology often confuses and blurs the important distinctions at the centre of this monograph. Instead, we will clarify their implicit equality attribute(s). IV. Method 1. Equality Ethics and Equality Analysis If ethics suggests a systematic exploration of and reflection on behaviour (as in, e.g., Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics), then most of the sources discussed in this monograph are not ethical documents. Nevertheless, they still contain discussions of desired and/or actual behaviour that can be analysed. Hence, we extend Zimmermann’s multi-perspective approach for discovering NT ethics to each collection of sources analysed, deriving from each collection’s explicit statements an underlying order of ethical values and arguments, its “ethical superstructure” or “implicit ethics,” that reveals its ethical thought process.23 In this monograph, our collections are Pauline scholarship on slave welfare (chapter two), classical Athenian and Roman slave welfare (chapter three), Jewish slave welfare (chapter four), and the Pauline corpus (chapter five). Where necessary, we will discuss any hermeneutical issues specific to each collection immediately before that collection’s analysis. Where pertinent, we supplement historical-grammatical exegesis of a text with its reception history. Equality analysis is our term for the heuristic approach of this monograph to analyse how a collection reasons about equality. Where a collection’s author(s), redactor(s) and/or compiler(s) (hereafter, author) uses equality terminology, equality analysis classifies the kind of equality concept being implied and identifies its equality parameters; for example, whether equal distribution or equal treatment, whether numerical or proportionate equality, and, if the latter, to what attribute that variable treatment is proportionate. Our collective term is equality ethics. In essence, this descriptive use of equality analysis answers Pojman’s question, “Equal what?”24 Our equality analysis of Pauline scholarship on slave welfare (chapter two) is primarily descriptive to highlight 22 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 5.10.3–8 (1137b11–38a4). For the term arbitrative justice, see Wolfgang von Leyden, Aristotle on Equality and Justice: His Political Argument (Houndmills, Hants.: Macmillan, 1985), 95–96. 23 Ruben Zimmermann, “The ‘Implicit Ethics’ of New Testament Writings: A Draft on a New Methodology for Analysing New Testament Ethics,” Neot 43 (2009): 403. Implicit, Zimmermann prefers, to demonstrate that they are bound to the text and neither imposed upon the text from outside nor postulated of the text’s author apart from the text; they are discovered not created by the reader. 24 Pojman, “Theories of Equality,” 1.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

what kind of equality scholars mean when they use equality terminology to describe Paul’s ethics. This monograph also employs equality analysis to construct how a collection’s implied ethics reason about equality. We will not presume any a priori finding; instead we seek to identify the collection’s internal conceptual framework in equality terms. Equality analysis does not presume that the collection’s author is conscious of his own equality framework. We rely only on the claim that every ethical system has an explicit or implicit rationale for treating similar cases as alike and others as unlike.25 This is primarily a comparative process; for example, equality analysis compares how an implied ethic treats, for example, rich people, citizens and/or free persons with how that same implied ethic treats poor people, foreigners and/or slaves. In other words, equality analysis identifies cases where people are treated identically as numerical equals because of a shared equality attribute (despite other differences between them), cases where others are treated variably in proportion to an identified attribute, and cases where people are treated differently as unequals. Equality analysis discovers which equality parameters best fit a collection’s ethical reasoning and explores the reasons why. Our equality analysis of Jewish slave welfare (chapter four) is primarily constructive to deduce its author’s equality ethics from its multiple descriptions of desired behaviour. In our equality analysis of Greco-Roman slave welfare (chapter three) and Paul (chapter five), we correlate their authors’ use of equality terminology (that requires descriptive analysis) with their authors’ multiple descriptions of behaviour (constructive analysis). Inconsistent equality parameters in a collection could indicate either its arbitrariness or its incoherent ethical reasoning, but we do not identify any such cases in this monograph. We will, however, identify cases where a collection subset reveals one equality parameter and another subset reveals a different equality parameter. Equality analysis then explores the reasons why this apparent inconsistency exists between each collection subset and why one equality parameter trumps another in some cases but not others. To paraphrase Zimmermann, equality analysis identifies the author’s hierarchy of equality values.26 Thus, equality analysis also explores the comprehensiveness of (or, conversely, the limits to) any discovered cases of equal treatment. While I describe this heuristic approach as a series of sequential steps – historical-grammatical exegesis, then implied ethics discovery and finally equality ethic discovery – in practice these steps can be merged. Indeed, in this 25 26

Pojman, “Theories of Equality,” 3; Gosepath, “Equality,” §2.2. Zimmermann, “Implicit Ethics,” 409.

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monograph, its goal of equality ethic construction (or reconstruction) often directs our exegetical task. In these ways, equality analysis provides greater insight in the author’s conceptual framework. The monograph also explores possible Pauline dependency upon the other collections, as attested through shared equality ethics, regardless of any shared vocabulary. 2. Moral Action, Agent and Subject This monograph also identifies and distinguishes between the moral agent and the moral subject of a moral action. A moral action is morally significant because a third party (typically either a state or deity) applies consequences for compliance or immoral non-compliance. A moral action also requires a moral agent and moral subject. The moral agent is the person who performs or avoids the moral action and whom the third party holds accountable; the agent is the grammatical subject of an imperative. The moral subject is the person targeted by the moral action; the subject is the grammatical object of an imperative. Where slaves are denied moral subject status, their slave-masters’ actions towards them are amoral, i.e., morally neutral. We will analyse many texts where the agent and subject are explicitly stated as slave-master and slave (or vice versa). In others, however, the agent and subject are specified in inclusive terms; for example, “all” or “one another.” Such cases require additional grammatical-historical exegesis to determine whether slaves are implicitly included or excluded. Each instance is treated on a case-by-case basis; the monograph relies upon no general presumption. 3. Ethics and Ethos This monograph also distinguishes between ethics, how one should behave, and ethos, one’s actual lived-out behaviour.27 Ethics, thus understood, is the author’s desired ethos that he assumes to be normative but which may differ from the recipient’s ethos. Thus, the monograph also refers to an equality ethos. We will not downplay any source’s significance because its intended recipients may not behave accordingly. Our focus is on authorial intent, which should also be intelligible to his intended recipients. The monograph distinguishes

27

For the distinction, see Jan G. van der Watt, ed., Preface to Identity, Ethics, and Ethos in the New Testament, BZNW 141 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2006), vi–vii; Michael Wolter, “‘Let No One Seek His Own, But Each One the Other’s’ (1 Corinthians 10:24): Pauline Ethics according to 1 Corinthians,” in Identity, Ethics, and Ethos in the New Testament, ed. Jan G. van der Watt, BZNW 141 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2006), 200.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

between the equality ethics of the Pauline epistles and the early Christian ethos.28 Our focus is on the former, the monograph is ultimately agnostic on the latter,29 but we will discuss views of the latter where they affect the reconstruction of the former. We have already observed how human equality (even if rarely defined) is now presumed to be the norm. In antiquity, however, human inequality was the norm.30 To avoid anachronisms, we must appreciate when and why this development in human thought occurred. To this we now turn. V. The Rise of Equality in Contemporary Discourse Phelps Brown observes that the historical rise of equality rhetoric and egalitarianism was due to three factors: (i) a belief in human equality ‘by nature’ whose definition also changed, (ii) a humanitarian concern for another human being’s potential and (iii) the transition to individualism through the Renaissance, Reformation and Enlightenment. Prior to the rise of individualism, the human mindset passively accepted three interrelated ideas: (i) their collective (postFall)31 inequalitarian society preceded the individual, who should therefore 28 The distinction between ethics and ethos, however, is more blurred in some of the other sources we will discuss. 29 For one recent study into the early Christian slavery ethos that acknowledges the limitations of the available sources, see Hermut Löhr, “Einige Beobachtungen zur Rolle von Sklaven in christlichen Gemeinden in der zweiten Hälfte des ersten und in der ersten Hälfte des zweiten Jahrhunderts n. Chr,” in Ein neues Geschlecht? Entwicklungen des frühchristlichen Selbstbewusstseins, ed. Markus Lang, NTOA 105 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2014), 11–29. More generally, Wayne A. Meeks (The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul, 2nd ed. [New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003], 2) observes: “If we ask, ‘What was it like to become and be an ordinary Christian in the first century?’ we receive only vague and stammering replies.” Revisionist scholar Glancy (Slavery in Early Christianity [New York: Oxford University Press, 2002]), however, appears definitive. 30 Contemporary political philosophy often relies upon an intuitive equality presumption whereby only exceptions to the norm of treating persons equally require justification (Isaiah Berlin, “Equality as an Ideal,” PAS 56 [1955]: 305; Sefan Gosepath, “The Principles and the Presumption of Equality,” in Social Equality: On What It Means to Be Equals, ed. Carina Fourie, Fabian Schuppert, and Ivo Wallimann-Helmer [New York: Oxford University Press, 2015], 174–85; rejected Oppenheim, “Egalitarianism,” 143; Pojman, “Egalitarianism,” 5– 6). With the focus of this monograph being on slavery in antiquity, however, we may be more tempted to rely upon an intuitive inequality presumption. This monograph rejects both presumptions and seeks always to justify its logic on a case-by-case basis. 31 Apart from Rousseau and his followers, this equality debate was predominately conducted within a recognisably Christian framework that distinguished between the divinely created world of Gen 1–2 and the world after Adam and Eve’s sin (Gen 3).

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serve that inequalitarian society, (ii) that ‘by nature’ meant only what was original (pre-Fall) and (iii) that any hope for a utopian egalitarian life was only for life after death. But after individualism’s rise, the human mindset instead assumed (i) the individual preceded their collective society, which should serve the people by reflecting what the people are ‘by nature,’ (ii) ‘by nature’ also means what should be: people should be equal in their society because they are equal ‘by nature,’ and (iii) society could and ought to be changed within their lifetime. Phelps Brown argues that the rise of individualism (and emerging alternative political structures) created the intellectual environment necessary for a different, more egalitarian society to be conceived, preferred and attempted (even sometimes by revolution).32 Although ‘human equality by nature’ was prominent in the racially charged antebellum abolition debates,33 the rise of individualism was arguably more significant, for it had altered the previous definition of ‘by nature.’34 This monograph also observes the anachronism of some who fail to appreciate the historical distance between contemporary post-individualist thought and that from more than a millennium earlier. Its focus, however, is limited to Pauline slave welfare in his historical context.

C. Pauline Slavery and Slave Welfare I. Pauline Authorship and Ethical Development This monograph engages with the Pauline epistles to Philemon, the Galatians, Corinthians, Colossians and Ephesians. While the apostle Paul’s authorship of Philemon, Galatians and 1 and 2 Corinthians has not been seriously questioned, many argue that Colossians and Ephesians (and the Pastorals) are pseudonymous works written by a Pauline school after Paul’s death because of their

32

Henry Phelps Brown, Egalitarianism and the Generation of Inequality (Oxford: Clarendon, 1988), 1–260, on individualism esp. 50–58, 246–50, on ‘by nature’ definition esp. 97–98; cf. Paul E. Sigmund, “Hierarchy, Equality, and Consent in Medieval Christian Thought,” in Equality, ed. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, Nomos 9 (New York: Atherton, 1967), 134–53. 33 E.g., the speech just prior to the start of the American Civil War by the Confederacy Vice President Alexander H. Stephens (“Cornerstone Address, March 21, 1861,” Rebellion Record 1 [1861]: Documents 45). 34 Perhaps this also accounts for why some modern scholarship is more concerned with societal implications, for example, slavery’s abolition, than with the moral transformation of individuals such as a slave-master.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

distinctive literary styles, theology and ethics on inter alia slavery.35 The monograph, however, does not rely upon or conclude in favour of any view of Pauline authorship; it deploys the terms Paul and Pauline in an inclusive sense to refer to the Pauline tradition. Instead, we evaluate the more preliminary question of whether Paul’s equality ethics differ between ‘his’ epistles. II. Literal not Metaphorical Slavery This monograph analyses literal slavery and not the scholarly debate over the source of Pauline slavery metaphors in his self-description or description of other Christians as ‘slaves of Christ.’36 While the monograph may contribute to the debate over whether Paul is adopting Jewish or Greco-Roman slavery concepts,37 and it analyses how Paul’s explicit use of metaphorical slavery functions in his literal slavery exhortations,38 the monograph does not otherwise engage on Pauline use of

35 And the difficulty of locating each Pastoral within the known lifetime of the Apostle Paul. For a recent analysis of these issues, see Douglas A. Campbell, Framing Paul: An Epistolary Biography (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2014). 36 Our focus is on “thinking about slavery,” not “using the concept ‘slavery’ to think with” (Thomas E. J. Wiedemann, Slavery, 3rd ed., NSCl 19 [Oxford: Classical Association, Clarendon, 1987], 11 [emphasis original]). 37 The history of this debate into the origins of the Pauline metaphor – whether it derives from the honorific Jewish concept of its patriarchs et al. who were designated ėĘĆ ėĜþ ČĖ ĄĔċ Ąĥ (“servant/slave of the Lord”) or, arguably surprisingly, as a potentially derogatory association with a Greco-Roman slave – is outlined in John Byron, Recent Research on Paul and Slavery, RRBS 3 (Sheffield: Sheffield Phoenix, 2008), 67–91; John K. Goodrich, “From Slaves of Sin to Slaves of God: Reconsidering the Origin of Paul’s Slavery Metaphor in Romans 6,” BBR 23 (2013): 520–30. 38 Recent Pauline studies on metaphorical slavery have not focused on this question. For example, Isobel A. J. Combes (The Metaphor of Slavery in the Writings of the Early Church: From the New Testament to the Beginning of the Fifth Century, JSNTSup 156 [Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1998], 47–48, cf. 49n1, 69–70, 81–82) sharply distinguishes between literal and metaphorical slavery, but her study into early Christian writings analyses neither Col 3:22–4:11 nor Eph 6:5–9. We engage with Murray. J. Harris’s exegetical study (Colossians and Philemon, EGGNT [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1991]), upon which his later study into Pauline metaphorical slavery (Slave of Christ: A New Testament Metaphor for Total Devotion to Christ, NSBT 8 [Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity; Nottingham: Apollos, 1999], cf. 55n21, 58n28) relies. Conversely, Jean-Loop Ducasse (“Paul, esclave, et la soumission: La question de la soumission dans la lettre de Paul à Tite,” SémBib 137 [2010], 29–40) claims that Paul’s self-description in Tit 1:1 materially impacts on the epistle’s exhortation for slave obedience (2:9–10) despite that exhortation’s lack of any explicit connection between literal and metaphorical slavery. While this monograph will not focus on that exhortation for other

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metaphorical slavery.39 Nor do we engage with those who assume that the NT’s use of slavery metaphors and illustrations per se perpetuates slavery’s normalisation to its readers.40 III. Antebellum Chattel Slavery The horrors of antebellum chattel slavery cast a long shadow upon this and upon every other investigation into slavery. However, this monograph is an analysis into the various historical instances of slavery in antiquity and not into antebellum chattel slavery. Thus, we do not engage with the historical question of what happened in the antebellum era nor with its abolition debates,41 except reasons that we will discuss shortly, our analysis into where Paul explicitly connects the metaphorical to the literal may also contribute where others argue for an implicit connection. 39 E.g., we do not engage with Norman R. Petersen’s (Rediscovering Paul: Philemon and the Sociology of Paul’s Narrative World [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985]) extensive reconstruction of a Pauline symbolic universe to interpret Philemon. I also remain sceptical of an investigation that is allegedly decisive for understanding Philemon, yet which Petersen (Rediscovering Paul, 95–98, 200–286) also acknowledges is not applicable for understanding 1 Corinthians and the disputed Pauline epistles. For other criticisms of Petersen’s reconstruction, see Richard A. Horsley, “Paul and Slavery: A Critical Alternative to Recent Readings,” Semeia 83–84 (1998): 153–200; Stanley K. Stowers, “Paul and Slavery: A Response,” Semeia 83–84 (1998): 300–302. 40 E.g., Sheila Briggs, “Can an Enslaved God Liberate?,” Semeia 47 (1989): 137–53; Elizabeth A. Castelli, “Romans,” in vol. 2 of Searching the Scriptures: A Feminist Commentary, ed. Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, Ann Brock, and Shelly Matthews, 2 vols. (London: SCM, 1994), 294; Jennifer A. Glancy, Early Christianity, 38, 97–129. 41 From the British/Caribbean perspective, see William Hague, William Wilberforce: The Life of the Great Anti-slave Trade Campaigner (London: HarperCollins, 2007); Michael Taylor, “British Proslavery Arguments and the Bible, 1823–1833,” SlavAbol 37 (2015): 139–58. From the antebellum US perspective, see Willard M. Swartley, Slavery, Sabbath, War, and Women: Case Issues in Biblical Interpretation, Conrad Grebel Lectures 1982 (Scottdale, PA: Herald, 1983); Wayne A. Meeks, “The ‘Haustafeln’ and American Slavery: A Hermeneutical Challenge,” in Theology and Ethics in Paul and his Interpreters: Essays in Honor of Victor Paul Furnish, ed. Eugene H. Lovering, Jr. and Jerry L. Sumney (Nashville: Abingdon, 1996), 232–53; Elizabeth Fox-Genovese and Eugene D. Genovese, The Mind of the Master Class: History and Faith in the Southern Slaveholders’ Worldview (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005); J. Albert Harrill, Slaves in the New Testament: Literary, Social, and Moral Dimensions (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2006), 165–92; Mark A. Noll, The Civil War as a Theological Crisis, Steven and Janice Brose Lectures in the Civil War Era (Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 2006). From an African American perspective, see Byron (Recent Research, 36–66) and the anthology in Allen D. Callahan, Richard A. Horsley and Abraham Smith, eds., Slavery in Text and Interpretation, Semeia 83–84 (1998). Nevertheless, Meeks (“Haustafeln & American Slavery,” 245, 248) observes that “it is not easy to state clearly why the proslavery

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Chapter 1: Introduction

where antebellum chattel slavery intrudes into scholarly debates on slavery in antiquity. Nor does the monograph seek to establish contemporary implications from its historical conclusions. Less well-known today is the existence of New World indentured servitude whereby approximately half a million (white) Europeans (mostly British) between 1640 and 1775 amortised the cost of their trans-Atlantic voyage to the New World through an indentured servitude contract.42 Galenson charts indentured servitude’s decline as the European economy improved enough to allow potential emigrants to pay for their voyage up front before its legal prohibition in 1885 (US) and 1917 (British Empire), some 20 and 84 years after both jurisdictions prohibited (black) chattel slavery.43 The concurrence of both in the same historical context enables a comparison between them without comparing across different historical contexts. Galenson observes, “The essential difference between servitude and slavery was that it was the labor of the servant, rather than the person, which was bought and sold.”44 For example, whereas children born to female chattels belonged to their slave-master, female indentured servitude contracts prohibited marriage, specified a labour extension if pregnancy occurred anyway to compensate for her labour unavailability and then the mother and child departed together.45

readers of the Bible were wrong.… The abolitionists did not persuade the slaveowners [that their reading of the Bible was wrong]; slavery ceased to have an ethical claim in American society because a war was won and lost.” Meeks does not, however, consider that some then did argue that the Bible endorsed slavery in its era(s) while condemning antebellum slavery in their era; see further Noll, Civil War, 3–4, 37–38, 45–50, 135–38, 171n30. Noll, however, further observes that popular support for this nuanced position was squeezed because it failed to address the issue of race and it required extensive knowledge of the Bible, ANE and Greco-Roman slavery ethe rather than the much simpler appeal to common sense Bible interpretation (albeit differing) of both pro- and anti-slavery sides. Like Meeks, Noll (Civil War, 50) also observes: “The supreme crisis over the Bible was that there existed no apparent biblical resolution to the crisis.… It was left to those consummate theologians, the Reverend Doctors Ulysses S. Grant and William Tecumseh Sherman [Union army generals!], to decide what in fact the Bible actually meant.” 42 Richard B. Allen, “Slaves, Convicts, Abolitionism and the Global Origins of the PostEmancipation Indentured Labor System,” SlavAbol 35 (2014): 330. For a summary of research, see Sharon Salinger, “Labor, Markets, and Opportunity: Indentured Servitude in Early America,” LabH 38 (1997): 311–38. 43 David W. Galenson, “The Rise and Fall of Indentured Servitude in the Americas: An Economic Analysis,” JEconH 44 (1984): 1–26. 44 David W. Galenson, “The Market Evaluation of Human Capital: The Case of Indentured Servitude,” JPE 89 (1981): 447. 45 Galenson, “Market Evaluation,” 452.

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Thus, antebellum slave breeding and any enforced slave family breakup probably affected only the era’s chattel slaves. This monograph distinguishes between casual slave breeding – for example, through transactional sexual intercourse and/or rape – and how slave families reproduce, even though many scholars do not, probably because typically slave-masters could separate informal slave families and sell off individual members.46 IV. Slavery Definitions It is easier to ask for a definition of slavery than to provide a universal definition applicable across all historical contexts. A universal definition is philosophically questionable, but even a pragmatic definition is challenging because the more definitive any proposed definition is, the easier it is to locate a nonconforming historical instance. David Davis summarises, “The more we learn about slavery, the more difficulty we have in defining it.”47 Nevertheless, this monograph echoes the typical division of slavery throughout history into its three basic forms: debt slavery, chattel slavery and serfdom. Although their boundaries may be blurred in some historical instances, the three forms are usually readily distinguishable. Debt slavery is temporary slavery until the slave’s labour pays off an outstanding debt; thus, it is the consequence of poverty. Despite the term indentured servitude in the antebellum era, we adopt the more generic term debt slavery, because it encompasses all historical instances and neither Greek, Latin nor Hebrew writers typically deployed specialist vocabulary that distinguished between slavery forms. Chattel slaves were typically those defeated in war and were usually transported away from where they were captured. Their slavery was permanent and inherited by any descendants; they also remained as tradeable as any other commodity. Serfdom was likewise permanent and inheritable but was also characterised by a primary attachment between serfs and the land: when the land was traded, the ownership of its serfs followed. The next chapter discusses the recent scholarly debate about whether slaves should be defined by either their legal context (as a person and property) or their sociological context (natal alienation [loss of cultural heritage], dishonoured status and subjected to the power of another). However, that debate’s 46

For its practice in antebellum chattel slavery, see Mark Thornton, Mark A. Yanochik and Bradley T. Ewing, “Selling Slave Families Down the River: Property Rights and the Public Auction,” IndRev 14 (2009): 71–79; Gregory D. Smithers, Slave Breeding: Sex, Violence, and Memory in African American History (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2012). 47 David B. Davis, Slavery and Human Progress (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 8–12, here 8; cf. Harrill, Manumission, 13–17; Miers,“Slavery Definition,” 1–16.

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concern is with defining chattel slavery, and neither the legal nor sociological definition encompasses debt slavery and serfdom. Therefore, this monograph adopts the following pragmatic definitions based upon the undisputed intrinsic association of slavery of whatever form with labour. Thus, the monograph defines slavery as involuntary labour in the sense that slaves cannot of their own volition cease their labour supply.48 We also prefer the more generic term slave-master to slave-owner because the latter term presumes that even debt slaves were always their master’s property. Slavery is also antithetical to freedom, but there is no easy universal definition of freedom either. Indeed, the monograph observes how freedom in antiquity was much more constrained than what twenty-first century, post-Enlightenment, Western individuals might otherwise presume. Equality analysis compares the slave of each historical instance to the free person of the same historical instance, and not at all to any modern concept of freedom. We compare equality ethics across historical instances and do not compare slaves of one historical instance to free persons of another historical instance;49 to do otherwise would risk introducing anachronisms. Therefore, we pragmatically define freedom as the opposite of our definition of slavery: the ability to cease one’s own labour services to another. V. Why Slave Welfare By design, these definitions of “slavery” and “freedom” also exclude any presumptions as to slave welfare, i.e., how slaves should be treated (ethics) or were treated (ethos) in each historical instance during their period of enslavement. This monograph does not intend the term welfare to convey any presumption of mild treatment; it deploys the term generically and includes within its scope what many might evaluate as abuse. Our purpose in this monograph, however, is neither to commend nor condemn (even though it is sometimes difficult to resist immediate condemnation) but to increase understanding. Sometimes we need to condemn a little less to understand a little more; or at least we need to postpone the former until after we have completed the latter. Our literature review (chapter two) observes how scholarship has prioritised questions concerning slavery’s abolition and focused on the Pauline exhortations for slave obedience. Thus, when scholars investigate possible Pauline ethical sources on slavery, they tend to do so through the lens of slave obedience and manumission and conclude only that those sources are similar. Perhaps, 48 In most cases, slaves did not choose that state voluntarily. We discuss the possibly of self-sale into slavery in chapter three as part of our analysis of Roman slave welfare. 49 We discuss scholarship’s use of comparative slave studies in the next chapter.

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however, that is unsurprising since the labour obligation is intrinsic to every historical instance of slavery and investigations into what is common typically yield indistinct results. Conversely, this monograph prioritises where those sources might differ: their slave welfare ethics. In a different context, Ascough emphasises the importance of also analysing for difference: What is inherently interesting in the comparative process is not so much the similarities among various groups, although these are important, but the differences. It is precisely in finding difference that one is invited into “negotiation, classification and comparison.” It is only in defining peculiarities that one is able to note what was distinctive about early Christian groups.50

However, our literature review does not identify any thoughtful investigation dedicated to slave welfare. At most, the subject has been relegated to the margins of studies focused elsewhere. We seek to remedy these shortcomings in this monograph; it is by design an investigation not into what is common across historical instances, but into what it demonstrates is dissimilar: the equality ethics of slave welfare. It gleans its direct evidence from Paul’s explicit exhortations for slave welfare – Col 4:1, Eph 6:9 and Philemon – and from the slavery elements of his unification formulae – Gal 3:28, 1 Cor 12:13 and Col 3:11. While we also analyse their associated exhortations for slave obedience (Col 3:22–25 and Eph 6:5–8), we do not focus on those in the Pastorals (1 Tim 6:1– 2 and Tit 2:9–10) that do not occur alongside a slave welfare text. While some scholars argue from Pauline slavery to Pauline gender ethics and/or vice versa, this monograph is on slavery. Any implications for Pauline gender ethics will require further study. I suspect some will write off every slave welfare measure other than manumission or emancipation because they presume that those are the only meaningful response to enslavement. I beg to differ. We should be at least open to the possibility otherwise and let the evidence speak for itself. Paul’s approach to slave manumission/emancipation – while an important and legitimate line of inquiry – is only one facet of slave welfare, and perhaps, I suggest, not even the most important slave welfare facet in Paul’s view. We gain a more informed understanding of Paul’s views on slavery overall by asking additional questions to investigate a breadth of slave welfare facets, rather than limiting questions 50

Richard S. Ascough, Paul’s Macedonian Associations: The Social Context of Philippians and 1 Thessalonians, WUNT 2/161 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 2; citing Jonathan Z. Smith, Drudgery Divine: On the Comparison of Early Christianies and the Religions of Late Antiquity, JLCR 14 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990), 42, cf. 47; cf. also Jonathan Z. Smith, To Take Place: Toward a Theory in Ritual, CSHJ (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1987), 13–14; Samuel Sandmel, “Parallelomania,” JBL 81 (1962): 3.

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to only those relating to manumission/emancipation and slave obedience. We must first ask sufficient questions to understand Paul on his own terms and as intelligible to his first century AD recipients. VI. Relationship to Poverty Debt slavery, as mentioned earlier, is a consequence of poverty. Thus, this monograph also compares its slave welfare conclusions to the social equality ethics of the same historical instance where pertinent. VII. Paul and Manumission (1 Cor 7:21–24) The monograph does not engage with the debate over the Pauline manumission text of 1 Cor 7:21–24 because it is primarily addressing slaves, not slave-masters on slave welfare. Nevertheless, I briefly summarise the consensus view. In 7:21, Paul urges slaves not to be concerned about their slavery, but if they are ever offered their freedom through manumission, they should öĆõõø÷ íúĦûëó (“use rather”) something Paul leaves implicit. The debate over whether that implied object is freedom (they should use their newly offered freedom rather than their current enslavement) or slavery (use their continuing enslavement rather than this freedom offer) dates back at least to Chrysostom in the fourth century AD when he preferred the latter.51 Harrill, however, seems to have established a consensus for the former on philological grounds and because Paul is contrasting enslavement in 7:21–24 to the chapter’s discussion of marriage and circumcision.52 This suggests that Paul considers enslavement undesirable, that his slave recipients should take advantage of any legitimate opportunity for manumission and that (in 7:23) his free recipients should not choose enslavement. In summary, this monograph is an investigation into the Pauline ethical subject of slave welfare. Nevertheless, we now discuss pertinent matters relating to Pauline ethics more broadly. Unless justified separately, we should treat Paul’s approach to slave welfare no differently from how we approach other Pauline ethical subjects. 51

John Chrysostom Hom. 1 Cor. 19 (on 1 Cor 7:1, 2) (NPNF 1/12:108). Harrill, Manumission, 118–27; cf. Byron, Recent Research, 92–115. Contra S. Scott Bartchy (Mallon ChrƝsai: First-century Slavery and the Interpretation of 1 Corinthians 7:21, SBLDS 11 [Missoula, MT: Society of Biblical Literature, 1973], 155–59) who argues that öĆõõø÷íúĦûëó refers to the even earlier ĠôõĤùòÏ as in “live according to God’s call,” and Paul as deliberately ambiguous (Brad R. Braxton, The Tyranny of Resolution: 1 Corinthians 7:17–24, SBLDS 181 [Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2000], 109–10, 125–27, 224–28, 232–34, 274). 52

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VIII. Contemporary Ethics This monograph is a historical description of Pauline ethics;53 we do not opine on any contemporary ethical implications. Nevertheless, prior to the monograph’s conclusion, I will suggest two examples where further research could relate our findings to contemporary ethical debates.

D. Pauline Ethics I. Ethics not Theology This is a monograph on ethics; therefore, it does not engage with scholarly debates on Pauline theology. For example, it relies upon Dunn’s claim that Galatians is primarily about their going on to a “second phase” of Christian experience rather than directly about getting in or staying in, although Gal 3:3 compares the means of this ‘going on’ with how they ‘got in.’ ‘Going on,’ for Dunn, also includes conformity to the epistle’s ethics.54 While the monograph discusses the ethical consequences of Paul’s assertion of divine impartiality between Jew and Gentile (e.g., Rom 2:11; Gal 2:6), we will not engage with Paul’s theological rationale for placing an OT assertion about Yahweh into a Christocentric and Gentile-inclusive framework.55 The monograph also endorses Barclay’s warning against the uncritical mirror-reading of every Pauline exhortation as evidence per se of a pre-existing problem among his recipients.56 Indeed, we will observe how the ethos reconstructions of some scholars appear over-reliant on uncritical mirror-reading. 53 For a sixfold classification of studies into NT ethics, see Richard B. Hays, “Mapping the Field: Approaches to New Testament Ethics,” in Identity, Ethics, and Ethos in the New Testament, ed. Jan G. van der Watt, BZNW 141 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2006), 3–19. 54 James D. G. Dunn, The Epistle to the Galatians, BNTC (London: Black, 1993), 16– 17. The contrast between ‘getting in’ and ‘staying in’ is from the thesis of E. P. Sanders, Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion (London: SCM, 1977). 55 For a theological analysis of Paul’s claim of divine impartiality between Jew and Gentile in Rom 2:11 and for its theme throughout Romans, see Jouette M. Bassler, Divine Impartiality: Paul and a Theological Axiom, SBLDS 59 (Chico, CA: Scholars, 1982), esp. 121–70. See also Bassler (Divine Impartiality, 72–76) for rabbinic assertions of divine impartiality between Gentiles and Israelites. Pertinent also for chapter four is Christiana van Houten’s (The Alien in Israelite Law, JSOTSup 107 [Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1991]) subsequent argument that the Torah urges the equal treatment of Israelite and sojourner in non-cultic matters. I recommend further theological research. 56 John M. G. Barclay, “Mirror-reading a Polemical Letter: Galatians as a Test Case,” JSNT 10 (1987): 73–93; Obeying the Truth: A Study of Paul’s Ethics in Galatians

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II. Equality and Paul’s Unification Formulae Neutel categorises past scholarship on Gal 3:28 into two schools (our term). One school emphasises its ethnic pair, interprets it primarily through its epistolary context and concludes in favour of equality only coram Deo rather than any egalitarianism. The other emphasises 3:28’s gender pair, concentrates on the alleged implications of its allusion to Gen 1:27 and concludes in favour of gender egalitarianism.57 Neither school, however, appears to define equality robustly nor focus on the formulae’s slavery pair.58 Meanwhile, our monograph’s literature review (chapter two) also discusses how scholars investigating Pauline slavery have relied upon their own interpretations of Gal 3:28, and our fifth chapter analyses all three unification formulae (Gal 3:28; 1 Cor 12:13; Col 3:11) for equality across its ethnic and slavery pairs. Although we will not analyse the gender pair, the monograph also suggests a rationale for why 3:28 includes it. III. Epistolary Analysis of Ethics The scholarly debate between Balch and Elliott on the occasion behind 1 Peter’s composition illustrates how the epistolary context of a paraenetical section can influence interpretation. Whereas Balch, whose research on the Colossian Haustafel we discuss in the next chapter later,59 argues that the ethics (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 37–41; cf. Jerry L. Sumney, Identifying Paul’s Opponents: The Question of Method in 2 Corinthians, JSNTSup 40 (Sheffield: JSOT, 1990), 75–120; Nijay K. Gupta, “Mirror-Reading Moral Issues in Paul’s Letters,” JSNT 34 (2012): 361–81. 57 Karin B. Neutel, A Cosmopolitian Ideal: Paul’s Declaration ‘Neither Jew not Greek, Neither Slave nor Free, Nor Male and Female’ in the Context of First-Century Thought, LNTS 513 (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2015), 6–10; cf. D. Francois Tolmie, “Tendencies in the Interpretation of Galatians 3:28 since 1990,” AcT 33 (2014): 105–29. 58 Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza (In Memory of Her: A Feminist Theological Reconstruction of Christian Origins [London: SCM, 1983], 205–41) is a notable exception of the latter. 59 In the twentieth century, scholarship’s definition of Luther’s term, Haustafel(n), has narrowed to track its greater specificity in testing for genuine parallels. Martin Dibelius (An die Kolosser, Epheser an Philemon, ed. D. Heinrich Greeven, 3rd ed., HNT 12 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1953], 48), adopts it to describe both NT and non-canonical early Christian texts that were particular to one’s household station and that, he claims, were therefore [very] approximate to each other in form: Col 3:22–4:1; Eph 5:22–6:9; 1 Pet 2:13–3:7; 1 Tim 2:8– 15, 6:1–3; Tit 2:1–10; Did., 4.9–11; Barn., 19.5–7; 1 Clem., 1.3 (ANF 1:5), 21.6–9 (ANF 1:11); Pol., Phil. 4.2–6.3 (ANF 1:34); Ign., Pol. 5.1–2 (ANF 1:95). By Marlis Gielen (Tradition und Theologie neutestamentlicher Haustafelethik: Ein Beitrag zur Frage einer christlichen Auseinandersetzung mit gesellschaftlichen Normen, BBB 75 [Frankfurt am Main: Hain, 1990], 3–4), that list had shrunk to only the Pauline and Petrine instances. By

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of 1 Peter’s Haustafel reflects the surrounding Greco-Roman culture,60 Elliott, independently researched but published concurrently, argues for 1 Peter as maintaining a distinctive Christian identity in contrast to Greco-Roman culture.61 Furthermore, Elliott claims to interpret the Petrine Haustafel not only in isolation prior to its incorporation into the epistle (his accusation against Balch), but also in its new epistolary context. To Elliott, the latter should arbitrate between possible interpretations of the former.62 While we need not resolve a Petrine issue, this monograph concurs with Elliott’s method. Regarding the Pauline corpus, Barclay’s 1988 thesis, Obeying the Truth, established a new scholarly consensus for understanding Gal 5:13–6:10 as fully integrated into the epistle’s theological concerns and compositional occasion of conflict.63 Indeed, the paraenetical unit urges the behaviours necessary to uphold its unification formula (3:28),64 rather than being a mere appendix at most minimally influenced by the epistle’s theology.65 More recently, Hansen extends Barclay to demonstrate how the ethics of 1 Corinthians and Colossians (apart from its Haustafel) are also integrated with their respective unification formulae (1 Cor 12:13; Col 3:11).66 While neither Gombis on Ephesians nor Hering on Colossians appears to have been as persuasive in arguing for the

Haustafel and/or Haustafeln, this Pauline monograph means the Pauline Colossian and/or Ephesian instances unless, e.g., vis-à-vis Balch, it is further qualified. 60 David L. Balch, Let Wives Be Submissive: The Domestic Code in 1 Peter, SBLMS 26 (Chico, CA: Scholars, 1981). 61 John H. Elliott, A Home for the Homeless: A Sociological Exegesis of 1 Peter, Its Situation and Strategy (Philadelphia: Fortress; SCM: London, 1981). 62 John H. Elliott, “1 Peter, Its Situation and Strategy: A Discussion with David Balch,” in Perspectives on First Peter, ed. Charles H. Talbert (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1986), 65–67, 72–73. Cf. David G. Horrell (“Between Conformity and Resistance: Beyond the Balch-Elliott Debate Towards a Postcolonial Reading of 1 Peter,” in Reading First Peter with New Eyes: Methodological Reassessments of the Letter of First Peter, ed. Betsy Bauman-Martin and Robert L. Webb, LNTS 364 [London: T&T Clark, 2007], 114): “Where Balch sees assimilation and conformity, Elliot sees distinctiveness and resistance.” 63 Barclay, Obeying the Truth, 216–20; cf. Todd Wilson (The Curse of the Law and the Crises in Galatia, WUNT 2/225 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007], 4): “The question now for students of Galatians is not whether 5:13–6:10 relates to the earlier parts of the letter, but how it does so.” 64 Barclay, Obeying the Truth, 167–69, 208. 65 For the earlier consensus, see Barclay, Obeying the Truth, 9–26. 66 Bruce Hansen, ‘All of You Are One’: The Social Vision of Gal 3:28, 1 Cor 12:13 and Col 3:11, LNTS 409 (London: T&T Clark, 2010); cf. the more cautious Barclay, Obeying the Truth, 220–35. Both Barclay and Hansen, however, focus upon the unification formulae’s ethnic pair and neglect its slavery (and gender) pairs.

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integration of each’s Haustafel into its respective epistle,67 our equality analysis is also informed by their epistolary context. IV. Imitation Ethics The epistolary context of Eph 6:9 includes 5:1: the only explicit imitatio Deo exhortation in the Pauline corpus. More common in Paul is, as he continues in 5:2, an exhortation to imitatio Christi and in particular to imitate his cruciform love.68 Indeed, Horrell argues from Phil 2:5–11; 1 Cor 9:14–15, 21; 2 Cor 8:9– 15 and Gal 6:2 – “the tip of a much bigger iceberg” – that imitatio Christi is a Pauline ethical metanorm.69 This monograph adopts Gorman’s definition of cruciform love as: The rejection of selfish exploitation of status in favor of self-giving action.… Jesus … crucified … [as] the paradigm … of the rights-renouncing, others-regarding, cruciform humility and love that are needed for existence in the Christian community.70

Indeed, Rom 5:6–9 suggests that Paul views the magnitude of this love to be qualitatively unique in history.71 Horrell also suggests that such ethical imitation, and especially with its concurrence with ūûĻüòÏ (“equality”) in 2 Cor 8:13–15 (which, together with Col 4:1, are the Pauline instances of ūûĻüòÏ),

67

Timothy G. Gombis, “A Radically New Humanity: The Function of the Haustafel in Ephesians,” JETS 48 (2005): 317–30; James P. Hering, The Colossian and Ephesian Haustafeln in Theological Context: An Analysis of their Origins, Relationship, and Message, AUS 7/260 (New York: Peter Lang, 2007). 68 And also – e.g., in 1 Cor 4:16; 11:1 – imitatio Pauli. 69 David G. Horrell, Solidarity and Difference: A Contemporary Reading of Paul’s Ethics (London: T&T Clark, 2005), 204–45, here 241. He prefers to speak of imitating Christ’s “other regard.” For imitatio Christi as primarily related to Christ’s mindset and attitudes without impinging upon Christ’s uniqueness, see Michael Jensen, “Imitating Paul, Imitating Christ: How does Imitation Work as a Moral Concept?,” Chm 124 (2010): 17–36. 70 Michael J. Gorman, “Paul and the Cruciform Way of God in Christ,” JMT 2 (2013): 69. Cruciformity also rebuts how Elizabeth A. Castelli (Imitating Paul: A Discussion of Power [Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1991], 89–117) interprets Paul’s appeals to imitatio Christi as a power claim; see further Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians: A Commentary on the Greek Text, NIGTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Carlisle: Paternoster, 2000), 371–73, 796–97; Kathy Ehrensperger, “‘Be Imitators of Me as I am of Christ’: A Hidden Discourse of Power and Domination in Paul?,” LTQ 38 (2003): 241–61; Horrell, Solidarity & Difference, 242–43. 71 For the verses’ exegesis, see Douglas J. Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, NICNT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 304–9. Pauline scholars, however, do not readily distinguish between Pauline exhortations to imitate this degree of cruciform love and the exhortations of others to love.

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“conveys a certain impulse towards the goal of equality.”72 While the monograph clarifies how Paul’s appeal to imitating cruciform love functions to support his Corinthian equality ethics, it recommends further analysis of this nonslavery-related subject. Most scholars assume that references to mimesis in the LXX, Pseudepigrapha, Philo and Josephus are of Greek origin because of the lack of mimetic terminology in the OT.73 However, Ehrensperger argues that Paul is particularly reliant on the OT’s concept.74 Indeed, this monograph supplements Bassler’s theological analysis of divine impartiailty in Judaism and Paul to argue that Paul’s imitation ethics replicate how the OT urges the imitation of divine impartiality between persons. In other words, we will argue that Paul’s urges his recipients to imitate the divine equality ethos between Jew and Gentile, rich and poor, and slave and free. Meanwhile, the debate over Paul’s mimesis source reflects the scholarly debate over the source of Paul’s ethics more broadly. V. Ethical Sources 1. Testing for Greco-Roman or Jewish Source Horrell reviews scholarly arguments for Pauline dependency upon Jewish ethics, Greco-Roman ethics or the teachings of Jesus and concludes that none alone can satisfactorily account for Paul’s ethics. Horrell also argues that Paul is more influenced by the cruciform practice of Jesus than by Jesus’s words.75 This monograph also demurs from relying upon any general Pauline ethical source theory.76 Instead we compare Paul’s equality ethics on slave welfare to those of Judaism and Greco-Roman antiquity. 72

Horrell, Solidarity & Difference, 241. E.g., W. Michaelis, “öóöěøöëó, öóöòüĤÏ, ûýööóöòüĤÏ,” TDNT 4:663–74; Hans D. Betz, Nachfolge und Nachahmung Jesu Christi im Neuen Testament, BHT (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1967), 84–101; Castelli, Imitating Paul, 59–87; Willis P. De Boer, The Imitation of Paul: An Exegetical Study (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2016), 1–16, 24–91. 74 Ehrensperger,“Imitators of Me,” 242–46; cf. Jason B. Hood (Imitating God in Christ: Recapturing a Biblical Pattern [Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2013]), although he appears to aim for breadth of coverage not depth of analysis. For earlier support, see Ernest J. Tinsley, The Imitation of God in Christ: An Essay in the Biblical Basis of Christian Spirituality (London: SCM, 1960), 27–64; Stephen Smalley, “The Imitation of Christ in the New Testament,” Them 3 (1965): 13–22. 75 Horrell, Solidarity & Difference, 15–27. 76 For the need for a case-by-case analysis, see Barclay, Obeying the Truth, 170–77, 222– 23. For a general source theory example, see James W. Thompson (Moral Formation according to Paul: The Context and Coherence of Pauline Ethics [Grand Rapids: Baker, 73

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Our literature review also observes how most scholars assume Pauline comparability with the Greco-Roman slavery ethos. However, many of them rely upon common terminology or general equivalence between sources: a reliance that other Pauline scholars, not focused on slavery, criticise. For example, Sandmel coins the term “parallelomania” to criticise scholarly “extravagance” in relying upon superficial comparisons to claim dependence between sources.77 Sumney also observes: When interpreters identify parallels merely on the basis of verbal correspondence, verbal similarity, or similarity in general situation, almost any hypothesis can be ‘supported.’ … [Instead] the same conceptual framework must be present in both.78

Thus, this monograph deploys what Hays calls a “thematic coherence” test:79 does Paul’s equality ethics on slave welfare fit with those of Jewish or GrecoRoman antiquity? Both terms and concepts matter, but – as Barr emphasises regarding the TWNT/TDNT – they should not be confused.80 Indeed, concepts (and especially equality concepts) can cohere without common terminology.81 2. Reconstructing Jewish Ethics: Primary Source The next chapter also observes how some scholars deduce Paul’s compatibility with the Greco-Roman slavery ethos in part because they reconstruct Jewish slavery as indistinguishable from Greco-Roman slavery. These scholars – like, for example, W. D. Davies and Tomson more generally – reconstruct Judaism primarily from the Jewish Halakhah.82 Indeed, some in the next chapter are 2011], 15, 19–41, 88–109, 160, 189, 208–9) who argues that both Paul and Hellenistic Judaism presuppose rather than explicitly cite the Torah’s ethics, and that both emphasise the sexual ethics and the care for the poor and disadvantaged of Lev 17–26. While Thompson acknowledges that Paul occasionally deploys Greco-Roman rhetorical forms, Thompson claims that their ethical content is distinctly Jewish. 77 Sandmel, “Parallelomania,” 1. 78 Sumney, Paul’s Opponents, 92. 79 Richard B. Hays, Echoes of Scripture in the Letters of Paul (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989), 29–32, here 30. Cf. Brian S. Rosner, Paul, Scripture and Ethics: A Study of 1 Corinthians 5–7, AGJU 22 (Leiden: Brill 1994), 18–19. 80 James Barr, The Semantics of Biblical Language (London: Oxford University Press, 1961), 211–19; cf. Moisés Silva, Biblical Words and their Meaning: An Introduction to Lexical Semantics, rev. ed. (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1994), 18–28. 81 Cf. the “rare concept similarity” test of Christopher A. Beetham, Echoes of Scripture in the Letter of Paul to the Colossians, BibInt 96 (Leiden: Brill, 2008), 29. 82 W. D. Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism: Some Rabbinic Elements in Pauline Theology, 4th ed. (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980); Peter J. Tomson, Paul and the Jewish Law: Halakha in the Letters of the Apostle to the Gentiles, CRINT 3/1 (Assen, Netherlands:

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even more thorough in viewing the Torah only through their Halakhah-derived lens. In contrast, Rosner’s explicit aim is to demonstrate Pauline ethical reliance upon the Jewish scriptures and in particular the Torah. Thus, he begins with the Torah and interprets both Paul and the Halakhah through his Torah lens. In addition, Rosner argues that any correspondence between Paul and specific Halakhah texts demonstrates Judaism’s widespread agreement on particular ethical topoi rather than direct Pauline reliance upon the Halakhah. Indeed, Rosner claims that his method identifies additional Pauline dependencies upon the Torah that had been overlooked by those scholars who began with the Halakhah.83 While some of Rosner’s arguments to exclude certain Greco-Roman parallels have been questioned, there also appears to be growing support for Rosner’s general thesis.84 Rosner’s approach to reconstructing Jewish ethics has three advantages for this monograph. First, scholars who specialise in rabbinic literature argue that it is an unreliable guide to Judaism in the Pauline era, even where it cites earlier rabbis, because it reflects only the more apolitical rabbinic strand of Judaism that become dominant only after the falls of Jerusalem and Bar-Kokhba.85 Second, this method permits detecting where some Halakhah may have been influenced by Hellenism by separately analysing Greco-Roman antiquity and the Torah,86 and thereafter evaluating how the Halakhah may reflect both.

Gorcum; Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1990). Davies, however, emphasises Paul’s greater reliance upon Jesus’s words. For Paul and the Noahide Commandments, see also Markus Bockmuehl, Jewish Law in Gentile Churches: Halakhah and the Beginning of Christian Public Ethics, (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000), 145–73. Halakhah (our standardised spelling) is the collective body of Jewish teaching from the closure of the Jewish canon (c. 400 BC) to c. AD 500. For a list, see Rosner, Paul Scripture & Ethics, 40–45. For an introduction to their contents, see Hermann L. Strack and Günter Stemberger, Introduction to the Talmud and Midrash, trans. Markus Bockmuehl, 2nd ed. (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1996). 83 Rosner, Paul Scripture & Ethics, 1–15, 33–40. 84 E.g., Richard B. Hays, “The Role of Scripture in Paul’s Ethics,” in Theology and Ethics in Paul and his Interpreters: Essays in Honor of Victor Paul Furnish, ed. Eugene H. Lovering, Jr. and Jerry L. Sumney (Nashville: Abingdon, 1996), 32n7; Horrell, Solidarity & Difference, 16; Richard A. Burridge, Imitating Jesus: An Inclusive Approach to New Testament Ethics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 93–95. 85 Davies, Paul & Rabbinic Judaism, 3–4; Strack and Stemberger, Talmud & Midrash, 45–48, 57–62; David Instone-Brewer, Traditions of the Rabbis from the Era of the New Testament, 7 vols. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004–2011), 1:28–40. 86 Although the situation is more complex because, as chapter four demonstrates, Torah exegesis itself has been influenced by alleged Greco-Roman and/or ANE parallels.

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Third, Rosner’s approach avoids Neusner’s earlier criticism of E. P. Sanders for relying upon rabbinic Halakhah to reconstruct Jewish theology.87 While Neusner endorses Sanders’s method for comparing conceptual systems rather than individual statements, Neusner argues that Sanders imposes his own concerns about Pauline theology and framework of thought onto rabbinic material without first understanding the rabbis’ own framework of thought.88 To Neusner, understanding the latter requires an a priori understanding of the pertinent texts in the Jewish Scriptures: Surely we cannot cite isolated pericopae of these documents with no attention whatsoever to the intention of the documents which provide said pericopae.… How do we know that ‘the Rabbis’ and Paul are talking about the same thing, so that we may compare what they have to say? … I do not understand why Sanders does not begin his work of description with an account of the Old Testament legacy available to all the groups under discussion as well as with an account of how, in his view, each group receives and reshapes that legacy. Everyone claimed, after all, to build upon the foundations of Mosaic revelation … indeed, merely to restate what Moses or the prophets had originally said. It seems to me natural to give the Old Testament a central place in the description of any system resting upon an antecedent corpus of such authority as the Mosaic revelation and the prophetic writings.89

While Neusner is more open to diachronic development and synchronic diversity than Rosner, both concur that any reconstruction of Jewish antiquity should begin with the Torah. This monograph demonstrates how this methodological change reveals a distinctive Jewish ethic on slave welfare.

87 Jacob Neusner, “Comparing Judaisms,” Review of Paul and Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion by E. P. Sanders, HR 18 (1978): 177–91; cf. “The Use of the Later Rabbinic Evidence for the Study of Paul,” in vol. 2 of Approaches to Ancient Judaism: Theory and Practice, ed. William S. Green, BJS 9 (Missoula, MT: Scholars, 1980), 43–63. 88 Neusner, “Comparing Judaisms,” 179. 89 Neusner, “Comparing Judaisms,” 183, 187, 184n8. He speaks of ‘the Rabbis’ in quotes because he questions whether there can be such a thing as a single viewpoint called rabbinic Judaism. Thus, Neusner’s voluminous output has been controversial within Jewish scholarship, e.g., Saul Lieberman, “A Tragedy or a Comedy?,” review of The Talmud of the Land of Israel: A Prelimary Translation and Explanation by Jacob Neusner, JAOS 104 (1984): 315–19. For a rebuttal, see Jacob Neusner, Rabbinic Literature and the New Testament: What We Cannot Show, We Do Not Know (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2004), 137–66, esp. 142n4, 163.

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E. Monograph Statement This chapter has identified the issue at the heart of this monograph: the lack of a robust definition of and reasoning about equality. It also introduces the concept of equal treatment and specifies an equality analysis heuristic approach to deduce the implicit equality parameters of ancient texts. The monograph focuses on slave welfare in Paul and in his thought worlds of Greco-Roman and Jewish antiquities. Finally, this chapter locates this monograph among other studies on Pauline ethics. We will argue that Paul echoes the widespread Jewish interpretation of the Torah’s slave welfare texts as exhorting for a numerical equality of treatment between slave-master and slave. This, Paul claims, imitates how God treats slave-masters and slaves equally. In other words, Paul’s equality ethics and the divine’s equality ethos cohere. We will also argue that the equality ethics of Paul’s unification formulae between their ethnic and slavery pairs concur. Thus, there appears to be no evidence of any intra-Pauline ethical development. The monograph outline describes the investigative stages.

F. Monograph Outline The second chapter is a literature review into Pauline slave welfare that highlights how scholarship has reasoned about equality and associated terminology. In other words, the chapter performs an equality analysis of past Pauline scholarship on slave welfare. It also discusses how the more recent revisionist reconstruction of cruel (not mild) Greco-Roman slavery transforms some scholars’ understanding of both Seneca and Paul. The chapter raises further questions, including friendship with slaves and slave-masters’ sexual use of slaves, that direct the depth of later chapters. The third chapter critically reviews the revisionist reconstruction as it analyses Greco-Roman slave welfare. To avoid introducing anachronisms, the chapter compares the slave in Roman antiquity to its freeborn sons and its free poor. While Aristotle emphasised only the sheer inequality between free and slave, Roman social stratification interacted with its Stoic-influenced belief in slave-free equality by nature. Thus, Rome includes slaves – as the lowest of the low – within a Roman ethos that was proportionately equal to social status. However, this led to worsening treatment towards Rome’s free poor rather than to material improvements in slave welfare. This analysis also provides the historical context for the chapter to conclude with an equality analysis of Seneca on slave welfare.

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The fourth chapter engages in extensive grammatical-historical exegesis of the Torah slave welfare texts to construct its equality ethics. Where it proposes new interpretations, it cites examples of later Jewish Halakhah that presuppose those interpretations. Scholars, the chapter argues, have overlooked how their details conform to this chapter’s novel conclusion. The chapter discovers a widespread Jewish ethic of numerically equal treatment between both rich and poor and slave and free that imitates the Jewish understanding of how God treats all persons equally. It also observes where Philo appears to concur. The fifth chapter returns to Paul to argue that he adopts this (or retains his previous) Jewish ethic on slave welfare, as evidenced in his exhortations for slave welfare in Col 4:1 and Eph 6:9. The chapter also explores Paul’s interplay between unity and equal treatment in his Corinthian epistles and in Galatians, and suggests how the demand for Gentile circumcision can account for the three – ethnic, gender and slavery – pairs of 3:28. It concludes that Paul’s equal treatment ethic also applies between rich and poor. While there is no explicit Pauline condemnation of slave-masters’ sexual use of their own slaves, there is every indication that third- and fourth-century Christian leaders were correct to claim Pauline authority for their explicit prohibition. Contrary to most investigations into the epistle to Philemon, the chapter argues that Paul’s purpose is to urge Onesimus’s inclusion within Philemon’s already-compliant slave welfare ethos rather than to define for him a new ethic. Thus, the chapter discovers no evidence of an intra-Pauline ethic development that might suggest a Pauline ethical trajectory towards abolition. Nevertheless, the chapter suggests further research into Paul’s attitude to conquest and enslavement of the defeated, and into how to relate our findings to some contemporary ethical issues. A conclusion follows that commends this monograph’s methodology and suggests avenues for future research, including on Pauline gender ethics.

Chapter 2

Pauline Scholarship on Slave Welfare A. Introduction The previous chapter claims that scholarship on Pauline slavery rarely defines and reasons consistently about equality, and focuses more on the questions of abolition, manumission and slave obedience than on slave welfare.1 Indeed, scholarship’s neglect of Pauline slave welfare is also illustrated by the lack of any serious scholarly study focused on it.2 Hence, this chapter extracts the slave welfare implications of studies often focused elsewhere to describe Pauline scholarship on slave welfare ethics. Those studies include historical criticism into the origins of the Haustafeln, Paul’s explicit exhortations for slave welfare at Col 4:1 and Eph 6:9, the epistle to Philemon and the slavery pair of Gal 3:28. By describing what these scholars presume and reason about equality, this chapter demonstrates how contradictory views of equality underpin most of the scholarly disagreements it itemises. The chapter also demonstrates how scholarly evaluations of Paul’s possible ethical precedents – Aristotle, Seneca, Torah and Philo – differ and are often reliant on limited analysis. All scholarship on ancient texts presupposes a historical context in which those texts were composed and then first read. Therefore, the chapter concludes by discussing how revisionist scholars (hereafter, revisionist school) have, since the 1980s, transformed reconstructions of Greco-Roman and Pauline slavery. Rather than the earlier reconstruction of Paul ameliorating slave conditions, they argue that he made matters worse. In particular, this chapter 1 On the latter claim, see also the non-Haustafeln research summary by Byron, Recent Research. 2 Hendrick Goede (“The Exhortations to Slave-owners in the New Testament: A Philological Study” [PhD thesis, North-West University, South Africa, 2010]) is the only known study focused upon slave welfare. While this unpublished PhD is initially promising, it is undermined by analysis that presumes the existence of a reciprocal social contract throughout antiquity between slave-masters and slaves so that every exhortation to slaves also implies a reciprocal welfare exhortation to their slave-masters. Goede also manifests little awareness of what this monograph calls the revisionist school.

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Chapter 2: Pauline Scholarship on Slave Welfare

focuses upon Glancy’s argument for Pauline complicity in how slave-masters sexually exploited their own slaves. It also discusses how Glancy and Hezser rely upon their interpretation of the Jewish Halakhah to claim that the Jewish slavery ethos was not distinctive. This chapter also defines the depth of analysis required by chapter three into Greco-Roman slave welfare and chapter four into Jewish slave welfare. Both chapters three and four address the shortcomings identified in this chapter and they prepare for our re-engagement with Paul in chapter five.

B. Haustafeln Historical Criticism I. From Dibelius to Galatians 3:28 Many have compiled a history of critical scholarship’s research into the origins of the Colossian Haustafel form,3 which the consensus views as earlier than the Ephesian Haustafel.4 However, they focus primarily on its gender ethics and secondarily on the exhortation for slave obedience; none focuses on its exhortation for slave welfare. If they had, perhaps they would have discovered that early critical scholarship often argues that the origins of the Haustafel form and its ethics on slave welfare differ. On the one hand, Dibelius and Weidinger argue that the form was composed as enthusiasm waned for an imminent parousia by lightly christianizing the Stoic duty schema (and alleged Hellenistic Jewish equivalents). They also argue that the addressee’s construction of a nominative and definite article is of Hellenistic origin.5 Yet Dibelius reckons the Haustafel’s slave welfare ethics originate with the Jewish idea that belief in God motivates both slaves’ willingness to obey and the slave-masters’ willingness to grant their slaves justice.

3

Most thoroughly in Hering, Haustafeln, 9–60. Hering, Haustafeln, 107–56. 5 Dibelius, Kolosser Epheser Philemon, 45–49; Karl Weidinger, Die Haustafeln: Ein Stück urchristlicher Paränese, UNT 14 (Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1928). Prior to Dibelius, Alfred Seeberg (Der Katechismus der Urchristenheit, TB 26 [Leipzig: Deichert, 1966], 37–41; cf. with minor differences Philip Carrington, The Primitive Christian Catechism: A Study In The Epistles [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940], 49–51, 92–93; Edward G. Selwyn, The First Epistle of St. Peter [London: Macmillan, 1946], 17–22) was the first to posit an earlier literary form, the way, behind the NT’s ethics including those of the Colossian and Ephesian Haustafeln. For criticism of Seeberg et al., see James E. Crouch, The Origin and Intention of the Colossian Haustafel (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1972), 15–18; cf. Hering, Haustafeln, 14–17. 4

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Dibelius also claims that Philo’s sabbatarian ethics vis-à-vis slaves exaggerate those in the Torah.6 On the other hand, Lohmeyer accuses Dibelius of parallelomania and argues that the Haustafel’s origin was from a Jewish tradition that describes how women, children and slaves were to obey the Torah and participate in the Israelite cult. Indeed, he also argues that the addressee construction’s extensive LXX usage suggests its Jewishness.7 Nevertheless, Lohmeyer also argues that the Col 4:1 pair îŤôëóøÏ and ūûĻüòÏ (hereafter, the pair) must originate from Aristotle’s usage because they do not appear together in the LXX.8 However, Crouch rejects Lohmeyer’s Jewish tradition for lack of any extant evidence.9 We also mention Rengstorf because he pioneered the theory that the Haustafel’s gender exhortations were intended both to correct the widespread gender egalitarian interpretation of Gal 3:28 and to reassert the father’s responsibilities to uphold the distinctive Christian øŮôøÏ (“household”) and to love his wife, children and slaves.10 While Schroeder and Crouch rightly challenge both Rengstorf’s father-centric interpretation and his claim that the family upbringings of both Jesus and John the Baptist were distinctively Christian rather than Jewish,11 others develop from what Rengstorf inaugurated.12 For example, Laub emphasises both the integrative power of slaves’ unprecedented inclusion within the Christian øŮôøÏ and the rhetorical power of how both Haustafeln’s unprecedented direct address to the øŮôøÏ’s slaves presumes their moral agency.13 Meanwhile, Gal 3:28 would come to dominate scholarship on the Haustafeln. 6

Dibelius, Kolosser Epheser Philemon, 47–48. Ernst Lohmeyer, Die Briefe an die Philipper, an die Kolosser und an Philemon, 13th ed., KEK 9 (Göttingen: Dandenhoef & Ruprecht, 1964), 154–58. 8 Lohmeyer, Philipper Kolosser Philemon, 159–60n5. 9 Crouch, Origin & Intention, 23–24. 10 Karl H. Rengstorf, “Die neutestamentlichen Mahnungen an die Frau, sich dem Manne unterzuordnen,” in Verbum Dei: Manet in Aeternum: Eine Festschrift für Prof. D. Otto Schmitz zu seinem siebzigsten Geburstag am 16 Juni 1953 (Witten: Luther, 1953), 131–45. 11 David Schroeder , “Die Haustafeln des Neuen Testaments” (PhD thesis, Universität Hamburg,1959), 88–89; Crouch, Origin & Intention, 25–26. 12 E.g., Dieter Lührmann “Wo man nicht mehr Sklave oder Freier ist: Überlegungen zur Struktur frühchristlicher Gemeinden,” WD 13 (1975): 53–83; “Neutestamentliche Haustafeln und Antike Ökonomie,” NTS 27 (1980): 83–97; Gielen, Tradition u. Theologie; cf. Carolyn Osiek and David L. Balch, Families in the New Testament World: Households and House Churches (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1997). 13 Franz Laub, Die Begegnung des frühen Christentums mit der antiken Sklaverei, SBS 107 (Stuttgart: Katholisches Bibelwerk, 1982), 86, 89–92; “Sozialgeschichtlicher Hintergrund und ekklesiologische Relevanz der neutestamentlich-frühchristlichen Haus7

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II. Schroeder: Ethical Mutuality and Slavery Golden Age Schroeder argues that understanding how Paul adapts his ethical source(s) is more important than evaluating his possible literary dependencies.14 He claims that early Christians interpreted Gal 3:28 as dissolving the distinctions both between husband and wife, leading to sexual abstinence, and between slavemaster and slave, leading to slavery’s abolition: a slavery golden age. Thus, Schroeder argues that both Haustafeln mirror 1 Cor 7 to reinstate marital, sexual and slavery mutualities.15 Whereas Lohmeyer emphasises how the subordinate must obey their superior and Rengstorf the father’s love for each subordinate, Schroeder argues that only the uniquely Christian ŷøüĄûûïûùï (“submit”) and cruciform ċñëĆüï (“love”) can account for the Haustafeln’s indissoluble mutuality between its pairs; for example, the exhortation for wifely obedience should not be interpreted in isolation but only mutually vis-à-vis the husband’s love exhortation.16 While Schroeder is not explicit, I presume he also views the exhortation for slave welfare as moderating its exhortation for slave obedience. He also compares the Haustafeln‘s addressee construction to how the LXX translates the direct address of the OT’s apodictic laws, and he emphasises as paradigmatic how Eph 6:2–4 cites OT law to argue that the Haustafeln’s ethics moderate Jewish patriarchy through a distinctive christomorphic mutuality.17 Although Schroeder acknowledges that the Col 4:1 pair are Greco-Roman because of their absence in the LXX, he still asserts that the preceding verse’s assertion of impartiality indicates that they are of Jewish divine origin.18

und Gemeinde-Tafelparänese: Ein Beitrag zur Soziologie des Frühchristentums,” MTZ 37 (1986): 249–71. See David L. Balch (“Household Codes,” in Greco-Roman Literature and the New Testament: Selected Forms and Genres, ed. David E. Aune, SBLSBS 21 [Atlanta: Scholars, 1988], 33, 46–47) for extant examples of addressing slaves, but in them slaves are not directly addressed. 14 Schroeder, “Haustafeln,” 27–28. His unpublished thesis later became the explicit foundation for John H. Yoder, The Politics of Jesus: Vicit Agnus Noster, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994), 162–92. 15 Schroeder, “Haustafeln,” 89–91. 16 Schroeder, “Haustafeln,” 83–88, 116–26, 140. 17 Schroeder, “Haustafeln,” 92–108. Schroeder’s OT source is supported by Gielen (Tradition u. Theologie, 44) who is in turn criticised by David L. Balch, review of Tradition und Theologie neutestamentlicher Haustafelethik: Ein Beitrag zur Frage einer christlichen Auseinandersetzung mit gesellschaftlichen Normen by Marlis Gielen, JBL 114 (1995): 172– 74. 18 Schroeder, “Haustafeln,” 149.

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III. Crouch and Hellenistic Judaism Crouch attacks Schroeder’s assumption that ŷøüĄûûïûùï and ċñëĆüï are distinctively Christian, and how the latter apparently moderates the former without the former also moderating the latter.19 Crouch’s summary dismissal of the Col 4:1 pair’s divine origin also reflects his broader claim of Schroeder’s confusion between the Haustafel’s paired content and what Crouch calls its “theological presuppositions.”20 However, his assumption that the Haustafel’s theology can have no significance for its ethics is questionable. We will discuss later in this chapter other scholars who engage with how divine impartiality relates to the Haustafeln’s exhortations for slave welfare. Indeed, Crouch’s dismissal of the Haustafel’s theology is as arbitrary as Lohmeyer’s emphasis on its obedience exhortation, Rengstorf on its love exhortation and Schroeder on its mutuality. Our analysis of Haustafeln’s exhortations will not a priori privilege part of the text over the rest. Instead, Crouch argues that Jewish Christians adapted their pre-conversion Jewish ethics to rebut widespread gender egalitarianism and pneumatic excess by adapting how oriental Hellenistic Judaism had gradually incorporated reciprocity into the Stoic ôëùĦôø÷ (“duty”) schemas.21 While Crouch is sceptical of Schroeder’s mirror-reading claim of a slavery golden age from 1 Cor 7:20– 24, Crouch suggests that some slaves had equated the baptismal Gal 3:28 with sacral manumission.22 To Crouch, Philo’s Decalogue is the closest parallel to the Haustafel, but Crouch rejects Schroeder’s assertion that Philo’s source was the Decalogue: The fifth commandment of the Decalogue offers Philo his best opportunity to press the Stoic ôëùĦôø÷ schema into the service of the Jewish Torah.… Unfortunately, his [Schroeder’s] observation of the superficial similarity between this text and Ephesians 6:1ff., has led him to false conclusions both about Philo’s list of duties and the NT Haustafeln. The content of the codes in De Decalogo 165ff. is clearly Stoic. Furthermore, their relationship to the Decalogue is artificial. Philo simply found the schema a convenient exegetical help for discussing the relationship between parents and children. The form of these codes varies, however, from the traditional Stoic listing and demonstrates in its reciprocity and concern for the

19

Crouch Origin & Intention, 31, 111–13. Crouch, Origin & Intention, 73n81, cf. 119n115. 21 Crouch, Origin & Intention, 22, 47–114, 130–45. For Crouch’s oriental Hellenistic Judaism, see Franz Bömer, Die sogenannte sakrale Freilassung in Griechenland und die (douloi) ieroi, AAWLM.G (Wiesbaden: Steiner, 1960), 133–40; contra the Delphic emphasis of Gustav A. Deissmann, Light from the Ancient East: The New Testament Illustrated by Recently Discovered Texts of the Graeco-Roman World, trans. Lionel R. M. Strachan, 2nd ed. (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1911), 322–28. 22 Crouch, Origin & Intention, 121–29. 20

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duties of the inferior positions a closer similarity to the Colossian Haustafel than to the Stoic ôëùĦôø÷ schema.23

Crouch argues that Seneca’s claim that slaves could only perform “services” not “duties” means that the Stoic duty schemas could not describe slave duties. Instead, Crouch postulates the probable existence of a Hellenistic Jewish law on slave obedience.24 In addition, he dismisses Seneca’s singular call for humane treatment as atypically Stoic in its concern for literal, not metaphoric, enslavement. Instead, Crouch argues that the Jewish Christians sourced the Haustafel’s slave welfare obligation from the similarly humane (relative to Seneca) but more numerous slave welfare statements in Hellenistic Jewish sources.25 Crouch’s focus on the Haustafel’s reciprocity feature, however, leads to superficial analyses of its slavery exhortations, Seneca and Crouch’s alleged Hellenistic Jewish sources. Indeed, his quick dismissal of Seneca appears to be special pleading, and ‘humane’ possesses a very broad semantic range. We aim at a greater specificity that distinguishes between potential ethical sources. Moreover, Balch rejects Crouch’s oriental Jewish source theory because of insufficient evidence.26 IV. Balch and Household Management Notwithstanding the Balch and Elliott debate on 1 Peter, Balch’s source theory on the ïúťøūôøöŤëÏ (“about household management”) topos, which typically associated ‘just’ household management with ‘just’ political governance, remains the consensus.27 To Balch, ancient Greece was the first culture to deploy 23

Crouch, Origin & Intention, 79 (emphasis original); citing Philo, Decal. 165–67. Crouch, Origin & Intention, 116–17; citing Seneca, Ben. 3.17.4–28.6. 25 Crouch, Origin & Intention, 117–19; citing Seneca, Ep. 47. 26 David L. Balch, Wives Submissive, 8. 27 Balch, Wives Submissive, 21–62; summarised in Balch, “Household Codes,” 27–29. As consensus, see, e.g., James D. G. Dunn, The Epistles to the Colossians and to Philemon: A Commentary on the Greek Text, NIGTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Carlisle: Paternoster, 1996), 243; “The Household Rules in the New Testament,” in The Family in Theological Perspective, ed. Stephen C. Barton (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 49; Meeks, “Haustafeln & American Slavery,” 242; Margaret Y. MacDonald, Colossians and Ephesians, SP 17 (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical, 2000), 153, 160; cf. the more cautionary John M. G. Barclay, Colossians and Philemon, NTG (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1997), 69–73. For how feminist, family and post-colonial readings of the Colossian Haustafel build upon Balch, see Margaret Y. MacDonald, “Beyond Identification of the Topos of Household Management: Reading the Household Codes in Light of Recent Methodologies and Theoretical Perspectives in the Study of the New Testament,” NTS 57 (2011): 65–90. However, Daniel 24

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35

the “balanced pattern of submissiveness,”28 and Aristotle’s Politics Book 1 is the (Petrine and Pauline) Haustafeln’s most significant parallel because Aristotle also emphasised submission between the same three pairs of reciprocal relationships.29 Balch also claims that the Haustafeln’s defences of wifely submissiveness were occasioned by external slanders, rather than dimming enthusiasm for the parousia or (apart from in Corinth) egalitarian interpretations of Gal 3:28.30 Whereas Dibelius reckons that Philo exaggerates the Torah’s ethics on slave welfare, Balch attacks Philo for reinterpreting the Decalogue through the lens of Greek political ethics: “Instead of maintaining Moses’ protective attitude towards slaves, Hellenistic Judaism assimilated Aristotle’s repressive ideas about them.”31 Indeed, Balch treats Philo’s comment on slaves’ indispensability as an endorsement of Aristotelian natural slavery, and interprets Philo’s multiple comments to the contrary as referring only to the Jewish Therapeutae and Essene slave-free sects. Indeed, to Balch, this Jewish natural slavery debate merely echoes an earlier Greek debate.32 However, not every Philonic denial of natural slavery appears to relate to the sects; for example, his Special Laws, which does not once mention either sect, claims that in the Torah: [Slaves] rank lower in fortune but in nature can claim equality [lit. üĦÏëŻüĦÏ (“the same”)] with their masters, and in the law of God the standard of justice is adjusted to nature and not to fortune.33

Philo’s claim of the Torah’s same treatment between slave and slave-master, regardless presumably of the former’s obligation to labour for the latter, K. Darko (No Longer Living as the Gentiles: Differentiation and Shared Ethical Values in Ephesians 4.17–6.9, LNTS 375 [London: T&T Clark, 2008], 75–81) questions Balch’s extension of 1 Peter’s apologetic purpose to the Pauline Haustafeln, because the ïúťøūôøöŤëÏ topos did always link the fates of household and state together and neither the Colossian nor Ephesian epistles appear to have an apologetic purpose. 28 Balch, Wives Submissive, 1. 29 Balch, Wives Submissive, 34. Balch also traces this topos from Plato and Aristotle, through the later Middle Platonists and Peripatetics, and into Stoicism, Epicureanism, Hellenistic Judaism and Neopythagoreanism. 30 Balch, Wives Submissive, 54, 106–9, 120. 31 Balch, Wives Submissive, 53–55, here 55. Balch (Wives Submissive, 58n12) also cites Shalom M. Paul (Studies in the Book of the Covenant in the Light of Cuneiform and Biblical Law, VTSup 18 [Leiden: Brill, 1970], 40): “All [the] laws [in Exod 21] pertaining to slaves are concerned with furthering his protection and preserving his human dignity.” 32 Balch, Wives Submissive, 34, 55; “Household Codes,” 31; citing on indispensability Philo, Spec. 2.123; citing on the sects Philo, Spec. 2.69, 3.137; Contempl. 70; Prob. 79. 33 Philo, Spec. 3.137 (emended from Colson).

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appears to presuppose some kind of (numerical?) equality between them. Furthermore, Balch appears unaware that Stoicism practised literal slavery while denying Aristotelian natural slavery. Balch also assumes that the Pauline Haustafeln manifest similar assimilation to what Balch claims of Philo,34 but in a later work Balch acknowledges his inability to locate a parallel to both Eph 6:9 and the ūûĻüòÏ terminology of Col 4:1.35 It is as yet unclear whether Philo is following Aristotle as Balch claims, reading Stoicism into the Torah as Crouch claims, exaggerating the Torah’s concern for slave welfare as Dibelius claims or accurately reflecting it as Schroeder claims. While there may be a relationship between the equality ethics of Col 4:1 and Philo, no known Pauline scholar has yet analysed the Torah’s ethics on slave welfare to justify any conclusion.36 Our goal in this monograph is to untangle this confused picture by reconstructing the equality ethics of Aristotle, Seneca, Philo and the Torah on slave welfare. V. Hering: Epistolary Integration and Metaphorical Slavery Hering observes how these scholars focus on the Haustafeln’s pre-history at the expense of each’s epistolary context.37 While I endorse his desire to address the shortcoming, I question his findings. Hering highlights how Colossians emphasises Christ’s universal dominion,38 and that its multiple ôýúŤøÏ references throughout signify Christ’s rule, Christ as the eschatological judge and Christ as the only standard for ethics.39 Hering also equates this epistolary feature with how the Haustafel explicitly distinguishes between the slave’s ôëüą ûĄúôë ôýúŤøóÏ (“earthly master,” 3:22) and Christ Ġ÷ øŻúë÷Œ (“in heaven,” 4:1) to conclude that the slavery 34

Balch is explicit in Osiek and Balch, Families, 219–20. David L. Balch (“Neopythagorean Moralists and the New Testament Household Codes,” ANRW II 26.1 [1992]: 406–7 here 407): “Although the Colossian author was not philosophically sophisticated enough to define his term ‘fairness-equality,’ it is surprising that he would have used it at all.” This monograph demonstrates otherwise. 36 Although Crouch (Origin & Intention, 118) and Balch (Wives Submissive, 54–55, 59n13) cite this text (Philo, Spec. 3.137) as a parallel, neither discuss it in detail; and the analysis of Schroeder (“Haustafeln,” 83) is limited. Hering (Haustafeln, 233–45, esp. 240– 42) is more extensive on Philo but Hering does not relate Philo to the Torah. 37 Hering, Haustafeln; cf. Lars Hartman, “Some Unorthodox Thoughts on the ‘Household-Code Form’,” in The Social World of Formative Christianity and Judaism, ed. Jacob Neusner, E. Frerichs, and R. Horsely (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1988), 219–32. 38 Hering, Haustafeln, 61–65, 103; cf. Eduard Lohse, Colossians and Philemon: A Commentary on the Epistles to the Colossians and to Philemon, trans. William R. Poehlmann and Robert J. Karris, Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1971), 3. 39 Hering, Haustafeln, 67, 75–76, 84–85. 35

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37

exhortations of 3:23, 3:24 and 4:1 “intimate the universal nature of [metaphorical] servanthood to Christ, and strengthen the general rule of life in 3:17, to do all in the name of the Lord Jesus.”40 To Hering, the direct address to both slave and slave-master also reinforces their common primary identity with and accountability to Christ.41 However, I detect two potential problems with Hering’s analysis. First, Hering, in endorsing Gnilka – “Since Christ is only absolute authority, no ‘positive Ordnung [kann] das Endgültige sein’” – assumes that allegiance to Christ is incompatible with any realised ethic and negates the possible influence of other ethical sources.42 Second, Hering’s argument that both the epistle’s parenesis of 2:6–3:17 and the Haustafel’s slavery exhortations manifest the same contemporary and eschatological tension overlooks their differences.43 While he argues that Colossians’ ethos compliance with the fully specified intra-Colossian ethics of 2:6–3:17 remains incomplete until the parousia,44 he claims that slave and slave-master’s common salvation apparently “promotes a subtle level of [intra-household] egalitarianism” that remains incompletely specified until the parousia.45 In other words, Hering equates incomplete intraChristian ethos compliance to incomplete intra-household ethics. Nor does he justify his presumption that common salvation requires egalitarian ethics. Nevertheless, Hering raises two important questions that so far remain unanswered: how should each Haustafel be understood in its epistolary context and how do each Haustafel’s metaphorical slavery reference(s) function to support its literal slavery exhortations? This monograph will address both. VI. Evaluation Our focus on slave welfare addresses one identified limitation of scholarship. Whatever each Haustafel’s pre-history, our analysis includes its epistolary context. While each scholar’s selection criteria for focusing on certain Haustafel features at the expense of others appear arbitrary, our analysis considers every word of both the slave obedience and slave welfare exhortations in both Pauline Haustafeln. Another example of current scholarly limitations is in how they differ on Philo’s relationship to both the Torah and Stoicism. Indeed, they are over-eager 40

Hering, Haustafeln, 77–78, 91n75, here 78. Hering, Haustafeln, 80–84. 42 Hering, Haustafeln, 76n26; citing Joachim Gnilka, Der Kolosserbrief, HThKNT 10/1 (Freiburg: Herder, 1980), 217. 43 Hering, Haustafeln, 65–76, 83–85. 44 Hering, Haustafeln, 70–71. 45 Hering, Haustafeln, 67. 41

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to opine on Paul’s (and Philo’s) ethical source and on the merits of Seneca without any analysis of both the pertinent Torah’s primary texts and Seneca’s own historical context and compositional occasion. Both analyses are also required because this chapter also discusses a revisionist re-interpretation of Seneca as inhumane and the fourth chapter demonstrates much scholarly contention in exegeting the Torah on slave welfare. Our analysis targets these shortcomings. In essence, chapter three reconstructs Seneca’s historical context, which also requires analysing developments from Aristotle to first century AD Rome, to analyse Seneca’s slave welfare ethics. Likewise, chapter four exegetes and analyses the Torah’s pertinent slave welfare texts. Only thereafter does the monograph analyse Philo and the Haustafeln to deduce their best fit ethical source. Mindful also of Balch’s failure to locate a parallel to Col 4:1, we proceed to review other scholarship on the verse’s pair. From this point forward, scholarship’s reasoning about equality comes to the fore.

C. Colossians 4:1 ʄûĻüòÏ typically means ‘equality,’46 but most scholars ponder how Paul’s usage in the exhortation of 4:1 for slave welfare can be compatible with the preceding exhortation for slave obedience. Hence, most assume that ūûĻüòÏ and îŤôëóøÏ (‘the pair’) must exhort slave-masters for a lesser ‘equitable’ or ‘fair’ treatment of their slaves. We analyse which kind(s) of equality scholars reject or advocate, evaluate the consistency of their equality reasoning, and investigate whether this meaning for ūûĻüòÏ is linguistically feasible. Afterwards, we discuss the minority who either retain an ‘equality’ meaning for ūûĻüòÏ or suggest that it undermines the practice of slavery. I. ʄûĻüòÏ as “Equity” or “Fairness” 1. A Superficial Consensus While the consensus interprets the pair to require slave-masters to treat their slaves with ‘equity’ or ‘fairness,’ and many appear to agree with Ralph Martin that the pair implies “an amelioration of the slaves’ lot,”47 there remains much disagreement as to its ameliorative degree. For example, Martin claims that the pair implies “as human and humane … [treatment] as possible” that includes 46

Cf. KJV’s “just and equal” translation of Col 4:1. The revisionist Glancy (Early Christianity), whom we discuss later, is a notable exception. 47

C. Colossians 4:1

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wages and excludes any “unduly harsh measures of repression or victimization of those in a helpless position.”48 Gnilka claims that the pair implies the ample provision of necessities,49 but Pokorný, Melick and Foster limit it to necessities, “basic needs” and “some basic human rights,” respectively.50 These ‘fairness’ scholars also disagree on whether this fair treatment differs from the prevailing slavery ethos in Colossae. For example, Lohse claims that the pair was in common enough usage so that everyone then knew what they implied (yet he does not further enlighten his reader), which should be further transformed (to an undefined degree) by Christian love and accountability.51 N. T. Wright reckons that this fair treatment “would sound extraordinary to most slaveowners” in antiquity,52 but O’Brien reckons that it differs from Seneca only in its theological motivation.53 Meanwhile, Margaret MacDonald suggests that it would include slave-masters eventually manumitting their faithful slaves.54 Either way, all these comments appear rather arbitrary. Others differ on a possible Jewish origin for this fair treatment ethic. For example, Dunn argues for a Jewish tradition “which in general treated slaves more favorably than most other traditions.”55 But Leppä demurs and argues that slave welfare was not only a Jewish concern.56 Furthermore, while these ‘fairness’ scholars also concur that the final clause of 3:25, øŻôġûüó÷úøûþøõòöĀŤë (“there is no impartiality”), implies the slave-master’s divine accountability,57 they differ on whether this clause

48 Ralph P. Martin, Colossians and Philemon, NCB (London: Oliphants, 1974), 124; cf. on wages Norbert Hugedé, Commentaire de l’Épître aux Colossiens, ComB (Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1968), 199. 49 Gnilka, Kolosser, 225. 50 Fetr Pokorný, Colossians: A Commentary, trans. Siegfried S. Schatzmann (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1991), 184; Richard R. Melick, Jr., Philippians, Colossians, Philemon, NAC 32 (Nashville: Broadman, 1991), 319; Paul Foster, Colossians, BNTC (London: T&T Clark, 2016), 395. 51 Lohse, Colossians Philemon, 162–63; cf. Wolfgang Schrage, Die konkreten Einzelgebote in der paulinischen Paränese: Ein Beitrag zur neutestamentlichen Ethik (Gütersloh, Germany: Gütersloher, 1961), 266. 52 N. T. Wright, The Epistles of Paul to the Colossians and to Philemon: An Introduction and Commentary, TNTC (Leicester: InterVarsity; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1986), 151. 53 Peter T. O’Brien, Colossians, Philemon, WBC 44 (Waco, TX: Word, 1982), 232–33. 54 MacDonald, Colossians Ephesians, 159, 164. 55 Dunn, Colossians Philemon, 259. 56 Outi Leppä, The Making of Colossians: A Study on the Formation and Purpose of a Deutero-Pauline Letter, SUSJ 86 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003), 189. 57 E.g., Lohmeyer, Philipper Kolosser Philemon, 159–60; Gustav Stählin, “੅ıȠȢ, ੁıંIJȘȢ, ੁıંIJȚȝȠȢ,” TDNT 3:355.

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informs the Haustafel’s exhortation for slave welfare. Hume is the most explicit in his denial: “It is only God who treats slaves and masters as equals.”58 Conversely, Lincoln argues that slave-masters “are to emulate the” divine īżŘĜġĂ (lit. “level place,” but typically translated as “equity, fairness or uprightness”) judgement of Isa 11:3–4.59 Alternatively, Barth-Blanke argue that slave-masters should emulate how Christ treats his metaphorical slaves, which, they claim, transforms the otherwise equitable slave welfare ethic into an equality of treatment.60 In summary, this apparent ‘fairness’ consensus obscures much disagreement and arbitrariness about its definition, its possible source in Jewish ethics and the possible ethical significance of divine impartiality. Since all these scholars rely upon Stählin,61 we review his argument. 58

Charles R. Hume (Reading Through Colossians and Ephesians [London: SCM, 1998], 67 [emphasis additional]) whose comments are also informed by Eph 6:9. G. W. Garrod (The Epistle to the Colossians: Analysis and Examination Notes [London: Macmillan, 1898], 151) also emphasises how the Haustafel repeatedly asserts human equality from God’s perspective, but that does not influence Garrod’s interpretation of its exhortation for slave welfare. 59 Andrew T. Lincoln, “The Letter to the Colossians,” in vol. 11 of New Interpreter’s Bible, ed. Leander E. Keck, 12 vols. (Nashville: Abingdon, 2000), 658 (emphasis additional). 60 Markus Barth and Helmut Blanke, Colossians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, trans. Astrid B. Beck, AB 34B (New York: Doubleday, 1994), 450–51. 61 Gustav Stählin, “ŬûøÏ, ūûĻüòÏ, ūûĻüóöøÏ,” TWNT 3:343–56; trans. as TDNT 3:343– 55. Scholars agreeing with ‘fairness’ and/or ‘equity’ interpretation are legion. I distinguish those pre-Stählin from those post-Stählin, and those who refer to him from those who do not. Pre-Stählin (“ūûĻüòÏ,” MM 307; W. M. L. de Wette, Kurze Erklärung des Briefes an die Colosser, an Philemon, an die Ephesier und Philipper [Leipzig: Weidmann, 1843], 62; Charles J. Ellicott, Commentary on St. Paul’s Epistles to the Philippians, Colossians and to Philemon with a Revised Translation, 2nd ed. [London: Parker & Bourn, 1861], 194–95; Joseph A. Beet, A Commentary on St. Paul’s Epistles to the Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians and to Philemon [London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1890], 226–27; Thomas K. Abbott, The Epistles to the Ephesians and to the Colossians, ICC [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1897], 296; Joseph B. Lightfoot, Saint Paul’s Epistles to the Colossians and to Philemon, 9th ed. [London: Macmillan, 1890], 228; Garrod, Colossians, 151; Paul Ewald, Die Briefe des Paulus an die Epheser, Kolosser und Philemon, KNT 10 [Leipzig: Deichert, 1905], 434– 45; Lohmeyer, Philipper Kolosser Philemon, 159n5). Post-Stählin and who cite him directly or indirectly (Erich Beyreuther, “Like, Equal,” NIDNTT 2:496–508; “îŤôëóøÏ,” BDAG 246– 47; “ŬûøÏ,” EWNT 493–95; Hugedé, Colossiens, 199; Lohse, Colossians Philemon, 162n74; Gnilka, Kolosser, 224–25; O’Brien, Colossians Philemon, 232–33; Gielen, Tradition u. Theologie, 166n288, 160n290; Harris, Colossians Philemon, 188; Robert Wall, Colossians and Philemon, IVPNTC [Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1993], 163; Michael Wolter, Der Brief an die Kolosser. Der Brief an Philemon, ÖTKNT 12; GTBS 12 519 [Gütersloh, Germany: Gütersloher, 1993], 206–7; Barth and Blanke Colossians, 450; Dunn, Colossians Philemon, 259–60; Hans Hübner, An Philemon, An die Kolosser, An die Epheser, HNT 12

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2. Stählin on ‫ݯ‬ıިIJȘȢ as “Equity or Fairness, Not Equality”: An Inadequate Solution Stählin’s TWNT/TDNT article argues that the Col 4:1 pair denotes “Billigkeit … aequitas, equity” not “aequalitas, equality.”62 To demonstrate his solution’s inadequacy, I begin by citing his definition: ʄûĻüòÏ does not mean here an equal social position [it does not mean equality in any sense] which masters are to accord to their servants, cf. Melanchthon: “… vult servari aequalitatem geometrica proportione.” ʄûĻüòÏ is what is equitable;… “what cannot be brought under positive rules, but is in accordance with the judgement of a fair mind” [Abbott].… In any case, it will be left to the one Lord and Judge to say whether earthly masters have accorded and maintained îŤôëóøÏôëťūûĻüòüë, and this Lord and Judge is unconditionally îŤôëóøÏ ôëťŬûøÏ.63

Even on its own merits, Stählin’s definition generates multiple questions. According to the equality theorists’ definition, Melanchthon’s proportionate equality is a kind of equality, although, perhaps Melanchthon’s proportionate equality is more a reflection upon the preceding exhortation for slave [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1997], 114; MacDonald, Colossians Ephesians, 159; Leppä, Making Colossians, 189; R. McL.Wilson, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Colossians and Philemon, ICC [London: T&T Clark, 2005], 287; Douglas J. Moo, The Letters to the Colossians and to Philemon, PilNTC [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008], 316– 17). Post-Stählin but without citation (“isotƝs,” LSJ 840; E. F. Scott, The Epistles of Paul to the Colossians, to Philemon and to the Ephesians, MNTC [London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1948], 82; C. F. D. Moule, The Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Colossians and to Philemon: An Introduction and Commentary, CGTC [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957], 132; Herman Ridderbos, De Brief van Paulus aan de Kolossenzen, CNT(K) [Kampen: Uitgeversmaatschappij & Kok, 1960], 231–32; William Hendriksen, “Exposition of Colossians and Philemon,” in Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, Colossians, and Philemon, New Testament Commentary [Grand Rapids: Baker, 2007], 176; Martin, Colossians Philemon, 124; Gordon H. Clark, Colossians: Another Commentary on an Inexhaustible Message [Jefferson, MD: Trinity Foundation, 1979], 125; F. F. Bruce, The Epistles to the Colossians, to Philemon, and to the Ephesians, NICNT [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984], 171; Wright, Colossians Philemon, 150–51; Arthur G. Patzia, Ephesians, Colossians, Philemon, NIBC [Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1990], 94; Melick, Philippians Colossians Philemon, 319; Pokorný, Colossians, 184; Hume, Colossians Ephesians, 67; John G. Nordling, Philemon, ConcC [Saint Louis, MO: Concordia, 2004], 98; Marianne M. Thompson, Colossians and Philemon [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2005], 96). 62 German and Latin terms (Stählin, “ŬûøÏ [TWNT],” 3:355); English (Stählin, “ŬûøÏ [TDNT],” 3:354). 63 Stählin, “ŬûøÏ (TDNT),” 3:355 (interpolation from n. 69); citing Philip Melanchthon, “Enarratio Epistolae Pauli ad Colossenses,” in Opera Quae Supersunt Omnia, ed. Carolus G. Bretschneider, CR 15 (Halle: Scrwetscher and Son, 1848), 1279; Abbott, Ephesians Colossians, 296.

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obedience that maintains slavery’s hierarchy than on the usage of ūûĻüòÏ in 4:1. But even so, the shared property to which treatment should be proportionate is left undefined. Indeed, given the theorists’ assertion that all ethical systems imply some kind of equal treatment, ūûĻüòÏ could refer to another kind of equality rather than to a slave’s “equal social position.” We will turn to those who reckon so later. Meanwhile, Stählin also cites Abbott’s unrealised ethic, as if ūûĻüòÏ here were a synonym of ċ÷Ĥôþ (“what is due, fitting,” cf. 3:18). But even so, it remains unclear why Paul would introduce the potentially confusing term ūûĻüòÏ when he had already used ċ÷Ĥôþ only several verses earlier. Stählin also appears to hint at an analogy between the slave-masters’ treatment of their slaves and divine judgement without specifying how they relate. Furthermore, Stählin renders this exhortation unique in the Pauline corpus for entrusting its moral agents to make their own ethical assessment, and for which conscientious slave-masters could not be sure of avoiding divine condemnation. Indeed, we should not presume that ethicists in antiquity discussed slavery’s ethics differently from other ethical topics. Although Stählin dominates scholarship on 4:1, his conclusion appears inadequate. Indeed, his method is also flawed. 3. Stählin on ʄûĻüòÏ as “Equity or Fairness, Not Equality”: A Flawed Method Stählin argues for how “equality” as “exactness” became, through Xenophon, as “equity.” However, Stählin dates no source and confuses conceptual equality with the etymology of ŬûøÏ and cognates.64 Furthermore, he structures his article according to a list of equality topics that mirror his alleged development from “exactness” to “equity”: beginning with exact quantitative equality and exact equality of content or meaning, through human equality in Greek thought and Christianity, and concluding with the “equity” of Col 4:1. But a modern scholar’s topical ordering does not demonstrate an underlying development in antiquity. Stählin discusses how the “concept of legal equality” became “a principle of judicial righteousness,” which initially “implies simply that the judge will dispense the same law without respect of persons.”65 In other words, Stählin describes a numerically equal justice concept. However, he then claims to describe later developments to the “term” ŬûøÏ:

64 65

This confusion is typical for the early volumes of TWNT/TDNT. Stählin, “ŬûøÏ (TDNT),” 3:347.

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The term ŬûøÏ thus undergoes a development which brings it much closer to the concept of îŤôëóøÏ. This means that gradually the definition (legal ūûĻüòÏ is the granting of the same rights to all) is filled out or corrected by the insight that true righteousness consists in giving to each, not what is equal, but what is proper to him.66

Thus, Stählin now contrasts the concepts of equal treatment with “proper” treatment. Moreover, he justifies his alleged development by citing Xenophon’s “paradoxical statement” where the victorious soldiers discuss how to distribute the plunder: ÙëŤüøóġñþñïøŻîĜ÷ċ÷óûńüïúø÷÷øöŤāþĠ÷ċ÷ùúńøóÏïŮ÷ëóĬüøŶŬûøýüĻ÷üïôëôļ÷ ôëťüļ÷ċñëùļ÷ċÿóøŶûùëó 67

While Xenophon’s soldiers reject the concept of a numerically equal distribution, Xenophon’s narrative continues to reveal their preference for a distribution proportionately equal to individual merit.68 While Stählin reckons this text is a highly significant development, I suggest neither Plato (whose life was contemporaneous to Xenophon’s) nor Aristotle would agree because they both present numerical and proportionate distributions as valid kinds of equality and acknowledge the difficulty in assessing which is most appropriate given particular circumstances. They also favour the latter in their opposition to Athenian democracy. Indeed, Xenophon attributes the soldiers’ preference for proportionate equality to his admired Cyrus the Great, a Persian in the sixth century BC. Another flaw in Stählin’s article is his relegation of proportionate equality to a mere paragraph that he subsequently ignores.69 Furthermore, despite referring to the “term” ŬûøÏ, Stählin has been describing his view of conceptual equality. But even if this conceptual development were correct, he demonstrates no corresponding semantic development in the word ŬûøÏ or its cognates because throughout that Xenophon narrative, every instance of ŬûøÏ and cognates unambiguously denotes a numerically equal distribution.

66

Stählin, “੅ıȠȢ (TDNT),” 3:347 (emphasis additional), cf. 3:354n61. “And yet I believe that nothing is more unequal/unjust among men than for the bad and the good to be worthy of the equal [share]” (Xenophon, Cyr. 2.2.18, my translation). 68 Xenophon, Cyr. 2.2.18–22, 2.3.4–16. 69 Stählin, “ŬûøÏ (TDNT),” 3:346. For the originators of proportionate equality to be the Pythagoreans, see Harvey,“Two Kinds Equality,” 144–46. However, while their mathematical discoveries may have enabled the pertinent proportions to be calculated, I suspect an informal proportionate to merit concept long predated them; e.g., have not ancient rulers always rewarded themselves, particularly valiant soldiers or reliable officials greater than others? Indeed, Cyrus the Great mostly predated Pythagoras and I detect no evidence in Plato, Aristotle or Xenophon for proportionate equality being more novel than numerical equality. 67

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Stählin continues by citing Greek sources that label both the “righteous judge, who is impartial to all” and the “just or righteous” man as ŬûøÏ ôëť îŤôëóøÏ (or with their cognates).70 But again Stählin demonstrates no development towards an “equity” that is “not what is equal, but what is proper.” The righteous judge judging impartially – who treats plaintiffs and defendants before him as numerical equals, favouring neither because of any distinguishing characteristic between them, and evaluates the case only on its merits – results in a judgement that is both numerically equal and proper, rather than only proper and not equal. Regarding Menas, Stählin’s example of the “just or righteous” man, the epitaph honours him for serving the whole city – its citizens, inhabitants and foreigners – Ŭûø÷ôëťîŤôëóø÷ at his own expense.71 Thus, it appears that Menas demonstrated human numerical equality; indeed, Austin translates ŬûøÏ there as “impartial.”72 Thus, in neither case is there any evidence of any conceptual development and/or semantic development in ŬûøÏ and its cognates. Only in a late (eighth century AD) papyrus does Stählin cite an example of üļîŤôëóø÷ôëťüĥ÷ūûĻüòüë, whose context reveals that it refers, not to his equity definition, but to an example of proportionate equality.73 However, this late example demonstrates only how its semantic range could include proportional equality if further explained by its context just as in, for example, ūûĻüòÏ ñïþöïüúóôĤ (“geometric [or proportionate] equality”). Stählin’s reliance upon ੅ûøÏ and îŤôëóøÏ as synonymous in Aristotle is also flawed.74 Since Aristotle argues that what is equal is the just and what is just is the equal, 75 one term might stand for the other by metonymic substitution. But metonymy of two closely related terms does not alter either term’s distinctive semantic range.76 Nor does a regular pairing together of two closely related 70

Stählin, “ŬûøÏ (TDNT),” 3:354 (emphasis additional). For the text, see Willhelmus Dittenberger, ed. Orientis Graeci Inscriptiones Selectae: Supplementum Sylloges Inscriptionum Gracecarum, 2 vols. (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1903–1905), 1:339.51. 72 Michel M. Austin, ed. and trans., The Hellenistic World from Alexander to the Roman Conquest: A Selection of Ancient Sources in Translation, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 252. 73 Stählin, “ŬûøÏ (TDNT),” 3:355n66; for the text, see Frederic G. Kenyon et al., eds., Greek Papyri in the British Museum, 7 vols. (London: British Museum, 1893–1974), 1345.2. 74 Stählin, “ŬûøÏ (TDNT),” 3:354; cf. Lightfoot, Colossians Philemon, 228. In the same paragraph, Stählin also observes a debate in antiquity over the pair’s relationship to each other (I cite his two examples shortly), but those ancients who argued over which was the predecessor of the other were not treating them as synonymous. 75 Aristotle, Pol. 3.7.1 (1282b14–24). 76 Aristotle never claims that what is the just (or proper) is sometimes the unequal. 71

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terms somehow prioritise the semantic range of one over the other. Rather, pairing two closely related terms together asserts both: where the intersection of their respective semantic ranges overlap. Stählin cites no precedent for either interpretation of ŬûøÏ and îŤôëóøÏ. In essence, Stählin’s method is flawed on multiple levels. He dismisses proportionate equality and does not demonstrate his conceptual development from “equality” as “exactness” to “equality” as equity, “not what is equal but what is proper.” Nor does Stählin demonstrate a precedent for the term ŬûøÏ and cognates as denoting something other than an equality that is typically numerical or perhaps on occasion proportional when further specified by its context. His article dates from 1938, so we will now examine whether BDAG’s lexicon (last revised in 2000) offers a better justification. 4. BDAG on ʄûĻüòÏ as “Ǽquity” BDAG cites seven lexical examples where ūûĻüòÏ also occurs in “an extension of” its meaning to denote the “state of being fair, fairness,” without further definition.77 However, translators of all seven, who are probably unconcerned with the word’s usage in Col 4:1, retain its ‘equality’ sense. Four examples presume ūûĻüòÏ’s close relationship with justice, but in each it retains its sense of ‘equality’ rather than a more limited ‘fairness.’ Hence, in Menander’s pithy sentence, ūûĻüòüëüŤöë[ôëť]õïø÷ěôüïóöòîě÷ë (“honour…, [and] not claim advantage”),78 ūûĻüòüë is translated by Dindorf and Gottwein as aequalitatem and Gleichheit respectively.79 Diogenes Laertius lists üIJîĜîóôëóøûŴ÷įūûĻüòÏôëťïŻñ÷þöøûŴ÷ò (“to justice, equality and fairmindedness”) among Zeno’s virtues,80 but Philo claims that ŬûĻüòÏ … öĤüïú îóôëóøûŴ÷òÏ (“the mother of justice is equality”).81 Diodorus Siculus’s ūûĻüòÏ reference occurs as he describes Zeus introducing legal justice and democracy,82 which was premised on numerical, not proportional, human equality. 77

“ūûĻüòÏ,” BDAG 481. Menander, Mon. 259 (interpolation Dindorf, my translation). 79 Wilhelm Dindorf, trans., Aristophanis Comoediae et deperditarum fragmenta, ex nova recensione Guilelmi Dindorf. Accedunt Menandri et Philemonis fragmenta auctiora et emendatiora. Graece et Latine cum indicibus.Mon., SGB 2 (Paris: Didot, 1884), Menandri:95; E. Gottwein, trans., “Menander: Monosticha – Sententiae, Buchstabe I,” 2004–2019, http://www.gottwein.de/Grie/menand/monost_i.php; contra “fair dealing” trans. by John M. Edmonds in Menander, vol. 3B of The Fragments of Attic Comedy after Meineke, Bergk, and Kock, 4 parts in 3 vols. (Leiden: Brill, 1961), 922–23. 80 Diogenes Laertius, Vit. Phil. 7.126 Zeno (Hicks). 81 Philo, Spec. 4.231 (Colson). 82 Diodorus Siculus, Hist. 5.71.2. 78

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Polybius’s example – ŬûĻüòüóôëťƫóõë÷ùúþŤë (“equality and humanity [or philanthropy]”) – refers to how the Achaean league placed newcomers Ŭûë (“on exactly the same footing”) rather than treat its original members with õï ø÷ěôüòöë (“special privileges”);83 in other words, the league treated newcomers and original members numerically equally rather than proportional to their length of membership. BDAG’s final two examples occur in Valens’s astrology to equate astronomical distances.84 Thus, none of the examples justify BDAG’s extension of meaning to “fairness” in Col 4:1. Nor do they provide an example of ŬûĻüòÏ denoting a proportionate equality. Furthermore, BDAG (surprisingly for a lexicon) lists Plato, Aristotle and Seneca as conceptual parallels of ‘fair’ treatment. While we will investigate conceptual parallels further, it is striking that there is no linguistic precedent for interpreting ŬûĻüòÏ in 4:1 as ‘equity’ or ‘fairness.’ Perhaps it means ‘equality’ after all, but only a few argue for it. II. ʄûĻüòÏ as “Equality” Reformers Melanchthon and Calvin suggest that ūûĻüòÏ in Col 4:1 denotes a proportionate equality between slave-master and slave,85 but neither defines the shared property of both to which treatment should be proportionate. Alternatively, humanist Erasmus and Catholic exegete Lapide suggest it implies an intra-slave equality that prohibits slave-masters from favouritism,86 but Abbott complains that this would permit the harsh treatment of every slave.87 However, neither reformation view has gained more recent support.88 Schlatter argues for ūûĻüòÏ as equal treatment between slave-master and slave, without abolishing their respective roles,89 because of their same nature, 83

Polybius, Hist. 2.38.8 (Paton). Vettius Valens, Anth. 2.3 (59.25), 9.1 (332.34) ; trans. in Mark T. Riley, “Vettius Valens. The Anthology,” 2010, 26, 152, http://www.csus.edu/indiv/r/rileymt/Vettius%20 Valens%20entire.pdf. 85 Melanchthon, “Colossenses,” 1279; John Calvin, Commentaries, trans. John King et al., Calvin Translation Society ed., 45 vols. (1847–1855; repr. CCEL), 42:197, cf. 40:259, https://www.ccel.org/ccel/calvin/commentaries.i.html. 86 Desiderius Erasmus, Collected Works of Erasmus, ed. Robert D. Sider, Richard J. Schoeck, and Beatrice Corrigan, 89 vols. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974– 2018), 43:425; Cornelius a Lapide, Comentaria in scripturam sacram, 26 vols. (Paris: Apum Ludovicum Vives, 1891), 19:109–10. 87 Abbott, Ephesians Colossians, 296. 88 Although Foster (Colossians, 395) and Gregory K. Beale (Colossians and Philemon [Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2019], 328, cf. 332) combine their indirect advocacy of Stählin with a prohibition against favouritism. 89 Contra the misunderstanding of Wolter, Kolosser Philemon, 206–7. 84

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receipt of the divine gift and future goal in Christianity.90 But the comprehensiveness of Schlatter’s equal treatment remains vague.91 Vague also is Hering’s suggestion that the term “may have…, in its original context, intimated some sort of equality.”92 Spicq claims that ūûĻüòÏ denotes “a certain plane of equality” that reflects the slave-master’s “subjective appreciation … that recognizes an equal in every neighbor,” but Spicq only discusses rewarding slaves with food and clothing.93 Only Meyer engages against ‘equity’ or ‘fairness’ advocates, accusing them of assuming that “ūûĻüòÏ, ĽöëõĻüòÏ (‘evenness’) and õïóĻüòÏ (‘levelness’) are identical conceptions.”94 He insists: ʄûĻüòÏ is always … equality.… It distributes uniformly to equal and unequal a certain equality.… It is not at all, however, the equalization of the outward relation, which would be a de facto abolition of slavery, but rather the equality, which, amidst a continued subsistence of all the outward diversity, is brought about in the Christian ôøó÷þ÷Ťë [“community”] by kindly treatment.… It is just by the Christian status of both parties that he [Paul] desires to see their inequality in other respects ethically counterbalanced.95

It is striking that Meyer appears to be unique in accurately describing conceptual equality. While he does not cite any ethical precedent, his language may echo Philo’s claim in his Decalogue that the Torah urges “gentleness and kindness” from slave-masters, îóŊ÷ĠÿóûüøŶüëóüļČ÷óûø÷ (“by which inequality is equalized”).96 Nevertheless, I detect only a few scholars prior to Stählin who endorse Meyer,97 and a couple more who also include non-Christian 90

Adolf von Schlatter, Die Briefe an die Galater, Epheser, Kolosser und Philemon: Ausgelegt für Bibelleser, SENT 7 (Stuttgart: Calwer, 1949), 304. 91 Ridderbos (Kolossenzen, 232) interprets Schlatter as limiting the equality exhortation’s scope to only the slave’s equal right to pursue his vocation, which Ridderbos rejects as inappropriate given the context of îŤôëóøÏ and ëúěíøöëó (“treat, afford”). 92 Hering, Haustafeln, 102–3n110. 93 Ceslas Spicq, “ŬûøÏ, ūûĻüòÏ, ūûĻüóöøÏ,” TLNT 2:231. 94 Heinrich A. W. Meyer, Critical and Exegetical Handbook to the Epistles to the Philippians and Colossians, trans. John C. Moore and William P. Dickson (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1875), 462n1. 95 Meyer, Philippians Colossians, 462n1, 462 (emphasis original). 96 Philo, Decal. 167 (Colson). 97 Gottfried Thomasius, Praktische Auslegung des Briefes Pauli an die Kolosser (Erlangen: Andreas Deichert, 1869), 171; Karl Brune, “The Epistle of Paul to the Colossians,” in A Commentary on the Holy Scriptures: Critical, Doctrinal, and Homiletical, with Special Reference to Ministers and Students, ed. John P. Lange and Philip Schaff, trans. M. B. Riddle, The New Testament 7 (New York: Scribner’s Sons, 1870), 78; Hugues Oltramare, Commentaire sur les épitres de S. Paul aux Colossiens aux Éphésiens et a Philémon (Paris: Fischbacher, 1891), 439; D. Erich Haupt, “Der Briefe an die Kolosser,” in

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slaves.98 Abbott, however, criticises Meyer’s view for rendering Col 4:1’s syntax too obscure a means of expressing Meyer’s interpretation.99 But surely the question should be whether this interpretation was too obscure for those in the first century AD and whether, given our earlier analysis, the verse’s syntax is an even more obscure means of expressing slaves’ ‘equitable’ or ‘fair’ treatment. This monograph is designed to arbitrate. Post-Stählin, however, modern scholarship appears to have forgotten Meyer until Clark, misinterpreting Meyer as restricting his equal treatment to only spiritual matters, accepts Meyer’s view as linguistically possible but criticises it for advocating only that stated in Col 3:11.100 In addition, Barth-Blanke claim that their aforementioned ‘fairness’ view, after its transformation by Christ, largely concurs with both Meyer and the Torah’s slave welfare ethics,101 but neither they nor anyone else has yet analysed the Torah’s exhortations for slave welfare to confirm or rebut. More recently, Vasser argues that the BDAG’s lexical evidence advocates ūûĻüòÏ as ‘equality’ not ‘equity.’ He also claims that the exhortation mirrors how Seneca urges friendship with slaves and free alike and contrasts with Plato’s rejection of slave fraternisation.102 Again, our equality analysis of Paul’s potential sources will confirm or rebut. None of these advocates of ūûĻüòÏ in Col 4:1 as ‘equality’ claim that it undermines the practice of slavery in antiquity. We now turn to those who do.

