Media Governance: A Cosmopolitan Critique (Global Transformations in Media and Communication Research - A Palgrave and IAMCR Series) 3031050193, 9783031050190

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GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN MEDIA AND COMMUNICATION RESEARCH A PALGRAVE AND IAMCR SERIES

Media Governance A Cosmopolitan Critique Edited by Sarah Anne Ganter Hanan Badr

IAMCR AIECS AIERI

Global Transformations in Media and Communication Research - A Palgrave and IAMCR Series Series Editors

Marjan de Bruin Chair Technical Working Group Equity, Diversity and Inclusion The University of the West Indies, Mona Campus Kingston, Jamaica Claudia Padovani Department of Politics, Law and International Studies University of Padova Padova, Italy

The International Association for Media and Communications Research (IAMCR) has been, for over 50 years, a focal point and unique platform for academic debate and discussion on a variety of topics and issues generated by its many thematic Sections and Working groups (see http://iamcr. org/). This series specifically links to the intellectual capital of the IAMCR and offers more systematic and comprehensive opportunities for the publication of key research and debates. It provides a forum for collective knowledge production and exchange through trans-disciplinary contributions. In the current phase of globalizing processes and increasing interactions, the series provides a space to rethink those very categories of space and place, time and geography through which communication studies has evolved, thus contributing to identifying and refining concepts, theories and methods with which to explore the diverse realities of communication in a changing world. Its central aim is to provide a platform for knowledge exchange from different geo-cultural contexts. Books in the series contribute diverse and plural perspectives on communication developments including from outside the Anglo-speaking world which is much needed in today’s globalized world in order to make sense of the complexities and intercultural challenges communication studies are facing.

Sarah Anne Ganter  •  Hanan Badr Editors

Media Governance A Cosmopolitan Critique

Editors Sarah Anne Ganter School of Communication Simon Fraser University Burnaby, BC, Canada

Hanan Badr Department of Communication Studies Paris Lodron University of Salzburg Salzburg, Austria

ISSN 2634-5978     ISSN 2634-5986 (electronic) Global Transformations in Media and Communication Research - A Palgrave and IAMCR Series ISBN 978-3-031-05019-0    ISBN 978-3-031-05020-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05020-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the ­publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and ­institutional affiliations. Cover illustration: © Colin Anderson Productions pty ltd| Getty Images This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Acknowledgments

This volume had remained a few years in the idea stage, and several people contributed to take it to a book proposal and then to this manuscript. Arsh Gill at Simon Fraser University provided invaluable research support for the literature work to analyze the geographical spread of media governance studies and to systematically identify potential contributors. Dal Yong Jin, Zoë Druick, Naomi Sakr and Maria Löblich were fantastic colleagues to talk with through the idea for the volume and the practice of academic book editing in general. The volume also benefited from the Simon Fraser University Publications Fund. At Palgrave Macmillan, we were supported by a crowd of incredible women: Lucy Batrouney encouraged the initial idea, Mala Sanghera-Warren navigated us through the proposal stage toward its acceptance, and Lina Aboujieb, Lauriane Piette and Divya Suresh saw us through the finalization of the manuscript with patience and encouragement. We found ourselves in the midst of a global pandemic when working on this volume. Covid-19 caused us and our contributors, to work in conditions of constant alert, insecurity and often isolation from our loved ones. Working together on this book from across eleven different countries made the inequalities with which we live through this challenging time much more apparent than most of the everyday struggles that each of us endured. Therefore, we feel it is more so important to acknowledge our colleagues’ endurance, collegiality and connectedness with this project, at times when they, their friends, family members and colleagues went through particularly challenging, hard and often confusing experiences. Working together during the past months has reinforced our sense of v

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scholarly community, as well as our commitment to the very purpose of this book which is calling for and helping shape an academic discourse that exists through exchange and in recognition of the often very different realities that shape our work. We want to thank all our contributors for letting us in on their struggles and being empathetic toward our own, and dedicating their time and energy to this project. Finally, we thank our families, especially Juan and Enzo, Amr, Rana and Karim, as well as close friends who in these difficult times helped us remain healthy and cheered us up when we needed it the most.

Contents

1 Introduction:  Re-examining Media Governance Through Cosmopolitan Critique  1 Sarah Anne Ganter and Hanan Badr Part I Concepts and Epistemology  13 2 Sovereignty,  Power, and Agency in Neoliberal Configurations of Media and Governance in the Global South 15 Sanjay Asthana 3 Media  Governance as Diagnostic Lens to Probe Hidden Dimensions of Authoritarian Decision-Making in the Arab Middle East 39 Naomi Sakr 4 Challenges  of Media Governance and Media Policy in Latin America: In the Context of Media Reform Battles 59 Rodrigo Gómez 5 Media  Accountability in a Non-democratic Context: Conceptual Challenges and Adaptations 81 Judith Pies vii

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Contents

Part II Critique and Ambivalences: Assessing Media Governance 101 6 Cosmopolitan  Media, Contestation, and Critique: Assessing International Media Governance Standards from the Nigerian Perspective103 Ufuoma Akpojivi 7 Media  Governance and Fake News in Brazil125 Afonso de Albuquerque and Lucineide Magalhães de Matos 8 The  Egyptian Media Governance Framework: Gains and Limitations145 Rasha Allam 9 Media  Governance as a Utopian Concept in a Local Mediascape: Challenges for Conceptual Development in South Korea165 Hyejin Jo and Dal Yong Jin Part III New Perspectives and Conceptual Innovations 183 10 A  New Perspective on the Importance of the State in Global Internet Governance: Tracing China’s Participation185 Hong Shen 11 Democratic  Governance of Media and Public Communication: Latin American Participatory Institutions Created in the Twenty-First Century205 María Soledad Segura and Alejandro Linares 12 Understanding  the Dynamics of Social Media Governance in South Africa231 Trust Matsilele and Bruce Mutsvairo

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13 Deliberative  Policy Ecology Approach: Media Policy Studies from South Asia261 Preeti Raghunath 14 Conclusion:  Cosmopolitan Critique as a Counterhegemonic Methodology283 Sarah Anne Ganter and Hanan Badr Index307

Notes on Contributors

Ufuoma Akpojivi  is an associate professor at the Media Studies Department, University of the Witwatersrand. He holds a PhD in Communication Studies from the University of Leeds, UK. His research interests are in the areas of media policy, democratization, citizenship, new media, and activism authoring, with many academic articles published in these areas. He is a C2 rated researcher of the National Research Foundation (NRF) of South Africa. Afonso  de  Albuquerque is a professor at the Graduate Program in Communication Studies, Fluminense Federal University, Brazil. His previous works have appeared in Journalism; Journalism Studies; Media, Culture & Society; and Communication, Culture, and Critique. Rasha Allam  is an assistant professor and associate chair of the Department Journalism and Mass Communication, School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at The American University in Cairo. Allam’s research interests include Egyptian and Arab media management systems and business models, Arab broadcast, electronic and social media laws, policies and regulations. Allam’s publications address several issues, such as constructive journalism in the Arab region, the use of analytics inside newsrooms, and the functionality of media business models. Sanjay Asthana  teaches at the School of Journalism and Strategic Media in Middle Tennessee State University, USA. His areas of interest are media and cultural studies, youth media education, international and global communication. He is the author of Innovative Practices of Youth Participation in Media (2006), Youth Media Imaginaries from Around the World (2012), xi

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Palestinian Youth Media and the Pedagogies of Estrangement (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), and India’s State-Run Media: Broadcasting, Power, and Narrative (2019). Dr. Asthana is on a US Scholar Fulbright-Nehru Award to India, studying the ‘Dialectic of Environment and Political Ecology.’ Hanan Badr  is Full Professor and Chair for Public Spheres and Inequalities at the Department of Communication, University of Salzburg, Austria. Her work focuses on global inequalities and communication, comparing media systems, activism and digital public spheres, diversifying communication research, and how globalization and digitization transform journalism worldwide. Her work pushes epistemological approaches towards more inclusivity in communication studies. Hanan won awards including the Kluge Fellowship at the Library of Congress and the DAAD Scholarship Award and held positions in Cairo, Erfurt, Berlin, Beirut and Kuwait. Sarah Anne Ganter  is Assistant Professor of Communication and Cultural Policy in the School of Communication at Simon Fraser University in Vancouver. Her work is influenced by a cosmopolitan approach to academic work, integrating scholarly work from different cultural, linguistic and geographical academic settings. She has published widely on media governance, digital policy and regulation, and journalism, and analyzes media and digital policy transformations from a theoretical perspective that focuses on the dynamics and interactions shaping institutional fields. Rodrigo Gómez  is Professor in Communication Policies and Industries at the Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana-Cuajimalpa. He is the chair of the Political Economy section of the International Association for Media and Communication Research (IAMCR). His research is grounded in the critical political economy of communication, examining ownership and public policies in communication industries. He is co-editor (with Ben Birkinbine and Janet Wasko) of the series and book Global Media Giants (2017). Dal Yong Jin  is a distinguished professor at Simon Fraser University, Canada. He completed his PhD in the Institute of Communications Research at the University of Illinois in 2005. Jin’s major research and teaching interests are on digital platforms and digital games, globalization and media, transnational cultural studies, and the political economy of media and culture. Jin has published numerous books, journal articles, and book chapters. He is the founding book series editor of Routledge Research in Digital Media and Culture in Asia. He has been

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directing the Transnational Culture and Digital Technology Lab since summer 2021. Hyejin Jo  is a PhD student in the School of Communication at Simon Fraser University, Canada. She has two MAs in Communication at SFU and Media & Communication at Hankuk University of Foreign Studies, South Korea. Her research areas are critical media studies, cultural studies, and feminist political economy. She explores the intersections of popular culture, gender, and technologies. One key strand of her research focuses on a heteronormative start-up culture. She is working on a new project that engages critical theory and feminist approaches to the metaverse for technologies and power dynamics. Alejandro Linares  is a professor at the Universidad Nacional de Formosa (UNaF) and a researcher at Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET) in Argentina. Linares holds a PhD from the University of Buenos Aires in Social Sciences. Lucineide Magalhães de Matos  is a PhD candidate at Communication Program, Fluminense Federal University. Trust Matsilele is Lecturer in the Media and Communication Studies in the Department of the Cape Peninsula University of Technology (CPUT). He is also a research fellow of the CPUT’s Centre for Communication Studies. Matsilele holds a DLitt et Phil Communication Studies from University of Johannesburg. Matsilele is an interdisciplinary researcher with interest in digital humanities, intersection of artificial intelligence and journalism, cyber-protest cultures and the intersection of culture and technology. His monograph on social media and digital dissidence in Zimbabwe is set to be published in 2023. Bruce Mutsvairo is a professor in the Department of Media and Culture Studies at Utrecht University in The Netherlands. Judith Pies  is a communication researcher and has been the head of the German research, training, and consultancy organization Medien | Kompetenz | International since 2018. She received her PhD from the University of Erfurt and worked as a researcher and lecturer at different universities. Her research focus is on the transformation of journalism, international media and communication, and media accountability. Outside of her academic career, she has worked as a project manager for international media projects and as a journalist.

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Preeti Raghunath  is Lecturer of Communication and Media Studies at Monash University Malaysia. She is the author of Community Radio Policies in South Asia: A Deliberative Policy Ecology Approach, published by Palgrave Macmillan, in 2020. She is exploring Southern theorising of media policy studies. Naomi  Sakr  is Professor of Media Policy at the Communication and Media Research Institute (CAMRI) of the University of Westminster in the UK and author, co-author, editor or co-editor of eight books on Arab media. María  Soledad  Segura  is a professor at the Universidad Nacional de Córdoba (UNC) and a researcher at Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET). Hong Shen  is a Systems Scientist in the Human-Computer Interaction Institute at Carnegie Mellon University (CMU). She received her PhD in Communications from the University of Illinois at Urbana-­Champaign (UIUC). Her research focuses on global Internet industry and policy (with an emphasis on China) as well as the social and policy implications of digital platforms and algorithmic systems.

List of Figures

Fig. 8.1 Fig. 12.1 Fig. 12.2 Fig. 12.3 Fig. 12.4 Fig. 12.5 Fig. 12.6 Fig. 12.7 Fig. 12.8 Fig. 12.9 Fig. 12.10 Fig. 12.11 Fig. 12.12 Fig. 12.13 Fig. 12.14 Fig. 12.15 Fig. 12.16

The new regulatory bodies and their scope in Egypt 150 Combined Tweets of South African political parties and leaders243 ANC’s use of Twitter during the period under research 244 DA’s use of Twitter during the research period 244 Rate of frequency by the EFF during the four-month period 245 Cyril Ramaphosa’s use of Twitter during the research period 246 Mmusi Maimane’s use of Twitter during the period under study247 EFF’s Julius Malema’s use of Twitter during the research period248 EFF’s Twitter campaign poster 249 Twitter poster advertising Ramaphosa’s outreach activities 249 The EFF use Twitter to communicate meeting details for its campaign250 The DA also used twitter to show its growing support among the black population 251 President Ramaphosa engaging citizens on social media platform252 The EFF leader employs Twitter to respond to media reports 252 DA appropriates social media for profiling failures of the ruling party 253 DA leader takes a swipe at the President Ramaphosa for promising new bullet trains 254 EFF frames the media as part of the anti-EFF campaign 254

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: Re-examining Media Governance Through Cosmopolitan Critique Sarah Anne Ganter and Hanan Badr

The global pandemic that hit in 2020 has interrupted exchanges across borders in the social sciences and has exposed the multiple inequalities shaping academic work across gender, class, race, and geographies (Masiero et al. 2021; Badr and Elmaghraby 2021; Adjin-Tettey 2020). In this climate, even though it might be easier to remain in what Waisbord (2019) described as “silos” of academia, it is even more important to insist on and reinforce international perspectives and collaboration. Instead of reverting back to national-only outlooks, this book brings together eighteen researchers from the field of media and communication policy, media democratization, international communication, media structures, and

S. A. Ganter (*) School of Communication, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada e-mail: [email protected] H. Badr Department of Communication Studies, Paris Lodron University of Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. A. Ganter, H. Badr (eds.), Media Governance, Global Transformations in Media and Communication Research - A Palgrave and IAMCR Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05020-6_1

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media economics to question, revisit, renew, and advance the concept of media governance under the light of a cosmopolitan critique. The notion of a cosmopolitan critique refers to the idea of academic cosmopolitanism, which derives from scholarship advocating for intellectual exchange across borders to open scholarship up to often under-represented realities (Waisbord 2015, 2016; Ganter and Ortega 2019; Badr et al. 2020; Ganter 2020; Badr and Ganter 2021). An important goal of academic cosmopolitanism is epistemic transformation (Walsh 2002) through dialogue between scholars, which is intended to achieve the inclusion of wider conceptual, theoretical, and empirical perspectives in the spirit of talking with rather than about realities that are often invisible on major academic publishing platforms (Ganter and Ortega 2019). In the spirit of academic cosmopolitanism, regardless of the challenges posed by the global pandemic, in this book, we work together across five continents to establish the need to foster a cosmopolitan critique to open the field up to more diverse scholarship on media governance.

Selected Puzzle Sets Media governance has achieved considerable influence in media and communication studies as a descriptive term, an analytical approach, or as a normative concept (Donges 2007). The field has developed based on political and academic definitions and recommendations around what concerns media governance analytically, ideologically, and practically. Politically originated terms, such as “good governance” (Woods 1999), have led to the hegemonic use of governance as something “ideal” or “good.” However, as a field of study, media governance requires a critical lens through which to generate knowledge around frameworks of rules and practices that influence the behavior of individuals, organizations, and firms, and shape societal understandings of media and communication at large, which means that the study of the complex patterns behind the interactions shaping regulatory structures and rules of behavior are equally important (Ganter 2016, p. 78). Accordingly, Hamelink and Nordenstreng (2007) describe media governance as a mixture of processes and practices that determine institutional settings and rules delimiting the performance of new and traditional media. It has been emphasized how the field is broad, with room for many perspectives (Puppis 2010). Kleinsteuber and Nehls (2011) distinguished between the governance of traditional media and the governance of new media, while most scholars speak of media governance (Donges 2007;

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Puppis 2007, 2010; Raboy 2002, 2004). With the increasing digitalization of the media overall, an array of new terms have emerged: “Internet governance,” “governance by things,” “governance of/by platforms,” “governance by algorithms,” or “platform governance.” These terms belong to media governance but in the literature are seldom put into perspective with the field. In this volume, we treat media governance as a term including the converging momentum that challenges clear-cut binary distinctions between the governance of “new” and “traditional” media. Therefore, the contributions to this volume address a variety of media governance related to issues ranging from traditional media to social media governance. Media governance has been criticized for being a buzzword, too broad of a concept, or an ideologically coined term (Ginosar 2014; Karppinen and Moe 2013). The critique established thus far refers to the broad scope of media governance and its applications, and its related conceptual challenges and ambiguities (Ginosar 2014), as well as to implicit normative consequences and ideological connotations (e.g., Karppinen and Moe 2013). This hints at the need for further examinations, discussions, and delineations according to new perspectives and contexts, which, to date, have been widely ignored when discussing media governance and its conceptual values and limitations. In light of these critiques, media governance, as a subfield of media policy studies, has never moved beyond its adolescence. The “governance turn” (Jessop 2000) was introduced from policy studies in media and communication studies. As such, it mainly surfaced in North America and Europe, and as José (2007) has rightly pointed out, the use of governance in its original form is part of a dominant narrative in itself. In other contexts, the “governance turn” did not take place at all, or at least not to the same extent. For instance, Latin American scholars often prefer the more static term of “governability” (gobernabilidad) rather than looking at the process-oriented “governance” perspective (gobernanza). While the latter examines the governing role of the state, civil society, and the market, and their respective interactions, the former examines the quality of governance (Kooiman and Bavinck 2013). Others frankly admitted their preference by dismissing governance as an antiquated concept early on (Camou 1995). These examples indicate that media governance has considerable limitations despite its conceptual breadth and openness, as a narrow set of contexts has shaped our understanding of media governance. In a systematic

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review of the literature in the timeframe between 2002 and 2019, we identified 153 scholars using media governance terminologies in journal articles, books, and book chapters published during that time (we considered work published in English, Spanish, Portuguese, and French). The geographical distribution shows that 45.75% of those scholars work at universities in Europe, 30.72% in North America, and 7.19% in Oceania, and this leaves a total of 16.34% of scholars having used media governance as a perspective in their published work from universities in the Global South. The literature review also reveals that scholars working from within and on countries such as Canada, the USA, Germany, the UK, and Switzerland have been particularly dominant in shaping our understanding of media governance. While media governance as a concept has mainly been criticized in the past by European scholars (e.g., Karppinen and Moe 2013), there is a lack of insight into the usability, value, and significance of media governance as a perspective in research in Global South contexts. The consequences of this gap in the knowledge making in media governance as a field have not been addressed sufficiently in the literature. As media governance has mainly been defined by Western scholars, more recent literature using the concept from within the Global South (e.g., Bhuiya 2014; Kim 2018; Opperman 2018) is adopting it without revisiting its value as much as its shortcomings. With this edited volume, we aim at triggering a critical dialogue between scholars who work in and on overlooked geographical, socio-economic, and political contexts and the traditional literature and conceptualizations, which mainly stem from scholars working in Central Europe and North America. Media governance, in the end, might take on different meanings and interpretations depending on the lived experiences of scholars, media regulators, policy-­ makers, media workers, media organizations, and citizens. This should be reflected in the ways in which we conceptually work with media governance approaches.

Academic Cosmopolitanism Calls for cosmopolitanism in media and communication studies have become as varied as they are pressing and are repeatedly vocalized. While the idea of a field that thrives through dialogue and multiple perspectives has existed for some time (Boczkowski and Siles 2014; Waisbord 2016), it has only recently been shaped through a sense of collectivity that strives for an implementation toward cosmopolitan media and communication

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studies (Ganter and Ortega 2019; Waisbord 2019; Badr et al. 2020; Badr and Ganter 2021). As a research stream, academic cosmopolitanism has emerged out of a variety of calls for de-Westernization (Curran and Park 2000; Lee 2015; Miike 2006; Wang 2011) and the unmasking of communication as a predominantly white discipline (Chakravartty et al. 2018; Hirji et al. 2020) that reproduces academic provincialism and contributes to the asymmetries and invisibilities of entire research terrains and scholarly voices. Given the many years in which calls for meta-change in our field have repeatedly vaporized, academic cosmopolitanism increasingly recognizes that to maneuver calls for de-Westernization into calls for action what is needed, is the recognition that this is a common cause that all academics should engage with. The cosmopolitan outlook, as Beck asserted, is “simultaneously skeptical, disillusional, and self-critical” (2006, p. 3). In academia, this has transpired into calls for theoretical and methodological openness, an epistemic transformation, and an examination of the structural reasons for the invisibility of some voices. All of this has represented the idea of an academic cosmopolitanism beyond the notion of exchanges across borders or a lived global experience. However, to date, the application of this critique as a next step has been missing. By offering a cosmopolitan critique of media governance as a field of study, we hope to start moving from envisioning to enacting academic cosmopolitanism. A cosmopolitan critique hereby aims at the theoretical and methodological foundations of the field by revealing difference, distinction, misinterpretations, and paradoxes through including the truths of others and examining their consequences for the current limited conceptualizations. Through enacting a cosmopolitan critique in this volume, we hope to provide a new sense of community beyond the established, disentangled field we have. Academic cosmopolitanism, in this sense, does not strive for universalism, but for a respectful and inclusive differentiation that transpires at the level of theory and method; only in that way can we “shift the geopolitics of critical knowledge,” as Walsh (2007, p. 225) put it, and allow for more selection among the different puzzle sets available in the field of study.

The Organization of This Book Through this volume, we want to offer an open and well-measured critique, which will help us to improve this conceptual lens through the perspectives of scholars working beyond Western contexts. Literature on

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media governance often emphasizes more instrumental evaluations attached to efficiency, output, and performance. The contributions in this book give more prominence to considerations around hegemony, power, sovereignty, and identity, which belong to an often-neglected vocabulary within the media governance literature. With that, the chapters advance our critical knowledge about theoretical developments and the epistemic transformation of media governance in the spirit of academic cosmopolitanism. As such, the book presents a map that critically navigates the concept. The contributors discuss the shortcomings, opportunities, alternatives, and new approaches that they identify through their work for the established media governance canon. The chapters point to the relevance, translatability, adaptability, political concerns, and other conceptual shortcomings and merits of media governance as a descriptive term, analytical framework, and normative concept when looking beyond Western contexts. The cosmopolitan critique of the field of media governance is the immanent theme across the twelve contributions in this book. We organized the chapters into three parts. The first part addresses the epistemological and ontological flaws in the use and adaptation of media governance. The second part opens pathways for critique and provides a thorough understanding of the ambivalences that scholars encounter when working with or addressing media governance as a field of study. The third part highlights the shortcomings in terms of geographical narrowness and tensions in the use of media governance conceptualizations. It offers new conceptual ideas to enhance media governance studies in the spirit of openness and by taking advantage of the existing broad conceptualization of media governance.

Part I. Concepts and Epistemology At the outset of this volume, Sanjay Asthana explains the need to get past the dominant conception of media governance and calls for a sustained examination of media governance in relation to different communication means and for the reshaping of sovereignty, power, and agency in the Global South. He argues that media governance as a composite disables both words in terms of their potential to enhance social change and concludes his critique with a suggestion for “cosmopolitan media and information commons.”

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Naomi Sakr discovers in Chap. 3 the value of using media governance diagnostically to unravel informal mechanisms and practices of the authoritarian systems of the Arab Middle East. With that, she emphasizes the common ground between governance theory and observable processes affecting Arab media, while also explaining why media governance is not a prominently used concept in Middle Eastern studies. In Chap. 4, Rodrigo Gómez offers a critique of media governance studies through a historical account of media policy studies in Latin America and the alternatives established for the field in the region. He examines the link between the intellectual environment, the rise of National Communication Policies (NCP) and normative constituencies, all situated in what he describes as “socio-economic contradictions calling for societal change.” With that Gómez delineates the intersections and differences of Media Governance with the Political Economy of Communication (PEC) tradition. In Chap. 5, Judith Pies analyses the challenges media governance studies face in transnational projects that include countries with very different socio-economic and political realities. Drawing from her experience in a comparative project on media accountability in the Arab countries, she calls for the inclusion of informal and less institutionalized practices to acknowledge contexts that range outside of liberal democracies and pluralistic media systems.

Part II. Critique and Ambivalence: Assessing Media Governance In Chap. 6, Ufuoma Akpojivi examines regulatory structures and the governance of cosmopolitan media in Nigeria to provide empirical evidence and enhance the theorization of cosmopolitan media governance from within the Nigerian context. He argues that attempts to localize international standards counter-act attempts to facilitate inclusivity, participation, empowerment, and cultural diversity in the governance of cosmopolitan media. Afonso de Albuquerque and Lucineide Magalhães de Matos unfold their critique of media governance in Chap. 7 by analyzing how what they call a “media governance logic” led to a change in media regulation in Brazil and served as justification for political bias against left-­ wing alternative media. Using the case of moral panic caused by fake news, they develop a critique that deciphers the neoliberal political nature of media governance. Rasha Allam offers in Chap. 8, rare conceptual

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knowledge of media governance frameworks from the Egyptian context through statements from media and scholarly colleagues working in the country. Through a detailed examination of recent regulatory developments, she questions the value of imported governance models, drawing from challenges in sustaining media independence as a core value in media governance in transitional countries such as Egypt. In Chap. 9, Hyejin Jo and Dal Yong Jin unmask the utopian nature of media governance as a concept in a local media scape, such as South Korea. Using the PEC approach, they make clear where and to what extent media governance as a concept lacks refinement and fails to acknowledge local challenges that exist within the local mediascape.

Part III. Conceptual Innovations and New Perspectives Hong Shen connects media governance and international communication in Chap. 10. In her contribution, she traces China’s participation in global Internet policy-making and calls for reconsidering the role of the state in global Internet governance. Sheng thus offers an insight into alternatives to the existing US-led, market-oriented Internet governance regimes and questions whether a new multilateralism—as is often called for—will be conceivable. In Chap. 11, María Soledad Segura and Alejandro Linares analyze the creation of participatory institutions created in Latin America between 2000 and 2015 and conclude that the participatory policies they identify differ from the multi-stakeholder governance model that they argue consolidates existing inequalities. Through their analysis, they delineate the differences between the participatory and multi-stakeholder governance models and show how academic conceptualizations can protect existing inequalities. In Chap. 12, Trust Matsilele and Bruce Mutsvairo create a rare link between social media governance and political communication. In their empirical study, they situate Twitter use during the South Africa 2019 elections within the context of emerging social media governance mechanisms. Showing that Twitter had been the most reliable platform for smaller parties for campaign purposes, Matsilele and Mutsvairo also examine the consequences that the new laws, such as the Protection of Private Information Act, could potentially unfold for the dissemination of information via social emails among political opponents, which might be interpreted as a punishable offense. In Chap. 13 Preeti

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Raghunath juxtaposes media governance with the deliberative policy ecology approach to investigate media policy from a perspective that considers what she terms “voice parity.” She suggests “sustainable media governance” as a decolonial approach to scholarship and praxes. Her chapter therefore proffers clear suggestions what theorization from the Global South could look like in the field of media governance. Based on these rich contributions, in our concluding chapter, we draw a roadmap for a cosmopolitan research agenda and incorporate the idea of the cosmopolitan critique as a methodology in media governance. By covering the three parts I Concepts and Epistemology, II Critique and Ambivalence: Assessing Media Governance, and finally III Conceptual Innovations and New Perspectives, the book decenters our knowledge on media governance. A conclusion by the editors ties the chapters together and further advances the argumentation toward cosmopolitan critique as a methodological approach.

References Adjin-Tettey, T. D. (2020). The media have muted the voices of women during COVID-19: Can the tide be turned? The Conversation. https://theconversat i o n . c o m / t h e -­m e d i a -­h a v e -­m u t e d -­t h e -­v o i c e s -­o f -­w o m e n -­d u r i n g covid-­19-­can-­the-­tide-­be-­turned-­148010 Badr, H., Behmer, M., Fengler, S., Fiedler, A., Grüne, A., Hafez, K, Hahn, O., Hamidi, K., Hanitzsch, T., Horz, C., Illg, B., Litvinenko, A., Löffelholz, M., Radue, M., Richter, C., Thomaß, B., & Töpfl, F. (2020). Kosmopolitische Kommunikationswissenschaft: Plädoyer für eine “„tiefe Internationalisierung”“ des Fachs in Deutschland: Ein wissenschaftspolitisches Positionspapier [Cosmopolitan communication studies: A plea for “deep internationalization” of the discipline in Germany: A policy paper].] Publizistik, 65(3), 295–303. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11616-­020-­00576-­6 Badr, H., Elmaghraby, S. (2021) How Higher Education Faculty in Egypt Perceive the Effects of Covid-19 on Teaching Journalism and Mass Communication: Perspectives From the Global South. Journalism and Mass Communication Educator. https://doi.org/10.1177/10776958211025199 Badr, H. & Ganter, S. A. (2021). Towards cosmopolitan media and communication studies Cosmopolitan Media and Communication Studies: Bringing diverse epistemic perspectives into the field. Global Media Journal—German Edition, 11(1), 1–7. https://doi.org/10.22032/dbt.49164 Beck, U. (2006). The cosmopolitan vision. Polity Press.

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Bhuiya, A. (2014). Internet governance and the Global South: Demand for a new framework. Palgrave Macmillan. Boczkowski, P., & Siles, I. (2014). Steps towards cosmopolitanism in the study of media technologies: Integrating scholarship on production, consumption, materiality, and content. Information, Communication & Society, 17, 560–571. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369118X.2013.808358 Camou, A. (1995). Gobernabilidad y Democracia:. Cuadernos de Divulgación de la Cultura Democrática No. 6. México Instituto Federal Electoral. Available from: http://www.ife.org.mx/documentos/DECEYEC/gobernabilidad_y_ democracia.htm Chakravartty, P., Kuo, R., Grubbs, V., & Mclwain, C. (2018). #CommunicationSoWhite. Journal of Communication, 68(2), 254–266. https://doi.org/10.1093/joc/jqy003 Curran, J., & Park, M. J. (2000). De-Westernizing media studies Media Studies. Routledge. Donges, P. (2007). Medienpolitik und Media Governance. In P. Donges, (Ed.), Von der Medienpolitik zur Media Governance? (pp. 7–23). Köln: von Harlem. Ganter, S. A. (2016). Audio-visual media policy and the (re)configuration of audio-­ visual spaces in the Mercosur: Amplified governance, geographies and sovereignty [Unpublished doctoral dissertation]. University of Vienna. Ganter, S. A. (2020, March, 9). Academic cosmopolitanism on the conference circuit: Reaching beyond the comfort zone. Conference Inference: Blogging the World of Conferences. https://conferenceinference.wordpress.com/2020/03/ 09/academic-­cosmopolitanism-­on-­the-­conference-circuit-­reaching-­beyond-­the-­ comfort-­zone-­sarah-­anne-­ganter/ Ganter, S. A., & Ortega, F. (2019). The invisibility of Latin American scholarship in European media and communication studies: Challenges and opportunities of de-westernization and academic cosmopolitanism. International Journal of Communication, 13, 68–91. https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/ view/8449 Ginosar, S. (2014). Media governance: A conceptual framework or merely a buzzword? Communication Theory, 23(2), 356–374. https://doi.org/10.1111/ comt.12026 Hamelink, C., & Nordenstreng, K. (2007). Towards democratic media governance. In E. de Bens (Eded.), Media between culture and commerce (pp. 225–240). Bristol: Intellect. Hirji, F., Jiwani, Y., & McAllister, K. E. (2020). On the margins of the margins: #CommunicationSoWhite—Canadian style. Communication, Culture and Critique, 13(2), 168–184. https://doi.org/10.1093/ccc/tcaa019 Jessop, B. (2000). The crisis of the national spatio-temporal fix and the tendential ecological dominance of globalizing capitalism. International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, 24(2), 323–360. https://doi.org/10.1111/ 1468-2427.00251-60

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Waisbord, S. (2016). Communication studies without frontiers? Translation and cosmopolitanism across academic cultures. International Journal of Communication, 10, 868–886. https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/ view/3483 Waisbord, S. (2019). Communication: A post-discipline. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. Walsh, C. (2002). Las geopolíticas del conocimiento y colonialidad del poder. Entrevista a Walter Mignolo [Geopolitics of knowledge and coloniality of power: Interview with Walter Mignolo]. In C. Walsh, F. Schiwy, & S. Castro-­ Gómez (Eds.), Indisciplinar las ciencias sociales. Geopoliticas del conocimiento y colonialidad del poder. Perspectativas desde lo Andino [Creating interdisciplinary social sciences: Geopolitics of knowing and coloniality of power. Perspectives from the Andes]. Quito, Ecuador: UASB/Abya Yala. Retrieved from http:// www.oei.es/salactsi/walsh.htm Walsh, C. (2007). Shifting the geopolitics of critical knowledge. Cultural Studies, 21(2–3), 224–239. https://doi.org/10.1080/09502380601162530 Wang, G. (2011). Beyond de-Westernizing communication research. In G. Wang (Ed.), De-Westernizing communication research: Altering questions and changing frameworks (pp. 1–18). New York, NY: Routledge. Woods, N. (1999). Good governance in international organizations. Global Governance, 5(1999), 39–61. https://www.jstor.org/stable/27800219

PART I

Concepts and Epistemology

CHAPTER 2

Sovereignty, Power, and Agency in Neoliberal Configurations of Media and Governance in the Global South Sanjay Asthana

Introduction In much of the postcolonial world, economic globalization has precipitated the rise of neoliberal forms of governance that has impacted broadcasting and media policy-making in a variety of ways. The ongoing developments are also leading to new kinds of alliances between state and private—national, regional, as well as transnational—corporations in

Webpage. https://www.mtsu.edu/faculty/sanjay-­asthana and Twitter handle. @SanjayxAsthana

S. Asthana (*) School of Journalism and Strategic Media, Middle Tennessee State University, Murfreesboro, TN, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. A. Ganter, H. Badr (eds.), Media Governance, Global Transformations in Media and Communication Research - A Palgrave and IAMCR Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05020-6_2

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regulating and controlling the media. This chapter examines the discourse and practices of neoliberal governance in the global South, focusing specifically on the ways in which it has been deployed by governments, international agencies, supranational organization, and private corporations. The conjugation of ‘governance’ with ‘media’ into a composite meta-­ category has displaced the social commitments inscribed in media and communication policy-making practices with technical jargon and semantics which has profound implications for sovereignty.1 Although scholarship has explored the ‘unbundling’ and ‘disaggregation’ of sovereignty into multiple components of power, and have pointed out that nation-­ states reassert their authority through a range of political, legal, and economic strategies (Sassen 2006), what is missing from such studies is a sustained examination of neoliberal governance in relation to media, information and communication technologies (ICTs), the Internet, and the concomitant reshaping of sovereignty, power, and agency in the global South. First, through a brief discussion of colonial and postcolonial histories of media, I identify and trace several key themes around communication technologies and media that operated in the state-market-capital nexus. Second, I explore the discourses of sovereignty, power, and agency through a brief discussion of the early developments and institutionalization of telegraph and radio in the colonial period; the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) and the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) debates, and the subsequent liberalization and privatization of telecommunications and media infrastructures and systems. In the concluding section, I explore the idea of a ‘cosmopolitan media and information commons’ as a way to get past the dominant conception of media governance. My analytic approach draws theoretical insights from the two influential accounts of neoliberalism, Marxist and Foucauldian, postcolonial studies, and the Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL; e.g. Eslava 2019; Gathii 2019). It is worth 1  The neoliberal deployment of ‘policy transfer’ discourses in the name of trade liberalization and marketization of audio-visual industries in the South have displaced media and communications policy-making with the newly minted ‘media governance’. See Sarikakis and Ganter (2014) for an excellent discussion of such policy transfer mechanisms in Mercosur, an economic and political bloc comprising Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela. For an excellent account of how the neoliberal turn has effected regional trade agreements such as Mercosur within the ‘good [market] governance’ discourse in the South, see Gathii (2011).

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noting that within media and communication research, the utility of TWAIL scholarship has generally remained unexplored, especially in studies of telecommunications, broadcasting, ICTs, digital media, and the Internet. In addition to the broader topics of political economy of international law and sovereignty, TWAIL offers insights into policy-making mechanisms, the intersectionality of international and media law, production of legal rationalities and media governance. Before proceeding further, it is necessary to define and explicate the key terms and concepts briefly referenced above—neoliberalism, media, ICTs, governance, sovereignty, and the global South. The last two decades have witnessed a proliferation of media and ICTs in the global South. While ICTs refer to an assortment of information and communication technologies, a range of new ICTs are increasingly embedded in transmedial environments, dissolving the conventional notion of ‘media’ into complex technological forms, artifacts, devices. Therefore, ICTs should be understood as an ensemble of technologies which enable electronic and digital processing, distribution, retrieval, sharing, and storage of data and information. To this end, I situate media and new ICTs in terms of Lievrouw and Livingstone’s (2006) analytic heuristic of ‘ ‘infrastructure’ comprising three components, artefacts and devices used to communicate and share information; the activities and practices in which people engage to communicate and share information; and the social arrangements or organizational forms that develop around these devices and practices’ (2, emphasis in original). According to the Marxist geographer, David Harvey (2005), ‘Neoliberalism is in the first instance a theory of political economic practices that propose that human well-being can best be advanced by liberating individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework characterized by strong private property rights, free market, and free trade. The role of the state is to create and preserve an institutional framework appropriate to such practice’ (2). Per Wendy Brown’s (2015) Foucauldian perspective, neoliberalism is ‘a governing rationality through which everything is ‘economized’ and in a very specific way: human beings become market actors and nothing but, every field of activity is seen as market, and every entity (whether public or private, whether person, business, or state) is governed as a firm’ (112). Brown (2015) argues that ‘neoliberalism has appropriated the term governance as a specific form of management’ (122), a political modality through which it legitimizes itself. Furthermore, Brown (2015), quoting social theorist,

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Thomas Lemke, notes that ‘governance announces the eclipse or erosion of state sovereignty’ (123). The term global South broadly refers to the formerly colonized countries of the non-Western world, gaining traction since 1970s, especially with the rise of neoliberalism and economic globalization. While usually designated in terms of the geographic coordinates, ‘South’ is deployed to represent the poor, underdeveloped, and developing nations in the postcolonial world, distinguished from the rich and developed Western countries such as United States and Europe, the ‘North’. In many ways, global South has displaced the earlier moniker, ‘Third World’ which was commonly used to designate the decolonized countries in the 1940–1960s; the political conjunctures of the projects of Bandung and Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), and the early UNESCO debates (Alina 2020).2 Although scholarship has scrupulously examined the ascendancy of neoliberalism in the global South through the IMF and the World Bank’s economic ideologies of ‘free markets’ implemented via the ‘Structural Adjustment Programs’ (SAPs) (Harvey 2005) and the ‘Washington Consensus’ (Harvey 2005), there is a tendency to consider neoliberalism as a ‘by-product of the internal dynamics of the global North’ (Connell and Dados 2014, 124). A ‘diffusionist approach’ to neoliberalism—viewed as originating around 1973 in the West, and gradually spreading to the non-West—grounded in universalist models of theory, loses sight of the global histories of colonialism, empire, and imperialism that constituted the capitalist system. In theorizing neoliberalism, then, we need to contextually foreground the social, political, and economic relations in particular societies in the global South, identifying the ways in which land ownership, agricultural production, migration, health, education, communication technologies and media are being reconfigured to the demands of capital. And, yet such reconfiguration does not happen ex nihilo; rather, it is a complex interweaving and reworking of neoliberalism, combining other modes of power and agency. It is, indeed, the inchoate and the evolving assemblages of technologies, electronic as well as digital, and the media forms, artifacts, infrastructures, and systems that require a more careful and comprehensive explication and analysis. In this chapter, I 2  The decolonized countries from Asia, Africa, and Latin America came together as part of the Non-aligned Movement (NAM), and in 1955, twenty-nine nations from Africa and Asia organized a conference at Bandung, Indonesia, commonly referred to as the Bandung Project. In the later section, these will be discussed in specific detail.

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explore media and ICTs, sovereignty, and governance in terms of their multiple iterations, from the colonial, postcolonial, to liberal, and neoliberal. Therefore, instead of construing neoliberalism as a unitary phenomenon, an already formed ideology or a set of techniques spreading across non-Western nations, it would be productive to study the ways in which neoliberal ideas and agendas entwine with the economic and political contexts in the global South.3 It is in these interstitial conjunctural spaces that neoliberalism gets transcoded and mediated by states, bureaucracies, global institutions, and comprador bourgeoisie. According to Connell and Dados (2014), neoliberalism was programmed as a ‘developmental strategy’ (122) in most of the non-Western world, a strategy that perforce marked a shift from industrialization to expansion of export industries. Several neoliberal projects of export industries resulted in predatory practices, extraction of resources ranging from mining of minerals, land grabs, and commercial agriculture. Influential studies of neoliberalism from David Harvey’s (2005) formulation of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ and Wendy Brown’s (2015) explication of governance as ‘neoliberalism’s primary administrative form’ (123) refer to capital’s resource extraction on a worldwide scale, but they do not pay enough attention to the colonial-­ imperial dialectic of capitalism in the global South. Neoliberalism in their accounts is understood as heralding new political and economic ideologies and rationalities, for instance, private property rights, individual liberty, competitive individualism, and governance techniques. We need to retread and ‘retheorize’ neoliberalism’s anterior history, illuminating transnational and transversal linkages across multiple pathways of power and control. In the study of British commercial telegraph in colonial Gibraltar, Bryce Peak (2018) noted that the privatization of public infrastructures, indicative of contemporary neoliberalism is not a new 3  A few studies have examined ‘actually existing’ neoliberalism in the global South by producing new theoretical concepts. These studies on the workings of neoliberalism in the global South have yielded a rich repertoire of conceptual insights that deepen and diverge from pre-existing categories of European social theory: civil society, citizenship, and rights. For instance, Partha Chatterjee’s (2004) explorations of India’s ‘informal economy’ through what he characterized as ‘political society’ and ‘non-corporate’ capital, and Asef Bayat’s (2004) account of Egyptian working poor’s everyday lives in the context of the ongoing neoliberal restructuring, and Ravi Sundaram’s (2010), study of informal ‘pirate networks’ for computer hardware, software, and cell phones in Delhi, are grounded and nuanced interpretations and analyses of neoliberalism in the global South.

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phenomenon, rather, ‘the neoliberal mode of production was a material condition formulated in the colony’, and ‘what is narrated as a post-World War II political economic rationality in Europe has deeply set imperial roots as part of a long colonial history of neoliberal transformation’ (31). Although Dan Schiller (1999) is one of the first scholar in media and communication studies to trace neoliberalism’s anterior history to Britain’s enclosure movement of the 1600s in terms the colonization and commodification of public information, his work does not connect the deeper colonial-imperial histories of capitalism. Onur Ulas Ince’s (2018) detailed explication of the entangled histories of liberalism, capitalism, and empire in the development of commercial liberal society in Britain points to the violence undergirding colonial economic structures as part of the expansionary logics of ‘colonial capitalism’. While neoliberalism could be construed in terms of specific socioeconomic, political, and historical conjunctures—whether in the work of Friedrich Hayek and Milton Friedman, the Mont Pelerin society—we could argue that since capitalism and liberalism share kinship, hence the extractive logics are already prefigured in neoliberalism. As a popular working-class wisdom states: genealogies don’t lie. We could infer that neoliberalism is indeed not a new phenomenon, rather a refurbished version that has inherited the qualities of its older forbears.

Notes on Colonial and Postcolonial Histories of Telegraph and Radio I have argued elsewhere (Asthana 2019) that we ought to explore the histories of communication and media technologies by tracing the uneven topographies of power across multiple contexts, paying attention to what Chris Bayly (2004) had noted, ‘all local, national, or regional histories must, in important ways, therefore be global histories’ (2) involving complex interweaving of social, political, and economic forces. The development of these technologies cannot be seen apart from the colonial and imperial histories of conquest and domination. For instance, the British, French, Dutch, and German rivalries in eighteenth and nineteenth centuries exploited and recalibrated telegraph’s communication potential—in overcoming distances—to control and connect the non-Western world into a network of global colonial economy (Winseck and Pike 2009; Márquez 2010; O’Hara 2010; Tworek and Muller 2015).

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Telegraph’s global historical itinerary, particularly in the colonies of Asia and Africa remains largely underexplored. Furthermore, scholarly studies of media have largely ignored telegraph ideologies that have underpinned the spatiotemporalities of broadcasting (radio and television), digital technologies, and the Internet in late colonial and postcolonial societies.4 Since the publication of Carey’s (1989) work, media and communication studies scholarship has focused on telegraph and the emergence of global news agencies and networks (Rantanen 2005). A few critical accounts of the history of the telegraph in the colonial world offer a corrective to media and communication studies which has largely remained centered on Euro-American contexts. These studies argued that the telegraph in the colonial world was put to use for military and security purposes as an instrument and a tool of colonial-imperial formations— British, French, German, Dutch, Persian, Ottoman—mobilized to manage, consolidate, and centralize power; in short, to dominate and control the colonial subjects rather than for the improvement and amelioration of their lives (Chowdhury 2010; Headrick 2010; Wenzlhuemer 2013; Ewing 2013; Thomas 2019). Telegraph was pressed into the service of capitalism’s resource extraction and commodity export from the global South. The spatiotemporal unmooring of information and communication that telegraph precipitated had profound implications and impact in the ways in which colonial states restructured the global economy and the market and consolidation of political power through a mix of techniques and strategies that ranged from brute application of force, punitive measures, legal strictures, and so on. Such colonial forms of ‘governance’—of ‘command and

4  James Carey (1989) does mention the role of colonial rule but does not specify much. Although he noted that the domain of empire remains a crucial site of investigation, his overall assessment remains within Innis’s framework of empire and communication. Recent work looks at the colonial legacies of telegraph in Internet’s development, in particular by exploring Internet’s fiber-optic cables laid on the same undersea pathways of telegraphic cables constituting as a newer version of the colonial communication grid which underserves the global South at the expense of the rich nations of Europe and the West (Thorat 2019).

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control’—were legitimized through ordinances,5 constitutional mandates, provisions and acts that were designed to censor native printing presses in from publishing newspapers, magazines, and pamphlets. Thus, in understanding and interpretation of media, we need to examine the colonial-­ imperial juridical-legal discourses that underpinned histories of media.6 The various media ordinances, legislation, acts, laws from the colonial to postcolonial periods can be viewed as processes of governing, regulating, managing, steering media systems. The eighteenth- and nineteenth-century expansion of colonial rule coincided with the establishment of the principles of liberalism in Britain and Europe. Liberal theorists have reframed the concept of sovereignty to include citizens’ rights and freedom. However, these principles contradicted colonialism in the global South. As an organizing discourse of colonial sovereignty, then, liberal imperialism shaped administrative and bureaucratic procedures that the colonial powers applied in terms of various ‘state projects’ in the global South—geographic, cartographic, statistical surveys, enumerative practices, and so on—in the name of colonial modernization. Indeed, the configurations of colonial forms of sovereignty operated through several overlapping layers of power involving local landholding elite, tribal chieftains, provincial rulers, and religious authorities, who were granted permission by the colonial state to impose 5  The genealogy of the word ordinance reveals a peculiar range of meanings and is related to governance. Its roots can be traced to French and Medieval Latin. Per the Oxford English Dictionary, ordinance refers to something ‘ordained by a deity or destiny’, ‘an authoritative decree or command’, ‘a public injunction or regulation’. It has a close link with another for, ordnance which refers to military supplies such as ammunition, weapons, armors, and so on. In the context of colonial and imperial rule in the non-Western world, ordinance was a mode of power and control of territories, subjects, and populations, therefore, can be viewed as an earlier form of governance. In the context of India (as well as Africa), colonial powers stored munitions in ordnance depots near military cantonments close to cities to quell any potential uprising. 6  For instance, the classical liberal theorist John Stuart Mill (1858, 74), in his famous Memorandum of the Improvements in the Administration of India, an extensive propaganda piece written for the East India Company, argued that ‘even more important as a means of communication than railways, is the electric telegraph; the use of which, at the commencement of the late disturbances [referring to the 1857 Indian Mutiny], may be said with scarcely any exaggeration to have saved our empire. Having already, in a wonderfully short space of time, connected the seats of the different Governments by lines of telegraph upwards of three thousand miles in length, the Government of India is now engaged in establishing additional lines of about the same extent, through which the most important places will be brought into communication with each other by alternative routes’.

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taxation, and adjudicate local courts and village councils, but the ultimate power vested with the British colonial state (Hansen 2008, 172). The colonial construct of sovereignty—and with it, the procedures of governmentality—significantly shaped the spatialities of radio broadcasting. An example of liberal imperialism articulated in the Plymouth Report published by the Colonial Office in 1937 situated broadcasting as part of the ‘machinery of civilization and administration’ of native populations. Although the colonial and postcolonial spatialities of broadcasting exhibited distinct modalities of power, they share several common ideologies. The imperial ideology of colonial broadcasting as an ‘instrument of advanced administration’ (Hill 2010, 29), and for the ‘moral and material improvement’ of colonial subjects (Mill 1858, 2). As Andrew Hill (2010, 34), among others, noted, the idea and practices of ‘communal listening’ was perfected by colonial administrators and missionaries in Africa and South Asia. Indeed, the ideological basis for this line of argument can be traced to how colonial broadcasting was imagined in the colonies, especially Africa and India, in the 1920s by colonial officials like Bowyer, who considered colonial broadcasting ‘not as an instrument of entertainment … but as an instrument of advanced administration … for the enlightenment and education of native populations and their instructions in public health, agriculture, etc.’ (quoted in Hill 2010, 34; see also, Head 1979). In his study of colonial radio broadcasting in Gold Coast (former name of Ghana), Sydney Head (1979) argued that radio was drawn into the colonial modality of administration through a spatial and centralized organization of radio receivers and broadcast terrestrial towers around towns and villages. Colonial governors and officers of the empire—in Britain and elsewhere in the colonial outposts in Africa, India, and the Middle East—shared knowledge of governing techniques perfected through radio broadcasting. Telegraphy paved the way for the rise of telecommunications as crucial to diverse areas ranging from postal services, trade, commerce, commodity markets, and so on, all of which depended on constant flows of information. To cater to the information and communication needs, several private news agencies were established. The emerging transportation and communication hubs and networks constituted by railways, steamships, seaports, telegraph organized the spatiotemporal dynamics of the global colonial economy that was built on resource extraction and commodity supply from the global South to Europe. The extractive practices enabled the consolidation of imperialism and mercantilist capitalism. An important

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aspect is the ways private corporations and colonial governments structured the formation of trade and commerce of resources and commodities through alliances and agreements that shaped the discourse of governance ever since. Governance under colonial rule operated in the ‘command and control’ mode through ‘constitutional’ mandates and legal strictures, for instance, as in the Provincial Autonomy of India, 1919, and the Government of India, 1935 Act. Governance thus emerged from its brutal forms of control and exercise of authority to subtler exercise of power on the surface but with logics of dominance and control firmly entrenched beneath the veneer of the concept. In terms of the analytic duty and its actual reach, the term ‘governance’ encapsulates an incommensurable range of meanings and come to signify a neutral-sounding descriptor for ‘steering’ and ‘coordination’ of actions, policies, programs, and so on, and is widely popular in domains such as corporate management, market discourses, and the field of health, education, among others (Rhodes 1996). Within the general thrust of media governance, then, the social state is transformed into ‘a collection of inter-organizational entities’ constituted by private and non-profit social actors, civil society organizations, interest groups, think-tanks, and so on. In the context of media, it has displaced media and communication policy-making, dislodging the social and political commitments inscribed in such policies with technical jargon and semantics (Raboy and Padovani 2010). To this end, Sarikakis (2012) has argued that ‘communication scholars must engage more intensively with the question: ‘How is media governance used as a mediator in this space between capital and private interests and public interest’ (17). The advances in printing and emerging cable and wireless technologies, telegraph and radio in particular, the confluence of interests between private corporations, colonial states, the formation of cartels point to market-­ state-­capital configurations in media monopolies in global news agencies and broadcasting. Despite the control of media systems by the colonial state and private corporations, colonial subjects and nationalist movements set up printing presses, published newspapers and pamphlets, utilized telegraphic communication to mobilize people in their struggle against the colonial rule. To thwart access printing and publications of newspapers the colonial states—Britain and France—instituted sedition laws, ordinances, and mandates. The colonial state’s juridical-legal strictures and strategies inscribed media and governance within the folds of power. In the domain of communication technologies and media,

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governance operated through legal-administrative strictures against printing presses, newspapers, use of telegraph and radio broadcasting through scores of telegraph and newspaper ordinances, laws, and ‘acts’ from Algeria to Zambia (Zaghlimi 2016).

Information, Communication, and the Internet: Global Debates and Policy Regimes There is a burgeoning scholarly literature on the NWICO and WSIS debates, focusing on the role of individual actors and political institutions in the constitution of information and communication orders (Calabrese 2004; Thussu 2005; Mansell and Nordenstreng 2007; Pickard 2007: Chakravartty 2007; Raboy et al. 2010; Frau-Meigs et al. 2012; Alhassan and Chakravartty 2014). Drawing insights from these studies, I trace the discourses on information, communication, and the Internet through the lens of sovereignty and governance refracting the play of power, perspectives, and agency in the various policy regimes. The decades of 1940s–1960s witnessed decolonization of large swathes of the non-Western world in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, after hard and long struggles for independence: 82 countries with a combined population of 2  billion were coming out of the yoke of foreign rule and domination. While the independence mass movements in the respective countries mobilized the working classes, peasants, and rural populations, these anti-colonial nationalist struggles were mainly led by middle class bourgeoisie. Despite achieving formal independence from colonial rule, the newly emerging nations had to contend with class, race, caste, ethnic, gender, religious, socioeconomic and cultural inequalities. Bedeviled by the disparate configurations of power and domination they had experienced under the colonial rule, the postcolonial nation-states embarked on their respective projects of nation building and programs of economic development.7 7  Within the domain of postcolonial bureaucratic policy-making, media legislations and ordinances from colonial period were reworked and recalibrated to serve the interests of the newly independent states. The postcolonial government-led media policies and laws retained state control of the media systems by invoking nation building and national sovereignty arguments, and the control over media persisted and stifled media autonomy and freedom resulting in the political misuses of broadcasting. For Amin Alhassan and Paula Chakravartty (2014), although postcolonial information, media, and communication policy has drawn on modernization and development discourses, it is still tied to the colonial and transnational imperatives of capital and governance.

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To overcome the political dynamics of the bipolar world—divided between the capitalist West and the communist Soviet Union—and the ‘cold war’, the postcolonial nation-states banded together under the umbrella of ‘Non-Alignment’, that is, a ‘third world’ of countries with no political allegiance to either the two major power blocs. Indeed, the formation of the Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), and the tri-continental meeting initiated at Bandung, Indonesia in 1955 resulted in a series of declarations on national economic development and calls for rectifying the imbalances in the ‘flow of information’ from the West. It is the particular emphasis on information and the role of the press and media in safeguarding national sovereignty of the newly independent nations that became a point of contention and spilled over in the subsequent international and global debates under the auspices of UNESCO (1950s–1980s) and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU; 2000 onward). The liberal-neoliberal hegemony effected through policy discourse, a crucial mechanism through which capitalism has not only changed the relations between state and the market, but configured media primarily as an economic enterprise, away from its public service and developmental role. This is indicative in the diminution and gradual erosion of media and journalism accountability to citizens; the increasing corporatization of not only the media organizations but also media content production and distribution, wherein ‘news’ and information have acquired the characteristics and features of ‘entertainment’ is a baleful development in the global South. A few areas where the neoliberal configurations of media are most salient pertain to the formation and consolidation of cartels, monopolies, and conglomerates; debates around the ‘free flow of information and communication rights; discourse of ‘free speech’ and ‘press freedom’, wherein the idea of free speech has become increasingly privatized and corporatized, detached from substantive social and public commitments. The geopolitics of cold war and the fear of socialism led the Western nations, particularly the United States, Britain, and west Europe to thwart attempts by the Bandung group for calls for a New International Economic Order (NIEO) that was later renamed as the New International Information and Economic Order (NIIEO). Both, International and Information were problematic to the West, and were perceived as posing a threat to liberalism and capitalism. The subsequent global debates initiated by UNESCO under the new conception of the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO), and the publication of the MacBride Report argued for a ‘free and balanced flow of

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information’, emphasizing the important role of state to institute safeguards against the increasing privatization and commercialization of media, and national sovereignty as a bulwark against market intrusions. This led to bitter acrimony and these tussles between the West and the global South. For the Western nations the global debates around NWICO and the MacBride Report, where the third world countries came together to exercise their collective agency in articulating and envisioning a just and fair information and communication order, posed a threat to their power not only in the sphere of media and ICTs, but to the liberal, capitalist system itself. For the nation-states in the global South, ‘sovereignty’ remained a crucial organizing principle through which freedom and autonomy from colonial rule was sought. The idea of ‘national sovereignty’ served as an underlying framework for the newly decolonized countries since circa 1945. Several major media-based infrastructural issues ranging from equities in international communication and telecommunications, satellite control, distribution of radio frequencies, and so on were framed within the rubric of national sovereignty at Bandung and NAM meetings. UNESCO played an active role though its espousal of the NWICO, formalized at the Declaration on Mass Media at its 1978 General Assembly. The global media and communications debates on the importance of national sovereignty for the countries of the global South initiated under the aegis of Bandung, NAM, and UNESCO opened up deep fissures between the Western nations and the non-Western countries. For the United States and the United Kingdom, NWICO, and the issue of national sovereignty remained deeply problematic. In order to counter the debates and the issues raised at the UNESCO forums, they crafted rhetorical tropes around specific topics such as ‘free flow of information’ in the liberal (and neoliberal) language of ‘free speech’ and ‘press freedom’ articulated by lobbyists and interests groups such as the World Press Freedom Committee (WPFC) based in the United States.8 A major debate centered on ‘press freedom’ and the ‘right to communicate’ respectively. While the West led by the United States and Europe argued for press freedom as fundamental to media, the postcolonial 8  Herbert Schiller (1974) noted that the doctrine of free flow was an ideological component of American foreign policy agenda, mainly deployed for promoting its economic interests. WPFC and other interest groups have relied on this to articulate the trope of press freedom as commercial media freedom.

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nations of the global South stressed the importance of right to communicate as the individual and social levels. The notion of press freedom came to be aligned with the doctrine of ‘free speech’ and ‘free expression’, where the individual is construed as the bearer of such rights. Within the liberal tradition, the concept of free speech is posited as a procedural right claiming its legitimacy in relation to private property and individualism. The liberal genealogy of free speech transmuted with the colonial, mercantile trajectories of capitalism in the global South situated at the nexus between state and the market. For the decolonized countries, the principle of ‘right to communicate’ ought to be located sociopolitical and cultural domains and articulated as a collective right, thus reframing ‘communication’ as a substantive right, not a procedural one grounded in the private realm but in the public sphere. Thus, freed from ties to individualism and private property, it envisioned a different social horizon in which the market is not an exclusive preponderant entity. According to Pickard (2007), the substantive media infrastructural and equity-based issues raised at the NWICO and WSIS global communication debates became diluted subsequently as they were forced into the ‘narrowing terrains predicated by a foundational neoliberal economic logic’ which can be traced to ‘corporate liberalism, an early forbear to today’s neoliberalism that structured 1930s broadcasting policy’ (120) in the United States.9 The increasing valences of the neoliberal economic logics in the global debates is evident in the WSIS debates which were conducted in two parts: Phase 1 held in Geneva, Switzerland in 2003, and phase 2 in Tunis, Tunisia in 2005. This is also marked by the marginalization of UNESCO in the global communication debates and the ascendancy of ITU, a shift away from the inter-state political deliberations to a ‘multistakeholder’ approach focusing on technical aspects and marketing expertise conducted under ‘media governance’ as a new moniker (Chakravartty 2007). Within the complex of state-market-capital, media loses its social valences to the corporatist language of neoliberalism. In the initial global debates around NIEO and NIIEO, and NWICO, the social and political dimensions of media were in the forefront, gradually waning 9  Victor Picard (2007) is referring to Tom Streeter’s (1996) conceptualization of ‘corporate liberalism’ that shaped media and broadcasting policies in 1930s United States. It is important to note that some of the seminal critiques of capitalism, particularly neoliberalism in relation to media, information, and communication industries was developed by political economy of communication scholarship.

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in significance during the WSIS phase that was dominated by technical discussions of the Internet within the organizing rubrics of governance and corporate management regulatory discourse. In the domains of media, ICTs, digital networks, and the Internet, such legal instruments and mechanisms have increasingly precipitated the ‘coordination and steering’ of complex technologies across multiple vectors of neoliberal governance: these range from issues such as the technical standard-setting and management of the Internet, the hegemony of the US non-profit corporation, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) in Domain Naming System (DNS).10 Although the deliberations were framed as technical, they were deeply political in nature. For example, Senegal’s proposal for building digital and ICTs infrastructure in Africa through the establishment of a Digital Solidarity Fund was opposed by the Western nations in favor of a Digital Freedom Initiative aligned with US government’s corporate-based development model for Africa.11 Another issue pertains to the allocation of highest levels of Internet domain names to Western countries at the expense of the countries from the South. The issue of communication rights was gradually marginalized in favor of the discourse of human rights. Despite the WSIS debates, and the establishment of the working group, Internet Governance Forum (IGF) through European initiatives, the last two decades have witnessed an increasing privatization and corporatization of ICTs, digital networks, and the Internet in the global South (Drake and Ernst 2008). Global South is not a singular entity and is marked by uneven topographies of power, wherein some countries are considered developing, others semi-developing, and still others underdeveloped. In terms of media and ICTs, some countries of the South have better infrastructure than others, as in the case of India. The neoliberal ICTs and digital media discourse— orchestrated through USAID’s programs and investments from transnational private corporations—in countries of Africa has been deeply problematic. Although most African countries lack adequate media and digital infrastructure, the recent spurt in mobile telephony networking 10  According to scholars, the WSIS debates involving diverse actors and institutions, mostly private and interest groups, and several non-profit and ‘civil society organizations’ focused on technical issues such as Internet governance, intellectual property, open software, human rights, and communication rights (Raboy et al. 2010). 11  For an account of the representations of Africa in the ‘good governance’ discourse, see Gathii (1999).

