Political and Security Dynamics of South and Southeast Asia 9789812304773

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POLITICAL SECURITY DYNAMICS

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OF SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

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Reproduced from Political and Security Dynamics of South and Southeast Asia, edited by Daljit Singh (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007). This version was obtained electronically direct from the publisher on condition that copyright is not infringed. No part of this publication may be reproduced without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. Individual articles are available at < http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg >

The Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) was established as an autonomous organization in 1968. It is a regional centre dedicated to the study of socio-political, security and economic trends and developments in Southeast Asia and its wider geostrategic and economic environment. The Institute’s research programmes are the Regional Economic Studies (RES, including ASEAN and APEC), Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS), and Regional Social and Cultural Studies (RSCS). ISEAS Publishing, an established academic press, has issued almost 2,000 books and journals. It is the largest scholarly publisher of research about Southeast Asia from within the region. ISEAS Publishing works with many other academic and trade publishers and distributors to disseminate important research and analyses from and about Southeast Asia to the rest of the world.

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POLITICAL SECURITY DYNAMICS

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OF SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA EDITED BY

DALJIT SINGH

I5EA5 INSTITUTE OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES SINGAPORE

First published in Singapore in 2007 by ISEAS Publishing Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace Pasir Panjang Singapore 119614 E-mail: [email protected] Website: http://bookshop.iseas.edu.sg All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. © 2007 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore The responsibility for facts and opinions in this publication rests exclusively with the editor and contributors and their interpretations do not necessarily reflect the views or the policy of the publisher or its supporters.

ISEAS Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data Political and security dynamics in South and Southeast Asia / edited by Daljit Singh. 1. Southeast Asia—Politics and government—1945– —Congresses. 2. South Asia—Politics and government—Congresses. 3. Indian Ocean Region—Politics and government—Congresses. 4. National security—Southeast Asia—Congresses. 5. National security—South Asia—Congresses. 6. National security—Indian Ocean Region—Congresses. I. Daljit Singh. II. Observer Research Foundation. III. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. IV. Bilateral Dialogue on Political and Security Dynamics in South and Southeast Asia : Shared Concerns (1st : 2006 : New Delhi, India) DS526.7 P762 2007 ISBN 978-981-230-476-6 (hard cover) ISBN 978-981-230-477-3 (PDF) Typeset by Superskill Graphics Pte Ltd Printed in Singapore by Photoplates Pte Ltd

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Contents Foreword

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Introduction

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The Contributors

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List of Abbreviations

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The Dawn of a New Era K. Kesavapany

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Asia’s Rise: The Challenge of Stability S.D. Muni

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The East Asia Summit: An Overview K. Kesavapany

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Implications of the East Asia Summit: An Indian Perspective D.S. Rajan and Raakhee Suryaprakash

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Asia-Pacific Political and Security Dynamics Daljit Singh

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America’s Role in Asia Harinder Sekhon

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China and Japan Competition in East Asia D.S. Rajan

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Major Powers and Southeast Asia: A Restrained Competition? Kripa Sridharan

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Political and Security Dynamics in the Indian Ocean Region: Role of Extra-regional Powers Vijay Sakhuja

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Politics and Security in Southeast Asia: Trends and Challenges Tin Maung Maung Than

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Bilateral and Regional Initiatives to Curb Acts of Maritime Terrorism and Piracy in the Region R.S. Vasan

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Index

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Foreword This volume is a collection of edited papers which were first presented at the inaugural Dialogue between the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) of Singapore and the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) of India. The idea of such a Dialogue was first mooted at the end of 2004 by Mr B. Raman, then Distinguished Fellow with ORF and Convenor of the ORF Chennai Chapter. In May 2005, in his first formal communication to ISEAS on the subject, Mr Raman spoke of the need “for studying and having a periodic exchange of views on subjects of common interest and concern to India and Singapore”. He wanted the Dialogue to be with ISEAS because of its expertise on Southeast Asia, a region of growing importance to India. ISEAS found the proposal to be timely and far-sighted. The exchange gives ISEAS the opportunity to contribute to a better understanding of Southeast Asia in policy-related research circles in India. ISEAS for its part benefits from Indian perspectives on contemporary issues like terrorism, policies of the major powers inAsia, Asian regionalism, and developments in Southeast Asia itself. The inaugural Dialogue, held at the ORF headquarters in New Delhi on 30–31 March 2006, under the banner “Political and Security Dynamics in South and Southeast Asia: Shared Concerns” more than lived up to expectations. The presentations generated lively and insightful discussions. ISEAS had agreed to edit and publish the papers and it is my pleasure to present them in this volume.

K. Kesavapany Director Institute of Southeast Asian Studies Singapore

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Introduction The Dialogue on 30–31 March 2006 between the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) and the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) provided an opportunity for scholars from India and Singapore to reflect on Asia’s resurgence and regional transformations. The delegations from both sides included members with a strong policy background.The broadranging opening presentations and observations on the EastAsian Summit (EAS) set the context for the subsequent discussions. The Indian side enquired about the Singaporean and ASEAN perspectives on how the EAS was likely to evolve while the Singapore side emphasized that Asia was now inter -connected as never before and India had to become even more outward looking — developments in East and Southeast Asia could no longer be viewed with indif ference. In this context it was also interesting to note the observation of Professor Muni, Executive Director of International Affairs at ORF, that eventually it may not be possible to divorce East Asian integration, as defined by the EAS, from what was happening in West Asia and Central Asia since the whole question of Indian Ocean maritime security and ener gy security involves these two regions. The roles of the USA, China and Japan elicited extensive discussion. Indian views on the security dynamics of the Indian Ocean, including as a theatre of deployment of the navies of extra-regional powers, were appreciated by the Singapore side. The Indian scholars also felt that Russia should not be written off in the Asian strategic equation, especially in view of its vast energy and other resources which not only bring it much foreign exchange but can also be used as instruments of influence. Another issue which received considerable attention was non-traditional security, both in the context of the Indian Ocean region and Southeast Asia, particularly the danger of possible failed states in South Asia and uncertainties about the domestic politics and stability of a number of states in both South and Southeast Asia. Non-traditional security issues also featured prominently in the papers on Maritime Terrorism and Piracy and Southeast Asian Politics and Security. ix

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There were different perspectives on some of the issues, as befits a frank exchange. Notwithstanding this, there was considerable convergence of views on the main factors shaping the security environment and the main areas of concern. The divergence was often more of the nature of whether a glass should be seen as half full or half empty . The Singapore side seemed more upbeat about the future, in view of the economic spill over from the rise of China and India and the regional community building trends that are taking shape. ISEAS Director Mr Kesavapany highlighted the integrative trends in Asia as illustrated by the EAS, describing them as the dawn of a new era, while at the same time recognizing that there were also many difficult challenges posed by modernization and globalization, diseases like avian flu, international terrorism, and other non-traditional security threats. The Indian side, while acknowledging the salubrious regional trends, noted that power politics among states, including the great powers, as well as domestic instabilities, could still adversely affect the Asian century. The papers in this volume constitute the revised versions of the formal presentations on designated topics for the ISEAS–ORF Dialogue. They seek to provide an analysis of the changing South and Southeast Asian security and political dynamics from the ventage point of mid-2006. Naturally they do not capture all the richness of the wide-ranging discussions held in New Delhi, but to the interested reader they can still of fer useful and interesting perspectives.

Daljit Singh Editor

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The Contributors K. Kesavapany is Director of the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. S.D. Muni is Executive Director of International Affairs at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. D.S. Rajan is Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, Chennai Chapter. Vijay Sakhuja is Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. Harinder Sekhon is Senior Fellow at the Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi. Daljit Singh is Visiting Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. Kripa Sridharan is Senior Lecturer in the Department of Political Science at the National University of Singapore. Raakhee Suryaprakash is Research Assistant at the Observer Research Foundation, Chennai Chapter. Tin Maung Maung Than is Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore. R.S. Vasan is the Additional Director, Projects and Development, Observer Research Foundation, Chennai Chapter.

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List of Abbreviations AFP AIDS AP APEC ARF ASEAN ASG ATP BBC BCIM BIMSTEC BN CEP CECA CG CII CNOOC CPP CSI DPR DP EAS EEZ EIU EU FDI FPDA FTA GAM GDP

Armed Forces of the Philippines Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome Associated Press Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Asean Regional Forum Association of Southeast Asian Nations Abu Sayyaf Group Amphetamine-Type (psychotropic) Products British Broadcasting Corporation Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation Barisan Nasional Closer Economic Partnership Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement Coast Guard Confederation of Indian Industry China National Offshore Oil Corporation Communist Party of the Philippines Container Security Initiative Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat or House of People’ s Representatives Democrat Party East Asian Summit Exclusive Economic Zone Economist Intelligence Unit European Union Foreign Direct Investment Five Power Defence Arrangements Free Trade Agreement Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or Aceh Freedom Movement Gross Domestic Product xii

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List of Abbreviations

GRP HIV ICBM IDSS IMB JASDF JI KNLA KNPP KNU LDP LET MALSINDO MILF MSDF NATO NCMP NLD NMP NPA NRC ODA OPM ORF P&O PAP PLA PRC QDR R&D RMSI ROK SAARC SAR SARS SBY SCO SEANWFZ

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Group Representation Constituency Human Immunodeficiency Virus Inter-Continental Ballistic Missile Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies International Maritime Bureau Japan Air Self-Defence Forces Jemaah Islamiyah Karen National Liberation Army Karenni National Progressive Party Karen National Union Liberal Democratic Party Lashkar-e-Toiba Malaysia-Singapore-Indonesia Moro Islamic Liberation Front Maritime Self-Defence Force North Atlantic Treaty Organisation Non-Constituency Member of Parliament National League for Democracy Nominated Member of Parliament New People’s Army National Reconciliation Commission Official Development Assistance Organisasi Papua Merdeka or Papua Freedom Organisation Observer Research Foundation Peninsular & Oriental People’s Action Party People’s Liberation Army People’s Republic of China Quadrennial Defence Review Research and Development Regional Maritime Security Initiative Republic of Korea South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation Search and Rescue Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone

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SEZ SLORC SPDC SSA SURA SSN TAC TRT UAE UMNO UNSC UNCLOS UNOCAL WMD

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Special Economic Zone State Law and Order Restoration Council State Peace and Development Council Shan State Army Shan United Revolutionary Army Attack Submarine Nuclear-powered Treaty of Amity and Cooperation Thai Rak Thai United Arab Emirates United Malays National Organisation United Nations Security Council United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Union Oil Company of California Weapon of Mass Destruction

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The Dawn of a New Era

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1 The Dawn of a New Era K. Kesavapany

Asia began a new-era with the launch of the East Asia Summit (EAS) in December 2005 in Kuala Lumpur . Great movements often begin as a small event, which in retrospect, is understood to be a turning point in history. For instance, who would have thought the launch of ASEAN in 1967 would yield such rich dividends forty years later , with the launch of the EAS, which its members agreed would be driven by ASEAN?

Trends in the Asia-Pacific Region There are three major regional trends which would justify some attention. Firstly, with the newly established EAS, all members, including India, now have to take in the wider Asian arena, beyond their traditional subregional focus. All members’ political radars will now have to scan and pay attention to such hot spots as the Korean peninsula, Taiwan-China relations, Japan-China relations. These issues are no longer far-off nor less relevant, but now deeply concern regional well-being as they determine the progress of the EAS. Many Asian policy-makers and thinkers have now to grapple with new concepts and new responsibilities such as how China, India and Japan should provide the regional public goods and how should these three powers meet the new high expectations of ODA(Official Development Assistance) and FDI (Foreign Direct Investment) from the less developed EAS members. This focus on the Asia-Pacific region is not new , because the far sighted then Prime Minister J. Nehru, whilst he was imprisoned in Ahmadnegar Prison during World War II, wrote:

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Though not directly a Pacific state, important influence there.

India will inevitably exercise an

There is obviously much to think about and much to discuss regarding the new and wider regional role and responsibilities of the three great Asian powers. Secondly, beyond the EAS, we see rising confidence inAsia, buoyed by fast economic growth and sustained political stability. These economic and political strengths give Asia a greater sense of empowerment, in playing a more meaningful role in world af fairs. We face many and difficult challenges, including modernization and globalization, diseases like avian flu, international terrorism and various non-traditional security threats. But the sense of Asian brotherhood which Prime Minister Nehru had tried to foster by organizing such international conferences as early as the 1947 Asian Relations Conference and the 1955 Bandung Conference, and which was suppressed by western colonialism and divided by foreign ideologies, has now revived. Thirdly, the geo-political map of Asia has shifted dramatically. Nontraditional, outlying states like Australia, New Zealand and Russia have either joined or expressed interest to join the EAS. The launch of the EAS has sharpened American interest in Asia. The United States had been distracted by the War on Terrorism and by the challenges of Afghanistan, Iraq and Iran. But now, with the rise of China and India, the United States has refocused on Asia. The recent evidence includes: the U.S. courtship of India, symbolized by the U.S.India nuclear agreement; the U.S. pressures on China, such as asking China to be more transparent in its military budget; trade frictions; pressing China to revalue the yuan and requesting China to become a more responsible stake-holder in the international systems. Russia too is paying closer attention to China, with the recent visit in March 2006 of President Putin to China and the various bilateral agreements on natural gas supplies. This is a great mental shift.Asia for once is now worthy of interest and worthy of being closely associated with. Such interest is welcome as it denotes open and inclusive regionalism. It is important that this openmindedness be institutionalized right from the beginning, because closed invariably minds spell decline and decay . Thus a liberal approach and willingness to learn from others will power an Asian renaissance.

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The Asian Renaissance India, China and Japan, together withASEAN, will work hard to achieve this Asian renaissance, in arts and culture, science and technology , via people connectivity boosted by budget airlines, IT and telecommunications. When Asians begin to discover each other and begin to explore the delights of each other ’s cuisines and cultures, we begin to understand that we share a greater commonality as Asians than differences in languages, religions and political borders. We begin to think Asian; we begin to build bridges and institutions likeAsian schools and universities, where our children study together and form friendships and networks that span Asia.

The Importance of Education In Singapore, for instance, we have set up the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, where nineteen Indian students are studying and establishing personal linkages with students fromASEAN, China, Korea and elsewhere. We have also seen the establishment of the Bhavan Indian International School and the Delhi Public School. Several other educational institutions like the S.P. Jain Business Management School, the Xavier Labor Relations Institute, the Indian Institute of Management-Bangalore are contemplating establishing a presence in Singapore. An Asian equivalent of the United World College, where students will study Asian subjects and languages and imbibe an Asian mentality is a desirable model. Likewise, Japan has decided to set up an Eton-style boarding college, which shows the need for such schools. In the field of education, India is well placed to make a massive contribution. In his book entitled Being Indian: The Truth about Why the 21st Century will be India’s, senior Indian diplomat P.K. Varma noted that Indians have a particular genius for classification, which influences the way they deal with networking and or ganizing information. Indians also look beyond the details to the bigger picture to observe how things are interconnected. These are all essential traits for science, education and gathering knowledge and deepening understanding between Asians. If the EAS is to rest on firm foundations, then cooperation in education is essential. Indeed, this was the vision which HE President of India,

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Dr Kalam, proposed during his visit to Singapore in February 2006, when he suggested, a WorId Knowledge Platform or IT links between India and Singapore and South Korea.

Conclusion The ties between India and Singapore are blooming. We do not need to enumerate in detail the long list of blossoming links, but I wish to quote our Education Minister, Mr Tharman Shanmugaratnam, who in a speech in 19 October 2005, said: Some Indians refer to Singapore as India’ s nicest city , a place that Indians regard as home, an extension of India.

This is a sentiment which the 90,000 Indian expatriates living and working in Singapore might share. In conclusion, India and Singapore have made significant political investment by joining the EAS. Now the key question is how both our countries can work together to make the EAS a dynamic or ganization.

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2 Asia’s Rise: The Challenge of Stability S.D. Muni

Politics and security are driven by economic and social dynamics and we would do justice to politics and security by paying proper attention to the economic forces. Economic and social drivers of strategic dynamics are reflected in the rise of India and China as the major Asian players and in the establishment of the East Asian Summit with the objective of building an Asian community. It’s now an acknowledged fact thatAsia is on the rise although this rise is not quite in the form of the Nehruvian vision, which we in India are very familiar with. Nehru had a vision of integrating Asia and making it a focal point of influence in world politics; shaping world politics in a manner conducive and advantageous to Asians. There were factors which fitted that vision but there were also forces which did not allow that vision to take shape at that particular point of time; although there is now a new drive to recreate that vision. Of course, in this new context it cannot be exactly what Nehru might have thought of but it certainly carries the core of Nehru’s idea. In this rise of Asia, I see India and China as the core players and actors. They have shown more than eight per cent economic growth and together represent one-third of humanity . India and China are indeed critical to the whole question of global prosperity and growth. I think their prosperity and their growth rates are generating economic surpluses which are attracting global corporate interest to Asia in a manner not seen before.This in turn is creating high expectations of the two countries, whatever may be the doubts about their ability to work together and move Asia forward. 5

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But the rise of India and China is also raising apprehensions. I have read the reports of speeches of both President Bush and Prime Minister Blair warning their own people that if they do not work hard enough India and China would over take them. They used the word “Chindia”, which I believe Jairam Ramesh used in his book called “Chindia”. President Bush also said that these countries are rising and that the West will have to meet the challenge. In fact Indian and Chinese companies are already competing very successfully with many western companies, if the competition in the steel industry presented by the Mittal group is any indication. But it is not only India’ s and China’s economies which are growing; other economies in Asia namely, Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and Vietnam, are amongst the fastest growing economies in the world, not to mention the former superpower Russia. It is this cumulative impact of economic dynamism which is focusing much greater attention on Asia. This economic dynamism in turn is leading to the tendency to integrate Asia as manifested in the plethora of or ganizational structures. This morning, I was at the Sixth Meeting of the BCIM forum which is going on here in New Delhi. The BCIM Forum — Bangladesh, China, India and Myanmar Forum — earlier referred to as Kunming initiative, is unfolding various other projects. So among regional or ganizations and fora we have ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation), BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation), the Ganga Mekong project, ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), APEC (AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation) and of course, now on the top of it all the East Asia Summit which in a way, as Ambassador Kesavapany has rightly pointed out, is integrating most of these sub-regional exercises. My feeling is that the overarching integrative framework would not weaken the subregional groupings but strengthen and reinforce much greater and more vigorous activity at the sub-regional level because you still find the syner gy far more comfortable at the sub-regional level from where it would link with the wider regional framework. This would of course lead to challenges and potentialities, both within the sub-regional groupings as well as in the Asian integration. The Kuala Lumpur Summit itself revealed all kind of pulls and tensions, which might assume larger and more unmanageable form later. The role of the United States would be just one of them but I think even within the group, the challenge of scholarship and leadership would be to cope with some of

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these tensions and to see that the growth becomes far more harmonious. But we are going to go through a very dynamic phase of integration in Asia, which I am afraid would not remain confined to South and Southeast Asia. India is not only following a Look East policy but we have also pronounced a Look West policy, Look West not in terms of America and Europe but in terms of West Asia, Central Asia and the Gulf and this was Nehru’s vision of Asian integration. This policy will generate influences and ripples even on the East Asian integrative process because major issues like trade, investment and energy cannot be de-linked from what is happening in that part of the world.The whole question of Indian Ocean maritime security and energy security involves these regions, and, considering these factors, I think eventually we will have to integrate them. Now when these economic forces unleash their power I am sure the strategic factors would creep in and one of the major strategic dynamics would be how the great powers in the region are going to relate to that. Here the United States would be a major factor , even though I hesitate to refer to the United States as an Asian country as some have called it, though it is omnipresent. Another major factor would be how India and China look at this centrality of the U.S. influence.There are different ways of describing U.S. initiatives including that of containing China and therefore roping in otherAsian powers including Japan, Korea andAustralia into what some western analysts call an “Asian NA TO” so that China’ s rise in future is not too uncomfortable. Much would depend upon the dynamics of three or four major actors. Of course, Europe and Russia would also be factors but mainly it is the interactions of India, China, Japan and the United States with each other which would shape strategic relations. But the great power relations alone will not determine the future of Asia. A major area of concern is political stability . We have political orders and systems that are taken for granted but I have my doubts about them. Then we have rising insurgencies, which are killing thousands and yet are viewed as small smouldering fires here and there. At stake is the political order in some of our South and Southeast Asian nations. Take Nepal for instance; we don’t know what will happen there: whether there will be a monarchy , a democracy , a military or Maoist takeover , or whether it will continue in some form of chaos for a fairly long time to come. In Sri Lanka no one can be sure that the present ceasefire will hold in the absence of a political process to resolve the conflict.

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Then there are Pakistan and Bangladesh. I don’t know to what degree Southeast Asia is sensitive to the notion that we in India sometimes feel surrounded by states which are failing. And this is what even international commentators are saying — that two or three states are in a very precarious situation. We don’t know what will happen if they fail. We don’t wish them to fail, we would work to try to ensure that they don’t fail, but if they fail I think the debris and spill-over ef fects would be serious. Probably the Southeast Asian situation is not as bad or perhaps we don’t see it as that bad sitting here in Delhi. But still we do get some disturbing signals about Thailand, Myanmar, Indonesia, and Philippines. Then there is the question of democracy , which is quite an issue in the newer parts of ASEAN, in Myanmar, Laos, Cambodia. Cambodia has a democracy but all current indicators are that the democracy there is deteriorating rather than strengthening. The pertinent question is what would be the shape of the political system in these countries in the future, and I think a lot would be decided by the outcome of these internal churnings and processes which we have not been able to assess and predict. This leads me to our concern about terrorism. It is a major problem after September 11. You cannot call any revolt or violence terrorism. We have just turned out a book on responses to South Asian terrorism and we find that the most common response is to deal with it is as a law and order problem. The legislative responses, the developmental and economic responses, and political responses are few and that is why without going into the root causes of many of these problems we are touching only the outer manifestations. I am not qualified to comment on how Southeast Asia is dealing with it, but I do see, if I may say so, certain divergences in Southeast Asian and South Asian perspectives on terrorism. I find that the major thrust of the Southeast Asian understanding of responses to terrorism is guided by the global war against terror in which Islamic extremism is a major force to contend with. In SouthAsia we have a different perception of Islamic extremism and how we can deal with it. I recall that when Singapore’s Defence Minister was in New Delhi, we had a discussion in ORF on terrorism because he was very keen to discuss the subject and he found totally dif ferent perspectives coming from the Indian leaders and decision-makers who have dealt with the problem of terrorism. Then he said that there was the need for us to share our thoughts and ideas and he was quite willing to support any such exercise between South and Southeast Asia and I think after that a lot is being done. The

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Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS) is doing a lot on how terrorism has to be dealt with. But there is a certain diver gence in our perspectives and we have to thrash it out so as to determine what should be the right approach. We all agree that the question of maritime security and maritime terrorism including more critical issues like the Container Security Initiative and the Proliferation Security Initiative which have been proposed, not by us, would have much wider global implications.We will have to fit them to our concerns about maritime security . These I think are some of the issues relating to our political and security concerns, but we must look at them both in terms of economic and social dynamics like ethnicity and identities because we see in South and Southeast Asia a sort of triple explosion in terms of information and awareness of the people, aspirations of the people and identities of the people. Unless good governance, proper development, and equitable distribution of our gains and advantages are addressed some of these root causes would continue to be there together with their outward, often violent, manifestations.

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3 The East Asia Summit An Overview K. Kesavapany The possibilities of India’s engagement with Asia, envisaged by Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, took clear shape at the inaugural East Asia Summit (EAS) in Kuala Lumpur in December 2005. In some ways, the EAS is the successor to the 1947 Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi as well as the 1955 Bandung Conference. Both these conferences focused on themes of Asian cooperation and Asian brotherhood. Now it is up to the heirs of Prime Minister Nehru to implement his vision for Asian cooperation. Why is the EAS so important and so different from various preceding regional fora? After all, we have witnessed the formation of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), SAARC (SouthAsian Association for Regional Cooperation, the SCO (Shanghai Cooperation Organisation), APEC (Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, the ARF (ASEAN Regional Forum), ASEAN Plus Three, BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation), Indian Ocean Rim Cooperation, etc. The EAS is special and dif ferent because • • •

it is inter-regional, uniting the sub-regions of NortheastAsia, Southeast Asia, South Asia and Australasia; it is the first Asian grouping which includes all the greatAsian powers; and it is based on open and inclusive regionalism.

India was included unequivocally since it had met the three Cebu criteria set by ASEAN, having signed the ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation without delay or reservations. As a full member of the EAS, it will play a full and equal role within the EAS. 10

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Definition of EAS Footprint There has been some uneasiness about the geographical definition of East Asia, and India’ s place, since India is part of South Asia. As far as Singapore is concerned, our Senior Minister, Mr Goh Chok Tong, a good friend of India, said at the 4thAsia Pacific Round Table, held in Singapore in February 2006, that: Globalization has meant an ever greater disconnect between physical geography and political geography. Economic space no longer coincides with political boundaries. A region is what we define it to be in terms of real political, economic, social and other connections.

This functional definition of Asia as a region is important because it opens up the way for other Asian countries to join the EAS, which should eventually become the core of a pan-Asian regional group.

How Singapore Views the EAS Mr Goh’s speech at the Asia-Pacific Round Table is a definitive statement of Singapore’s views of the EAS. He is bullish about the EAS and ar gues that EAS member-states can achieve present EU standards of living by 2030. He also believes that Asia is undergoing a renaissance and finding its own way towards Asian integration. This integration must be marketbased, a process that member -states should help to enhance. The EAS members now have the autonomy to create their own future and the future of Asia. Member-states must accept responsibility both in domestic governance and in external relations, especially in three key relationships: Sino-Japanese relations; ASEAN integration; and the Sino-Indian relationship. Finally, he emphasizes the need for changes in mindsets. These points are worth pondering over . Just as APEC was aimed at engaging the United States during the 1990s, when it seemed that it might become isolationist in the aftermath of the Cold War, and just as the ARF was aimed at engaging all the great powers interested and involved in Asia-Pacific security issues, the EAS could well serve as a political framework to engage the three great Asian powers to work in harmony on building an Asian community. One important aim is to enable China and Japan to amicably resolve their dif ferences within the EAS framework. Thus the role of the EAS is to serve as a framework for building an Asian community, and its purpose is to promote harmony and cooperation between and among its member-states.

