Pakistan's Democratic Transition: Change and Persistence (Routledge Studies in South Asian Politics) [1 ed.] 1138647969, 9781138647961

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Pakistan’s Democratic Transition

Politics in Pakistan has traditionally been understood in the context of civil– military relationship. In May 2013, for the first time in history, Pakistan saw an elected government complete a full term in office and transfer power through the ballot box to another civilian government. In view of such an important development, this book offers critical perspectives on Pakistan’s current democratic transition and its implications for national politics, security and foreign policy. It analyses the emerging political trends in the country, including their underlying sources, attributes, constraints, and prospects of sustainability. Drawing on history, diverse theoretical perspectives and empirical evidence, it explains the dynamics of the democratic process, contested borders and spaces, and regionalism. Contributions are from 13 prominent scholars in the field, who provide a wide-ranging analysis of Pakistan’s contemporary national and regional challenges, as well as the opportunities they entail for its viability as a democratic state. Taking the debate on Pakistan beyond the outmoded notions of praetorian politics and security, the book explores the future prospects of civilian supremacy in the country. It will be of interest to students and scholars of South Asian Politics, Political Sociology and Security Studies, as well as policy-makers, diplomats, security experts and military professionals. Ishtiaq Ahmad is Director of the School of Politics and International Relations at Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad, Pakistan. Adnan Rafiq is a DPhil candidate at the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford, UK.

Routledge Studies in South Asian Politics

1

Nepal and the Geo-Strategic Rivalry between China and India Sanjay Upadhya

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US–Pakistan Relations Pakistan’s strategic choices in the 1990s Nasra Talat Farooq

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Security Community in South Asia Muhammad Shoaib Pervez

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Public Policy and Governance in Bangladesh Forty years of experience Nizam Ahmed

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Refugees and Borders in South Asia The great exodus of 1971 Antara Datta

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Separatist Violence in South Asia A comparative study Matthew J. Webb

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Pakistan’s Democratic Transition Change and persistence Edited by Ishtiaq Ahmad and Adnan Rafiq

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5

India’s Human Security Lost debates, forgotten people, intractable challenges Edited by Jason Miklian and Ashild Kolas Poverty and Governance in South Asia Syeda Parnini

Pakistan’s Democratic Transition Change and persistence

Edited by Ishtiaq Ahmad and Adnan Rafiq

First published 2017 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2017 Ishtiaq Ahmad and Adnan Rafiq The right of the editors to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN: 978-1-138-64796-1 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-3156-2674-1 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear

Contents

List of figures List of tables Notes on contributors Acknowledgements Introduction 1 Pakistan’s third democratic transition

vii viii ix xii 1 23

ISHTIAQ AHMAD

2 Enduring challenges to democracy

39

MAYA TUDOR

3 Mapping the ‘Establishment’

53

AYESHA SIDDIQA

4 New politics of the middle class

72

ADNAN RAFIQ

5 Social drivers of democratic change

95

RASUL BAKHSH RAIS

6 Military, militancy, and the crisis of governance

110

MOHAMMAD WASEEM

7 Pluralist society vs. monist state

126

SAEED SHAFQAT

8 Judicial activism, and the rule of law IMTIAZ GUL

140

vi

Contents

9 Demographic dividend, and democracy

156

MOSHARRAF ZAIDI

10 The Baloch question after the Eighteenth Amendment

169

RAFIULLAH KAKAR

11 The challenges of a resilient economy

192

RASHID AMJAD

12 Civil–military convergence for stability

210

HUSSAIN NADIM

13 Great powers, military supremacy, and persistent contestation

222

HANNES EBERT

Index

244

Figures

3.1 Military hegemony 4.1 Rural, urban, and total population (actual and projected) in Pakistan 4.2 Pakistani households by class 4.3 Mobile phone ownership 2013 9.1 Alif Ailaan news bulletin 9.2 Proportion of out-of-school childen (OOSC) by income level 10.1 Voter turnout in national assembly elections (%) 10.2 Balochistan assembly elections voter turnout (%) 10.3 Categorization of Balochistan assembly constituencies based on voter turnout 13.1 Changing primary external patrons and focal points

58 77 81 88 162 165 178 179 179 239

Tables

3.1 3.2 4.1 4.2 4.3

Patterns of rule in Pakistan Mapping the Establishment Percentage and numbers of strict and expanded middle class in Pakistan National household aggregates Growth of private and public education institutions in Pakistan

58 65 80 81 83

Contributors

Ishtiaq Ahmad is Director of the School of Politics and International Relations, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. He previously served as the Quaid-iAzam Fellow at St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford, and Assistant Professor of International Relations, Eastern Mediterranean University, Cyprus. Also a Fulbright Fellow at University of California, Santa Barbra, he has authored several publications on Pakistan and South Asia, and is currently working on a book titled Conflict and Cooperation in South Asia: The Search for Security and Stability in India and Pakistan (I.B. Tauris). Rashid Amjad is Professor of Economics and Director, Graduate Institute of Development Studies, Lahore School of Economics. He previously served as Vice-Chancellor of the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics; Chief Economist and Member of the Pakistan Planning Commission; and Director of South East Asia and the Pacific at the International Labor Organization. His books include: Private Industrial Investment in Pakistan 1960–70 (CUP, 2008), and The Management of the Pakistan Economy 1947–82 (OUP, 1985). He also edited Pakistan Development Review. Hannes Ebert is a PhD candidate at the GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies in Hamburg. He has served as external policy analyst with the German Federal Foreign Office’s Planning Staff, and been affiliated with Harvard University’s Centre for European Studies at Harvard University, and Oxford University’s Department of Politics and International Relations. His research focuses on governance, armed conflicts and foreign policy in South Asia, and he has published articles in journals such as Third World Quarterly and Strategic Analysis. Imtiaz Gul is Executive Director of the Centre for Research and Security Studies, Islamabad, and the author of Pakistan: Before and After Osama (Roli, 2012), The Most Dangerous Place: Pakistan’s Lawless Frontier (Penguin, 2011), and The Unholy Nexus (Vanguard, 2002). A prominent security expert, he has reported the conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan for over two decades for Radio Deutsche Welle, DPA (German newswire), CNN and NPR. He also contributes articles to several news publications, including Foreign Policy, The Wall Street Journal, The Friday Times, and The Express Tribune.

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Contributors

Rafiullah Kakar is a public policy analyst currently based in London. He was the 2013 Rhodes Scholar from Pakistan at the University of Oxford, where he did a Masters in Public Policy at the Blavatnik School of Government, and an MSc in Global Governance and Diplomacy at the Department of International Development. His research focuses on ethnic and religious conflict in South Asia, and has appeared in academic publications such as Journal of Asian Politics and History. Hussain Nadim is a PhD candidate at the University of Sydney. He is also Project Director for the Peace and Development Unit at the Ministry of Planning, Development and Reforms, Government of Pakistan, where he initially served as Special Assistant to the Federal Minister. Previously, he was a Visiting Scholar at Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, DC, and Adjunct Fellow at the International Centre for Study of Radicalization at King’s College, London. He also contributes to prominent news publications such as Foreign Policy. Adnan Rafiq is a DPhil candidate at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford. His DPhil thesis examines the socioeconomic transformations underpinning Pakistan’s current democratic transition. He holds an MPhil degree in Innovation, Strategy and Organisation from the Judge Business School, University of Cambridge. He has published in scholarly journals such as Telecommunications Policy and contributed op-eds in news publications like The Huffington Post, Dawn and The Express Tribune. Rasul Bakhsh Rais is Professor of Political Science at the Department of Social Sciences, Lahore University of Management Sciences. He has previously served as Director General of Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad; Professor of International Relations and Director of Area Study Centre at Quaidi-Azam University, Islamabad; Quaid-i-Azam Professor at Columbia University; Fulbright Fellow at Wake Forest University; and Social Science Research Fellow at Harvard University. His books include: Recovering the Frontier State: War, Ethnicity and State in Afghanistan (OUP, 2008) and State, Society and Democratic Change in Pakistan (OUP, 1997). Saeed Shafqat is Professor and Director at the Centre for Public Policy and Governance, Forman Christian University, Lahore. He previously served as Quaid-i-Azam Professor at Columbia University; Executive Director of the National Institute of Population Studies, Islamabad; Chief Instructor and Warden of Pakistan Civil Services Academy, Lahore; and Chairman of the Department of Pakistan Studies at Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. His books include: New Perspectives on Pakistan (OUP, 2008), and Civil-Military Relations in Pakistan (Westview, 1997). Ayesha Siddiqa is a prominent scholar, who has published extensively on civil– military relations in South Asia and is the author of two important books: Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy (Pluto Press, 2007), and

Contributors

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Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup: In Search of a Policy (Palgrave, 2001). With a PhD in War Studies from King’s College, London, she has served as the Charles Wallace Fellow at St Antony’s College, Oxford, Pakistan Fellow at Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, and Ford Fellow at Bonn International Center for Conversion. Maya Tudor is Associate Professor of Government and Public Policy at Blavatnik School of Government, University of Oxford. She has also worked as Special Assistant to Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz at the World Bank, at UNICEF, in the US Senate, and at the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee. She has a PhD in Politics and Public Policy from Princeton University, and her research investigates the origins of stable, democratic and effective states in South Asia. She is the author of The Promise of Power: The Origins of Democracy in India and Autocracy in Pakistan (CUP, 2013). Mohammad Waseem is Professor of Political Science at the Department of Social Sciences, Lahore University of Management Sciences. He previously served as Chair of International Relations Department, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad; Quaid-i-Azam Fellow at St Antony’s College, University of Oxford; Visiting Professor in Sciences Po, Paris; and Fulbright Fellow at Brookings Institution and Columbia University. His books include: Political Conflict in Pakistan (Routledge, 2015) and Democratization in Pakistan: A Study of the 2002 Elections (OUP, 2002). Mosharraf Zaidi is Campaign Director for Alif Ailaan – a political campaign addressing Pakistan’s education crisis. Previously, he served as Advisor to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan and held senior positions with various government and international organizations. He has advised the United Nations, European Union, World Bank, Asian Development Bank, UK Government’s DFID, as well as Danish and Swiss governments on policy issues in South Asia, especially Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Acknowledgements

The idea of this book was conceived during an international conference on ‘Pakistan: Opportunity in Crisis’ that we convened at the Asian Studies Centre, St. Antony’s College, University of Oxford on 10–11 May 2014. On the occasion, a diverse group of scholars on Pakistan, including both established and emerging ones, offered critical perspectives on a range of political, economic, social and foreign policy issues of the country. Since the topic of the conference was quite broad, we have chosen only those papers for this volume that are relevant to its specific theme on Pakistan’s current transition to democracy. So, first of all, we are truly grateful to all our contributors for their timely submissions and subsequent cooperation during the editorial process. We are also highly indebted to Dr. Faisal Devji, Director of the Asian Studies Centre, and Prof. Margaret MacMillan, Warden of St. Antony’s College, for their support in organising the conference and encouragement for producing this volume. Lastly, we would like to acknowledge the endless support, guidance and patience of the editorial team at Routledge, especially Dorothea Schaefter, Rebecca Lawrence and Jillian Morrison. We would also like to thank Ashleigh Phillips at Wearset, and Louise Lubke Cuss for her exceptional editing and proofreading work. Oxford has been a beacon of light for the world for centuries, and we take great pride in our association with this renowned institution of learning. It is our hope that this literary product from Oxford will make an important contribution to the critical discourse in global scholarship on Pakistan.

Introduction

Pakistan’s third transition to civilian rule, which was triggered by the onset of the Lawyers’ Movement in March 2007 and formally began with the general elections a year later, has been markedly distinct from the previous two democratic spells of 1971–77 and 1988–99 due to the starkly different nature of recent social and political transformations. The emergence of an independent judiciary, a proactive civil society, a vibrant media, and a growing consensus among major political parties and public opinion in general for sustaining democracy are particular attributes of this transition. Consequently, the country was able to experience the first-ever peaceful transfer of power from one elected government to another through the general elections of May 2013. The elections brought Nawaz Sharif, the leader of Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) to power for the third time as prime minister. These critical developments defied the previous pattern of politics in Pakistan, when the military was able to rule directly for half of its history and indirectly during most of the rest through successive constitutional manipulations and interventions in politics. Despite structural shortcomings in the prevailing procedural democracy, newfound resilience of civilian leadership, adverse internal security and economic conditions, and external geo-political circumstances have emerged as constraints against direct military intervention. Emboldened by its electoral triumph, the Sharif government put former military ruler General Pervez Musharraf on trial for treason, decided to resume peace talks with India and political reconciliation in Afghanistan, and opted for negotiations with the terrorist group, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). These actions signalled an attempt on the part of civilian leadership to take a lead on national security and foreign policy and consolidate democratic gains in the country. However, within just over a year of the Sharif regime’s coming to power, democratic gains of the debut political transition of 2013 started to reverse. In June 2014, the army launched Operation Zarb-e-Azb against the TTP in North Waziristan. Two months later, Imran Khan of the Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI) and cleric Tahirul Qadri led anti-government protests in Islamabad for several weeks, accusing Prime Minister Sharif of coming to power through rigged elections and demanding his resignation. While protestors failed to achieve this goal, they certainly weakened the government. In the strident political culture of

2

Introduction

Pakistan, a number of minor political crises are expected to emerge such as the recent brawl over the Panama Leaks, however the 2014 protests were the first major crisis after the 2013 elections that altered the political power equation and deserve to be given due consideration here. Later in the year, renewed tensions with India and subsequent terrorist attacks in India blamed on Pakistan based Jaish-e-Muhammad put Sharif ’s plan for peace with the South Asian rival in jeopardy. Furthermore, the deadly TTP attack on the Army Public School in Peshawar in December 2014 further weakened civilian authority, when both ruling and opposition political parties acceded to a military-backed National Action Plan (NAP) to combat terrorism and lifted the years-long ban on capital punishment. In January 2015, they also approved the Twenty-First Constitutional Amendment to establish military courts for trying terror suspects. Since then, the military top brass has dominated internal security, for instance, through the NAP-mandated provincial apex committees. Army Chief General Raheel Sharif remained in the media spotlight for proactive engagements at home and diplomatic tours abroad. For its part, the Sharif government has avoided confrontation with the military over India policy and Musharraf ’s trial. Its interests have increasingly converged with those of the military over internal security issues such as the operation against the TTP and the rehabilitation campaign in North Waziristan as well as the anti-corruption drive in Sindh and campaign against armed criminals in Karachi. The government has prioritized major economic developmental projects such as the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), where civil–military interests also fundamentally converge. Politics revolving around the traditional civil–military contestation for power, however, seems to show diverse trends. While the July 2015 verdict of the Judicial Commission, which found no evidence of any systematic rigging in the 2013 elections, re-energized the government,1 the August 2015 decision of the Supreme Court to allow the military courts to function empowered the military establishment.2 Subsequent events through the year 2016 also showed a mixed trend, including the political firestorm that the Panama Leaks generated in the country – with civilian and military interests competing over one issue and converging over another.3 Throughout Pakistani history, the pendulum of power has swung between prolonged military rules and unstable civilian orders. While uncertainty prevails over how current politico-military arrangements will unfold in the future, it is worth investigating whether, in the wake of apparent resurgence of the military, the familiar pattern of praetorian politics has made a comeback in the country. Or is this an over-statement, given the recent pro-democratic shifts in its political, social and economic conditions as well as external circumstances and, more importantly, instances of civil–military convergence over internal security and economic issues? In other words, is the all-too-familiar framework for analysing Pakistani politics – where the civil and the military are treated as two monoliths of a zero-sum-game waging a perpetual struggle for power – any more relevant? The issue, in essence, is about the present state and future prospect of democracy in Pakistan, which this volume seeks to address – by offering a variety of

Introduction

3

critical perspectives on the current democratic transition, its underlying sources, attributes and constraints as well as prospects of sustainability. Its key objective is to offer a nuanced understanding of the complex reality of Pakistani politics today, especially with respect to areas of conflict, competition and cooperation in civil–military relations. The authors of its 13 chapters use multidisciplinary approaches to scrutinize both the broad contours and specific features of this transition. They cover a range of relevant topics such as the history of civil–military conflict and its current orientation, the role of judiciary, urbanization and its implications, political economy of change, religious militancy and governability crisis, ethnicity and devolution of power. Before we introduce their respective perspectives, it makes sense to critically assess the available literature on democratic transition and Pakistan’s current political trajectory, what its key limitations are, and whether or why there is a need for alternative perspectives on the subject.

Perspectives on democratic transition Regime type and political change has been a topic of interest for a long time in the study of politics and sociology. In particular, transition from authoritarian regimes and democratization has been studied in a number of contexts, and various theories exist about involvement of the military in the political arena. The theories that explain military’s political role generally operate on three levels. Mainstream scholarship focuses on the institution of the military itself, which is presented as a disciplined, hierarchal and centralized organization.4 It is argued that a modern military requires efficiency, unity of command and stability, and emphasizes rational decision-making, merit and adherence to rules and regulations. This brings it into sharp contrast with the social realities of most developing countries where the political arena is generally more chaotic, operates on the basis of tradition and custom and has a propensity to produce a variety of crises potentially leading to the breakdown of authority. Consequently, the military, as the most modernized and coherent of the institutions, is able to step in, to protect and further expand its institutional and corporate interests. Another set of theories explores the structural dynamics (as opposed to institutional) of the military, arguing that it is as susceptible to the social undercurrents as any other section of society.5 The social cleavages and tensions on the basis of class, ethnicity, ideological, generational or other differences affect the worldview of the military towards politics. This view envisages military as an extension of the society that it operates in and explains its policies on the basis of its dominant constituent base and its intrinsic link with larger social conflict. Lastly, some studies6 are based on the individual level analysis and view military as a collection of distinct armed camps that owe their clientelist allegiance to a handful of officers with a variety of corporate, institutional and personal interests. This view seeks to explain the role of ambition and other personal characteristics and interests among a particular group of individuals at the helm of affairs that may see an opportunity for themselves in a disorderly political system.

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Introduction

We believe that each set of theories described above only provides a partial explanation of the complex socio-political reality of Pakistan. Hence, we have included a variety of perspectives in this book that adhere to one or a combination of these theories. It is only through a multidisciplinary and holistic approach that we can best understand the current state of politics in the country, especially with reference to civil–military relations. A great deal of empirical work has already been carried out concerning developing countries going through political transition, which paints a mixed picture. Latin America is an important region where this phenomenon has been systematically studied over time. There are many countries in this region (e.g. Brazil, Argentina and Chile) where it was possible to discredit the military coup as an acceptable path to power on an (almost) permanent basis. On the contrary, there are other countries (such as Venezuela, Ecuador and Bolivia) where new forms of populist regimes were able to block ideas of liberal representative democracy by creating direct vertical linkages between the leader and the public. There are many lessons from the South American experience for the countries making transitions from authoritarian rule in other parts of the world. Studies7 show that chances of coup are significantly higher in countries that have a history of military takeovers. This, in Putnam’s view,8 increases the “habituation” of the military to intervene. Therefore, democratic consolidation in the post-transition states remains the real challenge, far greater in magnitude than the transition itself. Second, the move from authoritarianism to consolidation of democracy seldom has a sequential (let alone linear) trajectory. In most cases, the balance of power swings like a pendulum between various players before a certain regime type takes root.9 Some of the common features, however, where it was possible to achieve democratic transition and consolidation, include emergence of a middle class and that of a vibrant civil society, improved governance leading to reduction in poverty, and consensus among political parties at the right and left of the political spectrum on the need for a welfare state capable of delivering basic services.10 A recent study11 of 18 Latin American countries shows that greater political competition significantly lowers the risk of a military coup. Authors argue that in countries where political opposition has little chance of an electoral victory (either due to genuine lack of support among voters or due to attempts by the incumbent to thwart competition through use of force, state resources or fraud) it is easier for the military to exploit political divisions leading to conspiracies potentially leading to the overthrow of the government. In contrast, robust political competition, with likelihood of more than one player achieving electoral victory, leads to less reliance on military support and thus lowers the risk of a coup. Along with the prevalence of internal factors, a number of studies also point to the external factors critical for launching and sustaining a coup. A recent study,12 for example, reports a dramatic fall in the number of successful coups since the end of the Cold War. Compared to the 245 coups from 1945 to 1991 that resulted in prolonged authoritarian regimes, most of the 56 coups since had to be followed by elections within five years. This was especially the case where

Introduction

5

the concerned country relied on the international community for foreign assistance for economic growth and development. Exogenous factors were also at play in the case of Turkey, for example, where the opportunity to potentially join the European Union provided an incentive for military to take the back stage. In other countries such as Egypt, where the international community, especially the West, was largely indifferent, the military was able to remove the elected President Mohammed Morsi during a political crisis in the aftermath of the Arab Spring. Understanding the myriad complexities of transitional polities, however, remains a work in progress and Pakistan is an important case study in this regard. This book therefore contributes to the evolving literature on democratic transition and consolidation by providing detailed accounts of various aspects of political realities in the country.

Scholarship on Pakistan Politics in Pakistan has been traditionally understood in the context of civil–military relationship, or contextualized within the narrow confines of security studies.13 Current debates on the country also focus on the binaries of military rule versus electoral democracy, with some recent works14 underscoring the military’s overt or covert dominance of the political process. The country is conceptualized as a “warrior state”,15 a “garrison state”16 or a “Praetorian state”,17 where the military-led oligarchy dominates domestic politics and shapes foreign policy. Singh and Bailey, for instance, describe Pakistan’s current transition to democracy as a continuation of what has been observed for the past few decades – oscillations between periods of electoral democracy, along with military oversight, and direct military rule, with dramatic curtailment of civil liberties. The military allows multiparty elections to determine who will staff the formal machinery of government, while reserving for itself control over key domains of power. Not only is the military not subordinate to civilian rule but also the elected government operates within circumscribed boundaries. Mechanisms, constitutional and other, exist for removing the elected government when it exceeds its authority – a judgment the military reserves for itself. In their view, Pakistan’s enduring blend of electoral democracy and military oversight presents a kind of regime worthy of its own label in accordance with its particular features. Praetorian democracy as practiced by Pakistan is not a transitional phase in democracy consolidation, but an end-state.18 Paul likewise argues that the chances for the decline of power of the security state in Pakistan are minimal, as it primarily remains “a garrison state, alternating periodically between straight military rule and hybrid democracy”. He identifies several conditions that give rise to a garrison state, including the prevalence of external or internal threats, preference for a military solution to conflict, the existence of inept political leadership as well as a small middle class

6

Introduction

and civil society.19 Shah attributes the military’s continued involvement in politics, among other things, to its self-perception as the only organization capable of defending Pakistan from the myriad threats, violent and otherwise, that it allegedly faces.20 Fair says that the Pakistani army perceives that its success depends on resistance to India’s purported drive for regional hegemony and territorial status quo. Because the army is unlikely to change this perception, she adds, Pakistan will remain a destabilizing force in world politics for the foreseeable future.21 According to Jaffrelot, one of the persisting tensions in Pakistan pertains to a form of concentration of power that the army officers and the politicians have developed over the course of time. In his view, some politicians have certainly fought for democracy, but they have never managed to dislodge from power a very well entrenched civil–military establishment and promote progressive reforms in a decisive manner – either because they were co-opted, or because they eventually turned out to be autocrats themselves.22 Like many post-colonial states, the dominance of civil and military bureaucracy in Pakistan goes back to the British era when these institutions were established along modern lines. It was also during this period that the role of the state in ordering social life increased dramatically. Police, courts, land registry and other administrative apparatus was set up to ensure order, collect revenue and govern through processes that were largely alien to pre-colonial Indian society. This sowed the seeds of establishing what Alavi23 termed as an “over-developed state” in an “under-developed society”. The imperialist connection meant that civil and military bureaucracy maintained “Sandhurst” ethos as well as the colonial patterns of patronage that had a significant effect on the politics and power configuration of the post-partitioned subcontinent. It is important to note, however, that despite inheriting the same colonial institutions, the political evolution of India and Pakistan was anything but similar. While Pakistan limped from one authoritarian regime to another, India was able to develop relative political consensus on a secular, liberal and representative democracy. Jalal24 argues that the deep-rooted permanence of military in the political sphere of Pakistan is largely due to its image as the saviour of the nation and the colonial Punjab connection. Right at the time of partition, especially after the brief war fought over Kashmir within months of independence, Pakistan’s sovereignty was linked to its ability to develop adequate defence capability to ward off India, which was perceived to be vying to swallow the nascent country. The already established imperative of national security allowed military to assume its role as the arbiter of political power, albeit with some opposition from some under-represented ethno-nationalist groups such as the Bengalis. Another aspect that legitimises the military’s historic dominance in Pakistan (and was much despised by other ethnic groups) is the Punjab connection. Punjab, which today forms the heartland of Pakistan, became an interesting case of social reengineering during British rule. The construction of the perennial irrigation canal system, one of the largest in the world, provided the state with unprecedented power to shape the social order.25 The northwest frontier of the subcontinent was

Introduction

7

considered by the colonial state as a crucial buffer meant to save the vast British Indian Empire from aggression from the west. The rank and file of the British Indian Army was therefore largely drawn from the Punjab and the Pashtun areas of the northwest frontier. The land grants in the canal colonies were effectively used by the state to buy the loyalty of this voluntary army in these areas resulting in a military-bureaucracy-landed aristocracy nexus that has persisted till today.26 These structural realities shaped Pakistan in the mould of what many consider as a National Security State and have dominated the scholarship on the country as the framework of analysis. The continued predominance of the military in the Pakistani political structure may be a reality. However, portraying the country’s persisting disequilibrium in civil–military power as being inherently unchanging, as most of the above works seem to do, is problematic. Singh and Bailey’s reference to praetorian democracy in Pakistan being an end-state27 would mean that we should forget about democracy making any progress in the future. Their structural argument gives the impression that everything in Pakistan is controlled by the military, which is not the case. Its ability to manipulate election outcomes or remove the assertive civilian regime through arbitrary constitutional provisions is now significantly constrained. While all other conditions that Paul cites for the persistence of the garrison state in Pakistan may be relevant, his reference to the “small middle class and civil society”28 as a factor in this regard is certainly not true. Likewise, Shah’s work fails to explain the dynamics of collaboration and co-optation that often define civil–military relations,29 and Fair overlooks the fact that the army does pursue its interests pragmatically – the Musharraf regime’s willingness to compromise on a traditional stance on Kashmir, and the military’s current support for Afghan reconciliation being two examples.30 Finally, Jaffrelot is right when he blames politicians for showing dictatorial tendencies (such as Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in the 1970s), or colluding with the military (like major political parties did in the 1990s). Whether the same fact is applicable today is however doubtful – especially when both the civilian and military establishments have to reshape their public conduct in politics while adapting to recent socio-economic and political transformations in the country.31 Pakistan’s third democratic transition has also been assessed in national and international media largely within the civil–military framework. Each political incident worthy of attention is perceived as a shift in the balance of power one way or another. The debate on protests against the Sharif government in the later part of 2014 and their implications for democracy is worth analysing in some detail. Most analysts viewed these protests as a battle between the military and the established civilian political parties, and a setback for democracy. The difference of opinion, however, was on what the whole episode meant for the civil– military equation and to what extent the trend of civilian surge has reversed. Perspectives varied on whether the military deliberately held back from staging a coup, or the socio-economic and political changes occurring over the last decade or so impeded its ability to do so.

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Introduction

Prior to the 2014 protests, several columnists had indeed acknowledged the emergence of new power centres in the country, blurred boundaries between various institutional domains of influence, and the resulting power struggle between them. For instance, on the eve of 2013 elections, Yusuf argued that Pakistan’s traditional power balance consisted of a “veto-wielding” military and a divided and submissive judicial and political elite. However, over the last ten years or so, a number of “profound changes have . . . thrown the field open for recalibration of the power balance”.32 When the Sharif government decided to indict General Musharraf on charges of high treason, Akhtar argued, “We need to focus less on Musharraf ’s person and think deeply about the evolving structure of power in Pakistan that has thrown up an event as momentous as Musharraf ’s indictment”.33 Ahead of the 2014 protests, Zaidi opined, The military’s hegemony has been questioned, and at times even challenged, since 2007, by institutions which have not until now, been able to do so. The judiciary, parliament and to some degree the media, have tried to assert their independence and sovereignty over the public and political domain, in effect pushing the military aside, and making elbow room at the table for themselves.34 While the transition under way is partial, tentative and reversible, one is beginning to see the power of the military in Pakistan . . . diminish as a different transition allows for alternate contenders of power. Like all transitions, this one will also be disruptive, contentious and long-winded, yet the direction may have been established.35 However, most journalistic accounts on Pakistan since the military’s resurgence post-2014 protests seem to share the pessimistic assessment available in academic publications cited before. Rizvi, for example, describes the current political order in Pakistan as a “civil–military hybrid”,36 where the military has expanded its domain of action because of the inability of the civilian leadership to command the management of internal security, especially when it comes to the eradication of terrorism and dealing with external security threats. Nawaz Sharif has therefore found it convenient to give space to the military in policymaking and policy enforcement in security, foreign affairs and internal security and administration.37 According to Haider, with the socio-political evolution on the civilian side, the military has adapted and evolved its strategy. It makes no sense to get into the driver’s seat when it can safeguard its core interests without doing so. It has gotten out of the rough patch in which Musharraf had landed it and is now once again center-stage. And its greatest advantage is that if things go wrong, it can get to blame the civilians.38

Introduction

9

The authority of the Sharif government may have weakened since the 2014 protests and those in 2016 over the Panama Leaks, and it may have consequently compromised on the Musharraf trial by letting him go abroad and by acceding to the army’s preference for tackling terrorism through using force, hanging convicted terrorists, trying terror suspects in military courts, as well as allowing the army and paramilitary commanders to operate against terrorists and armed gangs in Karachi. But to argue that this undemocratic tilt in the civil–military power equilibrium is somehow permanent is rather simplistic. It is even more problematic to consider that politics in Pakistan still revolves strictly around the civil–military binary – especially at a time when both civilian and military establishments are faced with formidable socio-economic and politico-security challenges, which require altogether new modes of behaviour on their part and have led to significant convergence in civil–military interests. Contrary to rigorous academic analyses that give due importance to the underlying causes and effects of a political phenomenon, journalistic perspectives are too often superficial, offering little in terms of why such a phenomenon occurs and what its future course could possibly be. In a country like Pakistan where military-led authoritarianism has a pretty long history, it is natural to find reporters sensationalizing a political event that could potentially undermine the civilian authority to the extent of associating it with the possibility of an impending military coup. So, during and after the 2014 protests, references to a “soft coup”39 or “creeping coup”40 have been in abundance. Moreover, the military has over time been able to cultivate significant support for itself in national media, including among leading columnists, anchors and experts. Hence, in much of the journalistic narrative, communicated especially through primetime TV talk shows and Urdu newspapers that have a mass appeal, the army leadership is portrayed as a “saviour” of the nation, and civilian leaders, especially when they are in power, are hounded for being corrupt and potentially disloyal.41 The civilian lack of capacity is cited as a rationale for the military’s assertive role in politics, that despite having elements of truth is inadequate to justify it.42 In the 1990s, it was relatively easier for the military to dominate the political scene through instruments such as the Eighth Constitutional Amendment and justifications like the security threat from India; in the post-Musharraf period, the transformed nature of politics and society has complicated its ability to dominate politics. Politics has become more eventful and displayed clear shifts in the civil–military power balance: pro-civilian till mid-2014, and pro-military since then. So leading columnists have been compelled to re-calibrate their opinions accordingly. Almeida, for instance, was quick to declare during the height of the 2014 crisis that the Sharif government’s days were “numbered”.43 Interestingly, a year before the Sharif regime came to power, he wrote, new players have arrived on the scene and the motivations and strategy of the oldest player, the army, are in flux. . . . Welcome to the new Pakistan, where power centres are diffused, outcomes less certain and no grand conspirator to make it all come together, or fall apart, at the appropriate time.44

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Media perspectives in general on the eve of the 2013 political transition were more optimistic about the prospects of democracy in the country, which is in stark contrast with the rather pessimistic analyses in the period during and after the 2014 protests. A middle ground between both positions also exists, which acknowledges the changes in institutional dynamics but refuses to underestimate the power that the military still wields to achieve its objectives. As Wolf argued on the eve of these protests, both sides, military and PM Sharif, are aware that options to stage a coup against an elected government have been significantly reduced. Therefore, for now, the military may still retain the capability to destabilize the government, but it cannot dethrone it. This does not however mean that civilian supremacy has been achieved. Far from it, it means that the civil–military power equation remains in a flux, and the relations between both can be expected to remain tense, with both civilians and the military trying to outmaneuver each other.45 According to Sareen, the Nawaz Sharif government has, at least for the time being, reconciled to playing a subservient role to the military. While it is likely to avoid any step that causes friction with the army, it will not be averse to taking advantage of any blowback of policies that the army forces on the country to claw back some of the space it had had to cede to the military.46 Such perspectives also suffer from the limitation of treating the civilian and military domains of Pakistani power structure as monoliths, thereby overlooking the possibility of a power play within each case and a blurring of the boundaries between the two.

Why revisit politics? Most of the afore-cited perspectives may be important in their own right, but they seem to ignore the myriad complexities of politics in Pakistan today, which are rooted essentially in the noticeable socio-political shifts underpinning its third democratic transition. As is clear from the preceding discussion, only a tiny segment of the media discourse offers a nuanced understanding of the subject, while the recently published academic literature on the country by and large remains fixated on outmoded frameworks of analysis. Let us take the 2014 anti-government protests as a reference point again. Most works cited above seem to take the military’s consequent resurgence in politics as evidence to argue that democracy in the country remains as fragile as before. But this line of reasoning is correct only up to a point. For these protests also simultaneously brought to the fore the newfound resilience of Pakistan’s current democratic structure.

Introduction 47

11

By staging these protests on the flimsy pretext of alleged rigging in the 2013 elections, the PTI, in league with cleric Qadri’s group, apparently sought the ouster of the Sharif regime through mass mobilization potentially paving the way for a military intervention. A perfect opportunity for this purpose arose when protestors ransacked the headquarters of the state-owned Pakistan Television, and marched towards the Prime Minister’s House. Such an episode occurring in the 1990s would have in all likelihood triggered the coup process. Yet the Army General Headquarters (GHQ)’s response to this episode remained limited to a renewed call for restraint.48 The alleged London Plan49 to use the turmoil generated by protestors as a justification for ousting the Sharif regime failed to materialize because the entire parliament, minus the PTI, stood by the government. So did the higher judiciary, lawyers’ associations and other civil society bodies. Tales of the military’s adept media handling and its nexus with protestors became rife.50 The stunning disclosure by PTI President Javed Hashmi about party leadership’s contacts with the military rendered the final blow to protestors’ desire to oust the government.51 All of this forced the military leadership to publicly pronounce its neutrality and contend with its mediating role to defuse the crisis.52 Thus, ultimately, the attempt to oust the elected government by challenging its legitimacy through allegations of rigged elections, mass mobilization, and possibly military involvement failed because the desperate ambition of bringing down an elected government through un-constitutional means was not in conformity with new dynamics of politics and structural changes that are shaping the political trajectory of Pakistan today. This demonstrated a general consensus in favour of a democratic system. In fact, what makes its third democratic transition distinct from previous eras of civilian rule is the substantially different modes of behaviour and pattern of distribution of power and resources among various political players. Unlike the 1990s, when the military was able to maintain its hegemonic control by pitting the PML-N against the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), the majority of the civilian political forces in the post-Musharraf period have shown due cooperation for limiting the military’s ability to dominate. While aspiring for the continuation of democratic order, they have acted with maturity when faced with a crisis. Since the signing of the Charter of Democracy in 2006, both the mainstream parties, the PML-N and PPP, and regional parties such as Awami National Party (ANP), Pasktunkhwa Milli Awami Party (PkMAP), Jamaat-eIslami (JI) and Jamiyat-e-Ulema-e-Islam-Fazalur Rehman (JUI-F ) have stood together to keep the democratic process on track. They have forged an incredible bipartisan consensus to make substantial changes in the structure of the Federation under the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment, giving more powers to the provinces and restoring parliamentary supremacy. Any reversal of this process is unacceptable to most political players in the country. No surprise that even Mehmood Khan Achakzai, the leader of PkMAP, a Pashtun party from the minority province of Balochistan that has long distrusted the Punjabi-dominated federal state, went so far as to issue a stern warning during

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the 2014 protests that any attempt to dislodge the elected government could lead to disintegration of the federation.53 Furthermore, most political parties have had bitter experiences in the past, when the army pitched them against each other to maintain its hegemony over politics. They have therefore matured enough to avoid falling for short-term gains by destabilizing an elected government. There is unanimity between both left leaning parties such as the ANP and PPP and the right wing parties like the JUI-F and JI for keeping the military out of overt politics.54 This is a significant development because from the time of the military rule of General Ziaul Haq, the right wing had traditionally allied with the Army. The infamous MullahMilitary alliance has faced recurrent tensions since Pakistan joined the US-led War on Terror in Afghanistan.55 As for the PTI, it does represent simmering discontent in certain sections of society, however its alleged nexus with the military (if true) can only be tactical rather than strategic. The PTI may have succumbed to the need for the military’s support to dismiss the government, however it is unlikely to support another military regime. For the military, the PTI may serve the role of a political destabilizer to keep the elected government under pressure. Beyond this, it is difficult to imagine that the army leadership has enough trust in Imran Khan, who is seen as a highly ambitious politician least expected to accept a subservient position once in power. In contrast, Nawaz Sharif seemed to have learnt from his previous experience, and preferred to pursue a policy of accommodation rather than confrontation with the military leadership.56 A more plausible outcome of the post-Musharraf democratic transition is the better negotiated and mutually agreed civil–military domain of influence, where the military retains its corporate interests and budgetary allocations, but concedes overt rule over the country to the civilians. It is therefore important that Pakistan’s complex reality today is understood beyond the traditional binary of civil–military contestation. On many of the issues facing the country, the concerns of the civilian government and military establishment have also converged at times. They have a shared interest, for instance, in re-establishing the writ of the state in tribal areas controlled by the Taliban or parts of Karachi where criminal gangs run amok. The military is also socially transformed, with greater middle class representation in officer cadre and diversity of views on political and policy matters. Its institutional priorities are quite pragmatic in a changed global environment. Just like the rest of society, divisions along ideological and ethnic lines have also been visible in military circles since the Musharraf era.57 The surge of an urbanized middle class and politically active youth constitutes an important social determinant of the shifting political trends, and all political parties are left with no other choice but to cope with these changes. As the results of the 2013 elections indicate, political parties have to duly perform while governing and cannot expect to win the next round of elections merely by playing politics of patronage.58 They have to co-opt a highly politicized middle class, especially its youth component. The assertive higher judiciary, civil society and mass media have not only held civilian rulers accountable for

Introduction

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mismanaging governance and corrupt practices, but also placed new checks on the military’s ability to manoeuvre the political system. It is no surprise that the military courts, after having been established in January 2015, were not able to execute their punishments for several months, as the Twenty-First Constitutional Amendment remained in dispute at the Supreme Court.59 The new civilian forces have created a niche for themselves in the political structure. Rather than surrendering the captured political space, they may constitute an effective hedge against future military takeover and become an even greater source of accountability for the civilian rulers.60 Domestic security and economic compulsions as well as regional and global constraints have also impacted the dynamics of domestic politics in Pakistan. Given the deep nexus between domestic politics and foreign policy, what happens internally will decide how the country behaves externally. India remains a major factor in the military’s threat perception, as major sources of tension like the unresolved Kashmir dispute, rivalry in Afghanistan and counter-terrorism issues remain intact. Given that, change in the security aspect of this core foreign relationship will take time to trump persistence. As for its economic dimension in bilateral and regional contexts, civil–military interests have already somewhat converged. Still foreign policy and internal security will remain contested domains, and tensions can boil over due to disagreements. In view of the above analysis, future politics in Pakistan will most likely oscillate between instances of relative assertion of the military over the civilians, and vice versa. However, as political power further diffuses amid persisting challenges to national survival, we can reasonably expect the future state of civil–military relations to be less prone to outright conflict and more amenable to pragmatic competition and meaningful cooperation.

The debate This edited volume attempts to present a fresh and nuanced understanding of the murky world of Pakistani power politics today, as evident from the discussion above. It brings together a variety of intellectually rich and largely indigenous perspectives on Pakistan’s third democratic transition, its key determinants as well as future prospects and policy implications. The contributors of its 13 chapters offer contending views on a host of crucial issues underpinning Pakistan’s third democratic transition, including the growth of the middle class and its consequential significance for democratization, the relative erosion or expansion of political space for the military, and the scope for civil–military conflict, competition and cooperation during the present transition. In this volume, we have attempted to take the debate on Pakistan beyond the fixed notions of praetorian politics and security state. The country has indeed experienced some crucial social, political and economic shifts in the past decade or so, which may determine the future course of its politics in ways that are starkly different from before in terms of perpetual military domination of the civilian sphere. Given these shifts, is it rational to continue assessing Pakistani

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politics within the strict parameter of a civil–military binary relationship – perceiving the civil and the military as two monoliths trying to undermine each other? Or is it also equally crucial to understand the peculiar dynamics within the structural domains of the civil and the military, and explore the processes of cooperation, competition and conflict between them? Our contributors provide different answers to these questions, while identifying some factors that have traditionally stymied the growth of democracy in Pakistan and others that have more recently enabled the country to defy this historical pattern. A brief preview of each chapter follows. In Chapter 1, Ishtiaq Ahmad considers the current phase of democratic rule in Pakistan, which formally began with the 2008 elections, as having shown a somewhat different trajectory to the politics-as-usual of the past. The military still calls the shots in core areas of internal security and foreign policy, but has not openly subverted the democratic process. Its traditional domination of political structure and policy apparatus has also been challenged by a number of increasingly assertive civilian political actors. Moreover, politics of the country is no more a zero-sum-game between the civilian government and the military establishment, as the gravity of internal and external challenges has led to growing civil–military convergence over security, economic and foreign policy issues. In his view, Pakistan’s post-Musharraf political reality has evolved enough to justify revisiting its complex nature and dynamics. For how the process of political change proceeds in future will determine what shape its fragile democracy takes and how the country conducts itself in the region. In Chapter 2, Maya Tudor pinpoints three structural impediments that have stymied the sustenance of democratic order in Pakistan in previous decades, including the absence of programmatic and internally democratic political parties in the country, the coupling of religion with the state, and the hostility towards India as the basis of the military’s hegemony over power. According to her, these key sources of civil–military power disequilibrium remain in place, despite Pakistan’s current transition to civilian rule being facilitated by the emergence of a sizable middle class, an independent judiciary and an assertive media. The continuing security quagmire and economic crisis additionally constrain the prospect of civilian assertion. Unless the political parties overcome their relative weakness, the state disassociates itself from Islamic identity, and relations with India become cooperative, Pakistan’s democratic system will remain fragile as ever. In Chapter 3, Ayesha Siddiqa opines that the lack of direct intervention by the army in politics should not be assumed as an indicator of democratic consolidation in the post-Musharraf period. For while the military’s corporate interests may not necessarily require overt political interference, its established linkages with various civilian stakeholders and continued dominance over the national narrative are enough to ensure the protection of its core institutional interests in Pakistan. In her view, in the persisting hybrid-military rule in Pakistan, the military maintains control through constitutional-legal arrangements and

Introduction

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building multiple partnerships in the civil society and the polity. The newer groups or individuals have maintained their links with various units of the armed forces. This is a two-way relationship because while the military shares and protects their interests, the latter protect the military’s interests and ensure that a metamorphosis in politics does not take place. In Chapter 4, Adnan Rafiq questions the widely held view about the praetorian nature of Pakistani politics, and considers political contestation in the country as a three-way struggle for power between the military, feudal-industrial civilian elite and the newly emerging middle class. In his view, the emergence of new power centres such as a proactive media, an assertive judiciary, a vibrant civil society and the rise of a third political force, the PTI, have considerably altered the power equation between various political players. Social transformations such as rampant urbanization, the youth bulge and technological shift have produced a middle class that has been able to break free from the traditional social structures, thereby giving rise to new forms of identities and a quest for new lifestyles. Consequently, the political landscape of the country is being increasingly shaped by the urban, educated middle-class youth, which desires increased political power, social recognition, and is more demanding of the state to respond to its needs and aspirations. In Chapter 5, Rasul Bakhsh Rais focuses on the emergence of new social forces and consequent civil society activism in Pakistan, amid the enduring crisis of civil–military relations. He argues that institutional structures of democracy – constitution, elections, political parties and parliament – are necessary but not enough for sustaining democracy in the country, given the long history of military intervention. Therefore, a credible shift towards participatory politics will depend on both the political behaviour of dominant elites and the social context within which they operate, and whether or not the power contestants use democratic means and the social forces consider them as the only legitimate means to power. In his view, civil society has supported democratic rule in the past decade, and hence its continued defence of independence of media, judiciary, rule of law, and demand for accountability of public office holders will strengthen democratic institutions and practices. In Chapter 6, Mohammad Waseem considers Islamic militancy and hegemonic military as primary sources of the acute crisis governance in Pakistan, where two dichotomous trends are currently visible: On the one hand, structural dynamics of the post-military state are characterized by smooth transition from one democratically elected regime to another, four provincial governments being led by different political parties, assertive judiciary and media, and intense mobilization of various social and political groups. On the other, the graph of operational dynamics of governance has grossly fallen due to the lack of will or capacity of the state establishment to eliminate Islamic terrorism and simmering tension in civil–military relations. However, with the writ of the state increasingly vanishing and its ability to provide even basic services to the populace deteriorating, there is a real danger that a significant section of society will look for yet another “saviour”.

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In Chapter 7, Saeed Shafqat assesses the unresolved tension in Pakistan between a pluralist society and a monist state since independence. In the author’s view, the pluralist foundations of society have been consistently undermined by the security imperatives of the state, which are justified through promoting a regressive national narrative rooted in the portrayal of Islamic ideology as the basis of Pakistani nationhood. This has created a constant schism between state-building and nation-building processes. While assessing successive state education policies, the study argues that democracy in the country cannot flourish unless the ideologically grounded state-building process is done away with. It considers the revolutionary political changes brought about by the Eighteenth Amendment to the 1973 Constitution as potentially conducive for promoting civic education and pluralist society as building blocks of liberal democracy in Pakistan. In Chapter 8, Imtiaz Gul underlines one distinctive expression of the diffusion of power in Pakistan i.e. the emergence of an independent judiciary. In his opinion, the defiance shown by the higher judiciary and the lawyers’ community under the populist leadership of former Supreme Court Chief Justice Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry was a defining moment in Pakistani politics, leading to the ouster of General Musharraf and the return of parliamentary democracy in the country. Since then, judicial activism has helped shift the balance of power in support of the rule of law – at least at the level of the senior judiciary. Although Pakistan has yet to go a long way in establishing a people-focused justice dispensation, judicial intervention is putting new checks on the traditional power structures and creating greater resonance for the rule of law in the country. It has instilled fear not only among politicians and civil bureaucrats but also put the military on the defensive, diluting some of its authority and overindulgence in politics. In Chapter 9, Mosharraf Zaidi points towards the ‘youth bulge’ to opine that the extent to which young people are educated and the quality of education they receive will be critical to Pakistan’s democratic future. Since the demographic transition happens to be timed alongside the country’s democratic transition, the intimacy of their interplay, both real and perceived, is inevitable. The current situation is, however, quite alarming, since Pakistan is headed in a direction that will produce multiple generations of illiterate, unlettered and unfulfilled citizens. Frequent allusions to democratic transition and demographic dividend are therefore out of synch with the reality both the state and society are invested in, and actively working towards. There is little to no indication that a major transformational change is on the cards, despite a significant change in some aspects of education. In Chapter 10, Rafiullah Kakar takes on the ethnic question in Balochistan and assesses the prospects of its resolution in the wake of the Eighteenth Amendment to the 1973 Constitution and the coming into power of an alliance of Baloch and Pashtun nationalist parties in the 2013 general elections. He argues that the Eighteenth Amendment has created the necessary but not sufficient conditions for resolving the Balochistan conflict. By eliminating the constitutional barriers that have long impeded a political solution, the amendment has created

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17

an environment in which genuine political reconciliation can be tried. However, these conditions are not enough to achieve a durable settlement. This is because the primary driver of the Balochistan conflict – the use of force – persists and has not been affected by the Eighteenth Amendment. In Chapter 11, Rashid Amjad argues that relatively poorer economic performance of civilian regimes is one instrument that the military has often used in the past to dictate or intervene in politics. Given that, how well the present civilian dispensation performs in reviving the economy will have important implications for the future sustainability of democracy in the country. In his view, the Sharif government has indeed taken some meaningful reforms to boost revenue, investment and exports, and create a business-friendly environment. There are favourable factors such as the inherent economic resilience of the country, the potential improvement in its security situation, and the smooth implementation of regional economic initiatives like the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, which could lead to an economic turnaround and put to rest the controversy that only military regimes are capable of delivering high economic growth. In Chapter 12, Hussain Nadim cites internal security and economic problems, external threat perceptions, the changing nature of warfare and global power dynamics as critical factors that have led to growing convergence of civil–military interests in Pakistan. In his opinion, the military is willing to live with democracy while considering economy as a key source of national stability, and considers physical meddling in Afghanistan as counter-productive for national security. The PML-N has also come of age. Nawaz Sharif is mature enough to avoid unnecessary confrontation with the military, and his government has prioritized economic development and clean governance as a means to keep the army top brass on board and sustain public support for future political gains. Hence, a crackdown against violent sectarian and political outfits in Karachi, operation against militant safe havens in North Waziristan, and, at the same time, landmark deals with China as well as a visible change of course on other foreign policy fronts are all part of the new framework of civil–military cooperation that is shaping Pakistan’s future. In Chapter 13, Hannes Ebert contends that great power politics has played a pivotal role in shaping Pakistan’s persistent contestation towards India by providing the military with opportunities to consolidate its power to the detriment of civilian forces. Accordingly, successive periods of its foreign policy since independence manifest different types and degrees of great power involvement, of the United States and China in particular. In the wake of the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan and the loss of its frontline state status, Pakistan has sought to consolidate strategic relations with China. It does not appear to be reconsidering its balancing act, but has rather engaged in hedging its allies. It is most likely, therefore, that the constants of Pakistan’s foreign policy will persist in future, limiting the political scope of post-Musharraf transition to civilian supremacy in the country. The contributors of this book include a number of experienced as well as emerging scholars on Pakistan with varying preferences in terms of research

18

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methodology. It therefore uses mixed methods research to explore the issues related to democratic transition in Pakistan. The research methods used range from interviews to analysis of secondary quantitative data. The interpretive nature of various contributions is evident from the fact that they at times differ in their explanation of social phenomena to a contradictory level. Some authors bring valuable experience of working with various relevant stakeholders such as the government, international organizations, civil society and others, and have shared their personal observations and experiences. The emphasis has been to allow flexibility in terms of using preferred methods of collecting and analysing data by various contributors to ensure that triangulation is achieved and multiple perspectives are presented on the basis of different sets of data or different interpretations of these. This adds to the academic strength and versatility of the book and enhances its neutrality as an effort to objectively and honestly understand the complex political realities in Pakistan. It is obvious from the above chapter summaries that the scholarly debate on Pakistan’s third democratic transition remains diverse at best. Some of our contributors share the pessimistic opinion expressed in the published works cited before, by arguing that the status quo ante, i.e. the military’s domination of politics and foreign policy, will most likely persist in Pakistan. Others envision an optimistic scenario while referring to the growing social impulse for democracy in the country. However, most contributors acknowledge that Pakistan is indeed undergoing major social, political and economic transformations. Where their opinions seem to diverge is over the scope and outcome of these transformations. There are opposing views, for instance, about the recent growth of the middle class and its consequential significance for democratization, the relative erosion or expansion of political space for the military, and the scope of civil–military conflict, competition and cooperation during the present transition. Diverse scholarly narratives in the book acknowledge the gravity of terrorism, the energy crisis, ethno-sectarian issues, and the threat posed by non-state actors who have increasingly occupied the space where writ of the state is weak. They recognize how the urgency of managing grave security, economic and foreign policy challenges has led to growing convergence in civil–military interests. While some contributors broadly deal with the subject of political change, others delve into specific issues of extremism, ethnicity, economy, rule of law, and the role of the judiciary, media and education. Together, they provide an exciting new paradigm to understand varied social and political trends underpinning the current democratic era and assess their potential outcomes for internal politics and external relations. What emerges as a result is a holistic picture of Pakistani politics, where the drivers of change seem to be as powerful as the forces of persistence. This is contrary to the rather limited focus of existing scholarship on civil–military conflict, and issues of security, terrorism and geopolitics in Pakistan. The authors of these 13 chapters identify a host of serious challenges facing the growth of democracy in Pakistan at present, including civil–military power disequilibrium, lack of civilian capacity for governance, unabated

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19

religious-sectarian violence, pending ethnic grievances, the relatively slow pace of economic recovery, and uncertainty concerning regional relationships, particularly with India. They also pinpoint factors that may over time help the country overcome these challenges, and, as well, do not overlook the deep nexus between domestic politics and foreign policy, linking the progress in democracy at home with the prospects for peace in the region. We hope the dispassionate appraisal of these intersecting themes will help clarify the rather hazy and intricate picture of politics in Pakistan, and provide a comprehensive snapshot of its present predicament and future possibilities. Our role as editors is to let these multiple scholarly standpoints find their fullest expression in one major publication on Pakistan.

Notes 1 The three-member Judicial Commission stated that, despite some lapses on the part of the Election Commission of Pakistan, ‘the 2013 general elections were in large part organized and conducted fairly and in accordance with the law’. See Abdul Manan and Hasnaat Malik, ‘Inquiry commission’s report endorses PML-N’s mandate: PM Sharif ’, The Express Tribune, 23 July 2015. 2 ‘Pakistan empowers military courts to pass death sentences on civilians’, Reuters, 5 August 2015. 3 Hasan Askari Rizvi, ‘The Panama leaks and Pakistani politics’, The Express Tribune, 1 May 2016. 4 See, for example, John J. Johnson, The Role of the Military in the Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1962). 5 See, for instance, Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). 6 See, for instance, Donald Horowitz, Coup Theories and Officers’ Motives: Sri Lanka in Comparative Perspective (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). 7 See, for instance, J. Londregan and K. Poole, ‘Poverty, the Coup Trap, and the Seizure of Executive Power’, World Politics, 42, (1990), pp. 151–183; and Adam Przeworski, ‘Democracy and Economic Development’, in E. Mansfield and R. Sisson, eds, Political Science and the Public Interest (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2001). 8 Robert Putnam, ‘Towards explaining military intervention in Latin American politics’, World Politics, Volume 20, Issue 1 (1967), pp. 83–110. 9 Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe Schmitter, Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative conclusions about Uncertain Democracies (New Jersey: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2013). 10 D. Acemoglu and J. Robinson, Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 11 Fabrice Lehoucq and Anibal Perez-Linan, ‘Breaking Out of the Coup Trap: Political Competition and Military Coups in Latin America’, Comparative Political Studies, 20 (2013), pp. 1–25. 12 Nikolay Marinov and Hein Goemans, ‘Coups and Democracy’, British Journal of Political Science, 44 (2014), pp. 799–825. 13 See, for instance, Ahmed Rashid, Pakistan on the Brink: The Future of Pakistan, Afghanistan and the West (New York: Penguin, 2013); Khaled Ahmed, Pakistan: The State in Crisis (Lahore: Vanguard Books, 2012); and Hasan Nawaz Gardezi, Pakistan, the Roots of Dictatorship: The Political Economy of a Praetorian State (London: Zed Press, 1983).

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14 See Aqil Shah, The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014); C. Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Bruce Riedel, Avoiding Armageddon: America, India and Pakistan to the Brink and Back (Washington: Brookings Institution Press, 2013); and Husain Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding (New York: Public Affairs, 2013). 15 T.V. Paul, The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 16 Ishtiaq Ahmed, The Pakistan Garrison State: Origins, Evolutions, Consequences, 1947–2011 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2013). 17 Hasan Askari-Rizvi, ‘Pakistan: civil–military relations in a praetorian state’, in R.J. May and Viberto Selochan (eds), The Military and Democracy in Asia and the Pacific (Canberra: Australian National University Press, 2004). 18 Chaitram Singh and Michael Bailey, ‘Praetorian democracy, illiberal but enduring: Pakistan as exemplar’, Southeast Review of Asian Studies 35 (2013), pp. 103, 124–25. 19 T.V. Paul, The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 20 Aqil Shah, The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014). 21 C. Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 22 Christophe Jaffrelot, The Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience (London: C. Hurst & Co Publishers, 2015). 23 Hamza Alavi, ‘The State in Post-Colonial Societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh’, New Left Review, Volume 74, Issue 1 (1972), pp. 59–81. 24 Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: the origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). 25 I. Habib, Essays in Indian History (New Delhi: Manohar, 1995). 26 S. Akbar Zaidi, Issues in Pakistan’s Economy (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005). 27 Chaitram Singh and Michael Bailey, ‘Praetorian democracy, illiberal but enduring: Pakistan as exemplar’, Southeast Review of Asian Studies 35 (2013), pp. 103, 124–25. 28 T.V. Paul, The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 29 Hassan Javaid, ‘Cover Story: The army and democracy: military politics in Pakistan’, Dawn, 23 November 2014. 30 Moreover, Fair’s critique of the military’s role in Pakistanis is as much premised on regional priorities of an external power i.e. the United States, as is the case with Riedel’s Avoiding Armageddon, Haqqani’s Magnificent Delusions and Ahmed Rashid’s Pakistan on the Brink (see notes 13 and 14). 31 The edited volume by Maleeha Lodhi does acknowledge these socio-economic changes, but then it fails to appreciate the corresponding shifts in politics. However, like Anatol Lieven’s Pakistan: A Hard Country, it points towards the inherent resilience of Pakistani society as a key factor in defying doomsday scenarios being sketched by most of the recently published Western-origin studies on Pakistan, such as those by Fair, Riedel and Haqqani (note 14). For details, see Maleeha Lodhi, ed., Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis State (London: Hurst and Co., 2011); Anatol Lieven, Pakistan: A Hard Country (London: Allen Lane, 2011). 32 Moeed Yusuf, ‘Beyond a game of chess’, Dawn, 12 February 2012. 33 Asim Sajjad Akhtar, ‘Ruling Pakistan’, Dawn, 4 April 2014. 34 S. Akbar Zaidi, ‘Military’s continued interference’, Dawn, 5 April 2014. 35 S Akbar Zaidi, ‘Military’s waning power’, Dawn, 3 May 2014. 36 Hasan-Askari Rizvi, ‘The civil-military hybrid’, The Express Tribune, 23 February 2015.

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37 Hasan-Askari Rizvi, ‘Democracy and performance’, The Express Tribune, 28 June 2015. 38 Ejaz Haider, ‘Military primacy 2.0’, Newsweek Pakistan, 22 June 2015. 39 Ishaan Tharoor, ‘Did a soft coup just happen in Pakistan?’ Washington Post, 29 August 2014. 40 Mehreen Zahra-Malik, ‘Pakistan military move on Karachi seen part of a creeping coup’, Reuters, 27 April 2015. 41 For details, see Huma Yusuf, ‘One-sided picture’, Dawn, 24 November 2014. Also see Huma Yusuf and Emrys Schoemaker, The Media of Pakistan: Fostering Inclusion in a Fragile Democracy, Policy Briefing No. 9 (London: BBC Media Action, September 2013). Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/pdf/bbc_media_ action_pakistan_policy_briefing.pdf (accessed 9 July 2015). 42 Western authors such as Anatol Lieven have also advanced a similar thesis by considering the army as the primary ‘force of stability’ in Pakistan, because ‘the state is weak’. See Lieven, Pakistan: A Hard Country (London: Allen Lane, 2011). 43 Cyril Almeida, ‘A rare certainty in Pakistani politics – Nawaz Sharif is doomed’, Dawn, 2 September 2014. 44 Cyril Almeida, ‘Searching for answers’, Dawn, 12 February 2012. 45 Siegfried O. Wolf, ‘Pakistan: Ending the Semblance of Civil-Military Cordiality?’ International Security Observer, 13 November 2014. 46 Sushant Sareen, Pakistan in 2015, IPCS Special Report # 170 (New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, January 2015), p. 3. 47 It was flimsy because most national and international election observers did not find any evidence pointing to systematic rigging of the elections conducted by a caretaker regime. On the whole, the 2013 elections were considered as free and fair. The July 2015 verdict of the Judicial Commission establishes this fact. For the perspective of international election observers, see Zafar Aslam, ‘Final report: EU observers satisfied with May 11 elections’, The Express Tribune, 11 July 2013; ‘US considers 2013 Pakistan elections free and fair’, The Economic Times, 4 September 2014. 48 Mahreen Zahra-Malik, ‘Pakistan army chief “overruled generals calling for coup” ’, Reuters, 5 September 2014. 49 See Ansar Abbasi, ‘Two ex-ISI chiefs pushed anti-govt London plan of sit.in: defense minister’, The News International, 13 July 2015. 50 Neha Ansari, ‘Not fit to print: an insider account of Pakistani censorship’, Foreign Policy, 20 November 2014. 51 Hashmi disclosed that Imran Khan had been telling key confidants in the party (including him) that the Army was with them, and that it would support the ouster of the government and hold fresh elections. He further claimed that party leaders had decided not to march towards PM House and parliament, but Khan over ruled out this decision after receiving a message from an unknown source, implying the incumbent or former chief of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). See Dean Nelson and Javed Siddiq, ‘Imran Khan “plotted with army to overthrow Nawaz Sharif, colleague claims” ’, Independent, 1 September 2013. 52 Mahreen Zahra-Malik, ‘Political crisis puts army back in the driving seat’, Reuters, 21 August 2014. 53 ‘Politicians resolve to defend constitution’, The News International, 23 August 2014. 54 ‘Politicians resolve to defend constitution’, The News International, 23 August 2014. 55 See Jayshree Bajoria, Islam and Politics in Pakistan (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 5 May 2011). Available at: www.cfr.org/pakistan/islam-politicspakistan/p24728 (accessed 7 July 2016). 56 Hasan-Askari Rizvi, ‘Democracy and performance’, The Express Tribune, 28 June 2015.

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57 For details, see Shuja Nawaz, ‘Army and politics’, in M. Lodhi (ed.), Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis State, pp. 79–94 (London: Hurst and Co., 2011); and Stephen Cohen, Shooting for a Century: The India–Pakistan Conundrum (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2013). 58 Abdul Basit, Pakistan’s 2013 Elections: A Milestone, But Fragile Democracy (Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies, 4 April 2013). 59 Hasnaat Malik, ‘Military courts: SC reserves judgment on constitutional amendments’, The Express Tribune, 26 June 2015. 60 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan 2020: A Vision for Building a Better Future (Washington, DC: Institute for Social Policy and Understanding, 17 May 2011).

1

Pakistan’s third democratic transition Ishtiaq Ahmad

Pakistan has been ruled for most of its history directly by the military. Even during brief periods when the country returned to democratic rule – for instance, during 1971–1977 and 1988–1999 – the military persistently interfered in politics, eventually staging the coups of 1977 and 1999. However, the current phase of democratic rule in Pakistan, which formally began with the 2008 elections, has shown a somewhat different trajectory to the politics-as-usual of the past. The military still calls the shots in core areas of internal security and foreign policy, but has not openly subverted the democratic process. Its traditional domination of political structure and policy apparatus has also been challenged by a number of increasingly assertive civilian political actors. Moreover, politics of the country is no more a zero-sum-game between the civilian government and the military establishment, as the gravity of internal and external challenges has led to growing civil–military convergence over security, economic and foreign policy issues. Pakistan’s post-Musharraf political reality has evolved enough to justify revisiting its complex nature and dynamics. For how the process of political change proceeds in the future will determine what shape its fragile democracy takes and how the country conducts itself in the region. This chapter begins by placing Pakistan’s praetorian politics in a historical perspective. It then underlines major drivers of change and sources of persistence in its politics during and after the Musharraf era. Subsequent discussion explores the key areas of convergence and divergence in the civil–military relationship at present, as well as the nexus between the democratic process and regional peace, especially with reference to Pakistan’s India policy.

Historical context Pakistan emerged out of British India in 1947 as a significantly weak country – divided into two wings, eastern and western, separated by 1,000 miles. As compared to the Indian National Congress, the Muslim League, its founding party, did not have a strong political base. Therefore, feudal and civil–military bureaucratic political elites initially dominated the power structure. The war with India over Kashmir soon after Partition enabled the military to dictate national security and defence affairs right at the start. It was able to capture power in 1958, after a

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tumultuous first decade that witnessed recurrent political crises, including the death of the founding father Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the assassination of first Prime Minister Liaqat Ali Khan, and constant politico-bureaucratic squabbling that produced six more prime ministers.1 The first military rule of General Ayub Khan eventually paved the way for the first-ever general elections in 1970, which were followed by the break-up of the country within a year. Since then, Pakistan has seen two prolonged military or quasi-military regimes (General Ziaul Haq, 1977–1988; General Pervez Musharraf, 1999–2008) and reverted to civilian rule thrice (1971–1977, 1988–1999, and 2008–present). The previous two civilian transitions ended with the coups of 1977 and 1999, with one elected prime minister being hanged and the other forced into exile. Throughout the 1990s, despite four elections and an ostensibly civilian set-up represented by an executive and a legislature, the military was able to pull the strings from behind the scenes and pull the plug whenever required. Consequently, four consecutive governments were unable to complete their five-year constitutional tenure, with each lasting between 18 and 30 months. The Eighth Amendment to the 1973 Constitution, especially its Article 58–2(b), a legacy of the Zia era that empowered the indirectly elected president to arbitrarily dismiss the elected government, was the key instrument that enabled the military to dominate politics during this period.2 Beyond these structural constraints, the civilian political elites also suffered due to their reliance on patronage-based politics, lack of governing capacity, inherent inefficiency and corruption in the public sector. They also failed to capitalize on the opportunity for democratic assertion in the 1990s, provided by the erosion of US strategic interests in the Pakistan–Afghanistan region following the end of the Cold War. During this period, not only did the US assistance (that peaked during the Zia regime) stop, but Washington also placed additional restrictions on Pakistan under the Pressler Amendment. It must be noted here that the US has played a major role in scuttling democracy in Pakistan by supporting its successive military regimes and using them as pawns in securing its strategic interests in the region. The 1990s therefore turned out to be a decade of ‘zero growth’, and the civilian governments had to bear the brunt of a faltering national economy. The situation was further compounded when the two mainstream parties, the PPP and PML-N, willingly chose to play the politics of confrontation, thereby directly playing into the military’s hands.3 However, in March 1997, soon after the landslide electoral victory of Sharif, the two mainstream parties displayed unprecedented parliamentary consensus to remove the notorious Article 58–2(b) from the Constitution. Without this article in the Constitution, the military was unable to remove the elected rulers through a pliable president. A subsequent confrontation between Prime Minister Sharif and the Supreme Court, which had until then mostly endorsed the military takeovers under the ‘doctrine of necessity’, also failed to topple the government. The final showdown between the Sharif regime and the military establishment was to occur over India policy. The military was able to control politics and foreign policy by sustaining the fear of security threat from India among people, and

Pakistan’s third democratic transition 25 portraying itself as the sole saviour of the nation against this ‘existential’ danger. Thus, during the post-Zia democratic transition, any civilian leader attempting to make peace with India was instantly branded as a “national security risk”. In February 1999, Sharif was bold enough to invite Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to Lahore, where the two leaders signed a historic peace accord. This triggered the military’s response in the form of the Kargil conflict with India, and the ensuing civil–military tension eventually ended with the October 1999 military coup by General Musharraf.4 General Musharraf ’s tactics to monopolize political power were no different from his two military predecessors, Generals Ayub and Zia: Introducing a nonparty based local bodies system, which enabled the military regime to claim political legitimacy in the name of ‘grass-root’ democracy and simultaneously marginalize mainstream political parties in the opposition; playing ‘divide and rule’ tactics aimed at pitching political parties against each other; and manipulating the Constitution by introducing anti-democratic provisions. The examples of the use of former tactics include General Ayub’s 1962 Constitution that for the first time introduced the local bodies system of Basic Democracies, and General Zia’s 1985 Revival of the Constitution of 1973 Order that for the first time incorporated Article 58–2 (b).5 The seeds of future political instability were thus sown during the military rule, and the civilian regimes that came to power during successive periods of democratic transition had to spend much of their time and effort in reversing the undemocratic legacies of the previous military era. The worsening of the ethnic question during the Ayub era led to the establishment of Bangladesh as well as the intensification of Pashtun and Balochi separatist movements in the remainder of Pakistan, which the Bhutto regime had to crush by force. Ethnic fissures in urban Sindh, particularly Karachi, pitted Mohajirs against other ethnic groups during Zia’s regime and added to sharpened sectarian divisions. The task of managing the consequent ethnic and sectarian violence was left to PPP and PML-N governments in the subsequent decade. During each of the two civilian phases, the military could always rely on a section of the politico-religious establishment to destabilize elected regimes during this phase – as was the case with the Pakistan National Alliance movement against Pakistan’s first elected government of Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in the 1970s, or the mode of confrontational politics that prevailed during much of the 1990s, including recurrent instances of the use of ‘street power’ through long marches by PPP, PML-N and Jamaat-e-Islami.6 The Musharraf era was no different in this respect, as it reintroduced the nonparty based local bodies system, helped create the Pakistan Muslim LeagueQuaid (PML-Q) and openly favoured the MQM, the representative party of the Urdu-speaking Mohajir people in urban Sindh, especially Karachi. On the other hand, General Musharraf used heavy-handed tactics in dealing with the ethnically aggrieved people of Balochistan – the 2006 assassination of Balochi leader Akbar Khan Bugti being its highlight and, in fact, a turning point in the province’s ethnic strife in subsequent years. Moreover, through the 2002 Legal

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Framework Order, the Musharraf government reintroduced the arbitrary provision of the Eighth Amendment in the 1973 Constitution. Despite this, the third period of democratic transition since Musharraf ’s demise has had a markedly different political profile than the previous two civilian spells.7

Drivers of change In many ways, the policies pursued by the Musharraf government appear to have created the very conditions that limit the military’s ability to use traditional justifications and instruments to control politics. Combined with visible shifts in Pakistan’s domestic realities and external conditions during the period, they have presented new opportunities for the mainstream national and regional political parties to get their acts together for sustaining the process of democratization, even if the odds against this are still quite heavy. First, the Musharraf regime defied the pattern of civil–military ties that prevailed for several years during the post-Zia period, whereby the military would support the opposition party to destabilize the ruling party and eventually justify dismissal of the elected government through pliable presidents. It instead chose to victimize the leaderships of both the mainstream political parties, by first trying Nawaz Sharif on charges of treason and then forcing him into exile in Saudi Arabia, and simultaneously keeping Benazir Bhutto out of the country. In this way he reinforced the natural alliance between the two key civilian leaders who had served the country twice as prime ministers and already shown a rare consensus in doing away with a major constitutional aberration back in 1997. This alliance among a majority of the country’s political parties, reflected in a broad political consensus to prevent the democratic process from being disrupted again by exigencies of the military and its political stooges, has emerged as a major feature of the current democratic transition. Since the signing of the Charter of Democracy in 2006, the PML-N, PPP and other political parties have stood together to keep the democratic process on track.8 In 2010, they forged an incredible bipartisan consensus to make substantial changes in the structure of the federation under the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment, giving more powers to the provinces and restoring parliamentary supremacy.9 The process of devolution itself constitutes an important barrier to the interventionist streak of a centralized state system – a trend that will over time strengthen, as the process of implementing this amendment completes its course. Second, even though General Musharraf was directly responsible for triggering the 1999 Kargil conflict with India, and a major military standoff occurred during his tenure in 2001–2002, he publicly pronounced his willingness to compromise Pakistan’s traditional stand on Kashmir settlement through UN resolutions for the sake of peace with India. In 2002, largely under US pressure, he declared that no organization would be allowed to use Pakistani soil for carrying out armed action in Indian-administered Kashmir.10 In this way the army chief himself limited the military’s potential ability to use the all-too-familiar theme of hostility with ‘belligerent’ India or the dispute over Kashmir as an ‘unfinished

Pakistan’s third democratic transition 27 chapter’ of Partition as a justification for domestic political control. In any case, India or Kashmir had stopped being a major issue in the election campaigns since the February 1997 election, which the PML-N leadership won with a promise to normalize relations with India. Again in the 2002 elections held under the Musharraf regime, neither India nor Kashmir was a major political issue.11 The same trend persisted during the 2008 and 2013 elections. Despite this, however, the current civilian era has not seen credible progress in Indo-Pak relations, as both the PPP-led and PML-N regimes have chosen not to confront the military on India policy. Third, although US military and financial support to Pakistan after the terrorist incidents of 11 September 2001 was crucial in sustaining General Musharraf ’s regime, its alleged pursuit of a ‘double game’ in the US-led ‘War on Terror’ – as manifested in a hard approach towards home-grown extremist groups committing domestic terrorism and a soft policy towards foreign militant outfits fuelling the Afghan war from bases in tribal areas – did eventually create a serious wedge in US–Pakistan relations. As argued earlier, the United States has traditionally preferred to deal with the Pakistani military to secure its strategic interests in the region, consequently scuttling the process of democracy in the country. However, the alleged Pakistani counter-terrorism duality for the first time forced it to side with the civilians, as apparent from the Obama Administration-sponsored 2009 Kerry–Lugar–Berman Act to provide $7.5 billion in civilian assistance to Pakistan during a five-year period.12 However, pragmatic requirements of the NATO withdrawal process in subsequent years have helped normalize ties between security establishments of the two countries that were seriously ruptured after the May 2011 US operation to kill al-Qaeda leader Usama bin Laden in Pakistan. Meanwhile, as part of Operation Zarb-eAzb, the Pakistani military has combated the TTP and disrupted the Haqqani Network in North Waziristan, as well as contributed to the Afghan reconciliation process. As for the Obama Administration, it has tried to balance US relations with both the civilian and military leaders in Pakistan, while still having its concerns about the alleged covert links between the ISI and militant outfits like Lashkar-e-Tayyiba.13 Fourth, serious security and economic challenges facing Pakistan have emerged as an important hedge against military intervention in politics. In the 1990s, Pakistan did not face the sort of security quagmire it has confronted in the past decade. It then openly supported Taliban proxies in Afghanistan as part of its ‘strategic depth’ policy in the war-ravaged nation as well as the armed struggle in Indian-administered Kashmir. However, by joining the US-led War on Terror, the Musharraf regime provoked local militants who had previously waged jihad in Afghanistan and Kashmir. The consequent blowback in the form of continued terrorist insurgency has resulted in the death of 20,507 civilians and 6,220 security personnel, including four general officers, from 2003 to July 2015.14 The sheer scale of terrorism is such that the military and intelligence establishment have remained consistently engaged in combating terrorism and insurgency in the country. Worsening economic conditions since the departure

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of General Musharraf have likewise kept the military away from direct intervention in politics. The energy crisis is unprecedented, and it is difficult to resolve in the short run. The cost of terrorism to the national economy, according to government estimates, is $78 billion, as foreign investment dried up, businesses moved abroad, human capital emigrated, and the cost of doing business in Pakistan increased.15 In short, grave security and economic conditions may have by default created the opportunity for the former PPP-led government to complete its full tenure and the present PML-N regime to continue to govern, even while muddling through successive challenges on the way. Fifth, the Musharraf era has also been instrumental in liberalizing mass media in Pakistan. The proliferation of privately owned broadcast media outlets since then has been a crucial component of Pakistan’s democratic transition. Together with print and social media, they have enabled a more inclusive and representative public sphere, and populations historically excluded from national debates are increasingly able to have their voices heard. Critical views in support of the civilian government and its policy priorities, and continuity of democratic order in the country, have helped restrain the military from direct intervention in civilian affairs. During the 2014 protests, for instance, the nexus between the ISI and protesting leaders could not be hidden from media eyes. Before this, extensive media coverage of the Lawyers’ Movement in 2007–2008 helped in the demise of General Musharraf. It is, however, true that the media narrative, especially of Urdu newspapers and news channels, on crucial issues of politics and foreign policy, is still largely controlled and shaped by the military. Privately owned media outlets are vulnerable to security threats and political pressure. Moreover, previously marginalized voices that now engage in public debates include polarizing and violence-inciting actors, such as the violent extremist groups.16 Yet critical discourse in multiple channels of media, however limited, continues. Sixth, an important consequence of the Musharraf era, and a consistent feature of the current democratic transition that never existed in the previous two civilian eras, is the emergence of an independent judiciary. The Supreme Court had justified all military coups, including that of 1999, on the basis of the Doctrine of Necessity. However, led by Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry during Musharraf ’s last years, it began to assert and take the military regime to task on its defiance of the due process of law, violation of human rights and suppression of political dissent. In March 2007, Chief Justice Chaudhry refused to second the military dictator’s bid to renew presidential tenure. His subsequent dismissal from office triggered the popular Lawyers’ Movement, which finally managed to fully restore higher judiciary under Chaudhry’s leadership in March 2009. Since then, the Supreme Court and provincial High Courts have not only held civilian rulers accountable for mismanaging governance and corrupt practices, but also placed new checks on the military’s ability to manoeuvre the political system. The Supreme Court has indicted General Musharraf on charges of high treason, and adjudicated important national issues, while the higher judiciary has consistently cautioned the military against political adventurism,17 and supported the democratic process – the verdict of the July 2015 verdict of the Supreme Court’s

Pakistan’s third democratic transition 29 Judicial Commission on the veracity of the 2013 elections being the most recent reflection of its resolve for the purpose. Finally, in the past decade and a half, Pakistan has experienced an important demographic transformation in the form of the emergence of a politically active educated, professional middle class, especially the youth. Perspectives vary on whether or how far this development is conducive for democracy. However, the reality of the ‘youth bulge’, and forceful articulation of its material needs and political aspirations through relatively new political parties such as the PTI as well as vibrant media and civil society platforms, has forced major political parties to re-think their previous approach of securing electoral gains through patronage-based politics. The 2013 elections were a clear manifestation of this new class of young and educated voters playing a pivotal role in determining the election outcome on the basis of the performance of the party in power.18 This development also constitutes a potential barrier to the predatory ambitions of the military, as public support for whoever controls power in Pakistan in future, the civilians or the military, will be conditional on the regime’s capacity for service delivery. In retrospect, what makes the third democratic transition distinct from previous civilian eras is the substantially different modes of behaviour and pattern of distribution of power and resources among various political players. The emergence of new power centres such as the assertive higher judiciary, mass media and civil society as well as visible political consensus among the majority of political parties on the value of democracy are among the crucial factors underpinning this transition and redefining the parameters of civil–military relations. The military can no more use legal instruments like Article 58–2(b) of the Eighth Amendment to oust civilian rulers on the pretext of being ‘corrupt’ or a ‘security risk’. Domestic security and economic compulsions as well as regional and global constraints have also impacted the dynamics of domestic politics in support of democracy.