Die Briefe an die Kolosser, Phillipper und an Philemon, KEK (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1897), 172. 98 John Eadie, A Commentary on the Greek Text of the Epistle of Paul to the Colossians (New York: Carter 1856), 269; Daniel Schenkel, Die Briefe an die Epheser, Philipper, Kolosser (Bielefeld, Germany: Velhagen und Klasing, 1862), 211; R. C. H. Lenski, The Interpretation of St. Paul’s Epistles to the Colossians, to the Thessalonians, to Timothy, to Titus and to Philemon (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg, 1937), 186. 99 Abbott Ephesians Colossians, 296; cf. O’Brien, Colossians Philemon, 232. 100 Clark, Colossians, 125; cf. Ellicott (Philippians Colossians Philemon, 195) who criticises Meyer for limiting his equal treatment to spiritual matters when ūûĻüòÏ is paired with the non-spiritual îŤôëóøÏ. 101 Barth and Blanke, Colossians, 450–51; Markus Barth and Helmut Blanke, The Letter to Philemon: A New Translation with Notes and Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 152, cf. 161–63, 231–32. 102 Murray Vasser, “Grant Slaves Equality: Re-examining the Translation of Colossians 4:1,” TynBul 68 (2017): 62–66; citing Seneca, Ep. 47, cf. 3.2–3, 48.2; Plato, Leg. 6.777D– E.

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III. ʄûĻüòÏ as “Revolutionary Change” Standhartinger refers to Aristides’s declaration that Rome upholds “a great and fair equality (ūûĻüòÏ)” and emphasises Philo’s claim that the Essenes oppose slavery because it violates the law of ūûĻüòÏ.103 Thus, she claims that ūûĻüòÏ in Col 4:1 is “an interpretative key … [that] counters the apparent prevailing subordination-ethos.”104 Sumney reasons: If masters would truly accord justice and equality to slaves, then slaves would no longer be treated as slaves.… [ʄûĻüòÏ] subverts the system that the previous verses seem to support.… [It] direct[s] us to read it ‘against the grain,’ viewing its calls for conformity as a [necessary] public concession.”105

Notwithstanding their arbitrary privileging of one word to undermine the plain meaning of the preceding exhortation for slave obedience, they both presume that their view of equality is the only possible meaning of ūûĻüòÏ in Col 4:1. However, ūûĻüòÏ is probably equivocal in Philo, for we have already discussed other instances of Philo’s equality reasoning and use of ŬûøÏ cognates to describe the slavery practices of mainstream Judaism. Indeed, unlike Standhartinger and Sumney, Philo appears to perceive of more than one kind of equality. Furthermore, Aristides’s ūûĻüòÏ rhetoric does not appear to advocate the end of Roman social inequality. Thus, ūûĻüòÏ is not even an alleged interpretative keyword in the evidence they present, let alone applicable to Col 4:1.106 While this may be a more obvious example of flawed equality reasoning, this chapter observes that they are not alone. IV. Evaluation Indeed, with the possible exception of Meyer, Dworkin’s observation of a confused political discourse caused by unspecified equality definitions also applies to scholarship on Col 4:1.107 Particularly prominent here, I suggest, is the mismatch between the linguistic evidence that – despite Stählin’s efforts and BDAG’s claims – suggests that ūûĻüòÏ always means ‘equality’ and the 103

Angela Standhartinger, “The Origin and Intention of the Household Code in the Letter to the Colossians,” JSNT 79 (2000): 128; citing Aelius Publius Aristides, Or. 26.39; Philo, Prob. 79. 104 Standhartinger,“Origin & Intention,” 129; cf. Hansen, All One, 185–86. 105 Jerry L. Sumney, Colossians: A Commentary, NTL (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2008), 253–54; cf. David W. Pao, Colossians & Philemon, ZECNT 12 (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2012), 277–78. 106 For other criticisms, see Hering, Haustafeln, 40n110, 102–3n110; Gerhard Sellin, Der Brief an die Epheser, KEK 8 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2008), 431n36. 107 Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, 2.

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scholarly presumption that conceptual equality must be contradictory to the practice of slavery. This monograph endorses the linguistic evidence but disputes the equality presumption of the latter. Vasser’s equal friendship proposal, however, is only one possibility. Chapters three and four will reconstruct the equality ethics of Paul’s possible ethical sources – Aristotelian natural slavery, Seneca’s slave welfare and the Torah – to determine whether the equality ethics of any might account for Paul’s choice of ūûĻüòÏ in Col 4:1. Next, we analyse scholarship on its Ephesian parallel.

D. Ephesians 6:9 We discuss two issues with Eph 6:9, the Ephesian exhortation for slave welfare. While scholarship already debates the first, the uncertain referent of üąëŻüĄ (“the same”),108 I also demonstrate the second: inconsistent equality reasoning on the exhortation’s appeal to divine impartiality. We analyse each before engaging with those who argue for an ethical precedent. I. Referent of üąëŻüĄ Chrysostom argues that the referent of üą ëŻüĄ is 6:7’s öïü ïŻ÷øŤëÏ îøý õïŴø÷üïÏ (“serving with goodwill”) so that slave-masters should also serve their slaves,109 but today only Witherington gives Chrysostom any credence.110 More popular is üąëŻüĄ’s linkage to the previous occurrences of øóěþ (“do, make”). While some relate it to öïü ïŻ÷øŤëÏ,111 Best is probably correct to argue that øóïŦüï suggests activity rather than manner.112 Indeed, others suggest that its referent is üó øóĤûį ċñëùĻ÷ (“whatever good one does,” 6:8),

108

Cf. the debate’s assessment by Gielen, Tradition u. Theologie, 306n466. John Chrysostom, Hom. Eph. 22 (on 6:5–9) (NPNF 1/13:158). 110 Ben Witherington, The Letters to Philemon, the Colossians, and the Ephesians: A Socio-rhetorical Commentary on the Captivity Epistles (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 342; cf. Thomas R. Y. Neufeld, Ephesians, BCBC (Waterloo, ON: Herald, 2002), 274. 111 Heinrich A. W. Meyer, Critical and Exegetical Handbook to the Epistle to the Ephesians and the Epistle to Philemon, trans. Maurice J. Evans and William P. Dickson (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1875), 321; Ewald, Epheser Kolosser Philemon, 250–51; Scott, Colossians Philemon Ephesians, 246; Clinton E. Arnold, ZECNT 10 (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2010), 425; cf. Gielen, Tradition u. Theologie, 307. 112 Ernest Best, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Ephesians, ICC (London: T&T Clark, 1998), 580. 109

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but their import remains vague; for example, Hering suggests that slave-masters should “be engaged in various deeds related to the good.”113 Nevertheless, the majority reject üąëŻüĄ as possessing a specific reference. While some suggest that slave-masters should follow the same principles as in the exhortation for slave obedience,114 most reckon that slave-masters should have the same spirit and/or attitudes, especially towards God, as exhorted from slaves in the previous exhortation for slave obedience.115 But Alford and Best suggest that the exhortation for slave obedience needs to be adjusted mutatis mutandis before it can be applied to slave-masters regarding slave welfare.116 While Best’s proportionate view may initially appear reasonable, Louw-Nida’s semantic domain analysis distinguishes between üąëŻüĄ as “same or equivalent kind or class” and vocabulary, such as üą ľöøóë (“like”), that denote a comparison.117 Indeed, equality theorists argue that any ethic advocating the “same” action(s) towards different people presupposes their numerical, not proportionate, equality. Perhaps, therefore, it is tempting to concur with Schlier’s characterisation of 6:9a as “eine laxe Wendung”!118 Nevertheless, scholarship is also

113

Hering, Haustafeln, 154; cf. Wette, Colosser Philemon Ephesier Philipper, 155; John P. Heil, Ephesians: Empowerment to Walk in Love for the Unity of All in Christ, SBLStBL 13 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 267; William J. Larkin, Ephesians: A Handbook on the Greek Text, BHGNT (Waco, TX: Baylor University Press, 2009), 153. 114 Beet, Ephesians Philippians Colossians Philemon, 368–69; John O. F. Murray, The Epistle of Paul the Apostle to the Ephesians (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1914), 100. 115 Abbott, Ephesians Colossians, 180; Bruce, Colossians Philemon Ephesians, 401; Romano Penna, La Lettera agli Efesini, SOCr 10 (Bologna: Dehoniane, 1988), 246; Andrew T. Lincoln, Ephesians, WBC 42 (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 1990), 423; Patzia, Ephesians Colossians Philemon, 281; Peter T. O’Brien, The Letter to the Ephesians, PilNTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 454; Harold W. Hoehner, Ephesians: An Exegetical Commentary (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2002), 813; Arnold, Ephesians, 425–26; Stephen E. Fowl, Ephesians: A Commentary, NTL (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2012), 196. 116 I.e., with those things having been changed which need to be changed (Best, Ephesians, 580; cf. Henry Alford, “Ephesians,” in The Epistles of St. Paul, NTER 2/1 [London: Rivingtons; Cambridge: Deighton Bell, 1865], 408). Cf. also Lenski, Colossians Thessalonians Timothy Titus Philemon, 655; F. W. Grosheide, De Brief van Paulus aan de Efeziërs, CNT(K) (Kampen: Uitgeversmaatschappij & Kok, 1960), 93; Rudolf Schnackenburg, Ephesians: A Commentary, trans. Helen Heron (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 285; Larkin, Ephesians, 153). 117 Louw-Nida §58.31, cf. §64; cf. Gal 5:21. 118 Heinrich Schlier, Der Brief an die Epheser: Ein Kommentar (Düsseldorf: Patmos, 1957), 286.

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inconsistent in its equality reasoning over the exhortation’s appeal to divine impartiality. II. Bassler: Divine Impartiality and Imitation Ethics Bassler’s theological investigation into divine impartial soteriology between Jew and Gentile in Rom 2:9–11 has become the consensus for understanding divine impartiality in Eph 6:9.119 After tracing divine impartiality from the Torah, into Jewish Halakhah and into Paul, Bassler claims that 6:9 is “a fairly straightforward application” of divine impartiality to ground an ethical imperative that warns slave-masters of their future accountability to an impartial divine for any “unjust [slave welfare] treatment.”120 She continues: [Eph 6:9] presents divine impartiality as a model for human behaviour.… God, then, accepts both rich and poor, slave and free, and masters should bear this in mind in their dealings with their slaves.121

However, her language here is much more vague than her ethical conclusion on the imitation ethics of the Torah: This [Exod 23] impartial justice demands absolute equity toward the poor. They are to be neither favored because of their unfortunate circumstances (v. 3) nor denied justice because of their low social status (v. 6). This is an aspect of impartiality that is developed in several texts – all, rich and poor, great and small, are to be treated alike without regard for social distinctions.… Impartiality is thus a judicial concept, one aspect of righteous judgment … [indicating] unbiased adjudication for all social classes.122

Two issues are pertinent. First, her language of divine impartiality grounding the exhortation for slave welfare also includes (unlike Crouch) its ethical example or “model” that informs the imperative. Second, Bassler’s definition of “absolute equity” appears to mean God’s impartiality that the Israelites should imitate. In other words, her OT examples call for Israelite imitation of God’s numerically equal treatment. Yet, in Eph 6:9, she downgrades that ethical imitation to the much vaguer language of slave-masters bearing divine impartiality 119

Bassler, Divine Impartiality; endorsed by Meeks, Social World, 219n80; Bruce, Colossians Philemon Ephesians, 169n212; Penna, Efesini, 247n590; Lincoln, Ephesians, 424; Harris, Colossians Philemon, 187; Dunn, Colossians Philemon, 258–59; Standhartinger,“Origin & Intention,” 128; John Muddiman, A Commentary on the Epistle to the Ephesians, BNTC (London: Continuum, 2001), 281; Hoehner, Ephesians, 815n4; Heil, Ephesians, 267n85; Witherington, Philemon Colossians Ephesians, 343; Fowl, Ephesians, 197. 120 Bassler, Divine Impartiality, 178. 121 Bassler, Divine Impartiality, 178 (emphasis additional). 122 Bassler, Divine Impartiality, 8–9 (emphasis additional).

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“in mind.” Her inconsistency suggests that it is not for her “a fairly straightforward application” of divine impartiality even if it can be accounted for by the shift from social equality to slavery. Hence, the equality reasoning of scholarship on 6:9 appears also inconsistent. We will compare social and slavery equality ethics where possible: at Rome (chapter three), in Judaism (chapter four) and in Paul’s first Corinthian epistle (chapter five). We will also further examine how these equality ethics relate to their imitation ethics. III. Ethical Precedent While the exhortation’s citation of the Jewish concept of divine impartiality might indicate a Jewish source of its ethics, Best attacks Paul for not requiring slave-masters to manumit their Christian slaves after seven years as the Torah required Israelites to manumit their Israelite slaves, when the Haustafel’s exhortations on marriage and parenting cite the OT and when the “love your neighbour” exhortation of Eph 4:25, which also originates in the OT, includes Gentile Christians within its moral subject scope. Best concludes, “Perhaps for … [Paul] the OT is only a guide in ethical matters where it suits him.”123 On the other hand, O’Brien reckons the “reciprocal, though not symmetrical” exhortation is “shocking” and “outrageous” for the first-century GrecoRoman world.124 Conversely, Harrill reckons that its reciprocity is comparable to the Stoic Hierocles: “A slave will be well treated by one who considers how he would like to be treated by him if he were the master, and himself the slave.”125 We will test whether possible Pauline ethical sources can account for this exhortation’s equality reasoning. IV. Evaluation Although the language of this Ephesian exhortation for slave welfare differs from its Col 4:1 parallel, the same confusion over equality contaminates scholarship on both. I suggest one of two possibilities: either Schlier is correct and Paul’s own ethical reasoning is inconsistent, or scholarship has not yet noticed its own inconsistent equality reasoning on Paul.

123

Best, Ephesians, 581–82, here 582. O’Brien, Ephesians, 454; cf. Neufeld, Ephesians, 274. 125 Harrill, Slaves NT, 90; citing Stobaeus, Flor. 4.660.17–61.4 (translation, Harrill); alt. trans. in Hierocles, Frag. 89–91; contra Muddiman, Ephesians, 281. 124

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E. Philemon We now turn to the brief epistle to Philemon.126 Before we can evaluate existing scholarship on its equality ethics, we review scholarship’s debate on its occasion. I. Historical Occasion 1. Traditional Hypothesis Nordling defends the traditional hypothesis – of the slave Onesimus,127 a fugitive, somehow meeting the imprisoned Paul in Rome (or Caesarea or Ephesus),128 converting to Christianity,129 and becoming very useful to Paul (v. 11) – from Sara Winter’s hypothesis of Onesimus as a church emissary bringing aid to Paul.130 While Winter attempts to resolve the unlikely somehow of the traditional view, it seems more unlikely that a church would choose to send a

126

For past scholarship on Philemon, see Byron, Recent Research, 116–37; D. Francois Tolmie, “Tendencies in the Research on the Letter to Philemon since 1980,” in Philemon in Perspective: Interpreting a Pauline Letter, ed. D. Francois Tolmie, BZNW 169 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2010), 1–27. 127 For rebuttals of Allen D. Callahan (“Paul’s Epistle to Philemon: Toward an Alternative Argumentum,” HTR 86 [1993]: 362–63, 369–70), who argues that Onesimus was Philemon’s literal brother and only metaphorically his slave, see Margaret M. Mitchell, “John Chrysostom on Philemon: A Second Look,” HTR 88 (1995), 135–48; J. Albert Harrill, review of Allen Dwight Callahan, Embassy of Onesimus: The Letter of Paul to Philemon, CBQ 60 (1998): 758–59; Joseph A. Fitzmyer , The Letter to Philemon: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 34C (New York: Doubleday,2000), 114–16; John G. Nordling, review of Embassy of Onesimus: The Letter of Paul to Philemon by Allen Dwight Callahan, CTQ 64 (2000): 251–52. 128 Most modern commentaries debate Paul’s location, e.g., Bruce, Colossians Philemon Ephesians, 193–96; Dunn, Colossians Philemon, 307–8; Barth and Blanke, Philemon, 121– 26. 129 Contra Moule (Colossians Philemon, 19) and Nicholas Taylor (“Onesimus: A Case Study of Slave Conversion in Early Christianity,” R&T 3 [1996]: 266–67) who suggest that Onesimus had previously converted to Christianity, albeit perhaps incompletely or that he subsequently lapsed, prior to fleeing from Philemon. 130 John G. Nordling, “Onesimus Fugitivus: A Defense of the Runaway Slave Hypothesis in Philemon,” JSNT 41 (1991): 91–119; cf. Lightfoot, Colossians Philemon, 310–14; John Chrysostom, Hom. Phlm. Argument (NPNF 1/13:545). Mitchell (“Chrysostom on Philemon,” 135–48) argues that Chrysostom’s view was not novel then. Contra Sara C. Winter, “Paul’s Letter to Philemon,” NTS 33 (1987): 2–3; cf. Wolfang Schenk, “Der Brief des Paulus an Philemon in der neuren Forschung (1945–1987),” ANRW II 25.4 (1987): 3460– 61, 3480–83.

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useless (v. 11) slave.131 Nordling argues that Paul neither needed to list Onesimus’s past offences, which Philemon already knew, nor inform Philemon of Onesimus’s repentance given his return. Nordling also suggests that Paul did not specify Onesimus’s fugitivus status to protect him from any authorities who might intercept him and discover his status.132 2. Alternatives: Amicus Domini (Rapske) or Erro (Arzt-Grabner) Perhaps a majority now support Rapske’s alternative hypothesis of Onesimus seeking arbitration from Paul as an amicus domini (“friend of master”).133 To Rapske, an imprisoned Roman citizen could neither have met a captured fugitivus (because they would be kept in different prisons) nor initiated a captured fugitive’s return, and Paul would not have hidden Onesimus’s status from the authorities because that would risk both Paul’s case before them and his pre-existing relationships with Philemon and nearby churches.134 Indeed, 131

John M. G.Barclay, “Paul, Philemon and the Dilemma of Christian Slave-ownership,” NTS 37 (1991): 163–64. 132 Nordling,“Onesimus Fugitivus,” 99–101, 105, 107–10, 118. 133 Brian M. Rapske, “The Prisoner Paul in the Eyes of Onesimus,” NTS 37 (1991): 187– 203. For the legal distinction, see Peter Lampe, “Keine ‘Sklavenflucht’ des Onesimus,” ZNW 76 (1985): 135–37; “Affects and Emotions in the Rhetoric of Paul’s Letter to Philemon,” in Philemon in Perspective: Interpreting a Pauline Letter, ed. D. Francois Tolmie, BZNW 169 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2010), 63–64; cf. Alfred Suhl, Der Brief an Philemon, ZBK 13 (Zurich: Theologischer, 1981, 22; Bruce, Colossians Philemon Ephesians, 197. For support of the amicus domini hypothesis, see S. Scott Bartchy, “Philemon, Epistle to,” ABD 5:307–8; I. Howard Marshall, “The Theology of Philemon: The Gospel and Slavery,” in The Theology of the Shorter Pauline Letters, ed. Karl P. Donfried and I. Howard Marshall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 178; Wolter, Kolosser Philemon, 228–30; Dunn, Colossians Philemon, 303–6; Taylor,“Onesimus Conversion,” 267–68; Hübner, Philemon Kolosser Epheser, 33–35; Fitzmyer, Philemon, 17–18; David L. Balch, “Paul, Families, and Households,” in Paul in the Greco-Roman World: A Handbook, ed. J. Paul Sampley (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity, 2003), 280; Isak J. Du Plessis, “How Christians Can Survive in a Hostile Social-Economic Environment: Paul’s Mind Concerning Difficult Social Conditions in the Letter to Philemon,” in Identity, Ethics, and Ethos in the New Testament, ed. Jan G. van der Watt, BZNW 141 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2006), 396–99; Eckart Reinmuth, Der Brief des Paulus an Philemon, THKNT 11.2 (Leipzig: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 2006), 10– 12, 14–15; Peter Müller, Der Brief an Philemon, KEK 9.3 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2012), 127–28; Campbell, Framing Paul, 255; Martin Ebner, Der Brief an Philemon, EKKNT 18 (Ostfildern: Patmos; Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2017), 133–34. See also Rapske (“Prisoner Paul,” 194–95) for his critique of an earlier hypothesis of Onesimus seeking temple sanctuary with Paul (Erwin R. Goodenough, “Paul and Onesimus,” HTR 22 [1929]: 181–83). 134 Rapske, “Prisoner Paul,” 191–92.

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others suggest that Onesimus had fled because he had been wronged by Philemon,135 but the epistle neither rebukes Philemon nor asserts Onesimus’s innocence; instead v. 18 appears to acknowledge at least the possibility of Onesimus’s guilt.136 Others also criticise Rapske’s hypothesis. Llewelyn questions whether the legal distinction between fugitivus and amicus domini would have applied in Colossae and asks why Paul is vague on the timescale (v. 15) when a fugitivus had to demonstrate his original amicus domini intention by his immediate actions upon departure.137 Harrill also argues that the Roman jurists’ distinctions reflect only academic reasoning rather than practical legal realities in Colossae.138 Indeed, Witherington questions why Paul emphasises his decision-making role in vv. 12–14 if returning was Onesimus’s original intention.139 Meanwhile, Barth-Blanke question whether Onesimus could have been confident enough that both Paul would accept the role and Philemon would accept Paul’s intervention.140 Wengst observes that Philemon would have assumed fugitivus until proven otherwise and questions why Onesimus had to flee to Paul to find 135 Cain H. Felder, “The Letter to Philemon: Introduction, Commentary, and Reflections,” in vol. 11 of The Interpreter’s Bible, ed. Leander E. Keck, 12 vols. (Nashville: Abingdon, 2000), 885, 887, 898; Thompson, Colossians Philemon, 195n4, 197n7; W. Eckey, Die Briefe des Paulus an die Philipper und an Philemon: Ein Kommentar (Neukirchen: Neukirchener, 2006), 149–50; Max Turner, “Human Reconciliation in the New Testament with Special Reference to Philemon, Colossians and Ephesians,” EuroJTh 16 (2007): 39. Cf. Richard Lehmann (Épitre a Philémon: Le christianisme primitif et l’esclavage [Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1978], 27) who suggests that Onesimus’s flight was because Philemon had failed to manumit Onesimus upon his conversion to Christianity. 136 For whether this guilt relates to some wrongdoing by Onesimus prior to his departure or only that his subsequent absence that deprived his slave-master Philemon of Onesimus’s labour, see Hans Förster, “Die Bitte des Paulus für den Sklaven Onesimus: Semantische und syntakische Überlegungen zum Philemonbrief,” NovT 60 (2018): 271–72. However, I am unconvinced of his attempt to distinguish between the verb tenses in the protasis of v. 18. Contra also Förster’s (“Bitte des Paulus,” 273–78) attempt to reinterpret v. 19 as Paul’s promise to reimburse Philemon for Onesimus’s recent services to Paul because Philemon was not in either material or spiritual debt to Paul. 137 Stephen R. Llewelyn, “The Government’s Pursuit of Runaway Slaves,” NewDocs 8 (1997): 40–44. 138 J. Albert Harrill, “Using the Roman Jurists to Interpret Philemon,” ZNW 90 (1999): 135–38. 139 Witherington, Philemon Colossians Ephesians, 70. Dunn(Colossians Philemon, 306) and Fitzmyer (Philemon, 110) suggest that v. 13 reflects Paul’s concurrence with Onesimus’s original intention but, if true, then it remains puzzling why Paul did not explicitly endorse it to help Onesimus’s case. 140 Barth and Blanke, Philemon, 228.

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an amicus domini, at least 190 km away (assuming Paul’s imprisonment in the nearest possible location of Ephesus), at least a week’s walk.141 A handful of scholars highlight Philemon’s absence from the greetings in the epistle to Colossians to suggest that Philemon could have been residing in or near Rome (not Colossae) when Paul (under house arrest in Rome) wrote Philemon.142 While this conjecture minimises Onesimus’s travels and, they argue, explains Paul’s intended plan upon release to visit Philemon (v. 22), it introduces another imponderable: why did Paul need to write this delicatelyphrased letter when he could have simply asked Philemon to visit and then discussed Onesimus’s situation in person? I remain unconvinced. In any case, vv. 10–13 suggest a significant period of Onesimus’s useful service to Paul before Onesimus left to return to Philemon. This alone appears contrary to Onesimus seeking out Paul for a prompt adjudication. Meanwhile, Arzt-Grabner cites examples where ĠíþúŤûùį (“was separated, left,” v. 15) functions as an active rather than a divine passive to argue that Onesimus intentionally left Philemon only úļÏňúë÷ (“for a short time”) as an erro (“truant, to roam”) rather than ëūń÷óø÷ (“forever”) as a fugitivus.143 141 Klaus Wengst, Der Brief an Philemon, ThKNT 16 (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2005), 30–31. 142 Marlis Gielen, “Paulus – Gefangener in Ephesus? Teil 1,” BN 131 (2006): 91–92; Ebner, Philemon, 22–25, 134–40; Vicky Balabanski, “Where is Philemon? The Case for a Logical Fallacy in the Correlation of the Data in Philemon and Colossians 1.1–2; 4.7–18,” JSNT 38 (2015): 131–50; cf. Jürgen Roloff, Einführung in das Neue Testament (Stuttgart: Reclams, 2012), 145. Gielen, Ebner and Balabanski argue against a Colossae location for Philemon by observing that Onesimus and Epaphras as “one of you” (Col 4:9, 12) requires only that they had both originated from Colossae. Gielen and Ebner suggest that Philemon had also lived in Colossae previously before relocating to or near Rome, perhaps even (Ebner) travelling on the same ship as Paul. Balabanski suggests both that Onesimus was a native of Colossae who was (at some point) enslaved to Roman (or nearby) resident Philemon and that Paul had sent Archippus away from Philemon and Rome to the Lycus Valley for an asyet-uncompleted task in the year or two-year interval between the writing of Philemon (cf. Phlm 2) and Colossians (cf. Col 4:17). While these hypotheses are ingenious attempts to resolve the distance problem of the amicus domini hypothesis and plot a path around the individuals who are named (or not) in both Philemon and Colossians, they lack definite evidence in favour. 143 Peter Arzt-Grabner, “The Case of Onesimos: An Interpretation of Paul’s Letter to Philemon Based on Documentary Papyri and Ostraca,” ASEs (2001): 607; Philemon, PKNT 1 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2003), 66–70, 103–4, 190–263; “Onesimus erro: Zur Vorgeschichte des Philemonbriefes,” ZNW 95 (2004): 131–43; “How to Deal with Onesimus? Paul’s Solution within the Frame of Ancient Legal and Documentary Sources,” in Philemon in Perspective: Interpreting a Pauline Letter, ed. D. Francois Tolmie, BZNW 169 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2010), 123–25, 132–35.

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But ĠíþúŤûùį functioning as active in some texts does not necessarily mean that it must be functioning as active in this epistle.144 In addition, N. T. Wright observes that Paul would hardly have expressed doubt, though üĄíë (“perhaps,” v. 15), were he trying to convince Philemon that Onesimus had always intended to return.145 I conclude that the erro hypothesis is probably more questionable than Rapske’s hypothesis without resolving how a roaming Onesimus somehow met Paul.146 In essence, all these hypotheses rely upon the unlikely occurring. I lean towards the traditional hypothesis as most likely – throughout history, letters have been written after unexpected encounters – and for ĠíþúŤûùį as a passive alluding to divine intervention. When we return to Philemon in chapter five after our analysis of Greco-Roman and Jewish slave welfare, I advocate another reason for preferring the traditional hypothesis. II. Implied Ethics 1. Knox: Onesimus Resumptive Knox contrasts Paul’s vagueness in requesting Philemon’s forgiveness and on Onesimus’s repentance to Pliny’s direct supplication in an otherwise similar letter. To Knox, Paul’s vagueness suggests that the epistle has a deeper purpose

144 Likewise, with Arzt-Grabner’s (“Case of Onesimos,” 608–14; Philemon, 226–34; “Deal with Onesimus,” 135–40) argument that v. 17 must reflect commercial apprenticeship contracts and urge Philemon to receive Onesimus back as his ôøó÷þ÷ĻÏ (“business partner”) because ôøó÷þ÷ĻÏ and úøûõëöìĄ÷þ (“receive/welcome”) frequently occur in commercial apprenticeship contracts. But v. 6’s ħôøó÷þ÷ŤëüĦÏŤûüþěÏ (“the partnership/sharing of the faith”) is not commercial and nowhere else in the Pauline corpus is ôøó÷þ÷Ťë or cognates used in a commercial sense. Cf. how Winter (“Philemon,” 11–12) extends to Philemon the theory of J. Paul Sampley (Pauline Partnership in Christ: Christian Community and Commitment in Light of Roman Law [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980], 11–20, 79–81) that a Roman societas is behind the ôøó÷þ÷ĻÏ terminology of v. 17, but Sampley himself is not certain regarding Philemon; see further Barth and Blanke, Philemon, 474–75. Nor am I convinced by Förster’s (“Bitte des Paulus,” 279–86) attempt, building upon Arzt-Grabner’s commercial reading of the letter, to interpret üļ ċ÷Ħôø÷ (traditionally, “what is fitting/required,” v. 8) as referring to Onesimus’s status under Roman law as Philemon’s property. 145 N. T. Wright, Paul and the Faithfulness of God, vol. 4 (in 2 parts) of Christian Origins and the Question of God, 4 vols. (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2013), 9. 146 Arzt-Grabner’s (“Deal with Onesimus,” 134–35) further hypothesis, of a roaming Onesimus somehow meeting others who brought him to Paul, could also apply to the traditional hypothesis, but I prefer to refrain from that degree of speculation. For further criticism of the erro hypothesis, see Nordling, Philemon, 140–47.

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of requesting Philemon to permit Onesimus’s return to resume his useful help to Paul (hereafter, Onesimus resumptive).147 Regardless of Knox’s historical claim, Onesimus resumptive now appears to be the majority view; for example, Marshall: “If that [ôëťŷěú (‘even more,’ v. 21) as alluding to vv. 13–14] is not a request for Onesimus to join Paul’s circle, I do not know what is.”148 But others object. Moule argues that ëūń÷óø÷ in v. 15 indicates Paul’s intention is for Onesimus to return to Philemon permanently rather than to be Philemon’s Christian brother eternally,149 but O’Brien responds that Onesimus could return to Paul while remaining Philemon’s slave.150 Moule also refers to a slave’s voluntary decision in Exod 21:6 to continue serving his slave-master,151 but R. McL. Wilson and Wengst object because the two legal systems were incomparable and Philemon had not offered to manumit Onesimus.152 Church argues that rhetorical conventions prevent Paul’s peroration (vv. 17–21) from introducing a new request,153 but Paul might not always follow conventions and Onesimus resumptive only requires 147

John Knox, Philemon Among the Letters of Paul, rev. ed. (London: Collins, 1960), 17–18, 22, 24–27, 50, 55, 59–61; citing Pliny the Younger, Ep. 103. Knox (Philemon, 19– 21, 24, 37–60) buttresses his argument with novel (but immaterial) exegesis that nearly all scholars reject; see further Nordling, Philemon, 4, 16–18, 249–51. Furthermore, Knox (Philemon, 87–92; cf. Barth and Blanke, Philemon, 141, 148–49) posits that Onesimus returned, became Bishop of Ephesus and orchestrated the epistle’s canonisation. 148 Marshall “Theology of Philemon,” 179–80, 183–85, here 188; cf. Percy N. Harrison, “Onesimus and Philemon,” AThR 32 (1950): 275–76; Peter Stuhlmacher, Der Brief an Philemon, EKKNT (Zürich: Benziger, 1975), 24, 40–41, 43, 53; Roland Gayer, Die Stellung des Sklaven in den paulinischen Gemeinden und bei Paulus: Zugleich ein sozialgeschichtlich vergleichender Beitrag zur Wertung des Sklaven in der Antike, EHS.T 23/78 (Bern: Lang, 1976), 240–41; O’Brien, Colossians Philemon, 267, 296, 306; Bruce, Colossians Philemon Ephesians, 199, 215, 220–21; Harris, Colossians Philemon, 241, 243, 265, 275, 278; Dunn Colossians Philemon, 306, 332–33, 345 (possible); Barth and Blanke, Philemon, 136, 492; Eckey, Philipper Philemon, 170–71, 176; Witherington, Philemon Colossians Ephesians, 28, 75–76, 86; Judith Ryan, ed. Bonnie B. Thurston and Judith Ryan, SP 10 (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical, 2009), 185, 191, 193, 236–38, 243, 258; Müller, Philemon, 117, 133; Pao, Colossians Philemon, 348, 392, 420; Wright, PFG, 13, 15; Ebner, Philemon, 122, 146. 149 Moule, Colossians Philemon, 146–47; cf. Stowers, “Paul & Slavery,” 295–311; Barth and Blanke, Philemon, 397–402; Jennifer A. Glancy, “Response to Harrill,” BibInt 15 (2007): 202. 150 O’Brien, Colossians Philemon, 296. 151 Moule, Colossians Philemon, 146; cf. Hermann Sasse, “ëūń÷, ëūń÷óøÏ,” TDNT 1:209. 152 Wilson, Colossians Philemon, 355; Wengst, Philemon, 66n82. 153 Frank F. Church, “Rhetorical Structure and Design in Paul’s letter to Philemon,” HTR 71 (1978): 30–31.

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v. 21 to allude back to the hint of vv. 13–14. Suhl reckons Onesimus resumptive unlikely because of Paul’s stated intention to visit shortly (v. 22),154 but Harrison suggests that the epistle’s purpose was either to anticipate Paul’s departure from Philemon with Onesimus or for Philemon to send Onesimus back to the still-imprisoned Paul.155 Meanwhile, Verdam and many others highlight how Paul’s return of Onesimus contradicts the Jewish slave asylum law of Deut 23:15–16[16–17].156 Nevertheless, Onesimus resumptive remains plausible. When we return to Philemon after our analysis of Greco-Roman and Jewish slave welfare, I advocate another reason for preferring Onesimus resumptive. 2. Manumission Modern scholarship is divided on whether Paul in v. 16, with or without ôëť ŷěú in v. 21, encourages Onesimus’s prompt manumission.157 Dibelius is emphatic: “Die juristische Seite der Sache ist überhaupt nicht in Sicht.”158 154 Suhl, Philemon, 33, 36; cf. Hermann Binder and Joachim Rohde, Der Brief des Paulus an Philemon, THKNT 11.2 (Berlin: Evangelische Verlagsanstalt, 1990), 37, 58; Wolter, Kolosser Philemon, 232–33; Moo, Colossians Philemon, 370, 414, 436–37. 155 Harrison, “Onesimus,” 287–88. 156 P. J. Verdam, “St-Paul et un serf fugitif,” in Symbolae ad jus et historiam antiquitatis pertinentes Julio Christiano van Oven dedicatae: (symbolae van Oven), ed. M. David et al. (Leiden: Brill, 1946), 215–30; cf. Henneke Gülzow, Christentum und Sklaverei in den ersten drei Jahrhunderten (Bonn: Habelt, 1969), 37n1; Gayer, Stellung, 254–55; Lehmann, Philémon, 38; Gnilka, Philemon, 37; O’Brien, Colossians Philemon, 239; Bruce, Colossians Philemon Ephesians, 197n19; Binder and Rohde, Philemon, 39; Barclay, “Dilemma,” 165; Barth and Blanke, Philemon, 29, 61n172, 205, 354; Fitzmyer, Philemon, 31; Glancy, Early Christianity, 92; Wengst, Philemon, 41–42; Reinmuth, Philemon, 12–15; Eckey, Philipper Philemon, 152. For an alternative OT theory, connecting Philemon to Jonah, see G. FeeleyHarnik, “Is Historical Anthropology Possible? The Case of a Runaway Slave,” in Humanizing America’s Iconic Book, ed. Gene M. Tucker and Douglas A. Knight, BSNA 6 (Chico, CA: Scholars, 1982), 95–126. 157 Barclay (Colossians Philemon, 115) reckons the majority is against Philemon implying manumission, but I suggest his assessment is no longer accurate. For our purposes, we do not need to distinguish between those who reckon v. 16 alone implies manumission and those that reckon v. 16 and v. 21 together imply manumission. 158 Dibelius, Kolosser Epheser Philemon, 107; cf. Scott, Colossians Philemon Ephesians, 110, 113; Gülzow, Christentum u. Sklaverei, 38–39; Stuhlmacher, Philemon, 40–41; O’Brien, Colossians Philemon, 269, 298, 303, 305; Binder and Rohde, Philemon, 40, 60, 65–66; Patzia, Ephesians Colossians Philemon, 113; Melick, Philippians Colossians Philemon, 365, 367; Taylor, “Onesimus Conversion,” 270–71; Hübner, Philemon Kolosser Epheser, 37–38; Barth and Blanke, Philemon, 141, 149, 412–76, 491–93; Nordling, Philemon, 255–56, 286n15; Hendriksen, “Colossians Philemon,” 220, 224; Turner,

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However, Lohmeyer is one of many who, with varying degrees of probability, argue for the opposite and at least a proto-abolitionist Paul.159 Nicholas Taylor (who leans against manumission) outlines the dilemma: Each phrase in Phlm 16 capable of interpretation as calling for Onesimus’ manumission is capable also of the opposite meaning, that is, of demanding the slave’s continued servitude in Philemon’s household, alongside his brotherhood with Philemon in the church.160

Indeed, R. McL. Wilson observes, “The matter of manumission may not have been so vital for Paul as it has seemed to some of his modern interpreters.”161 Similarly, Ebner emphasises that Onesimus’s new status as an equal brother in the church will affect his daily life in Philemon’s household even though Onesimus’s legal status is both unchanged and, to Paul, largely immaterial.162 In addition, Förster argues that Paul wants Philemon to treat Onesimus as a person rather than as an item of property as deemed by Roman law.163 Meanwhile, a few scholars suggest that requiring Philemon to love Onesimus would be more radical than his possible manumission.164 However, Glancy reckons that Philemon is too ambiguous and personal to reconstruct from it any universal slavery ethic.165

“Reconciliation,” 40–41; Arzt-Grabner, “Deal with Onesimus,” 141; Müller, Philemon, 122–23, 133–34; Förster, “Bitte des Paulus,” 286. 159 Lohmeyer, Philipper Kolosser Philemon, 188; cf. Harrison, “Onesimus,” 277–78; Martin, Colossians Philemon, 146, 168; Wright, Colossians Philemon, 167, 185, 189; PFG, 12–13, 15; Winter, “Philemon,” 11; Bartchy, “Philemon,” 5:308–9; Wall, Colossians Philemon, 209–13; Wolter, Kolosser Philemon, 233–35; Harrill, Manumission, 3; Dunn, Colossians Philemon, 306–7, 334–35; Orlando Patterson, “Paul, Slavery and Freedom: Personal and Socio-historical Reflections,” Semeia 83–84 (1998): 269–71; Balch, “Families & Households,” 281; Laura L. Sanders, “Equality and a Request for the Manumission of Onesimus,” ResQ 46 (2004): 110–11, 113–14; Wengst, Philemon, 72; Wilson, Colossians Philemon, 318, 354, 364; Eckey, Colossians Philemon, 173, 176; Reinmuth, Philemon, 48; Witherington, Philemon Colossians Ephesians, 26, 28, 73, 75–77, 79–81, 86; Moo, Colossians Philemon, 373–77, 421–25, 436; Ryan, “Philemon,” 185–86, 188–89, 191–92, 239, 250–51, 258; Roloff, Einführung, 144. 160 Taylor, “Onesimus Conversion,” 270. 161 Wilson, Colossians Philemon, 2005, 356. 162 Ebner, Philemon, 89–90, 104–5, 143–45. 163 Förster, “Bitte des Paulus,” 279–86. 164 Suhl, Philemon, 39; Craig S. de Vos, “Once a Slave, Always a Slave? Slavery, Manumission and Relational Patterns in Paul’s letter to Philemon,” JSNT 82 (2001): 101; Ryan, “Philemon,” 185–86, 188–89, 191–92, 239, 250–51, 258; cf. Pao, Colossians Philemon, 350–51. 165 Glancy, Early Christianity, 92, 140–41.

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Conversely, Dunn suggests Paul obscured his manumission call to avoid the authorities accusing him of “disrupting the social fabric.”166 But even if Dunn is correct on how they would interpret a general slave manumission call, it is unclear why they would react against a single letter rewarding a single slave’s useful service with manumission. Furthermore, we will observe how the revisionist school on Greco-Roman slavery argues that regular manumissions in Rome reinforced its slavery ethos.167 If they are correct, then recommending a slave’s manumission would not undermine Roman society. Barth-Blanke also highlight how Roman law – which, they claim, prohibited a slave’s manumission before the age of thirty – might apply to Onesimus;168 but even so Paul could still have recommended Onesimus’s future manumission. Alternatively, Barclay argues that Paul’s ambiguity reflects his own uncertainty of what Philemon should do given the practical differences that would arise were Christian slave-masters to manumit their slaves.169 Meanwhile, Andrew Wilson suggests Paul’s ambiguity is because of his politeness to a social superior.170 However, Nicholas Taylor observes that v. 21 expects Philemon’s obedience to whatever Paul requires.171 Furthermore, in 1 Cor 7:21–24, Paul appears neither uncertain nor indifferent to whether Corinthian Christians were enslaved. Indeed, Paul at Gal 1:10 and 1 Thess 2:4 claims that he does not selfmoderate to please others, and there appears no reason to expect otherwise from Paul on slavery. 3. Brotherhood and Ethical Precedent Several scholars compare and contrast possible Jewish (Lev 25:46–48; Deut 15:12) and Greco-Roman (Seneca and Epictetus)172 brotherhood backgrounds.173 Barth-Blanke also evaluate Sir 33:31 and how both Aristotle and

166

Dunn, Colossians Philemon, 324. Cf. also Barclay, “Dilemma,” 168–69. 168 Barth and Blanke, Philemon, 141; especially, they argue, if he was the (young) Onesimus who later became Bishop of Ephesus. For their imprecision over the age limits imposed by Roman law, see our discussion of the lex Aelia Sentia in the next chapter. 169 Barclay, “Dilemma,” 166, 172–77, 183–84; cf. Wright, PFG, 12. 170 Andrew Wilson, “The Pragmatics of Politeness and Pauline Epistolography: A Case Study of the Letter to Philemon,” JSNT 48 (1992): 116; cf. Dunn, Colossians Philemon, 323–24. 171 Taylor, “Onesimus Conversion,” 269. 172 Seneca, Ep. 47.10; Epictetus, Diatr. 1.13.3, 3.24.16. 173 Gayer, Stellung, 237–40; Gnilka, Philemon, 51–52; O’Brien, Colossians Philemon, 297; Barth and Blanke, Philemon, 423–45. 167

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Seneca advocate friendship with one’s slaves.174 But these scholars do not reach a definitive conclusion on Paul’s ethical source. Meanwhile, Ebner compares Philemon’s daily treatment of (his ecclesiastically equal brother and legal slave) Onesimus to that urged by Seneca.175 In addition, Förster suggests that the letter’s lack of any reference to the Torah may indicate Philemon’s Gentile background.176 Conversely, N. T. Wright argues that ëūń÷óø÷ in Phlm 15, and the epistle’s rhetoric of brotherhood and ôøó÷þ÷Ťëôøó÷þ÷ĻÏ (“fellowship, partnership,” vv. 6, 17) combine to allude to how Exod 21:6 and Deut 15:17 describe a slave, although entitled to manumission, preferring to stay with his master’s family forever because of harmonious relations between slave and master.177 While we will analyse these OT passages in chapter four, it appears unlikely that even a proven allusion in the epistle to a slave remaining with his master forever could justify Wright’s inference that ongoing enslavement is incompatible with a reconciled Christian community and that Philemon should therefore manumit Onesimus.178 Arzt-Grabner observes that the papyrological evidence where ċîïõƫĻÏ and ôŴúóøÏ occur together is ambiguous because it is difficult to determine whether the terms are intended literally or metaphorically.179 However, he later suggests that Christian brotherhood might have led to greater “Gleichstellung” (i.e., egalitarianism) in due course.180 Clarke suggests that for Paul, “brotherly love … holds together the relationships between brothers, notwithstanding such inequalities. Brotherly love is concerned with mutuality, rather than equality.”181 But the equality parameters of what Clarke describes as “mutuality” are unclear given that what he describes as “equality” is egalitarianism. However, BarthBlanke observe that Paul’s description of his fellow workers as his brothers does not prohibit Paul from directing their ministry.182

174

Barth and Blanke, Philemon, 432. Ebner, Philemon, 95–97, 146; citing Seneca, Ep. 47.13, 15. 176 Förster, “Bitte des Paulus,” 289. 177 Wright, PFG, 13. 178 Wright, PFG, 10–19, 22. 179 Peter Arzt-Grabner, “‘Brothers’ and ‘Sisters’ in Documentary Papyri and in Early Christianity,” RivB 50 (2002): 188–89. 180 Arzt-Grabner, Philemon, 156. 181 Andrew D. Clarke, “Equality or Mutuality? Paul’s Use of ‘Brother’ Language,” in The New Testament in its First Century Setting: Essays on Context and Background in Honour of B. W. Winter on his 65th Birthday, ed. P. J. Williams et al. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 164. 182 Barth and Blanke, Philemon, 232. 175

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Alternatively, Barclay argues that 1 Tim 6:2 demonstrates how Christian brotherhood could “disrupt the power relations that undergirded the masterslave relationship,”183 but mirror-reading incongruity into a single exhortation is questionable, and the verse also suggests that the implied ethics of Christian brotherhood are not inherently antithetical to ongoing enslavement. III. Evaluation As with the Haustafeln, much scholarly disagreement over Philemon is rooted in their differing understandings of equality. Thus, our equality analysis may cut through this Gordian knot of an epistle. Our analysis will need to cover Roman legal distinctions and possible ethical precedents for slave/free friendship and brotherhood. We will return to Philemon in chapter five. Meanwhile, scholarship on both the Haustafeln and Philemon cite Gal 3:28 to support their differing arguments. Hence, we now turn to the most-frequently cited Pauline verse on equality.

F. Galatians 3:28 and Slavery Meeks classifies how scholars deploy Gal 3:28 to advocate contradictory ethical trajectories. Some argue for a post-Pauline trajectory where the egalitarian “mustard seed” of Gal 3:28 and the Christian brotherhood of Philemon are progressively realised through history to improve upon the Haustafeln’s ethics.184 Lightfoot’s argument on Philemon remains a landmark advocate: The word ‘emancipation’ seems to be trembling on his [Paul’s] lips, and yet he does not once utter it.… But meanwhile a principle is boldly enunciated, which must in the end prove fatal to slavery.… When in short the Apostolic precept that “in Christ Jesus is neither bond nor free” [Gal 3:28] was not only recognised but acted upon, then slavery was doomed. Henceforth it was only a question of time.… “The brotherhood of man, in short, is the idea which Christianity in its social phase has always been striving to realise.” … Indeed throughout this epistle the idea would seem to be present to his thoughts, though the word never passes his lips.… Slavery is never directly attacked as such, but principles are inculcated which must prove fatal to it.185

183

Barclay, Colossians Philemon, 117. Elsewhere, however, he is cautious of such mirror-reading. 184 Meeks (“Haustafeln & American Slavery,” 245–46, 249–50), within which I also include what Meeks classifies as “immutable principles” (“Haustafeln & American Slavery,” 245). 185 Lightfoot, Colossians Philemon, 321, 323–24, 343 (emphasis additional); citing Goldwin Smith, Does the Bible Sanction American Slavery? (Oxford: Henry & Parker,

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However, Barclay cites the horrors of the antebellum slave trade to criticise Lightfoot’s historical naivety and to argue that Christian attitudes were changed by the Enlightenment rather than Philemon.186 Alternatively, Rengstorf, Schroeder and Schüssler Fiorenza reconstruct early gender egalitarian and slave-free Christian communities, who were initially inspired by Gal 3:28 but later rebuked by a hierarchical Paul in 1 Corinthians and the Haustafeln.187 In other words, these “golden age” scholars argue for an intra-Pauline inegalitarian trajectory.188 Once again, this debate centres upon different understandings of equality. As this monograph is on Pauline ethics, we focus only on Paul’s intention and do not engage with those – for example, Vincent and Marshall – who argue for an egalitarian trajectory beyond Paul’s conscious awareness.189 After chapters three and four analyse Greco-Roman and Jewish slave welfare for equality, chapter five will review the evidence for a slavery “golden age” and consider any possible development between the equality ethics of Gal 3:28 and the Haustafeln.

G. The Revisionist School I. From Mild to Cruel Roman Slavery Early scholarship reconstructs Roman slavery from legal texts, philosophical moralists, satirists and inscriptions, and emphasises a relatively “mild” (relative to antebellum slavery) and improving ethos that approaches an equality 1863). Cf. Marvin R. Vincent, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Philippians and to Philemon, ICC 37 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1897), 165–67; Martin, Colossians Philemon, 149–50; Suhl, Philemon, 39; Wright, Colossians Philemon, 169; Harris, Colossians Philemon, 268; Dunn, Colossians Philemon, 307; Wilson, Colossians Philemon, 361; Marshall, “Theology of Philemon,” 190; cf. also Bruce (Colossians Philemon Ephesians, 171, 197–98): “The household codes do not give detailed advice for the complexities of modern industrialism.… They embody basic and abiding Christian principles, which can be applied in changing social structures from time to time and from place to place.…What the letter of Philemon does is to bring the institution into an atmosphere where it could only wilt and die.” For an alternative intra-Pauline trajectory, where Colossians is successfully improved by Ephesians and Philemon, see Witherington, Philemon Colossians Ephesians, 26, 30, 103–4n11, 185–86, 212–13, 321–22, 342–43. 186 Barclay, Colossians Philemon, 123–24. 187 Karl H. Rengstorf, “Mahnungen,” 131–45; Schroeder, “Haustafeln,” 89–91; Schüssler Fiorenza, Memory, 209–10, 214–31, 251–59, 266–70, 278–79. 188 For “golden age,” see Meeks, “Haustafeln & American Slavery,” 246–49. 189 Vincent Philippians & Philemon, 165–67; Marshall, “Theology of Philemon,” 190.

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between slave and free.190 For example, Harnack comments that the early Christian church protected female slaves’ modesty and equally honoured slave and free.191 Barrow emphasises how slaves were fully integrated into family life and that prosperous former slaves credited their success to how their enslavement was an apprenticeship.192 William Westermann claims, “In practical affairs as well as in the increased kindness of attitude toward slaves as exhibited in social speculation regarding them, the lines of class cleavage between free and slave tended to disappear.”193 Wiedemann suggests that Roman manumissions of loyal domestic slaves were “so widespread that the ‘model’ of slavery as a process of integration may be useful here.”194 Bartchy’s thesis on 1 Cor 7:21–24 relies upon the classical research of Joseph Vogt and his Mainz Academy, who emphasise the lack of slave revolts in the history of the Roman Empire as indicative of Roman slavery’s mildness and of slaves’ general contentment.195 Indeed, Bartchy’s mild Roman slavery ethos dominated NT scholarship for two decades.196 Tidball exemplifies NT scholarship then: In the first place, the institution of slavery was such an integral part of the social fabric in Paul’s day that it would have been difficult for Paul or others to conceive of social organisation without it.… It was possible to accept slavery in this manner because by the time of Paul it was not a severe and cruel institution.… More and more humanitarian legislation had been introduced in the first century AD.… From the slave’s viewpoint then, the Roman social system could be seen as working in his best interests. There was no widespread

190

Byron, Recent Research, 21; cf. Lightfoot, Colossians Philemon, 309–12. Adolf von Harnack, The Expansion of Christianity in the First Three Centuries, trans. James Moffatt, 2 vols., TTL 19 (London: Williams & Northgate; New York: Putnam, 1904), 1:209; cf. Edgar J. Goodspeed, “Paul and Slavery,” JBR 11 (1943): 170. 192 Reginald H. Barrow, Slavery in the Roman Empire (London: Methuen, 1928), 60–63, 170–72. 193 William L. Westermann, The Slave Systems of Greek and Roman Antiquity, MAPS 40 (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1955), 114. 194 Thomas E. J. Wiedemann, Greek and Roman Slavery, Routledge Sourcebooks for the Ancient World (London: Routledge, 2005), 3. 195 Bartchy, Mallon ChrƝsai, 24–120; cf. “Philemon,” 5:305–10; S. Scott Bartchy, “Slavery (Greco-Roman),” ABD 6:65–73; “Response to Keith Bradley’s Scholarship on Slavery,” BibInt 21 (2013): 525–27; cf. also Joseph Vogt, Ancient Slavery and the Ideal of Man, trans. Thomas E. J. Wiedemann, BCS (Oxford: Blackwell, 1974). For other Mainz publications, see the biography in Thomas E. J. Wiedemann, “Fifty Years of Research on Ancient Slavery: The Mainz Academy Project,” SlavAbol 21 (2000): 158. 196 Byron, Recent Research, 26. 191

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discontent about slavery. So, to the early church the question of the abolition of slavery was probably insignificant.197

However, Bartchy’s mea culpa at the 2012 SBL conference, with Roman historian Bradley and NT scholars Harrill and Glancy, symbolises the rise of their revisionist consensus of a cruel, “steady state” Roman slavery ethos.198 Bradley argues that the aforementioned sources, all composed from the slave-master perspective, must be complemented by a sociological analysis of how Roman slaves experienced their slavery, for which he relies upon comparative analysis from the preserved testimony of former antebellum chattel slaves.199 Bradley rejects Vogt’s claim that the lack of slave revolts are evidence of slave contentment,200 and argues that the allegedly mild features of Roman slavery (e.g., regular manumission) were cynical devices designed to incentivise slave productivity and to disguise from slaves the true depths of their enslaved plight.201 Furthermore, Bradley dismisses Seneca as conventional, manipulative and not significantly humanitarian because his alleged ‘fair’ slave welfare was intended only to help the slave-master become a better Stoic, and his spiritual equality between slave and free was of little practical significance.202 Bradley follows his predecessor Finley in accusing Vogt and Mainz of bias because of their West-German anti-Marxism amid the Cold War.203 However, 197

Derek Tidball, The Social Context of the New Testament: A Sociological Analysis (Grand Rapids: Academie, 1984), 114–15. 198 Bartchy, “Response to Bradley,” 524–32; for “steady state,” see Keith R. Bradley, Slavery and Society at Rome, KTAH (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 173; “Review Article: The Problem of Slavery in Classical Culture,” review of The Manumission of Slaves in Early Christianity, J. Albert Harrill; Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine, Peter Garnsey, CP 92 (1997): 281. 199 Keith R. Bradley, Slaves and Masters in the Roman Empire: A Study in Social Control, Oxford ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 13–14, 18–20, 142; Slavery & Society, 7–9, 92–95, 109–11, 131, 163–64, 178–81. Cf. Harrill (Manumission, 14): “Slave studies as a field is essentially comparative social history.” Jennifer A. Glancy (“Resistance and Humanity in Roman Slavery,” BibInt 21 [2013]: 498–99) also endorses such comparative analysis. 200 Bradley, Slaves & Masters, 31, 145–46; Slavery & Society, 107–31; Keith R. Bradley, “Resisting Slavery at Rome,” AMW 362–84; cf. Harrill, Manumission, 98, 121–22n207; J. Albert Harrill, “Slavery and Inhumanity: Keith Bradley’s Legacy on Slavery in New Testament Studies.” BibInt 21 (2013): 509–10; Glancy, Early Christianity, 139. 201 Bradley, Slaves & Masters, 19–20, 81–112; Slavery & Society, 154–65. 202 Keith R. Bradley, “Seneca and Slavery,” CM 37 (1986): 162, 164–66, 170–72; cf. Glancy, Early Christianity, 137; Sandra R. Joshel, “Slavery and Roman Literary Culture,” AMW 227–34. 203 Bradley, Slaves & Masters, 19–20; Slavery & Society, 184; cf. Moses I. Finley, Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology, ed. Brent D. Shaw, exp. ed (Princeton: Markus

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Wiedemann defends their academic rigour from Finley’s “grotesque misrepresentation” and accuses Finley of conflating scholarly method and politics.204 Meanwhile, historiographer McKeown argues that both Vogt and Bradley exaggerate the evidence to justify their a priori reconstructions.205 Indeed, Bartchy’s only remaining disagreement with Bradley is on the latter’s uncritical acceptance of testimony of former antebellum slaves that McKeown suggests may have been shaped by other factors; for example, the 1930s great depression.206 McKeown warns of confirmatory bias: [Vogt and Bradley] also illustrate, today, just as much in the 1930s, the fact that the way we choose to interpret ancient slavery has much to do with the way we want to interpret it. The problem is not so much that we invent the past as that, when we explore it, we tend to find what we are looking for. Often, when we appear to claim that ‘this is the way it actually was,’ we are, in practice, asking the reader to share our ethical ideals, which is something very different.207

Independently, sociologist Patterson rejects the Roman legal definition of the slave as simultaneously property and a person in favour of a sociological analysis of power and control; slavery, he defines universally, is “the permanent, violent domination of natally alienated and generally dishonored persons.”208 While the revisionist school endorses Patterson’s definition,209 Flesher Wiener, 1998), 84–85, 123–32, 296–97; cf. also Brent D. Shaw, ed., “‘A Wolf by the Ears’: M. I. Finley’s Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology in Historical Context,” introduction to Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology, by Moses I. Finley, exp. ed (Princeton: Markus Wiener, 1998), 49–50. 204 Wiedemann, “Fifty Years,” 157. 205 Niall McKeown, The Invention of Ancient Slavery? (London: Duckworth, 2007), 30– 41, 77–98. 206 Bartchy, “Response to Bradley,” 527–32; cf. McKeown, Invention, 91–95; contra Keith R. Bradley, “Engaging with Slavery,” BibInt 21 (2013): 541–46. 207 McKeown, Invention, 28–29; cf. “Resistance among Chattel Slaves in the Classical Greek World,” AMW 153. Cf. also Finley (Ancient Slavery, 131): “The habit of using the ancient world as a springboard for a larger political polemic is of course not a monopoly of any one camp or school.” Indeed, Thiselton (New Horizons, 429) observes more generally: “Until recently hermeneutical suspicion might duly fall on hierarchal claims for a status quo; but with egalitarian trends in socio-literary and socio-political ideologies, suspicion needs to be exercized in a double direction about vested interests” (emphasis original). 208 Orlando Patterson, Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982), 1–101, here 13. 209 Keith R. Bradley, “Roman Slavery and Roman Law,” HRRH 15 (1988): 494; Harrill, Manumission, 14–17; J. Albert Harrill, “Paul and Slavery,” in Paul in the Greco-Roman World: A Handbook, ed. J. Paul Sampley (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity, 2003), 577; Glancy, Early Christianity, 18, 114; Catherine Hezser, Jewish Slavery in Antiquity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 8–11, 26–27; cf. Miers, “Slavery Definition,” 1. For Patterson’s

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criticises Patterson for over-emphasising cross-cultural comparison at the expense of investigating any particular historical instance of slavery.210 Other prominent members of this revisionist school include Harrill, whose thesis on 1 Cor 7:21–24 attacked both Bartchy’s method and conclusions, and introduced NT scholarship to Bradley and Patterson;211 Glancy, who emphasises the pervasive sexual exploitation of slaves in Roman slavery and in early Christianity, and reappraises Paul’s exhortations for slave welfare;212 and Hezser, who reconstructs Jewish slavery.213 We will now turn to Glancy and Hezser. II. Glancy: From Fairness to Unfairness Glancy’s reconstruction of Greco-Roman, early Christian and Pauline complicity in slave-masters’ casual sexual use of their own slaves intersects with our analysis of Pauline slave welfare ethics. Indeed, her argument on Paul and the sexual use of slaves is a more tangible subset of this investigation into his slave welfare ethics. While this monograph on Pauline ethics endorses her reconstruction of the Greco-Roman ethos and is ultimately agnostic on the early Christian ethos, we engage with how she argues from the Greco-Roman ethos, via the early Christian ethos to Pauline ethics. In other words, this review focuses more on her interpretative method rather than her understanding of equality. Our later chapters seek to reconstruct Jewish and Pauline ethics on the sexual use of slaves.

limited impact upon NT scholarship, see Allen D. Callahan, Richard A. Horsley and Abraham Smith, “Introduction: The Slavery of New Testament Studies,” Semeia 83–84 (1998): 1–2, 8; Richard A. Horsley, “The Slave Systems of Classical Antiquity and their Reluctant Recognition by Modern Scholars,” Semeia 83–84 (1998): 29. 210 Paul V. McC. Flesher, Oxen, Women, or Citizens? Slaves in the System of the Mishnah, BJS 143 (Atlanta: Scholars, 1988), 175–76; cf. David M. Lewis, “Orlando Patterson, Property, and Ancient Slavery: The Definitional Problem Revisited,” in On Human Bondage: After Slavery and Social Death, ed. John Bodel and Walter Scheidel, AWCH (Chichester: Wiley Blackwell, 2017), 31–54. 211 Harrill, Manumission. Thus, later reconstructions of Greco-Roman slavery by Pauline scholars, e.g., Combes (Metaphor of Slavery, 24–42) and Harris (Slave of Christ, 25–68, esp. 35n24, 42–43, 70n5), are more ambivalent than Bartchy (Mallon ChrƝsai, 24–120) and Tidball (Social Context, 114–15). 212 Glancy, Early Christianity; Jennifer A. Glancy, “Slavery and the Rise of Christianity,” AMW 456–81. 213 Hezser, Jewish Slavery; Catherine Hezser, “Slavery and the Jews,” AMW 438–55.

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1. Greco-Roman Slavery Ethos Glancy demonstrates the amorality of the sexual use of slaves in Greco-Roman antiquity, providing that slave-master’s property rights over their own slaves’ bodies were upheld. In other words, slaves in Greco-Roman antiquity were not moral subjects. Thus, male slave-masters were free to exploit sexually both those whom other slave-masters prostituted and their own slaves. However, freeborn women were expected to be chaste. Only Musonius Rufus is on record opposing the casual sexual use of slaves; he argues that the good Stoic man should not be less self-controlled than freeborn women.214 2. Early Christian Slavery Ethos Glancy concludes that early Christianity was indistinguishable from GrecoRoman antiquity: Although the words of some ancient Christian can be summoned to rebut almost any generalisation about the ancient Church and slavery, Christians, who frequently insisted that the distinction between free and slave was of no importance in the eyes of God, typically supported the institution of slavery.… We do not have sufficient evidence to conclude that Christian slaveholders were appreciably distinguished from other Greco-Roman slaveholders by avoidance or even moderation of corporal punishment.… From the east to the west of the empire, Christian theologians wrestled with a situation they confronted in their own communities, the socially sanctioned sexual use of slaves by slaveholders, including Christian slaveholders. Despite the objections of theologians, Christian slaveholders conformed to the universally attested ancient practice of relying on slaves as sexual outlets.215

Third- and fourth-century Christian leaders – Hippolytus, Lactantius, Jerome, Ambrose, Basil and Chrysostom – explicitly prohibited sexual relations with slaves.216 However, Glancy highlights their emphasis on gender equality 214

Glancy, Early Christianity, 9–14, 21–24, 27, 50–58; cf. Finley, Ancient Slavery, 163– 64; citing Musonius Rufus, Diatr. 12. 215 Glancy, “Rise,” 456, 466, 468. 216 Glancy, Early Christianity, 50–51, 58–59; citing [Hippolytus], Trad. ap. 16.23; Lactantius, Epit. 66 (ANF 7:250); Jerome, Ep. 77.3 (NPNF 2/6:158); Ambrose, Abr. 1.4.25. Glancy(“Rise,” 467–68) also cites Basil, Ep. 199.49 (NPNF 2/8:240); Hom. 15 (on Ps 32:5); John Chrysostom, Hom. 1 Thess 5 (on 1 Thess. 4:1–3) (NPNF 1/13:345); Lactantius, Inst. 6:23; Ambrose, Abr. 1.4.22–26; Jos. 5.22; Ep. 37 (54); Virg. 3.7.32–37 (NPNF 2/10:386– 87). Not cited by Glancy is John Chrysostom, Hom. 1 Cor. 7:2, §4 (PG 51:213–15); trans. by Catherine P. Roth and David Anderson (John Chrysostom: On Marriage and Family Life, PopPS [Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1986], 86–88) and in Kyle Harper, Slavery in the Late Roman World, AD 275–425 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 281–82. On Chrysostom and slavery, see further Chris L. de Wet, Preaching Bondage: John Chrysostom and the Discourse of Slavery in Early Christianity (Oakland, CA: University of California Press, 2015), 220–70, esp. 231–36, 243–44, 268.

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without expressing concern for the slave; to her, they are as insignificant as Rufus: lone voices protesting against prevalent practice. Indeed, she mirrorreads these Christian exhortations and the earlier silence in Christian sources as evidence of the practice among Christians.217 While evaluating her reconstruction of the early Christian ethos is beyond the scope of this monograph, her uncritical mirror-reading is questionable. In a later article, Glancy self-identifies as a moral progressive who is engaged in “politically motivated” scholarship to critique a conservative Paul whose teachings have often been used to harm.218 While I admire her candour, her early Christian ethos argument may be circular because she requires early Christians to disprove her hypothesis while evaluating both their silence and non-silence as complicity. In other words, her method prevents any evidence from challenging her hypothesis. Perhaps her actual argument amounts to little more than this: since early Christians supported slavery, they must have also participated in its abuses. Conversely, our monograph is predicated upon distinguishing between the universal practice of slavery in antiquity and ethical variability between historical contexts in how slaves should be treated. Moreover, she overlooks three factors: (i) several of those third- and fourthcentury Christian leaders warn those who sexually exploit their slaves of divine judgement; (ii) Jerome (whom Glancy both quotes and acknowledges presumes a Christian consensus against exploitation as of AD 399)219 also cites Pauline authority for his variance from how the Roman law on adultery tolerated male sexual use of slaves;220 and (iii) Chrysostom’s prohibitions, which occur in his Pauline sermons, argue against non-marital sexual intercourse with any female, explicitly whether she be the Emperor’s wife or a slave. Thus, Chrysostom may allude to the divine impartiality of Eph 6:9. In other words, these later Christian voices present their opposition to the Greco-Roman practice as in continuation with Paul. As such, they are also potential evidence for evaluating Paul’s attitude towards the sexual use of slaves. 217

Glancy, Early Christianity, 58–59; “Rise,” 466–68; cf. Carolyn Osiek, “Female Slaves, Porneia, and the Limits of Obedience,” in Early Christian Families in Context: An Interdisciplinary Dialogue, ed. David L. Balch and Carolyn Osiek (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003), 274. 218 Jennifer A. Glancy, “Slavery, Historiography, and Theology,” BibInt 15 (2007): 202; cf. “Early Christianity, Slavery, and Woman’s Bodies,” in Beyond Slavery: Overcoming Its Religious and Sexual Legacies, ed. Bernadette J. Brooten, BRWTSJ (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 143–44, 156–57. 219 Glancy, “Rise,” 467. 220 Jerome (Ep. 77.3) also explicitly contrasts Paul with Roman jurist Papinianus (third century AD). On Papinianus, see further Matthew J. Perry, Gender, Manumission, and the Roman Freedwoman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 23–24.

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3. Pauline Slavery Ethics Given the prevalent sexual use of slaves in Greco-Roman antiquity, Glancy asks how Paul’s Greco-Roman readers would have understood his usage of øú÷ïŤë (“sexual immorality”) as prohibiting the practice without an explicit statement: “Paul warned against porneia, but he did not define the parameters of porneia.”221 Indeed, she highlights Paul’s “surprising,” “peculiar,” “strange” and indifferent silence.222 In other words, Glancy requires a silent Paul to disprove her hypothesis. Nevertheless, Glancy also cites four Pauline texts in support of her hypothesis, including Col 4:1. We discuss the others first. She claims that 1 Cor 5:1– 13 demonstrates the lack of a fixed definition of øú÷ïŤë and highlights, along with 1 Cor 6:12–20, how Paul’s concern is only for the man and not the woman. To her, Paul seeks to protect the Christian community from slave prostitutes rather than to welcome them in.223 Glancy also argues that since ûôïŶøÏ (lit. “vessel,” 1 Thess 4:4) could, she claims, denote a slave, Paul “could be construed” as advocating avoiding øú ÷ïŤë by acquiring a slave vessel for sex instead. Indeed, she claims that Paul’s prohibition would have been “sufficiently countercultural” that Paul should have repeated it even if he had prohibited it during an earlier visit. Thus, Glancy reasons, given the absence of a specific Pauline prohibition, that “in the first century, many who heard such counsel would understand it as consistent with reliance on slaves as morally neutral sexual outlets.”224 However, Gupta independently rejects those who mirror-read any significant øú÷ïŤë problem into Thessalonica from the prohibition,225 and Glancy seamlessly traverses along a trajectory of probability – from “could” to “would” – with no apparent evidence beyond her own (a priori?) opinion to substantiate even the “could.” Neutel also highlights how 4:5 contrasts Paul’s desired sexual behaviour with 221

Glancy, Early Christianity, 60. Glancy, Early Christianity, 60, 62, 70, 144; cf. Sheila Briggs, “Paul on Bondage and Freedom in Imperial Roman Society,” in Paul and Politics: Ekklesia, Israel, Imperium, Interpretation: Essays in Honor of Krister Stendahl, ed. Richard A. Horsley (Harrisburg, PA: Trinity, 2000), 115–17. 223 Glancy, Early Christianity, 63–67. 224 Glancy, Early Christianity, 60, 62 (emphasis additional). For the scholarly debate on its phrase üļĝëýüøŶûôïŶøÏôüĆûùëó, see further Jouette M. Bassler, “Skeuos: A Modest Proposal for Illuminating Paul’s Use of Metaphor in 1 Thessalonians 4:4,” in Social World of the First Christians: Essays in Honor of Wayne A. Meeks, ed. L. Michael White and O. Larry Yarbrough (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 53–66; Torleif Elgvin, “‘To Master His Own Vessel’. 1 Thess 4.4 in Light of New Qumran Evidence,” NTS 43 (1997): 604–19. 225 Gupta, “Mirror-Reading,” 370–73. 222

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Greco-Roman practices.226 Even fellow revisionist Harrill demurs on 1 Thess 4:4,227 and I disagree more strongly. Meanwhile, Glancy’s evaluation of Paul as complicit unless he disproves her hypothesis, and her Greco-Roman reader-response emphasis are also visible in her reasoning on Col 4:1: How did first-century slaveholders understand instructions to treat slaves justly and fairly? Did many slaveholders in the Roman Empire perceive themselves to be unjust and unfair? Did the author of Colossians intend anything different from what any other Greco-Roman moralist would intend with these words? … If he [the author of Colossians] adopts the distinctive posture of decrying the sexual use of slaves, we must also ask how he expects his readers to grasp his position?228

Indeed, Glancy’s rhetoric suggests that she views this ‘fairness’ exhortation as an unfairness exhortation. To her, Paul’s “neither … slave nor free” in Gal 3:28 is “only a cover up.”229 Rather than the Haustafeln advocating slaves’ moral agency and ameliorating their enslavement, Glancy joins Ste Croix and Bradley in arguing that Christianity (and in particular the Haustafeln) made slaves’ lives worse: Throughout the Empire, slaves understood that obedience and hard work might promote their own interests. With their eyes cast deferentially down, slaves hoped that their faithful execution of duties might spare them from the sting of the whip or aid them in securing their own manumission or the manumission of others they loved. Colossians and Ephesians disparage such motivations for servile cooperation, advocating instead that slaves submit their bodies and souls to their masters because such behaviour is pleasing to God.230

226

Karin B. Neutel, “Slave Regulations and Slave Participation in Two Ancient Religious Groups,” in Slaves and Religions in Graeco-Roman Antiquity and Modern Brazil, ed. Stephen Hodkinson and Dick Geary (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2012), 141n18. 227 J. Albert Harrill, review of Slavery in Early Christianity by Jennifer A. Glancy, CBQ 64 (2002): 759; cf. John G. Nordling, review of Slavery in Early Christianity by Jennifer A. Glancy, JAAR 73 (2005): 1213; Victor P. Furnish, 1 & 2 Thessalonians, ANTC 13–14 (Nashville: Abingdon, 2007), 89–90; Lynn H. Cohick, Women in the World of the Earliest Christians: Illuminating Ancient Ways of Life (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2009), 280–81; contra Joseph A. Marchal, “The Usefulness of an Onesimus: The Sexual Use of Slaves and Paul’s Letter to Philemon,” JBL 130 (2011): 769. 228 Glancy, Early Christianity, 143–44; cf. MacDonald, Colossians Ephesians, 165; “Slavery, Sexuality and House Churches: A Reassessment of Colossians 3.18–4.1 in Light of New Research on the Roman Family,” NTS 53 (2007): 101–5. 229 Glancy, Early Christianity, 35; cf. Neutel, Cosmopolitian Ideal, 4. 230 Glancy, Early Christianity, 145; cf. G. E. M. de Ste Croix, The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1981), 419–25; Bradley, Slavery & Society, 145–53; “Engaging Slavery,” 540.

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Despite Glancy’s conclusions, however, third- and fourth-century Christian leaders thought that Paul had prohibited the slave-masters’ sexual exploitation of their slaves. Thus, two possibilities require further investigation. Either Paul was in continuity with a widely known Jewish prohibition against the practice or it was understood as included within Paul’s broader condemnations of nonmarital sexual intercourse,231 or both. This monograph will evaluate both options, even though Glancy and Hezser deny a distinctive Jewish ethic on slavery. III. Jewish Slavery Ethics and Ethos as Greco-Roman Ethics and Ethos While Glancy mentions Abraham’s dalliance with Hagar (Gen 16) and observes that early Christianity, including Paul in Philemon, did not honour the Torah’s slave asylum law (Deut 23:15–16[16–17]),232 Glancy primarily relies upon Dale Martin’s conclusion that Jewish and Greco-Roman slavery ethe were indistinguishable: Jewishness itself had little if any relevance for the structures of slavery amongst Jews. Jews both had slaves and freedpersons and were slaves and freedpersons. Slavery among Jews of the Greco-Roman period did not differ from the slave structures of those peoples among whom Jews lived. The relevant factors for slave structures and the existence of slavery itself were geographical and socio-economic and had little if anything to do with ethnicity or religion.233

By “slave structures,” Martin means how Jewish sources in the Greco-Roman era are structured according to the free/slave distinction of then-contemporary chattel slavery rather than according to the Torah’s original distinction of Israelite temporary debt slavery versus Canaanite permanent slavery; for example, only six of the Mishnah’s 129 slave references uphold the latter distinction.234 However, perhaps the Mishnah’s authors understood that distinction to be irrelevant to the other 121 references for other reasons; the significance of any text’s taxonomy on slavery can only be determined in the context of its broader structuring principles and purpose. Furthermore, similar “slave structures” between two legal systems may indicate only that both practised slavery and 231 MacDonald (“Slavery Sexuality & House Churches,” 100–102) also suggests the possibility. 232 Glancy, Early Christianity, 35–36, 52, 90–92. For convenience and in accordance with most scholars, this monograph refers throughout to the later names “Abraham” and “Sarah” rather than to “Abram” and “Sarai” as of Gen 16. 233 Dale B. Martin, “Slavery and the Ancient Jewish Family,” in The Jewish Family in Antiquity, ed. Shaye J. D. Cohen (Atlanta: Scholars, 1989), 113; cited Glancy, Early Christianity, 6–7. 234 Martin, “Ancient Jewish,” 115–16; cf. Flesher, Slaves Mishnah, 35–36, 39, 54.

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needed occasionally to distinguish between slave and free. More in-depth analysis is required to determine whether the two systems’ ethics on slave welfare differed. Indeed, this monograph argues that such Jewish sources must first be understood in their Torah context and only thereafter compared to Greco-Roman sources. More recently, while Glancy acknowledges that Jewish sources included using prostitutes within its øú÷ïŤë definition, she insists that there is no extant source before the third century AD of øú÷ïŤë including a slave-masters’ sexual use of his own slaves. She also relies upon Hezser’s understanding of where the Torah’s slavery ethic downplays sexual relations with slaves (Exod 21:7– 11; Lev 19:20–22; Deut 21:10–14) and alleges several examples in Hellenistic Jewish sources of slave-masters exploiting their own slaves sexually.235 Chapter four will investigate these claims. Meanwhile, Hezser’s method is evident from her second opening sentence: This study examines ancient Jewish discourse on slavery in the context of Graeco-Roman literary, legal, and documentary writings and on the basis of the social, economic and political circumstances under which Jews lived.236

Like Glancy, Hezser relies upon Dale Martin; like Glancy, Hezser begins by examining the Greco-Roman slavery ethos before comparing it to Hellenistic Jewish sources; only thereafter, through the eyes of both ethe, does Hezser itemise pertinent Torah texts.237 This monograph will test whether their method is susceptible to Neusner’s methodological criticism by reconstructing Greco-Roman and Jewish ethics on slave welfare separately. IV. Evaluation Glancy demonstrates how a revisionist ‘cruel’ historical reconstruction of Greco-Roman slavery can lead (via re-evaluations of both Seneca and the early 235

Jennifer A. Glancy, “The Sexual Use of Slaves: A Response to Kyle Harper on Jewish and Christian Porneia,” JBL 134 (2015): 215–29; cf. Hezser, Jewish Slavery, 192–93, 386; David P. Wright, “‘She Shall Not Go Free as Male Slaves Do’: Developing Views about Slavery and Gender in the Laws of the Hebrew Bible,” in Beyond Slavery: Overcoming Its Religious and Sexual Legacies, ed. Bernadette J. Brooten, BRWTSJ (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 125–42. 236 Hezser, Jewish Slavery, 1. 237 Hezser, Jewish Slavery, 7–8. Like Dale Martin, Hezser also relies upon Flesher, Slaves Mishnah. Unlike Hezser, Flesher (who did his PhD thesis under Neusner’s supervision) begins with an analysis of the Torah. While Hezser acknowledges how some individual Jewish texts (which we discuss in chapter four) appear to presume some kind of equality between slave and free, she quickly dismisses their significance.

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Christian ethos) to a revisionist Pauline slave welfare ethic that inter alia was complicit in slave-masters’ sexual use of their own slaves. The next chapter will review the revisionists’ conclusions. Rather than Paul ameliorating slave conditions, Glancy argues that he made them worse. In addition, if, as the revisionists claim, manumission was an intrinsic part of Greco-Roman slavery, then it is difficult to determine why Paul would need to obscure any desire he may have had for Onesimus’s manumission. However, Glancy relies more upon how the historical record does not disprove her hypothesis than in establishing her hypothesis in the first place. Furthermore, she and Hezser rely upon reconstructing Jewish slavery through the prism of Greco-Roman slavery, which might obscure any differences between them in slave welfare. Indeed, chapter four will demonstrate how Hezser overlooks how the nuances of her later Jewish sources reveal their continuation with the Torah’s distinctive slave welfare ethics rather than assimilation to the Greco-Roman slavery ethos.

H. Conclusion Although there has not yet been a comprehensive investigation focused upon Pauline slave welfare, investigations into the Haustafeln’s origins, the explicit welfare exhortations of Col 4:1 and Eph 6:9, the enigmatic letter of Philemon and Gal 3:28 all touch on the subject. This chapter has demonstrated how they all share the same defect: a failure to define and reason consistently about equality. Hence the focus of this monograph. Furthermore, revisionist views of Greco-Roman slavery and of Seneca in particular alter what scholars mean when they claim or deny Pauline correspondence to Seneca. Chapter three will proceed with an equality analysis of slave welfare in Greco-Roman antiquity (key sources: Aristotle and Seneca), and chapter four will do so for Judaism (key sources: Torah and Philo). Both analyses include the possibility of friendship and brotherhood across the slavery and social divides. In accordance with the methodological principle discussed in chapter one, we will analyse Greco-Roman and Jewish ethics on slave welfare separately rather than interpret the latter through the former. Indeed, this method will reveal previously overlooked differences between their slave welfare ethics. Thereafter, in chapter five, we return to Paul.

Chapter 3

Slave Welfare in Greco-Roman Antiquity A. Introduction This chapter analyses Greek and Roman ethics on slave welfare for equality. Since the vast majority of extant Greek literature hails from classical Athens, scholars tend to refer to the latter when they speak of the former. We follow this convention although this chapter also discusses what is known of the other instances of Greek slavery. Our previous chapter requires this chapter to focus on Aristotle and (to a lesser extent) Plato in the context of Athenian slavery and Seneca in the context of Roman slavery, and to be sufficiently detailed to review the revisionist school claim of cruel, steady-state Roman slavery and untangle the alleged contrast between Plato and Seneca on befriending slaves. Our chapter broadly, but not uncritically, supports the revisionist corrective to the excessive idealism of earlier scholarship. We proceed by first reconstructing Greek slavery to provide the historical context to analyse Aristotle. This Aristotelian analysis also discusses Plato’s often briefer remarks where pertinent. We then repeat the process with Roman slavery and Seneca, and discuss how Roman slavery intermingled with Roman social stratification. All historical investigations depend upon the historicity of extant sources that are more fragmentary for Greek slavery than Roman slavery. While I retain some scepticism on their historicity and I acknowledge that they were composed by slave-masters rather than slaves, our focus on ethicists’ intention means that this monograph is less impacted than perhaps other studies. This chapter distinguishes between conquest slavery and natural slavery. Conquest slavery is the universal ethos in antiquity of enslaving those conquered; defeat per se causes enslavement. Athenian philosopher and historian Xenophon, for example, cites the universal acceptance, “for all time among all men that … the persons and the property” of those defeated belong to their conquerors,1 and Roman jurists observed that their conquest slavery was by the

1

Xenophon, Cyr. 7.5.73 (Miller).

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jus gentium ([universal] law as observed by all nations).2 While we analyse Aristotle’s definition of natural slavery shortly, I highlight up front that natural slavery is a justification for why the superior can or even should enslave those they conquer. While many may assume that any possible distinction between Greek and Roman slavery must be inconsequential given the prevalence in both of abusive chattel slavery, multiple Romans, from the first century BC to the fifth century AD, with their first-hand experience (as slave-masters) of Roman slavery, argued that Roman conquest slavery was not reliant upon a natural slavery justification. The chapter will argue that their denial accurately reflects the Roman slavery ethos and accounts for where Roman slavery differed from Athenian slavery. The distinction between conquest slavery and natural slavery also helps comprehend the historical context of Seneca’s ethical reasoning on slave welfare. It also informs chapter five’s analysis of possible Pauline ethical trajectories.

B. Greek Slavery: Aristotle’s Historical Context I. Classical Athens 1. Origins Greek historian Plutarch (first century AD) claims that Athenian statesman Solon in 594/3 BC cancelled debts and abolished debt slavery between Athenians. Solon also purchased large numbers of barbarian chattel slaves from Chios, “the first to buy slaves for cash,”3 to provide a replacement workforce. Like Chios, Athens granted its citizens freedom and political participation by purchasing chattel slaves who remained as natally alienated and tradeable commodities.4 Solon also legalised slave-capturing expeditions.5 Numerous intra-Greek city-state wars generated prisoners of war who were enslaved if not ransomed by relatives. From the fifth century BC, the Persian 2

Dig. 1.5.4.1–3, 1.5.5.1, cf. 1.1.1.4, 1.1.9; cf. also Justinian, Inst. 1.5. Theopompus, FGrHist 155 F 122; trans. from Paul Cartledge, “The Helots: A Contemporary Review,” AMW 80. 4 Plutarch, Sol. 13.2, 15.2–5; cf. Aristotle, Ath. pol. 2.2, 5.1–6.1, 9.1, 12.4. See further Nicholas G. L. Hammond, A History of Greece to 322 B.C, 3rd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 157–70; Yvon Garlan, Slavery in Ancient Greece, trans. Janet Lloyd, rev. and exp. ed. (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1988), 38–39, 45–46, 88–91; Dimitris J. Kyrtatas, “Slavery and Economy in the Greek World,” AMW 94–95. For preSolon slavery, see Garlan, Greece, 24–39, 120; Peter Hunt, “Slaves in Greek Literary Culture,” AMW 22–35. 5 Garlan, Greece, 38. 3

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wars boosted the numbers of captive slaves. While a growing sense of intraGreek solidarity, probably stimulated in response to the Persian threat, led to some disquiet about enslaving fellow Greeks and an increasing desire to ransom back those enslaved after previous intra-Greek wars,6 there is no extant evidence of any disquiet against enslaving captured barbarians.7 2. Slave Welfare Garlan observes that free and slave worked together on public construction projects where pay rates and working conditions were similar. However, Athenians preferred slave labour in part because slave-masters would profit through providing their slaves with only the minimum of necessities.8 Murder of anyone, whether slave or free, caused communal religious pollution. Hence in theory, neither a slave-master nor anyone else could kill a slave without a valid reason and without the possibility of judicial review. But in reality, any objections were more likely against the killer’s failure to purify himself afterwards than for the killing.9 Likewise, castrating slaves was prohibited because it was thought to risk the gods’ displeasure and revenge.10 Fear of divine retribution probably also lies behind the Greek custom of protecting slaves seeking sanctuary from abusive masters at their temples.11 With no public prosecutor in Athens and slaves (unlike metics [non-citizen residents]) unable to initiate legal action, slaves were unable to seek legal redress against their own master, including for unjust enslavement, unless a third party intervened to represent the slave. But, since slave witness testimony was usually only admissible under torture and the third party risked defamation penalties if they lost the case, there was little to incentivise either the slave or 6

Garlan, Greece, 48–51, 120–21; Hunt, “Greek Literary,” 24, 36–38; T. E. Rihll, “Classical Athens,” AMW 53; Cartledge, “Helots,” 75. However, Vincent J. Rosivach (“Enslaving ‘Barbaroi’ and the Athenian Ideology of Slavery,” Historia 48 [1999]: 129–41) argues that only women and children prisoners of war were typically enslaved since unransomed male prisoners of war were typically executed before Philip II of Macedonia’s defeat of Thebes in 338 BC. 7 Kyrtatas, “Economy Greek,” 93–94. 8 Garlan, Greece, 70–72; cf. Morris Silver, “Slaves versus Free Hired Workers in Ancient Greece,” Historia 55 (2006): 257–63. 9 Isocrates, Paneg. 181; cf. Plato, Leg. 9.865C–D, 9.868A–B; cf. also Garlan, Greece, 44; Rihll, “Athens,” 51–52. Antiphon (5.47–48 Herodes) records an objection to the summary execution without a public trial of slave accused of murder, yet the free man raising the objection, also accused of the same murder, appears unconcerned about the slave’s fate and complains only that he cannot question the slave in court about his alleged confession. 10 Cf. the fate of Panionius of Chios as told by Herodotus, Hist. 8.105–6. 11 Garlan, Greece, 45; Rihll, “Athens,” 52.

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the third party.12 On the other hand, apparently even a slave could initiate proceedings against free men for hubris: Solon’s law against physical and verbal attacks on a person’s honour or status. While perhaps initially paradoxical, for Athenian slaves had little if any honour or status to be slighted, orators Demosthenes and Aeschines reasoned that the victim’s status was irrelevant as Solon’s intent was to curb aggressive and abusive arrogance.13 Solon also appears to have established Athens’s low-cost brothels, staffed with female slaves, so that even poor Athenians could partake.14 Athenian males’ sexual use of slaves appears to have been common.15 Xenophon’s nonchalance is evident in how he describes his protagonist’s preference for consensual sexual intercourse with his wife to intercourse with a female slave who “is forced to do what you want,” with no suggestion that he curtailed his casual sexual use of the latter.16 Xenophon also presents slave breeding in rural farms as routine, urging slave-masters to keep the doors between male and female slave quarters locked to control who mated with whom.17 The Pseudo-Aristotelian Oeconomics also advocates using slave offspring as “hostages” against the risk of parents absconding; to its author, that was not contradictory to his other advice to avoid cruel treatment.18 Both Pseudo-Aristotle’s and Xenophon’s Oeconomics offer advice on treating rural slaves and recommend using food and clothing to reward and punish. To Pseudo-Aristotle, food is the means to control slaves: too little food

12 Plato, Leg. 9.937A–B, 9.938B–C,; cf. Glenn R. Morrow, “Plato and Greek Slavery,” Mind 48 (1939): 192; Garlan, Greece, 42–45; Sviatoslav Dmitriev, “The Protection of Slaves in the Athenian Law against Hubris,” Phoenix 780 (2016): 64. For a portrayal of slave torture, see Aristophanes, Ran. 618–25; cf. Kenneth J. Dover, Aristophanes: Frogs (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 24–27. 13 Demosthenes, Mid. 46–49; Aeschines, Tim. 16–17; cf. Garlan, Greece, 41; Rihll, “Athens,” 52, 54. On hubris, see further Dmitriev, “Protection,” 64–76. 14 Garlan, Greece, 146; Mark Golden, “Slavery and the Greek Family,” AMW 148. 15 Garlan, Greece, 152–53; John Bodel, “Slave Labour and Roman Society,” AMW 125– 27; Golden, “Greek Family,” 135, 146–51. 16 Xenophon, Oec. 10.12 (Marchant & Todd). Cf. orator Dio Chrysostom (2 Serv. lib. 5, first century AD): “Do not many Athenian men have intercourse with their maidservants, some of them secretly, but others quite openly?” (Cohoon). Cf. also Artemidorus Daldianus (Onir. 1.78, second century AD) who interpreted a slave-master’s dream of sexual intercourse with his slave (either male or female) as a sign of his delight in his increasingly valuable property. 17 Xenophon, Oec. 9.5; cf. Garlan, Greece, 52–53; Bodel, “Labour,” 125–26. 18 [Aristotle], Oec. 1.5.6 (1344b20–21) (Tredennick & Armstrong); for its authorship, see Sarah B. Pomeroy, Xenophon Oeconomics: A Social and Historical Commentary (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 68.

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weakens slaves physically and too much food without enough correction breads insolence.19 Xenophon compares training slaves to training animals and emphasises the training and close monitoring of competent stewards and housekeepers. According to him, the slave-master’s wife should ensure slaves’ provisioning and take care of sick slaves. He also records his wife’s response to his demand: “It will be delightful, assuming that those who are well cared for are going to feel grateful and be more loyal than before.”20 Thus, she appears more motivated by self-interest than any humanitarian concern. 3. Slave Penalties The differences in penalties for a slave and a free perpetrator or for crimes against a slave and a free victim are the most explicit extant evidence from antiquity for equality analysis. While it is uncertain how precisely Plato’s idealistic Laws compare to what we can reconstruct of classical Athenian conventions,21 a comparison is possible only with the former. A free man who kills another free man must purify himself and is only temporarily exiled if it is his first offence, but a free man who kills a slave must purify himself and pay compensation to the slave’s master at up to twice the slave’s value. Only if the slave was killed to prevent him testifying, does Plato require the same punishment of exile as if the victim were free.22 A slave could plead self-defence for killing another slave but could not do so if the victim were free. Instead, the slave must be handed over either to the victim’s family to be punished until death in their chosen manner, or flogged and killed by the state executioner in full view of the victim’s tomb.23 Plato may be the best-known advocate in antiquity for reformative punishment,24 but that was only for free men; captive slaves were executed; they were given no second chances. If a slave injured a free man, then the slave’s master could choose to either pay compensation or surrender the slave to as much flogging as the victim desired so long as, where 19

[Aristotle], Oec. 1.5.3 (1344a35–b4). Xenophon, Oec. 5.15–16, 7.35–41, 9.11–19, 12.2–9, 13.6–12, here 7.37 (Millar & Todd). Cf. Garlan, Greece, 147–51; Rihll, “Athens,” 64; Golden, “Greek Family,” 137–38. 21 Morrow (“Plato,” 194–99) argues that Athenian law was in certain respects less harsh towards slaves than in Plato’s Laws, but I remain unconvinced. On Greek utopias, see further Garlan, Greece, 126–38, 156–58; Hunt, “Greek Literary,” 38–40; McKeown, “Resistance Greek,” 168–71. 22 Plato, Leg. 9.865C–D, 9.868A–B, 9.872B–C; cf. 9.866D–67C for the distinction between premediated and spontaneous murder of free men. 23 Plato, Leg. 9.868B–C, 9.872B–C, 9.877B. 24 See further (but without attention to slavery differentials) R. F. Stalley, “Punishment in Plato’s ‘Laws’,” HPT 16 (1995): 469–87. 20

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the slave had been judged as acting without rage, the slave’s value to his own master was unimpaired.25 4. Manumission Garlan observes from the preserved records at Delphi and elsewhere that most manumissions were either paid for by the surpluses retained by slaves who lived apart from their slave-master’s household (íþúťÏøūôøŶüïÏ) and engaged in business on his behalf,26 or funded by a loan and repaid by the slave’s future earnings.27 However, extant evidence of manumission without financial compensation is limited. Pseudo-Aristotle advised slave-masters to incentivise domestic slaves, who would not have had any earning power, with the prospect of future manumission.28 Another fragment suggests slaves purchased to care for a child might expect their manumission when that child married.29 The historical record also attests to some testamentary manumissions.30 Freed male slaves became metics with personal and legal but no political rights unless citizenship was also granted as a reward for exceptional public service.31 Metics also had ongoing commitments to their former slave-masters, probably specified on a case-by-case basis as part of the manumission agreement. Plato’s Laws require, on sanction of re-enslavement, metics to visit their former slave-master three times a month for “just and feasible” tasks, gain his approval for marriage, and leave Athens within twenty years. The Laws also prohibit metics from becoming richer than their former master by requiring the metic to give his master any surplus.32 25

Plato, Leg. 9.879A, 9.882A–C. On Athenian slave occupations, including the íþúťÏ øūôøŶüïÏ, see further Garlan, Greece, 60–73, 92–93; Rihll, “Athens,” 55, 61–69; Kyrtatas, “Economy Greek,” 96–109; Golden, “Greek Family,” 140–43. 27 For the loan as either from the slave-master or from Greek associations established for this purpose, see Garlan, Greece, 73–75; Rihll, “Athens,” 56–57. 28 [Aristotle], Oec. 1.5.6 (1344b15–20). 29 “Anon. Fr. 582,” cited by Rihll, “Athens,” 58. 30 Rihll, “Athens,” 58; Kyrtatas, “Economy Greek,” 107. 31 Garlan, Greece, 77–84. I am unpersuaded by Rihll (“Athens,” 56, 59–60), through Demosthenes (Pro Phorm. 28–30, 34), that a possible Athenian desire to protect one’s status might have caused a systematic under recording of those citizens who were once, or were descended from, slaves. Dio Chrysostom (2 Serv. lib. 17) claims that an Athenian law actively prohibited those born into slavery from receiving citizenship. While Garlan (Greece, 83) questions Dio Chrysostom’s reliability, I suggest his Roman audience would assume as credible his implicit contrast between their contemporary slavery ethos with his historical claim about Athens. 32 Plato, Leg. 11.915A–C (Bury). 26

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It is impossible to estimate the proportion of slaves who were manumitted, but later Greeks expressed surprise both at the frequency of manumissions in the Roman Republic and at how the Romans grew their state by granting their freedmen political rights.33 II. Sparta For Athenians, the principal contrast to their chattel slavery was Spartan Helotage, a form of serfdom. The Helots were ethnically Greek, not natally alienated, owned by the Spartan state and only designated to serve individual Spartans, and acknowledged to be free beyond Sparta’s borders. The Helots worked their own designated land parcel, from which they paid a tribute. They probably also had other personal obligations to serve either their designated master or the Spartan state.34 They arguably had more freedom than many Athenian chattel slaves; yet the Spartans treated the Helots worse and they rebelled more, notoriously so.35 For example, rhetorician Athenaeus (AD 170–230) claims that the Spartans degraded the Helots to remind them of their lowly slave status through forcing them to wear dog-skin caps and drink themselves into a drunken stupor, by subjecting all to regular corporal punishments regardless of any wrongdoing, by executing any over-vigorous Helot, and by punishing Helot supervisors, up to and including by execution, for not rebuking any overweight Helot or not ensuring full tribute payment.36 Xenophon graphically describes the Helot attitude towards their enslavers: “Whenever … mention was made of Spartiatae, no one was able to conceal the fact that he would be glad to eat them raw.”37 Plutarch ascribes the radical Spartan social equality to Lycurgus’s reforms.38 Spartan citizens even called themselves øŧ ľöøóøó (“the Equals”), but their equality was at the Helots’ expense. III. Kinds of Slavery Elsewhere Classical Athens and Sparta form the historical context for our impending Aristotelian analysis. While evidence of slavery practices in the other Greek city33

Philip V of Macedon (late third century BC); letter trans. in Austin, “Hellenistic World,” 75.31–34. Cf. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 1.9.4; Appian, Bell. civ. 2.17.120. Cf. also Garlan, Greece, 83; Bradley, “Republic,” 254–55. 34 Garlan, Greece, 95–98; Cartledge, “Helots,” 75–76, 79–83. 35 Garlan, Greece, 153–55, 176–80; Cartledge, “Helots,” 83–88. 36 Athenaeus, Deipn. 14.657D–E; for others, see Plutarch, Lyc. 28.1–5; Thucydides, Hist. 4.80.3–4. 37 Xenophon, Hell. 3.3.6 (Brownson). 38 Plutarch, Lyc. 8.1–9.2, 10.1–3, 24.4. For its historicity, see Hammond, History, 102– 3.

