Pakistan at the Millennium 0195797760, 9780195797763

Citation preview

PAKISTAN AT THE MILLENNIUM '

01g1t1zed oy

Go'3J",Pakialan

"'""'" • Google

• Google

Orijabl..Mlduape (d91all).KllMdlqbal.c.1986,oilonc..,vH.IQ-.JO"",-of

0. M."""'*9.Uo-. Pakistan

Ori;inollrorn

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

11. c - . , ar.. ..-.

~J•lal.19&1.oilonc.mu, 36"•47",anisl'1- .Llhore ,

Pakista.11

"'""'" • Google

= . , . . , , , - - - - - - - - , 19. Bobb,., K""lid 1qi..1. 1983. oil"" c........ 13'"il0".arlitl'1~. L llhore. Pakil1an

20. a.luclt. S...OAltports of nuclear-capable missiles and missilerelated technologies. See chapter 3b on China in Jones and McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, op. cit., especially pp. 55-57. 29. Support vehicles might include fuel tankers (e.g., for a liquid-fueled missile transported without its fuel, and ordinary fuel for the other motorized vehicles), mobile radar, radar electronics control and firecontrol vans, point defence surface-to-air missiles or artillery, and temporary shelter and provisions for personnel. 30. India claimed that it had 'inducted' a contingent of the Prithvi-1 missiles and stored them near Jullundur, but denied they were 'deployed.' For the controversy, see account in the author's 'Palcistan's Nuclear Posture: Arms Race Instabilities in South Asia,' in Asian Affairs: An American Review, Vol. 25, No. 2, Summer 1998, pp. 72, and 84; and Jones and McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Chans, I 998, op. cit., p. 116. 31. ln response to the question 'Have you mated nuclear warheads that were tested in Pokhran with the Agni?', the answer quoting India's missile developer, A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, was: 'Yes, Agni-II is designed to carry a nuclear warhead if required. In any case, we had already tested an Agniclass payload at Pokhran last year (1998].' The reponing of the Agni-II test also claimed that the Agni-II was 'combat-ready,' illustrated a rail- . mobile basing scheme, and indicated that rail cars designed to 'house' Agni were contracted for with the Coach Factory at Kapurthala three ·years ago. It implied, without saying as much, that the Wheeler Island used as a missile test site had been cleared of villages and might be, de facto, India's first Agni missile base. Raj Chengappa, 'Missiles: Boom for Boom,' India Today International, 26 April 1999, pp. 28-30. 32. The Prithvi system is operationally cumbenome, and its fuel is loaded by tankers only after the missile and launcher have been set up at a launch site. Moving these systems from garrison to pre-surveyed sites and preparing them for action would talce at least one or two days after orders are received. 33. See Eric Arnett. 'Nuclear Stability and Arms Sales to India: Implications for U.S. Policy,' Arms Control Today, Vol. 27, No. 5, (August 1997), p. 8, and related discussion in Rodney W. Jones, ' Pakistan's Nuclear

0191t1zea by

Google

Origiral frcn1

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

348

34.

35.

36.

37.

38.

39.

PAKISTAN AT THE MILLENNIUM

Posture: Arms Race Instabilities in South Asia,' Asian Affairs: An American Review, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Summer 1998), especially pp. 73-81. The only fielded Palcistani surface-to-surface ballistic missile is the Hatf-1, with a nominal range of about 80 miles. While theoretically nuclearcapable, its range is too limited to make it a nuclear delivery system of choice. Therefore, it is excluded from this analysis. Firing positions in the south of Pakistan, in the desert east of Karachi, could define a 2000 km. arc extending to Calcutta in eastern India and almost to Cape Comorin at the southern tip. Bases in northern Pakistan could be as much as 1000 km further than southern Pakistan from sites in southern India. Whereas Western anns control experts take satisfaction in the lndoPakistani agreement to notify their ballistic missile tests, these notifications, perversely, have become confidence-building measures (CBMs) only for the domestic bureaucracies and publics involved assuring them that notice is being taken of their accomplishments. Between the two societies, the tests are provocative. The public relations fanfare attending the tests has become tantamount to sticking a finger in the other's eye, stimulating counter-demonstrations, rather than reducing tensions - in accordance with the theoretical goals of CBMs. Missile test notifications have little confidence-building (arms control) value unless they are conducted within a legal regime that establishes limits, under which the tests fulfill obligations to show that the limits are being observed. In the case of deployed US and Russian strategic missiles which are being reduced by treaty agreements, for example, CBMs are practiced to preclude misperception, by pre-notifying the other side that an action detectable by the other side's national technical means or early warning systems is a test and not the sign of a missile strike underway. This may change at a much later stage, when the essentials of Pakistan's posture have already been pieced together through the gradual accumulation of infonnation and analysis in public knowledge. China officially proposed an international ban among the nuclear weapon states on first use of nuclear weapons, and is the only such state to have consistently maintained a no-first-use declaratory policy. India's national security advisory board also incorporated the concept of an international ban on first use in its draft 'nuclear doctrine' of August 17. Even if there were a bilateral agiecment on 'no first use,' of course, military experts would not expect it could hold up if Pakistan's survival were at stake. Nor would they share any illusion that India would adhere to such an agreement, either, if during a widening conventional war India reliably detected the preparations to launch a Pakistani all-out nuclear strike and reckoned it might limit the scope of that strike by executing nuclear counterforce strikes in a nuclear preventive warfare campaign. As mentioned earlier, India's draft 'nuclear doctrine' of August 17 already

0191t1zea by

Google

Origiral frcn1

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

349

PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR POSTURE

40.

41.

42.

43.

44.

