Patterns of News Consumption in a High-Choice Media Environment: A Romanian Perspective (Springer Studies in Media and Political Communication) 3031419537, 9783031419539

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Springer Studies in Media and Political Communication

Raluca Buturoiu Nicoleta Corbu Mădălina Boțan

Patterns of News Consumption in a High-Choice Media Environment A Romanian Perspective

Springer Studies in Media and Political Communication Series Editors Stylianos Papathanassopoulos, Department of Communication and Media Studies, National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, Athens, Greece Susana Salgado, Instituto de Ciencias Sociais, Universidade de Lisboa, Lisboa, Portugal

This book series offers an outlet for cutting-edge research on all areas at the nexus of politics, the media, and political communication. Springer Studies in Media and Political Communication (SSMPC) welcomes theoretically sound and empirically robust monographs, edited volumes and handbooks from various disciplines and approaches on topics such as the role and function of communication in the realm of politics including campaigns and elections, media, and political institutions; the relations between political actors, citizens, and the media; as well as research investigating the influence of media coverage on political behavior or attitudes, party communication strategies, political campaigns, agenda-setting, and political journalism. All books in this series are peer-reviewed.

Raluca Buturoiu • Nicoleta Corbu • M˘ad˘alina Bot,an

Patterns of News Consumption in a High-Choice Media Environment A Romanian Perspective

Raluca Buturoiu Faculty of Communication and Public Relations National University of Political Studies and Public Administration (SNSPA) Bucharest, Romania

Nicoleta Corbu Faculty of Communication and Public Relations National University of Political Studies and Public Administration (SNSPA) Bucharest, Romania

M˘ad˘alina Bot,an Faculty of Communication and Public Relations National University of Political Studies and Public Administration (SNSPA) Bucharest, Romania

ISSN 2731-4081 ISSN 2731-409X (electronic) Springer Studies in Media and Political Communication ISBN 978-3-031-41953-9 ISBN 978-3-031-41954-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41954-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland Paper in this product is recyclable.

Contents

1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 5

2

Agenda-Setting: 50 Years of Research . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Agenda-Setting Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Agenda-Setting, Priming and Framing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1 Conceptual Clarifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.2 Two Traditions of Framing Research: Equivalence vs Emphasis Frames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.3 Typologies of Frames . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Agenda-Setting in the New Media Landscape . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

11 11 13 16 16

3

4

New Avenues for Agenda-Setting Research: Network Agenda-Setting, Agenda-Melding and Intermedia Agenda-Setting . . . . . 3.1 New Directions in Agenda-Setting Theory and Research . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Network Agenda-Setting. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Agenda-Melding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Intermedia Agenda-Setting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.1 Intermedia Agenda-Setting in the Social Media Era . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Setting the Agenda During the COVID-19 Pandemic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1 Measurements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.1 Visibility of the Pandemic-Related News and Topics . . . . . . 4.3.2 Actors Who Set the Media Agenda During the Pandemic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.3 Intermedia Agenda-Setting During the Pandemic . . . . . . . . . .

19 21 24 28 31 31 32 34 36 37 40 43 43 46 47 48 48 50 53 v

vi

Contents

4.4 Discussion and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

6

7

8

News Consumption Patterns Then and Now: From Traditional Media Repertoires to New Ways of Consuming News . . . . 5.1 Setting the Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 From Low- to High-Choice Media Environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Media Repertoires: Patterns of Media Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Profiles of News Consumption Within the High-Choice Media Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.5 Healthy Patterns of Media Consumption: A Healthy News Media Diet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.6 Implications and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . News Media Consumption and Key Covariates: Media-Related and Socio-Demographic Factors Influencing Media Diets . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Setting the Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 News Avoidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 Selective Exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 Incidental News Exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.5 Echo Chambers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.6 Trust in News Media Sources. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.7 Socio-Demographics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.8 Implications and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Information Disorders in the Current Media Environment . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 Setting the Context . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 Disinformation as a Type of Information Disorder: Definitions and Meaning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 Disinformation Consequences/Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 The Fight Against Disinformation: Possible Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.5 Implications and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . What’s on the Menu for Today? Consumption Patterns, Threats and Opportunities of the High-Choice Media Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3.1 Media Diets: A Descriptive and Normative Approach . . . . . 8.3.2 Threats and Opportunities of the High-Choice Media Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

57 60 63 63 65 68 70 79 81 82

87 87 88 93 96 100 104 107 109 110 119 119 120 125 130 136 137

145 145 149 150 150 155

Contents

vii

8.3.3

News Avoidance and Selective Exposure: Causes, Effects and Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3.4 Disinformation: Causes, Effects and Solutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4 Discussion and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

10

Patterns of News Consumption in a High-Choice Media Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2 Method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.2.1 Measurements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3 Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3.1 People’s Media Diets in a High-Choice Media Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3.2 Media Consumption Patterns by Socio-Demographic Characteristics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3.3 Media Trust Patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3.4 Diversity of Media Diet. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3.5 Incidental News Exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.3.6 General News Consumption Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9.4 Discussion and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.1 The New Information Ecosystem and the Changing Patterns of Media Production and Consumption. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.2 Recent Conceptual Advances in Media Effects Theories . . . . . . . . . . 10.3 The Fragmentation of the Media Landscape and the Prevailing Patterns of News Consumption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.4 Changing Patterns of Media Consumption in Today’s High-Choice Media Environment: Empirical Evidence from Romania . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10.5 New Media Coverage Patterns During Crisis Situations . . . . . . . . . . . 10.6 The Transition from Low- to High-Choice Media Landscape . . . . . 10.7 New Media-Related Maladies and Possible Remedies . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

159 164 167 170 175 175 179 179 180 181 183 186 190 192 194 195 197 201 201 203 204

205 206 207 208 211

List of Figures

Fig. 4.1 Fig. 4.2

Visibility of the pandemic-related news . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Visibility of pandemic-related topics during the peak and routine periods in TV news stories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fig. 4.3 Visibility of pandemic-related topics during the peak and routine periods in online news stories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fig. 4.4 Visibility of pandemic-related topics during the peak and routine periods, by media source (TV vs. online) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fig. 4.5 Actors setting the agenda for online news (% of total COVID-19 related news) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fig. 4.6 Actors setting the agenda for TV news (% of total COVID-19 related news) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fig. 4.7 Intermedia agenda for online sources (% of total COVID-19-related news) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fig. 4.8 Intermedia agenda for TV news (% of total COVID-19-related news) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fig. 4.9 The lag between the source and the published news for online news. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fig. 4.10 The lag for the intermedia agenda-setting for the first and second sources cited (online news only .N = 506 for the first source; .N = 191 for the second source) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fig. 4.11 The lag for the intermedia agenda-setting per type of period (routine vs peak) (online news only) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fig. 9.1 Media diet for each news consumption profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fig. 9.2 News consumption patterns by gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fig. 9.3 News consumption patterns by education levels . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fig. 9.4 News consumption patterns by age groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fig. 9.5 Media trust patterns by news consumers’ profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fig. 9.6 Media trust by news consumption profiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fig. 9.7 Media trust by level of education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fig. 9.8 Media trust by age groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fig. 9.9 Trust in types of media by age groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fig. 9.10 Trust in types of media by gender. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

49 49 50 51 52 52 53 54 55

55 56 181 183 184 185 186 188 188 189 189 190 ix

List of Tables

Table 4.1

Descriptives of lags for the first and second sources for all online news . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Table 4.2 Descriptives of lags shorter than 1 month for the first and second sources for online news . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Table 4.3 Descriptives of lags lower than 1 month for the first and second sources for online news per type of period (peak vs routine) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Table 8.1 Sample of participants in interviews . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Table 9.1 Profiles of news consumers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Table 9.2 News consumption patterns for all profiles consumers . . . . . . . . . . . Table 9.3 Gender distribution in each media consumption profile. . . . . . . . . . . Table 9.4 Level of education distribution in each media consumption profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Table 9.5 Mean age of people in each media consumption profile . . . . . . . . . . Table 9.6 Descriptives of trust in the media for each media consumption profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Table 9.7 Descriptives of the diversity of media diet for each media consumption profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Table 9.8 Descriptives of diversity of media diet by level of education . . . . . Table 9.9 Descriptives of diversity of media diet by age . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Table 9.10 Descriptives of incidental news exposure for each media consumption profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Table 9.11 Descriptives of incidental news exposure by age categories . . . . . . Table 9.12 OLS regression models predicting news consumption for mainstream and social media . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

56 57

57 150 179 182 184 185 186 187 191 191 192 193 193 194

xi

Chapter 1

Introduction

We live in times of exponential changes due to the rapidly evolving technology, affecting all aspects of human life: from individual choices of spending time to economy, tourism and geopolitics, to name just a few. But maybe nothing has changed as much in the last few years as the media landscape. All we know from the classic media effects paradigms are being questioned nowadays, especially due to the transition from low-choice to high-choice media environment. The abundant academic literature dedicated to this transformation (for overviews, see Strömbäck et al., 2022; Van Aelst et al., 2017) is yet to keep pace with the many implications of such a radical change. The authors discuss general concerns of the new “political information environment” (Aalberg et al., 2010), but also more fine-grained consequences and phenomena that are enhanced in these new media landscapes. In their seminal paper from 2017, Van Aelst et al. (2017). synthesise the main concerns in six key issues: “(1) declining supply of political information, (2) declining quality of news, (3) increasing media concentration and declining diversity of news, (4) increasing fragmentation and polarisation, (5) increasing relativism and (6) increasing inequality in political knowledge” (p. 4). Other studies refer more to punctual phenomena that manifest themselves more prominently in the new media environment, such as changes in the news production routines (Diakopoulos, 2019; Hanusch et al., 2019; Zamith & Westlund, 2022), in the setting of the public agenda (Bentivegna & Artieri, 2020; DjerfPierre & Shehata, 2017), news avoidance (Karlsen et al., 2020), selective exposure (Skovsgaard et al., 2016), diversity of media diets (Dubois & Blank, 2018) or misand disinformation (Hameleers & Van der Meer, 2020; Villi et al., 2022), to name just a few. Additionally, it is important to remember that research shows that both the supply and demand sides of political information are context-dependent (Castro et al., 2022, Humprecht et al., 2020). However, the academic literature dedicated to these important changes is still mainly reporting from the US and Western European countries (for notable exceptions, see Gross & Jakubowicz, 2012; Surowiec & Stetka, 2018). In this book, we focus on patterns of news consumption and the © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Buturoiu et al., Patterns of News Consumption in a High-Choice Media Environment, Springer Studies in Media and Political Communication, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41954-6_1

1

2

1 Introduction

associated phenomena related to several changes brought about by the transition to the high-choice media environment in the last few years in an Eastern European democracy, namely, Romania. In this way, we hope to add a new perspective on topics very often investigated in other social and political contexts. In the last few years, there have been dramatic changes in the “political information environment”, which is defined as “the aggregate supply of news or political information that is out there” (Van Aelst et al., 2017, p. 5). When discussing the political information environment, researchers focus first and foremost on the supply side of the political information, even though there have also been important changes in the demand side, sometimes as an immediate result of the supply side transformation. When taking into account the supply side, researchers usually focus not only on the amount and quality of political news circulating in all media but also on the opportunity structures associated with it, as the political information environment has significant consequences on the way people consume news (Sindermann et al., 2021), their knowledge about politics and current affairs (Castro et al., 2022) or other associated phenomena, such as news avoidance (Toff & Kalogeropoulos, 2020), selective exposure (Steppat et al., 2022) or exposure to misinformation (Hameleers & Van der Meer, 2020). The supply side is mainly associated with news production, seen as routine patterns of producing the news, often set in organisational and ideological contexts (Wahl-Jorgensen and Hanitzsch, 2019). It is worth mentioning that, in the last years, there have been dramatic changes in news production, largely due to two factors: citizen journalism and automated journalism. The demand side refers to “the amount and quality of information that people are interested in consuming and the skills they require to comprehend and retain this information” (Van Aelst et al., 2017, p. 6). From this perspective, in the last years, much attention has been given to the profiles of news consumers (Castro et al., 2022; Choi, 2016; Edgerly, 2015; Strömbäck et al., 2018; Swart et al., 2017; Vandenplas & Picone, 2021): to what kind of media people consume, why and with what consequences. Having as a general context all these changes brought about by the new political information environment, the book focuses on both the supply and the demand sides of political information. In the first step, we discuss the changes in the way media set the agenda in the current context. Then, we move towards discussing media diets, from a descriptive and a normative perspective, as well as the phenomena associated with the subject, such as news avoidance, selective exposure, news snacking, newsfinds-me perception and mis- and disinformation. The general structure of the book is built on the following logic: we first introduce a block of theories and related concepts and then provide an empirical study based on the respective theoretical background. First, we discuss agenda-setting and its ramifications and then present the results of a content analysis regarding intermedia agenda-setting during the COVID-19 pandemic in Romania. Second, the next three theoretical chapters are dedicated to the changes brought about by the new highchoice media environment, namely, how people form their media diets and their associated consumption patterns: news-finds-me perception, selective exposure,

1 Introduction

3

news snacking, news avoidance, incidental news exposure and disinformation. We then continue with two empirical chapters, presenting one qualitative and one quantitative study rooted in the concepts discussed in the previous theoretical chapters. In the end, we propose new directions and avenues of research dedicated to all the concepts covered in this book, with an emphasis on what has changed and what is expected to change in the near future with regard to the high-choice media environment. The book contains nine chapters. In the first chapter, we discuss the agendasetting theory in its most classic sense: from its first conceptualisation in 1972 by Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw to its already traditional ramifications, framing and priming. Considered one of the most prolific mass communication theories, agenda-setting has yet to account for the latest changes and transformations of the media landscape. In this context, we offer an overview of the classical approach in an era where the media mainly consisted of TV, printed newspapers and radio (McCombs and Shaw, 1972; Iyengar, 1991; Krosnick and Kinder, 1990), as well as an up-to-date evolution of the way in which the media have come to set the agenda in the high-choice media environment (Coleman & Wu, 2022; De Blasio et al., 2020; Geiß, 2022; Langer & Gruber, 2021; Perloff, 2022). Moreover, we propose a historical overview of the concepts of framing and priming, with a focus on framing, to which a huge amount of academic research has been devoted (for an overview, see Lecheler & De Vreese, 2019). We follow the main directions of analysis found in the academic literature to date with reference to the distinction between emphasis and equivalence frames, typology of news frames and moderators and mediators of framing effects. The second chapter is dedicated to the more recent developments of agendasetting research, that is, network agenda-setting, agenda-melding and intermedia agenda-setting. The network or third-level agenda-setting was first theorised in 2012 (Guo, 2012), adding a new dimension to the classic objects and attributes agenda and showing how the interconnectivity between topics provided by the media “migrate” on citizens agenda. In this chapter, we discuss the short history of the concept, as well as the main methodological challenges and critiques of the theory. Additionally, we discuss agenda-melding, with a special focus on how social media has changed the way audiences combine different media and personal agendas (Bantimaroudis, 2021; Minooie, 2021; Riley & Cowart, 2018). In the end, we explore intermedia agenda-setting and how the interdependency between various media sources in setting the public agenda changed over time (Su & Xiao, 2021). This particular subchapter is further used as a basis for the first empirical chapter (Chap. 4) dedicated to the way news media topics migrate between various media outlets in Romania. In the first empirical chapter (Chap. 4 of the book), we report on a content analysis conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic in Romania, aiming to understand how topics/news stories migrate from one media outlet to another in a crisis situation in two different moments: immediately after the outbreak of the pandemic (March 2020) and in a more “normalised” period of the crisis (January 2021). Building on the intermedia agenda theoretical background, we are particularly interested in

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1 Introduction

understanding the role played by the mainstream media and the online and social media in reporting on the pandemic and the speed (or “lag”) with which the topics migrate from one medium’s agenda to another in a crisis situation, dominated by a huge level of “need for orientation” (Matthes, 2006) and in a multi-choice media landscape dominated by fierce competition for attention (Nielsen et al., 2016). In the fourth chapter, we cover the new ways in which people consume political information in the high-choice media environment. We rely on the media repertoires approach to look into people’s news consumption patterns (Kim, 2016; Mangold & Bachl, 2018). The main focus of this chapter is on news consumption profiles, trying to shed light on the way people consume news in the current media landscape. Studies conducted in the last decade have shown different patterns of news consumption in different countries (Castro et al., 2022; Mourão et al., 2018; Oh et al., 2021; Strömbäck et al., 2018; Vandenplas & Picone, 2021), based not only on context differences but also on how researchers measured news consumption patterns. A subchapter is dedicated to the “media diets” metaphor, proposing a normative approach to what a healthy media diet should be. This will be further empirically explored in Chaps. 8 and 9. The fifth chapter is dedicated to the news-related phenomena enhanced by the high-choice media environment: news avoidance, selective exposure, incidental news exposure, echo chambers, media trust, etc. We argue that people’s media diets are in part the result of such phenomena and discuss the role played by sociodemographic variables in shaping the way nowadays people consume news. We show that such phenomena could have important detrimental effects on democracy, such as making people disengaged (Skovsgaard & Andersen, 2020) or trapped in echo chambers (Cinelli et al., 2020, 2021), leading to fragmented audiences (Messing & Westwood, 2014) or high levels of polarisation (Johnson et al., 2020; Trilling et al., 2017), etc. In this way, we provide the setting for the survey-based analysis on which we report in Chap. 9. In Chap. 7, we present the state of the art related to information disorders. We start by reviewing the terminology of this particular issue, with the already classic distinctions between disinformation, misinformation, “fake news”, etc. Then we focus solely on disinformation, which is one of the main foci of the empirical qualitative research of Chap. 8. We discuss various effects of information disorders, at both individual and societal levels. At the individual level, we argue about the power of misleading content to influence beliefs and behaviours (Featherstone et al., 2019; Levy, 2017; Thorson, 2016), including further distribution of inaccurate information (Corbu et al., 2021; Rapp & Salovich, 2018; Salovich & Rapp, 2018) or the emergence of several political attitudes, such as inefficacy, alienation and cynicism towards political candidates (Balmas, 2014). At the society level, previous studies showed negative effects of disinformation, such as distrust of the media (including mainstream media) (Ognyanova et al., 2020), poorly informed citizenry and election outcomes (Baptista & Gradim, 2022; Bradshaw & Howard, 2018; Grinberg et al., 2019) or threat to democracy as a whole (Buehler et al., 2021, p. 24). We pay particular attention to the study of information disorders in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic (Kapantai et al., 2021; Lynas, 2020; Matthes et al., 2022).

References

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In the end, we discuss possible solutions to fight disinformation currently existing at the national and European levels (Frau-Meigs, 2022; HLEG, 2018). In Chap. 8, we report on qualitative research conducted within the THREATPIE international project.1 In 2021, researchers from five countries conducted focus groups with ordinary people and expert interviews with politicians and journalists to assess perceptions about the most important threats and opportunities of highchoice media environment. In this chapter, we report on the Romanian data. We mainly discuss the phenomena already covered in the theoretical chapters: news avoidance, selective exposure, disinformation as well as media diets, from both a descriptive and a normative perspective. Chapter 9 complements the qualitative study, with quantitative data gathered by means of a national survey conducted in October 2021. We focus on similar phenomena as in the previous chapter, trying to investigate the most prevalent news consumption patterns among the Romanian population and the factors influencing these patterns. We argue about important differences between mainstream and social media information, in terms of both media diets and associated phenomena: incidental news exposure, trust in the media, diversity of media diets and sociodemographic factors. Results are in line with previous studies highlighting such differences (Bergström & Jervelycke Belfrage, 2018; Dubois & Blank, 2018; Fletcher & Nielsen, 2018). We conclude with a chapter opening new directions of investigation in political communication. First, we discuss a paradigm shift in theoretical models in communication studies towards contingent effects, particularly in the increasingly complex political information environment and a shift in news consumption patterns, due to the unprecedented high-choice media landscape. We plead for more empirical studies conducted in diverse cultural contexts (as the mainstream academic literature largely reports on EU and Western European studies), ideally comparative in nature, to grasp the ongoing (sometimes spectacular) changes brought about by the newly available digital technologies.

References Aalberg, T., Van Aelst, P., & Curran, J. (2010). Media systems and the political information environment: A cross-national comparison. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 15(3), 255–271. Balmas, M. (2014). When fake news becomes real: Combined exposure to multiple news sources and political attitudes of inefficacy, alienation, and cynicism. Communication Research, 41(3), 430–454. Bantimaroudis, P. (2021). Conspiratorial discourses on social media: Agendamelding explorations and COVID-19. International Journal of Communication, 15, 24.

1 More

information about THREATPIE project can be found at: http://threatpie.eu/.

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Baptista, J. P., & Gradim, A. (2022). Online disinformation on Facebook: the spread of fake news during the Portuguese 2019 election. Journal of Contemporary European Studies, 30(2), 297– 312. Bentivegna, S., & Artieri, G. B. (2020). Rethinking public agenda in a time of high-choice media environment. Media and Communication, 8(4), 6–15. Bergström, A., & Jervelycke Belfrage, M. (2018). News in social media: Incidental consumption and the role of opinion leaders. Digital Journalism, 6(5), 583–598. Bradshaw, S., & Howard, P. N. (2018). The global organization of social media disinformation campaigns. Journal of International Affairs, 71(1_5), 23–32. Buehler, M., Schatz, E., Ali, S. M., Greene, C., & Sombatpoonsiri, J. (2021). How information disorder affirms authoritarianism and destabilizes democracy: Evidence, trends, and actionable mitigation strategies from Asia and the Pacific. Asian Development Bank Economics Working Paper Series, (1). Castro, L., Strömbäck, J., Esser, F., Van Aelst, P., de Vreese, C., Aalberg, T., Cardenal, A. S., Corbu, N., Hopmann, D. N., Koc-Michalska, K., Matthes, J., Schemer, C., Sheafer, T., Splendore, S., Stanyer, J., Stepi´nska, A., Št˘etka, V., & Theocharis, Y. (2022). Navigating high-choice European political information environments: A comparative analysis of news user profiles and political knowledge. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 27(4), 827–859. Choi, J. (2016). Why do people use news differently on SNSs? An investigation of the role of motivations, media repertoires, and technology cluster on citizens’ news-related activities. Computers in Human Behavior, 54, 249–256. Cinelli, M., Brugnoli, E., Schmidt, A. L., Zollo, F., Quattrociocchi, W., & Scala, A. (2020). Selective exposure shapes the Facebook news diet. PloS one, 15(3), e0229129. Coleman, R., & Wu, H. D. (2022). Individual differences in affective agenda setting: A crosssectional analysis of three US presidential elections. Journalism, 23(5), 992–1009. Corbu, N., Bârg˘aoanu, A., Durach, F., & Udrea, G. (2021). Fake news going viral: The mediating effect of negative emotions. Media Literacy and Academic Research, 4(2). De Blasio, E., Kneuer, M., Schünemann, W., & Sorice, M. (2020). The ongoing transformation of the digital public sphere: Basic considerations on a moving target. Media and Communication, 8(4), 1–5. Diakopoulos, N. (2019). Automating the news. In Automating the news. How algorithms are rewriting the media. Harvard University Press. Djerf-Pierre, M., & Shehata, A. (2017). Still an agenda setter: Traditional news media and public opinion during the transition from low to high choice media environments. Journal of Communication, 67(5), 733–757. Dubois, E., & Blank, G. (2018). The echo chamber is overstated: the moderating effect of political interest and diverse media. Information, Communication & Society, 21(5), 729–745. Edgerly, S. (2015). Red media, blue media, and purple media: News repertoires in the colorful media landscape. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 59(1), 1–21. Featherstone, J. D., Davis, C. A., & Zhang, J. (2019). Correcting vaccine misinformation on social media using fact-checking labels. APHA’s 2019 Annual Meeting and Expo (Nov. 2–Nov. 6). Fletcher, R., & Nielsen, R. K. (2018). Are people incidentally exposed to news on social media? A comparative analysis. New Media & Society, 20(7), 2450–2468. Frau-Meigs, D. (2022). How disinformation reshaped the relationship between journalism and media and information literacy (MIL): Old and new perspectives revisited. Digital Journalism, 10(5), 912–922. Guo, L. (2012). The application of social network analysis in agenda setting research: A methodological exploration. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 56(4), 616–631. Geiß, S. (2022). The media’s conditional agenda-setting power: How baselines and spikes of issue salience affect likelihood and strength of agenda-setting. Communication Research, 49(2), 296– 323. Grinberg, N., Joseph, K., Friedland, L., Swire-Thompson, B., & Lazer, D. (2019). Fake news on Twitter during the 2016 US presidential election. Science, 363(6425), 374–378.

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Gross, P., & Jakubowicz, K. (Eds.). (2012). Media transformations in the post-communist world: Eastern Europe’s tortured path to change. Rowman & Littlefield. Hameleers, M., & Van der Meer, T. G. (2020). Misinformation and polarization in a high-choice media environment: How effective are political fact-checkers? Communication Research, 47(2), 227–250. Hanusch, F., Tandoc, E. C., Dimitrakopoulou, D., Muchtar, N., Rafter, K., Ramírez, M. M., Rupar, V., & Sacco, V. (2019). Transformations: Journalists’ reflections on changes in news work. In Worlds of journalism (pp. 259–282). Columbia University Press. HLEG. (2018). A multi-dimensional approach to disinformation: report of the independent highlevel group (HLEG) on fake news and online disinformation. European Commission. Publications Office of the European Union. https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/ final-report-high-level-expert-group-fake-news-and-online-disinformation Humprecht, E., Esser, F., & Van Aelst, P. (2020). Resilience to online disinformation: A framework for cross-national comparative research. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 25(3), 493–516. Iyengar, S. (1991). Is anyone responsible? How television frames political issues. University of Chicago Press. Johnson, B. K., Neo, R. L., Heijnen, M. E., Smits, L., & van Veen, C. (2020). Issues, involvement, and influence: Effects of selective exposure and sharing on polarization and participation. Computers in Human Behavior, 104, 106155. Kapantai, E., Christopoulou, A., Berberidis, C., & Peristeras, V. (2021). A systematic literature review on disinformation: Toward a unified taxonomical framework. New Media & Society, 23(5), 1301–1326. Karlsen, R., Beyer, A., & Steen-Johnsen, K. (2020). Do high-choice media environments facilitate news avoidance? A longitudinal study 1997–2016. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 64(5), 794–814. Kim, S. J. (2016). A repertoire approach to cross-platform media use behavior. New Media & Society, 18(3), 353–372. Krosnick, J. A., & Kinder, D. R. (1990). Altering the foundations of support for the president 816 through priming. American Political Science Review, 84, 497–512. Langer, A. I., & Gruber, J. B. (2021). Political agenda setting in the hybrid media system: Why legacy media still matter a great deal. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 26(2), 313– 340. Lecheler, S., & De Vreese, C. H. (2019). News framing effects: Theory and practice (p. 138). Taylor & Francis. Levy, N. (2017). The bad news about fake news. Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective, 6(8), 20–36. Lynas, M. (2020). COVID: Top 10 current conspiracy theories–alliance for science. Alliance for Science. https://allianceforscience.cornell.edu/blog/2020/04/covid-top-10-current-conspiracytheories/ Mangold, F., & Bachl, M. (2018). New news media, new opinion leaders? How political opinion leaders navigate the modern high-choice media environment. Journal of Communication, 68(5), 896–919. Matthes, J. (2006). The need for orientation towards news media: Revising and validating a classic concept. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 18(4), 422–444. Matthes, J., Corbu, N., Jin., S., Theocharis, J., Schemer, C., Van Aelst, P., Strömbäck, J., KocMichalska, K., Esser, F., Aalberg, T., Cardenal, A. S., Castro, L., de Vreese, C., Hopmann, D., Sheafer, T., Splendore, S., Stanyer, J., Stepinska, A., Štetka, V., & Zoizner, A. (2022). Perceived prevalence of misinformation fuels worries about COVID-19: A cross-country, multi-method investigation. Information, Communication & Society, online first, 1-24. McCombs, M., & Shaw, D. (1972). The agenda-setting function of the mass media. Public Opinion Quarterly, 36, 176–187.

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Messing, S., & Westwood, S. J. (2014). Selective exposure in the age of social media: Endorsements trump partisan source affiliation when selecting news online. Communication Research, 41(8), 1042–1063. Minooie, M. (2021). Agendamelding: How Americans meld agendas. The Agenda Setting Journal, 5(2), 177–204. Mourão, R. R., Thorson, E., Chen, W., & Tham, S. M. (2018). Media repertoires and news trust during the early Trump administration. Journalism Studies, 19(13), 1945–1956. Nielsen, R. K., Cornia, A., Kalogeropoulos, A., & Kalogeropoulos, A. (2016). Challenges and Opportunities for News Media and Journalism in an Increasingly Digital, Mobile, and Social Media Environment. Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2879383 Ognyanova, K., Lazer, D., Robertson, R. E., & Wilson, C. (2020). Misinformation in action: Fake news exposure is linked to lower trust in media, higher trust in government when your side is in power. Harvard Kennedy School Misinformation Review. https://misinforeview.hks.harvard. edu/article/misinformation-in-action-fake-news-exposure-is-linked-to-lower-trust-in-mediahigher-trust-in-government-when-your-side-is-in-power/ Oh, H. J., Lor, Z., & Choi, J. (2021). News repertoires and political information efficacy: Focusing on the mediating role of perceived news overload. SAGE Open, 11(1), 2158244020988685. Perloff, R. M. (2022). The fifty-year legacy of agenda-setting: Storied past, complex conundrums, future possibilities. Mass Communication and Society, 25(4), 469–499. Rapp, D. N., & Salovich, N. A. (2018). Can’t we just disregard fake news? The consequences of exposure to inaccurate information. Policy Insights from the Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 5(2), 232–239. Riley, J. K., & Cowart, H. S. (2018). Agendamelding and out-group derogation: Examining how aggregated content can be used to prove in-group membership. The Agenda Setting Journal, 2(2), 124–144. Salovich, N. A., & Rapp, D. N. (2018). Readers’ perceived resistance to misinformation is inversely related to their use of inaccurate content. In Paper presented at the 28th Annual Meeting of the Society for Text & Discourse, Brighton, UK. Sindermann, C., Kannen, C., & Montag, C. (2021). The degree of heterogeneity of news consumption in Germany–Descriptive statistics and relations with individual differences in personality, ideological attitudes, and voting intentions. New Media & Society, online first, 1–24. Skovsgaard, M., & Andersen, K. (2020). Conceptualizing news avoidance: Towards a shared understanding of different causes and potential solutions. Journalism Studies, 21(4), 459–476. Skovsgaard, M., Shehata, A., & Strömbäck, J. (2016). Opportunity structures for selective exposure: Investigating selective exposure and learning in Swedish election campaigns using panel survey data. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 21(4), 527–546. Steppat, D., Castro Herrero, L., & Esser, F. (2022). Selective exposure in different political information environments-How media fragmentation and polarization shape congruent news use. European Journal of Communication, 37(1), 82–102. Strömbäck, J., Boomgaarden, H., Broda, E., Damstra, A., Lindgren, E., Tsfati, Y., & Vliegenthart, R. (2022). From low-choice to high-choice media environments: Implications for knowledge resistance. In Knowledge resistance in high-choice information environments (pp. 49–68). Routledge. Strömbäck, J., Falasca, K., & Kruikemeier, S. (2018). The mix of media use matters: Investigating the effects of individual news repertoires on offline and online political participation. Political Communication, 35(3), 413–432. Su, Y., & Xiao, X. (2021). Mapping the intermedia agenda setting (IAS) literature: Current trajectories and future directions. The Agenda Setting Journal, 5(1), 56–83. Surowiec, P., & Stetka, V. (Eds.). (2018). Social media and politics in central and Eastern Europe. Routledge. Swart, J., Peters, C., & Broersma, M. (2017). Navigating cross-media news use: Media repertoires and the value of news in everyday life. Journalism Studies, 18(11), 1343–1362.

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Chapter 2

Agenda-Setting: 50 Years of Research

2.1 Introduction The news media have been labelled the fourth estate due to their normative role in society. Referring to news and journalism in general as the fourth estate is an acknowledgement of the power information holds in contemporary society. News media guide people in understanding the world they live in and provide them with information and viewpoints that enable them to function as citizens, fostering public debate and democracy. Not surprisingly, then, the news media have a significant impact on the individuals’ attitudes, cognitions and behaviours. Media influences occur across a broad spectrum of issues, impact all social groups and span countries and cultures around the globe. Over the past half-century, communication studies have focused on various theories that explain the role media play in shaping our world and the way we interpret it; among them, agenda-setting theory is the most prominent one. This theory has helped public opinion researchers to better understand how individuals process and respond to the political and social information they are exposed to. A half-century has elapsed since the Chapel Hill study dedicated to agenda-setting was first published. In understanding the concept, it is important to trace how it was broadened, extended with experimental research, challenged by the concept of framing and adapted to the present era with a multitude of online and social media agenda-setting studies (for an overview, see Perloff, 2022). The famous notion of media agenda-setting was introduced by Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw in 1972. The authors have continued the paradigm of powerful media effects, shifting, however, from media messages to how these morph into beliefs and attitudes. McCombs and Shaw have started their research from Cohen’s (1963) observation that media may not be successful in telling people what to think, but it has a powerful effect in telling them what to think about. “What to think about” refers to the correlations between media exposure and attitude © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Buturoiu et al., Patterns of News Consumption in a High-Choice Media Environment, Springer Studies in Media and Political Communication, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41954-6_2

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and opinion change, and this interrelationship was at the core of the classical research pioneered by the two American scholars. Furthermore, the authors added a new element focusing on the “what to think about” variable – the analysis of the public agenda. The resulting agenda-setting research tradition has been incredibly successful and prolific, with hundreds of agenda-setting studies published in the past 50 years (for an overview, see Valkenburg & Oliver, 2020), while the classical theory continues to be regarded as relevant in communication studies. When first advanced, agenda-setting research revolved around the reciprocal influences between mass media, policymakers and the public (McCombs & Shaw, 1972). In the 1990s, the agenda-setting paradigm expanded to include new concepts such as framing and priming. They are both dedicated to the mechanisms of influence that media exert over individuals’ attitudes, cognitions and behaviours (Iyengar et al., 2019). This chapter provides an overview of these highly influential concepts in communication studies: media agenda-setting, which occurs when increased media coverage of an issue leads to increased perceptions of the salience of that issue; priming, which refers to the salience of an issue promoted by media that becomes the basis for political evaluation (Iyengar, 2001; Iyengar et al., 2019); and framing, which is a process by which news content is created and shapes individuals’ perceptions and behaviours (Ewoldsen & Rhodes, 2020; Moy et al., 2001). Other recent theoretical ramifications of the agenda-setting model include third-level agenda-setting, agenda-melding and intermedia agenda, which will be discussed in the following chapter. Coming back to the main conceptual ramifications of agenda-setting, framing has received consistent interest in the past three decades. In the 1990s, framing (a concept that dates back to Goffman, 1974) came to receive scholarly attention (e.g. Entman, 1993; Kosicki, 1993). Frames provide a conceptual understanding of how individuals and media interpret politics, with a focus on how disparate events are connected, how public problems are defined and which particular remedies are proposed (Entman & Usher, 2018). During the 1990s and early 2000s, frames offered a broader understanding of how political issues were covered in the media than the narrow agenda-setting concept. As Perloff (2022) observes, framing challenged agenda-setting, suggesting there was a more complex cognitive construct to explain media effects, which went beyond saliences and could explain causal attributions, moral assessments and proposed solutions. There has not been consistent consensus among agenda-setting scholars in regard to framing and its important implications for political communication. Many see it as a more nuanced manifestation of agenda-setting and even consider it synonymous with the second-level agenda-setting, which focuses on the salience of the attributes or aspects of the particular issue (e.g. McCombs & Valenzuela, 2021). However, unlike agenda-setting, framing is not a theory that makes specific hypotheses but a fine-grained approach for mapping the larger political universe. Entman’s (1993) and others’ definitions (for an overview, see Entman & Usher, 2018) of frames indicate that frames are more multi-faceted and complex than attributes. Framing is more than selecting a number of dominant attributes; it examines the broader, dynamic definition of the problem and its interpretation, construction and evaluation

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(Perloff, 2022). In the debate revolving around attribute agenda-setting versus framing, even the researchers of framing indicated the key problem of framing: its vagueness (Lee et al., 2021). Consequently, some authors (Cacciatore et al., 2016; Guo & Vargo, 2020) argue for a return to linguistically based equivalent framing, an approach focused on internal validity, but with less applicability, given that different facets of an issue cannot always be presented in frames that contain logically identical content (Luo et al., 2019). These conceptual confusions have led to a decline of framing as the main research tool in mapping the current political universe (for an in-depth analysis of the evolution of the term, see Perloff, 2022). Unlike framing, agenda-setting is still largely used today (with serious amendments to the original theory), even if it has been advanced in a dramatically different media era. Many scholars still consider the original theoretical framework valuable, adapting or expanding it to examine the complex new media ecosystem (Coleman & Wu, 2021; McCombs & Valenzuela, 2021; Rossiter, 2021; Perloff, 2022). In spite of the widespread use of agenda-setting theory, its critics often argue that its conceptual foundation is neither sufficiently clear nor consistently operationalised (Vargo et al., 2018). The main weakness of the original theory is the vagueness of the “setting the issues” process, which is not clearly defined and solidly validated via empirical research (Valkenburg & Oliver, 2020). Furthermore, even though recent conceptual expansions have been added to the traditional explanatory model, some researchers argue that classical agenda-setting studies lack robust and time-tested causal relationships (Lee et al., 2021). We will address all these shortcomings of the classical agenda-setting theory in the next pages. We divide this chapter into four parts. After an introductory overview of the agenda-setting classical research and its limitations, we explore the concepts of priming and framing and their implications for communication research. This includes a conceptual overview of the various research traditions dedicated to priming and framing in communication studies and their relationship with agendasetting. Thirdly, we explore the typologies of media frames, namely, emphasis frames and equivalence frames, and discuss their similarities with the original agenda-setting model. Last but not least, we consider more recent research in tune with the current technologies and advancements in online communication and social media and discuss new developments of agenda-setting, more relevant for today’s complex media environment.

2.2 Agenda-Setting Theory As previously stated, the agenda-setting theory was proposed in the early 1970s by Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw to explain the relationship between media exposure and the attitudinal and behavioural responses it elicits. The widespread belief at the time was that media effects were immediate reactions to media consumption, and exposure was thought to lead to greater effects, while the mechanisms behind the mere exposure were left in the dark (Perloff, 2022). Agenda-

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setting theory advanced for the first time the hypothesis that exposure was not enough; media content needed to be made significant (salient) to the user before being processed and accepted (McCombs & Valenzuela, 2021). Thus, agendasetting brought a change of perspective in communication studies, bringing about a paradigmatic shift from what effects media have to how these effects work at both a micro- and macro-social level (Shaw et al., 2019). The authors initially argued (McCombs & Shaw, 1972) that media audiences have the option to choose what topics they want to engage with; however, the selection of “important” issues is already determined by the media. Moreover, the more salient an issue is in the media, the more likely it is to be advanced and processed as important by the public. As a consequence, people deem more important the issues that media cover the most or more frequently. The more media coverage an issue receives, the more salient it becomes, and it gains, consequently, more public attention. This transfer of salience from the media to the public was at the core of the initial agenda-setting research (for an overview, see McCombs & Valenzuela, 2021). McCombs and Shaw (1972) have started their agenda-setting study during the 1968 presidential campaign, advancing the hypothesis that mass media have an agenda-setting function, which consists of a transfer of issue importance from their agenda towards public opinion. When analysing the public’s perceptions of important voting issues, McCombs and Shaw attempted to see if there was a correlation between these important issues and the main issues that have received media attention throughout the campaign. The targeted area was Chapel Hill, North Carolina, and the analysed media content covered all news sources during 3 weeks of the electoral campaign. During the same period, the researchers also interviewed 100 undecided registered voters, asking them to rank the key campaign issues. After analysing the data, McCombs and Shaw discovered a very strong correlation between the voters’ perceptions of salient issues and those issues covered the most by the media, regardless of their ideological orientation or partisanship. Such results confirmed the hypothesis that the media sets the agenda for the public. Moreover, the public perceptions of salient issues were influenced during the campaign not only by partisan media that presumably reinforce viewers’ prior ideology but by media in general. In short, the two scholars did not identify a partisan effect of the media, and that was the reason why they advanced the hypothesis that media does not tell the audience how to think but rather what to think about (for an overview of the initial research, see Shaw et al., 2019). If originally agenda-setting theory was centred on issue salience and salience transfer from the media to the public, the more recent theoretical extensions (Iyengar et al., 2019; Shaw et al., 2019) have expanded the classical theory to a more complex conceptual construct, which overlaps with priming and framing theories. As various authors suggest (e.g. Entman & Usher, 2018; Lee et al., 2021), it is important not to think of agenda-setting as a theory about issues only; the added value of the theory relies on the emphasis of the salience transfer from media to the public and the salience of the attributes that define the discussed issues. As a result of the further conceptual additions, agenda-setting emerged as a more fine-grained explanatory

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mechanism that approaches both the media content and the corresponding audience attitudes about this content. The new conceptualisation moved beyond issue salience to also explore, for instance, what was defined as attribute salience or the secondlevel agenda-setting (McCombs and Shaw, 2017). Other refinements of the initial theory explored the process of reverse agenda-setting (McCombs, 2004), which referred to how journalists respond to public interests and to how, in fact, the public agenda precedes and influences the media agenda. Similarly, expanding on the relationship between the various actors involved in the formation of the media agenda, Shoemaker and Reese (2014) have advanced a conceptual model named agenda-building, composed of five factors: individual factors, journalists and media, media routines, organisational factors, social institutions and cultural/ideological considerations. This theoretical appendix does not identify the general public as a significant influence in the model and is more centred on a journalistic perspective on media agenda. In the same vein of research, Kiousis and McCombs (2004) have expanded agenda-setting theory into an analysis of media effects on audience attitudes, finding that any extra attention directed towards an issue triggers stronger attitudes towards that topic. Weaver (2007) also refined the original theory, focusing not on the extent of media coverage but on its content. Expanding the classical line of research, he has reinforced the concept of two levels of agenda-setting: the salience of topics and the salience of the attributes of the topics. In this extension of the traditional research, the perception of the importance of issues is not central anymore; more attention is allocated to the media content and how issues are framed (which attributes they receive) within the media content that viewers are exposed to. McCombs and his colleagues have tried to translate framing in the language of the second-level agenda-setting, suggesting that framing is the selection of a restricted number of thematically related attributes for inclusion on the media agenda (McCombs & Shaw, 2017). They insist on defining framing as a set of attributes with which media operate when covering certain issues. Moreover, in McCombs’s vein of research (for an overview, see McCombs & Valenzuela, 2021), there are various types of attributes, such as aspects of issues and traits of political candidates, which need to be mapped in order to advance a taxonomy of the frames employed in agenda-setting-related studies. Not all scholars agree, however, that the second-level agenda-setting is equivalent to framing (Lee et al., 2021; Luo et al., 2019; Perloff, 2022). Framing has been described as an analytical model that includes various condensing symbols (catchphrases, examples, metaphors, depictions, visual images) and reasoning devices (causes and consequences, appeals to principles or moral claims), which offer a broader perspective on how people interpret news and the political universe they portray than agenda-setting (Valkenburg & Oliver, 2020). In short, while some authors (Weaver et al., 2004) suggest that second-level agenda-setting is similar to framing, others (e.g. Scheufele & Iyengar, 2014; Valkenburg & Oliver, 2020) argue that framing is a stand-alone concept, even if it is closely linked to other forms of media influence such as agenda-setting or persuasion. We will further explore these conceptual distinctions in the next section.

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2.3 Agenda-Setting, Priming and Framing 2.3.1 Conceptual Clarifications From a historical perspective, the agenda-setting approach to media effects marks a transition from theories, such as the spiral of silence (Noelle-Neumann, 1974) or cultivation (Gerbner and Gross, 1976), that hypothesise unidirectional attitudinal and behavioural effects. The early approaches to media effects dating from the early 1940s, such as the magic bullet or hypodermic needle, were focused mostly on direct persuasion (i.e. telling people what to believe). Agenda-setting moves away from persuasive communication and focuses on the media’s more subtle role in telling people what to think about (for an overview, see McCombs & Valenzuela, 2021). As noted in the previous section, the original model of agenda-setting refers to the transfer of salience of issues from mass media to the public; if an issue is covered more frequently or prominently in the media, the audience is also more likely to attribute importance to that particular issue. Even if a half-century has elapsed since the Chapel Hill study dedicated to agenda-setting was first published, the theory still ranks high in bibliometrics, receiving more than 12,000 scholarly citations in Google Scholar in the past three decades (Valkenburg & Oliver, 2020). Starting with the 1990s, however, more scholarly attention has been allocated to framing and priming, seen as extensions of the original agenda-setting theory. These two models are centred on the cognitive processes used by individuals when interpreting information (Iyengar et al., 2019). Even if generally grouped together, agenda-setting, priming and framing have different theoretical premises and cannot be, therefore, merged into a single conceptual framework, as suggested by McCombs & Valenzuela (2021), who considers framing a mere agenda-setting effect or an equivalent to secondlevel agenda-setting (McCombs, 1997). This is mainly because framing is neither a persuasion model nor concerned with agenda-setting; it addresses instead how people interpret the information they receive (Howlett, 2022). In order to better understand the distinctions between these three models, we will explore in the next pages their different conceptual foundations. The concept of priming is related to the activation theory in psychology, and it can, in many ways, be seen as a logical extension of agenda-setting processes. Priming refers to the standards people use to make political evaluations and occurs when news content suggests to news audiences what specific issues they should use as benchmarks for evaluating the performance of leaders and governments (Iyengar, 1991; Iyengar et al., 2019). It is often understood as an extension of agenda-setting mainly because they are both effects based on memory and cognitions and grasp the role they play in information processing (Lee et al., 2021). This cognitive model suggests that individuals use the most salient (or accessible) considerations when they form their opinions or when they are asked to make decisions. Through their agenda, media make certain issues more salient in people’s minds and influence,

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therefore, also the criteria people use when making judgments about social matters and political candidates (priming) (for an overview, see Luo et al., 2019). At the beginning of the 1990s, the main studies dedicated to agenda-setting have examined attitude formation, namely, how media coverage of various public issues primed opinions about political leaders (e.g. Iyengar, 1991; Krosnick & Kinder, 1990). The concept of priming suggests that media attention to political issues also provides the criteria people use when evaluating political leaders. For example, if the media highlights the economy, politicians are more likely to be evaluated based on their performance on economic issues. In such a situation, reporting about strong economic performance would trigger positive public evaluations, and the economy would be considered a key campaign issue. The main conceptual expansion towards introducing priming into the agendasetting research was offered by Iyengar and his colleagues at Stanford (Iyengar & Kinder, 1987), who experimentally proved that news agendas have a consistent impact on political beliefs about the important issues of the day. Iyengar and Kinder’s experiments also examined factors that mediated agenda-setting effects. By applying priming to political communication, researchers have advanced the hypothesis that media agendas prime people to evaluate political candidates based on their performance in handling the particular problems media have raised attention about. In this sense, they took agenda-setting a step further, demonstrating that agenda-setting could influence the standards by which politicians were judged and, in this way, shape voters’ evaluations of political candidates (for an overview, see Valkenburg & Oliver, 2020). The capacity of people to assess candidates accurately is nonetheless problematic, and some scholars argue that voters do not usually make cognitive efforts when processing political information, using instead the most accessible information in their memory as a cognitive shortcut (Guo & Vargo, 2020; Vargo, 2018). Furthermore, beyond the limitations in accurately assessing topics of public interest, people usually use certain topics as evaluation criteria simply because they are on the media agenda. There are, however, ideological or controversial issues that are likely to have electoral effects. Such issues are primed by the media because people are affectively attached to them; therefore, these issues become affectively charged, positively or negatively, and can have a major impact in time of elections or public referenda (Iyengar et al., 2019). Albeit such limitations, by the early 1990s, scholars started to recognise priming as a critical extension of agenda-setting, working through accessibility, heuristics and other cognitive pathways (Perloff, 2022). This represented a consistent contribution in demonstrating causation and connecting social psychology to agenda-setting. In understanding the multi-faceted agenda-setting research, it is important to trace how it was broadened and extended with experimental research of enriching concepts such as priming; another concept that has not only enriched but also challenged the initial theory is framing. Framing defines a dynamic process of opinion formation in which the prevailing modes of presentation in news media coverage shape public opinion (Lee et al., 2021). In the vast literature dedicated to framing, various authors employ a number of definitions of framing, including

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problem definitions, causal interpretations, moral evaluations and treatment recommendations, as well as key themes, phrases and words (for an overview, see Entman & Usher, 2018). The most widespread approach on framing is the constructionist one, which argues that “framing incorporates a wider range of factors than priming and agenda-setting, which are both cognitive concepts” and that “frames are tied in with culture as a macrosocietal structure” (Weaver, 2007, p. 143). Regardless of how framing is defined, there are substantially more definitions for framing than for agenda-setting or priming, and it is obvious that the concept of framing has raised more academic attention in the past decades than agenda-setting and priming (for an overview, see Valkenburg & Oliver, 2020). In one of the most widely cited definitions of frames, Entman argues that “to frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described” (Entman, 1993, p. 52). Entman’s all-encompassing definition offers a conceptual framework for numerous research undertaken in the past 30 years. However, Entman operationalises frames as measures of media agenda, examining, for instance, the news coverage of certain events prominent in the media at a given time, but does not limit them to media coverage solely. Thus, his approach overlaps only to a certain degree to the classical approach of McCombs and Shaw (1972) on measuring media agenda. Overall, since the early 1990s, the literature on framing, priming and agendasetting has been divided into two main schools of thought. The first group (McCombs & Valenzuela, 2021; McCombs, 2004; McCombs & Shaw, 1972) sees all three theoretical models as related to the central concept of agenda-setting and the salience-based explanations underlying it. From their perspective, mass media influence public opinion by emphasising the importance of issues (firstlevel agenda-setting) or issue attributes (second-level agenda-setting, which they see as equivalent to framing). This approach is limited in terms of conceptual clarity, and, consequently, a number of researchers have suggested that a clearer definition of framing is needed (Iyengar, 1991; Lee et al., 2021; Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007; Tewksbury & Scheufele, 2009; Vargo, 2018). This second school of thought approaches framing as media effects that are due to variations in the mode of presentation for a given piece of information (equivalence-based). In short, framing effects refer to communication effects that are not due to differences in what is being communicated but rather to variations in how certain issues are presented (or framed) in news media. However, framing depends also on the preexisting mental schemas of the public. The mode of presentation of a message is, therefore, more likely to have an impact if it resonates with the audience members’ mental schemas (Rossiter, 2021). If the relevant schema does not exist at all among audience members, framing effects are unlikely to occur. Furthermore, schemas are a cultural construct. Therefore, framing effects do not produce similar effects in different cultural contexts (Gilardi et al., 2022). At this point, it is important to note that the numerous operationalisations of framing have begun to create confusion and blur the distinctions between framing

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and other media effects models. As a consequence, various authors argue for the need to change how framing is approached as a theoretical construct (Cacciatore et al., 2016; Perloff, 2022) and even plead for the abandonment of the general term framing, distinguishing instead between different types of framing (Valkenburg & Oliver, 2020). The aim of this conceptual shift is to adjust the classical theory to the recent evolutions in media effects research. The transition from an era of mass communication to one of tailored, hyper-personalised information, echo chambers and micro-targeting requires an updated conceptual approach. In line with this approach, we also consider that framing as a stand-alone concept can and should be a conceptual bridge between various media-related paradigms.

