Oceans of Crime: Maritime Piracy and Transnational Security in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh 9789814279437

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Oceans of Crime

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IIAS/ISEAS Series on Maritime Issues and Piracy in Asia

Series Advisory Board

• Professor Alfred Soons Institute for the Law of the Sea, Utrecht, The Netherlands

• Vice-Admiral Mihir Roy Society for Indian Ocean Studies, Delhi, India

• Professor Hasjim Djalal Department of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries, Jakarta, Indonesia

• Dr Peter Chalk Rand Corporation, California, United States

• Professor Dr J.L. Blussé van Oud-Alblas Leiden University, The Netherlands • Professor Togo Kazuhiko Princeton University/IIAS • Professor Jean-Luc Domenach Sciences-Po, Paris, Italy/ Tsinghua University, Beijing, People’s Republic of China • Dr Mark Valencia Maritime Policy Expert, Hawaii, United States

• Dr Stein Tönnesson International Peace Research Institute, Norway • Dr John Kleinen University of Amsterdam, The Netherlands • Professor James Warren Murdoch University, Australia • Mr Tanner Campbell Maritime Intelligence Group, Washington, D.C., United States

The IIAS/ISEAS Series on Maritime Issues and Policy in Asia is an initiative to catalyse research on the topic of piracy and robbery in the Asian seas. Considerable attention in the popular media has been directed to maritime piracy in recent years reflecting the fact/ perception that piracy is again a growing concern for coastal nations of the world. The epicentre of global pirate activity is the congested sea-lanes of Southeast Asia but attacks have been registered in wide-scattered regions of the world. The International Institute for Asian Studies (IIAS) is a post-doctoral research centre based in Leiden and Amsterdam, the Netherlands. IIAS’ main objective is to encourage Asian studies in the humanities and social sciences — and their interaction with other sciences — by promoting national and international co-operation in these fields. IIAS publications reflect the broad scope of the Institute’s interests. The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) was established in Singapore as an autonomous organization in 1968. It is a regional centre dedicated to the study of sociopolitical, security and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its wider geostrategic and economic environment. ISEAS Publishing has issued over 2,000 scholarly books and journals since 1972.

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IIAS-P5 title page.pdf

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IIAS/ISEAS Series on Maritime Issues and Piracy in Asia

Oceans of Crime Maritime Piracy and Transnational Security in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh

Carolin Liss

International Institute for Asian Studies The Netherlands

Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Singapore

First published in Singapore in 2011 by ISEAS Publishing Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 E-mail: [email protected] Website: All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. © 2011 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies The responsibility for facts and opinions in this publication rests exclusively with the author and her interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the publishers or their supporters. ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Liss, Carolin. Oceans of crime : maritime piracy & transnational security in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh. 1. Pirates—Southeast Asia. 2. Maritime terrorism—Southeast Asia. 3. Pirates—Bangladesh. 4. Maritime terrorism—Bangladesh. I. Title. HV6431 A8L77 2011 ISBN 978-981-4279-46-8 (soft cover) ISBN 978-981-4279-43-7 (E-book PDF) Photo Credit Cover photo reproduced with kind permission of Karsten von Hoesslin. This book is meant for educational and learning purposes. The authors of the book have taken all reasonable care to ensure that the contents of the book do not violate any existing copyright or other intellectual property rights of any person in any manner whatsoever. In the event the authors have been unable to track any source and if any copyright has been inadvertently infringed, please notify the publisher in writing for corrective action.

Typeset by Superskill Graphics Pte Ltd Printed in Singapore by

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In memory of my father, Helmut Liss

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Oceans of Crime

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CONTENTS Maps, Tables, and Photos

xi

List of Abbreviations

xv

Acknowledgements

xvii

Introduction A Brief Historical Overview of Piracy in Southeast Asia Contemporary Maritime Piracy — A Chimera? The Significance of Piracy: The Objectives and Structure of this Study Part I: Contemporary Piracy in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh 1.

2.

Pirate Attacks on Merchant Vessels in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh, 1980–2006 Introduction Piracy in Southeast Asia in the 1980s Piracy in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh from the Early 1990s to 2006 Conclusion Piracy and Fishers: Attacks on Small Craft in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh Introduction Attacks on and by Fishers since the Late 1970s Attacks on Yachts and Fishing Vessels from 1990 to 2006 Conclusion

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1 1 6 9 19

21 21 22 23 45

55 55 56 61 89

viii

Contents

Part II: The Sea

97

3.

The Fishing Industry Introduction Fishing in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh Fishers and/as Pirates Beyond Piracy — Security Implications Conclusion

99 99 100 109 118 125

4.

Merchant Shipping Introduction International Regulatory Regimes Exploitation of Security Weaknesses by Pirates Beyond Piracy — Security Implications Conclusion

135 135 136 149 157 161

Part III: The Dark Side

171

5.

Organized Crime Introduction Organized Crime Organized Crime and Piracy Beyond Piracy — Security Implications Conclusion

173 173 174 183 201 207

6.

Terrorist and Guerrilla Movements Introduction Terrorists and Guerrillas Terrorists and Guerrillas and/as Pirates Beyond Piracy — Security Implications Conclusion

220 220 221 230 244 251

Part IV: Counter-Forces

265

7.

267 267

State Responses to Piracy Introduction States, Borders, and Militaries in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh

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268

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Contents

Resources and Corruption — The Impact upon Piracy Beyond Piracy — Security Implications Conclusion 8.

Privatizing the Fight against Piracy Introduction Privatization of Security Privatizing the Fight against Piracy Piracy and Beyond — Security Implications Conclusion

275 303 309 321 321 322 328 331 347

Conclusion

359

Appendix 1

363

Appendix 2

366

Bibliography

369

Index

407

About the Author

426

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MAPS, TABLES, AND PHOTOS Maps Map 1.1 Map 1.2

East and Southeast Asia Ports and Indicative Shipping Routes in the Malacca Strait

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Map 2.1 Map 2.2 Map 2.3

Bangladesh Malacca Strait Southern Philippines

59 73 85

Map 3.1

Riau Archipelago

Map 7.1 Map 7.2a Map 7.2b

Route of Hijacked MT Selayang 281 Maritime Zones in the Malacca Strait (As Claimed) 297 Maritime Zones in the Malacca Strait (In Accordance with International Law) 298

Tables Table 1.1 Table 1.2

Table 1.3 Table 1.4a Table 1.4b

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Attacks and Attempted Attacks Worldwide, the Asian Region, Southeast Asia, and Bangladesh 1992–2006 27 Location of Actual and Attempted Attacks: China Area, Southeast Asia, and Bangladesh, 1993–2006 28 Actual and Attempted Attacks in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh: Types of Vessel by Year, 1995–2006 33 Actual Attacks in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh: Hijackings by Location, 1995–2006 35 Actual Attacks in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh: Boardings by Location, 1995–2006 35

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xii Table 1.5 Table 1.6 Table 1.7 Table 1.8 Table 2.1 Table 2.2 Table 2.3 Table 5.1 Table 5.2

Photos Photo 1.1 Photo 1.2

Photo 2.1

Maps, Tables, and Photos

Types of Vessel Hijacked in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh, 1995–2006 Actual Attacks by Status of Vessel, Location, and Year, 1997–2006 Types of Arms by Location and Year, 1997–2006 Types of Violence by Location and Year, 1997–2006

39 46 48

Actual Attacks on Fishing Vessels in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh: IMB Reports, 1995–2006 Attacks in Sabah — Different Sources, 1991–2006 Attacks in Sabah Waters by Vessel Type, 2001–2003

66 83 83

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Details of Pirates — Selayang Hijacking Hijackings by Vessel Type: Southeast Asia and Bangladesh, 1995–2006

190

The Renamed Petchem Cabin of Petchem Where Crew Members Were Held Hostage

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199

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Photo 2.3 Photo 2.4 Photo 2.5 Photo 2.6 Photo 2.7 Photo 2.8

Bangladeshi Fishers Performing a Play Based on their Experiences with Pirates Bangladeshi Fishers Producing a Poster for Anti-piracy Demonstrations Kuala Perlis Fishing Boat, Kuala Perlis Fishing Boat, Teluk Bahang Fishing Boat, Hutan Melintang Traditional Fishing Boats, Semporna Fishing Net, Semporna