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states is limited, there appear to have been significant differences between them and Athens. Indeed, Garlan warns against the “pernicious” political and historical error of Marxist historians conflating the different Greek slaveries.39 While Garlan accepts that the slaveries shared some characteristics, he also argues that it is “exaggeratedly reductionist” not to acknowledge the differences that arose because of the historical particularities of each Greek state.40 For example, in Gortyna, some îøŶõøó and øūôěüëó could advocate their own case in court and may have had their marriages and personal possessions protected, yet they also could be traded and have any descendants sold off by their slave-masters. Others in Gortyna who were reduced to debt slavery retained family links and political rights, probably could not be sold abroad, and shared with their slave-masters any fine imposed on another for their mistreatment.41 Aristotle also mentions some îøŶõøó and øūôěüëó in Crete who, he claims, enjoyed the same rights as their masters except being unable to join the gymnasia and bear arms; but, with nothing further known about them, it is difficult to clarify further.42 Rather than presume an immutable binary division between ‘slave’ and ‘free,’ we should probably appreciate a spectrum of statuses between them in antiquity given how rhetorican Pollux (second century AD) categorised his plethora of specialised Greek nomenclature as a range of statuses in between (absolute) slave and free.43 ÓøýõĻÏÓøýõïŤë appears to have been used by Greek writers in a generic sense, but when necessary they did distinguish further.44 It is difficult to ascertain how much chattel slavery spread into the other Greek city-states beyond Athens and Chios. Chattel slavery appears to have spread in the later Hellenistic kingdoms, although probably only in towns and among the elites and other Hellenistic settlers; otherwise the various local particularities of debt slavery and serfdom continued as before.45 Multiple forms of slavery could and did coexist concurrently. While Athenian chattel slavery 39

Garlan, Greece, 202. Garlan, Greece, 85–86, 100, here 85. 41 Garlan, Greece, 91, 100; cf. R. Schlaifer, “Greek Theories of Slavery from Homer to Aristotle,” HSCP 47 (1935): 105–6, 110–12. David M. Lewis (“Slavery and Manumission,” in The Oxford Handbook of Ancient Greek Law, ed. Edward Harris and Mirko Canevaro [Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming; doi: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199599257.001 .0001, Aug 2015], §3), however, is less convinced. 42 Aristotle, Pol. 2.2.12 (1264a20–23); cf. Garlan, Greece, 100. 43 Pollux, Onom. 3.78–83; cf. Garlan, Greece, 87. 44 Garlan, Greece, 19–22, 26–27, 30–31, 87–89, 95, 98–102, 201–2. 45 Dorothy J. Thompson, “Slavery in the Hellenistic World,” AMW 208–10. 40

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is the best-known form of slavery in the classical Greek era, Rihll concludes that it was probably not typical of Greek slavery overall.46

C. Aristotle: Natural and Conquest Slavery I. Natural Slavery Definition We turn to Aristotle’s theory of natural slavery, cognisant of both his Greek historical context and what Hunt calls its “immense and pernicious influence.”47 Garnsey dismisses Aristotle’s “battered shipwreck of a theory” for its multiple inconsistencies,48 but more recent scholars argue that many have misunderstood Aristotle’s logically coherent, but empirically questionable, argument.49 We review his natural slave definition before analysing his implied ethics. 1. “The Best” Rule Aristotle grounds his argument on his empirical claim that all compound objects essentially and beneficially consist of a ruling and a ruled part.50 In the best person, the soul rules the body despotically, i.e., with neither impediment nor distortion, for the body’s actions are inseparable from the soul’s command; but the intellect rules the appetite politically because, although separable in action, the best person’s appetite listens to the intellect’s judgement of reason.51 Such is Aristotle’s pathway to virtue; the opposite, where the body and the appetite rule the soul and the intellect, is the pathway to vice.52 Simpson clarifies that what Aristotle means by “the best” is not the average: 46

Rihll, “Athens,” 51. Hunt, “Greek Literary,” 41. 48 Peter Garnsey, Ideas of Slavery from Aristotle to Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 107; for others, see also Darrell Dobbs, “Natural Right and the Problem of Aristotle’s Defense of Slavery,” JOP 56 (1994): 71–72. 49 Dobbs, “Natural Right,” 72–73; Peter L. P. Simpson, “Aristotle’s Defensible Defense of Slavery,” Hypnos 7 (2001): 237–38; Malcolm Heath, “Aristotle on Natural Slavery,” Phron. 53 (2008): 268. Cf. Heath (“Natural Slavery,” 244): “Here, ideological repugnance has proved a deterrent. But Aristotle has a good track-record for intelligent reasoning. If in this case he reasons intelligently from beliefs that I do not share to conclusions that I reject and deplore, I see no cause for embarrassment.” The following is indebted (but not beholden) to Simpson’s commentary. 50 Aristotle, Pol. 1.2.8–9 (1254a20–33); cf. Simpson, “Aristotle,” 229–30. 51 Aristotle, Pol. 1.2.9–12 (1254a28–b14); cf. Simpson, “Aristotle,” 230–31. 52 Simpson, “Aristotle,” 230. 47

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The sort of random sampling that makes no prior judgments about better and worse and that we moderns prefer as the way to truth is here precisely the way to error. It may tell us what, in a given population, is common or average; it will not, unless the population includes only the best, tell us what is natural.53

By “the best” Aristotle excludes exceptions to the norm; for example, the diseased and vicious (e.g., greedy or otherwise degenerate) men. Only virtuous men with healthy souls and bodies reveal what Aristotle reckons to be empirically true “by nature.” Indeed, “nature,” in the sense of natural processes, such as child rearing, often fails to conform things to what they should be “by nature.”54 2. Differentiated Rule Aristotle proceeds to distinguish between different kinds of rule in contrast to those, including Plato, who argue that all rule is identical in kind.55 To Aristotle, husbands rule their wives politically (only barbarians, he claims, rule their wives, and Persians rule their sons, despotically)56 because the best male possesses greater deliberation, control and authority by nature than his wife, who can contribute to decision making, but not (even in the best) fully impose (she does not have “full authority”) her rational deliberation upon herself and others.57 The best man can foresee with his mind to deliberate teleologically, i.e., to reason how to achieve the Aristotelian goal of the happy, virtuous and good life.58 Children’s minds are, however, undeveloped; therefore, they are to be ruled by their father politically and monarchically (akin to a king ruling over his proportionally equal subjects) due to his seniority and merited affection.59 Humans rule despotically over tame animals, and taming wild animals is empirically better for both the human owner and the animal. Aristotle argues

53

Simpson, “Aristotle,” 230; cf. Aristotle, Pol. 1.2.10 (1254a36–b3). Aristotle, Pol. 1.2.14 (1254b33–34), 1.2.19 (1255b3–4), 1.5.2 (1259b6–7). For Aristotle's multiple uses of the term "nature," see Heath, “Natural Slavery,” 260. 55 Aristotle, Pol. 1.1.2 (1252a7–18), 1.2.8 (1254a24–25), 1.5.6 (1260a8–14); cf. Eth. nic. 8.10 (1160a31–61a9). For Plato, see Gregory Vlastos, “Slavery in Plato’s Thought,” PhRev 50 (1941): 293. 56 Barbarians (Aristotle, Pol. 1.1.5 [1252b5–9]); Persians (Eth. nic. 8.10.4 [1160b28–33]) 57 Aristotle, Pol. 1.5.6 (1260a8–14) (Rackham). 58 For Aristotle’s ethical reasoning, including the connection between rationality and virtue, and his ultimate goal of happiness or the good life, see Richard Kraut, “Aristotle’s Ethics,” SEP (Summer 2018). 59 Aristotle, Pol. 1.5.2 (1259a40–b18), 1.5.6 (1260a8–14). 54

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that the greater the thing is under rule, the greater is the ruling; ruling over human slaves, therefore, is even better than ruling over animals.60 3. Slave Rule Aristotle argues that a man’s rule over his natural slave is despotic because in the best natural slave that teleological deliberative faculty to reason his way to the good life is absent. While he can perceive his master’s reason through his master’s commands and be taught skills, he cannot reason teleologically about those skills.61 Therefore, he requires a slave-master’s direction, to whom the slave absolutely and wholly belongs as an article of property. Consequently, the natural slave’s best work can only be what he does with his body.62 The natural slave is a living tool, like an animal: “The usefulness of slaves diverges little from that of animals; bodily service for the necessities of life is forthcoming from both.”63 Such rule, Aristotle reasons, is by nature essential and the best, benefiting both the natural slave-master and the natural slave,64 because “when both master and slave are designed by nature for their positions their interests are the same,”65 i.e., aligned to the slave-master’s goal of his own good life.66 To Aristotle, there unarguably exist some who are slaves by nature. Indeed, he suggests the fact of being ruled over by a slave-master is itself evidence that one is a natural slave.67 II. Implied Ethics 1. On Sparta For Aristotle, managing slaves is unimportant and troublesome. Indeed, it should be delegated to a steward so that one can devote himself instead to 60 Aristotle, Pol. 1.2.8 (1254a25–28), 1.2.12 (1254b10–14); cf. Simpson, “Aristotle,” 229, 231. 61 Aristotle, Pol. 1.1.4 (1252a31–34), 1.5.6 (1260a11–14), 1.2.23 (1255b34–35). Simpson (“Aristotle,” 232–33) argues that previous commentators and translators of Aristotle (Pol. 1.2.13 [1254b23–24]) have misunderstood him to be distinguishing between the natural slave and an animal when Aristotle is in fact continuing his comparison. For Aristotle’s natural slave’s limited rationality, see Dobbs, “Natural Right,” 79–86; Simpson, “Aristotle,” 233–34; Heath , “Natural Slavery,” 244–53. 62 Aristotle, Pol. 1.2.6 (1254a10–13), 1.2.7 (1254a14–18). 63 Aristotle, Pol. 1.2.14 (1254b25–27) (Rackham). 64 Aristotle, Pol. 1.2.13 (1254b19–21), cf. 1.1.4 (1252a31–34), 1.2.20–21 (1255b6–14). 65 Aristotle, Pol. 3.4.4 (1278b33–35) (Rackham). 66 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 10.6.8 (1177a8–9); cf. Pol. 3.5.10 (1280a32–35). 67 Aristotle, Pol. 1.2.13 (1254b21–23).

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politics and philosophy.68 Nevertheless, his comments on Sparta’s failure to manage their Helots provide some insight. He observes that if the Spartans loosen their control over the Helots, then the Helots respond by insolently reckoning themselves to be equal (Ŭûþ÷) to their Spartan masters, but if the Spartans treat the Helots more harshly, then the Helots hate and plot against the Spartans even more.69 Indeed, Aristotle claims his approach is the golden mean of slave welfare between two extremes,70 but milder slavery than Sparta is hardly mild by any objective standard. Indeed, Aristotle’s principle is to select one’s slaves carefully to avoid anyone highly spirited and to prefer a racial mix of pre-existing slaves or, as second best, newly enslaved barbarians.71 In other words, Aristotle’s ethical solution to the Spartan Helotage problem is the Athenian practice of trading natally alienated chattel slaves. Plato’s earlier, non-systematic and much briefer remarks on natural slavery appear to be an embryonic version of Aristotle.72 Like Aristotle, Plato’s slave welfare comments are in the context of Sparta’s troublesome Helots, and he also recommends selecting a racial mix of “docile and good” slaves.73 He also urges slave-masters to exercise as much personal restraint against using violence as possible, to employ a simple command-only mode of instruction and not to engage in “foolish indulgence” such as friendly joking that could cause slaves to become conceited.74 However, Plato’s concern is more for the slavemaster’s character as revealed in how he treats his inferiors such as slaves than for slaves’ welfare. To Plato, the virtuous slave-master will produce good slaves.75 Aristotle’s only explicit disagreement with Plato is to advocate some reasoning (not just by command only) with slaves to help them learn their tasks,76 advice which coheres with Aristotle’s view of natural slaves’ limited rationality.

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Aristotle, Pol. 1.2.23 (1255b33–37). Aristotle, Pol. 2.6.2–4 (1269a34–b11). 70 See further Cartledge, “Helots,” 84. 71 Aristotle, Pol. 7.9.9 (1330a26–30). Aristotle’s preference for pre-existing slaves appears to be because their lack of spirit can be verified, whereas for newly enslaved barbarians, their character is only promised. 72 Vlastos, “Slavery Plato,” 301–3. For a more recent synopsis of Plato on slavery, see McKeown, “Resistance Greek,” 168–72. 73 Plato, Leg. 6.776D (Bury). 74 Plato, Leg. 6.778A (Bury) 75 Plato, Leg. 6.777D–E. 76 Aristotle, Pol. 1.5.11 (1260b5–7). 69

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2. Manumission Aristotle also promises a rationale for incentivising natural slaves with the prospect of manumission,77 but such, if ever composed, is no longer extant. Although some might think it inconsistent with his definition of natural slavery for the best natural slave to need the prospect of manumission, perhaps Aristotle could argue that the best natural slaves could feel freedom’s allure without possessing the rational capacity for self-direction if manumitted. Aristotle might also argue for it as a pragmatic means of extracting the most from the best natural slaves.78 Perhaps Aristotle could consider it just to manumit those who were no longer natural slaves, but I suggest it would be near impossible for any chattel slave to demonstrate to their Aristotelian-minded slave-master that they were anything other than a natural slave.79 Indeed, no one unjustly enslaved in Athens had a viable opportunity to seek redress. This also appears consistent with the evidence of only very limited gratis slave manumission in Athens. 3. Justice Aristotle is emphatic: “For these [natural slaves] slavery is an institution is both expedient and just.”80 Indeed, Aristotle’s logic extends to claiming that it is by nature just to wage war to subjugate those natural slaves who are refusing to submit; it is akin to taming wild animals.81 In his Nicomachean Ethics, he argues that there can be neither justice nor any law between master and slave, only justice in a metaphorical sense analogous to the domestic justice between father and child; both the natural slave and child are “as it were, a part of oneself, and no one chooses to harm himself; hence there can be no injustice towards them, and hence nothing just or unjust in the political sense.”82 In other words, slave-masters’ slave welfare should be autonomous from the state. 77

Aristotle, Pol. 7.9.9 (1330a32–33). Contra Dobbs, “Natural Right,” 87. 79 Since Aristotle always writes of the natural slave’s present condition that Aristotle (Pol. 1.2.8 [1254a23–24]) states is only for some congenital, Dobbs (“Natural Right,” 88– 92) and Simpson (“Aristotle,” 234) suggest that their state could cease through education. But Aristotle distinguished between children, whose teleological reasoning is immature, and natural slaves, where it is wholly absent. Perhaps a chattel slave could somehow demonstrate his on-going compliance to his slave-master while suggesting to him teleologically-reasoned courses of action, but the possibility of any chattel slave having such an opportunity must have been vanishingly small. 80 Aristotle, Pol. 1.2.15 (1255a1–3) (Rackham). 81 Aristotle, Pol. 1.3.8 (1256b24–27). 82 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 5.6.4–9, here 5.6.8–9 (1134a25–b17, here 34b11–14) (Rackham). 78

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Perhaps, therefore, Aristotle’s ‘metaphorical’ justice is no more than a play on words. We also turn to Aristotle’s alleged critics, “the depressingly short list of ancient critics of slavery,”83 for further analysis on Aristotle’s relationship between justice and slavery.84 III. Aristotle’s Alleged Critics on Conquest Slavery: His Philosophical Context 1. Justice and the Conquest Slavery Convention We group Aristotle’s alleged critics in pairs. The first pair, according to Aristotle’s portrayal, debates conquest slavery.85 Indeed, his first critic apparently criticises the ÷ĻöøÏ (“convention”) of conquest slavery because who enslaves whom is arbitrarily determined by force.86 Aristotle, however, claims that this debate is actually on the extent of the (unwritten) conquest ÷ĻöøÏ rather than on the merits of conquest slavery, because the first critic reckons that the conquest ÷ĻöøÏ unjustly allows the strong, a condition of only the body, to enslave those conquered. Whereas the critic’s debating partner reckons that, since anyone strong enough to conquer another must also possess virtue, the conquest ÷ĻöøÏ justly allows the strong and virtuous, a condition of both body and soul, to enslave those conquered. To Aristotle, therefore, this debate highlights only how both agree with him that the justice of enslaving captives depends on the condition of the conqueror’s soul. Both sides, Aristotle claims, assume that the virtuous can justly enslave those without virtue.87 2. Natural versus Ethnic Slavery Aristotle also attacks the inconsistency of his third and fourth critics. His third critic claims that conquest slavery is always just in all circumstances yet also admits that while it is unjust for barbarians to enslave Greeks and especially

83

Hunt, “Greek Literary,” 40. For these Aristotelian opponents, see Giuseppe Cambiano, “Aristotle and the Anonymous Opponents of Slavery,” trans. Mario Di Gregorio, in Classical Slavery, ed. Moses I. Finley (London: Cass, 1987), 28–31; Dobbs, “Natural Right,” 75–77; Garnsey, Ideas, 75–78; Simpson, “Aristotle,” 234–37; Hunt, “Greek Literary,” 40–41. 85 This appears to be in the context of the sophist philosophical debate over whether the Greek ÷ĻöøÏ is justly founded on something physical or natural, i.e., based on empirically demonstrable reality, or unjustly founded only on the arbitrary and invented morality of its promulgators. See further C. C. W. Taylor and Mi-Kyoung Lee, “The Sophists,” SEP (Winter 2016): §2. 86 Aristotle, Pol. 1.2.3 (1253b15–23). 87 Aristotle, Pol. 1.2.16–17 (1255a3–22); cf. Simpson, “Aristotle,” 234–36. 84

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their nobility, it is always just for Greeks to enslave barbarians.88 Conversely Aristotle’s fourth critic, the Greek noble, reckons it just to enslave barbarian nobles while arguing that his own ancestry would render unjust his own enslavement. Again, Aristotle highlights that both critics acknowledge that the justice of captive slavery depends upon some personal characteristic.89 While our knowledge of these alleged critics is only from Aristotle, none apparently argued that the Athenian practice of conquest slavery was in any way unjust. Indeed, Aristotle claims that they all uphold something similar to Aristotle’s natural slavery theory. Simpson also argues that Aristotle goes further than these critics in hinting that Helen of Troy, a daughter of Zeus (noble ancestry) who was renowned both for her beauty (an attribute of body) and (in at least some accounts) for her adultery (evidence of her vicious soul), was a natural slave.90 Thus, Aristotle may allude to the just enslavement of some of his fellow Greeks who, as natural slaves, deserve it! Today many assume Aristotle to be empirically flawed, racist and immoral, but he was also, I suggest, coherent, nuanced and less ethnicist than his contemporaries.91 IV. Equality and Friendship For Aristotle, since there is no meaningful sense of justice between natural slave-master and natural slave and justice is inseparable to equality,92 there can be no meaningful equality between them either. Indeed, Aristotle consistently excludes slaves whenever he refers to human equality. He can describe the state’s citizenship as comprising those who are ĠõïŴùïúøÏ (“free”) and ŬûøÏ,93 and can distinguish between republican and monarchical government based on either numerical or proportional equality, respectively, between the natures of both ruler and ruled;94 but Aristotle excludes slaves from both comparisons. Throughout Aristotle’s Politics and Nicomachean Ethics, slavery is presented as the antithesis of human equality.95 88

Aristotle, Pol. 1.2.18 (1255a22–33); cf. Simpson, “Aristotle,” 236. Aristotle, Pol. 1.2.19 (1255a34–36); cf. Simpson, “Aristotle,” 237. 90 Simpson, “Aristotle,” 237. 91 For how Greeks (including Aristotle) blamed the inferior barbarian climate for their natural inferiority, see Heath, “Natural Slavery,” 253–54. However, Aristotle(Pol. 7.6.1–2 [1327b18–28a1]), also argues that ethnicity is derivative of their natural deficiency rather than its primary cause. Thus, while he would probably endorse the antebellum chattel slavery of black Africans, he might also endorse the enslavement of some of the white colonists! 92 Aristotle, Pol. 3.7.1 (1282b14–24). 93 Aristotle, Pol. 1.2.21 (1255b21). 94 Aristotle, Pol. 1.5.2 (1259a40–b18). 95 Most prominently at Aristotle, Eth. nic. 5.5.6 (1132b32–33a1); cf. Plato, Leg. 6.777D. 89

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Perhaps it could be argued that Aristotle treats all persons equally in the sense of in proportion to their differing natures, for all coherent theories presuppose some kind of equality basis,96 but not even Aristotle goes as far as describing it as such.97 Aristotle’s division of all things into ruler and ruled appears far too intrinsic for the gap between natural slave-master and natural slave to be bridged in any meaningful sense. Indeed, Aristotle observes, “master and slave have nothing in common.”98 Husbands, wives and children differ in proportion to their teleological reasoning. Thus, they may be deemed proportionately equal to each other. But, for Aristotle, such reasoning is binary vis-à-vis natural slaves: natural slaves possess no such reasoning; thus, they are the unequals. While Plato prohibited friendship with slaves,99 Aristotle, for whom friendship (whether intra-family, inter-citizen, between ruler and ruled, or intra-state) was a noble and beneficial mark of civilisation,100 argues for “a certain community of interest and friendship” between natural slave-master and natural slave, because with the best of both there would be no need for any force.101 However, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics argues that friendship presumes equality,102 and is to be celebrated between those “in the prime of life” (i.e., the best) for assisting both “in noble deeds … to plan and to execute.”103 In other words, friendship involves the meeting of minds, but natural slaves do not have the ability to reason teleologically. Thus, Aristotle is dismissive when he distinguishes between different types of friendship; he denies friendship with slaves as slaves and allows only “little scope” for friendship with slaves as human beings, akin only to the degree of friendship between a tyrant and those he rules.104

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Gosepath, “Equality,” §2.2; Pojman, “Theories of Equality,” 3. Not even, a ‘metaphorical’ equality! 98 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 8.11.6 (1161b3) (Rackham). 99 Plato, Leg. 6.757A, 6.777D–78A. Plato may be criticising the example of Archytas, Frag. A7, A8; cf. Golden, “Greek Family,” 137–38. 100 Aristotle, Pol. 2.1.15–17 (1262a39–b25), 3.5.14 (1280b35–81a4), 6.3.5 (1320b5–6); Eth. nic. 8–9 (1155a–72a16). 101 Aristotle, Pol. 1.2.21 (1255b13–15) (Rackham) 102 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 8.11.5 (1161a25–31). 103 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 8.1.2 (1155a14–17), cf. 8.11.5 (1161a25–31) (Rackham). 104 Aristotle, Eth. nic. 8.11.6–8 (1161a31–b10) (Rackham). 97

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V. Other Alleged Critics of Natural Slavery Modern scholarship identifies a handful of other alleged critics of natural slavery, but they are somewhat ambiguous and probably insignificant. None of them are necessarily critiquing captive slavery. 1. Alcidamas Garnsey reviews a fragment from the sophist Alcidamas: “The deity gave liberty to all men, and nature created no one a slave.”105 Alcidamas’s historical context was his defence of the Theban-assisted liberation of the Messenian Helots from Sparta in c. 370 BC, but his literary context is unclear. Cambiano suggests that its scope is limited only to those Helots, fellow Greeks, whose enslavement and treatment even Plato and Aristotle thought was contentious.106 Garnsey may be guilty of wishful thinking in claiming that it “reads as a negative comment on the concept of natural slavery, and thus as an attack on the morality of the institutional slavery, and that is how I propose to take it.”107 But even if we were to accept Alcidamas’s universality, it would not follow that it is an attack on slavery per se, for this chapter will also demonstrate that many in Rome upheld slavery by the mere fact of conquest alone. 2. Euripides One of Euripides’s (fifth century BC) slave characters claims that the only disgraceful aspect in a slave is the name and that some slaves’ souls are no worse than (or, in other fragments, better than) those of the free.108 Notwithstanding whether a slave’s voice in Greek plays should be taken literally (in the play, the slave character is describing himself as noble for agreeing to murder his slave-master’s illegitimate offspring if his slave-master’s wife will murder her husband [i.e., his slave-master]!), Aristotle would not necessarily disagree with Euripides. Aristotle’s focus was on the best slave-master and the best slave, not on the worst in any population sample, and he hints that some who are free (such as this wife) might actually be natural slaves. Moreover, Aristotle would evaluate a slave committing such a murder and such conspiracy to murder as vicious not noble. To Aristotle, such vice and faulty reasoning would be evidence of natural slavery.

105

Garnsey, Ideas, 75; cf. Stephanos, Scholia to Arist. Rhet. 74.31–32; Aristotle, Rhet. 1.13.2 (1373b18); cf. also Hunt, “Greek Literary,” 40. 106 Cambiano, “Aristotle Opponents,” 31–32. 107 Garnsey, Ideas, 76. 108 Euripides, Ion 2.854–56; Frag. 511, 831.

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3. Prohibitions against Purchasing Slaves One pseudonymous source records an obscure law (c. 330 BC) of Lycurgus that prohibited Athenians from purchasing as slaves certain prisoners of war, but its scope was possibly limited to preventing the purchase of those who had been previously enslaved by the defeated foe without that foe’s consent.109 If correct, then its purpose may have been to prevent a slave from escaping from his current slave-master in wartime without that master’s (or if killed, his descendants’) approval even if that master was subsequently defeated in battle. Thus, the law may be only a mutually beneficial regulation to discourage slaves from taking advantage of any intra Greek wartime confusion.110 Even more obscure is the ancient claim that the Corinthian tyrant Peisander (sixth century BC) once banned the purchase of slaves.111 4. Philemon An extant fragment from the playwright Philemon (c. 360s–260s BC) distinguishes between enslavement by fortune and by nature.112 While this may allude to a Stoic (or proto-Stoic) distinction that we analyse shortly, the fragment does not substantiate a claim that its speaker might be critical of enslaving captives. Collectively, this is very thin gruel from which to substantiate any significant opposition to natural slavery, let alone opposition to barbarian conquest slavery, in classical Athens before the rise of Hellenism and Stoicism. VI. Summary: Aristotelian Equality Ethics on Slave Welfare We focus upon Athenian slavery because it is the best-known Greek example, but it is only one slavery instance among the Greek city-states, each of whose slave welfare details probably varied. Athenian slavery also serves as a useful contrast to Roman slavery.

109

[Plutarch], Vit. X orat. 842a; cf. Rihll, “Athens,” 53–54. Rosivach (“Enslaving Barbaroi,” 141) suggests that it may have been prompted by how Phillip II of Macedonia began enslaving Greek prisoners of war. 111 Hunt, “Greek Literary,” 41n67; cf. O. Picard, “Periandre et l’interdiction d’acquerir des esclaves,” in Aux origines de l’hellénisme: la Crète et la Grèce: hommage à Henri van Effenterre, ed. H. van Effenterre and Centre G. Glotz, Histoire ancienne et médiévale 15 (Paris: Sorbonne, 1984), 187–91. 112 Philemon, Incert. fab. frag. 39; trans. in Thomas B. Harbottle, ed. Dictionary of Quotations (Classical), 3rd ed. (London: Swan Sonnenschein, 1906), 403; Garnsey, Ideas, 76n1. 110

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Both Plato and Aristotle deny any meaningful equality, justice and friendship between slave and free. While Aristotle’s compositional aim was probably only philosophical, its complete inequality between slave and free coheres with what we know of the Athenian slavery ethos with its next-to-zero concern for slave welfare, differential slave penalties, minimal numbers of manumissions and metic deportations. Athenian slavery appears to be purely exploitative with no assimilative intent. No Aristotelian-minded person, I suggest, would require slaves to be treated – as Paul requires in Col 4:1 – with an apparently unqualified justice and some kind of equity and/or equality however interpreted. No one in Aristotle’s era appears to have questioned the practice of barbarian conquest slavery. Indeed, Aristotle relies upon how his critics concede that some but not others deserve captive slavery to argue that they also endorse some kind of natural slavery justification. Today we, when reading Aristotle, can deduce the possibility of unjustly enslaving non-natural slaves, but it appears that Aristotle either did not reckon on the possibility or was unconcerned about it occurring. Instead, Aristotle relies upon his twofold claim that slaves’ enslavement per se demonstrates that they are slaves by nature and that it is just to wage war to capture natural slaves. He assumes, I suggest, that captive slavery is more or less coterminous with natural slavery. The historical context and scope of Alcidamas’s apparent rejection of natural slavery remain uncertain, but his criticism may only be against intra Greek slavery rather than against all captive slavery. Philemon appears to be the first to distinguish between slavery by nature and slavery by fortune; thus, he may be a forerunner of a Stoic distinction that is also evident in the Roman slavery ethos. Contrary to Garnsey, however, this chapter will demonstrate that Stoic rejection of natural slavery did not in any way diminish the Stoics’ practice of conquest slavery. Instead, they justified the latter differently by means apparently unanticipated by Aristotle.

D. Between Athens and Hellenism: Stoicism and Rome In 338 BC, Philip II of Macedonia defeated an alliance between Thebes and Athens, enslaving the former but treating Athens leniently.113 However, everything changed for Athens after the death of Philip’s successor, Alexander the Great, in 322 BC. Aristotle was exiled and died a year later. Athens lost its independence in a war with Antipater. Plutocracy followed. Classical Athens

113

Hammond, History, 570.

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was subsumed into Hellenism.114 Interest in a polis-centred political philosophy was replaced with an introspective philosophy of the sufficient wise man.115 Assuming Phelps Brown is correct, political philosophy did not return until the rise of individualism nearly two thousand years later. Zeno (born c. 334 BC) founded Stoicism.116 Zeno and his fellow Stoics rejected natural slavery because every human soul was part of the divine ÷ïŶöëõĻñøÏ, with enslavement only the result of (mis-)fortune.117 Chattel slavery spread alongside Hellenism into the Hellenistic kingdoms, but probably co-existing with unchanging local variations. For example, ongoing debt slavery is attested in Ptolemaic Egypt,118 and in the Seleucid East, the õëøŤ system, probably closer to tenant farming than to serfdom, continued with perhaps only the paymaster changing.119 Meanwhile, a new power, Rome, was growing in the west. Stoicism reached Rome in the mid-second century BC, but since our knowledge of Stoicism is largely mediated through Roman voices (especially Cicero, Seneca and Marcus Aurelius),120 it is difficult to distinguish between Stoic and Roman ethe. Extant evidence of Stoic thought on literal slavery before Seneca is limited,121 but Manning cites a handful of Stoic fragments to warn against assuming that Stoicism’s natural equality between slave and free led to improvements in slave welfare.122 In any case, Stoic denial of natural slavery did not lead to a questioning of literal slavery; indeed, Stoic philosophers continued to own slaves.123 Furthermore, according to Garlan, the Stoic 114

Hammond, History, 645–49. Finley, Ancient Slavery, 120. 116 For a fuller treatment of Stoic attitudes towards slavery and on Stoic influences upon Roman law and practice, see C. E. Manning, “Stoicism and Slavery in the Roman Empire,” ANRW II 33.6 (1989): 1518–44; Bradley, Slavery & Society, 135–39; Garnsey, Ideas, 128– 52. Epicureanism, in time the main philosophical alternative to Stoicism, also rejected any natural inequality between slave and free (David Konstan, Some Aspects of Epicurean Psychology, PhA 25 [Leiden: Brill, 1973], 63–64n20); Manning, “Stoicism,” 1522). 117 Manning, “Stoicism,” 1518, 1530–31; Hunt, “Greek Literary,” 45. 118 Garlan, Greece, 91–92. 119 Garlan, Greece, 106–8; cf. Thompson, “Hellenistic,” 194–213. 120 In addition, to a more disputed degree, Philo. 121 Some reckon that Posidonius was behind Diodorus Siculus’s slave-sympathetic account (Hist. 34/35.2–48) of the First Slave War in Sicily (Garlan, Greece, 151n42; Bradley, “Republic,” 247; Garnsey, Ideas, 56–57; contra James Morton, “Rebels and Slaves: Reinterpreting the First Sicilian Slave War” [MSc thesis, University of Edinburgh, 2008], 8–12). 122 Manning, “Stoicism,” 1520–24. 123 Garlan, Greece, 126. 115

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understanding of slavery as only the consequence of fortune made the enslavement of men in the Hellenistic kingdoms easier to justify; no one had to argue that the enslaved merited enslavement, only to acknowledge the fact of enslavement.124 Conquest alone, the rest of this chapter argues, became sufficient to justify one’s slavery ethos. Stoics, however, tended not to think about the realities of literal slavery; instead they deployed the concept of slavery to think with.125 Freedom was recast metaphorically as the power of independent action, slavery as its opposite: the mind being compelled by one’s own passions, vices or external needs.126 Thus, even a slave-master’s need for or dependence upon his slaves was evidence of his enslavement to them,127 whereas, for slaves, their external enslavement to a master was a matter of indifference: what matters is only the independence of one’s mind.128 Literal enslavement controlled the body, Seneca acknowledged, but “the better part of him [the slave’s mind] is exempt,… is its own master, and is so free and unshackled.”129 The comic writer Menander advised, “Be a slave in a free-spirited way; then you will not be a slave.”130 Moreover, Stoics appear to have satisfied themselves with calls to minimise the number of slaves one needed and to await the cooling of one’s anger before punishing slaves for any perceived misdemeanours.131 For example, the Stoicinfluenced doctor and philosopher Galen (second century AD) urges his friends to wait until their anger has subsided before punishing their slaves with “as many blows as they wished.”132 Before analysing Seneca, we need to review his historical context: Roman slavery.

124 125

Garlan, Greece, 126. Wiedemann, Slavery, 11; cf. Hunt, “Greek Literary,” 24; Joshel, “Roman Literary,”

230. 126

E.g., Diogenes Laertius, Vit. Phil. 7.121 Zeno. E.g., Manes’ abandonment of Diogenes the Cynic as narrated by Seneca, Tranq. 8.7– 9.2; cf. Diogenes Laertius, Vit. Phil. 6.55 Diogenes. 128 Bradley, Slavery & Society, 135–37; cf. Hunt, “Greek Literary,” 45. 129 Seneca, Ben. 3.20 (Basore); cf. Ep. 47.17. 130 “Fr. 857,” cited by Hunt, “Greek Literary,” 45. 131 Rihll, “Athens,” 54; Bradley, “Republic,” 252; cf. Seneca, Ira 1.15.3, 2.25, 3.12.5–7, 3.24.2–3. 132 Galen, Anim. Pass. 1.4, cf. 1.8 (Harkins). 127

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E. Roman Slavery: Seneca’s Historical Context I. Origins and Kinds of Slavery Scholarly reconstructions of the Twelve Tables (fifth century BC) reveal intracommunity debt (nexum) slavery and “sale abroad, across the Tiber” beyond Rome’s border, probably for the persistent failure to repay debt.133 Livy describes a plebiscite in 326 BC abolishing nexum slavery after popular outrage against Papirius for stripping and whipping a young nexus who had resisted his slave-master’s sexual advances.134 What would become commonplace with chattel slaves was earlier considered abhorrent with Roman nexum slaves. While chattel slavery predominates the extant literature, a few sources hint at an ongoing de facto practice of debt slavery in at least some provinces of the Roman empire.135 In 104 BC, Nicomedes III complains that most of his subjects had been carried off by tax collectors (probably because of debt arising from inability to pay) and sold as (chattel?) slaves elsewhere in the empire.136 Agriculturists Varro (first century BC) and Columella (first century AD) both mention debt slaves, called obaerarii and nexum respectively, in rural settings.137 While Romans were prohibited from selling their children into slavery,138 others did so often enough for it to become a topos against barbarous peoples.139 Legal rulings in the Dominate era regulated a twenty-year term for the lease of minors who could not be sold overseas and did not officially lose their ‘free’ status.140 Justinian, aware of the ongoing practice of debt slavery in the Roman provinces, prohibited it in AD 556.141 Scheidel concludes that debt 133

XII Tab. 3.5 (Warmington); cf. Bradley, “Republic,” 244; Jane F. Gardner, “Slavery and Roman Law,” AMW 415. 134 Livy, Ab urbe cond. 8.28; cf. Varro (Ling. 7.105) who dates event to 313 BC. For whether the popular outrage was more over homosexuality, see Craig A. Williams, Roman Homosexuality, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 110. 135 Bradley, Slavery & Society, 13; Keith R. and Bradley and Paul Cartledge, eds., Series Editors’ Introduction to AMW, ix. 136 Diodorus Siculus, Hist. 36.3.1–3. 137 Varro, Rust. 1.17.2; Columella, Rust. 1.3.12; cf. David B. Hollander, Money in the Late Roman Republic, CSCT (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 73–75. Varro speaks of many obaerarii in Asia, Egypt and Illyricum. 138 Walter Scheidel, “The Roman Slave Supply,” AMW 299. Although for infant exposure and perhaps sale, see Scheidel (“Roman Supply,” 297–99) and Ville Vuolanto (“Selling a Freeborn Child: Rhetoric and Social Realities in the Late Roman World,” AncSoc 33 [2003]: 197–202). 139 Vuolanto, “Selling,” 170–79, 203–4. 140 Scheidel, “Roman Supply,” 299. 141 Nov. Iust. 134.7.

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slavery may have been a common de facto practice even though it is not that explicit in the extant literature.142 Thus, I interpret Jewish sources from the Roman era that regulate Jewish debt slavery, for example the Mishnah, to be an indicator of its ongoing practice among Jews. Such works appear too substantial to be only academic works.143 II. Slave Supply There is no known time when Rome did not enslave as chattels those it captured. The mother of the sixth king of Rome, Servius Tullius, was said to have been a war captive from Corniculum and, in some accounts, enslaved by Tullius’s predecessor.144 According to historian Tacitus, by the early Principate many Roman citizens, including those of senator and equine rank, were descended from once-captive slaves.145 As the Republic expanded through warfare and diplomatic subjugation, the defeated alien became a natally alienated slave often traded by a network of dealers away from the front line to Rome or to one of its other major slave trading centres like Corinth or Ephesus. Roman chattel slave reproduction was probably common, but extant evidence is limited until the second century AD.146 Columella advised slave-masters to reward their more fertile female slaves for reproduction of male vernae (“house born”): three and they were excused from labour, more resulted in their manumission.147 However, slave-masters could break up de facto slave marriages and family units until Constantine’s reforms.148 Despite slave reproduction, Bradley and Cartledge argue that the essential connection between Roman slavery and warfare remained unbroken. They conclude: 142

Scheidel, “Roman Supply,” 299–300; cf. Vuolanto, “Selling,” 189–97, 205–6. For the development of the Roman colonate system (which was perhaps in-between tenant farming and serfdom), see Bradley, Slavery & Society, 74; Cartledge, “Helots,” 78; Bodel, “Labour,” 320; Cam Grey, “Slavery in the Late Roman World,” AMW 490–92, 506. 143 Contra Martin, “Ancient Jewish,” 115–16. I do not claim, however, that the Jewish ethos then complied with the Mishnah’s ethics. 144 Livy, Ab urbe cond. 1.38.5–39.3; Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 4.1.1–3; cf. Bradley, “Republic,” 243. 145 Tacitus, Ann. 13.27. 146 Bradley, Slaves & Masters, 62–70; Slavery & Society, 33–35, 39–43, 48–49; Scheidel, “Roman Supply,” 293, 306–8; Gardner, “Roman Law,” 416–17. For further evidence, see H. Sigismund-Nielsen, “Ditis Examen Domus? On the Use of the Term Verna in the Roman Epigraphical Material and Literary Sources,” CM 42 (1991): 221–40. 147 Columella, Rust. 1.9.19; cf. Dig. 1.5.15–16; cf. also Bradley, Slavery & Society, 48– 50. 148 Cod. Iust. 3.38.11; Cod. Theod. 2.25.1; cf. Gardner, “Roman Law,” 425; Grey, “Late Roman,” 487–88, 505–6.

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If a single origin for the practice and maintenance of chattel slavery in antiquity can be identified, it lies in the right of victors in warfare, endemic in the ancient world, to dispose of the defeated as they saw fit: to free, hold to ransom, or kill them; or to retain them in a state of servitude as long as they wished.149

III. Conquest not Natural Slavery Romans consciously distinguished their conquest slavery from an Aristotelianlike natural slavery. Romans separated what was inseparable to Aristotle. I argue that this distinction accounts for how Romans reasoned differently (from Greeks) about slave equality and in some respects slave welfare. In 44 BC, Cicero rejects the Aristotelian threefold distinction by nature of free men, slaves and animals in favour of a twofold distinguishing between men and animals.150 Property ownership is not by nature but through first possession or conquest.151 Although Cicero may have fallen into Aristotle’s trap for his critics when he denounced a provincial governor for handing publicans over for enslavement to “Jews and Syrians, peoples born to be slaves,”152 I judge that Cicero’s rhetorical outburst does not outweigh his more considered stance. While Aristotle argues that it is just to wage war to enslave natural slaves, Cicero reverses the reasoning: it is just to enslave those captured after a just war. While he may have once conceded the possibility of unjust captive slavery, he insisted that Rome only ever fought just wars.153 Thus, Cicero’s only concern for those enslaved after the siege of Pindenissum appears to be for their price at the slave market.154 Meanwhile, Seneca appears content to accept what Aristotle’s critics denied: that anyone anywhere (including himself and his friends) might by fortune (rather than by nature) be captured and enslaved.155

149 Keith R. Bradley and Paul Cartledge, eds., Introduction to AMW, 2; cf. Bradley, Slavery & Society, 27–28, 33; “Republic,” 243. 150 Cicero, Off. 1.4.11–14. 151 Cicero, Off. 1.7.21. 152 Cicero, Prov. cons. 1.5 (1.10) (Gardner). 153 Cicero, Rep. 3.35, 38; Off. 2.26–27; cf. Garnsey, Ideas, 59, 61–62n5. For Cicero’s just war argument, see G. A. Harrer, “Cicero on Peace and War,” CJ 14 (1918): 26–38, Berit Van Neste, “Cicero and St. Augustine’s Just War Theory: Classical Influences on a Christian Idea” (MA thesis, University of South Florida, 2006). Suetonius (Aug. 21.2) claims the same for Augustus: he only fought just wars for due cause. For widespread Roman understanding of their Empire’s expansion as just, see Mary Beard, SPQR: A History of Ancient Rome (London: Profile, 2015), 192–97. 154 Cicero, Att. 5.20.5. 155 Seneca, Ep. 47.10–12.

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Furthermore, denying a natural justification for Roman captive slavery does not appear to be the preserve of only Stoic-influenced Romans. In c. 8 BC, historian Dionysius of Halicarnassus attributes to Rome’s sixth king and apparent ex-slave Servius Tullius a speech in which Tullius both rejects a natural distinction between slave and free and inaugurates the Roman ethos of enlarging the population of their state by (in sequence) conquering, enslaving, manumitting and granting citizenship rights.156 Undoubtedly, Dionysius intended his attribution to advance his contemporary concerns, but his argument relies upon a general consensus among his audience by the late first century BC. Romans told themselves that their practice dated from Rome’s beginnings.157 Roman rejection of a natural slavery justification, however, did not in the least reduce their support for ongoing captive slavery. Later Roman jurists codified the distinction between natural and conquest slavery. Severan jurist Ulpian (early third century AD) observes that, whereas slaves and free are equal in natural law, Roman law treats slaves as “not existing.”158 Florentinus (late fourth century AD) defined slavery as: An institution of the jus gentium, whereby someone is against nature made subject to the ownership of another. Slaves (servi) are so-called, because generals have a custom of selling their prisoners and thereby preserving [servare] rather than killing them: and indeed they are said to be mancipia, because they are captives in the hand (manus) of their enemies.159

Florentius’s etymological justifications may be linguistically indefensible, but their collation into Justinian’s Digest (fifth century AD) demonstrates both the continued rejection of a natural justification for Roman slavery and the continued acceptance of Roman conquest slavery that inter alia granted to the slavemaster the “power of life and death” over those conquered.160 Alan Watson and Bradley suggest that Florentius’s preserved definition is evidence of an uneasiness over the morality of Roman slavery that necessitated its defence,161 but there is no extant evidence of any debate. Bradley also compares numerous 156

Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 4.23.1. In my judgement, it was probably not a Stoic-influenced innovation. Of possible indications of the contrary, I am aware only of Gaius’s claim that the lex Aquila (third century BC) apparently treated slaves and animals alike (Dig. 9.2.2; cf. Justinian, Inst. 4.3; cf. Gardner, “Roman Law,” 415–16). Livy (Ab urbe cond. 36.17.5) also reports an eve-of-battle speech by a Roman commander in 191 BC who claims that the enemy were “born for slavery” (Yardley). Neither, in my judgement, are compelling. 158 Dig. 50.17.32 (Crawford). Cf. and contrast with Philo (Spec. 3.137). 159 Dig. 1.5.4.1–2 (D. N. MacCormick, emphasis original). 160 Gaius, Inst. 1.52. 161 Alan Watson, Roman Slave Law (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1987), 8; Bradley, Slavery & Society, 134–35; cf. Garnsey, Ideas, 48. 157

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Roman examples of derogatory comments about chattel slaves to antebellum equivalents to conclude that Romans considered slaves to be “in all senses a naturally inferior species,”162 but correlation in the antebellum era does not demonstrate causation in the Roman era.163 Romans, I suggest, were also not unaccustomed to applying such insults to all and sundry.164 Such insults directed towards slaves should not outweigh all the evidence to the contrary. Some scholars label this Roman view as “unnatural” slavery,165 but such terminology, while accurate in one sense, perhaps permits the erroneous assumption that only an inferiority by nature can ever have been the historical justification of chattel slavery and that if only the Romans had realised the full logical implications of their natural equality position, then they would have become slavery abolitionists. Such an assumption ignores the Roman self-understanding that conquering others alone fully justified their mass enslavement. We digress briefly to highlight an implication for this monograph. While the introduction of any Christian view of human equality – for example, ontological equality through all created in the divine image – could potentially challenge an Aristotelian-like justification for slavery, it would not in itself challenge anyone’s reliance on a conquest justification alone. Only if Christianity challenged minds on the justice of war or on the acceptability of enslaving the defeated, might it potentially reduce the supply of new slaves. IV. Slave Welfare 1. Variability All slaves were subject to their master’s every whim: whether good, bad or indifferent.166 Extant descriptions of how particular slave-masters treated 162 Bradley, Slavery & Society, 123–25, 134–35, 140–45, here 144; cf. Slaves & Masters, 27–31, 35; “Roman Slavery & Law,” 481, 491–95. 163 For another analysis of Roman slave law that argues for this contrast between it and antebellum chattel slavery, see A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr., Forward to Roman Slave Law, by Alan Watson (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1987), ix–xvi; cf. Watson, Roman Slave Law, 3–4. 164 For insults in Roman political rhetoric as a comparison, see Martin Jehne, “Die Dickfelligkeit der Elite und die Dünnhäutigkeit des Volkes. Invektivkonstellationen in römischen Volksversammlungen,” Saec. 70 (2020): 34–38. 165 Vlastos, “Slavery Plato,” 294n24; William K. C. Guthrie A History of Greek Philosophy, 6 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962–1983), 3:161; Manning, “Stoicism,” 1521, 1540; Hering, Haustafeln, 102n110; cf. Garnsey, Ideas, 105, 116, 126. 166 Neville Morley, “Slavery under the Principate,” AMW 280–83; Bradley, “Resisting Rome,” 378.

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particular slaves are largely anecdotal and manifest a wide variability.167 For example, Cicero’s disregard for his Pindenissum captives contrasts with his extraordinarily warm relationship with his slave and secretary Tiro.168 A few more examples sufficiently illustrate. Cato (mid second century BC) appears the most dismissive of the Roman agriculturists: the master should “sell worn-out oxen, blemished cattle, blemished sheep … an old wagon, old tools, an old slave, a sickly slave, and whatever else is superfluous.”169 However, Plutarch later criticises Cato’s meanness.170 Columella is the most detailed giver of advice including the need to incentivise slaves with the prospect of manumission, seek their advice and listen to their complaints. But he also urges employing them in gangs of ten for better supervision and productivity gains. Indeed, Columella argues that such iustitia (“justice”) and cura (“care”) will greatly benefit slave-masters’ estates.171 Like the other Greco-Roman agriculturists, his primary concern appears to be the slave-master’s self-interest.172 Most slaves at least had an owner who would ordinarily provide for their daily necessities, whereas the typical free person would have to fend for himself, for better or for worse.173 Moreover, the imperial household slaves probably had a better quality of life than many if not most free persons.174 On the other hand, slaves in the mines and the mills endured the worst conditions. Historian Diodorus Siculus (first century BC) claims to have verified earlier accounts of many men and women, both young and old, bound in chains, working naked day and night in the gold mines of Ptolemaic Egypt and Roman Spain without relief: No leniency or respite of any kind is given to any man who is sick, or maimed, or aged, or in the case of a woman for her weakness, but all without exception are compelled by blows to persevere in their labours, until through ill-treatment they die in the midst of their tortures. Consequently the poor unfortunates believe, because their punishment is so excessively

167

Finley, Ancient Slavery, 93; Bradley, Slavery & Society, 1–4. E.g., Cicero, Fam. 16.4, 16.16; cf. Bradley, Slavery & Society, 1. 169 Cato, Agr. 2.2, 5–7, 56–59, here 2.7 (Hooper & Ash); cf. Varro, Rust. 1.17–18. 170 Plutarch, Cat. Maj. 4.4–5.2, 5.6–7. 171 Columella, Rust. 1.1.19, 1.2.1, 1.5.3, 1.7.6–7, 1.8, 1.9.5–8, 1.11.3, 1.11.14–23. 172 See further Bradley, Slaves & Masters, 21–22, 25–26; Slavery & Society, 73–75, 81– 82, 89–90, 139; Joshel, “Roman Literary,” 215, 223–24; Bodel, “Labour,” 324. 173 Bradley, Slavery & Society, 92; cf. Epictetus (Diatr. 4.27–33, whose quote was popularised by Bartchy, Mallon ChrƝsai, 71, 85. 174 Bradley “Resisting Rome,” 378. 168

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severe, that the future will always be more terrible than the present and therefore look forward to death as more to be desired than life.175

Meanwhile, Galen observes how many people struck, kicked, stabbed and gouged out the eyes of their slaves in anger, and despairs of his mother’s inability to control her anger that frequently led her to bite her maids. Furthermore, he claims to have witnessed a slave’s eye stabbed with a reed pen and a friend striking a slave on the head with a sheathed sword with enough force for the sword to travel through the scabbard and endanger the slave’s life through loss of blood.176 While anecdotal, these accounts (plus those we discuss shortly) persuade me that the revisionist school helpfully corrects past benign reconstructions. 2. Protection from Death An extant fragment from Dionysius of Halicarnassus claims that the regimen morum (“public morals”) responsibilities of the Republic’s censors included slave protection.177 While other sources attest to non-slave regimen morum investigations, Astin warns against misinterpreting their existence as evidence of regular enforcement; in reality, the censors only arbitrarily investigated egregious rumours of immorality among the Roman elite that the censors evaluated as posing a risk to the Roman state.178 It is not impossible, therefore, that censors might have very rarely investigated slave relations, but even so such investigations were more likely into controversial nexum cases, such as with Papirius where Livy reports their involvement,179 than into chattel slave welfare. Buckland claims that the censors protected slaves from abuse, but he cites no 175

Diodorus Siculus, Hist. (of Ptolemaic Egypt) 3.12–13, here 3.13.3 (Oldfather), cf. (of mines in Roman Spain) 5.38.1. For grim mill conditions, see Apuleius, Metam. 9.12–13. The revisionist scholarship treats these graphic descriptions as representative of both Roman (Bradley, Slaves & Masters, 15) and (earlier) Greek mining (Garlan, Greece, 145; Rihll, “Athens,” 68–69). While Detlev Dormeyer (“Sklavenarbeit in den Silbergruben von Laureion: Entwicklung, Schutzbestimmungen Asylrecht und Vereinsbildung der Sklaven,” in Arbeit in der Antike, in Judentum und Christentum, ed. Detlev Dormeyer, Folker Siegert, and J. Cornelis de Vos, MJSt 20 [Berlin: LIT, 2006], 62) is more positive about slave welfare conditions at Laurion prior to Rome’s conquest of Greece, he has probably misunderstood the function of the mine’s underground pillars; see further R. J. Hopper, “The Attic Silver Mines in the Fourth Century B.C,” ABSA 48 (1953): 222–24. 176 Galen, Anim. Pass. 1.4, 1.8. 177 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 20.13. 178 Alan E. Astin, “Regimen Morum,” JRS 78 (1988): 25–26; cf. Watson, Roman Slave Law, 116–20. 179 Livy, Ab urbe cond. 8.28.

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supporting evidence other than the censors’ duty to regulate slave markets against false advertising.180 Slaves were sold on a catasta, a raised platform, so that any potential buyer could fully inspect and medically examine the oftenundressed slave to verify the seller’s claims prior to purchase.181 However, by the first century BC, many Romans appear to have been repulsed by unjustified slave killing. In 66 BC, Cicero undermined a witness’s reputation in court by savaging her cruelty in first cutting off one of her slaves’ tongue and then crucifying him to prevent his testimony. The effectiveness of Cicero’s rhetoric suggests that such abuse already met with significant public distaste, even though such abuse was fully legal.182 Statesman and historian Dio Cassius (late second, early third century AD) records a notorious incident when Vedius Pollio (deceased 15 BC), while dining with emperor Augustus (reign 27 BC–AD 14), ordered a slave to be thrown into Pollio’s pond of maneating lampreys for breaking a crystal goblet. However, the slave immediately appealed to Augustus, who intervened to save the slave’s life. Augustus also appears to have shared the popular disgust at Pollio, for although Pollio left much of his estate to Augustus, Augustus refused to honour Pollio with the monument his will demanded in return.183 Indeed, Bradley suggests this incident may have prompted Augustus to grant slaves the right to appeal a death sentence to the prefect or governor.184 Thereafter, Roman law appears to have evolved into mandating a judicial review before slave-masters could execute their own slaves. A lex Petronia (pre AD 79) prohibited slaves’ damnatio ad bestias (“condemnation to wild beasts”) without prior judicial approval.185 Emperor Hadrian (AD 117–138) prohibited slave-masters from executing their own slaves, telling slave-masters to use the courts instead.186 Emperor Antoninus Pius (AD 138–161) ruled that 180

W. W. Buckland, The Roman Law of Slavery: The Condition of the Slave in Private Law from Augustus to Justinian (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1908), 36; cf. P. Willems, Le Droit Public Romain ou Les Institutions Politiques de Rome depuis L’Origine de la ville Jusqu’a Justinien, 6th ed. (Louvain, Belgium: Peeters; Paris: Larose & Forcel, 1888), 288. 181 Bradley, Slavery & Society, 52–55; “Republic,” 242. 182 Cicero, Clu. 187–88. 183 Dio Cassius, Hist. rom. 54.23; cf. Pliny the Elder, Nat. 9.39; Seneca, Ira 3.40. Apparently, such slave punishment was not uncommon in Pollio’s household. 184 Bradley, Slaves & Masters, 123–24, 126; Slavery & Society, 100–101; cf. Manning, “Stoicism,” 1532n51. 185 Dig. 48.8.11.1–2, cf. 18.1.42; cf. also Gardner, “Roman Law,” 433; Manning, “Stoicism,” 1532n53. 186 Hist. Aug. Had. 18.7–11; cf. Bradley, Slaves & Masters, 120n41, 126; Gardner, “Roman Law,” 433.

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a slave-master who summarily executed his own slave without judicial preapproval was to be treated the same as a person who killed someone else’s slave.187 Gardner objects to Buckland’s claim that such a slave-master would be punished for the capital offence of murder rather than for mere property damage,188 but Gardner overlooks another extant fragment that asserts the former if the slave’s death was intentional.189 Bradley emphasises the extreme difficulty any slave would have had in both locating the Roman prefect or governor and receiving a fair hearing,190 but the same was probably true for all but Roman citizens. Perhaps Bradley also exaggerates the unlikelihood of an investigation after a slave death because Galen’s friend fled the locality to escape sanction when he thought he had killed the slave he had hit on the head.191 In AD 319, Constantine ruled that a slave-master whose slave had died after a prescribed form of disciplinary beating had no fear of being charged with murder.192 While Bradley and Grey emphasise Constantine’s exceptions,193 a delay to the slave’s death after injury was not one of them,194 and Constantine’s phraseology also suggests that by then many slavemasters did fear judicial investigations into any slave deaths. While extant evidence is largely anecdotal, it does appear that Rome was more concerned than Athens to protect slaves from unwarranted execution by their slave-masters. What was in Athens at most an issue of religious pollution became in Rome a criminal offence for which some at least feared punishment. 3. Extreme Abuse In addition, Roman law also evolved to protect slaves against extreme cases of slave abuse. Emperor Tiberius (AD 14–37) prohibited, upon punishment of death, a slave-master beating his slave at a statue of the newly deified Augustus.195 Tacitus also records Tiberius and the senate implementing a formal recognition scheme for provincial temple sanctuaries because of their disgust at how criminals and slaves, by maligning their slave-masters, were abusing the temple sanctuary custom in Rome’s former Greek territories.196 Pius 187

Dig. 1.6.2; Gaius, Inst. 1.53, cf. 3.213; Justinian, Inst. 1.8.2, cf. 4.3.11. Gardner, “Roman Law,” 433; cf. Buckland, Law Slavery, 37. 189 Coll. Mos. Rom. 3.2.1; cf. Paulus, Sent. 5.23.6. 190 Bradley, Slavery & Society, 171; Slaves & Masters , 123–29, 137. 191 Galen, Anim. Pass. 1.4 192 Cod. Iust. 9.14.1; Cod. Theod. 9.12.1. 193 Bradley, Slaves & Masters, 126; Grey, “Late Roman,” 488. 194 See further our discussion of Exod 21:20–21 in the next chapter. 195 Suetonius, Tib. 58. 196 Tacitus, Ann. 3.36, 60; cf. Dig. 47.11.5. 188

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ordered that slave allegations be investigated so that, if his slave-master was deemed guilty of excessive cruelty, the slave could be sold to another slavemaster.197 Bradley downplays the probability that a slave’s arrival at a sanctuary would be noticed and his appeal heard,198 but at least his new physical location would offer protection in that he probably could not be forcibly returned to his slave-master without first being noticed and receiving a hearing.199 On the other hand, however, slave testimony at any hearing would still have to be given under torture. Indeed, proconsul Pertinax (AD 188–189) crucified slaves deemed guilty of making false accusations against their slave-masters.200 Ulpian both denies that Pius’s protection measures are in any way intended to impinge on a slave-master’s autonomy and argues that they are in his interest.201 Fellow jurist Gaius (second century AD) argues that such slave abuse is simply a profligate waste of one’s own property,202 a long-standing and widespread Roman concern against wasting property of whatever kind, frequently asserted to protect an inheritance for the next generation.203 However, another source claims that the measures were intended to avoid slave rebellion.204 While Romans blamed slave rebellions on local authorities not restraining extreme slave abuse, for example, historian Diodorus Siculus on the first Sicilian slave war (135–132 BC),205 the Roman response never amounted to more than prohibiting the very worst of abuses. While Bradley latches onto the threat of

197

Contra Bradley (Slaves & Masters, 127 esp n82), these terms are the specified cases for which a slave can initiate proceedings. Buckland (Law Slavery, 37), without citing any evidence, states they prohibited the “attempt to debauch an ancilla” (‘maid’), but that is unlikely given widespread Roman sexual use of female slaves. Garnsey (Ideas, 96) thinks it remarkable that “domestic feuds” between slave and master could get the attention of the local proconsul and then the emperor, but its occurrence is more understandable given Rome newly encountering Greek practice. 198 Bradley, Slaves & Masters, 124–25. 199 Assuming, of course, that slaves could travel there in the first place (probably unlikely for at least those enslaved in the Roman mines and mills). 200 Hist. Aug. Pert. 9.10; cf. Bradley, Slaves & Masters, 124n64. 201 Dig. 1.6.2. 202 Gaius, Inst. 1.53; cf. Gardner (“Roman Law,” 433–34) who argues for the same to be behind Hadrian’s slave decrees. 203 Astin, “Regimen Morum,” 22–23; Gaius, Inst. 1.199; Paulus, Sent. 3.4.7; Dig. 22.1.38.1, 24.3.22.1, 26.4.1, 27.10.1, 37.4.16; Justinian, Inst. 1.24. 204 Coll. Mos. Rom. 3.6.5. 205 Diodorus Siculus, Hist. 34/35.2–48.

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slave rebellion,206 it is possible that the rebellion risk was cited only to persuade the Roman slave-owning elite to support the measure. Rome’s other legal prohibitions against slave abuse were also limited to extreme cases. Castration of male slaves was repeatedly prohibited, but ownership of castrated slaves was not prohibited until Justinian in AD 558.207 Hadrian prohibited slave-masters from selling their slaves to become prostitutes or gladiators without good reason and prohibited underground prisons for both free and slaves.208 He also, apparently, once temporarily exiled a slave-mistress for the atrocissime (“most brutal”) treatment of a slave for only the levissmus (“most trifling”) of reasons.209 Nevertheless, the threshold of a good reason remains unclear; it may not have been that difficult for slave-masters to pass. Notwithstanding the singular (and exceptional?) case of banishment by Hadrian, there does not appear to be enough evidence to substantiate significant Roman improvement in slave welfare beyond the requirement for judicial preapproval. Thus, older scholarship appears to have exaggerated these reforms. While requiring judicial pre-approval for harsh treatment is superior to the full autonomy of the Athenian slave-master, the overall slave welfare impact for slaves in antiquity was probably, at best, marginal. 4. Wrongful Enslavement Perhaps the Roman view of the natural equality between slave and free accounts for Rome’s relative bias towards slave claims of unjust slavery. As in classical Athens, Roman slaves could not normally instigate legal proceedings, but, unlike Athenian slaves, Roman slaves could appeal to the Roman judicial system, up to and including petitioning the emperor, in cases of either unjust enslavement or re-enslavement after manumission. From at least the lex Junia petronia (AD 19), but perhaps from as early as the Twelve Tables, the Roman judicial system was also weighted in favour of granting freedom in marginal

206 Bradley, Slavery & Society, 48–50; Slaves & Masters, 126–29; cf. Garnsey, Ideas, 91–92, 97. 207 Suetonius, Dom. 7.1; Dig. 48.8.3.4, 48.8.6; Cod. Iust. 4.42; cf. Dig. 9.2.27.28. For Justinian, see Nov. Iust. 142; cf. Bradley, Slaves & Masters, 128–29; Gardner, “Roman Law,” 435–36. 208 Hist. Aug. Had. 18.7–11; cf. Bradley, Slaves & Masters, 120n41, 126; Gardner, “Roman Law,” 433. Magie, the trans. of Hist. Aug., incorrectly translates ergastula as “houses of hard labour” rather than underground prisons. 209 Coll. Mos. Rom. 3.3.4 (Hyamson); Dig. 1.6.2.

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cases. Extant accounts even suggest that many slaves’ appeals were successful.210 Perhaps Emperor Claudius’s (AD 41–54) ruling follows in this tradition. He emancipated some sick slaves, who had been abandoned by their slave-master to die, only for the slave-master to re-enslave them after their unexpected recovery.211 Nevertheless, this should not be exaggerated either. As with infants, passive action such as exposure leading to likely starvation was acceptable; only intentional killing was outlawed. 5. Fugitive Slaves Many of those enumerated in the previous chapter who argue for the relevance of the legal distinction between slave fugitivus, erro and amici domini appear to assume that such status differentials would affect the returning slave’s welfare. However, the pertinent legal rulings are in the context of valuing slaves for sale and not in any of the texts relating to a slave’s welfare.212 Thus, they probably arose through Roman commercial rather than criminal law to clarify allegations of slaves sold without disclosure of past flight, rather than out of any concern for slave welfare. While we cannot exclude the possibility that the distinctions could be significant for what constituted a good reason for punishment, there is no extant evidence that anyone ever argued accordingly. Furthermore, as Rome’s legal slave protection was only ever against extreme instances of abuse, at most the distinctions could only relate to such cases. Indeed, since any investigation would presumably require the slave’s testimony under torture, it is difficult to imagine a scenario where any slave would be concerned with whether his slavemaster correctly deemed him a fugitivus or erro or recognised his desire for an amicus domini.213 I suspect instead that the Roman legal distinctions were for the slave-master’s benefit to allow him to declare a slave’s absence to be other 210

Bradley, Slaves & Masters, 125–26; Slavery & Society, 162; Edmondson, “Roman Family,” 342; cf. Manning, “Stoicism,” 1533. 211 According to Suetonius (Claud. 25.2). According to Suetonius, Claudius also penalised as murder a master’s proactive euthanising of his sick slaves, but this latter aspect does not appear to have been preserved by Justinian’s Digest or later collations of Roman law. Thus, scholars question Suetonius’s historicity (Buckland, Law Slavery, 37; Bradley, Slaves & Masters, 127; Gardner, “Roman Law,” 433), but perhaps this prohibition against euthanasia was simply subsumed into the aforementioned protections against killing slaves. 212 Dig. 21.1.17, 21.1.43.1–3. Lampe (“Affects & Emotions,” 64) also acknowledges their slave market origin. 213 Fugitive status, however, might matter for the slave’s eligibility for manumission, see below.

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than that of a fugitivus and sell him for a higher price. Indeed, perhaps the law’s codifiers sought to limit such convenient but false declarations when they referred to a slave returning “at a late hour” and to another who was absent for “the whole night.”214 6. Summary At best, Roman law only concerned itself with protecting against wrongful enslavement and requiring judicial pre-approval for execution and extreme abuse. While these laws are all noteworthy, they should not be exaggerated. Furthermore, the Roman laws on fugitive slaves were probably immaterial vis-à-vis these legal protections. Day-to-day slave welfare depended far more upon the quality of relationship between slave-master and slave. Roman inequality extended far more than just between slave and free. Indeed, I will now argue that while Roman slave inequality remained the worst of its inequalities, it was only one among many. Indeed, slave inequality appears to have become the fixed standard towards which Rome’s other inequalities widened. V. Unequal Rome 1. Social Stratification Roman social inequality intermingled with Roman slave inequality. In unequal Rome, did current wealth matter more than one’s noble ancestry? Or did current wealth matter more than one’s former slave status? From the recorded disgust of Seneca and the satire of Juvenal, some rich freedmen appear to have thought so.215 While Dale Martin’s argument that self-sale into managerial slavery to a socially elite master was viewed as a desirable means for one’s upward mobility remains controversial, undisputed is Martin’s observation that one’s identity as a slave did not matter as much as the identity of one’s slavemaster.216 For example, the freedmen and slaves of the Roman imperial household enjoyed a higher social status than most because many prized, envied and distrusted their control of access to the emperor. Morley concludes, “Of course

214

Dig. 21.1.17.14–15 (Thomas). Seneca, Ep. 27.5, 47.9; Juvenal, Sat. 1.24–30, 102–16, 3.131–32. 216 Dale B. Martin, Slavery as Salvation: The Metaphor of Slavery in Pauline Christianity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990), 15–22, 47–49. On the subsequent debate, see further Byron, Recent Research, 30–32, 77–90; cf. Bradley (Slavery & Society, 152) who observes that even the socially highest slaves in Rome were vulnerable to their master’s changeable whim. 215

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the slave remained inferior in law, but this seemed to matter less than his association with money and power.”217 Roman social stratification extended to competition between the rich Roman elite for greater social status. Thus, rich Romans owned many slaves to boost their social standing rather than for economic gain from their labour. Such slaves’ primary purpose was to exist and to be seen (often in uniform) publicly by the masses. One aspiring politician was said to have never left home without an accompanying crowd of three to four thousand of his slaves and freedmen. Common too among the elite was to own slaves, especially the most beautiful, both male and female, whose primary service was to attend dinner parties at least for show and thereafter perhaps for fulfilling the male guests’ desires.218 Even the prominent annual slave festival and holiday, the Saturnalia, held in memory of a supposed earlier slave-free and labour-free golden age, was not exclusively focused on slavery. While Macrobius’s (fifth century AD) explanation focuses on the Saturnalia’s temporary and partial equalising of slave and free,219 Lucian’s earlier (second century AD) account focuses upon the temporary redress of Roman social inequality.220 I suggest that the poor’s absence from Macrobius is probably because his account, which was written by and for elite Romans, who owned many slaves but had little interaction with free but poor Romans, did not need to highlight the festival’s purpose for the free poor.221 Lucian claims that Roman social inequality arose because of Cronus’s abdication in favour of Zeus except for a week each year where Cronus regained temporary charge. However, Cronus’s ambition for his week-long rule extended only to holding this festival of eating and chatting together, drunken escapism and avoiding “unnecessary speculations.”222 Nothing in this

217

Morley, “Slavery Principate,” 280. Bradley, Slaves & Masters, 14–16; Slavery & Society, 87–88; “Republic,” 252–53; Bodel, “Labour,” 312–13; Edmondson, “Roman Family,” 352–53. 219 Macrobius, Sat. 1.7.37, 1.10.22–11.50,1.12.7, 1.24.22–23. Albeit only that slaves ate the meal separately before the free members of the household. Slaves are also absent from the extended recorded discourse. For its alleged parallel with sketchy accounts of Greek slave holidays, see Rachel Zelnick-Abramovitz, “Slaves and Role Reversal in Ancient Greek Cults,” in Slaves and Religions in Graeco-Roman Antiquity and Modern Brazil, ed. Stephen Hodkinson and Dick Geary (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2012), 96–132. 220 Lucian, Sat. 1.7, 1.13; cf. Philo, Legat. 2(547).13. 221 Classifying individuals as either ‘rich’ or ‘poor’ is a simplification, albeit sufficient for this monograph. For a seven-fold scale, see Steven J. Friesen, “Paul and Economics: The Jerusalem Collection as an Alternative to Patronage,” in Paul Unbound: Other Perspectives on the Apostle (Peabody, Mass: Hendrickson, 2010), 35. 222 Lucian, Sat. 1.1, 2, 7, 11, 25, 36, here 1.9 (Kilburn). 218

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festival challenged existing Roman social stratification or its slavery ethos.223 Indeed, Cicero sold off those Pindenissum captives on the third day of the festival.224 If, as Bradley argues, the festival was a means of social control,225 then its primary purpose appears to have been for the Roman elite to control the frustrations and discontent of the poor: whether free or slave. 2. Roman Citizenship Another Roman inequality was that between Roman citizens and its free noncitizens. Slavery was ordinarily the fate of only those whom Rome reckoned to have opposed their colonisation; the rest of the conquered population, whom Rome reckoned to have acquiesced, became peregrini (lit. “from abroad”).226 While a slave enslaved to a Roman citizen might one day be manumitted and ultimately gain citizenship, peregrini had no possibility of Roman citizenship unless as a (probably rare) reward for exceptional service to Rome. While extant evidence is sketchy, peregrinus status was probably closer to that of a slave than to that of a Roman citizen. For example, while Roman citizens possessed the right to a full trial and even appeal to the emperor, and slave-masters needed judicial approval before executing their own slaves, local Roman provincial governors could execute peregrini after only a summary hearing.227 Roman citizens were rarely executed but, if so, it was by beheading; and all their property would also be confiscated.228 But slaves and peregrini alike were crucified.229 3. Criminal Penalties As we observed of Athens, differential criminal penalties are often the most explicit extant evidence of inequality. As Rome’s criminal law developed, 223

Conclusion vis-à-vis slavery by recent revisionist scholarship on the Saturnalia (and also on the Matronalia and the Compitalia festivals) (Bradley, Slavery & Society, 19; “Republic,” 241–42; “Resisting Rome,” 381–82; Edmondson, “Roman Family,” 359–60). They do not, however, evaluate the relationship between these festivals and Roman social stratification. 224 Cicero, Att. 5.20.5. 225 Bradley, Slaves & Masters, 39–45. 226 Although their political leaders might have been rewarded/bribed with citizenship and Roman backing for their subservient rule as the recognised governor. 227 Graham Burton, “Government and the Provinces,” in vol. 1 of The Roman World, ed. John Wacher, 2 vols. (Abingdon, Ox.: Routledge, 1987), 430–33. 228 Dig. 48.20.1; see further Richard A. Bauman, Crime and Punishment in Ancient Rome (Abingdon, Ox.: Routledge, 1996), passim. 229 Hence Paul, a Roman citizen, was apparently beheaded but Jesus and Peter, peregrini, crucified.

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however, its long-standing social stratification became more evident in those new statutes. Indeed, Roman law treated the free poor nearly as badly as slaves. The Roman Twelve Tables reveal early evidence of unequal penalties applying to slaves and free. The compensation for causing injury to a free person was twice that if the victim were a slave. A thief, if a free person, was flogged and enslaved to the victim, but if the thief were a slave, then he was to be flogged and executed by being thrown off the Tarpeian Rock: the same ignominious punishment that applied to a free man guilty of treason or false testimony.230 Development of Roman criminal law, however, lagged behind its commerical counterpart, and it was not until the second century AD that Rome began to pay significant attention to its criminal statute book. Nevertheless, as the Roman jurists frequently asserted an earlier precedent, their rulings probably reflected earlier de facto norms;231 for example, jurist Callistratus (third century AD) explains, “Our ancestors, whatever the punishment, penalized slaves more severely than freemen.”232 Evidence of early Roman penal differentials between rich and poor Romans is more sketchy, but the differentials probably always existed to some degree given the long-standing Roman conflict between plebeians (commoners) and patricians (aristocrats).233 The Twelve Tables also distinguished between social classes by prohibiting plebeian and patrician intermarriage and requiring proletarians (lit. “[only] the breeder of progeny”) to appear in court whereas landowners could send a representative.234 As the Principate progressed, free but poor culprits were increasingly penalised more severely than elite citizens guilty of the same crime.235 For example, while every Roman citizen may have originally had the theoretical option to choose voluntary exile in capital cases,

230 XII Tab. 8.3, 14; cf. Bradley, Slavery & Society, 17. For other crimes liable to servus poenae (enslavement), see Scheidel, “Roman Supply,” 298; cf. Manning, “Stoicism,” 1537. 231 Richard A. Bauman, “The ‘Leges iudiciorum publicorum’ and their Interpretation in the Republic, Principate and Later Empire,” ANRW II 13 (1980): 103–233; Crime & Punishment, 3–4. For other sources of earlier Roman criminal law ethos, we are largely reliant on either court proceedings (e.g., Cicero’s published arguments) or philosophical treatises of those seeking to shape Roman legal practice (e.g., Seneca). 232 Dig. 48.19.28.16 (Robinson); cf. Bauman, Crime & Punishment, 134; Bradley, Slaves & Masters, 199–200; “Republic,” 243. 233 E.g., Beard, SPQR, 146–52, 435–72, 528–29. 234 XII Tab. 1.4, 11.1. 235 Bauman, Crime & Punishment, 133; cf. Richard A. Bauman, Lawyers and Politics in the Early Roman Empire: A Study of Relations between the Roman Jurists and the Emperors from Augustus to Hadrian, MBPF 82 (Munich: Beck, 1989), 102–7.

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in practice the option may have been only realistic for rich Romans.236 When the jurists later codified this alternative of exile, they limited it as available only to elite Romans. In other words, what became de jure was probably already de facto. In AD 212, Caracalla granted Roman citizenship to all peregrini throughout the Empire. But perhaps this made little difference to Roman social stratification because by then Rome was treating their poor citizens and peregrini as broadly similar. Thus, perhaps only rich peregrini benefitted. Caracalla’s edict eradicated the citizen-peregrini distinction only to replace it with the newly codified (but probably pre-existing de facto) Roman dual-penalty system that distinguished between honestiores (“elite citizens”) and humiliores (“lowly citizens”).237 Hence, Roman law frequently prescribes exile for honestiores but execution for humiliores in most capital cases. While in the worst of cases (for example, for treason), honestiores were decapitated or allowed to commit suicide, humiliores were executed by crucifixion, cremation alive or damnatio ad bestias,238 penalties more typically associated with slave culprits. By the early third century, jurist Marcian was arguing in reverse: slaves should be punished like humiliores.239 Historically, slaves’ testimony was only permissible in criminal cases under torture. Slaves were also prohibited from giving evidence against their own master. However, Rome could bend this principle where no other evidence could be attained or when it was in the state’s self-interest. For example, the lex Julia de adulteriis (18 BC) permitted the torturing of slaves to obtain evidence of a woman’s adultery, and in AD 16 the slaves of one master accused of treason were conveniently sold to another so that they could then be tortured to provide evidence against their former master. Indeed, since at least AD 24, slaves could be rewarded with manumission for testifying in treason cases,240 and the Severan jurists codified the routine torture of the slaves of those masters accused of treason, state fraud or corruption in the provision of public

236

Bauman (Crime & Punishment, 36–37, 159, 204n58) observes that exile was not always considered to be burdensome and it permitted those exiled to avoid indignity. 237 See further Bauman, Crime & Punishment, 133–36; Bradley, Slaves & Masters, 134n114; Gardner, “Roman Law,” 431; cf. Dig. 48.1. 238 Bauman, Crime & Punishment, passim esp. 1, 7–8. 239 Dig. 48.19.10. 240 Dig. 47.10.5.11; see further Bauman, Crime & Punishment, 52–53. Manumission was probably offered because testifying for Rome against one’s master accused of treason against Rome demonstrates one’s supreme loyalty and obedience to Rome as embodied in its emperor, the pater patriae (“father of the fatherland”).

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utilities (e.g., Rome’s food supply).241 By then, however, humiliores too could be tortured, whereas honesitiores remained exempt except in treason cases. Despite also urging moderation,242 Ulpian acknowledged that torturing could be very severe: in a ruling that no one should be sentenced to death by torture, he comments, “Very many happen to die while being tortured.”243 Even if we allow for some exaggeration, his remark underscores torture’s gruesome reality. This considerable narrowing between humiliores and slaves demonstrates that as pre-existing Roman social inequality became more and more institutionalised and codified, it combined with pre-existing Roman slave inequality.244 In theory, the lack of a natural distinction between slave and free in Rome might have led to slave penalties becoming similar to those previously applied to the free but poor, but in highly socially stratified Rome the opposite happened: penalties applicable to the free but poor became increasingly similar to those previously applicable to slaves. 4. Honour Rome’s intermingling of multiple statuses can probably be amalgamated in terms of what Romans classified as a person’s honour as chiefly determined by one’s wealth and ancestry. Thus, the free poor had little honour, and captive slaves had already lost all honour through their (or their ancestors’) defeat. As Roman law developed, Rome’s de facto ethos as proportionate to honour also became increasingly codified. Romans could also sue for outrage, losing honour.245 While some jurists argued that the Roman outrage law was equivalent to the Athenian hubris law,246 they were distinct in that Solon intended hubris to punish Athenian character defects – for which the victim’s status was irrelevant – whereas Roman outrage compensated for only the loss of honour. Slaves, however, had no honour to lose.

241

Dig. 48.5.27, 48.18; cf. Gardner, “Roman Law,” 431–32; Bradley, Slaves & Masters, 133; Slavery & Society, 165–71; cf. also Blume (while translating Cod. Iust. 9.41). 242 Dig. 48.18.7. 243 Dig. 48.19.8.3 (Robinson). 244 Not full equivalence between them (Dig. 48.19.10; Bauman, Crime & Punishment, 129–36; cf. Bradley, Slaves & Masters, 129–34). Contra the emphases of Grey (“Late Roman,” 489–92) whose study into slavery in the late Roman era downplays Roman social inequality pre-Caracalla. 245 Dig. 44.7.9, 47.10.17.10–14; Gaius, Inst. 3.220–24; Justinian, Inst. 4.4. 246 Justinian, Inst. 4.4.1.

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5. Summary Rome was probably always a very unequal society; as its laws developed, so de facto honour inequality became de jure honour inequality. While Rome’s greatest inequality was between slave and free, slavery also intermingled with Rome’s other inequalities between rich and poor, citizens and peregrini, and those of noble and common birth. Perhaps this intermingling is best illustrated through the status incongruities of the imperial household slave and of the rich freedman: while some despised the freedman because of his slave background, others (including probably himself) honoured him because of his wealth. While classical Athens appears to have consistently treated slaves as unequals in an absolute sense, Rome’s status intermingling suggests that each one of its many inequalities was more a matter of degree. Rome, I suggest, appears to have increasingly codified its social stratification as proportionally equal to each person’s honour with its treatment of peregrini and especially the poor worsening over time to become more like how slaves were traditionally treated. Such treatment also coheres with the Roman opposition to a natural distinction between free and slaves, provided we also acknowledge that Rome’s endorsement of natural equality did not challenge its complex socially-stratified ethos as proportionally equal to one’s honour; in Rome, the latter trumped the former. Nevertheless, natural equality between slave and free in Rome also permitted another – perhaps surprising – comparison between Roman slaves and Roman sons. VI. Slaves and Sons Scholarly investigations into Roman slavery have not compared slaves and sons within the same paterfamilias (“father of family”), perhaps in part because Justinian’s Digest handles slavery relations and the paterfamilias– filiusfamilias (“son of family”) relationship in separate chapters,247 and/or because slavery scholarship presumes no significant equivalence between a slave and a freeborn son. However, some scholars of Roman family law who focus on the Roman concept of patria potestas (“fatherly power”) compare them because both slave and sons were unconditionally subject to it.248 Our equality 247

Albeit successive (Dig. 1.5–6). W. W. Buckland, A Text-book of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921), 102–42, 146–47, 416; cf. George Long and E. A. Whittuck, “Patria Potestas,” DGRA 2:351–53; Poste (while translating Gaius, Inst. 1.55); Blume (while translating Cod. Iust. 4.26, 8.46). Scholars investigating slavery, however, tend to emphasise the comparison between slaves and animals. This monograph demonstrates the need to do both. 248

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analysis between slaves and sons also includes the Roman freedman but avoids an anachronistic comparison between a Roman slave and the modern autonomous individual. I will argue that both patria potestas and Roman natural equality mutually reinforce each other; together they account for why Rome manumitted far more than classical Athens. This analysis completes the reconstruction of the historical context for analysing Seneca’s ethics on slave welfare, which will follow. 1. Sui juris, alieni juris and Son Manumissions Aristotle claimed that only Persians treat their sons as if slaves, but Rome did so too.249 From its earliest Twelve Tables, Romans treated children and slaves alike as incorporated within the sui juris (lit. “of one’s own right”) of the paterfamilias. By patria potestas, both children and slaves alike were alieni juris (lit. “of another’s right”), in mancipio sint (“existing in possession”) to the paterfamilias.250 Thus, the paterfamilias had the power of sale, life and death over both. The Twelve Tables granted sons their freedom from their paterfamilias if he sold them three times.251 What probably began as a welfare concession against Roman sons being repeatedly sold into time-limited nexum slavery appears to have developed into a mechanism whereby the paterfamilias could manumit his own freeborn son from himself. If carried out, then the relationship between son and paterfamilias became equal to that of a freedman to his former slavemaster, his patron.252 However, such son manumissions appear to have been very rare. Ordinarily Roman sons remained alieni juris until the deaths of their male ancestors, when each son (if or when over twenty-five years of age) would establish his own sui juris paterfamilias.253 Until then, non-manumitted sons were also like slaves in that they had no right to private property, only the use of a peculium that formally belonged to the paterfamilias.254 On the other hand, 249

Aristotle Eth. nic. 8.10.4 (1160b28–33)). Aristotle’s ignorance is unsurprising: by his death Rome had yet to conquer the whole of what today we call Italy. 250 XII Tab. 4.2. 251 XII Tab. 4.2. 252 Albeit without the son losing his right to his paterfamilias’s affection and inheritance; see below. 253 Dig. 1.6, 1.6.3–8, 1.7.28, 1.7.36, 50.16.195–96; Gaius, Inst. 1.48–49, 55, 108–46; Justinian, Inst. 1.9.3, 1.12.6, 10. 254 Augustus permitted sons to enjoy full control over any earned military wages or rewards (Dig. 49.17). Blume (while translating Cod. Iust. 6.60) also observes that from the era of Constantine, a son’s right of ownership and control of his own property gradually broadened.

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only sons inherited at birth their father’s citizenship and honour, and could also hold public office in their own individual right.255 2. Commerce and Institores As alieni juris, sons and especially slaves were part of the paterfamilias’s person and could fully represent him in commercial contracts, but sui juris free employees and freedmen could not easily do so. It was also more advantageous for a business owner to use his slaves because then his liability to a creditor would be limited to the applicable slave’s peculium and person (noxal surrender) even if the creditor could prove the owner’s knowledge of and consent to the contract.256 Although the peculium and noxal liability of slaves did equally apply to sons, we can probably assume that most patresfamilias would be more willing to surrender a slave than a son. The Roman equivalent of the Athenian íþúťÏ øūôøŶüïÏ was the institor (“manager, agent”). Institores also permitted elite Romans to engage in business discreetly without detracting from their social status. Some institores probably earned enough to purchase their freedom and sometimes became wealthy slave-masters themselves. Alternatively, and perhaps more often utilised for more routine tasks, slave-masters could trade slaves’ usufruct separately from their person. 3. Dominicide and Parricide Rome was at its severest when a slave-master was killed. All slaves present were tortured, and any found to have failed in proactively preventing the murder were executed even if they feared their intervention(s) would lead only to their own deaths. If the murderer was a slave, then every slave was executed.257 Some of the few extant dominicide accounts also highlight extreme masterly abuse,258 but no slave could utilise that in his defence. Tacitus records the senate debate after the murder of prefect Lucius Pedanius Secundus by one of his slaves in AD 61 under the reign of Nero, whose 255

Even to the extent of ruling as a public official over his own manumission from his paterfamilias (Dig. 1.6.9, 1.7.3, 36.1.14). 256 Dig. 14.3; cf. Bradley, Slavery & Society, 85–86; Morley, “Slavery Principate,” 278– 79; Bodel, “Labour,” 315–16; Gardner, “Roman Law,” 414–15, 419–23. 257 Dig. 29.5.1; cf. Bradley, Slavery & Society, 113–15; Gardner, “Roman Law,” 430– 31. 258 See further Tacitus, Ann. 13.32.1; Dig. 29.5.14, 48.19.28.11. Cf. Bradley (Slavery & Society, 111–14) who may be exaggerating the significance of the word saepe (“often”) at Dig. 29.5.1.27. Cf. also Michael I. Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic History of the Roman Empire (Oxford: Clarendon, 1926), 144.

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advisor then was Seneca.259 Despite opinions to the contrary in the senate and a public revolt,260 the majority opinion in favour of executing all of Secundus’s four hundred slaves according to precedent prevailed. Bauman locates this case within the broader first-century debate within Stoicism about whether mitigating circumstances should influence Roman criminal penalties;261 later we will analyse Seneca’s contribution to this debate. Modern day horror at such a murder and the retribution enacted afterwards, however, also needs to be relativised with the punishment for parricide: Whoever, secretly or openly, shall hasten the death of a parent, or son or other near relative … will suffer the penalty of parricide. He will not be punished by the sword, by fire or by some other ordinary form of execution, but he will be sewn up in a sack and, in this dismal prison, have serpents as his companions.… He shall be thrown into the neighboring sea or into the river, so that even while living he may be deprived of the enjoyment of the elements, the air being denied him while living and interment in the earth when dead.262

Such parricide punishment was codified by the lex Pompeia de parricidiis of 52 BC, but that law may only reflect earlier norms.263 Justinian’s Digest also preserves how Severan jurist Saturninus argues that the culprits’ common nature – son and slave alike – justifies the similar severity of Rome’s parricide and dominicide punishments. While Bradley denigrates this explanation as evidence only of Roman law’s tortuousness on slavery,264 this chapter repeatedly demonstrates how Roman conceptual reasoning was based on the natural equality between slave and free. 4. Equal Power of Life and Death The jurists observed that while the paterfamilias’s absolute power of life and death over slaves was universal (jus gentium), almost unique to Rome was his same power over his children.265 Significantly, Romans, aware of Greek 259

Tacitus, Ann. 14.42–45. Bauman (Lawyers & Politics, 102–7) argues that the public revolt was not against punishing the innocent as Tacitus (Ann. 14.42) claims, but against the economic loss of executing so many slaves and the public’s fear that the case would establish a precedent for the state usurping their own land and slaves. I remain unconvinced. 261 Bauman, Crime & Punishment, 81–83. 262 Cod. Iust. 9.17.1 (Blume); cf. Dig. 48.9; Justinian, Inst. 4.18.6; Cod. Theod. 9.15.1. 263 See further Bauman, Crime & Punishment, 30–32, 70–73. 264 Dig. 48.2.12.4. I judge the trans. of “cum natura communis est” in Bradley (“Roman Slavery & Law,” 487, “[whose] nature is the same”) to be more accurate than Robinson’s trans. of the Digest. 265 Justinian (Inst. 1.9.2) claimed Rome was unique. Gaius (Inst. 1.55; cf. Dig. 1.6.3–5, 1.6.8) names Galatia as his only known exception, by which he probably means that it was 260

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practice in the past, understood their own ethos as distinguishable. Roman antiquity preserves ten cases before Tiberius where patresfamilias summarily executed their own children for capital offences. Often the patresfamilias mentioned were consuls or other magistrates and the extant reports tend to stress their resolution to public duty at the expense of the family tragedy. Hence, many scholars question whether the paterfamilias’s de jure permission over his sons ever became a significant de facto reality.266 While the paterfamilias’s right to execute his own sons continued in a formal sense until the fourth century AD,267 displeasure at its severity became increasing codified. In contrast to the re-sale of abused slaves to another slavemaster, emperor Trajan (AD 98–117) ruled that an abused son should be emancipated from his cruel father and that, when the son later died before his father, the father should not inherit from his son because of the father’s evident lack of affection.268 Hadrian formally upheld the lex Pompeia de parricidiis, which logically exempted the paterfamilias as the only family member who could not be guilty of parricide, but creatively found one paterfamilias, who had killed his own son for committing adultery with his stepmother, guilty of stealing his son’s right to parental affection.269 Nevertheless, the requirement for judicial approval before a paterfamilias could execute his own son was not established until AD 227,270 a century after Hadrian’s equivalent ruling regarding slaves.271 I suspect, however, that the time lag is probably only evidence that such legal also a Galatian custom prior to Roman colonisation. (If correct, then this may shed further insight into Paul’s comparison of sons and slaves in Gal 4:1.) Blume (while translating Cod. Iust. 8.46) also includes Gaul, the origin of the Galatians. 266 For the patria potestae right of life and death over children, see William V. Harris, “The Roman Father’s Power of Life and Death,” in Studies in Roman Law: In Memory of A. Arthur Schiller, ed. Roger S. Bagnall and William V. Harris, CSCT 13 (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 81–95; Emma Johnson, “Patriarchal Power in the Roman Republic: Ideologies and Realities of the Paterfamilias,” Hirundo 5 (2007): 99–117. The power of life and death may also have been exercised more frequently in the sense of banishment to exile. If correct, then the case of Q. Fabius Maximus in the late second century BC may require revision. Maximus had exiled his son, probably for homosexuality, but thereafter sent two of his slaves to execute him in his place of exile. Harris (“Roman Father,” 84–85) presumes Maximus’ defence of patria potestas was unsuccessful, but it is possible that Maximus was exiled for breaching an exiled person’s right of sanctuary as long as they stayed away from Rome rather than for murdering his own son. 267 Harris “Roman Father,” 92. 268 Dig. 37.12.5; cf. also the contrast between disciplining slaves and sons at Cod. Iust. 9.14–15. 269 Dig. 48.9.5, cf. the rhetoric of 50.16.220.3. 270 Cod. Iust. 8.46.3; Dig. 48.8.2. 271 Hist. Aug. Had. 18.7–11.

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protection for sons was not thought necessary any earlier. Furthermore, Roman judges would probably have been highly unlikely to agree to a paterfamilias seeking judicial approval to execute his son, but amenable to any paterfamilias who desired to execute a slave. In the former case, the judge could also call on the son to be a witness; in the latter, any judge desiring the slave’s testimony would first torture him. 5. Variable Affection … and Manumission Hadrian’s ruling also suggests that the patresfamilias’s welfare for their children (and vice versa) was decisively shaped by de facto paternal affection rather than by the absolutes of Roman law. By the early third century AD, Roman jurists also recognised the legal right to intra-family affection and respect. For example, in extremis a parent could sue a child for lack of affection and respect,272 and a disinherited child could seek to have their parent’s will (or vice versa) annulled on the assumed grounds of the deceased’s insanity because only it was thought to explain the manifest lack of affection.273 Thus, while the paterfamilias’s legal rights over his sons and slaves were theoretically equivalent, slaves undoubtedly experienced the exercise of those rights far more frequently. Unlike sons, slaves had no right to any affection from the paterfamilias. Slaves were in the first instance to be exploited but, through loyalty and obedience thereafter, they might earn affection from their slave-masters.274 Trust had to be earned, but trust if earned led to a spectrum of affection from the slave-master. Undoubtedly, some slave-masters took advantage of their power. Many slaves probably experienced zero if not negative affection from their slave-masters, no matter what they did. I also suspect some slave-masters self-justified their lack of slave affection as merited by their slaves’ captured status and subsequent poor performance. On the other hand, some other slaves received considerable affection from their slave-masters; for example, the aforementioned relationship between Cicero and Tiro, and how Pliny the Younger’s epistles reveal his care, worry and grief over his slaves.275 While Joshel accurately describes Pliny as paternalistic for casually assuming that his own agency and benefit eliminates any sense of the same in his slaves,276 no one in a Roman household apart from the paterfamilias – not even Pliny’s eldest freeborn son – would have enjoyed personal autonomy, agency 272

Cod. Iust. 5.25.4. Dig. 5.2.2, 15, 22; Cod. Iust. 3.28.28, 34–35, 5.25.4. 274 Cf. Bradley, Slaves & Masters, 21–44, 96–99; Joshel, “Roman Literary,” 218, 226. 275 Pliny the Younger, Ep. 1.4, 5.19, 8.1, 8.16, 8.19. 276 Joshel, “Roman Literary,” 234–39. 273

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and benefit. Perhaps Joshel’s evaluation is skewed by comparing Pliny’s slaves to her own modern ideal. Furthermore, while slave-masters could enjoy casual sexual access to their slaves and adopt any resulting illegitimate children, Roman law expressly permitted non-elite male slave-masters to manumit and marry a female slave. Extant inscriptions demonstrate that many slave-masters did so.277 Thus, this chapter argues that variability in slave welfare can be understood as proportional to the degree of affection between slave-masters and their slaves. Indeed, sons and slaves, I suggest, were treated as (numerically) equal by nature but only proportionately equal in affection. In Rome the latter trumped the former; variable affection, anywhere from zero or less to copious, rather than nature, determined how slaves were treated. As the lex Aelia Sentia (AD 4) explains, in the Roman self-understanding, the slave-master manumitting a slave was an affectionate act; it was evidence of their sincere attachment and not of their relationship’s dissolution.278 Hence, the patron, the now former slave-master, had the legal right to require the same affection and respect from his freedmen for the rest of the freedmen’s lives as the patron would expect from his freeborn sons.279 Indeed, patrons could sue their freedmen, but not vice versa, for the lack of gratitude if evidenced by their freedmen’s failure to comply.280 Only upon the patron’s death did his freedmen (or their heirs) became free from all their obligations to their patron’s descendants.281 However, the same was true of the patron’s freeborn sons. Thus, the freedom offered to a slave by manumission was not freedom in a Western individualist sense, but the freedom to be a dutiful son in the Roman sense. If today some reckon that only the former would constitute significant slave welfare reform, then perhaps it is unsurprising that they find none. I avoid such anachronistic analysis to argue otherwise. 277 However, problematic was a free female who desired to manumit and marry a male slave; see further Judith Evans-Grubbs “‘Marriage More Shameful Than Adultery’: SlaveMistress Relationships, ‘Mixed Marriages’, and Late Roman Law,” Phoenix 47 (1993): 127– 30. Of course, amorous relationships between slave-masters and slaves did not require marriage; e.g., the gold bracelet inscribed with the words, “The master to his very own slavegirl,” discovered on the arm of a female victim outside Pompeii (Edmondson, “Roman Family,” 352; Michele George, “Slavery and the Roman Material Culture,” AMW 397). 278 Dig. 40.2.16. 279 Dig. 35.3.5.15–20, 37.15.9; Cod. Iust. 7.6.10. Plus some menial services that Romans thought was unworthy to demand from children (Dig. 37.15.10. Cf. Bradley, Slaves & Masters, 81, 96–99; Slavery & Society, 165; Morley, “Slavery Principate,” 281–84). 280 On the shifting trends as to what was constituted freedman ingratitude and the corresponding sanctions, see Harper, Late Roman, 485–89. 281 Dig. 37.15.8.

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In essence, a slave’s manumission was the paterfamilias’s voluntary but formal acknowledgement that, since their relationship had become akin to that of a paterfamilias towards his son, their relationship would now be legally acknowledged and regulated as such.282 We proceed to evaluate how often this occurred. 6. Manumission Frequency Cicero’s epistles that recommend his friends’ freedmen exemplify how his fellow elite Romans manumitted some of their slaves and utilised their freedmen to further their own interests. Presumably how these freedmen had impressed Cicero mirrored how they had earlier gained their manumission.283 In one epistle, Cicero warmly commends an existing slave of one friend to another;284 such a slave recommendation would increase his slave-master’s trust in and affection for the slave and boost his chances of being manumitted. The preponderance of freedmen in extant Roman literature and the large numbers of preserved memorials of freedmen and freedwomen in Rome and throughout Italy also demonstrate the numbers that Rome manumitted. Indeed, many of these freedmen in turn became slave-masters themselves.285 This chapter argues that the Roman self-understanding of their slavery as captive not natural helps account for Rome’s readiness to manumit, and to grant citizenship and even political office to slaves or former slaves. Romans manumitting their slaves, out of affection, was part and parcel of the Roman slavery ethos. Voluntary manumission was not a sign of any disquiet against the system. Indeed, we have already observed how Greeks, who manumitted very few and then deported them later, commented on this strange Roman practice when they first encountered Romans.286 While Athenian slavery was probably pure 282

Strictly speaking, the freedmen became a manumitted son. Cicero, Fam. 13.16, 21, 22, 23, 46, 60, 69, 70; cf. Bradley, Slavery & Society, 78–79. 284 Cicero, Fam. 13.45. 285 Bradley, Slaves & Masters, 81–83; Slavery & Society, 162–64; “Resisting Rome,” 254–59; “Republic,” 378–79; Morley, “Slavery Principate,” 281; Edmondson, “Roman Family,” 360. 286 E.g., Philip V of Macedon (late third century BC), who claimed that freed slaves in Rome could even become magistrates. Letter trans. in Austin (“Hellenistic World,” 75.31– 34) who reckons Philip exaggerates because only the sons of freedmen could become magistrates. However, that restriction may not have applied in the Republic, before the Augustan leges Fufia Caninia and Aelia Sentia (see below), and/or exceptions may have been made for former slaves of prominent slave-masters. See further Colin J. Hemer (“The Name of Felix Again,” JSNT 31 [1987]: 45–49) for how Felix, Roman governor of Judea at the time of Paul’s arrest (Acts 24), may have been a former slave of a member of the imperial family. 283

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exploitation, Roman slavery was first exploitation and then ideally, but in reality only for some, assimilation. However, Bradley rightly observes that the evidence substantiates only regular, not necessarily frequent or multitudinous, manumission.287 Posterity only records the success stories; countless unknown others never gained enough affection to be manumitted. Nevertheless, the numbers that were manumitted demonstrate a Roman willingness to assimilate those they first exploited as slaves, a willingness that appears correlated with their rejection of natural slavery. The old consensus was correct to highlight Roman slavery’s assimilative possibility, but its scholars’ focus only on how a minority prospered, and its neglect of the majority who only experienced lifelong exploitation creates a misleading impression of Roman slavery’s benignness. In Rome, slave-master affection for his slaves was not the only reason he might have manumitted them. 7. Manumission Developments Undisputed is that Augustus’s manumission reforms, the lex Fufia Caninia (2 BC) and the lex Aelia Sentia (AD 4), were in part a formalisation of previously informal manumission arrangements; disputed is the rationale for their additional restrictions. Caninia restricted the number of slaves a Roman could manumit by testament on a sliding scale, from half if he owned over two slaves to a maximum of one hundred if he owned over five hundred slaves. Sentia prevented Romans aged under twenty from manumitting any slave except in approved exceptional circumstances, such as for marriage, and also only ever permitted the manumission of those slaves who had never been punished with chains or brands, tortured on a criminal charge, imprisoned or sent to gladiatorial school. In other words, Sentia introduced a character test for any would be freedmen. Anyone manumitted in defiance of this character test was deemed a dediticius (“surrendered prisoner of war”) and barred, on penalty of re-enslavement, from living within a hundred miles of Rome. Furthermore, only slaves manumitted after the age of thirty gained Roman citizenship at manumission; otherwise they had to wait until they married and had a child who survived for at least a year.288 See also Thomas E. J. Wiedemann (“The Regularity of Manumission at Rome,” CIQ 35 [1985]: 162) for Athens as a “closed” slavery society and Rome as an “open” slavery society. For the rarity of manumission in antebellum chattel slavery, see Harrill, Manumission, 74– 75. 287 Bradley, “Republic,” 256. 288 Gaius, Inst. 1.13–46; Justinian, Inst. 1.5.3; cf. Buckland, Law Slavery, 533–37; Gardner, “Roman Law,” 427–30.

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Historian Suetonius claims that Augustus’s motive was to keep the Roman “people pure and unsullied by any taint of foreign or servile blood.”289 While today some may interpret that as evidence of racism, both Bradley and Gardner reckon a racist motive was unlikely as Rome was already very racially mixed and as Sentia explicitly encouraged freedmen to breed.290 Augustus also appears to have frequently labelled political threats to himself and Rome as a ‘foreign’ threat whenever possible to gain popular support for his actions.291 Thus, such Augustan claims may be more rhetorical than actual and/or rely upon the populace’s political loyalty to Rome rather than emphasising racial difference. Dio Cassius claims that Augustus’s reforms were motivated by many freeing their slaves ċôúǀüþÏ (“indiscriminately”), which Bradley interprets as a qualitative and quantitative assessment.292 They also appear to fulfil the desire of Dionysius of Halicarnassus (c. 8 BC) for a freedman screening process as he despaired of how far too many slaves were being manumitted because of theft or corruption, or because slave-masters manumitted many to gain popular acclaim for their generosity. To Dionysius, too many immoral slaves in his day were being manumitted in contrast to how ancient Romans only manumitted and gave citizenship to loyal slaves of good character.293 Bradley, however, downplays Dionysius of Halicarnassus’s concerns for Roman morality as a mere rhetorical topos to focus upon how Roman slaves would have perceived these reforms. He emphasises (or perhaps exaggerates) the frequency of slave revolts and of slaves’ involvement, motivated by promises of freedom, in Rome’s recent civil wars. Thus, Bradley argues that Augustus intended to reduce the slave threat to Rome’s social and moral order by restricting those whom slave-masters could manumit in their lifetime to only those few slaves who survived to at least thirty, and by encouraging servile loyalty and obedience through inter-slave competition for one of the few manumission slots available by testament.294 Gardner also suggests Augustus focused on childless testators who may upon death have manumitted large numbers of their slaves.295 However, I am unpersuaded by both Bradley and Gardner. If the threat of slave rebellion was as real as Bradley suggests, then surely reducing the 289

Suetonius, Aug. 40.3 (Rolfe). Gardner, “Roman Law,” 426; Bradley, Slaves & Masters, 87. 291 E.g., Antony and Cleopatra (Beard, SPQR, 351). 292 Dio Cassius, Hist. rom. 45.13.7; cf. Bradley, Slaves & Masters, 89–91. 293 Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Ant. rom. 4.23–24. 294 Bradley, Slaves & Masters, 85–87, 90–96, cf. 148–49. 295 Gardner, “Roman Law,” 427. 290

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likelihood of slaves’ future manumission would more likely have instead increased the threat. Perhaps more pertinent instead is the evidence of numerous alleged plots against Augustus, and of his own extensive financial support of some election candidates in contrast to how he outlawed others from bribing any candidates.296 Thus, I suggest that Augustus could have perceived as a political threat to Rome (i.e., to himself) anyone ostentatiously manumitting large numbers of slaves, who could then vote for their ‘generous’ patron (or his heir) and persuade other poor Roman citizens of his future generosity to them as well.297 Understood in this way, these reforms would seriously hinder any elite Roman trying to build up an alternative political support base among Rome’s poorest: normally the pre-requisite of any would-be pretender. Furthermore, Gardner highlights that while most Roman codification appears to have benefitted the elite, these reforms would only have greatly affected the relatively few elite Romans,298 those wealthy enough to own hundreds if not thousands of surplus slaves, who loved to impress the public with their generosity, and who could be a potential political threat to Augustus if they gained widespread popular support. In contrast, the reforms would have been largely immaterial to the typical Roman citizen, who relied upon their few slaves and who posed no political threat to Augustus. In addition, Bradley’s thesis of Augustus deliberately increasing servile competition for manumission relies upon a previously high manumission rate that these reforms significantly reduced: an initial presumption that Bradley is elsewhere always keen to dismiss. Thus, these reforms probably made little difference to slaves other than perhaps to those elite Romans bought for show or to those troublesome slaves whom Augustus, consistent with his well-attested concern for Roman morals and decorum among the citizenship body, wanted to protect Rome from. To Augustus, only the ideal slave, who is already displaying the qualities that matched Augustus’s ideal of the good Roman, should be manumitted and gain citizenship. Thus, Augustus’s reforms probably also reflect Rome’s long-standing selfidealism as evidenced in, for example, Cicero’s claims that nature established the Roman paterfamilias for moral improvement.299 This idealism was probably also applied to slaves: the captured prisoner of war was to be embedded with a paterfamilias as a lowly slave for his moral improvement until (in the exclusive judgement of his paterfamilias) he or she (or their descendants) 296

Suetonius, Aug. 10.3, 14–15, 16.3–4, 17, 19, 27.3–4, 35.2, 40.2, 49.1–2, 60, 66.2, 67.2. It is difficult to ascertain whether these plots were real or imaginary. 297 Acknowledged Bradley (Slaves & Masters, 84) but thereafter downplayed. 298 Gardner, “Roman Law,” 429–30. 299 Cicero, Off. 1.4.12.

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demonstrated through his loyalty and obedience to his paterfamilias the advanced morality worthy of being his son and also a son of Rome. However, I suspect that Roman reality rarely matched such Roman idealism. Augustus’s reforms did not oblige the slave-master to manumit any slave for his or her loyalty and obedience. Rather, they prohibited any other ground for manumission. While Roman slavery was exploitative and ideally assimilative, it was assimilative only for a minority: probably for only a small minority. While assimilation relied upon a natural equality between slave and Rome, assimilation did not oblige manumission. Every assimilative step was also subject to the paterfamilias’s voluntary and variable whim. Roman law did not challenge his whim; it only regulated the manumission process. VII. Summary: Roman Equality Ethics on Slave Welfare While extant sources and our analysis have focused mainly upon Roman chattel slavery, it probably coexisted with various local forms of debt slavery among non-Roman citizens in its provinces. Many assume that the exploitation of chattel slaves always required a natural justification everywhere, but we have observed how its conscious denial was part of the Roman slavery ethos. While Aristotle justified war to enslave pre-existing natural slaves, Roman conviction in the justice of their wars justified their enslavement of those they conquered. Captive slavery in antiquity was unquestioned. The only foreseen alternative to enslaving prisoners of war then was their summary execution. Life then was brutal, conflict was common and inevitable, and whoever won relished the chance to enslave and exploit the defeated.300 While Aristotelian natural slavery denied any kind of human equality between slave and free, the Roman view that enslavement was only the result of fortune permits Rome’s slavery ethos to be potentially assimilative. However, the latter also means that any Christian view of ontological human equality would be insufficient by itself to challenge Rome’s slavery ethos. Nevertheless, I advocate further research into whether any early Christian views of just war and/or of enslaving the defeated might challenge the Roman slave supply. Perhaps Roman slavery’s most surprising characteristic is its considerable legal equality between slaves and sons relative to their paterfamilias. But it coheres with Rome’s self-understanding of human equality by nature and accounts for Rome’s assimilative ideal of how an initially exploited slave (i) could demonstrate his loyalty and obedience to his paterfamilias and thereby also to Rome, and (ii) could eventually earn similar levels of affection from the paterfamilias as his sons enjoyed by virtue of their lineage. Accordingly, that 300

Cf. Beard, SPQR, 17–18, 161–64, 209.