45.

proposes conventional pre-emptive strikes against parties that simply threaten nuclear weapons use against India. This new nuclear-specific risk could be altered over time. It could even be eliminated, or at least tempered by: (I) a mutual nuclear stand-down and rollback of Indian and Pakistani nuclear forces; (2) a larger and more robust Pakistani nuclear force that has the inherent capacity to shift to a secure second-strike posture, and (3) negotiated arms control that limits the hair-trigger and pre-emptive potentials of future Indian forces. While ballistic missiles have been the main theme in nuclear-capable missile proliferation for the last two decades, today cruise missile technologies are spreading rapidly. Cruise missiles are unmanned aircraft with built-in flight control and navigation systems that can be launched from aircraft and naval platforms as well as from ground sites. They are already in use in South Asia as recoverable platforms for photographic and signals surveillance, reconnaissance and warning, and as conventional anti-ship systems. India is said to be developing a 600 km range, nuclearcapable cruise missile called Lakshya. Since Pakistan has not thus far exhibited nuclear-capable cruise missile acquisition or development activities, they are not pan of the present conjecture, but could become an avenue of integrating the Navy directly in nuclear deterrent operations using surface naval and submarine platforms. Pakistan's space efforts will also grow in due course, and have already begun to use indigenously-assembled observation and communication satellites launched commercially in Kazakhstan. Pakistan recently announced that it hopes to develop a space launch vehicle (SL , ) capable of lofting small satellites into low-earth orbit by the year 2003. SLV operations may support advances in ballistic missile weapon technologies of atmospheric re-entry and terminal guidance, as well as missile defences and their countermeasures. Other approaches are conceivable but improbable. For example, it would be possible to develop both missile and airborne nuclear forces as specialized organizations within the Army. Alternatively, the nuclear forces could be assembled as an altogether new organization of special forces distinct from the traditional services, although it might recruit from and reconstitute personnel from all three. These alternatives probably would be resisted, the first at least by the Air Force, and the second by all three existing services. India revealed in the course of adhering to the CWC and taking a position on the Board of Executives that it had an active chemical weapons production programme and weapons inventory, but was renouncing these weapons and would proceed to eliminate them under the terms of the Convention. Former Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Agha Shahi noted recently that 'among the concessions reportedly being sought by India for signing the

0191t1zea by

Google

Origiral frcn1

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

350

PAKISTAN AT THE MILLENNIUM

CTBT are missile testing, weaponization (because of alleged deployment of Chinese missiles in Tibet), high technology transfer and enhanced economic interaction.' He advocated furthet" that Pakistani signature of the CTBT be made to depend on Pakistan receiving equally 'any concessions or favours extended to India for adhering to the treaty.' See his opinion piece, 'CTBT and Deterrence,' in The Nation, 30 Novet"nber 1999. 46. See Hasan Akhtar, '$attar's address at Institute of Strategic Studies: Palcistan to reply if India tests Nuclear device,' Dawn, 26 Nov=ber 1999. 47. While Islamabad might discover that negotiating ceilings on various categories of conventional forces and on the details of a zonal setback sch=e seems interminable, adding new pro.-..edures to an existing practice of interim notifications of military exet"cises and mov=ents - regarding the size and charactet" of deployed and rotating military units - could have useful crisis-prevention effects. Agreement to exchange and host teams of military observers for each zone on a routine and continuing basis could do a great deal to reduce the destabilizing effects of sudden fotce movements. While Pakistan as well as India will have major concerns about the loss of sensitive information from this practice, the risk reduction benefits of mutual observation arguably would greatly outweigh such information losses. Pakistan would stand to gain from controlled access transparency in this conventional force context. India would lose some of the intimidating effects of its larger forces, but would lose little information of strategic value. Both might gain from mutual observation of service resolve and organizational discipline. If agreed zones ·and force restriction criteria can be stipulated even before they are finally negotiated, data transmitted from voluntary international monitoring could preclude false alarms.

Another version of this article has been published in the Journal of Regional Studies. Also, up-to-date additional information on both Pakistan's and India's nuclear capabilities and postures can be accessed at www.dtra.miVabout/ organization/south_asia.pdf.

0191t1zea by

Google

Origiral frcn1

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

13 Ayub Khan, Constantinos Doxiadis, and Islamabad: Biography as Modernity in a Planned Urban Space Frank C. Spaulding

Capitals are not built, nor do they exist, just for the sake of, shall we say, utility. Utility is important, but at the same time the capital of a country has to encompass much bigger vistas, and provide light and direction to the efforts of the people. (Ayub Khan 1967:97)

Much has been written recently regarding the modernist project of nation-building in the post-colonial world. These discussions have often focused on the role social identity plays in the · political consolidation of the post-colonial nation-state and of the latter's relationship to the projects of modernity and global capitalism. The politics of national identity is an issue that Pakistan has grappled with literally since its founding in 1947. Its checkered history chronicles the struggles of a state that has repeatedly sought, yet often failed, to create the conditions for the production of a truly national identity. Studies that have examined the urban built form environment of the planned cities of the developed and developing worlds have, of late, been particularly productive of insights concerning the complex relationship of national and personal identities.' This study seeks to contribute to this growing trend of analysis by examining, from the perspective of the state's larger national objectives, the design and layout of the Master Plan of Pakistan's capital city, Islamabad. As the Islamabad case material

0191t1zea by

Google

Origiral frcn1

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

352

PAKISTAN AT THE MILLENNIUM

demonstrates, 'modernity,' and the statist project of national reproduction inherent to it, is most productively viewed as a process that combines elements of both the global and the local. The study is introduced with a brief analysis of the government's intentions in moving the seat of the national government to a new city. A following section describes the Islamabad built form environment largely from the perspective outlined in the city's Master Plan. A third section examines some biographical material on Mohammad Ayub Khan and Constantinos Doxiadis, the two men most responsible for designing and founding Islamabad. A following section returns to consider the urban built form of Islamabad from the perspective afforded by the review of this biographical material. The paper closes with a consideration of the ways in which Islamabad might contribute to current discussions regarding the nature of modernity as a global process.

The Archaeology of Islamabad Shortly after he assumed office as Pakistan's first military dictator, Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan (1907-1974) publicly announced his desire to consider removing the seat of the national government from Karachi. He appointed a 'Special Commission for the Location of the Federal Capital' to look into the matter. Composed of high-ranking government and military officials, the Commission's charge was twofold. First, it had to determine if it was feasible for Karachi- the port city that had served as the nation's interim capital since the country's founding in 1947- to continue as a seat for the national government. At the same time, the Commission had also to consider a list of potential alternative sites, assessing each against key objective criteria such as its geography and climate, relative defensiveness, the availability of local building materials, regional communication systems, and so forth (Doxiadis Associates l 959a).