Photo 3.1 Photo 3.2

Polluted Coast of Semporna Fishing Boats, Hutan Melintang

103 116

Photo 4.1 Photo 4.2

Alondra Rainbow Renamed Bullet Holes inside Alondra Rainbow

152 153

Photo 2.2

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69 70 74 75 78 81 86 87

xiii

Maps, Tables, and Photos

Photo 5.1 Photo 5.2 Photo 5.3 Photo 5.4 Photo 5.5

Renamed Selayang Original Name Obscured Belongings of Pirates Nylon Ropes and Fire Hydrants Brought on Board by Pirates Crew Members Demonstrating How They Were Restrained

Photos 7.1–7.3 Malaysian Marine Police Counter-Piracy Demonstration at Tri-Annual IMB Piracy Conference 2007 Photo 7.4 Military Personnel Stationed on Sipadan Island Photo 7.5 Fast Military Vessel, Semporna Photo 7.6 Police Boats, Semporna

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186 186 187 188 189

285–86 288 289 289

Oceans of Crime

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AFP ARF ASEAN CSI CTI EEZ EiS ETA FAO FBI FERIT FOC FPDA GAM GRT hp IACS ILO IMB IMO IPOA IRI ISPS Code ITF IUU fishing JI JWC

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Armed Forces of the Philippines ASEAN Regional Forum Association of Southeast Asian Nations Container Security Initiative Counter Terrorism International Exclusive Economic Zone Eyes in the Sky Euskadi ta Askatasuna, Basque Homeland and Freedom Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations Federal Bureau of Investigation (USA) Far East Regional Investigation Team Flag of Convenience Five Power Defence Arrangements Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, Free Aceh Movement Gross Registered Tons/Tonnage Horsepower International Association of Classification Societies International Labour Organization International Maritime Bureau International Maritime Organization International Peace Operations Association International Registries Incorporated International Ship and Port Facility Security Code International Transport Workers’ Federation Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing Jemaah Islamiyah Joint War Committee

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xvi LISCR LTTE MALSINDO MECC mgt MILF MISC MMEA MNLF New PULO NGO PLO PMC PNG PRC PSC PSI PULO ReCAAP RMN RMSI RUF SLOC SOLAS SSA SUA TNI UN UNCLOS UNCTAD WMD

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Abbreviations

Liberian International Ship and Corporate Register Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia agreement to conduct coordinated patrols in the Malacca Strait Maritime Enforcement Coordination Centre (Malaysia) Million gross tons Moro Islamic Liberation Front Malaysian International Shipping Corporation Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency Moro National Liberation Front New Pattani United Liberation Organization Non-Governmental Organization Palestine Liberation Organization Private Military Company Papua New Guinea Piracy Reporting Centre (IMB) Private Security Company Proliferation Security Initiative Pattani United Liberation Organization Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia Royal Malaysian Navy Regional Maritime Security Initiative Revolutionary United Front (Liberia) Sea Lanes of Communication Safety of Life at Sea Singapore Shipping Association Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Marine Navigation Convention Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian Military United Nations United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea United Nations Conference on Trade and Development Weapons of Mass Destruction

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS No book is ever written alone. Indeed, without the help of a number of people in Europe, Southeast Asia, and Australia, I could not have completed my Ph.D. thesis on which this book is based and I hope they realize how much their assistance is appreciated. Starting in Europe, I would like to thank my extended family, particularly my mother, Christl Liss, and her partner Ralf Liebe, for their relentless support, and my brother Fabian Liss, for the many packages containing not only books on piracy. Thanks are also due to Helmut Bley (University of Hannover), without whom I would not have been able to come to Australia, and Arndt Graf (University of Frankfurt) for his support over the past several years. In Germany and the Netherlands I extend my gratitude to Erica Pladdet, Georg Mischuk, and Mark Bruyneel, who share my interest in piracy. In Great Britain I would like to thank Lena Waldbaer and Svenja and Sven Hanson, who generously shared their home with me. Also, Pottungal Mukundan, director of the IMB, deserves mention for answering my countless e-mails over the years. Stopping over in Southeast Asia thanks are due to a range of people who made my two years in Singapore and Malaysia not only productive, but also enjoyable. Some of the most helpful people, however, asked to remain anonymous, but “thank you” nonetheless. In Malaysia, I am particularly grateful for the help I received from Zarina Othman (University Kebangsaan Malaysia) who put me in contact with valuable informants. Also, without the assistance of Mak Joon Num, his language skills, and his small 4WD, some of the most valuable interviews conducted in remote communities along the Malacca Strait would not have taken place. Furthermore, Sani S. and his extended family deserve special mentioning. Sani not only organized interviews for me, but also taught me much about local politics and the culture in Sabah. He became a good friend and kept me informed about local events (often with phone calls between two and

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Acknowledgements

four in the morning) after I returned to Australia. In Singapore, I would like to thank Ambassador K. Kesavapany, Director of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, as well as Lee Hock Guan, Remco Oostendorp, Atzimba Luna Becerril, and so many others for their support while I was based at ISEAS. I was also fortunate to be associated with the Asia Research Institute (ARI), National University of Singapore. At ARI, I was struck by (and greatly appreciated) the friendliness of its researchers who made me feel welcome. Deserving particular mention in this regard are Li Tang, Paul Hutchcroft, Geoff Wade, and Eric Tagliacozzo. In Singapore, I also extend my gratitude to Namunu Maddage, who always made me laugh, and who learned more about piracy and the privatization of security than he ever wanted to. In Australia, I am grateful to Helen White, who is a good friend and a fantastic editor. I would also like to thank Karl Uher for keeping me (and the Beetle) on the road despite my constant shortage of funds. I also appreciated the help of Ian Austin (Edith Cowan University) who “volunteered” to read the entire draft of the thesis. Thanks also to Bruce who often tried to cheer me up when I looked particularly stressed out. At Murdoch University, I would like to thank Anne Randell for showing compassion at a time when I really needed it. Furthermore, I extend my gratitude to everyone at the Asia Research Centre (ARC), including director Garry Rodan, for providing funding and a good place for me to write and an entertaining atmosphere to have lunch. At the ARC, I would particularly like to thank James Boyd, Miyume Tanji, Carol Warren, Kanishka Jayasuriya, Ian Wilson, Malcolm Tull, Jane Hutchison, Jeannette Taylor, and Kurt Stenross for their comments. I am also indebted to Narrelle Morris for her invaluable help with endnote, to Dirk Steenbergen for the title and to Toby Carroll for his untiring and necessary assistance and friendship. Moreover, a very special thank you goes to Tamara Dent (and her family), whose patience, support, skills, friendship, and generosity do not seem to have a limit. I am also grateful for the comments I received from the examiners of my thesis. John Butcher (Griffith University) and Brian M. Jenkins (RAND) have been particularly helpful and I am thankful for the time and energy they spent and the insights they provided. Finally, without doubt the best elements of this study owe much to the efforts of James Francis Warren, who, as supervisor, not only made exhaustive comments on all aspects of the research and writing, but also had the patience to deal with an often rather stubborn German.

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Introduction

INTRODUCTION Young Elizabeth: I think it’d be rather exciting to meet a pirate. Norrington: Think again, Miss Swann. Vile and dissolute creatures, the lot of them. Pirates of the Carribbean1

Everybody knows what a pirate is. We all have mental images of bearded men with earrings, a peg leg, an eyepatch, and a parrot on the shoulder as epitomized by Robert Louis Stevenson’s Long John Silver. The activities of pirates also do not seem very mysterious: they attack vessels and steal whatever they can lay their hands on. However this popular, Western literary-historical notion of a pirate is far too simplistic. Indeed, “piracy” has been associated with a variety of economic and political activities and has carried different connotations over space and time. Hence, definitions of piracy have varied historically and culturally and are highly contested by individuals, groups, and nations. The label “pirate” is inevitably emotive, and linked to particular cultural-historical contexts and moments in globalregional time, especially in Southeast Asia, where the scourge of piracy and its eradication featured largely in the annals of colonial mercantile history. In the past, the categorization of individuals or ethnic groups as “pirates” was ascribed to local “marauders” by colonial powers, signifying a powerful value judgement which was invariably connected to political and territorial ambitions, world commerce, and economic growth. Given the long history of piracy in Southeast Asia, it is necessary to discuss briefly the historical background of sea robbery in the region before shifting the focus to contemporary piracy.