2.3.2 Two Traditions of Framing Research: Equivalence vs Emphasis Frames The complexity of defining framing comes from its interdisciplinary roots in sociology (Goffman, 1974; Gamson & Modigliani, 1987) and psychology (Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984). In order to operationalise framing, it is important to understand these two traditions of research and to draw some distinctions in order to decipher the applicability of the concept in communication studies. The sociological approach is rooted in the analysis of social movements and general sociology literature. Goffman (1974) was one of the first authors to advance a general definition of framing. The majority of sociologists approach framing as a societal, macro-level phenomenon and employ, therefore, more general definitions of framing. Goffman calls frames a schemata of interpretation: a framework that helps people to understand meaningless successions of events, a way to organise what they see in everyday life. Also with a sociological mindset, Gamson (1992) conceptualises framing very broadly as the relationship between ideas and symbols used in public discourse and the meaning that people construct around political issues. Since frames are central organising ideas, journalists also use them in order to classify information more quickly and offer a context for the presented facts and events. The psychological tradition initiated by Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman (Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman & Tversky, 1984) has used the term framing in order to describe subtle differences in the definition of choice alternatives. The authors proved that choices could be altered by defining outcomes as either potential gains or losses. Subjects participating in their experiments were asked to make choices between identical scenarios but described in an antagonistic manner (e.g. the probability of “winning” or “losing” an amount of money). Kahneman and Tversky demonstrated that choice was contingent on the description of choice problems. When presented with outcomes defined as potential gains, people showed risk aversion and chose the safe scenario. But when the identical outcome was defined as potential losses

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instead of gains, people became risk seekers and preferred the outcome with less certainty of gains (for an overview, see Lee et al., 2021). In the same vein, a recent study (Nabi et al., 2020) has indicated that frames elicit emotional responses in the audience, with gain frames inducing positive emotions and loss frames inducing negative emotions. Emotional responses are, therefore, a potential pathway through which gain- and loss-framed messages exert persuasive influence. As other authors point out (Iyengar et al., 2019), similar presentation effects occur in surveys; changes in the wording of attitude questions entail shifts in public opinion. People react less emphatically, for instance, when asked whether “people on welfare” should receive government aid than when asked about aid for “poor people”. In this line of research, framing is dependent on a certain given context; how we interpret information depends on how that information is contextualised or framed. This psychological approach to framing is based on the assumption that framing refers to differential modes of presentation for the same piece of information. This tradition of framing research is labelled equivalence framing and differs from the sociologically rooted tradition, which is focused on emphasis framing, which does not revolve around logically equivalent information but on a selection of sets of facts or arguments that can be defined as a frame (Cacciatore et al., 2016). In the sociological tradition, studies often manipulate what an audience receives rather than expose it to equivalent information with differences only in how it is presented. The sociologically oriented emphasis framing approach has expanded the scope of studies that could fall under the framing label, including, for instance, studies focusing on thematic framing (presenting an issue in a general context) and episodic framing (the treatment of an issue more singularly) (Iyengar, 2005). The sociological tradition has maybe helped galvanise framing work, but, as some authors note (Entman & Usher, 2018), it has also pushed the field of communications towards an outdated model of media effects. As a possible remedy, some scholars (Cacciatore et al., 2016) suggest a return to Denis McQuail’s “constructed reality” paradigm, built on the belief that mass media has potentially strong effects on attitudes and information processing, but that these effects depend on individual-level characteristics (McQuail, 2005). As a result, this loose definition of framing has undoubtedly contributed to making framing effects appear much more widespread and powerful than they actually are (for an overview, see Lee et al., 2021). To wrap up, we can conclude that the main limitations of the sociological approach come from the imprecise definition of framing as information that offers different perspectives on some events or issues. In this tradition of emphasis frames, framing effects represent differences in opinion that cannot be attributed exclusively to differences in presentation. Thus, the prevalence of the emphasis over the equivalence mode of framing makes the framing concept more redundant and more difficult to isolate within other media effects (Entman & Usher, 2018; Iyengar et al., 2019). As underlined previously, this approach has been criticised due to its lack of conceptual and empirical solidity, and various researchers have argued for the

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necessity to use more equivalency-based definitions of framing in communication studies (Lee et al., 2021; Perloff, 2022; Tewksbury & Scheufele, 2009).

2.3.3 Typologies of Frames In media research, framing analysis is centred on various forms of presentation, more nuanced than the simple choice of words. For the past two decades, scholars have focused largely on experimental research, trying to understand how different frames can affect the audiences’ opinions, attitudes or political behaviour (Guo & Vargo, 2020; Entman & Usher, 2018). As briefly noted in the previous section, a well-known classification of media frames distinguishes between thematic or episodic news frames (Iyengar et al., 2019; Iyengar, 1991). Thematic framing offers a broader context by usually involving in-depth reports. An example of thematic framing would be covering the war in Ukraine by addressing the historical context of the relations between Russia and Ukraine in order to explain the causes of the current conflict. On the other hand, episodic framing portrays issues in terms of specific events or individual perspectives, for instance – if we expand the example of the Ukrainian war – the carnage resulted from the Russian invasion of the Ukrainian cities. Usually, episodic coverage uses dramatic visual footage, while thematic reports tend to focus more on debating a certain issue, with mainly “talking heads” and not so much use of video support or live transmissions. Continuing the psychological line of research, other scholars and authors have begun to investigate competing or complementary frames by giving participants more than one perspective on a certain event or phenomenon (Lee et al., 2021). The research design used for these studies uses longitudinal approaches in which experiment participants are exposed either synchronously (at a single point in time) or repeatedly to certain frames. These studies have mainly focused on the difference of framing effects in single frame conditions. However, more recent research has focused on the effects of multiple frame conditions, where the same subjects get alternative frames of an issue (Sniderman & Theriault, 2004) or are exposed to opposing frames (Borah, 2011). The evidence from these studies is that the effects of the framing are dependent not only on the types and quantity of the frames but also on how these frames are processed by the members of the audience (Lee et al., 2021). As explained above, various typologies of frames have been advanced in the past 20 years of research. Another widespread classification makes a distinction between generic and issue-specific frames (e.g. De Vreese, 2005; Valkenburg & Oliver, 2020). Certain frames are relevant only for specific topics or events – these are issue-specific frames, while other frames are more general and can be applied to different topics in different cultures – these frames are labelled generic frames. Other typologies make a distinction between strategic and value frames, loss and gain (Shah et al., 2003), the game and the strategy frame (Cappella and HallJamieson, 2010) and the conflict frame (Price & Tewksbury, 1997; Semetko &

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Valkenburg, 2000) and risk and opportunity frames (Schuck & de Vreese, 2006), to name just the most well-known. These frames surpass thematic boundaries and can be applied across a range of topics, whereas issue-specific frames are intrinsically related to certain topics or news events. Research of issue-specific news frames has covered a multitude of fields, such as political or communication studies, international relations or public affairs (for an overview, see Valkenburg & Oliver, 2020). Overall, the study of news frames from an issue-specific approach allows researchers to disentangle the specificity of a certain issue and offers a more fine-grained approach to the investigated events. Nonetheless, a high degree of issue sensitivity makes generalisations and comparisons more difficult for studies based on issue-specific frames. Additionally, as some authors note (Lee et al., 2021), specific frames tailored for specific studies have made the field of framing analysis even more fragmented, mainly due to the tendency of scholars to generate a unique set of frames for every study. Such limitations call for more conceptual solidity and require the use of common framing definitions and typologies in order to compare and extrapolate research results. An important element when evaluating frames other than their type is their valence as well. As empirically proven, the valence of news frames matters because it can affect both cognitive responses (e.g. Gilardi et al., 2022; Shah et al., 2004) and attitudes (Luo et al., 2019; Schuck & de Vreese, 2006). Frames differ from the perspective of the evaluations – implicit or explicit – they contain. In his classical analysis, Entman (1993) took as a case study of framing an American and a Russian plane accident, which was framed in the media as either a “tragedy” (in the US case) or an “attack” (in the Russian case). This is a clear-cut example of how frames can alter the public’s interpretations through their valence (for an overview, see Entman & Usher, 2018). In addition to valence, the negativity or positivity of news frames also has an impact on attitude formation. Negative information seems to have a stronger impact than positive information. For instance, it has been proven that negative economic news has a stronger effect on public perceptions than positive economic information (Geiß, 2019). A similar effect of negative information has been identified with regard to electoral campaigns (Iyengar et al., 2019) or health communication (Langer & Gruber, 2021). Negative arguments can evoke fear, anger and other emotions (Gilardi et al., 2022) and thus can serve as accessible sources of information when individuals evaluate policy proposals or candidates. In spite of the extant literature dedicated to framing, we believe there is still a need to differentiate the consequences of equivalence vs emphasis frames. The first are defined as presentations that differ only in substantive content (equivalence framing), while the latter are presentations that differ on several content features (emphasis framing), and, as emphasised by numerous researchers (e.g. Lee et al., 2021), they have a differential effect on opinion formation and attitudes. Furthermore, the effects of multiple or even contradictory frames are still an open question. Such shortcomings should be addressed by future studies in order to disentangle the effects of multiple frames exposure, especially since, in the complex environment

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of new media, the viewers are constantly exposed to an abundance of information consisting of a multitude of frames. Several psychological processes involved in framing have been widely studied (Guo & Vargo, 2020; Iyengar et al., 2019; Vargo, 2018), but the moderating and mediating processes have received the most consistent scholarly attention. A moderator is a variable that affects the direction and/or strength of the relation between a predictor and a variable (Borah et al., 2022). In terms of framing, the variables that condition framing effects are called moderators. In general, framing involves a process where individuals choose from a set of available beliefs stored in memory. These beliefs are applicable and are mediators in the process of decoding frames. A mediator is described as a missing link between two variables that influences the relationship between those two variables. In other words, a mediator variable accounts for the relation between the predictor and the criterion variable (Lee et al., 2021). One consistent line of research suggests that framing effects are mainly mediated by belief importance (e.g. Entman & Usher, 2018). This means that individuals are influenced by framing through the way media frames alter the salience (perceived importance) of certain issues. This perspective maintains that opinions have a belief support, which can be influenced by the way media frames highlight or ignore certain cues, rendering beliefs as more or less important (Luo et al., 2019; Vargo, 2018). Furthermore, researchers have demonstrated that framing effects affect belief importance by offering new considerations to an individual (e.g. Iyengar et al., 2019). Such studies imply that by being exposed to certain information, individuals might form connections between beliefs and topics they had not thought about before. New information can cause individuals to revise their beliefs; as a consequence, existing beliefs themselves are altered and not only the perceived importance of certain topics covered in the media (Guo & Vargo, 2020). In short, framing can operate in multiple ways, both via a direct route of affecting belief importance and indirectly by offering new considerations and links between considerations that did not exist before. Studies dedicated to the moderation effect of frames and the mediating variables that intervene in the process suggest that framing effects are not magic bulletlike effects where audiences play a passive role (Valkenburg & Oliver, 2020). Furthermore, there is a consistent body of research on framing (Borah, 2011; Geiß, 2019; Langer & Gruber, 2021) that has demonstrated the differential effects of framing; individual characteristics can shape the influence of frames. Understanding these various individual characteristics and their interplay with the psychological processes is thus key to understanding framing effects. In an overview study dedicated to frames (Lee et al., 2021), the authors have indicated that moderators and mediators of framing effects have been largely employed in research during the past two decades. Some moderators tested the most in framing studies include the need for cognition, values, need to evaluate, ideology or political schema. Notwithstanding the various repertoires of moderators, the most largely used moderator in communication research is political knowledge. This individual-level moderator has produced mixed results in the past. Some studies

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found that frames influence the more knowledgeable individuals (e.g. Chong & Druckman, 2007), whereas other studies (de Vreese, 2010; Druckman & Nelson, 2003; Schuck & de Vreese, 2006) demonstrated just the opposite, namely, that less knowledgeable individuals are more strongly affected by news frames. Similar to political knowledge, political sophistication is another moderator employed in framing analysis. It has been defined by Zaller (1992) as an individual’s engagement with public affairs. As other research suggests (Shehata & Strömbäck, 2013), political sophistication is important when trying to understand why frames do not have a universal impact. More politically aware individuals are more likely to be exposed to news frames involving politics and are better equipped to understand and integrate the frames into their opinions. Empirical testing of this moderator has not provided, however, consistent results either (for an overview, see Iyengar et al., 2019). Therefore, future studies should extend the empirical testing of various moderators and explore their applicability in the rapidly changing media landscape of today. In the contemporary era, when media are increasingly partisan and people are increasingly affected by selective exposure to political content, media no longer have a common effect on viewers. And since people are not exposed to the same mediated agendas, researchers testing framing effects would have to expose the participants in experiments to a range of different, partisan frames rather than a series of edited stories from newscasts, as the experimenters did in the past decades. Thus, the notion that the media set the same homogenous agenda for a large part of the public is clearly outdated (Shaw et al., 2019). There are increasingly more empirical proofs of the phenomena of partisan selective exposure and polarisation (e.g. Iyengar et al., 2019); therefore, the experimental design from the previous decades cannot be generalised to the current partisan media environment. Partisanship should therefore be built into the experimental design in order to explore salience for divisive topics, such as illegal immigration, minorities or crime, and the much more fragmented media agendas that we are exposed to nowadays (Perloff, 2022).

2.4 Agenda-Setting in the New Media Landscape To wrap up, we can conclude that agenda-setting is, beyond any doubt, one of the major theories in mass communication research, explaining the influence of news coverage on audience members’ attitudes and beliefs about politics and societal issues. In the traditional model of mass media effects, news organisations or journalists select stories based on verified newsworthiness criteria. Agendasetting traditionally investigates the role of journalistic filtering of stories and the consequences of the selections news organisations make. The power redistribution that marks today’s media imposes, however, a re-examination of the traditional functions of journalism. With the advent of social media, which holds the power to disseminate information to a scale and with a speed unseen before, the balance

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of influence has been readjusted. Traditional media, in need of market share, have also adopted more flexible business models and have incorporated social media as source material, just as social media rely largely on traditional media for information (Coleman & Wu, 2021; Gilardi et al., 2022; Langer & Gruber, 2021; Neuman et al., 2014). Additionally, recent research on comparative framing effects in the traditional versus social media has found that the new process of agenda-setting implies a complex, multi-pattern relationship between both traditional/online media and media audience (Geiß, 2019; Luo et al., 2019). Since the digital media is evolving so fast, the dynamics of agenda-setting are becoming increasingly complex. Today both traditional and social media are online, and they can be, therefore, more easily analysed using tools that enable large-scale data analysis, which were not available even a few years ago. A recent study (Gilardi et al., 2022) examines, for instance, the role of social media in political agenda-setting by analysing the connections between three agendas: the traditional media agenda, the social media agenda of parties and the social media agenda of politicians. Results show that they influence one another, but, overall, no agenda leads the others more than it is led by them. These findings show how closely the social media agenda of parties and politicians and traditional media agenda are tied together. Another innovative research (Langer & Gruber, 2021) uses mixed methods and multiplatform data in order to provide a detailed analysis of the roles and interactions between different types of media and how they are used by politicians and advocacy organisations. The authors explore the paths to attention that lead to setting certain issues in the political and media agendas. One of the most relevant findings is that legacy news media still amplify the salience of a certain issue and are key for sustaining attention on that particular issue; in this sense, legacy media remain at the core of the “national conversation”. Other recent studies (Coleman & Wu, 2021; Rossiter, 2021) show that the public agenda, as reflected in social media, is not a replication of the traditional news media agenda. Social media seem to be more centred on social issues, while blogs and Twitter posts are a prevalent medium for discussing political and foreign affairsrelated issues (Geiß, 2019). In spite of a different thematic hierarchy, the authors have nonetheless identified a strong interdependence between traditional media and social media agendas and reciprocal causality. Instead of a single direction of influence or a “one-way agenda-setting”, there seems to be a constant exchange of influence between traditional and online media (see in the next section the ramification called intermedia agenda-setting). As emphasised above, the Internet has dramatically changed how information is disseminated. Traditional media outlets such as television or newspapers no longer function as the primary sources of news. There are multiple consequences of this shifting in information dissemination, for instance, the increasingly big differences between generations due to the larger engagement of younger adults with news on online platforms compared to their older counterparts or the danger of unintentional exposure to news on social media (Coleman & Wu, 2021). From a research perspective, it is important to understand how the new media ecosystem

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influences the attitude towards news because news, regardless of whether they have online or offline support, helps people to navigate better the world they live in and enable them to act as independent, self-discerning citizens. To wrap up, news media have evolved, and so have the influences they exert. The traditional formulations of agenda-setting, priming and framing were built on certain assumptions about how news organisations operate and how audiences process the received information. These suppositions were based on a modus operandi of the media systems, which no longer exists today. Contemporary news organisations and online platforms provide people not only with an unprecedented volume of information but also with the opportunity to offer feedback and to serve as news distributors, shaping the content of the information they receive. These new realities of the online news ecosystem reshape how agenda-setting, priming and framing operate today and will operate in the future. The contemporary news environment allows the public to play a substantial influence on agenda-building and news-framing processes. Through social media activity, citizens, knowingly or not, have an impact on how the news is produced and what becomes newsworthy. Consequently, alternative or controversial issues – and their frames – have more chances of becoming newsworthy, reshaping the public agenda and the role traditional agenda builders such as journalists or politicians play (Moy et al., 2001). Furthermore, the omnipresence of smartphones and other devices allows individuals to initiate and share newsworthy content, thereby contributing to a rapid frame distribution (Gilardi et al., 2022; Langer & Gruber, 2021). When people share the news, individuals influence frame distribution by opting for certain stories and frames instead of others. Even if information is already filtered and customised by algorithms, the fact that news audiences prefer certain information frames creates a new layer between journalist-focused frame-building and audiencefocused frame-setting (Moy et al., 2001). Besides all this, as news consumption has migrated online, people have greater control over the news they choose to receive. Selective exposure and familiarity with certain issues and how they are framed play a crucial role in the new habits of news consumption. Furthermore, this increased ability of individuals to select news made possible by the new technologies renders them as active players and not passive consumers and imposes a revision of what agenda-setting means. Classical media effects models, such as agenda-setting, assume widespread exposure, but social media outlets are increasingly allowing people to be selective, thus reshaping how much influence the news media exert on popular perceptions, attitudes and behaviours. In spite of the explanatory value of such models, they were, however, tailored for a different media setting. The current media landscape is dominated by tech companies, such as Facebook and Twitter, as well as by traditional media giants. Media content is nowadays attentively curated, and the information we receive is usually customised and hyper-personalised by algorithms, but how does this influence the agenda-setting process? According to the traditional theory, mass media influence the public’s priorities by drawing attention to a certain selection of topics. However, in today’s media landscape dominated by social media, do

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traditional media still maintain the power to set the agenda for the public or has the balance of power shifted? Is this shift beneficial for media consumers, and does it imply a healthy evolution in the mass media ecosystem? These questions still remain largely unanswered in spite of the large number of studies dedicated to media effects. In conclusion, the technological advances and the prevalence of social media require a reinterpretation of the traditional model of media agenda-setting. The public sphere has always been crystallised through interpersonal conversations about public issues, and nowadays, such conversations proliferate primarily on social media platforms. Even if Facebook posts, online tweets, blogs or online comments on any given platform consist largely of superfluous information or hateful and polarising speech, there are diverse political conversation and commentary as well. Even if it is problematic to equate online platforms to public opinion in general, nonetheless, social media represent an important X-ray of public opinion in a society at a given time. From a normative perspective, the main concerns relate to how divisive media can create false agendas and how partisan selective exposure can produce a multiplicity of agendas that undermine the consensus needed for a democratic process (Perloff, 2022). To survive and advance, agenda-setting should emphasise theoretical clarity and suggest an intersection between the main correlated concepts. As Guo (2016) notes, agenda-setting can be mediated by applicability as well as accessibility; framing can equally work by accessing dominant frames. Researchers (Ewoldsen & Rhodes, 2020) have also re-examined how priming can extend third-level agenda-setting and how new experiments could take Iyengar and Kinder’s early work to today’s media world by building partisanship into agenda-setting research models. Partisanship plays a major role in today’s politics (Iyengar et al., 2019), and some researchers have already started to insert it into agenda-setting research by measuring, for instance, how selective exposure to partisan sites moderates agenda-setting effects (Stroud, 2013). Just as framing models have incorporated partisanship (Entman & Usher, 2018), some authors (Perloff, 2022) believe agenda-setting approaches should do the same, also considering the interactions among its main moderating variables: selective exposure and need for orientation. Last but not least, studies have started to examine agenda-setting effects at the individual rather than aggregate level (Guo & Vargo, 2020), suggesting more fine-grained analysis on selective exposure and the influences of algorithms in tailoring hyper-personalised agendas. Finally, we can conclude by saying that agenda-setting, priming and framing theories have become central to the study of public opinion, and thus, they will continue to be used in future research, regardless of the technological transformations impacting the news media landscape.

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Scheufele, D. A. & Iyengar, S. (2014). The state of framing research. Oxford Handbooks Online. Scheufele, D., & Tewksbury, D. (2007). Framing, agenda setting, and priming: The evolution of three media effects models. Journal of Communication, 57(1), 9–20. Schuck, A., & de Vreese, C. (2006). Between risk and opportunity: News framing and its effects on public support for EU enlargement. European Journal of Communication, 21(1), 5–32. Semetko, H., & Valkenburg, P. (2000). Framing European politics: A content analysis of press and television news. Journal of Communication, 50(2), 93–109. Shah, D., Domke, D., & Wackman, D. B. (2003). The effects of value-framing on political judgment and reasoning. In S. Reese, O. Gandy, & A. Grant (Eds.), Framing public life: Perspectives on media and our understanding of the social world (pp. 227–244). Erlbaum. Shah, D., Kwak, N., Schmierbach, M., & Zubric, J. (2004). The interplay of news frames on cognitive complexity. Human Communication Research, 30(1), 102–120. Shaw, D. L., Minooie, M., Aikat, D., & Vargo, C. J. (2019). Agendamelding: News, social media, audiences, and civic community. Peter Lang. Shehata, A., & Strömbäck, J. (2013). Not (yet) a new era of minimal effects: A study of agenda setting at the aggregate and individual levels. International Journal of Press/Politics, 18(2), 234–255. Shoemaker, P., & Reese, S. (2014). Mediating the message in the 21st century: A media sociology perspective (3rd ed.). Routledge. Sniderman, P., & Theriault, S. (2004). The structure of political argument and the logic of issue framing. In W. Saris & P. Sniderman (Eds.), Studies in public opinion: Attitudes, nonattitudes, measurement error, and change (pp. 133–165). Princeton University Press. Stroud, N. J. (2013). The American media system today: Is the public fragmenting? In T. N. Ridout (Ed.), New directions in media and politics (pp. 6–23). Routledge. Tewksbury, D., & Scheufele, D. (2009). News framing theory and research. In J. Bryant, & M. Oliver (Eds.), Media effects: Advances in theory and research (pp. 17–33). Routledge. Valkenburg, P. M., & Oliver, M. B. (2020). Media effects theories: An overview. In M. B. Oliver, A. A. Raney, & J. Bryant (Eds.), Media effects: Advances in theory and research (4th ed., pp. 16–35). Routledge. Vargo, C. J. (2018). Fifty years of agenda-setting research: New directions and challenges for the theory. The Agenda Setting Journal, 2(2), 105–123. Vargo, C. J., Guo, L., & Amazeen, M. A. (2018). The agenda-setting power of fake news: A big data analysis of the online media landscape from 2014 to 2016. New Media & Society, 20(5), 2028–2049. Weaver, D., McCombs, M., & Shaw, D. L. (2004). Agenda-setting research: Issues, attributes, and influences. In Lee-Kaid, L. (Ed.). Handbook of political communication research, (pp. 257– 280). Lawrence Erlbaum Associates. Weaver, D. (2007). Thoughts on agenda setting, framing, and priming. Journal of Communication, 57, 142–147. Zaller, J. (1992). The nature and origins of mass opinion. Cambridge University Press.

Chapter 3

New Avenues for Agenda-Setting Research: Network Agenda-Setting, Agenda-Melding and Intermedia Agenda-Setting

3.1 New Directions in Agenda-Setting Theory and Research In spite of reaching its 50th anniversary recently, agenda-setting theory is still a fertile conceptual and methodological framework for media and communication research. From its beginning in the 1960s with the Chapel Hill study, agenda-setting has evolved into a multi-faceted theory, moving beyond the original hypothesis of the issue of salience transfer from the media to the public. From the perspective of the scholars who have advanced the theory for the first time, the new facets of the agenda-setting theory refer to (a) the impact of the media agenda on the public agenda (the first level of agenda-setting), (b) the impact of the media agenda on the public agenda regarding the attributes of the issues or objects covered in the media (the second level of agenda-setting or the attributes agenda) and (c) the impact of the networked media agenda of attributes on the networked public agenda of attribute salience (the third level of agenda-setting) (McCombs & Valenzuela, 2021). New expansions of agenda-setting in our 2.0 world include, however, other conceptual additions to the initial model, such as the melding of agendas (agendamelding) in the digital sphere (Shaw et al., 1999), the debate over how the fragmented media landscape impacts how citizens decode the political universe (agenda-building) and whether mainstream media still tell people what to think about when they are exposed to virtually unlimited news media choices, which greatly influence each other (intermedia agenda) (Vargo, 2018). As Perloff (2022) suggests, the modern online agenda-building process, the increased partisan selective exposure driven by algorithms and social networks might bring an end to media agenda-setting research. In spite of such challenges, recent work has adapted agenda-setting to the contemporary political world by using computational social science methods. These studies (e.g. Shehata and Strömbäck, 2013; Vargo & Guo, 2017) show that partisan media and new online platforms exert significant, reciprocal influences on intermedia agenda-setting and the public agenda. Fake © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Buturoiu et al., Patterns of News Consumption in a High-Choice Media Environment, Springer Studies in Media and Political Communication, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41954-6_3

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news can influence agendas of partisan outlets; however, their ability to penetrate the public agenda is still debatable (Guo & Vargo, 2020; Vargo et al., 2018). All these concepts should, however, be revitalised by exploring online intermedia agenda influences and by questioning the historically established causation between media and public agendas. While there is experimental and survey evidence that media influence public agendas and individual saliences (McCombs & Valenzuela, 2021), the complex today’s media world challenges researchers to try to document the new causal impacts. Careful measurement also remains important, even if computational social science approaches suggest promising avenues for research. However, social media data, such as tweets, might not represent an agenda and may reflect conformity effects, where users tweet an issue, attribute or association because others do the same (Vargo, 2018). Moreover, as some authors suggest (Perloff, 2022), just reporting media-agenda relationships is no longer enough to understand the nowadays complex media universe. Nonetheless, we believe that the notion of media setting agendas, the core construct of salience, emphasis on mediating processes and appreciation of the role agendas play in the exercise of power in a democracy remain important issues. To conclude, for more than half a century, agenda-setting has inspired numerous studies, and there is now a vast literature dedicated to agenda effects. Research literature has moved in the past 20 years beyond the original focus of the theory on issue agenda in order to explain agenda-setting core concepts further. Within the broader area of conceptual developments inspired by agenda research, network agenda-setting, agenda-melding and intermedia agenda-setting are the most dominant. These three models are particularly relevant for the theoretical expansion of agenda-setting contemporary research and will be discussed in more detail in the coming pages.

3.2 Network Agenda-Setting This section starts with a brief overview of network agenda-setting (NAS). We offer a conceptual presentation of the term and a methodological summary of how agenda-setting research can benefit from network analysis. Several theoretical advances are discussed, but also limitations and possible conceptual haziness, which should be addressed in future studies. The incorporation of network analysis into agenda-setting research might be particularly timely for studying media effects in today’s media ecosystem dominated by online information. In short, the conceptual framework of the NAS model is built on the assumption that cognitive representations do not operate linearly in learning or perceiving the world but rather have a network-like structure (Vargo, 2018). Network analysis allows the further exploration of media messages and how these messages are perceived and interconnected by the audience members. Various studies (e.g. Guo & Vargo, 2020; McCombs & Valenzuela, 2021) suggest that the application of network analysis to agenda-setting research offers a more nuanced

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understanding of both public and media agendas by disentangling the network interconnections among issues or attributes emphasised by the media and, consequently, more likely to be retained by the public. Furthermore, such studies have the merit to clarify if NAS works similarly across newspaper, radio, television and online news media and identify strong correlations between online media network agendas and the general agenda of other media sources, which reflects the increasingly dominant role of the online in today’s media landscape (Guo & Vargo, 2020). In terms of methodology, the network agenda-setting model tries to have access to a broader cognitive map of the audience members, and in doing so, it applies social network analysis to agenda effects. Social network analysis examines the relationship between different nodes and measures how close individual nodes are to the centre of the action in a network. By measuring centrality in agenda-setting research, researchers (e.g. Guo & Vargo, 2020) can trace which objects or attributes are at the very top of the agenda, but also which elements are at the centre of the picture or in relationships with other elements. Using this approach, researchers can identify issues that are tied to one another, in other words, topics that are bundled together. In this way, researchers can move beyond rankings of objects and attributes and have access to a broader picture of the interconnections constructed by the media and transferred to the public. The exploration of the networked agendas is done through more fine-grained methodologies than simple surveys, for instance, mind mapping surveys, which explore explicit associations of elements (Guo and McCombs, 2011; Vargo, 2018). Mind mapping refers to a radiant thinking approach in determining how people make associations among objects and attributes on the public agenda and how respondents retrieve implicitly and explicitly connected messages. The next step in conducting network analysis is to transfer the content analysis and survey data to matrices based on the associations between messages made by individuals. Other authors (McCombs & Valenzuela, 2021) employ the NAS concept to describe how people evaluate political candidates or the information they receive. A political candidate, for example, might be evaluated through a mental network-shaped picture composed of various issues and attributes connecting to each other in the mind of the voters. Similarly, news media could also transfer a network of interrelationships between issues and attributes to the public’s mind. Furthermore, the more often news media link issues, the more these issues are activated jointly and retrieved together from memory later on. What remains, however, confusing in McCombs’s research is the juxtaposition of the terms, network agenda-setting and third-level agendasetting, seen as interchangeable, which does not provide sufficient clarity for the model’s theoretical scope. Not only that the network agenda-setting model has been empirically validated, but its use in agenda research demonstrated that the media and the public agenda networks are significantly correlated (Guo and McCombs, 2011; Guo & Vargo, 2020). This approach in the study of agenda-setting effects expands the perspective from the transfer of objects and their attributes from media to the public to how they work in a matrix. Building on such findings, we can clearly observe that such conceptual developments of agenda-setting offer a broader perspective on media

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effects. The observation that issues co-exist in the daily information environment with other issues offers a broader perspective on the information environment and echoes other conceptual developments, such as media diets and media repertoires (which will be addressed in the next section). To sum up, we can conclude that network agenda research at both macro and micro level remains ambitious; furthermore, the shift of the media landscape towards online and social media and the new media consumption patterns impose different paths for media researchers and place a special emphasis on how technological platforms redesign the today media ecosystem.

3.3 Agenda-Melding Agenda-melding, which is another theoretical expansion of the classical agendasetting model, can briefly be defined as the way people merge the agendas of the media with their personal views and experiences (Shaw et al., 1999). The concept of agenda-melding illustrates more in detail how audiences combine different media and personal agendas in an active way. These audiences meld agendas from a multitude of sources into a personalised mix of issues and attributes, which instructs their opinions, attitudes and, ultimately, social and political behaviours. McCombs and his colleagues describe agenda-melding as an unconscious process by which people borrow from a variety of agendas to find or create a satisfying picture of the world (McCombs & Valenzuela, 2021). Central to understanding this new conceptual development of agenda-setting is the psychological construct of “need for orientation”, which helps researchers to better grasp the impact of media exposure and agenda-setting effects on attitudes, opinions and behaviour. As various authors argue (e.g. Guo & Vargo, 2020; Lee et al., 2021), at a psychological level, every individual has a need for orientation in order to be familiar with his physical and cognitive environment. In their initial study dedicated to how the media set the agenda during presidential campaigns, McCombs and Shaw (1972) found that a high interest in the campaign and a high political uncertainty in terms of party identification or voting choices correlated with a high need for orientation. Building on such findings, other studies dedicated to the need for orientation concept (Geiß, 2019; Matthes, 2006) confirm the assumption that when a political campaign has a low relevance for certain individuals, their need for orientation is also low. The need for orientation translates, for instance, in the active seeking of facts and journalistic evaluations during a political campaign, instead of being passively exposed to campaign messages. Furthermore, low levels of need for orientation are linked to infrequent and passive media usage, which results in limited agenda-setting effects (Rossiter, 2021). Agenda-setting effects can also occur from passive or accidental media exposure or active information seeking. Building on such data, recent studies (Geiß, 2019) indicate that attention to mainstream media and a high need for information result in a strong agenda-setting effect. Moreover, agenda-melding has a clear impact on

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both niche and mainstream media use, with users with a high need for information seeking more mainstream, non-partisan media and resulting, therefore, in stronger agenda-setting effects (Rossiter, 2021). Agenda-setting classical correlations measure the level of agreement between media and audience’s agendas. As shown by certain studies (Langer & Gruber, 2021), if there is no agreement on the public interest issues (the civic agenda), society is not sufficiently cohesive. In stable, functioning societies, there is at least a minimal agreement among citizens, institutions and political leaders. The civic agenda is a common set of values and priorities agreed upon by both social and political systems. Langer and Gruber (2021) build on the concept of agendamelding, referring to how it helps create communities with a shared interest in public matters. Well-functioning communities are defined by a high level of civic agenda agreement among their members. Furthermore, in cohesive societies, people recognise the necessity of collectivity. The main ingredients for effectively melding agendas are (a) information about the civic community, (b) information about personal communities and (c) personal interests, experiences and beliefs. If all three co-exist and are based on a common set of values, there is a solid basis for democracy and effective citizenry. Recent research (e.g. Rossiter, 2021) demonstrates that in the online universe, the role of the audience and how they meld their own agendas become key. Various studies (Geiß, 2019; Gilardi et al., 2021) have linked agenda-melding effects to the audience’s interest in media content. When the audience is active, issues and attributes are transferred more easily among its members. The concept of agenda-melding illustrates more in detail how audiences combine different media and personal agendas in an active way. Issues from a multitude of media and personal conversations are melded into a personalised mix (Geiß, 2019). When it comes to news, they are disseminated among audiences either horizontally or vertically. The vertical transfer of information flows from higher, more elitist sources to general audiences. Nowadays, societies are, however, less rigid and stratified, and people rely less on authorities and institutions, turning instead to more horizontal information from their own communities. Gilardi et al. (2021) argue that some media are more aligned to these horizontal media, composed mainly of niche media, which address specific communities of people based on their demographics and topics of interest. Media organisations are not the only ones that target these communities. Journalists, celebrities and social media influencers transmit information horizontally, increasingly tailoring their messages for specific communities of people. Other studies (Rossiter, 2021) further explore how distinctive audiences meld agendas from vertical and horizontal media differently. Their findings confirm the agenda-melding hypothesis that different audience members meld agendas differently using different mixes of media sources. Moreover, they empirically prove that elite media transfer agendas vertically, reaching out to the largest audience. To wrap up, we can conclude that such studies dedicated to the concept of agenda-melding represent an advancement of the traditional agenda-setting research, offering a more

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fine-grained understanding of media effects among different types of media and audience categories in today’s fragmented and hyper-personalised media landscape.

3.4 Intermedia Agenda-Setting Another important conceptual development of agenda-related research is intermedia agenda-setting or, in other words, the power of some media to influence the agendas of other media. In the past years, more research interest was placed on how intermedia dynamics have changed in an online news environment. While some research suggests that intermedia agenda-setting (IAS) is the same for online news as for traditional print news (Howlett, 2022), other research demonstrates that online media have fundamentally altered agenda-setting flows (e.g. Billard, 2018; Su & Xiao, 2021; Vonbun et al., 2016). We will build on such insights in the coming pages, emphasising the role of online and social media in (re)shaping media effects and their impact on social and political life. The interactions across media channels and platforms are at the core of IAS effects. In the past years, the number of scholarly articles dedicated to IAS has increased, with the majority of them confirming the main hypothesis of the original agenda-setting study. Recent studies (e.g. Luo et al., 2019) confirm, however, that the flow among different types of media has changed with the advent of the Internet and social media in particular. The questions that have been raised more recently by researchers interested in IAS refer mainly to (a) how traditional and emerging media interact, (b) how these interactions influence public opinion and (c) whether traditional/legacy media are still the top influencer (Guo & Vargo, 2020; Vargo, 2018). Research dedicated to IAS explores not only various media channels but also the mechanisms behind the processes of influence. Trying to identify the common patterns in theoretical and methodological intermedia agenda-setting-related research, a recent study (Su & Xiao, 2021) reviews research from 1997 through 2019. Mapping the IAS literature, Su and Xiao (2021) found that most studies were centred on the exploration of whether IAS effects flow (1) from traditional media to emerging media (e.g. Haim et al., 2018) and (2) from elite media to non-elite media (e.g. Guo & Vargo, 2020; Vargo, 2018). Some research established that the agenda flow depends on whether the media is traditional or emerging (e.g. Guo et al., 2019; Stern et al., 2020; Vargo & Guo, 2017). Other studies found that the direction of the agenda flow is dependent on whether the media is elite national platforms or less prestigious outlets (Howlett, 2022). Such reflections on the IAS are key to understanding limits and future directions. Recently, scholars have started to explore the specific role of social networking sites (SNS), such as Twitter and Facebook, confirming their increasingly consistent role in imposing a public agenda (e.g. Vargo et al., 2014). In terms of types of media, the majority of the IAS-dedicated studies has validated the traditional-tosocial direction (e.g. Guo et al., 2019; Kruikemeier et al., 2018). Furthermore,

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mainstream traditional media seem to be less interested in the agenda of emerging media. Nonetheless, other empirical research shows that social networking sites have redesigned the directionality of the agenda flow between media platforms. Twitter political conversations set the agendas even for elite newspapers such as The New York Times (Guo & Vargo, 2020), while online partisan media set the agenda for elite newspapers (Stern et al., 2020). In spite of their different approaches to IAS, all these studies further validate the interconnectivity between traditional and online media. In short, there seems to be a growing body of research confirming the flow of IAS from elite, national media to non-elite media. This increasingly crystallised consensus over the directionality of agenda-setting refers mainly to elite versus non-elite media and does not seem to be applicable between traditional and emerging types of media. Online media platforms and social media remain vastly under-examined, and studies focused on intermedia agenda-setting effect lack sufficient proof to clearly state the new directionality in the social networking sitesdominated media platforms. Furthermore, the rapid proliferation of social media has transformed intermedia agenda-setting dynamics even more, as social media content engages in reciprocal agenda-setting with traditional news media (Guo & Vargo, 2020). Even if changes in traditional or legacy press coverage due to the influence of online content are confirmed, legacy press still seems to retain some (limited) power in setting specific issue agendas (Howlett, 2022). Both digital and legacy news entities use web metrics in their gatekeeping practices; however, online outlets are more flexible in integrating metrics into their daily routines due to their decentralised modus operandi. Moreover, web metrics that identify high-traffic content allow online publications to test a larger selection of topics and increase their chances of reaching a wider audience. The economic and organisational logics of news media enable, therefore, a more rapid reaction to new topics. Additionally, digital news distribution allows for the specialised targeting of narrower audiences in order to maximise visitor counts, as editors use web metrics to determine which topics, headlines and stories are more likely to generate traffic (Stern et al., 2020).

3.4.1 Intermedia Agenda-Setting in the Social Media Era As emphasised above, with the advent of online platforms and their increasingly important role in shaping media agendas, more scholarly attention has been attributed to online media and social networking services (SNS). Recent explorations of IAS (Harder, Sevenans, & Van Aelst, 2017) have confirmed that the hegemonic role of established publications, such as The New York Times, in setting the agenda of other news outlets is seriously challenged by online news sites and social media, which have gained a prominent role in setting the general news agenda. Furthermore, research seems to validate the hypothesis that in the new media ecosystem, SNS dominate intermedia agenda-setting and create a new

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3 New Avenues for Agenda-Setting Research: Network Agenda-Setting, Agenda-. . .

type of offline-to-online-to-SNS media context (Howlett, 2022). The existence of an intermedia agenda-setting effect, consisting of a flow from social networking platforms to traditional offline media, has been empirically proven (Haim et al., 2018). Such an IAS pattern has been further explored by other researchers (Stern et al., 2020) with more or less similar results, thus contributing to a growing number of empirical evidence of social networking platforms affecting traditional media more strongly than vice versa. Such findings should be placed in the larger context of the new fragmented media landscape, with publications increasingly focused on selecting and curating content for their audiences instead of borrowing content from established news organisations (Howlett, 2022). Moreover, a greater understanding of media audiences, made possible by the new tools in media monitoring and audience research, allows microtargeting media content, making it increasingly relevant for specific segments of the audience. In this new media landscape, editorial choice decisions cannot be solely based on intermedia agenda-setting, as some authors have pointed out (Ritter, 2020). New directions in agenda-setting research should, therefore, be focused on how the Internet impacts what is newsworthy and how journalistic practices fluctuate under the influence of online platforms. Another consistent influence in setting an intermedia agenda, which should be further investigated, comes from Twitter. This platform holds great power in setting the trend for political conversations. Recent studies indicate that there is a clear intermedia influence between Twitter and newspapers’ agendas in the United States (Rossiter, 2021; Su & Borah, 2019). According to these studies, Twitter influences newspapers when important political events happen, such as elections or the Paris Agreement on climate change. However, Twitter’s influence seems shortlived, with newspapers and TV stations regaining their hegemonic impact after the surge in attention towards a specific event has passed. These results suggest that Twitter has a larger probability of influencing traditional media in terms of breaking news, whereas traditional media outlets are more likely to set Twitter’s agenda in uneventful periods (Su & Borah, 2019). When it comes to the limitations of the IAS studies, the fact that the majority of them was contextualised in the United States may decrease the generalisability and external validity of their findings. Cross-national comparative research is still needed to explore how the IAS concept is employed in different settings. Furthermore, IAS effects have been mainly explored for traditional news sources; even if some recent studies have investigated the intermedia influence of social networking platforms (e.g. Guo et al., 2019; Su et al., 2021), the conceptual and methodological framework of these studies still needs improvements. Methodological innovations have started to be applied to Twitter or social media-related IAS studies in order to explore the transfer of agendas from one platform to another (Ritter, 2020). Given the proliferation of social media services, new techniques are still needed to address the unique features of digital content. Machine learning or other types of automated content analyses will be for sure increasingly used in the future to better fit examinations of social networking sites such as Twitter and Facebook and other platforms such as YouTube and Facebook. This shifting focus from traditional media

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to emerging media follows the shift in consumption patterns, with information being largely accessed nowadays via social media platforms. In terms of the flow of IAS effects, recent studies conclude that elite media are no longer the sole agenda-setter in today media landscape (e.g. Su & Xiao, 2021). Twitter and social networking sites increasingly challenge the status quo of elite media. Furthermore, the rise of social media has modified the media ecosystem, and research is still needed in order to explore the impact this shift has brought to both media institutions and consumers; therefore, it is still difficult to have a crystallised consensus on the directionality of the agenda-setting flow. Even if “who leads whom” still remains a debated question, the reciprocal influences across platforms have become more evident in recent IAS research (e.g. Guo & Vargo, 2020). In spite of such findings, how these new patterns influence media credibility and media usage in general is still to be explored. Another recent investigation (Stern et al., 2020) finds that news sources act as agenda-setters (i.e. central nodes) with respect to certain topics and as followers (i.e. peripheral nodes) with respect to others. At the same time, the researchers find evidence that intermedia influence can be a positive factor in presenting diverse perspectives. Finally, the study also shows that elite media sources still have more power than other media sources even if the balance of power is more balanced nowadays, with online news sources such as Twitter, Google and Facebook playing a bigger role in setting the general agenda of the public. In response to a shifting audience, the large elite media have become attentive to the agendas of smaller online news sources and particularly to the public sentiment expressed via social networking sites (Vargo and Guo, 2017). In this new media environment, new patterns of intermedia agenda-setting have been created, with online news sources having a greater role than before and affecting, subsequently, the information presented to the public (Coleman & Wu, 2021). As discussed above, several studies have attempted to quantify the impact of intermedia agenda-setting in specific countries or contexts, but these approaches were largely US-centred and, therefore, impacted by US characteristics. To wrap up, intermedia agendasetting and the directionality of agenda flows have an impact on decision-making positions and public perceptions. As the research cited above validates, the flow is still from elite to non-elite, regardless of the media landscape evolutions. This means that the agenda of the elite national media still spreads vertically within the news hierarchy. Similar to the agenda-melding hypothesis, the elite media transfer agendas vertically, reaching out to the largest population possible (Su & Xiao, 2021). It is, however, debatable whether this vertical hierarchy will still hold true in the context of increasingly social media-centred news consumption. In short, the global arena of information made possible by the Internet and various online platforms has redesigned the distribution and reception of world news, opinions and agendas. Moreover, the widespread usage of social network sites nowadays allows a rapid transfer of information at a global scale and facilitates the dissemination of issues of global importance, such as the recent pandemics or the ongoing Ukrainian conflict. In terms of agenda-setting, these changes call for a redefinition of classical theory. The traditional model of agenda-setting defines

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a stimulus-response relationship between the media and the public, whose agenda is shaped by the media agenda. The present media ecosystem has redesigned this relationship in the sense that there is a continual exchange between media and their audiences. Overall, the globalisation of the online polarised public sphere imposes a new model of agenda-setting with social media at its core. Issues and opinions spread rapidly nowadays, and their reach and impact depend on various characteristics, actors and influences. Nonetheless, what impacts news dissemination the most are the tech giants, such as Facebook and Google, and the platforms they have created. This being the case, the agenda-setting theory needs both theoretical reformulation as well as new methodological approaches and empirical validation in accordance with today’s media ecosystem. In conclusion, even though the agenda-setting research paradigm has had an established position in media and communication research for the past 50 years, the present redesign of the media landscape imposes a conceptual facelift of the concept. We believe future work should not be designed to demonstrate the mere existence of the agenda-setting phenomenon but focused instead on how this works in the new media ecosystem. Furthermore, a special emphasis should be placed on how framing operates in social media and, more broadly, in the online environment. To turn the concept into a viable research avenue for online and social media, future research should specify the new conditions under which frames emerge in online media and how they operate in public opinion formation.

References Billard, T. (2018). Setting the transgender agenda: intermedia agenda-setting in the digital news environment. Politics, Groups, and Identities, 7(1), 165–176. Coleman, R., & Wu, H. D. (2021). Individual differences in affective agenda setting: A crosssectional analysis of three U.S. presidential elections. Journalism, 23(5), 992–1009. Geiß, S. (2019). The media’s conditional agenda-setting power: How baselines and spikes of issue salience affect likelihood and strength of agenda-setting. Communication Research, 49(2), 296– 323. Gilardi, F., Gessler, T., Kubli, M., & Müller, S. (2021). Social media and political agenda setting. Political Communication, 39(1), 39–60. Guo, L., & McCombs, M. (2011). Network agenda setting: A third level of media effects. In annual conference of the International Communication Association, Boston, MA. Guo, L., Mays, K., & Wang, J. (2019). Whose story wins on twitter? Visualizing the South China Sea dispute. Journalism Studies, 20(4), 563–584. Guo, L., & Vargo, C. (2020). “Fake news” and emerging online media ecosystem: An integrated intermedia agenda-setting analysis of the 2016 U.S. presidential election. Communication Research, 47(2), 178–200. Haim, M., Weimann, G., & Brosius, H. (2018). Who sets the cyber agenda? Intermedia agendasetting online: The case of Edward Snowden’s NSA revelations. Journal of Computational Social Science, 1(2), 277–294.

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Harder, R., Sevenans, J., & Van Aelst, P. (2017). Intermedia agenda setting in the social media age: How traditional players dominate the news agenda in election times. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 22(3), 275–293. Howlett, M. (2022). The routledge handbook of policy tools (Routledge international handbooks) (1st ed.). Routledge. Kruikemeier, S., Gattermann, K., & Vliegenthart, R. (2018). Understanding the dynamics of politicians’ visibility in traditional and social media. The Information Society, 34(4), 215–228. Langer, A. I., & Gruber, J. B. (2021). Political agenda setting in the hybrid media system: Why legacy media still matter a great deal. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 26(2), 313– 340. Lee, B., Liu, J., Choung, H., & McLeod, D. M. (2021). Exploring numerical framing effects: The interaction effects of gain/loss frames and numerical presentation formats on message comprehension, emotion, and perceived issue seriousness. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 98(2), 387–406. Luo, Y., Burley, H., Moe, A., & Sui, M. (2019). A meta-analysis of news media’s public agendasetting effects, 1972–2015. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 96(1), 150–172. Matthes, J. (2006). The need for orientation towards news media: Revising and validating a classic concept. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 18(4), 422–444. McCombs, M., & Shaw, D. (1972). The agenda-setting function of mass media. Public Opinion Quarterly, 36(2), 176–187. McCombs, M., & Valenzuela, S. (2021). Setting the agenda: Mass media and public opinion (3rd ed.). Polity. Perloff, R. M. (2022). The fifty-year legacy of agenda-setting: Storied past, complex conundrums, future possibilities. Mass Communication and Society, 25(4), 469–499. Ritter, M. (2020). Intraday intermedia agenda-setting in the manic world of online news reporting. Southern Communication Journal, 85(4), 244–253. Rossiter, E. L. (2021). Measuring agenda setting in interactive political communication. American Journal of Political Science, 66(2), 337–351. Shehata, A., & Strömbäck, J. (2013). Not (yet) a new era of minimal effects: A study of agenda setting at the aggregate and individual levels. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 18(2), 234–255. Shaw, D. L., McCombs, M., Weaver, D. H., & Hamm, B. J. (1999). Individuals, groups, and agenda melding: A theory of social dissonance. International Journal of Public Opinion Research, 11(1), 2–24. Stern, S., Livan, G., & Smith, R. (2020). A network perspective on intermedia agenda-setting. Applied Network Science, 5(31). https://doi.org/10.1007/s41109-020-00272-4 Su, Y., & Borah, P. (2019). Who is the agenda setter? Examining the intermedia agenda-setting effect between Twitter and newspapers. Journal of Information Technology & Politics, 16(3), 236–249. Su, Y., Lee, D., Xiao, X., Li, W., & Shu, W. (2021). Who endorses conspiracy theories? A moderated mediation model of Chinese and international social media use, media skepticism, need for cognition, and COVID-19 conspiracy theory endorsement in China. Computers in Human Behavior, 120, 106760. Su, Y., & Xiao, X. (2021). Mapping the intermedia agenda setting (IAS) literature. The Agenda Setting Journal, 5(1), 56–83. Vargo, C., & Guo, L. (2017). Networks, big data, and intermedia agenda setting: An analysis of traditional, partisan, and emerging online U.S. news. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 94(4), 1031–1055. Vargo, C. J. (2018). Fifty years of agenda-setting research: New directions and challenges for the theory. The Agenda Setting Journal, 2(2), 105–123. Vargo, C., Guo, L., McCombs, M., & Shaw, D. (2014). Network issue agendas on Twitter During the 2012 U.S. presidential election. Journal of Communication, 64(2), 296–316.