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and digital online platforms have been touted as panaceas for lack bridging the digital divide. According to Ayodele Odilile (2020), the ICTs discourse in Africa continues to deploy the language of technology as a commodity and not a as public good, and the recent ‘move to exploit AI [Artificial Intelligence], the IoT [Internet of Things] and 5G technology is one that developing countries are being encouraged to embrace while inequities in information society, and the international system of governance have not disappeared’ (80).12 Building up the ICTs and Internet infrastructure through indigenous capital is essential for national sovereignty, economic security, self-reliance of respective countries in the global South. Nicole Starosielski (2015) noted that the Internet’s network has been mapped onto the older telegraphic routes of the colonial empires that link the Western nations at the expense of the South. Jayashree Thorat’s (2019) account of the Internet undersea landing stations points to the persistence of colonial media formations, especially when the ‘pre-established cable routes, and the precarious infrastructure of cable lines and cable landing stations are all shaped by colonial and neocolonial power relations, patterns of cable ownership are another significant aspect of this colonial topography of the Internet infrastructure’ (261).13

Toward Transversal Engagements and Cosmopolitan Ethos This chapter briefly explored the colonial-imperial histories of media and governance in the global South, tracing the ways in which ‘governance’ as a mode for exercising authority and control was mobilized through the apparatus of telegraph and radio. Indeed, media and communication technologies were not just ‘instruments’ and ‘tools of empire’; the conduits for 12  Indeed, as Odilile (2020) notes, ‘positive developments such as the disease response measures … the great successes in financial services sector with the development and deployment of mobile money solutions such as M-Pesa, obscure the reality of Africa’s lagging digital transformation’. 13  Although built on the capitalist, private-public partnership model, SEACOM is an example of a South-South Internet cable network connecting India, East Africa, and the Middle East. For an elegant account, see Thorat (2019). The last several years have also witnessed new regional politico-economic alliances such as the Brazil, India, China, South Africa (BRICS), and other regional groupings in Africa, South America, and the Middle East. These developments complicate the picture of a uniform global South.

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the exercise of governance, but central to the construction and mapping of the colonial-imperial cartographies of power and industrial capitalism’s extraction of resources from the global South. While the chapter’s focus has been on neoliberalism’s effects on media, especially the ways in which information and communication technologies and the Internet in the global South, a broader thrust of the analysis pointed to the political control and corporatization of media and communication technologies within the state-market-capital nexus through a discussion of the colonial-­imperial legacies of press, telegraph, and radio; press freedom and right to communicate debates; media cartels and monopolies from a global South perspective. Policy-making cannot remain the prerogative of technocratic procedures, and although these are aimed as technical exercises in rule-­ making and instituting governance mechanisms, such procedures have political implications. TWAIL scholarship has alerted us to the deeply troubling political intentions entrenched in the global legal and technical rule-making detrimental to the interests of non-Western world, hindering their economic and political freedoms. How then, should we envision an egalitarian and just society in which media and ICTs do not serve corporate interests; rather open-up, ‘spaces of hope’ for the people, citizens of the world, the downtrodden, dispossessed, multitudes, the ‘public’. In the following programmatic outline, I briefly discuss some interconnected approaches located outside the strict ambit of state-market-capital nexus through an expansive idea of ‘public good’ one which needs to be articulated and developed within the rubrics of cosmopolitanism and transversality Although cosmopolitanism has been outlined as a theoretical notion within the Western philosophical schools, it has remained an important idea in ancient and medieval intellectual traditions of the world, and thus, has no claims to a single genealogy. It broadly refers to humans as members of a single community, ‘citizens of the world’ who are guided by openness and tolerance to the other. In the chapter, I use cosmopolitanism in its wider provenance that transcends the West/non-West binary, yet alert to the disparate modes of power and hegemony. For instance, one dominant version of normative ‘cosmopolitical world order’ proposed by David Held, Ulrich Beck, and others is deeply problematic in its disavowal of anti-imperialism and empire and an articulation of the discourse of human rights that supplant sovereignty of nation-states (see Pollock et al. 2000; Cohen 2006; Chatterjee 2016). Instead, a cosmopolitanism that neither espouses an uncompromising universalism nor capitalist and neoliberal values, rather one that is

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grounded in shared values, beliefs, and commitments, the lived realities of the people (Ponzanesi 2020; Fenton 2013), and a transversality based on interconnections and dialogues between people, social actors, and institutions across national borders and boundaries (Bleiker 2000; Sassen 2013). A crucial approach relates to foregrounding the principles and practices of ‘commoning’ in international and global affairs not as an addendum but an ethical component of governance and rule-making. In the context of media and ICTs, there are a few notable examples of ‘cosmopolitan information commons’ such as weather forecasting and radio spectrum organized as the public good that offer a path forward in formulating non-­ corporate-­based rule-making and governance (Edwards 2013; Wormbs 2013). Despite the increasing corporatization of communication and the Internet, there have been numerous social and political movements that have ‘reimagined’ the emancipatory potentials of the new communication technologies in their struggles toward creating a non-corporate, ‘media commons’. A wide range of ‘commons-based’ community media and alternative media organizations in the global South provide marginalized populations not only access to information, but critical social and economic developmental resources and infrastructures of knowledge. In the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, several community media organizations have been in the forefront in providing crucial knowledge resources to disadvantaged and marginalized populations in the South (for an overview, see Milan et al. 2021; Pavarala and Jena 2020). Children and young people in the global South and the North are debating entrenched socioeconomic inequities, environmental concerns, climate change issues, hate speech, conflict and violence, and so on, via civic activism through public engagement and movements on digital and online spaces as well as offline in the real world (Asthana 2017, 2020). These instances of ‘media commons’ provide alternatives to the hyper-commercialized neoliberal media systems around the world. In developing pluralist organizational structures of media and communication, such movements open-up cosmopolitan horizons of understanding, forging transversal connections and linkages across and beyond the national boundaries thereby reanimating politics and culture. The coming together of such social forms and movements engenders unexpected conversations, conviviality, and dialogues, where different experiences are shared and brought together to solve ‘wicked problems’ confronting the world. Indeed, such border-crossings of ideas and thoughts, lives and experiences result in uncanny wisdom that always occurs within spaces of

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encounters between intellectual traditions, wherein diverse modes of thinking cut through conceptual cul-de-sacs thereby regenerating new thought to arise.

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CHAPTER 3

Media Governance as Diagnostic Lens to Probe Hidden Dimensions of Authoritarian Decision-Making in the Arab Middle East Naomi Sakr

Introduction There are several reasons why theories around governance generally, let alone media governance specifically, are not prominent in Middle East studies, except in a normative but often vague sense of ‘good governance’. Political scientist R.A.W. Rhodes, who theorised governance in the context of public administration and policy networks in Britain in the 1990s, was concerned with issues of accountability in a situation of growing institutional complexity and an attempted ‘hollowing out of the state’ (e.g. Rhodes 1997). Theories of global governance in the 1990s were likewise

N. Sakr (*) Communication and Media Research Institute (CAMRI), University of Westminster, London, UK e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. A. Ganter, H. Badr (eds.), Media Governance, Global Transformations in Media and Communication Research - A Palgrave and IAMCR Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05020-6_3

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driven by the perceived decline of hegemons (e.g. Rosenau 1992) along with the growing role of non-state actors and the development of increasingly complex societies composed of ‘more autonomous sub-­ systems within which the roles of the actors are diversified’ (Milani 2005: 20). Such phenomena seem far removed from circumstances in the Arab Middle East, where centralisation, not complexification, is a key feature of authoritarian governments (e.g. Sassoon 2016: 70–72), where loyalty to those at the centre is valued as the antithesis of autonomy (Sassoon 2016: 66–67), and where access to services is made conditional on political support for the centre by coercive gatekeepers of the so-called ‘deep state’ (Springborg 2020: 61–73). Such apparently divergent scenarios may help to explain why a 28-chapter ‘handbook’ entitled Governance in the Middle East and North Africa sidesteps the contradictions: its editor treats the notion of governance as self-explanatory, being related to ‘economic performance, trade agreements, political economy, religious radicalization, state-intellectual relations, women’s status, and the role of social movements’ (Kadhim 2013: x) and meriting no overarching theoretical introduction. On the other hand, perhaps potential does exist for an overlap between governance as understood in the context of self-organising administrative networks and governance as understood in states where informality is a significant characteristic, whether in forms of power, informal practices or modes of employment. Justification for seeing informality as a meeting point between the two theorisations lies in James Rosenau’s observation (1992: 5) that ‘it is possible to conceive of governance’ as ‘regulatory mechanisms … which function effectively even though they are not endowed with formal authority’. As defined by the World Bank (Gatti et al. 2014: 33), informality is a multifaceted phenomenon, ‘determined by the relationship that the state establishes with private agents through regulation, monitoring, and provision of public services’. Studies of informal power in the Middle East note that ideas about it as ‘abnormal’ are misplaced: that, in an environment of authoritarianism, ‘weak formal institutions … are vulnerable to infiltration by informal networks’ (Alhamad 2008: 46), and to decouple the formal and informal reflects an erroneous downgrading of informal powers based on ‘essentialised views of culture characteristic of neo-Orientalism’ (Teti et al. 2014: 2–3). Research equally shows that informal practices, albeit ‘difficult to capture empirically’, play a ‘profound role’ in the Middle East context, often occupying the same

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conceptual space as clientelism and patronage but not necessarily synonymous with corruption (Kubba and Varraich 2020: 3, 10). Meanwhile informal employment is so widespread in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) that a typical MENA country ‘produces about one-third of its GDP and employs 65  per cent of its labor force informally’, with the undeclared portion of economic output not registered for tax purposes (Gatti et al. 2014: 33). If two-thirds of a country’s workers are outside state social security coverage, with no health insurance, pension or employment protection, there is a de facto dispersal of social and economic responsibilities to non-state agents. At the same time, ever-­ closer ties between political and business elites in Arab Gulf countries (Kamrava et al. 2016), Lebanon (Assouad 2021) and Egypt (Völkel 2021) are enabled by an absence of formal regulatory curbs on business, whether to prevent monopolies or conflicts of interest or to safeguard the interests of the workforce. A particular model of governance is thus discernible here in the combination of dispersed roles with informal mechanisms and practices that ensure the dispersal operates in the interests of the ruling elite. This model is not incompatible with a highly centralised power base. As Paul Du Gay has pointed out (2002), in his critique of variants of governance theory that privilege the ‘capacities for self-governance’ of people, communities or civil society, the capacities of these agents are ‘not their intrinsic property—as the governance narrative would have it—but an effect of their relationship with the state’ (2002: 20–21).

Informal Mechanisms and Dispersed Roles To theorise Arab media governance in terms of informal mechanisms and dispersed roles geared to serving elite interests is reasonably consistent with concepts of media governance in other contexts. It sits within Des Freedman’s (2008: 14) wide definition of media governance as ‘broader both spatially and instrumentally than regulation’, referring to the ‘sum total of mechanisms, both formal and informal, national and supranational, centralized and dispersed, that aim to organize media systems’. It also responds to Freedman’s call (2010: 347, 358) for media scholars to focus on gaps and silences in regulatory activity that are reflected in opacity and apparent inaction rather than visibility and action. Given that views on the usefulness of media governance as a theoretical approach ‘depend greatly on what we expect it to do for us’ (Karppinen and Moe 2013: 78), and taking account of warnings against a ‘drab discourse’ that flattens out

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power relations and conflicts (Karppinen and Moe 2013: 77), it may be legitimate to look for the norms and taken-for-granted assumptions inherent in organisational cultures and habits that some associate with media governance (Karppinen and Moe 2013: 78) and seek to discern whether these buttress informal mechanisms and dispersed roles that ultimately owe their capacities to the state. Such an approach is supported in respect of Arab media by Adel Iskander’s argument (2021: 346) that, with very few exceptions, ‘the model for both political governance and media that pervades the region is now both neoliberal and authoritarian’. By that he means that ‘what was once the dominion of government officials has been outsourced to corporations’ (Iskander 2021: 346) in a ‘compelling structural maneuver’, whereby deregulation of the media sector has allowed ‘loyalist and government-­aligned investors and entrepreneurs to own and run networks, channels and companies’ under a model that ensures that each of these entities ‘reflects, implicitly or explicitly, the perspectives espoused by the government of the country’ from which it operates (Iskander 2021: 348). Joe Khalil, writing on the ‘layered modalities’ of media governance in the Arab world (2015: 30), discerned the development of ‘symbiotic relationships’ between governments and media owners through the growth of private ownership, where ‘private’ is a problematic category (Khalil 2015: 13, 17). George Joffé pinpoints a taken-for-granted assumption that governments can and should exert ‘unilateral control’ over media that are ostensibly privately owned. Reviewing confrontations over regulatory issues in Tunisia, which saw ten major government changes in the decade after 2011, Joffé concludes (2021: 67) that ‘despite the revolution and the establishment of new institutions to ensure the independence of the media in Tunisia … political culture remains little changed’. His evidence suggests that ‘whatever party or coalition comes to power in future, it will be operating in the same informal climate of the culture of governance as has applied to date’, since such ‘habits of mind’ change only slowly (Joffé 2021: 68). Bouziane Zaid’s research (2018: 4413) suggests that, where broadcast regulators were introduced in Arab states, they were intended to ‘function as modern institutional support systems for authoritarian rule’, being part of fake reforms that give a false impression of democratisation. Zaid shows (2018) how far legal practices that lack the formality of precision enable these regulatory bodies to support the central political elite, from vague wording of laws that allow wide margins of interpretation, to lack of

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documentation on or justification of judicial rulings, to inconsistencies in constitutions and laws. Since, as he argues (2018: 4402), the question is not ‘whether the state wields power over broadcasting but rather how much and of which types’, the phenomena of loose wording and selective application of legal codes would appear to justify recourse to a concept of media governance that encompasses roles and mechanisms not captured by explicit regulatory provision. The relevance of looking beyond explicit media law and policy is highlighted by the performance of many Arab states in terms of ‘Voice and Accountability’, one of six dimensions covered by the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). On this measure, which the WGI links to media freedom, political participation and freedom of association, Egypt, Syria and five Gulf states—Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE)—performed even worse in 2019 than they did before the 2011 uprisings across the region, to the point where Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia were among the world’s worst 10 per cent (World Bank 2020). Rankings like these call for a diagnosis that includes analysis of the ‘informal climate of the culture of [media] governance’ (Joffé 2021: 68) and seeks to capture it empirically. Analysis that uncovers hidden workings of authoritarianism could ultimately be useful in confronting it. The following two case studies of media regulatory outcomes explore informal mechanisms and dispersed roles to understand their contribution to the regulatory process, either through action or inaction since inaction also has outcomes. Process tracing, which infers causal linkages between factors and outcomes, is adopted as the appropriate method for this exploration, given its value in theory development (George and Bennett 2005: 208–211) and this chapter’s objective of theorising media governance in the Arab Middle East in terms of unacknowledged mechanisms and decisions. Processes are traced primarily through analysis of press accounts and journalistic investigations, where these are interpreted reflexively as sources to document things that happened rather than as texts of interest in their own right (Karppinen and Moe 2012: 184–186). The first case study concerns dispersed action and inaction on protecting intellectual property (IP) rights in the face of a piracy operation with apparently powerful but secretive backers. The second concerns controls exerted on social media use through a combination of trolling and non-transparent moderation by companies owning social media platforms. The chapter ends by drawing conclusions about insights such an approach can offer on practices and mechanisms not captured by formal media regulation.

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Saudi Arabia and Copyright Infringement Protection of copyright is provided for internationally by the Trade-­ Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS) Agreement, which came into effect with the creation of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 1995 and was one of the features differentiating the WTO from the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that preceded it. When Saudi Arabia joined the WTO in 2005, after protracted negotiations, local commentators highlighted copyright protection, along with ‘greater transparency’, ‘rule of law, and more foreign investment’ as a key long-­ term benefit of WTO membership (e.g. Zahid 2005). From 2005 until 2018, however, responsibility for protecting intellectual property (IP) rights in Saudi Arabia was distributed among different ministries (Abou Chakra 2018), with the precise responsibilities of some, such as the Ministry of Communication and Information Technology or Ministry of Culture and Information, obscured and complicated by changes of name, remit and minister during the period 2014–17. From late 2018, after accusations of Saudi copyright breaches, moves were made to rectify this situation through the creation of a new public body, the Saudi Authority for Intellectual Property (SAIP), tasked—according to a law firm participant at a workshop held with stakeholders in September that year—with consolidating the various regulatory functions associated with different forms of IP and ensuring implementation of Saudi Arabia’s obligations under international conventions such as TRIPS. The same participant noted that several areas, including enforcement and adjudication, required ‘further clarification’ (Abou Chakra 2018). Long-standing lack of clarity about who should act against content infringement on the airwaves, together with dissatisfaction at a lack of enforcement, helps to explain the formation in 2014 of a MENA Anti-­ Piracy Coalition chaired by Sam Barnett, then chief executive officer (CEO) of the region’s leading TV network, Saudi-owned MBC Group, co-founded by Walid al-Ibrahim, brother-in-law of King Fahd, who ruled Saudi Arabia from 1982 to 2005. Barnett complained that pirate channels were ‘stealing hundreds of movies a week and broadcasting them across tens of millions of homes’, assisted and supported by ‘a few otherwise respectable companies’ (quoted in Cherian 2014). Coming together on what the coalition charter, posted on its website (menaapc.org), described as a ‘voluntary basis to share information and align strategies’ with no legal obligation, coalition members included regional broadcasters,

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satellite operators and service providers alongside the Motion Picture Association (MPA), the international arm of the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA). The MPAA lobbies on behalf of Hollywood film companies, took part in drafting the TRIPS agreement and, through its alliance with other US bodies interested in copyright protection, liaises with the Office of the US Trade Representative (USTR) in the latter’s monitoring of foreign government inaction vis-à-vis content piracy (McDonald 2016: 694). The informal MENA Anti-Piracy Coalition claimed periodic success in closing pirate operations in the region. BroadcastProME, a monthly trade journal published by Dubai-based CPI TradeMedia, which began organising an annual Anti-Piracy Conference in Dubai in 2018, regularly reported the addition of new coalition members, as well as coalition claims about numbers of channels taken off air through its actions: 15 in 2014, 30 in 2017 and 18 in 2018. A coalition communiqué in 2017 said its members had agreed to collaborate in lobbying regional authorities, police, customs, legal and licencing bodies and to run joint education and awareness campaigns aimed at informing government entities and customers across the region (Forrester 2017). At the time MBC, also based in Dubai, was said to be one of three bodies monitoring piracy, along with Jordan Media City and the pay-TV provider OSN (Forrester 2017). However, no further press releases were posted on the coalition website after October 2017. Reasons for coalition inaction at that point can be traced to events in Saudi Arabia in 2017—in its internal politics, its policy towards neighbouring Qatar, and its ambitions vis-à-vis rights to broadcast premium international sporting events. Causal chains under each heading can be seen as converging and interacting (George and Bennett 2005: 212) to produce a series of outcomes relating to the protection or non-protection of IP. Looking first at internal politics, June 2017 was the point at which Saudi Arabia’s King Salman promoted his 31-year-old son Mohammed bin Salman from Deputy Crown Prince to Crown Prince, replacing another relative who was eventually placed under house arrest in 2020. Mohammed bin Salman, widely referred to as MBS, had been in the ascendant in directing economic and foreign policy from the moment King Salman took the throne in 2015. In November 2017, soon after his promotion, in the guise of an anti-corruption purge, MBS had more than 150 princes, business tycoons and former ministers arrested and detained at the Ritz-Carlton hotel in Riyadh with the officially stated aim of taking over $100bn worth of their assets (Kerr 2018). Among those held was

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Walid bin Ibrahim, holder of a controlling stake in MBC Group, which MBS, known to be keen to tighten the government’s grip on media, had previously tried to acquire for a price below that acceptable to the seller (Kerr 2018; Hubbard 2018). When MBC CEO Sam Barnett announced Walid bin Ibrahim’s release in January 2018, after 83 days in detention, he did not elaborate on any new ownership arrangements (Hubbard 2018). The following year, however, Barnett resigned, and in early 2020 the new CEO, Marc Antoine d’Halluin, announced that MBC Group would move from its base in Dubai, outside formal Saudi jurisdiction, to a new high-­ tech complex inside Saudi Arabia, in the capital Riyadh, conceived as part of the kingdom’s Vision 2030 ‘reform’ programme (Khereiji 2020). In parallel with these events, MBS and the Saudi authorities were pursuing a boycott of Qatar. Saudi Arabia and a few of its regional allies cut diplomatic and trade ties with Qatar in June 2017 in protest at what they alleged to be Qatari support for terrorism and relations with Iran. The boycott included blocking the Qatari broadcaster beIN Group, holder of billions of dollars’ worth of broadcasting rights for major global sporting events and entertainment shows and subscribed to by some 55  million customers worldwide, including in Saudi Arabia. Saudi viewers were thereby denied access to top football matches in England, Spain and Italy and potentially to the 2018 World Cup, for which beIN had acquired exclusive regional broadcasting rights. The effects of the boycott were just being felt when a pirate operator arrived on the scene to put back what the blocking of beIN had taken away. Provocatively named beoutQ, it started by illegally streaming beIN’s sports channels but soon had the infrastructure of a full-scale broadcaster, complete with satellite transmission and branded set-top boxes (Ritman 2019). Boxes on sale in Saudi Arabia were able to receive beoutQ channels from Arabsat, an Arab League satellite operation headquartered in Riyadh in which Saudi Arabia is the biggest shareholder, with beoutQ using social media to notify customers about which Arabsat frequencies to tune to (Ibid). BeoutQ aired advertisements for Saudi companies, used Saudi sports commentators and hosts and substituted its own name for the beIN logo on screen. Alex Ritman of The Hollywood Reporter reported having seen an advertising rate card with rates quoted in Saudi riyals (Ibid). What Ritman, attuned to Middle East politics through a previous stint with The National newspaper in Abu Dhabi, also noted (2019) was a ‘rather deafening silence from the entertainment world around the subject of beoutQ’. He found very few other than Qatar’s beIN itself willing even

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to discuss it let alone condemn it—something he attributed to Saudi Arabia’s ‘financial muscle’ and its rulers’ ‘tight relationship with the Trump administration’ (Ritman 2019). The Saudi authorities rebutted complaints from international tennis bodies in 2018 that piracy by beoutQ was depriving the sport of funding, describing them as part of an ‘irresponsible smear campaign’ against the kingdom (quoted in Mann 2018). In February 2019 beIN, hit by financial losses caused through beoutQ’s piracy, opted not to renew its Formula One licence, leaving the way open for MBC Group to step in the very next month and, according to Reuters and other news agencies, acquire rights to show all Formula One races live and free-to-air across Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Middle East and North Africa for the next five years. Even though IPTV apps preloaded on beoutQ set-top boxes gave viewers access not only to sport but to thousands of hours of Hollywood entertainment, the MPAA’s representative for Europe, the Middle East and Africa refused to comment to The Hollywood Reporter on any link to Saudi Arabia, referring Ritman instead to the MENA Anti-Piracy Coalition. Yet, as Ritman (2019) discovered, the coalition, having written to its own member, Arabsat, about the piracy, failed to take any follow-up action because of disagreement over wording. BroadcastPro ME’s reporting on its own 2019 MENA Anti-Piracy Conference in Dubai made no mention of beoutQ, either in publicising the event in April that year or when the conference took place in June. The silence was broken only after beoutQ ceased operations in August 2019. It was around this time that official institutions and formal mechanisms gradually moved to bring clarity to the grey area of cover-up, anonymity, indistinct lines of command and apparent intimidation that had surrounded beoutQ so far. The murder and dismemberment of Saudi Arabian journalist Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018 had aggravated a sense of intimidation in some quarters while engendering outrage in others. In July 2019 a group of football organisations whose matches were being shown illegally on beoutQ released a joint statement asking for help from Saudi Arabia to end what they called ‘flagrant breaches of our intellectual property rights taking place in the country’ (quoted in Cherian 2019). Even with the subsequent closure of beoutQ itself, set-top boxes supplied for the service continued to provide illegal access to copyrighted content and England’s Premier League found that no law firm in the kingdom would act on its behalf (Bloomberg 2020). The International Bar Association revealed that football’s international governing body FIFA had spoken to nine law firms in Saudi Arabia over 15  months, ‘each of

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which either simply refused to act on our behalf or initially accepted the instruction, only later to recuse themselves’ (Mekay 2020). With the scale of informal mechanisms becoming apparent, an even bigger alliance of sports bodies wrote to the Office of the US Trade Representative ahead of the USTR February 2020 hearings on IP protection, calling for Saudi Arabia to be moved up the watchlist of countries failing to meet their international obligations (Ibid). Finally, in June 2020, the WTO itself ruled, in response to a case brought on behalf of beIN, that Saudi Arabia had breached its obligations under the TRIPS Agreement; it established ‘prima facie that beoutQ is operated by individuals or entities under the jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia’ (WTO 2020: 124). A week later the recently created Saudi Authority for Intellectual Property announced that it was blocking 231 websites it had found to be violating copyright protection law by streaming movies, sports channels and music without authorisation from the rights holder (Clover 2020). In July 2020 Saudi Arabia’s General Authority for Competition said it had permanently barred beIN Sports from broadcasting in the kingdom and was fining it 10 million riyals (US$2.7m) for what it said were ‘monopolistic practices’, a charge disputed by beIN (Reuters 2020). Later that month, with beIN Sports having secured rights to air Premier League matches until 2025, a consortium led by Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund, controlled by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, pulled out of a £300m deal to buy Newcastle United football club, having failed to gain Premier League approval for the deal. With the Saudi authorities compelled to acknowledge the WTO ruling, which they did by appealing against it, IP protection in the kingdom began to move away from the realms of informality, but only after a major attack had been sustained over nearly three years against a large non-Saudi broadcasting group, international sporting bodies and, despite their reticence on the subject, Hollywood studios.

Global Digital Platforms, Local Autocrats and the Right to Communicate The right to ‘seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds’ through any medium and regardless of frontiers is enshrined in Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), restricted only by the need to respect the ‘rights and reputations of others’

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and protect national security, public order, public health and morals. Advocates of a ‘right to communicate’, meaning the right of every individual and community to have their views and stories heard, note that this ‘umbrella term’ (ARTICLE 19 2002) should be conceived as encompassing existing rights which states are obliged to take ‘positive measures’ to protect (ARTICLE 19 2002). Others point to the centrality of communication in claiming or asserting human rights in general. Where the right to communicate is obstructed, the question of whether or not complainants can seek effective remedy potentially has implications for the enjoyment of all other human rights. Arab states that score poorly on the World Bank Voice and Accountability Indicators mentioned above have shown persistent disregard for the ICCPR. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have not signed it. Egypt and Syria signed and ratified it decades ago but have omitted to submit mandatory periodic reports on their compliance with the Covenant since the early 2000s.1 However, multinational companies that supply digital services to residents of these states are based in countries where the right to communicate is officially contested only in cases of recognised online harms. Given the discrepancy between regulations on either side of the provision of services, it seems relevant to look further into mechanisms and roles that appear to be at work when the social media accounts of individuals and groups in Arab countries are hacked or blocked. Collaboration between communications companies based in the Global North and repressive governments in Arab countries has rarely been formally admitted but examples have been documented in sufficient number for processes on both sides to be traced as causes behind the silencing of individuals and groups. A lack of safeguards against governments ‘intent on snooping on their citizens’ forcing private companies to comply with ‘inappropriate or excessive data acquisition’ demands was highlighted after UK-based Vodafone revealed it had handed data on users of its mobile phone network in Egypt to the Egyptian government after demonstrators in the town of Mehalla el-Kubra in April 2008 used their phones to organise, leading many to believe the user data had led to arrests (Noman 2009). The uprising against Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in 2011 saw Vodafone again doing the government’s bidding by sending 1  The status of UN human rights treaty ratifications and reporting status for individual Arab countries can be viewed at https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Countries/Pages/ HumanRightsintheWorld.aspx.

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pro-Mubarak text messages to subscribers, including one urging them to ‘confront the traitors and criminals’ taking part in the uprising (Greenberg 2011). Decisions by social media giants like Facebook and Twitter about the removal of content posted online by dissidents in Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia include some that are never explained, some attributed to company policy and some that occur because of campaigns by pro-government trolls. In cases investigated by journalists there often appears to have been an overlap between the mechanisms behind all three types. The Atlantic published a report in February 2014 describing bafflement among peaceful civil society activists in Syria as to why Facebook removed pages of local media centres and human rights groups documenting casualties and rights abuses in Syria’s civil war (Pizzi 2014). With Facebook itself acknowledging the potential for human error in such decisions but unwilling to discuss specific cases, opposition activists could only explain the removal by reference to Facebook’s own Report Abuse facility, which allows users to complain about content they allege violates the social network’s community standards. Evidence suggested that a pro-regime entity called the Syrian Electronic Army had gamed the system by sending in enough reports to get the civil society pages closed (Pizzi 2014). As a reporter for The Verge suggested in relation to comparable pro-government trolling against Vietnamese journalists and activists, Facebook had to weigh the risk that ‘ending up on the wrong side of the government’ would endanger its ability to operate in the country at all (Brandom 2014). During 2017, Egyptian dissidents on Facebook had a similar experience. They provided journalist Dania Akkad (2018) with numerous detailed examples of Facebook ‘repeatedly’ banning their pages and shutting down their livestreams after ‘trolls reported their posts over and over again’ (Akkad 2018). The closures had prompted accusations that Facebook was conducting far-reaching and unaccountable censorship at the behest of governments (Akkad 2018). In 2019, for the first time, helped by the investigative website Bellingcat, Facebook announced that it had identified and ended a ‘covert influence campaign’ (quoted in O’Sullivan 2019) with links to Saudi Arabia, involving 217 Facebook accounts, 144 Facebook pages, five Facebook groups and 31 Instagram accounts, which were taken down ‘based on their behavior, not the content they posted’ (quoted in O’Sullivan 2019). The company also announced the removal of a separate network of campaign accounts run out of the UAE and Egypt.

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Saudi troll farms found to be operating via Twitter have highlighted the challenge of detecting and disabling accounts run by individuals as distinct from automated messaging via bots. Jamal Khashoggi was subjected to sustained attacks on Twitter and, shortly after his murder in 2018, The New York Times ran an investigation into trolling undertaken on behalf of the Saudi government. It found that hundreds of young men had been recruited through advertisements on Twitter, with an offer of 10,000 Saudi riyals (about US$3000) per month, and once hired they were contacted through ‘group chats in apps like WhatsApp and Telegram’ and sent ‘lists of people to threaten, insult and intimidate; daily tweet quotas to fill; and pro-government messages to augment’ on issues like the war in Yemen or women’s rights (Benner et  al. 2018). Informants told The New York Times they feared they would have been ‘targeted as possible dissenters themselves if they had turned down the job’ (Benner et  al. 2018). Evidence that individuals in the US had also been part of Twitter campaigns against figures targeted by the Saudi authorities emerged with a lawsuit brought at the end of 2020 by a Lebanese news anchor working with the Qatari channel Al-Jazeera. Images hacked from Ghada Oueiss’s phone through WhatsApp had been doctored as part of an online intimidation campaign disseminated by a network of pro-government Twitter users, including an American woman (Srivastava 2020). In November 2019, when two former employees of Twitter were formally charged in the US with spying for Saudi Arabia, a spokesperson for Twitter acknowledged the ‘incredible risks’ faced by many Twitter users trying to hold those in power to account but said it had ‘tools in place to protect their privacy and their ability to do their vital work’ (quoted by Lecher 2019). Yet only a few weeks earlier Twitter had closed dozens of Egyptian accounts, including many critical of the Egyptian government, and despite a later apology offered no explanation, while activists in Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Yemen and other Arab countries lodged complaints about similar treatment against Twitter’s MENA office in the UAE (Abdulla 2021: 431). Wael Eskandar, one of those affected, investigated. He found that accounts based in the US had also been censored through an algorithm that singled out mild everyday Arabic expressions critical of public figures as ‘hateful conduct’ even though tweets containing English equivalents of these expressions attracted no such action. He received no response from Twitter about his findings (Eskandar 2019). Twitter opened its MENA office in the UAE in August 2015, one day after a UAE economist was arrested for a tweet critical of the government.

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Two months later Saudi billionaire Prince Alwaleed bin Talal and his Kingdom Holding Company, who first acquired a stake in Twitter in 2011, provided a cash injection that raised the Saudi shareholding to 5 per cent. In June 2016 Twitter’s CEO met MBS, then deputy crown prince of Saudi Arabia, to discuss training and technology, six months after Twitter first discovered that a Saudi employee had been accessing the personal data of users (Akkad 2019). Alwaleed, detained by MBS in November 2017  in the same way as MBC’s founder Waleed bin Ibrahim, did not clarify on his release what arrangement had been reached for control over his assets. Since then there have been calls for Twitter’s MENA office to be moved to Tunisia and for its relations with the UAE government to be investigated, amid continuing concerns about selective silencing of social media users in MENA countries.

Conclusion If good governance is the non-specialist umbrella term for transparency, accountability and due legal process, its opposite is what happens when laws are circumvented or broken in an opaque manner and no one is held responsible. Governance theory in academic literature has been concerned with issues of accountability (Rhodes 1997) arising from ‘complex and dispersed’ interactions (Khalil 2015: 13) among the wide range of actors who have the means and motivation to influence regulatory outcomes. Media governance offers a way to theorise such outcomes in the context of authoritarian political systems because it prompts the researcher to go beyond those elements of policy, law or regulation that are formal and visible and instead turn the spotlight on regulatory mechanisms that are characterised by opacity and official silence. As shown by the two case studies presented here, tracing informal regulatory processes reveals widely dispersed—and often unacknowledged—responsibility for outcomes. In both cases, informal regulatory roles straddled international borders, involving US-based actors as well as both non-state and state actors in Arab states, and were exercised through a limited repertoire of modalities. Examining decisions surrounding the pirate operation beoutQ reveals apparently deliberate inaction on the part of Hollywood representatives in the MPA and Arab companies in the MENA Anti-Piracy Coalition during the three years of beoutQ’s illegal retransmission of hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of content belonging to Qatar’s beIN Group—inaction that seems to have resulted from a combination of intimidation, coercion

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and manipulation by powerful forces behind the scenes. MBC’s changing role during the course of the three years underlines the point made in existing work on Arab media governance that, whatever the law may say, private media outlets are obliged, one way or another, to align themselves with government objectives (Iskander 2021; Joffé 2021). Examining the closure and suspension by Facebook and Twitter of social media accounts held by activists in Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia reveals the extent to which decisions, ostensibly taken by US-based companies, could be traced to trolling by individuals, orchestrated anonymously through Arab state largesse and intimidation, coupled with the crafting of algorithms and a determination by global businesses to retain their foothold in affluent markets. Theorising media governance in terms of regulatory outcomes rooted in non-transparent processes informally linking dispersed state and non-­ state players, often across borders, opens up avenues of data collection and analysis that have the potential to improve our understanding of the depth of the challenge posed by authoritarianism. Layers of silence and opacity brought about through coercion and intimidation are inherently difficult to penetrate but media scholars are equipped to listen out for marginalised and suppressed voices in Arab societies and discover the mechanisms through which suppression occurs.

References Abdulla, R. (2021). Tweeting the revolution. The evolution of social media use in Egypt’s turbulent times. In R. Springborg et al. (Eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Egypt (pp. 424–434). Abingdon: Routledge. Abou Chakra, B. (2018). Launch of Saudi IP authority. November. Available at https://www.tamimi.com/law-­update-­articles/launch-­of-­saudi-­ip-­authority/ Akkad, D. (2018). Revealed: Seven years later, how Facebook shuts down free speech in Egypt. Middle East Eye, 30 January. https://www.middleeasteye. net/news/revealed-­s even-­y ears-­l ater-­h ow-­f acebook-­s huts-­d own-­f ree-­ speech-­egypt Akkad, D. (2019). Revealed: Twitter boss met Mohammed bin Salman months after Saudi spy discovered. Middle East Eye, 9 November. https://www.middleeasteye.net/news/exclusive-twitter-ceo-met-mbs-six-months-after-saudispy-discovered Alhamad, L. (2008) Formal and informal venues of engagement. In E. Lust-Okar and S. Zerhouni (Eds.) Political Participation in the Middle East (pp. 33–47) Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

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ARTICLE 19 (2002). The right to communicate. London: ARTICLE 19, 27 April. https://www.article19.org/resources/right-tocommunicate/ Assouad, L. (2021) Lebanon’s Political Economy: From Predatory to Self-Devouring. Beirut: Carnegie Middle East Center. Benner, K., Mazzetti, M., Hubbard, B., & Isaac, M. (2018) Saudis deploy a swarm of online trolls to stifle critics like Khashoggi. New York Times, 21 October, A.1. Bloomberg (2020). FIFA, NFL ask US to keep Saudi Arabia on watchlist over piracy. ArabianBusiness, 25 February. https://www.arabianbusiness.com/ media/441100-­fifa-­nfl-­ask-­us-­to-­keep-­saudi-­arabia-­on-­watchlist-­over-­piracy Brandom, R. (2014). Facebook’s report abuse button has become a tool of global oppression. The Verge, 2 September. https://www.theverge.com/2014/ 9/2/6083647/facebook-­s-­report-­abuse-­button-­has-­become-­a-­tool-­of-­global-­ oppression Cherian, V. (2014). MENA TV players join hands to form Anti-Piracy Coalition. Broadcastpro ME, 19 March. https://www.broadcastprome.com/news/ mena-­tv-­players-­join-­hands-­to-­form-­anti-­piracy-­coalition/ Cherian, V. (2019). Pirate service beoutQ goes off air. Broadcastpro ME, 14 August. https://www.broadcastprome.com/news/pirate-­service-­beoutq-­ goes-­off-­air/ Clover, J. (2020). Saudi Arabia launches piracy crackdown. BroadbandTV News, 22 June. Saudi Arabia launches piracy crackdown (broadbandtvnews.com). Du Gay, P. (2002). A common power to keep them all in awe: A comment on governance. Cultural Values, 6 (1–2), 11–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/ 1362517022019720 Eskandar, W. (2019). How Twitter is gagging Arabic users and acting as morality police. OpenDemocracy, 23 October. https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/ north-africa-west-asia/how-twitter-gagging-arabic-users-and-acting-moralitypolice/ Forrester, C. (2017) Middle East anti-piracy group to remove channels. Advanced Television, 2 May. Middle East anti-piracy TV group to remove channels | (advanced-­television.com). Freedman, D. (2008). The Politics of Media Policy. Cambridge: Polity Press. Freedman, D. (2010). Media policy silences: The hidden face of communications decision making. International Journal of Press/Politics 15 (3) 344–361. https://doi.org/10.1177/1940161210368292 Gatti, R., Angel-Urdinola, D.F., Silva, J. & Bodor, A. (2014) Striving for Better Jobs: The Challenge of Informality in the Middle East and North Africa. Washington: World Bank George, A. L. & Bennett, A. (2005). Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Greenberg, A. (2011). As Egyptians reconnect their government will be watching. Forbes, 4 February. https://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreen-

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berg/2011/02/04/as-­e gyptians-­r econnect-­t heir-­g overnment-­w ill-­b e-­ watching/?sh=2d982a106400 Hubbard, B. (2018) Saudi Arabia frees media mogul, but his company’s fate remains a mystery. New York Times, 26 January. https://www.nytimes. c o m / 2 0 1 8 / 0 1 / 2 6 / w o r l d / m i d d l e e a s t / s a u d i -­m b c -­c o r r u p t i o n -­ crackdown.html Iskander, A. (2021). Media as method in the age of revolution: Statism and digital contestation. In A.  Ghazal & J.  Hanssen (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Middle Eastern and North African History (pp.  342–364). Oxford: Oxford University Press. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfor dhb/9780199672530.013.4 Joffé, G. (2021). Government-media relations in Tunisia: a paradigm shift in the culture of governance? In R. Farmanfarmaian (Ed.), Media and Politics in the Southern Mediterranean: Communicating Power in Transition after 2011 (pp. 51–74). Abingdon: Routledge. Kadhim, A. (2013). Preface. In A. Khadim (Ed.) Governance in the Middle East and North Africa: A Handbook (pp x–xi). Abingdon: Routledge. Kamrava, M., Nonneman, G., Nosova, A., and Valeri, M. (2016) Ruling Families and Business Elites in the Gulf Monarchies: Ever Closer? London: Chatham House. Karppinen, K. & Moe, H. (2012). What we talk about when we talk about document analysis. In N. Just & M. Puppis (Eds.) Trends in Communication Policy Research (pp. 177–193). Bristol: Intellect. Karppinen, K. & Moe, H. (2013). A critique of ‘media governance’. In M. Löblich and S. Pfaff-Rüdiger (Eds.) Communication and Media Policy in the Era of the Internet (pp. 69–80) Baden-Baden: Nomos. Kerr, S. (2018). Top Saudi broadcaster caught up in Riyadh’s corruption shakedown. Financial Times, 26 January. Khalil, J. F. (2015). Modalities of media governance in the Arab world. In D. Della Ratta, N. Sakr & J. Skovgaard-Petersen (Eds.) Arab Media Moguls (pp. 13–30). London: I B Tauris. Khereiji, M. (2020). MBC media group moves to Riyadh as Saudi Arabia seeks to ‘reinvent’ itself. The Arab Weekly, 16 February. Kubba, I. & Varraich, A. (2020) Introduction. In I. Kubba & A. Varraich (Eds.) Corruption and Informal Practices in the Middle East and North Africa (pp. 1–20) Abingdon: Routledge. Lecher, C. (2019) Two former Twitter employees charged with spying for Saudi Arabia. The Verge, 6 November. Mann, C. (2018). Saudi Arabia rejects Wimbledon piracy claims. Advanced Television, 9 July. Saudi Arabia rejects Wimbledon piracy claims | ­(advanced-­television.com).

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Mekay, E. (2020) Premier League football: copyright spat derails Saudi ambitions. International Bar Association website, 22 September. IBA—Premier League football: copyright spat derails Saudi ambitions (ibanet.org). McDonald, P. (2016) Hollywood, the MPAA, and the formation of anti-piracy policy, International Journal of Cultural Policy, 22 (5), 686–705, https://doi. org/10.1080/10286632.2016.1223635 Milani, C. (2005). Non-governmental organizations in global governance. In S. Ben Néfissa, N. Abd al-Fattah, S. Hanafi and C. Milani (Eds.) NGOs and Governance in the Arab World (pp. 19–37). Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press Noman, H. (2009). Can they hear me now? (ICT regulations, governments and transparency). Open Net Initiative, 24 February. https://opennet.net/ blog/2009/02/can-­they-­hear-­me-­now-­on-­ict-­regulations-­governments-­and-­ transparency O’Sullivan, D. (2019). Facebook announces first takedown of influence campaign with ties to Saudi government. CNN Business, 2 August. https://edition.cnn. com/2019/08/01/tech/facebook-saudi-arabia-pages-removed/index.html Pizzi, M. (2014). The Syrian opposition is disappearing from Facebook. The Atlantic, 4 February. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2014/02/ the-­syrian-­opposition-­is-­disappearing-­from-­facebook/283562/ Reuters (2020). Saudi Arabia permanently cancels license of Qatar’s BeIN Sports. 14 July. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-­gulf-­qatar-­saudi-­bein-­id USKCN24F1PB Rhodes, R.A.W. (1997) Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability. Maidenhead: Oxford University Press. Ritman, A. (2019). Could this be the world’s biggest state-sponsored piracy operation? The Hollywood Reporter, 20 June. Rosenau, J.  N. (1992). Governance, order, and change in world politics. In J.  N. Rosenau and E.-O.  Czempiel (Eds.), Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics (pp.  1–29). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Sassoon, J. (2016). Anatomy of Authoritarianism in the Arab Republics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Springborg, R. (2020). Political Economies of the Middle East and North Africa. Cambridge: Polity Press. Srivastava, M. (2020). Al Jazeera journalist sues Saudi crown prince and UAE leader over phone hack. Financial Times, 10 December. Teti, A., Gervasio, G. & Anceschi, L. (2014) Introduction: Crossing the Formal/ Informal Boundary. In L.  Anceschi, G.  Gervasio & A.  Teti (Eds.) Informal Power in the Greater Middle East: Hidden Geographies (pp.  1–7). Abingdon: Routledge.

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Völkel, J. C. (2021). The fingers of the ‘invisible hand’: Egypt’s government institutions. In R. Springborg et al (Eds.) The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Egypt (pp. 107–119). Abingdon: Routledge. World Bank (2020). Worldwide Governance Indicators. Washington: World Bank. WGI 2020 Interactive > Home (worldbank.org). WTO (2020) Saudi Arabia—Measures Concerning the Protection of Intellectual Property Rights: Report of the Panel, Geneva: WTO, 16 June. Available at https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/567r_e.pdf (Accessed 14 August 2020). Zahid, Khan H. (2005) The impact of WTO on Saudi Arabia. Arab News, 19 September. Zaid, B. (2018) A normative study of broadcast regulators in the Arab world. International Journal of Communication 12: 4401–4420.

CHAPTER 4

Challenges of Media Governance and Media Policy in Latin America: In the Context of Media Reform Battles Rodrigo Gómez

Introduction National communication systems and World Communication (Mattelart 1996) are experiencing a flux mutation since the technological convergence process began during the first decade of the twenty-first century. In fact, this mutation is accelerating, guided by the technological and telecommunication industries and their business models that are pushing to connect and communicate “everything.” I am thinking here about the Internet of Things and G5 infrastructure, just to give some examples that follow global capitalism imperatives. This chapter will present some reflections from the political economy of communication (PEC) perspective as

R. Gómez (*) Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana-Cuajimalpa, Mexico City, Mexico e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. A. Ganter, H. Badr (eds.), Media Governance, Global Transformations in Media and Communication Research - A Palgrave and IAMCR Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05020-6_4

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a complement to the media governance literature to address the historical contexts and challenges of media policy in Latin America. Latin America has been through a process of political battles across the region. Since the beginning of the century, a group of countries has experienced a turn to the left, better known as populist left governments (Waisbord 2011, 2013a). In fact, that tendency was named the “Pink Tide” (Artz 2017), as Latin America had a significant block of different left-wing governments that proposed other ways to create public economic policies in the face of global capitalism, particularly in relation to media policy and media reform (Badillo et al. 2015; Becerra and Wagner 2018; Kitzberger, 2012). Those countries were Venezuela, Uruguay, Ecuador, Argentina, and Bolivia. This situation affected the entire region in relation to media reform (Gómez 2013) and generated prolific debates and proposals about how to democratize the different Latin American media systems in line with their different characteristics and struggles (United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization [UNESCO] 2019). In that respect, the proposal to reserve 1/3 of the spectrum to community media or non-profit organizations and to establish communication as a human right at the constitutional level were landmark proposals, which are all measures that are aligned with what is commonly understood as media governance. However, in fact, the main goal was to challenge the neoliberal logic and dynamic to make public policies where the “business first” imperative ruled, or to put it differently, the aim was at least to contain neoliberal public policies. After this first wave of media reform in Latin America from 2000 to 2014, some countries stagnated—for example, Venezuela—and others are in a process of implementation (e.g., Mexico), with Ecuador, Uruguay, and Argentina trying to adjust accordingly with resistance and tensions, even having experienced counter-reforms. At the beginning of the century, Van Cuilenburg and McQuail (2003) proposed a new paradigm to think about media/communication policies in the United States and Western Europe. Two decades later, it is worth re-thinking this idea of a media policy paradigm in light of the different convergence processes that have accelerated the mutation of communication systems (Chadwick 2013; Iosifidis 2011; Murdock 2000), particularly in Latin American economic and political contexts. Twenty years ago, Van Cuilenburg and McQuail recognized that “media policy and telecommunication policy are still on course towards an integrated communication policy” (2003, p. 201), and from my perspective, this is still in process,

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with an element that was not as clear at the beginning of the century—the prominence that tech companies have in this process, mainly through digital platforms. Examples of this are the irruption of social media platforms (Facebook, YouTube, Google, Twitter), subscription video-on-­demand (SVOD) platforms (Netflix, Amazon Prime), search engines (Google), and browser platforms (Google/Chrome) in the communication systems. Thus, the challenges of addressing these circumstances for policy making are complex, with an important degree of uncertainty. In fact, the complexity has to be read at different levels, not just in the context of convergence across media, telecommunications, and the Internet, but also in the context of national, regional, and global levels, as well as the different politically polarized battles in Latin America. Going back to Van Cuilenburg and McQuail’s (2003) new communication policy paradigm, I am interested in recalling the objectives that they proposed to address regarding political welfare, socio-cultural welfare, and economic welfare, which, in some way, the national communication policies (NCPs) proposed in the 1970s in Latin America identified as democratization, cultural autonomy, and development (Fernández and Guimerà 2012; Solis 2016). This is important, because in the case of Latin America, the three goals are far from being accomplished nor understood by the different governments/administrations, and they remain central in political debates and public policy challenges. In fact, it can be assumed that from a wider political perspective, media governance in the region has a deficit in all Latin American democracies. Hence, both Van Cuilenberg and McQuail’s (2003) and the NCPs’ articulations of media policy purposes are aligned with some of the thinking around media governance as fostering democratization and negotiating a string of political, socio-­ cultural, and economic values (e.g., Aceves 2007; Price 2002). Before I revisit the media policy and media governance challenges in the region, I will first present a brief history of the practical and theoretical construction of communication policy claims in Latin America via an overview of the PEC perspective. PEC plays a critical role when recalling how the thought around democratizing communication policies in Latin America has developed (and persisted) practically, but also as a central subfield of media studies in the region. Second, I will highlight the different tendencies of media reform in the region and the irruption of global platforms as mediators of news and cultural content. Third, I will present the challenges and final remarks regarding media governance perspectives

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in Latin America. Thus, this chapter highlights the benefits of using PEC to study media governance practices and processes.

Latin America and National Communication Policies: A Brief History At the beginning of the 1970s, Latin America was an international hub of the debate around NCPs. In fact, UNESCO actively promoted that agenda, and Colombia, Mexico, and Venezuela hosted different NCP workshops (Chakravarty and Sarikakis 2006; Fernández and Guimerà 2012; Fox 1988). Mexico, in particular, became an intellectual hub because it received intellectuals and academics who were expulsed by the ruling dictatorships in the region (e.g., Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, Peru, and Paraguay). Additionally, the Latin American Institute of Transnational Studies (Instituto Latinoamericano de Estudios Transnacionales [ILET]), led by Chilean diplomats Francisco Reyes Matta and Juan Somavía, generated important critical voices in relation to NCPs. The members of the ILET communication division exemplify how the Institute was able to build an important critical mass in the region. Key members were Diego Portales (Chile), Rafael Roncagliolo (Perú), Luis Ramiro Beltrán (Bolivia), Gregorio Selser, and Héctor Schmucler (Argentina), plus Noreene Janus (USA) and Cees Hamelink (the Netherlands). The Institute had a scientific committee formed by Herbert Schiller (USA), Armand Mattelart (Chile/Belgium), Luis Gonzaga Motta (Brazil), Oswaldo Capriles (Venezuela), Patricia Anzola (Colombia), Soledad Robina (Mexico), and Tapio Varis (Finland) (Altamirano 2020). It is important to add that, during those years, Elizabeth Fox was Luis Ramiro Beltrán’s research assistant, and she was a key scholar who developed and spread the seminal ideas of the ILET group. This was the time when the Latin American “school” of communication started to emerge (Altamirano 2020; Barranquero 2020; Solis 2016). In the following, I will recall this history of the intellectual life of Latin America in relation to the study of communication, but in particular, with regard to the history of the theory and praxis of NCPs. Fernández and Guimerà (2012) summarized the work of the Latin American school in relation to the “NCP project [which] was presented in the 1970s as a tool of cultural autonomy, democratization and development for developing societies” (p.  214), and, in my view, the idea of

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communication as a human right was key to this line of thought. Another important aspect that has to be underlined is that the intellectual group at ILET built transnational discussion and theoretical production networks, yet, at the same time, this group was very active in cultural diplomacy, particularly in relation to the UNESCO agenda (Altamirano 2020). Herbert Schiller and Armand Mattelart1 were active participants within this network that was established under the intellectual framework of development theory, cultural imperialism theories, and the political project of the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO), which was prompted by UNESCO in the McBride Report (Altamirano 2020; Chakravarty and Sarikakis 2006; Gómez and Birkinbine 2018). All of these developments are critical to understanding the centrality of the study and NCP praxis in Latin America. After this contextualization, I will move on to consider the present and future of media policy in the region, but first I will review key media policy concepts.

Media Policy and the Political Economy of Communication Perspective First, it is important for practice purposes to briefly define what communication policy is nowadays. This refers to the regulation of different mass media and telecommunications, which in the era of digital convergence embraces new digital media, social media, and Internet platforms (Iosifidis 2011). Another definition that has to be established is what is media governance? Dennis McQuail defined it as “the formal and informal, national and supranational, centralized and dispersed mechanisms that aim to organize media systems” (2003, p. 98). Finally, the other concept that has to be addressed is media regulation. Puppis and Van den Bulck (2019) proposes a definition as follows: The regulatory tools available for intervening in media systems are manifold. Thus, statutory regulation as a deliberate state influence that encompasses not only command-based regimes but all actions designed to influence

1  Mattelart’s early career as a media scholar started in Latin America and during his exile in Mexico from Chile. He was a founding Professor of Social Communication Department at the Autonomous Metropolitan University (Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana) Xochimilco campus in Mexico City.

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industrial or social behavior, including economic incentives and the supply of information. (p. 7)

These definitions help us to have a starting point or landmark for the rest of the chapter. In the vibrant environment of the 1970s, Herbert Schiller (1975) wrote an article entitled “The Appearance of National Communication Policies: A New Arena for Social Struggles.” I recall this paper, because in my view, more than ever, this arena is where social and political struggles take place globally, and particularly, in Latin America. In the article, Schiller (1975) points out an aspect that continues to be central to understanding the importance of NCPs: “underpinning all media and communication systems in general, is technological base. The creation of new technology, its management and its distribution are the ultimate test of modern power and the ability to dominate” (p. 86). This idea works very well as it aids in our understanding of how the tech giants have gained centrality in our communication systems and in World Communication2 (Mattelart 1996). Moreover, Schiller (1975) continues: “Yet despite the prevailing patterns of international media flows and the technical processes and economic power that support them, the technology now appearing could be disturbing, at least potentially, to the structure of domination that presently exists” (p.  86). This idea is important because Schiller understands that, over time, new communication and information technologies could be an opportunity for social and political change, but in such a strong structure as capitalism, it is difficult to challenge those structures. However, the point here is that when each technological innovation emerges, it could potentially disturb the dominant structures, and we can observe many examples of that taking place during the last two decades. I am thinking about how social movements use social media technology in a special historical context—in part thanks to the lower costs of market entry—to communicate and disseminate their ideas horizontally as well as to generate better processes as organizations (Castells 2009; Treré 2019) 2  Mattelart (1996) understands “World Communication” as an historic analysis perspective that involves multiple entries, following the concept of Fernand Braudel on the World Economy, where the world approach is a “contradictory system made up all at once of interdependencies and interconnections of schism, fragmentations, and exclusion … To better understand the tension and the new complexity of a world crisscrossed by struggles for hegemony in the giving of meaning to the world” (viii–ix) focusing on what the role of communication is in organizing the world system and world economy.

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in a context of “critical junctures” that opened the window to social change (McChesney 2013), and, in the case of Latin America, to media reform. In other words, PEC places special attention on the study of innovation and technology, but technological innovation is fostered—or not fostered—by the prevailing social system and its structural conditions, dynamics, and imperatives (Schiller 1975; Williams 1974). Thus, PEC examines the historical structural conditions in which communication and information technology infrastructures (e.g., broadcasting, satellites, or the Internet) are being introduced and also the logics from underlying them (Sánchez-Ruiz 1992). This is important because the point is that it denaturalizes media policies. In Victor Pickard’s (2020) words, “it shows that the status quo was the result of conflict where certain interests, values and logics, won out over others” (p. 510). In the same vein, Robert McChesney (2013) summarized how PEC assesses and analyses: [H]ow communication policies have been debated and determined, and it has a strong historical component looking at how media policies and systems were created in the past. Communication policy debates are the nucleus of the atom, and if media systems are to be reformed or changed, this is where one must go. (p. 64)

Since the 1970s, Herbert Schiller, with his PEC perspective, has identified some issues that continue nowadays: The issues in the communication field take on increasing significance in the larger struggle to maintain or to change the total system. Information and the entire communication process have become key elements in the business of social control. Accordingly, national communication policy-making may be regarded as a battleground of the contending forces in the social stage. (1975, p. 91)

In this chapter, I argue that the situation observed during the 1970s has been exacerbated in the context of political mediatization, global platforms, and global media giants. The structure of communication systems has been the center of attention for PEC, particularly because of its concentration in a few commercial media firms. This not only generates important economic profits, but

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concentrates the control over culture and news outlets that can be characterized as different types of media power3 and as monopolies of knowledge4 (Innis 2007). Thus, PEC understands media policy as an important tool that could model this structure symmetrically, not only to promote competition and freedom of expression, but to generate a robust public sphere that reflects the political plurality, access to information, and cultural diversity of our dynamic contemporary societies (Becerra and Mastrini 2017; Golding and Murdock 2003; McChesney 2013). Consequently, the institutional design of media governance through media policy is a key element that could favor democracy in any media system. This central argument had its early development during the 1970s around the NCP debates in Latin America (Fernández and Guimerà 2012; Solis 2016). The NCP approach also had a practical impact outside of the region, for example, in Cataluña, Spain, where the NCP guidelines were used to design the Catalan media subsystem in the context of the democratization of Spain’s media system after Franco’s regime ended. In the words of Catalan scholars, the ‘Catalan communication space’ designee— espai català de comunicació—was inspired by the guidelines for the NCP ideas (Fernández and Guimerà 2012). In my view, when summarizing the development of NCPs under the influence of PEC, media governance could reflect an institutional democratic maturity that shapes the dynamics and logics of the different actors that interact in any media system under the logic of public interest to generate the three main objectives of public communication policies: political welfare, economic welfare, and socio-­ cultural welfare. Clearly, media policy and media systems cannot be understood in isolation, and, at the same time, political systems and their political cultures cannot be understood without their media systems (Hallin and Mancini 2004). Thus, “Media are at the center of struggles for power and control in any society” (McChesney 2013, p. 64). In the same vein, Chakravarty and Sarikakis (2006) assert that the separation of politics from policy is an artificial and ideologically loaded position that falsely claims neutrality. 3  For more on media power read Avella and Rincón (2018), Des Freedman (2014), James Curran (2002), and Nick Couldry and James Curran (2003). 4  Innis (2007) defined this as the monopoly that involves explicit and/or implicit control over the social pool of information and how that information is used in developing what is known. This definition is very helpful to understand the power that digital platforms have in our lives.

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Van Cuilenburg and McQuail (2003), in their influential article, defined the main elements of policy for media and telecommunications as follows: [T]he goals or objectives to be pursued; the values and criteria by which goals are defined or organized; the various content and communication services to which policy applies; the different distribution services (mainly print publishing, cable, satellite and broadcast dissemination and telecommunication and digital platforms) [italic text added by the author]; and finally the appropriate policy measures and means of implementation (mainly embodied in law, regulation, self-regulation or market practices. (pp. 183–184)

In my view, this is the main output of Van Cuilenburg and McQuail’s (2003) article, because it summarizes, in an organized way, how to address public communication policies in any given context and gives us a clear analytical framework for communication policies. Thus, if we combine this proposal with PEC, we could have robust variables for an analysis in order to understand media policy and media governance.

Latin America and Its Long Road Communication

to Democratizing

Even though Latin America was the hub for the intellectual critical mass that thought about and set the framework for NCPs with UNESCO’s support during the 1970s, the region could not apply those important proposals for the democratization of its media systems due to the lack of democracy in the various political systems (Fox 1988; Sinclair 1999), with the only exception, according to Luis Ramiro Beltrán, being Costa Rica, which elaborated some guidelines to develop its NCP (see the interview between Mario Kaplún and Luis Ramiro Beltrán in Solis 2016, p.  55). This makes sense because Costa Rica was the only Latin American national state during those years that exercised democratic practices, such as free and transparent elections. In fact, we could propose a historical hypothesis that, thanks to this public policy making in Costa Rica, the Central American Nation has strengthened its democracy and consolidated its political culture since those years. In other words, Costa Rica was the only Latin American national state in which its media system encouraged a democratic system (Rockwell and Janus 2003). Thus, the media systems in Latin America from the 1970s until the 1990s were controlled by corporate media groups with close ties to

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authoritarian regimes and dictatorships (Fox 1988; Hughes and Lawson 2005; Sinclair 1999). Because of this collision between corporate power and political power, any initiative that suggested media reform through NCP democratization guidelines was rejected or simply silenced. Even during the first wave of democratic governments after dictatorships or authoritarian regimes had fallen,5 the media systems of Latin America were not reformed. However, it is important to note that, at different levels and velocities, the democratization of those media systems started without media reform, thanks to the citizens/audiences, professional journalism, and some media outlets acting in different ways (Hughes and Lawson 2005; Waisbord 2000). In the context of the 1990s, Hughes and Lawson identified five structural barriers to media reform in Latin America: “(a) generalized weakness in the rule of law, (b) holdover authoritarian legislation, (c) oligarchic ownership of media outlets, (d) uneven journalistic standards, and (e) limited audience access to diverse sources of information” (2005, pp. 9–10). In addition to these barriers, Hallin and Papathanassopoulos (2002) note how the media systems in Latin America were identified as being in a close relation to a broader history of political clientelism in the media, with the following major characteristics: “low levels of newspaper circulation, a tradition of advocacy reporting, instrumentalization of privately-owned media, politicization of public broadcasting and broadcast regulation, and limited development of journalism as an autonomous profession” (pp. 176–177). This is another important variable that has to be added in relation to Latin American political systems, as it helps us to understand the collusion between governments and media company owners, and the negative practices in relation to institutional governance resulting from the high level of corruption in the region (Echeverría et al. 2021). It was not until the first decade of the twenty-first century that the processes of media reform in Latin America started—again at different levels and with different particularities—and the NCP debates and discussions of the 1970s were finally reborn, and the redesign of Latin American media systems and their democratization thus entered a new phase. Even though the barriers identified by Hughes and Lawson (2005) remained, the 5  The majority of the regional governments that won elections during the 1990s were governments that followed the World Bank (WB) and Monetary International Fund (MIF) recipes to “modernize” their administrative structures and particularly the economic policies under the logic of neoliberalism.

