Radicalization in Pakistan (Routledge Advances in South Asian Studies) [1 ed.] 0367618540, 9780367618544

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Radicalization in Pakistan

This book offers a critical analysis of radicalization in Pakistan by deconstructing the global and the official state narratives designed to restrain Pakistani radicalization. Chapters are centered around three distinct themes: educational norms, religious practices, and geopolitical aspects of radicalization to examine the prevalent state and global practices that propagate Pakistani radicalization discourse. The book argues that there is both a global agenda, which presents Pakistan as the epicenter and sponsor of terrorism, and a domestic, or official, agenda that portrays Pakistan as the state that sacrificed and suffered the most in the recent War on Terror, which allows the country to gain sympathy as a victim. Delineating both conflicting agendas through a critical analysis of global and state practices in order to understand the myths and narratives of radicalization in Pakistan constructed by powerful elites, the book enables readers to gain a better understanding of this phenomenon. A multidisciplinary critical approach to comprehending radicalization in Pakistan with innovative prescriptions for counter-radicalization policy, this book will be of interest to researchers working in the fields of International Relations, Security Studies, Asian Politics, as well as Religious Studies and Education, in particular in the context of South Asia. Muhammad Shoaib Pervez is an Associate Professor and the Chair of the Department of Political Science and International Relations at University of Management and Technology Lahore, Pakistan. His book Security Community in South Asia, also published by Routledge (2012), was awarded the National Outstanding Research Award for the best book in Social Science 2012 by the Higher Education Commission, Government of Pakistan. He was also the Fulbright Post-Doctoral Fellow at Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at SIPA, Columbia University, USA from 2014 to 2015.

Routledge Advances in South Asian Studies Edited by Subrata K. Mitra, Heidelberg University, Germany and Rani Mullen College of William and Mary, USA

South Asia, with its burgeoning, ethnically diverse population, soaring economies, and nuclear weapons, is an increasingly important region in the global context. The series, which builds on this complex, dynamic, and volatile area, features innovative and original research on the region as a whole or on the countries. Its scope extends to scholarly works drawing on history, politics, development studies, sociology, and economics of individual countries from the region as well those that take an interdisciplinary and comparative approach to the area as a whole or to a comparison of two or more countries from this region. In terms of theory and method, rather than basing itself on any one orthodoxy, the series draws broadly on the insights germane to area studies, as well as the tool kit of the social sciences in general, emphasizing comparison, the analysis of the structure and processes, and the application of qualitative and quantitative methods. The series welcomes submissions from established authors in the field as well as from young authors who have recently completed their doctoral dissertations. 36. Ethno-political Conflict in Pakistan The Baloch Movement Rizwan Zeb 37. Perspectives on Contemporary Pakistan Governance, Development and Environment Ghulam Ali and Ejaz Hussain 38. Radicalization in Pakistan A Critical Perspective Edited by Muhammad Shoaib Pervez 39. Society, Resistance and Civil Nuclear Policy in India Nuclearising the State Varigonda Kesava Chandra For a full list of titles, please see: https://www.routledge.com/asianstudies/series /RASAS

Radicalization in Pakistan A Critical Perspective

Edited by Muhammad Shoaib Pervez

First published 2021 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2021 selection and editorial matter, Muhammad Shoaib Pervez; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Muhammad Shoaib Pervez to be identified as the author of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-0-367-61854-4 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-10789-7 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India

Dedicated to the loving memory of my late father, Wajeeh Uddin Pervez (1941–2019) (who inculcated me with the values of honesty, truthfulness, and straightforwardness)

Contents

List of tables List of boxes List of appendices List of contributors Acknowledgments 1

Introduction: Conceptual conundrum and the approach of the book

ix x xi xii xiv

1

MUHAMMAD SHOAIB PERVEZ

PART I

Educational aspect 2

Education and radicalization in Pakistan: A post-colonial perspective

15 17

FATIMA WAQI SAJJAD

3

Teaching toward a culture of peace: Analysis of Islamiat and Ethics textbooks

35

ASHAR JOHNSON KHOKHAR

4

Infusing cultural diversity into Pakistan Studies textbooks: An analysis of textbooks and teachers’ perspectives

61

YAAR MUHAMMAD AND PETER BRETT

PART II

Religious aspect 5

Pacifying Sunni–Shī’ite relations in Pakistan: Patterns of (de)humanization and prospects of trust-building SOHAIB ALI AND FATIMA WAQI SAJJAD

77 79

viii Contents PART III

Geopolitical aspect 6

The radicalized regional order of India–Pakistan and prospects of a security community

103 105

MUHAMMAD SHOAIB PERVEZ

7

Deconstructing the myth of Pashtun as a nation of extremists and warriors: Causes of radicalization in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

129

ARSHAD ALI AND FAZAL SUBHAN

8

Conclusion

149

MUHAMMAD SHOAIB PERVEZ

Index

153

Tables

3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5

Tri-phase analytical framework List of textbooks analyzed in this study Outline of Ethics textbook content Ethics textbooks Classes 9 and 10 Islamic Education Classes 9 and 10

43 44 48 49 53

Boxes

3.1 3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5

Excerpt from Ethics textbook explaining to pupils how ethics is rooted in religion Excerpt from Ethics textbook explaining reasons for studying religions and their basic teachings Excerpt from Ethics textbook explaining to pupils (non-Muslims) Pakistan’s pluralistic aspect Excerpt from Ethics textbook explaining the reasons for selecting the Ethics textbook content Excerpt from Ethics textbook explaining the objectives of teaching Ethics as a subject

45 45 46 46 47

Appendices

7.1 List of interviewees 7.2 Questionnaire

145 146

Contributors

Arshad Ali (PhD, Otago University, New Zealand), Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Management and Technology. Co-author: The Evolution of the National Security State in Pakistan: 1947-1989, in the journal Democracy and Security, 2019. Ashar Johnson Khokkhar, doctoral candidate, Assistant Professor, Forman Christian College (a chartered university). Author: ‘Women academic leaders in higher education in Pakistan: Perspectives of female students enrolled in higher education degrees,’ Pakistan Journal of Women's Studies: Alame-Niswan (2018); ‘National identity clarity or confusion: English and Urdu Textbooks’ (2017); ‘Why do teachers educators not practice what they believe: ICT integration gaps’ (2016); ‘Students and teachers perceptions of ICT use in classroom: Pakistani classrooms’ (2016). Co-author: ‘Content analysis of language textbooks (English, Urdu, Sindhi) for Inclusivity,’ Journal of Education & Social Sciences (2018); ‘Information communication technology integration: Trained secondary school teachers’ dilemma,’ Journal of Research in Social Sciences, JRSS (2017). Fatima Waqi Sajjad (PhD, Punjab University), Assistant Professor, Dept. of Political Science and International Relations, University of Management and Technology Lahore. Author: book chapter ‘Countering radicalization through education: Global policy trends and the case of Pakistan,’ Radicalization in South Asia (2019); ‘De-radicalizing Pakistani society: the receptivity of youth to a liberal religious worldview,’ Journal of Peace Research (2017); ‘Countering extremists’ narratives in Pakistan,’ Journal of National Defence University, Pakistan (2015); ‘Reforming madrasa education in Pakistan: Post 9/11 Perspectives,’ Journal of Islamic Thought and Civilization, Pakistan (2013); co-author ‘Revisiting arms race between India and Pakistan: A case of asymmetrical causal relationship of military expenditures,’ Journal of Defence and Peace Economics (2019). Fazal Subhan (MS), Subject Specialist in Economics, Department of Elementary and Secondary Education, Government of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province.

Contributors

xiii

Muhammad Shoaib Pervez (PhD, Leiden University), Fulbright Post-Doctoral Fellow Columbia University, New York, Associate Professor and Chairperson Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Management and Technology Lahore. Author: Security Community in South Asia, Routledge, 2012 (winner of outstanding Research Award by Government of Pakistan); single-authored peer- reviewed articles ‘Strategic culture reconceptualised: the case of India and the BJP,’ International Politics (2019); ‘The association of South East Asian nations (ASEAN): A galactic security community?,’ South East Asia Research (2019); ‘The normative structure of the European Union: A constructivist analysis,’ Journal of European Studies (2018) Peter Brett (PhD, University of Durham), Senior Lecturer in Humanities and Social Sciences Education, University of Tasmania, Australia. Co-editor: Teaching Humanities and Social Sciences: Teaching and Learning across Australia (2019); co-author: Education for Democratic Citizenship (2009); author ‘Citizenship education in England in the shadow of the Great War,’ Citizenship Teaching & Learning (2013); ‘Beyond “navel-gazing” and “mush”: Learning about identity in Australian classrooms,’ Citizenship, Social and Economic Education (2013); ‘“The sacred spark of wonder”: Local museums, Australian curriculum history, and pre-service primary teacher education: A Tasmanian case study,’ Australian Journal of Teacher Education (2014); ‘Discovering argument: Linking literacy, citizenship education, and persuasive advocacy,’ Journal of Social Science Education (2014). Sohaib Ali, doctoral candidate in International Relations, Freie Universität Berlin; MSc Social Science Research Methods, Middlesex University, London; lecturer, Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Management and Technology, Lahore. Yaar Muhammad (PhD, University of Tasmania), Assistant Professor, University of Management and Technology, Lahore. Co-author ‘Islamic habitus in English language textbooks produced by boards in Pakistan,’ The Journal of Islamic Thought and Civilization (JITC) (2020); ‘Pakistani national identity, curriculum reform and citizenship education textbooks: Understanding teachers’ perspectives,’ Journal of Research & Reflections in Education (2020); ‘Some challenges in teaching citizenship in an Islamic context: Pakistan studies teachers’ perspectives and practices in relation to teaching about identity,’ Citizenship Teaching & Learning (2017); ‘Beyond binary discourses? Pakistan studies textbooks and representations of cultural, national, and global identity,’ IARTEM e-Journal (2017).

Acknowledgments

I must thank the Almighty Allah for giving me the courage to complete this arduous task. I am also very grateful to all the contributors of this book who always responded to my calls in spite of having very hectic schedules of their own at their universities. Special thanks to my departmental colleagues, especially Sohaib Ali, and good luck with his PhD at Freie Universitat, Germany. I am also indebted to my trustworthy comrade and departmental colleague Fatima Sajjad for her exhaustive work and meticulous planning in organizing an international conference and also for her incisive comments during the initial phase of planning this book. This endeavor is the fruit of an international conference on ‘Contemporary education and countering violent extremism practices in Pakistan’ organized by the Department of Political Science and International Relations at University of Management and Technology Lahore (27 to 28 March 2019). It was at this venue that all the contributors of this book decided to work together for a better understanding of the radicalization discourse of Pakistan. This book encompasses my own intellectual growth, as I am obsessed with the question of why Pakistan is in such a mess and how can it be rescued from this colossal abyss. This is a country with immense potential and abundant natural resources that has become trapped in a pit of radicalization: the question is, why? After seeing the fruits of peace in Europe where I did my PhD (Leiden Holland, 2010) and after closely watching the American dream (before the era of President Trump) during my post-doctoral study at Saltzmann Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University, New York (2015), I was at a loss with regard to my own homeland. This country has made a mockery of the pristine credentials of her founding father, Jinnah. All forms of governments, be they democracy or dictatorship, have been practiced in their extreme, perverted forms in this land of the pure. On top of that, the tsunami of radicalization in the post-9/11 era has severely jolted the very foundations of Pakistan. The radicalization phenomenon will take time to subside but, importantly, the Pakistani state needs to adopt a critical approach based on popular perceptions toward countering violent extremism by dismissing conventional methods; these tactics have so far failed to bear any fruit. The state has to question its own practices and should allow its people some form of liberty to critically analyze its policies. This book points toward some of these key areas through a critical perspective.

Acknowledgments xv On a personal note, I want to thank my beloved parents, Wajeeh Uddin Pervez and Shahida Pervez, for their prayers and also for inculcating values of honesty and straightforwardness in me, especially my late father Wajeeh Uddin Pervez (who died on 16 June 2019), in whose loving memory, I am dedicating this book. My father was a gem of a person, strong on values and silent over miseries and joys. A very contented man, he made no complaint over the complications of his Parkinson’s disease, nor about anything. He made sure that all of his four children were brought up with honest money for which he toiled very hard. He was a dedicated civil servant and worked day and night for the welfare of Pakistan Railways with an unblemished career record until his retirement in 2001. At home he was very strict in the upbringing of his children but at the same time very particular about high-quality education and career-making for them. He sent me to Pakistan’s premier institutions, such as Crescent Model School Lahore, Cadet College Hasanabdal, Government College Lahore. My bond with him was more about awe and respect than love and compassion. I learned from him the virtues of being straightforward, calling a spade a spade in front of superiors, helping others silently, and justifying your job in an optimal way. These virtues have provided me with the bedrock from which to rise more strongly every time I am down and out in my life. I am very glad that I never looked toward greener pastures and was able to be with him during his difficult times, and my time spent at his bedside during his illness is the most precious time of my life. May Allah bless him with the highest place in paradise (Janatul Firdous) and let me reunite with him (Ameen). I am also grateful to my father-in-law, Pirzada Riffat Nawaz, whose intellectual acumen is far ahead of many scholars of today and with whom I have enjoyed many scholarly debates. Many of the ideas in this book are the result of my interaction with him. I am also grateful to my mother-in-law, Bushra Riffat, for her prayers. Part of this book was completed at the home of my dear brother, Muhammad Saleem Pervez, in Dubai with warm hospitality given by his wife, Ujala Saleem, and by my nephews, Hadi and Haisam. It was an excellent intellectual sojourn and was desperately needed to refine my work for this book. Saleem is always a helping hand to me and my family thoroughly enjoyed his conviviality in Dubai. Thanks to my sisters, Huma Majid and Ayesha, too, and my sister-inlaw, Tehmina, who herself is a genuine scholar in the making. The biggest debt, however, that I owe for my intellectual growth is reserved for my lovely wife Sadia, whose love and affection is beyond any words. She always remains steadfastly behind me, has provided me with peace of mind for my intellectual work, and has always encouraged me to strive hard for my true potential against all odds and despite immense pressures. This unflinching support of my better half during all of my scholarly growth is a great asset in my life. Lastly, I am thankful to my sons, Muneeb and Moiz, for giving me time to follow my intellectual pursuits. I hope that one day they will find a better world to live in and both of them will also contribute for its betterment through values inculcated in them by their forefathers, InshAllah.

1

Introduction Conceptual conundrum and the approach of the book Muhammad Shoaib Pervez

Radicalization, counter-radicalization, terrorism, countering violent extremism: these have been some of the buzz words in contemporary politics since 9/11. The rhetoric of globalization for peace has finally given way to dark forces of radicalization. This can be ascertained from the surge in far-left racial nationalism in Europe, religious fundamentalism in Asia, and the rhetoric of white supremacy in America. All this has a devastating impact on world peace today, resulting in a great increase in the suffering of common people, caught in the crossfire of these contrasting ideologies. At the epicenter of all this chaos and mayhem is the state of Pakistan, which, in her chequered history, has suffered greatly, first, by playing the role of a proxy state for the USA in the Cold War and, second, by becoming the closest ally of the USA in its war against terrorism in the post-9/11 era. The geostrategic location of Pakistan has played a pivotal role in global politics but at the popular level it has turned out to be a geostrategic curse for Pakistani society. The state is now facing its worst existential crisis in the wake of a faltering economy, bad governance, and growing indicators of societal radicalization. At an empirical level, or historically speaking, the seeds of radicalization were sown precisely at the time of the movement for an independent Pakistan. The aim of the movement for an independent Pakistan was for a piece of land where Islam could be practiced; however, since independence only half-hearted efforts have been made in this regard. There is no implementation of any Islamic system of governance in Pakistan. Islam was used instrumentally by the founding fathers of Pakistan to rally the Muslims of the subcontinent around the flag of an independent Pakistan. For the millions of common Muslims who emigrated to Pakistan on its birth in 1947, this was the promised land where they would be able to order their lives according to Islamic Shariah law. However, that did not transpire, especially after the early demise of the founding father, Jinnah, in 1948, barely a year after Pakistan’s independence. Interestingly, a majority of the Ulema were against the formation of Pakistan as an independent entity; however, once it became a reality, they unanimously demanded an Islamic form of government. The polarization of society began at an early stage: the religious elites, with lot of street power, were clamouring for an Islamic form of government while the liberal elites, with effective representation in parliament, resisted such changes and clung to the colonial state apparatus for governance. This was the

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common fate of the majority of post-colonial Muslim states who achieved independence in the 1950 and 1960s, remaining as they did, attached to the vestiges of the old, neo-colonial economic order. There is no new world out there for the majority of hapless people who dreamt of such a place after having thrown off the colonial yoke. This is the point at which radicalization in third-world Muslim societies such as Pakistan is born; there is a clash between the liberal-minded minority and the Islamic-minded majority clamoring for change by labeling their state elites stooges of the colonial masters of the past. Radicalization in Pakistan moved up a gear in the mid-1980s when the then President of Pakistan, General Muhammad Ziaul-Haq through his practices almost declared Pakistan a Sunni state, which started a decade-long feud between the Sunni majority and Shia minority. Furthermore, the Afghanistan imbroglio began in 1979 and Pakistan became the frontline proxy state of the United States for the defeat of communism. This continued until the death of Zia in a mysterious plane crash in 1988 (various conspiracy theories were hatched, including one that put the blame on the Shia pilot of the C130 aircraft carrying Zia and his top military brass). As a result of the disparity between Pakistan’s foundational ontology and its epistemological practices, a dilemma exists in the minds of Pakistanis as to how to make a distinction between what they perceive as being their own national identity and the acquired identity of the Pakistan state. This confusion has a polarizing affect in society, resulting, on the one hand, in religious fundamentalism and, on the other, ultra-liberal fascism, with no possibility of a dialogue between the two camps. Due to this, terrorist movements such as Tahrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, whose uncompromising aim was to enforce Sharia law by the use of firearms, were successful in 2008 of getting a foothold in settled areas of Pakistan such as Swat. At the same time, most of the people residing in urban areas considered religion of little relevance to their daily practices. The phenomenon of radicalization is born at this critical junction, as confusion leads to divergent practices which may become violent due to a radical mindset. The simmering tension between the opposing groups lead to violent clashes, such as the one witnessed in the anti-blasphemy movement of Tehreek-e-Labbaik party (TLP) prior to Pakistan’s 2018 general election. Even the statistics of the general election of 2018 are an eye-opener, as this far-right Islamist Party, TLP, was able to get the third-highest number of votes in the populous province of Punjab and was placed in overall fifth position nationally. The question is: How can we understand this polarization of Pakistani society which is leading to radicalization? There is a plethora of books and articles on radicalization in Pakistan, so how can this book add to an already burgeoning literature on this issue? The answer lies in its radically different critical approach. This book is a critique of how the issues of radicalization in Muslim countries, including Pakistan, are conventionally understood both by policymakers and scholars. For example, in the recent edited volume titled Eradicating Terrorism from the Middle East: Policy and Administrative Approaches, (Dawoody et al. 2016) used the Western constructs of globalization, good governance, and Islamophobia to discuss issues of terrorism in the Middle East. There is nothing wrong in this

Introduction 3 approach but our emphasis is to apply indigenous constructs for first understanding radicalization and then to prescribe measures for counter-radicalization. It is akin to what Robert Cox describes as the difference between problem-solving and critical theory, with the former merely content to aim for minor alteration of the existing analytical framework while the later considers the existing analytical framework as part of a problem that must be replaced (Cox 1981). Similarly, on the policy side, a recent RAND study titled Deradicalizing Islamists Extremists, a fascinating account of counter-radicalization policies adopted by various countries, explains, using a rational methodological approach, how successful the deradicalization policies of these countries have been (Rand Report 2010). In our book, we have questioned the policies adopted by the state as well as by other actors involved in constructing knowledge through educational curricula in Pakistan. Our approach is evolutionary, with radicalization and counter-radicalization requiring a lengthy overhaul. There is no rationalist model of cost–benefit calculations at work, rather a ‘logic of appropriateness’ better explains Pakistani radicalization (Olsen and March 1989). This logic defines behavior through the binding force of hidden norms working as an institution to prescribe or proscribe behavior. Even the so-called ‘new approaches to countering terrorism’ (El-Said 2015) are like old wine in new bottle as the various case studies remain bound to the historical context of what has gone wrong in various countries. For example, in the case study of Turkey scant discussion is made on how and why the polarization of Turkish society into pro-Kemalist and pro-Islamist has made every successive government a firm autocrat ready to quell any form of dissent. An epistemological reorientation is needed to fully explain many facets of radicalization. This requires shifting the focus of understanding radicalization from an elite centric approach to a popular centric one. The current focus of almost all of debate about radicalization is based on carving out dichotomies of ‘Us versus Them,’ the Muslims versus the Christians and Jews, East versus West, or haves versus have-nots, all constructed from the position of strength (elite perspective). These binaries have blurred the actual fault lines behind radicalization and have proven to be an easy scapegoat in order for powerful actors to solidify their own hegemonic practices. The societal level (people perspective) is missing in most of the scholarship on radicalization in Pakistan. The ontological basis of this book is a post-positivist framework, with reality being socially constructed. The main argument of this book, followed by all its contributors, is based on a presumption that the epistemological reorientation of radicalization requires interpolation by critically examining the practices of the powerful elites in order to deconstruct the motives behind their actions. Radicalization and its antidote, de-radicalization, are both evolutionary processes which are initiated by the authoritative actions of the powerful. The process of radicalization in a country is generally understood as beginning with the phenomenon of smoldering tensions faced by the state from disgruntled elements as a reaction to its own policies. This is a state perspective of radicalization as the state is generally considered to be the harbinger of peace and prosperity for its citizens. So, any anomic activity inside the state is considered anti-state,

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legitimately allowed to be dealt with by coercive power of state. This traditional conceptualization of the state has been taken to task in the critical perspective of international relations, which work for the emancipation of people from all realms of oppression and where the state is sometimes also considered to be one of the forms of persecution. This book looks at radicalization in line with this critical perspective, which asks for a popular discourse on radicalization by questioning the established narratives, myths, policies, and practices of the state. A critical radical approach primarily questions the conventional wisdom of existing literature; it is, therefore, pertinent to first mention some of the assumptions of this conventional discourse on radicalization. Radicalization literature gained momentum after 9/11 due to the shift in US policies of pre-empting terrorism with a specific focus on Muslim societies. Radicalization and Islam became synonymous terms, with a plethora of article and books written in the post-9/11 era defining Muslims as terrorists who are hell-bent upon crushing the dominant Western order. Radicalization is generally attributed to a reaction by discontented Muslims toward the actions of Western governments or toward those of their own governments. Remarkably, in almost all major global events, it is Muslims who are on the receiving end, so generally scholars have attributed their Islamic beliefs to a natural recourse of radicalization. The older version of terrorism has a political motive but in its newer and most virulent form, Islamic fundamentalist ideology is the sole impetus behind it (Walter Laqueur 1998) Generally, radical tendencies are more rampant in Muslim societies as they have a clear belief system based on a worldview of life after death, and the bad governance of their respective states spurs on this mindset. The burden of radicalization is placed squarely on Muslim shoulders as generally they are the only ones ready to wear suicide vests in their quest to enter paradise. Muslim ruling elites are inefficient and corrupt and have failed to curb radical tendencies in their societies; radicalization is measured solely as a threat to Western values and the rulers of these Islamic regimes constantly need the financial support of Western governments in order to survive politically. Interestingly, the elites of the Muslim states have also poignantly played a double game: they ask for Western financial support to curb radicalization in their societies and at the same time have also played the victim card to their masses by portraying themselves as helpless against Western aggrandizement. They thus perpetuate their own corrupt rule by using the rhetoric of a danger from the West that is hell-bent upon crushing Muslim states. The discourse of radicalization is constrained by the donor agencies, which, most of the time, is the hegemonic state or a global financial agency who are involved in constructing recipient state security narratives through policy prescriptions. Most of the time, the policy prescriptions submitted by the epistemic community or intelligentsia are in line with the objectives of their donors. At the popular level, it is considered that radicalization in Pakistan has only become a global problem because of the state’s possession of nuclear weapons (weapons of mass destruction or WMDs). Had this not been the case, Pakistan

Introduction 5 would long have been another Syria, Iraq, or Afghanistan. It is the global fear that nuclear weapons should not get into the hands of radical elements in Pakistan that has led to the glut of research on radicalization in Pakistan. Now let me briefly sketch out the critical assumptions of this book. Radicalization in Pakistan is conceptualized as a phenomenon that has arisen due to the practices of elites being discordant with the aspirations of the people. Radicalization in this book has also been explained as a ‘thick signifier’ as it privileges dominant norms constructed for countering radicalization and suppresses all forms of dissent. This book has studied these dominant norms and values by arguing that these ways of imposing a worldview are creating more radicalization in Pakistan. It can also be termed an ‘empty signifier,’ its meanings ‘temporarily fixed, and continuously contested and rearticulated, in political settings determined by power struggles’ (Isabel 2017). This explains that there is a deliberate empty space constructed around counter-radicalization policies in order to serve the vested interests of those in power. The large-scale funding of counter-radicalization by various governments of the world also demonstrates a fascinating trend, wherein most academics write tailor-made policy documents to facilitate governments’ practices aimed at counter-radicalization (Kundnani 2015: 17). This has resulted in a ‘systematic failure’ of the understanding of ‘political conflicts,’ let alone calling for their prognosis or for the re-examination of the radicalization that emerges as a result of these conflicts (Kundnani 2015: 17). Radicalization is a multifaceted phenomenon which needs not only introspection with a close focus on what is happening inside the state but also extrapolation of the global trends that are influencing the sociocultural makeup of society. A critical perspective on radicalization questions the conventional wisdom used to explain the underlying assumptions, presumptions, as well as the suggested prescriptions for eradicating radicalization (Kundnani 2015). Radicalization as a phenomenon can be understood if we critically examine and challenge the constructed narrative of state security. Kundnani notes that radicalization ‘owe[s] more to the aims and objectives of the states that are the primary consumers of their literature, than to an objective study of the subject’ (Kundnani 2015: 17). Radicalization is a slow process aimed at transforming, through indoctrination, the mindsets or beliefs of citizens who abide by the law into those of mobs who break it; hence, its prognosis through de-radicalization is also an evolutionary process whose steps involve not only isolating the root causes and treatment of the symptomatic causes of radicalization but also the allocation and mobilization of resources for redressing grievances and incorporating disgruntled elements into the mainstream of the body politic. Radicalization in Pakistan has mostly been studied from the established positional framework of either a state perspective or a global one. In the state-guided discourse, the governmental sector has manipulated radicalization as a deterrent, in order to coerce people into accepting national security policies, with the risk of marginalizing all forms of dissent. Interestingly, the global discourse of the eradication of the menace of radicalization has also been framed in the same confrontational way, with convenient labeling of Pakistan as a radical state on account of its

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religious identity and the remedy being sought through the imposition of Western values via controlled educational curricula. A critical view of de-radicalization should bring to light the popular perceptions and apprehensions constructed by the majority of the population, not merely those constructed by the elite. The literature on radicalization was demarcated by Kundnani into two branches: radicalization as a ‘theological process’ and radicalization as a ‘psychological process’ (Kundnani 2015: 22, 23). In the former variety, a radical individual is purely following their constructed religious belief, which orders them to privilege their own worldview over any prevalent ones and, if necessary, adopt violent means for the fulfillment of their agenda. In the latter, the radical tendencies are the offshoots of the ‘cultural-psychological predispositions’ of an individual, which develop radical tendencies and a commitment to carry out terrorist activities (Kundnani 2015: 20). Here the psychological makeup of an individual, or the sociocultural environment, plays a dominant role in the radicalization process (Baker-Beall et al. 2015). Remarkably, it is the psychological explanation that is most often invoked. For example, in the case of a white Western terrorist, phrases such as ‘lone-wolf attack’ or ‘mentally deranged individual’ are used in most mass-media outlets; however, in the case of a non-white Muslim perpetrator involved in a terrorist attack, the line of argument is that of ‘an organised terrorist activity, an Al-Qaeda plan, or a state sponsored activity.’ Sedgwick explains: ‘So long as the circumstances that produce Islamist radicals’ declared grievances are not taken into account, it is inevitable that the Islamist radical will often appear as a “rebel without a cause”’ (Sedgwick 2010: 480–482). This book is not taking the above line of argument, which would mean adding another layer to the heap of ‘Us versus Them’ literature, presenting ‘us,’ the Muslims, as best and ‘them,’ the West, as the beasts. This book is more a reflection on what is wrong in Muslim societies and, in particular, in Pakistani society, which has suffered considerably in the ‘war on terror’ and which, even after paying the price of the highest body count, has so far not been able to gain one iota of respect within the comity of nations. It basically challenges the notion of the power–knowledge construct in a Foucauldian way. The way in which power connives with knowledge as constructed in the radicalization discourse will be deconstructed through a thematic approach to studying Pakistani radicalization. This thematic approach centers around three main aspects: education, religion, and geopolitics. For example, in Pakistan, the educational system is deliberately divided into three branches: the most impoverished children usually join madrassas; pupils from the middle class enter government-sector schools, many of which are devoid of basic infrastructure; and privileged children join highly competitive and affluent ‘post-modernist’ schools. I label them ‘post-modernist’ because of their goal of joining the league of UK schools such Eton and Harrow. In these schools, the syllabuses taught are from Cambridge University and they take pride in becoming affiliated to leading UK universities. A case study of the educational system will be discussed in her chapter by Fatima Sajjad, who will examine the pedagogy and curricula of these schools by questioning the Western mantra of madrassas being breeding grounds for radicalization in Pakistan. All the authors

Introduction 7 and contributors in this edited volume are of the opinion that an understanding of radicalization requires a critical examination of prevalent practices by giving space to marginalized popular perspectives. The societal aspect of radicalization can be understood by focusing on the various epochs through which the state of Pakistan state has gone. Let me briefly recap the history of Pakistan with particular significance to societal radicalization. Pakistan is at the epicenter of global terrorist trends and has suffered greatly but at the same time is also regarded with suspicion at and charged with transnational terrorism by the forces spearheading the war on terror. The people of Pakistan, residing in her four provinces of Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan, and Khyber-Pakhtonkhawa, observe different sociocultural practices and are bound together only by Islam. The state has its own chequered history mired in both external and internal crises; the roller coaster civil–military relationship has made a mockery of its democratic credentials by creating a sham democracy. On 17 December 2019, for the first time in the history of Pakistan a special court imposed a death sentence on former dictator President General Musharraf (living in exile), under Article Six of the constitution for having, in November 2007, subverted it through an emergency promulgation. This decision was later quashed by the Lahore High Court. Ironically, the sitting government of Prime Minister Imran Khan does not want to pursue the case and even went to the high court in an effort to overturn the verdict because of the fear of a military backlash. The country has faced 33 years of direct military rule and, although it has been sufficiently resurgent to emerge from various crises, the sociocultural fabric of society has paid a heavy price. For example, the country was torn apart in 1971, in the aftermath of President Ayub’s martial law (1958–1969), and Pakistani society became religiously intolerant due to bigotry during President General Zia’s term of office (1977–1988). Heroin and Kalashnikovs are the other two gifts of Zia’s regime. Then there was the military rule of President General Musharraf (1999–2008); during his tenure suicide bombing became the catch-all activity among religious zealots, all of them prepared to kill fellow Muslim Pakistanis for not practicing a pure form of Islam. Unfortunately, under civilian rule the country fared no better, with widespread corruption, nepotism, and inept leadership leading to economic quagmire. This is a very brief history of Pakistan, but this book is not an elaboration of historical facts, as there is an overabundance of literature available on the state, the society, and the history of Pakistan. This book focuses on contemporary practices of violent extremism fueled by the state itself as part of its national security narrative to curb existential threats to the identity of Pakistan. Since 9/11 and to date, Pakistan has encountered the worst possible existential threat in the form of societal radicalization on top of political instability and myriad problems of regional insecurity and economic fragility. This book focuses on the domestic sources of radicalization, critically examines them, and, on a prescriptive note, puts forward a case for countering violent extremism (CVE) by exposing such practices. This does not mean that the global forces involved in radicalizing Pakistan society will be totally ignored, as to a large extent the country was at the receiving end of a power struggle between the USA and the former

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USSR during the cold war and played a part in a long proxy war in Afghanistan at the behest of America. However, the objective of this book is more related to self-examination and primarily on countering violent extremism (CVE) at a societal level. Through an interpretive framework and by focusing on different facets of critical radicalization, this book explains the causes for the failure of the counter-radicalization efforts of the state. It also avoids a theoretical straitjacket, and ‘methodological eclecticism’ is adopted in order to accommodate contributions from varied perspectives (Katzeinstein et al. 2010). Methodological eclecticism does not mean that there is no common thread to these chapters; it merely refers to the fact that a free hand has been given to all contributors to analyze data according to their chosen methodological framework. On the use of eclecticism, certain features are woven around all contributions, such as criticism of existing practices of powerful actors, a reliance on the perspectives on radicalization of the people, and a prescriptive tone for counter-radicalization. Furthermore, thematic analysis of this book puts these chapters into three distinct categories. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 focus on educational norms as practiced in Pakistan’s schools and universities and all three criticize the existing curricula taught as well as the pedagogical practices adopted for knowledge dissemination. Chapter 5 critically engages with the religious aspect of radicalization while Chapters 6 and 7 are both geopolitical ones, wherein both regional (India–Pakistan), as well as local case studies on Pakistan’s restive province of Khyber Pakhtonkha (KP), are discussed with reference to radicalization. The synopsis of these chapters are given in detail in the next section. Here it is sufficient to say that eclecticism is not adopted as a free joyride for everyone, rather it is carefully adopted for better understanding of cases through an overarching structure of critique by bringing to light the perspective of the people. Hence the scope of this book is clearly tilted toward reforming the educational system of Pakistan, whether this is temporal education in the shape of curricula being taught at elite schools, government schools, and universities, or religious education as practiced by the Shia and Sunni sects in Pakistan. This is because there is a close nexus between a radicalized mind and the type of information being imbibed by that mind in the form of education. However, in addition to educational norms the chapters on geopolitical aspects of radicalization discuss these from the vantage point of state policies toward constructing rivalry in the region as well as toward its restive areas, such as KP province.

Structure of the book The overarching structure of this book will engage critically with the phenomenon of radicalization in Pakistan by discussing it thematically from three distinct aspects; educational, religious, and geopolitical. In these three thematic approaches, the contributors have questioned the prevalent practices of dominant actors that are presumed to curb the flames of radicalization but are in fact paving the way for its conflagration in the state of Pakistan. In sum, there are eight chapters, including this introductory chapter, divided into three distinct sections.

Introduction 9 The first section of this book critically analyzes the educational curriculum in Pakistan in order to devise certain counter-radicalization prescriptions through educational norms. This section is composed of three chapters (Chapters 2 to 4). All three of these chapters look at the educational system of Pakistan and discuss radicalization as the by-product of educational curricula. In Chapter 2, titled ‘Education and radicalization in Pakistan: a post-colonial perspective,’ Fatima Sajjad will question the prevalent post-9/11 global policy of education for security with an argument that these practices are themselves embedded in dominant forms of subjugation. She will cast a wider theoretical net of critical theories which include Critical Post-Colonial Theory, Critical Pedagogy, and Critical Race Theory. Her analysis will also reflect upon the conventional wisdom of madrassas being the fountain spring of radicalization in Pakistan. The global mind-set is that these madrassas operate within Pakistan with impunity and that the state is fearful of the mushrooming of these institutions. She will debunk this myth and instead will focus on current global neo-liberal educational reforms, which are portrayed as an effective tool to counter violent extremism. In this regard, her analysis will be of global educational practices, particularly of the Cambridge International Examination (CIE) at higher secondary-school level, in Pakistan and how their pedagogical techniques discourage any form of questioning and critical thinking that might lead pupils into a radical mind-set. Her work will further juxtapose the curricula of madrassa education with that of elitist schools in Pakistan. Her argument will reveal the hollowness behind the claim of the neoliberal educational framework to be a conduit for counter-radicalization in developing societies. The prescriptive value of her chapter encourages critical thinking in education with the aim of emancipating thought processes, as the only way forward to halt radicalization in Pakistan. In a similar vein, Asher’s contribution in Chapter 3, titled, ‘Teaching toward a culture of peace: Analysis of Islamiat and ethics textbooks,’ looks at religious education (RE) in Pakistan by exploring the state-guided compulsory Islamic studies textbooks, where he will perform a content analysis of these books by arguing that there is no space given to the worldviews of minorities. Minorities in Pakistan are usually given an option to study ethics books in lieu of the religious Islamiat textbooks. He has developed a self-proclaimed criterion of promoting universal ethical values through education based upon positive concept, inner peace, social peace, respect for life in all forms, and peace with nature. The lack of progression of minorities born in Pakistan is a fait accompli wherein the state apparatus does not allow minorities a level playing field. At a normative level, he will argue the case for promoting ‘universal ethical values’ for a multi-ethnoreligious pluralistic Pakistani society. He will further elaborate why there is a monolithic construction of religion in books by the Pakistani state elites. In Chapter 4, titled ‘Infusing cultural diversity into Pakistan studies textbooks: An analysis of textbooks and teachers’ perspectives,’ Yaar Muhammad and Peter Bret will focus on the cultural diversity of Pakistan. Both will discuss the latest Pakistan secondary school curriculum policy and will argue that it inadequately accommodates the cultural diversity of the state. They adopt a methodology of

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content analysis of the educational policies and also triangulate their data by qualitative interviews of secondary-school teachers. This approach focuses at the cognition level and will highlight how the state conveniently put forward its own (mis)information agenda by sacrificing local voices in the guise of supreme national interests. They will explain how cultural diversity is being sidelined by the state due to its obsession with the ideology of carving out one nation through ethno-linguistically disparate regions. For both authors, the disrespect shown by the Pakistani state toward its own cultural diversity is the source of extremism among various communities living in Pakistan. The second section deals with religious norms, especially the sectarian issue of Shia and Sunni in Pakistan. In this religious realm, in Chapter 5, ‘Pacifying Sunni–Shī’ite relations in Pakistan: Patterns of (de)humanization and prospects for trust-building,’ Sohaib Ali and Fatima Sajjad will approach the volatile issue of sectarianism in Pakistan from a very different vantage point. Sectarian radicalization has become an acute problem in Pakistan and this study will employ discursive construction of the humanizing and dehumanizing discourses found in both Shia and Sunni literature. Conventionally, Sunni and Shia practices are considered to be at opposite extremes, with no point of convergence between the two; however in this chapter Sohaib Ali will argue otherwise. He will adopt a Foucauldian discourse analysis to discuss some of the practices and rhetoric used by the Shia and Sunni elites for ‘humanizing’ the other as a means of rapprochement between the two and to pacify the radical elements found in abundance in the two opposing sects in Pakistan. This is, again, a unique perspective, as usually, we found violent interaction between the two sects in Pakistan and the rhetoric and practices that are encouraging cordiality between rival Shia and Sunni sects have hitherto remained unexplored and have been ignored because of vested interests. This Shia–Sunni schism is a major source of radicalization in Pakistani society. He will further elaborate the Pakistani state’s latest initiative of Paighame-Pakistan (message from Pakistan) which is a peace declaration jointly issued by all major sects in January 2018. The third section of this book is on the geopolitical aspects of radicalization in Pakistan. On the geopolitical side, there are two chapters (Chapters 6 and 7) focused on understanding radicalization at the regional level as well as at the state level. At the regional level, in Chapter 6, titled ‘The radicalized regional order of India–Pakistan and prospects of a security community,’ Pervez will examine India–Pakistan societies and will argue that radicalization is part of a perpetual rivalry constructed by the elites of these two states and that their practices are fueling violence in their respective societies. Pakistan lies in South Asia and the whole region is held hostage to the rivalry between India and Pakistan. There are two dominant actors in the societies of both states: the army in the case of Pakistan and Hindu fundamental parties in the shape of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in India. The army has ruled Pakistan both directly and indirectly and has been involved in the self-fulfilling prophesy of portraying itself as the savior of the nation by constructing the image of a rival India as the sole nemesis of the state of Pakistan. Ironically, the situation in India is similar in that a right-wing

Introduction 11 fundamental Hindu party (BJP) is on the rise and its electoral success is largely dependent upon an anti-Pakistan stance coupled with slogans of ‘Hindutva,’ an ultra-orthodox ideology of Hindu rule in India with intolerance toward all minorities, especially Muslims (Pervez 2013). In August 2019 the Indian Prime Minister Narinder Modi and his BJP party revoked the special status (Article 370 of the Indian Constitution) of the only Indian Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir. In 2019 Prime Minister Modi also brought forward amendments to the citizenship act of 1955 whereby Muslims have been specifically discriminated against when applying for Indian citizenship. There seems to be a connivance of interests between political party ideology (BJP) and the practices of its elites (Pervez 2019). Ultimately, Pakistan sharing long borders with India and home to a large Muslim population means it is at loggerheads with India and both countries are involved in constructing an antagonistic regional order; an order that needs careful inspection as to how the practices of the elites of both states develop patterns of rivalry through sociocultural norms of societies. Pervez’ conceptualization of security is based on the everyday practices of elites and his notion of ontological security depends upon how elites develop a sense of existential threat among ordinary people for their own vested interests. He critically analyzes the compulsory history textbooks found in both India and Pakistan and will show how the elites of both states propagate radicalization through educational norms. These norms are found abundantly in the textbooks of both states which are regularly taught to young students from primary to university level, and the excessive use of these books ensures that young minds are not in a position to question conventional wisdom and are bound to follow the state-constructed narrative on identity and security. Pervez also adopts a popular culture methodology in which he will perform an interpretative analysis of award-winning Indian films based on India–Pakistan rivalry and how these films portray ‘the other’ as ones’ nemesis. The censorship policies of the state again expose the elites, who are hell-bent on propagating radicalization in each other’s societies. This has so far led to regional chaos and instability coupled with insecurity in the lives of millions of people on the subcontinent. On a prescriptive note, his chapter will further elaborate the contours of a hypothetical security community as a conduit of peace in one of the most radicalized region (South-Asia) of the world. In Chapter 7, at the local (state) political level, ‘Deconstructing the myth of Pashtuns as a nation of extremists and warriors: Causes of radicalization in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa,’ Arshad Ali and Fazal Subhan will produce a case study of radicalization in Pashtun society in the northwest Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province of Pakistan. In 2007, the Pakistani Taliban took over not only the lawless tribal areas (previously the FATA region) but also established control over settled areas in the Malakand Division of the KP province from 2007 to 2009, until the army got it back in 2009. Arshad and Subhan will deconstruct the conventional wisdom, or the myth, of Pashtun being extremist and warrior-like with radicalization embedded in their social structure and traditional norms and values. They will argue that Pashtun society has been transformed into an extremist society by the

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post-colonial garrison state of Pakistan for its own strategic interests. This chapter will further explore what went wrong in the Pashtun society and in spite of the tall claims of the state to be the region’s savior, there are still lingering suspicion between the military and the local population which is concocting a radicalized society at the local level. In Chapter 8, a conclusion will be drawn based on the various arguments offered by the contributors of this volume by stressing upon the need to understand radicalization in Pakistan from a popular prespective. This is the only way forward for state elites to devise counter-radicalization strategies and to bring peace and harmony in the volatile South Asian region. All contributors follow a broad overlay of critical radicalization by questioning the dominant state-constructed narrative and how it carries seeds of radicalization for Pakistani society. All of the chapters also promote a popular perspective for an inclusive radicalization policy. This is because radicalization is a problem of minds, which requires avenues of dialogue for constructive engagement. This can help the Pakistan state come up with tangible results while warding off radicalization. All contributors to chapters in this book agree on the ‘punchline’ that ‘cognitive processes depend fundamentally on and cannot be meaningfully understood independent of socio-cultural and historical processes’ (Nabuzuka et al. 2010). A critical appraisal of current practices will bring to light new thinking on halting the scourge of radicalization in Pakistan. It is this broader overlay which weaves all the individual contributions of this book into one cohesive framework. Furthermore, radicalization is taken to be a process in which means will justify the ends. In this book, we have questioned some of the means adopted for countering violent extremism in Pakistan. I hope that this book will generate more questions for future research in the problematic area of understanding radicalization in postcolonial countries such as Pakistan.