Sources of persistence However, despite being devoid of traditional instruments and justifications of political control due to the emergence of a host of pro-democracy factors described above, the military was able to keep the former PPP-led government under pressure and also reassert itself soon after Nawaz Sharif ’s first year in office. The reasons for this are not difficult to discern. First, the military remains a powerful political player in the country – with its huge business empire still intact, share in the national exchequer unquestioned, ability to destabilize the civilian regime through new proxies in politics uninterrupted, and the ways to shape public opinion and foreign policy still considerable, albeit contested. The military has ruled Pakistan for so long directly and indirectly – consequently penetrated so deeply in civilian structure, societal fabric and economic structure – that it still has considerable capacity to use current political divisions and security threats to its advantage and constrain the process of civilian assertion.19

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However, as is clear from the preceding discussion, its ability to stay on top of politics as consistently as it did previously has faced serious limitations in the post-Musharraf period. The choice of staging another coup is particularly constrained by domestic security, economic and political circumstances. Second, for any democratic civilian regime, traditionally on a weaker footing as compared to authoritarian military set-ups, managing gigantic structural, institutional and ideological issues facing the country is not an easy task. This is especially so, as each military regime has sown the seeds of political and economic instability that succeeding civilian regimes have to deal with. Meanwhile, the political role of religion in the country continues to lack critical scrutiny, despite recurrence of hyper sectarian and extremist violence.20 Moreover, ethnic strife in Balochistan and problems of law and order in metropolitan cities like Karachi remain largely unaddressed, and are further compounded by the gravity of economic crisis denoted by serious energy shortages. These two historical trends, the growth of religiosity and intensification of ethnicity, have contributed significantly to the prevailing crisis of governance. During the previous PPP-led regime, poor governance, persistent adversarial relations between the executive and the judiciary, allegations of corruption, and the inability of the political leadership to build consensus to combat continued to cast aspersions on the democratic process.21 The situation has somewhat improved on most counts under the present regime, but its capacity to sustain the democratic process remains limited, largely due to persistence of patronage-based politics and limited or receding capacity of the state to cater to the needs and aspirations of the populace. Third, the surge of the urbanized middle class both in terms of size and aspiration – particularly the educated, professional and younger people – constitutes an important social determinant of the shifting political trends in the recent past. This is a potential driver of change, as described before, but its transformative value for the current democratic process is questionable. For the first time, the key challenge to traditional political parties, including both the PML-N and the PPP, is being posed by the politically charged urban population, which expects the government to improve service delivery. This is clear from the performance-based voting pattern in the 2013 elections that caused the demise of PPP in the Centre and Punjab and of the Awami National Party in the KPK province.22 In many ways, the serious political crisis that the PML-N government faced in 2014 was a reflection of this new political reality – which helped the military to assert itself and weaken the PML-N government. In a sense, the PTI – which led the 2014 protests and represents the educated, professional and youthful component of the urbanized middle class – has played the same role in undermining an elected government as pro-military presidents did in the 1990s through Article 58–2(b) of the Eighth Amendment. Fourth, changing modes of communications and the emergence of digital platforms as arenas for expression and accessing information pose new challenges for traditional political parties. The urban, educated, middle class youth has not only triumphed the underprivileged but also the incumbent social and

Pakistan’s third democratic transition 31 political elite in the access to and use of information technology. Among the traditional players, however, the military has been most successful in recognizing the changing technological landscape and shaping the national discourse on social media. Despite new space being opened up in cyber space for dissenting views, it has also provided the military with a platform to reinforce its image and standing. Traditional political parties are still catching up with this phenomenon and have ceded considerable space to new entrants such as the PTI, which have, in turn, helped the military to regain the lost space in controlling politics and shaping national security and foreign policy. Through pliable politicians, journalists and analysts, the military has likewise been able to steer the media narrative against politicians and polices of the civilian regime.23 Finally, in a country like Pakistan that is gripped by terrorist insurgency, a proactive role of the military establishment and its intelligence apparatus in managing internal security affairs is difficult to overrule. This is especially so when civilian law enforcement institutions seriously lack the capacity to combat terrorism. The Sharif government has willingly enabled the military to take the lead on internal security arrangements. In June 2014, the decision to launch an offensive in North Waziristan came from the military leadership and was announced through the military’s press wing. The civilian endorsement of this operation came later.24 Similarly, since the attack on a Peshawar school in December 2014, the military has been calling the shots, and once again the civilian government has abdicated its responsibility for handling internal security.25 Currently an ad hoc arrangement at the province level is manifest in apex committees led by military commanders.26 Of course, when the use of force becomes imperative to combat terrorism, it is but natural that the military’s influence in managing internal affairs will increase at the expense of civilian authority. On the other hand, letting the military perform its professionally assigned task of mitigating internal security challenges keeps it away from politics and allows the civilian leadership to concentrate on developmental projects and raise its political profile.

Beyond the civil–military divide One distinguishing attribute of the present democratic era in Pakistan is the qualitative change in civil–military relations. There are tangible indicators of the evolution of nuanced power-sharing mechanisms between the civilian and military sides. Whether this shift in the civil–military power equation is tactical or strategic is debatable, but its role in shaping the contours of Pakistani politics today cannot be overlooked. Combating terrorism and militancy is the first domain where the interests of the military establishment and the civilian regime have increasingly converged. After all, as stated earlier, the TTP and its affiliates have targeted both military personnel and the civilian population. Terrorism has also had severe economic consequences for the country. Stabilizing the economy is a realistic interest that both civilian and military leaderships equally subscribe to. Their priorities indeed differed at the start, when the Nawaz Sharif government attempted to

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negotiate peace with the TTP against the military’s wishes. Subsequently, the army did launch Operation Zarb-e-Azb without civilian authorization, but the government has owned it ever since. In fact, in the aftermath of the Peshawar school attack, it swiftly organized an All Parties Conference, where the leaders of all political groups sat alongside military and intelligence chiefs and agreed on a comprehensive 20-point National Action Plan (NPC), which focuses on combating both terrorism and militancy and addresses endemic insecurity and radicalization.27 It was against this backdrop that the parliament approved the Twenty-First Amendment to the 1973 Constitution to establish military courts. Although contested on legal grounds, the amendment represents the civil–military consensus on the utter failure of the civilian justice system to bring terrorists to task and the urgent need for an alternative legal regime to try terror suspects. A second related sphere over which civilian and military positions have converged is the law and order situation in urban spaces such as Karachi, which represents new forms of contestation outside the traditional arena of power struggle in the country. In large swathes of the country, not necessarily confined to remote tribal areas of the northwest, violent forces have emerged as new arbiters of local conflicts, effectively replacing the state (or local social hierarchy) to enforce contracts and provide justice. This is a worrying trend for both civilian and military elites. Karachi is the financial hub of Pakistan, where criminal gangs allegedly affiliated with political parties have run amok for decades. Given that, the apex committee of the Sindh province established under the NPC and comprising both provincial political leaders and military commanders has attempted to tighten the noose around these armed gangs. The MQM, which has long dominated politics in urban Sindh, especially Karachi, allegedly through political coercion and financial extraction, has been a particular target of this ‘Operation Clean-up’. This is not the first time that the PML-N government and the military establishment have joined hands against the MQM. In 1992 as well, the Muhajir ethnic party had faced the brunt of an army operation.28 However, this does not mean civil–military preferences are the same when it comes to the management of all internal security challenges facing the state. How to handle the ethnic question in Balochistan is one major area of domestic security policy where a clear wedge exists between the military and the civilian government – with the former preferring to use force and the latter trying to find peaceful means to settle the conflict.29 Third, even if the military continues to play a predominant role in shaping the core areas of Pakistan’s foreign policy, there is hardly any difference in the preferences of the civilian government and the military establishment in some respects, including relations with major powers such as the United States and China and immediate neighbours like Afghanistan and Iran. For instance, the approach of the PML-N government hardly seems to differ with that of the military establishment in facilitating NATO’s military disengagement from Afghanistan, bringing a peaceful end to the Afghan war or cementing strategic relations with China. The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor is one project over which civil–military interests have fundamentally converged.

Pakistan’s third democratic transition 33 In fact, it is argued that both the PML-N government and the military consider this corridor so crucial to the future economic prosperity of Pakistan, and hence, to ensure its smooth implementation, have joined hands to eliminate the scourge of terrorism from tribal areas, and improve the security situation in Karachi and Balochistan. Both sides feel that the incentive of Chinese investment and involvement is a good enough reason to join forces and clean house in this once-and-for-all moment that is presenting itself. Pakistan’s infamously fractured civ–mil dynamic hasn’t been firmer in years, perhaps decades. And so the civilians and the brass are climbing out of their defensive and distrustful crouches and taking the war of reform to the areas that need order, including their own.30

Democratic process and regional peace Pakistan’s third democratic transition has been accompanied by a major shift in foreign policy, which is officially described as a ‘regional pivot’.31 Unveiled in 2009 during the PPP-led government, this policy shift, reflected in both official pronouncements and tangible actions, has occurred largely in response to challenging domestic and regional circumstances, and the enormous opportunities they present. Consequently, civil–military interests in the country have increasingly converged over issues of national security, democratic politics and regional peace. In the perception of both the civilian government and state establishment, Pakistan remains a strategically significant country in South Asia – but one that now wants to distance itself from geopolitical rivalries of the likes of the Cold War or the War on Terror and instead seeks geo-economically motivated peace and cooperation in the neighbourhood, including political reconciliation in Afghanistan, access to energy resources of Iran and Central Asia, a workable peace process with India and, above all, an economic corridor with China. The PML-N regime has attempted to build upon the already prevalent policy trend to consolidate Pakistan’s economic future in the region. For example, Prime Minister Sharif issued a directive to all foreign missions soon after taking over, urging them to try to overcome whatever divergences still exist in key relationships. This has resulted in a visible shift in Afghan policy, a major transition in strategic relations with China from security sphere to economic domain, moves to enhance energy ties with Central Asian states, and a meaningful progress in security relations with Russia. The only sphere where divergence still persists is the policy towards India, notwithstanding the back channel diplomacy by the two countries’ National Security Advisors as well as their decision to initiate a ‘comprehensive dialogue’ to discuss and resolve mutual conflicts. Given the nexus between domestic politics and foreign policy, it is essentially the pro-democratic currents during Pakistan’s present civilian era that have led to this changed regional outlook, which represents a pragmatic response of its civil–military elites to prevailing security and economic conditions at home and in the region. They both aspire to take Pakistan out of the perpetual conflict that

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it has entangled itself in by pursuing a regional approach of supporting jihadi proxies in Afghanistan or Kashmir, which has eventually backfired. Pakistan seeks peaceful relations with Afghanistan, because in the perception of both civilian and military leaders, as long as Afghanistan is at war Pakistan can never be at peace. It seeks to build regional ties also because the grave internal security situation in the country is accompanied by an acute economic crisis, and the pursuit of regionalism entails a massive opportunity for economic prosperity. Pakistan continues to benefit from US security and civilian help, but its simultaneous push to consolidate strategic relations with the ‘most trusted’ patron, China, is meant to reduce dependence on a global power that pursues a transient bilateral relationship and is also not interested in moving beyond the precarious aid-centric approach.32 The regional pivot in foreign policy during the current civilian era has manifested itself in both official civil–military discourses and subsequent tangible policy outcomes. These discourses reveal that rather than trying to dominate the physical space in Afghanistan through Taliban proxies, with whom the extent of its strategic relationship is debatable, Pakistan sees its interest in building friendly relations with the Afghan government.33 Consequently, since early 2012, it has reached out to all sides in the Afghan conflict and shown growing interest in facilitating the Afghan peace settlement. These efforts have borne fruit, as relations between Kabul and Islamabad have improved significantly under President Ashraf Ghani’s regime in Afghanistan. This is reflected in close coordination between their intelligence agencies over counter-terrorism issues34 and initiation of formal talks between the Afghan government and Afghan Taliban leaders under Pakistani auspices.35 Harnessing the rich energy resources of Central Asia is a pragmatic economic ambition that peaceful resolution of the Afghan conflict entails for Pakistan, especially through the implementation of two projects: the Turkmenistan–Afghanistan–Pakistan–India (TAPI) gas pipeline project and CASA 1000 electricity transmission line from Tajikistan.36 One regional relationship that has always been cherished by successive Pakistani civil–military leaders, and made the topmost priority by the present government, is with China. The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) is the most visible reflection of the ongoing shift in Pakistan’s regional and foreign policy outlook from geo-politics to geo-economics. China has pledged over $46 billion for developing a number of energy projects and building an extensive transportation and trade network to link the Gwadar seaport in Balochistan with Xinjiang province. This is occurring at a time when Pakistan, through a National Action Plan, is dealing with the domestic implications of two international wars fought in the last three and a half decades as a frontline state of the United States: the war against Soviet communism and the War on Terror in Afghanistan. Therefore, it is a great opportunity for taking the country out of a security quagmire and consequent economic impoverishment, as well as a great challenge, which has both internal and external dimensions. CPEC’s future viability is synonymous with Pakistan’s national survival, especially in terms of its potential contribution to political stability, economic growth

Pakistan’s third democratic transition 35 and the regional profile of the country. CPEC could be a game-changer not only for Pakistan but also the whole of the South and Central Asian region. Its successful realization would not only contribute massively to Pakistan’s economic growth but could also integrate the two regions through a network of trade routes as well as enhanced levels of energy and investment cooperation among Central Asian and South Asian states. This CPEC has great potential for national economic development and South Asian integration – provided political consensus over this crucial national project is sustained, internal security conditions continue to improve, and Afghanistan and India respond in kind to Pakistan’s peace overtures. While progress on energy projects with Central Asian states hinges on political settlement of the Afghan conflict, an additional area of energy cooperation for the country is the gas pipeline deal with Iran, which could not be implemented due to economic sanctions on Iran – a key impediment that the international deal over Iran’s nuclear programme may help overcome. If there is one area where the regional pivot approach has not made a major difference, and over which serious divergence in civil–military policy preferences persists, it is Pakistan’s traditionally hostile relationship with India. The military remains wary of a fast-track peace process with India that may undermine its relative power in domestic politics as well as the prospect of resolving major territorial conflicts such as Kashmir. During the current civilian era, the attempts by the PPP-led government and the PML-N government to improve economic and political relations with India have therefore met with strong resistance from the military. Weakened by the 2014 protests, the Sharif government has been careful enough not to take any bold step towards peace with India unilaterally, to avoid unnecessary confrontation with the military.37 Thus, the shifting internal power equation inside Pakistan and India’s lack of interest in resuming political dialogue have been two major reasons impeding the prospect of any breakthrough in Indo-Pak relations.38 However, the year 2015 indeed ended on a positive note, when Prime Minister Modi paid a surprise visit to Lahore, and the two countries decided to resume the peace process. The disclosure that their National Security Advisors had also been meeting behind the scenes to discuss tricky issues such as cross-border terrorism was also a promising development. For any dialogue with India to succeed, the military leadership in Pakistan has to be on board. It is important to mention here that the country’s civil–military interests with respect to India’s regional economic pursuits have indeed shown some accommodation, as reflected in India’s inclusion in the TAPI gas pipeline project.39 The shared objective of the two countries for permanent membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization – the process for which formally began at the organization’s summit in Ufa, Russia, in July 2015 – may help facilitate the Indo-Pak peace process.40 For this to be effective, however, the two countries will have to overcome historically rooted structural and ideological barriers to their relationship. In Pakistan, where the military has sustained its hegemonic control over politics until the recent past on the basis of an existential threat from India, progress towards peace with India will contribute to a democratic process at home. After

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all, democracy at home and peace with India are two sides of the same coin. Thus, rather than sustaining unnecessary tensions with Pakistan under a democratic dispensation, India’s interest lies in working closely with the civilian government in Pakistan to resolve long-standing conflicts such as Kashmir. This may take time. In the meantime, however, as is the case with Sino-India ties, the two countries can put their pending security issues aside, keep the diplomatic process for conflict resolution alive and simultaneously make rapid progress in an economic relationship in both bilateral and regional contexts.

Notes 1 For detailed discussion on this formative era, see Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid, Pakistan: Roots of Dictatorship (London: Zed Books, 1993); and Robert W. Stern, Democracy and Dictatorship in South Asia: Dominant Classes and Political Outcomes in India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh (Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2000). 2 Article 58–2(b) stated: 2) Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (2) of Article 48, the President may also dissolve the National Assembly in his discretion where, in his opinion . . . (b) a situation has arisen in which the Government of the Federation cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution and an appeal to the electorate is necessary. 3 For discussion on the 1990s politics, see Hasan-Askari Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); and Mohammad Waseem, ‘Civil–military relations in Pakistan’, in R. Jetly, Pakistan in Regional and Global Politics (Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2009), pp. 181–211. 4 Hasan-Askari Rizvi, Military, State and Society in Pakistan (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000); and Mohammad Waseem, ‘Civil–military relations in Pakistan’, in R. Jetly, Pakistan in Regional and Global Politics (Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2009), pp. 181–211. On developments pertaining to India policy during Nawaz Sharif ’s second tenure, see Aparna Pande, Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: Escaping India (Abingdon, Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2014). 5 Ashok K. Behuria, ‘How the military dominates the political space in Pakistan: a study of Musharraf ’s era (1999–2009)’, Journal of Peace Studies 16/1–2 (2009). 6 See Hassan Gardezi and Jamil Rashid, Pakistan: Roots of Dictatorship (London: Zed Books, 1993); Mohammad Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan (Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1994); and Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror (New York: East Gate Publishing, 2005). 7 Ashok K. Behuria, ‘How the military dominates the political space in Pakistan: a study of Musharraf ’s era (1999–2009)’, Journal of Peace Studies 16/1–2 (2009). 8 See ‘Text of the Charter of Democracy’, Dawn, 16 May 2006. 9 For detailed analysis of the Eighteenth Amendment, see International Crisis Group, Parliament’s Role in Pakistan’s Democratic Transition, Asia Report no. 249 (Brussels: ICG, September 2013), pp. 9–12. Available at www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/ asia/south-asia/pakistan/249-parliament-s-role-in-pakistan-s-democratic-transition. aspx (accessed 20 March 2016). 10 For details, see Ishtiaq Ahmad and Aaamir Bashir, India and Pakistan: Charting a Path to Peace (Islamabad: Pan-Graphics, 2004). 11 Ishtiaq Ahmad and Hannes Ebert, ‘Breaking the equilibrium? New leaders and old structures in the India–Pakistan rivalry’, Asian Affairs: An American Review 42/1 (2015), pp. 46–75.

Pakistan’s third democratic transition 37 12 See Ishtiaq Ahmad, ‘The Fallout of US Af–Pak Strategy on Current and Future US–Pak Relations’, in J. Schofiled and U. Butt (eds), Pakistan: The US, Geopolitics and Grand Strategies (London: Pluto Press, 2012), pp. 130–148. 13 For instance, the US State Department’s country reports on terrorism for the year 2014 stated: The Pakistani military undertook operations against groups that conducted attacks within Pakistan such as TTP, but did not take action against other groups such as Lashkar e-Tayyiba, which continued to operate, train, rally, propagandize, and fundraise in Pakistan. Afghan Taliban and Haqqani Network leadership continued to find safe haven in Pakistan, and although Pakistan military operations disrupted the actions of these groups, it did not directly target them.

14 15 16 17

18 19

20

21 22 23 24 25 26 27

See US Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism, Country Reports on Terrorism 2014 (Washington, DC: US Department of State, June 2015), p. 224. South Asia Terrorism Portal, Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003–2015. Available at www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htmwww. satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/database/casualties.htm (accessed 22 March 2016). Ismail Khan, ‘Pakistan most terror-hit nation’, Dawn, February 23, 2014. Huma Yusuf, ‘New media in Naya Pakistan: technologies of transformation or control?’, in C.C. Fair and S.J. Watson (eds), Pakistan’s Enduring Crisis (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015). See Haris Gazdar, ‘Judicial activism vs democratic consolidation in Pakistan’, Economic and Political Weekly 44/32 (January 2009), pp. 10–11; Syed Sami Ahmad, The Judiciary of Pakistan and its Role in Political Crises (Karachi: Royal Book Company, 2013). The Commonwealth Secretariat, Pakistan General Elections 13 May 2013 (London: The Commonwealth Secretariat, 13 May 2013). See Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc.: Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy (London: Pluto Press, 2007); Hasan-Askari Rizvi, The Military and Politics in Pakistan (Lahore: Sang-e-Meel, 2000); Stephen P. Cohen, Pakistan Army (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984); and Ayesha Jalal, The State of Martial Rule: The origins of Pakistan’s Political Economy of Defence (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) and Democracy and Authoritarianism in South Asia (Lahore: Sange-Meel, 1990). Religion continues to be used as an instrument by both political and military elites, which explains the growth of religiously inspired violence in Pakistan in recent decades. The process of Islamization of laws has become a pivotal factor in the breakup of social order in the country. It is still unclear whether the government has the capacity and the willingness to reduce the influence of Islam in politics and make the national polity compatible with the modern world. Saeed Shafqat, Performance and Prospects of Democracy in Pakistan: Political Scenarios Affecting the Elections 2013 (Islamabad: Jinnah Institute, 1 April 2013), p. 1. The Commonwealth Secretariat, Pakistan General Elections 13 May 2013 (London: The Commonwealth Secretariat, 13 May 2013). Huma Yusuf, ‘New media in Naya Pakistan: technologies of transformation or control?’ in C.C. Fair and S.J. Watson (eds), Pakistan’s Enduring Crisis (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015). Raza Rumi, Charting Pakistan’s Internal Security Policy (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, May 2015), p. 14. Zahid Hussain, ‘Down a slippery slope’, Dawn, 21 January 2015. Raza Rumi, Charting Pakistan’s Internal Security Policy (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, May 2015), p. 14. Raza Rumi, Charting Pakistan’s Internal Security Policy (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, May 2015), p. 8.

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28 For details, see Laurent Gayer, Karachi: Ordered Disorder and the Struggle for the City (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); ‘Should the military fight crime and dispense justice?’ Herald, 3 July 2015. 29 Imtiaz Gul, ‘Bringing back Balochistan’, The Friday Times, 12 December 2014. 30 Wajahat S. Khan, ‘With China, for China’, India Today, 10 July 2015. 31 For a comprehensive analysis of the subject, see ‘Pakistan’s “regional pivot” and the endgame in Afghanistan’, IPRI Journal 13/2 (2013), pp. 1–20. 32 ‘Pakistan’s “regional pivot” and the endgame in Afghanistan’, IPRI Journal 13/2 (2013), pp. 1–20. 33 For instance, former foreign minister Hina Rabbani Khar stated in September 2012: ‘Pakistan is building and stabilizing relations within its immediate region, and pursuing policies that privileged enhanced trade relations and energy cooperation over zero-sum security competitions’, Ms Khar’s address at Asia Society in New York on 27 September 2012 is available in video format at its website http://asiasociety.org/ video/policy/hina-rabbani-khar-pakistans-perspective-complete (accessed 12 January 2016). Former army chief General Pervez Ashfaq Kayani said in January 2010: We want to have strategic depth in Afghanistan, but that does not imply controlling it. If we have a peaceful, stable and friendly Afghanistan, automatically we will have our strategic depth because our western border will be secure, and we will not be looking at two fronts.

34 35 36 37

38 39 40

See Pamela Constable, ‘Pakistan’s Army Chief Seeks Friendly and Stable Afghanistan’, Washington Post, 2 February 2010. In an interview with this author on 7 December 2011 in Islamabad, General Athar Abbas, former Director General of InterServices Public Relations (ISPR), elaborated the same point while arguing that post9/11 circumstantial realities have, indeed, led to a conceptual shift in Pakistan’s Afghan policy, whereby Pakistan wants to have a peaceful western border as a hedge against the traditional security threat from India in the east. ‘ISI, Afghan intelligence in landmark deal’, Dawn, 19 May 2015. Akbar Jan Marwat, ‘Muree peace talks’, Daily Times, 22 July 2015. ‘Pakistan’s “regional pivot” and the endgame in Afghanistan’, IPRI Journal 13/2 (2013), pp. 1–20. The pursuit of peaceful relations with India was one course that Nawaz Sharif, during his previous stint in power, chose to assert his government’s relative position in the domestic power equation with the military, by inviting Prime Minister Vajpayee to Pakistan in February 1999 to sign the historic Lahore Accord. This fateful step led to the Kargil war in summer 1999 and Sharif ’s ouster through a military coup later that year. Ishtiaq Ahmad and Hannes Ebert, ‘Breaking the equilibrium? New leaders and old structures in the India-Pakistan rivalry’, Asian Affairs: An American Review 42/1 (2015), pp. 46–75. Ishtiaq Ahmad and Hannes Ebert, ‘Breaking the equilibrium? New leaders and old structures in the India–Pakistan rivalry’, Asian Affairs: An American Review 42/1 (2015), pp. 46–75. Ayesha Siddiqa, ‘Ufa’s uff!,, The Express Tribune, 14 July 2015.

2

Enduring challenges to democracy Maya Tudor

In 2014, the anti-government protests led by PTI chief Imran Khan against the alleged fraud in the previous year’s elections1 shuttered the central artery of the capital city and, for some precarious weeks, thrust the viability of Nawaz Sharif’s government into question. Amid the ensuing political unrest, the Pakistani army arbitrated between these duelling democratically elected representatives.2 The upshot of this confrontation was a weakened but tenable prime minister and a loss of face for the protesting leadership.3 The genuine winner from this political circus has been the military – an organization that was able to yet again position itself as the key source of stability in the country. It has since then consolidated this position by an institutionalizing role in administration through newly formed Apex Committees4 at federal and provincial levels that include the military and civilian leadership. The civilian elite, both ruling and in opposition, was also forced into setting up Military Courts through a constitutional amendment that provides the military with complete control over security affairs.5 This story of slow but steady military ascendance is as old as the country itself. For much of its nearly seven decades as a sovereign nation, Pakistan has lived under overt or covert military rule, careening between a fragile democracy and open military rule with alarming regularity. Comparative research has found that initial military coups tend to breed subsequent military coups,6 underscoring the fact that Pakistan’s political instability was critically formed by the ascendance of the military during the post-independence decade.7

Past is present? During that pivotal decade, the weakness of its dominant political party, the Pakistan Muslim League, was primarily responsible for the military’s ascendance in politics. The Muslim League was an incoherent and organizationally weak movement. Established in 1906 to champion the interests of Muslims in one province of colonial India, the organization remained a paper party for decades thereafter. After the Indian National Congress’s dominating victory in the 1937 provincial elections, Muslim leaders clearly understood that colonial guarantees of Muslim influence in British India would vanish with independence. The sudden alarm among influential Muslims spearheaded the movement

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for a separate state that was first broadly articulated in 1940. Under the stewardship of Mohammed Ali Jinnah, the Muslim League drove the creation of Pakistan seven years later by forging coalitions with the existing political movements in the pivotal Muslim-majority provinces of Punjab and Bengal. Other than a desire for protecting Muslim interests within a united India, the alliance between Punjabi landlords and Bengali peasant cultivators was not based upon any shared governing agenda. Moreover, the party developed little organizational loyalty. Buoyed by colonial sponsorship, the Muslim League’s mobilization created Pakistan in 1947. But the raison d’être of its nationalist movement – protecting Muslim interests at the political centre within colonial India – also disappeared, exposing the shallowness of the coalitions that had supported the Muslim League. Because no clear plans for regional power sharing, socio-economic development or even the basic elements of nationhood had been agreed upon, there was little to keep regional elites within the party fold. Consequently, the real power holders in the new state – traditional big-men in Punjab and the peasant movement in Bengal, which represented the new country’s demographic majority – abandoned the party as soon as their own short-term interests conflicted with the interests of the party elite. The inability of Pakistan’s dominant political party to command genuine grassroots support meant that each successive administration directed its energies towards stabilizing fragile coalitions and undercutting potential threats – driving a politics of musical chairs.8 This often meant relying upon the military to put down opposition. Unlike neighbouring India, which faced many of the same challenges of building a new state from colonial institutions amid a variety of external and internal challenges but created a stable democracy after independence, Pakistan was not governed by a party that possessed loyal politicians who could rely upon grassroots support for particular policy reforms. Consequently, increasingly fragile governing administrations politicized the military in order to stay in power. Thus, the 1958 coup simply formalized the end of Pakistan’s tentative democratic experiment. Since that formative first decade, Pakistan has witnessed two democratic transitions, both of which have failed to override the military’s grip on power, followed by prolonged periods of army rule. The first democratic transition of 1971 occurred in the wake of the Pakistani military’s murderous campaign to put down the democratically elected Awami League of East Pakistan. Having won a comfortable democratic majority of seats in the national elections of 1970, the Awami League called for a major decentralization of power. When the PPP led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto opposed the League’s demand, the conflict between these parties enabled the military to pose itself as an arbiter and to provoke an open rebellion by East Pakistan that the military planned to crush.9 The ensuing genocidal campaign by the Pakistani military culminated in war with India and the subsequent secession of East Pakistan in 1971. After this defeat, under a military government, the narrative of the Pakistani military as the guardian of national integrity was shaken to its core. If a military government could not protect the country against disintegration at the hands of its archenemy, then its very raison

Enduring challenges to democracy 41 d’être was subject to question. With the legitimacy of the military at its nadir, civilian governments experienced their first opportunity to establish a measure of control over the military and initiate a democratic transition. Instead, Pakistan’s first democratic transition backslid into military rule within six years. This happened for three overarching reasons: because the military, now institutionally primed to regain political power, perpetually sought to undermine civilian rule; because the government and opposition politicians alike readily made common cause with the military to undermine opponents; and because the governing party did not possess grassroots support and thus operated autocratically, as it had before it came to power. In an attempt to curtail the military’s powers, the Bhutto government initiated an expected series of constitutional and administrative reforms, creating a civilian-led constitution and establishing administrative structures that subordinated top military officials to civilian command. Without a loyal base of party supporters to rely on, Bhutto governed in an autocratic manner that belied the fact that he won less than half the votes (though a plurality of seats) within West Pakistan.10 Over the course of his term, as he possessed neither a clear governing agenda nor a loyal base of support, Bhutto systematically alienated potential supporters by using any means possible to solidify his power. As Bhutto increasingly resorted to such heavyhanded tactics as sidelining dissenters within the party, dismissing regional governments on dubious pretexts, and allegedly murdering political opponents, his opposition solidified into an alliance. An increasingly fragile Bhutto turned to the military to put down opposition protests. Drawn back into the political orbit, a history of military intervention in politics helped facilitate another military coup. In 1977, General Ziaul Haq’s suspension of civilian rule inaugurated another 11 years of military rule. Pakistan’s second democratic transition occurred in 1988 and repeated the pattern that had emerged in the previous failed democratic transition. The country’s “musical chair politics” was distinctly recognizable during the next 11 years: civilian governments fighting against opposition politicians called in the military for protection and military politicization led to the eventual downfall of that civilian regime. The same three underlying reasons – military machinations to undercut civilian rule, eventual appeals to military muscle for protection and mediation, and weak parties – drove the next military coup. Though opposition infighting provided the immediate rationale for the military’s arrogation of power, it is important to note that the military (and the intelligence services) created the conditions for such infighting by systematically seeking to destabilize civilian governments. For example, during the first democratic government, the military changed electoral laws and helped to form key opposition parties with a view towards weakening the electoral mandate for the clear favourite, Benazir Bhutto.11 When Bhutto nonetheless won enough seats and formed a government in coalition with the MQM, the military reportedly agreed to transfer power to Bhutto only so long as the military’s preferred candidate became president (the position from which military coups have typically been initiated), the same (antagonistic) foreign policy towards India was

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pursued, and the military itself remained immune to civilian oversight.12 During the subsequent government of Nawaz Sharif, the military was invited to put down unrest in rural Sindh and overstepped its mandate by expanding its operations against the urban-based MQM (then a coalition partner of the Sharif government). The ensuing tensions within the ruling coalition eventually brought down the government. All four governments were removed from power within months after prime ministers either engaged in peace talks with India or attempted reforms to reign in the political autonomy of the military – and often both.13 Because genuine peace with India would threaten the military’s underlying justification for assuming political control while constitutional or administrative reforms would threaten the institutional sanctions for assuming political power, such moves pre-empted a reassertion of military power. In 1989, Bhutto initiated high-level dialogue with Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and set up a direct hotline between the two countries to resolve international crises. The same year, she also appointed a retired military officer to head the ISI directorate. Later that year, military officers engineered a parliamentary vote of “no confidence”.14 In April 1993, a power struggle between Sharif and the military-backed president led to Sharif ’s dismissal in July. In October 1998, Sharif sacked the military chief Jehangir Karamat after the latter publicly criticized Sharif ’s government and in February 1999, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee signed the Lahore Declaration with Sharif, which heightened peaceful bilateral engagement with India. Later that year, army chief General Musharraf launched the Kargil operation across the Line of Control in Kashmir, allegedly without informing Sharif.15 Prime Minister Sharif ’s subsequent dismissal of Musharraf instigated the last military coup. Throughout the 1990s, while the military made strong but plausibly deniable efforts to weaken civilian governments, politicians also created conditions conducive to military interventions because they typically called upon the armed forces to intervene when doing so suited their short-term political interests. In 1990, after the MQM defected from the PPP coalition and violently protested against the elected government, the PPP called in the military to restore law and order. In 1993, when the military-backed president, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, was attempting to destabilize the Sharif regime, Benazir Bhutto announced a long march on Islamabad to further weaken her political rival. Such moves to directly or indirectly politicize the military often promoted the short-term interests of politicians. In the long term, however, it perpetuated a norm of military intervention that undermined the shared interest of all civilian politicians of keeping the military in the barracks. Given this history, it is all the more remarkable that the established pattern of “musical chair politics” has been interrupted during the last half-decade. Not only did the government band together with opposition to pass the Eighteenth Amendment, which eliminates the sweeping presidential powers that have historically been used to pave the way for military rule. But, perhaps more astonishingly, a civilian government completed a full term in office and handed the

Enduring challenges to democracy 43 reins of executive power to an elected opposition government without military intervention. This historic moment, many observers concluded, was an auspicious moment for Pakistan’s troubled democracy because, however messy democratic politics was, it had been allowed to function largely unimpeded.

Challenges to democracy While the 2013 civilian-led transfer of power may offer renewed hope that democracy is sprouting roots, three historically entrenched obstacles must be overcome, if Pakistan’s third democratic transition is to sustain itself, including weak political parties, marginalization of minorities, and India-centric state narrative. Lacklustre political parties The first major obstacle to democratic consolidation in Pakistan is the abiding weakness among Pakistani political parties, a weakness that has its origins in the nature of Pakistan’s nationalist movement. When the growth of an urban, educated middle class promoting electoral politics threatened the position of politically entrenched Muslims in one region of colonial India, these Muslims spearheaded the founding of a political organization – the Muslim League – in 1906. As evidenced by its stated goals for the first decades, the overarching goal of this organization was to protect the social and economic position of Muslims in the Indian State of Uttar Pradesh. Accordingly, the Muslim League lobbied for separate electorates – which fixed Muslim representation in colonial institutions and allowed only Muslims to vote for those seats. Separate electorates reinforced traditional social hierarchies and inured Muslim masses to political mobilization because movements representing other social or ideological groupings had no incentives to mobilize among Muslim masses. From its inception then, the Muslim League or Pakistan’s nationalist movement faced little incentive to slog through the hard work of building consensus around discrete political programmes and grassroots mobilization, relying instead on the socio-economic power of traditional big-men to deliver votes. From independence until the present, then, weak political parties have continued to undercut possibilities for democratic consolidation in Pakistan. Parties’ inability to develop independent bases of grassroots support for specific political agendas, coupled with the willingness of parties to make common cause with the military in the pursuit of short-term interests (often the personal interests of the party’s charismatic leader) have enabled the Pakistani army to exploit public dissatisfaction with democratic politics. Pakistan’s political parties still do not articulate detailed platforms or hold competitive intraparty elections that allows much less fast-tracks talent into leadership roles. Consequently, Pakistan has tangoed between frustratingly incoherent party rule and more orderly but ultimately illegitimate military rule via an astonishingly predictable cycle. First, the military subtly works to undermine the

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democratically elected government by highlighting its corruption and promoting political opponents. Second, a political crisis invariably ensues in which the military can position itself as a sensible force for stability and steadfast governance. Third, the military overtly governs, typically passing constitutional changes which preserves a façade of constitutionality. Fourth, amid a growing chorus of civilian forces capitalizing upon the invariable discontents of military rule, the army cedes the reins of governing power to civilians. Fifth, the military waits in the wings for an opportunity to intervene in civilian government.16 Political parties’ short-term reliance on feudal families to deliver votes through traditional channels of social influence undermines their long-term ability to govern because the interests of the powerful feudals are often at direct odds with the kind of redistributive agenda that a party representing a median voter would pursue. Feudal families are immensely powerful and wealthy: Pakistan’s Planning Commission calculated that in 1973, 22 families owned 66 per cent of the nation’s industrial wealth and 87 per cent of banking and insurance wealth.17 Such wealth and concentration in land ownership has heavily influenced patterns of political power. Parliamentary seats occupied by members of Pakistan’s dynastic families have increased from 37 per cent in 1977 to 50 per cent in 1993, averaging 44 per cent in the Assemblies elected in 2008. Those rural, landowning families who supported the Muslim League in 1946 are largely (though not wholly) the same families who maintain outsized influence over politics in the Pakistani countryside today. While some reports imply that the grasp of feudal elites may be waning,18 creating powerful parties still requires sustained party attention to mobilizing on the basis of programmatic commitments rather than defaulting to social hierarchies. Growing minority marginalization The second historical obstacle impeding Pakistan’s democratic consolidation is that full citizenship rights in the country have been increasingly associated with an exclusive Sunni Islam. The growing identification of Pakistani citizenship with orthodox Sunni Islam has encouraged polarizing political debates that destabilize democratic governments and distract them from pursuing muchneeded developmental agendas.19 The identification of Islam with Pakistani citizenship has historical roots, for the very idea of Pakistan first gained sustained political attention by decrying that Islam was in danger. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, as the father of the nation and ironically a Shia Muslim, stated at the time: It is a dream that the Hindus and Muslims can ever evolve a common nationality . . . [they] belong to two different religious philosophies, social customs, literatures. They neither intermarry nor inter-dine together and, indeed, they belong to two different civilizations. . . . To yoke together two such nations under a single state, one as a numerical minority and the other as a majority, must lead to growing discontent and final destruction of any fabric that may be so built for the government of such a state.20

Enduring challenges to democracy 45 Pakistan’s nationalist movement legitimated the demand for a state by virtue of the need to protect Islam, thereby closely associating citizenship of the state with Muslim-ness. While many countries make loose references to dominant religions in their constitutions, the close identity between Pakistani citizenship and Islam has served to undermine democratic politics because it allowed religious elites in the new state a legitimate and constitutional role in determining who was a full citizen. Initially, the identification of citizenship with Islam only marginalized non-Muslims. The 1956 Constitution pronounced the new country “The Islamic Republic of Pakistan” and specified that no law must be passed that was deemed contrary to the teachings of the Quran. This early legitimation of religion in defining citizenship was problematic because the fifth of the population that was non-Muslim in 1947 (trimmed to 5 per cent after the secession of East Pakistan) was not accorded equal respect before the law and was not considered a full citizen of the state. Over time, Pakistan’s religious elites have publicly promoted orthodox Sunnis as having more legitimate claims on the state than other Islamic sects.21 Religious groups have utilized the close connection between Islam and Pakistani citizenship to lobby for laws and constitutional amendments that have increasingly marginalized excluded Shia Muslims. The marginalization of minorities particularly intensified under General Zia’s tenure between 1977 and 1988. The military regime added Article 227 to the Constitution, enabling parliamentary laws to be challenged on religious grounds. Today, a Federal Shariat Court gives binding interpretations to the law and candidates for public office would be required have “adequate” knowledge of Islamic teachings. Pakistan’s blasphemy laws are strict even among theocratic Muslim countries and serve to focus public attention on what brand of Islam politicians practice or represent rather than the kinds of policies they hope to implement. The salience of religion in public life has steadily grown over time because political parties and the military both turn to Islam as a means of bolstering their waning legitimacy.22 That a campaign to reform these blasphemy laws led to the assassinations of prominent liberal politicians such as Punjab Governor Salman Taseer in 2011, and that these assassinations have not been widely condemned, speaks volumes about the protection of minority rights that is absolutely core to the definition of a democracy. A national identity bound up with an exclusive Sunni Islam is also problematic because it propels growing levels of political violence. While civilian casualties from domestic terrorism receive ample international attention, the escalating sectarian violence has been less appreciated.23 Unsurprisingly, the Pew Research Center recently gave Pakistan the worst possible score on social hostilities with respect to religion.24 The rise of polarizing identity politics not only excludes non-Muslims, Ahmadi Muslims and Shia Muslims from the full fruits of citizenship but also leads to a lower provision of public goods such as health care and education.25 In the long term, democracies are only stable when they develop socially and economically.26 For Pakistan’s tentative democratic consolidation to continue, Pakistan will need to spur on economic and social

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development. To jumpstart and maintain investments in human and social development, Pakistan will need to develop an egalitarian public that eschews polarizing conceptions of citizenship. Narrative of eternal Indian enemy The final historically rooted obstacle to democratic consolidation in Pakistan is the deeply embedded view that India’s geostrategic ambitions pose an existential threat to Pakistan. This narrative has been given fillip by the three wars fought with India since independence. Rather than motivating investment in social and economic development, as it has in many East Asian countries, the perception of high degree of external threat has led Pakistan to prioritize military budgets and neglect investments in social welfare. Unless and until a more secure Pakistan is equated with a healthy and well-educated Pakistani people to the same degree that it is currently equated with military spending, democratic consolidation remains at risk. The narrative of India as a major threat to Pakistan’s very existence has undermined democratic politics in three discrete ways over time. First, this narrative led Pakistan to forge a geostrategic alliance with the United States that has steadily empowered the military relative to other domestic actors and therefore critically enabled military coups. Upon independence, Pakistan immediately clashed with India over the control of Kashmir. Pakistan’s inferior conventional arms capability led its generals to actively court an alliance with the United States. Pakistan’s predominant goal in forging this alliance was to compensate for India’s conventional arms superiority. Pakistan received access to sophisticated US-made weapons, which helped to strengthen the Pakistani military vis-à-vis India.27 The US role in undermining democratic ideals in Pakistan was perhaps most clear in 1971, when because of Pakistan’s mediation in the US opening towards China, the Nixon administration was conspicuously silent as West Pakistan undertook a large-scale killing spree against a democratically elected government in East Pakistan.28 Over time, this alliance has evolved considerably. But then and now, its overall effect has been to augment the importance of the military as a domestic actor and therefore to diminish the possibilities for enduring democratic reform that hinge on effective civilian control of the military. The second way in which the narrative of a deep-seated Indian threat has fed democratic weakening is that it has spawned a domestic terror network that is now undermining Pakistan’s internal peace and stability. The United States entered into an alliance with Pakistan to maintain a regional bulwark against Soviet communism in 1953. After the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the United States funded and trained the Afghan mujahideen. These mujahideen networks have blown back in the form of pervasive terror attacks within Pakistan’s own borders. When the United States began to wash its hands of Pakistan after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, it also cut off the supply of military spare parts and refused to deliver paid military equipment. The Pakistani military met its strategic goal of balancing against India by re-deploying

Enduring challenges to democracy 47 the mujahideen to fight a war against India in Kashmir and by supporting a Taliban government in Afghanistan that would protect its interests against India. This low-intensity conflict in Kashmir in the end accomplished little, while Pakistan’s support for Taliban, increasingly linked up with Al Qaeda, has steadily fed an internal security crisis.29 Third, the focus on India as a threat has been directly used by the military to justify its seizure of power, thereby hindering any serious progress towards democratic consolidation. In the 1999 Kargil conflict, General Musharraf ordered the army to cross the Line of Control in Kashmir without fully informing the prime minister. When Sharif tried to prevent Musharraf ’s return to Pakistan from a trip abroad later that year, the fourth military coup ensued. As most observers understand, the most crucial challenge to Pakistan’s democratic consolidation is containing the predatory ambition of the military. This requires changing the self-image of the military as the sole competent guardian of national interests.30 As long as India is seen as the primary axis around which foreign policy revolves, this is unlikely to happen.

A new dawn! The last decade has witnessed myriad changes in Pakistan’s politics. The many pro-democratic developments in the country – two sets of fair elections, the growth of new political movements, a newly vigorous judiciary, heightened media scrutiny, and most of all the constitutionally-determined transfer of power between opposing political parties that have served out their full terms – have been matched by anti-democratic trends, especially the security quagmire and economic crisis. The upshot of these mutually conflicting trends on the future of current democratic transition is however not yet fully clear. Three democracyconducive trends during this period are worth mentioning. First, a propitious change in the nature of Pakistani politics is the growth of a more autonomous judiciary. In the past, Pakistani courts endorsed military coups ex post facto through the “doctrine of necessity”.31 This changed after Musharraf appointed Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry as Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Justice Chaudhry surprisingly began to rule against the Musharraf government on issues that judiciaries of the past had typically dismissed. When General Musharraf recognized that Chaudhry’s newfound activism might threaten his chances of prolonging his rule, he tried to put the chief justice on compulsory leave in July 2007. In an unprecedented display of institutional independence, Justice Chaudhry contested these charges. He was supported by a cross-section of lawyers and liberal elites, who protested for months on behalf of Justice Chaudhry’s reinstatement. When the Supreme Court subsequently ruled the dismissal unconstitutional, Musharraf declared a state of emergency. But after weeks of vigorous and well-publicized dissent, Musharraf resigned his army position and consented to hold elections in 2008. What is new about these developments is the unprecedented groundswell of support in the name of judicial independence. The Supreme Court’s successes in resisting military rule have

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emboldened the Court to be increasingly active in the past several years, so much so that it has raised concerns over whether it is overstepping its mandate. The Court has used its original jurisdiction under Article 184(3) of the Constitution (its suo motu powers) so often that independent observers have raised questions over the arbitrary use of the courts’ jurisdiction.32 Second, the past decade has also seen hitherto rival political parties initiating a critical pro-democratic constitutional reform process. The short-term focus on narrow political gain that was so conspicuous in the 1990s has attenuated noticeably and the 2008–2013 Parliament saw the PML-N and PPP forming a coalition and passing three constitutional amendments. Of these, the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution removed presidential power to dismiss elected governments and further limited presidential power in a variety of ways, a signal that elites may be learning from their earlier attempts at democratic reform.33 Moreover, the Parliament has used its term to pass a number of needed reforms – such as the Criminal Law Act protecting women from the legal disinheritance of property and the Acid Control and Acid Crime Prevention Bill, and provided for substantial decentralization of power to the provinces.34 The cooperation between the PPP and the PML-N could portend a new understanding of the necessity of a united front against military intervention, even as new parties like the PTI make their mark in the political fray and potentially destabilize what appears to be a more united front against military intervention. Third, beyond the realm of formal political institutions, the widening of media outlets is an encouraging influence for democratic supporters. Asserting control over media messages had been the military’s first step in asserting autocratic control over the state in previous dismissals or coups. The army seized the Pakistan Television network almost simultaneously with the announcement of state power in 1999. This was a wholly feasible act when Pakistan possessed three television channels. However, today, when Pakistan has over 50 privately owned TV channels, and 170 FM radio channels,35 there is no readily available focal point for muzzling media should the military deem it necessary. The explosion in formal media outlets has been amplified (and democratized) by the rise of social media. Over the past decade, mobile phone ownership grew at an astoundingly fast rate in Pakistan, with 53 per cent of the adult population now owning a cellphone, up from just 5 per cent in 2002.36 In a country where 63 per cent of the population is under the age of 25, the mushrooming of technological savvy and the diversity of news sources are expanding expectations of not just information but performance. The changes in media penetration of Pakistani society were manifest in the 2013 elections, when mobile networks were used to report instances of voter intimidation. Imran Khan’s PTI movement, extremely popular among the liberal urban youth, used a popular social media-based campaign strategy. Even established media outlets are now using social media as a way of generating ideas for news stories. The rise of television and radio broadcasts in local languages has also lowered the barriers to media entry for many Pakistanis. So long as this new engagement can be channelled into organized political participation, it bodes well for Pakistan’s democratic consolidation.

Enduring challenges to democracy 49 It is in this backdrop that the May 2013 elections paved the way for a civilian government fully serving out a parliamentary term and passing the governing baton to an opposing political party. In exit polls, 87 per cent of voters felt confident that their vote mattered, the highest level of optimism since 1990.37 For these reasons alone, the 2013 election stood out as a glimmer of hope against the predictable civilian-military tango of the past several decades. But there were also other reasons to hope that these elections themselves portend change. One was that a sorely needed youth engagement had begun to materialize. But if Imran Khan was the darling of the urban, educated middle class, the PML-N basically won over everyone else: among the least-educated segment of the population, the PML-N won by a 24 per cent margin over the PTI. Among the college educated, the PML-N lost by a 5 per cent margin.38 Should democratic politics continue to consolidate in Pakistan, this burger versus bun-kebab divide is likely to feature prominently.39 Another upside of the PML-N’s ability to singlehandedly form the government is that clear lines of accountability are created. Sharif cannot blame coalition partners for what his government does not achieve. How the PML-N government will be judged during the next elections can almost be summed up in a single word: electricity.40 Sharif recognized that the crippling power crisis should be his immediate priority. After assuming power, he brokered a deal with China to build a new nuclear power complex. In 2015, the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor agreement was concluded, with the aim of linking the Gawadr port in Balochistan with China’s Xinjiang province through an extensive network of rail and road as well as overcoming Pakistan’s severe energy crisis.41 In the longer run, addressing Pakistan’s structural problems (concerning balance of payments, economic growth and job creation) will require growing tax revenues, currently among the lowest in the world, and other elements of a broad economic reforms package.42 Pakistan’s persisting security quagmire is another major hurdle to democratization, which will take a long time to overcome. For it is rooted essentially in the country’s questionable track record in combating terrorism in the region. Despite claiming to be a frontline ally in the US-led War on Terror,43 the Pakistani military has secretly supported the Taliban as an insurance against India in Afghanistan once US-led international commitment to its security erodes.44 This has resulted in the mushrooming of militant groups that threaten national security.45 The consequent spiral in domestic terror attacks has permeated almost every facet of civilian life in Pakistan.46 Yet, in a Pew Research Center survey on the eve of 2013 elections, more Pakistanis (52 per cent) still felt India posed a serious threat to the country than the Taliban (48 per cent), reflecting the depth of the public’s anti-Indian sentiment.47 Pakistan’s subsequent tensions with India may have only fuelled these anti-India public sentiments. Since June 2014, the military has indeed operated more seriously against local Taliban groups, and the establishment of military courts may have enhanced its deterrent capacity against domestic terrorism. Yet, it still maintains strategic alliance with Afghan Taliban and anti-India jihadi groups. Paradoxically, the intensified terrorism

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problem has itself become the key reason for the military’s resurgence, especially after the December 2014 Peshawar school attack, further weakening the PML-N government.

Conclusion Despite the many distinctive features and accomplishments of Pakistan’s post2008 democratic transition process, nothing much has happened with regards to tackling the traditional sources of the civil–military power equilibrium in the country. The 2014 confrontation with Imran Khan has left Nawaz Sharif with an even more immediate concern: sheer political survival. In trying to stay in office for the short term, however, Sharif may well have done the one thing, i.e. calling in the army leadership to mediate between rival politicians, that complicates his long-term agenda of placing the military under civilian control. The fact that the military now micromanages national security affairs – for instance, by steering the management of law and order in Karachi through the Apex Committee in Sindh – and has been able to assert itself politically on the national political scene since the 2014 protests confirms the continuing weakness of the civilian political parties. The minorities of the country, including religious and ethnic, continue to be marginalized, with both the state establishment and civilian regime showing no inclination to do away with the founding paradox of Islamic ideology being the basis of a religiously and ethnically diverse national fabric. Finally, renewed tensions with India have undermined the Sharif regime’s ability to improve relations with the traditional rival – a development that reinforces the military’s ability to dominate internal politics on the basis of the continuing threat from India. The future of democracy in Pakistan still largely hinges on tackling the same problems it has confronted since independence. First, the country must develop more programmatic and internally democratic political parties; second, the pervasive myth of India as Pakistan’s archenemy must be marginalized so that the state can sideline the military’s rationale for intervention and focus on investing resources and energies into boosting the abysmal state of human and social development; and third, the close identification of Sunni Islam with Pakistani citizenship must be decoupled in order to escape the polarizing and ultimately anti-developmental nature of current political debates.

Notes 1 While there were certainly incidents of vote rigging (there were handfuls of districts in which voter turnout was reported to exceed 100 per cent, a sure sign of election rigging), the critical question for the current crisis is whether such rigging systematically favoured a particular party. Given Sharif ’s large margin of victory, no serious observer of Pakistani politics, including international election monitors, has called the elections systematically rigged. 2 ‘Pakistani army chief mediates, meets Imran Khan, cleric Tahir-ul-Qadri’, NDTV, 29 August 2014. Available at www.ndtv.com/article/world/pakistan-army-chief-mediatesmeets-imran-khan-cleric-tahir-ul-qadri-583463 (accessed 23 March 2016).

Enduring challenges to democracy 51 3 ‘Pakistan protests: Imran Khan in a tight spot’, BBC News Online, 1 November 2014. Available at www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-29845232 (accessed 5 March 2016). 4 Hasan A. Rizvi, ‘The civil-military hybrid’, The Express Tribune, 23 February 2015. 5 Siegfried O. Wolf, Formal Institutionalization of Military Rule: The 21st Amendment in Pakistan, Briefing Paper No. 71 (Durham: Pakistan Security Research Unit, University of Durham, May 2015). 6 John B. Londregan and Keith T. Poole, ‘Poverty, the coup trap, and the seizure of executive power’, World Politics 42/2 (1990), pp. 151–183. 7 For details, see Maya Tudor, The Promise of Power: The Origins of Democracy in India and Autocracy in Pakistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 8 The conceptualization of a ‘politics of musical chairs’, defined as the continual reshuffling of the same handful of characters to prevent any single individual from amassing too much political power, was coined by Joel Migdal, State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). For the application of this concept to Pakistan’s formative political decade, see Tudor, The Promise of Power: The Origins of Democracy in India and Autocracy in Pakistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013). 9 Rounaq Jahan, Bangladesh Politics: Problems and Issues (Dhaka: Dhaka University Press, 1980). 10 Through Pakistan’s first-past-the-post voting system, however, a minority of votes translated into a majority of seats. 11 Tahir Mehdi, ‘The politics of ID cards’, Dawn, 17 June 2012. Available at www. dawn.com/news/727369/the-politics-of-id-cards (accessed 26 March 2015). 12 Aqil Shah, The Army and Democracy (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2014), p. 168. 13 Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005). 14 Maleela Lodhi, Pakistan’s Encounter with Democracy (Lahore: Vanguard Publishers, 2005), pp. 146–147. 15 ‘Nawaz blames Musharraf for Kargil’, The Times of India, 26 May 2006. 16 Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2004). 17 Ishrat Husain, Pakistan: The Economy of an Elitist State (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 19. 18 See Jason Burke, ‘Pakistan elections: why feudal ties no longer bind for voters’, Guardian, 5 May 2013; ‘Pakistan’s waning feudalism: gone with the wind’, The Economist, 18 May 2013. 19 T.V. Paul, The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014). 20 Address by Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah at Lahore Session of Muslim League, March, 1940 (Islamabad: Directorate of Films and Publishing, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, 1983), pp. 5–23. Available at www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00islamlinks/txt_jinnah_lahore_ 1940.html (accessed 2 March 2015). 21 See Hanna Lerner, ‘Permissive constitutions, democracy, and religious freedom in India, Indonesia, Israel, and Turkey’, World Politics 65/4 (October 2013). 22 For details, see Farzana Shaikh, Making Sense of Pakistan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012). 23 Ahmed Rashid, ‘Pakistan’s extremist democracy’, New York Review of Books, 18 March 2013. Available at: www.nybooks.com/blogs/nyrblog/2013/mar/18/pakistanextremist-democracy (accessed 6 March 2015); ‘Sectarian violence increased in 2013, says report’, Dawn, 6 January 2014. 24 Nena Sahgal, ‘In Pakistan, most say Ahmadis are not Muslims’, Factank, 10 September 2013. Available at www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/09/10/in-pakistan-mostsay-ahmadis-are-not-muslim/ (accessed 9 July 2015).

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25 William Easterly, ‘The political economy of growth without development: a case study of Pakistan’, Paper for the Analytical Narratives of Growth Project, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, June 2001. Available at http:// williameasterly.files.wordpress.com/2010/08/9_-easterly_thepoliticaleconomyofgrowth withoutdevelopmentpakistan.pdf (accessed 5 March 2016). 26 See Adam Prezworski and Fernando Limongi, ‘Modernization: theories and facts’, World Politics 49/2 (1997), pp. 155–183; Carles Boix and Susan Stokes, ‘Endogenous democratization’, World Politics 55/4 (2003), pp. 517–543. 27 Zahid Hussain, The Scorpion’s Tail: The Relentless Rise of Islamic Militants in Pakistan – and How It Threatens America (New York: Free Press, 2013). 28 Gary Bass, The Blood Telegram: Nixon, Kissinger, and a Forgotten Genocide (New York: Knopf Publishing, 2013). 29 Zahid Hussain, The Scorpion’s Tail: The Relentless Rise of Islamic Militants in Pakistan – and How It Threatens America (New York: Free Press, 2013). 30 Aqil Shah, The Army and Democracy (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2014), p. 168. 31 Paula Newberg, Judging the State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 32 International Commission of Jurists. Authority Without Accountability: The Search for Justice in Pakistan (Geneva: ICJ, December 2013), pp. 40–55. 33 Nancy Bermeo, ‘Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship’, Comparative Politics 24/3 (2013), pp. 273–291. 34 International Crisis Group, Drones: Myths and Realities in Pakistan (Brussels: ICG, 2013), pp. 10–11. 35 International Federation of Journalists, Media and Gender in Pakistan, Country Report (Brussels: IFJ, March 2015), p. 1. 36 ‘The rise of mobile phone and social media in Pakistan’, Dawn, 6 November 2014. 37 Gallup Pakistan, The New Tide of Voter Turnout in Pakistan, Report No. 1 on Voter Turnout in Pakistan’s National Elections 2013. Available at http://gallup.com.pk/ election/Report1.pdf (accessed 9 January 2016). 38 Gallup Pakistan, The New Tide of Voter Turn-out in Pakistan, Report No. 3 on Voter Turn-out in Pakistan’s National Election: 2013. Available at http://gallup.com.pk/ election/Report3.pdf (accessed 9 July 2015). 39 Huma Yusuf, ‘Burgers and bun kebabs’, New York Times, 22 May 2013. Available at http://latitude.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/05/22/in-pakistan-even-jibes-about-food-suggestviolent-underlying-divisions/ (accessed 9 January 2016). 40 Gallup Pakistan, The New Tide of Voter Turn-out in Pakistan, Report No. 3 on Voter Turn-out in Pakistan’s National Election: 2013. Available at http://gallup.com.pk/ election/Report3.pdf (accessed 9 July 2015). 41 Hassan Khan, ‘Is China–Pakistan economic corridor really a game changer?’ Pakistan Today, 13 June 2015. 42 ‘Pakistan election: economic challenges facing Nawaz Sharif ’, BBC News Online, 4 June 2013. Available at www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-22770496 (accessed 10 May 2015). 43 ‘US threatened to bomb Pakistan’, BBC News Online, 22 September 2006. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/5369198.stm (accessed 2 May 2016). 44 Zahid Hussain, The Scorpion’s Tail: The Relentless Rise of Islamic Militants in Pakistan – and How It Threatens America (New York: Free Press, 2013). 45 Zachary Laub, Pakistan’s New Generation of Terrorists (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, 18 November 2013). 46 Mohsin Hamid, ‘Why they get Pakistan wrong’, New York Review of Books, 29 September 2011. 47 Pew Research Center, On Eve of Elections, a Dismal Public Mood in Pakistan, 7 May 2013. Available at www.pewglobal.org/2013/05/07/on-eve-of-elections-a-dismalpublic-mood-in-pakistan/ (accessed 9 April 2016).

3

Mapping the ‘Establishment’ Ayesha Siddiqa

Pakistan’s debut transition in 2013 from one civilian government completing its full term to another has led some scholars to argue that democratic rule in the country is strengthening and the civil–military balance is gradually tilting towards the civilians. A natural addendum to this approach is that improvement in governance will naturally result in advancement of the civil–military balance, as a professional army would have little need for direct intervention. Such a perspective offers a linear approach to understanding the dynamics of power politics and civil–military relations in Pakistan. To the contrary, a professionallyhierarchically designed military has a greater tendency to establish its hegemony by building multi-dimensional relationships. It is therefore wrong to assume that non-intervention is an indicator of democratic consolidation, as the military’s corporate interests may not necessarily demand direct involvement in politics. The military can still make gains through establishing linkages with civilian stakeholders and dominate the narrative, which ensures security of its organizational interests. Given that, while elaborating the recent trajectory of civil–military relations, this chapter maps out the powerful Establishment in Pakistan – the various players and their strategic connections with each other. It begins by laying down the theoretical context for civil–military relations as it relates to the history of military domination of politics and its current orientation in Pakistan. Then the various instruments of military control at present are discussed, constituents of the Establishment identified. On this basis, some valid conclusions about the future of current civilian transition are drawn in the end.

Introduction In his pioneering book, The Soldier and the State, published first in 1957, Huntington defined civil–military relations as an issue of civilian control of the military.1 A good balance of civil–military relations, he wrote, was where the armed forces are subservient to political leadership. Decades later, Feaver also talked about civil–military relations but argued that a good balance depended on the civilian leadership. Political governments that have the capacity to punish military for disobedience of any kind will manage to control the military better.2

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But what about socio-political cultures where governments are not developed to hold the armed forces accountable? Other authors such as Stepan,3 Perlmutter,4 and Janowitz5 added more to the literature while trying to define the diverse roles militaries played and how to attain objective control of the military by civilians. These authors wrote about cultures where militaries as organizations were more advanced than the civil society and the political class. Such states find it tedious to ensure a subservient military. These authors, especially those looking at Latin and South America, were of the view that, given the nature of state and society in these regions, the military has a far bigger task than envisioned by Huntington. These militaries are expected to perform tasks other than war fighting. While extending these perspectives further, we can argue that improving civil–military relations positively for the former becomes difficult in praetorian political cultures where predatory militaries find a way to expand their control through building multiple partnerships. In underdeveloped political structures, the militaries become political, which means that they are as conscious of the need for legitimacy as the political class. This, in turn, implies that the military may not directly intervene all the time but maintain its reputation of being a neutral arbiter that will overthrow a civilian dispensation only at a time of acute crisis in the country. However, even when it is not in power, the military watches over its interests and ensures their realization through building partnerships with other powerful segments of the society or creating power cliques to protect its interests. These stakeholders to national power, who would otherwise challenge the military, become its partners. They either enhance the military’s role or put up a lame resistance to military control. As a result, the military may opt to exercise direct or indirect control of the state depending on a host of factors including geo-political circumstances, but it will never surrender control of the state and its resources. There is always the possibility of a Turkish precedent, whereby a single actor can develop sufficient consensus to challenge the military’s control and draw people into an alternative patronage network. However, this requires a different kind of political culture in which the state led by a charismatic leader has the vision and capacity to dominate the thinking of an entire nation. Pakistan is another case in which a consensus around the military never developed to the same degree as in Turkey. What is peculiar about this case is that even the military, which evolved as a powerful institution, has not only developed its own patronage network but it is also connected with other networks to build partnerships. These partnerships are crucial, as they bring legitimacy to the military and, to some extent, to its partners amongst the civil society and political leadership. This chapter explores how the Establishment in Pakistan, which is dominated by the armed forces, is a multi-faced and multi-layered entity that describes the powerful oligarchy running the country. Mapping the Establishment means exploring the character and dynamics of Pakistan’s kleptocracy. Since 2007, the debate in Pakistan regarding transition to democracy indicates a sense of some change having taken place. Starting from the popular Lawyers’

Mapping the ‘Establishment’ 55 Movement of 2007, which shook the government of former dictator General Pervez Musharraf and pushed him to surrender power, many people believe that civil–military relations in Pakistan have entered a new phase. There is a general sense that the days of military takeover are over. During the five years of the previous civilian government (2008–2013), both the civilian and military leaderships often claimed to have a smooth working relationship. Analysts talked about how the then army chief and head of the ISI made presentations before the parliament, sharing operational details. As part of the larger argument of military subscribing to civilian control, it was claimed that the army was unable to conduct a military operation in North Waziristan against the Taliban due to unwillingness of the Nawaz Sharif government. However, amid the late 2014 political crisis gripping this government, former military officers and promilitary political analysts argued frequently in the media that the days of military takeover were not over. For instance, the former director general of InterServices Public Relations (ISPR) stated, “if you try to clip the army’s wings it will react, (on PM Sharif ’s case) the army has reacted”.6 On the issue of General Musharraf ’s court trial on charges of treason, the government was warned to avoid confrontation with the military, as this could jeopardize the democratic process. Clearly such arguments were meant to invoke the fear of military takeover amongst the people and the government. During the protests, the military also portrayed itself as a neutral arbiter, even while strong evidence existed about its covert support for the PTI and its aligned group led by cleric Tahirul Qadri protesting leadership to undermine the Sharif government – a purpose that seems to have been largely achieved. Despite many of Nawaz Sharif ’s political shortcomings, he had challenged the military’s prime patronage, which the army felt ought to be restored. The ISPR categorically denied having any links with protesting leaders Imran Khan or Qadri. In an official statement, its chief Major-General Asim Bajwa also talked about the army being apolitical. This was contrary to the fact of the army chief meeting Imran and Qadri and the army not intervening in pushing back the protesters who would certainly show deference to the armed forces and not use sticks to beat soldiers as they did with the police.7 Since these protests, and especially after the creation of the military courts under the Twenty-First Constitutional Amendment, the Nawaz Sharif government has reconciled to playing a subservient role to the military. The army will continue to burnish its image in the public eye and will use this to keep the civilian government under pressure. Civilians will be used to rubberstamp decisions that the army takes on issues like counter-terrorism, Afghanistan, India, the US and other security and foreign policy issues.8 At present, direct military takeover in Pakistan is a maximalist position in the trajectory of military influence. The absence of direct intervention, however, does not necessarily mean weakening of military control. Shah, in his recent work The Army and Democracy, lays out an organizational culture on the basis of hundreds of interviews of military officers and officials and assessment of military writings, which does not accept the superiority of civilian leadership.9 The Army remains entrenched in polity through its multiple political and societal

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partners. Building partnerships means direct intervention can be replaced for a long period with another process whereby the military remains entrenched in the polity to benefit and secure its interests. In this process, it will rule through multiple partners that are then part of the Establishment or the military fraternity, which comprises of the military as an organization, its serving and retired members as well as the civilians who are dependent on serving the interests of and benefiting from the military’s power. This concept is different from Rebecca Schiff ’s ‘concordance’ theory according to which the military, the political elite and the citizenry must have a cooperative relationship to ensure ‘objective control’.10 The partnerships are exploitative – the military uses partners to gain socio-political legitimacy and the latter associate with the former to enhance their power vis-à-vis other competitors.

Military’s hegemonic control Pakistan’s first peaceful transfer of power in 2013 from one elected government to another through the ballot box is certainly a milestone in the transition from military authoritarianism to democratization. Should this change be considered as a fundamental transformation of the polity or a cosmetic development? From Feaver’s point of view, elections represent a small step that does not necessarily indicate that democracy as a permanent value has been anchored in the state and societal system.11 Such an outcome depends on the building up of civilian capability to engage with the military but also a process through which greater political control over the state apparatus is established. A political military has greater capacity to negotiate its interests as is obvious from the case of Brazil’s transition to democracy during the mid-1980s. While the armed forces negotiated to vacate the presidency, it ensured that its prerogatives remained unchallenged. Such outcomes also depend on military’s ability to manoeuvre the political system.12 A professionally structured army with a protracted political role and ambition has greater capacity to manipulate a democratic system. It achieves this goal through establishing its hegemony, a process that Antonio Gramsci identifies as “a spontaneous consent given by the great masses of population to the general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group”13 which in Pakistan’s case is its military. Gramsci and Max Weber, though representing different normative and theoretical perspectives, talked about central control of “coercive apparatus in modern authoritarian states”.14 The military tends to maintain its prominent position in power politics in two ways: (a) manipulating the national narrative and (b) establishing control over both the state and society. The first component is ensured through emphasizing the significance of national security state ideology, which, as it has happened in other cases too, allows for the military’s expanded role in politics.15 Establishing control over the society, on the other hand, is achieved through both hard and soft coercion. Historically, the military has used coercion and continues to do so selectively. It tends to use national security to exercise control over peripheral areas and in

Mapping the ‘Establishment’ 57 the process use force. The Missing Persons case in Balochistan and the use of force in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) are two cases in point. In the case of Balochistan, people are allegedly picked up, held in habeas corpus and often killed. In the case of the latter, the military, conscious of its own need to seek political legitimacy, tends to use softer coercion in areas central to its own power. This is done through alignment of interests with key societal and political stakeholders and their subsequent manipulation. As part of the military fraternity, these allies play a critical role in negotiating control as they depend on military’s coercive protection for furthering their own interests. Such relationships are part of the process that allows negotiating with the political government. Thus, in the case of a crisis between the civilian dispensation and the military leadership, we can always return to what Stepan defined as the ‘Brumairean moments’. This refers to “strategic fractions of the bourgeoisie” abdicating their claim on power to the military.16 Given Pakistan’s sordid political history, the ‘Brumairean moments’ may not necessarily materialize in a coup but they can generate fear of coup that would force a weak political government to make compromises resulting in a ‘limited democracy’ or a political system where we can think in terms of a democraticallyelected-civilian garrison state. Furthermore, such moments can be a result of direct coercion but can also be caused by softer methods. The fear of losing opportunities or being deprived of share in state resources will bolster affinity for military control. Constantly being reminded of the military’s power or that the defence establishment is a critical representation of the raison d’être of the nation impresses upon the stakeholders the need to respect the organization as a primary power player. Waseem considers fragmentation and factionalism amongst the civil society and the political class as a cause for weakness of the political leadership, especially to negotiate power.17 Such fragmentation, however, becomes almost natural in a society ridden with “amoral familism”.18 This concept refers to a system in which each group focuses on maximizing its own interests and forms temporary coalitions to further their respective interests. Pakistan’s military has an expanded role in the state and society. It is not only a prominent political player but also a significant economic actor, which does not create monopolies but monopolizes resources along with its larger fraternity. Over years, the military has also developed the capacity of intellectual engagement with key stakeholders in society and significant socio-economic groups and classes (see Figure 3.1).

Military’s political power Pakistan’s armed forces are the primary stakeholder in the country’s power politics. In the country’s 67-year history, the army has played both an direct and indirect role in politics. A glance at Table 3.1, which forms part of Waseem’s study of civil–military relations, divides this period into five types. While the first two categories are self-explanatory, the third type pertains to the years when the army chief ‘oversaw’ politics from the backseat. This was a period when

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Political power

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Economic power

Intellectual control

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Figure 3.1 Military hegemony. Table 3.1 Patterns of rule in Pakistan Type

Duration

Period

1 Director military rule

17 years

1958–1962 1969–1971 1977–1985 1999–2002

2 Elected government under a military President

15 years

1962–1969 1985–1988 2002–2007

3 Elected government under a civilian President ‘Rule of Troika’

14+ years

1988–1999 2008–2009

4 Supremacy of the non-parliamentary forces under formal parliamentary rule

11 years

1947–1959

5 Civilian supremacy

6 years

1971–1977

civilian presidents served the interest of the military and sacked seemingly pretentious civilian governments by invoking Article 58 (2)(B) of the 1973 Constitution, which empowered the head of the state to dismiss the parliament. The fourth type refers to years when the civil bureaucracy played an influential role in partnership with the military. The fact is that the army had begun to gain

Mapping the ‘Establishment’ 59 influence in the mid-1950s when the army chief, General Ayub Khan, was appointed as the defence minister and included in the cabinet. The power increased with the first martial law imposed in 1958. General Ayub later became the president and held on to power until 1969 when he became unpopular and was removed by the then army chief General Yahya. The elections held in 1970 followed by a civil war in East Pakistan, a war and separation of the eastern wing from the federation, resulted in a crisis that eventually resulted in transfer of power to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto. General Zia, who continued in power until his death in a mysterious air crash in 1988, interrupted the civilian rule in 1977 with imposition of the third martial law. General Zia held elections on a non-political party basis in 1985, a government he sacked in 1987 using the aforementioned article. From 1988–1999, there were four governments, which lasted an average of two years after which they were sacked by the presidents and through the indirect intervention of the army. The military intervened directly in October 1999 and remained in control up until 2002. The elections held in 2002 brought a quasi-civilian regime, which continued in power until 2008. Since then, the country has had two elected civilian regimes, those led by the PPP and its successor, the PML-N. The military’s political influence or intervention in politics is through the following three methods: a b c

Direct intervention Partnering with civilian actors Former military officers in parliament and political parties

While the first dimension is self-explanatory and described earlier, the other two will be explained later. At this point, suffice to say that the military in Pakistan depends on building partnership amongst political and civil society stakeholders. Although military presidents are known to provide patronage to and take over existing political party structures, thus far, the military is not inclined, as in some Latin American countries or Bangladesh, to make its own political party. The usual pattern is to put the army’s organizational weight behind one party or one faction of a party and then manufacture consent amongst political stakeholders who join the crowd favoured by the GHQ. The Islami Jamhoori Ittihad (IJI) created during the late 1980s to oppose Benazir Bhutto’s PPP, the MQM and the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid (PML-Q) are some of the examples of political forces developed with the military’s help. The only time generals have created parties is when they dabbled in politics themselves. In such instances, the military does not necessarily put its weight behind the general-politician. The tendency is to make use of existing and established political platforms. But referring to generals in politics, barring General Ayub, who tried to become a politician while being a military general and president, most others formed parties after retirement. These include generals like the former army chief General Mirza Aslam Beg (1988–1992) and General Musharraf. In both cases, the political fate of the parties has been quite disappointing. Musharraf

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launched his party after leaving the country in 2008. He believed that politicians from different parties would eventually join him.19 This did not happen essentially because the general’s own organization, the military, was unwilling to support his political adventure. The military’s key preference, however, remains building partnerships, an approach that is facilitated by the presence of promilitary officers getting elected to the parliament by aligning with the existing political parties. Interestingly, it is mostly these pro-military politicians who chair the parliamentary committees on defence and foreign policy or are its members. In any case, there is no history of any substantive discussion in the parliament on defence issues. In one particular case, opposition members in the parliament were not allowed to discuss a case pertaining to military’s encroachment on the rights of fishermen.20 But this is not the extent of military intervention in politics. Every party seems to have people that have a closer link with the military and are often used by their party leaders to communicate with the GHQ. The positions these people take often forms the observation regarding the actual loyalty of such party members.21 What this also means is that being part of a government at a given time does not qualify a politician or a regime to become part of the Establishment. In instances where the military is distrustful of the head of government or the state, the latter are not considered as insiders to the Establishment or the powerful oligarchy. The army, for instance, never trusted Benazir Bhutto.22 It has over time built a similar perception about Nawaz Sharif.