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difference came about due to two historical circumstances that the region started to experience. In the first place, the left-wing political parties began to govern countries such as Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, Uruguay, Ecuador, and Brazil. Second, the technological change due to digitalization was another opportunity for the entire region (and world) to rethink its media systems in light of the potentialities of the digital dividend in relation to the open spectrum in favor of democracy, social justice, and freedom of expression. Before this technological opportunity, the different governments across the region upheld, as their main argument, that they could not open their broadcasting spectrum, because there was a lack of spectrum allocation to assign new licenses to new commercial, public, or community media. Following Robert McChesney (2013), this chapter understands these two historical circumstances—the political turn to the left (democratization processes in articulation with social movements that were fighting for the democratization of communication) and the technological potentialities of digitalization to reorganize the broadcast and telecommunication spectrum—as a breeding ground for “critical junctures” that finally enabled a dialectic process of media reforms in Latin America to take place. However, these circumstances are certainly positive for the democratic processes in the region, and particularly, in relation to media and communication, as these critical junctures create the conditions for the battle for social change and democratization. At the same time, two contextual levels have to be included in these historical processes: First, political polarization, where different, old oligarchy media played their role as the partisan press with neoliberal imperatives, for example, El Clarín in Argentina against Cristina Kirchner’s administration, Globovisión y RCTV (even actively participating in a coup d’état in 2002) in Venezuela against Hugo Chávez’s regime, and the traditional press in Ecuador against the Correa administration. Additionally, the exacerbation of fake news and the disinformation on social media that worked against these governments have even been characterized as “media coups” (Sierra and Sola-Morales 2020). But, at the same time, some of those governments counterattacked with strong measures that had a dire impact on international standards for the freedom of the press, according to reports by UNESCO (2019) and the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) (2017). In other words, as Waisbord (2013b) has

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identified, there is a clear mediatization of politics and politicization of the media in the DNA of the media reforms by the left populist countries. On another level, the emergence of global capitalist digital platforms is changing the general dynamics and logics of all media systems. I am thinking mainly about Facebook as the most influential social media platform, of Google’s search engine and navigator, YouTube (Google) as a VOD service, Twitter (microblogging), and Instagram (Facebook). For example, global platforms’ irruption in Latin American media systems has to be addressed in terms of their moderation and levels of concentration. Accordingly, with Statcounter (data from May 2021), the browser market share is controlled by Chrome (Google) at 82.95%, followed by Safari (Apple) at 5.92%, Samsung Internet at 2.66%, Opera at 2.61%, Edge (Microsoft) at 2.55%, and Firefox at 2.38%. In the case of the search engine market share, the numbers are worse: Google is at 97.25%, Bing at 1.6%, Yahoo at 0.92%, and DuckDuckgo is at 0.12%. The other layer that gives us another example of the prominence of American digital platforms is the market share for social media: Facebook (68.39%), Pinterest (15.69%), YouTube (Google, 5.58%), Instagram (Facebook, 5.36%), Twitter (3.76%), and Tumblr (0.82%) (https://gs.statcounter. com/social-­media-­stats#monthly-­202005-­202105). These data are very important because these platforms are re-shaping how audiences consume news and cultural content. For example, these platforms are carriers of fake news, and they curate the news information provided by traditional media in every single country; at the same time, they provide an important space for public debates. Thus, these new actors are affecting traditional media systems in different ways, and, of course, they have to be part of the equation regarding media policies and media governance. The effect of the irruption of digital platforms in relation to media policy and media governance is still uncertain and is in the first stages of discussion across the region (Observacom 2019). This new interaction has to be addressed to re-shape media policy understanding.

Media Reforms Now, it is important to briefly identify the outputs of that first wave of media reform prompted by the “Pink Tide” and the impacts on the entire region. Herein, I note that even though media reform was prompted in the first instance by leftist governments (Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela, and Uruguay), the other nations with governments aligned to

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neoliberal and technocrats’ policies (Colombia, Chile, Mexico, Peru) had to propose some alternatives as a result of regional discussions and debates that were accompanied by international multistakeholder actors as regional institutions (the Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression of the IACHR) (see Ganter 2018), global and regional civil society organizations (World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters [AMARC]), global think tanks (Open Society Foundations or Article 19), global or regional academic associations, and of course, national civil society organizations and social movements. The first act that generated that initial round of reforms and that made Latin America the catalyst for discussions on communication policies around the world was the Venezuelan Law on Social Responsibility on Radio and Television (Ley Resorte in Spanish). Its aim was to set a legal framework for the social responsibility of radio and television broadcasters, national and independent producers of radio and TV programming, and audiences. This law was criticized by media owners and some journalism and human rights associations, because according to freedom of expression standards, the government had the capacity to exercise censorship and control information and content. On the other hand, the law reinvigorated the historic NCP guidelines for the protection of Venezuelan culture, the promotion of national industry, the adoption of indigenous languages, and it made important room for community media outlets. However, in these discussions, it is important to underline that this law was issued as a direct result of the coup d’état suffered by Chávez in 2002 and the active participation of some commercial media. Clearly, this law generated controversy and, after 15  years, the Venezuelan media system changed dramatically, for example, according to official statistics, there are 244 radio stations, 37 television stations, and over 200 newspapers run by communities (Gobierno Bolivariano de Venezuela, 2010 in Waisbord 2013a, p. 510). Unfortunately, the positive aspects of this outcome, whereby Venezuela tried to reorganize its system under the logic of the right to communication and cultural autonomy, have been controlled by the Chávez and Maduro regimes. Thus, it could be said that this experience has stagnated due to the political status of its political battles. However, Venezuela was the nation state that triggered different agendas and discussions around media reform in Latin America. In Uruguay, during the first period of Tabaré Vázquez’s administration (2005–2010), a paradigmatic law was issued in 2007—the Community Radio Broadcasting Law. This act’s principal proposal reserved 33% of the

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radio spectrum for social actors, better known as the third sector of the media, that had historically been prohibited access to licenses and had been criminalized. Since then, this proposal has been on the agenda of every country in Latin America when media reform is on the table. In practical terms, this provision guarantees, at the level of the spectrum, the democratization of communication, making room for the sector that, for decades, had been criminalized. Two years later, in 2009 in Argentina, the Audiovisual Communication Services Law (ACS Law), better known as the Media Law (Ley de Medios), was issued. This reform was controversial too. First, due to the political context of a dispute between El Clarín—the main communication group in that country—and Cristina Fernández de Kitchener, and second, because this law recovered 21 basic points for the democratization of broadcasting, presented in 2004 by the Coalition for Democratic Broadcasting. This law prompted public service obligations on commercial media, reserved one-third of the spectrum for non-profit organizations, created a regulatory authority and established limits to concentration and to broadcasting cross-ownership, and banned telecommunication companies from holding media licenses (Becerra et al. 2012). It has to be noted that participation in the debate on this law, with open forums and public discussions, according to Mastrini and Becerra (2017), constituted an unprecedented event in the history of media policy in Argentina. This point is remarkable, as prior to this law, any single change or agreement in relation to media policies was set by the government in office and in media owners’ chambers. And, during Cristina Kirchner’s mandate, the dynamics changed radically, because academia and civil society were included at the negotiation table (Segura and Waisbord 2016). The Argentinian law replicated the Uruguayan proposal to reserve 1/3 of the spectrum for non-profit organizations. In fact, we have to recognize that this proposal was better known globally after the issue with the ACS Law in Argentina. After 12 years of this important law being in place, according to Mastrini and Becerra (2017), the implementation has been difficult and has more pending aims than achievements. Actually, during the Macri administration (2015–2019), the law had some setbacks via presidential decrees, mainly in terms of economic aspects and a lack of support for state (public) media. Bolivia (2011) and Ecuador were the next national states to issue media acts in the region. In the case of the former, Evo Morales’ administration

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issued the General Law of Telecommunications, Information Technologies, and Communication. This law followed the proposal to reserve 34% of spectrum for the third media sector, but with an innovative approach of reserving 17% of that for the community social sector and 17% for original indigenous populations and afro-Bolivians. It is important to note the special room for original indigenous populations and afro-Bolivians, who, for decades, had been marginalized in terms of access to the media and the spectrum. In the case of the latter, in 2013, the Organic Communications Law (Ley Orgánica de Comunicaciones [LOC]) was issued. Importantly, it included a 33% spectrum reserve for community media and establish public media services, but in a similar approach to Venezuela (2004 Law), it authorized control of the informational content of the media. In 2019, the Lenin Moreno administration (2017–2021) canceled public media in Ecuador. During the writing of this chapter, the new liberal government in office in Ecuador (2021–2016) has proposed a new communication law that is seen as a counter-reform by community media and civil society organizations (Observacom 2021). The only nation state that was not aligned with populist “left” governments and that carried out a media reform at the end of 2020 was Mexico. The 2014 Telecommunications and Broadcasting Law, which replaced that of 1960 for radio broadcasting and that of 1995 for telecommunications, was the product of a political agreement called the Pact for Mexico (Pacto por México), following a close presidential election and the emergence of the student social movement #YoSoy132, which had, as its principal demand, the democratization of communication (Gómez and Treré 2014). The pact was signed by the three most important political forces in those years. The pact included a reform of the Constitution in 2013 that laid down a binding route map for legislating secondary laws. The reform of the Constitution decreed, among other things, the recognition of telecommunications and broadcasting as public services of general interest, as well as the creation of a new autonomous regulatory body with authority over economic competition, and room for the third media sector (Álvarez 2015). In Mexico, as in the rest of the region, media reform was expected to represent a major vector in terms of freedom of expression, equal access to all three sectors, cultural diversity, economic competition, and better communication services. It is important to underline that the public communication policy perspective shaping the Mexican media system is the market

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logic under the imperatives of neoliberal, corporate, and global capitalism (Álvarez 2015). Even though these circumstances exist, the Mexican media system is experiencing a new shape, and its major actor, the Federal Telecommunication Institute, is modeling the system under the logics of transparency, competition, and free concurrence (Gómez 2020). In 2018, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador (2018–2024) took office and has been showing his relationship with the mainstream media in general terms, which Waisbord (2013a) characterized as a populist’s “media rupture” that “has been the touchstone for heated debates about press and democracy. Endless controversy has taken place among presidents and cabinet members, with frequent verbal fusillades against oppositional media and journalists, and one-sided coverage of the governments by oppositional media” (p. 510). Article 19 has documented this in its annual reports of 2019 and 2020 (Artículo 19 2021). The IACHR and the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression were key players in promoting the reserve of the spectrum as a best practice or standard for the region. In its text, “Freedom of Expression Standards for Free and Inclusive Broadcasting,” it proposes the recognition of different actors in its 68th and 69th recommendations, which develops the importance of this idea to democratize media systems in the Americas (Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression of the IACHR 2009). Finally, after this overview of media reforms in Latin America, the chapter agrees with Waisbord, who explains the relevance and logics of media reform for populist left governments: It represents the confrontation between a conception of media politics that reflects popular demands and culture against the old order embodied by traditional media corporations. Although it is debatable whether populism has effectively transformed the old media order, a point that is considered below, its ambition to spearhead major transformations in media systems is undeniable. (2013a, p. 515)

A negative outcome of these different populist reforms could be summarized using Waisbord, as follows: “The problem is that populist reforms have tended to strengthen the communicative capacity of the Executive rather than to benefit the public through overhauling commercial media systems, bolstering public broadcasting, and/or strengthening truly autonomous citizens’ media” (2013b, p. 515). This observation fits with

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López Obrador’s administration (2018–2024) in Mexico; however, until now, his administration has not proposed any amendments or new media reforms. In my view, these reforms, except for the Mexican one, have to be seen from a wider perspective where the different leftist populist governments separately and under the failed alliance of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) tried to challenge the hegemonic economic policies shaped by neoliberalism and international institutions, such as the World Bank and the International World Fund. However, the proposals, in some way, tried to generate a new framework to change the media system status quo and, at the same time, to accomplish the three main goals of the NCP legacy: democratization, cultural autonomy, and development (mainly economic). In terms of media governance, after this chapter’s analyses and in my opinion, it could be established that the political polarization context does not give the political and institutional stability required to finally arrive at some democratic maturity in order to exercise media governance. As shown, there have been and still are many political changes in the region; thus, media reform is at the center of political battles. The counter-­ reforms in Ecuador and Uruguay are a clear example of these “battles.” However, the historic critical juncture continues in the region, with the process moving ahead at different velocities and trajectories to shape the media systems and political systems that consolidate Latin American democracy through a participative public sphere.

Challenges and Final Remarks The main challenge for the region, certainly, is to consolidate democracy. Thus, on the one hand, media policies in the region are part of the political battlefield, and on the other, the media systems are still in continuous tension between the political agendas of two polarized ideological perspectives. In short, the region, at some stage, will have to find democratic stability that will allow the countries in the region to discuss and debate their national communication policies so that they favor the three proposed NCP objectives and Van Cuilenberg and McQuail’s (2003) objectives: political welfare, socio-cultural welfare, and economic welfare. The first wave of media reform has some important positive outcomes; for example, to revendicate community media and the right of communication as the landmarks of media reform, to reinforce public media as a central player in the media system, and anti-concentration measures. Thus,

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these governments call international public opinion’s attention to critical issues in relation to media and democracy, for example, media ownership, market structures, editorial policies, and industrial interests. If the equation was difficult to understand regarding the relation between media policy, media governance, and media systems in the socio-­ economic contradictory conditions of Latin America, the irruption of global platforms is even more challenging, because these new actors are highly concentrated, and their power—in terms of the use of private and public information and how they shape our cultural consumption—is global. Thus, the PEC proposes to address this complexity via World Communication multiple entry and the historic critical juncture perspectives, with the aim of establishing the different contradictions that are expressed in global capitalism in relation to media policy and media governance. The challenges and tensions are multiple; Latin America could be seen as a battleground for the different contradictions of global capitalism and how their democracies are trying to consolidate to generate better socio-economic conditions. Another aspect that has to be noted in these final remarks as a work-in-­ progress hypothesis is that, at the academic level, the media governance approach has not worked consistently, because Latin American media policies resulting from democratic discussions are young, and this reality or stage has been the focus of the academic discussion. Finally, it could be said that Latin America has introduced alternative frames to address media policy during the last 50 years and has given us the chance to ask important questions about whose interests are most mobilized in the existing global capitalism context and whose perspectives are marginalized.

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CHAPTER 5

Media Accountability in a Non-democratic Context: Conceptual Challenges and Adaptations Judith Pies

Introduction In 2009, I became part of an interdisciplinary consortium of researchers working on a comparative project on media accountability and transparency called MediaAcT, which was coordinated by the Erich Brost Institute for International Journalism (EBI) in Dortmund, Germany. The project’s aim was to find out whether media accountability systems (MASs) were an indicator of media pluralism and how Internet activities by media professionals or the public contributed to such pluralism. The preliminary results were published in 2011, mapping the status quo of mechanisms that were able to hold the media to account by non-state means in the twelve participating European countries, and in Tunisia and Jordan (Eberwein

J. Pies (*) Medien|Kompetenz|International, Stuttgart, Germany e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. A. Ganter, H. Badr (eds.), Media Governance, Global Transformations in Media and Communication Research - A Palgrave and IAMCR Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05020-6_5

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et al. 2011). The publication was criticized for the choice of countries, in particular for comparing European “pluralistic media systems” with countries such as Jordan and Tunisia, “where this did not apply at the date of research” (Thomaß 2012, p. 112, transl. JP). The criticism referred to the chosen concept of media accountability as outlined by Bertrand (2000), who—indeed—had developed the concept with democracies and pluralistic media systems in mind. The research consortium kept on using media accountability as a conceptual framework, it stuck to the chosen countries, and even expanded it to additional non-European and non-democratic countries (Heikkilä 2011; Heikkilä et al. 2014; Pies and Madanat 2011a, b; Pies et al. 2011). The reason behind choosing non-democracies was to get “meaningful insights to the questions [regarding] how MAS, especially via [the] Internet, can help [in] breaking up strong media–politics dependencies and thus support the establishment of democracies” (Fengler 2009, p. 10). Tunisia and Jordan, at that time, represented authoritarian regimes at different points of political liberalization: Jordan had looked back on a “stop-and-go transition” (Sakr 2002) since 1989, with some democratic elements, such as elections or limited press freedom guarantees; Tunisia had presidential authoritarian rule and little space to voice opposition and strict control of public communication. In both countries, digitalization and limited economic liberalization had opened the media sector up to new players. Hence, consortium members were curious to explore how Internet activities might change the way in which the media were held to account in such countries when compared to different types of democratic rule in Europe. Since the start of the project, researchers have covered other countries and world regions outside Europe to probe the concept (cf. e.g., Bastian 2019; Ifeduba 2014; Fengler et al. 2022a; Speck 2017). I have been using the concept of media accountability for further research on Jordan together with my Jordanian colleague Philip Madanat (cf. e.g., Madanat and Pies 2021, 2022; Pies 2014, 2015) and have been involved in several follow-up research projects (cf. Fengler et  al. 2022a, 2021b) as well as international media cooperation projects1 (cf. e.g., Fengler et al. 2021a).

1  Ombudspersons in Tunisia, Media Accountability in Transition, Media Accountability in the MENA region all located at the Erich Brost Institute for International Journalism (EBI) in Dortmund, and Media for Peace at the Bundeswehr University Munich.

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During the latest piece of field research on media accountability practices in Jordan in 2020, we noticed a certain fatigue among former media accountability enthusiasts, and we started to search for the reasons. One reason that was explicitly mentioned by interviewees was the impression that they held that all the activities had had little impact. This was linked to economic hardship in the country in general and the media sector in particular, unfulfilled expectations regarding more political freedoms and prosperity, and regulatory measures that restricted press freedoms rather than loosening them. All these aspects were among the given explanations for this rather pessimistic view on media accountability (cf. Madanat and Pies 2021). After presenting our research results on the challenges and prospects of media accountability in the MENA region (cf. Fengler et al. 2021a) to publishers, journalists, and activists from the region in an online conference in February 2021, in which the question of impact was critically raised again, I wondered whether the concept of media accountability itself was part of the problem, so I revisited the aforementioned criticism. The normative implication of media accountability is to “safeguard media freedom” or to “gain from a responsible media environment that helps improve (…) democratic deficits,” and this obviously raises high expectations (Tettey 2006, p.  246). International donor organizations work with the concept, too. The German Deutsche Welle Akademie puts responsibility at the forefront of its ideals: “We believe that independent media and responsible journalism are essential worldwide. […] We consider this to be an important prerequisite for peace and democracy” (Deutsche Welle Akademie n.d.). Other organizations support the establishment of media accountability structures as part of a self-regulatory environment. International organizations point to the importance of media accountability infrastructures as a key feature for democratic or free media development. The United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the Council of Europe, and the African Unions’ African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights employ the existence of media accountability structures and instruments of media self-­regulation as an indicator to assess media development around the globe (cf. Fengler et al. 2022b). In this chapter, I will use my research experience to reflect upon the dilemma I face regarding knowledge production as a Western socialized and situated researcher working on media and communication in the Global South. By pointing to the challenges when applying the concept of

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media accountability as part of the media governance literature to the social reality in Jordan, I aim to de-Westernize the concept in the sense that its application will produce “‘legitimate’ knowledge” (cf. Waisbord and Mellado 2014, p. 366). This is even more important, as the media accountability concept is not only used to produce knowledge on media– society relations but also to effect media environments on the ground through the activities of international organizations. The chapter will first critically recap on the origins of the media accountability concept, before reporting on the conceptual challenges that came along with applying it to a new national context and the adaptions that were and still are necessary in order to apply the concept to non-­democratic contexts in an analytical way.

The Origins of the Media Accountability Concept The current research on media accountability mostly refers to the book Media Ethics and Accountability Systems by the French researcher Claud-­ Jean Bertrand (2000). As the book title already indicates, he brings together two strings of media research—media ethics and (self-) regulation—both having quality management within and outside the journalistic profession in mind. While the former takes the discursive and reflective function of ethics in the process of defining professional norms into account (cf. e.g., Funiok 2007; Krainer 2001), the latter focuses on measures for their enforcement. Bertrand gave much room to discussing professional norms in ethics codes worldwide, but his idea of MASs became much more famous in media research. He defines MASs as “any non-state means of making media responsible towards the public” (Bertrand 2000, p. 107). With this definition in mind alongside observations from different parts of the world, he describes a variety of activities and actors who take part in the process of holding the media to account. He includes different practices from inside and outside the profession, and hence, he widens the concept of media self-regulation or self-control. The latter is commonly referred to as practices, in which members of the profession, for example, journalists, publishers, and/or owners, initiate measures without any interference from the state to monitor journalistic output with the intention of motivating responsible media practices and keeping the state out of their affairs (cf. Fengler et  al.  2022b) Thus, the media accountability concept is broader in the way in which it considers media stakeholders from outside the profession, except for the state.

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Media Accountability as Part of the Media Governance Canon The concept of media accountability is part of the governance canon. Both focus on structures, rules, and the variety of stakeholders involved in the process of “shaping and implementing public policies and regulation” (Ginosar 2013, p.  357). Puppis (2007) further underlines the process character of both media accountability and media governance, which allows both concepts to consider change as an important and natural element. The variety of actors has caught the attention of most researchers working with the concept of media accountability. Bertrand identifies different “participants,” media owners, editors and news directors, news people, and media users who are involved in media accountability processes in various ways, separately or together. Bardoel and d’Haenens (2004a, b) use a model that distinguishes four “locations” for media accountability mechanisms: political accountability, market accountability, public accountability, and professional accountability. While political accountability relates to media regulations and laws as a means for holding the media to account, market accountability is an economic perspective on accountability referring to the “system of demand and supply” (Bardoel and d’Haenens 2004a, p. 9). Apart from these systemic powers of the state and the market, media accountability is pursued through mechanisms of professional self-regulation, such as codes of ethics or editorial guidelines. However, public accountability refers to the relationship with the public, and it is practiced through discussion and dialogue. Other authors call for a consideration of actors from different spheres of influence on journalism, and distinguish between the individual, organizational, professional, and international spheres (cf. Bastian 2019; Fengler et al. 2015). This actor-­ centered approach is reflected in the media governance concept, too: “In most cases, the term either replaces or is related to ‘media policy’ and ‘media regulation’ and to the participation of a variety of actors in media policy processes” (Ginosar 2013, p. 364). Another aspect that has become central for research on media accountability is the factors shaping the system of media accountability. This is due to the fact that much of the academic literature uses comparative analyses and struggles with the different conditions under which the media work in different countries. For liberal democracies, the key factors have been explored, such as the degree of professionalization and the independence of journalism, alongside the forms of political control or the market conditions for certain media segments (cf. Dobek-Ostrowska et  al. 2014;

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Eberwein et  al. 2018; Von Krogh 2012). For Latin America, Bastian (2019) points out that the level of public participation, the historical development of democratic practices, and the safety of journalists need more consideration than in Europe, for example. Safety is also a key factor for the establishment and functioning of media accountability instruments in war-torn countries such as Iraq or Syria (cf. Pies and Madanat 2021; Wollenberg 2022). New ways of controlling (through) technologies are another factor observed in different parts of the world (cf. Fengler et al. 2022b, for Egypt cf. Badr and Leihs 2022). Finally, the focus has been on the mechanisms of rule enforcement. Bertrand set the tone when he started his chapter on MASs by saying: “Media ethics faces one crucial problem: finding means to enforce its rules that are acceptable, that is to say non-governmental. How can a human being be incited to behave well?” (2000, p. 107). McQuail also focuses on the process of answerability when he defines media accountability as “voluntary or involuntary processes by which the media answer directly or indirectly to their society for the quality and/or consequences of publication” (2005, p. 207). In this vein, media accountability is seen as a mechanism to regulate the media via a process of social control. In (Western) scholarship, the necessity for this social control is often related to the media’s role in democracies. It is rooted in the conviction that the media and journalism fulfill an important function in democracies by observing the behavior of actors from different social systems, particularly from politics and the economy, and “making it transparent and understandable for the public at large, in order to serve the public interest” (Fengler et al. 2022b). The challenge when applying such a concept to non-democratic contexts is that even though the public has a legitimate interest in the media, the power to define that interest lies in the hands of authoritarian governments. Actors from the Jordanian political power center repeatedly called for “responsible freedom,” which made media practitioners hesitant toward the concept of media accountability (cf. Hawatmeh and Pies 2011). This is why Ferjani concludes: “the meanings of ‘freedom,’ ‘integrity,’ ‘objectivity,’ ‘ethics,’ ‘responsibility’ etc. are part of the struggles engaging different agents and institutions in unequal fights for recognition” (cf. 2011, p. 182).

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Structures: From Instruments to Cases and Practices This normative dilemma was at the center of the discussion when the abovementioned MediAcT project started its empirical research with an internal kick-off meeting in Dortmund in February 2010. Financed by the European Union, it was the first to systematically apply the concept of media accountability to academic research on non-Western and non-­ democratic countries from a comparative perspective. At that time, in some of the countries involved in the project, little or no research had been conducted on the effects that digitalization had had on the way in which the media were held to account by professionals and the public. Researchers from the twelve European and two Arab countries agreed on a joint definition of media accountability that they expected to be applicable to their specific country conditions. They defined media accountability instruments as “any informal institutions, both offline and online, performed by both media professionals and media users, which intends to monitor, comment on and criticize journalism and seeks to expose and debate problems of journalism: • At the individual level (e.g., plagiarism of a single [piece of] journalism, misquotations in an article) • At the level of media routines (e.g., the acceptance of corruption among journalists) • At the organizational level (e.g., PR influence on editorial decisions in a newsroom) • At the extra-media level (e.g., state repressions against journalism)” (Fengler et al. 2011, p. 20) The compromised definition was not perfect for Jordan and Tunisia, as I will show in the following paragraphs. But it allowed a rather open exploration of those instruments that were potentially holding the media to account, also thanks to an additional typology of media accountability instruments based on two dimensions: the degree of institutionalization and the position of instruments inside or outside the journalistic field (Fengler et al. 2011). This typology was a good starting point from which to research media accountability in non-Western and non-democratic countries because it allowed us to search for practices beyond the “established media accountability instruments,” often referred to as self-­ regulatory institutions, such as codes of ethics, press councils,

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ombudspersons, journalism on media issues, or letters to the editors. This was due to the fact that exploring “innovative media accountability instruments,” such as media blogs, citizens’ and journalists’ websites critically addressing media issues, online documentation of journalistic research, podcasts of internal critique sessions, and online ombudspersons, was a central goal of the project and a research desideratum for all countries (cf. Eberwein et al. 2011). The first inventory of the media accountability landscape in Jordan that applied the aforementioned definition concluded as follows: Many accountability instruments are still “under the patronage” of the regime, which directly contradicts the concept of self-regulation. For example, the Higher Media Council’s Freedoms Committee, as part of a basically governmental institution, was not a genuine ombuds committee due to the by-laws restricting its activities. By contrast, the Jordan Press Association’s code of ethics is mentioned in the Press and Publications Law as having the force of law and indeed other laws form the bases for every article in the code. As a consequence, these media accountability instruments have limited force in terms of strengthening the independence (and freedom) of journalism in Jordan. […] Only a little evidence can be found of professional journalists using the Internet to make their work more transparent for the public and for fellow journalists (e.g., sahafi.jo, journalist bloggers or AmmanNet). (Hawatmeh and Pies 2011, p. 112)

The findings seemed to underline the assumption that media accountability in non-democratic states does not work. Contrary to its original meaning, the instruments seemed to function as another “smart” authoritarian mechanism, and not as a safeguard of or enhancement for freedom. But the research consortium from Tunisia and Jordan noticed that non-institutionalized ways to hold the media to account, by various actors, were not included in the research frame: Every now and then, bloggers who published mainly on political, economic, or societal issues included media criticism, tackling the publication of rumors without any investigation, making an ownership structure transparent to the public, or making fun of the state-owned media, for example. In Tunisia, the interaction between exiled journalists, bloggers, or activists in Europe or Canada and those in Tunisia provided ways of criticizing the media. Tunisian bloggers or activists used posts and publications from abroad to point to the lack of public accountability by the Tunisian media, particularly on issues that the Tunisian media did not report on (cf. Ferjani 2011; Pies and Madanat

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2011a). Research on institutionalized forms of self-regulation and professional media accountability had excluded such practices that had a similar meaning but not the same structure. In reaction to these findings, the MediaAcT research consortium changed the object of research that aimed at finding out about “innovative instruments of media accountability.” Instead of searching for instruments, the focus was now on practices and cases. The key question was: When do we consider a practice or a case as a relevant media accountability practice? We defined practices as relevant if they fostered either transparency or responsiveness. Transparency refers to practices that shed light on the “background to news production by describing who the producers are and explaining what they are doing,” whereas responsiveness refers to practices “whereby media users can give feedback to producers and expect them to respond to users’ concerns from either within the news organization or outside of them” (Heikkilä et  al. 2014, p.  51). By opening the structural framework up (cases and practices instead of instruments) and, at the same time, making the impact level more explicit, it was possible to sketch out more than the already well-known “Western-style” instruments, such as press councils, ombudspersons, and codes of ethics, in all countries. The conclusions for countries such as Jordan, pre-war Syria (i.e., before 2012), Lebanon, or Tunisia were—not enthusiastic but—optimistic in that mechanisms for media accountability beyond state control did exist, though in a much less-institutionalized way and with different normative claims than in the “Western” liberal democracies. Those claims included providing an alternative news agenda, making the audience aware of unethical media practices, extending the “red lines” of censorship, or allying with the audience in making fun of the “dull media,” as in the case of the Tunisian bodourou.blog that had called for its readers to vote for the worst article, the worst journalist, and the worst newspaper of the month (cf. Ferjani 2011, 2012; Pies and Madanat 2011a, b; Pies et  al. 2011). Furthermore, the analysis of cases showed that media accountability was often practiced in an ad hoc manner and did not always target the media themselves but the political structure behind those media. In 2010, a group of Tunisian activists started a campaign against the state-initiated blockage of flickr.com and other social media channels. It rolled out on different channels, with different actors involved, and it even took people onto the streets to protest against censorship in a rally (cf. Ferjani 2012). Another prominent example from Egypt dates back to 2010, when the

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newspaper Al-Ahram manipulated an internationally circulating news agency picture in such a way that then-president Hosni Mubarak seemed to walk in front of US President Barak Obama and other regional leaders instead of next to them. Social media users uncovered the manipulation, which caused a public outcry (Badr and Leihs 2022). The Jordanian report concluded: Given this failure of institutionalized MA practices, the Internet may be interpreted as an opportunity to “restart” MA practices and it indeed has been used for that purpose but mainly by news rooms and not individuals outside the news rooms. […] Social networks such as Facebook have proven to be an important part of the Internet culture in Jordan and are playing a role in distributing, commenting on and evaluating news media. Yet, a focus on media criticism has not developed which is most probably due to the relatively small amount of systematic and active individual contributions in blogs, for example. (Pies and Madanat 2011a)

For Syria and Lebanon, social media was also mentioned as an important place to observe, criticize, and hold the media to account, but on a rather ad hoc basis (cf. Pies et al. 2011 or Pies and Madanat 2011b). One conclusion, in terms of the media accountability concept, is therefore to take non- or less-institutionalized practices of media accountability more seriously into account. In his proposal for an analytical framework of media governance, Ginosar refers to a regular as well as an ad hoc manner for activities in such institutions, “which can be conducted only by formal or only by informal institutions or both cooperating” (2013, p.  368). Such an analytical framework would also be useful for adapting the concept of media accountability to non-democratic states. Yet, this perspective needs further clarification in terms of who holds the media to account and for what purpose.

Actors: From Classification to Relations The classification of actors into public and professional actors became particularly challenging in the in-depth analysis of the explorative field study in 2010, which was part of the MediaAcT project. Qualitative interviews with journalists, representatives of self-regulatory institutions, policy-­ makers, bloggers, civic activists, and experts in media ethics from democratic and non-democratic settings had to be analyzed to explore new ways

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of holding the media to account online (cf. Heikkilä et  al. 2014). The question “Is a former journalist who is now critically blogging on media issues to be grouped into the ‘public’ or the ‘professional’ actor group?” was not only hard to answer for the Jordanian and Tunisian context, but for all other countries, too. In a non-democratic context in which parts of the media are owned by ministries, individual politicians, individuals related to or befriended by monarchs, presidents, or prime ministers, the border between professional, public, economic, and political is even more problematic as long as the aim is to classify a media organization or an instrument of media accountability as “independent” or to distinguish it from an instrument of (state) regulation. For example, in Jordan, the problem became apparent when we first classified Akeed as a state means of holding the media to account. Interviewees from our qualitative field research critically asked whether this was really the case. Akeed is run by the Jordan Media Institute, which was found by HRH Rym Ali and receives funding from the Hashemite Court and the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. Within its organizational structure, it is not directly bound to directives from the palace. It has experimented with practices of holding the media to account by publicly criticizing media coverage for not adhering to the professional norm of accuracy. At the same time, Akeed itself is criticized for its choice of criticism, which is said to be voiced only against certain publications instead of against all of them (cf. Madanat and Pies 2022). While the call for accuracy can be interpreted as a norm in the public interest, the structure is still not fully “non-state.” Can such practices be classified as media accountability practices according to the narrow definition outlined above? And finally: Do they foster independent media? These questions are related to the notion of media accountability itself. Difficulties with the concept come up when we think in clear-cut lines and have the normative base of media accountability in mind. Instead, it would be more inspiring to ask who holds the media to account, for what purpose, and— to include the question of power—from which position in society? Bourdieu’s field theory applied to journalism takes up such questions (cf. Benson and Neveu 2005) and has already been adopted by media accountability research (cf. Baisnée and Zambrano 2014; Pies 2015). Media accountability practices are understood as “indicators of the main forces weighing on the journalistic profession in each national context” (Baisnée and Zambrano 2014, p. 183). In this sense, media accountability

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deals both with “what happens within the journalistic field and with the relationships it maintains with other social spaces” (Baisnée and Zambrano 2014, p. 183). Accordingly, the actors’ position in the field and their interactions would need to be spelled out more explicitly. What are their resources on an individual as well as an organizational level in terms of financial resources? Is international money sufficient to change a position within the field? What other resources are necessary to give normative claims toward media acceptance and power? A long-term analysis of the normative framework under which journalism operated in Jordan between 1952 and 2007 revealed that claims that had been voiced in non-­ governmental organization (NGO)-established codes of ethics (e.g., the right to access information) had widened and contested the established normative framework, and this was taken up by regime initiatives later on. In 2007, a law that theoretically guaranteed access to information for journalists was passed, for example (cf. Pies 2015). Besides the resources that hint at their potential impact, it is necessary to explicitly spell out what actors stand for. In our research, we have already identified different claims for improving media–society relations. One is to enrich the often-limited agenda of mostly state-controlled media. Others were to strengthen responsiveness and improve fact-­ checking or media literacy. The concept of actors needs to better reflect the complex environment of authoritarian contexts. Although actors are not totally free to act, they are neither completely restricted nor are they solely victims or supporters of the regime. Authoritarian regimes themselves are diverse and encompass differing and often competing actors. While parts of the regime may support rather strict media control, others advocate for reducing it (cf. for Iran, Alimardani and Michaelsen 2022). I would therefore suggest analyzing media accountability practices by setting the actors in relation to their position in society and grouping them by their interest in the media. This goes back to the idea that the media play a central role in today’s societies, and thus they have to be accountable to society. This would mean that we define media accountability practices and cases not as a mechanism of social control, but in a broader sense, as a place or an arena to voice and discuss norms for and expectations of journalism. Participation in these arenas can take place either via ad hoc voicing (visible in so-called cases) or through different forms of institutionalized practices. Instead of referring to cases of media scandals as a necessity for “establishing effective means for assessing and safeguarding the quality of journalistic performance” (Fengler et  al.

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2022b, p.5)—that is, media accountability practices—such cases represent a moment of reassuring, contesting, or redefining norms and expectations (cf. Pies 2014; Pies and Madanat 2011a, b). But how would this analytical turn help to address the challenges on the ground as described in the introduction? To answer this, I come back to the process character of media accountability and to the question regarding how we can evaluate the impact of media accountability practices.

Processes: Media Accountability as a Multi-level Process In addition to the aforementioned understanding of structures and actors, the process character of media accountability is often mentioned in the academic literature. The definition by Fengler and colleagues refers to an institution that “intends to monitor, comment on and criticize journalism and seeks to expose and debate problems of journalism” (2011, p. 20). Others relate to the “process of setting, implementing and sanctioning rules by the members of the profession itself” (Puppis 2009, p.  36) or describe it in three steps: defining norms, observing abidance of the norms, and sanctioning a violation of norms (cf. Pies 2015). Ginosar (2013) points out that most of the literature on media governance refers instead to the process of implementation or sanctioning rather than to that of defining. This is also true for the empirical research on media accountability. In my research on the changing norms in Jordanian journalism, the actors involved in the two processes differed. While the variety of actors involved in defining norms for journalism was wide, those involved in the process of sanctioning were merely government or government-­controlled actors (cf. Pies 2015). When looking at the latter, the conclusion would be that nothing has changed and media accountability is still solely the business of the regime. Analytically distinguishing between the processes reveals that, while the sanctioning process is still in the hands of regime actors, the norms that are sanctionable stem from a more pluralistic group of actors. I analyzed this based on the example of the media ethics code for audio-visual media in Jordan. When, in 2004, the Higher Media Council was established by Royal Decree to replace the Information Ministry as an institution for media policy, it started a definition process to formulate a code of ethics for audio-visual media. For the

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first time, media professionals from state-owned as well as privately owned media were invited to participate in this definition process. It took at least two years to finalize the code, and although the final decision about the formulated version of the code lay in the hands of regime-controlled actors, it contributed to explicitly voicing new norms on how journalists should work. The code called for the economic independence of journalists, access to information for journalists, and for accuracy—all norms that had not been explicitly formulated in codes or laws before (cf. Pies 2015). For a nuanced analysis of such a definition process, I therefore suggest—by referring to Freedman (2006, 2008)—answering three questions: . Who are those initiating the definition process? 1 2. Which actors are involved in explicitly formulating norms? 3. How does the process of formulation take place (integrative or authoritarian)? The manner of defining norms can suggest potentially high or low legitimacy in the journalistic field as well as in society as a whole. Actors and activities could then be effective if they were involved in practices of (re)defining norms for journalism and expectations toward it (cf. Pies 2015). This definition process needs to be more focused on in times of transformation and in places with small margins of freedom. At the same time, the process of observing and sanctioning is highly relevant for evaluating the enforcement of media accountability practices and should not be left aside. But it should be more sensitive toward different actors, phases, and resources, and it should answer the following questions: . Which actors are involved in the process of observing norms? 1 2. Which actors have the right to call for sanctions? 3. What is the degree of institutionalization of those actors? 4. Which sanctions do they have at hand, material as well as immaterial? Such a process-oriented analysis would also allow for an integration of different levels in terms of geography. In Jordan, the process of defining journalistic norms is influenced by international organizations to which journalists or NGOs refer when they voice their claims against the media and about how journalism should be and function. Yet, in the process of implementation, the national level is still dominant (cf. Pies 2015).

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Conclusion As outlined above, the original idea of media accountability has been developed with liberal democracies and pluralistic media systems in mind. Therefore, the criticized inclusion of non-democratic countries in the MediaAcT project seems to be partly justified. Badr et al. (2020) point out that anti-stereotypical choices for international comparisons are meaningless if they work with concepts that do not fit the researched contexts and hence produce stereotypical results. One example that illustrates this problem was the original focus on institutionalized media accountability practices stemming from the research tradition of media self-regulation, which would have turned out to be non-existent in authoritarian contexts. But by shifting the focus toward informal and less-institutionalized practices illustrated through certain cases, the mechanism for holding the media to account, even in closed media systems such as Syria before the war, became visible. The reflections on knowledge production in terms of media accountability have demonstrated how awareness within the research process for such a normative notion is already an important prerequisite in order to challenge and adopt the concept to find meaningful answers to the question regarding how media–society relations function in diverse contexts. Sometimes it might already be enough to shift the focus to the dynamics and multi-phases of a process, as demonstrated with the process of defining norms to reveal the potential for social change. In other cases, such as the relational positioning of actors, more research and elaboration are needed. But such conceptional adaptions need to meet a key condition: If there had not been the chance to jointly discuss definitions, results, and challenges, and if there had not been openness toward adaptions among the researchers from different contexts, some of the media accountability practices might have remained invisible, also in European countries. The example of the media accountability concept illustrates how comparative research helps to challenge the understanding of a concept, to pinpoint its weaknesses, and therefore help to make it more fruitful for diverse contexts. Yet, a country comparison is only one way of producing knowledge. Instead of evaluating the status quo in a given country via pre-­ designed concepts or criteria, it is necessary to further complement, enhance, or contest the concept of media accountability. To better understand and “translate” (Waisbord 2016, p.  870) the processes that take place on the ground in different contexts, more single country, single

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practice, or even single case analysis is needed. This would enrich the process of finding an open and elaborated analytical framework that could then be used again to make comparisons. Such an analytical framework is even more important, as the media accountability concept is used in international organizations to evaluate, shape, and fund parts of the media landscape in the Global South. As a consultant for organizations on media projects worldwide, my experience is that our research sometimes affects societies on the ground. Therefore, a strong analytical and context-sensitive concept of media accountability is not only a theoretical academic effort, but academia’s cosmopolitan responsibility.

References Alimardani, M., & Michaelsen, M. (2022). Iran: Centralised control and tattered accountability. In S. Fengler, T. Eberwein, & M. Karmasin (Eds.), Global handbook of media accountability. Routledge. (298–307). Badr, H., & Leihs, N. (2022). Egypt: No horizons for independent media accountability? In S. Fengler, T. Eberwein, & M. Karmasin (Eds.), Global handbook of media accountability. Routledge. (pp. 266–276). Badr, H., Behmer, M., Fengler, S., Fiedler, A., Grüne, A., Hafez, K., Hahn, O., Hamidi, K., Hanitzsch, T., Horz, C., Illg, B., Litvinenko, A., Löffelholz, M., Radue, M., Richter, C., Thomaß, B., & Töpfl, F. (2020). Kosmopolitische Kommunikationswissenschaft: Plädoyer für eine “tiefe Internationalisierung” des Fachs in Deutschland: Ein wissenschaftspolitisches Positionspapier. Publizistik, 65, 295–303. https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/ s11616-­020-­00576-­6 Baisnée, O., & Zambrano, S. V. (2014). Reals of influence on media accountability. In S. Fengler, T. Eberwein, G. Mazzoleni, & C. Porlezza (Eds.), Journalists and media accountability: An international study of news people in the digital age (pp. 181–191). Peter Lang. Bardoel, J., & d’Haenens, L. (2004a). Media responsibility and accountability: New conceptualizations and practices. Communications, 29(1), 5–25. https:// doi.org/10.1515/comm.2004.007 Bardoel, J., & d’Haenens, L. (2004b). Media meet the citizen: Beyond market mechanisms and government regulations. European Journal of Communication, 19(2), 165–194. https://doi.org/10.1177/0267323104042909 Bastian, M. (2019). Media and accountability in Latin America. Framework— Conditions—Instruments. Springer VS. Benson, R., & Neveu, E. (Eds.). (2005). Bourdieu and the journalistic field. Polity.

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PART II

Critique and Ambivalences: Assessing Media Governance

CHAPTER 6

Cosmopolitan Media, Contestation, and Critique: Assessing International Media Governance Standards from the Nigerian Perspective Ufuoma Akpojivi

Introduction Present-day society is commonly referred to as a cosmopolitan society that is transformative and accommodative of all and that does not oppose othering, as evidenced in the vast literature on society and the public (Christensen 2014; Ong 2009; Urry 2002). This notion of being cosmopolitan suggests the globalization of culture and ideologies. According to Szerszynski and Urry (2002), we live within a “culture of cosmopolitanism” that is reflected in democracy, theories of society, consumption, and citizens being able to travel. Szerszynski and Urry (2002) note that this

U. Akpojivi (*) Media Studies Department, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. A. Ganter, H. Badr (eds.), Media Governance, Global Transformations in Media and Communication Research - A Palgrave and IAMCR Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05020-6_6

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new socio-technical relationship arising from the culture of cosmopolitanism has positively connected societies and relations. The mass media and new information technologies have been considered a germane factor in building this cosmopolitan society due to the globalization that has transformed social lives. McLuhan and Fiore (1967), while alluding to the impact of globalization in this process, stated that “electric circuitry has overthrown the regime of time and space and pours us instantly and continuously the concerns of all other men” (p.  16). Norris and Inglehart (2009) vividly capture the centrality of the media in the creation of this cosmopolitan society by arguing that the integration of information communication technologies (ICTs) has led to what they term “cosmopolitan communications,” in which nation states are exposed to global ideas and practices. While the above assertions suggest a hybrid, interconnected, and transformative communication space, there are questions about media production, attempts to meet the needs of cosmopolitan societies, and whether, indeed, the media can be cosmopolitanized. Consequently, it is necessary to interrogate the idea of a “cosmopolitan media” from the perspective of a country in the Global South, in this case Nigeria, to ascertain the challenges and criticisms associated with such a “cosmopolitan media.” It is crucial to examine this cosmopolitan media notion because, as previously stated, it can be regarded as one of the new frames of media democracy that nation states should facilitate and embrace, as it encourages openness and accessibility, and promotes citizens’ empowerment (Christensen 2012). The ideas of inclusion and participation are at the heart of cosmopolitan media and are central to the attainment of media democracy (Alfandika and Akpojivi 2020). Just like any other country, the Nigerian mass media has been significantly affected by these ideas of globalization and cosmopolitanism. Ake (1979) argues that Nigerian society, like any other African society, has been inundated with globalized policies, culture, and practices. From media ownership to media production, the media sphere has been transformative. For instance, the proliferation of the mass media is evident across the country, with an increase in 24-hour channels, such as Channels TV, TVC News, African Independent Television (AIT), and Silverbird, and online entertainment streaming platforms and pay television, such as Iroko TV, Ibaka TV, and Nevada Bridge TV. In addition, the print industry, historically identified as a religious and partisan tool, has become a more robust political, entertainment, and cultural medium (see Olaniyan and Akpojivi 2020). Similarly, there has been an unprecedented increase in

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the creative industry; for example, the Nigerian music and movie industries have not only become entertainment tools, but economic and ideological tools that promote this cosmopolitan idea. Thus, Nigerian media is regarded as “one of the liveliest in Africa” because of its reach and content (British Broadcasting Corporation [BBC] 2019). However, these developments have not been effectively explored to ascertain if indeed the transformation occurring within the Nigerian media speaks of a cosmopolitan media or if the media is creating and mediatizing the cosmopolitan world (Christensen 2014). This chapter, therefore, uses interviews conducted with ten media practitioners who were purposively selected from the dominant broadcast media houses in Nigeria, alongside a policy document analysis that seeks to examine the notion of a cosmopolitan media in Nigeria and the contestations surrounding the concept, and a critique of the governance structure of the Nigerian  National Broadcasting Commission (NBC) in this cosmopolitan media environment. A cosmopolitan media adheres to certain practices and ideas that will inform its operation. Hence, regulatory agencies are required to formulate and implement frameworks that will govern these practices and ideas. However, the frameworks from postcolonial African states are mostly internationalized in content and structure (Nyamnjoh 2005) for legitimacy reasons, due to the global nature of policy flows and the influence of media assistance aid to these countries to support their democratic media processes (see Akpojivi 2012; Ganter 2018). Therefore, there is a need to examine the governance structure of the Nigerian NBC, which aims at facilitating this cosmopolitan media environment. It is important to explore these issues for two reasons. First, Marx and Engels (1952, cited in Urry 2000, p.  1) argued that the ever-changing market, due to globalization, results in the bourgeoisie chasing and exploiting the market to give a “cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in derby country.” Likewise, Ganter (2018) argues that the advancement of technology, globalization, and media democracy poses some challenges to the media, industry, and government. This statement is truer within the Nigerian context, as the deregulation of the media industry and the subsequent proliferation of ownership have resulted in a fragmented and contested media sphere that has shaped media content. Thus, media production and consumption are not only influenced by technological, political, and cultural needs, but also by the economic interests of the media owners (Akpojivi 2018). Secondly, while scholars like Norris and Inglehart (2009) posit that we live in a cosmopolitan

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society in which the media is thought to play a key role due to the globalization of ideas and content, and the subsequent “cosmopolitan culture,” Voltmer (2008) and Nyamnjoh (2005) have argued that Western notions and ideas cannot easily be transplanted to work within other countries without recognizing the unique political, economic, and cultural contexts within those countries. Consequently, it is necessary to interrogate the idea of a “cosmopolitan media” in Nigeria to ascertain the challenges and criticisms associated with it. The focus of this chapter will be on the broadcast media (radio, television, new media) as it has the widest reach in Nigeria. The print media has been excluded as it has seen a decline in readership in recent years due to the digitalization of the media and as it requires some form of literacy. In addition, the broadcasting industry has generated huge controversy over the changing nature of its media practices due to globalization (Onyedinefu 2019). The following research questions are addressed in this chapter: How is a cosmopolitan media approached within the Nigerian media environment? What are the ideological issues surrounding such a conceptualization within Nigeria? Based on the revised Broadcasting Code, what are the contestations surrounding the governance structure of the NBC?

What Is Cosmopolitan Media? Much has been written about the concept of “cosmopolitan,” and the ideas from the existing literature will be used to understand the concept of cosmopolitan media from the perspective of the Global South. The concept of cosmopolitan has been approached differently by many scholars, resulting in numerous contestations, and most of the available literature about cosmopolitanism is from the West, with little or none from the Global South. Although my conceptualization will draw heavily from these Western ideas, there is a need to provide conceptual clarity and a nuanced discussion before situating cosmopolitanism within the context of the case study, Nigeria. According to Kant (1964), the word “cosmopolitan” means being a citizen of two worlds, that is, “cosmos” (of the world) and “polis” (of a city or its immediate environs). This understanding has shaped how scholars have conceptualized cosmopolitan. For instance, Beck (2002) sees cosmopolitan as the shaping of identities due to the globalization and localization of ideas, and this process results in “dialogic imagination.” According to Beck (2002), there is a cultural clash and conflict due to the

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openness that cosmopolitanism facilitates, and this “clash of cultures and rationalities” (p. 18) occurs within one’s life. Tomlinson (1999), on the other hand, argues that cosmopolitanism should be seen from the perspective of the ethical intersection or relationship between the global and local, as according to him, in the discourse on globalization and cosmopolitanism, local people are constructed to be at the expense of globalization. That is, they are presumed to suffer greatly from the impact of globalization and cosmopolitanism. Therefore, to Tomlinson (1999), cosmopolitanism is the openness of people or society to other cultures, people, and experiences. Similarly, Khoo (2009) approached cosmopolitanism within Malaysia from the perspective of the diversity and inclusivity of all, that is, a space or an act of interconnection between different races, genders, ages, and classes. Expanding these cosmopolitan debates, Christensen (2012) further argues that there is no universal positionality to cosmopolitanism and that scholars approach the concept based on the focus of their studies, as there is no single view due to the significant differences in the conceptualization of cosmopolitanism. This is what Beck means by “there is not one language of cosmopolitanism, but many languages, tongues, grammars. The emerging significance of cosmopolitanism is about a plurality of antagonisms and differences” (2002, p. 35). Accordingly, in this study, I approach cosmopolitan from Christensen’s perspective, which conceives of “cosmopolitan in relation to mediations of (re)attachment, positionality and openness” (2012, p.  893). This conceptualization emphasizes human experiences and emotions that are created and mediated by the media. This means, to understand cosmopolitanism from the Nigerian perspective, it must be done with an understanding of the everyday life and realities of Nigerians within the wider frame or spectrum of society, that is, local and global. In other words, the everyday life and realities of Nigerians should be mediated by the media by providing an opportunity for these experiences to be created, enacted, and shared via media content. To this end, by “cosmopolitan media,” I mean the mediation of shared and lived experiences and realities that promote a sense of cultural belonging and identity. As the media is germane to the formation of a cosmopolitan state because it is part of “people’s everyday realities” (Urry 2000), identities are formed and shared via the media due to the interaction and connections that such mediation creates. According to Christensen:

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in the cosmopolitan formations and mental orientations is not the existence or absence of attachments but the ways in which such attachments are enacted and how individuals navigate their lives across multiple domains of choice and (in)formally conceived reciprocal, unilateral and forced obligations and allegiances (e.g., familial and traditional boundaries). (2012, p. 894)

This means moving cosmopolitanism from an abstract idea into the “lived and performed everyday life” of citizens (Ong 2009, p. 451). Such a translation of cosmopolitanism from abstract to performed everyday realities is important because citizens become part of media and societal discourses, allowing for inclusivity and empowerment. Failure to do this means cosmopolitanism remains a buzzword and an abstract idea without any impact on citizens’ lives. Through the help of the media, members of the public are able to enact their lives and forge their identities, which is central to their development and empowerment. While forging their identities, there is a struggle with the intersection of the “inside national-state societies” (internal) and the outside-globalized societies (Jansson 2012). This results in the “everyday consciousness and identities” of the public and society, which is evident through the ideological constructs, political beliefs, and wider ideas governing society. Thus, a cosmopolitan media seeks to achieve a balance between “cosmopolitan internal beliefs” and “globalization” in order to avert a cosmopolitan crisis. To this end, the media is confronted with the challenges of achieving a balance between mediatizing this “external cosmopolitan belief” of globalized and internationalized practices and meeting the “internal cosmopolitan belief,” that is, the everyday needs and realities of the public (Jansson 2012). Tomlinson (1999), while alluding to this challenge, argues that the media is faced with the challenge of not alienating the local context or realities of the public in the process of trying to attain cosmopolitanism through its mediation, because “in the everyday lifestyle choices and decisions made by the locals, cosmopolitans need routinely to experience the wider world as touching their local lifeworld, and vice versa” (p. 198). This means that there is a constant contestation between the media actors, state actors (regulators), and citizens (Alfandika and Akpojivi 2020) on how best to achieve a cosmopolitan media. That is, the media provides the ideal space for citizens to (re)enact their lived realities, as the media struggles to meet the interests of the citizens (inclusivity and participation) over the pressures of acceptable practices and the format that such (re)enactments should follow. In some

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cases, it is a struggle regarding the approach, ideas, and structure that the cosmopolitan media should follow. This highlights the need for regulatory mechanisms that will promote this balance so as to attain the desired cosmopolitan media and society, without which there will be chaos and a “rule of force and ruse” (Beck 2002, p. 20), because ideally, cosmopolitanism is big and includes different kinds of people with conflicting customs, assorted hopes and shames, so many sheer techno-logical and scientific possibilities and risks … there is a greater need for an evident ethical dimension in the decisions, both private and public, that intervene in all aspects of life and add up to the texture of cosmopolitan societies. (Beck 2002, p. 20)

To address these conflicting customs and attain a balance, there is a need for a regulatory mechanism or governance structure that recognizes these issues and that re-invents and re-defines the risk of a cosmopolitan society and media (Randeria 1999). Hence, subsequent discussions in this chapter will examine the governance structure within the Nigerian state and the extent to which it has been able to re-invent and redefine itself to address the issues associated with Nigeria’s cosmopolitan media and mediated cosmopolitan society.

The Nigerian Broadcasting Media Governance Structure The history of Nigerian media has been well documented by numerous scholars, including Omu (1996), Bourne (2015), and Akpojivi (2018), among others. Therefore, the purpose of this section and discussion is not to have a chronological discussion of the history of broadcast media in Nigeria, but to highlight the impact of the historical development of the media within the current media governance structure. Broadcasting began in Nigeria in 1932 with the relaying of radio programs from the BBC. These rebroadcast programs, known as the Radio Distribution System (RDS), were used by the colonialist (Britain) to communicate administrative information to the public, and it initially broadcasted to major towns, such as Lagos, Ibadan, and Kano (Akpojivi 2018; Mackay 1964), before it expanded to other towns, such as Calabar, Jos, Abeokuta, and Port-Harcourt, among others. However, the RDS was taken over by the Public Relations Office and the Posts and Telegraphs

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Department to enhance reach to the local public and communicate administrative information effectively, which resulted in the production of some local content for broadcasting in 1939 (Mackay 1964). Following the proliferation of the RDS (13) as of 1951, and its popularity among the public, literate and illiterate people alike were encouraged to actively participate in local content production. All existing RDSs were consolidated into the Nigerian Broadcasting Service (NBS) (Adejunmobi 1974). To provide a comprehensive regulatory structure to micro-manage the rapidly growing RDS, the Nigeria Broadcasting Corporation, with the responsibility of overseeing broadcasting, was created in 1957 through an Act of Parliament (Mackay 1964). Nevertheless, the politicization of the NBC, the heightened tension due to the independence struggle between the respective nationalist actors, and the desire of each region to promote its ideological beliefs led to the establishment of the first television station, Western Nigeria Television (WNTV) in 1959 in Ibadan, and the subsequent establishment of television by the eastern and northern regions in 1960 and 1962, respectively (Akpojivi 2018). The political tensions and proliferation of the media following independence led to the monopolization of broadcasting by the state and the creation of the Nigeria Television Authority (NTA) and the Federal Radio Corporation of Nigeria (FRCN) via Decree 24 of 1977 (Bourgault 1995) and Decree 8 of 1978. Onwumechili (2007) argues that the establishment of the National Broadcasting Commission (NBC) in 1992 following the globalization of deregulation and privatization policies led to the significant development of Nigerian media, as the NBC was tasked with regulating the media sphere in accordance with international practices. This policy of deregulation, built around opening the media sphere up to active competition, promoting plurality, diversity, and a free-market economy, was considered the international standard by which nation states should open up their media spheres, facilitate development (Chakravartty and Sarikakis 2006; Ganter 2018), and encourage citizen participation in both media and political discourses. Akpojivi (2018) posited that emerging democracies, such as Nigeria, embraced these policies of liberalization (deregulation and privatization) as proof of their willingness to transform their media spaces and democratization processes. The ideas of freedom and openness that characterized the reform process are universal ideas that must be imbibed due to technical assistance, aid, and other monetary support offered to emerging democracies, such as Nigeria, in their quest for development and democratic sustenance

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(Akpojivi 2012; see Price 2002). Ake (1979) questioned the ideas surrounding the political development of Nigeria and posited that these ideas were Western and a tool for subordinating the country into another due to the “unequal exchange” of political, economic, and cultural ideas during the reforms. Consequently, Fukuyama (1992) argues that societies are witnessing the end of human history due to the universalization of ideas. Okonjo-Iweala (2012), while buttressing this universalization of ideas during Nigeria’s reform process, argued that the worsened economic condition following the coups and civil war, which the country never recovered from, meant that Nigeria had to accept these Western and universal ideas during its reform process, as they formed the basis on which the country was judged to be democratic. Concerning media reform, Onwumechili (2007) further argues that these universal ideas form the standards of any democratic media reform, as they prescribe underlying principles, such as openness, citizen participation, and independent regulatory mechanisms, among other yardsticks, for development and democratization. Consequently, these ideological principles shaped the media governance structure that nation states were expected to have. Thus, upon its establishment in 1992, the NBC was confronted with the challenges of enacting these ideological principles to address the realities of the broadcast media landscape. Freedman (2008) posits that achieving these ideological principles is mostly difficult due to “narrow instrumental reasons,” and within the Nigerian context, these narrow instrumental reasons have been evident from the start of the historical development of the broadcast media. For instance, since the inception of the broadcast media in Nigeria (from the RDS to becoming cosmopolitan), the media has always sought mediatization by addressing the information needs of the public instead of the colonialist, as seen in the rapid diffusion and engagement of the public in content creation coupled with the relays from BBC. However, the politicization of the process by the different nationalists and the media being under the direct control of the colonialists attest to the narrow instrumental reasons alluded to by Freedman (2008). Additionally, various governments have thought the broadcasting media should be controlled, as it is seen as “too sensitive,” and this contestation over control of the broadcast media by the government further speaks to this. More so, the media governance structure currently in place is regarded as one of “give and take,” and thus it has been laced with contradictions seemingly geared toward limiting the media (see Akpojivi 2018). Ronning and Kupe (2000), while

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summing up this position, stated that the regulatory frameworks of most African states are a “reflection of this discrepancy between a democratic and authoritarian impetus” (p. 138), because these governments want to create the impression that they are democratic by embracing these policies that seek to promote international standards and, on the other hand, they want to hold on to stiff principles that promote their authoritarian enclaves (Ake 2000). These examples of narrow instrumental reasons, among other factors, pose a problem regarding how the cosmopolitan crisis of control, alluded to by Beck (2002), can be managed within the Nigerian state. The emergence of media owners and content creators who want to exploit this cosmopolitan media, coupled with the dynamic social, political, and economic fragments of the Nigerian state, has resulted in a risk and/or challenge regarding how to regulate the media so that the shared experiences and realities of Nigerians are effectively balanced and the public can have a sense of belonging without being alienated in a mediatized cosmopolitan society.

Theoretical Framework The objective of this chapter is not to present a theoretical engagement of cosmopolitanism, but to provide empirical evidence that could be used to theorize on the cosmopolitan media and governance structure from the Nigerian perspective. Cosmopolitanism has been theorized from the media and cultural studies perspective, as it is based on the relationship between media consumption and moral consciousness (Ong 2009). In other words, the media acts as a mediated space for addressing and meeting the needs and realities of the people, and this mediated space, according to Silverstone (2006), is the primary virtue of media creation, as cosmopolitanism is rooted in unconditioned hospitality. This means that the media creates a platform on which the realities of ordinary citizens are met and mediated. A proponent of mediatization, Altheide (2018), states that, through mediatization, we have knowledge of society and issues affecting citizens, as the media creates what is termed “media logic,” which in turn results in the enlargement “of audience conscience” (Ong 2009). To this end, the Nigerian media will be regarded as cosmopolitan if it creates an avenue for citizens’ political, economic, and cultural needs to be met, rather than suppressing them for vested interests. Such mediatization

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via media content should likewise conscientize citizens and prompt them to address societal injustice, whether local or global. Ong (2009), while buttressing the above, stated that the media has a significant role in the development of morality, as it reports on repression, injustice, everyday culture, and conflict. However, this process is not free from conflict and tension (Beck 2002), and this tension is between “proximity and distance, between attachment and commitment, between global and local, between universals and particulars, between us and them, between media and identity” (Ong 2009, p.  464). Within the Nigerian context, this tension is between the regulatory authority and media organizations as they seek to achieve a balance between the interests of the citizens against the state and the interests of media owners against regulatory interests, and to promote an identity that is both publicly and nationally oriented.

Methodology This study seeks to understand Nigeria’s cosmopolitan media and its governance structure. Therefore, the study addresses the “what” and “how” research questions associated with qualitative studies. Qualitative studies seek to construct meanings and their embodiment in social actions from the world (Dominick and Wimmer 1994). Within the context of this study, the qualitative approach enables the researcher to interrogate, interpret details, and have a holistic view of the social relations of the study. Using a qualitative approach, data were garnered through semi-structured interviews with ten highly experienced, purposively sampled broadcast media practitioners from leading privately and state-owned media houses based in Lagos and Abuja, including AIT, Channels TV, the NTA, Silverbird, Independent Television and Radio (ITV), and the FRCN, which are the dominant broadcast media players with the largest reach across the country. Robinson (2014) argues that purposive sampling is the intentional selection of research participants who will help to explain a phenomenon based on their knowledge and experience. To this end, media practitioners with over 16 years of experience between them were interviewed between December 2020 and January 2021 via Zoom. Their experiences within the broadcast media industry meant that they would be able to offer invaluable insights into Nigeria’s cosmopolitan media and highlight any issues with the governance structure. Ethical implications of using Zoom were considered during data collection. Due to Covid-19 and its travel restrictions, the researcher had to adhere to the lockdown

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restrictions, which meant that the videoconferencing facility was the only viable way of collecting data from the selected participants. Before the commencement of the interviews, the study was explained to all participants, and all their queries were addressed. Since the participants wanted anonymity regarding their opinions in the study, P1–P10 were used to anonymize their identities. In addition to carrying out semi-structured interviews, policy documents were collected and analyzed that specifically relate to the governance of the broadcast media, such as the sixth edition of the NBC’s Broadcasting Code and the subsequently amended code released on June 11, 2020. A critical interpretative approach was used to analyze the data. The sociological imagination embedded in a critical interpretative approach provided insights into the understanding of Nigeria’s cosmopolitan media and governance structure.