References Baker-Beall, Charlotte, Heath-Kelly, and Lee Jarvis ed.. 2015. Counter-Radicalisation: Critical Perspectives. New York: Routledge. Cox, R. 1981. “Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International Relations Theory.” Millennium: Journal of International Studies 10, no. 2: 126–155. Dawoody, Alexander R, ed., 2016. Eradicating Terrorism from the Middle East: Policy and Administrative Approaches. New York: Springer Press. El-Said, Hamed. 2015. New Approaches to Countering Terrorism: Designing and Evaluating Counter Radicalization and De-Radicalization Programs. New York: Palgrave MacMillan. Isabel, A. 2017. “Insecurity from Thick Signifier to Empty Signifier.” e-International. https://www.e-ir.info/2017/05/14/insecurity-from-thick-signifier-to-empty-signifier/, accessed October 23, 2019. Katzeinstein, P and R Sil. 2010. Beyond Paradigms: Analytical Eclecticism in the Study of World Politics. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Kundani, A. 2015. “Radicalisation: The Journey of a Concept.” In Counter Radicalisation: Critical Perspectives, edited by Baker-Beall et al., 14–35. New York: Routledge.

Introduction 13 Laqueur, W. 1998. “Terror’s New Face.” Harvard International Review 20, no. 4: 48–51. Nabuzuka, D and J Empson. 2010. “Culture and Psychological Development.” In Nabuzuka and Empson, eds,Culture and Psychological Development, 142–177. New York: Palgrave McMillan. Olsen, JP and JG March. 1989. Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics. New York: Free Press. Pervez, MS. 2013. Security Community in South Asia: India-Pakistan. New York: Routledge. Pervez, MS. 2019. “Strategic Culture Reconceptualized: The Case of India and the BJP.” International Politics 56, no. 1: 87–102. Rand Report. 2010. Deradicalizing Islamist Extremists. New York: Rand Corporation. Sedgwick, M. 2010. “The Concept of Radicalization as a Source of Confusion.” Terrorism and Political Violence 22, no. 4: 479–494.

Part I

Educational aspect

2

Education and radicalization in Pakistan A post-colonial perspective Fatima Waqi Sajjad

Introduction Ever since the Army Public School massacre in Peshawar Pakistan,1 schools in Pakistan have looked like military entrenchments. Students enter schools in the morning, crossing through road blocks, fences, armed guards, and barracks. Inside schools, they remain surrounded by high walls with barbed wire and guards with guns watching from the roof tops. Inside classrooms, however, the teachers, the books, the lessons remain silent on these surroundings. Even subjects like Pakistan Studies/Social Studies remain concerned with other seemingly important issues. Students are left to make sense of their surroundings on their own, as inside classrooms they must remain focused on the main purpose of their coming to school—getting good grades to secure good jobs in the future. Ghosh et al. (2016) list a number of questions that remain a puzzle for security analysts despite ample theorizing on violent extremism. One question stands out: why does religious extremism continue to be on the rise rather than on the decline? The question is significant, especially against the backdrop of vast academic research and extensive policy initiatives to counter extremism since 9/11. Despite extensive anti-radicalization efforts across the globe, the rise in violent extremism is now a globally acknowledged phenomenon. The United Nations Plan of Action to prevent violent extremism, launched in December 2015, recognizes that violent extremism has ‘now reached a level of threat and sophistication that requires concerted [global] action beyond law enforcement, military or security measures’ (UN 2015: 2). The recent global upsurge in violent extremism calls for a critical re-examination of post-9/11 education policies and practices that aimed to counter radicalization through education. This chapter is an attempt to critically review policy discourses on counter-radicalization and its link to education. I argue that using education to counter radicalization is a complex undertaking that can be counterproductive if we choose to ignore the broader and deeper problems of systemic violence in education and in counter-radicalization discourses. I use the notion of epistemic violence, as explained by Gayatri Spivak, to point out the subtle and hidden violence in contemporary counter-radicalization discourses. I utilize Paulo Freire’s conception of banking and problem-posing education and David

18 Fatima Waqi Sajjad Gillborn’s idea of White supremacy, to discuss violence embedded in our everyday education systems and practices. I question policy discourses that aim to counter radicalization yet fail to take into account their own biases and those of the prevailing education systems. The focus of this study is the case of Pakistan, where according to Novelli (2017), ‘education became a central battleground in the war [on terror]’ (6). The education system in Pakistan has been subjected to intense academic scrutiny since 9/11. I shall review the policy discourses linking radicalization to education in Pakistan, with a critical, post- colonial perspective. I begin by briefly explaining the concepts and theoretical insights that shape the current study.

Theoretical underpinnings Banking and problem-posing education Paulo Freire is considered the founder of the Critical Pedagogy movement in the field of education. Freire (2005) offers two distinct visions of education: banking education and problem-posing education. The traditional and dominant banking education regards students as containers and the task of teacher as to fill students by making deposits of information considered as knowledge. The more students work as storing the deposits entrusted to them, the less they develop the critical consciousness which would result from their intervention in the world as transformers of the world. The more completely they accept the passive role imposed on them. (73) Problem-posing education, on the other hand, invites students to think critically about the world around them and seek to transform it for the better. It fosters students thinking, reflecting, questioning, and transforming capacities. The goal of such an education is emancipation from oppression, which may have different forms. Emancipatory education stands for active struggle against ‘the injury to human beings that happens through standardized testing, scripted instruction and hyper discipline’ (Freire 2005: 87). Understanding epistemic violence Drawing on Michel Foucault’s conception of the episteme and Antonio Gramsci’s idea of the conquered subaltern, Gayatri Spivak, in her seminal essay ‘Can the subaltern speak?,’ introduces the notion of epistemic violence. Broadly, the notion refers to the violent knowledge production of the imperial West about their subjects that defines and constitutes the character of the subjects, that claims to speak for the subjects, but does not allow them to speak for themselves. Spivak considers epistemic violence as an inherent feature of the Western colonial project. It undermines local knowledge systems and ways of knowing by imposing Western epistemologies on the local and by claiming that the Western

Education and radicalization in Pakistan 19 knowledge about the local is the truth (Bartels et al. 2019). Thus, the possibility of ‘self-representation’ of the local, by the local, is denied to them. This systematic silencing of subjugated people that comes with claims of representing them and their interests, is termed epistemic violence by Spivak. As a result of sustained epistemic violence, the subjugated subaltern is rendered unable to speak for himself or herself as he or she lacks access to institutionally validated language (Spivak 1999). Following Spivak, multiple scholars have offered explanations of the term epistemic violence; Claudia Brunner (as quoted in AAU, n.d.) explains the term in the following words: By epistemic violence, I understand the very contribution to violent societal conditions that is rooted in knowledge itself: in its formation, shape, set-up, and effectiveness. … Epistemic violence is deeply embedded in our knowledge as well as in the ways on which we strive towards it. Galván-Álvarez (as quoted in AAU, n.d.) describes the term in the following way: Epistemic violence, that is, violence exerted against or through knowledge, is probably one of the key elements in any process of domination. It is not only through the construction of exploitative economic links or the control of the politico-military apparatuses that domination is accomplished, but also and, I would argue, most importantly through the construction of epistemic frameworks that legitimize and enshrine those practices of domination. Andrew Norman (as quoted in AAU, n.d.) points out the sophisticated academic tone of this type of violence that conceals the underlying domination and control. Of course, the phenomenon in question would not ordinarily be thought of as violence: it is too respectable, too academic, too genteel for that. It is violence all the same, and deserves to be seen for what it is. Bunch (2015) classifies epistemic violence into three distinct categories: discriminatory, testimonial, and distributive. She explains the distinction in the following way: discriminatory epistemic violence refers to ‘dehumanization of the outgroup.’ It refers to epistemic construction of the other as essentially and morally inferior, projecting them as inhuman or subhuman. Bunch asserts that discriminatory epistemic violence is often the first to be exercised as it creates the base—the other—and is frequently used by those in power as a stepping stone to garner majority support for policies of separation from the other. (Bunch 2015: 12)

20 Fatima Waqi Sajjad Testimonial epistemic violence refers to two things: reduced credibility and silencing of the other. For the in-group audience, the other is portrayed as less credible and hence not worthy of serious academic attention. Construction of stereotypes and refusal to acknowledge the other as a knower bars their entry into academic discourse and hence their perspective is effectively silenced. Distributive epistemic violence refers to the denial of material sources to the out-group. Particularly lack of education in common language constraints the other’s ability to effectively communicate his or her views and concerns. At the same time, there is a lack of accurate information about the other that results in persistence of stereotyping and discrimination against them. The notion of White supremacy and its configuration in Pakistan Critical Race Theory (CRT) reveals violence hidden in our normal practices by focusing on the everyday experiences of people of color. CRT uses the term ‘White supremacy’ to refer to everyday, subtle, and pervasive forces that ‘shape the world in the interest of the White people’ (Ansley as quoted by Gillborn 2015: 278). The notion refers to a system of advantage or privilege based on race. As a socially constructed phenomenon, Whiteness refers to ‘a set of assumptions, beliefs, and practices that place the interests and perspectives of White people at the center of what is considered normal or everyday’ (Ladson Billings and Tate as cited by Gillborn 2015: 278). Gillborn clarifies that the concept of White supremacy is not an attack on White people, who quite often remain unaware of the inherent prejudice of contemporary social structures, but it is an attack on ‘socially constructed and constantly reinforced power of White identifications, norms and interests’ (278). Gillborn (2005, 2008) discusses at length, how White supremacy shapes contemporary education policies and structures in and outside Britain. The multifarious education system of Pakistan has been classified into a few major types of institutions: namely, elitist English medium schools, Urdu medium schools (or public schools), madrassas (religious seminaries), and public and private colleges/universities. White supremacy, in the context of Pakistani education, refers to (a) a deep-rooted inequality in the system that helps maintain the hegemony of the local elite class, and (b) a growing preference of the working middle class for English medium schools, offering White Western education and qualifications. The working class strives hard to have access to elite private schools that offer international education and assessment programs, while the majority receives a local education that supposedly does not meet the international standards. The elite education is widely considered an epitome of quality education and a gateway to a successful future. Hence, teaching and learning practices in elite schools are seldom questioned. Using insights from Gillborn’s work on White supremacy in education, I shall examine elite education practices in Pakistan. Gillborn (2005) proposes three deceptively simple questions to judge education policies: first, who or what is driving education policy? Second, who wins and who loses as a result? Third, what are the effects or outcomes of the policy (13)?

Education and radicalization in Pakistan 21 These three questions will shape the discussion on elite education practices in Pakistan. But prior to this discussion, I shall review the post-9/11 global security discourse that linked international security with education in Pakistan. Using the conceptual lens of epistemic violence, as explained by leading postcolonial critic Gayatri Spivak, I contend that far from seeking emancipation of individuals, post 9/11 policy literature on countering radicalization through education represents political domination and control by hegemonic Western powers. In the case of Pakistan, I question the exclusive focus of policy papers on madrassas or public education practices as a potential source of the problem, and the exclusion of elite education institutions and their everyday practices from analysis. Through an empirical case study of a compulsory Cambridge O-level Pakistan Studies course, I highlight how everyday practices of elite education systems, offering international qualifications, undermine students’ critical faculties. I assert that education can help build a secure world, only if it frees individuals from oppressive structures of domination. I advance the idea of Davies (2015), who proclaims, that ‘the answer to extremism is not moderation, but a highly critical and informed idealism.’ For long-term security, education has to become ‘brave’ and create ‘ripples of turbulence’ (16). Post-9/11 epistemic construction of the radical mind and surveillance of education in Pakistan We learned about an enemy who is sophisticated, patient, disciplined, and lethal… its hostility towards us and our values is limitless. Its purpose is to rid the world of religious and political pluralism, the plebiscite, and equal rights for women. It makes no distinction between military and civilian targets. Collateral damage is not in its lexicon. (Kean and Hamilton 2004: xvi) The morally inferior, intensely hostile, and radicalized enemy identified in the 9/11 Commission Report was found to have close links with religious seminaries in Pakistan commonly known as madrassas. The madrassas became the subject of strong academic scrutiny in the following years ( ICG 2002). Fair (2008) describes how American policymakers had hardly heard of the term madrassa before 2001, but after the incident, the subject became a focus of policy literature that widely regarded the institution as a set of ‘factories of ideological indoctrination and even military training for terrorist organizations’ (3). The connection between Pakistani madrassas, religious indoctrination, and militancy was highlighted by a multitude of scholars and security analysts from the United States and Europe. Madrassas were termed ‘Islam’s Medieval Outposts,’ ‘Jihad Factory,’ and ‘Incubators of Violent Extremism’ (Haqqani 2002; Kean and Hamilton 2004; Sareen 2005). Sensing the popularity of the subject, some local scholars also contributed to this discourse. Hussain Haqqani, a Pakistani scholar and diplomat, narrated his childhood experience of madrassa education in the widely read American journal Foreign Policy. He described how in his early days, his

22 Fatima Waqi Sajjad madrassa teacher once rebuked him for dressing like a farangi (European), how this teacher maintained a restricted worldview and discouraged reading ‘too many books.’ Haqqani’s account effectively reduces the credibility of madrassa teachers as well as of students, who are represented as individuals with limited thinking capacity and restricted worldviews. Madrassas are termed ‘universities of Jihad’ spreading their ‘medieval theology’ worldwide (Haqqani 2002). Similar ideas were expressed by a number of other policy reports and policymakers during this time. US Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld posed a scathing question in 2002: ‘are we capturing, killing or deterring and dissuading more terrorists every day than the madrassas … are recruiting, training and deploying against us?’ US Secretary of State Colin Powell later termed madrassas breeding grounds for ‘fundamentalists and terrorists’ (as noted in a Guardian article on 20 July 2005). Later studies however, described the statistics and alarms about madrassas as largely exaggerated and argued that contrary to popular belief, madrassas are not directly linked to militancy; however they may provide networking opportunities to militant groups, religious ideologues, and potential recruits (Andrabi, Das, Fair, and Khawaja 2009; Bergen and Pandey 2006; Fair 2007; Malik 2007). The academic focus on madrassas thus shifted to public education in Pakistan in the following years. The connection between public education and radicalization was keenly explored in security policy discourses. The proliferation of literature on the subject, particularly in the US, was so extensive that one author suggested, ‘Washington seems to be in a season of worrying—some might say “obsessing”—about the education system in Pakistan’ (Hathaway 2005: 1). Concerns were raised about the poor quality of the mainstream education system and the content of national curricula and textbooks (Hussian, Salim, and Naveed 2011; Siddiqa 2010; Winthrop and Graff 2010). Various studies pointed toward poor governance, alarmingly low literacy rates, inaccessible education, and the poor quality of existing education as risk factors that create widespread grievances, negative perceptions, and hence opportunities for militants to pull young people into their fold (Hathaway 2005; Winthrop and Graff 2010, Haider 2011). The content of curricula and textbooks was emphasized as another risk factor. Hussain, Salim, and Naveed (2011) conducted a study sponsored by the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) and the International Centre for Religion and Diplomacy (ICRD) that highlighted textbook material and teaching practices in Pakistan that could be a source of religious intolerance and discrimination in the country, especially against Hindu and Christian minorities. An International Crisis Group report in 2014 noted that national textbooks on history, literature, and even sciences were being used to create a discourse on national identity that emphasized ‘national cohesion at the expense of regional diversity’ (ICG 2014: 3). Yusuf (2014), while synthesizing information on youth radicalism in Pakistan for a United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report, observed that ‘Pakistani youth are prone to the state’s version of history and depiction of

Education and radicalization in Pakistan 23 Pakistan as a victim of negative externalities’ (9). Afzal (2015) observed that ‘Pakistan Studies textbooks forge an identity exclusively based on Islam and derived in opposition to India’ (1). She warned that such an education led to the growth of radical attitudes and intolerance towards the ‘other,’ be it religious minorities within the country, India, or the United States. The role of education to counter extremism was another key area actively explored by academics and policymakers during the years following 9/11. A multitude of recommendations were made for madrassas and public education reform in Pakistan to counter the sway of extremist ideas. The government also pursued an active agenda to counter extremism. Concerns raised about the ‘outdated’ and ‘medieval’ curriculum of madrassas were addressed by introducing ‘modern day,’ ‘secular’ subjects like Math, Science, and Computer to madrassa curricula. Lucrative grants were offered to madrassas willing to embrace new government reforms. A parallel project named Education Sector Reform (ESR) aimed to improve the quality and structure of public education with generous financial support by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (Curtis 2007; Kronstadt, 2004). It was assumed that teaching secular subjects in madrassas and improving the overall structure of public education would help mitigate extremism in the country. Stil, other studies pointed out the need to reform the content of public education to promote tolerance and peace. They demanded complete renewal of textbooks and curricula especially in subjects such as Pakistan/Social Studies, Civics, and History. Removal of material that encourages or justifies discrimination and inclusion of values of social justice and respect for diversity was strongly recommended (Afzal 2015; Hussain, Salim, and Naveed 2011; Nayyar and Salim 2003; Winthrop and Graff 2010). Afzal (2015) suggests that standards of Pakistan Studies curricula, in particular, must be raised to international level, official textbooks should be authored by international scholars, and their content should incorporate ‘rigorous analysis and critical thinking to nurture tolerant and analytical global citizens’ (1). If we sum up the main concerns expressed by security analysts regarding madrassas and public education systems in Pakistan, they essentially point toward the failure of these education systems to produce thinking individuals. Madrassas are accused of maintaining a system of rote learning and public schools are blamed for upholding state-sponsored curricula and a culture of compliance. In both cases, the credibility of Pakistani madrassas and public-school teachers as well as students is significantly reduced as their thinking abilities are questioned. Also it must be noted that the security discourses refuse to engage with the voices of their subject. Most studies conveniently judge thinking capacity of madrassas/public school teachers and students without engaging with their perspectives. Hence, Pakistani students and teachers are effectively silenced while they are being evaluated for their thinking abilities and militant extremist potential. The extensive literature on education reform in Pakistan also remains silent on the elite education system in the country, in terms of its performance in mitigating extremism. The literature points out umpteen problems with public schools

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and madrassas who mostly offer free education or charge a marginal fee for their services, but the curricula, teaching, and learning practices in highly expensive elite schools are seldom examined or questioned. Although Rahman (2004) points toward the dangers of widespread grievances caused by the great educational divide in the country and Siddiqa (2010) reveals traces of latent radicalism in students of elite universities, these studies do not pay much attention to the teaching and learning practices inside elite schools or consider how these may be in need of reform. The following section examines everyday teaching and learning practices inside the elite education system of Pakistan through a case study of Cambridge O-level Pakistan Studies. It begins with a brief overview of Pakistan’s divided education system and then explores how Cambridge Assessment International Education operates in Pakistan. I use insights from David Gillborn’s conceptualization of White supremacy in education, to reveal concealed violence in prevailing elite education structures. I use Paulo Freire’s conceptualization of banking and problem-posing education to reveal concealed oppression in everyday education practices. I question how education can counter radicalization if we allow the concealed oppression in the system to prevail. The case of Cambridge O-level Pakistan Studies The education landscape of Pakistan is representative of, and contributes to, socioeconomic disparity as well as ideological polarization in the country (Rahman 2004: 148–149). Private schools catering to the elite class have existed since the British colonial era. There were two types of elitist schools in British India: Chiefs’ Colleges that catered to heredity aristocracy, and English schools that catered to the emerging professional class. The idea of ‘the white man’s burden’ shaped the teaching philosophy of these institutions that aimed to help the Indian elite come up to the level of the British. The presumed superiority of English values and norms was embedded in the elite education system established in India under the British rule (Rahman 2004). After independence in 1947, the elitist schools continued to flourish in Pakistan as a parallel education system that catered to the needs of the military and higher bureaucracy of the newly independent country. From 1985 onward, in addition to old British military and convent schools, new elite school systems were introduced which offered innovative teaching and learning methods. These new elite school chains gradually spread and became popular all over Pakistan, catering to the needs of the emerging professional middle class (Rahman 2004). Currently, Cambridge O-level is the most commonly offered program at higher secondary level in the elite private schools of Pakistan. The program is offered under the banner of Cambridge International Examinations (CIE, now called CAIE2), which claims to be the world’s largest provider of international education programs and qualifications for 5- to 19-year-olds.3 Cambridge O-level Pakistan Studies is a compulsory course for all candidates of Cambridge O level in Pakistan (aged 14 to 16 years). The case of Cambridge O-level Pakistan Studies is selected for examination owing to its popularity in Pakistan’s

Education and radicalization in Pakistan 25 elite schools and its relevance to the existing study. The popularity of the program can be gauged by the sheer number of students that appear in CIE O-level examinations each year. In May 2016, over 270,000 entries were reported by schools all over Pakistan for Cambridge qualifications. The number of these entries increases considerably every year (Ghani 2016). Pakistan Studies is a course made compulsory for all Pakistani students at secondary and higher secondary school levels, by the state. Following the state requirement, CIE offers this course to all prospective O-level candidates in Pakistan. The course is divided into two separate parts: Pakistan Studies: History and Culture, and Environment of Pakistan. Both parts are taught as independent courses. The current study focuses on the first part of O-level Pakistan Studies, as it deals with the subject relevant to the current study, that is, the history and culture of Pakistan. It is to be noted that most studies on extremism and education in Pakistan cited earlier include analysis of Pakistan Studies curricula and textbooks (Afzal 2015; Hussain, Salim and Naveed 2011; Nayyar and Salim 2003). There is an added reason for the selection of this case. I have the advantage of observing teaching and learning practices of this course as an insider, since I taught the course myself for some time at a well- known elite school in Lahore. It was largely my personal experience of teaching this particular course to young Pakistani students in the years following 9/11 that drove me to conduct the current study.

Materials and methods To assess the education system and the learning experience of Cambridge O-level Pakistan Studies, I used the three questions by Gillborn (2005) cited earlier. The original plan was to examine the course curriculum at three levels: curriculummaking, teaching, and learning. For curriculum-making, I tried to explore the question of ‘who’ designs the curriculum, ‘who’ sets curriculum objectives and assessments. What kind of teaching and learning philosophy guides the making of the curriculum? For curriculum teaching, I collected the views of 13 expert teachers, 9 of whom were key informants as they had an average teaching experience of 20 years and were working as program coordinators and teacher trainers in prominent elite institutions. A few among them were renowned teachers owing to the outstanding results they produce consistently each year, and the high number of students they teach in schools as well as in tuition academies (an estimated 800 to 1,000 students per year). For curriculum learning, the ideas and experiences of O-level students were collected through semi-structured interviews and focus groups. Two distinct levels of students were selected for interview and focus group discussions. Level 1—students who at the time of the interview were studying the course and were about to sit for their exams in two weeks (interviews conducted in late April, CIE exam held in early May 2017). This group included 24 participants (average age 16 years). Level 2—students who had studied and successfully completed the course a couple of years earlier (all of them were currently enrolled in the CIE A-level program). This group included 12 participants (average age 17.5 years).

26 Fatima Waqi Sajjad The reason for selection of two different levels of students was to be able to collect their opinion on the course when they were directly and intensely experiencing it and when they were able to express their ideas on the course in a detached manner. Focus group discussions were added to allow free expression to students of a younger age group, who seemed more comfortable in a group setting rather than in a formal interview setting. The study was conducted in Lahore, a key urban educational center of Pakistan. The teachers and students were reached through personal contact. All students interviewed represented top elite schools in Pakistan. The following discussion will also utilize insights from Critical Pedagogy to make sense of the connection between global political concerns and local education practices in Pakistan. CIE O-level Pakistan Studies curriculum: who does it? The search for ‘who’ designs the curriculum of CIE O-level Pakistan Studies, in order to explore the teaching and learning objectives of the course, turned out to be a very challenging task. Despite multiple efforts through many of the available channels, I was unable to access information on the people who design the course curriculum. The search, however, did provide useful insights on the way CIE operates locally. A key finding of this initial search was that the information on curriculum-making at CIE is generally not available to the people who are teaching the curriculum on the ground. School administrators, seasoned teachers, and subject coordinators were clueless about the curriculum-making process at CIE. They confided that the syllabus was just ‘handed down’ to them to be implemented; they did not have access to syllabus-makers to discuss curriculum objectives, content, or assessment of the course. The syllabus is imposed on us from above. We are supposed to implement it—not question it. In the occasional training webinars too, the trainers just tell, they seldom ask about our concerns or problems. The lack of connection and communication between curriculum-makers and teachers is in direct contradiction to CIE’s professed pedagogy of ‘effective teaching and active learning’ that requires an active role of teachers and students in whatever is being taught and learned in classrooms (CIE Code of Practice 2008: 6). Another important finding was that as a ‘local’ researcher, I was unable to access information on CIE curriculum-making people and processes. After a long e-mail correspondence, CIE customer service eventually sent the following reply: Unfortunately, we do not provide the type of information you have requested as it is business sensitive, additionally we need to be fair and transparent in all our dealings—providing this data to any one individual would contravene this. (Enquiry id 509887—e-mail correspondence: 1–15 March 2017)

Education and radicalization in Pakistan 27 After repeated e-mails, the CIE regional team provided the following response: Thank you for explaining more fully about your research project. It sounds interesting but it is of course a complex area. In our development work for Pakistan Studies we adhere closely to the Pakistan national curriculum and we do suggest that this is the best starting point for your work. All good wishes for your research project and sorry that we are not able to help you to a greater extent. (E-mail correspondence: 5 March–10 April 10 2017) It may be noted that my earlier research experience with exploring madrassa education system in Pakistan was somewhat different, as madrassa leaders turned out to be quite accessible and seemed accustomed to being scrutinized regularly by local and foreign researchers (Sajjad, 2013). The contrast between accessibility of madrassas and CIE policymakers, when the former is labeled a source of threat and the latter is excluded from security analysis, displays the multiple ways in which power operates in practice. Owing to the inaccessibility of data on curriculum-making, the original plan was altered. Instead of collecting the views of the people who make the O-level Pakistan Studies curriculum, the study now shifted its focus to the stated goals and education philosophy of CIE. CIE education policy briefs, readily available on the CIE website, including key documents titled ‘CIE Code of Practice,’ ‘Cambridge Learner and Teacher Attributes,’ and ‘The Cambridge Approach,’ were examined for this purpose. Two insights emerged from this examination: (a) CIE education continues to be driven by the ‘career motive.’ ‘Admission to the best universities’ is widely described as the prime motive of Cambridge qualifications. The experiences of CIE teachers and students confirm this observation. The teachers, for example, noted: ‘It is not history but technique—how to attempt paper and how to get grades. It is grade oriented not learning oriented.’ ‘The objective is cramming history. Grades remain the main focus of O-level Pakistan History. I find that very frustrating.’ ‘The problem is with the real purpose—it’s done for grades and it’s done for business.’ ‘I tell my students (amusingly) … do not make the mistake of thinking that this course is about learning, it is not. The purpose is to get an A*.’4 The students learning experiences support teachers’ views: ‘It is more about good grade. The course did not allow us much spare time for free thinking.’ ‘I realized it was to get an A* and not to understand history.’ ‘Getting a good grade is the main purpose.’

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The voices of teachers and learners indicate that, in practice, it is an unthinking race for grades that drives learning in this key Pakistan history and culture course. Giroux (2003) laments how the preponderance of a free-market economy and corporate culture is creating a threatening competitive environment which blocks the thinking capacities of individuals (8). Students as well as teachers struggle to fit into the world as it is, rather than think or seek to transform it for the better. Education makes them more passive and compliant to the existing norms even when they see these norms as problematic. (b) Another notable contradiction in CIE policy briefs is that CIE keeps asking teachers to listen to the voices of students and practice pedagogy of reflection, but they do not seem to listen to the voices of teachers to reflect on their own curricula. Reflective practice supported by professional development is an essential and continuous part of a teacher’s life … Teachers need to … listen to the voice of the learner. (Implementing the curriculum with Cambridge: A guide for school leaders, accessed April 25, 2016 : 11) Whether CIE itself listens to the voices of the teachers and school leaders it serves, whether it actively seeks their feedback to improve its services, or whether it regularly reflects on its current practices, is not mentioned in CIE policy briefs. The voices of the teachers and the students remain excluded from CIE policy briefs. Freire describes the paradox of the dominant elite that while they never fail to think for or about the people, they cannot think with the people since such an exercise would challenge their domination (Freire (2005): Those who steal the words of others develop a deep doubt in the abilities of the others and consider them incompetent. Each time they say their word without hearing the word of those they have forbidden to speak, they grow more accustomed to power and acquire a taste for guiding, ordering and commanding. (Freire 2005: 131) Who gets the benefit/who loses? The voices of teachers and students convey that the beneficiaries of current elite education structure in Pakistan are the global testing services, the local elite schools, and tuition academies, all of whom mint large sums of money out of the system. The teachers revealed that owing to excessive emphasis on grades, the tuition culture has expanded rapidly in recent years. In the case of O-level Pakistan Studies, teachers reported a very high percentage of students who attend tuition academies in the evening, in addition to their regular school classes. When asked why students need to take tuition in addition to their regular school classes, the teachers cited multiple reasons:

Education and radicalization in Pakistan 29 They have to learn how to attempt the paper. For this course, learning the paper technique is important. (discussion with O-level teacher) Schools do not hire proper subject specialists for Social Science courses like Pak Studies. Any person who speaks English qualifies to teach this course. The time allocated to these courses is also less, compared to other courses. These are marginalized subjects which no one pays much attention to. (discussion/interview with O-level teacher) The losing side of the current system remains that of teachers, students, and of learning. The aforementioned statements by teachers indicate how education has been reduced to learning ‘technique’ to attempt the CIE paper, and how subjects that can potentially offer critical insights on contemporary social and political issues are being marginalized in elite school systems. It is Freire’s banking education that prevails in the elite schools of Pakistan. Teachers are under a lot of pressure to cover a big course in short time. Generally we have to finish the prescribed course in two years. Active Learning is not possible in this scenario. Teaching thinking takes time. (interview with O-level teacher) I try to include multiple perspectives in history but we have limited time so we have to get back on track, as CIE assessment does not check these aspects of understanding. (interview with O-level teacher) The CIE assessment design and limited time duration was another major concern for the teachers: Analysis is predictable. There is a set paper pattern and predictable questions. Guess papers are common and time duration (for exam) is short for a reasoned opinion. It’s no surprise that the outcome is rote memorization. (interview with O-level teacher) Evaluation is also turned into memorization. For expected questions students are told in advance the best perspective from examiner’s point of view. Besides, they do not have time during the test to analyze and evaluate a position. The limited time only allows reproduction of already learnt answers. (interview with O-level teacher) Students expressed similar concerns about CIE assessment design: (Exam papers are) too repetitive… no learning. Students are made to do past papers.

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Fatima Waqi Sajjad What’s the point of making students write so much in such little time? It is unfair domination and control … why are we being ruled by the same people? First it was EIC now it is CIE.5 (O-level student response recorded)

The effects and outcomes The effect of a system of education that promotes compliance and conformity to the norm, even when one disagrees with it, is either restriction on thinking or frustration and aggression. Either way, such an education cannot address the contemporary problem of youth radicalization. Freire (2005) laments that the contemporary banking concept of education is denying students the opportunities to reflect. From reflection comes necessary engagement for liberation. Elite education in Pakistan remains a part of the prevailing education systems that favor the interests of the dominant global and local elites. Such an education reproduces global and local inequalities rather than addresses them. Teachers within this education system struggle to meet the contradictory demands of the curricula imposed on them from above. The curriculum design and the pressure to produce good results restrict teachers’ capacity to teach thinking. Students, in this fiercely competitive system, struggle to do well. Learning is ultimately driven by the fear of the exam and the anxiety about getting a good grade. The net outcome, in terms of learning in such a system, is questionable. I was able to interview a few students after they had received their exam results. About the course content, one student commented, ‘I do not remember anything now … mostly because I do not want to remember.’ This student did manage to get an A grade in the course.

Conclusion Let us revisit here the question raised earlier: why, despite extensive counterradicalization policies across the globe, the phenomenon of radicalization is on the rise and has become a very vexing problem for world peace? My assertion is that radicalization will exist as long as systemic violence exists. The systemic oppression refers to the measures taken arbitrarily by authorities for counterradicalization without any proper consultation with stakeholders or the ordinary people concerned. We cannot undo human resistance through greater oppression. To counter radicalization through education, we must identify, acknowledge, and address the violence hidden in current counter-radicalization policies and in our everyday education practices. As far as counter-radicalization policies are concerned, this study finds rampant epistemic violence embedded in policy literature. In fact, Western policy discourse on the subject presents a typical case of epistemic violence where knowledge about the other is constructed for domination and control. For example, three trends are clearly visible in Western policy discourse on radicalization in Pakistan and its link to Pakistani education:

Education and radicalization in Pakistan 31 1. The discourse is built around selective emphases and silences. The larger picture of a fragmented, sharply divided, and unequal education system of Pakistan is not taken into account. The structural injustices and embedded White supremacy of the Pakistani education system are never discussed. Instead, Western discourses remain focused on current problems of madrassa or public education. They choose to remain silent on problems of elite education and the working of global testing regimes in Pakistan. The allegations leveled against madrassas and public schools mainly include their tendency to suppress students’ independent thinking and ability to question. But this study finds visible suppression of independent thinking in elite education system as well. The way grade-oriented international education is being practiced in elite schools leaves little room for critical questioning and independent thinking. But these dynamics remain excluded from extensive policy discussions on education reform in Pakistan. The anti-radicalization policies choose to ignore how deep-rooted elitism and inequality shape the education system of Pakistan and how such dynamics contribute to conditions that breed anger and violence in the society at large. The focus remains on fixing madrassas and public schools. 2. The possibility of self-representation has been consistently denied to the radical other. The discourse defines and constitutes the character of the ‘radical,’ it speaks for the radical and also for the so-called sympathizers of the radical, but it does not allow them to speak for themselves. It claims that the Western knowledge about the radical is the truth and thus denies all other possibilities. There is apparent undermining of the local knowledge systems. Western knowledge is recurrently proposed and imposed to fix the problem; for example, the widely projected notion that the outdated, medieval madrassa curricula must embrace Western secular subjects to de-radicalize madrasa students. Thus, counter-radicalization discourses present a classic case of epistemic violence as envisaged by Gayatri Spivak. 3. Also, this study finds rampant discriminatory, testimonial, and distributive epistemic violence in anti-radicalization policy discourses. The ‘radical’ is frequently dehumanized and stereotyped as morally inferior or inhuman. He or she is not considered worthy of entering into academic or policy discussions. Moreover, opportunities for material sources and access to common language is denied to them to curtail their power to communicate with a wider global audience. Hence, the current policies to counter radicalization through education under the global watchdogs remain counterproductive as they reinforce systemic violence and stimulate fear and anxiety. To enhance global security in the long run, I propose that instead of propagating education to counter radicalization, we need to promote education that embraces radicalization as envisioned by Freire. If emancipation from oppression, as envisioned by Freire, is the goal of education, contemporary efforts to enhance global security through education must focus on this key objective. Emancipation, according to Freire (2005), is a practice: ‘the action

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and reflection of men and women upon their world in order to transform it’ (79). Thinking and reflection tend to be dangerous as they identify and challenge systems of oppression. Freire (2005) warns that ‘the dominant elite are so well aware of this fact that they instinctively use all means, including physical violence, to keep the people from thinking’ (149). For long-term security, we need to radically reform education practices that suppress thinking and promote conformity by encouraging a blind race for top grades, top universities, and top careers. The higher purpose of education to nourish human minds and intellects must be realized at all levels and practiced by all stakeholders.

Notes 1 On 16 December 2014, Army Public School in Peshawar Pakistan was attacked by seven gunmen reportedly affiliated with the radical militant organization Tehrik Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The militants captured the school and systematically targeted young children/teachers, killing 141 people, 132 of whom were between 8 and 18 years of age. 2 CAIE—Cambridge Assessment International Education. The name changed recently. The old name, CIE (Cambridge International Examination), will be used throughout the study for clarity as the study was conducted last year when the old name was in use. 3 See http://www.cambridgeinternational.org/ 4 A* is the highest grade for a CIE O-level course followed by an A grade. 5 EIC stands for East India Company, the British trading company mainly responsible for colonizing India in the seventeenth century. EIC is prominently featured in the O-level Pak Studies: History and Culture course and hence students are quite familiar with its role in colonizing India

References AAU (Alps-Adriatic University Klagenfurt). n.d. Epistemic Violence. http://epistemicviol ence.aau.at/index.php/en/home-2/, accessed February 2, 2020. Afzal, Madiha. 2015. Education and Attitudes in Pakistan: Understanding Perceptions of Terrorism. Washington: United States Institute of Peace. https://www.usip.org/sites/def ault/files/SR367-Education-and-Attitudes-in-Pakistan. Andrabi, Tahir, Jishnu Das, C Christine Fair, and Asim Ijaz Khwaja. 2009. “The Madrasa Myth.” Foreign Policy. 1–2. https://foreignpolicy.com/2009/06/01/the-madrasa-myth/, accessed February 3, 2020. Bartels, Anke, Lars Eckstein, Nicole Waller, and Dirk Wiemann. 2019. “Interlude: Epistemic Violence.” In Bartels et al., Postcolonial Literatures in English: An Introduction. Basingstoke: Springer, 153–154. Bergen, Peter and Swati Pandey. 2006. “The Madrassa Scapegoat.” The Washington Quarterly 29, no. 2: 115–125. doi:10.1162/wash.29.2.117. Bunch, Allie J. 2015. “Epistemic Violence in the Process of Othering: Real-World Applications and Moving Forward.” Scholarly Undergraduate Research Journal 1, Article 2. Clark University. https://commons.clarku.edu/surj/vol1/iss1/2/, accessed February 2, 2020. CIE Code of Practice. 2008. https://tribune.com.pk/story/1160600/cambridge-results-recor d-setting-year-pakistanis/, accessed June 24, 2018.

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3

Teaching toward a culture of peace Analysis of Islamiat and Ethics textbooks Ashar Johnson Khokhar

Introduction South Asia is unique due to its religious makeup; India is a Hindu majority country but also has a significant number of religious minorities while Sri Lanka is a Buddhist majority country but also has a considerable number of religious minorities living there. Afghanistan, Bangladesh, the Maldives, and Pakistan are Muslim majority countries while a small number of religious minorities live in these countries, apart from Bangladesh, where the non-Muslim population makes up about ten percent of the total population. Islam is enshrined as the state religion in the constitutional and legal frameworks of these countries, and the legal and social systems of these countries are conceived and build on Islamic principles. Pakistan was conceived as an Islamic Republic for those Muslims living in the Muslim majority areas of the subcontinent, and the Islamic orientation of Pakistan’s development continued to shape the country’s constitutional and legal frameworks, and education structure and system. The Islamization of every aspect of life in Pakistan began in the early years of Pakistan becoming an independent country, and, slowly, Islam permeated every aspect of life. The Objectives Resolution, adopted by the Constituent Assembly in 1949, declared that Islam and Pakistan were intertwined, as it stated that ‘whereas sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to Allah Almighty alone and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan, through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by Him is a sacred trust’ (GoP 2012: 1). This statement set up Pakistan’s present and its future, as the state would shape its legal and constitutional framework, and the social and cultural lives of citizens of this newly created state would be shaped and molded by Islam. The Objectives Resolution, even though opposed by the members from religious minorities and liberal Muslim parties, was passed by the Constituent Assembly which was later adopted as a preamble in the first Constitution of Pakistan. Later, it was incorporated into the 1973 Constitution, and it continued to affect every aspect of life, including education and curriculum policies (Ahmad 2018).

Islam and Islamization of education policies The first education Minister of Pakistan, Fazalur Rehman, who himself was a religious scholar (Sunni Islam), set the course for the education system to be developed

36 Ashar Johnson Khokhar and to evolve around Islam, Islamic teachings, and Islamic traditions. He believed that knowledge about Islam was an essential course of study for Muslims, and he suggested that the education system and curriculum of the newly established state should release itself from un-Islamic shackles and base itself in Islam and Islamic tradition (Ahsan 2003; Hameed-ur-Rehman and Sewani 2013; Parveen 2010). The state and policymakers in the early years of Pakistan’s modern history suggested normalizing the study of Islam; they believed that Muslims under the British had not learned about Islam because the state (i.e., the British rulers) had not wanted Muslims to learn about true Islam and true Islamic teachings and values. The government of Pakistan blamed the Indian National Congress, whom they considered to be representative of the Hindu majority, and believed that they colluded with the British and put obstacles in the way of making the study of Islam a course of study in schools (Qasmi 2019). Pakistan’s national education policies given by different Governments of Pakistan (GoP) had always been rooted in the Objectives Resolution of 1949, and it was observed that ‘foremost is the issue of ideology – the role of Islam in curriculum and instruction. Since Pakistan came into being as a homeland of Muslim Indians, the sentiments towards the position of Islam in education are always high’ (Hameed-ur-Rehman and Sewani 2013: 248; Kamei 2018). The 2009 education policy, adopted during the so-called ‘enlightened’ Islamic decade in Pakistan (under General Pervez Musharraf who ruled from 1999 to 2008 as Army General, Chief Executive, and President), stated that education should be ‘embedded within the Islamic ethos as enshrined in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan’ (GoP 2009: 2). The document stated that the education system must provide quality education to our children and youth to enable them to realize their individual potential and contribute to development of society and nation, creating a sense of Pakistani nationhood, the concepts of tolerance, social justice, democracy, their regional and local culture and history based on the basic ideology enunciated in the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan. (GoP 2009 10) The 2009 education policy dedicated a chapter to Islamic education, whereby it declared that Islamic teaching and values should be promoted not only through Islamic education but also through all curricular and non-curricular activities in schools (Leirvik 2010). The state of Pakistan declared Islamic education, or Islamiat, to be a core subject for all Muslim pupils from Classes 3 to 12 and recommended Ethics as an alternative subject for non-Muslims (GoP 2009). The policy also stated that ‘Non-Muslim students shall not be required to read lessons/pages on Islam in the textbook of integrated subject for Grades I and II’ (24). All stakeholders (teachers, academics, politicians, people involved in social activities, community workers, religious leaders, and parents, whether secular or religious-minded) in the education process hold strong views about Religious Education (RE) and its place in the general education and some (Gearon 2012;

Teaching toward a culture of peace 37 Jackson et al. 2007) approached this debate from a broader perspective—that of religion and society. There is no denying the fact that religiopolitical parties were influential in forcing the regimes of textbook boards and textbook writers to alter textbooks according to their demands. A single episode will demonstrate how powerful they were— and still are. In the province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa there was a dispute between government allies (AFP 2014; Zia 2014). Pakistan Tehrik-e-Insaf (Pakistan Justice Party), the majority party in the ruling coalition, and Jamiat-e-Islami, the minority partner in the ruling coalition, disagreed on a textbook newly produced by the provincial textbook board. The Education Minister of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, who was from the minority party, insisted that their demands be met and that the provincial textbook board should produce new textbooks to incorporate the changes they demanded. These changes related to Islamic education: they required the addition of verses about Jihad; the removal of images of females without headscarves; the use of ‘Assalam-o-Alaikum’ instead of ‘Good morning’ in English textbooks; and the removal of chapters on Raja Dahir and Raja Ranjit Singh from History/Geography textbooks. Although the majority party disagreed with the suggestions given by its minority ruling party, the majority party gave in to these demands, and all the changes that had been made in the textbook after the 2006/2007 curriculum reformation exercise were reversed as per the demands of the minority party.