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now-assimilated slave’s possible manumission was the legal recognition that his relationship to his former slave-master, now as freedman to patron, was essentially that of a son to his paterfamilias. Indeed, freedmen, or their descendants, gained Roman citizenship and many became slave-masters themselves. Romans told themselves this assimilative story of how Rome grew itself by repeatedly exploiting those they captured and permitting patresfamilias to reward the subset who acquiesced and assimilated. While this was possible because Rome rejected an unsurmountable natural distinction between slave and free, it was motivated more by self-interest than by any general humanitarian concern.301 Furthermore, the former scholarly consensus mistook this idealism for Roman reality. While Rome manumitted far more than classical Athens, probably only a small minority of Roman slaves ever benefitted. Augustus’s manumission reforms regulated this process to ensure that this idealism should be the only rationale for a slave-master’s voluntary decision to manumit a slave. As Roman law developed, it preserved slave-master autonomy, and, at most, it only required judicial approval before slaves’ execution or very severe punishment. Slave welfare was arbitrary and varied according to the paterfamilias’s (or his stewards’) changeable affection towards his slaves. Roman law on slave fugitives probably originated out of commercial considerations governing false slave advertising and remained pertinent only when selling slaves. Hence, an absent slave’s legal status, for example, whether fugitivus or erro, would probably have made little if any difference to his or her welfare upon return; both would have been severely punished. In Roman antiquity, one’s status and honour were proportionate to one’s ancestry, wealth, access to power, citizenship and, as the lowest of the low, enslavement. Rome’s endorsement of human natural equality did not challenge its complex ethos as proportionally equal to one’s honour; in Rome, the latter consistently trumped the former. It was possible, however, at least in the eyes of some, for a freedman’s new wealth or a slave’s access to the emperor to count for more than, for example, one’s ancestral pedigree. This chapter has argued for analysing Roman slavery within this intermingling network of Roman relationships – specifically towards the poor, the son and the freedman then – rather than comparing the Roman slave to a modern autonomous individual. As Rome’s de facto proportionality became increasingly codified, its

301 Cf. the more emphatic assertion of Bradley, Slaves & Masters, 23–25, 83–84, 111– 12; Slavery & Society, 160–61; “Republic,” 261.

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welfare of the lowest free persons descended towards that known to have previously applied to slaves.

F. Seneca the Younger on Slave Welfare I. Clementia and Secundus We complete our chapter by analysing three selections from Seneca that discuss slave welfare. We begin with Seneca’s argument for slave-master moderation and for slaves to receive clementia (“mercy”). While some may initially interpret such language as advocating significant slave welfare reform, Seneca’s desired reform was rather modest, and, even so, the senate rejected it in the Secundus dominicide case. Bauman describes how Rome’s criminal law traditionally required judges to sentence according to a fixed and non-discretionary penalty tariff schedule. While some defended it, Seneca, first Nero’s tutor and then advisor, was prominent in the other side of the debate, arguing that Roman judges should exercise moderation through clementia instead of anger in their sentencing.302 Clementia, as already practised in Roman commercial law, was not pardoning the guilty, but permitting judges to exercise discretion in sentencing to consider individual mitigating circumstances such as the defendant’s age, likelihood of reform, or whether he committed the crime while intoxicated or through error. To Seneca, a judge taking these mitigating factors into account would be more just than the traditional Roman fixed and non-discretionary penalty tariff: Clementia “has freedom in decision; it sentences not by formula (‘the letter of the law’), but in accordance with what is aequo et bono.”303 While Basore in his LCL translation of Seneca’s text translates the latin phrase as “what is fair and good,” it literally is “equal and good.” However, the sentencing equality Seneca intends is not that between persons regardless of status, but rather that the sentencing of all should be equal to the individual circumstances of their crime. Seneca’s logic covers all relationships between a superior and an inferior, including that between slave-masters and slaves. Thus, earlier in the same work, Seneca reminds Nero that it is praiseworthy for slave-masters to rule 302

Bauman, Lawyers & Politics, 92–107; Crime & Punishment, 78–85; cf. Seneca, Clem.

2.3. 303 Seneca, Clem. 2.7.3 (Basore); cf. Bauman, Crime & Punishment, 78–79. Cf. also Seneca, Ira 3.32. Bauman (Crime & Punishment, 73, 78–79, 136–39, 162) also explains that a Roman orator’s appeal to humanitas (“humanity”) was merely rhetorical.

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moderately, with clementia, over their slaves: slave-masters’ rule should be limited by aequi bonique natura, rather than limited only to the extent necessary to avoid slave retaliation.304 While Basore translates this Latin phrase as “the principles of equity and right,” we can now clarify Seneca’s equality reasoning. His argument is this: because slaves and free are equal by nature, slaves also deserve by nature the equal right to clementia, that is the equal right to have their individual circumstances considered. In other words, Seneca is not advocating the identical sentence to both slave and free if the circumstances of their crimes were equivalent; there is no evidence that Seneca ever advocated abolishing Rome’s differential penalties. He argues only for the more modest principle of individualised slave punishments per an individualised assessment of each slave’s mitigating circumstances. Seneca also commends an example where Augustus exercised clementia on a case of attempted parricide by reducing its sentence to mere exile for a young but faint-hearted son who did not follow through with his plan.305 However, in the Secundus dominicide case, Tacitus includes neither Nero nor Seneca as among those arguing against the denial of clementia to any of Secundus’s slaves, even to those slaves whom the senate knew were uninvolved.306 All his four hundred slaves were treated as an undifferentiated collective group and executed. Rome’s senators, presumably each one a slave-master, preferred instead to demonstrate the severity of Rome’s wrath in dominicide cases. Roman political reality trumped slave welfare.307 However, Nero later commuted the senate’s sentence of exile upon Secundus’s freedmen.308 The youth who attempted parricide received clementia and Secundus’s freedmen received some clementia, but his slaves received none. II. De Beneficiis Seneca’s aim in De Beneficiis is to advocate the voluntary and reciprocal giving of benefits to each other out of gratitude rather than rendering only those compulsory services that one is required to give to the other. While most of the work discusses relationships between free men, Seneca also argues against the view that slaves can only render non-reciprocal compulsory services to their 304 Seneca, Clem. 1.18.1, cf. 1.19.1. In-between, as the alternative to be avoided, Seneca recalls Pollio’s desire to throw his slave into his pond of man-eating lampreys. 305 Seneca, Clem. 1.15.7–16.1. 306 Tacitus, Ann. 14.42–45. 307 Bauman (Crime & Punishment, 83) suggests that Nero and Seneca did not engage because they knew that they did not have the votes to win. 308 Tacitus, Ann. 14.45. For Seneca’s impact (or otherwise) on Neronian slave legislation more broadly, see Manning, “Stoicism,” 1538–40.

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slave-masters because of their enslaved status. Instead, he argues that slaves can also give voluntary benefits to their slave-master, who should then reciprocate.309 While Garnsey claims that De Beneficiis constitutes evidence of slavery’s “progressive” easing,310 Bradley dismisses its significance for failing to challenge Seneca’s “social context.”311 However, Seneca’s underlying philosophy coheres with our reconstruction of the Roman slavery ethos. Despite De Beneficiis emphasising the equality between slaves and free, Seneca’s ethical consequences remain modest: Why should a man’s condition lessen the value of a service, and the very value of the service not exalt the man’s condition? We all spring from the same source, have the same origin; no man is more noble than another except in so far as the nature of one man is more upright and more capable of good actions.… Heaven is the one parent of us all.… Do not despise any man, even if he belongs with those whose names are forgotten, and have had too little favour from Fortune.312

To Seneca, personal character is independent of one’s enslaved status; both slaves and free can be virtuous.313 Some slaves, he argues, rise above their aversion to enslavement and hatred towards their slave-masters to become affectionate towards them.314 Whereas Aristotle argues that the natural slave has no tangible mind of his own, Seneca argues that fortune enslaves only the Roman slave’s body: his mind, his “better part,” remains unsold, “exempt” from enslavement and thus free.315 Hence, Seneca argues that obligatory services are those required from the slave’s body; but benefits are those deeds that arise voluntarily and motivated by the slave’s “friendly affection” towards his slavemaster.316 Slave-masters, Seneca insists, do not receive benefits from slaves per se but from human beings.317 Whatever a slave-master labels as a benefit from free men, he should also label a benefit if done by slaves.318 Just as soldiers can give benefits to their generals, subjects can give benefits to their king, and employees can exceed their contractual obligations to give benefits to their

309

Seneca, Ben. 3.17.3–28.6, esp. 3.18.1, 3.19.1. Garnsey, Ideas, 64, cf. 66, 90. 311 Bradley, “Seneca,” 162, cf. 165–66. 312 Seneca, Ben. 3.28.1–3 (Basore). 313 Seneca, Ben. 3.18.2. 314 Seneca, Ben. 3.19.4. 315 Seneca, Ben. 3.20.1 (Basore). 316 Seneca, Ben. 3.21.2 (Basore). 317 Seneca, Ben. 3.22.4. 318 Seneca, Ben. 3.19.4–21.1. 310

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employers,319 so too (according to Seneca) can slaves give benefits to their slave-masters.320 His theme is that all benefits should be reciprocated; gratitude, he asserts, responds to the giver’s intention rather than to the giver.321 Seneca also illustrates his argument with examples of slaves’ giving benefits. He describes cases where slaves risked or sacrificed their lives or endured torture to protect their slave-masters’ lives. In another case, a slave gave wise and profitable advice as to his slave-master’s best course of action.322 Indeed, the slave thereby demonstrates his teleological reasoning. Seneca argues that such benefits, motivated by affection, should be reciprocated: presumably, in most cases, by slave-masters’ rising affection for and further beneficial actions towards those slaves.323 In one of Seneca’s examples, the reciprocal benefit given was instant manumission.324 In other words, De Beneficiis argues from the natural equality between slave and free to their equal treatment regarding their potential to give reciprocal benefits out of affection that should also be reciprocated by their slave-master, perhaps even enough affection eventually to nudge slave-masters into manumitting. On the other hand, Seneca’s examples appear to suggest that a slave’s actions would have to be exceptional before they merit a reciprocal benefit. If correct, then a slave’s obedience, as a mere slave service, would not merit any reciprocal affection, let alone ultimate manumission. Indeed, perhaps the examples imply that slave-masters should only manumit their exceptional slaves.325 319

Seneca, Ben. 3.22.4. Basore (Seneca’s trans.) ascribes Seneca’s comparison between slaves, “a hireling for life,” and employees to the Stoic Chrysippus (c. 280–206 BC) (SVF 3:351). Bradley (“Seneca,” 163) rejects Seneca’s comparison because the different types of rule are “not strictly analogous;” however, Bradley appears unaware of how Romans, unlike Aristotle, equated slave-master rule with that of both the paterfamilias over his son and the emperor, as the pater patriae, over the empire. 320 Seneca, Ben. 3.18.3–4. 321 Seneca, Ben. 3.17.3–4, 3.18.2. 322 Seneca, Ben. 3.19.2–3, 3.23.2–27.4. 323 Seneca (Ben. 3.21.1) also contrasts how slave-masters need to give food and clothing to their slaves with (some) slave-masters’ voluntarily choosing to give (some of) their slaves the benefit of education. 324 Seneca, Ben. 3.23.3. 325 This appears consistent with the reasoning of Cicero (Off. 1.13.41): “Let us remember that we must have regard for justice even towards the humblest. Now the humblest station and the poorest fortune are those of slaves … they must be required to work; they must be given their dues” (Millar). While Cicero does not define what slaves’ dues should be, he repeatedly argues (Off.1.3.7–8, 1.4.14, 1.14.42–15.45, 2.15.52–55, 2.20.71) that his praiseworthy ideal of kind and generous actions should be reciprocal, motivated by affection, be

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III. Epistulae morales 47 Seneca’s forty-seventh epistle urges Lucilius to show affection rather than hostility towards his slaves because each is a man who “sprang from the same stock … [and who] on equal terms with yourself breathes, lives, and dies.”326 Slaves are Lucilius’s “unpretentious friends” and his “fellow-slaves” are equally subject to the vagaries of fortune.327 Hence Seneca’s ‘golden rule’ argues that the slave-master should treat his slaves as he would wish to be treated were he a slave. Today’s slave-master, Seneca reminds Lucilius, could still by fortune end up (literally) enslaved.328 Indeed, Seneca reasons that friendship, gentleness and affable treatment generate slaves’ respect, love and loyalty even under torture or at the cost of their own lives; but slave-masters only generate fear and enemies if they treat slaves as if animals with hostility, high-handedness and cruelty.329 Seneca also caricatures a prosperous slave-master as (metaphorically) enslaved to his passions of “monstrous greed,” gluttony, drunkenness and lust, and angrily beating his slaves until and unless they demonstrate control over even involuntary coughs, sneezes and hiccups. Seneca’s portrait reverses both roles: the literal slave-master is in reality a metaphorical slave to his many passions who insists that his literal slaves must be metaphorical slave-masters over even their involuntary actions.330 To Garnsey, Seneca’s epistle is “passionate and humane,” and indicates that Seneca “felt a twinge of conscience at the inhumanity and injustice of slavery.”331 On the other hand, Bradley dismisses the epistle for calling only for social harmony between slave-masters and their slaves rather than being “a disinterested statement on the common humanity of all men” that would have necessitated slavery’s abolition.332 Although Bradley is correct to highlight Seneca’s goal of social harmony, neither Bradley’s nor Garnsey’s proportionate to the recipient’s moral character and must not impoverish others, especially one’s own next of kin. Cicero’s focus is his despair at how Roman politicians practised generosity to the poor citizenry of Rome in return for their political support at the expense of elite Romans. Nevertheless, Cicero’s logic may be extendable to limit slaves’ dues to only that which they earned and that their slave-master should not manumit them if it would impoverish his heirs. 326 Seneca, Ep. 47.10 (Gummere). 327 Seneca, Ep. 47.1, cf. 47.12 (Gummere). 328 Seneca, Ep. 47.10–12. 329 Seneca, Ep. 47.4–5, 11, 13, 18–20. 330 Seneca, Ep. 47.2–3, 5–7, 17, 20, here 47.2. 331 Garnsey, Ideas, 55–58, 67–68, 143, here 57, 69. 332 Bradley, “Seneca,” 164–68, here 168; cf. Garlan, Greece, 149–51.

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exaggerations grasp the precision of Seneca’s intent. Instead, Seneca relies upon slaves’ natural equality with free persons to argue: I propose to value them [slaves] according to their [individual] character, and not according to their [slave] duties. Invite some to your table because they deserve the honour, and others that they may come to deserve it.333

What Seneca applies here to slaves, he demonstrates through his caricature as applying also to slave-masters. Hence, he advocates the equal treatment of all, slave and free alike, in valuing persons proportionally according to their character rather than according to a given ranking of their duties or employments.334 For Seneca, friendly conversation and table fellowship demonstrate equality and affection, and so he advocates eating with those slaves who either already deserve or might reciprocate such affection, instead of compelling them to observe free persons demonstrating only their own metaphorical enslavement to their passions.335 While De Beneficiis urges slave-masters to reciprocate slaves’ affection, this epistle also urges slave-masters to initiate affection towards some of their slaves in anticipation of its reciprocation. Nevertheless, Seneca’s golden rule of slave-masters treating slaves the same as the slave-master would hope for were he enslaved demonstrates the limits of Stoic/Roman thought: the best anyone enslaved could hope for was an affectionate slave-master. While mutual affection did on occasion lead to manumission, it is also striking that Seneca’s golden rule did not explicitly extend to recommending that eventuality for any slave. Seneca appears to assume that a newly enslaved slave could not realistically hope for his or her manumission.336 Captive slavery, to him, was then unquestionable and its demise unimaginable.

333

Seneca, Ep. 47.15–16 (Gummere). Seneca (Ep. 47.11, 15) also contrasts the low social ranking of slave farmers with the high ranking of beautiful male slaves who are tailored to appear still prepubescent, shown off at dinner parties and are made sexually available afterwards. Character, to Seneca, is selfearned; one’s duties are assigned by accident. 335 Cf. Seneca, Ep. 47.2, 8, 13, 15–16. Manning (“Stoicism,” 1525) also observes Seneca’s agreement with the Stoic view that all were capable of moral improvement. 336 Watson (Roman Slave Law, 23) assumes that Cicero (Phil. 8.11 [8.32]) demonstrates that “well behaved and conscientious” (Bailey, Ramsey & Manuwald) slaves could expect to serve no more than six years before being manumitted. While perhaps it may have been true of a few exceptional slaves, Cicero’s rhetorical flattery about how long his fellow senators would have to serve before being manumitted if they happened to be enslaved is unlikely to have correlated with reality (cf. Bradley, Slaves & Masters, 85; “Roman Slavery & Law,” 483–85). 334

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IV. Summary: Seneca Equality Ethics on Slave Welfare Bradley is probably correct to suggest that Seneca is representative of Stoicism more broadly in his greater concern for reforming slave-masters’ characters than for directly improving slaves’ welfare for their own sake.337 Nevertheless, Seneca’s focus on the former would, if followed, indirectly benefit the latter, and his call for individualised slave treatment demonstrates a similar appreciation for slaves’ characters. While both his assertion of natural equality between slave and free and his appreciation for slaves’ characters and mental capabilities contrast with Aristotle, Seneca’s views did not generate any internal squeamishness over slavery. To him, conquest slavery by fortune alone was an unassailable fact of life. Bradley also dismisses Seneca’s ethics on slave welfare for not challenging the principle of enslavement, but I concur with Manning, who argues that Seneca’s appeal for slave-masters to initiate affection towards their slaves is a significant, albeit modest, improvement upon the pure economic utilitarianism of the Greco-Roman agriculturalists.338 Seneca’s ethics also reflect his desire for his fellow Romans to practise their idealism; but the degree to which they did or not is difficult to ascertain. As in the Secundus case, slave-master self-interest may often have trumped Roman idealism despite Seneca’s arguments to the contrary. Nevertheless, the limits of Seneca’s slave welfare ethics are perhaps even more significant. His call for clementia to slaves was only a call for equal treatment between free and slave regarding the right to individual consideration of mitigating circumstances. He did not challenge Rome’s proportionate equal scheme of differential penalties. Nor did Seneca’s call for slave-masters to initiate affection towards their slaves extend to calling on slave-masters to manumit those slaves who reciprocated. Thus, these specifics are unlikely to represent synecdochically any greater and more comprehensive equality ethic. We now return to Vasser claim’s that Seneca argues for an equality (and not just some undefined fairness) between slave and free that does not thereby imply slavery’s abolition.339 While Vasser is correct to highlight Seneca’s ontological equality and to contrast Plato and Seneca on slave friendships, Vasser’s analysis lacks the nuances necessary to distinguish between differing kinds of equality and to address both the literary and historical limitations of his source selections. Perhaps we can conclude that Seneca argues for numerically equal treatment between slave and free only regarding their potential for friendship. It is also surely unwarranted to assume that anyone in antiquity (such as Paul) 337

Bradley, “Seneca,” 171. Manning, “Stoicism,” 1526–27; contra Bradley, “Seneca,” 168. 339 Vasser, “Grant Slaves Equality,” 62–66. 338

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could describe this rather limited kind of equal treatment by means of the unqualified term ūûĻüòÏ.

G. Conclusion This chapter is the first of three that demonstrate the viability and value of equality analysis to investigate an ethical domain in antiquity such as slavery, which many may assume was predicated upon pure human inequality. While true of classical Athens, it was not for Rome. Since Roman conquest slavery was not predicated upon an Aristotelian-like natural slavery, any hypothetical Christian assertion of ontological human equality would not necessarily challenge the pre-existing Roman slavery ethos. However, further research is recommended into how early Christianity might have reduced Rome’s slave supply by challenging Roman (and others’) attitudes to the justice of conducting war and enslaving the defeated. By comparing slaves to the poor, non-citizens and sons of the same era, we have demonstrated equality analysis’s ability to avoid anachronistic comparisons between slaves in antiquity and the modern autonomous individual. With minimal legal protections against slave abuse, Roman slave welfare was proportionate to the degree of mutual affection between individual slaves and their slave-master, the paterfamilias. Indeed, slaves were the lowest of the low as Rome treated all in proportion to an individual’s status and honour. Roman social stratification trumped Rome’s natural human equality, but the latter permitted some to climb the status ladder in a way impossible in Athens. Perhaps most surprising is Rome’s significant legal equality between a paterfamilias’s sons and slaves. While legal protections against the paterfamilias’s abuse of both were minimal in first century AD, sons and slaves were decisively distinguished by variable levels of paterfamilias affection. Sons enjoyed affection by virtue of their lineage; slaves, however, had to earn it from their often-capricious slave-master. We deduce, therefore, that Roman slave manumission was, in effect, the legal recognition that, in that paterfamilas’s judgement, his relationship to his slave had reached the affection akin to that between a paterfamilias and his son. Hence the freedman remained obligated to his patron. While the idealism of Roman slavery emphasised the slave assimilative process from pure exploitation, through rising affection and manumission, to freedman status and citizenship, the former scholarly consensus mistook this idealism for reality. Furthermore, the Roman fugitivus and erro legal distinction was pertinent only regarding disclosure

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when selling slaves; the distinction was probably immaterial to a returning slave’s welfare. Seneca’s slave welfare ethics reflects this historical context as he advocates for two interrelated reforms. First, he urges individualised rather than undifferentiated treatment of slaves in proportion to their individual characters and circumstances, just as Rome already practised for the free. Second, he urges slavemasters to initiate affection towards their slaves. Thus, he appears to urge Romans to turn their idealism into reality. While rising affection should generate improvements in slave welfare and might lead to manumission, the limits of Seneca’s hope are for only an affectionate slave-master. Nor does he tackle any other pre-existing Roman proportionate equalities between slave and free. Thus, this chapter concludes that Seneca’s equality ethics advocate only an equality of friendship-potential between slave and free. Vasser should not exaggerate what was a relatively modest improvement.

Chapter 4

Slave Welfare in Jewish Antiquity A. Introduction We have already observed that recent scholarship on Jewish slavery evaluates Halakhah material through the lens of Greco-Roman slavery and concurs with Dale Martin’s assessment that Jewish and Greco-Roman slavery ethe shared similar “slave structures” and were therefore indistinguishable.1 As is more common among scholars investigating other Pauline topoi, we will reconstruct Jewish slavery in antiquity by first analysing the Torah on slave welfare and then assessing whether the later Halakhah material reflects the Torah’s ethics (as the Halakhah authors claimed), manifests assimilation to Greco-Roman slavery as reconstructed in the previous chapter, or both. Our approach will demonstrate that recent scholarship’s reliance upon similar “slave structures” in Greco-Roman and Jewish slavery overlooks substantial divergence in their equality ethics on slave welfare. While the previous chapter could rely upon high-level, systemised statements and analyse ‘top down’ from these to more concrete ethical examples, there are no similar systemised statements in the Torah and its Jewish reception (except, as we will observe, arguably in Philo). Thus, this chapter systemises ‘bottom up’ from the Torah’s collection of concrete examples, each of whose interpretation has been contentious. This requires us to engage in extensive historical-grammatical exegesis of the Torah’s slave welfare texts. Such exegesis is further complicated because scholars wish to supply further data to fill out what they perceive to be missing in the extant Torah text from other historical contexts more than a millennium apart: ANE, Greco-Roman antiquity and arguably also the antebellum era.2 Such comparisons occur at 1

Martin, “Ancient Jewish,” 113. For a history of scholarship into Jewish slavery, see Hezser, Jewish Slavery, 3–21. Undisputed is that Jews in Roman antiquity practised chattel slavery. 2 Perhaps most explicitly in Raymond Westbrook, Studies in Biblical and Cuneiform Law, CahRB 26 (Paris: Gabalda, 1988); Bernard S. Jackson, “Biblical Laws of Slavery: A Comparative Approach,” in Slavery and Other Forms of Unfree Labour, ed. Leonie Archer (London: Routledge, 1988), 86–101.

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every level of the interpretative process: from exegesis of the smallest textual element, through assessments of each textual collection and beyond to how the collections are integrated together. The danger, however, is that comparison can lead to unjustified assimilation. Snell warns, “As [the] evidence is more scarce, there is of course more leeway to impose one’s own preconceived notions on it.”3 While it will be for the reader to evaluate whether my exegesis has morphed into eisegesis, we begin our analysis with Lafont’s explanation for the apparent incompleteness of cuneiform codes, such as the CC: Regardless of the way it is expressed, Mesopotamian scientific thinking remains basically casuistic, not because of its conditional ‘cloth,’ but because of its incomplete feature. Oriental codes do not aim at exhaustiveness; they rather clarify debated points or regulate topics thought interesting by their promulgators.… Modern rules could be formulated in the ‘casuistic’ way, but they would still have a fundamentally different character from the Near Eastern laws. Even if one could write the whole French Civil Code in the manner of the [LH], it would nevertheless remain a complete corpus, aiming at treating all matters of law and not only specific points.4

Our equality analysis of the Torah seeks to ascertain the equality ethics behind what its “promulgators” or authors thought was interesting and/or debatable before extrapolating from that implicit equality to address perceived evidential gaps. This also concurs with Phillips’ methodological criticism of (non-slavery) CC scholars who prematurely assimilate and/or emend its extant text to alleged parallels without justification: Comparative interpretations ought not to be the starting point for an examination of a particular legal enactment.… Before engaging in a kind of parallel-hunting involving the abstraction of material out of its context, a proper internal analysis of the Bible material must first be carried out. Only then in the light of the complete picture so obtained may comparison with extra-Biblical texts be properly undertaken.5

3

Daniel C. Snell, “Slavery in the Ancient Near East,” AMW 6. Sophie Lafont (“Ancient Near Eastern Laws: Continuity and Pluralism,” in Theory and Method in Biblical and Cuneiform Law: Revision, Interpolation and Development, ed. Bernard M. Levinson, JSOTSup 181 [Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1994], 101), who also argues that the literary distinction between apodictic and casuistic legal forms, as emphasised by Albrecht Alt (“The Origins of Israelite Law,” in Essays on Old Testament History and Religion, trans. R. A. Wilson [Oxford: Blackwell, 1966], 81–132), is of no legal significance. 5 Anthony Phillips, “The Laws of Slavery: Exodus 21:2–11,” JSOT 30 (1984): 54–55 (emphasis additional); cf. Moshe Greenberg, “Some Postulates of Biblical Criminal Law,” in Yehezkel Kaufmann Jubilee Volume: Studies in Bible and Jewish Religion Dedicated to Yehezkel Kaufmann on the Occasion of His Seventieth Birthday, ed. M. Haran (Jerusalem: Detus Goldberg, 1960), 8; cf. also the one-off concurrence of Bernard S. Jackson, Wisdom4

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Patrick’s methodology further guides our equality analysis. By “law,” Patrick means a conceptual ethical system; we seek to reconstruct its equality ethics: One must consider what the gaps, order, and reasoning mean. If one assumes that the legal doctrine taught in texts is limited to the explicit verbal formulations, each considered in isolation, any conceptual scheme will escape one’s notice. If, on the other hand, one projects him- or herself into the role of a judge seeking an answer to a legal issue, the formulations will be read for the principles and concepts applicable to the issue; a comprehensive, consistent system will emerge in the process of interpretation. How can one confirm the superiority of one or the other [non-legal] interpretative posture? Probably no decisive test can be designed. However, hermeneutical principles may resolve the impasse. The legal texts would be better texts if they constituted a comprehensive, consistent system of principles and concepts, and interpretation should be committed in principle to interpreting texts as the best texts they can be. If the search for a conceptual system regularly yields inconsistences and gaps, then we will have to conclude that the legal texts of the Torah are not very good, or are best interpreted as something other than law. If, on the other hand, a sophisticated, profound conceptual system can be constructed which accounts for the legal statements of our texts, the conceptual, synchronic mode of interpretation will be vindicated.6

We traverse through the Torah’s slave welfare and poverty texts, collection by collection and book by book (Exodus, Deuteronomy and Leviticus). Within each book and each collection, I arrange the order of presentation to best suit my argument and to minimise repetition. The analysis of Exod 21:20–21, 26– 32 is the most detailed because it is the most critical to our argument’s conclusion; thereafter, our tempo increases. Job 31:13–15 is analysed towards the close of the chapter’s Deuteronomic analysis. Where pertinent, we also discuss how the Torah’s texts, collections and/or conceptual thought may have been received by later Halakhah. Afterwards we analyse Philo on slave welfare and evaluate Glancy’s evidence for Jewish slave-masters also exploiting their own slaves for casual sex. Schultz cites 1 Kgs 12:7, where the narrative records King Rehoboam being advised to become an Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ to the population to ĖĘą Ćĥ (“serve, work”) them so that they become the king’s ĠĜĖĂ ĆĔĀĥ forever, to argue that Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ’s inherent meaning is the person dependent upon another and who labours for that other’s benefit rather than inherently denoting a status differential, an exclusive relationship or ownership.7 Likewise, both Hannah and Ruth self-designate laws: A Study of the Mishpatim of Exodus 12:1–22:16 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 271n78. 6 Dale Patrick, “Studying Biblical Law as a Humanities,” Semeia 45 (1989): 29–30 (emphasis additional). 7 Richard Schultz, “Servant, Slave,” NIDOTTE 4:1184. For consistency and readability, I adopt masculine pronouns for Ė ĄĔĥĄ although, in some cases, it may be meant in a generic sense and Exod 21:26–29 explicitly references both male Ė ĄĔĥĄ s and female ė Ćġ Ćēs.

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themselves as ė Ćġ Ćē and ė ĆĚħþ Ř, Ă with no implied slavery or sexual connotation, to Yahweh and Eli in 1 Sam 1:11, 16 and 18, and to Boaz in Ruth 3:9 and 2:13, respectively.8 I leave Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ (generic “slave”), ė Ćġ Ćē and ė ĆĚħþ ŘĂ (both “female slave, maid”) untranslated so as not to prejudge the particular kind of slave – permanent chattel or temporary debt – being referred to. Our focus is on how Torah readers in antiquity, such as Paul in the first century AD, his contemporaries and possible antecedents, would have understood the Torah, which by then had already been collated into a single work.9 In that era, no one sought to reconstruct a text’s pre-history or would have been aware of the rigours and scepticisms of modern-day critical scholars. Thus, this chapter favours synchronic over diachronic interpretations.10 While we detect ethical developments between the Torah books, the equality ethics of each book appear consistent. Our chapter demonstrates the widespread acceptance in Jewish antiquity of how the Torah specifies a comprehensive equality of treatment between temporary Israelite debt slave and free. While only a subset of extant Jewish sources reckons that this Torah equality ethic also spans permanent non-Israelite chattel slaves, their view may reflect the Torah’s originally intended scope. This comprehensive equality treatment is limited only by slaves’ inherent labour obligation to labour for their slave-masters while enslaved. This conceptually consistent conclusion, however, sharply contrasts with previous

8 See further Alfred Jepsen, “Amah und Schipchah,” VT 8 (1958): 293–97; Chaim Cohen, “Studies in Extra-Biblical Hebrew Inscriptions 1: The Semantic Range and Usage of the Terms ėġē and ėĚħĬ,” Shnaton 5–6 (1982) : xxv–liii; cf. Carl Westermann, “eved servant; amah maidservant,” TLOT 2:823–24; Richard Schultz “’Ɨmâ,” NIDOTTE 1:418–21; “sࡅ ipতâ,” NIDOTTE 4:211–13. 9 For recent research into the Torah’s collation, see the anthology in Gary N. Knoppers and Bernard M. Levinson, eds., The Pentateuch as Torah: New Models for Understanding its Promulgation and Acceptance (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2007). 10 For the current state of diachronic research into the Torah’s slavery laws, see Bernard M. Levinson, “The Manumission of Hermeneutics: The Slave Laws of the Pentateuch as a Challenge to Contemporary Pentateuchal Theory,” in Congress Volume: Leiden, 2004, ed. André Lemaire, VTSup 109 (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 281–324. For rare synchronic readings across the CC, see Joe M. Sprinkle (‘The Book of the Covenant’: A Literary Approach, JSOTSup 174 [Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1994]); and for across the Torah’s primary slavery laws, see Gregory Chirichigno, Debt-slavery in Israel and the Ancient Near East, JSOTSup 141 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1993). For criticism of Chirichigno’s approach, see Levinson, “Manumission Hermeneutics,” 288–90. For perhaps a moderating view between diachronic and synchronic extremes, see Cornelis Houtman, Exodus, trans. Sierd Woudstra, 3 vols., HCOT (Leuven, Belgium: Peeters, 2000), 3:81–98.

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scholarship on the Torah. Hence, our exegesis begins where scholarship is most convinced of inconsistency: the Exodus CC.

B. Exodus The principal slave welfare collection in Exodus (and, indeed, in the Torah) is found at the beginning of its ancient CC.11 While scholarship is inconsistent in its terminology, the term ‘law’ in this CC analysis denotes multiple interrelated ‘cases’ that are collectively analysed for equality. We begin with those laws and cases that scholarship reckons are inconsistent and the most problematic to argue instead for a revised understanding that both upholds their mutual consistency and reveals a certain equality relationship between slave and free. We then demonstrate how all the other laws and collections build upon this equality ethic. I. Consistency (21:20–21; cf. 21:26–27) 1. The Consensus The scholarly consensus echoes Philo’s threefold understanding of 21:21: (i) its protasis presumes that the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ has died following a beating from his Ė ĄĔ Ąĥmaster, but (ii) the case rejects causality and/or intentionality because of the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ’s delayed death, and (iii) its apodosis grants the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ-master immunity because the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ was his master’s property.12 Yet 21:26–27 require the ĖĄĔ Ąĥ’s emancipation should he survive with certain injuries. Jackson presumes that the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ in both laws must be a debt slave because “we can hardly imagine a permanent slave … being released because his master has knocked his tooth out.”13 But, even if both laws refer to only debt slaves (and I argue against that), Boecker’s observation of glaring inconsistency remains: 11

Notwithstanding differing views as to the CC’s origin and redaction thereafter, critical scholars are united in viewing it as very ancient, preceding the other collections we analyse. See further the anthology in Bernard M. Levinson, ed., Theory and Method in Biblical and Cuneiform Law: Revision, Interpolation and Development, JSOTSup 181 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1994). 12 Philo, Spec. 3.142. 13 Jackson, “Biblical Laws,” 96; cf. Wisdom-laws, 249–52; cf. also H. Cazelles, Études sur le code de l’alliance, 3rd ed. (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1946), 54; Westbrook, Biblical & Cuneiform, 89–90; Joe M. Sprinkle, “The Interpretation of Exodus 21:22–25 (Lex Talionis) and Abortion,” WTJ 55 (1993): 252–53; Book, 97; Ludger Schwienhorst-Schönberger, Das Bundesbuch (Ex 20,22–23,33), Studien zu seiner Entstehung und Theologie, BZAW 188 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1990), 62, 310–11.

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These prescriptions [21:20–21, 26–27] raise a series of questions, not all of which can be answered with total certainty. In the context of the preceding verses, the reason given at the end of v. 21 … is especially puzzling. If this is taken literally, the remaining prescriptions are not only superfluous but unintelligible. If a slave was regarded as no more than a possession without personal rights, as the end of v. 21 regards him, his owner could do with him as he liked.14

Some explain away the inconsistency as evidence of an interpolation,15 but Chirichigno argues that the CC’s redactor, given his sophisticated literary structure in 21:2–11, would have noticed and resolved such a glaring inconsistency.16 Like Chirichigno, but not identically so, I argue for an alternative to the threefold consensus on 21:21. As this alternative is both coherent and reveals a certain equality relationship between Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ and free, it is – according to Patrick’s test – the better reading. 2. Causation and Intention According to the consensus, the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ-master is punished in 21:20 because he immediately causes the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ’s death, but the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ-master is not punished in 21:21 because the death is delayed. Perhaps, scholars reason, this is because other unknown reasons also contributed to the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ’s delayed death and/or because the delay indicates that the beating was of a less severe nature and hence assumed to be disciplinary and the death unintentional. But Chirichigno asks why causality/intention should be determined by how long an Ė ĄĔĄĥ takes to die when the same distinction does not apply to the free man in 21:12–14.17 Colson, while translating Philo, also asks why the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ’s status as property, which allegedly protects the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ-master if he kills his Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ slowly in 21:21, should not also protect the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ-master if he kills his Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ quickly in 21:20.18 Furthermore, I question why this causality/intentionality test is specified here and not elsewhere; for example, in 21:15 and 18, which deploy the same verb ė ĆĞĆģ 14

Hans J. Boecker, Law and the Administration of Justice in the Old Testament and Ancient East (Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg, 1980), 161. 15 Verse 21c as a remnant of earlier tradition (Innocenzo Cardellini, Die biblischen ‘Sklaven’ – Gesetze im Lichte des keilschriftlichen Sklavenrechts: Ein Beitrag zur Tradition, Überlieferung und Redaktion der alttestamentlichen Rechtstexte [Königstein: Hanstein, 1981], 265–66). As a later addition (Alfred Jepsen, Untersuchungen zum Bundesbuch, BWA(N)T 41 [Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1927], 32–33; Brevard S. Childs, The Book of Exodus: A Critical, Theological Commentary, OTL [Philadelphia: Westminster, 1974], 472– 73; Boecker, Law & Justice, 161; Jackson, Wisdom-laws, 244–45). 16 Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 171. 17 Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 170. 18 See Colson’s footnote at his translation of Philo, Spec. 3.142 (p. 565nb).

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(“strike”). Daube acknowledges the arbitrariness of a temporal threshold for demonstrating causality and Jackson the crudeness of its test,19 but neither explains why it is so limited when the laws of 21:12–14 and 21:28–32 appear to be otherwise. Perhaps, therefore, this law was both intended and understood otherwise. Perhaps Philo, desirous to promote the Mosaic law wherever possible as the originator of enlightened Stoic values, such as clementia, engaged more in eisegesis than exegesis. While I cannot locate any other Stoic or Jewish example that defines or guides how the judges should evaluate mitigating circumstances, Constantine’s explicit prohibition against a slave-master defending himself due to a delay in the slave’s death probably indicates that some Roman slave-masters had previously relied upon this defence.20 But if this is correct, then advocates of the scholarly consensus still need to explain why Constantine would have prohibited this defence if Christians then understood this text as expressly permitting it. As we continue to examine each of the consensus’s claims, I will argue for an alternative understanding of each. 3. Death Jackson acknowledges that the scholarly consensus on 21:21 infers from the prior case (21:20) that the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ dies after a period of Ė ąġ Ćĥ (“standing, living”).21 Apparently, this delay before implied death justifies the antithesis between these two cases: syntactically, 21:21’s Ġ ąŰĉĜ ēć ğ (“do not avenge”) contrasts with how 21:20’s double usage emphasises its imperative. On this understanding, the adverbial timeframe in 21:21’s protasis, Ġ ĂĜ ąġżĜżēĠżĜ (“a day or two days”), specifies the duration of the verb Ė ąġ Ćĥ that must have ceased before the timing of the verse’s apodosis.22 However, the durative timeframe in 21:21 is unmarked by any further qualifier that explicitly defines how it relates to the verb.23 Moreover, while many of Ė ąġ Ćĥ’s 1,262 occurrences in the OT describe ingression into a state of standing/living, only in Ruth 2:7 does Ė ąġ Ćĥ’s context describe egression from such a state. Indeed, Ruth 2:7 only does so because of its explicit telicity marker Ė ąĥ 19 David Daube, “Direct and Indirect Causation in Biblical Law,” VT 11 (1961): 246, 248–49; Bernard S. Jackson, Essays in Jewish and Comparative Legal History, SJLA 10 (Leiden: Brill, 1975), 95; cf. Flesher, Slaves Mishnah, 24. 20 Cod. Iust. 9.14.1; Cod. Theod. 9.12.1. 21 Jackson, Wisdom-laws, 242n8. 22 Cf. Houtman, Exodus, 3:160. 23 On the relationship between durative phrases and verbs, see further IBHS §§10.2.2c– d, 30.1c–d, 30.2.1b; F. W. Dobbs-Allsopp, “Biblical Hebrew Statives and Situation Aspect,” JSS 45 (2000): 21–53. None of their examples, however, match the syntax of 21:21.

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(“as far as, until”). I suggest, therefore, that the scholarly presumption that the Ė ąġ Ćĥ has ceased before the timing of the verse’s apodosis requires an unprecedented use of Ė ąġ Ćĥ. Before proceeding further on 21:21, we also discuss its relationship with its earlier cases, 21:18–19 and 20, which also specify consequences after somebody has hit another. Jackson follows Philo in arguing that although the injured free man in 21:18–19, still needing a staff just to stand, subsequently dies, his limited standing nevertheless suffices to demonstrate a lack of causality and/or intentionality.24 Indeed, Philo understands the laws of 21:18–19 and 21 to treat the free and the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ equally regarding their delayed deaths.25 However, Jackson admits that the free man’s alleged death is contrary to how 21:19 concludes with the emphasising double usage of ē ĆħīĆ (“heal, heal completely”). But Jackson’s solution of relocating the double instance of ē ĆħīĆ to the end of 21:18 is an arbitrary emendation of the text to make it fit with his a priori derived hypothesis. Philo’s interpretation of 21:18–19 also appears forced to cohere with his reading of 21:21. Instead, the scholarly consensus interprets the protases of these cases to be contrasting both victims and outcomes: the hit free man survives in 21:18–19, but the hit Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ in both 21:20 and 21 dies. However, this double change also means that this law fails to guide the judge if only one of those two variables changes. For example, it is unclear what should happen if the hit Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ survives. Returning to 21:21, the assumption that Ė ąġ Ćĥ has implicitly ceased by the timing of 21:21’s apodosis is questionable. Its author could have made the protasis’s telicity explicit – for example, by supplying either Ė ąĥ or Īīą (“only”) to prefix its timeframe phrase, or ĭġ ć ŦĆ Ęą (“and he died”) after Ėġ ć ĥ Ā Ĝą (“he stands, lives”) – but its author did not. I suggest we consider the possibility that this absence is intentional rather than elliptical. But if the protasis is not telic, then what duration could its timeframe be measuring? Chirichigno and several others assume that the state of Ė ąġ Ćĥ continues into the timing of its apodosis by suggesting that the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ survives rather than dies.26 Chirichigno interprets the durative timeframe as specifying the time 24

Jackson, Wisdom-laws, 175–77; Philo, Spec. 3.104–7. Philo, Spec. 3.136–37. 26 Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 174–77; cf. Franz M. T. Böhl, Exodus (Groningen: Wolters, 1928), 154; Joël Vredenburg, De Pentateuch en de Haphtaroth met Nederlandsche vertaling, 5 vols. (Amsterdam: Joachimsthal, 1928), 118; Benno Jacob, The Second Book of the Bible: Exodus, trans. Walter Jacob and Yaakov Elman (Hoboken, NJ: Ktav, 1992), 649–50; Gwynne H. Davies, Exodus: Introduction and Commentary (London: SCM, 1967), 177–78; Peter Enns, Exodus, NIVAC (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2000), 446–50; cf. also NIV. I recommend more research into why the 1920–1930s German and Dutch rabbis assume that the 25

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duration of bed rest between the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ being struck in 21:20 and the ingress of his Ė ąġ Ćĥ in 21:21, translating its protasis as “if, however, within a day or two he gets up.”27 However, Propp rightly critiques Chirichigno’s interpretation as unprecedented.28 Indeed, such temporal intervals between phrases are typically expressed elsewhere in the OT either through the prepositional prefix þş¹ (“in”) or by the timeframe being preceded by the telic marker ī ąĚ ąē (“after”). Instead, I argue that 21:21’s adverbial timeframe could relate to the duration of an initial phase of Ė ąġ Ćĥ that is presumed to continue thereafter. If this recovery lasts for at least a day or two, then the author’s assumption is that the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ has permanently recovered. If correct, then 21:21’s protasis tests for recovery from a serious but non-fatal injury by specifying a durative threshold of the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ’s Ė ąġ Ćĥ. We could translate the protasis as: “if he recovers for at least a day or two.” This possible interpretation becomes more certain, I argue with Patrick, because I demonstrate how it best fits 21:21’s context and best reveals overall ethical coherence. Whereas the scholarly consensus assumes that the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ lives/stands for only a day or two and then is presumed to die, I argue instead that his standing/living for at least a day or two is taken as evidence of his survival. If correct, then the cases of 21:18–19 and 21 relate together coherently, and Ė ąġ Ćĥ in 21:21 summarises how 21:19’s protasis emphasises its victim’s ē Ćħī, Ć his complete healing. Both the cases of 21:18–19 and 21 share the same outcome but differ in the victim’s Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ status; the two cases differ only in one variable, not two as with the consensus’s interpretation of 21:21. Contrary also to Chirichigno, the cases of 21:19 and 21 are concerned only that both victims recover and not about how long their recoveries took. As we proceed, I continue to argue that my interpretation best fits its context and best reveals overall ethical coherence. 4. Property According to the scholarly consensus, the final clause in 21:21 – ēţėżŮĤþ ąĞĜŨĂ (“for he [the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ] [is] his [the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ-master’s] silver [i.e., property]”) – both justifies the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ-master’s immunity (Ġ ąŰĉĜ ēć ğ) because of the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ’s chattel status and motivates the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ-master against harming his own investment in the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ. However, if the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ survives, then this clause needs to be Ė ĄĔĥĄ lives, whereas the medieval Rashi (The Torah, with Rashi’s Commentary Translated, Annotated and Elucidated trans. Rabbi Yisrael I. Z. Herczeg, Saperstein ed., 5 vols. [New York: Menorah, 1995], 2:265–66) did not. 27 Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 174 (emphasis additional). 28 William H. Propp, Exodus 19–40: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 2 (New York: Doubleday, 1999), 220.

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reinterpreted. Chirichigno argues that the apodosis’s Ġ ąŰĉĜēć ğ alludes to how 21:19’s apodosis begins with ė ĄŨ ąŪ ąėė ĆŰ Ăģ þĜ (“and be free [of the charge] of striking”),29 and that, in both cases, the perpetrator must take care of his victim. Thus, he interprets 21:21 as insisting that the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ-master take care of his injured Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ, because he [the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ] is his [the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ-master’s] property.30 In other words, for Chirichigno, this final clause does not explain Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ-master immunity, but enforces Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ-master responsibility for the injured. Chirichigno also claims that if the injury is more serious, then the law of 21:26–27 also applies: care first, then emancipation. Indeed, he also observes that his interpretation places “chattel-slaves on a level [i.e., treated equally] with freemen.”31 Jackson challenges Chirichigno’s understanding for failing to explain the need for the verse’s prohibitive apodosis (Ġ ąŰĉĜ ēć ğ) if the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ does not die,32 but the same prohibition’s only other occurrence in the OT, in Lev 19:18, is also without an apparent death. Instead, I argue that Chirichigno’s interpretation is unlikely because it interprets Exod 21:21’s final clause as justifying the applicability of its much more distant clause in 21:19 about payments and healing rather than explaining its immediately prior prohibition. While Chirichigno’s interpretation does not render the prohibition completely superfluous, he downgrades it into a mere literary device to import the apodosis of 21:19 into 21:21. I make two further observations to argue for an alternative interpretation of the explanatory clause and for its relationship with 21:19. Firstly, 21:18–19 complies with how Ġ ąğ ĆĬ (“restitution”) occurs fourteen times in 21:34– 22:15[14] to regulate how the perpetrators in those cases are only required to fully compensate their victims.33 Likewise, 21:19 specifies no sanction other than requiring full economic restitution through healing and compensation for lost income. Secondly, the word Ħ ĄĤ ĄŨ (“silver”) in the explanatory clause of 21:21 does not necessitate chattel status;34 it is simply the ancient unit of exchange. Scholars, we will observe, do not assume that the ė Ćġ Ćē of 21:7–11 is a chattel slave even though 21:11 alludes to her past Ħ ĄĤ ĄŨ purchase, and Ħ ĄĤ ĄŨ in Gen 17:12– 29

Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 173–76. Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 175–77. 31 Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 177. 32 Jackson, Wisdom-laws, 242n8; cf. Houtman, Exodus, 3:160. 33 Even in cases where Ġ ąğ ĆĬ is absent, such as how 22:16–17[15–16] compensates the father for losing the bride-price he would normatively expect if his daughter had not been deflowered. For why this is a case of seduction rather than rape, see our later analysis of Deut 22:28. 34 Contra Flesher, Slaves Mishnah, 23n29, 23–24n30; Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 179. 30

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27 distinguishes only between purchased and home-born chattel slaves. Although Lev 22:11 refers to a slave bought with Ħ ĄĤ ĄŨ as ĢąĜ þģĪĂ (“acquisition, property”) and Exod 12:44 refers to the ėąģĪþ ġĂ (“purchase”) of foreign slaves bought with Ħ ĄĤ ĄŨ, these slavery usages do not require Ħ ĄĤ ĄŨ in 21:21 to denote chattel status. Instead, the Ħ ĄĤ ĄŨ in 21:21 could simply refer to the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ-master’s investment in either the purchase price already paid for the chattel slave or the pre-existing debt that is being amortised by the debt slave’s ongoing labour.35 Indeed, this ambiguity could be intentional to encompass both. Again, I claim only that this interpretation is plausible; more decisive is how this interpretation best fits 21:21’s context and best reveals overall ethical coherence. In 21:19, the injured victim suffers an income loss from his inability to labour while recovering, so his perpetrator has to compensate. According to our interpretation of the injured Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ’s survival in 21:21, the resulting loss is already the perpetrator’s because he, also the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ-master, has already paid for that lost labour when he either purchased the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ or agreed to amortise outstanding debt through the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ’s labour services. The temporal distinction in when a person’s labour earns income, either as he labours if a free person or effectively pre-paid in advance if an Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ, necessitates the distinction between the free in 21:19 and the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ in 21:21. With this interpretation, 21:21’s prohibitive apodosis is necessary to explain why no penalty at all is due, not even the financial payment of 21:19. Indeed, given this comparison of 21:19 and 21 and our overall argument, 21:21 probably presumes that the ĖĖĄ Ąĥ-master is responsible for his Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ’s thorough healing. If correct, then 21:21 need not be explicit as it does not differ from 21:19. 5. Summary We argue that 21:21, contrary to the scholarly consensus, (i) neither crudely nor arbitrarily specifies a causative and/or intentionality test, (ii) does not 35

Alternatively, Westbrook (Biblical & Cuneiform, 98–100) suggests a parallel with a similar, but vicarious punishment imposing regulation of LH §116. He reads 21:21c as “it [Ġ ąĪĆģ interpreted as the vicarious punishment penalty normatively due for a death] is [i.e., replaced by] his [the surviving Ė ĄĔĥĄ ’s family] money [the original enslaving debt now forfeited by the master]” so that the Ė ĄĔĥĄ ’s family cannot in this case enact vicarious punishment on the master. Schwienhorst-Schönberger (Bundesbuch, 66–67, 70) amends Westbrook’s parallel to LH §115 instead to read, “it [the ĖĖĄ Ąĥ’s death] is his [the master’s] money [the outstanding debt],” and to indicate that the Ė ĄĔĥĄ -master cannot pursue the family for the remaining debt. For critiques of both, see Jackson, Wisdom-laws, 244–45n26; Houtman, Exodus, 3:158–59. Nevertheless, both scholars’ linkage of Ħ ĄĤ ĄŨ to the Ė ĄĔĥĄ ’s debt rather than to his property status is closer to our proposal.

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assume the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ’s delayed death, and (iii) does not cite the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ’s property status to justify the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ-master’s immunity. Rather, 21:21 is both precise and concise in its formulation to explain why the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ-master’s pre-payment for his now-injured Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ’s labour means that no one other than the injury’s perpetrator has suffered an economic loss and therefore why no compensation, ēć ğ Ġ ąŰĉĜ, is owed. The cases of 21:19 and 21 differ only because of the intrinsic difference between when the labour of a free person and an Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ is paid. Thus, their author’s logic could apply regardless of whether the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ in 21:21 is an Israelite debt slave or a foreign chattel slave. Our equality analysis compares slaves to free persons in the same historical context whose form of redress was solely economic restitution. We should avoid an anachronistic comparison between slaves then and free persons of a later context whose imprisonment and/or pecuniary redresses differ. Some might challenge this interpretation for being too obvious, too simple or too logical, but perhaps this is why 21:21 begins with the usually untranslated ź ąē (“surely”). While the consensus presumes that 21:21 demonstrates inequality between slave and free, we argue that it advocates the numerically equal treatment of both slave and free that does not minimise in any way the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ’s labour obligation. Throughout the rest of this chapter, we will observe multiple out-workings of this equality of treatment principle across the different scenarios discussed. 6. Jewish Reception: A Precedent While this is a novel interpretation of 21:21, both the Jewish Mishnah and Tosefta may preserve similar reasoning even though Balberg observes how both also demonstrate assimilation to how Roman legal reasoning distinguished between five compensation “counts”: for injury, pain, medical costs, loss of time and indignity:36 (Mishnah) He who injures a Hebrew slave is liable on all counts, except for loss of time when he belongs to him [who did the damage]. He who injures a Canaanite slave belonging to other people is liable on all counts … [except] indignity.… And he who injures a Canaanite slave belonging to himself is exempt on all counts.37 (Tosefta) If he injured a Hebrew boy-slave or girl-slave belonging to other people, they collect from him.… [If he injured] his Canaanite boy-slave or girl-slave, he is liable on all counts, but exempt on the count of compensation for the loss of time, for compensation for

36 Mira Balberg, “Pricing Persons: Consecration, Compensation, and Individuality in the Mishnah,” JQR 103 (2013): 184n45. 37 m. B. Qam 8:3, 5, cf. 8:1 (Neusner, interpolations Neusner, emphasis additional).

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loss of time in any event belongs to him [the owner]. If he beat them more than is appropriate, he is liable.38

Although Hezser acknowledges contradictions and ambiguities in both texts, her desire to equate Jewish and Greco-Roman slavery ethe steers her away from any analysis.39 However, these texts differ from the Greco-Roman slavery ethe in three ways. First, both texts maintain the Torah’s distinction between Hebrew and Canaanite slaves even though the labels were by time of composition already archaic. I interpret them as referring to Jewish debt slaves and nonJewish chattel slaves, respectively, in the Roman era. Second, both appear to articulate reasoning that is similar to our interpretation of Exod 21:21 in explaining why no compensation is payable to slaves for their loss of time after an injury inflicted by their own slave-master. Third, while the Mishnah, like Rome, assumes chattel slaves possess no dignity to lose and grants slave-masters’ immunity for injuring their own chattel slaves, the Tosefta treats chattel and debt slaves alike as possessing dignity and requires compensation from their slave-masters for any injuries. Thus, while the Mishnah assumes that Exod 21:21 only applies to Israelite debt slaves, the Tosefta assumes that 21:21 also originally included Canaanite chattels. While Strack-Stemberger demonstrates that scholarly attempts to reconstruct the origins of and relationship between the Mishnah and Tosefta remain speculative,40 the lectio difficilior potior principle would favour the Tosefta’s inclusive reading as reflecting the earliest Jewish understanding of Exod 21:21. 7. Lex talionis (21:24) versus Emancipation (21:26–27) The CC, however, distinguishes between free and Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ where the injury is permanent. According to the vicarious lex talionis principle of 21:23–25, the perpetrator of a permanent injury to a free person is penalised with exactly the same injury, including “eye for eye, tooth for tooth” (21:24). But, according to 21:26–27, if the perpetrator damaged the eye or tooth of his own Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ or ė Ćġ Ćē, then the victim is emancipated instead; the perpetrator loses his Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ or ė Ćġ Ćē rather than suffering the same injury.41

38

t. B. Qam 9:8, 10, cf. 9:1, 21 (Neusner, interpolations Neusner, emphasis additional). Hezser, Jewish Slavery, 208–9. 40 Strack and Stemberger, Talmud & Midrash, 124–39, 149–58. 41 For the eye and tooth as paradigmatic of other injuries, see Nahum M. Sarna, Exodus: The Traditional Hebrew text with the New JPS Translation, JPSTC (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1991), 127; contra Propp, Exodus 19–40, 231. 39

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While Durham lauds 21:26–27 as “a remarkably humanitarian provision directed at cruelty and sadism in a slave owner,”42 others argue that its concern is more minimal and tilted in favour of the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ- or ė Ćġ Ćē-master perpetrator. For example, Propp argues that releasing an injured Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ or ė Ćġ Ćē would hardly be compassionate,43 but we have already argued that 21:19’s healing and recovery requirement would probably also apply. Enns argues that the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ- or ė Ćġ Ćē-master perpetrator would prefer to lose his financial investment in the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ or ė ĆġĆē rather than lose a tooth or eye.44 But perhaps Enns overstates his case since the cost of a replacement would have then been a considerable sum to the typical Israelite. Indeed, if we update this case to reflect modern injury compensation claim levels, the labour replacement cost would be much more than the three weeks or a year’s average earnings pay-out from the UK criminal injuries compensation scheme in 2016 for losing a front tooth or an eye, respectively.45 Instead, I concur with Philo’s observation that an injured Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ or ė Ćġ Ćē would prefer their freedom to the risk of repeated violence.46 Thus, this inequality of treatment between the free in 21:24 and the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ or ė Ćġ Ćē in 21:26–27 is tilted towards greater slave welfare provision. Since the unqualified Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ in 21:21 was probably originally understood to refer to both Israelite debt slaves and non-Israelite chattel slaves, even though later Jewish reception restricted it to the former, presumably the unqualified Ė ĄĔĄĥ and ė Ćġ Ćē in 21:26– 27 originally shared the same inclusivity. Hezser emphasises only the Rabbinic attempts to narrow the protasis’s scope further, including limiting its applicability to only Jewish debt slaves. She also presumes that this ethic was never enforced and claims its broad similarity to the [minimal] Roman chattel slave welfare reforms.47 However, she overlooks how even the most grossly injured chattel slave in Rome was at best sold to another slave-master rather than compensated with emancipation.

42

John I. Durham , Exodus, WBC (Waco, TX: Word, 1987), 324. Propp, Exodus 19–40, 232. 44 Enns, Exodus, 447. 45 CICA, “Calculate your CICA Award,” 2016, http://www.criminal-injuries.co.uk/cicacompensation-calculator.html; ONS, “Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings UK: 2016 Provisonal Results,” 2016, https://www.ons.gov.uk/employmentandlabourmarket/peoplein work/earningsandworkinghours/bulletins/annualsurveyofhoursandearnings/2016provisiona lresults. 46 Philo, Spec. 3.195–97. 47 Hezser, Jewish Slavery, 208–11, 311. 43

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8. Capital Punishment (21:20) Having completed our analysis of cases of slave injury, we turn to 21:20, where the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ has undisputedly been killed by his Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ-master. While many argue that Ġ ąĪĆģ (“avenge”) here denotes the death penalty as is usual elsewhere throughout the OT,48 others presume that the death penalty could not have applied to an Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ-master for killing his own chattel slave.49 For example, at Eshnunna the death penalty applied only after the killing of a wrongly enslaved debt slave.50 However, since the SP prefers the explicit ĭġ (“put to death”) to the three instances of Ġ ąĪĆģ in 21:20–21 and even Rome later deemed intentional slave killing a capital offence, a scholarly presumption against the death penalty here appears unwarranted. Furthermore, if we are correct on the numerically equal treatment between slave and free in cases of slave injury, then we should favour a coherent interpretation on slave murder. Exodus 21:12–19 is directed at free victims: 21:12– 17 requires the death penalty for murder and for other serious crimes, including for kidnaping into Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ-ship (21:16),51 and 21:18–19 require healing and economic restitution for inflicting recoverable injuries. Therefore, 21:20–21 is required to explain why free and Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ victims should be treated identically if murdered but differently in terms of income compensation in cases of recoverable injuries. Finally, 21:23–27 relates to permanent injuries: 21:23–25 applies to free victims and require talion, but 21:26–27 breaches the equal treatment principle to favour slave victims by requiring their emancipation. Consistency also suggests that the Ė ĄĔĄĥ and ė Ćġ Ćē throughout these verses are inclusive of both Israelite debt slaves and non-Israelite chattel slaves.

48

Jacob, Exodus, 648–49; Martin Noth, Exodus: A Commentary, trans. J. S. Bowden, OTL (London: SCM, 1962), 181; Umberto Cassuto, A Commentary on the Book of Exodus, trans. Israel Abrahams, Publications of the Perry Foundation for Biblical Research in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1967), 273; Paul, Studies, 69–70; Ronald E. Clements, Exodus, CBC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 137; Christopher J. H. Wright, God’s People in God’s Land: Family, Land and Property in the Old Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Carlisle: Paternoster, 1990), 241–42; Sarna, Exodus, 124; Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 149–63; Jackson, Wisdom-laws, 246–48. 49 S. R. Driver, The Book of Exodus, rev. ed., CBSC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1911), 218; Childs, Exodus, 471–73; Houtman, Exodus, 3:157–59; cf. Flesher, Slaves Mishnah, 24n31. 50 LE §§23–24. 51 For the scholarly debate as to whether the death sentence for kidnapping into slavery is directed at the kidnapper, at the subsequent buyer or both, see Houtman, Exodus, 3:151. See further Propp (Exodus 19–40, 212–13) for seven possible interpretations of 21:16b’s syntax. See further our analysis of the parallel Deut 24:7.

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However, our emerging equality ethic also contrasts with the scholarly consensus on how the goring ox law of 21:28–32 also demonstrates Jewish slavery’s blatant inequality between slave and free. II. How Much: The Goring Ox Law (21:28–32) 1. The Consensus While 21:29–30 permits the negligent owner of an ox who has gored a free person to death to redeem his life from execution by paying an unspecified ī ĄħĞ ć (“ransom”) redemption amount,52 21:32 obliges the negligent ox owner to Ģ ąĭĆģ (“give”) the deceased’s Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ or ė Ćġ Ćēmaster thirty shekels. Wenham correlates how Lev 27:2–8 values persons for their redemption after a vow with ancient slave prices and concludes that the thirty shekel figure in Exod 21:32 is “closely related to the market value for slaves in Israel.”53 Thus to modern scholarship, the ī ĄħĞ ć substitution for the owner’s execution at least partly endorses the humanity of a free victim, but 21:32 treats a Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ or ė Ćġ Ćē victim as mere property in requiring only economic restitution for their master at the average slave market price.54 For example, Patrick observes, “the slave is the one exception to the rule that humans cannot be assigned monetary value.”55 Modern scholarship is content with highlighting this blatant inequality between free and slave. However, it fails to explain why Exod 21:28–32 is explicitly gender neutral when Lev 27:2–8 distinguishes between both gender and age groups. Moreover, the Tosefta appears to disagree that the thirty shekels is only the slave’s economic value because if the slave was jointly owned by two slave-masters,56 it rules that the ox’s owner should pay the full thirty shekels to each master rather than dividing it between them.57 Therefore, we turn to the Jewish rabbis who ask what modern scholarship does not: how to calculate the 52 Scholarship assumes that this ī ĄħćĞ alternative was usually followed; for the rabbinic rationale, see Jackson, Wisdom-laws, 271–72, 274–75. 53 Gordon J. Wenham, “Leviticus 27:2–8 and the Price of Slaves,” ZAW 90 (1978): 265; cf. August Dillman, Die Bücher Exodus und Leviticus, 2nd ed., KEH (Leipzig: Hirzel, 1880), 233; Driver, Exodus, 222; Noth, Exodus, 182–83; Cassuto, Exodus, 280; Davies, Exodus, 179; Propp, Exodus 19–40, 236; Jackson, Wisdom-laws, 168n254. 54 Contra only Jacob (Exodus, 669) who states, without any rationale, that the thirty shekels, as with all financial amounts in the Torah more generally, represents a “symbolic meaning.” 55 Dale Patrick, Old Testament Law (London: SCM, 1986), 78, cf. 250–51. 56 A scenario probably prompted by the Tosefta’s historical context since Roman commercial law regulates dual slave ownership whereas it appears unforeseen by the Torah. 57 t. B. Qam 4:8F, cf. the scenario of 4:8G–H where the killed slave was half free and half enslaved.

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ī ĄħĞ ć amount in 21:30 where the ox’s victim was a free person.58 First, we summarise Balberg on how the rabbis valued people; thereafter, I extend Balberg to re-evaluate this goring ox law. 2. Balberg: Philo and the Rabbis on Leviticus 27, Talion and Social Equality While Balberg acknowledges that Lev 27’s tariff list correlates with slave prices to a degree, she distinguishes it from slave market practices because the tariff classifies only according to age bracket and gender whereas markets throughout antiquity value people individually according to a whole range of factors such as appearance, skills and health.59 While today some might critique Lev 27’s age and gender inequality, Balberg highlights how Philo celebrated its equality for disregarding many other individual differences such as wealth and ancestry.60 Philo argues that Lev 27 treats people equally in contrast to slave markets because God honours equality while men honour inequality. He also highlights how the Torah requires the judge to be impartial, resist bribes if offered and refrain from bias towards his relatives and friends.61 His ethics derive from how the CC (Exod 23:3, 6) and Lev 19:15 explicitly require judicial impartiality by prohibiting partiality in favour of either the poor or the rich.62 Thus, Philo’s social equality ethics contrast with the social inequality of his day, although his emphasis appears tilted more against the dangers of being too sympathetic to the poor than to the rich. Balberg also contrasts Philo with the dual valuation system of the tannaitic and later rabbis who distinguished between a person’s źīĄ ăĥ (“value”) according to Lev 27’s tariff list and their economic ĠġĂ ĖĆ (“price/worth” in the Talmud): how much a person would achieve if sold in the slave market. To Balberg, the latter was not an expansion of the former because the two valuation systems represent “fundamentally different conceptual infrastructure[s].”63 The rabbis understood the źīĄ ăĥ of Lev 27 to be a monetary expression of a person’s humanity, while a person’s ĠġĂ ĖĆ valued them as this individual person; for 58

t. B. Qam 4:7; Mek. Nez. 10; cf. the medieval Rashi, Torah, 2:272. Conversely, Philo (Spec. 2.145) states only that it is for the court to determine the amount. 59 Balberg, “Pricing,” 174. 60 Balberg, “Pricing,” 175. 61 Philo, Spec. 2.32–34. 62 Some have deemed Exod 23:3’s opposition to poor partiality to be improbable given the Torah’s frequent opposition to rich partiality and proposed emending the text from ğĖĆ þĘ (“to the poor”) to ğĖ ć ŠĆ (“the great”), but all the extant evidence supports ğĖĆ þĘ; see further David L. Baker, Tight Fists and Open Hands (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009), 209–11. 63 Balberg, “Pricing,” 175–78, here 178 (emphasis original).

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example, the rabbis rated the dead and the severely disfigured, whose ĠġĂ ĖĆ would be zero, as having the same źīĄ ăĥ as the living and beautiful.64 They also used the language of how assessments could sometimes rule leniently and sometimes rule stringently to acknowledge that for some individuals their ĠġĂ ĖĆ would exceed their źīĄ ăĥ, whereas for others it would be vice versa.65 Balberg argues that the rabbis’ źīĄ ăĥ assessment upholds human equality while their ĠġĂ ĖĆ assessment treats persons as unequals.66 Balberg also gives three examples of the dual valuation system in operation. First, the rabbis adapted Lev 27 to allow a Jewish vower to choose their preferred valuation value: either their socially equal fixed źīĄ ăĥ or their individualistic ĠġĂ Ė. Ć 67 Second, in cases of seduction and rape, the rabbis combined the two valuation methods. They retained the Torah’s fifty-shekel payment to the victim’s father as the socially equal fixed źīĄ ăĥ value of a daughter’s virginity and added a variable compensation payment to reflect the victim’s individual loss of ĠġĂ Ė, Ć the decrease in her price if sold in the slave market because of her loss of virginity.68 Third, while Philo also celebrates the equality of the Torah’s vicarious lex talionis and Josephus grants the injured victim the option of receiving monetary compensation instead,69 the rabbis replaced the vicarious talionis with monetary equivalent compensation, calculated according to the individual’s loss of ĠġĂ Ė, Ć the decrease in their price if sold in the slave market because of the new disability. A missing body part would not, by the rabbis’ logic, affect a person’s źīĄ ăĥ.70 Balberg highlights that the rabbis could have replaced the vicarious talionis with a similar socially equal fixed monetary compensation amount for each body part. Instead, she argues that their rejection of it in favour of a variable compensation scheme proportionate to the parties’ individual characteristics reflects their assimilation to the highly stratified Roman Empire.71 Cognisant 64

Balberg, “Pricing,” 177–80; cf. m. Arakh. 5.2; b. Arakh. 2a; Sifra, Behuqotai Parashah

3. 65

Balberg, “Pricing,” 180. Balberg, “Pricing,” 177. 67 Balberg, “Pricing,” 179–81; cf. m. Arakh. 5.2. 68 Balberg, “Pricing,” 188–90; cf. m. Arakh. 3:1, 4, Ketub. 3:1–4:1, esp. 3:7; b. Arakh. 14b. 69 Philo, Spec. 3.182; Josephus, A.J. 4.280. Balberg (”Pricing,” 183n40) however, misreads Josephus as agreeing with Philo. For a fuller analysis of the Jewish lex talionis texts, see James F. Davis, Lex Talionis in Early Judaism and the Exhortation of Jesus in Matthew 5.38–42, LNTS 281 (London: T&T Clark, 2005), 55–103. 70 Balberg, “Pricing,” 179, 181–85; cf. m. Arakh. 5.2, B. Qam 8:1–3, 6. 71 Balberg (“Pricing,” 183–88, 190–92), who also refers to the latter, imprecisely, as “an inequality” (“Pricing,” 177, 186–87, 191); cf. b. B. Qam 83b–84a (8:I.5) . 66

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in particular of Balberg’s conclusion that the rabbis regarded all human beings as if a slave whenever they needed to assign a monetary value to a person,72 we return to the goring ox law of Exod 21:28–32. 3. How Much, Revisited In the case of an ox which is an attested danger which killed a slave … to rule leniently and to rule stringently: How so? All the same are one who killed the most beautiful among slaves and … the ugliest among slaves – [the owner] pays thirty selas. [If] it killed a free man, he pays his [actual] value [Ĝć þĘ ĆŘ = ĠġĂ Ė]. Ć 73

To the Mishnah’s rabbis, the fixed thirty-shekel payment in 21:32 reflects the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ or ė Ćġ Ćē victim’s źīă ăĥ, their value as a human being, which would be sometimes greater than and at other times less than their ĠġĂ ĆĖ: what they would have achieved if they had been sold in the slave market. Hence, the Tosefta’s thirty-shekel payment per slave-master compensates each for losing a person rather than their fraction of the individual slave. Conversely, the rabbis interpreted the unspecified ī ĄħĞ ć amount in 21:30 as indicating that it should accord with what the free victim would have achieved if sold in the slave market, their ĠġĂ Ė. Ć Indeed, they debated which free person should be assessed: either the ĠġĂ ĖĆ of the (often richer, I observe) negligent ox owner, whose life would be redeemed by the ī ĄħĞ ć payment, as maybe suggested by the phraseology of 21:30,74 or the ĠġĂ ĖĆ of the ox’s (often poorer) free victim because 21:32 relates to the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ / ė Ćġ Ćē victim.75 In any case, I highlight the striking contrast between modern scholarship and the rabbis on Exod 21:28–32: scholarship assumes that the free victim is at least partially respected as a human being while the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ / ė Ćġ Ćē victim is treated as only property with an economic value, but the rabbis priced every free victim as if a slave and valued every slave victim as a human being! If correct, this reasoning would also explain why Exod 21:28–32 is gender neutral and possibly, given 21:31, also age neutral.76 I also observe that both the 72

Balberg, “Pricing,” 194. m. Arakh. 3:3 (Neusner, interpolations Neusner except for the final addition to demonstrate the equivalence between the original Mishnaic Hebrew and Balberg’s terminology, see further m. Arakh. 3:1); cf. m. B. Qam 4:5F–G; Mek. Nez. 11; cf. also b. B. Qam 83b (8:1D), 84a–b (8.I.13–16). 74 Jacob J. Finkelstein, “The Ox that Gored,” TAPS 71.2 (1981): 29–32; cf. Jackson, Wisdom-laws, 133n74. 75 Rashi (Torah, 2:272) appears uncertain. 76 Scholarship typically argues that 21:31 counters how LH §§116, 210 and 230 demands that the ox’s owner son or daughter should be executed instead; see further Jackson (Essays, 150–52) who dismisses the verse as an interpolation. 73

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Mishnah and the Tosefta applied this rule to slaves generically rather than limiting its applicability, as they did elsewhere, to only Israelite debt slaves. I suggest that the rabbis’ lex talionis innovation probably extended to their pricing of the free as if slaves in 21:30. This appears more likely than the alternative hypotheses of either early Jewish interpretations of 21:28–32 treating slaves more favourably than free persons or the rabbis innovating on treating slaves as if persons while surrounded by the Roman slavery ethos. If correct, then early Jewish interpreters of 21:28–32 did treat slave and free equally as persons, and they would not have needed to debate whose life in 21:30, the ox’s owner or victim, should be assessed. In any case, since Jews in antiquity understood 21:32 to be not valuing slave victims economically as mere property, I argue that modern scholarship should no longer assume that this goring ox law reveals Jewish inequality between slave and free. Furthermore, perhaps Matt 26:15 and 27:3–9, in claiming that the thirty ċúñŴúóø÷ (“silver pieces”) was üóöĥëŨöëüøÏ (“blood money”) and alluding through Zech 11:12–13 to Exod 21:32, may confirm how earlier Jews originally compensated for free victims with a ī ĄħĞ ć payment of also thirty shekels. Carson assumes that Matthew is equating the Jewish leadership’s disdain for Jesus with Zechariah’s ironic praise at how its shepherd-narrator merited only the lowly value of a slave.77 However, there is no hint either in Matthew that the Jewish leadership is thereby treating Jesus as if a slave or in Zechariah that its shepherd-narrator would have been satisfied if he had been, say, valued at the fifty-shekel figure of Lev 27:3.78 McComiskey suggests that Zechariah’s shepherd-narrator may have viewed the amount as “slave wages,” depending upon how long he had worked as a shepherd;79 but the shepherds in Zech 10– 11 are metaphorical – representing the Jewish leadership – rather than literal, and there is also no hint in Zechariah of the shepherd-narrator’s length of service. I suggest that McComisky’s view is also unlikely because Jewish interpretation did not relate the thirty shekels of Exod 21:32 to a slave’s economic value. Instead, Zechariah could be ironically comparing the manslaughter compensation level payable in lieu of every victim, whether slave or free alike, with the intentional acts behind the shepherd-narrator’s reward of piercing and death

77

Donald A. Carson, “Matthew,” in vol. 8 of Expositor’s Bible Commentary, ed. Frank E. Gaebelein, J. D. Douglas, and Richard P. Polcyn, 12 vols. (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1976), 528. 78 While Paul identifies Jesus as a metaphorical slave, e.g., in Phil 2:7, neither he nor any other known Christian writer relies upon this thirty-shekel value to do so. 79 Thomas E. McComiskey, “Zechariah,” in The Minor Prophets: An Exegetical and Expository Commentary (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2009), 1200–1201, here 1200.

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for his service (Zech 12:10; 13:7).80 If correct, then such a comparison would also fit the Matthean context, forming an ironic contrast between manslaughter compensation and the intentional actions of both Judas and the Jewish leadership. While Matthew’s use of Zechariah is beyond the scope of this monograph, their shared assessment of thirty shekels for a free person’s death is suggestive and worthy of further research. I conclude that the earlier Jewish interpretation of Exod 21:28–32 probably relied upon an a minori ad majus hermeneutical argument: the rabbinic qal wać payment for the manhomer principle.81 If thirty shekels is the stated ī ĄħĞ slaughter of any slave then an identical payment is appropriate for the manslaughter of any victim. If correct, then such reasoning would mirror how Jewish interpretation applied the specifically ė Ćġ Ćē case of 21:10–11 to every Jewish wife. Hence, we now analyse the ė Ćġ Ćē law of 21:7–11. III. Concubine or Wife (21:7–11) Both Glancy and Hezser rely upon the probable scholarly majority who assume that this law is similar to how many contemporaneous ANE cultures practised concubinage:82 when the young ė Ćġ Ćē of 21:7 matures, as Ė ąĥĆĜ (“appointed, agreed”) with her father at the outset,83 she becomes either her master’s (21:7– 8) (or his son’s [21:9])84 concubine. Houtman, for example, is particularly 80

For the connection between these verses, see further McComiskey, “Zechariah,” 1214,

1223. 81

For an introduction to rabbinical hermeneutics, see Strack and Stemberger, Talmud & Midrash, 15–30, esp. 18. 82 Glancy, “Sexual Use,” 216–17; Hezser, Jewish Slavery, 192–93; “Jews (AMW),” 442, 445; cf. Wright, “Not Go Free,” 130–33. 83 Majority view, adopting the Qere variant of 21:8 (ŢĖĆ ĆĥĜþ żğ [“appointed for himself”]) because a past designation to the master better explains the moral disapproval suggested by the usage of Ėąĕ Ćş (“act unfaithfully”) (Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 249–50; contra Propp, Exodus 19–40, 199). Contra also those who adopt the Kethiv variant ŢĖĆ ĥĆ þ Ĝþ ēć ğ [“not appointed”]) (Boecker, Law & Justice, 160; Adrian Schenker, “Affranchissement d’une esclave selon Ex 21:7–11,” Bib 69 [1988]: 549–51; Jacob, Exodus, 622–23). Contra also J. A. Wagenaar (“The Annulment of a ’Purchase‘ Marriage in Exodus 21,7–11,” ZABR 10 [2004]: 224–26) who additionally, following the Syriac Peshitta, emends the verb ĖĥĆ ĜĆ to ĥĖĆą Ĝ (“know”) so that the test in both 21:8–9 is whether sexual intercourse has occurred. 84 Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 250; Propp, Exodus 19–40, 199–200; Jackson, Wisdomlaws, 91. Contra Willem H. Gispen (Exodus, trans. Ed van der Maas, BSC [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1982], 209–10) and Jacob (Exodus, 625) who consider 21:9 to be an alternative option available after the master has decided he does not want her for himself. But it is unlikely that a master who has rejected the ė Ćġ Ćē for being ĥīą (“evil, bad”) would nevertheless pass her on to his son. Contra Wagenaar (“Annulment,” 228–29) who thinks 21:9

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damning: “Instead of having to give a dowry to his daughter, the person in question now is getting money for her!”85 Actual evidence supporting her intended concubine destination, however, is thin. Childs advocates it because in Genesis ė Ćġ Ćē “always means concubine,”86 but this is inconclusive because none of those examples match the circumstances of this CC case and elsewhere (as we have already observed) the attested semantic range of ė Ćġ Ćē is much broader. Pressler relies on the ė Ćġ Ćē being ī ąĞ Ćġ (“sold”) by her father in 21:7 rather than Ģ ąĭĆģ,87 but again the semantic ranges of these verbs (and of ėģĆ ĆĪ [“buy,” 21:2]) are broad enough to cover all kinds of transactions,88 including how Gen 31:15 describes the patriarch Jacob’s marriages to both Leah and Rachel.89 Westbrook also advocates her concubinage destination because, he argues, the three entitlements in the protasis of Exod 21:10, traditionally food (or meat), clothing and ėĆģ ćĥ (“conjugal rights”),90 would have been so self-evidently applicable for wives that no one

requires the master to act in loco parentis to find for her another husband if his son has rejected her. Contra also Cardellini (Sklaven, 255–57) who suggests that the ė Ćġ Ćē of 21:8 is appointed for marriage, but that the ė Ćġ Ćē of 21:10–11 has become a concubine. The protases of 21:8 and 9 distinguish between their viewpoint aspect of Ė ĥą ĜĆ : in 21:8 it is a Qal perfect, viewing it as a whole, to regulate how that past agreement should be annulled through relative redemption; in 21:9, it is a Qal imperfect, viewing it from the inside as an ongoing reality, to regulate how the ė Ćġ Ćē should be treated while that agreement is ongoing. 85 Houtman, Exodus 3:127. However, Exod 22:16–17[15–16] suggests that the father of the bride ordinarily receives the bride-price from the groom (and/or his family) upon the marriage and not vice versa. 86 Childs, Exodus, 448n7. 87 Carolyn Pressler, “Wives and Daughters, Bond and Free: Views of Women in the Slave Laws of Exodus 21:2–11,” GLHBANE 163–64. 88 Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 245; Jackson, Wisdom-laws, 81–82. 89 Contra the attempt of Pressler (“Wives & Daughters Exodus,” 163n39) to downplay this example’s significance. 90 For a rebuttal of Robert North’s (“Flesh, Covering, and Response, Exodus 21:10,” VT 5 [1955]: 204–6) argument that the three entitlements should be understood as sexual satisfaction, “harem-seclusion” shelter and the right to motherhood, see Propp, Exodus 19–40, 201–3. More widely supported is Paul (Studies, 56–61; cf. Jacob, Exodus, 427; Sarna, Exodus, 121; Raymond Westbrook, “The Female Slave,” GLHBANE 218n8) who compares the three entitlements to several ANE parallels that require certain women to be provided with their basic necessities of food, clothing and oil. Paul argues, therefore, that the third entitlement, the hapax legomenon ėĆģ ĥć , should be understood as “oil” not “conjugal rights;” however, there is no philological support for his connotation. Alternatively, Wagenaar (“Annulment,” 229–30) suggests “housing.” For justification of the traditional understanding nevertheless, see Étan Levine, “On Exodus 21,10 ‫ދ‬onah and Biblical Marriage,” ZABR 5 (1999): 133–64.

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would have questioned these wifely rights.91 While I concur with Westbrook’s observation, the protasis of 21:10 could be testing whether this former ė Ćġ Ćē is now treated as a wife with these entitlements or as a concubine without them. Only a minority argue that the ė Ćġ Ćē is destined for marriage. If correct, then the verb Ė ąĥĜĆ probably indicates that the original agreement was less formal than a Ĭīą Ćē (“betrothal”), probably because the ė Ćġ Ćē of 21:7 is younger and will serve in the household until she is mature enough to marry.92 Goldingay, for example, is affirming: “Selling your daughter in this way would be a way of arranging her marriage to the master or his son; you would be eventually arranging her marriage anyway.”93 We also review the evidence for this marital destination. Mendelsohn, Paul and Chirichigno cite parallel Nuzi examples of women growing up in the households of those they would later become wives to.94 To Paul, these parallels demonstrate that the phrase ĭżģ Ćş ąėě ąŮŘþ ġĂ Ũþ (“like the rights of the daughters,” 21:9) is a technical term meaning “to treat as a free(born) woman,” including her normative expectation of marriage.95 Propp attempts to disqualify the comparison because 21:7–11, unlike the Nuzi examples, mention neither a home city nor nationality;96 but an Israelite audience of this law would probably assume the ė Ćġ Ćē’s Hebrew ethnicity.97 Chirichigno concludes: 91

Westbrook, “Female Slave,” 236–37. Presumably every biological daughter in all but the richest of households would also have had her fair share of household duties to perform. Given the strictures of 21:15–17, there would have been little if any practical difference in the obligations of a biological daughter and a young ė Ćġ Ćē to obey the head of the household. Jackson (Wisdom-laws, 90n64) rightly observes that the author’s choice of Ėĥą ĜĆ instead of Ĭīą Ćē is irrelevant for arbitrating between a marital and concubinage agreement. Contra Wagenaar (“Annulment,” 219–31) who, while assuming a marital destination, has a unique interpretation of this law. 93 John Goldingay, Exodus and Leviticus for Everyone, OTEo (London: SPCK, 2010), 84. 94 Isaac Mendelsohn, “The Conditional Sale into Slavery of Free-Born Daughters in Nuzi and the Law of Ex. 21: 7–11,” JAOS 55 (1935): 190–95; Paul, Studies, 48–49, 52–56; Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 246–47. Westbrook (“Female Slave,” 218–19) challenges Mendelsohn’s Nuzi sources for referring only to young free woman (not female slaves) becoming wives, but he omits discussion of Paul’s additional sources (cf. Pressler, “Wives & Daughters Exodus,” 163–64). 95 Paul, Studies, 55 (parenthesis original). 96 Propp, Exodus 19–40, 200. 97 While scholars differ on some details, there is consensus that 21:7–11 parallels 21:2– 6; see further Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 186, 196–99. Therefore, pertinent also is the majority interpretation of ĜīĂ Ĕþ Ăĥ (“Hebrew”) in 21:2 as a gentilic qualifier, which we will discuss shortly. 92

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Although the law in Exod. 21.7–11 refers to the sale of an ėġē, which can be compared with the sale of a chattel-slave or concubine, nevertheless this law should not be compared with these institutions, but rather this law should be understood as an attempt to guarantee to a girl who is sold as a wife those rights that were normally afforded to daughters who were married in the customary manner.98

In other words, the case of 21:10–11 requires equality between a man’s sexual partners even if one had a lowly beginning as an ė Ćġ Ćē of 21:7; she has also become his wife and he should not treat her as a lessor as if, in effect, a concubine. While I doubt Paul’s claim that 21:9 is technical language, the verse nevertheless requires the head of the household to treat the ė Ćġ Ćē and his freeborn daughter as equals in a context that also anticipates the ė Ćġ Ćē’s future sexual relationship.99 Pressler counters by arguing that the language of “redemption” (21:8) and “letting go” (21:11) contrast with divorce language,100 but the ė Ćġ Ćē’s ėĖĆ ĆŮ (“ransom, redeem,” 21:8), by her relatives,101 fits the case where the Ė ąĥĆĜ has broken down because it reverts the still-virgin ė Ćġ Ćē back to her status quo prior to the Ė ąĥĆĜ, and the ė Ćġ Ćē’s permission to ē ĆĩĆĜ (“go out”) in 21:11 appears less harsh than a wife being Ě ąğ ĆŘ (“sent out”) in the divorce legislation of Deut 24:1–4. Pressler also overlooks how the rabbis relied upon their qal wa-homer hermeneutic to argue from the ė Ćġ Ćē’s departure right in Exod 21:10–11 to a wifely right to divorce her husband for his failure to uphold its three entitlements.102 98

Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 251. Scholars also debate the referent of ě ĆŮŘþ ġĂ (“judgement/rule”) in 21:9. Houtman (Exodus, 3:129) argues that its referent is the rule of 21:7, therefore granting the master in loco parentis rights to sell her to another. However, this grants to the master what 21:8 denies just because she is designated to his son rather than to himself; and, as Propp (Exodus 19– 40, 200) also observes in this context, the imperfect Ė ĥą ĜĆ indicates that her designation to the son is still envisaged. Contra also Sarna (Exodus, 121) and Propp (Exodus 19–40, 199–200) who argue that its referent is the specific incestual prohibition against a father having sexual relations with his daughter because the ė Ćġ Ćē is destined for his son, but if that were the limit of the rights intended, then it is unclear why its author did not say so, e.g., through ėĄŠĕą ĭēć þ ğ Ţ ąĭĆĘīþ ĥĄ (“not uncover her nakedness”) as per Lev 18:15. Instead, ě ĆŮ Řþ ġĂ in 21:9 probably follows how its plural usage in 21:1 denotes all the laws and cases that follow; thus, 21:9 references those laws and cases that are pertinent to daughters (albeit nowhere explicitly defined). Cf. also ě ĆŮ Řþ ġ’s Ă usage in Deut 21:17. 100 Pressler, “Wives & Daughters Exodus,” 163; cf. Hezser, “Jews (AMW),” 193n67. 101 Interpreting ĜīĂ ĞĆþ ģ (typically “foreigner, non-Israelite”) in 21:8 relatively, i.e. non-relative (Noth, Exodus, 179; Sarna, Exodus, 121; Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 249; Propp, Exodus 19–40, 198–99; contra Driver, Exodus, 213; Houtman, Exodus, 3:128). 102 Also vice versa, the same right to husbands; see further David Instone-Brewer (Divorce and Remarriage in the Bible: The Social and Literary Context [Grand Rapids: 99

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Jewish interpretation also presumes her future marriage. The Mishnah’s taxonomy separates its regulation of this ėĆġ Ćē-ship from her future sexual relationship. A father could only sell his prepubescent daughter (typically, younger than twelve years old) into an ė Ćġ Ćē-ship,103 out of which she “acquires herself” at puberty.104 Presumably, given that Jewish females were typically betrothed just before and married at or around puberty, the rabbinic expectation was then that her sexuality and likely imminent marriage to whomever (whether her ė Ćġ Ćē-master, his son or another) would then be regulated according to those separate Mishnah’s regulations. The Mishnah’s taxonomy on female sexual relationships, therefore, does not distinguish between those with a former ė Ćġ Ćēmaster (or his son) and those with another. The later Talmuds debate complications regarding the ė Ćġ Ćē’s perutah (“bride-price”) payment for and the timing of her betrothal to either the ė Ćġ Ćē-master or his son, but undisputed therein is the assumption that her prepubescent betrothal (for otherwise she then “acquires herself” as in the Mishnah) is the prelude to a standard marriage.105 Later, we will observe how Lev 19:20–22 regulates a scenario where this ė Ćġ Ćē welfare measure was not followed. Nevertheless, our focus here is on the Torah’s slave welfare ethics that oblige the ė Ćġ Ćē-master to treat a young ė Ćġ Ćē in his household as an equal to his own (free) daughter and the polygamous husband to treat his wives as equals to each other even if one of them began as a lowly ė Ćġ Ćē in his household. In these two respects, Exod 21:7–11 advocates the numerically equal treatment between ė Ćġ Ćē and free.

Eerdmans, 2002], 8–9, 90, 99–110, 214–25, cf. 192–97) where he also argues that Exod 21:10–11 was Paul’s ultimate ethical source behind his mutual marital and sexual ethics of 1 Cor 7. 103 m. Ketub. 3:8. For female classification vis-à-vis puberty and age 12, see m. Ketub. 4:1, Nid. 5:6–6:1; for other Jewish support, see Sarna, Exodus, 120, 252n21. 104 m. Qidd. 1:2 (Neusner); cf. j. Qidd. 1:2[D], 59a; 1.2X, 59b; cf. also 1.2XVII, 59c; 1.2XVIII[M], 59c; b. Qidd. 18b–19b. For the Jewish debate as to whether this should occur at the onset of puberty or at maturity (six months later), see Rashi, Torah,, 2:257. Her selfacquiry gives her more autonomy, akin to that of a divorcee or widow (cf. m. Qidd. 1:1), than the free Jewish virgin who is ‘acquired’ from her father by her husband upon marriage. 105 For rabbinic views on sexuality and marriage, see further Rachel Biale, Women and Jewish Law, 2nd ed. (New York: Schocken, 1995), 44–69, 121–69; Instone-Brewer, Divorce, 117–18.

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IV. Debt Slavery, Slave Breeding and Family Breakup (21:2–6) Rabbinic tradition claims that the only cause of Israelite debt slavery was the thief unable to repay the required restitution to his victim (22:3[2]),106 but this appears improbable. The OT itself reports debt slavery at 2 Kgs 4:1 and Neh 5:5, and it was probably endemic throughout the ANE, where interest rates typically ranged from 25% to 50%.107 Thus, small debts could easily mushroom into unpayable debt and the debtor (or a family member) becoming enslaved to his creditor until the debt is, if ever, amortised. Indeed, the CC’s prohibition of usury (22:23[22]) is part of its poor and slave welfare ethic that attempts to prevent poverty turning into temporary debt slavery and prevents debt slavery when it occurs from becoming permanent.108 Verse 2 establishes the CC’s primary principle that the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ’s labour term has fully amortised the principal; he thereafter departs ĠūĆ ĚĂ (“freely, for nothing”), without further payment. Levinson observes: It seeks to restore the purchased person to his original status quo ante once the term of service has been completed.… Indeed, the entire focus of the law is upon the matter of the 106 Sarna, Exodus, 119, 252n11. For ĜīĂ Ĕþ Ăĥ (“Hebrew”) in 21:2 as a gentilic qualifier because there is no extant evidence of an equivalent to the ANE habiru/hupsu intermediate social class in ancient Israel, see Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 200–18; Propp, Exodus 19–40, 186–90; Jackson, Wisdom-laws, 80, 84; contra Noth, Exodus, 178; Cassuto, Exodus, 265– 66; Paul, Studies, 45–48; Niels P. Lemche, “The Hebrew Slave: Comments on the Slave Law, Ex 21:2–11,” VT 25 (1975): 136–42. Contra also the claim of Wright (God’s People, 253–56) that ĜīĂ Ĕþ Ăĥ denotes an Israelite landless class. We will discuss later as part of our analysis into Deut 15:12 the scholarly debate as to whether Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ in Exod 21:2–6 refers to generic (including female) slaves except for those females referred to in 21:7–11 (i.e., harmonious with Deut 15:17), or that Exod 21:2–6 and 7–11 refers to all male and all female slaves respectively (which the Deuteronomist altered). 107 See further Isaac Mendelsohn, Slavery in the Ancient Near East: A Comparative Study of Slavery in Babylonia, Assyria, Syria, and Palestine, From the Middle of the Third Millennium to the End of the First Millennium (New York: Oxford University Press, 1949, 23–33; Baker, Tight Fists, 253–57. 108 For 21:2 representing the commencement of debt slavery, see Bernard M. Levinson, “The ‘Effected Object’ in Contractual Legal Language: The Semantics of ‘If you purchase a Hebrew slave’ (Exod. xxi 2),” VT 56 (2006): 485–504; contra John Van Seters (“The Law of the Hebrew Slave,” ZAW 108 [1996], 540; A Law Book for the Diaspora: Revision in the Study of the Covenant Code, [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003], 87; “Law of the Hebrew Slave: A Continuing Debate,” ZAW 119 [2007], 170–72) who argues that the Ė ĄĔĥĄ in 21:2 was a pre-existing slave purchased by an Israelite. For an evaluation of debt slavery vis-à-vis debtor prison, see Christopher J. H. Wright Old Testament Ethics for the People of God (Leicester: InterVarsity, 2004), 333, 352–53. Crucial to any comparison, however, as Wright acknowledges, is the debt slave’s welfare protection since he cannot (unlike a hired worker) leave.

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status change in such a way as to distinguish between the intrinsic freedom of the patient and his contingent status.109

This concurs with how the CC’s context within the Exodus narrative suggests that the purpose of its opening law is to protect Israelite debt slaves from suffering permanent Egyptian-like slavery.110 However, Hamilton argues that the seven-year term reflects degraded conditions relative to the three-year term of LH §§117–18,111 but the Genesis narrative of Jacob’s dispute with Laban (Gen 29), where both nevertheless uphold the seven-year term, suggests its longstanding pedigree.112 Given the diversity we have already observed among the Greek city-states, there appears no reason to assume that an identical debt slavery ethos originally applied across the different ANE cultures; different term lengths probably reflect only different initial debt levels that require different labour lengths to amortise. Verse 3 appears to be the norm in that the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ remains in the same state, either single or married, throughout the labour term. Verse 4, therefore, is the author’s attempt to clarify what should happen when a single Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ enters a sexual relationship with an ė ĆŘēĂ (“woman, wife”) during his term.113 While the majority assume that the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ-master has given (Ģ ąĭģĆ ) his Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ an ė ĆŘēĂ as part of a casual slave breeding programme,114 Ģ ąĭĆģ’s semantic range is broad enough to encompass other scenarios. While comparative antebellum evidence supports Chirichigno’s contention that ANE debt slavery did not include slave Ă status, not the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ’s debt breeding,115 the pertinent issue in 21:4 is the ė ĆŘē’s status. 109

Levinson, “Effected Object,” 501; cf. Jackson, Wisdom-laws, 103. Enns, Exodus, 42–43. 111 Victor P. Hamilton, Exodus: An Exegetical Commentary (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2011), 372; cf. David P. Wright, Inventing God’s Law: How the Covenant Code of the Bible Used and Revised the Laws of Hammurabi (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 137. See also our analysis of Deut 15:18. For minority Jewish assimilation to the Sabbatical year of Exod 23:10–11, see Sarna, Exodus, 119, 252n13. 112 For an even closer parallel between Gen 29 and Exod 21:2–6, see Calum Carmichael, “The Three Laws on the Release of Slaves (Ex 21,2–11; Dtn 15,12–18; Lev 25,39–46),” ZAW 112 (2000): 510–15; contra Jean-François Lefebvre, Le jubilé biblique: Lv 25 – exégèse et théologie, OBO 194 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 2003), 303–4n12. 113 Contra Jacob (Exodus, 615-16) who argues that 21:4 is consequent to 21:3b, i.e., the already married Ė ĄĔĥĄ is given a second wife to breed with. 114 E.g., Sarna, Exodus, 119, 252n14; Jackson, Wisdom-laws, 85, 88–89; Hamilton, Exodus, 368. 115 Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 69, 145, 179, 223, 352–53; cf. Theophile J. Meek, “A New Interpretation of Code of Hammurabi §§ 117–19,” JNES 7 (1948): 180–83. For LU §4 as applying to chattel slaves, see Jackson, Wisdom-laws, 85n30. 110

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Since the ė ĆŘēĂ and her children appear unable to leave with the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ, scholarship assumes that she must be a permanent Canaanite female slave. However, the semantic range of ė ĆŘēĂ is broad enough to include other females. For example, Chirichigno envisages, given the example of Jacob’s multiple debt slaveries to Laban in Gen 29 to repay each daughter’s perutah, the ė ĆŘēĂ could denote a Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ-master’s own free daughter.116 Perhaps ė ĆŘēĂ in this case could also denote a female debt slave; in which case ġ Ćğ ćĥ (typically “forever”) in 21:6 would denote a relative “later,” i.e., until her own labour term has concluded.117 Thus, perhaps this law’s intention is to facilitate a marriage for an impoverished Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ, who could neither redeem an enslaved ė ĆŘēĂ nor provide the customary perutah to a free ė ĆŘē’s Ă father, rather than to exploit both Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ and ė ĆŘēĂ in their master’s slave breeding programme. If correct, then this law facilities the marriage as long as all acknowledge that the marriage changes neither party’s status. In other words, the law provides an equal opportunity for both Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ and free to marry, while clarifying how the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ’s inability to ‘pay’ for his marriage affects their future. Some may object that this provides equal opportunity to the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ at the ė Ćġ Ćē’s expense, but, if Deut 24:1–4 reflects the historical attitude to a husband’s ability to divorce his initially free wife, then Exod 21:2–6 does not itself discriminate between a free and an enslaved ė ĆŘē. Ă 118 Furthermore, since this law would have been a known fact to all parties, they probably would have agreed on the way ahead in advance.119 The scholarly majority is also sceptical (or cynical) of the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ’s love motivation for remaining. Jackson, for example, labels 21:5–6 as hypothetical, the work of “a consummate literary genius,” unlikely to have been chosen by the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ whose interest in the ė Ćġ Ćē was only reproductive.120 Jacob is perhaps only slightly less dismissive: “As the slave wife had not been freely chosen, the separation at the end of the term of service should not have been difficult.”121 Yet 21:4–5 presumes that the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ and ė Ćġ Ćē’s relationship has continued through pregnancy, birth and thereafter until the moment of the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ’s 116

Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 229. Heinisch, Das Buch Exodus, HSAT 1/2 (Bonn: Hanstein, 1934), 164. For ġ Ćğćē being understood in a relative sense in Ps 77:5[6], see Anthony Tomasino, “‘ôlƗm,” NIDOTTE 3:346; contra Propp, Exodus 19–40, 195. Rabbinic harmonisation capped the ġ Ćğ ćĥ at either the next jubilee or by the master’s death, see further Jacob, Exodus, 619–20; Sarna, Exodus, 120, 252n20. 118 For Jewish disagreements on the acceptable grounds of divorce, but without engagement with Exod 21:4–6, see Instone-Brewer, Divorce. 119 Cf. Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 227–29. 120 Jackson, Wisdom-laws, 89n56. 121 Jacob, Exodus, 616. 117

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manumission. Thus, it is hardly as casual as Jackson and Jacob suggest. Furthermore, there appears no reason to doubt that slave family attachments in antiquity could have been as genuine as those attested to in the antebellum era. Indeed, 21:4–5 insists that any slave family separation is for the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ to decide and not for the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ-master to impose. This may even account for Constantine’s innovative Roman legislation against slave family breakup;122 further research into Constantine’s motivations is required. Alternatively, Daube reckons the case demonstrates the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ-master’s emotional manipulation to retain his Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ.123 Others also warn against an over-romantic interpretation of the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ’s love for his Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ-master, arguing that it signifies only the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ’s preference for the relative security of slavery versus the everyday poverty as a free person trying to survive.124 But Chirichigno responds by highlighting how (i) the word order in 21:5 emphasises the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ’s love for his Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ-master before that for the ė Ćġ Ćē and children, (ii) the parallel Deut 15:16, which does not envisage any Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ relationship, also cites love for his Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ-master, and (iii) the typical Israelite Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ could normally return to relatives rather than being destitute alone.125 We recall Patrick’s observation that a law’s gaps and/or ambiguities also reveal what its author is uninterested in because his purpose is otherwise. We should prioritise what its author made explicit for immediate interpretation rather than read in from other historical contexts. While this law may not itself explicitly prohibit slave breeding, it neither presumes, regulates nor tolerates the practice. Indeed, we will argue later – from our analysis of Deut 21:10–17, Lev 19:20–22 and elsewhere – against early Jewish toleration of slave breeding and/or the casual sexual use of slaves. Thus, here we emphasise only this law’s twofold intent to provide an impoverished Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ with the equal opportunity to marry as long as the ė Ćġ Ćē’s status remains unaffected and to prohibit the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥmaster from initiating the slave family’s breakup. While the law’s potential impact for an abandoned ė Ćġ Ćē may appear harsh today, it probably does not

122

Cod. Iust. 3.38.11; Cod. Theod. 2.25.1; cf. Gardner, “Roman Law,” 425; Grey, “Late Roman,” 487–88, 505–6. 123 David Daube, The Exodus Pattern in the Bible, ASSt 2 (London: Faber & Faber, 1963), 48–49. 124 Carl F. Keil and Franz Delitizsch, Biblical Commentary on the Old Testament: The Pentateuch, trans. James Martin, 3 vols., CFTL 4/2–4 (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1867–1872), 3:372–73; Heinisch, Exodus, 167; Noth, Exodus, 178; J. Philip Hyatt, Commentary on Exodus, NCB (London: Oliphants, 1971), 229; Clements, Exodus, 132–33; Childs, Exodus, 468; Phillips, “Exodus 21:2–11,” 51; cf. Epictetus, Diatr. 4.27–33. 125 Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 228–30.

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increase an enslaved ė Ćġ Ćē’s susceptibility to divorce relative to a free ė ĆŘēĂ in Jewish antiquity. V. Summary: Equality and the Covenant Code The sum of this analysis is greater than the parts; ethical coherence across cases and laws reinforces our exegesis and analysis of each one. Rather than the CC’s slavery cases and laws failing Patrick’s test, they can and should be interpreted as reflecting a conceptual system of slave welfare law that is predicated upon its author’s numerical equality between slave and free. This exegesis and analysis present ‘better’ texts: ones that regulate the numerically equal treatment between free and Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ in cases of murder, injury and negligent manslaughter, and between wives where one had been an ė Ćġ Ćē. We also reject reading Exod 21:2–11 as endorsing the casual sexual use of slaves. Indeed, later Judaism argued a minori ad majus for the same right to divorce for those wives who had never experienced enslavement. This also appears coherent with the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ’s inclusion in Exodus’s Passover celebration (12:44) and both Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ and ė Ćġ Ćē’s inclusion in the Sabbath rest commandment (20:10–11).126 Furthermore, the case laws favour the slave by compensating the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ and ė Ćġ Ćē with emancipation after a permanent injury and offering the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ an equal opportunity relative to a free male to marry. The only examples of non-identical treatment between Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ and free that remain are those the CC’s author deemed necessary to reflect slavery’s intrinsic financials. While both the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ law of 21:2–6 and the ė Ćġ Ćē law of 21:7–11 regulate the exit from debt slavery for only Israelites, there appears no conceptual reason to doubt that the unqualified terms elsewhere in the chapter originally applied to both Israelite debt and non-Israelite chattel slaves. As our equality analysis continues into Deuteronomy and Leviticus, we will observe how both build upon Exodus’s equality ethics. Perhaps this emerging conclusion is not as novel as it first appears because we also observe two possibly supportive studies. First, Urbach argues that the Mishnah and other Halkahah texts treat slaves and free with an “absolute equality … in all matters regarding the judicial safeguarding of their lives [that] has no parallel in either Greek or Roman law.”127 While Urbach’s conclusion appears to be due to how he only evaluated those Jewish texts only on their 126

On both, see further Hezser, Jewish Slavery, 35–47. On the latter, see also our analysis into its Deut 5:12–15 parallel. 127 Efraim E. Urbach, “The Laws regarding Slavery as a Source for Social History of the Period of the Second Temple, the Mishnah and the Talmud,” in Papers of the Institute of Jewish Studies London, ed. J. G. Weiss (Jerusalem: Magnes, 1964), 39–40.