Nigeria’s Cosmopolitan Media: Ideas and Contestation From the collected data, the concept of cosmopolitan media has been approached differently, and these different views reflect the idea that the concept of cosmopolitan media is a new phenomenon within the Nigerian media sphere, thus influencing media practitioners’ understanding and operationalization of the concept. As one participant puts it, “I must say, this is a new term in the media jargon” (P1, personal communication, 2021). Likewise, P10 stated, “this is a new phrase within the media industry, which we are grappling with” (personal communication, 2021). Despite the perceived newness of the word, media practitioners largely conceive of cosmopolitan media from the perspective of cultural diversity in content, human rights and the promotion of humanity, global and local reach, and inclusivity. For instance, P2 held that “cosmopolitan media could be referred to as the media with a global reach and great cultural diversity” (personal communication, 2021). P3 posited that “cosmopolitan media revolves around inclusivity of all, respect and recognition of human rights, a platform where people, irrespective of status, can all be heard and valued” (personal communication, 2021), and P5 stated that “cosmopolitan media are media organizations that appeal to the national and international needs of audiences and promote universal ideas of humanity and cultural diversity, and content should be on par with the best practices of other countries” (personal communication, 2021). These

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conceptions are in line with Ong’s (2009) ideas of how cosmopolitanism is perceived within the media and cultural industries. However, it should be noted that these ideas portray the universal principles attributed to cosmopolitan media being localized to meet the needs of the Nigerian state. This approach of the localization of ideas to reflect the everyday needs and realities of citizens within cosmopolitan media is further reflected in the National Broadcasting Code, which states, “in broadcasting, every Nigerian is expected to partake in the sharing of ideas and experiences that will enrich the life of citizenry and help them live in a complex, dynamic and humane society” (NBC Broadcasting Code 2016, p.  8). This, therefore, moves the cosmopolitan media from being an abstract or buzz concept without any impact on the lives of ordinary citizens into reflecting the lived realities of the public. Essentially, the media is charged with reflecting the “diverse social, cultural, economic, political and religious configuration” by values and norms that will foster the Nigerian identity without compromising fundamental international standards (NBC Broadcasting Code 2016, p. 9). From the above, it can be argued that the idea of a cosmopolitan media that seeks to meet and reflect the needs and realities of Nigerians is encapsulated within the Nigerian policy framework, thus shaping the regulatory framework and cosmopolitan media duties. The policy framework calls for a balance between local realities and universal principles, but the process of achieving this balance is problematic due to the contestation between the media actors over what a cosmopolitan media in Nigeria should do and what it actually does. This view was shared by all the media practitioners interviewed. For instance, the policy framework states that broadcasting in Nigeria should professionally match its counterparts anywhere in the world; however, it should be distinctively Nigerian in accordance with the policy goals of having a “universal standard of broadcasting with specific application to Nigeria” (NBC Broadcasting Code 2016, p. 17). The contestation resulting from the execution of the policy framework evidently exposes the haphazardness of the media governance structure, as policy frameworks tend to imbibe universal ideas that are somewhat restricted during operationalization. According to P3, “the major challenge confronting and hindering the full realization of cosmopolitan media within the Nigerian media sphere is the lack of transparency, and the restrictive and stringent policy framework from the NBC” (personal communication, 2021). Similarly, P6 posited that

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outwardly, the Nigerian media are perceived to be cosmopolitan due to the diversity in content, their wide reach, and ability to encourage citizen ­participation. However, inwardly, they are mainly governments’ mouthpieces or, at worse, the mouthpiece of those with money due to the stringent governance structure that impacts media operations and content. (Personal communication, 2021)

Onyenankeya and Salawu (2020) explain this complicated situation and its impact by stating that there are tensions and struggles within the media sphere due to political, economic, and cultural factors, and these tensions have hindered the media from attaining its full potential or living up to its constituted responsibilities. As previously stated, such tensions observed in the policy framework that governs the Nigerian media industry (NBC Broadcasting Code 2016) emanate from the universal policy principles that countries are being made to implement as part of their democratic or media reform processes (Chakravartty and Sarikakis 2006). This is because technical assistance, aid, and funding from agencies, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and other international agencies and donors, such as the United States Agency for International Development, and the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organization, among others, are avenues through which these ideas are passed to countries (Akpojivi 2012; Awagu 2020; Ganter 2018). According to Okonjo-Iweala (2012), the neoliberal policies of deregulation and privatization that characterized the reform processes in 1999 are believed to be the solution to addressing Nigeria’s political and economic challenges. Consequently, the desire of the state to be perceived as democratic and interested in a democratic media, and likewise, the desire to maintain the status quo of media control, resulted in the haphazard nature of the regulatory framework and the resultant contestation (Ake 2000; Akpojivi 2012; Ronning and Kupe 2000), which Campbell (2011) attributes to the insincerity of the Nigerian state regarding the reform process. P8 describes this tension as follows: The Nigerian media tries to be cosmopolitan by being inclusive, whether in content or programming, as it considers the needs of the citizens and encourages them to participate in media content creation. However, this hasn’t been an easy thing due to the contradictory NBC Code.

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A fundamental point of contestation arising from the contradictory regulatory framework is on the issue of inclusivity and the idea of belonging, which is a salient characteristic of cosmopolitan media (Urry 2000). Nonetheless, this inclusivity challenge has been made easier with the emergence and convergence of ICTs. P8 states that: The use of ICT as well as the Internet has enabled inclusivity and shaped media content significantly, as anyone from anywhere in Nigeria or in the diaspora can contribute or share their lived experiences. For instance, look at the Lekki toll gate incident1; the lived experiences of protesters, both Nigerians at home and abroad, were actively reflected in media content due to these technologies. (Personal communication, 2021)

Atton and Mabweazara (2011) argue that the integration of ICT by media houses has revolutionized media practice and content in Africa; however, revolutionization, which encourages citizen participation and creates a sense of belonging, has been a major issue. As reflected in the Broadcasting Code, “the impact of modern technology has significantly enabled citizens to contribute to journalism, beneficial to broadcasting…. broadcasters using social media sources (or these modern technologies) shall ensure due caution and professionalism” (NBC Broadcasting Code 2016, p. 19). It appears that the notions of “caution” and “professionalism” are being used by the regulatory body to restrict inclusivity and hinder people from sharing their lived experiences, which is pivotal in any cosmopolitan media. According to P10: NBC is selective with this idea of inclusivity and people sharing their lived experiences. Three media organizations that tried creating a platform for citizens to share their experiences during the #EndSars protests were slammed with huge fines. NBC is yet to recognize the place of social media in achieving a cosmopolitan media that is inclusive. (Personal communication, 2021)

On October 26, 2020, AIT, Channels, and Arise TV were sanctioned for “unprofessional conduct,” and each was fined three million naira ($7900 USD) for using social media content in their reportage of the 1  In October 2020, Nigerian youths took to the streets to protest about police brutality across major cities in Nigeria. This resulted in the killings of some youths by the military at Lekkitoll Gate, which was the epicenter of the protest in Lagos.

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#EndSars protests, with threats made by the regulatory body, the NBC, regarding their licenses being withdrawn (Daily Trust 2020). Equally, P6 held that “NBC is literally stopping media organizations from using social media content in programming, as views which they do not like are suppressed, therefore making this notion of inclusivity redundant.” Olaniyan and Akpojivi (2020) argued that while new media technologies have transformed communication in Nigeria due to their inclusivity and accessibility (i.e., citizens can easily contribute to national discourses and share their lived experiences), in using the notion of national interests, governments have systematically curtailed citizens’ inclusivity in content creation, as citizens and broadcast houses could be fined for engaging in activities that are deemed to be against the national interest. Another issue within the regulatory mechanism that has been criticized is that of content production and distribution. Content is important for the realization of cosmopolitanism, as it is through media content that mediatization occurs (Christensen 2012), enabling people to create and re-enact their realities. Jansson (2012) argues that content is central to identity creation as it creates a sense of belonging that people can associate with. P4 commented that “the difference between a cosmopolitan media and others is content, which should be diverse to address and meet the needs of all races, faiths, ages, genders, and classes. Content should not be limited in scope but include constituents from all parts of Nigeria and beyond” (personal communication, 2021). In addition, P3 states, “a cosmopolitan media has the characteristics of relaying content to reflect the views of all, with a large audience reach” (personal communication, 2021). There is no doubt that Nigerian media strives to be inclusive by having content that meets the diverse cultural needs of Nigerians, as stated in the Broadcasting Code, which calls on the media to “promote Nigerian content and encourage the production and projection of Nigerian life within and outside its borders, striving to attain 100% local content” (NBC Broadcasting Code 2016, p. 41). From the above, the regulatory framework of the Broadcasting Code emphasizes the importance of having increased local content as a way of projecting national culture against cultural hegemony as a result of globalization (see Awagu 2020). However, there have been a series of contestations over content production and regulation to achieve inclusivity and promote the diverse Nigerian culture needed in a cosmopolitan society. For instance, according to the amended

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NBC Broadcasting Code (2016), there are restrictions to web content creation, sporting rights, and anti-competition rights. Following the deregulation of the media sector in 1992 and the emergence and integration of ICT in broadcasting, there has been an increase in PayTV services, such as IrokoTV, African Magic, Filmhouse Cinema, and Netflix, among others, providing content that meets the needs of a diverse Nigeria. Likewise, media houses have invested in local content so as to meet the mandatory requirements stipulated by the NBC. According to P2, “the Nigerian broadcast media have invested significantly in local content creation so as to achieve a rich cultural diversity, as stated by NBC” (personal communication, 2021). Nonetheless, Sections 9.0.1 to 9.0.3 of the amended Code restrict exclusive rights to content and allow for forced sub-licenses so that exclusive content, for example, sports and movies, enjoy “compelling viewership.” Simply stated, media content, such as sports with exclusive sporting rights, is prohibited, and the owners of such rights must make that right available to others. Likewise, Section 9.1.1.8 compels content creators with exclusive rights to any genre of program with a large viewership to sell or sub-license the program to others at a fee determined by the regulatory body. While these regulatory provisions are meant to address global anti-competition and licensing issues that have characterized the media sphere since its deregulation, there have been criticisms—especially regarding the idea of the forced sharing of exclusive rights and at a fee determined by the regulator—from some media actors, content creators, and social critics about the regulatory framework due to its localization within the Nigerian context. Interviewee P9 deliberates on this issue when he says, “How can we have a cosmopolitan media with rich and diverse content, when there is undue interference from the government in local content production?” This sentiment is also shared by the Chief Executive of one of the leading PayTV platforms, IrokoTV, who asserted that “the provisions of the code which prohibit exclusivity, compel content sub-licensing to competitors, and empowers the NBC to determine sub-licensing fees will discourage investment in local content production” (Onaleye 2020). According to him: I invest billions of Naira in content … I am compelled to share with everyone else as NBC sets the price. … under these conditions, it makes zero sense for @irokotv, @DSTV, @NetflixNaija, @africamagictv, @ Filmhousecinema, @Silverbird, @SceneoneTV, or any other platform or independent production house to invest in local content. (Onaleye 2020)

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Such contestations between the media actors and the regulatory body question the adequacy of the regulatory framework in addressing concerns and issues of cosmopolitan media. P4, while summing it up, stated that “with the issue of local content and challenges of cosmopolitan media, NBC should be thinking of fine tuning its framework to the demands of society.”

Conclusions The above findings revealed that cosmopolitan media is approached from the perspective of lived realities of inclusivity and cultural diversity within Nigeria. The state’s action through the regulatory body (NBC) and its policy framework’s governance structure have not supported the media in facilitating these lived realities. Therefore, this raises the salient question of how best to facilitate a cosmopolitan media within an environment laden with restrictions and excessive government interference, albeit flowing from the desire to localize universal ideas that are tailored to protect the perceived “national interests.” Beck (2002) calls this the cosmopolitan crisis, and within the context of the study, the crisis is between public interest and state interest, media and content creators, and the NBC, thus jeopardizing inclusivity, diversity, and participation. Failure to achieve this inclusivity, participation, and cultural diversity means that the cosmopolitan media will remain abstract or a buzzword without any relevance to the public. Therefore, all stakeholders in the Nigerian media industry need to (re)think of ways of supporting Nigeria’s cosmopolitan media in an environment characterized by political and economic imbalances due to historical antecedence. Categorically, a robust engagement between the different media actors in relation to addressing concerns of inclusivity and local content creation will lead to a cosmopolitan media that is reflective of the lived realities and experiences of Nigerian citizens through its mediatization and content.

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CHAPTER 7

Media Governance and Fake News in Brazil Afonso de Albuquerque and Lucineide Magalhães de Matos

Introduction This chapter discusses the occurrence of a recent change regarding media regulation in Brazil. In this country, media regulation has been historically associated with state rules that would establish legal limits for media outlets’ behavior. Media regulation in Brazil has been very fragile at best, and the mainstream media have presented fierce opposition to any attempt to regulate the regulation. Such efforts have often been presented as attacks against freedom of press; even raising this topic is taboo. Recently, however, media regulation has taken a U-turn. A new media governance-based approach has emerged in connection to changes in the media landscape. Two aspects of this problem are particularly relevant here: (1) the rise of social media platforms, which play a central role in the contemporary media landscape, and (2) the moral panic caused by fake news (Carlson 2020), which emerged globally after Donald Trump’s victory in the US presidential election and the referendum that decided for Brexit in the

A. d. Albuquerque • L. M. d. Matos (*) Fluminense Federal University, Niterói, Brazil e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. A. Ganter, H. Badr (eds.), Media Governance, Global Transformations in Media and Communication Research - A Palgrave and IAMCR Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05020-6_7

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UK. In Brazil, fake news has been primely associated with the rise of Jair Bolsonaro to presidency. The fight against disinformation provided an opportunity for the creation of a new media regulation model based on governance logic. In this model, the mainstream media are part of a multistakeholder system—together with fact-checking agencies, social media platforms, and other non-state actors—aiming to inhibit the spread of disinformation. In this schema, the media are no longer subject to external regulation; rather, they assume the role of regulators of the public discourse. How did this happen? For Brazilian legacy media, the idea of media regulation has been an anathema. In their view, attempts to regulate the media present a threat to freedom of press. Worries about media regulation became recurrent after the end of military dictatorship (1964–1985). In the first few years of the new democratic regime, the power of legacy media was at its peak. The military governments were very generous to the media supporting them. Massive public investments allowed local media to become influential on a national scale. Yet, it became clear that the regime was doomed, as these organizations changed sides. During the political transition, they presented themselves as guarantors of democracy. The absence of regulation allowed them to exert their power almost without any restriction. From 1985 to 2002, political allies occupied presidency. Given this background, it is not surprising that avoiding regulation became a political priority for legacy media. However, in 2003, this pattern changed, with the ascent of Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva to presidency. A member of the Workers’ Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores; PT), Lula maintained a relationship of mutual distrust with these media. During the next 13  years, PT stayed ahead of presidency. Lula was re-elected in 2006, and Dilma Rousseff won two consecutive elections in 2010 and 2014. During this period, the mainstream media presented a firm and systematic opposition to PT-led governments. On the other hand, PT proposed legal initiatives toward media regulation, without success, however. Unable to defeat PT through electoral means, the mainstream media recurred to alternative methods. By depicting PT as a criminal organization, it attempted to create a climate of political polarization. These circumstances led to the impeachment of President Dilma Rousseff in August 2016. Added to this, Lula was imprisoned in 2018 under charges of corruption. Strong evidence suggests that Judge Moro, the prosecutors ahead of accusations, and the media colluded to convict Lula, based on fragile legal evidence (Duarte, The Intercept Brasil, 2020).

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Nevertheless, Lula’s prison averted him to run in the 2018 presidential campaign. Fernando Haddad, who replaced Lula, lost the election. However, the victory of mainstream media was not complete. The far-­ right candidate, Jair Messias Bolsonaro, won the election and proved much more hostile toward the legacy media than Lula himself. In fact, Bolsonaro’s communication strategy attributed pivotal importance to social media. His supporters (including his son Carlos Bolsonaro) ran a fake news and hate-speech schema, known as “hatred office” (gabinete do ódio). For the Brazilian mainstream media, this was both a curse and a blessing. On the one hand, Bolsonaro proved to be a fierce enemy, much more hostile toward them than his PT predecessors. On the other hand, he provided these media with an opportunity to overcome their recent past as promoters of political polarization and the related legitimity crisis (Mick and Tavares 2017). In opposition to Bolsonaro, the media presented themselves as guardians of the truth and democracy. The circumstances in late 2010 differ from those existing in the mid-­1980s. At present, Brazilian legacy media face new challenges and opportunities. Their financial situation is much less comfortable than it was in the past, with their circulation rates, broadcasting audiences, and advertising budget experiencing a significant drop (Benício 2020; Poder 360 2021). The digital environment allows the public to access much of their content for free. This has also fostered the rise of new social media competitors. From a political standpoint, the legacy media lost much of their earlier prestige, which was largely due to their own behavior in previous years. In their effort to take PT out of presidency, they actively fostered political polarization (Albuquerque 2021a) and associated representative politics with corruption. In doing this, they fostered a climate of distrust with respect to all institutions, including the press itself.

Media Regulation and Its Critics in Brazil At the end of the military regime, the legacy media emerged as a powerful political player in Brazil. The military took the government through a coup in 1964, supported by conservative politicians. Unsatisfied with President João Goulart’s progressive policies, the media hoped that the military would soon restore power to them. However, the military dictatorship endured until 1985 (Fico 2004). The military rulers used iron hands against media organizations opposing them, but they were very generous to the media supporting them. Military support allowed local

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media organizations to obtain a national status. No one benefited more than the Globo Media Organization, as massive government investments allowed it to become the largest television company in Brazil (Ortiz 1988). In fact, some authors have referred to Globo as a monopoly (Amaral and Guimarães 1994). The military left the power in disgrace, and a political vacuum followed. When it was clear that the military regime went into crisis, the legacy media supporting it changed sides. They rebranded themselves as the guarantors of the new democratic order (Guimarães and Amaral 1988). The political circumstances were favorable to them. Under the created political vacuum, the political forces seemed too divided to provide a solid basis for the new democratic order. The mainstream media took this role for themselves. They employed a particular type of fourth-power discourse in this regard. On the one hand, this discourse referred to the Anglo-­ American Fourth Estate tradition, according to which the media act as government watchdogs on behalf of the citizens’ interests. The authority of the media lies in their independence from political institutions (Porto 2012). On the other hand, they appeal to a different model of the fourth power, which is peculiar to Brazil. The Moderating Power (Poder Moderador) originated in the Constitution of 1824 (Lynch 2005), which was expected to resolve disputes among the other three branches (Executive, Legislature, and Judiciary). References to Poder Moderador disappeared from the following constitutions (Lessa 2001). However, the idea that a superpower would be necessary to make the system of the three branches work remained influential in Brazil. In the mid-1980s, Brazilian legacy media suggested that they should play this role (Albuquerque 2005). At that time, the power of the legacy media peaked. No other media organization was as powerful as the Globo Organization. Its owner, Roberto Marinho, has often been described as the “Brazilian Citizen Kane.” In a very television-centered society, Globo TV had roughly three-­ quarters of the national television share. Marinho’s power was huge enough to allow him to choose his friend Antonio Carlos Magalhães as President José Sarney’s Minister of Communication. As Marinho himself, Magalhães was also a supporter of the military regime, who defected when its fall proved inevitable (Porto 2012). Both shared worries about losing the privileges obtained during the military governments. A key factor would be to avoid media regulation (Paulino and Guazina 2020). In the absence of a regulatory framework, the legacy media would be free to use their power without any restriction, a circumstance they would proceed to

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use. In the following years, the legacy media helped to elect presidents Fernando Collor de Mello (1989) and Fernando Henrique Cardoso (1994 and 1998). During this period, the news media coverage presented a consistent anti-PT bias (Azevedo 2017). The Constitution of 1988 established the principle of media regulation and created the Social Communication Council (Conselho de Comunicação Social; CCS). This initiative was inspired by the US Federal Communications Commission (Simis 2010). However, the National Congress never approved a regulatory framework for Brazilian media. Consequently, media outlets remained free from regulation. The National Congress took evident initiatives to establish such a framework. Table  7.1 summarizes these initiatives. The legacy media reacted with fury to any attempt made to regulate them. The O Estado de São Paulo newspaper called the creation of CCS “a dangerous idea” (Estado de São Paulo, São Paulo, 10 de junho de 1987). In an editorial piece, it suggested that the CCS would promote media nationalization. According to it, CCS was a leftist project aiming to curb media independence, “as in Cuba and Nicaragua.” The alarm sirens sounded even louder during the PT government. The reception to the Councils of Journalism Bill was especially hostile. The Folha de S. Paulo newspaper stated that “Lula wants Council to supervise journalism” (Folha de São Paulo, São Paulo, 06 de agosto de 2004). The Veja magazine went further and denounced “the phantom of authoritarianism” (Veja, 18 de Agosto de 2004).

Governance as a Concept and a Policy Paradigm Different definitions of governance coexist. Usually, they focus on the modes of control exerted beyond the state, and sometimes, without the state (Levi-Faur 2012). Others present governance as opposed to the more established concept of government. According to Bevir (2010), “governance is less focused on state institutions, and more focused on the processes and interactions that tie the state to civil society” (p. 1). Basically, the term “governance” has been used in two different senses. From an analytical viewpoint, it provides a means to describe reality. Analytical concepts are valuable owing to their ability to shed light on the relevant aspects of a phenomenon in a clear and precise manner. The other approach takes governance as a policy paradigm (Hall 1993). In this sense, it works as an instrument for managing reality. Here, the

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Table 7.1  Frameworks regulating media in Brazil Regulatory framework General Law of Mass Communication

Context

Fernando H. Cardoso Presidency (PSDB)

Description

1994–2001. Project of modernization of the Brazilian

Rejected by the

Lula da Silva

Creation of federal and

Presidency

regional councils of journalism

(PT) Project of Creation of the National Agency for Cinema and Audiovisual (Ancinav).

National Congress in December 2004 after an agreement between the parties

Luis Inácio

Extension of the role of the

Lula da Silva

National Agency (Ancine) to

Presidency

regulate audiovisual and

(PT)

television

Archived in 2006

Proposal to the

Project of Creation

Luis Inácio

of the National

Lula da Silva

Proposal of creation of a

Agency for

Presidency

regulatory agency. Year: 2010

Communication

(PT)

General Law of

Lula da Silva

Mass

Presidency

Communication

(PT)

Luis Inácio

Archived in 2001

telecommunication code

Luis Inácio Bill 3985/2004

Consequence

National Congress aborted by the executive due to the negative coverage

Creation of a commission to discuss a law project. Year: 2010

Aborted by the executive due to the negative coverage

value of the term is less analytic than pragmatic. Policy paradigms allow social agents to do things with words. The value of policy paradigms does not depend primarily on their intrinsic merits. Rather, it is related to the degree of social influence exerted by the policymaking institutions sponsoring them. Here, vagueness is not a problem. Policy paradigms must be flexible enough to encompass diverse practical circumstances. Does one of these senses dominate the academic debate on governance?

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Here, we contend that governance was first developed as a term for policy governance and only then as an academic conceptual device. The first evidence in this respect originates from its “comet-like career” (Offe 2009, p.  550). Until a few decades ago, the term “governance” was unknown in the academic debate. Since the 1980s, it has become a mainstream category for Economy and Social Sciences. References to “media governance” are still more recent; they are roughly a decade old. In the words of Bardoel and d’Haenens (2004), it “emerged from nowhere, taking a central position in policy debates” (p. 171). Yet, this is not a precise description of how governance emerged and developed. Together with other concepts, as a rule of law, and the definition of corruption as “the abuse of public office for private gains,” governance is part of a conceptual toolkit promoted by the World Bank and other policymaking institutions (Williams and Young 1994). Their rhetoric often associates “governance” with broader principles of “good governance” and “best practices” (Bevir 2010). The predominance of the policy paradigm approach helps to explain both the strengths and weaknesses that the scholarly literature associates with governance. On the positive side, some authors have emphasized its ability to describe recent changes in the world. The description of new ideas and values requires new concepts. Governance “highlights phenomena that are hybrid and multijurisdictional with plural stakeholders who come together in networks” (Bevir 2011, p. 2). Moreover, the concept of governance is comprehensive, covering a vast range of phenomena at the macro, meso, and micro levels. It became popular in several disciplines, including economy, political science, sociology, law, and public administration (Bevir 2011; Levi-Faur 2012). However, for some authors committed to a stricter academic view of governance, this versatility is a weakness, not a virtue (Bevir, 2010; Offe 2009). According to them, governance is too vague and imprecise to be useful as a concept. It refers to phenomena too diverse, and it is difficult to find a common denominator between them. The absence of conceptual contours makes governance open to all sorts of uses (Offe 2009). Even authors sympathizing with it recognize the catch-all nature of governance (Peters 2012). A second criticism refers to the depoliticizing nature of governance. This characteristic is related to the World Bank’s role in sponsoring the concept. The World Bank’s statutes averted it to intervene in the countries’ political affairs. For this motive, it defined governance as an economic rather than a political topic (Santos 2006). However, this does

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not mean that governance is without political consequences. The World Bank just names technical what is essentially political (Brown 2013; Cammack 2002). These cleavages also appear in the debate on media governance. On the positive side, Puppis (2010) emphasized the encompassing nature of the concept. Media governance allows discussion “aspects of media policy and regulation so far overlooked” (p. 135). While the term regulation remains intrinsically tied to the state, governance goes beyond. Besides statutory regulation, it covers two other types of regulation: self-regulation, which is exerted by non-state actors, and coregulation, which refers to self-­ regulation exerted with some supervision by the state. Media governance also focuses on the regulation mechanisms existing beyond the state. Ginosar (2013) adopted a different approach to praise media governance as a concept. In his view, it provides the basis for a less Western-centric and normative analytical framework for media regulation. This happens because governance bears in mind more variables than other comparative efforts. It considers the state and non-state actors at the national and international levels, as well as the multiple relations they establish with each other. Critics have focused on different aspects of media governance. Karppinen and Moe (2013) focused on three main conceptual problems. First, media governance is too vague. It has variegated disciplinary roots and applies to different problems in different contexts. Second, vagueness is a fair price to pay for dealing with new problems. Yet, Karppinen and Moe argued that “regulation” covers much of the innovative processes described by “media governance.” Third, media governance has a political bias. By emphasizing the role of networked actors to the detriment of the state, it contributes to legitimizing the globalized neoliberal order. Despite being a topic of transnational, globalized debates, the attention paid to media governance as a topic of scholarly attention is not the same everywhere. This happens because not all societies play an equally active role in this debate. The academic debate on media governance cannot be separated from the broader processes of policy/knowledge transfer, in which international organizations, state, and non-state actors participate (Ganter 2013; Stone 2014). Debates on media governance tend to be more relevant to policy/knowledge exporters, such as the United States and European Union, than to importing societies, such as Brazil and other members of the Mercosul/Mercosur group (Sarikakis and Ganter 2013). The effort made to Europeanize the media of European Union countries

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has provided an additional stimulus for the debate on media governance in this region (Papathanassopoulos and Negrine 2011). On the other hand, in Brazil, the topic of media governance has received modest attention from the academic milieu. There are concrete reasons for this, as Brazil did not experience significant structural changes in its media structure since the 1980–1990s. Unlike what happened in Europe, public broadcasting has never played a relevant role in the country; moreover, transnationalization of the media has been quite limited. In the absence of a deep structural change in the media landscape, the academic debate on media governance remains highly modest.1 Governance as a Neoliberal Policy Paradigm A different approach takes media governance as a policy paradigm (Hall 1993). The reason behind the occurrence of policy paradigms is not to describe the reality but to manage it. The influence exerted by a certain policy paradigm relates to the power of the institutions promoting them. The International Financing Institutions (IFIs)—the World Bank above all—have been key sponsors of the idea of governance (Cammack 2002). Starting in the 1980s, they have played a pivotal role ahead of the neoliberal globalization process. The concept of governance was instrumental in this regard. Good governance is a core criterium used by the World Bank for lending money to countries (Bevir 2010). By doing this, the IFIs disguised political decisions as technical (Williams and Young 1994). Numerous other agencies have exerted a supporting task in this process. The role of the ranking agencies is especially relevant here. They cover different aspects of governance. Some work on credit rating (e.g., Standard & Poor’s, Fitch, and Moody’s), whereas others rate freedom of press (e.g., Freedom House and Reporters without Borders) and corruption (Transparency International) among numerous other aspects (Cooley and Snyder 2015). Being well-ranked provides countries and institutions with social prestige and all sorts of advantages, including better financing 1  The analysis of the titles of articles published in EPTIC, which is the main Brazilian academic journal focusing on political economy of communication, since 2010 shows no reference to the word “governance” (or its Portuguese correspondent “governança”). Mick and Tavares (2017) presented one of the few cases of Brazilian researchers that focus on governance. Nevertheless, they did not make any effort to present an original definition in this regard.

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conditions. Nevertheless, numerous authors have claimed that the criteria and methods behind these rankings are seldom transparent (Giannone 2010; Klein and Chiang 2004). They provided a blatant example of the weight of private authorities in our globalized society (Hall and Biersteker 2009). The rhetoric of governance is full of political consequences. To begin with, it presents a pronounced anti-political and anti-state bias. Governance refers to a set of “good practices” exerted beyond the state. To start with, states are not in charge of defining what “good practices” mean. This responsibility lies in the hands of international, globalized organizations (Brown 2013). Besides, states are not alone in the task of implementing these policies. Civil society organizations (CSOs) also exert a serious role in this respect. At first glance, this appears to be an approach to bring the government closer to the citizens. In fact, since the 1980s, the CSOs have gained considerable prestige. They were associated with a grassroots model of organization and post-materialist values (Offe 1985) and appeared to be the answer to a perceived crisis of political representation. However, on a practical level, in the governance model, the power stays more distant from the regular citizen. Governance relates to the rise of a global civil society (Keane 2003), which makes all the difference. Global status is not available to everybody. It takes considerable organizational and financial resources, as well as prestige, to achieve such status. This indicates that global CSOs are big players, not grassroots organizations (DeMars 2005). They are even more distant from common people than the state. Governance also opposes the principle of popular sovereignty. It contends that decisions relative to some public topics are too serious to be in the hands of voters. On the other hand, specialists should be responsible for making such decisions (Brown 2013). Neoliberals repute dangerous the idea that the elected officials should first listen to the voters. They often call it “populism.” Recently, the notion that populist leaders present a danger to democracy has gained momentum (Levitsky and Ziblatt 2018). Notorious examples include Presidents Donald Trump, in the US, and Jair Bolsonaro, in Brazil. However, accusations of “populism” have targeted politicians with an entirely different profile. Sometimes, promoting social democratic policies can be enough to define politicians as populist. The case of former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva is exemplary here. Social policies targeted at the poor made his government extremely popular. This allowed him to

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get a second term in the 2006 presidential election. He also made his fellow PT member, Dilma Rousseff, his successor in 2010 and again in 2014. This was the first time that a party won four presidential elections in a row. Sectors of the political opposition considered the perspective of a PT’s fifth term intolerable. With the active support of the mainstream media, they claimed that Lula was a populist and thus a threat to democracy. They even coined a term—Lulopetismo—to compare the PT terms ahead of presidency to Venezuela’s Chavismo (Albuquerque and Gagliardi 2020). A campaign of defamation and judicial persecution against Lula and PT took place. In particular, the anticorruption judicial operation Lava Jato proved to be decisive. At first, it was an anticorruption initiative aiming to tackle corruption in Petrobrás—Brazil’s state-owned oil company. However, its focus soon changed to investigate Lula and PT (Meyer 2018). In the end, these efforts succeeded. In 2016, Rousseff was overthrown due to an impeachment process. Brazilian law establishes that impeachment is not a no-confidence vote. A grave felony must happen to justify it. Yet, there was no crime. This led some observers to describe her impeachment as a parliamentary coup. In 2017, Lula was convicted of corruption, based on fragile evidence. He got to jail the next year and was banned from disputing the presidential election (Silva 2020). In 2018, the far-­ right candidate Jair Bolsonaro preyed on this situation and got elected president. In brief, the recent Brazilian misfortunes exemplify how governance may oppose government. Journalist Leitão (2021) provides a crystal-clear example of how this logic works. According to her, Rousseff did not fall because of pedaladas fiscai,2 which was the official reason for impeaching her. A defender of Roussef’s impeachment, she justifies it as a result of “economic mistakes.” She calls it a “fiscal responsibility crime,” but does not explain which crime was committed. In this case, good governance stands above democracy.

2  Pedaladas fiscais is the Brazilian name given to the use of funds from state banks to cover budget gaps. At that time, there was no consensus that this constituted a crime. In fact, this is a usual practice in Brazil. Only two days after overthrowing Rousseff, the Senate decided this would not be a motive for impeachment anymore.

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Regulating Fake News or Maintaining a Monopoly on Truth? The year 2018 was bittersweet for Brazilian mainstream media. Their arch enemy PT lost the first presidential dispute since 2002. However, contrary to their best hopes, this did not open space for a political ally. Instead, the far-right candidate Jair Bolsonaro won the dispute and took advantage of the demoralization of the representative institutions, following Lava Jato. For more than a decade, the media systematically associated them with corruption (Albuquerque and Gagliardi 2020). This provided an ideal scenario for a candidate with an anti-system political style, like Bolsonaro. Bolsonaro had a much more hostile approach to the mainstream media than PT. He served as a federal representative in the National Congress for 27  years and had an obscure political career during most of this time. Political analysts perceived him as a lunatic politician with an extremist agenda (Araújo and Oliveira 2020; Hunter and Power 2019). No one believed he could reach some influence beyond a small circle of followers. However, things changed in 2014. During the election campaign, the mainstream media fostered political polarization against PT (Miguel 2019). This environment proved fertile for far-right groups and allowed Bolsonaro to rise as a leader of the emerging far-right. Using social media, they were PT’s most active opponents (Santos Jr. 2019). Since then, disinformation has been a core part of their political strategy. However, this did not appear as a major problem from the viewpoint of mainstream media organizations (Miguel 2019). After all, they had PT as a common enemy. Despite their opponents’ efforts, Dilma Rousseff managed to win a second presidential term. Defeated in the election’s second round, Aécio Neves did not accept this result and claimed he was a victim of fraud. The mobilization for taking Rousseff out of presidency began soon after the confirmation of her victory. Street protests occurred in many cities in 2014 and 2015, which were presented by the mainstream media as civic events under very favorable lenses (Albuquerque 2019). In this scenario, the far-­ right worked as an important destabilizing actor. They were unpleasant but useful. It was only in 2018 that the fight against disinformation became a core element of the mainstream media’s discourse. The rise of Bolsonaro’s popularity provided the media with a perfect excuse for rebranding themselves. Formerly a contentious player, engaged in regime change, they

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now presented themselves as circumspect accountability agents. They were in charge of defense of “truth” against disinformation initiatives conducted by political extremists. The rhetoric of media governance proved instrumental in this respect. In an ironic plot twist, the mainstream media moved from opposing regulation as such to a piece in a new, neoliberal-­ inspired regulation system. In August 2020, 27 entities representing different sectors of the commercial media joined in the “Freedom with Responsibility Coalition,” including the National Association of Newspapers (Associação Brasileira de Jornais), Brazilian Association of Radio and Television, and other representative institutions of big business. They claimed that it was necessary to protect professional journalism in a digital environment polluted by fake news (Strano 2018). However, the media are not alone. They are a part of a broader, multistakeholder governance system that replaces government regulation. Other stakeholders include social media platforms, fact-checking agencies, philanthropic foundations, universities, and not less important, the Judiciary (Albuquerque 2021b). Fact-checking agencies are a central element of this system. They are in charge of detecting fake news as a means to contain disinformation. Fact-checking is a relatively recent phenomenon. The first initiative in this respect was Factcheck.org, created in the United States in 2003. The creation of the International Fact-Checking Network in 2015 helped to make fact-checking a global phenomenon (Amazeen 2020; Graves 2018). In general, fact-checking agencies work in a similar manner to other ranking agencies. Thus, the criteria they use for selecting the material that they check and analyze are not transparent (Uscinski and Butler 2013). Fact-checking fits well in the logics of media governance and neoliberal globalization. To start with, it relies on an anti-politics worldview. It equates politics to lie and contends with the task of bringing truth to the public. The Washington Post’s Fact Checker initiative makes this crystal clear. It evaluates the politicians’ utterances with a scale of Pinocchios (different degrees of a lie) and Geppetto (when there is no lie). According to this logic, lying is the default for politicians (Uscinski and Butler 2013). Fact-checking agencies do not check mainstream media utterances; their status as truth is taken for granted. However, the same does not hold for the alternative media (Carvalho et  al. 2019; Miguel 2019). Therefore, fake news is not only about what is said but also about who says it. In 2018, the fight against fake news provided an occasion for building a gigantic media coalition. The name given to it was Projeto Comprova

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(Verify Project). The relations between the different agents involved in the project illustrate important aspects of truth-building in the neoliberal globalized era. Twenty-one Brazilian media outlets were part of the project. Some of them were heavyweight members of Brazilian media, including O Estado de São Paulo and Folha de S. Paulo newspapers and Veja and Exame magazines. TV broadcasters (SBT, Band) as well as regional outlets (GaúchaZH and Gazeta do Povo) and digital-born journalistic initiatives (Poder360 and Nexo Jornal) were also members. Three fact-checking agencies were part of the project, too: Truco, Aos Fatos, and Lupa. The initiative was coordinated by the Brazilian Investigative Journalism Association (Associação Brasileira de Jornalismo Investigativo; ABRAJI). For its part, the inception of ABRAJI followed the lead of the Knight Center for Journalism in the Americas, cited in the University of Texas, Austin. The center counts with the support of Knight Foundation. Other foreign institutions supporting the project are the Harvard Kennedy School, Google News Initiative, and Facebook Journalism Project (Albuquerque 2021b). This project aims to not only denounce fake news but also punish the agents who are responsible for spreading it. For this purpose, Facebook attributed a police-like role to fact-checking agencies. Although these agents claim that their task is purely technical, their political bias is perceptible. On June 18, 2018, mainstream and alternative news media informed that Juan Grabois, a Pope Francis’ aide, sent a chaplet to Lula, who was in jail. This was a clear gesture of political solidarity to Lula and happened in a sensitive moment, as the decision on Lula’s right to run for presidency was still pending. There was controversy whether the Pope had, in fact, sent the chaplet or had just blessed them. Lupa classified the version that the Pope sent the chaplet as fake news and recommended sanctions against some media outlets. Although vehicles from the mainstream media also spread the information, only left-wing alternative vehicles were punished. In the following days, Lupa was forced to recognize its error. This led the punishment to be suspended (Santos Jr. and Albuquerque 2019). This episode exemplifies how private authority can work as a means for restricting public speech. However, private authority does not sum up all aspects of this arrangement. Since 2018, proposals to regulate fake news have been over the table in Brazil. They come as an echo already reported in some countries, such as Malaysia, Germany, France, and Italy (Alemanno 2018; Santuraki 2019). In Malaysia, for example, there is a legal provision for

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imprisonment for the disclosure of false information (Smith 2019). In these contexts, the prediction of regulating fake news faced some resistance. Critics argue that this can erode freedom of expression (Santuraki 2019). In Brazil, Bolsonaro’s presidency added complexity to the debate about fake news regulation. This happened because Bolsonaro and his allies were avid disinformation diffusers. In fact, Bolsonaro’s supporter created a disinformation schema known as “hatred office” (gabinete do ódio). Carlos Bolsonaro—the son of the president—is one of the leaders of this initiative. Added to this, the relationship between Bolsonaro and the Legislature and Judiciary went from bad to worse. As he was a federal representative, Bolsonaro never hid his authoritarian inclinations. Several times, he talked about closing the National Congress and Supreme Court. Therefore, the fight against fake news occurred in an environment of institutional instability. In July 2019, the National Congress created a Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry to investigate the fake news delivered in 2018. In the same year, the Superior Electoral Court (Supremo Tribunal Eleitoral) opened a similar investigation. Even though both these investigations were stalled, they provoked angry reactions from far-right activists and intensified attacks on public institutions, especially the Supreme Court (Benitez and Jiménez 2020). Despite the tense relationship with Bolsonaro, the far-right was not the sole target of the Brazilian Judiciary. A patent example of this occurred in 2018 during the election campaign. On September 28, the President of the Supreme Court, Luis Fux, denied a request made by journalist Monica Bergamo to interview Lula in jail. This violated Lula’s constitutional principle of freedom of speech. According to Fux, “regulating free speech is important during the election campaign to protect voters from fake or imprecise information” (Albuquerque and Gagliardi 2020, p.  78). He concluded, “an exceptional relativization of the freedom of the press is needed” (cited in Albuquerque and Gagliardi 2020, p. 78).

Conclusion Media governance is more than a concept; it is also a policy paradigm. It does more than providing means for explaining the world. In fact, it provides a justification that legitimizes certain ways of modifying reality through public policies. Media governance relates to viewpoints and interests associated with the neoliberal globalization process. This chapter

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explores how the media governance logic allowed Brazilian legacy media to change their views about media regulation. Historically, these media have stood against the principle of media regulation as such. In particular, as part of an authoritarian project, they considered the attempts to approve a media regulation framework during the time when PT was ahead of presidency. In response, they engaged in a campaign for taking out PT of presidency by all means and succeeded. In 2016, President Dilma was impeached, and in 2018, Lula’s prison dwarfed PT’s chances to return to presidency. Jair Bolsonaro emerged as the winner of the 2018 elections. His feelings about the mainstream media were much more hostile than those of his PT’s predecessors. Bolsonaro and his allies ran their own social media-­ based disinformation schema, which provided the media with both a problem and an opportunity. On account of fighting fake news, a new model of media regulation emerged, based on the principle of media governance. In this model, the mainstream media was a part of a multistakeholder system, together with other institutions, such as fake news agencies, philanthropic foundations, social media platforms, universities, and the judiciary. These actors reclaimed the role of public speech regulators, especially in social media. As with other neoliberal arrangements, these actors justified their authority in technical terms. However, at a practical level, the exercise of this power revealed a political bias against not only far-right disinformation agents but also the left-wing alternative media.

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Puppis, M. (2010). Media governance: A new concept for the analysis of media policy and regulation. Communication, Culture & Critique, 3, 134–149. Santos, A. (2006). The World Bank’s uses of the “rule of law” promise in economic development. In D. M. Trubek, & A. Santos (Eds.). The new law and economic development: A critical appraisal (pp.  253–300). Cambridge University Press. Santos, M. A., Jr. (2019). VaipraCuba! A gênese das redes de direita no Facebook [Go to Cuba! The genesis of the rightist networks in Facebook]. Appris. Santos, M. A., Jr., & Albuquerque, A. (2019). Perda de hegemonia da imprensa: A disputa pela visibilidade na eleição de 2018 [The press’ hegemony fall. The dispute for visibility in the 2018 election]. Lumina, 13(3), 5–28. Santuraki, S. U. (2019). Trends in the regulation of hate speech and fake news: A threat to free speech? Hasanuddin Law Review, 5(2), 140–158. https://doi. org/10.20956/halrev.v5i2.1625 Sarikakis, K., & Ganter, S.  A. (2013). Priorities in global media policy transfer audiovisual and digital policy mutations in the EU, MERCOSUR, and US triangle. European Journal of Communication, 29(1), 17–33. https://doi. org/10.1177/0267323113509360 Silva, F. S. (2020). From car wash to Bolsonaro: Law and lawyers in Brazil’s illiberal turn (2014–2018). Journal of Law and Society, 47(s1), 90–110. Simis, A. (2010). Conselho de comunicação social: uma válvula para o diálogo ou para o silêncio? [Social Communication Council. A valve for dialogue or silence?] Revista Brasileira de Ciências Sociais, 25(72), 59–174. https://doi. org/10.1590/S0102-­69092010000100005. Smith, R. C. (2019). Fake news, French law and democratic legitimacy: Lessons for the United Kingdom? Journal of Media Law, 11(1), 52–81. https://doi. org/10.1080/17577632.2019.1679424 Stone, D. (2014). Non-governmental Public Action: Knowledge Actors and Transnational Governance. Palgrave Macmillan Strano, S. (2018). Projeto Comprova reúne 24 veículos contra a fake news. Meio & Mensagem, June 19, 2018. https://www.meioemensagem.com.br/home/ midia/2018/06/29/projeto-­comprova-­reune-­24-­veiculos-­contra-­fake-­news. html Acessed October 1, 2020. Uscinski, J.  E., & Butler, R.  W. (2013). The epistemology of fact checking. Critical Review, 25(2), 162–180. Williams, D., & Young, T. (1994). Governance, the World Bank, and liberal theory. Political Studies, 42(1), 84–100. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.14679248.1994.tb01675.x

CHAPTER 8

The Egyptian Media Governance Framework: Gains and Limitations Rasha Allam

Introduction In the last two decades, the Egyptian media has gone through several changes and challenges in terms of ownership, structure, regulatory and legal frameworks. The media system in Egypt has long been classified as transitional (Allam, 2019; Khamis 2011; Rugh 2004). In fact, as little progress can be observed, and the question emerges as to whether a transition will emerge as a continuum in Egypt. Since the 2011 Revolution, the Egyptian media has experienced changes for more than a decade, and although the media landscape has witnessed many regulatory changes as well, these changes continue to be under debate. In transitional countries, it is usually argued that it is the political will that can promote an enabling governance framework that enjoys financial and organizational

R. Allam (*) Department Journalism and Mass Communication, School of Global Affairs and Public Policy, The American University in Cairo, Cairo, Egypt e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. A. Ganter, H. Badr (eds.), Media Governance, Global Transformations in Media and Communication Research - A Palgrave and IAMCR Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05020-6_8

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freedom and serves the public interest or takes different forms of control over the media, such as privatization strategies designed to put the media in the hands of a few people who are connected with the governing regime, preventing media outlets from falling into foreign hands, attempting to promote the rise of politically friendly media—sometimes with the use of state companies or funds—attempting to delay the actual transformation of state broadcasters into public service ones, and later, heavy involvement in the appointment of their governing and managerial bodies. Looking at the new changes and the new landscape would explain the pros and cons. For example, the  newly issued Law# 178, states that the National Media Authority (NMA), formerly known as the Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU) is an indpendent body, yet the only reform that took place was clear in the Egyptian main national1 channel (Channel 1) through the privately owned company Eaalam El-Masryeen, which is known for its strong ties with the government. Yet, the rest of the channels that operate under the NMA have not seen yet any reform approaches, and they still operate with the old governance structure (a rigid structure and a centralized system), which disables and hinders any reform process. In addition, many of the private mainstream media are owned by the same company, Eaalam El-Masryeen. This explains that part of  the media governance framework in Egypt might be in favor of serving the government news agenda, whether in news production, current affairs programs, or entertainment content, and that many steps are still required to be taken for progress to be achieved. The transitional episode is characterized by the paradox of existing elements of freedom of expression that co-exist with very strong elements that favor government control and power. In fact, scholars have recently pointed out that the new practices and the current legal and regulatory framework changes reflect dictating signs of governmental insistence on maintaining control over the national media outlets (Badr 2021). These recent developments are said that they might  place the Egyptian media into a revived form of authoritarianism or neo-­ authoritarianism (Badr 2021; Pioppi et al. 2011). Neo-authoritarianism falls under the umbrella of the authoritarianism concept, where the media’s role is to transfer state messages and plans to the citizens, and where structural aspects, such as ownership concentration and the legal 1

 The term “national” means state-owned and not a public service broadcaster.

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framework, align with the government’s interests (Becker 2004). In the following, I will discuss the historical development of the Egyptian media landscape and show that similar mechanisms of control and power have been present historically.

Foundations of the Egyptian Media Landscape The Egyptian media operate under a dual system of state-owned and private ownership (as well as a diminishing form of political party ownership in the print sector that can be negligible). The oppositional media appear mainly in the press sector, yet their impact is minimal, reflecting the lack of diverse political parties on the ground in addition to the financial difficulties that make it hard to survive (Badr 2021; EJC 2018). Since its introduction, the media (print and broadcast) in Egypt have been performing under different forms of power. Those powers, whether political or commercial, have various direct and indirect tools to influence the production of content delivered to the public. These powers have differed in scope and capacity from time to time (Buccianti and El Richani 2015). For example, the state had practiced full control over media ownership since the 1960s, and since then, it has employed different tools to maintain control over the media, in general, and the broadcast media, in particular, due to its strong influence as a result of high rates of illiteracy (Allam and Chan-Olmsted 2020; Khamis 2011; Webb 2014). In the 1970s, the Egyptian government had a strong grip on the broadcasting sector through Law 13 of 1979 of the Radio and Television Union, which was issued to replace Law 1 of 1971. Law 13 states the establishment of the Ministry of Information (MoI), the appointment of the Minister of Information as a specialist minister for radio and television affairs, and defines the scope of the minister’s work by the president, including his relationship with the Radio and Television Union. This law described the ERTU as a “national” entity, and it was the only entity to be exclusively entrusted with the establishment and ownership of the audio-­ visual broadcasting stations in Egypt, as well as the supervision and control of the audio and visual material broadcast from within. The law also states that the MoI supervises the ERTU and follows up on its implementation of the national goals and services, and other tasks stipulated in this law, in order to ensure that these goals and services are linked to the national goals, social peace, national unity, and the state’s media plan (El-Gody 2014). Law 13 was last modified by Law 223 in 1989, and it

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functioned until early December 2016 when the Egyptian parliament approved Law 92 for 2016 that deals with the institutional restructuring of the Egyptian media. As for print media, the Egyptian government owns controlling stocks in the legacy daily national newspapers in Egypt: Al Ahram, Al Akhbar, and Al Gomhuriya. Historically, the editors of these dailies were used to being appointed by the Shura Council, the Upper Legislation Body, but since 2018, their appointment comes from the newly established regulatory body, the National Press Authority (NPA). The national newspapers are known to be government outlets that support the regime’s political programs. The state-managed national print media have been depending on government subsidies and advertisements as funding mechanisms, yet both funding streams have decreased since 2011 after their pro-Mubarak coverage of the Revolution, which aggravated the journalism crisis. Later, a strong economic reform program led to the flotation of the Egyptian currency that led to a sharp increase in prices of all raw materials, especially imported paper and inks, therefore increasing the losses. Private newspapers were introduced into the market in 2004 with Al Masry Al Youm, which has been able to compete with the established Al Ahram newspaper. Within a few months, it got almost similar circulation rates due to its coverage of key local problems and by introducing a news agenda that differed from the state-owned agenda. Al Masry Al Youm succeeded in attracting a good number of readers. Currently, the three private newspapers with the highest circulation are Al Masry Al Youm (2004), Al Youm7 (2008), Al Watan (2012). Despite the introduction and the development of private media channels and news organizations, in the ealry 2000s, and the increasing critical coverage, the government contained oppositional trends via various governance mechanisms, such as demanding large deposits for the establishment of a newspaper or a website, controlling the issuance of broadcast licenses to private stations, controlling printing facilities, and delaying the issuance of licenses (Allam 2019; Amin 2002; Khamis 2011; Webb 2014). The licensing process for private media used to be issued by the General Authority for Investment (GAFI), which belongs to the Ministry of Investment, and it is a clear example of the containment strategy. Licensed media would not dare to cross the red lines in order not to risk losing their licenses. One recent example illustrates this: in 2016, the Egyptian TV presenter Rania Badawi was permanently suspended from co-hosting a daily talk show on OnE, a private satellite Egyptian channel, after

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criticizing the Minister of Investment by describing her as the “worst” Minister of Investment. A new rising actor on the media scene is social media, where private news organizations’ presence on the digital and social media platforms highly exceeds the state-owned presence (El-Gody 2020). Higher levels of engagement with private media are evident, with 9–13  million on Facebook and 2.8–7 million on Twitter, when compared to state-owned media followers, who fall in the range of 600,000–2 million on Facebook and 29,000–4.5  million on Twitter as of 2019 (Allam and Hollifield 2021). Digital native news websites, such as Masrawy, Welad El Balad, and others, started to appear, attracting rising audiences. Yet it is important to highlight that digital websites are not free from different sorts of control and restraint when they go beyond the red lines.

Media Governance Within the Post-2011 Legal Framework Since the 2011 Revolution, there have been several calls to safeguard the independence of the media by curbing direct and indirect government interference and establishing a regulatory system for Egyptian media outlets (Allam 2021; Badr 2021). The abolition of the MoI was one of the main demands that was fulfilled in 2014. Two years later, in 2016, a new law was ratified, creating three new bodies that would regulate the print, broadcast, and electronic media after intensive negotiation rounds with media experts, practitioners, and owners. The three regulatory bodies are the Supreme Council for Media Regulations (SCMR), which regulates the private sector  and identifies its relations to the national/state-owned media, the NMA, which supervises the Egyptian national broadcasting sector and replaces the ERTU, and the National Press Authority (NPA), which regulates the Egyptian national press organizations and replaces the Higher Council of the Press (Fig. 8.1). The structure of governance for the Egyptian media has started to take a different shape since then, as the Egyptian media landscape has undergone several changes that make the question of adaptation to the new environment worth studying. A new legal framework was introduced encompassing the following: the change of the state-owned broadcaster, from the ERTU to the NMA, defining it in the new law as a public service broadcaster that enjoys

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Law 180 for 2018 Supreme Council for Media Regulations SCMR

Regulating and Licensing Private Media Outlets

Regulating and Licensing Digital Websites

Law 179 National Press Authority

Law 178 National Media Authority

Regulating Stateowned Publications

Regulating Stateowned Broadcast Media

Fig. 8.1  The new regulatory bodies and their scope in Egypt

management and financial independence (Allam 2021), in addition to the cancelation of the MoI and the establishment of a regulatory body, the SCMR. The new framework also incorporates the changes that took place in the press sector, where it used to operate under Law 96 of 1996, yet now it operates under Law 179 of 2018. The Higher Council of the Press was replaced by the NPA to regulate state-owned press organizations. In late 2018, three new laws were approved by the parliament and ratified by the president; these laws shape the new governance framework for Egyptian media. • Law 180 of 2018: The Regulating Law for the Press, Media, and the SCMR (it identifies the role of the SCMR and its relation to state-­ owned and private media organizations). • Law 179 of 2018: National Press Authority Regulation Law (it identifies the work inside the state-owned press organizations). • Law 178 of 2018: National Media Authority Regulation Law (it identifies the work inside the state-owned broadcast organizations and replaced the ERTU in 2018). Some of these laws, together with the issued policies, were criticized by international and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) for limiting media freedom in Egypt and influencing their behavior. This exemplifies the tensions that have arisen between the push for transformation and conservative interests. According to the Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP), the laws include vague terms, such as national security,

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which would allow authorities to interfere through website blockage or publication suspension, which creates a restrictive media regulatory scheme and highly monitored narratives on social media platforms (TIMEP 2019). Article 19 (2018) has criticized the power given to the regulatory bodies, describing them as “sweeping powers.” In addition, the AFTE, The Freedom of Thought and Expression Organization, had referred to some of the practices amid the absence of the executive charter (AFTE 2019). For example, the conflict of competencies between the Public Prosecution and the SCMR regarding decisions to ban publication remains, as Law 180 of 2018 grants the Council, in Article 94, the power to “prevent publishing or broadcasting media material for a specific period or permanently.” This conflict was clear in the 57,357 Hospital Incident, when the veteran Egyptian scriptwriter Wahid Hamed wrote about the existence of financial and administrative irregularities in the hospital. At this point, the SCMR relied on the texts of Articles 2, 3, and 26 of Law 92 of 2016 for the Institutional Organization of the Press and Media to prevent the broadcast or publication of any material for a specified period or permanently in the event that the media and press institutions violated the standards and principles of the profession, or if they failed to comply with the requirements of national security. Therefore, the SCMR issued a decision to stop publishing content on the issue. As a result, the Public Prosecution summoned the former Head of the Supreme Media Council, Makram Muhammad Ahmad, to question him about the decision, which the Public Prosecution considered to be an infringement of its competence as the body responsible for the publication ban. At the time, Makram Mohamed Ahmed stated that he would ask the concerned authorities to clarify and explain the text of Article 26 of the Law Regulating the Press and Media, confirming the legality of the decision. Another legal concern is that the duration of the work of the Council coincides with the duration of the parliamentary and presidential sessions. The duration of the work of the Supreme Media Council should not coincide with the duration of parliamentary or presidential sessions in order to ensure that such independent bodies are not affected by the government or political parties and that the existence of independent bodies does not depend on the authorities concerned with appointing their members. The report also pointed out that the Drama Committee, established by the SCMR to supervise serials shown on television channels, was in violation of the provisions of Law 430 of 1955, which grants the Central Administration for Censorship of Artistic Works of the Ministry of Culture

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the power to supervise and censor dramas. The same law clarifies the necessary procedures for obtaining a license for a drama series and the right to withdraw the display license after its approval. The above-mentioned examples show the flaws of the governance framework in different aspects, such as conflict between authorities, a lack of demarcation of responsibilities, and the duration of council membership. Another case that exemplifies the struggle and confusion of the current political system with media governance is the creation of the State Ministry of Information (SMoI) in 2020, with Osama Heikal, former head of the media committee in the parliament and former head of the media production city, as the new minister. Even though the ministry is not inscribed into the Constitution, it was developed with the aim of ensuring that governmental policies were well presented in the media and that citizens were aware of the government’s efforts. Yet, on the other hand, heads of regulatory bodies started to criticize the establishment of the ministry since they felt that it might threaten their scope of power. Consequently, many tensions were created between Heikal and the heads of the regulatory bodies, as questions about competencies increasingly arose. The tensions remained throughout the duration of the SMoI, and they clashed when Heikal stated that the media were in crisis, stating that the circulation and advertisement rates of the state-owned newspapers have sharply declined and that the viewership of the state-owned broadcast stations was falling as well. A wave of criticism was directed toward Heikal from different professionals until he submitted his resignation, and the position remained empty until the time of writing this chapter. The ongoing transitional state of media governance in Egypt also comes to light in the controversies about regulating digital media. Digital technology has led to a remarkable increase in the number of Internet users and in the usage of social media platforms in Egypt, which has accordingly affected consumption patterns (Allam and Chan-Olmsted 2020): Mobile penetration has reached almost 90% of the, and the proportion of mobile Internet users  reached  almost 70% with an annual growth rate 30% (Information and Communication Technology Report, 2020). According to Terzis (2008) and d’Haenens et al. (2018), the changes brought about by digital technologies should not affect the basic principles of freedom of expression, nor should they lead to a loss of protection for audiences’ interests and rights. The hype that took place in digital media in Egypt gave citizens room to voice their opinions, and many native digital projects were introduced. Some of them were unable to sustain

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themselves  financilly, while others developed sustainable business models, such as Masrawy, which is the first private news portal in Egypt. It produces all kinds of news, reports, features, and interviews, in addition to its sister websites, the specialized sports website Yalla Kora. Yet, on the other hand, Egypt has witnessed a hype in the amount of fake and fabricated news, and the current limitations, such as the remained state control over the media and a lack of professional and regulatory standards that result in widespread rumors, false news, and partisanship, make it difficult for average citizens to obtain an adequate understanding of the effects of news media on their daily lives (Allam and El-Ghetany 2020). This is in addition to the fact that the governance of digital platforms is still quite vague. For example, the SCMR asked all digital news websites to send an official request for license issuance to legitimize their status, yet to date, the SCMR has issued licenses to a limited number of native digital websites on an occasional basis; yet still the general rules of obtaining or revoking the license are neither clear nor standardized. Other laws that have recently been issued, such as the Cybercrime Law in 2018, trigger much criticism, especially as it requires social media users with more than 5000 followers to be placed under the supervision of Egypt’s media regulator, the Supreme Council for the Administration of the Media. Although it is seen by policy makers as a tool to combat fake news and rumors, it is criticized for being a way to silence users and threaten them. As mentioned above, the new law encompasses digital media and sets rules on those who are willing to launch news websites. In order to limit the phenomena of fake news and fabricated information, the law states that any personal account on social media platforms that exceeds 5000 followers should be registered as a media outlet. Although this was seen as a crackdown on the freedom of expression (TIMEP 2019), the SCMR stated that the rationale was to limit and control the dissemination of fake news.

Media Governance as an Emerging Concept in Transitioning Countries Media governance, from an analytical perspective, acknowledges the role of different stakeholders in setting the governance framework for the media industries. The governance concept is not limited to new methods or new regulations for governing media industries since the concept is broader and encompasses different stakeholders (McQuail 2003; Meier 2018). Therefore, media governance may seem appropriate as a practical

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method applied in transitional regimes to negotiate new conditions and action frameworks. Yet, even though there are recent studies on the Egyptian and Arab media systems, such as by Richter and Kozman (2021), the literature about media governance either in Egypt or in the Arab world is lacking. Media governance in Egypt is neither clearly defined nor put into practice, which itself reflects the limitations of the transitional character of the system. In line with this, Ahmed Esmat, Executive Director of the Alexandria Media Forum, believes that several professionals and practitioners think that the term “media governance” is exchangeable with “media regulations.” He clarified that the term “media governance” is a relatively recent term that is concerned with dealing with media policies, legal rules, and ownership systems (A.  Esmat, personal communication, December, 2020). Hussein Amin, Professor of Journalism at the American University in Cairo, confirms this, as he mentioned that the term “media governance” was not clear in the academic sectors in all universities and media research, not only in Egypt but also in the Middle East, and the region is still in the early stages of building a governance framework (H. Amin, personal communication, January 15, 2020). This might be for several reasons: first, the system that the media used to operate within through a centralized system meant that employees viewed themselves as civil servants who should serve the government’s agenda instead of fulfilling their journalistic role (Khamis 2011). Second, the transitional phase experienced several direct and indirect interferences from the government, which led to media professionals practicing self-censorship to avoid upsetting the government. Third, the lack of knowledge about the concept of media governance was not on the top of media professionals’ minds, so training and more discussion around the topic might be needed. Although there is a lack of definitional work from within Egypt with regard to media governance, and based on the conversations mentioned above, these preliminary definitions given by the experts give important insights into the different aspects of governance, such as the structural-oriented perspective and the professional aspect that focuses on the involvement of workers’ unions and civil society organizations to ensure the inclusion and participation of all stakeholders. Again, it is clear that the concept of media governance in Egypt is challenged by old authoritarian mal-practices, which stand as an obstacle toward achieving an effective governance framework or a clear set of regulations and policies that would be used as a reference and work for the public interest. In fact, with the move toward transition, media

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governance as policy practice is being slowly introduced in Egypt, and hence the literature and debates about its distinctiveness in this context are still emerging (this chapter thus refers to some personal communications with colleagues during the writing of this analysis). Scholarly reflections on media governance focus on the causes of its limitations in Egypt and seek definitional contributions through exploring stakeholders and the tensions between formal and informal mechanisms that surround media governance. For example, Amin explained the limitations and obstacles for media governance, stating that “the state-owned broadcasting system used to operate under a system where favoritism and nepotism were highly practiced. That is why when ERTU changed into the NMA, it did not conform to any governance rule because this concept is new and unusual” (H. Amin, personal communication, January 15, 2020). Furthermore, he emphasized that even after it was changed into the NMA, according to the new law, it is still not conforming to the governance rules, because it was a new entity along with the SCMR and the NPC. This resonates with an earlier analysis pointing to the power of the regime that still prevails in the NMA board governance structure, influencing its news agenda, most of the time in favor of the government (Allam 2020). Therefore, an important reason for blocking institutional change is the organizational structure of the state-owned media, whether broadcast or print, and the old hierarches with a centralized system which controls the communication process inside the organization and over news production (H. Amin, personal communication, January 15, 2020). This opinion echoes with Mahmoud Alam El-Din, Professor of Journalism at Cairo University and a former member of the NPA, who believes that any governance framework aims toward setting rules that should be serving the public interest first. As for private media organizations, Amin added, they do not all operate under a governance framework because they are not aware of the concept, and neither are all the regulatory bodies. In addition to this structure-oriented perspective, in his analytical piece, Esmat (2020) pointed to the informal process of governance as well, describing how the application of the concept of “media governance” on the ground starts with the professional unions of the press and the broadcast organizations, in addition to the institutions responsible for the development of workers and the review of all laws and rules that impede their work. In parallel, a comprehensive societal dialogue about what consumers aspire to should be initiated, and civil society should become involved to create a common ground from which decision makers, owners of media and entertainment

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institutions, and parties concerned with the industry can start. In his assessment, “media governance” does a great service to societies in emerging democracies, and it highlights aspects of the changing nature of media policies in light of the unprecedented technological acceleration (Esmat 2020). This belief that media governance will uplift democratic rule in transitional societies is not uncommon and is at the root of the importation of governance models into transitional countries.