Why study Islamic education and Ethics textbooks now? Islamiat, or Islamic education, has remained contentious among majority and minority Muslim groups since Pakistan’s independence. The 1973 constitution made Islamiat a compulsory subject at all levels but General’s Zia’s Islamization drive, which began in 1980 and continued until the 2000s, focused on Islamizing the curriculum and the practices of educational institutes (Valliani 2014). The Ethics textbooks were also Islamized, and the content was presented to non-Muslim pupils from an Islamic perspective; a study noted that textbooks taught pupils about Islam and Islamic values and not about ethics, ethical values, and how to live an ethical life (Nayyar and Salim 2005). Even though Islamiat was made compulsory for all Muslims and Ethics compulsory for non-Muslims, it has continued to be a sensitive issue in Pakistan, and there have been few studies analyzing these textbooks. The curriculum document stated the purpose of teaching Islamiat and Ethics. The purpose of the latter, offered as an alternate to non-Muslim pupils, was to make pupils ‘realize that all religions teach the similar values and there is no reason to have negative feelings against other faiths’ and that ‘experience of learning common moral teachings will bring the people of different faiths closer to each other’ (GoP 2006a: 1). The writers of the curriculum document also envisaged that ‘the present generation will group up healthy, tolerant and sound moral character,’ which will ‘result in the creation of a “good society.” Such a society has been dream of sages throughout the ages’ (GoP 2006a: 1). The policymakers and curriculum document writers wanted to attain this dream by teaching non-Muslim pupils about world religions and their social and ethical values. The Islamiat

38 Ashar Johnson Khokhar curriculum document writers wanted this subject to be taught to make ‘Muslim pupils believe in the eternal message of Islam, and its teachings and practice in school will ultimately result in permeating their everyday lives’ (GoP 2006b: 1). Along with learning about Islamic teachings and practices, the writers also envisioned the teaching of the Islamic values of ‘Muslim unity and brotherhood, tolerance, justice, simplicity, truthfulness, punctuality, cleanliness, and rights of neighbors and other Muslims’ and how to ‘develop a liking of Pakistan’s distinct ideology, rooted in Islam’ (GoP 2006b: 2).

Studies analyzing Islamiat and Ethics textbooks Analysis of Islamiat and Ethics curriculum documents reveals similarities between them, especially with regard to setting the purpose of teaching these subjects, such as to inculcate values of tolerance, justice, and other values that would result in the creation of an ethical society. There are differences too; the Islamiat document focused on developing good Muslims, in the belief that Muslims will learn to tolerate and accept dogmatic and ethical differences merely by learning Islamic teachings, while the Ethics document aimed to develop tolerance and acceptance of differences (religious and ethical) by being aware of, and studying, them. There is a plethora of studies analyzing textbooks and curriculum documents, but all of them focus on Social Studies, Pakistan Studies, English, and Urdu. The studies analyzed curriculum documents and textbooks with regard to, for example, the formation of Pakistani identity, representation of gender, messages of peace and coexistence, the historical narrative of Pakistan, and the incorrect information presented in textbooks. There are only a few studies of Islamiat textbooks, due to the sensitive nature of the subject and because of the fear that the researcher might be accused of blasphemy and killed. The studies that analyzed the content of Islamiat textbooks (Arshad and Zamir 2018; Ahmad, Mustafa, and Mushtaq 2019) focused on social ethics and civic sense. The researchers found that these textbooks successfully presented the Islamic model of civic and social values to pupils. Another study of Islamiat textbooks was made by Ali (2008), where she looked at how revised textbooks legitimized the religious teachings, rites, rituals, and personalities of the majority group (Sunni Muslims) and delegitimized those of the minority group (Shia Muslims). This conflict led to violent clashes in Shia majority areas, especially the Northern Areas (now called Gilgit-Baltistan province), and many people lost their lives. The curriculum reformation exercise in 2006/2007 resulted in new Islamic education and Ethics curriculum documents, which, according to the curriculum document writers, were intended to make textbooks reflective of the tolerant and enlightened Islamic faith. The textbooks analyzed in this study were produced after the curriculum reformation exercise and presumed that the textbook regimes and textbook writers had attempted to produce inclusive Islamic education and Ethics textbooks. The Islamiat textbook was divided into two parts, one for Sunni Muslims and the other for Shia Muslims. There is not a single study on Ethics textbooks, and this is the first study that has analyzed Ethics textbooks and its curriculum document. This study is also the first study where both Islamiat and Ethics curriculum documents and textbooks

Teaching toward a culture of peace 39 have been analyzed against criteria taken from the documents and textbooks themselves. The Ethics textbooks currently used were presented alongside the Ethics curriculum framework and prepared with the consultation of all stakeholders, that is, all non-Muslim groups. The non-Muslims (Christian, Hindus, Sikhs) found the content unrepresentative of their religious and ethical values. They complained that the state had not consulted them in the writing and approval processes (Yousafzai 2016). The state refused to listen to the complaints of these groups, and non-Muslim pupils were forced to study these textbooks, as they did not have an alternate source of information.

Religion, religious education, and its scope Academics tried to define and redefine religious education (Islamiat and Ethics in the case of Pakistani) and the place of religion in RE, and it continued to be an essential area of research (Berglund, Shanneik, and Bocking 2016; Philip Barnes 2015). In monolithic and homogeneous societies RE was rooted in religion, which made minorities invisible, but this started to change with industrialization and mass migration. The societal structure and political and cultural values of firstworld countries changed into multi-cultural, multi-religious, and multi-ethnic ones, and this also affected RE, its content and pedagogical practices. RE became a progressive subject and aimed to prepare pupils to live in a fast-changing world. John Dewy (2013) tried to redefine religious education; Archibald (1987) summed up Dewey’s idea of religious education in the phrase ‘any education fit to be,’ and his ideas helped in redefining religious education from being ‘education about a specific religion’ to ‘education to become a fit human being’ (406) living in a diverse and changing society. This change in the focus of RE brought about a transformation of values, the result of a process that Archibald (1987) called ‘a religious process’ (406). The debate about the RE curriculum moved from whether it should be part of the core curriculum to whether it should be a course based on values, and thus to a debate about what values (social, ethical, and moral) should be taught and inculcated through RE and its teaching in school. Teachers of RE using a subjective or faith-based approach became engaged in explaining their convictions to pupils. In contrast, those using an objective approach focused on developing pupils’ critical-thinking skills and questioning abilities as pupils learned about and acquired a religious belief system. It was argued that RE should focus on the personal development of both teacher and pupil as they journeyed together and shared, and learned from, each other’s religious and spiritual experiences, beliefs, commitments, and practices (Berglund, Shanneik, and Bocking 2016; Barnes and Davis 2015; Philip Barnes 2015; Jackson 2013). The school and the classroom environment were important in RE as both the teacher and the pupil learned to appreciate the other’s belief system and accept differences without condemning the other as being less intelligent. The work of Grimmitt (1994) looked at RE differently, and he suggested two approaches, which were “religious absolutism” and “religious equality and neutrality.” The former approach required education to be informed and shaped

40 Ashar Johnson Khokhar by the belief and value system of a particular religion (Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam), while the latter viewed education as shaped by the values of equality and neutrality. Religious absolutism, Grimmitt claimed, was unacceptable and had no place in the modern world, which was continuously being shaped by mass migration and becoming diverse in all aspects, including religious traditions. Cultural absolutism viewed one’s own culture as superior to others, and believed that only its own value system should inform education, thereby transmitting those values to the pupils. This perspective viewed society as being in transition, and considered that those coming into a culture should be assimilated into it and its values. This view of RE presented a challenge to the perspective of cultural relativism, which viewed RE in terms of equality and neutrality; that is, in a democratic society all belief systems were equal, and cultural diversity in such a society was desirable and should be recognized and promoted. The values of education were informed by the belief and value systems (ethnic, religious, cultural, and social) of a society, and pupils learned about them in a ‘non-evaluative’ and ‘descriptive’ (Grimmitt 1994: 173) manner. Cultural relativism presented RE as focused on promoting understanding of various belief systems, inculcating the value of tolerance and respect for different belief systems, outlooks, and identities, either of majority or of minority groups. The current trends of RE are different in secular countries and in Muslim majority countries, including Pakistan. The Western world has moved on to what some have called an integrative approach (Alberts 2007), encompassing world religions (Shepherd 2017b, 2017a), and founding their RE curricula on inclusive values; the trend in Muslim majority countries is the opposite, as the RE curriculum is based on Islamic teachings and values and the pedagogical practices are rooted in faith and the confessional approach, in order to produce good Muslims. A study by Leirvik (2010) identified this in his analysis of the teaching of RE in Muslim majority countries around the world. Christians, the only religious minority in the Middle East and North Africa, complained of being ignored by the state. The Muslim majority countries in South East Asia (Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei Darussalam) and South Asia (Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Afghanistan) have people from different religions (Buddhism, Christianity, and Hinduism, and other small religions). All of these minorities have been made invisible because the state has only put resources into preparing the Islamiat curriculum and textbooks. An example is the lack of Ethics reading material and textbooks (for pupils until middle school) and pedagogical practice booklets and educational opportunities for teachers at all levels, although Islamiat is offered as one of the subject specialization areas in teacher education programs in all universities in Pakistan that offer such programs (GoP 2010). The purpose of RE should be to help ‘pupils learn about the beliefs, teachings, and practices of the great religious traditions of the world’ and ‘learn from their studies in religion about themselves – about discerning ultimate questions and “signals of transcendence” in their own experience and considering how

Teaching toward a culture of peace 41 they might respond to them’ (Teece 2010: 94). Since the inception of Pakistan Islam has always been used as a ‘dominant principle of the Pakistani national character’ (Ashraf 2018, 4). The teacher education curriculum document (GoP 2010) stated that those studying Methods of Teaching Islamic Studies should have studied and understood Islamic teachings, Islamic history, Islamic values and systems, and Islamic influence on different aspects of life. However, the document was silent on the content of Ethics, its scope, and Methods of Teaching Ethics. There were debates about the role of RE in schools and its links with religious studies departments in universities, and it was argued that both parties—teachers of RE and academics teaching in universities—should complement one another (Barnes 2014). These debates and discussions on possible ways to help each other suggested frequent interactions between these groups so that they could complement each other’s learning and learn from each other’s experiences. The academics focused more on ethics and the moral aspects of religion while the school teachers remained focused on the basics of the religion or religions, not going beyond information and the teachings and connecting them to the present. It was believed that this interaction would help teachers have a ‘depth of knowledge about a range of religious traditions and appropriate pedagogies for teaching them’ and be ‘able to cover wider philosophical and ethical issues’ (Jackson 2013: 180). Studies also revealed that a continuous linkage between schools and universities helped both parties contribute positively to achieving the goals of education set by the state where religious and ethical development of pupils was also an important component of formal schooling (Baumfield and Cush 2017; Jackson 2013; Johannessen and Skeie 2019; Stoeckl and Roy 2015). These linkages and interaction between RE teachers and Religious Studies departments in universities produced results in the developed world as the latter was influential in shaping the content and the pedagogical practices of teachers of RE (Engebretson et al. 2010; Skeie 2006; Freathy and John 2018; Jackson 2015; Schreiner 2015). However, these interactions made RE, its curriculum, and pedagogical practices Islamic-centered, indicating the increasing influence of religious groups not only in public spaces but also in universities across Pakistan where academics working to make curricula more inclusive fled the country due to increasing threats to their lives and those of their family members. Dr Bernadette Dean, who worked to develop an inclusive ethics curriculum for all grades, and who was an activist promoting inclusivity in the curriculum, fled the country because of a campaign against her by religious and political groups (Staff Reporter 2015). Methodology There is an increased interest in discourse analysis among researchers as they try to understand the social reality constructed and founded on an individual’s subjective orientation of what they decide to do—that is, on their social actions. Pupils

42 Ashar Johnson Khokhar construct and understand, and also connect to, the world around them through their textbooks, just as the writers of textbooks construct and present the world around them in the textbooks. Sociological discourse analysis (SDA) is used to analyze the textbooks in this study. Discourse is a widely used analysis tool in the humanities and the social science of communication; literary critics and sociologists, to name a few, use it to study society and how language is changing societies, for the better or the worse. Language is approached in a systematic way by paying close attention to the text and its context. SDA is founded on ideas adopted and adapted from discourse analysis methods developed and used in other social sciences. Ruiz (2009) refers to SDA as a method that analyzes text at textual, contextual, and sociological levels to understand the discourse and argues that the text ‘display[s] the goals and intentions of human actors’ (200). The analysis of textbook content at the textual level examines the composition and structure of the discourse. The textual analysis of textbook content also helps to understand the purpose of the content’s selection and inclusion in textbook. The decisions as to what has to be included or excluded in textbook are made keeping in mind the audience, pupils in this case. Textual analysis involves working with the content of the textbook, and for this purpose, the content is broken down and divided into codes and categories. Kuckartz (2019) argued that ‘working with codes and categories is a proven method in qualitative research,’ and it is ‘reliable, easy to learn, transparent’ (181) and Schreier (2014) suggested two approaches to developing codes and categories—concept-driven and data-driven. The categories and codes in concept-driven strategy were derived from ‘previous knowledge: a theory, prior research, everyday knowledge, logic, or an interview guide’ (Schreier 2014, 176) while the data-driven strategy categories were based on examining the content and placing it under evolving and developing categories. The researcher continues to read the content and may read the same content many times till she/he has reached saturation point and new codes and categories cannot be extracted from the content. This study used both content-driven and concept-driven strategies to identify categories. The main categories were derived after the careful reading and analysis of the National Islamiat (GoP 2006b) and Ethics (GoP 2006a) curriculum documents. The focus in reading the national curriculum documents was to identify similar ideas and group them and this exercise resulted in developing the three main categories of inner peace, social peace, and peace with nature (see Table 3.1). The curriculum documents used the phrases social justice, harmony, peace, and values multiple times and also ensured that these values are made part of every textbook—that is, Class 3 to Class 12—through different stories. The next step entailed reading each textbook in detail to identify and place chunks of texts under main categories, which also helped in creating subcategories (see Table 3.1). It was made certain that the classification of text under the main categories in the first reading aligned with those of the second reading, and there was no conflict between either of these classifications. The contextual phase of the analysis looked at participants and their intention by first identifying the participants in a discourse, and then establishing their role

Teaching toward a culture of peace 43 Table 3.1 Tri-phase analytical framework Inner peace values

Social and cultural peace values

Peace with nature

• Positive self-concept • Hard work • Achieving one’s goal/ dream • Trusting in one’s potential • Healthy body • Attitude and behavior leading to a healthy life and a healthy body • Sympathy toward the weak sections of society • Compassion toward those who need us

• Ability to listen to others from a different faith • Ability to communicate with those from a different faith • Learning about the multicultural and multilingual world • Learning about tolerance and working with others • Learning about discrimination and discriminatory practices in a society • Learning about one’s social responsibility

• Respect for Mother Earth • Respect for life • Respect for the eco-system • Role and responsibility in protecting extinct species • Role and responsibility in promoting a sustainable world • Learning about the interdependence of holistic peace and sustainable development

in the discourse by comprehending the meaning of the discourse. Discourse analysis also analyzes whether these discourses are initiated and sustained by those engaged in the discourse, or whether these discourses are merely reflective of the life and social structure of society. The human actors in the Pakistani context are the textbook writers and bureaucracy in the Curriculum Wing or Bureau of each Provincial Education Department in Pakistan. The analysis unpacks the text to discover the values advocating peace culture through texts and images. The social peace values also explored the unequal relationship between and amongst different participants of discourses. The texts and the images are also looked at for messages about peace with nature. The analytical framework is also derived using concept-drive strategy to design coding framework and for this purpose, studies from Wells (2003), Iram and Wahrman (2006), Baltork, Mansoori, and Azad (2015), UNESCO (2010), and Mcdermott et al. (2020) are used.

Why only these textbooks? The Islamiat and Ethics textbooks of Classes 9 and 10 from Punjab and Sindh textbook boards were analyzed in this study; this decision was based on the availability of Ethics textbooks. Though there were five state textbook publishing authorities—four provincial and one federal—only two provincial textbook authorities—Punjab and Sindh textbook boards—published Ethics textbooks for pupils, although all textbook publishing authorities published Islamiat textbooks for pupils in Classes 1 to 10. The two provincial textbook authorities (Punjab and Sindh textbook boards) published Ethics textbooks only for pupils of Classes 9 and 10, and did not produce any textbooks for pupils of Classes 1 to 8. The

44 Ashar Johnson Khokhar only set of textbooks available for comparison was for Classes 9 and 10 from the Punjab and Sindh textbook boards. Data analysis, findings Analysis of the Ethics textbook Philosophers view ethics as a study of moral norms, and of their history and justification; in contemporary parlance the word ‘ethics’ has replaced the word ‘moral’ and is now widely used in phrases such as ethical practices, ethical code of conduct, medical ethics, business ethics, etc. Ethics is now rooted in human nature, and the elements of the ‘good’ and ‘evil’ found in human nature are discussed and explored while discussing ethical dilemmas. The study of ethics is no longer rooted in religion but the Ethics textbook published by the Punjab and Sindh textbook boards (see Table 3.2) used an old approach, that is, defining ethics in term of religion; finding ‘good’ and ‘evil’ as given in different faiths. This section also explained to pupils the importance of religion and how to keep themselves healthy (physically, socially, emotionally, and psychologically) and to transform themselves into holistic human beings (see Box 3.4).The Ethics textbook presented religion as a savior of humanity, protecting it from moral denegation. The textbook also highlighted how religion and religious teachings and values contributed in the regeneration of a society and societal structures. The Ethics textbook began with a very philosophical introduction explaining to pupils the roots of ethics and religion (see Box 3.1 and Box 3.2). The preface explained the objectives of the textbook (Box 3.3, Box 3.4, and Box 3.5), stating that the purpose of choosing different texts is to prepare students to live ethical lives and contribute to the economic, social, and cultural development of Pakistan. The textbook had chapters (see Table 3.3) informing students about the lives of the spiritual leaders of different religions (Mahavira, the twenty-fourth Tirthankara of Jainism and Sri Arubindu, a Hindu religious leader). There was a chapter on ethics and values, and the writers told pupils about different social aspects of the major religions such as tolerance, acceptance of difference, respecting the places of worship of other faiths and religions, human dignity, and other general ethical values (honesty, punctuality, how to behave in public places, and use of public facilities).

Table 3.2 List of textbooks analyzed in this study Textbook publisher

Islamic education

Ethics

Punjab Curriculum and Textbook Board Sindh Textbook Board Total books

1 1 2

1 1 2

‫‪Teaching toward a culture of peace 45‬‬

‫‪BOX 3.1 EXCERPT FROM ETHICS TEXTBOOK‬‬ ‫‪EXPLAINING TO PUPILS HOW‬‬ ‫‪ETHICS IS ROOTED IN RELIGION‬‬ ‫مذاہب اخالقیات کے ماخذ بھی ہیں اور انہیں پروان بھی چڑھاتے ہیں۔ ہم روزمرہ زندگی میں‬ ‫دیکھتے ہیں کہ دیانت داری‪ ،‬صداقت‪ ،‬ہمدردی‪ ،‬دریا دلی اور جذبہ خدمت ِخلق جیسی اقدار مذاہب‬ ‫ہی کی عطا ہیں۔ اگرچہ مذاہب مختلف ہیں لیکن یہ اخالقی اقدار ایک جیسی ہیں۔ عملی زندگی میں‬ ‫آپ نے بہت سے ایسے لوگوں کو دیکھا ہو گا جن کا تعلق مختلف مذاہب سے ہوتا ہے لیکن وہ‬ ‫سب بنیادی اخالقی اقدار پر عمل پیرا ہوتے ہیں۔ دیانت داری‪ ،‬سچائی‪ ،‬درد ِ دل اور دوسروں کا‬ ‫بھال سوچنا ان کا وطیرہ ہوتا ہے۔ مذہب کی ہدایات پر صدق ِ دل سے یقین رکھنے اور عمل کرنے‬ ‫والے ہمیشہ دوسروں کے دکھ سکھ میں شریک رہتے ہیں اور کسی قدرتی آفت کے موقع پر مذہب‬ ‫اور ملت کی تفریق کے بغیرخدمت ِخلق میں پیش پیش ہوتے ہیں۔ وہ کبھی دوسروں کا دل نہیں‬ ‫دکھاتے بلکہ ہمدردی سے پیش آتے ہیں۔ وہ صرف جھوٹ اور ظلم سے نفرت کرتے ہیں۔‬ ‫‪Translation:‬‬ ‫‪Religions are the chief source of ethics and should be promoted. It is seen in‬‬ ‫‪everyday life that values like honesty, truth, sympathy, generosity, and passion‬‬ ‫‪for serving humanity emanate from religion. Although religions are different,‬‬ ‫‪these moral values are the same. In practical life, you might have seen many‬‬ ‫‪people who belong to different religions, but they all practice the basic code‬‬ ‫‪of ethics. They are committed to honesty, truth, generosity, and philanthropy.‬‬ ‫‪Those who believe wholeheartedly in the teachings of religion and bring them‬‬ ‫‪into practices always participate in the joys and sorrows of others, and at the‬‬ ‫‪time of any natural calamity, they serve humanity without any religious or‬‬ ‫‪national discrimination.‬‬

‫‪BOX 3.2 EXCERPT FROM ETHICS TEXTBOOK‬‬ ‫‪EXPLAINING REASONS FOR STUDYING‬‬ ‫‪RELIGIONS AND THEIR BASIC TEACHINGS‬‬ ‫مذہب انسان کو کئی قسم کی نفسیاتی بیماریوں سے بچاتا ہے۔ حسد‪ ،‬کینہ‪ ،‬غیبت‪ ،‬بدگوئی اور‬ ‫انتقامی جذبے جیسی منفی سوچ سے انسان کے اندر کی کیفیت بدل جاتی ہے اور بدن کے اندر‬ ‫ایسی رطوبتیں پیدا ہوتی ہیں جو اندرونی نظاموں کے لیے تباہ کن ہوتی ہیں۔ مذہب ان قباحتوں سے‬ ‫بچنے کی نہ صرف تاکید کرتا ہے‪ ،‬بلکہ انھیں گناہ قرار دیتا ہے۔ اس کا مفید پہلو یہ ہے کہ‬ ‫انسان نہ صرف ذہنی خلش اور منفی سوچ سے بچ جاتا ہے‪ ،‬بلکہ وہ صحت مند سوچ بھی اپنا لیتا‬ ‫‪-‬ہے۔ اس کے ساتھ ہی مذہب منفی سوچ کو روکتا ہے‬

46 Ashar Johnson Khokhar Translation: Pakistan is a country of Muslim majority, but besides Christians, Hindus, Sikh, and Parsi there are other non-Muslim minorities living here. There are holy places for Hindus and Sikhs, which are visited by thousands of pilgrims every year. There is a religious harmony and unity among people of all religions here.

BOX 3.3 EXCERPT FROM ETHICS TEXTBOOK EXPLAINING TO PUPILS (NON-MUSLIMS) PAKISTAN’S PLURALISTIC ASPECT ‫ پارسی اور دیگر غیر‬،‫ بدھ‬،‫ سکھ‬،‫ ہندو‬،‫پاکستان مسلم اکثریت کا ملک ہے لیکن اس میں مسیحی‬ ‫مسلم اقلیتیں بھی موجود ہیں۔ یہاں ہندوؤں اور سکھوں کے مقدس مقامات بھی موجود ہیں اور ہر‬ ‫سال ہزاروں زائرین بیرون ِملک سے ان مقدس مقامات کی زیارت کے لیے آتے ہیں۔ یہاں تمام‬ ‫مذاہب کے لوگوں میں باہمی اتحاد اور یگانگت پائی جاتی ہے‬Translation: Pakistan is a country of Muslim majority, but besides Christians, Hindus, Sikh, and Parsis, there are other non-Muslim minorities living here. There are also Holy places for Hindus and Sikhs, which are visited by thousands of pilgrims every year.

BOX 3.4 EXCERPT FROM ETHICS TEXTBOOK EXPLAINING THE REASONS FOR SELECTING THE ETHICS TEXTBOOK CONTENT ‫اخالقیات کی اس درسی کتاب میں نہایت مفید اورمعلومات افزا مواد شامل کیا گیا ہے۔ مذہب کی‬ ‫ عالمی‬،‫ اخالقی اقدار بحرانوں میں اور جرائم کی روک تھام میں مذہب کا کردار‬،‫نفسیاتی اہمیت‬ ‫ عبادت کے طریقے‬،‫ عبادت گاہیں‬،‫مذاہب کی عطا کردہ اخالقی اقدار سے انسانی کردار کی تشکیل‬ ‫ فلورنس نائیٹ‬،‫ عمان ویل کانٹ‬،‫ امام غزالی‬،‫ ارسطو‬،‫اور انسانی رویوں پر عبادت کے اثرات‬ ‫انگیل اور سری اربندو جیسے مشاہیر کے افکار و کردار کو شامل نصاب کیا گیا ہے اسی طرح‬ ‫عالمی مذاہب میں سے جین مت اور مہاویر کی تعلیمات بھی شامل ِ نصاب ہیں۔ یہ معلومات طلبہ‬ ‫کے لیے مفید ثابت ہوں گی۔‬

Teaching toward a culture of peace 47 Translation: In this textbook of Ethics, very informative and useful material has been included. The psychological significance of religion, ethical values in crises, the role of religion in putting an end to crime, personality development through ethical values delivered by internationally recognized religions, places of worship, ways of saying prayers, and impact of worship on attitudes have been made part of the syllabus. Besides this, the schools of thoughts and the personalities of Aristotle, Imam Ghazali, Emmanuel Kant, Florence Nightingale, Sri Arbandu have also been included in the syllabus. Similarly, among internationally recognized religions, the teachings of Jainism and Mahaveer have been included in the syllabus, which provides useful information to students.

BOX 3.5 EXCERPT FROM ETHICS TEXTBOOK EXPLAINING THE OBJECTIVES OF TEACHING ETHICS AS A SUBJECT ‫اخالقیات پڑھانے کے جو مقاصد طے کیے گئے ہیں زیر نظر درسی کتاب میں شامل مواد انہیں‬ ‫پورا کرتا ہے۔ توقع کی جاتی ہے کہ یہ نصاب پڑھ کر طلبہ معاشرے میں مفید اور مثبت کردار‬ ‫ اخالقی اقدار اور سماجی زندگی کی قدر و قیمت‬،‫ادا کر سکیں گے۔ وہ مذاہب کی بنیادی تعلیمات‬ ‫جان کر اور مشاہیر کی زندگی کے عملی نمونوں سے استفادہ کرتے ہوئے خود کو بدلیں گے اس‬ ‫ دوسروں کا احترام کرنے اور وسیع الظرفی‬،‫ رواداری‬،‫طرح یہ کتاب طلبہ میں بلند اخالقی‬ ‫جیسی صفات پیدا کرنے میں معاون ثابت ہوں گی۔‬ Translation: The material reviewed in the textbook meets the objectives that have been set out for teaching ethics. It is expected that the students will play a positive and useful role in society after studying this syllabus. They will change themselves while drawing benefits from the basic teachings of religion, merits of ethical and social values, and the practical life patterns of renowned personalities. In this way, this book shall help students to develop high morals, tolerance, respect for others, and broad-mindedness.

48 Ashar Johnson Khokhar Table 3.3 Outline of Ethics textbook content ‫فہرست مضامین‬ List of topics ‫فہرست نصاب کالس دہم‬ List of topics Class 10

‫فہرست نصاب کالس نہم‬ List of topics Class 9

‫ عنوانات‬Topics :‫ پہال باب‬Chapter 1 ‫ مذاہب کا تعارف‬Introduction to Religion ‫ مشکالت کے حل میں مذاہب‬Religion, Solutions ‫ کی رہنمائی‬of Difficult Life Situations ‫ گناہ اور جرم کا تصور‬Concept of Evil and Sin :‫دوسرا باب‬ ‫عالمی مذاہب‬ ‫مہادیر۔ تعارف اور بنیادی‬ ‫تعلیمات‬

Chapter 2 World Religions Mahavira: Introduction and Teachings

:‫تیسرا باب‬ ‫اخالق و اقدار‬ ‫عبادت کے انسانی زندگی‬ ‫پر اثرات‬

Chapter 3 Ethics and Values Prayer and its Influence on Human Lives Perspectives of World Religions Ethics and Values in World Religions Accountablity and its Influence on Human Character Punctuality in Reliious Teachings

‫مذاہب عالمی کی روشنی میں‬ ‫عالمی مذاہب میں اخالقی‬ ‫اقدار‬ ‫انسانی کردار سازی پر‬ ‫احتساب کے اثرات‬ ‫مذہبی تعلیمات میں پابندئ‬ ‫وقت‬

:‫ چوتھا باب‬Chapter 4 ‫ آداب‬Etiquettes ‫ عوامی مقامات کے آداب‬Etiquettes of Public Places ‫ریلوے اسٹیشن‬، Railway Station ‫ بس اسٹینڈ‬Bus Terminal ‫ہوائی اڈا‬، Airort ‫بازار‬, Market :‫ پانچواں باب‬Chapter 5 ‫ مشاہیر‬Personalities ‫ ارسطو‬Aristotle ‫ کانٹ‬Immanuel Kant ‫ سری اربندو‬Sri Arubindu

‫ عنوانات‬Topics :‫ پہال باب‬Chapter 1 ‫ مذہب کا تعارف‬Introduction to Religion ‫ مذاہب کی ذاتی اور‬Sociological and ‫ نفسیاتی اہمیت‬Psychological influence of Religion ‫ سماج اور اخالق‬،‫ مذہب‬Religion, Society and Ethics :‫دوسرا باب‬ ‫عالمی مذاہب‬ ‫جین مت۔ تعارف اور‬ ‫ارتقا‬ :‫تیسرا باب‬ ‫اخالق و اقدار‬ ‫خدا کی عظمت‬ ‫عبادت گاہیں اور نظام‬ ‫ہائے عبادت‬ ‫انسانی رویوں پر اثرات‬ ،‫ بدھ مت‬،‫ہندو دھرم‬ ،‫ مسیحیت‬،‫زرتشت‬ ‫اسالم‬

Chapter 2 World Religions Jainism: Introduction and Evolution Chapter 3 Ethics and Values Greatness of God Worship Houses and Worship Rites and Rituals Impact on Human Behavior Hinduism Buddhism Zoroastrianism Christianity Islam

:‫ چوتھا باب‬Chapter 4 ‫ آداب‬Etiquettes ‫ عبادت گاہوں کے آداب‬Etiquettes of Houses of Worship ‫ عوامی مقامات کے آداب‬Etiquettes of Public Places ‫ دفاتر‬، Offices -‫بینک‬, Bank :‫پانچواں باب‬ ‫مشاہیر‬ ‫امام غزالی‬ ‫فلورنس نائیٹ انگیل‬

Chapter 5 Personalities Iman Ghazali Florence Nightingale

Teaching toward a culture of peace 49 Table 3.4 Ethics textbooks Classes 9 and 10 Positive self-concept

Inner peace (good health and compassion)

Social peace (tolerance, solidarity, and social responsibility) Peace with nature (respect for nature, respect for life in all forms and care for the environment)

‫ مذاہب کا تعارف‬:1 ‫باب‬ Chapter 1: Introduction of Religion ‫ اخالق و اقدار‬:3 ‫باب‬ Chapter 3: Ethics and Values ‫ اخالق و اقدار‬:3 ‫باب‬ Chapter 3: Ethics and Values ‫ آداب‬:4 ‫باب‬ Chapter: Social Values ‫ اخالق و اقدار‬:3 ‫باب‬ Chapter 3: Ethics and Values ‫ آداب‬:4 ‫باب‬ Chapter 4: Social Values

The Ethics textbook asked pupils to view themselves and develop themselves (positive self-concept) through the lenses of their religion: inner peace (good health and compassion) could be achieved by observing and doing what was prescribed by their religion; social peace (tolerance, solidarity, and social responsibility) was also possible only if one followed one’s religion and observed its teachings (see Table 3.4). It did not present teachings and examples from the life stories of important and influential personalities of different religions, be it Jesus, Gautama Buddha, or avatars of some Hindu gods. The textbook writers presumed that pupils would be learning these stories and teachings at home and in their places of worship. The textbook did not contain text about peace with nature (respect for nature, respect for life in all its forms, and care of the environment); it did not inform pupils about nature and how to protect it, how creatures are part of this eco-system, and how to use resources found in nature in a sustainable way, and how not to exploit them, even though different Buddhists (One Earth Sangha 2015), Christians (The Church of England 2015, Pope Francis 2015), and Hindus (Swami Vibudhesha Teertha n.d.) are very active in promoting sustainable development and supporting movements promoting the ethical use of natural resources. The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) has been working with all faiths, and has gathered together enormous resources on the environment, and how different religions view it and their response to current environmental changes (United Nations Environment Programme n.d.); however, the content of the textbook indicated that either the writers had intentionally ignored this source of information or they were unaware of its existence. Positive self-concept The first chapter in the Ethics textbook, while introducing the concepts of religion, god, good, and bad to pupils, suggested that ethics rooted in religion ‘save humans from evil thoughts and prevent them taking actions that could harm other

50 Ashar Johnson Khokhar humans’ (PCTB 2018a: 3); and the feelings ‘of helping others and proving beneficial to other’ (PCTB 2018a: 3) improved one’s concept of being good to others and was beneficial to humankind. The idea is presented that ethics transforms individuals from savages to humans who, by practicing the values of faith (compassion, charity, and justice), protect themselves from becoming psychologically sick—a person practicing unethical values and behaviors such as sexual promiscuity, becoming addicted to harmful drugs/substances, greed, lust, and hoarding wealth and goods—thus making it possible for individuals ‘to live a balanced life[,] for this lifestyle will develop physically developed, mentally stabled, and psychologically balanced individuals’ (STB 2018a, 4). This chapter also highlighted how religions transform people into self-sacrificing individuals, and make societies caring and thus ensure that they continue for generations. The pupils of other faiths (pupils from religious minorities) also learned that the textbook writers praised all religions and stated that all religions promoted values considered universal. Inner peace (good health and compassion) The textbook, while informing pupils of the origins and history of different religions, emphasized the elements of inner peace in all religions, be they the three Abrahamic religions or the Eastern religions. The writers classified world religions into groups according to Islamic ideas, that is, the partially true and the wholly false, corresponding to Islam, the People of the Book (Jews, Christians, and Zoroastrians), and polytheism. The textbook also included, along with the Middle Eastern religions, Eastern religions (Hinduism, Buddhism, Confucianism, Daoism, Shintoism, and Sikhism) and informed pupils about the importance of ethical and social values. The textbook, while reinforcing the idea of the link between inner peace and believing in one’s religion and practicing its religious values (social and ethical), also emphasized the importance of these values in creating peaceful societies. The textbook writers suggested that Prayer is an important component of the basic beliefs of a religion and it also affect human psychologically. Prayer does the opposite to what anger, frustration, fear and evil deeds does to human. Prayers help individuals to create an internally harmonious being as she/he asks forgiveness of all the harm done to himself/herself and to others due to anger, frustration, fear and evil deeds. Humans feel changed individuals and found peace in their inner being. (PCTB 2018a: 43) The textbook writers stressed ritualistic religious practices such as prayer rituals and praying at a place of worship to attain inner peace. Inner peace is embedded in prayer, and it is argued that those who pray live ethical lives because prayers mold and shape the inner self of human beings, which leads to living a peaceful life, the external reflection of the inner peace acquired by a person.

Teaching toward a culture of peace 51 Social peace (tolerance, solidarity, and social responsibility) The textbook writers underlined the link between prayer and inner peace and how this contributed to living a moral and ethical life. They also underscored values such as tolerance, solidarity, and social responsibility, which, they argued, lead to inculcating social peace within individuals and in their surroundings, that is, in their communities and in society. Tolerance of difference of opinion, both theological and dogmatic, and working together with others who pray differently and in a different place of worship, transforms individuals into useful and helpful human beings; they are also aware of their social responsibility, that is, to help those in need, and work alongside others who also wish to help improve the weaker segments of a community or a society. A person can only develop these values if she/he ‘meets with others and set aside one’s vanity and ego’ (PCTB 2018a: 43) and opens her/himself up to accepting others. The textbook writers claimed that inner peace produced social peace as individuals learned to live with others and to practice the values of tolerance, solidarity, and social responsibility, be it within their close circle of family and neighborhood or the larger circle of community and society. It was argued that ‘prayer brings about changes, both internal and external’ (STB 2018a: 44), and social peace is the outcome of external changes that are initiated by the changes within a person. Peace with nature (respect for nature, respect for life in all forms, and care for the environment) The Ethics textbook did not make any direct reference to the protection of the environment and animals but makes an indirect reference while explaining teachings about the rights and responsibilities of individuals in a society such as care for each other and, through it, caring for human life and nature. The chapter on social values spoke about values that individuals should practice in public places such as markets, railway stations, airports, and offices. By ensuring that pupils did not destroy or damage these public places and facilities, the textbook writers promoted values that protect the state, society, and the country. The textbooks expressed the view that pupils should keep Pakistan clean and that they could achieve this by adhering to the laws of Pakistan and by becoming aware of their responsibilities in all public places. The orderly use of public places and of state utilities contributes indirectly to making pupils aware of the need to protect the environment, which is the property of everyone living in Pakistan and the world. Analysis of the Islamiat textbook The Islamic education (Islamiat) textbook was organized following the pattern suggested by the Islamiat curriculum document. The textbook was divided into three sections. The first section had three Surahs from the Qur’ān; the second section of the textbook consisted of sayings of the Prophet Muhammad (Hadith);

52 Ashar Johnson Khokhar and the third section of the textbook explained different topics, such as Islam’s holy book, the Qur’ān, its revelation and importance, pillars of Islam, and various social and societal Islamic values. The first section of the Islamiat textbook by the Punjab Curriculum and Textbook Board (PCTB) and Sindh Textbook Board (STB) contained Surah Al-Anfal (The Bounties), the eighth chapter, Surah Al-Ahzab, (The Clans, The Coalition, The Combined Forces), the thirty-third chapter, and Surah Al-Mumtahanah (The Woman Under Questioning), the sixtieth chapter of Qur’ān. The first Surah (Surah Al-Anfal) elaborates the themes of war principles, laying the foundation for the moral behavior of Muslims in wars against non-Muslims. The second Surah (Surah Al-Ahzab) explains instructions and laws about marriage, divorce, women and purdah, inheritance, and regulations related to social and economic aspects of society. The Surah Al-Mumtahanah gives guidelines as to with whom Muslims should and should not have friendship. The second section of the textbook quoted Hadith related to many social aspects of life and values that Muslims should possess and practice in their everyday lives. The third section focused on social and cultural aspects of society, and the topics were chosen according to the ideas found in the Surahs such as Jihad and war, women, social and family life, and the responsibilities of a good Muslims. Table 3.5 shows the categorization of text into different categories, though the messages are repeated in different sections of the textbook. Positive self-concept The Surah and Hadith have many references to positive self-concept as a Muslim. A careful analysis of these Surahs highlight the following themes: (1) Jihad and just war and the responsibilities of Muslim soldiers and army if they defeat their non-Muslim enemy, how to treat fallen soldiers and their women, and how war bounty be distributed amongst Muslims; (2) shaping lives according to the laws enshrined in the Surahs, such as making friends, dealings with non-Muslims, and family values, how women should behave in Islamic society, and laws guiding family matters. These Surahs focus on self-concept, that is, becoming a good Muslim, a good Muslim husband, and a good Muslim wife, and state laws guiding the lives of Muslim men and women, inside and outside the house. The themes of the Hadith are: (1) the best act of one’s life is to remember Allah and say he was the greatest amongst all and ask for one’s forgiveness; (2) the best person is someone who learns and teaches the Qur’ān; (3) you cannot be called a Muslim until your life is shaped according to the teachings of the Prophet. Pupils are to feel enlightened as they discover what will make them a true Muslim who is close to Allah and the Prophet Muhammad. Pupils will also understand the importance of learning the Qur’ān and its teachings and other aspects of life such as observing the basic tenants of Islam, prayer, zakat, and fasting, as this behavior will transform them into good Muslims, living their lives according to the teachings of Qur’ān and the Sunnah of Prophet Mohammad.