0191t1zea by

Google

Origiral frcn1

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

AYUB KHAN, CONSTANTINOS DOXIADIS & ISLAMABAD

353

The Commission's deliberations concluded in June of 1959, but its report was not made public. The government has consistently asserted that the Commission recommended that the capital be relocated to the Potwar Plateau-a spur of deeply undercut alluvial land in the northern reaches of the Punjab. Nevertheless, there is a distinct possibility that the Commission concluded its deliberations not with a recommendation, but with a request to conduct further study as it had been unable to choose between Karachi or the Potwar Plateau.2 Perhaps ·out of fear that further delay might wrest from him what providence had placed in his hands, Ayub Khan acted decisively, settling the matter by publicly announcing the government's choice of the Potwar Plateau as the site for his new capital. By moving the Capital, Ayub Khan was stating in as clear a fashion as was possible that the paralysis that had gripped the country in the 1950s was to be made a thing of the past. 3 Yoked to its exemplary new capital city, Pakistan would be led inexorably into a bright new era of national writy and integration. And it was to do so not on the basis of favouring any traditional political parties or ideologies, but rather by a commitment to a programme of national consolidation and rational, scientific development. In a sense then. Islamabad's founding was an attempt to delineate the parameters around which discussions of the country's national discourse would henceforth be played out. As a rhetoric of political will and intentionality, Islamabad sought to normalize this grand experiment in nation building as it constructed an urban space which merged as one the concepts of nationalism, rationality, science and modernity.4 The appointment of a Special Commission for the Location of the Federal Capital was essential to embedding these national objectives within the city's foundation charter. As a further step, it was equally critical in linking the city to the regime's project of economic development and national consolidation. In achieving both of these objectives, maintaining the Special Commission' s image of neutrality was an important factor. So doing, licensed the regime to assert that its political intervention was not aimed at achieving political gain nor personal advantage.

0191t1zea by

Google

Origiral frcn1

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

354

PAKISTAN ATTHE MILLENNIUM

Rather, the government could argue that as arbiter of the state's will and as the lead institution in the nation's programme of rational economic development, it was obligated to follow the Commission's recommendation, no matter how controversial or unwelcome. Stated simply, the Commission's terms of reference left Ayub Khan with no other option but to pursue its recommendation.

The 'Community' Design of Islamabad To oversee the city's development, the President appointed the Federal Capital Commission (with Army Chief of Staff, Yahya Khan serving as Chair) in September of 1959. Subsequently, Doxiadis Associates-the town and city planning firm of Constantinos Doxiadis- was commissioned to draft a Master Plan and Programme of Implementation. From lat~ 1959 up to the mid-l 960s, the firm submitted a number of reports and studies to the Federal Capital Commission and its successor organization, the Capital Development Authority. A preliminary proposal for a Master Plan was submitted to the government in May 1960 (Doxiadis Associates l 960b). This document provides a brief summary of the Master Plan in terms of the ideas and principles ·underlying its layout and design. Also included are a general outline of the city, examples of some specific applications, and an overview of Doxiadis' emerging urban philosophy. A two volume final Master Plan was submitted to the government in September of 1960. Relative to the preliminary programme, the latter document provides more detailed information on Islamabad's Master Plan. Nevertheless, this too is a summary of the reports, proposals, and studies that Doxiadis and his firm conducted for the Government of Pakistan. If, as they say, the devil is in the details, then the details of the Islamabad Master Plan are to be found in these other documents, rather than in the summary reports that most researchers have consulted. It is in these other documents that one finds detailed descriptions on matters

0191t1zea by

Google

Origiral frcn1

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

A YUB KHAN, CONSTANTINOS OOXIADIS & ISLAMABAO

355

relating to population growth, financing, road layout and design, sewerage and water supplies, the laying of electric, water, and gas lines, the allocation and distribution of public, commercial, and private structures;the city's phased development schedule, and so forth. Taken together, these documents constitute what I refer to as the city's Master Plan. In accordance with its Master Plan, Islamabad was to have an urban population of two million by the year 2000 (Doxiadis Associates 1960b:333). To accommodate such growth, the city was to expand toward the south-west, moving away from its focal point at the foot of the Presidency and following, ad infinitum, the 'endless axis' of the road called the Khyaban-iQuaid-i-Azam (Doxiadis Associates 1960a).5 As the city grew, its leading edge was to expand fan-like, encompassing an increasing, broader cross-section of sectors. Local geography was essential to ensuring this pattern of growth. The combination of the Margalla Hills, the Muree Hills, Islamabad Park, and Rawalpindi were to form a geographic 'container' that effectively delimited the extent and direction of growth during the city's early stages of existence. Conversely, the broadening of the Potwar Plateau as it merged with the greater Punjab Plain was envisioned as a means to allow for the acceleration of the city's growth as it expanded toward the south-west. The Master Plan is based on an orthogonal urban grid. Except for the special purpose areas (e.g., the administrative sector) or where pre-existing structures (e.g., Rawalpindi) or natural features (e.g., the Margalla Hills) preclude it, each sector was to be approximately 2000 by 2200 meters square. On the basis of zoning regulations applied to the urban grid, each grid sector was designated for a particular urban •function' such as the military, industry, government and so forth. 6 The majority of urban sectors, however, were designated as a residential zone. In the Doxiadis vocabulary, residential sectors were subdivided in accordance to a 'class' hierarchy. The Class V community corresponded to a residential sector. Optimally it was to contain 30,000 to 40,000 people (Doxiadis Associates 1960b). At the next lower level were the Class IV communities.