Flawed Importation of “Independence” as a Dimension in Media Governance Independence of Regulatory Entities It is known that governance is not separate from the socio-political system within which media operate, since the social and political characteristics of a country play a big role in shaping its media system in different ways (Terzis 2008; d’Haenens et al. 2018). Cases from Eastern European transitional countries and from Latin America (Sarikakis and Ganter 2014) have followed in the footsteps of Western countries, which have a big influence over the performance of any governance structure in those transitional systems. In general, the UK model of media governance, which has an independent regulatory body to regulate media outlets, with its socially responsible core concept (Mendel et al. 2013), has always been closer to Egypt compared to the American model (Allam 2020). Since the 2011 Revolution, the UK media governance structure has been one of the most attractive models for the Egyptian media system, specifically the idea of an independent regulatory body that sets the different regulations for all audio-visual media outlets. The Office of Communication (Ofcom) is seen as an ideal model that would enable and guarantee media independence and ensure a regulated market that allows fair competition (EJC 2018; Sakr 2012). Although there are other countries that have this dual model, the UK model exemplified by the BBC has built a brand known for impartiality and objectivity, and it uses the English language, which is the most commonly used foreign language. Yasser Abdel Aziz, a media expert and international trainer, wrote in several op-ed articles that “the UK model is attractive to the Egyptian government because it has a unique duality: giving the state the right to own while operating the network for the benefit

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of the public and taxpayers’ money, and it gives the private sector the right to develop and operate” (Abdel-Aziz 2011). He said it was a model worthy of consideration and admiration, and the Arab countries often refer to it when trying to reproduce and borrow some of its features (Abdel-Aziz 2011). Yet, it is apparent that the governance framework of the Egyptian media is not yet capable of implementing an independent media system that would follow a Western model. In the following, I will discuss this by examining the establishment of independent regulatory bodies that were created following some Western examples; and disucss if  the tensions between transition and neo-authoritarian forces pose challenges to successful implementation and foster the dominance of governmental influences. Ideally, regulatory bodies, in general, are state institutions at an arm’s length. Their role is crucial in setting the rules and policies to provide guidelines for media organizations’ practices. However, when looking closely at the structures of the SCMR, NMA, and NPA, they testify to the dominance of government representation and the absence of other vital institutions, such as civil society organizations and NGOs, which would guarantee pluralism. This shows that the regulatory bodies did not establish the foreseen freedoms, which resonates with Hamzawy (2017), who pointed out that the regulatory and legal reforms might help in the creation of a re-authoritarian system. Looking at Law 180, which defines the SCMR’s scope, the law places the regulations for broadcast-, print-, and Internet-based media in one basket and fails to distinguish between them. For example, print- and Internet-based media are preferably self-regulated rather than regulated by state councils. According to Article 19 (2018), giving such unlimited power to the regulatory bodies with vague terms will end up in acts that are biased and disproportionate. Article 19 (2018) states that self-­ regulation has proven to be the best practice to limit government interference, specifically in developing countries. Delegating the process for the regulation of the press and Internet-based media to the regulatory bodies and stating their right to block or shut down websites without mentioning specific conditions that would justify the blockage risks content being blocked arbitrarily and excessively. In addition, the blockage of websites, as per Article 19 (2018), must be determined by a court that has determined that blocking measures are necessary to protect the rights of others’ diversity.

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When examining the appointment mechanism of the three regulatory bodies, it is apparent that there is clear government dominance. The majority are representatives of different governmental bodies, and about one-third are appointed by the president. Although the law ensures independence, the composition does not reflect pluralism or diversity, and it shows a tendency toward applying a government narrative. The SCMR board of trustees is composed of nine members (the head is appointed by the President of the Republic, Vice-Premier of the Council of State; a representative of the Ministry of Finance; a representative of the National Telecommunication Regulatory Authority [NTRA]; a public figure with expertise chosen, again, by the President of the Republic; a member of a press syndicate; a member of a broadcast syndicate; a public figure recommended by parliament; and a representative of the Higher Council of Education). Thus, the government representative and the members appointed by the president constitute more than half of the members. In addition, there is an absence of civil society, NGOs, national councils (i.e., the National Council for Women, National Council for Motherhood and Childhood, etc.), whose presence is important and would ensure diversity during this transitional period. Almost the same structure applies in the governance structure of the NPA and NMA. In both authorities, the government representatives constitute more than half of the board members. In addition to the imbalanced composition, a recent statement by Karam Gabr, the head of the SCMR, raises doubts about the independence and the role of the regulatory body. Gabr wrote in his op-ed in the Al Akhbar daily state-owned newspaper that he will remain “a faithful guard to the Egyptian state adopting its battles and defending it” (Eissa 2021). This statement has been heavily criticized by other opinion writers who ensured the importance of the regulatory body’s independence. Legal and Structural Independence: Ambivalent Outcomes Although the Egyptian media system has undergone several legal and structural changes, when looking closely at the new set of laws, one can understand that there are some advantages and some flaws. Law 180 of 2018 states in its Article 68 that the SCMR is an independent body and is in charge of regulating the affairs of audio, visual, and digital media, print and digital press, and others. It also states that the council enjoys technical, financial, and administrative independence in exercising its functions, and interference in its affairs is not permitted.

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Article 2 ensures that the state guarantees the freedom of the press, the media, printing, and paper, audio, visual, and electronic publishing, and Article 3 confirms that it is prohibited, in any way, to impose censorship on Egyptian newspapers and the media, and it is prohibited to confiscate, suspend, or close them down. However, in Article 4, the Supreme Council may prohibit publications, newspapers, informational, or advertising materials for national security considerations. The same term “national security” was repeated again in Article 69 that talks about the SCMR goals, and it states that one of the SCMR goals is to ensure that media institutions adhere to the requirements of national security. According to Ehab Sallam, a media law expert, the term “national security” is understood yet is left undefined, and in such a transitional phase, this gives room for interference and abuse of the term. Looking at the extent to which the new law adheres to the legal norms, one can see that Egypt’s domestic and international legal obligations ensure the respect of citizens’ freedom of thought, opinions, publications, and expressions, yet the vague usage of terms such as national security or public order might disturb these legal obligations (TIMEP 2019). This law incorporates, for the first time, private and digital platforms, which means that the SCMR has become the sole entity for issuing licensing or imposing fines and revoking licenses. This means that the GAFI, a government entity  that belongs to the minsitry of investment and the body that used to issue license for any private media outlet, is no longer in charge of the process regarding the private sector. In relation to digital platforms, Law 178, which regulates the NMA, demands that all public stations have a presence on digital platforms, recognizing the importance of reaching new generations who are heavy consumers of digital media (Allam 2021). It is also important here to highlight two practices that influence the editorial independence of the Egyptian media outlets and that also have a direct impact on the outcome (content) and the efficacy of the governance framework. First, the different ownership practices that take place in mega companies, such as Eaa’lam El Masryeen, in order to control the majority of the most influential media outlets in Egypt, and second, the dependence of the NMA on government subsidies. These are good reasons to influence the editorial lines of public and private media outlets. These two practices are the outcome of the flaws in the new laws that permits horitontal and diagnoal expansion for a big number of media outlets which sometimes limit and even silence critical or oppositional voices.

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Financial Independence: Confusing Mechanisms Another element of the governance structure deals with financial independence. This is mainly defined through Law 180, which includes some market entry barriers that impede the market entry of new media companies in both print and digital print media. For example, Article 34 states that the establishment of newspapers requires a deposit of LE 6  million ($383,000) for a daily newspaper, or LE 2  million ($128,000) if it is weekly, and for the native digital websites, it should not be less than LE 1000. The deposit should be placed in any bank that falls under the supervision of the Central Bank of Egypt. The law requires that half of these amounts should be placed in the bank for one year prior to any establishment procedures to guarantee the employees’ and workers’ rights in case of discontinuation. According to Mahmound Alam El-Din, Professor of Journalism and Mass Communication at Cairo University and a former member of the NPA, this article is very important in regulating the press industry, in general, and digital media, in particular. He said: The article does not mean to impose restrictions on the number of newspapers or websites, but it is a way to protect the rights of hundreds of employees and it is also correcting a misperception about the digital media, as many believe that it is an easy thing and does not differ from a blog. (M. El-Din, personal interview, February 12, 2021)

On the other hand, this article was criticized for imposing heavy financial burdens on the owners, which might discourage good projects from taking place. Furthermore, Article 87 in Law 180 shows that the SCMR enjoys a variety of funding sources: a budget allocated by the state, fees from licensing media entities, grants and donations, and bank loans. Looking at the imported models, such as Ofcom in the United Kingdom, their funding comes mainly from license fees and/or network and service administrative fees. Sometimes it accepts grant-in-aid from the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport to meet the costs of spectrum management and other statutory duties, such as public interest tests, local media assessments, joint ventures, nuisance calls, and consumer protection. As seen, the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Department funding is limited to certain activities that have to be of help and serve the public as well. Unfortunately, a culture of transparency in terms of budget spending inquiries and allocation does not yet exist. Additionally, the SCMR budget is not public.

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Looking at the financial streams of the NMA according to Law 178, Article 24, the funding sources stated are: government grants; fees from the state budget; fees in return for the work, studies, publications, research, consultations, and services performed by the Commission for those who request it, both at home and abroad; grants and donations accepted by the Commission in accordance with the prescribed rules; the outcome of its activities and the return on investments; and loans given to the Commission after following the prescribed legal procedures. It is quite clear that the main funding source that exists in most of the international models, which is the license fee that is paid monthly by households, is not listed. It is also important to highlight that government grants are not fixed for a certain time period, and this is changeable every year, which makes the whole operation of the NMA vulnerable to government interference or pressure. This resonates with Badr (2021) in terms of the contradiction that exists between the acknowledged freedom in the Constitution and the constraining measures through different legal articles and some practices.

Looking Ahead Importing a model does not guarantee instant success, yet it depends on two main factors: the readiness of the system for actual change and the change of culture that was cultivated within an authoritarian system. This chapter elaborated on the flaws of importing Western models and concepts—such as the idea of “independence”—into a country like Egypt. The argument here is that Egypt has not yet escaped from its transitional phase and is now experiencing tensions between the push for transition and the neo-authoritarian pull. This paradoxical situation also reflects on the media system, where media organizations have been performing under full or partial government control or interference and where the idea of independence or accountability is being abused. The governance framework in Egypt has witnessed several changes since the 2011 Revolution. These changes encompass the establishment of a regulatory body, the cancelation of the MoI, and the issuance of new laws. Although those changes were the main demands of the 2011 Revolution to enable the country to move toward an independent media serving the public interest, it is clear that they are many obstacles to yet overcome. The current governance framework indicates that the government still needs to hold its authority through different means: the composition of regulatory bodies’ boards of trustees, funding streams of public

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media, broadening the scope of the SCMR, and issuing laws, such as anti-­ terrorism and cybercrime laws, which indirectly influence media platforms. The structural reforms that took place, yet with ambivalent outcomes, highlight the necessity of revisiting some legal articles, ensuring the independence of the regulatory bodies, and encouraging content diversity and the representation of different critical opinions. It is apparent that the current media governance framework in Egypt still suffers from challenges during the transition to more responsible, pluralistic, and independent media systems, which is slowing down the transformation process. Although there is some improvement in many legal texts, there are other texts that are articulated in such a way that they help the government maintain and exercise its power. Being under an authoritarian system for the past decades has played a role in the transformation process. Maybe there is no need for more media policies, but what is needed is the real political will to support an effective transformation toward independence at the administrative, financial, and program levels to ensure media institutions’ efficacy. However, while media governance is a possible way to accelerate the transitional processes, its good intentions will always be flawed if there is no consistent assessment of its performance that puts citizens first.

References Abdel-Aziz, Y. (2011). Matha Nafaal be ala’lam almasry. [“How should the Egyptian Media Be Like?”]. Al-Masry Al-Youm. https://www.almasryalyoum. com/news/details/1828854 Allam, R. (2019). Constructive Journalism in Arab Transitional Democracies: Perceptions, Attitudes and Performance, Journalism Practice. https://doi. org/10.1080/17512786.2019.1588145 Allam, R. (2020). Al-Seyasat Al-Monazema Lel’lam [Policies regulating media in Egypt]. Dar Nahdet Masr Press. Allam, R. (2021). From flabby to fit: Restructuring the public broadcasting system in Egypt. Global Media and Communication. Advance online publication. https://doi.org/10.1177/17427665211023978 Allam, R., & Chan-Olmsted, S. (2020). The development of video streaming industry in Egypt: Examining its market environment and business model. Journal of Media Business Studies. Advance online publication. https://doi. org/10.1080/16522354.2020.1853436 Allam, R., & El-Ghetany, S. (2020). News media literacy in the digital age: A measure of need and usefulness of a university curriculum in Egypt. In W. Christ

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& B.  De Abreu (Eds.), Media literacy in a disruptive media environment. (pp. 175–193). Routledge. Allam, R. & Hollifield, A. (2021) Factors Influencing the Use of Journalism Analytics as a Management Tool in Egyptian News Organizations. Journalism Practice. https://doi.org/10.1080/17512786.2021.1927803 Amin, H. (2002). Freedom as a Value in Arab Media: Perception and Attitudes Among Journalists. Political Communication. 19:2, 125 135, https://doi. org/10.1080/10584600252907407 Article 19. (2018). Egypt: 2018 Law on the Organization of Press, Media and the Supreme Council of Media: Legal analysis. https://www.article19.org/wp-­ content/uploads/2019/03/Egypt-­Law-­analysis-­Final-­Nov-­2018.pdf Badr, H. (2021). Egypt: A divided and restricted media landscape after the transformation. In C.  Richter & C.  Kozman (Eds.), Arab media systems (pp. 215–232). Open Book Publishers. Becker, J. (2004). Lessons From Russia: A neo-Authoritarian Media System. European Journal of Communication 19 (2): 139–163. Buccianti, A., & El Richani, S. (2015, September). Policy briefing: After the Arab uprisings. Prospects for a media that serves the public. BBC Media Action. https://www.bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/publications-­and-­r esources/policy/ briefings/after-­the-­arab-­uprisings D’Haenens, L., Sousa, H., & Trappel, J. (2018). Comparative media policy, regulation and governance in Europe: Unpacking the policy cycle. Euro-media Research Group. El-Gody, A. (2014). The use of information and communication technologies in three Egyptian newsrooms. Digital Journalism, 2(1), 77–97. https://doi. org/10.1080/21670811.2013.850202 El-Gody, A. (2020, February 27–28). Convergence and divergence of ICTs inside Egyptian newsrooms: A longitudinal approach [Paper presentation]. @frica Digital Media Conference, Houston, United States. Eissa, El Sayyed. (2021). Al’alam Almasry khat defaa qawi fi zahr el dawla…wa almohema saaba. [“The Egyptian Media is a Front Line to Protect the State…and the Mission is Difficult.”] Akhbar Alyoum Newspaper. https://m. a k h b a r e l y o m . c o m / n e w s / n e w d e t a i l s / 3 3 0 6 0 2 8 / 1 / % 2 ‫­جرب‬-‫كرم‬D % 2 D ‫­صعبة‬-‫­واملهمة‬-..‫­ادلوةل‬-‫­ظهر‬-‫­ىف‬-‫­قوي‬-‫­دفاع‬-‫­خط‬-‫­املرصي‬-‫إالعالم‬ Esmat, A. (2020). Ma yageb an taarefaho aan hawkamet alaalam. [What you should know about media governance.] E’lam.com. https://www.e3lam. com/544098/ European Journalism Centre (EJC). 2018. Media Landscapes. Egypt. https:// medialandscapes.org/country/egypt/education/professional-­development Freedom of Thought and Expression Law Firm (AFTE) (2019). The Supreme Council for Media Regulation: A Reading into the competencies and practices. https://afteegypt.org/en/media_freedom-­2 /2019/04/22/17432-­ afteegypt.html

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Hamzawy, A. (2017). Egypt after the 2013 military coup: Law-making in service of the new authoritarianism. Philosophy & Social Criticism, 43(4–5), 392–405. https://doi.org/10.1177/0191453717695367 Khamis, S. (2011). The transformative Egyptian media landscape: Changes, challenges and comparative perspectives. International Journal of Communication, 5, 1159–1177. https://ijoc.org/index.php/ijoc/article/view/813/592 McQuail, D. (2003). Media accountability and freedom of publication. Oxford University Press. Meier, W. (2018). Media governance: More than a buzzword? In L. D’Haenens, H. Sousa, & J. Trappel (Eds.), Comparative media policy, regulation and governance in Europe (Chapter 4). UK. Mendel, T. et al. (2013). Assessment of Media Development in Egypt. Based on UNESCO’s Media Development Indicators. The International Program for the Development of Communicaton. https://fanack.com/wp-­content/ uploads/Unesco-­Assessment.pdf Pioppi, Daniela, et al. 2011. Transition to What: Egypt Uncertain Departure from the Neo-Authoritarianism. Mediterranean paper series 2011. www.iai.it/sites/ default/#les/mediterranean-­paper_11.pdf Richter, C, Kozman, C. (eds), 2021. Arab Media Systems. Open Book Publishers. https://doi.org/10.11647/OBP.0238 Rugh, W (2004) Arab Mass Media: Newspapers, Radio, and Television in Arab Politics. Westport, CT: Praeger. Sakr, N. (2012). The place of public service broadcasting in Arab democratization processes. In R. C. Bugs & R. Huguenin-Benjamin (Eds.), Public service broadcasting in the MENA region: Potential for reform (pp.  30–36). Panos Paris Institute and the Mediterranean Observatory of Communication. Sarikakis K, Ganter S. (2014). Priorities in global media policy transfer: Audiovisual and digital policy mutations in the EU, MERCOSUR and US triangle. European Journal of Communication 29(1): 17–33. https://doi. org/10.1177/0267323113509360 Terzis, G. (2008). European Media Governance: The Brussels Dimension. Intellect Books, The University of Chicago Press. The Tahrir Institute for Middle East Policy (TIMEP). (2019). TIMEP Brief: The law regulating the press, media, and the Supreme Council for Media Regulation. TIMEP. https://timep.org/reports-­briefings/timep-­brief-­the-­law-­regulating-­ the-­press-­media-­and-­the-­supreme-­council-­for-­media-­regulation/ Webb, E. (2014). Media in Egypt and Tunisia: From control to transition? Palgrave Macmillan.

CHAPTER 9

Media Governance as a Utopian Concept in a Local Mediascape: Challenges for Conceptual Development in South Korea Hyejin Jo and Dal Yong Jin

Introduction It is inevitable that power relations between nation states and corporations are viewed in terms of the conceptual development and challenges of media governance. Furthermore, the general business strategy of conglomerates as active agents in the media industry implies that there are gray zones that could be interpreted as openness, but are, in fact, more strongly linked to utopianism. To explore this utopianism that is embedded in the conceptual development of media governance, along with its challenges, it is crucial to argue that media governance is a utopian concept in the Korean context because it fails to acknowledge the local challenges and shapes the gray areas of media regulation mostly due to the

H. Jo • D. Y. Jin (*) Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada e-mail: [email protected]; [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. A. Ganter, H. Badr (eds.), Media Governance, Global Transformations in Media and Communication Research - A Palgrave and IAMCR Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05020-6_9

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concept’s Western-originating regulations and policies. In addition, the word “utopian” herein refers to how challenging media governance represents the local context and, at the same time, how this suits an internationalized mediascape. The utopianism of media governance is not only a problem in Korea but is also an issue in the rest of the world. Its importance has been highlighted ever since the emergence of the Internet as a decisive part of the contemporary mediascape. If the concept of media governance worked adequately enough to enable the integration of the demands of governments, institutional organizations, and civil society, there would be no uncertainty or utopianism, and media governance would not need to be seen as a utopian concept. The problem is that the roles of governments, institutional organizations, and civil society are different and often irreconcilable; they have quite distinct interests, even if they sometimes work together toward particular aims embedded in the media system. The government sometimes allows some media corporations a free hand in governing their content and platforms. In this respect, it is more important—especially in the global context of media governance—to unpack the power relations between governments and corporations at the local level. This chapter examines how in South Korea (hereafter Korea) the conceptual development of media governance and its challenges imply utopianism in the local media-governance context since the local mediascape drives many changes in new media environments. More specifically, the media industry in Korea has played a significant role in the political economy since the conglomerate-driven development led by Samsung, LG, and Hyundai in the 1990s (Ryoo 2008). These corporations’ business strategy was closely connected to the change in Korea’s mediascape and policies that interacted with the media (Ito et al. 2010; Kim 2018; Ryoo 2008). Through a Korean case study analyzing local cases via a political economic framework, we aim to show the ways in which utopianism facilitates media governance as a utopian concept in this setting. Herein, the political economy is viewed as an adequate lens through which to determine the interplays between the public and private sectors and to unpack the utopianism embedded in the media and digital platforms’ governance frameworks. More specifically, we first briefly examine governance as a theoretically open concept (Puppis 2010) across various social science fields. Second, we assess media governance specifically in terms of Internet and platform governance frameworks. This offers an integrated view of utopianism embedded in the unclear boundaries between the media, the

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Internet, and the platforms by focusing on the gray areas formed by the transitions among them. Finally, we conclude by discussing what is currently missing in Korean media governance.

A Korean Perspective on Media Governance Many scholars have disagreed on the definition of governance due to the openness of the concept (Puppis 2010). Similarly, it is an inherently interdisciplinary concept because it is discussed from various perspectives, such as those of economics, political science, international relations, public policy, law, sociology, and media communication studies (van Eeten and Mueller 2013), which creates space for discussing governance from many different regulatory structural dimensions. Analyzing any governance framework initially requires identifying the relevant actors from the public and private sectors and their socio-political dimensions (Kim 2018). Modern governance not only involves formal government actors and agencies but also private-sector actors—from a variety of stakeholder institutions, organizations, and corporations—and civil society. It is sometimes thought of only in terms of regulation, but governance involves a great deal more than regulation (Youn 2020). In addition, governance can be broadly viewed “as institutional steering” (Just and Latzer 2017, p. 241 as cited in Schneider and Kenis 1996), which is used to expand the role of traditional governments both horizontally and vertically (Engel 2004; Just and Latzer 2017). Governance therefore involves a complex network of nation states, corporations, and a variety of other stakeholder organizations, along with the “ecosystem” of relationships among them (Just and Latzer 2017; Kim 2018; Puppis 2010; Youn 2020). The lack of a clear, generally accepted definition of governance results in a blurred boundary between regulatory structures, socio-political circumstances, and the various forms of regulation that are in place both locally and globally. One could argue that governance, as a concept, is open (Puppis 2010), and one could assert that this blurry characteristic of governance is an essential aspect of governance. However, it certainly makes governance ambiguous in many ways. In addition, the varying contexts of regulatory structures result in a gray area connected to utopianism regarding the roles played by the multiplicity of public- and private-sector actors who are involved (Youn 2020). This chapter therefore starts with the issue of utopianism as a challenge embedded in the idea of governance. In this sense, from a Korean perspective on media governance—especially due to

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it being actively driven by the major corporations and the unique characteristics of the Korean infrastructure (Im et al. 2010; Jin and Ryoo 2016)—it is necessary to revisit whether governance’s openness, in terms of its conceptual development and challenges, is based on its ambiguous positionality in the context of utopianism, since it resembles the structural logic of corporation-driven changes (Ryoo 2008) in the globalized media industry, and the recent platformization has been led by several major corporations expanding their platform power by utilizing Korean media governance.

Platformization in Media Governance The growth of information and communication technology (ICT) across the globe has changed the contemporary media environment in many ways. There have been changes, often profound ones, in its format, structure, content, usage, and systems (Kim 2018). Locally, the Internet and relevant technologies, including those that exclusively target domestic markets (Im et  al. 2010), and the Internet and other media based on mobile technologies, have grown rapidly and enormously as a form of platformization. According to Nieborg and Poell (2018), the term platformization means “the penetration of economic, governmental, and infrastructural extensions” (p.  4276) of digital platforms into the relevant ecosystems affecting not only the cultural industry but also the media ecosystem. That is, platformization is defined as a hierarchical extension of a platform’s broader coverage, and it has a far-reaching influence from the top (the government and the platform company) to the bottom, as it is embedded in people’s daily experiences of digital platforms and their services (Just 2018). Hence, we bring this term into the discussion on media governance, along with Internet and platform governance, to examine how media companies dominate the market due to the penetration of their digital platforms. Simultaneously, as the media industry has been globalized within internationalized mediascapes, the need for new media regulations and policies has risen (Kim 2018). According to Flew et al. (2019), the paradigm shift from media as the Internet to media as a digital platform has been accomplished by online users, and media as a digital platform is now regarded as the Internet. This shift puts the onus on the media located between the Internet and digital platforms to regulate themselves. Media governance can thus move beyond regulations and policies toward an integrated approach to managing the

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ecosystem. This point is connected to the perspective on governance as management rather than just as regulations (Youn 2020), but it does not capture precisely how media governance operates in the gray areas formed by the interactions between traditional media, the Internet, and platforms. According to Kim (2018), the relationship between media and ICT was initially applied to the concept of Internet governance, which is a useful framework for seeing the interplay and development of ICT-driven media and their impact on media as infrastructure. The term Internet is itself related to the infrastructure perspective enacted by operational technologies and relevant policies (DeNardis 2014; DeNardis and Hackl 2015). It is used to indicate “the institutional and policy problems related to the global coordination of Internet domain names and addresses” (van Eeten and Mueller 2013, p.  724). Internet governance is a form of regulatory reform, but it focuses on the issues embedded in Internet construction in order to reach users. Thus, the discussion mainly deals with classic problems of privacy and security, such as the role of the public and private sectors and the power relations between them from an economic and socio-cultural perspective (van Eeten and Mueller 2013). The approach or the orientation of regulations and policies is different from that of media and digital platforms. However, Internet governance and media governance are not separable in their usage of terms, and they play a replaceable role in terms of conceptual awareness. Internet governance as infrastructure concerns the development of Internet operations, which do not relate to content but to the format. This does not mean that Internet governance is not related to content regulations and policies, but the approach is closer to technical designs and access issues than to the content of media and platforms (or media as a digital platform). Meanwhile, there has been a strong call for reforms of the regulations and policies due to the changing global mediascape in order to strengthen civil networks in terms of both decision-making and conceptual development (Puppis 2010). This call has focused on digital platforms because these platforms have driven most of the changes (Fay 2019, para 2). Similarly, media globalization has facilitated change because “media globalization intersects with a transformation of media itself, due to media convergence and the rise of global digital platforms” (Flew et al. 2019, p. 45). In Korea’s case, two local platform companies primarily used by locals (Jin and Ryoo 2016)—Kakao and Naver—are now globalizing in some regions of Asia (Steinberg 2020). Global platforms (mostly social media

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platforms), such as Facebook, YouTube, Google, Twitter, and Instagram, provide essential branding services that accelerate content rather than create it (Gillespie 2010; Gorwa 2019), and thus they have been leading actors in rapid platformization. For Kakao and Naver, what is different from those global platforms is that they create content. These businesses acquired and merged some corporations vertically to produce and distribute forms of content from K-pop to K-drama. Srnicek (2016) argues that the term platform properly refers not only to the services that platform companies provide but also to the platform companies themselves. Media companies thus call themselves platform companies and social media companies. Therefore, media governance and platform governance overlap in terms of media policies and regulations. At the same time, there is a rising demand for citizen participation in both media and platform content, although with the accelerating platformization of media industries, the distinction is increasingly meaningless, since media companies are now also virtually platform companies (Flew et al. 2019). In addition, due to the market being flooded by global platforms, more precisely U.S.-made platforms, platform imperialism is connected to platformization in the media system, and it affects media and platform governance in terms of regulatory reforms. The Western dominance in local cultural markets— specifically, in Asian markets—driven by the power of Western digital platforms requires more robust local regulatory frameworks because, in most cases, U.S.-made platforms are regulated only by the law and policies of their country of origin (Choi 2020a), when they can be said to be regulated at all. Platform governance scholars (Gillespie 2015; Gorwa 2019; Langlois 2013) acknowledge that the services that platform companies provide impact individual behavior, which is driven by the content they curate and present. This is more oriented to individual engagement at the user level. At the same time, it emphasizes citizen participation at a network level, enacted by media outlets in the context of media governance (Gorwa 2019; Langlois 2013). Thus, Internet access to social media platforms has been an essential aspect of the ongoing conversation around who should control the Internet (DeNardis and Hackl 2015). Nevertheless, platformization in media governance has a distinctive approach that situates it in relation to changing mediascapes. It is the challenge posed by overlapping relationships among frameworks that leads to uncertainties about citizen participation and the role of the public and private sectors in decision-making.

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Two Giants: Kakao and Naver This section uses two case studies to present utopianism as embedded in the regulatory framework of media governance. We examine the top two Korean media and platform companies—Kakao and Naver—as leading private-sector actors in the conceptual development of media governance in Korea. Through our examination, we show how the public sector maps out a corporate-centric governance framework, and we investigate how this corporate-centric decision-making process has excluded new actors in the private sector, thus diminishing the diversity of the process. This has resulted in fierce competition and has sparked the debate on Kakao’s mobility service versus Tada, a new mobility platform. No discussion on the history of the Internet, media, and digital platforms in Korea can ignore the two “giants” of the sector: Kakao, one of the large, hegemonic “conglomerates” that dominates the Korean economy and is a pioneer of Korea’s IT sector (Cho 2019), and Naver. They are mega platform companies whose market presence in the Korean mediascape can be compared to that of global corporations in international mediascapes. Kakao (originally Daum Kakao) can broadly be classified as an IT firm, but it also qualifies as a media company because its services include the curation of online news and broadcasting. Daum is one of the local portal sites in Korea. Kakao and Daum merged under the name Daum Kakao in 2014 (Shu 2014). It has since changed its name back to Kakao. At the same time, it can be regarded as a platform because of its hegemonic online messaging service, KakaoTalk, the most popular messenger app in Korea, used by 45.98  million active users, as of Q4 2020, out of 51.82 million of the total population of Korea (KOSIS 2019; Statista 2020). In other words, almost all Korean users download and use KakaoTalk in Korea (Park 2021). Since launching KakaoTalk in 2010, Kakao has continuously expanded its service empire, often working together with the Korean government and in close alignment with national development policies. One recent example of this was in 2019, when Kakao launched a youth loan program via its mobile banking service, Kakao Bank, in collaboration with the Seoul Metropolitan Government (Department of Youth 2019). Many of Kakao’s other services are similarly integrated with ministry-level policymaking processes aimed at promoting government-led national development goals. Naver, owned by NHN, a Korean IT company (previously Hangame, a game company), since 1999, has not yet provided a wireless service, but it

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owns the most powerful search engine in Korea, where its dominance even exceeds Google’s (PunchKorea 2020). Naver has recently come to be regarded more as an online platform than as a portal site. With the advent of smartphones as most people’s primary means of Internet access, Google’s dominance has increased because it is set as the default search engine in both iOS and Android operating systems (Chen 2020). Both Naver and Google offer similar services, but Google’s continuing expansion in Korea has prompted the Fair Trade Commission to look into its performance several times since 2017 regarding information security and monopolistic operations (along with Facebook’s) (CPI 2017; Kim 2020a; Nam 2020a). In terms of platformization, these issues overlap with the question of Internet governance in various aspects. At the same time, the role of the Korean government is bound to increase as data governance or artificial intelligence (AI) governance (also known as algorithmic governance) comes to the fore of media, Internet, and platform governance, which is the current trend in globalized mediascapes alongside the growing internationalized “techlash” against monopolistic platforms. Algorithmic governance is defined as “an example of governance by technology” (Just and Latzer 2017, p. 242). In this regard, AI governance, in this chapter, is defined as a more data-driven form of governance than that of traditional governance by the media, the Internet, and digital platforms, yet it contains those overlapping issues embedded in the governance frameworks. In the age of globalization, new media technologies are deeply connected (Jin 2020), specifically to data-driven societal issues affecting governance frameworks. Data governance aims to manage data securely (Jeong et al. 2020), which brings us back to the fundamental Internet-­ governance questions regarding security, confidentiality, and privacy. ICTs are thoroughly embedded in the conceptual development of governance frameworks, and they also play a crucial role in globalization (Jin 2020; Ryoo 2008). The issue of utopianism has become a repetitive concern in discussions on new regulations and policies and even in the regulatory reformations involving the same problems in the same sectors. The relationship between the local leading actors, such as Kakao and Naver in the private sector, can highlight how policies and regulations made by governments can enhance capitalist accumulation and power through governance frameworks. It is therefore more appropriate to look into the local case between two local platforms.

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Mobility War: Tada Versus Kakao’s T Venti Mobility services, such as Uber, which launched its carpool service in Korea in 2017 (Yonhap 2017), and Lyft in North America, are the leading global players in the ride-hailing service sector, and they are neither media nor social networking services, such as Twitter, Facebook, or Instagram. However, this does not preclude media platform companies from entering the mobility market. In Korea, for example, one mobility service, T Venti, is owned by Kakao. Launched in 2019 (Kwak 2019) as part of Kakao T services, it was restructured in 2020 specifically for people using a mobility service for work (Choi 2020b), although many of those using Kakao T for work also use it for personal transportation. The government’s corporate-­centric policies and regulations impacted media governance by enabling Kakao to launch a nonmedia service. Korea’s mobility services’ central point relates to how those services are linked to the existing taxi industry to maintain its ecosystem. In 2018, Tada jumped into the field and, in so doing, inserted itself at the center of an ecosystem debate between the public and private sectors. The government had no problem with media/platform companies launching new platform services, such as mobility or even banking (Choi 2016) services, in the context of the ambiguous media-governance framework. In contrast, it had trouble with a small, local ride-hailing platform company, Tada, at least after the service started to be used by large numbers of people, threatening larger companies’ dominance of the private sector (Lee 2020). Nation-state power and its impact on the private sector remain prevalent in governance, regulations, and policies. This is not so as to emphasize “governing without government” (Czempiel and Rosenau 1992, cited in Colebatch 2009, p. 60) but to move from government to governance, a situation in which “the state becomes a collection of inter-­ organizational networks made up of governmental and societal actors with no sovereign actor able to steer or regulate” (Colebatch 2009, p.  60). Through the examination of Tada and Kakao, utopianism embedded in corporate-centric, apparently Kakao-centric, policymaking can be applied, and not only to media governance facilitated by media and platform companies’ non-media services.

Streaming War: Netflix Versus Watcha The competition between Netflix and Watcha highlights a different aspect of utopianism in Korean media governance. Netflix, well known as the world’s dominant video-streaming platform, as of 2020, had 195 million

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subscribers globally (Laporte 2020). Netflix began video-streaming services in the United States in 2010, and by 2020, it had subscribers in more than 190 countries (Dwyer et al. 2018; Setoodeh 2017). In Korea, Netflix Korea launched its services in January 2016 and reached 4.1 million paid subscribers in 2020 (Kim 2021). Its success has naturally inspired many video-on-demand (VOD) streaming competitors, such as Disney Plus, HBO, Hulu, Amazon Prime Video, YouTube Movies and Shows, and Apple TV.  However, after Netflix launched in Korea in 2016, Korea’s over-the-top (OTT) market entered a new phase marked by more intense competition (Dwyer et al. 2018). Many content-streaming platforms, also known as OTT services, have entered the market since the late 2010s, most notably Watcha, Seen, Wavve, and TVing. OTT services in Korea, such as Gom TV and Afreeca TV, which are Internet-based video- and live-streaming services, have been in the market since 2004 (Dwyer et al. 2018). However, they are technically different from more recent VOD streaming services. Later, Netflix-looking VOD services were launched by the top three telecommunication companies—SK Telecom, KT, and LG U Plus—through their Internet Protocol TV (IPTV) services—Btv, olleh tv, and U+tv in Korea. Most are operated by or affiliated with larger traditional broadcasting and media companies and specialize in content from these channels or related production companies. Existing broadcasting companies, media firms, Internet providers, and startup companies entered the market, yet the platform power of Netflix in the Korean market continued to grow. By March 2020, Netflix in Korea had achieved a 10,000 percent increase in revenue (Chung 2020). Simultaneously, since Netflix arrived in Korea, the relevant policies and regulations have arguably been eased (Ko 2020) or not even modified, because Netflix is not a Korean-made platform. We are not arguing that the public sector in Korea should regulate Western platforms including Netflix or disable those services in Korea because banning those platforms is not feasible. Although there have been rising demands to do so, we contend that it is more important to make local platforms stronger (Kang 2019; Kim 2020b; Ko 2020; Kwak 2019; Seo 2020a), as this is the public’s ambiguous positionality sector. Watcha, for example, faces various conflicts driven by the utopianism of the public sector. Like Netflix, Watcha is not affiliated with a more traditional broadcasting company presenting its own channels’ VODs, but unlike its giant competitor, it has not produced original content. In

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December 2020, however, Watcha announced that it would soon have its own content based on the model of Netflix originals (Cho 2020). As a result, the foreign platform content dominance can be expected to decrease (Jung 2020); however, because the U.S.-made platforms are arguably privileged at being able to enter the local market and expand in that market, it is skeptical to see locally produced content would contribute to the local market dominance practically against platform imperialism. Jin (2013) describes the privileged expansion of U.S.-made digital platforms in local markets, such as Korea, as platform imperialism, benefiting from the (Western) platforms for capital accumulation, which equates to the same dominance as the imperial power embedded in such platforms (Jin 2013, 2015). In Watcha’s case, the hierarchical media system embedded in the capitalist ecosystem is stacked against smaller local companies, such as Watcha and Tada. Local restrictions on 4K services (as infrastructure) have prevented Watcha from starting its 4K service, while in contrast, 4K is available on Netflix, YouTube, and a local platform, Wavve, operated by one of the telecommunication companies, SK Telecom, which has merged with three large broadcasting companies’ OTT platforms—KBS, MBC, and SBS (Nam 2020b). Wavve (previously Pooq TV) mainly offers on-air broadcasters’ channels. Movies are available, and 4K services can only be provided if the VODs are associated with large broadcasting companies (Shim 2020). More specifically, Netflix, YouTube, and Wavve do not have to pay the high-priced network usage fees because Netflix and YouTube are not Korean-born platforms, and Wavve is backed up by three major broadcasting companies and the most powerful telecommunication company in Korea. The problem of availing of a 4K service is connected to the ongoing but, to date, indecisive discussion on net neutrality. The point of the long debate is that Watcha has been paying for Internet usage as a content-­ streaming service, but because the network was constructed by telecommunication companies, there are no servers available for foreign digital platforms such as Netflix and YouTube. According to the telecommunication companies, if these foreign platforms cause traffic, there is no server for their operations (Seo 2020b). Thus, there is no reason to make them pay a net usage fee, despite the number of users climbing rapidly. In this regard, 4K services are not available at Watcha. Utopianism embedded in treating similar services differently highlights a hierarchical regulatory problem. As discussed, Netflix’s position is

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arguably privileged by the government easing the regulations for Netflix due to the origin of the platform (Ko 2020), whereas Watcha is struggling with a local regulatory framework for local platforms. In 2004, there was an attempt to reform the vertical media-governance regulatory framework by introducing a more flexible system, but it did not get far, despite the emerging necessity of doing so, which the government acknowledged (Kim 2018). In fact, the hierarchical rigidity of traditional regulatory frameworks has, if anything, been hardening due to the effect of ambiguities regarding the extent of the regulations. Flexibility does not always end utopian troubleshooting, and vice versa, but it changes approaches and boundaries in regulations and policies for media governance. Therefore, it is evident that media governance in Korea is ambiguous, largely as a result of a vertical structure that cements the leading role of powerful, established actors.

Conclusion This chapter has investigated utopianism in the conceptual development of Korean media governance via practical observations. More specifically, it explored how platform companies collaborate with the Korean government and platformize the local mediascape with the dominant Western platform powers present in the mediascape. This chapter concluded that utopianism is a repetitive issue embedded in the process of platformization in Korea where new regulations and policies are under discussion. Similarly, through the case studies, we identified the current trend toward platformization as an effective way of expanding Western cultural dominance facilitated by foreign media companies. This can enable a deeper questioning of the problem of ownership and centralized power (Flew and Waisbord 2015) as facilitators of market monopolies and governance decision-­ making. This is why many practitioners in Korea emphasize the use of local platforms (Kang 2019; Kwak 2019; Ko 2020; Kim 2020b; Seo 2020a), but there is still a lack room for citizen participation in Korean media governance. Thus, to raise more media-governance opportunities for citizens, we suggest that Korea’s corporate-centric approach to media governance and hierarchical platformization should embrace various voices from civil society so that Korean citizens can participate in media governance.

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Setoodeh, R. (2017, August 15). Has Netflix’s Ted Sarandos rescued (or ruined) Hollywood? Variety. http://variety.com/2017/digital/features/ted-­sarandos-­ netflix-­original-­moviesshonda-­rhimes-­1202527321/ Shim, J. S. (2020, January 16). 왓챠의 울분…“한국서 4K는 유튜브⋅넷플릭스⋅웨 이브만 가능” [Watcha’s resentment. 4K is only available at YouTube, Netflix and Wavve in Korea]. Byline Network. https://byline.network/2020/01/16-­78/ Shu, C. (2014, May 25). Kakao and Daum to merge, creating one of South Korea’s largest Internet companies. TechCrunch. http://bit.ly/1mpNvZl Srnicek, N. (2016). Platform capitalism. Polity Press. Statista. (2020). Number of monthly active users of KakaoTalk in South Korea from 2nd quarter of 2015 to 1st quarter of 2020. Statista. https://www. statista.com/statistics/746249/south-­korea-­kakaotalk-­monthly-­active-­users/ Steinberg, M. (2020). LINE as super app: Platformization in East Asia. Social Media + Society, 6(2), 1–10. https://doi.org/10.1177/2056305120933285 van Eeten, M. J. G., & Mueller, M. (2013). Where is the governance in Internet governance? New Media & Society, 15(5), 720–736. https://doi.org/ 10.1177/1461444812462850 Yonhap. (2017, September 21). Uber launches carpool service in Seoul for diversification. The Korea Herald. http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud= 20170921000873 Youn, S. M. (2020). Media governance. Nanam.

PART III

New Perspectives and Conceptual Innovations

CHAPTER 10

A New Perspective on the Importance of the State in Global Internet Governance: Tracing China’s Participation Hong Shen

Introduction Using China as a case, this chapter argues that we need to re-consider the role of the state in the discussion of global Internet governance. I start by reviewing the “rise and fall” of the state in the scholarly literature in the field of international communication, from the modernization theory in the 1950s to various variants of globalization theory in the 2000s. The rise of the Internet has further contributed to the decline of the state. Against this trend, this chapter argues that we need to re-consider the role of the state, especially within the subfield of global Internet governance. First, despite all the rhetoric of a spontaneous, self-organizing, or “multi-­ stakeholder” global Internet governance community, state power,

H. Shen (*) Human-Computer Interaction Institute, Carnegie Mellon University (CMU), Pittsburgh, PA, USA e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. A. Ganter, H. Badr (eds.), Media Governance, Global Transformations in Media and Communication Research - A Palgrave and IAMCR Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05020-6_10

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especially the power of the United States, is still the dominant force in managing today’s global Internet. Second, recognizing that, especially for the global South, the “nation-state remains a key vector of political economic and technological power” (Zhao 2010, p. 268), a more just and democratic global Internet governance system requires more active and equal participation of the states from the South. The complicated role of the state, and its dynamic interaction with market players—as my short review of China’s participation in this crucial domain shows—however, requires careful and detailed analysis.1 Before elaborating on those points, however, there is a necessity to discuss the concept of the “state” and “market” first. Although I will still use them as two independent terms in this chapter, it is only for analytical convenience—for the use of the term “state” and “market” will be more easily contextualized in the literature. Rather than being two autonomous entities, however, the state and the market, or the political and economic power, have been mutually constituted throughout history. Indeed, as critical scholars (e.g., Polanyi 1944) have argued against free market utopians, that treating the “state” and the “market” as two distinct conception containers is deeply problematic as there is no such thing as a “free market” (or a “spontaneous, self-regulating” market) that is entirely independent from state intervention. Similarly, in a capitalist society, it is also hard to imagine a state that is entirely “free from” various social power relations. Nordenstreng (2001) reminds us that “state and intergovernmental organization are not socio-politically neutral or inherently biased in one or another direction, but always represent the forces that happen to be in power” (p. 159). To fully elaborate on the contentious debates over the “state” and the “market,” and their complex relations, would be beyond the scope of this chapter.2 Without engaging these long-standing debates, in this chapter, I want to emphasize the mutually constitutive relationship—and complex interactions—between the “state” and the “market” in constructing China’s participation in global Internet governance, moving beyond a simplistic state versus market dichotomy. 1  Despite its growing regional and international power, China might still be considered a country of the global South, for its relatively low Human Development Index score, its semicolonial history, its sociologist revolution, and its participation in the South-South cooperation projects. For a detailed discussion, see Bhuiyan (2014). 2  For the famous debate between Ralph Miliband and Nicos Poulantzas on the role of the state in the 1960s and its influence in communication studies, see Mosco (1982).

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The “Rise and Fall” of the State in International Communication: An Overview In this section, I will provide a historical overview of the field of international communication, with an emphasis on how varying theoretical paradigms position the role of the state in their analytical frameworks. My intention is not to provide a comprehensive intellectual history of all the theoretical approaches in international communication (for a more comprehesive overview, see Thussu 2000). Instead, this section foregrounds that over the years, the state’s role has received varying degrees of attention in the literature and, in general, there has been a “rise and fall” of the state as the focus of investigation in the field. Finally, I will provide a short insight into how the Chinese academic discourse has been heavily influenced by Western literature. Early modernization theories in the 1950s and 1960s, anchored in the Cold War context, argued that communication was both a critical tool for and an important index of the development and modernization of developing countries. Later, the rise of the dependency and cultural imperialism theses of the 1970s, which climaxed in the New World Information and communication order (NWICO) debate, could be viewed as the field’s intellectual responses to the political, economic, and cultural struggles of the newly independent “Third World states.”3 Both of the approaches prioritize the role of the state in their analyses. In the 1980s, the “cultural turn” (Kavoori and Chadha 2009) started to emerge and quickly gained influence, with a specific emphasis on textual polysemy and audience power. Toward the 1990s, the field has been dominated by different variants of globalization theory. Despite its internal diversity, the globalization paradigm in general assumes that the state is no longer an important actor in international communication (Morris and Waisbord 2001). Keeping in mind the limitations of linear narratives, in the following analysis, I wish to highlight the ways in which those shifting theoretical paradigms have approached the role of the state in their research agenda, and how those

3  Note that in the communication literature, countries that participated in the NWICO movements were commonly known as the “Third World states,” which refer to the nations in Asia, Africa, and Latin America that were not aligned with either the Soviet Union or the United States during the Cold War. This term was then incorporated into the more general term of “global South” after the end of the Cold War. I used the term “Third World” here to help more easily contextualize in the literature.

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different positions have interacted with the larger geopolitical, economic, cultural, and theoretical contexts. Mehdi Semati (2004) reminds us that US communication research has always been a defining context in organizing scholarly inquiry in the field of international communication. The early development and modernization theory was no exception. Indeed, the modernization perspective grew out of a very particular historical context—the Cold War—and was deeply embedded in the post-WWII US foreign policy. In this sense, the competition and power struggles between nation-states—especially the Soviet Union-led communist bloc and the US-led capitalist bloc—constituted the historical background of this theoretical paradigm. As scholars have pointed out (e.g., Melkote 2010), for modernization theorists, the world was divided into two camps: (1) the “modern” or “developed” countries, and (2) the “traditional” or “developing/underdeveloped” countries. In their specific historical context, “development” or “modernization” means to bring those backward, traditional, underdeveloped nation-states, especially the newly independent countries of the global South, into the contemporary capitalist world system. And such transition can be accelerated or achieved using mass communication tools, such as radio. Daniel Lerner (1958), one of the leading scholars in this paradigm, in The Passing of Traditional Society, argued that mass media could work both as the agent and the index of modernization in the developing countries. Lerner argues that serving as the “mobility multiplier,” mass media exposed individuals in the traditional societies to new environments and ideas and helped them develop a high degree of empathy, which was considered as the key in the modern world. Lerner’s thesis was further popularized by Wilbur Schramm. In Mass Media and National Development, Schramm viewed communication and information as a tool to help transfer the political and economic model of the West to the developing countries of the South—as a tool for “national development” (Schramm 1964). During the 1950s and early 1960s, the modernization thesis was the dominant force in the field of international communication, accompanying with the discourse of the “free flow of information” at the policy front. The logic behind this was very influential: Developing countries in the South should relax or remove their state regulations to allow the “free flow” of information into their territory in order to be transformed into “modern” societies. This paradigm was later criticized for, among many other things, its ethnocentrism, its artificial dichotomy between “modern”

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and “traditional,” and its misuse of the development process of the West as a predictor of change in the South (Melkote 2010). For the purpose of this chapter, it will be argued that, during this period, the role of the state was at the analytical center of international communication, and its role was often counterposed to market forces. As critical scholar Herbert Schiller (1976) has demonstrated, the “free flow of information” doctrine, which was at the forefront of the then US foreign policy, aimed at decreasing state regulation in the realm of international cultural trades, in order to ensure the power of the Western, especially the US media, on the global market. As part of the “free market” discourse, it generally viewed the state as repressive and controlling and the market as promoting freedom and diversity. In the late 1960s, alternative theoretical formulations of international communication, especially the dependency theory (Frank 1966) and cultural imperialism thesis (Schiller 1976) started to emerge—both from the United States and from Latin America. This theoretical paradigm shift questioned the modernization thesis. If the early development and modernization paradigm was deeply rooted in the Cold War context, the theories of dependency and cultural imperialism arose in company with the political struggles of the newly independent nations of the “Third World.” Later, the political economic struggles of the “Third World” were extended to the communication realm. Recognizing the disparity in access to communication means and the uneven information flows between the North and the South, the developing countries called for a New World Information and Economic Order (NWICO) through the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). This larger political economic context both influenced and interacted with this paradigm shift. In critique of the modernization formula, dependency theorists targeted the unequal structural conditions that dominated the world capitalist system by foregrounding the role of transnational corporations (TNCs). For example, Armand Mattelart (1979), in Multinational Corporations and the control of Culture, argued that Western-based TNCs, with the political help of their home states, exercised cultural control over the developing countries. By setting out the uneven terms of international trade, a highly problematic dependent relationship was established and maintained between the North and the South. In other words, “dependency” means that the South was subordinated to the global capitalist system. For some critical scholars, “the

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development of underdevelopment” in the “Third World” has been deeply related with “the development of the West” (Frank 1966). Inspired by the dependency approach, communication scholars developed the theory of cultural imperialism in the 1970s to understand and reflect on the unequal international communication order at the time. In Communication and Cultural Domination, Herbert Schiller (1976) provided a much-cited definition of this important theorization in international communication. According to him, “cultural imperialism” is: the sum of the processes by which a society is brought into the modern world system and how its dominating stratum is attracted, pressured, forced, and sometimes bribed into shaping social institutions to correspond to, or even to promote, the values and structures of the dominant centre of the system. (p. 9)

For Schiller, in the 1970s, the United States had increasingly become a new imperial power in the global political economic system, with its ever-­ increasing military, economic, and, especially, communication influences. On the one hand, through the tight control of the electronic communication systems and the deployment of “free flow of information” as part of its foreign policy, the United States and the US-based TNCs successfully opened up the cultural markets of the “Third World countries” and created highly uneven trade flows of cultural goods, especially TV programs. Furthermore, Schiller pointed out, because the media and cultural production system in the United States was ultimately supported by commercial advertising, the large-scale exports of US cultural products into the “Third World countries” not only promoted the sale of US products and services but also promoted—sometimes behind the scenes—the capitalist social relations. On the other hand, Schiller also recognized that such uneven communication flows sometimes called for protective national communication policies in the developing countries. However, he also noticed that rather than a unified and smooth process of policymaking, the field of national communication policies was “a new arena for social struggle” (Schiller 1976, p. 68). Despite internal variations, many scholars examined such structural inequality of international communication under the theses of “cultural imperialism” or “media imperialism” (e.g., Boyd-Barrett 1977; Mattelart 1979; Tunstall 1977). This paradigm was once the most influential theoretical development in the 1970s and 1980s, especially during the NWICO debate. Later, with the changing global political economy in the 1990s,

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the theory of media and cultural imperialism became less prominent. It was also criticized in the academic literature for its lack of coherent body of thought (Tomlinson 1991) and its neglect of media content and audience interpretation (Fiske 1987). During this period, the role of the state occupied the analytical center of international communication. Indeed, both the dependency theory and the cultural imperialism thesis could be viewed as the cultural/communication extension of the “Third World” political project. On the one hand, theorists in both approaches raised proactive and insightful critique of the role of Western states in building an unequal structure of international system, including the communication system. They also criticized the capitalist market for producing media concentration, restricting cultural diversity and creating communication inequalities. On the other hand, against the imperial power of the Western, especially US capitalism, scholars also highlighted the regulatory role of the state in developing countries in making protective national communication policies. They emphasized “the vital importance of communication in the struggle to achieve meaningful national autonomy” (Nordenstreng and Schiller 1979). Admittedly, as with many macro approaches, the early dependency and cultural imperialism literature did not fully take into account the role of people’s practices, which is an important component in international communication (Thussu 2000). Later, especially in the late 1970s, a social class perspective was introduced into this theoretical framework to rectify this deficit. For example, Herbert Schiller (1976) quoted Evelina Dagnion to modify the usage of the term “invasion”: “the effects of cultural dependence on the lives of Latin Americans are not a consequence of an ‘invasion’ led by a foreign ‘enemy,’ but of choices made by their own ruling class, in the name of national development” (p.  16). Armand Mattelart also contended in his introduction to the two-volume anthology Communication and Class Struggle (Mattelart and Siegelaub 1979) that a class perspective is needed to be foregrounded in communication studies in order to sufficiently examine “how in the struggle against exploitation and oppression, the popular and working classes have developed and are developing their own communication practice and theory, and a new, liberated mode of communication, culture and daily life” (p. 19). Entering into the late 1980s, violent changes have been introduced into the global political economy, with the rise of neoliberalism that aimed to create market privatization, liberalization and deregulation, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the failure of the “Third World” project (Harvey

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2005). The ideas of the “free market,” once again, became the dominant discourse. Accordingly, the role of the state has been systematically marginalized. In international communication, the theoretical paradigm shifts again, from a state-centric analysis to analyses that increasingly foregrounded people’s practices and individuals’ cultural identities, with the upswing of postmodernism as the larger theoretical backdrop. During this time period, various theoretical approaches—from post-colonialism to critical cultural studies, and different methodological approaches—from textual analysis to ethnography started to emerge and influence the field of international communication (Thussu 2000). Some of these debates continued into the 1990s, which were later assimilated into the various theories of “globalization.” One major push behind this discernible transition was the development and expansion of new communication and information technologies, which has made instant transnational communication a reality. In parallel with the development of global communication networks was the continued ascendency of neoliberal ideas that promoted the role of “free market” and marginalized the role of “state regulation.” Both of the technological breakthroughs and the dominance of neoliberal ideology contributed to the significant expansion and concentration of transnational corporation power, which further weakened the regulatory power of the state. In his analysis of the three largest transnational media corporations: Time Warner, Disney, and News Corporation—the “holy trinity” of the “global media system”— Robert McChesney (2010) points out “whereas media systems had been primarily national before the 1990s, a global commercial media market has emerged full force by the dawn of the twenty-first century” (p. 188). Accordingly, the role of the nation-states has been de-emphasized in international communicant research in the 1990s and early 2000s. The complexity of media production and individual behaviors has increasingly become the organizing themes of the field. Some scholars explore the multilevel centers of media production in an increasingly globalized media system. For example, Thussu (2010) proposes a typology of global, transnational, and geo-cultural to unpack the complexity of global media production. He notices that the rapid commercialization of media systems indicates that the key factor in the expansion of media flows has shifted “from a state-centric and national view of media to one defined by consumer interests and transnational market” (p.  222). In other words, media production and flow are no longer

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discussed solely in a state-centric system, instead, multiple layers of media production—from global, regional, national, to local—are foregrounded in this strand of research. Others have focused their attention on the individual level. In addition to the earlier research on “active audience,” the issue of identity, which is often embedded in local cultural settings, has become an important site to connect various issues of race, ethnicity, sexuality, and gender in cultural studies approach to international communication, sometimes without paying enough attention to the issue of class (Thussu 2010). Scholars have also argued that the further diffusion of new information and communication technologies, especially the Internet and social media tools, has empowered people’s communication capacity. For Manuel Castells, this means a new form of communication—the “mass self-communication”— that is primarily based on the individual level and generally bypasses the control of nation-state. According to Castells, “mass self-communication” means “networks of communication that connect many-to-many in the sending and receiving of messages in a multimodal form of communication that bypasses mass media and often escapes government control” (Castells 2008, p. 90). During this stage, increasingly, concepts like “imperialism” and “nation-­ states” have further faded away. New formulations such as “the global and the local” and “glocalization” became the buzzwords in the field. As Morris and Waisbord (2001, p. ix) point out that “pinned between the global and the local, states continue to be largely absent from current analysis in media and communications.” It is worth noting that during the majority of the time covered by this short review, the Chinese communication literature was heavily influenced by the mainstream American communication research, in general, and the modernization paradigm, in particular. This process was intertwined with China’s own “reform and opening up” policies in the 1980s, which themselves followed the modernization thesis by reintegrating the Chinese political economy into the more “modern” and “advanced” global capitalism. Indeed, Wilbur Schramm’s China visit in 1982 was often commented as the “ice-breaking journey” toward communication studies in China. Although critical political economist Dallas Smythe also visited China in the 1970s, the critical paradigm toward global capitalism has become the “lost history” in China’s communication research (Zhao 2019). As Zhao points out, during the 1980s and 1990s, communication studies in China were heavily shaped by the modernization theory as well as a

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“depoliticized culturalism,” which de-emphasized China’s revolutionary history as well as the role of the state (Zhao 2019).

“Why the State (Still) Matters”: The Field of Global Internet Governance If a brief overview of the intellectual history of international communication has showed that there has been a “rise and fall” of the state in the scholarly literature, which has also heavily influenced the Chinese academic discourse, the arrival of the so-called Internet age has further contributed to the “fall” of the state in major theoretical formulations of the field after the 1990s. Recently, in the subfield of global Internet governance, a crucial domain of today’s international communication, however, the role of the state has once again become the center of the debate. Indeed, during the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in 2003–2005 and the World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT-12) in 2012, countries from the global South called for re-defining “internationalization” in global Internet governance by demanding more equal footing with the global North countries in governing this vital international infrastructure. This section reviews the critical and highly contentious role of the state in global Internet governance and calls for a more detailed analysis of the state in the scholarly literature. My argument is organized around the following two interconnected points: First, despite all the rhetoric of a spontaneous, self-organizing, or “multi-stakeholder” global Internet governance community, the state power of the United States still dominates today’s global Internet. Admittedly, the early development of the cyberspace bears a strong liberal imprint, which was probably best summarized by John Perry Barlow in his “A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace.” For these earlier Internet designers, most of whom are elite American scientists and engineers, “governments of the Industrial World … have no sovereignty” over the cyberspace (Barlow 1996). However, with the Internet taking off, this early liberal perception of a “decentralized and borderless” cyberspace that is inherently “uncontrollable” by the nation-states has been soon proved as an “illusion.” Goldsmith and Wu (2006), using a wide range of case studies, argue that the Internet system is essentially bordered and organized by state

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powers—not only because the Internet’s operation relies on the government-­built and often geographical-based infrastructures but also because human activities in cyberspace are fundamentally subject to the regulatory power of national laws. Concerning with the global Internet, scholars have further demonstrated that the existing Internet governance system is actually organized around one state—the United States. For example, Milton Mueller (2002), in Ruling the Root, provides an important historical account of the struggle over the management of the Domain Name System (DNS), which he considers as the major point of control over the Internet. He demonstrates that through the DNS, that is, the “root,” the Internet has been far more extensively managed—governed—than is often recognized and that this critical governance function was institutionalized by the United States in the 1990s through the complex arrangement of the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) contract, which made the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), a private institute that controls the DNS, formally accountable to the US Commerce Department. As Mueller (2010) contends, such arrangements signify that, with respect to cyberspace, the US state exercises a “unilateral globalism” (p. 62). On the other hand, the ideological configuration of the dominant global Internet governance model—the model of “multi-stakeholderism” (Mueller 2010)—also bears a strong US-centric print. Indeed, multi-­ stakeholderism has become a pervasive concept of Internet governance. In principle, it compels governments, businesses, and civil society groups to participate in the policymaking process on an equal basis. However, as Mueller points out, although this model identifies governments, private actors, and civil society organizations as the primary players in Internet governance, it “does not determine how power is distributed among these groups or how much weight they are given in decision-making processes” (Mueller 2010, p. 8). For instance, although other states are “allowed” to participate in the multi-stakeholder policymaking process of ICANN, the only room for their participation is the Governmental Advisor Committee (GAC), which is authorized only to “consider and provide advice on the activities of ICANN,” while ICANN, the institute itself, is directly accountable to the US state. In other words, the organizational structure of ICANN, which is claimed to be based on the principles of multi-­ stakeholderism, is designed to favor the United States and private sectors, with little space for other governments to share its authority. As Schiller

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(2014) argues, multi-stakeholderism is a contentious practice in global Internet governance because it downgrades all states, except the United States, from meaningful participations. As will be discussed later in this chapter, China’s approach to global Internet governance was often being perceived as indirect opposition to this multi-stakeholder model (Downes 2012). Indeed, over the years, there have been much debate and political struggle around this US-centric global Internet governance scheme, especially during the WSIS in 2003–2005 and the WCIT-12 in 2012; in both events China played a highly visible role. As scholars have argued (e.g., Zhao 2004; Bhuiyan 2014), in many ways, the controversies surrounding global Internet governance at the WSIS show continuities with the NWICO movement of the 1970s, as in both debates the global South sought a more equal international communication system. However, the WSIS and WCIT-12 were often framed by the popular media as a “UN takeover of the Internet,” or a top-down, state-centric governance model trying to replace a bottom-up, self-organizing Internet governance system (McDowell 2012). As the dominant role of the US state has become increasingly visible throughout global cyberspace, however, it is necessary to bring the state back into discussion. After all, the United States is also a nation-state. This brings up my second point: A more just and democratic global Internet governance system perhaps requires more active and equal participation of the states—especially from the South—in the policymaking process. In other words, the role of the state in global Internet governance needs both analytical inclusion and detailed scholarly analysis. The existing Internet governance scheme, as outlined above, is rooted in a highly unequal international communications system, in which nation-­ states are still the major carrier of political economic power, especially for global South countries. Indeed, one major problem of the multi-­ stakeholder model is that it does not take into account the profound global inequality between the North and the South. For example, a critical look at the composition of the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF), a leading organization in Internet standardization, reveals the crucial power asymmetries in this domain. In fact, the majority of technical experts in the IETF come from the North, especially computer companies in the United States, while the South is largely absent, since regular attendance at the various meetings requires not only knowledge and expertise but also time and resources. Furthermore, if the South lacks strong representatives from

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their business sectors to constitute meaningful participation in the existing market-based Internet governance system, the issue of civil society is probably even more problematic. As Zhao comments on the debate at the WSIS summits: if authoritarian governments in the South are unable to truly represent the interests and inspirations of their own population, what is to ensure that there is indeed a genuine global civil society at the Summit, given that participation by civil society organizations across the globe is by no means even, especially given that countries such as China do not even have any independent civil society organizations? (Zhao 2004, p. 279)

Viewing from this perspective, perhaps the strong demand of many global South countries in the WSIS and WCIT-12 process was not so much a demand to “let the UN take over the Internet,” but a demand to establish a more “internationalized” global Internet governance system— a system in which they have more equal footing with the global North countries? Indeed, in Internet Governance and the Global South, Bhuiyan (2014) provides a wide-ranging analysis of how the global South countries negotiated Internet-related issues at the WSIS. His analysis raises the following question: Is a “new multilateralism” possible for global Internet governance? According to Bhuiyan, “new multilateralism”—an alternative to the extising US-centric, market-oriented Internet governance system— needs to meet two requirements. First, it demands active and equal participation of the states from both the global North and South. Second, the states need to be fully democratized to make sure they represent the interests of their people, rather than the interests of the ruling social classes. Of course, whether this “new multilateralism” is achievable remains uncertain at this point—indeed, Bhuiyan himself observes deep ambiguities in the position of the global South countries. For example, while many global South countries at the WSIS worked hard to establish the state as the supreme authority of international Internet policymaking, they have nevertheless chosen to activley collaborate with transnational corporations to build digital infrastuctures in their own countries (Bhuiyan 2014).