A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF PIRACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA Long before the arrival of the Europeans in the sixteenth century, insular Southeast Asia was inhabited by Muslim people of Malay origin, who

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were much involved in maritime raiding and trading.2 Opportunistic attacks conducted by maritime people, such as fishers and petty traders, were common throughout the region, but particularly in the adjacent waters of the kingdoms and entrepots of Kedah, Perak, Selangor, Malacca, and Johor. Furthermore, more sophisticated and well organized attacks and slave raids against coastal communities were conducted by certain maritime ethnic groups in the region, which intensified with the arrival of the European seaborne powers in Southeast Asia, and the ensuing transformation of the global and regional economy. Indeed, the occurrence of “piracy” and the intensity and nature of such attacks in Southeast Asia has often been inextricably linked to the presence and trade of European powers in the region. Even the label “pirate” is “essentially a European one”3 that was used by the colonial powers to characterize and/or demonize as criminal and barbaric activities which thwarted European interests, but were generally considered legitimate political or commercial endeavours by local inhabitants.4 In fact, as Tarling points out, in previous centuries in the Malay world there was “often a strong political element to robbery and violence at sea”,5 with slave raids and attacks usually sponsored by local rulers or communities.6 Scholars such as Warren have indeed convincingly demonstrated that certain local autonomous states, such as the Sulu Sultanate in today’s southern Philippines, flourished, using slave raids and piratical activities as instruments of statecraft to enhance their political power and economic prosperity.7 Such patronage of raids by local rulers and communities offered the maritime marauders a comparatively safe haven to launch their raids and sell their booty. These state supported raids were, therefore, characterized by a relatively high level of organization and involved large numbers of vessels and marauders. The raiding vessels originating from places such as Sulu and Riau-Lingga were usually well equipped with gunpowder, arms, and weaponry and the sea raiders were feared for their brutality and ruthlessness in coastal communities throughout the region. Given the high degree of state sponsorship, the raiders were not considered outlaws by their own communities and the expeditions were mostly led by rulers, aristocrats, or respected warriors of various indigenous societies.8 State sponsorship also determined the targets of these raiders, with booty sought that was of real advantage not only for the attackers themselves, but also for their sponsors. The raiders targeted any kind of

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Introduction

vessel, ranging from local fishing boats to large European merchant ships, as well as defenceless coastal communities. While goods such as opium, arms, textiles, rice, and marine products were seized, the principal and most favoured loot were captives. Slaves were in demand not only among the colonial powers, but also in Southeast Asian societies in which the status and power of a ruler rested on the control of people and not necessarily the control of land.9 In the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, some vigorous predatory headhunting coastal tribal groups were notorious among both Europeans and locals for conducting pirate attacks and shoreline raids. Among the most feared were the Sea Dayaks from northwest Borneo, who regularly attacked commercial vessels along the coast of Sarawak, a district under the rule of the sultan of Brunei. Furthermore, in the Riau-Lingga archipelago and south-eastern Sumatra, along several busy trade routes, Orang Laut pirate communities existed in which sultans and the local elite of Johor actively sponsored and supported sizeable raids between the mid-seventeenth and the early nineteenth centuries.10 However it was the Iranun and Balangingi — the Vikings of Asia — who posed the most serious threat to trade routes and trade itself in Southeast Asia. The Iranun and Balangingi raids were sponsored by the Sulu Sultanate to acquire slaves. To satisfy European requirements for the China trade, the Sulu Sultanate and local Taosug aristocrats and merchants were forced to increase the production of sea cucumber, bird’s nest, and other sought after exotic commodities drastically, which in turn required the constant supply of additional labour power to collect, harvest, and distribute these products. Consequently, long-distance slave raids were organized, outfitted and conducted under the patronage of the Sultan of Sulu or coastal Taosug aristocrats in order to meet the escalating demand for additional labour. As commerce between China, the European powers, and local rulers intensified, maritime raiding and the regional trade in slaves became an integral, albeit independent, part of the commercial exchange of commodities.11 The long-distance maritime raids were conducted by the Iranun and Balangingi Samal who lived in fortified villages on the southern coast of Mindanao and Basilan, as well as on the islands of Balangingi and Tunkil. For the sea raiders, sponsors, and their communities, slave raiding and piracy were part of an honourable way of life and an important aspect of their societal system and statecraft. Furthermore, the raids were a powerful

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means of resisting encroachment by adversary powers, particularly nonMuslim states and forces. The raiding and slaving activities and resulting profits, therefore, strengthened the Iranun and Balangingi communities and the rulers and societies that sponsored the raids.12 To satisfy the increasing demand for slaves, the raiding voyages conducted by the Iranun and Balangingi encompassed the entire Southeast Asian region by 1798, including the Philippines, the Malacca Strait, the Gulf of Siam, the islands beyond Sulawesi, and the northern tip of Australia. The Sulu raiders were devastating and attacked with laser-like precision, targeting coastal settlements as well as vessels of any size, ranging from small fishing vessels in the Malacca Strait to large European ships engaged in the trade with China. By the 1840s the increasing number and scale of these fearsome attacks prompted anti-piracy counter-measures from all European powers present in the region.13 Indeed, the eradication of piracy had become politically important from the beginning of the nineteenth century onward, as the European presence in Southeast Asia began to change markedly in character. At the time, the British and Dutch colonial empires started to encroach upon the territories and seas of the Malay archipelago. As a result, indigenous states and societies, and their traditional economic interests, came increasingly into conflict with European imperial aspirations and expansions. Anti-piracy measures were, therefore, considered a strategic part of the colonial powers’ political reorganization of the region, aimed at weakening the power of Asian, and particularly Southeast Asian, societies, and protecting European commerce in the region. Furthermore, slave raiding and piracy also became ideologically incompatible with newly emerging European liberal principles, such as free trade and the rejection of the institution of slavery.14 The elimination of piracy in Southeast Asia proved to be a difficult and protracted affair and required not only the curbing of attacks on vessels, but also the abolition of the slave trade itself in the region, and the cooperation of the various colonial powers. It was, therefore, only in the 1860s, after the macro-imperial conflicts and rivalries between European states were resolved — albeit temporarily — and their conflicting colonial territorial claims in Southeast Asia largely settled, that any real progress was made towards the elimination of piracy in Southeast Asia. Methods employed to counter piracy and slave raiding included increased anti-piracy patrols and the collection of information

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about pirates and their sponsors, followed by sweeping attacks on pirate strongholds. Also, the development of the steam gunboat gave a major boost to the anti-piracy campaigns and, along with advances in weapons technology and the build-up of large navies by nations such as Great Britain, effectively brought an end to slave raiding and organized pirate raids in Southeast Asia by 1880.15 While the anti-piracy efforts of the colonial powers proved successful in fighting sophisticated organized pirate attacks and slave raids, piracy never disappeared entirely from Southeast Asian waters and opportunistic attacks on merchant vessels and small craft continued to occur. Only during World War II did attacks on merchant vessels cease, but small craft were still targeted. While attacks on all kinds of vessels resumed after the end of the war, comparatively little is known about pirate attacks on small craft and merchant vessels between the end of World War II and the early 1980s. Indeed, information available often only focuses on individual attacks or a spate of attacks in various locations in the region, which makes it difficult to assess the scope and magnitude of piracy at the time.16 However, it is clear that piracy changed in nature after World War II. Pirate attacks after the war were no longer supported and organized by entire maritime communities and states, and were no longer conducted to strengthen the political and economic character of sponsoring states and societies. Pirate attacks after World War II were instead either opportunistic attacks on vessels conducted by fishers or other seafarers, or the work of organized criminal gangs. There are some similarities between piracy in the past, particularly the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and the present. For example, pirates in the past and the present took advantage of similar economic and geographic conditions. Pirates in both eras have targeted vessels engaged in regional or international trade, and pirates at all times have operated in places geographically suitable for attacks. The Malacca Strait is one case in point, as vessels have to slow down to traverse the narrow waterway and small islands in and around the strait offer numerous hideouts for pirates.17 However, contemporary piracy in Southeast Asia is different in scope, character, and nature, from the long-distance maritime raids of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Today, raids on villages or towns are the exception and the booty sought by the perpetrators are no longer slaves, but cash, valuables, the cargo, or the vessel itself. Most important, however, is that piracy is at present an act of either opportunistic pirates,

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or organized criminal gangs, conducted for private ends. Piracy is, therefore, no longer a political or diplomatic instrument to strengthen or support the structure of pre-capitalist traditional states.18 Given these important fundamental differences between piracy in the past and at present, a more neutral, objective, and judicially applicable definition, one less socially judgemental, is generally used for contemporary piracy. While pirates are still identified as criminals, piracy is today largely defined by the systemic interdependent and interconnected nature of grey area activities conducted by pirates worldwide, and is no longer principally associated with certain ethnic groups.19 However, overall little is known about contemporary piracy in Southeast Asia and other parts of the world. Despite a range of literature and data on piracy published by academics, international institutions, and from within the maritime industry, serious anthropological and indepth criminological studies of piracy are still rare. Data and publications by institutions and authors from within the maritime industry often offer valuable insights, but in their contributions, piracy is usually not placed in the wider security, social, or political contexts. Also, until recently, academic publications have seldom been based on extensive fieldwork or archival research and, therefore, give only limited insights into modern-day piracy. Hence, little is known about the organization of pirate gangs and their financial and inter-institutional backings, the identity of pirates, and from which socio-economic background and strata of society they come, or whether or not members of local law enforcement agencies and radical politically motivated groups, such as terrorists, are involved in piracy. This book attempts to address some these shortcomings. It is based on extensive fieldwork conducted in Southeast Asia, Europe, and Australia, and aims, through a blend of fieldwork and social analysis, to provide a better understanding of modern-day piracy in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh. The book offers a very detailed examination of the root causes of contemporary piracy and places it in the broader social, political and security contexts by discussing the wider security implications of piracy and its root causes.