Military’s economic power Pakistan’s armed forces are also a prominent economic actor. Besides its annual share of the government’s financial resources in the form of the defence budget, the military takes a large share of the overall national resources. There is a constant flow of resources from the civilian sector to the military. The example of the Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa government contributing Rs.100 million to the flood relief fund in September 2014 is a case in point.23 This is despite the fact that the government pays for the equipment, personnel and maintenance of the defence infrastructure. The real story, however, is that of the defence services having built a large commercial empire by using their political influence rather than professional capabilities. Rather than using its defence industry for moneymaking (the defence industry is operated by the armed forces but is not of the level which would help fetch money), the military is involved in civilian commercial ventures ranging from fertilizer and cement manufacture to private security, real estate and education. The military is present in all three major sectors of the economy, including agriculture, the service industry and manufacturing industry. It operates in the formal, informal and illegal segments of the economy. The military’s commercial empire is a three-tiered structure: a

Military’s small cooperative-type ventures involving the organization (China style)

Mapping the ‘Establishment’ 61 b c

Operations by military’s subsidiaries using pension funds (Turkey style) Ventures by retired personnel representing predatory behaviour of the echelons (Latin American style)

This economic power feeds directly into the military’s political strength for two main reasons. First, it enhances the military’s sense of autonomy. This is necessary particularly in a socio-political environment where the armed forces consider civilians as undependable and inferior. Second, it increases the military’s confidence in its own survival especially where there is a trust deficit vis-à-vis the political leadership. In the words of the German military analyst Peter Lock, It is for example conceivable that the military elite anticipates a profound crisis of the state and seeks its own productive resources aiming at autonomy and institutional stability in the midst of the turmoil shattering the civil society. The adoption of such a strategy presupposes an elitist selfimage of the military.24 In Pakistan’s case, the military embarked upon commercial ventures by using its influence on defence matters. Unlike India, where a share of the war veterans’ fund transferred by the British at the time of partition was distributed amongst the stakeholders, Pakistan’s military chose to set up its own industrial units. In the ensuing years, the commercial empire expanded, with the military using its political influence to expand its financial stakes. This economic process is now a cyclical process: political power resulting in greater economic stakes, which, in turn, encourage the officer cadre to extend the organization’s political power.

Military’s intellectual control One of the primary methods employed by the military for societal control is through dominance of the national narrative. This is achieved through (a) overemphasizing external threat and significance of military security, (b) glorifying the military and presenting it as the only credible alternative, and (c) amplifying the shortcomings of political actors and institutions. A recent example pertains to the media’s presentation of the military’s relief efforts during the 2010 floods in Pakistan. All media channels glorified the military and degraded the efforts of the political government as if the military was independent of the government. The intellectual control, on the other hand, is realized through militarization of the national narrative and influencing elements that help in opinion making. For instance, the conspiracy mindset of the average Pakistani, who believes that India, the US and Israel are behind all national crises, helps in creating insecurity and fear, which strengthens military’s control of society. The military poses as the only institution that has Pakistan’s interests at heart and the capability to protect the country. The encouragement provided to religious right and militant groups, which deepens the society’s ideological tilt, makes it convenient to market the GHQ’s brand of nationalism. There, of course, is also the alternative

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image of the military fighting the Taliban that helps the liberal segments support the army rather than any other institution.25 The militarization of thought is not just a coincidence, but a process carried out institutionally. In fact, a glance at Figure 3.1 will indicate multiple actors used to engage with the civil society. This engagement reflects a shift from using coercive methods only, which happened up until the end of the 1980s, to using a mix of hard and soft coercion. The intelligence agency’s act of picking up people engaged in what the military considers as nefarious activities, without putting them through a legal system, is meant to inculcate fear. Softer coercion involves active engagement with various civil society actors with the intent of drawing them into a partnership. Activities often comprise of engaging media, academia and think-tanks through financing public sector universities and creating a network of young academics and media persons. Not to mention the role being played by senior commanders who regularly meet top media persons and other civil society actors to sell the army’s point of view. The military’s presence in the aforementioned three areas of activity tends to generate diverse partnerships, which are important in establishing the ‘superordinate-subordinate’ relationship with the civilian sector mentioned by Saeed Shafqat in his book on the civil–military relationship.26 Although his analysis is limited to politics, over the years the military has penetrated all segments of the state and society. This does not necessarily mean that the military wants to rule the country all the time, but it certainly aims to remain at the top of power politics and a leader of an informal club of powerful stakeholders generally referred to as the Establishment. There is also the possibility of conflict emerging between the military and other members or amongst various members themselves. However, such conflict, as is obvious from the recent media-military spat, is a natural consequence of the battle for dominance of the Establishment, or a particular calculation of a media group and the civilian government to change the power balance within the Establishment.27 The political crisis that erupted in August 2014 was not the first or last of its kind, because it indicates the contestation that has been happening since the creation of the state for dominance of power politics. The military resurgence since this crisis reinforces this thesis.

Mapping the Establishment The traditional civil–military relations theory looks at civil–military as two opposing poles. It simplistically looks at the issue of a better civil–military balance as one of formal civilian control of the military. However, looking at elite relations or the overall power dynamics in a linear fashion does not explain the overall relationship amongst the stakeholders or behaviour of the state. Nor does it explain that the conflict and contestation between the various stakeholders is not the only method of reviewing their relationship. There is also an element of cooperation based on shared interests of the elite groups. While Pakistan appears to be a case of a non-stop battle between civilian versus military

Mapping the ‘Establishment’ 63 forces, the fact is also that these seemingly opposing pillars of the state and society have become intertwined mainly because of shared interests. It can be argued that conflict is natural in explaining the inner contestation between competing stakeholders. The relative political power that various players have is to compete for dominance of the political process. Competition amongst various actors and their interests lies at the heart of the state-society relationship. It is this competition that shapes politics.28 The competition also generates tension amongst the various competitors caused by the strife and uncertainty that is characteristic of the struggle which accompanies the allocation of resources.29 In Pakistan, the military remains fundamental to the Establishment and in defining its contours. The perceived monopoly over violence that it enjoys makes it both a stakeholder and a tool that other members of the elite group may want to use to bargain for a bigger share of power and resources. The defence establishment also plays a critical role in the formulation of new power groups and helping certain other stakeholders climb up the ladder into the elite circle. Thus, the organization is intrinsically part of the elite formation process. What this means is that reducing the power of the military will not be possible without a serious shift in the nature of Pakistan’s elitist polity or a major contestation within the larger group. While theorizing the “crisis of an overdeveloped state”, Alavi describes three dominant elite classes: (a) landed-feudal, (b) indigenous bourgeoisie, and (c) metropolitan capital.30 The state’s bureaucracy was meant to serve the interest of this ruling elite. Thus, the main problem that hinders metamorphosis of civil– military relations in Pakistan is not just of military’s excessive power but the predatory and authoritarian nature of the ruling elite. The military’s power in relation to other stakeholders also depends on how it manages to legitimize itself, which means justifying its excessive power and frequent political intervention. Although Pakistani people support the idea of democracy and the democratic process, there is also the tendency to seek the military’s intervention in times of political chaos, a situation no different from similar situations in Latin America. Since the society seems to have militarized and turned praetorian, the ruling elite and general public, especially from the dominant ethnic group of Punjabis, accept the military’s role as a political arbiter. In the last nearly seven decades, the armed forces have progressed from the category of what was defined by Perlmutter as “arbiter” military to being a “parent-guardian”31 type, which establishes partnership with various societal and political players to perpetuate its role permanently. Turkey and Indonesia also fall in the same category.32 This kind of perpetuation of power depends on the legitimizing of the military’s role, which is achieved not through direct control but by aligning with major societal players and the ruling elite, who then ensure that the military remains in constant circulation. While the use of force is one formula to sustain power, the other dimension to establish the role of an arbiter is to forge relationships. Before describing what constitutes the Establishment, it is vital to make three points. First, as argued by Waseem33 and Shafqat34, Pakistan’s polity is essentially

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bureaucratic in nature. The state was developed as a bureaucratic polity in which the state bureaucracy had a larger part to play than politicians. Politicians and political parties were used mainly to seek legitimacy in the eyes of the public. It is noteworthy that political legitimacy is as essential for a political army as the political leadership. Therefore, we see the military make room for political rule every ten years which is only interrupted if and when there is a threat to the military’s core interests. This also explains why the politicians tend not to learn from their past mistakes. Such behaviour also makes the military vital for the political process, as it is the prime arbiter and often creator of a new power elite. From a political perspective, the military, in fact, was responsible for creating three sets of elite: (a) during the 1950s, (b) the 1980s, and (c) 2000s. This is mainly done through providing access to both legitimate and illegitimate opportunities to extract resources, and selecting new set of individuals that can play the role of the military’s cronies. The local bodies elections are a sure method to achieve such an objective. Second, as Alavi argued, the state bureaucracy’s (civil and military) interests were intertwined with those of the ruling elite, and the state bureaucracies were meant to serve elite interests. Such over-concentration of power made the civil and military bureaucracy powerful stakeholders, and turned the military into an independent class itself that negotiated its interests and contested for resources along with other elite groups. Third, the linkages between various elite groups were further expanded due to personal ties. A detailed analysis of family linkages would show a hyper-connectivity between the various elite groups. It is common to observe a power elite having interests in various political parties with opposing ideologies and political agendas. But this is no longer limited to political parties only. Hence, the powerful Establishment always comprises of a primary group, which is aided by a secondary group of beneficiaries. It is the prime actors who form the core of the Establishment. Cohen, in his book The Idea of Pakistan, talks about an elite group that runs the country. He mentions a small but “culturally and socially intertwined elite” comprising of about 500 people that form part of the Establishment. Belonging to different sub-groups, these people are known for their loyalty to the “core principles” of a central state.35 This number refers to powerful individuals who may play a critical role in the political process or policymaking at large. But it does not refer to other groups that have enjoyed a share in power from time to time (see Table 3.2). Mapping the Establishment would require detailed information on the role played by different organizations and individuals at different times in the country’s history. Furthermore, given that picking out individual power players requires a perfect data set, the assessment in this study is limited to identifying broad categories and their relationship with the Establishment. This does not mean that every individual of that group is powerful. However, given the important role that a group or institution have in politics at a particular time, its powerbase would create natural opportunities for its larger membership. Some members may benefit due to their closeness to primary players within a certain

Mapping the ‘Establishment’ 65 36

Table 3.2 Mapping the Establishment 1947–1954:

(Primary) LF + TIs + CB + Mil (Secondary) TMs + LC + Media

1954–1971:

(Primary) Mil + CB + LF + TIs + B&I (Secondary) LC + PMIs + Media

1971–1977:

(Primary) LF + TIs + CB + Mil (Secondary) Mil + B&I + LC + Media + PMIs

1977–1988:

(Primary) Mil + CB + B&I + PMIs (Secondary) LF + TIs + LC + Media

1988–1999:

(Primary) Mil + B&I + CB + PMIs (Secondary) LF + TIs + Media + LC

1999–2001:

(Primary) Mil + B&I + CB + PMIs + Media (Secondary) LF + TIs + LC + NGOSec + ForExp

2001–2008:

(Primary) Mil + B&I + CB + Media + PMIs (Secondary) LF + TIs + LC

2008–to date

(Primary) Mil + B&I + CB + Media + LC (Secondary) LF + TIs + NGOSec + ForExp

group, which will determine whether they are part of the core group of individuals that determine state policies. The civil and military bureaucracy in Pakistan was always part of the primary group of players. The military had gained power even during the early years after the country’s birth. This was primarily due to the role it had to play in the first war with India in 1947–1948. The war ensured the civilian government diverted almost 75 per cent of the central government’s expenditure on military security. Furthermore, the military was not reprimanded by the political leadership for its refusal to move the forces on the orders of the founding father, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who was then the governor-general. While the political leadership remained embroiled in solving problems pertaining to comparative regional balance between two wings of the country, the military established its autonomy. Thus, as Khuro writes in the biography of her father Ayub Khuro, the army would not allow the political government control over matters pertaining to weapons procurement.37 The military grew independent of the political establishment by evolving its self-autonomy over the decades. For instance, former army chief General Ashfaq Pervez Kiyani chaired a meeting of civilian bureaucrats to discuss matters of national security. His successor, General Raheel Sharif, is no different. While being projected by certain elements in the media known for their close contacts with the armed forces as sympathetic to democracy, the army chief kept up the tradition of intruding in the civilian domain. In September 2014, he extended the tenure of a serving general to a position meant for civilian bureaucracy.38 The military’s power was not even challenged during the five years of the popularly elected government of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1971–1977). Although the military’s economic role was challenged during the

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1970s,39 it still remained important for the political leadership. Bhutto was authoritarian and rebuilt the military to fulfill his ambitions of being leader of a military power in the Muslim world and the Third World. Despite the occasional tension between the military and civilian bureaucracy, the latter remains a prominent beneficiary of military power. This is mainly because the political army requires a bureaucracy to implement its orders and run the system, which the military cannot run on its own. Initially, it was the civil bureaucracy that brought the military to power assuming that it would manage a superordinate-subordinate relationship with the armed forces. But the military turned the tables soon after the first coup in 1958. The Ayub regime tried to establish its superiority vis-à-vis the civil bureaucracy by firing 303 bureaucrats for inefficiency and corruption. General Musharraf subsequently followed this formula as well by suspending about 1,000 civil servants. While such tactics do not ensure improved efficiency, it certainly manufactures a partnership with the military in a superordinate role. Mubashar Hassan, who served as finance minister in the Z.A. Bhutto government, however, believes that it is the bureaucrats who have always led the military by its nose.40 Such an impression exists because, as mentioned earlier, military officers eventually depend on civil servants to carry out orders regarding matters the former do not have any knowledge of. Ever since independence, the military and civil bureaucracy has emerged as a powerful actor in Pakistan. Contrary to the view that feudal landowners dominate the ruling oligarchy, the power of this group has gradually dwindled. According to Alavi, the feudal landowners were a powerful group at the time of independence. The feudal landowners were linked with the pirs representing Sufi shrines. This group is identified in Table 3.2 as Traditional Islamists (TIs). The feudal and TIs were associated with the British colonial state as well and served its interests. Sarah Ansari’s work on pirs of Sindh provides details of the colonial power clique, with pirs and feudal at its centre.41 While the feudal and tribal leaders continued to partner with the state and dominate the political system, their influence started to gradually erode with the strengthening of Pakistan as a bureaucratic polity. The military’s apparent effort to encourage grass-roots democracy through establishing a system of local government was always to create a parallel political patronage, which would reduce the power of the traditional elite. General Ayub Khan’s land reforms were also meant to reduce power of the feudal landowners. The results were attained, as there are now a handful of traditional feudal landowners in the parliament. The strength of the clan or baradari system may give an impression that it is people from the same clan who have remained in power. However, clan politics tends to be illusive in hiding the fact of how the powerful oligarchy tends to select individuals from a clan and bring them to both political and economic power. The example of Pakistan’s former prime minister and a PPP leader, Yusuf Raza Gillani, is a case in point. He is one of the many people who were selected during the Zia regime and built up politically in return for their allegiance to the regime. The parliament has a considerable number of people from rural areas who mostly represent

Mapping the ‘Establishment’ 67 the rural middle class (in terms of their origin) rather than the traditional feudal elite.42 During the 1950s and the 1960s, the military created a new group of actors – the Business and Industry. The Ayub regime provided financial resources to build up the domestic private sector. The government’s financial and institutional assistance was instrumental in creating large industrial and business houses in the country. The government established financial institutions such as the Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation to provide financial loans and other incentives to potential entrepreneurs.43 In fact, generals also aligned with the Big Business through building family links. General Ayub Khan’s son, for instance, became an entrepreneur and used his father’s connections to build himself up. Not to mention the fact that the military itself established industries starting from the 1950s with the objective of adding to the nascent industrial development in the country. This move brought the business community in closer contact with the military. The 1980s witnessed strengthening of the religious right and religious militants, which are identified in this study as Post-Modernist Islamists (PMIs). The encouragement of religious militancy had started during the mid-1970s as a mechanism to counter an unfriendly government in Afghanistan. This approach was pursued much more vigorously during the 1980s after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. In order to fight the war in Afghanistan, General Ziaul Haq provided patronage to religious parties such as Jamaat-e-Islami and Jamaat Ulema-e-Islam (JUI-F ).44 These parties were used to establish madrassas and expand their network all over the country from where militants could be recruited and trained for use as cannon fodder during the war. The militants proliferated both vertically and horizontally. They not only grew in numbers but also infiltrated national security policymaking. The military eventually developed a dependency on these militants for use as proxies on fronts strategic to the armed forces. Some of the militants such as Lashkar-e-Tayyiba and Jamaat-udDaawa (the Ahl-Hadith/Salafi network) and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, Lashkare-Jhangavi, Jaish-e-Muhammad and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (the Deobandi network) have expanded themselves in the political system and society at large. Representatives of these groups have become neo-feudal, acquiring the position of intermediaries between an agrarian pre-capitalist society and the state. The legal community also seems to have gained importance since the mid2000s. However, the echelons of this group were always entrenched with the Establishment. Kochanek’s work on significant interest groups in Pakistan45 identifies the legal community as one of the early entrants. Numerous judges passed judgments to favour military takeovers. Although former chief justice Iftikhar Chaudhry was popularly considered as a judge who challenged the military’s political role during the 2000s, more recent debates indicate that he might have been a case of favouring one set of military generals versus Musharraf. The political crisis that began in early 2007 allowed prominent members of the legal community to become major political players. The same period also saw the growing significance of the media and NGO sectors. Both these groups owe their

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power to General Musharraf. While the media gained power due to structural changes such as expansion and encouragement of the private sector, the NGOs proliferated due to the aid coming from outside to deal with poverty, extremism and other critical issues. In both cases, a partnership with the Establishment was critical for success. In the case of media, which has proven to be the most effective propaganda tool for the military, there are rich stories of penetration and control. It is worth noting that the power nexus revolves around mutual interests. Hence, even resourceful and socially influential Pakistani expatriates consider association with the Establishment beneficial. There are numerous Pakistanis in the UK, US, Europe and the Middle East who volunteer to become conduits of the Establishment. The expats are inclined to cooperate with the Establishment for several reasons such as identity issues they face in the countries they have migrated to. Additionally, it is easier to gain influence in country of origin, which they develop through the use of their money, contacts in country of residence and cooperation with the Establishment in Pakistan. Financing conferences and other events and providing inroads to the Pakistani Establishment in political circles in the country of residence are amongst the many activities undertaken for this purpose. The peculiar power relationship does not necessarily mean the end of internal conflict, since the elite is driven by its myopic self-interests and aims for enhancement of individual rents. They even use violence or threat of violence to negotiate a comparative position in the power hierarchy. In fact, violence is intrinsic to the politics of such an elitist system. Pakistan can thus be described as a ‘fragile natural state’ where elites threaten each other to enhance their position and vie for greater share in rents.46 Gaining the most dominant position in the elite hierarchy guarantees greater rents, which is what generates conflict as well. The greatest issue with such a system is that principles become secondary. Power, which can guarantee rents, becomes primary. Therefore, the various power stakeholders tend to partner with the military in such a manner that its capacity to carry out violence or the threat of it could determine the power of the non-military players. Unsurprisingly, therefore, force is now inbuilt into the socio-political system of the Pakistani state and its society.

Conclusion Is it appropriate to view civil–military relations in a linear trajectory? Or to assume that a simple control mechanism will ensure that armed forces do the civilian leadership’s bidding? A simple civilian administrative control does not signify anything, especially when civilians may not be inclined to keep the military on a tight leash. A powerful military would never surrender control or the ability to dominate the state and its resources. The more professionally structured a political army is the more methods it will adopt to protect its stakes. In fact, the military might do so in such a fashion that the people would get confused about who actually controls the state. This is not to argue that civilian

Mapping the ‘Establishment’ 69 leaders are not to blame. They are certainly responsible for allowing the military to develop political prowess unchecked. Today, the military in Pakistan does not necessarily aim for direct intervention, since it can achieve its organizational objectives while controlling politics from the back seat. Its resurgence in the aftermath of the 2014 anti-government protests is a clear manifestation of the persistence of hybrid-military rule47 in Pakistan. It is indeed a ‘parent-guardian’ military type that maintains control through constitutional-legal arrangements and building multiple partnerships in the civil society and the polity. The process of elite formulation and circulation in an authoritarian state and society makes armed forces and their monopoly over violence critical for groups or individuals that have climbed to positions of power. In fact, the relationship with the military is critical to ensure that an organization, which can use force, is a partner and could intervene on their behalf against older elite groups. In the past seven decades, Pakistan has experienced four cycles of elite circulation. The newer groups or individuals have maintained their links with various units of the armed forces. This is a two-way relationship because while the military shares and protects their interests, the latter protect military’s interests and ensure that a metamorphosis in politics does not take place.

Notes 1 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of CivilMilitary Relations (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 1957). 2 Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants, Agency, Oversight and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2005). 3 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988). 4 Amos Perlmutter, Modern Authoritarianism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981). 5 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (London: Free Press, 1964). 6 Yaroslav Trafimov, ‘Pakistan leader’s predicament shows power of the “deep state” ’, Wall Street Journal, 9 September 2014. 7 Sushant Sareen, Pakistan in 2015, IPCS Special Report # 170 (New Delhi: Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, January 2015), p. 3. 8 For details, see Ayesha Siddiqa, ‘Politics and the Military’, The Express Tribune, 4 September 2014. 9 See Aqil Shah, The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014). According to Shah, this attitude is built into the psyche of the officer during training in different institutions. For instance, at the National Defence University, very little time is given to explaining to the officer his role and the subservience to civilian authorities as laid down in the Constitution. Reading through pages of the army’s ‘Green Book’ that contains perspectives of different ranks of officers, one cannot miss the sense of suspicion that has deepened amongst the officers regarding the civilian leadership. The author narrates conversations in which officers expounded their ideas about how leaders needed to be trained and educated. The army has in fact laid out its plan to train civilians from different walks of life through its national security workshops. However, this is a training that introduces people to a particular perspective only.

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10 Rebecca L. Schiff, The Military and Domestic Politics: A Concordance Theory of Civil-Military Relations (London: Routledge, 2008). 11 Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants, Agency, Oversight and Civil–Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2005). 12 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988). 13 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 11. 14 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988). 15 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), p. 14. 16 Alfred Stepan, Rethinking Military Politics (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988), pp. 10–11. 17 Mohammad Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), p. 115. 18 Edward C. Banfield, The Moral Basis of a Backward Society (New York: Free Press, 1958), p. 85. 19 Author’s interview with General Musharraf, Washington, DC, 20 July 2011. 20 ‘Resolution on fishermen issue disallowed’, Dawn, 26 November 2004. 21 ‘Nisar, Aitzaz spat shatters veneer of parliament’s “unity” ’, The Express Tribune, 5 September 2014. 22 Aqil Shah, The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2014), pp. 165–185. 23 ‘Flood Relief: CM Khatak hands over Rs.100 million cheque to army chief ’, Dunya News, 17 September 2014. Available at http://dunyanews.tv/index.php/en/Pakistan/ 235949-Flood-relief-CM-Khatak-hands-over-Rs-100-million- (accessed 17 April 2016). 24 Peter Lock, ‘Exploring the changing role of the military in the economy’, paper presented at the International Conference on Soldiers in Business: Military as an Economic Actor, organized by Bonn International Center for Conversion (Jakarta, 17–19 October 2000), p. 9. 25 Author’s discussion with Pakistani scholar Pervez Hoodbhoy, Islamabad, 9 February 2011. 26 Saeed Shafqat, Civil–Military Relations in Pakistan (Boulder, Col: Westview Press, 1997). 27 Saeed Shah, ‘Pakistani military seeks shut down of leading TV news channel Geo’, Wall Street Journal, 4 May 2014. 28 Eric Nordlinger, On the Autonomy of the Democratic State (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1981). See also Clifford Greetz, Negara: the Theatre State in Nineteenth Century Bali (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981); Stephen Skowronek, Building a New American State: the Expansion of National Administrative Capacities (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Robert Dahl, Who Governs: Democracy and Power in an American City (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1961); and Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988). 29 Stephen D. Krasner, ‘Approaches to the state: alternative conceptions and historical dynamics’, Comparative Politics 16/2 (1984), p. 225. 30 Hamza Alavi, ‘The structure of peripheral capitalism’, in H. Alavi and T. Shanin (eds), Sociology of ‘Developing Societies’ (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982). See also Hamza Alavi, ‘Class and state’, in H. Gardezi and J. Rashid (eds), Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship (London: Zed Press, 1983). 31 Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc, Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy (London: Pluto Press, 2007).

Mapping the ‘Establishment’ 71 32 Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc, Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy (London: Pluto Press, 2007). 33 Mohammad Waseem, Politics and the State in Pakistan (Lahore: Progressive Publishers, 1989), p. 115. 34 Saeed Shafqat, Civil–Military Relations in Pakistan (Boulder, Col: Westview Press, 1997). 35 Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2004), p. 69. 36 LF = Landed-Feudal, Mil = Military, TMs = Trader-Merchant class, B&I = Business and Industry, CB = Civil Bureaucracy, LC = Legal Community (a glance at Kochanek’s work will show that the legal community was always part of the power elite. They were included in the initial legislatures and played a more formal role in the form of the judiciary), TIs = Traditional Islamists (pirs and sajjada nasheens), PMIs = Post-modernist Islamists (religious right and religious warriors), NGOSec = non-governmental sector, ForExp = Elite Foreign Expatriates that are increasingly becoming partners of the state bureaucracy and frequently channel money into military sponsored projects abroad. These connections are useful especially in terms of financing positions and endowments abroad that will service the interest of the bureaucracy. 37 Hamida Khuhro, Mohammad Ayub Khuhro A Life of Courage in Politics (Lahore: Ferozsons, 1998), pp. 439–440. 38 ‘Armyman to retain control over 42 cantonments’, Dawn, 8 September 2014. 39 Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc, Inside Pakistan’s Military Economy (London: Pluto Press, 2007).. 40 Author’s discussion with Dr Mubashar Hassan, Islamabad, 25 June 2010. 41 Sarah D. Ansari, Sufi, Saints and State Power: The Pirs of Sind, 1843–1947 (Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 42 Ayesha Siddiqa, ‘Pakistan’s modernity – between the military and militancy’, Economic and Political Weekly VLVI/51 (17 December 2011), p. 63. 43 Saeed Shafqat, Civil–Military Relations in Pakistan (Boulder, Col: Westview Press, 1997), p. 45. 44 Ayesha Siddiqa-Agha, Pakistan’s Arms Procurement and Military Buildup, 1979–99 In Search of a Policy (Basingstoke: Palgrave Press, 2001), pp. 76–77. 45 Stanley Kochanek, Interest Groups and Development Business and Politics in Pakistan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1983). 46 Douglass C. North, John Joseph Wallis and Barry R. Weingast, Violence and Social Orders (Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 47 Abdullah Zaidi, ‘An incomplete transition?’ The Friday Times, 20 March 2015.

4

New politics of the middle class Adnan Rafiq

The debate on politics in Pakistan continues to focus on the binaries of military rule versus electoral democracy. Even in most recently published studies, the primary contestation in Pakistan is considered to be still between the largely industrial or feudal political elite and the military, while the rest of the society is mostly ignored or treated as mere pawns in the game of high politics and deprived of agency. Yet there are some indications of changes in the polity and indeed the society in Pakistan over the last couple of decades that require deeper insight and systematic analysis. In particular, the country’s politics is being increasingly shaped by an unprecedented wave of urban mobilization. Therefore, contesting the established viewpoints, this chapter views political contestation in Pakistan as a three-way struggle for power among the military, the feudal-cumindustrial civilian elite and the newly emerging middle class. Two protest movements since 2007 provide the most vivid indicator to date of this triangular struggle for power. The most recent instance was the protest movement led by Imran Khan’s PTI, which is generally viewed as representing the urbanized youth of Pakistan, against the alleged rigging of the 2013 elections by the ruling PML-N. The military had ample opportunity to intervene, but it could not. Instead, a high stake poker game ensued between it and the PTI, the new entrant in the political arena, as well as the incumbent PML-N – with each vying to outsmart the other two. Eventually, the military appeared to have gained the most from the episode after striking an alleged deal with the government that gave it much of its lost ground since Pakistan’s return to civilian rule in 2008.1 The second instance was the Lawyers’ Movement, which began in March 2007 when Musharraf ’s military regime sacked the higher judiciary, and continued until its restoration by the PPP-led civilian government in March 2009. This nationwide protest movement provides credible evidence of the increasingly active political role being played by the urban middle class. While the PPP with its support base in rural Sindh had little appetite for a powerful judiciary, the PTI and PML-N, the parties largely representing the urban constituency (particularly the middle class to varying degrees), took the lead along with lawyers and other members of the civil society (again with urban middle class roots) in the movement for the restoration of judges. In fact, the emergence of an active

New politics of the middle class 73 judiciary and a vibrant media that has been generally hostile towards both the military regime and the PPP government represents an urban middle class discontent against both traditional political parties and military rule. This chapter therefore argues that behind these political developments lie the structural changes that the society is going through. Pakistan, for instance, is one of the fastest urbanizing countries in the world with one of the highest rates of urbanization among the South Asian countries. This has a profound impact on all aspects of the society, including environment, culture, infrastructure and politics. It also coincides with a few other trends that are increasingly shaping the socio-political realities of the country. The high growth rate and relatively shorter life spans mean that the country has a huge youth bulge where over 60 per cent of the population is under 25 years of age.2 Moreover, the economic growth (at an average of around 6 per cent during the 2000s) has given rise to a sizable middle class, mostly based in urban areas with markedly different aspirations compared to their rural counterparts. Lastly, the young, educated middle class urbanites are increasingly interested in politics to reshape the status quo that has prevailed since independence of the country in 1947. These socio-economic changes have led to the emergence of a new politically active middle class that desires increased political power, social recognition, and is more demanding of the state to respond to its needs and aspirations. This class of second-generation urbanites is less reliant on traditional kinship ties on the basis of which a patronage-based political system operates. It is in search of new forms of identities, and demands meritocracy, transparency, leaner and muscular governance, as well as an end to dynastic politics. Primarily the beneficiary of an expanding services industry, this political constituency has increasingly shown the capacity to sustain political action and has emerged as a key pressure group as well as an electoral block. The future of the democracy in Pakistan thus hinges on its ability to serve the growing needs and appetite for power and resources of this class. Its emergence and politicization must be seen within the context of deeper demographic and structural changes taking place in Pakistani society, which have resulted in new aspirants for political power and its diffusion among a much larger section of the society than ever before. Therefore, rather than studying Pakistan within the narrow confines of security studies, this chapter attempts to bridge the prevailing gap in knowledge by analysing the new socio-economic trends and their political implications in Pakistan. The role of the middle class in establishing and sustaining liberal democracies is well documented in the context of Western/developed countries, however evidence seems to be sketchy and at times contradictory in the cases of developing countries. In some countries such as Turkey, the emergence of the middle class has led to democratization, while in others like Malaysia, Singapore and Russia, the middle class, for having been served well under authoritarian regimes, has remained indifferent. There is, however, a consensus in literature3 that demographic changes do have a transformative effect on the socio-political structure of a country, and that they need to be systematically explored on a case-by-case basis.

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The chapter begins by introducing the traditional political structure of the country and discussing the key demographic trends shaping the contours of its contemporary politics, especially the history, context and causes of urbanization. It then analyses the size of the middle class and its various socio-economic characteristics as well as the major changes this demographic shift is bringing about in the traditional political structure. The concluding discussion points to the trajectory of current and future political trends based on the rapidly changing socioeconomic conditions.

Traditional political system The socio-political structures in the region constituting Pakistan have been shaped throughout history by the social structures of caste, tribe and ethnicity, which played a major role in determining an individual’s place in the society. The modern state structure in Pakistan however has its roots in the British colonial period when institutions such as the bureaucracy, judiciary and military were established along modern lines. The British significantly altered social life in the Indian subcontinent. In pre-British India, state mattered little in the daily lives of village communities who were effectively autonomous and regulated their affairs through primeval institutions of village councils where caste or position in the tribal hierarchy defined the role of community members.4 It was during the British rule that the role of the state in ordering social life increased. Dispute resolution and contract enforcement became the responsibility of the state represented by police, courts and the administrative apparatus. The integration of the Indian subcontinent with the imperial economy significantly altered the role of local actors. The “landholders”, for example, in a short span of time transformed into “landowners”, not through a long-winded organic economic change, but due to the largesse of the state.5 In short, the state was responsible for many processes of class formation that were alien to the pre-colonial Indian society and resulted in what is termed as an “over developed state” in an “under developed society”, a legacy that remains true in the view of many scholars in the case of Pakistan even today.6 During the British colonial period, the private ownership of land and relocation of millions of people to “canal colonies” led to the emergence of a feudal society where land became the primary distinction between various sections of society.7 Since independence, the landed aristocracy has been a willing partner with the military in sharing power in the country with the latter being the dominant player. Since the vast majority of the population resided in the rural areas and was dependent on agriculture, a patronage-based political system evolved where the landed elite provided the masses with limited access to the state. The newly independent country had inherited the colonial administration, including the bureaucracy and military, that was trained to maintain law and order and suppress people rather than to serve them. This state apparatus was effectively used by the ruling oligarchy to keep the politics within the domain of the elite.

New politics of the middle class 75 The industrialization during the 1960s under the military regime of Ayub Khan resulted in high economic growth, however inequality also rose massively. The emergence of socialism and communism on the global stage inspired many among the lower strata of society as well as the working class to launch a movement aimed at removing the Ayub regime from power.8 The labourers in the newly emerging industry as well as the peasants provided the force that managed to oust the first military dictator, who handed the reins of the country to his second-in-command General Yahya Khan. The first elections on the basis of “one man one vote” were held in 1970 and were unexpectedly swept by a newly established the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) in West Pakistan. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, a charismatic leader who had served as the foreign minister under Ayub but later quit the military regime, led the PPP. Despite being a scion of a landed family, Bhutto’s PPP fought the election under the socialist slogan of “roti, kapra aur makan” (food, clothing and shelter). Many of the party’s leaders were left-leaning intellectuals and student leaders. Surprisingly, the PPP managed to defeat established politicians and went on to form a government in a truncated Pakistan after the eastern wing separated to become independent Bangladesh. The remaining political elite finally succeeded in drafting a constitution for the country with a consensus that envisaged the country as an “Islamic Republic” with a federal parliamentary system of governance.9 The PPP-led government initiated a process of nationalization of the industry and land reforms. However, the party workers were not satisfied with these measures. Many of the leaders with a socialist bent left the party after developing differences with Mr Bhutto, who then reverted to traditional political elite, transforming the dominant class base of the party leadership. The right-wing parties, especially the religious parties, joined hands to form a formidable opposition and succeeded in achieving considerable concessions, including constitutionally declaring adherents of Ahmadi/Qadiani faith as non-Muslims. In the 1976 elections, the PPP government won a landslide victory. However, doubts were cast by the opposition on the fairness of election and the government was accused of massive rigging. It is generally believed that the PPP would have still won the elections by a decisive margin, but there did exist some evidence of electoral malpractice in some constituencies. A massive movement thus emerged against the newly formed government that culminated in another coup that brought General Ziaul Haq into power. By this time, most of the working class that initially got the PPP into power had been alienated and the traditional landed elite in the PPP was too divided and fearful of the military to react. Bhutto was thus hanged in what is considered a “judicial murder” in 1976.10 The industrial elite as well as the upper-middle classes despised Bhutto and the PPP and happily aligned themselves with the Zia regime. The new government also found religious parties a willing partner to provide much-needed legitimacy and went on to successfully break the power of trade unions and peasant associations. Subsequent elections held under the Zia regime on a non-party basis firmly reverted the politics to the caste and clan based patronage networks. Throughout the 1990s, patronage-based politics

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continued, culminating in another military coup that installed General Musharraf as the head of the state.11 The limited political process during the late 1980s onwards however also resulted in competition between the elite that, in turn, produced increased demand for “service delivery” among the electorate. In the absence of local bodies (except for a brief period during the Musharraf regime), the development projects in all constituencies remain firmly in the hands of elected members of provincial and national assemblies. Thus electoral politics is heavily influenced by the perceived ability of the candidates to deliver basic services, for example, the provision of electricity, gas, tapped water, sanitation and a communications network along with their ability to provide patronage when it comes to dealing with state institutions such as the police (thana), lower courts (kachehri) and land registry (patwari). This means that a candidate’s stance on policy issues and skills in law making has not been an important consideration for the electorate. While this empowers the civil and military bureaucracy to maintain its firm grip on policy making and strategic decision making, the politicians’ role remains largely limited to looking after infrastructure in their constituencies and grappling with unending demands from the electorate. The politics today in Pakistan largely remains that of “service delivery” – with all the political parties vowing to “serve” the people and compete with each other on the basis of a better track record in this regard.

Impending socio-economic changes Pakistan is the sixth most populous country in the world, with 185 million inhabitants according to the UN Population Division’s estimate.12 With the annual growth rate of 2.2 per cent, the population is expected to reach 335 million by 2050. High rate of growth, rampant poverty (with 70 million people living below the poverty line) and a faltering economy pose serious challenges for the government in terms of service delivery. In particular, urban areas are under stress due to the exponential rise in population that constitutes one of the major demographic changes that this chapter will discuss. Waves of urbanisation The last census held in Pakistan in 1998 shows that the total urban population is around 35 per cent with a projected rise to 50 per cent by 2030. Out of this, 49.7 per cent of the (urban) population is concentrated in six million-plus cities compared to only 17.7 per cent (in one million-plus cities) in 1951.13 While quite clearly the largest cities continue to grow, another important factor has been the growth of smaller cities and towns of between half to one million population. These towns are expected to more than double in size by 2025 at which point they will account for 11 per cent of the population.14 Since 1951, the major urban centres of Karachi and Gujranwala have grown nine times, while most of the other cities have grown six times. However there do

New politics of the middle class 77 400 350

Rural Urban Total

Population in millions

300 250 200 150 100 50 0

1951

1981

1998

2000

2010

2012

2030

2050

Year

Figure 4.1 Rural, urban and total population (actual and projected) in Pakistan. Source: World Bank, retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS?end= 2009&locations=PK&start=1960, accessed 11 July 2016.

exist some regional variations, for example, while nearly half of the populations in the most populous Punjab and Sindh provinces are urbanized, the percentage remains 16.7 per cent in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and 23.89 per cent in Baluchistan. Both of these provinces are, however, fast catching up with their capital cities of Peshawar and Quetta, expanding over 3.6 times between 1981 and 1998. Three major factors can be identified from the literature to account for the rampant urbanization in the country since independence. First was the partition of India that led to the creation of Pakistan. Second, internal migration, and the third being the international migration and the return of overseas Pakistanis. Another wave of migration had already occurred during colonial times when peasants from eastern Punjab (now part of India) were relocated to 4.5 million hectares of land that now constitutes Pakistani Punjab.15 The partition saw an influx of around 6.5 million Muslims to Pakistan while 4.5 million Hindus and Sikhs left for India. Most of these immigrants chose to live in the major urban areas, especially those in Punjab and Sindh. Large dwellings had to be divided into multiple smaller houses, and informal settlements occupied open spaces. These settlements have expanded over the years and become a regular feature of urban areas in Pakistan. The internal migration from villages to towns and cities is another major cause of urbanization in Pakistan. More than half of the rural population is

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landless and, for many people, migration to the city is the only hedge against fluctuations in wage, demand for labour and prices for essential commodities. The improvements in quality of life due to better health, sanitation and education facilities, social freedoms, as well as job opportunities, also attract citizens to the urban areas.16 Lastly, the large influx of migrants fuelled by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the resulting civil war in the country along with the return of overseas Pakistanis provide the third major cause of urbanization. Around ten million Afghans, mostly Pashtuns (an ethnic group inhabiting both Afghanistan and Pakistan) took refuge in Pakistan. Most of these are spread out in cities due to better work opportunities and awful living conditions in refugee camps. Over the last three decades, many of these Afghan refugees have settled in Pakistan despite not being given citizenship. They have caused significant demographic change in the biggest metropolitan city in Pakistan, Karachi, among others. The 1970s and 1980s saw the migration of over five million labourers to Saudi Arabia (61 per cent), other Gulf states (30 per cent) and the West (remainder). This has resulted in considerable remittances being received by their families from overseas and gradually many of these moved to the cities to access better facilities. Therefore, urbanization has been a cause, and a result, of upward social mobility, notwithstanding the presence of large slums and alarming urban poverty in the country.17 Many forms of urbanization have been witnessed in Pakistan’s recent history, ranging from temporary or seasonal migration by males to complete physical relocation of entire families to the urban and peri-urban areas. Urbanization has not only, however, meant movement from rural to urban areas, but it has also moved from the urban to rural areas in the form of changing economic and technological systems that have enormous impact on livelihoods and behaviour. This has resulted in a substantial increase in a mixed rural-urban livelihood system where households draw their income not just from a rural production system but also a more distant peri-urban, urban or even international economic system. This has led to gradual monetization of the barter-based rural economies and the emergence of consumerism. The shift in technology has brought an information revolution through mobile phones, internet and satellite channels, resulting in a quest for completely different lifestyles and aspirations.18 This has resulted in embedding a set of expectations in terms of service provisions by the state even in the far-flung corners of the country. Expansion of the middle class The second key demographic shift that is shaping contemporary Pakistan is the emergence of a young, educated middle class in the country. “Middle class” is one of the most widely used terms in social sciences, especially in economics, sociology and political science, however there is no consensus in the literature on its definition. Generally, it is used to describe those in a society that are “between” and separate from the rich (upper class) and the poor (lower class). The boundaries between these, however, remain vague and are measured using a

New politics of the middle class 79 variety of ways depending on the context in which the terms are used. According to the Marxist tradition, middle class resides between those who engage in manual labour for survival (the proletariat) and those who own the means of production (the bourgeoisie) and is sometimes referred to as the petty bourgeoisie. Weberian tradition in contrast locates the middle class as occupying the mid-position on the continuum of wealth, power and prestige. Recent developments in the world economy, however, have had a farreaching impact on the classical classification of society into the working and capitalist classes. The emergence of the knowledge economy, bolstered by the increasing degree of education, shift to digital communications and improvements in regulatory mechanisms have resulted in the growth of the service industry dominated by the white collar occupations, salaried and self-employed entrepreneurs and professionals. The size, influence and significance of this growing segment of the society seems to be increasing. This new professional class is different from petty bourgeoisie (that comprises of shopkeepers and small independent producers) and is increasingly distinguishing itself from other classes due to the skills it possesses and its ability to shape the discourse in public affairs. It is therefore important to explore the size and influence of middle class in Pakistan and the political behaviour it exhibits. This however poses the basic question of quantifying this segment of the society. Comprehensive studies on the middle class in Pakistan are scarce. Durr-e-Nayab offers a weighted composite index to estimate the middle class in Pakistan.19 Generally, middle class can be measured in relative terms (the position of this segment of society on a scale comprising various indices vis-à-vis other socio-economic groups within same context e.g. a country) or in absolute terms (a strict economic measure based on income, expenditure, assets or a combination of these, normally applied across the countries at global level). Nayab, however, uses a combination of relative and absolute approaches to take into consideration economic (e.g. wealth, income and occupation), political (status and power) and sociological (values, beliefs, lifestyle and education) dimensions. The indices used to segment the population include: Education (to qualify as a member of middle class, at least one individual in the household must have college education), Income (households with at least an income of double the poverty line), Housing (ownership of house with availability of electricity, gas and tapped water as well as a reasonable number of persons per room), Lifestyle (ownership of 23 consumer items such as various appliances and a motor vehicle) and Occupation (employment in non-manual occupations). The study classified Pakistani society into Lower Class (with sub-classes including lower-lower (LLC), middle-lower (MLC) and upper-lower (ULC)), Middle Class (lower-middle (LMC), middle-middle (MMC) and upper-middle (UMC)) and Upper Class. One can then take either a strict view of the middle class to only include the upper, middle and lower-middle class or an expanded view that also includes the upper-lower class (ULC) that is normally considered to be on the verge of entering the middle class with same/similar lifestyle

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Table 4.1 Percentage and numbers of strict and expanded middle class in Pakistan Middle class (strict view)

Middle class (expanded view)

Numbers (in millions) Total Urban Rural

32.5 22.6 9.8

61.0 38.5 22.4

Proportion (%) Total Urban Rural

18.8 32.9 32.5

34.6 53.7 20.9

Source: Durr-e-Nayab, Pakistan Development Review 50/1 (2011) (see note 19).

aspirations and worldview. A strict definition of the middle class puts the size of this segment at around 20 per cent (or 32.5 million), however an expanded view of the middle class increases this to around 35 per cent (or 61 million) of the population. Interestingly, in urban areas, the middle class ranges between 33 per cent of the population (strict view) and 54 per cent (using expanded view). The Asia Development Bank20 identifies Pakistan as being one of the top five countries in terms of the rate of growth of the middle classes between 1990 and 2008. This is supported by the fact that from 2002 to 2011, according to another key study conducted by Ghani,21 the number of people defined as middle class grew from 38 to 84 million, with a resultant increase of households in this social group from 32 per cent to 52 per cent. During the same period, there was an approximate increase in national consumption in Pakistan of approximately $60 billion, 90 per cent of which was accounted for by the middle classes. As a foundation for his study into the expansion of the middle class (demonstrated by Figure 4.2), Ghani analysed the information available from the Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLM) conducted by Pakistan’s Federal Bureau of Statistics, which is conducted bi-annually and is based on responses from around 16,000 households across the country. Ghani’s classification of various classes is based on expenditure compared to income as it is increasingly considered to provide greater accuracy and allow comparisons across studies. Furthermore, non-cash consumption and the variations of expenditures in rural populace food expenditures and urban housing rentals were also taken into consideration. Although the standard definition for middle class is based on the PSLM $2–10 per household, in his analysis of the changes in consumption Ghani subdivided this further, into lower-middle class (LMC – $2–4) and upper-middle class (UMC – $4–10). The results, based on the data analysed, confirmed that in the period reviewed the lower-middle class households increased by over 16 per cent and the upper-middle class by over 5 per cent. To assess the impact of this change in class structure measured by the consumption of durables, Ghani then assessed the change in TV, refrigerator and motorcycle ownership in Pakistan using the decile approach to analysis. The analysis shows that for each class across all of these durables, there has been a

New politics of the middle class 81

Upper class

0.9%

Upper m-class

1.8%

6.1%

Lower m-class

11.5%

26.3%

42.6%

Lower 66.6% class

44.1%

2001–2002: 21.2 million households

2010–2011: 27.7 million households

Figure 4.2 Pakistani households by class. Source: Ghani (2015), The emerging middle class in Pakistan (Karachi: Institute of Business Administration).

marked increase in consumption across the population. However, it is apparent from the findings that, although the comparative change in terms of TV has remained relatively similar across the deciles, for refrigerators it has widened during the period and for motorcycle ownership there has been a significant increase in the differential between the lower 10 per cent and highest 10 per cent. In this latter case, while the change in this consumption for the two periods for the lowest decile is less than 5 per cent, the change in motorcycle ownership in the highest decile has increased from around 27 per cent to just over 50 per cent. Overall, therefore, these findings serve to confirm that the consumption level gap between upper and middle class and the lower class is increasing particularly in relation to their consumption of higher priced durable products with the middle class taking the lion’s share. In equating these findings with the national household aggregates, Ghani’s analysis confirms that the middle class contribution to Pakistan’s total consumption has increased from 44.36 per cent ($43.3 billion) of the total in 2001–2002 to 61.9 per cent ($98 billion) of the total in 2010–2011. Equally, there has been a Table 4.2 National household aggregates National household aggregates ($ billions)

All Pk (2001–2002) All Pk (2010–2011) M-class (2001–2002) M-class (2010–2011)

Consumption

Cash spending

Income

Assets

97.6 158.3 43.3 98.0

71.5 120.2 31.9 74.2

85.0 151.6 38.2 96.5

387.2 772.6 208.1 522.6

Source: Ghani (2015), The emerging middle class in Pakistan (Karachi: Institute of Business Administration).

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similar increase in the middle class’s contribution to the other economic factors of cash spending, income and assets. However, perhaps the most notable area of change in these findings was in relation to the assets owned by the middle classes. In 2001–2002, it shows that the middle classes owned $208.1 billion of the nation’s total assets (53.74 per cent), whereas in 2010–2011 this had increased to $522.6 billion (71.54 per cent). In addition to the factors discussed previously, there are, of course, other differentials that exist between the Pakistan middle and lower classes. Not of least importance in this respect is the fact that compared to the lower class, household expenditures are typically about 60 per cent, income is around 80 per cent, and wealth is over three times higher in the middle class.22 Furthermore, differences exist in terms of educational levels. According to this study, the number of middle class households where at least one person has, or is in the process of completing, college education, is over five times the number of lower class households. It is apparent that this differential contributes to the higher incomes as persons within the middle class households can take advantage of higher paid job opportunities, such as managerial positions. Both Durr-e-Nayab and Ghani therefore point to the increasing size of the middle class in Pakistan that is shaping the evolving political economy in the country. Increased educational indices It is pertinent to discuss the rising levels of education among the urbanized middle class and the expansion of the service sector that has created new ways for upward social mobility over the last couple of decades. The telecommunications, media, banking and finance, insurance, software development, private health and education as well as non-governmental development sectors have proliferated, boosting the service industry that now contributes 59 per cent of the Gross Domestic Product. Agriculture in contrast has shrunk considerably while the manufacturing sector has shown mild growth.23 Since most of the service industry is urban centric and requires a skilled workforce, it is the urban middle class that has been its major beneficiary as well as the driving force. The expansion of the private education sector and the class composition of its customer base also provide strong evidence of this phenomenon. The private education sector in Pakistan has expanded exponentially over the last decade. This is evident from the number of private schools that rose by 69 per cent from 1999 to 2008 compared to a mere 8 per cent increase in the government schools. In 2000, the number of children enrolled in private schools was around six million. Within eight years, it doubled to reach 12 million (equivalent to 34 per cent of total enrolment) and the trend is expected to have continued beyond 2008. The number of teachers also more than doubled in this period. Although new private schools in rural areas have outnumbered those in urban areas, much higher enrolment rates in urban areas mean these are smaller in size with limited capacity. The expansion of private higher education institutions has been much more remarkable. Between 1999 and 2008, the sector grew by 137 per cent

New politics of the middle class 83 Table 4.3 Growth of private and public education institutions in Pakistan S. No

Level

Type

1999–2000

2007–2008

Change (%)

1

Primary

Private Public Total

14,748 131,779 146,527

17,250 139,342 156,592

17 6 7

2

Middle

Private Public Total

12,550 12,085 24,635

24,847 15,982 40,829

98 32 66

3

High

Private Public Total

5,940 8,509 14,449

14,053 9,911 23,964

137 16 66

4

Total (1–3)

Private Public Total

33,238 152,373 185,611

56,150 165,235 221,385

69 8 19

5

Total

Private Public Total

35,889 153,062 188,951

73,529 168,659 242,188

105 10 28

Source: Pakistan Bureau of Statistics, obtained from National Educational Management Information System of Academy of Educational Planning and Management, retrieved at www.aepam.edu.pk, accessed 11 July 2016.

compared to a paltry increase of 17 per cent in public higher education. Given that the overall household annual expenditure per pupil is 3.5 times higher in the private institutions compared to the public sector, it can safely be deduced that the upper-lower and the middle class segments of society are the main drivers and beneficiaries of the rise in private educational institutions. This means a significant increase in the number of educated middle class urbanites compared to any other era in the history of Pakistan. The debate on the exact size of the middle class in Pakistan continues with estimates in various studies ranging between 25 million and 70 million, however it is clear that the vast majority of these reside in the urban centres and rapidly urbanizing peri-urban and rural areas. Youth bulge The third key demographic change that is shaping contemporary Pakistan is the youth bulge. An unabated population growth rate has resulted in a large number of young people in Pakistan. The population doubled between 1975 and 2005 while the median age reduced to 21 years with 60 per cent of the population being under 30 years of age. Reading these numbers along with the increasing size of the urban population as well as that of the middle class, one can safely argue that a large urban, educated middle class has emerged with a significant proportion of second-generation and young urbanites. This represents a significant change in the political economy of the country and has far-reaching implications in a number of socio-economic fields.

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Increased access to information through diffusion of internet and mobile technologies in Pakistan (discussed in detail later) means that over half of Pakistani youth today uses these to access news, opinions and other data that shapes their worldview, a trend that Soomro et al.24 expect to further grow going forward. Furthermore, a recent study by Iqbal25 sought to examine attitudes among Pakistani youth towards politics and political engagement. He used a sample of 178 students at the University of Sargodha in the age range of 15–29 with 50 per cent each selected from the social sciences and natural sciences departments. The findings confirmed that not only did a high percentage of the students signify an interest in politics, but also a significant percentage agreed that “their vote could bring a change in political set up” and that “it is the duty of every citizen to cast his/her vote”.26 However, the findings also showed that there was a deep level of youth mistrust regarding their current political leadership. An overwhelming majority of the participants considered that politicians are not interested in people’s opinions. Therefore, it can be argued that it is the lack of engagement with the youth of Pakistan by the ruling elite that is helping fuel public unrest in the country, and has increased the demand for the creation of a more transparent and inclusive system of governance.

Political implications of structural changes The rampant urbanization, emergence of a sizable middle class and the youth bulge are changing the traditional political structures and patronage mechanisms in Pakistan. Since the 1980s, a large number of traders’ guilds, chambers of commerce and transporters’ unions gradually started to emerge at the local level in the urban and peri-urban areas. New forms of patronage networks were established between the medium sized enterprises in manufacturing and service sectors in urban areas that relied on low waged labour from rural areas. The entrepreneurial as well as salaried middle class comprising professionals on permanent contracts and with better work conditions also emerged and increased in number owing to deregulation and expansion in various industry sectors, particularly service industries such as telecommunication, banking and media. A number of studies have mentioned how the desire for services such as health and education facilities as well as infrastructure including communication networks attracted people to peri-urban areas and in small (but increasingly swelling) towns. At the same time, the quest for even better facilities than these has resulted in the movement of intellectual, cultural and social elites from small towns to larger cities, disturbing the traditional caste-based socio-political networks in towns and villages and catalysing the changing political behaviour. Although trader classes in peri-urban areas may have ceded political power to traditional landed or feudal elites in exchange for patronage-based access to state apparatus, this is not on the basis of kinship ties such as caste, tribal affiliations and ethnicity alone.27 The ability of the political elite to deliver services has become the primary factor in ensuring them wider public support. Expectations for infrastructure maintenance (roads, communications, sewerage, water) as well

New politics of the middle class 85 as better health, education and recreational facilities, contract enforcement and conflict resolution, have all become important for the political elite to retain legitimacy and public support. The large-scale migration from mostly rural areas to the US, UK and Middle East has also had a significant impact on political behaviour in the country. Today, multi-billion dollar annual foreign remittances remain critical to its economy. The Pakistani diaspora has over time developed its own understanding of the problems that the country faces and has demonstrated on many occasions the willingness to make a contribution. Along with philanthropic aid, the diaspora is also increasingly investing in politics, however due to its socially and politically conservative character, the centre-right parties have been the key beneficiaries. Financial support from the diaspora community for example has been a key source of funding for the emerging Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf (PTI) headed by cricketer-turned-politician Imran Khan.28 The politics in Pakistan remains at the local constituency level where significant networks based on kinship ties (caste, clan and ethnicity) exist as a means for collective bargaining. However, the nature of the bargaining itself has changed from the traditionally desired patronage to access job opportunities in the public sector and facilitation in conflict resolution and contract enforcement through state machinery (police and courts) to a demand for better service delivery. In many areas, especially in large cities (as well as increasingly in periurban areas) new forms of identities are taking shape. This movement away from reliance on kinship ties is triggered by rise of the professional associations such as of lawyers, journalists, teachers, doctors, transporters, merchants and other bodies that have increasingly started to play a key role in politics. The demise of the Musharraf regime for example was a direct consequence of a movement spearheaded by lawyers, organized all over the country by “bar associations” in reaction to the sacking of senior judges of the higher judiciary. Similarly, doctors and teachers have also shown signs of political action demanding better work conditions, job security and better rates of pay.29 An additional factor that is changing the political realities in Pakistan is the emergence of second-generation young urbanites. They are educated, middle class and tech-savvy. This segment of society has shown a growing appetite to challenge the traditional patronage-based political system. Brought up in an urban environment where the basis for prestige and privilege lies not in caste or position in tribal hierarchy but in professional status and social as well as economic capital, these young urbanities are all but cut off from their kinship ties. This has given rise to a search for new forms of identities and means for collective bargaining and fermented an ensuing conflict with the traditional political elite that still relies on decades-old patronage networks for power and legitimacy. Due to the transient nature of society, both the established channels of accessing state resources as well as the resistance to these are being played out simultaneously, as evident from the rise of the PTI and the anti-government demonstrations during 2014. The conflict stems from the compulsion of the

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traditional political class to provide patronage to key loyalists who must be accommodated when making key appointments, starting from the family and including other political allies. Similarly, state resources through government procurement, contracts to deliver service/development and other means have to be used to provide financial incentive/monetary benefit to a loyal network of allies. This inherently means favouring the lack of transparency, promoting nepotism, putting “merit” on the back burner and ignoring “corruption”. The emerging urban middle class youth, however, is not part of, and does not benefit from, these vertical patronage networks, which are still largely based on kinship ties. At the same time, this segment of society demands its due (and at times even disproportionate) share in the key government appointments, representation in parliament, a greater say in decision making, access to leadership positions, and a greater share of state resources. To complicate the situation further, it believes that it is the primary engine of economic growth and is bearing the burden of paying taxes (either indirect taxes through GST or income tax levied on the salaried class) while the elite and those benefiting from the patronage-based political system evade taxes altogether. Thus, the urban middle class youth wishes to limit the ability of the elite to disburse patronage by demanding more transparency, accountability, an end to corruption, and tax reforms (generally labelled as “good governance”). It also wants greater representation, not just in the media, judiciary, military and bureaucracy but also in the parliament and within political parties. It has great resentment for “dynastic” politics and hate for the “VIP” culture. The urban middle class is also conscious of retaining (and expanding) its access to state-sponsored education e.g. through scholarship schemes offered by the Higher Education Commission, and has therefore sought to bitterly oppose the devolution of higher education to provinces after the Eighteenth Amendment. The following three key trends can therefore be noticed in urban Pakistan, which challenge its traditional political structure. New forms of identity The reliance of an urban, better-educated middle class, especially its second/ third generation, on affiliations based on kinship ties (such as caste and tribe) is significantly reduced and, hence, new forms of identities have surfaced. This is represented by the emergence of new forms of associations for group bargaining based along professional lines for example bar associations, doctors’ associations, teachers’ associations, trader unions, chambers of commerce and transporters’ unions, etc. Still, many educated urbanites in other industry sectors remain without adequate representation in a social network and seek their representation through (newly emerging) political platforms such as the PTI. Lifestyle changes also mean that while remaining socially and politically conservative, the urban-educated middle class seeks more freedom, liberty and, more importantly, economic and political empowerment leading to a greater share in resources and decision making.

New politics of the middle class 87 Changing nature of state institutions Much has changed since Lord Macaulay’s education system that made a clear demarcation between the elite and commoners’ job destinations. The urban middle class in Pakistan, utilizing better quality private educational institutions, has been able to significantly infiltrate the state institutions that until recently were largely dominated by the landed and industrial elite. It is important to note that all institutions, including political parties, are multi-class coalitions, however a particular class, ethnicity, ideology or segment of society may dominate these at a particular point in time. One can therefore note significant change in the class composition of institutions such as the media, judiciary, bureaucracy and military. An upwardly mobile urban middle class now largely dominates these institutions. This has a significant effect on politics, as these institutions yield greater influence and play a key role in shaping politics. Hegemony over narrative Location of state power in Pakistan has long been reflected by the control over media in Pakistan. Centralized media control was institutionalized by General Ayub through the Press and Publication Ordinance in 1960 that enabled the state to censor and take over media institutions.30 General Zia ul-Haq during his rule (1977–1988) oversaw the worst form of media control along with using it as a tool for his Islamization project. During the 1990s, the country saw a “satellite revolution” that helped broadcast independent news via the BBC World Service and CNN and also made a number of Indian channels available to audiences in Pakistan. Pakistan’s modern media sector has been just over a decade in the making. In 2002 the Pakistani government under General Musharraf liberalized the broadcast media sector, leading to an explosion of local, privately-owned satellite television channels distributed via cable networks. Between 2002 and 2010, 89 television channels were launched and 26 foreign channels granted broadcast rights. On the radio front, 138 FM radio licences were granted during the same period, of which about 115 had become operational by 2012. The Musharraf government also created the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority (PEMRA) to regulate this newly liberalized sector. Today, television remains the most popular media with PTV being the only terrestrial network along with an expanding cable network. A recent study31 found access to television at around the 90 per cent mark. Radio and print media seems to be declining rapidly with the increase in the internet and mobile subscriber base. While until 2013, only 6 per cent of the population was estimated to have internet access, this is expected to increase dramatically due to availability of internet via 3G and 4G mobile networks and the wide availability of low cost smart phones. Most of the mobile users, that constitute 56 per cent of the country’s population, are expected to have access to the internet through handheld devices and are expected to consume information through digital networks.

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Forms of political communication have therefore changed significantly, as the emerging urban middle class (especially youth) prefers communicating through electronic means. The middle class has triumphed not just the working class but also the elite class in utilizing electronic forms of communication (e.g. social media). This means that they have achieved the ability to “amplify” their voice manifold, and much more than their numbers, through a resonating electronic media. This is evident from the rise of social media. By the end of 2015, the number of Facebook subscribers in Pakistan had crossed 20 million (almost 10 per cent of the population).32 These include around 15 million male and 4.7 million female subscribers. Around two-thirds of these users are under 25 years of age, belong to the richest 10 per cent households, and are concentrated in urban areas (especially the female users). Thirty per cent of the total online population in Pakistan uses Facebook including 33 per cent of all mobile users. Although, as is the case with most social media network users, the majority of subscribers use this medium for personal and recreational purposes, it is also used for the purpose of discussing social and political issues. One has to, however, carefully examine the usage of social media and indeed the access to electronic and print media in Pakistan. The figures show that access to information through media has expanded mainly in the middle class and upper-lower class who have become a key consumer market for political content as evident from the popularity of political talk shows. Various studies33,34 show that media content, including news, analyses, talk shows and entertainment programmes all have strong urban bias. In fact, the rankings for these programmes that are used to attract advertisement revenue are based on samples that are heavily drawn from the urban centres such as Lahore, Karachi and Islamabad–Rawalpindi. The advertisers are also mostly quick to back content that is more relevant and popular in the urban middle class that has emerged as the major market for consumer goods and services. It is inevitable

Does not own a mobile phone

Owns a mobile phone

44%

56%

Figure 4.3 Mobile phone ownership 2013. Source: Pakistan Telecommunications Authority, retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/ indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS?end=2009&locations=PK&start=1960, accessed 11 July 2016.

New politics of the middle class 89 therefore that the media is largely catering to the urban, middle class sections of society and is dominated by young, educated professionals that are very much a product and beneficiaries of the socio-economic changes discussed in this chapter. It is only natural therefore that media disproportionately highlights the concerns, predicaments, challenges and issues that affect this section of the society and thus acts as a powerful platform being used by it to shape the narrative in Pakistan. Due to its increasing outreach and expansion, media also serves to portray and disseminate the lifestyle of this segment that creates strong demand among lower social strata for upward mobility and affects the worldview, aspirations and expectations of the populace still living in a rural setting and among the under-privileged urban areas. Being the active consumers and producers of content that dominates the print and electronic media, the urban middle class has been able to significantly challenge the traditional political elite, especially the feudal and industrial elite on a number of critical issues. This is evident from the case of Shahzeb Khan,35 son of a police officer in Karachi who was murdered by the scion of an influential feudal lord. An unprecedented uproar among the people including support from the media and judiciary saw the main accused awarded the death penalty and four accomplices sentenced to life imprisonment. Similarly, prominent leader of the ruling PPP in Sindh, Mr Rahman Malik, was forced36 to leave the plane by the passengers when a flight was delayed for around two hours for him. The ruling PML-N’s member of parliament, Ms Nighat Sheikh,37 ended up in a police station for slapping a bus hostess after passengers and the driver refused to accept the maltreatment and the party had to suspend her membership. Incidents such as these and many others were unprecedented in the country where the elite had become accustomed to getting its way with impunity. The changing dynamics of Pakistan’s film industry are also an important indicator of the shift in the production and consumption of media content. The film industry in Pakistan until a decade ago was almost on the verge of collapsing completely.38 Starting from 2003, however, with slow progress over the years, young film makers with a new set of ideas set about to make movies on emerging themes that were relevant to the contemporary realities in the country. Unsurprisingly the majority of these film makers are themselves from the urban, educated middle class, and the content they create is also developed keeping the same market segment in mind. Since the remarkable success of Shoaib Mansoor’s Khuda Ke Liay (In the Name of God) that aimed to highlight the creeping religious fundamentalism in society, the industry has gone through a revival of sorts. The number of films produced per year has increased as well as the revenues they are earning. A number of multiplex cinemas have started mushrooming in all major urban areas in the country, especially in expanding upscale localities such as Defence Housing Societies, Bahria Towns and other similar developments. The ban on Indian movies has also been lifted, pushing Pakistani film makers to compete on the basis of creative ideas and compelling story lines, as they still cannot match the financial resources of Bollywood. The industry has therefore, in the words of prominent cultural critic Nadeem Paracha, gone

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through a “change of guard” with film makers from more modern middle class backgrounds now playing an active role.39 The emerging domination of the urban middle class in print and electronic media including the social media and growing film industry provides it with unprecedented influence over national discourse. It is therefore better able than other segments of society to develop a class consciousness, frame issues in a favourable way and shape behaviour, giving it disproportionate sway on narrative. These impending structural changes continue to shape Pakistan that remains a colonial bureaucratic state focusing on ruling and maintaining law and order rather than public service delivery and governance. The changing dominant class base of the intermediaries, however, including the bureaucracy, political parties, media, judiciary and the military, is expected to create strong demand for good governance, meritocracy, transparency and greater share of power and resources.

Concluding observations The foregoing analysis shows that a new middle class has emerged in Pakistan as a result of various factors over the last couple of decades. This social transformation is denoted by immense expansion of the private services sector, especially in banking and finance, telecommunications, legal, health and educational services, media, non-governmental organizations, along with the traditional trading class, public sector employees, and those who benefit from the informal economy. What makes the middle class even stronger is the number of people who may not yet be categorized as middle class on the basis of their income or assets, but have middle class aspirations. This may be a result of being exposed to the middle class lifestyle and values through discourse (e.g. through cable TV and internet), formal education or migration from rural to urban areas. The majority of the population now resides in urban centres. The improved per capita income, consumption behaviour and anecdotal evidence confirms that the resulting urban-educated middle class has disposable income and resources that it can and has invested into political action to affect/shape the redistributive mechanisms of the state (in its favour) in order to get its piece of the cake from the state and gain political empowerment and social status. The increased political power of this class is manifested in the changing nature of institutions such as the media and judiciary, which both largely represent and respond to the needs of this class. The NGOs, trader associations, professional associations (e.g. Young Doctors’ Association) also represent this class. Furthermore, it is also worth noting that, contrary to the past, this segment of society is now increasingly interested in politics. This is evident from the campaigns on social and electronic media, popularity of political talk shows (and their rating mechanisms being heavily based on urban, educated households), increased turnout during the 2013 elections and the coming to prominence of new political players like the PTI that largely represents this segment of society (along with the ruling PML-N that has consciously tried to woo this section of society in the run-up to elections with some degree of success).

New politics of the middle class 91 The urban middle class has been further strengthened by the rising levels of literacy rates and the electronic platforms now available to access information almost in real time. Underlying some of these changes is the shift in technology, especially the diffusion of internet, mobile telephony and cable TV, that has given this class further leverage and means to construct and sustain a narrative. It can be argued that this class has been the biggest beneficiary of the digital divide in Pakistan and has even triumphed over the traditional feudal/tribal aristocracy (along with of course those at the bottom of the pyramid) in the use of electronic and social media. These tools have also helped members of this class organize themselves better and forge extensive networks that can be mobilized more quickly and effectively for political action. Both sets of factors (changes in the socio-economic conditions and enhanced ability to frame the issues in a favourable way) have provided the middle class with disproportionate power vis-à-vis other segments of society. This has important implications for the regime type. Some literature exists on the link between middle class and the nature of government a country has. Moore40 associates the emergence of middle class with the consolidation of democracy. Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler argue that in a number of democracies, the middle class has aligned with the lower classes to demand an inclusive political system.41 However, scholars like Bahar Levento42 opine that the middle class has also been seen to side with the upper class resulting in a restricted democracy or a dictatorship. This ambivalent behaviour of the middle class puts it in the pivotal position of being the “decisive” class that holds the key for a particular system of governance.43 Whatever appeal democracy enjoys among middle class Pakistanis will hold so as long as democracy is perceived as being able to serve its interests. This means that although a military coup cannot be ruled out, the emerging middle class has to be co-opted in order to launch and sustain one. This, with increasing demands among the middle class for political power and access to economic resources (which it will not be willing to forego or sacrifice) means that a coup may not have become impossible, but it has certainly become very expensive. The growing appetite in the middle class for political and economic empowerment is an antithesis to the closed, authoritarian and centralized nature of a dictatorship. There are however some limitations, as well, of this study, and further detailed analysis is required on a number of emerging themes on this phenomenon. The middle class in Pakistan, for example, is not a homogenous group. There are significant sectarian, ethnic, urban/rural and other divides as well. However, the resonance of its shared concerns and issues through the print, electronic and social media as well as social networks has given its members better consciousness of their class interests and served to provide a greater cohesion to their narrative and alliance among themselves. During the Lawyers’ Movement, therefore, the ideological, sectarian, ethnic or other divides between the participants were not in prominence – rather the consciousness about their shared interests and objectives i.e. restoration of a higher judiciary and the supporting

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narrative of “rule of law” (supported and legitimised by people both on the right and left of the political spectrum) was what held supreme. Also, consensus among the middle class is not the only factor that makes a democratic system better suited to the country, but other aspects such as the ethnic makeup of the country, the state of the federation and little appetite in smaller provinces for centralization of power and authoritarianism also remain important. This has compelled the dominant Punjabi (civilian) elite and middle class to realize that without sharing economic resources and political power with other ethnic groups, the nation-building project will collapse. Although equitable political power and economic resources are still not being shared with various ethnicities, some progress has been made in this regard for example through the Eighteenth Amendment. There is also some realization, therefore, in Punjab that in order to keep this federation together, the democratic project has to be sustained. Lastly, all of the discussion above has been confined to the realm of power politics within the state structures. The key challenge is also that the state monopoly over violence is contested, along with the receding ability to enforce contracts, resolve conflict, and provide any sense of security in large swathes of the country. The politics is increasingly becoming localized with room for new actors who can effectively replace the state by offering security, contract enforcement, dispute resolution, and providing other basic services that the state is unable or unwilling to provide. This is where, despite internal differences, there also does exist some convergence of interest between the military, traditional civilian political elite, and the emerging middle class to cooperate. Such cooperation has already resulted in the Twenty-First Constitutional Amendment that established military courts in the country in an attempt to deal with the increasing instances of terrorism in the country. However, as detailed before, the struggle for control over scarce resources and competition for power means that there remain enough areas of divergence that are expected to keep this three-way political conflict alive in the foreseeable future.

Notes 1 ‘Political crisis puts army back in the driving seat’, Daily Times, 21 August 2014. 2 Shahid Javaid Burki, ‘Historical trends in Pakistan’s demographics and population policy’, in M. Kugelman and R.M. Hathaway (eds), Reaping the Dividend: Overcoming Pakistan’s Demographic Challenges (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011), p. 67. 3 See, for instance, Barrington Moore, Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966); Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, ‘Ethnicity, politics and economic performance’, Economics and Politics 12/3 (2000), pp. 225–245; Bahar Levento, ‘Social mobility, middle class and political transitions’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 58/5 (2003), pp. 419–433; and Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Political Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2003). 4 Sudipta Kaviraj, ‘On the enchantment of the state: Indian thought on the role of the state in the narrative of modernity’, European Journal of Sociology 46/2 (2005), pp. 263–296.

New politics of the middle class 93 5 Satish Saberwal, Roots of Crisis: Interpreting Contemporary Indian Society (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986). 6 Hamza Alavi, ‘The state in post-colonial societies: Pakistan and Bangladesh’, New Left Review 74/1 (1972), pp. 59–81. 7 Sudipta Kaviraj, ‘On the enchantment of the state: Indian thought on the role of the state in the narrative of modernity’, European Journal of Sociology 46/2 (2005), pp. 263–296. 8 S. Akbar Zaidi, Issues in Pakistan’s Economy (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005). 9 H. Gardezi and J. Rashid (eds), Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship (London: Zed Press, 1983). 10 H. Gardezi and J. Rashid (eds), Pakistan: The Roots of Dictatorship (London: Zed Press, 1983). 11 S. Akbar Zaidi, Issues in Pakistan’s Economy (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005). 12 Arif Hasan and Mansoor Raza, Migration and Small Towns in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012). 13 Shahid Javaid Burki, ‘Historical trends in Pakistan’s demographics and population policy’, in M. Kugelman and R.M. Hathaway (eds), Reaping the Dividend: Overcoming Pakistan’s Demographic Challenges (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2011), p. 67. 14 Arif Hasan and Mansoor Raza, Migration and Small Towns in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012). 15 Bahrawar Jan, Mohammad Iqbal and Iftikharuddin, ‘Urbanisation trends and urban population projection of Pakistan using weighted approach’, Sarhad Journal of Agriculture, 24 (2008), pp. 173–180. 16 Arif Hasan, ‘Migration, small towns and social transformations in Pakistan’, Environment & Urbanisation, 22 (2010). 17 S. Akbar Zaidi, Issues in Pakistan’s Economy (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2005). 18 Adnan Rafiq and Ping Gao, ‘The transformation of mobile telecommunications industry in Pakistan: a developing country perspective’, Telecommunications Policy, 33/5–6 (2009), pp. 309–323. 19 Durr-e-Nayab, ‘Estimating the middle class in Pakistan’, Pakistan Development Review 50/1 (2011), pp. 1–28. 20 N. Chun, Middle Class Size in the Past, Present, and Future: A description of Trends in Asia, Working Paper No. 217, Asian Development Bank (2010). 21 Jawaid Abdul Ghani, The emerging middle class in Pakistan: how it consumes, earns and saves (Karachi: Institute of Business Administration, 2015), pp. 1–19. 22 Jawaid Abdul Ghani, The emerging middle class in Pakistan: how it consumes, earns and saves (Karachi: Institute of Business Administration, 2015), p. 9. 23 Muhammad Farooq, Muhammad Idrees, Shahnaz Tariq, Furdos Ghulzat and Haq Nawaz Anwar, ‘Consequences of youth bulge in Pakistan’, Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 22/5 (2014), pp. 2216–2222. 24 Kamran Ahmed Soomro, Tan Shukui and Sarfaraz Ahmed Shaikh, ‘Factors motivating youth for the adoption of e-government services in Pakistan’, Asian Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities 4 (2015): 48–57. 25 S. Iqbal, ‘Exploring political attitude among educated youth: A study at University of Sargodha’, Asian Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, 3 (2012): 375–382. 26 S. Iqbal, ‘Exploring political attitude among educated youth: A study at University of Sargodha’, Asian Journal of Social Sciences and Humanities, 3 (2012): 375–382. 27 Arif Hasan, ‘Migration, small towns and social transformations in Pakistan’, Environment & Urbanisation, 22 (2010). 28 Danish Mustafa and Amiera Sawas, ‘Urbanization and political change in Pakistan: exploring the known unknowns’, Third World Quarterly, 34 (2013).