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The Complicated Role of the State: China and Global Internet Governance If a brief overview of the controversies around global Internet governance at both the WSIS and WCIT-12 has revealed the still critical role of the state in international communication, China’s participation in this vital domain has further illustrated the complicated role of the state, and its dynamic interactions with market players, in this process. As I have discussed elsewhere (Shen 2016, 2017), China started its engagement with the governing institutes of the global Internet in the 1990s, from a very marginalized position. For example, at the 2002 IETF meeting, among over 1000 participants, only around 10 were Mainland Chinese. China was only able to co-author one RFC (Requests for Comments)—the key documents for the development of Internet standards—in the entire 1990s. Meanwhile, the US control over the DNS— the “root” of the global Internet (Mueller 2002)—via ICANN also generated deep-seated concerns and insecurities for the Chinese leadership. As a result, throughout most of the 2000s, there were heightened alienation between China and the major institutions of global Internet governnace. For example, China not only stopped attending the ICANN GAC meetings but also activley developed a number of initiatives domestically to boost its control over critical Internet resources (e.g., domain names, IP addresses). Such alienation culminated at the WSIS, during which China proposed to place the governance of the DNS under a state-­ oriented international organization such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU). From the Chinese perpsecitive, the global Internet is an international resource and therefore should be governed jointly by developing and developed nations—the United Nations (UN) affilate ITU is an approripate venue for this. As an active player in both the WSIS and WCIT-12, China’s approach to global Internet governance has been a highly contentious topic. Domestically, Chinese academic literature perceived the current Internet order as being dominated by US hegemony, and the existing debates at both the WSIS and WCIT-12 offered opportunities for China to rebalance this order and advance its own strategic interests via intergovernmental governance organizations (Arsène 2016). In the United States, commentators often framed the Chinese position as in direct oppostion to the US-led “multi-stakeholder” approach, and even called to have the UN—and the states—to “take over” the free global Internet (Downes

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2012). These simplified portrayals of the role of the state in global Internet policymaking, however, obscure the complexity of the power dynamics among different state entities and capital units in shaping China’s approach to global Internet governance. First, as scholars have long observed (see, for example, Mueller and Tan 1997; Yang 2009; Zhao 2010; Hong 2017), instead of operating as a monolithic actor, the Internet governing system in China is actually marked by deep fragmentation. A thorough understanding of the role of the state therefore needs to bring in the complex power interactions among different state agencies with often competing interests. For example, as Zheng (2007) points out, the Chinese leadership has historically managed the Internet sector by two overlapping—and often conflicting— regimes: A political system oriented more toward political control and an economic regulatory system geared more toward economic growth. Second, with the growing power of its domestic Internet indusry, we saw Chinese digital corporate players have played a more siginificant role in the policymaking of the global Internet. For example, China telecom giant Huawei has become more and more active at IETF, and even become a “global host” for three of its future meetings in 2020 (IETF 2020). A study done by German patent statistics company IPlytics also found Huawei to be the leader in the contribution to 5G standard development as of January 2020, followed by Samsung, ZTE, and LG Electronics (Yu 2020). Moreover, as I have demonstrated elsewhere (Shen 2017, 2018), the interests of these Chinese coporate players were not always in line with the interests of the Chinese state. Under certain circumstances, transnational and domestic business players might work together to oppose the state’s agenda. China’s approach to global Internet governance, therefore, demonstrated the complicated interations between different state and market players in this critical domain. Rather than simplified objectifications, it requires careful historical consideration (Shen 2017, 2018; Zhao 2010).

Conclusion As this chapter has demonstrated, after the “rise and fall” of the state as an analytical category in international communication in both the Western and Chinese academic discourse, the role of the state, has once again, become the center of the debate in global Internet policymaking. At both the WSIS and WCIT-12, countries from the global South demanded more

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equal participation of all the states—especially the ones from the South— in the governance of this critical international infrastructure, and this position is often perceived as an alternative to the existing US-led, market-oriented Internet governance regime. Instead of simplifying these calls as efforts of letting the state “taking over the free Internet,” we need serious scholarly attention to understand the complexities, contradictions, and ambiguities of these demands, as well as the complicated role of the state, as I’ve discussed in the case of China, one of the key players in these debates. Admittedly, in many ways, global South is an umbrella term for a variety of states whose powers are not equal and whose interests are not always aligned. In particular, although China is positioned as a global South state for its still relatively low score in Human Development Index, its semi-­ colonial history, its sociologist revolution, its active participation in the “South-South cooperation” projects, as well as its shared position with many South countries in the global Internet governance debates, the growing regional and international power of Chinese political and economic entities might seriously complicate its position. Whether a “new multilateralism” (Bhuiyan 2014) is conceivable—in which all nations enjoy equality in Internet policymaking and their representatives are fully democratized to represent the interests of their populations—remains to be seen. Indeed, as this chapter has argued, the state remains a vital actor in international communication and its role demands sustained attention.

References Arsène, Séverine. (2016). “Global Internet Governance in Chinese Academic Literature,” China Perspectives, 2, 25–35. Barlow, J. (1996). A declaration of the Independece of cyberspace. https://projects.eff.org/~barlow/Declaration-­Final.html. Accessed 1 May 2021. Bhuiyan, A. J. M. S. (2014). Internet governance and the global South: Demand a new framework. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Boyd-Barrett, O. (1977). Media imperialism: Towards an international framework for the analysis of media systems. In J. Curran, M. Gurevitch, & J. Woollacott (Eds.), Mass communication and society (pp. 116–135). London: Edward Arnold. Castells, M. (2008). The new public sphere: Global civil society, communication networks, and global governance. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616, 78–93.

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Downes, L. (2012, August 9). Why is the UN trying to take over the Internet? Forbes. http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrydownes/2012/08/09/why-­the-­ un-­is-­trying-­to-­take-­over-­the-­internet/#4275043230f6. Accessed 1 May 2021. Fiske, J. (1987). Television culture. London: Routledge. Frank, A. (1966). The development of underdevelopment. Monthly Review, 18(4), 17–31. Goldsmith, L. & Wu, T. (2006). Who controls the Internet: Illusions of a borderless world. New York: Oxford University Press. Harvey, D. (2005). A brief history of neoliberalism. New  York: Oxford University Press. Hong, Y. (2017). Networking China: The digital transformation of the Chinese economy. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press. IETF. (2020, April 28). Huawei commits as global host to support the work of the Internet Engineering Task Force. https://www.ietf.org/blog/global-­host-­ huawei. Accessed 1 May 2021. Kavoori, A., & Chadha, K. (2009). The cultural turn in international communication. Journal of Broadcasting & Electronic Media, 53(2), 336–346. Lerner, D. (1958). The passing of traditional society: Modernizing the Middle East. New York: Free Press. Mattelart, A. (1979). Multinational corporations and the control of culture: The ideological apparatuses of imperialism. Brighton: Harvester Press. Mattelart, A., & Siegelaub, S. (Eds.). (1979). Communication and class struggle. New York: International General. Mcchesney, R. (2010). The global media system. In D. Thussu (Ed.), International communication: A reader (pp. 105–121). New York: Routledge. McDowell, R. (2012, February 21). The U.N. threat to Internet freedom. The Wall Street Journal. http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204792404 577229074023195322. Accessed 1 May 2021. Melkote, S. (2010). Theories of development communication. In D.  Thussu (Ed.), International communication: A reader (pp.  105–121). New  York: Routledge. Morris, N. & Waisbord, S. (2001). Introduction: Rethinking media globalization and state power. In N. Morris & S. Waisbord (Eds.), Media and globalization: Why the state matters (pp. i–vii). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Mosco, V. (1982). Pushbutton fantasies: Critical perspectives on Videotex and information technology. Norwood, NJ: Ablex. Mueller, M. (2002). Ruling the root: Internet governance and the taming of cyberspace. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Mueller, M. (2010). Networks and states: The global politics of Internet governance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Mueller, M., & Tan, Z. (1997). China in the information age: Telecommunications and the dilemmas of reform (No. 169). Greenwood Publishing Group.

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Nordenstreng, K. (2001). Epilogue. In N. Morris & S. Waisbord (Eds.), Media and globalization: Why the state matters (pp. 155–160). Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. Nordenstreng, K., & Schiller, H. (1979). National sovereignty and international communication. Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing Company. Polanyi, K. (1944). The great transformation: The political and economic origins of our time. Boston, MA: Beacon Press. Schiller, D. (2014). Digital depression: Information technology and economic crisis. Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press. Schiller, H. (1976). Communication and cultural domination. White Plains, NY: International Arts and Science Press. Schramm, W. (1964). Mass media and national development: The role of information in the developing countries. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Semati, M. (2004). New frontiers in international communication theory. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. Shen, H. (2016). China and global internet governance: Toward an alternative analytical framework. Chinese Journal of Communication, 9(3), 304–324. Shen, H. (2017). Across the Great (Fire) Wall: China and the global Internet (doctoral dissertation). Champaign, IL: University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. Shen, H. (2018). Building a digital silk road? Situating the Internet in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. International Journal of Communication, 12, 2683–2701. Thussu, D. (2000). International communication: Continuity and change. London: Hodder Education. Thussu, D. (Ed.). (2010). International communication: A reader. London: Routledge. Tomlinson, J. (1991). Cultural imperialism: A critical introduction. London: Printer. Tunstall, J. (1977). The media are American: Anglo-American media in the world. New York: Columbia University Press. Yang, G. (2009). The power of the Internet in China: Citizen activism online. New York: Columbia University Press. Yu, Y. (2020, June 16). US to allow companies to work with Huawei on 5G standards. Nikkei Asia. https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Huawei-­crackdown/ U S -­t o -­a l l o w -­c o m p a n i e s -­t o -­w o r k -­w i t h -­H u a w e i -­o n -­5 G -­ standards#:~:text=Huawei%20has%20emerged%20as%20a,Samsung%2C%20 ZTE%20and%20LG%20Electronics. Accessed 1 May 2021. Zhao, Y. (2004). Between a world summit and a Chinese movie: Visions of the “Information Society”. Gazette: The International Journal for Communication Studies, 66(3–4): 275–280. Zhao, Y. (2010). China’s pursuits of indigenous innovations in information technology developments: Hopes, follies and uncertainties. Chinese Journal of Communication, 3(3), 266–289.

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CHAPTER 11

Democratic Governance of Media and Public Communication: Latin American Participatory Institutions Created in the Twenty-First Century María Soledad Segura and Alejandro Linares

Introduction Historically, Latin American communication policies have been captured by economic and political elites (Guerrero and Márquez-Ramírez 2014). This implies enormous inequality during the policy-making process because civic organizations do not participate (Segura and Waisbord 2016). The resulting policies have led to the configuration of a public

M. S. Segura Universidad Nacional de Córdoba (UNC), Córdoba, Argentina Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET), Buenos Aires, Argentina © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. A. Ganter, H. Badr (eds.), Media Governance, Global Transformations in Media and Communication Research - A Palgrave and IAMCR Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05020-6_11

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sphere that reproduces existing social, economic, political, cultural, religious, gender, sexual orientation, and/or generational inequalities. Nonetheless, during the first two decades of the twenty-first century, there was unprecedented state and social activism in the region regarding communication policies. Many laws were reformed, and in most cases, this was done with citizen participation. Thus, it is possible to speak about a “participatory turn” in communication policies in the region during that period. With these new communication laws, civil society achieved the creation of participatory institutions for the debate, definition, implementation, and control of communication policies to avoid or limit their capture by the elites. Mexico, Ecuador, Argentina, and Uruguay went through different political processes during those years, and most of the new laws created advisory councils, commissions, and ombudsmen/ombudswomen. These entities implicated that there was a new model of media governance in the region. These institutions were based on a participatory model that is different from the multi-stakeholder governance model, as discussed below. Although some preliminary analyses of their design and operation (Linares 2016, 2018; Segura 2015, 2018a; Retegui 2017) and their impact on media systems have been recorded (Segura et al. 2018), a comprehensive and comparative analysis of participatory institutions’ communication policies has not yet been carried out. This chapter is based on ongoing research funded by Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (Latin America) that aims to fill this gap by discussing their creation, design, implementation, and results. The study of participatory institutions’ communication policies in Latin America is important in order to achieve a better understanding of fundamental questions that are at the center of recent studies on the media, Internet governance, and democratic theory. Critical questions in this area include: Why is participation in policy-making normatively desirable?

A. Linares (*) Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas (CONICET), Buenos Aires, Argentina Universidad Nacional de Formosa (UNaF), Formosa, Argentina

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What difference does it make if citizens participate in these processes? Is citizen participation similar to multi-stakeholder governance? The central problem covered in this chapter is as follows: To what extent did participatory institutions created with social participation between 2000 and 2015  in Mexico, Ecuador, Argentina, and Uruguay succeed in enabling the impact of civic organizations on policy-making processes and in avoiding or limiting their capture by political and economic elites? Our argument is as follows: The participatory institutions created by communication laws sanctioned via social participation in Mexico, Ecuador, Argentina, and Uruguay between 2000 and 2015 did not succeed in ensuring a citizen impact on media governance but remained subsumed within party negotiations and/or political alliances that were dependent on general social disputes. This prevented them from autonomously tackling the resistance from the government and business elites to the reforms. However, they did manage to carry out some initiatives that, circumstantially, limited or suspended the elite capture of communication policies. First, the theoretical and methodological approach is presented. Then, the historical elite-captured process of communication policy-making and the participatory reforms in the 2000s and 2010s in Latin America are contextualized. Third, the new participatory institutions of media governance created by law in Argentina, Uruguay, Ecuador, and Mexico—the Latin American countries where these agencies were created in recent years—are characterized. Afterwards, the functioning of these agencies is analyzed in Argentina—the country, along with Uruguay, where these institutions were more varied and achieved the longest and strongest life. Finally, conclusions and the lessons learned are presented.

Participation, Democratic Governance, and the Right to Communicate In this section, the theories and methodologies applied to the study and synthesized herein are presented. In particular, the Latin American scholarly contributions to the participation concept’s definition are discussed. In addition, the differences between the participatory and multi-­ stakeholder approaches to governance are debated.

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Communication policy-making is a dynamic process of interaction among different actors, institutional or not, who have an unequal capacity to influence, who have diverse interests, and who use formal and informal mechanisms to impact media and public communication systems (Califano 2016). The conflict in the policy-making process is indissociable from power relations in the global social process and takes place in wider social and political disputes (Segura 2018a). Media governance refers to the rules, principles, institutions, and regulations that shape the dynamics of media systems (Puppis 2010). With the expansion of the Internet, the literature began to speak about governance rather than policy to differentiate between a process with the state as the main actor and one involving new and non-hierarchic regulatory dynamics where all actors take part concurrently, such as regulators and regulated entities (Bizberge and Segura 2020). Governance also refers to the new forms of international regulation of communications characterized by informal and non-state mechanisms, the participation of global companies, the high speed of the processes, and, above all, the global dimension (Mastrini et  al. 2012). Therefore, media governance includes national policies and formal practices but goes further by also incorporating a wider group of movements involved in shaping the media scenario. The internationalization of debates with regards to Internet governance and the strengthening of technical and economic perspectives have further weakened citizen participation (Mastrini et  al. 2012). There are important economic and political power inequalities among the different stakeholders, and international participation is extremely difficult for most national and local civil society organizations (CSOs). Therefore, participatory policies are not the same as multi-stakeholder governance. Latin American experiences of social participation in communication policy-making processes during the first decades of the twenty-first century allow for the formulation of a theoretical model of citizen participation that is different from the multi-stakeholder model. Even though both paradigms imply various kinds of actors with diverse interests being involved in the policy-making process, there is one crucial difference between them. The participation model recognizes the inequality of power among states, global commercial corporations, and CSOs. Therefore, the citizen participation concept identifies the national state as the main institution involved in public policy-making and in guaranteeing rights, such as freedom of speech and access to information. In that sense, the participation mechanisms were thought to make the inclusion of

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citizen demands in the national communication policies possible and, at the same time, to find, in the state, an ally to curb the power of international corporations and to prevent the economic elites from capturing the policies. On the other hand, the multi-stakeholder model presumes that there is a simulation of equality between the participants in the discussion and during the formulation of public policies. In this way, this model consolidates, in fact, the inequalities. Economic and political elites capture policy-making processes when an “individual actor or a group of organized actors (or not) whose control or possession of some resource of strategic power in a given context give them the ability to consciously take advantage of power relations and define public policies based on their interests and strategies, to the detriment of general interest” (Oxfam 2018, p. 19). Actors who capture communication policies are (1) the main info-communicational companies that have a key resource: media. With it, they are able to hide or explain the capture process and to offer benefits, such as friendly media treatment, to governments; and (2) public servants, politicians, or groups who are in charge of the state and use this position to protect particular interests. Political and economic elites, like media owners or CEOs, and officials and public servants, maintain permanent mutually beneficial relationships to capture policies. On the other hand, CSOs also attempt to impact communication policies. They have different values, founding mechanisms, organizational characteristics, and activities, and they maintain complex relationships with relative autonomy from the state and market (Sorj 2010). In particular, citizen participation in the state impacts the quality of state institutions (Ippolito-O’Donnell 2013). Historically, Latin American communication studies have made key contributions to the conceptualization of participation in developing communication policies and practices and to the design of concrete participatory mechanisms and institutions (Barranquero 2017). From their beginnings in the 1960s, regional scholars were concerned with the democratization of media systems and the ways in which to guarantee the right to communicate (Segura 2008). These theoretical developments accompanied the political and social struggles to democratize public communication in the region. Indeed, academics have been active in movements for the reform of communication policies (Segura 2018a). Citizen participation in communication policy-making process “implies public involvement in the production and management of communication

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systems” (UNESCO 1977, p. 4), and also includes new actors and institutions (Rich et al. 2019). Therefore, participation refers to the institutional architecture in each country that regulates and controls media functions. Nonetheless, taking part does not guarantee the impact of participation on the policy outcome. Many people can participate; however, decisions can be made by a few key actors behind closed doors (Freedman 2006). Thus, the analysis must recognize the capability of institutions and practices to guarantee the impact of the participation process. The idea of participation relates to the concept of the right to communication—“the right of each one to try to communicate to others its own points of view” and “the right of everybody to know opinions and news” (Inter-American Commission of Human Rights [IACHR] 1985, p. 32). The exercise of this right through the media “is a basic guarantee to properly do the process of collective deliberation on public affairs” (IACHR 2010, p. 2). As “there are actors of diverse origins, sizes and conditions both objective and subjective” (Loreti and Lozano 2014, p.  48), the intervention of the state is necessary to universally guarantee the possibilities of being able to participate in the public arena. On the contrary, the principle of “letting thing be” means the conservation and deepening of historically built inequalities (Gargarella 2013). The democratization of communications is a process rather than an achievement. The emphasis on the process allows for the identification of advances and setbacks, partial achievements, and failures (Linares 2018; Segura 2018a). During this process, citizen participation and social impacts resulting from participatory processes are key dimensions to increase the level of communication democratization. Based on the theoretical framework described above, the object of analysis is participatory state institutions created between 2000 and 2015 in Mexico, Ecuador, Argentina, and Uruguay by audiovisual communication, telecommunications, and access to information laws. These agencies were formed in the region as a result of social participation in communication policy reforms during the last few decades. The methodological approach is based on Linares (2016, 2018), who operationalized UNESCO’s (1977) concept of participation. From this wider perspective, eight dimensions are selected to analyze participatory institutions: The composition and sectors or parties represented; the effectiveness of mechanisms and operating rules; the fulfillment of rules, criteria, and obligations; the functioning and conflict-resolution dynamics; the degree of cooperation, complementarity, and/or overlap with other

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agencies; transparency and publicity regarding activities; the modalities, times, and formats generated for citizen participation; and the consequences of the participation process. The methods used are a bibliography and document review and analysis. Thus, primary and secondary sources are used, including literature and laws, bills, decrees, and official and/or independent reports.

From Elite-Captured to Citizen-Centered Policy-Making? In this section, historical, elite-centered policy-making and its consequences regarding the inequalities of the media and public communication systems are contextualized. In addition, the participatory turn in the 2000s and 2010s is characterized. The analysis is based on empirical research that was previously undertaken by the authors and by other scholars in the region, and it follows Oxfam’s (2018) taxonomy of elite-­ capture mechanisms. The communication policy-making processes in Mexico, Ecuador, Argentina, and Uruguay have been continuously captured by the elites, at least during the last three decades of the twentieth century. Generally, the capture extends to public bodies involved in planning, regulation, or control. The elite capture addresses the sector, and/or the drafting of the regulations, for example, of pay TV in Argentina, Uruguay, and Ecuador (Comisión 2009; Kaplún 2014; Marino 2012). In Mexico and Argentina, in some cases, laws or decrees merely follow and legalize what the market has already changed (Guerrero 2010; Rossi 2005). In other cases, these laws and decrees enable operations that were already planned by the dominant business sector (Bizberge 2019). The main capture dynamics in the four countries that were studied were regulation in the hands of the regulated actors who dominate the sector—the big media companies; fitting regulations to align with and favor the requirements of a business activity or state control inaction; and the non-observance of the existing norms when they hinder the advancement of the elite. These dynamics were favored due to a lack of citizen participation and a lack of transparency in the planning, regulation, and control of the audiovisual and telecommunication sectors. In the four countries studied, constant secrecy surrounded government decisions that were made regarding the audiovisual and telecommunication

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sectors (Segura and Linares forthcoming). In addition, the link between political leaders and media owners or managers was explicit, to the point that, in Mexico, Ecuador, and Argentina, there were political leaders who owned the media (Becerra and Lacunza 2012; Comisión 2009). Additionally, there were few or no formal instances of social participation in policy-making. The previous communication policies generally did not include participatory mechanisms, governments did not create them, and social movements did not have enough power to press for their creation. The most visible elite-capture mechanisms included revolving doors, particularly in Ecuador (Comisión 2009); extraordinary legislative procedures, which refer to surprising (unplanned) or ad hoc sessions in parliaments and decrees or resolutions without any debate, as in Argentina and Mexico (Gómez and Sosa 2006; Marino 2012); and the designation of officials in public agencies of control, as in Ecuador and Mexico (Amézquita 2013; Gómez and Sosa 2006). The capture in Uruguay is not so evident, but the development of the audiovisual sector by commercial actors is not controlled by the state (Kaplún 2014). In addition, the concentration of property (Becerra and Mastrini 2017) is a consequence of capture in all countries. At the same time, a concentrated media industry hinders issues coming to light that directly counter the interests of elite ownership, thus contributing to the invisibility of positions that question such capture. Lobbying is another useful tool that is difficult to trace, but which was present in each country. One kind of lobbying involves “experts” who take part in discussions or planning and present political and commercial guidelines as technical knowledge. “Cultural capture” refers to public officers who share policy frameworks with CEOs (García Delgado et  al. 2018). Cultural capture has been noted to have taken place in Mexico, Uruguay, and Argentina (Marino 2012; Gómez and Sosa 2006; Kaplún 2014). These policies have resulted in hyper-concentrated and commercial media systems, with production centralized in a few urban centers, sustained by advertising and government benefits, non-existent or poor public media, with small audiences or little credibility, and popular media that subsist, in many cases, in illegality, or that are restricted in their development (Becerra and Mastrini 2017). Other historical characteristics of public communication in Latin America are the so-called gag laws that criminalize contempt, defamation, slander, and insults, and encourage prior censorship, the secret practices of governments and companies in

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handling public information, and attacks on press workers (Loreti and Lozano 2014). Thus, concentrated commercial actors were huge beneficiaries, and non-profit (social and state) actors were the main losers of these capture dynamics. At the same time, governments and political leaders from the ruling parties obtained benefits from these processes in terms of friendly media coverage and, in some cases, the frequency of media coverage. Therefore, these elite-captured policies also resulted in an increase in and the consolidation of the inequality in access to and participation in public communication (Graziano 1988). Thus, they configure a public sphere that reproduces existing inequalities within each country and between different nations. Nonetheless, the first 15 years of the new century welcomed unprecedented processes of state and social activism in communication matters in the region, contrary to historical trends. The expansion of the social debate and the approval of laws would not have been possible without citizen participation (Segura 2014a). The civic organizations that mobilized around communication reforms had a broad agenda. Some proposed reducing the historical predominance of the private sector in media systems, while others sought to curb government control of information and expression. The first group aimed to limit the concentration of media ownership; legalize and promote community media and native peoples; and promote national, local, and independent audiovisual production and work. The second set included organizations with the goal of regulating access to public information, official advertising, and public media; decriminalizing slander and libel; and revoking the contempt laws (Segura and Waisbord 2016). Latin American civic organizations claiming communication rights intensified their mobilization during the political and economic crisis in the late 1990s and early 2000s. In the 2000s and 2010s, all of these organizations built broad coalitions. The Argentinean Coalición por una Radiodifusión Democrática, the Uruguayan Foro de Comunicación y Participación Ciudadana and Coalición por una Comunicación Democrática, the Ecuadorian Foro Ecuatoriano de la Comunicación, Colectivo Ciudadano por los Derechos de la Comunicación and Autoconvocados de la Comunicación, and the Mexican Frente Nacional por la Reforma de los Medios de Comunicación and Coalición Ciudadana Democracia y Medios promoted broadcasting and telecommunication policy reforms. The Uruguayan Grupo Archivos y Acceso a la Información

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Pública (CAInfo), the Ecuadorian Coalición de Organizaciones Civiles por el Acceso a la Información Pública, and the Mexican Grupo Oaxaca fostered the regulation of access to public information. In Argentina, several organizations, such as the Asociación por los Derechos Civiles (ADC), Centro de Implementación de Políticas Públicas para la Equidad y el Crecimiento (CIPPEC), Poder Ciudadano, Foro de Periodismo Argentino (FOPEA), and Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales (CELS) collaborated on various initiatives, including common proposals to regulate access to public information (Segura 2014b; Segura and Waisbord 2016). In addition, multilateral organizations had an impact on the communication policy-making processes in the region and established alliances with citizen movements and governments (see Ganter 2018; Segura 2018b; Segura and Waisbord 2016). In particular, the design of participatory agencies in the Argentine broadcasting and telecommunication laws as well as the Uruguayan broadcasting and access to information laws is strongly inspired by the United Nations (UN) and the Organization of American States (OAS) human rights principles (Ganter 2018; Segura 2011). Meanwhile, the Mexican broadcasting and telecommunication reform followed the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) proposals. Social demands that were focused on limiting the power of the markets in media systems had an impact on the new broadcasting laws that were passed in Latin America in recent years. Eleven new broadcasting laws have been passed in the region during the last few decades. Some regulate broadcasting services in general: Peru in 2004, Venezuela in 2005 and 2009, Argentina in 2009, Bolivia in 2011, and Uruguay in 2014. Other rules are more general since they also regulate the press and freedom of expression, such as those passed in Ecuador in 2013. Some laws only deal with community media such as in Uruguay in 2007, and other laws only deal with pay TV like in Brazil in 2011. In addition, others include telecommunications in addition to broadcasting, such as those of Mexico in 2005 and 2014 (Segura 2014a; Segura and Waisbord 2016). CSOs also made significant contributions to the passage of laws that guaranteed access to public information in this century. Between 2002 and 2016, eighteen Latin American countries passed these laws: Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, and Peru in 2002; Saint Vincent and the Grenadines in 2003; the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, and Antigua and Barbuda in 2004; Honduras in 2006; Nicaragua in 2007; Chile, Uruguay, and

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Guatemala in 2008; Brazil and El Salvador in 2011; Guyana in 2013; and Paraguay in 2014 (UNESCO 2014). In summary, these processes implied, to a certain extent, a transition from communication policy-making captured by elites to participatory policy-making.

The Design of the New Participatory Institutions In this section, the participatory institutions created between 2000 and 2015 by the laws on audiovisual communication, telecommunications, and access to information in Mexico, Ecuador, Argentina, and Uruguay are discussed by comparing the institutions established in that period. In particular, the designs of the regulatory authorities’ consultative councils are evaluated through five dimensions: Their composition, functions, formal dependence on other institutions, funding mechanisms, and formal operating rules. These characteristics indicate the level of achievement in three main areas: The autonomy of the government and business elites that they envisage, the diversity that they include, and the social impact that they ensure. The findings are grounded on the ongoing research carried out by the authors. With these new communication laws, social organizations achieved the creation of institutions through social participation in the debate, definition, implementation, and control of communication policies. Thus, CSOs aimed to institutionalize citizen inclusion to ensure the impact of their proposals on these policies over time, and to avoid or limit their capture by government and business elites. Indeed, one of the most innovative aspects of broadcasting and access to public information laws in Argentina, Ecuador, Mexico, and Uruguay was the creation of participatory mechanisms for defining, implementing, and controlling media policies. In the four countries, a regulatory authority council or commission for audiovisual communication and telecommunications was created. The Consejo Nacional de Comunicación Audiovisual [National Council of Audiovisual Communication] (COFECA) and Consejo Nacional de Tecnologías de la Información y la Comunicación [National Council of Information and Communication Technologies] (Consejo TIC) were established in Argentina in the 2009 Ley de Servicios de Comunicación Audiovisual [Audiovisual Communication Services Act] (LSCA) and in the 2014 law Argentina Digital [Digital Argentina Law], respectively. The Comisión Honoraria Asesora de Servicios de Comunicación Audiovisual

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[Honorary Advisory Commission for Audiovisual Communication Services] (CHASCA) originated in the 2014 Uruguayan ley de Medios [Media Law]. The Consejo Consultivo [Advisory Council] of the Instituto Federal de Telecomunicaciones [Federal Institute of Telecommunications] (IFT) was founded in Mexico by the 2014 Ley Federal de Telecomunicaciones y Radiodifusión [Telecommunications and Broadcasting Federal Law]. Finally, the Consejo Consultivo [Advisory Council] of the Consejo de Regulación, Desarrollo y Promoción de la Información y la Comunicación [Council for the Regulation, Development and Promotion of Information and Communication] (CORDICOM) was set up in Ecuador by the 2013 Ley Orgánica de Comunicación [Organic Law of Communication]. Three of the four countries also established a public media council or commission: The Consejo Honorario de Medios Públicos [Honorary Council of Public Media] of Argentina, the Comisión Asesora Honoraria Independiente del Sistema Nacional de Radio y Televisión Pública [Independent Honorary Advisory Commission of the National Public Radio and Television System] of Uruguay, and the Consejo Ciudadano de Medios Públicos no Oficiales [Citizen Council of Unofficial Public Media] of Ecuador. Mexico has a public media council at the state level, not at the federal level. Three of the four countries also have an ombudsman/woman office for audiences, but with very different aims and institutional designs. Argentina created the Defensoría del Público de Servicios de Comunicación Audiovisual [Ombudsman/woman for Audiovisual Communication Services], Uruguay gave new functions to protect communication rights to the preexisting Defensor del Pueblo [general Ombudsman/woman], and Ecuador forced the media to designate a Defensor de las Audiencias [Defender of the Audiences], and also conferred new attributions on the general Ombudsman/woman. Mexico does not have any public defender. Only two countries have a participatory institution for access to public information. Uruguay established the Consejo Consultivo [Consultative Council] of the Unidad de Acceso a la Información Pública [Public Information Access Unit] in the 2008 Ley de Acceso a la Información [Access to Public Information Law] and Mexico established the Consejo Consultivo [Consultative Council] of the Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Información Pública [Federal Institute for Access to Public Information] in the 2016 Ley Federal de Transparencia y Acceso a la Información Pública [Federal Law of Transparency and Access to Public Information].

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Only Argentina has a Consejo Nacional de Audiovisual e Infancia [National Council of Audiovisual and Childhood] (CONACAI) created by a 2009 law. In addition, Uruguay includes a representative of the Instituto del Niño y el Adolescente [Institute for Children and Adolescents] and of a non-governmental organization that promotes children’s rights in the CHASCA.  Only Uruguay had a council for community media founded by the 2007 Ley de Radiodifusión Comunitaria [Community Broadcasting Law], but it was then also integrated into the CHASCA. Thus, the four countries considered that it was important to enable social participation in audiovisual communications and telecommunications, especially in public media. Most considered it relevant to have a defender for the audiences, but they gave them different aims. Fewer countries created a participatory organism for access to information, and only one country created a participatory entity to work on audiovisual media for children. Regarding the composition of the regulatory authorities’ social councils, the Argentine COFECA is the biggest with 39 members, followed by the Uruguayan CHASCA with 17 representatives, the Mexican IFT Council with 15 members, and, finally, the Ecuadorian Council of CORDICOM with 8 members. In Argentina, Uruguay, and Mexico, all representatives are ad honorem members, while in Ecuador, the law does not establish that aspect. In Argentina and Mexico, the councils elect their own authorities, unlike in Uruguay, where the council president is the representative of the Ministerio de Industria, Energía y Minería [Ministry of Industry, Energy and Mining] of the National Executive Power, while the Ecuadorian law does not mention its authorities. The COFECA’s members are designated by the executive but proposed by the organizations and institutions they represent, and the IFT Council’s members are designated by the IFT authorities, which are designated by the executive with the ratification of the senate. Uruguayan and Ecuadorian laws do not establish who nominates and designates the CHASCA’s and CORDICOM Council’s members. The Argentine, Uruguayan, and Ecuadorian Councils include representatives from CSOs involved in human rights, non-discrimination and/ or communication, and cultural rights. The Argentine Council has representatives from commercial, community, public, and indigenous media; the Ecuadorian one from commercial, community, and public media; and the Uruguayan one from commercial and community media. Argentina, Uruguay, and Ecuador integrate workers’ union representatives. Argentina

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and Uruguay involve university representatives. Regarding state organisms, the Argentine COFECA integrates representatives from the 23 provinces and from the capital city, while the Uruguayan CHASCA includes representatives from two ministries of the national executive and one from the legislative assembly. Only the Ecuadorian Council integrates representatives from indigenous people, afro descendants, and Montubio people. The laws of Argentina, Uruguay, and Ecuador establish how many representatives from which sector should be integrated into the councils, unlike the Mexican law, which only stipulates that one member should have experience and/or knowledge about community media. The Argentine COFECA, followed by the Uruguayan CHASCA, are not only the biggest but also the most diverse of these participatory regulatory authority councils in audiovisual communication and telecommunications. The Argentine Council has the most independent design when considering the manner of nomination and designation of its members, as well as the way in which it elects its authorities. The four participatory councils depend on the regulatory authority of the audiovisual and/or telecommunication policies of each country. The Argentine COFECA depends on the Autoridad Federal de Servicios de Comunicación Audiovisual [Federal Authority of Audiovisual Communication Services] (AFSCA). The Uruguayan CHASCA is independent, but administratively, it depends on the Consejo de Comunicación Audiovisual [Audiovisual Communication Council]. The Mexican Consultative Council depends on the IFT and the Ecuadorian Consultative Council on CORDICOM. Most of the laws establish that these regulatory authorities must also provide the funds, resources, and infrastructure to the councils that they need in order to function. Only the Ecuadorian law says nothing about the financing of the Consultative Council. One key point regarding guaranteeing the real functioning of these entities relates to who provides the budget. In this sense, the Ecuadorian Council has a weaker design as it does not guarantee its economic independence. The COFECA and CHASCA have the power to issue their own regulations, unlike the Mexican and Ecuadorian Councils, which do not stipulate who regulates their councils. Thus, the Argentine and Uruguayan Councils are, by law, more independent in this sense. Regarding their functions, the four councils are advisory bodies on communication policies about freedom of speech, access to information, and other rights, but their recommendations are not binding. In Mexico

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and Ecuador, the laws that create them do not specify their attributions. Instead, in Uruguay and Argentina, their functions are clearly delimited. In both cases, the councils participate and give opinions about the procedures and criteria to give media permits and receive the annual reports from the regulatory authorities. In addition, the CHASCA must ensure that the regulatory authority’s acts are publicized, and it presides over the public hearings that the regulatory authority convenes. Besides all these functions, the Argentine COFECA has many more attributions. One of its members is part of the regulatory authority board, and the council has the power to remove directors of the AFSCA board and to propose two public media directors. It must also collaborate in broadcasting public policy formulations, make a list of relevant events that the media should transmit, select community and indigenous media projects that will receive the promotional funding established by law, and inform Congress annually about fulfilling its legal requirements. Therefore, the design of the Argentine COFECA has created the most powerful Latin American participatory and consultative council of all the audiovisual communication and/or telecommunication regulatory authorities in the region in terms of its capacity to impact policies. In summary, the most complex sets of participatory agencies in the communication policy field were designed and approved in Argentina and Uruguay. They achieved the creation and design of powerful participatory institutions that are more varied, autonomous, financed, and inclusive. These two South American countries have strong historical and current CSO mobilization regarding communication matters. In addition, in recent decades, there has been an alliance between CSOs and governments to foster communication rights-based reforms to curb the power of the economic media elites. Moreover, the reforms were more clearly grounded on international human rights standards.

Achievements and Setbacks Some of these participatory communication policy institutions that were created in Mexico, Ecuador, Argentina, and Uruguay during the 2000s and 2010s were never realized. Others were realized late or only partially. Of those that did work, some functioned regularly, and others were underfunded, repealed, or replaced. In this section, the implementation and functioning of the Argentinean participatory institutions created between 2000 and 2015 by the

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audiovisual communication and telecommunication laws are examined based on the ongoing research carried out by the authors. The dimensions considered include how these institutions became operational, the social organizations that participated, the mechanisms of designation, how long after the enactment of the law they were launched, the funding allocated, and the institutional support granted. Additionally, the actions these agencies undertook, the levels of autonomy from the government and business elites they had, the operating dynamics they established, their interaction with other state and non-state organizations, how they publicly communicated their activity, the modalities or formats of participation they implemented, the conflict and resolution channels they developed, the visible consequences of their actions, and the repercussions on the functioning of these institutions are also analyzed. These dimensions refer to the five dimensions that were analyzed in the institutional design section and include three others identified in the methodological approach: The transparency of and publicity for their activities, the times and formats generated for citizen participation, and the consequences of the participation process. In Argentina, even if the expectations of social organizations that promoted the legislative reform were not completely satisfied, community media, cooperative media, small and medium media companies, and native media associations actively participated in the COFECA and CONACAI, they collaborated informally with AFSCA and the Ombudsman/woman Office for Audiences, and they also kept demanding for the law to be fully implemented via the use of public documents, street protests, and administrative requests, among other strategies (Segura 2015). The COFECA started in 2009, a few months after the law was passed. Every sector quickly designated its representatives, and they were confirmed by the president. When the time arrived, the COFECA also renewed its members, as the law had established. Its first chairman belonged to the Coalición por una Radiodifusión Democrática [Coalition for Democratic Broadcasting]. As for its achievements, it generated a list of general interest events between 2011 and 2015, enforcing the law (Linares 2018). In addition, it promoted training and technological update programs. Even if the body discussed and worked on other key and necessary audiovisual policies, such as organizing the radioelectric spectrum, it could not reach an internal consensus or impact AFSCA’s board concerning these conflicting issues. In some cases, the COFECA’s representatives on AFSCA’s board showed a lack of autonomy, for example,

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when they voted against the law and the general interest in the case that decided on enlarging the limits of Telefonica’s concentration—one of the dominant telecommunication corporations (Retegui 2017). In April 2011, a year after the law went into effect, the Advisory Council of Audiovisual Communication and Childhood was established. The Council was organized into three commissions to accomplish its objectives, as established by law: Contents and research, education and training, and development and production (Baccaro and Maglieri 2020). In 2013, the CONACAI presented a guide of 14 qualitative criteria for the production of content for children and adolescents, grounded on the International Convention on the Rights of the Child and the national laws of the Comprehensive Protection of Girls, Children and Adolescents, of Education, and of the Audiovisual Communication Services. In addition, based on the same Convention and national laws as well as other local regulations, it coordinated actions with the United Nations Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), the AFSCA, and the Audiences’ Ombudswoman to publicize and promote compliance with childhood rights and democratic communication. It published training material and implemented workshops for communicators (Weckesser 2020). The Office of the Ombudsman for Audiences started in 2012, three years after the LSCA was passed. In a few years, it achieved positive experiences for different types of citizen participation: Legal and administrative assistance, and training programs made with community and indigenous media (Segura et  al. 2021); research about TV news, in which annual reports were published and shared with channel editors; public hearings that were regularly organized in the different regions of the country; and thematic manuals with recommendations to improve journalistic coverage, among others. Its work was rapidly recognized within and outside the country. In 2014, the Argentinean Ombudswoman of Audiences was designated as the first president of the Inter-American Organization of Audiences’ Ombudswomen and Ombudsman, created in its first meeting in Buenos Aires. In 2016, it won the Inter-American Award for the Innovation for Effective Public Management, awarded by the OAS, which stressed “the promotion of gender equity in radio and TV.” Unlike the other participatory institutions created by the LSCA, which functioned well even shortly after the law was passed, the members of the Public Media Council proposed by their institutions were only nominated by the president in January 2015. Its first formal meeting was in September 2015, six years after the law was passed and only three months before the

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government changed. This prevented the realization of public audiences with open participation making citizen proposals or demands and evaluating the functioning of public state media. There is no organized civil society that promotes state public media. The delay in the designation and functioning of the Public Media Council was only denounced in 2012 by the two national associations of college careers of communication and by nine national congressmen/women in 2013 (Segura 2015). What was even worse was that the ICT Council never started its work until the dissolution of the Autoridad Federal de Tecnologías de la Información y las Comunicaciones [Federal Authority of Information and Communication Technologies] (AFTIC), which the next president decided on. The change of government in 2015 implied a turning point for communication policies in general, and especially for participatory agencies. During his second day as president, Mauricio Macri’s second decree aimed at changing key media policies. Among them, he dissolved the main participatory state institution created by the Audiovisual Communication Services and by the Digital Argentine Laws: The COFECA and the Consejo TIC. They were replaced by the Consejo Federal de Comunicaciones [Federal Communications Council] (COFECO), whose composition and functions were defined eight months later (Decree 916/2016). The COFECO, on the one hand, combined the responsibilities of the two previous councils, and on the other hand, it vastly reduced the number of its members to eight. Nonetheless, the same sectors (except for national universities delivering communication courses) were represented: Commercial entities, non-profit associations, indigenous peoples, public media, unions of workers, users and consumers, the National Interuniversity Council, and the provinces. In addition, it reduced the functions of the previous councils: It does not have the power to appoint or remove directors in the regulatory agency that replaced the AFSCA and AFTIC—the Ente Nacional de Comunicaciones [National Communications Entity] (ENACOM)—evaluate Fondo de Fomento Concursable para Medios de Comunicación Audiovisual [Competitive Promotion Found for Audiovisual Media] (FOMECA) projects, nor determine the events of public interest. It only proposes juries and licensing contest guidelines, advises on policy formulation, and submits an annual report to the Bicameral Commission. The COFECO has not yet started to function, so in the six years of its existence, there has been no participation or institutionalized social control of policy implementation (Segura 2019).

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OSCs organized street demonstrations, public declarations, positioning documents, and judiciary denunciations. In addition, they made demands of the national state in the IACHR due to the worsening communication rights that the changes to the 2009 law implied. Nonetheless, they have not been taken into account by the government. Meanwhile, the Public Media Council denounced having had to carry out its work in solitude, in a discontinuous manner, without a budget, information, or channels of dialogue with the authorities of Radio y Televisión Argentina (CCHMP 2017). However, it held a public hearing in 2016 and presented its report to the Bicameral Commission in 2017. In fact, the public forum was a useful mechanism for the citizen audit of the management of Radio y Televisión Argentina Sociedad del Estado [Argentine Radio and Television State Society] (RTA SE), with relevant— and several—critics and demands (Linares and Mallimaci 2020). Its mandate ended in 2017, and the executive did not appoint new members, so the Public Media Council has, in fact, been deactivated. As there were no social organizations actively supporting this council, it was easy for governments to ignore it (Segura 2019). The Audiences’ Ombudsman/woman ended her mandate in 2016, but the Bicameral Commission did not appoint a new defender. In this way, the Ombudsman’s Office has been leaderless since then and up to 2018, when a “provisional defender” was appointed, with no precedent, and a process of institutional erosion began, with threats of dismissal and the de-hierarchization of officials who had been key in the institutional construction. Ombudsman Office workers, community radio and TV stations, communication scholars, non-governmental organizations, and other groups publicly protested, but they were unable to stop the regressive changes (Segura 2019). During the presidency of Mauricio Macri (2015–2019), there was also a decline in audiovisual policies for children. The key modifications to the LSCA affected both the financing of audiovisual production premises and CONACAI’s operation (Weckesser 2020). During the new period of government that started in 2019, the COFECO, the CONACAI, and the Public Media Council have remained inactive, even though they were established via current regulations. Only a new Audiences’ Ombudsman/woman was correctly designated by the Bicameral Commission, and the Office re-started its functioning. After almost 12 years, it is the only participatory agency that remains functional after a period of uncertainty.

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In summary, the Argentinean experience illustrates that participatory institutions are extremely dependent on governmental changes and global political disputes. Social mobilization to defend the functioning of participatory agencies helps to prevent regressive changes, but it is not enough if there is no political will. When social mobilization is weak or even lacking, participatory institutions disappear.

Conclusions Which theoretical lessons can be drawn from the analysis of the design and implementation of the participatory communication policy institutions created in Latin America in the 2000s and 2010s? Did these agencies limit the elite capture, did they contribute to promoting citizen participation, and did they make the human right to communication more respected? As stated above, the participation model recognizes the inequality of power among states, global business corporations, and CSOs. This conceptualization emphasizes the main role of the state in communication policy-making. The cases analyzed confirm that participation mechanisms can open doors to a real impact in terms of policies and they can limit the elite capture of the policies under specific circumstances. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the actors involved have contradictory and even antagonistic interests and that not all of them have the same ability to impose their voice. Thus, in this chapter, we demonstrate that without social mobilization, the design, creation, putting into operation, functioning, sustainability, continuity, and impact of participatory institutions is not possible. Citizen participation was very important for sustaining the sanctioning of laws, and it was also a necessary condition for the maintenance and functioning of participatory agencies. Therefore, participatory institutions are supported from the bottom up and not the other way around. As another analysis has demonstrated (Prato et al. 2018), the social participation promoted by the states and the participatory agencies designed technocratically depend on the political will of the government in charge. This dependance makes these agencies fragile. Thus, they can easily disappear when the state withdraws its support. Nonetheless, civic mobilization is not a sufficient condition to guarantee the maintenance and impact of participatory agencies. The study confirms the conclusions of previous research in Latin America (Segura 2018a;

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Segura and Waisbord 2016): National states and governments in charge of the states remain key actors with veto power in communication policy-­ making processes. Political parties and their leaders are, in the best-case scenario, weakly persuaded or, mostly, not at all convinced of the relevance that the institutionalization of citizen participation has for democratic politics. The political will of establishing and holding up participatory institutions is linked to the usefulness that officials attribute to them in their confrontations with economic and media elites. When the historical alliance between governmental and media elites in each country is broken, it is more probable that a set of participatory agencies will be created and promoted. On the contrary, if the political and economic elites are exchanging mutual benefits, it is more probable that the institutionalization of social participation will be hampered. Multilateral organizations have an impact during the debate, design, and creation of participatory institutions. Those multilateral human rights organizations, such as the UN and OAS Freedom of Expression Rapporteurs, or the IACHR, have promoted the strongest sets of participatory institutions established by law in Latin America. On the other hand, multilateral organizations with private-sector members and a techno-economical approach have fostered weaker participatory institutions. The private sector that captures policies does not settle its interests from within participatory institutions, even when it has designated representative members in them. The commercial actors of the media and communication system solve their problems by capturing mechanisms and mutually beneficial relationships with officials. In fact, the great difficulties that participatory institutions face highlight the effectiveness of political and economic elite-capture mechanisms. Finally, when the participatory agencies are designed with many representatives from diverse sectors, they have richer and livelier debates; meanwhile, when they are designed with a leader in charge, they exhibit more capacity for action. The media and communication system is very dynamic, and if discussions slow down decision making and do not end in concrete actions, participatory mechanisms are too slow to solve problems. On the contrary, if decisions are made without a strong debate, they risk imposing the position of only one or two interested sectors, resulting in capture by the elites.

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In sum, participatory agencies, when they have strong social mobilization supporting them and when they have been designed following human rights standards, contribute to limiting the elite capture of communication policies. Nevertheless, the functioning and impact of participatory institutions are restricted by the same obstacles they aim to curb: Political and business power.

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Segura, M. S. (2018a). De la resistencia a la incidencia. Ediciones UNGS. Segura, M.  S. (2018b). The influence of international cooperation in Latin American communication field. Journal of Latin American Communication Research, 6(1–2), 81–97. http://journal.pubalaic.org/index.php/jlacr/article/view/289/147. Segura, M. S. (2019). Un modelo cada vez más excluyente [An increasingly exclusive model]. In M. Nazareno, M. S. Segura, & G. Vázquez (Eds.), Pasaron cosas (pp. 171–197). FCS-UNC/Brujas. Bizberge, A., & Segura, M. S. (2020). Los derechos digitales durante la pandemia COVID-19 en Argentina, Brasil y México [Digital rights during COVID-19 pandemic in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico]. Revista De Comunicación, 19(2), 61–85. https://doi.org/10.26441/RC19.2-­2020-­A4. Segura, M. S., & Linares, A. (forthcoming). ¿Cómo evitar que las políticas de comunicación sean capturadas por las élites? Instituciones participativas en América Latina 2000–2020. EDUVIM. Segura, M. S., & Waisbord, S. (2016). Media movements. Zedbooks. Segura, M. S., Linares, A., Espada, A., Longo, V., Hidalgo, A. L., Traversaro, N., & Vinelli, N. (2018). La multiplicación de los medios comunitarios, populares y alternativos en Argentina [he multiplication of community, popular and alternative media in Argentina. Explanations, scope and limitations]. Revista Internacional de Comunicación y Desarrollo, 2(9), 88–114. https://doi. org/10.15304/ricd.2.9.5530 Segura, M. S., Linares, A., Longo, V., Vinelli, N., Espada, A., Traversaro, N., & Hidalgo, A. L. (2021). Alternativas. Condiciones y estrategias de las radios y los canales sin fines de lucro desde la sanción de la Ley Audiovisual. Edunse. Sorj, B. (2010). Usos, abusos y desafíos de la sociedad civil en América Latina. Siglo XXI. UNESCO. (1977). Informe final de la Reunión sobre la autogestión, el acceso y la participación ciudadana en materia de comunicación. UNESCO. UNESCO. (2014). World trends in freedom of expression and media development. UNESCO. Weckesser, C. (2020). Cuerpo y democracia: formas de estar juntos en producciones audiovisuales para la primera infancia [Body and democracy: ways of being together in audiovisual productions for early childhood]. Revista Internacional de Comunicación y Desarrollo, 3(12), 90–105. https://doi. org/10.15304/ricd.3.12.6655

CHAPTER 12

Understanding the Dynamics of Social Media Governance in South Africa Trust Matsilele and Bruce Mutsvairo

Introduction The past decade has seen a surge in research investigating the effects of social media in varying political contexts. Most of these studies in Africa have tended to focus on the effects of social media use for political mobilizations (Dwyer and Molony 2019;  Chitanana and Mutsvairo 2019; Matsilele and Ruhanya 2021, Badr 2018; Langmia 2014; Ghannam 2011; Hamdy and Gomaa 2012; Bailard 2012; Metzgar and Maruggi 2009; Enli 2017; Bessi and Ferrara 2016; Storck 2011) with a few (Nwafor et.al. 2013; Moyo 2010) looking at elections. Chitanana and Mutsvairo’s study (2019) examines the democratization potential of social media in

T. Matsilele Cape Peninsula University of Technology, Cape Town, South Africa B. Mutsvairo (*) Department of Media and Culture Studies, Utrecht University, Utrecht, The Netherlands e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. A. Ganter, H. Badr (eds.), Media Governance, Global Transformations in Media and Communication Research - A Palgrave and IAMCR Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05020-6_12

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Zimbabwe. Langmia and Mpande (2014) assess the extent to which social media contributed to a speculative hope for “the revolutionary winds” in sub-Saharan Africa following success in North Africa. Ghannam (2011) looked at how social media improved free expression leading up to the toppling of the North African dictators with Hamdy and Gomaa (2012) interrogating social media’s framing of the Egyptian uprising. Bailard (2012) considered interpenetrating ways in which media systems and communication networks have complexly conditioned and facilitated the Arab uprisings with Storck (2011) conducting a wide-ranging study looking at the extent to which Egyptian activists used social media as tools for organizing and generating awareness in the uprisings that took place in Egypt. These few examples give an indication of much broader research that has gone into trying to understand the nexus between social media and political mobilization in Africa. With social media use becoming more and more popular in Africa, most of the media governance debates in the region have tended to focus on the regulation-related issues (Roberts and Bosch 2021; Mutsvairo and Rønning 2020; Munoriyarwa 2021; Sampaio-Dias et al. 2019; Ndlela and Mano 2020). The continent has also seen a surge in government-led Internet shutdowns with attempts aimed at curbing online dissent currently underway in eSwatini (formerly Swaziland), Cameroon, Ethiopia, Gambia and Uganda (Mutsvairo 2020). At the time of writing this chapter (early July 2021), eSwatini had just banned Internet use in the country following sporadic protests against King Mswati’s governance. Other developments include the October 2019 introduction of an extensive Social Media bill in Nigeria which raised fears of state-sponsored censorship campaign. Lesotho followed up, issuing a decree forcing social media users with more than 100 followers to register its media regulator (Karombo 2020). In Uganda, online content creators and distributors, mainly bloggers and political influencers, who use social media now need to register with the Uganda Communications Commission. The trend is ongoing as many African countries introduce laws, which they argue are important for security reasons while critics believe they are meant to sustain some of the leaders’ longevity in power. Like the rest of the world, African governments and policy makers are struggling to find a permanent solution to digital disinformation campaigns even though for now, it seems some leaders have opted to crackdown and place restrictions on their digital platforms.

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Before delving into media governance issues, it is important to get a clear picture on the tense and difficult relationship between politics and digital media in Africa. As the above corpus demonstrates, the nexus between social media and elections remains under-researched, especially in the governance context. An online search of social media and elections in academic portals for articles and contributions immediately points to most of the studies conducted in western Europe and North America (Allcott and Gentzkow 2017; Strandberg 2013; Metaxas and Mustafaraj 2012; Broersma and Graham 2012) with little on Africa (Mare 2018; Mare and Matsilele 2020; Smyth and Best 2013; Bailard 2012; Mäkinen and Kuira 2008). Mare and Matsilele (2020) have looked at hybrid media system in Zimbabwe’s 2018 elections, Smyth and Best (2013) investigated the use of social media in West African elections, Bailard (2012) looked at the Internet’s effects in an African election with Mäkinen and Kuira (2008) having studied social media and post-election crisis in Kenya. Other studies that come to the fore include the one by Walton and Donner (2012) which looked at mobile-mediated publics in South Africa’s 2009 elections, Moyo’s (2010) study that examined the use of mobile phones during Zimbabwe’s 2008 elections, and Okoro and Nwafor’s (2013) investigation that sought to understand the use of social media in Nigeria’s 2011 general elections. Mare’s 2018 study has a structural resemblance to this current investigation though his focus was the use of Facebook in electoral campaigns in Zimbabwe. Mare (2018) investigated how three major political parties and candidates in Zimbabwe used Facebook for campaign purposes during the so-called watershed 2013 elections. South Africa’s election of 2019 was also regarded as a “watershed” as the governing party was projected to lose the elections by most pollsters. Ifukor (2010) led another study exploring blogging and tweeting in Nigeria’s 2007 general elections. But Africa’s problems run deeper. First, only 29 percent of Africa has access to the Internet (Affordability report 2019) while about 300 million Africans live more than 50 kilometers from a fiber or cable broadband connection (World Bank 2021) highlighting longstanding, fundamental accessibility concerns. Ownership is another disconcerting issue. It is not known what percentage of the global digital media economy is in the hands of Africans. What is clear though, as argued by Milner and Traub (2021), is the way in which digital platforms are driving society to the brink of worsening inequality and unprecedented control of citizens, consequently buttressing persistent power disparities. Digital colonialism

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(Kwet 2019) is also hogging the limelight as Silicon Valley faces criticism for venturing into Africa for profit and plunder. As more and more Africans get used to being told to embrace these digital technologies, there is a noticeable lack of studies highlighting the longstanding power dynamics and their gloom-­ridden impact on African societies. Consequently, there is an observable gap in literature looking at Africa’s most industrialized economy, South Africa, and how its political elites use Twitter during electoral competition. It also seems like there are few or no studies looking at matters of social media governance issues in the country, a gap this study seeks to fill. This is important as South Africans spend more time on the Internet than any other country, with social media use estimated to be at 50 percent of the total population, far above regional peers. For example, as the International Labour Conference (ILC)1 (2022) observes, 19 percent of individuals in the least developed countries (LDCs) use the Internet. Elsewhere in Africa restrictions on social media use continue to gather pace. It is common cause that African governments continue to face accusations of blocking access to WhatsApp, Twitter and other social media platforms with several countries crafting laws galvanizing censorship of social media content for political purposes.

Social Media Governance From an African perspective, social media governance refers to attempts by African governments and policy makers to find consensus on an organized way of instituting processes leading to formalized operational mechanisms for digital realms. Consensus on these issues is almost unheard of in Africa. This is because politically many leaders tend to stay in power for longer periods leading to protests from the public and members of the non-governmental communities, some of whom are accused of representing the interests of Western governments. Indeed, the potential of social media as a tool to undo attempts to prolong power is massive. For example, Sudan’s Omar Al Bashir’s 30  years in power ended in 2019 after a series of social media-organized protests. It therefore is totally understandable why any African leader seeking to prolong power would keep an eye on social media and only support self-driven policies. As Bosch (2016) 1  Ana Maria Lebada UNCTAD Report Looks at Digitalization Challenges, Opportunities. Accessed on 19/08/2019: http://sdg.iisd.org/news/unctad-report-looks-at-digitalizationchallenges-opportunities/.

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also observes, with a particular scholarly focus on the role of social media, the Internet has been listed as a vehicle for fostering political participation. This use, she adds, can enhance voter information about candidates and elections, stimulating increased participation. Some of the popular networking sites on the Internet include Facebook, Instagram, YouTube and Twitter. Commenting on the latter and barring its limitations, Bosch (2016, 4) intimates that, “spaces like Twitter represent discursive arenas, even if they are micro-public spheres,” allowing people to meet and deliberate. This is what Loader and Mercea (2011), writing on the developed South, argue saying that social media has started providing opportunities for a networked citizen-centered perspective connecting the private sphere of autonomous political identity to a multitude of political spaces. It is this aspect of identity formation that political actors often nurture for political gain and election purposes. This study, in part, borrows from Yin (2015, 557) who argues, writing on migrant communities, that, “when they meet online, their identity construction should be investigated through a ‘cyber-­ lens’ and in a more nuanced manner.” To some degree, this is what this present investigation seeks to do, to have an understanding of how identity, specifically political identity, is constructed and governed by parties through social media lens. This study deals with networked citizen leaders and how they employ social media and the extent to which political identities constructed online relate to offline intentions. For South Africa’s three leading political parties beginning with opposition Economic Freedom Fighters, its identity is constructed around the label “fighters,” while supporters of the ruling African National Congress prefer to refer themselves as “comrades” and while the Democratic Alliance considers itself “the democrats.” As this study demonstrates in the discussion section, political actors cultivated these identities during the campaign period of 2019 elections with the ultimate goal to harvest votes. Compared with other African countries, which have opted to shut down the Internet during political campaigns, social media governance issues were not a major topic under discussion in South Africa, which is considered largely open, that is, to a larger extent, the government does not openly support legislation aimed at curbing citizens’ rights to free speech. South Africans have become more active on the virtual sphere following successes of the Fees Must Fall movement of 2016 that employed social media as part of student activists’ communicative strategy. This movement, predominantly organized and facilitated by university

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students, called for no fee university education in the country. Commenting on this, Bosch et al. (2018) observe that activists resorted to social media in an environment where mainstream commercial media served elite interests. This demonstrates the role social media is playing in facilitating symmetrical relations between power holders and citizenry. While Bosch’s study looks at how activists used digital media for their mobilization and circumventing mass media filters, it is important to note the mainstream media has also been accused of negative framing by all three political parties used as cases for this investigation. This notion is supported by a tweet from the Economic Freedom Fighters’ deputy president, Floyd Shivambu, who said that “the advantages of social media is that we all have an opportunity to promptly rebuff nonsensical allegations written by sponsored and conflicted newspapers. In the bygone era, we were going to wait for the next Friday Mail & Guardian to expose their lies.”2 As such, political actors saw social media’s power to remove filters and gatekeepers and have direct contact with the media and voters (Stier et al. 2018). However, the superior role that has been accredited to social media has received an equal measure of push back from eminent thinkers like Gladwell (2010), who argued that social media only made a small change as it tended to ride on the wave of the social infrastructure that existed within the society. Scholars and journalists also agree on the power of social media in agenda setting a role in the past was a preserve for journalists (Feezell 2018). Hence, political actors would use social media to set their political agenda as well as contesting the ones other interests set. Lastly, social media is also becoming a site for accountability where elected officials and public officials “report back” on critical aspects in the society (Treem 2015; Stamati et al. 2015; Bertot et al. 2012). Hence, political actors use social media to “account” and defend their policies and political records. South Africa is ranked second in the sub-Saharan Africa region on the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) Networked Readiness Index, few notches behind Mauritius as far as the adaptation of ICTs is concerned. It is this networked-ness of South Africans coupled with social media consumption patterns that makes social media an interesting case for study.