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As to how the EAS will develop, this is really in the hands of the sixteen members. Recalling that the EU took fifty years to develop fully , whilst ASEAN took thirty years to achieve its present configuration, we should remember that it has been only three months since the EAS was formally launched. We can be sure that it will develop its own momentum and create its own mechanisms for regional cooperation, just asAPEC did. What is the impact of the EAS on Asian geopolitics and Asian economics? Much will depend, of course, on how it develops or whether it becomes a talk-shop. But its potential is so great that it is unlikely to end up as a talk-shop. The economic trends and political impulses towards Asian regionalism are too strong and, besides, China will be a very powerful force driving the EAS forward. Once it overcomes its suspicions about Trojan horses within the EAS, China will perceive it as a useful forum for influence and networking and recognise its potential to unify Asia.

Implications of the EAS for India These trends have implications for India. as follows: • •

•

•

The main implications are

EAS membership suggests that India has transcended its South Asian focus and has emer ged on the wider regional scene as an actor with significantly broader Asian interests. EAS membership means that India can now address its bilateral relations with its EAS neighbours within a wider regional framework. India now has to think Asian and not just SouthAsian. For instance, its relations with ASEAN will be strengthened by ASEAN’s role as the driver of the EAS. EAS membership means that India will have a more proximate view of the China Factor since Beijing is increasingly becoming a prime engine of Asian economic, political and security developments. As Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said to Chinese Premier Wen Jiaobao, during the latter ’s visit to Delhi in April 2005, “India and China together can reshape the world order”. EAS membership means that India will increasingly have to meet higher expectations within Asia, whether as one of the producers of regional security public goods, or as a source of developmental aid to the less-developed EAS members, or as an active EAS member that provides leadership, ideas and initiatives.

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The China Factor China, India and Japan are the three great Asian powers that drive the region’s economics, politics and security agenda and activities.The others, like ASEAN, South Korea and Australia, play a supplementary role, and occasionally produce important initiatives such as the EAS, which was originally a concept promoted by then Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia. Among the three, Japan has slipped behind because of its decadelong economic stagnation, from which it is only now recovering. It has also undermined itself by the insistence of its leaders to visit the Yasukuni shrine, to whitewash its World War II atrocities and by somewhat distancing itself from Asia-centred activities. A recent example was the statement by the new Japanese Foreign Minister , which unfortunately gave the impression that Japan had turned its back on Asia. This wrong impression was later corrected but some damage had been done. Thus, for the time being India and China will play a leadership role in tandem in Asia, and their relationship will be a key link within the EAS. Fortunately, Sino-Indian relations have improved, while Sino-Japanese relations are on hold, waiting, on the Chinese side, for a change in the Japanese leadership. The desire for better Sino-Japanese relations does exist, as was shown in the borrowing of the felt pen by then Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi from Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiaobao at the EAS in December 2005. Meanwhile, Japan is fast becoming a normal nation, and moving from a peace-loving to a peace-supporting country. China is trying to grasp the implications of a normal Japan while Tokyo is trying to reflect on the implications of the peaceful rise of China. The EAS and the ARF provide two useful forums for all major Asian powers to discuss the nuances of evolving Asian strategic relations. For both China and India, with their development and prosperity dependent in large part on the outside world, their notions of national security have extended beyond their borders, and can partly be accommodated within the EAS framework. Sino-Indian relations are proceeding well.This positive state of relations can be seen in Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’ s interview with the Singapore Straits Times (30 June 2005): The basic paradigm is that we are seeking to improve relations while addressing outstanding differences.

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On China’s part, Prime Minister Wen Jiaobao, during his visit to India in Apri1 2005, said that: China and India could have a positive influence on peace and development in Asia through a harmonious relationship, enhancing mutual trust and expanding cooperation.

There are several indicators of the upward trend in bilateral relations, such as the agreement to set up a Strategic and Cooperative Partnership for Peace and Prosperity, based on Pancasila, and various schemes and MoUs mentioned in the joint statement issued by both sides during Mr Wen’s visit in April 2005. That successful visit built on the foundations laid by former Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee to China in June 2003. Earlier , in May 1998, the Indian nuclear tests had caused a chill in bilateral relations. The two countries held their first strategic talks in Delhi in January 2006, and expressed their concerns over U.S.-Iran relations. In general, Sino-Indian relations can be said to be both competitive and complementary. Both countries compete for markets, FDI and energy sources but are complementary in areas such as IT,education and combating infectious diseases such as avian flu. Within the WTO, both countries are working closely together. The three key issues in bilateral relations are the border issue; Tibet; and Sino-Pakistani nuclear and missile cooperation. On Pakistan, China urges discussions and moderation and no longer gives unconditional support to Pakistan over Kashmir . For its part, India is concerned over China’s role in and use of the port of Gwadar in Pakistan. As Dr Vijay Sakhuja of the Observer Research Foundation noted during a seminar that he recently gave at ISEAS, China has been building a strategic relationship with Pakistan and probably wants to do the same with Myanmar as part of its aim of expanding its naval presence.

The Courtship of India India is now being courted by the United States and Japan, which seek to cultivate India as a counterweight to China.Taiwan and Japan are beginning to divert some investments to India as part of their China-plus strategy. On India being courted as a counter weight to China, Mr Goh ChokTong said, in his speech cited above, that India and China are huge countries with wise and old civilizations that know how to calculate their national interests, and that neither would allow itself to be used. India will surely be aware that allowing itself to be manipulated against China will damage bilateral

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relations and will also af fect the EAS. However , India could use the leverage from its courtship by Japan to help China and Japan gradually restore good relations without either side losing face. Sino-Japanese relations have been described as “economically hot and politically cool”, so India could help both sides to warm up political relations. ASEAN stands to benefit from the twin engines of growth that will propel Asia into the twenty-first century.

Regional Public Goods As a leading EAS member, India will be able to contribute to the stability of the region in economic, political and security terms. Both China and India now have a strong interest in the security of sea-lanes and in the security of their energy sources. Thus, India has an interest in contributing to the safety of navigation in the Straits of Malacca, in combating piracy and maritime terrorism, in helping EAS members to fight infectious diseases through joint research and development, in playing mediatory roles where possible, and most importantly , in being a full, active and constructive member of the EAS. India’s economic strengths in IT, for instance, can be used as leverage to help other member -states that might request its assistance.

Bilateral Relations Both India and Singapore can play useful roles by cooperating within the EAS framework. The two countries enjoy warm and cordial relations, as exemplified by the successful visit of HE the President of India, Dr A.P.J. Abdul Kalam, to Singapore in February 2006; Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong’s visit to Kolkata in January 2006, when he addressed the Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) summit; and Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong’s visit to Delhi in June 2005, when he signed the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA). Singapore companies have invested in India’ s telecoms, ports, logistics, healthcare, financial sector, industrial parks as in Bangalore, and in Indian towns. There are more than 1,600 Indian companies in Singapore, including the top 20 Indian IT companies. A dozen leading Indian firms are interested in making Singapore their base for global operations. The India-Singapore Partnership Fund was launched in 2006, and the Institute of South Asian Studies was set up in 2005. Both sides have set up a Parliamentary Forum.

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In education, some reputable Indian schools have established branches in Singapore, and world-class international institutes are contemplating similar initiatives. Singapore is emphasizing research and development, and it has set up the National Research Foundation, with S$13.5 billion in funding over the next five years. This is one promising area for bilateral cooperation. Another good area is trade and economics, with the CECAas the framework. Bilateral trade in 2005 totalled US$10 billion and Singapore was the third lar gest foreign investor in India in 2005. Singapore firms such as Ascendas have set up IT Parks in Chennai, Kolkata and Bangalore. Our National University of Singapore has set up its fifth overseas college in Bangalore. Mr Goh has proposed setting up an SEZ in India, to be managed by the private sector, an ASEAN-India Connect and an aviation hub in India. As suggested in President Abdul Kalam’s speech during his visit to Singapore this year , both countries can work together in implementing these initiatives.

Western Backlash At the January 2006 World Economic Forum’s Davos Conference, one prominent theme discussed was how the West was coping with the competition posed by China and India. Globalization and technological advances could trigger a Western backlash in the form of protectionism, especially in countries that have grown comfortable and complacent. Both China and India have added hundreds of millions of cheap and skilled labour at the exact moment when technological advance has rendered distance obsolete. Two key questions for China and India are how to avoid Western protectionism and how to maintain sustainable economic development. The controversies in the United States and the European Union over the attempts by CNOOC (China National Of fshore Oil Company) to buy UNOCAL and India’s Mittal to buy Arcelor and the U.S. Congressional unhappiness over Dubai Ports World’s purchase of P&O in February 2006, show that globalization does not mean a level playing field, with the same rules for Asians and Westerners.

Conclusions The EAS proposal emerged from the Report of the EastAsia Study Group, which recommended its launch in 2007–08, but interest was so keen that it was launched in December 2005. The EAS will use existing ASEAN

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and ASEAN Plus mechanisms to study and implement ideas. We can expect it to take off because it is an idea whose time has come. However , institutions depend not only on the right conditions, but on leadership, to thrive. The right conditions are created by the regional autonomy that exists. India, like all other EAS members, has the freedom to decide on its own future. The sine qua non, however, will be the creation of national conditions that will facilitate the full and free operations of the market. It is likely that the EAS will evolve to become a high-level forum for strategic dialogue and Asian cooperation, and that it will complement existing regional structures. India and ASEAN should build links that strengthen the EAS. However, for the EAS to progress, a new mindset of cooperation should replace old mindsets of protectionism and zero-sum game approaches. India-China cooperation will be the lynchpin of the EAS. In some ways, the institution shows the way to revert to the ancient connections between two ancient civilizations that used to trade in Buddhist wisdom and engage in maritime trade in Indian spices for Chinese silks, tea and porcelain. Singapore also wishes to take part in this international trade in ideas, regional cooperation, scientific and technological R&D, and political dialogue and economic cooperation. Let me end on the note that the stars are well-aligned for the twentyfirst century to be declared Asia’s century.

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4 Implications of the East Asia Summit: An Indian Perspective D.S. Rajan Raakhee Suryaprakash

Introduction The inaugural session of the EastAsia Summit (EAS) was a much-awaited event in Asian affairs. Since the idea for an East Asian forum was first mooted by former Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad a decade and a half ago there has been great expectancy amongst the “East Asian” powers. The summit meeting on 14 December 2005 saw seventeen heads of state (including the Russian leader Vladimir Putin who was present as a guest) from a region extending from India and Japan to New Zealand come together at Kuala Lumpur for the session. Attending leaders from ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations), South Korea, China, Japan, India,Australia and New Zealand, in the “Kuala Lumpur Declaration” of 14 December 2005 pledged themselves to work towards realizing the dream of building an EastAsian Community. This, according to the Declaration, would be done through a “broad based dialogue on strategic, political and economic issues of common interests”. In the course of the first summit, issues like “financial stability , energy security, economic integration, growth, and trade and investment expansion, narrowing down of the developmental gap and eradication of poverty, and good governance”1 were given special emphasis. In addition to these broad-based ideals, many specific concerns common to this region were also discussed.

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Although over the past few years there have been many positive developments in the Asian region, there still remain many deep-rooted problems that require joint effort to tackle and eradicate; terrorism, poverty, religious extremism, fundamentalism, piracy, communicable diseases and political instability, to name but a few . The EAS has the potential to address them. Although the first EAS met for only three hours, the most noteworthy achievement was the decision to hold the summit annually alongside the ASEAN summit and under the chair of ASEAN. This decision, at least for the foreseeable future, puts theASEAN member-states firmly in the driving seat. Convened by ASEAN, the meeting’s participants represented countries with roughly one-half of the world’ s population and accounting for onefifth of its trade; the region is also the locus of key problems mentioned above that have global ramifications. The fact that such a forum exists for heads of states to interact with one another and discuss shared concerns is perhaps the greatest advantage of the EAS. The EAS needs to be viewed against the discord between the key players, particularly the Sino-Indian rivalry and the Sino-Japanese competition witnessed prior to and after the summit. The Chinese were reportedly hesitant in including India (in addition to Australia and New Zealand) in the summit. India finally participated as a result of the efforts of Singapore, Japan and other ASEAN members. Another point of difference which was visible during the conception of the summit was whether or not it should be only Asia-focused. At least from as early as the 1990s Malaysia’s Prime Minister Mahathir had proposed an “East Asian Economic Group” which would have had an exclusively Asian membership. The ASEAN nations were able to sort out this issue on the basis of their membership criteria: substantive relations with ASEAN, dialogue partnership with ASEAN, and the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). India, Australia and New Zealand met all three pre-conditions.

Implications for India India has strengthened its civilisational links with Southeast and Northeast Asia only over the past decade, as New Delhi’ s policies have been reworked to constructively engage the East Asian nations through the Look East policy. In this context India looks at the EAS as a move in the direction of realizing its long cherished dream of building an Asian

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community. The summit even in this stage is of considerable significance to India on many fronts.

Economic Interests Following independence and during the ColdWar, India’s closed economy and leanings towards the Soviet Union precluded any serious engagement with the East. The 1962 war with China and the pro-U.S. stance of Japan also ensured that India remained isolated inAsia. However, the opening up of India’s economy under the then Prime Minister Narasimha Rao and the present premier Dr Manmohan Singh and the launch of the Look East policy, paved the way for New Delhi to for ge new partnerships. The engagement continued through the 1997 financial crisis and, as the economies of Southeast Asia and Japan slowly revived and that of China grew in leaps and bounds, India began to see the benefits of its decade old Look East policy . To quote the architect of India’ s open economy, Dr Manmohan Singh: Our trade with Asia has increased exponentially in the past decade. Today the East Asian Community of nations has overtaken Europe and the Americas as the largest bloc among our trading partners. 2

The ASEAN countries, in particular, have come to play an important part in India’s trade and in its policy considerations over the last decade. The EAS will, hopefully, facilitate the process of Free Trade Agreements (FTA) and other modes of economic engagement. To fulfil its current and future commitments, India has to reform its economy faster in order to prepare itself for active participation in a panAsian Free Trade Agreement, an idea that found echo during the inaugural EAS. India has pledged all possible support, ranging from credit lines to building human resource and technological capabilities for the weaker member countries, in addition to welcoming the opportunity , when it arises, for it to join the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, and thereby reinforce its commitment to the whole region. In playing its positive role in East Asia, India will be directed by its legitimate interests in compliance with “peace, stability and prosperity of the region” as a whole, and not by old animosities or new af finities. The EAS is the first step in the direction of a vision of the Asian people. Through bilateral and multilateral interactions and dialogue on “broad strategic, political and economic issues of common interests and concerns”,

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the members would “strive to strengthen global norms and universally recognised values”. India’s participation in the EAS is a real opportunity to broaden and deepen its engagement with the emer ging Asia. The links between Tokyo and New Delhi have yet to reach their full potential. As yet, India is a new frontier for Japanese companies, but as India presents opportunities that are not to be missed, there is a desire to work with India and combine resources to explore new markets (e.g., Joint Special Economic Zones involving Singapore and Japan in India). Under the aegis of the EAS and the guidance of theASEAN further links between India and Japan as well as other nations can be forged. To quote Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong, Geographically, ASEAN and India are close regional neighbours. Culturally, our peoples are comfortable with each other and our links are growing. This better reflects the present reality , which is that trade, investment, and people linkages are transcending conventional physical geographical boundaries, and India, Australia and New Zealand are already becoming an integral part of the region. 3

Trade and investment between the Asian giants India and China have also seen a phenomenal increase in the recent years. Bilateral trade in 2005 was up almost forty per cent from 2004 at US$18.7 billion, and China is soon expected to overtake the United States as India’ s largest trading partner. India’s software giants like Infosys and Satyam Computer Services, are looking to China as a second base, where there are opportunities for applying research and innovation in cost-ef fective ways. Chinese manufacturers in return look to India as a potentially vast market for its manufactures, mainly appliances and cars, as well as the steel that is used in their production.

Strategic Perspectives New Delhi is prepared to use the factor of economic interdependence as a lever for the betterment of strategic relations. Speaking in Shanghai in early January, Indian Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran said India and China “are too big to contain each other or be contained by any other country”. He spoke of both countries fashioning a “strategic and cooperative partnership for peace and prosperity”. Dr Manmohan Singh, before leaving for the EAS also emphasized the growing importance of cooperation with China, rejecting the speculation that India is interested in containing or

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balancing China in the region.A similar approach was taken by him during his meeting in Kuala Lumpur with his Chinese counterpart. India’s strategic interests in the East Asian region are becoming clear. They were brought out by the then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, in his address to the Combined Commanders Conference in 2003. Our security environment ranges from the Persian Gulf to the Straits of Malacca across the Indian Ocean, includes CentralAsia and Afghanistan in the North West, China in the North East and South East Asia. Our strategic thinking has also to extend to these horizons … [For] as we grow in international stature, our defence strategies should naturally reflect our political, economic and security concerns, extending well beyond the geographical confines of South Asia.

Earlier, in the Singapore Lecture at ISEAS in 2002, he had emphasized the need for cooperation to address the security problems that are common to India and her neighbours. He stated We have crucial stakes in protecting our common commercial sea lanes, combating piracy, choking off narco-trade and curbing gun running. We need to tackle this jointly in a determined manner , through regular exchange of experiences, information and intelligence.

India took active part in EAS discussions on maritime security , technology exchange, coordination and information/intelligence exchange on terrorism and the bird flu epidemics. India strongly supported ASEAN as core of the EAS. India’s Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh made this clear on the eve of his departure for Kuala Lumpur by describing ASEAN as the “experienced driver”. The EAS call for “fostering strategic dialogue and promoting cooperation in political and security issues to ensure that our countries can live at peace with one another and with the world at lar ge in a just, democratic and harmonious environment” is in conformity with India’s strategic outlook. New Delhi’s strategy is also reflected in the defence cooperation progressing rapidly between India and other participants. Since the EAS a bilateral defence agreement was inked between the Philippines and India. Most of the nations represented at the EAS participated in the joint naval exercise Milan in the Andaman Islands, India, in early 2006. Indian and Indonesian navies held exercises and co-ordinated patrols in the vicinity of their maritime borders at the western approaches of the Straits of Malacca in March 2006. Ef forts are also continuing between India and China to increase military contacts.

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Also of immediate concern is the danger of an avian flu pandemic. In the inaugural session the means to launch a coordinated fight against the deadly virus was discussed. The outbreaks in India have made the government take notice and India can benefit from the Southeast Asian experience in containing the epidemic. The summit leaders thus adopted the EAS Declaration on Avian Influenza Prevention, Control and Response. The combined response could also be extended to other epidemics like AIDS and SARS through the sharing of information and practices to combat the spread of these diseases. In a nutshell, it can be said that India’ s “Look East” policy goes well beyond purely economic considerations. It also marks a strategic shift in India’s vision of the world and its place in the evolving global economy . Most of all, it is about reaching out to civilizational neighbours in the region by India.

Conclusion Time and again the twenty-first century has been referred to as the Asian Century. Although moves are underway to integrate the East Asian region economically and strategically, there is still a long way to go.The problems of ensuring cohesiveness within a grouping as nations strive to secure individual national interests remain a major challenge. The discords apparently arising from mutual differences between key players have the potential to destabilize the summit process in the future if not handled properly. Important to note is the reluctance with which Beijing accepted the inclusion of India, Australia and New Zealand in the EAS. Beijing fears that an extended EAS might erode its authority and clout. The SinoJapanese antagonism could also turn out to be a negative factor in the future of EAS. Notwithstanding such stumbling blocks, the fact that this grouping represents over a third of the world’ s population and a fifth of global trade is definitely a plus point once the internal dif ferences are sorted out and the EAS grows with time.A sincere effort is required by the participants of the summit to view each other without discrimination and suspicion as well as to treat all members on an equal footing. Hopefully, before the second summit is held in Cebu City, Philippines, the future role of the EAS will be clearer . Although America was not invited to this grouping its allies and friends — Japan, the Philippines and Australia, amply represent its interests. There is a possibility of United

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States being included in the group in the future if and when it decides to sign ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation as it meets all other criteria.

Notes 1. 2. 3.

Kuala Lumpur Declaration on the East Asia Summit, 14 December 2005. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s speech at the Asia Society’s 16th Asian Corporate Conference, 18 March 2006. Speech by Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong at the 1 1th International Conference on “The Future of Asia”, 25 May 2005, Tokyo, .

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5 Asia-Pacific Political and Security Dynamics Daljit Singh

We are in a period of a historic redistribution of global power to Asia. But it will be a prolonged transition, taking up a good part of the twenty-first century. Both China and India still have a long journey ahead before achieving their full potential in terms of standards of living, quality of governance and institutions. The road ahead will not be without pitfalls and setbacks. In this paper I examine briefly some of the political and security dynamics at work today in this changing Asia-Pacific region.

The Role of the United States With a US$12 trillion technology-driven competitive economy , a global military reach and unique influence in the key global institutions, the United States will remain the pre-eminent power for the foreseeable future. For these reasons it will probably continue to play a key role in Asian affairs for a long time, even after China overtakes it in sheer GDP size. The United States is in a unique position to help shape the emer ging balance of power in Asia by tilting towards one party or another and by providing it economic and technological inducements. It can also influence the shape of Asian regionalism through its influence on allies like Japan and Australia. The fundamental U.S. goal in the Asia-Pacific probably remains what it has been for the past century, that is, to prevent the domination of East Asia (now Asia) by any other power or concert of powers. In this respect Asian regionalism that excludes it poses a challenge for the United States, 25

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but as of now it seems assured by its alliances with two members of the East Asian Summit, Japan and Australia, and its developing friendship with a third, India. Further, from the American perspective, because of the conflict of interests between the major Asian players, Asian regionalism remains an uncertain venture. The present Bush Administration, when it came to power in January 2001, served notice that it was determined to maintain the pre-eminent military position of the United States in EastAsia against any potential challenger, having China very much in mind. Since September 1 1 much of the administration’s attention and energies have been taken up by Iraq and the war on terrorism and relations and cooperation with China have improved significantly. But the future direction of China’s policies is still a subject of concern which could feature prominently again in the future. 1 Despite preoccupation with Iraq, the United States has been consolidating its military position in EastAsia in recent years. The alliances with Japan and Australia have been strengthened. Guam has a new importance in the U.S. military posture in East Asia. Heavy bombers and SSNs — both equipped with long-range land attack cruise missiles — have been deployed in Guam. 2 In an environment in which countries of over one billion people are on the rise, it would be dif ficult, if not impossible, for a country of 300 million to indefinitely remain the hegemon, however dynamic its economy and however innovative its people. So the relative decline of U.S. power over the longer term seems inevitable, even as the relative power of China grows. The United States will need the help of allies and friends in the heavy task of balancing China in the future, especially since, as a global power, the United States will probably have other security preoccupations elsewhere. In this context, the importance of the U.S.-Japan alliance needs to be underlined. In February 2005 the two governments announced that they had forged a common security agenda for the alliance (in which they also recognized Taiwan as “a mutual security concern”). They have agreed to share military bases in Japan by the armed forces of both countries, improved bilateral interoperability and increased joint exercises.And Japan seems to be locking itself into the U.S. ballistic missile defence system. It is important to appreciate this is a military alliance of two of the technologically most advanced countries in the world with a combined

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GDP of about US$17 trillion today . As Japan becomes a more “normal” power it can be expected to play a lar ger security role. It is important for Asia to see the United States remain a significant element in the Asian strategic equation, with a credible military force presence. It is worth remembering that the United States will always have the option of pulling out its military forces from Asia and resorting to a strategy of of fshore balancing that Britain practised for a long time in relation to continental Europe if it thinks the political and security risks of forward deployments are too great. That is likely to be more destabilizing and less in Asia’s interests than having the United States firmly anchored within Asia. Over the short term, say the next 5–10 years, the United States will face some serious challenges, particularly in relation to the Middle East and international terrorism. This U.S. administration has unwisely squandered resources and military assets, when wisdom would have dictated the need to husband resources and wage wars as far as possible without combat, as the ancient Chinese philosopher SunTze would have advocated. However, because the United States is so rich and powerful, it will probably still maintain its strategic poise and credibility. Its capacity for regeneration from setbacks, as shown in the past, should also not be underestimated.

The Rise of China China is a central driver of Asia-Pacific security dynamics. Its rapid rise over the past two decades — manifest in economic performance, on-going military modernization, extension of diplomatic influence and a feverish quest for ener gy resources — has a crucial impact on America’s and Japan’s policies, and on the countries of Southeast Asia and South Asia. Over the longer term China probably aspires to supplant America’s pre-eminence. But in the shorter and medium term it is preoccupied with domestic problems, with trying to expand its influence in neighbouring regions and warding off perceived U.S. pressures or designs that are seen as inimical to China’s interests. In recent years China has sought a more multipolar world in which U.S. power is constrained by other major powers. But this has not produced the desired result because of the relative weaknesses of the other powers and their greater need of the United States than of each other . China has

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also been building various cooperative multilateral institutions and bilateral partnerships with neighbouring countries to enlar ge its political and economic space and to conscribe the United States from undertaking perceived anti-China moves in these regions. Even though China is in no position yet to match U.S. power or Japan’s economic clout, over the past decade, and especially over the past five years, it has made major strides in expanding its influence in Asia. There is widespread perception in Southeast Asia that its influence in the region surpasses that of Japan. Over any matter of significant security and foreign policy import, there is a tendency among regional states to think how China will react if a decision is taken in a certain way. In other words, there is, to a lesser or greater degree, a concern among many countries of possible adverse Chinese reactions to foreign policy decisions that may displease China.3 China has also made considerable headway in eroding traditional Southeast Asian mistrust of it. These gains are can be attributed not just to China’ s geographical proximity to Southeast Asia and its dynamic economy , but also to its skilful economic and political diplomacy based on long-term strategic thinking and systematic execution. China has also skilfully used concerns about U.S. unilateralism and intervention in internal affairs of other countries to advance Chinese interests in SoutheastAsia. It has been facilitated in its political and diplomatic advances in Asia by America’s preoccupation with Iraq and the war on terrorism. Its strategists would be delighted at the prospect of a long-term U.S. preoccupation with these contingencies and would view it as a window of opportunity for China. However, just as it is important not to underestimate China, so it is important also not to exaggerate its power at the present juncture. It is still a developing country and has many domestic and external constraints. There is a mismatch between the social and economic changes that have been taking place and the political system. Income disparities between the rich and the poor, rural unrest due to these disparities and abuses by local officials, and rampant corruption are just some of the socio-economic problems China faces. China’s impressive trade statistics do not necessarily make it a trade super-power. A large part of the trade in high tech products is handled by foreign companies that have invested in China. China has been used largely to assemble and export components produced elsewhere — in Japan, NIEs, and by foreign multinational companies operating inASEAN

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— and China’s contribution in terms of value added has been limited. The main beneficiaries are the foreign companies which control about sixty per cent of China’s exports.4 Its external Asian environment is marked by difficult or uneasy relations with the other major players. Sino-Japanese relations have deteriorated in recent years and will probably remain dif ficult. Relations with India, though much improved, are still lacking in trust.There is cooperation with Russia, an important source of modern weapons, but Russia does not appear entirely at ease about China’s possible longer-term intentions. The ASEAN region will hedge with all powers — the United States, China, India and Japan.