Teaching toward a culture of peace 53 Table 3.5 Islamic education Classes 9 and 10 (Translation: Al-Mumtaḥanah, Chapter 60) ‫حنۃ‬ َ َ ‫الممت‬ ُ ُ ‫سْورۃ‬ َ ‫سْورۃ َاال‬ (Translation: Al-Aḥzāb, Chapter 33) ‫حزاب‬ ُ inner peace social (good 7- ‫صِغْیَرنَا َولَْم یَُوِقّْر َکِبْیَرنَا‬ َ ‫س ِمنَّا َمْن لَْم یَْرَحْم‬ َ ‫ لَْی‬-7 health and compassion) ‫ جو ہمارے چھوٹوں پر رحم نہ کرے اور‬، ‫ وہ ہم میں سے نہیں‬:‫ترجمہ‬ ‫ہمارے بڑوں کا احترام نہ کرے۔‬ Translation: He is not one of us who does not show mercy to little ones (children) and does not respect elders. 8- ‫ار۔‬ َّ َ ‫ ا‬-8 ِ َّ‫ی ِکَالہ َُما فِی الن‬ ُ ‫ی َوْالُمْرت َِش‬ ُ ‫لرِش‬ ‫ رشوت دینے واال اور رشوت لینے واال دونوں آگ میں ہیں۔‬:‫ترجمہ‬ Translation: The bribe and the bribe-taker are both in the fire. َ ‫لی‬ 9- ‫بٖہ۔‬ ِ َ‫ی َرٰدی فَُھَو یُْنَزعُ ِبذ َن‬ َ ‫صَر قَْوَمٗہ‬ َ َّ‫ َمْن ن‬-9 ْ ‫غْیِر ْالَح ِ ّق فَُھَو َکْالبَِعْیِرالَِّذ‬ ٰ ‫ع‬ ‫ جس شخص نے کسی ناجائز معاملے میں اپنی قوم کی مدد کی تو‬:‫ترجمہ‬ ‫اس کی مثال ایسی ہے جیسے کوئی اونٹ کنوئیں میں گر رہا ہو اور وہ‬ ‫اس کی دم پکڑ کر لٹک جائے تو خود بھی اس میں جا گرے۔‬ Translation: If anyone helps his people in an unrighteous cause, he is like a camel that falls into a well and is pulled out by its tail. 10- ‫سنُُھْم ُخلُقًا۔‬ َ ‫ ِاَّن ا َْکَمَل ْالُمْؤِمِنْیَن ِاْیَمانًا ا َْح‬-10 ‫ یقینًا مومنوں میں سے کامل ایمان واال وہ ہے جو ا ُن میں اخالق کے‬:‫ترجمہ‬ ‫لحاظ سے سب سے اچھا ہے۔‬ Translation: The best among believers is one who is good in morals. 19- ‫تٖہ۔‬ ِ َّ‫عْن َّرِعی‬ َ ‫ ُکلَُّکم َراعٍ َوُکلَُّکم َمْسئ ُْوٌل‬-19 ‫ تم میں سے ہر ایک نگہبان ہے اور تم میں سے ہر ایک اپنی‬:‫ترجمہ‬ ‫رعیت کے بارے میں جواب دہ ہے‬ Translation: Each of you is a shepherd and each of you is responsible for his flock. positive self-concept

Social peace (tolerance solidarity and social responsibilities)

20- ‫اس۔‬ ِ َّ‫ َخْیُر الن‬-20 َ َّ‫اسَمْن یَّْنفَُع الن‬ ‫ لوگوں میں سب سےاچھا وہ ہے جو دوسروں کےلیے نفع مند ہے۔‬:‫ترجمہ‬ Translation: The best people are those who are best in benefit to other people. ‫ کسی کے لیے‬،‫لوگو! میری بات سنو اور سمجھو! ہر مسلمان کا بھائی ہے‬ ‫یہ جائز نہیں کہ وہ اپنے مسلمان بھائی سے کچھ لے سوائے اس کے‬ ‫جسے اس کا بھائی بر ضا ور غبت عطا کر دے۔‬ Translation: O’ people, listen to my words carefully, behold! Every Muslim is the brother of another Muslim and it is not fair to take anything that belongs to his brother except he allows you to have it with his free will. (Continued)

54 Ashar Johnson Khokhar Table 3.5 Continued ‫ہمسائے کے حقوق کے بارے میں حضور اکرم ﷺ نے خاص طور پر تا‬ ‫آپنے فرمایا کہ مجھے جبرائیل باربار پڑوسی کے ساتھ‬ ؐ ‫کید فرمائی۔‬ ‫حسن سلوک کی تاکید کرتے رہے یہاں تک کہ مجھے خیال پیدا ہونے‬ ‫تعالیہمسائے کو وراثت میں شریک کر دیں۔ ہمسائے‬ ‫لگا کہ شاید اللہ‬ ٰ ‫کے اس حق کی روشنی میں انسان کو جہاں بہت سی ذمہ داریاں‬ ‫سونپی گئیں وہاں اسے بہت سے حقوق بھی حاصل ہوئے کیونکہ ہر‬ ‫فرد کسی نہ کسی کا ہمسایہ ہوتا ہے۔‬ Translation: The Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) exclusively expressed about the rights of neighbors. He said, ‘The angel Gabriel (RA) asked me repeatedly to treat the neighbors politely and fairly. He emphasized it to the extent that I began to think, Allah Almighty would make the neighbors shareholder in the inheritance.’ In the light of these rights where human beings have been entrusted with many responsibilities, they have also been given rights as everyone is the neighbor of another. ‫اپنے نفس پر اور دوسروں پر زیادتی نہ کرو اور ہاں تمھارے غالم! اِن کا‬ ‫خیال رکھو۔ جو تم کھاؤ اس میں سے ان کو کھالؤ جو تم پہنو اسی میں‬ ‫ان کو پہناؤ۔ اگر۔ وہ کوئی ایسی خطا کریں جسے تم معاف نہ کرنا‬ ‫چاہو تو اللہ کے بندو انھیں فروخت کر دو اور انھیں سزا نہ دو۔‬ Translation: Don’t inflict sufferings upon yourself nor upon others. You have slaves, treat them politely and gently. Give them to eat what you eat yourself; give them clothes you wear yourself. If they commit any mistake that you cannot forgive, set them free and do not punish them. peace with nature (respect ‫خواہ مخواہ پانی ضائع نہ کیا جائے۔‬ for nature, respect for life Translation: Do not use water in a careless way and do not in all its forms and care waste it. for the environment)

Inner peace (good health and compassion) The textbook writers portrayed Islam as a source of inner peace, and by practicing the tenets of Islam in their everyday lives the Muslims discover their innate selfrighteousness, which is then outwardly projected through their good deeds in the world. The Qur’ānic verses about just wars, and how Muslims should treat nonMuslims who have lost a battle, reveal to pupils the aspect of compassion built into Islamic teachings as they read what Allah said and what Prophet Mohammad said and practiced in his life. The idea of Jihad came up in Surah (Al-Ahzab), in Hadith and also in the third section explaining different aspects of human lives through various stories from Prophet Muhammad’s life. The other element of inner peace (compassion) also came up in Surah, in Hadith, and Jihad stories from Prophet Muhammad’s life. Muslims should avoid Jihad at all costs and only use it as a last resort to resolve conflict with non-Muslims; the textbook writers explained other forms of Jihad that pupils could become part of and which result in better human beings and a better society (PCTB 2018b, 2018a). The Hadith

Teaching toward a culture of peace 55 ‘none of us did not have mercy on our young and did not esteem our elders’ (PCTB 2018b: 51), and the Hadith ‘the bribe and the bribe-taker are both in the fire’ (STB 2018b: 51) reflect the social aspect of inner peace. Social peace (tolerance, solidarity and social responsibilities) The significant highlight of the Islamiat textbook was the message of social peace, reflected through Muslims following the message of tolerance, solidarity, and social responsibility. The three Surahs found in textbooks focused on tolerance of others, be they Muslims or non-Muslims, solidarity with other Muslims, and the social responsibility of Muslims toward other Muslims, be they living in Muslim lands or non-Muslim lands. A few Hadith were quoted in the textbook: ‘whose feet get dirty in their way to follow the path of Allah’ (PCTB 2018b, 54); ‘every Muslims is a protector of other Muslims and every Muslim ruler is responsible for the people living in the state’ (STB 2018b, 54); and ‘the best among you who is most beneficial to other Muslims’ (PCTB 2018b, 55). The section on the rights and responsibilities of Muslims, be it the rights of a neighbor or the rights of women, explained in detail the rights of others: ‘every Muslim (man) is brother to another Muslim (man) and a Muslim should not take anything that is not theirs unless it is given by the other Muslim’ (PCTB 2018b: 80). The message of equality amongst Muslims was repeated many times, and the message is stated in the textbook to ‘take care of your slaves, give them what you eat, make them wear what you wear’ (STB 2018b, 80). The importance of the message of equality is highlighted by quoting the last sermons of Prophet Muhammad where he said: ‘superiority of some people over others is measured by faith and taqwa (piety, mindfulness of Allah), doing what Allah has enjoined and refraining from what Allah has forbidden be it Arabs or non-Arabs’ (PCTB 2018b: 80). Peace with nature (respect for nature, respect for life in all its forms and care for the environment) The Islamiat textbook referred to the importance of narrating events from Prophet Muhammad’s life on social and ethical values. The textbook writers continued to reinforce the concept of a good Muslim, someone who obeys all the commandments given by Prophet Muhammad, be it with regard to one’s family life, work life, or one’s interaction with other Muslims and non-Muslims; although it was mentioned that it was Allah who created everything for man, there were no references to the protection of creatures created by Allah. The only creation mentioned in the textbook was water, and Muslims were urged to use it carefully and not to waste it (STB 2018b, 68). Analysis The study found a few similarities between the topics found in Ethics textbooks and in Islamiat textbooks, for example, the relationship between religion and

56 Ashar Johnson Khokhar humans and society, and how it proved beneficial to teach and promote good ethical and moral values. The textbook writers presented to pupils studying the Ethics textbook the idea that it was only religion that had a positive influence on humans and society. They informed pupils about different social, cultural, moral, and social ethical values promoted by various religions. The pupils studying Islamiat learned about Islam, its history, and they also read the teachings transmitted to Muslims, through the Qur’ān and Hadith, through different biographical accounts. Muslim pupils learned that Islam was the only religion that communicated the social, moral, and ethical values of an ideal society and ideal humans. The Islamiat textbooks also mentioned the rewards promised to Muslims if they live their lives according to Islamic ethical and moral values and for those transforming their lives according to the teachings of Prophet Muhammad, a place in heaven; and, for those who did not live according to the principles laid down by Islam, a place in hell. The writers of the Ethics textbook gave a general overview of major religions practiced in South Asia and explained to pupils the social, religious, moral, and ethical aspects of life as presented in these religions. The writers did not follow the same pattern as that followed in Islamiat textbooks, where pupils read sayings of Prophet Muhammad, and different incidents were narrated in order to explain different values to pupils and the impact on their lives living of these values. The nonMuslim pupils read only general information about different religions in the Ethics textbook, without learning about any particular incident or event where the prophet of a religion had asked followers to shape their lives according to a set of values. The Ethics textbook focused more on inner peace (compassion) and social peace (tolerance); textbook writers informed pupils about different ethical and moral values required while living with other pupils belonging to different religions. The positive self-concept element was not emphasized, other than with regard to the religious aspect of their lives, suggesting that only prayer could make them ethical and moral human beings. The Islamiat textbook writers followed a different pattern of presenting information to pupils. They emphasized the value and importance of prayer in Muslim life, suggesting that aspects such as charity, family values, rights of women, and rights of non-Muslims are inculcated among Muslims who pray. The content of Islamiat textbook covered all aspects of life, such as domestic life (family life, the role and responsibility of the husband, the wife, and children), social life (how to live with other Muslims), political life (the responsibilities of Muslim rulers), and religious life (practicing Islamic teachings and principles), economic life (business, trade, fair wages), and human rights (equality and justice). Writers reinforced the idea that only Islam as a religion encompasses all aspects of human life. The textbook writers focused on a few selected religions practiced in South Asia (Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Sikhism, and Zoroastrianism) but left out many smaller religious communities living in South Asia for centuries, such as Bhai, Jewish, and Jain communities. The Ethics textbook writers used a narrow category while selecting religions and included only information about them. The other groups (Atheist, Animist, Totemist) remained undiscovered by

Teaching toward a culture of peace 57 pupils even though the world has learned a lot about the guiding principles and values shaping the ethical, social, and moral lives of these groups. The Ethics textbook and Islamiat textbook writers chose to remain silent on peace with nature as they did not inform pupils about the current ethical issue of environmental degradation and how different religious groups, small or big, are working toward creating a sustainable environment on their own initiative or by joining a multilateral organization such as the United Nations. Christian churches have prepared documents to create awareness among Christians and to inform others about the Bible’s teaching on the environment and sustainable use of resources, which are gifts from God. Muslim scholars and scholars from other faiths have also produced proclamations on the environment and have urged their followers to make sensible choices when using the gifts of the creator. The writers should have included this topic in the textbooks and presented it as an area of concern and collaboration among the followers of all religions. Recommendations This study acknowledges that religion is an essential aspect of human life, especially in Pakistan, and almost the majority of pupils and teachers are religious and belong to some religious group. It is suggested that the content of the textbooks should become inclusive, addressing issues faced by Pakistan, such as religious intolerance, social cohesiveness, civic responsibilities, and environmental issues to ensure sustainable peace in society. The textbook authorities and writers should broaden the scope of learning about peace and present it, as is needed in the twenty-first century, as the requirement to learn how to share this planet with others whose beliefs, values, and practices are different and also with other creatures sharing it with them. This study also suggests that the textbook authorities and writers should also include perspectives that do not fall into the monotheist and polytheist categories as the inclusion of these will make pupils aware of and sensitive to the ideas and perspectives followed by different groups around the world.

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60 Ashar Johnson Khokhar Shepherd, John J. 2017a. Ninian Smart on World Religions: Volume 1: Religious Experience and Philosophical Analysis. New York: Routledge. Shepherd, John J. 2017b. Ninian Smart on World Religions: Volume 2: Traditions and the Challenges of Modernity. New York: Routledge. Skeie, Geir. 2006. “Plurality and Pluralism in Religious Education.” In International Handbook of the Religious, Moral and Spiritual Dimensions in Education, edited by Marian de Souza, Gloria Durka, Kathleen Engebretson, Robert Jackson, and Andrew McGrady, 307–319. Dordrecht: Springer. Staff Reporter. 2015. “Senior Educationist Dr Bernadette Leaves Pakistan after Receiving Death Threats.” Dawn, May 12. https://www.dawn.com/news/1181357. STB. 2018a. Ethics for 9-10. Edited by Sindh Textbook Board. Jamshoro, Sindh: STB. STB. 2018b. Islamiat for 9-10. Edited by Sindh Textbook Board. Jamshoro, Sindh: STB. Stoeckl, Kristina, and Olivier Roy, eds. 2015. The Future of Religious Education in Europe. Florence, Italy: European University Institute. Swami Vibudhesha Teertha. n.d. Hindu Faith Statement on the Environment: Sustaining the Balance. Jerusalem: The Interfaith Center for Sustainable Development. Teece, Geoff. 2010. Is It Learning about and from Religions, Religion or Religious Education? And is it any wonder some teachers don’t get it?” British Journal of Religious Education 32, no. 2: 93–103. The Church of England. 2015. Climate Change. London: The Church of England. UNESCO. 2010. Culture of Peace: What Is It? Paris: UNESCO. United Nations Environment Programme. n.d. “Religions and Environmental Protection.” United Nations Environment Programme. https://www.unenvironment.org/about-un-e nvironment/faith-earth-initiative/religions-and-environmental-protection. Valliani, Amin. 2014. “Teaching Islamiat.” Dawn, November 07. Wells, Leah C. 2003. “A Culture of Teaching Peace.” UNESCO Conference on Intercultural Education in Finland on June 16, 2003, Jyväskylä, Finland, 15–18 June. Yousafzai, Arshad. 2016. “Non-Muslim Students Reluctant to Study Islamic Studies or Ethics.” Daily Times, 18 December. https://dailytimes.com.pk/39753/non-muslim-st udents-reluctant-to-study-islamic-studies-or-ethics/. Zia, Asad. 2014. “Revised Curriculum: JI Pushes Through its Agenda on Textbooks in KP.” Express Tribune, 27 October. https://tribune.com.pk/story/781717/revised-curric ulum-ji-pushes-through-its-agenda-on-textbooks-in-k-p/.

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Infusing cultural diversity into Pakistan Studies textbooks An analysis of textbooks and teachers’ perspectives Yaar Muhammad and Peter Brett

Introduction One of the challenges faced by diverse democratic nation-states such as Pakistan is to provide opportunities for different groups to maintain aspects of the culture of their religion, region, or community while constructing a national political and educational narrative in which these groups are structurally included and to which they feel allegiance. Banks (2009: 9) noted that: ‘schools and nations cannot marginalize the cultures of groups and expect them to feel structurally included within the nation and to develop a strong allegiance to it.’ More than this, excluded students, who official narratives present as the ‘other,’ might be attracted to alternative narratives that fuel their sense of being unrecognized, underappreciated, or even potentially violent outsiders. This is why sensitive approaches to cultural diversity matter; without such sensitivity, there may be unwitting support offered to extremist groups proffering more alluring narratives. In Pakistan in the recent past, teaching an ethnically monocultural historical narrative has been seen as providing curricular cement for binding young people to a singular vision of the country’s foundation, progress, and unity. School subjects such as Social Studies, Civics, and Pakistan Studies (PS) have each been seen as critical contributors in imparting and constructing Pakistani national identity (Lall 2012; Zia 2003a, 2003b; Muhammad and Brett 2017). Pakistan Studies, in particular, has been used to consciously promote a ‘homogenous vision of culture, history, and religion in Pakistan—with Islam and a proud nationalism at the heart of the curriculum’ (Muhammad and Brett 2015: 75). Moreover, knowledge of the Qur’ān and Hadith have been foregrounded as content within the PS curriculum in the hope of developing the moral values of future citizens. Curricula, textbooks, and other teaching materials used across all types of Pakistani schools have generally devoted little attention to the voices of minorities—seeing them as a potential threat to national unity. Textbooks tended to represent dominant groups and to place relatively little focus upon the histories and cultures of minority groups (Hashmi 2011). Whenever content relating to other religious and ethnic groups was incorporated in the textbooks, it was generally described only from a majoritarian perspective. Zaidi (2011) reviewed PS textbooks (produced in 1997) and found that they had mainly represented Muhajirs

62 Yaar Muhammad and Peter Brett and Punjabis and rarely included developed and balanced knowledge about the histories and cultures of different minority groups. Moreover, Ali (2008, 2010) asserted that the PS curriculum taught young people to become good Sunni Muslims and underscored the dominant Sunni Punjabi group and its ritualistic and pietistic Islam, resulting in promotion of exclusionary conceptions of Pakistani national identity. It has been reported by numerous earlier studies that successive Pakistani textbooks failed to incorporate meaningful content about the religious and ethnic diversity of Pakistan (e.g., Ali 2010; Saigol 2005). In 2006, a new curriculum policy for Pakistan Studies was introduced, which was generally perceived as more democratic and pluralistic in its intention. Compared to the previous curriculum policy which had a theocratic/Islamic emphasis, the new curriculum policy more explicitly recognized cultural diversity within Pakistan and underscored the equality of all citizens regardless of their ethnic or religious backgrounds. This intention to prepare young people to be democratic citizens of a diverse society was clearly aligned with a liberal-democratic conception of Pakistani national identity promoting a more pluralistic agenda. The issuing of Paigham-e-Pakistan in 2018—a national narrative to counter violence, extremism, and terrorism, supported by more than 5,000 Ulema and over 1,800 religious clerics and scholars of all schools of thought—has further underpinned official support for messages of tolerance: ‘the reconstruction of Pakistani society is imperative where democracy, liberty, equality, tolerance, harmony, mutual respect and justice are ensured. So that a congenial atmosphere for peaceful coexistence is achieved’ (Munir 2018: 309). There was a call for ‘intellectual jihad against extremist mind-sets’ (Munir 2018: 307). The pertinent question is, how can it be done through educational norms? And in which direction is the present official policy of education guiding the common Pakistani? Education policy documents produced in 2006 and later, positively acknowledged cultural diversity in Pakistan—all seeking to address the problem of educating multi-ethnic and multi-religious Pakistan. For example, the National Education Policy (NEP) 2009 aimed ‘to promote national cohesion by respecting all faiths and religions and recognizing cultural and ethnic diversity’ (10). Regarding religious minorities in Pakistan, the NEP 2009 aimed ‘to provide minorities with adequate facilities for their cultural and religious development, enabling them to participate effectively in the overall national effort’ (11). There had been no explicit incorporation of human rights issues in the previous curriculum (Ahmad 2003). The policy articulated a key objective of the education system as ‘to raise individuals committed to democratic and moral values, aware of fundamental human rights, open to new ideas, having a sense of personal responsibility and participation in the productive activities in society for the common good’ (11). The policy also aimed to produce an idealized Pakistani citizen characterized as ‘a self-reliant individual, capable of analytical and original thinking, a responsible member of society and a global citizen’ (11). The National Curriculum for Pakistan Studies 2006 Grades IX–X introduced by the Federal Ministry of Education in 2006 sought to support and strengthen the underpinning ideals of Pakistani ideology. In addition, it aimed to inculcate

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a sense of nationhood, social and cultural harmony, and national cohesion by respecting all religious, cultural, and ethnic groups and to provide generous scope for the religious and cultural development of minority groups (Government of Pakistan 2009a, 2006). Many other policy documents produced during this era incorporated overarching national educational objectives reinforcing the pluralist and progressive agenda of this time period in Pakistan. For example, a UNESCO sponsored policy document, the National Professional Standards for Teachers in Pakistan (Government of Pakistan 2009b), emphasized the teacher dispositions aligned with the pluralist and progressive agenda such as ‘respect for individual and cultural/religious differences, and the basic worth of each individual and cultural/ religious group’ and ‘toleration and celebration of diversity’ (12). There are always differences between the intended and the enacted (or implemented) curriculum in any national jurisdiction, since the context influences the interpretation of policy messages (Trowler 2003; Kelly 2009). These differences are perhaps accentuated in the case of Pakistan as the new policy rhetoric reflected a significant cultural shift of language and discourse. Though hailed by liberal Pakistanis, who constitute only a handful of the Pakistani population, the kinds of values referenced in the 2006–2009 policy documents were seen by some Islamic nationalists as alien to Pakistan’s traditions. They promised a reordering of curriculum content around Islamic thought in order to give it a more ideological orientation. They rejected the new national curriculum content believing it embodied a Westernized and secular vision of Pakistani national identity. Some saw the new national curriculum policy as an American conspiracy (Ahmad 2008).

Methods This chapter explores aspects of early twenty-first century Pakistan Studies curriculum policy focusing specifically on the theme of representations of cultural diversity in relation to textbook content and teacher perspectives. More specifically, this chapter explores whether and how revised curriculum policy recommendations concerning cultural diversity were being incorporated in the recent PS textbooks. Moreover, the perceptions on cultural diversity of the teachers teaching PS textbooks for the ninth and tenth grades are also incorporated. This study used multi-case study research design (Yin 2018) informed by an interpretive paradigm (Stake 2013, 2010). The reason for undertaking the multicase study was to examine how the officially approved textbooks were perceived in different education settings (Stake 2013). The sample (or the cases) of the research included the officially endorsed PS textbooks for the ninth and tenth grades and 27 PS teachers working in one district of the Punjab. Semi-structured interviews were undertaken in 2015 with PS teachers from public, private, military, and Christian schools in one district of Punjab. Teachers’ perspectives and affiliations often determine pedagogical approaches to the national curriculum (Anand 2019).

64 Yaar Muhammad and Peter Brett Two recent Year 9 (Choudhary, Kawish, and Azam 2014) and Year 10 (Dar 2013) PS textbooks were analyzed. These textbooks aimed to translate new national curriculum policy. The content of these textbooks was quality-assured by The Provincial Textbook Board of Punjab through a process of competition. Using NVivo 12, qualitative content analysis was conducted to analyze the content of the PS textbooks. The analysis was specifically focused upon how the ethnic and religious diversity of Pakistan was treated. The PS textbooks’ content was deconstructed to identify representation of the ethnic and religious diversity of Pakistan. Very few images were provided in the PS textbooks; therefore, these images were not a major area of focus. Representations of cultural diversity were analyzed, keeping in view the portrayal of ethnic, indigenous, religious, and ethnic groups and the use of language in the description of these groups (for further detail on the coding processes deployed see Muhammad and Brett 2015). Twenty-seven interviews were undertaken with PS teachers from public, private, military, and Christian schools in one district of Punjab. To elicit teachers’ perceptions regarding their teaching of the theme of cultural diversity, they were asked to delineate the ethnic/cultural concepts and ideas taught in their PS classes. Cultural diversity themes here were assumed to be the content of PS textbooks dealing with Pakistan’s communal diversity—‘self-conscious and more or less well-organized communities entertaining and living by their own different systems of beliefs and practices’ (Parekh 2000: 3). They included Pakistan’s long established four provincial communities such as Punjabis, Sindhis, Pakhtoons, and Balochis; indigenous peoples such as Kalash; and the various religious communities of Pakistan such as Muslims, Christians, Hindus, and Parsis. Moreover, the teachers were also asked to comment on cultural groups they thought secured the most attention in the new PS textbooks and the ethnic/religious groups they thought gained less attention. Cross-case analysis (Stake 2013; Miles, Huberman, and Saldaña 2014; Saldaña 2013) of interview data was conducted to draw conclusions about the PS teachers’ perspectives on content of PS textbooks dealing with Pakistan’s cultural diversity. NVivo 12 was used to facilitate the process of organizing and analyzing the interview data (Edhlund and McDougall 2019). All of the audio files were transcribed verbatim and all the interview transcriptions were imported in NVivo 12 as internal sources. In order to identify specific points in the data and to get a sense of the whole, the first reading of the interview data was rapid but purposeful, directed but not bound by the research objectives (Bazeley and Jackson 2013). Annotations were used to add brief comments about a particular text segment whereas memos were used for storing extensive reflective thoughts about the particular text segment. In conjunction with reading, reflecting, annotating, memoing, and structuring cases, coding was undertaken on teachers’ responses to particular aspects of the researched phenomenon. The goal was to capture the finer nuances of meaning lying within the interview transcripts by storing each topic or concept within a particular node. Later, nodes were grouped together ‘and moved into a branching structure (a “tree”)—a hierarchy in which nodes representing subcategories are placed under higher-level or “parent” nodes’ (Bazeley and Jackson 2013: 76).

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The codes were used to construct matrix displays using the matrix framework function in NVivo (Bazeley 2009; Edhlund and McDougall 2019). The matrix displays enabled the researchers to assess both patterns of association and the nature of the associations, thus facilitating comparative analysis of teachers’ responses. Moreover, they showed how uniformity or disparity characterized the teachers’ perspectives.

Textbook analysis The qualitative content analysis of the selected PS textbooks identified that in the new PS textbooks there was continued emphasis on the theological and geographical homogeneity of Pakistani Muslims—with an overwhelming focus upon Sunni Muslims. For instance, the textbooks underscored that ‘at the present time … there is religious uniformity in Pakistan. Pakistan’s most important recognition is Islam even while there are regional, provincial, lingual, racial and other bases’ (Dar 2013: 103). Interestingly, the PS 9 textbook (Chapter 1) incorporated Sunni Islamic beliefs and practices, which can be a cause of resentment on the part of other Islamic groups. For example, the Shia Muslim community of Pakistan often rejects the incorporation of content on Sunni Islamic beliefs and practices for the development of Pakistan national identity through the curriculum. Blunt assertion of a Sunni interpretation of Islamic beliefs and practices and deliberate ignoring of Shia interpretations has been a controversial issue in Pakistan (Ali 2008), resulting in Shia Muslim community protests—leading on occasions to ‘student boycotts of classes, long-term school closures, riots and deaths’ (for details see Stöber 2007; Muhammad and Brett 2015). Paigham-e-Pakistan (the official narrative of the state on religious harmony via dialogue amongst sectarian voices), notes a ‘surge in sectarianism’ as a challenge for Pakistan and signposts a commitment to ‘juristic diversity.’ It adds that ‘there is no space for sectarianism or disagreement for the sake of disagreement’ (Munir 2019: 145). Nevertheless, the textbooks’ failure to acknowledge the differing beliefs and practices of the Shia Muslim community seem to continue the practice of textbook writing from a majoritarian perspective. Almost all administrative regions in Pakistan—such as the four provinces of Pakistan: de-facto province, Gilgit Baltistan; the self-governing states of Azad Jammu and Kashmir; the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATAs); and the semi-autonomous northwest tribal territories—have their own distinct cultures (Halai and Durrani 2017). The ethnic and linguistic homogeneity of one region differs from another region. Nevertheless, the PS textbooks’ treatment of the ethnic diversity of Pakistan was mainly confined to descriptions of regional languages and did not incorporate a positive and comprehensive introduction to history, culture and the contemporary beliefs of these groups, thus ultimately discouraging students from constructing their own provincial identities. The content related to diversity was mainly incorporated into the PS 10 textbook—and this only provided ‘a study of the beginning and development of a few famous regional languages of Pakistan’ (Dar 2013: 110). Students were ‘introduced to

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the origins of these languages and their dialects; areas where they are spoken; the major literary figures and the literary works in these languages; and the positive developments in these languages after the creation of Pakistan’ (Muhammad and Brett 2015). Compared to the previous textbooks, this way of incorporating the diversity of Pakistan in the new textbooks was a significant improvement but was not sufficient for students to develop clear national identities, informed by a full appreciation of the different cultures of Pakistan. The textbooks were more concerned with incorporating a nationalistic narrative rather than positively paying attention to various Pakistani cultural groups’ histories and achievements. For example, the PS 10 textbook emphasized the importance of the Urdu language for unity in Pakistan by stating that Urdu ‘is not associated with a specific region or racial group of Pakistan. It is spoken and understood all over Pakistan … After the creation of Pakistan, Urdu was given the status of the national language’ (107). Although the textbook acknowledged that ‘all four provinces of Pakistan have their provincial cultures’ (106), it brought to the student consciousness that ‘in spite of regional and linguistic differences, with the passage of time regional cultural similarities are thriving’ (106). Moreover, it emphasized that ‘in spite of different regional affiliations (Punjabi, Sindhi, Pathan, and Balochi) Pakistani people have feelings of brotherhood. Common religious beliefs foster unity’ (106). Furthermore, the textbook asserted that cultural heritage and the roots of Pakistani national identity lie in the era of Muslim rulers in the subcontinent. In short, the deductive imparting of messages about national unity, integrity, harmony, and cohesion tended to flatten the distinctiveness of regional cultures within Pakistan. The PS textbooks provided a cautious historical and political narrative which, as far as possible, demonstrated that there existed internal harmony within Pakistan. Both textbooks dedicated more space to the pillars of the national narrative and less space was allocated to positive evaluation of the internal diversity of Pakistan. For example, the PS 9 textbook devoted three chapters to providing a condensed and un-problematized story of the Pakistani nation. With the exception of sporadic mentions of internal ethnic and religious diversity in these chapters, the textbook generally omitted conflicting memories, contested readings of the national past, and the existence of national/ethnic prejudices. The recent political history of Pakistan extending from 1970 to 2006 was dealt with in the PS 10 textbook—and the political narrative was cautious as it explicated the civil– military discord of these years, indicating internal harmonious relations as far as possible. Regarding religious minorities, the PS 10 textbook underlined that under the 1973 Constitution, minorities were provided equal social, political, and economic rights. The textbooks also incorporated Quaid-e-Azam’s famous 1947 speech in order to promote positive attitudes toward religious diversity in Pakistan: ‘in this state of Pakistan you are free. Go to your temples, mosques or other places of worship. The running of the state has nothing to do with the religion, caste, creed or faith you belong to’ (quoted in Dar 2013: 117). Nevertheless, the textbook emphasized the expectation of the reciprocal obligations of being loyal to one’s

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country and of rising above all kinds of biases that might undermine the integrity of Pakistan. This analysis is indicative of small steps forward toward the inclusion of several themes related to the religious and ethnic diversity of Pakistan. However, these efforts have been marred by an overemphasis on national unity, harmony, and cohesion. The central intention may have been ‘unity in diversity.’ However, the dominant discourse of ‘unity’ in the textbooks diminished, denied, or at best only modestly recognized the internal ethnic and cultural diversity of Pakistan.

Teachers’ perspectives on cultural diversity themes in PS textbooks Categorizing the responses of the teachers in relation to the cultural diversity theme within the revised curriculum and textbooks resulted in the classification of the teachers into two groups: most teachers perceived that there were certain changes in the articulation of the cultural diversity theme of the textbooks. However, only one teacher stated that he did not know about the changes in this theme within the PS curriculum and textbooks. Most of the teachers, who recognized that there were some revisions in the cultural diversity theme within the textbooks, either appreciated or expressed concern about the changes in this dimension of the PS textbooks. They appreciated the inclusion of fair treatment for all the provincial cultures of Pakistan and commented upon the addition of information related to Brahvis, Saraikis, and Kasmiris, more positive approaches to Sindhis, and the non-representation of non-Muslim cultural groups. Some were also concerned about the limited representation of Balochis and the non-representation of GilgitBaltistan. However, they were concerned about balance in the treatment of Punjab within Pakistan and the narration of a coherent unifying, national story. Most of the teachers—mainly from public schools—perceived that all provinces were represented fairly. They perceived that no dominant provincial ethnic group was being promoted in these textbooks. They argued that although there was a lack of richness in the detail about different cultures, there was an equality in the depiction of the ethnic/cultural groups of Pakistan: ‘no one is preferred; no one is given more attention. All cultures of Pakistan are presented in a balanced way’ (Teacher 10PG). Some further argued that a curriculum should be neutral in order to promote national integration and from this point of view they perceived that the new PS curriculum/textbook was good. A few of the 27 teachers—mainly from private schools but some from public schools—perceived that all provincial cultural groups were covered but that the representation of them was not balanced. They recognized that Punjabis were overrepresented in the PS textbooks. They justified this overrepresentation on various grounds. For example, a teacher argued that Punjabis got the most attention in the new Pakistan textbooks because they were the largest group and most Pakistani leaders were from Punjab: ‘if by chance, there is discussion or depiction of a leader who happens to Punjabi, then it is not his fault. No leader is mentioned specifically that he is Punjabi or Sindhi’ (Teacher 20E.Pri). Another perceived

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it to be because Punjabis had made more sacrifices for Pakistan and because Punjabis had been more involved in politics compared to other ethnic groups: ‘I do not think there is over representation of Punjabis in this book. It is true that if those who made sacrifices for Pakistan are more from Punjab, it is not Punjabis who are to blame’ (Teacher 10PG). Another perceived it to be a representation of the political and administrative reality of Pakistan; Punjabis have greater representation in the federal government and are dominant in politics. Obviously, this book is a Punjab textbook; therefore, Punjabis are being given more attention in the textbook. Nawaz Sharif is being promoted in it because he has been ruling Punjab for a long time. You will see their influences in the textbook. They have described other cultures but more on Punjab maybe because it is being taught in Punjab. Maybe in different provinces it is different. (Teacher 21E.Pri) Yet another believed that it was good to have more knowledge and information regarding Punjab compared to other cultures of the country because this teacher believed it helped in the cultivation of students’ Punjabi identity first. One teacher also argued for adding city-level knowledge and information to the textbook so that students could develop affinity with the culture and place where they themselves were living. Some teachers—from public as well as private schools—appreciated the addition of content related to some small language groups such as Kashmiri, Brahvi, Saraiki, and Hindko. They maintained that the previous curricula and textbooks had neglected these ethnic groups and only the four main provincial groups had been the focus of the textbooks. Moreover, they claimed that this addition would be helpful in enhancing the cultural knowledge of students. Other teachers appreciated the strong representation of Islamic culture and argued that less representation of non-Muslim groups was justified on the grounds that Pakistan is an Islamic country. Moreover, they reasoned that in their schools most of the students were Muslims, and non-Muslims were few; therefore, it was reasonable for the PS textbooks to focus on Muslim culture: Muslims are in majority so they have given more attention to Islamic culture. As far as the representation of religious minorities are concerned, they are few—only 3% whereas Muslim are 97%. Pakistan is an Islamic country. It is not wrong to highlight Islamic culture. (Teacher 6PG) Some teachers—from public as well as private schools—were concerned about the limited representation of non-Muslim cultural groups in the textbook and perceived it as an injustice to the non-Muslim groups of Pakistan. They even believed that the textbooks were not up to an appropriate standard because they had no

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information regarding the non-Muslim subcultures of Pakistan such as Christians or Hindus. For them, just mentioning the Christian, Hindu, and Parsi segments of the population was not sufficient. They wanted to see elaborated discussions of their cultures in the textbooks. One teacher argued: ‘they are also citizens of Pakistan—though they are in the minority. They have as many rights as do others’ (Teacher 10PG). They expressed some cynicism about the purpose of the textbooks, as one teacher believed that the textbook was more geared toward cultivating ‘liberty’ in youth than providing information about the cultural groups of Pakistan. A few teachers—from public as well as private schools—were concerned about the representation of Balochis. They argued that the representation of them was important because they formed a significant part of Pakistan. Furthermore, they asserted that their representation in the textbooks would not only enhance the Punjabi students’ positive knowledge of a major cultural group of Pakistan, it would also help in ameliorating the sense of deprivation in Balochis; they would feel more a part of the Pakistani nation. Two teachers expressed concern about the non-representation of GilgitBaltistan—the newly created fifth province of Pakistan—in the new PS textbooks. For example, a teacher stated, ‘Gilgit-Baltistan has become the fifth province but this book still says that Pakistan has four provinces’ (Teacher 1FG). Another two teachers were concerned about the non-representation of international cultures that had influenced the development of Pakistan. Arguing that there was an absence of knowledge related to international cultures in the textbooks, a teacher stated: The British ruled here for hundred years. There is political history related to that in this textbook but nothing is related to their culture. Knowledge about different cultures—the real beauty of Pakistan Studies—is neglected here. In this textbook, we do not even have information about Arabs, from whom our religion has originated. (Teacher 7PG) Only one teacher fell into the category of ‘I don’t know.’ When asked to comment upon the cultural diversity content of the textbooks, this teacher stated that he had no concerns with the content of the curriculum/textbooks. He argued: ‘I am not giving students knowledge, I just want them to pass the examination successfully. Students are not here to receive knowledge. They are here to pass the examination’ (Teacher 6PG). Teachers were also asked to provide their suggestions with respect to the cultural diversity theme of PS textbooks so that the representation of cultural groups in the new PS might be improved. The dominant suggestion regarding the improvement of the cultural diversity content of the Pakistan Studies textbooks was that instead of highlighting a particular ethnic or religious group, there was a need for more emphasis upon commonalities among all the ethnic or religious groups in Pakistan. A teacher explained:

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Yaar Muhammad and Peter Brett If you want to promote national integration then you need to be balanced. If you pay more attention to a certain ethnic group or a region, there is already chaos in Pakistan, it will add to that. No special attention or space even to the deprived ethnic groups—such as Balochis—should be given. (Teacher 15AF)

Some equated commonalities with a unified ‘Pakistani culture’ and argued strongly for it. As one public school teacher put it: Pakistani culture should be promoted more—more than the present textbooks do. This should be done by highlighting those things that are common between Muslims, Christians, Hindus, Ismailis and Parsis living here. They are all Pakistanis. (Teacher 7PG) Others also equated the promotion of common beliefs and values with what they termed a balanced approach to teaching Pakistan Studies: ‘it is PS so a balanced approach should be taken to the representation of all cultures’ (Teacher 23Pri). To this end, some suggested that PS textbooks should not represent non-Muslims groups at all. For instance, a teacher argued fervently: Non-Muslim minorities have values different from the national values and their way of living is different so they should not be represented in the textbooks… Christian students are studying in Pakistan; they must learn Pakistani (Islamic) culture. (Teacher 4PG) Another teacher argued that non-Muslim groups should not be part of this curriculum ‘because the majority is Muslim students; only their perspective should be in the textbooks’ (Teacher 8PG), while a different respondent argued that adding more content on non-Muslim groups would undermine the neutrality of the curriculum: I think it (content on non-Muslim groups) should not be part of Pakistan Studies. Now it is neutral, it is emphasizing neither Muslims nor non-Muslim. If you add another chapter on Muslim and non-Muslim (cultures), it would become a topic of discussion (and controversy). (Teacher 16AF) She further rejected the idea of adding more content on non-Muslim groups because she believed it would obstruct the students’ opportunities to express their views and learn communication skills in PS classes: If you introduce a chapter on non-Muslim groups, it would give a point of debate. The benefit of having Pakistan Studies at this level is that it gives

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students an opportunity to express their views and learn communication skills. The benefit of having a neutral chapter is that the students can easily talk about a particular topic. If we add a chapter on religious groups, it will not make them express their views fully. (Teacher 16AF) In a similar way, a public-school teacher argued that Balochis should not be part of this curriculum: ‘Balochis cannot be represented in this textbook because they are running a separatist movement. Pakistan Studies should depict only those people as heroes who are acknowledged by the whole of Pakistan’ (Teacher 10PG). Nevertheless, a few teachers were ready to make concessions on their ‘balanced approach’ in the case of Balochis. They argued that common values should be promoted but Balochis could be given more attention so that their sense of alienation might be alleviated and national integrity could be promoted. For example, a teacher argued: More could be added in the syllabus for the chapter on different cultures but with balanced focus on all the main cultures of Pakistan. If Balochis are given more space due to their long history of deprivation and not being in mainstream politics, they can be given extra coverage—so that some difference can be made in their life. (Teacher 17AF) Similarly, some teachers suggested that in order to improve the cultural diversity content of the textbooks, non-Muslim groups should be given equitable representation in it. Arguing for the equitable representation of non-Muslim groups in the PS textbooks, a teacher stated: ‘I would not say that the representation of all should be on an equal basis but non-Muslim cultural groups are free and independent citizens of this country so they should also be given some space’ (Teacher 1FG). Another qualified the extent of representation with their contribution to the Pakistani nation by arguing: Pakistan Studies is about what is in Pakistan—they are either minorities or any other group. Representations of Christians and other religious minorities in these books are not as they should be. If they have done something for the country, they should be given space in the textbook. (Teacher 2FG) Another reasoned that the addition of information on Christian and Hindu cultures would help in enhancing the cultural knowledge of Muslim students: There are more Christians in Punjab, so in the Punjab textbooks, more information should be added; and there are more Hindus in Sindh, so in the Sindh textbooks more information should be added… this would be helpful to our students to understand Pakistan’s diversity. (Teacher 26M)

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Yet, some teachers expressed fear of a religious backlash because they perceived that Sunni Muslims had traditionally resisted the addition of the perspectives of other religions in the textbooks. For example, a teacher elaborated it as: Content related to the cultures of non-Muslim groups should be added into these textbooks only with the consensus of all—after having seen the figures of their population, if government feels that. Only through consensus because there can be a religious backlash. If all school of thoughts come to a consensus on certain content, then it is OK! (Teacher 14PG) Some teachers argued for the addition of more information on the people of GilgitBaltistan, Waziristan, and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Textbooks, they argued, should also talk about Gilgit-Baltistan on an equal footing with other provinces. Arguing for the inclusion of Waziristan and FATA in the textbook a teacher, stated: The cultures of four provinces are represented in the book but the people of FATA and Waziristan are also Pakistanis. They have the same Islamic values and their way of living is not very different so they should be given representation in these books. (Teacher 4PG) Two teachers who believed in Islamic humanism argued that the textbook content should be underpinned by the principles of Islamic humanism. This, according to one of the respondents, would help students in cultivating respect and tolerance for the religious diversity existing within Pakistan as well as beyond its borders. More information regarding Islamic humanism should be given, as they are common and compatible with the non-Muslim cultural values in a way that the students feel the whole world as their home. Allah has considered human beings as His family. (Teacher 9PG) Contrary to the views of those teachers who were against any kind of promotion of a particular ethnic or religious group, two teachers believed that it was of the utmost importance at this level of study that students should be given knowledge regarding their own culture and surroundings. This, they argued, would help students cultivate an identification with the place in which they lived. As one teacher argued: If other cultures are given less attention then it is what it should be. I think students at this level should be given more information regarding Punjab and less information regarding other provinces. At the lower level, I would

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suggest that students should be given more information regarding their own city. (Teacher 11PG) They went on to suggest that the textbooks being used in Punjab should have more focus on Punjabis and books taught in other provinces should have more representation of their respective cultures. Nevertheless, they were not totally against adding content related to other cultures. For example, a teacher argued: ‘this is not to suggest that the Punjabi students should not be given information regarding other cultures within Pakistan. At least bits of information can be added related to other cultures’ (Teacher 25Pri). The very wide range of perspectives offered by the teachers highlights the significant professional challenges faced by the textbook writers addressing multiple audiences of regulators, teachers, and students on a topic area where Pakistani educators’ opinions differ significantly.