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Vargo, C. J., Guo, L., & Amazeen, M. A. (2018). The agenda-setting power of fake news: A big data analysis of the online media landscape from 2014 to 2016. New Media & Society, 20(5), 2028–2049. Vonbun, R., Königslöw, K., & Schoenbach, K. (2016). Intermedia agenda-setting in a multimedia news environment. Journalism: Theory, Practice & Criticism, 17(8), 1054–1073.

Chapter 4

Setting the Agenda During the COVID-19 Pandemic

4.1 Introduction COVID-19-related topics have been extensively covered by the media worldwide (Ferraresi 2020; Jia & Lu 2021), mainly because of its global proportions and potential to shake up important aspects of people’s lives. From February to March 2020, all media channels started to prominently refer to COVID-19-related topics. In the spring of 2020, the media coverage of the pandemic was mainly focused on the numbers of new cases and deaths associated with the disease and also on the main restrictions imposed by the authorities to stop the spread of the virus. At that time, people’s levels of uncertainty were high, trying to get some answers to their questions, and, therefore, they used the media to get some orientation (high need for orientation; see Matthes 2006, 2008). Afterwards, in the early months of 2021, while topics related to the COVID-19 pandemic were present on the media agenda, both the media and the audiences have become more accustomed to this new form of “reality” or the “new normal” era as it was labelled (Jamaludin et al. 2020; Tria 2020). Compared with the beginning of the pandemic, in early 2021, people’s levels of uncertainty regarding the dangers associated with the SARS-CoV-2 virus and the disease were relatively stable. There were already significant numbers of individuals (relatives, friends) who got the disease, and, therefore, more and more people started having “first-hand” experience with the virus and the disease, thus using the media less to get new information. Against this background, this chapter looks into aspects related to media coverage of COVID-19-related topics in Romania during both a peak event and a routine period. This study is important for several reasons. One reason is that this study is among the few tackling media coverage of pandemic-related issues in Romania (see also Buturoiu & Gavrilescu 2021; Buturoiu & Voloc 2021) and the first focusing on the comparative perspective between media coverage of COVID19-related topics during a peak event and a routine period. Another reason is that © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Buturoiu et al., Patterns of News Consumption in a High-Choice Media Environment, Springer Studies in Media and Political Communication, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41954-6_4

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it is particularly important to thoroughly analyse the way the media cover public interest issues as they might have a significant impact on the way people understand and further relate to those issues (McCombs & Shaw 1972; Stern et al. 2020). Furthermore, especially during times of crisis, people’s need for orientation is high, and, thus, they use the media to get access to the surrounding reality (Camaj & Weaver 2013; Matthes 2006, 2008). With particular reference to the COVID-19 pandemic, the media were the main sources of information, especially in its early days, when few people experienced the disease (Poirier et al. 2020). The purpose of the empirical analysis in this chapter is to comparatively explore the media coverage of the COVID-19 pandemic during a peak event period (i.e. the nationwide lockdown in March 2020) and a routine period (i.e. the period of early 2021, namely, January 2021, when pandemic-related topics become “normalised” on both the media and the public agenda) (for an overview regarding the moment when COVID-19 became “normalised”, see Johansson et al. 2021). The analysis focuses on both television and online news stories released during the two periods, in an attempt to shed more light on the agenda-setting effects of the media (visibility of topics, which media sources acted as agenda-setters) and the phenomenon known as intermedia agenda-setting. Precisely, the purpose of this analysis is to explore (1) the most visible topics related to the COVID-19 pandemic on the agenda of both television and online news outlets during the analysed periods; (2) the most important sources for the COVID-19 pandemic-related news released in the analysed periods, as they were mentioned in the news; and (3) the degree of reciprocity (intermedia agenda-setting) between the television and the online news agenda during the analysed periods and the time lag needed for one topic to be transferred from one media agenda to the other. In terms of visibility, it is important to mention that, especially during times of crisis, the COVID-19 pandemic included, media coverage of crisis-related topics is crucial, as it can influence what people understand and learn. In this particular case, the media have the power to transmit key information about the severity of the disease, its spread, the relevance of preventive measures, the efficiency of the vaccines, etc. (te Poel et al. 2021). For example, Hameleers (2021) argues that governments across the globe relied heavily on legacy media, not only to inform citizens about several developments during times of crisis but also to stimulate compliance with strict interventions. Therefore, people might learn from the media how to protect themselves and others around them, which means that the media have an important impact not only on people’s perceptions but also on their attitudes and behaviours, which are vital in crisis situations, as they could help better manage the crisis (Melki et al. 2022). Drawing on the agenda-setting theoretical background discussed in the first two chapters of the book, we aim to reveal the visibility of COVID-19 topics in both a peak event and a routine period. Our aim is based on the core assumption behind the agenda-setting theory that news media are able to set the public agenda by making some issues more salient at the expense of other issues (McCombs & Shaw 1972; Van Aelst & Walgrave 2011). Specifically, the more news on a specific topic, the

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more accessible that topic is in the minds of citizens (Damstra et al. 2021). In such a context, we ask the first research question: • RQ1. What were the most visible topics related to the COVID-19 pandemic on the media agenda in Romania during a peak event and a routine period? At the same time, we aim to unveil both the sources of news and their interplay (i.e. intermedia agenda-setting) with regard to COVID-19-related topics. To do this, we start with some observations from the academic literature to date stating that within the current media environment, social networking sites could become “important intermedia agenda-setting agents” (Groshek & Clough Groshek 2013, p. 17) mainly because of their capacity to enable users to share news instantaneously. Some researchers (e.g. Nowak 2016) talk about “hybridisation” of media systems, referring to the fact that nowadays media users can easily become “producers” of news or news sources. Furthermore, Gruszczynski and Wagner (2017, p. 397) talk about the theory of agenda-uptake to better explain the transfer of issue salience between different actors present in the digital media environment. This is, in fact, the main assumption behind the intermedia agenda-setting ramification (for more details about the main reasons why intermedia agenda-setting occurs, see Guo & Vargo 2020), referring to the process of news diffusion where coverage of one media outlet is influenced by the agenda of other outlets (Mohammed & McCombs 2021; Su & Borah 2019; Vliegenthart & Walgrave 2008; Vonbun et al. 2016). Regarding the degree of reciprocity between media agendas, some studies (Conway et al. 2015, p. 363) show that there is a “symbiotic relationship” between what is shared on online platforms’ feeds and what is transmitted by means of traditional/legacy media outlets. In other words, both media agendas influence and support each other in transmitting messages to a wider audience (Moy et al. 2016), and news that can be found in the online media environment are highly comparable with those found in more conventional media sources (Maier 2010; Vargo & Guo 2017). As Feezell (2018, p. 484) suggests, “for every ten posts one scrolls through on News Feed, at least one contains hard-news content”. Furthermore, with particular reference to the COVID-19 context, studies show that social media platforms could have an important role in “boosting” efforts of government authorities by disseminating accurate and accessible information to prevent the spread of the disease and limit the spread of disinformation (Limaye et al. 2020). In such a context, we aim to explore the most important sources for the COVID19 pandemic-related news released in the analysed periods, as they were mentioned in the news. Thus, we advance the second research question: • RQ2. Who set the agenda during the COVID-19 pandemic in Romania? Last but not least, we are interested in revealing the time lag necessary for one topic to be transferred from the agenda of one media outlet to another. While previous studies looked at time lags of 1 week or longer, it is noteworthy to mention that online media and digitalisation of newsrooms have accelerated news production, thus shortening the timeframe for intermedia agenda-setting (Vonbun et al. 2016). In fact, Vonbun et al. (2016) suggest that intermedia agenda-setting should be better

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investigated on a daily basis, as longer intervals may be a sign of media convergence rather than intermedia agenda-setting (see also Geiß 2022). Following the same line of reasoning, Harder et al. (2017) suggest that today, within the current media landscape, the interval at which media influence one another may have become more variable in the sense that while there are news stories that spread almost instantaneously, others might stay “under the radar” and attract attention at a later point in time (Conway et al. 2015). Against this backdrop, we aim to explore the time lags associated with the intermedia agenda-setting phenomenon observed during the COVID-19 pandemic. Thus, we ask the third research question: • RQ3. How long does it take for a topic to migrate from the agenda of one medium to another?

4.2 Method To investigate how the agenda was set during the COVID-19 pandemic, at the beginning of the pandemic and after it became normalised, we conducted a quantitative content analysis of TV and online news during two periods: a peak event, 18–31 March 2020, around the first nationwide lockdown in Romania imposed on 25 March, and a routine one, 18–31 January 2021. “Routine” is probably not the most accurate description of the period, as in Romania, the vaccination campaign began at the end of December 2020. However, taking into account the vivid public debate about the vaccination in the months prior to the large distribution of vaccines and immediately after the formal launch of the first stage of vaccination (end of December), we decided to opt for this rather uneventful period in which both the pandemic and vaccination became to some extent the “new normal”. However, we expect the topic of vaccination to be quite prominent during this period, but not to the extent as to overwhelm the media agenda, as the pandemic did in March 2020. We content analysed1 the pandemic-related news broadcasted in primetime by the two most successful commercial TV channels (based on audience ratings in March-April 2020), PRO TV and Antena 1, and the public channel, TVR1 (N = 666 (of which 661 were pandemic-related) for March 2020 and N = 611 (of which 315 were pandemic-related) for January 2021). Additionally, we analysed a sample of the online news stories published on the two most prominent quality (adevarul.ro) and popular (libertatea.ro) newspaper websites, based on unique visitors during March-April 2020 (www.brat.ro/sati for March-April 2020). The sample for March 2020 was drawn randomly from a total population of N = 3381 news published in the Coronavirus section of both online newspapers and contained N = 413 news stories from adevarul.ro and N = 432 from libertatea.ro. The total sample error for online 1 Data from this chapter was collected as part of a grant supported by the Ministry of Research, Innovation and Digitization, CNCS/CCCDI–UEFISCDI, project number PN-III-P1-1.1-PD-20190034, within PNCDI III.

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news was .+/.−3% for the analysed period. The sample for January 2021 was N = 518 and contained all pandemic-related news published by the two dailies during 18–31 January 2021. We used six coders for online news and six for TV news. Intercoder reliability was measured using Krippendorff’s alpha for key variables in this study and ranged from 0.626 to 0.991 for the online coding and from 0.786 to 0.960 for TV.

4.2.1 Measurements The topics covered in the news were coded using 21 binary variables related to the pandemic. Each news story could cover one or more of the topics, which were then clustered into seven broader categories: (1) statistics and situations (statistics of any type referring to the number of cases, deaths, situation in hospitals, etc., from Romania or worldwide), (2) decisions of authorities (decisions taken by the authorities; restriction measures taken to confine the spread of the virus; various positions of the World Health Organization or national political bodies, such as the government or the Strategic Communications Group; sanctions granted for noncompliance with the restriction measures; etc.), (3) symptoms or treatment related to the disease (symptoms of the disease, individual disease-related stories, forms of the disease, treatment options, etc.), (4) effects of the virus (effects on the economy in general, on a specific economic sector and on people in general, the pandemic seen as an opportunity, protests against the restrictive rules, etc.), (5) disinformation (misleading content, conspiracy theories, etc. regarding the pandemic), (6) COVID19 vaccination and (7) other topics. Visibility of each topic was measured by the number of news stories containing a certain topic and the prominence using the number of seconds for TV news and the average number of words for online news. Comments were used to measure prominence as well, but in a limited way, as only one of the two online outlets allowed comments to their news stories. Actors setting the agenda were coded as binary variables measuring the presence in the news story of opinions/positions of journalists, opinion leaders, authorities (president, prime minister, other ministers, etc.), official institutions (such as the World Health Organization, the Ministry of Health, etc.) and companies (pharmaceutical companies, various companies working in pandemic-related sectors). To investigate the intermedia agenda-setting phenomenon, we coded the explicitly mentioned references to other news sources, regardless of which media outlet they came from. We coded them as binary variables accounting for TV sources, radio, printed newspapers, online newspapers and social media. For online news, we computed the lag needed for a topic to “migrate” from one outlet to the analysed online newspapers in order to investigate the average time needed for a subject to be picked up by a different medium once it was published. Not all sources mentioned in the analysed online news had a timestamp, which means that the lag was computed only when there was a clearly mentioned source, with link, with a timestamp. There

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are possible errors included in this type of analysis due to the fact that some media outlets change their timestamp with every update they publish. We cleaned the database for each identified situation of this type.

4.3 Findings Setting the agenda during the pandemic was, from many perspectives, highly atypical, as the general topic of the virus and its implications overwhelmed the media agenda for months. Even when the pandemic became “normalised”, in the sense that people got adjusted and used to the “new normal”, there were always new topics that set the media agenda to a very high degree. Such topics include, but are not limited to, new variants, peaks of various waves, vaccination, etc. From this perspective, it is hard to define a “routine” period in the classic sense of the word. However, almost no other period compared to the total takeover of all media agenda that happened in the first weeks of the pandemic. Due to the general feelings of insecurity, people’s need for orientation (Matthes 2006, 2008) increased dramatically. If we add to this the fact that the pandemic was almost the only type of content media broadcasted during these first weeks, it is highly likely that the media agenda largely influenced citizens’ agenda in that specific period. In this context, we look at the visibility of the topics in both televised and online news media, the actors and media outlets that influence public agenda during the pandemic.

4.3.1 Visibility of the Pandemic-Related News and Topics To have only a general estimation of visibility, we computed the visibility of the news stories related in any way to the pandemic. For TV, only 5 news stories out of 666 in the 2 weeks from the beginning of the pandemic were not related to the crisis in any way, which suggests a visibility of 99.3% of the COVID-19-related news. During the routine period, the visibility dropped to 51.7%, which shows that the period was still hardly “routine”; it was still very much atypical in the sense that a specific topic still remained very prominent on the public agenda. The total estimated population of online news (regardless of the topic) published in a 2-week period on both media outlets is about 4,300 news stories, which suggests a visibility of the pandemic-related topics of about 78% in the peak period and about 12% during the routine period (see Fig. 4.1). In this context, we investigated the most visible topics related to the pandemic during the two types of periods. The most visible topic on TV in both periods was that of the decisions taken by the authorities. Both at the beginning of the pandemic and almost 1 year later, this topic was present in more than 50% of all the news broadcasted on TV (Fig. 4.2). Authorities’ decisions were found in 44.4% of all online news in March 2020 and in only 17.8% in January 2021 (Fig. 4.3). This

4.3 Findings

100%

49

99% 78%

75% 52% 50%

25% 12% 0% March 2020

January 2021 TV news

Online news

Fig. 4.1 Visibility of the pandemic-related news 52.7% 52.5%

Decisions of authorities Effects of the virus

40.5%

28.2%

39.5%

Statistics and situations

46.5% 22.4%

Symptoms and treatment

Disinformation

31.3%

1.7%

Vaccination

44.0% .5% .3%

Other 0.0%

7.2% 5.4% 10.0%

20.0%

March 2020

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

January 2021

Fig. 4.2 Visibility of pandemic-related topics during the peak and routine periods in TV news stories

shows an increased interest of the Romanian decision-makers to communicate their decisions, especially by means of TV news stories, which arguably reach a larger audience. The interest in the effects of the virus was relatively high at the beginning of the pandemic and decreased substantially 10 months later, and this tendency was even more visible in the online environment. Statistics about the pandemic were constantly discussed in the media in both periods, with an even increased interest in the second period, most probably due to the vaccine-related information.

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4 Setting the Agenda During the COVID-19 Pandemic

Decisions of authorities

44.4%

27.8%

41.2%

Stitistics and situations Effects of the virus

49.6%

32.8%

13.1% 20.8% 19.1%

Symptoms and treatment

Vaccination

2.2% 1.9% 1.8%

Other

2.6%

Disinformation

0%

38.0%

7.5% 15%

March 2020

30%

45%

60%

January 2021

Fig. 4.3 Visibility of pandemic-related topics during the peak and routine periods in online news stories

As expected, due to the developments of the discussions about vaccination and the availability of the vaccines themselves, the topic only became very visible in January 2021, when Romania was preparing to enter phase 2 of the vaccination campaign (see Fig. 4.4). Even though fake news in all its forms (including conspiracy theories) was very much part of the communication during the pandemic, disinformation was barely a news topic during both periods (less than 1% of TV and less than 3% of online news discussed this topic) (Fig. 4.4). Looking comparatively (Fig. 4.4), authorities’ decisions were the main topic in both TV and online news at the beginning of the pandemic (for TV even later), while statistics and figures related to the crisis dominated the media 10 months later.

4.3.2 Actors Who Set the Media Agenda During the Pandemic Setting the media agenda in times of crisis is atypical, first because of the people’s increased need for orientation and second because of the pressure of timely information with regard to the management of the crisis. In this context, we seek to understand the key actors who set the agenda during a sanitary crisis such as the COVID-19 pandemic, but also how the topics that set the media agenda migrate from one medium to another. Looking at the online news distributed during the two periods analysed in this study, 71% of them have either an actor or other media outlet as sources who set the agenda. 819 news stories, which represents 60.09% of the online news about the pandemic, had at least 1 media source (being subject of intermedia agenda

4.3 Findings

51

52.7% 44.4%

Decisions of authorities

52.5% 27.8% 40.5% 32.8%

Effects of the virus

28.2% 13.1% 39.5% 41.2% Statistics and situations

46.5% 49.6% 22.4% 20.8%

Symptoms and treatment

31.3% 19.1% 1.7% 1.8%

Vaccination

44.0% 38.0% .5% 2.2%

Disinformation

.3% 1.9%

7.2% 2.6% Other 5.4% 7.5% 0% TV March 2020

10%

20%

Online March 2020

30%

40%

50%

60%

TV January 2021 Online January 2021

Fig. 4.4 Visibility of pandemic-related topics during the peak and routine periods, by media source (TV vs. online)

phenomenon), and 295 (21.64%) news stories mention at least 1 key actor in the pandemic content (journalist, opinion leader, authority, institutions, companies). For TV news, 20.70% of the total pandemic-related news had at least one reference to another news story as a source, and 28.9% of the news mentioned at least one key actor. The actors who set the agenda most often were the authorities and institutions in both periods and both types of media (see Figs. 4.5 and 4.6). These two key actors were more visible during the January 2021 period, as they played a key role in the vaccination campaign. At the same time, the other actors who could have set the agenda related to the pandemic were almost entirely absent in both analysed periods.

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4 Setting the Agenda During the COVID-19 Pandemic

9%

Authorities

19% 4%

Institutions

12% 1% 5%

Opinion leaders

1% 3%

Companies

% 1%

Journalists

%

25%

50%

March 2020

January 2021

75%

100%

Fig. 4.5 Actors setting the agenda for online news (% of total COVID-19 related news)

22%

Authorities

34% 13%

Institutions

22% 1% 0%

Opinion leaders

2% 4%

Companies Journalists

0% 0% 0%

25%

50%

March 2020

January 2021

75%

100%

Fig. 4.6 Actors setting the agenda for TV news (% of total COVID-19 related news)

Comparatively, both authorities and institutions were more visible in the TV news stories than in online news. For example, during the so-called routine period, authorities were mentioned in 33.9% of the TV news, and only 18.5% of the online news related to the pandemic. Opinion leaders were somewhat visible online (4.6%) during the routine period, while companies were almost equally present on TV (4.4%) during the same period.

4.3 Findings

53

Summing up, both online and TV media used various authorities (such as the President of Romania, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Health, etc.) and institutions dealing with the pandemic (such as WHO, Ministry of Health, etc.) as key actors communicating about the crisis, while opinion leaders or various companies were not actually setting the media agenda.

4.3.3 Intermedia Agenda-Setting During the Pandemic As mentioned before, intermedia agenda-setting refers to the phenomenon of news migrating from one media outlet to another. In this study, we looked at how various media outlets used previously published or broadcasted news as a source for current news. As mentioned in the previous section, 60.09% of the online news about the pandemic made reference to another news story, and 20.70% of the total TV pandemic-related news was the subject of intermedia agenda. In this section, we look into the type of media outlet that was preferred as the first source mentioned in online and TV news (as in some of the stories analysed in this study, there was more than one media source mentioned). In online newspapers, the preferred media outlets used to set the agenda were other online sources, in both periods, even more so in January 2021 than in March 2020. The second most mentioned source was social media posts, with about 12.8% of the pandemic-related news published in the peak event period having at least one reference to a social media source (see Fig. 4.7).

40%

Online sources

62% 13% 9%

Social media 4% 3%

TV Radio

% 1%

Newspapers print

2% % %

25% March 2020

50%

75%

January 2021

Fig. 4.7 Intermedia agenda for online sources (% of total COVID-19-related news)

100%

54

4 Setting the Agenda During the COVID-19 Pandemic

6%

Online sources

22% 7% 6%

Social media

4% 8%

TV

0% 3%

Radio Newspapers print

0% 0% 0%

25% March 2020

50%

75%

100%

January 2021

Fig. 4.8 Intermedia agenda for TV news (% of total COVID-19-related news)

TV news was relatively rarely used as a source for online information (4.3% in March 2020 and 3.5% in January 2021), while radio or printed press was almost entirely absent as sources of agenda-setting (Fig. 4.8). As far as TV news is concerned, social media, online sources and other TV news were referred to as sources of information almost equally in March 2020, but in January, there was a clear preference for online news as a source for TV news (22.5% of the pandemic-related news in that period mentioned at least one online source). Social media as a source was almost as often mentioned in the routine period as TV, and radio became somewhat visible as an intermedia agenda-setter. Overall, intermedia agenda happened much more often in the online environment than on TV. Online sources citing other online sources are the preferred way of “borrowing” information from one agenda to another. Social media outlets became more and more a source of news, for both online and TV news. For online news published during the pandemic, we were able to trace the date and time of the online and social media sources, which helped us assess how quickly topics migrate from one agenda to the other. We computed the lag between the published news and its first and second mentioned sources that had a timestamp. Generally speaking, most of the news migrated from one media to the next either within the same day (55.3%) or in the next 1–2 days (28.1%). A total of 91.5% of the news that migrates from one agenda to the other does so within a week (Fig. 4.9). Looking at the second source, the intermedia phenomenon shows a slightly different pattern, with 77.0% of news migrating within a week (Fig. 4.10). When a second source is mentioned, this seems to be done without the same pressure of immediacy as with the first one.

4.3 Findings

55

0 days

55%

1-2 days

28%

3-7 days

8%

8-30 days

4%

more than 30 days

4% 0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

First source Fig. 4.9 The lag between the source and the published news for online news

55%

0 days

33% 28% 29%

1-2 days 8%

3-7 days

15% 4%

8-30 days

13% 4%

more than 30 days

10% 0%

25% First source

50%

75%

100%

Second source

Fig. 4.10 The lag for the intermedia agenda-setting for the first and second sources cited (online news only .N = 506 for the first source; .N = 191 for the second source)

Looking at the two different periods, we see similar patterns: practically, information migrates from one media outlet to the other within 24 hours for more than half of the news for which this phenomenon could be traced, and about 90% migrate within a week (Fig. 4.11). The data shows the pressure of time in reporting news in the online environment, which can be traced even more fine-grain if we look at the central tendency of the variables measuring the exact lags. The mean of the time elapsed between the

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4 Setting the Agenda During the COVID-19 Pandemic

58.9% 53%

0 days 26.5% 29%

1-2 days 9.1% 7%

3-7 days

4.6% 4%

8-30 days

.9%

more than 30 days

7% 0%

25% March 2020

50%

75%

100%

January 2021

Fig. 4.11 The lag for the intermedia agenda-setting per type of period (routine vs peak) (online news only)

source and the citing news is not relevant in this case, as there are a few outliers that seriously alter results. Therefore, we prefer the median to approximate the time lag (Table 4.1). Overall, the average time needed for a piece of information to “jump” from one media agenda to another is about 7 hours for the first source and about 2 days for the second. If we ignore the outliers (news that cite information dated more than 1 month before), then the median of the lag for the first source is about 6 hours and for the second source about 1 day and 14 hours (both median and mean are reported in Table 4.2). Looking at both time periods, we find more or less similar patterns: it took a piece of information about 6.5 hours in March 2020 and about 6 hours in January 2021 to be translated from one media agenda to another as a first source and about 1 day and 7 hours in March 2020 and 1 day and 20 hours in January 2021 for a second source (Table 4.3). Summing up, intermedia agenda-setting manifests itself as an important phenomenon in times of crisis under the pressure of keeping people constantly

Table 4.1 Descriptives of lags for the first and second sources for all online news N Mean Median Std. deviation

Lag first source 365 13364 (9 days 6 h 44 min) 416 (0 day 6 h 56 min) 63099 (43 days 19 h 39 min)

Lag second source 146 42798 (29 days 17 h 18 min) 2872 (1 day 23 h 52 min) 147955 (102 day 17 h 55 min)

4.4 Discussion and Conclusions

57

Table 4.2 Descriptives of lags shorter than 1 month for the first and second sources for online news N Mean Median Std. deviation

Lag first source 344 2002 (1 day 9 h 22 min) 369 (0 days 6 h 9 min) 4534 (3 days 3 h 34 min)

Lag second source 127 5203 (3 days 14 h 43 min) 2268 (1 day 13 h 48 min) 8246 (5 days 18 h 34 min)

Table 4.3 Descriptives of lags lower than 1 month for the first and second sources for online news per type of period (peak vs routine) March 2020

January 2021

N Mean Median Std. deviation N Mean Median Std. deviation

Lag first source 138 1782 (1 day 5 h 42 min) 396 (0 days 6 h 36 min) 3648 (2 days 12 h 48 min) 206 2149 (1 day 11 h 49 min) 347 (0 days 5 h 47 min) 5045 (3 days 12 h 5 min)

Lag second source 36 3391 (2 days 8 h 31 min) 1856 (1 day 6 h 56 min) 4529 (3 days 3 h 29 min) 91 5919 (4 days 2 h 39 min) 2666 (1 day 20 h 26 min) 9240 (1 day 10 h 0 min)

informed, especially in online media. In such a context, more than 60% of the news had as source information from other media, and news migrated as quickly as within the same day in more than half of these cases. Additionally, about 23.0% of the news referring to other media sources use information from the same source (intramedia agenda), 54.7% use a different source, and 22.3% use both their own and different media sources.

4.4 Discussion and Conclusions Results from this study are important mainly due to the fact that they offer descriptive yet important insights into the media coverage of the COVID-19 pandemic from a comparative perspective. In fact, this is, to the best of our knowledge, the first approach in Romania so far dedicated to an in-depth investigation of pandemicrelated topics from television and online Romanian media during both a peak event and a routine period. In fact, we explored whether the visibility of COVID-19related topics, the actors/sources involved in setting the agenda and the intermedia agenda-setting phenomenon (with its associated time lag) differ according to the context – i.e. March 2020 was defined as the peak event period, because of the nationwide lockdown imposed on 25 March 2020 versus the period in January 2021 which was defined as the routine period, taking into account that, at that time, people got accustomed with the virus and the disease and the COVID-19 pandemic became “normalised”.

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4 Setting the Agenda During the COVID-19 Pandemic

On a general level, the main results show that setting the agenda during the COVID-19 pandemic was highly atypical, especially if we take into account the fact that the general topic of the virus and its implications overwhelmed the media agenda for months. With specific reference to the visibility of COVID-19 topics on the media agendas during the analysed periods, results show a general visibility of almost 100% (namely, 99.3%) of such topics during the peak event period, while in the routine period, the visibility dropped to 51.7%. In other words, results show that media outlets were overwhelmed with COVID-19 topics, mainly in the peak event period. These results confirm the fact that, during times of crisis, media coverage of crisis-related topics is high and acts as a crucial driver for public perceptions, attitudes and behaviours (Abdullah et al. 2020). The power of the media in transmitting key information about the severity of the disease and its implications, as well as about the relevance of preventive measures, was highly debated (e.g. Melki et al. 2022; te Poel et al. 2021). Furthermore, results at this level show that even during the routine period, pandemic-related issues remained salient, probably due to its global, long-term implications. Additionally, if we ignore the vaccine-related topics, which were the most prominent pandemic-related topic at the time, the salience of the pandemic was considerably lower. The most visible topic in the analysed TV news stories from both periods was decisions taken by the authorities; this is in line with results from similar research studies, showing that governments across the globe preferred using legacy media sources not only to inform citizens about the pandemic but also to stimulate compliance with strict interventions (Hameleers 2021). In terms of key actors/sources, it is worth mentioning that both TV and online media outlets used various actors/sources communicating about the crisis, with a significantly higher percentage among the analysed online news outlets. Specifically, approximately 60% of the online news stories on COVID-19 topics made reference to another news story, while approximately 20% of the TV news stories were subject to what is known as intermedia agenda. For the online news outlets, the preferred media channels used to set the agenda were other online news stories, in both analysed periods. For the TV news outlets, social media, online news sources and other TV news were used as sources of information almost equally in March 2020 and January 2021, with a clear preference for online news media sources in the latter period. Overall, it can be observed that the phenomenon of intermedia agenda-setting happened mostly in online news stories and that online sources citing other online news stories was the preferred way of “borrowing” information between the media agendas. These results offer fresh insights into the new way of transferring information from one medium to the next during periods of crisis and can be further replicated in other contexts and settings to check their validity and reliability. In fact, they are rather different from other studies on intermedia agenda-setting phenomenon, showing that traditional media agendas influence in a similar manner the agenda of emerging media outlets (Maier 2010; Vargo & Guo 2017). Here, results from our study show a clear tendency for online media outlets to function as a source of news, both for other online news stories and for traditional, televised, news stories. Furthermore, there is clear evidence that

4.4 Discussion and Conclusions

59

social media are becoming a source of news for both online and TV news stories. This is particularly important because there is recent evidence showing the role social media platforms could play in “boosting” efforts of government authorities by disseminating accurate and accessible information to prevent the spread of the disease and limit the spread of disinformation (Limaye et al. 2020). Thus, while social media are more and more used as a source for or carrier of news, efforts should be invested into making them a safer place where accurate information is shared to ensure that they further inform other news stories in an accurate manner. As far as time lag is concerned, results from our study show that most of the news migrates from one media agenda to the other either during the same day (over 50%) or in the following 1–2 days (approx. 28%). Such results confirm prior studies on the intermedia agenda-setting phenomenon suggesting that today, within the current media environment, the news production is accelerated and, thus, time lags necessary from one topic to migrate from one media agenda to another are significantly shorter than before (Geiß 2022; Vonbun et al. 2016). Of course, there are exceptions, in the sense that there are some topics that might stay under the radar and gain the media’s attention again at a later point in time (Conway et al. 2015). Under the pressure of keeping the audience informed almost instantaneously about what is happening and also in an attempt to attribute newsworthiness to online stories (Denham 2019), results from this study show that intermedia agendasetting manifests itself as an obvious phenomenon, especially in online media (more than 60% of news reporting taking information from other media sources in the online environment; information migrates within the timeframe of a single day for more than a half of these cases). The power of online media outlets is extremely important in setting the agenda in today’s media landscape, which is also shown in other similar studies (e.g. Valenzuela et al. 2017). This leads us to the idea that the power of legacy media has been transferred, at least during the COVID-19 pandemic context, to online media outlets that have become mainstream. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that almost 23.0% of the news making reference to other media sources use information from the same source (intramedia agenda-setting), 54.7% use information from other media sources (intermedia agenda-setting) and 22.3% use both references to own information and information from other media sources (both intra- and intermedia agenda-setting). The relatively high prevalence of the phenomenon known as intramedia agenda-setting might be explained with reference to the gatekeeping function of the media and how it has been revisited in the digitised media landscape (Wallace 2018). As with any other social sciences study, this comes with some limitations. First, the key limitation of this study is that we did not differentiate between entire information taken from another media outlet and only pieces of information being traced back to another source. Other limitations are related to the fact that we did not differentiate between intermedia and intramedia agenda-setting effects, except for some transitory final comments, because the corpus of news for the phenomenon that could be traced with timestamp is limited and going more indepth with the analysis would have become irrelevant. Also, the time lag associated with the emergence of the intermedia agenda phenomenon could be fine-grain

60

4 Setting the Agenda During the COVID-19 Pandemic

measured for TV news stories. Additionally, we could probably not talk about a real “routine period”, as we labelled, during a pandemic, as there was always a new “hot topic” about the crisis itself on the agenda. Furthermore, results are bound to the national context and cannot be generalised to other media environments where some dynamics of agenda-setting could be different. Last but not least, results are mainly descriptive, and we cannot imply any causation between the variables we included in our study. Nevertheless, despite such limitations, results from this study shed light on the agenda-setting effects of the media during the pandemic. The generalised high visibility of COVID-19 topics in both online and TV news stories, the high prevalence of intermedia agenda-setting and the in-depth analysis of the time lags necessary for one topic to migrate from one agenda to the other are just some of the contributions of the present study. They can be used as starting points in discussing media coverage during times of crisis and how it is linked to public perceptions, attitudes and behaviours. The way the media covered topics related to the COVID-19 pandemic illuminates several underexplored yet vital public attitudes and behaviours, such as compliance with preventive measures, trust in the authorities and vaccine-related attitudes like vaccine acceptance and its subsequent effects, such as vaccination rates.

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te Poel, F., Linn, A. J., Baumgartner, S. E., van Dijk, L., & Smit, E. S. (2021). Sick for information?: Information needs and media use of the dutch public during the COVID-19 pandemic. European Journal of Health Communication, 2(3), 24–43. Tria, J. Z. (2020). The COVID-19 pandemic through the lens of education in the Philippines: The new normal. International Journal of Pedagogical Development and Lifelong Learning, 1(1), 2–4. Valenzuela, S., Puente, S., & Flores, P. M. (2017). Comparing disaster news on Twitter and television: An intermedia agenda-setting perspective. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 61(4), 615–637. Van Aelst, P., & Walgrave, S. (2011). Minimal or massive? The political agenda-setting power of the mass media according to different methods. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 16(3), 295–313. Vargo, C. J., & Guo, L. (2017). Networks, big data, and intermedia agenda setting: An analysis of traditional, partisan, and emerging online US news. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 94(4), 1031–1055. Vliegenthart, R., & Walgrave, S. (2008). The contingency of intermedia agenda setting: A longitudinal study in Belgium. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 85(4), 860–877. Vonbun, R., Königslöw, K. K. V., & Schoenbach, K. (2016). Intermedia agenda-setting in a multimedia news environment. Journalism, 17(8), 1054–1073. Wallace, J. (2018). Modelling contemporary gatekeeping: The rise of individuals, algorithms and platforms in digital news dissemination. Digital Journalism, 6(3), 274–293.

Chapter 5

News Consumption Patterns Then and Now: From Traditional Media Repertoires to New Ways of Consuming News

5.1 Setting the Context A well-functioning democracy requires free and diverse media sources to keep people informed about relevant topics. At the same time, the media can foster public debate by enabling both citizens and elites to make their voices heard at a certain point in time (Aalberg & Curran 2012; Nielsen et al. 2016). The important role of the media in a democracy is nowadays challenged by a series of changes happening within the current media environments, some of them associated with recent technological developments and the rise of digital media (Nielsen et al. 2016). Thus, within the current, rapidly changing media environment, it is essential to investigate the most recent trends, habits and practices related to news media consumption. As Nielsen et al. (2016) suggest, we are moving, in an accelerated way, towards a fully digitalised, social media environment, where the competition for attention is increasing. As a result, we are witnessing some dramatic changes in people’s news consumption habits. More and more people tend to turn to social media to get their information; they increasingly access news stories via mobile phones and rely on social media sources to get access to new information. In turn, legacy media sources such as broadcasters and print newspapers are losing ground and become less important, even though they still remain the main producers of news stories. At the same time, they are facing serious pressure mainly because they are permanently trying to develop new business models to keep themselves alive. However, it is not clear whether digital-born media organisations are protected against such challenges. In this context, it becomes important to explore how some changes in the communication field, mainly brought about by technological advancements and the rise of digital and alternative media systems, pose a series of challenges to the “old order” within the media environment (Mazzoleni & Schulz 1999, p. 259).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Buturoiu et al., Patterns of News Consumption in a High-Choice Media Environment, Springer Studies in Media and Political Communication, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41954-6_5

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The transition from low- to high-choice media environments is among the most important changes, with major ramifications for the whole information environment (Strömbäck et al. 2022; Van Aelst et al. 2017). Compared with the pre-social media era, today, people can access information through a wide variety of media sources and interpersonal discussions (Dubois & Blank 2018; Van Aelst et al. 2017); they have numerous opportunities to get access to different perspectives about an event, and they are free to decide whether and how to combine information from various media sources or, alternatively, use a single source. At the same time, some media sources expose people to diverse content, while others overlap (Dubois & Blank 2018). This can, over time, undermine the diversity of media production (Nielsen et al. 2016). Even though our attention is not focused on media production patterns, we have to acknowledge that one cannot consider news consumption patterns without completely ignoring news production patterns. Several authors point to the fact that news production patterns have the potential to influence, in a significant manner, news consumption patterns. For example, “journalistic «cultures of production»whose output is contingent on national contexts, market configurations, and the individual characteristics of news outlets” (Ferrer-Conill et al. 2023, p. 96) influence “cultures of news consumption” (also see Doudaki & Spyridou 2015). The relationship between patterns of news production and patterns of news consumption is currently under important transformations. For example, there is no clear delineation between news consumers and news producers, in the sense that each news consumer could become a producer of content in the digital media landscape (Gauntlett 2009). Furthermore, more and more media users become involved in the news production process, which means that journalists tend to lose total control over what is being published; instead of being a consumer of news, users are co-producers of news (Karlsson 2011). Other important transformations are linked to algorithmic curation, automated writing and news bots which result in serious consequences related to transparency in news production (Diakopoulos & Koliska 2017). In other words, we can see that, today, we are facing a new dynamic of both available sources of information and users’ preferences for getting access to news and information. This is linked to what Van Aelst et al. (2017) named the supply and demand sides of the information environment. The supply side refers to the quantity, quality and structure of news and information available via various old and new media sources, whereas the demand side refers to the way various entities within a society use the available news and information. Against this background, this chapter explores some key changes within the current media environment, particularly pointing to the way in which they impact news consumption patterns. Even though they are equally important, we will not focus on news production patterns in this chapter, as they will not be included in any of our empirical analyses. This chapter is organised as follows: First, we delve into the main effects associated with the transition from low- to high-choice media environments and, at the same time, with the changes in both the supply and demand sides of the information environment. Second, we discuss how people

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consume media content from both traditional and new, alternative media sources. Third, we analyse current profiles of news consumption. Fourth, we dig into a more normative approach, referring to the idea of “healthy” news media consumption. Fifth, we explain how these changes in news consumption habits are related to the research studies we conducted (see Chaps. 7 and 8).

5.2 From Low- to High-Choice Media Environments There seems to be a consensus among researchers that the media play a crucial role in democratic societies. In this context, Van Aelst et al. (2017) suggest that one key concept assessing the interplay between the media, politics and citizens is the political information environment (Van Aelst et al. 2017). Labelled by some researchers (e.g. Aalberg et al. 2010; Banducci et al. 2017; Delli Carpini 2000; Jerit et al. 2006) as information environment or media environment, this concept encompasses the aggregate supply of news or political information that is available at a certain point in time. In a similar manner, Esser et al. (2012, p. 250) state that the political information environment is defined as “the quantitative supply of news and public affairs content provided to a national audience by routinely available sources”. Several studies investigate the association between the political information environment and people’s media use patterns (Aalberg & Curran 2012; Prior 2007). Their main conclusion is that the political information environment significantly impacts media consumption patterns and people’s knowledge of politics and current affairs. In other words, studies broadly suggest that the supply side of the political information environments is relevant. Its relevance resides in the fact that, when there is a larger amount of available information about a specific topic, there is a higher probability that people can be exposed to it and, therefore, learn from it (Van Aelst et al. 2017). Nevertheless, it is not all about the supply side of the political information environment, mainly because, oftentimes, supply is strongly linked to demand. The demand side is defined as “the amount and quality of information that people are interested in consuming and the skills they require to comprehend and retain this information” (Van Aelst et al. 2017, p. 6). For several reasons, today, this relationship between the supply and the demand sides of political information is under pressure, generating a sort of fragile balance between what the media offer as news and information and what citizens need to get informed. In part, this imbalance between the supply and demand sides of political information is associated with the transition from low- to high-choice media environments. Over 35 years ago, Heeter (1985) put forward one of the first documented studies regarding the way in which the emergence of newer forms of media sources, namely, cable television, significantly altered the media environment. He observes that the diversity of channels made available to the public due to the emergence of cable television is associated with a change in programme choices that people make. Specifically, he suggests that the emergence of cable television led to three main changes compared to the broadcast television era, which was mainly a low-choice

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media environment. First, viewers are responsible for selecting the programmes they want to watch; this task is complex and might result in the impossibility of being aware of all the available alternatives. Second, some cable channels offer specialised programmes that can be continuously followed by certain viewers, resulting in the ability to watch certain programmes at any given time. Third, cable television often encourages viewers to actively watch a certain programme since they enable them to decide whether and when they change the programme. Another significant contribution related to the transition from low- to highchoice media environments belongs to Prior (2005, 2007). He suggests that, as media choice increases, content preferences become the key to understanding political learning and participation. Specifically, compared with the situation in the low-choice media environment, where media users did not enjoy the possibility of making choices in terms of what content to consume, in the high-choice environment, people really enjoy this possibility. Actually, within the current highchoice media environment, people can choose anything they want from the vast array of media sources and media content, while in the broadcast era, both media sources and content choices were rather limited (see also Arceneaux & Johnson 2013; Webster 2005). Back in the broadcast television era, for example, people could not opt to avoid the news, as they can do today. Largely unexposed to entertainment competition, within the low-choice media environment, news had its own place in people’s media diets. However, today, as both entertainment and news are available around the clock, people’s media consumption patterns are strongly influenced by both the source and content preferences. Prior’s (2005, 2007) work derives from the theories of programme choice. Accordingly, users have certain preferences towards certain sources and content, and thus, their consumption habits are strongly influenced by those preferences. Prior (2005) suggests that media users (especially television viewers) have preferences over programme characteristics and types, selecting those programmes that best satisfy their preferences. He also points to the fact that one of the simplest models refers to the distinction between preferences for information versus preferences for entertainment. In this context, he argues that in the low-choice media environment, most people watched the news and learned from them mainly because they hesitated and did not want to turn off the TV set even though the programme they were watching was not in line with their preferences. He also gives an example of a study conducted in the early 1970s, showing that 40% of the respondents reported “watching programmes because they appeared on the channel they were already watching or because someone else wanted to see them” (Prior 2005, p. 578). In other terms, in the broadcast era, people tended to be accidentally exposed to the news. Actually, most of the time, they did not have the opportunity to deliberately choose a programme to watch. Instead, television viewing was mostly determined by “convenience, availability of spare time and the decision to spend that time in front of the TV set” (Prior 2005, p. 579). On the other hand, in line with Heeter’s (1985) viewpoints, Prior (2005, p. 579) also advances the idea that accidental exposure to news should occur less likely in the high-choice media environment because the multiple media content available at the same time could

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increase the chance that viewers find content that is in line with their preferences, thus resulting in “indiscriminate” viewing. More recent studies related to the way in which the rise of new media, the decline of many old media and the increasing media choice affect media consumption patterns offer interesting insights. For example, according to Strömbäck et al. (2013, p. 414), the ever-increasing information supply makes people more selective when deciding the media sources and content they consume (see also Bennett & Iyengar 2008). As a result, audience preferences thus become more important for explaining news media use (Prior 2005, 2007; Stroud 2011). Such studies suggest, among other things, that increasing media choice might result in an increasing share of “news avoiders” (Strömbäck et al. 2013; Van Aelst et al. 2017). This is particularly applicable to news in the traditional news media environment. Nevertheless, while some authors suggest that it is still debatable whether “the extent to which people are incidentally exposed to and learn from news and other political information via digital and social media” (Van Aelst et al. 2017, p. 5), others offer a more definite viewpoint. For example, Karlsen et al. (2020, p. 794) point to the idea that, in a highchoice media environment, politically interested individuals can consume more news, while the uninterested are more likely to avoid such content. In other words, this high choice is believed to increase overall news avoidance and, concurrently, news avoidance gaps based on gender, age and socioeconomic factors. Other researchers point to the fact that the transition from the low- to highchoice media environments enabled “news grazers” (Andersen & Strömbäck 2021; Bennett et al. 2008) to change channels, websites or outlets when they encounter news in which they are not interested. This concept refers to those individuals “who watch television news with the remote control in hand and switch to another channel when an uninteresting topic comes up” (Morris & Forgette 2007, p. 91). With particular reference to the digital media environment, “news grazers” have even more opportunities due to the increasing media choice and personalisation of media consumption (Andersen & Strömbäck 2021). Furthermore, within high-choice media environments, the relationship between the demand and supply sides of the information environment is even more relevant. This happens because increasing choice requires a stronger link between what is offered (the supply side) and what is actually consumed (the demand side). In order to remain competitive, media sources have to offer the kind of content that is really consumed by their target groups (Hamilton 2011). In such a context, some media sources use an array of more or less legitimate tactics to attract users’ attention, including, for example, clickbait or sensational headlines (Carcioppolo et al. 2022; Munger et al. 2020). Put together, all these studies suggest that, in order to better understand news media consumption patterns within the current, high-choice media environment, it becomes remarkably important to consider both the supply and the demand sides of information environments (see also Panek 2016). When new types of media content are available but not widely used by citizens, it is highly improbable that they have an impact. On the other hand, when certain types of media content are not supplied any more, it is highly improbable that citizens consume them. In other terms, both

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the supply and demand sides are equally important. In line with this reasoning, the next section is dedicated to a thorough analysis of both traditional and new media repertoires and the way they influence media consumption patterns.

5.3 Media Repertoires: Patterns of Media Consumption In the current high-choice media environments, researchers opt for a media repertoire approach to examine the dynamics of people’s media consumption habits (e.g. Edgerly 2015; Hasebrink & Popp 2006; Kim 2016; Mangold & Bachl 2018). According to the repertoire-oriented approach, media users integrate multiple media sources and content to form personal media repertoires to meet their needs and get specific gratifications. Specifically, users tend to actively combine different media sources, traditional and new, into complex media use patterns. These patterns might explain, among other things, certain differences in users’ opinions and attitudes due to their link to media use (Yuan 2011). For example, taking a close look at people’s media repertoires might highlight important issues related to public agendas and their dynamics in today’s media environment. The concept of channel “repertoire” was first introduced by Heeter et al. (1983) to describe the tendency of television viewers to choose the ones that best fit their preferences of the moment from a set of available programmes. Oftentimes, television viewers selected those channels based on their routines, and they represented only a small portion of the available channels of the time (Heeter 1985; Yuan 2011). For example, Heeter et al. (1983) found that television viewers who had 34 channels available at a certain point in time watched, on average, less than 10 channels a week. In other words, this subset of channels, or repertoires, was used as a coping mechanism within a rich and complex media environment (Heeter 1985; Taneja et al. 2012). Years later, Ferguson and Perse (2000) applied the repertoire approach with reference to Internet sources. Their findings show that online users also follow a repertoire approach when using the Internet (i.e. by using some websites more frequently). The media repertoire approach was further expanded from single to multiple media sources, allowing us to consider that a media repertoire may “consist of different types of media platforms or, more specifically, different television channels, radio stations and newspaper titles” (Yuan 2011, p. 1002) which an individual uses at a certain moment in time. One of the first approaches referring to the fact that people use multiple arrays of media sources and contents and that their media repertoires are actually crossmedia belongs to Reagan et al. (1995, p. 23). They introduced the idea that a media repertoire consists of a set of sources that an individual selects for a given topic. In this respect, the authors identified a “sports repertoire” consisting of older media (radio and newspaper use) and a “community news repertoire” that mixed old and new media (newspaper, television, radio, computer, cellular phone use) (also see Edgerly 2015, p. 5).