The Revival of Japan For almost a decade and a half Japan has been in a period of economic stagnation, which affected its self-confidence and limited its influence in the region. Further, since the 1990s, it has for the first time faced competition from another Asian power, namely China. And lately India has also become an increasingly important player in Asian affairs. But just as Japan was overrated in the 1980s, sometimes way beyond its potential, it may recently have been underrated. Japan’ s economy is recovering and it seems determined to become a “normal” power . So its influence and clout in Asia will probably increase in the next decade. The value that Japan attaches to the alliance with the United States is high. The alliance seems to be accepted across the political spectrum and by a lar ge majority of the public. However , beyond the alliance, there are different currents in motion on important issues like Japan’ s relations with Asia and its posture towards Asian regionalism. Japan’s business community as well as its Ministry of International Economy and Trade favour closer economic cooperation in an ASEAN Plus Three FTA. They see enormous economic synergies for Japan from connecting Japan’s two existing production networks, in Southeast Asia and in China, that such a development would allow . They do not see China as a serious economic competitor to Japan for the foreseeable future. 5 In recent years Japan has given the impression of being too U.S.centric. A more flexible Japanese diplomatic policy , while keeping the military alliance with the United States solid, may go down well in Asia and make positive contributions to Asian stability. It may also be in the

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longer term interest of the United States for its closest Asian ally not to be seen as a mere lackey of Washington. To Southeast Asia, Japan’s post-World War II international conduct has been almost exemplary . Japan was among the first of the outside powers to have a dialogue relationship with ASEAN and three years ago both sides celebrated its 30th anniversary. Attitudes to Japan in the region are no longer marred, at least not to any significant degree, by memories of Japanese occupation during the PacificWar, as they obviously are in the case of China and Korea. Nobody today raises eyebrows about Japan’ s involvement in overseas peace-keeping operations. Japanese naval vessels have been part of the U.S. naval task force in the Indian Ocean thousands of miles from Japan and such deployments as part of U.S. missions are now virtually taken for granted. Yet Japan’s shortcomings are also worth noting. Firstly, Prime Minister Koizumi’s visits to Yasukuni shrine and Japan’s inability to put the textbook issue at rest, have unnecessarily revived memories of Japan’ s wartime conduct which is a serious liability in its relations with its Northeast Asian neighbours. Secondly, there seems to be lack of long-term strategic thinking, diplomatic sophistication and coordination of policies between the different agencies to advance Japan’ s influence in Asia. Policies of considerable importance are sometimes determined by parochial thinking. Koizumi’s visits to the shrine is a case in point: apparently they have continued as a tit-for -tat with China and to please right-wing groups, irrespective of the damage to Japan’ s international position. Both the preferred choices of Koizumi as his successors, Cabinet Secretary Abe and Foreign Minister Aso are rightists. There is some risk that Japan under either of them could base its policies on a narrow nationalism of a kind which is unnecessarily provocative to China and Korea. The principal beneficiary of such a course would be China which will then have not only a propaganda windfall but would also be in a better position to drive a wedge between Japan and the United States, especially if Japanese rightists start flirting withTaiwanese independence seekers. America seems to be encouraging the re-armament of Japan but in a way which allows Japan to contribute more to the Asian balance in a responsible manner. For the reasons given above, it is not surprising that in Southeast Asia today Japan’s influence is being eclipsed by China’ s, notwithstanding Japan’s massive economic presence in Southeast Asia, its active role in

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regional organizations like ARF, APEC, and its dialogue relationship with ASEAN. It is left to be seen to what extent Japan’ s reviving economic muscle, especially if supplemented by more sophisticated diplomacy and more military clout, will be able to halt or reverse this trend.

The Rise of India Economic and strategic challenges of the post-Cold War world have been changing India’s old mindset and helping it to break out of its SouthAsian confinement. The opening up of the economy since the early 1990s has led to growth rates averaging six per cent per year . The sea change in IndiaU.S. security relations arising from the increasing convergence of strategic and security interests is also a development of major significance. A richer India that is even partly freed from its preoccupation with South Asia, would be in a better position to pursue its oft stated security interests outside the land mass of the subcontinent. It has defined these, following in the footsteps of the British Raj, as stretching from Aden to Singapore, or as then Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh said in Singapore in June 2000, from the Persian Gulf to Southeast Asia including “an uninterrupted access to the Malacca Straits and the South China Sea”. India at present has a modest size navy with thirty-eight principal combatants (destroyers, frigates, submarines and an aircraft carrier). It has been cooperating with a number of Southeast Asian navies in training and exercises and has also carried out coordinated patrols with the Indonesian navy in the vicinity of the maritime border between the two countries. As more potent and capable vessels enter its navy, its reach will be expanding. The navy’s Far Eastern Subcommand has its Headquarters in Port Blair in the Andaman Islands, which is very close to the northern entrance of the Straits of Malacca. It is clearly to India’ s advantage to advance its relations with all the other three major powers — the United States, China and Japan — and it is doing precisely that. However, at the same time, it cannot be denied that the underlying quality of India’s relations with each of these three powers remains different. A significant feature of the strategic landscape is the deepening U.S.-India strategic cooperation. In the coming years there will probably also be a strengthening of the India-Japan leg of the quadrangular U.S.-China-India-Japan relationship which has so far been weak compared with the other two legs. Still, India’s policies will ultimately be guided by

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what best serves India’ s interests. With its growing self-perception as a future great power, it would not want to be regarded as a mere handmaid of another great power. India has an important contribution to make to peace and stability in Asia by helping to build a multipolar balance in Asia that is softened by a network of cooperative multilateral and bilateral engagement and cooperation. It can also make a significant contribution in the maritime sphere. What are the political and security factors which could potentially impede the ef fective contribution by India to the Asian and Southeast Asian balance? Firstly, the South Asian quagmire. Extrication from it requires breakthroughs in relations with neighbours, especially Pakistan. It also requires domestic peace and stability in South Asian countries because instability in places like Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh has adverse implications for India’s security. So far, both still appear out of reach. So India has to rise and play a lar ger geopolitical role in Asia despite South Asia, somehow transcending it. There is also the need for wise management of relations with China, which, given India’ s difficult relations with its neighbours, could potentially be a spoiler for India in its neighbourhood if it sees its interests threatened. The importance and sensitivity of the subject is heightened by India’s deepening strategic cooperation with the United States. A second challenge lies on India’s domestic front. India suf fers from cross-border terrorism in Kashmir, insurgencies in the northeast, and Maoist violence in parts of the Indian heartland. More ominously , there are indications that some Indian Muslims, though apparently still small in number, have been involved in acts of terrorism in the Indian heartland. This raises the important question whether the Pakistan-based militant organizations, especially Lashkar -e-Toiba (LET), and the international jihadi movement are succeeding in nurturing a home-grown terrorist movement among India’s Muslims. Until recently it used to be said that no Indian Muslims had been involved in jihadi terrorist organizations. If this is starting to change, does India have not just the intelligence and security capabilities but, more important, the institutions and the rule of law to deal with the situation? If there is a concerted strategy and effort on the part of outside groups to start Hindu-Muslim communal violence in order to radicalize Indian Muslims

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and draw them into jihadi ranks, will India’ s politicians, government agencies and courts measure up to the challenge?

The Russian Factor Russia’s weight in international affairs is clearly much reduced compared to the Soviet days. In the Asia-Pacific the Russian Pacific Fleet seems no longer a major factor in the strategic equation, the way the Soviet Pacific Fleet was. A major beneficiary of this precipitate decline of Soviet/Russian conventional power in the Asia-Pacific over the past fifteen years has been China. With its northern flank virtually secure, China has much more strategic latitude and is able to look eastwards and southwards and develop a maritime capability. But Russia still wields certain important instruments of power and influence: its nuclear capabilities, permanent membership of the UN Security Council, ability to sell advanced modern weapons like aircraft and submarines; and perhaps most important, its vast natural resources, especially energy resources. For instance, despite an otherwise weak economic hand, Russia is the object of competitive courtship by both China and Japan for oil supplies. Russia has been instrumental in enhancing China’s military capabilities by selling Beijing advanced military aircraft and diesel submarines. It is happy to waltz with China to earn foreign exchange and to obtain a bit of leverage on America, while also being wary of Beijing. It is a factor in the Korean equation as a member of the six-party talks and by virtue of geographic proximity . Hence Russia still has some influence in northeast Asia. However at present it is largely inconsequential in Southeast Asia relative to the other major players.

International Terrorism International terrorism, especially since September 11, has had a momentous impact on the geo-strategic landscape of Asia. It has led to significant American military involvement in Central and South Asia, accelerated U.S.-India strategic cooperation, and changed the climate (if not yet the substance) of Indo-Pakistan relations. But September 11 and the success in ousting the Taliban regime from Afghanistan also inspired the neoconservatives in the U.S. administration to launch the invasion and occupation of Iraq, which resulted in a new centre of al-Qaeda terrorism,

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helped to radicalize Muslim youths in Europe and the Levant, and increased anti-American sentiment in the Muslim world. The Iraq war has diverted U.S. energies and attention to the Middle East and, in the Asia-Pacific, China has been the main beneficiary of this since it has given China more strategic room to pursue its interests. But it has also given an impetus and a rationale for Japan’s moves towards becoming a more normal power . In Southeast Asia itself jihadi terrorism remains a threat in Indonesia and the Philippines. The good news is that the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) is no longer what it once used to be — it is splintered and its international connections are weaker. In a way this is part of an international trend — partly in response to security action, it can be said that there is now not one al-Qaeda in the world but many , as different radicalized groups in their own regions and countries, sharing al-Qaeda ideology , mount their own terrorist operations. But in Indonesia there is also increasingly a tendency among many groups to focus more on achieving an Islamic state in Indonesia than on international jihadi causes. Suicide bombings have come to Indonesia since 2002 and democracy has ar guably provided extremist and conservative forces more leeway to push their agenda. 6 Perhaps the weakest link in the war against terrorism in Southeast Asia now is the Philippines. The JI has long had training facilities with factions of the MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front), and more recently elements of the old JI who are dedicated to international jihad as well as some freelance jihadists are reported to have sought shelter with them to evade security action by the authorities in Indonesia. Another ominous development in the Philippines is that the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), after a period of diversion into banditry in which it came to be seen as largely a criminal/bandit or ganization, has now reverted to its original Islamic agenda laid down by the late Aburrazak Janjalani, the ASG’s founder.7 The ASG has carried out or plotted terrorist attacks in various parts of the Philippines. Limited state capacity and reach in parts of Mindanao in the southern Philippines has allowed elements of JI, the ASG, freelance jihadists and members of a virulent new group of Filipino converts to Islam, the Rajah Solaiman Movement, to maintain informal contacts and train under the shelter of certain MILF factions. A senior American diplomat in Manila has described Mindanao as the “next Afghanistan”. How the so-called war on terrorism progresses or regresses in the future on the global plane will obviously have significant geo-strategic

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implications. If the jihadists in the Middle East and inAfghanistan/Pakistan gather more strength and successes, if America’s resolve is seen to be weakening, the consequences will be adverse for moderate governments from the Middle East to Southeast Asia. Outside links and support for jihadists in Southeast Asia could then increase again.

Conclusion There has been a proliferation of dialogue and cooperative security endeavours at various levels in Asia, both multilateral and bilateral. The ASEAN Plus One, ASEAN Plus Three, ARF, bilateral strategic and economic partnerships are all important in promoting dialogue and confidence building and helping to promote better understanding of each others’ positions. But at the same time they cannot hide the uncertainties, the fluidity and the underlying sense of insecurity in the region, especially when such profound changes are taking place. The challenge is to manage change peacefully. The uncertainties are compounded by the challenges of globalization and political change within states, not to mention nontraditional security threats like terrorism, HIV and other diseases, narcotics, and illegal migration.

Notes 1.

2. 3.

4.

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For U.S. concerns about China see Quadrennial Defense Review Report (Washington: Department of Defense, United States of America, 6 February 2006), pp. 29–31; and The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China (Washington: Department of Defense, United States of America, July 2006). See Edward Cody , “Shifts in Pacific Force US Military to Adapt Thinking”, Washington Post Foreign Service, 17 September 2005, (accessed 17 September 2005). These observations are based on conversations of this writer with some Southeast Asian officials. Also see Milton Osborne, The Paramount Power: China and the Countries of Southeast Asia, Lowy Institute Paper No. 1 1 (Australia: Lowy Institute, 2006). For an account of the limitation of China in Southeast Asia, see Sheng Lijun, “China in Southeast Asia: The Limits of Power”, in Japan Focus, of Cornell University (4 August 2006).

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5.

For an analysis of Japan in relation to East Asian regionalism, see Tsutomu Kikuchi, “Japan in an Insecure East Asia: Redefining Its Role in East Asian Community-Building”, in Southeast Asian Affairs 2006, edited by Daljit and Lorraine Salazar (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), pp. 39–54. For a discussion of jihadi terrorism in Southeast Asia, see Sidney Jones, “Terrorism in the Region: Changing Alliances, New Directions”, in Regional Outlook 2006–2007 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), pp. 8–11. See Rommel C. Banlaoi, “The Abu Sayyaf Group: From Mere Banditry to Genuine Terrorism”, in Southeast Asian Affairs 2006, edited by Daljit Singh and Lorraine Salazar (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), pp. 247–62.

6.

7.

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6 America’s Role in Asia Harinder Sekhon

The United States has a vital, enduring and growing interest in Asia. Although America’s Asian allies had expressed fears and concerns of an American withdrawal from the region after the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, by virtue of history , geography, cultural ties, and economic imperatives, the fate of the United States seems to be inescapably bound up with Asia. Asia is a region of formidable security challenges. Military spending in Asia surpasses that of Europe, historical grievances and mutual distrust loom lar ge, territorial disputes dot the landscape, nuclear proliferation is a major threat, and there are few mediating regional institutions. September 11 has only served to underline that the United States cannot afford to ignore this region.

The United States and South Asia The United States has several key interests in South Asia and its war on terror is far from over . It seems unlikely that the United States can withdraw its forces from Afghanistan or give up the use of bases in Pakistan in the near future, as the task of curbing Islamic extremism is nowhere near complete. To further strengthen its position in the region, the United States has taken necessary steps to go that extra mile to develop a strong strategic and economic partnership with India. Though Pakistan is still a valuable ally, Indo-U.S. relations have been “de-hyphenated” from the U.S. relationship with Pakistan. Each is to be pursued independent of the other . Indo-U.S. relations have witnessed a qualitative change in recent years. Since the end of the Cold War, and more especially after September 11, a realistic appraisal of India’ s strategic potential has led to serious re-evaluation in the United States of its relationship with India. For India 37

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too, the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the Soviet Union from the global strategic framework created the necessity to engage with the West, the United States in particular , in a more ef fective manner. A number of bilateral agreements were signed between India and the United States during 2005. Of these, the Indo-U.S. Defense FrameworkAgreement of 28 June 2005, the India-U.S. Joint Statement of 18 July 2005 and the Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement signed on 17 October 2005, are significant. On 2 March 2006 the United States and India reached agreement on the nuclear deal besides signing a number of other Memorandum of Understanding (MoUs) during President Bush’ s successful visit to India. These represent a new set of landmarks and recognition by the United States of India’ s impending rise as a global player. An assessment of its own position, security and other interests in a rapidly changing Asia and a growing realization about India’s strategic and economic potential are among the factors that have contributed to a reassessment among U.S. policy-makers and the declared intention of assisting India’s rise as a major world power . Simultaneously, additional factors like India’ s economic liberalization and the gradual opening up of the Indian market after 1991 allowed greater interaction between Indian and American business communities. India’ s growing economy, the concurrent growth of India’ s military and technical capability, as well as the emergence of an increasingly vocal Indian diaspora in the United States has had an enduring positive impact on Indo-U.S. relations.1 The Indian diaspora, a highly educated and prosperous community of techno-savvy entrepreneurs and professionals has in fact played a critically important role in bringing the two countries closer together . The United States has come to view India as a key regional power and an emerging global player. More recently, as a rising China has acquired a higher international profile, the United States has shown recognition of the Indian democracy’ s importance as a factor in the emer ging Asian balance of power. Mutual desire to strengthen bilateral relations is reinforced by factors such as shared democratic values. Globalization has also played a role and the requirements of global strategic policy have helped focus the attention of U.S. policy-makers on India. Ambassador Frank G. Wisner, speaking at the United Services Institution, New Delhi, on 10 November 1994, stated: No single country can bear the burden of bringing stability to this dangerous and confusing world — not the US, nor anyone else.We need

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strong partners. With India, we share a commitment to global peace. In order to achieve the goals, our security strategy must draw upon more than traditional military preparedness and the alliance architecture of the Cold War. We must support global political stability, advance democracy and promote economic growth. 2

India therefore assumes importance as a potential partner in maintaining stability in the Indian Ocean region, particularly in fighting Islamic extremism, and in preventing the spread of WMDs (Weapons of Mass Destruction). Other priority issues for the United States in South Asia are to prevent a potentially dangerous nuclear arms race on the subcontinent and to continue with its efforts to find an amicable solution to the Kashmir problem. While relations between India and the United States have improved, obstacles still remain. Potential areas of tension are the pace of economic reforms, especially the quantum of foreign direct investment that India would be willing to allow and the opening up of the insurance sector to foreign players, approval of the Indo-U.S. agreement on civil nuclear cooperation in the U.S. Congress and U.S. commitment to build “India’ s economic competitiveness, its military capability , and its international standing in forums such as the United Nations to counter growing Chinese hegemony if necessary”. 3 But a confrontationist approach towards China could prove counter -productive. It would be in the interest of both to encourage China’s rise in positive direction rather than in a negative one. This would be economically advantageous for the United States as well as Asia. Similarly, larger economic considerations have forced the United States to take note of South Asia’s economic and military potential and to stop regarding the region as “a third-class backwater”4 as was the case till about a decade ago.

Indo-U.S. Relations: The New Bilateral Environment U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice visited India on 16 March 2005, her first visit to Asia upon becoming Secretary of State, and stated the United States aim to accelerate the relationship with India and, in fact, take it to a higher level of cooperation that would encompass ener gy and military cooperation. Speaking in New Delhi, Rice expressed satisfaction at the progress in Indo-U.S. relations and described it as “a relationship that has transpired … transformed in recent years from one that had great

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potential into one that is really now realizing that potential”.5 Speaking at the Sofia University at Tokyo on 19 March, she “offered a vision for a decisively broader strategic relationship, to help India achieve its goals as one of the world’s great multi-ethnic democracies” through “cooperation on a global strategy for peace, on defense, on ener gy, and on economic growth”. 6 Assisting India become a “major world power” in the 21st century is now official U.S. government policy . State Department of ficials in Washington further enunciated this in a background briefing on 25 March 2005. The press statement said: The Administration has made a fundamental judgment that the future of this region as a whole is simply vital to the future of the United States. You’ve got India, which is the most populous democracy on earth and it is soon to pass China as the most populous country on earth. You’ve got Pakistan, which is the second most populous Muslim country in the world and, by the way , the only one with nuclear weapons. You’ve got Afghanistan, which is a fragile but emer ging democracy. You have a region that, if you see it from India through Afghanistan, is going to be critical both in the world’ s future demographically and economically, and also with China on one side, Iran and the Middle East on the other , and as we can see a somewhat turbulent Central Asian region to the north. So it’s important for the United States Government to see how the strategies towards all these countries actually interconnect and its important for you to see that because the decision was to try to pull a number of these dif ferent threads together to weave something that would build long-term foundations of security and friendship for this vital subcontinent with the United States. 7

American policy-makers believe that they finally have a new grand strategy towards South Asia. The strategy is outlined by Ashley Tellis in a policy brief published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in May 2005. According to this, the U.S. objective is to enable India to become a great power while at the same time assisting Pakistan in attaining security and stability . “By expanding relations with both states in a differentiated way matched to their geo-strategic weights,” Tellis argues, “the Bush administration seeks to assist Pakistan in becoming a successful state while it enables India to secure a trouble free ascent to great-power status.” According to Tellis, these objectives would be achieved “through a large economic and military assistance package to Islamabad and through three separate dialogues with New Delhi that will review various challenging

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issues such as civil nuclear cooperation, space, defense co-production, regional and global security, and bilateral trade.” 8 This is the first time the United States is basing its SouthAsia strategy on positive engagement with Pakistan coupled with a clear acknowledgement of India’ s ascendancy. In the past American policymakers were cautious as they feared that support for one would upset the other, an assumption about which they were not entirely wrong. In his policy brief Tellis also points out some of the potential challenges in realizing the United States’s strategic goals. The major problem with the American grand strategy for the region appears to be that it might be based on assumptions about the intentions of regional players that prove incorrect over time. Is Pakistan, for example, reconciled to India’ s status as the region’s pre-eminent power? Or, can India or the United States deal with the inevitable diver gence between Pakistan’ s stated and actual policies that has been the norm so far?9 Certain issues that remain unresolved may, therefore, become sources of concern in the future.

Technology Cooperation Technology transfer has increasingly figured in the ongoing bilateral discussions. Plans to expand U.S.-India high technology trade and civilian space and civilian nuclear cooperation have become key bilateral issues in recent years. The 18 July 2005 India-U.S. joint statement marked a paradigm shift in U.S. policy towards India.The agreement undoubtedly is a testimony to the growing trust and meaningful strategic partnership between New Delhi and Washington. The United States has recognized India as “a responsible state with advanced nuclear technology” that should be given the “same benefits and advantages as other such states” thereby marking an end to the Cold War policy of containing India. When fully implemented, the 18 July 2005 agreement will end India’s nuclear isolation and satisfactorily address its ener gy needs, vital for its economic growth. The United States has promised to seek U.S. Congressional approval to modify its domestic laws and policies and also to “work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India” and to facilitate supply of nuclear fuel. India will then be able to explore the possibility of obtaining nuclear reactors in the international market. Besides, New Delhi can also aspire to be a partner in the research pertaining to the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor and in the G-IV advanced reactor

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programme group. By acknowledging India as a “responsible” nuclear power, the deal completes the process of “de-hyphenating” India and Pakistan in U.S. foreign policy calculus. 10 The joint statement signifies that the global partnership between India and the United States has evolved to satisfactory levels and now “stands on its own”. This suggests a momentous “point of departure” for U.S. foreign policy, “not just in South Asia but worldwide”. In the face of obstacles that seemed intractable just a few years ago, this is a meaningful step forward. A lot however depends upon the successful implementation of this accord: for the moment it seems to be merely a roadmap to further cooperation between India and the United States.

Economic Cooperation The United States supports India’ s efforts to transform its once quasisocialist economy through fiscal reform and market opening. The United States has been keenly observing that since 1991, India has been taking steps to reduce inflation and the budget deficit, privatize state-owned industries, and reduce tarif fs and licensing controls. Though coalition governments have kept India on a general path of economic reform, the United States would like much more to be done and has been generally critical of the slow pace of reforms and bureaucratic hurdles.The changing nature of the Indian economy since the 1990s and growing economic interdependence has provided a major impetus to growing U.S. interest in India. In a globalized world it is only natural that economic interdependence will, over a period of time, extend to political and strategic fields. In an effort to strengthen economic relations between the two nations, a U.S.-India economic dialogue to boost cooperation in the spheres of finance, commerce and trade was initiated in March 2000 during President Clinton’s visit to India. The nature and scope of this dialogue subsequently was expanded with the inclusion of separate ener gy and environment components and President Bush and Prime MinisterVajpayee in Washington made a joint announcement on 9 November 2001. This declaration also sought to promote greater direct private sector interaction between the business communities in both countries to broaden and deepen Indo-U.S. economic ties. Unfortunately, despite several meetings, progress on the economic dialogue has so far been much below U.S. expectations. Negotiations however continue between representatives of the two countries to evolve a new strategy on a bilateral free-trade agreement on which the

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United States is keen, and also removing some of the irritants of the WTO regime. While the United States would like to see immediate major changes in India’s domestic policies that it claims are critical to India’ s economic growth, India understandably is being cautious: it has to synchronize the interests of a vast rural population with those of the urban centres and large-scale industrialization.11

The United States in Relation to East and Southeast Asia In East and Southeast Asia, maintaining its military presence has been a cornerstone of U.S. National Security Strategy. The United States considers itself a Pacific nation with extensive interests throughout the region. The United States also feels that its “sustained engagement” is the only guarantee for the “region’ s stability and prosperity” through “maintaining robust partnerships supported by a forward defense posture, supporting economic integration through expanded trade and investment and promoting democracy and human rights”. 12 Yet, the end of the Cold War resulted, as expected, in fluidity of international relations of the region. “With the end of the Cold War and the recession of Communist threat, U.S. allies and friends are no longer heavily reliant on U.S. protection. Not surprisingly , they are more intent on seeking their own security interests in ways that may not always be in line with Washington. The divergence between Seoul and Washington over the approach to Pyongyang, for example, is one case in point. Countries such as ROK, Thailand, and the Philippines endeavor to augment their security coefficients through developing political, economic and security ties with their neighbours. For them, the US is only one of the several pillars upon which their security is based”. 13 The end of the ColdWar also saw functional issues like the proliferation of WMD, terrorism, illegal migration, drug trafficking, natural calamities like the tsunami and the threat of pandemics coming to the fore to shape the regional security agenda.As a result of the emergence of non-traditional security concerns, there are common interests among these nations that impel them to deal with the new challenges thereby leading to more cooperation rather than competition.14 Economic integration and cooperation are being increasingly relied upon to deal with security challenges, as is being attempted in the case of the two Koreas and by China by fostering robust economic ties with Taiwan.