Discussion and conclusion It is a difficult task to achieve a balance between representing a unified and convincing national narrative and respecting the rights, identities, and histories of diverse minority groups, and telling a more complex and contested story. Establishing this balance is difficult for all countries—including secular Western democracies with established traditions of more critical and exploratory pedagogical approaches. It is not only in Pakistan that nationalism can overwhelm regional and cultural nuance (see Zajda (2012) on recent history textbooks in Vladimir Putin’s Russia). Nevertheless, an overemphasis upon one official historical narrative can deny students knowledge and pride in their own cultural and regional identities (Banks 2011), thus hindering the possibility of development of their authentic, clarified, and nuanced identities. Citizens in a diverse democratic society such as Pakistan should be able to maintain attachments to their cultural communities as well as participate effectively in a shared national culture. Official Pakistani policy has recognized the challenge and set out worthwhile pluralist ideals. Paigham-e-Pakistan has usefully provided official support for these ideals (‘Reconstruction of Pakistani society demands that Pakistanis neither demean other religions nor humiliate the founders of other religions’ [Munir 2019: 136].) Nevertheless, the textbook analysis and teacher interviews shared here indicate the gap between policy rhetoric and school-based realities. However, the breadth of the teacher opinions shared in this chapter about how best to teach about regional, cultural, and religious diversity in Pakistan is marked. The teacher comments confirm the degree of challenge in reconciling, balancing, or synthesizing national theocratic visions and liberal democratic visions of the purposes of PS. The evidence indicates that there would be benefits in clarifying the ideological foundations of PS and the relationship between national and regional narratives.

74 Yaar Muhammad and Peter Brett The contestation in this area is real but perhaps the challenges should be acknowledged and embraced rather than evaded or sidestepped. The interviews provided evidence of able, thoughtful, articulate, and enthusiastic teachers with a clear vision of their core purposes: There should be relevance between provincialism and nationalism because I want to make my students not Balochi, Sindhi, Pathan, or Punjabi but Pakistani. We should correlate Pakistan Studies with Islamic Studies, Muslim Ummah as well as other countries. (Teacher 18F) I try to project national issues more so that our national identity can be developed … No Punjabism. No provincialism. I always talk about Pakistan and promoting Pakistanism … We have a glorious past of Muslim Ummah. But as a nation, when we see our past, we do not have a glorious past. Basically, I want to tell them about the glorious past (of Ummah) so that we can move towards renaissance… so that we can become a self-reliant nation … All Muslims are like Jammat [one nation]; therefore, it is necessary to tell them that wherever there are Muslims, they are part of Jammat. (Teacher 01.FG) I am against provincialism, prejudice, and intolerance. Nationalism is first. Pakistan is like a bouquet, and provinces are its beauty. For me, Pakistan First—and then the peace of the world. First, there should be peace at home (Pakistan) and then world peace. (Teacher 14.PG) These teachers are clear about what they dislike—all three bemoan what they see as a narrow and, by implication, small-minded, inward-looking, intolerant ‘provincialism.’ There is an implicit sense, however, that in giving attention to internal cultural and ethnic diversity, this might tend to dilute and fragment a clear and positive national narrative: ‘if we do not go to nationalism, then we have all other contending identities’ (Teacher 11.PG). Some of the teachers were more explicit in who they would leave out of the national story: ‘Balochis cannot be represented in the textbook because they are running a separatist movement’ (Teacher 10.PG); ‘Non-Islamic minorities have different values from the national values, and their way of living is different so they should not be represented in the textbooks. When they are studying in Pakistan, they need to learn Pakistani culture’ (Teacher 14.PG). The ‘othering’ of minority cultures here is obvious. There is an admirable spirit evident from the three teachers quoted above, however, of seeking to use the PS curriculum to teach about unity, internal harmony, and stability drawing upon positive messages from Islam; but the tenets of ‘Pakistanism’ and ‘Pakistan First’ still remain ill-defined. One teacher offered the insight:

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If we cannot demonstrate the contribution of provinces, we cannot develop a national identity. All provinces should be equally represented. Things start going wrong, where there is inequality. (Teacher 16.AF) Such thinking may help teachers to link the threads of the distinctive cultural and linguistic histories of different Pakistani geographical and ethnic regions in ways that enter into dialogue with national themes and landmark events.

References Ahmad, Iftikhar. 2008. “The Anatomy of an Islamic Model: Citizenship Education in Pakistan.” In Citizenship Curriculum in Asia and the Pacific, edited by David Grossman, Wing O Lee, and Kerry Kennedy, 97–109. Netherlands: Springer. Ahmad, Syed Jaffar. 2003. “Teaching Human Rights.” In The Subtle Subversion: The State of Curricula and Textbooks in Pakistan Urdu, English, Social Studies and Civics, edited by Abdul Hameed Nayyar and Ahmed Salim, 107–118. Islamabad: Sustainable Development Policy Institute. Ali, Nosheen. 2008. “Outrageous State, Sectarianized Citizens: Deconstructing the ‘Textbook Controversy’ in the Northern Areas, Pakistan.” South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal 2: 2–19. Ali, Nosheen. 2010. “Sectarian Imaginaries: The Micropolitics of Sectarianism and StateMaking in Northern Pakistan.” Current Sociology 58, no. 5: 738–754. Anand, Kusha. 2019. Teaching India and Pakistan Relations: Teachers’ Pedagogical Responses and Strategies. Unpublished doctoral dissertation. UCL (University College London). Banks, James A. 2011. “Educating Citizens in Diverse Societies.” Intercultural Education 22, no. 4: 243–251. Banks, James A. 2009. “Diversity and Citizenship Education in Multicultural Nations.” Multicultural Education Review 1, no. 1: 1–28. Bazeley, Patricia. 2009. “Analysing Qualitative Data: More Than ‘Identifying Themes.’” Malaysian Journal of Qualitative Research 2, no. 2: 6–22. Bazeley, Patricia and Kristi Jackson. 2013. Qualitative Data Analysis With NVivo. London: Sage. Choudhary, Muhammad Hussain, Mahmood Ahmad Kawish, and Uzma Azam. 2014. Pakistan Studies Class 9th. Lahore: G.F.H. Publishers. Dar, Aftab Ahmad. 2013. Pakistan Studies 10. Lahore: Gohar Publishers. Edhlund, Bengt and Allan McDougall. 2019. NVivo 12 Essentials: Your Guide to the Leading Qualitative Data Analysis Software. Stallarholmen, Sweden: Form & Kunskap. Government of Pakistan. 2006. National Curriculum for Pakistan Studies Grades IX–X. Islamabad: Ministry of Education. Government of Pakistan. 2009a. National Education Policy. Islamabad: Ministry of Education. Government of Pakistan. 2009b. National Professional Standards for Teachers in Pakistan. Islamabad: Policy and Planning Wing, Ministry of Education. Halai, Anjum and Naureen Durrani. 2017. “Teachers as Agents of Peace? Exploring Teacher Agency in Social Cohesion in Pakistan.” Compare: A Journal of Comparative & International Education. 48, no. 4: 535–552. doi:10.1080/03057925.2017.1322491.

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Hashmi, K. 2011. “An Analytical Study on Issues, Challenges and Reforms in the Pakistan Studies Curriculum at Secondary Level.” International Journal of Social Sciences 1, no. 3: 210–222. Kelly, Albert Victor. 2009. The Curriculum: Theory and Practice (6th ed.). London: Sage. Lall, Marie. 2012. “Citizenship in Pakistan: State, Nation and Contemporary Faultlines.” Contemporary Politics 18, no. 1: 71–86. Miles, Matthew, Michael Huberman, and Johnny Saldaña. 2014. Qualitative Data Analysis: A Methods Sourcebook (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Muhammad, Yaar and Peter Brett. 2015. “Beyond Binary Discourses? Pakistan Studies Textbooks and Representations of Cultural, National, and Global Identity.” IARTEM e-Journal (Special Issue Dec.): 74–100. Muhammad, Yaar and Peter Brett. 2017. “Some Challenges in Teaching Citizenship in an Islamic Context: Pakistan Studies Teachers’ Perspectives and Practices in Relation to Teaching About Identity.” Citizenship Teaching & Learning 12, no. 3: 279–298. Munir, Muhammad Ahmad. 2018. “Paigham-e-Pakistan (The Message of Pakistan) National Narrative Counter to Violence, Extremism, and Terrorism in an Islamic Perspective.” Islamic Studies 57, no. (3–4): 299–309. Munir, Muhammad Ahmad. 2019. “Paigham-e-Pakistan (The Message of Pakistan) II National Narrative Counter to Violence, Extremism, and Terrorism in an Islamic Perspective Translated.” Islamic Studies 58, no. 1: 127–148. Parekh, Bhikhu. 2000. Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory. London: Macmillan. Saigol, Rubina. 2005. “Enemies Within and Enemies Without: The Besieged Self in Pakistani Textbooks.” Futures 37, no. 9: 1005–1035. Saldaña, Johnny. 2013. The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers (2nd ed.). London: Sage. Stake, Robert E. 2010. Qualitative Research: Studying How Things Work. New York: Guilford Press. Stake, Robert E. 2013. Multiple Case Study Analysis. New York: Guilford Press. Stöber, Georg. 2007. “Religious Identities Provoked: The Gilgit ‘Textbook Controversy’ and Its Conflictual Context.” Internationale Schulbuchforschung 29, no. 4: 389. Trowler, Paul. 2003. Education Policy. London: Routledge. Yin, Robert K. 2018. Case Study Research and Applications: Design and Methods (6th ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. Zaidi, Syed Manzar Abbas. 2011. “Polarisation of Social Studies Textbooks in Pakistan.” The Curriculum Journal 22, no. 1: 43–59. Zajda, Joseph. 2012. “Transforming Images of Nation-Building, Ideology and Nationalism in History School Textbooks in Putin’s Russia: 2001–2010.” In History Wars in the Classroom-Global Perspectives, edited by Tony Taylor and Robert Guyver, 125–142. Charlotte, NC: Information Age Pub. Zia, Rukhsana. 2003a. “Education and Citizenship in Pakistan: An Overview.” In Citizenship Education and Lifelong Learning: Power and Place, edited by Michael Williams and Graham Humphrys, 153–164. New York: Nova Science Publishers. Zia, Rukhsana. 2003b. “Religion and Education in Pakistan: An Overview.” Prospects 33, no. 2: 165–178.

Part II

Religious aspect

5

Pacifying Sunni–Shī’ite relations in Pakistan Patterns of (de)humanization and prospects of trust-building Sohaib Ali and Fatima Waqi Sajjad1

Introduction The Sunni–Shī’ite discord has been a prominent feature of the sprawling Muslim community since the first century of Islam. Rooted in differences over legitimate leadership of the community, it has been a major impediment in bringing social cohesion and political stability to Muslim polities (Madelung 1997; Robinson 2010). Qur’ān has remained common to Sunnism and Shī’ism as the supreme source of guidance, having untarnished textual sanctity (Al-A’zami 2003; Al-Khu’i 1998), but the secondary scriptural resource of Hadīth that serves to elaborate and supplement the Qur’ān evolved in an almost parallel and mutually exclusive manner for these sects. With the consolidation of Sunni and (Twelver) Shī’ite Hadīth canon by the eleventh century CE (Brown 2009; Gleave 2001), self-contained pathways to Islamic faith and history had been firmly laid down. Hence, doctrinal imperatives for Sunnis and Shī’ites have been substantiated through within-tradition argumentation and are internally sustained—foreclosing the possibility of negotiation and accommodation, particularly with regard to certain core tenets of the faith and key historical events. Pakistan, after Iran, is home to the second largest Shī’ite population in the world (Rieck 2016: 55). The colonial and pre-colonial era dynamics of Sunni– Shī’ite relations prevailing in the South Asian subcontinent persisted in postindependence Pakistan until the 1970s—generally, violent confrontation had occurred intermittently, on a smaller scale, and fizzled out in relatively short time frames (Jones and Qasmi, 2015; Jones 2012). But the calculus drastically altered during the eventful 1980s, largely due to two factors: the spectacular results of Iran’s Islamic Revolution inspired confidence in Pakistani Shī’ites, making their leadership more assertive about their rights and constitutional safeguards (most notably, Arif Hussain Hussaini’s faction of Tehrīk-i Nifāz-i Fiqh-i Ja’faria which he led from February 1984 onward); and, owing to its role as a frontline state in the anti-Soviet ‘Afghan Jihad,’ a significant section of non-state Sunni actors in Pakistan had become militarized (Nasr 2017; Zaman 1998). As hawkish elements of each sect strived to contain the influence of the other, these twin factors combined to harden the rhetoric and tactics of exclusion. The ensuing imbroglio involved a dehumanization of the sectarian out-group that also came to elicit

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recourse to violent means. Established by Sunnis of Deobandi orientation in 1985, Sipāh-i Sahāba Pakistan (SSP) began as a radical anti-Shī’ite organization with the aim of curtailing the influence of Shī’ites through proselytization, polemics, and lobbying (Jaffrelot and Gayer, 2010). However, violent tactics received impetus in 1994 when dissident members of SSP formed Lashkar-i Jhangvi (LJ) to embark upon making Pakistan a Sunni state by waging an armed struggle against Shī’ites (Abbas 2010: 37). In the previous year, a militant Shī’ite outfit Sipāh-i Muhammad had been formed with the aim of ‘clearing all accounts’ with SSP (Rana 2004: 414), hence by the mid-1990s the stage was set for long-drawn-out violent conflict. According to the BFRS dataset on political violence in Pakistan, during the peak years from January 1988 to December 2010, there were 1,117 incidents of sectarian violence resulting in 1,724 deaths (Fair 2015: 1144). The growing literature on Sunni–Shī’ite contestation and the Shī’ite community in Pakistan (Fuchs 2019; Murphy 2019; Nasr 2017; Rafiq 2014; Rieck 2016; Yusuf 2012) serves to rigorously problematize the emergence and perpetuation of an ongoing intergroup conflict having serious ramifications for social cohesion and regional peace. But ‘the focus on exclusion and discrimination remains pervasive in the scholarly literature’ (Fuchs and Fuchs 2020: 57). Having a limited and mostly synchronic focus on divisive interactions, the twin tasks of tracing the evolution and transformations in the conduct of sectarian actors and bringing pacifying tendencies to the fore remained beyond the remit of these studies. Murphy (2019) has produced the most detailed and masterful account of the violent side of Sunni–Shī’ite relations in Pakistan and its root causes, but while recommending educational reforms for pacifying sectarian relations he does not explore any indigenous discursive resources that can lend content to educationbased interventions. He has nonetheless hinted at the existence of such resources by making the crucial point that ‘Deobandism is often used uncritically as a synonym for extremism and violence. In Pakistan most well educated Deobandi ulama reject terrorism and violence’ and ‘So-called Deobandi terrorists, therefore, have little or no understanding of the traditional teachings of Deobandi Islam’ (Murphy 2019: 18). In the context of the Middle East, research has indeed been carried out on attempts of rapprochement between Sunnis and Shī’ites (Brunner 2004; Polka 2013), but Pakistan does not appear to be on the radar of researchers studying Sunni–Shī’ite ecumenism. In the Middle East, Iraq has endured deep social fragmentation on sectarian lines in recent decades. After the 2003 politico-military upheavals in Iraq, successive governments tried to curb sectarianism by managing what was being taught about Islamic faith and history in schools (Rohde 2013: 711). Education-based interventions can mitigate the divisiveness of sectarian identities through promotion of intra-faith ecumenism in volatile polities such as Pakistan as well. Therefore, while the present study acknowledges that a staunch adherence of Pakistan’s mainstream Sunni and Shī’ite authorities to their own traditions does not afford opportunities for extensive reconciliation, it nonetheless seeks to uncover supressed perspectives that can be utilized for pacifying the proponents and adherents of these sects. This study is concerned with understanding: how,

Pacifying Sunni–Shī’ite relations 81 in Pakistan, relations between Sunnis and Shī’ites initially took shape and subsequently transformed; how religious discourse is used by radical sectarian actors to dehumanize their other; and to what extent the discourses of mainstream religious actors can humanize the other and enhance trust?

Methodological approach Data collection Actor and artefact sampling for this research is based on purposive criteria whereby eligibility of individuals and texts is determined by research questions. In keeping with the conventions of a Foucauldian approach that emphasizes elite narratives (Bevir 2010), the analytical focus is on perspectives of Sunni and Shī’ite ulamā (traditionally trained scholars). The defining characteristics of selected scholars pertain to their prominence in Pakistan’s religious sphere, influence and standing in institutional settings, and readiness to contribute to debates that can instigate or diffuse sectarian tensions. For the section on initial inter-sectarian relations, programmatic statements of influential Deobandi ulamā were selected from the period 1946–1954. To answer subsequent research questions, on the Sunni side, discourses of dehumanization are primarily drawn from statements made by the second SSP chief, Zia-ur Rahmān Fārūqi (Haq Nawāz Jhungvi’s successor)— his elaborately crafted dossier, which demanded an official excommunication of Shī’ites by the Pakistani state, receives focussed attention. As for Shī’ites, statements revealing their dehumanizing posture have been extracted from Ghulām Hussain Najafi’s inflammatory polemics. By the time Najafi was assassinated in 2005, he had served on senior positions at prominent Shī’ite seminaries in Punjab and Sind. Discourses of humanization offered by influential Sunni scholars are mainly obtained from the writings of Muhammad Taqi Usmāni—mufti (jurisconsult) and most senior Hadīth instructor at Pakistan’s largest Deobandi seminary DārulUloom Karachi, he formerly served as a judge of the Federal Sharia Court of Pakistan and the Sharia Appellate Bench of the Supreme Court of Pakistan. The views of Mufti Muhammad Shafi (Taqi Usmāni’s father and former Chief Mufti at the Deoband seminary in British India) and his two influential disciples, Sarfrāz Khan Safdar and Salīmullah Khan, are also analyzed. On the Shī’ite side, statements with humanizing potential were taken from Pakistan’s only Grand Ayatollah Muhammad Hussain Najafi; talks delivered by Riāz Hussain Najafi—head of Pakistan’s official Shī’ite madrassa board and principal of the leading Shī’ite seminary Jamia al-Muntazar, Lahore; and views of Syed Sājid Ali Naqvi who is widely acknowledged as an official representative of Iran’s Supreme Leader in Pakistan. Texts from and about these influential figures are drawn from diverse genres that cover biographical and polemical works, and formal legal edicts (fatāwā) as well. Discourse samples were collected until no further conditions were being identified that made the production of (de)humanizing statements possible.

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Data analysis The analysis begins by viewing elite Sunni discourses from the perspective of genealogical governmentality (Bevir 2010; Biebricher 2016). This Foucauldian lens is used for probing presumed points of origin and posits contending rationalities for governing inter-sectarian relations. It also seeks to capture the counterconduct of radical elements that transformed initial solidaristic developments into supremacist trends. This historical contextualization yields the range of possibilities in the conduct of inter-sectarian relations and their patterns of emergence and transformation. For the subsequent section, the study draws on Foucauldian Discourse Analysis (FDA) to understand how hegemonic others and victim selves were constructed and how they (de)humanize their other. Through FDA (ArribasAyllon and Walkerdine 2017; Willig 2013) the discursive construction of Sunni– Shī’ite identities is elucidated by considering the subject positions these religious actors take up and ascribe to their other. This involves an analysis of their strategies of (de)legitimation and their respective action orientations. Intragroup variation in perspectives among Sunnis and Shī’ites reveals a fundamental point of difference between violent extremists and non-violent moderates—the former are lax in their adherence to Qur’ānic and Hadīth-derived injunctions on human sanctity and considerate conduct, while the latter take a decidedly cautious stance. This fundamental fissure delivers the analytical binaries through which sectarian discourses are deciphered in terms of dehumanizing and humanizing processes. Selected texts are hence viewed through two interpretive repertoires: one defines difference in humanizing terms, whereas for the other, difference entails dehumanization. After highlighting the dynamics of dehumanization that have left a violent imprint on Sunni–Shī’ite relations since the 1980s, the next subsection turns to humanization oriented discourses. This study employs the conceptualization of humanization and dehumanization developed by Haslam (2006) who presents it as a process that grants or denies qualities to ‘others’ that characterize humanness. Mainstream or radical, Sunni and Shī’ite scholars are committed to a common logic of exclusion based in a scriptural imaginary informed by the divine scheme of creation, reward, and retribution. Sunni and Shī’ite works of Qur’ānic exegesis (Shafi 2004; Shirazi 1992) make far-reaching conclusions about the raison d’être of human existence based on verses that stipulate devout servitude for all volitional beings (Qur’ān 51:56) and pronounce that adhering to the right religion is a matter of remaining true to the nature on which humans have been created (Qur’ān 30:30). Against this yardstick, all those who are capable of accessing and understanding the right religion are to be held accountable for their earnestness in seeking God’s approval. For these scholars, the defining features of genuine humanness are authentic religiosity, fidelity, and conscientiousness. However, given the deeply entrenched Sunni–Shī’ite divide in Pakistan, even non-violent mainstream voices abstain from granting these attributes to sectarian others. While a rhetoric of dehumanization accompanying verdicts of excommunication can be located in attribution of infidelity to others, calls for tolerance in sectarian relations mostly arise from

Pacifying Sunni–Shī’ite relations 83 a moral management of self, and lack a humanizing rhetoric capable of granting others sincerity of purpose in adhering to their sect. The analysis therefore makes out a considered depreciation of the need to deny these traits to others, as potentially humanizing; and is premised on the approach of hybrid peace governance that adopts post-liberal/illiberal means of peacebuilding that are indigenous to conflicting communities (Jarstad and Belloni 2012).

Conduct of inter-sectarian relations: beginnings and transformations In Pakistan, up until the promulgation of the first constitution in 1956, the conduct of politically mobilized Sunni ulamā revealed two distinct rationalities of governing the polity: a solidaristic rationality that sought to co-opt the Shī’ites for (Islamic) state-building, and a supremacist rationality aimed at subduing the sectarian other. The guiding truth for the former was that early schisms in Islam could not be undone or disregarded, while the latter deemed their own variant of the faith as one that must reign supreme without offering any accommodation and positive recognition to others. In the course of All India Muslim League’s participation in the last elections held for colonial India’s central and provincial legislatures during the winter of 1945–1946, the most prominent supporter of the Pakistan demand among senior Deobandi ulamā was Maulāna Shabbīr Ahmad Usmāni (Dhulipala 2015: 355). He had tried to allay concerns that an overwhelming Sunni majority in Pakistan would oppress the Shī’ite minority by drawing exclusively on the Sunni-Hanafi code of Islamic Law (Fuchs 2019: 12). In January 1946, at a large gathering in Lahore, Usmāni iterated the commitment of Muslim League that ‘in all Sharia related matters of Muslims, credence will be accorded to the opinions of Sunni ulamā and Shī’ite mujtahids’ (Sherkoti 1972: 210); and a ‘just Islamic rule will be established where all minorities will be extended a fair, rather generous treatment’ (214). The commitment he referred to was first made by the Muslim League in its June 1936 manifesto where the ‘Programme for Election’ began by stating that in ‘all matters of purely religious character, due weight shall be given to opinions of the Jamiat-Ulema-i-Hind and Mujtahids’ (Ahmad 2006: 273). Later, as a member of the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan when Shabbir Ahmad Usmāni and his likeminded legislators were pressing for framing a constitution on Islamic lines, he addressed a public gathering in East Pakistan on 11 February 1949 where he dismissed speculations that divisions within ulamā on the interpretation of Islam would undermine the constitution making process. Seemingly invoking the principle of majority rule, Usmāni retorted that ‘are there not different factions in politics? … [based] on what principle are their disagreements resolved? The same principle can resolve differences among the ulamā about Islamic constitution and state, if there are any’ (Sherkoti 1972: 334). The Objectives Resolution was passed on 13 March 1949 and in his address to the Constituent Assembly at that occasion Usmāni had reassuringly stated, ‘owing to blessings of the Pakistan Movement, differences between Islamic sects have

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significantly diminished, and if some persist, they will be wiped away by fraternal reconciliation’ (Usmani 1950: 13). For Pakistani Shī’ites, having a say in negotiating constitutional safeguards became possible once, following the adoption of Objectives Resolution, the Basic Principles Committee (BPC) was constituted for carrying out further constitutional groundwork. Mufti Ja’far Hussain was among six members of the Talimat-i Islamiya/Islamic Teachings Board (TIB) that would function as a special subcommittee of the BPC (Rieck 2016: 63). The technology of constitution-framing mechanisms had finally been extended to a Shī’ite representative through the TIB, but the BPC’s interim report presented to the Constituent Assembly on 28 September, 1950 almost wholly ignored the recommendations of the TIB (Binder 1961). However, when Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan called for a wider public deliberation on issues under consideration of the BPC until 31 January 1951 (Afzal 2001: 63) it gave the TIB members an opportunity to bring forth their arguments and seek refinement and endorsements from other senior ulamā. Maulāna Syed Sulaimān Nadvi, who was made the head of TIB at its formation, presided over a meeting of 31 ulamā at Karachi during 21–24 January 1951 (Afzal 2001: 64). Along with Mufti Ja’far Hussain, a leading Shī’ite scholar Hāfiz Kafāyat Hussain was also among the ulamā who formulated 22 points for laying down the parameters of developing an Islamic constitution. The most significant gain for Shī’ites was the inclusion of a clause that guaranteed (Ali 1997: 99): The recognised Muslim schools of thought shall have, within the limits of the law, complete religious freedom, the right to impart religious instruction to their followers, and shall have the freedom to propagate their views. Matters relating to their personal status shall be administered in accordance with their respective codes of jurisprudence. It will be desirable to make provisions for the administration of such matters by their respective qazis. Rieck (2016: 69) therefore observes, ‘[t]his conference … turned out to be a landmark of unity among Sunni and Shia ulamā.’ Syed Sulaimān Nadvi tried to maintain the momentum of unifying interactions by organizing an international Islamic conference at Karachi in February 1952. He observed with a sense of achievement, since it was the first [such] gathering, mistakes were there, but it was not void of benefit, especially the arrival of ulamā from Iran and Najaf was a milestone in the way of [achieving] inter-sectarian cordiality between different mazāhib [schools] to an amicable extent. (Nadvi 1954: 221) A solidaristic rationality was also on display when, following the anti-Ahmadia agitations, the Munir–Kiyani Commission sought testimonies from ulamā for determining who was to be recognized as a Muslim. In his seminal study of the Commission’s proceedings, Qasmi (2014: 147) reports,

Pacifying Sunni–Shī’ite relations 85 Ahmad Ali Lahori, of Deobandi persuasion … [said] that condemnation of the first two caliphs of Islam as usurpers does not take a person completely outside the pale of Islam. Mufti Shafi, the most celebrated of Deobandi scholars at that time, held the same opinion. A close associate of Shabbīr Ahmed Usmāni and also a member of the TIB, Mufti Muhammad Shafi reflected on the vexing situation that could have derailed his solidarity seeking efforts (Usmani 2005: 1106): In the court, Qādiānis [Ahmadis] raised the issue that Deobandi ulamā declare all Shī’ites to be infidels, I disapproved that such unqualified attribution of infidelity to Shī’ites is not at all the practice of [ulamā associated with Dārul-Uloom] Deoband. The disputing party presented a published fatwa that apparently pronounced Shī’ites to be infidels without any qualification. I again said that I was not ready to accept it as a fatwa of Deoband [school] unless it was verified from [Dārul-Uloom] Deoband. On returning [from the court] I wrote a letter to the Rector [of Dārul-Uloom Deoband] for gaining confirmation. In his reply to Mufti Muhammad Shafi, the Rector Muhammad Tayyab Qāsmi informed about his inspection of the fatwa record at Dārul-Uloom Deoband, and confirmed that elders [of the Deoband school] have not resorted to an unqualified excommunication of the Shī’ite sect as a whole, they have only excommunicated those who deny the essentials of faith … if an unqualified excommunication has been carried out anywhere, it would be an individual edict that cannot represent the Deoband school. (Usmani 2005: 1108–1109) By the mid-1950s, this solidaristic rationality characterizing the politics and policies of senior Deobandi ulamā had come under strain as a younger generation of Deobandis became active at the grass roots. Unifying trends emerging from technologies of constitutional mechanisms, joint forums, and collective charters faced intense pressures from a counter-conduct orchestrated by ultra-purist Deobandi elements operating under a supremacist rationality. Reick (2016: 90) has noted that ‘it was only in 1955’ that agitation against mourning processions of Shī’ites began by Noor-ul Hassan Bukhāri’s Tehreek-i Ahl-i Sunnat (TAS) ‘resurfaced in earnest.’ This is understandable since a much improved second BPC report appearing in December 1952 and dissolution of the Constituent Assembly in October 1954 (Afzal 2001: 135) had brought a marked reduction in collaborative interactions of senior Sunni and Shī’ite ulamā for developing an Islamic constitution. Pakistanis witnessed anti-Shī’ite unrest for the first time in August 1955 (Muharram 1375H) when mourning processions taken out by Shī’ites were

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banned or attacked at around 25 places in Punjab, and 12 people were seriously injured at an Imam-bārgah in Karachi (Reick 2016: 90). The next year also saw heightened tensions during the first ten days of Muharram when TAS increased its activities at Sunni mosques in several towns of Punjab. To address the controversies surrounding their mourning rites, on 17 May 1957 Shī’ite organizations united and convened the first All-Pakistan Azadāri Conference in Ahmadpur East. On the same day, the TAS organ Da’wat carried an editorial that, on top of their earlier objection that mourning processions should be banned because Shī’ites indulge in criticism of the Prophet’s Companions, offered a new argument that (Sunni) Islam was fundamentally opposed to mourning for the dead and martyred. During 1957, TAS propaganda through speeches and posters became more extreme and the month of Muharram saw violent attacks on mourning processions leaving at least four Shī’ites dead and three seriously injured. Later that year, the scale of anti-Shī’ite sentiment widened as Maulāna Qamruddin Siyālvi, a highly influential shaikh of the Chishti Sufi Order and leading figure of Jamiat-i Ulamā-i Pakistan (political organisation of Barelvi Sunnis) issued a fatwa that excommunicated Shī’ites and exhorted Sunnis to undertake their social boycott (Rieck 2016: 93–96). By the Muharram rites of 1958, a prominent Shī’ite figure Muzaffar Ali Khan Qizilbāsh had become the Chief Minister of West Pakistan whose concerted efforts to engage Sunni and Shī’ite religious leaders resulted in a largely peaceful observance of Muharram rites. This relative calm stretched over the next few years due to the imposition of martial law by General Ayub Khan, though once it was lifted and freedoms to gather and agitate were restored, bloodshed resumed. The unprecedented violence on 3 June 1963 (10 Muharram) in Theri, Lahore and other places left around 120 Shī’ites dead—making it the first instance of largescale killing of Shī’ites in Pakistan (Reick 2016: 110). Toward the end of the 1960s, significant instances of deadly violence initiated by Shī’ites also came to the fore. The confrontation at Bāb-i Umar in Jhang city during the 1969 Muharram processions resulted in six deaths, including that of a Sunni ālim and prayer leader at Masjid-i Taqwa. As the Sunni population there belonged to a lower social strata and presumably felt dominated by numerous local Shī’ite landlords, this deadly encounter agitated Sunnis in and around Jhang during the years to come. Most importantly, the lingering memory of this incident served as a rallying call for Haq Nawāz Jhangvi to launch his virulent anti-Shī’ite campaign amid rising Shī’ite activism in Pakistan after the Islamic Revolution in Iran (Kamran 2016: 346).

Discursive construction of hegemonic sectarian identities Sunni discourses of dehumanization The epitome of SSP’s polemical writings for advancing the case of Shī’ites’ excommunication is the Historic Dossier compiled by Zia-ur Rahmān Fārūqi, though it has been aptly noted that the exegesis provided in the dossier remained ‘one-sided and uncomplex’ (Fuchs 2019: 182). This document was originally

Pacifying Sunni–Shī’ite relations 87 submitted to the Prime Minister of Pakistan on 28 September 1991 in a gathering of 400 ulamā at the Governor House in Lahore. Fārūqi (1995: 4) made an ‘important declaration’ at the very outset—unlike routine polemics, the dossier did not merely cite and quote objectionable views from authoritative Shī’ite sources; it was claimed that the unique merit of their endeavor was to provide facsimiles of original Shī’ite works as evidence. Fārūqi contended that ‘now, it is no longer possible for Shī’ites to deny [what is contained in] this photocopied documentation from their authoritative books. Following this publication, Shī’ites should abandon the tactic of dissimulation, and come [forth] with a courageous confession’ (4). The dossier is replete with accusations of subterfuge. Although Shī’ites do not deny that dissimulation (taqiya) has been a mainstay in their public conduct, they justify the practice of concealing their views owing to an imminent threat of persecution by Sunnis who have enjoyed an overwhelming majority in the community of believers since the first centuries of Islam. But, for their adversaries, dissimulation practiced by Shī’ites is, above all, an indication of their immoral, subversive, and parasitic approach to the Islamic faith. Fārūqi (1995: 14) assured his readers: This book will be sufficient for closing all doors upon the dissimulation and lying of Shī’ites throughout the world. Because nowadays whenever you ask any Shī’ites if they consider the Prophet’s Companions to be unbelievers or if they believe the Qur’ān was altered—they reply that these are false accusations, only Sipah-i Sahāba hurl such false allegations at us … The Historic Dossier is a mirror reflecting two hundred and thirty two books of Shī’ites … By bringing into public view these two hundred and thirty two books, resort to dissimulation has been thwarted for sure. Either Shī’ites will repudiate their faith altogether, or plead guilty and openly expose themselves. Fārūqi noted that, ironically, it was the large-scale publication and dissemination of Shī’ite works from Iran, in the years following Khomeini’s Revolution, that made such an expose of their beliefs possible (Faruqi 1995: 14). Gaining access to Shī’ite works offered an opportunity to Sunnis that was hitherto unavailable. The actuality and extent of Shī’ites’ divergence from the majority’s beliefs became clear as post-Pahlavi Iran’s educational and missionary outreach resulted in an unprecedented disclosure of Shī’ite faith. Fārūqi (1995: 18) could therefore argue: Following the publication of all such literature and repeated avowal of these heretical doctrines by Khomeini’s government—[i.e.] in the aftermath of Khomeini’s declaration to [effectively] annul dissimulation—now, it is incumbent upon the whole Muslim Ummah to openly proclaim the expulsion of those who believe and express heretical doctrines. The action orientation of SSP’s exclusionist discourse was aimed at affecting a decisive and irrevocable break from the rival sect and undermining the Islamic credentials of Iran under Shī’ite rule. While individual points of divergence from

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Sunni positions still mattered, dehumanizing tendencies could now resonate widely by fomenting the perception of Shī’ites’ duplicity through the very nature of evidence being produced. Demands made by SSP assumed two different outcomes. Either Shī’ites would renounce the doctrines and authorities highlighted by the dossier, or they would tacitly acknowledge the veracity of documentary evidence contained therein, without trying to conform to the Sunni tradition. The latter was more probable, so having already presented Shī’ites as duplicitous, Fārūqi (1995: 744) gave a concluding note at the end of the dossier stating that, If the government of Iran or the world’s Shī’ites continue to assert their claim of [having faith in] Islam, then it will be our shar’ī [legal] obligation to keep proclaiming their infidelity with the same vigour and courage [animating us now]. SSP might have contented themselves with the perpetual labor of carrying out written and verbal denunciation of Shī’ites. But a splinter group, LJ, opted for a violent course of action aimed at eliminating the Shī’ite community in Pakistan. A detailed edict by LJ muftis (Lashkar-i Jhangvi 2008) ominously declared, ‘the war hasn’t just begun, it has now entered a decisive stage … remember, we believe in action not mere lip service’ (80–81). For LJ, Shī’ites were ‘the greatest enemies of Islam’ (85) who have ‘a long history of inflicting atrocities on Islam and Muslims’—to prove their point, references were made to instances of Shī’ite’s purported treachery where they are said to have sided with foreign invaders such as Mongols and European colonialists to trounce Sunnis (11). By transposing blame through temporal hurdles and generalizing reprehensible characteristics to contemporary Shī’ites, it became possible for LJ to answer the question raised in their tract’s title with most gruesome effects, ‘Why is it an obligation to kill Shī’ites?’ The subtitle is amply suggestive of the pretext that grounds arguments given in the edict, ‘Sorting out the marauder.’ Shī’ite discourses of dehumanization In the turmoil-stricken closing decades of the twentieth century, Pakistani Shī’ite scholars also indulged in polemics that were patently provocative. Perhaps no notable Shī’ite scholar was as aggressive as Ghulām Hussain Najafi, who engaged and rebuked his Sunni opponents in an extremely offensive mode. In his ‘Are Nāsibis Muslims?’ Najafi emphatically proclaimed on the title page, ‘Death to the opponents of Ali’s successor-ship [of the Prophet].’ Non-Shī’ite Muslims during the Umayyad era included: factions of Sunnis who did not favor the Umayyads over Ali and the Prophet’s progeny; and Nāsibis, whose absolute approbation of Muāwiya I and his son Yazīd made them dogmatically prejudiced toward the revered descendants of the Prophet. Najafi had therefore conflated the otherwise distinct categories of Sunnis and Nāsibis (whose doctrinal orientation flourished in the heydays of Umayyads). The latter sect had received vehement condemnation

Pacifying Sunni–Shī’ite relations 89 from Sunnis throughout Muslim history (Naumani 2004). For polemical purposes, Najafi’s contemporary Sunni adversaries had to be given a more damning doctrinal lineage. His strategy for achieving that goal was unabashedly contradictory and inconsistent—past Sunni authorities were both sources for establishing that Nāsibis were an exceedingly deviant sect and are also implicated for being Nāsibis themselves. For instance, without naming Ibn Kathīr, his monumental history of Islam (Al-Bidāya Wal Nihāya) was cited for establishing that the fourth Umayyad caliph ‘Marwān was among those who slandered Ali’ (Najafi, 1988: 15). Here, this historical work was presented as an ‘authoritative book of Sunnis’ to determine the reprehensible attributes of Nāsibis, yet elsewhere its author was named and condemned as an‘imam [supreme leader] of Nāsibis’ (Najafi 1988: 5). Apparently for Najafi, being unable to extend exclusive allegiance to the Prophet’s progeny, Sunnis were as deplorable as Nāsibis. Disregarding clear and substantial differences between Sunnis and Nāsibis, Najafi (1988: 14–15) implored his readers: Do not let their long beards deceive you, within [them] are enemies of Ali— they express this animosity in speeches, writings and casual talk but in a manner that escapes notice of laymen. Their attitude is exactly that of hypocrites [living in the Prophet’s age], they used to profess faith in God and the Prophet with their tongues but in their hearts they were enemies; and a criterion for judging hypocrisy is to find animosity and malice for Ali. Hence, hypocrites and Nāsibis are united on the point of opposing Ali … Those who issue fatwas pronouncing that Shī’ites are infidels—all of them are spiritual descendants of Marwān and Muāwiya … they are dogs of Umayyads, and hounds of Marwānids. Their fatwas do not scare us. [These] scoundrel Nāsibis who write that we [Shī’ites] are infidels, are themselves the grand infidels. Najafi (1988: 19) further elaborated that his hybrid Sunni-Nasibī adversary carried ‘a distinct marker: they deceive our [lay] Sunni friends by posing as supporters of [the Prophet’s] Companions. They will seemingly praise the Companions, but while doing that, also degrade the Prophet’s progeny.’ Moreover, Najafi’s accusations were frequently punctuated by obscene outbursts. One of his most commonly used analogies implied that since Sunnis do not derive their creed and law from Shī’ite sources, they resemble an illegitimate offspring. He wrote in a tactless manner that his opponents were born of ‘fornication—who issue fatwas of takfīr [excommunication] against partisans of Ali … these people are foremost in depravity and shamelessness’ (117). Matching SSP’s polemics, the other sect was portrayed as inauthentic since ‘Shī’ites are the true servants of Islam,’ whereas Companions of the Prophet had ‘committed atrocities on the Prophet’s kin, owing to which Shī’ites can neither view every Companion with respect, nor accept them as successors to the Prophet’ (254–255). An image of Prophet’s Companions and Sunnis as usurpers of religio-political authority belonging to Shī’ites was thus popularized by Najafi through an incendiary portrayal that could seriously aggravate sectarian tensions. Sunni and Shī’ite radical elements had therefore engaged

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in strategic deployment and appropriation of historical accounts for sustaining rival identities—to the point of dehumanizing their sectarian other. Sunni discourses of humanization By the mid-1990s, it was reasonably clear that mainstream Deobandi Sunnis were not willing to toe the violence-prone line of SSP and LJ. An altogether different subject position was taken up that combined the responsibility of protecting Islam from corrupting influences with the sacred duty of being conscientious while judging others. Dārul-Uloom Karachi, the largest Deobandi seminary in the country, had refrained from endorsing an unqualified excommunication of Twelver Shī’ites during the volatile 1980s (Ludhianvi 2001: 248). In July 1991, the most authoritative voice from Dārul-Uloom Karachi eventually responded to a query concerning Shī’ites—one that specifically asked why, in preceding years, scholars of that seminary had desisted joining Pakistani and Indian Sunni ulamā who decreed that Twelver Shī’ites were infidels. In his weighed response, Mufti Muhammad Taqi Usmāni (2010: 96–97) mentioned some extreme views expressed by certain Shī’ites and then elucidated: Research [on our part] could not establish that … beliefs sanctioning excommunication are held by all Shī’ites. And many Shī’ites contend that everything written in ‘al-Kāfi’ … [and] other [Shī’ite Hadīth sources] is not deemed by them to be true. On the other hand, declaring someone an infidel is an extremely sensitive matter, therefore utmost caution should be exercised. Supposedly, if someone practices dissimulation, then owing to his concealed belief he will be an infidel before Allah, but the fatwa will have to be based on his avowed belief … Since the times of Grand Mufti Maulāna Muhammad Shafi, Dārul-Uloom Karachi has … issued the fatwa—in accordance with the stance of majority of Ummah’s scholars—that only those Shī’ites are infidels who hold such false beliefs; absolute excommunication of all Shī’ites, disregarding what they [avowedly] believe in is … to be cautiously avoided. Taqi Usmāni’s brief fatwa alluded to the stance taken by a majority of Sunni scholars, including his father Mufti Muhammad Shafi, though he did not delve into their arguments. In September 2008, a relatively detailed fatwa compiled by Maulāna Muhammad Arif was issued from Dārul-Uloom Karachi on the same issue—carrying formal endorsements of Taqi Usmāni, his elder brother Mufti Muhammad Rafi Usmāni, and eight other scholars based at that seminary. This detailed fatwa (Arif 2008) began with an almost verbatim quote of Usmāni’s 1991 edict and then augmented it by quoting other Sunni authorities, specifically from the Deobandi tradition. The moot points requiring resolution were: first, whether earlier generations of authoritative Deobandi scholars had unanimously declared that all Shī’ites of the Twelver denomination were infidels; second, what legal conditionalities had to be satisfied for undertaking the excommunication of a self-avowed Muslim community. Hence, the fatwa cited edicts of three former

Pacifying Sunni–Shī’ite relations 91 chief muftis of Dārul-Uloom Deoband and one of its renowned patrons—each offering an authoritative precedent as well as dispelling any perception of a Deobandi consensus on Shī’ites’ collective excommunication. Attending to the second issue, a crucial caveat was highlighted in the edicts of these luminaries: the verdict of excommunication could not apply to whole sects such as the Twelvers. Refusing to consider Twelver Shī’ites as a monolithic body of believers, these Deobandi scholars proposed excommunication on an individual case-by-case basis. For instance, most of the cited edicts contend that if some Twelver Shī’ites espouse the belief that the Qur’ān was altered or Arch-Angel Gabriel erred in transmitting God’s revelations, then such Shī’ites would face excommunication—not their sect as a whole. The 2008 fatwa also referred to a thoroughgoing edict issued by Mufti Muhammad Shafi on the principles of excommunication. While acknowledging the need to identify and expel infidels from the community of believers, he had argued that it was as important to avoid callousness in pushing Muslims outside the pale of Islam. Shafi substantiated his cautious approach by citing a verse from the Qur’ān (4: 94) that enjoins: O you who have believed, when you go forth [to fight] in the cause of Allah, investigate; and do not say to one who gives you [a greeting of] peace ‘You are not a believer,’ aspiring for the goods of worldly life; for with Allah are abundant acquisitions. Highlighting the principle deduced from this verse, Shafi (2010: 127) emphasized that when ‘someone professes faith in Islam, calling him an infidel without carefully investigating his infidelity is [a] proscribed and immensely devastating [practice].’ Therefore, for Shafi and like-minded Sunni scholars, each Shī’ite sect and its members are to be viewed individually. This allowed Shafi to contend that Shī’ites who: merely oppose the majority of Ummah [the global Muslim community] by considering Ali to be the most esteemed Companion [of the Prophet] and the first [legitimate] caliph—are disobedient and deviant, not infidels … [hence, Sunni Muslims] are allowed to undertake all Islamic dealings with them that are approved with respect to other disobedient and deviant [Muslims] (179) By way of example, Shafi then listed some relations Sunnis can have with such Shī’ites and notably includes: marriage (provided the divergence of beliefs is not concealed and consent of legal guardians is taken beforehand), and offering funeral prayers for them. Tangible outcomes resulting from this alternative discourse may seem incremental and conservative, but it has the benefit of meeting discourses of dehumanization on their own purportedly traditional terms, and delegitimizing them.