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Furthermore, with particular reference to cross-media use, it is relevant to mention here the work put forward by Hasebrink and his colleagues (e.g. Hasebrink & Domeyer 2012; Hasebrink & Hepp 2017; Hasebrink & Hölig 2013; Hasebrink & Popp 2006). Hasebrink and Hepp (2017) state that it is essential to consider the entirety of media sources and content that a person uses when trying to assess media consumption patterns. According to the two authors, media repertoires “can be regarded as relatively stable cross-media patterns of media practices” (Hasebrink & Hepp 2017, p. 6). In this respect, Hasebrink and Domeyer (2012) suggest three main principles that characterise a repertoire-oriented approach. First, they suggest that the concept of media repertoires puts the user in the centre, in the sense that it focuses on which media an individual uses and not on which individuals media sources reach. Second, the repertoire-oriented approach emphasised the need to take into account the entirety of media sources and content, not just single media sources or particular content. Third, it is important to consider the interrelations between the components of a media repertoire, as a media repertoire is not just a collection of different media sources and contents but a “meaningfully structured composition of media” (Hasebrink & Domeyer 2012, p. 760). Following the same reasoning, Wolf and Schnauber 2015, p. 761 suggest that a media repertoire can be defined as “the combination of multiple media sources a person uses regularly for news (e.g., politics, economy, celebrities, regional and national current and background news) and service content (e.g., weather, advice and consumer information, transportation and traffic)”. Similarly, Taneja et al. (2012, p. 952) suggest that, as media consumption has become “an anywhere, anytime proposition”, one should be aware of the fact that people cannot use all the available media. Instead, they tend to cope with the abundance of choices by using a small subset of the available media or repertoires of their preferred media sources. However, the authors suggest that there is still little empirical evidence about how users create such media repertoires in rich media environments. To fill this identified gap, more recent studies (Andersen et al. 2022) advance a media repertoire approach to examine people’s patterns of media consumption, including traditional mainstream media, as well as new information sources, such as social media and alternative websites. Such approaches are extremely relevant because they aim to analyse the nature of people’s media habits in environments that are close to real-life ones. They take into account the fundamental changes through which the media environments were passing through in the last years, mostly those related to new technological inventions. All these changes have a serious impact on people’s media consumption habits. For example, Andersen et al. (2022, p. 238) suggest that technological advancements such as personal computers, smartphones, the Internet and the wide use of digital media platforms enable a media environment “saturated with information”. At the same time, generalised low levels of trust in mainstream media and the rise of alternative media sources are important changes that should be considered as well. All these issues have profound implications for the media consumption habits, as the audience have become more and more fragmented and been relying on alter-

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native information sources, thus posing serious threats to democracies worldwide. Specifically, due to the multitude of opportunities and choices from which media users might select what to follow and where to get their information, people could easily become less informed, misinformed or even not informed at all. For example, if people are not interested in following the news and have a low level of trust in mainstream news, then they can easily avoid news or try to follow just those news stories that are in line with their predispositions. In both cases, the societal implications are worth considering, as they strongly contribute to people’s accurate views about what is going on in the world around them (Andersen et al. 2022; Stroud 2008). Against this background, as Vandenplas and Picone (2021) suggest, to better explore media consumption habits, it becomes increasingly important not only to analyse which media technologies are used and the extent to which they are used but also to investigate users’ repertoires. This kind of perspective that takes into account the cross-media use contributes to a better understanding of how media users navigate the media environment and combine different media sources and contents. Therefore, in the following section of the current chapter, we will refer to specific forms of news media repertoires in an attempt to map the existing literature about the main patterns of news media consumption within the high-choice media environment.

5.4 Profiles of News Consumption Within the High-Choice Media Environment One can easily observe that, while research adopting a news media repertoire is rather common, there is a lot of variation in how news exposure is measured and, therefore, in the corresponding emerging news media repertoires (Edgerly et al. 2018; Kim 2016). In the following lines, we will critically review the available literature on news media repertoires in an attempt to shed more light on the existing profiles of news consumption within the current high-choice media environment. To better observe the evolution of news consumption profiles across countries, we will refer to the available literature from a chronological perspective. The first attempts to map profiles of news media consumption in a highchoice media environment date back to the early 2000s. Specifically, based on data collected in the Netherlands, Van Eijck and Van Rees (2000) analysed profiles of consumption among print newspapers, magazines and television consumers. They make the distinction between five types of readers’ profiles, namely, “entertainment” readers, “information” readers, “regional readers”, “nonreaders” and “omnivore” readers. According to the two Dutch researchers, entertainment readers are not very interested in consuming what is labelled as serious information, but instead, they are very interested in consuming light entertainment programmes, especially from private broadcasters rather than public ones. They generally tend to prefer

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television viewing rather than reading newspapers. This profile seems to be the most popular among women and younger generations. On the other hand, those who prefer reading quality newspapers are labelled “information readers”. Generally, they tend to use mainly print newspapers to get their information and employ television for purposes other than information seeking. “Regional readers” are more common in the Netherlands due to the specificity of media outlets. They tend to follow regional newspapers and magazines while having a preference for light entertainment. Therefore, they share more or less the same characteristics as “entertainment readers”, although people in this category tend to belong mostly to the older generations. Furthermore, “nonreaders” are those media consumers who prefer using television rather than reading print newspapers or magazines. For them, television seems to be the only information source, which is why most nonreaders tend to be heavy television users. Generally, this group of media consumers consists of people with average and low education levels. Lastly, “omnivore readers” are those people who consume almost any information, generally irrespective of its source (either print newspapers or magazines) and origin (public versus private broadcasters). Based on this attempt, the same researchers put forward another study to uncover specific media repertoires. Their approach differentiates between different types of media use that can, generally speaking, belong to one of the following categories: serious or light information and legitimate or light entertainment. Van Rees and Van Eijck (2003) distinguish between the following media repertoires: “regional and public media” (regional newspapers, local television, public television), “serious info” (opinion magazines), “popular and public media” (public television, public radio, popular national newspapers), “women” (popular women’s magazines), “commercial” (commercial television, commercial radio), “PC hobby” (personal computer, hobby magazines, serious Internet info, video), “Internet” (Internet other use) and “story” (books). Among other things, their research points to the fact that traditional media sources tend to be preferred among the older generations, whereas new media sources are more common among the younger cohorts. Age also plays a role in media use, in the sense that younger people with low levels of education prefer commercial media compared with older people with the same levels of education, who prefer popular and public media. Taneja et al. (2012) offer a detailed analysis of media repertoires that users create in rich media environments. The starting point of their analysis is related to the fact that within the new high-choice media environment, people use small subsets or repertoires of their preferred media to navigate the abundance of choices both with regard to media sources and with regard to media contents. In such a context, it is highly probable that people are exposed to cross-platform content most of the time. Therefore, the authors’ analysis explores patterns of cross-platform media use in an attempt to shed more light on macro-level repertoire formation. Based on an American sample, their main findings reveal four distinct media repertoires that Americans use to navigate the rich media environment. Specifically, they make the distinction between “computing for work” (high use of email services, web search, office software programmes), “television viewing” (high use of news programmes,

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entertainment/info programmes, channel surfing), “media on mobile” (high use of mobile applications, messages, texts, websites) and “media online” (high use of online video sites, web news and sports, digital video streaming). According to their analysis, “television viewing” is the most common repertoire, followed by “computing for work”, “media on mobile” and “media online”. In terms of socio-demographics, Taneja et al.’s study (2012, pp. 963–964) suggests that highly educated users and those who use computers at work tend to access more “media online”. Furthermore, older people are more likely to watch television, less likely to use “computing for work” and even less likely to use mobile devices. Such findings indicate that such repertoires seem to reflect people’s preference to use those media sources and contents that are available to them. Nevertheless, a closer look at these media repertoires reflects that they are guided by the social context in which a certain medium is used. In other words, it is not all about the media people have at their disposal at a certain point in time but also about the entire social context they live in. This might explain, among other things, why certain media users are more inclined to use certain media contents, mainly because they are “recursively activated within their daily social practice” (Taneja et al. 2012, p. 964). In another piece of research, based on a Korean sample, Lee and Yang (2014) identify three news repertoire groups: “news avoiders” (72.7%), “emerging news seekers” (9.6%) who prefer newer media (i.e. Internet, mobile and social networking sites) and “traditional news seekers” (17.7%) who heavily rely on older media. Their research suggests that the largest group is the one of news avoiders, that is, people who rarely consume news irrespective of the source. They link news avoidance patterns to the media environment itself, in the sense that they suggest that nowadays, within the high-choice media environment, people tend to “constantly turn their faces away from news” (Lee & Yang 2014, p. 610). Mosca and Quaranta (2017) conducted a comparative study in Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, on representative samples of Internet users, and found four possible patterns of media usage after cross-classifying the traditional and the digital sources of information. Thus, they make the distinction between “occasional/intermittent” users (those who make infrequent use of both traditional and digital media), “traditional univores” (those who use prevalently traditional media), “digital univores” (those who use prevalently digital media) and “omnivores” (those who frequently use both traditional and digital media). Their results suggest that there are significant differences in media consumption patterns across countries. The United Kingdom has the highest proportion of occasional respondents (40.9%). Traditional “univores” are more prevalent in Germany (25.4%), whereas the proportion of omnivores is highest in Italy (51.2%). Coming back to the US context, Edgerly (2015) identifies six types of news media repertoires. First, there are “news avoiders” (who report low use of all components of news, particularly online news); people in this cluster seem to use the high-choice environment to “flee from news” (Edgerly 2015, p. 13). Second, there is the “online-only” news repertoire; people with this repertoire use the Internet as the only source of news. Third, there is the “television and print” news repertoire; people with this repertoire mainly consume broadcast news, television news commentary

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and print news. Fourth, there is the “liberal and online” news repertoire; people with this repertoire consume news with a liberal voice (via the Internet and radio) and also general online news. Fifth, there is the “conservative-only” repertoire; people with this repertoire consume news with a conservative voice via TV, radio and the Internet. Lastly, there is the “omnivore” repertoire, characterising people who consume news from both liberal and conservative sources, as well as broadcast, television, commentary, print and online news. Based on another study conducted on a representative American sample, Choi (2016) suggests that, while Internet-based media have become a widely used source of information, it is essential to think about patterns of news media consumption by making the difference between people that use the Internet as the most important source of news and people that stick to traditional news sources. In this respect, the author distinguishes between two types of news media repertoires, namely, “traditional media repertoire” and “Internet-based media repertoire”. The main motivation behind this distinction is related to people’s news consumption habits by generation. While younger people are more likely to get their news and information from Internet media outlets such as websites or digital media platforms, there is still a group of people, mostly from the older generations, that continue to get their news and information from traditional news sources such as television, print newspapers and radio. As previously mentioned, Choi (2016) also suggests that news media consumption patterns are linked to a combination of factors, including personal motivations, media habits and technology clusters. In other words, people’s preference towards either traditional or Internet media sources is associated with both the availability of certain devices that enable access to a specific media source and personal motivations and previous media consumption habits. Furthermore, the author suggests that people’s preference towards a specific news source and, consequently, different media repertoires might explain a series of public attitudes. For example, those people who consume information from social networking sites to fulfil their entertainment-related needs are less likely to post news on their feeds. Kim (2016) explores media repertoires emerging from Korean media users. The author identifies five media repertoires. The “TV-oriented entertainment” repertoire consists mainly of female media users with low levels of education. They are generally not interested in news and politics, but instead, they prefer entertainmentrelated programmes. On the other hand, the “Internet-only” repertoire consists mainly of those people who predominantly use the Internet for their daily media diet. They are generally from the younger generations and have higher levels of education. The third media repertoire, the “news on traditional media” repertoire, consists of the oldest media users among the five types of media repertoire users, showing the strong relationship between news media use and age. The fourth media repertoire, the “tabloid newspapers” repertoire, consists of media users who prefer sports newspapers as well as free daily newspapers. They are generally middle-aged people with medium levels of education. The fifth identified media repertoire, the “cable TV-only” repertoire, consists of mainly female users, less educated, who spend a small portion of their time on news media.

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Furthermore, based on a study from the Netherlands, Bos et al. (2016) put forward the distinction between four news media repertoires. Their analysis uses latent profile analysis to map news media consumption patterns. In this context, the authors refer to four patterns of media consumption, namely, “minimalists”, “public news consumers”, “popular news consumers” and “omnivores”. According to the authors, minimalists use media the least but constitute the largest group (65.94%) of the analysed sample. They rarely watch current affairs programmes (less than once a week), barely read a newspaper but do occasionally watch the public news broadcast or the commercial broadcast (1 to 2 days a week) and also follow the news online (1 to 2 days a week). Even though minimalists tend to consume news about current affairs the least, they do not avoid news completely. Public news consumers are, by far, less numerous (21.46% of the sample). They tend to watch public news broadcasts and be interested in watching current affairs programmes (on average, they watch two of the main programmes every other day). Popular news consumers (6.74% of the sample) are those people who consume free newspapers, avidly reading popular newspapers. Omnivores (5.86% of the sample) are those people exposed to all types of news and current affairs media at least once a week. They also tend to watch the public news broadcast on a regular basis and often use online news media. One important mention with reference to these news consumption habits among the Dutch population is linked to the relatively wide use of public broadcast news. In the analysed sample from the Netherlands, the public news broadcast can be found as part of each of the four news media profiles, playing an important role even in the media diet of the minimalists. This is entirely different compared to the United States, where public broadcasting programmes play a minimal role because they reach a small number of US citizens. Such findings suggest that, despite many similarities between the American and the European public spheres, it seems that one major difference is related to the role of public broadcast media. If solid, they can play a crucial role in informing citizens and, thus, creating a “healthier” public sphere. Another European-based study distinguishes between five types of news users’ profiles: “regionally oriented”, “background-oriented”, “digital”, “laid-back” and “nationally oriented” (Swart et al. 2017). People with the regionally oriented news use repertoire tend to follow the news coming from regional newspapers and regional television, along with national TV and radio broadcasts on public channels. These people consider regional news providers important because the events referred to by these sources are perceived as relevant to their everyday lives. People with a background-oriented news repertoire prefer quality newspapers, weekly news magazines and serious current affairs TV programmes. People with this news repertoire tend to use the news to get knowledge about the world around them and make certain connections between the events presented in the news and their lives. In fact, background-oriented users follow the news to make sense of the world and further discuss with others about lessons learnt from the news. People with the digital news repertoire tend to follow mainly online-born media (i.e. “media without a traditional print or broadcast counterpart”, Swart et al. 2017, p. 1350),

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websites of national and local broadcasters, online quality newspapers and also websites of international news organisations. Users with this repertoire are very critical towards the news and question the objectivity of the news media, irrespective of source (traditional or new media). The laid-back news media repertoire was characterised by media that allow the news to find you, such as Facebook, free local newspapers and professional magazines at work. Generally, people with this media repertoire have relatively little interest in news, and instead, they are more likely to be characterised as “monitorial” users, in the sense that they monitor the news so that they can be alerted in case an event happens and they have to take action (Schudson 1998). Lastly, people with a nationally oriented media repertoire tend to follow quality print newspapers, TV news broadcasts on commercial channels, light current affairs TV programmes and Facebook. For them, “the news was a way to relax, at home or as a break in between difficult tasks at work” (Swart et al. 2017, p. 1352). Besides the above-mentioned users’ profiles, Swart et al. (2017) conclude that media users do not always use what they prefer nor do they prefer what they use. At the same time, they suggest that, within the current, rapidly changing media environment, media users tend to define what news is and is not in different ways. Specifically, the boundaries people draw between news and other types of information they can find in the media are clearly shifting. Other two studies on Swedish samples distinguish between different profiles of news users. Strömbäck et al. (2018) suggest that, nowadays, people increasingly mix and combine their use of various news media into personal news repertoires. In this respect, using latent profile analysis, the authors identify five news users’ repertoires, namely, “minimalists”, “public news consumers”, “local news consumers”, “social media news consumers” and “popular online news consumers”. First, minimalists (38.8% of the analysed sample) are those who tend to consume very little news; they are often young people with high levels of education and less interest in politics. Second, public news consumers (4.5% of the analysed sample) are more likely to consume news from broadcast television or quality or local newspapers. Generally, they are older, have higher education levels and are more likely to be interested in politics. Third, local news consumers (31.2% of the analysed sample) are more likely to read a local newspaper in print and to consume both public and private news on television and listen to the radio. People in this group are often older and have a lower educational level. Fourth, social media news consumers (18.1% of the analysed sample) are more likely to consume news from social media, such as Facebook. Social news consumers are more likely to be younger, female and generally interested in politics. Finally, popular online news consumers (7.4% of the analysed sample) are omnivores; they tend to consume news from public and commercial broadcasters. People in this group are generally interested in politics. Besides differences, there is an important similarity to be mentioned with regard to the identified groups. Specifically, it seems that the largest group is that of minimalists or news avoiders (see Bos et al. 2016; Edgerly et al. 2018; Lee & Yang 2014). The same technique, latent profile analysis, was also used by Mourão et al. (2018). They refer to four types of news repertoires: “low news users/some local

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news”, “news junkies”, “conservative news users” and “mainstream news users”. The first profile (low news users, some local news) consists of people with lower levels of news use across the board, except for local television news. People from this group also watch some nightly broadcast news and tend to read local newspapers; they are generally older and less likely to discuss politics. The second profile (news junkies) consists of people who consume news from all sources at high levels; they are generally younger and tend to discuss politics more but have lower levels of political knowledge than people in the other profiles. The third profile (conservative news users) consists of people who consume news from conservative sources (television, websites, radio); they are right-leaning and more likely to have higher levels of political interest. The final profile (mainstream media users) consists of those who consume nightly TV news, local TV news, local newspapers and national newspapers; they tend to have higher levels of political discussion than people belonging to other groups. Interestingly, Lindell (2018) analyses the role social class plays in shaping news users’ orientations within the current, high-choice media environment. Results from this study focus on the importance of class habitus for the formation of digital news repertoires. The author points to the fact that people’s news repertoires are not sociologically neutral in the sense that people’s choices in terms of media use are more or less influenced by their social position. In this respect, the author identifies two clusters of media consumption, mainly based on class structure: “cultural middle class” repertoire and “economic middle class” repertoire. While people in the cultural middle class tend to consume more news on science, politics, war and culture or “hard news”, in short, those in the economic middle class tend to be more interested in economic news. Furthermore, it is important to mention that enjoyment of sports news and weather forecasts increases as the level of cultural capital decreases. In other terms, class might strongly influence news consumption habits. Specifically, as the author suggests, whereas the cultural middle class prefers sources with a pronounced elite status and “hard news” (politics, culture, debate) while considering themselves knowledgeable about current affairs, “those lacking cultural capital do and think the opposite” (Lindell 2018, p. 2042). The way people consume news media in the digital era is the focus of Edgerly et al. et al.’s work (2018). Results from a national survey of US youth aged 12 to 17 reveal four distinct news repertoires: “news avoiders”, “curated news-only”, “traditional news-only” and “news omnivores”. First, news avoiders are people with a generalised low news use and represent about half (52%) of the youth sample. Despite ample news options in the form of sources, services and devices, young people with this repertoire seem uninterested in the news. Second, curated newsonly repertoire characterises 15% of the sample. Youth with this repertoire tend to depend primarily on social and algorithm-based methods for consuming news, oftentimes through sources that offer young people the opportunity to customise their news experiences. Third, the traditional news-only repertoire characterises 19% of youth respondents. For them, the preference is for a moderate level of traditional news while largely being uninterested in online native sources and curated website services. Fourth, the news omnivore repertoire represents 14% of

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youth respondents; they are people who consume news irrespective of its form, from online native sources of news (for which they exhibit the strongest preference) to curated news services and even traditional news. Among other things, these profiles suggest that “for a large proportion of youth, news consumption is best characterised by patterns of avoidance” (Edgerly et al. 2018, p. 207). Recent studies conducted in both European (e.g. Castro et al. 2022; Vandenplas & Picone 2021) and non-European (e.g. Oh et al. 2021) settings looked into patterns of news consumption by taking into account cross-media news use, while research on news repertoires at the outlet level remains rather limited (see, e.g. Ksiazek et al. 2019). Therefore, in the following lines, we are going to refer to the most recent research studies available to date with regard to patterns of news consumption within the high-choice media environment. Based on a two-wave online survey in South Korea, Oh et al. (2021) identify three news repertoires: “commentary-oriented”, “TV news” and “social media news” repertoires. First, people with a commentary-oriented news repertoire tend to consume news from print newspapers, news magazines, news podcasts and political talk shows. They have a clear preference for news that offer an interpretive analysis of the ongoing events. Consequently, they tend to turn to those news stories that do not just cover the events but also that explain those events. Second, TV news consumers are more likely to consume news from TV sources (either network or cable). Third, social media news consumers are those people who consume news stories from social networking sites, mobile applications, blogs and other platforms such as YouTube. According to the authors, this last category is worth considering mainly within the current media environment, where news circulating in the digital space seems to be associated with serious, long-lasting effects. For example, Oh et al. (2021) point to recent studies showing that digital media platforms such as Telegram are key channels for the dissemination of junk news (i.e. low-quality news) and that such news has the potential to generate more user engagement than the news produced by mainstream media (Knuutila et al. 2020). With reference to the European context, Vandenplas and Picone (2021) used latent class analysis to uncover media consumption patterns among a representative Flemish sample. They refer to six news media repertoires, as follows: “television-oriented”, “dabblers”, “budding enthusiasts”, “entertainment seekers”, “allrounders” and “quality seekers”. Television-oriented users exhibit the lowest overall media use compared to users of all other repertoires. Due to their limited use of the Internet, online media (such as news sites, social media networks) and online video or music streaming are absent from this repertoire. Instead, users of this repertoire tend to get their news mostly from television news sources. On the other hand, dabblers tend to have more or less the same media consumption habits, but they do incorporate online news into their news consumption diet. Budding enthusiasts exhibit a much wider repertoire of media practices compared to the previously mentioned clusters. They are prominently younger media users and exhibit more openness to different media practices than users of other repertoires. Entertainment seekers tend to have a wide variety of media practices and devices. At the same time, they tend to engage in “active Internet use” (e.g. sharing and

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posting self-made videos, audio or blog posts online) more often than people in the other repertoires. Allrounders exhibit frequent use of all kinds of media devices, whereas quality seekers have a much narrower repertoire. Actually, their repertoire is prominently oriented towards the use of news media and radio, with some occasional dips into television and online media. In terms of socio-demographics, the study shows that one of the most important differences in terms of education, age and income is between television-oriented news users and allrounders. Actually, television-oriented repertoire is specific mainly to older women with low education levels and income, while allrounders are generally middle-aged men with high education levels and a relatively high income. Another important distinction is between dabblers and entertainment seekers, on the one hand, and all the other news profiles, on the other. Dabblers and entertainment seekers are generally younger than people from the other repertoires. The same technique, latent class analysis or latent profile analysis, was used in one of the first cross-national, comparative studies conducted so far. The study was performed in 17 countries all over Europe (Castro et al. 2022). The authors refer to five news repertoires or profiles, mapping the most relevant patterns of news consumption within the current, high-choice media environment. Specifically, Castro et al. (2022)) differentiate between “news minimalists” (17% of the analysed sample), “social media news users” (22% of the analysed sample), “traditionalists” (19% of the analysed sample), “online news seekers” (32% of the analysed sample) and “hypernews consumers” (10% of the analysed sample). The news minimalists group includes those users who seldom consume news and use very few media outlets or platforms, if any. Social media news users mainly inform themselves through social media and consume little information beyond that. People in this group are frequently exposed to news through social platforms such as Facebook, Twitter or Instagram. At the same time, they also express higher levels of newsfinds-me perceptions, are younger than the average news user and tend to trust the media less. They are the least educated and politically interested compared with users from other profiles. Traditionalists are mainly those people who prefer traditional and public service-oriented news sources. They watch TV more than the two previous profiles and also use traditional newspapers and radio as news sources. Additionally, they are men, generally belonging to older generations, have higher levels of education, tend to trust the media more and barely feel that “news will find them”. Online news seekers are people often exposed to news and tend to actively use various news outlets and online platforms and are generally women. They tend to have more sophisticated news media repertoires than all the other profiles, as “they engage in higher levels of selective exposure and are more prone to seeking like-minded perspectives in political information” (Castro et al. 2022, p. 841). They are more prone to use alternative media and have generalised low levels of trust in the media. Finally, hyperconsumers of news use all sorts of news outlets and platforms; they are also very politically interested and tend to trust the media more while scoring higher in news-finds-me perceptions. Besides the results at the aggregate level, Castro et al. et al.’s (2022) study shows the distribution of each profile by country. In this context, it is worth mentioning that in Romania, the largest

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category is that of online news seekers (44% of the Romanian sample), followed by social media news consumers (19% of the sample) and hypernews consumers (17%). Traditional news consumers represent 12% of the Romanian sample, while news minimalists represent 8.5%. One of the most recent studies that used the same technique to identify profiles of news users belongs to Andersen et al. (2022). Using a four-wave panel survey from Sweden, the authors identify four groups of news users: “public service-oriented traditionalists” (characterised by high use of public service radio and TV news and low use of other news sources), “minimalists” (characterised by low use of all news sources), “engaged pluralists” (characterised by high use of news across most traditional news sources, but also a very high use of alternative news outlets and a strong reliance on social media) and “quality-oriented explorers” (characterised by high use of public service TV and radio news as well as broadsheet newspapers and, to some extent, use of social media and online news sites to get news about social issues not reported by traditional media). Among other things, their research concludes that news repertoires are highly stable, in the sense that people most often maintain their news habits rather than reform them. Against this background, we can conclude that while approaches to news repertoires largely vary in terms of what media are included (e.g. traditional vs newer media), the specificity of measurement (e.g. general Internet news use vs use of specific news websites), the genres of news (e.g. soft news vs hard news), the nature of the media sources (e.g. SNS vs news organisations) and the way profiles are constructed (e.g. mainly quantitative-based vs qualitative-based), there are some similarities that research studies share (Edgerly et al. 2018). One of the most consistent findings among recent studies is the identification of a news avoider or news minimalist repertoire (e.g. users who have low overall news use) and a news omnivore or hypernews consumer/“engaged pluralist” repertoire (e.g. users who have high overall new use) (e.g. Andersen et al. 2022; Bos et al. 2016; Castro et al. 2022; Edgerly et al. 2018; Lee & Yang 2014; Strömbäck et al. 2018). Even though we do have a rather clear idea about profiles of news consumption within the current media environment, it remains unclear, for example, which patterns of news consumption account for a healthy media diet. Therefore, the next section is dedicated to a thorough analysis of what a healthy media diet is and what it should contain.

5.5 Healthy Patterns of Media Consumption: A Healthy News Media Diet As shown above, people’s media repertoires differ in many respects: first, in terms of how many media are included; second, in terms of which media people are more inclined to use; and third, in terms of how people tend to combine those media. All these are included in what some researchers call the “media diet”, i.e. “the regular,

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daily set of media individuals use” (Dubois & Blank 2018, p. 733). In other terms, what people “consume” from the media constitutes their media diet. In a high-choice media environment, where people might be exposed simultaneously to huge amounts of information, it becomes crucial to take into account what goes into citizens’ media diet, what they actually consume (i.e. their media repertoires) and, at the same time, what they should consume to stay healthy and, thus, well informed (i.e. what accounts for a “healthy” media diet). The idea of a “healthy” media diet stems from the saying that “you are what you read” (Jackson 2019), which is, in turn, coming from the proverbial saying “you are what you eat”. To be fit and healthy, one has to eat healthy, good food. Taking regular meals and avoiding fast food and snacks are also key to a balanced diet. Similarly, to be well informed, one has to consume media content in a balanced manner. Irresponsible media consumption, in the form of excessive information consumption and news snacking, is oftentimes associated with information overload (Bawden & Robinson 2009; Li 2017). According to Bawden and Robinson (2021), the information overload phenomenon has been described in many ways, such as “information overabundance”, “infobesity”, “infoglut”, “data smog”, “information pollution”, “information fatigue”, “social media fatigue”, “social media overload”, “information anxiety”, “library anxiety”, “infostress”, “infoxication”, “reading overload”, “communication overload”, “cognitive overload”, “information violence” and “information assault”. The two authors state that, while there is no single generally accepted definition, information overload refers to the situation where there is so much relevant and potentially useful information available that it becomes a hindrance rather than a help. The same idea belongs to Fan et al. (2021, p. 2), who define information overload as “the situation where information exceeds the ability of a user to process and utilize it, resulting in negative feelings of failure”. The fact that information is available immediately and that, most of the time, there is plenty of available information is not always a good thing. Not all the available information leads to a healthy, balanced media diet (Conner-Gaten et al 2020). Researchers document a series of “diseases” associated with exposure to too much information or information overload, such as news avoidance (Park 2019), selective exposure (Lee et al. 2017), incidental news exposure (Matthes et al. 2020), misinformation (Bawden & Robinson 2021) or high probability to be exposed only to similar views/get stuck in echo chambers (Dubois & Blank 2018). Because it is almost impossible to process all the information one is exposed to at a certain point in time, people who are generally exposed to much information end up being less informed. On the other hand, due to information overload, some people end up being selectively exposed to certain news/views or avoid news altogether. In such a context, it remains debatable what counts for a healthy media diet. According to a recent article, probably the “healthiest” news media diet is traditional media but consumed in a wise manner, mainly because too much media consumption might leave people uninformed (Benton 2021). Others (e.g. Brasunas 2021) suggest that a balanced news media diet is one that contains all sorts of media sources (i.e. independent and corporate) and often contrasting viewpoints. Another important challenge is to be able to filter facts from opinions and consciously

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consider news rather than simply consume all the available information at a certain point in time. All the above-mentioned media-related phenomena and some others (e.g. low trust in media sources) will be the focus of the next chapter of the book. In fact, thinking about people’s media diets in the current, high-choice media environment should not exclude these important media-related phenomena that might impact people’s media consumption patterns. In other words, it is essential to think about current patterns of media consumption and, at the same time, about how these patterns could be improved to contribute to healthy media consumption and, in the end, to a healthy democracy.

5.6 Implications and Conclusion According to the literature to date, in contemporary rich media environments, there are several concerns related to people’s media diets (i.e. the way people consume news/patterns of news consumption) and what counts for a healthy news media diet. As stated above, even though approaches to news media repertoires seem to vary, one striking similarity observed in a consistent body of studies refers to the existence of two profiles of news media consumers. One is that of news avoiders (i.e. people with low overall news use), while on the other side of the spectrum, there are the news omnivores (i.e. people with high overall news use) (Andersen et al. 2022; Bos et al. 2016; Castro et al. 2022; Edgerly et al. 2018; Lee & Yang 2014; Strömbäck et al. 2018). Of course, this leaves a vast area in between, in the sense that there are many media users who consume news in different combinations from a diverse array of sources (Edgerly et al. 2018). Furthermore, in terms of what accounts for a healthy media diet, perspectives are also different. The main suggestion is to use a balanced media diet while trying to avoid potentially “poisoned” information that might cause detrimental effects, leaving people less informed or even uninformed. In such a context, this literature review section together with the next one serve as the basis for Chaps. 7 and 8. Chapter 7 is dedicated to a thorough analysis of (more or less healthy) media diets in a changing media environment, whereas Chap. 8 explores patterns of media consumption, that is, profiles of people using certain types of media outlets. Starting from the literature to date, our first aim is to unveil how people themselves perceive their news media consumption patterns in today’s media environment (i.e. to explore people’s media diets) and to map what they perceive as a “healthy” media diet. Drawing on a news repertoire approach, our second aim is to find patterns of news consumption within the current media environment and discuss how they might affect various aspects related to democracy.

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Jackson, J. (2019). You Are What You Read: Why changing your media diet can change the world. Unbound Publishing. Lee, H., & Yang, J. (2014). Political knowledge gaps among news consumers with different news media repertoires across multiple platforms. International Journal of Communication, 8, 597– 617. Lee, S. K., Lindsey, N. J., & Kim, K. S. (2017). The effects of news consumption via social media and news information overload on perceptions of journalistic norms and practices. Computers in Human Behavior, 75, 254–263. Li, C. Y. (2017). Why do online consumers experience information overload? An extension of communication theory. Journal of Information Science, 43(6), 835–851. Lindell, J. (2018). Distinction recapped: Digital news repertoires in the class structure. New Media & Society, 20(8), 3029–3049. Mangold, F., & Bachl, M. (2018). New news media, new opinion leaders? How political opinion leaders navigate the modern high-choice media environment. Journal of Communication, 68(5), 896–919. Matthes, J., Nanz, A., Stubenvoll, M., & Heiss, R. (2020). Processing news on social media. The political incidental news exposure model (PINE). Journalism, 21(8), 1031–1048. Mazzoleni, G., & Schulz, W. (1999). “Mediatization” of politics: A challenge for democracy?. Political Communication, 16(3), 247–261. Morris, J. S., & Forgette, R. (2007). News grazers, television news, political knowledge, and engagement. The International Journal of Press/Politics, 12(1), 91–107. Mosca, L., & Quaranta, M. (2017). Comparing News Diets, Electoral Choices and EU Attitudes in Germany, Italy and the UK in the 2014 European Parliament Election. In M. Caiani & S. Guerra. (Eds.) Euroscepticism, Democracy and the Media. Palgrave Studies in European Political Sociology. Palgrave Macmillan. Mourão, R. R., Thorson, E., Chen, W., & Tham, S. M. (2018). Media repertoires and news trust during the early Trump administration. Journalism Studies, 19(13), 1945–1956. Munger, K., Luca, M., Nagler, J., & Tucker, J. (2020). The (null) effects of clickbait headlines on polarization, trust, and learning. Public Opinion Quarterly, 84(1), 49–73. Nielsen, R. K., Cornia, A., & Kalogeropoulos, A. (2016). Challenges and opportunities for news media and journalism in an increasingly digital, mobile, and social media environment. https:// ssrn.com/abstract=2879383 Oh, H. J., Lor, Z., & Choi, J. (2021). News repertoires and political information efficacy: Focusing on the mediating role of perceived news overload. SAGE Open, 11(1), 2158244020988685. Panek, E. (2016). High-choice revisited: An experimental analysis of the dynamics of news selection behavior in high-choice media environments. Journalism & Mass Communication Quarterly, 93(4), 836–856. Park, C. S. (2019). Does too much news on social media discourage news seeking? Mediating role of news efficacy between perceived news overload and news avoidance on social media. Social Media+ Society, 5(3), 2056305119872956. Prior, M. (2005). News vs. entertainment: How increasing media choice widens gaps in political knowledge and turnout. American Journal of Political Science, 49(3), 577–592. Prior, M. (2007). Post-broadcast democracy: How media choice increases inequality in political involvement and polarizes elections. Cambridge University Press. Reagan, J., Pinkleton, B., Chen, C., & Aaronson, D. (1995). How do technologies relate to the repertoire of information sources? Telematics and Informatics, 12, 21–27. Schudson, M. (1998). The good citizen: A history of American civic life. Free Press. Stroud, N. J. (2008). Media use and political predispositions: Revisiting the concept of selective exposure. Political Behavior, 30(3), 341–366. Stroud, N. J. (2011). Niche news: The politics of news choice. Oxford University Press on Demand. Strömbäck, J., Boomgaarden, H., Broda, E., Damstra, A., Lindgren, E., Tsfati, Y., & Vliegenthart, R. (2022). From low-choice to high-choice media environments: Implications for knowledge resistance. In J. Strömbäck, Å. Wikforss, K. Glüer, T. Lindholm, & H. Oscarsson (Eds.), Knowledge resistance in high-choice information environments (pp. 49–68). Routledge.

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Chapter 6

News Media Consumption and Key Covariates: Media-Related and Socio-Demographic Factors Influencing Media Diets

6.1 Setting the Context There seems to be a consensus among researchers that the media do play an important role in providing political and public affairs information to citizens and, thus, in making democracy work (Aalberg & Curran 2012; Strömbäck 2008). However, the media’s role has been highly debated especially within the current high-choice media environment, mainly because of the significant challenges nowadays media environments are facing (Andersen et al. 2021; Djerf-Pierre & Shehata 2017; Shehata & Strömbäck 2021). News avoidance, selective exposure, incidental news exposure, high probability of encountering only similar views and getting trapped in echo chambers, decreasing levels of trust in media sources and digital disinformation are just a few of the changes and challenges associated with technological advancement and increasingly high use of digital media platforms. All these profoundly influence people’s news consumption habits. For example, people’s tendency to avoid news, to selectively expose themselves to certain news or to prefer information that is in line with their pre-existing beliefs might leave citizens less informed and even uninformed. Furthermore, exposure to so-called fake news and other forms of misleading content might leave citizens misinformed. In such a context, it becomes important to analyse if and how such media-related phenomena influence people’s news consumption habits. Besides the above-mentioned factors that are related to media use, people’s news consumption patterns are also influenced by a series of socio-demographic factors. Gender, age and education do play a significant role in this respect (Esser & Steppat 2017; Karlsen et al. 2020). For example, studies report gender gaps in news consumption; women in some countries are less likely to watch TV news, read print newspapers and read news on the Internet than their male counterparts (Cohen 2013). Age gaps in news consumption are also frequent. For instance, Cohen (2013) reports that older people tend to consume more traditional mass media (television © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Buturoiu et al., Patterns of News Consumption in a High-Choice Media Environment, Springer Studies in Media and Political Communication, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41954-6_6

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and print newspapers), whereas younger people prefer online news. In terms of education, studies suggest that it could influence news consumption patterns. For example, some studies report a negative relationship between education and TV use in general (i.e. people with higher levels of education tend to use TV less compared with their less educated counterparts) (e.g. Aalberg et al. 2013; Shehata and Strömbäck 2011). Furthermore, highly educated people seem to be more attracted to spending time-consuming news in digital formats (Cohen 2013). Against this background, this chapter examines both media-related changes and challenges the current media environments are facing and the most relevant sociodemographic variables that could influence news consumption patterns today. We decided to take into account not only media-related factors but also individualrelated ones (e.g. gender, age and education), as studies so far have demonstrated their potential influence on news media consumption patterns (e.g. Esser & Steppat 2017; Karlsen et al. 2020). Against this backdrop, in the first part of this chapter, we critically review the available literature regarding news avoidance, selective exposure to news, incidental news exposure, echo chambers and trust in media sources in an attempt to shed more light on the current changes and trends that are to be found within rich media environments and that, in turn, might influence people’s media diets. Because of the high prevalence of digital disorders (including different forms of mis- and disinformation) and taking into account their potential negative effects, we decided to dedicate a separate chapter to them (see this chapter). In the second part of this chapter, we describe three of the most important sociodemographic variables that might explain some variance in news consumption patterns. The choice for these particular variables is also motivated by the fact that the research studies we have conducted are focused on how both media-related and socio-demographic factors are linked to the research studies we have conducted (see Chaps. 7 and 8).

6.2 News Avoidance News avoidance is among the most discussed issues with regard to the current media environment. It is considered an important problem for both the news industry and democracies at large, mainly because news companies are losing their consumers and democracies are losing informed foundation and, thus, risk entering an era of rather disengaged citizenry (Skovsgaard & Andersen 2020). However, despite the fact that the phenomenon of news avoidance has attracted considerable interest, it is challenged by conceptual ambiguity. As most studies do not offer a common definition of news avoidance, while the concept is operationalised in a number of different ways, there are many significant differences in the proportion of news avoiders in different cross-country studies (from 11 to 73 per cent). Furthermore, the main causes associated with the emergence of this phenomenon are not always clearly stated, which might lead to inconsistent solutions to prevent this large-scale phenomenon (Skovsgaard & Andersen 2020).

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Skovsgaard and Andersen (2020) offer an accurate and well-documented picture of different conceptualisations and operationalisations of news avoidance in an attempt to shed more light on the main types, causes and consequences associated with this widespread phenomenon. They start from the idea that, within the current media environment, where plenty of news is available 24/7, it is a paradox that people are increasingly turning their backs on the news. Specifically, several recent studies have documented important numbers of people who consume no or just limited amounts of news and labelled them “news avoiders”, “minimalists”, “nonusers” or “intermittents” (e.g. Bos et al. 2016; Castro et al. 2022; Strömbäck 2017; Strömbäck et al. 2018; Trilling & Schönbach 2013; Wolfsfeld et al. 2016). The same authors point to the discrepancies in the proportions of news avoiders. For example, based on a South Korean sample, Lee and Yang (2014) reported 73% of respondents as news avoiders, while a Swedish study labelled 15% of news users as news avoiders (Strömbäck et al. 2013), and a Dutch study found 11% of news avoiders (Trilling & Schönbach 2013). Other more recent studies reported proportions in between these extremes (e.g. Castro et al. 2022; Bos et al. 2016). Skovsgaard and Andersen (2020) suggest that such discrepancies might be attributed, at least to a certain extent, to various conceptualisations and operationalisations of news avoidance. In such a context, they put forward a thorough analysis of the phenomenon. Their analysis is based on the distinction between intentional and unintentional news avoidance (also see Damstra et al. 2021). Intentional news avoidance is defined as people’s tendency to avoid including certain genres in their individual media diet. This type of antipathy towards the news explains intentional news avoidance. Some possible reasons that could explain people’s tendency to avoid the news are too much negativity in the news, the news cannot be trusted and there is too much news available around the clock. First, news is sometimes focused exclusively on negative or conflictual issues and, therefore, is regarded as “very depressing”; hence, people are inclined to intentionally avoid it (Schrøder and Østen 2016). Another reason explaining intentional news avoidance is attributed to the lack of trust in the news. People tend to perceive that some news media sources are biased and/or ideologically driven, and thus, they do not know whether they can trust the news media or not (Newman & Fletcher 2017; Schrøder & Østen 2016). Consequently, if people develop a sceptical attitude towards the media and have lower levels of trust in news media, it is highly possible that people avoid news media use (also see Tsfati & Cappella (2003)). Furthermore, information overload or exposure to too much news might be another reason why people tend to avoid the news. When exposed to huge amounts of news, people try to find coping mechanisms, and one of them is to actively avoid the news altogether. Unintentional news avoidance is based on people’s relative preference for news compared with other types of media content. This implies that the preference for news is not necessarily low; instead, the preference for other media genres is stronger. In other terms, it is important here to consider the context of choices. As suggested by Skovsgaard and Andersen (2020), when the context favours easy access to an individual’s strongest preference, then the other, oftentimes weaker preferences are less likely to be met. Specifically, the authors refer to the

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current high-choice media environment, in which the supply side of information is increasing and, consequently, people can find more easily the media content they prefer and in which there is a stronger preference for entertainment-related content. In such a context, people will more easily seek out entertainment-related content not only because of a personal preference but also because it takes less effort to constantly find entertainment content. Another factor explaining unintentional news avoidance is related to digital algorithms (Thorson et al. 2021). Often based on users’ prior digital behaviour measured in clicks and other forms of online engagement such as comments, likes and shares, digital algorithms make decisions and curate digital content for users, for example, by exposing them to entertainmentrelated content rather than news stories. Last but not least, unintentional exposure to news in high-choice media environments can lead some people to believe that, irrespective of their media consumption patterns, news will find them. This “newsfinds-me” perception is described as the “belief that one can be well informed without having to actively seek for and follow news”, mainly because one can get the news indirectly via various channels, including Internet use, peers and social networking sites (Goyanes et al. 2023, pp. 5–6). More recent studies suggest that the form of news avoidance that is most concerning is not intentional news avoidance but, instead, the one based on gaps in actual exposure to news (Palmer & Toff 2022), oftentimes attributed reasons related to escaping emotionally unsettling news (YtreArne & Moe 2021). Besides different conceptualisations and operationalisations of news avoidance, researchers point to the fact that the current, high-choice media environment enables news avoidance (Edgerly 2022; Karlsen et al. 2020). Starting from the definition of news as “information about current events, which can be consumed by audiences in a variety of media spaces, that facilitates civic and political engagement” (Edgerly 2022, p. 1830), the author analyses factors related to extremely low levels of news consumption in contemporary media environment (for an overview of TV news avoidance, see Van den Bulck 2006). Based on a representative US sample, one main conclusion of this study is that individuals tend to avoid news more and more, even though news options are more accessible and abundant in today’s media environment. The main factors explaining news avoidance are not related to demographics but, instead, to some other cognitive-related variables, such as disinterest in politics, perceptions of news lacking relevance, low news self-efficacy and a lack of knowledge about the news system. Specifically, interest in politics is highly predictive of the overall news consumption, in the sense that people that are more interested in politics are more likely to consider news to have greater value, compared with people less interested in politics. Furthermore, news relevance also plays an important role in explaining overall levels of news consumption, i.e. individuals who believe that news does not have an impact on their own lives tend to exhibit lower levels of news consumption. Another factor explaining low levels of news consumption is related to the lack of self-confidence in how to navigate the current media environment. Mainly because people are not confident in their ability to distinguish opinion from fact and act in such a way to verify and seek out credible information, they tend to avoid news altogether. Against this background,

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we can conclude that, while there is no single explanation for news avoidance, nor is there a single solution to diminish it. Possible approaches include “increasing the value of news, while reducing the cognitive costs of navigating today’s news environment” (Edgerly 2022, p. 1841). Motivations behind news avoidance practices were largely studied. For example, Aharoni et al. (2021) suggest three main dimensions of news avoidance motivations. The first dimension is linked to the attributes of news content, such as negativity, untrustworthiness and commercialised nature. The second refers to the technological issues related to news consumption, such as the inability to control live broadcasts and mobile push notifications. The third dimension refers to the ubiquitous exposure to news, facilitated through the use of digital media platforms that can, in turn, lead to a sense of overload, overuse and fear of addiction. As such, practices of news avoidance related to this dimension are mostly the result of a desire to reduce media consumption at large. In another study, Toff and Kalogeropoulos (2020) examine more than 67,000 survey respondents across 35 countries worldwide and analyse how factors including demographics, political attitudes and news genre preferences shape news avoidance across media environments. Findings from their study suggest that people’s news use practices depend not only on personal characteristics and preferences but also on the news available to them, as well as on some culturally specific norms. Respectively, they find out that among the most important individual-level predictors of active news avoidance are trust in news and media genre preferences. Beyond that, press freedom and political freedom and stability are negatively correlated with news avoidance, being, thus, among the most important contextual-level predictors of news avoidance. Being younger, female and left-winged and having lower levels of internal efficacy or trust in news strongly predict active news avoidance (for an overview of gender gaps in news avoidance, see Toff & Palmer 2019). In other words, this study shows that, while demographic characteristics, resources and political attitudes may have a decisive role in shaping people’s news consumption habits within countries, these habits are also influenced, in a consistent manner, by the amount and quality of news that is available at a certain point in time; these contextual-level characteristics, suggestively called “cultures of news consumption” (Toff & Kalogeropoulos 2020, p. 367), might have a major impact on how people perceive news sources – deficient or untrustworthy or vice versa. In another cross-country analysis based on semi-structured interviews with 488 individuals from Argentina, Finland, Israel, Japan and the United States, Villi et al. (2022, p. 154) reveal two drivers of intentional news avoidance. The first is related to a set of cognitive factors that mainly refer to a “repetition of high-profile news items, which in turn leads to a sense of overload”, while the second is related to a set of emotional drivers such as too much negativity and conflict. The first set of drivers for avoiding the news concerns the exposure to extensive coverage of certain topics and are oftentimes linked to “news inundation, overload, or fatigue” (Villi et al. 2022, p. 154). For example, perceptions of corruption and deceit by politicians are mentioned as a main reason for avoiding news in Argentina. By contrast, in Japan, news avoidance is linked to a rather habitual political apathy or cultural desire

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towards avoiding disagreement and controversy. In terms of emotional drivers of news avoidance, people point to high negativity of news, especially in the form of high coverage of car accidents, terror attacks and natural disasters. Exposure to such news elicits strong emotional reactions, varying from fear and despair to anger and disgust (Villi et al. 2022, p. 156). In this context, when exposed to such news, people tend to prevent the negative emotions associated with this content and, consequently, in some cases, to completely avoid it. These emotional drivers of news avoidance are sometimes referred to as a useful strategy to limit information overload or emotional drain (Ytre-Arne & Moe 2021). In other words, news avoidance could have positive outcomes in the sense that people tend to avoid the news in order to cope with hopelessness or feelings of compassion when human suffering is present. Emotional fatigue seems to be a rather common characteristic in a rich media environment, suggesting that some people might find “emotional relief in short breaks while maintaining engagement with news” (Ytre-Arne & Moe 2021, p. 5). This specific attitude towards the news was found as an important coping strategy during the extraordinary situation of the COVID-19 pandemic. While at the beginning of the pandemic, levels of news consumption were constantly high, afterwards, there was a significant increase in news avoidance (Kalogeropoulos et al. 2020). Recent studies focusing on news avoidance during the COVID-19 pandemic suggest a specific type of avoidance of news stories related to the pandemic. For example, Vandenplas et al. (2021) refer to the conscious avoidance of COVID19-related news in terms of “coronablocking”. They point to a news consumption behaviour that was first characterised by high news seeking (also see Vermeer et al. 2022) that preceded the rise in news avoidance practices. In other terms, they suggest that news avoidance “is part of an ebb and flow of news consumption”, in the sense that, at least for some users, news consumption in the early days of the pandemic led up to a “tipping point”, while afterwards their consumption of news “ebbed” away to such an extent that it turned into news avoidance. Because they were exposed to too much, often negative information (i.e. information overload and negativity of content), people tended to opt out of news. This phenomenon of low news consumption was termed by other researchers as “news fatigue”, defined as the “desire to consume less news in an effort to preserve and protect one’s mental health” (Fitzpatrick 2022, p. 145). Studies on news avoidance during the pandemic have found that news avoidance remains a widespread phenomenon, 10% higher compared with the period before the COVID-19 outbreak (Fletcher et al. 2020), and that some users have not returned to their previous levels of news consumption (Nguyen et al. 2021). Fletcher et al. (2020) discuss the most important reasons why people tend to avoid the news within the pandemic context. The most commonly given reason is that the news has a bad effect on people’s mood, followed by news overload (i.e. too much news that is available at the same time), lower levels of trust in the news and concerns about information utility (i.e. people do not feel like there is anything they can do with the information). Among the least mentioned reasons for news avoidance are a feeling

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that news is unimportant, a general lack of interest in the news and the fact that the news distracts people from other things. Besides the specific examples of news avoidance within the COVID-19 pandemic background, which is an extreme case context, we need to understand various forms of news avoidance as meaningful and inherently human rather than inherently problematic. In fact, we are all, at times, news avoiders (Ytre-Arne & Moe 2021). Nevertheless, while news avoidance is not always a problem, it should be treated with serious consideration mainly because it is strongly linked to (un)informed and (un)engaged citizenry. In this respect, based on the distinction between intentional and unintentional news avoidance, Skovsgaard and Andersen (2020) suggest that different forms of news avoidance require different solutions. For example, an efficient strategy that might reduce intentional news avoidance is offering news stories that are mostly fact-based, transparent and constructive, in an attempt to help people overcome their perceptions of news overload, negativity and untrustworthiness. This responsibility for changing patterns of news selection and presentation belongs to news media organisations and journalists. On the other hand, in order to reduce unintentional news avoidance, news should be made available at attractive time slots, while platforms (with the help of algorithms) might place news content in connection to entertainment content. In this way, the costs and efforts associated with exposure to news content will be lowered, while people will need increasing effort to avoid the news.