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29 Mustafa Haider, ‘Pakistan’s urbanization challenges: transport and mobility’, in M. Kugelman (ed.), Pakistan’s runaway urbanisation: what can be done? (Washington, DC: Wilson Center, 2014), pp. 78–106. 30 H. Yusuf and E. Schoemaker, The Media of Pakistan: Fostering Inclusion in a Fragile Democracy? Policy Briefing No. 9, BBC (2013). Available at: http://downloads. bbc.co.uk/mediaaction/pdf/bbc_media_action_pakistan_policy_briefing.pdf (accessed 2 April 2016). 31 H. Yusuf and E. Schoemaker, The Media of Pakistan: Fostering Inclusion in a Fragile Democracy? Policy Briefing No. 9, BBC (2013). Available at: http://downloads.bbc.co. uk/mediaaction/pdf/bbc_media_action_pakistan_policy_briefing.pdf (accessed 2 April 2016). 32 Umair Qureshi, ‘Pakistan Facebook Users crosses the landmark of 20 Million users’, blog post based on figures from Facebook Ads Manager, 2015. Available at: http:// umairqureshi.com/pakistan-deepens-facebook-user-base-with-over-11-million-users (accessed 8 July 2016). 33 S. Majumdar, A. Mani and S. Mukand, Politics, Information and the Urban Bias, Queens University Working Papers Series, 2013. Available at: www.econ.queensu.ca/ files/other/urbanfinal5.pdf (accessed 2 April 2016). 34 G. Peshimam, Media-powered democracy: how media support has been pivotal to Pakistan’s latest democratisation project, Reuters Institute Fellowship Paper, University of Oxford (2013). 35 ‘Shahzeb Khan murder case’, The Express Tribune, 8 June 2013. 36 ‘Passengers force ex-minister off plane’, Dawn, 16 September 2014. 37 ‘PML-N leader’s party membership suspended over bus hostess slap incident’, The Express Tribune, 19 June 2013. 38 N. Paracha, ‘New Wave of Pakistani cinema: Zinda and kicking’, Dawn, 26 September 2013. 39 N. Paracha, ‘New Wave of Pakistani cinema: Zinda and kicking’, Dawn, 26 September 2013. 40 Moore, B. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modern World (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966). 41 Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, ‘Ethnicity, politics and economic performance’, Economics and Politics 12/3 (2000), pp. 225–245. 42 Levento, B. ‘Social mobility, middle class and political transitions’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 58/5 (2003), pp. 419–433. 43 Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, Political Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2003), p. 30.

5

Social drivers of democratic change Rasul Bakhsh Rais

At least three most salient social changes occurring gradually in Pakistan carry great potential to influence future politics and the way the country will be governed. They are urbanisation, migration and the emergence of very large middle and professional classes. This chapter assesses the challenges and prospects of democracy in Pakistan while focusing on two important products of the recent social transformation: the emergence of new social forces and the vitality of civil society, amid the enduring crisis of civil–military relations. The main argument is that institutional structures of democracy – constitution, elections, political parties and parliament – are necessary but not enough to sustain and consolidate democracy in Pakistan, which has a long history of military intervention. A sustainable shift towards participatory politics would depend on both the political behaviour of dominant elites and the social context within which they operate, and whether or not the contestants for power use democratic means and the social forces consider them as the only legitimate means to power. The pages ahead first explore the prerequisites of sustaining democracy in Pakistan and then assess whether the country meets them in view of the historical trajectory of civil–military relations. Subsequent discussion focuses on recent social and political transformations. The concluding part analyses key challenges to democratic consolidation, and answers the question of whether they can be tackled through the shifts underway in politics and society.

Prerequisites of democracy Even during Pakistan’s current democratic spell, worries about political stability and democracy’s march onward abound. In a country whose politics has mostly been dominated by the military, any discussion concerning the persistence of civilian rule must be cautionary. What is quite essential for securing democracy are necessary conditions, which, if developed, would firm up its foundations, and over time consolidate the democratic process.1 What are those conditions? Whether or not there is a universal template of democracy building, or do we consider each country as a unique case? Let us answer the second question first. Each country has very specific conditions, history, culture and a range of political actors and institutions, and may

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have a sense of balance among them. This may help understand the first part of the question about conditions. Between the mature end of liberal democracy and the least requirement of democratic rule, i.e. the holding of elections on a regular basis and formation of an elected government, we need to look at social transitions to assess the challenge to democracy. Pakistan does meet minimal commonly understood requirements of democracy, which include universal suffrage, the right to run for office, freedom of expression, and multiple sources of information and freedom of association.2 But these basic conditions, and even more essential ones, like constitution, political parties and free political contests have hardly ensured democratic stability, at least in the case of Pakistan. The present political situation in the country conforms to the views of some democracy theorists who argue that “formal political institutions cannot and do not play the decisive role in democratic consolidation”.3 They only provide a framework within which democracy may develop over time if other conditions, like positive social change in political attitudes toward democracy, also exist. Perhaps we may apply a more rigorous test for democratic consolidation than the standard minimum procedures. Students of democratic transitions look for a composite set of factors. This may include civilian supremacy over the military, weakening of anti-democratic actors, broadening of popular support for political parties, popular legitimacy, rule of law, and deepening of democratic values.4 In some of these areas, Pakistan has been deficient while in others it has made some gains.

Civil–military trajectory Rebuilding democracy on the debris of the institutional wreck brought about by long years of military rule has not been an easy job for Pakistan’s political elite. Along with divisions, they faced a huge task of restoring a perverted constitution and corrupted political order. All the military rulers restructured the political order to suit their interests and promote their vision of a good Pakistan and good society. That translated into a military-dominant political order. Above all, each military ruler attempted to reshape state and political institutions with an overriding interest in keeping the civilian, electable crowd, as an appendage of the political system. This required creation of a hybrid political order that rested on military–civilian alliance, with the military being in the driving seat. The hybrid regimes sought legitimacy by manipulating the judiciary, amending the constitution, and creating broad networks of social and political support. In all political matters and tasks of consolidating their power and building ‘true’ or ‘guided’ democracy, they used every bit of state resources, subverting Pakistan’s natural growth of parliamentary democracy in the process. Consequently, the country could not escape three stubborn legacies of military rule that have reproduced and reinforced each other. First, over the decades, the military has emerged as a powerful institution within the institutions of the state and has carved out an independent political and social support base for its view of national security and role in the politics of Pakistan. Perhaps

Social drivers of democratic change 97 a more useful concept is ‘autonomy’, that we can use to explain the dominant role of the military, for impunity of its actions and playing a role in areas that are constitutionally not within its domain. Second, frequent deviations from the constitution and manipulation of political institutions from fragmentation of political parties to rigging of elections have made the task of restoring institutional balance and democratic norms difficult, complex and full of risks of political confrontations. Sustaining democracy remains Pakistan’s primary political challenge. The minimal objective is to prevent the military from re-imposing direct or indirect military rule through its political proxies. This would be the first stage from where democratic forces gain strength to make democracy the basic political and social framework of the society. Even the process of realising this minimal objective in Pakistan’s case has been quite problematic. Along with the lingering effects and legacies of the military rule, there have emerged a host of constraints in the way of democratic stability – for instance, political violence, insurgencies, and the declining capacity of the state to provide effective governance. Pakistan is however not unique in facing these constraints. All democratically successful states have faced such constraints and countered them effectively. There are indeed some hopeful signs of democratic change in Pakistan, including the emergence of political consensus on democracy, on purging the constitution of distortions, and granting of greater autonomy to the provinces.5 The first political turnover, an essential test of democratic consolidation, has already occurred in 2013. However, consolidation of democracy is not an event; it is a process, a conscious act toward a common end of adopting a democratic way of life. Democratic politics includes a constellation of varied factors that contribute to the strengthening of democratic norms, practices and institutions.6 In Pakistan’s case, we need to look at democratic endeavours within a larger and dynamic political sphere that may over time stabilise democracy. We also cannot overlook major constraints in the process as well as some hopeful signs such as the recent salience of civil society and a free media, which point to relatively better conditions for democratic growth in the country. Yet we must evaluate the prevailing political conditions with a note of caution: The case of Pakistan, and that of many other countries which democratised during the ‘third wave’, suggest that making democracy survive and strengthen itself is far more difficult than removing a military or civilian dictator from power.7 The country must have serious political actors with a deep interest in democracy, and having a broad social base and national consensus behind them. How democracy sustains itself and grows will depend on many factors that include the character and strength of political actors in terms of how assertive and persistent they are in establishing the supremacy of civilian authority and what choices they make in addressing structural constraints that have caused reversal to military rule in the past. In all these respects, Pakistan presents a blurry picture. It has a mixed history of democratic rule, democratic breakdowns, military takeovers and democratic movements. But this history is not a closed cycle, as social and political

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conditions in the country have in the past decade changed in many important ways. While we cannot overlook the lingering shadow of long periods of military rule and the influence of their allies in the media and political groups, we cannot ignore the recent social and political transformation in the country. However, at this stage, we can only be cautiously optimistic about the potential of such transformation installing a military-instigated regime change or preventing the risk of a hyperpolitical confrontation witnessed during the late 2014 protests by Imran Khan’s PTI and Tahirul Qadri’s group to bring down the democratically elected government. Even with all the positive signs, democracy in Pakistan has shallow cultural and political roots. Public opinion on democracy remains divided between prodemocracy and pro-military segments of society. As transitions are never a complete break with the past, we may consider this divide as natural but at the same time a key weakness of the political forces. It is however important to note recent transformation in society and politics has helped democratic forces gain relatively greater strength than the apologists for military rule. The question is, will such strength be sufficient enough to prevent military intervention when some of the opposition parties resort to street agitation with a singular goal of removing an elected government? In the past, agitations have produced anarchic social conditions, chaos and political disorder. Such conditions have brought the military into power. The security establishment and its political allies in society driven by ambition for power may not be daunted by the fledgling civil society, media and the new social forces. In the case of successful democratic transitions in post-colonial developing countries, three factors have made the difference – the quality of leadership, civic capacity of society, and the effectiveness of political institutions. Pakistan’s accumulative heritage in these areas has been on the decline. There are visible signs of recovery and revival in some respects, but the pace is slow and public frustrations appear to be rising. For decades, Pakistani politics has remained highly unstable and unpredictable owing to a multipronged contest between political parties and the military, on the one hand, and dynastic political parties dominated by landowning elites on the other. Over the past seven years the political scene in Pakistan has changed rather dramatically with new issues and players on the political scene. What has not changed, however, is the character of political actors, the role of various power centres and the shadow of uneasy civil–military relations that continues to affect the democratic transition and consolidation in Pakistan. Transition to democracy from procedural to substantive democracy will be a gradual and painful process. As is clear from the following description, this requires supportive transformations in the society that have somewhat taken place. The most important transformative change since independence is that feudalism is no longer the essential marker of Pakistan’s political culture. Its structural elements have broken down, and so has its social base. Nor is military the same autonomous, powerful institution it once was. Its institutional influence is on the decline.8 Yet the military will remain a major factor in politics until

Social drivers of democratic change 99 socio-political transformation underway in the country strengthens the democratic process to the extent that the civil–military balance of power shifts credibly towards the former. Pakistan’s multiple crises in the form of insurgencies, political violence, religious extremism, ineffective application of law, and poor performance of elected governments remain a key impediment to democratic growth. However, the momentum of social change is such, and the basket of problems is so heavy, that any military adventurer would be greatly constrained to intervene at least in an overt fashion. In the murky and complex politics of Pakistan, the military’s indirect influence and its behind-the-scenes manipulation cannot be ruled out.

Quest for civilian supremacy Establishing civilian supremacy – which means the supremacy of the democratic government – is the most critical test of democratic consolidation. This is still in process and an unfinished business, and may remain a major challenge for some time. One of the major issues in democratic transition is the military retaining some of the major government functions that are normally within the power and jurisdiction of a civilian government. This makes the civilian government weak and wrongly responsible for the decisions and policies that it might have very little to do with. Traditionally, the military has shaped Pakistan’s national security and foreign policy on some of the most critical problems – insurgency in Balochistan and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and relations with Afghanistan, India and the United States. There has been a consultation process between the civilian governments and the military, but the military’s view has mostly prevailed in major decisions. There has emerged a pattern in civil–military relations, whereby the military plays an influential role in shaping critical aspects of national security and foreign policy. The present democratic transition therefore remains partial and incomplete, as the civilian government has every power under the constitution but it is overly cautious and restrained in taking a lead on defence and national security matters. Defence and foreign policy issues have nonetheless remained contested issues between the civilian governments and the military. This contest, if and when settled in favour of the civilian governments, would change the character of civil–military relations, and thus reinforce democratic consolidation. Concerning this conventional deficit of civilian power, some developments are noteworthy: First, there is a consensus across the political divide in Pakistan on improving relations with India, non-intervention in Afghanistan, and transparency in relations with the United States. This consensus, very much articulated both privately and in public spaces as well as in the media, has begun to develop into a counter-narrative on national security, and over the role of military in national affairs. The military and its allies, however, continue to exercise influence on national security as they have captured a much larger space in the media and security-related research institutes. Second, and perhaps more important, is the fact that some major political and social actors have become vocal on rectifying

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informal and formal imbalances within the security and civilian institutions. Three of them are important to mention – the judiciary under the former chief justice, Iftikhar Mohammad Choudhry, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, and the proliferating and exceptionally vocal electronic media. Interestingly, all of them are products of military rule but have acquired an independent status. They have posed a serious popular challenge to the domination of the military. Finally, an even more critical development is a political consensus among the major, mainstream political parties on democracy.9 Even with so many coupmongers still around and speaking loudly, the consensus has held out so far. It started building up with a historic document – the Charter of Democracy that the late Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif signed in 2006.10 The political parties of these leaders, the PPP and the PML-N, have more often than not cooperated with each other to strengthen democratic rule. In the worst of security and economic climates since 2008, we have seen them standing together and defending the democratic order. Their primary political nemesis, Imran Khan, Chairman of the PTI, terms this relationship a collusion to protect each other’s corruption.11 In its first year in office, the Nawaz Sharif government did assert a civilian view of national security and foreign policy choices. Although controversial, the government decided to engage with the Taliban for a political settlement against the latent feelings and reservations of the security establishment. Later on, it caved under the influence of the military to own and support the military operation, codenamed Zarb-e-Azb, in North Waziristan.12 The government also made important moves toward India. It was about to announce the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status for India in March 2014 but postponed it, apparently under pressure from the military and the religious right, more than because of elections in India. The government also took the important initiative of establishing the National Security Committee under the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, which made the National Security Council, established by the Musharraf regime, dysfunctional.13 The change was obviously meant to have greater representation of the cabinet in national security matters. For the first time ever, a national security policy document emerged out of the Ministry of Interior. However, after having been greatly weakened by the 2014 political crisis, the PML-N government has relented on seeking greater space on foreign and security policy matters that are central to the concerns of the security establishment. Twice earlier, the primary cause of Nawaz Sharif ’s political troubles was the inability to balance his ambition to exercise power while not crossing the security establishment over foreign and security policy priorities. Moreover, with more than three decades in politics, Sharif has mastered the art of elite networking, using patronage politics to keep such political families personally loyal and within the fold of the PML-N. Clearly this political style is not in sync with the emergence of new political actors on the national scene such as Imran Khan’s PTI – denoting activism of the urban youth, a rising middle class and an anti-elite political narrative. While the military’s assertion in the aftermath of 2014 anti-government protests has indeed undermined the civilian quest for supremacy, the changes underway in Pakistani society may augur well for

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democracy in the long term. But this will depend on how far the mainstream political parties, such as the PML-N and PPP, are able and willing to cater to the needs and aspirations of the new social forces in the country.

Emergence of new social forces In many ways, Pakistan has changed, and in so many ways it remains the same. Continuity and change are two opposite poles of the modernisation process in traditional societies like Pakistan. Except for major revolutions, societies change incrementally at varying rates depending on economic and technological development. It is very important to note that a society can achieve material progress in a few decades, but change in social relations, structures of social and political power, and individual behaviour may take generations. But it is bound to take place essentially through the cultural sphere. Therefore, social change is largely a gradual, invisible process, which depends on material forces and their characteristics – concentration, broad distribution, equity, and equality or inequality in society of wealth and power. In most post-colonial societies, economics and technology have greatly altered the ways people live their lives or relate to each other or with political authority. This includes a wide array of things that generally escape our attention but have great meanings in terms of social transformations. Such transformations can be explained in terms of empowerment and increased capacity of social classes, migration, mobility, and weakening of hierarchical social structures. We also need to understand how these social classes would influence politics, impact on traditional power networks and claim political power in Pakistani society. The rise of new social forces does impact politics in a significant way, and when it does, that signifies a critical shift in the balance of social forces, largely in an incremental way. Such a shift is never a clean, linear event but often marks a turbulent and confrontational contest between the old power groups and the new forces challenging them. There are certain issues that the new social classes consider important for their empowerment. In a nonrevolutionary transformation, the struggle is over accountability, rule of law and representation. The first step is to subject the constitution to the exercise of power. Simultaneously, the new social forces aspire for broader division of power in the political system. Given that, it makes sense to assess the relative strength of social forces, degree of change in their balance and their likely impact on the political system and exercise of power in Pakistan. Pakistan is a typical, not a unique, transitional society. It is in the process of a transformation that is slow and has not made remarkable progress. Nor does it present an integrated or comprehensive image of social change that would take many generations and more rapid material progress to come about. Nonetheless, there are changes in society, big and small, in pockets and in larger milieus. Three major social changes, which carry great potential for sustaining the current civilian transition, include urbanisation, migration, and the emergence of very large middle and professional classes. The

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middle class in Pakistan is estimated to be 34 per cent of the population, which is the second highest in South Asia, after Sri Lanka.15 We may disagree on the scale of these changes, but we cannot dismiss them as socially or politically insignificant. Pakistan’s big cities and rural district towns have rapidly expanded, which is as much a result of migration from rural areas as it is a reflection of population growth rate. Some of the urban centres have over time seen a manifold increase in their population. Pakistan’s rate of urbanisation is one of the highest in the region. The percentage of people living in the urban areas has increased from 17 per cent in 1951 to 37 per cent in 2010. It is estimated that, by 2020, half of Pakistan’s population will be living in urban centres.16 The rate of urbanisation is undercounted in Pakistan because of minimal universal markers of this phenomenon. Urbanisation seems to be adding new social qualities to Pakistan’s demographic landscape. Every town and city represents quilt-type ethnic, caste and classes patches, adding perplexing social complexity as well as diversity to city life. This diversity has competing demands on services, allocation of urban spaces, and on the social and political significance of different groups. The question of equity and balance ultimately requires institutional and political intervention to mediate conflict over scarce resources. The income gaps and perceptions of marginality, which are real, are likely to make disadvantaged groups the target of political mobilisation. With greater democracy and openness through media and electoral politics, both the marginalised and better-placed sectors of the society would become agitated, clamorous and demand fairness and representation in times of political failures, corruption and misuse of power. Which party or political groups will really capture the attention and support of the marginalised, urban poor and transform them into a constituency is a moot question. In ethnically more diverse cities like Karachi, the poor are divided among ethnic, religious and mainstream political parties. This reflects the general polarised character of the society. This pattern may change in the future, however, if ethno-social solidarities give way to urban citizenship sensibilities. This factor may equally replicate itself in the submerging of caste, tribe and other differential characteristics into city identity in other provincial capitals. That will in effect produce issue-based, pragmatic and problem-solving politics – a major step toward democratisation of society. Except for Karachi, interprovincial migration is not a post-independence development. The people in the broader Indus Valley region have lived, intermingled and cohabited for thousands of years. Migration, however, during the last century – more so, in its second half and beyond – has been faster than at any time in history. This has created a complex web of ethnic and social relationships, which might have serious social and political implications for the new locations as well as on the old ones that immigrants have left behind. Finally, the growth of middle and professional classes in Pakistan has been substantial. This becomes clear by looking at the matrix of general lifestyle, rather than merely counting the trendy and pricy food joints, or estimating how much money goes each day to the new businesses or consumption of new items.

Social drivers of democratic change 103 This phenomenon is not restricted to urban areas, as people in rural Pakistan also increasingly subscribe to middle class aspirations. It has already outpaced the old ruling classes considerably by capturing media, civil society, the intellectual and cultural life of Pakistan. It is the middle and professional classes that have recently emerged as the vanguard of new political awakening and led the movement for freedom of speech, human rights and democracy. These new social forces have impacted the way politics in the country is played – a trend that is likely to gain momentum in the future. Politics and power would not remain the preserve of the old dominant, landowning classes. The PTI’s leadership and constituency primarily hail from middle and professional classes. Its emergence as the second largest party in the 2013 elections reflects the growing influence of these classes in shaping national politics. However, by playing confrontational politics – as apparent from its long march from Lahore and subsequent sit-in in Islamabad, along with the PAT, in 2014 – the PTI did attempt to sabotage recent gains in the democratic process. Still, the fact that a significant number of people belonging to the educated, professional middle class, especially the youth, were willing to protest en masse for realising ideals such as ensuring transparency in elections and freeing politics from corruption,17 is a significant indicator for the strength of democracy in the long run.

Implications of civil society activism Civil society has played a more significant role in the current democratic transition than the political parties.18 We saw for the first time the peaceful and orderly removal of an unpopular military ruler under collective pressure from the political parties, national parliament, media and the civil society. It was a remarkable departure from the familiar pattern of how military rulers have left the political scene. In the past, the military top brass forced two of the military rulers of Pakistan out of their office and the third one died in an air crash, which remains an unresolved mystery. In the ouster of General Pervez Musharraf, it was not the military or an accident but a result of the political will of the major political parties and popular pressure behind them. All military rulers of Pakistan have faced popular resistance in varying degrees of intensity, but managed to sail through for the larger part of their selfdetermined and undefined tenures. Facing greater opposition in their waning years, they all lost political sheen over time, proved as corrupt as the political class they first indicted, and then co-opted a section of this class to perpetuate their rule – eventually losing their real power base, i.e. support from the military. General Musharraf ’s ouster is, however, unique in one significant way. The primary push for his ouster did not come from the military. He had his uniform on, which he often described as his ‘second skin’, and had the support of the armed forces when the civil society reacted against his unlawful decision to dismiss the sitting chief justice. At the time, General Musharraf was at the apex of his power, and frequently vowed that he would never allow the late Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif to return from political exile. He even got the

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constitution amended by a rubber stamp parliament to bar them from becoming prime minister for the third time.19 How then did his sudden demise from power occur? We know that the unprecedented protest movement that emerged on the political scene in 2007 had multiple actors, but civil society was surely in the lead. The lawyers did set its momentum, but so did other members of the educated, professional middle classes, citizen groups, the youth, and poor people. The movement was well organised, issue-focused and able to sustain itself in the face of many hardships. Another element of the civil society, the fledgling electronic media, played no less significant a role in shaping the political discourse, maintaining public interest in the movement and raising the level of popular resentment against Musharraf on account of his brazen assault on the judiciary. The lawyers were not a new force, nor had they launched a social movement for the first time. They were part of the political agitation against the first military dictator, General Ayub Khan. The electronic media and civil society groups were new actors but no less powerful than the lawyers. All of these forces coalesced and reinforced each other in pursuing a common agenda of restoring an independent judiciary. Unlike the past, the civil society groups, including the lawyers, were no longer divided along political party loyalties. It was the unity and tenacity that helped them succeed. All efforts of the Musharraf regime to divide the civil society failed. His decision to impose emergency rule on 3 November 2007 and place curbs on electronic media proved counterproductive.20 The electronic media, encouraged by the Musharraf regime in the first instance, resisted emergency rule and was supported by wider society. The taste of free debate, and the power TV anchors enjoyed in shaping the tenor of that debate, was something Pakistan had never seen before. Unlike in the past, the military regime could not really control or even defuse attacks from the media or scare off civil society groups. More recently, the military has indeed consistently made use of the powerful mass media tools – print, electronic and social – to float public narratives conducive to its political and foreign policy interests. But the same tools have emerged as a key hedge against military takeover. This is clear from the downfall of the Musharraf regime and persistence of independent media voices that support civilian supremacy in politics and foreign policy. Civil society and the media are powerful forces that every government now will have to contend with. Their emergence, activism and sustainability are the result of a meaningful social change that has taken place in the urban landscape. Also, they represent a new generation of middle class that has entered new professions. What makes the civil society so powerful, and a sign of hope for freedom and democracy, is its autonomy from the state. It is sustained and nurtured by the private, market economy and foreign donors, something the political elite and the security establishment resent. The civil society has a stake in freedom of expression and the rule of law. For this reason, it has an embedded and abiding interest in ensuring that the Pakistani state governs under the law and is responsible to society. Today, Pakistan has an effective counterweight against the authoritarian instincts of the ruling

Social drivers of democratic change 105 groups in the form of a proactive mass media and vibrant civil society. The resilience mass media has gained during the past decade will help it become of even greater value as a social actor. The growth of civil society continues to open up the possibility of a free and transparent politics, which is the essence of democracy. In all new democracies, where transition from military to civilian rule has taken place, the middle class and civil society have acted as a key propellant of democracy. The same may be true in Pakistan’s case.

Challenges and prospects of democracy However, we still cannot argue convincingly that Pakistan’s third democratic transition cannot or will not be reversed. There are many things that remain unsettled in the society and polity, from the rapacious character of the elected representatives to the weak party system run by family dynasties. Violence in society is on the rise, not only from the Taliban and sectarian extremists but also from political groups trying to protect their political turf. Ethnic nationalists have resorted to violence both against their rivals as well as against the security agencies. The foremost challenge Pakistan faces is the internal security threat from ethnic, religious, sectarian militants. Violence, and the failure to control it through effective application of law and the judicial process, could create obstacles in the way of democracy. The writ of the state and the rule of law have weakened over the decades in every area of governance – public education, health, law and order, and delivery of services. As citizens have a daily harsh reminder of these problems, we see the inability or unwillingness of the ruling elite to address them. Political expediency, more than political resolve to address difficult structural issues, has become a political norm across party lines. With the concentration of power in the provincial capitals, the elected governments have resisted the democratisation of local governments, which represent the most important layer of democracy. At the same time, we see the executive’s arbitrariness both at the provincial and federal levels, a habit from the past that confines important national decisions within a small group around the party leadership. Moreover, support for democracy at the popular level remains shallow. The idea of good governance has never been associated with elected civilian regimes. The civilian leadership has often failed to deliver – a major factor that prevents democracy from taking roots in the society. The consequent public disaffection then spills over into the streets, a factor that also contributed to the 2014 protest marches and sit-ins against the Sharif government. Performance – delivering on promises – of the elected has emerged as the key decider of electoral outcome, as the 2013 election outcome suggests, and therefore the most viable path to the success of democracy. The last election was a referendum on energy outages, a worsening economic and security situation and growing disconnect between the government and society. Prime Minister Sharif has so far been successful in securing the cooperation of the PPP and regional parties for his government, as they share a common interest in protecting the democratic system. However, it

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will take much more for the PML-N leadership – better governance and effective policy execution – to keep his rule stable or overcome any political crisis until the end of his third political term in 2018. Given Pakistan’s troubled history of civil–military relations, the future of current democratic transition also rests considerably on a cooperative relationship between the civilian government and the military leadership. Like the PPPled government before it, the Nawaz Sharif regime attempted to carve out a space on foreign and security policy issues by pursuing peace with India and rethinking national security – but with little success. However, unlike the PPP leadership and despite being removed by the military twice in the past, Prime Minister Sharif was quick to develop serious differences with the military leadership over sensitive internal matters, such as the treason trial against General Musharraf and tackling Taliban terrorism. However, in the aftermath of the protests, the pendulum of political power has indeed shifted significantly in favour of the military – with the civilian government giving in on almost all the areas of potential friction with the security establishment. Following the Peshawar school tragedy in December 2014, Nawaz Sharif was on the same page with Army Chief General Raheel Sharif in giving a befitting response to domestic terrorism. A comprehensive National Action Plan was announced for countering terrorism, the moratorium on the death penalty was lifted, and the Military Courts were also established under the Twenty-First Amendment to the Constitution. It seems as if the civilian leadership has willingly taken a backseat, as the thrust of security, defence and foreign policy is back with the military. There is also a palpable increase in the profile of military leadership as it organises trips to major ally countries to deliberate over policy issues.21 In times of high level of internal security threats and multiple crises facing the state and society, any serious discord between the civilian government and the military leadership will derail democracy. Establishing civilian supremacy is a slow process and requires balancing the “popular politics and the sensitivities of the military’s top brass”.22 Thus, rather than picking unnecessary fights with the military, the civilian leadership must strive to perform better in governance, which is what will guarantee it success in the next elections and contribute to civilian supremacy in the long run. In any case, political parties and their leaders bear greater responsibility for sustaining the growth of democracy. For this, they have to reform themselves by introducing democracy within their ranks, something that has yet to happen. Democracy is never, like citizens’ other rights, a gift in post-military regimes; it has to be earned through hard work, better performance and creating public trust in democracy. This requires the elected regimes to perform better in governance, honour their part of the social contract with the people and respect each other’s political mandate.

Concluding observations Transition to democracy takes many forms, paths and modes. History, culture and the political interests of various social classes are among the factors that

Social drivers of democratic change 107 matter in building a democratic political order. Whether or not the salient sections of society embrace ideas of representative government and the rule of law is a key factor in this regard. In a traditionally feudalistic society with a history of military takeovers, such social change takes time to occur. As a system of governance, democracy grows, develops and perfects itself in an open environment in which different interests compete and various layers of society play out their political games, but with the limits of prescribed rules. Therefore, democratic changes have never occurred as a single package or in one go. They take place incrementally through a series of invisible social revolutions, and sometimes in major shifts in the balance of power among social forces. Pakistan’s democratic development has a mixed record of progress as well as setbacks, and its future course rests significantly on the nature and dynamics of ongoing socio-political transformation. It is remarkable that the country’s takeover by a coalition of bureaucratic-military establishment and landed aristocracy has finally begun to provoke an intellectual, social and political reaction from the new social forces. The driving force behind this phenomenon is the emergence of a politically charged middle class that is the result of relative modernisation, urbanisation and the political economy of immigrant workers. The social location of these forces is of great significance, as they are articulate, urban and professional, and have become politically autonomous of the traditional power structures. Signalling the gradual breakdown of a feudalistic social order, the new social forces have a strident voice on national issues, particularly on making Pakistan a truly representative democracy. They have been pressing for an impartial process of accountability and responsive government that delivers. These were the major issues that leaders of the protestors in Islamabad highlighted in their daily speeches covered live by television networks for several weeks in 2014. While the strategies and means adopted by the protesting parties raised controversy, their calls for fair election, clean government and accountability of political leaders did register with the masses. Such ideas, if taken root, could take Pakistan to the next stage of social and political development, on which the fabric of a mature democratic state can be built. The civil society, media and professional associations represent the new, reformist and progressive outlook for Pakistan. These forces have already won some of the battles in the long war of ideas that carry the potential for stabilising democracy. These successes are reflected in the liberalisation of the media and restoration of an independent judiciary. The new social forces continue to focus their efforts on catalysing a rule-bound, moderate and open society. Clearly Pakistan is a divided society and it remains polarised on vital issues, but the liberalist vision, which is more articulated through the politics of rights and demands and less by the philosophical exegesis of Western liberal thought in the Pakistani social climate, adds a positive dimension to political pluralism. The desire for a representative and constitutional government is intrinsic to the character of the new middle classes in almost every society. There can be legitimate concerns about the ability of the new social forces to set Pakistan on a democratic-constitutionalist path, but to question their existence or say that they

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can easily be cordened off amounts to misreading Pakistan’s changing social and political scene. Since scholarly discourses on Pakistan often focus on topics like radical Islam, militancy and oligarchic-military elites, the activism of the new social classes generally gets little or no attention. We can therefore be more optimistic that Pakistan’s third democratic transition may hold ground as compared to the previous two such phases. There are good reasons to expect the new social forces to gain further ground in the future. Over the past decade, we have seen that support for democracy and democratic rule has been an overall objective of the civil society.23 Its defence of the independence of media, judiciary, rule of law, and demand for accountability of public office holders would build and strengthen democratic institutions and practices. The role of the mass media for this purpose would be equally important. The fiery debates that people across the country are daily exposed to – despite lacking seriously in quality or due focus on critical social and political issues – would in the long run contribute to evolving a culture of civic engagement and free speech. The ability of these new social forces to sustain the growth of democracy in Pakistan cannot be underestimated.

Notes 1 J. Samuel Valenzuela, Democratic Consolidation in Post-transitional Settings: Notion, Process, and Facilitating Conditions, Working Paper No. 150 (Kellogg Institute, Notre Dame University, Notre Dame, December 1990). 2 Guillermo O’Donnell uses Robert Dahl’s conception of ‘polyarchy’ for this list. See Robert Dahl, ‘Why the rule of law matters’, Journal of Democracy 7/2 (1996), pp. 34–51. 3 Gerard Alexander, ‘Institutions, path dependence, and democratic consolidation’, Journal of Theoretical Politics 13/3 (2001), p. 249. 4 Andreas Schedler, ‘What is democratic consolidation?’ Journal of Democracy 9/2 (1998), pp. 91–92. 5 That is the substance of the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment that all the political parties brought about with remarkable consensus. See Mian Raza Rabbani, Biography of Pakistan Federalism: Unity in Diversity (Islamabad: Leo Books, 2012). 6 Andreas Schedler, ‘What is democratic consolidation?’ Journal of Democracy 9/2 (1998), p. 100. 7 Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999). 8 S. Akbar Zaidi, ‘The military’s waning power’, Dawn, 3 May 2014. 9 The joint session of the Parliament convened in the wake of the ‘long march’ and sit-in of the PTI and PAT. See Mateen Haider, ‘PM summons joint session of parliament on Tuesday’, Dawn, 31 August 2014. 10 ‘Text of the Charter of Democracy’, Dawn, 16 May 2006. 11 ‘The PMLN-PPP unity to shield against corruption cases: PTI Chief ’, Dawn, 18 April 2014. 12 ‘Pakistan army launches operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan’, The News International, 16 June 2014. 13 ‘DDC to be reconstituted as Committee on national security’, Dawn, 22 August 2013. 14 ‘DDC to be reconstituted as Committee on national security’, Dawn, 22 August 2013. 15 Durr-e-Nayab, ‘Estimating the middle class in Pakistan’, Pakistan Development Review 50/1 (2011), pp. 1–28.

Social drivers of democratic change 109 16 For details, see Isharat Husain, ‘Urbanization in Pakistan’, Keynote address at the South Asia Cities Conference and Pakistan Urban Forum, Karachi, 9 January 2014. 17 Author’s observation based on interviews with some protestors on two occasions in August–September 2014. 18 Larry Diamond makes a forceful argument about the role of civil society in the third wave of democratic transitions. See Larry Diamond, ‘Rethinking civil society: toward democratic consolidation’, Journal of Democracy 5/3 (1994), pp. 4–10. 19 Bhutto and Sharif served as prime minister twice but were not allowed to complete their tenure by the military. 20 See ‘Treason trial: FIA panel chief holds Musharraf responsible for 2007 emergency’, The Express Tribune, 12 September 2014. 21 Abdullah Zaidi, ‘An incomplete transition’, The Friday Times, 20 March 2015. 22 Hasan Askari-Rizvi, ‘The crisis of civilian supremacy’, The Express Tribune, 22 April 2014. 23 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, ‘HRCP Warns against Latest Snare for Democracy’, 30 August 2014. Available at http://hrcp-web.org/hrcpweb/hrcp-warnsagainst-latest-snare-for-democracy/ (accessed 20 April 2016).

6

Military, militancy, and the crisis of governance Mohammad Waseem

The present civilian era in Pakistan is marked by two opposing trends. At one end, the structural dynamics of the post-military state are characterized by a smooth transition from one democratically elected regime to another through the 2013 elections, four provincial governments being led by different political parties, an independent judiciary, a hyperactive electronic media, and intense mobilization of various social and political groups. The ongoing legal, institutional, formal and deliberative forms of public life belie the doomsday scenario of a failing state. At the other end, the graph of operational dynamics of governance has grossly fallen. Two major factors are at play here: first, the lack of will or capacity of the state establishment to eliminate terrorism carried out under Islamic cover in all of its forms and manifestations; and, second, the simmering tension in civil–military relations over unresolved issues such as relations with India, in particular the military’s re-assertion after the late 2014 protests and subsequent terrorist incidents in Peshawar and elsewhere. Which one of these two trends prevails will determine the future of democracy in Pakistan. This chapter analyses both structural and operational aspects of democratic governance. The discussion covers key determinants of the collapse of the state’s delivery system in terms of the lack of institutional capacity, religious–sectarian conflicts, and gaps in civil–military relations. The crisis of governance is first theoretically contextualized and explained, and then challenges arising from terrorism and civil–military tensions are analysed. The chapter offers a fresh analysis of different areas of the Pakistani state, including the politics of Islam, ethnicity, law and politics, and foreign policy. Its concluding part suggests a way out of the prevailing political, administrative and security logjam.

Introduction Pakistan has returned to democratic rule since 2008 that culminated in the smooth transfer of power through elections in 2013. However, this has not translated into any visible improvement in the delivery of services. Two key impediments in the elusive goal of improving governance remain the political discord and conflict among state institutions and political players as well as the continuing problem of terrorism. The security situation has sharply deteriorated in

Military, militancy, and governance crisis 111 recent years due to terrorism and sectarianism by jihadist outfits led by the Taliban, along with ethnic militancy in Balochistan and Karachi. For decades, the state pursued its quest for legitimacy through an ever-expanding agenda of Islamization. The Islamic project increasingly defined the institutional ethos and functioning of the government departments. The army gave a fillip to this project through what is popularly understood as ‘Pakistan’s unholy alliance’ between the militants and the military1 for more than four decades. The resultant crisis of governance is underscored by the challenge of belligerent identities and a potential clash of institutions such as between the executive and judiciary, the civilian government and army, the media and government, and the judiciary and parliament. The most devastating challenge to the state’s writ, however, comes from terrorism pursued by the Taliban and proto-Taliban groups in the name of establishing a Sunni-based Sharia in the country. As a consequence, the state’s writ has suffered tremendously in terms of its demonstrated inability to save its citizens’ lives. In the meantime, civil–military tensions have continued to undermine the authority of the executive wing of the state. The Nawaz Sharif government has been firefighting rather than governing in the face of the phenomenon of terrorism, while the army chief remains expressly committed to safeguarding the ‘honour’ of his institution at all costs.2

Theoretical context Pakistan’s persisting crisis of governance has elicited a vast array of scholarly opinions and public profiles of the country. Some authors such as Wirsing and Cohen are sceptical of the country’s ability to overcome multiple crises in the foreseeable future,3 while others term Pakistan as a failing state and express a general cynicism about ‘a dream gone sour’.4 At the other end of the spectrum, we find a series of optimistic positions such as Leiven’s portrayal of the army as the “only Pakistani institution which actually works”.5 Another work edited by Lodhi that claims to look beyond the crisis state represents a somewhat unfounded and be-laboured optimism for a stable Pakistan in the coming years.6 A near farcical approach to what is envisaged as the country’s bright future is reflected through a relatively quixotic treatment of the subject.7 Most studies of the nation’s travails reflect cynicism while discussing various aspects of the overarching phenomenon of institutional decay and a multi-dimensional political conflict. The perspective of a malfunctioning state can be couched in the framework of a society that is increasingly characterized by strident new entrants in the public arena seeking visibility on the political landscape. As Migdal argues, social contenders for power influence and shape the structural and operational dynamics of the state beyond the general tendency to reify and anthropomorphize it as an organic entity. He looks at society as a melange of contending groups and organizations, both struggling to maintain their respective patterns of control vertically and seeking to influence the outermost structure of the state horizontally. These arenas of struggle produce controversies over issues ranging from the right to

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interpret religion to re-allocation of resources to various constituent parts of the social formation.8 In Pakistan, mobilization of social and political forces after the Musharraf period (1999–2008) – ethnic, religious, sectarian, tribal, factional, professional and paraprofessional – has brought about a general governability crisis. Kohli points towards a similar phenomenon in India in the 1970s and 1980s, which he ascribes to weakening institutions and power conflicts rooted in multiple demands that rendered it difficult to keep the ruling coalitions intact.9 In other words, multiplicity of social and political actors and limited institutional capacity of the state together pose a challenge to governance. Such a situation would let violence move in as an instrument of power not only from above, such as in the form of military operations, but also from below – such as conflict resolution mechanisms operating from outside the purview of law, typically in villages and urban squatter settlements. As the centralized interventionist Indian state lost ground in directing policy and progress, it settled for struggling to meet the demands of actual or potential contenders for power and thus became a reactive state in the midst of multiple power struggles.10 In this context, Huntington’s neo-institutional approach to political development and modernization points to the lack of potential of the political community to create mechanisms for the regulation of public behaviour.11 However, his focus on institutions does not distinguish between state institutions and political institutions. The former represent the military-bureaucratic establishment, while the latter represent electoral and parliamentary forces such as political parties. Huntington’s thesis misses the point inasmuch as it is focused on the control function of institutions, i.e. political order, at the cost of their participatory function in a democratic political system. How is this brief theoretical backdrop on the subject relevant to the political scene in today’s Pakistan?

Roots of the crisis Pakistan’s crisis of governance is rooted in the erosion of the state’s institutional ethos and efficiency, which draws heavily on the elite conflict and can be explained in terms of the ‘un-governability thesis’.12 A clash of institutions has set in whereby the judicial, political and military leaderships have been engaged in a conflict over carving out respective space in the body politic. The nature of the crisis relates to the rival interpretations of constitutional provisions.13 Whether a consensus among them is likely to emerge in the foreseeable future remains an open question. The institutional design of the state of Pakistan was negotiated among the government in British India, the All India Congress and the All India Muslim League. It was put together as the 1947 Independence of India Act, which provided a constitutional framework for the new state. Its territorial limits were defined by the Radcliffe Award based on the principle of Muslim majority in provinces as well as districts and even tehsils. What was not part of the design was that new rules of game as well as new contenders for power would emerge

Military, militancy, and governance crisis 113 in Pakistan after 1947. Foremost among these new factors was the Islamic project. The Muslim League leadership heralded the Pakistan Movement that eventually assumed the character of an ever-expanding project of Islamization after Partition. The state sought to use religion as an instrument of policy of legitimizing Partition and later de-ethicizing politics. Over the years, religion sought to define the state itself. The new ‘Arabist shift’14 in rituals and jurisprudence and the Afghan-led jihadist mission put together a grand political force that sought to reshape the state. By the second decade of the new millennium, the doctrinally extremist and strategically militant Sunni-majoritarian Islamic agenda had emerged as a devastating challenge to modern statehood in the country.15 Pakistan emerged as a migrant state after independence, which turned the country into an elitist state. The Pakistan Movement drew upon the aspirations of Muslims in the framework of the Two-Nation Theory all over India. It overran the local power structures, especially in the Muslim majority provinces that would provide the territorial base for future Pakistan. The bulk of Punjab that provided half of the British army – equal to the rest of India – was included in Pakistan. As a ‘quasi-military state’ in late colonialism,16 Punjab emerged as the power base of the new country. Even more than agency, the army represents the structure of power and privilege rooted in military establishments dotting the province for several generations, grants of canal-irrigated lands, quotas for employment and, not least, a series of self-serving business enterprises.17 Successive coups created dozens of strategic strongholds for the army across the political landscape. Especially the army enjoyed a tacit support base in the fast expanding urban middle class, which had no love lost for electoral politics that traditionally favoured the landed elite. The twin processes of Punjabization and militarization of the state system led to centralization of power and emergence of two power centres represented by the political class and the middle class. The Islamic project was underscored by the migration of eight million Muslims from India to Pakistan, who came from East Punjab, UP, West Bengal, Bombay, Hyderabad Deccan, and many other states of India. A majority of them exhibited four characteristics that gradually shaped the thinking of state elite, especially bureaucratic and military leadership: deification of state; commitment to unity at the expense of diversity; focus on religion as the principle of national integration rather than language that could allegedly divide the public into subnational categories; and disdain for politicians and political parties.18 Many of the migrants settled in cities, acquired property, and influenced the ideological and behavioural dimensions of the middle class in general. In Pakistan, the middle class is socially progressive but politically conservative. It wants to open up to the world of science and technology, cultivate education as the key to progress, and grow out of the traditional stranglehold of the customary law that bars women from a respectable status. Simultaneously, however, it prefers a presidential system than a parliamentary system, hates corruption, nepotism, and dynastic rule in the political class, and privileges security over democracy and state over constitution.19 Inasmuch as the middle class is the

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recruitment base for bureaucracy, technocrats, professionals, businessmen and increasingly the officer-cadre of army, it has served as the power base of the state elite as opposed to the political elite. Large Muhajir (Urdu-speaking migrant) sections of the urban middle class were sucked into MQM’s orbit in Sindh in the 1980s. Before the elections in 2013 and during the protest movement in 2014, PTI leader Imran Khan was able to mobilize large sections of the urban middle class in Punjab, which had traditionally shunned electoral politics. Discussion in the following sections brings out specific dimensions of this general framework of power distribution in the country.

From Islamization to Talibanization As stated before, what is generally understood to be an organizational and ideological force collectively called the ‘Islamic establishment’ was never a part of the original institutional and constitutional design. By the 1990s, Islamism started to penetrate the institutional apparatus of the state itself. Thus, some proIslamist members of the judiciary sought to dismantle the whole state system because they considered the 1973 Constitution totally un-Islamic.20 In 2010, five army officers were arrested and later sentenced to jail terms for joining Hizb-ulTahrir, which seeks to establish the Islamic state in Pakistan as part of its agenda of formation of the caliphate in the world.21 In their new ‘jihadist’ incarnation as Taliban, extremist Islamic elements deny legitimacy to the state along with its laws and institutions. The phenomenon of militancy has weakened the constitutional state by leading to theodicy – divine justification – for spreading a counternarrative based on transcendental sources of legitimacy.22 The Talibanization of political discourse represents a potentially lethal input in the body politic that has led to social acquiescence towards violence in pursuit of sacred causes. This has worked as an alibi for absence of the writ of the state in various regions, sectors and groups of the population. The Islamic agenda has led to a dichotomous worldview in the context of war against the West and Westernization at home. This is an extra-systemic input that has mounted an extraordinary pressure on the working of the political system. The state authority operates according to an entirely different set of rules and norms of public behaviour, such as electoral democracy, rational-legal bureaucracy, provision of equal citizenship and human rights, parliamentary sovereignty and constitutionalism as the highest source of legitimacy, all inherited from colonial times.23 One of the major factors behind the steady erosion of legitimacy of the state’s institutional apparatus is the continuation of the anti-colonial framework of mind after 1947. Over the years, decolonization became the name of the game for both the theory and practice of diluting, pruning away and even eliminating various constituent parts of the prevalent institutional-constitutional conundrum ruling Pakistan, thereby cutting links with the Western legal and political philosophy. The narrative of de-Westernization of the statecraft was often couched in a strident agenda of Islamizing the state and society that essentially boiled down to anti-modernism. There followed institutionalization of Islamic influence on the

Military, militancy, and governance crisis 115 statecraft through representation of ulema in the Senate, Council of Islamic Ideology, as well as Islamic banking, Daawa Academy of the International Islamic University in Islamabad, mandatory teaching of Islamic Studies up to graduation level in colleges and universities of Pakistan, and Islamic legislation through martial law ordinances and case law. The power of the ascendant Islamic discourse was soon reflected through friction between the institutional ethos of the state and the new ‘agency’ represented by Islamism. Muslim nationalism in British India embraced an increasingly insular and exclusivist character after Partition. The upholders of the ideological construct of Muslim separatism belonging to the independence generation sought to redefine, reshape and remould the legal and institutional design of the postcolonial state.24 This led to incremental erosion of the sources of legitimacy couched in the British Common Law as inherited by Pakistan. Its engagement in the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s paved the way for social acceptance of militancy in pursuit of a faith-based agenda. This factor rendered power into the hands of militant non-state actors in the 1990s and 2000s, thus pushing the state back to the pre-Westphalia form of national existence where the state was not the only actor on the political stage. This phenomenon destabilized inter-personal and inter-group relations in society.25 One after another, people of different faiths and sects were exposed to murderous attacks, bombing of places of worship and target killings. That, in turn, led to potential decriminalization of murder in pursuit of elimination of those billed as enemies of Islam, including Ahmedis, Shias, Ismailis, Zikris, Hindus, Christians and Sikhs.26 What is generally described as hate crime in other societies committed in the form of arson, murder or any other kind of bodily harm has been elevated by extremists to a duty of right-thinking Muslims in order to get rid of infidels. All this put religious minorities at a disadvantage. The persistent, though controversial, pursuit of the Islamic project by successive civil and military governments lent credence to the impression of complicity of the powerful elements in the gradual marginalization of citizens belonging to religious and sectarian minorities. General Zia’s system of separate electorates for religious communities became operational from 1979 onwards till the joint electorates were reintroduced in 2002, after two decades of struggle waged by progressive and liberal elements at home and the human rights regime abroad.27 Similarly, the judiciary gradually lost the will to protect minorities in a series of court cases.28 These developments have produced – almost by default – a two-level citizenship, first class and second class, the former belonging to the Sunni majority and the latter including all others as victims of varying degrees of discrimination. The second contribution of Talibanization relates to the electoral domain inasmuch as the organizational activity of political parties was constrained by the TTP and various proto-Taliban sectarian and jihadi outfits such as Lashkar-eJhangvi and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba/Jamaat-ud-Daawa. During the 2013 election campaign, the TTP declared three parties, the PPP, MQM and ANP as ‘secular’, and thus disallowed them from running the election campaign in public. Their party offices were burnt, workers and cadres killed and public meetings attacked

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and disrupted. The terrorist outfit also announced a list of bona fide parties which could take part in elections, including the PML-N, PTI, Jamaat-e-Islami and JUIF.29 TTP’s election strategy virtually divided the country along provincial lines. Punjab emerged as a zone of security, where the leading party PML-N and the runner-up party PTI were spared punishment. However, terrorist attacks in Sindh and KPK rendered these provinces irrelevant for political mobilization. Islamism set the new standards of loyalty and disloyalty.30 Not surprisingly, the electorate fell back on Sindhi and Muhajir identities in Sindh as a safeguard against uncertainty. In KPK, the PTI filled the vacuum created by the ANP’s ouster from the electoral scene under threat from the Taliban, the PPP’s lack of initiative after five years of bad governance and the PML-N’s focus on Punjab in a nervous attempt to safeguard its stronghold at the Centre. Punjab’s relative security paid dividends in the form of a smooth electoral process, due to the TTP’s strategy of sparing the PML-N and PTI, but pushing the PPP out of the electoral landscape. The bullet played a role in shaping the ballot. After the elections, the Sharif government was responsible for maintaining law and order and thus containing Taliban’s terrorist activities. The massive jailbreak in Dera Ismail Khan by the Taliban put further pressure on the incumbent governments of PML-N and PTI in Islamabad and Peshawar respectively to upgrade the national security apparatus. The public and the media posed various questions that stared the two governments in the eye. Was it the lack of capacity or will on the part of the state’s law enforcing agencies that inhibited the process of decision making in pursuit of re-establishing the writ of the state? Certainly, there was a lack of action for a whole year that selectively paralysed the decision making potential of the authority structure and rendered it into a mere state shell in that respect. The third aspect of governance involving terrorist menace was the state’s readiness to negotiate with Taliban militants as part of its over a decade-long effort to end terrorism. The post-9/11 exodus of Taliban from Afghanistan to Pakistan transformed them first into fugitives and later into militants in and around FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas), where they were able to join hands with their local counterparts and mount pressure for Islamization of the state through jihad. Negotiations with the Taliban pursued by both civilian and military wings of the state can be described as tactical moves on the part of two combatants, the Taliban and the army. The former often looked for a pause in the negotiating process in order to gain ground in the face of the formidable military presence in the area. The latter sought to deflect the pressure of the Taliban due to the lack of a grand strategy in the regional context of the war in Afghanistan, where the Taliban relentlessly fought against Kabul and by default sought to constrain the Indian influence.31 Not surprisingly, the Pakistani army high command led by General Ashfaq Pervaiz Kayani (2007–2013) chose not to attack the North Waziristan agency – home to the Haqqani Network, which allegedly operated across the border in Afghanistan – despite constant pressure from the US and other NATO members. The official approach to negotiations with the Taliban during the Musharraf,

Military, militancy, and governance crisis 117 Zardari and Sharif regimes was underscored by foreign policy considerations about regional actors India and Afghanistan. On the one hand, the non-state actors served as an instrument of the government’s foreign policy objectives in Afghanistan for three decades and in Indian-administered Kashmir from 1989 to 2002. On the other, they posed a serious threat to: the life and property of citizens in Pakistan, including security personnel, with a combined toll of over 50,000;32 implements of state authority such as GHQ in Rawalpindi, Naval Headquarters in Karachi, the Aeronautical Engineering Complex in Kamra and police stations, Rangers headquarters and regional offices of the ISI; and legitimacy of the state’s institutional apparatus, democratic practices and norms by rendering them un-Islamic.33 Prime Minister Sharif initiated the process of comprehensive negotiations with the Taliban in early 2014 as a follow-up to his commitment during the election campaign. While the ideological divide between the left and right had almost disappeared from electoral politics by 2013, the issue of negotiations with the Taliban created a new division among political parties in the aftermath of elections. An All Parties Conference held in September 2013 had passed a unanimous resolution in favour of negotiations as the way to peace.34 However, the PPP, MQM and ANP along with smaller outfits and individual politicians continued to favour military operation against the Taliban. It was clear that the resolution served as an alibi for the ‘liberal’ members of parliament, who shied away from being accused of opposing ‘our Muslim brothers’ and supporting the ‘American infidels’. On the other hand, Imran Khan emerged as the leading champion of the cause of negotiations with the Taliban, along with various Islamic outfits such as JUI-S, JUI-F and JI.35 The PML-N moved from support of negotiations before elections to long periods of paralysis of policy and action in this regard after coming to power. Soon after the All Parties Conference, the Taliban carried out an ambush and killed five serving military officers, including an army major general. Meanwhile, the government formed a committee for negotiations that started the dialogue with a Taliban committee. However, it faced contradictory pressures on this issue from within and outside the PML-N. The government also issued a National Security Policy that sought to integrate the operational dynamics of various intelligence agencies.36 However, no significant move in the direction of implementation of the new security policy was visible. The government got a sweeping anti-terror legislation – the Pakistan Protection Bill – passed by the parliament in July 2014, which allowed the shooting of suspects on sight, arresting them without a warrant and withholding information about the detainees.37 The human rights associations from outside the parliament termed it a draconian law because it allowed wide operational powers to security forces, especially in the context of the Zarb-e-Azb military operation against TTP in North Waziristan that began in June 2014. This operation did gain momentum after the terrorist tragedy struck at the Army Public School in Peshawar, following which the military seemingly further asserted itself in managing national security. The civilian rulers and

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almost all the political parties agreed to the Twenty-First Constitutional Amendment, under which the military courts were subsequently established – and the years-long moratorium on the death penalty was lifted. A comprehensive counter-terrorism programme, the National Action Plan, was also launched. However, it was soon clear that swift military justice in the form of military courts and executions and a rapid deployment anti-terrorist force would not be a sufficiently strong deterrence to terrorism, let alone uproot it, because the government would not make much headway in curbing the underground activities of non-state radical Islamic actors like Lashkare Jhangvi, Lashkar-e-Tayyiba, Jaishe Mohammad and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen or their various front organizations, or plug their sources of funding. The fate of these groups rests in the hands of the ISI, which manages them in line with the military’s regional security policy visà-vis India and Afghanistan and this is not likely to change significantly in the short term.38 Prior to the start of Zarb-e-Azb, while the Taliban threatened presidential elections in Afghanistan ahead of NATO troops’ withdrawal, Imran Khan made his pro-Taliban policy the centre-point of his political strategy, and linked it up with his consistently anti-American stance on the issues of NATO supply through Pakistan and the US drone attacks in tribal areas. Alleging that the 2013 elections were rigged, the PTI leader threatened to amass a million people in Islamabad on 14 August 2014, the Independence Day, to force the government out of office. In June 2014, Tahirul Qadri landed in the country with a clarion call for revolution. There was a brutal Punjab police action outside the headquarters of his party PAT in Lahore, killing over a dozen PAT workers. Qadri vowed to topple the government within weeks by leading a ‘revolution march’ on the same day as PTI’s ‘freedom march’ from Lahore to Islamabad. In their weeks-long sit-ins outside the parliament building, both Qadri and Imran warned senior police officers of serious consequences if they used force against the protestors and also asked them to rebel against the government. In several incidents, violent protestors beat up police personnel and ordinary citizens. They also stormed the state-run Pakistan Television and entered the restricted zone of the parliament. In the end, however, the conspiracy, real or perceived, to dislodge the civilian leadership from power was once again averted. Politicians found in Nawaz Sharif not only the Leader of the House but a symbol of democracy in the face of two imagined or real challenges: one, from the protestors gathered outside the Parliament House, and two, from the Establishment whose intervention was wildly speculated on in the media.39 However, the episodes of anarchy during the protests, marking serious erosion of the writ of the state in the heart of Pakistani capital, occurred in parallel with rampant lawlessness and major incidents of terrorism in the country. Their debilitating effect on the civilian regime’s ability to effectively manage the lingering crisis of governance can hardly be overlooked.

Military, militancy, and governance crisis 119

Civil–military tensions The 2014 protests were preceded by heightened civil–military tensions. Even as the direct military rule ended in 2003 and General Musharraf resigned as president in 2008, civilian control over significant aspects of public policy has remained elusive, especially in the domain of strategic thinking and practice. We can outline three potentially grey areas of policy underscored by reservations of the army leadership about the government’s policy initiatives. First, Prime Minister Sharif was compelled to slow down the progress in pursuit of his declared policy of opening up to India both diplomatically and by way of trade. Second, Musharraf ’s trial on charges of high treason for declaring the state of emergency in November 2007 took several twists and turns whereby the government as well as the judiciary showed an ambivalent attitude towards pushing the case to its logical end. Third, the murderous attack on prominent journalist Hamid Mir in April 2014, particularly the alleged role of the then ISI chief in it as reported by Geo News, became a major source of contention between the government and the military. As for Sharif ’s India policy, it had overtones of his declared orientation in the 1990s towards balancing diplomatic relations and promoting trade with India. During the last two decades, this pattern of thinking got a fillip from various scholarly studies that favoured a horizontal expansion of commercial activity in the region of South Asia.40 After assuming power, the prime minister put former foreign secretary Shehryar Khan in charge of back-channel diplomacy. The latter pursued the matter through informal meetings with his Indian counterparts in several rounds. The lack of progress on this front was ascribed to the Indian insistence to bring the culprits of Mumbai attacks to justice and thus close that chapter in order to move forward.41 For the Pakistani security establishment, this was neither realistic nor acceptable. There was, however, some progress in the form of an agreement on a NonDiscriminatory Market Access approach to trade between Islamabad and Delhi, as Pakistan failed to meet its earlier pledge to grant India the Most Favoured Nation status. However, implementation of this initiative was later deferred.42 The establishment of separate commercial outposts at the border crossing at Wahgah-Attari to facilitate the handling of merchandise symbolized progress in this direction. However, the bureaucracy opposed expansion in commercial activity with India in a situation of adverse balance of trade. The army has long had its reservations about the eventual emergence of a peace stakeholder in the form of the trading community.43 In its view, as long as there was no resolution of the Kashmir conflict with India, there could be no substantive trade with that country. The absence of a strong and viable lobby for peace and trade with India, or even a vibrant public debate on the issue within or outside the parliament, pointed to the lack of a bold initiative on the part of Prime Minister Sharif. This testified to the old wisdom about the limits of any substantial foreign policy move to materialize without the expressed approval of the army.44 The Sharif regime’s India peace policy seems to have been doomed, ever since it allegedly

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agreed to ‘share space’45 with the military in running security and foreign policy in the wake of the pressure generated by the protestors in Islamabad. Second, Musharraf ’s trial under Article 6 for committing high treason by declaring an emergency on 3 November 2007 also became a symbol of incomplete transition from military to civilian rule. He did so by sacking scores of judges and packing the courts with handpicked judges. Musharraf ’s imposition of an emergency was formally challenged in the Supreme Court in 2013. However, the military high command linked up this issue with the morale of the army. There was a clear message that men in uniform would not countenance Musharraf ’s trial. At the same time, Prime Minister Sharif enjoyed the tacit support of the opposition, including the PPP, ANP and various smaller parties in pursuing this case. The idea was to set a precedent for future adventurists in the form of a deterrent such as prosecution under Article 6 of the Constitution. The political situation seemed to be ripe for pursuing the case against Musharraf. Under President Asif Ali Zardari (2008–2013), a growing consensus had emerged among political parties against supporting a coup maker in the aftermath of Musharraf ’s ignominious exit from power. However, after the 2013 elections, the MQM and PML-Q publically supported Musharraf and accused the government of pursuing a vendetta against the general. A series of events followed, ranging from the Special Court’s proceedings marred by ugly exchanges with Musharraf ’s lawyers to the general’s allegedly fake illness that made him a fugitive from the court. Public disbelief in the capacity of the civilian government to pursue the case to its logical end led to rumours about a deal between the army and the government to allow General Musharraf to leave the country, especially after his indictment and release from house arrest in early 2014. However, it took two years for these rumours to be true, as the former president departed Pakistan in early 2016. In essence, Musharraf ’s trial reflected the endless balancing act that characterized civil–military relations in Pakistan for six decades. Political actors and analysts sought answers to a series of questions in this regard. Was a clash of institutions imminent on the issue of Musharraf ’s trial? Was Sharif putting his rule at stake by taking the risk of alienating the army leadership in pursuit of his political objective of setting a precedent for future? Was the military compelled to maintain a low profile on this issue due to the relatively high commitment of the political class, the media as well as the higher judiciary to bar the army from politics? The fact was that both the civilian and military establishments were trying to play it safe, taking two steps forward and one step back. The chief judge of the three-member special court hearing stormed out of the court after an angry exchange with Musharraf ’s lawyers, but later announced that he did not recuse himself from the case.46 After the indictment of General Musharraf in March 2014, the Sindh High Court and the Supreme Court respectively allowed and disallowed that his name be taken off the Exit Control List. The public believed that Musharraf ’s fate hung in the balance, essentially, in terms of the duration of time for which the Court and the government could keep the case going in the public eye.

Military, militancy, and governance crisis 121 Subsequently, the special trial court allowed General Musharraf to rope in former prime minister Shaukat Aziz, Law Minister Zahid Hamid and Chief Justice Abdul Hameed Dogar as co-conspirators, in effect diluting the focus on General Musharraf and ensuring unending delays in processing appeals and counter-appeals by the various accused and the government. This suited the government and the military – the former could claim to be pursuing the case vigorously while the latter could remain sanguine that no harm would befall its ex-chief and ‘humiliate’ the institution.47 The real purpose of the government and the judiciary seemed to be to project a profile of accountability of generals rearing Bonapartist ambitions. The fact that Sharif ’s core support base lay in Punjab – the bastion of power in Pakistan – worked in his favour. However, the army’s high command seemed to be equally sure that the case would not go beyond a certain level after the civilian institutions would have made their point. The third case of civil–military tensions during Sharif ’s third term relates to TV anchor Hamid Mir, who was the target of a murderous attack in Karachi in April 2014. His family implicated Lieutenant General Zaheer-ul-Islam, Director General of the ISI, in the attempted assassination. Geo News channel’s coverage of the suspicion was projected loud and clear with a focus on the ISI chief, beyond the norms of editorial control and professional ethics. The civilian government’s immediate reaction to the attack was a show of solidarity with the journalist, with Sharif personally visiting Hamid Mir in hospital in Karachi. Later, the military’s ISPR condemned what it considered to be vilification of the leading intelligence agency of the country and by extension the army. It also asked the Pakistan Electronic Media Regulatory Authority to take action against Geo. The government was clearly put on the defensive after pro-military religious outfits ranging from Jamaat-ud-Daawa to Sunni Ittehad Council and Tanzeem Mashaikh Azzam as well as the PTI held rallies in support of the army and ISI.48 Consequently, the prime minister felt obliged to meet the army chief General Raheel Sharif as well as the ISI chief, and publicly endorsed their role in defence of the nation. Various TV channels distanced themselves from Geo. Some even held a vilification campaign against it for being an Indian agent, because it was a partner of The Times of India for a joint peace project called Aman Ki Asha (Hope for Peace).49 Soon after, Geo was condemned for broadcasting an antiIslamic talk show. Allegations of being pro-India and anti-Islam led to a fine and suspension of the broadcasts of Geo News and Geo Entertainment channels. For months, cable operators across the country, allegedly under pressure from the ISI, kept Geo News off air, despite clear instructions by the Supreme Court and PEMRA to broadcast its transmissions. During this period, the ISI was able to demonstrate its power and influence by mobilizing public support from not only the pro-army religious groups and political parties but also the PTI. During the late 2014 sit-ins, party leaders, especially Imran Khan, repeatedly castigated Geo owner Mir Shakeel-ur-Rehman and Hamid Mir for working against the state. Subsequently, however, it did recover from the crisis, although it did so by compromising some of its critical stances.

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Apart from exposing the ultimate political loyalty of various contenders for power in the tacit civil–military conflict, the spillover of the tension to the street and to the print and electronic media is a strong indicator of the way the military revisited its role under a democratic dispensation. At least three conclusions can be drawn from the major issue areas of civil–military relations discussed above. First, it is clear that the army has continued to have a strong input in foreign policy, especially relating to India. The military operation in North Waziristan launched in June 2014 was apparently the result of a trilateral understanding between the army, Pentagon and Kabul that largely overruled the priorities of the civilian government in terms of its scale and timing. Second, while Musharraf was struggling through the courts that sought to determine his role in the imposition of the emergency in November 2007, there was a clear indication from the army that his fate would not be left to civilian institutions to decide. Speculations in this regard discounted the constitutional or judicial route to resolution of the conflict. Finally, the army clearly demonstrated that it had its vast network of allies not only among political leaders and cadres, though mainly on the periphery of the political system with the exception of the PTI, but also in the electronic media, which regularly aired its priorities and preferences.

Conclusion In this chapter, we set out to locate the nature and character of the current crisis of governance in Pakistan with reference to the conceptual framework of the state as an arena for rival social contenders for power, with the legal state apparatus being one of them. We discussed the way the state’s incremental infighting has been led by civil and military wings, whereby the latter carved out a space for Islamic forces operating from inside and – recently and more significantly – from outside the political system. In this process, the extra-systemic forces represented by militant non-state actors such as the vast array of jihadi parties, sectarian outfits and the TTP robbed the state of its paramount character in terms of legitimacy and monopoly over the use of force. The military operation in North Waziristan launched in June 2014 testifies to the need for addressing the persisting governance crisis by going back to the post-Westphalian state in principle, which would not countenance any role for the non-state actors in the Weberian state in practice in the sense of monopoly over the legitimate use of violence. The way to restore the state’s capacity to deliver lies in cultivation of its exclusive and ultimate authority to be defined and interpreted solely with reference to the constitution. The most obvious obligation of the security apparatus of any state is to strengthen the government in terms of power, prestige, authority and diplomatic clout with the outside world. The two parallel foci of power operating in the country can only pull the warring factions and groups further apart from each other. In the present context, the agenda of cutting the Sharif government down to size is tantamount to weakening the writ of the state.50

Military, militancy, and governance crisis 123 The Establishment needs to undergo a transformative process whereby it would learn to live under the constitution, not above it. This will ensure that militancy under the Islamic cover would no longer confuse the decision makers and citizens at large by defusing the agenda of eliminating terrorism in Pakistan. The task of re-establishing the writ of the state is the key to development and prosperity, whereby a new credibility regime in Islamabad could engage with the diplomatic and financial world abroad. However, the way out of the current crisis can materialize only if the state sheds its bi-focal and perennially conflict-prone pattern of authority and develops a model of civilian supremacy by taking the army on board as the principle of power that makes the government’s authority credible and meaningful. There must be an institutional mechanism that eschews the need for the army or ISI to go public with its grievances through the ISPR, media or surrogate political outfits. This would bring down the level of uncertainty in the domain of civil– military relations and help conduct public affairs with the requisite level of credibility and predictability. The controversy over a range of issues including the government’s diplomatic and economic logic behind opening up to India, a legal approach to Musharraf ’s trial, and the right of expression of the media smacks of tension in civil–military relations. Now is the time for issues of governance to be addressed with the full institutional-constitutional authority of the state. For this purpose, the state establishment has to rethink the role of the political class as a stabilizing force, democracy as the only game in town, parallel centres of power as disastrous, harbouring terrorists as suicidal, politics of proxies as a recipe for instability, casting aspersions on citizens’ patriotism as undesirable, as well as follow, rather than lead, people’s aspirations. Otherwise, Pakistan’s long-standing conflicts rooted in the perennial civil–military contestation for power, which have already acquired a new level of intensity and brutality, will not only threaten the sovereign existence of the country but also destabilize the regional order.

Notes 1 Zahid Hussain, Frontline Pakistan: The Struggle with Militant Islam (Lahore: Vanguard Publishers, 2007), p. 12. 2 ‘Army will preserve its honour at all costs: Ge. Raheel’, The Express Tribune, 7 April 2014. 3 Robert Wirsing, ‘Pakistan’s transformation: the limits of “extreme makeover” in US counter terrorism strategy’, Paper presented at fifth annual Social Sciences Conference, Lahore University of Management Sciences (31 March–3 April 2005), pp. 16–19; Stephen Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2006), pp. 267–269. 4 See Roedad Khan, Pakistan: A Dream Gone Sour (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1999). 5 Anatol Lieven, Pakistan: A Hard Country (London: Allen Lane, 2011), p. 21. 6 Maleeha Lodhi (ed.), Pakistan: Beyond the Crisis State (London: Hurst and Co., 2011). 7 Javed Jabbar, Pakistan: Unique Origins, Unique Destiny (Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 2011).

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8 Joel S. Migdal, ‘Integration and disintegration: An approach to society-formation’, in L.V. de Goor, K. Rupesinghe and P. Sciarone (eds), Between Development and Destruction (London: Macmillan Press, 1996), pp. 95–99. 9 Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent: India’s Growing Crisis of Governability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 383. 10 Atul Kohli, Democracy and Discontent: India’s Growing Crisis of Governability (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 7–8, 14. 11 Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Heaven: Yale University Press, 1968), pp. 12–15. 12 Mustafa Kamal Pasha, ‘The hyper-extended state: Civil society and democracy’, in R.B. Rais (ed.), State, Society and Democratic Change in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 183. 13 Paula R. Newberg, Judging the State: Courts and Constitutional Politics in Pakistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), p. 2. 14 Suroosh Irfani, ‘Pakistan’s sectarian violence: between the “Arabist shift” and IndoPersian culture’, in R. Wirsing, (ed.), Religious Radicalism and Security in South Asia (Honolulu: Asia-Pacific Center for Strategic Studies, 2004), p. 147. 15 See Mohammad Waseem, Patterns of Conflict in Pakistan: Implications for Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2011), pp. 9–13. 16 Tan Ti Yong, ‘Punjab and making of Pakistan: the roots of a civil–military state’, International Journal of Punjab Studies 4/1 (July 1997), p. 18. 17 See Imran Ali, The Punjab under Imperialism 1885–1947 (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988); Ayesha Siddiqa, Military Inc.: Pakistan’s Military Economy (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2007). 18 For further discussion, see Mohammad Waseem, ‘Mohajirs in Pakistan: a case of nativization of migrants’, in C. Bates (ed.), Community, Empire and Migration: South Asians in Diaspora (New York: Palgrave, 2001). 19 Mohammad Waseem, ‘Mohajirs in Pakistan: a case of nativization of migrants’, in C. Bates (ed.), Community, Empire and Migration: South Asians in Diaspora (New York: Palgrave, 2001). 20 Martin Lau, The Role of Islam in the Legal System of Pakistan (Leiden: Martinus Nijhof, 2006), pp. 32–35. 21 ‘Hizbut Tahrir and the army’, The Express Tribune, 4 August 2012. 22 See Colin Campbell, ‘Weber, rationalization and religious evolution in the modern era’, in J. Beckford and J. Walliss (eds), Theorising Religion: Classical and Contemporary Debates (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2006), p. 27. 23 Amir Mir, Talibanization of Pakistan (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2010), pp. 5–12. 24 See Wayne Wilcox, ‘Ideological dilemmas in Pakistan’s political culture’, in D.E. Smith (ed.), South Asian Politics and Religion (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1966). 25 Ahmed Rashid, Pakistan on the Brink (London: Allen Lane, 2012), p. 27. 26 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, State of Human Rights in 2013 (Lahore: HRCP, 2014), pp. 83–106. 27 See Mohammad Waseem, ‘Religious minorities: The case for a pluralist democracy’, in M. Waseem (ed.), Electoral Reform in Pakistan (Islamabad: Frederich Ebert Stiftung, 2002), pp. 145–155. 28 Tayyab Mahmud, ‘Freedom of religion & religious minorities in Pakistan: a study of judicial practice’, Fordham International Law Journal 19/1 (1995), pp. 97–100. 29 For discussion, see Imtiaz Alam, ‘Elections in Pakistan’, South Asian Journal 2/2 (July–September 2013). 30 Philip Oldenburg, ‘The threat posed by extremist groups to Pakistan: Loyalty, disloyalty and semi-loyalty in a hybrid regime’, Paper presented at the conference on State and Democracy in South Asia, Delhi University (28 February–1 March 2014), pp. 12–14.

Military, militancy, and governance crisis 125 31 Abdul Basit, ‘Militant landscape after Miranshah agreement’, in M.A. Rana, Dynamics of Taliban Insurgency in FATA (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, 2010), pp. 98–105. 32 Mudassar Raja, ‘Pakistani victims: War on terror toll put at 49,000’, The Express Tribune, 27 March 2013. 33 Tahir Khan, ‘Un-Islamic system: Taliban call for poll boycott’, The Express Tribune, 9 April 2013. 34 ‘Resolution of the All-Parties Conference on Sept 9, 2013’, Dawn, 10 September 2013. 35 See Rubina Saigol, ‘Three pillars of wisdom: a critical assessment of Imran Khan and his politics’, Herald, January 2014. 36 See Ejaz Haider, ‘National internal security policy: the road ahead’, Newsweek, 26 February 2014. 37 ‘Pakistan approves sweeping anti-terror bill, prompting warnings from rights groups’, New York Times, 2 July 2014. 38 Najam Sethi, ‘Political forecast 2015’, The Friday Times, 9 January 2015. 39 Mohammad Waseem, ‘Winners and losers’, The Express Tribune, 16 September 2014. 40 Zareen Fatima Naqvi and Philip Schuler (eds), The Challenges and Potential of Pakistan-India Trade (Washington, DC: The World Bank, June 2007). Several chapters in the book deal with the issue of trade between the two countries as an imperative for growth in the region. 41 Author’s interview with Shehryar Khan, Lahore, 9 December 2013. 42 Shahbaz Rana, ‘Non-discriminatory market access. Pakistan, India all but sign trade normalisation deal’, The Express Tribune, 15 March 2014. 43 See Bidanda M. Chengappa, ‘India–Pakistan trade relations’, Strategic Analysis XXIII/3 (1999); ‘Gen. Hamid Gul exposing Nawaz Sharif about India policy’, News Insights (video), 17 September 2014. Available at www.pakistantv.tv/2013/09/17/ gen-hamid-gul-exposing-nawaz-sharif-india-policy/#sthash.SSfTQO2X.dpbs (accessed 8 March 2016). 44 Ian Talbot, ‘Does the army shape Pakistan’s foreign policy’, in C. Jaffrelot (ed.), Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation (New Delhi: Manohar, 2002), pp. 323–333. 45 ‘From czar-like prime minister to deputy commissioner-type character’, Reuters, 20 August 2014. 46 ‘Chief judge in Pervez Musharraf treason trial quits bench’, The Economic Times, 27 March 2014. 47 Najam Sethi, ‘Political forecast 2015’, The Friday Times, 9 January 2015. 48 ‘In solidarity with the army: rallies staged in Lahore, Islamabad’, Pakistan Times, 29 April 2014. 49 This partly reflected the findings of the Supreme Court’s Media Commission report in 2013 that pointed to the dubious character of finances of the peace project, and PEMRA’s allegation about Geo’s expensive advertising contracts abroad. See Shahram Ali, ‘Judicial report on Jang group’s Aman ki Asha: The footprints lead to Indian sponsors including Indian state TV’, LUBP (Let Us Build Pakistan) blog, 14 July 2013. Available at http://lubpak.com/archives/274659 (accessed 17 April 2016). 50 Mohammad Waseem, ‘Can the establishment change its mind?’ The Express Tribune, 14 October 2014.