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Antithetical to demands of dehumanizing discourses, Shafi’s approach offered a nuanced and deft handling of sectarian differences. For Shafi and his followers, alienation of the other must be proportioned to the extent of their divergence from Sunni orthodoxy. Moreover, they subordinated the exclusionist impulse of polemical thinking to higher ecumenical aims. The other is to be persuaded and won over, not expelled or annihilated. Critiquing the inconsiderate use of takfīri diction, Taqi Usmāni propagated a principle gleaned from the Qur’ān by his father. Mufti Shafi had tried to temper radical voices by pointing out how God had instructed Prophets Moses and Aaron to undertake their proselytizing mission—the Qur’ān (20: 43–44) narrates, ‘Go, both of you, to Pharaoh, for he has exceeded all bounds. Speak to him gently, so that he may take heed or show some fear.’ According to Taqi Usmāni his father asserted that, ‘you can never be a greater reformer than Moses [or Aaron], and your opponent can never be more deviant than the Pharaoh, … [yet, both the prophets] were enjoined to speak gently’ (Usmani 2014: 12). Usmani condemned the use of terminology pertaining to takfīr as derogatory slur words. Citing the official compendium of Sharia edicts compiled during the reign of Mughal emperor Aurangzeb (Fatāwa-i Alamgīri), Taqi Usmāni has argued that even in an inter-faith context, ‘if someone addressed a Jew or a Zoroastrian as a kāfir [infidel]’ and that non-Muslim felt hurt by it, ‘the person who addressed [the non-Muslim with disdain] will be a sinner’ (Usmani 2015). It would however be an overstatement to claim that most mainstream Deobandi Sunnis fully adhered to the considerate approach advocated by Mufti Muhammad Shafi and his associates. Nonetheless, a moderating effect can be discerned in the circle of Shafi’s disciples and beyond. Maulāna Sarfrāz Khan Safdar who studied under Shafi at Dārul-Uloom Deoband had eventually become the leading Deobandi authority on doctrinal issues; he highly appreciated Shafi’s principled approach to excommunication that could ‘avoid the exclusion of Muslim sects from Islam, and [at the same time] keep non-Muslim factions out of Islam’ (Usmani 2005: 646). However, Safdar was of the view that Twelver Shī’ites could be collectively excommunicated while exempting individual Shī’ites whose deviation from Sunni Islam wasn’t as grave as that of orthodox Twelvers. Yet his conduct was influenced by Mufti Shafi’s ethos of moderation. In January 1992, at the height of SSP’s dehumanizing castigation of Shī’ites, Maulāna Safdar admonished their leadership (Rashidi 2004: 6): The young are emotional and … end up saying and doing too much. Extremism and harshness never solve problems, and neither can force and might eliminate any … ideology. [So] sternly stop [the youth] from resorting to extremism in their speech and action. No doubt Shī’ites are infidels, but wall chalking and chanting slogans of ‘infidel, infidel’ is of no use, it only causes harm … Some superficial minds may construe from [my counsel] that I’ve been bought; by Allah’s grace this sinner couldn’t be bought or pressurized when he was extremely poor and young—how can I be bought or pressurized now, when I’m eighty and nearing my grave?

Pacifying Sunni–Shī’ite relations 93 It is palpable that SSP’s onslaught had created an internal crisis of legitimacy that even compelled a Deobandi scholar of Maulāna Safdar’s stature to defend his integrity while seeking to curb sectarian extremism. Another luminary among Mufti Muhammad Shafi’s disciples at Deoband was Maulāna Salīmullah Khan who was the longest serving president (1989–2017) of Pakistan’s official Deobandi madrassa board Wifāqul Madāris. He shared Maulāna Safdar’s perspective on the excommunication of Twelver Shī’ites, yet did not refrain from interacting with representatives of their madrassa sector. In an editorial written for the official organ of Wifāqul Madāris in September 2002, he celebrated the ‘blessing of unity’ witnessed during consultations with government authorities where all madrassa boards had put up a united front (Khan 2006: 51). He was also the founding head of Ittehād-i Tanzimāt-i Madāris Pakistan (ITMP) which has become a permanent forum of all five madrassa boards in Pakistan for pursuing common goals. In a letter Salīmullah Khan wrote to the SSP/Millat-i Islamia Chief Ali Sher Haidari in September 2005, he rejected Haidari’s criticism of the decision to include the Shī’ite madrassa board in a joint forum such as ITMP. Denouncing the extremism unleashed by SSP and its more extreme violent off-shoots, Salīmullah Khan questioned their affiliation with the Deoband school and deplored dehumanizing tendencies through shrewd moral self-management— this vigorous critique of SSP by a Deobandi luminary needs to be quoted extensively (Nasir 2014: 153): Have the senior Deobandi ulamā been on this track [of SSP]? … A horrifying and shuddering conclusion of your policy has spread throughout the world that Muslims are terrorists and Islam preaches terrorism. You can see that corpses are falling in imam-bārras and mosques, the injured are in agony … fear keeps people from offering prayers in congregation and this trend is not coming to an end … your provocative slogans and their heinous outcomes have brought a bad name to the [Prophet’s] Companions, the deceitful antagonist says, ‘since this militia of Sahāba are terrorists and such are their misdeeds, you can imagine how the Sahāba must have been’ … everyone knows that, in order to achieve its goals, this group [radicalized by SSP propaganda] committed burglaries and thefts and engaged in abductions. Surely, you know about these tactics, and you also consider them to be wrong but controlling them is beyond your capacity, yet you are responsible [for their actions] because all this is a necessary and inevitable outcome of your policy … for Allah’s sake, ponder … the losses incurred by ulamā and madrassas due to this rabble-rousing movement need no elaboration. Shī’ite discourses of humanization Toward the late 1990s, the severity of sectarian discourse on the Shī’ite side had also waned. Even though moderate mainstream voices continued to view their own sect as the sole source and benchmark of true Islamic guidance, there was a visible eagerness to find common ground—usually made possible by constructing

94 Sohaib Ali and Fatima Waqi Sajjad a common enemy: external destabilizing forces. While extolling Shī’ism in the All-Pakistan Shia Ulamā Conference, Syed Sājid Ali Naqvi signaled a non-confrontationist course of action (Muntazar 2012: 39–40): [The South Asian] subcontinent is a market of sects, in which Shī’ism signifies struggle and a system [of belief and practice]—this very system has introduced and protected Islam. The best, most superior and exalted interpretation and exegesis of Islam to be found is Shī’ism. It is we, who have to comprehend all conspiracies against Islam and make amends. It is we, who can confront non-Islamic culture and civilization—as true followers of Islam, this is our responsibility. [The] missionaries [among you must] go out and reform the society … I’m not telling you to confront any sect. [Yet] it is our responsibility to project the attributes of our culture, identity and realities. If Shī’ism gains strength, Islam will gain strength. It is evident that the humanizing discourse shunning violence remains resolutely hegemonic. Sunnis could only qualify and bring specificity in their practice of excommunication with regard to Twelver Shī’ites while maintaining that Shī’ites who were not considered to be infidels, were nonetheless deviant and in need of guidance (for example, their core belief rejecting the caliphate of Prophet’s Companions other than Ali, had to be rectified). Similarly, mainstream Shī’ite scholars could, at best, tell their followers to shun violent confrontation while trying to reform a polity dominated by Sunnis. In a rare video interview given in his native Urdu, the most accomplished contemporary Shī’ite marja’ of Pakistani origin (based at the prestigious Najaf seminary since the 1960s) Grand Ayatollah Bashir Hussain Najafi repeatedly emphasized the significance of converting nonShī’ite Muslims to Shī’ism (Katchera 2016). Nonetheless, the only Grand Ayatollah based in Pakistan, Muhammad Hussain Najafi, emphasized a theologically nuanced approach to framing the doctrinal divide between the two sects. In his exposition of the term dharuriyāt-i deen (essentials of the faith), which is common to Sunni and Shī’ite discussions of core fundamentals of Islam, Najafi used the term dharuriyāt-i mazhab (essentials of the school) in a manner that leaves a positive doctrinal category open for non-Shī’ites. The latter term covers beliefs and practices that are uniquely of a (Twelver) Shī’ite origin, whereas the former pertains to widely shared fundamentals such as belief in one God, His messengers, and revealed books, etc. He concluded that matters ‘established as essentials of the Imāmia [Twelver] school, once negated by someone result in the expulsion [of that person] from the School of Prophet’s Progeny (though not from the pale of Islam)’ (Najafi 2009: 4). He asserted that having high esteem and devotion for the Prophet’s progeny is among the essentials of faith, therefore Nāsibis and Khārijis are to be condemned as infidels, but Najafi does not label Sunnis as such. Muhammad Hussain Najafi’s biographer has noted that the Grand Ayatollah refrains from offending his opponents and contributes to efforts for uniting Muslims in and outside Pakistan; owing to his pacifying influence, when Najafi was put in police custody along with other

Pacifying Sunni–Shī’ite relations 95 ulamā for preventing unrest around Muharram rites, local Deobandi ulamā negotiated his release with the authorities by arguing that the Ayatollah’s presence outside would help in preserving order (Awan 2009: 106). In recent years, the pursuit of proselytizing goals has compelled leading Shī’ite scholars to give up the aggressive Khomeini-inspired mode of activism and proselytizing practiced in the 1980s and 90s. But Ayatollah Khomeini was too important to be ignored. Therefore, it had become necessary to side-step earlier rhetoric of defeating ‘American Islam’ by fighting ‘against western and eastern tyrants’ (Shaheed Foundation 2016)—and construct an inclusive orientation of Khomeini’s legacy that was devoid of belligerence towards Sunnis. On 5 June 2008, Iran’s cultural center at Lahore held a seminar on the occasion of Ayatollah Khomeini’s nineteenth death anniversary, where speakers were invited to highlight the views of Khomeini and his successor Ayatollah Khamenei about the ‘need for awakening and unity in the Islamic world’ (Tirmizi 2008: 1). The forum allowed Shī’ite bridge-builders of diverse vocations to tease out the grounds for humanized engagement with their sectarian other. In his introductory remarks the center’s director stated that Ayatollah Khomeini envisaged pan-Islamic unity on the basis of commonalities such as ‘God’s oneness, one qibla [direction of praying], one revealed scripture i.e. Qur’ān, an Islamic identity, and a common enemy and shared goal.’ According to him, Khomeini had emphasized that Islamic countries can unite by ‘forgetting their differences and grouping together on the basis of principles and strategy’ (Tirmizi 2008: 14). Among the speakers was Ayatollah Syed Riāz Hussain Najafi who celebrated the benevolence of post-revolution Iran in glowing terms (Tirmizi 2008: 69–70): Imam Khomeini had consolidated [state] institutions before his demise … and today we can see that nineteen years [on], his honourable disciple Ayatollah Khamenei continues to execute his responsibilities befittingly. Three years ago, we met Ayatollah Khamenei during a study trip to [Iran’s] Islamic institutions. Salīmullah Khan [senior Deobandi scholar], Mufti Muneebur Rahman and Dr Sarfrāz Naeemi [senior Barelvi Sunni scholars] were also present with us. Khamenei remarked, ‘We are working for humanity. We helped the Bosnian Muslims, though you would know there is no Shī’ite population there. Similarly, we also helped Palestinian Muslims, even though there are very few Shī’ites there and the majority are Sunni Muslims. The whole Muslim world left them on their own, but we helped them; because we are working for Islam, not Shī’ism.’ Syed Riāz Hussain argued that the Iranian nation was ‘instructed by the revolution’s founder that if you want to survive, set aside Shī’ism and Sunnism [and only] refer to Islam. Sunnis are Muslims and so are Shī’ites; [so] work for Islam and not just for your sect’ (Muntazar 2012: 8). This approach to inter-sectarian relations downplays creedal differences and ennobles the pursuit of common religious and humanitarian goals. Making use of Khomeini’s advice to forget what has divided Muslims, this humanized depiction may, to some extent, enable

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Shī’ites to view Sunnis in a favorable light, and vice versa. But it remains to be seen if humanizing strategies relying on doctrinal naiveté can ameliorate sectarian tensions to any significant degree. Nonetheless, Sunni and Shī’ite leadership demonstrated considerable unanimity while formulating and ratifying the Paighām-i Pakistan edict and declaration. This development qualifies both as an instance of, and potential starting point for, sectarian reconciliation. Launched from the Secretariat of the President of Pakistan in January 2018, the Paighām-i Pakistan initiative incorporated the views of Pakistan’s leading Sunni and Shī’ite ulamā for constructing and disseminating a counter-narrative aimed at curbing religious extremism. Representatives of Pakistan’s five madrassa networks, including Deobandi Sunnis and Twelver Shī’ites, reached an unprecedented agreement on the prohibition of violence and hate mongering. Although this state-sponsored initiative was largely aimed at delegitimizing insurgent militant Islamists who became active in the aftermath of 9/11, sectarian violence also received its due share of attention. Along with foremost Deobandi figures that included Maulāna Abdur Razzaq Sikandar, Mufti Muhammad Rafi Usmani, and Mufti Muhammad Taqi Usmani, Shī’ite elites such as Ayatollah Syed Riāz Hussain Najafi and senior members of the Shia Ulamā Council also ratified Paighām-i Pakistan. Holding out a shared normative standpoint, these leading ulamā acknowledged and declared (IRP 2018: 43): Sectarian hatred, armed sectarian conflict and imposing ones ideology on others by force is in clear violation of the injunctions of Shari‘ah and is disorder on earth. Further, it is a national crime as per the law and the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan.

Conclusions and recommendations: trustbuilding and educational interventions Given the hegemonic dispositions of mainstream Pakistani religious actors, an absence of sectarian amity educes a kind of restrained engagement that can be characterized as adversarial cordiality. Humanizing tendencies in Sunni and Shī’ite discourses lack a follow-through that extends to how the other is conceived and portrayed—the main corrective strategy employed by both sects for curbing dehumanization ceases at a prudent positioning of self, and forgoes the need to gauge the goodwill and moral competence of their out-group. From a conventional perspective, trust-building between the two sects would require points of contact that can function as sites for fulfilment of positive expectations (Giddens 1991; Luhmann 1988). But in the volatile sectarian milieu of Pakistan a tangible common ground is found wanting where interests can be collectively articulated, harmonized, and pursued. For instance, Milli Yakjehti Council (MYC)—the most long-established forum offering opportunities for direct contact to representatives of both sects—had recoiled to an extremely narrow agenda soon after its inception in March 1995. Since then, MYC has primarily concerned itself with peaceful observance of Shī’ite’s mourning rites (Rieck, 2016: 258). Interaction restricted

Pacifying Sunni–Shī’ite relations 97 to such activities amounts to infrequent contact which ‘is a pointless strategy’ for ‘eliciting trustworthiness’ (Jones 1996: 23). Likewise, Abu-Nimer and Kadayifci (2011) argue that points of contact made possible by foreign third-party facilitation have lacked follow-up and sustainability. Rigidly withdrawn attitudes on both sides of the sectarian divide, therefore, require a long-term strategy that employs an indirect approach to trust-building based on imagined contact. This form of contact involves ‘mental simulation of a social interaction with a member or members of an outgroup category’ (Crisp and Turner 2009: 234), and requires conceiving situations of reciprocal self-disclosure in amicable settings (Pagotto et al. 2013). To that end, the counter-radicalization agenda of Paighām-i Pakistan can be channelled to provide a sustainable and effective mode of inter-sectarian engagement. Pursuing the goals of Paighām-i Pakistan, the traditional madrassa curriculum, which includes courses for imparting dialectical skills, can be complemented by courses aimed at honing the dialogic aptitude of students by way of understanding their sectarian other. Compulsory Islamic education in schools, colleges, and universities can also be reoriented to ensure that teachings common to both sects are given maximum coverage. Such curricular strategies can harness the abilities of students to approach their sectarian other with understanding and well-founded positive expectations. This study has mainly focused on contemporary discourses that deliver self-images and portrayals of the other sect. Manifest articulations of religiously motivated civility and tolerance analyzed here can inform conceptions of how the other may respond in a contact situation. However, to significantly expand and consolidate a shared knowledgebase educing alternative constructions of the other, a latent body of amenable perceptions can be explored in the Sunni and Shī’ite Hadīth corpuses with a focus on narrations concerning ethical ideals, past events, and coming eschatological episodes. Before the rivalry-revitalizing Iranian Revolution, a rare glimpse of such underexplored Hadīth resources was offered by the eclectic Pakistani Sunni scholar Maulāna Syed Jā’far Shah Phulwāri in his Majmā’ al-Bahrain (Meeting of the Two Oceans). In 1969, Phulwāri compiled a topically arranged selection of identical Hadīths recorded by classical Sunni and Twelver Shī’ite authorities. In his endorsement, the leading Shī’ite scholar of pre-1980s Pakistan, Mufti Jā’far Hussain, had enthusiastically commended the efforts of Phulwāri in trying to distil a shared heritage (Phulwari 2001: 11). Although some crucial doctrinal differences remain irreconcilable, identifying similarities in other beliefs and ideals can produce a normative proximity capable of generating dialogue and positive expectations. For instance, if the decision of the Prophet’s elder grandson Hasan to abdicate in favour of Muāwiya I is taken to be squarely aimed at curbing infighting among Muslims, contemporary Sunnis and Shī’ites can carve out a precedent that accords primacy to intra-faith harmony and social cohesion. Phulwāri’s anthology demonstrates that Hadīth corpuses of both sects contain numerous common narrations that espouse an ethos centered on universal compassion. He reports from Sunni and Shī’ite Hadīth authorities, ‘All creation is Allah’s kin’ and ‘The best human is one who brings greatest benefit to people’ (Phulwari 2001: 95). Deobandi

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scholar Maulāna Zahid-ur Rāshidi has reported that overlap in the content of Sunni and Shī’ite Hadīth narrations is estimated to be around 70 percent (Rashidi 2008: 276). A shared normative outlook can hence be forged through educational measures that impart common ideals of piety and benevolence. The ensuing interactions, imagined and actual, are likely to be eminently conducive for building trust.

Note 1 This study was designed by Fatima Waqi Sajjad; collection and analysis of data and writing were wholly done by Sohaib Ali.

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Part III

Geopolitical aspect

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The radicalized regional order of India–Pakistan and prospects of a security community1 Muhammad Shoaib Pervez

The seeds of radicalization in India–Pakistan societies were sown by the elites of both states after the demise of each states’ founding father. The relationship of distrust between the two states was built on the trauma of the partition of the subcontinent in 1947. Ironically, the elite of each side has always constructed a victimized self-identity at the expense of the vanquished identity of the ‘Other.’ This pattern of rivalry continues unabated. This chapter will elucidate some of the sociocultural norms found in India–Pakistan societies where the elites have constructed a radicalized regional order in South Asia through self-fulfilling prophesies of glorifying themselves at the expense of the ‘Other.’ The radicalized regional order refers to the opposite of ‘we feeling’ which is a prerequisite for constructing a security community; it means a feeling based on enmity deliberately constructed by the elites for their own vested interests and at the expense of regional peace. That is why, I conceptualize it as an ‘order,’ one which has an authoritative dispensation. Another term requiring clarification here is ‘the elite.’ In the context of India–Pakistan elite is used generically for all those officials who follow the state-constructed narratives of hatred of each other. Sometimes they themselves are entrepreneurs of norms of hatred and at other times they are simply following the lines of animosity constructed by their predecessors who have been at the helm in both states. The state security narratives of both states are being constructed by the elites for mass consumption through negative norms which all portray the “Other” (state) as it’s nemesis, like the educational policies of both states; the rhetorical practice of maligning ‘the Other’ during election campaigns; and the censorship policies imposed on the mass media by the elite of the ruling state. These social norms have so far proven to be an obstacle to the formation of a security community. At the prescriptive level, in order to overcome the malady of radicalization, this chapter will also envision a hypothetical security community based on ideational norms found at the popular level in the societies of both India and Pakistan. It will explore ‘positive norms’ constructed by popular social practices which include: literary classics written by acclaimed writers of both societies that depict nostalgic feelings about each other; religious practices (Bhakti movement) of the subcontinent; and contemporary media initiatives by private mass media conglomerates of the two states with the code name ‘Aman ki Asha’ (Desire for Peace).

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This chapter will utilize the methodology of the popular culture approach within an interpretive exploratory framework. It is divided into three main sections. The first section focuses on some of the negative norms behind a radicalized regional order as propagated by the elites for their own parochial interests. As this book is intended for an understanding of radicalization in Pakistan through a critical framework, the major emphasis is on analyzing the practices of the elites. However, in order to overcome this radicalization order, I will elucidate the pathdependence model of a security community in the second section of this chapter. The third section will discuss some of the positive norms found in the popular social practices of both states which are required for this hypothetical India– Pakistan security community. The primary sources used for this chapter include the examination of the compulsory history textbooks used in primary schools and high schools in India and Pakistan. I have established no limit of time on the textbooks used; regarding questions of identity, ideology, and India–Pakistan security relations there has been little change in the syllabi of these textbooks since independence (1947) because they are strictly under government control. Another primary source is the study of commercial Indian films in the decade of the 1990s.This decade is very important as it was the time during which the Hindu Fundamental party BJP came into power in India and the optimal level of hatred between the two countries was reached. Furthermore, in Pakistan, it is the start of guided democracy under the tutelage of its army after the end of long direct military rule (1977–1989). Another reason to focus on patterns of rivalry in films during this decade is due to the start of violent Kashmir movement in late 1989. The selected films focus especially on the India–Pakistan rivalry. Their popularity is gauged from mass media reports and the national recognition they received in the shape of awards from the state. It can be argued that there may not be a singular effect of films on the masses. However, watching commercial Indian (Bollywood) films in India and particularly in Pakistan is not only a favorite pastime for ordinary citizens, but it has become part of the daily practice of the people in both states. Another source of mass appeal is the study of novels written by acclaimed Indian and Pakistani literary giants on themes of partition and community.

The social practices of elites, and propagation of negative norms Among social norms, the educational textbooks used at primary and secondary school levels are of considerable importance. It is at this level that young minds are exposed to the outside world for the first time. These young minds come to know their existential identity by learning the various national narratives that are being taught to them in their history textbooks. On average, a child begins school at the age of 4 and finishes high school at age 16. In India and Pakistan, the curriculum, prescribed books, and the publication of history books at both grade school and higher school/college level are under government control. In Pakistan, history has been taught under the subject label of ‘Social Sciences’ since 1961. History is a compulsory subject at school and the officially prescribed textbooks

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are a way of imparting historical knowledge. The content analysis of these books illustrates that up to this point textbooks have been used as a means of creating an image of India and Pakistan as ‘Us versus Them.’ The relational aspects of social identity in the young minds of these students are being formed in these texts by positively attributing a Pakistani identity and negatively describing an Indian one, or vice versa. By the time children reach adolescence, almost every Indian child is fervently anti-Pakistani and every average Pakistani is ardently anti-Indian. From high school to graduate college level, the subject of history is renamed as ‘Pakistan Studies.’ Every student must pass these obligatory courses in this subject area and the subject material comes only from the officially prescribed textbooks. The pedagogical culture that uses these textbooks is also very interesting, since in both India and Pakistan the knowledge provided in textbooks is largely unexamined and is often considered sacred. In order to pass their examination, students are required to memorize the subject matter by heart. The critical evaluation or cross-examination of the material is discouraged in the classroom (Hasanain and Nayyer 1997). It seems that history is not being taught through unbiased views or with objective facts, but rather teaching has become a useful conduit through which the state elites can impose their biased nationalist ideas on young minds. I start with a case study of educational practices in Pakistan. A distinguished historian of Pakistan, KK Aziz, in his text entitled The Murder of History, surveyed the history textbooks of Pakistan that are prescribed for educational institutions (Aziz 1998). The following are some of the examples taken from his book. The excerpts from a history textbook published at Peshawar (Khyber-Pakhtoonkhawa province) in Pakistan states: The Hindus wanted to control the government of India after independence. The British sided with the Hindus. But the Muslims did not accept the decision. (Aziz 1998: 13) More extracts from the Grade 4 textbook: The religion of the Hindus did not teach them good things… Hindus did not respect women. Hasanain and Nayyer 1997) Hindus worship in temples which are very narrow and dark places, where they worship idols. Only one person can enter the temple at a time. In our mosques, on the other hand, all Muslims can say their prayers together. (Hasanain and Nayyer 1997) Another prominent Pakistani historian, Ayesha Jalal, quotes from a compulsory history textbook used for college students written by Ikram Rabbani and Monawar Ali Sayyed entitled the Introduction to Pakistan Studies, which states that ‘the

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coming of Islam to the Indian subcontinent was a blessing because Hinduism was based on an unethical caste system’ (Jalal 1995: 78). As Aziz has pointed out, the titles of the chapters in these textbooks also make interesting reading. Some of the chapter names include: ‘Differences in Muslim and Hindu civilizations,’ ‘The need for the creation of an independent state,’ ‘The ideology of Pakistan,’ and ‘India’s evil designs against Pakistan’ (Aziz 1998: 16). Invariably, in almost all history books, whether they are grade-school textbooks or academic history books, what is common among them is the tendency to label Hindus as ‘unclean’ and their culture as ‘inferior’ (Aziz 1998). Likewise, the treatment of the history of the post-independence years of Pakistan is not that much different. For example, it is claimed in the textbooks in Pakistan that the India–Pakistan war of 1965 was a success for the Pakistani army and that it was initiated by Indian forces. This is in spite of the fact that there is now a general consensus among various Pakistani intellectuals that the 1965 war was started by Pakistan in the Kashmir region under the code name ‘Operation Gibraltar,’ which sought to liberate Indian-held Kashmir, but that the conflict ended in a stalemate with neither side accomplishing anything (Nawaz 2008). The same is true for the 1971 war with India. The Pakistani textbooks frequently refer to India’s involvement in the separation of East Pakistan, which may be true, but few references are made to the atrocities committed by the Pakistani army and the social practices of the political elites leading to the chaotic situation in 1971. The Pakistan Studies textbook for Grade 9 and 10 (Secondary School level) states: ‘In 1971 while Pakistan was facing political difficulties in East Pakistan, India helped anti-Pakistan elements and later on attacked Pakistan’ (Aziz 1998). The processes involved in writing, publishing, and printing these textbooks reveals the involvement of the state’s ruling elites. For example, the government of Pakistan selects a panel of educational advisors who devise the syllabi and curricula. The advisors have themselves acknowledged that there are set policy ‘guidelines’ given to them that indicate which historical aspects are to be emphasized (Aziz 1998). Moreover, they are advised to write these books with the ideological framework of the establishment of Pakistan in mind. The ideology of Pakistan, obviously, demands the marginalization of Hindus, or India, and the promotion of Islamic ideology or the highlighting of Muslim rule of the subcontinent. After the submission of drafts by the educational advisors, their work is again reviewed and revised by the government before it is sent for final publication (Aziz 1998). The policy guidelines given to the writers of these textbooks include the development of an awareness of Hindu–Muslim differences among the students, evaluating the role of Indian aggression toward Pakistan, and the reinvigoration of the Kashmir dispute by elaborating the evil designs of India (Naseem 2006). There is a strong connection between historiography and the state’s identity concerning the writing of these history textbooks. It seems as if the state’s elites are involved in a self-fulfilling prophecy that seeks to glorify the identity of the state while sacrificing objective historical facts on the altar of nationalism and patriotism. This is done despite the fact that people in both India and Pakistan have a common history and ancestral heritage. The majority of Pakistanis are

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the descendants of Hindus who later converted to Islam. But it is a strange fact that in all the history textbooks of Pakistan the genealogy of Pakistanis is linked to the Turkish militias and Afghan war lords who invaded India time and again. Educational norms have become a cultural repository for the state’s identity. This shows the ways in which the social practices of elites have an influence on educational policies and demonstrates how Pakistan’s identity is being discursively constructed at the cost of portraying India as the sole nemesis of Pakistan’s identity and stability. I am not saying that there are no differences between the Muslim and the Hindu culture or civilization. There is no doubt that both have distinct cultures and that this difference is one of the basic reasons for the independence of Pakistan. However, to emphasize difference when teaching young minds these socially constructed historical narratives is like germinating conflict for future generations. At the educational level, the teaching of history can serve as a tool to instruct future generations of society about what is wrong and what is right. Currently the educational norms in both states serve to promote malice in the construction of each other’s identities. Once these identities are carved out and formed then the narration of history becomes the conflict between the ‘righteous Muslim’ or Pakistani and the ‘idolatrous Hindu’ or Indian (Jalal 1995). What is common between the various regimes (democratic or totalitarian) in Pakistan is the historiography of Pakistan under the tutelage of its ideology. This has helped to formulate the state’s identity under the broad rubric of Islamic nationalism on the one hand and ‘Otherness toward India’ on the other hand. How does identity based on an ideology strengthen the elites who profess it? Apple points out that it ‘distorts one’s picture of social reality and serves the interest of the dominant classes in the society’ (Apple 1979: 20–21). For a Pakistani student the ‘social reality’ is constructed by distorting the facts of history. The national symbolism of Pakistan’s identity is paraphrased below from some of the history textbooks used in Pakistan. Some of the textbooks claim that: 1. Pakistan came into being when Muhammad Bin Qasim entered Sindh in 712 AD. Sindh is referred to as the ‘Bab-e-Islam’ or gateway to Islam in the textbooks. The symbolism of a common ancestry between Muslims of the subcontinent and former Arab rulers is created by the naming of ‘Bab-eIslam.’ However, Islam was not spread throughout India by Arab invaders. Islam was in fact spread throughout India by ‘Sufism.’ 2. Akbar, the great Mughal Emperor who ruled India, is denounced as a ruler of the subcontinent since he practiced many ‘Hindu’ traditions and married Hindu ‘ranis’ or ladies. 3. The freedom movement of India is symbolized by the struggle against Hindu domination and the search for an Islamic identity of the state. The emphasis has been placed on the struggle against Hindu domination rather than on the attempts by the people to throw away their common colonial yoke (Ali 2002). 4. The post-independence period in the textbooks repeats symbolic phrases such as ‘our neighbouring enemy state’ casting an ‘evil design’ on our statehood, thereby holding India responsible for all the misery of Pakistan.

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Let us now take a look at the educational policies of India. In many ways, the basic tenants for a biased historiography remain the same, with the categorization of Muslims as ‘violent, despotic and masculine’ while their Hindu counterparts are portrayed as ‘indolent, passive and effeminate’ (Chaturvedi 2001). The history textbooks for schools and colleges in India have been produced by the National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT) since the 1970s. NCERT is a central body formed by the Indian government in New Delhi. Some books for school children are also published by the respective states’ boards. An interesting episode occurred in 2002 when NCERT issued four new textbooks under a revised curriculum. The Indian History Congress (not to be confused with Indian Congress Party), a supervisory organization established in 1935 to oversee the development of Indian history, scrutinized the new textbooks, particularly on the question of how new ‘values’ were being indoctrinated through ‘education in religion’ by the elites (Habib, Jaiswal, and Makherjee 2003: preface). It published a detailed report in 2003 which heavily criticized the history textbooks being used in Indian schools and colleges. Interestingly the report states: ‘the textbooks draw heavily on the kind of propaganda that the so called Sangh Parivar [a group of Hindu fundamentalist parties] publications have been projecting for quite some time’ (Habib, Jaiswal, Makherjee 2003: 3). In the textbooks, the Hindu leaders were portrayed as ‘true patriots’ during the freedom struggle to throw off the colonial yoke, while all the Muslim leaders were portrayed as communalist separatists. The narratives about Muslim rulers on the subcontinent depict them as ‘invaders’ and ‘temple-destroyers’ with them bringing nothing positive in terms of monuments and cultural heritage (Habib, Jaiswal, and Makherjee 2003). The revised curriculum was issued when the BJP was in power and its slogan of ‘Hindutva’ or cultural revitalization of India was in vogue. Educational norms were being used here as a vehicle to promote the Hindutva values of the BJP. An explanation of these ‘new values’ and their indoctrination in educational norms will help us to better understand the constructed nature of the security dilemma between India and Pakistan. Textbooks in India are easily accessible and are a cheap source of knowledge and history and play a fundamental role in ‘transmitting’ cultural values to future generations (Pandey 2006). The cultural myths spread about Muslims in Indian textbooks portray them as arrogant, belligerent, and prone to fundamentalism (Nandy 1997). In almost all history textbooks in India the symbolism used for the partition of the subcontinent and the independence of Pakistan is punctuated with phrases such as ‘entirely inevitable,’ ‘with a heavy heart,’ ‘was allowed to happen,’ ‘a blow to nationalism,’ ‘to allow the scourge of communalism.’ A Grade 10 textbook, published by NCERT, states: ‘the nationalist leaders agreed to the partition of India in order to avoid the large scale bloodbath that communal riots threatened … but they did not accept the two-nation theory’ (Kumar 2001: 207). According to renowned Indian historian RC Majumdar, the primary reasons for distortions of objective history in these textbooks were the government directives to the historians who were put in charge of writing them (Majumdar 1970).

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These directives included the repudiation of Muslim rulers of the subcontinent and their portrayal as invaders and destroyers of Hindu temples, and led to the ‘politicisation of history’ (Bhargava 2000). In other words, it is evident that a deliberate policy was adopted by the political elites who were at the helm, to hold hostage the various means of disseminating knowledge by concealing the true facts and distorting an appropriate portrayal of historical events. This paved the way for the development of distrust between the people of both countries and trust is the fundamental edifice required for building a security community. In spite of having a common cultural past and having struggled together for independence from colonialism, the ‘official’ historians of the two countries are at loggerheads with each other. One despises the ‘Other’ while portraying their competing national narratives of the past. The aim is to forge a nexus between historiography and the national identity of the Indian state (Bhargava 2000). The paradox of history textbooks is self-explanatory, wherein the Indian textbooks often reject the ‘Two Nation Theory,’ the basis of the independence of Pakistan, and the partition of the subcontinent is only deemed acceptable if seen as having occurred in dire circumstances. Indian identity dictates the marginalization of sentiments toward partition and keeping communalist forces at bay, while in Pakistan the incessant clinging to Islamic ideology at the expense of Hindu alienation is the alternative projection (Kumar 2001). To summarize, the elite-guided educational policies of India and Pakistan have encouraged the establishment of intersubjective feelings of hostility between India and Pakistan. The identities of the states are conflated with the reconstructed myths from the sociocultural norms of society. The presence of this kind of material in the educational curriculum has long-lasting effects on the minds of impressionable schoolchildren. India, as ‘the Other,’ becomes a convenient scapegoat to absorb the ethnic and regional fissures within Pakistan. The same is true for India, where lessons are being taught on the futility of the founding of Pakistan along communalists lines in a multiethnic pluralistic India. Now the question arises, how does the trust deficit spread into every nook and cranny in India and Pakistan, given the high rates of illiteracy of the huge populations of both countries? In this regard, the role of the mass media, especially popular Indian films, and electoral norms, which disseminate hate toward each other, must be taken into account as significant contributing factors. Starting with the electoral practice of maligning Pakistan, I will focus on the electoral campaign and the related atmosphere during the fifteenth general Lok Sabha (lower house) elections in 2009 created by the BJP and the Congress party (the two mainstream parties). Due to periodic martial law regimes in Pakistan, I overlook the case study of Pakistan’s political parties’ electoral campaigns. However, one common focus of all mainstream Pakistani political parties in their election campaigns is engaging in dialogue with India regarding the settlement of all outstanding issues, including the core issue of Jammu and Kashmir. The shadow of both states’ identities looms large in all electoral campaigns in India, but has particularly become a more prominent feature in Indian election campaigns since the 1990s. It is cultural, in the sense that the contested

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sociocultural norms of Hinduism are being deliberately used by political parties in their electoral campaigns in order to revitalize the Hindu identity of India. This all began after the demolition of the Babari Mosque in 1992 and various communal riots between the Hindus and the Muslims in India, namely, the Ayodhya riots in 1992 and the Gujarat riots in 2002 and 2005. The state’s identity became more narrowly defined and based on the idea of one people—one community. The secularist fervour of the Congress party governments before the 1990s plummeted with the emergence of ‘Hindutva’ to take center stage in politics. With the rise of the BJP in the 1990s, Indian election campaigns took on a more belligerent tone toward Pakistan. This is because the BJP quite often use the anti-Pakistani card to stir up nationalist feelings among the electorate. Even the secular Congress party, in power in India before the 2009 general elections, cannot break away from the established electoral norms of maligning Pakistan. It is pertinent to see what the elites of these parties have propagated through their social practices toward Pakistan. The Manifesto of the BJP was released in April 2009 under the title ‘Good governance, development and security’ for the fifteenth general election in India (BJPManifesto 2009). The opening pages explained the rich cultural history of India from 900 AD to the present time, evading the period of Mughal rule in India. It states, with regard to cultural heritage that is irrevocably linked to Hindu mythology, that: ‘the civilizational consciousness of India has been well defined by the sages and philosophers and has its roots in Bharatiya or the Hindu world view … Hinduism is the most ennobling experience in spiritual co-existence’ (Manifesto 2009: 5). Here India’s cultural heritage is being directly linked to the ‘Hindu world view,’ with no regard to the cultural influences of more than 300 years of Muslim rule during the Mughal period. It is a conscious effort on the part of the BJP party leaders to reinvigorate Hindu norms leading to animosity with Pakistan and the abhorrence of Muslim rule in India. It is akin to ‘the return of culture’ in the identity politics of the state (Lapid and Kratochwil 1997). The Manifesto further pledged that if the BJP were elected it would pursue the construction of the contentious Ram Temple at the site of the Babari Mosque, which had previously been demolished by Hindu mobs that were actively supported by the elites of the BJP in 1992. It is interesting to explain the role of the elites in this episode. The Liberhan Commission Report officially recognized the role played by the BJP elites in the demolition of the Babari Mosque. This one-man commission headed by Justice Manmohan Singh Liberhan was established in 1992 to find and probe into the reasons behind this gory incident. The report was submitted and 17 years later, in 2009, was leaked to the public. It formally indicts the ex-BJP Prime Minister Vajpayee, the ex-Home Minister of the BJP Advani, and some other BJP stalwarts on the grounds of being behind the ‘meticulously planned’ demolition of the Babari Mosque (The Times of India 2009, Gilani 2009). This formal indictment shows the centrality of the elites’ social practices in the India– Pakistan rivalry. Coming back to the Manifesto, it reiterated that the special status granted to Kashmir under Article 370 of the Constitution of India would be withdrawn,

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along with the promulgation of a uniform civil code of India. This would mean that Muslims would no longer settle their family disputes according to Muslim social laws and customs. All these issues were bracketed together in a chapter in the Manifesto entitled ‘Cultural nationalism’ (Manifesto 2009: 8). Cultural terms such as ‘Ramjanambhoomi’ (birth place of Hindu god Ram) and ‘Hindutva’ norms have seeped into the popular vocabulary after their propagation from the top. The BJP elite’s belief in ‘Hindutva’ raises a new level of mistrust between India and Pakistan as is evident in the electoral norms which form another component of the (in)security community between the two states. The bashing of Pakistan was one of the central points in the electoral campaign of 2009 in India. Pertaining to security, the BJP Manifesto states: ‘terrorism sponsored by Pakistani agencies is only one of the reasons behind the fear that grips the people in cities, towns and villages’ (Manifesto 2009). The other major party that participated in the 2009 election was the Congress Party. The Congress Party does not profess ‘Hindutva’ credentials and labels itself a ‘secular and nationalist’ party. It was the party in power (2004–2009) before the general election and it highlighted various achievements in its Manifesto for the 2009 election. Among its achievements, it listed the Pakistan government’s formal acceptance of the involvement of a Pakistani national in the Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008 as a ‘notable victory’ in foreign policy for the Congress Party government (Manifesto 2009). During an electoral campaign speech, the Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, reiterated: ‘We all know the epicentre of terrorism in the world today is Pakistan. The world community has to come to grips with this harsh reality’ (Naqvi 2009). It is not merely a question of communal politics within India; when analyzing the broader context of India–Pakistan security relations it becomes readily apparent that what happens to Muslims in India has far-reaching effects in the security relations between the two states. In addition to rhetoric, popular culture is another medium for the propagation of negative norms constructed by elites. Popular culture includes the mass media, including film and print media, among other things. Electronic and print media are fairly independent in both countries when compared to the film industry. Taking, as an offshoot, a popular culture approach, I will examine the role of Indian elites in the film industry in establishing norms of animosity toward Pakistan. Indian films are one of the largest sources of entertainment for the population of both states and millions watch them in their leisure time. However, the film industry is not completely free in India. It is under the control of political elites who use state censorship policies to control and limit what is being produced. I will elaborate on this in significant detail. My selection of Indian films as representative of popular culture is due to their significance in terms of their global reach, industrial status, popular following in Pakistan, and the interference of the elites in their production. It is the only mass medium where all these factors have converged. All other forms of mass media, like print media and television, are relatively free from government control; however, due to government censorship policies, elites have a sort of leverage in film.