0191t1zea by

Google

Origiral frcn1

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

356

PAKISTAN ATTHE MILLENNIUM

Roughly equivalent to a quadrant in size, these latter residential units were to accommodate about 10,000 people each. Class III communities housed approximately 2500 people. The Class II communities----containing groups of about one hundred peopl~ were to constitute the city's local neighbourhoods. The most exclusive communities, those at the Class I level, comprise a family or any gathering of two or three people (Doxiadis Associates 1959b:l4-21). Within each residential community, 'urban functions' were disposed on the basis of a hierarchy of allocation. That is to say, that the range, type and number of services provided at a particular 'community' level were pre-determined on the basis of the given unit of population to be served. As the Class V communities were to be in large part self-sufficient, they were to be allocated the largest number of urban functions. Thus, at the centre of each sector, one was to find a full complement of public, civic and. commercial institutions, including fire and police stations, a post office, a mosque, various food markets, clothing stores, restaurants, schools, and hospitals. The Class IV community served a smaller population (i.e., the sub-sector). Therefore, its functions were limited to a food market, a mosque, a secondary school, a health clinic, a restaurant, a police station, a sub-post office and a municipal maintenance office. At the Class III community level, urban functions were further limited to a few commercial establishments, a primary school, a tea house, and a praying area. Class II community centres had only a comer shop. Based on its scale, no civic, public, or commercial institutions were provided for the Class I communities (i.e., families). Differences in the relative ability of a family to avail themselves of the city's various services was determined on the basis of one's rank in the civil service (or income equivalency). In general, high ranking bureaucrats were afforded a number of privileges that were otherwise denied to lower income groups. For example, while the elite were allocated spacious and comfortable living accommodations, low ranking government servants were assigned to cheaply built, government subsidized

0191t1zea by

Google

Origiral frcn1

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

AYUB KHAN, CONSTANTINOS OOXIADIS & ISLAMABAD

357

housing. Not only this, but families of privilege were assured an ease of access to the city's transportation networks, another privilege that was otherwise denied to lower income .groups (see Doxiadis 1968, 1975:274-276; Doxiadis Associates 1960b, 196la; 196lb, 1962a, 1962b, 1963a, 1963b; 1964:332). The residential disposition of families of different income levels varied in direct relation to the size of the community. For example, each Class III community was to include families from two or three adjacent income groups, while at the sector level, the housing policy allowed for the settlement of families from up to six different income groups. In regard to differences in relative spatial location, the wealthier a family, the closer its plot would be located to the north-east comer of a particular residential community. These settlement policies combined to establish a south-west to north-east socio-economic gradient. First brought into focus at the Class III community level (i.e., the quarter), this socioeconomic geography was to achieve its ultimate expression in the bifurcation of the city's housing market into a string of poor residential sectors along its southern border with Rawalpindi and a series of affluent sectors nestled at the base of the Margalla Hills to the north.7

The Genealogy of the Master Plan Notwithstanding Ayub Khan 's efforts to elevate Islamabad to a symbol of the irrevocable break with the past achieved by his ' revolution,' common sense alone should suffice to dispel the notion that the founding of Islamabad transcended the political, social, and cultural forces operative w ithin the Pakistan body politic. Developing an understanding of the nature of these domestic influences as they affected decisions concerning the design and layout of Islamabad, is therefore, an essential first step toward deepening our appreciation of ' modernity' as a product of the interaction of the local and the global.

0191t1zea by

Google

Origiral frcn1

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

358

PAKISTAN AT THE MILLENNIUM

cow:se.

Of this is a major project and cannot be dealt with adequately within the confines of a short study such as this. For this reason, this section is limited to an examination of the life and times of the two men who played pivotal roles in the building of Islamabad, Mohammad Ayub Khan and Constantinos Doxiadis.8 Important turning points in their lives are identified as a means to explicate how particular events and life experiences contributed to the solutions they proposed for the problems confronting Pakistan in the late 1950s. The discussion is introduced with a brief overview of the life of Constantinos Doxiadis. This is followed by an equally brief consideration of some biographical material relating to Ayub Khan. However, as there is so·much that has been written about Ayub Khan, the focus shifts to an examination of the political world view of the Pakistani officers who served in the British Indian army during the years leading up to Partition. As I attempt to show, Ayub Khan's Islamabad project appears to have drawn heavily on the organizational reforms of the British Indian army that followed in the wake of the revolt of 1857. Constantinos Apostolos Doxiadis was born on 14 May 1913, in Stenimachos, Bulgaria (d. 1975).9 At the outbreak of the First World War, his family fled to Athens where his father served in a number of mid-level bureaucratic positions. Foreshadowing his son's later career interests, Doxiadis' father was instrumental in the government's programme to provide shelter to the refugees fleeing the collapsing Ottoman empire. At the age of nineteen, Doxiadis enrolled in the National Metsovion Technical University in Athens. While at the University, he settled on the idea of a career in town and city planning. Following his graduation, Doxiadis pursued his educational interests by enrolling at the Berlin-Charlottenberg Institute of Technology. He earned a doctorate (with distinction) in engineering and city planning in 1936 for his dissertation on the visual effects achieved by the spatial relationships obtaining among structures located in the sacred precincts and cities of ancient Greece. 10

0191t1zea by

Google

Origiral frcn1

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

AYUB KHAN, CONSTANTINOS OOXIADIS & ISLAMABAD

359

Doxiadis' educational experiences in Berlin were critical in his development as both a practitioner and an urban philosopher. · It at once gave him the technical skills and credentials that be would later need as an international consultant. In addition to this, be adopted unquestioningly many of the urban pfanning concepts formulated by fascists during the 1920s and 1930s. In this regard, minor details, such as his impressionistically based assertion of the overwhelming functionality of post and lintel architecture, are worthy of note (Doxiadis 1963:167-171). However, it is for the idea of the 'endless axis,' that Doxiadis owes the greatest debt to his German professors.11 It was on the basis of this planning concept, that Doxiadis formulated the Islamabad Master Plan (see Doxiadis Associates 1960a). Perhaps of equal importance to this, however, was the idealism that these educational experiences lent to Doxiadis' personal philosophy. While it is far more difficult to identify the sources of something as intangible as a personal philosophy, even a cursory glimpse at his works is sufficient to demonstrate the point. In reading Doxiadis, one is struck by the extent to which his discussion remains in the realm of ideas and concepts, rather than actual implementation. It is the former which clearly drew his interest and analytical attention. Rather than delving into the material dimensions of existence as they impinge upon the human experience, Doxiadis was content in offering solutions that border on the nonsensical. For example, in explaining the housing crisis in the developing world, he chooses to locate its causes in a failure of the will of architects who are unable or refuse to create and imagine viable solutions to the problem (Doxiadis 1963:34-37). Doxiadis' inability to grapple with the materialist dimensions of his projects has profound implications for the history of Islamabad. One of the major shortfalls of the planning process was Doxiadis' willingness to let the idea ofthe city, as portrayed in drawings, scale models, and diagrams, stand for the reality of the city as it is lived by its residents. In so doing, Doxiadis was destined to fail in his attempts to predict the course of the city's development. As an example, one need only consider the katchi