7

Pluralist society vs. monist state Saeed Shafqat

Pakistan was born as a pluralist society and, in reality, continues to be vibrant and diverse – ethnically, linguistically and culturally. Yet, since independence, the pluralist foundations of its society have been consistently undermined by security imperatives of the state. Proponents of monolithic ideologies have dominated the national discourse, which treats Islamic ideology as the basis of nationhood. This has created a constant schism between state-building and nation-building processes. Prospects of democracy in the country thus hinge largely on reversing an ideologically grounded state-building process sustained through successive education policies. The Eighteenth Amendment to the 1973 Constitution has made education a provincial subject. Thus, civilian leaders and policy makers now have a rare opportunity to promote civic education in Pakistan and thus revive the pluralist characteristic of its society, on which the edifice of a sustainable democracy can be built. This chapter begins by defining relevant concepts such as liberalism, constitutionalism and pluralism. It then underlines the persisting tension in postcolonial states between a pluralist society and monist state, especially its relevance to Pakistan. Subsequent discussion narrates how the promotion of monolithic ideologies through state education policies, especially from 1979 onwards, has undermined civic education, and why the Eighteenth Amendment can be a potential driver for bridging the gap between a pluralist society and a monist state.

Post-independence paradox Liberalism and constitutionalism are generally identified as two crucial components of a democratic system.1 Although there are varied interpretations of the meaning and understanding of these two concepts, liberalism implies upholding the values of tolerance, protecting minority rights, freedom of expression and association, while constitutionalism means respect for the law, and equal and fair rule of law that ensures justice and equal rights for all – irrespective of caste, class, colour and religious creed. Upholding and pursuing these ideals also heightens tension between the majority rule and protection of individual rights, between the government and the opposition, and between competition and

Pluralist society vs. monist state 127 inclusiveness. Thus, modern democracy and states making transitions to democracy have inherent paradoxes that need to be navigated carefully. Pluralism needs to be understood within the context of the twin pillars of liberalism and constitutionalism. It literally means ‘manyness’ – as opposed to ‘monism’ or oneness. Marc Plattner defines pluralism as “a multiplicity or diversity of groups that exert influence within a polity”.2 According to Robert Dahl, power in democracies is dispersed among a number of competing economic, social and ideological pressure groups and not held by a single elite or group.3 Pluralism has over time acquired a much wider meaning, whereby ethnic, cultural and religious groups are seen exerting for influence, space, resources and sharing of power in a society and its political system. At one level, there are religious, ethnic, linguistic, cultural and socio-economic inequalities in most postcolonial states and societies, which could be described as pluralist. At another level, that is liberalism and constitutionalism, such societies would immediately fall in Fareed Zakaria’s apt conceptualization of ‘illiberal democracies’ – where elections are held, political parties do exist and in some cases peaceful transfer of power also occurs, yet democratic norms remain weak, and corruption and crony capitalism reign supreme.4 Applying these concepts to Pakistan, it emerges that the country was indeed born in 1947 as a multi-lingual, multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society and state. It inherited a pluralist society, where East Bengal had its own language and history. Similarly, in West Pakistan, the four provinces of Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan and NWFP (now KPK) had rich linguistic and cultural diversity. These multi-ethnic and multi-lingual groups banded together to create one nation. However, the movement for Pakistan was not led by, to borrow Shahid Javed Burki’s formulation, the ‘insiders’ but by the ‘outsiders’ – those who belonged to Muslim-minority provinces in undivided India.5 Religion played a key role in binding them together and shaping their group identity. During the critical phase of the Pakistan Movement (1937–1947) and immediately after independence, Islam as a belief system and Muslim as a group identity came to be used interchangeably. This obliterated the evolution of pluralist values. The cultural heritage of Pakistan was pluralist but not liberal, as the freedom of individual choice and dissent was limited. For the leaders, policy makers and intelligentsia, preserving the state and its security, rather than protecting and promoting the pluralist nature of the nation, became a major concern. Thus, after gaining independence, an imbalance emerged between state-building and nation-building processes, which acquired the overtones of Oneness vs. Pluralism.

Ten fateful decisions Since independence, the pluralist inheritance and character of Pakistani society have been constantly undermined by state elites. We can identify ten fateful decisions that hindered the growth of pluralist values and civic culture in the country.

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1 In 1948, when the Bengalis demanded that Bangla should also be given the status of a national language, the state responded by imposing Urdu as the national language. 2 The Objectives Resolution, passed by the Constituent Assembly in 1949, declared that sovereignty shall rest with Allah and the minorities shall have the right of protection to practice their faith. These twin pillars of the Objectives Resolution defined the ideological direction of the Pakistani state in subsequent decades. This clearly meant that the state would allow minorities to ‘practice their faith’ but not guarantee them the right of equal citizenship. Thus, the state constricted its civic responsibility of ensuring fairness, justice and equal rights to all citizens. 3 The creation of ‘One Unit’ in 1955 – as result of which all the four provinces of West Pakistan were unified – without the consent of the provinces. Thus, provincial autonomy was usurped and the pluralist character of Pakistan disrupted. The NWFP, Sindh and Balochistan all had strong linguistic and cultural identities and their respective sense of history. On the other hand, in Punjab (population-wise the largest, 58 per cent), linguistic identity was relatively weak. Smaller provinces, therefore, resented the formation of ‘One Unit’. In 1970, One Unit was broken up, restoring all the four provinces in West Pakistan. 4 The introduction of the Legal Framework Order of 1970, which introduced Islamic ideology, disallowed political parties to challenge its enforcement and curbed demands for provincial autonomy. 5 The break-up of Pakistan in 1971, which increased state insecurity and discredited the military and civil bureaucracy. Since state building was the preferred policy choice, its failure was portrayed as a failure in nation building. The reality was that the proponents of monist ideology had undermined the pluralist spirit and character of the nation. 6 The Grand Compromise of the 1973 Constitution – which revived the federal spirit, recognizing the principle of power-sharing and provincial autonomy, yet strengthened the ideological tilt of the Pakistani state by declaring: Whereas the sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Almighty Allah alone, and the authority to be exercised by the people of Pakistan within the limits prescribed by Him as a sacred trust. . . . Wherein the Muslims shall be enabled to order their lives in the individual and collective spheres in accordance with the teachings and requirements of Islam as set out in the Holy Quran and Sunnah. 7 In 1978, Pakistan studies and Islamic studies were introduced as compulsory subjects at the high school and college level. The curriculum and teaching of these subjects encouraged ideas of oneness and imposition of ideological unity, thus striking at the very roots of pluralist thinking and vision about Pakistan.

Pluralist society vs. monist state 129 8 The Eighth Amendment, known as the Revival of Constitutional Order March 1985, included all acts, ordinances and orders that General Ziaul Haq passed between 1977 and 1985 and could not be challenged or reversed under any Court or Act of Parliament, including Shariah Acts and the Federal Shariat Court. This clearly showed the ideological and centralizing character of the Pakistani state. 9 The Local Government Order 2001, which – despite focusing on devolution, decentralization and de-concentration of administration – bypassed the provinces and thus undermined pluralism. No surprise that the provinces never owned it. 10 The Seventeenth Amendment of 2003 enhanced the power of the president, allowing him to hold the office of chief of army staff as well as the president,empowering him to dissolve the National Assembly and the Governor appointed by him to dissolve the provincial assembly. The consequent centralization of the state further weakened the pluralist dimensions of Pakistani society. These fateful decisions have contributed to developing a narrative for state building rather than paying attention to the complexities and challenges of nation building. A combination of centralizing and ideological responses and policy choices from the leaders and policy makers – whose primary concern was security of the state – has sustained tension between monists and the pluralists in the nation-building process. Little effort was made post-independence to develop intellectual and cultural linkages among various regions of Pakistan. Historical and cultural heritage of the territories comprising the country was thought insufficient to glue the nation. Instead of building harmony among different ethnic and linguistic groups and weaving a multi-cultural heritage, the emphasis was laid on imposing unity through Islamic ideology.

Consequences for civic education Analysing the history of education development in Pakistan, it becomes obvious that in different phases, one or a combination of the afore-cited decisions shaped not only the intellectual discourse but also the curriculum formation and education policy makers’ vision of civic education. The curriculum in government schools, projected through Pakistan and Islamic Studies, emphasized the construction of a monist Islamic state identity, while glossing over the transmission of universal democratic values such as individual liberty, gender equality, critical thinking, and respect for religious and cultural diversity. The failure to recognize the utility of these basic principles of civic education during the formative years eventually caused the break-up of Pakistan in 1971. In his critique of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) government’s education policy of propagating Hindutuva in India in the 1990s, Andre Beteille writes:

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S. Shafqat The free development of knowledge is harmed when a government or a party uses the institutions of education and research to promote its own ideology. This is true irrespective of the nature of the ideology, whether it is conservative or radical, of the right or of the left.6

In the same way, the state authorities in Pakistan have deliberately undermined civic education and independent research. In the formative phase, the preoccupation with state security and state building kept university education and academia excluded from the policy process. Thus, state and academia grew not as partners but as adversaries. That is why social sciences remained peripheral in promoting better understanding of societal changes and pressures that confronted the state. The process was further complicated and compromised, as the state in the late 1970s started systematically promoting Islamic ideology as the sole unifier of Pakistani nationhood, and all other intellectual, cultural and political narratives were considered irrelevant. Another equally potent factor has been the persistent and prolonged military rules. In the eyes of many Pakistanis, besides Islamic ideology, the military is a guarantor of state security and a key unifier among diverse ethnic and linguistic groups.7 The proponents of this view equate pluralist character of the nation and society with disharmony and divisiveness, which can be averted by relying on the twin pillars of ideology and the military as preservers of the monist state. Thus, in the post-1977 phase, the military has assumed the role of a key defender and protector of Pakistan’s “territorial and ideological frontiers”.8 It constitutes the dominant power elite. The interplay of monist ideology and the military has considerably influenced the shaping of intellectual and cultural discourse in the country. The military values of conformity, regimentation and masculinity are underscored in the society in general and in the educational institutions in particular. In this role, the military has been skilful in building considerable support and influence at the societal level. These tendencies over a long period have hampered free speech, dissent and critical thinking. During the 1980s, the privatization of education and the emergence of the middle class increased the demand for English medium schools. This led to commoditization of education. The Cambridge- and Oxford-driven O and A level schools emerged. This commercialized education, and mushrooming of private English medium schools spread across the country. The public sector education was almost abandoned, and civic virtues as a public good lost value. This trend was most visible at the high school level, where civic education is crucial for promoting linkages between national and regional histories. Thus, education was equated with performance in grade achievement and not on investing in producing good and productive citizens. The privatization process also accelerated the pace of opening and expanding the madrassas.9 Since the Afghan Jihad and revolution in Iran, the madrassas have been increasingly linked with militancy and extremism. The privatization of education has created multiple systems of education, where curriculum design, quality and content of teaching material and marginalization of civic education have emerged as key challenges. The imposition of

Pluralist society vs. monist state 131 ideology, centralization and militarization has given rise to militancy and extremism in the educational institutions. Competing religious extremist groups became militants, accumulated deadly weapons, organized their parallel armies and engaged in violence. They have created an environment of fear, hostility and intimidation in schools, colleges and universities. How have the national education policies contributed to this malaise?

Review of state education policies Pakistan has had seven national education policies from 1947 to 2010 – the year when education became a provincial subject under the Eighteenth Amendment. While assessing these policies, we need to look at three aspects: the vision statement in each policy, the role of university education and research, and the role of madrassas. I 1947 and 1951 education conferences: nebulous and formative The discussions, deliberations and recommendations of the 1947 and 1951 conference fall in this category, where the primary concern of policy makers was not to disrupt the existing education system inherited from the British colonial rule but to incorporate changes with reference to Islam and nation building that would best suit the needs of Pakistan. Two noticeable shifts are visible in the 1951 conference: First, Urdu is declared as the national and official language; second, for the first time, the phrase ‘Islamic ideology’ is invoked to Islamize the education system. This happens because, in 1949, the Objectives Resolution is adopted, which gives legitimacy to the notion of promoting Islamic ideology in Pakistan and also declares that minorities will have the right to practice their religion. Thus, Islamic ideology and minority rights emerge as a contentious issue, both in education policies and on the national political scene. II Reform and problem identification: the Sharif report The 1959 Commission on Education Reform report, prepared by the then Chief Secretary S.M. Sharif, remains perhaps one of the most comprehensive investigations on the problems of education in Pakistan. It touched upon all the major issues confronting teachers’ training, financing and curriculum at all levels. Yet it was not forceful in making concise recommendations. Clearly, the Sharif report was favourably disposed towards utilizing education as a vehicle to promote nation building and espoused liberal and progressive interpretation of Islam. It was ambiguous on the relationship between national and regional languages but visualized Urdu as the national language, though accepting two official languages (Bengali being the other). The 1966 Commission report was yet another comprehensive exercise in identifying the issues of student unrest, particularly at college and university level. It was also insightful in analysing the problems of teaching community.

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This report had an inherent weakness of political commitment, as it came in the wake of the 1965 war and the emerging political discontent on university campuses in East Pakistan. It was also a precursor to the 1967–1969 periods of agitation and protest. Thus, many of the meaningful suggestions on university autonomy, curriculum reform and academic programmes never caught the imagination of decision makers. III Transition and ideological drift: education policies 1969–1970 The 1969 and 1970 reports reflected the turbulence of the time, when campus revolts were a global phenomenon. The situation was no different in Pakistan. The 1965 war with India and collapse of the Ayub regime in 1969 were the two factors that triggered political upheaval in the country. In the wake of these developments, the debate on Islamic ideology and the role of religion in Pakistani politics acquired a new meaning. It is worth noting here that between 1947 and 1971, successive governments in Pakistan remained preoccupied with political order, political stability and institutional continuity. Thus, governance through bureaucracy, military and judiciary came to dominate decision-making. Consequently, state building expanded, while nation building was stunted. The formulation of public policy and, particularly, the education policy, could not escape this malaise. Therefore, the general thrust of the policy makers remained on identifying the issues of discontent and, in the light of these, curriculum reform and modernization were to be adopted. However, on the issues of medium of instruction, universalization of primary education, degree and scale of private education, elite educational institutions and the role of religion, the education policy remained muffled. In 1969, not only in politics but also in education, Pakistan ideology and the role of Islam acquired the centre stage. This was a turning point in the history of education. With the break-up of the Pakistani state in 1971, the nation was in fragments and the challenge was whether the policy makers would be able to provide a vision and framework of an education policy that rejuvenated the nation. IV 1972 policy: radical and populist The underlying theme of the educational reform effort from 1947 to 1970 was defining and providing a vision of nation building and national integration in conformity with Islamic culture and values. Education was visualized, like many developing countries, as a nation-building project. However, the policy makers showed infirmities and lack of commitment on the degree and scale of making a clean break from the colonial mode of the prevailing education system and also on the role of Islam in promoting national integration and inculcating a sense of Pakistani citizenship. These ambiguities and anxieties of nation building acquired new salience in post-1971 Pakistan. The break-up of the country was a traumatic event. It shook the very foundation of the idea of Pakistan. Therefore, in the shaping up of ‘new Pakistan’, national education acquired a new meaning.

Pluralist society vs. monist state 133 However, like everything else, the policy makers and people by and large were traumatized and least prepared to face the new emerging realities. Given that, the 1972 education policy was a radical departure from the past policies. It was sketchy, written in haste; it was populist and aimed at universalization of primary education (without adequately working out the financial costs, teachers’ training and other infrastructure) and nationalization of the entire or most of the education system (without fully comprehending the consequences). The policy led to massive expansion of public sector education in the country. The policy of nationalization led to the burgeoning of public sector education in the country, raised the financial cost, expanded the education department’s bureaucracy and adversely affected the quality of public sector education. The number of teachers, schools, colleges, universities and students increased, but the quality of public education deteriorated. While the 1972 education policy was under the implementation process, Pakistan went through yet another regime change that unleashed social forces and groups to power who were not only opposed to the nationalization of education but also believed that Islamization of education was essential to reform it. The ideology of Pakistan, which is defined as equivalent to Islam, was henceforth introduced into and became a focal concept for Pakistan studies books.10 V 1979 education policy: ideological and Islamist This education policy put ‘Islamic ideology’, ‘Pakistan ideology’ and its linkage with Islam as the core of all education in Pakistan. The centrality of Islam and Islamization of education become the primary theme of the policy. Simultaneously, the policy embarked on partial de-nationalization, ensuring that there would be no further nationalization, and encouraged privatization in education. Islamization and private sector investment become the benchmarks of the education policy, although the pace on privatization remained slow. The establishment of a Shariah Faculty at the International Islamic University, the introduction of Pakistan studies and Islamic studies as compulsory subjects in secondary/high school and legitimating of madrassa degrees were some of the steps that mainstreamed religion into the Pakistani education system. VI 1992–1998: ideological and Islamist (phase-II) The 1992 education policy was a continuation of the 1979 policy, as it expanded the Islamization process and also moved forward on the privatization of education. It clearly reflected that ‘secular’, ‘liberal’ space had shrunk in the social, political and educational domain. The policy re-informed the trend of not only Islamizing the textbooks and curriculum but also emphasized re-orienting the teachers and students on Islam and developing an Islamic worldview. Thus, teachers’ training and Islamization of the curriculum and textbooks that was initiated in 1979 was continued and consolidated. To eradicate illiteracy, the cosmetic notion of ‘Mosque and Mohalla’ non-formal schools was introduced.

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VII 1998–2010: fundamentalist and technological The last national education policy reflects the schizophrenic tendencies of Pakistan’s education system. On the one hand, the policy leans towards Islamization of knowledge, ‘Taliban style’, as it emphatically recommended that nothing repugnant to Sharia and the Holy Quran should be taught. It also propounds to Islamize social sciences and possibly all knowledge and even makes a case for encouraging those sports that are indigenous and close to local culture. On the other, the policy ventures to comprehend the forces of globalization and modernization, emphasizing computer literacy, vocational education, and research in science and technology. The policy document conveys the impression that it is accepting technology out of fear rather than as an instrument of change and modernization. Is it the fear of technological revolution and globalization that causes an excessive emphasis on Islamization of education? The report correctly points out that past efforts only aimed to expand the educational infrastructure rather than work on the modernization of teaching methods and curriculum. Resultantly, the continual decay of the education system, and quality and type of students that it produced could not rouse much public confidence in the system. However, the report is misdirected in proposing Islamization of the entire education system. Islamizing textbooks and the curriculum constricts the possibility of any reform and innovation. Some new ideas of reform and innovation, such as the introduction of Information Technology, computer literacy, and vocational education included in the report seem completely hostage to Ideology and Islamization. In its vision and objectives, the report is ideological and leaves little space for progressive liberal society, enlightened, modern, democratic, Muslim and forward-looking Pakistan. It projects an ideological education that is subservient to the Quran and Sunnah and does not give importance to notions of exploration, innovation and scepticism, which are the basis of a vibrant and dynamic society. The review of these policies reflects four persisting trends in the state education policy-making process. First, the ideas of piecemeal reforms, particularly concerning the modernization of the textbook curriculum as propounded in policy documents from 1947–1972, have become distant goals. Second, in the post-1979 period, the Islamization of education has become a central theme of educational reform. Third, liberal, democratic, scientific and technological education has remained peripheral, despite considerable rhetoric to this effect in post-1979 education policies. Fourth, each policy document has been high on promise and low on delivery and monitoring of what it proposed.

The Eighteenth Amendment and after Since the 1970 elections, the first in Pakistan’s history, the electoral process and outcome of each election has demonstrated the pluralist character of Pakistani culture and society. The 2008 elections reinforced the plurality of Pakistani politics and culture by bringing to power a multi-party coalition led by the PPP at

Pluralist society vs. monist state 135 the federal level and coalitions at the provincial levels. This transition to democracy and its sustenance provided the political leadership with an opportunity to revive and energize the pluralist resilience of the society. Seizing this opportunity, the political parties embarked on a process to redefine the parameters of federation–province relations and set the stage in 2009, when the Parliament constituted a parliamentary committee for initiating and instituting constitutional reforms. The committee embarked on a process of mutual consultation lasting over a year that paved the way for the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment Act, 2010, by the National Assembly and Senate, and its subsequent approval by the president, in April 2010. The Act amended 102 articles and devolved 47 subjects to the exclusive legislative and executive domain of the provinces.11 The Eighteenth Amendment decentralized political power by curtailing the oft-abused powers of the presidency as well as empowering the country’s four provinces by transferring federal-level resources and responsibilities to provincial governments. Its passage was termed as “one of the most dramatic deconcentrations of power in Pakistan” since the drafting of the 1973 Constitution, with PPP Senator Raza Rabbani, the amendment’s architect, hailing it as the “most significant restructuring process” since independence.12 Apart from political restructuring, the amendment entailed major implications for the education system, as it made two distinctive changes in the Constitution. First, the inclusion of Article 25A that ensures the right to education to children from five to 16 years and, second, the exclusion of the Concurrent List, implying that the curriculum, syllabus, planning, policy and standards of education would be devolved and placed under provincial jurisdiction.13 With the mandate of education policy devolved to provinces under the Eighteenth Amendment, we have to see how the four provincial governments have fared in preparing and implementing their respective education policies. The measures adopted for this purpose, for instance, in the case of curriculum reforms, have not been so promising. Following the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment, new curriculum authorities were formed in all the provinces, which have mostly followed the guidelines contained in the revised National Curriculum of 2006 approved during the Musharraf regime. Meanwhile, Pakistan studies textbooks continue to forge an identity exclusively based on Islam, while textbook review committees (part of the new provincial curriculum authorities) often reject the more tolerant submissions. For example, the Oxford University Press in Pakistan submitted textbooks to a competition in Punjab but was asked by the review committee to reintroduce the word ‘jihad’, even though the curriculum documents do not ask for it to be mentioned.14 In some places where improvements were made, political factors have undone them. For example, the PTI-led government in KPK has reversed many of the revisions in textbooks made by the liberal Awami National Party’s regime in 2012, such as reintroducing mentions of jihad – largely under pressure from its coalition partner, the Jamaat-e-Islami.15 The implementation process of the Eighteenth Amendment’s provisions concerning education and other spheres has indeed faced recurrent obstacles and

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proceeded slowly. Yet its overall significance in strengthening the parliamentary system and provincial autonomy cannot be overlooked. The fact that the amendment was passed unanimously by Parliament reflects a rare consensus between all the major political parties. If seen within the context of the ten fateful decisions identified above that marred Pakistan’s democratic fate, it provided a fresh opportunity to political leaders and policy makers to restore the pluralist character of Pakistani polity based on recognition of diversity as the basis of national unity. The amendment also signalled a paradigm shift in governance by paving the way for a decentralized, devolved administrative set-up. Legitimizing ethnicity, language and culture is an as indelible attribute of a representative government as the revolutionary changes entailed in the amendment aim to realize in the long term. In addition to devolving education, the Eighteenth Amendment has opened new vistas for a pluralist Pakistan in six ways: 1

2

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By removing the Seventeenth Amendment, it has laid to rest the presidential discretion to dissolve the national and provincial assemblies and remove the prime minister. Thus, the Eighteenth Amendment has laid the foundations of executive restrain in dealing with the parliamentary and democratic processes. It has tilted the balance of power in favour of the prime minister and the chief ministers of the provinces. The Eighteenth Amendment has restored, revived and enhanced provincial autonomy. It has redefined the federation–province relationship, by doing away with the Concurrent List. The federation has devolved 17 ministries, dealing with social sector to the provinces such as education, health, housing, population, women and human rights. This offers the provinces an opportunity to build their capacity for improving governance and delivery of services. It ensures, protects and advances the provinces’ control over their natural and economic resources – which implies not just political autonomy but also ownership of their economic sources of power, thereby reinvigorating the federation–province relationship. The amendment has paved the way for fiscal decentralization, as the seventh National Finance Commission has radically redefined the terms of allocating fiscal resources, enhancing the share and role of the provinces and reducing the same for the federation. It has energized the Council of Common Interest (CCI) as a body, which must meet every three months and where the chief ministers of the provinces are equally represented to resolve issues amicably between the federation and the provinces. The Eighteenth Amendment has made local government a third tier of the federation by devolving administrative and political power to the district level, thereby empowering people. It mandated the holding of local government elections by the provincial governments. The process of holding these elections has, however, been slow, with the Sindh government having resisted the option for several years.

Pluralist society vs. monist state 137 All of the above provisions of the Eighteenth Amendment, if properly implemented, would strengthen the pluralist dimensions of the Pakistani nation as well as consolidate the federation. This would help in developing a shared national vision, in which each religious, ethnic, linguistic group and region has an equal stake. Today’s Pakistan is a compact territorial entity. It is confronted with the challenges of recognizing the realities of a pluralist society where diversity implies transparent and equal rules for all, social justice and religious tolerance, respecting dissent, protecting minorities, building trust and reconciliation among diverse communities. One way to achieve that would be by promoting civic education, protecting citizen rights, creating a sense of ownership in the social and economic policies that impact them, and thus paving a way for civic responsibility.

Concluding observations More recently, the forces of globalization, manifested in the form of cyber, satellite and cellular technologies, have unleashed a contradictory process of change, where ideological unity and pluralist aspirations have emerged as parallel currents. Is any synthesis possible between the two competing visions of monism as denoted by the former trend and pluralism that is characteristic of the latter? Is it possible to build a shared vision for the nation, while the monist and pluralist schism persists? The globalization process has, for instance, paved the way for privatization of higher education in Pakistan. Currently, it has more than 150 universities, both public and private. Most of these universities deal with fields of science and engineering, while little emphasis is given to social sciences, particularly civic education. It has mostly been integrated into social studies or Pakistan studies disciplines and is taught in schools from grades four to 14. In schools and colleges as well, more emphasis is placed on science and technology and little value is ascribed to social sciences and humanities and, thus, to civic education. There is a common belief among the bureaucrats, politicians, businessmen and other segments of society influencing state policy that social sciences do not require conceptual understanding. Therefore, any social science subject can be learnt by rote and anyone can teach it. Even less importance is given to civic education in universities. The universities have a number of departments that are related to the field of civic education, for example, women/gender studies, political science, journalism/media studies, Islamic studies, and now the emerging public policy centres. However, teaching in most of these departments is focused on knowledge acquisition rather than understanding of the key concepts and issues in society. This is despite the fact that civic education is widely considered as a crucial factor in triggering positive change in the behaviour, norms, values and political culture of people and their attitude towards civic responsibility.16 It is evident from the review of state education policies that state authorities have failed to give due priority to civic education. The situation in the aftermath of the Eighteenth Amendment continues to reflect the legacy of post-1979 education policies.

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However, a number of civil society organizations have indeed made civic education a priority. For instance, the realization that parliamentarians from both national and provincial assemblies as well as members of the local government are not well prepared for their role has led civil society organizations, such as the Centre for Civic Education and Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development, to educate legislators in general and women legislators in particular with the intention of building and strengthening democratic institutions in Pakistan. Several other civil society organizations are proactively engaged in promoting human rights, peace and harmony between different groups in society or advocating for change in discriminatory laws and practices and framing of laws based on human rights. Greater collaboration among academia, the research community, civil society organizations and the public sector can help improve the level of trust between citizens and the state, thereby laying the foundation of a pluralist Pakistan, where harmony is celebrated by tolerating diversity. To achieve this, however, the onus of responsibility still lies on state authorities and government functionaries. For it is because of their deliberate policies or inept approaches that regressive trends have become so well entrenched in the society that the task of realizing a pluralist and liberal democratic order in Pakistan still looks next to impossible.

Notes 1 Marc F. Plattner, ‘Populism, pluralism and liberal democracy’, Journal of Democracy, 21/1 (January 2010), pp. 81–92. See also, in the same issue of the journal, Francis Fukuyama, ‘Transitions to the rule of law’, pp. 33–34. 2 Marc F. Plattner, ‘Populism, pluralism and liberal democracy’, Journal of Democracy 21/1 (January 2010), p. 89. 3 Robert A. Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 17–32. 4 Fareed Zakaria, ‘The Rise of Illiberal Democracy’, Foreign Affairs 76/6 (November– December 1997), pp. 22–43. 5 Shahid Javed Burki, Pakistan Under Bhutto: 1971–77 (London: Macmillan Press, 1980), pp. 11–35. 6 Andre Beteille, Ideology and Social Science (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2006). 7 For detailed discussion and competing viewpoints on this subject, see Saeed Shafqat, ‘Politics of Islamization: the ideological debate on Pakistan’s political system’, Asian Profile 15/5 (October 1987). Also see Asaf Hussain, Elite Politics in an Ideological State (London: Islamic Foundation, 1979), pp. 162–168. 8 On 5 July 1977, after the military coup, General Ziaul Haq stated that the military would defend the “ideological and territorial frontiers of Pakistan”. Former Army Chief, General Pervez Ashraf Kayani, while addressing the cadets at the Pakistan Military Academy on 13 August 2013, echoed the same sentiments. 9 Muhammad Qaim Zaman, ‘Religious education and the rhetoric of reform: The madrassa in British India and Pakistan’, Comparative Studies in Society and History 41/2 (1999), pp. 294–323. 10 Pervez Hoodbhoy and A.H. Nayyar, ‘Rewriting the history of Pakistan’, in A. Khan (ed.), Islam, Politics, and the State (London: Zed Books, 1985). 11 Abdul Bari, ‘Higher education: implications of the 8th amendment’, Dawn, 8 September 2013.

Pluralist society vs. monist state 139 12 Colin Cookman, The 8th Amendment and Pakistan’s Political Transitions (Washington, DC: Centre for American Progress, 19 April 2010). Available at www.american progress.org/issues/security/news/2010/04/19/7587/the-18th-amendment-and-pakistanspolitical-transitions/ (accessed 2 April 2016). 13 See Shahid Siddiqui, ‘8th amendment and education’, Dawn, 11 October 2010. 14 Madiha Afzal, Education and Attitudes in Pakistan: Understanding Perceptions of Terrorism (Washington, DC: US Institute of Peace, 2015), pp. 5–6. 15 See Sadia Qasim Shah, ‘Verses on jihad in syllabus: KP to rectify “mistake” ’, Dawn, 17 August 2013; and Khan Shehram Eusufzye, ‘Changing curriculum or minds’, The News on Sunday, 30 November 2014. 16 See, for example, Steven E. Finkel and Amy Erica Smith, ‘Civic education, political discussion, and the social transmission of democratic knowledge and values in new democracy: Kenya 2002’, American Journal of Political Science 55/2 (April 2011), pp. 417–435.

8

Judicial activism, and the rule of law Imtiaz Gul

One of the remarkable features of Pakistan’s present transition to democracy is the emergence of an independent higher judiciary. In March 2007, for the first time in history and in a rare show of defiance of the military establishment, former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Iftikhar Muhammad Chaudhry declined General Musharraf ’s candidature for a second presidential term. This unprecedented act unleashed an eventful process that has catapulted the judiciary into Pakistan’s political power structures as an important stakeholder. It has subsequently emerged as a key defender of democratic system, rule of law, transparency in governance and corruption-free politics – and constantly challenged both the military and political elites, albeit with limitations. However, judicial activism is yet to make any visible impact on the functional efficiency of lower courts. Moreover, the independence of the higher judiciary may itself have been potentially constrained by the establishment of military courts in January 2015 to deal with terrorist cases, even though only for a limited period of two years. This chapter begins with a brief history of the role the higher judiciary has played in scuttling democracy in Pakistan. It then elaborates the circumstances that paved the way for judicial activism. Subsequent discussion covers in detail the crucial role that the higher judiciary and legal fraternity have played in sustaining the current democratic transition. The study concludes by underlining the key challenges and prospects of judicial activism, and what they entail for the future of democracy.

Tainted history Historically, the role of the Supreme Court has undoubtedly been antidemocratic. During Pakistan’s five extra-constitutional emergency or martial law regimes, the Constitution was either entirely abrogated or partly or wholly suspended. All the four military-led interventions leading up to martial laws – in 1958, by Iskandar Mirza who appointed General Ayub Khan as the Chief Martial Law Administrator; in 1969, by General Yahya Khan himself; in 1977, by General Ziaul Haq; and in 1999 and 2007, by General Musharraf1 – were legitimized by the Supreme Court by invoking the Doctrine of Necessity.

Judicial activism, and the rule of law 141 It was Chief Justice Muhammad Munir who introduced this doctrine in the mid-1950s, drawing on the ‘law of necessity’ from Braxton’s maxim, which stated, “That which is otherwise not lawful is made lawful by necessity”, and the Roman dictum, “the well-being of the people is the supreme law”.2 Thereafter, the Doctrine of Necessity became a convenient tool for pliant judges and ascendant military rulers to justify military takeovers. All interventions took place in the context of unending squabbling among ruling political elites that seemed to threaten internal stability, or in situations when the military thought the law and order was breaking down. The Generals would also use “corruption” of political elites as another pretext to justify the coups, basing their legitimacy to do so on the grounds that it was for the well-being of the nation. Interestingly, some postfacto rulings of the Supreme Court declared previous military-led martial law either invalid or the military ruler a usurper. However, these rulings did not deter the next martial law in the least.3 Often people at large took such rulings with a pinch of salt – as they reflected a timid and expedient mindset within the judiciary which spoke only after the dictator had vanished from the scene, a judiciary virtually under the thumb of the mighty military when it came to political adjudication. The military staged its last coup against an elected government on 12 October 1999, after the Nawaz Sharif government developed differences with the army over relations with India by inviting Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee to Lahore and concluding a historic peace agreement in February 1999. The civil–military conflict intensified, as India and Pakistan fought a limited war over the Kargil hills in the disputed Kashmir region in summer of that year. This prompted General Musharraf and his associates to seize power forcibly. As expected, Musharraf followed the example of General Zia and had the sitting Prime Minister tried in a court of law.4 General Zia had deposed Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in July 1977, despite the fact that Bhutto was on the verge of reaching a negotiated settlement with the opposition Pakistan National Alliance over allegations of rigging in the March 1977 general elections. Bhutto was jailed and later tried for the murder of an opposition leader. The Supreme Court then upheld Bhutto’s conviction to death by a junior court with an extremely narrow margin and he was eventually executed in April 1979. General Musharraf, too, put Sharif on trial, had him convicted through a special court on graft and tax evasion charges, but later let him slip into Saudi Arabian exile following a deal brokered by the Saudi royal family. In 2000, he had all the judges take a new oath of duty under the Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO).5 Justice Saeed-uz-Zaman Siddiqui was the only judge who refused to oblige and instead opted to resign his post. Unsurprisingly, the next seniormost judge, Justice Irshad Hasan Khan, consented and took the fresh oath along with many others. By doing so, these judges accorded legitimacy to Musharraf’s coup, once again invoking the Doctrine of Necessity and the principle of salus populi suprema lex – meaning, “Let the good of the people be the supreme law.”6 General Musharraf ruled Pakistan initially for over two years on the basis of PCO, then manipulated the electoral process, held parliamentary elections in

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2002 and got a five-year presidential mandate from the new national and provincial assemblies. Musharraf did create the space for women’s representation in Parliament and for a free private electronic media, but his appetite for authority showed no respite. Thus, as the deadline for his five-year presidential term approached in 2007, amid surging political opposition to his rule, Musharraf sought legal endorsement from the Supreme Court. This was a tipping point in more than six decades of the country’s existence, where the judiciary had always succumbed to the will of the military and invoked the Doctrine of Necessity to always upend the rule of law and constitutional integrity. During this period, all of the senior-most judges had, willing or unwillingly, legitimised military coups, military dictatorships and constitutional violations, masquerading them as a necessary evil for the good of the people. In March 2007, however, Pakistan witnessed a watershed exception, in the person of Justice Chaudhry.

Moment of truth Long before Chief Justice Chaudhry refused to play second fiddle to the whims of General Musharraf, the vibes from him were already alarming. In several court hearings, the chief justice clearly sounded pro-democracy, embedding constitutionalism in his remarks with subtle hints that he was opposed to Musharraf ’s bid for a second presidential term. Sensing the latent danger, Musharraf summoned Chief Justice Chaudhry to his office in Rawalpindi on 9 March, 2007, asking him for support. Although faced with a daunting company – Musharraf and four other generals – the chief justice stood his ground and told them that only the court could rule on Musharraf ’s fate as a second-term president. Justice Chaudhry had taken over as head of the Supreme Court in 2005. Ironically, he had been part of the bench that had validated General Musharraf ’s 1999 coup as well as approved his extra-constitutional referendum in 2000 as well as several subsequent amendments in the Constitution. That he would defiantly challenge the dual role of General Musharraf as president and the army chief of staff7 was thus an unexpected shock. An enraged Musharraf, anticipating a major legal challenge to his re-election, immediately suspended Chief Justice Chaudhry and appointed the next senior-most judge, Justice Javed Iqbal, as acting chief justice of the Supreme Court. The move to make Chief Justice Chaudhry ‘non-functional’ was followed by another controversial decision to send a reference under Article 209 of the Constitution to the Supreme Judicial Council to investigate allegations of misconduct against him.8 General Musharraf most probably had never imagined that a pre-emptive strike to secure a second presidential term would eventually morph into a deadly blow to his political ambitions. Justice Chaudhry’s suspension kicked up an unprecedented storm across the country, galvanizing media, lawyers, political parties and the rest of civil society, unnerving Musharraf and his advisors. Although the reference was filed in the Supreme Judicial Council that was to be headed by the acting chief justice and

Judicial activism, and the rule of law 143 had, among its members, senior Supreme Court and High Court judges, the full bench of the Supreme Court was formed to hear a petition filed against the suspension of Justice Chaudhry. The full bench, after a few hearings, unanimously rejected the allegations against Justice Chaudhry and reinstated him as the chief justice. While Musharraf had to swallow the proverbial bitter pill, the unprecedented show of solidarity by the bar and the bench was a first in the country’s judicial history. Despite a gradually surging outcry against suspension of the judges, Musharraf and his political allies, especially the Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid, still went ahead with the presidential election on 6 October 2007, which the general expectedly won. His victory though was preceded by a legal challenge – as one of his rival candidates, Wajihuddin Siddiqi, a former Supreme Court judge, petitioned the apex court, praying that Musharraf did not qualify to contest the election. A ten-member bench of the Court admitted the petition but ruled that the results of the presidential election would not be notified until a decision was made on the petition challenging Musharraf ’s credentials. As the hearing continued, General Musharraf ’s anxiety grew in the face of the increasingly hostile attitude of the court, also supported by an ascendant lawyers’ community, political parties and the media. Unnerved, and apprehensive of an adverse ruling on his controversial re-election, Musharraf imposed emergency rule on 3 November 2007 and enacted Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) No. 1, suspending the entire senior judiciary, including over five dozen judges of the Supreme Court and four High Courts.9 This marked the beginning of the end for Musharraf ’s rule on the one hand, and the journey for an independent judiciary on the other. In fact, this unravelling of a military order flowed from a series of events that had begun unfolding a couple of years prior to this. The defiance in March 2007, therefore, should not be seen as a sudden bolt from the blue. In 2005, a certain bold pattern had begun emerging within the judiciary, setting a new precedent previously deemed inconceivable. It gradually laid the foundation that would lend an entirely different character, making it a cogent, assertive and seemingly infallible institution. These events merit mention here for a better contextual understanding.

Judicial assertion After taking over as chief justice in 2005, Justice Chaudhry had slowly begun to exercise the court’s suo motu judicial review powers. One of the two major cases in which he exercised these powers during Musharraf ’s rule was the Pakistan Steel Mills Case. While hearing this case, he and other judges came down hard on economic mismanagement, deviation from rules and regulations governing the giant Steel Mills, and the collusion between management and steel traders. The other was the missing persons case, pertaining to alleged Balochi insurgents and religious militants kidnapped or illegally detained by the army and its intelligence agencies without the due legal process. The court consistently kept the latter under pressure to produce the missing persons.10

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After General Musharraf proclaimed the emergency rule in November 2007, enacted PCO No. 1 under the flimsy pretext of the ‘War on Terror’ and suspended the Constitution as well as the Parliament, he found in the judiciary the biggest hurdle. Unlike the PCO of 2000, this time the Supreme Court issued a restraining order, prohibiting senior judges from taking oath under the new PCO.11 Almost two-thirds of these judges, numbering 97, rejected the imposition of emergency rule. This was indeed an unprecedented bold step.12 Even after Justice Chaudhry and nearly 60 other judges, who had all supported his reinstatement by the Supreme Court in July 2007, were put under house arrest, the lawyers, political and civil society activists kept protesting.13 The Lawyers’ Movement that started soon after the suspension of the Justice in March 2007 was manifested in a long march from Karachi, which culminated in a major rally outside the Parliament House in Islamabad in June 2008.14 In August 2008, General Musharraf resigned under immense public and political pressure,15 after the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) had won the elections in March the same year. But the restore-judges movement was still raging. The PPP leadership, fearful of revival of old graft cases, now appeared to drag its feet on the promise of reinstating the judges. Some 80,000 lawyers, despite conflicting political affiliations, rallied from Karachi to Peshawar to press for the reinstatement of Justice Chaudhry and his colleagues. As the protests grew louder, an ever-increasing number of human rights activists, media persons and students flocked to join what was called Adliya Bachao Tehreek (Save the Judiciary Movement). Relentless pressure through lobbying with political parties and public rallies in support of the judges eventually led to the restoration of Chief Justice Chaudhry and other judges on 16 March 2009. It was widely speculated then that the popular upsurge against Musharraf also had the backing of estranged elements within the military and ISI Directorate.16 Nawaz Sharif, who had pulled out of the coalition government several months ago on the same issue, provided the real trigger when he announced his intention to march on Islamabad if the reticent PPP government refused to restore the judges. Sharif ’s decision to mount a march on Islamabad for the rehabilitation of the judges was the first major deviation from the Charter of Democracy that former PPP Chairperson Benazir Bhutto, Sharif and several other political leaders had concluded in London in July 2007. During the post-Zia decade of democratic transition (1988–99), the military was successful in exploiting the political differences between the PPP and PML-N by pitting them against each other to strengthen its hold over key areas of interest. The military was also able to overthrow civilian governments through its collaboration with a pliable president empowered under the Eighth Amendment to the 1973 Constitution to dissolve legislative assemblies. By late 1990s, the PPP and PML-N leaders developed a consensus on how to outmanoeuvre the military’s ‘divide-and-rule’ strategy. In March 1997, they collaborated in the Parliament to remove this notorious article from the Constitution, thereby stripping the presidential office of the power to arbitrarily dismiss an elected government. This major move could not prevent the military coup by General Musharraf in 1999, but it did become a precursor to

Judicial activism, and the rule of law 145 lengthy negotiations between both parties that culminated in the agreement on the Charter of Democracy in 2007. By signing this Charter, all political parties committed themselves not to undermine democracy by conspiring against or becoming part of a conspiracy against one another. They also vowed never again to support military takeovers. The Charter stated that military dictatorship and the nation could not co-exist, as the former had continued not only to damage the economy but also undermined the defence capabilities and democratic institutions of Pakistan. The landmark document further underlined that “it was time political parties in Pakistan coalesced with each other to remove the loopholes in Pakistan’s politics that obstructed the process of democratization and provided pretexts to the military to intervene time and again”.17 However, despite the Charter of Democracy being in place, for fear of judicial persecution on account of graft cases pending against him since the mid1990s, President Asif Ali Zardari was reluctant to restore the judges. On the other hand, Sharif and other political leaders favoured the judges’ restoration, considering it crucial for the country’s democratic transition. The second major deviation from the Charter of Democracy was the National Reconciliation Ordinance (NRO), which Bhutto’s PPP had concluded with the Musharraf regime in October 2007. This controversial deal granted amnesty to political leaders, party activists and bureaucrats, who were accused of murder, money laundering, corruption, embezzlement and terrorism. The NRO had in fact paved the way for the return of Bhutto and Sharif and his brother Shahbaz Sharif, who had been in exile since 1999 and 2000 respectively. As expected, the Supreme Court annulled the NRO in March 2009, soon after the restoration of Justice Chaudhry and several other members of the senior judiciary.18 Then, in a landmark ruling in July that year, which underscored the senior judiciary’s growing institutional independence, the apex court struck down Musharraf ’s 3 November 2007 State of Emergency proclamation for being extra-constitutional and illegal. It also vowed that no judge of the superior judiciary would ever validate abrogation or usurpation of the Constitution by anyone. Justice Chaudhry stated that the judiciary would completely refrain from endorsing any constitutional deviation in the future.19 On numerous occasions later, Justice Chaudhry and his colleagues reiterated that the Doctrine of Necessity was dead too. This marked the culmination of a process that began in 2005 and climaxed in March 2009 with the reinstatement of all judges, a process during which the entire judiciary, lawyers and vast sections of society stood in stark and shocking defiance to both military chutzpah and intercession in the name of public good, as well as governmental stagnation and passivity. Within four years, Pakistan saw the birth of a new judiciary, which today instils fear of law in the hearts of all the ruling elites.

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Suo motu actions As the military establishment watched in awe its political predominance being put to the judicial sword by an increasingly incontrovertible Supreme Court, the civilian ruling elites also appeared unnerved because the court also began intruding into the executive domain, questioning governmental actions which were previously an exclusive domain of the elected politicians. Almost all political appointments and governance issues ranging from political, administrative, social and economic to foreign investment inter alia faced intense scrutiny from the judiciary. The most preferred tool for the purpose became the suo motu jurisdiction under the Constitution’s Article 184 (3), which reads as follows: Without prejudice to the provisions of Article 199, the Supreme Court shall, if it considers that a question of public importance with reference to the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights conferred by Chapter I of Part II is involved, have the power to make an order of the nature mentioned in the said Article.20 In fact, the term suo motu is considered synonymous with the legacy of Justice Chaudhry today. The Supreme Court even extended the scope of Public Interest Litigation by expanding its scope to the fundamental rights of individuals. In the expansion of fundamental rights, it was held that any case which raises a matter of constitutional interpretation and enforcement regarding the composition, processes and powers of the legislature is thus by its very nature a case of public importance, as it affects the rights of the public at large, and also affects the Fundamental Rights of the citizens.21 Under Justice Chaudhry, the Supreme Court took more than 100 suo motu actions, including actions against army personnel, politicians, government officials and even several media persons.22 Due to its activism through suo motu jurisdiction, the Court brought immense pressure on not only the military but also the elected Parliament and the federal government, while insisting that it possessed overriding powers of suo motu actions conferred by the Constitution.23 The popularity of suo motu actions even encouraged four provincial High Courts to exercise this authority, at times in insignificant matters too. This overbearing activism injected immense fear into the minds of the military and the civilian administration to the extent of partially paralysing the governing structures – with the effect that “the parliament and the executive” became “uncertain about what they can even do or cannot do”.24 In June 2012, the Supreme Court for the first time disqualified a prime minister from holding a seat in the Parliament for not complying with its orders. Following months of gruelling legal debates, the Supreme Court convicted Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gilani for committing Contempt of Court and disqualified him retroactively from April 2012 in June 2012.25 As the democratically elected party lost a

Judicial activism, and the rule of law 147 premier, the Supreme Court established its unwavering superiority over the civilian government and underscored the incorruptible nature of the rule of law. Other than repealing the NRO in 2009, the Supreme Court annulled several statutory provisions and commercial deals involving Foreign Direct Investment worth billions of US dollars.26 In this way, the Supreme Court exercised its authority even in those matters that normally belonged to the legislative and executive organs of the State. Some prominent cases denoting this practice included the Privatization of Pakistan Steel Mill Case, Missing Persons Case, Musharraf ’s Treason Case, the Rental Power Plants Case, Reko Diq Gold and Copper Mines Project Case, Haj Corruption Case, NICL Corruption Case, and Shahzeb Murder Case. The year 2013 witnessed the highest number of suo motu cases by the Supreme Court. Most of the suo motu actions taken by the Supreme Court and the provincial High Courts concerned the alleged acts of corruption committed by members of Parliament, bureaucrats, executive or other government offices.27

Critical appraisal By overwhelmingly stretching itself into what is usually the executive’s domain – checks on prices, television censorship and graft cases, for example – the apex court risked losing sight of its primary function, i.e. serving as the guardian and interpreter of fundamental human rights. Its focus remained on high profile cases that were administrative and political in nature rather than on setting new benchmarks for the accountability of public representatives and the ruling elite and ensuring the rule of and respect for law. Consequently, the problem of massive pendency became prevalent at the Supreme Court as well as higher and lower courts, which was mounting due to the deterioration of law and order and abuse of law. An annual report of the Supreme Court covering the period between April 2010 and December 2011 mentioned a staggering pendency of 17,246 cases. The courts in Punjab faced a pendency of some 1.6 million cases, and the situation was no different in other provinces. This ran contrary to the new judicial policy developed under Justice Chaudhry’s guidance, which had stipulated a maximum of six months for adjudication of civil cases, with Justice Chaudhry publicly committing to end the backlog through quicker settlements.28 Amid all the accomplishments of Justice Chaudhry, this stands out as perhaps the biggest stain. Despite his commitment, the Supreme Court too fell victim to the same quagmire of backlogs, pendency and prolonged, lethargic proceedings – as witnessed in the lower judiciary across the country. The Human Rights Cell of the Supreme Court, that works under the chief justice, also attempted to provide free of charge relief to the common man.29 Unquestionably, this generated a high degree of trust and confidence of the general public in the superior judiciary. However, simultaneously, this allowed the courts to convert a simple application into a petition by bypassing regular procedural requirements, and summon any state functionary to respond to the

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said application. In doing so, the superior judiciary has strengthened the perception that other state organs had somehow lost their credibility, and that the trust of the people should be in judicial activism as the only remedy available to revive democracy and the rule of law in Pakistan.30 A sort of inertia thus crept into bureaucratic decision-making, with public servants delaying decisions on politically sensitive issues for fear of judicial accountability. Rather than focusing on their professional job, government officials often find themselves embroiled in lengthy court hearings, which adversely affects their service delivery efficiency. Justice Chaudhry retired in December 2013 after steering the Supreme Court for more than seven years to new levels of independence, albeit not without controversies. With him ended an epochal era, during which public optimism for justice was accompanied by politically motivated controversies, some involving Justice Chaudhry’s son Arsalan Iftikhar as well as the senior judiciary’s excessive reliance on suo motu as a tool to correct injustice and improve governance. Some of the suo motu actions by the Court have been remarkable in the sense that both the government and the military found it hard, if not impossible, to circumvent court orders. In some cases, critics accused Justice Chaudhry of acting in a partisan manner, especially favouring Sharif and his party, and nurturing a personal vendetta against General Musharraf. The judiciary under his leadership was visibly harsh towards the PPP leadership, as was clear from the dismissal of Prime Minister Gilani and the hounding of his successor Raja Pervez Ashraf. The Zardari regime was constantly kept under pressure through the corruption case pertaining to Swiss bank accounts and the memo-gate scandal, involving ambassador to the US Hussain Haqqani. The relentless pursuit of the NRO case led to a perception that the Supreme Court was being driven by political motives. The PML-N regime and leaders, on the other hand, have not faced the same level of accountability. This duality may have stemmed from PPP’s refusal to restore the judiciary, yet Chaudhry’s ostensible bias against PPP leaders drew considerable scorn from opponents and even turned arch supporters like Aitzaz Ahsan into enemies. Since the departure of Justice Chaudhry, the senior judiciary remains active but appears to have transformed from a personalised style to an institutionalised mode of decision-making. This is quite meaningful, as Justice Chaudhry-centric judicial activism had indeed raised eyebrows and triggered controversies, especially after his son Arsalan Iftikhar faced corruption charges in the same Court. In addition, while such activism may have been the need of the hour, it was unsustainable in the long run. In terms of consequences, Justice Chaudhry, for better or worse, is an iconic personality in the troublesome judicial history of Pakistan, a person who has single-handedly redefined the role of senior judiciary in Pakistan. His presence, actions and barrage of suo motu notices riled many but rallied most of the legal community and civil society alike. Pakistan probably needed such an unusual person to extricate the judiciary from the hold of the mighty military establishment and its civilian collaborators.

Judicial activism, and the rule of law 149 Chief Justice Tassuduq Jillani, successor to Justice Chaudhry, made a visible departure from his predecessor’s overdrive on issues such as suo motu from the day he took oath as chief justice in December 2013. His statements on various occasions and observations during hearings indicated a conscious but gradual departure from activism to a kind of moderation and ‘guarded pragmatism’, which is needed to realign the judiciary’s role as an essential pillar for the enforcement of the rule of law as laid out in the Constitution.31 For example, in his address at the inaugural session of International Judicial Conference in April 2014, Justice Jillani cautiously noted: The Supreme Court needs to ensure that in its zeal to do good, it does not neglect to define appropriate limits for the exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 184. Anything short of that would be tantamount to encouraging frivolous and motivated petitions and subverting the purpose of Article 199, which would in turn negate the underlying intention and rationale of Article 184 (3).32 Chief Justice Jillani retired in July 2014, leaving a brief, though noticeable, imprint on the Court’s public conduct. He too resorted to a few suo motu actions, yet he hardly matched the zeal that Justice Chaudhry displayed. Justice Nasirul Mulk succeeded him a month later, displaying the same judicial restraint as exercised by his predecessor. His conduct seemed to match what he said at Chief Justice Jillani’s farewell: That judges must not allow personal perceptions of justice to interfere with decision-making and instead remain stuck to the law. For Pakistan to run smoothly, state institutions must work together. . . . It is their constitutional duty to desist from undue interference in the functioning of other pillars of state.33 Clearly, the courts have tipped the balance of power within the state, and elevated the judiciary into a formidable power structure – parallel to, if not stronger than, other state organs. All senior judges, it seems, feel compelled to address issues that they believe the government or the military is unable to address. We can discern such sense of empowerment from the remarks that Justice Jawwad S. Khwaja, one of the senior Supreme Court judges who took over as chief justice for over a month in August 2015, made during a hearing on 23 January 2014: “If the anti-corruption institutions fall into slumber, should the courts close their eyes too? Australia has mentioned in its laws that if investigation agencies show slackness in investigation, then the court is authorized to take notice.”34 Subsequent chief justices have kept the proactive institutional trait of the Court alive, as is apparent from the 2016 judicial probe into the Panama Leaks. Two years before that, the Supreme Court’s resolve to act within the confines of the Constitution was indeed put to the test during the anti-government protest marches from Lahore and sit-ins in Islamabad by PTI and PAT leaders and

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followers. It issued a tightly worded warning to both the civilian government and the military, stating: “All the state authorities and functionaries are directed to act only in accordance with the constitution. They are restrained from acting in any manner unwarranted by the constitution and the law.”35 In a judgement passed by the Lahore High Court a day before, protestors were directed to remain lawful and avoid resorting to any illegal actions. During the weeks-long crisis in front of the parliament building, the Supreme Court – through its judgements, directives and remarks – acted as a custodian of the Constitution and a protector of democracy. The Supreme Court also set up a Judicial Commission of Enquiry to determine whether systemic rigging took place in the 2013 elections or not. Its landmark verdict in July 2015, wherein no such evidence was found, was an endorsement of the government’s stance on the issue.36

Current challenges The higher judiciary indeed managed to dissuade the military from adventurism during the 2014 anti-government protests, and its verdict on the 2013 elections was major headway in the democratic process. However, it is true that, having weakened after these protests, the PML-N has compromised on the trial of high treason against General Musharraf in the Supreme Court. The former military ruler had returned to Pakistan after living for five years in exile abroad in March 2013,37 two months ahead of the elections. Even though he departed the country three years later, he has faced a series of legal challenges during this period, including his involvement in the Red Mosque operation of July 2007, failure to provide adequate security to PPP leader Benazir Bhutto, who was assassinated in December 2007 in Rawalpindi after a public rally, and the charge of conspiracy to murder Baloch leader Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti. However, it was Musharraf ’s decision to declare a state of emergency in November 2007 that put him in the dock. After the Sharif government approached the Supreme Court in this respect in December 2013, he was formally indicted on charges of committing high treason under Article 6 of the 1973 Constitution.38 The decision to pursue a treason case against a former general, however, drew a significant wedge between the civilian government and the army. It is generally argued that one of the reasons why the military might have orchestrated the 2014 protests led by the PTI and cleric Qadri’s group was to force the government to compromise on Musharraf ’s treason trial. In February 2015, the Supreme Court bench hearing the treason case also rejected the prosecution’s plea for a solo trial against General Musharraf, while including former prime minister Shaukat Aziz, former chief justice Abdul Hameed Dogar and law minister Zahid Hamid as abettors of the imposition of the emergency in November 2007.39 Since then, the treason trial against General Musharraf has become dormant – and, even more so, after the government allowed him to leave the country on health grounds in early 2016. It was in essence a political issue, and, with the government’s lack of interest, the higher judiciary alone cannot ensure that the process of law should take its due course in this case.

Judicial activism, and the rule of law 151 However, the unabated problem of terrorism still allows the military the opportunity to retain a pre-eminent position and undermine judicial assertion. For instance, in response to the Peshawar school tragedy, all the political parties in the government and the opposition agreed to launch a wide-ranging National Action Plan to combat terrorism and other forms of violence and lift the moratorium on the death penalty. Between December 2014 and June 2015, over 170 executions were carried out, 23 for terrorism offences,40 while the National Action Plan has allowed the military command to steer the administration of law and order in urban spaces such as Karachi. Military courts More importantly, on 6 January 2015, the National Assembly and the Senate unanimously approved the Twenty-First Constitutional Amendment Bill and Pakistan Army Act 1952 (Amendment) Bill 2015.41 These laws will provide constitutional cover for extending the jurisdiction to military courts for the trial of terrorism suspects for a two-year period.42 More concrete, they provide for the creation of speed trial military courts for offences relating to terrorism, waging war against Pakistan, and prevention of acts threatening the security of the country.43 The establishment of military courts poses the first major challenge to judicial activism in Pakistan. The government has justified their creation by arguing that extraordinary conditions demand special measures. There is no doubt that the civilian courts have failed to provide justice for reasons well known – the state unable to provide protection to judges, witnesses and prosecution lawyers. As a result, the entire judicial machinery, fearing for its life, has been practically paralysed while many acquitted terrorists. And those who are awaiting trial have languished in jails for years.44 However, despite the fact that these courts have been mandated to operate for a limited period, this extraordinary step has raised enormous concern in media and civil society, especially among members of the human rights and lawyers’ community. Deeply concerned that the establishment of military courts could undermine democracy and the judiciary, the critics have argued that, by this move, the government has ceded yet more control to an army that already dominates security and foreign policy making. It is considered a major step backward, as civilian courts had been enjoying unprecedented independence in recent years, after a long history of operating at the military’s behest and on occasion providing it with legal cover for unconstitutional takeovers.45 It was not surprising, therefore, that the Pakistan Bar Council held protests and supported petitions filed with the Supreme Court against military courts, arguing that the law was in contradiction of fundamental rights and the basic structure of the constitution.46 Consequently, in April 2015, the apex court ordered a stay of execution of six militants convicted by military courts, after a petition seeking a halt to the implementation of death sentences awarded by military courts was filed by the Supreme Court Bar Association.47 Many other petitioners challenged the

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establishment of the military courts in the Supreme Court.48 Finally, several months after their establishment, in August 2015, the Supreme Court ruled that the military courts were legal and the Twenty-First Amendment under which they were established was in accordance with the Constitution.49 However, even if the ban on the executions awarded by the military courts was lifted, the limited time bar on their existence may still augur well for the newfound judicial assertion and independence in the country. However, the two years for which military courts were allowed to function should be seen as a window during which the civilian powers of investigation and prosecution could be strengthened. The protection of judges and witnesses also needs to be a priority.50 Judicial backlog A second challenge facing judicial activism emanates from within the judiciary. It is a fact that judicial activism has thus far remained largely confined to the arena of high politics, failing to make any significant difference in the delivery of justice to the common man. Lower courts remain beset with corruption, massive pendency, and a source of manipulation of litigation to the disadvantage of the aggrieved. Beyond the echelons of power and confines of high politics, the country’s anachronistic legal system is largely lethargic and lackadaisical in dispensing justice – reflected in the heavy pendency of over two million cases in lower courts across the country. Ten-year aggregate data from all the provincial High Courts demonstrates that other than some brief, unsustainable progress, the gap between disposed and newly initiated cases is an ever-widening one – in other words, case backlogs, and hence court delays, are relentlessly on the rise.51 Precisely because judicial activism has failed to trickle down to the masses level, the country continues to seriously lag behind in the rule of law. Unsurprisingly, thus, the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index-2014 painted a worrisome picture of Pakistan: Of the 99 countries surveyed for government accountability, crime, fundamental rights and access to justice, Pakistan ranked ninety-sixth.52 Dispensing justice at the federal or provincial apex of judicial power represents an unprecedented prodemocratic shift in Pakistan’s political order. However, by failing to continue this process down the judicial ladder, the process will inevitably stall and stoke despair. It is, therefore, critical for democratic progress in Pakistan as well as for the supremacy of the rule of law that the Supreme Court pushes for immediate reform of the legal justice system. Only then will the court continue to command public respect and authority.

Concluding remarks An assertive higher judiciary in Pakistani politics is a relatively recent development and, therefore, its impact on the rule of law still quite limited. Nonetheless, it is a key distinctive feature of the present transition to civilian rule. Judicial activism has helped shift the balance of power in support of the rule of law – at

Judicial activism, and the rule of law 153 least at the level of senior judiciary. Although Pakistan is yet to go a long way in establishing a people-focused justice dispensation, judicial intervention is putting new checks on the traditional power structures and creating greater resonance for the rule of law in the country. It has instilled fear not only among politicians and civil bureaucrats but also put the military on the defensive, diluting some of its authority and over-indulgence in politics. The Supreme Court has emerged as a central player in politics, by constituting Judicial Commissions of enquiry over major contentious issues such as the killing of Usama bin Laden, the memo-gate scandal, and alleged rigging in the 2013 election. Its findings and recommendations in each case have helped increase the institutional profile of the higher judiciary in the national power structure as well as its stature in the eyes of the general public. By indicting General Musharraf on charges of high treason, the Supreme Court has indeed set a new precedent. For never before in Pakistan’s turbulent history has a former army chief faced such a charge, or appeared before civilian courts in his defence. Regardless of its eventual outcome, the Musharraf case and several verdicts of the Supreme Court and High Courts cloak a forewarning to the military leadership of possible judicial consequences of any extraconstitutional act. Never before were military officials from the powerful ISI and the Frontier Corps made to depose before the apex court in cases such as the Missing Persons in Balochistan. In the past, a general could always justify a military takeover on the basis of the Law of Necessity from pliable Supreme Court judges. From members of the superior judiciary who jealously guard their newly gained independence, it may be difficult to get judicial sanction for a future military takeover. While defending the rule of law, the lawyers’ associations and members of the civil society have provided a useful platform of support to the higher judiciary, which now serves as a constitutional check on the arbitrariness of both the military and politicians. Emerging from under the shadows of the military rule and then throwing its weight around in subsequent years, sometimes arbitrarily and unnecessarily, it has gradually moderated its view of Public Interest Litigation, while remaining focused on the criticality of rule of law for social peace, harmony and a sense of justice at the grass roots. But judicial activism also places a huge responsibility on members of the higher judiciary to reform the legal justice system holistically and conduct themselves in a manner that strengthens constitutionalism through indiscriminate application of law in the country.

Notes 1 Amanullah Shah, The Impact of Army on Independence of the Judiciary in Pakistan (D.I. Khan: Gomal University, 2009). 2 Sabina Qazi, ‘Necessity as the mother of laws’, Herald, 12 July 2012. 3 ‘Power and its six degrees of separation’, Dawn, 3 August 2012. 4 Sabina Qazi, ‘Necessity as the mother of laws’, Herald, 12 July 2012. 5 Amanullah Shah, The Impact of Army on Independence of the Judiciary in Pakistan (D.I. Khan: Gomal University, 2009).

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6 Center for Research and Security Studies, Pakistan: Justice Restored. What Next? (Islamabad: CRSS, 2009). Available at www.transparency.org.pk/documents/Pakistan %20-%20Justice%20Restored,%20What%20Next.pdf (accessed 8 January 2016). 7 Asher A Qazi, ‘Iftikhar Chaudhry: the strategy of suo motu’, The News International, 11 December 2013. 8 Declan Walsh, ‘Lawyers clash with riot police over Musharraf ’s removal of Chief Justice’, New York Times, 13 March 2007. 9 See Jordyn Phelps, Pakistan’s Lawyers Movement: 2007–2009 (Washington, DC: International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, 2009). Available at: www.nonviolentconflict.org/pakistans-lawyers-movement-2007-2009/ (accessed 29 June 2016). 10 See Iram Khalid, ‘Role of judiciary in the evolvement of democracy in Pakistan’, Journal of Political Studies 19/2 (2012), pp. 125–142. 11 Center for Research and Security Studies, Pakistan: Justice Restored. What Next? (Islamabad: CRSS, 2009). Available at www.transparency.org.pk/documents/Pakistan %20-%20Justice%20Restored,%20What%20Next.pdf (accessed 8 January 2016). 12 Jordyn Phelps, Pakistan’s Lawyers Movement: 2007–2009 (Washington, DC: International Center on Nonviolent Conflict, 2009). Available at: www.nonviolent-conflict. org/index.php/movements-and-campaigns/movements-and-campaigns-summaries? sobi2Task=sobi2Details&catid=21&sobi2Id=30 (accessed 18 March 2016). 13 ‘Power and its six degrees of separation’, Dawn, 3 August 2012. 14 ‘Power and its six degrees of separation’, Dawn, 3 August 2012. 15 Saeed Shah, ‘Pervez Musharraf resigns as president of Pakistan’, Guardian, 18 August 2008. 16 See Mahmood Ali, ‘Pakistan’s shadowy secret service’, BBC News Online, 9 October 2006. Available at www.bbc.co.uk/news/10391539 (accessed 18 July 2015). 17 ‘Text of the Charter of Democracy’, Dawn, 16 May 2006. 18 Sardar Mumtaz Ali Bhutto, ‘The NRO democracy’, The News International, 9 January 2010. 19 ‘No judicial activism, only judicial constitutionalism: CJ Iftikhar’, Pakistan Herald, 10 October 2010. 20 For details, see Ahmed Uzair, ‘Judicial activism of the High Court using suo motu’, The Counsel (2010). Available at www.counselpakistan.com/vol-2/constitution/ judicial-activism.php (accessed 18 July 2015). 21 Muhammad Raheem Awan, Judicial Activism in Pakistan in Commercial and Constitutional Matters (University of Bedfordshire, 2014). 22 Hasnaat Malik, ‘The year of “suo motus” and judicial activism culminates’, Daily Times, 2 January 2014. 23 Iram Khalid, ‘Role of judiciary in the evolvement of democracy in Pakistan’, Journal of Political Studies 19/2 (2012), pp. 125–142. 24 Muhammad Raheem Awan, Judicial Activism in Pakistan in Commercial and Constitutional Matters (University of Bedfordshire, 2014). 25 ‘Yousuf Raza Gilani is sent packing’, The News International, 19 June 2012. 26 Muhammad Raheem Awan, Judicial Activism in Pakistan in Commercial and Constitutional Matters (University of Bedfordshire, 2014). 27 Hasnaat Malik, ‘The year of “suo motus” and judicial activism culminates’, Daily Times, 2 January 2014. 28 See Imtiaz Gul, ‘An Open Letter to the Chief Justice of Pakistan’, The Express Tribune, 30 August 2012. 29 Imtiaz Gul, ‘An Open Letter to the Chief Justice of Pakistan’, The Express Tribune, 30 August 2012. 30 ‘No judicial activism, only judicial constitutionalism: CJ Iftikhar’, Pakistan Herald, 10 October 2010. 31 Imtiaz Gul, ‘Towards a pragmatic judiciary’, The Express Tribune, 23 April 2014.

Judicial activism, and the rule of law 155 32 ‘International Judicial Conference: Chief justice stresses judiciary’s role in promoting tolerance’, The Express Tribune, 19 April 2014. 33 Tariq Butt, ‘Pakistan’s new chief justice assumes office’, The Gulf Today, 7 July 2014. 34 Imitaz Gul, ‘Enforcing the Rule of Law’, The Express Tribune, 12 February 2007. 35 Saeed Shah and Qasim Nauman, ‘Pakistan protestors reach capital as Supreme Court issues warning’, The Wall Street Journal, 18 August 2014. 36 Abdul Manan and Hasnaat Malik, ‘Inquiry commission’s report endorses PML-N’s mandate: PM Sharif ’, The Express Tribune, 23 July 2015. 37 Orla Guerin, ‘Musharraf returns to Pakistan despite threats’, BBC, 24 March 2013. 38 Shumaila Jaffery, ‘Pakistan’s Musharraf charged in treason case’, BBC, 31 March, 2014. 39 Amir Jalil Bobra, ‘Court rejects govt’s solo trial plea in Musharraf ’s case’, Daily Times, 9 January 2015. 40 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Pakistan In-Year Update: July 2015 (London: FCO, 15 July 2015). 41 ‘NA passes 21st amendment, Army Act amendment unopposed’, Daily Times, 6 January 2015. 42 Article 8 (1) of the Constitution says “any law, or any custom or usage having the force of law, in so far as it is inconsistent with the rights conferred by this Chapter, shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void”. Article 8 (2) says “the state shall not make any law which takes away or abridges the rights so conferred and any law made in contravention of this clause shall, to the extent of such contravention, be void”. 43 ‘NA passes 21st amendment, Army Act amendment unopposed’, Daily Times, 6 January 2015. 44 Talat Masood, ‘Biting the bullet’, The Express Tribune, 31 December 2014. 45 Huma Yusuf, ‘The resurgence of Pakistan’s military’, New York Times, 11 January 2015. 46 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Pakistan In-Year Update: July 2015. 47 Nasir Iqbal, ‘SC stays executions awarded by military courts’, Dawn, 16 April 2015. 48 Hasnaat Malik, ‘Military courts: SC reserves judgment on constitutional amendments’, The Express Tribune, 26 June 2015. 49 ‘Pakistan empowers military courts to pass death sentences on civilians’, Reuters, 5 August 2015. 50 Editorial, ‘Beyond military courts’, Dawn, 12 January 2015. 51 Osama Siddique, Pakistan’s Experience with Formal Law: An Alien Justice (Cambridge, Mass: Cambridge University Press, 2013); Osama Siddique, ‘Waiting for Justice’, The Express Tribune, 27 March 2012. 52 The World Justice Project, WJP Rule of Law Index 2014. Available at http://world justiceproject.org/rule-of-law-index (accessed 18 April 2016).

9

Demographic dividend, and democracy Mosharraf Zaidi

Pakistan is among a unique set of countries that is at the start of a demographic phase when its working population will constantly increase, in relation to those that are not at a working age. The extent to which young people will be educated and the quality of education they receive will be critical to Pakistan’s future. Since the demographic transition happens to be timed alongside the country’s democratic transition, the intimacy of their interplay, both real and perceived, is inevitable. The current situation is, however, quite alarming, since Pakistan is headed in a direction that will produce multiple generations of illiterate, unlettered and unfulfilled citizens. Frequent allusions to democratic transition and demographic dividend are therefore out of synch with the reality both the state and society are invested in, and actively working towards. There is little to no indication that a major transformational change is on the cards, despite a significant change in some aspects of education. This chapter begins by assessing what a set of positive signs with regards to democratic transition in Pakistan looks like from the lens of reform in education. It then identifies how those signs may be catalysed, and what it will take to sustain them so that they represent the beginnings of a larger social, economic and political transformation in the country.

Introduction The first-ever transfer of power through an election – rather than a coup, forced resignation or dismissal of government – took place in Pakistan in 2013, as one elected government made way for another. Many saw it as the high point of a democratic transition, whereby the country’s democratic institutions began to settle down and assert themselves as the principal arbiters of decision-making. However, far from putting to rest the debate about the best way forward for Pakistan, this democratic transition has stimulated a fascinating contest for political power and control over the narrative of what kind of system of governance Pakistan needs for the future of its 200 million citizens. The civil military divide, seen by many as a defining cleavage in Pakistan’s identity as a nation-state, not only continues to fester but, in many ways, has emerged as an even stronger factor as the democratic transition shifts into the

Demographic dividend, and democracy 157 second phase – beyond merely the consolidation of democratic processes like elections, transfers of power and legislation to the actual competition for authority over decision-making in contested realms like national security and foreign policy. For many democrats in Pakistan, therefore, there has never been a greater urgency to demonstrate not just the normative or constitutional supremacy of democracy but also the functional benefits of this democracy. Democracy in Pakistan is still in its infancy, and no reasonable analysis can expect its national institutions to transform and start to deliver over a mere two terms. But the use of the term transition should also be conditional. We can only refer to Pakistan as being a country experiencing a democratic transition if it exhibits actual signs of being in transition. This transition can manifest in a number of ways, but one critical means of assessment is the manner in which the country prepares for the future of its children.

Demographic dividend Pakistan is home to one of the world’s youngest populations. Half of all Pakistanis are under the age of 20;1 and two out of three Pakistanis are under the age of 30.2 This ‘youth bulge’ has not gone unnoticed. Pakistani advertisers and politicians have caught on, and the dominant drivers in both the high-consumption urban economy and overall political discourse reflect a robust consciousness that the biggest population segment in the country is young people. The 2013 general election was hailed as a ‘youth’ election. The demographic estimates suggest that all elections in Pakistan will continue to be ‘youth’ elections from now, until about the middle of this century, when the ‘youth bulge’ is expected to ease around 2045.3 What is demographic dividend? Theoretically, demographic dividend is the difference between the rate of growth of the working age population and total population. When the difference is in favour of working age population, it is considered to be a window of opportunity offered by a country’s demography to be utilized for economic growth.4 The technical definition of demographic dividend is the expected economic gains created by a transformation in the age structure of the population, as an increase in the working age population combines with a decline in the dependent age population.5 The demographic transition that Pakistan is currently experiencing began in the 1990s and peaked in the early 2000s. The basis for considering it a dividend is that there are more people in the economy who are earning incomes and able to take care of others, than there are people not earning incomes who need to be taken care of. The problem is that “many policymakers mistakenly think that a demographic dividend results automatically from a large population of young people relative to the population of working age adults and without the needed population, social, and economic policies. This is not the case”.6 The Pakistani discourse on demographic dividend is quite problematic. Finance Ministry officials often refer to it, as do those from international financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF ), on whom these

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officials rely for timely bailouts for potentially counterproductive fiscal policies. For instance, at the Pakistan Development Forum 2007, the annual meeting of bilateral and multilateral donors to Pakistan, the government (in partnership with the World Bank) billed the event as ‘The Demographic Dividend: Unleashing the Human Potential’. The then adviser to the Prime Minister on Finance, Salman Ahmed Shah, mistakenly but tellingly referred to the event in his keynote speech as ‘En-cashing the Demographic Dividend: Unleashing the Human Potential’.7 The slip was understandable, given that the public policy discourse in the country has continued to be largely informed by narratives shaped by multilateral and bilateral donors, and applied locally through a policy elite incentivized to address the issues important to those donors rather than to the specific contexts and cultures in which they operate. A sincere and effective approach to realizing the economic, social and political potentials of Pakistan’s demographic transition that could yield a ‘demographic dividend’ would need to have, at its very heart, a clear commitment to, and implementation of, education policies that put children in school, keep them there throughout their school age, and ensure that they are constantly learning. On the strength of the existing evidence, such policies did not exist in 2007, and they do not exist today.