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Popular cinema is a vast medium with huge mass appeal irrespective of high illiteracy rates in both states. When compared to other forms of popular culture, Indian films share certain commonalities with Pakistani audiences and so what is being depicted in them has a direct impact on the psyche of the people across the border. To understand the role of Indian films it is important to appreciate the global and domestic reach of the Indian cinema industry. The Northern Indian film industry is called Bollywood, from the historic city of Bombay, now known as Mumbai. It is the biggest industry in the world in terms of viewers and budget allocation (Rajadhyaksha and Willemen 1999). It is estimated that the yearly production of films in India is between 800 and 1,000 films with 10 to 15 million tickets sold daily (Srinivas 2002). According to latest estimates in an article updated in March 2020 in Encyclopedia Britannica, at the turn of the 21st century, the Indian film industry—of which Bollywood remained the largest component—was producing as many as 1,000 feature films annually in all of India’s major languages and in a variety of cities, and international audiences began to develop among South Asians in the United Kingdom and in the United States. (Cunningham 2020) The Bollywood film Slumdog Millionaire won eight Academy Awards (Oscars) in 2009. For the majority of people in India and Pakistan watching Indian films is part of their regular social activities. More importantly, Indian films are easily available throughout Pakistan and since the language is perfectly understood with only small variations in dialect, no translation is required. In Pakistan, the language is called Urdu and in India it is referred to as Hindi or Hindustani. In the aftermath of the 1965 war with India, Indian films were banned in Pakistan, but pirated CDs and cassettes of Indian films are easily available (BBC 2006). In 2006, the Pakistani government lifted the ban on Indian films to allow them to be viewed in cinemas (BBC 2006). It is interesting to mention here that Bollywood films need ‘no passport, no visa’ to cross the border and reach Pakistan (Sen 2005). They are the major source of knowledge about the identity of the ‘Other.’ In contrast, Pakistan’s film industry is very weak and has few viewers, even within Pakistan; currently, the industry is almost ‘non-existent’ with only ‘12 films per year’ being produced (Tahir 2010). In 2020 there are 30 films scheduled to be released, with the situation for cinemas showing Pakistani films described as very ‘bad’ (Shabbir 2020). Therefore, how the Bollywood film industry portrays Muslims and Pakistan in its movies has an important link with the social norms of society, since there is very little contact between the populations of both states. The cinema in India is an important means of understanding the social milieu of Indian society. It can be taken as ‘a metaphor for society’ (Ahmed 1992). Since 1990 onward, India witnessed two phenomenal rises in two sectors of its polity. One is the rise of the right-wing orthodox Indian party, the BJP, and the

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other is the growth of mass media in the shape of numerous television channels along with a surge in high-budget Indian movies. A close nexus is established between the values and norms articulated by the orthodox right in India and the interpellation of these norms by the mass media. Prior to the 1990s, very few films were made on contentious subjects such as the partition of the subcontinent, security issues, the Kashmir dispute, and the identity issues of the state. For example, Garam Hawa (Hot Wind) was released in 1973, and on Indo-Pakistan wars, the film Hindustan ki Kasam (Pledge to India) was released in 1973. However, the decade of 1990 saw an increase in the popularity of ‘martial themes’ in Bollywood (Athique 2008). The state elites strongly used the right of censorship on Bollywood films while ‘policing Hindi cinema’ (Bose 2009). I have taken my data on Indian films from the Encyclopaedia of Indian Cinema (Rajadhyaksha and Willemen 1999). This encyclopaedia is an authoritative account of the Indian film industry published in joint collaboration with the British Film Institute and the National Film Archive of India. It includes national film entries from 1896 through 1995 along with all the major regional language films of India (Tamil, Telugo, Bengali, Gujarati, and Marathi). The statistics are also staggering, stating that ‘23 million Indians go to the movies everyday’ (Rajadhyaksha and Willemen 1999). The statistics regarding the number of viewers of Indian films in Pakistan cannot be easily determined. However, the popularity of Indian films in Pakistan can be gauged by taking into account their accessibility on the cable television network in major parts of Pakistan as well as the presence of pirated CDs on the open market and the projection of Indian films in Pakistani mass media. There are many ‘blockbuster’ Indian films based on anti-Pakistan and anti-Muslim themes such as Roja, Mission Kashmir, Pukar, Gadar, LOC, Bombay, and Border, among others films. I refer to these films as ‘blockbusters’ since they were a success at the box office, as reported in the Encyclopaedia of Indian Cinema (Rajadhyaksha and Willemen 1999). These types of films caused resentment among Pakistanis because of their negative propaganda. It seems that these sorts of films are only being produced to spread the elites’ agenda of constructing negative norms concerning Pakistan. The availability of cable television in almost every part of Pakistan and the frequent airing of new Indian films has made watching Indian films easier for the people of Pakistan. Indian films also witnessed a change in their credentials. From the romantic and melodious films of the 1950s, the 1960s, and the 1970s, the tone and tenor of Indian films changed in the 1990s so that they were more action-packed, more nationalist, and increasingly anti-Pakistani. The connivance of the social norms of Hindutva explicated by the Indian elites and the majority of Indian films released since the 1990s has helped to produce ‘a monolithic Indian identity that is Hindu’ (Malhotra and Alagh 2004). Such an exclusive identity has marginal space for the Muslims of India. In most of the films produced since the 1990s, Muslims are stereotyped as traitors, terrorists, insurgents, and brutal, in order to create a ‘phobia’ in Indian society by portraying ‘negative images’ of Muslims (Jinabade 2009). In the post-independence period, many Muslim stars in Indian cinema adopted Hindu names to receive acclaim in order to pass the implicit norms of the

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‘All India League of Censorship’ (Hijri 2008). Some of these big names include ‘Dilip Kumar’ (Yusaf Khan), ‘Menna Kumari’ (Mahjabeen Bano), ‘Madhubala’ (Mumtaz Jehan Begum Dehlavi) (Hijri 2008: 60–61). The Bollywood films that are based on the nationalist discourse derive their themes extensively from Hindu ‘mythology and symbolism’ in spite of India being a multicultural secular country (Hijri 2008). Many films are produced on thematic issues of the confrontation with Pakistan (films like Fiza, Soldier, Border, Bombay, Gadar, etc.] in order to reify Hindu identity. For example, the Bollywood film Bombay was released in 1995, after having being censored many times by the Indian government (Bose 2009). The film was released in the social context of the demolition of the Babari Mosque (1992) and the role played by the Hindu religious parties, and portrays the role of Mr Bal Thackeray, the Hindu fundamentalist leader of ‘Shiv Sena,’ an anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistani militant party from Mumbai. It is based on a love story between a Muslim girl and a Hindu boy and was shown during the heightened religious and communal tensions in India at that time. The Indian Censor Board deleted the words ‘Pakistan,’ ‘Islamic state,’ and the visuals of the Babari Mosque under the pretext of suppressing communal violence which might ensue after the release of the film (Bose 2009). But this did not help its cause, since after the film was released its director had to flee for his life and his home was bombed. Bombay was also boycotted by Muslims in India and its release was banned in many Muslim countries on account of its incorrect portrayal of Muslim social norms. Bollywood films such as Bombay have power and social recognition in disseminating the views of powerful groups or elites at the expense of ‘misrepresenting’ Muslims who are in the minority in India (Mallhi 2005). Indian films that deal with the Kashmir dispute tend to emphasize India’s claim on Kashmir; they include Mission Kashmir and Refugee. These films were banned by the Pakistani government, but pirated cassettes and CDs were nevertheless available and were watched by people in Pakistan and taken with a ‘pinch of salt’ (Athique 2008). Another Bollywood film, Roja, was one of the most popular films in 1992 in India. It was based upon the India–Pakistan rivalry over Kashmir when the Kashmir separatist struggle started in 1989 in Indian-held Kashmir. The film has long sequences to convince viewers of the ‘righteousness’ of the Indian claim over Kashmir and has many scenes which are antiPakistani. In a dialogue in the film the viewer is told, ‘India has already been partitioned once and now we will not allow it to divide again.’ The Indian claim over Kashmir was supported with powerful national narratives and Pakistan was depicted as the source of evil and the aggressor state behind the Kashmir separatist struggle. Dirks explains that Roja was used as a medium for ‘a particular set of political arguments about the state’ (Dirks 2008: 142). The film was officially recognized by the state, won three national awards, and, surprisingly, also won the award for the ‘Best Film on National Integration.’ Here Indian national integration is forged at the expense of maligning Pakistan, and vice versa. In other words, the Indian identity gets an ‘identity signifier’ through films by castigating Pakistan’s identity. The aim of films such as Roja is the ‘manufacture of consent’

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of the people on state practices disguised as cultural contestations (Bharucha 1994). Border is another Indian film released in 1997; it was a blockbuster in India, receiving many national awards. The songs of the films were instant hits. The film is based on the theme of the 1971 war with Pakistan. Naturally the Pakistan army was on the losing side in the film and the image of the Indian army was projected with valor and dignity. The anti-Pakistani dialogue in the film is its hallmark, punctuated with nationalist melodrama to impress the Indian audiences. However, it may be asked, what message is being conveyed to Pakistani audiences? It reflects the stereotyping of Pakistan as the ‘Other.’ It is important here to elaborate further on the ‘manufacture of consent’ by censorship policies in Indian films and how these films contribute to developing norms of animosity toward Pakistan. There is a long history of the involvement of the state’s elites in the ‘censorship policies’ for Indian films. Significantly, the influence of elites is more prominent in those films where the image of Pakistan is being portrayed as an enemy of the state or the ‘Other.’ Every film in India requires a certificate from the Central Board of Film Certification (CBFC). The Board is a statutory body organized under the Indian Cinematograph Act of 1952. Even though the first amendment of the Indian Constitution grants people’s ‘Right to the Freedom of Speech and Expression,’ the constitution also grants special powers to the executive to impose restrictions on the mass media if what is to be aired is deemed detrimental to the security of the state (Bhowmik 2002). The fourteenth amendment to the Indian constitution also gives more authority to the state to impose ‘reasonable restrictions’ on forms of expression on the pretext of the sovereignty and the integrity of India (Granville 1999). It is also interesting to note that other forms of expression, such as print and electronic media, manage to secure their freedom because of their ‘political clout’ and it is only the popular cinema which has ‘remained vulnerable’ (Bhowmik 2002). Here, political clout refers to the involvement of Indian political elites, who are sometimes the owners of the various media channels or, in other cases, media conglomerates that finance the election campaigns of the ruling political elites in India. Every film, be it a commercial venture, documentary film, or an art movie, has to be reviewed by the state to get a CBFC certificate before it can be shown publicly. Appeals against any arbitrariness lie with the Indian Ministry of Information and Broadcasting. Even the appellate body is a government ministry and it is like ‘an appeal from Caesar to Caesar’ (Noorani 1983). A film is given a certificate for ten years and it can be renewed after that period. This shows the arbitrary and impulsive attitude of the executive to keeping forms of the mass media in check and under control (Noorani 1983). All the guidelines, principles, and policies of the CBFC are framed by the government. Section 5B of the Indian Cinematograph Act of 1952 sets out the ‘Principles for guidance in certifying films’ as: A film shall not be certified for public exhibition if, in the opinion of the authority competent to grant the certificate, the film or any part of it is against the interest of the security of the state, friendly relations with foreign states,

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Along with the above ‘set guidelines’ for film certification the central government also has the discretion to issue ‘directives’ to the competent authority, that is, the CBFC. The members of the CBFC are politically appointed and are not selected based on their expertise in the field of cinema (Bhowmik 2003). In 2002 the CBFC refused to give a certificate to Anand’s documentary film Jung aur Aman (War and Peace). The committee made the following recommendation to the director to ‘delete the scenes showing Pakistanis burning India’s national flag.’ But nothing was said regarding ‘Indians burning Pakistan’s national flag’ (Bhowmik 2002: 3575). Many critics of Indian films have questioned this governmental role, describing it as ‘cultural police’ (Bhowmik 2002). Similarly, in March 2003, the CBFC also refused to give a certificate to the documentary film Aakrosch (Cry of Pain) based on the communal violence directed against Muslims in Gujarat in 2002. This incident caused a communal frenzy in India and led to increased tension between the two countries. The state police did not even allow private showings of the film since it did not have the censor’s certificate from the CBFC (Hindu 2003). In any case, most private television channels in India do not even dare to air documentary films on political issues (Hindu 2003). Nevertheless, Indian films that portray violent scenes usually go uncensored by the CBFC when they show the bravery of the Indian armed forces and the humiliation of the Pakistan army (Bose 2009). An example worth mentioning here is the film LOC (Line of Control) released in 2003. This is a film about the Kargil war between India and Pakistan. LOC was released during a heightened military stand-off between the Pakistani and Indian armed forces in the year 2001–2002. At this time, India had rapidly mobilized its military to the border under the code name of ‘Operation Parakaram,’ only for Pakistan to reciprocate by sending in its military. In the film, Pakistan was treated as a rogue state and an overtly hostile one, with General Musharraff being portrayed as the main architect of the Kargil war for Indian audiences. Another film, Gaddar: Ek Prem Katha (Mutiny: A Love Story) was released in 2001 and depicts the turbulent partition period of 1947. In this film, the Pakistani Muslim father of a girl is the villain behind what is otherwise the love story of a Sikh boy and a Muslim girl. Pukar (Cry Out) is another film based on the theme of cross-border terrorism. Lamhaa (Moment) is another film based on the Kashmir struggle. The movie previews promised ‘to tell the story of violence in the region as never seen before’ (Dawn 2010). The film faced stringent censorship before its release in July 2010. The Indian Censor Board objected to the fact that the narration on Kashmir in the preview of the film started with ‘the most dangerous place in the world’ (Dawn 2010). The film explains the post-partition traumas in Kashmir and widespread corruption in Indian-held Kashmir, and was at loggerheads with the Indian Censor Board.

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Censorship of films in India and Pakistan is firmly controlled by the governments in power. The Indian Supreme Court’s decision regarding the state’s right to censor, as not only ‘desirable, but also necessary’ is quoted in all the annual reports of the Indian certification board (Bose 2009). It is evident from this analysis of India’s censorship policies that they are significantly influenced by the ruling elites who are ‘politically motivated’ in constructing social norms of hatred toward Pakistan (Bhowmik 2002). The connivance of CBFC with state elites demonstrates state patronage of ‘jingoistic’ anti-Pakistan films such as Roja, Gadar, or Sarfrosh that incite audiences to shout ‘anti-Pakistan slogans’ (Bhowmik 2003). Such films show the stark contrast in the state’s attitude toward films which are based on themes of mutual harmony and peace, such as Anand’s documentary Jung aur Aman (War and Peace). Even China–India relations were not spared this manifestation of the state in a film entitled Haqeeqat made by Anand in 1964. This film, showing the valor of Indian forces in the shadow of the 1962 war with China, received ‘unprecedented’ acclaim by the state (Bhowmik 2003). In many ways, Indian popular cinema seems to be held hostage by ‘politicians’ malice’ and tailored to match their vision of Indian security (Bhowmik 2002). The film censorship regime in India has become a ‘manifestation of state power’ (Bhowmik 2003). Vasudevan attributes this to the lack of a ‘modernist outlook of the political elite’ (Vasudevan 2005). It is the culmination of Indian rulers’ desire for ‘cultural homogeneity’ by way of ‘social engineering’ that leads to ‘disoriented cultural’ practices (Bhowmik 2003). It serves as a vehicle for imposing Hindu identity on the entirety of multicultural India by the ‘Hindu nationalist discourse’ of excluding minorities and identifying a common enemy (Pakistan) (Bose 2009). The aim of the ‘political manipulation’ of the censorship regime is not only to prevent ‘objectionable films’ from mass screening, but also to deliberately promote ‘favourable’ ones and such actions have been taken by all governments ‘irrespective of their ideological bias’ (Bhowmik 2003). The state’s involvement in censor boards can help shape and determine public opinion to support its social practices. Films that produced animosity toward the other are responsible for creating a ‘stereotyping image.’ This is what French philosopher Michel Foucault refers to as the ‘Power of Knowledge.’ He points out that those who hold power are also in the position to disseminate particular beliefs and values of society (Foucault 1994). Power relations cannot be explained solely in terms of governmental authority, but they are also found in a ‘system of social networks’ (Foucault 1982). The power of popular cinema in India, particularly from the 1990s onward, has helped to disseminate ‘Hindu majoritarian nationalism’ by constructing myths from religious norms (Vasudevan 2000). This explains the underlying structure of social power that has its roots in cultural norms but is being controlled by the ruling elites in India and Pakistan. They have helped in the construction of knowledge and power relationships by reinforcing negative stereotypes of each other. The question may be asked, can change be brought about in people’s perceptions of one another, if alternative films are released about each other that reinforce norms of friendship and goodwill between the two countries? Although

120 Muhammad Shoaib Pervez examples of these types of films are rare, I argue, particularly considering the large demand for Indian films in Pakistan, that, if people are given a chance, there is every possibility that the current hostile relationship may blossom into friendship. Against the backdrop of a military standoff between the two countries in 2002, a film was released in India in 2004 entitled Veer Zaara. This film was based on friendship between the two countries and was extremely popular among both Indian and Pakistani audiences. Another film that was nominated for an Oscar award is Lagaan. This is a film that focuses on the past and shows how Muslims, Hindus, Sikhs, and Dalits joined hands to defeat an imperial power. It shows the ‘cultural accomplishment’ of the past (Stadtler 2005). The venue of battle is an imagined field of cricket. Do such past cultural accomplishments have the potential to change the current scenario of the security dilemma between India and Pakistan? The possibility of changing this radicalized order will be discussed in the next section through the possibility of a security community between the two states.

A path dependence model of a security community A path dependence model refers to institutions understanding their normative behavior by historically tracing their roots in their respective regional cultures (North 1990). For the establishment of a security community, two states may develop a ‘path dependence model’ which means that there should not be a fixed correlation between cause and effect, but rather their security ties should be strengthened step by step and in any direction (Waever 1998). The formation of a security community thus ‘remains precariously balanced on a constellation of a large number of factors’ (Waever 1998: 76). Protagonists of a security community have singled out ‘desecuritization’ as the prime reason behind security community formation (Waever 1995). This means that once a state joins a security community its contentious security concerns will ‘progressively’ decrease in favor of other mutual benefits (Waever 1995). By accepting identity and security as a discourse, I further examine the path dependence model of a security community by arguing: • •

•

That it is dependent upon the shared experiences of selected traumas in the psyche of the population. Elites can construct experiences positively for a community’s sake or negatively for their own vested interests. That the public rhetoric of the elites plays a role in security community formation. Weaver has already defined ‘desecuritization’ as the prime reason for security community formation. However, this is not only about desecuritization. Perhaps more importantly, it also has to do with the formation of a collective identity for the sake of desecuritization. States that are involved in conflict will only lessen their guard toward each other if they see an alternative progression of collective identity formation in a security community. That there is a confluence between the sociocultural norms of a society and the regional norms of the security community. Most often studies of security

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communities are aimed at the level of norm compliance by the participating states. However, I will argue that a lot is also at stake in obtaining a better understanding of the sociocultural norms of the societies that are involved and participating in such a security community. That there is a hidden normative structure based on the sociocultural norms of societies which can bind the states together, such as set rules for inclusion and exclusion in a security community, which further acts as a deterrence for its norms compliance.

Therefore, the formation of a security community is a long, gradual process and, more importantly, it is not strictly related to security at all. I argue with regard to the formation of an India–Pakistan security community, that there is little possibility of having an ‘amalgamated’ security community, since this goes against the rationale of creating an independent Pakistan in the first place. Instead, I argue for the creation of a ‘pluralistic’ security community hypothetically conceived at the popular level which would have sufficient potential to change the elites’ constructed security dilemma that exists between India and Pakistan. Ideationally, there is enough normative ground to unite the two countries in a security community framework of their own. This is due to the fact that the people of both states know each other very well, with a shared experience of having lived side by side as communities before the partition of the subcontinent. The popular social practices based on the sociocultural norms of these two countries share much in common. An important factor in the context of the formation of a security community is the ruling elites’ behavior with regard to their ‘speech acts.’ One uses the terms ‘speech acts’ or ‘discursive practices’ when the elites discursively construct an issue (Waever 1995). These practices can play an important role in a state’s security discourse since at critical junctures they help to create an intersubjective understanding either of hostility or of cooperation among states. So my conception of a security community lies at the junction of elite and popular social practices. A hypothetical India–Pakistan security community refers to intangible or abstract factors. These factors have been discussed in terms of ‘negative norms’ at the elite level and are seen as being responsible for preventing the formulation of a security community (Khoo 2004). However, there are sufficient ‘positive norms’ found at the popular level that, if given elite patronage, have the potential to formulate a security community between India and Pakistan. Amongst such positive norms are the literary classics, religious norms of Sufism, and mass media initiatives for friendship between the two countries.

Popular social practices and some positive norms The suggested normative structure of an India–Pakistan security community can be found in nostalgic literary works written by acclaimed Indian and Pakistani writers. Some of the Pakistani authors include Saadat Hassan Manto, Intizar

122 Muhammad Shoaib Pervez Hussain, Bapsi Sidhwa, and many others. On the Indian side these famous writers include Krishen Singh Bedi, Ismaat Chughtai, Krishna Sobti, Bhisham Sahni, Gopi Chand Kishan, Qurratul Ain Haider, Krishna Baldev, Khushnet Singh, and others. All these authors have fictionalized their own experiences of living together in an undivided India (Chakravarty and Hussain 1998; Bhalla 2008). Their narration of the period of partition carries within it the seeds of a conceptualized normative security community between India and Pakistan. Their status as towering personalities of Urdu/Hindi literature is never in doubt in their respective societies; however, they seldom get recognition from the state in the form of their books being part of the educational curriculum for younger generations. This indicates the difference between an elite version of a state identity and a popular one. The commonality of language has made these masterpieces easily accessible and understandable for the populations of both states. However, the state-guided discourses of national identity do not offer these authors any place in the national curriculum. Ted Hopf, a conventional constructivist, has examined the relationship between a state’s identity and domestic or societal claims. He identified a ‘social cognitive structure’ based on ‘discursive formations’ which includes the study of literary classics in order to formulate a domestic ‘discourse’ of the state’s identity (Hopf 2002). In the preface of his magnum opus, Hopf encouraged scholars to ‘read pulp fiction in order to understand a state’s foreign policy.’ Presently, the states’ elites postulate educational norms by spreading cultural myths of ancient rivalries against one another in the minds of people. An alternative ‘social cognitive structure’ could be offered that would be based on the work of these renowned literary personalities in both states, which could be considered to be a way of informing and presenting the credentials of the ‘Other’s’ identity. I will briefly explore some of these classic texts in order to show what kind of social cognitive structure can be offered as an alternative. The classic Pakistani short story writer Saadat Hasan Manto, in his story ‘Dekh Kabira Roya’ (Look Kabir Has Wept), presents the uselessness of the savagery behind the carnage during partition. The main character is Kabir, named after the Sufi saint Kabir who was the main figure behind the seventeenth-century Bhakti movement. The movement promoted the mutual coexistence of the Hindus and Muslims of the subcontinent by encouraging them to shun their religious differences. In another classic, ‘Toba Tek Singh,’ Manto laments the level of hostility between India and Pakistan. In this story, Hindu and Muslim elites are portrayed as lunatics fighting incessantly over a piece of land in ‘Toba Tek Singh’ (a city in Pakistan). Intizar Hussain, another Pakistani writer, derided the present-day animosity between India and Pakistan and talks about tranquil times in his novel Basti (Community). The title of Intizar’s novel describes the ideal type of cohabitation between Hindus and Muslims in pre-partition days. He explains how the Muslims and the Hindus respected each other’s religious traditions and fervently participated in each other’s festivities. While giving an interview he talked about his devout Muslim father’s close friendship with an equally devout Hindu (Bhalla 2008). This again shows one of the differences

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between a Western understanding of a security community, where secularism serves as the foundational pillar, as opposed to that of religious South Asian states like India and Pakistan. It should also be mentioned here that there is a significant difference between a religious Hindu or Muslim fundamentalist and a devout Hindu or Muslim. The nostalgia created in these writings by the first generation of people who participated in the partition of the subcontinent needs to be shared with today’s fourth generation. These stories should also be included in the history books taught in schools in both India and Pakistan. Indian writer Qurratulain Hyder’s novel Aag ka Darya (River of Fire) is one of the most famous works on either side of the divide (Hyder 2007), although the list is never-ending, since literary classics are being created in abundance by literary elites of both states. Popular social practices show that these novels and stories are being read and enjoyed by people in both states, yet these stories or texts are not included in the educational curriculum of either state. Writers in both India and Pakistan have shown nostalgic feelings toward one another in their works. Many acclaimed Indian and Pakistani writers and novelists set their works in the past when people lived together in peace and tranquillity. After partition, these writers have emphasized mutual respect and love of each other’s country. Bapsi Sidhwa, in the opening page of Alok Bhalla’s book wrote: ‘we, Indians and Pakistanis alike, are always emotionally involved in our politics … I should add that politics in the subcontinent touches each person’s life’ (Bhalla 2008). These writers’ novels are extremely popular on both sides of the border. They have written extensively on the former periods of friendship between the two communities (Hindu and Muslim). The irony is that though the contribution of these writers has been recognized by their respective governments and some of them have even been given national awards, the works of these authors have never been incorporated into the general curriculums of the education systems. In summary, the main thrust of these great classics is that they present Hindu and Muslim identities in a more complex manner than the antagonistically articulated identities in the two states’ nationalist identity discourses. But the question arises, why is this ‘social cognitive structure’ not given a central place by the states’ ruling elites? The answer is obvious and points toward the vested interests of the ruling elites of both states and their politically motivated agendas. Now I will explain some of the popular social practices based on religious norms. Hinduism and Islam are generally considered to be two distinct religions, with nothing in common between them. Although Muslims and Hindus lived side by side for centuries on the subcontinent, their religious beliefs are poles apart. However, in the fifteenth century, the Bhakti movement developed in the subcontinent and tried to bridge the gap between the two communities with regard to their religious differences. The movement was highly successful in the region, with a mass following on the subcontinent. This does not mean that Muslims and Hindus started to ignore their religious differences, but that their followers began to respect each other and each other religious doctrines. The Bhakti movement developed peaceful religious norms of mutual coexistence. It is useful to mention

124 Muhammad Shoaib Pervez some of the salient principles of the Bhakti movement in the context of establishing better security relations between India and Pakistan. The movement was initiated by Kabir (1398–1518) of Banaras (India), who is considered a saint by both Muslims and Hindus. His aim was to propagate peaceful religious norms of Islam and Hinduism. The idea behind the movement was to help Muslims and Hindus of the subcontinent to rise above their religious differences and live peacefully together in an undivided India. The Bhakti movement was the converging point of mysticism in Islam and Hinduism. Kabir taught that the attributes of God remain the same whether one calls him ‘Ram’ in Hinduism or ‘Allah’ in Islam. He believed that all these differences were human artifices and not divinely created. He emphasized the positive attributes of Hinduism and Islam that were acceptable to both Hindus and Muslims. He stressed the unity of Muslims and Hindus in a common ‘religio-social platform’ (Hedayetullah 1977). Kabir also denounced the self-appointed guardians of Hinduism, the Brahmins, the caste system in India, and the Muslim pirs (clergy) who distorted religion according to their own interests. He proclaimed the universality of human beings while stressing the simple and comprehensible principles of Islam and Hinduism to the people. However, after Kabir’s death the Bhakti movement fell into disarray. The other important popular social practice derived from religious norms is reverence toward Sufism. The shrines of Muslim saints in India are held in high esteem by Hindus and Muslims alike. It is quite interesting to see local Hindus meditating at the shrines of Muslim saints such as Saleem Chisti in FatehpurSakri, Mueen uddin Chisti, and many others in India. The popular mass media initiative, ‘Aman ki Asha’ (Desire of Peace), of national dailies like The News (Daily Jang) of Pakistan and Times of India also explains the deviation of popular social practices from those of elites. The popular stories of the masses are published daily in these widely read newspapers in both states; they describe the desire of people on either side of the border to visit their lost possessions belongings, see their distant and close relatives, and reunite with their family. The strict visa requirements of both states do not allow people to freely visit each other’s countries. Visas are usually issued only for a specified city and people are not allowed to travel throughout the whole country. In spite of these limitations, the Pakistan High Commission in India issues on average 500 visas daily (Butalia 2010). The absurdity of these stringent visa sanctions, enforced by the elites, are even more evident whenever the border controls are eased a little, with emotional reunions of family members at the border crossings between India and Pakistan (Butalia 2010).

Conclusion Radicalization in South Asia is the result of a hostile environment constructed by elites; it is becoming increasingly more intense. The elites on either side have a vested interest to remain in power at the expense of misery for the common people of both states. The discursive practices of elites explain how much is at stake for them. I have discussed some of their practices in the form of their

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electoral rhetoric, and stringent censorship of mass media, films, and educational curricula. Time and again chosen traumas are deliberately formulated by both states’ elites, especially that of the partition of the subcontinent, to construct each other’s identities in terms of hostile binaries. The rhetoric of ‘surgical strikes’ used by the Indian Prime Minister Narrender Modi (2019), the downing of an Indian plane by Pakistan in the aftermath of Pulwama attack (2019), abrogation of article 370 which has guaranteed special rights to the Muslims in Kashmir, have already shown that the entire region is at risk of nuclear holocaust. On top of all this, the jingoistic slogans of the masses, used against each other on social media, indicate the influence of deep-seated radicalization in the region. The solution to this malicious radicalization lies in the formation of a security community that can argue for a realistic expectation of peace between the two states and resolution of disputes, short of war. I have discussed some of the positive norms found in the societies of both states; these need official patronage to play down the misery caused by the chosen traumas of each. This can provide a way forward for the elites and for a more harmonious future for over a billion people found in the societies of both states. To conclude, the differences between popular and elite social practices allow room for community formation at the popular level. It is important that we study radicalization in South Asian societies as an identity discourse continuously negotiated and renegotiated by the elites, and not as a given reality of an anarchic world system. The prominent grey areas of cooperation between the two states have been held hostage by the elites after identifying each other as existential threats. At the elite level, the preparation of educational curricula, rhetoric, and censorship of popular culture are some of the daily routines of the elites. At the popular level, the role of literacy classics, Sufism, and popular mass media initiatives show popular social practices conducive to security community formation. In recent decades, the citizens of India and Pakistan have been presented with only one perspective of the Other as their enemy. This has led to mass radicalization, whereby no tangible effort has been made by the ruling elites of either country to promote amicable relations based on centuries-old cultural ties and experiences. The people of both countries have common ancestors, understand the same language, wear the same clothes, and quite often imitate each other’s social norms at occasions such as marriages, yet the ‘we feeling’ required for a security community is currently at its lowest ebb. There is limited social mobility across the border between India and Pakistan, which is a key variable required for regional integration. The most potent means of overcoming radicalization in volatile India–Pakistan societies lies in reconstructing state narratives from the vestiges of some of the common norms developed by Hindu–Muslim communities and which have evolved by communities living together for centuries. Indian cinema has the potential to act as an effective non-state actor by playing a vital role in establishing social norms of cooperation and trust-building across borders. A joint venture could be set up between the two countries to produce films on common themes and issues such as poverty and terrorism. It is also essential that textbooks that profess hatred and intolerance toward each other should be eliminated from the

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educational curricula of both states. This is a tall order, but herein lies the foundations of an ever-elusive security community based on social norms of peace and harmony. The precursor to a security community is a socially conceptualized ‘collective identity’ (we feeling) between the two societies, which fortunately is in abundance at the popular level and merely requires reinforcement through the practices of the elites.

Note 1 A major portion of this chapter forms part of my book Security Community in South Asia: India–Pakistan, 2013, Routledge. I am very grateful to Taylor & Francis (Routledge) for granting me the permission to publish it again.

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7

Deconstructing the myth of Pashtun as a nation of extremists and warriors Causes of radicalization in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Arshad Ali and Fazal Subhan

With the rise of radical Islam, non-state actors became an extremely dangerous phenomenon in the post–Cold War era. In 2007, the Pakistani Taliban took over not only the lawless former Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) but also established control over settled districts in Malakand Division of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) province. Consequently, radicalization was further orchestrated within Pashtun society by the Taliban during their years of ascendency in the province of KP. In fact, extremism and radicalism in Pakistan reached such a level that a bright young student, Mashal Khan, was lynched on false charges of blasphemy at Abdul Wali Khan University in Mardan district of KP province in April 2017 (Imran and Nasir 2008). The incident happened in a land that was known for the non-violent Khudai Khudai Khidmatgaar Movement (KKM) and ‘Frontier Gandhi,’ Bacha Khan (Hussain 2017). Thus, radicalization has now spread to seats of enlightenment and university campuses in the country. Most of the literature has linked Taliban militancy and radicalism with Pashtun culture and society. It is believed that the rise of Taliban is a phenomena native to Pashtun society, and that it is the new expression of the Pashtun nationalism. For example, mullahs (religious clerics) have been an integral part of Pashtun society and have demonstrated resistance against foreign occupations (Johnson and Mason 2008). Moreover, Pashtun harbored foreign militants in their land who were given refuge and protection under the Pashtunwali code of life (Taj 2011). Nonetheless, regional and global politics played a key role in the radicalization of Pashtun society. For example, Pakistan has continued with its proxy wars in Afghanistan and Kashmir and tried to use militant groups in those locations as foreign policy tools to protect its strategic interests in South Asia. The Pashtun border areas became the epicenter of local and foreign militant groups during and after the Cold War (GSDR 2007). However, the proxy wars had serious repercussions for Pakistan’s internal security, radicalizing its society. In 2013, ‘the security situation reached such a level that Islamabad became more concerned about its internal security threat from Taliban militant groups than the external threat from India’ (Ali 2019). Therefore, it is necessary to deconstruct whether extremism and radicalization is embedded in Pashtun culture and society or if it has been imposed on the

130 Arshad Ali and Fazal Subhan region by the post-garrison Pakistan state in order to protect its strategic interests vis-à-vis Afghanistan and India. This chapter further explores what went wrong, particularly in former FATA and generally in the rest of the KP province, that is brewing up a radicalized society at the local level. This case study will cast new light on Pakistan’s radicalization discourse from an unconventional critical perspective. The chapter exposes the fact that Pashtun society has been transformed into one that is extreme and radical by the post-colonial garrison-state mindset of Pakistani elites for their own parochial strategic interests.

Understanding Pashtun geography: a gateway of empires Geographically, KP province is situated in northwest Pakistan in the Pakistan– Afghanistan border region that has remained a buffer between the two superpowers. The region is located at the juncture of the three prominent regions of Asia: South Asia, Central Asia, and China. In the south, ‘the border region begins at tropical area of Indian subcontinent and pushes northward into the three great ranges of Central Asia-the Himalaya, Pamir, and Hindu Kush’ (Johnson and Mason 2008). Moreover, the border region contains some very important passes, which have served as gateways to subcontinental India and Central Asia, while exposing the region and its inhabitants to the outside world. So, the border region has geopolitical importance in the world. In the past, the traditional powers made expansionist expeditions into subcontinental India from central Asia and vice versa. In the recent past, Muslim emperors under the Turks (Mughal), Afghans, and Iranians made incursions into India. Similarly, Indian emperor Muhammad bin Tughluq led an expedition into Central Asia and, most recently, in the nineteenth century, the British advanced into Afghanistan. This is also apparent from the Anglo–Afghan wars, the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan, and the recent US-led global war on terror (Sultan-i-Rome 2013). More importantly, the Pashtun region had great strategic importance for the superpowers in the ‘Great Game.’ The British thought that the Pashtun border areas with Afghanistan were key to its foreign and defense policy in the subcontinent of India. Therefore, they needed to have control at key strategic points in order to contain Tsarist Russia and, later, the Soviet Union. The British identified five key passes: Malakand, Kurram, Khyber, North Waziristan, and South Waziristan. They believed that controlling these points would be to circumvent the free movement of Tsar of Russia and to curtail its attacks from the north and protect their strategic interests in the subcontinental region (Khurshid Khan, interview by authors, Swat, 3 May 2020). The unique geography of the region gave birth to two important phenomena: first, the natural social evolution of the region was interrupted by the destructive wars imposed on it by the great powers; and second, it strengthened Pashtun tribalism in the region. Consequently, a political vacuum was created, which was filled first by the British colonial empire and later by the Pakistan post-garrison state. In this process, Pashtuns often had to fight for their survival, which required strong connections between tribes and clans. Nonetheless, the natural evolution

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of the Pashtun nation was interrupted by the politics of the superpowers and this held back their process of nation building (NDCP 2003). This has had a profound impact on Pashtun polity in the northwest of Pakistan. The complex tribal dynamics are the byproduct of the unique geography and of various circumstances during different periods. The border region has remained a buffer between the superpowers and its population is the victim of the politics of the great powers in the region. However, the Pashtuns showed resilience and survived the invasions and the expeditions of the superpowers (Aman 2013). The notion of Pashtun being a nation of warriors has been constructed on the basis of this interaction with the outside world, and most writers romanticized ‘the Pashtuns as valiant, brave and unbeatable when the British failed to subjugate them.’ In particular, colonial ethnographers describing Pashtuns as a ‘martial race’ played a major part in the notion becoming internalized in Pashtun society (Saigol 2012); such glorification has meant that writers have ignored other key aspects of Pashtun society that are based on its tribal codes.

Pashtunwali—the Pashtun code of life: understanding Pashtun society Pashtuns are the most tribalized group of people in the world. Historically, Pashtun society comprised a triangle: traditional elites (Khan/Malak), saints (AstanadarPir, Mian, Mullah, and Syed), and artisans (Kasabgar). The role of this triangle was defined under Pashtuns’s customary laws (riwaj), along with their sources of livelihood in the Pashtun society. The traditional elites were engaged in politics and wars. Kasabgar provided services, be it trader, jeweler, hairdresser, dancer, and so forth. Astanadars were considered very pious people among Pashtuns. More importantly, they were impartial, outside the tribal loyalty, and had no worldly interest in land or tribal wealth. These impartial characters allowed them to lead intra-tribal peace jirgas and their main task was arbitration among conflicting parties. Thus, Astanadar played a key mediatory role when the traditional elites disagreed on an internal dispute and/or ruler; at this point they were assigned a leadership role but when the dispute was over the power was transferred back to the traditional elites (Khurshid Khan, interview by authors, Swat, 3 May 2020). Pashto1 is not only a language but also the code that governs the lives of those who speak it. The social organization of the Pashtuns is regulated by the Pashtunwali code of life (Sultan-i-Rome 2013). It is based on various codes such as jirga (council of elders), badal (revenge), nanawati (forgiveness), pardah (gender segregation), teegah (ceasefire), and milmastia (hospitality). It is important to note that Pashtunwali established a social order and governance system at a time before the state system was introduced into the region (Liebl 2007). It is based, in theory at least, on egalitarian principles, where the entire people are given equal representation, which was evident from its jirga system. Jirga is an assembly of community businesses where both public and private matters of public interest are subject to its jurisdiction. Decisions are made by mutual consensus among all community representatives and are binding on all the conflicting groups.

132 Arshad Ali and Fazal Subhan Thus, ‘jirga exercised executive, judicial and legislative functions’ (Sultan-iRome 2013). Moreover, it is a process, rather than being static, and often resolves the disputes through discussion and listening to all the rival groups (Taj 2011). Traditionally, women sent their representatives to the jirga, while in some cases they participated directly. Therefore, the jirga system enjoyed widespread legitimacy and enforceability. Pashtunwali has acted as a governing body, because the decisions of the jirga were binding on all the people in its jurisdiction. Badal is the second important characteristic of the Pashtunwali where it is mandatory to take revenge against the family or clan of anyone who has caused ‘any devastation, repression and other problems.’ These conflicts usually occurred due to personal feuds rather than tribal animosities. However, the notion of badal also considers it an obligation to reciprocate assistance to a person who has helped you in the past. It therefore promotes cooperation and communal development (Sultan-i-Rome 2013). Moreover, badal was often applied to the powerful rather than those who are oppressed and marginalized. For example, Pashtuns did not attack women and children in their feuds with rival groups (Ali Arqam, interview by authors, Swat, 3 May 2020). Milmastia is the third main feature of Pashtunwali. It is offered to everyone, including an enemy. It is the responsibility of the host to protect and escort him to a safe place (Wazir 2014). Panah (refuge) is a subset of hospitality. It is a kind of granting of asylum, but it was given on the basis of kuff (class equality) which means that Malak will give refuge to Malak, not to a cobbler (Inayat Ullah, interview by authors, Swat, 5 May 2020). Once refuge is given, it is honoured by the individual and the hosting tribe. However, the jirga revoked the asylum if they found it necessary (Liebl 2007). Subsequently, the jirga ask the refugee to leave the area. In the nineteenth century, Pashtuns gave refuge to Syed Ahmad Brilvi and he was honored by the traditional elite in what is the present KP region. He was welcomed by the elite in their national interest to fight against the resurgent Punjabi Sikh rulers, but not for religious reasons. He was expelled from the region when he violated the Pashtun code and attempted to occupy the region (Inayat Ullah, interview by authors, Swat, 3 May 2020). Nanawati is another key tenant of Pashtunwali that ‘literally means begging pardon for any wrongdoings and ranging from murder to theft to verbal squabbling’ (Wazir 2014). This code provides a dispute resolution mechanism in which the offending party tenders an unconditional apology and surrenders to the victim party. Subsequently, the offending party goes with family members and masharan (elders) to the house of the victim house, begging for forgiveness and expressing regret for their transgressions. They also bring black sheep or goats, women from their family, and the Qur’ān to the victim’s house. In this way, the offending party shows modesty for their offenses. Thus, nanawati is ‘the provision of absolute refuge from war or persecution, or the forgiveness of wrongs’ (Wazir 2014). Teegah, which literally means ‘stone,’ is also a key tenant in the Pashtunwali code. It is normally used in local feuds when the dispute remains unresolved and formal settlement is not yet achieved between the rival groups. It is called ‘teegah kekhwadal,’ which means a truce between rival parties and an agreement that they

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will not fight or violate the truce until a permanent settlement is made (Sultani-Rome 2013). Thus, it is a dispute management mechanism in which temporary peace is restored between rival groups that ultimately leads to permanent settlement. Riwaj, which ‘means custom, prevalence and customary law,’ is another key feature of the Pashtunwali code. This code governs the conduct and behavior of the Pashtuns. Customary laws have been honored in the Pashtun society. More importantly, they have been followed more than Islamic Sharia laws. ‘When in Rome, do as the Romans do’: similarly, while living in Pashtun society, everyone has to abide by the riwaj under Pashtunwali (Sultan-i-Rome 2013). Some other key tenants of the Pashtunwali are turah (bravery), imandari (righteousness), istiqamat (persistence), and ghairat (honor) (Liebl 2007). These are less obligatory on the individuals and tribes but are largely observed in Pashtun society. So, Pashtunwali is comprised of the traditional, legal, and moral codes that have determined social order and responsibilities in Pashtun society. Interestingly, Pashtuns only accept the part of Islam that accords with their code of life. For example, they don’t give inheritance rights to woman, as per Islamic law. According to Professor Khurshid Khan (interview by authors, Swat, 3 May 2020), ‘the Babuzai area of Swat state rejected inheritance rights to woman based on their customary law while making their administrative state system in the 20th century.’ Like other cultures, Pashtun culture has evolved over time. For example, women used to wear the burqa (veil) but it has now been replaced by shawl in most parts of KP province and its size and length vary from place to place, although in some tribal areas woman still wear the burqa (Saigol 2012). Furthermore, Pashtun women have actively participated in various movements including the Muslim League, the KKM, and now in the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM), the new form of Pashtun nationalism. So, women’s participation in social and political movements is not unusual in Pashtun society (Sultan-i-Rome, interview by authors, Swat, 3 May 2020). Furthermore, Pashtuns are mostly Sunni Muslims, but a significant Shia Pashtun minority lives in the KP province. More importantly, marriages between sects were accepted in the region. Prior to Talibanization in Pashtun areas, both the sects live together peacefully. The Sunni not only celebrated the Shia’s Ashura rituals but actively participated in the arrangements across the KP province; and the Shia also celebrated Sunni rituals (Saigol 2012). Moreover, Pashtunwali was observed by all inhabitants including non-Pashtuns and non-Muslims in the Pashtun region. For example, the Pashtun code of life was observed by Hindu and Sikh minority religious communities as well as by Punjabi settlers living in the Pashtun region (Taj 2011). More importantly, they lived together peacefully in the region and, even during the bloody partition of India in 1947, no communal riots were reported in Pashtun areas where Hindu and Sikh communities were living. Hence, prior to the radicalization of Pashtun society during the Afghan war in 1979, Pashtuns coexisted peacefully with their fellow non-Pashtuns.