6.3 Selective Exposure In today’s media environment, mainly due to media fragmentation and polarisation, news users could be confronted with an abundant choice of media outlets, while some of them could have strong ideological leanings (Mummolo 2016; Steppat et al. 2021). Against such a background, people might choose to follow mostly those media outlets that are in line with their previous preferences and interests, thus keeping them away from any form of disagreement. As Steppat et al. (2021, p. 2) suggest, media polarisation and fragmentation at the aggregate level offer people the perfect ground to seek and expose themselves to information congruent with their prior beliefs or, in other words, to selective exposure at the individual level. Selective exposure is a debated concept, especially in contemporary studies (Arendt et al. 2019; Knobloch-Westerwick 2015; Knobloch-Westerwick & Hastall 2010; Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng 2009; Knobloch-Westerwick et al. 2005; Stroud 2008; Sude & Knobloch-Westerwick 2022). While this debate started early, when researchers noted that “the tendency of people to expose themselves to mass communications in accord with their existing opinions and interests and to avoid unsympathetic material, has been widely demonstrated” (Klapper 1960, pp. 19–20), the debate still persists. In this respect, Zaller (1992) challenges previous studies, suggesting that selective exposure is not a widespread phenomenon. Instead, he claims that most media users “are simply not so rigid in their information-seeking

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behaviour that they will expose themselves only to ideas that they find congenial. To the extent selective exposure occurs at all, it appears to do so under special conditions that do not typically arise in situations of mass persuasion” (p. 139). On the other hand, Jonas et al. (2005) claim that, when searching for new information, people tend to be biased to follow the information that is in line with their previously held beliefs, thus suggesting high levels of selective exposure. While conclusions about selective exposure are mixed, implications of partisan selective exposure need attention. In terms of implications, if partisan selective exposure is widespread, people may develop more polarised attitudes in the direction of their already-held predispositions and, thus, different perceptions about the world. More broadly, partisan selective exposure could limit the possible effects of governmental policies aimed at satisfying people’s needs (Stroud 2008). Thus, selective exposure to news and information should be carefully considered because higher levels of selective exposure are oftentimes associated with higher probability of being trapped in echo chambers (Cinelli et al. 2020, 2021) and, thus, in the impossibility of being accurately informed. Stroud (2017) offers an overview of five possible reasons behind selective exposure (i.e. why people might be inclined to follow congenial messages and information that are in line with their prior preferences). First, selective exposure might be explained with reference to cognitive dissonance in the sense that people tend to selectively expose themselves to congruent information to reduce a possible dissonant state that might occur when exposed to new information. Second, selective exposure might be linked to the fact that people tend to seek supportive information, which might be easily approached by following congenial information. Third, selective exposure might be explained if we consider the fact that congenial information requires substantially less effort than uncongenial information; thus, people tend to engage in selective exposure because they find it easier. Fourth, selective exposure is more likely to occur in information contexts dominated by negative moods and emotions. For example, it was found that anger and fear affect selective exposure (Kim 2010). A fifth explanation for selective exposure is related to the fact that people tend to evaluate the quality of information to which they are exposed. In turn, quality judgements might be influenced by people’s prior beliefs; thus, selective exposure might occur because people believe that congenial information is of higher quality and more trustworthy compared with uncongenial information (Metzger et al. 2020). In a more recent piece of research, Mukerjee and Yang (2021) point to the importance of cognitive dissonance and information utility as the main reasons explaining selective exposure. Specifically, they suggest that the first is mostly related to the fact that people are motivated to seek out information to defend their attitudes and behaviours while avoiding that information that challenges their prior beliefs and has the potential to produce cognitive dissonance. Furthermore, selective exposure might occur because of an accuracy motivation in the sense that people might seek to expose themselves to the information perceived as high quality, as trustworthy and as helpful in making informed decisions.

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Stroud (2017) reviews four types of selective exposure, mainly based on the reasons motivating exposure. Accordingly, there are (1) the selection of news over entertainment, (2) the selection of messages, (3) the preference for a certain medium/source and (4) the selection of congruent messages. On the other hand, taking into account other aspects related to exposure, there is mediated versus interpersonal selective exposure. In this context, Mutz (2001) suggested that people have been exposed to a diversity of viewpoints through media use rather than through interpersonal interactions. Nevertheless, the authors anticipated that in a rich media environment, where media choices are numerous, people might be less likely exposed to diverse content. Other categorisations of selective exposure are based on whether people make a one-time selection (which involves low levels of commitment) or habitually return to a news source to find information for a series of topics (which, of course, involves greater commitment). In terms of variables influencing different degrees of selective exposure, Stroud (2017) differentiates between two types of moderators: individual versus environmental. First, there are some individual-level factors that might enhance selective exposure. Among them, there is the certainty with which an individual holds a position, political knowledge and mortality salience (i.e. people’s tendency to think about their deaths). Second, there are some individual-level variables that might reduce selective exposure such as defensive confidence and need for cognition. On the other hand, environmental-related factors such as information utility or being exposed to many choices are thought to influence selective exposure. Specifically, information that is perceived as useful might be preferred whether it is congenial or not, whereas when given more options, people tend to consider their preferences and select those options that best fit their prior preferences. Furthermore, being part of a homogenous group is expected to enhance selective exposure. In the contemporary high-choice media environment, selective exposure might be even more pronounced because news media consumers nowadays have greater control over both sources and content to which they are exposed (Metzger et al. 2020). Even before the widespread adoption of the Internet, modern technologies and, implicitly, digital media platforms, some researchers manifested their concerns about the potentially harmful effects associated with selective exposure in a democratic context (e.g. Masip et al. 2018; Sunstein 2001). Increased levels of news selectivity might be associated with a consistent reduction in political and ideological differences which, in turn, might lead to more and more fragmented audiences (Messing & Westwood 2014). In this context, such fragmentation could lead to a society based on small groups of like-minded individuals that are more concerned about their own immediate needs rather than societal demands, thus contributing to the construction of an “atomised audience” (Masip et al. 2018, p. 303). The same idea is shared by other studies that point to the fact that technology may exacerbate selective exposure in the current media environment through two mechanisms: choice (voluntary exposure) and algorithmic filtering (involuntary exposure) (Cardenal et al. 2019; Dubois & Blank 2018). Specifically, if we start from the assumption that individuals tend to prefer like-minded information and that

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the high-choice media environment offers people the opportunity to choose both the sources and the content they expose themselves to, then people are more likely to expose to those sources and information that best match their prior preferences. In other terms, when given the opportunity to choose, selective exposure might be the outcome of voluntary action (Cardenal et al. 2019, p. 467). On the other hand, in some cases, digital algorithms might curate the information flow, and, thus, information might be selected automatically, without direct control from individuals. Even though algorithms are usually expected to function based on people’s past choices and tastes, they are thought “to be conducive to selective exposure from involuntary action and without users’ consent” (Cardenal et al. 2019, p. 467; Zuiderveen Borgesius et al. 2016). As Cardenal et al. (2019) suggest, involuntary selective exposure, oftentimes resulting from algorithmic filtering, is largely known in the literature as the filter bubble argument (Dubois & Blank 2018; Pariser 2011). Other studies that looked into the way selective exposure shapes people’s news media diets (e.g. Cinelli et al. 2020) found evidence that “the mechanism of selective exposure, together with users’ limits to attention, strongly affects the way users select and consume news” (p. 11). Specifically, findings from their study suggest that the segregation of users in echo chambers could be linked to users’ activity on social media and that selective exposure, defined as people’s tendency to consume information consistent with their prior preferences, could be a “major driver in their consumption patterns” (Cinelli et al. 2020, p. 1). In conclusion, despite various definitions, conceptualisations and motivations, one should take into account that selective exposure tends to be a widespread phenomenon in today’s media environment and can have significant effects. Broadly speaking, its main implications for democracy are related to “informed citizenry” (Brown 1997). Selective exposure is oftentimes associated with the development of even more polarised attitudes in the direction of their already-held predispositions and, thus, in a higher probability of being exposed to one-sided information and being trapped in echo chambers.

6.4 Incidental News Exposure News exposure and newsgathering have been regarded as a purposeful, directed activity (Tewksbury et al. 2001). Engaging in various forms of traditional media consumption, such as reading newspapers, listening to the radio or watching television programs, is normally the result of conscious choices users make for themselves. For example, someone can easily turn on or off the television without coming across news stories by accident. Nevertheless, things have changed with regard to Internet-based media sources. Such sources can provide people with a large number of information choices that, most of the time, extend beyond what they actually seek. Specifically, people nowadays might encounter various news and information accidentally, without actively seeking them. This type of encounter

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is called incidental exposure and “may be an important contemporary avenue for citizen acquisition of current affairs information” (Tewksbury et al. 2001, p. 534). While many recent studies discuss the prevalence of incidental news exposure in the context of online media platforms (e.g. Borah et al. 2022; Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2021; Park & Kaye 2020), some ideas behind this phenomenon are not new at all. For example, Downs (1957, p. 223) referred to the fact that newsgathering is generally based on two different mechanisms: “sought-for data” or actively collected data and “accidental data” or passively acquired data (also see Karnowski et al. 2017). The same idea is shared by Tewksbury et al. (2001), who suggested that the newsgathering process can be either purposive or non-purposive. While purposive newsgathering refers to the fact that people consciously seek and consume news and information, non-purposive newsgathering implies that media users might be accidentally exposed to news and information. Thus, studies of incidental news exposure are not limited to social media, but, instead, the phenomenon has been studied also with reference to other media, such as print and broadcast (Borah et al. 2022; Mitchelstein et al. 2020). Matthes et al. (2020) refer to three underlying assumptions behind the phenomenon of incidental exposure. First, there is the assumption that news exposure might be either intentional or incidental. While exposure to content is considered intentional if the recipient had the goal to encounter that specific content, incidental exposure is characterised by the lack of a goal to be exposed to that specific content. Second, there is the assumption that people can experience incidental news exposure when they use the media for other purposes, such as entertainment. Third, there is the assumption that incidental news exposure might be operationalised as encountering or coming across news accidentally while not seeking out for news. This typical operationalisation of incidental news exposure might be problematic in the sense that it relies on people’s understanding of these terms while not clearly stating whether people who report being incidentally exposed to news really consumed the news or indicated they just encountered them. In an attempt to shed more light on this rather controversial phenomenon significantly influencing patterns of news media consumption, studies have examined both antecedents (e.g. Ahmadi & Wohn 2018) and consequences (e.g. Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2021; Kim et al. 2013) of the phenomenon. For example, Ahmadi and Wohn (2018) suggest that both personality traits (e.g. openness to new experiences) and technological-related issues (e.g. recommendation algorithms) might facilitate incidental news exposure. Specifically, people might be more prone to be accidentally exposed to news, on the one hand, if they have the personality conditions to be more open to new experiences and, on the other, if social media platforms, by means of recommendation algorithms, highlight specific news content within their news feed. While some studies (Ahmadi & Wohn 2018) point out that users’ behaviour (e.g. frequent clicking on news related linked on social media) might lead to incidental news exposure, others (Goyanes 2020) suggest that users who trust social media are more likely to stumble upon news in this way. Other recent studies (e.g. Weeks & Lane 2020) point to the fact that there is an entire set of possible antecedents that might explain incidental news exposure, especially in today’s media environment.

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Specifically, Weeks and Lane (2020) claim that demographic, cognitive, attitudinal and perceptual characteristics of each individual might shape their motivation to seek news and, consequently, might determine whether news are encountered incidentally or not. In this respect, the authors identify two distinct types of incidental exposure: state unmotivated exposure and trait unmotivated exposure. First, state unmotivated exposure occurs if an individual encounters news when using digital media for a non-news purpose, such as sending an email or scrolling through the photos of their online friends (also see Valeriani & Vaccari 2016; Weeks et al. 2017). This type of incidental exposure can be experienced by avid news consumers who are typically very interested in seeking news but may also stumble upon news while being online for entertainment or socialising purposes. Second, trait unmotivated exposure occurs if an individual encounters news in digital media even though they are unmotivated to seek news. This type of incidental news exposure mainly occurs among politically disinterested or apathetic individuals who generally do not visit news websites or prefer entertainment-related content. In other terms, trait unmotivated exposure can be experienced by those people who rarely or never actively seek news but are exposed to news items when going online for other purposes (Kobayashi et al. 2020). In terms of consequences, studies point to either positive or negative effects associated with incidental news exposure (Borah et al. 2022). A significant number of studies (e.g. Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2021; Lee & Kim 2017; Kim et al. 2013; Valeriani & Vaccari 2016) make reference to the positive consequences of incidental news exposure. For example, Kim et al. (2013) found evidence that incidental news exposure in the online media environment is positively related to political participation (i.e. those individuals incidentally exposed to news exhibited higher levels of both online and offline political participation). In other words, the online media environment offers increased opportunities for unintentional exposure to news, thus enabling people to be exposed to a greater number of stories about public affairs, including mobilising information. This, in turn, can have important effects in terms of participatory citizenship, in the sense that incidental news exposure might increase people’s levels of engagement in activities concerning public affairs and politics. Other studies have also shown that incidental news exposure is associated with increased information seeking, political learning and news engagement (Lee & Kim 2017; Yamamoto & Morey 2019). On the other hand, there are studies pointing to the negative or null effects of incidental news exposure (e.g. Feezell & Ortiz 2021; Oeldorf-Hirsch 2018). Nevertheless, while conclusions regarding the consequences associated with incidental news exposure are mixed, most research points that people are significantly impacted when they accidentally stumble upon news (Borah et al. 2022). This type of incidental news exposure and its associated consequences have been investigated mostly with regard to the social media environment (e.g. Boczkowski et al. 2018; Park & Kaye 2020; Strauß et al. 2020; Weeks & Lane 2020; Yamamoto & Morey 2019). Even though there might be a significant number of users that engages in both incidental and intentional news consumption on social media and quite often within the same day (Boczkowski et al. 2018, p. 3534; Mitchelstein

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et al. 2020), there is evidence that digital technologies and platforms offer citizens even more opportunities to encounter news in an incidental way “as a by-product of their online activities or just through serendipitous inadvertent exposure, changing their media practices and affecting their knowledge of public affairs and politics” (Goyanes & Demeter 2022, pp. 761–762). Opportunities for incidental news exposure have significantly grown with the high use of social media (Park & Kaye 2020). Because of convenient tools, such as “share” or “like” buttons, social media facilitate the dissemination of news content among users, oftentimes increasing the possibility of incidental exposure (Bergström & Jervelycke Belfrage 2018). On social media platforms, there are several ways in which users might incidentally encounter news (Park & Kaye 2020). Even in moments when they are seeking entertainment content, social media users might, for example, come across user-generated news content containing a link to the original news story or see a news headline or a few sequences of a video. At the same time, incidental news exposure is a frequent phenomenon on social media platforms due to user interactions; incidental exposure is facilitated by peers and friends by means of online engagement (likes, comments and shares). Other mechanisms through which people might become incidentally exposed to news on social media are related to algorithmic curation; some news stories are recommended by digital algorithms and included in users’ feeds mainly based on their prior interactions with the content on the platform (Thorson 2020; Vergara et al. 2021). In short, on social media platforms, users are likely to be exposed to news they do not seek, with which they do not agree or in which they might not be interested. In other terms, incidental exposure to news on social media is not an isolated phenomenon, but, instead, it has moved “from the periphery to the center of the contemporary repertoire of online information practices” (Boczkowski et al. 2018, p. 3524). Against such a background, pointing to the fact that incidental news exposure might be a widespread phenomenon in the digital media environment, Park and Kaye (2020) suggest a series of consequences associated with incidental news exposure on social media. First, the authors find evidence of the negative impact of incidental exposure on traditional and online news consumption; the more often social media users incidentally come across news, the less likely they are to seek news from traditional and online media outlets. This is generally in line with the news consumption trends confirming people’s preference to use social media for news instead of traditional mass media (Gottfried 2020). Another explanation for this negative association between incidental exposure and news consumption via traditional and online media relates to news efficacy. Individuals scoring low on news efficacy (i.e. self-perception of one’s capacity to understand current issues related to news) might be more prone to rely on incidental news because they do not trust their own capacity to find and understand what they encounter in social media. At the same time, Park and Kaye (2020) also suggest that personal characteristics are critical for news seeking and, thus, for the likelihood of being incidentally exposed to news on social media. Education, income, political interest, internal political

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efficacy and political talk are positively correlated with news consumption and, in turn, with incidental exposure. These studies show different consequences associated with incidental exposure within the current media environment. Some of them are related to news consumption habits, in the sense that incidental exposure might significantly influence the way people consume news today and, therefore, their knowledge about what is going on at a certain point in time. Thus, incidental news exposure, especially via social media, should be considered an important factor in explaining different patterns of news consumption within the current, high-choice media environment (Kümpel 2019).

6.5 Echo Chambers In online media environments, people have an almost infinitely wide choice of what information to consume or engage with. Unlike their offline counterparts (e.g. limited numbers of newspapers or television programs, geographically constrained circles of social contacts), online environments facilitate, among other things, the emergence of echo chambers – i.e. online spaces that enable a variety of subgroups to function along ideologically driven lines, in which people engage in discussions only with those with whom they are already in agreement (Bright 2018). Even though people’s tendency to group in echo chambers is mostly related to the dramatic technological changes within the media environment in the past few decades, environments and behaviour that facilitate echo chambers are not new at all (Levy & Razin 2019). The emergence of echo chambers is often linked to people’s general tendency to segregate – both online and offline. Before going more in-depth into the literature on echo chambers, we have to acknowledge the fact that the concept of echo chambers is oftentimes associated with the concept of filter bubbles and their relationship is subject to an ongoing academic debate (Rhodes 2022). Being frequently operationalised as ideological bubbles (Möller 2021), these two concepts are “potent metaphors that encapsulate widespread public fear that the use of social media may limit the information that users encounter or consume online” (Kitchens et al. 2020, p. 1619). The first voice warning of the dangers associated with echo chambers belongs to Sunstein (2001, 2002, 2018), who noted that “widespread error and social fragmentation are likely to result when like-minded people, insulated from others, move in extreme directions simply because of limited argument pools and parochial influences” (Sunstein 2002, p. 186). On the other hand, the primary voice referring to the potential emergence of filter bubbles belongs to Pariser (2011), who predicted that individualised personalisation enabled through algorithmic filtering would lead to intellectual isolation and social fragmentation. Both metaphors share two constituent characteristics (Kitchens et al. 2020). One is related to a lack of information diversity due to the restriction of information sources. While in echo chambers, individuals are exposed only to information from

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like-minded individuals that confirms their pre-existing beliefs (Bakshy et al. 2015; Shore et al. 2018), filter bubbles are a “unique universe of information for each of us” (Pariser 2011, p. 9), where individuals only see information they agree with (Lazer 2015). The other is related to the fact that both concepts share the ideas of ideological segregation (i.e. people’s tendency to associate with others who share their viewpoints) and partisan polarisation (i.e. the adoption of extreme views). While echo chambers are associated with the idea of fragmentation of users into ideologically narrow groups (Shore et al. 2018), with political fragmentation and social polarisation (Garrett 2009) and with segregation by interest or opinion [that] will . . . increase political polarisation (Dubois & Blank 2018, pp. 1–2), filter bubbles are a “centrifugal force pulling us apart” (Pariser 2011, p. 10), in which algorithms work in the direction of amplifying ideological segregation (Flaxman et al. 2016). Nevertheless, besides the things they have in common, it is important to acknowledge the difference between the two terms. An echo chamber is a form of virtual bubble in which people could, in some instances, choose to live (i.e. it is not necessarily their choice, but it could be). On the other hand, a filter bubble is primarily a form of virtual space in which people are exposed to personalised content without any active choice on their part (i.e. this is a possible outcome of specific aspects of how information is distributed online) (Ross Arguedas et al. 2022). With specific reference to echo chambers, Terren and Borge-Bravo (2021) offer a comprehensive overview of the literature on echo chambers on social media (they analysed a total of 55 studies). According to the authors, the key assumption behind the idea of echo chambers is that social media users tend to engage with likeminded others and ideologically driven content, thus avoiding conflicting ideas. This process is thought to be even more prominent because of algorithmic curation based on users’ previous activity on the platform (i.e. filter bubbles), thus limiting the diversity of viewpoints and content users might be exposed to at a certain point in time. As a result, while excluding diversity of viewpoints, users become more segregated and polarised. Against this background, echo chambers are situations or spaces where pre-existing beliefs are permanently repeated and, thus, reinforced. In such virtual spaces, users mostly communicate with like-minded others, and this tendency is oftentimes attributed to homophily (i.e. preference to interact and associate with similar others), selective exposure (i.e. preference to consume ideologically aligned information) and confirmation bias (i.e. preference to engage with information in line with one’s own beliefs). All these possible drivers that might explain why people tend to find “shelter” in echo chambers on social media are, in turn, linked to their willingness to avoid a state of cognitive dissonance or contradictory situations. Similar mechanisms hold true for the emergence of filter bubbles. While the concepts of echo chambers and filter bubbles are sometimes used interchangeably, there is a clear distinction in the situation they depict (Terren & Borge-Bravo 2021). Specifically, unlike echo chambers, filter bubbles are usually associated with the idea that social media users are usually exposed to ideologically aligned content, mainly due to algorithmic curation based on users’ previous online

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behaviour. Nguyen (2020) suggests a clear differentiation between the two concepts. Accordingly, while an epistemic or filter bubble is a structure in which other relevant voices have been left out, perhaps accidentally, an echo chamber is a structure from which other relevant voices have been actively excluded and discredited. While being rather difficult to be conceptualised and operationalised, the concept of echo chamber on social media has been largely studied (e.g. Auxier & Vitak 2019; Cinelli et al. 2021; Ross Arguedas et al. 2022). There seem to be three different categories of studies. Some found clear evidence of echo chambers on social media, and others found that echo chambers are likely to emerge on social media but under certain conditions, while a third category of studies found no evidence of echo chambers on social media (Terren & Borge-Bravo 2021). Almost half of the analysed studies point to the existence of echo chambers on social media, suggesting that users’ activity on social media is oftentimes based on homophily and takes place in closed communities of like-minded people. Such communities of like-minded people are more likely to occur when controversial topics are discussed; conflicting or controversial narratives have greater potential to lead to the segregation of users into homogenous echo chambers (Bessi et al. 2016; Zollo et al. 2017). On the other hand, close to half of the studies included in Terren and Borge-Bravo’ (2021) sample generated mixed findings in the sense that they suggest that echo chambers are likely to occur on social media but under certain conditions (Flaxman et al. 2016). For example, Barberá et al. (2015) found evidence of echo chambers on social media, but mostly around political topics or controversial issues (Garimella et al. 2018), while Bright (2018) found evidence of echo chambers in the case of groups that are segregated on ideologically driven issues. The third category of studies (5 out of 55) included in Terren and Borge-Bravo’ (2021) review found no evidence of echo chambers on social media. In this context, the study of Dubois and Blank (2018) is representative. Results from their study, based on a survey conducted in the United Kingdom, show that social media users tend to check multiple sources while being online, trying to confirm online information using external sources of information. Another representative study (Semaan et al. 2014) that did not find evidence for the emergence of echo chambers on social media suggests that social media enable users to get access to heterogeneous viewpoints, thus facilitating discussion and deliberation. In other words, such studies point to the fact that social media use enables users to access various points of view, therefore “lessening concerns about social media echo chambers” (Terren & Borge-Bravo 2021, p. 111). One prominent approach to the idea that the concept of echo chambers on social media is overstated belongs to Dubois and Blank (2018). Their research points to the fact that the Internet creates a high-choice media environment where individuals might be exposed to a diverse array of media content and sources. In this respect, people can form different media repertoires. These repertoires can differ in terms of how many media are included, which media and how people choose to combine them. Thus, the main differences in a person’s media repertoire might account for what researchers defined as media diversity. Against this background, Dubois and Blank (2018) expect that the greater the number of media sources and content people are exposed to, the greater the opportunity for people to encounter different

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viewpoints. Therefore, they refer to three main reasons why it is less likely for people to get trapped in echo chambers on social media. First, even people with strong partisan affiliations report using both general and niche news sites, thus having a rather diverse media diet, including both non-partisan and general issues and partisan and specific issues. Second, on social media, there is a high probability of being incidentally exposed to news, which, in turn, means that people might encounter various viewpoints, whether they are interested or not in them. Third, not all media are used for the same purpose and content; thus, it is expected that an increase in media diversity leads to an increase in content diversity. For example, while an individual might receive primarily left-leaning content on Twitter, they may also be incidentally exposed to right-leaning content shared by a family member on Facebook, or they might hear a television debate between representatives of both left- and right-leaning sides. In other words, the authors put forward the assumption that the emergence of echo chambers on social media largely depends on the diversity of media diet in the sense that the more diverse the media diet of an individual, the less likely they are to be trapped in a social media echo chamber. Their assumption was confirmed; a diverse media diet is, therefore, a step towards exposure to diverse information and perspectives. Individuals might either actively expose themselves to new sources and information by checking multiple points of view, or they might passively encounter information they disagree with. The more diverse the media diet of an individual, the lower the likelihood of being in an echo chamber. In another recent study, Geiß et al. (2021) suggest that echo chambers still lack a clear definition as a concept of media effects and that many studies use the concept of echo chambers to conceptualise other media-related phenomena such as selective exposure, cognitive dissonance or political polarisation (also see Dahlgren 2020). Accordingly, they state that, in some cases, the metaphor related to the emergence of echo chambers is an oversimplification and that reality is much more nuanced. Furthermore, in line with the study put forward by Dubois and Blank (2018), Geiß et al. (2021) advance the idea that the likelihood of echo chambers emerging is high only when certain conditions are met: networks are homogenous, topics are controversial, and political predispositions are strong. In other words, one cannot say that media users are trapped in echo chambers unless they carefully consider both individual-level and contextual-level conditions that might explain the emergence of such online spaces. Nevertheless, if echo chambers met the conditions to emerge, then opinion expression is expected to be stronger inside them due to three main reasons: the in-group attitude strength is expected to increase along with the identification with the other members of the group; members of echo chambers expect a reduced likelihood to face argumentative challenges and social sanctions; and members of echo chambers might be motivated to express their opinion because of the engaging and provocative activity of other members of the group. In conclusion, while we witness different points of view regarding the likelihood of echo chambers emerging on social media, varying from those that suggest a high probability of social media users being trapped in echo chambers to those that completely deny their existence, we do believe that in the current, high-choice media

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environment, social media facilitate the emergence of echo chambers and they develop under certain conditions. One important condition refers to what researchers called the diversity of media diet, leading us to put forward the idea that social media users and people with low media diversity are more prone to be trapped in echo chambers than those who use mainly mainstream media sources and, thus, could have a more diverse media diet. Nevertheless, irrespective of the reason why people can get trapped in echo chambers on social media, the effects associated with this type of getting information about what is going on in society are certainly detrimental to making informed decisions. While in echo chambers, people are less likely to think independently and thoroughly assess news and information and, thus, less likely to develop well-informed opinions, attitudes and behaviours.

6.6 Trust in News Media Sources While the provision of trusted news sources is essential for citizens to make informed decisions (Holbert 2005), recent studies point to a perceived decline in news trust (Park et al. 2020; Strömbäck et al. 2020). Digital technology has dramatically changed the dynamics within the current media environment in the sense that it has reduced the barriers to entry for new media sources while generating serious concerns about the credibility of news on the Internet or on social media platforms (Park et al. 2020). While more and more people all over the world tend to rely on news gathered through search engines or news aggregators based on recommendation algorithms, there is growing concern about the quality and veracity of information (Park et al. 2020). Against this background, the issues related to media trust come into discussion. Strömbäck et al. (2020) suggest that media trust is often discussed together with related concepts such as media credibility and media trustworthiness, while its opposite is usually conceptualised as distrust, media cynicism or media scepticism (for an overview, see Kiousis 2001; Melican & Dixon 2008; Tsfati & Cappella 2003). As with any other type of trust, media trust often refers to a relationship between two sides. On the one side, there is a trustor that places trust, and on the other, there is a trustee or the side that is being trusted (Tsfati & Cappella 2003, p. 505). Within this relationship, it is important to consider that the higher the degree of uncertainty, the higher the level of credibility of the trustee (Strömbäck et al. 2020). Oftentimes, perceptions of media credibility are based on certain estimations that people make to evaluate their trust in the media, and, consequently, this explains why news credibility is sometimes tightly linked to news media trust (Strömbäck et al. 2020). Another important thing to be considered with regard to both trust in general and news media trust is the trustor’s expectation that interactions with the trustee will lead to gains rather than losses on the part of the trustor (Tsfati & Cappella 2003). This is strongly linked to the idea that the audience is rational and wants to achieve the highest levels of utility from the news media they use. However,

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the audience is not able to attend all the available news on a certain topic. Thus, it is highly probable that people follow the news media they trust. In other terms, “a correlation between news media trust and exposure can be expected” (Strömbäck et al. 2020, p. 145). Hovland et al. (1953) conducted some of the first studies on media credibility. The authors investigated whether different source characteristics impact people’s willingness to change their attitudes after exposure to news media. They put forward the idea that source credibility consists of two main components, namely, expertise and trustworthiness. Nevertheless, as Kohring and Matthes (2007) suggested, it remains unclear whether these two components are dimensions or reasons accounting for credibility. Other studies (e.g. Meyer 1988) suggest that media credibility includes more components than expertise and trustworthiness; among them, they mention, for example, the degree to which the media are perceived to be fair, unbiased and accurate. Despite various conceptualisations and operationalisations of trust in the news media, it is noteworthy that within the current, high-choice media environment, understanding trust in news media becomes even more important than before. While contemporary studies of trust in news build on research on media credibility, more flexible categories are needed within the digital media environment (Park et al. 2020). For example, Tsfati and Cohen (2005) refer to three aspects of news that have the potential to influence people’s trust in news media. The first one is related to characteristics of the individual, such as background, attitudes and behaviours. The second is related to media content, way of reporting, platform and brand, while the third refers to the social context in which the news is consumed. In this respect, Tsfati and Ariely (2014) found that political interest, interpersonal trust and exposure to television news and newspapers are positively correlated with trust in the media, while education and exposure to news on the Internet were negatively correlated. Other variables influencing news media trust are income, education, gender and age. At the same time, news interest, political interest, efficacy/engagement, Internet use, news media preference (TV audiences vs social media users) and pathways to online news are also important factors influencing people’s levels of trust in news media. People who primarily use traditional media tend to trust news more than those who mainly use social media or online news sources. In other terms, trust in news media is positively associated with news interest (Park et al. 2020). On the other hand, in terms of media content, Kohring and Matthes (2007) refer to four key categories influencing trust in news media, namely, trust in journalists, evidence in stories, accuracy of news stories and the accompanying analysis in stories. Other content-related issues that might influence people’s levels of trust in news media are related to the aesthetic presentation of the story, writing style, website design and technological affordances (Flanagin & Metzger 2007). Lastly, referring to the social context in which the news is consumed, Sterrett et al. (2019) suggest that, when assessing the credibility of online information, people tend, for example, to look to the person who shared a specific story. In other terms, in the process of evaluating information online, many people use heuristics and

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cues. Among the most frequently used cues are who shares the information and the original reporting source of the story. Strictly with reference to the way in which news media trust influences news media consumption, Tsfati (2010) expects that people who do not trust mainstream media to have less mainstream media news as part of their media diets. Mainstream media sceptics are expected to seek alternative, non-mainstream, news sources more frequently than their trusting counterparts (Tsfati & Cappella 2003). In other terms, news media exposure can sometimes be explained less as a cognitive and rational process and more as a result of selective exposure to specific sources and contents. In this respect, Wheeless (1974) suggests that, when offered the opportunity, people tended to select exposing themselves to media sources they trusted while rejecting those sources they mistrusted. In other words, whenever possible, people tend to avoid sources they mistrust (Tsfati 2010). As noted above, Tsfati and Cappella (2003) make an important distinction between mainstream and non-mainstream news exposure and associated levels of trust. Their conclusion is that media scepticism is associated with non-mainstream news exposure. National and local television stations and printed newspapers were labelled mainstream news sources, whereas non-mainstream news sources included talk radio and online news. Nowadays, with the growth of the Internet, many mainstream news brands have developed their own online platforms, and much of their content is now accessible in online formats. Therefore, online news is no longer considered “straightforwardly non-mainstream” (Fletcher & Park 2017, p. 1284). In a follow-up study, Tsfati (2010) found that media scepticism is positively associated with exposure to non-mainstream news sites, even though the associates are rather modest. More recently, Fletcher and Park (2017) found out that low levels of trust in news media are significantly associated with a preference for non-mainstream news sources, while the opposite holds true for higher levels of news trust. On the other hand, there are some studies (e.g. Kalogeropoulos et al. 2019) that report a positive rather than a negative relationship between high use of non-mainstream media (defined in this study as digital-born news outlets and news on social media) and higher levels of trust in news media. Nevertheless, despite such findings, the high use of social media as the main source of information was associated with lower levels of trust in news media sources (Strömbäck et al. 2020, p. 146). To conclude, trust in news media sources does play an essential role in the dynamics of the current, high-choice media environment. Since it is “abundantly clear that many people do not trust traditional news media” (Strömbäck et al. 2020, p. 151) and that the transformations and challenges threatening to undermine news media trust are highly visible, it has never been more suitable to thoroughly consider the impact news trust might have on people’s news consumption habits. While in decline, trust in mainstream, traditional news sources might be even more threatened by their digital, alternative competitors, posing serious concerns about the quality and veracity of the information news media users consume.

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6.7 Socio-Demographics Previous studies document that gender, age and education influence news media consumption patterns (e.g. Esser & Steppat 2017; Karlsen et al. 2020). Therefore, in the following lines, we will critically analyse the available literature on the way these particular socio-demographic variables affect news media consumption patterns. As far as age is concerned, Cohen (2013) suggests that there is a tendency among older people to consume more traditional mass media (television and print newspapers) compared with their younger counterparts, who prefer online news. In other terms, there is clear evidence that young people tend to turn away from traditional news media sources. Similar conclusions are to be found in a comparative research study put forward by Nielsen and Schrøder (2014), who point to the fact that younger people tend to believe that online news sources are the most important sources of getting new information. Other studies confirm the above-mentioned trends (e.g. Aalberg et al. 2013), while Papathanassopoulos et al. (2013) found that younger people are also among those more prone to avoid news altogether, irrespective of its source. Furthermore, the authors suggest that younger people (aged 18–34) tend to use the Internet as a source of news more than middle-aged (aged 35–54) or older people (55 and above), especially in Australia, Greece, Japan, South Korea and the United Kingdom. However, even though, by means of the Internet, younger people have greater access to an abundance of information about public affairs, this does not mean they know more about hard news or they are more empowered. In other terms, even though they have proper conditions to become more interested in and engaged with the news, most young people remain rather indifferent when it comes to news in general, compared with older cohorts. In a similar manner, other studies (e.g. Bergström et al. 2019) suggest that news media use is more widespread among older generations and that younger people, born in high-choice media environments, do not have the same habits of following the news as their older counterparts (Wadbring & Bergström 2017). Furthermore, with regard to some of the potential reasons why younger people tend to avoid reading news from mainstream media, Huang (2009) makes reference to lack of time, use of another news medium, lack of interest in the contents or decline in reading interest, too much effort needed, changing lifestyles, a generalised lack of motivation to seek new information, perceived relevance of media content, perceived credibility of the medium and the influence from parents’ news consumption habits. All these elements were positively correlated with young people’s motivation to seek news. Therefore, strategies to make younger people more interested in or engaged with the news should take into account at least some of the above-mentioned predictors of news use among younger generations. As far as gender is concerned, previous studies (e.g. Cohen 2013; Elvestad & Blekesaune 2008) document gender gaps in news consumption. For example, Cohen 2013 reports that women belonging to certain countries, such as Germany, Switzerland, Taiwan and the United States, are less likely to watch TV compared

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with their male counterparts. The same trend was also observed with regard to newspaper reading. Women from Chile, Germany, Portugal, Singapore, Switzerland and the United States read newspapers less frequently than men. With very few exceptions (e.g. Brazil, Canada, China and Hong Kong), men spend more time reading news on the Internet compared with women. Similar patterns of news media consumption were also reported by Elvestad and Blekesaune (2008). They found that in all European countries except Poland, women read newspapers less frequently compared with their male counterparts. Another important finding from their study is that these gender-based gaps in news media consumption are higher in polarised pluralist media systems (Esser & Steppat 2017). Benesch (2012) suggests that gender-based differences in news consumption are especially large for news about international affairs, business, finance and politics. These differences are reflected in women scoring low on hard news consumption. Men are more interested in these types of news as well as in news related to sports, the environment and science and technology, whereas they are shown to closely follow news on religion, the local community, entertainment, celebrities, arts and culture, the weather, education and health. In other words, this does not mean that women simply do not consume news, but, instead, that they pay particularly little attention to news on current affairs and politics. While it is rather difficult to identify the main sources of these gender-based gaps in news media consumption, Benesch (2012) suggests they appear to be located in the political and economic sphere. Specifically, while lower political interest among women or lower benefits of political knowledge for women might explain lower news media consumption on current affairs and political topics, there are some other reasons why women do not consume this type of news. As pointed out by Benesch (2012), “the dual burden of job and children seems to restrain women’s news consumption in certain countries” (p. 165). The implications associated with such news consumption patterns should be carefully considered. Specifically, even though these gender-based gaps might be the result of differences in preferences for various forms of media content, they may lead, among other things, to women being less informed about important issues, being less engaged and being poorly represented in the political process (Benesch 2012). A similar idea was also raised by Toff & Palmer (2019, p. 1575), who point to the fact that general gender inequalities influence gender-based gaps in news media consumption. Structural inequalities that make it harder for women than men to engage with news are likely to contribute to ongoing inequalities in political engagement and other economic and social inequalities that political activism could help to address. Education was also found as an important predictor of news media consumption (Esser & Steppat 2017). Generally, education has a negative effect on TV watching time and a positive effect on newspaper reading time (offline and online). Specifically, people with higher education tend to watch less TV programs and read more offline and online news compared with their less educated counterparts. In other terms, there is a divide between watching and reading the news, and, with specific reference to this divide, education proves to be a significant predictor (also see Aalberg et al. 2013; Shehata & Strömbäck 2011). Besides this, education also

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influences TV viewing time. For example, Meulemann (2012) points to the fact that, especially in formerly communist countries, people with higher levels of education tend to spend more time watching TV than their less educated counterparts. The same trends were identified with regard to online news use and education in the sense that people with higher levels of education are more prone to spend time reading news in both digital and print formats (Cohen 2013). Following the same pattern, Trilling and Schönbach (2013) found that “low educated people are more likely to avoid news overviews completely, both on- and offline” (p. 42). This might have serious implications in the sense that people with lower levels of education might end up being less informed and, thus, less engaged in any social or political activity. This, in turn, could have a negative overall impact, generating even more inequalities. Therefore, when analysing news consumption patterns, it is essential to consider some of the most relevant socio-demographics, such as age, gender and education. They might better explain the dynamics of news media consumption, especially within the current complex media environment. At the same time, they could offer important insights into various reasons why some people are more or less avid news consumers. Only by taking into account socio-demographic variables could we develop real-based analyses about news media use and profiles of news media consumption within high-choice media environments.

6.8 Implications and Conclusion This chapter focuses on the available literature about possible factors influencing news media consumption patterns. We particularly refer to some of the most profound media-related changes and challenges to be found today and to a series of socio-demographics that might influence news consumption habits. News avoidance, selective exposure, incidental news exposure, echo chambers and trust in media sources are of particular importance within the current, high-choice media environment. Together with gender, age and education, the above-mentioned mediarelated phenomena are expected to influence people’s profiles of news consumption. While some are associated with higher levels of exposure to news media, others are linked to lower levels of news exposure and consumption, having, thus, severe consequences in what researchers call “informed citizenry” (Brown 1997). As documented in the literature, news avoidance, selective exposure to news and incidental news exposure affect the way people consume news and information in the current media landscape. In terms of implications, it should be noted that, while there is no single explanation for all these phenomena, there is not a single answer to curb them. Instead, efforts to convert news avoiders, those who selectively expose to news and those who come across news by accident into more regular consumers of news should, on the one hand, increase the value of news while, on the other, reduce the cognitive costs of navigating today’s news environment. In other words, new ways to navigate the modern information landscape should be considered in

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order to secure a news audience for the future and to allow for growing a more robust and participatory democratic society (Edgerly 2022). Also, in terms of the implications associated with people’s potential preference to consume information that is in line with their pre-existing beliefs (i.e. and, thus, live in echo chambers), along with their decreasing levels of trust in the media, it should be noted that they both influence information consumption habits and contribute to the potential emergence of different media consumption patterns (Cardenal et al. 2019). Furthermore, to better understand the profiles of news and information consumption in today’s media landscape, the role of socio-demographic variables should not be overlooked (Koiranen et al. 2020). They might explain, at some point, certain differences in terms of news consumption patterns in a specific society and might, therefore, also explain the potential success of efforts invested in growing a more robust participatory democratic society. To conclude, this literature review section, together with the previous one, serves as the basis for Chap. 7 and 8. Chapter 7 focuses on a thorough analysis of people’s media diets in a changing media environment, whereas Chap. 8 explores profiles of people using certain types of media outlets. Starting from the studies mentioned above, we have two main aims: first, to unveil how people themselves perceive their news media consumption patterns in today’s media environment (i.e. to explore people’s media diets) and to map what they perceive as a “healthy” media diet and second, to find patterns of news media consumption within the high-choice media environment and to discuss how they might affect various aspects related to democracy.

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Chapter 7

Information Disorders in the Current Media Environment

7.1 Setting the Context Spreading false or inaccurate information is not a new phenomenon (Kapantai et al. 2021). There are several facts that are combined with half-truths or untruths in a more or less intelligent manner, creating what is called “factitious informational blends” (Rojecki & Meraz 2016; Verrall & Mason 2018). Nevertheless, in the current high-choice media environment, the novelty resides today in the speed and global reach of various information disorders, coupled with the large scale, high complexity and abundance of information (Kapantai et al. 2021). Digital media platforms enable the rapid production and spread of various forms of misleading or incorrect information, with potentially harmful effects on public, scientific and democratic health (Pilditch et al. 2022). This new, hyper-dynamic media environment favours the emergence of a new era of information and communication flows that needs special attention, in particular with regard to conceptual frameworks used to define various forms of false, untrue or even half-true information (Bennett & Pfetsch 2018; Cooke 2017; Kapantai et al. 2021; Wang et al. 2018). The available academic literature encompasses several terms and concepts to describe various forms of false, untrue or half-true information such as fake news (Lazer et al. 2018; Tandoc Jr. et al. 2018), false news (Rodríguez et al. 2020; Vosoughi et al. 2018), misinformation (Hameleers & Van der Meer 2020; Jia 2020), disinformation (Amazeen & Bucy 2019; HLEG 2018; Krämer 2021; Wardle 2017, 2018, 2019; Wardle & Derekshan 2017) and so on. Despite various conceptualisations and points of view, in our work, we focus on the term disinformation that, according to the definition offered by the HLEG (2018), refers to “all forms of false, inaccurate, or misleading information designed, presented and promoted to intentionally cause public harm or for profit”. Against this background, this chapter is dedicated to the review of the academic literature on disinformation. The first part is dedicated to a thorough analysis of the © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Buturoiu et al., Patterns of News Consumption in a High-Choice Media Environment, Springer Studies in Media and Political Communication, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41954-6_7

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main definitions and meanings attributed to this concept, as well as to the examination of other “cousin” concepts, such as misinformation and malinformation, as forms of pseudo-information (Kim & Gil de Zúñiga 2021) or information disorders. Then, we will focus on some documented consequences/effects of disinformation, at both individual and societal levels. In the third part of this chapter, the focus will be on the investigation of potential solutions tailored to combat disinformation.

7.2 Disinformation as a Type of Information Disorder: Definitions and Meaning First, before starting to look more in-depth into the possible causes and consequences of disinformation, it is important to place it in the appropriate conceptual framework. While the phenomenon has reached vast attention recently, its definitions and meanings vary. In this context, this section is dedicated to an investigation of the available academic literature on disinformation and other information disorders. According to Buehler et al. (2021, p. 9), information disorder is “an environment in which distorted and manipulated information is ubiquitous” (see also Ali 2022). The authors suggest that this concept has become the preferred one among analysts to describe an environment in which “disinformation”, “misinformation” and “malinformation” are present and often overlap and shape politics in new and unexpected ways. In this context, one main contribution to the field is that of Wardle and Derekshan (2017), two widely cited scholars who put forward an important conceptual framework for examining information disorders in the current media environment. Using the dimensions of harm and falseness, the authors differentiate between misinformation, referring to false information shared without the intention to cause harm; disinformation, referring to false information shared with the intention to cause harm; and malinformation, referring to genuine information shared with the intention to cause harm, often by making public some private information. Starting from these three distinctions, Wardle and Derekshan (2017) suggest that, in order to better understand any type of information disorders, it is useful to take into account both the elements and the phases of information disorder. In this respect, we will briefly summarise them below. According to the authors, three elements should be considered when thinking about information disorder. First is the agent – referring to the entity or agents that created, produced and distributed the information and also to their main motivations. Second is the message – referring to the type of message that was transmitted and its format and characteristics. Third is the interpreter – referring to the time when the message is received, the way it is received by the recipient and if the recipient takes any action or not. Besides these, when thinking about any information disorder, it is noteworthy to also consider the three phases of information disorder, namely, the creation of the message (i.e. when the message is created), the production of the

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message (i.e. when the message is turned into a media product) and the distribution of the message (i.e. when the message is distributed to the public). The abovementioned elements and phases of information disorder are helpful in the sense that they illuminate how the process of creating, producing and distributing various forms of misleading information is working. As the authors mention, it happens that most of the time, the agent that creates the content is fundamentally different from the agent who produces and/or distributes it. Once a certain message has been created, it can be (re)produced and distributed in an endless manner, by various different agents, with different motivations. For example, a post on social media can be distributed by several social media communities, thus making it interesting for mainstream media as well. The message is then picked up and (re)produced by mainstream media sources and further distributed to other communities. In this context, the so-called original meaning of the message is severely lost while being amplified by various social and mainstream media sources, all having various motivations to do this. Thus, it is extremely important to consider such elements and phases of information disorder to be able to further understand the nuances associated with the various forms information disorders could take (for some reallife examples of the elements and phases of information disorder, see Wardle & Derekshan 2017, p. 25). Wardle and Derekshan also (2017, pp 38–39) suggest other important things to consider when thinking about information disorders. First, it is noteworthy that the type of actors involved in the process of information disorder has an impact on the sophistication and effects of a disinformation campaign. For example, when official actors are involved, the creation, production and dissemination strategies are far more sophisticated, and consequently, the potential negative effects are greater. Second, with reference to the format of the messages, it is noteworthy to mention that there are some characteristics of a message that make it more appealing to the public and, thus, more likely to be consumed and further distributed. Among them, key characteristics are whether or not the message provokes an emotional response, has a powerful visual component, has a strong narrative and is repeated. When it comes to potential causes favouring the emergence of dis-, misand malinformation cases in so many scenarios, Akers et al. (2018) attribute the emergence of such information disorders to six main factors, namely, the democratisation of content creation, the rapid news cycle and economic incentives, the wide and immediate reach and interactivity, the organic and intentionally created filter bubbles, the algorithmic curation and lack of transparency and also the scale and anonymity in online accounts. In other words, the authors suggest that the rapid growth of digital media platforms and the rapid technological advancement have created the almost perfect place for the creation, production and dissemination of an extremely large variety of information disorders, with harmful effects on democratic public spheres all over the world (Karlova & Fisher 2013; Santos-D’Amorim & de Oliveira Miranda 2021). In terms of possible intents behind information deception, Shu et al. (2020, p. 4) point to many of them, including persuading people to either support or oppose certain individuals, groups or ideas; producing strong emotional reactions,

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oftentimes negative ones, towards some individuals, groups or ideas with the intent to further cultivate either support for or opposition against them; and preventing some embarrassing actions from being believed by distracting attention from them or creating confusion over past incidents or actions. Based on the widely debated theoretical framework put forward by Wardle and Derekshan (2017), we will further refer to the concept of disinformation and its associated definitions and meanings. This will also be the focus of our research regarding citizens’ and elites’ perceptions of disinformation within the current media landscape (see this chapter). Fallis (2009) suggests that, in order to disinform, one has to intend to deceive someone else. Following the same line of reasoning, Floridi (2013) states that disinformation refers to that type of misinformation which is purposefully created and spread to mislead the receiver so that they think it is accurate information. In other words, as Karlova and Fisher (2013) put it, disinformation refers to that type of information that is deceptive on purpose, and oftentimes, the intentions behind such deception are unknown. This type of spreading deceptive information is particularly dangerous because disinformation comes from entities that are actively engaged in an attempt to mislead (Fallis 2014, p. 136). Several recent studies in fields varying from communication to other fields, such as health or international relations, document the impact of information disorders on important aspects at both individual and societal levels (see, e.g. Chen et al. 2022; Giachanou et al. 2022; Hansson et al. 2021; Rodríguez-Ferrándiz 2022; Wang et al. 2019). In such a context, we will briefly summarise some of the most relevant types of problematic content (in the form of both mis- and disinformation) as they emerge from the available literature in the field of media and communication studies. One noteworthy contribution in this respect belongs to Wardle (2017, 2019). In fact, the author argues for the presence of seven distinct types of problematic content that could be found in the current media landscape on a scale measuring the intent to deceive and do harm. Specifically, on a scale varying from low harm to high potential to harm, Wardle (2019) points to the existence of seven types of problematic information. Satire is at one end, while clickbait content, misleading content, genuine content reframed in a false context, imposter and manipulated content and also fabricated content are at the other side of the spectrum (for a clear picture of these types of mis- and disinformation, see Wardle 2019, p. 10). Satire or parody is one type of problematic content within the current media landscape. They refer to that type of content that has the potential to fool, even though it has not been created with the intention to cause harm. There are some doubts whether satire should be considered problematic. However, as Wardle (2019, p. 13) suggests, in the current media environment, satire can be used strategically to “bypass fact-checkers and to distribute rumors and conspiracies”, thus making it a tool for promoting hateful, polarising and divisive content. In fact, while satire or parody are forms of art for some, there is ground to believe that satire and parody have become important tools through which one could transmit various forms of twisted and reframed messages.