0191t1zea by

Google

Origiral frcn1

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

360

PAKISTAN AT THE MILLENNIUM

abadis (shanty town settlements) that have become a mainstay of the city's social landscape over the last decade and a half. Found in widely distributed pockets throughout the city, these unplanned and ramshackle residential settlements are a clear affront to the provisions of the Master Plan. In regard to their relationship to the Master Plan, it seems incontrovertible that Doxiadis' idealism lead him to overlook the impact that local topography would have on the city's 'sub-structural' social geography. Specifically, because he worked from a mental image of Islamabad and a representation of it as captured by a table model, he failed to appreciate the role the undercut and rivulet laced topography of the area would have in the establishment of katchi abadis. In the Doxiadis Master Plan, the lowest structural level for human habitation in the city was defined in direct relation to the plane represented by the table upon which he erected his scale models. While other factors contribute to this feature of the city's social topography, one does find that in general, it is in those areas where the topography dips below this putative plane of human habitation that one finds the katchi abadis. To have controlled for such a development would have required Doxiadis and his associates to realize that the planning table upon which their scale models rested was a poor substitute for the reality of the area's topography.1 2 Doxiadis' experiences during and after the Second World War contributed to the development of his technical skills as much as it did to promote his professional career. In 1937, Doxiadis returned to Greece where he took an appointment as the Director of Town Planning Studies of the Greater Athens Area, the same position his father had occupied in the 1920s. The German occupation of Greece (1940 -1944) found Doxiadis heading the Town and Country Planning Bureau within the Ministry of Public Works, a position that he had created on his own. He served in this position throughout the Second World War in spite of his involvement in the Hephaestus National Resistance. After the war, Doxiadis was appointed Undersecretary for Reconstruction, Ministry of Housing and Reconstruction. From

0191t1zea by

Google

Origiral frcn1

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

AYUB KHAN, CONSTANTINOS OOXIADIS & ISLAMABAD

361

this position, he succeeded in convincing the Greek government to upgrade his office to an 'authority,' with him serving as its first Director General. In 1948, he became Minister-Coordinator of the Greek Recovery Programme and Undersecretary of the Ministry of Co-ordination. He was subsequently promoted to Permanent Secretary of Housing and appointed to oversee the disposition of US Marshall funds earmarked for the nation's refugee housing and resettlement programme. His benefactorsespecially those from the US-recognized in Doxiadis an ability to act decisively, and to synthesize the ideas and concepts of his colleagues and subordinates. For instance, to solve Greece's housing crisis, he devised a programme of material standardization and design conformity that allowed for the rapid erection of a number of flats. Doxiadis' efforts in the Greek recovery programme gained him a measure of recognition among international development agencies. Accordingly, in 1955, his firm, Doxiadis Associates, was selected to provide architectural services to the jointly sponsored Pakistan-Ford Foundation's Academies of Village Development at Comilla and Peshawar. 13 This was followed by an appointment later that year as the rural housing consultant to the Ford Foundation-sponsored Harvard Advisory Council to the government of Pakistan.' 4 It appears that it was at this time that Doxiadis was first introduced to Ayub Khan. Doxiadis secured a number of lucrative contracts with the Ayub Khan government from the late 1950s up to the midl 960s. In addition to the Islamabad project and to the Comilla and Peshawar Academies of Village Development,15 he was awarded contracts for projects in Karachi (Korangi, North Karachi, Korangi Military Airport, and 37 primary and secondary schools), Faisalabad (the New Campus at Faisalabad Agriculture College), Lahore (the New Campus at the University of the Punjab, the Educational Extension Centre), and Rawalpindi (Liaquat Memorial, Rawalpindi Polytechnical Institute). 16 He was also commissioned to design a number of schools in East Pakistan. Of these projects, however, it was Islamabad that was to be Doxiadis' most ambitious venture. As

0191t1zea by

Google

Origiral frcn1

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

362

PAKJSTAN AT THE MILLENNIUM

Doxiadis ( 1965: 1) himself has noted, Islamabad demonstrated 'in actual practice, and in the best possible way, the implementation of my analysis.' Nonetheless, if he had hopes to create what he referred to as an 'ekistically' balanced urban society (see Doxiadis 1968), he had also to deal with the demands and expectations of government officials. This was especially so in the case of Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan. As was previously mentioned, a great deal more is known about Mohammad Ayub Khan's background than is the case for Constantinos Doxiadis. His younger days in his home village of Rehana, his educational experiences at Aligarh and Sandhurst, and his subsequent military and political careers have all been amply chronicled in a number of biographical and analytical publications. To recount . these formative influences as they affected Ayub Khan would be needlessly redundant. Instead, the objective here is to develop an initial understanding of how his experiences as a British Indian army officer may have helped shaped the vision of his new city. Throughout the latter half of the nineteenth century, the British Indian Army had followed a policy of explicit discrimination against their Muslim soldiers and officers. Of course, it is well known that the roots of anti-Muslim sentiment run deep into the very fabric of European society and culture, and predate the advent of European colonization of India by some good number of centuries (Said 1978). The policies the British implemented in India are, therefore, of little surprise. Yet, the latter half of the 1800s saw a dramatic upsurge in antiMuslim prejudice, culminating in its elevation to the status of official military doctrine. This upswing in anti-Muslim sentiments was in large part precipitated by the British belief that the Muslims of India had been instrumental in instigating the abortive revolt of 1857. Subsequent to the suppression of the revolt, the British turned their attention to identifying the causes of the uprising. A special commission was appointed by Parliament to look into the matter. Its charge consisted of two objectives: (I) to identify the causes