Educating the youth Pakistan’s Millennium Development Goals performance is a good starting point to assess the impact of decades of negligence toward educating children. The net enrolment rate reported in the Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey 2012–2013 is 59.9 per cent. The total literacy rate for the youth (aged 15 to 24) in the same survey is 58 per cent. The adage ‘garbage in, garbage out’ may seldom be as perfectly illustrated as this. If you only put 59 per cent of your children in school at the primary level, it is reasonable to expect that there will be 59 per cent or less children that will have a chance to qualify as ‘literate’ when they are 15 years old, or older. In fact, the similarity of the two numbers is remarkable, and unlikely to be sustained in the longer term, given that roughly 30 per cent of those enrolled in primary school do not complete primary school, instead dropping out.8 The nutrition levels for children under the age of five, who represent the future cohort of school-going children, point to a dismal situation. Forty-five per cent of these children are too short for their age, and 30 per cent are underweight for their age. One out of four children is born with a low birth weight, and 11 per cent of all children under five are too thin for their height.9 A factsheet prepared by Alif Ailaan – a political campaign, funded by the UK Department for International Development (DFID) to help make education a more central issue in Pakistani national discourse – points to several crucial realities underscoring the gravity of the education crisis in the country.10 First, Pakistan has the world’s second-highest number of out-of-school children at the primary level. There are over 52 million children between the ages of

Demographic dividend, and democracy 159 five and 16, of which 25 million, or 47.7 per cent, are out of school. One out of every 12 children out of school in the world is in Pakistan. On average, Pakistanis spend only 3.9 years in schools. Second, Pakistan spends a meagre 1.9 per cent of the GDP on education, and thus ranks fifth among countries that spend the least on education. Of the total combined budget allocation for education in 2013, 74 per cent is earmarked for current expenditure (mainly salaries) and 26 per cent for development expenditure (construction of new facilities, upgrading existing facilities, etc.). The budget allocations on education have been increasing but most of this increase has been absorbed in teacher salaries (Punjab: 79 per cent; Sindh: 61 per cent; KPK: 45 per cent; and Balochistan: 16 per cent). Third, half of the children who have ever attended school drop out before finishing primary school. The dropout rate for girls is 48 per cent and 46 per cent for boys. Most of the out-of-school children have never been to school. Sixtyeight per cent of out-of-school children have never been to school and 32 per cent dropped out. Enrolment rates drop drastically at middle and high school level. The net enrolment rate at primary school is as low as 57 per cent. This number drops to 22 per cent in middle school and 13 per cent in high school. There are many reasons that children drop out of school, but most are supplyrather than demand-related. Fifty-three per cent of boys drop out of school, as they are unwilling to endure the corporal punishment that is implemented in schools. Nineteem per cent of girls drop out of school because their parents do not allow them to transition to higher education. Fourth, only 50 per cent of females have ever attended school in Pakistan. In rural areas, this number is lower at 39 per cent. Thirty-eight per cent of women have never attended school due to lack of parental consent, while 16 per cent have never attended school as it is considered too expensive. Fifth, the condition of schools remains deplorable throughout the country. Approximately 45 per cent of school buildings are in ‘unsatisfactory’ condition, according to the respective provincial Education Department in each province. Half the schools function without electricity. One out of every three schools has no drinking water. Two out of five schools are missing the basic facility of a toilet. One out of every three schools is without boundary walls. There is not enough space available for learning. Seventeen per cent of the total primary schools are singleclassroom schools. Sixth, teachers are not enough, and not good enough. A third of the total primary schools in the country are single-teacher schools. The average number of teachers in a primary government school is less than three. Furthermore, a rough estimate shows that at least 10–18 per cent of public school teachers are absent from school on any given day. Seventh, scarce resources for schools are being wasted. According to a survey conducted by the Supreme Court, there are at least 8,252 ghost schools (which exist only on paper) in Pakistan; out of these 6,164 are in Sindh alone. Finally, learning outcomes are weak across the nation. Children score poorly in reading and mathematics across all major provinces. In Class 5, 50 per cent of children cannot read a story in Urdu, Sindhi or Pashto, 57 per cent cannot a read sentence fluently in English, and 57 per cent cannot

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perform simple two-digit division. Given the current rate of progress, it will be the year 2088 before every Pakistani child is in school. As is clear from the above data, Pakistan is headed in a direction that will produce multiple generations of illiterate, unlettered and unfulfilled citizens, incapable of communicating effectively, incapable of the numeracy required in the twenty-first century, and incapable of competing with an increasingly sophisticated global marketplace. Worst of all, these citizens will be robbed of the opportunity to fulfil their human potential. Without an urgent appraisal and even more urgent effort to address the education crisis in Pakistan, the democratic transition is at risk of joining the ‘demographic dividend’ in the category of unthinking narratives designed by disconnected policymakers seeking only to comfort people about the future. Under present circumstances, and given the current trajectory, Pakistani children do not have a bright future. The promise of a democratic transition however is to prevent the country’s continuation on the current trajectory. What then are the circumstances under which the promise of a democratic transition in Pakistan may be fulfilled?

Locating ‘democratic transitions’ We must first locate the idea of democracy or democratic transition and how it is related to education. The oldest argument goes back as far as Aristotle, whose ideas about the quality of governance or democracy being intricately linked to the quality of life, particularly levels of education of the populace, were brought back into academic debate in a seminal study by Seymour Lipset.11 The data for over 100 countries, across a timeframe of 35 years (1960–1995), confirms that better social indicators predict more democracy, “as measured by a subjective indicator of electoral rights. The propensity for democracy rises with per capita GDP, primary schooling, and a smaller gap between male and female primary attainment”.12 The direction of this relationship is not narrow and one sided either. A significant body of literature exists on the impact of democratization on spending and outcomes in primary education in Latin America. For example, Robert R. Kaufman and Alex Segura-Ubierg argue that a “shift to democracy leads to increases in health and education spending, which reaches a larger segment of the population”.13 Similarly, there is evidence from Africa that more democracy has produced better education outcomes. A study of 44 countries across the timeframe of 1980 to 1996 shows that democratically elected African governments, which came to power in the 1990s, helped move the average for primary education across the entire continent, in part by spending more on primary education than their non-democratic predecessors.14 There is also a range of academic work on the capacity for resisting dictatorship and engendering democracy in transitional societies where democracy is still weak. Education increases support for democracy, partly because democracy relies on people with high participation benefits for its support (and participation rates increase directly with education attainment levels). More “educated nations are more likely both

Demographic dividend, and democracy 161 to participate in and preserve their democracies as well as to protect and inoculate them from coups”.15 In short, there is a substantial body of work that correlates education and democracy, as well as education and democratic transitions. Even critics of the approach that privileges democracy as an instrument for increased growth and improved development outcomes find evidence that, at least in terms of primary education, democracies do better.16 The correlations are not necessarily indicative of causation, but the dual track of the correlations is important to consider. More educated countries tend to be more democratic, and more democratic countries tend to invest in the education of their people. If the data and evidence from other studies holds true, the only possible future direction for a country like Pakistan, in which a weak democracy is getting stronger and more resistant to undemocratic forces, is for it to increase its investments in education. Concurrently, the state of the country, and in particular the demographic transition in which Pakistan finds itself, would compel any rational actors within the decisionmaking domain to make those investments in education urgently. The outcomes of Pakistan’s education policies do not suggest, as described above, that this urgency exists. But how would we know if this was beginning to manifest itself? What would a set of positive signs with regards to democratic transition look like from the lens of reform in education? How can we tell whether education has become a priority in Pakistan?

Bellwethers in education The state system in Pakistan has already figured out the first ‘layer’ of what needs doing in education. There are three signs that it has done so. First, political leaders have made education a constitutional right, with an explicit invocation to the cost of education as being ‘free’. Article 25-A was included in the Eighteenth Amendment in 2010, as part of a dramatic reform that is widely seen as the most significant (and most democratic) structural reform of democracy since the early 1970s. Second, the state is now committed to universal primary education at least in letter, if only partially in spirit. Beyond its international covenants and commitments that indicate this, there is growing evidence, based on the annual school season, that, for several years now, the provincial and federal governments undertake expansive enrolment drives to increase enrolment rates, focusing exclusively on primary education. This commitment has yet to achieve its goal, with close to seven million children between five and nine that are still out of school,17 but progress on this front is evident from both the data over the years and the quality of effort invested on a yearly basis. Third, society at large is responding to the education crisis, although this response needs to be framed in an absolute picture of education (which is nothing short of dismal), rather than a relative picture (in which it seems to indicate responsiveness). The Alif Ailaan campaign tracked the coverage of education in the mass media for a full year from February 2013 to February 2014. The

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100 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Alif Ailaan education news bulletin

y  0.0596x
2430.2

15-Feb-13 22-Feb-13 01-Mar-13 08-Mar-13 15-Mar-13 22-Mar-13 29-Mar-13 05-Apr-13 12-Apr-13 19-Apr-13 26-Apr-13 03-May-13 10-May-13 17-May-13 24-May-13 31-May-13 07-Jun-13 14-Jun-13 21-Jun-13 28-Jun-13 05-Jul-13 12-Jul-13 19-Jul-13 26-Jul-13 02-Aug-13 09-Aug-13 16-Aug-13 23-Aug-13 30-Aug-13 06-Sep-13 13-Sep-13 20-Sep-13 27-Sep-13 04-Oct-13 11-Oct-13 18-Oct-13 25-Oct-13 01-Nov-13 08-Nov-13 15-Nov-13 22-Nov-13 29-Nov-13 06-Dec-13 13-Dec-13 20-Dec-13 27-Dec-13 03-Jan-14 10-Jan-14 17-Jan-14 24-Jan-14 31-Jan-14 07-Feb-14 14-Feb-14 21-Feb-14 28-Feb-14

Weekly number of news articles

word clouds related to the coverage were subsequently analysed at the MIT Media Labs, and the change in the volume of coverage has been distinct: The various spikes in the discourse (Figure 9.1) have been informed by various stimuli, and the significant troughs are explained by a range of noneducation related stories that essentially ‘crowd out’ education from the discourse altogether. But the overarching trend in the coverage of education has been demonstrably positive. An average of roughly 30 stories a week in February 2013 grew to an average of over 50 per week by February 2014. Attribution of why this has taken place is due to a range of events as well as political and social actors – some acting consciously in support of education, others acting in self-interest. The October 2014 Nobel Peace Prize victory of Malala Yousafzai, campaigns like Alif Ailaan, and events like the UN General Assembly side sessions on education, as well as a fundamental shift in political attitudes, partly informed by demographics and partly by the urbanization of the electorate, have all converged to produce a higher propensity for reporting stories that relate to education in Pakistan. The political discourse has decidedly shifted more visibly toward articulating commitments to education, and some of the unlikeliest candidates tend to be the most vocal and vociferous. In their 2013 election manifestos, each one of the political parties made a range of important promises to improve education – in particular, to increase spending on education. Every party committed to spending a minimum of 4 per cent of the GDP on education, with most committing to 4 per cent to 5 per cent. The JUI-F, a party commonly seen as having a regressive social policy orientation, committed to spending 15 per cent of GDP annually on education – an almost eight-fold increase on the current levels, which would amount to an actual increase of at least $25 billion annually.

Week

Figure 9.1 Alif Ailaan news bulletin. Source: Alif Ailaan.

Demographic dividend, and democracy 163 Quite apart from how realistic (or unrealistic) such commitments may be, they do represent something new. But this is no tangible sign of progress. There are a range of second-order indicators that would represent a real shift, and following those, a third and fourth order of indicators. The fundamental point here is that there is an urgent need for a sustained fiscal, administrative and creative effort to fix the state of education in Pakistan. In the short run, we can identify progress by examining four specific aspects of the education sector. First, the focus on enrolment needs to be integrated with a conversation about retention. In practical terms, this would not be sufficiently demonstrated by op-eds or newspaper stories about dropouts (though these would help). This enriching of the spectrum of universal primary education would be sufficiently demonstrated only by the inclusion of dropout statistics in the indicators used by executives within the administrative structure of education delivery, starting from chief ministers down through the district officers for education. Presently, the entire hierarchy is chiefly concerned with bi-annual enrolment data from the two annual enrolment drives in March–April and August–September, which masks two major problems: one, there is no tracking of new enrolments, and the system cannot tell whether the newly enrolled are staying in school or not. Two, there is no tracking of already enrolled children, and the system cannot tell whether there is a first in, first out, kind of revolving door in primary schools in Pakistan. However, one thing is certain: the total number of out-of-school children is not changing very much, despite some very impressive post-enrolment drive statistics. This can only be interrogated by tracking, quite rigorously, the dropout rates and the retention rates at least at the primary level. Second, enrolment and the flip side of dropouts must be seen not only from the perspective of the overall data, but specifically in terms of what happens to the data for girls. The gender gap in enrolment begins before birth, but its first manifestation on the national data ‘grid’ is in the shape of the dramatic difference in out-of-school populations in Pakistan. The majority of the 25 million out-of-school children are girls. Explanations that privilege Pakistan’s ‘culture’, ‘tradition’ or ‘values’ do not stand outside of a small sliver of its 145 districts, in which there are physical limitations to female participation in schooling and/or labour. At best, roughly 30 per cent of out-of-school girls can be attributed to parental restrictions – but the reasons for those restrictions are more rooted in concerns about the availability of schools’ facilities, such as running water, and covered and walled bathrooms in schools. Parents wanting a safe environment for their daughters is not a unique cultural construct for Pakistanis, but a universal phenomenon. The failure to educate girls needs to be located precisely where it belongs: at the feet of the government system. This is a supply-side failure, and constant allusions to ‘culture’ smack both of orientalism and a desire to seek excuses for failed state delivery mechanisms. Interventions to increase the safety and comfort of girls and their mothers within schools, en route to schools and up the chain of schools (from primary, to middle, to high, and to higher secondary) would represent a clear signal that the

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evolution from the simplistic enrolment construct is beginning to make way for a more nuanced and sophisticated understanding of the lack of enrolment. Third, government data needs to reflect outcomes as much as it does inputs. In simple terms, the government must collect and report on the quality of education being provided in the country. Currently, there is no such data available. Learning outcome measurements in Pakistan today come from NGOs and private data collectors, not as part of the package of government data that drives and shapes public policy. This focus on the quality of education being provided is not simply about the outcomes, but rather is instrumental in assessing what teachers are doing in the classroom and what administrators are doing to support them. Pakistan does not have a database on the quality of education. There is no consistent national testing, and the provincial standardized tests of learning achievements before the matriculation exams are in their infancy in only two provinces. Creating a national database on the quality of national education is no doubt an arduous task, but it cannot be delayed. These fitful efforts, mostly funded by external donors such as the World Bank, the European Union and the British and American aid bureaucracies, have sought to address data on quality, but as ever, the level of political ownership for these efforts is woefully inadequate for their longer term sustainability. Fourth, there needs to be an indication that the government is interested in enforcing its writ, and protecting the future of children. There would be no better indicator of this than a programme that seeks to decertify low quality government and private schools, as well as to assess teacher quality on a regular basis. There is an important caveat to this condition. It cannot be fulfilled in the absence of official data on quality, and an overarching improvement in the perception of government capacity and ownership in the education sector. The state of government officials in the education sector today, and the perceptions of corruption and patronage that currently exist, would render the sudden emergence of decertification exercises completely counterproductive. So if this condition is to be met, it must be met as a product of at least meeting the other three. Finally, while these measure or indicators would signify a positive trajectory, we also need to be keenly on the lookout for signs of inertia and a lack of progress. It will not merely be the lack of the above indicators that demonstrates a lack of progress. How then will we know progress is not happening? We would know if two things that are currently embedded within the discourse and the system continue to go unchallenged. These problems may not entirely be resolved in the short and medium term, but if a robust, mainstream challenge to them does not emerge in the short run, the children of Pakistan are not likely to be rescued from the grinder of demographic and democratic transitions the country’s economists and politicians have been celebrating since the turn of the century. The first problem that needs to be challenged in the national discourse is the embedded narrative of ‘the private sector’ as the saviour of education. The reason for this is quite simple. The biggest problem of enrolment, retention and quality – the triple facet of the education crisis – exists in the lowest economic

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quintile in the country. As is clear from Figure 9.2, the number of the out-ofschool children (OOSC) increases as income levels fall. Among children belonging to the poorest households, 57 per cent are not in school while it is 26 per cent in upper middle and 10 per cent in rich.18 There is no example in human history, and certainly none since the Westphalian state emerged, of the universalization of education, and the mass capacitation of human capital that has been undertaken by the narrowly interested private sector. In the most benign cases, appeals to the private sector are a function of desperation by government officials and donors in response to the urgency of Pakistan’s education crisis. In the worst-case scenarios, they are a product of ideological conviction. Either way, the continued and uncontested dominance of the idea that Pakistan simply needs to continue allowing the private sector to grow unfettered, and continue to allow the public sector schools to atrophy and corrode, is bad for children, especially those who belong to the lowest income quintile. The second problem that needs to be challenged is the overwhelming lack of political ownership in the education reform discourse, and the resulting dominance of multilateral and bilateral donors within this discourse. It is important to identify how this challenge should not be framed. There is an existing narrative that challenges donors’ involvement in education. It is largely rooted in an insecure national security discourse that derives from soft xenophobia. This may be legitimate in some specific instances (such as the discourse surrounding Dr Shakil Afridi, the Pakistani doctor who helped the United States locate Osama bin Laden’s whereabouts, and his fake vaccination campaign’s impact on the polio discourse). However it is wildly inaccurate in most instances, and serves to undermine the real reasons for seeking a lessening of donor involvement in service-delivery issues like healthcare, water and sanitation and education. The real cause for seeking a reduction and gradual termination of donor financing and involvement in issues like education reform is that continued engagement 55 50 45 40 35 30 25 20 15 10 5 0

48 37 31 22 14

Poor

Lower-middle

Middle Income level

Upper-middle

Figure 9.2 Proportion of out-of-school children (OOSC) by income level.

Rich

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has a dual negative impact on the organic discourse for reform. In the first instance, it reduces the pressure on elected leaders and government officials to reform themselves, knowing that they can depend on donors for inputs and support. In the second, it subsidizes the cost to Pakistani leaders of continuing to make decisions, and allocating effort and resources as they have in the past. In short, donors may be unwittingly incentivizing the very behaviour they are trying to alter.

Conclusion There are four facts that form the basis of the assertions in this chapter. First, Pakistan is a country of young people, and therefore education is a demographically relevant issue to explore. Second, education in Pakistan is in a state of crisis, and portends disastrous future social and political outcomes. Third, there is substantial evidence that more democracy is better for educational outcomes, particularly primary education, and that more education strengthens democracies. Finally, the mere evidence of the correlations between democracy and education, or signs of awareness of the problem, is not enough to predict that Pakistan will address the education crisis with the level of urgency that it deserves. On the basis of these facts, the preceding discussion identified a set of four conditions or indicators that would demonstrate second-order progress in the education discourse – including the focus on school dropouts and retention; the value of girls’ education; the importance of collecting and reporting data on the quality of education; and the demonstration of government intent to regulate and invest in certification/decertification of schools and teachers. Those in government would be best served by focusing on the factors that can immediately be addressed – especially the first three positive indicators. Those in the private sectors would be best served by focusing on the last positive indicator. Such a focus is inevitable, but how and when it comes about is important. Those in the international community, particularly multilateral and bilateral donors, should focus on addressing the two problems identified above as a key reason for the lack of progress in reforming the education sector, including the overt reliance on private sector and the sheer lack of political ownership. The conventional wisdom of the benefits of private sector participation in service delivery, when applied to Pakistan as it currently is configured, undermines many of the core aspirations of neoliberal agenda that form the basis of many donor interventions. More importantly, it leaves the poorest and most vulnerable at the mercy of failed markets and almost failed governments. This is a direct contradiction of the aims and objectives of most donors and their benevolent programmes in Pakistan. Finally, the absence of the emergence of a robust discourse for education reform, and the failure of governments to finance such reforms of their own accord, is an indicator of the failure to stimulate real and abiding political ownership of the education reform agenda. Only a dramatic improvement in the indigenous political ownership of the education reform agenda will cause a reduction of donor participation in the discussion about education in Pakistan.

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Notes 1 The British Council, Pakistan: The Next Generation (Islamabad: The British Council, 2009). Available at www.britishcouncil.pk/sites/britishcouncil.pk/files/next-generationreport.pdf (accessed 13 April 2016). 2 The British Council, Pakistan: The Next Generation (Islamabad: The British Council, 2009). Available at www.britishcouncil.pk/sites/britishcouncil.pk/files/next-generationreport.pdf (accessed 13 April 2016). 3 Durr-e-Nayab, Demographic Dividend or Demographic Threat in Pakistan (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 2006). Also see Zeba A. Sathar, Rabbi Royan and John Bongaarts (eds), Capturing the Demographic Dividend in Pakistan (New York: The Population Council, 2013). 4 Andrew Mason, ‘Demographic transition and demographic dividends in developed and developing countries’, paper presented at United Nations Expert Group Meeting on Social and Economic Implications of Changing Population Age Structure, Mexico City, 31 August–2 September 2005. Available at www.un.org/esa/population/ meetings/Proceedings_EGM_Mex_2005/mason.pdf (accessed 10 February 2016). 5 Durr-e-Nayab, Demographic Dividend or Demographic Threat in Pakistan (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 2006). 6 James Gribble and Jason Bremner, ‘Achieving a demographic dividend’, Population Bulletin 67/2 (December 2012). Available at www.prb.org/pdf12/achievingdemographic-dividend.pdf (accessed 13 May 2015). 7 Salman Ahmed, ‘The N-11: More Than an Acronym’, Speech at Pakistan Development Forum, April 2007. 8 The World Bank data on the state of primary education in Pakistan for 2013 is available at http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.CMPT.ZS (accessed 9 April 2016). 9 Ministry of Health, Government of Pakistan, Pakistan: National Nutrition Survey 2011. Available at https://pak.humanitarianresponse.info/system/files/documents/files/ Pakistan_NNS_Version%2027.7.June%202012.pdf (accessed 10 March 2016). 10 The Factsheet is available at: www.alifailaan.pk. Data sourced from: Annual Status of Education Survey Report (ASER) 2013; Pakistan Education Atlas 2013; EFA UNESCO Global Monitoring Report 2013–14; National Education Management Information System (NEMIS) 2011–12; Pakistan Social and Living Standards Measurement Survey (PSLMS) 2012–13; Public Financing of Education in Pakistan (Analysis of Federal, Provincial and District Budgets 2010–11 to 2013–14); Supreme Court of Pakistan, Constitution Petition No. 37 of 2012 (Petition Regarding Miserable Condition of the Schools); Public Financing of Education in Pakistan (Analysis of Federal Provincial and District Budgets 2010–11 to 2013–14); Institute of Social and Policy Sciences (ISAPS). 11 Seymour Martin Lipset, ‘Some social requisites for democracy: economic development and political legitimacy’, American Political Science Review 53/1 (1959), pp. 69–105. 12 Robert J. Barro, ‘Determinants of democracy’, Journal of Political Economy 107/6 (199), pp. 158–183. 13 Robert R. Kaufman and Alex Segura-Ubierg, ‘Globalization, domestic politics, and social spending in Latin America: a time-series cross-section analysis, 1973–97’, World Politics 53/4 (2001), pp. 553–587. 14 David Stasavage, ‘Democracy and Education Spending in Africa’, American Journal of Political Science 49/2 (April 2005), pp. 343–358. 15 E. Glaeser, G. Ponzetto and A. Shleifer, ‘Why does democracy need education?’ Journal of Economic Growth 12/2 (2007), pp. 77–99. 16 Michael Ross, ‘Is democracy good for the poor?’ American Journal of Political Science 50/2 (April 2006), pp. 860–874.

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17 D. Lynd, The Education System in Pakistan: Assessment of the National Education Census (Islamabad: UNESCO, 2007). Available at http://unesco.org.pk/education/ teachereducation/files/sa4.pdf (accessed 27 March 2016). 18 Riazul Haq, ‘Gloomy picture: 52m children out of school, says report’, The Express Tribune, 22 October 2014.

10 The Baloch question after the Eighteenth Amendment Rafiullah Kakar

Federalism has become one of the most commonly advocated tools for conflict regulation in ethnically divided societies. A multi-ethnic state confronted with the self-assertion of different ethnic groups since its inception, Pakistan has experimented with different institutional designs to manage its ethnic diversity. The latest major transformation in the constitutional design of the country was the unanimous passage of the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment in April 2010. Widely regarded as one of the landmark achievements in the constitutional and political history of Pakistan, the amendment, among others, redefined the troubled federal-provincial relations through the devolution of powers to the provinces. This decentralization, framers and supporters of the amendment hoped, would allay the concerns of ethno-regional minorities and bolster interethnic harmony and federal integrity. In particular, it was expected to have a pacifying impact on the ethnic conflict in Balochistan. This has not happened. Although moderate Baloch have re-entered the mainstream political process and formed the provincial government, Baloch separatists continue to fight. The persistence of low-scale insurgency in Balochistan raises serious questions about the efficacy of political and fiscal decentralization as a means of ethnic conflict management. This chapter aims to evaluate the potential of the Eighteenth Amendment to reduce and ultimately resolve the ethnic conflict in Balochistan. It examines the political concessions granted by the Eighteenth Amendment and assesses their effect on the ethno-nationalist politics of the province. Recognizing the considerably short time that has passed since the implementation of the amendment started, the study seeks to understand and identify the diverse ways in which the amendment has affected, and is likely to affect, ethno-nationalist politics in the province.

Conceptual framework The impact of federalism or decentralized federalism on ethnic conflict has been intensely debated by political scientists.1 Most scholars have used an institutional approach to study the link between decentralization and ethnic conflict. Some scholars argue that decentralization dampens ethnic conflict2; others contend that

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it exacerbates ethnic conflicts.3 According to the former group of scholars, decentralization recognizes and concedes the right of ethnic minorities to manage their affairs and promote their distinct culture and language.4 Propounding his famous theory of “consociational” democracy, Lijphart argued that the successful establishment of democracy in deeply divided societies is possible only if the type of democracy is characterized by the following four elements: grand coalition, group autonomy, minority veto and proportionality. In line with Lijphart’s theory, McGarry and O’Leary maintain that federalism can be an effective conflict-regulating device only if it combines territorial self-rule with consociational government at the centre. They, however, also warn that federalism is unlikely to contain conflict if the relevant ethnic groups are not geographically clustered or concentrated. Bermeo compared the performance of federal states with unitary states in regards to the accommodation of territorially based minorities and found that “federal institutions promote successful accommodation”. Furthermore, she contended that “no violent separatist movement has ever succeeded in a federal democracy”.5 Horowitz provides a more nuanced and qualified endorsement of decentralization as a method of ethnic conflict management.6 In contrast, many scholars have warned against the adoption of decentralization as a conflict-regulating tool. They maintain that by recognizing certain ethnic groups, territorial autonomy reinforces ethnic cleavages and thus increases the likelihood of conflict.7 Philip Roeder analysed the role of political institutions in shaping the mobilization of ethnic communities and found that ethnic federalism empowers political entrepreneurs and facilitates the politicization of ethnicity and mobilization of protest. Federalism provides ethnic groups with more resources, he argued, to engage in an ethnic conflict and even potentially secede.8 Moreover, by empowering a local majority in a region, territorial autonomy encourages or allows potential discrimination against regional minorities, engendering what Schuck calls the “minority-within-minority” problem.9 Dawn Brancati contends that the impact of decentralization on ethnic conflict is determined by the presence of ethno-regional parties. If ethno-regional parties are reasonably strong, then decentralization is likely to increase ethnic conflict.10 Distinguishing between ethnic agitation and secessionism, Hechter maintains that while decentralization may lead to a rise in protest events by ethno-cultural minorities, it does so in a way that curtails secessionism.11 In the context of Pakistan, a growing body of literature exists on the politics of federalism12 and ethnicity.13 However, there is a disconnect between the two bodies of scholarly literature. Only recently, a few scholarly works have attempted to study the role of federal structures and design in managing ethnic tensions and conflicts.14 Waseem maintains that the federal structure of the 1973 constitution “exacerbated ethnic conflict by creating de jure recognition of core linguistic communities identified with their respective federating units”.15 Maryam Khan also asserts that ethnic federalism has deepened inter-group cleavages and worsened ethnic conflict. Samad believes that Pakistan has traditionally used hegemonic control to manage ethnic differences. Characterized by

Baloch question post-Eighteenth Amendment 171 over-centralization of power and intense use of coercion and co-optation, the hegemonic control mode, he argues, has been unable to successfully manage ethnic differences. Mushtaq holds that the exclusive design of power structure and relatively centralized governance have aggravated inter-ethnic group relations in Pakistan. The findings of this project corroborate the view that decentralization defuses ethnic conflict. The Eighteenth Amendment has resolved most issues concerning provincial autonomy and has pacified the Balochistan ethnic conflict to a considerable extent. This pacification is manifested in the improvement in the levels of political participation, weakening of the ethno-nationalist narrative and increasingly pro-federation attitude of the moderate ethno-nationalists. The study, however, argues that the amendment does not address the most critical driver of the contemporary conflict in Balochistan – the dominance of the military and their repressive approach. Dominance of the military indicates the endurance of one of Pakistan’s most enduring and long-standing structural issues, praetorianism – an analytical framework used to describe military involvement in politics.16 Praetorianism combined with the ineffective implementation of the Eighteenth Amendment continues to fuel discontent in Balochistan.

Authoritarian federalism Owing to the fragile foundations of the freedom movement in the areas that came to constitute Pakistan, the new state was born with a deep-seated anxiety about ethnic or regional identity assertions and therefore soon came to regard them as a threat to national integrity. This fear combined with the security threat from India defined the country’s approach towards political and economic development in the aftermath of independence. There were two prominent tenets of this approach. First, Islam and the Urdu language were used as tools to bond the otherwise disparate ethno-regional groups into a cohesive national unit. The logic underpinning this policy was that, given its universal emphasis and renunciation of racial, ethnic and linguistic foundations of nationalism, Islam would go a long way towards neutralizing and muzzling regional ethno-nationalist movements. Second, greater priority was assigned to the survival and physical security of the state over the need to establish participatory political processes and institutions.17 The outcome was the establishment of an authoritarian system where the doors to effective political participation were almost closed, especially for ethnoregional minorities. This was rather ironic given the Muslim League’s vigorous advocacy of a strong federation with maximum autonomy for provinces in the pre-partition period. The adoption of the Government of India Act 1935 as the interim constitution after independence undermined the original federal vision for the country. Conscious of their distinct cultural and linguistic identity, different ethnoregional groups expressed their unease with the centralized state structure and

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the over-arching Islamic nationalism of the state. Besides Bengalis, this was especially true in case of the Baloch and Pashtun nationalists who, on account of their secular approach, were not enchanted with the Muslim League’s preindependence slogan of “Islam in danger”. Consequently, these groups began political struggle to achieve cultural recognition in a more inclusive national narrative and regional autonomy within a radically restructured federal framework. The Bengali movement culminated in the separation of East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. The Baloch ethno-nationalist movement remains the last serious challenge to the integrity of the Pakistani state. The demand for provincial autonomy remained the cornerstone of the Baloch and Pashtun nationalist movements. In the years following independence, the Pakistani state retained the colonial policies regarding Balochistan. The Agent to the Governor General continued to rule the erstwhile British Balochistan and former rulers of Kalat, Kharan, Makran and Lasbela looked after their respective states with a considerable degree of internal freedom. Calls for reforms and introduction of representative institutions were ignored by the central government. In 1950, the Constituent Assembly approved the formation of a Reforms Committee on Balochistan, which in its final report recommended that British Balochistan should be elevated to the status of a fully-fledged governor province.18 The recommendations of the report, however, were never implemented. The efforts to change the constitutional status and administrative organization of Balochistan and the four states received a serious setback when the One-Unit plan was introduced in 1955. The Baloch and Pashtun nationalists of Balochistan were outraged at the scheme and joined the National Awami Party in the struggle against One-Unit. The 1956 constitution created a federal form of government and provided some autonomy to the provinces. However, it could not placate the sentiments of the nationalists who continued their agitation against the One-Unit. The situation in the province deteriorated with the imposition of Martial Law in the country, which not only accentuated the political exclusion of Balochistan but also marked the beginning of an era of brutal use of force against the Baloch. The 1962 constitution, which retained the One-Unit and further centralized powers, intensified fears of marginalization in Balochistan. The 1960s was also the period when the Baloch nationalist movement acquired its peculiar characteristics and developed sustainable resistance capacity. The 1973 constitution granted more powers to provinces than the previous constitutions and created constitutional arrangements for resolving interprovincial and centre-province problems. Baloch nationalists reluctantly accepted the autonomy granted under the 1973 constitution.19 However, when Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto tried to deny even that level of autonomy, the Baloch resented it vehemently. Bhutto dismissed the first-ever elected government of Balochistan and launched what was to become the biggest military operation in Balochistan. Bhutto’s brutal suppression of nationalist voices marked a turning point in the political history of Balochistan. It engendered serious disillusionment about parliamentary struggle and intensified separatist feelings among the Baloch people.

Baloch question post-Eighteenth Amendment 173 With the return of the military to power in 1977, the military operation ended and the nationalist leaders were released. Under the military rule, Balochistan largely remained calm as most of the nationalist leaders went into exile. With the restoration of democracy in the country in 1988, Baloch and Pashtun nationalists re-joined the political process and resumed their struggle for achieving provincial autonomy. By the late 1990s, the nationalists had become an entrenched part of the parliamentary process. In 1998, the Baloch, Pashtun, Sindhi and Seraiki nationalists joined forces and formed the Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement (PONM). The most important demand of the PONM was the reconstitution of Pakistan in line with the spirit of the Lahore Resolution of 1940, which had guaranteed maximum autonomy to the federating units.20 The federal government, however, did not give up the administrative approach to centre-province relations. In 1998, the then Chief Minister, Sardar Akhtar Mengal, resigned for not being kept in the loop over the nuclear tests carried out in Balochistan by Islamabad.21 General Pervez Musharraf ’s high-handed approach towards Balochistan marked yet another turning point in the history of Balochistan. He announced mega-development projects in Balochistan and did not heed the concerns raised by the Baloch nationalists. Nawab Akbar Bugti, a prominent Baloch leader, vowed to oppose any project launched without the prior consent of the Baloch people. A special parliamentary committee was formed to talk to Baloch leaders, review the situation in the fractious province and make recommendations.22 The committee members claimed several times to have held successful negotiations and broken the deadlock with the veteran Baloch leader.23 However, Musharraf disregarded the advice of the parliamentary committee and launched a military operation in Dera Bugti and the surrounding areas. The top brass of civilian leadership, including PML-Q leaders Shujaat Hussain and Mushahid Hussain Syed, and the then Director General of the ISI, General Ashfaq Kiyani, reportedly opposed the use of force against Bugti.24 Not surprisingly, Musharraf ’s view prevailed and hence one of the few prominent pro-federation Baloch leaders was finally killed on 26 August 2006. As if Bugti’s murder was not enough, the government refused to hand over Bugti’s dead body to his family and did not allow family members to attend the funeral.25 General Musharraf did not spare other notable Baloch nationalist leaders either. He implicated Sardar Khair Bakhsh Marri in a murder case. Akhtar Mengal was incarcerated and charged with treason and alleged abduction and torture of two Military Intelligence officials. He was denied basic legal and human rights and was made to stand in an iron cage during the in-prison court hearings.26 Moreover, in the post-Bugti period, the military, baffled by the ensuing turmoil, started a systematic campaign of abducting Baloch political activists.27 This eventually came to be known as the notorious Missing Persons saga. General Musharraf ’s interventionist and arbitrary policies reignited conflict and fundamentally altered the politics of Balochistan. He pushed the political situation of the province to almost a point of no return and caused irreparable damage to the federal integrity of the country. By killing Bugti, Musharraf not

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only elevated him to the pantheon of Baloch heroes and martyrs but also sparked an unprecedented wave of anti-Pakistan sentiments that in turn provided great impetus to the Baloch insurgency and the separatist cause. While Bugti was willing to hold dialogue with the federal government, the new cadre of Baloch leadership spurns dialogue and coexistence with the federation.

The Eighteenth Amendment After assuming power, the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) government formed a 27-member Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Reforms in 2009 to recommend a package of amendments for restoring the 1973 constitution to its original shape and intent. Members of the committee were drawn from all major political parties. Except for the Balochistan National Party (BNP-Mengal), all other major nationalist parties of Balochistan were represented in the committee. There was one member each from the National Party (NP), the PkMAP, the Jamhori Watan Party (JWP) and the Balochistan National Party (BNP-Awami). In an unprecedented display of political maturity, the committee produced a consensus draft bill that the National Assembly and the Senate passed unanimously on 8 and 15 April 2010 respectively. On 19 April 2010, the President signed the Eighteenth Amendment into law. The Eighteenth Amendment is widely considered as one of the most important milestones in Pakistan’s political history. Its major features are: • • • • • •

Restoration of the federal and parliamentary structure of the government as envisaged in the original constitution of 1973 Abolition of the concurrent list and re-invigoration of the Council of Common Interests (CCI) Enhancement of the powers of the Prime Minister and the Parliament Increase in the number of Fundamental Rights in the constitution (right to fair trial, right to education and right to information) Strengthening of the Election Commission of Pakistan Strengthening of the independence of the Judiciary through the introduction of a consultative and transparent mechanism for judicial appointments.

Abolition of concurrent list The Eighteenth Amendment fulfilled a long-standing demand of the smaller provinces pertaining to the abolition of the concurrent list. The concurrent list, which contained 47 subjects and had joint federal and provincial jurisdiction, has been abolished altogether. Out of the 47 subjects, one item has been shifted to the Federal Legislative List Part-I and two items have been moved to the Federal Legislative List Part-II. Other than these three entries, all other subjects previously in the concurrent list now fall under the jurisdiction of the provinces. The Federal Legislative List Part-I, over which the federal government has exclusive jurisdiction, has gone down from 59 to 53 entries. Similarly, the Federal

Baloch question post-Eighteenth Amendment 175 Legislative List Part-II has gone up from eight to 18 entries. Of these new entries, two have come from the abolished concurrent list, four entries have been shifted from Federal Legislative List Part-I and four new entries have been added.28 Matters within the Federal List-II fall under the domain of the CCI – the highest conflict-resolution body on disputes between the centre and the federating units. The CCI has been reinvigorated and its membership has been strengthened. The changes introduced by the Eighteenth Amendment have far-reaching implications for federation. First, the amendment has substantially enhanced the role of provinces in federal decision-making by expanding the Federal Legislative Part-II and strengthening the institutional mechanism regulating the affairs between the Centre and the provinces. Second, by abolishing the concurrent list and deleting certain items from the Federal Legislative Part-I, the Eighteenth Amendment has substantially increased the quantum of provincial autonomy.29 Provincial autonomy The Eighteenth Amendment has given provinces full control over social sectors such as education, health, population, labour, social welfare, Zakat, Auqaf, environment, tourism, print media and cinematograph films, culture and archaeology. For instance, provinces now have full control over the education sector. Though education was mainly a provincial subject previously, however, the overbearing role of the Centre in higher education, planning and syllabus design had significantly reduced the space for provinces. Now, federal government is only authorized to deal with international student exchange (Fed Leg List-I) and standards of higher education and research (Fed Leg List-II). Other than these two areas, provinces are solely responsible for the education sector. Besides, the insertion of Article 25A, which requires the state to provide free and compulsory elementary education, places additional responsibility on the provinces. The Eighteenth Amendment has enabled the provinces to introduce education policies that not only aim at imparting quality and market-oriented education but also reflect their real cultural and political history. This is important because the inclusion of the authentic history of provinces and their renowned personalities in the school textbooks has long remained a key demand of the Baloch and Pashtun nationalists. The later always complained that the state had been using curriculum not only to construct and propagate an “exclusivist” identity narrative but also to contaminate the minds of the younger generation about indigenous heroes and political leaders. Veteran leaders and freedom fighters who sacrificed their lives for today’s generation, the nationalists would lament, were portrayed as “traitors” in the Pakistani school textbooks. The Eighteenth Amendment has provided them with a rare opportunity to re-write history. Control over natural resources Control over natural resources has long remained an outstanding demand of Baloch nationalists. The Eighteenth Amendment gives provinces 50 per cent

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ownership of natural resources within their territorial boundaries. The amended Article 172 now means that the Balochistan government has an equal say in making decisions regarding its gas, copper and other natural resources. Additionally, the article declares that fish stock within territorial waters belongs to the provinces.30 Before the Eighteenth Amendment, the net proceeds of federal excise on natural gas were paid to the provinces but not on oil. Now, Article 161 has been amended such that the net proceeds of federal excise on oil shall also go to the province of origin. Similarly, the revision of Article 157 has made it obligatory for federal government to consult a provincial government before constructing hydroelectric power stations within its territory. Fiscal decentralization With the devolution of certain subjects to the provinces, the Eighteenth Amendment increased the revenue generation potential of provinces by empowering them to levy fees in respect of these subjects. These subjects include state lotteries, duties in respect of succession to property, estate duty in respect of property, and taxes on capital value of immovable property. The federal government was never able to generate meaningful funds from the above sources. Now, provinces have been given an opportunity to exploit their potential. Given its serious capacity constraints, the Balochistan government is unlikely to fully exploit these revenue-generation sources in the short and medium term. Additionally, the seventh National Finance Commission (NFC) Award recognized that tax on services is a provincial subject and may be collected by provinces if they so desire. The Eighteenth Amendment confirmed this right of provinces by excluding sales tax on services from the jurisdiction of the federal government. Finally, the Eighteenth Amendment permits provinces to raise domestic as well as foreign loans and issue guarantees subject to limitations specified by the National Economic Council. All of these sources, if utilized carefully and efficiently, have the potential to enhance the revenue-generating potential of provinces. Seventh NFC Award Another critical contribution of the Eighteenth Amendment was that it made the vertical resource distribution formula agreed upon in the seventh NFC Award irreversible. Article (3A) reads as follows: “The share of provinces in each Award of National Finance Commission shall not be less than the share given to the provinces in the previous Award.” Similarly, another clause [3(B)] subjected the award to regular monitoring by the federal and provincial governments. A brief summary of the unanimously agreed seventh NFC Award is germane to this discussion. The NFC awards design the formula for the distribution of resources between the federal and provincial governments and among the four provinces. Historically, the awards have been beset by deadlocks over both the

Baloch question post-Eighteenth Amendment 177 vertical and horizontal distribution formulae. Since 1971, there have been only three conclusive awards (1974, 1991 and 1997) and one presidential distribution order in 2007 prior to the seventh award. In all these four awards, the criterion for the distribution of the divisible pool among provinces was only population. As a result, the smaller provinces always suffered. With its meagre 5 per cent population but massive developmental challenges, Balochistan was the major victim of this unjust formula. Against this backdrop, the seventh NFC Award can be regarded as a landmark achievement as it altered both the vertical and horizontal distribution of resources in profound ways. Beginning with the former, the award allocated 56 per cent of the divisible pool to the provinces for the year 2010–2011 and 57.5 per cent from the financial year 2011–2012 onwards. Compared to the previous award, this award increased the share of provinces by 10 per cent. As far as the horizontal distribution is concerned, the award for the first time took into consideration factors other than population. The erstwhile population-based distribution criterion was broadened to include factors such as poverty, revenue generation, revenue collection and area. Balochistan was the biggest beneficiary of this new award. Its share in the provincial pool jumped to 9.09 per cent. Punjab was allocated a share of 51.74 per cent, Sindh 24.55 per cent and the NWFP 14.62 per cent. Whereas Balochistan’s share increased by 1.82 per cent, the shares of Punjab, Sindh and KPK dropped by 1.27 per cent, 0.39 per cent and 0.26 per cent respectively.31 Balochistan’s estimated share amounted to Rs.83 billion in the first year. The award guaranteed Balochistan the receipt of its projected sum and obligated the federal government to make up for the remaining funds in case of a shortfall. The award also revised the formula for the computation of gas development surcharge (GDS) on the demand of the government of Balochistan. The rate of excise duty on gas was increased from Rs.5.09 to Rs.10 per MMBTU. The new formula meant an additional increase of Rs.2 million per annum to Balochistan government. Moreover, the award also provided for the retroactive payment of GDS arrears to Balochistan on the basis of the new formula. These gains, nevertheless, were a bit offset by the abolition of the grants-in-aid to all provinces given under the previous award.32 Finally, another significant feature of the seventh NFC Award was the acceptance of provincial rights over revenue from General Sales Tax (GST) on services. Revenue from GST on services will no longer be a part of the federal divisible pool.

Conflict-pacifying impact of the Eighteenth Amendment The devolution of powers under the Eighteenth Amendment has affected the ethno-nationalist politics of Balochistan in diverse ways. Although it is a bit too early to accurately appraise these effects, some emerging trends can be identified. To begin with, a considerable degree of conflict-pacifying effect can be discerned, thus corroborating the view that decentralization defuses, if not resolves, ethnic conflict. This is demonstrated by an improvement in the levels of political

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participation, weakening of the ethno-nationalist narrative and increasingly profederation attitude of the moderate ethno-nationalists. Improvement in political participation There has been a qualitative and quantitative improvement in levels of political participation in the post-Eighteenth Amendment Balochistan. All major Baloch and Pashtun ethno-nationalist parties that had boycotted the 2008 general elections re-entered the electoral fold in the 2013 general elections. Having remained on the margins of political process since 2006, these parties began to shun political dormancy during the deliberations of the Parliamentary Committee on Constitutional Reforms that prepared the draft of the Eighteenth Amendment bill. When the 2013 elections approached, the Baloch ethno-nationalist parties – the BNP and NP – were under tremendous pressure from the hardliners and separatists to boycott the elections.33 Despite threats from militants and reservations about the military establishment’s continued meddling in political affairs, the nationalists decided to contest the elections. While there were multiple factors that shaped this decision, the devolution of powers combined with the relative democratic consolidation in the country served as great pull factors.34 The devolution of powers to provinces incentivized ethno-nationalist parties to re-join the electoral process and exercise the newly-devolved authority. Ethno-regional parties have traditionally found it easier to secure power at provincial level. The decision of the ethno-nationalists to participate in the elections appeared to receive endorsement from a significant segment of the population. The 2013 elections saw the highest voter turnout in Balochistan compared to the previous two elections (see Figures 10.1 and 10.2). The turnout was 43 per cent and 41 per cent in the national and provincial assembly elections respectively. Although 60

Percentage

50

National voter turnout Balochistan voter turnout

40 30 20 10 0

2002 elections

2008 elections

Figure 10.1 Voter turnout in national assembly elections (%). Source: The Election Commission of Pakistan.

2013 elections

Baloch question post-Eighteenth Amendment 179

2002 elections

2008 elections

2013 elections 0

10

21

31

41

51

Percentage

Figure 10.2 Balochistan assembly elections voter turnout (%). Source: The Election Commission of Pakistan.

it was still below the national average, turnout in the 2013 elections was a significant improvement over the turnout of the last two polls. Notwithstanding this improvement, the turnout was terribly low in some insurgency-hit areas in Southern Balochistan. Nevertheless, the low turnout areas were few in number. Out of the 51 provincial assembly constituencies, only five (10 per cent) experienced a voter turnout below 20 per cent. In 32 (63 per cent) constituencies, the turnout was above 40 per cent (see Figure 10.3). This rise in turnout was an indication of the increasing public confidence in federation and parliamentary politics. 10% 6%

63%

21%

0–20% turnout 20–30% turnout 30–40% turnout Above 40% turnout

Figure 10.3 Categorization of Balochistan assembly constituencies based on voter turnout. Source: The Election Commission of Pakistan.

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The re-entry of ethno-nationalists in the electoral arena and their subsequent formation of the provincial government also signify a qualitative shift in the politics of the restive province. In the 2013 elections, the Baloch and Pashtun ethnonationalist parties collectively secured 45 per cent of the total provincial assembly seats, the largest share grabbed by them in the last four general elections. In terms of support base and social composition, there is one key feature that makes these parties stand out from the traditional and religious parties such as the PML-N, PPP and JUI-F. Ethnic parties have a strong support base among a politically-conscious middle class comprising educated youth and professionals. This middle class often constitutes the “ideological core” of these parties. Ethnic parties are more deeply rooted and connected at the grassroots level compared to the state-wide parties. The voter base of ethnic parties is relatively wide and often transcends tribal loyalties. In contrast, the state-wide parties almost always comprise tribal chiefs and political turncoats with a personalized and narrow voter base. The state-wide parties have rarely been able to cultivate support among the common masses or establish a group of core supporters who subscribe to the party’s programme. Instead, they have often relied on the evergreen tribal chiefs and their individual support base. Conventional practices associated with brokerage and patronage define the modus operandi of the statewide parties in Balochistan. They do not have a meaningful organizational presence at the grassroots level. As a matter of fact, given Balochistan’s unique demographic features and Pakistan’s majoritarian federalism model, the statewide parties have very little incentive to make political investment in Balochistan. Balochistan has only 17 seats in an assembly of 342 members. The majoritarian institutional structure makes Balochistan the least rewarding political constituency for state-wide parties. This in turn has obstructed the rise in political competition and accentuated regional disparities. This has important political implications. First, the ethnic parties have furthered national integration by bringing a frustrated segment of the population, especially the educated middle class, closer to the government and connecting them to the state. Given that the contemporary Baloch insurgency also draws support from educated middle class,35 the ethnic parties are in effect shrinking the size of the pool from which the separatists draw support. In other words, by swaying the educated middle class towards parliamentary politics, the ethnic parties are stymying the growth of the secessionist movement. Second, owing to their peculiar composition and support base, ethnic parties, more than any other party, will have to contend with the aspirations of the middle class i.e. efficient and effective public service delivery, reduction of barriers to upward mobility within party and internal party democracy, and protection of core ideological interests of the party. The future electoral success of ethnic parties greatly depends on how they deal with these aspirations and pressures. Indeed, some shifts along these lines can already be discerned.

Baloch question post-Eighteenth Amendment 181 Weakening of ethno-nationalist narrative Since Pakistan’s creation, provincial autonomy has remained the most important irritant in centre-province relations. By devolving powers to the provinces, the Eighteenth Amendment addressed an issue that has been defining and shaping ethno-nationalist politics in Pakistan since its inception. The devolution of power combined with the passage of the seventh NFC Award have not only accommodated long-standing demands of ethnic minorities but also effectively reduced the range of issues to be politicized by ethno-nationalist parties. It has transferred the target of political mobilization from the centre to the provinces. In the new scenario, political parties, civil society organizations and the common public are focusing more on internal issues and the role of provincial government in exacerbating or resolving these issues. Consequently, the ability of ethnonationalist parties to politicize ethnicity and “otherize” the dominant ethnic group – the Punjabis – has been significantly constrained. In other words, these parties will find it increasingly difficult to evade their responsibility and deflect blame onto Islamabad. They can no longer secure electoral gains purely on the basis of an “anti-Islamabad” narrative. In the emerging political scenario, ethnonationalists will face stronger accountability and will be able to sustain electoral victories mainly through governance performance. It can be argued that devolution of powers has weakened the narrative of ethno-nationalist parties. Traditionally, ethnic parties sought support from their respective ethnic groups based on their claims of being the defenders of the rights of these groups. Under military and highly centralized civilian regimes, these parties often remained in opposition and championed the cause of smaller provinces and ethnicities within a radically restructured federal framework. Over the years, the non-recognition of their demands and the use of repressive tactics by successive governments enhanced their legitimacy and enabled them to claim a high moral ground before a domestic political audience. These parties mainly focused on ideological politics and did not pay meaningful attention to service delivery, arguing that the latter cannot be ensured without first achieving a significant degree of self-rule. In the post-Eighteenth Amendment period, these parties will have to deliver and perform in order to secure and sustain electoral gains. Cognizant of the changing political trend, the ruling ethno-nationalist parties in Balochistan have not only shifted attention to service delivery36 but also moderated their position and rhetoric on certain ideological issues. From issues concerning violation of the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment by federal government to grievances about the province’s share in the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, the ethnonationalist parties have avoided taking the hard line characteristic of them in the past. Similarly, Baloch nationalists have lately become relatively quiet on the military’s continued use of force against Baloch separatists. Lastly, the Pashtun ethno-nationalist party, PkMAP, has traditionally been opposed to recognizing the Durand Line as the international boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In the past, it had raised its voice against the Pakistani government’s

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proposal of fencing the porous border for curbing cross-border movement of militants. Recently, the Pakistani government dug a deep, long trench along the troubled border.37 Contrary to its previous vociferous resistance, the PkMAP maintained silence on the project. The above analysis does not imply that ethno-nationalist parties will not try to mobilize people along ethnic lines or resort to traditional anti-Islamabad or antiPunjab rhetoric. Instead, it suggests that these parties would find it increasingly difficult to secure electoral gains purely on these grounds. The politics of service delivery seems to be taking precedence and the ethno-nationalist parties will have to adapt to this changing reality if they want to succeed in the electoral arena. They will have to come up with new attractive political programmes to retain the support of voters. On the one hand, devolution of power to the provinces has weakened the narrative of ethno-nationalist parties; on the other hand, it has also promoted greater regionalization of politics not only in Balochistan but also in rest of the country. It has incentivized political parties with a particular regional base to think increasingly in terms of “regional interests”. While ethno-nationalist parties are self-confessed defenders of the rights of particular ethno-regional groups, the ostensibly non-ethnic and non-regional state-wide parties have also become increasingly “provincial” in their approach. The positions taken by the PTI regarding power outages and tariffs and the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor are indicative of an increasing regionalization of politics.38 Similarly, the PML-N and PPP have begun catering to their provincial base and are becoming increasingly inward looking. This chapter maintains that the regionalization of politics does not necessarily translate into a weakening of the federation. Especially from the perspective of smaller provinces, the increase in political protests along provincial lines acts as a stabilizing force rather than a disintegrating force. The fact that political parties from Balochistan and Khyber Pakhunkhwa have protested against what they satirically dub as the “China Punjab Economic Corridor”39 is indicative of their willingness to economically integrate in the federation and use non-violent parliamentary means for the pursuit of desired goals. Greater stake in federalism and democracy Lastly, decentralization has given ethnic minorities a greater stake in the maintenance of a democratic and federal Pakistan. Traditionally, ethno-nationalists from Balochistan have strongly opposed authoritarian regimes, which, they believe, are strongly linked with centralization of power and political exclusion of genuine representatives of people. The post-Eighteenth Amendment political dispensation was the closest, at least in theory, to what ethno-nationalists have been demanding since Pakistan’s independence. Therefore, it not only incentivized them to participate in the political process but also gave them a greater stake in the preservation of the political system. This was evident during the political crisis generated by the marathon sit-in of the PTI and cleric Tahirul Qadri’s group in Islamabad in late 2014. Baloch and Pashtun ethno-nationalists feared

Baloch question post-Eighteenth Amendment 183 that the crisis might derail democracy, which in turn would put the hard-won provincial autonomy in peril. Therefore, NP, PkMAP and ANP extended unconditional support to the ruling PML-N. In contrast, the MQM and Jamat-e-Islami seemed to be playing on both sides of the fence whereas PPP and JUI-F supported the government though not without conditions. It was a remarkable turnaround of history when the likes of Hasil Bizenjo and Mehmood Khan Achakzai, who had been branded as “traitors” in the past and whose ancestors had served long prison sentences for the same “crime”, wholeheartedly came forward in defence of democracy and parliament. While requesting the political forces to form a democratic front for safeguarding the country’s constitution and parliament, Achakzai warned that the federation’s existence would be endangered if democracy was derailed.40 The fact that Baloch and Pashtun nationalists extended unwavering support to a Punjabi Prime Minister to defend democracy reveals how the decentralized institutional structure may give ethnic minorities a higher stake in the preservation of the political system. Baloch and Pashtun nationalists tie the success of federalism with the consolidation of democracy in the country. Although democracy reinforces majoritarian federalism – a fact that does not necessarily augur well for smaller provinces – these nationalists nevertheless feel that they stand a better chance of renegotiating the rules of the game in a democratic set-up, however fragile it may be. They feel more comfortable in dealing and bargaining with the Punjabi civilian leadership compared to military leadership. Therefore, they seem willing to work under a majoritarian federation in a democratic set-up, hoping that one day they would be able to constrain the “majoritarian” aspect of Pakistani federalism through steps such as the enhancement of the powers of Senate. The Eighteenth Amendment has increased their stake in the federation and by extension in the preservation of the fledgling democratic set-up.

Major challenges in the post-Eighteenth-Amendment Balochistan Although the devolution of power has defused the ethnic conflict to a considerable extent, it has been unable to put an end to the conflict. A low-scale insurgency continues to threaten peace and stability in the province. A number of challenges continue to fuel sentiments of marginalization and deprivation among the masses. Persistence of repressive approach First, the policy of use of force against Baloch militants and political activists that has remained the key driver of conflict over the past decade has remained in place after the Eighteenth Amendment. The military and other security agencies are not subordinate to the civilian leadership. Though the nationalists-led civilian regime tried to assert civilian control over security agencies, it was able to secure only marginal gains.41

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Owing to its important geo-strategic location and vast natural resources, Balochistan is viewed by the military fundamentally through a security prism. Regional geo-politics shape the military’s opinion and policy regarding the restive province. It views the Baloch separatist insurgency as a conspiracy by hostile regional and extra-regional players to destabilise and disintegrate Pakistan. In their view, the Baloch nationalists are pawns controlled by foreign actors and therefore cannot be trusted to rule the province.42 Recently, increased regional and international interest in the Gwadar port and the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor has intensified fears of the army. It has often used aggressive tactics such as repression, political exclusion and co-optation to deal with the Baloch ethnic issue. It has demonstrated very low tolerance for assertive and independent civilian governments. It is not surprising that no civilian government in Balochistan has been able to counter the army’s narrative and approach. In the post-Eighteenth Amendment period, the military continued its repressive approach in dealing with the Baloch ethnic issue. Enforced disappearances of Baloch activists did not cease.43 In January 2014, the provincial government conceded before the Supreme Court that it was handicapped in recovering missing Baloch persons, arguing it had no effective control over the Frontier Corps (FC), which was accused of “detaining” these persons.44 The provincial government’s helplessness was palpably evident on the occasion of Dr Malik’s visit to the protest camp of the pro-independence Balochistan Student Organization Azad (BSO-A) activist Lateef Johar – who had gone on hunger strike after the abduction of BSO-A chairman Zahid Baloch. Unable to guarantee the recovery of the BSO-A student leader, the Chief Minister could not convince Lateef to call off his hunger strike. His words “I can’t make promises that can’t be fulfilled” succinctly explained the situation.45 The military continues to be the most powerful player in the fragile democratic set-up, exercising control over internal security and foreign policy.46 The only difference is that it now operates behind the façade of a civilian regime. This has adversely affected the legitimacy of the civilian government. The Eighteenth Amendment did not bring any significant practical change as far as the civil–military equation is concerned. Instead, over the past year, some degree of “authoritarian backsliding” has occurred as the military has gained new powers in the name of the renewed counter-terrorism drive.47 The National Action Plan (NAP) devised in the wake of the Peshawar incident has further tilted the balance of power in favour of the military. In this new scenario, with military courts operating, it has become increasingly difficult to scrutinize its policies in Balochistan and hold it accountable for its alleged repressive actions. Although the military continues to call the shots in Balochistan, lately the civilian leadership in Balochistan seems to have developed a good working relationship with the military. Political analysts and observers believe that this thaw in civil–military relations is primarily explained by what many consider a shift in the military’s traditional approach and attitude. To begin with, the military leadership has recently demonstrated higher tolerance for the relatively assertive nationalist leadership in Balochistan. While the pro-state tribal Sardars have

Baloch question post-Eighteenth Amendment 185 always remained the military’s favourites in Balochistan, the nationalists have historically been regarded as suspects and untrustworthy. In the past, both the civilian and military regimes have attempted to exclude them from the political process. The 2013 elections marked a fundamental change in this regard. For the first time, the nationalists not only won large number of seats but also formed the government without any major problem. For local analysts, this signalled a shift in the military’s approach towards Balochistan. They contend that the nationalists could not have formed a government without the tacit approval of the military.48 Some critics even claim that the victory of nationalists was possible only because of the active electoral manoeuvring by the military. While it is difficult to independently verify such claims, there is no denying that the military has developed a good working relationship with Baloch and Pashtun nationalists.49 Unlike in the past, the military has shown a higher comfort level with the nationalist-led government. Another instance of a change in military’s approach is their withdrawal of support from proxy groups. The current military leadership has not only withdrawn patronage but also reportedly cracked down on what Baloch nationalists dub as “death squads”. These were pro-state tribal and sectarian militias who specifically suppressed and eliminated pro-separatist and pro-nationalist voices in Baloch society. They were believed to be supported by the security agencies.50 In this regard, the most prominent name is that of Shafiq Mengal, the son of a former federal minister. Shafiq Mengal formed a pro-government tribal militia known as the Baloch Musallah Difaee Tanzeem (BMDT) in 2008. The group ostensibly aimed to protect the local population in Khuzdar and surrounding areas against attacks from Baloch separatist militants. It, however, soon came to be known for its ruthless decimation of not only Baloch nationalists but also journalists and civil society members.51 Mengal is also widely believed to be responsible for the mass graves that were discovered in the Tootak area of Khuzdar in January 2014.52 In an interview with the author, the provincial Home Minister, Sarfaraz Bugti, admitted that these proxies were created by the state agencies to tackle the growing threat from Baloch separatist militants. These proxies were created to supplement the coercive capacity of the state in the face of democratic pressures to curtail the role of army in Balochistan. Over the past couple of years, the military appears to have abandoned support to these groups. Lastly, the military has deepened and enhanced cooperation with the civilian government and civilian law enforcement agencies in dealing with Baloch insurgency and religious and sectarian terrorism. This cooperation has facilitated a much more harmonious and amicable relationship between the civilian and military leadership of the province.53 While the military has moderated its position vis-à-vis the pro-federation nationalists, it has taken an increasingly hard line against Baloch separatists. It has continued the use of brutal force against separatists and has apparently succeeded in improving the law and order situation. However, this improvement in security has happened at the cost of deepening of alienation among Baloch masses. Additionally, this approach has also adversely affected the legitimacy of

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the civilian government which is considered powerless to restrain the military. Finally, this aggressive approach has reduced the prospects of a political settlement to Baloch insurgency. Challenges to the implementation process The implementation of the Eighteenth Amendment is far from satisfactory. There are two main challenges to its effective implementation: prevalence of a “centralist” mindset in Islamabad and lack of capacity of provinces. The current federal government has been reluctant to devolve key subjects to the provinces, prompting experts to predict the “end of the devolution dream”.54 Other political experts believe that the ruling party has not yet internalized the intent of the amendment.55 The Balochistan government contends that a “centralist” mindset continues to prevail in the policy-making circles in Islamabad.56 The federal bureaucracy has also come under criticism for undermining the implementation of the Eighteenth Amendment. Main complaints advanced by the provinces include: •

•

A number of federal bodies that now fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of provinces have not been devolved. In this regard, the most prominent examples are the Employees Old-Age Benefits Institution (EOBI) and the Workers Welfare Fund (WWF ). Critics argue that the federal government is reluctant to devolve these because they are revenue-generating bodies. The mining sector too should have devolved to the provinces, but this has not happened.57 The Balochistan government has raised concerns about the composition of the Oil and Gas Development Company Limited (OGDCL) and Pakistan Petroleum Limited. The ownership of these corporations should have transferred to Balochistan proportionate to the province’s share in oil and gas production. However, this has not happened. There is a tussle between the provinces and the federal government regarding interpretation of Article 172(3) that establishes joint ownership rights of centre and provinces with regards to natural resources.58 This, combined with the protracted dispute over the Reko Diq project, has made many Baloch people think that the Eighteenth Amendment has failed to give them control over their natural resources. These fears have intensified recently with the development of the Gwadar port under the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) project. While the federal government is hopeful that economic activity created by CPEC will benefit local people and weaken support for separatism, locals do not share the government’s optimism.59 Concerned about the project’s political, economic and strategic arrangements, Baloch nationalists maintain that such developmental projects have historically “increased the oppression and isolation of the Baloch rather than providing them socio-economic development and integration”.60 Given the expected influx of skilled human labour with the development of Gwadar port, the Baloch see it as a serious demographic threat.61

Baloch question post-Eighteenth Amendment 187 •

•

The provincial regimes, including that of Balochistan, have also criticized the creation of new federal government ministries to carry out what the latter sees as its continued responsibilities in certain devolved fields such as higher education and Pakistan’s compliance with international agreements on health and human rights.62 The rule that the CCI should meet at least once every 90 days has not been followed.63

The implementation issues indicate that a de jure change in institutional structure is unlikely to produce the desired outcomes if it is not accompanied by a de facto change. Despite the de jure change, centralization has tended to persist because decentralization created losers – the federal bureaucracy and government – who are resisting the change and trying to reverse it. The winners of the game – provinces – are too poorly equipped, under-resourced and politically weak to translate the de jure change into a de facto change. Additionally, lack of capacity of provinces has also hindered the implementation of the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment. It would be fair to argue that the devolution of powers to provinces took place relatively abruptly and without any consideration for the capacity of the provinces to handle these powers. In the case of Balochistan, the capacity issue is particularly acute. Political elites not only lack the capacity to handle the devolved powers but have also demonstrated a lethargic attitude in operationalizing them.64 They have good intentions but little vision. They had been yearning for autonomy but never prepared themselves for responsibly handling it.65 The provincial bureaucracy is too poorly equipped and inexperienced.66 More importantly, the much-needed civil service reform has not taken place in the wake of the devolution of powers. Most importantly, although Balochistan was the first province to conduct local government elections, the provincial government has been reluctant to devolve powers and funds to the local government. Local bodies in Balochistan have protested against the lack of administrative and financial powers on a number of occasions.67 The above challenges to the implementation of the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment have delayed the expected trickle-down effect of devolution. Consequently, the common citizen has yet to see a drastic improvement in governance. No surprise that the socio-economic milieu continues to offer a fertile space for discontent and violence.

Conclusions The Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment addressed an issue that had remained the major irritant in centre-province relations since the creation of Pakistan. It has palliated the ethnic conflict in Balochistan to a considerable extent, thus substantiating the view that decentralization contains and dampens ethnic conflict. Nevertheless, continuity of a repressive approach in dealing with Baloch insurgency and ineffective implementation of the Eighteenth Amendment, owing to the prevalence

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of a “centralist” mindset in Islamabad and poor capacity of the Balochistan government, continue to stymie political and economic progress in the restive province. This chapter concludes with three major recommendations for improving the situation in Balochistan. First, the continuity and consolidation of democratic set-up is indispensable for the success of devolution introduced by the Eighteenth Amendment. Democratic consolidation will go a long way towards strengthening centripetal forces in Balochistan. Second, introduction of some sort of consociational power-sharing measures will be a great complementary measure to the territorial decentralization introduced by the Eighteenth Amendment. Although the rejuvenated CCI provides greater space to provinces to participate in federal decision-making, it is not enough to give Balochistan any meaningful role at the federal level given its unique demographic features. In order to give Balochistan a larger role at the federal level and to incentivize state-wide political parties to give it due importance, it is vital to enhance the powers of Senate and replace indirect election of Senators with direct elections. Lastly, steps should be taken for the capacity building of the provinces. In this regard, political parties, federal government and international donor agencies have an important role to play. Political parties from Balochistan in particular need to augment their technical capacity through recruiting professionals and technical people in their cadres.

Notes 1 For a thorough account of this debate, see Jan Erk and Lawrence Anderson, ‘The Paradox of Federalism: Does Self-Rule Accommodate or Exacerbate Ethnic Divisions?’ Regional & Federal Studies 19/2 (2009), pp. 191–202. 2 See Arend Lijphart, Democracy in Plural societies : A Comparative Exploration (London: Yale University Press, 1977); John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary (eds), The Politics of Ethnic Conflict Regulation (London: Routledge, 1993); Ted Robert Gurr, Peoples versus States: Minorities at Risk in the New Century (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2000); Nancy Ginna Bermeo, ‘The Import of Institutions’, Journal of Democracy 13/2 (2002), pp. 96–110. 3 See: Philip G. Roeder, ‘Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization’, World Politics 43/2 (1991), pp. 196–232. Eric Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies (Cambridge, MA: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1972). David A. Lake, D.A. and Donald Rothchild, ‘Territorial Decentralization and Civil War Settlements’, in P.G. Roeder and D. Rothchild (eds), Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars (London: Cornell University Press, 2005), pp. 109–132. 4 Arend Lijphart, ‘The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation’, American Political Science Review 90/2 (1996), pp. 258–268. 5 Nancy Ginna Bermeo, ‘The Import of Institutions’, Journal of Democracy 13/2 (2002), p. 108. 6 Donald L. Horowitz, Ethnic Groups in Conflicts (London: University of California Press, 2000). 7 Eric Nordlinger, Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies (Cambridge, MA: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University, 1972). 8 Philip G. Roeder, ‘Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization’, World Politics 43/2 (1991), p. 199. 9 Peter H. Schuck, ‘Citizenship in Federal System’, American Journal of Comparative Law 48 (2000), p. 212.

Baloch question post-Eighteenth Amendment 189 10 Dawn Brancati, ‘The Origins and Strengths of Regional Parties’, British Journal of Political Science 38/1 (2008), pp. 135–159. Also see Dawn Brancati, ‘Decentralization: Fueling the Fire or Dampening the Flames of Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism?’ International Organization 60/3 (2006), pp. 651–685. 11 Michael Hechter, Containing Nationalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 146. 12 Katherine Adeney, Federalism and Ethnic Conflict Regulation in India and Pakistan (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007). Mohammad Waseem, ‘Pakistan: A MajorityConstraining Federalism’, India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs 67/3 (2011), pp. 213–228. 13 See: Tahir Amin, Ethno-national Movements of Pakistan: Domestic and International Factors (Islamabad: Institute of Policy Studies, 1988). Adeel Khan, Politics of Identity: Ethnic Nationalism and the State in Pakistan (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2005). Feroz Ahmed, Ethnicity and Politics in Pakistan (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998). Farhan Hanif Siddiqui, The Politics of Ethnicity in Pakistan: The Baloch, Sindhi and Mohajir Ethnic Movements (London: Routledge, 2012). 14 Maryam S. Khan, ‘Ethnic federalism in Pakistan: Federal design, Construction of Ethno-linguistic Identity and Group Conflict’, Harvard Journal on Racial and Ethnic Justice 30/5 (2014), pp. 77–129. Yunas Samad, ‘Managing Diversity in Pakistan: Going Beyond Federalism’, Sustainable Development Policy Institute, Working Paper no 131, 2013. Muhammad Mushtaq, ‘Managing Ethnic Diversity and Federalism in Pakistan,’ European Journal of Scientific Research 33/2 (2009), pp. 279–294. 15 Mohammad Waseem, ‘Pakistan: A Majority-Constraining Federalism’, India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs 67/3 (2011), p. 218. 16 Asli O.P. Dogra, The Soldier and the Civilian: Conscription and Military Power in Turkey (New York University: Proquest Dissertation & Theses, 2007). Available at: http://search.proquest.com/docview/304842879 (accessed 3 June 2015). 17 Hasan Askari-Rizvi, ‘Federalism and provincial autonomy’, Daily Times, 1 March 2004. 18 Martin Axmann, Back to the Future: The Khanate of Kalat and the Genesis of Baloch Nationalism 1915–1955 (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 209. 19 It is believed that there was an unwritten understanding between the PPP government and the major opposition parties at the time of the approval of the constitution to review the distribution of powers between the centre and provinces after ten years. See: Hasan Askari-Rizvi, ‘Federalism and provincial autonomy’, Daily Times, 1 March 2004. 20 ‘Declaration of Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement’, in A democratic Pakistan: The Federation of Nations (Quetta: Pashtoonkhwa Milli Awami Party, 1998), p. 4. Also see Eva Cheng, ‘Pakistan: oppressed national groups struggle for autonomy’, Green Left, 15 May 2002. Available at: www.greenleft.org.au/node/27517 (accessed 10 April 2016). 21 Though the nuclear tests were the immediate cause of Mengal’s resignation, he also had differences with Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif over the improper allocation of funds derived from the exploration of natural gas in Balochistan. See: Christophe Jaffrelot, A History of Pakistan and its Origins (London: Anthem Press, 2004), pp. 30–31. 22 ‘Parliamentary panel on Balochistan formed’, Dawn, 30 September 2004. 23 ‘Balochistan deadlock ends, says PML leader: Shujaat meets Bugti’, Dawn, 25 March 2005. 24 Mushahid Hussain Syed, who was the chairman of one of the sub-committees on Balochistan and was actively involved in negotiations with Akbar Bugti, revealed this in a live television programme. The TV talk show is available at www.youtube.com/ watch?V=e6axnarybb8 (accessed 10 April 2015). 25 ‘Lonely burial for a Baloch leader’, BBC News Online, 1 September 2006. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/5304594.stm (accessed 20 March 2016).

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26 Ardeshir Cowasjee, ‘The man in the iron cage’, Dawn, 14 January 2007. 27 Iqbal Haider, ‘Balochistan: a thousand apologies are not enough’, The News International, 21 March 2012. 28 New entries in the Federal Legislative List-II include electricity, legal and medical professions, ports, census, national planning and economic coordination, public debt, education and research standards in higher education institutes, and inter-provincial coordination. 29 Pervez Tahir, ‘Does Amended 1973 Constitution Provide a Mechanism to End Corruption and Ensure Economic Security of Pakistan?’ in Maqsudul Hasan Nuri, Muhammad Hanif and Muhammad Nawaz Khan (eds), Eighteenth Amendment Revisited (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2011), pp. 110–128. 30 Pervez Tahir, ‘Does Amended 1973 Constitution Provide a Mechanism to End Corruption and Ensure Economic Security of Pakistan?’ in Maqsudul Hasan Nuri, Muhammad Hanif and Muhammad Nawaz Khan (eds), Eighteenth Amendment Revisited (Islamabad: Islamabad Policy Research Institute, 2011), p. 118. 31 ‘7th NFC Award signed in Gwadar’, Dawn, 31 December 2009. 32 Social Policy and Development Centre (SPDC), Annual Review 2011–12: Devolution and Social Development in Pakistan (Karachi: 2012), pp. 54–56. 33 Mahvish Ahmad, ‘As Mengal lands, pressure builds to boycott elections’, Dawn, 25 March 2013. 34 Personal interviews with: Nasrullah Zayrai (Member Balochistan Assembly); Dr Abdul Malik Baloch (Chief Minister Balochistan) on 18 March 2015 and Hasil Khan Bizenjo (Senator and President National Party (NP)) on 5 April 2015. 35 Mahvish Ahmad, ‘Balochistan: middle-class rebellion’, Dawn, 5 June 2012. Also see: Mahvish Ahmad, ‘The changing character of Balochistan’s separatist insurgency’, The Caravan, 1 July 2014. 36 Personal Interview with members of Balochistan Assembly: Nasrullah Zayrai. Sardar Raza Muhammad Barech (Advisor to the CM Balochistan for Education), 9 April 2015. 37 Qaiser Butt, ‘Cross-border movement: Ditch along Pak-Afghan border to cost Rs14 billio’, The Express Tribune, 3 January 2015. 38 ‘KP lawmaker threatens to move court against Centre’, The News, 27 January 2016. Also see: Zulfiqar Ali, ‘Khattak threatens “extreme step” ’ over CPEC project,’ Dawn, 1 January 2016. 39 Syed Irfan Raza, ‘Senators say CPEC turned into “China–Punjab” corridor’, Dawn, 24 November 2015. 40 Syed Ali Shah, ‘Derailing democracy will harm federation, says Mehmood Achakzai’, Dawn, 24 August 2014. 41 Personal interview with Dr Abdul Malik Baloch (Chief Minister Balochistan) on 18 March 2015. 42 Cyril Almeida, ‘Inclusive strategy, not army, will solve Baloch issue’, Sunday Guardian, 2011. 43 Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), Balochistan: Blinkered slide into chaos (Lahore: HRCP Fact-finding Mission, 2011). 44 ‘Balochistan govt tells SC it has no control over FC’, Dawn, The Express Tribune, 31 January 2014. 45 Rabia Ali, ‘Balochistan CM asks Lateef Johar to end strike’, The Express Tribune, 30 May 2014. 46 Aqil Shah, The Army and Democracy: Military and Politics in Pakistan (London: Harvard University Press, 2014). 47 Personal communication with Dr Ayesha Siddiqa (Academic and Political Analyst) on 15 May 2015. 48 Personal interviews with Dr Jehanzeb Jamaldini (Senator Balochistan National Party (BNP)) on 11 April 2015; Anwar-ul-Haq Kakar (political analyst) on 8 September 2014; Syed Ali Shah (local journalist) on 5 April 2015.