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A challenge for the United States in this region is the evolving Chinese role in regional security . Before the mid-1990s, China’ s involvement in regional security was predominantly reactive and bilateral. But in recent years Beijing has become more pro-active. It took the initiative to create the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, and is now playing an active and crucial role in six-party talks over the North Korean nuclear issue. While Beijing appears to feel more comfortable with promoting multilateral security dialogue and cooperation, it seeks to enhance its influence through these regional initiatives. 15 In view of China’ s growing political and economic clout, its active participation in regional af fairs is of great significance to regional peace and stability . The rise of Chinese influence, including its rapid economic development over the past two decades, has been observed with some anxiety by the United States. There is concern that China’ s economic rise will change the political landscape in the region, as China will try to match its economic power with a parallel increase in its political influence. The United States has taken matching steps to strengthen its own position through strong multilateral and bilateral engagement and also a more active participation in ASEAN, APEC and the ASEAN Regional Forum. Through the first two, the United States is looking for ways to gain greater access to markets in the region and thereby create complementary opportunities for American business and regional prosperity . The ARF has also become more active in the last two or three years through a deeper level of engagement on important security issues such as maritime security, non-proliferation of WMD, counter terrorism cooperation and through promoting cooperation in new areas like combating avian influenza. China’s military modernization is also viewed with consternation by the United States. The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) Report released on 30 September 2001 pointed to “a military competitor with a formidable resource base” as the major challenge to the United States in East Asia, suggesting that the defence planners within the Bush administration viewed China as the primary security threat and intended to reorganize U.S. military assets around this central theme.This concern over the growing Chinese capability has not vanished from Pentagon’ s radar screen, as is evident from the latest QDR Report released in February 2006. The United States is apprehensive that consistent Chinese military build-up, “particularly in its strategic arsenal and capabilities”,

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is “designed to improve its capability to project power beyond its borders”. China also has the “greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages”. While there is concern about the potential danger from China, “U.S. policy remains focused on encouraging China to play a constructive, peaceful role in the AsiaPacific region and to serve as a partner in addressing common security challenges…”. There is now a move to co-opt China as a “responsible stakeholder and force for good in the world” rather than embarking upon a course of military threat and intimidation. Since the mid-1990s, alliance enhancement with Japan has been a principal concern in U.S. Asian security policy. For the defence planners in the Bush administration, if the primary security challenge is to deal with a rising China, the United States has to rely on the traditional approaches like alliances and forward military deployment. As stressed in the QDR, “The defense strategy is premised on ef forts to strengthen America’s alliances and partnerships and to develop new forms of security cooperation.”

Southeast Asia Southeast Asia remains an area of importance to the United States. The region’s combined GDP is over US$750 billion and is growing at a rapid pace. U.S. two-way trade with the Southeast Asian states totalled US$136 billion in 2004. “Southeast Asia is a multi-billion dollar market for U.S. agricultural products and supports, directly and indirectly , millions of American jobs in all sectors of (U.S.) economy . It is the fifth lar gest market for U.S. exports. U.S. direct investment in the area reached over $90 billion in 2003.” 16 Besides its economic worth, Southeast Asia is of great strategic significance for the United States. It sits astride the sea routes from the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean to the Pacific, through which much of the world’s trade and energy supplies pass. Though U.S. interests in this area are adequately protected through its alliances with Thailand and the Philippines and its close security relationship with Singapore, the United States is confronted with daunting security challenges for which it will have to evolve a durable long-term solution in concurrence with its regional allies. The task is not easy.

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Conclusion Although the United States remains vigilant regarding China’ s military modernization and developments in North Korea and across the Taiwan Strait, overall its security concerns in Asia have become much more diverse. This was in evidence soon after the tsunami struck lar ge parts of the region in December 2004 and the United States used its diplomacy and alliances to form a core donor group to coordinate relief ef forts. Developments in Nepal and Burma too are new challenges that have emerged. This has reportedly led the Pentagon to a review its policy of military deployment. Though U.S. military presence is not likely to be reduced in Asia in the coming 20 to 25 years, the focus may shift somewhat in line with the southward and westward turn in the U.S. military strategy in Asia primarily due to the war against terrorism and new security challenges in the Middle East and Indian Ocean regions. The key principles of U.S. foreign policy would continue to be the following: • • • • •

Maintaining American supremacy and preventing the rise of any new Eurasian challenger Preventing the formation of any anti-American concert Preventing the rise of regional hegemons Preventing the spread of WMD and missile technologies, particularly ballistic missile development. Increasing American access to global markets.

It can therefore be concluded that Asia, with its growing regional economies, vast populations, military might and regional tensions, will define the course of American international relations during much of the twenty-first century.

Notes 1. For a detailed narrative on Indo-U.S. relations, see, Dennis Kux, India and the United States: Estranged Democracies, 1941–1991 (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1992); on the early years of Indo-U.S. relations, see, Surjit Mansingh, India’s Search for Power: Indira Gandhi’s Foreign Policy 1966–1982 (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1984), pp. 68– 128; for a more general treatment of the India-U.S. Relations in the post-Cold War period, see, Engaged Democracies: India-US Relations in the 21st Century edited by Kanti P. Bajpai and Amitabh Mattoo (New Delhi, 2000);

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and Stephen P. Cohen, “India and America: An Emerging Relationship”, paper presented to the Conference on the Nation-State System and Transnational Forces in South Asia, Kyoto, Japan, 8–10 December 2000. R.P. Khanna, “New Dimensions in India-US Cooperation”, Asian Defence Journal (July 1995): p. 37. Dana R. Dillon, “US Strategic Objectives in South Asia”, Heritage Lecture No. 889, 14 June 2005, The Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C. Ibid. Press Statement by U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice at Hyderabad House, New Delhi, 16 March 2005. Remarks by U.S. Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice at Sophia University, Tokyo, Japan, 19 March 2005, available at . U.S. Department of State Background briefing by Administration Officials on US-South Asia Relations, 25 March 2005, available at . Ashley J. Tellis, South Asian Seesaw: A New US Policy on the Subcontinent, Carnegie Endowment Policy Brief No. 38, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, May 2005. Ibid. Joint Statement Between President Geor ge W. Bush and Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, available at . Ashley J. Tellis, India as a New Global Power — an Action Agenda for the United States, Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2005, (Carnegie Report), pp. 43–47. The National Security Strategy of the United States ofAmerica, March 2006, p. 40. Ibid. Wu Xinbo, “America’s Role in Asia — US Security Policy in East Asia: Adjusting to a New Security Setting”, The Asia Foundation, Washington, D.C. Ibid. Testimony of U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary Eric G. John, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs before the House Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 21 September 2005, available at .

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7 China and Japan Competition in East Asia D.S. Rajan

Shifts in the regional power balance are becoming more pronounced in East Asia as a result of the ongoing changes in relations between two important players — China and Japan. What are the contributing factors to the changes? The People’s Republic of China (PRC) has been rising rapidly since the 1990s, in comparison to Japan’ s economic stagnation during the same period. Japan is still the second lar gest economy in the world, but the PRC’s enhanced economic relations with Asian countries, combined with its diplomacy , have been successful in eroding into the power and influence hitherto enjoyed by Japan. Changes in Sino-Japanese relations also have a military dimension. No doubt, China’ s declared policy for the present, arising out of the perceived necessity to have a stable international and regional environment so that it can concentrate on its domestic development, is for pursuing a non-confrontational foreign policy course. Its central message to the outside world is that the PRC’s “peaceful development” does not pose a “threat” to other countries. However, because Beijing is at the same time pursuing an active military modernization drive, East Asian nations in general and Japan in particular, are responding with some scepticism to the “peaceful development” message. Tokyo is reacting by beginning to revamp its defence, security and foreign policies, geared not only to address the issue of the rise of China, but also the threat coming from North Korea’ s development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. The growing nationalism in Japan is facilitating such attempts to reformulate policies. As China and Japan strive for regional leadership by competing in a

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variety of fields like politics, military , economy and energy, their rivalry raises questions about future stability and equilibrium in East Asia.

The History Issue A political issue which divides Japan on one side and significant parts of East Asia on the other relates to Tokyo’s wartime role. China and the two Koreas in particular want Tokyo to atone for its wartime conduct and avoid policy measures which may encourage right wing and militarist elements in Japan. These three countries however see that Japan’s response has so far not only been inadequate but also provocative; symptomatic for them in this regard are the frequent visits being made by Japanese leaders including Prime Minister Koizumi to the Yasukuni shrine in Tokyo where the souls of war criminals have also been enshrined, as well as the periodic revisions of Japanese school text books that ignore or whitewash the misconduct of the imperial army in occupied territories. The Japanese, on their part, consider such criticisms as “interference in internal af fairs” of their country. A clash between different “nationalisms” of these countries thus appears to be taking place.

Threat Perceptions and Policy Responses The budding Sino-Japanese military competition in East Asia stems from their respective threat perceptions that have evolved of late. According to its Defence White Paper of December 2004, Beijing finds increasing “complicated security factors” in the region as the United States realigns its military presence by “buttressing military alliances and accelerating deployment of missile defence systems” and Japan “steps up its constitutional overhaul, adjusting military and security policies and developing missile defence system for future deployment”. Tokyo, on the other hand, according to its New Defence Programme Outline FY 2005 assesses that China (and North Korea) is a potential threat to Japan’ s security. The Defence White Paper of August 2005 stated that “the military directions of China are receiving the broad concern of every country”. In the same vein, the then Foreign Minister Taro Aso claimed in December 2005 that “China is becoming a threat to a considerable degree”, while the White Paper on Japan’s Disarmament and Diplomacy released on 2 March 2006 said that “China’s strengthening of its military power has become a factor directly linked to the matter of

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guaranteeing Japan’s security”. Tokyo’s step-by-step hardening of its position on Beijing thus becomes obvious. The threat perceptions above are being translated into action on the ground by both China and Japan. China is modernizing its nuclear, missile and conventional capabilities as well as naval and air forces. Its deployment of missiles against Taiwan in particular is being viewed with concern as having the potential to tilt the balance of power in the Taiwan Strait, a region of strategic interest to Japan. There are also signs that China wants to develop long range power projection capabilities, initially over significant areas of the western Pacific by covering the inner and outer island chains stretching from Japan to Indonesia. Moreover, the double-digit economic growth over the last decade allows China to spend more on its military .1 As far as Japan is concerned, the contours of a pro-active defence posture were visible as early as 2001. In September that year , Japan despatched its Maritime Self-Defence Forces (MSDF) to the Indian Ocean to assist the U.S. operations in Afghanistan. Then, as a landmark event, it dispatched troops to Iraq on a “humanitarian mission” in December 2003 after passing enabling legislation earlier that year . Another milestone was crossed in March 2005 through adoption of a new National Defence Programme Outline. In the main, the Outline marked a shift in Japanese defence strategy, from the “basic defence force concept” to international peace keeping activities and counter -terrorism, in other words, from homeland defence to international security.2 While reiterating the missile threat from North Korea, the Outline, for the first time, identified China as a potential security threat. Then, in August 2005, the annual Defence White Paper further elaborated on the China threat by stressing the need to monitor the Chinese military modernization programme including plans for building a blue water Navy and developing new nuclear capable ICBMs (intercontinental ballistic missiles), both land and sea-based.As a countermeasure, it recommended the creation of a Joint Japan-U.S. Missile Defence Shield, which later received the formal approval of both countries in December 2005. 3 Defence policy changes assumed a concrete shape in the final months of 2005. Details of a proposed bill seeking to set up procedures for holding a referendum in the country on revision of the country’s pacifist constitution, which has remained unchanged since 1947, were announced during the 50th Anniversary celebrations of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party

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(LDP) in November. The Japanese Parliament (Diet) is expected to discuss and adopt the bill sometime in 2006. Whereas the existing U.S.-imposed Constitution, particularly itsArticle 9, prevents Japan from using war as a policy option and disallows “maintenance of land, sea or air forces as well as other war potentials”, the one after revision, while still keeping the clause renouncing war , could stipulate that Japan may keep an “Army for Self-Defence”, authorized not only to maintain fundamental public order in the country , but also to exercise its right for “collective self-defence” and take part in international peacekeeping efforts. In other words, the Army would be allowed constitutionally to join allies like the United States in non-aggressive military operations overseas. The then Prime Minister Koizumi had himself given the rationale behind the proposed revision by stressing, on 23 November 2005, the need for Japan to “match its weight as the world’s second biggest economy by cooperating more with the international community”. His emphasis that Japan should “take up the challenges of strife and conflict that may face international society over the next 50 years”, was significant. 4 Security perceptions undoubtedly affect external relations. For Beijing, its foreign policy goal to have a peaceful environment in the region to enable it to concentrate on its domestic development, is not working in the case of relations with Japan because of the clash of strategic interests between the two. Regional economic cooperation (e.g., East Asia Community proposal) and the North Korean nuclear issue (six-party talks) are the only two areas providing the opportunity for the two to cooperate. For Japan, the new foreign policy line seems to stress the need for a proactive political and military role internationally for Japan in place of the old “cheque book diplomacy”.

Reaching out to Asia but with the U.S. Alliance Intact Subtle changes in Japan’s policy towards the United States are also visible. No doubt, the U.S.-Japan alliance, always described by Japan as based on “equal relations”, remains the corner stone of its international ties and the alliance has of late been further strengthened through the signing of important bilateral documents like the recent Security Consultative Committee “Document on U.S.-Japan Alliance: Transformation and Realignment for the Future” which was signed in Tokyo on 29 October

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2005, providing among other things “for global cooperation between the two in ef forts to improve international security environment and joint operational coordination between the armed forces of the two sides”. As viewed in Japan, this has, in reality, reflected the transformation of JapanU.S. alliance into an alliance functioning in a global context. 5 At the same time, getting closer to Asian nations, with the U.S. alliance remaining a “critical aspect” for the economy and security of the region, has become a policy priority. “Japan has now returned toAsia after remaining involved with rich countries for a long time”, highlight Japanese diplomats.6 Firm signals are appearing confirming a new conceptual approach on the part of Tokyo towards Asia. Japan now perceives itself as a “thought leader and stabilizing force” in the region; “thought leader” because of Japan’s proven ability to handle problems in the region such as nationalism, environment, democracy and market economy and “stablizing force” due to Japan’ s capacity to assist Asian nations as shown in its handling of the financial crisis of 1998–99. 7 South Asia has now been included in Japan’s Asian outlook and the proliferation of nuclear technology from Pakistan to North Korea has made Japan look at regional security from the perspective of Asia as a whole. The new assertive Japanese foreign policy , “Asia-centric but with US alliance intact”, is casting a shadow on Tokyo-Beijing relations. China is coming out with harsh criticisms against Japan’ s increasing hard line position on a host of issues, for example portraying China as a potential security threat. In particular , Beijing, for which unification with Taiwan remains one of the “three major historic tasks”, appears to be nurturing great suspicions over the intentions of Japan, along with the United States, to interfere in any future conflict over the Taiwan Strait. For instance, it is concerned with the inclusion of Taiwan Strait for the first time, along with China and North Korea, in the U.S.-Japan Common Strategic Objectives as announced in Washington on 19 February 2005. The decision made at the U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Meeting of October 2005 to “integrate” the militaries of the two countries (see above), has been criticized by China as “aimed at containing the PRC and coping with armed conflict that may possibly occur inTaiwan Straits and the Korean peninsula in future”. 8 Japan’s recent moves towards amending Article 9 of its Constitution allowing deployment of troops in “non-aggressive operations” overseas, have only added to the Chinese fears over the possibility of Tokyo’s

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military help to Washington on the Taiwan question. Beijing has also not taken kindly to the remarks made by Japanese Foreign minister Taro Aso on 9 March 2006 which described Taiwan as a law-abiding “country”. 9

Energy Competition and Territorial Disputes Sino-Japanese energy competition is related to their respective territorial claims in the region. Beijing considers Diao Yu islands (called Senkakus by Japan) in the East China Sea as part of China since ancient times on the basis of historical and legal evidence. Veteran leader Deng Xiaoping said in 1978 that the issue be shelved and left to the future generations of both China and Japan to resolve. The islands are however under Japan’ s administrative control since the return of Okinawa to Japan in 1972. With Japan also having a territorial dispute with South Korea over Tokdo islets (called Takeshima by Japan), the lingering conflicts over territory remain an unstable factor for East Asia. The East China Sea is also a bone of contention for its oil and gas deposits in the disputed Chunxiao field northeast of Taiwan. With the East China Sea Continental Shelf demarcation issue yet to be decided at the U.N., both Beijing and Tokyo are forcefully pressing their viewpoints and taking actions at ground level to strengthen their positions ahead of any negotiations. Beijing claims that its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) extends along the Shelf to areas near the Okinawa Prefecture of Japan. Tokyo on its part, argues the “median line” between the two coasts should be the demarcation line. In early 2004, Chinese maritime vessels were seen operating in the areas near Senkakus to determine the exact nature of oil and gas deposits. In November that year , a Han class Chinese nuclear submarine was spotted near Miyako Island close to Okinawa.The Japanese Maritime Self-Defence Force was for the first time of ficially ordered to intercept the submarine, escalating tensions with China in the military sense. The granting of natural gas drilling rights in the East China Sea areas to some private companies by the Japanese Government in March 2005 received a matching response from the PRC when it began a gas exploration project near areas close to the Japanese “median” line in May. Till as recent as March 2006, Japan and China have conducted negotiations over gas reserves in the East China Sea. The two are also competing for Russian oil, in an ef fort to end total dependence on the Middle East and diversify their resources. Beijing is pushing for a 2,400-kilometre pipeline

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route from Angarsk in Siberia to Daqing in Heilongjiang, China, while Tokyo favours a 4,000-kilometre pipeline from Taishet to the Pacific port of Nakhodka. The Sino-Japanese tussle over gas and oil may not end soon as both nations are net oil importers and their demands for ener gy would continue to expand with the growth of their economies.

The Economic Dimension Beijing-Tokyo rivalry for leadership in EastAsia is also felt strongly in the economic and trade spheres. China and Japan are competing to bring the ASEAN nations under their influence by of fering Free Trade Area and Comprehensive Economic Partnership proposals by 2010 and 2012 respectively. China-ASEAN trade volume was to the tune of US$105.9 billion in 2004 and this figure is expected to increase to US$200 billion after their FTA materializes. However , despite China’ s activism to get closer to ASEAN nations economically , it is still behind Japan in this regard. Japan-ASEAN trade volume is three times that of China-ASEAN and annual Japanese FDI is ten times bigger . A notable point is that China and Japan remain important to each other economically. The PRC, including Hongkong, has surpassed the United States as Japan’s biggest trading partner. China has also become a significant manufacturing base for many Japanese companies. As a sign of China’ s realistic appraisal of the situation and the need to arrest the downturn in Sino-Japan ties, Beijing has started highlighting the likely negative consequences of Sino-Japanese political tensions for the economies of both countries. Commerce Minister Bo Xilai of China has himself taken the lead in this regard. Admitting to initial signs of “economic cold” in China-Japan relations as a result of political tensions, he pointed to Japan’ s falling status as China’ s trade partner . Japan topped the list, but since 2004, its position has been overtaken by the E.U. In 2002, Japan’s share of China’s total trade was 16.4%. This figure came down to 14.5% in 2004. Japan has of late slipped to second position in the list of China’ s largest trade partners, with the E.U. holding the top position. In 2004, investments by Republic of Korea in China were lar ger than those of Japan. 10 The Official Development Assistance (ODA) issue is also an irritant in Sino-Japanese relations. Since the Year 2000, the level of Japanese ODA to China has been falling. Japanese loans under the ODA to China fell from ¥214.4 billion in 2000 to ¥85.9 billion in 2004, marking a 60% reduction. China now ranks third in the list of Japanese ODA recipients.

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Tokyo announced its plans to freeze the ODA to China temporarily in the fiscal 2006–07.11 Japan’s backtracking is due to its perception that the PRC no longer required Japanese ODA because of its high growth levels and better standards of living.

Conclusion China is rising rapidly as an economic powerhouse and its military might is increasing. In response, Japan is reasserting itself in the region as well as in the world. The two nations are competing in key fields like economy, energy and security. What is at stake is the future character of the balance of power in Asia, so far guaranteed by the United States and its allies, including Japan and Australia. Tokyo under the circumstances might want to broaden its support base by drawing towards it Asian countries like South Korea and India, as well as Russia. In fact, it has moved in this direction. Realizing Japan’ s motives, and also in order to reduce U.S. influence in Asia, Beijing is actively wooing Seoul and New Delhi. And, its strategic relations with Russia are being further strengthened. The growing China-Russia strategic ties were demonstrated in the holding of a joint military exercise in 2005, the first of its kind, and the visit to China in March 2006 of President Putin which resulted in important agreements on ener gy supplies from Russia. A big geo-political game is thus on in Asia. The situation demands a quick pace of conflict management, the responsibility for which lies with Beijing and Tokyo. The United States has also a role to play in this regard by ensuring that Sino-Japanese tensions do not spiral out of control.

Notes 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

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Washington Times, 7 June 2005. Asia Pacific Security Studies, U.S. Pacific Command, March 2005. BBC News, 24 December 2005. China Daily, 19 January 2006. Japan Echo 33, no. 1, February 2006. Yasukuni Inoki, Ambassador of Japan, Seminar of Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, 23 February 2005. Taro Aso, Foreign Correspondents Association of Japan, 7 December 2005. People’s Daily, 5 November 2005. China Daily, 10 March 2006. People’s Daily, 12 May 2005. AP, 23 March 2006.

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8 Major Powers and Southeast Asia: A Restrained Competition? Kripa Sridharan

Introduction This paper highlights major power equations that have a strong bearing on Southeast Asia’s international relations. While the interactions between the major powers impact on the region it should not be assumed that the latter is a passive onlooker. Acting under a regional umbrella the Southeast Asian states have generated certain norms of inter -state behaviour which guide the exchanges between the regional and extra-regional states. Major power relations are generally explained within two dominant theoretical frameworks. One is of fensive realism which ar gues that great power conflicts are inevitable given the zero-sum nature of their interests. The other explanatory tool is liberal institutionalism with its emphasis on complex interdependence. This paper does not explicitly make use of these frameworks to explain great power relations but it draws upon some of their assumptions. The presence of extra-regional actors in SoutheastAsia with significant tangible and intangible interests of their own has had a major impact in shaping the region’s intra-regional and international relations. Regarding the role of major powers in the region the regional strategy has exhibited two tendencies simultaneously — regional peace and stability to be ensured by the regional states themselves without the deleterious influence of extra-regional actors and, at the same time, reliance on bilateral associations with outside powers to ensure their own security. The two are contradictory in some ways but that has not prevented the regional states from pursuing 56

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these strategies simultaneously. The presence of external actors in Southeast Asia has been both due to the initiatives of individual regional states and the keenness on the part of external actors to fish in the troubled waters of the region. Managing the presence of extra-regional actors without losing complete control over regional affairs has been a regional pre-occupation. Since the presence of extra-regional actors cannot be avoided the best option, from the region’ s point of view , is to ensure that no one single power becomes a dominant entity. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has in many ways helped in moderating and channelling the involvement of external powers in regional affairs. The mechanisms used by ASEAN are dialogue partnerships, post-ministerial conference and the various summits it holds with different major powers. While aware of the possibility that the region might become a cockpit of rivalry between competing major powers the ASEAN states have been successful in making some of these powers common stakeholders in the region’ s security. The most visible manifestation of this strategy was in the creation of theASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) after the end of the Cold War. This ASEAN-driven forum is based on the idea of cooperative security with its emphasis on normbased behaviour and inclusivity. ARF has made it possible for the major powers, the United States, China and Japan and India among others, to engage the region in a benign mode and is a reiteration of the longstanding regional view that a balanced relationship among these powers could redound to the region’ s benefit. Engagement on their terms is a better strategy for the regional states to pursue rather than letting the region become an object of ugly rivalry between the great powers. This fear has assumed greater salience in the wake of China’s rise and America’s moves to checkmate it. Similarly, the current deterioration in Sino-Japanese political relations is also causing unease among the ASEAN states because of its destabilizing ef fects beyond Northeast Asia. This is not all, India’s resurgence and its courting by the United States and Japan, which has been duly noted by China, raises another set of anxiety. It would be ideal from the regional point of view if all these powers were in a cooperative mode while engaging the region. But unfortunately this is not the case and the more their interests diverge the more Southeast Asia feels anxious. Its major worry is not to be pushed into a situation where it might have to choose between these powers, particularly between China and the United States or between China and India.

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United States, China and Southeast Asia American policy-makers admit that the United States cannot af ford to ignore China’s increasing influence in the Southeast Asian region. Its economic reach has grown enormously in the last few years and now it wants to match that with political influence. 1 One line of argument is that the burgeoning influence of China is the direct result of the low priority that the United States has assigned to the region. From this follows the prescription that the United States should strengthen its policy towards Southeast Asia.2 It has been widely noted that the 1997 economic crisis was a turning point in the region’ s relations with these two major powers. While the United States showed little sympathy and failed to provide necessary and timely help to the af fected countries China came forward with bilateral loans and pointedly avoided devaluing its currency . Since devaluation would have added to the region’s woes, refraining from such a policy enabled China to reap tremendous good will.American relations with the region suffered also because of Washington’s insouciance towards Chinese activities in the South China Sea in 1995 and 1999. This was unsettling to the regional states. The third dampener was the East Timor crisis in which America took an extraordinary interest but this only resulted in widening the gap between the United States and Indonesia. The U.S. Congress sharply responded to the allegations of atrocities committed by the Indonesian army in East Timor by cutting off the aid that was meant to help in the army’s training. This proved detrimental to bilateral relations since Indonesia was irked by the decision.All in all, in comparison to the healthy state of relations that had existed earlier between the United States and the Southeast Asian states the late 1990s was noticeably sclerotic. The subsequent period did not see any great reversal in America’s perceived indifference towards the region. Washington’s obsessive concern with the war on terror not only added to the feeling of neglect but also opened up the space for China to enhance its profile in SoutheastAsia. The decision by the U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice to skip the ARF meeting in July 2005 citing a clash of schedule in her travel plans, further reinforced the perception of neglect. ASEAN leaders openly expressed their disappointment and put down her decision to plain disinterest on America’s part.3 Washington’s lack of commitment was being seen as a threat to the Asian balance even though Southeast Asia states were careful not to verbalize openly the fear of a hyperactive China.