CONTEMPORARY MARITIME PIRACY — A CHIMERA? On 17 April 1998, the Singapore-owned tanker, Petro Ranger, was attacked by twelve Indonesian pirates on its journey from Singapore to Ho Chi

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Minh City, Vietnam. Under cover of darkness, the pirates climbed on board, took control of the vessel, and imprisoned the crew. To conceal the identity of the hijacked ship, the pirates renamed the 12,000 ton tanker Wilby and replaced the Singapore flag under which the vessel had been sailing with Honduran colours. A few days after the hijacking, the pirates rendezvoused at sea with two tankers and transferred half of the Wilby’s cargo of fuel to the other vessels, while the crew was held prisoner in the ship’s cabins. After nearly two weeks in the hands of the pirates, the hostages’ ordeal finally seemed to come to an end when a Chinese coastguard vessel intercepted the Wilby for a routine document inspection. During the inspection, the Petro Ranger’s commander, Captain Blyth, and some members of his crew, were able to alert the Chinese officers to the real identity of the vessel and its alleged captain and crew. To investigate the incident, the Wilby was taken to Haikou Harbour (Map 1.1), where Blyth and his crew were held for a further month before they were allowed to leave China. The pirates were arrested by the Chinese authorities, but were subsequently released and repatriated within one year of the hijacking.20 Accounts of individual pirate attacks and hijackings of vessels such as the Petro Ranger are regularly published in the global media and are often supported by articles based on data from the International Maritime Bureau’s (IMB) Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC).21 The PRC, located in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, collects reports of pirate attacks on merchant vessels, fishing boats, and other craft at sea and in ports from all around the world, offering the most comprehensive database on contemporary piracy. According to the PRC, the number of actual and attempted pirate attacks reported between 1992 and 2006 ranges from ninety attacks in 1994 to as many as 469 reported incidents in 2000.22 However, not all regions and countries were equally affected by piracy at the time, with most attacks reported in developing countries in Africa and, even more in Asia. Indeed, according to the IMB’s statistics, Asia, including Southeast Asia, the South China Sea, and China, has been the most “pirate infested” region in the world between 1992 and 2006. Within the Asian region, the waters of Southeast Asian countries have accounted for the majority of attacks, with the highest number of incidents reported in Indonesian waters. In 2004, for instance, Indonesia accounted for ninety-three out of 325 attacks recorded worldwide. The second highest number of attacks, namely thirty-seven incidents, was reported in the Malacca Strait — a strategic waterway bounded jointly by Indonesia and Malaysia.23

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Despite these seemingly high numbers of reported incidents, the question nonetheless arises as to whether or not piracy is today a serious security problem. A closer examination of the IMB data, for instance, reveals that many attacks included in the statistics are only “attempted” attacks, and most of the actual incidents are nothing but simple hit-andrun robberies conducted either at sea or in harbours, in which nothing but a length of rope or a can of paint is stolen. The IMB statistics also appear insignificant when compared with the large number of vessels and seafarers involved in the global shipping industry. Today, maritime trade accounts for 90 per cent of world commerce, with 1995 figures showing 82,890 selfpropelled seagoing merchant ships over 100 gross tons (gt) plying the world’s oceans, manned by over a million seafarers.24 The number of pirate attacks, therefore, remains low in comparison to the number of merchant ships trading internationally, particularly if fishing vessels and other small craft are also included in the calculation. Even in so-called piracy hot spots, such as the Malacca Strait, the chance of a ship being attacked was small between 1992 and 2006. In 2004, for example, when thirty-seven attempted and actual attacks were reported in the Malacca Strait, the risk of a vessel being targeted in this waterway was less than 0.06 per cent.25 Modern piracy in itself, therefore, hardly posed a serious threat to shipping or vital shipping lanes, nor did it cause a chronic financial burden for the shipping or insurance industries.26 Furthermore, while contemporary pirates are often armed with modern firearms and other weapons, which pose a significant threat to the victims of their attacks, the number of seafarers and fishers killed or injured by pirates remains low compared with the number of casualties and injuries due to accidents, environmental hazards, or illness at sea. Piracy also did not rank amongst the most serious security threats for the international community and individual states between 1992 and 2006 because shipping was not seriously threatened by piracy, and pirate attacks occurring at sea or in ports, had in most cases little or no alarming consequences for people living ashore. Indeed, even in countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia, where the number of reported pirate attacks was comparatively high, piracy was one of the least pressing of many security risks, which included natural disasters, the threat posed by separatist and terrorist groups, and the high incidence of crimes committed on land. In 2000, for instance, the Malaysian police recorded a total of 167,173 attempted and committed crimes.27 The total of twenty-one actual and attempted

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pirate attacks reported to the IMB in the same year in Malaysian waters and ports seems insignificant in comparison. Even if the seventy-five attacks recorded in that year in the Malacca Strait are included, the statistical impression that the vast majority of crimes are committed on land remains uncontested.28 Similarly, the most pirate-infested seas in the year 2000 were Indonesian waters, with a total of 119 recorded actual and attempted attacks, and a further seventy-five attacks reported in the Malacca Strait. This, however, has to be compared with 146,314 attempted and committed crimes listed in the United Nations survey of crime trends for Indonesia in the same year.29 In comparison to these other criminal activities, it does indeed seem difficult to consider maritime piracy a major security concern. So what is it about piracy that makes it such an important issue and problem, and why does it warrant thorough investigation?

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF PIRACY: THE OBJECTIVES AND STRUCTURE OF THIS STUDY Contemporary maritime piracy, including robbery at sea and the hijacking of vessels, often receives attention because the activities of modern pirates seem out of the ordinary and are mostly associated with an era long gone. Indeed, the idea that in this day and age, entire merchant vessels can still simply be stolen is astounding and such incidents, therefore, seem worthy of investigation. While this notion may appear somewhat simplistic, it is nonetheless based on a crucial question, namely: How can piracy still exist in our modern world? This study has two objectives. First, it attempts to answer the question of why, and in what form, piracy still exists. The focus here is on piracy between 1992 and 2006 in the waters of insular Southeast Asia, namely Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, the Philippines, and Thailand, which were identified by the IMB at the time as the most pirate-infested waters of the world.30 Bangladesh is also included in this study because the country’s waters have in recent years become a piracy hot spot in the wider Asian region. Piracy in Bangladesh is, in some respects, very different in nature to pirate activities in Southeast Asia. The inclusion of Bangladesh, therefore, provides a contrasting view of piracy and offers insights into aspects of the phenomenon not found in Southeast Asia. Thus, the choice of countries included in this study has been made to a large extent in accordance with the number of pirate attacks recorded by the IMB, rather than along

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cultural, ethnic, or political lines. The period of time chosen for investigation has also been influenced by the IMB reports. The IMB began to publish comprehensive piracy statistics on a regular basis in 1992. As no comparable database of contemporary pirate attacks exists, this study focuses on piracy in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh from 1992 to 2006. Also, apart from the availability of macro-empirical data, an examination of this period is useful as it covers the post-Cold War era. Political, economic, and social changes associated with the end of the Cold War can, therefore, be taken into account when discussing the root causes of piracy. The second objective of this book is to show that a close examination of piracy is important because it can be understood as both a symptom and a reflection of a number of geopolitical and socio-economic problems and security concerns prevalent not only in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh, but also in other “pirate infested” areas around the world and in countries and regions beyond those in which pirate attacks currently occur. To establish the link between piracy and other security concerns, the book examines the root causes of contemporary piracy in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh. The integrated analysis of these root causes links declining fish stocks, radical, politically motivated groups, organized crime networks, the use of flags of convenience, the lack of state control over national territory, problems in relations and cooperation between countries, and the activities of Private Security Companies (PSCs) to piracy. It will then be demonstrated that these root causes and factors that are conducive to the occurrence of pirate attacks have security implications well beyond piracy.