Baloch question post-Eighteenth Amendment 191 49 Personal interview with Dr Abdul Malik Baloch (Chief Minister Balochistan) on 18 March 2015 and interview with Hasil Khan Bizenjo (Senator and President, National Party) on 5 April 2015. 50 Hamid Mir, ‘Ak din Khuzdar mae (A day in Khuzdar)’, Jang, 4 March 2013. 51 Saher Baloch, ‘Mangled facts’, Dawn, 20 March 2014. Also see: Amnesty International Report, ‘ “A bullet has been chosen for you”: Attacks on journalists in Pakistan’, July 2014, p. 51. Available at www.amnesty.ch/fr/pays/asie-pacifique/pakistan/ docs/2014/journalistes-victimes-de-violences-et-d-assassinats/rapport-a-bullet-has-beenchosen-for-you-anglais-66-pages (accessed 28 March 2015). 52 Saher Baloch, ‘Mangled facts’, Dawn, 20 March 2014. Also see: Amnesty International Report, ‘ “A bullet has been chosen for you”: Attacks on journalists in Pakistan’, July 2014, p. 51. Available at www.amnesty.ch/fr/pays/asie-pacifique/pakistan/ docs/2014/journalistes-victimes-de-violences-et-d-assassinats/rapport-a-bullet-has-beenchosen-for-you-anglais-66-pages (accessed 28 March 2015). 53 Author’s interviews with Dr Abdul Malik Baloch (Chief Minister), 18 March 2015, and Sarfaraz Bugti (Home Minister), 19 March 2015. 54 Zafarullah Khan, ‘End of the Devolution Dream’, Newsline, 22 April 2015. 55 Afrasiab Khattak, ‘Internalizing Federalism’, The Nation, 30 May 2015. Personal interviews with Amjad Bhatti (National Technical Advisor, UNDP) on 11 April 2015; Dr Kaiser Bengali (Head of the Chief Minister Policy Reform Unit (CMPRU) & Advisor to CM Balochistan) on 7 April 2015. 56 Interviews with Dr Abdul Malik Baloch (Chief Minister Balochistan) on 18 March 2015 and Hasil Khan Bizenjo (Senator and President National Party (NP)) on 5 April 2015. 57 U.N.D.P. Pakistan, ‘Five years of the 18th Constitutional Amendment: Federalist imperatives on public policy and planning’, Development Advocate Pakistan 2/1 (April 2015), pp. 3–8. 58 U.N.D.P. Pakistan, ‘Five years of the 18th Constitutional Amendment: Federalist imperatives on public policy and planning’, Development Advocate Pakistan 2/1 (April 2015), pp. 3–8. 59 ‘Gwadar residents raise concerns over CPEC benefits’, The Express Tribune, 5 February 2016. 60 Sanaullah Baloch, ‘Another Kalabagh’, The News, 9 January 2016. 61 Shah Meer, ‘CPEC: A Bad Deal for the Baloch People’, The Diplomat, 30 December 2015. Also see: Jon Boone & Kiyya Baloch, ‘A new Shenzhen? Poor Pakistan fishing town’s horror at Chinese plans’, Guardian, 4 February 2016. 62 In 2013, a ministry for Education, Training and Standards in Higher Education was created with the aim to “establish the National Curriculum Council to introduce a syllabus with a minimum standard for all provinces”. This is in conflict with the amendment that clearly makes provincial governments the sole authority in the development of curriculum for primary and secondary education in their respective provinces. See: Umer Farooq and Muhammad B. Alam, ‘Centre of controversy’, Herald, 19 July 2013. 63 U.N.D.P. Pakistan, ‘Five years of the 18th Constitutional Amendment: Federalist imperatives on public policy and planning’, Development Advocate Pakistan 2/1 (April 2015), pp. 3–8. 64 Zafarullah Khan, ‘End of the Devolution Dream’, Newsline, 22 April 2015. 65 Interview with Sardar Raza Muhammad Barech (Advisor to Chief Minister Balochistan for Education), 9 April 2015. 66 Personal interviews with Naseebullah Khan Bazai (Additional Chief Secretary Planning and Development Department, Balochistan) on 9 April 2015 and Lal Jan Jaffar (Additional Secretary, Public Finance Balochistan) on 3 April 2015. 67 Saleem Shahid, ‘Balochistan’s local bodies seek financial, administrative powers’, Dawn, 10 June 2015.

11 The challenges of a resilient economy Rashid Amjad

Pakistan’s economic growth path has been cyclical, with periods of high economic growth followed by low growth and lacklustre performance. The causes of these stop-go cycles have been subject to much debate and interpreted differently in recent years. An important issue underlying this debate is why the economy has performed much better under periods of military rule than under civilian governments. It also raises the issue of whether the third government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif can finally break this cycle and show that civilian governments too are capable of providing economic leadership and prudent economic management that can shift the economy to a higher and sustainable growth path. This chapter looks at Pakistan’s growth patterns during successive periods since independence to explain how and why its economy has been resilient enough to absorb internal and external shocks. It underscores the comparative performance of the civilian and military regimes in terms of absorbing these shocks and sustaining growth even during times of economic recession, and concludes by assessing the viability of the current economic recovery plan and proposing a workable way forward. The relatively poorer economic performance of the civilian regimes is one instrument that the military has often used in the past to dictate or intervene in politics. In public perception as well, the comparatively better economic performance of the military regimes has been an important factor in undermining successive civilian rules. Moreover, the sustainability of the civilian rule is ultimately determined by its success in meeting basic public needs through effective governance and efficient management of the economy. Thus, how well the Sharif government performs in reviving and restructuring the economy may well dictate not just its own political future but also that of democracy in the country. Its efforts to revive the economy have produced some tangible results, but are they enough to realise sustained economic growth? Before we assess whether the present civilian era would or could be any different from previous ones in terms of performance, it is worth reviewing how the economy has evolved since independence and what lessons it entails for overcoming the current economic impasse.

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Past trajectory Pakistan’s economy has confounded its critics more than once by performing much better than expected, while at other times disappointing those who believed it could and should have performed far better than it did. Indeed, many observers had predicted that the economy would be unable to bear the shock of Partition in 1947 and soon collapse. Pakistan’s early economic performance was to prove them wrong. At the same time, those who in the 1960s had portrayed Pakistan as a model for economic development based on its impressive economic performance – long before Newly Industrialised Countries (NICs) such as South Korea – were disappointed when it subsequently failed to achieve sustained high economic growth. While it is true that Pakistan did not realise its earlier potential or replicate the stellar performance of the NICs, its growth performance averaging around 5 per cent between 1947 and 2014 is still respectable by developing countries’ standards. During 1960–1990, the Pakistani economy was among the top ten fastest growing economies of the world.1 Except for 1951, when it recorded a negative growth rate, the economy has always registered positive growth. The Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 was a defining moment in terms of its far-reaching impact on Pakistan’s growth prospects and structural transformation. It became a frontline state in the US-led jihad against the Soviets in Afghanistan. The 11 September 2011 terrorist attacks in the United States renewed Pakistan’s status as a frontline state in the US-led War on Terror. As a consequence, Pakistan has seen the rise of religious extremism, resulting in severe domestic insurgency and sectarian violence. These developments have played a major part in preventing the country from achieving sustained economic growth. Terrorism, largely as a consequence of Pakistan’s participation in the War on Terror, has incurred huge economic losses to the country. The economic revival efforts of the present civilian regime, as well as its two civilian and military predecessors, have to be assessed within this underlying constraining factor. The economy might have collapsed, had it not been traditionally resilient to withstand internally and externally driven shocks to the growth process. However, resilience of the economy – desirable as it may be – is by no means sufficient to overcome the daunting economic problems that have arisen over the years. There are major structural economic constraints that the present government has to overcome in order to revive the economy and achieve sustained growth. These constraints entail complex issues and critical questions, which form the basis of discussion in the pages ahead.

Why military regimes perform better Pakistan’s economic performance is generally divided into periods of relatively high growth (1960s, 1980s, and 2002–2007), which were also associated with military rule, and periods of low growth (1950s, 1970s, 1990s and post-2008), which coincided with periods of civilian or democratically elected governments.2

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The economic downturns were mostly triggered by the emergence of a foreign exchange constraint. This was eased considerably when military governments took over in situations where Western governments needed Pakistan’s support, which the military in power was both better able and willing to provide. It is, therefore, no coincidence that economic upturns and military rule coincided with major geopolitical developments: the Cold War between the West and the former Soviet Union in the 1960s (General Ayub Khan’s rule, 1958–1969); the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1988, which the US and other Western powers opposed by channelling arms and funds to Afghan resistance through Pakistan (General Ziaul Haq regime, 1977–1988); and the post-9/11 US-led NATO intervention in Afghanistan (supported by the General Pervez Musharraf government, 1999–2008). This classification of Pakistan’s economic performance into periods of military and civilian rule, and the explanation that better performance of the former can be traced to large doses of external assistance, is contested by Matthew McCartney.3 He identifies a different breakdown of the country’s economic performance by dividing it into three episodes of growth – 1951–1952 to 1958–1959, 1960–1961 to 1969–1970, and 2003–2004 to 2008–2009 – and two episodes of stagnation – 1970–1971 to 1991–1992 and 1992–1993 to 2002–2003. The early period of civilian rule in the 1950s is seen as a period of economic growth and structural transformation. Interestingly, McCartney does not see a break in the 1970s economic downturn until the early 1990s. More importantly, he finds no credible evidence for attributing Pakistan’s episodes of growth to increases in foreign aid inflows or to shocks emerging from the external economy. His argument is that even when Western aid was cut off or slowed down, Pakistan managed to turn to other countries, such as China after 1965 or Saudi Arabia and other donors in more recent years. McCartney’s view is that the role of the state, rather than external factors, was mainly responsible for Pakistan’s economic growth spurts and reversals. The state, according to him, creates conditions through its economic policies, which results in high profits, and then channels credit to the private sector to invest in these sectors or industries. This may be true, but we cannot overlook the role of growing foreign resource inflows in breaking or at least easing the foreign exchange constraint that Pakistan has periodically faced.4 There are, however, some important lessons to draw from McCartney’s analysis. If the role of the state is critical in creating conditions that are conducive to investment and growth, then clearly after the 1950s the military governments were relatively more successful in creating such conditions than their civilian counterparts. Other recent studies,5 focusing on growth patterns during 1960–2010, identify eight episodes of high growth of more than 5 per cent spanning 28 years in all, with an annual average of 7 per cent. The longest spurt extends over six years from 1978 to 1983. They also identify eight episodes of low growth of less than 5 per cent spanning 22 years in all, with an average growth rate of 3.3 per cent. The longest period in this case lasted seven years from 1997 to 2003. A 2013 World Bank report on economic growth in Pakistan points to increasing episodes

The challenges of a resilient economy 195 of short growth acceleration as well as the fact that growth expectations are becoming increasingly less optimistic.6 This is worrying, given the prevailing notion that developing countries need growth acceleration to stretch over a period of at least eight years in order to move onto a higher and sustained growth path.7 The above report further states that external shocks resulting in increased foreign resource inflows produce growth accelerations, which fizzle out when these inflows decline; and also that economic reforms remain a significant predictor of sustained accelerations. We can draw three conclusions from this analysis. First, the availability of external resources has played an important role in generating episodes of economic growth. This partly explains the better economic performance of military regimes, which had easier access to such resources. Second, economic reforms increase the efficiency and productivity of the economy by fostering foreign and domestic competition as well as through measures leading to better governance and economic management. This occurs in part when the arbitrary interference exercised through government controls is reduced, which accelerates economic growth. Again, there is evidence that military governments have been far more committed to and successful in implementing such reforms as compared to their civilian counterparts. Finally, the economy’s potential to accelerate economic growth has been reduced over time. This may be due to the economy becoming structurally more inefficient and hence the reforms needed become more severe and more challenging to implement. The traditional classification of Pakistan’s economic history into periods of military and civilian rule appears to have been replaced by new divisions and timeframes, which may be less conducive to the military’s relative strength in generating episodes of economic growth. Yet the fact remains that military regimes have traditionally been more successful in undertaking reforms and better utilising external resource inflows. The civilian rulers can defy this historical pattern by drawing up an economic reform and development agenda with clear timelines, and displaying the required political will and economic management skills to implement it. They can certainly count on the inherent resilience of the economy as a supportive factor in this regard.

Why the economy has been so resilient In media debates and academic analyses, Pakistan is generally portrayed as a country bordering on economic collapse. Its economy could have indeed performed much better if successive governments had overcome the various structural constraints. However, it is true that the country has often bounced back from economic downturns. It has achieved an average growth rate of around 5 per cent during 1947–2014 and only once in these 67 years registered a negative growth rate. An important dimension of the economy that is not sufficiently recognised is its resilience against internal and external shocks, which becomes clear from analysing its response to four major structural and external shocks: the Partition of 1947; the 1971 dismemberment of East Pakistan; the Soviet

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intervention in Afghanistan in 1979; and the 2001 US-led NATO intervention in Afghanistan. In the first period following independence in 1947, there was considerable scepticism about Pakistan’s economic viability as a newly born state. The country hardly had any industries, and its main raw materials, jute and cotton, were processed in factories in neighbouring India. It also lacked a functioning government structure, including key financial institutions. The formative years were made more difficult when Pakistan refused to devalue its currency. Finally, India cut off all trade relations and refused to pay higher prices for Pakistani raw material exports. Consequently, the country faced a negative growth rate during the 1950–1951 financial year. The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 provided the much-needed relief, as global prices of Pakistani raw materials jumped up. When the war ended and foreign exchange reserves declined, the government imposed barriers on the import of manufactured goods. Perhaps mindful of its over-reliance on India, Pakistan embarked on a drive for consumer-good-led industrialisation, mainly in textiles. It was extremely successful in doing so, as traders who had made high profits during the Korean War boom shifted their surplus into setting up new industries. This also promised a high rate of return, given that there was no external competition. The government also played an important role in setting up industries, especially jute and sugar, which were then sold to the private sector. The State Bank and other financial institutions were established, the existing infrastructure upgraded and new infrastructure built. Four factors explain why Pakistan was able to cope so well with the formidable economic challenges it faced as a new country: a competent, committed and honest bureaucracy; a large number of migrants that included well educated professionals who played a vital role in strengthening civil services and setting up and managing the financial structure; a class of dynamic entrepreneurs, many of whom had migrated from India, mainly from the Memon, Bohra, and Khoja communities, and settled in Karachi; and the availability of external funding at concessional terms to finance much-needed public infrastructure.8 The second period beginning with the separation of East Pakistan in 1971 saw the PPP regime of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto adopt radical economic reforms, which helped the country absorb the shock of dismemberment. For West Pakistan, East Pakistan had served as a major destination for exports and a valuable source of foreign exchange earnings. However, over the years, a major drain of economic resources from East to West Pakistan had occurred. This included foreign exchange earnings from jute, which was grown and manufactured in the eastern wing. Growth rates had plummeted to less than 1 per cent during the civil war and military action. Yet the economy recovered in the first three years of the Bhutto government and posted a healthy growth rate of over 5 per cent. The government also devalued the currency and removed the multiple exchange rate system, which helped in diverting the exports to new markets. The key indicators of economic performance9 during this period were as follows: first, in the initial two years, the economy was successfully rehabilitated and structural economic reforms undertaken. This included the nationalisation of

The challenges of a resilient economy 197 banks and selected industries, land reforms and more secure tenancy arrangements, and labour laws that strengthened workers’ rights, including the right of association. Second, the increase in the prices of agricultural products helped in removing the earlier pro-industrial bias in policymaking. The resulting incentive structure improved terms of trade for the agriculture sector. Third, although this factor later proved costly, the economy moved towards a more balanced industrial sector by setting up heavy industries, such as the Karachi Steel Mill and Taxila Heavy Mechanical Complex, mainly in the public sector to remove the earlier thrust on consumer goods industries set up by the private sector. Fourth, the government was instrumental in sending a large number of workers abroad, mainly to the Middle East, by making it much easier to obtain passports. A significant increase in foreign remittances and valuable foreign exchange was generated later. Finally, the above measures brought about a fundamental change in the attitudes of the working class, which became more conscious and assertive of its rights. On the whole, therefore, the economy adjusted well to the shock of losing the captive eastern wing market. It was able to generate exports to replace the more easily available foreign exchange from exports produced by the former eastern wing. That the economy was unable to move onto a higher growth path in later years under the PPP government can be attributed to several factors: poor economic policies, made worse by the oil price shock of 1973; the floods of 1974; and, most importantly, the drastic fall in private investment that resulted from the loss of business confidence following the nationalisation of selected industries and the government’s pro-labour stance. The third period, beginning with the 1979 Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and followed by a devastating Afghan civil war that continued well into the 1990s, had a far-reaching impact on Pakistan’s economy and the pace, structure and direction of its future growth. In particular, it led to the militarisation of large parts of the country, including the industrial and commercial hub of Karachi. Arms were freely sold and bought in a country where the availability of weapons had been strictly regulated and very few people outside the tribal belt owned firearms. This resulted in a sharp deterioration in law and order, seriously eroding the writ of the state in large parts of the country. Various armed militant extremist groups emerged not only in the regions bordering Afghanistan but also in areas such as southern and central Punjab where they had not existed earlier. These developments saw the rising incidence of kidnappings for ransom, the spread of violent crime, and increasing acts of sabotage and suicide bombings. It did not take long for foreign investors and even local investors to see Pakistan as a dangerous country for investment. Although the economy showed steady growth in the early 1980s, resulting from increased aid inflows, the high level of remittances, and spillovers from large expenditures incurred by the US and Western powers, the overall costs of the Afghan civil war were very high in terms of Pakistan’s medium- to longterm growth prospects. First, Pakistan lost out on the rising tide of globalisation that started in the mid-1980s and enormously benefitted regional powers like

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China and India.10 The economic policymakers led by Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who served as Finance Minister in the Zia regime, delayed instituting the economic reforms, as foreign inflows at concessional terms were more easily available. In this sense, the 1980s turned out to be a ‘lost economic decade’ for the country. Second, the inflow of 3.2 million refugees from Afghanistan posed daunting social and economic problems. While many stayed in refugee camps, a large number made their way to Karachi, which had earlier attracted labour from Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province and Tribal Areas. Soon, Karachi became the world’s largest Pashtun city after Peshawar.11 This heightened ethnic and sectarian tensions, and resulted in violent strife and turf wars from which the city is still suffering. Third, there was a large increase in military expenditure during the 1980s, while state expenditure on social sectors remained abysmally low. The fourth period, starting with the events of 9/11 and Pakistan’s renewed strategic significance for the US as a result, has seen an initial surge in economic growth followed by a period of stagflation – low growth and high inflation – that began in 2007–2008 and continued into 2013–2014. The boom years between 2002–2003 and 2006–2007 were a result of increased foreign aid inflows, sizable debt relief, a substantial increase in public investment, and a revival in business confidence. Both the manufacturing sector, including exports and services sector, performed well. The agriculture sector’s performance was mixed but the country remained food self-sufficient. However, the cost to the economy and security increased manifold, as the Musharraf government turned against its former allies, the Afghan Taliban, even while providing refuge to their leaders. This spurred the emergence of the Pakistani Taliban, whose insurgency and terrorism in the past decade have incurred irreparable material and human loss as well as seriously undermined the law and order. The Economic Survey of Pakistan 2013–2014 estimated the economic cost of the war in Afghanistan since 2001 at $102.5 billion,12 especially due to the loss of infrastructure, businesses, exports, domestic and foreign investment and industrial output. Energy shortages have shaved off almost 2 per cent of GDP in terms of loss of production in recent years, although this cannot be attributed directly to the war in Afghanistan but rather to poor economic management during the last years of the Musharraf government and thereafter. However, losses sustained by the country due to the Afghan war have gradually come down – standing at $6.7 billion in 2003–2014 as compared to $3.3 billion or one-third less than the previous fiscal year – highlighting a gradual recovery.13 Conforming to the previous pattern, in the post-9/11 era, the economy has remained resilient during years of low growth and high inflation from 2007–2008 to 2012–2013. It displayed dynamism in terms of the growth of major sectors, including the agricultural and rural economy, services, the informal economy, and parts of the large undocumented economy. This was spurred by several factors: the growth-friendly policies of the PPP government, which raised the procurement prices of agricultural goods, especially wheat; large inflows of foreign remittances, which increased from around $1.5 billion in 1999–2000 to over $14 billion in 2012–2013, accounting for almost 7 per cent of GDP; and

The challenges of a resilient economy 199 spillovers from large expenditures incurred by the US and its Western allies in Afghanistan – around $16 billion in 2011–2012, of which slightly less than half was allocated to the development and civil works.14 Other factors contributing to economic resilience include the youth bulge.15 Pakistan is experiencing a demographic transition, with many young people entering the labour market or finding jobs overseas. More and more young educated women are also joining the workforce and finding jobs mostly in the services sector, although their overall labour force participation rate remains very low at just over 20 per cent. There has also been a shift in the growth pole from Karachi to northern and central Punjab, where the interaction of growth in agriculture, light engineering and high remittances has resulted in a vibrant growth triangle enveloping major cities. This dynamism of the economy in recent years has been evident from the movement and performance of some key economic variables: first, despite low economic growth, consumption levels have grown faster. This reflects not only the fact that a larger portion of national output is being consumed rather than invested, but also that a large part of foreign remittances and income generated from undocumented economy, estimated at 80 to 90 per cent of the documented economy, is driving the higher levels of consumption.16 Second, the high levels of consumption are reflected in the high profitability ratios of food industries quoted on the Karachi Stock Exchange since 2009 as well as the high profits of foreign companies such as Pepsi, Unilever and Nestle, whose profits and sales have grown between 15 and 20 per cent per annum in this period.17 Third, poverty levels have declined. The income of around 11,000 rupees per month for a six-person household declined from over 30 per cent in 2000–2001 to around 17.2 per cent in 2007–2008 and further to 12.4 per cent in 2010–2011. The declining pattern in poverty levels has persisted since 2010–2011.18 Fourth, there is an emerging middle class whose share of the total number of households increased between 2007–2008 and 2010–2011 from 18.8 per cent to 24.2 per cent, based on a strict definition of the middle class, or from 34.6 to 42.9 per cent, based on an expanded definition.19 A recent Asian Development Bank study20 has shown that, in 2005, the percentage of total households living on $2 to $4 per day in Pakistan was around 32.94 per cent as compared to 20.45 per cent in India the same year. The proportion of people living on $4 to 10 was 6.56 in Pakistan as compared to 4.15 per cent in India. The annual sale of around 1.7 million motorcycles a year in 2013 points to an emerging middle class as do the rising sales of many consumer durables. A final reason explaining the economy’s resilience in surviving recent economic downturns is that real wages of agricultural workers and people employed in the services sector have increased.21 Pakistan also has a very high tele-density: in July 2013, the number of mobile phone users in the country was estimated at 125 million out of a population of 180 million.22 Several conclusions can be drawn from this discussion. First, despite having been buffeted by internal and external shocks, largely as a result of the neighbourhood in which Pakistan is located, the economy has displayed a robust

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capacity to absorb these pressures rather than derail or collapse. Second, the economy may have weathered the devastating shocks from successive wars in Afghanistan, but this has certainly impaired its capacity to regenerate sustained higher growth. Third, the economy’s resilience to shocks depends increasingly on external factors such as the manifold increase in foreign remittances, which currently account for just over 6 per cent of GDP.23 This is worrying, because the economy is vulnerable to changes in remittance inflows. There is no real guarantee that these inflows will remain continuous or necessarily rise. Thus, while resilience has been an important feature of the economy in difficult times, merely finding solace in this factor may not be enough to tackle persisting economic challenges.

How to break out of the economic impasse Not only does Pakistan need to break out of the current stagflation, it must also move onto a higher, sustained and inclusive growth path. Despite impressive growth performance in previous periods, its record in developing human resources has been extremely poor, which points towards a case of economic growth without development. A major factor that has seriously dampened the country’s growth performance has been the continuing high growth rate of the population, at 2.1 per cent.24 This is the highest in South Asia and among the highest in the developing world, with the exception of countries in the Middle East and sub-Saharan Africa. Pakistan has thus failed to reap the demographic dividend – unlike the East Asian countries as well as India and Bangladesh, where marked decline in population growth has been an important factor in spurring higher growth.25 The exceptionally high growth rate of the population has resulted in a continuing high growth rate for the labour force, which is estimated at 3 to 3.5 per cent.26 This implies that the economy must grow by at least 7 to 8 per cent, based on the historical elasticity of employment growth to GDP growth, to absorb new entrants into the labour force. It must grow even faster to reduce the high level of unemployment and underemployment. The growth of the informal economy and overseas migration has blunted to some extent the pressures on the labour market, but the emerging youth bulge, if not productively and remuneratively employed, could seriously threaten the existing and already fragile socioeconomic fabric. The continuing energy crisis, resulting in daily power outages of between eight and 12 hours in urban areas and 12 to 16 hours in rural areas, especially in the summer, has also shaved off an estimated 2 per cent of annual GDP growth.27 Basic mistakes made in the past such as the increasing reliance on oil- and gaspowered energy plants in the 1990s, when the price of oil was relatively low and indigenous gas abundantly available, have resulted in an economically unaffordable energy supply structure. This is because oil prices had until recently increased tenfold, while indigenous gas reserves have been almost depleted because of negligence in selling them at throwaway prices. Unsurprisingly, a

The challenges of a resilient economy 201 major factor in the PPP’s defeat in the 2013 elections was its dismal performance in reducing power outages. The significant fall in oil prices since late 2014 has, indeed, helped the present government to ward off public criticism of its economic performance. However, until major new energy projects become operational, the energy crisis will continue to haunt the PML-N regime. At the heart of the current economic impasse has been the sharp decline in recent years in the levels of investment, which were ever high even historically, to 12 and 14 per cent in 2012–2013 and 2013–2014 respectively. Both private and public investments have declined, the former as a result of uncertain conditions and energy shortages, and the latter due to resource crunch.28 A sustained economic revival would need investment levels to return to their earlier high of around 25 per cent; but if the economy is to generate growth at 7 to 8 per cent, then investment levels would need to rise to and be sustained at 30 to 35 per cent of GDP. Public investment needs to increase from its current low level of around 3 to 4 per cent of GDP to 7 to 8 per cent, given the growing gaps in physical infrastructure and badly needed investment in education and health. A major part of this investment needs to be undertaken by the provincial governments whose share of government revenues has increased significantly after the seventh National Finance Commission Award. Their responsibilities have increased, especially in the development of human resources, following the Eighteenth, Nineteenth and Twentieth Constitutional Amendments, which have devolved these areas from the federal government’s Concurrent List to the provinces. A major structural constraint is Pakistan’s poor export performance and its failure to take advantage of rapid globalisation unlike the NICs, China and, in the last decade, India. The share of exports in GDP has remained stagnant at around 10 per cent. This poor performance has been a major factor in triggering recurring foreign exchange crises and compelling the government to resort to the IMF for assistance to avoid defaulting on foreign loans. Low levels of investment, outdated technology, and the lack of an educated and skilled workforce have contributed to Pakistan’s loss of global competitiveness. Moreover, the overall security situation and fear of terrorist attacks, even if vastly exaggerated, have driven away not just foreign investors but also foreign buyers. Steady growth in economy requires a secure environment as well as a stable political situation. The political instability caused by protests, rallies and sit-ins in Islamabad in late 2014 did cause enormous economic loss to the country, estimated by the government to be around $4 billion in losses.29 Another key barrier to sustained growth and the government’s ability to invest in physical infrastructure and human capital is Pakistan’s very low tax-toGDP ratio. At less than 10 per cent, it is far below the required 17 to 20 per cent – the average for fast-growing developing countries including India. The low tax-to-GDP ratio has translated into recurring high fiscal deficits, resulting in inflation and pressure on the current account deficit. This is clearly an area in which both military and civil governments have failed, mainly due to the lack of political will and strong vested interests, especially among the agriculture lobby, which has not allowed any direct taxation on agricultural incomes, and a strong

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middle class-led business community, which either avoids falling within the tax net or grossly under-declares its earned income. While extreme poverty may have declined, it still remains high in certain regions, especially in rural Sindh and southern Punjab. Using a slightly higher poverty line puts a major proportion of the population below it.30 Pakistan’s greatest weakness in terms of development performance is its very poor human development indicators. A glaring reflection of this is that the country was unable to achieve many of the Millennium Development Goals in 2015. These shortfalls are especially severe in female education, child mortality rates, and malnutrition and stunting among children. In terms of physical infrastructure, and notwithstanding the urgent need to resolve its growing energy shortfall, Pakistan must invest heavily to increase the availability of groundwater if it is to meet rising demand and rehabilitate the Indus irrigation system, which is the “strong heart of the country’s economy”.31 This will require increasing its storage capacity and building two large dams on the Indus, which has not happened thus far due to political differences. Pakistan’s major economic challenges thus encompass the following: regaining macroeconomic balance and ensuring macroeconomic stability, breaking out of the current stagflation, reigniting growth, reintegrating itself with the global economy and increasing its share of global markets, overcoming energy and water shortages, and most importantly improving its poor human development indicators. Overcoming these challenges requires action in the following areas: renewing confidence in the economy at the national, regional and global levels to attract domestic and foreign investment in key sectors; prudent macro-management and removing the current disconnect between fiscal, monetary and development expenditures; remaining focused on resolving the energy crisis and prioritising the use of limited resources, especially in developing an educated and skilled workforce; shifting the economy from consumption-driven growth to exportand investment-led growth; and setting up transparent mechanisms and putting in place competent managers who can ensure timely, cost-effective delivery while ensuring quality.

Can the Sharif government turn the economy around? The PML-N government came to power by declaring that economic recovery would be its key priority. The emerging signs on the whole have been mixed, but there is real cause for concern. To start with, the government’s basic approach has been to rely on external funding to solve pressing economic problems – a route taken by its predecessors with little success. On coming into power, its first step was to go to the IMF and enter into an agreement for a loan of $6.6 billion under the Extended Fund Facility (EFF ) to restore macroeconomic stability and release pressure on foreign exchange reserves, which had fallen to low levels, raising the possibility of a default on external debt repayments.32 Later that year, it raised $2 billion from the Euro bond market at very high interest rates of

The challenges of a resilient economy 203 around 8 per cent when even countries such as Greece have borrowed at half that rate. In February 2014, Saudi Arabia loaned $1.5 billion to Pakistan to help Islamabad shore up its foreign exchange reserves, meet debt-service obligations, and undertake large energy and infrastructure projects.33 A year later, the Obama Administration proposed to provide $1 billion in US civilian and military assistance to the country.34 It also raised around $1.2 billion with the sale of 3G and 4G licences and another $350 million by divesting its shares in United Bank Limited.35 The Sharif government has trumpeted each of these steps as a major feather in its cap. It has claimed that these measures – by increasing foreign exchange reserves from around $6 billion in May 2013 to $9.5 billion in July 2014 – have eased the foreign exchange situation, thus reducing pressure on the exchange rate and restoring donors’ confidence in its capacity to service debts. If we include foreign exchange holdings by private banks, these reserves stood at $14 billion in 2014 as compared to around $10 billion in the previous year.36 In 2015, they had grown further by well over $3 billion. The problem per se does not relate to asking the IMF for support or to some of the measures listed above. The real question is a more fundamental one. IMF borrowing comes with severe conditionalities to implement reforms: the government must agree to restore macroeconomic stability and revive economic growth. Will the Sharif regime be able to deliver on the reform measures it has agreed to with the IMF as part of the loan agreement? Will it be in a position to pay back the $6.6 billion when repayments become due after three years? Will it once again run to the IMF for another loan to pay off this one, just as it did for the IMF loan taken by the previous PPP government? Will the government keep selling its assets to raise foreign exchange as a way of bolstering foreign exchange reserves? Will it keep hoping that some friendly country will make it a generous present to stabilise the exchange rate? So far, the agreement with the IMF is holding. But the list of waivers on agreed actions is getting longer and causing the IMF concern. These include, among others, reducing energy subsidies, restructuring and privatising public sector enterprises, and granting autonomy to the State Bank.37 The government has already retreated on the strong measures it had promised to bring the large number of tax evaders into the tax net. Progress on abolishing the use of Statutory Regulatory Orders (SROs) to give arbitrary concessions to domestic producers by restricting imports and distorting the tariff structure is still caught up in the bureaucratic labyrinth rather than being translated into any concrete action. This is a road Pakistan has taken many times before. We can only hope that this time things will be different and the government will sooner rather than later build up the courage to take badly needed action. Let us now turn to the government’s approach to the energy crisis, which was a major cause of the PPP government’s debacle in the May 2013 general elections and of the premature termination of the last IMF agreement in the winter of 2011. On taking office in May 2013, the Sharif regime decided to pay off a substantial part of the circular debt owed to private power producers so as to

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increase energy supplies. Unfortunately, it did this by the old-fashioned practice of borrowing from the State Bank. This resulted in raising the fiscal deficit in June 2013 from an expected 7 per cent to 8.5 per cent of GDP.38 The government conveniently blamed this high fiscal deficit on its predecessor. This was a classic case of being clever and not wise: it was not a permanent solution to the problem of circular debt or the energy crisis. After a few months, during which the economy certainly benefitted from greater availability of power, the circular debt reappeared and the economy returned to long power outages and falling production. However, the real solution to increasing energy supplies in the short term is a challenging one. It entails moving simultaneously on a number of fronts. Such measures would include the unpopular step of reducing subsidies while protecting low-income consumers and raising energy prices to cover costs; firm action to reduce power theft and other leakages; and appointing competent managers instead of political favourites to improve the efficiency and performance of power generation and distribution companies. On all these fronts, progress has been slow. The present government, like previous ones, has promised more action on these fronts in future. But is this being said merely to placate donors, or is there a real blueprint of action with firm timelines that the government plans to follow seriously? However, this is not to suggest that the PML-N government is either unaware or not giving priority to resolving the energy crisis – at least in terms of promises and plans. In August 2013, soon after taking power, it announced a new energy policy with a detailed analysis of supply and demand projections, expected shortfalls, and measures to overcome them in the short, medium and long term. After many visits and negotiations, it has reached an agreement with China for financial and technical support to generate 22,000 MW of electricity costing around $22 billion over the next ten years.39 The government has started implementing plans to build two major dams – Diamer-Bhasha and Dasu – simultaneously, for which it has been promised part funding by the World Bank and other donors.40 The total amount needed will be very large: around $30 billion over the next ten years. All these planned actions will, therefore, take time to materialise and, that too, only if they are translated into concrete running plants that can generate electricity at affordable prices. As per the government’s claim, the economy grew by 4.1 per cent during its first year in office, and that this was the highest growth rate achieved in the last five years.41 However, a 4 per cent growth rate should hardly be a cause for celebration. Even if it is slightly lower in the revised estimates, it makes little difference to the stark reality that the economy remains steeped in stagflation. Even more worrying is that investment in 2013–2014 remained abysmally low at 14 per cent of GDP, with little recovery from last year’s level of around 13 per cent.42 However, a positive clue from this growth performance is that at least it did not plunge to negligible levels as it had done twice before, in 2000–2001 and 2008–2009, when previous government entered into agreements with the IMF. This happened because the economic team that negotiated the EFF loan

The challenges of a resilient economy 205 agreement was able to persuade the IMF to agree to a more gradual compression of aggregate demand, mainly through a more gradual reduction in the budget deficit. Yet the government takes some credit for the economy’s new stability. Foreign exchange reserves have more than doubled, to $17.7 billion. Electricity tariffs have been raised, and some unpaid bills collected, easing the cash burden on hard-pressed distribution companies. Tax receipts have risen, albeit from pitiful levels, in response to efforts to broaden the base and cut exemptions. Consumer prices rose by 2.5 per cent in the first three months of 2015, the smallest increase for more than a decade. Twice already the same year, the Central Bank lowered its benchmark interest rate. Consequently, the IMF reckons that the economy will grow by 4.7 per cent in 2016, the fastest rate in eight years. A fall of two-fifths in the oil price is a huge slice of luck for a country such as Pakistan, which relies on imported fuel oil for two-fifths of its power supply and is prone to periodic balance-of-payments crises. If oil prices stay low, Pakistan could save a total of $12 billion in the next three years, says the IMF. The money could be spent on things with more local content and give the economy a lift.43 That said, moving the economy onto a higher growth trajectory under an IMF programme with its stringent conditions will be a challenging task. What measures could then help revive growth? In the immediate future, given the underused capacity of the economy, its better utilisation, especially by increasing the power supply, could lead to a significant increase in production levels. Some of the measures outlined earlier could increase economic growth by almost 2 per cent. The grant of GSP-plus status by the European Union in 2014 also has a considerable potential in boosting exports and pushing up economic growth. Unless the EU’s concerns about Pakistan’s decision to resume the death penalty after the terrorist attack in Peshawar in December 2014 disrupt the new economic opening, an annual increase of between $700 million and $1 billion in exports is projected. The government announced a 15 per cent increase in textile exports in July 2014, primarily due to the availability of this facility.44 In April 2015, China and Pakistan launched a plan for energy and infrastructure projects in Pakistan worth $46 billion, linking their economies and underscoring China’s economic ambitions in Asia and beyond. These projects, concluded by Chinese President Xi Jinping with his Pakistani counterpart during his visit to Islamabad, are part of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor between Pakistan’s southern Gwadar port on the Arabian Sea and China’s western Xinjiang region.45 The economic corridor with China and the EU’s GSP-plus status denote meaningful signs and, if carried through with concerted effort, they could bear considerable fruit. The real positive attribute that this government needs to capitalise on is the groundswell of confidence – the “feel-good factor” – it has generated among businessmen and producers (whether large, medium, or small) as well as investors ever since coming into office. There is little doubt that this government, in stark contrast to its predecessor, generates confidence in the private sector. The real challenge now is for it to help translate this sentiment – which remains

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largely unaffected by political instability caused by late 2014 protest marches – into concrete investments that will generate job opportunities and stimulate growth.46 There are three major areas in which government action could yield positive results in this direction. The first is to concentrate federal public sector development expenditures, in close collaboration with the provincial governments’ development plans, in removing the binding constraints to the economy. In this, the government has been slow in action and wayward in direction. The annual economic growth plans announced with the successive budgets have not shown real concentration and prioritisation in development expenditures. Unfortunately, ambitious motorways, highways and road projects – a past obsession – take up a large share of the limited available resources. The priority that should have been assigned to energy and education is glaringly absent, though lofty promises have been made in both of these critical sectors. The second critical area that will encourage new investment, both domestic and foreign, is an improvement in the law and order situation and the firm reestablishment of the writ of the state. Here, some decisive steps have been taken. The launch of Zarb-e-Azb, a military operation in North Waziristan against terrorist outfits, which has achieved significant successes, shows that the state has finally decided to confront terrorism rather than appease it. The government has also pursued a concerted operation against criminal gangs and extremist groups in Karachi. Yet a lot remains to be done with respect to restoring law and order, and creating a secure environment for economic progress.47 The third decisive area of restoring investor confidence in Pakistan will be the return of peaceful conditions in Afghanistan and good relations with India. Despite relative successes in security and political transition to the post-2014 period, Afghanistan’s future remains uncertain. Pakistan’s cooperation in facilitating a political solution to the Afghan conflict will be crucial for realising Afghan peace, which will, in turn, contribute to stabilising its own security and economic situation. On improving relations with India, the decision to grant India a Non-Discriminatory Market Access, if not the Most Favoured Nation status – with safeguards as well as working mechanisms to help resolve problems arising from existing nontariff barriers – will go a long way in facilitating trade and investment, with considerable economic benefits for both countries. The fact that both countries have pro-business governments with economic revival as their major goals presents an opportunity that should not be lost. However, unlike the marked improvement in Pakistan’s ties with Afghanistan, its relations with India remain tense, which is not an encouraging sign for the government’s quest for reviving the economy. The economic corridor with China offers a great opportunity for reviving national economy through regional geo-economic connectivity, whose scope must be extended to Pakistan’s immediate neighbourhood, particularly India and Afghanistan. Pakistan’s consistent involvement in regional geopolitics since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 has played a major role in deflecting the growth path of its economy, reducing considerably its chances of achieving potentially

The challenges of a resilient economy 207 higher and sustainable growth. However, as is clear from the preceding discussion, there are several factors that can still lead to a turnaround in the economy. These include the inherent economic resilience of the country, the groundswell of support that the current government has generated among domestic and foreign investors, the start of military action against those who have challenged the writ of the state, and prospects of an improvement in the situation in Afghanistan and better trade relations with India. The stakes are indeed high, and domestic economic challenges mounting. The present government should learn from its mixed performance since coming into power in 2013 and move the economy onto a higher, sustained and more equitable growth path in the remaining period of its five-year tenure. This would lead to decisive improvements in the standard of living for a vast majority of people who increasingly believe that the system has so far benefitted only the few. By so doing, the government might finally put to rest the controversy that only military regimes are capable of delivering high economic growth, a thesis that is already facing considerable doubt.

Notes 1 Pakistan’s average growth during this period was around 6.5 per cent. The economies which grew faster than Pakistan included China, Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Hong Kong. 2 See Viqar Ahmed and Rashid Amjad, The Management of the Pakistan Economy 1947–82 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). 3 Matthew McCartney, Pakistan: The Political Economy of Growth, Stagnation and the State, 1951–2009 (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011). 4 See Rashid Amjad, Private Industrial Investment in Pakistan 1960–70 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). 5 See, for instance, Jose R. López-Cálix, Thirumali G. Srinivasan and Muhammad Waheed, What Do We Know About Growth Patterns in Pakistan? (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2012). 6 The World Bank, Pakistan: Finding the Path to Job-Enhancing Growth (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2013). 7 Ricardo Hausmann, Lant Pritchett and Dani Rodrik, ‘Growth accelerations’, Journal of Economic Growth 10/4 (2005), pp. 303–329. 8 Pervez Hasan, ‘Failed economic promise: lessons from Pakistan’s development experience’, in R. Amjad and S.J. Burki (eds), Pakistan: Moving the Economy Forward (Lahore: Lahore School of Economics, 2013). 9 Viqar Ahmed and Rashid Amjad, The Management of the Pakistan Economy 1947–82 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984). 10 India, despite having a closed economy at the time as compared to Pakistan, greatly benefitted from this phenomenon. See Geoffrey Jones, Entrepreneurship and Multinationals: Global Business and the Making of the Modern World (Cheltenham, Glos: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013). 11 Anatol Lieven, ‘The coming blowback’, American Review 12 (2013). Available at http:// americanreviewmag.com/opinions/The-coming-blowback (accessed 8 April 2016). 12 Shahbaz Rana, ‘Economic Survey: 13-year war cost $102.5 billion’, The Express Tribune, 2 June 2014. 13 Shahbaz Rana, ‘Economic Survey: 13-year war cost $102.5 billion’, The Express Tribune, 2 June 2014.

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14 The World Bank, Afghanistan in Transition: Looking beyond 2014 (Washington, DC: The World Bank, May 2012). 15 Durr-e-Nayab, Youth Bulge and the Middle Class (Islamabad: Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 2012). 16 M. Ali Kemal and Ahmed Waqar Qasim, ‘Precise estimates of the informal economy’, The Pakistan Development Review 51/4 (2012), pp. 505–516. 17 ‘Strong earnings push KSE-100 to highest level in 4 years’, South Asian Investor Review, 20 August 2012. 18 John Newman, Recovering Strong Positive Trends in Poverty and Opportunity (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2013). 19 Durr-e-Nayab, ‘Estimating the middle class in Pakistan’, Pakistan Development Review 50/1 (2011), pp. 1–28. 20 Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators for Asia and the Pacific 2010 (Manila: ADB, August 2010). 21 Rashid Amjad, ‘Stagflation, labour market impact and the poverty puzzle in Pakistan: a preliminary analysis’, Lahore Journal of Economics 17/Special Edition (2012), pp. 17, 51–71. 22 ‘Pakistan crosses 125m mobile users mark’, The Express Tribune, 11 July 2013. 23 ‘Overseas Pakistanis send $14.9bn as global remittances grow’, Dawn, 23 December 2013. 24 World Population Review, ‘Pakistan Population 2014’. Available at: http://worldpopulation review.com/countries/pakistan-population/ (accessed 10 May 2015). 25 Zeba Sathar, Rabbi Royan and John Bongaarts (eds), Capturing the Demographic Dividend in Pakistan (New York, NY: Population Council, 2013). 26 Zeba, Sathar, Rabbi Royan and John Bongaarts (eds), Capturing the Demographic Dividend in Pakistan (New York, NY: Population Council, 2013). 27 ‘Energy crisis inflicting two percent loss on GDP growth annually’, Business Recorder, 30 March 2014. 28 Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Highlights of Pakistan Economic Survey (Islamabad: Ministry of Finance, 2014). Available at: http://finance.gov.pk/ survey/chapters_14/Highlights_ES_201314.pdf (accessed 2 May 2016). 29 ‘Pakistan suffers Rs.400 billion economic loss amid PTI, PAT protests’, The News Tribe, 21 August 2014. 30 John Newman, Recovering Strong Positive Trends in Poverty and Opportunity (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2013). 31 Shahid Amjad Chaudhry, ‘Pakistan’s Indus Basin strategy: Past, present and future’, in R. Amjad and S.J. Burki (eds), Pakistan: Moving the Economy Forward (Lahore: Lahore School of Economics, 2013). 32 Declan Walsh and Salman Masood, ‘IMF and Pakistan agree to a $5.3 billion bailout’, New York Times, 4 July 2013. 33 Mehreen Zahra-Malik, Saudi Arabia loans Pakistan $1.5 billion to shore up economy’, Reuters, 13 March 2014. 34 ‘Barack Obama proposes over $1 billion in civil-military aid to Pakistan’, Firstpost, 3 February 2015. 35 Kazim Alam, ‘Pakistan raises $2 billion through Eurobonds’, The Express Tribune, 9 April 2014. 36 Kazim Alam, ‘Pakistan raises $2 billion through Eurobonds’, The Express Tribune, 9 April 2014. 37 ‘IMF ’s third review’, Dawn, 9 July 2014. 38 Government of Pakistan, Ministry of Finance, Highlights of Pakistan Economic Survey (Islamabad: Ministry of Finance, 2014). Available at: http://finance.gov.pk/ survey/chapters_14/Highlights_ES_201314.pdf (accessed 2 May 2016). 39 ‘China reveals its cards for investing $20 billion in Pakistan’, The News International, 20 January 2014.

The challenges of a resilient economy 209 ‘Nawaz approves allocation for Bhasha, Dasu dams, motorways’, Dawn, 23 May 2014. ‘Nawaz approves allocation for Bhasha, Dasu dams, motorways’, Dawn, 23 May 2014. ‘Nawaz approves allocation for Bhasha, Dasu dams, motorways’, Dawn, 23 May 2014. ‘Pakistan’s economy: fuel injection’, The Economist, 2 May 2015. The Pakistan Business Council, A Roadmap for Optimizing Pakistan’s GSP Plus Status (Karachi: PBC, 2014). Available at http://pbc.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2014/ 06/Road_Map_-_Final_PDF.pdf (accessed 10 May 2015). 45 Katharine Houred, ‘China and Pakistan launch economic corridor plan worth $46billion’, Reuters, 20 April 2015. 46 In the short term, economic reforms can help ease some of the existing constraints to growth. For example, adjusting prices to reduce or eliminate subsidies and reducing theft can help improve the energy supply situation. In the medium to long term, a sustained, high level of investment is needed to bring about sustained and higher growth. This will require re-establishing business confidence among domestic and foreign investors, which economic reforms per se are not sufficient to provide. For further details, see Rashid Amjad and Anam Yusuf, More and Better Jobs for Pakistan: Can the Manufacturing Sector Play a Greater Role? MPRA Paper (Munich: University Library of Munich, June 2014); Nicholas Kaldor, Causes of the Slow Rate of Economic Growth of the United Kingdom (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996); José Antonio Ocampo, ‘The quest for dynamic efficiency: Structural dynamics and economic growth in developing countries’, in J.A. Ocampo (ed.), Beyond Reforms: Structural Dynamics and Macroeconomic Vulnerability (Washington, DC: United Nations Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, 2005), pp. 3–43. 47 For details, see Atif Mian, ‘Growing pains’, The Herald, July 2014. The author argues, 40 41 42 43 44

There is a close connection between the increasingly intolerant and hostile environment that has pervaded Pakistan’s cities and the difficulty in attracting and retaining Pakistan’s top talent. Today’s urban professional demands a multicultural, pluralistic and inclusive environment, where critical thinking is not only accepted but encouraged. Unfortunately the political and social environment in Pakistan has increasingly gone in the opposite direction.

12 Civil–military convergence for stability Hussain Nadim

Torn between democracy and dictatorship, and political instability since independence in 1947, Pakistan may have entered a new phase of civil–military balance triggered by several internal and external monumental changes, including: the first-ever democratic transition, evolution of civil and military institutions, consensus on cleaning up both the militant and political violence, and recent global shifts in power dynamics. However, this new era of cordial relations between the civilian regime and military establishment on foreign, defence and internal policies is not without its criticism.1 There are strong voices that the military has covertly taken over the leash of power in a ‘soft coup’ following the anti-government protests by PTI against the alleged rigging in 2013 elections.2 Rumours have majorly sparked, even as the language of both civil and military leaders has converged on areas of national interest that were previously hotly contested. One such issue is fixing Karachi. However, beyond the notion of ‘soft coup’ and the traditionally held views about civil–military conflict, it is also interesting to note that both civil-political and the military institutions have undergone significant structural and psychological changes, which seem to be paving the way for a new civil–military partnership, and collaborations on key strategic economic and political policies. This chapter points to such noticeable shifts that the Pakistani military and the ruling party, the PML-N, have undergone over the past decade or more, and the drivers behind these changes. Within this context, various areas of convergence between the civilian and military establishments are assessed, and the future course of politics in the country envisioned.

Evolution of military’s mindset The rapid commercialization of technology has changed global socio-political and security dynamics more quickly than most experts perceived.3 Especially in developing countries like Pakistan, the realization took time to dawn upon the military.4 As security experts in the country explored new dimensions of technology and economics, they understood the loss Pakistan had incurred over the decades for being a late entrant in the field.5 Advancement and development in technology have altered the role of tactics and weapons in line with sophistication. The

Civil–military convergence for stability 211 character of warfare has also changed, and we are effectively in an age of hybrid wars. Challenges posed by non-state actors transgressing states’ limits beg intelligence gathering for counter-insurgency operations. The security requirements for waging asymmetrical warfare are radically different. Economic warfare, cyber terrorism and psychological warfare became the new realities that the country’s security establishment was not prepared for. Despite its multi-billion dollar budget, and research and development, the security establishment, perhaps entangled in its pursuit to run the government and play politics with civilians, drifted away from appreciating the changing nature of warfare. The war was not about the border or geographical location any more. The conventional threat perception and indicators became obsolete. A new framework, a new mentality was needed, for which external experts were called and consultations with them begun. It was the product of these consultations that went on for years within the top echelons of the security establishment, which brought about a clear change in the policy and mindset of the establishment on domestic politics, foreign alliances, threat perceptions and tools of warfare.6 The shift away from conventional mindset, while still being digested within the system, would take several more years to become ingrained in an enormous institution of the military. Over the past two decades there are three noticeable changes that have occurred in the military mindset, and one notion that continued and strengthened further. The first change in the military is the belief that democracy may be a necessary evil that it will have to live with in Pakistan. In the current military brass, the acceptance of a democratic government and continuation of electoral process are well understood and underscored norms.7 The realization that it is not the military’s job to intervene in running the government is strong, and has come out of a decade-long military rule under General Musharraf, which not only politically and economically destabilized the country, but also seriously impacted the structure of the military itself by demoralizing soldiers, delaying promotions, and over-centralization of command. Moreover, the difficulty with running the government down to the district level is enormous, and the political parties that partner with the military are discredited in the public eye, eventually squaring the blame on the military. General Musharraf ’s alliance with PML-Q is a classic case. The military men are also not economists or financial experts, and running the government takes serious management and governance skills that the military is not trained to deliver. Another reason for such a mindset to develop is that the military has accidentally become sensitized to the civilian perspective. Gone are the days when military men lived in seclusion from the rest of the country in separate garrisons, their children attending separate schools and hospitals. Today, mixing has occurred, with civilians’ penetration into housing enclaves run by the Defence Housing Authority, military men with better salaries being able to afford private schools and hospitals, and, more importantly, the same media channels playing in every house have brought down the walls and struck ideological uniformity on some level. Every soldier now is also a civilian after work hours, something that has

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ushered in an understanding within the military of why the institution must stay out of the business of politics.8 However, part of the reason why the military has come to terms with democracy may also be because a military government is not acceptable in the international world.9 It would, however, be an exaggeration to state that the military is now convinced with the idea of democracy in its entirety. It may have only accepted democracy with reservations and limitations. Selective freedom under democracy is being granted and tolerated. But, for many in Pakistan, even this is a significant moment that the military seems to have finally understood the significance of letting the democratic system continue. However, until and unless three or four successive government transitions take place, it is hard to say with conviction that the military really believes in the system of democracy to the extent of not posing any major hurdle in its evolution in the future. A second and very important change in the military mindset and policy is the idea that there will be no more physical meddling in Afghanistan. This puts an end to the idea of ‘strategic depth’ as we know it.10 Afghanistan, more than for the US, has been a graveyard for Pakistan. This is a general view of the soldiers who are exhausted with fighting the war and tired of confronting their own Pashtun brothers.11 The human and material cost that Pakistan bore of the first Afghan war, later in helping the Taliban to stabilize Afghanistan, and finally the post 9/11 decade of war in Afghanistan has been massive. Pakistan not only lost its moment to be an Asian tiger, but in the process nearly destroyed its own economy and industry. Even national priorities were completely incoherent. Needless to count, there is an entire generation of Pakistanis who have grown up in war – a traumatic consequence, a psychological damage that cannot be quantified.12 Given what Pakistan has gone through and learning from past mistakes, the security establishment is convinced that Afghanistan needs a regional solution brokered by a power other than Pakistan.13 Partly because the US will leave sooner or later, and Afghanistan will not be a matter of urgent attention in Washington circles, what the country needs is a regional power like China to ensure that Afghanistan does not end up like Iraq. While China has always been a close ally, the security establishment of Pakistan had never engaged it in its affairs on the War on Terror and Afghanistan. However, against the backdrop of US withdrawal from Afghanistan, China has stepped up to play an active role in the Afghan peace process, engaging major stakeholders, including the Taliban, on the issue.14 A tangible initiative in this respect, facilitated by Pakistan, became evident in July 2015, when a delegation from the Afghan government met with members of the Taliban – with Pakistani, Chinese and U.S. officials present as observers. Two months earlier, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed between the intelligence agencies of the two countries, Pakistan’s ISI and Afghanistan’s National Directorate of Security, to jointly combat terrorism. Pakistan’s support for President Ashraf Ghani’s government in Kabul and efforts to develop close ties with it show that the country has effectively abandoned its past policy of dominating Afghanistan through the ‘strategic depth’ policy.15

Civil–military convergence for stability 213 The third and the final noticeable shift in the security establishment’s paradigm is its stress on the economy as a way forward for enhanced stability and security. In almost all the meetings the author had with top officials of the security establishment,16 the single largest concern expressed was the economic meltdown of the country. For, at the end of the day, it all boils down to pure economics and numbers. And the military has realized that the Fourth Generation Warfare is all about economic prosperity and defeating the enemy through economic means – something that Pakistan has been a victim of for past decades, and the awareness of which is still not fully understood at all levels of society. The newfound belief in democracy within the security establishment also stems from the same reason that the economy needs to be put on track for Pakistan to flex its muscle politically. In its perception, the Nawaz Sharif government is doing substantial work on improving the economic conditions of Pakistan. That the government does think long-term for the country is clear from the Pakistan Vision 2025 policy document, which sets out a number of targets, including “the ultimate aspiration to see Pakistan among the ten largest economies of the world by 2047”.17 This goal may be too ambitious to materialize by the centennial year of Pakistan’s independence, but at least it shows the long-term commitment of the current civilian leadership. This explains why the military leadership has resisted the temptation for a military takeover, for instance, during the 2014 anti-government agitation,18 and has preferred to have a working relationship with its civilian counterpart. However, one thing that has not changed is the military establishment’s perceived insecurity from international forces. Despite all the shifts in the military mindset, there is a very strong conspiratorial belief, reinforced by the situation in Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria, that Pakistan is the next target for powerful outside actors (America, Israel, India and the like) to run and test their proxies and new weapons. To save Pakistan from falling into the same league, a strong military is a necessity. The Army’s GHQ justified its demand for raising the amount of defence spending in the 2015–16 National Budget on the same basis.19 The aforementioned shifts in military mindset have been felt by all the political parties, allowing them the space to position themselves accordingly in this new power structure – where there is internal confrontation but, at the same time, strong convergence on areas of interest. In this light, Pakistan’s civilian front has also undergone several monumental changes.

The rebirth of PML-N The tenure of General Musharraf was a decade of missed opportunities for Pakistan, which failed to take off economically. This happened due to prolonged military rule and consequent political instability in the country as well as its role of a frontline state in the US-led war in Afghanistan and its implications for internal security. The PPP-led government took control in 2008, but it also failed to improve the economic situation, concentrating instead on completing its tenure and ensuring a smooth transition of power – perhaps the only success that

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it can claim due credit for after being five years in power.20 Enter 2013, with the PML-N government in power. Perhaps because the party had previously formed the provincial government in Punjab and understood the gravity of the economic crisis, it was in a position to undertake tangible economic reforms at the federal level. The government took the economic downturn both as a challenge and an opportunity,21 and, therefore, opted for realizing regional connectivity, fighting against internal sources of instability, and enhancing the country’s ties with China and Turkey.22 In the last decade, the PML-N as a political party has also undergone a series of changes, the first one being political maturity. In its 2013 election campaign, such shifts were quite visible. The party neither used anti-Indian rhetoric nor instigated any anti-American fervour. The campaign was entirely squared around the issues of energy and security.23 More importantly, following these elections, the PML-N struck the right balance, by allowing the PTI to form the government in KPK, and the Pashtun and Baloch nationalist political parties to set up the government in Balochistan. In this way, the party engaged an entire political class to contribute towards national development in the provinces where they received their respective political mandate. Maintaining close cooperation with the PPP at the federal level became a key priority of the PML, and no attempt was made to politically victimize the former ruling party – thus sending out a clear message that the 1990s pattern of the two mainstream parties toppling each other’s governments with the help of the military would not be repeated. Second, a strong perception in PML-N ranks, that started during the election campaign and became more apparent after the 2013 election victory, was that this might be the party’s last chance in power. Pakistan, and more specifically the Punjab and KPK, would vote on delivery and nothing less.24 So, urgency and self-accountability is at the centre of politics, and PML-N leaders are quite conscious of the fact that they have to bring structural and long-term changes, especially in economy and the energy sector, in order to win the next elections. With economy trumping politics, Nawaz Sharif appealed to his political rivals: “It is our repeated appeal to other parties to stop playing politics, and start playing economics. Work, and let the government work, otherwise we won’t have another moment.”25 In fact, unlike in the past, the prime minister has pursued a policy of reconciliation. For instance, when deep differences emerged over the direction of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor, whether an eastern highway via Punjab or a western road network via the Pashtun belt of KPK, the PML-N leader invited leaders from across the political spectrum to an All-Parties Conference in Islamabad, securing political consensus on the issue. In another instance, after the Supreme Court’s Judicial Commission of enquiry endorsed the government’s position that the 2013 elections were free and fair, Prime Minister Sharif invited the PTI leadership to work together for political stability and economic progress of the country. Third, this time around, the PML-N has striven hard to strike a civil–military balance. The media often makes it appear that the PML-N is on a collision course with the military. The ground reality, instead, is that the Sharif regime

Civil–military convergence for stability 215 has made no move to curtail the powers of the security establishment or interfere with its official business. After initially pursuing the treason case against General Musharraf, it has over time understood the fallacy of confronting the military over what in its perception is essentially a non-issue. In fact, if anything, the Sharif regime has backed major policy decisions of the military, providing them with political ownership, such as the security operation against TTP in tribal areas and armed gangs in urban Sindh.26 In fact, the long political exile has made Nawaz Sharif politically more mature. He, therefore, does not see any point in having another confrontation with the military, and has, instead, partnered with General Raheel Sharif in managing security and improving the economy.27 The final noticeable attribute of the PML-N government is its preference for corruption-free politics. Unlike the former PPP-led regime, it has not been accused of any major corruption scandal, and the country has improved 12 spots on the corruption index since 2012.28 Most of the developmental projects are managed in a transparent manner, with positions being filled on merit, again sending out a loud message that the government is committed to not only ending deep rooted corruption, but also bringing institutional and governance reforms.29 For instance, the two most sought after diplomatic positions, those of the ambassadors to the US and UK, which have always been a reserved for political appointees, were allotted on merit to the most deserving Foreign Service officers. It is an outcome of this changing mindset that PML-N has prioritized stability and economic growth of the country over politics and confrontation with the military. This has consequently opened new avenues of partnership and collaboration in civil–military relations – a new beginning for Pakistan’s internal politics that may over time become more sophisticated and mature with the continuation of democracy.

Civil–military points of convergence Given the evolution that military and political leadership have gone through during the current democratic transition in general and since the coming to power of the Sharif regime in particular, they have largely accepted each other’s working boundaries in the midst of changing global and internal threat perceptions. Consequently, several areas of convergence in civil–military relations have emerged. Operation Clean-up One of the major concerns for the PML-N as soon it formed the government was how to tackle and pull Pakistan out of terrorism-ridden insurgency that has been going on for years in tribal areas and has practically destroyed Pakistan’s economy and blocked foreign investment, tourism and sporting activities in the country. It started a dialogue process with the TTP to strike peace, a necessary condition for economic takeoff.30 It failed, but the consensus soon developed

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between the government and the Army’s GHQ on launching a full-scale military operation against the TTP. Operation Zarb-e-Azb was launched by the military with full ownership of the civilian leadership. Then, a comprehensive National Action Plan was developed in the aftermath of the December 2014 Peshawar school attack to curb militancy and hate, not just in lawless regions but also major cities and mosques all over the country.31 Since the start of 2015, the military and civilian establishments have embarked upon a joint venture to squeeze out armed gangs affiliated with political parties from the financial hub Karachi, which has been a home to political, ethnic and sectarian violence, with some of its areas previously out of the government’s writ.32 China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) Another important civil–military point of convergence is the economic revival of the country. Both the government and the military understand the significance of economic prosperity to achieve internal and external stability and guard the country against Fourth Generation Warfare.33 For the PML-N, perhaps recovering the economy also constitutes a pragmatic means to win the next elections scheduled for 2018. Hence, the Sharif government has signed a landmark deal with China worth over $46 billion, which will develop Pakistan’s major infrastructure, Gwadar port, and several energy projects.34 This is the largest ever investment made by China in any part of the world, and also the largest investment received by Pakistan in its history. The comprehensive Chinese assistance package – hinged on the 3,000 kilometre-long CPEC, an aggressive energy build-up and military modernization – may exceed over $100 billion in the next decade and a half, and is being seen as the next, and perhaps the last, big thing that war-weary Pakistan must grab on to, at any cost.35 The PML-N leadership considers CPEC as a potential ‘fate changer’ for the country. This monumental investment plan for development is also fully backed by the military, which understands the significance of such a deal for Pakistan.36 As such, the idea is to develop the relatively under-developed regions of the country, including Balochistan, which has long been marred with ethnic separatism. Naturally, given its strategic importance, regional powers like India have come out strongly against the initiative. But, with both the military and the entire political brass fully backing the project, the prospects of its smooth implementation are quite bright. Neutrality in the Middle East At the height of the Yemen crisis in 2015, when Saudi Arabia asked Pakistan for help, it refused to take sides in the messy Middle Eastern politics.37 This episode confirms the tangible shift in Pakistan’s Middle East policy, whose underlying rationale is to ensure that the country does not become a proxy in the regional sectarian war and, instead, should balance out its ties with both Iran and Saudi

Civil–military convergence for stability 217 Arabia. The PML-N government made this landmark decision in close cooperation with the military.38 This is in spite of the special relationship that Nawaz Sharif and Shehbaz Sharif, his brother and chief minister of Punjab, have with the Saudi regime for being in exile there during most of the Musharraf era. In any case, Pakistan has in recent years moved away from its decades-old policy of relying exclusively on Arab Gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, for support in times of crisis. The PML-N government has particularly tried to cultivate close political and economic ties with Turkey, whose diplomatic profile in the Middle East has also grown more recently.39 Moreover, with the global centre of power moving to Asia, Pakistan is eyeing a bigger opportunity with the Chinese – as is clear from progress on the Economic Corridor front.40 Finally, it is not that both Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and Army Chief General Raheel Sharif bluntly refused to meet the Saudi demand for contributing troops and military hardware to its war effort in Yemen. They visited Riyadh and tried to convince the Saudi leadership that Pakistan itself was extensively engaged in the military operation, and therefore due public support for engaging the military elsewhere and also that the parliament had resolved against it. The Saudi leadership was, however, assured of military help if there was an attack on the kingdom from Yemen.41 Balancing out between US and China During the Cold War period, Pakistan served the US global cause against Soviet Communism, playing a crucial part in the Afghan war against the Soviets in the 1980s. Since then, its frontline role in the US-led War on Terror can be questioned on several grounds, but its support to the international campaign in Afghanistan nonetheless has been crucial. Throughout these decades, if there is one constant in Pakistan’s foreign policy, it has been this strategic relationship with China. On the eve of the US withdrawal from Afghanistan, Sino-Pak strategic ties have indeed witnessed an important transformation: from security to development. While Pakistan has ensured that the process of the NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan remains relatively smooth, and it most likely wishes to pursue closer relations with the United States, the conclusion of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor deal represents a major shift in its strategic priorities vis-à-vis great power relationships.42 Over decades of partnership with the US during the Cold War and the War on Terror, Pakistan barely received even the aid it was promised. With Chinese investment of over $46 billion dwarfing 60 years of US financial assistance to Pakistan, there should be little doubt where the country is likely to fall in terms of its future foreign commitments. However, Pakistan has close security and intelligence relations with the US and an elite that has studied, worked and has family and children there. Therefore, balancing out its relations between the US and China is going to be the major foreign policy challenge. Tiptoeing between the US and China is a game that has converged the interests of both civil and military leadership in Pakistan.

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Reconciliation in Afghanistan As stated before, under Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif and General Raheel Sharif, a major shift has already occurred in Pakistan’s policy on Afghanistan – a total breakaway from the past, when the military unilaterally called shots.43 For the first time in decades, leaderships in both countries are working closely towards the end game in Afghanistan and fostering peace by negotiating with the Taliban – a path that is being facilitated by the Pakistani military given its clout over the Afghan Taliban leadership, limited or otherwise. Moreover, the older mentality of ‘strategic depth’ is not prevalent any more in the military mindset, and both the military and civil leadership in Pakistan want a stable Afghanistan that will not have spillover effects in Pakistan.44 As the US withdraws from Afghanistan, peace in Afghanistan is now being backed by China. With the critical deal signed by their intelligence agencies in May 2015 and Islamabad subsequently making a tangible move to facilitate the Afghan reconciliation process, the two countries have begun to approach the quest for peace with the seriousness it deserves.45 However, it is true that the lack of trust deficit often gets in the way of pursuing a sustainable Afghan peace process through Pakistan’s support. Braving the Indian threat Striking close ties with India was the first foreign policy goal of Nawaz Sharif as soon as he took over.46 In fact, in his very first speech, he talked about visa liberalization and close trade ties with India – an approach over which the military establishment had serious reservations.47 However, over time, tensions have soared with the Indian government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, leaving Prime Minister Sharif with no choice but to reluctantly agree with the military’s view that Pakistan may have to go slow in its pursuit of the peace process with India.48 In fact, repeated moves by Pakistan to pacify border tensions with India have seldom been responded to positively by the Modi regime. Given that, and Pakistan’s new close ties with China, that have ticked off the Indian establishment into making offensive moves, both countries have drifted away from peace talks.49 On the flip side, however, civil–military interests in Pakistan have converged on dealing with Indian belligerence under a Hindu nationalist leadership. It is still uncertain whether the process of the two countries’ membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, following the SCO summit at Ufa in Russia in July 2015 (where Sharif and Modi were able to meet on the sidelines), will help break the ice in Indo-Pak ties.

Conclusion Having analysed the evolution of military and civilian political leadership in Pakistan and contextualized it under current policy decisions by the government, it is apparent that a new dynamics of civil–military relations has set in. The

Civil–military convergence for stability 219 economic meltdown, severe internal political instability and the changing nature of global politics have created a convergence of interests between the civil and military leadership over the need for close collaboration. Politics, it is understood by both spheres, is only doable if the economy is on track. And there are sentiments across the political and military spectrum that there shall be no politics over internal stability. Hence, the crackdown against violent sectarian and political outfits in Karachi, operation against militants’ safe havens in North Waziristan, at the same time as landmark deals with China and a visible change of course on the foreign policy front, are all part of the new framework of civil– military cooperation that is shaping Pakistan’s future.

Notes 1 Farooq Yusaf, ‘Pakistan’s 21st amendment: national consensus or soft coup?’ Open Democracy, 6 January 2015. Available at www.opendemocracy.net/open-security/ farooq-yousaf/pakistan%E2%80%99s-21st-amendment-national-consensus-or-softcoup (accessed 2 May 2016). 2 Ishaan Tharoor, ‘Did a soft coup just happen in Pakistan?’ Washington Post, 29 August 2014. 3 William Fielding Ogburn, ‘How technology changes society’, The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 249 (1947), pp. 81–88. 4 Stephen Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004). 5 Hussain Nadim, ‘How the Pakistani military mindset evolved’, Foreign Policy, 26 August 2014. 6 The author had the opportunity to be a part of such consultations. 7 Muhammad Anees, ‘Army chief assures full support for democratic forces in Pakistan’, The News Tribe, 14 May 2014. Available at www.thenewstribe.com/2014/05/14/armychief-assures-full-support-for-democratic-forces-in-pakistan/ (accessed 16 April 2016). 8 Hussain Nadim, ‘How the Pakistan’s military mindset evolved’, Foreign Policy, 26 August 2014. 9 ‘UN official urges respect for human rights, restoration of rule of law following Thai coup’, UN News, 23 May 2014. Available at www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?News ID=47871#.U8V68qDz3zI (accessed 25 January 2016). 10 Strategic depth has been a vivid idea at the centre of Pakistan’s Afghan policy that it must have a control on Afghanistan so as not to have an enemy on both its eastern and western border. 11 Musa Khan Jalalzai, ‘Pakistan army and its war on terror’, Daily Times, 1 May 2013. 12 Nadia Mushtaq Abbasi, ‘Impact of terrorism on Pakistan’, Strategic Studies 32/4 (2013), pp. 33–68. 13 Hussain Nadim, ‘Pakistan’s new, optimistic Afghan strategy’, Foreign Policy, 17 June 2014. 14 Hussain Nadim, ‘Pakistan’s new, optimistic Afghan strategy’, Foreign Policy, 17 June 2014. 15 Aziz Hakimi, ‘Af-Pak: what strategic depth?’ Open Democracy, 4 February 2010. Available at www.opendemocracy.net/opensecurity/aziz-hakimi/af-pak-what-strategicdepth (accessed 2 July 2015); Imtiaz Gul, ‘Afghanistan: light at the end of the tunnel’, The Express Tribune, 15 July 2015. 16 As Special Assistant to the Federal Minister for Planning, Development and Reforms, Government of Pakistan, the author frequently interacted with top-ranking Pakistani military officials.

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17 Planning Commission, Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform, Government of Pakistan, Pakistan 2025: One Nation, One Vision. Available at www.google.co.uk/ #q=Pakistan+2025:+One+Nation%2C+One+Vision (accessed 1 July 2016). 18 Mahreen Zahra-Malik, ‘Pakistan army chief “overruled generals calling for coup” ’, Reuters, 5 September 2014. 19 Ismail Sheikh and Kamran Yousaf, ‘Budget 2014: govt announces 700bn defence budget’, The Express Tribune, 3 June 2014. 20 Hussain H Zaidi, ‘The Legacy of the PPP Government’, The News International, 1 April 2013. 21 ‘We are ready to counter economic challenges: Nawaz’, The Pakistan Today, 3 May 2013. 22 Kamran Yousaf, ‘Modi inauguration: historic meeting kindles hope of new beginning’, The Express Tribune, 27 May 2014. 23 Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, ‘A Comparative Analysis of Election Manifestoes of Major Political Parties’ (Islamabad: PILDAT, 2013). Available at www.pildat.org/publications/publication/elections/Election2013_ ManifestoesComparison.pdf (accessed 2 July 2015). 24 Anwar Iqbal, ‘Sharif risks straining ties with military, warns intelligence report’, Dawn, 2 February 2014. 25 ‘Stop leg pulling, let us do work’, The Nation, 20 June 2014. 26 Hussain Nadim, ‘The crisis media creates’, The Express Tribune, 13 June 2014. 27 Jaan Haider, ‘All’s well between army and govt.’, The Pakistan Today, 18 April 2014. 28 ‘Corruption index: Pakistan’s ranking globally Improves by 12 spots’, The Express Tribune, 3 December 2013. 29 ‘Govt ensuring transparency, merit in every domain: PM’, Business Recorder, 19 May 2015. Available at: www.brecorder.com/top-news/1/242770-govt-ensuring-transparencymerit-in-every-domain-pm.html (accessed 1 July 2016). 30 ‘Peace talks with TTP top priority’, The Express Tribune, 17 December 2013. 31 Anup Kaphle, ‘Pakistan announces national plan to fight terrorism’, Washington Post, 24 December 2014. 32 ‘PM to approve second phase of Karachi operation’, The Express Tribune, 25 March 2015. 33 ‘Nawaz didn’t use defence institutions in anyone’s interest: Rashid’, The News International, 23 March 2014. 34 ‘Chinese President Xi Jinping unveils $46 bn. investment in Pakistan’, ABC Network, 20 April 2015. Available at www.abc.net.au/news/2015–04–20/china-to-invest-46billion-in-pakistan-economy/6407354 (accessed 12 December 2015). 35 Wajahat S Khan, ‘With China, for China’, India Today, 10 July 2015. 36 ‘No one dare cast an evil eye on Pakistan’, The Express Tribune, 10 June 2015. 37 Ankit Panda, ‘Pakistan’s neutrality in the Yemen crisis brought to you by China’, The Diplomat, 28 April 2015. 38 ‘Pakistan PM Nawaz Sharif, Army Chief to visit Saudi Arab to mend ties over Yemen’, Economic Times, 22 April 2015. 39 Paul Anderson, ‘Turkey and Pakistan boost ties’, BBC News Online, 16 June 2003. Available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2994458.stm (accessed 7 April 2016). 40 Ankit Panda, ‘Pakistan’s neutrality in the Yemen crisis brought to you by China’, The Diplomat, 28 April 2015. 41 ‘Pakistan at Saudi beck and call on Yemen’, Pakistan Today, 24 April 2015. 42 ‘Pakistan at Saudi beck and call on Yemen’, Pakistan Today, 24 April 2015. 43 Hussain Nadim, ‘Pakistan’s new, optimistic Afghan strategy’, Foreign Policy, 17 June 2014. 44 Hussain Nadim, ‘Pakistan’s new, optimistic Afghan strategy’, Foreign Policy, 17 June 2014.

Civil–military convergence for stability 221 45 ‘ISI, Afghan intelligence in landmark deal’, Dawn, 19 May 2015. Also see Akbar Jan Marwat, ‘Muree peace talks’, Daily Times, 22 July 2015. 46 Dean Nelson, ‘Nawaz Sharif to appeal to India for peace’, Telegraph, 18 September 2013. 47 ‘Go slow on Indi: Gen Kayani tells Sharif ’, Times of India, 19 May 2013. 48 Hussain Nadim, ‘Blaming India where it is due’, The Express Tribune, 30 May 2015. 49 ‘India will carry out strikes at any place and time’, Dawn, 10 June 2015.

13 Great powers, military supremacy, and persistent contestation Hannes Ebert

Two constants have dominated Pakistan’s foreign policy since independence in 1947: the perception of India as the primary threat to its security, and the need to ‘balance’ this threat with the help of external patrons. The great power politics has played a pivotal role in shaping the country’s persistent contestation towards India by providing the military with opportunities to consolidate its power to the detriment of civilian forces. Successive periods of foreign policy since independence manifest different types and degrees of great power involvement, of the United States and China in particular. They demonstrate that while the sources of Pakistan’s revisionism are primarily domestic and tied to developments during Partition, its persistence can significantly be attributed to the ways in which significant great powers were involved in the India–Pakistan rivalry. With the likely erosion of US military and economic support post-2014 NATO withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan has sought to consolidate strategic relations with China, with the conclusion in 2015 of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor accord being its foremost manifestation. Meanwhile, resurgence of IndoPakistan tensions has dimmed renewed hopes for rapprochement between the two countries. This means that Pakistan’s India-centric foreign policy is likely to persist, thereby limiting the Nawaz Sharif government’s ability to forge closer relations with its eastern neighbour. This chapter provides an overview of Pakistan’s foreign policy evolution with a focus on how its persistent India-centrism was interlinked with its reliance on great powers’ assistance. It divides the foreign policy since independence into six historical periods, each distinct in terms of level of dominance of particular patrons, with variation either driven by changes in domestic political constellations or in the external environment at a given time: 1947–1962, 1962–1971, 1971–1979, 1979–1988, 1988–2001, and 2001–2014.1

Introduction Pakistani foreign policy has stayed its course for almost seven decades. Since independence in 1947, the various political strands of foreign policy making in the country were all equally underpinned by the perception that India presented a fundamental threat to its existence and international status. Based on this

Foreign policy persistence 223 perception, ‘balancing’ Indian hostility and hegemony has remained Pakistan’s primary foreign policy objective. In order to achieve this goal despite a professed economic and military inferiority, Pakistan has sought to capitalize on its favourable geostrategic location and geopolitical prominence by entering alignments with great powers to assist in ‘balancing’ the Indian threat. As a result, it has become increasingly entangled in great power politics. How did this entanglement influence Pakistan’s persistent contestation toward India? Which forms of cooperation and great power allies has Pakistan primarily chosen, and what influence have these patrons exerted on the dynamics of its contestation? Much has been said about the sources of Pakistan’s contestation.2 The role of great powers is, however, still contested. Some observers argue that the great powers’ extensive diplomatic, economic and military assistance to Pakistan and pressure placed on India have substantially contributed to its prolonged contestation, in particular by providing the change-averse military opportunities to foster their grip over foreign policy at the detriment of civilian political actors.3 Others emphasize third-party mediatory effects and argue that in the absence of the great powers’ pivotal deterrence, diplomatic disputes and conflicts may have morphed into outright military conflicts.4 This debate emerged again when the most recent phase of civilian ascendance to power was accommodated by hopes for rapprochement in Pakistan’s India policy and received unprecedented backing by great powers. In 2008, the transition from military to civilian rule was internationally supported by the newly established ad-hoc coalition of the Democratic Friends of Pakistan (including China and the US as founding members) and the historic tilt of US aid away from focusing on military assistance to civilian support in the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009, commonly known as the Kerry–Lugar–Berman Act. It was further strengthened with democratic transition in 2013. The civilian regime under Sharif, in particular, declared its intention to boost economic and normalize political ties with India, a shift similarly supported by the US and China. However, its advances triggered the military to intervene and marginalize the prime minister – driven among other factors by the urge to regain hold over the country’s foreign policy.5 This episode seems to suggest that convergence of Pakistani civilians and great powers on improving ties with India is too recent a development and the external resolve too limited to trump persistent revisionism of the long-backed military leadership.6 A brief review of the aforementioned six periods of foreign policy in the pages ahead testifies to this assumption.