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Clearly, the inroads that China has been making into Southeast Asia have implications for American interests. But not everyone in the U.S. policy-making circle regards China’s forward thrust in the region in negative terms. They see this as a natural consequence of its growing economic muscle. They are also aware that China enjoys the advantage of geographical proximity. It is ar gued that Beijing’s integration with the region could ultimately help in advancing the goals of the United States in terms of China’s socialization. Deeper involvement with the multilateral arrangements in the region could result in China’s deeper commitment to the cooperative norms espoused by the regional states. On the other hand, a well-entrenched Chinese presence in Southeast Asia is regarded in ominous terms by some observers who are worried that the region under China’s spell might leave little space for the United States to pursue its objectives. 4 The main concern in these formulations is how will China use its rising influence and power? Some see China adopting a conscious policy to exclude the United States not only from Southeast Asia but also from the widerAsia-Pacific region. The clutch of initiatives mooted by China in 2005 seemed to confirm this. These included a joint military exercise with Russia; multilateral search-andrescue exercises in Hong Kong; pointed advice to the United States during the Shanghai-Six meeting to withdraw its military forces from Uzbekistan; and, most telling of all, the decision to keep the United States out of the East Asia Summit.5 As one American analysis notes: China has demonstrated a remarkably deft ability to use its policy tools, literally manoeuvring the United States out of its seat at a growing number of international fora. Furthermore, China has become an important provider of security assistance, and the presence of its military far from home is becoming commonplace. If Beijing has its way and Washington continues to neglect Southeast Asia, American military and security guarantees will soon be redundant to the Chinese presence. 6

Apart from the apparent forward thrust in China’ s Southeast Asia policy that directly challenges the United States, Washington is no less handicapped by widespread anti-American sentiments in some of the ASEAN countries. One Southeast Asian scholar lists the lapses in the following terms: (America’s) soft power is continuously eroding and the U.S. administration is not making ef forts to expand its relations with the region beyond

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terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. U.S. economic policies and relations with … Southeast Asia are unattended. Education and culture, which have been so important to appreciate U.S. leadership, have been limited due to migration policies. Support for democracy and human rights, which the U.S. has been championing, have become rhetoric (sic) or are wrongly implemented. 7

Notwithstanding the level of American involvement in the region which is still substantial nothing can be taken for granted. The task is not an easy one for America since it has to overcome suspicion and soothe ruf fled feathers. At a time when the United States has been struggling to convince the regional states of its seriousness of purpose China continues to pursue an active outreach policy.8 Its regional level interactions with Southeast Asia have burgeoned as evidenced in the agreements it has signed in the last few years: the Declaration of Conduct in the South China Sea; Joint Declaration on Cooperation in the field of Non-traditional Security Issues; and, the Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation. China acceded to the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in 2003. These agreements reflect the norms and mechanisms that ASEAN states have assiduously put together which now China has embraced. China’ s endorsement of the conflict-mitigating mechanisms perfected by the ASEAN states reflects a commonality in the views of the signatories to create a predictable regional environment. China’s reassuring behaviour has naturally produced dividends also in other areas. In 2004 ASEAN leaders agreed to recognize China as a full market economy and in the same year they signed an Agreement on Trade in Goods and an Agreement on Dispute Settlement Mechanism. Overall, China’s regional level initiatives have complemented its bilateral commercial interests and interactions. One indication of the level of importance accorded by China to the region is that Premier Wen Jiabao himself oversees the ASEAN portfolio.9 The advantages that ASEAN and ASEAN-led forums offer to Beijing should not be underestimated. They are vital to a rapidly rising China that is looked upon with suspicion by the United States. China’ s diplomatic endeavour to convince the states on its periphery that it is a credible international stakeholder is beginning to take effect. Its “soft power” skills have resulted in an image makeover within a short span of time. Historical antipathies and suspicions nurtured by its smaller neighbours are now in

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the process of being replaced by amity and trust. This is not only because of China’s economic attractions but also its willingness to be flexible on hard core issues like subscribing to a regional code of conduct and tailoring its economic policies by paying heed to the lar ger interest of the region. These initiatives are aimed at dispelling the “China threat” theory and underscore its preference for a multilateral approach to deal with regional and global issues. It is not unusual for regional elites to compare the regional presence and performance of China and the United States, especially since the 1990s, and draw some worrying conclusions. For instance, Singapore’ s Senior Minister Goh Chok Tong tellingly observed that the number of mechanisms between ASEAN and China since the time the latter became a formal partner of ASEAN in 1996, amounted to twenty-seven while the United States, which has enjoyed a formal relationship with ASEAN since 1977, can boast of just seven U.S.-ASEAN bodies, which meet rather infrequently.10 The growing push by China and Washington’s complacent attitude are regarded as detrimental to the long-term interests of both America and Southeast Asia. The current U.S. position is derided by some American analysts as a “policy without a strategy” that cries for immediate correction. This line of argument is countered by those who say that Chinese ascendance at the expense of the United States is a vastly exaggerated fear . David Shambaugh observes: It would be hasty to assume that China’ s obvious economic heft accompanies equally influential political and diplomatic influence … China’s geo-economic strategy in Asia also has practical limitations because the country remains very poor , as Chinese leaders themselves admit.11

Obviously, China is not having it all its way in the region because not all the ASEAN states are sanguine about a pro-active China. One example of ASEAN’s wariness about China was evident in its decision not to take up Beijing’s offer to sign the Protocol to the Treaty of the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ). China was told that the region would prefer a simultaneous accession by all the nuclear powers. ASEAN countries are aware of the negative consequences of too tight an embrace by China and this is one of the reasons why they stress that a balanced presence of all the major powers would be the most desirable option. By

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highlighting Beijing’s ever expanding role they want to make sure that the United States and Japan remain committed to the region. Of late, India has also been added to the list of powers that can lend some regional stability. The repeated calls for a policy correction by Washington have begun to produce some ef fect. The United States has come to realize that its approach has given rise to the impression that it was forsaking the region. The visit by Condoleezza Rice to Indonesia when she ef fusively praised that country’s democratic transformation and the moderate face of Islam that it exhibits, underscored America’s eagerness to impress upon Southeast Asians that Southeast Asia remains vital to its interests. Rice assured her hosts that “the U.S. was eager to work with ASEAN” and that it would particularly like to see Indonesia playing a leadership role in the region. 12 This was followed by Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’ s eightday visit to the region which was a consultation and listening exercise. These initiatives though important, still created a feeling that the ef forts were somewhat belated and reactive. China’s efforts in comparison seem more focused and fast-paced. Thus Beijing’s engagement with its Southeast Asian neighbours, to some extent, has acted as a trigger for renewed U.S. interest. But regional states do not overtly speak in terms of China upstaging the United States. On its part, the United States denies having any desire to counter China’ s influence in the region.13 China is equally keen to disabuse the notion that its policies are aimed at displacing the United States. It says that on the contrary, it welcomes the “American presence in theAsia-Pacific region as a stabilizing factor”.14 Beijing cites its own internal weaknesses as a major impediment for entertaining any ideas of dominance. By its own admission, it will take China 100 years to catch up with today’ s developed nations, which also means that the “China threat theory” is vastly overblown. And secondly, Chinese leaders are at pains to point out that when China becomes powerful it will continue to remain amiable. In other words, China will ascend peacefully. Beijing’s claim of its peaceful rise is endorsed by the ASEAN countries in their well-known style, which is to express an aspiration in terms of an assertion. They never tire of pointing out that a prosperous China will also be a responsible China but at the same time they are eager for the United States to strengthen its regional perch. It would not be wrong to say that it is hope rather than conviction that drives them to paint an optimistic picture of China’ s regional policy. They realize that a China which is firmly embedded in the region’ s normative order will be less susceptible to mischief.

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Japan, China and Southeast Asia The second set of bilateral ties of consequence to the region is the relationship between the two East Asian major powers, China and Japan. As China moves closer to its ASEAN neighbours the distance between Tokyo and the region is beginning to widen.ASEAN leaders look askance at the war of words between their Northeast Asian neighbours well aware of the damage that this can cause. In Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi’s words, the rivalry’s … consequence to the region and the world will be nothing less than catastrophic if current trends continue. Any future conflict will draw into its vortex the world’s most potent economic and military powers with a history of bitter wars against each other , though the alignment will be different this time around. 15

Added to this is the general feeling that, of late, Japan’ s interest in the region has considerably declined. At one time Japan had been Southeast Asia’s economic model and provider. Japanese aid, trade and investment helped the regional countries to notch up impressive growth figures. But this is now being challenged by the Chinese juggernaut. From a yen-based to a yuan-based influence in the region is now palpable. The bursting of its bubble economy in the 1990s left Japan in a very weak condition to continue with the kind of economic interaction that had been the norm easlier betweenTokyo and the Southeast Asian countries. As Japan’s economic woes continued unabated China’ s economy boomed which inevitably drew the attention of ASEAN states. As mentioned earlier, the last few years have seen China edging out Japan as the economic partner of choice for the region. 16 However, Japan’s economy in the last couple of years has begun to look up, partly because of the reforms that it undertook in the wake of its economic downturn. Char ged by a revitalised economy and aware of China’s aggressive economic initiatives in the region, Japan is now trying to regain its clout by pursuing the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) route. It has signed an FTA with Singapore but the negotiations with othersASEAN countries like, Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia are proceeding rather slowly because of disagreements over agriculture and investment issues. The framework talks on ASEAN-Japan FTA have also not made much headway. As opposed to China’s pursuit of these agreements the Japanese effort has been inward looking since the benefits are always presented in terms of Japanese rather than Southeast Asian gains. Japan would like a Tokyo-centred economic framework as a way to balance the rapid strides

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made by China in the economic sphere but this is proving hard to pull of f given Japan’s special interests and the scars left by the economic trauma of the 1990s. ASEAN states are disappointed by the slow progress of the JapanASEAN Closer Economic Partnership (CEP) in comparison with the pace of the Chinese initiative.17 At the same time, some in Southeast Asia see a silver lining in the Sino-Japanese rivalry. They feel this will spur Japan to seek a vigorous re-engagement with the region. It is felt that Japan would not have bothered to move on the CEP but for China’ s 2002 dramatic initiative.18 The region feels somewhat reassured by the improvement in bilateral trade figures with Japan which has climbed from US$99 billion in 2000 to US$135.9 billion in 2004. Apart from the expectation that Japan will regain its former position in the region’s economy a more vital hope is that China and Japan will develop a stable relationship. Despite the strong economic links between these two East Asian neighbours their political relations have been marred by mutual recriminations. Hardy perennials like the row over Japanese history text books, insuf ficient apology for war time atrocities, visits by Prime Minister Koizumi to the Yasukuni shrine (which honours, among the war dead, the country’ s Class A war criminals), U.S.-Japan alliance commitments and their implications for Taiwan, the claims over Senkaku Islands and Tokyo’s endeavours towards becoming a “normal” country have all contributed to the deterioration in ties. China’ s opposition to Japan’s bid for a Security Council seat has riled the Japanese who openly articulate the “China threat” theory in retaliation. The traditional bilateral meeting between China and Japan that are usually held on the sidelines of the annual ASEAN Summit was cancelled last year much to the dismay of the ASEAN states. The rift between China and Japan has been exacerbated by the vigorous pursuit of closer security cooperation between the United States and Japan in the last four years. In the early part of the 1990s Japan seemed eager to consolidate its ties with China almost as an alternative to its relations with the United States. Similarly the United Stated under President Clinton made a strong move to for ge a strategic partnership with China that virtually downgraded its alliance with Tokyo. But the Bush administration reversed that trend by broadening the scope of existing bilateral relations and giving it a more pronounced strategic orientation. An assertive Japan under Prime Minister Koizumi warmly welcomed the new approach which further complicated Sino-Japanese relations. For instance, Beijing took

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strong exception to the joint U.S.-Japanese statement that mentionedTaiwan as a common security issue and urged China to improve the transparency of its military af fairs.19 This made the already fraught relations tenser . Since then nationalist fervour in the two countries has been mounting making the spat uglier . The tenuous ties between China and Japan are causing regional jitters because no one is pleased at the prospect of a conflict that may erupt over Taiwan destabilizing the whole region.

India, China and Southeast Asia India is the third major Asian power of interest to the Southeast Asian region. Despite a late start India-ASEAN relations have attained maturity within a very short period. Even though India’s bilateral interactions with individual ASEAN countries dif fer vastly in depth and scope, overall, New Delhi has become a part of the region’ s imagination. In tangible terms bilateral trade between India and the regional countries has grown five times in the last ten years. In 2003–04 it stood at US$13.25 billion which is expected expand to US$30 billion by 2007. In comparison to China’s trade with ASEAN which was US$105.9 billion in 2004, the Indian figures look paltry but this has not dampened the enthusiasm of the two sides to press ahead. Clearly China has made impressive progress in its relations with the Southeast Asian countries in the past fifteen years. This is largely because of its growing economic power and a pro-active diplomacy that knows how to combine interest with influence. This is reflected in its enthusiastic participation in the region’s multilateral institutions, cultivation of strategic bilateral ties and a determined effort to promote trust and confidence in the security arena.20 China’s relentless pursuit of the region is causing some misgivings and is prompting the ASEAN states to seek a more visible Indian role within the region. Unlike in the past, India is more receptive to the idea of greater regional engagement. India and the ASEAN countries share a common objective in working towards a norm-based regional system. Regional security and economic endeavours have been supported by India in the last ten years. New Delhi’ s trans-regional relationship has also provided it with an opportunity to pursue its policy of engaging the major international actors on a regular basis during the annual meetings ofASEAN-led forums. Anyone familiar with the history of India-Southeast Asia relations cannot but be impressed by the formal and informal linkages that have been

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forged by the two sides in the last few years. No less important has been the change in mutual perceptions. But this is not to claim that there are no gaps in expectations. One of the critical variables that has been of consequence to IndiaSoutheast Asia relations is India’ s interactions with the major powers. Given the steady rise in India’s global profile this factor has the potential to impact on the region’ s international relations. As is clear from the earlier sections the two most important external players of consequence for the region are the United States and China.Therefore India’s relationship with them is automatically factored into regional perceptions of New Delhi. Improvement in Indo-U.S. and Sino-Indian relations are seen as a stabilizing influence not only in SouthAsia but also in SoutheastAsia. The frigidity that had crept into Indo-U.S. relations in the wake of the nuclear tests was of concern to the ASEAN states because it appeared as though the two countries would go back to their equations of Cold War years. But the seriousness that India brought to its parleys with the United States following the nuclear tests as evidenced in the Singh-T albott talks, convinced ASEAN that India’s approach to great power diplomacy had vastly changed. A more confident India was trying its utmost to repair its ties with the world’ s super power after having upset it by its unilateral decision to conduct the nuclear tests. Its task was made easier when the Bush administration took office in 2000 because of congruence of views between the two countries over certain strategic issues. This caused some anxiety in SoutheastAsia initially. It was feared that India would be persuaded to act in tandem with the United States to checkmate a rising China and the region could well become one of the arenas for this competition to play out. But once it became clear that India was determined to follow an autonomous China policy despite its support for Bush administration’s national missile defence initiative, the region’ s perception of India became more positive. Nevertheless, residual fears about Washington’s policy to enmesh India in a “containment of China” strategy linger. Some analysts compare the present Indo-U.S. partnership to that of United States’ rapprochement with China that changed the general international balance of power and raised Beijing’ s profile. A similar trajectory for India is now anticipated. The Bush administration views India as an important player in Asia, and as a vital strategic partner which needs to be strengthened. India’s growing economic and military

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stature, its commitment to democracy and pluralism seem to have added to its attractiveness. American policy seems to be geared towards cautioning China as evidenced in its avowed objective of catapulting India to the ranks of a great power in the twenty-first century . The United States has even begun referring to India as one of the five great powers of the world which naturally riles China. Some influential voices in the United States hint that India’s Look East policy should be duly noted and embraced by the United States to advance its strategic interests in the Asia-Pacific region.21 But New Delhi does not want to be drawn into a “containment game” as it is keen to keep its relationship with — China autonomous. It has worked hard to improve cross-border ties leading to an impressive growth in bilateral trade. It does not want to dismantle the “bridge of friendship” and unduly complicate its relations with China. This is reassuring to the Southeast Asian states which are aware that India is far too independent to act as America’s lackey and indulge in a game of balancing China at the behest of the United States. They feel India’s U.S. policy has not shown that tendency in the past and it is unlikely to do so now. India’s strategic behaviour thus gets evaluated from dif ferent angles and the one which is considered the most beneficial to the region is a stable relationship between the two Asian giants rather than any attempted balance. This is one of the critical elements that has lent a great deal of stability to India’s relations with its Southeast Asian neighbours so far. Regional thinking understands that a rising India and China can present the region with advantages but the element of possible rivalry is also not overlooked. As Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew put it: India and China can one day regain the 45 to 50 per cent share of the global gross domestic product they had before the Industrial Revolution. But the two giants should not end up in opposing camps.As you go back to the old balance, Chinese and Indian influence will meet in Southeast Asia, and they should meet in a cooperative and a positive competitive mode, not in an adversarial mode, then all will prosper .22

At the same time, the role of India “to of fset a potential Chinese hegemony”23 finds palpable support within the region. The challenge for Indian policy is to creatively satisfy these expectations without harming its own long-term interest in its extended neighbourhood.

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Conclusion Much like any other region Southeast Asia is subject to the pulls and pressures of great power politics. Its ability to determine the course of regional affairs independent of external forces is naturally limited. But this does not mean that it lacks agency. For one thing, the presence of a formal regional cooperative machinery like ASEAN has been useful in enhancing the region’s adaptive capacity . By acting as a regional anchor for the various multilateral forums it has been able to provide a mediating influence on great power activities within the region. This is particularly applicable in the case of China which is the key piece in the regional puzzle.ASEAN states’ aim is to integrate China into the regional order while keeping the other powers engaged in the region.The United States has always occupied an important place in the regional pecking order because of its longstanding ties with the region. The economic engine of the region was Japan for a considerable period of time and therefore its allure remains. But China is now in the process of replacing Japan and this causes some worry because of its aim to match its growing economic interest with political influence. The region’s enthusiastic embrace of India is born out of the uncertainties about China’s long-term designs although as of now , it enjoys the benefit of doubt.All this suggests a strategy of mix and match but as everyone knows getting the right mix is not always easy. This is so for both the regional states and their external partners.

Notes 1. Statement by Deputy Assistant Secretary Eric G. John, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, before the House Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, 21 September 2005, . 2. Catharine E. Dalpino, “China’s Emergence in Asia and Implications for US Relations with Southeast Asia”, Statement before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 7 June 2005, . 3. “US Misses Rare Chance to Discuss Security Issues with Asia”, Channel News Asia, 23 July 2005, 23 July 2005, . 4. John Mearsheimer, “Why China’s Rise Will not be Peaceful”, 17 September 2004, . 5. Phillip P. Pan, “Rumsfeld Chides China for Mixed Signals”, Washington Post, 20 October 2005.

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6. Dana R. Dillon and John J. Tkacik, Jr., “China and ASEAN: Endangered American Primacy in South Asia”, Backgrounder #1886, Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 19 October 2005. 7. Jusuf Wanandi, “Recent Strategic Developments in East Asia”, Jakarta Post, 2 March 2006. 8. . 9. Dalpino, op. cit. 10. Goh Chok Tong, “Constructing a New East Asia”, Straits Times, 10 June 2005. 11. David Shambaugh, “The Eagle’ s Grip on Asia Still Holds”, Straits Times, 25 April 2005. 12. Straits Times, 18 March 2006. 13. Evelyn Goh, “Southeast Asia Bright on US Radar Screen”, Asia Times Online, 28 May 2005. 14. Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan’s statement quoted in David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia”, International Security 29, no. 3 (Winter 2004): 91. 15. Keynote Speech by Prime Minister Abdullah Badawi at the Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Kuala Lumpur, 1 June 2005, . 16. See Hisane Masaki, “China, Japan Tug of War over Indochina”, Asia Times Online, 5 October 2005. 17. “The Future of East Asian Cooperation”, speech by Prime Minster Lee Hsien Loong, Tokyo, 25 May 2005, . 18. Takashi Kitazume, “ASEAN Sees the Brighter Side of Japan-China Leadership Rivalry”, Japan Times, 10 March 2005. 19. “FM: US-Japan Statement on Taiwan Wrong”, 21 February 2005, . 20. David Shambaugh, “China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order”, International Security 29, no. 3 (Winter 2004–05): 64–99. 21. See Richard Armitage’s interview in Oriental Economist, March 2006. 22. Straits Times, 18 November 2005. 23. Meidyatama Suryodiningrat, “Befriending Asia’s Powerful But For gotten Giant”, Jakarta Post, 25 November 2005.

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9 Political and Security Dynamics in the Indian Ocean Region: Role of Extra-regional Powers Vijay Sakhuja

Historically, the Indian Ocean region has been a critical geo-strategic space of competitive maritime security that features the presence of extraregional naval forces. During the pre-1945 period, the Indian Ocean was regarded as an imperial territory and British lake featuring colonial basing and expansion. During the 1950s and 1960s, it was a region for colonial domination and also an area of interest to the United States. With the exit of British naval forces from East of Suez in 1970s, the region witnessed superpower interest, resulting in dominance by the United States and the Soviet Union. The 1971 India-Pakistan War was a watershed event and further reinforced the fact that the Indian Ocean was fast emer ging as a strategic sea space of super power rivalry . The India-Pakistan naval engagements during the war continued against the backdrop of a significant move by a U.S. Carrier Task Force comprising the nuclear aircraft carrier U.S.S. Enterprise in an apparent measure of U.S. support to Pakistan and assurances by the Soviet Union to India about the presence of the Soviet naval fleet in the region. Today, the Indian Ocean has emerged as an area of geo-economic and geo-strategic consequence to a lar ge number of Indian Ocean littorals as well as to non-littorals. Enormous ener gy and natural resources of the region appear to drive the importance of the Ocean. Besides, globalization has the promise and potential for further regional economic development. At the same time, the Indian Ocean is also witness to developing power 70

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rivalries, power transitions, and growing asymmetric conflicts. Also there are the emerging geo-energy stakes in the adjoining Central Asian region that hold promise for the prosperity of the ener gy-hungry growing economies of the Asia Pacific region. Besides, the regional events following the September 11 incidents and the 2003 U.S.-led war on Iraq have transformed the maritime space of the Indian Ocean. At the peak of operations during the U.S.-ledWar on Terror, more than a hundred ships, submarines and support vessels were deployed in the North Arabian Sea. Today, the maritime dynamics in the Indian Ocean are premised on force postures of the extra-regional navies deployed for the tasks of regional power projection, challenging Violent Non State Actors, securing energy reserves and security of energy supply chains. The emerging strategic significance of the Indian Ocean region is evident from the emergent missions, new doctrines and technologies that are showcased by extra-regional naval forces. This paper attempts to examine the political and security dynamics of the Indian Ocean. It is based on an assessment of the ambitions of extra regional powers particularly the United States, United Kingdom, France, China, Japan and Russia that are slowly but steadily carving out a share for themselves in shaping the regional security environment.

United States of America With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the United States remains the only superpower in the world.Though being both a Pacific and an Atlantic power, it has not turned its attention away from Indian Ocean. Interestingly, whatever the future strength of its presence and commitment in the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans, it remains deeply involved in the Indian Ocean region. The current U.S. military presence is conspicuous in the entire swath of Indian Ocean: from Iraq in the Persian Gulf, Horn of Africa, South Asia to Southeast Asia. The United States is also combating terrorist groups linked with al-Qaeda in the Arabian Sea and Southeast Asian waters. It remains concerned about safeguarding its long-term energy and security interests. The United States also has military alliances, treaties and bilateral cooperation mechanism with several countries in the region. In short, it continues to play a dominant role from the Red Sea to the South China Sea. The United States predominance is primarily based on two important aspects. Firstly, it has the capability to project military power in the region

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and secondly, a well-defined strategy to pursue its policy of pre-eminence. During the Cold War, the U.S. military strategy was aimed primarily at containing the Soviet Union, exercising deterrence and defeating the Communist forces of the Soviet Union, North Korea and even China. The U.S. maritime strategy of the 1980s (published in 1986) envisioned a global war that would be initiated by the Soviet Union. The war at sea would be won by sea control. The new strategic thrust aims to move away from classical sea control/sea denial to influencing events further ashore as exemplified in Afghanistan. The concept of the forward deployment and presence has been the primary mission of U.S. naval forces. Forward deployment has enabled U.S. forces engaged in operations in the Indian Ocean to secure its geostrategic and geo-economic interests. At one end of the spectrum, it has provided the U.S. naval forces the means for both coercive and benign naval operations. And at the other end, it has fostered naval diplomacy in the form of joint naval exercises, joint naval patrols, disaster relief and humanitarian missions and maintaining order at sea. At the same time, forward presence had also reinforced expeditionary operations in coercive missions and has enhanced deterrence in times of crisis. Post September 11, the salience of U.S. forward naval presence in the Indian Ocean region has emerged in different contours in the form of war on terror and countering maritime terrorism and sea piracy. Today, the U.S. navy has forward access facilities in Oman, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, Changi Naval Base in Singapore and facilities in Northern Australia to serve as “lily pads” for a rapid sur ge in the Indian Ocean. At the same time, the United States is also bolstering regional capabilities with technology transfers aimed at rapid response capabilities. However, Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean is the hub of U.S. naval forces in the Indian Ocean and supports U.S. naval operations in Afghanistan and Iraq and other deployments in the Indian Ocean.