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False connection refers to the use of “clickbait” content. In numerous situations, news media outlets use sensational language to drive clicks. This strategy of gaining substantial traffic on the website in the short term has profound negative effects on people’s relationship with news. Frequently, the way the headline is written has a decisive impact on people reading or not the actual piece of news. In other words, the strength of a headline can oftentimes make the difference between a limited number of people reading a post and access to a wider audience. Misleading content is another type of information disorder that is quite common within the current media environment. Some techniques of creating and spreading misleading information include reframing stories in headlines, using certain fragments of quotes to support a wider point, using only those statistics that align with a certain position and letting apart certain details if they have the potential to undermine the dominant argument. Moreover, it is important to mention the fact that it is very hard to define what is misleading or not, mainly because misleading refers to context and nuances that might, indeed, vary from one situation to the other. On the other hand, false context describes that type of information disorder that includes creating and distributing genuine content that has been reframed in dangerous ways. Imposter content refers to false or misleading content that uses well-known logos or the news from established figures or journalists. The use of some characteristics associated with the impersonated sources is what makes that specific content more trustworthy; people use these logos as a form of heuristics (mental shortcuts) for credibility. For example, the logos of some established news brands have been used to push false and misleading information. Another type of information disorder is manipulated content. This mainly refers to photos and videos being altered from the genuine variants. Last but not least, there is fabricated content, referring to 100% false content designed to deceive and do harm. All these types of problematic content found in today’s media landscape show the complexity of information disorders. Some of them could be described as lowlevel information pollution, such as clickbait headlines, sloppy captions or satire that fools, while several others are sophisticated and deeply deceptive. In such a context, Wardle (2019) suggests that, in order to correctly understand and combat all these phenomena, it is highly important to thoroughly place them in the appropriate conceptual framework because correct terminology and definitions might be key to developing successful measures against information disorders. Besides Wardle’s (2017; 2018; 2019) work on accurately defining and explaining information disorders and other recent approaches that followed the same theoretical framework (e.g. Baptista & Gradim 2022a; Khan et al. 2022), there are also some other important attempts to define and characterise various forms of problematic information (e.g. Gelfert 2018; Ha et al. 2021; Molina et al. 2021). In this respect, Lazer et al. (2018) focus on fake news, defined as “fabricated information that mimics news media content in form but not in organizational process or intent” (p. 1094). The authors also suggest that fake news overlaps with other information disorders, such as mis- and disinformation. Furthermore, another worth mentioning approach belongs to Tandoc Jr. (2019, 2022). The author point to the fact that fake news refers to a specific type of

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disinformation, namely, the one that is false, that is intended to deceive people and that does so by trying to look like real news (for more fake news definitions, see Egelhofer and Lecheler 2019, p. 99). Together with colleagues, Tandoc Jr. et al. (2018) advances an important typology of fake news. Specifically, based on the levels of facticity and deception, they refer to news satire, news parody, fabrication, manipulation, advertising and propaganda (for a clear overview of the main typologies of fake news definitions, based on the two dimensions – level of facticity and intention to deceive – see Tandoc Jr. et al. (2018, p. 148). News satire and news parody have been referred to as forms of fake news. They share many characteristics because they both rely on humour as means of attracting the attention of the audience. Another common characteristic is that both mimic mainstream news media formats. Nevertheless, parodies differ from satires in their use of non-factual information to inject humour. The parody plays on the ridiculous background of an issue to make up completely fictitious news stories. On the other hand, news fabrication refers to articles which “have no factual basis but are published in the style of news articles to create legitimacy” (Tandoc Jr. et al. 2018, p. 143). Photo manipulation or manipulation of images has become an important form of problematic content in the current digital media landscape, especially due to the advent of digital photos, powerful image manipulation software and knowledge of techniques (Tandoc Jr. et al. 2018, p. 144). Fake news has also been used to describe advertising and public relations materials. One major distinction with regard to public relations or advertising-related fake news compared with the other typologies refers to the emphasis on the financial gain. One specific example here refers to the more and more widely used technique of “clickbait” headlines, designed to encourage the reader to “click” on something and, thus, moving the reader to a commercial website. Propaganda, on the other hand, refers to those news stories which are intentionally created and shared by political entities to influence public perceptions. While it is not under the scope of this theoretical chapter, it is noteworthy that various forms of mis- and disinformation have been created and distributed during the COVID-19 pandemic. The wide use of social media platforms coupled with the uncertainty surrounding the COVID-19 pandemic created the “perfect storm for fake news” (Baines & Elliott 2020; Canavilhas & Jorge 2022; Hadlington et al. 2022; León et al. 2022; Verrall 2022). Conspiracy theories, a “close cousin” of fake news (Allcott & Gentzkow 2017, p. 214), are among the most commonly spread type of problematic content during the COVID-19 pandemic, with serious effects on both an individual and a societal level (for an overview of COVID-19-related conspiracy theories and their effects, see recent research such as (Batzdorfer et al. 2022; Bruder and Kunert 2022; Buturoiu et al. 2021; Douglas 2021; Hughes et al. 2022; Pummerer et al. 2022). Conspiracy theories are defined as explanations for events based on power-holders’ secret, malevolent arrangements (Goertzel 1994), and their emergence and amplification gathered unprecedented scale within the COVID-19 pandemic. To conclude, it is noteworthy that conceptual clarifications are needed with reference to what is generically known as information disorders. In line with

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Wardle’s (2017; 2018; 2019) conceptualisation of information disorders, we will further refer to disinformation and its various forms to refer to false, untrue or half-true information. Furthermore, taking into account the above-mentioned conceptualisations of disinformation, when referring to disinformation perceptions, we will analyse whether people believe that the news media deliberately mislead people and spread false information on purpose (Hameleers 2022).

7.3 Disinformation Consequences/Effects As outlined above, all types of information disorders are complex, thus having the potential to generate equally complex effects. While we are entering an era of “information warfare” (Baumann 2020; Guadagno & Guttieri 2021), in which digital media platforms have become “weapons” and started to run complex disinformation campaigns, the impact of disinformation, created and spread with the intention to cause harm, should be carefully considered because it can be devastating for every aspect of life (Kapantai et al. 2021). In this context, the aim of this section is to shed light on the important consequences of disinformation at both individual and societal levels. Previous research has demonstrated that even short (under 5 minutes) exposure to various forms of disinformation could have a significant impact on the unconscious behaviour of individuals (Bastick 2021). Generally speaking, the capacity of disinformation to influence beliefs is linked to its associated capacity to influence behaviours (Levy 2017). This is supported by a strong tradition in behavioural studies investigating the rational and social determinants of behaviour (Bastick 2021). In this context, we take notice of a growing body of research dedicated to the capacity of fake news (as a specific form of disinformation) and other misleading content to influence people’s beliefs. Oftentimes, studies in this area include experimental research designs aimed at understanding whether people believe certain forms of disinformation combined with an intervention mechanism to combat them. In this respect, there are four streams of research that are worth mentioning (Bastick 2021). First, there are those studies that have found implications of fact-checking labels on people’s perceptions about the credibility of the content and other associated beliefs. For example, Featherstone et al. (2019) found that fact-checking labels on Twitterbased anti-vaccine misleading content can increase vaccine acceptance. Second, there are studies focusing on the believability of information after having been corrected. For example, there are studies showing that public health authorities are more effective in correcting various forms of disinformation compared with digital media platforms (Vraga & Bode 2017). Third, other studies focus on the research of “continued influence effect”, i.e. whether exposure to misleading content still has an impact on people after being corrected (Thorson 2016). Fourth, research was dedicated to indirect positive associations between exposure to misleading content in the media and feelings of inefficacy, alienation and cynicism towards politicians (Balmas 2014).

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In the following lines, we will refer to individual-level consequences of disinformation. It is noteworthy that exposure to various forms of inaccurate information might lead to confusion about what is true or not, doubt about an accurate understanding of issues and also further reliance on falsehoods (Rapp & Salovich 2018). First, in terms of the potential to cause confusion, prior knowledge and experiences are relevant sources of information. However, when exposed to inaccurate information, people might become confused about the validity and relevance of such sources, when, in fact, they should not be. Among the most common markers of confusion after being exposed to misleading/inaccurate content in the media is that, when asked questions about the information they have recently read, people tend to weigh multiple possibilities even though only one is viable. Second, another negative consequence of exposure to inaccurate information is that people tend to express uncertainty or doubt about the ideas they should be confident about and that are obviously true. It happens most of the time that ignoring, discounting or revising what people already know to be true affects people’s social, mental and even physical well-being (Rapp & Salovich 2018, p. 234). It is important to mention here that confidence can predict people’s use of false information but in the opposite direction. More precisely, people who are overconfident in their abilities to detect and ignore inaccurate information are more likely to reproduce inaccurate ideas (Rapp & Salovich 2018; Salovich & Rapp 2018). Third, another consequence of exposure to inaccurate information is relying on it to complete subsequent goals. It happens frequently that people reproduce inaccuracies they have been exposed to on other subsequent activities. This type of consequence is among the most problematic. In another piece of research, Balmas (2014) analyses the possible associations between exposure to a specific form of fake news (i.e. political satire) and attitudes of inefficacy, alienation and cynicism towards political candidates. The main findings from this study using survey data collected during the 2006 Israeli election campaign provide evidence for an indirect positive effect of political satire viewing in making people develop feelings of inefficacy, alienation and cynicism through the mediator variable of perceived realism of this particular type of fake news. These findings indicate the important role played by entertainment media in shaping political perceptions (see also Tsfati et al. 2009; Young 2004). Even though it is intended mainly to entertain rather than to inform, satire does not only educate viewers about the political arena and current affairs issues but also contributes to generating deeper attitudes towards the political environment (Balmas 2014, p. 447). Furthermore, it is important to mention that such feelings of alienation and cynicism can further fuel the development of political misperceptions (Guess et al. 2020) that can affect people’s behaviour, including voting decisions (Weeks and Garrett 2014). Jang and Kim (2018) suggest that, while real-world consequences of fake news (as the authors label misleading information) have not yet been fully understood, there is growing public concern regarding the fact that fake news might cause confusion in the fact-checking process and, as a result, might undermine informed citizenry. Thus, they examine people’s beliefs of the effects of fake news in the context of the 2012 US presidential election by using the theoretical framework

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of the third-person effect. In short, this effect refers to the consistent discrepancy between individuals’ perceptions of the media effects on themselves and the perceived effects on others (Davison 1983; Sun et al. 2008). Their main findings show that people tend to regard others as more susceptible than themselves to the potentially harmful effects of fake news. Such findings are in line with results from similar studies (e.g. Chang 2021; Lim 2017; for an overview of how these effects ¸ ani¸ta˘ occur in the Romanian context, see Corbu et al. 2020; Corbu et al. 2022; Stef˘ et al. 2018). Such individual-level consequences are important because they shed light on the way in which exposure to various misleading/inaccurate information impacts people’s unconscious behaviour. While some might think that individual-level effects are not worth considering, it is important to mention that they might illuminate several aspects that are vital for the well-functioning of society and politics. For example, exposure to disinformation is often associated with the risk of skewing individuals’ world-views and informing their behaviour in a detrimental way. Deliberately produced and targeted disinformation aimed at behaviour change further amplifies such risks beyond platforms to the entire media environment. Thus, the individual-level effects of disinformation should be understood as potential factors amplifying the societal-level consequences of disinformation and, therefore, should be given full consideration (Bastick 2021). In the following lines, we will refer to societal-level consequences of disinformation. First, it is important to mention that scholars, journalists and politicians expressed alarm that the spread of fake news and other forms of disinformation could destabilise political institutions and delegitimise media organisations (Ognyanova et al. 2020). Based on survey data collected shortly before and shortly after the US midterm elections in 2018, Ognyanova et al. (2020) found that fake news exposure was associated with a decline in mainstream media trust among respondents. Another important result was that fake news consumption was linked to lower political trust, but only for strong liberals. For moderates and conservatives, fake news consumption predicted higher trust in political institutions. Such findings suggest that the consequences of exposure to fake news or any other form of disinformation cannot be examined in isolation and that the large-scale implications of disinformation should be considered taking into account the complexity of the current media and political environment. In politics, for example, disinformation has serious implications, ranging from legitimate propaganda to election manipulation (Kapantai et al. 2021). Especially during electoral times, various forms of inaccurate or misleading information are put in circulation, having various motivations. Results of exposure to such information are associated with poorly informed citizenry and also with some election outcomes (Baptista & Gradim 2022b; Bradshaw & Howard 2018; Grinberg et al. 2019). Other societal-level consequences associated with exposure to disinformation include the spread of uncertainty, fear and racism. For example, studies conducted in Germany and the United States (Bursztyn et al. 2019; Müller & Schwarz 2021) find evidence of the association between social media content and incidents of hate crimes against ethnic minorities (see also Jackson 2018). Furthermore, in

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terms of terrorism, there is evidence showing that disinformation spread through social media platforms has the potential to contribute to political polarisation within countries, which, in turn, favours the emergence of an environment where domestic terrorism is more likely to occur (Piazza 2022). Other studies also confirm that exposure to various conspiracy theories (as forms of disinformation) is associated with public attitudes showing extremist-related signs of radicalisation and violence. For example, in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, there was a conspiracy theory that claimed that “infected” immigrants were “imported” to decimate white populations (Kapantai et al. 2021; Wallner & White 2020). Disinformation spread in domains related to medicine and healthcare needs special attention. Most of the time, disinformation spread in such domains not only affects people’s lives but also provokes worldwide disasters that could have been prevented (Kapantai et al. 2021). Vaccination, cancer, nutrition and smokingrelated issues are more prone to be surrounded by disinformation. For example, in the COVID-19 pandemic context, there have been several such inaccurate claims that have been spread in the public sphere and that have resulted, in some cases, in decreasing levels of trust in the authorities regarding the effective management of the pandemic (OECD 2020). The idea that death rates are being inflated and that there is no clear reason to adopt lockdown regulations and further comply with the preventive measures such as social distancing and wearing masks could help to further spread the epidemic (Kapantai et al. 2021; Lynas 2020). At the same time, it is important to mention here the fact that there is evidence showing that regular media users tend to agree more with disinformation presented in a sober rather than sensationalist manner. This is particularly important because this type of what is called sober disinformation (i.e. disinformation presented neutrally, not in a sensationalist manner) is harder to detect, and thus, potential actions to combat it are more difficult to be crafted (Staender et al. 2021). Some other societal-level consequences of disinformation include its negative impact on environmental policies and climate change (Lewandowsky 2021) and its associated threats to business owners and citizens alike. For example, fake reviews affect both the trustworthiness of the brands and business owners and the purchase process (Kapantai et al. 2021; Visentin et al. 2019). Buehler et al. (2021, p. 24) suggest that information disorders have the potential to undermine democratisation and corrode democracies on multiple levels: individual, institutional and systemic. Inaccurate or distorted information can weaken the credibility of individuals and organisations or even reduce to silence those voices that contradict the official narratives in both democratic and authoritarian regimes (Turˇcilo & Obrenovi´c 2020). Furthermore, information disorders might facilitate the emergence of “exclusivist political agendas” (Buehler et al. 2021, p. 24). For example, it affects women and members of the LGBTQIA+ in a disproportionate manner. When they are targets of disinformation campaigns, women might be driven out of important positions and out of politics, they might be suffering from bad reputations, and their credentials might be questioned. Likewise, distorted information is often used to push members of the LGBTQIA+ community back

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to the margins of the political arena whenever they try to make their voices count as they strive for greater equality. Other indirect consequences of information disorders include sowing confusion and distrust. They, in turn, may create and amplify political divisions and polarisation. For example, populists may take advantage of information disorders to engage in divide-and-rule strategies and also make people prone to rally around their causes (Buehler et al. 2021). In such a context, information disorders might be associated not only with the corrosion of the public discourse and its quality but also with lower voter turnout and lower levels of participation in any form of public affairs more broadly (Avaaz 2021). In fact, by sowing confusion and distrust, information disorders have the potential to undermine the core background in which democratic institutions are supposed to function properly. While regular citizens cannot separate what is true from what is not true, general levels of distrust, cynicism about political processes and generalised institutional cynicism (Diresta & Rose-Stockwell 2021) as well as reluctance to believe any kind of information are alarmingly growing (Wardle & Derekshan 2017). What disinformation campaigns aim to create is more or less similar to an environment “where any news or material is concurrently both circumspect and potentially vital” (Buehler et al. 2021, p. 24). Needless to say, information disorders have a different impact depending on the levels of democracy and socio-democratic development in the sense that, according to evidence, in countries with weak political institutions, limitations on independent media and fragile civil societies, populations are more vulnerable to various forms of inaccurate information and, therefore, possible consequences of information disorders are more visible and burdensome (Humprecht et al. 2020; Wallis et al. 2021). In the attempt to shed light on the implications of disinformation on democracies, McKay & Tenove (2021) suggest that disinformation campaigns mounted by Russian agents around the 2016 US elections illustrate the use of anti-deliberative tactics aimed at influencing system-level anti-deliberative properties such as epistemic cynicism, polarisation and inauthenticity. Such harms are important because they have the potential to undermine citizens’ capacity to engage in logical and factualbased communication, moral respect and democratic inclusion. Furthermore, the two authors suggest that it is highly important to point to the main risks posed by disinformation to democratic goods because, in this way, potential solutions to reduce such risks could be more easily addressed (also see Tenove 2020). Another recent attempt at unveiling the effects of disinformation belongs to Schünemann (2022, p. 35). The author points to the fact that the issue of disinformation has caused us to enter a new phase of threat politics. In the current media context, the notion of cyberwar has gained new meanings and is widely used to make reference to the new forms of cyber “catastrophes” generally fed by feelings of anxiety about disinformation as a threat to democracy (Jamieson 2020). Two prominent examples reflecting these “new cyber doom scenarios” (Schünemann 2022, p. 35) of disinformation in the current media landscape are the election of Donald Trump and Brexit (see also Bennett & Livingston (2018)). In conclusion, the possible consequences associated with exposure to disinformation in the media are multiple and highly diversified. One can refer to either the

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individual-level effects or the societal-level ones. In any case, the implications of such effects for the well-functioning of societies in the broader context are worth considering because even when referring to rather “local”, individually related effects, exposure to disinformation does not refer strictly to what is or can be quantified on the spot. Instead, effects associated with exposure to information disorders are to be seen in action on a long-term basis. Thus, such implications should be carefully considered because they might help design more effective solutions to fight against the multitude of forms disinformation could take.

7.4 The Fight Against Disinformation: Possible Solutions While the previous sections of this chapter focused on defining and understanding the myriad forms of disinformation that circulate in today’s media landscape, we will now focus on possible remedies and interventions aimed at limiting the negative effects of disinformation. The unprecedented spread of disinformation seems to be a trademark of the present polarised media ecosystem (Freelon & Wells 2020; Hameleers 2022; Hameleers & Van der Meer 2020). As emphasised in the previous chapters, misinformation consists of manipulated, fabricated or decontextualised information (Tandoc Jr. et al. 2018). Nonetheless, the updated definitions of the term also include content hosted by technology companies; online, print and broadcast reporting; and information circulating in offline spaces. In addition, researchers and practitioners are now considering misleading advertising, reporting errors, satire and parody and partisan news with the intent to cause harm as forms of disinformation as well (Hameleers 2022). Disinformation has, therefore, become a complex phenomenon, amassing seemingly disparate elements such as commercial interests, political propaganda and all sorts of hybrid cyber-threats (for an overview, see Frau-Meigs 2022). The rapid advent of disinformation on the public scene in the past years has had a tremendous impact, not only on the public sphere and journalistic practices but also on democracy in general (e.g. Vraga et al. 2021). As Wardle and Derekshan (2017) note in their seminal study, disinformation affects the integrity of democracy through the large web of fabricated falsehoods and “alternative facts” that has penetrated public life. As a consequence of the unprecedented spread of disinformation, ordinary citizens may become confused about the truthfulness of the information they need in order to make informed political decisions (e.g. Van Aelst et al. 2017). To counter the toxic effects of disinformation, numerous solutions have been advanced by scholars, practitioners and public institutions alike (e.g. Bennett & Livingston 2018; Frau-Meigs 2019). In general, four main solutions for fighting disinformation can be distinguished: (1) news media literacy interventions, (2) fact-checkers that verify the facticity of various forms of information, (3) public awareness campaigns related to disinformation and (4) public policies aimed at reducing its negative effects.

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Recent research has primarily focused on media literacy and the importance of fact-checking in reducing the pervasive effects of disinformation (Hameleers & Van der Meer 2020). Nonetheless, other empirical studies show people tend to avoid corrected information that does not align with their views or beliefs (Hameleers et al., 2021). Furthermore, although media and information literacy (MIL) interventions offer an effective journalistic tool to prevent disinformation by educating media consumers about various information disorders, such as fake news or, more generally, persuasive communication, their effectiveness of such corrections has not been yet established (Tully et al. 2019). Some researchers (Clayton et al. 2019) have indicated that warnings and corrections can be effective in reducing the credibility of false information; however, their effectiveness is reduced when not accompanied by fact-checks. Yet, fact-checkers can only respond to a small percentage of false information; therefore, larger-scale interventions are needed to tackle the vast amount of disinformation made possible by the technological tools available today. When it comes to targeted interventions, media and information literacy has been promoted for years as an effective way to counter propaganda and disinformation. MIL is most often considered a critical engagement with information and media messages and audiences in general (Carlsson 2019). MIL practitioners have become increasingly numerous, comprising civil society organisations, scholars, educators and, more and more, teachers as MIL have started to be introduced in a growing number of academic curricula. Gladly, the technological advancements offer more effective ways to forestall both disruptive online usages and propagandistic interferences. As some authors show, these new technologies hold the power to revitalise the public sphere through their capabilities to enable journalism independence and media education (Frau-Meigs 2022). Journalists and citizens alike can now access fact-checking networks or data made available by analytics firms (e.g. CheckFirst1 ), which have recently emerged. Similarly, news literacy associations like Lie Detectors2 and Faktabaari,3 networks promoting media literacy like SavoirDevenir4 and ERIM (Equal Rights and Independent Media)5 and crowd-sourced platforms like Mind over Media6 offer now more possibilities to fight disinformation. Moreover, independent initiatives such as YouCheck!7 and YouVerify!8 offer a common platform to journalists, practitioners, data scientists and citizens interested in fact-checking. Journalists, practitioners as well as ordinary people now have the possibility to verify and expose “fake

1 https://www.checkfirst.gov.sg/. 2 https://lie-detectors.org/. 3 https://faktabaari.fi/in-english/. 4 https://savoirdevenir.net/. 5 https://erim.ngo/about-us/. 6 https://www.mindovermedia.us/. 7 https://www.ucheck.co.uk/. 8 https://youverify.co/.

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news” using fact-checking tools such as InVID-WeVerify9 or various national and European websites that check information and offer regular updates and reports. Innovations such as social media platforms have accelerated changes in regulations and public policies, enabling ordinary citizens to be part of a professional field, which has been, for a long time, reserved for governmental representatives and official bodies (Carlsson 2019). The European Union has initiated a series of pioneering initiatives aimed to fight disinformation both at a micro level, through individual or group actions, and at a macro level by supporting numerous organisations and programs focused on tackling fake news and various forms of mis-/disinformation. An ambitious initiative undertaken by the EU, the 2018 EU Action Plan, has proposed guidelines for social media platforms and has advanced a Directive for Audiovisual Media Services and a European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO). These measures aim to introduce media studies in academic curricula by as many European countries as possible and to address disinformation as a national priority. The new European regulations, transposed in national and regional legislations, have effectively promoted factchecking and media literacy initiatives across numerous European countries. A recent EDMO report indicates that the main objectives of disinformation, regardless of the tactics used or the subject matter, are to “sow division, create confusion, alter the terms of public conversations in liberal democracies”.10 Additionally, an important finding of the EDMO report is that even though disinformation flows are global and cross-platform, responses are national or regional and are disseminated primarily via established technology companies. In regard to media literacy, as indicated previously, serious progress has been made, at least at a European level. Apart from consistent funding from European institutions through programs such as those coordinated by DG-connect, media institutions and journalists have received funds from Facebook and Google, which have been publicly criticised in the past years for their profit-oriented practices and modest actions undertaken in order to reduce disinformation (Frau-Meigs 2022). Reporters Sans Frontieres (RSF), for instance, and the International Fact-Checking Network (IFCN) have advanced standards and codes of principles, emphasising the need for transparency in journalism, and have created their own online tools for depicting misinformation, available for free on their websites.11 Various media monitoring organisations make available for free their reports and even offer tutorials on how to fact-check and depict disinformation. Notable initiatives have been undertaken by Poynter Institute,12 TinEye13 or InVID-WeVerify.14 All these organisations have invested in creating a solid infrastructure for depicting dis- and 9 https://www.invid-project.eu/tools-and-services/invid-verification-plugin/. 10 https://edmo.eu/2022/06/29/10. 11 https://www.factcheck.org/,

https://www.politifact.com/, https://factuel.afp.com/.

12 https://www.poynter.org/ifcn/. 13 https://defyhatenow.org/tineye-essential-for-fact-checkers/. 14 https://www.invid-project.eu/tools-and-services/invid-verification-plugin.

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misinformation, showcasing their findings and their fact-checking tools on their websites free of charge. Besides all this, a High-Level Expert Group on Fake News and Online Disinformation was established in 2018 by the European Commission, which delivered a report15 that synthesises the most important steps that need to be taken when fighting disinformation. The Report16 emphasises the reality that disinformation is a complex phenomenon that goes beyond the term “fake news”, which needs to be operationalised with a common set of definitions and researched in a comparative, transnational context. The HLEG recommends both short-term responses to the most pressing problems and longer-term responses aimed to increase societal resilience to disinformation. For short to medium term, the HLEG suggests a selfregulatory approach based on an engagement process among online platforms, news media organisations (press and broadcasters), journalists, fact-checkers, independent content creators and the advertising industry, who are called upon to commit to a Code of Practices. This Code should reflect stakeholders’ roles and responsibilities with the intent to promote freedom of expression by fostering the transparency of different types of digital information channels, algorithm accountability and public trust in media. In short, the experts who act as advisers for the European Commission recommend a multi-dimensional approach designed to 1. enhance transparency of online news, 2. promote media and information literacy to counter disinformation and help users navigate the digital media environment, 3. develop tools for empowering users and journalists to tackle disinformation and foster a positive engagement with fastevolving information technologies, 4. safeguard the diversity of the European news media ecosystem and 5. promote continued research on the impact of disinformation and constantly adjust the necessary responses. Given the fragmentation of the media sector, public authorities should play a facilitating role in reducing the harmful effects of information pollution. As the High-Level Expert Group17 recommends, public authorities, at both the EU and national level, should support the development of a network of independent European centres for academic research on disinformation. This network should be open to fact- and source-checkers, accredited journalists and researchers from different relevant fields and platforms. To wrap up, all initiatives undertaken by various bodies and organisations place special emphasis on a) continually monitoring the scale, techniques and tools and the precise nature and impact of disinformation in society, b) assessing the veracity of news and information across areas of general interest, c) identifying and mapping disinformation sources and mechanisms that contribute to their digital amplification, d) providing a safe space for accessing and

15 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/final-report-high-level-expert-group-fake-news-

and-online-disinformation. 16 https://ec.europa.eu/newsroom/dae/document.cfm?doc_id=50271. 17 https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/library/final-report-high-level-expert-group-fake-newsand-online-disinformation.

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analysing platforms’ data and for a better understanding of algorithm functioning, e) contributing to the development of objective and reliable indicators for source transparency and f) sharing knowledge with news media and platforms to enhance public awareness about disinformation. Concerns over fake news have triggered an unprecedented interest in various forms of media literacy. As shown by numerous studies (Dumitru et al. 2022; Hameleers 2022; Jones-Jang et al. 2019), literacy interventions help audiences to be “inoculated” against any harmful effects of misleading information. Furthermore, recent studies (Scheibenzuber et al. 2021) have empirically proven that information literacy significantly increases the likelihood of identifying fake news. Additionally, corrective approaches such as news media literacy interventions and fact-checkers can effectively be combined to counter different forms of misinformation. Some studies have empirically investigated such assumptions, finding that evidence-based misinformation is seen as more accurate than fact-free misinformation and the combination of news media literacy interventions and fact-checkers is most effective in lowering issue agreement and perceived accuracy of misinformation across countries (Hameleers 2022). Numerous studies which investigate how to combat misinformation have also examined more fine-grained interventions, such as pre-emptive (“prebunking”) and retroactive (“debunking”), in an attempt to see which of these two predominant approaches is more effective. Such studies have found that, in general, both prebunking and debunking reduce misinformation reliance and also that individuals tend to rely more on explicit than implied misinformation both with and without interventions (e.g. Tay et al. 2021). Furthermore, other authors (Basol et al. 2021) have assessed the efficacy of targeted browser games as a form of “prebunking” intervention aimed at improving people’s ability to spot manipulation techniques. Their study found that specially designed games can (a) increase the perceived manipulativeness of misinformation, (b) improve people’s attitudinal certainty (confidence) in their ability to spot misinformation and (c) reduce self-reported willingness to share misinformation with others. Similarly, other interventions draw on the theory of psychological inoculation, analogous to the process of medical immunisation (Roozenbeek et al. 2020). The authors find that “prebunking” or pre-emptively warning and exposing people to weakened doses of misinformation can help cultivate “mental antibodies” against fake news. Prebunking interventions based on the psychological theory of “inoculation” can reduce susceptibility to misinformation across cultures (four countries have been included in the study: Sweden, German, Poland and Greece). Such findings represent a major contribution to understanding how to foster psychological resistance against common online misinformation strategies (e.g. conspiracy theories, manipulating emotions, political polarisation) and how to boost immunity against dis- and misinformation across a variety of cultural, linguistic and political settings. As a result of its recent public prominence, MIL has been included in various comprehensive programs such as Creative Europe, Horizon Europe and Digital

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Europe and is embedded in the EU Digital Education Action Plan.18 Since 2017, there is also a Media Literacy Index19 available, with the objective of evaluating the resilience to disinformation; the index initially covered 35 European countries, but it has been recently expanded to more countries, including the United States.20 From an educational perspective, media literacy training and interventions have been empirically proven to be effective ways to empower people to fight fake news. As a consequence, various initiatives, from either media institutions or nongovernmental organisations, have led to interventions in schools, implementing new technological tools and updated teaching practices into the educational process. A multitude of materials and online tools are now available for teachers and students, such as the MOOC Disinformation Step by Step (YouVerify.eu) or fact-checking tools and media literacy toolkits (e.g. Poynter Institute and InVID-WeVerify). Additionally, due to the recent context of emergency online learning, some authors (Scheibenzuber et al. 2021) have tested the effects of online educational courses addressing fake news illiteracy, with a focus on giving students an insight into the form and effects of fake news. The course was built upon current fake news research and the problem-based learning approach. Such interventions suggest that problem-based online courses can be appropriate learning environments, even in the context of “emergency online learning”, and, furthermore, that they can serve as an instrument for combating fake news illiteracy. Albeit the importance of such tools and interventions, recent work (Dumitru et al. 2022) points out that the majority of them a) are mainly tailored for students and educators, excluding other groups, b) take place mainly in educational settings and c) are not predominantly evidence based, which means that neither their long-term nor short-term efficacy can be tested. Such findings shed light on the relatively poor reliability of the available training and interventions and their limited effectiveness and argue for a larger reach of ML interventions and a more personalised approach dedicated to various target groups. To wrap up, we can conclude that the evolution of media and information literacy is influenced by a multitude of factors. The importance of consistent funding for literacy programs and fact-checking platforms is obviously one of the most important. As already pointed out by some scholars and researchers (e.g. Tay et al. 2021), in the future, AI is going to be an active player in the process of fighting disinformation. In the meantime, however, human capabilities are crucial in debunking fake information, and initiatives and actions are still needed from policymakers, representatives of technology companies and independent organisations. On the general audiences’ side, the visibility of media literacy programs and their gradual insertion into school curricula are expected to produce more awareness and critical thinking skills.

18 https://education.ec.europa.eu/focus-topics/digital-education/action-plan. 19 https://osis.bg/?p=3750&lang=en. 20 https://medialiteracynow.org/a-new-index-shows-that-the-us-scores-low-on-media-literacy-

education/.

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In terms of media organisations and their operations, new practices are speeding the digital transformation; nonetheless, larger transnational initiatives are needed to scale up the fight against disinformation. One such initiative is YouChoose.ai,21 which is a free software project whose mission is to empower users and content creators over big Internet corporations in order to bypass the monopolies established by algorithms such as those employed by Google or Facebook. This project aims to decentralise online content curation and transfer this filter to the community of users. As indicated by some authors, such technological ecosystems are viable alternatives to social media platforms and giant corporations which control the online ecosystem and have no interest in fostering transparency (Carlsson 2019; Frau-Meigs 2022).

7.5 Implications and Conclusion To sum up such significant initiatives, we can conclude that, in the current context of widespread disinformation, all actors involved in communication practices, media practitioners, scholars and journalists alike, have reinforced the importance of factual information and source verification. As pointed out by various researchers (e.g. Bradshaw & Howard 2018), journalists need to add technology and data science to their basic skills. In addition to technological competencies, cognitive and psychological tools are nowadays needed as well for better understanding and interpreting facts and events. Fact-checking and news literacy become, therefore, part of the journalistic professional routine, one that is beneficial for both ordinary citizens and societies at large, helping in the creation of a collective immunisation towards all sorts of information disorders. All these practices have also led to a more efficient dialogue between practitioners and media users, with various examples of open-data collaborations and free websites,22 which, overall, contributes to better debunking fake information. In addition to this, transnational responses to disinformation are better than individual nation-state responses; yet, disinformation is not only larger than national borders but also larger than European borders. Therefore, as emphasised above, the disinformation war cannot be “won” without transnational initiatives and a global, cross-platform response. As the experts from the European Digital Media Observatory indicate,23 instead of seeking quick fix “technical” options, media and journalism ought to be strengthened through serious funding and investment in

21 https://youchoose.ai/. 22 For

example, http://helpmeinvestigate.com/. Recommendations by the Taskforce on Disinformation and the War in Ukraine; https:// edmo.eu/2022/06/29/10-recommendations-by-the-taskforce-on-disinformation-and-the-war-inukraine. 23 10

References

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media literacy (including digital, critical, news and information literacies) in order to build a global resilience towards disinformation. In conclusion, the evolution of media literacy, the increased prominence of factchecking and the numerous initiatives undertaken recently at both the European and national level demonstrate that solutions can be implemented in the fields of journalism and media literacy. New projects and forms of collaboration bridge the gap between media practitioners and general audiences. Additionally, the newly advanced technological tools create a more fertile dialogue between journalists and independent organisations, helping in the same time ordinary citizens to debunk fake information. This new context also brings the opportunity to update governance systems and implement regulatory policies faster than before. Nowadays, all actors involved in the fields of journalism and MIL seem to recognise the importance of source verification, the role of data and algorithms in debunking fake information and the role the general audiences play in reducing the amplification of disinformation.

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Chapter 8

What’s on the Menu for Today? Consumption Patterns, Threats and Opportunities of the High-Choice Media Environment

8.1 Introduction Recent research has raised several concerns regarding news consumption patterns in today’s media environment (e.g. Strömbäck et al. 2022). Some of the most frequently mentioned concerns refer to how people’s media diets look like and how they should look like, to news avoidance, to selective exposure patterns of news consumption (i.e. preference for entertaining rather than information-related content) as well as to several threats associated with exposure to various forms of misleading content in the media (e.g. Hopmann et al. 2016; Müller et al. 2017; Van Aelst et al. 2017). In this context, the current chapter includes an analysis of people’s media diets (specifically the descriptive perspective, what people actually consume and what their media diets include, and the normative perspective, what people should consume and how their media diets should look like), as well as references to three important threats associated with current patterns of news consumption with important consequences. Based on the currently available literature, news avoidance, selective exposure and exposure to disinformation are discussed as three of the most important threats posing serious consequences to the functioning of liberal democracies worldwide (Miller & Vaccari 2020). We will discuss the above-mentioned aspects by looking into how both ordinary people and experts (in this particular case, journalists and politicians) perceive both the media diets in today’s rich media environment and the potential threats associated with exposure to news (with a focus on news avoidance, selective exposure and disinformation). Our approach is motivated by the fact that, to the best of our knowledge, there are no other research studies so far conducted in Romania or any other Eastern European country exploring both citizens’ and elites’ perceptions of people’s media consumption patterns and potential informationrelated threats within the high-choice media environment. Furthermore, we believe that such a comparative approach will help us gain a better understanding of the © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Buturoiu et al., Patterns of News Consumption in a High-Choice Media Environment, Springer Studies in Media and Political Communication, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41954-6_8

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whole information environment and serve as a well-documented basis for addressing concerns at both levels – the ordinary citizens and the experts. Knowledge of both citizens’ and experts’ opinions is useful because it lays the ground for comparisons, including the awareness of possible divergences in views of potential threats between experts and ordinary people (Scholte et al. 2021). In this chapter, our aim is twofold. First, we are interested in mapping both ordinary citizens’ and experts’ perceptions of the main types of media content people in general (not experts) can choose from within the current media environment, with a focus on how a “healthy” media diet should look like (i.e. what people should consume to be able to form accurate opinions about what is going on in society and, therefore, develop sound attitudes and behaviours). Second, we aim to investigate how both citizens and experts perceive the emergence of, the consequences of and the solutions to three of the most relevant information-related threats within the current media landscape: news avoidance, selective exposure and disinformation. To accomplish these aims, first, we distinguish between two approaches – the descriptive and the normative. The descriptive approach refers to an in-depth analysis of current media consumption habits in the eyes of both citizens and experts, while the normative approach refers to the main principles of a “healthy” media diet (i.e. how a healthy media diet should look like). As most studies on media diets and news consumption patterns are based on a quantitative research design (for some exceptions, see Russmann & Hess 2020), they might miss this distinction between what is in a media diet and what should be there. One starting point to the emergence of a “healthy media diet” is connected to Jackson’s (2019) proverbial saying that “you are what you read”, referring to the fact that media consumption is similar to food consumption. Irresponsible intake of media might have similar consequences to irresponsible intake of food. Excessive consumption of information and information snacking are oftentimes associated with information overload (Bawden & Robinson 2009; Li 2017) or “infobesity” (Conner-Gaten et al. 2020). Furthermore, information overload is also associated with the difficulty of discerning true from false information (Lewandowsky 2019). The wide availability of media content and sources could leave people uninformed (as they are not able to process all the available information), less informed or misinformed (as they cannot make the difference between correct and misleading information). According to Benton (2021), the “healthiest” news media diet is traditional media but consumed in a conscious manner because much of any media might leave people uninformed. Therefore, the first research question we aim to explore tackles both the descriptive and the normative approach to media diets: • RQ1. What are and what should be the news consumption patterns of citizens in the high-choice media environment? Second, we investigate the main threats/challenges and opportunities in the current media environment (in line with the research study conducted by Castro et al. (2022). In terms of challenges or threats that can be found today in the current media landscape, studies so far have pointed to patterns of avoiding and/or selectively exposing to news and information and also to the emergence of echo chambers

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and potential exposure to misleading information (see Dahlgren 2020; Humprecht et al. 2020; Morosoli et al. 2022). Before going more in-depth and analysing three of the most important threats people might be exposed to when consuming news media today, we are interested in revealing how both ordinary people and experts perceive the array of changes the current information environment is facing. This approach is relevant because it seems to be the first of this type exploring both the perceptions of ordinary people and those of elites on the potential threats and the available opportunities available in the rich media environment. In this context, we ask the second research question: • RQ2. What are the main threats and opportunities of the current media landscape? While general perceptions of the threats and opportunities within the current information environment are relevant as well, we strongly believe that some changes, such as news avoidance, selective news use and potential exposure to misleading content in the media, need special attention. Therefore, we focus our research on the above-mentioned three main threats associated with news media consumption in today’s media landscape. With regard to news avoidance, it is important to mention that, despite the increasing availability of news, people tend to avoid news either intentionally or unintentionally (Skovsgaard & Andersen 2020). Unintentional news is linked to the increased supply of media content and people’s preference for entertainment or other media products that often combine quality information with talk shows, comedy or fiction. Such media sources have become information sources, especially for people with a low interest in politics (Delli Carpini 2017). Intentional news avoidance is linked to a conscious decision to “tune out” of news. This behaviour is often connected with various reasons, such as the fact that news is framed in a pessimistic way, thus eliciting negative effects on people’s mood (Boukes & Vliegenthart 2017), decreasing trust in the media (Zerba 2011) or the feeling of information overload (i.e. people become tired of receiving, selecting, processing and evaluating (relevant) information that is available at a certain point in time) (Song et al. 2017). This holds particularly true with reference to social media news use (Van Erkel & Van Aelst 2021). The main concern related to news avoidance is that citizens remain uninformed about important public issues. This might have a negative impact on democracy in the sense that it could contribute to further fragmentation, block equal access to information (Karlsen et al. 2020) and lower the chances of the emergence of a shared basis for deliberation and opinion formation, one pre-existing condition for successful liberal democracies (Habermas 2006). In this context, we advance the third research question: • RQ3. What are the causes, consequences and solutions to news avoidance perceived by ordinary people, journalists and politicians?

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Selective news use or selective exposure to news refers to people’s tendency to select only those news pieces that support their pre-existing beliefs. Concerns about selective exposure to news have recently gained ground (Thorson et al. 2019). This happened mainly because such exposure to news has the potential to limit people’s exposure to cross-cutting content and attitude-inconsistent views (Liao & Fu 2013; Stroud 2008). Those people who selectively expose themselves to news can be trapped in the so-called echo chambers of their own beliefs and interests (Barberá 2020; Sunstein 2018). This, in turn, might contribute to polarisation and threaten the existence of a shared space for information seeking, debate and opinion formation (Müller et al. 2017; Terren & Borge-Bravo 2021). In such a context, it becomes essential to start thinking about both ordinary citizens’ and experts’ perceptions of the causes, consequences and solutions towards such a threat that has the potential to result in letting people selectively be informed about what is going on in society at a certain point in time. Therefore, we ask the fourth research question: • RQ4. What are the causes, consequences and solutions to selective exposure perceived by ordinary people, journalists and politicians? Besides those concerns related to media users being either uninformed or selectively informed, there is a growing concern associated with the negative effects of exposure to misleading content in the media (more details on the causes and consequences of exposure to misleading content in the media are available in Chap. 6). Recent events (especially the COVID-19 pandemic) have facilitated the emergence of several studies tackling the role of the media (particularly social media) in spreading misand disinformation (e.g. Bin Naeem & Kamel Boulos 2021; Li et al. 2022; Scheufele & Krause 2019; Verrall 2022). In any form, misleading content spread in the media poses critical challenges to democratic societies. Political polarisation, emergence of inaccurate perceptions of public actors and issues and decreasing levels of trust in the media, journalists and other public institutions are some of the negative effects associated with exposure to misleading information in the media (Allcott & Gentzkow 2017; Ciampaglia et al. 2018; Edelman 2019; Lewandowsky et al. 2012). General solutions to such threats usually involve fact-checking, quality journalism, policymaking and education (Bechmann 2020; Horowitz et al. 2022; Pherson et al. 2021; Saurwein & Spencer-Smith 2020; Shu et al. 2020). In such a context, it is relevant to look at both sides – citizens, on the one side, and experts (journalists and politicians), on the other – to better understand how they perceive such threats in terms of both causes and consequences and how they feel they could contribute to deal with such important threats. Against this backdrop, we formulate our fifth research question: • RQ5. What are the causes, consequences and solutions to disinformation perceived by ordinary people, journalists and politicians?

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8.2 Method We conducted two focus group interviews and nine in-depth expert interviews1 in Romania, from 18 April to 11 May 2021. We preferred to use focus groups for ordinary citizens, as they allow for both reaching group consensus, when existing, and fostering divergent opinions, providing insights into what people think and why they think in that particular way (Cyr 2016). The two focus groups were conducted with young people (18–25 years of age) and older people (more than 55 years of age), as current literature suggests pronounced generational differences in media use in the current media environment (Andersen et al. 2021). In the focus group with young people, two males and five females participated, and its total duration was 1h and 44 minutes; and the one with the elderly, two males and four females were interviewed for 1h and 21 minutes. Participants were recruited using existing second-order contacts of authors, none of them being a direct contact of the author leading the focus groups. Focus groups were conducted via the digital platform Webex and used a pre-defined question guide. To find out experts’ opinions about news consumption patterns and possible solutions to enduring problems of the current media environment, we chose to use in-depth interviews, as “elites are used to be asked about their opinions and thoughts” (Kvale 2007, p. 70), thus providing key insights into the proposed topics of discussion. In the expert interviews, we discussed with four politicians and five journalists. The politicians were all males, members of the Romanian Parliament in Education, Culture or Media Commissions and representing the four major parties in the Parliament (PSD, Social Democratic Party; PNL, National Liberal Party; USR, Save Romania Union; AUR, Alliance for the Unity of Romanians). The journalists were three females and two males, representing liberal and mission-oriented media (two), liberal and market-oriented media (one), neutral and mission-oriented (one) and conservative and mission-oriented media (one). All interviews were conducted on the Zoom platform, except for one politician who preferred to meet face to face in his office at the Parliament House. Each interview lasted between 35 minutes and 1 hour and 5 minutes. All participants in focus groups and interviews received, prior to data collection, an invitation and a file with detailed information about the project and offered either written or oral (registered) informed consent on a series of 13 statements regarding recording, data anonymity, further use of information, etc. All interviews were recorded and further transcribed verbatim, personal data being entirely deleted from all documents. To preserve people’s anonymity, we created codes for each participant, starting with the country code (as the research was conducted as part of a cross-country research design), followed by the type of participant (C stands for citizens, J for

1 Data in this chapter was gathered in the project The Threats and Potentials of a Changing Political Information Environment, THREATPIE (threatpie.eu).

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Table 8.1 Sample of participants in interviews Date 19 April 2021 19 April 2021 19 April 2021 23 April 2021 26 April 2021 Date 18 April 2021 22 April 2021 28 April 2021 11 April 2021

Code ROJ01 ROJ02 ROJ03 ROJ04 ROJ05 Code ROP01 ROP02 ROP03 ROP04

Gender M F M F F Gender M M M M

Type of media outlet Liberal and mission-oriented Conservative and mission-oriented Neutral and mission-oriented Liberal and market-oriented Liberal and mission-oriented Political orientation Right Right Right Left

Platform Zoom Zoom Zoom Zoom Zoom Platform Zoom Zoom Zoom Face to face

Duration 40:58 36:11 49:08 32:46 50:29 Duration 49:05 1:01:25 1:05:16 34:42

journalists, and P for politicians). Table 8.1 provides an overview of the sample of journalists and politicians.

8.3 Findings This section will be structured following the logic of the five research questions, each subsection presenting first ordinary people’s perceptions – comparing people’s perceptions from two generations – and then experts’ opinions – comparing journalists’ and politicians’ viewpoints. First, we will discuss people’s preferences in what concerns their media diets and then their perceptions about what a healthy diet should contain. Second, we investigate threats and opportunities within the current media landscape. Third, we analyse three important threats to democracy in the current high-choice media environment: news avoidance, selective exposure and disinformation. We need to say that, even though we expected some differences between different journalists and politicians based on their political affiliation or leaning, there were no particular differences worth mentioning from this point of view, and therefore, we did not refer to these differences in reporting results. We used a thematic analysis approach in analysing the data.

8.3.1 Media Diets: A Descriptive and Normative Approach The discussions about media diets mainly concerned the sources of information people prefer when following news about political issues but also a generational perspective of the main types of media outlets used by people in different age categories. Experts were questioned about their perception of general people’s preferences in terms of media diets and not about their own news consumption

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habits. Additionally, we report on an interesting discussion using the metaphor of media diet, about what a “healthy media diet” should contain.

8.3.1.1

Ordinary People’s Perspective on Media Diets

When discussing the main sources of information for political topics, young people agree that their generation’s media diet is heavily unbalanced, even toxic, as it contains mostly social media sources and, at the same time, there are some unhealthy habits of consuming news, such as “news snacking” or selective exposure: “I believe that nowadays young people have a toxic media diet, because not all that is online is ok [. . . ] very few are interested in politics or education, science, and many are only interested in sensationalist stories, TikTok, Instagram. . . ”. (ROC01) “They have this syndrome, lack of attention. People simply don’t have the desire to read an article or a news story till the end. They just see these clickbaits and just don’t have the patience to finish a news story”. (ROC04)

Young people are convinced that their generation is most of the time not interested in politics; therefore, most of the time, they prefer content related to entertainment, being almost entirely ignorant of the importance of following the news and its consequences. However, there is no consensus among respondents when people talk about their news consumption patterns (and not their generation as a whole): some of the young people describe themselves as heavy users of political news with a deep interest in politics, comparing national and international news sources, etc., while some others openly confess they are entirely avoiding news. On the other hand, the elderly prefer TV as the main source of political information, even though some also mention other sources: “We get the information from TV; I also use Facebook a lot, so this is it”. (ROC11) “Strictly for politics, I think that most of the people of our age take their news from TV, maybe 60–70% also use the Internet, Facebook, and other audio and video sources”. (ROC12)

Additionally, there is no consensus among this generation when discussing their own interests and preferences in terms of political news: some of the respondents tend to avoid the news but yet confess about “stumbling” on news while doing different other activities (incidental news exposure) or being unable to avoid the news, while others are more interested and follow the news on a more regular basis. As a whole, the elderly differ from the young generation, as they tend to believe that people are generally interested in political news. Maybe the most interesting finding was discovered when asking each generation to discuss the news consumption patterns of the other, revealing sort of a thirdperson effect: each generation believes the other to be more negatively influenced by the information they include into their media diets. On the one hand, young people appreciate that the elderly are more vulnerable to disinformation and more

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politically biased due to their lack of digital skills and heavy politically biased media preferences: “I believe that the elderly are more vulnerable to news and choose to consume even these stories that are fake, as they are not used to how social media work and the entire digital environment”. (ROC06) “I believe that the elderly are more vulnerable to news and choose to consume even these stories that are fake, as they are not used to how social media work and the entire digital environment”. (ROC06) “they feed themselves only with news about a certain issue, party, or ideology”. (ROC07)

On the other hand, people from generation 55.+ believe their young counterparts are much less interested in politics and only consume news from social networks: “They are a generation who grew up with computers, I-pads, laptops; they often have different activities they enjoy, and forget to watch news on TV”. (ROC13) “the most part of the young generations only consume entertainment, when it comes to media, and not news. Let alone politics . . . there is a general lack of interest [. . . ] There are obvious differences between generations, between the seniors, as you gracefully called us, and the juniors, the cadets”. (ROC08)

When discussing the changes brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic, both generations agree that the pandemic favoured increased news consumption in general, probably due to the need for orientation (Matthes 2006). To this, the youngsters add that the pandemic has brought about an unprecedented amount of misleading information (fake news) with the purpose of manipulating people: “Generally speaking, crises of all sorts make it easy for many people to influence the crowds, as it happened with this crisis”. (ROC03) “If we discuss in political terms, it becomes easy to manipulate others, in such a context. . . to impose ideas to people who stay at home and consume this news. This pandemic is a perfect opportunity for political (or any other type of) instruments”. (ROC04)

Using a normative perspective, we wanted to know how people see a healthy media diet. The diet analogy has proved effective in making people better understand normative practices (Marcu et al. 2015). The concept of healthy media diets was inspired by the saying “you are what you read” (Jackson 2019), based on the proverbial “you are what you eat”. Building on the food analogy, people could discuss irresponsible news consumption, the risk of information overload (Bawden & Robinson 2009; Li 2017) or “infobesity” (Conner-Gaten et al. 2020). For young people, a healthy diet could be the result of more (social) media regulation, but also more frequent, yet not excessive, news consumption, multiple and diversified news sources and fact-checking: “First of all, we should get informed daily, and from diverse sources”. (ROC03) “You mentioned the term ‘diet’: both in the alimentary and in the media diet there needs to be a limit, to know how to limit yourself. As in a diet, one chooses healthy food, so in the media diet, one needs to strive to find healthy news”. (ROC04)

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The older generation translates the idea of a healthy media diet in a similar way, that is, more but not excessive political information: “I would add political news to the media diet, as one puts salt on their meal: the less, the better, but [political news is] needed”. (ROC10) “I totally agree, we need to know what is happening in the world around us, not be ignorant about the world we live in, but too much is unhealthy, less news but of quality, if possible, real news”. (ROC09)

Summing up, there are important differences between the youth and the elderly in their perceptions regarding their own, their generation’s and the other generation’s media diets. Young people take their political news mostly from social media and perceive their generation as mostly uninterested in news in general and the older generation as more interested but also more vulnerable to biased information. Older people have a preference for TV as a news source and believe their generation to be more interested in news and the young generation more vulnerable to being less informed about public issues. A healthy diet is, for both generations, one in which people find the good balance of constantly but not obsessively following the news.