Structure The book is divided into four parts, each consisting of two chapters. Part I gives a general overview of contemporary maritime piracy in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh. It provides an insight into the nature, characteristics, and scale of piracy from 1992 to 2006, and demonstrates which areas of water were most affected by pirates in this region. Chapter 1 is predominantly based on data collected by the IMB and offers an overview of pirate attacks on merchant vessels, such as tankers, container ships, tugs, and barges in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh. After highlighting the difficulty of finding a satisfactory definition of modern piracy, it examines trends and developments in modern piracy and discusses the different types of pirate attacks occurring today, ranging from hijackings to hit-and-

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run sea robberies. The second chapter provides insights into the occurrence of attacks on fishing boats and other small craft in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh. It discusses the involvement of fishers in piracy, either as perpetrators or as victims. The chapter reveals that attacks on fishing vessels are a regular occurrence in some fishing communities even though they are seldom brought to the attention of local or international authorities or organizations. Having thus described the different types of pirate attacks that occur in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh, the remainder of the book explains why these different types of attacks occur in this region, allowing further insights into the nature of individual attacks and the working practices and motivations of pirates. This investigation is tied to the central argument of this study, namely that piracy can be understood as both a sign and a reflection of security threats and bureaucratic loopholes, as well as of other political, social, and economic developments undermining security. Each chapter looks at one particular issue shaping piracy and discusses the social and political developments, as well as the security threats, that this aspect of modern piracy reflects upon. These chapters all have the same structure, comprising three sections, with the first section providing an overview and important background information about the issue examined in the chapter. The second section discusses how these issues affect piracy and shape the nature of pirate attacks in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh. The last section of each chapter shows how the security shortcomings exploited by pirates, and the social and political developments that are conducive to the occurrence of pirate attacks, have wider implications for human, national, and international security. Part II, consisting of Chapters 3 and 4, is concerned with the sea. It discusses the sea firstly as a source of livelihood for fishers, and secondly as a place of business for merchant shipping. It explores how the nature of the fishing industry and the maritime trade is affecting pirate attacks on fishing boats and merchant ships in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh. It suggests that the nature of the maritime and fishing industries is conducive to the occurrence of pirate attacks, and explains how pirates exploit loopholes and shortcomings in the current maritime environment to conduct their operations. While there are certainly differences between the fishing and merchant maritime industries, there are significant international rules and regulations that impact on both sectors. Most important in this regard is the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

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(UNCLOS), which stipulates international guidelines on fundamental issues such as the ownership of the sea, the registration of vessels, and fisheries conservation matters. UNCLOS and other conventions that are relevant for both industries, as well as specific issues regarding the fisheries sector and merchant trade, are discussed in this part and their impact on piracy is explored. Chapter 3 starts with an overview of the fishing industry in Southeast Asia, Bangladesh, and beyond. It shows how the fishing industry has changed and expanded over the past decades and the impact this has had on the marine environment. The second section argues that the depletion of fish stock and the environmental degradation of the seas in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh, as well as illegal fishing activities in the region, are conducive to the occurrence of a certain type of piracy. This particular kind of piracy, involving fishers either as victims or as perpetrators, therefore, acts as a sign of these environmental problems and illegal activities. The last section of the chapter then suggests that resource decline, environmental degradation, illegal fishing, and other factors that affect the occurrence of pirate attacks, are significant regional — and even international — security concerns. Chapter 4 focuses on international and national shipping laws and regulations. It argues that the incidence of major pirate attacks and hijackings of commercial vessels signifies the serious problem of lax controls and regulations, as well as a comparatively low standard of safety, in the maritime sector. The last section demonstrates that these shortcomings in regulatory frameworks are also being exploited by other extra-legal organizations such as terrorist groups and crime syndicates. Part III is concerned with “the dark side” of piracy, namely the involvement of crime syndicates and radical politically motivated groups in pirate attacks. Chapters 5 discusses criminal organizations and their involvement in pirate attacks, while Chapter 6 focuses on terrorist and guerrilla movements, particularly those fighting for separatism. The distinction between criminally and politically motivated groups is deliberate. Put simply, what distinguishes the terrorist and guerrilla fighter from a modern-day criminal, including a pirate, is his motive, which conditions and influences his modus operandi. While the criminal is acting mainly for selfish, personal reasons, guerrillas and terrorists fight for political goals, driven by a specific ideology or political agenda.31 Yet, as will be discussed, the boundaries between politically and criminally motivated acts have become increasingly blurred, particularly after the

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end of the Cold War. Chapter 5 initially gives an overview of organized crime in the post-Cold War era. It then discusses the involvement of such organizations in hijackings and the long-term seizures of vessels, and suggests that these attacks are an indicator of the existence of organized crime syndicates operating in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh. The last section of the chapter demonstrates that criminal organizations are not only involved in piracy, but also in other related illegal activities such as smuggling, and pose a serious threat to national and international security. Chapter 6 first provides an overview of the radical, politically motivated groups, including terrorists and guerrillas, active in Southeast Asia.32 It then discusses the involvement of members of such movements in piracy in the region, with particular focus on members of the Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement, GAM) and Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) in Indonesia, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf in the southern Philippines, and the internationally operating al-Qaeda. The last section then demonstrates that these movements pose a threat to security well beyond piracy. The fourth part, consisting of Chapters 7 and 8, is concerned with national and international responses to piracy. Indeed, piracy in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh has become a major concern for shipowners, international organizations, insurance companies, and governments. These interest groups have consequently responded to the threat of piracy within their limits. For example, international organizations, such as the IMB, have raised the awareness of modern-day piracy and have initiated and promoted a number of counter-measures, including international antipiracy programmes and agreements. Of particular importance in actively combating piracy in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh are the responses of states and PSCs, and it is these that form the focus of this part of the book. Chapter 7 examines government responses to piracy in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh by countries from within and outside the region. It discusses the economic development of Bangladesh and the Southeast Asian nations and the parallel growth of national militaries and law enforcement agencies responsible for combating piracy. Cooperation between countries in Southeast Asia and between Bangladesh and its neighbours is also considered, as piracy is often a transnational crime. The second section explores how the lack of government resources for local militaries and law enforcement agencies and limited cooperation between countries impact on piracy. Piracy, it is suggested, is a symptom of a range

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of internal problems and security risks manifested within public authorities, as well as a sign of tensions in interstate relations. The last section of the chapter argues that these problems and interstate tensions have wider security implications, affecting, for example, the stability of countries and regions. Chapter 8 looks at private responses to piracy, namely the involvement of PSCs in the fight against piracy in Southeast Asia.33 The first section provides an overview of the growing privatization of security in Southeast Asia and beyond. The second section discusses the increasing involvement of PSCs in anti-piracy operations in Southeast Asia. The last section of the chapter discusses concerns about PSCs and the services they offer that result from their internal structure, information politics, and the nature of the operations they conduct. It examines some of the most crucial problems and shortcomings associated with the privatization of security, and highlights how these problems undermine security.

Notes 1. From Pirates of the Caribbean: The Curse of the Black Pearl (Walt Disney Pictures, 2003). 2. James Francis Warren, “A Tale of Two Centuries: The Globalisation of Maritime Raiding and Piracy in Southeast Asia at the End of the Eighteenth and Twentieth Centuries” (Long Version of Paper Presented). Paper presented at the “KITLV Jubilee Workshop”, Leiden, 14–16 June 2001, p. 8. 3. Carl A. Trocki, “Piracy in the Malay World”, in Encyclopaedia of Asian History, vol. 3, edited by Ainslie T. Embree (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1988), p. 262. 4. Ibid. Sources on piracy in the eighteenth and nineteeenth centuries are often based on observations by Europeans and are often heavily biased. There have, however, been attempts by some scholars, notably James Warren and Carl Trocki, to look at “piracy” from a more local point of view. 5. Nicholas Tarling, “Piracy”, in Southeast Asia: A Historical Encyclopaedia, from Angkor Wat to East Timor, Ooi Keat Gin, ed. (Santa Barbara, California: ABCCLIO, Inc, 2004), p. 1089. 6. The bond between raiders and their protectors was, however, not static and alliances could be shifted. See Ger Teitler, “Piracy in Southeast Asia: A Historical Comparison”. Mare Centre, (accessed 24 June 2005), p. 67. James Francis Warren, The Sulu Zone, 1768–1898: The Dynamics of External Trade, Slavery, and Ethnicity in the Transformation of a Southeast Asian Maritime State (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1981), pp. 188–89.