China China has long understood the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean. The Indian Ocean figured in the strategic thinking of ancient Chinese mariners who sailed in these waters first for trade and then suzerainty. The current Chinese maritime planners and practitioners are convinced that the Indian Ocean dominates the commercial and economic lifelines of the Asia-Pacific region. Beijing has no doubt that India would oppose China’s

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strategic surge into the Indian Ocean and this reality prompted, General Zhao Nanqi, Director of the General Logistic Department of the PLA (People’s Liberation Army), to issue a top-secret memorandum that explained in detail the PLA’s strategic plans to consolidate control over the South China Sea and the India Ocean. He noted, “We can no longer accept the Indian Ocean as only an ocean of the Indians … We are taking armed conflicts in the region into account.” 1 China has long been seeking an outlet into the Indian Ocean to safeguard its energy sea-lanes from the Persian Gulf.2 It is also well aware of the importance of choke points in maritime strategy.3 Towards that end it has consolidated itself in southern Asia and Southeast Asia and has encircled the Malacca Straits by establishing a strategic staging/listening post to control the western approaches of the Malacca Straits.4 In the east, the Spratly Islands, currently partially under its control, of fer a strategic location with respect to the sea-lanes. China has been actively engaged in building military infrastructure in Myanmar. It is believed that this infrastructure is for use by the Chinese Navy as and when it operates in the Indian Ocean. The Chinese build up in Myanmar did not take place till the 1990s when China’s post Cold War regional strategy began to take shape. The Myanmar military inventory today includes Chinese-origin fighter aircraft, radar and radio equipment, surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, rocket launchers and naval ships. The Chinese approach to maintaining and promoting diplomatic linkages with Bangladesh is also based on long-term maritime considerations. The geo-strategic location of Bangladesh provides a useful territorial over-bridge in reaching out to Myanmar, the Bay of Bengal and subsequently into the Indian Ocean. It is fairly well known that China has emerged as a major supplier of arms to the Bangladesh armed forces particularly the navy and the air force. As part of its aggressive strategy to encircle India and safeguard its long and vulnerable energy sea-lane from Persian Gulf, China has taken economic and military initiatives in the Maldives as well. It is negotiating with the Maldivian government to construct a submarine base at Marao Island, a coral reef.5 This initiative would enhance Chinese power projection capabilities and also challenge U.S. naval activity at Diego Garcia. According to reports, China will lease Marao Island for twentyfive years and create jobs for locals by building infrastructure for tourism and fishing.6

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Russia Russia has watched with great interest the developments in Afghanistan and Iraq where several navies from the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, the UAE,Australia and Japan participated in the U.S.-led war against terrorism. Of particular interest to the Russians are the deployments by the (British) Royal Navy , the French naval task group and the Japanese naval contribution. It is concerned about the creeping reach of these forces and believes that it will not be long before these navies begin permanent deployment in the Indian Ocean. The Russian leadership believes that influence in international affairs is based not only on its geographic size but also on the strength of its navy . For that it needs resources and bases to maintain a permanent presence in the Indian Ocean. During their 2003 and 2005 deployments, Russian warships spent about three months on combat duty in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea much in the same way they used to do during the Soviet era. These deployments were aimed at demonstrating the resurgence of the Russian navy as a symbol of Russia’s global interests. To that extent, the Russian navy appears to be carving out for itself a significant role in the Indian Ocean that was once frequented by Soviet ships, submarines and aircraft.

France France and the United Kingdom have their extended maritime interests in the region given their alliances as well as linkages from colonial times. France has consistently emphasized its independent role as an Indian Ocean power. Its strategy is shaped by its self-perception of an independent “great power” with economic and security concerns that include protection of its island territories in the Indian Ocean. 7 In 1978, France established an EEZ (Exclusive Economic Zone) of a total area of 640,400 square kilometres around these islands and therefore it maintains a sizeable naval capability in the Indian Ocean to safeguard its maritime interests. The French have a military presence in the Reunion, Tromlein and Mayotte islands. They also have facilities in the southwest Indian Ocean in the sub-Antarctic and Antarctic known as the Eparse Islands. These facilities are a clear demonstration of French forward presence. The French also have naval deployment in the South Pacific. These forward deployed forces transit through the Indian Ocean to take up their deployment stations.

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France has responded in a very different way to the geopolitics of the Indian Ocean. Firstly, it has not accepted a position as a subordinate of the United States in shaping geopolitics in the Indian Ocean. When Charles De Gaulle became President in 1958, he took decisive steps to create a special place for France within the Western alliance system. During the Cold War, France was by far the most restive of American allies and sought consistently and intensely to create the kind of room for manoeuvre for itself that it now has. The French navy is deployed in the Indian Ocean on continuous basis. Paris has consistently rejected the idea that it is an extra-regional power on the grounds that it has security interests in its island territories in the Indian Ocean. This strategic thought is further reinforced by the fact that French naval vessels have taken an active part in the US-led war on terrorism. French military hardware such as ships, submarines, surveillance aircraft, fighter jets, helicopters, missiles, electronic warfare equipment, and engineering equipment can be seen in the naval inventory of several countries of the Indian Ocean. France has been a dominant arms supplier to the region and has been conducting bilateral naval exercises with the Indian Ocean littoral states. Its interest in Southeast Asia emanates from its stakes in the South Pacific and its bur geoning trade and military ties with China. The French military hardware, though expensive, appears to be popular among the third world militaries primarily due to less fear of sanctions.8

United Kingdom The United Kingdom’s commitments in the Indian Ocean Region have been in the form of Naval Task Group 03 that was constituted for the “East of Suez” operations since 11 September 2001. The Royal Navy deployments are being primed for an expeditionary operations force that would be deployed in future. The United Kingdom is also a member of the Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) in Southeast Asia (established in 1971) that entails periodic naval forward presence and joint naval-air exercises withAustralia, Singapore, Malaysia and New Zealand. Since 2004 the scope of the FPDA has been changing from its earlier conventional defence obligations towards cooperative threat engagements in terrorism and piracy . The United Kingdom thus maintains a robust forward presence through deployment of Royal Navy warships and submarines and has been

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conducting joint naval exercises with several Indian Ocean littoral powers. It has also conducted maritime operations in the Persian Gulf or the Arabian Sea in support of U.S.-led Gulf War 1991, the war on terror and the 2003 war in Iraq.

Japan In recent years Japan’s military has increasingly begun to bridge the gap between being a self-defence force and a military power. By participating in the U.S.-led war on terrorism in Afghanistan, Japan has redefined its maritime defensive perimeter out into the Indian Ocean.The changing role clearly reflects the creeping assertiveness of the Japanese navy and a desire to shed the symbolic pacifism. In a strategic sense, Japan is at a turning point. During the last two decades, it has taken a series of steps to redefine its defence policy . In 1977, the Director General, Japanese Defence agency publicly stated that Japan should defend “key transport lanes within 1,000 miles of Japanese coast”. In May 1981, following a summit meeting with President Reagan, Prime Minister Zenko Suzuki declared that Japan had agreed to take responsibility for defending sea-lanes up to 1,000 nautical miles. In 1983, the Japanese Prime Minister Yashuhiro Nakasone, while on a visit to the United States, said that Japan should become “an unsinkable aircraft carrier” and also be able to control the Sea of Japan straits. He articulated the notion of sea-lanes as “between Guam and Tokyo and between the Straits of Taiwan and Osaka”. In February 2000, Japan’ s Foreign Ministry announced that Tokyo was considering deploying vessels to patrol the Straits of Malacca where shipping has been plagued by piracy . Maritime Safety Agency (coast guard) ships were expected to form part of the multinational anti-piracy patrol comprising coast guard and naval vessels of China, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia. Strong protests and nonacceptance of the proposal by China resulted in Japan keeping the idea on hold. By participating in the U.S.-led war on terrorism in Afghanistan, Japan has redefined its maritime defensive perimeter out to 3,000 nautical miles from the homeland.Although the 1,000 miles limitation has continued to exist to date and is noted in white papers, the counter terrorism operation has reinforced the growing debate in Japan on revising its constitution. Distant and joint naval operations once unthinkable are now accepted as

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part of national defence. If, at any stage, the Japanese agree to assist the United States in its war against the “axis of evil”, the defensive perimeter could extend far beyond 4,000 nautical miles into the Persian Gulf. The Japanese decision to dispatch naval forces to the Indian Ocean in support of the U.S.-led war on terrorism added to regional concerns about Tokyo’s role both in terms of expanded military reach and the type of missions. Interestingly, the July 2003 Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance to Iraq led to the deployment of units of the Japanese Air Self Defence Forces (JASDF) in logistics operations involving reconstruction materials and humanitarian relief supplies. This suggests that the Japanese naval presence in the Indian Ocean will be a lasting one in support of the U.S.-ledWar on Terror, own sea-lane safety, search and rescue, and addressing problems related to maritime order like piracy and terrorism at sea.

Concluding Remarks The security order of the Indian Ocean is a maritime order with its attendant regional political and security implications. Regional waterways have strategic significance and regional economic prosperity is intertwined with maritime affairs. Most of the Indian Ocean littorals have long coastlines and there is a determination to assert greater control over newly acquired maritime territories under UNCLOS III (UN Convention on the Law of the Sea) and to safeguard maritime interests. Hence, regional military modernization has a strong maritime orientation. A central feature of the emer ging security environment in the Indian Ocean is a general sense of insecurity . Most of the Indian Ocean states want a favourable and amicable balance of power for peace and stability in the region. Presently, the extra-regional powers appear to be preoccupied, in cooperation with regional states, with the prime objective of fighting the war on terror and also safeguarding their economic interests. The nature and scope of alliance dynamics and bilateral relationships — United States conferment of Major Non-NATO Ally status to Pakistan and Thailand, the Russia-India relations, U.S.-India relations and several bilateral relationship with accents on naval exercises — in the Indian Ocean region is also playing an important role in the assessments of the major naval actors in the region. India’s maritime interests are premised on a broad canvas capability that pivots the vital issues of maritime trade, ener gy flows and addresses

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the diverse challenges of maritime security. India confronts diverse strategic challenges in the region, including competitive naval dynamics involving the presence of extra-regional navies and the prevalence of low intensity maritime threats.

Notes 1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6 7.

Yossef Bodansky, “The PRC Sur ge for the Strait of Malacca and Spratly Confronts India and the US”, Defence & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, Washington, 30 September 1995, pp. 6–13, . In 1990, China’s oil demand was pegged at 2.1 million barrels/day and was expected to rise to 6.3 million barrels/day thus registering a growth of nearly 300 per cent. In the period 1993–99, China’s imports doubled from 313,000 barrels/day to 600,000 barrels per/day . For more details, see Rahul RoyChaudhury, India’s Maritime Security (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2000), p. 99. In 2004, China’ s total oil consumption was 6.7 million barrels/a day . Almost half came from imports with Saudi Arabia providing 16 per cent of China’s import needs, and Oman and Iran contributing another 24 per cent between them. As China’s economy expands, its import demands will grow to 5 million barrels/a day by 2010. “China’ s rising oil needs may lead to world tension: Analysts are unsure if the Saudis can keep up with demand”, Associated Press, 24 August 2005. For more details on Chinese understanding of Sun Tzu’s Art of War see Vijay Sakhuja, “Sun Tzu’s Art of War and Chinese Maritime Ambitions”, at the website of Peace Forum, Taiwan, at . The South China Sea in the east and India and Indonesia in the west dominate the approaches to the Malacca Straits. By virtue of its geography , Myanmar sits astride the sea-lane that transits the Malacca Straits from the Indian Ocean into the Pacific Ocean. A.B. Mahapatra, “China Acquires a Base in Maldives Against India With Some Help From India”, at the website of News Insight.Net, at . China already has had extensive experience of operating submarines in the shallow waters in the South China Sea. Ibid. These island territories are: Europa, the Glorioso Islands, Juan de Nova and Bassas da India in the Mozambique Channel, and Tromelin to the north-west of La Réunion. These island and reef areas are scattered to the west, north and east of Madagascar.

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Ali Abbas Rizvi, “Pakistan’s Search for New Arms Sources”, Asian Defence Journal, November 1995, p. 54. Past experiences highlight the fact that the French have honoured the military contracts and maintained delivery schedules. For instance, Islamabad is still tempted to procure military hardware from France, because there was less fear of sanctions (unlike the United States) as the French military sales policy is independent of the Western approach to sanctions.

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10 Politics and Security in Southeast Asia: Trends and Challenges1 Tin Maung Maung Than

Introduction As Southeast Asia2 entered the twenty-first century, political dynamics and security concerns in the region seemed to enter a new post-ColdWar phase characterized by significant leadership changes, political transitions and the rise in prominence of non-traditional security issues. 3 In recent years, new leaders have emer ged in countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and Singapore mainly through the democratic electoral process whereby major iconic figures like Suharto in Indonesia and Dr Mahathir in Malaysia had relinquished their dominant role in the respective ruling elites. Even one-party states like Vietnam and Laos showed signs of more tolerance, openness and transparency in the political sphere, especially at the grassroots level. 4 Traditional security threats in the form of insurgencies remained relevant though seemingly diminishing (except in southern Thailand where there has been a revival in the last few years) in Indonesia, Myanmar , Philippines and Thailand.5 Meanwhile, non-traditional security issues concerning viral epidemics (AIDS or Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome, SARS or Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome, and avian flu), tsunamis, narcotics, human trafficking, piracy and terrorism came to the fore in challenging the state’s capacity to safeguard human security and maintain the regime’ s authority and legitimacy.6 80

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On the other hand, political stability appeared to have been consolidated in the core of ASEAN (the five original members) until recently when public discontent spawned massive demonstrations on the streets of Manila and Bangkok. Such attempts to topple elected leaders by “people’s power” were seen by many observers as a setback for democratic consolidation in the very nations that were touted as examples of liberal democratic political order in the region. 7

Political Trends in Southeast Asia The most significant trends in the internal politics of Southeast Asia have been what one scholar called “political transitions” that entailed the replacement of authoritarian rule by more democratic political governance (Indonesia), less idiosyncratic style of leadership (Malaysia), “changing of the guard” and self-renewal of the ruling party (Singapore), unprecedented electoral mandate for the incumbent (Thailand), and a controversial second term for a beleaguered leader (Philippines). 8 Even Myanmar, ruled by a military junta since 1988, the outlier in the SoutheastAsian democratization process, had shown signs of stirring with the announcement of a “road map” towards parliamentary rule in 2003 and the resumption of the National Convention (a body drawing up the principles of a new democratic constitution) in 2004 after a recess of some eight years. The following sections examine the political dynamics in selected Southeast Asian countries where there have been significant developments in recent years.

Indonesia The fall of Suharto in May 1998 led to three seemingly ineffective leaders, who had been unable to serve out the full six-year term of the presidency. The first direct election for the presidency was conducted in July 2004 with no clear winner. Ex-Lt. General Susilo BambangYudhoyono (popularly known as SBY and a minister in previous administrations) became President (fourth after the demise of Suharto’s New Order) in October after winning sixty-one per cent of votes in the second round run-of f in September. He had campaigned with a platform emphasizing employment creation, economic reform and curbing of corruption. Earlier, the electoral reforms instituted over the previous six years culminated in the general elections of

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April 2004 in which the IndonesianArmed Forces was no longer represented in the 550-seat House of People’ s Representatives (DPR). 9 Nevertheless, SBY, with a narrow political base, has to contend with his vice president Jusuf Kala who, as head of Golkar (the party with the most seats in the parliament), wields a heavy political clout and whose support has been essential to carry the executive’ s policies past potential parliamentary opposition. Thus far, SBY has skilfully managed to avoid a serious falling out with JK over policy issues, fully aware that his partner remains a potential challenger for the top executive post in the nation of some 250 million people with the lar gest Muslim population in ASEAN. In his second year of incumbency the initial popularity of the honeymoon period has started to wane in the face of continuing corruption, poverty , unemployment, rise in insur gency and terrorism despite scoring some successes in those very areas. 10 The Indonesian President, who has been accused of being indecisive, has yet to establish performance legitimacy (in socio-economic terms). Meanwhile, the threat of another economic crisis remains a distinct possibility.11

Malaysia The smooth departure, at the end of October 2003, of the outspoken Dr Mahathir Mohamad who was paramount leader for 22 years allowed the ascension of his deputy Datuk Seri Abdullah Ahmad Badawi to UMNO (United Malays National Or ganization) presidency and hence the premiership. Known to be honest, calm, deeply religious and soft spoken, Prime Minister Abdullah has brought a low-key style of leadership to Malaysia, a country of more than 26 million people with a Muslim majority . He reaffirmed his mandate by leading UMNO and BN (Barisan Nasional, the ruling national front) to a landslide victory in the general elections in March 2004, securing sixty-two per cent of the popular vote.12 However, the af fable prime minister soon found that the task of overcoming entrenched vested interests and changing atrophied mindsets to fulfil his election promises was harder than expected. The outcome of his attempts at political, administrative, and economic reforms that entailed fighting corruption and “money politics”, revamping the much-maligned police, improving public services, instituting educational reforms, emphasizing the rule of law , enhancing transparency and accountability , reigning in wasteful mega-projects, ensuring good corporate governance, and alleviating poverty was far from satisfactory . Abdullah’s supporters

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13 could claim that he had made some progress in his reform agenda. Nevertheless, it appears that high hopes for the successful implementation of his reform agenda have dampened and frustration arising out of unfulfilled expectations has surfaced. 14 In the face of a severely weakened opposition, the BN stranglehold over Malaysian politics and UMNO’s dominance within it is expected to continue unchallenged for the foreseeable future. Premier Abdullah must raise the tempo of his reforms not only to fulfil the desires of the polity and UMNO rank and file but also to prevent the tendency for internecine power struggle within UMNO when the leader is perceived to be weak, especially in the face of a vicious personal attack by Tun Mahathir who seemed to have been angered by what was perceived as the dismantling of his political legacy by the very person whom he chose as his heir .15

Philippines The Philippines, with a population of over 80 million, has under gone a meandering process of transition from authoritarian rule after Ferdinand Marcos was toppled by a “people power” revolt in 1986. Its political system was unable to consolidate democracy and the incumbent political leaders rarely succeeded in establishing legitimacy in the last two decades that saw a dozen abortive coup attempts, corruption scandals in high office, endemic cronyism, presidential impeachment proceedings, and embattled governments. The country seems to have muddled through from one crisis to another. Constitutional changes and institutional arrangements designed to inhibit abuse of executive power, provide checks and balances in the political system, decentralize governing authority and allow greater participation had been carried out, but they remained weak and subject to co-optation or capture by vested interests. 16 The Philippines remains in a democracy twilight zone in which the accoutrements of a modern electoral democracy have not been able to make any inroad into the elitist money politics where nominal political parties revolved around self-styled leaders from rich and powerful clans who form shifting alliances and unstable coalitions to outfox one another. The current president Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, Estrada’s vicepresident who succeeded him when he was toppled by “People Power II” in 2001, won her re-election bid by a small margin (about 3.5 per cent) in the controversial elections of May 2004. Allegations of electoral fraud have continued to haunt Arroyo ever since her victory and fresh evidence

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in mid-2005 of her contacting election of ficials during the vote count as well as allegations of corruption by her husband and son triggered a failed impeachment move (dismissed in September) followed by unsuccessful attempts on the part of her political enemies and detractors to remove her through street demonstrations in Manila. 17 The latest crisis erupted withArroyo’s declaration of a state of national emergency on 24 February 2006, citing a coup attempt by elements of the AFP (Armed Forces of the Philippines).18 This drastic measure announced on the eve of the twentieth anniversary of Marcos’ removal created much resentment in Manila and the anti-Arroyo opposition, that included former president Aquino, tried to rally people to demonstrate despite restrictions imposed by emergency rule. However, the weak and disunited opposition could mobilize only a few thousands protestors instead of hundreds of thousands required for a successful people power movement. There appeared to be a tense stalemate afterArroyo ended the emergency rule on 3 March while street protests had fizzled out.19 So far, the Catholic Church (still influential) and the AFP top brass had stood by her but that could not be taken for granted indefinitely .20 Meanwhile, Arroyo’s administration, backed by the majority in the House of Representatives, continued its push for a constitutional change to institute a parliamentary system of government. However, it was blocked by the Senate and opposition groups fearing further entrenchment of Arroyo’s power.21 The fact that Arroyo has, thus far, been able to withstand all attempts to dislodge her, is mainly due to the lack of a credible alternative as well as the fragmented nature of the disparate opposition groups with varying agendas.22 Moreover, the polity is probably weary of people power movements as a quick fix to political woes of the ruling oligarchy . The crisis of February 2006 illustrates the problem of legitimacy that beset Philippines leadership in the post-authoritarian era. Unless that problem can be overcome, democracy would remain an empty promise and there will be more cycles of crises and demonstrations with the concomitant instability and uncertainty that inhibit meaningful political participation and socio-economic development.

Singapore Singapore, a city-state of some 3.5 million citizens, has a unique electoral system overlayed on the basic parliamentary system of government. The ruling People’s Action Party (PAP) that has dominated the political scene

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since independence in 1965 introduced many innovative representative schemes such as the group representation constituency (GRC; a multiracial team of candidates in a large constituency), the nominated member of parliament (NMP; non-elected distinguished person) and the nonconstituency member of parliament (NCMP; unsuccessful opposition candidate with the highest votes). According to the PAP leaders the aim of these mechanisms was to better represent the diverse interests of the multiethnic and multi-religious polity. Singapore’s Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong who succeeded Mr Goh Chok Tong in August 2004 promised to bring about a more open and caring Singapore, while reaf firming PAP’s long-standing doctrines of meritocracy and self-renewal. His ascension represents a changing of the guard to a second-generation leadership that is striving to bring third generation representatives into the PAP fold. Seeking a fresh mandate, Premier Lee led the P AP to a resounding election victory on the 6 May 2006 by winning an average 66.6 per cent of the votes cast and 82 out of 84 parliamentary seats. The opposition abandoned the usual strategy of contesting less than half the seats and contested 47 seats. It managed to retain the seats of the two incumbents with an increased share of votes compared to the 2001 elections. 23 Nobody expects the PAP to lose any election in the foreseeable future.24 Lacking a credible opposition that could seriously challenge its rule, the 25 dilemma facing the ruling party lies in its own unqualified success. While fulfilling its promise to practice a more open and inclusive politics the PAP government must also contend with challenges posed by relatively slower economic growth, structural unemployment, demographic trends (an ageing population and falling birth rates), globalization pressures, geopolitical imperatives and changing regional dynamics.

Thailand Most observers identified 1992 as a watershed inThailand’s democratization process when the last military coup was quickly overturned by urban protest that ended in violence which prompted intervention by the country’ s highly revered King. An elaborate constitution, promulgated in 1997 was widely praised as a guarantee for further consolidation of democracy in this kingdom of around 67 million people. The new electoral system transformed the 200-member Senate from an appointed to an elected body and senators were deprived of party af filiation. The House of

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Representatives’ 500-strong members were split into directly elected parliamentarians (400) and representatives from a party-list (100) apportioned according to the party’ s showing in the polls. Independent institutions such as the Election Commission, the National Commission on Human Rights, the Constitutional Court, the National Counter Corruption Commission and the State Audit Commission were put in place to safeguard societal interest and ensure transparency and accountability in government. 26 The first election under the new constitution, held in 2001, handed convincing victory to telecommunications billionaire Dr Thaksin Shanawatra’s Thai Rak Thai (TRT, Thais love Thais) Party, which won forty-nine per cent of the seats and formed a majority government in a three-party coalition. The non-establishment politician swept into power on a populist platform promising subsidized health care, poverty alleviation, quick recovery from the economic and financial crisis of 1998, and an end to entrenched elite politics.The voters were enamoured of his dynamic and business-savvy personality as well as his pro-poor and nationalist stance and believed that Thaksin with his ability to rapidly accumulate wealth could apply his ‘golden touch’ to turn the economy around and deliver the goods. 27 Thereafter, Thaksin forged ahead with his CEO (chief executive of ficer) style hands-on running of the government and mobilizing popular support for his policies despite incessant criticism and opposition by NGOs, media, bureaucrats, academics and opposition parties. 28 During the first full term of his premiership, Thaksin instituted an unorthodox economic agenda of “liberal populism” known asThaksinomics, expanded TRT by absorbing some parties and welcoming defectors from others, pursued a carrot and stick policy within the party to maintain loyalty, curbed the power of the media through intimidation and buyouts, politicized the watchdog institutions, disciplined the bureaucracy to toe the line29 and launched a violent anti-drug campaign that won support from the masses but elicited strong criticisms from human rights groups and opposition parties. Renewed violence in the Muslim-dominated South, mainly attributed to his hard line approach, marred Thaksin’s last year of rule before the elections of 2005. The subsequent cacophony of dissident voices did little to restrain Thaksin’s highly personalized approach to politics and administration. 30 TRT was returned to power in the February 2005 general elections with an overwhelming majority of 377 seats, thereby allowing Thaksin to

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assume his second term with great confidence and stronger authority .31 However, barely a year after his electoral triumph Thaksin was besieged by opposition forces, which cooperated towards ousting him by staging massive demonstrations in Bangkok. What began as a personal crusade by Sondhi Limthongkul, a maverick media mogul who was once a Thaksin supporter, gained momentum towards the end of 2005 as disgruntled groups coalesced around his weekly public tirades against Thaksin.32 All came to a head towards the end of January 2006 when it was announced that the Thaksin family had sold its stake in the telecommunication giant Shin Corp to Singapore’ s government-linked Temasek Holdings and stood to gain a tax-free profit of nearly $2 billion due to a cleverly exploited legal loophole. This deal became a rallying cause for Thaksin’s enemies. Playing up nationalist sentiments detractors claimed that the premier had lost the moral authority to govern due to his implication in the Shin Corp saga. By mid-February , the rallying crowds grew into tens of thousands and the disparate constellation of NGOs, urban intelligentsia, civil society groups, disaffected business groups, and opposition politicians formed a loose alliance and assumed a common identity naming themselves People’ s Alliance for Democracy that vowed not to let up the demonstrations unless Thaksin resigned from office. The confrontation continued with increasing tempo as Thaksin refused to yield to what he saw as mob rule. Meanwhile two of his ministers resigned and his erstwhile mentor former Bangkok Governor Chamlong entered the fray demanding his resignation. Thaksin rallied his party and government around him and sought support from his power base of rural folk and poor masses that threatened to bring hordes of Thaksin supporters to Bangkok. He dissolved parliament on 24 February announcing a snap election on 2 April. The opposition parties refused to participate in an election in which they could not hope to win. Attempts to bring the antagonists to negotiate on constitutional reforms in exchange for the opposition parties joining the electoral contest failed as both sides insisted on their own terms and conditions. 33 TRT won 57 per cent of the votes cast and 90 per cent of the seats but 38 seats in the one-sided elections remained vacant because the stipulated 20 per cent (minimum) vote was not attained. The total number of votes garnered by the TRT fell by about 16 per cent (3 million) from the previous election. Despite declaring victory Thaksin abruptly announced on 4 April (after an audience with the King on the previous day) that he would step aside in favour of Deputy Premier and Justice Minister Chidchai

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(a former colleague and staunch supporter), citing the need for unity in anticipation of the forthcoming (in June) celebrations for the King’s sixtieth anniversary of reign. The by-elections held on 23 April again resulted in fourteen vacant seats. Finally , on 8 May , the Constitutional Court ruled that the April election was invalid. The caretaker TRT government announced in late May that fresh polls would be held on 15 October and opposition political parties responded that they would take part in the new election. Thaksin came back to take charge of the government in late May amidst calls by the opposition to completely retire from Thai politics. In deference to the revered King the confrontation was put on hold for about two months after the April election.34 Meanwhile, in late June, it was reported that char ges against several political parties including the TRT and the Democrat Party (DP), for irregularities during the April elections, were being prepared for submission to the Constitutional Court, thereby creating more political uncertainty. In June and July, Thaksin and TRT went on the offensive by filing defamation suits against Sondhi and others as well as the DPand its leaders. However, Thaksin suffered a setback when the Bangkok Criminal Court sentenced the three remaining (one died and one resigned) members of the Election Commission to four years in prison for acting in favour of the ruling party in organizing the April elections.35 The TRT suffered a further loss when the DP swept to victory in the 23 July municipal elections for Bangkok Council and Bangkok district councils. It won 35 out of 57 seats in the city and 176 out of 255 district seats (covering 36 contested district constituencies out of 50 districts). 36 The present crisis of democracy in Thailand would remain intractable until both sides agree to compromise in instituting political reforms that would allow a return to normalcy in the near future.