8.3.1.2

Experts’ Perspective on Media Diets

Experts’ view on people’s media diets offers an outside perspective on the news consumption patterns among the general audience. The journalists and politicians we interviewed have more or less similar views on the subject: they generally agree that people consume both TV and social media information, with a preference for TV, even though online news sources have gained a lot of ground in the last years: “There has been an increase in the consumption of virtual news through the internet, websites, and social media”. (ROJ01) “I think that Romanians have remained big consumers of television news”. (ROJ02) “I keep believing that televisions have an important role in Romania [. . . ] people have started to turn to official sites and official information, I do not know how much, but I think that more and more people get their information from official and verified sites”. (ROP01)

Even though this is the dominant opinion among both journalists and politicians, there are some exceptions. One politician (ROP03) perceives both TV and online sources as equally important in people’s media diets, while another journalist provides a more nuanced perspective: there are two categories of public, one mostly uninformed and one very informed and pretentious with regard to news quality: “we have on the one hand the very informed public, that is very pretentious and has increased demands from the press [. . . ] on the other hand, we have that public that doesn’t even want a lot of information” (ROJ05). The same journalist believes that there is one segment of the population that does not have access to online news, people living in rural and small urban areas, which deprives them of a “healthy media diet”.

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The second pattern cited by both journalists and politicians is selective exposure: people tend to consume news that confirms their own beliefs and convictions. They watch, read and follow the same sources, living in a bubble equally constructed for them by algorithms and by their own preferences, sometimes referred to as “their daily routine” (ROP02). In this context, both journalists and politicians discuss the issue of news quality, which has decreased in the last years under the pressure of “breaking news”: “It’s just ridiculous to make breaking news out of anything, that is, to dilute it in a such a way, and then there’s sensational, the clickbait, and then [. . . ] there is the socalled news which broadcast for example funerals, weddings, a pot of everything” (ROP03). Another problem identified by both groups of experts is related to a more and more clear preference of the audience for soft news and entertainment, news that is “easy to digest” (ROJ03) and “entertainment news” (ROP03). This preference translates in a preference for tabloid content, sensationalist stories, which could lead to “pathologies” of news consumption: “Unfortunately, the vast majority of society feeds exclusively with this type of media food and, obviously, they are also «mentally obese»” (ROP03). However, people turn to politics when something important happens in the public arena, such as elections, demission of a member of the government or crisis situations, such as the COVID-19 pandemic. When discussing the potential consequences of the current media environment, journalists and politicians alike view two issues as salient: on the one hand, there is an overabundance of information, leading to low levels of understanding and making sense of the news and the possibility of encountering potentially harmful content; on the other hand, society is becoming more and more polarised: “My feeling is that a few years ago when you met a person, you could have a real discussion, based on arguments, while now, you don’t even make an effort to come up with arguments in front of the other person, because it’s very clear that they have a formed opinion that cannot be changed”. (ROJ02) “People are not necessarily polarized, but simply those who are on a certain central position are terrified that they are either cursed from the left or cursed from the right. If you allow yourself a point of view, for example, see what is happening on the radically progressive side with ‘cancel culture’, but also on the other side of right-wing extremism, so if you allow yourself a point of view on one of the delicate topics, it is almost impossible not to be attacked”. (ROP02)

Additionally, both journalists and politicians are concerned with the danger of the press becoming irrelevant and express their concerns about this issue, especially because the press should be an important means of education. At the same time, the news production patterns have changed under the pressure of immediacy of reporting, which affected the quality of news: “A threat is the quality of information, what the press sends to its audiences. We could see a change in the reasons behind the journalistic act. When I got my training as a journalist, we used to believe in notions such as equidistance, impartiality, multiple sources, common-sense notions, basics . . . I believe now the reasons which motivate journalists have changed. [. . . ]

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We go full speed, automatically, and in my view, this affects the quality of the press” (ROJ03). There is much variety in the way both journalists and politicians conceive a healthy media diet. Some of them believe political news should be an important part of people’s healthy media diet and 20–30% of people’s daily news should be political news (ROJ03; ROP01), while others propose a much lower percentage (10% – ROP03) or even eliminating politics entirely from the news media diet, as politics is merely a show (ROP02). Alternatively, people ought to recognise their own partisanship to be able to actually keep a diet, which means “eating what you don’t like, because that’s why you look like this, because you ate what you liked” [ROP02]. In other words, people need to expose themselves to a variety of sources, avoiding only seeking confirmation of their own beliefs. Another journalist (ROJ01) appreciates that the media diet should be personalised based on age, occupational status, etc., as long as it contains some political news, but in doses that would make people feel comfortable. One politician sees politics as a mandatory part of the daily news consumption routine, but in reasonable amounts: “People should consume politics almost every day. As you have three meals a day, you should consume politics three times a day, but in reasonable amounts. Between meals, it is said that you still have to eat fruit to see what is happening in your country and the world in general. Now everything is global; you see that your village is also connected to distant places on the globe. So, political news is important because it makes us better prepared for today’s world” (ROP04). Overall, experts appreciate that TV news is still the most prominent source of information for the large audience, while at the same time online news (including social media news) is gaining more and more ground and is becoming a key source of information, especially for younger generations. They believe that the current news consumption patterns include too much soft news, which influences the quality of (some) media content. Additionally, one key issue associated with the news within the high-choice media environment is selective exposure: people consume predominantly news that confirms their own views and biases, which leads to increased polarisation in society. A healthy media diet should include political news but in reasonable amounts.

8.3.2 Threats and Opportunities of the High-Choice Media Environment After discussing people’s consumption patterns and the normative perspective on media diets, our respondents were asked to provide information about the threats (or negative problems) associated with the current media landscape and opportunities provided by the same environment, especially due to the high-speed technological developments, platforms, toolkits, etc.

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In this section, we will discuss the threats and opportunities spontaneously mentioned by the respondents. In the subsequent sections, we focus on two salient threats discussed by the participants in both focus groups and interviews.

8.3.2.1

Ordinary People’s Perspective on Threats and Opportunities of the Current Media Environment

When discussing threats within the current media landscape, ordinary people first mention disinformation, in both groups, the youth and the elderly. The seniors do not see any other threats spontaneously, without them being mentioned by the moderator, but young people discuss several topics: manipulation, effects of algorithms, poor quality of journalism and viralisation of questionable content. Additionally, only the youth pointed to some opportunities brought about by the new technologies. Disinformation was the “hot topic” in both groups when people considered the negative aspects of the media landscape in the last decade. Both groups believe there is a very high incidence of misleading content in the media, but the elderly appreciate that misinformation (i.e. disinformation without intention – see Wardle (2017), for a typology), under the pressure of time and search for scoops, is more prevalent than disinformation: “I basically encounter fake news daily. They say that we live in a post-truth era. If I am to be honest, I think we have always lived surrounded by many false things, much disinformation, it is just that now it has become global, so to say . . . ”. (ROC04) “It happens quite often. I have encountered such news. Chasing the news, to be the first to publish the news, a TV channel could broadcast a news story without knowing too much about it”. (ROC12)

Clickbait, as a sign of poor-quality journalism, is spontaneously mentioned by both groups. In the context of the discussion of manipulation, young people have a long talk about the role played by algorithms, which they see as both a threat and an opportunity. On the one hand, algorithms could create the perfect environment for manipulation; on the other hand, they could help build perfectly personalised content for each individual, which makes relevant information accessible. In this context, the Cambridge Analytica scandal is invoked as a form of dangerous threat to democracy itself: “I think we should agree that social media are a weapon that could create extreme destruction. [. . . ] For example, Cambridge Analytica”. (ROC05) “The main thing with this algorithm is that it always gets better in a geometric progression. [. . . ] The algorithm has many possibilities to manipulate you through a different type of content, a little bit softer but close. [. . . ] for example “neo-Nazism”, at first you look for the word to understand what it means; then you get something soft, why we should not think neo-Nazis are not bad. . . then you start to think you would be cool at school to explain to your friends why neo-Nazism is not such a bad thing, so you start consuming info about

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it, to be informed. . . which is a very nice way starts to impregnate your consciousness”. (ROC04)

Virality of information is another threat discussed in the young people group, as it is difficult to discern between real and falsified information, which could make questionable content go viral, with negative personal and societal consequences (ROC07). Young people are knowledgeable about social media-associated phenomena, such as algorithms, bots, echo chambers, virality, etc.; therefore, the discussion was always more nuanced and elaborated. Older people seem to be unaware of such dangers or opportunities, and therefore, the spontaneous discussion about threats and opportunities was short and linear. Young people also discussed the possible effects of these new phenomena, most of them negative, at both personal and societal levels. At the personal level, the new media environment might influence a biased or deformed view of the world: “One of the effects would be that people might form wrong ideas about an issue; this is one of the greatest threats”. (ROC04) “This supposes that people form mistaken perceptions about the entire political sphere”. (ROC06)

Additionally, people could get “lost” and “confused” after being exposed to contradictory opinions on the same subject. In the elderly group, people discussed possible negative effects of disinformation, which, in the context of the sanitary crisis of COVID-19, are interpreted as a threat to people’s health. In the youth group, several opportunities were mentioned, such as instant access to information, various helpful apps or the diversity of information sources. Additionally, they see the changes in the quality of journalism in both a positive and a negative light. Some people see the pressure of “breaking news” as a real threat, while others believe that investigative journalism has become much deeper and has reached many more people, thanks to the new technologies. Overall, ordinary people see more threats than opportunities in the new media environment, with disinformation being the main negative problem and instant access to information the most important positive aspect.

8.3.2.2

Experts’ Perspective on Threats and Opportunities of the Current Media Environment

In the experts’ group, the discussion about threats and opportunities spontaneously mentioned by participants was much more nuanced than in the group of ordinary people. There are common points of view shared between journalists and politicians on many subjects, as well as unique perspectives offered by each subgroup. The common topics were disinformation and selective media exposure. Disinformation was, in fact, mentioned by two thirds of the interviewed experts (three journalists and three politicians). All other threats were usually discussed by one or two experts.

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Journalists discussed several negative aspects associated with the high-choice media environment: political news avoidance (ROJ01); partisan media coverage (polarisation) (ROJ01 and ROJ02); poor training of journalists (ROJ04); news relevance and news values (ROJ05); contextualisation, which could influence the way people interpret the news (ROJ05); and lack of follow-up, which sometimes makes journalism irrelevant for social change (ROJ05). Among politicians, there were two threats discussed by two interviewees: excessive use of media (especially due to and during the pandemic) (ROP02) and the way the public agenda is set up by the press, with important issues not covered in the media (ROP03). Journalists’ views on disinformation include two angles: disinformation which targets audiences and disinformation which focuses on journalists: “Online, social media and the traditional press are for the ordinary citizens. As a journalist, now, of course, unfortunately, the institutions will remain sources of disinformation, and this happens not because they lie, because, as we know, fake news has nothing to do with lies but with half-truths manipulated and used to serve a cause, and this happens very often at the level of institutions” (ROJ05). Additionally, they see this threat as spreading from the top down, involving public figures and affecting ordinary people (ROJ02; ROJ04). Sometimes, politicians are mentioned as sources of disinformation by the journalists, while journalists are blamed for occulting some important topics by the interviewed politicians. When asked about the possible effects of disinformation, both journalists and politicians mention polarisation, which could lead to hate and affect social cohesion (ROJ05; ROP04). Additionally, the journalists discuss the social movements during the pandemic, conspiracy theories and real health-threatening individual effects during the pandemic (“Let’s not forget that we had examples of people who drank disinfectant being convinced that it is the rescue against COVID” (ROJ02)), as well as erosion of trust in journalism, in general. Other individual-level effects are alienation, confusion and neuroticism (ROJ04; ROJ05) and isolation and marginalisation (ROP04). When discussing partisanship, journalists talk about the editorial politics dictated by the media owners, which could lead to people being captive in “parallel realities” and erosion of trust in authorities: “People voluntarily choose to do so and have neither the courage nor the competence to expand this sphere. Then, all these threats, namely highly polarized media companies and institutions that have actors outside the borders behind them erode trust in authorities, evident consequences that peaked during the pandemic”. (ROJ01) “We want to believe that we are objective, but people associate us with certain parties or with certain political directions”. (ROJ02)

The lack of training of journalists and the lack of real journalistic values, such as equidistance and objectivity, could lead to low levels of trust in the media and the journalistic act and the “alienation of the public” (ROJ03). The fact that journalistic routines of news production have changed, as they tend to cover more and more sensationalist news and soft topics at the expense of social and political news, diminishes the value of the news and makes it irrelevant (“we live in this area of

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consumerist news” (ROJ05)). Moreover, (de-)contextualisation could be misleading and confusing to people when understanding the news. Both journalists and politicians see some opportunities offered by the new media environment but very limited. The journalists discuss the opportunity of reaching people much faster and on many channels (ROJ01; ROJ02), as well as the diversification of the journalistic means, which now include podcasts, online video, digital content, etc. (ROJ05), diversification that reflects on changing patterns of news production. Only one politician mentions the opportunity that ordinary people have to make their voice heard: “if you really want to change something at some point, and you try as a citizen, and nothing happens, you have to appear on TV. [. . . ] In Romania, the only opportunity is the press. If it doesn’t work in any other way, call the press” (ROP03). Summing up, experts see many threats in the new media landscape, among which disinformation is the most prominent. Social and individual negative effects are discussed: at a societal level, diminished trust in both the media and authorities are the main threats, while at the individual level – confusion, alienation, health issues and isolation. The experts we interviewed see much fewer opportunities than threats, among which are the diversification of sources of information and the possibility of reaching audiences much faster.

8.3.3 News Avoidance and Selective Exposure: Causes, Effects and Solutions News avoidance and selective exposure as threats associated with the high-choice media environment were specifically investigated during the focus groups and interviews, irrespective of the fact that people spontaneously mentioned (or not) them during the discussions. Oftentimes, the discussions covered both phenomena, as the respondents linked the two or sometimes saw them as the two facets of the same coin. Other times, respondents, especially in the focus groups, paid much less attention to selective exposure (the elderly even considering that, in fact, there is no real problem with choosing the media that you resonate with as the sole source of information). In this section, we discuss ordinary people’s and experts’ views on these two particular threats, focusing on causes, consequences and possible solutions to both.

8.3.3.1

Ordinary People’s Perspective on News Avoidance and Selective Exposure

News avoidance was the main focus of the discussion in both groups, while selective exposure was only discussed in terms of solutions. Part of the reason is that selective exposure is not considered a real threat in the focus group with the elderly and the

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youth do not pay close attention to the phenomenon. News avoidance, on the other hand, was given plenty of attention in both groups. The main reasons why people avoid news are diverse and rather different between the two generations. The only commonly mentioned motivation is the lack of trust: in political news in general, in journalists and in politicians. Additionally, the elderly consider political news stressful and overwhelming and therefore tend to avoid it, while the youth see it as hard to understand, part of the problem being that the young generations are not educated enough to process news correctly. When discussing trust-related issues, the elderly consider journalists biased: “I don’t trust journalists, as I noticed that TV channels are biased; each journalist from each channel gives a different interpretation of a news story, and then people cannot have the news as such, because it is different on each channel”. (ROC12) “yes, journalists are biased, there is no objectivity anymore”. (ROC08)

In the group of young people, there are divergent opinions about trust in journalists: some of them believe people cannot trust journalists, as they are “local barons” with hidden interests who dictate the content of the press (ROC03); others believe that people “trust journalists too much” (ROC02), which is problematic as people become gullible to any type of information. In both groups, the link between politicians and media content seems obvious. Part of the reason why people avoid news is the accentuated lack of trust in politicians and their involvement in the editorial politics of media trusts (see the above-mentioned discussion about media barons), as well as the “spectacle” the media allow them to perform, in their race for higher audience rates: “I don’t like the way they [politicians] express themselves, the way they talk. [. . . ] We are sick and tired of spectacles”. (ROC11) “We are in a political mud. Excuse my French, but it is what we see and hear in the Parliament, on TV, as a way of talking of people with each other. Whether we talk about behaviour, professional abilities, the way the political dialogue goes is . . . the language is inacceptable”. (ROC09) “I don’t think they trust politicians much, honestly . . . maybe only someone that they really like or with certain experience, but I don’t think they have a lot of trust, in general, you never know if a politician tells the truth or not”. (ROC07)

As mentioned before, another reason for news avoidance is the fact that older people consider news stressful (“Maybe oftentimes it is harmful, I mean listening, or staying all the time in front of the TV and watching the news, zapping through the channels, seeing the same news story, seeing what another reporter has to say about the same thing. . . I avoid this, and I prefer to relax with a football match or a movie”. (ROC13)) and younger people see news as hard to understand (“why people avoid news: it is because they find these political concepts very hard to understand and additionally, they are not well informed; only in school, in classes of civic education we have heard some things. People avoid things they don’t understand or don’t want to understand”. (ROC04)).

8.3 Findings

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In the elderly group, people associate news avoidance with the news-finds-me phenomenon. They appreciate that being on Facebook makes it impossible to miss a subject, as there is always a post about the main topics of everyday news. In the youth group, respondents believe young people are not educated enough about the importance of following and understanding (political) news and therefore they lack interest in being informed about social and political issues. When discussing selective exposure, the elderly do not see the phenomenon as a problem, as they believe it to be a “question of subjectivity; each person perceives things a certain way, and a particular TV channel is the one that responds to that person’s expectations [. . . ] I think this is neutral, neither negative, nor positive” (ROC10). On the other hand, the young respondents believe selective exposure is rather a problem among people from the elderly generation, as “the elderly prefer a certain party and they are used to that specific party; most of the time, they live in a bubble, an echo chamber, they watch more TV than social media, and they stay in that bubble as they get fed only with news about a certain thing, party, or ideology” (ROC07). In terms of consequences of news avoidance (and selective exposure), the elderly talk about political cynicism, which leads to low turnout in elections (ROC08), while young people see the main consequence to be a general uninformed population, which could be dangerous for the democratic process (ROC06). Additionally, they discuss the danger of becoming “victims” of extreme (right-wing) party propaganda (ROC04; ROC05). In terms of solutions, media literacy is mentioned as the solution by both groups, but media literacy is not currently part of the mandatory school curricula. However, they believe children and adolescents who participated in media education classes are much better equipped to understand news and to get more involved in the democratic process (ROC08). In a similar vein, young respondents believe that teachers who teach in both elementary and high school should educate their pupils with regard to news importance and the possible consequences of not following news regularly. There is currently a total lack of such discussion in classrooms (ROC02). Both groups do not see journalists’ or politicians’ work as possible solutions as they are considered part of the problem due to their own interests. Summing up, news avoidance and, to some extent, selective exposure are seen as real problems of the current media environment. The motivations respondents mention most frequently are related to the lack of trust in journalists, politicians and political news in general, and the common possible solution suggested is (more) media education classes in schools.

8.3.3.2

Experts’ Perspective on News Avoidance and Selective Exposure

As in the case of ordinary people, journalists mainly discussed political news avoidance and only tangentially touched the topic of selective exposure, possibly because, as ordinary people mentioned, they are part of the problem. Politicians, on

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the other hand, saw selective exposure as an important issue and paid more attention to the topic. Selective exposure was seen as a serious threat at both individual and social levels. In politicians’ view, people develop political news consumption routines, which become a form of “belonging to an ideological tribe” (ROP02). The main reason why this type of news consumption pattern occurs is people’s need to reinforce their own beliefs and avoid cognitive dissonance. A second reason is the familiar feeling people get when watching or reading their favourite media brands, which adds to a lack of critical thinking (ROP02; ROP04). On the other hand, journalists see one possible cause of selective exposure in the way social media algorithms make visible the posts of people’s favourite media, reinforcing a vicious circle of selecting only the news that confirms people’s own beliefs and attitudes (ROJ01). The consequences of selective news exposure are twofold: personal level and societal level. At the personal level, this phenomenon could lead to alienation and real tensions in some families because of political discussions (ROP02). At the societal level, polarisation of the public debate on various topics was mentioned by both journalists and politicians: “As I said before, I see that kind of polarization; people looking for the news that confirms their prejudices. They seek those people they trust, some characters or even public personalities who function as gatekeepers of information”. (ROJ01) “Manicheism and this black and white judgment. We don’t have yet a study about Manicheism in Romania, but it had extremist forms in the past”. (ROP04) “Polarization and enhancement of partisanship. . . this leads to fanaticism and the radicalisms I have already talked about”. (ROP02)

Furthermore, at the societal level, journalists mentioned the danger of “parallel realities”: “There are people living in parallel perceptive worlds, even though they share the same city, the same country; this is happening because they become trapped by certain information sources [. . . ] a captivity to which they have willingly subscribed” (ROJ01). For politicians, there are also other negative consequences of selective exposure, such as decreased social cohesion, vulnerability to fake news and street protests (ROP02). The solution to this particular threat is education (i.e. media literacy in schools), raising the quality of journalism and restoring trust in both journalists and politicians. As mentioned before, news avoidance was discussed more in-depth by both journalists and politicians. When discussing the causes of political news avoidance, both journalists and politicians believe that one important reason is the fact that people perceive a negative valance associated with politics in general: “Politics, in general, has a very negative valence; it is a derogatory term, often associated with immorality and theft. That is why people seek to avoid political news”. (ROJ01) “people become disgusted by political news, disgusted by politicians and maybe that’s why they avoid them”. (ROJ04)

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“People are bored because politics is seen in a negative way, they say that all of them are the same. It is a big problem, and it is very difficult to address it, and this leads to the lack of desire to look for political news, to be interested in politics”. (ROP01)

Journalists mention various other reasons why people tend to avoid political news: lack of trust in politicians, as “the quality of the political act has decreased” (ROP01); the fact that media focus most of the time on political scandal, which leads to keeping politics “at the level of entertainment” (ROJ05); and the fact that “political discourse is presumed to be partisan or insincere” (ROJ05). Politicians, on the other hand, talk about political cynicism: people feel they are excluded and marginalised and politics is not relevant for them because they feel their voice is not heard or because this is more convenient for them: “They just don’t care, and they don’t care because they don’t think it’s relevant for their lives [. . . ]. Practically for a good part of those who do not consume politics, the lack of consumption is the recognition of a lack of power; politics is above”. (ROP02) “It is also the feeling that it is a world that does not belong to them [. . . ] a world to which they do not have access, and this is also the fault of the politician that tightly closes the doors”. (ROP04)

The possible effects of political news avoidance are uninformed citizens, vulnerability to disinformation and low turnout rates; all these three are mentioned by both journalists and politicians. Maybe the most prominent negative effect is that people become sceptic and refuse to vote in any type of election: “Avoiding news leads to disinterest [. . . ] and in the long-term people tend not to vote or not to be interested in the political reality. People have this idea that they can live outside, disconnected from the political reality”. (ROJ01) “This can be seen in the declining turnout. A party should bring people back to the centre of their attention and open up to society”. (ROP04)

As in the case of selective exposure, the one key solution to the problem of news avoidance is education. Journalists believe that media literacy is mostly needed for the younger generations, who could still change their news consumption patterns through a better understanding of the role of political news. Politicians perceive that critical thinking abilities should be created in schools, which would make the next generations more resilient and capable of getting the best out of the political news. Additionally, journalists believe media should play a role through media production routine changes, thus improving the quality of news: “Although we really want to be objective, very often we are not because, taking a look at other colleagues from all over the press, it is very clear to me that no matter how much we would like to leave the likes and dislikes at home or in the newsroom, they can be seen on TV. [. . . ] The press should return to what it once represented, to transmit information and not opinions” (ROJ02). Politicians, on the other hand, believe politics could be efficient in reducing the high polarisation within society created, most of the time, by selective exposure and political news avoidance “because there is no political class operating separately [from the public]” (ROP04).

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To conclude, experts see both selective exposure and news avoidance as serious threats to democracy and sometimes even to people’s personal lives. They believe people are becoming more and more cynical and sceptical, convinced that politics is out of their reach and they cannot do anything to change the important social problems. The main solution both groups suggest to counter these threats is media literacy, especially targeted at the young generations.

8.3.4 Disinformation: Causes, Effects and Solutions Disinformation was the one threat that all interviewed people spontaneously mentioned and viewed as a real danger to both individual and social life, with no exception. Part of the reason for the unanimous opinion is probably the vivid public debate about “fake news” and propaganda, which fuels people’s fears with regard to possible effects. In this section, we follow the same structure as for previous sections, focusing on ordinary people’s and experts’ perspectives on the reason, effects and solutions to the phenomenon of disinformation. In analysing the results, we will use Wardle and Derekshan (2017) distinction between “disinformation”, that is, misleading information intended to harm a person, group, organisation or country, and “misinformation”, which refers to unintended false information, for example, poor-quality journalism; misleading information circulated under the pressure of time, sometimes with the intention to help; etc. 8.3.4.1

Ordinary People’s Perspective on Disinformation

Before delving into a full discussion about the causes, effects and solutions of disinformation, the participants in the two focus groups briefly discussed how they perceive the prevalence of misleading information in the media in Romania. In the young people’s group, there was a unanimous perception that “fake news” is overwhelmingly present in many forms and is impossible to escape. The elderly make the distinction between intended and unintended disinformation (i.e. the already classic distinction between dis- and misinformation), appreciating that the latter is quite prevalent, especially under the pressure of immediacy in the media landscape. They also believe that disinformation is more prevalent in the online environment than on TV. Both groups mention clickbait as a frequent avatar of “fake news”. Moving to the reasons why dis- and misinformation are so prevalent, the older respondents mention ratings (chasing the breaking news) and political or financial interests: “Probably making a good audience. Ratings”. (ROC09) “I think that for the news about the pandemic and the vaccine, there are some interests involved. Political, financial interests”. (ROC10)

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The youth discuss at this point the distinction between intended and unintended spread of falsified content, which fuels people’s ignorance. Other motives for creating and spreading disinformation would be related to power and profit: “I think we could imagine a triangle, with one factor at each corner. The first would be profit, second would be ignorance, third would be power. Profit and power could go hand in hand but ignorance is the most important because if there are malicious people or who have some machiavellian purposes, ignorant people amplify the phenomenon, spreading it forward without even knowing” (ROC05). This type of ignorance is amplified by people’s need to receive self-gratification about knowing some rare information about an issue, a sort of “Dunning-Kruger effect” (ROC04). When discussing (negative) effects of disinformation, the elderly find it difficult to mention any of them explicitly but judge the effects as affecting both personal and social lives: “I believe that people are influenced by this news, not only at an individual level but also at societal level” (ROC10). The only instance mentioned as an example is the pandemic, with no further details. By contrast, the youth discuss effects in more depth, with many nuances. They believe disinformation could harm individuals at a personal level, by causing anxiety (which could then result in news avoidance), by turning people against each other or by creating a general feeling of insecurity: “Of course, disinformation has an effect on people’s choices, first of all, because this disinformation is very much based on fear; and this is a central element to create divides, turn people against each other. I think it is all related to our emotional side; once we fear something, we cling on that information, or a political figure, or a group, we see them as our saviours; only they could save us”. (ROC03) “There is this effect which has emerged because for many years there has been an enormous amount of news with negative psychological impact”. (ROC05)

Additionally, young people discuss disinformation as a threat to democracy by affecting voting, political inefficacy and polarisation (ROC05). The main “weapon” to fight dis- and misinformation is education. Both groups perceive media education classes as very much needed in schools, but also at the university level. Young people even discuss various ways of implementing media literacy: in universities, NGOs, public events and even focus groups as the one in which they were participating: “I have participated in this focus group and got some fresh information that I could apply; this is a step toward change; we need to do that with our colleagues, friends, cousins, step by step, we could change things” (ROC02). If for the young generation, education is the way to address the “fake news” phenomenon, the older generation also see possible solutions in media regulation: “This is exactly what I meant to say, we need a set of rules, procedures, to stop the journalists, the media channels to release fake news; they need to be punished somehow, this type of behaviour needs to have consequences. Then everybody will start obeying the rules, and things could get better” (ROC12). Generally speaking, disinformation is seen by both generations as a serious threat to both individuals and society as a whole, with effects on people’s well-being and

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democracy in general. Media education is considered the most powerful solution to actively fight against the overwhelmingly present “fake news” phenomenon.

8.3.4.2

Experts’ Perspective on Disinformation

Experts see disinformation as intended, first of all, for profit, the most common of all being generating traffic/audience. Both journalists and politicians consider this to be one of the most powerful reasons why people create misleading stories: “The reasons [. . . ] are related to the rating”. (ROJ04) “There are also various entities [. . . ] for example, bloggers, vloggers, who, for the sake of attracting clicks, audience, and traffic make use of this type of news”. (ROJ03) “The chase for sensationalism, the chase for clicks”. (ROP03)

Additionally, another motive for creating and spreading disinformation resides in the very nature of the political game: staining the opponents’ reputation (ROJ02), “the desire to influence public opinion in a certain direction or another depending on an agenda” (ROP03) or even “eroding trust in institutions, public figures, politicians, to change people’s opinions, voting options and even the direction of the country, the geopolitical choice of the country” (ROJ01). A particularly interesting point of view is that of one journalist (ROJ05) who sees geopolitical reasons related to third countries as an important driver of disinformation, giving the example of Russia’s or China’s political propaganda. In the same line, another journalist (ROJ01) proposes a distinction between “benign” and “malignant” disinformation (which would reflect Wardle and Derekshan (2017) between disinformation and malinformation), that is, the rather harmless chase for traffic and audience, as opposed to the more dangerous form of intending to erode trust in politicians, public figures or even institutions, influencing voting directions or even advancing geopolitical strategies of a country. Effects are discussed at both individual and societal level, sometimes with blurring boundaries between the two. Since the interviews were conducted during the COVID-19 pandemic, both journalists and politicians discussed health-related implications: life-threatening choices related to fake remedies, conspiracy theories, vaccine hesitancy, etc. The context of the pandemic was an opportunity to highlight other important negative effects of disinformation: people become isolated and lonely, which could affect social cohesion and conflicts within society: “On a societal level, even more so, because when you don’t have information, when you don’t feel the need to talk too much with the other or to listen to the other’s opinion, you become isolated and feel lonely. There are various groups, and people no longer communicate, and that seems pretty serious to me. Access to partial information [. . . ] leads to isolation, loneliness, and possible conflicts within a society” (ROP04). Other societal-level effects are polarisation (mentioned by both journalists and politicians), social movements (ROJ02), decreased trust in institutions (ROJ03) and uninformed citizens (ROJ04, ROP01, ROP04).

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Possible solutions to fight disinformation invoked by experts underline, in the first instance, the role of media professionals: journalists are convinced that their fellow colleagues should be at the forefront of the fight against disinformation, while politicians believe that media should educate people and journalism practices should change their routine to aim for high-quality standards: “Journalists are at the forefront in the fight against fake news. [. . . ] Journalists can help reduce this worrying phenomenon, first of all by inspiring others who are at the beginning, I mean equidistant journalists, those who make their profession in good faith and within a deontological framework”. (ROJ01) “I believe that the only way we can fight disinformation is education, responsibility, and awareness of the true role of the press. [. . . ] The role of the press is not to create clickbait, the role of the press is not to bring up the sensational, the role of the press is not to create values from non-values, the role of the press is completely different”. (ROP03) “Public television should respect the role from the constitution and play a much more active cultural and educational role. It should not enter a competition for profit since it will lose to others with more experience in this respect”. (ROP04)

The role of journalists should be to set quality standards for the news, to carefully check sources and facts, to make real agendas and to get involved in media literacy projects. Additionally, when thinking about solutions to fight disinformation, journalists see almost exclusively the role played by key actors: academics, public figures, institutions and politicians should combat disinformation with rational arguments, as it appears “on the radar” (ROJ01); communication experts should identify solutions to actively fight the phenomenon (ROJ02); and people themselves should be more responsible and more aware about the possibility of being victims of disinformation (ROJ04). Politicians, on the other hand, do not discuss too much the actors involved but more the practical solutions: much stricter media regulation (ROP03, ROP04); education, with a focus on developing critical thinking (ROP04); or other innovative solutions, such as a rating system of news by both citizens and professionals (ROP01). To sum up, disinformation is seen as the threat in the high-choice media environment by experts, who discuss personal and society effects, such as healthrelated poor choices, feelings of loneliness and insecurity or reduced trust in institutions, reduced social cohesion, high levels of polarisation, political cynicism, etc. In terms of solutions, journalists emphasise the role key actors, such as journalists, academics, politicians, communication experts but also citizens should play, while politicians discuss more about media regulation and media education.

8.4 Discussion and Conclusions Results from this study offer valuable insight into both ordinary citizens’ and experts’ perceptions of people’s media diets (on both what they look like and what they should) and of the main information-related threats within the high-choice

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media environment. We will briefly summarise below the main similarities and differences in perceptions, thus offering a comprehensive overview of how regular people’s media consumption patterns and associated threats are perceived from both sides – from the perspective of citizens themselves and from the perspective of experts (journalists and politicians). First, even though we expected some differences in perceptions of journalists and politicians (mainly based on their political affiliation or leaning) regarding media diets and information-related threats in the current media landscape, we could not find any worth mentioning differences. One possible explanation is that all the issues at stake are perceived in a similar manner, irrespective of political affiliation. In terms of media diets, the main findings show that young people acknowledge the fact that their generation’s media diet is highly unbalanced, even toxic, mainly because it contains much news from social media. On the other hand, the elderly still prefer getting most of the news from television. These results confirm previous research studies showing these news consumption patterns that differ between the two generations. Younger people prefer social media sources compared with their older counterparts (Loader et al. 2014; Newman et al. 2021). Another confirmation of previous studies comes when taking into account that the elderly tend to believe that people are generally interested in political news. For example, some studies confirm that political news exposure (almost) linearly increases from younger to older generations (Andersen et al. 2021). Furthermore, people from each generation perceive that those belonging to the other generation are more prone to a possible negative influence on their media diet, thus offering ground for a third-person effect (Tsfati & Cohen 2012). On the other hand, we found strong similarities between journalists’ and politicians’ perceptions of people’s media diets. Both categories believe that people consume information from both traditional and social media sources, acknowledging the high proliferation of social media as a source of news. Other mentioned issues related to people’s media diets within the current media landscape are people’s preferences for soft news and to selectively expose themselves to news overall. These findings are in line with findings from other studies showing a particular preference for soft rather than hard news, which might be beneficial for some media users, especially for the so-called politically inattentive individuals (Baum & Jamison 2006). Selective exposure to news is a pattern highly debated in the current literature; people tend to prefer news/information that is in line with pre-existing views and biases, thus favouring higher levels of polarisation and fragmentation (Stroud 2010; Trilling et al. 2017). Furthermore, in terms of a healthy media diet, perceptions of both citizens and experts that were interviewed in the current study centre around the idea that a healthy diet should be a balanced one and people should not follow the news in an obsessive manner, while political news should be part of the daily media diet, but in reasonable amounts. Such results are in line with the academic literature in the sense that they point to a responsible media consumption pattern, avoiding irresponsible “intake” of media content that could result in information overload or “infobesity” (Bawden & Robinson 2009; Conner-Gaten et al. 2020; Li 2017).

8.4 Discussion and Conclusions

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In terms of general threats and opportunities associated with the current media environment, both ordinary people and experts point to more threats than opportunities within the current media environment. Among them, both categories mention disinformation as the main threat, thus, in line with other recent studies (e.g. Hameleers & Van der Meer 2020; Jungherr & Schroeder 2021; Verrall 2022). The main negative effects associated with exposure to disinformation are working on both individual and societal levels; people acknowledge the potentially detrimental effects of disinformation pointing to confusion, the threat of letting people misinformation about important issues as well as polarisation, alienation and declining levels of trust in the media and other institutions. Such effects confirm similar studies focusing on the perceptions of the most detrimental effects of exposure to misleading content in the media that has the potential to pose serious threats to democracies worldwide (e.g. Liu & Huang 2020; Schünemann 2022) Among opportunities, people from both groups – the ordinary people and the experts – see some opportunities brought about by the new information environment. Specifically, they point to the wide and easy access to information, the wide array of information sources as well as the possibility to reach audiences faster. Such opportunities can also be found in other similar studies (e.g. Nielsen et al. 2016). However, it is important to mention that the opportunities were mentioned in a fugitive manner, while the main focus of the discussions was on identifying the threats associated with the current media landscape. In terms of the three analysed specific threats, news avoidance, selective exposure and disinformation, it is important to mention that, for ordinary people, news avoidance is an important threat compared with selective exposure. The main reasons why people avoid political news in particular are different from one generation to the other, in the sense that younger people tend to avoid such news because they feel they are not prepared to understand it, while the elderly perceive such news as stressful and overwhelmingly present in the media. Thus, to cope with the abundance of political news, they choose to avoid it. These results are in line with those from previous studies about intentional news avoidance, stating various reasons why people tend to “tune out” of news at a certain point in time. Song et al. (2017) suggest that, when people feel they are overwhelmed with information, they might opt to just unfollow the news altogether. The same trend can also be observed in the group of experts, even though in this group selective exposure is also pointed to as one important threat to both individuals and societies at large (especially by politicians). The main effects associated with news avoidance and selective exposure are also in line with what we can find in similar studies. Uninformed or selectively informed citizens, vulnerability in front of misleading content in the media and low turnout rates are mentioned by experts as important consequences associated with such threats (also see Arceneaux et al. 2012; Skovsgaard & Andersen 2020). As far as disinformation is concerned, there seems to be a consensus between both groups – ordinary people and experts – that disinformation is a serious threat to both individuals and societies at large, with effects on both people’s wellbeing and levels of information and democracy in general. More specifically, those in the expert group suggest that disinformation is the threat within the current

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information environment. Potential solutions are also those that can be found in other similar studies conducted so far (Balod & Hameleers 2021; Blanchette et al. 2021; Hameleers 2022; Hameleers et al. 2020). They include developing more media literacy skills, developing more regulations aimed at combating any type of digital disorder and involving more and more key actors in the fight against disinformation to enhance the chances of crafting effective solutions in this respect. Even though the journalists touched on the topic of news production in some instances, changing routines of news production and changing practices of factchecking (as a consequence of the transformation of the news circulation on social media – see Wahl-Jorgensen & Hanitzsch, 2019) were not mentioned as possible solutions. Fact-checkers, in fact, were almost entirely missing from the discussion about threats and opportunities of the high-choice media environment, which could be due to a Romanian specificity: the low visibility of the very few fact-checkers acting in the Romanian media environment. This study comes with some limitations. First, the results at the level of ordinary people might be influenced by their levels of education, residence and occupation. While people from younger generations were exclusively people enrolled in university-level studies in communication sciences, living in urban areas, not all those from the elderly group followed the same education and residence patterns. This could have an influence on the results, in the sense that younger people were more knowledgeable of the potential threats within the current media environment compared with the elderly. Second, it is important to mention that results could be influenced by the cultural environment in which data were collected. Nevertheless, despite limitations, this study offers important insights into both ordinary citizens’ and experts’ perceptions of nowadays people’s media diets (how they look like and how they should) and of the main threats and opportunities within the current rich media landscape. These could be used as a starting point for developing evidence-based solutions to manage the main information-related challenges that might affect people nowadays: the potential of having an unhealthy media diet and the potential to remain uninformed, less informed or even misinformed. Such solutions could be further used in the process of lowering the dangers associated with technological development and the emergence of new media sources and of making democracies work better.

References Allcott, H., & Gentzkow, M. (2017). Social media and fake news in the 2016 election. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 31(2), 211–36. Andersen, K., Ohme, J., Bjarnøe, C., Mats, J., Albæk, E., & de Vreese, C. H. (2021). Generational Gaps in Political Media Use and Civic Engagement: From Baby Boomers to Generation Z’. https://library.oapen.org/handle/20.500.12657/42390. Accessed April 2022. Arceneaux, K., Johnson, M., & Murphy, C. (2012). Polarized political communication, oppositional media hostility, and selective exposure. The Journal of Politics, 74(1), 174–186.

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Chapter 9

Patterns of News Consumption in a High-Choice Media Environment

9.1 Introduction The current media environment is pre-eminently a high-choice one. Media users have a large variety of options to follow at any time. Mainstream or alternative media sources make available a wide array of media content, mainly based on users’ preferences. To better understand the dynamics of users’ opinions and behaviours, often linked to their media use, it becomes important to take a closer look at media consumption patterns. One possible approach in this direction is to adopt a media repertoire approach (Edgerly 2015; Hasebrink & Popp 2006; Kim 2016; Mangold & Bachl 2018) and investigate which types of media sources and content people consume. The media repertoire approach suggests that, in order to get information on a certain topic, media users select certain media sources and media content available at a certain point in time. In other words, a media repertoire may “consist of different types of media platforms or, more specifically, different television channels, radio stations and newspaper titles” (Yuan 2011, p. 1002) that an individual uses at a certain moment in time. This happens mainly within the current media environment, characterised by an abundance of media choices and available content. To better cope with this abundance of choices (in terms of sources and content), individuals tend to use just a small subset of available media or repertoires of their preferred media sources and content (Taneja et al. 2012). Even though several researchers suggest that a media repertoire approach might be the key to understanding the dynamics of opinions and behaviours, there is still little empirical evidence about how media users create these repertoires in a high-choice media environment. In such a context, studies (e.g. Andersen et al. 2023) advance a media repertoire approach to investigate people’s media consumption patterns. While there are important comparative studies investigating media consumption patterns across countries (e.g. Castro et al. 2022), in-depth © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Buturoiu et al., Patterns of News Consumption in a High-Choice Media Environment, Springer Studies in Media and Political Communication, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41954-6_9

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analyses focusing on Romania are absent. At the aggregate level, in the comparative study by Castro et al.’s (2022), in Romania, the largest category of news consumers is that of online news seekers (44% of the Romanian sample), followed by social media news consumers (19% of the sample) and hypernews consumers (17%). Traditional news consumers represent 12% of the Romanian sample, while news minimalists represent 8.5%. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that we could not find any single study focusing solely on the profiles of news consumers in Romania. In such a context, we believe that it becomes important, besides taking a look at the aggregate level, to conduct an in-depth investigation into the way Romanian people consume news within the current media environment. Against this background, we ask our first research question: • RQ1. What are the main news consumption patterns of Romanians in the highchoice media environment? Furthermore, it is important to consider that several socio-demographic variables might influence news media consumption patterns (e.g. Esser and Steppat 2017; Karlsen et al. 2020). For example, in terms of age, Cohen (2013) suggests that older people are more inclined to consume news from traditional media sources, whereas younger people are more inclined to consume news from online media sources. Furthermore, there is evidence that younger people are more inclined to generally avoid the news, irrespective of the source, compared with their older counterparts (Papathanassopoulos et al. 2013). This might be linked to another agerelated attitude towards the news, in the sense that studies confirm generalised lower levels of engagement with the news from the younger generations. For example, Huang (2009) suggests several factors related to this low engagement with the news, including younger people’s lack of time, use of another news medium, lack of interest in the contents or decline in reading interest, too much effort needed, changing lifestyles, a generalised lack of motivation to seek new information, perceived relevance of media content, perceived credibility of the medium and the influence from parents’ news consumption habits. In terms of gender, Cohen (2013) reports that women from certain countries, such as Germany, Switzerland, Taiwan and the United States, are less likely to watch TV compared with their male counterparts. The same trend was also observed with regard to newspaper reading. Women from Chile, Germany, Portugal, Singapore, Switzerland and the United States read newspapers less frequently than men. Similarly, there are studies reporting that men spend more time consuming news compared with women (Elvestad & Blekesaune 2008). Some of these gender-based gaps in news media consumption are higher in polarised pluralist media systems (Esser and Steppat 2017). In terms of education, studies show that people with higher education tend to watch less TV programs and read more offline and online news compared with their less educated counterparts (Aalberg et al. 2013; Shehata & Strömbäck 2011). Besides this, education also influences TV viewing time (Meulemann 2012). The same trends were identified with regard to online news use and education in the sense that people with higher levels of education are more prone to spend time

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reading news in both digital and print formats (Cohen 2013). At the same time, people with lower levels of education are more inclined to avoid news altogether (Trilling & Schönbach 2013). A thorough analysis of the way in which socio-demographics influence the patterns of news media consumption is highly important. It might better explain the dynamics of news media consumption, especially within the current complex media environment. At the same time, it could offer insights into why some people are more or less avid news consumers. Only by taking into account socio-demographic variables could we develop real-based analyses about news media use and profiles of news media consumption within high-choice media environments. Thus, taking into account all of the above, we ask the second research question: • RQ2. Are there any significant differences in the socio-demographic composition of people in each media consumption profile? Concurrently, it becomes important to analyse whether and how different patterns of news media consumption and socio-demographics connect with some other media-related variables. We will first refer to news media trust and afterwards to incidental news exposure and diversity of media diets (echo chambers) (for a detailed literature review on these three concepts, see Chap. 5). First, with reference to news media trust, recent studies point to a generalised decline in mainstream news trust (Park et al. 2020; Strömbäck et al. 2020), leading to people’s orientation to alternative news media sources, enabling people to access viewpoints corresponding to their social and political predispositions, thus challenging mainstream media coverage (Andersen et al. 2023). Previous studies suggest the importance of considering news media trust in the sense that people tend to consume more media content from the sources they trust more (Tsfati 2010), thus putting them in a sort of a vicious cycle (i.e. people could step over important media content only because it comes from media sources they are not used to trust). In such a context, it becomes important to investigate whether trust in news media sources is, if at all, influenced by people’s patterns of news media consumption and socio-demographics. Therefore, we ask the third research question: • RQ3. How is media trust influenced by people’s media diets and sociodemographics? Second, with reference to incidental news exposure, previous studies suggest that people nowadays might encounter various news and information accidentally, without actively seeking them, a phenomenon known as incidental exposure (Tewksbury et al. 2001, p. 534). Given the complexity of the issue, studies have examined both its antecedents (e.g. Ahmadi & Wohn 2018) and consequences (e.g. Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2021; Kim et al. 2013). For example, personality traits (e.g. openness to new experiences) and technological-related issues (e.g. recommendation algorithms) have been found as antecedents of incidental news exposure. In terms of consequences, studies point to either positive or negative effects associated with incidental news exposure (Borah et al. 2022). A significant number of studies (e.g. Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2021; Lee & Kim 2017; Kim et al.

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2013; Valeriani & Vaccari 2016) make reference to the positive consequences of incidental news exposure. For example, Kim et al. (2013) found evidence that incidental news exposure in the online media environment is positively related to political participation (i.e. those individuals incidentally exposed to news exhibited higher levels of both online and offline political participation). Others point to the negative or null effects of incidental news exposure (e.g. Feezell & Ortiz 2021; Oeldorf-Hirsch 2018). Nevertheless, while there is no agreement regarding the positive or negative consequences of incidental news exposure, Borah et al. (2022) suggest that people are significantly impacted when they accidentally stumble upon news. Therefore, it becomes important to identify whether there are some specific patterns of incidental news exposure and if and how they are associated with various profiles of news consumption and socio-demographics. Therefore, we ask the fourth research question: • RQ4. What are the specific patterns of incidental news exposure across news consumers’ profiles and socio-demographics? Third, in terms of diversity of media diets (echo chamber), we avoid referring to the term often coined as echo chamber, because of its highly debatable nature (see Terren & Borge-Bravo 2021 and the detailed description in Chap. 5). Instead, we draw on the conceptualisation put forward by Dubois and Blank (2018), suggesting that the Internet creates a high-choice media environment where individuals might be exposed to a diverse array of media content and sources. In this respect, people can form different media repertoires. These repertoires can differ in terms of how many media are included, which media and how people choose to combine them. The authors, thus, expect that the greater the number of media sources and content people are exposed to, the greater the opportunity for people to encounter different viewpoints and avoid being trapped in what is generically called an echo chamber. In other words, the authors put forward the assumption that the emergence of echo chambers on social media largely depends on the diversity of media diet, in the sense that the more diverse the media diet of an individual, the less likely they are to be trapped in a social media echo chamber. Their assumption was confirmed; a diverse media diet is, therefore, a step towards exposure to diverse information and perspectives. Individuals might either actively expose themselves to new sources and information by checking multiple points of view or passively encounter information they disagree with. The more diverse the media diet of an individual, the lower the likelihood of being caught in an echo chamber. Against this background, we are interested in revealing whether there are specific patterns of media diversity across Romanians’ news media profiles and socio-demographics. Thus, we ask the fifth research question: • RQ5. What are the specific patterns of diversity of media diets (echo chambers) across news consumers’ profiles and socio-demographics?

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Table 9.1 Profiles of news consumers

High social media news consumers Low social media news consumers

High mainstream media news consumers All media consumers

Low mainstream media news consumers Social media consumers

Mainstream media consumers

Minimalists

9.2 Method To answer the research questions, we conducted a national survey1 among the Romanian online population, using quotas for regions (eight geographical regions of Romania), age (mean age M .= 42.9 years, SD .= 14.5) and gender (50% men, 50% women). Education was a soft quota, with quotas for “low and medium” (63%) vs “high” (37%) levels of education. The sample was skewed for residence, overrepresenting urban areas (79.3%). The survey was carried out by Daedalus New Media Research, during 6–18 October 2021.