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7. See Ibid. James Francis Warren, Iranun and Balangingi: Globalization, Maritime Raiding and the Birth of Ethnicity (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 2002). 8. See, for example, Warren, The Sulu Zone, 1768–1898, pp. 29, 168, 181; Warren, Iranun and Balangingi, pp. 296–97; Adam J. Young, “Roots of Contemporary Maritime Piracy in Southeast Asia”, in Piracy in Southeast Asia: Status, Issues, and Responses, edited by Derek Johnson and Mark Valencia (Singapore: ISEAS Publications, 2005), pp. 9–10. 9. See Warren, Iranun and Balangingi, pp. 309–42; Carl A. Trocki, “Borders and the Mapping of the Malay World”. Paper presented at the “Association of Asian Studies Annual Meeting”, San Diego, California, 9–12 March 2000, p. 6. 10. Teitler, “Piracy in Southeast Asia”, p. 69. 11. Warren, “A Tale of Two Centuries”, pp. 2, 12–15; James F. Warren, The Global Economy and the Sulu Zone: Connections, Commodities, and Culture (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 2000), pp. 17–24; Warren, The Sulu Zone, 1768– 1898, pp. 169–70; Warren, Iranun and Balangingi, pp. 267–68. Other Malay states including Brunei, Sambas, and Pontianak also relied on sponsoring raids as a means of seizing trading ships and slaves, but on a more moderate scale. 12. Warren, “A Tale of Two Centuries”, pp. 6, 20; Warren, The Sulu Zone, 1768– 1898, pp. 185–88; Teitler, “Piracy in Southeast Asia”, p. 70. 13. Warren, “A Tale of Two Centuries”, pp. 13–14, 18–20. Warren, Iranun and Balangingi, pp. 267–308. 14. Ibid., pp. 379–83; Trocki, “Piracy in the Malay World”, p. 262; Tarling, “Piracy”, p. 1090. Around 1800 the stance of Western governments towards privateering began to change as well, and by 1856 the Great Powers agreed on the abolition of privateering in the Declaration of Paris. M.J. Peterson, “An Historical Perspective on the Incidence of Piracy”, in Piracy at Sea, edited by Eric Ellen (Paris: ICC Publishing, 1989), pp. 53–54. 15. Warren, “A Tale of Two Centuries”, pp. 40–47; Andaya and Andaya, A History of Malaysia, 2nd edition (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2001), pp. 134–36. 16. See, for example, Stefan Eklöf, “The Return of Piracy: Decolonization and International Relations in a Maritime Border Region (the Sulu Sea), 1959–63”, Working Paper No. 15, Centre for East and South-East Asian Studies, Lund University, 2005 (accessed 30 April 2007), p. 3. 17. Donald B. Freeman, The Straits of Malacca: Gateway or Gauntlet (Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 2003), p. 176. 18. In fact, modern-day piracy is more likely to have an adverse effect on state power, weakening state control and contributing to the loss of state sovereignty. For a more exhaustive comparison see, Teitler, “Piracy in Southeast Asia”, pp. 78–81.

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19. The idea of a long-standing “culture of piracy” is therefore problematic. 20. Captain Ken Blyth and Peter Corris, Petro Pirates: The Hijacking of the Petro Ranger (St. Leonard, Australia: 2000). 21. The IMB, a non-profit making organization, was established under the International Chamber of Commerce in 1981. 22. As will be discussed in Chapter 1, definitions of piracy vary. The IMB includes in its analysis any “act of boarding any vessel with the intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act”. ICC, “Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: A Special Report. Revised Edition, March 1998”. International Chamber of Commerce, International Maritime Bureau, 1998, pp. 2, 12; ICC, “Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report, 1 January–31 December 2006” (Barking, Essex: International Chamber of Commerce, International Maritime Bureau, 2007), n.p. 23. ICC, “Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report, 1 January– 31 December 2004”, p. 16. 24. Martin Stopford, Maritime Economics, 2nd edition (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 19; MARISEC, “Overview of the International Shipping Industry”, in Shipping Facts (accessed 16 May 2005). 25. Data used for this calculation was taken from the Malaysian Marine Department website, which only includes vessels weighing 300 gt and above, or are 50 metres in length or above. Marine Department Malaysia, “Mandatory Ship Reporting System in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore”, (accessed 22 June 2007). 26. After 2006, attacks in the waters off Somalia posed an unprecedented threat to international shipping. However, maritime traffic through these dangerous waters continues. 27. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Division for Policy Analysis and Public Affairs, “Seventh United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems, Covering the Period from 1998– 2000”, (accessed 17 May 2005), p. 268. 28. ICC, “Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships: Annual Report, 1 January– 31 December 2000” (Barking, Essex: International Chamber of Commerce, International Maritime Bureau, 2001), p. 3. Many of the attacks recorded in the Malacca Strait have most likely occurred in Indonesian waters. 29. United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime Division for Policy Analysis and Public Affairs, “Seventh United Nations Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of Criminal Justice Systems”, p. 200. 30. The term Southeast Asia is, therefore, used here to refer to the above mentioned countries only.

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31. Bruce Hoffman, Inside Terrorism (London: Victor Gollancz, 1998), pp. 41–43. 32. According to the author’s sources, there are no terrorist or guerrilla groups active in Bangladesh that are involved in piracy. 33. The author did not come across any PSCs conducting anti-piracy operations in Bangladesh.

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PART I Contemporary Piracy in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh

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1 PIRATE ATTACKS ON MERCHANT VESSELS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND BANGLADESH, 1980–2006 I heard something from outside the mess room, then I open the door. In front of me there were pirates. So I move my hands up. Yoeli Janto, Master of the hijacked MT Selayang1

INTRODUCTION On 23 February 2000 the Japanese-owned tanker MT Global Mars was attacked in the Malacca Strait by a gang of twenty pirates, who approached the tanker in a fishing vessel and climbed on board unnoticed. Once on board, the pirates, masked and armed with guns and knives, overpowered the eighteen-man crew and took control of the vessel. The following day, the crew was transferred to the fishing boat and held on board, while the pirates repainted the tanker, renamed it Bulawan, and replaced its Panamanian flag with the colours of Honduras. After the change of identity was completed, the pirates sailed the Bulawan to an unidentified port where the cargo was sold. After thirteen days of captivity, the crew was moved to a smaller fishing boat and set adrift. After days at sea, the crew reached the island of Surin in Thailand, and called for help. The search for the crew and vessel had, however, already begun. The IMB had been notified of the attack shortly after the hijacking and a reward was offered for information regarding the location of the vessel. The Bulawan was

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eventually found in Chinese waters and the local authorities, acting on information from the IMB, seized the ship and arrested the “crew” on board on 30 May. The detained crew, eleven Filipinos and nine Burmese, denied they were pirates, claiming instead to be seamen hired to sail the Bulawan to South Korea. They were released a short time later.2 Pirate attacks occurring in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh at present range from hijackings of vessels, such as the Global Mars, to simple hitand-run robberies conducted by opportunistic thieves. This chapter offers an overview of pirate attacks on merchant vessels in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh from the early 1980s to 2006, with particular emphasis on attacks occurring after 1992. However, the objective here is not to provide an analysis of the underlying problems and causes of contemporary piracy in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh, as this will be presented in the following parts.

PIRACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA IN THE 1980s3 In the early 1980s, the IMB began the first systematic collection and publication of reports of pirate attacks. Throughout the 1980s, two regions received particular attention in these IMB reports, namely West Africa, where in the early years most attacks were reported, and the Singapore Area, encompassing the Phillip Channel and the Malacca Strait. Piracy in the Singapore Area remained rather unsophisticated in nature during the 1980s. Most attacks were simple hit-and-run robberies conducted by two to five men armed with parang (machetes) or knives. The attacks invariably occurred at night, were usually brief affairs, and in many instances, were only noticed once the culprits had left the target vessel. The level of violence of these attacks remained low, injuries were the exception, and no crew was reported killed by pirates in this area.4 While opportunistic attacks on merchant vessels also took place in other parts of Southeast Asia, some waters in the region were subjected to more serious maritime crime, including hijackings — the theft of entire merchant vessels. Pirates working for criminal syndicates hijacked vessels either to deliver them to a third party, or because they were hired by the owner of the ship for insurance fraud. In other instances, the hijacked vessel was used by the criminal syndicate to transport illegal goods or for cargo fraud operations. In all cases, the vessel’s original cargo was disposed of and the original crew either killed, thrown overboard, or put into small craft and left to their own devices. The ship was then registered under a

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different name and turned into a “phantom ship”. Equipped with its new identity, the vessel was then offered to an anxious shipper to transport his cargo. The cargo, however, never arrived at its destined port, as the vessel was diverted and the cargo offloaded in another port and sold to another consignee. The vessel was then once again re-registered under a different name and the “game” began all over again.5 The Philippines, particularly Manila Bay, was in the 1980s the most prominent place for such shipjackings. According to the IMB, a specific vessel could be “ordered” from criminal syndicates in the Philippines for about US$300,000. The ship was subsequently hijacked and delivered to the “customer” within days. A case in point was the attack on the freighter Isla Luzon off the Philippine coast. The ship was hijacked on 25 June 1989 and was later discovered trading between Taiwan, China, Korea, and Japan under its new name Nigel. A high level of organization and access to inside information about ships, routes, and cargoes was necessary to organize such a successful shipjacking. The perpetrators also needed contacts and knowledge of the regional market in order to sell stolen cargo. Investigations by the IMB suggest that in several cases in the 1980s goods from stolen ships were discharged outside Singapore. However, most of the stolen cargo in that period was sold to companies in China, and occasionally to buyers in the Philippines.6 The increasing number and, in some cases, serious nature of pirate attacks on merchant vessels in Southeast Asia in the 1980s set the tone for piracy and transnational crime in the 1990s. Indeed, throughout the 1980s, international organizations such as the IMB and the IMO, as well as governments around the world, became increasingly concerned about the rising incidence of pirate attacks on merchant vessels. However, while countries such as Singapore increased naval and police patrols in their territorial waters during the 1980s to prevent a further escalation of such incidents,7 it was only in the 1990s that piracy prompted serious international and regional responses.

PIRACY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA AND BANGLADESH FROM THE EARLY 1990s TO 2006 Defining Contemporary Piracy The rising number of pirate attacks in the region in the 1980s prompted the establishment of the IMB’s Regional Piracy Reporting Centre in Kuala

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Lumpur in October 1992. In its early years, the centre provided services only for the East Asian Region, including both Northeast and Southeast Asia. However, in 1998, the name of the agency was changed to IMB Piracy Reporting Centre (PRC) and the centre began to collect reports on piracy and armed robbery at sea from all around the world. Today, the PRC also issues warnings to seafarers, liaises with law enforcement authorities, issues consolidated reports to interested bodies, and regularly publishes reports on piracy and armed robbery at sea.8 In these reports, the IMB relies on its own definition of piracy, which differs from those of other institutions. Indeed, the definition of “piracy” remains highly contested, with no standardized definition being agreed on by institutions, academics, and governments around the world. Among the most controversial issues concerning a uniform definition of piracy remains the question of whether or not the motive behind a pirate attack should be a defining factor. Equally contested is the issue of whether only attacks committed on the high seas should be considered piracy or whether attacks on vessels in territorial waters, within Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs), and in ports also qualify as piracy. Consequently governments, companies, as well as public and private institutions, often employ their own definitions of piracy, suited to their particular objectives and interests. Coastal states, for instance, have their own domestic laws that determine which crime committed on the high seas or in their respective national waters is an act of piracy.9 Some countries, however, including China, do not cover maritime piracy under their laws, but rely on definitions such as robbery at sea to act against “pirates”.10 Two definitions of piracy, however, can be considered as the most prominent and commonly used at present. The first is the legal definition of piracy which was implemented in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Law of the Sea and the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).11 Article 101 of UNCLOS defines piracy as: Article 101 Definition of Piracy Piracy consists of any of the following acts: (a) any illegal acts of violence or detention, or any act of depredation, committed for private ends by the crew or the passengers of a private ship or a private aircraft, and directed: (i) on the high seas, against another ship or aircraft, or against persons or property on board such ship or aircraft;

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(ii) against a ship, aircraft, persons or property in a place outside the jurisdiction of any State; (b) any act of voluntary participation in the operation of a ship or of an aircraft with knowledge of facts making it a pirate ship or aircraft; (c) any act of inciting or of intentionally facilitating an act described in subparagraph (a) or (b).12

The UNCLOS definition is problematic and impractical in the eyes of many observers as it only includes attacks on the high seas “outside the jurisdiction of any state”. The vast majority of attacks on vessels reported at present in Southeast Asia are, however, conducted in territorial waters, EEZs, or ports and, therefore, clearly within the jurisdiction of coastal states.13 The second commonly used definition of piracy is the more inclusive version of the IMB. The IMB includes in its analysis any “act of boarding any vessel with the intent to commit theft or any other crime and with the intent or capability to use force in the furtherance of that act.”14 The IMB’s reports, therefore, include information on attempted attacks, attacks on vessels at anchorage, or at berth, simple hit-and-run robberies in territorial waters, as well as hijackings of vessels, and, somewhat controversially, certain acts of maritime terrorism. The IMB’s definition of piracy will be adopted here with the proviso that those acts have to be committed for private — as opposed to political — ends. A distinction is, therefore, made between attacks by pirates and politically motivated groups such as terrorists, based on the motivation for an assault. This distinction is important because by including terrorist attacks one would arguably increase the number of pirate attacks, and even more so, the number of casualties, as terrorists often aim at killing or injuring a large number of people in their attacks. The IMB’s definition of piracy and its data are not only controversial because they include terrorist attacks. Daniel Tan, executive director of the Singapore Shipping Association, for example, believes that the IMB is using its broad definition to exaggerate the piracy problem in order to receive continued funding, on which the existence of the PRC depends.15 Others have pointed to the serious problem of the under-reporting of attacks, suggesting that the actual number of pirate attacks worldwide may in fact be substantially higher than presented in the IMB’s reports. According to Noel Choong, the regional manager of the PRC, more than fifty per cent of all pirate attacks remain unreported, for a variety of reasons.16 Some shipowners, for instance, are reluctant to report attacks as

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26

Oceans of Crime

they fear that an investigation will delay their vessel’s operation, resulting in additional costs. Many also do not want to be branded as unreliable carriers of freight, or fear rising insurance costs. Governments and law enforcement agencies in the region are also often reluctant to disclose the number of attacks in their respective countries in order to preserve their reputations as safe places for trade and passage.17 Additionally, attacks on fishing boats and other smaller craft are rarely reported to the IMB. However, according to Mark Bruyneel, who has compared the IMB data with other collections, the IMB reports — despite flaws — are for the period examined here, the most reliable and comprehensive source of information available on pirate attacks around the world.18 The IMB data is, therefore, used as the basis for analysis in this chapter.

Pirate Attacks in Southeast Asia, Bangladesh, and the Wider Asian Region 1992–2006 According to data from the IMB the number of actual and attempted pirate attacks reported worldwide from 1992 to 2006 range from 90 attacks in 1994 to as many as 469 reported incidents in 2000, as shown in Table 1.1.19 Table 1.1 also demonstrates that the number of actual attacks can be substantially lower than the number of actual and attempted attacks. Furthermore, it shows that from the early 1990s to 2006, high numbers of attacks were reported in Asia. Even though this study focuses on Southeast Asia and Bangladesh, attacks in the wider Asian region are considered here in order to understand better the shifts in the distribution of attacks in Southeast Asia and Asia since the early 1990s (see Table 1.2). Between 1990 and 1992, the waters between the Malacca and Singapore Strait have been identified as the most pirate infested. The narrow Malacca Strait is one of the most congested waterways in the world, and particular care is required in navigation, as it is beset by numerous shallow points, forcing vessels to reduce speed to ensure safe passage. These conditions are favourable for pirates, as they can approach the slow moving targets in their speed boats without too much difficulty. However, after the initiation of coordinated anti-piracy patrols in this area, the focus of piracy shifted to the South China Sea, where between 1993 and 1995, a high proportion of reported attacks took place. Particularly affected were the territorial waters of Hong Kong and Macau and the so-called HLH “terror-triangle”,

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27

832 NA

732

NA

Actual + attempted attacks Asian Region**

Actual attacks Asian Region

Actual + attempted attacks Southeast Asia*** and Bangladesh

Actual1 attacks Southeast Asia and Bangladesh NA

15

NA

75

54

103

’93

29

39

52

66

68

90

’94

46

72

94

118

152

188

’95

69

126

117

143

186

228

’96

82

98

94

117

205

247

’97

72

98

78

105

166

202

’98

146

185

152

191

242

300

’99

197

292

208

314

318

469

’00

129

175

138

190

238

335

’01

145

185

155

197

286

370

’02

161

228

177

246

332

445

’03

123

172

136

188

237

329

’04

98

123

112

143

205

276

’05

96

130

100

134

176

239

’06

Notes: * Attempted attacks include: attempted attacks, attempted boardings and v essels fired upon. ** The Asian Region includes here: Indonesia, Malaysia, Malacca Strait, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore Strait, Thailand, South China Sea, China, Cambodia, HLH Area, Bangladesh and Vietnam. ***Southeast Asia includes here: Indonesia, Malaysia, Malacca Strait, the Philippines, Singapore Strait, and Thailand. 1. Includes missing vessels. The IMB reports include missing vessels in some years in attempted attacks and in others, in actual attacks. 2. Area not defined clear ly in IMB repor t. Source: ICC, “Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships”, Annual Reports, 1992–2006.