I 1947–1962: aligning with the West in search of security This formative period involved a shift from an independent foreign policy and a global search for allies to an alignment with the United States through multiple security pacts. Pakistan’s perception of India as a fundamental threat to its existence and the resultant search for allies was quite apparent from the start. The founding elite was dissatisfied with the division of the British India, and felt strongly disadvantaged by the terms of the June 1947 Plan and the Indian

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Independence Act. Massive violence, which accompanied the displacements following Partition, disputes about access to water sources, as well as conflicts over the princely states of Hyderabad, Junagadh and Kashmir defined the early years of foreign policy and installed the constrained relationship with India as the defining aspect of Pakistan’s external orientation.7 The claim for Kashmir led Pakistan to initiate the first war with India over the control of the state in 1947–1948. The causes of this war were manifold and the implications for Pakistan’s future foreign policy orientation consequential. Pakistan’s foundational elite deduced its claim to Kashmir from its political idea of statehood. The nationalist movement led by the Pakistan Muslim League advanced a vision of statehood built on religious coherence and the provision of a home to subcontinent Muslims. In contrast, the Indian Congress-led nationalist movement pursued a principally secular, democratic political system. The different trajectories of both countries’ nationalist movement shaped an ideology in Pakistan that was strongly anti-Indian.8 Kashmir, which was predominantly Muslim, ruled by a Hindu monarch and shared borders with both Pakistan and India, represented the natural arena for fighting over the competing visions. After Pakistan militarily intervened, Kashmir’s Hindu ruler quickly called for Indian intervention, which ultimately led to a division of the state. The conflict ended when India referred the issue to the United Nations Security Council, which facilitated a ceasefire in January 1949. However, the conflict’s root causes remained unresolved despite meaningful negotiations. Pakistan emerged as the ‘revisionist’ state demanding multilateral mediation and India as the ‘status quo’ state categorically opposing any thirdparty involvement. The dispute of the early years and the war of 1947–1948 led Pakistan to initially pursue a broad, open exploration of partnerships abroad, approaching the US, the USSR, China and other Muslim states alike to seek support for its claims in the region. In 1953, however, it began to align with the West in the fluctuating Cold War alliance system, entering multifaceted security arrangements with and receiving substantial economic and military assistance from the US. The West became Pakistan’s key security guarantor against India and also provided sufficient assistance to overcome a severe economic crisis and food shortage. Pakistan signed the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement with the Eisenhower Administration in May 1954, joined the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) in September 1954, and became a member of the Baghdad Pact (later renamed CENTO) in September 1955.9 Pakistan’s commitments paved the way for further defence and security arrangements with the US during initial years of the military regime of General Ayub Khan (1958–1969). He promoted the country as the ‘most allied ally’ of the US in Asia, a relationship which he later, in his autobiography Friends Not Masters, explained with reference to the perceived Indian threat: “The crux of the problem from the very beginning was the Indian attitude of hostility toward us: we had to look for allies to secure our position.”10 This alignment came at a high cost. It naturally increased concerns in Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal

Foreign policy persistence 225 Nehru’s government, which were already aggravated by the 1958 coup. It also provoked criticism not only by the USSR – which generally was more supportive of India on the Kashmir question and expressed support for Afghanistan’s territorial claims – but also other non-aligned Muslim states.

II 1962–1971: forging strategic partnership with China Following the Sino-Indian war in 1962, Pakistan allied more closely with China, which remained the most prominent external player during the 1960s and 1970s, providing substantial military and economic support that truncated the conventional South Asian asymmetry between Pakistan and India. During the 1962 Sino-Indian war, the Kennedy Administration provided military and economic to India, while perceiving it as a counterweight to Communist Beijing. This naturally raised concerns in Pakistan. Consequently, a de facto Sino-Pakistani alliance emerged. After India was bitterly defeated in the 1962 war, the Pakistani military still gave in to US demands and chose not to actively exploit India’s temporary weakness. In return, both the US and the UK used the increased Indian dependence on their assistance to pressure India to settle the Kashmir dispute on terms favourable to Pakistan and initiated six rounds of talks on Kashmir between Pakistani and Indian foreign ministers during 1962 and 1963. Ultimately, however, these talks failed to produce concrete results and Pakistan launched ‘Operation Gibraltar’ in April–May 1965 in Kashmir. In September 1965, however, the operation escalated into the second Kashmir war. Five months of fighting ended in a UN-mandated ceasefire and the conclusion of the Tashkent Agreement in 1966, in which India ceded territory gained during the war and both countries committed to refrain from the use of force to settle the Kashmir dispute.11 Yet the conflict remained unresolved and it took less than five years until both countries went to war again in late 1971. This time, Kashmir was not the object of conflict. Instead, an internal crisis in Pakistan spilled over into India. Pakistan’s military operation to suppress the civil strife in East Pakistan in March 1971 created massive refugee flows into India. While siding with Bengali separatists, India subsequently intervened militarily in East Pakistan to create a separate state in December 1971. After only 13 days of fighting, the Pakistani military was defeated and East Pakistan became the independent state of Bangladesh. Pakistan’s break-up created a dramatic asymmetry that fundamentally altered the conditions for its foreign policymaking. India had ultimately become the most dominant power in the region, and the possibility of seizing territory through conventional military means seemed to be off the table. Various domestic factors had led to this debacle, including internal mismanagement and East Pakistani leadership’s treachery, but Pakistan’s foreign policy elite united in blaming external forces, namely Indian aggression and the lack of the great power allies’ resolve. The great powers’ responses to the wars of 1965 and 1971 provide an illustrative example of how Cold War alliance dynamics influenced Pakistan’s foreign

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policy and how its strategy of external balancing largely failed. Both the US and China sided with Pakistan in these wars, which triggered Moscow’s alignment with New Delhi in 1971. President Kennedy tried to rebuild trust lost due to Washington’s assistance to India in the 1962 war by facilitating the IndoPakistani talks of 1962–1963. Yet, this was insufficient to alleviate Ayub’s fear that US-assisted Indian military mobilization would quickly overwhelm Pakistan’s capabilities, and his dismay that Washington had provided India with military and economic assistance without the strings attached to Pakistan’s alignment, which contributed to his decision to engage in Kashmir in 1965. Ayub’s expectation that the security pacts would come into force was not fulfilled – the US sided with Pakistan diplomatically, but refrained from intervening militarily on its side. Following the war, Washington imposed arms embargoes on both India and Pakistan, which had a much more severe effect on Pakistan than on India, as the former’s defence apparatus was almost entirely supplied by the US. Both the lack of support during the war and the sanctions thereafter deepened the distrust among the Pakistani leadership. In 1971, the US, despite hardening international protests, also backed Pakistan politically to help General Yahya achieve a negotiated settlement, but was equally reluctant to intervene militarily or activate the security pacts.12 When the Indian forces intervened, the US engaged in coercive diplomacy against India and sent its powerful Seventh Fleet to the Bay of Bengal, which strengthened Pakistan’s self-image, but had limited military value.13 Ultimately, Washington perceived the costs for military involvement as too high after Moscow had formally tilted toward India. Pakistan’s disillusionment with the US brought it closer to China. Pakistan entered a de facto alliance with Beijing based on their shared hostility toward India. Already in 1961, Pakistan had voted in favour of recognizing the People’s Republic of China in the UN General Assembly, and in 1963–1964, signed various trade and commerce agreements with Beijing and also ceded the Karakoram valley in Kashmir to China, an area likewise claimed by India. Pakistan, ignoring US threats of sanctions, welcomed Chinese Prime Minister Zhou Enlai for a state visit in 1964. In this context, China played an instigative role during the 1965 war by providing substantial diplomatic support. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was foreign minister under Ayub from 1963–1966, reportedly concluded that East Pakistan would have been taken over by India without Chinese assistance.14 China became Pakistan’s most important weapons and military equipment provider post-1965 – filling the void left by US sanctions. The first Sino-Pakistani agreement on military assistance was signed in 1966 and laid the ground for ever-growing military ties. In 1971, China – in convergence with the US – maintained its alignment with the Pakistani military regime, refrained from publicly criticizing its operations in East Pakistan, and emphasized the importance of Pakistan’s territorial integrity. In private, however, Bhutto was reportedly advised to seek a political solution for the crisis in East Pakistan on his visits to Beijing in 1971. Chinese leadership rejected Pakistani calls for military intervention, mainly because it did not want

Foreign policy persistence 227 to risk its endeavour to re-join the UN and become a permanent member of the UN Security Council in October that year and was constrained by domestic instabilities. In the aftermath of the armed conflict, only the warnings from Washington and Beijing to India prevented it from further advancing militarily into West Pakistan.15 Overall, during this period of transition from alignment with the West to a more diversified external balancing, Pakistan’s India-centric foreign policy persisted amid severe policy failure, and the great powers’ involvement either reinforced or at least fell short of transforming it. The root causes of the rivalry also largely remained unaddressed.

III 1971–1979: pursuit of non-alignment and bilateralism Pakistan’s foreign policy persistence was particularly puzzling during this phase following the country’s break-up, when internal and external conditions for foreign policy making were relatively conducive to change. First, costs to initiate another armed conflict with a neighbour that possessed overwhelming economic and military superiority and had demonstrated its ability to efficiently defeat the Pakistani army were now undeniably too high, and Pakistan was forced to reassess its foreign policy behaviour.16 Second, a new civilian leadership came into power that possessed considerable authority, promised radical political change and raised hopes of a rapprochement with India. In December 1971, Bhutto became president and in August 1973 the first elected civilian prime minister, a post he would remain in until his military ouster in July 1977. Bhutto was a highly charismatic political figure and his position as prime minister was invested with comprehensive powers under the new constitution of 1973. Moreover, he had gained great foreign policy authority when he used his diplomatic skills to adroitly negotiate the post-war Simla Agreement, which was perceived as favourable for Pakistan. Bhutto’s strong position in the new constellation of powers ruling Pakistan was further consolidated by the unprecedented weakness of the military that was heavily demoralized after its disastrous performance in the war. The country’s break-up questioned the military’s legitimacy as the sole guarantor of the state’s survival. As a result, “Bhutto’s views on foreign policy became those of Pakistan”.17 These conditions offered a genuine opportunity to change the course of Pakistan’s revisionist foreign policy. Yet, Bhutto demonstrated no inclination to use the opportunity for a genuine rapprochement with India, and hopes for change were soon dispelled. He shared with the military leadership the perception of India as a primary threat to Pakistan’s security and the conviction that it is the foreign policy’s foremost goal to ‘balance’ this threat with external help.18 India’s seizure of Pakistan’s Eastern part, Bhutto proclaimed, was only the climax of a long history of unabashed aggression toward Pakistan, a sign of Indian anti-Islamic, hegemonic aspirations, which had not reconciled with the post-Partition order of 1947.19 The fact that coercive diplomacy by outside powers was insufficient to deter Indian intervention justified the need to be stronger militarily and for additional patrons.20

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As soon as Bhutto returned from Simla, he embarked on a programme to develop nuclear weapons intended to serve as a ‘great equalizer’ by establishing strategic parity or at least ‘truncate’ the asymmetry.21 India’s ongoing military expansion in the 1970s and its first detonation of nuclear devices in May 1974 further strengthened his determination, and also led him to drastically increasing defence expenditures. The ambition for military modernization in a time of economic crisis increased the need for outside assistance. Given the disillusionment with Pakistan’s previous alliance-based security strategy, Bhutto made three recalibrations of his foreign policy. First, he sought to settle the acute outstanding conflict issues with India. This proceeded swiftly with the successful return of the Pakistani POWs, the withdrawal of Indian troops from occupied territory in Pakistan, and, in 1974, the recognition of Bangladesh as demanded by India. This tactical détente allowed the Bhutto government to turn the foreign policy elite’s focus away from a preoccupation with Kashmir and recalibrate the modalities of conducting foreign policy. Second, Bhutto ultimately shifted away from formal alliance building toward a ‘bilateral’ and ‘flexible’ approach that emphasized preserving balanced relations with all great powers on the basis of Pakistan’s independent interests.22 His foreign policy was framed in Islamic socialist and non-aligned rhetoric. From Bhutto’s perspective, the 1971 war had shown that entering formal military alliances at the side of one block of the Cold War had failed. In January 1972, he therefore announced Pakistan’s withdrawal from the Commonwealth and the SEATO. A diversification of foreign policy ensued, including deeper ties with states in Western and Eastern Europe (especially France, West Germany, Romania and Yugoslavia), Asia, Africa and South and Central America.23 In 1976, Pakistan joined the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) as an observer, and became its full member in 1979, quitting CENTO. Third, exempted from acute tensions with India and from rigid obligations within multilateral alignments, the Pakistani government strengthened existing bilateral ties with China and embarked on an unprecedented engagement with the Middle East.24 How did China and the US respond to and influence Bhutto’s post-war recalibrations? China, now a permanent member of the UN Security Council and appreciative of Pakistan’s facilitating role in the Sino-US rapprochement, consolidated its position as Pakistan’s most important strategic ally and strengthened Pakistan’s post-war bargaining position by using its first vetoes to block the entry of Bangladesh into the UN in 1972–1973 until India released the Pakistani POWs and Dhaka dissuaded from insisting on trying the 195 prisoners majorly responsible for the war massacres. China, in turn, appreciated Pakistan’s role as a facilitator of the Sino-US rapprochement and explicitly reiterated support for Pakistan’s Kashmir policy and its territorial integrity. Numerous high-level meetings in the 1970s subsequently led to growing ties in trade, culture and science. With the persistence of Washington’s arms embargo, China expanded its role as Pakistan’s main source of weapon procurement and the key partner for building up Pakistan’s civilian and defence industry.25 Most spectacularly, the strategic Karakoram Highway that connected Pakistan’s Northern Areas with

Foreign policy persistence 229 China’s Xinjiang Province through the Kunjerab Pass was completed in 1978. Some observers also assume that China provided expertise and technology to assist Pakistan’s nuclear ambitions already in the 1970s.26 Hence, Chinese military assistance “helped slow Pakistan’s gradual decline in comparison to India’s growing capability”.27 While China remained Pakistan’s key strategic ally in this period, it still rallied to maintain support from the US. Bhutto visited the US twice in September 1973 and February 1975 with the goal of getting the US arms embargo lifted and receiving economic and military support for Pakistan’s reconstruction and security. The Nixon and, after 1974, Ford administrations gradually withdrew their arms embargo. With the complete lifting of sanctions in 1975, the US again became a major supplier for military hardware. From 1976 to 1979, however, alienation between Pakistan and the US deepened when tensions erupted over nuclear issues. President Carter, in office since 1977, gradually suspended all US military sales and economic assistance to the country. Finally, Pakistan–US ties came to an all-time low when a mob in Islamabad burnt down the US embassy in November 1979.28

IV 1979–1988: fighting the US-funded jihad in Afghanistan With the Soviet invasion and occupation of Afghanistan in 1979, the fourth period saw Pakistan gaining geopolitical prominence as the frontline state in the Western struggle against Soviet expansion.29 In December 1979, Soviet troops landed in Kabul and occupied Afghanistan in order to support a communist Afghan regime against Islamist resistance groups, the Mujahideen. The Carter Administration had its vital interest in the free movement of oil in the Persian Gulf threatened, and sensed an opportunity to substantially weaken the USSR by bolstering the Afghan Mujahideen. In the Carter Doctrine, publicly announced on 23 January 1980, Washington declared it would militarily respond to the Soviet attempt to gain control of the Persian Gulf, subsequently built up the Rapid Deployment Force (later US Central Command (Centcom)), expanded its naval presence in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, and searched for partners. One potential ally, the pro-American Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran, had been overthrown earlier that year in the Iranian Revolution. General Ziaul Haq, who had come to power in a military coup in 1977, sought to exploit the unexpected opportunity and offered Pakistan’s services, and its geostrategic location and links to the Mujahideen made it an attractive partner. Only a few weeks after Pakistan’s relations to the US had come to an all-time low, General Zia was transformed overnight from an international pariah to America’s frontline ally in the fight against communism. Zia’s regime had its own motives to support the anti-Soviet resistance. First, it sought to avoid a security dilemma in which it would be threatened by two powerful hostile states, which shared close ties with each other. In the case of war with India, a two-front war became a palpable threat scenario with the Soviet expansion up to its borders. Moreover, Pakistan was concerned that

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Soviet forces in Afghanistan would provide assistance to dissidents in Balochistan. Second, the Afghan government installed by Moscow reinforced the irredentist claims for Pashtun areas in Pakistan. Third, Pakistan had to cope with a massive influx of refugees within months of the invasion. Given these motivations, the goals were threefold: to enforce the withdrawal of Soviet troops in the short term; to install a friendly government in Afghanistan; and to secure arms and funds to balance India and to bolster the military’s power. Pakistan’s relations with India, which had worsened since General Zia’s coup, initially saw cautious attempts at de-escalation after the Soviet invasion. From the Indian side, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi sent her foreign minister to Islamabad to convey that India would not exploit Pakistan’s emerging security dilemma, and that it would be interested in searching for a regional solution for the Afghanistan crisis. Gandhi later also suggested a treaty of peace and friendship. General Zia offered to set up a ‘no war’ pact, to establish a ‘nuclear free zone’, and to allow mutual inspection of Indian and Pakistani nuclear facilities.30 Both sides’ efforts, however, failed to materialize. Pakistan criticized India for not having condemned the Soviet invasion; India protested against the US rearmament of Pakistani military. Two crises, one in 1984 over competing territorial claims to Siachen, and another in 1986–1987 over the Brasstacks military exercise, India’s largest peacetime military exercise following Pakistan’s alleged support of Sikh separatists in Indian Punjab, further strained bilateral relations.31 In the shadow of the Afghanistan war, the 1980s had hence been a troublesome period for Indo-Pakistani relations – the great powers both fuelled the rivalry and defused acute crises. Most importantly, a fundamental transformation of Pakistan’s relations with the United States took place in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In the first year following the Soviet occupation, Pakistan pursued a cautious policy of external alignment and waited for the right moment to exploit its position as ‘frontline state’. An initial offer of support by President Carter of $400 million in 1979 was rejected as ‘peanuts’. General Zia’s patience paid off, and President Ronald Reagan, who succeeded Carter in 1981, offered the first sixyear assistance package, which was renewed in 1987. The first package amounted to $3.2 billion and the second to $4.02 billion of economic assistance and military sales.32 This made Pakistan the third largest recipient of US aid in 1987 after Israel and Egypt, and allowed it to play an international role disproportionate to its actual size and capabilities. While the Carter Administration had still enforced sanctions on the basis of Pakistan’s nuclear proliferation and human rights records, the Reagan Administration, preoccupied with expanding Pakistan’s status as frontline state in the struggle against Soviet communism, ignored both concerns despite Congressional opposition and the newly approved Pressler Amendment that made assistance dependent on the non-possession of a nuclear weapon – even though Pakistan had reportedly acquired nuclear capabilities in the early 1980s and run cold tests by 1983.33 In combination with substantial assistance received from Saudi Arabia, Pakistan’s military was thus capable of serving as ‘frontline state’,

Foreign policy persistence 231 a conduit for US and Saudi weapons sent to Afghan Mujahideen. The Pakistani military and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) coordinated funding, arming and training the Mujahideen in Afghanistan as well as in Pakistani training camps and madrassas, cooperated with the US intelligence, and developed close ties with the US Central Command. Ties with China, in the meantime, continued to deepen in several fields. Beijing, fearing a deepening Indo-Soviet alignment, endorsed Pakistan’s Afghan policy diplomatically and provided substantial support for its defence industry and nuclear programme. China, like the US, had reduced its military assistance during the crisis years of 1976–1977, but gradually increased it again after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan.34 China’s most pivotal impact on Pakistan’s India posture was the assistance provided for the Pakistani nuclear programme and missile technology. Since the late 1970s, the leading nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan, supposedly received material and know-how from Chinese scientists, including weapons-grade uranium and an entire weapon design that he later sold to other states.35 In 1986, finally, both governments signed a comprehensive nuclear cooperation agreement. What became clear in the 1980s, however, was that compared to the assistance provided in the crises of 1965 and 1971, China – given its improved relations with India and the military superiority of the USSR – had become more cautious in its support of Pakistan.36 Pakistan could expect ‘quiet support’, continuing military assistance and diplomatic support at the UN and other fora, but not a military intervention should a conflict with Soviet forces on the Afghan border occur.37 The Soviet defeat in Afghanistan had significant unintended consequences for Pakistan’s foreign policy: first, the ISI was bolstered to an extent that it developed as a ‘state in a state’ with a strong clout over foreign policy, structurally undermining civilian supremacy in that area. Second, the Pakistani ‘deep state’ realized that asymmetric warfare and playing ‘double games’ in Afghanistan was successful in defeating the Soviet military and could therefore be employed more vigorously than in the past against India – militant proxies left behind after the Soviet withdrawal or newly founded groups (such as Lashkar-eTayiba (LeT), founded in 1987 with the help of the ISI) would soon (be) turn(ed) against India. Third, Washington implicitly encouraged Pakistan’s deeper Islamization as it provided religious-committed resistant fighters for Afghanistan. Finally, approximately half of the US funds given to the ISI for fighting the Soviets were diverted to building nuclear weapons.38 Pakistan’s involvement in the Afghan conflict, while bringing short-term gains, had long lasting consequences and ultimately contributed to the military regime’s longevity and its persistent contestation.

V 1988–2001: overcoming isolation in the post-Cold War period In the late 1980s, Pakistan lost its strategic value in American eyes due to Soviet defeat in Afghanistan, and thereafter external balancing was complemented by

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the use of proxy militants and nuclear deterrence. During this period, several crises between Pakistan and India occurred, which sparked the risk of nuclear escalation and attracted growing outside interference. Concerns about nuclearization could now no longer be ignored in the US, leading to a set of sanctions and political alienation from the sole remaining superpower. Domestically, in 1988, Zia’s mysterious death in a plane crash paved the way for the election of Benazir Bhutto in 1988 as prime minister and the start of Pakistan’s second democratic period. Hopes for improving relations with India emerged again when in December 1988, Benazir and Indian PM Rajiv Gandhi – who were both highly popular and only had distant memories of Partition – signed two agreements on cooperation on Siachen and Sir Creek and a pact on the non-attack of each other’s nuclear facilities. In 1989, Gandhi paid an official visit to Pakistan, the first such visit in 30 years, and negotiations were expected to advance further.39 Yet the negotiations were quickly suspended when Gandhi lost the 1989 parliamentary elections and the ISI’s covert support of an unprecedented ethnoreligious insurgency in Jammu and Kashmir in 1989–1990 led to another bilateral crisis.40 As a result, the use of militant proxies evolved as a key tool of contestation against India in the post-Cold War era.41 Another contentious issue between Pakistan and India, which preoccupied Pakistan’s foreign policy during this period, was the ongoing civil war in Afghanistan. Once the Soviet withdrawal was achieved, Pakistan sought to install a ‘friendly’ government by using ISI’s leverage over the Islamist groups cultivated in the 1980s in order to counter growing Indian influence along Pakistan’s western border.42 Moreover, a ‘Pakistan-friendly’ Afghanistan would serve as ‘strategic depth’ in case of an Indian attack and a training area and safe haven for militant groups active in Kashmir.43 This strategy, promoted by Army Chief General Aslam Beg, Zia’s successor, definitively linked Pakistan’s India and Afghanistan policies. After the attempt to install a pro-Pakistan Mujahideen government had failed, Pakistan embraced the Taliban movement in 1994, helped it capture Kabul and assume power in September 1996, and was among the few states to recognize the Taliban government in May 1997. This policy limited Indian influence in Afghanistan, but also contributed to Pakistan’s international isolation. Afghanistan remained a contested arena between both rivals. In 1998, another tool was ultimately and overtly added to Pakistan’s contestation toolbox: nuclear deterrence. On 11 and 13 May, India engaged in its second nuclear test series. Pakistan followed suit on 28 and 30 May. Pakistan’s decision to test was driven by increasing domestic pressure and concerns triggered by hawkish tones from some members of the Indian ruling party BJP, but also by the lack of security guarantees from the US and the absence of immediate sanctions on India.44 Interestingly, this shock led to an initial rapprochement between the two rivals, which was however rapidly derailed when the Pakistani military under its new army chief, General Pervez Musharraf, launched a covert operation, infiltrating numerous Kashmiri militants and Pakistani paramilitaries into the Kargil heights on the Indian side of the Line of Control (LoC) in winter 1998–1999.

Foreign policy persistence 233 In the short term, the operation was a tactical success, as Pakistani forces and paramilitaries managed to occupy several positions by surprise and the provocation triggered a crisis that quickly escalated into limited war from May to July 1999 and attracted US attention. However, it ultimately resulted in a strategic failure both politically and militarily, as it was unanimously condemned internationally and the status quo antebellum was restored after Indian forces recaptured most occupied positions and Sharif agreed to withdraw troops. Heavily critical of the agreement, Musharraf assumed power in a coup in October that year, before the government could replace him as army chief. Under international mediation, both governments entered into a ceasefire in 2000, but India refused any contact with the new Pakistani leadership until July 2001 when Musharraf attended a summit in Agra.45 With the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1989, the end of the Cold War in 1990, the Soviet Union’s dissemination in 1991, and India’s economic liberalization following the 1991 economic crisis, the US priorities in South Asia shifted to Pakistan’s disadvantage. Washington now focused its engagement in the region on non-proliferation and stability, and Pakistan lost its strategic relevance as frontline state and became target of a series of sanctions. In October 1990, President George H.W. Bush suspended US economic assistance and military sales to Pakistan when he withheld certification under the Pressler Amendment that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear weapon.46 Islamabad reacted with ‘disbelief, shock and anger’ and perceived the sanctions as another example of the US as being a ‘fair-weather friend’.47 Washington’s focus on stability correlated with a new preference of the status quo in Kashmir.48 In the Kashmir crisis in 1990, the White House sent a high-level delegation, which was pivotal in de-escalating the hostilities and proposing confidence-building measures to prevent future similar crises.49 Subsequently, the US openly criticized Pakistan’s Kashmir policy, its support of the Taliban and its political instability. In 1998, Washington’s response to the nuclear tests was reportedly initially inept, as it was unaware of the Indian preparations, and subsequently ineffective, as it failed to persuade Pakistan’s leadership to follow suit. Washington’s influence over Pakistani decision-making was constrained by the general stress on their relations, the lack of US economic and security guarantees to Pakistan, and an intense perception of US ‘abandonment’ among the Pakistani elite during this period.50 The Clinton’s Administration’s decision to impose a second set of sanctions in the form of additional economic constraints further strained the relations and limited its leverage.51 Finally, Washington, now acutely concerned about nuclear escalation in South Asia, responded more vigorously to defuse the crisis in Kargil in 1999. When Sharif, after his request for support had been rebuffed in Beijing, visited Washington in July to bank on the US for escalation control and for pushing India to resolve the Kashmir dispute, Clinton forcefully rejected his request and unequivocally called on Pakistan to pull its troops back on its side of the LoC, bilaterally settle the dispute and resume dialogue, and threatened to stall an International Monetary Fund loan that Islamabad urgently needed.52

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The Kargil operation left an already friendless Pakistan isolated even by its closest allies, and when the operation became increasingly unpopular at home and the Indian counterattacks advanced, Sharif decided to ‘cut the losses’ and announced in July 1999 the immediate evacuation of the Kargil heights.53 Nevertheless, the US extended the nuclear-related sanctions after the Kargil crisis and the subsequent military coup in 1999 while commending India for its restraint.54 Washington’s blunt stance and its first open and firm accommodation of India’s position on Kashmir came as a rude shock to the Pakistani government and an unexpected surprise to the Indians. The US shift during the Kargil conflict paved the way for stronger ties with India. The sanctions meanwhile missed their aim of making Pakistan change its policy and instead led it to cultivate more reliable or cost-efficient strategies of contestation such as nuclear weapons and militant proxies. China’s political involvement in Pakistan’s foreign policy largely converged with that of the US during this period. Beijing’s strategic interest in Pakistan relatively declined as its focus shifted toward East, Southeast and Central Asia in the early post-Cold War period. China continued to assist Pakistan’s nuclear programme, but was also increasingly wary about the nuclear arsenal’s security. Moreover, growing tensions between the Chinese government and Uighur separatists in the Xinjiang province contributed to growing scepticism about the Pakistani state’s handling of Islamic militant groups inside Pakistan, some of which had links with the Uighurs. Finally, cautiously improving ties with India since Rajiv Gandhi’s visit to Beijing in December 1988 also added to a decline of interest in political alignment with Pakistan. During the Kashmir crisis in 1989–1990, Beijing still paid tribute to Pakistan’s Kashmir position. When Benazir Bhutto visited Beijing in December 1993, however, the Chinese government refused to mediate between India and Pakistan over Kashmir.55 In a watershed speech delivered to Pakistan’s National Assembly in December 1996, President Jiang Zemin for the first time openly urged Pakistan to bilaterally solve existing disputes and to divert its efforts away from India and Kashmir to domestic economic reforms. In 1998, Beijing’s response to the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests was closely coordinated with Washington.56 In 1999, China took a neutral stance and refrained from its traditional position of backing Pakistan in times of crisis. At the outset of the crisis, China called upon Pakistan to respect the LoC and to resume talks. When fighting broke out, Musharraf and Sharif went to China, but Prime Minister Wen Jiabao rebuffed their requests for support and merely advised Sharif to defuse the crisis.57 However, China’s new diplomatic take on Kashmir did not result in a significant change in its military support for Pakistan. Moreover, Beijing was keen to avoid a further isolation of Pakistan. China’s new ambivalence increased Pakistani insecurity about the reliability of external patrons in balancing India, and arguably contributed to a change of Musharraf ’s thinking on India and Kashmir.

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VI 2001–2014: from the War on Terror to regional pivot Following the terrorist events of 11 September 2001, Pakistan once again became a frontline state of the United States, this time in the global War on Terror. However, ahead of the withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan in December 2014, this sixth period in Pakistan’s foreign policy appeared to give way to a new regional outlook that aimed to forge closer relations with regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and, in particular, China. Pakistan sought to consolidate its strategic ties with Beijing as an alternative to the eroding US support. After 9/11 and on the eve of US military attack against the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, Pakistan rose from international isolation to regain the status of a pivotal US ally in the region – because it had established close links with the Taliban, shared a long border with Afghanistan and provided the only feasible route for international forces to attack Afghanistan.58 In the wake of the build-up of an overwhelming international front against Islamist terrorism emerging in the aftermath of 9/11, the military regime of General Pervez Musharraf abruptly suspended the support to Taliban and sided with the international coalition. Pakistan shared intelligence and conducted joint operations with US forces, which were allowed to use Pakistani airspace and a small number of airports in Balochistan and Sindh for communication, emergency and logistical support of their operations.59 However, the turn in Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy was a temporary tactical rather than a lasting strategic choice. Covert assistance to the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network continued, and any prospect for the Pakistani military to abandon its support was categorically undermined by its fear that India could dominate Afghanistan through its local Tajik allies once the US forces left. In fact, Musharraf argued that his Afghanistan policy was primarily driven by concerns that India would be the main benefactor of the new situation if Pakistan had refused to cooperate with the US. A sacrifice on the Afghan front was necessary to maintain leverage for the Kashmir cause.60 Consequently, Pakistan maintained its support of jihadi militants whose activities shifted from a focus on Kashmir to attacking India’s political and economic centres in 2001 and 2008 respectively. In December 2001, Kashmiri militants attacked the Indian parliament in India, leading the rivals to mobilize forces along their border.61 Having learnt in the Kargil crisis that a risk of conflict escalation would trigger decisive US intervention, both governments competed for US support – this time, India won.62 India created a credible threat situation in 2002, which led the US (and the UK) to intervene and defuse the so-called Twin Peak crisis. In the aftermath of the crisis, a remarkable opportunity for rapprochement occurred. Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee and President Musharraf resumed talks and the latter banned three terrorist organizations and accepted an unconditional ceasefire along the LoC. Subsequently, on the occasion of the twelfth SAARC Summit in January 2004, both leaders initiated a full-scale, ‘composite dialogue’ between their foreign ministers on concerns ranging from the demilitarization of the Siachen glacier dispute to nuclear confidence-building measures

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and also revived back-channel talks on Kashmir. Musharraf departed significantly from Pakistan’s traditional Kashmir policy of insisting on a UN referendum by offering bilateral Indo-Pakistani negotiations with the involvement of Kashmiri political groups.63 Arguably, this shift was driven by the failure of previous confrontations to yield any gains on Kashmir and increased international pressure on Pakistan after the proliferation activities of Pakistan’s key nuclear scientist, A.Q. Khan, were exposed in 2003. The dialogue allegedly produced a preliminary roadmap for the eventual settlement of the Kashmir dispute and almost led to a breakthrough. Yet, the process was again derailed. Musharraf had not mobilized sufficient backing in the army’s General Headquarters to counter internal resistance against his plans and had to retire from his positions as army chief and president in 2007 and 2008 respectively. General Ashfaq Kayani, who replaced Musharraf as army chief, returned to an India-centric foreign policy, not least to justify his reluctance to fight the Afghan Taliban networks in the tribal areas.64 The civilian government under President Asif Ali Zardari initially followed up on the dialogue, but all progress was lost when, in November 2008, militants attacked several sites in Mumbai. India immediately put the blame on Pakistan, but refrained from responding militarily. The dialogue would only be resumed in 2011 with cautious steps toward trade facilitation.65 Managing the highly ambivalent relationship with the United States was the primary focus of Pakistan’s foreign policy during this period. Once Pakistan sided with the US in Afghanistan, Washington lifted most sanctions in October– November 2001, revived bilateral relations in various fields such as trade, development, and military sales, and provided large-scale economic and military assistance.66 The assistance was primarily provided in unrestricted funds to combat terrorism. But it gradually became obvious that Pakistani and US goals in Afghanistan fundamentally ran counter to each other – not because the Pakistani military leadership was opposed to the US, but because it sought to maintain viable ties to the US’s enemy, the Afghan Taliban and the Haqqani Network. Large parts of US counter-terrorism assistance were therefore diverted to arm against India.67 In the crises of 2001–2002 and 2008, Washington sought to cultivate ties with both India and Pakistan and sought a balanced approach. The Bush Administration got actively involved in defusing the crisis of 2001–2002 in order to avoid Pakistani forces being transferred from the western to the eastern border. US government officials successfully reassured India that they would pressure Pakistan to take action against militant groups if, in return, the Indian forces would restrain their offensive, and strategically shared information with both parties.68 Washington, preoccupied in parallel with war in Iraq since 2003, stood by when the 2003–2008 Composite Dialogue failed and had to pick up the pieces in the aftermath of the Mumbai crisis, this time serving mostly as an information broker. Throughout the period, mistrust originating from a Pakistani sense of abandonment after 1989 was further deepened by the diverging goals in Afghanistan, but also by Washington’s historic rapprochement with India. It maintained

Foreign policy persistence 237 its geopolitical prominence by promoting its geostrategic location, and since the late 1980s, by manipulating the great powers’ fear of nuclear escalation and state failure. Pakistan was hence not simply a bystander of great power politics in the region, but actively sought asymmetric ways to benefit from it. Most importantly, a civil nuclear cooperation agreement Washington signed with India in 2008 but refused to Islamabad was perceived in Pakistan as a means also to enhance India’s fissile material stockpiles for future weapons.69 The Pakistani military was further frustrated with Washington when incoming President Barack Obama signed the Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act in 2009, authorizing the US Congress to triple civilian development assistance to the government of Pakistan to an annual $1.5 billion from 2010 to 2014 and tying the continuation of military assistance to the military’s non-interference in politics – a significant shift of US foreign aid practice away from a dominance of military to civilian support.70 However, the subsequent climb-down on the Enhanced Partnership Act demonstrated Washington’s reluctance to effectively pressure Pakistan’s military and its preference to engage with the most powerful institution, instead of the civilian government, as long as US forces remained in Afghanistan.71 The shift came in President Obama’s announcement in 2011 to withdraw combat forces from Afghanistan by the end of 2014 ultimately manifested a change of great power politics in Pakistan, contributing to a gradual diversification of its foreign policy, the pursuit of a regional pivot and further deepening of ties with China. Overall, however, China had an equally ambivalent influence on Pakistan’s foreign policy in this period. Beijing saw the increased US presence in the region with mixed feelings – on the one hand, it encouraged more US involvement to share the responsibility of maintaining Pakistan’s stability (and also share the Indian anger about extra-regional support to its rival); on the other hand, it was concerned about US military activities close to its border.72 China’s relief at the greater US presence was apparent in the Indo-Pak 2001–2002 crisis, when Beijing quietly coordinated its responses with Washington to defuse the crisis. Musharraf made three trips to Beijing during the crisis, yet, as was the case in the Kargil conflict, he returned with a call to resolve the crisis bilaterally and peacefully.73 In contrast, Beijing’s concerns became visible when, in 2007, Chinese citizens stationed in Pakistan were under threat during the assault of the Red Mosque and Beijing was forced for the first time to openly and firmly intervene in Pakistani domestic affairs.74 Following the 2008 Mumbai attacks, China expressed its concerns over the terrorism issue in Pakistan by ceasing its resistance in the UN Security Council towards resolutions declaring the Jamaat-udDawa a terrorist organization. In April 2010, Beijing struck a high-profile nuclear deal with Islamabad announcing its intentions to build two more nuclear power reactors in Pakistan, a move that was long planned but could now be easily justified as a tit-for-tat response to the Indo-US deal.75 Beijing’s continuing nuclear cooperation with Pakistan in this period was arguably as much driven by business interests as it was by efforts to facilitate a form of balance of power in South Asia.76

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In early 2012, Pakistan officially pronounced it would pursue what it termed as a “regional pivot” in foreign policy,77 which aimed to forge closer relations with regional powers such as Saudi Arabia and China. The PPP regime (2008–2013) had also declared its support of the “Afghan-driven and Afghanowned” peace process in Afghanistan and pledged to promote trade with India as part of the peace process that was revived in January 2011. After the Nawaz Sharif government came to power through the May 2013 elections, US–Pakistan relations moved steadily without any major friction ahead of the 2014 withdrawal of NATO troops from Afghanistan. However, sensing the likely erosion of US support to the country post-2014, the government clearly moved to consolidate strategic relations with China, which saw visible transformation from security to economic sphere. In 2015, the two countries agreed to the multibillion dollar China–Pakistan Economic Corridor that aimed to link Pakistan’s Gawadar port with China’s Xinjiang province through an extensive infrastructure network. However, as for relations with Afghanistan and India, the Sharif regime’s initial attempts to make peace could not produce a meaningful outcome. Whatever space it had carved out for itself in shaping these two core areas of foreign policy, independent of the military’s interests, was apparently lost within a year.78 This was due to violent anti-government protests in Islamabad by the PTI of Imran Khan and the PAT of Tahir-ul-Qadri, which allowed the military to reclaim its lost space in foreign policy. Meanwhile, the government of Prime Minister Narendra Modi in India, which after winning the May 2014 elections had shown due interest in normalizing relations with Pakistan, cancelled the scheduled foreign secretaries level talks between the two countries in August of that year. Within a month, the Indian and Pakistani armies were on the warpath again – with renewed shelling across the LoC in Kashmir and Working Boundary between the two countries, claiming several civilian lives on both sides. Their relationship remained tense until December 2015, when Modi’s surprise visit to Lahore revived hopes for the resumption of the peace process. In 2016, despite subsequent interaction between the National Security Advisors and Foreign Secretaries of the two countries, the fate of the Indo-Pak peace process appeared as uncertain as before.

Conclusion Throughout the six periods outlined above, the most consistent means of Pakistan’s revisionist agenda toward India, which is at the heart of its foreign policy as a whole, has been by way of borrowing power from extra-regional great powers involved in the region. Most prominently, Pakistan entered multiple formal and de facto military alliances with great powers involved in South Asia. Over the decades, it learnt to adapt to the waxing and waning involvement of the great powers: in the 1950s, 1980s and 2000s, the US had been the primary ally, replaced or complemented by China in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1990s (see Figure 13.1). It used the economic and military assistance to bolster its own capabilities

Foreign policy persistence 239

1950s

1960s

US

China

Cold War alliance

China tilt

1970s

1980s

China/ME US/China/ME Non-alignment bilateralism

Afghan jihad

1990s

2000s

Post-2011

ME

US/China

US/China

Overcoming isolation

War on Terror

Regional pivot

Figure 13.1 Changing primary external patrons and focal points [ME = Middle East].

and took into account the likelihood of third-party intervention and the great powers’ policy postures towards the region while devising its foreign and security policy. The more likely it thought it was that the US or China would intervene on its side, the more risk-tolerant it was to initiate and escalate conflict with India. Pakistan maintained its geopolitical prominence by promoting its geostrategic location, and, since the late 1980s, by manipulating the great powers’ fear of nuclear escalation and state failure. It was hence not simply a bystander of great power politics in the region, but its military establishment actively used it to sustain a hostile relationship with India. China and the United States – the two states that emerged as Pakistan’s most pivotal great power allies – have been deeply involved in the India–Pakistan rivalry. Their postures toward the rivalry ranged from conflict mitigation and management to conflict intensification. More often than not, mitigation through, for example, initiating peace talks, had no concrete results and fell short of mitigating the sources of Pakistan’s revisionist policy toward India. Conflict management has become a more common form of influence, in which Washington’s and Beijing’s role is confined to the containment of violent manifestations of Pakistan’s revisionism, for example by defusing crises. Intentionally or unintentionally, and sometimes contrary to their best intentions, both great powers’ involvement has more than anything else contributed to the persistence of Pakistan’s revisionism. First of all, economic and military assistance materially and ideologically bolstered the military institution (to the detriment of civilian players) whose strategic rationale remains averse to cooperation with India. Second, the readiness for political alignments fuelled the military’s (exaggerated) image of a geopolitical power in the region and its quest for strategic parity with India. Without this assistance, Pakistan’s security- and India-centrism would have arguably not been so prolonged, even though the possession of nuclear weapons has reduced its dependence on great powers to assist in balancing India. The tragedy of great power politics in Pakistan lies in the problem of unintended consequences of their involvement in the region. The strategy of seeking outside allies has been a constant balancing act that more often than not proved ineffective or even counterproductive to maximizing Pakistan’s security. In retrospect, the promotion of its geopolitical centrality has been a tactical blessing but a strategic curse. Short-term tactical gains came with the cost of long-term

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repercussions detrimental to Pakistan’s strategic goals toward India and the functioning of its state institutions. As a consequence, the dependence on assistance made Pakistan highly volatile to changing great power priorities and led it to become a rentier state, albeit one that lives off the rents for its strategic location. First signs indicate that Pakistan does not feel compelled to reconsider its balancing act in the wake of the withdrawal of US troops from Afghanistan and the loss of its frontline state status, but rather engages in hedging its allies. It is most likely, therefore, that the constants of Pakistan’s foreign policy will persist in the future, limiting the political scope of the post-Musharraf transition to civilian rule in the country.

Notes 1 For different perspectives on the periodization of Pakistan’s foreign policy, see HasanAskari Rizvi, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Overview, 1947–2004 (Lahore: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, 2004); Mohammad Waseem, ‘The dialectic between domestic politics and foreign policy’, in C. Jaffrelot (ed.), Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation? (London: Zed Books, 2002), pp. 263–283; and Karen Rasler, Sumit Ganguly and William R. Thompson, How Rivalries End (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2013), pp. 125–126. 2 See Stephen P. Cohen, Shooting for a Century. The India-Pakistan Conundrum (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2013); C. Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014); Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India–Pakistan Tensions since 1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); T.V. Paul, ‘Why has the India–Pakistan rivalry been so enduring? power asymmetry and an intractable conflict’, Security Studies 15/4 (2006), pp. 600–630. 3 Ashok Kapur, ‘Major powers and the persistence of the India–Pakistan conflict’, in T.V. Paul (ed.), The India–Pakistan Conflict. An Enduring Rivalry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 132–136. 4 Bhumitra Chakma, ‘Escalation control, deterrence diplomacy and America’s role in South Asia’s nuclear crises’, Contemporary Security Policy 33/3 (2012), pp. 554–576; Jason A. Kirk, ‘From “Tilt” to “pivot”?: U.S. intervention in India–Pakistan nuclear crises and implications for deterrence theory’, paper presented at the International Studies Association’s forty-ninth Annual Convention, San Francisco, 26 March 2008. 5 Alan Kronstadt and Samir Kumar, Pakistan Political Unrest (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2014). For detailed analyses on civil–military relations and their impact of Pakistan’s foreign policy, see Aqil Shah, The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in Pakistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror (Cambridge, Mass: M.E. Sharpe, 2005); Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 2010); and Aqil Shah, ‘Getting the military out of Pakistani politics’, Foreign Affairs (June 2011). Available at www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ 67742/aqil-shah/getting-the-military-out-of-pakistani-politics (accessed 2 May 2016). 6 Frederic Grare, ‘After Modi’s big win: can India and Pakistan enhance relations?’ The National Interest, 11 August 2014. 7 B.C. Rastogi, ‘Alignment and non-alignment in Pakistan’s foreign policy 1947–60’, International Studies 3/2 (1961), pp. 159–180. 8 Maya Tudor, The Promise of Power: The Origins of Democracy in India and Autocracy in Pakistan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2013).

Foreign policy persistence 241 9 Robert J. McMahon, The Cold War on the Periphery: The United States, India, and Pakistan (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). 10 Mohammed Ayub Khan, Friends Not Masters (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967), p. 154. 11 Sumit Ganguly, ‘Deterrence failure revisited: the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965’, Journal of Strategic Studies 13/4 (1990), pp. 77–93. 12 Husain Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding. (New York: Public Affairs, 2013), p. 158. 13 Christopher Van Hollen, ‘The tilt policy revisited: Nixon–Kissinger geopolitics and South Asia’, Asian Survey 20/4 (1980), pp. 339–361. 14 Aparna Pande, Explaining Pakistan’s Foreign Policy (Abingdon: Taylor and Francis, 2011), p. 41. 15 Shahid M. Amin, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 67–68. 16 Sumit Ganguly, Conflict Unending: India–Pakistan Tensions since 1947 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001), p. 79. 17 Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), p. 142. 18 Mohammad Waseem, ‘The dialectic between domestic politics and foreign policy’, in C. Jaffrelot (ed.), Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation? (London: Zed Books, 2002), p. 273. 19 Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, ‘Pakistan builds anew’, Foreign Affairs 51/3 (April 1973), pp. 541, 546. 20 T.V. Paul, The Warrior State. Pakistan in the Contemporary World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 52. 21 Samina Ahmed, ‘Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program: turning points and nuclear choices’, International Security 23/4 (1999), pp. 178–204. 22 Stephen P. Cohen, The Idea of Pakistan (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), p. 142. 23 Hasan-Askari Rizvi, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Overview, 1947–2004 (Lahore: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, 2004), p. 17. 24 Marvin G. Weinbaum and Gautam Sen, ‘Pakistan enters the Middle East’, Orbis 22/3 (1978), pp. 595–612. 25 W. Howard Wriggins, ‘Pakistan’s search for a foreign policy after the invasion of Afghanistan’, Pacific Affairs 57/2 (1 July 1984), pp. 286–295. 26 Hilary Synnott, ‘Regional relationships: India, China, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf ’, The Adelphi Papers 49/406 (June 1, 2009), p. 150. 27 W. Howard Wriggins, ‘Pakistan’s search for a foreign policy after the invasion of Afghanistan’, Pacific Affairs 57/2 (1 July 1984), p. 286. 28 Mohammad Waseem, ‘The dialectic between domestic politics and foreign policy’, in C. Jaffrelot (ed.), Pakistan: Nationalism without a Nation? (London: Zed Books, 2002), p. 273. 29 G.S. Bhargava, South Asian Security after Afghanistan (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1983). 30 W. Howard Wriggins, ‘Pakistan’s search for a foreign policy after the invasion of Afghanistan’, Pacific Affairs 57/2 (1 July 1984), p. 297. 31 K.P. Bajpai, P.R. Chari, P.I. Cheema, S.P. Cohen, S. Ganguly, Brasstacks and Beyond : Perception and Management of Crisis in South Asia (New Delhi: Manohar, 1995). 32 Hasan-Askari Rizvi, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Overview, 1947–2004 (Lahore: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, 2004), p. 19. 33 See Shahid M. Amin, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 184; Robert Wirsing, ‘The arms race in South Asia: implications for the United States’, Asian Survey 25/3 (1983), pp. 265–291.

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34 Francisco Aguilar, Randy Bell, Natalie Black, Sayce Falk, Sasha Rogers, Aki Peritz, An Introduction to Pakistan’s Military (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Kennedy School Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, July 2011), p. 12. 35 Jeffrey Smith and Joby Warrick, ‘Pakistani nuclear scientist’s accounts tell of Chinese proliferation’, Washington Post, 13 November 2011. 36 Shahid M. Amin, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 163. 37 W. Howard Wriggins, ‘Pakistan’s search for a foreign policy after the invasion of Afghanistan’, Pacific Affairs 57/2 (1 July 1984), p. 285. 38 Lawrence Wright, ‘The double game. Unintended consequences of American funding in Pakistan’, New Yorker, 16 May 2011. 39 J.N. Dixit, India–Pakistan in War and Peace (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 263. 40 Christian Wagner, ‘Pakistan’s foreign policy towards India and Afghanistan’, Sicherheit Und Frieden 28/4 (2010), p. 249. 41 S. Paul Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent: Nuclear Weapons Proliferation and Conflict in South Asia (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2007). 42 Husain Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding (New York: Public Affairs, 2013), p. 269. 43 Asad Durrani, ‘Strategic Depth – revisited’, The Express Tribune, 19 October 2011; Ejaz Haider, ‘Pakistan needs Strategic Depth’, The Express Tribune, 7 October 2011. 44 Samina Ahmed, ‘Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program: turning points and nuclear choices’, International Security 23/4 (1999), pp. 178–204. 45 Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, US Crisis Management in South Asia’s Twin Peaks Crisis (Washington, DC: Stimson Center, 2010), p. 14. 46 Lawrence Wright, ‘The double game. unintended consequences of American funding in Pakistan’, New Yorker, 16 May 2011. 47 Husain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005), pp. 281–282. 48 Howard B. Schaffer, The Limits of Influence: America’s Role in Kashmir (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), p. 6. 49 Sumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1997). 50 Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry. India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nuclear Weapons (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 134. 51 Sumit Ganguly, ‘Nuclear stability in South Asia’, International Security 33/2 (Fall 2008), p. 45. 52 Howard B. Schaffer, The Limits of Influence: America’s Role in Kashmir (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2009), p. 158. 53 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror (Cambridge, Mass: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), p. 174. 54 Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair and Jamison Jo Medby, Limited Conflicts Under the Nuclear Umbrella. Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2001), pp. 21–22. 55 Samina Yasmeen, ‘Pakistan’s cautious foreign policy’, Survival 36/2 (1994), p. 128. 56 Hassan Abbas, Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism: Allah, the Army, and America’s War on Terror (Cambridge, Mass: M.E. Sharpe, 2005), p. 174. 57 Swaran Singh, ‘The Kargil conflict: why and how of China’s neutrality’, Strategic Analysis 23/7 (1999), pp. 1083–1094; Ishtiaq Ahmed, Pakistan and Patrons: The United States, PR China and Saudi Arabia, ISAS Working Paper (Singapore: Institute of South Asian Studies, 2011); Howard B. Schaffer, How Pakistan Negotiates with the United States (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2011), p. 288. 58 Shahid M. Amin, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: A Reappraisal (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), p. 316; C. Raja Mohan, ‘China unlikely to adopt anti-India posture’, The Hindu, 11 June 1999; ‘Resume talks, China tells Sharif’, The Hindu, 29 June 1999.

Foreign policy persistence 243 59 Hasan-Askari Rizvi, Pakistan’s Foreign Policy: An Overview, 1947–2004 (Lahore: Pakistan Institute of Legislative Development and Transparency, 2004), p. 24; Husain Haqqani, Magnificent Delusions: Pakistan, the United States, and an Epic History of Misunderstanding. (New York: Public Affairs, 2013), p. 311. 60 C. Christine Fair, ‘The US–Pakistan relations after a decade of the War on Terror’, Contemporary South Asia 20/2 (June 2012), pp. 250–251. 61 Sumit Ganguly and Michael R. Kraig, ‘The 2001–2002 Indo-Pakistani crisis: exposing the limits of coercive diplomacy’, Security Studies 14/2 (April 2005), pp. 290–324. 62 P.R. Chari, P.I. Cheema and S.P. Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 186. 63 Steve Coll, ‘The back channel’, The New Yorker, 2 March 2009. 64 Christian Wagner, ‘Pakistan’s foreign policy towards India and Afghanistan’, Sicherheit Und Frieden 28/4 (2010), p. 250. 65 The newly elected governments in Pakistan and India in 2013 and 2014, respectively, promised to normalize relations, but persistent mistrust nurtured by constant fire exchanges at the LoC and political intervention by the Pakistani army averse to rapprochement have so far undermined any substantial advancements; see Ishtiaq Ahmad and Hannes Ebert, ‘Will Pakistan’s India policy under Sharif shift strategically?’ Strategic Analysis 37/6 (November 2013), pp. 667–674. 66 For an overview of US assistance to Pakistan between 2001–2011, see Susan B. Epstein and K. Alan Kronstadt, Pakistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2011). 67 Karen DeYoung, ‘Pakistan doubles its nuclear arsenal’, Washington Post, 31 January 2011. 68 Bhumitra Chakma, ‘Escalation control, deterrence diplomacy and America’s role in South Asia’s nuclear crises’, Contemporary Security Policy 33/3 (2012), pp. 554–576, pp. 564–570. 69 Karen DeYoung, ‘Pakistan doubles its nuclear arsenal’, Washington Post, 31 January 2011; Pervez Hoodbhoy, ‘Pakistan’s rush for more bombs – why?’ The Express Tribune, 29 January 2012. 70 Ishtiaq Ahmad, ‘The U.S. Af–Pak strategy: challenges and opportunities for Pakistan’, Asian Affairs: An American Review 37/4 (November 2010), p. 193; Claude Rakisits, ‘Pakistan’s military riled by the Kerry–Lugar Bill’, World Politics Review, 9 October 2009. 71 Aqil Shah, ‘Getting the military out of Pakistani politics’, Foreign Affairs (June 2011). Available at www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67742/aqil-shah/getting-themilitary-out-of-pakistani-politics (accessed 2 May 2016). 72 John W. Garver, The China–India–U.S. Triangle: Strategic Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, NBR Analysis (Seattle, WA: The National Bureau of Asian Research, October 2002), p. 41. 73 P.R. Chari, P.I. Cheema and S.P. Cohen, Four Crises and a Peace Process: American Engagement in South Asia (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 123. 74 C. Christine Fair, Fighting to the End: The Pakistan Army’s Way of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 190. 75 Ashley J. Tellis, The China–Pakistan Nuclear ‘Deal’. Separating Fact From Fiction (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2010). 76 T.V. Paul, ‘Chinese–Pakistani nuclear and missile ties and the balance of power’, The Nonproliferation Review 10/2 (Summer 2003), pp. 1–9. 77 For details, see Ishtiaq Ahmad, ‘Pakistan’s “Regional Pivot” and the endgame in Afghanistan’, IPRI Journal 13/2 (Summer 2013), pp. 1–20. 78 Mehreen Zahra Malik, ‘Pakistan’s political crisis puts army in the driving seat’, Reuters, 20 August 2014.

Index

Afghanistan 1, 12–13, 17, 20n13, 24, 27, 32–5, 38n31–8n36, 46–7, 49, 55, 67, 78, 99, 115–18, 181, 193–4, 196–200, 206, 208n14, 212–13, 217–18, 219n10, 219n15, 222, 225, 229–32, 235–8, 240, 241n25, 241n27, 241n29–41n30, 242n37, 242n40, 243n64, 243n77 agencies 34, 105, 116–17, 143, 149, 183, 185, 188, 212, 218 army 1, 6–7, 9–10, 12, 14, 17, 21n42, 21n51, 26, 32, 38n33, 39–40, 42–4, 47–8, 50, 53, 55–6, 62, 64–6, 68, 69n9, 141–3, 146, 150–1, 153, 184–5, 227, 232–3, 236 Army General Headquarters (GHQ) 11, 59–61, 117, 213, 216 Awami National Party (ANP) 12, 115–18, 120, 183 Balochistan 12, 16–17, 25, 30, 32–4, 49, 57, 99, 111, 127–8, 153, 159, 169, 171–4, 176–88, 189n21, 189n24, 190n34, 190n36, 190n41, 190n48, 190n49, 190n55, 190n56, 191n65, 191n66, 214, 216, 230, 235 Beijing 225–7, 231, 233–4, 237, 239 Bhutto, Benazir 26, 41–2, 59–60, 100, 103, 144–5, 150, 232 Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali 7, 25, 40–2, 59, 65–6, 75, 141, 172, 196, 226–9, 241n19 campaign 1, 27, 40, 45, 49, 90, 115, 117, 158, 161, 173, 214, 217 Central Asia 33–4, 234 centralisation 92, 113, 129, 131, 171, 182, 187–8, 211 China 17, 32–4, 46, 49, 60, 194, 198, 204–6, 207n1, 208n39, 209n45, 210, 212, 214, 216–19, 220n35–6, 220n40,

222–4, 228–9, 231, 234, 237–9, 241n26, 242n57–242n8, 243n72, 243n75 China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) 2, 34–5, 186, 190n38–190n39, 191n59, 191n61, 216 citizenship 44–6, 50, 78, 102, 114–15, 128, 132 civil-military 2–10, 12–15, 17–19, 20n17, 21n36, 21n45, 23, 25–6, 29, 31–6, 36n3–4, 50, 51n2, 53–5, 57, 62–3, 68, 69n1–69n2, 70n10–70n11, 70n26, 71n34, 71n43, 95–6, 98–9, 106, 110–11, 119–23, 124n16, 141, 184, 208n34, 210, 214–16, 218–21, 240n5 civilian 1–2, 5, 7–15, 17–19, 19n2, 23, 25–36, 39, 41–6, 49–50, 53–62, 65–6, 68, 69n7, 72, 92, 95–101, 104–6, 109n22, 110–11, 116–23, 126, 144, 146–8, 150–3, 155n49, 173, 181, 183–6, 189n16, 192–5, 203, 210–11, 213, 216, 218, 222–3, 227–8, 231, 236–40 civilian supremacy 1, 10, 18, 58, 96, 99, 104, 106, 123, 231 class 3–4, 6–7, 12–15, 18, 29–30, 43, 49, 54, 57, 63–4, 67, 72–5, 77–92, 100, 102–8, 113–14, 120, 123, 126, 130, 139, 164, 180, 196–7, 199, 202, 214 Cold War 4, 24, 33, 194, 217, 224–5, 228, 231–4, 241n9, 243n72 colonial state 6–7, 39–40, 43, 66, 74, 77, 90, 113, 114, 131, 132, 172; pre-colonial 6, 74; post-colonial 98, 101, 115, 126–7 conflict 3, 6, 13–14, 17–19, 25–6, 32–6, 40, 47, 62–3, 68, 85, 92, 102, 110–12, 119, 122–3, 141, 169–71, 175, 177, 183, 187, 191n62, 206, 210, 223–5, 227–8, 231, 234–5, 237–9 constitution 16, 24–6, 32, 36n2, 41, 45, 48, 58, 69n9, 75, 95–7, 99, 101, 104, 106–7,

Index 113–14, 120, 122–3, 126, 128, 135, 142, 144, 146, 149–52, 170–4, 183, 189n19, 227; coup 4, 8–11, 25, 30, 38n37, 40–2, 47, 57, 66, 72, 75–6, 82, 91, 100, 113, 120, 138n8, 141–2, 144, 156, 210, 225, 229–30, 233–4 decentralization 40, 48, 129, 136, 169–71, 176–7, 182, 187, 188n3, 189n10 democracy 1–2, 4–7, 10–11, 14–19, 20n29, 23–7, 29, 36, 39–40, 43, 45, 47, 50, 51n21, 51n23, 54, 56–7, 63, 65–6, 72–3, 91, 94n34, 95–8, 100–8, 110, 113–14, 118, 123, 126–7, 135, 140, 142, 144–5, 148, 150–1, 157–61, 163, 166, 170, 173, 180, 182–8, 192, 21–13, 215 democratic 1–5, 7, 9–16, 18, 23–6, 28–31, 33, 35–6, 41–1, 43–50, 53, 55–7, 63, 92, 95, 97–101, 103, 105–8, 109n18, 110, 112, 117, 122, 126–7, 129, 134, 136, 138, 140, 144–5, 150, 152, 156–7, 160–1, 164, 178, 182–5, 188, 193, 211–12, 215, 223–4, 232 developing countries/world 3, 4, 73, 98, 132, 193, 195, 200–2, 210 education 16, 18, 45, 60, 78–9, 82–7, 90, 105, 126, 129–39, 156, 158–66, 175, 187, 190n28, 191n62, 191n65, 201–2, 206 Eighteenth Amendment 16–17, 36n9, 48, 86, 92, 126, 131, 134–7, 161, 169, 171, 174–8, 181–4, 186–8, 190n29–190n30 Eighth Amendment/Article 58–2(b) 24, 25, 26, 29, 30, 129, 144 elections (1970) 24, 40, 59, 75, 134 elections (2008) 1, 23, 47, 134, 144, 178 elections (2013) 1, 2, 8, 11–15, 17, 27, 29, 30, 39, 48, 49, 56, 72, 90, 103, 110, 114, 118, 120, 150, 178, 179–80, 185, 201, 203, 210, 214, 238 elite 8, 15, 23–4, 31–3, 37n20, 39–40, 44–5, 47–8, 56, 61–4, 66–9, 71n36, 72, 74–6, 84–9, 92, 95, 98, 100, 104–5, 108, 112–14, 127, 130, 132, 138, 140–1, 146–7, 158, 187, 217, 223–5, 228, 233 establishment 2, 6–7, 12, 14–15, 23–5, 31–3, 49–50, 53–7, 60, 62–5, 67–8, 98, 100, 104, 106–7, 110–14, 118–20, 123, 125n50, 133, 140, 146, 148, 151–2, 170–1, 178, 206, 210–13, 216, 218, 239; ethnicity 3, 18, 30, 74, 84, 87, 110, 136, 170, 181 extremism 18, 27, 68, 99, 130–1, 193

245

extremist 27–8, 30, 105, 113–15, 131, 197, 206 federal 39, 45, 75, 105, 128, 135, 146, 152, 161, 169–77, 180–2, 185–8, 201, 206, 214 Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) 57, 99, 116 feudal 15, 23, 44, 51n18, 63, 66–7, 72, 74, 84, 89, 91, 98, 107 foreign policy 5, 13–14, 17–19, 21n50, 23–4, 28–2, 31–4, 36n4, 41, 47, 55, 60, 99–100, 104, 106, 110, 117, 119–20, 122, 125n44, 151, 157, 184, 217–18, 219n5, 219n8, 219n13–219n14, 220n43–220n4, 222–5, 227–8, 231–2, 234–9, 240n1, 240n5, 240n7, 241n14–241n15, 241n18, 241n23, 241n25, 241n27–41n8, 241n30, 242n36–7, 242n40, 242n55, 242n58, 243n59, 243n64 governance 4, 13, 15, 17, 19, 28, 30, 44, 53, 73, 75, 84, 86, 90–1, 97, 105–7, 110–12, 116, 118, 122–3, 132, 136, 140, 146, 148, 156, 160, 171, 181, 187, 192, 195, 211, 215 grassroots 41–2, 43, 180 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 159–60, 162, 198, 201, 204, 208n27 Gwadar 34, 184, 186, 205, 216 Haq, General Ziaul 12, 24, 41, 67, 75, 129, 138n8, 140, 194, 229 hierarchy 32, 68, 74, 85, 163 human rights 28, 103, 114–15, 117, 136, 138, 144, 147, 151, 173, 187, 219n9, 230 ideology 16, 50, 56, 87, 115, 126, 128–34, 224 India 1–12, 6–7, 9, 13–14, 17, 19, 23–5, 27, 33–6, 39–43, 56–7, 49–50, 55, 61, 65, 74, 77, 87, 89, 99–100, 106, 110, 112–13, 115–19, 121–3, 127, 129, 132, 141, 171, 196, 198–201, 206–7, 213–14, 216, 218, 222, 239 institutions 6, 8, 15, 31, 40, 43, 48, 61, 67, 69n9, 74, 76, 82–3, 87, 90, 95–8, 100, 108, 110–12, 114, 120–2, 130–2, 138, 145, 149, 156–8, 170–2, 188, 196, 210, 240 Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) 21n49, 21n51, 27–8, 38n34, 42, 55, 117–19, 121, 123, 144, 153, 173, 212, 231–2

246

Index

International Monetary Fund (IMF) 157, 201–5, 208n32, 208n37 Islam 37n20, 44–50, 59, 108, 110, 115, 127–8, 131–5, 171–3 Islamic 14–16, 45, 50, 75, 110–11, 113–15, 52n27, 52n29, 52n44, 117–18, 121–3, 126, 128–34, 137, 172, 227–8, 234 jihad 27, 34, 49, 111, 113–16, 122, 130, 135, 139n15, 193, 229, 235 Jinnah, Mohammad Ali 24, 37n21, 40, 44, 51n20, 65 Judicial Commission 2, 19n1, 21n47, 29, 150, 153, 214 judiciary 1, 3, 8, 11, 13, 14–16, 18, 28–30, 47, 72–4, 85–7, 89–91, 96, 100, 104, 107, 108, 110, 111, 114, 115, 119–21, 130, 140–53, 174 Justice Chaudhry 28, 47, 142–9, 154n7 Kashmir 6, 7, 13, 23, 26–7, 34–6, 42, 46–7, 117, 119, 141, 224–6, 228, 232–6, 242n48–9, 242n49, 242n52 Kerry-Lugar-Berman Act 27, 223 Khan, General Ayub 24–5, 59, 65–7, 71n37, 75, 87, 104, 132, 140, 194, 224, 226, 241n10 Khan, Imran 1, 12, 21n51, 39, 48, 50n2–50n3, 55, 72, 85, 98, 100, 114, 117–18, 121, 125n35, 238 Latin America 4, 59, 61, 63, 160 Lawyer’s Movement 1, 28, 72, 91, 144, 154n9, 154n12 leadership 1, 6, 8–9, 11–12, 16, 26–8, 31–1, 35, 37n13, 39, 43, 50, 53–5, 57, 61, 64–6, 68n9, 75, 84, 98, 103, 105–6, 112–13, 118–20, 135, 144, 148, 153, 173–4, 183–5, 192, 213–19, 223, 225–7, 233, 236 legitimacy 11, 25, 41, 45, 54, 56–7, 64, 75, 85, 96, 111, 114–15, 117, 122, 131, 141, 181, 184–5, 227 marginalization 43–5, 115, 130, 172, 183 media 1–2, 7–18, 28–9, 31, 47–8, 55, 61–2, 65, 67–8, 73, 82–4, 86–91, 97–8, 100, 102–5, 107–8, 110–11, 116, 118, 120, 122–3, 137, 142–4, 146, 151–2, 161, 175, 195, 211, 214 militancy 3, 15, 31–2, 67, 71n42, 108, 110–11, 114–15, 123, 130–1, 216 military coup 4, 9, 19n11, 25, 28, 38n37,

39, 41–2, 46–7, 76, 91, 138n8, 142, 144, 229, 234 minorities 43, 45, 50, 115, 128, 131, 137, 169–71, 181–3, 188 Musharraf, General Pervez 1–2, 7–9, 10, 11–12, 14, 16, 18, 23–8, 30, 36n5, 36n7, 42, 47, 51n15, 55, 59, 66–8, 70n19, 72, 76, 85, 87, 100, 103–4, 106, 109n20, 112, 116, 119–20, 123, 125n46, 135, 140–5, 147–8, 150, 153, 154n8, 154n15, 155n37–9, 155n73, 194, 198, 211, 213, 215, 217, 220n38, 232–7, 240 Muslim 39–40, 43–5, 66, 75, 77, 112–13, 115, 117, 127–8, 134, 224–5 Muslim League 23, 25, 39–40, 43–4, 51n20, 59, 112–13, 171–2, 224 Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) 25, 32, 41–2, 59, 114–15, 117, 120, 183 narrative 9, 15–16, 18, 31, 40, 43, 46, 53, 56, 61, 87, 89–92, 99, 100, 104, 114, 129, 156, 164–6, 171–2, 175, 178, 181–2, 184 National Action Plan (NAP) 2, 32, 34, 106, 118, 151, 184, 216 National Assembly 36n2, 129, 135, 151, 174, 234 national security 1, 6–7, 17, 23, 25, 31, 33, 49–50, 56, 65, 67, 69n9, 96, 99–100, 106, 108n13, 116–17, 157, 165, 238 national security state 5–6, 7, 13, 56 NATO 27, 32, 116, 118, 194, 196, 217, 222, 235, 238 news 28, 48, 84, 87–8, 119 non-state actors 18, 115, 117, 122, 211 North Waziristan 1–2, 17, 27, 31, 55, 100, 108n12, 116–17, 122, 206, 219 Obama, Barak 27, 203, 237 Pakistan Muslim League 1, 25, 39, 59, 143, 224 Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) 1, 11, 17, 24–8, 30, 32–3, 35, 48–50, 59, 72, 89–90, 100–6, 116–17, 144, 148, 150, 180, 182–3, 201–2, 204, 210, 213–17 Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) 11–12, 24–30, 33, 35, 40, 42, 44, 48, 59, 66, 72–3, 75, 89, 100–1, 105–6, 108n11, 115–17, 120, 134–5, 144–5, 148, 150, 174, 180, 182–3, 189n19, 196–8, 201, 203, 213–15, 220n20, 238 Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (PTI) 11–12, 15,

Index 29–31, 33–4, 39, 48–9, 31, 33–4, 39, 48–9, 55, 72, 85–6, 90, 98, 100, 103, 108n9, 108n11, 114, 116, 118, 121–2, 135, 149–50, 182, 208n29, 210, 214, 238 Panama Leaks 2, 9, 19n3, 149 parliament 8, 11, 15, 21n51, 32, 42, 48, 55, 58–60, 66, 86, 89, 95, 103–4, 108n9, 111, 117–19, 129, 135–6, 142, 144, 144, 146–7, 150, 172–4, 178, 183, 217, 232, 235 patronage networks/politics 6, 13, 24, 29, 30, 54, 55, 59, 66, 73–6, 84, 85–6, 100, 164, 180, 185 policies 3, 10, 16, 26, 38n33, 45, 65, 99, 126, 131–5, 137–8, 157–8, 161, 172–3, 175, 184, 194, 197–8, 210, 232 population 31–1, 45, 48–9, 56, 73–4, 76–7, 79–81, 83, 87–8, 90, 102, 114, 128, 136, 156–7, 160, 163, 175, 177–8, 180, 185, 199–200, 202 praetorian politics 1–2, 5, 13, 15, 23, 54, 63, 171 Punjab 6–7, 12, 30, 40, 45, 63, 77, 92, 113–14, 116, 118, 121, 127–8, 135, 147, 159, 177, 182, 197, 199, 202, 214, 217, 230 Raheel Sharif 2, 65, 106, 121, 215, 217–18 reforms 6, 17, 40–2, 48–9, 66, 75, 86, 134–5, 166, 172, 195–8, 203, 209n46, 214–15, 234 regime 1, 3–7, 11–12, 17, 21n47, 24–31, 33–4, 41–2, 45, 50, 59, 66–7, 72–3, 75–6, 85, 91, 96, 98, 100, 104–6, 110, 115, 117–19, 123, 124n30, 130, 132–3, 135, 140, 145, 148, 181–5, 187, 192–6, 198, 201, 223–4, 226, 229, 231, 235, 238 religion 14, 30, 37n20, 45, 112–13, 131–3 religious 3, 19, 25, 44–5, 50, 61, 67, 71n36, 75, 89, 99–100, 102, 105, 110, 112, 115, 121, 126–7, 129, 131, 137, 143, 180, 185, 193, 224, 231 rural 42, 44, 66–7, 72–4, 77–8, 80, 82–5, 89–91, 102–3, 159, 198, 200, 202; Sharif, Nawaz 1, 8, 10, 12, 17, 21n43, 21n51, 26, 29, 31, 36n4, 38n37, 39, 42, 50, 52n42, 55, 60, 100, 103, 106, 111, 118, 125n43, 141, 144, 189n21, 192, 213, 218, 220n38, 221n46–7 sectarian 17–19, 25, 30, 45, 91, 105, 112, 115, 122, 185, 193, 198, 216

247

security 1–2, 5–9, 13–14, 16–18, 23–4, 27–36, 38n33, 39, 47, 49–50, 53, 55–6, 60–1, 65, 67, 69n9, 73, 85, 92, 96, 98–100, 104–6, 110, 113, 116–20, 122, 126–30, 150–1, 157, 165, 171, 183–5, 198, 201, 206, 210–15, 217, 219, 222–4, 226–30, 233–4, 237–40 Sindh 2, 25, 32, 42, 50, 72, 77, 89, 114, 116, 120, 127–8, 136, 159, 177, 202, 215, 235 South Asia 2, 33–5, 73, 102, 119, 200, 225, 233, 237, 238 strategic 12, 17, 24, 27, 31–4, 38n33, 46, 49, 53, 57, 67, 76, 113, 119, 186, 198, 210, 212, 216–18, 219n10, 222, 225, 228–9, 231–40 Supreme Court 2, 13, 16, 24, 28, 47, 120–1, 125n49, 140–53, 155n35, 159, 167n10, 184, 214 Taliban 12, 27, 34, 37n13, 47, 49, 55, 62, 100, 105–6, 111, 114–18, 134, 198, 212, 218, 232–3, 235–6 Tehrik-e-Taliban (TTP) 1–2, 27, 31–2, 37n13, 115–17, 122, 215–16, 220n30 terrorism 1, 8, 9, 13, 15, 18–19, 27–8, 31–5, 37n13–14, 45, 49, 55, 92, 106, 110–11, 116, 118, 123n3, 139n14, 145, 151, 184–5, 193, 198, 206, 211–12, 215, 219n12, 220n31, 235–7 transition(s) 1, 3–5, 7–8, 10–16, 18, 24–6, 28–9, 31–3, 36n9, 40–1, 43, 47, 50, 53–4, 56, 71n47, 92n3, 94n42, 96, 98–9, 101, 103, 105–6, 108, 109n18, 109n21, 110, 120, 127, 132, 135, 139n12, 140, 144–5, 152, 156–61, 167n4, 199, 206, 210, 212–13, 215, 223, 227, 240 tribal 12, 27, 32–3, 66, 74, 84–5, 91, 112, 118, 180, 194–5, 197–8, 215, 236 Troika 58 Twenty-First Constitutional Amendment 55, 92, 118, 151 United States 17, 20n14, 20n30, 27, 32, 34, 46, 99, 165, 188n2, 193, 217, 222–3, 230, 235–6, 239, 241n9, 241n12, 241n33, 242n42, 242n57, 243n59 urban 15, 25, 30, 42–3, 48–9, 72–4, 76–8, 82–91, 100, 102–4, 107, 112–14, 151, 157, 162, 200, 209n47, 215 violence 19, 25, 28, 30, 37n20, 45, 63, 68–9, 92, 97, 99, 105, 112, 114, 122, 131, 151, 187, 193, 210, 216, 224

248

Index

war 6, 23, 27, 32–5, 38, 40, 47, 54, 59, 61, 65, 67, 78, 82, 84, 107, 114–16, 132, 141, 151, 196–200, 207n13, 211–13, 216–17, 224–33, 236, 241n11 War on Terror 12, 27, 33–4, 36n6, 49, 125n32, 144, 193, 212, 217, 219n11, 235, 240n5, 242n53, 242n56, 243n60

youth 12–13, 15–16, 29–30, 49, 72–3, 83–4, 86, 88, 100, 103–5, 157–8, 180, 199–200 Zarb-e-Azb 27, 32, 100, 117–18, 206, 216