2  Floyd Shivambu, the Economic Freedom Fighters second in command, tweeted in response to a damning article over the scandal his brother has been prominently named on.

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According to DataReportal,3 South Africa is the largest consumer of Internet-based media per capita in the world averaging eight hours per day.4 This study, therefore, sought to understand how political elites are harnessing these consumptive habits for political purposes. As of 2018, 63.8  percent of the South African population were Internet users. This share is projected to grow to 80.8  percent in 2023.5 This is by African standards a high rate of Internet use, which would make South Africa an interesting case to study. The country has 31.8  million Internet users with 23  million active social media users and 21  million of that being active on their mobile phone. According to the same report, South Africa has 28 million Internet active users on mobile phones with a figure comprising 50 percent of the total population of the country. These statistics present an interesting case for study. Most youths use social media for their everyday communication and networking which explains the high concentration of social media use in the 2019 elections. Social media would become a sphere for canvassing for youth votes considering the flexibility of this demographic group. However, the same youth has grown disillusioned by politics and politicians which explains why about 6 million young South Africans eligible to vote never registered to participate in the May 8 election.6 Digital elitism has become a major Africa-wide issue. As argued earlier on, rural dwellers do not always have access to the Internet. Neither is the Internet readily available to urbanites in South Africa and indeed other African countries. Many people access Twitter and Facebook during work hours, and posting comments on these platforms during non-working hours is considered a sign of digital elitism because it shows someone has personalized Internet access. It also leads to questions on how policies aimed at social media governance can be sustained or even be discussed in the first place particularly because the majority of Africans do not have 3  DataReportal 2019. Accessed on 19/08/2019 https://datareportal.com/reports/digital-2019-south-africa Accessed on 19/08/2019. 4  Digital 2019: South Africa. Accessed on 19/08/2019: https://datareportal.com/ reports/digital-2019-south-africa. 5   Statistics South Africa, Internet user penetration in South Africa from 2017 to 2023: Accessed on 19/08/2019: https://www.statista.com/statistics/484933/ internet-user-reach-south-africa/. 6  AFP Youth shun vote 25 years after SA’s first free election: Accessed on 20/08/2019: https://www.timeslive.co.za/politics/2019-04-29-youth-shun-vote-25-years-after-sasfirst-free-election/.

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access to these platforms. To illustrate this further, StatCounter,7 an online site that measures social media use, estimates that South Africa’s Twitter users account for 9.8  percent of the total social media demographics, behind Facebook with 46.92 percent and Pinterest with 37.22 percent. Instagram has 2.93 percent, YouTube 2.22 percent and Tumblr has the least with 0.36 percent. Internet World Stats, another online platform that quantifies Internet uses, conservatively agrees with the above estimates crediting Facebook with the highest number of social media users estimated at 16 million as of 2018. Twitter was considered for this study as the political leaders and their parties were more active on this social media in comparison to Facebook. For example, the African National Congress president and Economic Freedom Fighters leader do not have active Facebook accounts. The Democratic Alliance leader to the contrary uses social media to make live updates. Twitter was also considered as a field of study due to affordability when it comes to political advertisements compared to mainstream media. This view is supported by Nulty et al. (2016, 16) observing that, “for less mainstream challengers and also parties without big budgets, however, social media offers a direct route to campaign communication far less expensive than more traditional methods of advertising.” Twitter was also considered for this study because of the illusory power it possesses. Unlike Facebook, the medium is designed for one-way interactions where users “tweet” information to their contacts. This mechanical aspect empowers users to decide what to “broadcast” the same way mainstream media functions. This illusion of power is what is appropriated by political actors as they communicate with their followers whom in most cases endorse the position of their leaders. Secondly, Twitter has followers, unlike Facebook which has friends (Davenport et al. 2014, 213). Twitter uses language of power while Facebook uses communal language. We believe any study that wants to understand the uses and content political actors communicate to their constituents during election periods should consider Twitter because of the political economy, social capital, mechanical and tonal aspects that are inherently built within this social networking site.

7  StatCounter 2019. Accessed on 19/08/2019 https://gs.statcounter.com/social-mediastats/all/south-africa.

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Social Media and Elections Over the last decade, web-based outlets have become integrated parts of election campaigns at many levels (Strandberg 2013). The fields of humanities and sciences have seen an upsurge in research looking at how social media is being integrated into the lifeblood of the electoral process. For example, there have been studies on social media that have examined the use of social media for active political campaigns in Zimbabwe (Mare and Matsilele 2020), Finland (Strandberg 2013), United States (Gentzkow 2017; Metaxas and Mustafaraj 2012), and United Kingdom (Broersma and Graham 2012). A cursory survey of the literature in this area shows that studies conducted are multifaceted from political campaigns to mobilization and monitoring. For example, Gentzkow (2017) has studied how fake news played a critical role in the 2016 US elections and how that fed into the incumbent president Donald Trump’s campaign strategy. Kushin and Yamamoto (2010) studied college students’ use of online media for political purposes in the 2008 elections. Enli (2017) considered how social media was used in the US elections of 2016 as an unfiltered source of news bypassing editorial media. Metzgar and Maruggi (2009) investigated what they regard as “conventional wisdom” about social media and its applicability to political campaigns. Carlisle and Patton (2013) conceptualized political engagement in Facebook and examined the political activity of Facebook users during the 2008 US presidential primary and general election. Outside the United States, Broersma and Graham (2012) investigated the use of social media as a source of news in the United Kingdom and the Netherlands. Strandberg (2013) has attempted to understand the use of social media by both candidates and citizens in the 2011 Finnish parliamentary election campaign. Smyth and Best (2013) looked at the use of social media in sub-Saharan Africa broadly and West Africa with a view to understanding how, if at all, these new media perturb the political landscape. Closer to South Africa, Mare (2017) has explored the use of Facebook in Zimbabwe’s electoral campaigns. This chapter seeks to add literature to the existing body of knowledge with a view to understanding how Africa’s most developed nation’s citizens use social media during elections and galvanize our understanding on how the social media ecosystems should ultimately be governed. Beyond campaigns, social media can also be used in elections for predicting electoral outcomes (Tumasjan et  al. 2010; Schoen et  al. 2013),

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electoral monitoring (Kaczmirek et  al. 2013), as reservoirs of data for journalists covering elections (Knight 2012) and as an indicator of political behavior (DiGrazia et  al. 2013). Politicians and political marketers have discovered that social networks have a twofold benefit which Broersma and Graham (2012) writing on 2010 UK elections intimate that, on the one hand, they are relatively cheap, engaging and easy-to-­ control tools to reach out to voters without the mediation of traditional news media and journalism, while, on the other hand, they offer possibilities to set the news agenda and get their message included in the mass media virtually untouched by journalists (Broersma and Graham 2012). However, this powerful and often progressive role social media can play might also be undermined by the possibility of its vulnerability to manipulation (Metaxas and Mustafaraj 2012).

Context and Background to the 2019 Polls Section 25 of South Africa’s Electoral Act governs how elections are conducted in the country. Governance relates, inter alia, to the period of campaign, issues of the voters’ roll to be used during an election, who may vote and where can one cast the ballot. The voters’ roll is compiled by the Chief Electoral Officer in accordance with section 5 of the Act and published according to section 14(2)(h) of the Act. Section 6 of the Electoral Act provides for those persons who may apply for registration as voters as follows: any South African citizen in possession of an identity document may apply for registration as a voter. For the purposes of the general registration of voters contemplated in section 14, an identity document includes a temporary certificate in the form which corresponds materially with a form prescribed by the Minister of Home Affairs by notice in the Government Gazette and issued by the Director-General of Home Affairs to a South African citizen from particulars contained in the population register and who has applied for an identity document. South Africa’s national and provincial elections take place every five years. Voters vote for a political party, not individuals. The political party then gets a share of seats in Parliament in direct proportion to the number of votes it got in the election. Each party then decides on members to fill the seats it has won. This is called proportional representation (PR) voting system. The configuration of an electoral system is of fundamental importance to the nature of a country’s politics and, very importantly, the match between the preferences of citizens, the preferences of elected officials and

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government’s policy direction. South Africa’s “proportional representation” system was selected for its inclusiveness, its simplicity and its tendency to encourage coalition government. Electoral systems can be compared along three broad dimensions: its ballot structure (how citizens cast their vote, and what they vote for); its district structure (how many districts there are, and the number of seats per district) and the electoral formula (how votes are converted into seats). While the electoral code is not explicit about social media, there are some provisions that find more expression in the cyberspace such as the use of language which provokes violence and publishing false information about other candidates or parties. These two provisions find more expression on social media due to limited regulation and monitoring of what happens in this space, a phenomenon confirmed in a study by Allcott and Gentzkow (2017).

Framing the Study The study is organized around a reconfigured public sphere, triangulated methodology and virtual ethnography design. Therefore, the researchers discuss the theoretical framework first reworking Habermas before moving to the triangulation approach, often described as a mixed-methods approach and concluding with virtual ethnography and case study designs. Habermas (1989) based his conventional account of the advent of the modern public sphere on the critical and universalizing force of publicity that ultimately replaced the old representative order. The starting point of this thought was that “representation is something external to the public sphere and alien to its neat functioning” (Trenz 2009, 34). The public sphere has been conceptualized as a communicative space that resides between and mediates the different interests of the system (market and state) and the lifeworld. In critical theory, the system is perceived as colonizing the lifeworld (Valtysson 2012, 77).

Research Ethics in the Social Media Sphere Twitter and other social networking sites, often referred to as social media, are gaining recognition as powerful research tools for the social sciences. As Kraut et  al. (2004) observed, social media present researchers with opportunities to recruit and collect data from a diverse range of participants often at a cheaper cost than traditional methods. These platforms constitute a large and diverse pool of participants, who can be selectively

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recruited for both online and offline studies (Kosinski et  al. 2015). As Beaulieu and Estalella (2012) argued, conducting qualitative research online within virtual communities poses unique ethical challenges because of the persistence and “traceability” of quotes, often sensitive content of data and potential impact on both individuals and online communities. This is worsened by the fact that researchers are not in agreement on what is deemed ethical or unethical (Östman and Turtiainen 2016, 66). The ethical issues, Hair and Clark (2007) note, may vary according to the purpose of the research, the mode of data collection and the types of virtual environments accessed. One of the biggest areas of concern with social media data is the extent to whether such data should be considered public or private, with Boyd and Crawford (2012) arguing that researchers should go beyond accessibility when making arguments about ethics. As they further argued, “the process of evaluating the research ethics cannot be ignored simply because the data are seemingly public” (Boyd and Crawford 2012, 672). This kind of research requires ethical balances against potential harm to research participants or others. A further ethical challenge in conducting online research is the boundary between public and private communication (James and Busher 2015). The other challenge with online ethnography is that it is easy to create a fake profile on Facebook and use it to participate in the research (Yang et  al. 2011). However, the ethical challenges that come with online research are being offset by a layer of privacy that requires users to confirm the consent given to applications in making a profile public or private (Kosinski et al. 2015). In this study, the researchers focused mainly on public figures and their political party social media handles used for mass communication. The Twitter posts studied were not for private communication as the target was to ensure the targeted public sees the message. As such, there was not a crucial dilemma about privacy. The communication that was scrapped from Twitter was of a public, institutional nature, and all of it was intended to be accessible by the broader public.

Findings and Discussion The data used for this chapter were collected as part of the ongoing South African 2019 elections study looking at social media use in electoral politics. The researchers identified and collected data produced and shared by three cases selected from verified Twitter handles. The initial process was checking candidates’ use of social media together with their parties. Using

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Combined Tweets of Political Parties and Leaders

Number of Tweets

1200 1000 800

March

600

April

400

May June

200 0

DA

DA Leader

EFF Leader

EFF

ANC Leader

ANC

Political Parties and Leaders

Fig. 12.1  Combined Tweets of South African political parties and leaders

advanced search, the researchers collected all the social media (Twitter) communication centered around the candidates and their parties. This means every tweet, re-tweet and response of a candidate together with their political parties. However, the study was only confined to tweets and retweets. The data collection procedure lasted for four months from March 1, 2019, until June 30, 2019, covering the electioneering period, voting day and post-voting period up to swearing-in of the members of parliament and President (Fig. 12.1). The researchers observed a lesser variation of candidate Twitter adoption if compared against party proportions. For example, EFF’s Malema maintained his Twitter lead with a 36  percent margin (with 259 tweets and retweets), followed by DA’s Maimane (also, refer to graph 6 for twitter patterns) with 34 percent (with 247 tweets and retweets) and, lastly, ANC’s Ramaphosa had a 30 percent rate of adoption with 221 tweets and retweets. The EFF, just like its leader Malema, tweeted the most compared to the other two parties (for more on Malema twitter patterns refer to Fig. 12.7). It (EFF) had a lead of 39 percent (with 3082 tweets and retweets), followed by ANC with 32  percent (with 2538 tweets and retweets) and the DA tweeted the least with 30 percent of the share (with 2350 tweets and retweets) during the period under study. Figures 12.2, 12.3 and 12.5 give an illustration of tweeting patterns during this research period.

Number of Tweets

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140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0

@MYANC Tweets

March April May 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

June

Days of the Month

Fig. 12.2  ANC’s use of Twitter during the period under research @Our_DA Tweets Number of Tweets

60 50 40

March

30

April

20

May

10 0

June 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

Days of the Month

Fig. 12.3  DA’s use of Twitter during the research period

Figure 12.2 illustrates how the ruling ANC tweeted during the period under study. Vergeer (2020) assert that bigger parties and those enjoying incumbency are less likely to adopt Twitter. This trend was observed in South Africa where smaller parties lacking financial and human resources  have tended to maximise their use of social media for campaign purposes. This study observed that the governing party, the ANC, adopted Twitter but had a lower rate of frequency when compared to the other two. Most liberational formations in Africa are still reliant on older and loyal voting blocks as they struggle to capture the imaginations of younger voters who are mostly networked. Figure  12.2 shows ANC tweeting the most in the months of April and May, a period just before and soon after elections. A cursory look of statistics shows that the party’s

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@EFFSouthAfrica Tweets Number of Tweets

100 80 60 40 20 0

2

4

6

8

10 12 14 16 18 20 22 24 26 28 30

Days of the Month

Tweets @EFFSouthAfrica March Tweets @EFFSouthAfrica April Tweets @EFFSouthAfrica May Tweets @EFFSouthAfrica June

Fig. 12.4  Rate of frequency by the EFF during the four-month period

generated tweets appeared the most in April compared to the other three months. In March the party had 668 tweets and retweets, in April the number went up to 963, in May the number went down to 838 and in June the party only tweeted 69 times. April, as the researchers observed, accounts for more tweets as the party built its Twitter activity following President Ramaphosa’s hashtag campaign #HolaMatamela that was taking place on this platform. The DA, while it fared much better in comparison to the governing party, tweeted within the same region as the ANC. We observed that the party focused on tweeting events and responding to political developments. The party tweeted/retweeted 917 items in the month of March, and went slightly up in April to 929, there was a drop in May to 479 and in June there were 255 items tweeted/retweeted. Like the ANC, the DA did not seem to have a robust approach to Twitter use which is demonstrated by this “mild” social media adoption. Figure 12.4 below gives an illustration over the four-month period under study. The EFF tweeted the most in comparison to the two biggest parties. This study challenged Vergeer et al.’s (2011) assertions that bigger parties are most likely to adopt Twitter in comparison to smaller parties. The EFF tweeted/retweeted 1101 items in March (the ANC had 668 and the DA had 917), in April the party had 950 (the ANC had 963 and the DA had 929), in May 773 items (the ANC had 838 and the DA had 479) and in June the party had 258 (the ANC had 69 and the DA had 255). ANC’s high numbers in April, as the researchers have already argued, is attributed to the #HolaMatamela campaign.

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@CyrilRamaphosa Tweets Number of Tweets

25 20 15

March

10

April

5

May

0

June 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

Days of the Month

Fig. 12.5  Cyril Ramaphosa’s use of Twitter during the research period

The dataset here confirms Vergeer’s (2020) assertion, writing on Europe, that argued that incumbency status is one of the most important predictors of a candidate’s Twitter presence. Vergeer (2020) observes that oppositional parties, usually smaller in size, are most likely to use social media in comparison to the incumbent. The scholars observe that incumbent leaders are likely to tweet the most because of the advantage that comes with size, infrastructure and access to resources. This confirms what this study found as the smallest party (EFF) of the three tweeted the most during the period under study (refer to Graph 1). The researchers observed that, while EFF deliberately used twitter almost to comment on every topical issue, the ANC and the DA tended to rely on mainstream media that comes with incumbency. The two organizations are also conservative as the message goes through multiple structures before being conveyed due to the risk factor associated with being the ruling and the main opposition party in the parliament. The figures of the ANC leader, Ramaphosa, also benefited from the twitter campaign the president held in May under the hashtag #HolaMatamela in late April (refer to Fig. 12.5 below in the month of April). This explains why Ramaphosa has the highest number (80) under that specific month as the graph shows. The researchers also looked at party leaders’ adoption of Twitter during this campaign period. Allusions and inferences have already been made to that effect with regards to the ANC President and the #HolaMatamela

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@MmusiMaimane Tweets 18

Number of Tweets

16 14 12

March

10 8

April

6

May

4

June

2 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

Days of the Month

Fig. 12.6  Mmusi Maimane’s use of Twitter during the period under study

campaign in the month of April where the party leader registered a huge spike compared to other months. The total Twitter adoption percentage during the four-month period demonstrate that Ramaphosa registered 31.7  percent in March, 36.2  percent in April (consistent with the #HolaMatamela campaign), 23.5 percent in May and 8.6 percent in June. However, we found that when looking at the volume of tweets per day during this period of study, Ramaphosa had his highest in April with 23 per day compared to his highest per day in March with 8, 13 in May and 6 in June. Based on the statistics the researchers gleaned from this study, Ramaphosa did not tweet in a total of 47 days during the campaign period from his personal handle. The president also operates the Presidency handle which might explain the lower Twitter adoption on his personal handle. Maimane, like Ramaphosa, was not aggressive on his social media accounts. Figure 12.6 gives an indication of his rate of Twitter adoption and frequency during the period under study. For example, Maimane had a total of 251 tweets during the four-month period under study registering his highest per day of 16 in May, followed by 8 in April, 6 in March and 5 in June. During the research period, Maimane did not tweet a total number of 24 days meaning, on average, Maimane tweeted once in every 0.2  days. Of the total distribution of Twitter activity during the four-­ month period, Maimane tweeted 24.7 percent in March, 35.5 percent in April, 23.9 in May and 15.9 percent in June.

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Number of Tweets

@Julius_S_Malema Tweets 15 10

March April

5

May 0

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31

June

Days of the Month

Fig. 12.7  EFF’s Julius Malema’s use of Twitter during the research period

Lastly, the EFF leader Julius Malema tweeted the most when compared against the two other cases studied. Malema had his highest per day in the month of March with 14 (Ramaphosa had 8 and Maimane had 6), 7 in April (Ramaphosa had 23 and Maimane had 8), 8 in May (Ramaphosa had 13 and Maimane had 16) and 5 in June (Ramaphosa had 6 and Maimane had 5). However, unlike Ramaphosa who had 47 “untweeted” days, Malema had 27, which was slightly higher than Maimane’s 24 “untweeted” days. Malema, whenever he tweeted, had an average of 0.2 tweets per day which is similar to Maimane’s daily average (Fig. 12.7). Appropriating Social Media for Advertorial Purposes Political actors and parties in South Africa used social media as reservoirs of information with regards to elections. A study of the three top parties shows that Twitter was used as an information hub where party leaders and their parties kept supporters informed about developments and party positions leading up to and after the elections. Twitter’s ability to provide cheap and real-time updates on developments bring a competitive advantage when juxtaposed to traditional and mainstream media platforms (Figs. 12.8 and 12.9). South Africa, like the rest of the developing economies, has seen an improvement in social media use for screening of political events. We found that all studied political parties employed Twitter to cover their political rallies through live broadcast feeds. This happened even in instances where political parties had full coverage by the mainstream media channels. This allows political parties to communicate directly with voters without mainstream media filters (Mare and Matsilele 2020). However, debates regarding how social media should be governed has gathered momentum across Africa with many, particularly political players, calling for regulation. Countries such as Lesotho, Uganda, Kenya and Tanzania

Fig. 12.8  EFF’s Twitter campaign poster

Fig. 12.9  Twitter poster advertising Ramaphosa’s outreach activities

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have already introduced social media regulatory laws as African governments move toward enacting stricter controls of online platforms across the continent. For example, in Uganda, the social media tax law was passed. The law requires that all online publishers register with the state Communication Authority (TCRA). Tanzania passed the Electronic and Postal Communications (online content) Regulations bill with Kenya having passed the Digital Service Tax in 2018 (Irimu 2018). All these laws are meant to restrict production and dissemination of online content that could have adverse effects on perceptions around African strong men. South Africa, however, is one of the few countries in Africa that has yet to introduce strict guidelines and regulations pertaining social media use. Digital media also facilitated echo chambers and community building around partisan lines. These networks are what Gladwell (2010) described

Fig. 12.10  The EFF use Twitter to communicate meeting details for its campaign

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Fig. 12.11  The DA also used twitter to show its growing support among the black population

as loose bonds in his seminal critique of the power of social media looking at the successes of social media in the Arab world. Our study of the tweets by the political leaders of these parties demonstrates a deliberate effort by leaders to build a community around their brands. A closer reading of the message shows, for example, that as an appeal to supporters EFF leader, Julius Malema, would address his community as “fighters and red sea” with DA leader Mmusi Maimane addressing his followers as “Blue Army and democrats” and Cyril Ramaphosa addressing ANC followers as “comrades.” This branding of followers and supporters is argued to be a strategy to build a community of followers which become a spider web defender of a partisan agenda (Figs. 12.10 and 12.11). Twitter also provided a veritable site of political engagements with voters and cyber-propaganda. These engagements were mostly built around hashtags as a tool for popularizing a campaign. Examples of hashtags

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Fig. 12.12  President Ramaphosa engaging citizens on social media platform

Fig. 12.13  The EFF leader employs Twitter to respond to media reports

would include the one led by Ramaphosa when he held a #HolaMatamela live engagement with followers on April 15, 2019. Malema tended to create trends on social media on many aspects as he has a bigger following of active supporters. An example of a hashtag campaign involves his fight with Karima Brown which later led to him being dragged to the SAHRC over hate speech and inciting violence (Figs. 12.12, 12.13 and 12.14). Lastly, this study found that political parties, especially the opposition, used social media to troll the ruling party. This trolling of Ramaphosa by DA leader Mmusi Maimane and EFF leader Julius Malema was meant to weaken his “reputation” as a clean and untainted political actor who could redeem South Africa from former President Jacob Zuma’s lost nine years.

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Fig. 12.14  DA appropriates social media for profiling failures of the ruling party

Often offline trolling would be carried to the online sphere by rival political parties as they sought to sharpen their message and ensure both offline and online audiences were kept informed of party message (Figs. 12.15 and 12.16).

Conclusion Social media has been shown to be the most reliable platform for smaller parties when it comes to campaign purposes. However, with new laws such as Protection of Private Information Act (POPI 2013) coming into effect in 2021, dissemination of what is characterized as private information on social media, even among political opponents, might become a punishable offense. Similar legislations are already underway in Zimbabwe with “cyber crimes” law of 2019 prohibiting what the government

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Fig. 12.15  DA leader takes a swipe at the President Ramaphosa for promising new bullet trains

Fig. 12.16  EFF frames the media as part of the anti-EFF campaign

describes as the spread of inflammatory, insightful, fake news intended to cause panic and despondency. Additionally, similar laws have been proposed in countries like Zambia and Tanzania. The promulgation of new laws undermining campaigns on social media and other online platforms threatens the survival of small parties that heavily rely on social media for propaganda and mobilization purposes. As per our findings, South African

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political elites openly use social media for educational, mobilization and informational purposes. They also use Twitter to counter professional media frames. We also observed that leading political parties, while not at the same level as those from the developed world, are seeing a surge of social media use that can be deduced by frequency of Twitter use. For example, on average, Ramaphosa tweeted once in every 2.5  days while Maimane and Malema tweeted once in 0.2 days which can be considered a high Twitter adoption. This study argues that Twitter in South Africa has become what Bosch (2017), Bosch and Mutsvairo (2017) and Makwambeni (2017) have characterized as discursive arenas similar to Habermas’ coffee houses and theaters. Ramaphosa’s #HolaMatamela engagement with citizen became a sphere for promoting citizen engagement, “accountability” and a forum of exchange of ideas. This improved the appropriation of social media for public engagement purposes might require what Linke and Zerfass (2013) described as the “social governance of social media use” which calls for a review of regulatory framework of the social media space. We hope this study could be a good starting point to discuss the troubling trend of deliberate curbs targeting content creators and social media users in Africa, with the ultimate possibility to threaten free speech and legitimate political debate.

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CHAPTER 13

Deliberative Policy Ecology Approach: Media Policy Studies from South Asia Preeti Raghunath

Introduction The practice of communication governance in South Asia goes back all the way to the late 1800s. The introduction of the Telegraph into British India was initiated in 1851, and the trans-India telegraph was completed in 1854. About 30 years later, the Indian Telegraph Act of 1885 was promulgated, amended iterations of which continue to be in force in the region that is present-day South Asia. While the colonial beginnings of media and communication governance is a common starting point for the countries in the region, the postcolonies themselves have taken divergent trajectories, with their own preferences for policies that shape the media sectors in each of the countries with their own unique contexts. Having said that, contiguous peoples’ movements that cut across borders, foreign investments and donor aid funding into “regional” media development

P. Raghunath (*) Monash University Malaysia, Subang Jaya, Malaysia © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. A. Ganter, H. Badr (eds.), Media Governance, Global Transformations in Media and Communication Research - A Palgrave and IAMCR Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05020-6_13

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initiatives continue to provide commonalities for South Asia’s tryst with media growth and its governance. The dialectics between the instinct for commonalities and the practicalities of divergences characterize modern-­ day communication governance in the region. While the above passage provides a glimpse into the practice of communication and media governance, the study of the field has accrued interest only recently in the region. Much of the research in Communication and Media Studies has been in the realms of communication for development, health communication and film studies, owing to the priorities of the governmental and intergovernmental interventions, and popularity of certain kinds of media in the region. Being subsumed under the rubrics of International Communication or Media Laws and Ethics earlier, it is only of late that the arena of Media Policy and Governance as a distinct area of research is gaining traction in the region.1 While South Asian scholars operating outside of the region have conducted such research (Chakravartty and Sarikakis 2006; Rasul and McDowell 2014; Rahman 2020), much work has not happened in mainstream academia within the region. Traversing scholarship on media and communication governance from South Asia is an exercise in comprehending but also conversing with the temporalities set by Western modern thought. Calls for the de-­ westernization of the field of media studies (Curran and Park 2000) have been prevalent for close to a couple of decades now. Such an intervention came in the wake of globalization, when the influx of foreign capital into media industries gave rise to a universalizing tendency, often obscuring “cultural particularities” of the non-West.2 Postcolonial theories have provided a set of questions that capture the experiences of the postcolony, highlighting continuities and changes from the colonial times, and the postcolonial condition, as a special space of being (Mezzadra and Rahola 2015). More recently, the decolonial turn in media and communication scholarship (Moyo 2020) also brings with it corresponding implications for the field of media and communication governance. Meanwhile, countries like India are contending with what is a majoritarian and nativist 1  The Centre for Culture, Media and Governance (CCMG) was set up in Jamia Millia Islamia (JMI), New Delhi, and is the only Centre that offers a course in Media Governance in India and the larger region. 2  The very idea that a majority of the world could be hinged on the phrase, the “non-West” spoke of the primacy of the West in terms of linguistic connotation. I use it here to pinpoint and highlight the interventionist attitudes of the West, and not necessarily to buy into the defining of the rest of the world as the non-West.

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turn, with the current ruling party’s claims of ancient India harking back to a pristine time of civilizational prowess (Anderson and Damle 2018). All these strands of thought complicate the study of understanding media and communication governance from South Asia, in the larger scheme of field. The interplay between ideas of Cosmopolitanism and Communitarianism serves as an interesting prism through which one can view the nestling of particularizing the universal, and the juxtaposing of universalizing the particular. To elaborate, I define Cosmopolitanism as universal citizenship and Communitarianism as a boxed and particularizing tendency. The interplay of the Cosmopolitan and the Communitarian helps color the universal with heterogeneity and unbox the particular. Studying media policy becomes important for any study of the media in that it sets the boundaries and limits, allowances and parameters, as well as the freedom with which people can speak, write, read, watch and consume media content of all kinds. Therefore, in order to understand better and work in the area of communication and media governance, I conducted a media policy ethnography across four countries of South Asia (Raghunath 2020). Conducted over three years, the ethnography focused on policymaking for community radio in four countries of South Asia, namely, Sri Lanka, Nepal, India, and Bangladesh. Following a mapping process, it was an effort to identify the plural actors who “make” policy across formal and informal venues, drawing on diverse norms and values, rationalities and interests, in making a case for community radio in and across the countries under study. Such an ethnography gave rise to “thick data”, comprising over a 100 interviews and informal conversations, not to mention observations made as part of my travel and interactions in the countries. The ethnographic data was analyzed continuously, drawing on the tenets of Constructivist Grounded Theory (Charmaz 2006), thereby giving rise to a theoretical framework, the inclusive heuristic of the Deliberative Policy Ecology (DPE) Approach (Raghunath 2020). The DPE Approach seeks to locate Deliberation as an act of communication in a media policy ecology, without reifying the medium or the ecology, but by focusing on the linguistic capacities of the policy actors in question. It is an Approach that helps transcend universalisms and particularisms by allowing for their interplay through Speech Acts (Austin 1975) and Deliberation. Here it becomes important to note that while I acknowledge Habermasian conceptualizations of Deliberation, I move away from dichotomies of the public and private, since such neat demarcations are a matter of luxury in terms of spatialities and agencies in South Asia. This is because of a variety

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of reasons, ranging from the socio-economically being unable to lay claim to truly “private” spaces, to the blurring of boundaries between the public and the private, owing to cultural mores and socio-economic stratification. I, instead, locate it in the praxis of orality as an act of communication, wherein inherent incapabilities for equitable two-way communication, are mitigated through deliberation. This chapter is an effort in advancing this framework beyond the contours of the study of community radio policymaking, to the realm of communication and media policy studies in general. I seek to draw on the DPE Approach, to situate it in dialogue with the Cosmopolitan approach advanced by the editors of this volume. The chapter is divided into four sections: the first section appraises the reader of calls to go beyond the West, in bringing forth scholarship on communication and media studies from other parts of the world. The second section moves to look at South Asia more closely. It seeks to draw on the cultures of deliberation from South Asia, diverse and rich as it is in orality. This section attempts to draw on these attributes for the study and conduct of media governance. The third section is structured as a dialogue, situating the DPE Approach and the Cosmopolitan approach to Media Governance. The fourth and final section makes a provocation for what I call Sustainable Media Governance toward progressive decolonization through deliberative democratization.

Colonialism, Modernity, Difference Scholars like Chakrabarty (2005) and Kaviraj (2005) have pointed to the co-appearance of modernity in South Asia with British colonialism. The colonial regime left behind modern institutions as an extension of its empire, something South Asia had to witness without undergoing a “similar developmental process”, often conjured up in a manner of evolutionary undertones. The societies of the colonies were caught in the throes of becoming political in the modern sense, through anticolonial struggles, experiencing modern democracy first hand. The political, and by extension policy, that the nation-states of the region had to contend with has been intrinsically connected to the colonial. Even as the newly liberated states were bequeathed colonial-modern institutions, the leadership was tasked with decolonizing them, while retaining modern ethos. I use the term “decolonizing” in the way Nigam (2020) uses it to talk about epistemic reconstitution. This serves as a useful background to understand media policies and policymaking in South Asia.

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The field of communication and studies is no stranger to such a history as well. Much of the history of communication and media studies scholarship has been hinged on a Western telos that set the tone for the development and regulation of media in the world beyond the West. Numerous scholars were trained primarily in the US tradition, where communication was intimately tied to the US Department of State’s intervention in various parts of the world. For instance, Samarajiva and Shields (1990) talk about Daniel Lerner’s and Harold Lasswell’s roles in designing communication interventions in the Middle East at the height of the Cold War. In the post-Cold War world and what was hailed as the triumph of liberalism and predicted as the end of history, the economies of South Asia opened up to global capital. The post-9/11 world has seen media development initiatives in the region and beyond, in the spirit of exporting liberal democracy (Moyo 2020). All these developments are to be understood as the need to bring on board the rest of the world in congruence with the terms set by the West. The World Trade Organization (WTO) and Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreements that the “developing” world had to sign are in line with this tradition. Scholarship on anti-neoliberalism has been hinged on the pursuit of difference, conjuring up alternative pathways that serve as a practiced critique to the neoliberal project (Dutta 2021). However, such scholarship romanticizes the life of the subaltern or a supposedly premodern village life, even valorizing them as resisting the neoliberal regime. However, the subaltern, who can perhaps speak,3 thanks to the process of continuous democratization set in place by visionary leaders, question this burden of having to inhabit a different temporal reality. The subalterns in South Asia have been handed over the burden of having to safeguard “tradition” in the face of neoliberal erasures. They seek to inhabit universal time, on par with the rest of the world, without having to bear this burden and thereby having to miss out the opportunity to simply co-exist on the same temporal plane, which they have not been able to achieve across centuries of oppression due to serving in labor positions tied to ghettoized living and livelihood opportunities. Can one then imagine difference and assimilation as continuous negotiation and remediation of media processes, in a 3  It is my contention that the subalterns have been speaking through acts of courage and subversive measures but are “unheard and hated”. This is a theoretical and conceptual framing that  grants them their agency even in their silences by mobilizing this statement (Raghunath, 2022).

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manner of progressive democratization and decolonization of the formerly colonized?

Reading Against and with the Grain: Can There Be a Decolonial Normativity? As has been the case with colonial modernity, the machinations of imperium operate through the development and spread of a brand of normativity that is then universalized, concurring that the rest of the world must catch-up, ignoring and even taking away from the norms and values already prevalent or negating its possibility in the non-colonial and the particular. One example of this is the manner in which large technology corporations operating out of the Silicon Valley (Big Tech) play an instrumental role in defining internet access and governance in the non-West. The normative has often been conceptualized as a disciplining force, identifying right from wrong. This has, however, been used for colonial ends by demarcating “good people” from “bad people”. Against this backdrop, progressive scholars must conceptualize and work with ideas of a decolonial normativity, as indicative of a set of norms and values that do not cede to “the universal” but seek to invest in a pluralism that imagines multiple universals existing, occupying and working alongside, instead. Decolonial normativity recognizes epistemologies that are emancipatory and enabling of the processes of decolonizing colonial structures and systems. This would serve as an antidote to absolutist universalizing tendencies, with “the universal” then becoming an idea standing alongside, interacting with and even facilitating numerous “other” ideas. This diffusion of power is what the decolonial project envisages (Moyo 2020), thereby illuminating divergent norms and variations of values. Critics may argue that there exist larger ideas and tendencies that are not cowed by the transient and are more permanent. However, it is precisely incumbent on such ideas to traverse with the decolonial and the plurality of norms, shaping and in turn getting shaped with time. For instance, the idea of public interest assumes such a position in media policy studies (Napoli 2019). The norm exudes permanence, since it represents a lasting ideal. However, I would argue that it is then incumbent on proponents of public interest to present the most marginalized and the muted of the public, the stage to speak in favor of their interests.

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The Global South: Going Beyond Difference Prathama Banerjee (2020) in exploring the elementary aspects of the political in the Global South seeks to situate her work not in “difference”, and in the spirit of lightness of being, but chooses to simply open up what are seen as “other” histories, to bear upon what is considered “Indian”. She chooses to reside in the “Global South” to express “solidarity with the intellectual mobilisation happening around that term in academies of distant regions, including the decolonial institutional sites of Africa and Latin America” (p. 3). It is in keeping with this idea that I choose to draw on my work in and on South Asia as a way of approaching the Global South. South Asia is to be seen as an intersectional space, at the crossroads of influences and mobilities, ideas and regenerations, connections and comparisons. Such an idea of South Asia animates our understanding of the Global South as an architecture that is nimble yet firm, rooted yet ephemeral, and perpetual yet transient. It also animates our ideas around Southern epistemologies that are rooted in the theorizing of praxes, where the South is an epistemic space and not just a geographical locale. Such an understanding steers clear of nativist/neo-nativist ideas of premodern South Asia being an uncorrupted space and, instead, seeks to illuminate and work with understanding divergent influences, some colonial and some productive, the former then being interrogated and the latter critically appreciated. This also helps place the study of media policy in context, as a larger idea—the making, policing, regulation and governance of media. Set in the larger context, the health of the media anywhere is reflective of the deliberative potential (Raghunath 2020) of democratic discourse at any given point. It, therefore, becomes important to study deliberation as an act of communication for democratic functioning of media. The definition of democracy here is not hinged on the ideas set in place by liberal democracies alone and encompasses a range of what are essentially political engagements in a range of settings by people with diverse experiences and worldviews, speaking in a multiplicity of tongues, as I will showcase further ahead. The underlying condition for such an engagement is enabling media spaces.

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Cultures of Deliberation in South Asia Modern-day South Asia is home to diverse political systems, with varying degrees of democratic conditions prevalent. The electoral democratic systems in the countries that make up the region are a product of movements against the British colonial rule and the coming of Independence in these countries at various time periods. For instance, India attained Independence in 1947, while present-day Bangladesh (erstwhile East Pakistan) did so only in 1971, and Sri Lanka was a British Dominion until 1972. This is to elucidate the divergent experiences with decolonization in South Asia. While this description is to do with modern South Asia and its electoral processes, the ancient landmass that made up the region was home to a well-developed ethos of public reasoning and deliberation. That argumentation, reason-giving, dialogic negotiation and deliberation were central to the public life through time, in the region, is well-documented (Sen 2005; Bayly and Bayly 2000; Parthasarathy and Rao 2017). However, inequities and discriminatory practices have meant that only sections of the population could take active part in such acts of deliberation. Communicative inequities have continued to pose a challenge to deliberative democracy in modern-day South Asia, with numerous factors along intersectional lines contributing to such inequities. Drawing from this understanding, it becomes important to understand the linkages between media governance and deliberative cultures, since the former is important in that it sets the space and tone for conversations in a democracy, and the latter is the manifestation of such an ethos. This section seeks to explore and explicate this connection. Deliberative democracy theorizing has been useful in the study of policy across disciplinary silos. Dhoop and Dhoop (2020) write about deliberative democracy and the regulation of labor in India, drawing on a range of experiences from beyond the Western world to underscore the importance of dialogue and deliberation in resolving issues of poverty, access and poor labor conditions. The authors pinpoint the lack of deliberative democracy in present-­ day India, with massive inequities only accentuated and exposed by the pandemic. The authors then go on to highlight the positive examples of Dattatray Samant, a self-styled workers union leader from the Indian state of Odisha, the south-western state of Kerala’s initiatives with social security measures, and the Union Générale Tunisienne du Travail (UGTT) of Tunisia in negotiating labor rights, as examples of fostering deliberative

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democracy. However, the recently introduced labor codes in India have been passed arbitrarily without any efforts for consultation. In the area of governance reform in India, the 73rd and 74th amendments to the Constitution of India were a move toward decentralization, with the 73rd amendment strengthening the gram panchayats or village councils and the 74th amendment strengthening the municipalities. These developments have ensured somewhat the political participation of the most marginalized and “voiceless” communities in India. Rao and Sanyal (2010) examine the role of culture in deliberation, drawing from fieldwork across four southern Indian states. The authors look at the neglected focus on the relation between poverty and culture and stress the role of ceding agency to the “voiceless”, allowing them to participate in a deliberative democracy. Similarly, Sanyal et al. (2015) re-theorize deliberative democracy as “oral democracy” taking the burden off women participants in local village assemblies in India to engage only in “reasoned” debate. Oral competency of citizens is what the authors aim to uncover, defining it as “their capability of speaking in public in civic settings in a manner that is effective in eliciting a response, generating a discussion, and reaching a decision” (2015: 4). However, Sass and Dryzek (2014) suggest that critics of the above authors’ works only point to the prevalence of caste and gender inequities as pervasive and unrelenting, even with such mechanisms for deliberation in place. Drawing from this understanding, it becomes important to examine the importance of oral cultures in a region like South Asia in bringing about “voice parity”. While voice poverty (Couldry 2010) has been written about quite a bit in scholarly works on media, voice and participation, I propose the analytical concept of “voice parity” which focuses on equity.

Voice Parity, Media/Technology and Deliberation The idea of “voice parity” that I propose suggests that there exist pathways to work through structural violence along intersectional lines, often leading to discrimination along identity and class markers. While the idea of voice poverty seeks to attend to the subtractive, voice parity allows one to address this issue by invoking affective registers of hope and holistic love, and the critical praxis of resilience, even while contending intermittently with anger, despair, loss, and sorrow. A lot of times, fighting for voice parity through democratic means to bring about changes in structural and systemic conditions can be taxing and daunting, and is an

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ongoing process. The idea of voice parity addresses these inefficiencies of structures and systems, thereby calling for mutualism and respect for hospitable deliberation. Only this would lead to continuous negotiations on the policymaking front by actors who are otherwise rendered marginalized. In this context, it becomes important to examine a few cases from South Asia to understand the imaginaries and ongoing struggles for democratization. In Nepal, which is home to the region’s first independent radio, Radio Sagarmatha, a number of similar such stations cater to the needs of communities in far-flung areas in the mountains. These stations are free of governmental influence and cater to the needs of the communities that they serve. The Nepalese independent radio is a product of the country’s civil war, with the Save Independent Radio Movement (Raghunath 2020) occupying a big role in the country’s history of radio. These independent radios offer the much-needed space for deliberation among communities in the country. Meanwhile, in Bangladesh, independent bloggers take on the Islamist extremists, with many being shot by the extremists as a consequence. Avijit Roy, a Bangladeshi-American blogger was killed in 2015 by a militant group, while Mushtaq Ahmed who took to Facebook to air views was imprisoned under the country’s Digital Security Act and died in 2020. The Diplomat (2021) notes that, “The Asian Human Rights Commission, which compiled the count of detentions, noted that “the detainees include journalists, teachers, students, cartoonists, writers, political activists, and ordinary citizens” ”. In India, the “Renarration for All” initiative by Free and Open Source Software (FOSS) advocate and founder of Janastu, TB Dinesh is a case in point in underscoring the importance of orality-intertwined democracy in a country like India, which is mostly still not literate. The “Renarration for All” initiative looks at using social semantics of the web to renarrate its contents by rewriting and breaking down technicalities into commonly understood parlance. This is part of “designing for inclusion”, as the founder puts it. Dinesh et al. (2012) look at the Alipi architecture in this regard, helping us understand what it means for renarrators and those listening to the renarrations of web pages in the absence of written literacy. The work done by Graamvani is another case in point. The social technology enterprise has been reaching over 2.5 million users across 15 Indian states, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Namibia and South Africa, with content using mobile technology. The approach that the enterprise has taken is to

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reverse the flow of information by making it bottom-up. Similarly, CGNetSwara in central India works with low-cost technology, like Bluetooth and Mobile, to involve tribals and communities in participatory communication, enabling them to reach out to the authorities for grievance redressal, for safeguarding their oral cultures and histories, and reinvigorating democratic participation. However, India is currently a downgraded democracy, and these initiatives struggle against a majoritarian Hindu nationalist government with a muscular regulatory strategy. While not part of my ethnographic study, it is observed that Pakistan and Afghanistan, and even Myanmar of Southern Asia, have been home to militant groups and even state-sponsored terror, amply affect the potential for deliberation in these countries. These are only some instances of the cultures of deliberation in South Asia, a region rife with socio-economic inequities, and laws and policies that sometimes owe their origins to colonial rule or are deployed in a draconian fashion by the state. What follows is an understanding of the idea of voice parity, and how a policy ecology can be an enabler toward it.

Voice Parity and Policy Ecology Media policy is intimately connected with the idea of voice parity, in that it can serve as the force behind mitigating voice poverty, paving way for voice parity instead. However, as discussed above, structures and systems can be inhibiting and oppressive, thereby allowing one to look toward “openness” of cultures and technologies, and toward an ecological approach. To be sure, here, the ecology is seen as a continuum between idealistic typifications of the world, on the one hand, and ecological rationality, on the other. For voice parity to exist, it would require an enabling policy ecology as a precondition to presenting opportunities for people to understand their positions as they stand in society, mobilize and organize against inequities and structural injustices, and demand and procure parity in voicing their ideas and thoughts, concerns and suggestions. This would mean that those policy actors who work in a policy ecology must create deliberative spaces for conversations and discussions, make space for enabling dissenting views and opinions, and allow for plural ideas and voices to find resonance and flourish. Policy actors perform the crucial task of setting the tone for media development, regulation, governance and functioning in any given political climate, thereby setting the tone for

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democratic functioning of the state with its many branches, the civil society and other non-state actors. The above description allows us to mobilize the Deliberative Policy Ecology (DPE) Approach (Raghunath 2020) as a way to understanding a policy ecology, replete with its diverse actors and their plural articulations, relationality and interactions, norms and interests, in connection to the media at hand. The DPE Approach places criticality, normativity and emotive rationality as its cornerstones, among other aspects, allowing the media policy researcher to navigate complex policy terrains over time and across space through deeply engaged ethnographic research of media policy endeavors. The following section looks at the DPE Approach, in dialogue with the Cosmopolitan Media Governance approach that the editors of this volume espouse, for commonalities and disjunctions.

Situating the Deliberative Policy Ecology Approach: A Dialogue The Deliberative Policy Ecology Approach The Deliberative Policy Ecology Approach delves into the heuristics of media policymaking, as a continuous process, rooted in emancipatory politics. What proceeds is a description of the Approach, and how it was formulated. Background and Methodology: The DPE Approach was conceptualized and emerged out of my ethnographic fieldwork on media policymaking in four countries of South Asia, as mentioned in the introduction to this chapter. To recap, I conducted a policy ethnography to understand policymaking for community radio across four countries of South Asia, namely, Sri Lanka, Nepal, India and Bangladesh. Prior to conducting the fieldwork, I was engaged in a mapping exercise to identify key stakeholders— individuals, movements and organizations, among others—their locations and key areas of focus, and their contributions. This allowed me to get an understanding of the space I intended to embed myself in for the policy ethnography. At the end of the fieldwork spanning three years, I had over a 100 interviews and informal conversations, a good portion of them already analyzed in some ways, as reflected in field-notes and codes, concepts and categories that were subject to constant comparison, according to the tenets of Kathy Charmaz’s Constructivist Grounded Theory

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(2006). In terms of the methodological approach, I found Methodological Glocalism (Holton 2005; Axford 2013) very useful, as it helps to go beyond the nation, to open up the policy ecology to a range of international as well as local policy actors. It also helps underscore mobilities (Urry 2000) of people along the glocal axis, enabling the media policy researcher to trace shifts brought about by media policy over time. Constructing the DPE: In the process of making sense of my data, I sought to understand diverse policy actors and architectures in existing literature. From the positivist advocacy coalition framework (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993), to those espousing a network heuristic like the transnational advocacy network (Keck and Sikkink 1998), to understanding the role of knowledge through the idea of epistemic communities (Haas 1992), I was looking at a range of heuristics across literature on public policy, social movements and human rights issues. A simplistic cause-and-effect model does not take into account the fluidities of deliberation, and the manner in which it can bring about changes in the policy ecology. Therefore, while each of them explained parts of the field data, none could completely explain the more deliberative-dialectical, hybrid and fluid phenomena and cultures that are often part of policymaking in the Global South. Understanding the politics of international development and donor aid, and the interfacing of “communitarian ideals” with “cosmopolitan realities”, as were gleaned prior to and from the fieldwork, prompted me to go in search of an inclusive heuristic device. I sampled literature across ecology studies from diverse disciplines, ranging from political ecology (Perrault et al. 2015) to cultural ecology (Steward 1955), to ecological approaches in organizational studies (McLaughlin 2001), to media ecology (Innis 1950; McLuhan 1962) and communicative ecologies (Hearn and Foth 2007). In contrast to a naturalist approach where the ecology is often reified and conceived of in adaptionist overtones, the continuum between constructivist and ecological approaches emerged useful for my theoretical engagement. It allowed me to understand the interplay between the ideational and the material, thereby illuminating the epistemological and ontological proportions of the cultures of governance in media policymaking. It also helped me account for openness to cultures, technologies, actors, norms and rationalities, including emotive rationality that is often seen in social movements, the ability of civil society to influence policy, and beyond. It is through this progressive, iterative analysis that the Deliberative Policy

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Ecology Approach emerged as such an inclusive heuristic to the study of media policies and policymaking. Interfacing with a Cosmopolitan Approach to Media Governance: Commonalities and Differences Media Policy and Media Governance: While media policy in the DPE Approach looks at a range of actors, norms and interests, and could be conceptualized as a ground-up phenomenon, media governance has emerged with the interest to study the mechanisms of governing and ongoing power shifts of established institutional actors, including government and other corporate entities. However, there are hardly any key works on media governance from South Asia that delve into such a ground-up study in order to provide for a sample of such works from the region.4 Both are useful ways of understanding how the media comes to be made and ruled, with intersecting theoretical influences. Media policymaking and governance can be seen through the same prism, as well as widely altering lenses. For instance, while the study of media governance is inclusive of institutional actors, it is amenable to the study of informal actors like activists and advocates, besides formal policy bodies. The study of policymaking, on the other hand, is often restricted to institutional actors, or an understanding of recognized stakeholders.5 At large, the state of literature lacks in recognizing fluid identities6 that often characterize policymaking, including the becoming and unbecoming of policy actors, the exits and entry and re-entry, as well as the refashioning of policy actors. The latter could borrow the idea of opening up the policy ecology to a range of actors over time in order to facilitate more open and inclusive deliberative practices and cultures. While the importance of development 4  One such effort in bringing together work on media policies in South Asia was a sideevent organized at the annual conference of the International Association of Media and Communication Research (IAMCR), in 2021, by the Global Media Policy Working Group. An updated version of papers presented will be published as a special issue of the Journal of Digital Media and Policy (Intellect), in March 2022. 5  These stakeholders are recognized by officiating actors like the state or funding agencies that facilitate media policy processes. Such actors are usually the more established and institutionalized representatives of civil society and other formalized actors. 6  By “fluid identities”, I refer to those policy actors who are unrecognized or gain recognition over time, start off or masquerade as certain kinds of policy actors and evolve over time to assume divergent identities in the media policy space.

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over time has been understood in literature on historical and neo-­ institutionalism, the emerging and nurturing of non-traditional practices should be granted attention. The spatio-temporal attributes are central to the DPE approach. As a corollary, the approach helps to understand how ideas and actors get institutionalized into governance structures over time. While this effort has been recently pursued by scholars (Ganter and Löblich 2021) working on discursive institutionalism, especially in integrating it with the ideational aspects, the DPE Approach differs from such a prospect in the manner in which it focuses on agonistic spaces of participation, while the former focuses more on the manifestations of power and related aspects. Open Heuristic: Drawing from the previous point, the DPE Approach enshrines openness as a praxis-oriented attribute. This openness is also found in the editors’ cosmopolitan approach, which talks about openness to plural influences, especially from outside what is considered the “mainstream”. Openness here refers to openness to the ideational and the material, ranging from openness to cultures, technologies, norms and values, and languages, among other things. The DPE Approach allows to track media policy over time, opening up the study to the entry and re-entry of newer policy actors, ideas and norms over time. Similarly, the Approach also tries to look at efforts in space-making (Massey 1999), as a means to create avenues for older voices and newer articulations in the media policy terrain, to understand how collaborative ventures in media policy can be encouraged and studied. To elaborate, the DPE Approach does not entail working with dualisms and dichotomies, but with collaboration through speech, recognition and justification. This is true of the cosmopolitan approach as well, which seeks to embrace collaborations beyond Eurocentric confines (Waisbord 2015; Boczkowski and Siles 2014; Ganter and Ortega 2019). The General and the Particular: The tussle between the cosmopolitan and the communitarian is essentially a contestation between the general and the particular, epistemologically as well as ontologically. The general is often argued as the space comprising a universalizing governance, while the particular is seen as more rooted in culture(s). The oeuvre of media policy is placed at the intersectional level, where agonistic spaces of participation and activism are linked and brought to bear on international and national policymaking mechanisms. By placing policy at an intersectional space, it opens up possibilities for deliberation with participatory projects at the ground level, and larger decision-making ecologies. Media policy is

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conceived of here as an interstitial space that encourages and makes possible deliberation, opening up systems and structures to ground-level participatory efforts, leading to the conceptualization of a larger ecology. In South Asia, this is visible in spaces where policy is seen connecting what are “agonistic” spaces of participation, where non-traditional and informal actors convene and deliberate in policy avenues. They defy solely top-­ down imaginations and create spaces for policy knowledges, processes and practices that bring to the fore ground-based and grassroot expressions. These may be different from multi-stakeholder dialogic processes and avenues, since these interstitial spaces are necessarily about acting as amplifiers for grassroot mobilizations and citizen/community voices and activism, as opposed to what may often be reduced to piecemeal congregations of all stakeholders that end up as tokenism, or without a standpoint of operation. This ontological and epistemological intervention allows for the creation and study of deliberative sites (Raghunath 2020) for media policy. These deliberative sites7 and agonistic spaces, when connected by media policy, become veritable sites of promoting active progressive deliberative democratization as a process. Sustainable Media Governance: A Provocation This section seeks to summarize and provide a concluding provocation for conversation and praxis-oriented action on media governance, moving ahead. The DPE Approach, as outlined in my book and in this chapter, draws on the idea of deliberation as an activity that seeks to build bridges and connections, repairing experiences of voice poverty to bring about voice parity instead, as outlined in this chapter. In this chapter, I have tried to also find commonalities and points of divergence between the cosmopolitan approach to media governance and the DPE Approach. By drawing from the above understanding of such commonalities and differences, one can look for common agendas to progressive deliberative democratization and decolonization of media and its policies, toward imagining and putting into action what I set forth as Sustainable Media Governance. Here, I define Sustainability as the intrinsic characteristic of pathways that 7  In my previous work which developed the DPE Approach (Raghunath 2020), I speak of the policy ethnography at “deliberative sites”, where conversations and deliberations on various aspects of media policies take place. These could range from formal venues to informal spaces on the sidelines of more formal events.

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are enduring, premised on equity and praxis. I do not allude specifically to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), which are developmental goals set forth by top-down global institutions (in most cases). Here are a set of pointers on what such a path would entail: 1. Working toward addressing voice poverty and moving toward voice parity. This can be done through a range of measures, like setting up policy open houses, working on critical policy literacy and encouraging the creation of deliberative spaces, across levels. This would entail working with the deliberative democracy framework in understanding and facilitating ground-up participation in public policy and governance, in general, and media policymaking, in particular. 2. Bringing in critical policy literacy in media education and working toward decolonizing curricula in order to allow for a synthesized understanding of the efforts and politics of media policies and their making in the Global South, and influences from the West. 3. Working towards the building of open institutional mechanisms that would in turn create deliberative spaces for media policymaking, through engagement with a range of policy actors, beyond the formal and recognized ones. This would require that one works with the state, international media development agencies, activists and policy advocates, ethical technologists and lawyers as well. 4. Pluralizing the epistemological and ontological proportions of media policy deliberations would ensure inclusive practices being brought into the fold of policymaking, thereby creating cultures of accountability and transparency. 5. Empaneling divergent community-based norms and rationalities from the Global South, and registering them as part of media policy processes not just in the Global South but in the West as well, as we continue to work toward a multicultural, cosmopolitan worldview and to recognize the South(s) (Milan and Treré 2019) in the North. 6. Tying to the above point, working with the idea of plural universals or the pluriversal (Escobar 2017) would go a long way in respecting diverse contextual attributes of policymaking. This would then enable one to understand what democratic deliberation means in different cultures, and how one can go beyond a universal conceptualization of liberal democracies alone. 7. Enshrining reflexive and intersectional influences on media policies and policymaking in a bid to ensure non-appropriation of ­knowledges

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and articulations, even while encouraging deliberation and voice parity, would lead to long-term media policy changes. This allows us to go beyond a majoritarian muscular regulatory approach to the more inclusive and deliberative approach that is rooted in the recognition of difference even in the pursuit of common goals. This is placed across settings drawing on diverse cultures of deliberation, and not just in the liberal democracy framework, by espousing decolonial normativity, as explicated in the chapter. This is what the Southern approach would entail, with respect for the intellectual property of the most marginalized. All these efforts would ensure that the intersecting influences of the cosmopolitan approach to media governance and the Deliberative Policy Ecology (DPE) Approach lead to Sustainable Media Governance, rooted in openness and deliberation, enabling voice parity, espousing and making way for plural norms and rationality, and the co-existence of a multiplicity of perspectives and praxes.

References Anderson, W.A. & Damle, S. (2018) The RSS: A View to the Inside. Penguin Viking. Austin, J. L. (1975). How to Do Things with Words. Clarendon Press. Axford, B. (2013). Theories of Globalization. Polity Press. Banerjee, P. (2020). Elementary Aspects of the Political: Histories from the Global South. Duke University Press. Bayly, C.A. and Bayly, C.A. (2000). Empire and Information: Intelligence gathering and social communication in India, 1780–1870 (Vol. 1). Cambridge University Press. Boczkowski, P., & Siles, I. (2014). Steps towards cosmopolitanism in the study of media technologies: Integrating scholarship on production, consumption, materiality, and content. Information, Communication & Society, 17, 560–571. Chakrabarty, D. (2005). Provincialising Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference. Princeton University Press. Chakravartty, P., & Sarikakis, K. (2006). Media Policy and Globalization. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. Charmaz, K. (2006). Constructing Grounded Theory: A Practical Guide Through Qualitative Analysis. London: Sage Publications. Couldry, N. (2010). Why Voice Matters: Culture and Politics after Neoliberalism. Los Angeles: SAGE.

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Mezzadra S., Rahola F. (2015) The Postcolonial Condition: A Few Notes on the Quality of Historical Time in the Global Present. In: Malreddy P.K., Heidemann B., Laursen O.B., Wilson J. (eds) Reworking Postcolonialism. Palgrave Macmillan, London. Milan, S., & Treré, E. (2019). Big Data from the South(s): Beyond Data Universalism. Television & New Media, 20(4), 319–335. Moyo, L. (2020). The Decolonial Turn in Media Studies in Africa and the Global South. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Napoli, P. (2019). Social Media and the Public Interest. Columbia University Press. Nigam, A. (2020). Decolonising Theory: Thinking Across Traditions. Bloomsbury. Parthasarathy, R., & Rao, V. (2017). Deliberative Democracy in India. Policy Research Working Paper, No. 7995. World Bank, Washington, DC. Perrault, T., Bridge, G., & McCarthy, J. (Eds.). (2015). The Routledge Handbook of Political Ecology. London: Routledge. Raghunath, P. (2020) Community Radio Policies in South Asia: A Deliberative Policy Ecology Approach. Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan. Raghunath, P. (2022). ‘Hated Speech’ and the Costs of Freedom in India. Association for Progressive Communications. Rahman, A. (2020). The politico-commercial nexus and its implications for television industries in Bangladesh and South Asia. Media, Culture & Society, 42(7–8), 1153–1174. Rao V, Sanyal P. (2010) Dignity through Discourse: Poverty and the Culture of Deliberation in Indian Village Democracies. The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science; 629(1): 146–172. Rasul, A., & McDowell, S. D. (2014). Consolidation in the name of regulation: The Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) and the concentration of media ownership in Pakistan. Global Media Journal—American Edition, 12(20). Sabatier, P., & Jenkins-Smith, H. (1993). The Advocacy Coalition Framework: Assessment, Revisions, and Implications for Scholars and Practitioners. In P.  Sabatier & H.  Jenkins-Smith (Eds.), Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach (pp. 211–235). Boulder: Westview Press. Samarajiva, R., & Shields, P. (1990). Integration, Telecommunication, and Development: Power in the Paradigms. Journal of Communication, 40(3), 84–105. Sanyal, P., Rao, V. and Prabhakar, U., 2015. Oral democracy and women’s oratory competency in Indian Village Assemblies: A Qualitative Analysis. World Bank Policy Research Working Papers. Sass, J., & Dryzek, J. S. (2014). Deliberative Cultures. Political Theory, 42(1), 3–25. Sen A. (2005). The Argumentative Indian. US: Penguin

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CHAPTER 14

Conclusion: Cosmopolitan Critique as a Counterhegemonic Methodology Sarah Anne Ganter and Hanan Badr

Throughout the many different contexts from which the authors write their chapters, media governance as an analytical perspective, frame, and concept exists in vague or unrecognized pasts and presents. The contributions in this volume unveil a history of the failure to recognize the differences through which we study and conceptualize media governance. Disciplinary origins and developments vary from context to context. As such, media governance is highly fragmented and has so far successfully managed to act as a broad subdiscipline but has been lacking space for differentiation beyond dominating contexts. The contributions show that media governance as a field of study is far from being established; on the S. A. Ganter (*) School of Communication, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada e-mail: [email protected] H. Badr Department of Communication Studies, Paris Lodron University of Salzburg, Salzburg, Austria e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. A. Ganter, H. Badr (eds.), Media Governance, Global Transformations in Media and Communication Research - A Palgrave and IAMCR Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05020-6_14

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contrary, moving beyond existing Western critiques reveals how much its conceptualizations are in flux and how it needs scholarly self-reflection, reconsideration, and discussion to depart from universalist conceptualizations and methods of analysis. Silvio Waisbord (2019) has called for the creation of a common space in which to examine differences and commonalities transcending the many fragmentations that communication as a discipline endures. Enacting this examination by starting a cosmopolitan critique for the field of media governance, this book is part of a series of movements, initiatives, publications, conferences, and organizations that aim for local/global alliances working toward epistemic transformation and justice (de Sousa Santos 2007; Walsh 2003). The goal of this concluding chapter is to review the richness of the chapters in this book and to reflect upon and juxtapose their arguments and points of critique, which they raise to advance media governance as a field of study. The question of to what extent and how far the conceptualization of media governance is open to including different epistemological realities transpires throughout the chapters. The contributors are scholars working beyond Western contexts—some are working from within the Global South, and others work in Western countries. All experience the existence of boundaries between different academic realities to some extent and frequently try to cross/transcend them. In that endeavor, maybe not physically, but at least intellectually, we are all citizens of the world—in the sense that we contribute to our field not only in this volume but in the broader context of our scholarship. In that sense, we follow the spirit of letting the subaltern speak (Spivak 1988) and shape knowledge. The different contributions show that experience through local origin, status, class, race, and gender shape the ways in which scholars think about, reflect upon, investigate, and write about media governance. A cosmopolitan critique is a starting point to actively consider difference and to create a media governance community conversing beyond the West as part of an inaugural cosmopolitan iteration. Each chapter itself highlights differences in knowledge and standpoints with regards to media governance. The chapters connect reflections about hegemony, power, sovereignty, and identity as conceptual center points underpinning the scholarly works in this book and thus create new room for deflecting objectified discussions focused on the outcome and efficiency of governance mechanisms and processes (Ganter and Löblich 2021) into deeper terrain. We propose a cosmopolitan critique as a counterhegemonic methodology toward more cognitive—and eventually—global justice in academic

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knowledge. For that purpose, we outline the central lines of this cosmopolitan critique and iterate the reflections for the field of media governance as offered by the authors in this volume. With that, we acknowledge that a cosmopolitan critique as a counterhegemonic methodology is an ongoing process and that this volume is one iteration of many to follow. This concluding chapter reflects on the contributions through a synthesis in three parts. First, in the section “Decentering Knowledge About Media Governance,” we reiterate the dilemmas the contributors experience through the epistemic dominance of the conceptualization of media governance. Second, we develop the “Dimensions of the Cosmopolitan Critique” as a methodology, and, finally, the third part, “From Cosmopolitan Critique Toward Epistemic Transformation” delineates—based on the critique raised in the chapters across scholarly, pedagogical, and institutional dimensions—actions to trigger epistemic change.