NA

106

Actual attacks worldwide

Actual + attempted* attacks worldwide

’92

Table 1.1 Attacks and Attempted Attacks Worldwide, the Asian Region, Southeast Asia, and Bangladesh, 1992–2006

Pirate Attacks on Merchant Vessels in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh

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31 27 1 10 – – – 5 – – 6 12 6 22 4 – 5 3 3 2

’94 3 7 31 33 5 4 24 2 2 2

’95 2 4 9 57 5 16 39 3 2 4

’96 6 1 5 47 4 17 16 – 5 9

’97 5 – 2 60 10 2 15 1 1 9

’98

Source: ICC, “Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships”, Annual Reports, 2004–2006.

South China Sea HLH Area China/HK/Macau Indonesia Malaysia Thailand The Philippines Malacca Strait Singapore Strait Bangladesh

’93 3 – – 115 18 5 6 2 14 25

’99 9 – 2 119 21 8 9 75 5 55

’00 4 – – 91 19 8 8 17 7 25

’01 – – – 103 14 5 10 16 5 32

’02 2 – 1 121 5 2 12 28 2 58

’03 8 – 3 93 9 4 4 37 8 17

’04

6 – 4 79 3 1 – 12 7 21

’05

Table 1.2 Location of Actual and Attempted Attac ks: China Area, Southeast Asia, and Bangladesh, 1993–2006

1 – 1 50 10 1 6 11 5 47

’06

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Pirate Attacks on Merchant Vessels in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh

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encompassing the waters between Hong Kong, Luzon in the Philippines, and the Chinese island of Hainan (Map 1.1). (See Table 1.2.) Some observers believe that piracy could flourish in these waters because Chinese officials were responsible for some of the attacks.20 Indeed, Chinese authorities admitted that rogue elements of Chinese customs and other maritime law enforcement agencies were involved in the incidents and tightened control over personnel of the agencies under suspicion. As a result, pirate attacks in Chinese waters ceased by the mid-1990s, but China once again became the focus of international concern when in the late 1990s a rising number of hijacked vessels were found in Chinese ports. The international community became alarmed when, in cases such as the hijacking of the tanker Petro Ranger,21 the alleged pirates were repatriated without being brought to justice. As international pressure increased and the pirate attacks became more serious in nature, the Chinese authorities stepped up efforts to combat piracy. When in December 1998 the hijacked Tenyu was located in the Chinese port of Zhangjiagang, the authorities eventually intervened. As Zou explains: “The Tenyu case was the one that for the first time a Chinese judicial organ — the maritime court — had intervened by ordering the return of a foreign ship seized within Chinese territory to the relevant country.”22 When the hijackers of the bulk carrier Cheung Son were found in China a short time later, they were arrested and brought to court in December 1999 and received severe penalties under the law, including thirteen death sentences.23 (See Appendix 2 for a detailed account.) Other cases followed in which pirates arrested in China received severe punishment and, consequently, Chinese ports became less attractive for pirates and lost some of their appeal as a place of business involving hijacked vessels. Since the mid-1990s, as Soeharto’s New Order regime unravelled, Indonesian ports and territorial waters have been identified as the most pirate-infested in Southeast Asia, as demonstrated in Table 1.2. Combating piracy in Indonesia is not an easy task because the archipelagic state is comprised of more than 17,000 islands and spans 1.9 million square kilometres. With fewer funds available for local law enforcement agencies in the aftermath of the economic recession that followed the 1997 Asian financial crisis, the task became even more daunting. Furthermore, as in other parts of the region, pirates can readily slip across borders to conduct attacks and to escape pursuit by the authorities.24 Outside Indonesia, Bangladesh experienced a spate of attacks between 2000 and 2003, but

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Aceh Medan

Penang St ra it o fM ala cc a

Gulf of Thailand

E T

A A

Singapore Strait

L

Natunas Island

lat

M AT

Palembang

Lep

RA

12/14/10, 2:48 PM

D

JAKARTA

N

lia

I

Bangka Island

O

S I

JAVA

A SARAWAK

N

E

BALI

S

A

SUMBAWA

I

Santan

Sipadan

Kota Kinabalu

SABAH

Balikpapan

KALIMANTAN

Kuching

Java Sea

Y

Bandar Seri Bagawan

SUMBA

FLORES

SULAWESI

LEYTE

MINDANAO

Bahol

Cebu

Sulawesi Sea

NEGROS

PANAY

Manila

LUZON

Banda Sea

CERAM

TIMOR-LESTE

Dili

BURU

Arafura Sea

WEST PAPUA

Ocean

P a c i fi c

HALMAHERA

PHILIPPINES

TAIWAN Luzon Strait

MINDORO

PALAWAN

Spratly Islands

Paracel Islands

BRUNEI DARUSSALAM

Ho Chi Minh City

M

SINGAPORE

M

Phnom Penh

Sea

Ch i n a

South

Xiamen

Hong Kong

SHENZEN

Haikou

A

HAINAN

Beihai

N

A

N

Gulf of Tonkin

I

CAMBODIA

I

V

Kuala Lumpur Malacca

Bangkok

T HAI LAN D

Vientiene

LAO S

Se

Ocean

Indian

Banda Aceh

Nicorbar Islands

Andaman Sea Ranong

Andaman Islands

Great Coco Islands

Rangoon (Yangon) Gulf of Martaban

Phuket

Napyitaw

MYANMAR

Hanoi

H

it

C

Stra

BANGLADESH

SU

Mak assa r

30 lucc a Se a

01a Oceans_Crime Ch 1 Mo

Map 1.1 East and Southeast Asia

30 Oceans of Crime

Pirate Attacks on Merchant Vessels in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh

31

the number of incidents declined significantly in 2004 due to the introduction of additional anti-piracy patrols by the local authorities and improved security in harbours. However, the number of attacks in Bangladesh increased again in 2005 and 2006. Of considerable concern in the twenty-first century are also once again the high numbers of attacks in the busy Malacca Strait, and to a lesser extent, the Singapore Strait. Both waterways are among the busiest places for merchant traffic in the world with more than 60,000 vessels over 300 gross tons currently transiting the area annually.25 Twenty thousand of the vessels navigating passage through the Malacca Strait each year are tankers carrying, among other products, oil from the Middle East to China, Japan, and other Asian countries relying on imported fuel. Furthermore, after Hong Kong, Singapore harbour has the largest container turnover rate in the world, followed by the Chinese ports of Shanghai and Shenzhen. Vessels bound for these ports, or other major East and Southeast Asian harbours, pass through the Malacca Strait. Additionally, smaller vessels such as barges, fishing boats, and passenger vessels also sail through the strait (Map 1.2). The large number of vessels passing through this area put the actual number of attacks in perspective. Nonetheless, the attacks in the Malacca Strait are a matter of major concern, particularly because incidents of a serious nature, including the kidnapping of crew for ransom, have been conducted in this area.26

Types of Vessels Attacked Pirates operating in Southeast Asia and Bangladesh attack vessels of any nationality, type, and size, with the exception of very large vessels. In fact, smaller or medium sized cargo vessels are preferred targets.27 Table 1.3 provides an overview of the types of vessels mainly targeted by pirates in this area. Table 1.3 shows that bulk carriers have been targeted most, followed by general cargo vessels, tankers, container ships, and chemical/product tankers. With a total of ninety-eight attacks, fishing vessels and trawlers rank sixth, despite the fact that only a small percentage of attacks on such ships are reported to the IMB. However, the numbers of different types of vessels targeted have to be viewed in relation to the actual numbers of vessel types plying the world’s oceans. Discussing the growth of the world merchant fleet, Stopford states:

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