Myanmar The multi-ethnic nation of 54 million people has been, for all practical purposes, under military rule since 1962. The SLORC (State Law and Order Restoration Council), the predecessor of the current military regime that assumed power in September 1988 after lar ge-scale public protests that turned violent supervised elections that were held in May 1990 in which the National League for Democracy (NLD) led by Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of Myanmar’s martyred independence hero General Aung San, won over 80 per cent of the seats and 60 per cent of the votes.

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When the junta refused to hand over power to the NLD and insisted that a constitution must be drawn up as a first step the NLD refused to cooperate and the democratization process in Myanmar seemed stalled by the political impasse that followed. Nevertheless, SLORC convened a National Convention (NC) in 1993 to establish the detailed principles of a new democratic constitution. The NC went into a recess in 1996 after the NLD and its allied party walked out of the convention in late 1995 over issues of transparency and restrictive practices. The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) chaired by Senior General Than Shwe that replaced SLORC in November 1997 revived the NC process in May 2004 after the then Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt revealed a seven-step roadmap towards democracy on 30 August 2003. However, the political opposition and the US-led Western governments have still not accepted the legitimacy of the NC. Currently the NC is again in recess. General Khin Nyunt was removed in October 2004 for corruption and disobedience. Following a revamping of the government and the military hierarchy in the wake of the purge, the military is apparently instituting a new chain of command in preparation for the conclusion of the road map. Meanwhile, the international community has regarded the implementation of the road map as glacial and felt that the issues of human rights and ethnic autonomy remained unresolved. Broad issues of democratic reforms, human rights and the continued detention of opposition icon Daw Aung San Suu Kyi since May 2003 that dogged the regime since it came to power have been highlighted time and again by the regime’s critics and detractors. In 2005 calls emer ged for a move to refer Myanmar to the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) as threat to peace and security in the region. At present, the regime seems to be as strong and as determined as ever to institute its own version of economic and political transition towards the market economy and parliamentary democracy. The military regime appears to be at the apex of state power ever since independence in 1948. 37 In this context, the move of the administrative capital and the military headquarters to a new city (named Naypyitaw meaning “royal abode”; located near Pyinmana some 240 miles from Yangon the current capital) in central Myanmar may be interpreted as an attempt to further enhance the state’ s autonomy and power vis-à-vis societal actors in line with the regime’ s belief that the Tatmadaw (literally royal force; vernacular name for the Myanmar Armed Forces) is the embodiment of the Myanmar state.

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Security Challenges Security challenges to Southeast Asian states may be classified into two categories, namely, those relating to traditional security issues posed by armed threats to sovereignty and territorial integrity of the nation state mainly composed of ethnic and ideological revolts; and those identified with non-traditional security issues with trans-boundary implications and human security issues such as narcotics, refugees and illegal migrants, viral pandemics, environmental problems and terrorism.

Traditional Security Problems38 Indonesia, Myanmar, Philippines, and Thailand (South) face armed insurgencies associated with separatist and Communist movements leading to violent conflicts between government security forces and armed rebels. With the concomitant losses of lives and property among the civilian population these entail additional threats to human security of the noncombatants as well. Though not threatening to the central government per se, these security threats affect regional governance and development, not to mention the waste of human, material and moral resources of the state. They also bring undue attention by advocates of human rights and democracy to the conduct of security operations by the military and police. In Indonesia, the main security threats have been posed by the Aceh rebellion and (West) Papua revolt that have been going on for many years. Both have been quests for autonomy and have assumed an ethnic character with secession being the ultimate aim of the protagonists. However , in Aceh a peace agreement reached in August 2005 with GAM (Geraken Aceh Merdeka, Achenese Freedom Movement) is holding and has made progress in that GAM has given up its arms. The so-called “Aceh Bill” passed by Indonesia’s parliament on 11 July 2006 after some five months of deliberations provided for greater autonomy in political governance and management of the province’ s natural resources. It was hailed by its supporters (sympathetic to the central government) as a substantial step towards ending the three decades of violent conflict but regarded by Acehnese detractors as unsatisfactory.39 Meanwhile, in the Papuan conflict exemplifying the failure of the “special autonomy” granted in 2001, the secessionist OPM (Or ganisasi Papua Merdeka, Papuan Freedom Or ganization) is still pursuing armed struggle as part of its dual track policy to gain complete autonomy. But the

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conflict is at a very low level because the rebels are poorly armed and less well organized than GAM. Nevertheless, its threat to foreign mining companies and its potential to evolve into a more powerful separatist movement has profound implications for the integrity of the Indonesian state.40 Myanmar’s military junta is currently being challenged by three ethnicbased rebellions.41 In the northeastern border with Thailand, SSA-South or SURA (Shan State Army or Shan United Revolutionary Army) holds a small enclave and claims to be fighting for the independence of the Shan State. Branded as terrorists and drug traf fickers by the junta, SURA, reportedly fielding a few thousand fighters, is able to maintain a holding action to protect its small enclave straddling the border though exploiting the rough terrain and local support. It suf fered a setback when over 800 troops of a breakaway faction surrendered to the government in July 2006. In the Kayah State, west of Thailand, the KNPP (Karenni National Progressive Party) with several hundred tenacious fighters is fighting a running battle mainly involving guerrilla tactics. The once mighty KNLA(Karen National LiberationArmy), the military arm of the KNU (Karen National Union) operating in the southeastern border with Thailand is now reduced to a shell of its former self through attrition, splits, and defections despite having several thousand troops under arms. It claims to be still adhering to an informal ceasefire concluded with General Khin Nyunt way back in early 2004 but has frequently had skirmishes with government troops. It is now weak and its leaders divided on the issues of both means and ends in their struggle for autonomy . The Philippines is probably in the worst shape among ASEAN states regarding insurgencies. The ethnic rebellion in the South by MILF (Moro Islamic Liberation Front) has gone through off-and-on peace negotiations and ceasefire arrangements while sporadic fighting continues in parts of Mindanao island. Attempts to negotiate a settlement are still ongoing with some backsliding as well as advancements since 2001. 42 The Communist NPA (New People’s Army), the armed wing of the CPP (Communist Party of the Philippines), is currently the most powerful ideological insurgency in Southeast Asia that has vowed to overthrow Arroyo’s government. It is reported to have maintained its strength and has expanded its geographical penetration in recent years and still remains a serious internal threat to the government. 43 The insurgency in Buddhist Thailand’s South whose genesis goes back for decades has increasingly assumed the character of a religious

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(Muslim) struggle in contrast to its ethnic (Malay irredentist) character in the 1970s and 1980s. It had lain dormant for many years until January 2004 when a raid on an army camp to seize weapons signalled the beginning of a terror campaign on the security personnel and local population (especially Buddhist). Prime Minister Thaksin decided to crack down and declared martial law. The volatile situation worsened when in October 2004, after hundreds of demonstrators fought with police in a town called Tak Bai, over eighty of those arrested died of suf focation while being transported in overcrowded trucks. There have been over 1,000 deaths up to the end of 2005 and there is no sign of abatement in ambushes, killings, and destruction of public and private property . However, the government also seemed to be reluctant to act upon the recommendations of the National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), which it instituted in 2005. Apparently, the government preference is for hard security measures rather than the wide-ranging socio-economic and administrative measures proposed by the NRC. This vicious conflict in the provinces of Pattani, Yala, and Narathiwat has engendered widespread fear , uncertainty and insecurity in the af fected provinces and had also soured relations with bordering Malaysia due to the spillover ef fect.44

Non-traditional Security Threats45 Narcotics The main threat posed by narcotics in Southeast Asia is from heroin and, increasingly, synthetic ATP (amphetamine-type psychotropic products) substances. Production of opium poppy which is the base for heroin is concentrated in the Golden Triangle where the borders of Myanmar, Laos and Thailand meet but the majority of the cultivated area lies in Myanmar territory. In recent years, these three countries have been cooperating with other regional states to seize heroin and ATP factories, reduce poppy cultivation and interdict trafficking of ATP, opiates and heroin as well as precursor chemicals. As for Myanmar, since the early 1990s, the junta has been accused by its opponents and Western media of not tackling the narcotics issue ef fectively, especially the alleged involvement of those ethnic groups, Wa in particular, that had entered into ceasefire arrangements with the government. Moreover, in recent years there were also accusations that the junta had been unable to prevent the deluge of hundreds of millions of “speed” pills or methamphetamine tablets into Thailand and other neighbouring countries. 46

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The junta has been introducing legislative, institutional, administrative, and interventionist measures in its war against narcotic drugs. Several opium-free zones were set up with the cooperation of ceasefire groups in the border regions as well. Most outside observers opined that there had been a declining trend in opium production in recent years and Myanmar deserved to be removed from the infamous list in the annual U.S. “Presidential Determination” memorandum. Many believe that the United States has disregarded, for political reasons, real progress in Myanmar ’s opium eradication efforts in the past several years. Illegal Migration and Human Trafficking Illegal migration of cheap labour has become a security issue in Southeast Asia for receiving countries (mainly Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand) as well as sending countries (mainly Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos and Myanmar). For the migrant themselves it is more of a human security issue, while for the sending countries the major problem is border security. As for the receiving countries the negative impact is felt on many fronts including community tensions, social problems, criminal activities, alienation and misplaced loyalty, law and order problems, border insecurity, corruption, etc. It is believed that there are around one million Myanmar illegal migrants in Thailand as well as tens of thousands of Laotians and Cambodians. Malaysia is hosting several hundred thousand Indonesians and a large number of Filipinos. All these pose a burden to the state and the community as well as security threats. 47 Southeast Asia is not free from human trafficking, especially children and women for employment as sex workers or as quasi-slave labour or bonded labour. Lately ASEAN has been cooperating to tackle this problem on the regional scale by harmonizing laws and tightening enforcement. Bilateral cooperation has also been implemented in the most af fected countries.48 Haze In the last decade, smoke from the burning of forests and plantations in Indonesia has given rise to an unhealthy curtain of haze affecting, at times, Singapore and parts of Malaysia depending upon weather conditions and the extent of fires. 49 The affected countries have helped Indonesia to monitor these forest fires and occasionally even despatched fire-fighting teams. Despite improved cooperation and coordination on preventing and

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fighting the haze, the problem keeps recurring and there is a general uneasiness that not enough has been done by Indonesia in terms of measures for prevention, enforcement of prohibitions and prosecution of transgressors.50 Viral Pandemics The deadly H5N1 strain of avian influenza that infect chickens, ducks and other birds struck several Southeast Asian countries in recent years and resurfaced in Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar and Vietnam in mid-2006 with human casualties in all except Myanmar .51 Experts believe that a pandemic could kill millions, as the virus is similar to the influenza virus that killed tens of millions in the 1918 world epidemic. 52 HIV/AIDs is af fecting all the countries of Southeast Asia but is particularly endemic in Cambodia, Thailand and Myanmar. Among the three, in the first two countries the infection seems to have passed the peak and an integrated approach comprising measures to increase awareness (both private and public), enhanced prevention (physical as well as sociocultural) and effective treatment (drug cocktails) have been implemented. Due to financial and technical lack of resources and cultural inhibitions as well as of ficial denial (in the beginning) Myanmar has been slow in responding to the outbreak and now needs considerable support from the region and beyond to address the problem adequately so that it does not get out of control and become a sub-regional threat. 53 Terrorism and Piracy Terrorism is regarded as the most serious non-traditional security threat by all Southeast Asian states as this scourge sprung up in the region soon after the September 11 attack on the United States. Indonesia and Philippines which have home-grown terrorist networks as well as linkages to international terrorist organizations and their radical supporters had borne the brunt of terrorist attacks such as the Bali bombings of 2002 and 2005 (both in October) and numerous attacks on both hard and soft tar gets in Manila and other Filipino towns. Singapore, vulnerable with its highdensity urban environment and many soft tar gets, had a near miss when the authorities nabbed a terrorist network in 2001 during the scouting and planning stage. Malaysia and Thailand had been used as transit points and temporary safe havens for some terrorist cells and individuals and the former had produced a few home-grown terrorists. Cambodia, Laos,

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Myanmar and even Vietnam had suf fered their share of bombings and other kinds of attacks albeit on a smaller scale. On the whole due to the cooperative as well as individual efforts of security agencies in Southeast Asian states some terrorists groups appear to be on the run and “leading organizations” have been “weakened” but “no government in the region could be complacent”. 54 New attacks on non-strategic and soft tar gets as well as economic establishments, especially ener gy-related sites, cannot be ruled out. 55 Maritime terrorism poses a serious threat to Southeast Asian ports and in the narrow Malacca Straits with potentially enormous consequences in economic and strategic terms. Oil tankers and LPG transporters are lucrative targets for spectacular attacks with catastrophic consequences under the right circumstances.56 On the other hand, piracy has been highlighted in the region as a direct threat to ships and its crews and is now regarded as a serious threat though at a lower level than maritime terrorism. In the larger context of maritime terrorism the key words here are deterrence and prevention through technological, organizational and operational measures on both ships and ports. At the international level initiatives such as the CSI (Container Security Initiative) and multi-lateral measures such as coordinated sea patrols in the Malacca Straits reinforce deterrence. Closer cooperation and integrated ef forts among the littoral states of Southeast Asia would go a long way towards reducing the danger of maritime terrorism and piracy in the region. 57

Conclusion Southeast Asia entered the first decade of the twenty-first century with an encouraging trend towards a more democratic form of political governance underpinned by wider participation and political transitions that ushered in a new generation of leaders in five founding members of ASEAN. However, recent hiccups in Thailand and Philippines that seem to indicate some backsliding in the earlier movement towards stable democratic systems, suggest that there is an ur gent need for much improvement in the institutions of political governance and other independent watchdog bodies. It is also imperative that the ruling elite s whose interests appear to be at odds with the aspirations and demands of the urban middle class seriously address the resulting legitimacy-deficit that fuels political instability .58 Otherwise, the economic fallout from political uncertainty could erode the performance legitimacy of the ruling

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elites and further aggravate the situation leading to a vicious cycle of political crises.59 Both traditional and non-traditional security challenges are likely to continue but, in the main, appear to be manageable with continued vigilance and improved regional as well as international cooperation. However, the violence in the Thai South seems to be a cause for concern and it may require a more holistic approach than purely military means to prevent it from escalating into a full-fledged insur gency.60

Notes 1. An abridged and updated version of the paper presented at the First Bilateral Dialogue on “Political and Security Dynamics in South and Southeast Asia: Shared Concerns”, or ganized by the Observer Research Foundation (New Delhi) and Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (Singapore), New Delhi, 30–31 March 2006. 2. Here Southeast Asia comprises Brunei Darusssalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam. They also are members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). 3. See, e.g., Mely Caballero-Anthony, “Political Transitions in Southeast Asia”, in Southeast Asian Affairs 2005, edited by Chin Kin Wah and Daljit Singh (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005), pp. 24–44; and Jurgen Ruland, “The Nature off Southeast Asian Security Challenges”, Security Dailogue 36 no. 4 (2005): 545–63. 4. See, e.g., David Koh, “Democracy Beckons in Vietnam”, Asia Inc (March 2006), pp. 44–45; Nick Freeman, “Maintaining Economic Reform Focus”, Asian Analysis (online) monthly newsletter (September 2005); and Vatthana Pholsena, “Laos in 2004, Towards Sub-Regional Integration: 10 Years On”, in Chin and Singh, op. cit., pp. 173–88 and Kyaw Yin Hlaing, “Laos: The State of the State”, in Southeast Asian Affairs 2006, edited by Daljit Singh and Lorraine C. Salazar (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), pp. 129–47. 5. See, e.g., Tim Huxley, “Southeast Asia in 2004: Stable, but Facing Major Security Challenges” in Chin and Singh, op. cit., pp. 3–23; and Michael Vatikiotis, “Southeast Asia in 2005: Strength in the Face of Adversity”, in Singh and Salazar, op. cit., pp. 3–14. 6. See, e.g., Ralf Emmers, Non-Traditional Security in the Asia-Pacific: The Dynamics of Securitisation (Singapore: Eastern University Press, 2004). 7. See, e.g., Philip Bowring, “In Bangkok and Manila, Governments wobble”, International Herald Tribune, 27 February 2006, p. 8; and MichaelVatikiotis, “Democracy Fragile in South-East Asia”, Straits Times, 2 March 2006, p. 26.

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8. See Anthony, op. cit., p. 24. 9. Previously, under Suharto’s New Order the military, was allotted seats in the now defunct People’s Consultative Assembly (MPR). Polls for the new 128seat regional Representatives’ Assembly (DPD) were as also conducted at the same time. 10. See, e.g., “Indonesia”, in Regional Outlook Southeast Asia 2006–2007 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2006), pp. 27–31; and Leo Suryadinata, “Indonesia: The Year of the Democratic Elections”, in Chin and Singh, op. cit, pp. 133–49. The United States restored full military ties in November 2005 and formalizing security cooperation with Australia had been mooted in January 2006 ( EIU Country Report: Indonesia [February 2006], pp. 17, 20). 11. See, “Indonesia”, op. cit., p. 31. 12. In the state elections, BN also took back the northern state of Terengganu (lost to P AS in 1999) and nearly succeeded in wresting back the P AS stronghold, Kelantan. See, e.g., Paricia A. Martinez, “Malaysia in 2004: Abdullah Badawi Defines His Leadership” in Chin and Singh, op. cit., pp. 192–94. 13. Se, e.g., Anthony, op. cit., pp. 29–30. 14. See, e.g., Ooi Kee Beng, Ghosts of Compromises Past — Malaysia and the Limits of Change, ISEAS Trends in Southeast Asia 9 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, September 2005); and Liew Chin Tong, “Malaysia: Abdullah’s Long Honeymoon Over”, Asia Times (online), 8 March 2006, available at . 15. See, e.g., Colum Murphy, “Abdullah’s Imperfect Plan”, Far Eastern Economic Review July/August 2006, pp. 19–23. 16. For details see Anthony, op. cit., p. 38. 17. Ibid. See, also, “Philippines”, in Regional Outlook 2006–2007, op. cit., pp. 46–47. 18. As at early March, twenty-five military personnel (eight were of ficers) had been detained for involvement as well as one leftist Congressman. See AFP News, “25 Philippine Soldiers Detained, Accused of Involvement in Coup Plot”, Today, 10 March 2006, p. 16. 19. See, e.g., “Emergency Rules”, Time, 6 March 2006, pp. 1 1–13. 20. Interestingly, AFP and police personnel (including a marine colonel and a Scout Ranger general) who were implicated in the February coup attempt were treated leniently and yet to be formally char ged (see EIU Country Report: Philippines [July 2006], pp. 13–14). 21. See ibid., p. 14. 22. See, e.g., EIU Country Report: Philippines (January 2006), p. 14. 23. The previous strategy (known as a by-election strategy) was to garner more votes by assuring that the popular P AP would win the elections through a walkover in the majority of the seats.

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24. See, e.g., James Chin, “Singapore: The Invisible Opposition”, Asian Analysis Newsletter (online), March 2006; and “Singapore”, in Regional Outlook 2006–2007, op. cit., pp. 49–52. 25. In fact, barely two months after his election victory , Premier Lee reminded PAP members that the party must start preparing for the next election (to be held in 2001 1 at the latest) in anticipation of a “much tougher fight” (Li Xueying, “Battle Begins Now for Next Polls, Say PM”,Straits Times, 23 July 2006. 26. See, e.g., Anthony, op. cit., pp. 34–35. 27. See, e.g., John Funston, “Thailand: Thaksin Fever”, in Southeast Asian Affairs 2002 edited by Daljit Singh andAnthony L. Smith (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2002), pp. 305–7. 28. See, e.g., ibid., pp. 307–24. 29. See, e.g., Alex M. Mutebi, “Thailand’s Independent Agencies under Thaksin: Relentless Gridlock and Uncertainty”, in Singh and Salazar, op. cit, pp. 303– 21. 30 See, e.g., Michael Kelly Conners, “Thailand: The Facts and F(r)ictions of Ruling”, in Chin and Singh, op. cit., pp. 365–68, 370–76. For a more comprehensive critique, see Duncan McCar go and Ukrist Pathmanand, The Thaksinization of Thailand (Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2005). 31. See. e.g., Thitinan Pongsudhirak, Thai Politics after the 6 February 2005 General Elections, ISEAS Trends in Southeast Asia 6 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, April 2005). 32. In October 2005, Sondhi, whose talk show containing anti-Thaksin remarks was cancelled by state television, moved his personal talk show to a public park near Bangkok’ s financial district and continued attacking the prime minister. 33. See, e.g., Nirmal Ghosh, “Opposition Rejects Unity Call byThaksin”, Straits Times, 28 March 2006, p. 1. 34. See, e.g., EIU Country Report: Thailand (July 2006), pp. 13–15. 35. See “Thai Election Officials Sentenced to Prison”, Today, 26 July 2006. 36. Bangkok has always been a DP stronghold and its results usually have little bearing on the overall national voting pattern. 37. It could be weak in its capacity to manage change towards democratic governance and wealth creation but it would still be relatively strong compared to the past and measured against it opponents. 38. For this section, see Huxley, op. cit.; and Kusuma Snitwongse and W. Scott Thompson, Ethnic Conflicts in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005). 39. See, e.g., M. Taufiqurraham, “Aceh Bill Passed Despite Opposition”, Jakarta Post, 12 July 2006; and EIU Country Report: Indonesia (May 2006), pp. 14– 15. For concerns over growing dissatisfaction inAceh, see, e.g., John McBeth, “Peace Process under Pressure in Aceh”, Straits Times, 7 August 2006.

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40. See, e.g., ibid. pp. 15–16. 41. For troop strengths, see The Military Balance 2006 (London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 2006), pp. 428–29. 42. For a comprehensive analysis, see Miriam Coronel Ferrer, “The Moro and the Cordillera Conflicts in the Philippines and the Struggle for Autonomy” in Kusuma and Thompson, op. cit., pp. 109–50. See, also,EIU Philippines (July 2006), op. cit., p. 16. 43. Ibid. 44. See, e.g., EIU: Thailand (July 2006), op. cit., pp. 16–17. For a more critical analysis, see Srisompob Jitpiromsri and Panyasak Sobhonvasu, “Unpacking Thailand’s Southern Conflict: The Poverty of Structural Explanations”, Critical Asian Studies 38, no. 1 (2006): 95–1 17. 45. For this section, see Anthony, op. cit.; “Nontraditional Security Threats in Southeast Asia”, Policy Bulletin, 44th Strategy for Peace Conference, 16–18 October 2003, Warrenton, VA, The Stanley Foundation; Sidney Jones, “Terrorism in the Region: Changing Alliances, New Directions”, in Regional Outlook 2006–2007, op. cit., pp. 8–11; and Graham Gerard Ong-Web, “The Threats of Maritime Terrorism and Piracy”, in ibid., pp. 12–15. See, also, Kit Collier, “Terrorism: Evolving Regional Alliances and State Failure in Mindanao”, in Singh and Salazar , op. cit., pp. 26–38. 46. See, e.g., the section on Burma (Myanmar) in the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report-2005 (INCSR), released by the Bureau for the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs of the U.S. Department of State, in March 2005. It may be accessed at the following URL: ). 47. See, e.g., Jerrold W. Huguet and Sureeporn Punpuing, International Migration in Thailand, Report to the International Or ganization for Migration (IOM), Bangkok, IOM, 2005. 48. See, e.g., Nicole Piper , “A Problem by a Dif ferent Name? A Review of Research on Trafficking in South-East Asia and Oceania”, International Migration 43, no. 1/2 (2005): 203–33. 49. See, e.g., Tb. Arie Rukmantara, “Sumatra Haze Reaches Malaysia,Thailand”, Jakarta Post, 31 July 2006. 50. See, e.g., Meng Yew Choong, “No Respite from Annual Haze Problem at Least for a Decade”, Straits Times, 7 August 2006. 51. From 2003 to 26 July 2006, the fatalities consisted of six in Cambodia, 42 in Indonesia, 15 in Thailand and 42 in Vietnam . 52. See, e.g., comment by Bernadine Healy, “The Young People’s Plague”, U.S. News and World Report (1 May 2006), p. 63. 53. See, e.g., Ajay Tandon, “Macroeconomic Impact of HIV/AIDS in the Asian and Pacific Region”, ERD Working Paper No. 75, Asian Development Bank, Manila, November 2005.