0191t1zea by

Google

Origiral frcn1

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

AYUB KHAN, CONSTANTINOS OOXIADIS & ISLAMABAD

363

for the revolt; and, (2) to suggest possible administrative and military reforms needed to prevent its recurrence. The Peel Commission concluded that the growth of 'caste' and caste sentiment had created an alternative basis of social relations, thereby challenging the military chain of command. To render caste innocuous, the Commission considered a number of organizational changes. Among these was the suggestion that the army pursue a policy of divide et impera as it set out to replace the units that it had lost during the revolt (see Cohen 1990; MacMunn 1980; Beaumont 1977; and Saxena 1974: 86-94). The army often found it difficult to follow the recommendations of the Peel Commission. This was especially so in regard to the 'lesser' native armies of Madras and Bombay, which had remained loyal to the British during the uprising. 17 However, the Commission's recommendations were followed more closely in regard to the rebuilding of the Bengal Army. Here, the principle of divide et impera was implemented through the system of 'class' company recruitment. In this system, each company was composed exclusively of soldiers recruited from members of a similar 'class,' with different class companies serving to counter-balance each other. 18 In the words of Sir George MacMunn (1980:2 [1911)) the army that was thus destined to 'uphold the empire of Hindustan' was to be 'based on a systematic grouping of men by race and sect and clan, with a view to the full development of race efficiency.' Efficiency in this context was to be measured by the company's espirit d'corps, by its inherent (and racially defmed) fighting spirit, as much as it was by the balance of power the military achieved among the different social classes represented within the army. Over time, the 'class' company system came to be the modal unit of the Bengal army (Saxena 1974: 94-99). The threat of Russian e'l,pansion and advances in transportation and communications technologies during the latter half of the 1800s led to the gradual broadening of the organizational role 'caste' played in the Native Army (Saxena 1974:100-117). While the seeds of this idea had been planted

0191t1zea by

Google

Origiral frcn1

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

364

PAKISTAN AT THE MILLENNIUM

some decades earlier (it is inherent to the 'class' company system), during the 1870s and 1880s the British raised a number of companies, battalions, and even regiments from the 'martial caste' groups of North and North-west India. 19 Given the demography of religious groups in the north-west and their exemplary history of support for the British cause, it was inevitable that the British would raise army units consisting entirely of Muslims (e.g., Pathans). 20 Yet, in spite of mounting pressure to do so, the British remained steadfast in their commitment to the policy recommendations of the Peel Commission, at least in regard to their Muslim subjects. As a consequence, the British never allowed a Muslim officers corps to form that would be comparable in organizational scope to those of the Sikhs or Hindus. In fact, the lack of a Muslim unit of battalion size was one of the major deficiencies that hampered the formation of a Pakistan national army in 1947 (Ayub Khan 1967:20). The attention the British lavished on its Indian Army and the role the latter played in defending the empire-not just in the subcontinent, but throughout Britain's far flung imperial possessions-gave rise to a belief common among many sectors of Muslim, Hindu, and Sikh Indian officer corps that it was they, rather than their civilian counterparts, who constituted the organs and instruments of British governance within India (see Cohen 1984). On this basis, it seems reasonable to conclude that the military's interpretation of the events leading up to the founding of Pakistan-especially the relative tardiness of the Muslim League's adoption of the demand for Pakistan-differed in certain key respects from that of their civilian counterparts. To Muslim army officers, such as Ayub Khan, the chronology of events leading to the founding of Pakistan must have suggested to them that the military reforms of the 1850s had indeed achieved the intended effect. That is to say, the British policy of fragmentation had succeeded in forestalling the development of an all-Indian political identity within the ethnic minority community of Muslim India.

0191t1zea by

Google

Origiral frcn1

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

AYUB KHAN. CONSTANTINOS DOXIADIS & ISLAMABAD

365

The appointment of Ayub Khan in 1951 as the Commanderin-Chief of Pakistan ushered in a new era in Pakistan's military history. For the first time, the army had at its head a Pakistani, rather than a British army officer. This was also the occasion for yet another round of military reform. Under Ayub Khan, the army shed many of the vestiges that had remained from its colonial past. Differences in dress that had been used to mark the ethnic distinctiveness of a particular company were dropped and the 'class company' recruitment system abandoned. Added to this was the growing importance of Islam as a bond that bridged the divide among companies, as well as between officers andjawans (lit. young men), and military and civilian personnel. Although there continued to be regional disparities in recruitment, these changes allowed the military to claim that it had created a truly 'national' army (Cohen 1984:32-51). In assuming power as the country's first military dictator in 1958, Ayub Khan was confronted with problems that were in some sense similar in nature to those that had challenged British rule in the mid-l 800s. The state of national politics was in complete disarray. As had been the British experience in 1857 in the cities of India, it was principally in Pakistan's towns and cities, especially Karachi, that the country was experiencing its greatest turmoil. Politicians, business families, bureaucrats, religious leaders and others were increasingly recalcitrant to the idea that they needed to forego personal gain in favour of promoting the greater interests of the nation. In regard to their contributions to the country's travails, Ayub Khan distinguished the masses from the politicians, business families, and bureaucrats. To the latter he attributed responsibility for the lack of national unity, while he believed the masses to be wellmeaning, but easily misled due to a lack of education and political experience. They were thus susceptible to the artful manipulations of politicians and community leaders who played on the atavistic loyalties and sentiments of their supporters in order to further their own personal political interests. In seeking solutions to the seemingly insurmountable task of instilling discipline and ensuring the fidelity of these perceived

0191t1zea by

Google

Origiral frcn1

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

366

PAKISTAN AT THE MILLENNIUM

minor1t1es, Ayub Khan drew equally heavily from the organizational reforms enacted by the British following the 1857 revolt as well as from those he had himself implemented in the early 1950s.21 As the British had in the 1800s, Ayub Khan saw it as his task to suppress those political identities that competed with the state for the loyalty of its citizens. Having done so, be could in turn implement the types of organizational reforms that the army underwent in the 1950s. While a number of his programmes provide glimpses of the operation of these policies (see, e.g., Ewing 1983; Ziring 1971), perhaps nowhere is their legacy more evident, yet less widely recognized, than in the design of the Master Plan of Islamabad.