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Pashtuns and the post-colonial garrison state of Pakistan Within the context described earlier, Pashtun nationalism was largely based on its cultural values and on national identity rather than on religious identity. In the twentieth century, the anti-colonial KKM dominated those Pashtun areas that become part of Pakistan after the partition of India in 1947. The KKM was a non-violent civil rights movement that was struggling to win constitutional and civil rights for the Pashtuns, first from the British colonial empire and then from Pakistan after its independence. The KKM drew its identity from a Pashtun nationalism that was incompatible with the Pakistani state formed on the basis of Islamic religious identity, ignoring other identities in its federation. Subsequently, Pakistan used religious identity as a political tool to create national coherence and direct its foreign policy. This policy helped Pakistan to suppress ethnic nationalism, but it led to the dangerous phenomenon of Islamic extremism that surfaced after the end of the Cold War (Khan 2019). In addition, Pashtun areas in the northwest of Pakistan had been important for Pakistan’s security apparatus. First, they were used as a buffer during the Afghan war against the Soviet Union in the 1980s and then later in the global war on terror after the 9/11 terror attacks (Sultana and Aquil 2012). Furthermore, the tribesmen were also part of the strategy of Pakistan’s security establishment to liberate Kashmir from India immediately after independence in 1947. For example, the Pakistani army launched a tribal lashkar (militia) in Kashmir. Nonetheless, the Afghan clergy declared the call for the liberation of Kashmir in the form of jihad, un-Islamic (GSDR 2007). During the Afghan War, the Pashtun areas became the epicenter of the jihadi resistance groups after the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1978. In fact, the US-led Western bloc in alliance with Pakistan used the tribal areas and other parts of KP as a launchpad to counter the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (GSDR 2007). Thus, Pashtun areas have continued to be a buffer for Pakistani strategists and the tribal areas have been used as launchpads for militant groups during and after the Cold War. In this process, the Pashtun areas were radicalized during the Afghan War, and former tribal regions became a breeding ground for terror groups after 9/11 (see later section: The Afghan War in 1979). Besides this, Pashtun areas were largely neglected by the Pakistani state after partition in 1947. Lack of legislation, underdevelopment, and poor governance in tribal areas have provided fertile grounds for radicalization and extremism, which made it easier for Taliban militants to gain a foothold in the area. According to the 1998 census, the former FATA is the most economically marginalized and backward region in the country. For instance, the literacy rate was recorded as 17.42 percent in tribal areas compared to 56 percent at a national level, while about 60 percent of the region’s population lives below the poverty line (Wazir 2014). Moreover, the tribal areas have remained as no-go areas, providing sanctuary and hideouts in which militant groups can develop in the Pashtun regions. Despite being mineral rich, the area has no local industry that can extract it and provide jobs for the locals. In fact, the economy is based on ‘smugglings of arms, drugs and other goods from Afghanistan’ (GSDR 2007). On top of this, corruption

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has been rampant in the region. The political administration provides bribes to selected tribal maliks in order to win their loyalty in the tribal region. This has led to poor services, especially health and education. Consequently, people are sending their children to madrassas because of their poor socioeconomic conditions and a lack of formal schools (GSDR 2007). In addition, former FATA were governed through the colonial Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) after independence in 1947, which were reformed in May 2018 (Hashim 2018). Under the FCR, the tribal people were excluded from judiciary and it was based on collective punishment. Consequently, the overall family is punished for the crime of one of its individuals. Since independence, successive governments in Pakistan have failed to fully integrate the tribal areas into mainstream society (Weinbaum 2009). The government’s inability to initiate either political or administrative reforms contributed to a vacuum in vital services that has been filled by militant groups and their supporters. For example, the Taliban drew their support from such areas, which were largely deprived and marginalized. In fact, the Taliban promised to provide a just system based on Sharia. Moreover, many unemployed young Pashtuns joined the ranks of the Taliban and were given a monthly stipend of 10,000 to 15,000 Pakistani rupees. Interestingly, they have little knowledge of the Taliban’s ideology or Islam. Moreover, they were provided with sophisticated weapons that increased their stature among their peers (Weinbaum 2009). Against this backdrop, the Pashtuns were, before the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1978, largely peaceful. With the support of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), the transnational jihadi militant groups gathered in Pashtun areas along the Durand line to defeat the Soviet forces, which played a major role in the radicalization of the Pashtun region. The Afghan War in 1979: the rise of radicalization in Pashtun areas The Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in late December 1979. This created a major security threat to Pakistan as the country shares a long and porous border with Afghanistan and Pashtuns live on both sides of the border areas; this meant that there might be the fallout of Afghanistan’s instability in the Pashtun border region. More importantly, Pakistan feared that the Soviet Union might attack the western part of Pakistan to reach the warmer waters of the Arabian Sea (Rizvi 1988). After the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, General Zia-ul-Haq asked the ISI to prepare a detailed report on the nature of the Soviet threat and design a strategy to counter that threat to Pakistan. The ISI chief, General Akhtar Abdur Rehman, reported that the Soviet Union wanted to access the Arabian Sea and that they might invade Pakistan. General Akhtar devised a jihadi strategy to counter the Soviet threat by backing the Afghan resistance movements. However, the ISI needed external support to materialize this jihadi project. Therefore, Islamabad requested that the Arab countries provide financial assistance to the Afghan mujahidin. The Saudi government not only agreed to provide financial assistance but encouraged its nationals to voluntarily engage in Afghan jihad (Riedel 2014). The

136 Arshad Ali and Fazal Subhan Arab jihadi groups from Gulf countries gathered in Pashtun areas to fight against the Soviet forces. It is important to note that the US entered this Afghan war two years later. According to General Asad Durrani (interview by author, Rawalpindi, 22 November 2017), The US did bandwagon into Pakistan when we were fighting the Soviet Union. Two years later, the US came and found out that the Afghan mujahideen with [the] help of Pakistan were doing not too badly. So it was not the America[ns] but Pakistan and Afghan mujahideen who fought against the Soviet Union. This meant that the US aligned with Pakistan by finding that the jihadi resistance movement is effective to counter the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. As a result, Pakistan became the frontline state against Soviet expansion during the Cold War and the US provided massive economic and military aid. Pakistan’s strategy was twofold: one was to defeat the Soviets through the Afghan resistance movement and another was to have a greater influence in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal. To achieve this, Pakistan needed to create an Islamist regime in Kabul that would be pro-Islamabad. Afghan religious clerics and their students were largely living in refugee camps in the Pashtun areas of Balochistan and KP provinces, which became major recruiting centers for the jihadi project (Sultana and Aquil 2012). Moreover, local mujahidin from across Pakistan and a huge influx of Arab volunteers also joined the mujahidin camps in Peshawar and surrounding areas. Thus Pakistani strategists were successful in establishing a transnational jihadi movement against the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan. In this situation, madrassas mushroomed during the Afghan jihad in the 1980s. The number of madrassas grew from 700 registered in 1980 to 8,000 registered and 25,000 unregistered in 1988 (Ahmed 2000). Most of these madrassas were run by Deobandi or Arab charity organizations. Interestingly, the curriculum to encourage jihad was designed in the University of Nebraska, Omaha. The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) supported this project and paid the university US $5.1 million between 1984 and 1994 for designing the jihadi syllabus. Textbooks based on such a curriculum, and worth about US $13 million, were distributed in madrassas and schools across the country (Ashraf 2009). Such madrassas shaped their world view, ideology, and attitude towards other sects and religions which was based on radical Islam by strict interpretation of Sharia laws and pan Islamism (Akhtar 2009). Furthermore, Carter’s administration in Washington provided a secret annual fund of US $500 million for the Afghan resistance movement against the Soviet Union. Saudi Arabia provided about US $3.5 billion to fund the madrassas during General Zia’s regime. On top of this, US $66 billion’s worth of arms and ammunitions were introduced in the border areas to equip the jihadi groups (Steve 2004). This led to a jihadi security infrastructure that helped to defeat the Soviet forces in Afghanistan. However, it radicalized and weaponized Pakistani society,

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which became a major internal security threat to Pakistan after the 9/11 terror attacks. With the rise of madrassas, the mullahs grasped political power, with money pouring in from external charity organizations during the 1980s. Since then, the mullahs have used both madrassas and mosques to consolidate power, largely in Pashtun society. Unlike the traditional saints (Astanadars), the mullahs did not transfer power back to the traditional elite in Pashtun society (Liebl 2007). As a result, the Afghan war altered Pashtun social and administrative dynamics, in which the mullah became the dominant actor in the political affairs of Pashtun society. This is evident from the emergence of far-right Islamist groups in Pakistan and the emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan in the 1990s (Ahmed 2000). In this process, radicalism and extremism was unleashed into Pashtun society on both sides of the Durand line with the support of the Arab bloc and the US-led Western bloc. Many veteran members of the Afghan resistance movement played an active part in terror outfits, including Al-Qaeda and the Afghan Taliban in the 1990s (Saigol 2012). Thus, the seeds of radicalism were sown during the Afghan War in the 1980s. It is important to note that the Afghan Taliban emerged as a political power from the Afghan civil war in 1994. In the Afghan Taliban, Pakistan saw an opportunity to have a strategic partner in Kabul that could protect their regional and strategic interests. More specifically, Islamabad thought the Afghan Taliban would recognize the Durand line as an international border. The Taliban were also anti-India, which would help them to gain long-awaited strategic depth in Afghanistan (Ghufran 2009). Pakistan had leverage over the Afghan Taliban as they had studied in various madrassas in Pakistan. For example, many Afghan Taliban graduated from madrassa Darul Uloom Haqqania in Nowshera district of KP province. It is believed that Mullah Omer, the founder of the Afghan Taliban, graduated from this Haqqania madrassa, and its former director and rector Maulana Sami-ul-Haq proudly called himself the ‘Father of the Taliban’ (Ali 2007). With the covert support of Pakistan, the Afghan Taliban captured Kabul in 1996 and established its Islamic Emirates of Afghanistan. Pakistan recognized Islamic Emirates after their emergence but failed to convince the international community to recognize the Afghan Taliban as the legitimate rulers of Afghanistan. Nonetheless, Pakistani strategists succeeded in establishing a proPakistani regime in Afghanistan which they prioritized at the beginning of the Afghan war (Sultana and Aquil 2012). However, the establishment of Islamic Emirates fueled Islamist militancy in Pakistan. Subsequently, many Islamist groups demanded the imposition of Sharia law in the country. The sectarian and Kashmiri militant groups such Lashkar Jhangvi and Lashkar-e-Tayyaba increased their militant activities and started targeting minority religious groups (Grare 2007). For example, 1,977 terror attacks were reported during 1990 to 1999, in which 4,338 were wounded and 2,405 killed (Saeed et al. 2014). In addition, in the first half of the 1990s, the Tehrik-e-Nifaze-Shariat-e-Muhammadi (TNSM) started the movement to establish a Sharia system in Malakand division of KP province, using tactics both of violence and of

138 Arshad Ali and Fazal Subhan non-violence (Weinbaum 2009). Thus, the Islamist radicalization in Pakistan is a pre-9/11 phenomenon. With the rise of militant groups, madrassas became strongholds of religious political groups such as Jamiat Ulema-e Islami (JUI) and Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) during the Afghan war. Such groups have used madrassas as a grassroots means of achieving their religiopolitical goals. Moreover, the ISI established and strengthened an alliance with far-right Islamist political groups. It entrenched and protected their mutual interests during and after the Cold War. In fact, the ISI has mainly relied on Islamist groups to achieve its foreign policy objectives and suppress anti-establishment individuals and political groups in the country (Aziz 2015). For instance, this mullah–military alliance not only neutralized secular regional ethnic political parties, but also mainstream secularist parties such as the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP). With the alleged support of the ISI, the religious groups under the umbrella of the Muttihada Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) won the elections in 2002 and thus extended legitimacy for direct and indirect rule over the country. After winning the elections, MMA established coalition provincial governments in KP and Balochistan (Shuja 2007). Hence, the far-right religious groups gained substantive political power in the country. 9/11, state strategic interests, and Pashtun society The 9/11 terror attacks transformed the security dynamics of Pakistan. The US invaded Afghanistan to demolish the Afghan Taliban regime and dismantle the Al-Qaeda network in the region. Washington coerced Pakistan into breaking off its relationship with Afghanistan and joining the so-called global war on terror, which Pakistan subsequently did. However, the fallout had serious consequences for Pakistan as the Taliban militant landscape shifted into tribal areas in Pakistan (Ghufran 2009). Many Afghan Taliban, Al-Qaeda operatives, and other militant groups took refuge in the Pakistan–Afghan border region. More importantly, the Afghan Taliban leadership settled in the Pashtun areas in Balochistan. Mullah Omer operated from the provincial capital of Quetta in Balochistan whereas the Haqqani network was based in North Waziristan agency. In 2004, with the support of the ISI, the Afghan Taliban regrouped under the leadership of Mullah Omer and began their militant activities across the border in Afghanistan (Weinbaum 2009). Thus, Pakistani strategists did not break off their relations with the Afghan Taliban and allowed them to operate with near impunity. As discussed earlier, the MMA came into power in KP and Balochistan provinces in the 2002 elections. They adopted an ambiguous strategy with regard to the Taliban, and their leadership issued a public statement in support of an Afghan Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan. Moreover, the JUI’s madrassas supported and endorsed participation in the Taliban insurgency. Consequently, the JUI had greater influence over the Afghan Taliban who acted as intermediaries between the Afghan Taliban leadership and both the US and the Pakistani establishments. Furthermore, the Pakistani Taliban also emerged in 2004 and most of their cadres came from the Deobandi madrassas. Nonetheless, the Pakistani

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Taliban maintained a strong alliance with the Afghan Taliban and shared ideological, communal, and personal connections (Nadiri 2014). Thus, the Taliban established its control in tribal areas and started expansion into other parts in KP province during the MMA-led governments in KP province. In addition, the Taliban militants systematically targeted the traditional elites and tribal elders. Many tribal elders were killed by the Taliban, which had created a political vacuum in the tribal areas (Sultana and Aquil 2012). This situation was exploited by the Taliban and established their control in the tribal region; this further radicalized Pashtun society. Furthermore, the Taliban exploited bad governance, a poor law-and-order situation, and underdevelopment in the Pashtun region. For example, the Taliban militants used ‘a variety of violent and non-violent tactics including force, religious ideology, swift justice system under Sharia law, economic incentives to propagate and gain their political goals’ (Mehboob 2011). In this process, the Taliban militancy spread to settled areas in Malakand areas of KP province. Consequently, Pashtun areas came under the direct control of Taliban militant groups. However, Pashtun culture and society were linked to radicalization and extremism in a way that was clearly based on misperception and a wrong interpretation of their cultural norms and systems, lacking indigenous knowledge. In the post-9/11 era, Pashtuns were made responsible for the rise of Taliban and Al-Qaeda militancy in the region (Taj 2011). Therefore, it is necessary to deconstruct the idea that extremism and militancy is embedded in Pashtun culture and society and that it has been imposed by the state in order to protect its national interest vis-à-vis Afghanistan and India.

The Pashtun question: deconstructing the myth of Pashtuns as extremists and warriors Generally, it is a common perception that the Taliban are overwhelmingly Pashtun, and that it is predominantly an ethnic Pashtun phenomena. However, there are a significant number of non-Pashtuns in Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). In fact, many Al-Qaeda and Kashmir-based militant commanders joined TTP after its formation in 2007 (Siddiqa 2011). Despite Pashtuns being in the majority, Taliban militants have targeted the traditional structures of Pashtun cultural and social norms. For example, the Taliban attacked jirgas with suicide bombings in places such as Darra Adam Khel and Orakzai agency in which prominent tribal elders died (Saigol 2012). Moreover, the jirga has been the key institution for resolving personal feuds and tribal issues, but it was replaced by so-called shura system, with Taliban commanders in charge who have no regard for the Pashtunwali code. Unlike Pashtunwali, most of the jihadi groups take legitimacy on religious grounds in the shadow of implementation of Sharia law in the Pashtun region and establishing Islamic caliphate globally (Aman 2013). Talibanization: an indigenous Pashtun movement It has been widely perceived that the rise of Taliban was an indigenous movement in Pashtun society. Not only are the Taliban majority ethnic Pashtuns, but

140 Arshad Ali and Fazal Subhan the mullah has historically been a constant part of Pashtun society. According to Johnson and Mason (2008, 53–54): The rise of the mullahs is part of a continuing pattern in Pashtun history. So-called mad mullah led uprisings against the British Empire in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and the new Islamist mullahs have simply been leading a traditional uprising against Soviet (and later on against the US) interference in Pashtun affairs. It is important to note that traditionally mullahs had very little political say in the Pashtun social structure. Besides leading prayer, their primary role was solemnizing marriages, births, and circumcisions (Aman 2013). According to Professor Khurshid Khan (interview by authors, Swat, 3 May 2020), In Yousafzai tribal society when different social, political, and economic roles were assigned to different individuals and groups, the mullah asked the jirga: You did not define my role? The jirga replied that you should not consider yourself superior to Dam (dancer) and we would not consider you inferior to Dam. This manifests the social status of religious clergy and groups in Pashtun tribal society. In the past, religious clerics were given lands on lease for their religious services by the traditional elite. Therefore, the mullahs were dependent on the local traditional elite and it was not in their interests to challenge the political preferences of the local elders. Nonetheless, the recent rise of the mullahs has been an independent phenomenon, beyond local support. For example, local far-right religious groups were empowered by the Pakistani state, against the Soviets and with the support of the US and Middle Eastern countries. This support continued after the collapse of the Soviet Union in the form of charity from Middle Eastern countries to the madrassas (Kerr 2010). It was disastrous for the tribal region as, in the absence of the state, the system of very local governance, had been dismantled. However, the state’s proxy wars empowered ‘the mullahs socially, militarily, economically, and politically in the Pashtun society.’ This rise of the mullahs as key powerbrokers was exceptional. In addition, there has been significant difference between the rise Hudd mullah or Faqir Ipi which were internal resistance to defend their territory against the external aggression from British colonial empire without foreign links and support (Taj 2011). However, the Taliban uprisings, led by religious clergy in the Pashtun areas, were aimed at external causes, first, to defeat the Soviets forces in Afghanistan, and later, the US. Moreover, they fought to establish an Islamic Emirate (Escobar 2009). In this process, Pashtun society suffered the most and its social fabric was destroyed.

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Talibanization: Pashtunwali and internal dynamics The Pashtun code of life is often linked with the rise of Taliban militancy in Pashtun areas. It is claimed that tribal people gave refuge to foreign militants under their Pashtunwali code of refuge and hospitality. Many foreign militants were also assimilated into Pashtun society and married. It is important to note that asylum, hospitality, and forgiveness are conditional and offered in special circumstances to refugees. For example, asylum is granted to the seeker who has been involved in blood feuds. Moreover, the refugee must surrender his arms to the host and promise to remain peaceful during his period of asylum. Upon agreeing to these conditions, he is granted asylum under the hospitality code of Pashtunwali (Taj 2011). As per the Pashtunwali code, the host is bound to provide shelter and protect him from his enemies but any violation of these conditions on the part of refugee could lead to the immediate withdrawal of the asylum under the Pashtunwali. Against this context, the notion of refuge and hospitality has been used as justification for harboring foreign militants in the tribal areas. Did the foreign militants take refuge in the tribal areas based on these conditions? Did they have to surrender their weapons to their hosts? The answer is no, as the foreign militants never surrendered their arms. In fact, they established their links with local tribes through coercion and money. More importantly, they overpowered the tribal Pashtuns and killed those masharan who opposed them. More importantly, ‘the militants entered tribal areas with full state consent. So it is misperception that the foreign militants were allowed to enter under the Pashtun code of life’ (Taj 2011). In this context, Al-Qaeda and other militant groups did not seek refuge in the Pashtun region under its traditions. In addition, former FATA was not an independent territory, but was under the control of Pakistani federations. According to Maulana Inayat Ullah (interview by authors, Swat, 5 May 2020): The foreign militants took refuge in former FATA under the Islamic brotherhood norm and not Pashtunwali code, because the Taliban militants were in a dominant position in the tribal area who provided refuge to the foreign militants. So foreign militants were imposed by the Taliban and the decisions were made in the Taliban shura not under the riwaj or jirga system by the tribal elders. Since independence in 1947, the jirga was key in binding Pashtun society together in the presence of a loose state structure. In fact, law and order were maintained through the jirga system by the tribal elders. To establish their authority, Taliban militants started targeting the tribal elders and the jirga system. The Taliban killed hundreds of tribal elders alone in the tribal areas. Moreover, the jirga was constantly under threat from militant groups and targeted when it was thought to be anti-Taliban. Subsequently, it was replaced by the Taliban order. Beside this, the state has changed the nature of the jirga from a dispute resolution mechanism among the people into peace talks between the state and militant groups.

142 Arshad Ali and Fazal Subhan Moreover, the jirga has become no longer binding in Pashtun society (Aman 2013). Hence, the Taliban militancy has demolished the basic Pashtun traditional culture and norms that have existed for centuries in this part of the world. In addition, the Taliban has targeted the family values that are defined in the Pashtunwali code. However, the Taliban has violated and disregarded those values. For example, women’s clothing and her mobility in the public sphere were completely domestic matters but the Taliban physically coerce women to wear the burqa. The Taliban in KP province also forbid women from leaving the home or from going shopping. They have punished and even publicly executed many female NGO workers, which is unprecedented in Pashtun culture and society. The Taliban also banned the music that was an essential part of Pashtun traditions. They killed many local musicians and female dancers in KP province (Saigol 2012). Pashtuns traditionally never attacked women and children, who were considered weak in Pashtun patriarchal society. Thus, the Taliban order is incompatible with traditional Pashtun culture and society. Talibanization: a new manifestation of Pashtun nationalism Many scholars have linked the phenomena of Talibanization with Pashtun nationalism. According to Robert D Kaplan ‘the Taliban constitute merely the latest incarnation of Pashtun nationalism.’ Similarly, Tariq Ali, a well-known Marxist critic, ‘portrayed the Taliban as an anti-imperialist force, while simultaneously conflating them with Pashtun nationalism. He eulogized the Taliban as an indigenous nationalist movement, inspired by Pashtun nationalism and fighting against imperial occupation’ (Saigol 2012). These scholars have somehow linked the Taliban uprising with Pashtun nationalism. It is important to note that the rise of the Taliban is a different phenomenon from Pashtun nationalism on a number of grounds. First, Pashtun nationalists are fighting for the civil and constitutional rights of the Pashtuns whereas the Taliban are striving for an Islamic Emirates based on Islamic Sharia laws. More importantly, the Taliban never claimed to be representative of Pashtun nationalism. Second, Pashtun nationalists have adopted non-violent methods to achieve their political goals whereas the Taliban have used violence to attain their religious political objectives. Third, the Pashtun nationalist movements have been progressive, favoring the education of girls for social change while the Taliban are anti-girls and consider education for them un-Islamic (Ghufran 2009). Moreover, Pashtun nationalists believe in democracy and the constitution whereas the Taliban reject democracy, the parliament, the judiciary, and the constitution. In February 2009, the government concluded a peace agreement with Swat-based Taliban through TNSM chief Sufi Muhammad but the Taliban quickly rejected it, saying that they do not accept democracy, the Western judicial system, or the constitution (Saigol 2012). Thus, the Taliban did not draw their inspiration from Pashtun culture, identity, or history. The Taliban hold Deobandi Salafist ideology based on panIslamism in order to establish an Islamic Emirates that is directly opposed to

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Pashtun nationalism. The Taliban did not even spare the tomb of saint-poet Rehman Baba in Peshawar, which they demolished. Moreover, they bombed hundreds of schools across KP province (Escobar 2009). Unlike the Taliban, the KKM, PTM, the Awami National Party (ANP), and the Pashtunkhwa Mili Awami Party (PKMAP), have all claimed to be Pashtun nationalists and aim to win civil and constitutional rights for the Pashtuns in Pakistan. Both ANP and PKMAP were part of the landmark eighteenth amendment that won provincial autonomy and renamed the North-West Frontier Province as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. More importantly, Pashtun nationalists have strongly opposed the Afghan jihad on the grounds that it will radicalize Pashtun society and it is a foreign war imposed on the Pashtun land. Moreover, ANP has strongly opposed Taliban militancy and hundreds of their workers were killed by the Taliban, including their key provincial legislators (RFERL, November 13, 2013). This demonstrates that the Taliban is not a new manifestation of Pashtun nationalism. Talibanization: a Pashtun phenomenon Western and national media presented radicalization as a home-grown, phenomenon, organic to Pashtun society. The question is, why had Pashtuns not been radicalized before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan? Were Pashtuns only radicalized as a group during the Afghan war? According to Professor Sultan-i-Rome (interview by authors, Swat, 3 May 2020): Pashtuns were made radical by the Pakistani state and international powers against the Soviet occupation during the Afghan war. It was a state-sponsored jihadi phenomena that has radicalized many ethnic groups and nations including Punjabis, Baloch, Arab, Central Asians, and Pashtuns. So I think this should not be attributed only to Pashtuns. As a result of the Afghan War, the whole of Pakistan was radicalized that surfaced after the Cold War era. Many non-Pashtuns joined the TTP including the Punjabi Taliban, Central Asian, and Arab militants. For example, the sectarian and Kashmir-based militant groups such as the Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan, Lashkar-i-Jhangvi, and Jaish-i-Mohammad joined the ranks of the Taliban and were involved in major terror attacks across the country in all major cities including Lahore, Karachi, Rawalpindi, and Islamabad (Ghufran 2009). Interestingly, all these jihadi organizations have their social bases and leadership outside the Pashtun region, and are largely based in Punjab province of Pakistan. These jihadi organizations used madrassas as their recruiting agencies which are also largely based outsides KP province except for Darul Ulom Haqqania in Nowshera district (Ali, interview by authors, Swat, 3 May 2020). Moreover, the majority of the Al-Qaeda operatives took refuge in all the major cities of Pakistan including Lahore, Karachi, Faisalabad, Islamabad, and Rawalpindi and they were captured from these cities (Ashok 2007).

144 Arshad Ali and Fazal Subhan Nevertheless, the land of Pashtuns was used as a base and camp for radicalization. For instance, Peshawar was the epicenter of the transnational Afghan jihadi movement that had been used as a proxy in the war against Soviet forces in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1988 (Murphy and Malik 2009). Nonetheless, Pashtuns as a nation or tribe have not participated in these jihadi projects, except for a tiny portion of individuals who did participate in it. Many joined the Taliban or jihadi groups for the economic benefits and to gain social prestige. In fact, Pashtun society collectively shows its hatred of these violent jihadi cultures and movements (Inayat Ullah, interview by authors, Swat, 5 May 2020). Therefore, it is a misperception that the whole of Pashtun society was radicalized. According to the government’s own reports, there were 10,000 Taliban in Swat at its peak in 2008–2009. This number is negligible in a total population of 1.8 million in Swat at that time (Sultan-i-Rome, interview by authors, Swat, 3 May 2020). So, it is a wrong association. In addition, the young Pashtun generation that was born and raised in the so-called global war on terror is anti-war and anti-violence. One can look at the work of young poets such as Javed Shah Darman, Afsar-ul-Mulk Afghan and Munir Buneri who present a complete anti-thesis of the use of violence. Mr Darman said in his Pashto poetry: . This means that ‘I want to take revenge of my past lives from these wars … I have a gun at my home and I will purchase a rabab (music instrument) from it.’ In January 2018, PTM emerged as the most dynamic anti-war, non-parliamentary, and nonviolent movement in the history of Pakistan that has challenged Pakistan’s state narrative of the war on terror. PTM demanded that a truth and reconciliation commission investigate human rights violation in the militancy-hit Pashtun area and asked them ‘to investigate extra-judicial killings and forced disappearances in their rally in Lahore’ (Alam 2018). Advocate Sher Muhammad Khan also demanded a ‘truth and reconciliation commission’ during the opening ceremony of Darul Qaza in Swat (Sultan-i-Rome, interview by authors, Swat, 3 May 2020). So, if it is true that radicalization was a home-grown Pashtun phenomenon, then Pashtun would not have made these demands of the truth commission. Moreover, it is evident from the emergence of the PTM as a nonviolent movement from Waziristan, which was considered to be the most dangerous place on earth due to the presence of hardcore militant groups.

Conclusion In a nutshell, the rise of the Taliban is not an indigenous phenomenon in Pashtun society. The Taliban are not the new manifestation of Hudd mullah or Faqir Ipi who fought against external colonial power with local support. On the other hand, the Taliban rose to power with outside support and their entire ideology is based on the concept of Islamic Ummah and pan-Islamism which is the very anthesis of Pashtun nationalism. Moreover, Taliban militancy is incompatible with the Pashtunwali code. The Taliban have targeted the jirga system and replaced it with the Taliban shura system. However, jirga has remained relevant in the Pashtun

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society in all circumstances, where its legitimacy and enforceability was accepted in the whole Pashtun society. Thus, the Taliban have no respect or regard for the Pashtun code of life. Also, the Taliban have never claimed to be Pashtun nationalists. The former FATA had been governed through the draconian FCR laws and was abolished in May 2018 by merging it with KP province. Moreover, people of tribal areas had been living in abject poverty with low literacy rates and poor health systems as compared to other parts of the country. On top of this, bad governance, a poor law-and-order situation, and underdevelopment had been rampant in tribal regions. Such a situation presents fertile ground for militancy and radicalization. Beside political reform, there is a need to introduce economic reform by creating infrastructure, local industry, and other socioeconomic developments. Nonetheless, it is necessary to fully integrate the Pashtun tribal region into Pakistan. The seeds of radicalization in Pakistan were sown well before 9/11. The Pashtun areas in the northern part of Pakistan became the rallying point of the transnational jihadi groups fighting against the Soviets in Afghanistan. As a result, the Pashtun region become a launchpad for the jihadi groups that had radicalized Pashtun society. In fact, Pakistan had used the Pashtun border area as a buffer to protect its strategic interests and allowed the jihadi groups to operate from the tribal region. Consequently, the radicalization of Pashtun areas is linked to Pakistan’s foreign and security policies. Islamabad needs to take a realist approach based on the realities on the ground to address this grave issue of radicalism. For this, it is necessary to make a strategic shift in its foreign and security policies by ending its proxy wars in Afghanistan and Kashmir that have seriously backfired in the form of radicalization and Taliban militancy. More specifically, Islamabad needs to adopt an economically driven foreign policy based on non-interference in other countries’ affairs, especially those of neighboring countries such as Afghanistan. This will not only help there to be a friendly regime in Kabul but will also protect its geostrategic position in the region.

Appendix 7.1 List of interviewees No

Name

Designation/ Affiliation Positions

1

Dr Sultan-i-Rome

Professor

2

Khurshid Khan

2

Ali Arqam

Place

Malakand Swat University Assistant Government Swat Professor Degree College Mingora Journalist Newsline/ Swat UNDP-Media cell

Date 3 May 2020 3 May 2020

3 May 2020

146 Arshad Ali and Fazal Subhan 4

Maulana Innayat Ullah

Religious Scholar/ Director

5

General Mohammad Lieutenant Asad Durrani General/ Director General (retired)

Pakistan Islamic Swat Academy, Kozabandia Swat Pakistan Army/ Rawalpindi ISI

5 May 2020

22 November 2017

Appendix 7.2 Questionnaire 1. In your opinion, what were the factors that led to radicalization of Pashtun society before partition of India in 1947? How do you see the rise Hud mullah, the Rushnaye movement, and Faqir Ipi in Pashtun society? 2. In your view, why has Pashtun been an active and dominant part of jihadi movements in Pakistan? Do you think that radicalization is embedded in Pashtun culture and society? 3. In your opinion, how has the notion of warrior-nation been internalized in the memory of Pashtun nations? 4. In your opinion, do you think that Taliban militancy is an indigenous homegrown Pashtun movement and a new manifestation of Hud mullah and other related movements, as many Western scholars claim? Is it a new form of Pashtun nationalism? 5. Overall, in your view, what are the factors behind Taliban militancy in Pashtun areas? 6. Do you think foreign militants took refuge under the Pashtunwali code of life in tribal areas? 7. Do you think Pashtunwali is more compatible with the Sharia system or with a secular form of governance? 8. Do you think Pashtun ethnic nationalism has transformed into religious nationalism? 9. How do you see the role of non-violent civil rights movements in Pashtun society? With the rise of the PTM, do you think Pashtun society will be able to transform from a radicalized society into an egalitarian one? 10. In your view, what is the main myth about Pashtun radicalization in the available literature that you think must be addressed to form a proper action plan to address issues of radicalization in Pashtun society?

Note 1 Pashto is not only the name of the language but also the behavior defined by the code, or the code itself. Those who have written on the subject in English have ignored this very important point. Although Pashto includes laws, in practice it is subservient to riwaj.

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8

Conclusion Muhammad Shoaib Pervez

Radicalization is the perceptual predicament of adjusting to actual reality. There exists a perceptual reality constructed by the beliefs and norms of an individual and a given reality constructed around one’s surroundings. The wider this gap becomes, the more difficult it is to reconcile one’s ontological insecurity, and this leads to violent behavior. This is the premise upon which all chapters in this book are based. The book was conceived with a clear objective in mind: to bring out the constructed reality behind the veneer of official practices of countering radicalization in Pakistan society. Whether it is the case of educational curricula, either local or international (CIE, as argued in Chapter 2), or sectarian rapprochements (Chapter 5), or anything else discussed in different case studies in the chapters, there is prescription of norms from the top (elite society) with which the bottom (popular society) is expected to comply. By norms, I refer to behavior that is expected from a given identity. There is a common thread woven through every chapter that argues that a level playing field or a bottom-up approach of consensual acceptance toward norms is never adopted and this is the prime reason for radicalization in Pakistan. Due to the extensive involvement of the state in the body politic, any tangible efforts to develop a consensus to counter violent extremism in a highly polarized Pakistani society has met with disastrous results. The question arises as to why there is no bottom-up approach for countering radicalization in Pakistan. After all, the country has a chequered history of democracy and it carries the banner of a democratic liberal state. The answer lies in the genesis of democracy in the post-colonial Pakistani state. The fractured fault lines of the state are too fragile to give way to any meaningful thought processes for countering radicalization. Any effort in this regard is fraught with the danger of state implosion. Particularly after the separation of East Pakistan from Pakistan in 1971, the elites of the state were very careful not to allow any deviant behavior from the dotted lines of national security narratives of the state. This does not mean that there exists some autocratic regime, but, somehow or other, there is a fear of a panopticon-like gaze encompassing everyone. In a post-structuralist framework, the book has argued that there exists a contrast between what is being represented and how it is being represented. The politics of radicalization lie at this critical junction. The representation of Pakistani radicalization by the local elites, as well as by the outside world, is only a partial

150 Muhammad Shoaib Pervez one. Here, on the one hand, are the state elites who have portrayed radicalization through their rhetoric of Pakistan being the victim of the Western agenda of the war on terror; and on the other hand, is the Western agenda of needing to do more amid talk of the Pakistan state’s double standard of differentiating between good and bad terrorists. It is the perspective of the people that is missing in both these debates, of how the everyday practices of common people are shaped by these discourses of radicalization. In order to provide a clearer picture, this book presents these everyday practices through discussion about educational, religious, and geopolitical norms. A post-structuralist framework demands that those who are marginalized or excluded should also be discussed in the analytical framework. The book does not go into a detailed analysis of the policies of major world powers and how they have fanned the flames of radicalization in Pakistan; in the introduction, it is made clear that the book is tilted more toward introspection. More importantly, the book tackles the question of how the life of an average Pakistani is affected by the policies of counter-radicalization. The focus was developed on the themes of education norms in elite schools and the Pakistani educational system; religious norms as indoctrinated in the Shia and Sunni literature; and regional norms of intolerance, with a case study of India–Pakistan; and finally an in-depth analysis of the local Swat insurgency in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province of Pakistan. All these chapters discuss certain myths that have been constructed in the existing literature; these are deconstructed and debunked in all the chapters. Let me weave together various arguments presented in the individual chapters and how they grapple with this issue of deconstruction. After the introductory Chapter 1, which highlights the themes and scope of this book, Chapter 2 offers the same perceptual predicament of educational norms being prescribed from the top without incorporating feedback from the bottom. There is a connivance between systemic norms of neoliberal education to counter radicalization with the management of the local elite school system of Pakistan. The rat race of scoring more A* grades in CIE (Cambridge International Examination at high School level), without properly understanding the meanings of curriculum through critical reflection, give rise to an ontological insecurity in young pupils’ minds. This is the major source of frustration often leading to violent behavior among them. Cambridge University, which prides itself on being the torchbearer of critical thinking (consistently listed among the top-five best universities in QS World University Rankings), has a totally different curriculum and pedagogy to offer to students of post-colonial states like Pakistan. This system is geared toward winning accolades for high grades without any iota of respect for feedback from pupils and teachers upon their designed curriculum and pedagogy. Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 also argue along the same lines, albeit with some minor differences; here educational norms are studied from the local vantage point by exploring the norms propagated by the state itself at school and university level through content analysis of the textbooks on the subjects of Pakistan Studies and Islamic Studies. Interestingly, the findings are the same, as the sense of ontological insecurity is paramount. In Chapter 3, the lack of space given to religious minorities when devising curriculum for compulsory Islamic Studies books also

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points in the same direction of existential anxiety shown by the state. This results in creating simmering tensions in the minds of religious minorities. In Chapter 4, cultural diversity demands inclusion of local milieu in the curriculum of these text books but the state elites are focused on constructed national narratives by sacrificing the local context at the altar of national integration. In Chapter 5, the case of sectarian radicalization in Pakistan is studied in detail. The schism between Shia and Sunnis has a violent history in Islam and it has its bloody foothold in Pakistan too, especially during President Zia’s regime (1977– 1988). In this unique case study, the sectarian issue is dealt with through the rapprochement literature abundantly found in the texts of both the Shia minority and the Sunni majority in Pakistan but, amazingly, has seldom been practiced by the respective elites. Here also the bottom line is the same; the dye is cast around ontological insecurity by creating existential threats to religious identity. The protagonists of both sects thrive on disseminating their contrasting differences rather than preaching norms of ententes. Any conciliatory effort in this regard is a deathknell for their popularly accepted beliefs. The prescriptive value of this chapter is ‘Paigham-e-Pakistan,’ which is a joint declaration of peace by the Ulema of all sects of Pakistan. This chapter prescribes the bridging of the gap between popular perception and official practice through ‘Paigham-e-Pakistan,’ an official narrative of inter-sectarian peace which was duly endorsed by the major sectarian and religious parties of Pakistan in 2018. This is precisely the recommendation of this book: bridge the perceptual gap between popular and official reality for effective counter-radicalization practices. In Chapter 6 and Chapter 7, the geopolitical aspect of radicalization is explained through two different case studies. In Chapter 6, the issue of India–Pakistan rivalry and its spillover in the form of radicalization in the region is discussed. There are popular aspirations of a security community in the two states and at the same time animosity is wedged between these two nuclear arch rivals by the elites of both states. The author brings to light top-down norms of animosity through the study of the educational curriculum, popular culture, and also gathers bottom-up norms of constructing a peaceful security community through mutual norms of peaceful coexistence. Chapter 7 deals with the issue of radicalization in the restive province of Khyber Pakhtunkhawa of Pakistan where the Taliban rule held sway in Swat Valley in the year 2008 and here the authors expose the myth of Pashtun being war-hungry people. By disagreeing with the myth of Pakhtunwali, the authors explain the insurgency in Swat by exposing the narratives constructed around Pashtun society. Finally, to conclude, I will say that this book lays bare the conventional wisdom and the myths constructed around radicalization in Pakistan. This critical perspective is adopted by all contributors to this volume, which, on the one hand, critically analyzes the existing top-down practices of entrepreneurs of counterradicalization norms. These norms are disseminated across the board in all strata of Pakistani society without ascertaining their acceptability at the consumer level (popular level). Those who are involved in building up powerful narratives include the state itself, or entrepreneurs of neo-liberal educational norms, or the

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sectarian elites. On the other hand, this book also brings to light the aspirations on the popular level, whether in the shape of the building up of a security community, or dissemination of literature focusing on sectarian harmony, or transforming pedagogical approaches through cultural diversity and inculcating peaceful norms in religious education, or simply by providing young schoolchildren with tools for critical reflection. Herein lies the true prescriptive nature of this book, as it formulates countering violent extremism policies by appreciating popular inputs. Until and unless the common people are fully engaged, the entire project of countering violent extremism or mitigating societal radicalization in Pakistan is doomed.

Index

Afghan War 130, 133–138, 143 banking education 18, 29 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 10, 11, 106, 110–112, 114 Cambridge O-level Pakistan Studies 21, 24–25 conquered subaltern 18 countering violent extremism 1, 7, 21, 149, 152 counter-radicalization 1, 3, 5, 17, 30, 31 Critical Pedagogy 9, 18, 26 Critical Race Theory 9, 20 cross-case analysis 64; see also teachers’ perspectives cultural diversity 61, 62, 64, 67 cultural nationalism 113 curriculum 36, 37 curriculum document 37, 38 curriculum policies 35 Dārul-Uloom Karachi 81, 90 dehumanization 19, 79, 81, 82, 86, 88, 91, 96 Deobandi Sunnis 90, 92, 96 desecuritization 120 discriminatory epistemic violence 19 distributive epistemic violence 20, 31 eclecticism 8 educational interventions 80, 96 episteme 18 epistemic construction 19, 21 epistemic violence 17–21, 30–31 epistemology 2, 3 ethical values 39 ethics 36, 41 ethics curriculum 38, 39, 41

ethics curriculum document 37 ethics curriculum framework 38, 39 existential threat 7 extremism 129, 134, 137, 139 FATA 129, 130, 134, 135, 141, 145 Foucauldian 6, 81, 82 Freire, Paulo 18, 24, 28–32 Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) 135, 145 hindutva 11, 113 historiography 108, 109 humanization 79, 82, 90, 93 Jamia al-Munatzar 81 Lashkar-i Jhangvi (LJ) 80, 88, 90 madrassas 9, 135–138, 140, 143 National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT) 110 National Curriculum for Pakistan Studies 62–63 National Education Policy 62 9/11 terror attack 134, 137, 138 official narratives 61 ontology 2, 3 Paigham-i Pakistan 96, 97, 151 pashtunwali 129, 131–133, 139, 141, 142, 144 path-dependence 106, 120 popular culture 106, 113 post-colonial 17, 21 post-positivist 3

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Index

post-structuralism 149 problem-posing education 17, 18, 24 radicalization 1–5, 7, 10, 12, 17, 18, 21, 22, 24, 30, 105, 125, 129, 130, 133–135, 138, 139, 143–145, 149–151 religious minorities 66 sectarian relations 10, 80–83, 95 security community 105, 106, 120, 121, 125, 126 Sipāh-i Muhammad 80 Sipāh-i Sahāba Pakistan (SSP) 80, 81, 86–90, 92, 93

social cohesion 79, 80, 97 social peace 42, 43, 51 49, 55, 56 Spivak, Gayatri 17–19, 21, 31 surveillance 21 tahrik-e-Taliban 2 talibanization 133, 139, 141–143 teachers’ perspectives 67–73 testimonial epistemic violence 20 textbook analysis 65–67 trust-building 79, 96, 97 Twelver Shī’ites 79, 90–94, 96 whiteness 20 white supremacy 1, 18, 20, 24, 31