Decentering Knowledge About Media Governance To date, a few works have discussed media governance (e.g., Bhuiyan 2014; Kim 2018) or Internet governance (e.g., Oppermann 2018) from the perspective of the Global South. Some are written from a postcolonial perspective (e.g., Alhassan and Chakravartty 2011). While some of them want to “improve access and debates on Internet governance in different parts of the world” (Oppermann 2018, p. 7) or articulate their frustration of the enthusiastic scholarly, mainly Western-centered discussions of some policy developments (Bhuiyan 2014), others offer an adaptation of the existing literature. Kim (2018), for example, sees “the framework of media governance” (p. 7) as a useful tool to decipher dynamics between the private and public sectors in Korea. Describing Korea’s approach to media governance, he defines it as a “unique case that shows how industrialization, democratization, and informatization, under the influence of globalization, have seen the development of the nation’s media ecosystem” (p.  7). Orchard et  al. (2021) offer a different, but still enthusiastic approach, as they connect the term of governance to the ideal of the plurality of voices that they see granted through good governance and understood in their work as an important degree of social autonomy in the intermediate bodies of society, in addition to respect for human rights, low levels of corruption, and adequate mechanisms for public and private accountability. Good or democratic governance itself is hereby understood as the goal following the standards given by Western ideals.

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On the contrary, this volume approaches media governance with a critical distance from the Euro–North American ways of examining and establishing media governance. One of the aims here was to help understand the reasons for the apparent gap in epistemological thought in our discipline. Therefore, we sought material that went beyond Euro–North American-centric perspectives and explicitly established a sense of what a decentered, conceptual critique of media governance would look like to generate a new normative sense of the field. Thus, we hope to depart from the monolithic culture of knowledge in our field and to enter into what Boaventura de Sousa Santos has coined in recognition of epistemological diversity as “ecologies of knowledges” (de Sousa Santos 2014, p. 115). In line with this idea, we acknowledge reciprocal incompleteness rather than striving for completeness. In the process of this book, we asked the contributors to examine media governance from their perspective and the positionality of their research contexts. We particularly asked for engagement with the literature from the specific local/national context, rather than repeating references to the established Western canon. Through this work, we saw the risk of setting the contributions apart from a canon and thus creating a space apart instead of in between. However, the narrative of missing overlaps, separated realities, and disentanglements from the “governance turn” is telling in itself. It is an indication of how little media governance, as established in the canonical literature, has been relevant to societies with different philosophical and cultural principles and socioeconomic realities. Consequently, the contributors’ critique is a nuanced way of enhancing understanding and learning about the deficiencies that media governance as a concept, framework, and approach entails. The points of critique made in this volume are multi-faceted but also show some commonalities. To summarize some key points, the chapters first foreground the critique and suggestions for theoretical/conceptual advancement. Second, some chapters emphasize the disparities in their realities and pay attention to the structural and cultural reasons that make the dominant conceptual work in media governance a misfit for their contexts. Third, other chapters display how Western-centric theorizing and conceptualizing are influencing scholarly and professional practices and the consequences for their understanding of media governance as well as for existing inequalities. An important observation from the contributions is that, in some contexts, the “governance turn” did not take place at all, or at least not to the

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same extent as in Western contexts. In several chapters, the authors noticed that media governance is not an established subfield nor a framework that is used everywhere. In these cases, we encouraged contributors to look away from existing Western literature and to ask why there is a gap and which local scholars they would turn to in order to start thinking about media governance in their own context. It is striking how scholars positioned in contexts ranging from Latin America, the Arab region, and Southeast Asia share central observations when it comes to describing and explaining the troubled image that media governance has assumed. Rodrigo Gómez concludes, in his chapter, that “the media governance approach has not worked consistently, because Latin American media policies resulting from democratic discussions are young, and this reality or stage has been the focus of the academic discussion” (Chap. 4). Afonso de Albuquerque and Lucineide Magalhães de Matos describe how little structural change in Brazilian media and a lack of strong public broadcasters are some of the reasons why scholars in Brazil are giving media governance moderate attention when compared to other contexts (Chap. 7). In the Arab region, Rasha Allam explains the very recent development of scholarly work in the field from within Egypt by pointing to the clash between neo-authoritarian development and post-revolutionary transitional dynamics (Chap. 8). Similarly, Naomi Sakr illustrates contradictions in the Middle East between highly controlled political systems and the idea of complex, autonomous, and diverse subsystems portrayed in the media governance literature (Chap. 3). Preeti Raghunath observes that South Asian scholars working from outside the region have contributed to media governance research, while scholars working from within the region have only recently started to do so due “to the priorities of the governmental and intergovernmental interventions, and popularity of certain kinds of media in the region” (Chap. 13). What transpires throughout the chapters is the difficulty of undoing what has been acknowledged as the “first mover advantage” of Western theory (Waisbord 2019, p. 102); it is difficult reverting back or diversifying if the West is set as the default. Besides making this imbalance visible, one way to deal with it is to critically engage with Western literature, but with an analytical distance, allowing for the critique to be established. While some contributors chose to start with the existing Western literature, they then juxtaposed how the political, economic, and sociocultural circumstances cannot be adequately explored and understood when using terms and concepts deriving from Westernized ideas. Ufuoma Akpojivi

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first reflects, from the Nigerian perspective, on Western ideas about cosmopolitan media and provides empirical evidence to theorize it within the Nigerian context (Chap. 6). Hyejin Jo and Dal Yong Jin argue that media governance resembles corporation-driven rather than citizen-driven changes—a trend they see surging in light of powerful global platforms’ activities in Korea. Through that, they show how corporatism facilitates media governance as a utopian concept in the Korean setting (Chap. 9). In her chapter, Hong Shen unravels how Western literature conceptualizes the state in global Internet governance as almost exclusively referring to the United States of America (Chap. 10). Judith Pies concludes, in her self-reflective scholarly contribution, that media accountability practices in authoritarian systems are better understood as informal rather than as self-­ regulatory, institutionalized structures (Chap. 5). Departing from the normative conceptualizations offered in some Western literature, Gómez explains that alternative critical frameworks that ask questions around asymmetric power relations and the question of whose perspectives are marginalized have existed in Latin America for around 50  years in the scholarly conceptualization of national communication policies (Chap. 4). We learn from this book that commonplaces from media governance, with their axioms, rules, ideas, and postulates, are not necessarily accepted as evident by the subaltern (de Sousa Santos 2007, 2014). Throughout the chapters, we get to understand that those who have built the established disciplinary circle have been taking these invisible rules for granted for too long. Practiced non-adaptation is a form of counterhegemonic action and/or of a specific sustainable academic language of its own that does not need to be inspired by the media governance literature. This is exactly what is needed to achieve what Raewyn Connell (2007) suggested as “new configurations of knowledge that might result when Southern Theory is everywhere respected, and differently formed theories speak together” (p. xiv). Some contributions push for new or a distinct use of existing terminologies: Sanjay Asthana’s proposition of “cosmopolitan media and information commons” (Chap. 2) and Raghunath’s introduction to cultures of deliberation theorized from South Asian contexts, and her suggestion of “sustainable media governance” (Chap. 13), as well as María Soledad’s and Alejandro Linares’s conceptualization of “participatory policy” (Chap. 11) all aim at getting past dominant conceptions and terminologies of media governance. Both Raghunath and Sakr problematize the use of the “private” as a category as they examine the role of informality and orality in governance processes in their respective

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chapters. This questions the institutionalization dimension that often guides media governance and is at times impossible to import to other settings that have different histories and polities. With that, these contributors break with the self-referentiality of Western academia and, in part, rewrite ideas of the established view with authority and in a manner that Connell (2007) described as “a principled way when constructing arguments using materials from the metropole” (p.  225). Purposefully, the authors of this volume do not align with a media governance canon! Instead, they decipher, challenge existing formulations, and display their authority and agency when actively leaving certain theoretical concepts and positions behind. Asthana radically deconstructs media governance as a term per se by pointing to the weaknesses of the use of media and governance as a composite, as displacing social commitments with technical jargon and semantics (Chap. 2). This critique points to the linguistic aspects of many of the deficiencies in the media governance literature. Governance, for instance, is, in many languages, not translated into one equivalent term, which portrays its complex meaning (José 2007; Karppinen and Moe 2013). However, it is not only specific terminology that is directly transferred and used in another context. In several chapters, the contributors point to the practice of importing normative policy ideas, interpretations of freedom, independence, democracy, and the respective governance practices and administrative settings. Allam and Akpojivi both show that transfer reproduces dominant understandings of governance and reinforces the tendency of marginality, continuing transitionality, and confusion in peripheral world systems. Allam describes a “flawed import” and details, in her chapter, how in transitional countries such as Egypt, there is a gap between the spirit of new laws that are inspired by Western models and their application, which is still controlled by old authoritarian legacies, and which leads to confusing mechanisms and ambivalent outcomes (Chap. 8). Akpojivi shows how attempts to localize international regulatory standards and ideas lead to contestations between stakeholders in Nigeria—a situation that endangers inclusivity, participation, and empowerment (Chap. 6). Here, the authors describe the misfits, turbulences, and different reactions that result from the export of ideas, terminology, and research technologies from the centered perspective to the periphery (see Connell 2007). De Albuquerque and de Matos emphasize how the academic debate on media governance needs to be linked to policy- and knowledge-­ transfer processes and they point out how the issue tends to be more

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relevant to the exporters of media governance-related knowledge and principles (Chap. 7). Judith Pies’s self-reflection on the issues and consequences of importing analytical concepts and tools from a Western into a Southern context juxtaposes the Western with the Southern experience. Her account exemplifies both the problem of Western ontologies that are all about knowing, explaining, and guiding, and the chances of a transformed approach that leans into “knowing with, understanding, facilitating, sharing and walking alongside” (de Sousa Santos 2014, p. ix). In addition to the problematization of importing terminology, ideas, and interpretations, another point raised is the misguiding assumption of equality in media governance throughout the Western canon. Multilateralism is one of the concepts mentioned in several of the contributions as a misleading concept. Hong Shen questions debates that simplify calls for more involvement of different states and doubts that a “new multilateralism,” in which all nations enjoy equality in Internet policymaking, is conceivable (Chap. 10). This also reflects on the level of citizens’ influence, as economic and political power imbalances between national and local citizen organizations and other stakeholders can be considerable, as María Soledad Segura and Alejandro Linares point out (Chap. 11). Mystifying globalized processes—such as Mac Bride and the World Summit on the Information Society, and the discourse around the right to communicate by both academics and practitioners—has been questioned as too enthusiastic (e.g., Bhuiyan 2014) and as neglecting the neo-­ corporate mode of governance and neoliberal ideology that is reflected in these processes (Hamelink 2004; McLaughlin and Pickard 2005). Segura and Linares see the lack of acknowledging power structures as being at the root of the enthusiastic use of global media governance terminology (Chap. 11). This point is also reflected in the lack of problematizing state power and power relationships between stakeholders in practical and scholarly discussions. Trust Matsilele and Bruce Mutsvairo show how in many African countries, governance frameworks have been abused to curb online dissent, even to the point of a total ban on Internet use (Chap. 12). In a similar vein, Akpojivi reveals in his study how cosmopolitan media in Nigeria deal with what he describes as excessive government interference (Chap. 6). When it comes to global Internet governance, Shen argues in her chapter that if scholarly work examines the role of nation states at all, too much emphasis is often put on US influence. As a consequence, the role of other national power holders like China is downplayed as passive rather than as contributing (Chap. 10). Asthana’s critique is more general,

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as he points to a lack of a sustained examination of neoliberal media governance and the ways in which it shapes ideas of sovereignty, power, and agency in the Global South (Chap. 2). Raghunath tackles the problem of power imbalances with calls for a tighter link between knowledge-making and community knowledge through praxis-oriented action to achieve, through deliberation, what she calls “voice parity” in governance mechanisms (Chap. 13). Segura and Linares reason that without social mobilization, there will be no functioning participatory institutions and that participation mechanisms specifically aim at enabling citizen influence in high-level policymaking. Connell (2007) explains the sophistication of dealing with the detailed and complex analysis of power imbalances, as offered by these critiques, by asserting that “Southern Theory” embodies “a view from below on a world scale [and] has a more complex relationship with dominant systems of knowledge. Existing Southern Theory points to a more engaged relationship between knowledge systems and foreshadows a mutual learning process on a planetary scale” (p.  222). Behind this call for the better acknowledgment of power structures in the media governance literature stands the observation that existing inequalities are furthered through an unrecognizing media governance terminology. De Albuquerque and de Matos outlined the neoliberal history of multi-stakeholderism that turns the approach into one that safeguards the power of the powerful. Similarly, Segura and Linares emphasize this aspect through their critique of multi-stakeholderism as an often enthusiastically presented governance mode of democratic practice. They conclude their analysis of Latin American contexts, stating that the multi-stakeholder model presumes equality between participants in the discussion, and this consolidates existing inequalities. Consequently, they suggest the nation state as a context where citizen participation can be practiced. In her work, Shen follows this push for the nation state as an analytical unit that is an often-denied entity of power (Chap. 10). Several contributions offer an important critique that fosters understanding of how much the field and terminology we are working with is politicized. Matsilele and Mutsvairo highlight, for example, how, from an African perspective, it is almost impossible to reach consensus on formalized governance mechanisms (Chap. 12). De Albuquerque and de Matos conceptually see an immanent political bias in media governance and argue that it contributes to legitimizing the globalized neoliberal order and thus functions more as a policy paradigm than as a concept, as it goes far beyond explaining the world to prescribing a normative pathway

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(Chap. 7). In a similar argument, Asthana distinguishes colonial forms of governance as neoliberalist and explains how technical jargon and semantics disregard social and political aims (Chap. 2). Other contributions suggest the variable use of media governance as a heuristic with which to unravel the underlying power structures that are difficult to grasp. One suggested analytical understanding herein is that government and governance evolve as dimensions of fragmented authority—a circumstance that is critical to improving media policy frameworks and to better understand a wider approach toward processes and practices. Naomi Sakr points to the heuristic quality of the governance concept by using it beyond applications such as those of “good” governance, and general dichotomic approaches that separate good from bad, and functional from dysfunctional, like those of “good governance” applications (Chap. 3). Similarly, Jo and Jin argue that when approaching governance from contexts that are not part of a liberal democracy and Western argumentative circles, media governance may appear as an irrelevant, utopic, or ideal aim for the governing of media. Regardless of the mentioned shortcomings of media governance, several contributions emphasize the value of media governance as a heuristic in non-democratic or transitional systems. However, they point to the insights gained as depending on adjustment and refinement according to the distinct contexts in question. Matsilele and Mutsvairo point to the usefulness of media governance for better contextualizing frameworks shaping political action in times of polarization on social media (Chap. 12). Sakr sees potential overlaps between informal mechanisms and practices and observable processes that affect Arab media and governance theory (Chap. 3). Pies uses the example of media accountability to advocate for a process-oriented research practice that looks at structures, actors, and processes for a conceptual approach that considers transitional systems and takes non-or-less institutionalized practices of media governance into account through analyzing the actors in relation to their contextual backgrounds (Chap. 5). With that, their contributions point to the need to transcend governance as multi-level or as regulatory and to understand the lack of what is not addressed, not conceptualized, not studied, not asked. Sakr and Raghunath highlight the role of informality and orality in media governance, respectively. While Sakr points to informality as an expression of the often dispersed and obscured control that authoritarian regimes exercise in the interest of elites (Chap. 3), Raghunath unfolds oral cultures as a chance for “voice parity” (Chap. 13). Both see the informal, non-written,

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and obscure as a neglected analytical category that can give voice and visibility to the suppressed and marginalized. Similarly, Asthana describes the practices of “commoning” as an ethical component of governance that provides marginalized communities with access to infrastructures and resources of knowledge and that offers alternatives to neoliberal media systems (Chap. 2). This critique identifies imperial, elitist, positivist, administrative, and capitalist tendencies in media governance research, which are known for circumventing everyday people’s embedding in resistance and empowerment, and for silencing indigenous knowledge (Moyo 2020). The contributions in this book offer innovative directions toward scripts and terminologies different from those developed in the established so-called media governance canon. The chapters have extended the ways in which we speak about and construct media governance. However, it remains to be seen whether the academic framing will change through a cosmopolitan iteration and whether we will internalize the points of collective critique voiced throughout this book. The question of how we can speak about media governance looking forward seems more urgent than ever. The contributions contribute to countering the misleading idea that knowledge about media governance is distinct or clear cut, broad or expansive. Consequently, media governance scholars should regularly ask what truly constitutes media governance. Interestingly, the sense of being incomplete as a discipline is, in fact, quite prominent in Western media policy and governance work. A feeling of the discipline having analytical, conceptual, and theoretical shortcomings has been repeatedly articulated. However, these self-reflections have so far overlooked thinking about structural and epistemological imbalances as reasons for these shortcomings. Just (2009), for example, spoke of “analytical helplessness” (p.  105) that is experienced when trying to establish parameters to understand media diversity better. Others (Braman 2004; Just and Puppis 2018; Picard 2016) have detected some of the shortcomings of media policy work, which include a lack of theoretical grounding and thinking. All of this shows the ways through which our “failures of recognition” (Connell 2007, p. 226) have consequences for the field. The aim herein was to offer perspectives that transcend the Western understanding of the world, and, secondly, to identify the limitations of the premises of the work produced only from Western perspectives. However, the question of how we can further engage with the critical

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perspectives offered here and of what we will learn from them in the midand long term is equally important. Media governance as a field of study in itself offers plenty of possibilities for transformative thought and action. It could be a field that moves toward contesting a privileged minority’s control of a field of knowledge that has existed at the cost of geopolitical, linguistic, gender, and racial minorities (de Albuquerque 2021; Suzina 2021). The questions raised in the contributions intersect with questions of media policy and postcolonialism, class, gender, and race, and this is where our recognition needs to start moving forward.

Dimensions of the Cosmopolitan Critique Our proposal of a cosmopolitan critique expands on the idea of border-­ crossing methodologies. Decentering methodological approaches across cultural and socioeconomic spaces still needs to be better established, despite the advantages of symbiotic work that maximizes resources and their positive impact on global justice being obvious (Badr and Ganter 2021; Connell 2007; Moyo 2020; Waisbord 2019). Proposals seeking to connect global and local realities through methodological reflexivity (Ganter 2017; Mutsvairo et al. 2021; Salazar 2010; Roudometof 2016) so far remain detached from the realities that often hinder their consequent implementation throughout academia. Our proposal for a cosmopolitan methodology includes, but goes beyond, the argument for dialogue, recognition, and respect across contexts and cultural spaces, and seeks to ingrain those values into academic processes through a cosmopolitan iteration. Hereby, a cosmopolitan critique is a reciprocal constructive approach to media governance, which is dynamic, self-reflexive, inclusive, and empathetic, but not free from disagreement. A cosmopolitan iteration comprises the recognition of difference, inclusive differentiation, creation of in-between spaces, and intercultural translation. We derive our cosmopolitan iteration from what Seyla Benhabib (2006) called a “democratic iteration” (p. 16) to describe the practice of iterating cosmopolitan norms into democratic will formation. Cosmopolitan iterations in academia refer to iterating those norms into the knowledge-­ making process with the aim of altering the boundaries through which the conceptualization of media governance exists. A cosmopolitan iteration aims at revealing and connecting epistemic cultures (Knorr-Cetina 1999) that shape a discipline and its subdisciplines. It is a process based on the understanding that no complete knowledge exists (de Sousa Santos 2007)

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and that the regulating nature of knowledge in dominant academic cultures prevents us from access to a variety of knowledge. The metaphor of puzzle sets for different paradigms fits here (Jensen and Neuman 2013): Each puzzle set, and the shape of each particle, differs through the concepts, questions, and assumptions a scholar chooses to work with. Trying to understand a field through different contexts and positionings, however, requires access to other puzzles to be able to look at and engage with them, learn from them, and to connect and embed their own work within the broader picture. The understanding of our subject will remain limited if we always look at similar images (Carpentier et al. 2020). Access to different kinds of puzzle sets enables researchers to shift knowledge-making to emancipatory instead of regulatory work. In the long term, this access will trigger a shift from what Sousa Santos described as a monoculture to an “ecology of knowledges” (2007, p. li). Through working toward this shift, an ongoing cosmopolitan iteration facilitates building disciplinary identity beyond administrative settings, such as universities, research associations, journals, and funding mechanisms (Waisbord 2019), and triggers a stronger sense of community in the field of media governance. Achieving this will help to identify opportunities and missed aspects, establish new vocabulary, and rethink the foundations of the field. This cosmopolitan iteration proceeds by asking—what is the underlying motivation of this very process? Who is involved and why? How can we make sure we do not reproduce abyssal thinking and create closed contact zones? How can we identify alternate perspectives, ideas, and concepts? How can we create an in-between space in which cosmopolitan work takes place? These questions are challenging and there are often no ideal answers, and as such they feed the iteration as an important part of the cosmopolitan critique. The recognition of difference is an important aspect of a cosmopolitan critique. Inequality is a reality that continues to exist in spaces that follow a cosmopolitan iteration. Part of the cosmopolitan iteration is to acknowledge differences in access to resources for participation in cosmopolitan spaces and in the academic discourse, and to integrate this reality in the process. As Waisbord (2019) argued, scholars in the Global South had “to figure out ways to make sense of Western ideas [where] intellectual navel-­ gazing in the North seemed as natural as sunlight” (pp.  101–102). Coming to terms with these different realities, displaying recognition and concern for the other, and taking risks in establishing spaces for dialogue all form part of the cosmopolitan iteration.

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Moyo (2020) emphasized that consensual dialogue hinders hermeneutic understanding. Consequently, the idea of inclusive differentiation belongs to the iterative process. As Appiah (2006) put it, “there is much to learn from our differences” (p. xv). However, he also acknowledges that “[d]epending on the circumstances, conversations across boundaries can be delightful, or just vexing: what they mainly are, though is inevitable” (Appiah 2006, p. xxi). In line with this, we emphasize that inclusive differentiation embraces the practice of disagreement as a central element in a cosmopolitan critique. This is an important prerequisite to changing our minds, learning, and building communities. Another prerequisite for a cosmopolitan critique is the creation of in-­ between spaces that connect networks running throughout and across the periphery (Connell 2007). The decentralizing work of these networks lies in their engagement in intercultural translation (de Sousa Santos 2014; Waisbord 2016). Establishing these spaces is complicated work that is urgently needed and seldom recognized. The creation of what Sousa Santos (2014) calls the cosmopolitan contact zone, however, itself bears its pitfalls for reproducing inequalities that continue to exist in and through that zone. Creating these cosmopolitan spaces leads to a situation where power structures existing on the outside of the cosmopolitan space cannot be entirely balanced and need to be addressed and worked with. One example is the use of English as the lingua franca, which will not work equally well in all spaces; in fact, many contact zones are multi-lingual. This linguistic supremacy remains unacknowledged and makes the work of intercultural translation more complex (Suzina 2021). Intercultural translation is a reciprocal, dynamic process of mutual learning based on recognition and discussion among many voices. It can explore differences along a variety of axes: North/South, South/South, North/North. It is based on complex interactions beyond linguistic differences, extending to political, sociocultural, and economic conditions. It “concerns knowledge, practices and their agents” (de Sousa Santos 2014, p. 219) and is “basically an argumentative work, based on the cosmopolitan emotion of sharing the world with those who do not share our knowledge or experience” (p.  232). The result of intercultural translation processes is in flux and reversible, as it evolves through each documentation and new interaction, and the learning and understanding is an ongoing process that never ends. The idea here is that each participant can contribute equally, that all can learn from each other, and, in particular,

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that the North can learn from the South. This is in opposition to existing assumptions that US or Eurocentric ways of knowledge-making are ideal and per se of a higher standard (Ha 2019). The idea of learning from the South means going beyond knowledge produced in the North and the praxis to which it subscribes (Ganter 2020; Ganter and Ortega 2019; de Sousa Santos 2014). A lack of translation leaves us with modern problems for which there are no concepts and solutions, and they will be difficult to find based on knowledge that is based on Western systems alone. A constructive critique is vital for the translation process. Throughout the contributions in this book, it became evident that the use of case studies is at the heart of translational work. How should we establish a critique if we are not given the space to elaborate an argument, and how should we engage and understand if we know nothing about the context that the critique derives from? Case studies are where deeper insights and the search for commonalities and differences start, and where the search for patterns, criteria for comparison, and fundaments for diagnoses continue. In this volume, case studies help us understand, for example, dispersed action and inaction for protecting intellectual property rights, the nature of control through trolling and non-transparent moderation by social media companies (Chap. 3), the Nigerian conceptualization of cosmopolitan media (Chap. 6), or the utopic nature of media governance when trying to grasp the problem of ownership and centralized power (Chap. 9). Different case studies help identify and exemplify the challenges, promises, and possibilities that exist in dialogue between different cultures, cosmologies, and forms of knowledge (Connell 2007; de Sousa Santos 2007). The cosmopolitan iteration—and the critique articulated through it— starts and departs at the same time through the different contexts, examples, and cases that the contributors of this book have chosen to voice in their reflections on media governance as a field that has so far failed to recognize differences in the field. We have established the idea of the cosmopolitan critique as a methodological approach that develops through a cosmopolitan iteration, which is based on the principles of the recognition of difference, inclusive differentiation, the creation of in-between spaces, and the work of intercultural translation. However, the long-term goal is the push from critique to epistemic transformation.

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From a Cosmopolitan Critique Toward Epistemic Transformation Cosmopolitanism is often considered a noble but flawed utopian ideal. It is frequently seen as a philosophy that has never shaped an organized action and that leads to culminating, unattended obligations (Nussbaum 2019). We do not contest these objections and see cosmopolitanism as an aspirational ideal that is difficult to achieve, but that we, as scholars, see as our obligation to aim for (Ganter 2020). We understand the cosmopolitan critique as part of an ongoing iterative process that aims for the ideal of epistemic justice (de Sousa Santos 2007), which can only be accomplished through epistemic transformation, and which eventually links epistemic, political, and ethical projects of change in knowledge production (Walsh 2003, 2007). As Waisbord (2019) wrote, “It is time to find ways to shake up parochialisms and diversify the conceptions, evidence, and analytical frameworks in the study of communication” (p. 120). This includes being self-critical about the premises and limitations of work produced in the West, which was what triggered the idea for this volume. The push for epistemic justice here reinforced is part of the wider aim for global social justice (de Sousa Santos 2014). It is this spirit in which we put this volume together to further epistemic transformation in the field of media governance. We understand this book as a small contribution working toward those “epistemological breaks” that have been envisaged for some time (de Sousa Santos 2007, 2014). With our push for epistemic transformation, we offer a more dynamic and less static conceptualization of cosmopolitanism with the clear idea that a critique is necessary for transformation. However, the critique voiced in this volume also indicates how much work we still have to do if we are to take our obligations seriously. On the road toward cosmopolitan transformation, self-reflexivity is not just about giving space and creating visibility; it is about engagement, dialogue, and the understanding that one’s own work can be better understood and contextualized when engaging one’s thinking with works written from different contexts. This stance is in line with the thought that “mindful inclusiveness” (Rao 2019) will benefit our knowledge production. In that sense, the availability of and access to non-Western scholarship is a first step, but the more important step is that it gains more influence in conceptual debates and theoretical thinking. To further this influence, it is necessary to seriously consider what responses to the voiced points of critique could be addressed and which consequences could follow. The

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potential pathways to take a cosmopolitan critique of media governance further need to follow scholarly, institutional, and pedagogical approaches on all macro, meso, and micro levels and their intersections. As Moyo (2020) argued, we cannot discuss epistemic transformation without thinking about the role universities have played in circumventing change through the promotion of canonic thinking, their emphasis on key scholars, and, in general, their promotion of dominating power structures and academic knowledge-making that leaves little room for the other to be recognized and engaged with (Grosfoguel et al. 2016). Cosmopolitanism, however, is thought “to engage the margins as complex sites of ‘otherness,’ as well as inequality and power struggles” (Masiero et  al. 2021, p. 17). A cosmopolitan iteration is part of a counterhegemonic methodological tradition that engages knowledge from the margins to induce a change in media governance as a field of study. The following three sections offer a compendium of ideas of how to learn from the critiques and suggestions voiced in this volume: scholarly, pedagogical, and institutional. We see the proposal as in line with what Walter Mignolo called “reflect about problems” rather than “study problems” (interview with Walsh 2003, p.  17, original in Spanish). The list should be read as dynamic and has to be re-evaluated, discussed, critiqued, and transformed. Scholarly Dimension of the Cosmopolitan Critique • Acknowledge and seek to understand differences in the historical development of media governance as a perspective in media and communication policy research in countries and/or regions of the Global South. • Recognize and discuss ideological connotations and implicit normative understandings of the media governance perspective and their role in reproducing existing power structures and inequalities. • Recognize and actively discuss thick descriptions of contemporary constraints that media governance deploys as a descriptive term, analytical approach, or normative concept to research interests and realities in the Global South (e.g., sustainable media governance, participatory policies, cosmopolitan media and information commons). • Systematize the relation between different histories, knowledge-­ making, and knowledge that shapes our understanding of media governance.

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• Actively problematize, critique, and re-interpret governance-specific concepts, such as good governance, independence, accountability, media democracy, media ethics, advocacy, self-governance, and self-regulation. • Recognize different modes of sociopolitical or interactive media ­governance in the Global South (e.g., consequences of different interpretations of formality versus informality, independence in transformational systems). • Recognize and craft a critical response to existing conceptual pieces on media and communication governance from an othered research perspective or country/regional context (e.g., deliberative policy ecology approach, cosmopolitan media commons). • Sensitize for and emphasize the values and shortcomings of using media governance as an analytical term from the perspective of the Global South (e.g., exploring the utopianism behind media governance, problematizing the transfer of media governance concepts in scholarly and practical terms). • Develop new approaches for and interpretations of questions of power and control within conceptual approaches in media governance (e.g., the role of political praxis of subaltern groups in conceptual and theoretical thought, participatory policies, informal practices). • Recognize and discuss sociocultural and linguistic translatability issues when working with media and communication governance terminologies, related ambiguities on the analytical level, and the potential for new terminologies and alterations (e.g., exploring or developing media governance vocabulary in languages other than English, and its meanings and reasons for a lack of original vocabulary and consequences for understanding and addressing media governance). • Recognize epistemological diversity and depart from the monolithic culture of knowledge media governance toward ecologies of knowledges. Pedagogical Dimension of the Cosmopolitan Critique • Diversify the required and recommended course readings. • Encourage students to actively search for, read, discuss, and reference readings from non-Western scholars and in non-­Western contexts. • Co-create open canons to be transformed, instead of employing standardized, closed canons.

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• Use country/context comparisons not as relativizing work or mere case studies, but as learning experience per se. • Encourage students to work with and from their own backgrounds and in relation to the backgrounds of others. • Encourage reading and learning in different languages. • Include self-referential sensitization as a pedagogical goal. • Include and implement principles studied in media governance also on the level of course work. • Encourage reaching out to others to create networks among different contexts and outside those established by mentors. Institutional Dimension Toward a Cosmopolitan Critique • Acknowledge structural issues and existing inequalities and gaps in media governance research and the resulting conceptual delimitations. • Create spaces for engagement under consideration of the imbalances that also exist in these spaces. • Support the facilitation of the participation of all academics, communities, and marginalized voices in intersectional spaces for engagement. • Acknowledge and make visible translational work as appreciated academic labor. The list above derives from the contributions of this book. We hope we can contribute to Walter Mignolo’s call to academia to stop being “a constant actualization of critical European or US American thinking” (Mignolo in conversation with Walsh 2003, p. 16). Twenty years later, we are slowly starting to enact this call, turning it into a basic principle. It is time to take othered knowledge and its potential for shaping thoughts, concepts, categories, and theories seriously, regardless of the power geographies that shaped the process (see Walsh 2007; Said 2003). If we see our subject as dynamic, with an “interconnected set of intellectual projects that process from varied social starting points into an unpredictable future” (Connell 2007, p. 228), this process will be exciting, humbling, and will involve a steep learning curve. It will enable us to encounter and work with puzzle sets built in other social, economic, and political realities from which our own will benefit. Throughout this book and in our everyday realities, we experience that the pathway toward cosmopolitan media governance studies across

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scholarly, pedagogical, and institutional dimensions is long and complicated. We are aware that establishing a dialogue through publications and in discussion formats is, to some extent, an exercise of artificial scope. Time will tell whether the cosmopolitan critique of media governance articulated in this book and the many points of reflection offered by the contributors to this volume will be inserted into the academic discourse and contribute to the decentering of the field. We hope, of course, that they will. The creation of opportunities for further exchange to happen is an obligation for all of us. We hope the contributions in this book motivate us to discover other “knowledges” and practices that are insightful and help us to rethink established epistemic limits and push toward new analytical ideas, concepts, and research practices that speak to the complex realities that shape the knowledge-making cultures in our field.

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Index1

A Academic cosmopolitanism, 2, 4–6 Academic realities, 284 Access, 24, 32, 40, 46, 47, 66, 68, 72, 73, 92, 94, 127, 169, 170, 172, 189, 208, 210, 213–218, 233, 234, 237, 238, 246, 266, 268, 285, 293, 295, 298 Accountability, 7, 26, 39, 52, 81–96, 137, 161, 236, 255, 277, 285, 288, 292, 300 Accumulation by dispossession, 19 Advertorial, 248 Advocacy, 68, 273, 300 Advocate, 49, 92, 270, 274, 277, 292 Affective register, 269 Africa, 18n2, 21, 22n5, 23, 25, 29, 29n11, 30, 30n12, 30n13, 47, 105, 117, 187n3, 231–234, 239, 244, 248, 250, 255, 267

African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 83 African Independent Television (AIT), 104, 113, 117 African Union, 83 Agency, 6, 15–33, 47, 90, 105, 116, 126, 133, 137, 138, 140, 167, 199, 207, 210–212, 214, 219, 220, 222–226, 263, 265n3, 269, 274n5, 277, 289, 291 Analytical helplessness, 293 Anticolonial struggle, 264 Anti-Piracy Coalition, 44, 45, 47, 52 Appropriating, 248 Arab Media and governance theory, 292 Argentina, 16n1, 60, 62, 69, 70, 72, 206, 207, 210–212, 214–220 Article 19, 48, 49, 71, 74, 151, 157 Artificial intelligence (AI), 30, 172

 Note: Page numbers followed by ‘n’ refer to notes.

1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 S. A. Ganter, H. Badr (eds.), Media Governance, Global Transformations in Media and Communication Research - A Palgrave and IAMCR Series, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-05020-6

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INDEX

Asian Human Rights Commission, 270 Aspirational ideal, 298 Asymmetric power relations, 288 Audience, 68, 70, 71, 89, 114, 118, 127, 149, 152, 187, 191, 212, 216, 217, 222, 253 Audio-visual, 16n1, 93, 147, 156, 158, 159 Authoritarian rule, 42, 82 Authoritarian system, 7, 154, 161, 162, 288 Authority, 16, 22, 24, 30, 40, 45–48, 51, 72, 73, 113, 128, 134, 138, 140, 151, 152, 158, 161, 195, 197, 215, 217–219, 223, 271, 289, 292 B BeIN, 46–48 BeoutQ, 46, 47, 52 Bias, 7, 129, 132, 134, 138, 140, 291 media bias, 129, 132, 291 Border-crossing methodologies, 294 Brazil, 7, 16n1, 30n13, 62, 69, 125–140, 214, 215, 287 Brazilian Investigative Journalism Association, 138 Broadcast, 23, 42, 45, 67–69, 105, 106, 109, 111, 113, 114, 118, 119, 147–152, 155, 158, 238, 248 C Canonic thinking, 299 Capitalist system, 18, 27, 189 capitalism, 19–21, 23, 26, 28, 28n9, 31, 59, 60, 64, 74, 76, 191, 193

Centralization/centralized (centralisation/centralised), 23, 40, 41, 63, 146, 154, 155, 176, 212, 297 China, 8, 30n13, 185–200, 290 Citizens, 4, 22, 26, 49, 68, 74, 88, 103, 104, 106, 108, 112, 113, 115–118, 120, 128, 134, 146, 152, 153, 159, 162, 176, 207, 209, 214, 215, 222, 223, 233, 235, 239–241, 252, 255, 269, 270, 276 influence, 290, 291 organizations, 290 participation, 108, 110, 111, 116, 117, 170, 176, 206–211, 213, 220, 221, 224, 225, 291 of the world, 31, 284 Code of ethics, 88, 93 Colonial beginnings, 261 “Colonial capitalism”, 20 Commodification, 20 Commonplaces, 288 Communication, 2, 49, 59, 63–70, 104, 127, 154, 167, 187, 205–226, 261, 284 policy, 1, 25n7, 60, 61, 63, 65–67, 71, 73, 205–207, 209, 210, 212, 215, 218, 219, 222, 224, 226, 299 Communitarianism, 263 Community, 5, 31, 32, 41, 49, 50, 60, 69, 71, 73, 75, 185, 194, 213, 214, 217–221, 234, 235, 242, 250, 251, 269–271, 273, 276, 284, 291, 293, 295, 296, 301 radio, 223, 263, 264, 272 Connell, Raewyn, 18, 19, 288, 289, 293, 294, 296, 297, 301 Contestation, 103–120, 275, 289

 INDEX 

Context, 3–8, 19–21, 19n3, 22n5, 24, 32, 39–41, 52, 59–76, 81–96, 105, 106, 108, 111, 113, 119, 120, 132, 139, 155, 165–168, 170, 173, 187–189, 209, 231, 233, 240–241, 261, 267, 270, 283, 284, 286–292, 294, 295, 297, 298, 300, 301 Contextual, 69, 277, 292 Corporations, 15, 16, 24, 29, 42, 74, 165–168, 170, 171, 192, 197, 208, 209, 221, 224, 266 Corruption, 41, 68, 87, 126, 127, 131, 133, 135, 136, 285 Cosmologies, 297 Cosmopolitan communications, 104 contact zone, 296 critique, dimensions of, 285, 294–297, 299–302 iteration, 284, 293–295, 297, 299 media, 4, 7, 103–120, 288, 290, 297, 300, 301 media and information commons, 6, 16, 288, 299 methodology, 294 society, 103–105, 109, 112, 118 Cosmopolitanism, 4, 31, 104, 106–109, 112, 115, 118, 263, 298, 299 Council of Journalism, 129 Counterhegemonic/ counterhegemonic methodology, 283–302 Covid-19, 32, 113 Critical theory, 241 Critique, 1–9, 41, 88, 103–120, 189, 191, 251, 265, 283–302 Culture/cultural, 7, 25, 28, 32, 40, 42, 43, 61–63, 66, 67, 70, 71, 73–76, 90, 103–107, 111–116, 118–120, 160, 161, 168, 170,

309

176, 187–193, 206, 212, 217, 264, 268, 269, 271, 273–275, 277, 286, 292, 294, 295, 297, 302 of deliberation, 264, 268–269, 271, 278, 288 of knowledge, 286, 300 particularities, 262 D De Sousa Santos, Boaventura, 286 Decentering knowledge, 285–294 about media governance, 285 Decolonization/decolonial/ decolonialized, 9, 25, 262, 264, 266–268, 276 normativity, 266, 278 Deconstruct, 289 “Deep state,” 40 Deliberation, 28, 29, 210, 263, 264, 267–271, 273, 275–278, 276n7, 288, 291 Deliberative policy ecology, 9, 261–278, 300 Democracy, 7, 61, 66, 67, 69, 74–76, 82, 83, 85, 86, 89, 95, 103–105, 110, 126, 127, 134, 135, 156, 264, 267–271, 277, 289, 292, 300 Democratic, 66–69, 75, 76, 82, 83, 86, 90, 105, 110–112, 116, 126, 128, 134, 156, 186, 196, 205–226, 267–269, 271, 272, 277, 285, 287, 291, 294 governance, 205–226, 285 iteration, 294 Democratization, 1, 42, 61, 62, 66–69, 72, 73, 75, 110, 111, 209, 210, 231, 264–266, 270, 276, 285

310 

INDEX

Deregulation, 42, 105, 110, 116, 119, 191 Deutsche Welle, 83 Development, 6, 8, 15, 16, 20, 21n4, 25, 25n7, 26, 29, 30n12, 30n13, 40, 42, 43, 61–63, 66, 68, 75, 83, 86, 105, 108–111, 113, 146–148, 155, 165–176, 187–192, 194, 198, 199, 209, 212, 221, 232, 245, 248, 261, 262, 265, 266, 269, 271, 273, 274, 277, 283, 285, 287, 299 De-Westernization, 5, 262 Dialogue, 2, 4, 32, 85, 155, 223, 264, 268, 272–274, 294–298, 302 Dichotomic approaches, 292 Diffusionist approach, 18 Digital Freedom Initiative, 29 Digital Solidarity Fund, 29 Dimensions of cosmopolitan critique, 285, 298–301 Disciplinary circle, 288 identity, 295 silos, 268 Disinformation, 69, 126, 136, 137, 139, 140, 232 Diversifying, 287 Diversity, 7, 66, 73, 107, 110, 114, 116, 119, 120, 157, 158, 162, 171, 187, 189, 191, 215, 286, 293, 300 Domain Naming System (DNS), 29, 195, 198 Dynamics, 18, 23, 26, 60, 65, 66, 70, 72, 95, 112, 115, 186, 198, 199, 208, 210, 211, 213, 220, 225, 231–255, 285, 287, 294, 296, 298, 299, 301

E Ecologies of knowledges, 286, 295, 300 Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), 214 Economic framework, 166 Ecuador, 60, 69, 70, 72, 73, 75, 206, 207, 210–212, 214–219 Editorial guidelines, 85 Egypt, 8, 41, 43, 49, 50, 53, 86, 89, 145–148, 150, 152–156, 159–162, 232, 287, 289 Egyptian Radio and Television Union (ERTU), 146, 147, 149, 150, 155 Elections, 8, 67, 68n5, 73, 82, 125–127, 135, 136, 139, 140, 231, 233, 235, 237–240, 242, 244, 248 Emancipatory work, 295 Emotive rationality, 272, 273 Engagement, 30–33, 111, 112, 120, 149, 170, 198, 239, 251, 252, 255, 267, 273, 277, 286, 296, 298, 301 Epistemic change, 285, 298 Epistemic cultures, 294 Epistemic dominance, 285 Epistemic justice, 284, 298 Epistemic transformation, 2, 5, 6, 284, 297–299 Epistemological breaks, 298 Epistemological diversity, 286, 300 Epistemological realities, 284 Epistemology, 6–7, 266, 267 Equality in media governance, 290 Eurocentric, 275, 297 Europe, 3, 4, 18, 20, 21n4, 22, 23, 26, 27, 47, 82, 83, 86, 88, 133, 233

 INDEX 

European Union, 87, 132 Executive, 44, 74, 128, 151, 217, 218, 223 Extraction/extractive practices, 19, 21, 23, 31 F Facebook, 50, 53, 61, 70, 90, 138, 149, 170, 172, 173, 233, 235, 237–239, 242, 270 Fact-checking, 92, 126, 137, 138 Fake news, 7, 69, 70, 125–140, 153, 239, 254 Field theory, 91 First mover advantage, 287 Flawed import, 289 Flow of information, 26, 271 Foreign capital, 262 Foucauldian perspectives, 17 Fourth Estate, 128 Fragmented authority, 292 Free and Open Source Software (FOSS), 270 Freedom of expression, 66, 69, 71, 73, 139, 146, 152, 153, 214 G General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 44 Globalization, 15, 18, 103–108, 110, 118, 133, 137, 139, 169, 172, 185, 187, 192, 262, 285 Global justice, 294 in academic knowledge, 284 Global North, 18, 49, 194, 197 Global platforms, 61, 65, 70, 76, 169, 170, 288 Global South, 4, 6, 9, 15–33, 83, 96, 104, 106, 186, 186n1, 187n3,

311

188, 194, 196, 197, 199, 200, 267, 273, 277, 284, 285, 291, 295, 299, 300 Gobernabilidad, 3 Good governance, 2, 39, 52, 131, 133, 135, 285, 292, 300 Governance, 1–9, 15–33, 39–53, 59–76, 84, 85, 90, 93, 103–120, 125–140, 145–162, 165–176, 185–200, 205–226, 231–255, 261–264, 266–269, 271, 273–278, 283–295, 297–302 colonial forms of, 21, 292 mechanisms, 8, 31, 148, 284, 291 modes, 8, 134, 156, 195, 196, 206, 287, 291 practices, 62, 289 processes, 288 turn, 3, 286 Government, 16, 22n6, 24, 29, 40, 42, 45, 46, 49–53, 60, 61, 68–76, 68n5, 86, 93, 105, 111, 112, 116, 118–120, 126–129, 134, 135, 137, 146–149, 151, 152, 154–159, 161, 162, 166–168, 171–173, 176, 193, 195, 197, 207, 209, 211–215, 219, 220, 222–225, 232, 234, 235, 240, 241, 250, 253, 271, 274, 290, 292 Governmentality, 23 H Hegemony, 6, 26, 29, 31, 64n2, 118, 198, 284 Heuristic, 17, 263, 272–274, 292 Highly controlled political systems, 287 Human rights, 29, 29n10, 31, 49, 50, 60, 63, 71, 114, 214, 217, 219, 224–226, 273, 285

312 

INDEX

I IMF, 18 Imperialism/imperial, 18, 20, 22, 22n5, 23, 63, 170, 175, 187, 189–191, 193, 293 Importing ideas, 289, 290 In-between spaces, 294–297 Inclusive differentiation, 5, 294, 296, 297 Inclusivity, 7, 107, 108, 114, 117, 118, 120, 289 Independence, 8, 25, 42, 85, 88, 94, 110, 128, 129, 149, 150, 156–162, 218, 268, 289, 300 India, 19n3, 22n5, 22n6, 23, 24, 29, 30n13, 261–263, 262n1, 268–272 Indigenous, 71, 73, 217–219, 221, 222, 293 capital, 30 knowledge, 293 languages, 71 media, 217, 219, 221 Industrialization, 19, 285 Industry/media industry, 16n1, 19, 28n9, 59, 71, 104–106, 113–116, 120, 153, 156, 160, 165, 166, 168, 170, 173, 212, 217, 262 Inequality, 1, 8, 25, 190, 191, 196, 205, 206, 208–211, 213, 224, 233, 286, 291, 295, 296, 299, 301 Informal, 7, 19n3, 40–43, 45, 48, 52, 63, 87, 90, 95, 155, 208, 263, 272, 274, 276, 276n7, 288, 292, 300 Informality, 40, 48, 288, 292, 300 Information and communication technology (ICTs), 16, 17, 19, 27, 29–32, 104, 117, 119, 168, 169, 172, 193, 222, 236

Informatization, 285 Innovation, 8–9, 64, 65 Institutional architecture, 210 Institutional dimension, 285, 301–302 Institutionalization, 16, 87, 225, 289 Institutionalized practices, 7, 92, 292 Intercultural translation, 294, 296, 297 Intergovernmental interventions, 262, 287 International, 1, 17, 26, 30, 32, 44, 45, 47, 48, 52, 62, 64, 71, 75, 76, 82–85, 92, 94–96, 103–120, 132, 134, 150, 156, 159, 161, 167, 171, 186n1, 189, 191, 194, 197, 198, 200, 208, 209, 219, 273, 275, 277, 289 agencies, 16, 116 communications, 1, 8, 27, 185, 187–194, 196, 198–200, 262 law, 17 standards, 7, 69, 110, 112, 115 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 48, 49 International Financing Institutions (IFIs), 133 International Telecommunications Union (ITU), 26, 28, 198 Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), 29, 195, 198 Internet governance, 3, 8, 29n10, 169, 172, 195–197, 200, 206, 208, 285 global Internet governance, 8, 185–200, 288, 290 Internet Governance Forum (IGF), 29 Intersectionality, 17 Interventions, 186, 210, 262, 265, 276 governmental interventions, 262, 287 Invisibility, 5, 212

 INDEX 

J Jordan, 81–84, 87–94 Jordan Press Association, 88 Journalism, 26, 68, 71, 83, 85–88, 91–94, 117, 129, 137, 148, 240 Judiciary, 128, 137, 139, 140, 223 K Knight Foundation, 138 Knowledge, 2, 4, 6, 8, 9, 23, 32, 66, 84, 95, 112, 113, 132, 154, 196, 212, 218, 239, 273, 276, 277, 284, 285, 294–297, 299–302 production, 83, 95, 298 Korea, 166, 169, 171–176, 285, 288 Kuwait, 43 L Language, 27, 28, 30, 71, 107, 156, 238, 241, 275, 288, 289, 300, 301 Latin America, 7, 8, 18n2, 59–76, 86, 156, 187n3, 189, 206, 207, 212, 214, 224, 225, 267, 287, 288 Laws, 8, 17, 22, 24, 25, 25n7, 42–44, 47, 48, 52, 53, 67, 68, 71–73, 85, 88, 92, 94, 131, 135, 147–153, 155, 157–162, 167, 170, 195, 206, 207, 210–215, 217–221, 223–225, 232, 234, 250, 253, 254, 271, 289 Least developed countries (LDCs), 234 Legacy media, 126–129, 140 Legislature, 128, 139 Liberal democracy, 7, 85, 89, 95, 265, 267, 277, 278, 292 Licensing, 119, 148, 159, 160, 222 Limitations, 3, 145–162, 187, 235, 293, 298 Lingua franca, 296 Linguistic aspects, 289 Literacy, 92, 106, 270, 277

313

Lived reality, 32, 108, 115, 120 Local, 8, 20, 22, 23, 44, 48–52, 107, 108, 110, 113–115, 118–120, 148, 165, 166, 169–176, 193, 208, 213, 221, 269, 273, 284, 286, 287, 290, 294 local media, 8, 50, 126–128, 160 Loyalist, 42 M Mac Bride, 290 Mainstream media, 74, 125–128, 135–138, 140, 146, 236, 238, 246, 248 Marginality, 289 Marginalized, 29, 73, 76, 192, 198, 278, 288, 293, 301 populations, 32 Mass media, 63, 104, 188, 193, 236, 240 MBC Group, 44, 46, 47 Media accountability, 7, 81–96, 288, 292 control, 92, 116 ecosystem, 168, 239, 285 ethics, 84, 86, 90, 93, 300 freedom, 27n8, 43, 150 industry, 105, 113, 114, 116, 120, 153, 165, 166, 168, 170, 212, 262 law, 17, 43, 72, 159, 216, 262 policy, 3, 7, 9, 25n7, 59–76, 85, 93, 132, 154, 156, 162, 170, 215, 222, 261–278, 287, 292–294 regulation, 7, 43, 63, 85, 125–129, 132, 140, 154, 166, 168 scandals, 92 systems, 7, 22, 24, 25n7, 32, 41, 60, 63, 65–71, 73–76, 82, 95, 145, 154, 156–158, 161, 162, 166, 170, 175, 192, 206, 208, 209, 212–214, 232, 233, 293 technology, 20, 64, 172

314 

INDEX

Media accountability systems (MAS), 81, 82, 84, 86 MediaAcT, 81, 89, 90, 95 Media governance as concept, 1–4, 8, 41, 43, 85, 132, 139, 154, 155, 166, 286, 288, 300 as field of study, 2, 5, 6, 283, 284, 294, 299 as framework, 2, 8, 90, 115, 132, 145–162, 166, 171, 173, 176, 285–287 sustainable media governance, 9, 264, 276–278, 288, 299 Methodological reflexivity, 294 Methodology, 9, 113–114, 207, 241, 272, 283–302 Metropole, 289 Mexico, 60, 62, 63n1, 71, 73, 75, 206, 207, 210–212, 214–219 Middle East and North Africa (MENA), 41, 47, 51, 52, 82n1, 83, 153 Military, 21, 22n5, 117n1, 126–128, 190 Mindful inclusiveness, 298 Modernity, 264–266 Monolithic culture of knowledge, 286, 300 Monopoly, 24, 26, 31, 41, 66, 66n4, 128, 136–139, 176 Moral panic, 7, 125 Motion Picture Association (MPA), 45, 52 Multilateralism, 290 Multi-stakeholder, 8, 140, 185, 194–196, 198, 206–209, 276, 291 Multi-stakeholderism, 195, 196, 291

N National, 15, 20, 25n7, 26, 27, 30, 32, 41, 49, 59, 61–63, 65, 67, 71, 72, 75, 84, 91, 94, 114, 118, 126, 128, 132, 146–151, 146n1, 158, 159, 171, 190–193, 195, 208, 209, 213, 218, 221–223, 225, 240, 275, 286, 288, 290 National Media Authority (NMA), 146, 149, 155, 157–159, 161 Neo-authoritarian, 157, 161, 287 Neo-corporate, 290 Neoliberal, 7, 15–33, 42, 60, 69, 71, 74, 116, 132–135, 137–140, 192, 265, 290, 291, 293 governance, 16, 29 Neoliberalism, 16–20, 19n3, 28, 28n9, 31, 68n5, 75, 191 Nepal, 263, 270, 272 New multilateralism, 8, 197, 200, 290 New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO), 16, 25–28, 63, 187, 187n3, 190, 196 Nigeria, 7, 104–106, 109–111, 113–120, 117n1, 232, 233, 289, 290 Nigeria Broadcasting Corporation, 110 Non-Alignment Movement (NAM), 18, 18n2, 26, 27 Non-state players, 53 Non-transparent processes, 53 Normative, 2, 3, 6, 7, 31, 39, 83, 87, 89, 91, 92, 95, 132, 266, 286, 288, 289, 291, 299 frameworks, 92

 INDEX 

Norms, 42, 84, 91–95, 115, 159, 211, 263, 266, 272–275, 277, 278, 294 North Africa, 232 North/North axes, 296 North/South axes, 296 O Ongoing process, 270, 285, 296 Online dissent, 232, 290 Opposition activists, 50 Orality in governance processes, 288 Organization of American States (OAS), 214, 221, 225 Othered knowledge, 301 Otherness, 299 P Pandemic, 1, 2, 32, 268 Participation, participatory institutions, 7, 8, 43, 69, 71, 72, 85, 86, 92, 104, 108, 110, 111, 116, 117, 120, 154, 170, 176, 185–200, 205–226, 235, 269, 271, 275–277, 289, 291, 295, 301 Participatory policy, 215 Pedagogical dimension, 300–301 Platforms, digital platforms, 2, 3, 8, 30, 43, 48–52, 61, 63, 66n4, 70, 104, 112, 114, 117, 119, 125, 126, 137, 140, 149, 151–153, 159, 162, 166–176, 232–234, 237, 238, 241, 245, 248, 250, 252–254 Pluralism, 81, 157, 158, 266 Plurality, 66, 107, 110, 266 of voices, 285 Points of critique, 284, 286, 298 Policy, 1, 3, 7, 8, 16n1, 24–30, 39, 43, 45, 50, 52, 60, 61, 63, 65–67, 71, 73, 75, 76, 85, 104,

315

105, 110, 112, 114–116, 120, 127, 129–134, 139, 150, 152–157, 162, 166–174, 176, 188–191, 193, 205–210, 212, 213, 215, 218–220, 222–226, 232, 234, 236, 237, 241, 261, 263, 264, 268, 271–277, 274n4, 274n6, 276n7, 288, 289, 299, 300 development, 285 ecology, 9, 263, 271–274 paradigm, 60, 61, 129–135, 139, 291 Political bias, 7, 132, 138, 140, 291 Political economy, 17, 28n9, 40, 166, 190, 191, 193, 238 Politics political frameworks, 8, 212 political parties, 69, 147, 225, 233, 235, 236, 240, 242, 243, 248, 252, 253, 255 Populism, 74, 134 Positionality, 107, 168, 174, 286 Postcolonial, 15, 16, 18–27, 25n7, 105, 262 perspective, 285 Power, 6, 15–33, 40–43, 51, 64, 66, 66n4, 68, 76, 85, 86, 91, 92, 126–128, 133, 134, 140, 146, 147, 151, 152, 155, 157, 162, 170, 172–176, 186–192, 186n1, 195, 196, 199, 200, 208, 209, 212, 214, 218, 219, 222, 224–226, 232–234, 236, 238, 251, 266, 274, 275, 284, 290, 291 asymmetries, 196 geographies, 301 imbalances, 290, 291 relations, 30, 42, 165, 166, 169, 186, 208, 209, 288 structures, 290–292, 296, 299

316 

INDEX

Practice, 2, 7, 16, 17, 19, 22, 23, 32, 40–43, 62, 63, 67, 68, 74, 83, 84, 86–96, 104–106, 108, 110, 114, 117, 135n2, 146, 151, 154, 155, 157, 159, 161, 191, 192, 196, 208–210, 212, 261, 262, 274–277, 286, 288, 289, 291–294, 296, 300, 302 Praxis, 62, 63, 264, 269, 277, 297, 300 Press freedom, 26–28, 27n8, 31, 82, 83 Privatization, 16, 19, 27, 29, 110, 116, 146, 191 Problematization of private as category, 290 Professionalization, 85 Public good, 30–32 Public participation, 86 Public service, 26, 40, 72, 73, 146 broadcasting, 146n1, 149 Q Qatar, 43, 45, 46 R Radio Distribution System (RDS), 109–111 Reciprocal constructive approach, 294 Reciprocal incompleteness, 286 Recognition of difference, 278, 294, 295, 297 Reform, 42, 46, 59–76, 110, 111, 116, 146, 148, 157, 162, 169, 170, 176, 193, 207, 209, 210, 213, 214, 219, 220, 269 Regulations regulatory bodies, 42, 73, 117–120, 148–152, 155–158, 161, 162

regulatory frameworks, 112, 115–117, 119, 120, 128, 129, 146, 170, 171, 176, 255 Regulatory works, 295 Research contexts, 286 Right to communicate, 27, 28, 31, 48–52, 207–211, 290 S Saudi Arabia, 43–53 Scholarly dimension, 299–300 Self-governance, 41, 300 Self-referentiality of Western academia, 289 Self-reflection, 284, 290, 293 Self-regulation, 67, 83–85, 88, 89, 95, 132, 157, 300 Separated realities, 286 Silicon Valley, 266 Social autonomy, 285 media, 3, 8, 43, 46, 49, 50, 52, 53, 61, 63, 64, 69, 70, 89, 90, 117, 118, 125–127, 136, 137, 140, 149, 151–153, 169, 170, 193, 231–255, 292, 297 mobilization, 224, 226, 291 Socio-economic stratification, 264 South/South axes, 296 South Africa, 8, 231–255, 270 South Asia, 23, 261–278 Southern epistemology, 267 Southern Theory, 288, 291 South Korea, 8, 165–176 Sovereignty, 6, 15–33, 134, 194, 284, 291 Standpoint, 127, 276, 284 State-controlled, 92 State power, 185, 194, 290 State-sponsored terror, 271

 INDEX 

Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), 18 Structural imbalances, 293 Subaltern, 265, 265n3, 284, 288, 300 Subsystem, 66, 287 Supreme Council for Media Regulations (SCMR), 149–151, 153, 155, 157–160, 162 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), 277 Sustainable media governance, 264, 276–278, 288, 299 Syria, 43, 49, 50, 53, 86, 89, 90, 95 T Technology, 16–18, 20, 21, 24, 29–32, 52, 64, 65, 86, 104, 105, 117, 118, 152, 168, 169, 172, 192, 193, 234, 266, 269–271, 273, 275, 289 Telecommunication, 16, 17, 23, 27, 59–61, 63, 67, 69, 72, 73, 174, 175, 210, 211, 213–215, 217–221 Telegram, 51 Telegraph, 16, 19–25, 30, 31, 261 Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL), 16, 17, 31 Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property (TRIPS), 44, 45, 48, 265 Transformation, 2, 5, 6, 20, 30n12, 74, 94, 105, 146, 150, 162, 169, 284, 297–299 Transformative thought and action, 294 Translatability linguistic, 300 sociocultural, 300

317

Translation, 108, 294, 296, 297 Translational work, 297, 301 Transnational/transnationalization, 7, 15, 19, 25n7, 29, 63, 132, 133, 192, 197, 199, 273 Trolling, 43, 50, 51, 53, 252, 253, 297 Tunisia, 42, 52, 81, 82, 82n1, 87–89, 268 Twitter, 8, 50–53, 61, 70, 149, 170, 173, 234, 235, 237, 238, 241–252, 255 U United Arab Emirates (UAE), 43, 49–52 United Nations (UN), 49n1, 196–198, 214, 225 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), 18, 26–28, 60, 62, 63, 67, 69, 83, 116, 189, 210, 215 United States (U.S.), 8, 18, 27–29, 28n9, 45, 51–53, 60, 90, 125, 129, 132, 134, 137, 170, 174, 175, 186, 187n3, 188–191, 194–196, 198, 200, 239, 265, 288, 290, 297, 301 United States Agency for International Development (USAID), 29, 116 Universalism, 5, 31, 263 Universalist model, 18 Unrecognizing media governance terminology, 291 Us-centric, 195–197 US Trade Representative (USTR), 45, 48 Utopian, 8, 165–176, 186, 288, 298 Utopic, 292, 297

318 

INDEX

V Vocabulary, 6, 295, 300 Voice parity, 9, 269–272, 276–278, 291, 292 Voluntary and involuntary processes, 86 W Western, 4–6, 18, 26, 27, 29–31, 83, 86, 89, 106, 111, 156, 157, 161, 166, 170, 174–176, 187, 189, 191, 199, 233, 234, 262, 265, 268, 284–290, 293, 295, 297 argumentative circles, 292 canons, 286, 290 centric theorizing, 286 ideals, 285 ontologies, 290 self-referentiality, 289

standard/standardization/ standardized, 285, 289, 300 Westernized ideas, 287 WhatsApp, 51, 234 World Bank (WB), 18, 40, 43, 68n5, 75, 116, 131–133, 233 World Press Freedom Committee (WPFC), 27, 27n8 World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), 16, 25, 28, 29, 29n10, 194, 196–199, 290 World Trade Organisation (WTO), 44, 48, 265 Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI), 43 Z Zimbabwe, 232, 233, 239, 253