To Control, To Erase, To Inscribe: The Politics of the Islamabad Master Plan The organization of the city's residential sectors was critical to promoting political responsibility and nurturing the nationalist sentiments of the city's denizens.22 The disposition of housing, the layout of the city's road network, the allocation of community services and so forth were all wedded to these overriding political objectives. In terms of its physical dimensions, community services, for instance, were to be allocated in overabundance in the city's southern residential sectors. This was to have the desired effect of eliminating the need for the poor to leave the close confines of their local neighbourhood. Concomitant with this, was the imposition of a highly dendritic road network-again based on an ostensible hierarchy of allocations-that fragmented the city's densely settled sectors, effectively rendering these neighbourhoods amenable to the state's technologies of intervention and control (see Doxiadis Associates 1963b). The housing allocation scheme had similar objectives. As-was mentioned previously, housing and property were to be allocated on the basis of civil service rank (or income equivalency). Within this allocation schedule, families were to

0191t1zea by

Google

Origiral frcn1

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

AYUB KHAN, CONSTANTINOS OOXIADIS & ISLAMABAD

367

relocate as they ascended the civil service ladder. A system of social stratification was, therefore, to develop within the city that was remarkably similar to that of a military chain-ofcommand (Meier 1985:213). As in the military, promotion meant that a family had to cut ties with old friends and neighbours, and, in settling among families of a higher socio-economic class, put down new roots (Doxiadis Associates 1963c:177; Jamoud 1968:958). The government's dominance in the local economy was another pillar in its disciplinary regime. If loyalty to the state was not to be proffered freely, then obedience was to be purchased at the price of the bare bones fact that the government was the leading economic institution within the city. Not only this, but the government enjoyed the added leverage that came with it, being the largest landlord within the city, often leasing its property to its own employees. 23 Such economic predominance as was achieved by these measures, was amplified further by the location selected as the site for the new Capital. Nearly l 000 miles distant from Karachi, and in a relatively under-developed economic region, the isolation of the new Capital at the Potwar Plateau ensured the government that its bureaucrats, if they did not remain loyal to Ayub Khan, would, at the very least, suppress whatever dissenting political views they held in consideration of their continued employment. But compliance does not necessarily imply unwavering support. Having once ensured the political complacency of the city's denizens, and having rendered innocuous alternative forms of group cohesion, Is lamabad had also to nurture the growth of nationalist sentiment among city residents. Aside from the material inducements to which the government had ready-made recourse-patronage, jobs, and land-the symbols of the nation were also bent to the state's will in order to complement and complete the effects achieved by the government's interventions in other sectors of urban society. The spatial layout of the city's physical structures was a central feature of this effort, especially in regard to the site location of the Presidential Mansion. By-laws regulating the

0191t1zea by

Google

Origiral frcn1

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

368

PAKJSTAN AT THE MlLLENNIUM

design and layout of residential and commercial structures were enacted with the stated intent of ensuring the visual predominance of the Presidential estate in relation to all public and private buildings, whether in the administrative sector or located in the city at large (Doxiadis Associates l96la). As a consequence of this design feature, one of the central institutions of state governance:--the National Assembly building-was visually subordinated to the Presidency, indicative of the historic weakness of the former. In this regard, it is of equal significance to compare this spatial relationship to that between the Presidency and two other key national structures-the Supreme Court and the Central Secretariat. Their spatial location relative to the Presidency does not subject them to the same degree of visual subordination as does the treatment of the National Assembly building. This is suggestive of the somewhat more autonomous role that each of these institutions have historically exercised. Yet, that the Presidency is the terminal feature of the city's axis, rather than these other structures, serves as a constant reminder that each, in their own way, remains dependent upon the Central government for its existence, much as does the city as a whole.

Conclusion and Implications The Master Plan was a product of the collaborative relationship between Constantinos Doxiadis and Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan. Together they composed a carefully scripted and dramaturgical statement that sought to exalt the status and political power of the government's executive branch. By locating the Presidential Mansion at the very epicentre of the city, the President, in the form of his residence, was to be metaphorically linked to the urban project of Islamabad in a manner that was similar in design and nature to the role his regime sought to play in the modernist project of nationbuilding.

0191t1zea by

Google

Origiral frcn1

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

AYUB KHAN, CONSTANTINOS OOXIADIS & ISLAMABAD

369

It is obvious to even the most casual of observers that in attempting to achieve its political ends, Islamabad incorporates many of the general planning conventions of the modernist movement in architecture and urban planning. Techno-rational functionalism, a leitmotif of the modernist project, constitutes an underlying thematic principle of the city's Master Plan. Moreover, as is the case with other 'modem' cities such as Brasflia and Washington, Islamabad participates in the modernist project of national creation and self-reproduction. By mixing the symbolic with the material, each city seeks to promote and secure the loyalty and patriotism of its citizens, and in turn, to tie these sentiments to the state's project of national reproduction. Yet, in comparing these planned capital cities, one is equally struck by the vast differences in layout and design that obtain among them. Each city exhibits a unique combination of architectural elements and distinctive spatial arrangementS. Thus, while it is undeniable that the designs of the planned capital cities of the twentieth century are linked to, and an artifact of, the homogenizing effects of modernity and global capitalism (following Vale 1992),2• the Islamabad case demonstrates that the architectural expression of such forces is mediated by and made comprehensible from within the spatial locus of the personal, social, and political factors that infuse Islamabad's Master Plan with meaning and substance.

NOTES I. Holston (1989), Nilsson (1973, 1982), and Vale (1992), among others, have investigated the modem design principles of post-colonial cities. Discussions of colonial urbanism have also benefited from a concern with similar and related issues (see, e.g., AISayyad 1992; King 1976; Oldenberg 1984; Rabinow 1989; and Wright 1991 ). 2. In his 'political autobiography,' Friends, Not Masters, Ayub Khan (1967:96-97) asserts that the Special Commission recommended the Potwar Plateau as the site for the new capital. This has been ensconced as part of the city's official history, appearing repeatedly in various government publications. I have not had the opportunity to review the

0191t1zea by

Google

Origiral frcn1

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

370

3.