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own terms,128 our reconstruction of the equality ethics of the Exodus CC, upon which Urbach’s sources claimed reliance, supports his conclusion. Second, Houten argues that the Torah requires the numerically equal treatment between Israelite and foreigner in non-cultic matters.129 Perhaps her conclusion helps explain why the Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ’s status as Israelite debt or foreign chattel slave appears to be irrelevant to so many of the CC’s laws on slave welfare. Furthermore, we should expect an overlap between the social ethics and the ethics on debt slavery in every historical context. Perhaps Exodus is distinctive only in its social equality (23:3, 6) and its extension into both debt and chattel slave equality. Nevertheless, its equality ethics should not be exaggerated; they centre upon the consequences of poverty and enslavement to prevent the disadvantaged from further discrimination. Only the usury prohibition of 22:23[22] moderates the causes behind Israelite poverty and debt slavery.

C. Deuteronomy Regardless of whether Deuteronomy was originally a unified or disparate ancient work rediscovered during Josiah’s reforms, or composed and/or redacted in that late monarchical era to justify his reforms, we analyse it as a potentially coherent development of Exodus’s ethics. Tsai, for example, argues that Deuteronomy forms a conceptual unity between its discrete laws and commandments through its use of consistent terminology that she calls its “pattern language.”130 Many Deuteronomic scholars highlight Deuteronomy’s relative humanitarianism,131 but I argue that they do not yet appreciate the extent of 128 Nevertheless, Harrill (Manumission, 15n7; cf. Flesher, Slaves Mishnah, xi–xiii) correctly reject Urbach’s assumption that his ethical sources reveal the Jewish slavery ethos. 129 Houten, Alien, 52–58, 66–67; cf. Exod 22:21[20]. 130 Daisy Yulin Tsai, Human Rights in Deuteronomy: With Special Focus on Slave Laws, BZAW 464 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2014), 54–58, 67. 131 Moshe Weinfeld, “The Origin of Humanism in Deuteronomy,” JBL 80 (1961): 241– 47; Deuteronomy and the Deuteronomic School (Oxford: Clarendon, 1972), 282–97; Peter C. Craigie, The Book of Deuteronomy, NICOT (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1976), 238; Stephen A. Kaufman, “The Structure of the Deuteronomic Law,” Maarav 1 (1979): 116–17; Andrew D. H. Mayes, Deuteronomy, NCBC (London: Oliphants, 1979), 246, 250; Boecker, Law & Justice, 183; Roger H. Munchenberg, Deuteronomy, Òà (Adelaide: Lutheran, 1987), 123, 146, 150; Jeffries M. Hamilton, Social Justice and Deuteronomy: The Case of Deuteronomy 15, SBLDS 136 (Atlanta: Scholars, 1992), 80; Georg Braulik, “The Sequence of the Laws in Deuteronomy 12–26 and in the Decalogue,” in A Song of Power and the Power of Song: Essays on the Book of Deuteronomy, ed. Duane L. Christensen, trans. Linda M. Maloney (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1993), 327; Eckart Otto, “False Weights in the

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Deuteronomy’s equality ethics. We begin by highlighting Deuteronomy’s theological and sociological emphases and analysing its ethics towards the free person then to avoid anachronistic analysis. I. Justice and Impartiality, Yahweh and Brotherhood Deuteronomy 16:18–20 urge either the continuation or re-establishment of how 1:16–17 recalls an earlier establishment of judges who are to judge righteously and impartially. Furthermore, 10:17–19 urges the Israelites to love the nonIsraelite alien (resident or sojourner) living among them. It also grounds its ethics through a divine appeal: You shall appoint judges and officers in all your towns that the LORD your God is giving you, according to your tribes, and they shall judge the people with righteous judgement. You shall not pervert justice. You shall not show partiality, and you shall not accept a bribe, for a bribe blinds the eyes of the wise and subverts the cause of the righteous. Justice, and only justice, you shall follow…. And I [Moses] charged your judges at that time, “Hear the cases between your brothers, and judge righteously between a man and his brother or the alien who is with him. You shall not be partial in judgement. You shall hear the small and the great alike. You shall not be intimidated by anyone, for the judgement is God’s.…” For the LORD your God is God of gods and Lord of lords, the great, the mighty, and the awesome God, who is not partial and takes no bribe. He executes justice for the fatherless and the widow, and loves the sojourner, giving him food and clothing. Love the sojourner, therefore, for you were sojourners in the land of Egypt.132

Scales of Biblical Justice? Different Views of Women from Patriarchal Hierarchy to Religious Equality in the Book of Deuteronomy,” GLHBANE 128–46; Jacob Milgrom, Leviticus: A New Translation With Introduction and Commentary, 3 vols., AB 3, 3A, 3B (New York: Doubleday, 2000–2001), 2161, 2227, 2251; Richard D. Nelson, Deuteronomy: A Commentary, OTL (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2002), 197; Van Seters, Law Book, 84–85, 94–95; Peter T. Vogt, “Social Justice and the Vision of Deuteronomy,” JETS 51 (2008): 35–44; Jack R. Lundbom, Deuteronomy: A Commentary (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2013), 47–50; Tsai, Human Rights, 41, 50–52, 57–58, 66–67; A. Friedl, “The Reception of the Deuteronomic Social Law in the Primitive Church of Jerusalem according to the Book of Acts,” AcTSupp 23 (2016): 183; John C. Maxwell, Deuteronomy, CCS.OT 5 (Waco, TX: Word, 1987), 207, contra 246. Contra also Harold C. Washington, “‘Lest He Die in the Battle and Another Man Take Her’: Violence and the Construction of Gender in the Laws of Deuteronomy 20–22,” in GLHBANE 201–2; Nelson, Deuteronomy, 259; Sandra Jacobs, “Terms of Endearment: The Desirable Female Captive (ĖēĚĚħĜĚĬē) and Her Illicit Acquisition,” in Exodus and Deuteronomy, ed. Athalya Brenner and Gale A. Yee (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2012), 241, 245; cf. Carolyn Pressler, The View of Women found in the Deuteronomic Family Laws, BZAW 216 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1993), 105–11. 132 Deut 16:18–20; 1:16–17; 10:17–19. Unless otherwise indicated, all Scripture citations are from the ESV.

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The extended quotes highlight the Deuteronomist’s distinctive ‘pattern language’ of justice, righteousness and impartiality, and his call for the Israelite judicial system to uphold social equality coheres with Exodus’s social equality. Thus, the divine īżŘĜġĂ judgement of Isa 11:3–4 probably refers to this impartial judgement rather than to the mere equitable or fair judgement of Lincoln and Isaiah’s English translations.133 Ancient societies frequently grounded their call for justice with a theological reference,134 but McConville demonstrates how the Deuteronomist’s ethics transcend mere divine justification by requiring the mirroring of Yahweh’s own ethos; what Yahweh does, the Israelite community should imitate and its judges enforce: The commandments are not detachable from the question of who he [Yahweh] is…. It is the close connection between ethical imperatives and the person of Yahweh that distinguishes his requirements from those of law as such. The need for justice and righteousness was by no means confined to Israel in the ancient world.… [Apart from Israel], however, the relationship of the god to the laws themselves is somewhat detached. In Deuteronomy it is intimate. Here Yahweh not only initiates the standards inscribed in the law, but embodies them, and is even their executor…. [Justice and righteousness] emanate ultimately from the character of God himself…. Justice is not a commodity in the hands of those who can control it, but is in principle God’s.135

While Bassler’s Pauline-focused theological study downplays the degree of this imitation ethic,136 other scholars – who specialise in OT ethics – include it among their collection of imitation texts.137 Sociologically, Deuteronomy’s ‘pattern language’ of Ě Ćē (“brother, brotherhood”) functions rhetorically to reinforce its aim for unity and the equal treatment of every Israelite rather than only those with the same tribal or familial 133

Lincoln, “Colossians,” 658. For examples, see Moshe Weinfeld, “‘Justice and Righteousness’ in Ancient Israel against the Background of ‘Social Reforms’ in the Ancient Near East,” in Mespotamien und Seine Nachbarn, ed. Hans-Jörg Nissen and Johannes Renger, BBVO 1 (Berlin: Reimer, 1982), 504–11; “‘Justice and Righteousness’ – ėĪĖĩĘ ěħŘġ – The Expression and Meaning,” in Justice and Righteousness: Biblical Themes and their Influence: Festschrift Benhamin Uffenheimer, ed. Henning G. Reventlow and Yair Hoffman, JSOTSup 137 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1992), 228–46. 135 J. G. McConville, Deuteronomy, ApOTC 5 (Leicester: Apollos; Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2002), 208, 304, 67. For limited endorsement, see Lundbom, Deuteronomy, 393, 522; contra Weinfeld, “Origin,” 241–47. 136 Bassler, Divine Impartiality, 8–13. 137 For a recent history of research into imitation ethics in the OT, see Karen E. Durant, “Imitation of God as a Principle for Ethics Today: A Study of Selected Psalms” (PhD thesis, University of Birmingham, 2010), 5–37. 134

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connection. Even the Israelite criminal remains the Israelite judge’s brother and should not suffer excessive punishment.138 Deuteronomy distinguishes sojourners from brothers, yet Houten demonstrates how it treats the Israelite and the sojourner equally in non-cultic affairs.139 Even Edom’s ancestral sibling relationship to Israel grants the former better treatment relative to other nations.140 Therefore, Deuteronomy’s purpose in its brotherhood rhetoric is to expand, rather than to restrict, the scope of its ethics’ moral subject; it includes others who risk exclusion.141 Brotherhood is particularly significant in Deuteronomy’s response to poverty. II. Poverty Relief and Generosity Deuteronomy 15:4–6 presents an idealised picture of future Israelite prosperity due to Yahweh’s blessing in rewarding Israelite obedience with no poverty and no one falling into debt slavery.142 Nevertheless, this idealised future is surrounded by more realistic regulations that repeatedly call for brotherly generosity to relieve anticipated poverty;143 for example, 15:1–3 institutes a sevenyear cycle of debt relief.144 Elsewhere, Deuteronomy prohibits usury (for Israelite brothers but not foreigners, 23:19–20[20–21]), institutes the triennial tithe (14:28–29), prevents security pledged against loans from causing further deprivation (24:6–17), and requires landowners to permit localised scrumping (23:24–25[25–26]) and facilitate the gleaning of unharvested crops (24:19–21). All these measures expand on Exodus’s usury ban to moderate further the causes of poverty and debt slavery. We begin analysing Deuteronomy’s ethics 138

Deut 25:3. Houten, Alien, 77–99, esp. 97, 107–8. 140 Deut 2:8; 23:7[8]. 141 McConville, Deuteronomy, 75; contra Pierre Buis and Jacques Leclercq, Le Deutéronome (Paris: Gabalda, 1963), 119; Mayes, Deuteronomy, 124. 142 McConville, Deuteronomy, 256, 259–60; cf. William S. Morrow, Scribing the Center: Organization and Redaction in Deuteronomy 14:1–17:13, SBLMS 49 (Atlanta: Scholars, 1995), 94. 143 John Goldingay (Theological Diversity and the Authority of the Old Testament [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,1987], 153–66) also includes kingship (17:14–20) and divorce (24:1–4) in the Deuteronomist’s “pastoral strategy” of both upholding an ideal and regulating a lessor reality. 144 For this debt release as permanent rather than temporary, see Chirichigno, Debtslavery, 263–75; cf. Duane L. Christensen, Deuteronomy, 2nd ed., 2 vols., WBC 6 (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1997–2001), 310; Edward J. Woods, Deuteronomy: An Introduction and Commentary, Replacement ed., TOTC 5 (Nottingham: InterVarsity, 2011), 206; Lundbom, Deuteronomy, 487. Philo (Virt. 122; Spec. 2.71–73) celebrates its humanity in its generosity to the poor; contra Hillel’s prozbul workaround (m. Shev. 10:1, 3–5). 139

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on slave welfare for equality with its sabbath commandment because Kaufman and Braulik demonstrate how Deuteronomy is structured according to the ordering of its ten commandments and that its principal slave welfare text (15:12– 18) occurs within its expansion of the sabbath commandment.145 III. The Sabbath Commandment (5:12–15) The Deuteronomic version replaces Exodus’s appeal to imitate Yahweh’s postcreation rest (20:9–11) with recalling the Israelite exodus from Egyptian slavery (Deut 5:15). Both this and the slavery reference repetition immediately prior (5:14) emphasise Exodus’s equal treatment ethic between free, Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ and ė Ćġ Ćē regarding their labour and rest schedule. Thus, we should expect the equality ethics of the sabbath and Deut 15:12–18 to cohere. Indeed, we will observe how its distinctives relative to Exod 21:2–6 extend the comprehensiveness of the latter’s equality ethics. To minimise repetition, however, we present our analysis of Deut 21:10–17 first. IV. Female War Captives (21:10–17) Elsewhere Deuteronomy prescribes and regulates warfare that explicitly includes the enslavement of distant female and child captives.146 As is common throughout antiquity, the Deuteronomist endorses captive slavery. However, 21:10–17 appears to be a unique slave welfare measure in antiquity intended to protect female captives from one of warfare’s worst horrors: their summary rape and thereafter rapid discarding by victorious soldiers on the rampage. Sexual relations with the defeated are permitted, but only after a month-long delay and only then in what I argue is a marital not casual context. Deuteronomy 21:12–13 indicate that the delay is to permit the woman’s parental mourning rituals.147 Its length concurs with the time Israel mourned Moses (34:8) and Aaron (Num 29:29) and traditional Judaism’s sheloshim period. Rabbinic interpreters, however, suggest that the month’s ritual is to minimise her attractiveness, dissipate the capturer’s lust and thus minimise the likelihood of a marriage occurring that they disparaged as motivated by lust and doomed

145

Kaufman, “Structure,” 108–11, 129–33; Braulik, “Sequence,” 321, 325–26. Deut 7:1–3; 20:1–20. Those defeated of more local origin were to be executed instead. 147 Majority view; see further any of the major Deuteronomy commentaries, e.g., Christensen, Deuteronomy, 472–75; McConville, Deuteronomy, 325, 329–30; Lundbom, Deuteronomy, 596–600. Contra Pressler (“Women Deuteronomic,” 12–13) who interprets it as signifying her transition from one society to another. 146

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to end up as loveless (Deut 21:15–17) if not in divorce (21:14).148 Philo, who insists that this law requires a lawful marriage, also suggests that the man’s gentleness in giving her time to grieve is in part to reassure her that he will treat her as an equal.149 Even mediaeval Rashi agrees that this envisages her marriage.150 More recently, however, some more sceptical (or cynical) argue that the month’s delay is for a complete menstrual cycle to reassure her capturer that she is not already pregnant.151 While this law may have had secondary benefits, we continue to analyse all that is explicit before rushing to generalise over what its author presumed to be irrelevant. Perhaps most pertinent, therefore, is that this law treats the captive and Israelite orphans equally regarding time to mourn. Deuteronomy 21:11 describes the captive as becoming his ė ĆŘē. Ă While its attested semantic range is broader than “wife,” I argue that the law’s later cases treat her thereafter as an equal to his other wives. Nor should his description as ğ ąĥ Ćş (“lord, husband”) be taken as implying enslavement, for elsewhere it typically denotes the husband in marriages of free persons.152 We focus on the case of 21:14, whose protasis describes a reversal – he no longer delights in her whom 21:11 described as beautiful – and which prescribes three consequences and a rationale. He is positively to Ě ąğ ĆŘ: the same verb used of the manumitted debt slave in 15:12–13 and 18, of the divorced wife in 22:19, 29 and 24:1–4, and of the emancipated injured slave in Exod 21:26–27. Negatively, like the young ė Ćġ Ćē of Exod 21:7–11, she cannot be sold for silver or ī ąġ Ćĥ, a verb that occurs elsewhere in the OT only to describe the binding of sheaves (Ps 129[128]:7) or kidnapping into slavery (Deut 24:7). While ī ąġ Ćĥ’s translations vary,153 the overall sense of 21:14 is unambiguous; although his appreciation of her has reversed from that of 21:11, he cannot now (21:14) revert her to her former captive state of chattel slavery. Instead, he must treat her as free as any other Israelite divorcee. Hence, 21:10–14 may be

148

See further Rashi, Torah, 5:223–24; Tigay, Deuteronomy, 194; cf. Lundbom, Deuteronomy, 599. 149 Philo, Virt. 114, cf. 112. 150 Rashi, Torah, 5:222. Cf., however, our discussion on his slave breeding interpretation of Deut 15:18. 151 Washington, “Die,” 206; Nelson, Deuteronomy, 259; Deborah L. Ellens, Women in the Sex Texts of Leviticus and Deuteronomy: A Comparative Conceptual Analysis (New York: T&T Clark, 2008), 175. 152 Gen 20:3; Deut 22:22; 24:1; Ruth 1:13; Prov 30:23; Isa 54:1; 62:4–5. 153 See further any of the major commentaries, e.g., Christensen, Deuteronomy, 474; McConville, Deuteronomy, 325; Lundbom, Deuteronomy, 599.

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expanding the ė Ćġ Ćē ethics of Exod 21:7–11 to include the former non-Israelite captive. The final clause of 21:14 justifies its requirement by asserting that the man has ėĆģ Ćĥ (“humiliated”) her, a verb of shame because of a breach in sexual and marital ethics. Some argue that the verb identifies 21:11 as a case of rape and/or forced marriage in part because of the verb’s occurrences in 22:28–29 to compel marriage after an apparent rape and in Gen 34:2 to denote Shechem’s alleged rape of Dinah.154 Others, however, object to this reading of compulsion into the silence of Deut 21:11–13 because they observe how Gen 34 as a whole suggests Dinah’s complicity, and the verb ř ąħ Ćų (“seize, take hold”) in Deut 22:28 does not always occur in sexual contexts involving compulsion. They argue instead that a seduction scenario better fits its immediate context (as per Exod 22:16[15]).155 Furthermore, since ėģĆ Ćĥ in Deut 21:14 occurs in the case’s final clause, its purpose is more likely to justify the case’s apodosis by commenting negatively upon the protasis’s actions – the man’s subsequent rejection of the former captive – than to allude to the chronologically earlier and literarily more distant events of 21:11–13. Thus, although the Deuteronomist regulates what should happen after the rejection – the former captive is to regain her original preconquest freedom rather than being re-enslaved and/or sold – ėģĆ Ćĥ signifies the Deuteronomist’s displeasure at the temporariness of the marriage. If correct, then consistency would also suggest that his disapproval would be even greater of a man’s sexual use of his female chattel slave without even a temporary marriage between them. While today many may object to this law on just war, captive slavery and feminist grounds, the Deuteronomist’s explicit intent is both to require her numerically equal treatment relative to an Israelite female orphan in that historical context and to prohibit the casual sexual use of a female captive who is thereafter re-enslaved. She must first become his wife and cannot be further 154

Washington, “Die,” 198–211; Yael Shemesh, “Rape is Rape is Rape: The Story of Dinah and Shechem,” ZAW 119 (2007): 2–21; Ellens, Women, 170–88; Cynthia Edenburg, “Ideology and Social Context of the Deuteronomic Women’s Sex Laws (Deuteronomy 22:13–29),” JBL 128 (2009): 44–56, esp. 46n7, 46n10. 155 Weinfeld, DDS, 286; Pressler, Women Deuteronomic, 14–15, 35–41; Lyn M. Bechtel, “What if Dinah is not Raped? (Genesis 34),” JSOT 62 (1994): 19–36; Tikva S. FrymerKensky, “Virginity in the Bible,” GLHBANE 86–93 (who also argues that Deut 22:28–29 is not a case of rape either); Ellen van Wolde, “Does ‘Innâ denote rape? A Semantic Analysis of a Controversial Word,” VT 52 (2002): 528–44; Alison L. Joseph, “Understanding Genesis 34:2: ‘Innâ,” VT 66 (2016): 663–68. The verb in Exod 22:16[15] is ė ąĭ ĆŮ (“deceive, entice, persuade”): a verb of mental persuasion not compulsion.

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discriminated against later because of her lowly beginnings. In Philo’s words, she must receive, “the rights of full wedlock as her due.”156 Indeed, the Deuteronomist has probably expanded the ė Ćġ Ćē law of Exod 21:7–11 to include former captives since he continues in Deut 21:15–17 to envisage a polygamy scenario. Here, however, his purpose is to require the equal treatment of the firstborn’s double-inheritance right even if he is the progeny of the least-favoured wife. This is another example of the Deuteronomist regulating what he disapproves of. V. Debt Slavery (15:12–18) 1. Male and Female Debt Slaves (15:12) Deuteronomy 15:12 includes both male and female Hebrews in the same law in contrast to the separate laws of Exod 21:2–11, but this development is probably immaterial (i) because the latter’s ė Ćġ Ćē law refers only to prepubescent females who should marry their ė Ćġ Ćē-master or his son, (ii) its Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ law could refer to debt slaves of both genders, and (iii) the ethical coverage of each collection is incomplete.157 2. Generosity and the Departing Gift (15:13–14, 18) Perhaps the Deuteronomist’s most obvious development relative to Exod 21:2– 6 is his requirement for a generous departing gift to the debt slave.158 The emphatic doubling of Ī ąĔ Ćĥ (“provide a necklace”) in Deut 15:14, a rare word that only elsewhere occurs in the OT at Ps 73[72]:6, emphasises the degree of generosity; McConville suggests “honour and even extravagance.”159 The ‘pattern language’ of Exodus remembrance, as elsewhere in Deuteronomy, urges 156

Philo, Virt. 112 (Colson). On the gender relationship between Deut 15:12–18 and Exod 21:2–11, see further Pressler, “Wives & Daughters Exodus,” 148–50. I remained unconvinced that the passive and/or reflexive (niphal imperfect) form of ī ąĞ Ćġ in Deut 15:12 denotes a different enslavement occasion (e.g., self-sale) in contrast to its active (qal imperative and infinitives) forms at Exod 21:2, 7–8. For the debate see Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 275–26; Tigay, Deuteronomy, 149; McConville, Deuteronomy, 262. 158 This is not in strict contradiction to Exod 21:2 where the Ė ĄĔĥĄ is to leave for nothing, not with nothing. 159 McConville, Deuteronomy, 263. Chirichigno (Debt-slavery, 293; cf. Rashi, Torah, 5:166–67) argues that the named provisions should be understood synecdochally, the parts for the whole, of whatever provisions (or divine blessings) have increased. The Talmud (b. Qidd. 17a) records a rabbinic debate as to whether this gift can be converted into a monetary equivalent, including whether it should be set at thirty or fifty shekels as per Exod 21:32 or Lev 27:3 respectively. 157

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increased welfare of the disadvantaged. Instead of emulating Pharaoh, “People are to emulate the kindness and generosity of Yahweh. Let Israel never forget Yahweh’s most gracious act, upon which the entire law is based.”160 Chirichigno also suggests that Ī ąĔ Ćĥ and ġ ĆĪĜīă (“empty-handed”) in 15:13 allude to how Exod 3:21–22 (cf. 12:35–36) describes the Israelite children wearing Egyptian plunder.161 Many assume that the Deuteronomist’s purpose behind this departing gift is to avoid a cycle of dependency,162 but he does not make this explicit. Instead, Deut 15:13’s insistence that the debt slave is not to leave Ġ ĆĪĜīă appears to prepare for how 16:16–17 insists that all should offer a sacrifice proportionate to the degree of divine blessing received. If correct, then the recently manumitted debt slave’s divine blessing is expected to come from their former master. Elsewhere the Deuteronomic ‘pattern language’ of divine blessing incentivises Israelite sharing of past blessings with the disadvantaged by claiming that generosity will be rewarded with further blessing. Tigay suggests that this departing gift is akin to severance pay;163 but, as that compensates for a premature end of employment, a better comparison may be with profit sharing.164 The ‘profit,’ however, is attributed to divine blessing. 15:18 equates six years of debt slavery to ėģĄ Řþ ġĂ (“double”)165 that of a īĜĞĂ ĆĬ

160

Lundbom, Deuteronomy, 496, cf. 348; cf. Deut 5:15; 8:2; 16:12; 24:18, 22. Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 287–90. For a possible connection also to Jacob/Laban and Gen 31:42, see Carmichael, “Three Laws,” 521–22. Arnold B. Ehrlich (Randglossen zur hebräischen Blible, 7 vols. [Leipzig: Hinrichs, 1909–1914], 2:295–96) criticises the gift of wine because the departing Ė ĄĔĥĄ would have to drink it all at once, but McConville (Deuteronomy, 263) argues that, since the ĜīĂ Ĕþ ĥĂ is not a landless class (contra the claim of Wright [God’s People, 253–56]), the departing Ė ĄĔĥĄ could bring the produce to his ancestral landholding for storage. Deut 15:12–18, I will argue vis-à-vis Lev 25, is a land-irrelevant law rather than a law for landless persons. 162 Philo, Spec. 2.85; Keil and Delitizsch, Pentateuch, 3:372; Anthony Phillips, Deuteronomy, CBC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973), 106; Mayes, Deuteronomy, 251; David F. Payne, Deuteronomy, DSBOT (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1985), 95; Patrick D. Miller, Deuteronomy, IBC (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1990), 137; Tigay, Deuteronomy, 149; Christensen, Deuteronomy, 320; Walter Brueggemann, AOTC (Nashville: Abingdon, 2001), 166–67; Nelson, Deuteronomy, 199. 163 Tigay, Deuteronomy, 149. 164 Ajith Fernando, Deuteronomy: Loving Obedience to a Loving God, PtW (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2012), 418. 165 James M. Lindenberger, “How Much for a Hebrew Slave: The Meaning of Mišneh in Deut 15:18,” JBL 110 (1991): 479–82; cf. Morrow, Scribing the Center, 112; Christensen, Deuteronomy, 321; McConville, Deuteronomy, 256; contra Matitiahu Tsevat, “Alalakhiana,” HUCA 29 (1958): 109–34; “The Hebrew Slave According to Deuteronomy 161

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(“hired worker”). Tigay and the mediaeval rabbi Rashi suggest that this double benefit is because only the debt slave is available for labour during the day and night,166 but this may contradict how Deuteronomy’s sabbath command emphasises the equal treatment between slave and free regarding labour and rest. Rashi (but not Tigay) also suggests that the debt slave’s night-time labour is his participation in a slave breeding programme with Canaanite chattels, but syntactically 15:18 also applies to the Israelite female debt slave of 15:12, whose participation in such a slave breeding programme is unlikely. Furthermore, 15:12–18 appears uninterested in the debt slave’s sexuality and reproductive capacity (at least relative to Exod 21:2–11). Indeed, the Deuteronomist elsewhere consistently advocates a restrictive sexual ethic that applies also to recently captured females. Even Rashi thought so vis-à-vis Deut 21:10–17. So, perhaps Rashi here in 15:18 is reflecting later Jewish attitudes towards the sexual use of slaves. Mendelsohn argues that ėģĄ Řþ ġĂ reflects the double labour term relative to the three years of LH §117,167 but term length differences probably reflect only different historical contexts and debt levels rather than the Deuteronomist consciously worsening Hammurabi’s practice.168 In any case, Deut 15:18’s comparison is to the īĜĞĂ ĆŘ of the same historical context rather than to a debt slave elsewhere. Probably most likely is that it reflects how the salary costs of a hired worker, out of which he would have to support his entire family, would cost a farmer more than – perhaps even roughly double – the maintenance cost of a co-living, presumably single, debt slave.169 15:12–18: His Lot and the Value of his Work, with Special Attention to the Meaning of mshnh,” JBL 113 (1994): 587–95. 166 Tigay, Deuteronomy, 150; Rashi, Torah, 5:168. 167 Mendelsohn, Slavery ANE, 33, 89, 147n257; cf. Phillips, Deuteronomy, 107; Craigie, Deuteronomy, 239. 168 Cf. Phillips, “Exodus 21:2–11,” 65n28; Lundbom, Deuteronomy, 498. Contra Lindenberger (“How Much,” 482n20) who cites how LL §14 calls for the debt slave’s manumission once they have amortised double the original debt; i.e., an interest rate of 100% in contrast to Deut 23:19–20[20–21]’s ban on usury. 169 S. R. Driver, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Deuteronomy, 3rd ed. (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1902), 185; cf. Lindenberger, “How Much,” 482. Contra the mathematics of Chirichigno (Debt-slavery, 224–25) who argues, from the valuation prices of Lev 27:2–8 and allegedly typical salary rates, that such debt would only take around 3 years to amortise, but this also seems to imply an overall interest rate of 100%. Contra also Carmichael, “Three Laws,” 523. The mediaeval rabbi Ibn Ezra (Ibn Ezra’s commentary on the Pentateuch, trans. H. Norman Strickman and Arthur M. Silver, 5 vols. [New York: Menorah, 1988], 5:72; cf. Phillips, “Exodus 21:2–11,” 65n28) relates it to double the alleged three-year service term of a hired worker as per Isa 16:14, but fellow mediaevalist Rashbam

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Deuteronomy 15:14 also relates the magnitude of the master’s departing gift to the magnitude of experienced divine blessing. The MT contains the demonstrative pronoun ī ĄŘĀē (“that”) that would ordinarily suggest their equivalence, but Tigay advocates the SP variant īŘēĞ (“like that”) because the MT of 16:10, ī ĄŘĀē ąŨ (“like that”), explicitly urges a proportionate offering.170 On the other hand, however, the lectio difficilior potior principle would favour the MT’s originality. In any case, I suspect that the Deuteronomist is more concerned to establish the principle than with mathematical precision in its calculation. Regardless, the Deuteronomic trajectory in 15:14 is unambiguously towards greater equal treatment; at the very least, it establishes an important principle.171 Today, millennia later, profit sharing is still neither routine nor easily calculated. 3. The Well-off Debt Slave (15:16) Given the departing gift, it appears less probable that debt slaves would choose to remain with their slave-master out of their fear of destitution. Nevertheless, the Deuteronomist grants them the option out of love for their master and because they are well-off staying with him. While the Babylon Talmud and the Sifra usually elucidate rabbinic disagreements, here they present a consensus on what it means for the debt slave to be well-off: (Babylonian Talmud) He must be with [ie., equal to] thee in food and drink, that thou shouldst not eat white bread and he black bread, thou drink old wine and he new wine, thou sleep on a feather bed and he on straw. Hence it was said, Whoever buys a Hebrew slave is like buying a master for himself.172

(cited Tigay, Deuteronomy, 371n37) disagrees by appealing to the equally possible single year term of a hired worker in Isa 21:16. I am unpersuaded by either. 170 Tigay, Deuteronomy, 370–71n31; cf. Christensen, Deuteronomy, 318; McConville, Deuteronomy, 256. 171 Tigay (Deuteronomy, 149) and Christensen (Deuteronomy, 320) also relate the magnitude of the departing gift to what the master can afford. Alternatively, Chirichigno (Debtslavery, 284) suggests its magnitude was discretionary. The Talmud (b. Qidd. 17a) records a rabbinical debate, prompted by their desire to convert the listed provisions into monetary equivalents, as to whether the departing gift should be thirty (cf. Exod 21:32) or fifty shekels (cf. Lev 27:3), or less. 172 b. Qidd. 22a (Epstein, interpolation Epstein); for the contrast between breads and wine, see John Cooper, Eat and Be Satisfied: A Social History of Jewish Food (Northvale, NJ: Aronson, 1993), 40, 53.

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(Sifra) With you in food, with you in drink, with you in clean clothes. So that you are not to eat a fine piece of bread will [sic, while] he eats bread of coarse grain, you drink vintage wine while he drinks new wine, you sleep on down, and he sleeps on straw.173

While Hezser dismisses what she acknowledges is the Sifra’s “basic equality” for being “overtly idealistic,”174 these rabbis’ views align to this chapter’s reconstruction of the Torah’s equality ethics on slave welfare. Their views could not have originated from their experience of the Roman slavery ethos. Thus, this rabbinic interpretation of 15:16 appears to extend the equality ethics of Exod 21:9–11 into the minutiae of everyday life: the quality of bread eaten, liquid drunk, clothes worn and bedding slept on. It further demonstrates how these rabbis understood the Torah to advocate a comprehensive equality between Jewish master and Jewish debt slave. If this occurred, then it is conceivable that some debt slaves might choose to remain ‘well-off’ with a master whom they ‘love’ for treating them as his equals. 4. Your Brother Slave (15:12) However, the Deuteronomist refrains from labelling these debt slaves with the terms ĖĄĔĄĥ and ė Ćġ Ćē.175 He reserves the terminology of slavery for describing Israelite slavery in Egypt (15:15) and for those who prefer to remain with their slave-master in 15:16. Instead, he begins this exhortation for slave welfare by describing those male and female Israelites sold into debt slavery as ŻĜĚĂ Ćē (“your brother”). McConville observes that it establishes “the equal standing of all Israelites in principle in the covenant community.”176 Indeed, we have observed the Deuteronomist working out that principle in the various laws and cases he thought pertinent throughout the epistle; he is also following that pattern here in 15:12. Brotherhood, therefore, functions here rhetorically to reinforce his equality ethics on slave welfare by appealing to Israelite unity, solidarity, affinity and generosity in sharing Yahweh’s blessings.177 Thus, Israelite unity requires the numerically equal treatment of Israelites, whether free or debt slave, and their 173

Sifra, Behar Pereq 7:8 (Neusner). For the relatively unknown relationship between the Babylonian Talmud and Sifra, see Strack and Stemberger, Talmud & Midrash, 190–224, 259–65. 174 Hezser, Jewish Slavery, 153. Even if correct, she needs to explain where their idealism came from. Instead, Hezser (Jewish Slavery, 153n12) compares this to Artemidorus Daldianus’s (Onir, 3.28.1) dreams that equate slaves to mice sharing their masters’ food. 175 He does retain the cognate Ė ąĔ Ćĥ, but its semantic range includes the labour of free people in 5:13, 15:19 and of the hired worker in 15:18. 176 McConville, Deuteronomy, 262 (emphasis additional). 177 Cf. Philo, Spec. 2.80; cf. also how Sir 33:31 urges treating one’s slave as a brother.

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numerically equal treatment demonstrates Israelite unity. Another ancient text, Job, also appears to presume this understanding of Deuteronomy’s slave welfare ethics. VI. Job, Deuteronomy and Slavery In chapter 31, Job protests his innocence to God. Sandwiched between Job’s denial of adultery with and even lust towards women (Job 31:1–12) and his assertion of consistent generosity towards the disadvantaged (31:16–22, 32), Job challenges God to a lawsuit:178 If I have rejected the cause of my Ė ĄĔĥĄ or my ė Ćġ Ćē, when they brought a complaint against me, what then shall I do when God rises up? When he makes inquiry, what shall I answer him? Did not he who made me in the womb make him? And did not one fashion us in the womb?179

Christopher Wright labels this a “gem from the creation ethic [which] comes closer than anything else in the Old Testament to the finality of Paul’s assertion that slave and free are one in Christ (Gal 3:28)” and constitutes evidence of slaves possessing judicial rights.180 Conversely, Dawson disparages Job’s morality as a slavery perpetrator for having enjoyed the “systemic violence” of enslaving many slaves (Job 1:3) in a literary work that both identifies slavery as the par excellence example of oppression (3:17–19; 7:1–3; 19:15–16) and marginalises their own victim status. To her, Job’s cry of injustice against his plight overlooks how he had inflicted the same onto his slaves. What Wright hails, Dawson dismisses for not leading to manumission.181 But both appear to be interpreting the text through their respective (albeit differing) a priori derived slavery lens rather than first considering the book’s implied ethics that Witte identifies as the ethics of Deuteronomy.182 For example, Job’s defence 178

David J. A. Clines, Job 21–37, WBC 18A (Nashville: Thomas Nelson, 2006), 1012. Job 31:13–15. For the verses’ exegesis and possible alternative renderings, see further Clines, Job 21–37, 932, 964. 180 Wright, OT Ethics, 337; cf. God’s People, 244–49. 181 Kirsten Dawson, “‘Did Not He Who Made Me in the Belly Make Him, and the Same One Fashion Us in the Womb?’ (Job 31:15): Violence, Slavery, and the Book of Job,” BibInt 21 (2013): 435–68, esp. 461. 182 Markus Witte, “Does the Torah Keep its Promise? Job’s Critical Intextual Dialogue with Deuteronomy,” in Reading Job Intertextuality, ed. Katherine Dell and Will Kynes, LHBOTS 574 (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 54–65; “Job in Conversation with the Torah,” in Wisdom and Torah: The Reception of ‘Torah’ in the Wisdom Literature of the Second Temple Period, ed. Bernd U. Schipper and David A. Teeter, trans. Anselm C. Hagedorn, JSJ.S 163 (Leiden: Brill, 2013). 81–100; contra Carol A. Newsom, The Book of Job: A Contest of Moral Imaginations (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 196. 179

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of his generosity ethos appears to have been composed to demonstrate his compliance with Deuteronomy’s generosity ethics. Since household heads in antiquity, like Job, often functioned as a judge over their own households, I argue that Job 31:13–15 depends upon a Deuteronomy-like judicial imitation ethic of divine impartiality between slave and free. While Deuteronomy calls for human judges to imitate divine impartiality between slave and free, Job reverses the imitation order by calling on God to imitate towards himself, a free person, his own pre-existing impartially towards slaves’ complaints. Newsom’s observation that “what God requires of Job is what Job expects of God”183 applies also to slave welfare. The book of Job, therefore, demonstrates an early adaption for its own purposes of our chapter’s claim: a numerically equal treatment between slave and free. Indeed, Job’s justification for his equality ethos, slaves as his numerically equal because of their equal created status, is the earliest known justification for Deuteronomy’s (and Exodus’s) equal treatment ethic. This equal status in Job neither abolishes nor minimises the labour demands intrinsic to slavery; rather it requires the numerical equal treatment between slave and free, regardless. Wright, however, exaggerates. The closest that the book might come to hinting at slavery’s demise is in how Job’s final restitution (42:10–17) does not explicitly include slaves, but its silence is far from definitive.184 While Job’s text is explicit only on a slave-master’s adjudicating justice for his own slaves, Job’s claim of consistent compliance would render any possible third-party judicial process unnecessary. Dawson exaggerates differently because she assumes Job’s practice of slavery must be as cruel as that practised in other historical contexts rather than first evaluating Job’s own description of his unique ethos (cf. 1:8). While the book’s negative portrayal of slavery elsewhere probably demonstrates its author’s awareness of typically unpleasant (if not worse) enslavement, the pertinent issue for our chapter is whether the individual Job is righteous vis-à-vis his slave welfare (and generosity and sexuality) ethe. Job claims only that his own personal slave welfare ethos is uniquely righteous; he makes no such claim about others. Job’s appeal to a shared creation status rather than ethnicity in a literary work where Job and his slaves are unidentified as Israelites further suggests that its ancient author may have applied Deuteronomy’s slave welfare ethics universally. While servitude lengths between Israelite debt and non-Israelite chattel are evidently different, their slave welfare while enslaved might 183 184

Newsom, Job, 197. Cf. Dawson, “He Who Made Me,” 466–67.

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otherwise have been understood as identical. In other words, perhaps the Torah requires numerically equal treatment between Israelite debt and non-Israelite chattel slaves. VII. Kidnapping into Slavery (Deut 24:7) The Deuteronomist restricts to the Israelite Ě Ćē the moral subject of the two remaining Deuteronomic laws requiring analysis. Philo, for example, argues that the death penalty sentence for kidnapping a man into slavery – as stated in Exod 21:16 and as implied through Deut 24:7’s use of the ‘pattern language’ of purging evil from Israel that elsewhere requires capital punishment – is restricted by the latter’s reference to kidnapping an Israelite brother.185 However, since Houten observes five other references to Israelite-resident equality at 24:15 and 17–21,186 and 24:7’s prohibition of ī ąġ Ćĥ in hithpael form also applies to the formerly foreign captive of 21:14, 24:7’s scope probably matches the universality of Exod 21:16. Thus, Deut 24:7’s reference to brotherhood may be intended for emphasis rather than to restrict. VIII. Slave Asylum (Deut 23:15–16[16–17]) Mendelsohn limits this provision’s moral subject scope only to Israelite slaves escaping their enslavement in foreign countries;187 but, given its lack of brotherhood rhetoric, the scholarly consensus argues that it also includes a foreign slave fugitive who has fled to Israel. To the Deuteronomist, the land that provides liberty for the former Israelite slaves in Egypt is to provide the same for any slave, regardless of nationality, who reaches the land. Foreign fugitives should gain liberty of residence anywhere within Israel rather than be returned as ANE treaties often required.188 Presumably, therefore, their liberty of residence implies that they should not be kidnapped into chattel slavery inside Israel’s borders either. This further suggests that 24:7’s prohibition against kidnapping brothers was not originally ethnically restrictive. Some suggest that this provision may have also applied to Israelite (debt) slaves fleeing from an abusive Israelite master; Hamilton, for example, suggests it may imply an ethical trajectory that undermines the slavery it 185

Philo, Spec. 4.19. Philo still recognises the crime of kidnapping aliens, but he advocates only an unspecified court penalty adjudication. 186 Houten, Alien, 95. 187 Mendelsohn, Slavery ANE, 63–64; cf. Isaac Mendelsohn, “Slavery in the Old Testament,” IDB 384. 188 Hamilton, Social Justice, 119; Tigay, Deuteronomy, 215; McConville, Deuteronomy, 350–51; Lundbom, Deuteronomy, 654–56; Tsai, Human Rights, 63.

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regulates.189 But there is no textual evidence to substantiate his claim. Instead, it probably extends the slave welfare protection of Exod 21:26–27, where permanent physical injury within Israel is compensated by emancipation, to the foreign slave fleeing (presumed) abuse. The Deuteronomist desires Israel to be a land of notable slave welfare protection rather than a slavery-free zone. IX. Summary: Equality and the Deuteronomist While Deuteronomy approves of enslaving distant prisoners of war, it regulates their marriage to reject their casual use for sex. We have observed also that its additional cases also imply an equality of treatment between slave and free. In particular, the comprehensiveness of Deuteronomy’s equality ethic is suggested by how Jewish rabbis applied it to even the minutiae of everyday life such as food, clothing and sleeping provisions. It also appears consistent with how Israel’s judges should enforce the book’s social equality ethics. While Bassler overlooks how the book’s equality ethics imitates Yahweh’s equality ethos, the equality parameters between Deuteronomy’s ethics for Israel and its claims regarding Yahweh’s ethos match. The author of Job appears to confirm this reconstruction of Deuteronomy’s equality ethics on slave welfare. His numerically equal treatment rationale of an equal status of free and slave alike as divinely created could also account for the equality ethics of both Deuteronomy and Exodus CC. While Deuteronomy’s ethics emphasise the treatment of one’s Israelite brothers and most Jewish reception, except Job, restricts its moral subject scope, ethical consistency suggests that Deuteronomy’s brotherhood rhetoric was intended to reinforce the need for ethical compliance towards their fellow Israelites rather than to restrict compliance to only those cases involving Israelites. Although the term lengths of temporary Israelite debt slaves and permanent non-Israelite chattel slaves evidently differ, the Deuteronomist may have assumed their equal slave welfare protection while enslaved regardless.

D. Leviticus The principal Leviticus text is chapter 25 on the Jubilee, but the much briefer case law of Lev 19:20–22 is more exegetically disputed. Hence, we begin with the latter.

189 Hamilton, Social Justice, 119–21; cf. Wright, OT Ethics, 336–37; Tsai, Human Rights, 64–65.

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I. Slavery and Sex (19:20–22) This case lists three attributes of the ė ĆŘēĂ who has had sexual intercourse with Ă (ii) ĭ ĄħīĄ ĄĚĄģ (“assigned”) (to some extent less a free man.190 She is (i) a ė ĆĚħþ Ř, definitive than were a free woman Řīą Ćē [“betrothed”]) to another man,191 and (iii) Ţ ĆğČĢ ąų Ăģēć ğė ĆŘħþ ĉĚżēė ĆĭšĆ ħþ Ăģēć ğėăšħþ Ćė þĘ (lit. “redeemed not redeemed or free”) … ė ĆŘ ĆŮ ĉĚēć ğČĜŨĂ (lit. “because she is not free”). The majority assume that ė ĆĚħþ ŘĂ identifies her property status, which alone somehow accounts for this law’s lesser penalty upon the man. Again, to them, the longer attributive phrase merely confirms her ongoing slave and property status.192 Indeed, some suggest the man in question did not redeem the woman out of her slavery first as he should have.193 Although its language of redemption could allude to the Israelite ė Ćġ Ćē’s redemption in Exod 21:8, the Jewish interpretative tradition rejects the connection because most assume that the ė ĆĚħþ ŘĂ of Lev 19:20 must be a Canaanite slave. Hence they, and a few modern scholars who also explicitly exclude the ė Ćġ Ćē law for apparent irrelevancy,194 resort to a similar property-centred interpretation.195 Other rabbis suggest that she had been jointly owned by two masters and redeemed by one but not the other, but this appears to reflect more of

190

Contra Rashi (Torah, 3:239–40) who claims, without justification, that he is a Hebrew

slave. 191 For ĭ ĄħīĄ ĄĚĄģ as “assigned,” see Baruch J. Schwartz, “A Literary Study of the Slavegirl Pericope – Leviticus 19:20–22,” ScrHier 31 (1986): 245–46; Milgrom, Leviticus, 1667. For to “another” man, see Ephraim A. Speiser, “Leviticus and the Critics,” in Oriental and Biblical Studies: Collected Writings of E. A. Speiser, ed. Jacob J. Finkelstein and Moshe Greenberg (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1967), 129; Schwartz, “Slavegirl,” 245, 246n20; Milgrom, Leviticus, 1667; contra Karl Elliger, Leviticus, HAT 4 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1966), 260; Westbrook, Biblical & Cuneiform, 106–7. 192 N. H. Snaith, Leviticus and Numbers, New ed., CeB (London: Nelson, 1967), 132; A. Nooratzij, Leviticus, trans. Raymond Togtman, BSC (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1982), 201– 2; Schwartz, “Slave-girl,” 246–47; Milgrom, Leviticus, 1665, 1667; Ellens, Women, 101, 103, 106–9, 112–13. 193 Schwartz, “Slave-girl,” 245–47; cf. Baruch A. Levine, Leviticus, JPSTC (Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1989), 131; John E. Hartley, Leviticus, WBC 4 (Dallas: Word, 1992), 319; Milgrom, Leviticus, 1667. 194 Paul Heinisch, Das Buch Leviticus, HSAT 1/3 (Bonn: Hanstein, 1935), 90; Nooratzij, Leviticus, 201; Schwartz, “Slave-girl,” 245; Levine, Leviticus, 131; Hartley, Leviticus, 319; Philip J. Budd, Leviticus, NCBC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1996), 281. 195 See further Rashi, Torah, 3:239–40; David Hoffmann, Das Buch Leviticus, 2 vols. (Berlin: Poppelauer, 1905–1906), 2.47–48, 2.50; Milgrom, Leviticus, 1666; cf. Snaith, Leviticus Numbers, 132.

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the rabbis’ situation in the Roman empire than the early agricultural context as presented by Leviticus’s author.196 However, all these approaches appear problematic. First, all but the unlikely last approach fail to account for the author’s emphasis through repetition of both her non-redeemed and non-freed statuses. Indeed, we have already argued with Phillips,197 that we should evaluate all that is extant – including, in this case, how the text emphasises her status – before importing other ideas into the text. Second, those who discount Exod 21:7–11 on ethnicity grounds may read too much into the author’s choice of ė ĆĚħþ ŘĂ rather than ė Ćġ Ćē given how we have also already observed their considerable semantic overlap elsewhere in the OT. Instead, Schwartz suggests that ė ĆĚħþ Ř’s Ă unique usage in this legal text may be to establish assonance with ė ĆŘħþ ĉĚ (“freedom”) and ė ĆŘ ĆŮ ĉė (“freed”) to emphasise the case’s contrast between slave and free.198 Alternatively, perhaps ė ĆŘ ĆŮ ĉė indicates that this case’s moral subject also includes the non-Israelite female slave, in anticipation of how 19:34 explicitly includes the alien within the love your neighbour command of 19:18b. In any case, I argue that our earlier observation of how Jewish interpreters of Exod 21:7–11 required the young ė Ćġ Ćē either to be released at puberty for either marriage to her ė Ćġ Ćē-master (or his son) or to acquire herself so that she can marry another is a better fit for the scenario envisaged by Lev 19:20.199 Therefore, I extend Milgrom’s adoption of the minority Jewish view of the ė ĆĚħþ ŘĂ as an Israelite slave,200 and propose that the best fit scenario for 19:20– 22 is the ė Ćġ Ćē of Exod 21:7–11, now post-pubescent, who has been left in limbo because she has neither married as originally agreed, been redeemed by her relatives nor freed. In other words, she is still a slave who has  ēć ğ ė ĆŘħþ ĉĚżē Ţ ĆğČĢ ąų Ăģ as she should have. If correct, then the law’s author probably rejects her ė ĆĚħþ Ř-master’s Ă potential desire to have both her and her sexual partner executed (the verb ĭż Ćġ in 19:20b is plural) according to Deut 22:23–27 for consensual sexual intercourse between a man and a betrothed woman.201 196

See further Rashi, Torah, 3:239–40n9; Milgrom, Leviticus, 1668. Phillips, “Exodus 21:2–11,” 54–55. 198 Schwartz, “Slave-girl,” 244. 199 Schwartz (“Slave-girl,” 245) is correct that this is not explicit in Exod 21:7–11, but we have already observed the Jewish interpretative consensus on it. 200 Milgrom, Leviticus, 1666. 201 For “consensual,” see Milgrom, Leviticus, 1671; Lloyd R. Bailey, Leviticus–Numbers, SHBC 3 (Macon, GA: Smyth & Helwys, 2005), 263n21; Klaus Grünwaldt, Das Heiligkeitsgesetz Leviticus 17–26: Ursprüngliche Gestalt, Tradition und Theologie, BZAW 291 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1999), 43, 44n116, 242n580. Contra Erhard S. Gerstenberger (Leviticus: A Commentary, trans. Douglas W. Stott, OTL [Louisville, KY: Westminster John 197

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Perhaps the author’s sympathy for her trapped plight mirrors the respective author’s sympathy for Tamar (Gen 38) and Ruth (Ruth 3–4). In Lev 19:20–22 that sympathy extends to not punishing her who does either a Tamar with an unscrupulous man like Judah, who afterwards demands Tamar’s execution (Gen 38:24), or a Ruth with a less scrupulous man than Boaz.202 The ė ĆĚħþ ŘĂ in Lev 19:20–22 is not to be executed for perhaps taking the initiative when her right to ėģĆ ćĥ (cf. Exod 21:10) was initially (not just subsequently) withheld. Nor is the man to be executed either. The author’s sympathy, however, does not extend to condoning the sexual act since Lev 19:22 emphasises the man’s (but not apparently the ė ĆĚħþ Ř’s) Ă sin and requires him (but not her) in 19:21 to sacrifice a ram as a guilt offering to Yahweh. Perhaps his but not her penalty suggests that the Levitical author views her as more righteous than him (cf. Gen 38:26). Nor does the author require financial restitution to either the ė ĆĚħþ Ř’s Ă father or relatives, or to her ė ĆĚħþ Ř-master, Ă perhaps because the former relinquished their perutah right when she was ‘sold’ into ė ĆġĆē-ship and they have not redeemed her; and the latter’s loss, if any, is deemed his responsibility because he broke the original Ė ąĥĆĜ of. Exod 21:8. Our proposal also accounts for the hapax legomena ĭīĄ Ű ć ş. Ă Schwartz objects to the majority view of it denoting an “investigation, inquest” due to its most likely cognates,203 because, Schwartz claims, there are no facts to investigate beyond the protasis’s facts, which, as with every other Torah case law, are presumed as established.204 However, in our hypothesis the outstanding fact

Knox, 1993], 274) and Patrick (OT Law, 166) who overlook how the rejected dual capital sentence indicates that this is not a case of rape. 202 For ambiguity on Tamar, see Esther Menn, Judah and Tamar (Genesis 38) in Ancient Jewish Exegesis: Studies in Literary Form and Hermeneutics, JSJ.S 51 (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 12–106. For how levirate marriage developed within Judaism up to its codification in the Mishnah, see Dvora E. Weisberg, “Levirate Marriage and Halitzah in the Mishnah,” ARJ 1 (1998): 37–69. Ruth is explicitly compared to Tamar in Ruth 4:12. However, the Ruth narrative portrays Boaz as the ideal Deuteronomic male who is generous towards the gleaning poor (2:4–23), refuses to take advantage of Ruth’s vulnerability during their sexually charged night-time encounter and insists on following the correct levirate marriage processes. See further Robert L. Hubbard, Jr., The Book of Ruth, NICOT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988), 196, 202–12; contra Moshe J. Bernstein, “Two Multivalent Readings in the Ruth Narrative,” JSOT 50 (1991): 16–23; Frederic Bush, Ruth, Esther, WBC 9 (Waco, TX: Word, 1996), 151–53, 155–56. 203 See further Milgrom, Leviticus, 1670–71. 204 Schwartz, “Slave-girl,” 249; cf. Gordon J. Wenham, The Book of Leviticus, NICOT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979), 291; Christophe Nihan, From Priestly Torah to Pentateuch: A Study in the Composition of the Book of Leviticus (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 470.

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requiring investigation is into why she has ŢĆğČĢ ąų Ăģēć ğ ė ĆŘħþ ĉĚżē, the clause preceding ĭīĄ Ű ć ş, Ă when she should have.205 Instead, Schwartz claims that ĭīĄ Ű ć şĂ signifies a “differentiation, distinction” between this law and that of the betrothed woman in Deut 22:23–27, but this would be even more superfluous than his objection to “investigation, inquest.” No other Torah case law spells out the need to differentiate or distinguish between it and another. Our proposal also contrasts with the Jewish rabbis’ lack of sympathy towards the ė ĆĚħþ ŘĂ since they claim that ĭīĄ Ű ć şĂ requires her flogging.206 Indeed, they appear more concerned about the law’s apparent lack of punishment of her rather than of him,207 but modern scholarship is unanimous that the rabbis’ etymological argument on ĭīĄ Ű ć şĂ is unwarranted.208 Instead, I suggest Leviticus’s author is seeking to arbitrate on how to love their trapped Ě ĆĚħþ ŘĂ neighbour (cf. 19:18b), otherwise stuck in a kind of mixed status that should not occur.209 In summary, while some presume that this case either tolerates or endorses the casual sexual use of slaves, a better appreciation of its historical context indicates otherwise. As this is a slave welfare rather than a gender or marital monograph, our focus is on how it offers further slave welfare protection to the trapped ė ĆŘēĂ because of the failures of others to follow Exod 21:7–11. The sympathetic author of Lev 19:20–22 requires her equal treatment with the nonenslaved Tamar and Moabite Ruth: two women who seized the initiative to

205 Milgrom (Leviticus, 1668–71), defending the majority view against Schwartz, suggests that the alleged investigation would be to verify her slave or free status because a likely cognate is used in the virginity investigation ordered by the similar capital punishment case of Deut 22:13–21. However, that investigation would not have been into the protasis’s veracity, whether the husband accused his wife, but whether the husband’s accusation is true. 206 E.g., Sifra (Qedoshim Pereq 5) treats the man’s involvement as a mere inadvertence that can be mitigated through a sacrifice; see further Rashi, Torah, 3:240–41; Milgrom, Leviticus, 1669, 1676. Rashi also links it etymologically to his requirement for the judges to read Deut 28:58–59 aloud while flogging her. 207 Again, this suggests that they did not think it was a case of rape. 208 Wenham, Leviticus, 271; Schwartz, “Slave-girl,” 248–49; Milgrom, Leviticus, 1669. Unwarranted also is the claim of Speiser (“Leviticus & Critics,” 130–31; cf. J. R. Porter, Leviticus [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1976], 157; Wenham, Leviticus, 270– 71; Levine, Leviticus, 130; cf. also Westbrook, Biblical & Cuneiform, 108) that ĭ īćĄ ŰşĂ denotes “compensation” payable (as would be the case in other historical contexts) by the male for property damage to a slave belonging to a third party; for rebuttal, see Schwartz, “Slavegirl,” 250; Nihan, Priestly Torah, 470; cf. Milgrom, Leviticus, 1668. 209 Contra Milgrom’s (Leviticus, 1665) claim that this case is included here because it mentions the need for a sacrifice.

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overcome the failures of others over their levirate right to ėģĆ ćĥ within a marital context. II. Redemption and Jubilee (Lev 25) 1. Overview The final Torah slavery text is the redemption and jubilee regulations of Lev 25.210 We first outline its structure and contents to identify what requires further equality analysis and to explore its relationship to the slave welfare texts of Exodus and Deuteronomy. Verses 8–13 define the principle of the fixed fifty-year jubilee cycle and a strict pro rata valuation process for land ‘sales’ to prevent one from wronging another (25:14–17).211 Leviticus 25:23–55 repeatedly assert how the land ultimately belongs to Yahweh: in its introduction (25:23–24), conclusion (25:55) and at intervals (25:36, 38, 42–43). These verses are split into three cases, each introduced by protases (25:25, 35, 38) that begin with “if your brother becomes poor” and describe a different stage of impoverishment.212 In the first impoverishment stage (25:25–32), the landowner ‘sells,’ or ‘leases’ until the next jubilee, part of his ancestral land, for example, to pay off an existing debt, buy food because of a poor harvest or buy seed for planting. His closest relative should,213 when possible, redeem that land according to the same pro rata valuation basis. In such a scenario, the redeemer probably retains the land until the next jubilee to amoritise his own redemption costs rather than immediately returning it to its original landowner.214 Thus, this redemption

210 For how post-exilic Judaism interpreted the jubilee metaphorically rather than literarily, see John S. Bergsma, The Jubilee from Leviticus to Qumran: A History of Interpretation, VTSup 115 (Leiden: Brill, 2007). Some detect a degree of implied divine imitation in the chapter (Hartley, Leviticus, 439; Grünwaldt, Heiligkeitsgesetz, 343; Milgrom, Leviticus, 2190–91, 2234), but not to the degree I identify in Deut 15. 211 For how the Levitical fallow year relates to the Exodus fallow year regulations (23:10–11) and to the release regulations of Deut 15:2, see Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 302– 11; Milgrom, Leviticus, 2153–61, 2173–74, 2245–47. For whether the Jubilee year follows the seventh sabbatical year in each cycle or is concurrent with that seventh sabbatical year, see Hartley, Leviticus, 434–36; Milgrom, Leviticus, 2163, 2169, 2171, 2181–83, 2248–51. 212 This structure broadly follows Milgrom’s (Leviticus, 2147, 2149–51). 213 Or, as 25:49 suggests, by the landowner himself should his fortunes recover; for an example, see Calum M. Carmichael, Illuminating Leviticus (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2006), 132–33. 214 Hartley, Leviticus, 438–39; Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 325–26, 340–41; Milgrom, Leviticus, 2171, 2191–92, 2195–96, 2236; Samuel E. Balentine, Leviticus (Louisville, KY:

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opportunity ensures that ancestral land is kept within the wider family wherever possible. We follow Milgrom’s exegetical arguments on the second stage of impoverishment (25:35–38). First, the verb Īąę ĆĚ in 25:35 means “seize, take control of” when used of persons rather than to “strengthen” or provide charitable “support” provisions.215 Second, 25:35’s hendiadys Ĕ ĆŘżĭ þĘī㊠(“alien”) parallels its usage in 25:23 to describe the relationship of the original Israelite landowner to the land’s ultimate owner, Yahweh, as his (metaphorical) tenant farmer, rather than indicating mutual co-residence.216 Third, ź ĠĆ Ċ ĥĂ in 25:36 means “under you,” implying “some sort of subservience,” as elsewhere in the chapter (esp. 25:6, 23, 40–41, 47), beyond the merely co-locative “with you.”217 Thus, by this second stage, the landowner’s impoverishment has worsened, and he has probably lost all his ancestral land;218 he has become in effect a tenant farmer to his creditor, obliged to pay rent out of its harvest produce.219 Nevertheless, Israelites are to make further loans to the tenant farmer. Presumably repayment will be in additional produce at harvest time, for Israelites are prohibited from charging interest and making a profit out of the farmer’s distress.220 Thus, the case attempts to prevent the already-impoverished Israelite from spiralling further into ever-increasing debt levels and, given his loss of land, becoming like a classical serf.

John Knox, 2002), 195–96. This also assumes a parallel with 25:33 concerning Levitical property, see further Milgrom, Leviticus, 2199, 2201–2. Contra Wright, God’s People, 122. 215 Milgrom (Leviticus, 2206–207) also suggests that both meanings could be implied here: the strengthening and supporting achieved by complying with this stage’s regulations. 216 Milgrom, Leviticus, 2187, 2206–207. 217 Milgrom, Leviticus, 2205–206, 2208–209, here 2209. 218 Contra only some of their land (Wenham, Leviticus, 322; Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 323–28). 219 Milgrom, Leviticus, 2191–93, 2204–5, 2207–208, 2216; cf. Balentine, Leviticus, 196; John W. Kleinig, Leviticus, ConcC (Saint Louis, MO: Concordia, 2003), 542–43, 550; Nihan, Priestly Torah, 532; Jay Sklar, Leviticus: An Introduction and Commentary, TOTC 3 (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2013), 305; contra Adrian Schenker, “The Biblical Legislation on the Release of Slaves: The Road from Exodus to Leviticus,” JSOT 23 (1998): 29–30. Patrick (OT Law, 184) argues that the Ĕ ĆŘżĭ þĘ ī㊠has already lost all access to his land and therefore must support himself through casual labour or other work; for a partial rebuttal, see Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 327–28. 220 For ĚĜşĂ īþ ąų (lit. “increase,” 25:36) as “profit making”, see Porter, Leviticus, 205; Nooratzij, Leviticus, 258; Hartley, Leviticus, 421, 440; Milgrom, Leviticus, 2206, 2208–211; Kleinig, Leviticus, 550; Carmichael, Leviticus, 131. The strict pro rata valuation process throughout this chapter is also a means of eliminating profit-making.

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Nevertheless, 25:39–54 regulates the final stage where the now-landless Israelite is compelled to ‘sell,’ or ‘lease’ until the next jubilee, himself to either a fellow Israelite (25:39–43) or a non-Israelite resident (25:47–54). The former recites the jubilee emancipation principle; the latter also permits the ‘leased’ Israelite’s earlier redemption by a relative.221 Both parallel the chapter’s laws regarding ancestral land.222 Leviticus 25:39b and 42 insist that the ‘leased’ Israelite is not to be enslaved as if an ĖĄĔĄĥ because every Israelite is Yahweh’s ĖĄĔĄĥ; instead, 25:40 compares him to a Ĕ ĆŘżųīĜĞĂ ąĬ (“hired worker”) serving until the next jubilee. We will analyse these descriptors further for equality shortly. In between these two alternatives for “leased” Israelites, and forming a contrast with both, is the author’s explicit endorsement of purchasing non-Israelite permanent slaves, both male ĖĄĔĄĥ and female ė Ćġ Ćē, whose status is inheritable, and who are called the Israelite’s ėŤĆ ĉĚĀē (“possession/property”), akin to how the chapter describes the land. Thus, these non-Israelites are like classical chattel slaves. Leviticus 25:43 and 53b both prohibit źĄī Ąħ (“harsh”) ėĖą īĆ (“rule”) Ć īĄ Ąħ of non-Israfor the Israelite;223 but instead of 25:46 permitting the ėĖą īź elite slaves, as the broader contrastive parallel between 25:41–43 and 44–46 would otherwise suggest,224 25:46 repeats the prohibition of ėĖą īĆ źīĄ Ąħ towards the Israelite. This requires further analysis, but first we proceed to evaluate how this jubilee chapter relates to the slave welfare texts of Exodus and Deuteronomy; interrelated is whether Israel ever implemented the jubilee. 2. Leviticus 25’s Relationship to Exodus 21 and Deuteronomy 15 The principal critical solution follows Driver, who postulates that Israelite failure to enforce slave emancipation after six years led Leviticus to propose a more realistic fifty-year slavery term.225 De Vaux argues that this development took place in either the late monarchical or post-exilic era because of the lack

221

Contra Milgrom, Leviticus, 2191, 2217, 2213, 2243. The latter’s redemption regulations probably also apply in the former case, otherwise the Israelite ‘leased’ to a non-Israelite would be treated more favourably than if ‘leased’ to a non-relative Israelite. Milgrom argues that no redemption is necessary because there is no enslavement; I will disagree below. 222 Sara Japhet, “The Relationship between the Legal Corpora in the Pentateuch in Light of Manumission Laws,” ScrHier 31 (1986): 85–86. 223 Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 337–38; contra Snaith (Leviticus Numbers, 167) who argues that the verb per se denotes violent and oppressive rule. 224 For the parallel, see further Milgrom, Leviticus, 2218. 225 S. R. Driver, The Book of Leviticus (London: Clark, 1898), 97–99; cf. Patrick, OT Law, 184; Milgrom, Leviticus, 2184, 2189–90, 2194–95; cf. also Plato, Leg. 6.741B–C.

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of extant evidence for an early Israelite jubilee ethos.226 Both de Vaux and Milgrom argue that this extension was offset by improving slave welfare conditions to match a hireling’s working conditions (25:40).227 Christopher Wright, however, argues that such developmental theories create as many problems as those they claim to resolve. For example, he questions whether any alleged slave welfare improvements or a slave’s fifty-year release would be any more enforceable than the allegedly unenforceable six-year term.228 Indeed, given the lack of any extant evidence on early Israelite cultic and ethical practices, perhaps the lack of evidence of Israelites respecting this jubilee ethic is unsurprising.229 Elsewhere in antiquity, evidence attests to sporadic slave and debt releases; for example, Solon’s Athenian reforms or in the ANE to commemorate a new monarch. Perhaps, therefore, Lev 25’s distinctiveness in antiquity is its regularity rather than the principle.230 In contrast, the Jewish interpretative tradition harmonises the differing term lengths by requiring manumission according to whichever release came first.231 Mendelsohn and Chirichigno follow another less-attested Jewish tradition to argue that the six-year term is for those forced into servitude – for example, by a court after a theft conviction – and the up-to-fifty-year term is for those who voluntarily sell themselves into servitude.232 However, distinguishing between the passive and/or reflective aspect of ī ąĞ Ćġ in each collection is dubious,233 and it is unclear why voluntary action should be penalised so much more severely

226 Roland O. P. de Vaux, Ancient Israel: Its Life and Institutions, trans. John McHugh (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1961), 175–77. 227 Vaux, Ancient Israel, 83; Milgrom, Leviticus, 2253; cf. Nihan, Priestly Torah, 529– 30. 228 Wright, God’s People, 250–51. 229 Hartley, Leviticus, 430. For an intriguing, but probably unverifiable, proposal for early Jubilee observance that relies upon key exilic dates that are allegedly fifty years apart, see Lisbeth S. Fried and David N. Freedman, “Was the Jubilee Year Observed in Preexilic Judah?,” appendix to Leviticus 23–27, vol. 3 of Leviticus: A New Translation With Introduction and Commentary, by Jacob Milgrom, AB 3B (New York: Doubleday, 2000), 2257–70. 230 See further Hartley, Leviticus, 427–30; Milgrom, Leviticus, 2214, 2241–48; Jonathan Kaplan, “The Credibility of Liberty: The Plausibility of the Jubilee Legislation of Leviticus 25 in Ancient Israel and Judah,” CBQ 81 (2019): 183–203. 231 Philo, Spec. 2.122; m. Qidd. 1:2; j. Qidd. 1:2[B], 59a; 1:2VII[A]–[E], 59a–b; 1.2XVIII[M], 59c; Sifra, Behar Pereq 9:1. 232 Mendelsohn, Slavery ANE, 89; Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 275–86, 329–32; cf. b. Qidd. 14b. 233 Milgrom, Leviticus, 2219–20.

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than involuntary action.234 Instead, I observe, the greatest distinction between the jubilee and the slave welfare texts of Exodus and Deuteronomy is the jubilee’s emphasis on ancestral, divinely granted and inalienable agricultural land; ęīĄ Ąĥ (“land”) occurs twenty times in Lev 25.235 I suggest that is apposite because it is losing ancestral property, especially if interest and profit-making were not also prohibited, that intensifies a downward debt spiral into a kind of serfdom. While relative redemption might eventually concentrate land ownership at the clan level, jubilee on top of redemption safeguards each family’s ancestral ownership.236 Hence, Lev 25 treats the land and its owner as inextricably linked. Furthermore, the up-to-fifty-year term length means that the original landowner by then would often be an older man past working age, if not already deceased; thus, the principal jubilee beneficiary would often be the landowner’s descendants. Contrary to perhaps popular opinion, and unlike Exod 21:2–11 and Deut 15:12–18, the jubilee does not prioritise individual manumission.237 Indeed, given the jubilee’s strict pro rata valuation regulations, creditors would probably have capped the impoverished landowner’s debt at whatever level would be secured by his land and labour (and that of his family) for the remaining years until the next jubilee. If so, then jubilee provides for debt amortisation through land lease and labour rather than debt cancellation.238 While the jubilee does not guarantee any socially equal outcome, it does attempt to prevent social inequality increasing over generations by guaranteeing each generation’s equal opportunity to enjoy its ancestral land’s usufruct.239 234

Cf. Hartley, Leviticus, 432. Likewise, contra with the alleged social class distinction of Wright, God’s People, 253–59. Cf. also Milgrom, Leviticus, 2252–53. Contra also Schenker, “Biblical Legislation,” 23–24, 33–34, 38–39. 235 Acknowledged also by Hartley, Leviticus, 432–33; Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 324, 335. 236 Levine, Leviticus, 168–69; Christopher J. H. Wright, “Jubilee, Year Of,” ABD 3:1027; OT Ethics, 204–5; Milgrom, Leviticus, 2192. 237 Cf. B. D. Eerdmans, Das Buch Leviticus, AltS 4 (Gießen: Töpelmann, 1912), 129; Bailey, Leviticus Numbers, 304–5; Sklar, Leviticus, 312. Contra both its exaggeration by Wenham (Leviticus, 317) and its minimisation as “illusory” by Niels P. Lemche, “Manumission of Slaves – The Fallow Year – The Sabbatical Year – The Jubilee Year,” VT 26 (1976): 50. 238 Sklar, Leviticus, 208; cf. Lefebvre, Jubilé, 324–25, 330; Alfred Marx, Lévitique, 2 vols., CAT 3 (Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1993–2011), 2:186, 2:190; contra Hartley, Leviticus, 433. 239 A vaguer equality ethic is also identified by Wenham, Leviticus, 317; Hartley, Leviticus, 424–25, 443; Sklar, Leviticus, 298. Milgrom (Leviticus, 2233) asks rhetorically: “Has a more sublime safeguard against the pauperization of society ever been found?”

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Thus, the debt slaveries of the land-centric Lev 25, and the land-irrelevant Exod 21:2–11 and Deut 15:12–18 appear materially distinct. Furthermore, since the former’s land lease and labour term might on average endure for twenty-five years, debt levels amortisable by the former would have been an order of magnitude higher than for the latter.240 Given both the diversity and multiplicity of slaveries elsewhere in antiquity, both kinds of debt slavery could probably have co-existed in ancient Israel.241 I suggest that the Jewish and modern attempts at harmonisation impose an artificial uniformity upon antiquity’s diversity. This now completes our historical reconstruction necessary to enable an equality analysis of Lev 25’s slave welfare ethics. 3. Slave versus Hired Worker (25:39–42) Milgrom argues that the jubilee regulations improve the impoverished Israelite’s welfare because 25:39 and 42 prohibit his enslavement as an Ė ĄĔĄĥ; instead, 25:40 defines him as a hired worder.242 However, the MT is īĜĞĂ ĆřŨþ Ĕ ĆŘżĭŨþ (“like a hired worker”), and its double usage of the Hebraic analogical prefix ĄŨ (“like”) invokes comparison rather than identity; while he must not become an Ė ĄĔĄĥ, he becomes like a hired worker, not a hired worker in toto. Milgrom also argues that 25:40, 50 and 53 require the impoverished former owner to receive the same labour wages, from which he can repay his outstanding debt and retain a surplus, as a hired worker.243 This, Milgrom argues, converts the debt slavery of Exod 21 and Deut 15:12–18 into a “work for hire” scheme with improved working conditions,244 and “abolishes the slave status for an Israelite outright.”245 Indeed, Milgrom also comments, “Considering that

Perhaps few would agree with him vis-à-vis the late twentieth or early twenty-first centuries, but his view is more arguable prior to the development of modern-day welfare systems. 240 Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 313; cf. Hartley, Leviticus, 432–33. For an alternate dual debt level distinction, see Michael A. Harbin, “The Manumission of Slaves in Jubilee and Sabbath Years,” TynBul 63 (2012): 53–74. 241 Cf. Henry L. Ellison, “Hebrew Slave: A Study in Early Israelite Society,” EvQ 45 (1973): 30–35. Cf. also the relatively low levels of debt level that could be secured by, e.g., by the pledge of one’s cloak (Deut 24:1–3). Perhaps, therefore, ancient Israel categorised debt into three levels: low (Deut 24:1–3); medium, secured by an individual’s six years of labour (Exod 21:2–11; Deut 15:12–18); and high (Lev 25), secured by a longer (albeit variable) term of both land lease and labour. 242 Milgrom, Leviticus, 2237. 243 Milgrom, Leviticus, 2191–92, 2212–13, 2239. 244 Milgrom, Leviticus, 2213. 245 Milgrom, Leviticus, 2253. Cf. also Milgrom’s (Leviticus, 1666) acknowledgement of contradiction between his understanding of ongoing Israelite slavery in Lev 19:20–22 and

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the hireling is a free person, it may well be that if he finds the creditor’s conditions too harsh or the wages too low, he can seek another employer.”246 Alternatively, Chirichigno claims that the labour term, which for only very few would be for fifty years, provides the impoverished, but also otherwise debtfree, former landowner with the employment he cannot otherwise find to support his family.247 However, their rhetoric appears excessive. While Chirichigno is correct that only a few would serve close to fifty years, he overlooks how a presumably random occurrence of land loss – for example, because of famine or incompetence – would lead to a uniform term-length distribution averaging twenty-five years. Thus, I doubt whether anyone would want to commit himself to such a lengthy hired worker contract and, especially, whether any potential employer would want to commit himself to providing long-term paid employment to someone unable otherwise to secure a short-term hired worker contract. While Milgrom is correct that the former landowner would receive any hypothetical surplus since 25:36–37 prohibit the creditor from charging interest or profitmaking, there would probably never be an actual surplus because the chapter’s second impoverishment stage encourages further lending until the outstanding debt reaches the level secured by its potential amortisation through land lease and labour until the next jubilee. Until then, his labour would be obligated unless that indebted former landowner could either self-redeem (25:49b) or persuade, say, a relative to redeem him (and his family and land) by paying off his creditor and accepting the debt’s reassignment (25:25). Apart from this, ‘freedom’ from a ‘creditor’ would be impossible.248 In contrast, a hired worker could always (at least potentially) leave one employer for another. Nothing in Lev 25 appears to alter debt slavery’s intrinsic labour obligation. In summary, Lev 25 echoes how Deut 15:12–18 also reserves Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ for permanent slaves. Leviticus 25:40 also compares the debt slave to a hired worker because the debt slave’s labour obligation, while for most lengthy, is nevertheless only temporary until the next jubilee, and Lev 25:39–54 insists that its debt slavery is not to become either chattel slavery or serfdom. Our final task is to evaluate the significance of źīĄ Ąħ for slave welfare.

its effective abolition in Lev 25. His solution, to posit that the former is by P and the latter by H, leaves unresolved why Leviticus’s final redactor did not resolve the conflict. 246 Milgrom, Leviticus, 2223, cf. 2191, 2217, 2234 (emphasis additional). 247 Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 330, 335; cf. Cardellini, Sklaven, 288; Patrick, OT Law, 184; Milgrom, Leviticus, 2220. 248 Nor does Milgrom’s view appear consistent with his interpretation of ź ĠĆ Ċ Ăĥ as implying some sort of subservience.

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4. Harsh versus Non-harsh Welfare (25:43, 46, 53) źīĄ Ąħ is very rare in the OT, only occurring elsewhere in how Exod 1:13–14 describes the Israelites’ experience of Egyptian slavery and in Ezek 34:4’s condemnation of how the Jewish leadership was exploiting ė ĆĪę ĆĚ (“by force”) the disadvantaged rather than providing for them. Evidently, Leviticus’s author echoes how the narrative context of Exod 21 also prohibits the Israelites from treating their debt slaves as they were treated by the Egyptians, but źīĄ Ąħ’s rarity challenges any further precision. Some rabbis argue that Israelite debt slaves should be employed in their own trade rather than being humiliated with menial tasks, for example, washing feet and carrying their slave-masters on a litter,249 and should not be exhibited for sale upon a catasta.250 However, the rabbis provide no rationale for such specificity. The mediaeval Rashi suggests źīĄ Ąħ prohibits hard labour intended to torment rather than to fulfil slave-masters’ needs,251 but this distinction also appears to be arbitrary. Milgrom reckons from ėģĄ Řþ ġĂ in Deut 15:18 that a slave’s output was expected to be double that of a hired worker, perhaps because other ANE codes protected the working conditions of hired workers.252 However, Milgrom both ignores how Lev 25:6–7 explicitly includes the non-Israelite Ė ĄĔ Ąĥ within its call for everyone’s equal treatment on labour and sabbath rest, and interprets silence negatively when, in classical Athens at least, where extant evidence permits comparison, chattel slave and hired worker working conditions were similar. Furthermore, we have already observed that ėģĄ Řþ ġĂ in Deut 15:18 probably relates instead to the differential upkeep cost of an individual co-located Israelite debt slave versus a hired worker’s salary that would be supporting his family. Since Lev 25 appears to assume that the landowner’s entire family ends up in debt slavery, their upkeep costs would presumably equal that of a hired worker’s salary.253 Hartley and Baruch Levine suggest that źīĄ Ąħ prohibits dire working conditions and/or demands,254 but it is unlikely that źīĄ Ąħ denotes the worst of working conditions because Exod 1:14 describes the Israelite experience of Egyptian slavery before Exod 5 records the Israelite work quota being 249

Sifra, Behar Pereq 7:3–6; Mek. Nez. 1. We will discuss Philo separately shortly. Sifra, Behar Parashah 6:3. 251 Rashi, Torah, 3:339–40. 252 Milgrom, Leviticus, 2222–23; cf. Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 333–34. 253 Milgrom (Leviticus, 2224) succumbs to special pleading when he argues that the chapter’s silence over the landowner’s wife (but not his “children” [lit. sons, 25:41, 54]) indicates that Leviticus also advances upon Exod 21:7–11 and Deut 15:12–18 to prohibit wives from indenture and upon Exod 21:4 to ensure children leave with their father. 254 Hartley, Leviticus, 421–42; Levine, Leviticus, 179. 250

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increased. Alternatively, Chirichigno argues from how Exod 1:14’s “in mortar and brick, and in all kinds of work in the field” emphasises the type rather than the magnitude of labour to conclude that Lev 25’s źīĄ Ąħ prohibits compelling debt slaves to perform tasks that hired workers could refuse.255 While free hired workers, by definition, could always leave their employment, he provides no evidence of either Egyptians or other free workers throughout antiquity not also engaging in all types of construction and agriculture. I conclude that all these suggestions are unconvincing. There is no evidence in Lev 25 that its author is particularly concerned with slave welfare beyond protecting Israelite debt slaves from perpetual, inheritable chattel slavery and/or serfdom. Indeed, he appears focused only on regulating entry and exit slave conditions regarding redemption and jubilee. If correct, then his implied źĄī Ąħ treatment of non-Israelite chattels – which he refrains from stating explicitly – may follow how Mendelsohn, Chirichigno and Milgrom interpret ėŤĆ ĉĚĀē in 25:45 as denoting only chattel slave status rather than implying – by reading in from other historical contexts – worse slave welfare conditions while enslaved.256 If correct, then this interpretation of Lev 25:44–46 would be coherent with the chapter’s sabbath regulations (25:6–7), the equal treatment ethic between Israelite and īĕă (“sojourner”) in 19:33–34 and 24:22, Job 31:13 and 15, and also the apparent inclusion of non-Israelite slaves in the moral subject of Exod 21:20–21 and 26–27.257 III. Summary: Equality and Leviticus We conclude that Lev 25 neither extends nor contradicts the already identified free-slave equality of treatment between Israelite debt slaves and free. Its slave welfare ethics, like those elsewhere in the Torah, are a subset of its broader social equality concern. Redemption and jubilee are, in their own way, radical but should neither be exaggerated nor minimised; both appear designed to protect against chattel enslavement and serfdom, and to provide the equal opportunity for each generation to benefit from their family’s ancestral land even if an ancestor had descended into a debt spiral. Leviticus 25 may contain the starkest contrast between Israelite debt and non-Israelite chattel slaves among all the Torah texts, but its focus is on regulating entry and exit conditions for Israelite debt slaves rather than explicitly

255

Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 338. Mendelsohn, “Slavery OT,” 388; Chirichigno, Debt-slavery, 338n7; Milgrom, Leviticus, 2230. 257 Contra Milgrom, Leviticus, 2218, 2232. 256

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distinguishing between Israelite debt slave and non-Israelite chattel slave welfare conditions during servitude. Meanwhile, Lev 19:20–22 extends the pre-existing ė Ćġ Ćē law of Exod 21:7– 11 to include the case where she is wrongly trapped in servitude and prevented from sexual intercourse in the proper marital context.

E. Philo Having completed our Torah equality analysis, we conclude with two reception studies. Shortly, we will evaluate Glancy’s evidence for Jews’ casual sexual use of slaves, but first we analyse Philo, who argues that the Torah was the ethical source behind everything good (Epicureanism excepted) in Hellenistic philosophy. More recent Philonic scholarship tends to elevate his Jewishness over his Hellenism more than vice versa, especially vis-à-vis his exegetical works, but much remains unresolved.258 Some denigrate Philo’s consistency – for example, Garnsey attacks his “intellectual schizophrenia”259 – but others caution against evaluating him against the consistent standard expected of a philosopher or systematic theologian when he was principally a Torah exegete whose usage was less technical and more variable.260 Our equality analysis is limited to his slavery discussions in his principal exegetical works, the Decalogue and Special Laws. Our chapter has already observed Philo’s celebration of the Torah’s judicial impartiality and the social equality of both Exodus’s lex talionis and Lev 27’s personal valuation system. We also highlighted his equality interpretation of Deut 21:10–14. Even his implausible exegesis of Exod 21:18–21 is consistent in treating slave and free equally over their delayed deaths. Others, not focused on Philo and slavery, highlight his frequent elevation of equality and justice

258

Samuel Sandmel, “Philo Judaeus: An Introduction to the Man, his Writings, and his Significance,” ANRW II 22.1 (1984): 5, 14, 31–36; Peder Borgen, “Philo of Alexandria: A Critical and Synthetical Survey of Research,” ANRW II 22.1 (1984): 151. 259 Garnsey, Ideas, xv, cf. 161. 260 B. L. Mack, “Philo Judaeus and Exegetical Traditions in Alexandria,” ANRW II 22.1 (1984): 227–72; cf. Sandmel, “Philo Introduction,” 22; Borgen, “Philo Survey,” 142. Collectively, these three also provide an introduction to Philonic thought. For an earlier analysis, see Harry A. Wolfson, Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, rev. ed., 2 vols. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962). For Philo’s use of metaphorical slavery, see Garnsey, Ideas, 157–72.

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into two supreme virtues that should be realised through the ethical imitation of the Jewish God in whom, Philo claims, they originate.261 Philo’s Decalogue celebrates the jubilee’s humanity and îóôëóøûǂ÷ò in how he claims that the sabbath commandment urges simplicity, ħöïúǁüòÏ (“gentleness”), ôøó÷þ÷ǀë (“partnership, fellowship”) and ūûǁüòÏ.262 By ūûǁüòÏ, he cannot mean an equality that abolishes slavery, like the Essenes and Therapeutae, as if Jews should prevent fortune from causing slavery,263 because Philo’s jubilee discussion in his Special Laws relies upon one’s need for slaves (a rather un-Stoic like admission) to explain why Lev 25:44–46 permits buying nonJewish domestic chattels.264 Instead, Philo’s sabbatical ūûǁüòÏ probably refers to how that commandment requires the numerically equal treatment between slave and free regarding their rest from labour. Furthermore, Philo’s expansion of the next commandment, the parental, to include the Torah’s relational ethics further reveals his equality ethics on slave welfare. He claims that the Torah requires slave-masters ïūÏ īøĻüòüë ôëť úďĻüòüë (“to [show to their slaves] gentleness and kindness”) for the purpose of îóŊ÷ĠÿóûøŶüëóüļüļČ÷óûø÷ (“by which the inequality is equalized”).265 While calls for gentleness and kindness might, if treated atomistically, imply little more than Stoic calls for a slave-master’s moderation, Philo argues that their purpose is so that some kind of pre-existing inequality might lead to another kind of equality. Philo’s Special Laws clarifies what kind of equality he means when he argues of the Torah’s ethics on slave welfare in toto: For servants [slaves] are free by nature, no man being naturally a slave.266 Servants [slaves] rank lower in fortune but in nature can claim equality [lit. üĦÏëŻüĦÏ (“the same”)] with their masters, and in the law of God the standard of justice is adjusted to 261

See, e.g., what translator Colson describes as the “wearisome length” of Philo, Her. 146–206 (Introduction to Philo, Her., 275–26); cf. Decal. 41; Opif. 144; Spec. 1.265. See further R. Barraclough, “Philo’s Politics: Roman Rule and Hellenistic Judaism,” ANRW II 22.1 (1984): 490, 511–15, 517, 521–22; Paul B. Decock, “Philo’s De Decalogo: Educating to Respect the Socially Disadvantaged,” AcT 23 (2016): 104–7. 262 Philo, Decal. 162, 164. 263 Philo, Prob. 79; Contempl. 80. Cf. Josephus (A.J. 18.21) who offers an alternative explanation for their opposition to slavery. However, Hezser (Jewish Slavery, 273) argues that two Damascus Document fragments (4Q270–71), each of which instruct slave-masters on how to treat slaves, demonstrate some Essene practice of slavery. 264 Philo, Spec. 2.123. 265 Philo, Decal. 167 (Colson). 266 Philo, Spec. 2.69 (Colson, interpolation additional). Philo continues to elevate “unreasoning animals” (Colson) to the status of slaves because the Sabbath commandment also grants Sabbath rest to animals. This is, of course, distinct from treating slaves as only mere animals. Cf. and contrast also with the Roman jurist Ulpian (Dig. 50.17.32).

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nature and not to fortune. And therefore the masters should not make excessive use of their authority over slaves by showing arrogance and contempt and savage cruelty.267

Many correlate Philo’s distinction of slavery by fortune rather than by nature with Stoicism. In addition, his calls against arrogance and cruelty, together with calls against insulting and exhausting slaves,268 could be similar to Stoic calls for a slave-master to exercise moderation. However, Stoicism cannot account for Philo’s claim that the standard of justice in the law of God, the Torah, is according to slaves’ natural (and numerical) equality with their slave-masters rather than their unequal fortune. While our previous chapter observed how, for example, Roman law treats slave and free proportionally according to their divergent fortune, Philo claims that the Torah treats slave and free üĦÏëŻüĦÏ, that is with a numerical equality of treatment because of their equality in nature. Philo’s claim coheres with our equality analysis of the Torah. Thus, he further confirms what appears to be widespread agreement within Judaism in antiquity. Philo, however, does not engage in a systematic exploration of what equal treatment entails. He merely affirms its underlying principle. Indeed, Philo appears to engage in a little equality rhetoric of his own in observing how the inequality of one kind that he acknowledges still exists between slave and free – presumably by the former being obliged to labour for the latter – is equalised by the Torah in another sense, through how its laws require the equal treatment between both, regardless of that labour obligation. Despite his Stoic leanings, Philo echoes our chapter’s reconstruction of Jewish equality ethics on slave welfare.

F. Glancy on the Jewish Sexual Use of Slaves At this stage of our monograph, we turn to review Glancy’s cited evidence for her claim that Judaism tolerated slave-masters in Greco-Roman antiquity using their own slaves for casual sex. However, this chapter’s equality analysis of Exod 21:7–11, Deut 21:10–14 and Lev 19:20–22 has demonstrated the same marital boundaries for sexual intercourse between a slave-master and his own slave as the Torah elsewhere prescribes between free partners. Indeed, this marital ethic appears intentionally directed against that which Glancy claims the Torah and later Jews tolerate: the casual sexual use of slaves outside of marriage who are neither manumitted beforehand nor protected from 267 268

Philo, Spec. 3.137 (Colson, interpolations and emphases additional). Philo, Spec. 2.79–85, 2.89–91.

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enslavement afterwards.269 Even the mediaeval Rashi, who read casual slave breeding into Exod 21:2–6, insisted that Deut 21:10–14 required a newly enslaved captive to receive the protections given by marriage before sexual intercourse. Nevertheless, the most prominent Jewish example of the practice is Abraham’s sexual use of Hagar (Gen 16).270 While Wenham assumes an ANE ethos of slave surrogates for barren wives, both Wenham and Berg highlight how its Genesis author signifies his displeasure by inviting a comparison between 16:3–4a and 3:6b: “they are both accounts of a fall.”271 Its author, however, does not indicate whether he opposes Abraham and Sarah’s sexual use of Hagar per se, their premature initiative-taking rather than patiently waiting upon God, or both. Either way, Paul in Gal 4:23–29 (which we will evaluate more fully later) may echo this evaluation in observing how Ishmael was ôëüąûĄúÿ (“according to the flesh”) rather than îóɌĠëññïõŤëÏ (“through [the] promise”) of Gen 15:4. More significantly, at least some in the Jewish interpretative tradition claim that Abraham was dispassionately following Sarah’s instructions rather than being motivated (as they assume others would be) by impulse and/or lust.272 Other Jewish interpreters claim that Abraham later married the otherwise-celibate Hagar, now called Ketura, after Sarah’s death (Gen 25:1).273 While these strained mitigations appear designed to retain Abraham as Judaism’s paradigmatic moral example by arguing that his sexual use of Hagar was not casual, the mitigations demonstrate Jewish attempts to prevent anyone from claiming an Abrahamic precedent for their own casual sexual use of their own 269

Glancy, “Sexual Use,” 216; cf. Hezser, Jewish Slavery, 192–93, 386; cf. also Wright, “Not Go Free,” 125–42. Glancy also follows how Cecilia Wassen (Women in the Damascus Document, AcBib 21 [Leiden: Brill, 2005], 68–71) interpolates a sexually casual interpretation of Lev 19:20–22 into the highly fragmented 4Q270, but its possible reference to seven years could allude instead to the ė Ćġ Ćē’s pre-pubescent debt slavery as per Exod 21:7–11. 270 Cf. Glancy, Early Christianity, 34–36; Hezser, Jewish Slavery, 143, 155–55, 192, 286. 271 W. Berg, “Der Sündenfall Abrahams und Saras nach Gen 16:1–6,” BN 19 (1982): 9– 13; trans. in Gordon J. Wenham, Genesis, 2 vols., WBC 1–2 (Dallas: Word, 1994), 2:8; cf. also Gerhard von Rad, Genesis, trans. John H. Marks, 3rd ed. (London: SCM, 1972), 196; T. L. Thompson, The Historicity of the Patriarchal Narratives: The Quest for the Historical Abraham, BZAW 133 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1974), 252–69; contra Carl Westermann, Genesis 12–36, trans. John J. Scullion (London: SPCK, 1986), 238; Francis Watson, Paul and the Hermeneutics of Faith (London: T&T Clark, 203); Craig S. Keener, Galatians: A Commentary (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2019), 412n1865. 272 E.g., Rashbam as cited by Nahum M. Sarna (Genesis: The Traditional Hebrew text with the New JPS Translation, JPSTC [Philadelphia: Jewish Publication Society, 1989], 119); cf. the ten year wait emphasis of Rashi, Torah, 1:154–55. 273 E.g., Rashi, Torah, 1:265.

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slaves. Indeed, as we observed of Deut 21:10–14, the rabbinic tradition also discouraged Jewish males from marrying them. Thus, Josephus’s disgust at free men marrying slaves and/or prostitutes,274 does not warrant Glancy interpreting Josephus’s assertion, “the husband must have union with his wife alone; it is impious to assault the wife of another,”275 as silently condoning a slave-master’s casual use of his own slaves. Likewise, Josephus’s description of the practice by Herod the Great’s brother – who was hardly representative of Judaism – and the Parthian Phraates,276 cannot substantiate Glancy’s claim that Josephus is aware of significant Jewish practice, let alone advocates the tolerant ethic she alleges.277 Glancy also exceeds the evidence in utilising Philo’s disparaging comments on wanton slave girls and his many allegorical ramblings on Abraham and Hagar to equate Philo’s explicit marital restrictions on sexual intercourse with Plutarch’s toleration of a slave-master’s unobtrusive casual sexual use of his own slaves.278 Her arguments, I suggest, resort to special pleading. Glancy gathers her other Jewish citations from feminist critiques of how Jewish interpreters treat free females as if slaves (which, incidentally, reveals a Jewish ethic of treating slave and free females equally), additional disparaging comments about wanton slave girls and ambiguous narratives.279 While they substantiate Jewish awareness of the casual sexual use of slaves, they contain no evidence to quantify its Jewish frequency. Furthermore, many of the texts communicate moral disapproval. Glancy, as elsewhere, relies much upon reading Greco-Roman regularity into Jewish silence. We can safely interpret silence as evidence of complicity only in one case, where Ben Sira’s grandson (Sir 41:22) appears to have left untranslated into Greek his grandfather’s explicit Hebraic prohibition against slave-masters’ sexual use of their own slaves.280 Nevertheless, while Ben Sira’s grandson and translator appears to have assimilated, Ben Sira himself is supportive of an 274

Josephus, A.J. 4.244. Josephus, C. Ap. 2.201 (Thackeray, emphasis additional). 276 Josephus, C. Ap. 16.194, 18.4.40 277 Glancy, “Sexual Use,” 224–25. 278 Glancy, “Sexual Use,” 221–24; citing Philo, Congr. esp. 152, 154; Prob. 38; Spec. 3.69. Cf also Plutarch, Mor. 140B, 144C–D, 769F–70A. Glancy (“Sexual Use,” 223) in describing Plutarch as “Philo’s near contemporary” erroneously conflates their obvious situational differences, not least Philo’s Jewishness. 279 For references, see Glancy, “Sexual Use,” 225n40. 280 Glancy, “Sexual Use,” 218–19; cf. Patrick W. Skehan and Alexander A. Di Lella, The Wisdom of Ben Sira: A New Translation with Notes, AB 39 (New York: Doubleday, 1987), 51–60, 476, 479; Ibolya Balla, Ben Sira on Family, Gender, and Sexuality, DCLS 8 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2011), 154–55, 265. 275

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earlier Jewish ethic against the specific practice.281 While we cannot discount the possibility that some individual Jews may have partaken, Glancy’s argument that this was widespread is unsubstantiated. Also baseless is her argument for a Jewish tolerant ethic. The Jewish ethic required marriage first.

G. Conclusion If each of the Torah’s laws are analysed atomistically, through an ANE and/or Greco-Roman framework that fills out each law’s alleged incompleteness, and especially if anything possibly distinctive is also downplayed, then the Torah’s laws on slave welfare appear to be a haphazard assortment of various minimal welfare measures. However, if those same laws are first analysed in the context of each other, as we have done, then a coherent Torah equality ethic on slave welfare emerges. Furthermore, this equality ethic is predicated upon Yahweh’s equality ethos; their equal parameters match. In other words, the Torah exhorts the Israelites to imitate Yahweh’s impartiality between slaves and free. Indeed, this also correlates to how the Torah’s social equality ethics exhort the Israelites to imitate Yahweh’s impartiality between rich and poor. Each of the Torah’s books regulate Israelites’ exit from slavery to prevent them from becoming de facto permanent slaves. They also, contrary to Glancy, insist upon marriage rather than tolerate the casual use of slaves for sex, and treat slaves and free numerically equally regarding marital rights, divorce conditions, injuries and death, labour conditions and material provisions. Later Judaism also argued a minori ad majus for those explicit slave welfare measures to apply also to free persons. The few distinctions that remain – for example, Exod 21:26–27 and Lev 19:20–22 – favour the slave. While only Philo explicitly summarises this equality ethic, other Jewish interpreters developed further instances of its application. Thus, the ethic appears to be comprehensive in scope since it distinguishes between slave and free only in terms of their intrinsic differences on when their labour is paid for. There is, however, no extant systematic treatment of how this equality ethic translates into more concrete ethics. Nevertheless, these Jewish ethics are in sharp contrast to Greco-Roman antiquity, which at its best treats slave and free as proportionally equally.

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I also reject Glancy’s attempt to downgrade Ben Sira’s significance to being merely akin to Musonius Rufus’s opposition to slave-masters lusting after their slaves (Diatr. 12). I also question her criticism of the silence in how the pseudonymous Reuben-centric testament (T. Reu. 1:6 [OTP 1:782]) does not condemn Jacob’s intercourse with Bilhah and Zilpah while condemning Reuben’s incestual intercourse with Bilhah.

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There is no Torah law that explicitly draws a welfare distinction between Israelite debt and non-Israelite chattel slaves apart from the intrinsic distinction between temporary and permanent servitude terms. Their universal application would also be coherent with both Job 31:13–15’s appeal to equality by divine creation and the absence of any ethnic marker in Exod 21:20–21 and 26–27. While Jewish interpreters frequently emphasise only the law’s applicability to Israelite debt slaves, other extant evidence suggests that the laws were originally intended to – and understood to – apply also to non-Israelite chattels. Indeed, the more equal is their welfare, the less need there would be for Jewish scholars in the Greco-Roman era to maintain the distinction between Israelite debt and non-Israelite chattel slaves in their slave welfare texts. Hence, perhaps the relatively limited occurrence of this distinction in later Jewish texts is also suggestive. I expect these findings to disappoint those today who have already concluded that the only valid response to slavery of all forms in all eras in all places is its abolition. While some Torah laws – for example, the prohibition against usury and the jubilee – sought to minimise the likelihood of debt slavery and to prevent it becoming de facto permanent slavery, the Torah unashamedly regulates debt slavery, and explicitly authorises both the enslavement of distant captive slaves and the purchasing of those already enslaved. Nevertheless, the Torah’s slave welfare measures, if implemented and enforced, would materially improve the slave’s lot.

Chapter 5

Pauline Corpus A. Introduction Our final chapter analyses selected portions of the Pauline corpus in their respective epistolary contexts to determine their equality parameters and to argue that the numerically equal treatment between slave and free of Jewish antiquity (chapter four) is a better source fit for Paul’s equality ethics on slave welfare than Greco-Roman antiquity (chapter three). While some Jews appear to have restricted their ethic to apply only to Israelite debt slaves, Paul includes chattel slaves within his scope. Although scholarship analyses gender’s absence in 1 Cor 12:13 as a development from Gal 3:28 (or a similar predecessor),1 this chapter is ordered according to the explicitness of each portion’s equality rhetoric, from the most to the least, and to permit evaluation of those who argue for or against intra-Pauline ethical development vis-à-vis Gal 3:28. Thus, we begin with the Jerusalem Collection in 2 Corinthians, which along with Col 4:1 utilises the term ūûĻüòÏ; then 1 Corinthians, which is also analysed for social equality; and finally Galatians. Thereafter, we turn to Paul’s explicit slavery texts: Colossians’ unity statement (3:11) and its Haustafel (3:22–4:1); Ephesians’ Haustafel (6:5–9) and Philemon then follow. Our Haustafeln analysis is limited to their slave exhortations. We engage with Pauline theology only to the minimum extent necessary. Any possible gender implications will require further study. Finally, we integrate the separate analyses to ascertain the comprehensiveness of Paul’s equality ethics on slave welfare, to evaluate claims of intra-Pauline and post-Pauline development, and to determine whether Paul was complicit in a slave-master’s sexual use of his own slaves.

1

For the dating of 1 Corinthians, see Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 29–32. The chronological relationship between Galatians and Corinthians depends in part upon the northern or southern Galatia hypothesis, about which I offer no opinion; see further any of the major Galatians commentaries, most recently Keener, Galatians, 16–22.

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B. 2 Corinthians I. The Jerusalem Collection (8:13–15) While many assert that Paul cites equality in these verses only as an unspecific general principle,2 Georgi and Welborn highlight scholarship’s failure to comprehend Paul’s twofold usage of ūûĻüòÏ in 8:13c and 14c.3 Indeed, there are two issues to resolve with each ūûĻüòÏ instance: how its grammatical function contributes to Paul’s argument and the kind of equality it implies. The former requires exegesis; the latter also requires equality analysis. While ūûĻüòÏ’s second instance (ľþÏñě÷òüëóūûĻüòÏ, 8:14c), together with 8:15, specifies an equality as Paul’s goal, we analyse its kind later. First, we review scholarship’s attempts to exegete 8:13c’s prepositional phrase (ċõõɌĠÿūûĻüòüøÏ). Some repunctuate 8:13–14 so that ċõõɌĠÿūûĻüòüøÏ becomes attached to 8:14 rather than concluding the thought of 8:13,4 but Windisch and Georgi criticise that punctuation for disrupting 8:13’s rhythm and for rendering 8:14’s double instance as unwieldy and muddled, respectively.5 Windisch and Betz insert the subjunctive ñě÷òüëó (“should be”) into 8:13c and render ĠÿūûĻüòüøÏ as expressing purpose,6 but that would require an unprecedented purposive use

2 Hans Windisch, Der zweite Korintherbrief, 9th ed., KEK 6 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1924), 258n1; Hans Lietzmann, An die Korinther I/II, 5th ed., HNT 9 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1969), 134; Charles K. Barrett, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians, HNTC (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 226; Victor P. Furnish, II Corinthians, AB 32A (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1984), 399, 407; Paul Barnett, The Second Epistle to the Corinthians, NICNT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1997), 414; cf. Alfred Plummer, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Second Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians, ICC (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1915), 245; cf. also “fairness” trans. of NRSV; ESV. For a summary of scholarship into the Jerusalem Collection texts but without as much attention to the exegesis of 2 Cor 8:13–15, see David J. Downs, The Offering of the Gentiles: Paul’s Collection for Jerusalem in its Chronological, Cultural, and Cultic contexts, WUNT 2/248 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2008). 3 Dieter Georgi, Remembering the Poor: The History of Paul’s Collection for Jerusalem (Nashville: Abingdon, 1992), 87–88; Welborn, “Discourse of Equality,” 555–57; cf. Hays, Echoes, 88–89. 4 Barrett, 2 Corinthians, 226; KJV; NRSV; ESV. 5 Windisch, 2 Korinther, 257; Georgi, Remembering, 87–88. 6 Windisch, 2 Korinther, 258; Hans D. Betz, 2 Corinthians 8 and 9: A Commentary on Two Administrative Letters of the Apostle Paul, Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985), 37, 68.

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of Ġô, which typically indicates either source or cause.7 Instead, Welborn observes how Paul’s double instance of ūûĻüòÏ denotes “a mundane motion from source [8:13c] to outcome [8:14c], from presupposition to conclusion.”8 Indeed, since Paul’s logic is unlikely to be tautologous, he grounds his collection upon one kind of equality for the goal of another kind of equality. We analyse both. II. Equality as Ground (8:13c) Nevertheless, Georgi reads how Philo treats Ġÿ ūûĻüòüøÏ as if synonymous with ĠôùïøŶ (“from God”) and ĠôíĄúóüøÏ (“out of grace”) into ĠÿūûĻüòüøÏ,9 but Paul cannot be replaced by Philo.10 Alternatively, Welborn reads the Greek political equality debates on democracy and oligarchy into ĠÿūûĻüòüøÏ,11 but there is no evidence in 2 Corinthians that Paul is alluding to the Greek democracy debates that might substantiate Welborn’s claim that Paul asserts democracy’s numerical rather than oligarchy’s proportionate equality between peoples. Instead, I turn to the literary parallel Paul establishes between 8:1–16 and the Jewish and Gentile unity of 9:6–15 in part through his description of the collection as ôøó÷þ÷Ťë (“partnership, fellowship”)12 in 8:4 and 9:13.13 Paul’s explicit equality, between the Čõõøó (“others”) of 8:13a (the poor Jerusalem Christians) and the ŷöïŦÏ (“you”) of 8:13b (the mainly Gentile Corinthian

7

Daniel B. Wallace, Greek Grammar Beyond the Basics: An Exegetical Syntax of the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1996), 371, cf. 358; cf. also “Ġô,” BDAG 295– 98. 8 Welborn, “Discourse of Equality,” 557. 9 Georgi, Remembering, 86–89; cf. Philo, Her. 141–206. 10 Barrett, 2 Corinthians, 226–27; Furnish, 2 Corinthians, 407; Welborn, “Discourse of Equality,” 557. 11 Welborn, “Discourse of Equality,” 556–59. 12 Not, in any, a “financial contribution” (Julien M. Ogereau, “The Jerusalem Collection as ȀȠȚȞȦȞ઀Į: Paul’s Global Politics of Socio-economic Equality and Solidarity,” NTS 58 [2012]: 360–78, here 371). 13 Cf. Rom 15:26. On Paul’s ecumenical purpose, see further Downs, Offering, 15–19; Laurence L. Welborn, “‘That There May Be Equality’: The Contexts and Consequences of a Pauline Ideal,” NTS 59 (2013): 83–85. For the unity and structure of 2 Cor 8–9, see Craig L. Blomberg, “The Centrality of Scripture in 2 Corinthians 8–9,” in Paul and Scripture, ed. Stanley E. Porter and Christopher D. Land, Pauline Studies 10 (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 303– 22.