9.2.1 Measurements To address the research questions, we constructed profiles of news consumption users based on people’s habits of consuming mainstream media and social media news (see Table 9.1). We defined four profiles: all media consumers (high news consumption from both mainstream and social media), mainstream media consumers (high news consumption from mainstream sources, but low from social media), social media users (high news consumption from social media, but low from mainstream sources) and minimalists (low consumption from both mainstream and social media sources). As far as measurements are concerned, for mainstream media news consumption, we used a 4-item scale measuring the number of days in a week people follow the news on TV, radio, online and print newspapers and Internet websites (social media excluded). The items loaded on one factor (loading from 0.647 to 0.750; .α = 0.656, .M = 3.60, .SD = 1.74). Similarly, social media was measured with similar wording, using a 5-item scale, referring to news followed on social media and instant messaging platforms in Romania (Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, WhatsApp and Facebook messenger). Items loaded on one factor (loadings from 0.734 to 0.852; .α = 0.852, .M = 2.39, .SD = 2.03). In a second step, we categorised people, using

1 Data from this chapter was collected as part of a grant supported by the Ministry of Research, Innovation and Digitization, CNCS/CCCDI–UEFISCDI, project number PN-III-P1-1.1-PD-20190034, within PNCDI III.

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the mean as cut-off points for both types of media (.M = 3.60 for mainstream media, and .M = 2.39 for social media), by cross-tabulating the two variables. We measured trust in the media for both mainstream and social media, using the same type of outlets (general types) as we used for news consumption, on a scale from 1 to 7 (1 “no trust at all”; 7 “fully trust”). The four items loaded on one factor for mainstream media (loadings from 0.752 to 0.838; .α = 0.821, .M = 3.98, .SD = 1.43), and the five corresponding social media items loaded on one factor as well (loadings from 0.855 to 0.905; .α = 0.922, .M = 3.26, .SD = 1.64). Incidental news exposure was measured using an 8-item scale adapted from Kim et al. (2013). We used the following wording: “How often has it happened to you to stumble on information about current issues, public affairs, or politics when navigating on the following channels, with a different purpose than to read or visualize news? [search engines (such as Google), Online portals (such as Yahoo), personal emails, forums, blogs, social networks (such as Facebook or Instagram), online advertising, instant messaging platforms (such as WhatsApp or Facebook messenger)]”. Items loaded on one factor with loadings ranging from 0.720 to 0.791 (.α = 0.888, .M = 3.43, .SD = 1.47). We measured the diversity of news media diet (or echo chamber) with a 4-item scale adapted from Dubois and Blank (2018). On a scale from 1 “never” to 7 “very often”, we asked people how often they do the following actions when looking for political- or public affairs-related information: “Read/see things you do not agree with”; “Check other sources than the one you usually use”; “Try to confirm the information, searching for a different source”; and “Try to confirm the information, searching for an important offline source (TV, printed press, radio)”. Items loaded on one factor, with loadings ranging from 0.749 to 0.908 (.α = 0.882, .M = 4.41, .SD = 1.61). We used measures for three socio-demographic variables. Sex was measured binary (50% males, 50% females of the sample). Age was measured in full years of age (.M = 42.89; .SD = 14.53). Education was measured on an 8-item scale (following the International Standard Classification of Education scale for Romania (Eurostat 2011)).

9.3 Findings In this section, we will present the results of the research, starting with general data analysis about people’s media diets based on their news consumption habits and then media diets by socio-demographic profiles, followed by how trust in the media, diversity of media diet and incidental news exposure are correlated with people’s habits of following the news and socio-demographics.

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9.3.1 People’s Media Diets in a High-Choice Media Environment Generally speaking, most people are minimalists (52.9%), not regularly following any type of news, which raises questions about the quality of the democratic process in general. About 17.1% of the sample predominantly take their news from social media and instant messaging platforms, while 16.7% prefer mainstream media sources. Only 13.3% consume both mainstream and social media social and political information. Even though there is a clear preference for some specific type of media outlets, there are nuances regarding the sources from which people in each defined profile of consumers take their news (Fig. 9.1). Thus, all media users consume predominantly TV, websites and Facebook, while Instagram is the least used source for news. TV and websites are also the preferred media for mainstream media consumers, at levels comparable with all media consumers. The only source they use to some extent from social media is Facebook. Even though social media consumers take their news mostly from Facebook and Facebook messenger, they also include in their diets some websites and to some extent TV news. Newspapers and radio are rarely used. One important aspect is that websites surpass some social media and instant messaging (WhatsApp, YouTube and Instagram, in this order) in people’s media diets, while TV is preferred to Instagram as a news source. Minimalists actually consume some TV and websitesoriginated news and, to some extent, Facebook information. For exact descriptives of all consumption patterns, see Table 9.2. Summing up, people’s media diets include some preferred media outlet types, with websites and TV remaining among the most preferred in three profiles out of

Fig. 9.1 Media diet for each news consumption profile

Total

Minimalist user

SNS news user

Mainstream media user

All media news user

Mean N SD Mean N SD Mean N SD Mean N SD Mean N SD

TV 6.25 133 1.05 6.36 167 1.30 4.00 171 2.37 3.28 529 2.51 4.31 1000 2.55

Websites 6.45 133 0.90 6.16 167 1.24 4.98 171 2.03 3.26 529 2.30 4.46 1000 2.39

Newspapers 5.15 133 1.89 5.19 167 2.03 2.12 171 1.81 1.60 529 1.96 2.76 1000 2.51

Table 9.2 News consumption patterns for all profiles consumers Radio 5.09 133 2.12 4.72 167 2.38 2.13 171 1.86 1.97 529 2.07 2.87 1000 2.48

Facebook 6.40 133 1.06 3.65 167 2.67 5.94 171 1.54 2.51 529 2.31 3.80 1000 2.67

YouTube 5.36 133 1.95 1.68 167 2.02 4.36 171 2.21 1.01 529 1.62 2.27 1000 2.51

Instagram 4.14 133 2.75 0.52 167 1.22 3.33 171 2.64 0.50 529 1.20 1.47 1000 2.32

Facebook messenger 5.81 133 1.62 1.20 167 1.88 5.18 171 2.03 0.90 529 1.57 2.34 1000 2.69

WhatsApp 5.53 133 1.97 0.92 167 1.58 4.74 171 2.17 0.69 529 1.43 2.07 1000 2.62

182 9 Patterns of News Consumption in a High-Choice Media Environment

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183

four and quite high in the fourth as well. Radio (among mainstream sources) and Instagram (among social media sources) are the least preferred types of media in each profile. The only exception is the minimalist group, among which newspapers are even less used than radio, probably due to the fact that incidental exposure is more frequently happening while people are listening to the radio.

9.3.2 Media Consumption Patterns by Socio-Demographic Characteristics Media consumption patterns differ only to some extent by socio-demographic characteristics. There is a significant difference between men (M .= 3.84, SD .= 1.68) and women (M .= 3.36, SD .= 1.77) (t(995) .= 4.37, p .< 0.01) in terms of overall mainstream media consumption, but not for social media consumption (M .= 2.30 and SD .= 1.98 for men; M .= 2.48 and SD .= 2.09 for women). When looking at all media types, we could see a constant pattern: men used somewhat more mainstream media than women, while women preferred a bit more social media news than men (Fig. 9.2). The clearest differences are for TV (among mainstream media) and Instagram (for social media). Looking at each profile, we see that there are more men in the all media news consumers and mainstream media news consumers groups and more women in the social media consumers group. Minimalists are equally distributed among the two genders (Table 9.3).

7 6 5

4.58 4.04

4.70 4.23

3.94 3.67

4 3.18 2.90 2.62

3

2.56

2.43 2.24

2.35 2.19

2

2.14 1.99

1.68

1.26

1 0 TV

Websites

Newspapers

Radio

Facebook Male

Fig. 9.2 News consumption patterns by gender

Female

Youtube

Instagram

Facebook messanger

WhatsApp

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Table 9.3 Gender distribution in each media consumption profile

All media news user Mainstream media user SNS news user Minimalist user Entire sample

Males 51.9% 58.7% 41.5% 49.5% 50.0%

Females 48.1% 41.3% 58.5% 50.5% 50.0%

7 6 5 4

4.65

4.434.52 3.94

3.74

3.57 3.01

3

2.61

2.95

2.74

2.57

2.40

2.21

2.06

2

1.94 1.57

1.83

1.30

1 0 TV

Websites

Newspapers

Radio

Facebook

Low education

Youtube

Instagram

Facebook messanger

WhatsApp

High education

Fig. 9.3 News consumption patterns by education levels

Generally speaking, men have a certain preference for mainstream media and women for social media as a source of social and political news. Education only plays a role in the media diet for TV and newspaper use. There is a weak negative correlation (.r = −0.135, .N = 1000, p .< 0.01) between TV news consumption and education (more educated people consume less TV news) and a weak positive correlation (.r = 0.113, .N = 1000, p .< 0.01) between written press news consumption and education (more educated people consume more newspapers originated news, either print or online) – for descriptives for each media outlet, see Fig. 9.3. Even if they are not statistically significant, there are other trends worth mentioning: generally speaking, more educated people tend to consume newspapers and websites to get their news, while less educated people tend to consume more information from TV, radio, social media and instant messaging platforms. As far as profiles are concerned, highly educated people tend to be more mainstream media and minimalist users than the average of the sample, and less educated ones tend to use more social media and all media sources (Table 9.4). Summing up, education does not play a substantive role in people’s media diets; yet there are some notable differences, in the sense that more educated people use

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185

Table 9.4 Level of education distribution in each media consumption profile

All media news user Mainstream media user SNS news user Minimalist user Entire sample

Low education 70.68% 59.28% 68.42% 60.49% 63.00%

High education 29.32% 40.72% 31.58% 39.51% 37.00%

7

5

4

2

0 TV

Websites Newspapers 18-24

Radio 25-34

Facebook

Youtube

35-44

45-54

Instagram 55+

Facebook WhatsApp messanger

Fig. 9.4 News consumption patterns by age groups

more TV and newspapers as source of news than lower educated people, who prefer social media information. As far as age is concerned, there is a clear preference of young people for social media and of older people for TV news use. Specifically, there are a weak negative correlation between age and Instagram (.r = −0.285, .N = 1000, p .< 0.01) and YouTube (.r = −0.158, .N = 1000, p .< 0.01) and a moderate positive correlation between TV news use and age (.r = 0.351, .N = 1000, p .< 0.01). In short, young people tend to get their news more from social media than older people, specifically mostly from Instagram and YouTube, and older people tend to use more than the younger generation TV for getting their political and social news. Looking more in-depth, by age categories, there are clear patterns for other media sources as well (Fig. 9.4). For example, radio is rarely used by younger generations and more by older ones; Facebook and Facebook messenger are preferred by both very young and older than 55 years of age; WhatsApp is more used by the youth, etc. In the consumers’ profiles, minimalist users are about the same age as the entire sample. Social media users are slightly younger, while all media users are slightly older, and mainstream media users are considerably older than all others (see Table 9.5).

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Table 9.5 Mean age of people in each media consumption profile All media news user Mainstream media user SNS news user Minimalist user Entire sample

Mean age 43.25 49.01 38.64 42.24 42.89

N 133 167 171 529 1000

Standard deviation 14.68 12.09 16.21 14.02 14.53

Compared with all other socio-demographics analysed in this chapter, age shows more distinct patterns of news consumption, which suggests a clear change in media diets across generations: the new generation tends to take much more of their daily news from social media and instant messaging platforms, while the seniors consume TV news but also, to some extent, Facebook as a preferred social media platform.

9.3.3 Media Trust Patterns Media trust differs considerably by type of media source. As expected, people trust more the type of media they preponderantly consume (Fig. 9.5). However, there are important nuances to be detailed. All media news users trust all types of media to a greater extent, with a preference for television and websites. They trust Instagram the least, but still above average. Mainstream media users trust more mainstream sources and less social media ones. They prefer television and radio and distrust Instagram. Interestingly, social

Fig. 9.5 Media trust patterns by news consumers’ profiles

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187

Table 9.6 Descriptives of trust in the media for each media consumption profile All media news user

Mainstream media user SNS news user

Minimalist user

Total

Mean N SD Mean N SD Mean N SD Mean N SD Mean N SD

Trust in mainstream media 5.12 132 1.19 4.56 167 1.25 4.00 171 1.33 3.49 526 1.34 3.98 996 1.43

Trust in social media 4.89 132 1.48 2.89 165 1.36 4.20 171 1.53 2.63 503 1.34 3.26 971 1.64

media news users trust somewhat equally mainstream media and social media, with websites, Facebook and WhatsApp in the top of their preferences (for descriptives, see Table 9.6). At the aggregate level, there are significant differences across profiles for both mainstream media (.F (3,992) = 69.34, p .< 0.01) and social media (.F (3,967 = 122.59, p .< 0.01). As far as trust in the mainstream media is concerned, all groups significantly differ from each other (post hoc ANOVA Bonferroni tests significant), except for minimalists and mainstream users for trust in social media. Mean values by type of media (mainstream vs social media) could be seen in Fig. 9.6. In terms of education, there is no significant correlation between the level of education and trust in mainstream and social media (see Fig. 9.7). Generally speaking, regardless of the level of education, people tend to trust more mainstream media (television being the most trusted source) than social media (among which Facebook is the most trusted network). As far as age is concerned, there are not many differences across age groups. However, looking at the results (Fig. 9.8), one can see that the gap between trust in mainstream media and social media becomes wider and wider for older categories of people. Even though, at the aggregate level, there is no significant correlation between trust in mainstream or social media and age, when one looks at each medium, there are some interesting significant correlations. Older people trust TV more than younger ones (.r = 0.181, .N = 977, p .< 0.01), while younger people trust Instagram (.r = −0.246, .N = 796, p .< 0.01), YouTube (.r = −0.133, .N = 877, p .< 0.01) and WhatsApp (.r = 0.113, .N = 847, p .< 0.01) more. Figure 9.9 illustrates these differences across age categories.

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9 Patterns of News Consumption in a High-Choice Media Environment

7

6 5.12 5

4.89 4.56 4.00

4.20

4 3.49 2.89

3

2.63

2

1 All media news user Mainstream media user

SNS news user

Trust in mainstream media

Minimalist user

Trust in social media

Fig. 9.6 Media trust by news consumption profiles 7 6 5 4

4.27 3.95

4.07 3.91

3.79 3.58

3.97

4.10 3.57 3.24

3.48 3.39 2.84

3

2.63

3.21 2.94

3.35 3.11

Trust Facebook messanger

Trust WhatsApp

2 1 Trust TV

Trust Websites

Trust Newspapers

Trust Radio

Trust Facebook

Low education

Trust Youtube

Trust Instagram

High education

Fig. 9.7 Media trust by level of education

Gender only plays a marginal role in the extent to which people trust the media. No significant difference could be seen at the aggregate level. However, there are significant differences across genders for trust in Instagram (.t (794) = −2.29, p .< 0.05)) and trust in Facebook messenger as a news source (.t (848) = −2.49, p .< 0.05) (also see Fig. 9.10). Specifically, women trust a little bit more Instagram (.M = 2.91, .SD = 1.92) than men (.M = 2.61, .SD = 1.78) and a little bit more Facebook messenger (.M = 3.27, .SD = 1.96) than men (.M = 2.94, .SD = 1.87).

9.3 Findings

189

7 6 5 4

3.73

3.90

4.14

3.87

3.83 3.39

3.18

3.10

4.10 3.12

3 2 1 18-24

25-34

35-44 Trust SNS

45-54

55+

Trust mainstream

Fig. 9.8 Media trust by age groups 7

6

4

3

1 Trust TV

Trust Trust Trust Radio Trust Websites Newspapers Facebook 18-24

25-34

35-44

Trust Youtube 45-54

Trust Instagram

Trust Facebook messanger

Trust WhatsApp

55+

Fig. 9.9 Trust in types of media by age groups

Summing up, people tend to trust more the media they consume more frequently, with the exception of social media users who trust only slightly less mainstream media than mainstream media and all media users. There are some differences across trust in various types of media based on education, age and gender, but there are generally no notable differences based on socio-demographic characteristics.

190

9 Patterns of News Consumption in a High-Choice Media Environment

7 6 5 4.17 4.14 4

4.00 3.94

3.58 3.73

4.04 4.00 3.34

3.56

3

3.49 3.40

3.27 2.61

2.91

2.94

3.14

3.39

2 1 Trust TV

Trust Websites

Trust Newspapers

Trust Radio Trust Facebook Trust Youtube Trust Instagram Trust Facebook messanger Men

Trust WhatsApp

Women

Fig. 9.10 Trust in types of media by gender

9.3.4 Diversity of Media Diet One of the long-lasting problems of the high-choice media environment is people’s tendency to consume media content that is consistent with their own views of politics, society and public affairs. In recent years, the “echo chamber” concept has encompassed this phenomenon, with conflicting results about the degree to which people are actually “trapped” in these ideological bubbles. In this section, we will use the term “diversity of media diet”, which might better reflect the differences between individuals in this regard. In the “Measurements” section, we mentioned that the scale was measured so that high scores reflect a more diverse media diet, whereas low scores would mean that people are actually prisoners of echo chambers. Our data shows that there are differences in the diversity of the media diets based on the media people prefer (.F (3,996) = 27.31, p .< 0.01) (see Table 9.7). Specifically, minimalist users’ diet is significantly less diverse than the diet of any other group (post hoc Games-Howell tests significant), and social media users’ diet is significantly less diverse than all media news users’. As a general observation, the more diverse the media outlet type (may it be mainstream or social), the more diverse the media diet (i.e. people being exposed to diverse points of view). When looking at socio-demographic characteristics, education plays a role in how diverse people’s media diet is (.r = 160, .N = 1000, p .< 0.01). In other words, the higher the education level of a person, the more diverse the content they are exposed to (descriptives for aggregate levels of education in Table 9.8). Age does not significantly correlate with the diversity of the media diet. However, looking at general descriptives (see Table 9.9), we can see some differences between age categories in the sense that younger people tend to have a more diverse media diet. Differences between age groups are, however, minimal.

9.3 Findings Table 9.7 Descriptives of the diversity of media diet for each media consumption profile

191

All media news user

Mainstream media user

SNS news user

Minimalist user

Entire sample

Mean N SD Mean N SD Mean N SD Mean N SD Mean N SD

Diversity of media diet (echo chambers) 5.10 133 1.41 4.93 167 1.48 4.61 171 1.43 4.01 529 1.64 4.41 1000 1.61

Mean N SD Mean N SD Mean N SD

Diversity of media diet (echo chambers) 4.26 630 1.66 4.67 370 1.50 4.41 1000 1.61

Table 9.8 Descriptives of diversity of media diet by level of education Low education

High education

Entire sample

Gender does not play any role in this respect, with men having a media diet as diverse as women (.M = 4.41 and .SD = 1.59 for men and .M = 4.41 and .SD = 1.63 for women). Generally speaking, it seems that education and the use of a more diverse plethora of media (types of outlets) are factors that positively correlate with the diversity of people’s media diets.

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9 Patterns of News Consumption in a High-Choice Media Environment

Table 9.9 Descriptives of diversity of media diet by age 18–24 years

25–34 years

35–44 years

45–54 years

55.+ years

Entire sample

Mean N SD Mean N SD Mean N SD Mean N SD Mean N SD Mean N SD

Diversity of media diet (echo chambers) 4.57 117 1.32 4.38 210 1.58 4.43 239 1.60 4.45 210 1.58 4.30 224 1.80 4.41 1000 1.61

9.3.5 Incidental News Exposure Incidental news exposure has increasingly become a widespread phenomenon in the new media environment, especially due to the popularity of online social networks. Prior studies showed that this is particularly of interest, as people might get some political and social knowledge, even in the absence of interest or intention to follow the news. Our study shows that the phenomenon, however, occurs much more among people who already intentionally follow the news. Specifically, all media users’ profiles show high levels of incidental exposure, while minimalists exhibit much less incidental exposure (see Table 9.10). At the same time, having a preference for social media as a dominant source of information, as opposed to mainstream media, leads to a higher prevalence of the phenomenon. When looking at the statistically significant differences (.F (3,996) = 77.68, p .< 0.01), post hoc Bonferroni tests show significant differences between any two groups (profiles), except for between mainstream media and minimalist users. This means that the differences we identified in our sample are real in the entire population as well. Of the socio-demographics, the only significant antecedent of incidental exposure to news is age (.r = −0.111, .N = 1000, p .< 0.01), with gender and education being non-significant predictors. If we look at age, there is a trend that can be observed in the data: incidental exposure to news is more frequent among younger generations (Table 9.11).

9.3 Findings Table 9.10 Descriptives of incidental news exposure for each media consumption profile

193

All media news user

Mainstream media user

SNS news user

Minimalist user

Entire sample

Mean N SD Mean N SD Mean N SD Mean N SD Mean N SD

Incidental news exposure 4.80 133 1.36 3.26 167 1.31 3.92 171 1.31 2.97 529 1.32 3.43 1000 1.47

Mean N SD Mean N SD Mean N SD Mean N SD Mean N SD Mean N SD

Incidental news exposure 3.74 117 1.36 3.51 210 1.50 3.45 239 1.47 3.35 210 1.48 3.23 224 1.44 3.43 1000 1.47

Table 9.11 Descriptives of incidental news exposure by age categories 18–24 years

25–34 years

35–44 years

45–54 years

55.+ years

Entire sample

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9 Patterns of News Consumption in a High-Choice Media Environment

Gender makes no difference in being incidentally exposed to news (.M = 3.41 and .SD = 1.44 for men and .M = 3.45 and .SD = 1.49 for women). To sum up, people who use many media types and are more educated have higher chances of being incidentally exposed to news.

9.3.6 General News Consumption Models Trying to make sense of integrative models that would show how news consumption from both mainstream media and social media look like, we ran hierarchical OLS regression models predicting news consumption, with main socio-demographics included in the first block and the three investigated phenomena (media trust, incidental news exposure and diversity of media diet) in this chapter in the second block (see Table 9.12). Results show that news consumption from mainstream media is positively associated with age, being a man, trusting mainstream media, being incidentally exposed to news and having a more diverse media diet. Education does not significantly influence mainstream news consumption. For social media news consumption, the model shows a negative association with age and education and a positive correlation with trust in social media sources and incidental news exposure.

Table 9.12 OLS regression models predicting news consumption for mainstream and social media

Intercept Age Gender Education Adj. R.2 Intercept Age Gender (female) Education Trust in respective media Incidental news exposure Diversity of media diet Adj. R.2 *p .< 0.05, **p .< 0.01

Mainstream media news consumption B SE Beta 2.836 0.358 0.023 0.004 0.195∗∗ −0.392 0.109 −0.113∗∗ 0.060 0.043 0.043 0.05 0.061 0.340 0.022 0.003 0.187∗∗ −0.389 0.093 −0.112∗∗ 0.007 0.038 0.005 0.414 0.035 0.341∗∗

Social media news consumption B SE Beta 4.014 0.427 −.018 0.004 −0.128∗∗ 0.159 0.130 0.039 −0.178 0.052 −0.111∗∗ 0.02 0.261 0.364 −0.008 0.003 −0.060∗ 0.075 0.100 0.019 −0.134 0.040 −0.084∗∗ 0.597 0.034 0.486∗∗

0.174 0.036

0.146∗∗

0.339 0.041

0.243∗∗

0.200 0.032

0.185∗∗

0.023 0.034

0.018

0.31

0.43

9.4 Discussion and Conclusions

195

Generally speaking, older people consume more mainstream media news and less social media news, while educated people consume less news circulating on social media. Trust in the media is associated with the consumption of information from that particular media source, being also the most powerful predictor in both models. Incidental news exposure leads to increased consumption of both types of news, while the diversity of media diet only counts for news consumption of mainstream media news. Socio-demographics play a much lower role in predicting consumption patterns compared with the other variables.

9.4 Discussion and Conclusions People’s media diets play an important part in the way they act as citizens in liberal democracy, influencing political knowledge, political interest, public participation and media trust, to name just a few. In this chapter, we investigated the characteristics of people’s profiles based on the type of media they consume (mainstream vs social media), trying to understand who consumes political- and public affairs-related news in an Eastern European democracy, namely, Romania, and how. First, most people (53.9%) in Romania are what we called “minimalists”, meaning they consume less news than the average from both mainstream and social media. About 17% of people prefer news coming from social media, and a similar percentage prefer news coming from mainstream media. Only 13.3% of people take their news from all types of media. The most striking result is that minimalists are the dominant group. This confirms previous studies in countries such as those from the Netherlands (Bos et al. 2016), Sweden (Strömbäck et al. 2018) or the United States (Edgerly 2015). People’s news diets show a preference for certain types of media, even among the groups of people who prefer mostly either mainstream or social media. Websites and TV are the most preferred outlets, while radio and Instagram are the least preferred sources of news. However, such patterns might change rapidly over time, as there are differences in news consumption across generations, with young people choosing to follow much more news coming via social media and the elderly via TV. This is not necessarily a characteristic of the Romanian context; people from various other cultural backgrounds have been reported to have the same preferences (Castro et al. 2022; Choi 2016). Mainstream media users are predominantly men and older than the other groups. Among them, TV news users tend to be less educated, and printed press users tend to be more educated. Social media users are younger and predominantly women and, interestingly, prefer websites as news sources to some social media, such as WhatsApp or YouTube. As far as trust in the media is concerned, people generally trust more the media they consume, or maybe they consume more the media they trust (the literature has yet to establish a clear direction of this correlation). However, there is no strong

196

9 Patterns of News Consumption in a High-Choice Media Environment

correlation between the two, supporting the mixed results of studies investigating this relationship (for an overview, see Strömbäck et al. 2020). Among “all type media” group, people trust TV and websites more and Instagram the least, while mainstream media users trust TV and radio and distrust Instagram. One particularly interesting aspect is that social media users trust almost equally mainstream and social media sources. Minimalists trust the least all sources of news. In terms of most trusted types of media, people trust television the most among mainstream media and Facebook among social media. Generally speaking, regardless of the level of education, people tend to trust mainstream media more than social media, in line with recent research in 11 countries (Fletcher & Park 2017). Looking at socio-demographic characteristics, there are interesting variations across age categories. We observed a general trend of trusting mainstream media more and social media less the older people get, as also observed in prior studies (Choi 2016; Kim 2016; Van Rees and Van Eijck 2003). Significant correlations were established between age and some specific media outlets: older people trust TV more than younger ones, while the latter associate news credibility with Instagram, YouTube and WhatsApp more than their older counterparts. Gender only makes a difference in what Instagram and Facebook messenger are concerned in the sense that women tend to trust them more than men. One interesting and somewhat new pattern of news consumption discussed in the literature refers to incidental news exposure. With a wider and wider array of social networks and instant messaging platforms, the phenomenon has become inescapable in the last years (Bergström & Jervelycke Belfrage 2018; Fletcher & Nielsen 2018). As expected, the more people use social media, the more they stumble upon news by accident; however, people in all groups exhibit high levels of incidental news exposure, with minimalists being the least affected by the phenomenon. In terms of socio-demographic characteristics, age is the only significant antecedent, with younger generations being more exposed without intention to news than older ones. Another prevalent phenomenon related to the emergence of social media are “echo chambers”, which are a metaphorical way to describe that information and beliefs are shared among people with similar views; in other words, people mostly expose themselves to information they agree with (Dubois & Blank 2018; Jamieson & Cappella 2008). In this chapter, we referred to this phenomenon as “diversity of media diets”, based on the mix results concerning echo chambers of the studies in the last years (for an overview, see Terren & Borge-Bravo 2021). Our results show that the frequency of news consumption is correlated with the diversity of media diet (Dubois & Blank 2018). Specifically, minimalist users, for example, have the least diverse media diet among the four investigated groups, while social media users have a less diverse media diet than all media users. Additionally, education plays a role in how diverse one’s media diet is, in the sense that more educated people are less subject to being trapped in echo chambers. This study comes with limitations, which we acknowledge. First, the measures we used for media diets are limited in scope and lack some nuances that would allow a more fine-grained analysis. Second, the results are bound to the cultural

References

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environment in which data was collected, even though, in many respects, our data confirms key studies of the specific literature. Last but not least, the data we present in this chapter is mostly descriptive and does not offer causal explanations for the phenomena we discuss. Summing up, this chapter contributes to the literature in the field by showing how news repertoires are correlated to trust in media sources, incidental news exposure and echo chambers, as well as discussing the role of key socio-demographics (education, gender and age) in these processes.

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Chapter 10

Conclusions

10.1 The New Information Ecosystem and the Changing Patterns of Media Production and Consumption In the last decade, the journalism industry underwent epochal changes due to the digital disruption and the challenges it brought to both news production and news consumption. Newsrooms and journalists adapted to these changes with varying degrees of success. The emergence of “new” news values – immediacy, interactivity and participation – in the face of digital transformation has been both contested and embraced by journalists (for overviews, see Ferrer-Conill et al. 2023; Paul & Berkowitz 2019). Regardless if the rapid transformation of the media landscape triggers enthusiasm or reluctance, it is beyond any doubt that the new culture emanating from online journalism redefines news production patterns and faces journalists with increasingly high pressure to innovate in a rapidly changing news industry. Additionally, the current journalistic practices redesign specific news cultures (Strömbäck & Esser 2014), which are, on the one hand, journalistic “cultures of production” whose output is contingent on national contexts, market configurations and the individual characteristics of news outlets (Brüggemann et al. 2014; FerrerConill et al. 2023) and, on the other hand, “cultures of news consumption”, represented by patterns of consumption explained by country-level factors beyond individual user differences. This book does not offer a “cultural” approach to journalism; therefore, we do not focus in particular on scrutinising the Romanian journalistic context. We do, however, refer in our research chapters to some particularities of Romanian journalism, namely, that the news media market is not characterised by a strong presence of the state, which subsidises public broadcasting services, but has a marginal role in the overall media landscape. The state exerts a limited influence in the Romanian media system, unlike in the Nordic countries or some other Western © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023 R. Buturoiu et al., Patterns of News Consumption in a High-Choice Media Environment, Springer Studies in Media and Political Communication, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-41954-6_10

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European countries (for in-depth analysis, see Eldridge et al. 2019; Strömbäck & Esser 2014), and private media organisations are the only ones commercially viable. We believe that the lack of a strong public media sector alongside a commercial, private media limits public access to a diverse wealth of content and negatively impacts both journalistic professionalism and the democratic and social duties of news media. Coming back to the structure of this book, we cover considerable ground of recent theoretical advances in communication studies (Chaps. 1, 2, 4, 5, and 6) and offer empirical findings from a threefold research, which employs both qualitative and quantitative methodologies (discussed in Chaps. 3, 7, and 8). What unites the sections of this book is their fundamental concern with the present and the future of news consumption in which the new communication technologies and the “maladies” they produce, such as disinformation, polarisation, selective exposure and all sorts of radicalisms, play important roles in shaping our societies. Building on various research and conceptual advancements, we analyse some key changes within the current media environment. Furthermore, we bring empirical evidence on how the news production and consumption patterns have changed recently in a relatively young democracy, such as Romania, and try to understand how these patterns impact the way individuals interpret both the media and the political landscapes. We equally focus on the “new” news production patterns, which are embedded in the organisational and ideological contexts of the Romanian media and impact the journalistic settings. The main shifts in the news production process (referred to in some of the chapters) are related to the media market segmentation, automated journalism and, most of all, the widespread dissemination of information via social media. These new phenomena impact the news production patterns, affecting, on the one hand, the professional and social conventions of newsmaking (e.g. genre tradition, news values) and, on the other hand, user demand (e.g. users’ expectations, needs and consumption habits). In this conclusion section, we summarise some main themes of recent studies dedicated to the new media ecosystem, briefly present our own empirical findings and lay out directions for future research. In doing so, we first suggest a common framework for organising different theories about media consumption and how it affects the overall quality of public life; afterwards, we bring empirical evidence from Romania about the current media diets and their influences; and thirdly, we advance a normative approach on the new media usage patterns and suggest solutions to increase democratic participation in the new information-abundant environment we currently live in. We conclude this volume with the hope that scholars and researchers from various national (EU and non-EU) backgrounds will develop better common understandings of media usage strengths and weaknesses and that widespread media literacy will foster transparency, inclusiveness and a more satisfying level of citizen participation even in countries where solid democratic infrastructures are still in the making.

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10.2 Recent Conceptual Advances in Media Effects Theories In the first theoretical sections of the book (Chaps. 2 and 3), we reflect on the shift of the communication research field towards contingent effects, particularly in light of an increasingly complex political and social reality and a rapidly changing media landscape. The global arena of information made possible by the Internet and various online platforms has redesigned the distribution and reception of news and media agendas (for overviews, see Howlett 2022; Strömbäck et al. 2022). Moreover, as shown in various recent studies (Castro et al. 2022; Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2021), the widespread usage of social networking sites nowadays allows a rapid transfer of information at a global scale and facilitates the dissemination of issues of global importance, such as the recent COVID-19 pandemic or various political and economic crises. In terms of agenda-setting and its main conceptual ramifications, priming and framing, these changes call for a redefinition of the classical theory (for an overview, see Perloff 2022). The traditional model of agenda-setting defines a stimulusresponse relationship between the media and the public, whose agenda is shaped by the media agenda (Luo et al. 2019; McCombs & Valenzuela 2021; Vargo 2018). The present media ecosystem redesigns this relationship in the sense that there is a continual exchange between media and their audiences. Additionally, the observation that issues co-exist in the daily information environment with other issues (agenda-melding) offers a broader perspective on the information ecosystem and marks the transition from classical agenda-setting studies to more recent conceptual developments (e.g. Guo & Vargo 2020; Howlett 2022; Shaw et al. 2019). Furthermore, the new patterns of intermedia agenda-setting seem to validate that the flow is increasingly from emerging types of media to traditional media, instead of the old transfer of agenda from elite, national media to non-elite media (Coleman & Wu 2022; Lee et al. 2021). Likewise, the rapid proliferation of social media has further transformed intermedia agenda-setting dynamics, as social media content engages now in reciprocal agenda-setting with traditional news media (Geiß 2019; Langer & Gruber 2021; Rossiter 2021). Nowadays, issues and opinions spread rapidly, and their reach and impact depend on various channel characteristics and involved actors; nonetheless, what impacts news dissemination the most are the technology platforms, such as Facebook and Google, and the social media tools they enable. Moreover, the public sphere has always been crystallised through interpersonal conversations about public issues, and nowadays, such conversations proliferate primarily via social media platforms. Even if there is empirical evidence that social media posts, tweets, blogs or online comments on any given platform consist largely of superfluous information or hateful and polarising speech (Entman & Usher 2018; Guo & Vargo 2020; Iyengar et al. 2019; Lee et al. 2021), there are diverse political conversation and commentary as well. Unquestionably, social media represents an important X-ray of public opinion in the current media ecosystem. In short, we argue in the theoretical sections of this book that the technological advances and the prevalence of social media as

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agenda-setters require a reinterpretation of the traditional model of media agendasetting. To wrap up, even though the agenda-setting research paradigm has had an established position in media and communication research for the past 50 years, the present redesign of the media landscape imposes a conceptual facelift of the concept. New expansions of agenda-setting in the new media landscape include the melding of agendas in the digital sphere (Shaw et al. 2019) and the debate over how the fragmented media environment impacts how citizens decode the political universe and whether mainstream media still tell people what to think about when they are exposed to virtually unlimited news media choices (Guo & Vargo 2020; Vargo 2018). As Perloff (2022) suggests, the modern online agenda-building process, the increased partisan selective exposure, driven by algorithms and social networks might bring an end to media agenda-setting research. In spite of such challenges, recent work (Coleman & Wu 2021; Gilardi et al. 2022; Langer & Gruber 2021; Rossiter 2021) has adapted agenda-setting to the contemporary political world by enriching it conceptually and adding novel methodologies, such as computational social science methods. Additionally, recent studies (Shehata & Strömbäck 2013; Vargo & Guo 2017) show that partisan media and new online platforms exert significant, reciprocal influences on intermedia agenda-setting and the public agenda. Fake news can influence the agendas of partisan outlets, yet their ability to penetrate the public agenda is still debatable (Guo & Vargo 2020; Vargo et al. 2018). The concept of agenda-building has also been revitalised by exploring online intermedia agenda influences and questioning the historically established causation between media and public agendas (Howlett 2022; Vargo 2018). While there is experimental and survey evidence that media influence public agenda and what individuals perceive as salient (McCombs & Valenzuela 2021), the complex today’s media world challenges researchers to try to document the new causal impacts (e.g. Perloff 2022). In short, just reporting media-agenda relationships is no longer enough for understanding the nowadays complex media universe; but the notion of media setting agendas, construct of intermedia agenda, emphasis on the melding of agendas and appreciation of the role mainstream and social media agendas play in the exercise of power in a democracy remain important issues.

10.3 The Fragmentation of the Media Landscape and the Prevailing Patterns of News Consumption More emphasis is nowadays placed on the demand side of news production and, more precisely, on how to tailor content in accordance with the profiles of news consumers (Castro et al. 2022; Van Aelst et al. 2017; Vandenplas & Picone 2021). Another trend arises from the recent explosion of media vehicles; thanks to them, people enjoy increasingly inexpensive or free means for obtaining information and

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sharing it across group and geographical boundaries (Buehler et al. 2021). This diversification of media choices appears to promise an expansion of capacity for individual and social participation. However, as indicated by various studies (Basol et al. 2021; Castro et al. 2022; Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2021), the fragmentation of media audiences and their predisposition to selectively consume political information and form echo chambers work against inclusiveness and networked social and political activity, key criteria of democratic performance. Notwithstanding the importance of the above-mentioned studies dedicated to the rapidly changing media consumption patterns, they remain predominantly focused on either the United States or Western European countries. Recent comparative research (Castro et al. 2022) has shown there is consistent country variance with regard to which types of media are preferred for informational purposes. While comparative research on citizens’ media diets has advanced over the past years, Eastern Europe remains largely uncovered in terms of media use patterns and how they impact public perceptions and media trust. This book tries to fill this void by offering an in-depth analysis of the Romanian media landscape (Chap. 3), how different types of media are accessed for news (Chap. 7) and how the new diets of information influence the way citizens approach disinformation and other maladies of the nowadays media ecosystem (Chap. 8).

10.4 Changing Patterns of Media Consumption in Today’s High-Choice Media Environment: Empirical Evidence from Romania In the theoretical chapters, we summarise important findings from extensive research dedicated to the rapidly changing media consumption patterns (Coleman & Wu 2022; De Blasio et al. 2020; Geiß 2022; Langer & Gruber 2021; Strömbäck et al. 2022). As mentioned above, such theoretical and empirical contributions are primarily focused on either American or Western European contexts. There is an overwhelming deficit in terms of studies that cover Eastern Europe or various countries from Africa and Asia (with the notable exception of China,1 ) which are all underrepresented in the literature dedicated to media diets and preferences for certain media sources and types. This book represents an attempt to offer a broader perspective on a terra quasi-incognita: Eastern Europe and Romania, in particular. The empirical findings that we present and discuss in this book span over a period of more than 2 years. Our first attempt to understand what the changing media consumption patterns are and how they influence public communication and citizen engagement was undertaken during the COVID-19 pandemic. This first pillar of our

1 Where recent research has covered the main topics related to the high-choice media environment, the impact of emerging platforms and the fragmentation of media consumption, to name just a few. For instance, Luo et al. (2019), Lee et al. (2021), Guo & Vargo (2020), Tay et al. (2021).

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research was agenda-setting-centred, in the sense that we were interested not in the health crisis per se but in finding the media patterns of covering this large-scale crisis situation and how the crisis-related topics were disseminated among various media outlets. The other two research pillars change the perspective and investigate how media audiences consume news and how their news diets instruct their attitudes towards media and, overall, their social and political engagement.

10.5 New Media Coverage Patterns During Crisis Situations Our content analysis undertaken during the COVID-19 pandemic in Romania (presented in Chap. 3) was focused on identifying how news stories migrate from one media channel to another. Two periods were included in the research: March 2020 and January 2021. During this interval of time, the media coverage has been dramatically affected by the global health crisis generated by the pandemic. Our study is not, however, focused on the specific context of the pandemic but on larger phenomena, such as the changing patterns of media use, the redesign of the media landscape via the rapid proliferation of emerging media platforms and, last but not least, the large-scale disinformation, which has penetrated both private and public life. Building on the intermedia agenda theoretical background, we explore different patterns of covering the pandemic in mainstream media versus online platforms and social media and the migration speed (or “lag”) of news stories among various outlets and platforms, both on- and offline. Overall, our findings about the public agenda during the COVID-19 pandemic indicate that intermedia agenda-setting happened mostly via online platforms and that online sources citing other online outlets were the preferred vehicle for circulating information about the pandemic. These results offer a fresh insight into how information is “borrowed” and redistributed during periods of crisis and indicate that media agendas work in reciprocity, in the sense that both traditional and online media sources act as agenda-setters that mutually influence each other. Furthermore, our study confirms that online platforms have an increasingly dominant role in setting the public agenda; such findings have already been validated in similar studies (e.g. Lee et al. 2021; Shaw et al. 2019; Valenzuela et al. 2017). These results reiterate that the predominant power of legacy media to define public agenda is nowadays transferred (at least partially) to online media platforms, which have a central role in the current dissemination of information. In short, the results of our study offer important insights into how media coverage patterns work from a longitudinal perspective and clarify how issues migrate within the current media ecosystem. Furthermore, our empirical evidence that social media are becoming a key source of information for both online and TV news stories is particularly important since there is increasing evidence that social media platforms could play a crucial role in boosting governmental efforts by disseminating accurate and accessible information while also limiting the spread of disinformation (Hameleers & Van der Meer

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2020; Matthes et al. 2022). This medium is, however, the most vulnerable to the proliferation of bias, hateful and misleading information (Coleman & Wu 2022). Thus, we argue that while social media are increasingly used as news sources, more efforts should be invested into making them a safer place where accurate information is shared in the best interest of citizens.

10.6 The Transition from Low- to High-Choice Media Landscape As mentioned above, our empirical research was threefold. After a longitudinal content analysis of the Romanian media, we have focused our attention on disentangling the main media consumption patterns of Romanians via a national survey. In this empirical section (Chap. 8), we explore the main effects associated with the transition from low- to high-choice media landscape and the changes in both the supply and demand sides of the information environment. The current profiles of news consumption are discussed in the larger context of the shift from traditional to new media sources. The idea of a “healthy” news media consumption is at the core of this section of the book and is thoroughly investigated via empirical findings related to the impact of the news consumption habits prevalent in today’s society. In short, our main focus in this quantitative research was to understand how people consume information in the current high-choice media environment and how this information impacts them. In the vein of various conceptualisations dedicated to media repertoires (Kim 2016; Mangold & Bachl 2018) and news consumption profiles (Dubois & Blank 2018; Fletcher & Nielsen 2018), we explore the prevalent news consumption patterns in Romania. Recent comparative research (e.g. Castro et al. 2022; Oh et al. 2021; Strömbäck et al. 2018; Vandenplas & Picone 2021) indicate there are consistent country characteristics in how people consume news due not only to different national contexts but also to differences in how news consumption is conceptualised and measured. We build on such findings and use common conceptual frameworks in order to identify news consumption patterns in Romania. Specifically, our empirical exploration of the Romanians’ media diets suggests they are predominantly “minimalists”, i.e. they consume less news than initially anticipated. Mainstream media users are predominantly older men, while social media users are younger and predominantly women. Furthermore, TV news users tend to be less educated, while more educated people prefer printed press. Overall, regardless of their level of education, people tend to trust more mainstream media than social media. Education plays, however, a role in the diversity of media diets in the sense that more educated people use more diverse sources of information. Additionally, our results show that the diversity of the media diets is correlated with the frequency of news consumption. Unsurprisingly, minimalist users have the least

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diverse media diet, being vulnerable to becoming trapped in echo chambers, while people who consume more news have more diverse media diets. Furthermore, we assess the differences between mainstream and social media information and find they do have a differential effect in terms of media diets and associated media “maladies”, with social media users being more prone to incidental news exposure, disinformation and lack of trust in the media. In such a context, it remains debatable what counts for a healthy media diet. We argue that “healthy” media diets revolve around political and social issues consumed with moderation. Additionally, balanced news media diets contain a plurality of media sources (i.e. independent and corporate, public and private, mainstream and alternative, traditional and new, etc.) and should include contrasting viewpoints as well.

10.7 New Media-Related Maladies and Possible Remedies The rapid advent of disinformation on the public scene in the past years has had a tremendous impact not only on the public sphere and journalistic practices but on democracy in general as well. As we have argued in Chap. 6, disinformation affects the integrity of democracy through the large web of fabricated falsehoods and alternative facts that has penetrated public life (for an overview, see Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2021). To counter the toxic effects of disinformation, numerous solutions have been advanced by scholars, practitioners and public institutions alike (Basol et al. 2021; Castro et al. 2022; Roozenbeek et al. 2020). In general, three solutions for fighting disinformation can be distinguished: (1) news media literacy, (2) factchecking interventions and (3) policymaking and implementation in order to reduce the long-term negative effects of dis- and misinformation (Hameleers & Van der Meer 2020; Villi et al. 2022). As emphasised in Chap. 6, the disinformation war cannot be “won” without transnational initiatives and a global, cross-platform response. As the experts from the European Digital Media Observatory (EDMO) indicate, media and journalism ought to be strengthened through serious funding and investment in media literacy in order to build a global resilience towards disinformation. Recent initiatives have invested in creating a solid infrastructure for depicting misinformation (for an overview, see Frau-Meigs 2022). From an educational perspective, various projects, from either media institutions or non-governmental organisations, have led to interventions in schools and the implementation of new technological tools into the educational process. Notwithstanding such initiatives, there is still much to be done in order to reduce the negative effects of the information disorders that proliferate in today’s media landscape. Our qualitative research allows for more fine-grained observations regarding various maladies of the current information ecosystem. Through focus groups and interviews with experts, we bring insightful empirical evidence about Romanians’ current media diets and how they impact their public perceptions and, overall, their

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understanding of the political universe. Unsurprisingly, our findings indicate that younger people have more unbalanced media diets, heavily dependent on social media, and are more affected by toxic habits, such as “news snacking” or selective exposure to information. In terms of healthy media diets, perceptions of both ordinary people and experts crystallise around the idea of a balanced diet, with political news being part of the daily media routines. Our qualitative research data (discussed in Chap. 7) also show that both experts and ordinary citizens point to disinformation as the main problem of the new information ecosystem. Furthermore, disinformation is seen by ordinary people and experts alike as a serious threat with effects on both individual well-being and democracy in general. The data collected from the interviews with experts help us also to better understand the toxic effects of disinformation, such as polarisation, alienation and declining levels of trust in the media and other institutions. Overall, media education is considered by the majority of respondents as the most effective solution to fighting fake news dissemination and, more broadly, disinformation. Additionally, our study analyses in more detail how the journalism industry’s use of social media has affected news production patterns. The first change brought about by social media is the audience’s increased power to evaluate thematic relevance through dissemination. On social media, audiences can decide which stories they find most important and share them. Accordingly, news organisations now focus on how often their stories receive shares on social media, going so far as to capture this with analytics. Second, social media affect journalistic routines through a transfer of topics and relevance; increasingly, more journalists obtain sources, story ideas or general information about a topic via social media. Finally, the audience can enter the journalist’s network by using social media’s various feedback mechanisms, thus becoming important influences in tailoring content. Our interviews with journalists and media experts indicate that user involvement in news production means that journalism has lost some control over content and that users can increasingly be seen on a stage once predominantly reserved for journalists. Moreover, the rapid dissemination of information renders speed and real-time reporting as main filters in the news production process. Immediacy means that different provisory, incomplete and sometimes dubious news drafts are published. In line with similar research (e.g. Ferrucci 2018; Lee & Tandoc 2017), we find in our qualitative research that both user participation and immediacy have an impact on what is being published. As emphasised in our qualitative research, practitioners and media experts consider that news production patterns have changed under the pressure of immediacy of reporting, which has affected the quality of news. Additionally, journalists consider that the demand for soft news (being part of a larger process of tabloidisation of the news) and the increased difficulty of checking information disseminated via social media (for an overview of the topic of news circulation on social media, see Wahl-Jorgensen & Hanitzsch 2019) place great pressure on the journalistic practices. Another important finding of our study is that fact-checking is still largely missing from the Romanian journalistic practices, which might be related to the low visibility of the topic on the public agenda, even though in the past years, there have

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been consistent efforts made by various institutions and NGOs (mainly at EU level and less at national level) in order to tackle disinformation in all European countries. When it comes to the audience part, our research data points to an important challenge for news consumers nowadays, namely, their ability to filter facts from opinions and approach news in a critical manner rather than simply being exposed to it. As indicated by various studies, exposure to a large quantity of information leads, paradoxically, to people being less informed or even uninformed (JonesJang et al. 2019; Scheibenzuber et al. 2021). One of our main empirical findings is that individuals increasingly avoid news in spite of their abundance in today’s media environment. We argue that the main factors explaining news avoidance are related to cognitive-based variables such as disinterest in politics, perceptions of news lacking relevance, low news self-efficacy and, overall, a lack of knowledge about how news systems function. In line with similar recent research (Tay et al. 2021), we argue in Chap. 7 that the lack of self-confidence in how to navigate the current media environment is one of the most pervasive effects of the new media ecosystem. In conclusion, while news avoidance is not always a problem, possible remedies should be treated with priority by scholars and researchers mainly because news avoidance is linked to uninformed and disengaged citizenry (Basol et al. 2021; Scheibenzuber et al. 2021). An efficient strategy that might reduce intentional news avoidance should be implemented by news media organisations and journalists by offering more fact-based, transparent and constructive news in an attempt to help people overcome their perceptions of news overload, negativity and untrustworthiness. Furthermore, as indicated by our qualitative research, the increased negativity, untrustworthiness and commercialisation of news seem to be the main causes of news avoidance. In the same vein as other recent studies (Jones-Jang et al. 2019; Tay et al. 2021), our empirical data indicate that practices of news avoidance are mostly the result of a legitimate desire to reduce exposure to such pervasive phenomena. To wrap up, in this volume, we present a mix of viewpoints about what disorders the new media patterns bring about and how these media-related maladies contribute to or detract from various ideals of democratic, citizen engagement. We bring the book to a close with the conventional plea for more interdisciplinary and comparative research dedicated to media consumption patterns and their effects on political understanding. In proposing this volume, we argued that alterations in media systems and technologies have profound implications for media usage and social and political participation. In the 2 years it took to complete the book, this prophecy has become even more prominent. We have seen enough to be certain that, powered by the Internet and the rapid dissemination of content, online and social media have become the most influential medium in which dis-/misinformation will reign uninhibited if not unchallenged. Furthermore, this book sought to begin identifying solutions, framing questions and probing potential effects of how the current high-choice media landscape has changed our media diets and the way they impact our individual and collective lives. We hope the new research directions explored in this volume will result in more integrated conceptual frameworks and

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improved prospects for comparative analyses regarding media usage patterns and their effects on public life.

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