4. 5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

PAKISTAN ATTHE MILLENNIUM

Special Commission's Final Report, as it has not been released to the public. However, a summary of the Commission's Final Report submitted to the Government of Pakistan by Constantinos Doxiadis indicates that the Special Commission concluded its deliberations with a recommendation for further study (Doxiadis Associates 1959a:83-89). It should be noted that this was not the only instance that a commission dissented from Ayub Khan's stated intentions (in this regard, see The Report of the Constitution Commission of 1961). The early history of Pakistan had been tarnished by the inability of the country's leaders to craft a constitutional formula for the allocation of national political power. A widely held view of the times was that the country's political travails were attributable to the corrupt political environment of Karachi. For the use of 'space' as an analytical category see Gottdiener 1985; Lefebvre 1991, and Yaeger 1996. The 'axial' nature of Islamabad (as well as innumerable other design features of the Islamabad Master Plan) adapts principles of urban planning devised and implemented by the fascist regimes of pre-World War II Europe (see Helmer 1985:69-94). In spite of this, intermixture of functions within the city is the norm rather than the exception, reducing the 'zones' of the Master Plan to little more than a fairly high scale locator map. The blurring of urban functions is a distinctive feature of the Islamabad Master Plan. Along with numerous other differences (such as the absence of high rise residential housing units), such functional blurring marlcs Islamabad in direct contradistinction to the 'modernist' principles of urban and regional planning formulated by the Conference Internationale d' Architecture Moderne. The latter group's famous 1933 Charter of Athens envisioned the adoption of a rigid urban grid that strictly segregated urban functions. Essential to the successful execution of the latter plan, was the expectation that city growth would be strictly limited and predetermined (see Sert 1942:246249). Economic segregation assumes a regional expression in the contrast between impoverished Rawalpindi (to the southwest) and wealthy Islamabad (to the Northeast). Doxiadis and Ayub Khan apparently met on a number of occasions in the 1950s and early 1960s. Unfortunately, no record was kept of these conversations (or has been made available to this author). The difficulty this poses is compounded by the absence of citations and references in the documents that Doxiadis and his associates provided to the Government of Pakistan. Details of Doxiadis life have been pieced together from a number of sources. In addition to primary sources and interviews, I have consulted standard biographical reference materials, trade journals, government

0191t1zea by

Google

Origiral frcn1

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

AYUB KHAN, CONSTANTINOS DOXIAOIS & ISLAMABAO

I 0.

11. 12.

13.

14.

15.

16.

17.

18. 19.

371

reports, popular magazines and oth« periodical publications. 0th« important sources of infonnation include the largely impressionistic biography by Philip Deane ( 1965) a memorial issue of Ekistics (Doxiadis Associates 1976), the 'Editor's Foreword' in Ecology and Ekistics (Doxiadis 1977) and materials gathtted at the offices of Doxiadis Associates in Athens and at the Capital Development Authority in Islamabad. Published as Raumordnung im griechischen Stiidtebau in 1937 and republished in translation in 1972 under the title of Architectural Space in Ancient Greece. For the importance of 'axiality' in the urban plans of this pet"iod see Helm« 1985. Doxiadis' (Doxiadis Associates 1962b) treatment of the 'scale of the city,' in which the discussion takes place literally in reference to a series of models, illustrates the extent to which 'scale models' substituted for reality. Schuman (1967:26) discusses the generous budget the Comilla project received, noting that Doxiadis' architectural services were paid directly by the Ford Foundation. Interestingly, Doxiadis recommended at that time that Pakistan build a new city to serve as the seat of the federal government (Doxiadis Associates l 959a:3). These projects were initiated in the mid- l 950s, but wei-e not implemented until the late 1950s. They were renamed the Pakistan (and later Bangladesh) Academies of Rural Development. This rather remarkable level of activity becomes that much more impressive when one considers that these constituted only a portion of the network of building and design projects that stretched across five continents. From 1857 to 1903, the ' British Indian Anny' comprised three distinct regional armies, that of the Bengal, Madras, and Bombay Presidencies. The anomalous existence of three distinct armies was a legacy of the history of British colonization of the subcontinent. That neither the Bombay nor Madras annies mutinied in 1857 was used to justify their continued existence long after they had ceased to perfonn any useful function. In this instance 'class' was a gloss for tribal, caste, racial, and religious differences. However, in contradistinction to the conditions within the pre-Mutiny Native Indian Anny, the superior and inferior 'caste' groups remained segregated from each other as the Peel Commission had recommended.

0191t1zea by

Google

Origiral frcn1

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

372

PAKISTAN AT THE MILLENNIUM

20. Although Pathans (as well as Sheikhs, Syeds, and Mughals) were Muslim, the British chose to emphasize ethnic distinctions rather than differences in religious affiliation. 21. In his political autobiography, Friends, Not Masters, Ayub Khan (1967:186) notes tellingly that he operated 'in a military fashion' in reaching his decision to launch a coup d'etat as well as in formulating his national programme of reconstruction. 22. Ayub Khan did not invoke ethnic, class, or religious affiliation to mobilize political support. Rather, he chose to institute a highly centraliz.ed political system modeled on the basis of the military/state bureaucracy (see Ziring 1971). 23. The government's economic predominance was especially pronounced during the early stages of the city's history. Not only were the structures of the administrative sector among the first buildings to be erected, but fully 90% of the residents in G-6---the first residential sector to be completed-were government employees. While the government's presence in the local economy was to be reduced over time, it was projected that even by the year 2000 over 50% of the local labour force was to be employed by the government (Doxiadis Associates l 960c). 24. Vale ( 1992) includes these cities in his comparative overview of planned cities. His comparisons are not sharply drawn as he is more concerned with unearthing shared commonalties, rather than identifying what is unique about each project.

Bibliography Al Sayyad, Nezar, ed. Forms of Dominance: On the Architecture and Urbanism of the Colonial Enterprise. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 1992. Ayub Khan, Mohammad. Friends Not Masters: A Political Autobiography. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1967. Beaumont, Roger. Sword of the Raj: The British Anny in India. 1747-1947. Indianapolis and New Yori