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Christians), prefigures his later unity assertion. Thus, Paul extends Jewish and Gentile equality and unity in Christ beyond those in a particular locality.14 While Welborn does not account for 8:13’s double negations of øŻ (purpose) … ċõõĄ (grounds), they can be explained by the consensus view that Paul composed 2 Cor 1–10 in part to counter Corinthian suspicions of Paul’s motives towards them.15 In 8:13a–b, Paul feels it necessary to deny (øŻ) that he is attempting to exploit his relationship with the Corinthians to benefit others; instead (ċõõĄ), he asserts that his collection is grounded upon Jewish and Gentile equality in Christ. III. Equality as Goal (8:14–15) Welborn extends his Greek political inference into the economic realm and suggests that Paul is endorsing a trajectory towards an egalitarian outcome regarding poverty, gender and slavery.16 However, Welborn’s Greek inference regarding slavery is especially unwarranted given his lack of any evidence.17 Indeed, he appears to be reading modern equality concepts into Paul rather than those that he claims come from Greek antiquity. Alternatively, Barclay observes Paul’s parallel between the íĄúóÏ that is his collection project (8:4, 6, 7, 19; cf. 1 Cor 16:3) and the íĄúóÏ of God and/or Christ (2 Cor 8:1, 9; 9:8, 14).18 To Barclay, Paul urges the Corinthians to imitate Christ’s cruciform generosity and to anticipate their future gain from Paul’s reciprocal “mutual sharing of [all kinds of] surplus[es].”19 Indeed, Paul’s cruciform-imitation ethic probably functions to intensify the degree of Corinthian self-sacrificial generosity necessary for them to achieve his equality goal.

14 Cf. Ascough, Macedonian, 104; Meeks, Social World, 110; Ogereau, “Jerusalem Collection,” 360–61. 15 Summarised in Barnett, 2 Corinthians, 26–40. For the unity of 2 Cor 1–10 and 11–13, see Barnett, 2 Corinthians, 15–23. 16 Welborn, “Discourse of Equality,” 559–62; cf. Betz, 2 Corinthians, 37, 67–68. 17 Even Welborn’s cited Phaleas of Chalcedon argued for the public ownership of slaves (Aristotle, Pol. 2.4.13 [1267b14–17]). 18 John M. G. Barclay, “Manna and the Circulation of Grace: A Study of 2 Corinthians 8:1–15,” in The Word Leaps the Gap: Essays on Scripture and Theology in Honor of Richard B. Hays, ed. J. R. Wagner, C. Kavin Rowe, and A. K. Grieb (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 419–22. 19 Barclay, “Manna,” 411, 417, 422 (interpolation additional). Cf. 2 Cor 9:11 and Paul’s other reciprocal, one another-ings, such as those (1 Cor 12:25; Gal 5:2; 6:2) we engage with later. Cf. also Windisch, 2 Korinther, 259–60.

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Frequent exhortations towards generosity occur elsewhere both in the Pauline corpus and among the other NT writers.20 In particular, the Lukan Acts 4:34 alludes to the LXX of Deut 15:4, which exhorts Israelite generosity towards any poor “brothers,” to claim that the post-Pentecostal Jerusalem church fulfilled the Deuteronomist’s exhortations for the generous relief of poverty.21 While some Greco-Roman sources also promote generosity, especially towards fellow members of voluntary associations,22 I suggest that Paul is probably adapting the Torah’s social equality ethics because of its correlation with Paul’s generosity, equality and brotherhood rhetoric throughout 2 Cor 8–9. Paul also extends its scope to include Gentile Christians caring for Jewish Christians. For Barclay, reciprocity of action controls his interpretation of ūûĻüòÏ: Not Philo’s proportionality (the bigger people getting more, the smaller less) but equality, in the sense of equal opportunity to give, equal need of the other, and processes of equalization by which giving in one direction is continually, though perhaps differentially, equalized by giving in the other. And this is how Paul reads Exodus 16:18: not an equal apportionment of shares, but as a redistribution of surplus, which is not unidirectional … but bilateral.23

However, Barclay’s understanding is process-centric rather than, as 2 Cor 8:14c, goal-focused. Nor am I convinced that his alleged manna redistribution would ever lead to a reciprocal equality of outcome over time since stronger and fitter Israelites would be over-represented among the surplus gatherers and the weaker and unfit over-represented among those in need. Furthermore, Hays observes that the Exod 16 narrative neither requires nor even describes the sharing of unequal resources. Instead, Hays focuses on how 16:20 narrates Moses’s anger at those who hoarded manna to argue that Paul similarly warns the Corinthians against hoarding rather than donating their current surplus.24 20

Paul (Rom 12:8, 13; Eph 4:28; 1 Tim 5:16; 6:17–19). Others (Matt 5:42; 6:2–4; 19:21; 25:34–40; Luke 3:11; 6:38; 11:41; 12:33; Acts 20:35; Heb 13:16; 1 John 3:17). 21 Vogt, “Social Justice,” 42–43; Friedl, “Reception,” 185–90; cf. Alan C. Mitchell, “The Social Function of Friendship in Acts 2:44–47 and 4:32–37,” JBL 111 (1992): 252–72, contra Kirsopp Lake, “The Communism of Acts 2 and 4–6 and the Appointment of the Seven,” in vol. 5 of The Beginnings of Christianity, ed. F. J. Foakes Jackson and Kirsopp Lake, 5 vols. (London: MacMillan, 1920–1923), 140–50; David L. Mealand, “Community of Goods and Utopian Allusions in Acts ii–iv,” JTS 28 (1977): 96–99. 22 See further Downs, Offering, 73–119; Bruce W. Longenecker, Remember the Poor: Paul, Poverty, and The Greco-Roman World (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2010), 60–131; summarised “Poverty and Paul's Gospel,” ExAud 27 (2011): 31–33. Downs is agnostic on Paul’s ethical source, but Longenecker contrasts Jewish almsgiving and Greco-Roman generosity because the former offered systematic relief to those in the worst of poverties. 23 Barclay, “Manna,” 423. 24 Hays, Echoes, 89–91.

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However, if Hays is correct, then it is not apparent why Paul cites 16:18 rather than 16:20. Furthermore, the Exodus narrative is not explicit that those who retained manna did so at the expense of others’ provision. Instead, given its insistence that each collected the required quantity (16:16–18), the hoarders had probably chosen to eat less.25 Therefore, I suggest that Paul cites Exod 16:18, which describes only the result of the first day’s collection, to quantify 2 Cor 8:14c’s equality goal. In other words, Paul’s goal is for the same kind of equality as occurred after the manna collection. Since Exod 16:16b requires one omer per person per tent,26 Paul retains the language of øõŴÏ (“much”) versus ŀõŤñøÏ (“little”) to advocate a proportionate rather than Welborn’s numerical equality goal: proportionate to differential need rather than, as typical of Greek philosophy, proportionate to differential merit. IV. Summary: Equality and the Jerusalem Collection Once again, equality analysis can expose and clarify scholarship’s equality confusion in this non-slavery text. I suggest a new hypothesis beyond the scope of this slavery-focused monograph for further research. We limit our attention to both Paul’s appeal to cruciform imitation to achieve his equality goal and his correlation here between Jewish and Gentile equality and unity in Christ because both also feature in our later analyses. We turn now to Paul’s earlier letter to the Corinthians, which focuses more on their internal unity than on their equality.

25

See Keil and Delitizsch (Pentateuch, 2:68) for how rabbinic interpretation assumes that an additional divine miracle ensured that each gathered only the desired quantity whereas modern scholarship assumes that the manna was gathered into a heap and thereafter equally redistributed. Youtaek Kang (“God as Teacher: Studies on Deut 5–8 and Exodus 16” [PhD thesis, University of Durham, England, 2002], 119) argues, however, that the Hebrew text indicates that each Israelite only gathered the appropriate amount. For the collection quantity also being part of the divine test of Exod 18:4–5, see Rodney L. Plunket, “Between Elim and Sinai: A Theological Interpretation of Exodus Sixteen Shaped by its Canonical Context” (PhD thesis, University of Durham, England, 1996), 56, 58–59; Kang, “God as Teacher,” 118–20. 26 Keil and Delitizsch, Pentateuch, 2:68; A. H. McNeile, The Book of Exodus, WC (London: Methuen, 1908), 98; Plunket, “Elim & Sinai,” 58.

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C. 1 Corinthians Recent scholarship highlights the social stratification of first century AD Corinth.27 Thiselton describes the Corinthian church as self-congratulatory, obsessed with peer group prestige and contemptuous of those they deem inferior.28 We will analyse Paul’s equality response to three instances of Corinthian ûíŤûöëüë (“divisions”) between the followers of Paul and Apollos (1:10–12; 3:1–4:7), between the haves and the have nots (11:17–24) and between superior and inferior spiritual gifts (12:1–31).29 Wolter argues that the ethical reciprocity of 10:24 – “Let no one seek his own good, but the good of his neighbour” – is central to the epistle’s ethical coherence;30 I will argue that this reciprocity presupposes an intra-Corinthian unity and equality. Tilly asks whether Paul’s equality is merely eschatological or requires the egalitarian levelling of status differentiation,31 but I will demonstrate how Paul’s equality ethics coexist with acknowledged differences that he deems irrelevant. I. Paul versus Apollos (3:1–4:13) Thiselton parallels Paul’s introduction to the first Corinthian ûíŤûöë with his Galatian description of the works of the flesh (5:18–20); the Corinthians are still ûëúôóôøŤ (“fleshly”), engaged in āĦõøÏôëťġúóÏ (“jealousy and strife”) and ôëüąČ÷ùúþø÷ïúóëüïŦüï (“behaving humanly”) rather than as ÷ïý öëüóôĻó (“spiritual”).32 Bassler highlights Paul’s assertions of divine impartiality in the eschatological judgement of all according to each’s labour (1 Cor 3:8b, 13–15; cf. 4:3, 5–7),33 but she overlooks Paul’s impartial ethic between Apollos and himself.

27

See further Thiselton (1 Corinthians, 12–17) and the anthology in Steven J. Friesen, Sarah A. James and Daniel N. Schowalter, eds., Corinth in Contrast: Studies in Inequality, NovTSup 155 (Leiden: Brill, 2014). 28 Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 17. 29 For the unity of the epistle, see Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 36–41. The terminology of “the have nots” to denote üøŵÏöĥ ġíø÷üëÏ of 11:22 originates with G. G. Findlay, “The First Epistle of Paul to the Corinthians,” in vol. 2 of The Expositor’s Greek Testament, ed. William R. Nicoll, 5 vols. (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1910–1917), 879; for the contrast with “the haves,” see Bruce W. Winter, “Lord’s Supper at Corinth: An Alternative Reconstruction,” RTR 37 (1978): 82. 30 Wolter, “No One Seek Own,” 209–16. 31 Michael Tilly, “Social Equality and Christian Life in Paul’s First Letter to the Corinthians,” AcT 36 (2016): 225–37. 32 Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 286–95. 33 Bassler, Divine Impartiality, 175–77.

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Paul acknowledges Christ’s inauguration of the role distinction between himself, as the Corinthians’ founder, and Apollos, as their waterer (3:5), but dismisses its relevancy to the present situation because both are mere îóĄôø÷øó (“servants”), only the means through whom God achieves growth (3:6–7). Furnish observes how Paul’s explicit Ğ÷ (“oneness”) in 3:8 is predicated upon an implicit equality: Paul is concerned about defining the relationship of the apostles to one another. They are not in competition for status. They are all îóĄôø÷øó; they are all ‘equal.’ Moreover, their equality is the equality of ‘nothingness’ … before the God whom they serve; in God alone is the power that makes for growth. In this passage Paul is not trying to emphasize the dignity of apostolic status,… he is trying to emphasize that each apostle is but a îóĄôø÷øÏ of a common gospel.34

In other situations, Paul can assert his own apostolic priority, not least perhaps in 12:28, but he insists on its irrelevancy with regard to Corinthian boasting. Paul responds to those who boast in some over others by prohibiting boasting in anyone (3:21; cf. Gal 6:14). He exhorts the Corinthians to imitate God’s impartiality between îóĄôø÷øó; the Corinthians’ equality parameters should match. II. The Haves versus the Have Nots (11:17–34) Paul criticises Corinthian table fellowship for reflecting Corinth’s social inequality rather than demonstrating equality in Christ between the haves and the have nots (1 Cor 11:21).35 Paul does not propose any egalitarian levelling of Corinthian social inequality;36 rather, he insists on the Corinthians treating each other as their equals regardless. The have nots were mainly the poor, both free and slave,37 thus, rendering unlikely any alleged golden slave age. Theissen observes that Paul’s argument relies upon the meal belonging to the Lord (11:20); it is not one’s own (11:21). Therefore, Paul continues, the 34

Victor P. Furnish “Fellow Workers in God’s Service,” JBL 80 (1961): 369; cf. Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 303–6; contra Wolfgang Schrage, Der erste Brief an die Korinther, 4 vols., EKKNT 7 (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Neukirchener; Zürich: Benziger, 1991–2001), 1:292. 35 Barry D. Smith, “The Problem with the Observance of the Lord’s Supper in the Corinthian Church,” BBR 20 (2010): 517–20. 36 Acknowledged Dennis E. Smith, “Meals and Morality in Paul and his World,” in Society of Biblical Literature 1981 Seminar Papers, ed. Kent H. Richards, SBLSP 28 (Atlanta: Scholars, 1981), 328; cf. Lanuwabang Jamir, Exclusion and Judgement in Fellowship Meals: The Socio-historical Background of 1 Corinthians 11:17–34 (Eugene, OR: Pickwick, 2017), 130. 37 Acknowledged Winter, “Lord’s Supper Corinth,” 73. For the additional inclusion of others, see Jamir, Exclusion & Judgement, 128–35, 143.

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haves cannot usurp the Lord’s right to invite all those for whom he died (11:23– 26), the haves and the have nots alike without distinction, by discriminating against the have nots at the meal.38 In other words, Paul requires table fellowship Ġ÷ĠôôõòûŤď (“as a church,” 11:18, cf. 17, 20, 33, 34) to mirror cruciform impartiality; their equality parameters should match. As also with 2 Cor 8:13– 15, Paul’s cruciform-imitation ethics supports the realisation of his social equality ethics. Paul insists that Corinthian table fellowship is not for satisfying one’s hunger; the haves, he retorts, can do that Ġ÷øŬôŏ (“at home,” 1 Cor 11:34, cf. 22a). Theissen and Barton argue that Paul thereby allows the haves to enjoy exuberant, but private (Ġ÷øŬôŏ), dinner parties with their fellow haves.39 However, Paul’s rhetorical rebuff is probably not implicitly endorsing private excess given 5:11’s prohibition against eating with greedy and/or drunk believers. Perhaps we should also be cautious about assuming as sharp a divide in antiquity between Ġ÷ĠôôõòûŤď and Ġ÷øŬôŏ as exists today between the sacred and the secular.40 Indeed, Bassler’s post-Pauline examples, which call for imitating divine social impartiality, are not restricted to only Ġ÷ ĠôôõòûŤď occasions.41 Furthermore, James 2:1–9 (cf. 3:17), which is explicit about the Torah origin of its social equality ethics,42 equates its audience’s ethical failure Ġ÷ĠôôõòûŤď to their own distasteful experience of social partiality as diaspora in the Roman empire. Our later analyses of the Haustafeln, i.e., Ġ÷øŬôŏ, will confirm these doubts.

38

Gerd Theissen, “Social Integration and Sacramental Activity: An Analysis of 1 Cor 11:17–34,” in The Social Setting of Pauline Christianity, trans. John H. Schütz (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982), 148; cf. Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians, NICNT (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1987), 539–40; Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 862. 39 Theissen, “Social Integration,” 164; Stephen C. Barton, “Paul’s Sense of Place: An Anthropological Approach to Community Formation in Corinth,” NTS 32 (1986): 237–41; cf. Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 856–57, 862–65, 899; Ben Witherington, Conflict and Community in Corinth: A Socio-Rhetorical Commentary on 1 and 2 Corinthians (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Carlisle: Paternoster, 2005), 242; cf. also Fee (1 Corinthians, 568) who interprets 11:34a as, “if anyone wants to gorge.” 40 For the modernist origins of the latter, see David Kim, David McCalman and Dan Fisher, “The Sacred/Secular Divide and the Christian Worldview,” JBusE 109 (2012): 203– 6. 41 Bassler, Divine Impartiality, 180–82. 42 James 2:2 calls their Ġ÷ ĠôôõòûŤď meeting, a ûý÷ëñþñĤ (“synagogue”) and 2:8 describes it as a fulfilment of Lev 19:18b, the “royal law according to the Scripture.” I suggest loving one’s neighbour as oneself is equivalent to treating one’s neighbour as one’s equal.

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III. Spiritual Gifts and the Body (12:1–31) In 3:1–4:13, Paul urges the Corinthians’ equal treatment of their absent former leaders, Apollos and himself, regardless of their differences. In 11:17–34, Paul urges intra-Corinthian equal treatment regardless of their social inequality. Now, in chapter 12, he responds to both intra-Corinthian spiritual inferiority (“I do not belong to the body,” 12:16) and superiority (“I have no need of you,” 12:21) by urging Corinthian equal treatment, üļëŻüļŷĜúċõõĤõþ÷öïúó ö÷ņûó÷ (“the same care/concern for each other,” 12:25), regardless of their diverse spiritual giftings. While the majority reckon the chapter emphasises unity over diversity,43 it may be better summarised as equality amidst diversity because Paul’s desired unity requires intra-Corinthian equal treatment. 1. Spiritual Phenomena: Equality amidst Diversity (12:1–11) Paul stresses rather than minimises the diversity of spiritual phenomena: “different apportionings of gifts,” “varieties of ways of serving” and “different apportionings of what activates effects” (12:4–6).44 Yet, simultaneously, throughout the section, he also emphasises the phenomena’s equivalence through his repetition of their “same” origin.45 Paul also claims that their diverse distribution is because of the Spirit’s will (12:11, cf. 7) and, implicitly, neither by human choice nor merit. In this way, Paul argues that the diverse intra-Corinthian 43

Ernest Best, One Body in Christ: A Study in the Relationship of the Church to Christ in the Epistles of the Apostle Paul (New York: MacMillan, 1955), 96; Margaret M.Mitchell, Paul and the Rhetoric of Reconciliation: An Exegetical Investigation into the Language and Composition of 1 Corinthians, HUT 27 (Tübingen: Mohr, 1992), 267–70; Dale B. Martin, The Corinthian Body (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 87; Raymond F. Collins, First Corinthians, SP 7 (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical, 1999), 449; Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 928–29, 989, 1000–1002. Contra diversity over unity (John N. Collins, Diakonia: Reinterpreting the Ancient Sources [New York: Oxford University Press, 1990], 232; Antoinette C. Wire, The Corinthian Women Prophets: A Reconstruction through Paul’s Rhetoric [Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1990], 136–37; F. Lang, Die Briefe an die Korinther, NTD 7 [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1994], 168; Fee 1 Corinthians, 582–83, 585, 600–601, 607–8, 617; cf. Gordon D. Fee, God’s Empowering Presence: The Holy Spirit in the Letters of Paul [Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1994], 159, 163–64, 174–75, 183–84, 189). Contra diversity in 12:1–13 and unity in 12:14–30 (Jean Héring, The First Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians, trans. A. W. Heathcote and P. J. Allcock [London: Epworth, 1962], 129– 30; Gaston Deluz, A Companion to 1 Corinthians, trans. Grace E. Watt [London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1963], 178; Hans Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians: A Commentary, trans. James W. Leitch, Hermeneia [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1975], 207, 212). 44 For the translations, see Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 928, cf. 929–33. For the various gifts of 12:8–10, see Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 937–88. 45 Cf. the equality terminology of Schrage, 1 Korinther, 3:135–37.

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distribution of equal spiritual phenomena does not alter intra-Corinthian equality. Rather, for determining Corinthian spiritual equality, each’s particular spiritual phenomena are irrelevant. Paul began this chapter with a binary rather than proportionate test to ascertain one’s Ġ÷÷ïŴöëüó (“in Spirit,” 12:3). Thus, Paul rates a person’s spirituality only according to their Spirit-produced profession of ôŴúóøÏʄòûøŶÏ as “a spoken act of personal devotion and commitment which is part and parcel of a Christ-centered worship and lifestyle.”46 In other words, Paul argues for intra-Corinthian spiritual (numerical) equality because their common ôŴúóøÏ ʄòûøŶÏ professions (he presumes)47 attest to their common Ġ÷÷ïŴöëüó status. In this way, Paul opposes their ranking of each other proportionally to any human-originated ranking of Spirit-produced phenomena. Verse 7 suggests that the Corinthians should realise the divine purpose of unity, “for the common advantage,”48 behind the Spirit’s diverse allocation. In other words, Paul contrasts his ethic, which requires one to rate others as equally deserving as self, with the current Corinthian ethos for personal advantage that reflects their unequal status relative to each other. 2. The Body: Equality amidst Diversity (12:12–27) Paul’s argument proceeds from the individualist language of 12:4–11 to the corporate “body” metaphor from 12:12.49 This body, 12:13, unites across the ethnic and slavery divides, the latter of which, at least, was probably also a source of Corinthian table fellowship division. Indeed, Thiselton argues that Paul’s scope now broadens beyond diverse spiritual manifestations to incorporate every kind of intra-Corinthian differentiation.50 Paul describes the body as a divine ûýñôïúĄ÷÷ýöó (“composition,” 12:24), a verb others deploy to describe a painter mixing colours and a musician composing harmonies.51 Likewise, 12:18 claims that a divinely desired placing lies behind body differentiation; again, it is not by human choice or merit. Indeed, Paul equates both the necessity and universality of divine differentiation, ğ÷ ġôëûüø÷ëŻüņ÷ (“each one of them,” 12:18), across his body metaphor; as a human body requires each and every diverse body part, so too the Corinthian body requires each and every diverse Corinthian.

46

Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 901, 924–27, here 926; cf. Mitchell, Rhetoric, 267–68. Despite their ûíŤûöëüë; cf. 1 Cor 1:2, 4–9. 48 Mitchell, Rhetoric, 33–38, 142–46, cf. 162–63; Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 936, cf. 989. 49 For a history of ‘body’ scholarship, see Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 990–95. 50 Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 1003. 51 Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 1010; cf. the usage in Plato, Tim. 35A. 47

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Paul also presumes upon an equal body-part treatment ethic to rebuke those who rank their own body part differently from other body parts: either as relatively inferior, perhaps even as unnecessary to the body (12:15–18), or as relatively superior, perhaps even assuming that others are unnecessary (12:21). Thus, Paul’s equality ethics reflect his explicit divine differentiation purpose clause: üļëŻüļŷĜúċõõĤõþ÷öïúóö÷ņûó÷üąöěõò (12:25). Paul’s word order emphasises üļëŻüĻ;52 the Corinthians are to treat each other as the same rather than proportionally according to any ranking scheme. Neither does Paul urge them to eliminate or minimise their differences; rather, he emphasises them and requires their numerically equal treatment, regardless. He predicates his desired Corinthian-body unity (12:25a) upon Corinthian-body equality (12:25b) regardless of inter alia their ethnic and slavery distinctions. Dale Martin observes that Paul also reflects his epistle’s broader status reversal theme in how 12:20–22 invert the Greco-Roman political body hierarchy topos; as human beings honour their unpresentable private parts, God’s honours those body members who “feel inferior.”53 Martin also suggests that the Corinthians should realise this status reversal ethic through the self-styled superiors caring for those inferior.54 While I do not demur, Paul is explicit only that the intra-Corinthian ethos must realise the divine purpose of body unity and intra-body numerically equal treatment. Thiselton suggests that Paul also predicates this status reversal upon how Christ’s resurrection body superseded his lowly cruciform status.55 Perhaps Paul also understands this status reversal to be in part realised through imitating the divine’s greater appreciation of those otherwise perceived as inferior (cf. 1:26–28; 15:42–44). Thus, when evaluated together, equal status is maintained by how human rankings are balanced with their inverted divine ranking. Or perhaps Paul implies that the self-styled superior Corinthians will need to adopt

52

Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 1011. Martin, Body, 38–68, 87–103, esp. 39–40, 94–95; extending Mitchell, Rhetoric, 157– 64, cf. 68–83; cf. Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 992–93. For the subjective opinion of ŷûüï úøýöě÷ŏ (middle or passive), “feel inferior” or “appear inferior [to others]” in 12:24 as per ē*, A, C et al., instead of the objective reality of ŷûüïúøŶ÷üó (aorist), “inferior in fact” as per क़46vid, ēc, D, F, G et al., see Archibald T. Robertson and Alfred Plummer, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the First Epistle of St Paul to the Corinthians, 2nd ed., ICC (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1914), 276; Fee, 1 Corinthians, 608n2; Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 1009–10; contra Günther Zuntz, The Text of the Epistles: A Disquistion Upon the Corpus Paulinum, SchL (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), 128. 54 Martin, Body, 94–96, 102–3; cf. Best, Body, 103; cf. also Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 1011. 55 Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 995–96, 1007. 53

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a cruciform mindset of self-sacrifice, greater than they might have previously expected, if they are to treat others as their equals. If correct, then this would parallel how Paul concludes his previous section (8:1–11:1) by urging the Corinthians in 10:23–11:1 to imitate his own cruciform ethos in rejecting self-advantage to benefit others. Whether Paul’s ethical cases are buying meat in the marketplace, seeking Jewish and Gentile converts, urging the common good or insisting upon Corinthian intra-body unity, he appears to require cruciform self-sacrifice as a prerequisite of his desired equal treatment. 3. Primus inter Pares (12:28–31) Equal treatment is situationally dependent; certain human differentiations may be deemed irrelevant in some scenarios, but those differences may be pertinent in a different scenario. Paul is also unlikely to be contradicting himself between his equal treatment earlier in the chapter and 12:28’s enumerated sequence of teaching offices and unenumerated activity list. I concur with the consensus of scholars who suggest that the order of 12:28 denotes chronological development, precedence of teaching office authority or both.56 In this context, Thiselton highlights Paul’s earlier contrast between Corinthian prestige and the apostles’ struggle and humiliation (4:9–13).57 Perhaps Paul feels this clarification is necessary to prevent any further Corinthian misunderstanding of his (and their office-holders’) “equality of nothingness” from negating his (and their) teaching authority.58 Paul acknowledges his equality with each Corinthian, but he does not thereby intend to reduce his apostolic teaching authority over them.59 Instead, Paul insists that those with that

56

For a literature survey into this “exegetical and lexicographical minefield,” see Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 1013–18, here 1013; cf. Charles K. Barrett, Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, BNTC (London: Black, 1968), 295; F. F. Bruce, 1 and 2 Corinthians, NCB (London: Oliphants, 1971), 122–23; Lang, Korinther, 174–75; contra Christophe Senft, La première épitre de Saint-Paul aux Corinthiens, CNT 7 (Neuchatel: Delachaux & Niestlé, 1979; repr. Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1990), 164. 57 Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 1023–24. 58 Cf. Furnish, “Fellow Workers,” 369. 59 For the Corinthians as seeking autonomy, see Anthony C. Thiselton, “The Significance of Recent Research on 1 Corinthians for Hermeneutical Appropriation of this Epistle Today,” Neot 40 (2006): 320–52.

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authority and knowledge must serve everyone else, as their equals, with cruciform love (12:31–13:13).60 IV. Summary: Equality and 1 Corinthians According to Paul, the three instances of intra-Corinthian ûíŤûöëüë occur because of their propensity to rank each other. Paul’s response in each case is to argue for their unity as predicated upon their numerically equal status. Thus, they should treat each other as their numerical equals. While Paul’s equality ethics are more egalitarian than Corinthian culture, they are not egalitarian in the sense of reducing, let alone minimising, the Corinthian body’s diversity. Instead, Paul emphasises their variety, their divine origin (rather than by human choice or merit) and the divine intention for this differentiation to result in intra-Corinthian unity and numerically equal treatment. Paul’s cruciform ethics emphasise the degree of Corinthian self-sacrifice required to conform with Paul’s equality ethics. Paul’s assertion of numerically equal status between the haves and the have nots and his requirement for their numerically equal treatment both conforms with Jewish social ethics and contrasts with the Roman ethos. Given the probable inclusion of slaves among the have nots and the explicit inclusion of slaves in 12:13’s unity statement, the moral subject of Paul’s equality ethics includes slaves, at least Ġ÷ ĠôôõòûŤď. Our analyses of the Haustafeln will evaluate whether Paul’s equality ethics also apply Ġ÷ øŬôŏ, but first we analyse Gal 3:28 in its epistolary context.

D. Galatians As discussed in our first chapter, our analysis of Galatians relies upon the conclusions of three scholars. First, we recall Barclay’s integration of the Galatian paraenesis (5:13–6:10)61 with the epistle’s occasion of intra-Galatian conflict due to the circumcision demand, and his conclusion that the paraenesis compels behaviours intended to uphold the unity statement of 3:28.62 Second, we follow Neutel’s characterisation of how scholars either emphasise its ethnic pair and its epistolary context to argue for equality coram Deo, or emphasise its gender

60

For 12:31 to be ironically telling the Corinthians to keep on pursuing the greatest gift, provided they redefine that to be love, see J. F. M. Smit, “Two Puzzles: 1 Cor 12:31 and 13:3: Rhetorical Solution,” NTS 39 (1993): 250–54; cf. Thiselton, 1 Corinthians, 1024–26. 61 For Paul’s paraenesis beginning at 5:1, see Hansen, All One, 80n47. 62 Barclay, Obeying the Truth, 167–69, 208, 216–20.

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pair and its allusion to Gen 1:27 to argue in favour of gender egalitarianism.63 Third, we also rely upon Dunn’s theological observations that Galatians is not directly about getting in or staying in but about the Galatians going on to a “second phase” that includes conformity to the epistles’ ethics by the same means as how they got in.64 I will argue that understanding why demanding circumcision for going on contradicts how the Galatians got in both explains why Paul included all three pairs when he composed 3:28 and clarifies the kind of equality that Paul implies between them. In other words, this non-gender monograph interprets both the ethnic and slavery pairs of 3:28 in its epistolary context. In addition, I endorse the recent scholarly majority in favour of Gaventa’s observation that Paul intends his autobiographical remarks in the opening two chapters to be both apologetic and paradigmatic, and an integral part of the epistle even though the imitatio Pauli motif is not explicit until Gal 4:12.65 I also extend Gaventa’s argument to include the epistolary significance of Paul’s citation of divine impartiality in 2:6; thus, this is where our equality analysis begins.

63

Neutel, Cosmopolitian Ideal, 6–10 Dunn, Galatians, 16–17. 65 Beverly R.Gaventa, “Galatians 1 and 2: Autobiography as Paradigm,” NovT 28 (1986): 309–22, 326; cf. John H. Schütz, Paul and the Anatomy of Apostolic Authority, SNTSMS 26 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 134; George Lyons, Pauline Autobiography: Towards a New Understanding, SBLDS 73 (Atlanta: Scholars, 1985), 123– 76. Broadly endorsed (Dunn, Galatians, 3; James D. G. Dunn, The Theology of Paul’s Letter to the Galatians, New Testament Theology [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993], 5; J. Louis Martyn, Galatians: A New Translation with Introduction and Commentary, AB 33A [New York: Doubleday, 1998], 157n191, 160n198; Ben Witherington, Grace in Galatia: A Commentary on St Paul’s Letter to the Galatians [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1998], 25, 30, 38–39, 71–22, 162; Martinus C. de Boer, Galatians: A Commentary, NTL [Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 2011], 86; John M. G. Barclay, Paul and the Gift [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2015], 356n19). For others, see the biographies in Debbie Hunn, “Pleasing God or Pleasing People? Defending the Gospel in Galatians 1–2,” Bib 91 (2010): 29–31; Douglas J. Moo, Galatians, BECNT (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2013), 91. Contra Mark D. Nanos (The Irony of Galatians: Paul’s Letter in First-Century Context [Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2002a], 64–67) and Hunn (“Pleasing God or People,” 31–34), who claim that the reference in 2:6 to divine impartiality undercuts a paradigmatic reading. Unlike Lyons and Witherington, I do not dichotomise between the chapters’ paradigmatic and apologetic functions. For 4:12 as mimetic more broadly, see Susan G. Eastman, “‘Become Like Me!’ Mimetic Transformations in Galatians 4:12–20,” in Recovering Paul’s Mother Tongue: Language and Theology in Galatians (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2007), 25– 61. 64

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I. Imitation of Divine Impartiality (2:1–4:7) 1. Paul and the Pillars (2:6–10) Paul appeals to the principle of divine impartiality through its well-attested Jewish idiom: úĻûþø÷ Ľ ùïļÏ ċ÷ùúńøý øŻ õëöìĄ÷ïó (lit. “God receives/respects not the face/appearance of man”). Indeed, Bassler observes that both Paul and the Galatian agitators would have agreed upon the principle, but not Paul’s application, of divine impartiality.66 I suggest Paul’s appeal is both apologetic and paradigmatic. It is apologetic because Paul needs to respond to the agitators’ denigration of him as inferior to the well-regarded pillars in Jerusalem.67 And it is also paradigmatic because implicit in Paul’s appeal to 66 Bassler, Divine Impartiality, 189–91; cf. Keener, Galatians, 122. Probably incidental is any correlation between Paul’s disregard for personal reputations and Stoic adiaphora, as emphasised by Hans D. Betz, Galatians, Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979), 94. Bassler (Divine Impartiality, 172–73) also connects Paul’s impartiality appeal with his apologetic denial of pleasing people (1:10) to suggest Paul is also defending himself against the charge that he contradicted the principle by favouring Gentiles over Jews when he ceased requiring Gentile circumcision (5:11), but 5:11 probably refers to his zeal for Jewish traditions before his Christian conversion (cf. 1:13–14); see further Gaventa, “Autobiography,” 314; cf. Joseph B. Lightfoot, Saint Paul’s Epistles to the Galatians, 10th ed. (London: Macmillan, 1914), 207; Richard N. Longenecker, Galatians, WBC 41 (Waco, TX: Word, 1990), 233, cf. xcviii; Moo, Galatians, 336–37; contra Martyn, Galatians, 167–68, 476–77. For 5:11 as hypothetical, see Barclay, Obeying the Truth, 40; A. Andrew Das, Galatians, ConcC (Saint Louis, MO: Concordia, 2014), 540. As also related to Paul’s circumcision of Timothy and/or Jewish Christians more widely, see Lightfoot, Galatians, 206; F. F. Bruce, The Epistle to Galatians: A Commentary on the Greek Text, NIGTC (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), 27; Dunn, Galatians, 13, 279–80; David A. deSilva, Global Readings: A Sri Lankan Commentary on Paul’s Letter to the Galatians (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2011), 20, 254. 67 Majority view (Bruce, Galatians, 26; Barclay, Obeying the Truth, 59; Longenecker, Galatians, xcvi, 4, 10; Dunn, Galatians, 14–15, 18, 25–26, 49, 72; Martyn, Galatians, 169– 70, 178–80; Gordon D. Fee PentC 4 [Blandford, Dorset: Deo, 2007]), 30, 38, 65–66; Boer, Galatians, 74; Moo, Galatians, 90–91, 97; Keener, Galatians, 33, 75, 88–89). Contra Schütz, Paul & Anatomy, 126–28; Betz, Galatians, 39; Robert G. Hall, “Historical Inference and Rhetorical Effect: Another Look at Galatians 1 and 2,” in Persuasive Artistry: Studies in New Testament Rhetoric in Honor of George A. Kennedy, ed. Duane G. Watson, JSNTSup 50 (Sheffield: JSOT, 1991), 316–19; Joharl S. Vos, “Paul’s Argumentation in Galatians 1– 2,” HTR 87 (1994): 1–16; Witherington, Galatians, 25, 30, 38, 69, 71–72, 162; Das, Galatians, 118, 188, 205. A majority also recognise Paul’s claims in 2:7–9 that the pillars recognised his divine appointment, endorsed his ministry to Gentiles and deemed his gospel to be the same as theirs; e.g., Ernest D. W. Burton (A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, ICC [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1921], 91) observes that difference between the gospel to Paul and to Peter was “fundamentally not one of content but

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divine impartiality are both his own assertion of his own ethos – “God shows no partiality, nor do I”68 – and his ethical appeal for Galatian imitation – “… nor should you.” The Galatians should recognise Paul’s equality with the pillars and reject any spurious claims by the agitators that they represent Jerusalem’s more important opinion.69 Galatians 2:6 is a numerically equal treatment ethic. Paul simultaneously stresses both his multiple differences with the Jerusalem pillars in 1:11–2:10 and his equality with them, regardless. To Paul, those differences are irrelevant in how he treats the pillars. Nor, he implies, should those differences impact how the Galatians should be treating Paul and the pillars. In other words, Paul’s appeal is neither for an egalitarian minimising of the differences between him of the persons to whom it was addressed;” (cf. Bruce, Galatians, 37; Witherington, Galatians, 140–41; Boer, Galatians, 119; Moo, Galatians, 134; Das, Galatians, 184; Keener, Galatians, 108; contra Longenecker, Galatians, 55; U. Schnelle, Apostle Paul: His Life and Theology, trans. M. Eugene Boring [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2005], 126– 28; Ian J. Elmer, Paul, Jerusalem and the Judaizers: The Galatians Crisis in Its Broadest Historical Context, WUNT 2/258 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2009], 99). Many also highlight that sharing right hands indicates agreement (Betz, Galatians, 100; Longenecker, Galatians, 58; Dunn, Galatians, 110; Witherington, Galatians, 143–44; James D. G. Dunn, Beginning from Jerusalem, vol. 2 of Christianity in the Making, 3 vols. [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2009], 456n173; Das, Galatians, 190–91; Keener, Galatians, 129–30). While most of these scholars acknowledge multiple instances where the gesture is between acknowledged unequals, its implied equality rests not solely on the gesture but on the context, especially 2:6, in which it occurs; cf. Fee (Galatians, 66, 70): Paul did not go to Jerusalem to seek their approval, “rather he went as their equal,” and the hand sharing “acknowledges full acceptance of one another as an equal.” Others also observe Paul and the pillars’ equality without elaboration (Betz, Galatians, 84, cf. 98; Paul E. Kopak, “Rhetorical Identification in Paul’s Autobiographical Narrative: Galatians 1:13–2:14,” JSNT 40 [1990]: 105–6; Bruce J. Malina and Jerome H. Neyrey, Portraits of Paul: An Archaeology of Ancient Personality [Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox, 1996], 48–49; Witherington, Galatians, 142; Boer, Galatians, 124; Moo, Galatians, 135; Barclay, Paul & Gift, 364). 68 Interpolation suggested by Bassler, Divine Impartiality, 173 (emphasis original). 69 The agitators’ relationship to Jerusalem may be similar to that of the troublemakers in Antioch, whom Paul describes in 2:12 as ĠõùïŦ÷ … ċļʄëôńìøý (“coming from James”). Many assume that the phrase denotes James’ commissioning of their visit (Francis Watson, Paul, Judaism, and the Gentiles: A Sociological Approach, SNTSMS 56 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986], 52–53; Frank J. Matera, Galatians, SP 9 [Collegeville, MN: Liturgical, 1992], 89; Martyn, Galatians, 233, 252; Dunn, Beginning from Jerusalem, 479; Boer, Galatians, 132; contra Philip F. Esler, “Making and Breaking an Agreement Mediterranean Style: A New Reading of Galatians 2:1–14,” BibInt 3 [1995], 285–314). Alternatively, Keener (Galatians, 145–46) suggests it may only denote geographic movement from the same location as James, named here because he is one of the most prominent Jerusalem pillars.

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and the pillars nor for the Galatians to realise only a partial equality between him and the pillars in the present until a later eschatological fulfilment. 2. Titus (2:3–5) In 2:5,70 Paul presents his rejection of the demand to have Titus circumcised,71 at the same Jerusalem meeting,72 as immediate and consistent.73 Paul insists that requiring Titus’s circumcision contradicts ħ ċõĤùïóë üøŶ ïŻëññïõŤøý (“the truth of the gospel”), which Paul desires to preserve for the Galatian Christians: most of whom were probably Gentiles.74 Paul’s rhetoric echoes his opening denunciation of alternative gospels (1:6–9) and sets forth his consistency for the Galatians to imitate in contrast to their current flirtation with 70

For Paul’s anacolutha in 2:3–5, see Das, Galatians, 168. For differing possible explanations why, see Martyn, Galatians, 195; Witherington, Galatians, 134; Boer, Galatians, 112; deSilva, Galatians, 99; Das, Galatians, 172. For rationale to reject the omission of øŪÏ øŻîě in D* itd et al., see Bruce M. Metzger, Textual Commentary on the Greek New Testament, corrected ed. (New York: United Bible Societies, 1975), 522–23. 71 The issue is circumcision per se; not merely Titus’s compulsion vis-à-vis voluntary act (Burton, Galatians, 81; Betz, Galatians, 89n298; Longenecker, Galatians, 50; Witherington, Galatians, 135; Fee, Galatians, 61n53; Boer, Galatians, 111n164; Moo, Galatians, 125; Das, Galatians, 169–70; Keener, Galatians, 114n320; contra Kirsopp Lake, “The Apostolic Council of Jerusalem,” in vol. 5 of The Beginnings of Christianity, ed. F. J. Foakes Jackson and Kirsopp Lake, 5 vols. [London: MacMillan, 1920–1923], 197–98; F. C. Burkitt, Christian Beginnings [London: University of London, 1924], 118; George S. Duncan, The Epistle of Paul to the Galatians, MNTC [New York: Harper, 1934], 42–45; Arthur D. Nock, St. Paul [London: Oxford University Press, 1938], 108–9; Donald W. B. Robinson, “The Circumcision of Titus, and Paul’s ‘Liberty’,” ABR 12 [1964], 28–38). 72 Contra a different meeting either in Antioch or Galatia (Johannes Munck, Paul and the Salvation of Mankind, trans. Frank Clarke [Richmond: John Knox, 1959], 97–98; Bernard Orchard, “Ellipsis between Galatians 2,3 and 2,4,” Bib 54 [1973]: 469–81; “Once Again the Ellipsis between Gal. 2,3 and 2,4,” Bib 57 [1976]: 254–55; Watson, PJG, 50–53; Boer, Galatians, 112–13; Moo, Galatians, 128; Das, Galatians, 170; cf. Bruce, Galatians, 116). Gal 2:1–10 and Acts 15:1–29 probably describe the same event from different perspectives (Simon J. Kistemaker, Exposition of the Acts of the Apostles [Grand Rapids: Baker, 1990], 533–36; Fee, Galatians, 56n44, 61; Das, Galatians, 36–43, 170–71; Keener, Galatians, 108– 9, 114); contra with Acts 11:27–30 (Bruce, Galatians, 55, 108; Longenecker, Galatians, lxxiii–lxxxviii, 46; Witherington, Galatians, 13–20, 131, 147; Moo, Galatians, 9–16, 121– 23). 73 Paul’s possible ambiguity on the pillars’ response does not require either their initial concurrence or hesitancy (Boer, Galatians, 115; Moo, Galatians, 125; contra Lightfoot, Galatians, 105–6; George Howard, Paul: Crisis in Galatia: A Study in Early Christian Theology, SNTSMS 35 [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979], 28–29; Dunn, Galatians, 96, 104; Witherington, Galatians, 135). 74 Betz, Galatians, 4–5; Witherington, Galatians, 7–8; contra Martyn, Galatians, 16, 40.

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the agitators’ demand. While these Jerusalem infiltrators,75 the Antiochian troublemakers and Galatian agitators were probably not the same individuals,76 Paul equates them for the sake of his argument. In 2:3, Paul labels Titus a Greek to anticipate the ethnic term in 3:28’s unity statement.77 This, and the literary proximity to Paul’s appeal to divine impartiality in 2:6, suggests that Paul reckons that the principle of divine impartiality is also pertinent to his rejection of Gentile circumcision. As we proceed from this harmony between Paul and Cephas to their subsequent disagreement in Antioch,78 I demonstrate more evidence. 3. Antioch (2:11–14) Paul’s brief narrative of this Antioch incident leaves multiple interesting questions either unanswered or uncertain, including both why Cephas,79 Barnabas and the Jewish Christians withdrew from eating with Gentile Christians (e.g., impure food, the latter’s ongoing impurity and/or their still uncircumcised

They are ĀïýîĄîïõƫøÏ (“false brothers,” 2:4), ëúïŤûëôüøÏ (“secretly brought in”), ôëüëûôøěþ (“to spy”). 76 Roman Heiligenthal, “Soziologische Implikationen der paulinischen Rechtfertigungslehre im Galaterbrief am Beispiel der ‘Werke des Gesetzes’,” Kairos 26 (1984): 42; Barclay, Obeying the Truth, 76; Dunn, Theology of Galatians, 73; Martyn, Galatians, 218; Witherington, Galatians, 136; Keener, Galatians, 121, 139; contra Watson, PJG, 58–60; deSilva, Galatians, 20, 104. 77 Hansen, All One, 72. 78 Subsequent as the consensus (Burton, Galatians, 105; Betz, Galatians, 105n436; Barclay, Obeying the Truth, 76; Longenecker, Galatians, 64, 71; Dunn, Galatians, 116n1; Witherington, Galatians, 149; Moo, Galatians, 141–42, 145; Keener, Galatians, 140; contra Theodor Zahn, Der Brief des Paulus an die Galater, KNT 9 [Leipzig: Deichert, 1905], 110– 11; Munck, Paul & Salvation, 100–103; Gerd Lüdemann, Paul, Apostle to the Gentiles: Studies in Chronology, trans. Stanley F. Jones [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984], 75–77). 79 Cephas and Peter (2:7–9) are the same apostle (Dale C. Allison, “Peter and Cephas: One and the Same,” JBL 111 [1992]: 489–95). 75

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state),80 and how Cephas and Barnabas responded to Paul’s public rebuke.81 Furthermore, the semantic range of both verbs, requiring Gentile Christians ūøýîëŰāïó÷ (“to judaise”) and describing Cephas’s past as ŷĄúíþ÷Ġù÷óôņÏ (“living as a Gentile”) in 2:14, is broad, and Paul’s intended contrast between them may be only relative, relating to either greater or lesser compliance with Jewish purity regulations or the Jewish calendar (cf. 4:10), rather than requiring full compliance with every Jewish regulation, including circumcision.82 Paul can equate this incident to that involving Titus and the present Galatian situation because all three concern the question of Gentile inclusion in the early Christian communities even if some details are not identical. In antiquity, eating together demonstrates the acceptance of each other as social equals and friends. Therefore, Jewish Christians in Antioch withdrawing from eating with Gentile Christians signifies that the former now repudiate their earlier endorsement of the latter’s equal status.83 80

See further Richard Bauckham, “James, Peter and the Gentiles: Tensions in Early Christianity,” in The Missions of James, Peter and Paul: Tensions in Early Christianity, ed. Bruce Chilton and Craig Evans, NovTSup 115 (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 91–130; Boer, Galatians, 134–36; Michael F. Bird, “The Incident at Antioch (Gal 2.1–14): The Beginnings of Paulinism,” in Earliest Christian History: History, Literature, and Theology: Essays from the Tyndale Fellowship in Honor of Martin Hengel, ed. Michael F. Bird and Jason S. Maston, WUNT 2/230 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2012), 343–50; Das, Galatians, 216–32; Keener, Galatians, 137, 148–56. I suggest that the issue was probably ongoing susceptibility of Gentile Christians to ritual contamination from other Gentiles, not just their impure food; Charles B. Cousar (Reading Galatians, Philippians, and 1 Thessalonians: A Literary and Theological Commentary, ReadNT [Macon, GA: Smith & Helwys, 2001], 44): “What seems at issue in the text is not the menu of the meals but the guest list.” 81 For the most recent review of scholarly opinions, see Keener, Galatians, 140–43. 82 Betz (Galatians, 104) is definitive: “The issue is not circumcision but purity;” cf. Heiligenthal, “Soziologische Implikationen,” 42. Others are less so (Dunn, Galatians, 127– 29; Richard B. Hays, “The Letter to the Galatians,” in vol. 11 of New Interpreter’s Bible, ed. Leander E. Keck, 12 vols. [Nashville: Abingdon, 2000], 235; Thomas R. Schreiner, ZECNT [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2010], 146–47; Das, Galatians, 215; Barclay, Paul & Gift, 367n41; Keener, Galatians, 164). Contra as requiring circumcision (Mark D. Nanos, “What Was at Stake in Peter’s ‘Eating with Gentiles’ at Antioch?,” in The Galatians Debate: Contemporary Issues in Rhetorical and Historical Interpretation, ed. Mark D. Nanos [Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2002], 306–11; Bauckham, “JPG,” 126; Bird, “Incident,” 352– 54; Moo, Galatians, 151). 83 Hansen, All One, 72. All the more so if the meal was or included the Lord’s Supper, upon which scholarship is divided. Was the Lord’s supper (Heinrich Schlier, Der Brief an die Galater, 13th ed., KEK [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1965], 83; Esler, “Making & Breaking,” 286–87, 293, 296, 300–301, 306; Horrell, Solidarity & Difference, 120). Included Lord’s supper (Leonhard Goppelt, Jesus, Paul, and Judaism, trans. Edward

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Paul accuses Cephas of ċ÷ëñôĄāïóÏ (“compelling,” cf. 2:3) the Gentile Christians ūøýîëŰāïó÷. Paul’s reasoning presumes the inviolability of demonstrable Jewish and Gentile Christian equality through eating together; he does not entertain the possibility of continued segregation.84 Paul also claims that Cephas withdrew out of fear.85 In Paul’s view, Cephas favoured the troublemakers above the Gentile Christians, sought to please the former rather than God (cf. 1:10)86 and acted to protect his reputation with them rather than act impartially. In contrast, Paul’s public confrontation of Cephas demonstrates Paul’s impartial disregard for Cephas’s reputation (cf. 2:2, 6, 9). Once again, Paul implies that the Galatians should imitate his imitation of divine impartiality rather than follow Cephas’s failure. To Paul, Cephas and the rest are øŻôŀúùøøîøŶûó÷úļÏüĥ÷ċõĤùïóë÷ üøŶ ïŻëññïõŤøý (“not walking in line with the truth of the gospel,” 2:14), which contrasts with Paul’s preservation of the truth for the Galatians in 2:5. Das observes Jewish precedents in 1 Esd 4:38–40 and Sir 4:22–28 that interrelate impartiality, truth, the divine character and divine endorsement, and Schroeder [New York: Thomas Nelson, 1964], 123; Fee, Galatians, 72–73; deSilva, Galatians, 107; E. P. Sanders, Paul: The Apostle’s Life, Letters, and Thought [Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2015], 484; Keener, Galatians, 159–60). Common meal without Lord’s Supper (L. Ann Jervis, Galatians, NIBC 9 [Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 1999], 62–63; Hays, “Galatians,” 233–34; Moo, Galatians, 142, 146; Das, Galatians, 208). Cf. also Nanos (“At Stake,” 300–303, here 301; cf. The Mystery of Romans: The Jewish Context of Paul’s Letter [Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1996], 345–71) who argues that the dispute was over Gentile Christian identity as “full and equal members” with Jewish Christians. Bengt Holmberg (“Jewish Versus Christian Identity in the Early Church,” RB 105 [1998], 410), Hays (“Galatians,” 232) and Hansen (All One, 71) suggest Cephas et al. were perhaps advocating only a separate but equal Gentile status. Alternatively, Das (Galatians, 202) suggests Cephas’s actions had downgraded the Gentile Christians to second class Christian status. However, Witherington (Galatians, 158) rightly observes that Paul interprets Peter’s actions as signifying that “the unity of the body of Christ could not be preserved. ‘Separate but equal’ really meant inherently unequal and certainly not united.” 84 Dunn, Galatians, 129–30; Horrell, Solidarity & Difference, 120–21; Hansen, All One, 71–72. 85 For other possible motivations, see Craig C. Hill, Hellenists and Hebrews: Reappraising Division within the Earliest Church (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 1992), 126– 47; Peter Oakes, Galatians, Paideia (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2015), 78–79; Keener, Galatians, 146–49. However, given Paul’s lack of further explanation and no testimony from Cephas, reconstructions of any alternative or additional motives remain speculative. 86 Cf. Kopak (“Rhetorical Identification,” 106–7, 109, here 107): “As the climax of the [autobiographical] narrative, it [Gal 2:11–14] demonstrates how the consubstantial principles of unity and equality are betrayed when one chooses to base one’s actions on the desire to please humans rather than God.”

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highlights how Paul criticises the Galatian agitators for promoting circumcision to ïŻúøûþĦûëóĠ÷ûëúôŤ (“look good in the flesh,”87 6:12). Das concludes that Paul connects this incident and the Galatian situation to his earlier appeal to the principle of divine impartiality.88 Das and a few others also suggest Paul’s Antioch narrative anticipates Paul’s ethnic pair in 3:28.89 I suggest it also anticipates his summary exhortation of 5:7 to “obey the truth.” To Paul, Cephas is guilty of ŷĻôúóûóÏ (“hypocrisy,” 2:13): believing in an impartial gospel in theory but no longer living it out in practice. Jewett observes, “Whereas scholars have habitually separated Pauline ethics from his theology, defining the gospel in strictly theological terms, it is clear that he made no such distinction.”90 4. Theology (2:15–4:7) Regardless of how we should interpret Ġÿ ġúñþ÷ ÷Ļöøý (“by works of the law,” 2:16)91 and ŤûüóÏíúóûüøŶ (“faith in Christ” or “the faith of [belonging to] Christ”),92 Paul argues that justification is by the latter, not the former, for both Jew and Gentile alike. Thus, uncircumcised Gentile Christians and circumcised Jewish Christians are equal to each other coram Deo,93 “for in Christ Jesus neither circumcision nor uncircumcision counts for anything” (5:6a, cf. 6:15). Keener observes, “Paul reduces the social issue of table fellowship with 87

“ïŻúøûþěþ,” DK 155. Das, Galatians, 176–77; cf. David M. Hay, “Paul’s Indifference to Authority,” JBL 88 (1969): 41–42. For further analysis of divine impartiality in Sirach (but not chapter four) and 1 Esd 4, see Bassler, Divine Impartiality, 18–21, 25–26. 89 Das, Galatians, 202; Robert Jewett, “Gospel and Commensality: Social and Theological Implications of Galatians 2:14,” in Gospel in Paul: Studies on Corinthians, Galatians and Romans for Richard N. Longenecker, ed. L. Ann Jervis and Peter Richardson, JSNTSup 108 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic, 1994), 249–50; Martyn, Galatians, 243; Hansen, All One, 71–72. 90 Jewett, “Gospel & Commensality,” 250. 91 That is either denoting works as in Torah observance in general or works with a particular emphasis on Torah ‘boundary markers’ such as circumcision, Sabbath and purity laws. See further R. Barry Matlock, “Sins of the Flesh and Suspicious Minds: Dunn’s New Theology of Paul,” JSNT 21 (1998): 78–80; Watson, PHF, 334–35n41; James D. G. Dunn, The New Perspective on Paul, rev. ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), 22–28, 213–16, 224–26; Keener, Galatians, 183–88. 92 That is as either an objective or subjective genitive, respectively. See further Martyn, Galatians, 251, 259, 263–76; Richard B. Hays, The Faith of Jesus Christ: The Narrative Substructure of Galatians 3:1–4:11, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Dearborn, MI: Dove, 2002); Barclay, Paul & Gift, 378–84; Keener, Galatians, 177–83. 93 Also observed by Bassler, Divine Impartiality, 176–78. 88

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gentile believers as equals to the theological issue of equal justification before God.”94 They should treat each other as equals, regardless of circumcision status. So far Galatians has focused upon divine impartiality between Paul and the pillars, and between Jew and Gentile. So why did Paul in 3:28 suddenly include the slavery and gender pairs as also equal coram Deo? I argue that Paul intends divine impartiality to apply across all three pairs.95 II. Why the Three Pairs of 3:28? 1. Majority View The majority assumes that the three pairs reflect an early Christian baptismal liturgy. Hansen argues that its adoption by Paul explains its gender and slavery pairs even though they are “irrelevant” and “extraneous” to the Galatian situation.96 However, literary differences between its parallels (1 Cor 12:13; Col 3:11) and their gender pair’s omission demonstrate both individual adaption and the pairs’ separability.97 I suggest that Paul could easily have omitted the gender and slavery pairs if he had thought them irrelevant.98 2. Martin on Circumcision and Gen 17 Alternatively, Troy Martin suggests the agitators’ demand for Gentile circumcision lies behind Paul’s selection of the three pairs and his word order. Martin 94

Keener, Galatians, 168. Keener (Galatians, 123–24) also observes but without further elaboration: “Although Paul applies the [divine impartiality] principle to status in 2:6, it informs even the thrust of the letter in terms of ethnic partiality (and by implication other roles as well; cf. 3:28).” 96 Hansen, All One, 5–6; cf. Dennis R. MacDonald, There is No Male and Female: The Fate of a Dominical Saying in Paul and Gnosticism, HDR 20 (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1987), 4–5n7; Matera, Galatians, 85; Hays, “Galatians,” 233; Gesila N. Uzukwu, The Unity of Male and Female in Jesus Christ: An Exegetical Study of Galatians 3.28c in Light of Paul’s Theology of Promise, LNTS 531 (London: T&T Clark, 2015), 24n59; Keener, Galatians, 147. Although Lategan (“Reconsidering the Origin and Function of Galatians 3:28,” Neot 46 [2012]: 274–86) suggests that Gal 3:28 is a specifically Pauline formulation, he does not account for its slavery and gender pairs. 97 For the literary parallels, see further Troy W. Martin, “The Covenant of Circumcision (Genesis 17:9–14) and the Situational Antithesis in Galatians 3:28,” JBL 122 (2003): 112– 14. 98 Nor do I consider Paul’s use of metaphorical slavery later in the epistle to require a literal slavery reference in 3:28. Even if Dunn (Galatians, 206) is correct that the three pairs represent the “most profound and obvious differences in the ancient world,” that still does not explain their relevancy to the Galatian occasion. 95

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argues that circumcision more fully than Abrahamic ancestry determines who is a Jew rather than a Gentile and observes that neither free persons nor females in Jewish households were circumcised; only slaves and Jewish males were. Martin also observes that Paul’s word order reflects how Judaism requires circumcision of only the first named and never the second named of each pair and argues that 3:28 explains how the Galatian criteria for baptism and church entrance differ from Gen 17’s circumcision criteria.99 However, as we recall from Dunn, the Galatian dispute was not over baptismal and/or church entrance criteria, i.e., how to get in, but over how to go on.100 In other words, whether those already baptised and part of the church also need to be circumcised to go on in their Christianity. 3. Going on, Circumcision and Equality coram Deo We have already observed how divine impartiality between Jew and Gentile is paradigmatic in Paul’s autobiography, and Paul appears to extend that impartiality across the slavery and gender pairs. I argue that Paul emphasises the divine impartiality principle because he reckons that the agitators infringe it in demanding circumcision as the God-given means for Gentile Christians to go on in their Christianity. To demonstrate, I highlight the consequences of insisting on circumcision across the Galatian Christian population that was comprised of all three pairs. Demanding circumcision divides the Galatian Christians into the circumcised and the uncircumcised: not only those who refused circumcision but, in particular, those who could not be circumcised, such as females and slaves with unobliging masters. Indeed, Christian slaves had no choice in whether they were circumcised:101 those who had Jewish masters would have already been circumcised, those with non-Christian Gentile masters could not be circumcised even if they wanted to, and the circumcision or otherwise of those with

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Martin, “Covenant of Circumcision,” 117–21. He also argues that the gender pair’s terminology is too commonplace to conclude that Paul is alluding to Gen 1:27 and suggests instead that Paul deploys Čúûï÷ôëťùĦõý (“male and female”) rather than ċ÷ĤúøŻîĜñý÷Ĥ (“man [husband] or woman [wife]”) because it was young not adult males who were circumcised. Das (Galatians, 383–84) and Keener (Galatians, 305–6) cite Martin approvingly but without engagement. Barclay (Paul & Gift, 396) also acknowledges that circumcision would affect the ethnic pair and somehow the slavery pair, but he does not mention the gender pair. Hansen (All One, 22–23) attacks Martin for not considering the relationship between circumcision and the epistle’s ethics; this analysis of Galatians is my response 100 Dunn, Galatians, 16–17. 101 Acknowledged by Keener (Galatians, 305) but without elaboration.

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Christian Gentile slave-masters would depend upon their slave-masters’ opinion of the agitators’ demand. Thus, I suggest that Paul reasoned that circumcision, were it to become the new means of going on in Christianity, would create a new divide in the Galatian church between Christians who have gone on by circumcision and Christians who cannot go on because they cannot be circumcised: not just between Jew and Gentile but between all three pairs of 3:28.102 Indeed, if circumcision is the God-given means to go on in Christianity, as the agitators’ claim, then God’s means in Christ would distinguish between slave, free, male and female as well as between Jew and Gentile. Even more so, for Paul, it would also imply that God in Christ is partial and no longer impartial between each of the three pairs. If this accurately describes Paul’s reasoning, then we should not be surprised that Paul asserts explicitly the pairs’ unity – and implicitly their numerical equality – coram Christi in 3:28. In other words, I argue that Paul emphasises paradigmatic divine impartiality in 2:6 because he notices how the agitators’ circumcision demand contradicts his Christocentric interpretation of divine impartiality even though, as Jews, they probably concurred with its underlying principle.103 Furthermore, demanding circumcision would also mean that those who go on by God’s means are superior coram Deo to those who cannot. If the agitators are correct, then Jewish, Gentile, slave, free, male and female Christians in Galatia are no longer equals coram Deo. Thus, the superior boasting over the inferior would become appropriate (cf. 6:4, 13–14). This is probably also a recipe for new or greater intra-Galatian conflict between the three pairs of 3:28, including between slave and slave-master. Indeed, for those slaves (and all females) who cannot be circumcised, their newfound inequality would be insurmountable. But Paul asserts otherwise. The Spirit is impartial, but circumcision is partial; going on is by the Spirit, not by the flesh (3:3). Paul’s word order in 3:26– 29 emphasises Galatians’ unity and equality coram Deo in Christ: whether Jew or Gentile, slave or free, male and female. Indeed, both 3:26 and 28b begin with Ą÷üïÏ (“all”), and 3:29 begins with ľûøó (“as many as”);104 the all’s are without exception.105 Paul later insists in 5:6a, “in Christ Jesus neither circumcision nor uncircumcision counts for anything.” 102

While Paul’s Galatian reasoning is probably primarily theological, e.g., regarding justification and the Christ event, I argue that it also included ethics. Just as theology and ethics were inseparable for Paul in Antioch, Paul also treats them as inseparable in Galatia. 103 For the agreement in principle, see Bassler, Divine Impartiality, 189–91. 104 Martyn, Galatians, 374–75, 380. 105 Cf. Hays, “Galatians,” 271.

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III. Summary: Unity, Equality and 3:28 Much has been separately argued about both the theological consequences of requiring Gentile circumcision and the equality significance of 3:28, but we also should correlate the latter to the equality consequences of the former as stated in 2:6: the Jewish – and, for Paul, also the Christocentric – ethical principle of imitating divine impartiality. Paul understands the circumcision demand to contradict divine impartiality across all three pairs, nullify their previous equality coram Deo and deny how the Galatians must live out “the truth of the gospel” (2:5, 14) in their interpersonal relationships. The immediate ethical context of 2:6 is for the Galatians to imitate Paul’s own imitation of divine impartiality that insists on the numerically equal treatment of Paul and the Jerusalem pillars, regardless of specified differences. In 2:11–14, Paul insists on the numerically equal treatment of Jewish and Gentile Christians in Antioch, imitating (his own imitation of) divine impartiality over justification in Christ, regardless of their circumcision distinction. This ethical consistency suggests that 3:28’s unity statement also implies the numerically equal treatment of all Galatians, regardless of the stated distinctions between each pair. This also coheres with how Paul relates unity to numerically equal treatment and vice versa in his Corinthian correspondence. Indeed, it does not imply any egalitarian diminution (whether to be realised immediately or eschatologically) of those distinctions. To further confirm, we now demonstrate how the Galatian paraenesis also requires the numerically equal treatment between slave and free as well as between Jew and Gentile. IV. Paraenesis (5:13–6:10): Inclusive of Slave and Free I observe Paul’s consistent usage of inclusive second-person plural indicatives and exhortations in both 3:26–29 and 5:13–6:10, including the latter’s multiple one-anothering exhortations (5:13, 15, 26; 6:2), two of which explicitly challenge Galatian conflict and boasting. The exhortations’ moral agents and subjects appear coterminous in scope; Paul does not restrict them. Thus, all the exhortations appear to apply equally to all Galatians without distinction to challenge how the circumcision demand could have generated intra-pair conflict and boasting. Indeed, the moral agent scope of both Ľó … üøŶíúóûüøŶ (“those of Christ,” 5:24) and ĞôëûüøÏ (“each,” 6:4, 5), who are accountable at a future judgement,106 includes both Galatian slaves and slave-masters. While a minority ìëûüĄûïó (“will carry”) as future judgement (Matera, Galatians, 222; David W. Kuck, “‘Each Will Bear His Own Burden’: Paul’s Creative Use of an Apocalyptic Motif,” NTS 40 [1994]: 289–97; Schreiner, Galatians 362; Moo, Galatians, 381; Das, Galatians, 106

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argue that Paul’s label of øŧ÷ïýöëüóôøŤ (“the spiritual”) in 6:1a may denote a subset of mature Christians,107 the majority reckon it denotes all the Galatian Christians without distinction whom Paul associates with the impartial Spirit.108 Presumably, Paul also warns all without distinction in 6:1b of their own susceptibility to sin. Likewise, Paul intends no restriction to the moral subject of how üļ÷ Ğüïúø÷ (“the other,” 6:4) contrasts with the verse’s two instances of ĝëýüĻ÷ (“self”) and ĞôëûüøÏ. Paul is again being inclusive. In 5:14, he also cites Lev 19:18b: “love your neighbour as yourself.” Just as Paul presumably includes Gentile neighbours within its moral subject scope,109 I suggest, given also our analysis in chapter four of how 19:20–22 probably relates to 19:18b, that he could also be implying slave neighbours. Meanwhile, Paul’s distinction in Gal 6:6 between teachers and the taught appears intended only to exempt the former from the previous verse’s generality in how each Galatian should be self-supporting.110 Finally, Ġúñëāńöïùëüļċñëùļ÷úļÏĄ÷üëÏöĄõóûüëîĜúļÏüøŵÏ øūôïŤøýÏüĦÏŤûüïþÏ (“do good to everyone, especially to those of the household of faith,” 6:10), is explicitly inclusive. Indeed, given that it is Paul’s final exhortation in his paraenesis, he may intend it to function as summative. Although the Galatian occasion appears to be a solely internal matter, Paul expands the exhortation’s applicability beyond. The good work that all the Galatians are to do is towards everyone, to all three pairs without distinction, not

617 [possibly]; Barclay, Paul & Gift, 438). Contra as a gnomic principle (Dunn, Galatians, 326; Jan Lambrecht, “Paul’s Coherent Admonition in Galatians 6,1–6: Mutual Help and Individual Attentiveness,” Bib 78 [1997]: 33–56; Witherington, Galatians, 429 [cautiously]). Even if the latter are correct, my general point holds. Cf. also Gal 6:7, 8. 107 Marion L. Soards and Darrell J. Pursiful, Galatians, SHBC (Macon, GA: Smith & Helwys, 2015), 308. Schlier (Galater, 270) and Hans Lietzmann (An die Galater, 4th ed., HNT 10 [Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1971], 38; cf. Bruce Galatians, 260; Charles K. Barrett (Freedom and Obligation: A Study in the Epistle to the Galatians [London: SPCK, 1985], 79) suggest Paul adopts the ironic self-description of a Galatia subset. Cf. also Dunn (Galatians, 319) who suggests it refers to those who detected the sinful act. 108 Barclay, Obeying the Truth, 157; Longenecker, Galatians, xcix, 273; G. Walter Hansen, Galatians, IVPNTC (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1994), 184; Moo, Galatians, 374; Das, Galatians, 603; Keener, Galatians, 530. Cf. Witherington (Galatians, 422): all those not involved in the sinful act. For further options, see Dunn (Galatians, 319–20). Even if the minority were correct, then Paul’s (undefined) maturity criteria could perhaps apply impartially across the three pairs. 109 Keener, Galatians, 486. 110 Cf. 1 Cor 9:9–14; 1 Tim 5:17–18. Paul appears uninterested here to define any criteria who qualifies as the former, probably because it was not itself an issue in Galatia that Paul needed to counter.

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just üøŵÏøūôïŤøýÏüĦÏŤûüïþÏ or Ġ÷ĠôôõòûŤď but perhaps also, for example, to slaves Ġ÷øŬôŏ. V. Sexuality and Slavery While Paul does not explicitly prohibit the sexual use of slaves in Galatians, the epistle also provides an opportunity to evaluate whether Paul’s sexual ethics might include prohibiting slave-masters’ sexual use of their own slaves. Thus, I highlight that all three pairs of 3:28 appear to be included as moral agent and subject of both those conflict-causing üą ġúñë üĦÏ ûëúôĻÏ (“the works of the flesh”) vices in 5:19–21,111 and their bracketing exhortations of 5:15 and 26. There appears no reason to exclude slaves from their scope, nor from the scope of Paul’s three sexual vices in the same list.112 Perhaps Paul’s condemnation can also be inferred from the broader context surrounding his Sarah/Hagar allegory (4:22–31), whose Jewish exegesis we have already discussed. Paul contrasts Isaac with Ishmael: the former conceived through Abraham’s sexual intercourse with Sarah, îóɌ ĠëññïõŤëÏ (“through a promise,” 4:23) and ôëüą ÷ïŶöë (“according to Spirit,” 4:29); the latter conceived through intercourse with Sarah’s ëóîŤûôò (“slave girl,” Gal 4:22–23, 30–31; Gen 16:1–8 LXX) and ôëüąûĄúôëñïñě÷÷òüëó (“conceived by flesh,” 4:23, cf. 29). While ûĄúÿ in Galatians can denote neutral human material,113 and ôëüąûĄúôë in Paul’s other epistles can neutrally denote physical descent,114 ôëüąûĄúôë in Gal 5:17 and ûĄúÿ elsewhere in Galatians conveys strong moral disapproval.115 Furthermore, Paul’s contrast in 4:29 between ôëüą ÷ïŶöë as the Spirit’s power behind Isaac’s conception and Ishmael’s as ôëüąûĄúôë suggests that Paul views the latter as an alternative power rather than mere ‘natural’ means.116 Indeed, in Paul’s ûĄúÿ÷ïŶöë antithesis there appears to be no ‘natural’ human actions independent of both

ɭíùúëó (“instances of enmity”), ġúóÏ (“strife”), āĦõøÏ (“jealousy”), ùýöøŤ (“instances of anger”), ĠúóùïŦëó (“selfish ambition”), îóíøûüëûŤëó (“factional divisions”), ëŧúěûïóÏ (“instances of sectarianism”), and ƫùĻ÷øó (“occasions of envy”); trans. from Keener, Galatians, 509. 112 Þøú÷ïŤë, ċôëùëúûŤë (“impurity”), and ċûěõñïóë (“debauchery”). 113 Gal 1:16; 2:16, 20; 4:13–14. 114 Rom 1:3; 4:1; 9:3, 5; 1 Cor 10:18; 2 Cor 5:16. At Col 3:22 and Eph 6:5 (which we analyse later) it denotes a slave’s earthly slave-master in contrast to Christ. Cf. “ûĄúÿ,” BDAG 914–16. 115 Gal 3:3; 5:13, 16, 19, 24; 6:8, 12, 13. 116 Contra Bruce, Galatians, 217; Longenecker, Galatians, 199, 208; Martyn, Galatians, 435–36; Witherington, Galatians, 329. 111

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÷ïŶöë and ûĄúÿ.117 Paul also describes Ishmael as persecuting Isaac, perhaps to reinforce how ûĄúÿ always causes or contributes to conflict.118 Thus, ôëüą ûĄúôë in both 4:23 and 29 signifies Paul’s moral disapproval rather than Ishmael’s mere ‘natural’ conception.119 In other words, Paul concurs with the Genesis narrator’s disapproval of Abraham and Sarah’s initiative-taking and impatience, and perhaps also their sexual use of their own slave. At the very least, therefore, Paul’s use of this incident cannot be read as an endorsement. VI. Summary: Equality and Galatians Our Galatian analysis has integrated those scholars who relate Paul’s autobiography to Gal 3:28 with others who relate 3:28 to Paul’s paraenesis to demonstrate the ethical coherence of the whole epistle. We argue that scholarship has overlooked Paul’s paradigmatic citation of the Jewish divine impartiality principle in 2:6, with its implied equal treatment imitation ethic, and that the agitators’ circumcision demand breaches that principle by distinguishing between those who can be circumcised and go on in their Christianity and the many slaves (and all females) who cannot.120 Therefore, Paul cites the three pairs in 3:28 to re-establish Galatian unity in Christ, their equality coram Deo, and to insist that equal treatment must span across those pairs, regardless of their intrinsic differences. Paul claims constancy in his imitation of divine impartiality, unlike Cephas and the agitators, and urges the Galatians to imitate his imitation (4:12) in full immediately rather than waiting for a later eschatological realisation. While scholarship only debates whether 3:28 refers to the pairs’ equality coram Deo or also implies some egalitarian minimising of the differences between them, we argue that scholarship overlooks how this unity 117

Contra the conclusion of Barclay (Obeying the Truth, 110–17, 178–215, here 206): Paul uses “ûĄúÿ to designate what is merely human, in contrast to the divine activity displayed in the cross and in the gift of the Spirit” (emphasis original). 118 For a possible comparison between Ishmael persecuting Isaac and persecution of Paul, see Betz, Galatians, 250n116; Bruce, Galatians, 223–24; Longenecker, Galatians, 217, cf. 201–3. Although Paul cites Ishmael’s persecution of Isaac (Gen 21:10), Ishmael’s conception and birth in Gen 16:1–4a immediately leads to conflict between Sarah and Hagar (16:4b–6). 119 Martyn, Galatians, 435. Cf. Dunn (Galatians, 246–47) who reckons it denotes both Ishmael’s “natural” conception and Paul’s negative evaluation of Abraham’s actions; Moo (Galatians, 299, 309–10) who interprets ûĄúÿ in 4:23 negatively but is more neutral on ûĄúÿ in 4:29. Contra Boer (Galatians, 292, cf. 336) who emphases ûĄúÿ in 4:23, 29 as by ‘natural’ means only to later acknowledge that 4:29’s context gives it a negative connotation; and Keener (Galatians, 412) who describes 4:23’s ôëüąûĄúôë, as “not primarily negative … simply … birth in the natural manner,” in contrast to ôëüąûĄúôë as negative in 4:29. 120 The implications for Pauline gender ethics require further research.

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statement implies their numerically equal treatment both in how to go on in their Christianity and in their treatment of each other, regardless of stated differences. As in his Corinthian correspondence, Pauline unity implies equal treatment and vice versa. Furthermore, those pertinent matters include all the exhortations in Paul’s paraenesis; they apply to all without distinction as moral agent and subject and are applicable, beyond the immediate Galatian situation, even to those beyond üøŵÏøūôïŤøýÏüĦÏŤûüïþÏ (6:10). Therefore, the paraenesis’s sexual ethics apply also to all, including slaves as both moral agent and subject. While it is more likely than not that Paul also condemns Abraham’s sexual use of his wife’s slave, confirmation awaits our Haustafeln analysis.

E. Colossians Our Pauline equality analysis can now proceed to Colossians, within which lies its exhortation for unity (3:11) and its Haustafel. Our analysis focuses on its slavery exhortations (3:22–4:1), as interpreted in their epistolary context. We do not a priori prioritise any of their literary features above others. We will also examine how the exhortation for slave obedience to their slave-master utilises their – and, indeed, every Colossian’s – metaphorical slavery to Christ. First, however, we review recent epistle-wide scholarship on the epistle’s use of the OT, the epistle’s imitation ethics and its theme of Gentile inclusion, even though these scholars tend not to engage with its Haustafel. I. Use of Old Testament While the Colossians text contains no OT quotations, several scholars focus on identifying many OT allusions and/or echoes in the epistle.121 More recently, 121

Gordon D. Fee, “Old Testament Intertextuality in Colossians: Reflections on Pauline Christianity and Gentile Inclusion in God’s Story,” in New Testament Essays in Honor of Dr. E. Earle Ellis for his 80th Birthday, ed. Sang-Won (Aaron) Son (New York: T&T Clark, 2006), 201–21; Beetham, Echoes; Gregory K. Beale, “Colossians,” in Commentary on the New Testament Use of the Old Testament, ed. Donald A. Carson and Gregory K. Beale (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic; Nottingham: Apollos, 2007), 841–70; Colossians Philemon, 9–12; Jerry L. Sumney, “Writing ‘in the Image’ of Scripture: The Form and Function of References to Scripture in Colossians,” in Paul and Scripture: Extending the Conversation, ed. Christopher D. Stanley, SBLECL 9 (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2012), 185–229. For earlier scholarship on Colossians’ OT usage, see Beetham, Echoes, 1–9. For a rebuttal to Paul Foster’s (“Echoes without Resonance: Critiquing Certain Aspects of Recent Scholarly Trends in the Study of the Jewish Scriptures in the New

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Frederick independently argues for a better conceptual coherence between Colossians’ ethics and a christianised adaption of the Jewish ‘two ways’ tradition, rather than with Greco-Roman ethical alternatives even though all share common vocabulary.122 While Frederick does not engage with the Haustafel, he observes how Col 3’s virtues were frequently deployed by both Jewish tradition and elsewhere in the NT to describe the character of God, the righteous, and/or Christ.123 Furthermore, an increasing consensus identifies a substantial Jewish component to the Colossian heresy.124 Thus, the OT appears to be behind much of the epistle’s theology and ethics. We discuss only two examples. First, while childhood obedience was ubiquitous in antiquity,125 the Haustafel (3:20) christianises the Jewish interpretation of its Decalogue version (Exod 20:12; Deut 5:16) to mirror how Col 1:10 also urges all to please the Lord (i.e., Christ).126 Second, ôëüɌïūôĻ÷ëüøŶôüŤûë ÷üøÏëŻüĻ÷ (“[Renewed] according to the image of its creator,” 3:10) alludes to Gen 1:26–27 via how Col 1:15 describes Christ as ïūôŅ÷ üøŶ ùïøŶ üøŶ ċøúĄüøý (“the image of the invisible God”).127 Colossians 3:10’s context, within the epistle’s paraenesis, suggests that much of it may be underpinned by an imitation ethic; to which I presently turn. But first, we return to Glancy’s scepticism that the Colossian Gentiles could recognise the Haustafel’s common vocabulary as possibly denoting a slavery

Testament,” JSNT 38 [2015]: 96–222; Colossians, 52–60) disagreement, see Gregory K. Beale, “The Old Testament in Colossians: A Response to Paul Foster,” JSNT 41 (2018): 261–74. 122 John Frederick, The Ethics of the Enactment and Reception of Cruciform Love: A Comparative Lexical, Conceptual, Exegetical, and Theological Study of Colossians 3:1–17, WUNT II/487 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2019), 1, 133–36, 161–62. For the Jewish ‘two ways’ tradition and for earlier advocates of Colossian and Greco-Roman ethical similarity, see Frederick’s history of research (Ethics, 1, 3, 5–27). 123 Frederick, Ethics, 137–51, 161–62. 124 Albeit mixed (scholars differ on the degree) with other pagan ideas. For a recent history of scholarship, see Adam Copenhaver, Reconstructing the Historical Background of Paul’s Rhetoric in the Letter to Colossians, LNTS 585 (London: Bloomsbury T&T Clark, 2018), 1–39, cf. 237. 125 For enumerations, see Lincoln, Ephesians, 401; Dunn, Colossians Philemon, 250. 126 Sumney, “Writing Scripture,” 215–16; Beale, Colossians Philemon, 319–22; cf. Dunn, Colossians Philemon, 251. For preferring ĠúïùŤāïüï in 3:21 to Eph 6:4’s ëúøú ñŤāïüï, see Metzger, Textual Commentary, 558; Beale, Colossians Philemon, 331. 127 Fee, “OT in Colossians,” 218–20; Beetham, Echoes, 231–45; Beale, “Colossians (Use of OT),” 851–55, 865–66; Colossians Philemon, 282–83; Sumney, “Writing Scripture,” 210–13; cf. Frederick, Ethics, 211; contra Foster (“Echoes,” 104–5; cf. Colossians, 57–58, 336) who nevertheless acknowledges that the allusion’s widespread recognition.

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ethic distinctly different from the prevailing Greco-Roman slavery ethos.128 I respond by observing that the rest of the epistle appears to presume its recipients’ ability to recognise both that its common vocabulary originates from the OT and where its theology and ethics are distinctive from Greco-Roman thinking.129 Presumably, therefore, the Colossian Gentiles would also be capable of detecting any similar distinctiveness in its Haustafel’s slavery exhortations. II. Imitation Ethics Sumney suggests that Paul’s descriptions of his own suffering (1:24; 2:1; 4:3, 11, 18) are as paradigmatically intended as his autobiographical remarks elsewhere.130 But Sumney, whose epistolary analysis does not appear to include the Colossian Haustafel, also acknowledges that the epistle does not refer to any current or future Colossian suffering. I suggest that his attempt to parallel Paul’s (and Christ’s) sufferings in 1:24 with the Colossian need to reject alternative teaching (2:20–23) and mortify vices (3:5–7) appears forced.131 Nevertheless, we will observe an alternative possible parallel in the Colossian Haustafel’s slavery exhortations. Frederick also argues that his exegesis of the epistle’s ethics (Haustafel excepted) aims at “communal Christlike transformation through cruciform participation in divine love.”132 The greater Colossians’ reliance upon imitating God and/or Christ, the greater is the likelihood that its unity statement (3:11), which occurs immediately after 3:10’s appeal to imitate the creation image of God, does so as well. Hence, we now proceed to analyse 3:11. III. Inclusion, Unity and Equality (3:11) Fee highlights the Colossian inclusion motif of 1:12–14 that recalls the OT promises of Gentile inclusion, their future inheritance, and asserts Christ’s centrality to the divine act of incorporating Gentile Colossians, ŷöĆÏ (“you,” 128

Glancy, Early Christianity, 60, 62, 70, 144. Especially after subsequent readings (Beetham, Echoes, 255–57). 130 Jerry L. Sumney, “The Function of Ethos in Colossians,” in Rhetoric, Ethic, and Moral Persuasion in Biblical Discourse, ed. Thomas H. Olbricht and Anders Eriksson, ESEC 11 (New York: T&T Clark, 2005), 309–14; cf. “‘I Fill Up What is Lacking in the Afflictions of Christ’: Paul‘s Vicarious Suffering in Colossians,” CBQ 68 (2006): 664–80; contra Wayne A. Meeks, “‘To Walk Worthily of the Lord’: Moral Formation in the Pauline School Exemplified by the Letter to Colossians,” in Hermes and Athena: Biblical Exegesis and Philsophical Theology, ed. Eleonore Stump and Thomas P. Flint, StPR 7 (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1993), 44. 131 Sumney, “Ethos Colossians,” 310, 313. 132 Frederick, Ethics, 2. 129

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3:12),133 with the Jewish Paul and Timothy, ħöĆÏ (“us,” 3:13).134 Thus the ethnic pair of 3:11 reflects this theme of full Gentile inclusion alongside Jewish Christians in Christ.135 Indeed, its word order also emphasises the centrality of Christ and claims that the unity in him now transcends the distinctions between each of its pairs,136 including slaves and free.137 Colossians 3:12 also recasts Deut 7:6–8’s exclusive description of Israel as now inclusive of Gentiles.138 The occasion behind Colossians’ composition appears to be Paul’s stated opposition in Col 2:16–23 to how some were disqualifying the Colossians because of non-compliance in certain religious practices and/or non-participation in certain religious experiences.139 Conversely, Paul argues that it is their practitioners, not their abstainers, who are losing their connection to Christ. Thus, Paul emphasises the Colossians’ full inclusion in Christ. While his vice (3:8– 9) and virtue (3:12–14) lists appear more general than specifically targeted against any substantial Colossian disunity and inequality,140 Paul identifies the virtues’ goal as unity (3:14) and his emphasis on their one-anothering presumably encompasses all of 3:11’s pairs, including slaves, as both moral agent and subject. Therefore, 3:11 implies intra-Colossian unity and equal treatment between slaves and free, at least Ġ÷ĠôôõòûŤď. Furthermore, its co-location within

For preferring ŷöĆÏ to ħýĆÏ of ē, B et al. in 1:12, see Metzger, Textual Commentary, 553; Hansen, All One, 166n25. 134 Fee, “OT in Colossians,” 202–7; cf. Beetham, Echoes, 81–112; for others, see Beale, Colossians Philemon, 72–75. 135 See further Hansen (All One, 158–61, 170, 174–75, 178–79, 187, here 187): Col 3:11 is “a sub-plot of Christ reconciling all things to himself” (cf. Col 1:20, 27–28). For possible parallels between Colossians and Galatians, see Allan R. Bevere, “Let No One Disqualify You: A Study of the Paraenesis of Colossians and its Place within the Argument of the Letter” (PhD thesis, University of Durham, England, 1998), 85–178. 136 Rather than only eschatologically (Sumney, Colossians, 206–8). 137 The intended similarity or contrast between the barbarian and Scythian pair remains uncertain. For Scythians as more inferior to barbarians (from a Greek perspective), see Barth and Blanke, Colossians, 416; as Cynic philosophers, see Troy W. Martin, “The Scythian Perspective in Col 3:11,” NovT 37 (1995): 249–61. For the pair paralleling the slavery pair, see Douglas A. Campbell, “Unravelling Colossians 3.11b,” NTS 42 (1996): 127–32; “The Scythian Perspective in Col 3:11: A Response to Troy Martin,” NovT 39 (1997): 120–32. As a geographic distinction, see Sumney, Colossians, 205–6, 208–9. 138 Fee, “OT in Colossians,” 210; cf. Beale, Colossians Philemon, 309. 139 Cf. also Col 2:4 and 8a, which are vague on who these people were and on the extent of this dispute. Lars Hartman (“Humble and Confident,” ST 49 [1995]: 26) suggests their minority status; Pao (Colossians Philemon, 140) suggests that Paul’s rhetoric is designed to minimise them. 140 Unlike in Galatia and Corinth. 133

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a few verses of the Haustafel’s slavery exhortations enables a comparison between the epistle’s slavery ethics Ġ÷ĠôôõòûŤď and Ġ÷øŬôŏ. IV. Slave Obedience (3:22–25) While many echo Crouch and assume that the theology of this exhortation for slave obedience is intended only to justify it,141 our equality analysis suggests that Paul is intentionally comparing slaves’ literal obedience to their slavemasters to their – and, indeed, every Colossian Christian’s – metaphorical enslavement to Christ. In other words, I argue that Paul is comparing manners of obedience. He exhorts slaves to replicate towards their slave-master the same high quality of obedience he presumes that they – and, indeed, every Colossian – already render towards Christ. This high quality of slave obedience to their slave-master, I further argue, is greater than what a typical slave would ordinarily expect to render and greater than what the typical slave-master would ordinarily expect to receive from their slaves. Thus, while this exhortation does not justify slave obedience per se, as if Paul thought that these Colossian Christian slaves might have been doubting their ongoing labour obligation, his rhetoric nevertheless presumes it. 1. ÝŧîøŶõøó(3:22a) Laub emphasises Paul’s direct address to slaves.142 While it may be unique among extant literary sources, I doubt that the typical Christian slave would have heard this as noteworthy because slaves in antiquity were both commonly addressed through verbal commands and held accountable for their actions.143 They were always moral agents even when not moral subjects. 2. ʘëôøŴïüïôëüąĄ÷üë … öĥĠ÷ŀƫùëõöøîøýõŤďŇÏċ÷ùúþĄúïûôøó (3:22b–c) The slave’s ongoing obedience is qualified by two intensifying adverbial clauses. Positively (from Paul’s grammar perspective), obedience is ôëüą Ą÷üë (“in everything”),144 the same degree of obedience as exhorted for in 141

Crouch, Origin & Intention, 73n81, cf. 119n115. Laub, Begegnung, 86, 89–92; cf. also Moo, Colossians Philemon, 308; Pao, Colossians Philemon, 271. 143 Cf. Harrill, Slaves NT, 85–87. 144 क़46 and a minuscule omit ôëüą Ą÷üë. Hering (Haustafeln, 90n73) suggests its omission is to limit potential abuse. Wilson (Colossians Philemon, 281) reckons its omission is due to assimilation to Eph 6:5. In any case, the following phrase also intensifies the imperative. 142

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the child obedience exhortation of 3:20. Negatively, obedience is not ŀƫùëõ öøîøýõŤë ŇÏ ċ÷ùúþĄúïûôøó (“eye-service as people-pleasers”), a word pair whose only other Pauline occurrence is in the parallel Eph 6:6.145 Paul exhorts slaves to obey in everything not only, as may be more typical of slaves – and, indeed, of humanity in general – when their labour is under observation.146 While Paul contrasts pleasing people with God elsewhere (Rom 14:18; 2 Cor 5:9; Gal 1:10; 1 Thess 2:4), his argument in Col 3:22 appears to be a fortiori.147 The quality of obedience required to please the Lord, ôëüąĄ÷üë, will – when directed to serve people, I suggest – please them even more. Contrary to Schroeder,148 Paul intensifies, rather than moderates, the quality of slave obedience he requires relative to the prevailing Roman slavery ethos.149 3. âøŦÏôëüąûĄúôëôýúŤøóÏ … üļ÷ôŴúóø÷ (3:22b, d) Slaves are to obey their lord ôëüąûĄúôë, i.e., their slave-masters. The people of ċ÷ùúþĄúïûôøó (3:22c) are their slave-masters and probably also any steward or other overseer. On a literary level, their slave-master, as their lord ôëüą ûĄúôë, is contrasted with the unqualified Ľ ôŴúóøÏ, i.e., Christ. áĄúÿ here denotes the physical realm and does not appear to convey moral disapproval (cf. 1:22, 24; 2:1, 5, 11; unlike 2:13, 18, 23). While ôëüą ûĄúôë probably limits slaves’ enslavement to only this life, the Haustafel does not emphasise any eschatological freedom. Nor does Paul articulate any potential conflict between slaves’ dual masters: their slave-master and Christ.150 4. ɔõõɌĠ÷ćõĻüòüóôëúîŤëÏƫøìøŴöï÷øóüļ÷ôŴúóø÷ (3:22d) The adverbial phrase Ġ÷ćõĻüòüóôëúîŤëÏ, whose only other Pauline occurrence is in Eph 6:6, contrasts with the mere eye-service obedience of the previous clause. Instead of obedience only “under pretence, … feigned … for the 145

Moo (Colossians Philemon, 310) and Foster (Colossians, 386) also highlight Matt 6:22 as a close parallel. As ŀƫùëõöøîøýõŤëis unattested prior to Paul, many suggest the compound is of Pauline origin (Lightfoot, Colossians Philemon, 226; Moule, Colossians Philemon, 130; O’Brien, Colossians Philemon, 227; Leppä, Making Colossians, 184; Witherington, Philemon Colossians Ephesians, 193n66; Sumney, Colossians, 248). 146 Perhaps Paul is also contrasting a slave-master’s limited observation ability with divine and/or Christological omniscience. 147 Contra Gielen, Tradition u. Theologie, 168–69; Barth and Blanke, Colossians, 446; Hering, Haustafeln, 92n76; Sumney, Colossians, 248. 148 Schroeder, “Haustafeln,” 83–88, 116–26, 140. 149 Cf. Hering (Haustafeln, 91): “greatly increased responsibility … even more exacting.” 150 Contra Hering’s (Haustafeln, 93) “conflict of ultimate fidelity.” The Haustafel does not address the scenario where a slave-master requires his slave to disobey Christ.

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sake of human eyes,”151 it describes a ćõĻüòÏ (“singleness of, sincere”) ôëú îŤë (“heart”), without mental reservation.152 It also occurs vis-à-vis obeying God in 2 Chr 29:17 LXX, Wis 1:1 and in other Jewish sources.153 ÕøìøŴöï÷øó üļ÷ôŴúóø÷ (“fearing the Lord”) is a more widely attested Jewish motif, where it anticipates one’s future divine accountability.154 Crouch assumes that ƫøìøŴöï÷øóüļ÷ôŴúóø÷ is a causal participial phrase that grounds the imperative ŷëôøŴïüï (“obey”). I paraphrase him: slaves must obey … their slave-masters … with a sincere heart because they fear the Lord’s accountability.155 However, since all the Jewish parallels of both the adverbial and participle phrases are solely directed towards God, I suggest that the adverbial phrase immediately qualifies the participle so that both are directed towards üļ÷ ôŴúóø÷. In other words, 3:22d is an adverbial clause of manner. Thus, I re-paraphrase: slaves must obey in everything their slave-masters, not “under pretence, … feigned … for the sake of human eyes,”156 but with the sincere heart with which they fear the Lord. In other words, 3:22d collectively (as an adverbial clause of manner) describes slaves’ (indeed, every Colossian’s) presupposed attitude (or quality of obedience) towards üļ÷ ôŴúóø÷, which Paul then exhorts for slaves to imitate in their obedience to their slave-masters. Paul’s a fortiori comparison continues. 5. ʕĠą÷øóĦüïĠôĀýíĦÏĠúñĄāïûùï (3:23a–b) ʕ Ġą÷ øóĦüï (“Whatever you do”) recalls how the universally applicable exhortation of 3:17 begins.157 Lohse and Dunn also observe that Ġô ĀýíĦÏ (“from the soul, wholeheartedly”) echoes the Shema (Deut 6:4–6 LXX),158 which also emphasises ôëúîŤë and ĀýíĤ levels of obedience. Thus, Paul again requires from slaves towards their slave-master the same quality of obedience that he expects from all towards Christ. Here, 3:23a probably also universalises 151

Hering, Haustafeln, 92. Cf. “ćõĻüòÏ,” DK 43; “ćõĻüòÏ,” Friberg 65. 153 Enumerated in Dunn, Colossians Philemon, 254; Leppä, Making Colossians, 184. 154 Most recently enumerated in Beale, Colossians Philemon, 322n28, 323. Cf. also 3:5– 6. For endorsement of üļ÷ôŴúóø÷ rather than the late (> eighth century) variant ùïĻ÷, see Foster, Colossians, 387–88. 155 Also Harris, Colossians Philemon, 183; cf. the extra comma in KJV, ESV, NRSV. As manner (and possibly also cause), see Moo, Colossians Philemon, 311; Pao, Colossians Philemon, 273; Beale, Colossians Philemon, 322. 156 Hering, Haustafeln, 92. 157 Cf. Hering, Haustafeln, 93–94. 158 Lohse, Colossians Philemon, 160n56; Dunn, Colossians Philemon, 255–56; cf. Lohmeyer, Philipper Kolosser Philemon, 158n6. 152

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slaves’ task range; Paul requires their wholehearted obedience in each and every task they are given. Again, he intensifies the quality of slave obedience required beyond the typical. 6. ʡÏüŒôýúŤŏôëťøŻôċ÷ùúńøóÏ (3:23b) Thus, I argue that ŇÏ denotes a comparison, as is more typical, between manners of obedience – to the Lord versus to people – rather than being a rare causal use that justifies slave obedience per se.159 Paul’s comparison throughout 3:22–23 is between the greater quality of obedience of all üŒôýúŤŏ and that typical of slaves towards ċ÷ùúńøóÏ, their slave-masters. His contrast in 3:23b is of degree a fortiori rather than dichotomising between the slave’s two masters.160 Indeed, slave-masters would of course welcome any slave providing a greater than typical quality of obedience. 7. ÔūîĻüïÏľüóċļôýúŤøýċøõĤöĀïûùïüĥ÷ċ÷üëĻîøûó÷üĦÏ ôõòúø÷øöŤëÏ (3:24a) Paul only here begins his justification for his greater quality of slave obedience through the causal ïūîĻüïÏ (“knowing”).161 Frederick demonstrates how the rest of the epistle emphasises knowing God’s will as the prerequisite for good works.162 Here Paul begins to describe what slaves need to know to obey their slave-masters to the extent Paul desires. His word order emphasises that the reward that follows is ċļôýúŤøý,163 rather than from their slave-masters. ɔ÷üëĻîøûó÷üĦÏôõòúø÷øöŤëÏ is an appositional genitive, denoting the reward that is the Colossians’ inheritance,164 which Paul previously describes 159 Gregory K. Beale, Daniel J. Brendsel and William A. Ross, An Interpretive Lexicon of New Testament Greek: Analysis of Prepositions, Adverbs, Particles, Relative Pronouns, and Conjunctions (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2014), 93–94; Beale, Colossians Philemon, 323; contra Lohse, Colossians Philemon, 160n57. 160 Contra Hering, Haustafeln, 94. 161 Harris, Colossians Philemon, 184–85; Pao, Colossians Philemon, 274; Foster, Colossians, 389. 162 Frederick, Ethics, 221–22. 163 Moo, Colossians Philemon, 312; Foster, Colossians, 390. 164 Consensus (Abbott, Ephesians Colossians, 295; Lenski, Colossians Thessalonians Timothy Titus Philemon, 185; Moule, Colossians Philemon, 131; Lohse, Colossians Philemon, 154, 161; Josef Ernst, Die Briefe an die Philipper, an Philemon, an die Kolosser, an die Epheser [Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 1974], 237; Gnilka, Kolosser, 222–23; O’Brien, Colossians Philemon, 214, 229; Wright, Colossians Philemon, 150; Harris, Colossians Philemon, 185; Dunn, Colossians Philemon, 242n6, 257; Hübner, Philemon Kolosser Epheser, 113; Hume, Colossians Ephesians, 66; Lincoln, “Colossians,” 658; Moo,

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in 1:12 and 3:4.165 Since this inheritance is neither further defined nor qualified in 3:24a, Paul is not here emphasising any eschatological freedom for slaves. Instead, he reminds them of the reward ċļôýúŤøý that will also be for their same quality of obedience to their slave-masters as they (and, indeed, all) render to üļ÷ôŴúóø÷. Dunn claims that double prefix ċø … ċ÷üó indicates that this reward is compensation for abuse.166 However, this reward is for all, not just for slaves, and there has been no hint of any slave abuse so far. Rather, Paul is again incentivising greater slave obedience.167 While many scholars highlight slaves’ inability to inherit,168 I suggest Paul may also imply a comparison to how Roman slave-masters might reward obedient slaves with manumission. If correct, then Paul continues with his a fortiori comparison; he exhorts slaves to a greater than typical obedience because they know that the Lord will reward it with a greater and more certain reward than their possible manumission reward from their slave-masters. In other words, Paul argues that slaves should labour more to gain the former rather than labour only enough to hope for the latter. Nevertheless, slaves aiming at the former might also gain the latter. 8. âŒôýúŤŏÒúóûüŒîøýõïŴïüï (3:24b) ÓøýõïŴïüï could be either an indicative, i.e., you are serving the Lord Christ,169 or an imperative, i.e., serve the Lord Christ.170 If an indicative, then Colossians Philemon, 313–14; Sumney, Colossians, 250–51; Pao, Colossians Philemon, 275–76). 165 See further Beale, Colossians Philemon, 324–25; cf. Moo, Colossians Philemon, 312. 166 Dunn, Colossians Philemon, 256. 167 MacDonald, Colossians Ephesians, 158. 168 Lohmeyer, Philipper Kolosser Philemon, 159; Moule, Colossians Philemon, 131; Hendriksen, “Colossians Philemon,” 175; Gnilka, Kolosser, 222; Melick, Philippians Colossians Philemon, 318; Barth and Blanke, Colossians, 448; Dunn, Colossians Philemon, 257; MacDonald, Colossians Ephesians, 158; Hering, Haustafeln, 96; Sumney, Colossians, 250; Moo, Colossians Philemon, 312–13; Pao, Colossians Philemon, 274–75; Foster, Colossians, 391; Beale, Colossians Philemon, 325. 169 Lightfoot, Colossians Philemon, 227; Dunn, Colossians Philemon, 242, 257; MacDonald, Colossians Ephesians, 152; Wilson, Colossians Philemon, 285; Beale, Colossians Philemon, 325–26, 332; cf. ESV, NIV. KJV follows late manuscripts (> 9th century) which include an explanatory ñĄú. 170 Abbott, Ephesians Colossians, 295; Lenski, Colossians Thessalonians Timothy Titus Philemon, 185; Moule, Colossians Philemon, 131; Lohse, Colossians Philemon, 154, 161; Ernst, Philipper Philemon Kolosser Epheser, 237; Martin, Colossians Philemon, 123; Gnilka, Kolosser, 222–23; O’Brien, Colossians Philemon, 214, 229; Eduard Schweizer, The Letter to the Colossians: A Commentary, trans. Andrew Chester (London: SPCK, 1982),

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3:24b explains what has been implicit so far: Paul’s recasting of slaves’ obedience to their slave-masters as service to the Lord, whom he now explicitly names as Christ. If correct, then Paul may also be dignifying what slaves might otherwise think of as the daily drudgery of obedience.171 Indeed, he appears to equate slaves’ obedience to Christ with Tychicus as a ûŴ÷îøýõøÏ (“fellow [metaphorical] slave”) of the Lord (4:7), their own Epaphras as a metaphorical ûŴ÷îøýõøÏ (1:7) and îøŶõøÏ of Christ (4:12), and even perhaps himself (and Tychicus) as a îóĄôø÷øÏ of the gospel (1:23) and the church (3:25).172 If îøýõïŴïüï were an imperative, then Paul’s exhortation to slaves to serve Christ would also be applicable to every Colossian without distinction. Indeed, it would then be unique in either Haustafeln whose other imperatives are all relationally specific. For this reason,173 I lean in favour of the indicative.174 9. ʑñąúċîóôņ÷ôøöŤûïüëóĿīîŤôòûï÷ôëťøŻôġûüó÷úøûþøõòöĀŤë (3:25a–b) Paul also contrasts the slaves’ reward for obedience in 3:24a with a pronouncement of judgement: Ľ ċîóôņ÷ … ôøöŤûïüëó (“the wrongdoer will receive back,” 3:25a). Lohse reckons that it supports the imperative reading of 3:24b because he assumes that 3:25a warns any slave ċîóôņ÷ of divine judgement.175 However, we have already observed that the distinctly Jewish concept of impartiality (3:25b) always functions elsewhere to warn the privileged and reassure the disadvantaged that God will judge the privileged for mistreating the disadvantaged, rather than vice versa.176 Thus, Paul’s purpose in 3:25 appears primarily to reassure slaves; at most, any implied slave warning is secondary.177 226; Wright, Colossians Philemon, 150; Dunn, Colossians Philemon, 242n6, 257; Hübner, Philemon Kolosser Epheser, 113; Hume, Colossians Ephesians, 66; Lincoln, “Colossians,” 658; Moo, Colossians Philemon, 313–14; Sumney, Colossians, 250–51; Pao, Colossians Philemon, 275–76; cf. NAB, NEB. 171 Cf. Hering, Haustafeln, 94. 172 Hering, Haustafeln, 77–78. 173 Harris (Colossians Philemon, 185–86) and Foster (Colossians, 392) enumerate additional scholarly arguments for and against both interpretations, but in my judgement they remain inconclusive. 174 Sumney (Colossians, 251) and Beale (Colossians Philemon, 332) assume that it would make little practical difference for the slave whether the verb is rendered as an indicative or an imperative, but it does alter the primary emphasis of 3:25. 175 Lohse, Colossians Philemon, 161. 176 Also observed by Schweizer, Colossians, 227n58; Gnilka, Kolosser, 224; Barth and Blanke, Colossians, 449. 177 Cf. 1 Pet 2:18–21. About slave-master wrongdoing (Meyer, Philippians Colossians, 459–60; Abbott, Ephesians Colossians, 295–96; Melick, Philippians Colossians Philemon,

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Indeed, perhaps it also hints that slaves may have to endure wrongdoing from their slave-master in hope of this future divine recompense. If correct, then perhaps it also accounts in part for why Paul refers to Christ’s and his own sufferings in 1:24; he is not urging slaves to endure more than both Christ and himself.178 Paul’s øŻôġûüó÷úøûþøõòöĀŤë (“there is no partiality”) is expressed in absolute form, like Gal 2:6. Contrary to Lincoln, if this clause alludes to the divine judgement of Isa 11:3–4 then both judgements (Isaiah’s and Col 3:25) are strictly impartial rather than merely a fair or equitable judgement.179 While the clause supports Paul’s logic of 3:25a, its absoluteness also prepares for the exhortation for slave welfare (4:1) that follows. But before we proceed, I summarise our analysis of the exhortation for slave obedience, which I compare to what Paul expects of a free person in the same historical context, and evaluate Paul’s possible ethical sources. 10. Summary Rather than focus solely on one feature of this exhortation for slave obedience, such as the imperative ŷëôøŴïüï, our analysis has evaluated every term in relation to its epistolary context. Paul’s exhortation is concisely worded; yet his many qualifying phrases reveal his ethical reasoning. Our analysis has demonstrated how Paul presumes upon slaves’ wholehearted service to Christ to argue a fortiori that they also owe this same high quality of obedience to their slave-masters. Indeed, since the Colossians, Paul presumes, would not limit slaves’ obedience to Christ to mere Ġ÷ŀƫùëõöø îøýõŤďŇÏċ÷ùúþĄúïûôøó rather than ôëüąĄ÷üë, so Paul exhorts slaves to obey their slave-masters ôëüą Ą÷üë not just Ġ÷ ŀƫùëõöøîøýõŤď ŇÏ ċ÷ùúþĄúïûôøó. To Paul, slaves’ obedience to their slave-masters is an

318–19; Barth and Blanke, Colossians, 449). About slave wrongdoing (Lohmeyer, Philipper Kolosser Philemon, 159; Lenski, Colossians Thessalonians Timothy Titus Philemon, 185– 86; Scott, Colossians Philemon Ephesians, 81; Charles Masson, L’épitre de saint Paul aux Colossiens, CNT 10 [Paris: Delachaux et Niestlé, 1950], 150; Lohse, Colossians Philemon, 161; O’Brien, Colossians Philemon, 230–31; Bruce, Colossians Philemon Ephesians, 169; Lincoln, Ephesians, 422; Sumney, Colossians, 252; Foster, Colossians, 393; Beale, Colossians Philemon, 326). About both (Lightfoot, Colossians Philemon, 227; Hendriksen, “Colossians Philemon,” 175; Martin, Colossians Philemon 1974, 123–24; Gnilka, Kolosser, 223–24; Schweizer, Colossians, 226–27; Wright, Colossians Philemon 150; Dunn, Colossians Philemon, 258; Hering, Haustafeln, 98–99, cf. 95; Pao, Colossians Philemon, 276–77). 178 At least this is more plausible than Sumney, “Ethos Colossians,” 309–14. 179 Lincoln, “Colossians,” 658.

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essential part of their service to Christ. While Paul probably dignifies what slaves might perceive to be the drudgery of their obedience, he also intensifies its degree. The exhortation’s theological appeal is more to incentivise a high quality of slave obedience than to warn slaves against disobedience. The exhortation is more an appeal to slaves’ hope of a divine reward in Christ and for impartial divine justice against their wrongdoer than a warning to slaves of their own liability to judgement. While this views slaves as moral subjects who can be wronged and for whom God will repay, Paul otherwise presumes that slaves will not be conflicted between their two masters, their earthly slave-master and Christ. The exhortation also appeals to slaves’ greater and more certain hope for their eschatological reward in Christ than for the possibility of their eventual manumission. It exhorts for the greater quality of obedience that aims at the former, although that might also bring about the latter. It contains no explicit reference to slaves’ future freedom, however, not even in an eschatological postmortem life. 11. Equality Analysis Three observations regarding divine impartiality are pertinent to the exhortation for slave obedience. First, since the exhortation explicitly asserts impartiality in propositional form with neither further clarification nor qualification, Paul may be reminding the Colossians of what he assumes they already know from their exposure to Judaism rather than introducing a new concept. Second, while Paul applies impartiality to its most immediate context, divine recompense to the slaves’ wrongdoer, it probably also prepares for the immediately subsequent slave-master exhortation, to which we shortly turn. Third, impartiality also applies to each Colossian’s service to Christ, regardless of their 3:11 category. They should all serve Christ in everything, fearing Christ with a sincere heart, working wholeheartedly for him in each and every task, as they all anticipate both their impartial reward and impartial divine recompense to their wrongdoers. Meanwhile, the key distinction that remains is how slaves’ service to Christ should be expressed in hard work for their slave-masters’ benefit. Nevertheless, this may not be as unequal a treatment as first impressions suggest because free Romans were obliged to obey their paterfamilias anyway. In addition, 3:20 may exhort for the same greater-than-typical-degree of obedience from children as 3:22–25 requires of slaves. Paul also possessed a strong personal work ethos. While 1:24, 2:1 and 4:12– 13 describe his own suffering and Epaphras’s diligence on the Colossians’

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behalf, Paul does not explicitly urge Colossian imitation. He urges the imitation of his own work ethos in 1 Thess 2:9, 12, 4:11–12 and 2 Thess 3:7–12, but his purpose there appears limited to urging self-sufficiency rather than unnecessary intra-Thessalonian dependency.180 Paul also defends his work ethic as free of cost and for the Corinthians’ benefit from their accusations at 1 Cor 4:12, 9:1–19, 2 Cor 6:5, 11:7–9, 23 and 12:13–16. Thus, Paul, in this exhortation for slave obedience, may not be urging any greater level of labour from slaves than he urges elsewhere from others to imitate from himself. Since Ephesians more explicitly compares slave obedience to free labour, we will evaluate this possibility further during our analysis of Ephesians. 12. Ethical Source Since slave obedience is a prerequisite of slavery everywhere whether we possess an extant literary source that confirms it or not, we should not expect it to discriminate between possible ethical sources. Nevertheless, unmistakably Jewish is Paul’s assertion of impartiality in a slavery context that accompanies his reassurance to slaves of divine recompense to their wrongdoers. In contrast, we detected no such concern for any divine accountability for slave-masters throughout Greco-Roman antiquity, except on temple property or for slave castration and murder. V. Slave Welfare (4:1) 1. ÝŧôŴúóøóüļîŤôëóø÷ôëťüĥ÷ūûĻüòüëüøŦÏîøŴõøóÏëúěíïûùï (4:1a) The middle imperative ëúěíïûùï (“grant, provide, ensure”) probably reflects the Colossian slave-masters’ full autonomy over their household; the slavemaster is to grant his slaves from himself üļ îŤôëóø÷ ôëť üĥ÷ ūûĻüòüë and supervise how everyone else in his household treats his slaves.181 While this supervisory role appears similar to that advocated in the Greco-Roman agricultural manuals,182 the welfare standard of this exhortation is considerably greater.

180

He may also be redirecting those Thessalonians distracted by their obsession with the Parousia. 181 “ëúěíþ,” BDAG 776–77; “ëúěíþ,” Friberg 300; “ëúěíþ,” DK 272; cf. Dunn, Colossians Philemon, 259. 182 Cf. Harrill, Slaves NT, 85–117, esp. 97, 103, 113.

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I extend how Lincoln, Barth-Blanke and Bassler connect üļîŤôëóø÷ to the previous verse’s unqualified impartiality proposition.183 The slave-master is to exercise his judicial role over his household impartially, punishing anyone for wronging another regardless of both individuals’ status as either a free person, a slave or a steward responsible for many slaves. All are moral agents and moral subjects alike. In this, for Paul, “there is [also] no partiality (3:25b).” This appears to be another example where the epistle urges imitation of the divine. While modern scholarship cannot conceive of any kind of equality that is compatible with the ongoing labour obligation that is intrinsic to enslavement, and either minimises equality into a vague fairness or elevates it into an egalitarian minimising of differences, both proposals alter the equality parameters of divine impartiality. Instead, we have consistently argued in this monograph for the concept of numerically equal treatment where people are treated identically regardless of certain differences (often explicitly stated) between them. This, I argue, is what Paul exhorts for in 4:1a: for the slave-master to imitate divine impartiality and ensure impartial justice within his household.184 The equality parameters of the slave-master’s treatment of his slaves should match those of the divine ethos. In other words, Paul exhorts for a slave-master to ensure the numerically equal treatment between the free (including himself) and enslaved members of his household, regardless of his slaves’ obligation to obey him. This equality ethic between slave and free is also far more extensive than merely encompassing equality between slaves. Indeed, this finding finds concurrence only with Meyer.185 I argue that the Torah’s slave welfare ethics are the ethical source behind Paul’s slave welfare exhortation and his appeals to impartiality. The equality parameters of Paul’s exhortation for slave welfare and the divine ethos between slave and free concur. In other words, Paul urges slave-masters to imitate God’s numerically equal treatment between slave and free. The scope of Paul’s imitation ethics, therefore, includes slave welfare. While only Paul and Philo explicitly refer to the Torah’s ethics on slave welfare in equality terms, their equality ethics are consistent with that underlying the Torah.186 While Judaism sometimes restricted the moral subject of 183

Lincoln, “Colossians,” 658; Barth and Blanke, Colossians, 450–51; Bassler, Divine Impartiality, 179–80. 184 Contra Hume (Colossians Ephesians, 67) in particular. 185 Meyer, Philippians Colossians, 462. 186 I do not, contrary to Troels Engberg-Pedersen (Paul and the Stoics [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 2000]), claim Pauline dependence upon Philo; rather, this monograph argues for widespread Jewish agreement.

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this equality ethic to only their co-ethnic debt slaves, Paul appears to apply it universally to any kind of îøŶõøó. In particular, the best fit for Paul’s expression appears to be Job’s personal ethos claim (Job 31:13–15) of always acting upon his slaves’ complaints and ensuring that his slaves receive impartial justice; to Job, his slaves were his co-equals. While Lohse may be correct that the pair, üļ îŤôëóø÷ ôëť üĥ÷ ūûĻüòüë, had been commonly combined together often enough in Greco-Roman literature for at least some of Paul’s recipients to recognise the combination,187 Paul extends to slaves what Greco-Roman antiquity reserved to free persons. Certainly, Paul cannot have adopted either an Aristotelian slave welfare ethos that denies any kind of equality between slave and free, or a Seneca-like Roman slave welfare ethos that acknowledges slave and free’s equal status by nature but limits their equal treatment to only their friendship potential. Furthermore, Vasser’s assumption that Paul could have intended his unqualified ūûĻüòÏ in 4:1 to be limited in scope to only an equality in friendship (Vasser’s opinion)188 or only an equality in friendship-potential (our reconstruction of Seneca) is most unlikely. 2. Precedent Our second chapter demonstrated Stählin’s lack of any precedent for his ‘fairness’ interpretation of îŤôëóøÏ and ūûĻüòÏ.189 Instead, a preserved inscription from c. 70 BCE in Gytheion establishes a precedent for the pair denoting the equal treatment of all – including slave and free, and rich and poor – in its honouring of the city’s doctor, Damiadas, for treating everyone with îŤôëóøÏ and ŬûøÏ: üąîŤôëóëĠøŤòûïüøŦÏíúïŤë÷ġíøýûó÷ûøýîąÏôëťƫóõøüóöŤëÏøŻùĜ÷ĠõõïŤþ÷ ïūÏüļĄûó÷ŬûøÏïŬ÷ëóôëťě÷òûóôëťõøýûŤøóÏôëťîøŴõøóÏôëťĠõïýùěúøóÏ He did what was just to those in need, lacking nothing in zeal and concern about honor so as to treat equally all persons, both the needy and the rich, and slaves and freemen.190

As a professional in antiquity, Damiadas followed its philanthropic principle of freely serving anyone as his friend rather than charging fees in the modern sense, albeit with the cultural expectation that such philanthropy would be reciprocated through voluntary benefaction or gift.191 Understood in his historical 187

Lohse, Colossians Philemon, 162–63. Vasser, “Grant Slaves Equality,” 62–66 189 Stählin, “ŬûøÏ [TDNT],” 3:343–55. 190 “IG V 1145.17–20,” cited and trans. from H. F. J. Horstmanshoff, “The Ancient Physician: Craftsman or Scientist?,” JHMAS 45 (1990): 190–91. 191 Horstmanshoff, “Ancient Physician,” 193–96. 188

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context, perhaps his care for the poor is more noble than his care for slaves, for the latter might often have had a wealthy or politically powerful slave-master who could potentially generously reciprocate. There is no suggestion that Damiadas attempted any egalitarian levelling between rich and poor and slave and free in Gytheion. Rather, the epithet of îŤôëóøÏ and ŬûøÏ honours Damiadas’s equal treatment of all regardless of their wealth or slave status. 3. ÔūîĻüïÏľüóôëťŷöïŦÏġíïüïôŴúóø÷Ġ÷øŻúë÷Œ (4:1b) The causal ïūîĻüïÏ parallels its deployment in 3:24.192 Perhaps most significant in 4:1b, however, are the words ôëťŷöïŦÏ (“you also”), which remind slavemasters that they are not autonomous (as was emphasised in Greco-Roman reasoning) from their higher master, ôŴúóøÏĠ÷øŻúë÷Œ (“Lord in heaven”), i.e., Christ, who is impartial (3:25b). While 3:24 reassures slaves primarily, 4:1b warns slave-masters of their accountability to an impartial Christ. This phrase, albeit with an economy of words, probably also reminds slave-masters that they too need to wholeheartedly serve Christ in how they practise slave welfare to gain reward from him.193 4. Sexuality and Slavery Col 3:5, like Gal 5:19–21, includes sexual offences in its vice list. I argue that Paul more likely than not condemns those sexual vices per se regardless of their moral subject and any pre-existing relationship between culprit and victim, because Col 3:24 reassures slaves of divine impartiality in judgement against their wrongdoers and because Paul’s exhortation for slave welfare insists that slave-masters should treat slaves and free identically. If correct, then Paul was following our reconstruction in the previous chapter of the original Jewish consensus in opposing the sexual use of slaves: whether a slave-master’s own or those of others. Given that Paul’s readership must have been capable of detecting his epistle’s Jewishness, they were more likely than not already aware of his continuity with Jewish sexual ethics. 5. Summary Unlike many today, Paul, in following Jewish ethics, conceives of a numerically equal treatment ethic on slave welfare that disregards the differences between slave-masters and their slaves, except that which Paul views as intrinsic

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Hering, Haustafeln, 102; cf. Wolter, Kolosser Philemon, 208. Cf. MacDonald, Colossians Ephesians, 159; contra Lohse, Colossians Philemon, 162; O’Brien, Colossians Philemon, 231–32; Dunn, Colossians Philemon, 253, 259. 193

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to that relationship: the need of slaves to obey their slave-masters. Thus, Paul greatly intensifies slave-masters’ slave welfare obligations relative to the Greco-Roman slavery ethos. While Paul’s equality ethics probably covered sexual behaviour, we will discuss the comprehensiveness of his equality ethics further after our analysis of his epistles is complete. VI. Summary: Equality and Slave Welfare in Colossians We propose seven conclusions from Colossians. First, Paul compares literal slavery to every Colossians’ metaphorical slavery to Christ to exhort slaves to obey their slave-masters with the same high quality of obedience that every Christian should render towards Christ. In other words, Paul places his exhortation for slave obedience into a Christocentric framework. Second, üļ îŤôëóø÷ôëťüĥ÷ūûĻüòüë … ëúěíïûùï (4:1) requires slave-masters to ensure that their household treats its slaves and free members numerically equally apart from the intrinsic obligation of the former to obey their slave-master and his steward overseers. Third, this numerically equal treatment is an imitation of God’s numerically equal treatment between slave and free. Indeed, their equality parameters cohere. Later, we evaluate the comprehensiveness of this equal treatment. Fourth, this labour obligation of slaves should also be compared to how all the free members of the household would also have been obligated to obey the household’s paterfamilias and not to a modern autonomous individual. Fifth, Paul’s reassurance to slaves of impartial divine recompense against those who wrong them is the only sign of Paul perhaps perceiving of conflict between slaves’ allegiances to their slave-masters and to Christ. Instead, Paul presumes upon the latter to intensify both slaves’ obedience towards their slave-masters and slave-masters’ protection of their slaves. Sixth, this equal treatment between slaves and free Ġ÷øŬôŏ appears coherent with the equal treatment between both slaves and free and rich and poor Ġ÷ ĠôôõòûŤď in Galatians and both Corinthian epistles. Seventh, while Colossians does not explicitly prohibit slave-masters’ sexual use of their own slaves, Paul’s disapproval appears more likely than his complicity. We now proceed to Ephesians, where inter alia Paul’s work ethic for all and the breadth of Paul’s sexual ethics are more explicit.

F. Ephesians While Ephesians possesses its own distinctive vocabulary that reflects its own emphases and epistolary context, the equality ethics and purpose of the slavery

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exhortations of its Haustafel, as interpreted in its epistolary context, mirror those in Colossians. To avoid unnecessary repetition, we frequently reference our equality analysis of its Colossian parallel.194 Indeed, we also begin by reviewing recent epistle-wide scholarship on Ephesians’ use of the OT and its imitation ethics where, scholars observe, it is more extensive than Colossians. I. Use of Old Testament While I do not endorse all of Moritz’s arguments on the widespread use of the OT throughout Ephesians (including in its Haustafel’s marital and parental exhortations),195 three of his conclusions are valid and pertinent. First, Ephesians relies upon the OT just as much as Romans and Galatians, whose OT reliance was (at the time of Moritz’s study) more widely acknowledged. Second, Ephesians deliberately presents its ethics as in conformity with the Torah’s.196 Indeed, Moritz, writing before the latest research into Colossians’ use of the OT, suggests that Ephesians was composed by augmenting Colossians with OT references.197 Third, Moritz categorises the explicitness of how Ephesians uses the OT as spanning a spectrum “from bluntness to fine subtlety.”198 Since Ephesians presumes upon its recipients’ OT awareness even more so than Colossians,199 the Ephesians’ recipients would also recognise a potential, even if subtle, OT dependence in its Haustafel’s slavery exhortations. We also return to Best’s observed incongruity on Gentile inclusion between its Haustafel’s slavery exhortations and the epistle’s ethics more broadly. Specifically, he claims that the slavery exhortations do not incorporate Gentile slaves into the Torah’s seven-year Israelite manumission requirement, whereas 4:25 both reflects the epistle’s general OT ethical reliance and incorporates Gentile Christians into what Best assumes is the Israelite-exclusive neighbour exhortation of Zech 8:16.200 While Best overlooks the conceptual dissimilarity between temporary debt and permanent chattel slavery in antiquity, Best’s remaining incongruity will only be resolved by our analysis that will demonstrate how the Haustafel’s slavery exhortations also depend on the Torah.

194

For a side-by-side textual comparison, see Lincoln, Ephesians, 412–14. Thorsten Moritz, A Profound Mystery: The Use of the Old Testament in Ephesians, NovTSup 85 (Leiden: Brill, 1996), 87–177. 196 Moritz, Profound Mystery, 214. 197 Moritz, Profound Mystery, 219–20. 198 Moritz, Profound Mystery. 219. 199 Cf. Moritz, Profound Mystery, 216–17, 219. 200 Best, Ephesians, 581–82. 195

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II. Imitation Ethics Ephesians 5:1 is the only explicit Pauline exhortation to imitatio Deo. Scholarship also widely acknowledges that its immediate context, “forgiving one another as (ôëùńÏ) God in Christ forgave you” (4:32) and “walk in love, as (ôëùńÏ) Christ loved us and gave himself up for us” (5:2), demonstrates that its imitatio Deo involves imitating cruciform love.201 Scholarship also acknowledges that 5:25 exhorts husbands to imitate cruciform love towards their wives.202 Likewise, 4:2b and 15–16 require this cruciform love standard. Indeed, O’Brien observes that Christ is “the pattern or model” for the virtues of humility, gentleness and patience in 4:2 because elsewhere they describe Christ, God and/or Paul.203 Likewise, in 4:32, Paul continues to exhort the Ephesians to practise kindness and compassion: virtues that elsewhere describe God and Christ.204 Furthermore, Paul’s exhortation to unity in 4:1–6 may also implicitly call for Ephesian imitation of divine and gospel unity.205 I highlight how ŷöïŦÏ îĜ … ĠöĄùïüï üļ÷ ÒúóûüĻ÷ (“but you … learnt Christ,” 4:20) includes how the Ephesians learnt Christ, inclusive of Ephesian ethical conformity.206 Indeed, Paul reminds them that they had learnt to replace 201

Bruce, Colossians Philemon Ephesians, 367–68; Lincoln, Ephesians, 310–12; Schnackenburg, Ephesians, 212–13; Best, Ephesians, 464, 467–68; O’Brien, Ephesians, 351–54; Heil, Ephesians, 207; Hering, Haustafeln, 181–82; Witherington, Philemon Colossians Ephesians, 306; Arnold, Ephesians, 309–10. For preferring ŷöŦ÷ (not ħýŦ÷) in 4:32 and ħöĆÏ … ħýņ÷ (not ŷöĆÏ … ŷöņ÷) in 5:2, see Metzger, Textual Commentary, 538– 39; Lincoln, Ephesians, 293. 202 Ewald, Epheser Kolosser Philemon, 239; Schlier, Epheser, 255; Markus Barth, Ephesians, 2 vols., AB 34A (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1974), 557, 621–24; Lincoln, Ephesians, 374–75; Schnackenburg, Ephesians, 248–49; Best, Ephesians, 540–41; O’Brien, Ephesians, 419; Hoehner, Ephesians, 748–50; Witherington, Philemon Colossians Ephesians, 329; Arnold, Ephesians, 383; Fowl, Ephesians, 188. 203 O’Brien, Ephesians, 276–78, here 277. 204 Barth, Ephesians, 523; O’Brien, Ephesians, 351. 205 Cf. Lincoln, Ephesians, 238–39; O’Brien, Ephesians, 279–82, 286; Hoehner, Ephesians, 513–18, 602; Fowl, Ephesians, 133, 135, 145. I doubt that this amounts to enough evidence to presume pre-existing intra-Ephesian conflict (Lincoln, Ephesians, 232–33; Best, Ephesians, 366; Witherington, Philemon Colossians Ephesians, 285–86; Fowl, Ephesians, 129; contra Karl M. Fischer, Tendenz und Absicht des Epheserbriefes, FRLANT 111 [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1973], 79–83, 93–94, 201; H Merklein, “Eph 4, 1–5, 20 als Rezeption von Kol 3, 1–17,” in Kontinuität und Einheit: Festschrift für Franz Mussner, ed. Paul G. Müller and Werner Stenger [Freiburg: Herder, 1981], 209; Hoehner, Ephesians, 510). 206 Rengstorf, “öë÷ùĄ÷þ, ôëüëöë÷ùĄÏþ, öëùòüĤÏ, ûýööëùòüĤÏ, öëùĤüúóë, öëùò üïŴþ,” TDNT 4:410; Ernst, Philipper Philemon Kolosser Epheser, 363; Lincoln, Ephesians, 279–80, 283; Hoehner, Ephesians, 593–95; Hering, Haustafeln, 181–82; Witherington,

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their former ethos (4:22), which correlated with Paul’s disparaging description of the Gentile ethos in 4:17–19, with a new ethos as those üļ÷ ôëüą ùïļ÷ ôüóûùě÷üë Ġ÷ îóôëóøûŴ÷į ôëť ĽûóĻüòüó üĦÏ ċõòùïŤëÏ (“created after the likeness of God in true righteousness and holiness,” 4:24).207 Paul’s language is again suggestive of divine and/or Christological imitation. I also suggest that the rare ʄòûøŶÏ in Ġûüó÷ċõĤùïóëĠ÷üŒʄòûøŶ (“the truth that is in Jesus” 4:21b)208 refers in particular to the historicity of Jesus’s ethos.209 4:21 contains multiple comparisons;210 Paul correlates the ethical content in what the Ephesians first heard about Christ,211 and were later taught in Christ,212 to the historical Jesus,213 and, in particular, to the historicity of his Philemon Colossians Ephesians, 293–94, 297; Arnold, Ephesians, 284; Fowl, Ephesians, 150–51; Thomas M. Winger, Ephesians, ConcC (Saint Louis, MO: Concordia, 2015), 511. However, scholarship does not distinguish between Christ’s ethics (what he taught) and ethos (how he lived). See also Best (Ephesians, 426) who compares 3:20 to the Pauline “to know Christ” (Phil 3:10), “to proclaim Christ” (Gal 1:16; Phil 1:17–18; Col 1:28) and “to preach Christ” (1 Cor 1:23; 15:12; 2 Cor 4:5); and O’Brien (Ephesians, 324) who also compares Eph 4:20 to Col 2:6–7. 207 Cf. Lincoln, Ephesians, 288–89; O’Brien, Ephesians, 332–33; Frank Thielman, Ephesians, BECNT (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2010), 307. 208 For how abstract nouns like ċõĤùïóë frequently occur without a definite article, see Lincoln, Ephesians, 281; O’Brien, Ephesians, 325–26; Fowl, Ephesians, 146. ɔõĤùïóë here correlates to its usage vis-à-vis the divine in 3:24 and the exhortation of 3:25, and contrasts with ċĄüò (“deceit”) in 3:22 (Barth, Ephesians, 507, 510; Lincoln, Ephesians, 271; O’Brien, Ephesians, 326, 328–29, 333; Hoehner, Ephesians, 612–13; Arnold, Ephesians, 285, 290; Fowl, Ephesians, 152; Winger, Ephesians, 519). 209 Cf. Best, Ephesians, 430; Witherington, Philemon Colossians Ephesians, 298; cf. also Barth, Ephesians, 535–36; contra Lincoln, Ephesians, 282–83; Fowl, Ephesians, 151n6. For the scholarly debate as to the degree of Pauline awareness of the Jesus traditions, see Horrell, Solidarity & Difference, 24–27. 210 I interpret ôëùńÏ as comparative (Lincoln, Ephesians, 281, 283; Hoehner, Ephesians, 598; cf. also Winger, Ephesians, 512). Contra as casual (Best, Ephesians, 428–29; Arnold, Ephesians, 285; HCSB). Contra as introducing a quotation (Barth, Ephesians, 505, 530–36). 211 O’Brien, Ephesians, 325; Hoehner, Ephesians, 594–95; Witherington, Philemon Colossians Ephesians, 297; Winger, Ephesians, 512; contra Barth, Ephesians, 530; Best, Ephesians, 427; Thielman, Ephesians, 300–301. 212 I interpret the ôëŤ of 3:21a as adjunctive. For the temporal distinction, see Lincoln, Ephesians, 280; O’Brien, Ephesians, 324–25; Hoehner, Ephesians, 595; Winger, Ephesians, 512n33; contra Benjamin L. Merkle, Ephesians, EGGNT (Nashville, TN: B&H Academic, 2016), 140–41. The first-class condition assumes the protasis’s truthfulness. 213 Ernst, Philipper Philemon Kolosser Epheser, 363; Schnackenburg, Ephesians, 199; O’Brien, Ephesians, 326; Hoehner, Ephesians, 596–98; Arnold, Ephesians, 285; Winger, Ephesians, 513n38; Merkle, Ephesians, 142. Contra as distinguishing between earlier and later converts (Bruce, Colossians Philemon Ephesians, 357). Contra as only stylistic

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ethos. Thus, Paul asserts the inseparability of Christ’s ethics and ethos, and distinguishes both sharply from the Ephesians’ former Gentile ethos. In other words, according to Paul, this epistle continues to teach the Ephesians to imitate Christ. Collectively, therefore, imitation of God and/or Christ underpins much of the epistle’s ethics including, I will argue, its Haustafel’s exhortation for slave welfare. But first, we analyse its exhortation for slave obedience. III. Slave Obedience (6:5–8) As we have already observed regarding its Colossian parallel, Paul exhorts in Ephesians for a greater quality of slave obedience than perhaps typical in antiquity to mirror the same quality of obedience that every Ephesian (whether free or slave) should give to Christ. While the epistle, as a whole, does not explicitly describe free persons also as îøŶõøóÒúóûüøŶ, it may be implied by 6:8c and 6:9c. Furthermore, Paul’s self-description in a speech to the Ephesian elders, as recorded in Acts 20:19, may also indicate pre-existing Ephesian familiarity with the universality of Paul’s metaphorical slavery.214 Nevertheless, more of this exhortation’s phrases, relative to the Colossian exhortation, are elsewhere in the epistle applied to all, free and slave alike. 1. ÝŧîøŶõøóŷëôøŴïüïüøŦÏôëüąûĄúôëôýúŤøóÏ (6:5a) As with Col 3:22a–b, Paul exhorts slaves directly to obey üøŦÏôëüąûĄúôë ôýúŤøóÏ, who is compared to the unqualified ôŴúóøÏ in Eph 6:7b and 6:8.215 Ephesians, like Colossians, does not present these two masters as being in conflict.216

(Lincoln, Ephesians, 281–82; Thielman, Ephesians, 302). Contra as evidence of anti-gnostic distinction between Christ and Jesus (Schlier, Epheser, 216–17; Klaus Wegenast, Das Verständnis der Tradition bei Paulus und in den Deuteropaulinen, WMANT 8 [Neukirchen: Neukirchener, 1962], 131–32). 214 In part depending upon the historicity of Acts 20:18–19 and both the dating and authorship of Ephesians. 215 Ephesian scholars who emphasise the slaves’ direct address include Lincoln, Ephesians, 420; Witherington, Philemon Colossians Ephesians, 340; Merkle, Ephesians, 202; O’Brien, Ephesians, 448–49; Arnold, Ephesians, 422; Winger, Ephesians, 663. 216 Contra O’Brien, Ephesians, 448.

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2. ÛïüąƫĻìøýôëťüúĻöøýĠ÷ćõĻüòüóüĦÏôëúîŤëÏŷöņ÷ŇÏüŒ ÒúóûüŒ (6:5b) ɩ÷ ćõĻüòüó üĦÏ ôëúîŤëÏ mirrors Col 3:22d. But instead of Col 3:22b’s ôëüą Ą÷üë, Eph 6:5b has öïüą ƫĻìøý ôëť üúĻöøý (“with fear and trembling”). Bradley emphasises how Roman slavery relied upon slaves fearing their slave-master to conclude that “Christian leaders absorbed and indirectly supported the ideology of the slave-owning classes in Roman society,”217 but Bradley evaluates the phrase in isolation from its context. While üúĻöøÏ is unique in Ephesians, ùĻìøÏ and cognate ùĻìïþ occur in 5:21 and 5:33 to denote the fear of Christ and the wife’s fear of her husband, respectively. The phrase also frequently occurs in the LXX to describe the required attitude towards God, and Paul uses it elsewhere in Phil 2:12, 1 Cor 2:3, and 2 Cor 7:15 to describe the Corinthian attitude to Titus.218 Contrary to Bradley’s apparent implications, what Judaism and Paul called the fear of God and/or Christ, that which most translate as “respect” or “deep respect,” should not be equated with a slave’s fear of the worst of slave-masters.219 While this is neither a theology nor gender monograph, I suggest that Ephesians is not equating its recipients’ (whether slave or free) fear of Christ, a wife’s fear of her husband and/or the Corinthians’ fear of Titus with a Roman slave’s fear of the worst of slave-masters. Indeed, I will argue shortly that the exhortation for slave welfare prohibits slave-masters from engendering such fear. Rather than Paul borrowing from the Greco-Roman slavery ethos as Bradley contends, Paul, mirroring Col 3:22d on Ġ÷ćõĻüòüóüĦÏôëúîŤëÏ, is reapplying pre-existing theological language that he presumes describes the Ephesians’ attitude (or quality of obedience) üŒÒúóûüŒ to specify the quality of Ephesian slave obedience. Ephesians, like Colossians, argues a fortiori from Christ to slave-master to intensify the quality of slave obedience beyond that typical in antiquity.220 Paul’s metaphorical comparison is directional, from the attitude and obedience he presumes of all towards Christ, to the same manner of slave obedience to their slave-masters, and not vice versa.

217

Bradley, Slaves & Masters, 114; cf. Glancy, Early Christianity, 145; “Rise,” 470; cf. also Hoehner, Ephesians, 806. 218 Wegenast, Verständnis, 131–32; cf. the similar but non-identical 1 Pet 2:18; Did., 4:11; Barn., 19:7. 219 Cf. Thielman, Ephesians, 405–6. 220 Lincoln, Ephesians, 420–21; cf. Fowl, Ephesians, 196; Merkle, Ephesians, 202.

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3. ÛĥôëüɌŀƫùëõöøîøýõŤë÷ŇÏċ÷ùúþĄúïûôøóċõõŇÏîøŶõøó ÒúóûüøŶøóøŶ÷üïÏüļùěõòöëüøŶùïøŶĠôĀýíĦÏ (6:6a–b) For the phrases ŀƫùëõöøîøýõŤë÷ŇÏċ÷ùúþĄúïûôøóŇÏîøŶõøóÒúóûüøŶ and ĠôĀýíĦÏ see our analysis of their Colossian parallels.221 Regarding Eph 6:6b, both øóěþ (“do”) and üļùěõòöëüøŶùïøŶ (“the will of God”) occur frequently elsewhere in Ephesians. Two instances are pertinent: 2:3 describes the Ephesians’ former ethos as øóøŶ÷üïÏüąùïõĤöëüëüĦÏûëúôĻÏ (“doing the will of the flesh”) and 5:17 exhorts every Ephesian to ûý÷Ťïüï üŤ üļ ùěõòöëüøŶôýúŤøý (“understand what is the will of the Lord”). Verse 6:6b, therefore, helps slaves to comprehend what that will is for their situation. Perhaps Paul also implies that they should not revert to following the flesh’s will.222 Instead of slaves only obeying slave-masters when they are being watched as if they are only people-pleasers, Paul exhorts for the same wholeheartedness of slave obedience that Paul expects from every metaphorical slave of Christ in his or her wholehearted øóøŶ÷üïÏ of God’s will. Like Colossians, Ephesians also dignifies what might otherwise be the daily drudgery of slave obedience. 4. ÛïüɌïŻ÷øŤëÏîøýõïŴø÷üïÏŇÏüŒôýúŤŏôëťøŻôċ÷ùúńøóÏ (6:7) Both the participle îøýõïŴø÷üïÏ and ŇÏ suggest that Paul is continuing with his metaphorical slavery comparison. As in Col 3:23b, Eph 6:7 also highlights the greater level of service Paul expects from all as Christ’s metaphorical slaves üŒôýúŤŏ rather than that typical of the literal service of literal slaves in antiquity to their slave-masters. Ephesians, like Colossians, is arguing a fortiori to intensify the level of slave obedience Paul requires. All of Paul’s many qualifiers, both throughout Col 3:22–25 and in the Ephesian slave exhortation so far, are sourced from prior descriptions of a person’s relationship to God and/or Christ. However, 6:7’s ïż÷øóë (I prefer “affection, goodwill,” to “zeal, enthusiasm”),223 a NT hapax legomenon, only occurs in the LXX to describe interpersonal relationships without a clear example of it 221 Cf. also Lincoln, Ephesians, 421–22; O’Brien, Ephesians, 451; Hoehner, Ephesians, 808–9; Winger, Ephesians, 667; Merkle, Ephesians, 202–3. 222 Cf. how, in 1 Corinthians and Galatians, the flesh is the source of intra-Christian conflict. 223 Thus, as I explain, retaining its slavery association (Hoehner, Ephesians, 810; contra “ïŻ÷øŤë,” BDAG 409; “ïŻ÷øŤë,” Louw-Nida §25.72; Lincoln, Ephesians, 422; O’Brien, Ephesians, 451–52; Witherington, Philemon Colossians Ephesians, 341; Merkle, Ephesians, 203).

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describing a person’s relationship to God.224 Indeed, ïż÷øóë also occurs in many Greek texts to describe the ideal relationship between slave and slavemaster.225 I suggest that both Paul and the Ephesians would be familiar with the typical non-realisation of this ïż÷øóë ideal. Thus, in this instance, Paul’s metaphorical usage relies initially upon the literal slavery’s ideal to describe the Ephesians’ metaphorical reality (he presumes) to Christ,226 and ultimately to exhort slaves a fortiori for that ideal quality of literal slave obedience. 5. ÔūîĻüïÏľüóĞôëûüøÏ … ëúąôýúŤøýïŬüïîøŶõøÏïŬüïĠõïŴùïúøÏ (6:8a–c) As with Col 3:24, Paul begins his justification here in Eph 6:8 with a causal ïūîĻüïÏ to remind slaves of their hope in Christ. This hope proposition appears, at least in part, to answer Paul’s prayer in 1:18 for the Ephesians to know their hope in Christ. Paul explicitly emphasises its applicability to ĞôëûüøÏ (“each”) Ephesian, ïŬüïîøŶõøÏïŬüïĠõïŴùïúøÏ(“whether slave or free”). While 4:4 emphasises the oneness (or unity) of the Ephesian hope, 6:8c characterises this hope as equally applicable to both slave and free. In other words, the Lord, Paul claims, is impartial in rewarding both slave and free with this hope. In this way, the oneness of 4:1–6 is further confirmed to be premised upon an intraEphesian equality between slave and free and, given the broader epistle, Jew and Gentile. 6. ɩĄ÷üóøóĤûįċñëùĻ÷ (6:8a) The protasis of this third-class condition, üóøóĤûįċñëùĻ÷ (“whatever good one does”), recalls both how 2:10 describes the divine purpose behind the Ephesians’ salvation as ĠťġúñøóÏċñëùøŦÏ (“for good works”) and how 4:28– 29 contrasts theft and unfit speech with the exhortations ôøóĄüþĠúñëāĻöï ÷øÏ … üļċñëùĻ÷ (lit. “let one become exhausted by working the good”) 227 and üóÏċñëùļÏ (“whatever good”) speech. Thus, the magnitude of slave obedience Paul requires in 6:5–8 may not materially differ from that magnitude of hard work Paul requires from every Ephesian in 4:28. Perhaps Paul’s 224 Esth 2:23 LXX; 3:13 LXX; 6:4 LXX; 1 Macc 11:33, 53; 2 Macc 9:21, 26; 11:19; 12:30; 14:26, 37; 15:30; 3 Macc 3:3; 6:26; 7:7; 4 Macc 2:10; 13:25; Sir Prolog 16. Only in the final case may there be some ambiguity. 225 For sources, see “ïŻ÷øŤë,” BDAG 409; Lincoln, Ephesians, 422; Hoehner, Ephesians, 810. 226 Cf. how 6:24 presumes pre-existing Ephesian love for Christ. 227 For ôøóĄþ as “tire, become exhausted” (my definition) through hard work, see Hoehner, Ephesians, 625. For 4:28’s textual variants, see Metzger, Textual Commentary, 537; Lincoln, Ephesians, 292–93; Hoehner, Ephesians, 625–26n6.

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exhortations differ only to whom that labour benefits: 4:28, to the needy; 6:5– 8, to the slave-master. Indeed, perhaps – from the perspective of the modern forty-hour (or less) working week – it is not exaggerating to view these exhortations as reflecting a workaholic Paul urging all others, whether slave or free, to be workaholics also! 7. âøŶüøôøöŤûïüëóëúąôýúŤøý(6:8b) I observe that 6:8b functions purely to incentivise greater slave obedience rather than, as Col 3:25, to warn as well. The demonstrative pronoun, üøŶüø (“this”), equates the goodness of slaves’ future recompense ëúąôýúŤøý with the goodness of their deeds. Paul’s brevity emphasises the reciprocity of Christ’s reward as equally applicable to each Ephesian, ïŬüï îøŶõøÏ ïŬüï ĠõïŴùïúøÏ. Indeed, Christ’s reciprocity, Paul asserts, is impartial and inclusive of slaves’ good deeds towards their slave-masters. Perhaps Paul is also hinting that slave-masters should imitate Christ and reciprocate also; perhaps even by reciprocating slaves’ ïż÷øóë with manumission. In any case, 6:8b reassures slaves of Christ’s certain reciprocation even if their slave-masters do not.228 Paul may also be anticipating his subsequent exhortation for slave welfare, to which we will shortly turn. 8. Summary As with its Colossian equivalent, Paul’s ethical reasoning in his Ephesian slave obedience exhortation is revealed through his many qualifying phrases. Indeed, the Ephesian exhortation is more extensive than its Colossian parallel in applying terminology that elsewhere describes everyone in relation to Christ to the manner of slaves’ obedience to their slave-masters. Phrases such as öïüą ƫĻìøý ôëť üúĻöøý (Eph 6:5b) should be interpreted in their epistolary and Pauline context rather than in literary isolation and through the prism of abusive slavery throughout history. While this Ephesian exhortation for slave obedience deploys its own specific terminology, our analysis demonstrates how it, like the Colossian one, presumes upon slaves’ greater quality of service to Christ to argue a fortiori that they also owe this same quality of obedience to their slave-masters. While Paul probably dignifies what slaves might perceive to be the drudgery of their obedience, he also intensifies its degree. There is no evidence that this exhortation presumes any potential for conflict between the slaves’ two masters: their slave-master and Christ.

228

Cf. Hoehner, Ephesians, 812.

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Paul’s purpose behind his theological appeal appears solely intended to incentivise a greater level of slave obedience than typical in Greco-Roman antiquity. He appeals to slaves’ certain hope of Christ’s eschatological reciprocation for all their good deeds, inclusive of ïż÷øóë towards their slave-masters. While this may increase the likelihood of slave-masters reciprocating such behaviour and ïż÷øóë, and 6:8 may even hint that they should, he makes no explicit reference to slaves’ future freedom, not even in an eschatological postmortem life. 9. Equality Analysis This Ephesian exhortation for slave obedience explicitly asserts Christ’s reciprocation of good deeds (6:8) regardless of their moral agency as a slave or free. While it only hints that slave-masters should imitate this impartiality, it is more explicit in the exhortation for slave welfare that follows. Ephesians is also more explicit than Colossians in how Eph 4:28 exhorts everyone to hard work. Thus, Paul’s urging slaves to greater obedience appears to be only a subset of his non-discriminatory work ethic. The intrinsic difference that remains is how slaves’ hard work must benefit their slave-masters who, notwithstanding the morality of captive slavery, would have arguably paid up front for their slaves’ labour, whereas Paul argues that free persons’ hard work is to benefit the needy. 10. Ethical Source While slave obedience, as intrinsic to slavery everywhere, does not discriminate between possible ethical sources, both Paul’s application of metaphorical slavery to shape and intensify literal slave obedience and his universal work ethic appear novel. Further research into their origins is recommended. The Ephesian exhortation for slave welfare, however, does discriminate between possible ethical sources. IV. Slave Welfare (6:9) 1. ɔ÷óě÷üïÏüĥ÷ċïóõĤ÷ (6:9b) Our analysis proceeds in reverse order – Paul’s justification (6:9c–d) for his exhortation for slave welfare before the exhortation itself (6:9a) – because the former helps clarify the latter. However, we begin with the exhortation’s participle clause (6:9b) because it relates more to the preceding exhortation for slave obedience. ɔ÷Ťï÷üïÏ (“cease”) is probably an imperatival participle subservient to the exhortation’s imperative (øóïŦüï) in 6:9a because the scope of øóïŦüï

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appears broader than the specific ċ÷Ťï÷üïÏ.229 More pertinent, however, is Paul’s use of the definitive article, üĤ÷, rather than ŷöņ÷ (cf. 6:9c), and the singular üĥ÷ċïóõĤ÷ (“the threat”) that signifies Paul’s opposition to slavemasters, or their steward overseers, issuing (and implementing) threats. Thus, contrary to Bradley in 6:5b, 6:9b prohibits the principal means in Greco-Roman antiquity of increasing slaves’ fear of and obedience to their slave-masters.230 I reiterate, 6:5b exhorts slaves to mirror to their slave-masters the high quality of obedience that slaves (indeed, all) render to Christ because of their ùĻìøÏ and üúĻöøÏ towards Christ, whereas 6:9b prohibits the typical Greco-Roman use of threats to generate slave ùĻìøÏ and üúĻöøÏ towards their slave-masters. Thus, Paul, having mediated his exhortation for greater slave obedience through slaves’ pre-existing relationship to Christ, also prohibits slave-masters from exhorting their slaves for a greater slave obedience directly without appealing to Christ.231 Contrary to Bradley, Paul is opposing rather than adopting the ideology of Greco-Roman slave-masters. 2. ÔūîĻüïÏľüóôëťëŻüņ÷ôëťŷöņ÷ĽôŴúóĻÏĠûüó÷Ġ÷øŻúë÷øŦÏôëť úøûþøõòöĀŤëøŻôġûüó÷ëúɌëŻüŒ (6:9c–d) The justification for this exhortation for slave welfare begins with another causal ïūîĻüïÏ to parallel how Paul justifies his slave exhortation in 6:8. He cites two reasons whose equality parameters, I argue, cohere. Paul’s first reason (6:9c) reminds slave-masters that ôëťëŻüņ÷ (“both their [slaves’]”) ôëťŷöņ÷ (“and your”) ôŴúóĻÏ is in heaven. Merkle suggests that ëŻüņ÷ precedes ŷöņ÷ to emphasise that the slaves’ true lord is Christ rather than their slave-masters,232 but the two ô덒s suggest Paul’s emphasis is to correlate rather than to contrast. Instead, 6:9c reminds slave-masters of their common, rather than superior, position with their slaves relative to Christ. Slavemasters too are metaphorically îøŶõøóÒúóûüøŶ (6:6b)233 and relate to Christ in the same way as Paul has just outlined for slaves vis-à-vis Christ. In other words, Paul’s first reason reminds slave-masters of their numerical equality coram Christi with their slaves, regardless of the latter’s obligation to obey the former. 229 Cf. Thielman (Ephesians, 409n8), who argues that it is a participle of result that rhetorically functions as imperative. Contra as neither means nor manner (Hoehner, Ephesians, 813; Larkin, Ephesians, 154; Arnold, Ephesians, 426; Merkle, Ephesians, 205). 230 Observed also by Merkle (Ephesians, 205) but without further elaboration. 231 Paul, however, does not appear to advise slave-masters on how to handle recalcitrant slaves who refuse to obey and respond to Christ-mediated exhortation. 232 Merkle, Ephesians, 205. 233 Lincoln, Ephesians, 421.

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Furthermore, Paul’s second reason (6:9d) declares that Christ is úøûþø õòöĀŤë øŻô (“not partial”), i.e., Christ treats equally both slave-master and slave. Both reasons’ equality parameters cohere. While this second reason confirms that Paul’s incentive in 6:8 applies equally to both slaves and slave-masters, 6:9d also functions, as with the many other instances of divine impartiality we have analysed so far in this monograph, to warn slave-masters of Christ’s eschatological and impartial judgement upon them if they mistreat their slaves. While many, such as Bassler, emphasise only at most a vague correlation between this divine impartiality and Paul’s contemporary exhortation for slave welfare,234 this monograph has demonstrated equality parameter coherence between the divine ethos and the contemporary ethic being advocated in every case it analyses. Given also Ephesians’ widespread reliance upon both OT ethics and ethical imitation, we should expect the exhortation itself to cohere in equality terms. 3. ÙëťøŧôŴúóøóüąëŻüąøóïŦüïúļÏëŻüøŴÏ (6:9a) We now resume our analysis, picking up from where our second chapter observed that Paul’s word order apparently emphasises the neuter plural üąëŻüĄ (lit. “the same [actions]”), whose ambiguous referent is still debated.235 But that scholarly debate has so far overlooked Paul’s equality reasoning. Indeed, I suggest 6:9a’s üąëŻüĄ parallels both the Pauline üļëŻüļŷĜú ċõõĤõþ÷öïúóö÷ņûó÷üąöěõò (1 Cor 12:25), which we analysed earlier and whose word order also emphasises the pronoun, and the non-Pauline rhetorical questions, øŻíťôëťøŧüïõņ÷ëó/Ġù÷óôøťüļëŻüļøóøŶûó÷* (“do not even the tax collectors / Gentiles do the same [as you]?” Matt 5:46, 47). The context of each instance, I observe, indicates that the pronoun refers to the same treatment between persons that is premised upon their numerical equality rather than some vague and undefined mutatis mutandis proportionate treatment. Furthermore, perhaps üļëŻüĻ is singular in the three parallels because each refers to a singular, defined and self-contained instance of same treatment, whereas Eph 6:9a’s üąëŻüĄ is plural because its same treatments are more comprehensive in scope. Perhaps they include all those ethical exhortations in the epistle as a whole that implicitly includes slaves within their moral subject scope. As with 6:8, Paul’s brevity contains no superfluous words. Paul’s brevity’s also leaves unstated in 6:9a to whom these same actions towards slaves are being compared. Nevertheless, it is clear from 6:9c that its 234

Bassler, Divine Impartiality, 178. O’Brien (Ephesians, 448) suggests that this exhortation’s brevity may reflect the relative lack of slave-masters in the Ephesian churches. I remain unconvinced. 235

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context is imitating divine impartiality between slave and slave-master rather than only, for example, between slaves. Thus, I paraphrase 6:9’s equality reasoning: “slave-masters, treat them [your slaves] the same [not proportionally or differently] as others,236 and cease threatening them, because you know that they and you are numerically [rather than proportionally] equals vis-à-vis Christ and there is no partiality with him.” The equality parameters of Paul’s exhortation and twofold justification cohere. As is more explicit elsewhere throughout Ephesians, 6:9 implicitly urges slave-masters to imitate a characteristic of Christ’s ethos: his impartiality. While this Ephesian slave welfare exhortation has its own terminology and emphases, its equality ethics cohere with its Colossian equivalent. Paul in Eph 6:9, as throughout Ephesians, sources his ethics from the Torah. While this is a subtle rather than explicit use of the Torah,237 I argue that at least some of the Ephesians could have recognised this. 4. Sexuality and Slavery Immediately after one paraenetical section (4:32–5:2) that emphasises divine imitation and includes slaves among its implied moral subject, Paul proceeds to another section, beginning at 5:3, that emphasises sexual sin with no apparent new limitation as to its moral subject applicability. In addition to øú÷ïŤë, Paul’s vice list of 5:3 prohibits ċôëùëúûŤëĆûë (“all kinds of moral impurities”)238 for which he earlier condemns the Gentile ethos (4:19). His phrasing emphasises the breadth, not the narrowness, of his categories of sexual sin and contrasts his ethics with the Greco-Roman ethos. Furthermore, Paul intensifies his prohibition as he continues in 5:3: öòîĜŀ÷øöëāěûùþĠ÷ŷöŦ÷ (“let [them] not even be named among you”).239 Paul is not hinting that some activities may still be permissible in private because 5:11 exhorts the Ephesians to Ġõěñíïüï (“expose”)240 rather than ûýñôøó÷þ÷ïŦüï (“participate”) in what he calls üøŦÏ ġúñøóÏüøŦÏċôĄúøóÏüøŶûôĻüøýÏ (“the unfruitful work of darkness”). Indeed, according to 5:12, it is ëūûíúĻÏ (“shameful”) to even speak of such secret 236

I prefer “others” to “yourself” or “free persons” to render the exhortation as generic as possible. 237 Moritz, Profound Mystery. 219. 238 For ĆÏ with anarthous nouns denoting all kinds of, see “ĆÏ,” BDAG 783; Hoehner, Ephesians, 652. For ċôëùëúûŤë as not limited to only sexual impurities, see Barth, Ephesians, 503, 527n158, 561; Best, Ephesians, 422, 476; Hoehner, Ephesians, 591, 652– 53; Arnold, Ephesians, 320–21; Thielman, Ephesians, 328–29; Merkle, Ephesians, 140, 159; contra Lincoln, Ephesians, 321–22; cf. O’Brien, Ephesians, 360. 239 Cf. NIV “there must not be even a hint of sexual immorality.” 240 Lincoln, Ephesians, 329; Hoehner, Ephesians, 678–79.

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activities. In other words, Paul urges the exposure of sexual sin rather than covering it up. While Glancy is correct that Ephesians does not explicitly condemn a slavemaster’s private sexual use of his own slaves, Paul’s deliberate inclusivity and rejection of any cover-up in 5:3–12, in addition to all that we have argued so far in this monograph, render Pauline complicity with the specific practice implausible. 5. Summary Chapter two of this monograph criticised scholarly understandings of this slave welfare exhortation, especially Bassler, for their equality inconsistencies. In our alternative proposal, the equality ethics of Paul’s exhortation for the same treatment coheres with Paul’s twofold justification and the previous chapter’s advocacy of a Jewish equal treatment between both slave and free that originates in the Torah. Through this exhortation for slave welfare, Paul desires slave-masters to imitate divine and/or Christological impartiality between slave and free. While we will discuss the comprehensiveness of Paul’s equality ethics after we complete our analysis of his epistles, there is no sign that Paul restricts the moral subject applicability of any Ephesian imperative to only free persons (apart from, of course, 6:9). Paul’s exhortation for slave obedience, which is framed by slaves’ pre-existing ùĻìøÏ and üúĻöøÏ relationship to Christ, is also balanced by how this exhortation for slave welfare prohibits slave-masters from directly generating slaves’ ùĻìøÏ and üúĻöøÏ towards themselves. Both exhortations intensify the obligations of slaves and slave-masters to each other than was typical in the Greco-Roman slavery ethos. V. Summary: Equality and Slave Welfare in Ephesians We propose nine conclusions from Ephesians. First, Paul exhorts slaves to obey their slave-masters to the same high quality that he presumes is and should be the case for every Christian obeying Christ, inclusive of every Christian’s hard work. Second, Paul’s prohibition against slave-masters threatening slaves limits slave-masters, desiring greater output from their slaves, to appealing to their slaves on the basis of their pre-existing relationship to Christ. Third, üąëŻüĄ øóïŦüï, as the same treatment, in its exhortation to slave-masters for slave welfare, is consistent with its twofold justification for slave-masters to imitate divine impartiality. Fourth, Paul places the Jewish ethic on slave welfare into a Christocentric framework. Indeed, Paul also places the exhortation for slave obedience into a Christocentric framework, the Ephesians’ (both slave and

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free) metaphorical slavery to Christ. Fifth, this Christocentric framework functions to intensify both slaves’ obedience towards their slave-masters and slavemasters’ need to treat their slaves as equal to free persons. Sixth, while the Colossian and Ephesian slavery exhortations possess their own particular nuances, their equality ethics cohere. Seventh, as in Colossians, this equal treatment between slaves and free Ġ÷øŬôŏ appears to be also coherent with the equal treatment between both slaves and free and rich and poor Ġ÷ ĠôôõòûŤď in Galatians and both Corinthian epistles. In other words, there is no divergence in the equality ethics on slave welfare between Paul’s undisputed and disputed epistles. Eighth, there is no evidence of any Pauline conflict between slaves’ allegiance to their slave-masters and to Christ. Ninth, while Paul does not explicitly prohibit slave-masters’ private sexual use of their own slaves, his condemnation is almost certain because he urges the exposure of a broad range of sexual vices per se, inclusive of when slaves are their moral subjects.

G. Philemon We can now resume our engagement with this epistle after our analysis of both the Greco-Roman and Jewish slave welfare ethe. We begin with an equality analysis of the epistle to confirm our preliminary rejections both of Onesimus seeking out Paul as an amicus domini and of Onesimus as an erro or church emissary. Our analysis also further endorses both Onesimus fugitivus and Onesimus resumptive, perhaps through an agreed usufruct arrangement. Indeed, I suggest that this could have been preferable to Onesimus’s manumission, even from his perspective. I. Equality Analysis Paul mentions ten different individuals in this short epistle, plus himself and two collective references. Our analysis focuses only on Paul, Timothy, Philemon, Onesimus and the Ĉñóøó (“saints”), among whom were probably some slaves: both Philemon’s and others’. Equality analysis compares how Paul describes each vis-à-vis the others to reconstruct the epistle’s equality ethos from its text alone. The epistle describes Philemon as Paul and Timothy’s ċñëòüĻÏ … ûý ÷ïúñĻÏ (“beloved … fellow worker,” v. 1). Paul’s singular pronoun, ħöņ÷, probably reflects Philemon’s pre-existing relationship with both Paul and

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Timothy.241 Paul also describes both Timothy (v. 1) and Philemon (vv. 7, 20) as Paul’s ċîïõƫøŤ, and praises Philemon for his ċñĄò towards Ą÷üëÏüøŵÏ ćñŤøýÏ (“all the saints,” v. 5) and for refreshing their ûõĄñí÷ë (“hearts [lit. bowels],” v. 7). In comparison, the epistle also informs Philemon that Onesimus has now become Paul’s üąĠöąûõĄñí÷ë (“my heart [lit. bowels],” v. 12) and both Paul and Philemon’s ċîïõƫļ÷ċñëòüĻ÷ (v. 16). Verse 13 effectively describes Onesimus as Paul’s ûý÷ïúñĻÏ even though the word is absent. Later in v. 20, Paul requests Philemon to refresh his ûõĄñí÷ë in how he responds to Onesimus’s return. Paul’s characterisation of Onesimus in terms of Philemon’s pre-existing relationships appears intentional. It urges Philemon to integrate Onesimus within those relationships and to treat him like all the others: as another friend and another equal. In other words, Paul provides Philemon with equivalent examples of how to treat Onesimus as an ċîïõƫļ÷ċñëòüĻ÷. Furthermore, Paul’s explicit request for Philemon to ĝüøŤöëāěöøóÿï÷Ťë÷ (“prepare a guest room for me,” v. 22) may clarify Paul’s earlier exhortation for Philemon to úøûõë ìøŶ ëŻüļ÷ ŇÏ Ġöě (“welcome him [Onesimus] as me,” v. 17).242 If correct, then Paul exhorts Philemon to give Onesimus the same welcome as Philemon would anticipate giving Paul. Nevertheless, the comprehensiveness of this intended equality towards Onesimus remains ambiguous to us were we to read this short epistle in isolation today.243 However, since both Paul elsewhere advocates continuity with Jewish ethics on slave welfare and the epistle praises Philemon’s pre-existing ethos towards Ą÷üëÏüøŵÏ, including any enslaved, ćñŤøýÏ, I argue that Paul would not need to inform Philemon of what he already knew and complied with. For example, it would be sufficient for Paul’s epistle to urge Onesimus’s inclusion within Philemon’s pre-existing ethos that would have already included Philemon’s readiness to forgive others. In other words, while the epistle may be ambiguous to anyone today unaware of Paul’s slave welfare ethic, it would not have been ambiguous to Philemon. Indeed, Paul’s epistle would only need to reflect Paul’s three purposes: to inform Philemon of what has happened, to urge Onesimus’s full inclusion within Philemon’s pre-existing ethos 241 Edward Kolohai, “Paul as a ’Prisoner‘: A Socio-Rhetorical Analysis of Paul's Letter to Philemon” (MTh thesis, Pacific Theological College, Fuji, 2009), 77, 80–81. 242 Wendy J. Cotter “‘Welcome Him as You would Welcome Me’ (Philemon 17): Does Paul Call for Virtue or the Actualization of a Vision?,” in From Judaism to Christianity: Tradition and Transition: A Festschrift for Thomas H. Tobin, S.J., on the Occasion of His Sixty-fifth Birthday, ed. Patricia Walters, NovTSup 136 (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 205–6; cf. Barth and Blanke, Philemon, 475–76. 243 Cf. Glancy, Early Christianity, 91–92.

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on slave welfare rather than to specify a new ethic for Philemon, and to request Onesimus resumptive. This and no more, I argue, is precisely what the epistle does. II. Onesimus Resumptive I also argue that an additional comparison in v. 11b, where Paul describes Onesimus’s post-conversion usefulness ÷ý÷ťîĜôëťûøťôëťĠöøŤ (“… but now [both, indeed] to you [Philemon] and to me”), increases further the probability of Onesimus resumptive.244 I focus on v. 11b’s textual variant [ôëŤ], which modern English translators include but textual critics exclude.245 While its omission is almost universal in the Byzantine manuscript tradition and in all manuscripts from the tenth century onwards, other external evidence is mixed. In the Alexandrian tradition, the earliest ē (fourth century) and miniscule 33 (ninth century) include this ôëŤ, but the later A and C (fifth century) omit it. In the Western tradition, the earliest manuscript, D (sixth century), omits it, but the later F and G (ninth century) include it. With its external evidence so mixed, more decisive, I suggest, is that multiple copyists would probably have been more likely to omit it as apparently superfluous than to have erroneously inserted it immediately after the adversative îě. Indeed, its internal evidence and Onesimus resumptive are collectively persuasive. In v. 11, Paul temporally contrasts (îě) Onesimus’s øüě (“past”) uselessness to Philemon with Onesimus’s usefulness ÷ý÷Ť (“now”) to both Philemon and Paul by serving Paul on Philemon’s unknown-to-him behalf. Üý÷Ť, I suggest, appears to emphasise the durative nature of this new state of Onesimus’s usefulness to both rather than as, say, Ġñě÷ïüø (“he became”) would emphasise only Onesimus’s ingress to that state. In other words, ÷ý÷Ť to both in v. 11 appears more consistent with Paul anticipating Onesimus resumptive than Paul assuming that Onesimus’s departure for Philemon would be permanent. Thus, I argue that v. 11 probably anticipates Philemon’s conscious consent to Paul’s articulated, but overridden, desire in vv. 13–14 for Onesimus to continue serving Paul on Philemon’s behalf. I suggest that Philemon formally assigning Onesimus’s usufruct to Paul would have been the most optimal means of achieving Onesimus resumptive

244

I remain unconvinced of the significance of Paul’s naming order either way (contra Lightfoot, Colossians Philemon, 338; Barth and Blanke, Philemon, 343–44). 245 As original, but with no justification (Binder and Rohde, Philemon, 50; Pao, Colossians Philemon, 388; cf. NIB, ESV, NRSV). Originally omitted (Gnilka, Philemon, 39; Barth and Blanke, Philemon, 344; cf. KJV).

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for all concerned.246 To explain why, we revisit both the occasion behind the epistle’s composition and the pertinent legalities, given our analysis of GrecoRoman slavery. Not only do I suggest that a formal slave usufruct assignment would suffice, I also argue that manumission was neither requested nor probably in Onesimus’s own interests. III. Legalities and Occasion Our analysis of the Roman slave welfare ethos in chapter three indicates that Rome’s legal distinctions between a slave fugitivus, erro and seeking an amicus domini intervention, even if applicable in Colossae, arose out of allegations against the false advertising of slaves for resale. Rome’s jurists probably did not intend these distinctions either to govern a slave’s treatment or to provide him with any protection from punishment. Slave-master autonomy over his slaves remained absolute, except in cases of the most extreme abuse. Furthermore, vis-à-vis Philemon and Onesimus, the former’s forgiveness of the latter would be required regardless of whether the former was a fugitivus or erro. In addition, I doubt that anyone could be persuaded that a slave’s absence of at least two weeks, but probably much longer, was only that of a temporary erro when the pertinent legal texts refer only to either a late return the same day or an overnight absence. Indeed, two weeks would have been the minimum time for Onesimus to travel from Colossae to Ephesus and back, assuming Paul’s imprisonment in the nearest possible location to Colossae. Even if we were to accept the unlikely hypothesis that Philemon lived near Paul’s imprisonment in Rome, there also appears to have been a significant period of Onesimus’s useful service to Paul. I am also further convinced that Onesimus was not seeking Paul’s intervention as an amicus domini to resolve how Philemon had wronged Onesimus. Indeed, even if Onesimus did seek an intervention, then it appears to have been unsuccessful because Paul praises Philemon’s pre-existing ethos. In addition, Onesimus could probably have located a more convenient (both local and nonimprisoned) amicus domini among Ą÷üëÏüøŵÏćñŤøýÏ whom Philemon already loved. Finally, if Onesimus were an approved church emissary to Paul, then Paul would not need to request Onesimus’s full inclusion within Philemon’s pre-existing ethos. While the traditional fugitivus reconstruction leaves unexplained how Onesimus ever met an imprisoned Paul, this monograph further demonstrates

246 Contra Binder and Rohde (Philemon, 50) who cannot comprehend how a slave could be simultaneously useful to two geographically distinct persons.

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why it is more likely than the alternatives. Onesimus’s former fugitivus status would, however, impact upon the question of Onesimus’s manumission. IV. Manumission Like Dibelius, we detect no evidence that the epistle is concerned with Onesimus’s legal status.247 While we concur with N. T. Wright’s view that the epistle emphasises reconciliation between Onesimus and Philemon, we detect no evidence – either in the OT or elsewhere in Paul – for Wright’s supposition that such reconciliation should imply Onesimus’s manumission. While the Torah’s slave welfare ethics prohibit the abuses of an Egyptian-like slavery, our detailed analyses of both the Torah text and its subsequent Jewish reception does not endorse Wright’s supposition that the Exodus narrative implies the abolition of every kind of slavery.248 In addition, I suggest that Augustus’s manumission laws (discussed in chapter three) may have influenced Philemon’s subsequent decision-making, especially given the premise of Onesimus resumptive. Those laws would probably render invalid his hypothetical manumission because of his ex-fugitivus status and reduce his legal status to that of a dediticius, barred from being within one hundred miles of Rome on pain of re-enslavement.249 This would hardly be in Onesimus’s best interests, especially if Paul’s imprisonment was, as most likely, either in or en route to Rome. While those laws may not have applied in Colossae and I doubt anyone else would have cared either way as long as Onesimus remained a nobody in a backwater province, Paul both upheld and urged others to uphold Roman law. Onesimus resumptive would also return him to the orbit of this high profile imprisoned Roman citizen. Furthermore, both Paul and Philemon, notwithstanding v. 22, were probably aware that Paul’s imprisonment could lead to his execution. If that were to happen,250 Roman magistrates would seize all of Paul’s property, including any slaves, for resale.251

247

Dibelius, Kolosser Epheser Philemon, 107. Wright, PFG, 10–19, 22. 249 While the laws as now extant prohibit the manumission of those who had been punished for fleeing rather than for fleeing per se, I doubt that the distinction would have mattered in first century AD Rome. 250 Indeed, it possibly did happen, given the traditional understanding. However, some, to account for the chronology of the pastorals, advocate Paul’s initial release and a subsequent imprisonment before his execution. 251 Cf. Goodenough (“Paul & Onesimus,” 181) who suggests that such flawed goods would only be bought for enslavement in mines or onboard Roman galleys. 248

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Thus, it probably was also in Onesimus’s best interests for Paul and Philemon’s treatment of him to be beyond reproach: with Onesimus neither manumitted nor transferred into Paul’s ownership for both risk Onesimus’s future sale to the highest bidder. Instead, he would be most protected by a reconciled Philemon remaining Onesimus’s slave-master and formally assigning Onesimus’s usufruct to Paul. Such a formal agreement would not then have been extraordinary. It may also have been in Onesimus’s best interests for it to be widely known. V. Why Reticence While I concur with Nordling that it would have been both unwise and unnecessary for Paul to spell out Onesimus’s past offences and his fugitivus status,252 any reconstruction of the epistle needs also to explain v. 21’s reticence. Since our third chapter also endorses the revisionist school’s understanding of manumission as an inherent feature of Rome’s slavery ethos, I can only envisage both the Roman authorities and even slaves evaluating as uncontroversial any letter that recommended a particular slave to be rewarded with manumission for his past useful service. Paul would not need to be reticent about Onesimus’s manumission should he have desired it. While there is no extant example of such a recommendation in antiquity, it would not have been that major an advance beyond, say, Cicero’s recommending a friend’s slave to another.253 Instead, I compare Paul’s desire for Philemon’s voluntary acquiescence to Onesimus resumptive to Paul’s desire for a Corinthian voluntary response to his Jerusalem Collection in 2 Cor 9:7. Paul appears consistent in both: requesting, expecting and encouraging generosity while refraining from a direct command.254 VI. Summary: Equality and Slave Welfare in Philemon We should not expect an occasional letter between friends to define what is common knowledge between them. Indeed, we argue in this monograph that since Paul’s equality ethics on slave welfare were sourced from within Judaism, his Christian slave-owning friends like Philemon would probably have been already aware of Paul’s ethical stance. Given also the epistle’s praise for Philemon’s pre-existing ethos, this was almost certainly the case between Paul and Philemon. Thus, this epistle to Philemon did not need to define a new ethic for him. 252

Nordling,“Onesimus Fugitivus,” 99–101, 105, 107–10, 118. Cicero, Fam. 13.45. 254 Cf. Wright, PFG, 15. 253

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Thus, Paul’s intention in his epistle is only threefold: to inform Philemon of Onesimus’s transformation from useless fugitive to useful slave, to seek Onesimus’s inclusion within Philemon’s current ethos on slave welfare and to request Onesimus resumptive. Paul did not hint at Onesimus’s manumission; indeed, his manumission might not have even been in his best interests.

H. Slave Welfare beyond Paul With our equality analysis on slave welfare within the individual Pauline epistles complete, all that remains is to integrate our findings to answer those study questions still outstanding. While I will rebut current scholarly arguments for either intra-Pauline or post-Pauline ethical developments, I suggest a possible alternative argument for a post-Pauline ethical development that deserves further research. As Paul’s equality ethics on slave welfare also appear comprehensive in scope, I will conclude against Glancy’s claim of Pauline complicity with slave-masters’ sexual use of their own slaves. I. Intra-Pauline Ethical Development While Paul’s unification formulae (Gal 3:28; 1 Cor 12:13; Col 3:11), both Haustafeln and Philemon all possess their own emphases and phrasing, this chapter has demonstrated their common reliance upon the same Christianised version of the Jewish slave welfare equality ethic. Furthermore, Paul urges Philemon to include Onesimus within his pre-existing ethos rather than to adopt a new ethic. There is no evidence of any intra-Pauline ethical development. Our chapter also argues that the Haustafeln’s slave obedience exhortations call for greater slave obedience than was typical of antiquity rather than for slave obedience per se because Christian slaves were questioning their need to obey their slave-masters. While 1 Corinthians probably reveals an excessive (from Paul’s perspective) gender egalitarianism, the same Corinthians appear to have denigrated the poor, whether free or slave. Thus, the epistle demonstrates only the opposite of a Corinthian slavery golden age. Our finding also concurs vis-à-vis Pauline slavery with those non-slavery-focused scholars who are cautious about mirror-reading a major ethical problem behind every Pauline exhortation. In sum, this monograph discounts the possibility of any slavery golden age.

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II. A Comprehensive Equality Ethic While there is no explicit Pauline articulation of his equality ethics on slave welfare translated into more concrete examples, such as, for example, Paul’s social ethics and the Lord’s Supper in 1 Cor 11:17–34, there is also no evidence of any diminution from the apparent comprehensiveness of his Jewish source. We have also argued consistently that Paul’s ethical reasoning throughout his epistles is probably inclusive of both slaves and free as equal moral agents and subjects. Thus, we conclude that Paul’s slave welfare equality ethic is comprehensive enough to require any advocate of a particular Pauline inequality to demonstrate why it is an exception. In other words, the burden of proof should be on the inequality advocate to demonstrate his or her case. III. Glancy and Slave-masters’ Sexual Use of Their Own Slaves Glancy, however, treats Paul as guilty of complicity with slave-masters’ sexual use of their own slave unless proven innocent, and even then she interprets Pauline silence as complicity and post-Pauline condemnation, i.e., non-silence, as early Christian complicity. Indeed, our second chapter observed how Glancy’s method is problematic in not permitting her starting hypothesis of Pauline complicity to be falsified. Furthermore, her method, if applied consistently, would prevent scholarly reconstructions of both Paul’s ethics and the early Christianity ethos from ever diverging from the Roman ethos on anything. We have argued otherwise throughout this monograph. While Glancy is correct to observe that there is no extant usage of øú÷ïŤë that is explicitly inclusive of a slave-master’s sexual use of his own slaves before the third century AD, nor is there any extant usage of øú÷ïŤë in Judaism or Paul that explicitly excludes that practice from its scope. Notwithstanding Abraham and Hagar, Judaism disapproved of the practice and required its marital boundaries for sexual intercourse between free persons to apply also to any sexual relationships involving slaves. There is every reason to suppose that Paul also inherited this Jewish ethic. Not only did Paul’s sexual ethics apply to both slave and free alike and condemn the use of enslaved prostitutes who belonged to a third party, consistency suggests that Paul’s ethics also condemned a slave-master’s sexual use of his own slaves. Thus, when Jerome, for example, as Glancy acknowledges, explicitly condemned a slave-master’s sexual use of his own slaves, there is no reason to doubt his appeal to Pauline authority for his departure from the Roman ethos of his day.255 If Glancy still rejects ethical

255

Jerome, Ep. 77.3.

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continuation between these third- and fourth-century Christians and Paul, then she must also account for why this ethical innovation occurred at all. IV. Further Post-Pauline Ethical Development While Paul’s equality ethics on slave welfare was more egalitarian than the Greco-Roman ethos, his continuation with Jewish ethics suggests that he was neither intentionally nor in a sensus plenior sense a further egalitarian innovator to the extent implied by advocates of a trajectory towards abolition. Given pre-existing Stoic endorsement of slaves’ natural equality, we also observe no reason why Christian ontological equality would imply further ethical development. Paul’s cruciform love appeals appear to reinforce the degree of selfsacrifice required to achieve his equality ethics rather than to exceed them. There is no evidence that Paul intended those appeals to minimise or eliminate the intrinsic need of slaves to labour for their slave-masters. On the contrary, we have argued in this chapter that Paul’s appeal to slaves’ metaphorical slavery towards Christ intensifies their slave labour obligations towards their slavemasters. Glancy also rejects any early Christian amelioration of slave conditions, but perhaps this is only because she appears to consider any amelioration less than abolition to be unacceptable. Instead, our findings in this monograph may account for both how Lactantius in the third century also appears to rely upon Christian imitation of divinely modelled equality between both free and slave and rich and poor,256 and Augustine’s claim that Christianity led to improved slave relations.257 Indeed, if Augustine is correct, then in theory improved slave relations over time could lead to increased frequency of voluntary manumissions, which might, depending upon the rate of new slave supply, support a trajectory towards its gradual demise within Christian communities. Thus, pertinent also to the question of a post-Pauline ethical trajectory are the ethics of slave supply. However, it is beyond the scope of this monograph to investigate both Augustine’s separate claim that Paul prohibited the enslavement of captives,258 and Gregory of Nyssa’s apparent attack on at least acquiring slaves if 256

Lactantius, Inst. 5.15–19 (ANF 7:150–55); but cf. Ira 5, 17 (ANF 7:262, 274). Augustine, Mor. eccl. 1.30.63 (PL 32:1336); trans. by Richard Stothert and A. M. Overett in Augustine. Morals of the Catholic Church (Savage, MN: Lighthouse, 2015), 48. 258 Augustine, Ep. 24*.1; trans. by Robert B. Eno in vol. 6 of St. Augustine. Letters, FC 61 (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1989), 171–74; cf. Garnsey, Ideas, 61, 63. Perhaps in part, Augustine is relying on 1 Tim 1:10. For an attempt to disqualify it as pertinent, see J. Albert Harrill, “The Vice of Slave Dealers in Greco-Roman Society: The Use of a Topos in 1 Timothy 1:10,” JBL 118 (1999): 97–122. However, I suggest it is special pleading to argue from some extant instances of ċ÷îúëøîóûüĤÏ (“slave-dealer”) being 257

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not slavery per se in a sermon on Ecclesiastes.259 Further research is required, not least because many Christians in the antebellum era appear to have had no compunction against the forced enslavement and transportation of Africans. In any case, slavery’s abolition, even if ‘bottom up’ one manumission at a time, would probably also require ‘top down’ societal enforcement. Further research is also required on what I suspect is the non-trivial relationship between Pauline ethics and societal reform in general, as well as vis-à-vis slavery. While I am sympathetic to Patterson’s threefold distinction between the personal, institutional and systemic,260 our monograph did not discover any evidence of Paul as a proto-individualist who was concerned with more than the personal. V. Summary The Pauline corpus appears consistent in its slave welfare ethics; thus, there is no evidence of any intra-Pauline ethical development. Nor is there evidence of any early Christian slavery golden age. Across the Pauline corpus, there is much that suggests and nothing that limits the comprehensiveness of Paul’s ethical source: Jewish ethics on slave welfare. All the evidence collated in this chapter points more towards Paul’s rejection of rather than complicity with slave-masters’ sexual use of their own slaves. Thus, our chapter collectively argues against Glancy; the evidence of implicit Pauline disapproval – as thirdand fourth-century Christians claimed – is compelling.

rhetorically abusive to its occurrence in 1 Tim 1:10 as purely abusive without any reference to literal slavery in the otherwise literal vice list of 1 Tim 1:9–10. Likewise, Harrill appears to assume that Paul’s readership would interpret Paul’s threefold reference to ÷ĻöøÏ in 1:7– 9 as referring to Greco-Roman conventions rather than to the Jewish Torah that inter alia includes possible exhortations against slave capture at Exod 21:16 and Deut 24:7. For a defence of the non-Pauline Rev 18:13 to be critiquing the slave trade then, see Murray Vasser, “Bodies and Souls: The Case for Reading Revelation 18.13 as a Critique of the Slave Trade,” NTS 64 (2018): 397–409. 259 Gregory of Nyssa, Hom. 4.334,4–38,22 (GNHE 73–78). However, Glancy (“Rise,” 474, 481) is keen to discount both the extent of his condemnation and his significance. For further (and competing) analyses, see Lionel Wickham, “Homily 4,” GNHE 177–84; Maria M. Bergadá, “La condemnation de l'esclave dans l’Homélie IV,” GNHE 185–96; Daniel F. Stramara, “Gregory of Nyssa: An Ardent Abolitionist?,” SVTQ 41 (1997): 37–60; D. Bentley Hart, “The ‘Whole Humanity’: Gregory of Nyssa’s Critique of Slavery in Light of His Eschatology,” SJT 54 (2009): 51–69; Ilaria Ramelli, “Gregory of Nyssa’s Position in Late Antique Debates on Slavery and Poverty, and the Role of Asceticism,” JLAnt 5 (2012): 87– 118. 260 Patterson, “Paul Slavery & Freedom,” 266–69.

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While Paul’s slave welfare ethic could have, in theory, increased voluntary slave manumissions and led to slavery’s gradual demise among those who adopted his ethic, further research is required into Paul’s slave supply ethic. I also suggest further research into how to relate Pauline ethics to societal reform, but our chapter detects no evidence of Paul’s concern for the latter.

I. Equal Treatment beyond Slavery Although this monograph is limited to a historical description of Paul’s slave welfare ethics, its numerically equal treatment finding may also be pertinent to contemporary debates on other ethical issues. I suggest two candidates for further research. Notwithstanding slavery’s re-emergence in the guise of modern slavery, I turn to workplace ethics more generally. For example, further research should evaluate how a manager could treat his or her subordinates as his or her equals, regardless of their ongoing hierarchical relationship. What would this look like in more concrete terms? Perhaps managers today, somewhat like the Corinthians to whom Paul wrote, need to adopt a greater degree of sacrificial leadership than they currently envisage. Indeed, this research should be broadened to evaluate every existing hierarchical human relationship. While today some advocate the egalitarian abolition of all hierarchy, we should also evaluate what would genuine numerically equal treatment across each hierarchy look like in more concrete terms. Would this equal treatment reform per se regulate the abuses that often accompany human hierarchies? Further research is required. I also turn to the just demand for racial equality, prominent once again in the news as I finalise this monograph. I repeat Dworkin’s plea for rhetorical clarity over implied equality definitions,261 because I detect differences in two prominent approaches. When Martin Luther King, Jr. dreamt in 1963 of a day when his children would be judged by their character rather than race,262 King envisaged the numerically equal treatment of all regardless of racial difference. Alternatively, others argue for equitable not equal treatment to achieve an overall equality of outcome: meaning, in this context, for members of a historically disadvantaged group to be treated more favourably than those of a historically advantaged group. While this monograph cannot debate the merits and

261

Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue, 2. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have A Dream: Writings and Speeches that Changed the World ed. James M. Washington (New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 1992), 104. 262

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demerits of these approaches further,263 I observe two reasons why only King’s dream appears consistent with Paul’s equality ethics. First, we have observed Paul’s insistence on the numerically equal treatment of Jew and Gentile alike. While Paul’s argument is primarily soteriological, he also appears reliant on how the Torah required the numerically equal treatment of Israelite and sojourner alike in non-cultic matters. Second, this monograph’s social equality findings also appear pertinent. While both Paul and the Torah rebuke rich persons for discriminating against the poor, Paul presumably also adopts the Torah’s insistence on numerically equal treatment – explicitly favouring neither the rich nor the poor – rather than advocating compensating reverse discrimination against rich persons. Nevertheless, since Paul’s pre-individualist equality ethics do not easily map onto the contemporary (thus postindividualist) debate between equality of opportunity versus equality of outcome, further research is required.

J. Conclusion Our chapter resolves the lack of a rigorous equality definition in Pauline scholarship by engaging in an equality analysis of the Jerusalem Collection in 2 Cor 8:13–15, Paul’s attempts in 1 Corinthians to resolve the Corinthians’ internal conflicts, Gal 3:28, the slavery exhortations of the Colossian and Ephesian Haustafeln, and the epistle to Philemon. The chapter has argued for four conclusions. One, Pauline unity implies Pauline equal treatment and vice versa. Two, the Haustafeln place slavery relations into a Christocentric framework to intensify both the quality of slave obedience and the degree of slave welfare required relative to the prevailing Roman ethos. Three, the epistle to Philemon urges Onesimus’s inclusion within Philemon’s already-compliant ethos. Four, thus Paul continues with the comprehensive Jewish equality ethics on slave welfare, as reconstructed in our previous chapter. Although much Jewish interpretation excluded non-Israelite chattel slaves from their probable original inclusion as moral subjects of the Torah’s equality ethics on slave welfare, Paul’s equality ethics clearly includes chattel slaves. Therefore, our chapter locates no evidence of any intra-Pauline ethical development nor any Pauline-intended post-Pauline ethical trajectory. It also argues against Glancy’s view of Pauline complicity in slave-masters’ sexual use of their own slaves. Meanwhile, our chapter recommends further research into

263 For one such philosophical analysis, see William G. Tierney, “The Parameters of Affirmative Action: Equity and Excellence in the Academy,” RER 67 (1997): 165–96.

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Pauline ethics on slave supply. Beyond slavery and besides gender, our chapter also recommends further research into how Pauline equality ethics may translate into societal transformation and inform contemporary debates on workplace ethics and racial equality. This completes our equality analysis in this monograph; an overall conclusion follows.

Conclusion This monograph substantiates its claim in the first chapter that equality analysis can both expose and resolve modern scholarship’s shortcomings in failing to define and reason rigorously about equality. While today many assume that the only valid kind of equality is an egalitarianism that seeks to minimise differences between people, the monograph demonstrates otherwise. Our monograph establishes how equality rhetoric can frequently mean the identical treatment of numerically equal persons despite acknowledged differences between them. Our monograph further substantiates vis-à-vis slavery the claim of equality theorists that all coherent ethical systems, whether or not their advocates are conscious of it, contain a rationale for distinguishing between similar and different cases. While the monograph is focused only on slave welfare in antiquity, our heuristic equality analysis may assist research on other topics of interest such as, for example, Paul on gender. The monograph has but one main finding: Paul advocates for Christian slave-masters to treat their slaves as their equals notwithstanding the latter’s ongoing labour obligation to the former, which Paul leaves unchanged. While this is radical in the context of the prevailing Greco-Roman slavery ethos, it is in continuation with a long-standing and widely held Jewish ethic that originates in the ethical reasoning behind the Torah’s case laws on slave welfare. While I suspect some will disparage this finding for falling short of Paul advocating or hinting at slavery’s abolition, and even short of requiring Christian slave-masters to manumit their Christian slaves, I argue otherwise. I encourage readers to suspend our post-Enlightenment assumptions to evaluate one coherent ethical system in antiquity versus alternatives then. I also advocate further research into how this equal treatment ethic could apply in the modern workplace and might address contemporary racial inequalities. Nevertheless, it is possible that this Pauline ethic on slave welfare might have encouraged Christian slave-masters to manumit more slaves than they would have otherwise. But as long as there was a ready supply of new slaves, it appears unlikely that this ethic would ever lead to slavery’s demise. Therefore, I also recommend further research into Paul’s attitude to enslavement through conquest.

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In passing, our monograph also suggests new understandings of multiple topics. It denies Pauline complicity in slave-masters’ sexual use of their own slaves and argues that the Haustafeln’s exhortations intensify slave obedience by appealing to slaves’ metaphorical enslavement to Christ. It distinguishes between Greek and Roman reasoning on their practice of captive slavery. It clarifies Seneca’s and Philo’s equality ethics on slave welfare. It argues for a new understanding of Paul’s rationale for his Jerusalem Collection (2 Cor 8:13–15) and explains why the demand for circumcision as the means for the Galatian Christians to progress in their Christianity accounts for Paul’s unification formula of Gal 3:28. Indeed, Pauline unity between pairs requires a numerically equal treatment that spans the differences between each pair. Finally, our monograph argues that Paul did not have to inform Philemon of what he already knew and was already part of his slavery ethos: how to treat the returning Onesimus.

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–. “Job in Conversation with the Torah.” Translated by Anselm C. Hagedorn. Pages 81–100 in Wisdom and Torah: The Reception of ‘Torah’ in the Wisdom Literature of the Second Temple Period. Edited by Bernd U. Schipper and David A. Teeter. JSJ.S 163. Leiden: Brill, 2013. Wolde, Ellen van. “Does ‘Innâ denote rape? A Semantic Analysis of a Controversial Word.” VT 52 (2002): 528–44. Wolfson, Harry A. Philo: Foundations of Religious Philosophy in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Rev. ed. 2 vols. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962. Wolter, Michael. Der Brief an die Kolosser. Der Brief an Philemon. ÖTKNT 12; GTBS 519. Gütersloh, Germany: Gütersloher, 1993. –. “‘Let No One Seek His Own, But Each One the Other’s’ (1 Corinthians 10:24): Pauline Ethics according to 1 Corinthians.” Pages 199–217 in Identity, Ethics, and Ethos in the New Testament. Edited by Jan G. van der Watt. BZNW 141. Berlin: de Gruyter, 2006. Woods, Edward J. Deuteronomy: An Introduction and Commentary. Replacement ed. TOTC 5. Nottingham: InterVarsity, 2011. Wright, Christopher J. H. God’s People in God’s Land: Family, Land and Property in the Old Testament. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans; Carlisle: Paternoster, 1990. –. “Jubilee, Year Of.” ABD 3:1025–30. –. Old Testament Ethics for the People of God. Leicester: InterVarsity, 2004. Wright, David P. Inventing God’s Law: How the Covenant Code of the Bible Used and Revised the Laws of Hammurabi. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. –. “‘She Shall Not Go Free as Male Slaves Do’: Developing Views about Slavery and Gender in the Laws of the Hebrew Bible.” Pages 125–42 in Beyond Slavery: Overcoming Its Religious and Sexual Legacies. Edited by Bernadette J. Brooten. BRWTSJ. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Wright, N. T. 1986. The Epistles of Paul to the Colossians and to Philemon: An Introduction and Commentary. TNTC. Leicester: InterVarsity; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. –. Paul and the Faithfulness of God. Vol. 4 (in 2 parts) of Christian Origins and the Question of God. 4 vols. Minneapolis, MN: Fortress, 2013. Yoder, John H. The Politics of Jesus: Vicit Agnus Noster. 2nd ed. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994. Zahn, Theodor. Der Brief des Paulus an die Galater. KNT 9. Leipzig: Deichert, 1905. Zelnick-Abramovitz, Rachel. “Slaves and Role Reversal in Ancient Greek Cults.” Pages 96– 132 in Slaves and Religions in Graeco-Roman Antiquity and Modern Brazil. Edited by Stephen Hodkinson and Dick Geary. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2012. Zimmermann, Ruben. “The ‘Implicit Ethics’ of New Testament Writings: A Draft on a New Methodology for Analysing New Testament Ethics.” Neot 43 (2009): 399–423. Zuntz, Günther. The Text of the Epistles: A Disquistion Upon the Corpus Paulinum. SchL. London: Oxford University Press, 1953.

Index of References A. Old Testament Genesis 1–2 1:26–27 1:27

31:15 31:42 34 34:2 38 38:24 38:26

10n31 234 20, 218, 227n99 10n31 200 200 74, 74n232, 200 231 232n118 200 232n118 227 148 173n152 232n118 200 164, 164n112, 165 159 176n161 174 174 186 186 186

Exodus 1:13–14 1:14 3:21–22 5 12:35–36 12:44 16

195 195, 196 176 195 176 148, 167 208

3 3:6b 15:4 16 16:1–8 LXX 16:1–4a 16:3–4a 16:4b–6 17 17:12–27 20:3 21:10 25:1 29

16:16–18 16:16b 16:18 16:20 18:4–5 20:9–11 20:10–11 20:12 21 21:1 21:2–11

21:2–6

21:2

21:3 21:3b 21:4–6 21:4–5 21:4 21:5–6 21:5 21:6 21:7–11

209 209 208, 209 208, 209 209n25 172 167 234 35n31, 193, 195 161n99 143, 167, 175, 175n157, 177, 192, 193, 193n241 163n106, 164n112, 165, 167, 172, 175, 200, 160n97 159, 160n97, 163, 163n106, 168n108, 175n157, 175n158 164 164n113 165n118 165, 166 164, 164n113, 195n253 165 166 59, 63, 165 75, 147, 158, 160, 160n97, 161, 162, 163n106, 167,

316

21:7–8 21:7 21:8–9 21:8

21:9–11 21:9

21:10–11 21:10 21:11 21:12–19 21:12–17 21:12–14 21:15–17 21:15 21:16 21:16b 21:18–21 21:18–19 21:18 21:19 21:20–21

21:20–21 SP 21:20 21:21

21:21c 21:23–27

Index of References 173, 174, 175, 185, 185n196, 187, 195n253, 197, 199, 200n269 158, 175n157 158, 159, 160, 161, 161n99 158n83 158n83, 159n84, 161, 161n99, 161n101, 184, 186 179 158, 160, 161, 158n84, 161n99 158, 159n84, 161, 162n102 159, 160, 186 147, 161 152 152 143, 144 160n92 143 152, 182, 272n258 152n51 197 145, 146, 147, 152 143, 145 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 151 106n194, 140, 143, 152, 196, 203 152 143, 144, 145, 146, 152 142, 143, 144, 144n23, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151 143n15, 148n35 152

21:23–25 21:24 21:26–32 21:26–29 21:26–27

21:28–32 21:29–30 21:30 21:31 21:32

21:34–22:15[14] 22:3[2] 22:16–17[15–16] 22:16[15] 22:21[20] 22:23[22] 23 23:3 23:6 23:10–11

Leviticus 17–26 18:15 19:15 19:18 19:18b 19:20–22

19:20 19:20b 19:21 19:22 19:33–34 19:34 22:11

150, 152 150, 151 140 140n7 142, 143, 147, 150, 151, 152, 173, 183, 196, 202 144, 153, 156, 157, 158 153 154, 156, 157 156, 156n76 153, 156, 157, 175n159, 178n171 147 163 147n33, 159n85 174, 174n155 168n129 163, 168 52 52, 154, 154n62, 168 52, 154, 168 164n111, 188n211

24n76 161n99 154 147 185, 187, 230, 212n42 75, 162, 166, 183, 185, 186, 187, 193n245, 199, 200n269, 202, 230 184, 185 185 186 186 196 185 148

317

A. Old Testament 24:22 25

25:6–7 25:6 25:8–13 25:14–17 25:20–22 25:23–55 25:23–24 25:23 25:25–32 25:25 25:33 25:35–38 25:35 25:36–37 25:36 25:38 25:39–54 25:39–43 25:39 25:39b 25:40–41 25:40 25:41–43 25:41 25:42–43 25:42 25:43 25:44–46 25:45 25:46–48 25:46 25:47–54 25:47 25:49 25:49b 25:50 25:53 25:53b 25:54 25:55 27

196 176n161, 188, 191, 192, 193, 193n241, 194, 194n245, 195, 196 195, 196 189 188 188 197 188 188 189 188 188, 194 189n214 189 188, 189 194 188, 189, 189n220 188 190, 194 190 193 190 189 190, 191, 193, 194 190 195n253 188 190, 193 190 190, 196, 198 196 62 190 190 189 188n213 194 193 193 190 195n253 188 154, 155, 197

27:2–8 27:3 27:32

153, 177n169 175n159, 178n171 157

Numbers 29:20

172

Deuteronomy 1:16–17 2:8 5:12–15 5:13 5:14 5:15 5:16 6:4–6 LXX 7:1–3 7:6–8 8:2 10:17–19 14:28–29 15 15:1–3 15:2 15:4–6 15:4 LXX 15:12–18

15:12–13 15:12

15:13 15:14 15:14 SP 15:15 15:16 15:17 15:18

15:19 16:10 16:12

169 171n140 167n126 179n175 172 172, 176n160 234 239 172n146 236 176n160 169 171 188 171 188n211 171 208 172, 175n157, 176n161, 177, 192, 193, 193n241, 194, 195n253 173 62, 163n106, 175, 175n157, 177, 179 176 175, 178 178 179 166, 179 63, 163n106 164n111, 173, 173n150, 176, 177, 179n175, 195 179n175 178 176n160

318 16:16–17 16:18–20 17:14–20 20:1–20 21:10–17 21:10–14 21:11–13 21:11 21:12–13 21:14 21:15–17 21:17 22:13–21 22:19 22:22 22:23–27 22:28–29 22:28 22:29 23:7[8] 23:15–16[16–17] 23:19–20[20–21] 23:24–25[25–26] 24:1–4 24:1–3 24:1 24:6–17 24:7 24:15 24:17–21 24:18 24:19–21 25:3 28:58–59 34:8 Ruth 1:13 2:4–23 2:7 2:13 3–4 3:9 4:12

Index of References 176 169 171n143 172n146 166, 172, 177 75, 173, 197, 199, 200, 201 174 173, 174 172 173, 174, 182 173, 175 161n99 187n205 173 173n152 185, 187 174, 174n155 147n33, 174 173 171n140 60, 74 171, 177n168 171 161, 165, 171n143, 173 193n241 173n152 171 152n51, 173, 182, 272n258 182 182 176, 176n160 171 171n138 187n206 172

173n152 186n202 144 141 186 141 186n202

1 Samuel 1:11 1:16 1:18

141 141 141

1 Kings 12:7

140

2 Kings 4:1

163

2 Chronicles 29:17 LXX

239

Nehemiah 5:5

163

Esther 2:23 LXX 3:13 LXX 6:4 LXX

256n224 256n224 256n224

Job 1:3 1:8 3:17–19 7:1–3 19:15–16 31 31:1–12 31:13–15 31:13 31:15 31:16–22 31:32 42:10–17

180 181 180 180 180 180 180 140, 180, 181, 203, 247 196 196 180 180 181

Psalms 73[72]:6 77:5[6] 129[128]:7

175 165n117 173

Proverbs 30:19

173n152

Isaiah 11:3–4 16:14

40, 170, 243 177n169

319

B. ANE Texts 21:16 54:1 62:4–5

178n169 173n152 173n152

Ezekiel 34:4

195

Zechariah 8:16 10–11 11:12–13 12:10 13:7

250 157 157 158 158

B. ANE Texts Law of Eshunna §§23–24 Law of Hammurabi §115 §116 §§117–18 §117

152n50

148n35 148n35, 156n76 164 177

§210 §230

156n76 156n76

Law of Lipit-Ishtar §14

177n168

Law of Ur-Namma §4

164n115

C. Deuterocanonical Books Wisdom of Solomon 1:1

239

Sirach Prolog 16 4:22–28 33:31 41:22

256n224 224 62, 179n177 201

1 Maccabees 11:33 11:53 2 Maccabees 9:21 9:26 11:19

12:30 14:26 14:37 15:30

256n224 256n224 256n224 256n224

1 Esdras 4 4:38–40

225n88 224

256n224 256n224

3 Maccabees 3:3 6:26 7:7

256n224 256n224 256n224

256n224 256n224 256n224

4 Maccabees 2:10 13:25

256n224 256n224

D. Pseudepigrapha Testament of Reuben 1:6

202n281

320

Index of References

E. Dead Sea Scrolls 4Q270

198n263, 200n269

4Q271

198n263

F. Ancient Jewish Writers Josephus Antiquitates judaicae 4.244 4.280 18.21

201n274 155n69 198n263

Contra Apionem 2.201 16.194 18.4.40

201 201n276 201n276

Philo De congressu eruditionis gratia 152 201n278 154 201n278 De decalogo 41 162 164 165ff. 167

198n261 198n262 198n262 33 47, 198

Legatio ad Gaium 2(547).13

111n220

De opificio mundi 144

198n261

Quis rerum divinarum heres sit 141–206 206n9 146–206 198n261 Quod omnis probus liber sit 38 201n278 79 35n32, 49n103, 198n263

De specialibus legibus 1.265 2.32–34 2.69 2.71–73 2.79–85 2.80 2.85 2.89–91 2.122 2.123

3.182 3.195–97 4.19 4.231

198n261 154n61 35n32, 198 171n144 199n268 179n177 176n162 199n268 191n231 35n32, 198n264 154n58 201n278 145n24 145n25 35, 35n32, 36n36, 101n158, 198 142n12, 143n18 155n69 151n46 182n185 45

De virtutibus 112 114 122

173n149, 175 173n149 171n144

De vita contemplativa 70 80

35n32 198n263

2.145 3.69 3.104–7 3.136–37 3.137

3.142

G. New Testament

321

G. New Testament Matthew 5:42 5:46 5:47 6:2–4 6:22 19:21 25:34–40 26:15 27:3–9

208n20 260 260 208n20 238n145 208n20 208n20 157 157

Luke 3:11 6:38 11:41 12:33

208n20 208n20 208n20 208n20

Acts 4:34 11:27–30 15:1–29 20:18–19 20:19 20:35 24

208 221n72 221n72 253n214 253 208n20 123n286

Romans 1:3 2:9–11 2:11 4:1 5:6–9 9:3 9:5 12:8 12:13 14:18 15:26

231n114 52 19, 19n55 231n114 22 231n114 231n114 208n20 208n20 238 206n13

1 Corinthians 1:2 1:4–9 1:10–12 1:23 1:26–28 2:3

214n47 214n47 210 252n206 215 254

3:1–4:13 3:1–4:7 3:5 3:6–7 3:8 3:8b 3:13–15 3:21 4:3 4:5–7 4:9–13 4:12 4:16 5:1–13 5:11 6:12–20 7 7:20–24 7:21–24 7:21 7:23 8:1–11:1 9:1–19 9:9–14 9:14–15 9:21 10:18 10:23–11:1 10:24 11:1 11:17–34 11:17–24 11:17 11:18 11:20 11:21 11:22 11:22a 11:23–26 11:33 11:34 11:34a 12:1–31 12:1–13 12:3 12:4–11

213 210 211 211 211 210 210 211 210 210 216 245 22n68 72 212 72 32, 162n102 33 18, 62, 66, 69 18 18 216 245 230n110 22 22 231n114 216 210 22n68 213, 270 210 212 212 211, 212 211 210n29 212 212 212 212 212n39 210 213n43 214 214

322 12:4–6 12:7 12:8–10 12:11 12:12 12:13

12:14–30 12:15–18 12:16 12:18 12:20–22 12:21 12:24 12:25 12:25a 12:25b 12:28 12:31–13:13 12:31 15:12 15:42–44 16:3 2 Corinthians 1–10 4:5 5:9 5:16 6:5 7:15 8–9 8:1–16 8:1 8:4 8:6 8:7 8:9–15 8:9 8:13–15 8:13–14 8:13 8:13a–b 8:13a 8:13b 8:13c

Index of References 213 213 213n44 213 214 17, 20, 21, 204, 214, 217, 226, 269 213n43 215 213 214 215 213, 215 214, 215n53 207n19, 213, 215, 260 215 215 211, 216 217 217n60 252n206 215 207

207, 207n15 252n206 238 231n114 245 254 206n13, 208 206 207 206, 207 207 207 22 207 22, 205n2, 212, 274, 277 205 205, 207 207 206 206 205, 206

8:14 8:14c 8:15 8:19 9:6–15 9:7 9:8 9:11 9:13 9:14 11–13 11:7–9 11:23 12:13–16 Galatians 1:6–9 1:10 1:11–2:10 1:12–14 1:13–14 1:16 2:1–10 2:2 2:3–5 2:3 2:5 2:6

2:7–9 2:9 2:11–14 2:12 2:13 2:14 2:16 2:20 3:3 3:5–6

205 205, 206, 208, 209 205 207 206 268 207 207n19 206 207 207n15 245 245 245

221 62, 219n66, 224, 238 220 235 219n66 231n113, 252n206 221n72 224 221n70 222, 224, 222n75 221, 224, 229 19, 218, 218n65, 220, 220n67, 222, 224, 226n95, 228, 229, 232, 243 219n67, 222n79 224 224n86, 229 220n69 225 223, 224, 229 225, 231n113 231n113 19, 228, 231n115 239n154

G. New Testament 3:26–29 3:26 3:28

3:28b 3:29 4:1 4:10 4:12 4:13–14 4:22–31 4:22–23 4:23–29 4:23 4:29 4:30–31 4:32 5:1 5:2 5:6a 5:7 5:11 5:13–6:10 5:13 5:14 5:15 5:16 5:17 5:18–20 5:19 5:19–21 5:21 5:24 5:26 6:1a

228, 229 228 17, 20, 21, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 35, 64, 65, 73, 76, 180, 204, 217, 218, 222, 225, 226, 226n95, 226n96, 226n98, 227, 228, 229, 231, 232, 269, 274, 277 228 228 120n265 223 218, 218n65, 232 231n113 231 231 200 231, 232, 232n119 231, 232, 232n119 231 251n201 217n61 207n19 225, 228 225 219n66 21, 21n63, 217, 229 229, 231n115 230 229, 231 231n115 231 210 231n115 231, 248 51n117 229, 231n115 229, 231 230

6:1b 6:2 6:4 6:5 6:6 6:7 6:8 6:10 6:12 6:13–14 6:13 6:14 6:15 Ephesians 1:18 2:3 2:10 3:20 3:21a 3:22 3:24 3:25 4:1–6 4:2 4:2b 4:4 4:15–16 4:17–19 4:19 4:20 4:21 4:21b 4:24 4:25 4:28–29 4:28

4:32–5:2 4:32 5:1 5:2 5:3–12 5:3 5:11 5:12

323 230 22, 207n19, 229 228, 229, 230 229 230 230n106 230n106, 231n115 230, 233 225, 231n115 228 231n115 211 225

256 255 256 252n206 252n212 252n208 252n208 252n208 251, 256 251 251 256 251 252 261 251, 252n206 252 252 252 53, 250 256 208n20, 256, 256n227, 257, 258 261 251 22, 251 22, 251 262 261 261 261

324 5:17 5:21 5:22–6:9 5:25 5:33 6:1ff. 6:2–4 6:4 6:5–9 6:5–8 6:5

Index of References 1:27–28 1:28 2:1 2:4 2:5 2:6–3:17 2:6–7 2:8a 2:11 2:13 2:16–23 2:18 2:20–23 2:23 3:4 3:5–7 3:5 3:8–9 3:10 3:11

6:9a 6:9b 6:9c–d 6:9c 6:9d 6:24

255 254 20n59 251 254 33 32 234n126 12n38, 204 17, 256, 257 231n114, 237n144 254, 257, 259 238 255, 259 255 253 253, 256, 258, 259, 260 257 253, 256 17, 22, 28, 29, 36, 40n58, 50, 52, 53, 71, 76, 261, 262 51, 258, 260 258, 259 258 253, 259, 260 260 256n226

Philippians 1:17–18 2:5–11 2:7 2:12 3:10

252n206 22 157n78 254 252n206

3:22–25 3:22–23 3:22

242 234 236n133, 241 234 236n135 238 242 235, 238, 243, 244

3:22a–b 3:22b 3:22c 3:22d 3:23 3:23a 3:23b 3:24 3:24a 3:24b

6:5b 6:6 6:6b 6:7 6:7b 6:8 6:8b 6:8c 6:9

Colossians 1:7 1:10 1:12 1:15 1:20 1:22 1:23 1:24

3:12–14 3:12 3:13 3:14 3:17 3:18 3:20 3:21 3:22–4:1

236n135 252n206 235, 238, 244 236n139 238 37 252n206 236n139 238 238 236 238 235 238 241 235 248 236 234, 235 17, 20, 21, 48, 204, 226, 233, 235, 236, 236n135, 244, 269 236 236 236 236 37, 239 42 234, 238, 244 234n126 12n38, 20n59204, 233 17, 244, 255 240 36, 231n114, 238 253 254 238 239, 254 37 239 240, 255 37, 248, 256 241, 242 242

325

G. New Testament Titus 1:1 2:1–10 2:9–10

4:1a 4:1b 4:3 4:7 4:9 4:11 4:12–13 4:12 4:17 4:18 5:2

39, 242, 242n174, 243, 257 242, 243 242, 246, 248 6n19, 17, 22, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 36, 37, 38, 38n46, 41, 42, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 53, 72, 73, 76, 95, 204, 243, 247, 249 246 248 235 242 57n142 235 244 57n142, 242 57n142 235 251n201

1 Thessalonians 2:4 2:9 2:12 4:4 4:5 4:11–12

62, 238 245 245 72, 73 72 245

18

3:25

3:25a 3:25b 4:1

Philemon 1 2 5 6 7 8 10–13 11 11b 12–14 12 13–14 13 15 16 17–21 17

20 21

22 2 Thessalonians 3:7–12 1 Timothy 1:7–9 1:9–10 1:10 2:8–15 5:16 5:17–18 6:1–3 6:1–2 6:2 6:17–19

12n38 20n59 12n38, 17

263, 264 57n142 264 63, 58n144 264 58n144 57 54, 55, 265 265 56 264 59, 60, 265 264 56, 57, 58, 59, 63 60, 60n157, 61, 264 59 58n144, 63, 264 56, 56n136, 56n139 264 59, 60, , 60n157, 62, 268 57, 60, 264, 267

245

272n258 272n258 271n258, 272n258 20n59 208n20 230n110 20n59 17 64 208n20

Hebrews 13:16

208n20

James 2:1–9 2:2 2:8 3:17

212 212n42 212n42 212

1 Peter 2:13–3:7 2:18–21 2:18

20n59 242n177 254n218

326 1 John 3:17

Index of References

208n20

Revelation 18:13

272n258

H. Rabbinic Works Mishnah Shevi’it 10:1 10:3–5

171n144 171n144

Ketubbot 3:1–4:1 3:7 3:8 4:1

155n68 155n68 162n103 162n103

Qiddushin 1:1 1:2 2 Bava Qamma 4:5F–G 8:1–3 8:1 8:3 8:5 8:6 Arakhin 3:1 3:3 3:4 5:2

9:8 9:10 9:21 Babylonian Talmud Qiddushin 14b 17a

149 149 150n38

18b–19b 22a

191n232 175n159, 178n171 162n104 178

162n104 191n231 162

Bava Qamma 83b (8:1D) 83b–84a (8:I.5) 84a–b (8.I.13–16)

156n73 155n71 156n73

156n73 155n70 149n37 149 149 155n70

Arakhin 2a 14b

155n64 155n68

155n68, 156n73 156 1554n68 155n64, 155n67, 155n70

Niddah 5:6–6:11

162n103

Tosefta Bava Qamma 4:7 4:8F 4:8G–H 9:1

154n58 153n57 153n57 150n38

Jerusalem Talmud Qiddushin 1:2[B], 59a 1.2[D], 59a 1:2VII[A]–[E], 59a–b 1.2X, 59b 1.2XVII, 59c 1.2XVIII[M], 59c

191n231 162n104 191n231 162n104 162n104 162n104, 191n231

Mekilta Neziqin 1 10 11

195n249 154n58 156n73

Sifra Behar Parashah 6:3

195n250

327

I. Early Christian Writings Behar Pereq 7:3–6 7:8 9:1

195n249 179 191n231

Behuqotai Parashah 3

155n64

Qedoshim Pereq 5

187n206

I. Early Christian Writings Didache 4.9–11 4.11

20n59 254n218

Ambrose De Abraham 1.4.22–26 1.4.25

70n216 70n216

Epistulae 37 (54)

70n216

De Joseph patriarcha 5.22

Homiliae in epistulam ad Ephesios 22 (on 6:5–9) 50n109 Homiliae in epistulam i ad Thessalonicenses 5 (on 4:1–3) 70n216 Homiliae in epistulam ad Philemonem Argument 54n130 70n216

De virginibus 3.7.32–37

70n216

Augustine Epistulae 24*.1

271n258

De moribus ecclesiae catholicae 1.30.63 271n257 Barnabas 19.5–7 19.7

In illud: Propter fornicationes autem unusquisque suam uxorem habeat §4 70n216

20n59 254n218

Basil Epistulae 199.49

70n216

Homiliae 15 (on Ps 32:5)

70n216

Clement of Rome 1 Clement 1.3 21.6–9

20n59 20n59

Gregory of Nyssa Homiliae 4.334,4–38,22

272n259

[Hippolytus] Traditio apostolica 16.23

70n216

Ignatius Ad Polycarp 5.1–2

20n59

Jerome Epistulae 77.3 77.70

Chrysostom Homiliae in epistulam i ad Corinthios 19 (on 7:1, 2) 18n51

71n220, 270n255 70n216

328

Index of References

Lactantius Divinarum institutionum libri VII 5.15–19 271n256 6.23 70n216 Epitome divinarum institutionum 66 70n216

De ira Dei 5 17

271n256 271n256

Polycarp Ad Philipians 4.2–6.3

20n59

J. Greco-Roman Literature Codex Justinianus 3.28.28 3.28.34–35 3.38.11 4.26 4.42 5.25.4 6.60 7.6.10 8.46 8.46.3 9.14–15 9.14.1 9.17.1 9.41 Codex Theodosianus 2.25.1 9.12.1 9.15.1 9.25.1

121n273 121n273 99n148, 166n122 116n248 108n207 121n272, 121n273 117n254 122n279 116n248, 120n265 120n270 120n268 106n192, 144n20 119 115n241

99n148 106n192, 144n20 119n262 166n122

Collatio Mosaicarum et Romanarum Legum 3.2.1 106n189 3.3.4 108 3.6.5 107n204 Digesta 1.1.1.4 1.1.9 1.5–6

78n2 78n2 116n247

1.5.4.1–3 1.5.4.1–2 1.5.5.1 1.5.15–16 1.6 1.6.2 1.6.3–8 1.6.3–5 1.6.8 1.6.9 1.7.3 1.7.28 1.7.36 5.2.2 5.2.15 5.2.22 9.2.2 9.2.27.28 14.3 18.1.42 21.1.17 21.1.17.14–15 21.1.43.1–3 22.1.38.1 24.3.22.1 26.4.1 27.10.1 29.5.1 29.5.1.27 29.5.14 35.3.5.15–20 36.1.14 37.4.16 37.12.5 37.15.8 37.15.9

78n2 101 78n2 99n147 117n253 106n187, 107n201, 108 117n253 119n265 119n265 118n255 118n255 117n253 117n253 121n273 121n273 121n273 101n157 108n207 118n256 105n185 109n212 110 109n212 107n203 107n203 107n203 107n203 118n257 118n258 118n258 122n279 118n255 107n203 120n268 122n281 122n279

329

J. Greco-Roman Literature 37.15.10 40.2.16 44.7.9 47.10.5.11 47.10.17.10–14 47.11.5 48 48.2.12.4 48.5.27 48.8.2 48.8.3.4 48.8.6 48.8.11.1–2 48.9 48.9.5 48.18 48.18.7 48.19.10 48.19.28.11 48.19.28.16 48.20.1 49.17 48.19.8.3 50.16.195–96 50.16.220.3 50.17.32 Historia Augusta Hadrian 18.7–11

Pertinax 9.10

122n279 122n278 115n245 114n240 115n245 106n196 114n237 119n264 115n241 120n270 108n207 108n207 105n185 119n262 120n269 115n241 115n242 114n239, 115n244 118n258 113 112n228 117n254 115 117n253 120n269 101, 198n266

105n186, 108n208, 120n271 107n200

Leges Duodecim Tabularum 1.4 113n234 3.5 98 4.2 117n250, 117n251 8.3 113n230 8.14 113n230 11.1 113n234 Novellae Constitutiones 134.7 98n141 142 108n207

Aeschines In Timarchum 16–17

80n13

Antiphon 5.47–48 Herodes

79n9

Appian Bella civilia 2.17.120

83n33

Apuleius Metamorphoses 9.12–13

104n175

Archytas Fragmenta A7, A8

92n99

Aristides Orationes 26.39

49n103

Aristophanes Ranae 618–25

80n12

Aristotle Athenaion politeia 2.2 5.1–6.1 9.1 12.4

78n4 78n4 78n4 78n4

Ethica nicomachea 5 (1129a–38b15) 3n6 5.5.6 (1132b32–33a1) 91n95 5.6.4–9 (1134a25–b17) 89n82 5.6.8–9 (1134b11–14) 89 5.10.3–8 (1137b11–38a4) 7n22 8–9 (1155a–72a16) 92n100 8.1.2 (1155a14–17) 92 8.10 (1160a31–61a9) 86n55 8.10.4 (1160b28–33) 86n56, 117n249 8.11.5 (1161a25–31) 92n102, 92n103 8.11.6–8 (1161a31–b10) 92 8.11.6 (1161b3) 92

330 10.6.8 (1177a8–9) Politica 1 (1252a–60b26) 1.1.2 (1252a7–18) 1.1.4 (1252a31–34) 1.1.5 (1252b5–9) 1.2.3 (1253b15–23) 1.2.6 (1254a10–13) 1.2.7 (1254a14–18) 1.2.8–9 (1254a20–33) 1.2.8 (1254a23–24) 1.2.8 (1254a24–25) 1.2.8 (1254a25–28) 1.2.9–12 (1254a28–b14) 1.2.10 (1254a36–b3) 1.2.12 (1254b10–14) 1.2.13 (1254b19–21) 1.2.13 (1254b21–23) 1.2.13 (1254b23–24) 1.2.14 (1254b25–27) 1.2.14 (1254b33–34) 1.2.15 (1255a1–3) 1.2.16–17 (1255a3–22) 1.2.18 (1255a22–33) 1.2.19 (1255a34–36) 1.2.19 (1255b3–4) 1.2.20–21 (1255b6–14) 1.2.21 (1255b13–15) 1.2.21 (1255b21) 1.2.23 (1255b33–37) 1.2.23 (1255b34–35) 1.3.8 (1256b24–27) 1.5.2 (1259a40–b18) 1.5.2 (1259b6–7) 1.5.6 (1260a8–14)

Index of References 87n66

35 86n55 87n61, 87n64 86n56 90n86 87n62 87n62 85n50 89n79 86n55 87n60 85n51 86n53 87n60 87n64 87n67 87n61 87 86n54 89 90n86 91n88 91n89 86n54 87n64 92 91n93 88n68 87n61 89n81 86n59, 91n94 86n54 86, 86n55, 86n59 1.5.6 (1260a11–14) 87n61 1.5.11 (1260b5–7) 88n76 2.1.5–6 (1261a32–61b5) 4n12 2.1.15–17 (1262a39–b25) 92n100 2.2.12 (1264a20–23) 84n42 2.4.13 (1267b14–17) 207n17 2.6.2–4 (1269a34–b11) 88n69 3.4.4 (1278b33–35) 87 3.5–7 (1279a25–84a4) 3n6 3.5.10 (1280a32–35) 87n66 3.5.14 (1280b35–81a4) 92n100

3.7.1 (1282b14–24)

6n20, 44n74, 91n92 6.3.5 (1320b5–6) 92n100 7.6.1–2 (1327b18–28a1) 91n91 7.9.9 (1330a26–30) 88n71 7.9.9 (1330a32–33) 89n77 Rhetorica 1.13.2 (1373b18)

93n105

[Aristotle] Oeconomica 1.5.3 (1344a35–b4) 1.5.6 (1344b15–20) 1.5.6 (1344b20–21)

81n19 82n28 80

Artemidorus Daldianus Onirocritica 1.78 3.28.1

80n16 179n174

Athenaeus Deipnosophistae 14.657D–E

83n36

Cato the Elder De agricultura (De re rustica) 2.2 103n169 2.5–7 103n169 2.7 103 2.56–59 103n169 Chrysippus Stoicorvm Vetervm Fragmenta 3:351 132n319 Cicero Epistulae ad Atticum 5.20.5

100n154, 112n224

Pro Cluentio 187–88

105n182

Epistulae ad familiares 13.16 13.21 13.22 13.23

123n283 123n283 123n283 123n283

331

J. Greco-Roman Literature 13.45 13.46 13.60 13.69 13.70 16.4 16.16

123n284, 268n253 123n283 123n283 123n283 123n283 103n168 103n168

De officiis 1.3.7–8 1.4.11–14 1.4.12 1.4.14 1.7.21 1.13.41 1.14.42–15.45 2.15.52–55 2.20.71 2.26–27

132n325 100n150 126n299 132n325 100n151 132n325 132n325 132n325 132n325 100n153

Orationes philippicae 8.11 (8.32)

134n336, 134n336

De provinciis consularibus 1.5 (1.10) 100 De republica 3.35 3.38

100n153 100n153

Columella De re rustica 1.1.19 1.2.1 1.5.3 1.7.6–7 1.8 1.9.5–8 1.11.3 1.11.14–23 1.13.12 1.17.2

103n171 103n171 103n171 103n171 103n171 103n171 103n171 103n171 98n137 99n147

Demosthenes In Midiam 46–49

80n13

Pro Phormione 28–30 34

82n31 82n31

Dio Cassius Historia romana 45.13.7 54.23

125 105n183

Dio Chrysostom De servitute et libertate ii (Or. 15) 5 80n16, 80n16 17 82n31 Diodorus Siculus Historia 3.12–13 3.13.3 5.38.1 5.71.2 34/35.2–48 36.3.1–3

104n175 103 104n175 45n82 96n121, 107n205 98n136

Diogenes Laertius Vitae Philosophorum 6.55 Diogenes 7.121 Zeno 7.126 Zeno

97n127 97n126 45

Dionysius of Halicarnassus Antiquitates romanae 1.9.4 83n33 4.1.1–3 99n144 4.23–24 125n293 4.23.1 101n156 20.13 104n177

Epictetus Diatribai (Dissertationes) 1.13.3 62n172 3.24.16 62 4.27–33 103n173, 166n124 Euripides Fragmenta 511

93n108

332

Index of References

831

93n108

Ion 2.854–56

93n108

Gaius (Roman jurist) Institutiones 1.13–46 1.48–49 1.52 1.53 1.55

1.108–46 1.197 3.213 3.220–24 Galen De animi passionibus 1.4 1.8

124n288 117n253 101 106n187, 107n202 116n248, 117n253, 119n265 117n253 107n203 106n187 115n245

97, 104n176, 106n191 104n176

Herodotus Historiae 8.105–6

79n10

Hierocles Fragmenta 89–91

53n125

Isocrates Panegyricus (Or. 4) 181

79n9

Justinian Institutiones 1.5 1.5.3 1.8.2 1.9.2 1.9.3 1.12.6 1.12.10 1.24 4.3

78n2 124n288 106n187 119n265 117n253 117n253 117n253 107n203 101n157

4.3.11 4.4 4.4.1 4.18.6

106n187 115n245 115n246 119n262

Juvenal Satirae 1.24–30 1.102–16 3.131–32

110n215 110n215 110n215

Livy Ab urbe condita 1.38.5–39.3 8.28 36.17.5

Lucian Saturnalia 1.1 1.2 1.7 1.9 1.11 1.13 1.25 1.36

99n144 98n134, 104n179 101n157, 101n157

111n222 111n222 111n220, 111n222 111 111n222 111n220 111n222 111n222

Macrobius Saturnaliorum Libri Septem 1.7.37 111n219 1.10.22–11.50 111n219 1.12.7 111n219 1.24.22–23 111n219 Menander Monostichoi 259

45

Paulus (Roman jurist) Sententiae 3.4.7 5.23.6

107n203 106n189

333

J. Greco-Roman Literature Philemon (Gk. playwright) Incerta fabulae fragment 39 94n112 Plato Leges 6.741B–C 6.757A 6.757B–C 6.776D 6.777D–78A 6.777D–E 6.777D 6.778A 9.865C–D 9.866D–67C 9.868A–B 9.868B–C 9.872B–C 9.877B 9.879A 9.882A–C 9.937A–B 9.938B–C 11.915A–C Timaeus 35A

190n225 92n99 3n6 88 92n99 88, 48n102 91n95 88 79n9, 81n22 81n22 79n9, 81n22 81n23 81n22, 81n23 81n23 82n25 82n25 80n12 80n12 82

83n36

Moralia 140B 144C–D 769F–70A

201n278 201n278 201n278

Solon 13.2 15.2–5

78n4 78n4

[Plutarch] Vitae decem oratorum 842a

94n109

Pollux Onomasticon 3.78–83

84n43

Polybius Historiae 2.38.8

46

Rufus, Gaius Musonius Diatribes 12

70n214, 202n281

214n51

Pliny the Elder Naturalis historia 9.39

105n183

Pliny the Younger Epistulae 1.4 5.19 8.1 8.16 8.19 103

121n275 121n275 121n275 121n275 121n275 59n147

Plutarch Cato Major 4.4–5.2 5.6–7

103n170 103n170

Lycurgus 8.1–9.2

28.1–5

83n38

Seneca the Younger De beneficiis 3.17.3–28.6 3.17.3–4 3.17.4–28.6 3.18.1 3.18.2 3.18.3–4 3.19.1 3.19.2–3 3.19.4–21.1 3.19.4 3.20 3.20.1 3.21.1 3.21.2 3.22.4 3.23.2–27.4 3.23.3 3.28.1–3

131n309 132n321 34n24 131n309 132n321 132n320 131n309 132n322 131n318 131n314 97 131 132n323 131 131n317, 132n319 132n322 132n324 131

334 De clementia 1.15.7–16.1 1.18.1 1.19.1 2.3 2.7.3 Epistulae morales 3.2–3 27.5 47 47.1 47.2–3 47.2 47.4–5 47.5–7 47.8 47.9 47.10–12 47.10 47.11 47.12 47.13

47.15–16 47.15 47.17 47.18–20 47.20 48.2

Index of References

130n305 130 130n304 129n302 129

48n102 110n215 34n25, 48n102 133 133n330 133, 134n335 133n329 133n330 134n335 110n215 100n155, 133n328 62, 133 133n329, 134n334 133n327 63n175, 133n329, 134n335 134, 134n335 63n175, 134n334 97n129, 133n330 133n329 133n330 48n102

De ira 1.15.3 2.25 3.12.5–7 3.24.2–3 3.32 3.40

97n131 97n131 97n131 97n131 129n303 105n183

De tranquillitate animi 8.7–9.2

97n127

Stephanos Scholia to Aristotle, Rhet. 74.31–32 93n105 Stobaeus Florilgium 4.660.17–61.4

53n125

Suetonius Divus Augustus 10.3 14–15 16.3–4 17 19 21.2 27.3–4 35.2 40.2 40.3 49.1–2 60 66.2 67.2

126n296 126n296 126n296 126n296 126n296 100n153 126n296 126n296 126n296 125 126n296 126n296 126n296 126n296

Divus Claudius 25.2

109n211

Domitianus 7.1

108n207

Tiberius 58

106n195

Tacitus Annales 3.60 13.27 13.32.1 14.42–45 14.42 14.45 3.36

106n196 99n145 118n258 119n259, 130n306 119n260 130n308 106n196

Theopompus Fragmente der griechischen Historiker 155 F 122 78

335

J. Greco-Roman Literature Thucydides Historiae 4.80.3–4

83n36

Varro De lingua latina 7.105

98n134

De re rustica 1.17.2 1.17–18

98n137 103n169

Vettius Valens Anthologiarum Libri 2.3 (59.25) 9.1 (332.34)

46n84 46n84

Xenophon Cyropaedia 2.2.18–22 2.2.18 2.3.4–16 7.5.73 9.5 10.12

43n68 43 43n68 77 80n17 80

Hellenica 3.3.6

83

Oeconomicus 5.15–16 7.35–41 7.37 9.11–19 12.2–9 13.6–12

81n20 81n20 81 81n20 81n20 81n20

Index of Names Abbott, Thomas K. 41, 42, 46, 48, 40n61, 51n115, 240n164, 241n170, 242n177 Arndt, William F. 40n61, 45, 46, 48, 49, 206n7, 231n114, 245n181, 255n223, 256n225, 261n238 Arnold, Clinton E. 251n201, 251n202, 252n206, 252n208, 252n210, 252n213, 253n215, 259n229, 261n238 Arzt-Grabner, Peter 57, 58n144, 58n146, 61n158, 63 Ascough, Richard S. 17, 207n14 Astin, Alan E. 104, 107n203 Austin, Michel M. 44, 83n33, 123n286 Bailey, Lloyd R. 185n201, 192n237 Baker, David L. 154n62, 168n107 Balberg, Mira 149, 154, 155, 155n64, 155n65, 155n68, 155n70, 155n71, 156, 156n73 Balch, David L. 20, 21, 21n59, 21n62, 31n12, 32n13, 32n17, 34, 34n27, 35, 35n27, 35n29, 35n31, 36, 36n34, 36n35, 36n36, 38, 55n133, 61n159 Balentine, Samuel E. 188n214, 189n219 Barclay, John M. G. 19, 21, 21n64, 21n65, 21n66, 23n76, 34n27, 55n131, 60n156, 60n157, 62, 62n167, 64, 65, 207, 208, 217, 218n65, 219n66, 219n67, 220n67, 222n76, 222n78, 223n82, 225n92, 227n99, 230n106, 230n108, 232n117 Barnett, Paul 205n2, 207n15, 207n15 Barrett, Charles K. 205n2, 205n4, 206n10, 216n56, 230n107

Bartchy, S. Scott 18n52, 55n133, 61n159, 66, 67, 68, 69, 69n211, 103n173 Barth, Markus 40, 40n61, 48, 54n128, 56, 58n144, 59n147, 59n148, 59n149, 60n156, 60n158, 62, 62n173, 63, 236n137, 238n147, 241n168, 242n176, 243n177, 246, 251n202, 251n204, 252n208, 252n209, 252n210, 252n211, 261n238, 264n242, 265, 265n244 Basore, John W. 129, 130, 132n319 Bassler, Jouette M. 19n55, 23, 52, 53, 72n224, 170, 183, 210, 212, 219, 220, 219n66, 220n68, 225n88, 225n93, 228n103, 246, 260, 262 Bauckham, Richard 223n80, 223n82 Bauer, Walter 40n61, 45, 46, 48, 49, 206n7, 231n114, 245n181, 255n223, 256n225, 261n238 Bauman, Richard A. 112n228, 113n231, 113n232, 113n235, 114n236, 114n237, 114n238, 114n240, 115n244, 119, 119n260, 119n263, 129, 129n303, 130n307 Beale, Gregory K. 46n88, 233n121, 234n121, 234n126, 234n127, 236n134, 236n138, 239n154, 239n155, 240n159, 241n165, 241n168, 241n169, 242n174, 243n177 Beard, Mary 100n153, 113n233, 125n291, 127n300 Beet, Joseph A. 40n61, 51n114 Beetham, Christopher A. 24n81, 24n81, 233n121, 234n127, 235n129, 236n134 Best, Ernest 50, 51, 53, 213n43, 215n54, 250, 251n201, 251n202,

338

Index of Names

251n205, 252n206, 252n209, 252n210, 252n211, 261n238 Betz, Hans D. 23n73, 205, 207n16, 219n66, 219n67, 220n67, 221n71, 221n74, 222n78, 223n82, 232n118 Binder, Hermann 60n154, 60n156, 60n158, 265n245, 266n246 Bird, Michael F. 223n80, 223n82 Blanke, Helmut 40, 40n61, 48, 56, 54n128, 58n144, 59n147, 59n148, 59n149, 60n156, 60n158, 62, 62n173, 63, 236n137, 238n147, 241n168, 242n176, 243n177, 246, 264n242, 265n244, 265n245 Bodel, John 80n15, 80n17, 99n142, 103n172, 111n218, 118n256 Boecker, Hans J. 142, 143, 143n15, 158n83, 168n131 Boer, Martinus C. 218n65, 219n67, 220n67, 220n69, 221n70, 221n71, 221n72, 221n73, 223n80, 232n119 Borgen, Peder 197n258, 197n260 Bradley, Keith R. 67, 67n198, 68, 68n209, 69, 73, 83n33, 96n116, 96n121, 97n128, 97n131, 98n133, 98n135, 99, 99n142, 99n144, 99n146, 99n147, 100, 100n149, 101, 102, 102n166, 103n167, 103n168, 103n172, 103n173, 103n174, 104n175, 105, 105n181, 105n186, 106, 107, 107n197, 107n200, 108n207, 108n208, 109n210, 109n211, 110n216, 111n218, 112, 112n223, 113n230, 113n232, 114n237, 115n241, 115n244, 118n256, 118n257, 118n258, 119, 119n264, 121n274, 122n279, 123n283, 123n285, 124, 125, 126, 126n297, 128n301, 131, 132n319, 133, 134n336, 135, 254, 259 Braulik, Georg 172, 168n131 Briggs, Sheila 13n40, 72n222 Bruce, F. F. 41n61, 51n115, 52n119, 54n128, 55n133, 59n148, 60n156, 65n185, 216n56, 219n66, 219n67, 220n67, 221n72, 230n107, 231n116, 232n118, 243n177, 251n201, 252n213

Buckland, W. W. 104, 106, 107n197, 109n211, 116n248, 124n288 Burton, Ernest D. W. 219n67, 221n71, 222n78 Byron, John 12n37, 13n41, 18n52, 29n1, 54n126, 66n190, 110n216 Callahan, Allen D. 13n41, 54n127, 69n209 Cambiano, Giuseppe 90n84, 93 Campbell, Douglas A. 12n35, 55n133, 236n137 Cardellini, Innocenzo 143, 159n84, 194n247 Carmichael, Calum M. 164, 176n161, 177n169, 188n213, 189n220 Cartledge, Paul 78n3, 79n6, 83n34, 83n35, 88n70, 98n135, 99, 99n142, 100 Cassuto, Umberto 152n48, 153n53, 163n106 Castelli, Elizabeth A. 13n40, 22n70, 23n73 Childs, Brevard S. 143n15, 152n49, 159, 166n124 Chirichigno, Gregory 141n10, 143, 145, 146, 147, 147n34, 152n48, 158n83, 158n84, 159n88, 160, 160n97, 161, 161n101, 163n106, 164, 165, 165n119, 166, 171n144, 175n157, 175n159, 176, 177n169, 178n171, 188n211, 188n214, 189n218, 189n219, 190n223, 191, 192n235, 193n240, 194, 195n252, 196 Christensen, Duane L. 171n144, 172n147, 173n153, 176n162, 176n165, 178n170, 178n171 Clark, Gordon H. 41n61, 48 Clements, Ronald E. 152n48, 166n124 Clines, David J. 180n178, 180n179 Colson, F. H. 143, 198n261 Combes, Isobel A. J. 12n38, 69n211 Craigie, Peter C. 168n131, 177n167 Crouch, James E. 30n5, 31, 33, 34, 36, 36n36, 52, 237, 239 Danker, Frederick W. 40n61, 45, 46, 48, 49, 206n7, 225n87, 231n114,

Index of Names 239n152, 245n181, 255n223, 256n225, 261n238 Das, A. Andrew 219n66, 219n67, 220n67, 221n70, 221n71, 221n72, 223, 223n80, 224, 224n83, 225, 227n99, 229n106, 230n108 Daube, David 144, 166 Davies, Gwynne H. 146n26, 153n53 Davies, W. D. 24, 25n82, 25n85 Dawson, Kirsten 180, 181, 181n184 Delitizsch, Franz 166n124, 176n162, 209n25, 209n26 deSilva, David A. 219n66, 221n70, 222n76, 224n83 Dibelius, Martin 20n59, 30, 30n5, 31, 35, 36, 60, 267 Dindorf, Wilhelm 45, 45n78 Dmitriev, Sviatoslav 80n12, 80n13 Dobbs, Darrell 85n48, 85n49, 87n61, 89n78, 89n79, 90n84 Downs, David J. 205n2, 206n13, 208n22 Driver, S. R. 152n49, 153n53, 161n101, 177n169, 190 Dunn, James D. G. 19, 34n27, 39, 40n61, 52n119, 54n128, 55n133, 56n139, 59n148, 61n159, 62, 62n169, 65n185, 218, 218n65, 219n66, 219n67, 220n67, 220n69, 221n73, 222n76, 222n78, 223n82, 224n84, 225n91, 226n98, 227, 230n106, 230n107, 230n108, 232n119, 234n125, 234n126, 239, 239n153, 240n164, 241, 241n168, 241n169, 242n170, 243n177, 245n181, 248n192 Dworkin, Ronald M. XVI, 3, 49, 273 Ebner, Martin 55n133, 57n142, 59n148, 61, 63 Eckey, W. 56n135, 59n148, 60n156, 61n159 Edmondson, Jonathan 109n210, 111n218, 112n223, 122n277, 123n285 Ehrensperger, Kathy 22n70, 23 Ellens, Deborah L. 173, 174n154, 184n192 Ellicott, Charles J. 40n61, 48n100

339

Elliott, John H. 20, 21, 21n62, 34 Enns, Peter 146n26, 151, 164n110 Ernst, Josef 240n164, 241n170, 251n206, 252n213 Esler, Philip F. 220n69, 223n83 Ewald, Paul 40n61, 50n111, 251n202 Fee, Gordon D. 212n38, 212n39, 213n43, 215n53, 219n67, 220n67, 221n71, 221n72, 224n83, 233n121, 234n127, 235, 236n138 Finley, Moses I. 67, 68, 68n207, 70n214, 96n115, 103n167 Fitzmyer, Joseph A. 54n127, 55n133, 56n139, 60n156 Flesher, Paul V. McC. 68, 74n234, 75n237, 144n19, 147n34, 152n49, 167n128 Förster, Hans 56n136, 58n144, 61, 61n158, 63 Foster, Paul 39, 46n88, 233n121, 234n127, 238n145, 239n154, 240n161, 240n163, 241n168, 242n173, 243n177 Fowl, Stephen E. 51n115, 52n119, 251n202, 251n205, 252n206, 252n208, 252n209, 254n220 Frederick, John 234, 234n122, 234n127, 235, 240 Friberg, Barbara 239n152, 245n181 Friberg, Timothy 239n152, 245n181 Friedl, A. 169n131, 208n21 Friesen, Steven J. 111n221, 210n27 Furnish, Victor P. 73n227, 205n2, 206n10, 211, 216n58 Galenson, David W. 14, 14n45 Gardner, Jane F. 98n133, 99n146, 99n148, 101n157, 105n185, 105n186, 106, 107n202, 108n207, 108n208, 109n211, 114n237, 115n241, 118n256, 118n257, 124n288, 125, 126, 166n122 Garlan, Yvon 78n4, 78n4, 78n5, 79, 79n6, 79n9, 79n11, 80n12, 80n13, 80n14, 80n15, 80n17, 81n20, 81n21, 82, 82n31, 83n33, 83n34, 83n35, 84, 84n41, 84n42, 84n43, 84n44, 96,

340

Index of Names

96n118, 96n119, 96n121, 96n123, 104n175, 133n332 Garnsey, Peter 85, 90n84, 93, 94n112, 95, 96n116, 96n121, 100n153, 101n161, 102n165, 107n197, 108n206, 131, 133, 197, 197n260, 271n258 Garrod, G. W. 40n58, 40n61 Gaventa, Beverly R. 218, 219n66 Gayer, Roland 59n148, 60n156, 62n173 Georgi, Dieter 205, 206 Gielen, Marlis 20n59, 31n12, 32n17, 40n61, 50n108, 50n111, 57n142, 238n147 Gingrich, F. Wilbur 40n61, 45, 46, 48, 49, 206n7, 231n114, 245n181, 255n223, 256n225, 261n238 Glancy, Jennifer A. 10n29, 13n40, 30, 38n47, 59n149, 60n156, 61, 67, 67n199, 67n200, 67n202, 68n209, 69, 70, 70n216, 71, 72, 73, 74, 74n233, 75, 76, 140, 158, 197, 199, 200n269, 200n270, 201, 201n278, 201n279, 201n280, 202, 202n281, 234, 254n217, 262, 264n243, 269, 270, 271, 272, 272n259, 274 Gnilka, Joachim 37, 37n42, 39, 40n61, 60n156, 62n173, 240n164, 241n168, 241n170, 242n176, 243n177, 265n245 Golden, Mark 80n14, 80n15, 81n20, 82n26, 92n99 Goldingay, John 160, 171n143 Goodenough, Erwin R. 55n133, 267n251 Gosepath, Sefan XVI, 2n5, 3n7, 5, 6, 8n25, 10n30, 92n95 Grey, Cam 99n142, 99n148, 106, 115n244, 166n122 Grünwaldt, Klaus 185n201, 188n210 Gülzow, Henneke , 60n156, 60n158 Guthrie, William K. C. 102n165 Hamilton, Jeffries M. 168n131, 182, 182n188 Hamilton, Victor P. 164, 164n114 Hammond, Nicholas G. L. 78n4, 83n38, 95n113, 96n114

Hansen, Bruce 21, 21n66, 49n104, 217n61, 222n77, 223n83, 224n83, 224n84, 225n89, 226, 227n99, 236n133, 236n135 Harper, Kyle 70n216, 122n280 Harrill, J. Albert 2n4, 13n41, 15n47, 18, 53, 54n127, 56, 61n159, 67, 67n199, 67n200, 68n209, 69, 73, 124n286, 167n128, 237n143, 245n182, 271n258, 272 Harris, Murray J. 12n38, 40n61, 52n119, 59n148, 65n185, 69n211, 239n155, 240n161, 240n164, 242n173 Harris, William V. 120n266, 120n267 Harrison, Percy N. 59n148, 60, 61n159 Hartley, John E. 184n193, 184n194, 188n210, 188n211, 188n214, 189n220, 191n229, 191n230, 192n234, 192n235, 192n238, 192n239, 193n240, 195 Hartman, Lars 36n37, 236n139 Harvey, F. David 3n6, 43n69 Hays, Richard B. 19n53, 24, 25n84, 205n3, 208, 209, 223n82, 224n83, 225n92, 226n96, 228n105 Heath, Malcolm 85n49, 86n54, 87n61, 91n91 Heil, John P. 51n113, 52n119, 251n201 Heiligenthal, Roman 222n76, 223n82 Heinisch, Paul 165n117, 166n124, 184n194 Hendriksen, William 41n61, 60n158, 241n168, 243n177 Hering, James P. 21, 30n3, 30n4, 30n5, 36, 36n36, 37, 47, 49n106, 51, 102n165, 237n144, 238, 238n147, 238n149, 238n150, 239, 239n157, 240n160, 241n168, 242n171, 242n172, 243n177, 248n192, 251n201, 251n206 Hezser, Catherine 30, 68n209, 69, 74, 75, 75n235, 75n237, 76, 138n1, 150, 151, 158, 161n100, 167n126, 179, 179n174, 198n263, 200n269, 200n270 Hobbes, Thomas 3, 4 Hoehner, Harold W. 51n115, 52n119, 251n202, 251n205, 251n206,

Index of Names 252n208, 252n210, 252n211, 252n212, 252n213, 254n217, 255n221, 255n223, 256n225, 256n227, 257n228, 259n229, 261n238, 261n240 Horrell, David G. 21n62, 22, 22n69, 22n70, 23, 25n84, 223n83, 224n84, 252n209 Horsley, Richard A. 13n39, 13n41, 69n209 Horstmanshoff, H. F. J. 247n190, 247n191 Houten, Christiana van 19n55, 168, 171, 182 Houtman, Cornelis 141n10, 144n22, 147n32, 148n35, 152n49, 152n51, 158, 159, 161n99, 161n101 Hübner, Hans 40n61, 55n133, 60n158, 240n164, 242n170 Hugedé, Norbert 39n48, 40n61 Hume, Charles R. 40, 41n61, 240n164, 242n170, 246n184 Hunt, Peter 78n4, 79n6, 81n21, 85, 90, 90n84, 93n105, 94n111, 96n117, 97n125, 97n128, 97n130 Instone-Brewer, David 25n85, 161n102, 162n105, 165n118 Jackson, Bernard S. 138n2, 139n5, 142, 143n15, 144, 145, 147, 148n35, 152n48, 153n52, 153n53, 156n74, 156n76, 158n84, 159n88, 160n92, 163n106, 164n109, 164n114, 164n115, 165, 166 Jacob, Benno 146n26, 152n48, 153n54, 153n54, 158n83, 158n84, 159n90, 164n113, 165, 165n117, 166 Jamir, Lanuwabang 211n36, 211n37 Jepsen, Alfred 141n8, 143n15 Jewett, Robert 225, 225n89 Joshel, Sandra R. 67n202, 97n125, 103n172, 121, 121n274, 122 Kaufman, Stephen A. 168n131, 172 Keener, Craig S. 200n271, 204n1, 219n66, 219n67, 220n67, 220n69, 221n71, 221n72, 222n76, 222n78, 223n80, 223n81, 223n82, 224n83,

341

224n85, 225, 225n91, 225n92, 226n95, 226n96, 227n99, 227n101, 230n108, 230n109, 231n111, 232n119 Keil, Carl F. 166n124, 176n162, 209n25, 209n26 King, Martin Luther, Jr. 273, 274 Kleinig, John W. 189n219, 189n220 Knox, John 58, 59, 59n147 Kopak, Paul E. 220n67, 224n86 Krug, Kathryn 225n87, 239n152, 245n181 Kyrtatas, Dimitris J. 78n4, 79n7, 82n26, 82n30 Lake, Kirsopp 208n21, 221n71 Lampe, Peter 55n133, 109n212 Lang, F. 213n43, 216n56 Larkin, William J. 51n113, 51n116, 259n229 Laub, Franz 31, 237 Lefebvre, Jean-François 164n112, 192n238 Lehmann, Richard 56n135, 60n156 Lemche, Niels P. 163n106, 192n237 Lenski, R. C. H. 48n98, 51n116, 240n164, 241n170, 243n177 Leppä, Outi 39, 41n61, 238n145, 239n153 Levine, Baruch A. 184n193, 184n194, 187n208, 192n236, 195 Levinson, Barnard M. 141n9, 141n10, 141n10, 142n11, 163, 168n108 Lewis, David M. 69n210, 84n41 Lietzmann, Hans 205n2, 230n107 Lightfoot, Joseph B. 40n61, 44n74, 54n130, 64, 65, 66n190, 219n66, 221n73, 238n145, 241n169, 243n177, 265n244 Lincoln, Andrew T. 40, 51n115, 52n119, 170, 234n125, 240n164, 242n170, 243, 243n177, 246, 250n194, 251n201, 251n202, 251n205, 251n206, 252n207, 252n208, 252n209, 252n210, 252n212, 253n213, 253n215, 254n220, 255n221, 255n223, 256n225, 256n227, 259n233, 261n238, 261n240

342

Index of Names

Lindenberger, James M. 176n165, 177n168, 177n169 Lohmeyer, Ernst 31, 32, 33, 39n57, 40n61, 61, 239n158, 241n168, 243n177 Lohse, Eduard 36n38, 39, 40n61, 239, 240n159, 240n164, 241n170, 242, 243n177, 247, 248n192 Longenecker, Richard N. 219n66, 219n67, 220n67, 221n71, 221n72, 222n78, 230n108, 231n116, 232n118 Louw, Johannes P. 51, 255n223 Lüdemann, Gerd 31n12, 222n78 Lundbom, Jack R. 169n131, 170n135, 171n144, 172n147, 173n148, 173n153, 176, 177n168, 182n188 MacDonald, Margaret Y. 34n27, 39, 41n61, 73n228, 74n231, 241n167, 241n168, 241n169, 248n192 Manning, C. E. 96, 96n116, 96n117, 102n165, 105n184, 105n185, 109n210, 113n230, 130n308, 134n335, 135 Marshall, I. Howard 55n133, 59, 65, 65n185 Martin, Dale B. 74, 75, 75n237, 99n143, 110, 138, 213n43, 215 Martin, Ralph P. 38, 39, 41n61, 61n159, 65n185, 241n170, 243n177 Martin, Troy W. 226, 226n97,227, 227n99, 236n137 Martyn, J. Louis 218n65, 219n66, 219n67, 220n69, 221n70, 221n74, 222n76, 225n89, 225n92, 228n104, 231n116, 232n119 Matera, Frank J. 220n69, 226n96, 229n106 Mayes, Andrew D. H. 168n131, 171n141, 176n162 McComiskey, Thomas E. 157, 158n80 McConville, J. G. 170, 171n141, 171n142, 172n147, 173n153, 175, 175n157, 176n161, 176n165, 178n170, 179, 182n188 McKeown, Niall 68, 81n21, 88n72

Meeks, Wayne A. 10n29, 13n41, 14n41, 34n27, 52n119, 64, 64n184, 65n188, 207n14, 235n130 Melanchthon, Philip 41, 46 Melick, Richard R., Jr. 39, 41n61, 60n158, 241n168, 242n177 Mendelsohn, Isaac 160, 160n94, 163n107, 177, 182, 182n187, 191, 196 Merkle, Benjamin L. 252n212, 252n213, 253n215, 254n220, 255n221, 255n223, 259, 259n229, 259n230, 261n238 Metzger, Bruce M. 221n70, 234n126, 236n133, 251n201, 256n227 Meyer, Heinrich A. W. 47, 48, 48n100, 49, 50n111, 242n177, 246 Miers, Suzanne 1n2, 15n47, 68n209 Milgrom, Jacob 169n131, 184n191, 184n192, 184n193, 184n195, 185, 185n196, 185n201, 186n203, 187n205, 187n206, 187n208, 187n209, 188n210, 188n211, 188n212, 188n214, 189, 189n214, 189n219, 189n220, 190n221, 190n224, 190n225, 191, 191n230, 191n233, 192n234, 192n236, 192n239, 193, 193n245, 194, 194n247, 194n248, 195, 195n253, 196, 196n257 Millar, Neva F. 239n152, 245n181 Mitchell, Margaret M. 54n127, 54n130, 213n43, 214, 214n46, 215n53 Moo, Douglas J. 22n71, 41n61, 60n154, 61n159, 218n65, 219n66, 219n67, 220n67, 221n71, 221n72, 221n73, 222n78, 223n82, 224n83, 229n106, 230n108, 232n119, 237n142, 238n145, 239n155, 240n163, 240n164, 241n165, 241n168, 242n170 Moritz, Thorsten 250, 250n199, 261n237 Morley, Neville 102n166, 110, 118n256, 122n279, 123n285 Morrow, Glenn R. 80n12, 81n21 Morrow, William S. 171n142, 176n165

Index of Names Moule, C. F. D. 41n61, 54n129, 59, 238n145, 240n164, 241n168, 241n170 Muddiman, John 52n119, 53n125 Müller, Peter 55n133, 59n148, 61n158 Munck, Johannes 221n72, 222n78 Nanos, Mark D. 218n65, 223n82, 224n83 Nelson, Richard D. 169n131, 173n151, 176n162 Neufeld, Thomas R. Y. 50n110, 53n124 Neusner, Jacob 26, 26n89, 75, 75n237 Neutel, Karin B. 20, 72, 73n229, 217 Newsom, Carol A. 180n182, 181 Nida, Eugene A. 51, 255n223 Nihan, Christophe 186n204, 187n208, 189n219, 191n227 Nock, Arthur D. 221n71 Noll, Mark A. 13n41, 14n41 Nooratzij, A. 184n192, 184n194, 189n220 Nordling, John G. 41n61, 54, 54n127, 55, 58n146, 59n147, 60n158, 73n227, 268 Noth, Martin 152n48, 153n53, 161n101, 163n106, 166n124 O’Brien, Peter T. 39, 40n61, 48n99, 51n115, 53, 59, 59n148, 60n156, 60n158, 62n173, 238, 240n164, 241n170, 243n177, 248n192, 251, 251n201, 251n202, 251n204, 251n205, 252n206, 252n207, 252n208, 252n211, 252n212, 252n213, 253n215, 253n216, 255n221, 255n223, 260n235, 261n238 Ogereau, Julien M. 206n12, 207n14 Oppenheim, Felix 1n1, 3, 4n13, 5, 10n30 Osiek, Carolyn 31n12, 36n34, 71n217 Pao, David W. 49n105, 59n148, 61n164, 236n139, 237n142, 239n155, 240n161, 241n164, 241n168, 242n170, 243n177, 265n245

343

Patrick, Dale 140, 143, 146, 153, 166, 167, 186n201, 189n219, 190n225, 194n247 Patterson, Orlando 61n159, 68, 68n209, 69, 272 Patzia, Arthur G. 41n61, 51n115, 60n158 Paul, Shalom M. 35n31, 152n48, 159n90, 160, 160n94, 161, 163n106 Penna, Romano 51n115, 52n119 Phelps Brown, Henry 10, 11, 96 Phillips, Anthony 139, 166n124, 176n162, 177n167, 177n168, 177n169, 185 Plummer, Alfred 205n2, 215n53 Plunket, Rodney L. 209n25, 209n26 Pojman, Louis P. XVI, 1n1, 2n5, 4n11, 4n13, 5, 6n21, 7, 8n25, 10n30, 92n95 Pokorný, Fetr 39, 41n61 Porter, J. R. 187n208, 189n220 Pressler, Carolyn 159, 159n89, 160n94, 161, 169n131, 172n147, 174n155, 175n157 Propp, William H. 146, 150n41, 151, 152n51, 153n53, 158n83, 158n84, 159n90, 160, 161n99, 161n101, 163n106, 165n117 Rapske, Brian M. 55, 55n133, 56, 58 Reinmuth, Eckart 55n133, 60n156, 61n159 Rengstorf, Karl H. 31, 32, 33, 65, 251n206 Ridderbos, Herman 41n61, 47n91, 47n91 Rihll, T. E. 79n4, 79n9, 79n11, 80n13, 81n20, 82n26, 82n27, 82n29, 82n30, 82n31, 85, 94n109, 97n131, 104n175 Rohde, Joachim 60n154, 60n156, 60n158, 265n245, 266n246 Roloff, Jürgen 57n142, 61n159 Rosivach, Vincent J. 79n6, 94n110 Rosner, Brian S. 24n79, 25, 25n82, 26 Ryan, Judith 59n148, 61n159, 61n164 Sanders, E. P. 19n54, 26, 224n83

344

Index of Names

Sandmel, Samuel 17n50, 24, 197n258, 197n260 Sarna, Nahum M. 150n41, 152n48, 159n90, 161n99, 161n101, 162n103, 163n106, 164n111, 164n114, 165n117, 200n272 Scheidel, Walter 98, 98n138, 98n140, 99n146, 113n230 Schenker, Adrian 158n83, 189n219, 192n234 Schlatter, Adolf von 46, 47, 47n91 Schlier, Heinrich 51, 53, 223n83, 230n107, 251n202, 253n213 Schnackenburg, Rudolf 51n116, 251n201, 251n202, 252n213 Schrage, Wolfgang 39n51, 211n34, 213n45 Schreiner, Thomas R. 223n82, 229n106 Schroeder, David 31, 32, 33, 36, 36n36, 65, 238, 32n17 Schultz, Richard 140, 141n8 Schüssler Fiorenza, Elisabeth 20n58, 65 Schütz, John H. 218n65, 219n67 Schwartz, Baruch J. 184n191, 184n192, 184n193, 184n194, 185, 185n196, 186, 186n204, 187, 187n205, 187n208, 187n208 Schweizer, Eduard 241n170, 242n176, 243n177 Schwienhorst-Schönberger, Ludger 142n13, 148n35 Scott, E. F. 41n61, 50n111, 60n158, 243n177 Simpson, Peter L. P. 85, 85n49, 85n50, 85n51, 85n52, 86, 87n60, 87n61, 89n79, 90n84, 90n86, 91, 91n88, 91n89 Sklar, Jay 189n219, 192n237, 192n238, 192n239 Smith, Abraham 13n41, 69n209 Snaith, N. H. 184n192, 184n195, 190n223 Speiser, Ephraim A. 184n191, 187n208 Sprinkle, Joe M. 141n10, 142n13 Stählin, Gustav 39n57, 40, 40n61, 41, 41n61, 42, 43, 44, 44n74, 45, 46n88, 47, 48, 49, 247 Standhartinger, Angela 49, 52n119

Stemberger, Günter 25n82, 25n85, 150, 158n81, 179n173 Stowers, Stanley K. 13n39, 59n149 Strack, Hermann L. 25n82, 25n85, 150, 158n81, 179n173 Stuhlmacher, Peter 59n148, 60n158 Suhl, Alfred 55n133, 60, 61n164, 65n185 Sumney, Jerry L. 20n56, 24, 49, 233n121, 234n126, 234n127, 235, 236n136, 236n137, 238n145, 238n147, 241n164, 241n168, 242n170, 242n174, 243n177, 243n178 Taylor, Nicholas 54n129, 55n133, 60n158, 61, 62 Theissen, Gerd 211, 212 Thielman, Frank 252n207, 252n211, 253n213, 254n219, 259n229, 261n238 Thiselton, Anthony C. 1n3, 22n70, 68n207, 204n1, 210, 210n27, 210n29, 211n34, 212n38, 212n39, 213n43, 213n44, 214, 214n48, 214n49, 214n51, 215, 215n52, 215n53, 215n54, 216, 216n56, 216n59, 217n60 Thompson, Dorothy J. 84n45, 96n119 Thompson, James W. 23n76, 24n76 Thompson, Marianne M. 41n61, 56n135 Tidball, Derek 66, 69n211 Tierney, William G. 274n263 Tigay, Jeffrey H. 173n148, 175n157, 176, 176n162, 177, 178, 178n169, 178n171, 182n188 Tolmie, D. Francois, 20n57, 54n126 Tsai, Daisy Y. 168, 169n131, 182n188, 183n189 Turner, Max 56n135, 60n158 Urbach, Efraim E. 167, 167n128 Van Seters, John 168n108, 169n131 Vasser, Murray 48, 50, 135, 137, 247, 272n258 Vaux, Roland O. P. de 190, 191 Vincent, Marvin R. 65, 65n185

Index of Names Vlastos, Gregory 86n55, 88n72, 102n165 Vogt, Joseph 66, 67, 68 Vogt, Peter T. 169n131, 208n21 Vuolanto, Ville 98n138, 98n139, 99n142 Wagenaar, J. A. 158n83, 158n84, 159n90, 160n92 Wall, Robert W. 40n61, 61n159 Washington, Harold C. 169n131, 173n151, 174n154 Watson, Alan 101, 102n163, 104n178, 134n336 Watson, Francis 200n271, 220n69, 221n72, 222n76, 225n91 Wegenast, Klaus 253n213, 254n218 Weinfeld, Moshe 168n131, 170n134, 170n135, 174n155 Welborn, Laurence L. 3n6, 205, 206, 206n10, 206n13, 207, 209 Wengst, Klaus 56, 59, 60n156, 61n159 Wenham, Gordon J. 153, 186n204, 187n208, 189n218, 192n237, 192n239, 200 Westbrook, Raymond 138n2, 142n13, 148n35, 159, 159n90, 160, 160n94, 184n191, 187n208 Westermann, Carl 141n8, 200n271 Westmoreland, Robert 2n5, 4n13 Wette, W. M. L. de, 40n61, 51n113 Wiedemann, Thomas E. J. 12n36, 66, 66n195, 68, 97n125, 124n286

345

Wilson, R. McL. 41n61, 59, 61, 61n159, 65n185, 237n144, 241n169 Windisch, Hans 205, 205n2, 207n19 Winger, Thomas M. 252n206, 252n208, 252n210, 252n211, 252n212, 252n213, 253n215, 255n221 Winter, Bruce W. 210n29, 211n37 Winter, Sara C. 54, 58n144, 61n159 Witherington, Ben 50, 52n119, 56, 59n148, 61n159, 65n185, 212n39, 218n65, 219n67, 220n67, 221n70, 221n71, 221n72, 221n73, 221n74, 222n76, 222n78, 224n83, 230n106, 230n108, 231n116, 238n145, 251n201, 251n202, 251n205, 251n206, 252n209, 252n211, 253n215, 255n223 Wolter, Michael 9n27, 40n61, 46n89, 55n133, 60n154, 61n159, 210, 248n192 Wright, Christopher J. H. 152n48, 163n106, 168n108, 176n161, 180, 181, 183n189, 189n214, 191, 192n234, 192n236 Wright, David P. 75n235, 158n82, 164n111, 200n269 Wright, N. T. 39, 41n61, 58, 59n148, 61n159, 62n169, 63, 65n185, 240n164, 242n170, 243n177, 267, 268n254 Zimmermann, Ruben 7, 8

Subject Index Abraham (Abram) 74, 200–201, 227, 231–33, 270 Affection – between parents and children 86, 117n252, 120–23, 127 – from slave to slave-master – See Slave, ~ towards slave-master – from slave-master to slave – See Slave-master, ~ towards slave Age 153–54, 156, 192 – 1 year old 124 – 12 years old 162n103 – 20 years old 124 – 25 years old 117 – 30 years old 62, 124–25 – at marriage – See Marriage, ~ of bride Amount (financial) – 30 shekels 153, 156–58, 175n159, 178n171 – 50 shekels 155, 157, 175n159, 178n171 Autonomy 162n104, 216n59 – of modern individual – See Freedom, in antiquity verses modern day – of slave-master – See Slave-master, ~ Brotherhood – See Equality ethics, of brother rhetoric and Family, brother Christians – Gentile 234–35 – and equality with Jewish ~ – See Equality, between, Jew and Gentile – inclusion 19, 53, 208, 219– 20n67, 221–25, 227, 230, 235–36, 250 – Jewish 219n66, 222–23, 236

Circumcision 18, 28, 217–18, 219n66, 221–23, 225–29, 232, 277 Citizenship 3 – alien 99, 169, 182n185, 185, 189 – and democracy 2, 43, 45, 91, 206 – and oligarchy 2, 91, 206 – foreigner 44, 125, 161n101, 168, 171, 183 – metic 82, 95, 123 – See also Slave, compared to, ~ – peregrinus 112, 114, 116 – See also Slave, compared to ~ – political honours 2, 44 – political involvement 78, 82–83, 118, 123, 126 – resident 44, 169, 182, 190 – Roman 106, 112, 114, 118, 126, 128, 136 – See also Paul, as ~ citizen – upon manumission – See Slavery, manumission, and ~ – sojourner 19n55, 169, 171, 196, 274 Comparative analysis 8, 17, 38 – between different contexts 10–11, 16, 67, 69, 122, 138–39, 150–51, 164, 166, 177, 181, 187n208, 191, 196, 201–2, 212, 249, 257 – in same context 14, 16, 27, 77, 117, 128, 136–37, 139–41, 149, 169, 177, 187, 202, 249 Compensation 81, 113, 115, 149–51, 158 – emancipation – See Slavery, emancipation, as ~ – restitution 147–49, 152–53, 163, 186, 187n208 – See also Law, lex talionis (Jewish) Conflict 21, 113, 127, 210, 214, 217, 227–29, 231–32, 236 – See also Slave-master, and Christ, contrast

348

Subject Index

Criminal penalties – after only summary hearing 112 – comparison between – citizen and foreigner 171 – rich and poor 5, 113, 115 – See also Roman law, dual penalty system – slave and free 81, 95, 113, 115, 129–30, 143, 145, 147–49, 152, 184–87 – See also ~, death penalty, crucifixion – slave and freedman 130 – own and other’s slave 81, 106 – death penalty 81, 105–6, 112–14, 118–20, 130, 152, 182, 185–86, 187n205 – and property confiscation 112, 267–68 – crucifixion – for humiliores 114 – for slave – See Slave, death, crucifixion – for peregrinus 112 – exile 81, 108, 113–14, 120n266, 130 – flogging – See Slave, flogging – mitigating circumstances 5n14, 106, 119, 129, 130, 135, 143–44, 200 – See also Stoicism, clementia – re-enslavement – See Slavery, by penalty (servus poenae) – verses religious pollution – See Greek world, gods, pollution – vicarious punishment 148n33, 150– 51, 155, 156n76 Debt 177, 189–90 – amortisation 14–15, 148, 163–64, 177nn168–69, 188, 192–94 – creditor – See Slavery, kinds of, debt, and ~ – interest/usury 163, 168, 171, 177nn168–69, 189, 192, 194, 203 – relief 78, 98, 148n35, 171 – See also Jubilee – security for loan 171, 188–89, 192, 193n241, 194 – slavery – See Slavery, kinds of, ~ – See also Poverty

Divine 206 – and truth 252n208 – appeal 169 – appointment 219n67 – blessing 47, 171, 175n159, 176, 178–79 – as origin of human differences – See Human differences, cause – character 170, 176, 224, 234, 251 – creation 3, 10n31, 93, 102, 131, 133, 172, 180–81, 183, 203, 234, 252 – endorsement 224 – Greek gods – See Greek world, gods – grace 206–7 – holiness 252 – image of 3, 102, 234–35, 252 – impartiality 5, 19, 32, 50, 52–53, 71, 154, 169–70, 210, 218, 222, 242– 46, 248–49, 260–61 – See also Imitation ethics, of divine, ~ – imitation of – See Imitation ethics – in Stoicism – See Stoicism, ~ spirit/logos – judgement – See Justice, ~ – justification 170 – land 188–89, 192 – love 169, 235 – miracle 209n25 – omniscience 238n146 – purpose 214–15, 217, 256 – righteousness 170, 252 – sacrifice to 186, 187nn206, 209 – test 209n25 – valuation 215 – will 240, 255 – Yahweh 19, 141, 169–71, 176, 179, 183, 186, 188–90 Duty – of slave – See Slave, duties – towards family 120, 122–23, 160n92 – See also Stoicism, and duties Egalitarianism – See Equality, ~ Enlightenment, 3–4, 10, 16, 65, 276 Epaphras 57n142, 244–45

Subject Index Epicureanism 35n29, 96n116, 197 Equality – analysis 38, 50, 136, 204–5, 209– 10, 233, 244–47, 263, 276 – constructive use 8–9, 28, 36, 138–40, 168 – definition 7–9, 16 – depth required 23n74, 27, 30, 48, 64, 75, 77, 116–17 – descriptive use 7–8, 29 – and Christianity – See ~, natural, Christian – and cruciformity 22–23, 212 – See also Equality ethics, of ~ – and difference 6, 47, 63, 149, 152, 154–55, 165–67, 181, 199, 202,210–11, 213–17, 220, 226, 229, 232–33, 246, 248, 271, 273– 74, 276–77 – See also Human differences – and equal treatment – as inseparable XVI, 5–6 – See also ~ ethics – and justice 6, 38, 41–45, 47n91, 48n100, 49, 197–98, 246–48 – and neighbour 47 – See also Equality ethics, ~ – and unity 28, 206–7, 209–10, 224nn83, 86, 256 – See also Equality ethics, of ~ – attribute XVI, 2–5, 7–8, 42, 46 – between – citizen and foreigner 116 – Jew and Gentile 206–7, 225, 227–28, 256 – Paul and another 211, 216, 219– 21, 226, 229 – rich and poor 5, 156, 269 – See also ~, kinds of, social – slave and free 65–66, 75n237, 88, 91, 100, 108, 110, 111, 115–16, 128–31, 135, 137, 167, 179, 181, 199, 226, 228– 29, 232, 256–57, 259, 264, 269, 276–77 – slave and son 117, 127 – citizen and foreigner 116 – See also ~, kinds of and ~ ethics, between – confusion XVI, 3, 6–7, 20, 27, 29, 36, 38–53, 63–65, 76, 135–37, 179, 198–99, 205–9, 246, 262, 273–74, 276

349

Equality (contd.) – coram Christi 228, 259 – coram Deo 20, 40n58, 48, 70, 217, 225–26, 228–29, 232 – See also Divine, impartiality – definition XVI, 2–3, 27, 41–47, 49, 51–52, 76, 273–74, 276 – denied 3, 83, 88, 91–92, 95, 116, 127, 130, 136, 142, 149, 153–55, 157, 198–99, 210, 219, 223–25, 227–28, 236, 247 – egalitarianism 3, 6, 10–11, 20, 31, 33, 35, 37, 63, 65, 68n207, 207, 210–11, 217–18, 220, 229, 232, 246, 248, 269, 271, 273, 276 – eschatological 47, 210, 221, 229, 232, 236n136 – kinds of 49, 95, 135, 199, 205–6, 218 – legal 5, 42–43, 45, 127, 136, 167 – See also Justice – moral 2–4 – See also Equality, natural and Teleological reasoning – distribution 4, 43, 208–9 – opportunity 4, 165–67, 192, 196, 208, 274 – outcome 4, 192, 205–9, 273–74 – racial 91, 273–75, 276 – social 2, 4, 18, 52–53, 83, 110– 11, 115–16, 154–55, 168, 170, 183, 192, 196–97, 202, 204, 208, 210–12, 223, 270, 274 – See also ~, between, rich and poor – mutatis mutandis 51, 260 – See also ~, proportional – natural – Christian 3, 46, 102, 127, 136, 271 – Roman 100, 102, 108, 115–17, 119, 127–28, 136 – Stoicism 27, 36, 67, 96, 129–35, 198–99, 271 – See also Nature, by – numerical 2–3, 5–8, 42–45, 91, 122, 167, 181, 214, 216–17, 228, 259 – See also Equality ethics, ~ – parameters 7–8, 63, 204 – match 183, 202, 211–12, 246, 249, 259, 260–61 – presumption of 10

350

Subject Index

Equality (contd.) – proportional 2–3, 5–8, 41–46, 86, 91–92, 116, 122, 128, 137, 214 – See also Equality ethics, ~ – reciprocal 4 – See also ~ ethics, reciprocity – rhetoric 2–4, 10, 49, 198–99, 204–5, 208, 213n45, 276 – saturnalia 111–12 Equality ethics 36, 139–40, 169 – and neighbour 210, 212n42 – and impartiality 210 – as imitation – See Imitation ethics – author conscious of XVI, 5–6, 8, 42, 276 – bias towards slave – See Slave, bias towards – between – citizen and foreigner 5, 19n55, 44, 168, 171, 182, 196, 274 – Jew and Gentile 223–26, 229, 236, 274 – races 5, 273–74 – rich and poor 5–6, 18, 28, 154– 55, 168, 170–71, 202, 208, 211–12, 247, 249, 263, 270 – See also Roman empire, social stratification – slaves 6, 46, 182–83, 246, 261 – slave and daughter 160–62, 165 – slave and free 6, 27, 94–95, 127– 28, 131–35, 137, 141–43, 145, 147–49, 151–52, 154, 156–57, 165–68, 172, 178–79, 181, 183, 187, 195–99, 202, 204, 211–12, 229, 232–33, 236, 246–49, 257, 260–63, 276 – slave and son 165 – wives 159–62, 173–75 – See also Equality, between – definition 7–9 – numerical 4, 6 ,27–28, 132, 135, 141, 149, 152, 157, 162, 167–68, 170–71, 179–81, 183, 202, 204, 206, 209, 220, 229, 233, 246, 249, 273–74, 277 – as the same/identical treatment 5, 8, 35–36, 46, 51–52, 152, 158, 173, 178–79, 182, 198–99, 213, 215, 248, 260–62, 264, 276 – See also Equality, ~

Equality ethics (contd.) – of brother rhetoric 59, 61–64, 76, 170–71, 179, 182–83, 188, 208 – of cruciformity 207, 209, 212, 215– 17, 271 – of mutuality 32–33, 63, 161– 62n102, 207 – of unity 20, 27, 64–65, 170–71, 179–80, 204, 211, 213–18, 224– 29, 232–33, 235–36, 269, 274, 277 – over mourning 172–73 – proportional 4, 27, 46, 51, 92, 115– 16, 122, 132–33n325, 134–37, 155, 171, 176, 178, 199, 202, 206, 208–9, 215, 260–61 – as variable treatment 5, 8 – See also Equality, ~ – scope – church (ਥȞ ਥțțȜȘıȓ઺) 31, 212, 217, 230–31, 236–37, 249, 263 – comprehensiveness 5, 8, 47–48, 67, 135–37, 140–42, 172, 175, 179, 182–83, 187, 199, 202, 204, 246–47, 249, 260, 262– 64, 269–70, 272, 274 – household (ਥȞ Ƞ੅ț૳) 212, 217, 231, 237, 249, 263 – reciprocity 29n2, 207–8, 210, 247– 48, 257–58 – See also Equality, reciprocal – trajectory 12, 27, 28, 42–45, 78, 102, 127, 141, 168, 174–75, 177– 79, 187, 190–91, 193–94, 195n253, 196–97, 201–2, 204, 233, 263–65, 267–68, 272 – pragmatic rationale 49, 55, 62, 76, 268 – egalitarian and post-Pauline 64– 65, 180–83, 207, 271–72, 274 – See also Slavery, gradual demise – golden age – See Slavery, golden age – inegalitarian and intra Pauline 65, 269, 274 – mustard seed 64 – Pauline consciousness of 64–65, 271, 274 Equity 6, 38, 40–46, 48, 52, 95, 130, 170, 243, 273–74 – See also Equality, confusion

Subject Index Ethical sources 10n28, 12, 29–30, 38, 49, 50, 53, 63 – Ancient Near East 25n86, 138, 148n35, 152, 156n76, 158, 159n90, 160, 163–64, 177, 182, 191, 195, 202 – best fit 36, 185, 204 – thematic coherence 8–9, 23–24, 27, 53, 140–48, 167–68, 234 – Christian 31–32, 144, 226, 252–55 – Greco-Roman 23–24, 25n86, 27, 30–32, 44, 62, 75–76, 78, 138, 202, 204, 206–8, 215, 217, 234– 35, 245, 247–48, 256, 259, 271– 72n258 – Delphi 33n21, 82 – Judaism 23, 27–28, 30–31, 39, 40, 53, 74–75, 208n22, 217–18, 234, 239, 246n186, 254, 264, 268–70, 272, 274 – as similar to Greco-Roman slavery 24, 74–76, 138, 167–68, 172, 179, 181, 199, 201–3 – Gentile knowledge of 9, 18, 73– 74, 234–35, 244, 248, 250, 261 – Halakhah 24–26, 28, 30, 52, 99, 138, 140, 149–50, 153–54, 224, 225n88 – Hellenist 30, 35, 75 – Oriental 33–34 – Old Testament 19, 23, 26, 53, 60n156, 170, 233–35, 243, 247, 250, 260, 267 – Torah 19n55, 24n76, 25, 28, 31–33, 35–36, 47, 52, 59– 60, 62–63, 74–76, 141, 162n102, 198–200, 202–3, 204, 208, 212, 218, 230, 236, 239, 246, 250, 261– 62, 267, 272n258, 274, 276 – Stoicism 30, 33–34, 48, 76, 129–35, 137, 144, 198–99, 219n66, 246n186, 247 – method to distinguish – test for difference 16–17, 24, 34, 71, 75–76, 78, 84–85, 94, 96, 138–39, 167–68, 199, 201–2, 245, 247, 258 – concept verses words 24, 26, 135–37, 140–41, 167–68, 199, 202–3, 234–35, 246–49, 260– 62

351

Ethics – and theology 33, 225–26 – Christocentric framework 19, 32, 36–37, 207, 228–29, 234–37, 249, 252–57, 259, 261–63, 269, 274 – coherent 8, 85, 89, 116, 140–48, 152, 167–68, 175n158, 183, 197, 199, 202, 232, 262–63, 270, 272 – contemporary implications 19, 28, 65n185, 273–75, 276 – implicit 7–8, 180 – moral agent 9, 31, 42, 73, 229, 231, 233, 236–37, 246, 258, 270 – moral subject 9, 53, 70, 72, 171, 182, 185, 196, 217, 229–31, 233, 236–37, 244, 246–48, 260–63, 270, 274 – of action – amoral 9, 70, 72 – causality 142–45, 148 – complicity in 118 – immoral 9 – intentionality 56–60, 57, 65, 106, 109, 132, 142–43, 145, 148, 152, 157–58 – premeditation verses spontaneity 81n22, 200 – of work 65n185, 73, 199, 245, 249, 256–58, 262, 273, 275, 276 – See also Paul, ethos, hard work – realised 36–37, 42, 212 – relational 198, 229 – reciprocity 4, 33, 35, 53, 130–35 – See also Equality ethics, ~ – sabbatical – weekly cycle 31, 167, 172, 177, 195–96, 198, 225n91 – yearly cycle 164n111, 171, 188n211 – sacrificial 207, 215–17 – systematic analysis of 7, 197, 199, 202, 270 – unity 21 – See also Equality ethics, of ~ – verses ethos 9–10, 16, 37, 69, 99n143, 168n128, 185, 187, 252– 53 Exposure – infant 98n138, 109 – slave – See Slave, ~

352

Subject Index

Fairness 6, 36n35, 38–41, 45–46, 48– 49, 67, 73, 129, 135, 170, 205n2, 243, 246–47 – See also Equality, confusion Family 81, 163, 177, 194–96 – adoption 122 – brother 169–71, 179, 182–83, 188, 208 – See also Equality ethics, of ~ rhetoric – children 14, 79n6, 86, 89, 92, 98, 119–21, 124–25, 165–66, 172, 176, 192, 195n253, 273 – and obedience 234, 238, 244 – illegitimate 93, 122 – clan 86, 117, 192 – daughter 147n33, 155, 156n76, 158–62, 165 – father 31–32, 86, 89, 147n33, 155, 158–62, 165, 186, 195n253 – See also Roman empire, paterfamilias – household 31, 34, 160n92, 249 – orphan 169, 172–74 – parent 53, 86, 119, 121, 172, 198, 250 – relatives 78, 119, 148n35, 154, 159nn84–85, 161, 166, 170–71, 185–86, 188–90, 192, 194 – slave – See Slave, ~ – son 93, 119, 121 – firstborn 121, 175 – Jewish 156n76, 158, 159n84, 160, 161n99, 162, 175, 195n253 – Persian 86 – Roman – See Roman empire, ~ – tribe 169–71 – widow 162n104, 169 – See also Marriage Favouritism – See Equality ethics, between, slaves Flesh – negative usage 200, 210, 225, 228, 231–32, 238, 255 – power 231 – neutral usage – food 159 – human body 231 – natural means 231–32 – physical realm 238

Flesh (contd.) – slave-master of – See Slave-master, as per ~ Fortune 35, 131, 132n325, 133, 134n334 – by 94–97, 100, 127, 135, 198–99 Freeborn 70, 116–17, 122, 160–61 Freedman 74, 83, 110–11, 116, 118, 124–25 – compared to slave – See Slave, compared to ~ – compared to son, – See Roman empire, son, compared to ~ – become slave-master 118, 123, 128 – heir of 122, 123n286, 128 – obligations to patron 82, 117, 122– 23, 126–28, 136 Freedom 18, 78, 83, 89, 93, 117, 151, 164, 173–74, 182, 184–85, 194 – definition 16 – eschatological 238, 241, 244, 258 – in antiquity verses modern day 16, 117, 121–23, 128, 136, 249 – metaphorical 97 Friendship 50 – and slavery – See Slave-master, ~ – between free persons 48, 97, 100, 104, 106, 123, 154, 268 Gender 17, 20, 21n66, 28, 30–31, 33, 65, 70, 86, 140n7, 153–54, 156, 163n106, 172–75, 184–87, 199–201, 204, 207, 217–18, 226–29, 232, 254, 269, 275, 276 Gleaning 171, 186n202 Greek world 85 – Achaean league 46 – Athens (Classical) 43, 77–85, 88– 89, 94–95, 106, 108, 112, 115– 18, 123–24, 128, 136, 191, 195 – Solon 78, 80, 115, 191 – See also Slavery, ethos, Grecoroman, ~ – barbarians 78–79, 86, 88, 90–91, 95, 236n137 – See also Roman empire, ~ – Chios 78, 84 – Panionius 79n10 – city states 78, 83–84, 94, 164 – Corinth – Peisander 94

Subject Index

353

Greek world (contd.) – Crete 84 – gods 79 – Cronos 111 – pollution 79, 81, 106 – revenge 79 – Zeus 45, 91, 111 – Gortyna 84 – gymnasia 84 – Gytheion 247–48 – Damiadas 247–48 – Helen of Troy 91 – Hellenistic kingdoms 84, 96–97 – hubris – See Slave, and ~ – Laurion 104n175 – Lycurgus 83, 94 – Macedonia – Alexander the Great 95 – Antipater 95 – Philip II 79n6, 94n110, 95 – Philip V 83n33, 123n286 – metic – See Citizenship, ~ and Slave, compared to, ~ – nobles 91 – Phaleas of Chalcedon 207n17 – Ptolemaic Egypt 96, 103–4 – Seleucid East 96 – Sophists 90n85, 93 – Sparta 83, 88, 93 – Thebes 79n6, 93, 95

Hermeneutics (contd.) – interpretative lens 1n3, 16, 25–26, 75–76, 138–39, 144–45, 180, 202 – interpretative key 49, 182–83 – interpreting silence 70–73, 138–40, 166, 173–75, 181, 185, 195–96, 201–2, 270–71 – lectio difficilior potior 150, 178 – mirror-reading 19, 32–33, 64, 71– 72, 269 – qal wahomer (rabbinic) 158, 161, 167 – reception studies 7 – of OT ethics within Judaism 138, 140–41, 149–51, 153–57, 161–62, 167–68, 173, 177–81, 183–85, 187, 195, 197–202, 209n25, 267, 274 – of Paul 18, 270–72 – reader response 72 – synchronic verses diachronic interpretation 140–41 Hired worker – See Slave, compared to, ~ and Wages, ~ Human differences 3 – and equality – See Equality, and difference – cause 211, 213–15, 217 – See also Human merit Human merit 2–4, 43, 121, 132, 133n325, 134, 209, 213–14, 217

Hagar 74, 200–201, 231, 232n118, 270 Helots – See Slavery, kinds of, serfdom, Helotage Hermeneutics – a fortiori – See Slave-master, and Christ, comparison ~ – a minori ad majus 158, 167, 202 – authorial intent 9, 18, 145 – burden of proof 71–73, 270–71 – confirmatory bias 68, 71, 76, 90–91, 139 – epistolary analysis 20–22, 36–37, 139, 168–69, 172, 204, 206n13, 207n15, 210, 217–18, 227n99, 232–37, 243, 249–51, 253–57, 260–61, 263–64

Imitation ethics 22–23 – and Cephas 224–25, 232 – and Job 180–81 – of Christ 23n69, 234, 237, 251–53 – cruciformity 22–23, 32, 207, 209, 212, 215–17, 235, 243, 251, 271 – impartiality 40, 212, 256–58, 260–62 – of divine 42, 172, 176, 188n210, 234–35, 251–53 – impartiality 23, 27–28, 40, 52– 53, 169–70, 181, 183, 197–98, 202, 211–12, 219–20, 224–29, 232, 246, 249, 262, 271 – unity 251 – of Paul 22n68, 218, 221, 245, 257 – cruciformity 216, 243 – impartiality 210, 220, 224, 229, 232

354 Indentured servitude – See Slavery, kinds of, debt Individualism 10–11, 96, 122, 272–75 Injury 145, 147–49, 155, 167 – See also Slave, ~ Jewish – Christians – See Christians, ~ – diaspora 212 – Essenes 35, 48, 198 – Therapeutae 35, 198 – See also Ethical sources, Judaism Job – and imitation ethics – See Imitation ethics, and ~ – ethos 180–81, 247 – righteousness 181 Jubilee 183, 188–89, 193–94, 196–98, 203 – as debt cancellation 165n117, 192 – See also Debt, relief – and land – See ~ – and serfdom – See Slavery, kinds of, serfdom, and ~ – Israelite practice of 190–91 – metaphorical 188n210 Just war – See Justice, and war Justice – and equality – See Equality, and ~ – and righteousness 42–43, 169–70, 198 – and slavery – See Slavery, and ~ – and Christ 36, 248, 260 – See also Imitation ethics, of Christ, impartiality – and the state 34 – and war 78, 89, 95, 97, 100, 102, 127, 136, 172, 174, 183 – arbitrative 6–7, 187 – definition 6 – divine 41–42, 71, 79, 169–70, 180, 198–99, 210, 229, 239, 242–45, 249 – See also Imitation ethics, of divine, impartiality – eschatological 36, 210, 260

Subject Index Justice (contd.) – judge 121, 129, 140, 144–45, 171, 187n206 – as impartial 5, 42, 44, 154, 169– 70, 183, 197, 246–47 – metaphorical 89–91 – officials – as impartial 44, 247–48 – rhetoric 6, 35, 73, 100, 129n303, 169–70, 180 – See also Slave, accountability to God and Slave-master, accountability Land 182–83, 193 – ancestral 176n161, 188–90, 192, 196 – and slavery – See Slavery, kinds of, serfdom – as irrelevant to law 176n161, 193 – divine owner of – See Divine, ~ – human owner of 113, 119n260, 171, 188–89, 192, 194, 195n253 – ~less person 163n106, 176n161, 190 – lease 188, 190, 192–94 – parcel – See Slavery, kinds of, serfdom, Helotage – redemption 189–90, 194, 196 – pro-rata valuation 188, 189n220, 192 – tenant 96, 99n142, 189–90 – usufruct of 192 Law – lex talionis (Jewish) 150, 152, 197 – monetary equivalent to 155, 157, 175n159, 178n171 – natural 90n85, 101 – Roman – See Roman ~ Lease – of land – See Land, ~ – of person 98, 190 – See also Slavery, kinds of, debt Manslaughter 145, 153, 156–58, 167 – See also Slave, death, ~ Marriage 18, 53, 82, 86, 92–93, 124, 172–73, 175, 183, 185, 197, 199– 202, 250, 270 – age of bride 158, 160, 162, 185

Subject Index Marriage (contd.) – and divorce 70–71, 161, 162n104, 165–67, 171n143, 173–75, 202 – and sexuality – See ~ – betrothal 160, 162, 184–85, 187 – between slaves – See Slave, family – bride-price (perutah) 147n33, 155, 159–60, 162, 165, 186 – dowry – See ~, bride-price (perutah) – husband 159n84, 159n85, 161–62, 173, 187n205, 201, 251, 254 – levirate 186n202, 188 – prohibited 14, 113, 122n277, 185, 187, 197 – polygamy 161–62, 167, 173–75 – temporary 174 – See also Sexuality, intercourse, casual – to slave – See Slavery, manumission, for ~ – verses concubinage – See Slave, sexual use of, ~ – wife 81, 159–62, 173–75, 187n205, 195n253, 201, 251, 254 – See also Sexuality, intercourse, wife's conjugal right Mimesis 23, 218n65 – See also Imitation ethics Nature 126, 131 – by 90n85, 92, 100 – and equality 35, 130, 198 – See also Equality, natural – and slavery 87, 91, 93–95, 102, 122, 130, 198–99, 247 – See also Slavery, natural – definition 10–11, 86 Onesimus 277 – and amicus domini – See Slave-master, friendship, and amicus domini – as fugitive – See Slave, fugitive, ~ – as erro – See Slave, erro – as church emissary 54, 263, 266 – inclusion 28, 61, 264–67, 269, 274 – manumission – See Slavery, manumission, of ~

355

Onesimus (contd.) – resumptive 58–60, 263, 265–69 – usufruct – See Slave, usufruct of, ~ Pattern language 168, 170, 175–76, 179, 182 Paul 112n229, 123n286, 135–36, 141 – and gospel 211, 219–20n67, 221, 224–25, 251 – and slavery – See Slavery, and ~ – as apostle 211, 216 – as Roman citizen 55, 267 – authorship 11–12 – autobiography 218, 224n86, 227, 232, 235 – ethos 235, 243 – imitating Christ 216 – impartiality 220, 224, 229, 232 – hard work 244–45, 249, 256–57 – imprisonment 54–55, 57, 60, 266– 67 Peter 112n229, 222–23 – See also Imitation ethics, and Cephas Philanthropy 46, 247–48 Philemon 263, 267 – ethos 264–66, 269, 274, 277 – a priori knowledge 28, 55–56, 264, 268, 274, 277 Poverty 5, 15, 18, 24n76, 52, 80, 111– 16, 126, 128, 133n325, 140, 154, 163, 165–68, 171, 186n202, 188–89, 192–94, 206–9, 211–12, 247–48, 257–58, 269, 274 – cycle of dependency 166, 176, 178, 192, 196 – See also Debt Prisoner of War – and slavery – See Slavery, by conquest – dediticius – See Roman empire, ~ – execution 79n6, 100–101, 127, 172n146 – ransom 79, 100 Profit – making 189, 192, 194 – See also Debt, interest/usury – sharing 4, 176, 178 Puberty 134n334, 162, 175, 185, 200n269

356

Subject Index

Redemption – of land – See Land, ~ – of person 153, 156, 190, 192 – See also Slave, ~ Restitution – See Compensation, ~ Reward 242 – and inheritance 107, 117n252, 118, 120–21, 175, 235, 240–41 – from Christ 240–41, 244, 248, 256– 58 – from slave-master – See Slave-master, rewarding slave Rhetoric 102, 105, 120n269, 125, 134n336, 192n239, 194, 198, 212, 221, 236n139, 271–72n258 – of brotherhood – See Equality ethics, of brother ~ – and slavery – See Slavery, ~ – of equality – See Equality, ~ – of justice – See Justice, ~ Roman empire – and profligacy 107 – Antony and Cleopatria 125n291 – authorities of 55 – barbarians 98 – See also Greek world, ~ – Caesar 107n197, 108, 110 – Antonius Pius 105–7 – as pater patriae 114n240 – Augustus 100n153, 105–6, 117n254, 123n286, 124–28, 130, 267 – Caracalla 114 – Claudius 109 – Constantine 99, 106, 117n254, 144, 166 – Hadrian 105, 107n202, 108, 120–21 – Justinian 98, 108 – Nero 118, 129–30 – Tiberius 106, 120 – Trajan 120 – catasta – See Slave, market – censors 104 – citizenship – See Citizenship, Roman

– Colossae 56–57, 266–67 – ethos 37, 39 – consul 107n197, 120 – Pertinax 107 – Corinth 99 – ethos 35, 207, 210–11, 213, 215– 16, 269 – Corniculum 99 – dediticius 124, 267 – Ephesus 54, 57, 59n147, 62n168, 99, 266 – elite person 104, 108, 110–14, 118, 122, 126, 133n325 – See also Roman law, dual penalty system – equines 99 – eras of – Dominate 98 – Principate 99, 113 – Republic 83, 99, 104, 123n286 – Severan 101, 114, 119 – First Sicilian slave war – See Slave, rebellion, ~ – freedman – See ~ – governors 100, 105–6, 112 – Felix 123n286 – honour 114n236, 115–16, 118, 128, 136 – See also Slave, and ~ – Illyricum 98n137 – institor – See Slave, occupations, ~ – jurists 56, 77, 119, 121, 266 – Callistratus 113 – Florentius 101 – Gaius 101n157 – Marcian 114 – Papinianus 71n220 – Saturninus 119 – Ulpian 101, 107, 115, 198n266 – magistrates 120, 123n286, 267–68 – natural equality between persons – See Equality, natural, Roman – outrage – See ~, honour – paterfamilias 116–21, 123, 126–28, 132n319, 136, 244, 249 – See also Family, father – patria potestas 116–17, 120n266, 121, 132n319 – patricians 113

Subject Index Roman empire (contd.) – patron – See Freedman, obligations to ~ – peregrinus – death penalty – See Criminal penalties, death penalty, crucifixion, for ~ – verses citizenship – See Citizenship, ~ – verses slave – See Slave, compared to, ~ – Pindenissum 100, 103, 112 – plebians 113 – prefect 105–6, 118 – Lucius Pedanius Secundus 118– 19, 129, 130, 135 – proletarians 113 – provinces 98, 100, 106, 112, 127 – public morals (regimen morum) 104, 126 – publicans 100 – Q. Fabius Maximus 120n266 – Rome 54, 57, 96, 98–99, 101, 106, 107n197, 117n249, 119n265, 124–27, 266–67 – saturnalia – See Equality, ~ – senate 106, 118–19, 129–30 – senators 99, 130, 134n336 – Servius Tullius 99, 101 – social control 112 – social stratification 27, 49, 77, 110– 16, 128, 136, 155, 210, 212, 217 – son 117–21, 132n319 – compared to freedman 117, 122– 23, 127–28, 130, 136 – heir 120n265, 126, 133n325 – parricide 118–19, 130 – See also Slave, compared to, ~ – Vedius Pollio 105, 130n304 Roman law 58n144, 61–62, 64, 68, 71, 149, 167, 199, 267 – aleni juris 117–18 – commercial law 109–10, 113, 118, 129, 153n56 – See also Slave, market – criminal law 96n116, 110, 129–30 – penalties under – See Criminal penalities – development of 105–6, 112–16, 119–21, 128–30 – dual penalty system 114–15 – family law 116–17, 122

357

Roman law (contd.) – honestiores and humiliores – See ~, dual penalty system – jus gentium 78, 101, 119 – lex Aelia Sentia 62n168, 122, 123n286, 124–25, 267 – lex Aquila 101n157 – lex Fufia Caninia 123n286, 124, 267 – lex Julia de adulteriss 114 – lex Junia petronia 108 – lex Petronia 105 – lex Pompeia de parricidiis 119–20 – lex talionis – See Law, ~ (Jewish) – power of life and death 101, 117, 119–21 – sui juris 117–18 Ruth 140, 186–87 Sarah 74n232, 200, 231–32 Scythians 236n137 Serfdom – See Slavery, kinds of, ~ Sexuality 24n76, 141 – abstinence 32, 80, 200 – adultery 70–71, 91, 114, 120, 122n277, 180–81, 201 – concubinage – See Slave, sexual use of, ~ – homosexuality 98n134, 120n266 – immorality 74, 231, 233, 248, 261– 63 – ʌȠȡȞİȓĮ 231n112, 261 – definition of 72, 75, 270 – incest 161n99 – intercourse 80, 184–86, 201, 231 – casual 15, 158n83, 164–65, 167, 172, 174, 183, 187, 199–202, 270 – See also Marriage, temporary and Slave, sexual use of – lust 133, 172, 180–81, 200, 202n281 – of slave – See Slave, sexual use of – prostitution – See Slave, sexual use of, ~ – rape and/or seduction 15, 80, 147n33, 155, 172, 174, 185– 86n201, 187n207 – virginity 147n33, 155, 161, 162n104, 187n205 – wife's conjugal right 159–61, 186, 188, 197, 202

358

Subject Index

Slave – abuse 16, 71, 78, 83, 88, 104, 106– 10, 118, 124, 136, 182–83, 190n223, 237n144, 241, 257, 266–67 – branding 124 – castration 79, 108, 245 – cruelty 27, 80, 107, 133, 151, 181, 199 – harshness towards – See Slave-master, harshness towards ~ – in mines and mills 103, 104, 107n199, 267n251 – torture 79, 80n12, 103, 107, 109, 114–15, 118, 121, 124, 132– 33 – See also ~, death and ~, injury – accountability to God 229, 239, 242, 244, 257 – affection towards slave-master 81, 103, 131–34, 136, 165–66, 178– 79, 255–58 – and honour 68, 80, 115, 128, 134, 136, 149–50 – See also Roman empire, honour – and hubris 80, 115 – as property 14–16, 58n144, 61, 68, 70, 77, 80n16, 87, 100–101, 106– 7, 117, 140, 142–43, 146–49, 153, 156–57, 184, 187n208, 190, 196, 267 – as witness 79, 107, 109, 114, 121 – asylum 60, 74, 182 – benefits 130–32 – bias towards 108–9, 151–52, 156– 57, 167, 184–87, 202 – compared to – animal 81, 86–87, 89, 100, 101n157, 103, 116n248, 133, 179n174, 198n266 – daughter 160–61, 165 – free 80, 93, 100, 103, 110–11, 130–35, 142, 145–50, 152–53, 155–57, 165–67, 169, 173, 178–79, 184–87, 196, 198, 200–202, 204, 227–28, 230, 242–44, 246–49, 253, 256–58, 260–64, 276 – See also Equality, comparison between, slave and ~ – free poor 18, 27, 103, 111–15, 128–29, 136, 211–12

Slave – compared to (contd.) – freedman 117, 122–23, 130 – metic 79, 82, 136 – hired worker 79, 131–32, 148– 49, 163n108, 176–77, 178n169, 179n175, 190–91, 193–96 – peregrinus 106, 112, 136 – ~ owned by another 106, 149, 187n208, 248 – See also Equality, comparison between, own and other's ~ – son 27, 86, 116–23, 127, 130, 132n319, 136, 244 – See also Roman empire, ~ – corporal punishment of 70, 83, 97, 106, 109, 143, 149–50 – flogging 81, 97–98, 103, 113, 187 – death 103–4, 106, 109n211, 115, 132–33, 147, 148n35, 202 – crucifixion 105, 107, 112 – delayed 142–46, 148–49, 197 – execution 81, 83, 105–6, 114, 118–21 – judicial review 79, 105–6, 110, 112, 120–21, 128 – manslaughter 143, 153, 156–57 – murder 79, 81, 106, 109, 143, 152, 245 – See also Ethics, of action – dealer 99, 271–72n258 – See also ~, market and ~, trade – direct address to 31, 32n13, 37, 87– 88, 237, 253n216 – disobedience 121, 126, 238n150, 244, 259n231 – dominicide 118–19, 129–30 – duties 34, 73, 134 – economic value of 81–82, 109–10, 119n260, 153–57 – education 89n79, 132n323 – erro 57–58, 109–10, 128, 136–37, 263, 266 – exposure 109 – family 164–65, 177 – breakup 15, 80, 84, 99, 165–67 – favouritism – See Equality ethics, between, slaves – fear 133, 254, 259, 262

Subject Index Slave (contd.) – food and clothing 39, 47, 79–81, 103, 111n219, 132n323, 134, 159–60, 177–79, 183, 195, 202, 211–12 – fugitive 109–10, 124, 128, 136–37, 182 – Onesimus 54–58, 263, 266–69 – gladiator 108, 124 – hope 73, 104, 134, 137, 241, 243– 44, 256, 258 – housekeeper 81 – imprisonment 108, 124, 149 – injury 104–5, 145, 149–50, 202 – eye 104, 142, 150–51 – permanent 146, 152, 167, 183 – recovery/healing from 146–48, 151–52 – tooth 142, 150–51 – judicial rights 167, 180–81 – initiate legal action 79–80, 105– 7 – unjust enslavement 79, 89, 108– 9 – See also ~, death, judicial review and Slave-master, accountability, to state – labour obligation 16–17, 35, 141, 147–49, 165–66, 172, 177, 192– 94, 196, 199, 237, 244–46, 249, 259, 271, 276 – loyalty 81, 114n240, 121, 125, 127, 133 – market 100, 103, 105, 109–10, 112, 128, 137, 153–56, 173, 195, 266 – See also ~, trade – natal alienation 15, 68, 78, 83, 88, 99 – noxal liability 118 – obedience 12n38, 16–18, 29–30, 32, 37–38, 41–42, 49, 51,73, 114n240, 121, 125, 127, 132, 134n336, 233, 237–45, 249, 253– 59, 262 – occupations 79, 83, 87, 195–96, 239–40, 256 – institor 118 – remote from slave-master (ȤȦȡȓȢ ੑȚțȠȔIJİȢ) 82, 118 – of Christ (metaphorical) 12, 37, 40, 69n211, 233, 237–38, 241–44, 248–49, 253–57, 258–59, 262– 63, 271, 277

359

Slave (contd.) – of imperial household 103, 110, 116, 123n286 – of two slave-masters 153, 156, 184– 84, 240 – Onesimus – See ~ – overseer – See ~, steward – peculium 84, 117–18 – purchased with silver 146–48, 173 – rage 82 – rebellion 66–67, 80, 83, 88, 107–8, 118, 125–26, 130, 133 – First Sicilian slave war 96n121, 107 – recommendation 62, 123, 132, 134, 268 – redemption 153, 156, 159n84, 161, 165, 184–86, 188, 190, 194, 196 – pro-rata valuation 192 – re-sale to another slave-master 107, 114, 120, 151, 267–68 – services 34, 130–32 – sexual use of 27, 75 – breeding 15, 80, 99, 164–67, 173n150, 177, 200 – See also Slave, family – concubinage 74, 158–62, 200, 202n281, 231–33 – in early Christianity 28, 66, 69– 71, 76, 270–72 – in Greco-roman antiquity 69–75, 201 – Greek world 80 – Roman empire 69, 98–99, 107n197, 111, 122, 133, 134n334, 270 – in Judaism 74–75, 140–41, 158– 62, 164–67, 172–74, 183–87, 197, 199–202, 248, 270 – Pauline toleration of 28, 30, 69, 71–74, 76, 200, 204, 231–33, 248–49, 261–63, 269–72, 274, 277 – prostitution 70, 72, 80, 108, 201, 270 – steward 81, 87, 128, 238, 246, 249, 259 – submission 35, 73

360

Subject Index

Slave (contd.) – supply – through reproduction – See ~, sexual use of, breeding and Slavery, kinds of, home born (vernae) – through war – See Justice, and war and Slavery, by conquest – temple sanctuary 55n133, 79, 106– 7, 245 – the best 85–87, 89, 92–93 – Tiro 103, 121 – trade 1, 15, 65, 78, 84, 99, 203, 271–72n258, 272 – See also ~, market – trusted by slave-master 121, 123, 126–27 – usufruct of 118 – Onesimus 263, 265–66, 268 – wages 39, 157, 177, 193 – welfare 29–30, 32, 35–37, 79–81, 83, 88, 94–96, 100, 104, 106–9, 121–22, 129–30, 133, 135–37, 142, 147, 151, 163n108, 167–68, 178–83, 187, 191, 196–99, 202– 3, 245–49, 257–67, 269–75, 276– 77 – definition 16–18 – supervision by slave-master – See Slave-master, supervision of ~ – variable 102–3, 110, 127–28 – working conditions 103–4, 191, 193–97, 199, 202, 256, 258, 262 – dignity verses drudgery 242, 244, 255, 257 Slave-master 11n34, 16, 50–51, 78, 102, 110, 130, 133–34 – abusive – See Slave, abuse – accountability – to God 39, 52, 229, 242n177, 243–45 – to the Lord/Christ 248–49, 259– 60 – to state 104, 106, 107, 144 – See also Slave, judicial rights – See also ~, autonomy – affection towards slave 47, 61, 103, 121–23, 131–37, 256–58 – towards Tiro – See Slave, Tiro

Slave-master (contd.) – and Christ – comparison a fortiori 237–41, 243, 254–57, 259, 262 – contrast 36–37, 238, 240, 244, 249, 253, 257, 259, 263 – as per flesh 231n114, 238, 253 – autonomy 102, 108, 128, 143, 146– 47, 149–50, 248, 266 – from gods – See Greek world, gods, pollution – from state 107, 245 – See also Slave, death, judicial review – See also ~, accountability – friendship – and amicus domini 55–58, 109, 263, 266 – with slave 27, 48, 50, 63, 76, 48, 63, 77, 88, 92, 95, 131–35, 137, 247, 264 – harshness towards slave 39, 46, 108, 190, 194–97 – impartiality 181, 246–47 – indifference towards slave 88, 102 – judicial authority over own slave 30, 181, 245–46 – kindness 47, 66, 132n325, 198 – motives 124–25 – avoid rebellion 88, 107–8, 130 – become better person 67, 70, 97, 130–35, 199 – belief in God 30, 39, 51, 180–81 – boost own social status 111, 125–26 – humanitarian concern 34, 38, 66–67, 121, 128, 129n303, 133, 135, 151, 168, 171n144, 198–99 – paternalism 121–22 – self-interest 103, 123, 128, 135, 146, 166 – own slave as witness against 105, 114 – rewarding slave 62, 99, 240 – See also Slavery, manumission – supervision of slave welfare 81, 87, 88, 245–46 – the best 92–93 – threats from 254, 258–59, 261–62 – was former slave – See Freedman, become ~

Subject Index Slavery – abolition 1, 11, 13, 14n41, 16, 28, 29, 47, 50, 61, 67, 102, 133, 135, 183, 190n221, 193, 193–94n245, 198, 203, 207, 267, 271–72, 276 – See also ~, golden age – and justice 1, 30, 52, 89–91, 95, 102–3, 106, 108, 130, 132– 33n325, 180–81 – See also Justice and Slave, judicial rights – and Paul 55, 66–67, 71–72, 204 – ambiguity 61 – intentional 62 – modern reception 264, 268 – ameliorating conditions 29, 32, 38, 76, 203, 271 – intensifying obedience 237–45, 249, 253–59, 262–63, 269, 271, 274, 277 – intensifying slave welfare 245– 49, 259, 262–63, 271, 274, 276 – pragmatism – See Equality ethics, trajectory, pragmatic rationale – worsening conditions 29, 73, 76, 254 – and race 11, 14, 79, 88, 91, 93, 95, 125 – as assimilation 66, 95, 99, 101 – and Roman idealism, 124, 126– 28, 135–37, 256 – as exploitation 30, 69–71, 74–75, 95, 121, 123–24, 127, 136, 140, 165, 180 – as necessary (slave-master’s perspective) 35, 87, 97, 126, 195, 198 – as not unique issue 18, 24, 42, 62, 138–39, 269 – by conquest 15, 28, 77–79, 81, 88– 91, 93–95, 97, 99–103, 112, 115, 121, 123, 126–28, 134–36, 172– 75, 177, 183, 203, 258, 271–75, 276–77 – See also Justice, and war – by penalty (servus poenae) 82, 113, 124, 173–74, 191–92, 199–200, 267 – definition 15–16, 68

361

Slavery (contd.) – disapproval of 16, 18 – in antiquity 79, 90–91, 93–95, 101, 105–6, 119–20, 124, 127, 135, 158n83, 172–75, 181, 200–202, 231–33, 238, 270– 72 – modern day 1, 13, 65, 85, 91, 93, 107n197, 119, 142, 153, 159– 60, 165–66, 172–74, 180–81, 192–93n239, 203, 250, 258 – duration 181, 183, 203 – 3 years 164, 177 – 6/7 years 53, 134n336, 164, 176– 77, 190–91, 193n241, 200n269, 250 – 20 years 98 – 25 years 193–94 – 50 years 188, 190–92, 194 – prevent permanency 163–64, 192, 194, 196–97, 202–3 – emancipation 2, 17–18, 64, 109, 117, 120, 190 – as compensation 142, 147, 150– 52, 167, 173, 183 – for testimony against slave-master 114 – entry into 163, 196 – ethos – Ancient Near East 14n41, 158, 163–64, 195, 200 – antebellum era 1, 11, 13–15, 65, 67, 68, 91n91, 102, 124n286, 138, 164, 166, 272 – early Christian 10, 70–73, 271 – Egyptian (Israelite experience of) 164, 169, 172, 175–76, 179, 182, 195–96, 267 – Greco-Roman antiquity 14n41, 27, 235, 245, 249, 256, 258– 59, 262, 276 – as mild and improving (traditional view) 65–66, 108 – as cruel and steady state (revisionist view) 29, 62, 67– 69, 75–76, 77, 104, 124, 128, 131, 133, 268 – Greek world 85, 107, 119–20 – Athens 77–85, 88–89, 91, 94–95, 106, 108, 123– 24, 128, 136 – city states 83–84, 94, 164

362

Subject Index

Slavery – ethos - Greek world (contd.) – Sparta – See Slavery, kinds of, serfdom, Helotage – Roman empire 78, 83, 95–96, 98–103, 105–7, 109–10, 112, 114–15, 119–23, 125– 27, 135–37, 150, 153n56, 157, 179, 185, 238, 241, 254, 274 – Judaism 69, 99, 166, 173, 177, 181, 185, 190–91, 199–200 – as indistinguishable from Greco-Roman ~ – See Ethical sources, Judaism, as similar to Greco-Roman ~ – practice of ~ in Greco-Roman antiquity 150–51, 162, 167, 168n128, 178–79, 201–2 – debt 74, 99, 163 – chattel 74, 99, 138n1 – Stoicism 36, 95–97, 104, 131, 133, 198 – See also Slave, sexual use of – exit from 163–64, 167, 196, 202 – golden age 32–33, 65, 111, 211, 269, 272 – gradual demise 134, 271, 273, 276 – See also Equality ethics, trajectory, egalitarian and postPauline – kidnapping into 78, 152, 173, 182, 272n258 – kinds of – and their financial distinctives 141, 148–52, 165, 167, 202, 258 – chattel 13–16, 78, 83–84, 88–89, 96, 98–100, 102, 104, 127, 138n1, 141, 146–49, 161, 164n115, 173–74, 181–83, 185, 190, 194–98, 202–3, 204, 247, 250, 274 – Canaanite 74, 149–52, 165, 167–68, 177, 184, 274 – debated 141–42, 148–52, 157, 165, 167–68, 174–75, 181–85, 196–97, 202–3, 204, 247, 250, 274

Slavery – kinds of (contd.) – debt 14–16, 18, 78, 84, 96, 127 – and creditor 163, 189, 194 – compared to debtor prison 163n108 – compared to modern welfare system 192–93n239 – duration – See Slavery, ~ – Jewish practice of – See ~, ethos, Judaism, practice of ~ in GrecoRoman antiquity – Israelite/Jewish 74, 99, 141– 42, 148–52, 157, 160, 163– 65, 167–68, 171, 173, 175– 79, 181–85, 190, 192–97, 200n269, 202–4, 247, 250 – nexum 98, 104, 117 – obaerarii 98 – home born (vernae) 82n31, 99, 148 – serfdom 15–16, 84, 96, 99n142 – and jubilee 189–90, 192–4, 196 – coloni / laoi – See Land, tenant – Helotage 83, 88 – spectrum in antiquity 84–85, 94, 193 – managerial 16n48, 110 – manumission 1, 2n4, 16–18, 29, 39, 53, 89, 103, 108, 117, 118n255, 122, 132, 134–37, 173, 180, 191– 92, 241, 244, 250, 257–58, 276 – and citizenship 82, 99, 101, 112, 123–28, 136 – eligibility criteria 73, 99, 109n213, 124–28, 133n325, 267 – for marriage 122, 124, 162, 165– 66, 172–73, 185, 199 – frequency 66–67, 89, 95, 123– 26, 271, 273, 276 – Rome relative to Athens 83, 117, 123, 124n286, 128 – gratis 82, 89 – of Onesimus 56n135, 59–63, 76, 263, 266–69 – of Tiro – See Slave, ~ – paid for 82, 118, 177n168

Subject Index Slavery – manumission (contd.) – sacral 33 – testamentary 82, 124–25 – voluntary 123, 127, 128, 271, 273 – with additional gift 175–77 – See also Freedman and Slave, redemption – metaphorical 12–13, 34, 54n127, 97, 133–34, 140–41, 157n78, 190, 197n260, 226n98 – to Christ – See Slave, of Christ (metaphorical) – natural 3, 4, 35–36, 77–78, 85–96, 100–102, 115, 123–24, 127, 131, 198 – See also Nature – rhetoric 100, 102 – See also Slave, direct address to – self-sale into 16n48, 18, 110, 175n157, 190–92 – sell one's children into 98 – unnatural 102 Spirit – and impartiality 228, 230 – and excess 33 – as power 231–32 – as source of human diversity – See Human differences, cause Stoicism 35n29, 37, 67, 70, 94–97, 101, 198–99, 202n281 – and slave benefits – See Slave, benefits – and duties 30, 33–34 – See also Slave, duties – and slave services – See Slave, services – clementia 119, 130, 135, 144 – See also Criminal penalties, mitigating circumstances – divine spirit/logos 96 – fortune – See ~ – natural equality – See Equality, natural, Stoicism – slavery practice – See Slavery, ethos, ~ – See also Ethical sources, ~ Tamar 186–87

363

Teleological reasoning 4, 86–89, 92– 93, 97, 131–32, 135 Theology – and ethics – See Ethics, and ~ – and Seneca 39 – See also Stoicism, divine spirit/logos – Christian 3 – Christology – Parousia 30, 35, 37, 245n180 – See also Jesus Christ – Jewish 26, 169–70 – Pauline 170 – justification 225–26, 228n102, 229 – limited treatment of 19, 204, 254 – new perspective 19, 26, 218, 225, 227 – pneumatology – See Spirit – sanctification 211, 218, 233, 277 – as impartial 227–28, 232 – soteriology 227 – as impartial 52, 212, 225–26, 229, 274 Timothy 219n66, 236, 263–64 Torture 115 – See also Slave, abuse, ~ Unity – and equality – See Equality ethics, of ~ – between Jew and Gentile 206–7, 209, 214, 217, 222, 236 – ethics (non-equality related) – See Ethics, ~ – imitation of – See Imitation ethics, of divine, ~ Valuation – of land – See Land, ~ – of person 153–57, 177n169, 197 – See also Slave, economic value of Vice 85–86, 91, 93, 97, 231, 235–36, 248 – anger 97, 104, 129, 133, 208, 231n111 – boasting 211, 228–29 – bribery 112n226, 125–26, 154, 169 – drunkenness 83, 111, 129, 133, 212 – greed 86, 133, 212

364

Subject Index

Vice (contd.) – murder 79, 93, 118–19, 120n266, 145, 152, 157–58, 167 – See also Slave, death, ~ – negligence – See Slave, death, manslaughter – passions 97, 133–34, 200 – racism – See Equality, kinds of, racial and Slavery, and race – sexual – See Sexuality – theft 5, 113–15, 125, 163, 191, 256 – See also Flesh Virtue 45, 85–86, 88, 90, 131, 198, 234, 236, 251 – compassion 251 – love 31–33, 39, 61, 165–66, 169, 173, 217, 256n226 – for neighbour 53, 185, 187, 210, 212n42, 229, 250 – See also Affection

Virtue (contd.) – generosity 125–26, 132–33n325, 171, 175–76, 179–81, 186n202, 207–8, 248, 257–58, 268 – gentleness 47, 133, 173, 198, 251 – kindness 176, 251 – See also Slave-master, kindness – patience 200, 232, 251 Wages – hired worker 177, 189n219, 193–95 – slave – See Slave, ~ – soldiers 117n254 War 99–100 – justice of – See Justice, and ~ Zilpah 202n281