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54. See Jones, op. cit., p. 1 1. 55. For an example of threats to the ener gy industry, see Inggrid Panontongan, “Energy Industry and Terrorism in Indonesia”, IDSS Commentaries 73/2006 (11 July 2006). 56. See, e.g., Michael Richardson, A Time Bomb for Global Trade: Maritimerelated Terrorism in an Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2004). 57. See, e.g., “Trio Join Anti-piracy Pact”, 8 April 2006, . 58. See, e.g., “Unstable Democracies in Southeast Asia; The Philippine and Thai Crises”, IISS Strategic Comments (May 2006), online version at . 59. See, e.g., Pichit Likitkijsomboon, “Thais Pay the Price for PoliticalTurmoil”, Far Eastern Economic Review (July/August 2006), pp. 49–53. 60. See, e.g., Marawan Macan-Markar , “Thai Insur gency Gaining Ground”, 4 August 2006, .

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11 Bilateral and Regional Initiatives to Curb Acts of Maritime Terrorism and Piracy in the Region R.S. Vasan

It is my intention to examine the maritime threat potential in South and Southeast Asia and draw attention to some of the trends in regional/ bilateral initiatives by which the countries in the region are planning to secure their maritime interests. There have been a few important developments in the maritime dimension especially in the last five to ten years. To the immediate south of India, the foremost threat comes in the form of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which has been extremely active on the high seas. Not that it is a new phenomenon. In fact, the very sustenance of this guerrilla force has been largely dependent on the use of both the territorial waters in and around Sri Lanka, and the adjoining high seas.The importance of the seas to the armed struggle by LTTE is indicated by the speech of the its leader (Velupillai Prabhakaran) during one of the Heroes Day speeches in which he had this to say: Geographically, the security of Tamil Eelam is interlinked with that of its seas. It’s only when we are strong in the seas and break the dominance our enemy now has that we will be able to retain land areas we liberated and drive our enemies from our homeland.

Realising the importance of sea communication, LTTE created its own sea logistic group by investing in merchant ships with dual use. They were registered in Flags of Convenience countries and were used for legitimate and illegitimate trade. These ships were used in the past for picking up

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military hardware for LTTE from arms markets around the world. It was also reported that they were involved in the drugs trade to finance their arms deals. It is known and recorded that many of the arms purchases were made in Southeast Asian countries. Let me cite as an example the case of MV Yahata. It left Phuket with a huge weapons cargo for Karachi in January 1993. In the Bay of Bengal the boat changed its name to MV Ahat by obliterating the first and last letters in the original name. The Indian navy, patrolling the sea southeast of Madras on 13 January 1993, spotted the 400-hundred tonne ship,Yahata alias Ahat, without navigation lights, en route to Madras. In the subsequent duel, the ship was abandoned and set on fire. The sinking of MV Ahat in the Bay of Bengal along with LTTE leader Kittu was proof enough of the use of such ships in moving of arms to LTTE. There have been many such cases that have been recorded, but it is obvious that for each event that is recorded that there would be many more which would have been unreported. However, the post September 1 1 scenario that brought about various security measures including the International Ship and Port Security (ISPS), Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), Container Security Initiative (CSI), Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), and MSO initiatives would have made it challenging for LTTE to continue with the kind of freedom of the seas it enjoyed before. The creation of the air wing of L TTE has also caused a flutter in Sri Lanka as well as in India. Not that the force levels are high, but given the past performance of LTTE, any capability that is added would allow them to pursue their goals more vigorously. The air elements are small aircraft but could be as dangerous in the air as the small boats laden with explosives are on the high seas. The seaborne attacks on the Sri Lankan patrol craft early in 2006 by suicide boats and the killing of Sri Lankan cadres have brought to fore the threat in the neighbouring seas. Soon after the tsunami (2004), it was speculated that LTTE might have lost many of its naval assets and cadres. But the recent skirmishes have clearly indicated that the capability of the Sea Tigers has not been blunted. The Sea Tigers have remained a potent force and so have the suicide squads called the Black Sea Tigers specially trained and equipped in sea warfare which have provided that asymmetric edge to the Sea Tigers. The Cease Fire Agreement that has been in force since 2002 has been in danger of collapsing on many occasions.The acceptance by both the parties at Geneva to pursue the peace process by keeping the Agreement alive has given it a temporary reprieve. The election of

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Mr Mahinda Rajapakse was facilitated by L TTE by ensuring that the Tamils did not vote during the elections. Sri Lanka has looked to India for help. The Norwegian mediation also did come in for criticism and many Sri Lankans and Indian observers felt that India needed to be actively engaged in the process of peace settlement in the island. The process of direct engagement has been rendered dif ficult with the declaration of LTTE as a terrorist or ganization, with its leader wanted for the killing of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in a gruesome attack by a Sri Lankan suicide bomber . The declaration of L TTE as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation and the ban on group travel by the Tigers in the European Union have all contributed to influencing the behaviour of LTTE to a certain extent. Another factor is the regional politics of Tamil Nadu where the two regional parties have differing perceptions of the Indian role in the peace facilitation. There have been excellent military-to-military relations between the two countries. It was expected that a defence agreement would be signed, but this has not happened though there have been high level visits and exchanges. The Indian Navy and the Coast Guard have been regularly holding exercises and meetings with Sri Lankan counter -parts to ensure mutual cooperation and inter -operability. Also, the Sethusamudram Ship Channel Project while connecting the Palk Bay with the Gulf of Mannar and providing a navigable channel on the East Coast has introduced new dimensions of maritime security challenges in India’ s neighbourhood.

Southeast Asia — Straits of Malacca The situation in the maritime neighbourhood of the Andaman Sea and the Malacca Straits is quite dif ferent given its international dimensions. The Malacca Straits has always been important, especially in respect of energy security. The passage of over 200 ships every day through the Straits has forced the littoral states to look at ways to protect such passage through this vital sea-lane of communication. With the spiralling ener gy demands, the growing economies in the region and the geo-political rivalries, the importance of the straits will not diminish. The United States, China and Japan are all equally interested in ensuring the safety of the straits for both strategic and economic reasons. The littoral states, namely Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia andThailand, that have major stakes in the security of the straits have been criticized for not doing enough in the past. The scourge of piracy in the straits assumed

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such proportions as to warrant the setting up of a Piracy Reporting Centre at Kuala Lumpur by the International Maritime Bureau (IMB).The regular reporting of the piracy incidents helped the shipping industry to keep tab on them. The period till 2004 saw an increase in the number of piracy attacks. However, the number of incidents has come down after various initiatives taken by the littoral states which were coming under increased international pressure to act together. Such coming together was always a difficult proposition in the past given the socio-politico-economic complexities of interstate relations. However , slowly but steadily , the littoral states have had to come together to combat the menace of piracy and terrorism. The major momentum came post September 1 1. The implementation of the International Ship and Port Security code was lar gely due to the efforts of the international maritime community spearheaded by the United States, which feared major sea borne attacks by the terrorists. It was feared that ships might be hijacked and used as floating bombs to attack maritime infrastructure. Possible linkages were seen between acts of piracy and terrorism. While not directly related to the subject of this study , it is important to draw attention to the increase in piracy attacks of f the coast of Somalia. The warlords ashore have invested in mercenaries and sympathizers to take over ships and crew on the high seas and hold them to ransom. The classification of the Malacca Straits as a terror -prone area by the Joint War Committee of the Lloyd’s in 2005 raised insurance costs. This economic pressure led the local governments to respond sharply to such classification citing the recent decline, notably in the last two years, in the number of piracy attacks. Worldwide, reported piracy attacks in 2005 fell to 276 from 329 in 2004, the lowest figure in the preceding six years, according to IMB’s 2005 annual report on Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships. The report indicated that the action by agencies in Indonesia and the Malacca Straits had proven to be ef fective. Effectiveness of Operation Gurita, a show of force in known hot spots, and several intelligence-led actions resulted in gangs of pirates being caught and at least six small vessels being recovered. Let us then look at the maritime initiatives taken in the region by countries located in the hot spots.The RMSI, an U.S.-led initiative, though supported by Singapore, faced stiff opposition from Malaysia and Indonesia. Both countries considered that such presence of outside forces would be

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an infringement of their sovereignty. It was felt that the RMSI would give America the freedom to undertake patrols and law enforcement at will in their backyards and undermine UNCLOS (UN Convention on Law of the Sea) provisions, which only permit “innocent passage” of warships through international straits. The regional response was to set up the MALSINDO agreement for undertaking coordinated patrolling by the Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore to ensure the security of shipping in the Malacca Straits with dedicated resources being made available. There is continued reluctance to permit joint patrolling due to the problem of sovereignty. The good news of 2005 was that Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, and Thailand agreed to institute joint air patrols to provide real time surface picture to the security forces in the region; it was a significant step in the right direction after decades of mutual distrust.

Cooperation with Southeast Asian Countries India, with its extended maritime border at Andaman and Nicobar Islands, has everything to gain by engaging with its Southeast Asian neighbours especially in view of strong historical, cultural and economic linkages with them. Some of the initiatives in the maritime neighbourhood are worth mentioning.

Malaysia The Indo-Malaysian defence cooperation had received a major fillip with the constitution of the Joint Working Group on Defence Cooperation in February 1993. The operational interaction between the two navies has been in the areas of training, visits by high-level delegations and regular visits by warships to each other ’s ports. Royal Malaysian naval ships KD Lekir and KD Kasturi visited Mumbai from 8 to 12 September 2004. A high-level delegation led by the Chief of Royal Malaysia Navy also visited India in September 2004. During 2003–04, six Malaysian officers underwent training in India and three Indian Navy personnel received training in Malaysia. Both the navies also interact regularly under the aegis of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium. In addition, Indian Navy ships have regularly participated in the Lima series of exhibitions/conference hosted biennially at Langkawi by the Malaysian defence ministry .

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106

R.S. Vasan

Indonesia The Indian Navy conducts coordinated patrols with the Indonesian Navy in the six-degree channel separating both the countries. The first IndiaIndonesia coordinated patrols were conducted in September 2002 and since then four coordinated patrols have been successfully conducted by patrolling along the International Maritime Boundary Line between the two countries aimed as a deterrent against poaching, gun-running, smuggling, drug trafficking and other illegal activities.

Others Defence cooperation agreements have also been concluded with Indonesia, Thailand, Philippines and Singapore. A memoradum of understanding for Coordinated Patrol between India and Thailand was signed in May 2005. In addition annual navy-to-navy staff talks are conducted with Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia as well as an annual strategic dialogue withAustralia. This arrangement provides the platform for enhancement of understanding between the two navies and building confidence.

Coast Guard Cooperation The cooperation in the maritime sphere is not limited to the Indian navy as the Indian Coast Guard (CG) has also played its part in regional cooperation. This includes growing interaction with the Japanese CG, with annual exercises being conducted alternately in India and Japan. The primary areas the exercises cover are anti-piracy and oil spill responses. The other country with which the CG has been having regular interaction is the Maldives where Search and Rescue (SAR) and oil spill response exercises are conducted. In addition the CG has begun visiting littoral states for coordination of SAR and oil spill response, which require a multinational approach. The countries involved include Sri Lanka, Mauritius, Seychelles, Indonesia, Thailand, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Philippines and Vietnam. Maritime interaction by the CG is at times preferred to involvement of the Navy , especially where the host prefers interacting with an agency without a militarist image. Both the Indian Navy and the Indian Coast Guard undertook extensive relief operations after the tsunami in December 2004 and responded quickly to the humanitarian needs of neighbouring countries while

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Acts of Maritime Terrorism and Piracy

107

attending to disaster relief tasks on Indian territories. This has provided an opportunity for the navies and the coast guards of the region to come together to plan, lay down and implement contingency measures for natural or man-made disasters.

Milan The Indian Navy took the initiative to start the Milan forum to facilitate navy-to-navy interaction between the Bay of Bengal regional navies. This biennial initiative was aimed at facilitating confidence-building interaction between Bay of Bengal and Andaman Sea littorals and adjacent Southeast Asian countries. In over a decade of existence, the interaction has grown to include more professional activities by way of discussions, seminars and exercises and participation has been widened to our extended maritime neighbourhood by the inclusion of Brunei, Cambodia, Vietnam, Australia and New Zealand.

Conclusion It is evident that the economic compulsions and a desire to promote safety on the seas have brought together countries in the region. There is greater transparency and a willingness to share each other ’s assets, expertise and experience to combat the menace of terrorism and piracy at sea. India is in a position to take part in the maritime safety architecture that may be developing to face the security threats on the seas.

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108

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R.S. Vasan

108

9/26/07, 10:59 AM

Index

109

Index Abdul Kalam, 4, 15, 16 Abdullah Badawi, 63, 82 Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG), 34 Aburrazak Janjalani, 34 Aceh Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), 90 political autonomy, 90 Aceh Bill, 90 Afghanistan, 2, 33, 37, 72, 76 Ahmadnegar Prison, 1 air patrols joint, 105 Agreement on Dispute Settlement Mechanism, 60 Agreement on Trade in Goods, 60 AIDS combined response needed, 23 al-Qaeda new centre, 33 amphetamine-type psychotropic products, 92 ancient Chinese mariners, 72 Andaman Islands, 22 Andaman Sea, 103 littorals, 107 anti-American sentiment, 34, 59 anti-Arroyo opposition, 84 Arroyo, Gloria Macapagal, 83 Ascendas, 16 ASEAN, 6, 13 dialogue with Japan, 30

hedging with all powers, 29 integration, 11 multilateral institutions, 65 political relations, 57 ASEAN countries negotiations for FTAs, 63 relations with India, 65 ASEAN Plus mechanisms, 17 ASEAN Plus One, 35 ASEAN Plus Three, 10, 35 ASEAN Plus Three FTA and Japan, 29 ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), 6, 10, 13, 31, 35, 44, 57, 58 ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, 10, 19, 23, 60 ASEAN-India Connect, 16 ASEAN-Japan FTA, 63 ASEAN-led forums, 60, 65 Asia balance of power, 25, 55 integration, 7 military spending, 37 organizational structures, 6 redistribution of global power, 25 role of United States, 37 Asia-Pacific fundamental U.S. goal, 25 political and security dynamics, 25 role of United States, 25 security dynamics, 27

109

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109

9/26/07, 10:59 AM

110

Index

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 6, 10, 20, 31 engaging U.S., 11 Asia-Pacific Round Table, 11 Asian Century, 23 Asian community building, 11 Asian cooperation, 10 Asian economics East Asia Summit, 12 Asian geopolitics East Asia Summit, 12 Asian integration, 11 Asian NATO, 7 Asian powers, 13 wider regional role, 2 Asian regionalism, 12, 25 Asian Relations Conference, 2, 10 Asian renaissance, 2, 3, 1 1 Asian strategic relations, 13 Aso, Taro, 30, 49, 53 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 10, see also ASEAN Australasia, 10 Australia, 2, 7, 13, 19 alliance with United States, 26 influence of United States, 25 U.S. forward access facilities, 72 avian flu danger of a pandemic, 23, 94 aviation hub India, 16 Bahrain, 72 Bali bombings, 94 ballistic missiles, 48 Bandung Conference, 2, 10 Bangalore industrial parks, 15 IT park, 16

12 PS&Dynamics_Index

110

Bangkok demonstrations, 81 DP stronghold, 98 Bangkok Criminal Court, 88 Bangladesh, 6, 8 diplomatic linkages, 73 Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Forum, 6 Barisan Nasional (BN), 82 Bassas da India, 78 Bay of Bengal, 73 regional navies, 107 Bay of Bengal Initiative for MultiSectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), 6, 10 Bhavan Indian International School, 3 bilateral free-trade agreement, 42 bilateral naval exercises, 75 bilateral partnerships, 28 bilateral relations India and Singapore, 15 issues, 14 bilateral trade India and ASEAN, 65 Black Sea Tigers, 102 Blair, 6 Bo Xilai, 54 Britain strategy of offshore balancing, 27 Burma, 46 Bush, 6, 64 visit to India, 38 Bush Administration, 26 by-election strategy, 97 Cambodia, 8 caretaker TRT government, 88 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 40

9/26/07, 10:59 AM

Index

111

Catholic Church influence in Philippines, 84 Central Asia, 7 geo-energy stakes, 71 Changi Naval Base, 72 Chennai IT parks, 16 China, 6, 13 cheap labour, 16 competition for oil supplies, 33 containment, 66 credible international stakeholder, 60 demand for oil, 78 domestic and external constraints, 28 economic and political diplomacy, 28 exports, 29 foreign companies, 29 impact on U.S.’s policies, 27 increasing influence, 58 interest in Straits of Malacca, 103 joint military exercises, 59 lease of Marao Islands, 73 military infrastructure in Myanmar, 73 military modernization, 46 non-confrontational foreign policy course, 48 primary security threat, 44 regional presence, 61 relations with India, 21, 29 relations with Russia, 29, 55 relationship with Japan, 11, 63, 65 reluctance to certain countries in EAS, 23 response of West, 16 rise of, 5, 6, 27 rising influence and power, 44, 59 role in regional security, 44

12 PS&Dynamics_Index

111

strategic importance of Indian Ocean, 72 threat, dispelling, 61 trade with India, 21 unification of Asia, 12 U.S. influence, 7 U.S. pressures, 2 use of port in Pakistan, 14 war with India, 20 China National Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC), 16 China-ASEAN trade volume, 54 China-Russia strategic ties, 55 Chindia, 6 Chinese hegemony, 67 growing, 39 Chinese manufacturers, 21 Chunxiao field, 53 Clinton, 64 visit to India, 42 coast guard cooperation, 106, 107 Cold War, 20, 43 end of, 38 Cold War policy, 41 Combined Commanders Conference, 22 combined response AIDS and SARS, 23 Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA), 15, 16 Comprehensive Economic Partnership, 54 Communist NPA (New People’s Army), 91 Communist Party of the Philippines, 91 Confederation of Indian Industry (CII), 15 confidence-building interaction, 107 Constitution Thailand, 85

9/26/07, 10:59 AM

112

Index

Container Security Initiative (CSI), 9, 95, 102 cooperative multilateral institutions, 28 coordinated patrols India and Thailand, 106 corruption scandals Philippines, 83 Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, 88 de Gaulle, Charles, 75 Declaration of Conduct in the South China Sea, 60 defence cooperation agreements, 106 defence policy changes, 50 Defence White Paper, 49 defense co-production, 41 Delhi Public School, 3 Deng Xiaoping, 53 Diao Yu islands, 53 Diego Garcia, 72, 73 disaster relief Indian Ocean, 72 tasks, 107 Dubai Ports World purchase of P&O, 16 EAS Declaration on Avian Influenza Prevention, Control and Response, 23 East Asia domination of, 25 mutual differences, 23 U.S. military posture, 26 East Asia Study Group report, 16 East Asian Community, 18 trading partner with India, 20 East Asian Economic Group, 19 East Asian Summit (EAS), 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 10, 26, 59

12 PS&Dynamics_Index

112

discussions on maritime security, 22 effect on India, 12 features, 10 footprint, 11 forum for strategic dialogue, 17 impact on Asian geopolitics, 12 implications for India, 19 Indian perspective, 18 India’s participation, 21 second summit, 23 East China Sea, 53 East of Suez operations, 75 East Timor crisis, 58 economic crisis, 58 economic growth slow, 85 economic integration, 43 economic liberalization, 38 education cooperation, 3 importance, 3 electoral fraud allegations, 83 energy competition for, 53 securing supplies, 71 energy security, 7 ethnicity, 9 Europa, 78 Europe, 7 radicalizing Muslim youths, 34 European Union (EU), 103 standard of living, 11 Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), 53, 74 financial crisis, 20, 52, 58 First Bilateral Dialogue, 96 Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA), 75

9/26/07, 10:59 AM

Index

113

Flags of Convenience countries, 101 Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), 1, 14 Foreign Terrorist Organization, 103 Framework Agreement on Comprehensive Economic Cooperation, 60 France dominant arms supplier, 75 engagement in Indian Ocean region, 74, 75 military contracts, 79 Free Trade Agreements (FTAs), 20 with ASEAN countries, 63 Free Trade Area, 54 French navy, 75 G-IV advanced reactor, 41 Ganga Mekong project, 6 gas and oil, see also energy Sino-Japanese rivalry, 54 Gandhi, Rajiv, 103 Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM), 90, 91 globalization, 11, 16, 38 effect on Indian Ocean littorals, 70 pressures from, 85 Glorioso Islands, 78 Goh Chok Tong, 11, 14, 61, 85 visit to Kolkata, 15 Golden Triangle, 92 Gwadar use by China, 14 Guam, 26 Gulf of Mannar,103 Gulf War (1991), 76 haze problem, 93 Heroes Day, 101 Hindu-Muslim communal violence, 32

12 PS&Dynamics_Index

113

House of Representatives, Philippines, 84 human trafficking, 80, 93 humanitarian mission Indian Ocean, 72 India, 6, 8, 13, 14, 15 annual strategic dialogue with Australia, 106 aviation hub, 16 Bush’s visit, 38 cheap labour, 16 closed economy, 20 Coast Guard, 103 companies in Singapore, 15 contribution to peace and stability, 32 contribution to regional stability, 15 cooperation with China, 21 cooperation with Indonesia, 106 cooperation with Southeast Asian countries, 105–07 cooperation with Thailand, 106 cross-border terrorism in Kashmir, 32 economic interdependence, 21 economic liberalization, 38 effect of EAS, 12 interaction with major powers, 66 interactions with other countries, 7 joint research and development, 15 Look East policy, 7, 67 Maoist violence, 32 maritime interests, 77 navy-to-navy talks with Singapore, 106 nuclear deal with U.S., 38 nuclear isolation, 41 nuclear tests, 14 offsetting Chinese hegemony, 67

9/26/07, 10:59 AM

114

Index

Parliamentary Forum, 15 participation in EAS, 20 partnership with United States, 42 political investment, 4 regional engagement, 65 relations with ASEAN, 65 response of West, 16 responsible nuclear power, 42 rise of, 5, 6, 31 role in maritime safety, 107 security strategy, 39 self perception, 32 strength in IT, 15 trade with China, 21 U.S. influence, 7 visit by Condoleezza Rice, 62 visit of Wen Jiaobao, 14 war with China, 20 India strategic potential, 37 India-Pakistan War, 70 India-Singapore Partnership Fund, 15 India-Singapore relations areas of cooperation, 16 India-U.S. Joint Statement, 38, 41 India-U.S. relations, 31, 37–39, 41 improvement, 66 Science and Technology Cooperation Agreement, 38 Indian Coast Guard, 106 Indian diaspora, 38 Indian Institute of ManagementBangalore, 3 Indian market, opening up, 38 Indian Navy, 31, 103 coordinated patrols with Indonesian Navy, 106 Far Eastern Subcommand, 31 initiative for Milan forum, 107 participation in Lima series of exhibitions, 105 Indian Ocean energy security, 7

12 PS&Dynamics_Index

114

extra-regional naval forces, 70 importance to China 72 Japan’s Maritime Self-Defence Forces, 50 maintaining stability, 39 maritime security, 7 new security challenges, 46 political and security dynamics, 70–79 U.S. military presence, 71 U.S. naval task force, 30 Indian Ocean littorals effect of globalization, 70 Indian Ocean Rim Cooperation, 10 Indian schools branches in Singapore, 16 Indo-Pakistan relations, 30 Indo-U.S. Defense Framework Agreement, 38 Indonesia, 8 Aceh Bill, 90 Aceh rebellion, 90 electoral reforms, 81 fall of Suharto, 81 forest fires, 93 jihadi terrorism, 34 major state in Straits of Malacca, 103 opposition against RMSI, 104 Papua rebellion, 90 widening gap with United States, 58 Indonesian Armed Forces, 82 Indonesian Navy coordinated patrols with Indian Navy, 106 Infosys, 21 Institute for Defence and Strategic Studies (IDSS), 9 Institute of South Asian Studies, 15 insurance costs, 104 insurgencies, rising, 7 intercontinental ballistic missile, 50 international terrorism, 33

9/26/07, 10:59 AM

Index

115

International Maritime Boundary India and Indonesia, 106 International Maritime Bureau (IMB), 104 annual report on Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships, 104 International Ship and Port Security (ISPS), 102, 104 International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor, 41 Iran, 2 Iraq, 2, 72 U.S. preoccupation with, 26 war on, 71 island territories, 78 IT links, India, 4 Japan, 7, 13 alliance with U.S., 26, 29, 45 bid for Security Council, 64 Constitution, 51, 52 dialogue with ASEAN, 30 difference with China, 11 diplomatic policy, 29 East Asian regionalism, 29, 36 economy, 28, 29 economic presence in Southeast Asia, 30 engagement in Indian Ocean region, 76, 77 Foreign Ministry, 76 foreign policy, 52 influence of United States, 25 investment in India, 14 Maritime Self-Defence Forces, 50, 53 Ministry of International Economy and Trade, 29 model for Southeast Asia, 63 nationalism, 48 oil from Russia, 33 peace-keeping operations, 30

12 PS&Dynamics_Index

115

political divide, 49 post-World War II conduct, 30 presence in Afghanistan, 76 re-armament, 30 relationship with China, 63, 65 security role, 27 Japan-ASEAN Closer Economic Partnership (CEP), 64 Japan-ASEAN trade, 54 Japanese Air Self Defence Forces, 77 Japanese coast guard interaction with Indian Coast Guard, 106 Japanese Occupation, 30 Japanese Parliament (Diet), 51 Japanese rightists, 30 Japan’s Disarmament and Diplomacy, 49 Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), 34 jihadi terrorism, 36 jihadi terrorist organizations, 32 Joint Declaration on Cooperation in the Field of Non-traditional Security Issues, 60 Joint Japan-U.S. Missile Defence Shield, 50 joint naval exercises, 76 Indian Ocean, 72 Joint Special Economic Zones, 21 Joint War Committee of the Lloyd’s, 104 Joint Working Group on Defence Cooperation, 105 Juan de Nova, 78 Jusuf Kala, 82 Karen National Liberation Army, 91 Karen National Union, 91 Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP), 91 Kashmir, 14, 32 KD Kasturi, 105

9/26/07, 10:59 AM

116

Index

KD Lekir, 105 Kesavapany, 6 Khin Nyunt, 89, 91 Koizumi, Junichiro, 13, 30, 49, 51, 64 Kolkata, IT parks, 16 Korea, 7 Kuala Lumpur Declaration, 18, 24 Kuala Lumpur Summit, 6 Kunming initiative, 6 La Réunion, 78 labour China, 16 India, 16 Langkawi, 105 Laos, 8, 80 Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET), 32 Law Concerning Special Measures on Humanitarian and Reconstruction Assistance to Iraq, 77 Lee Hsien Loong, 21, 85 visit to Delhi, 15 speech, 24 Lee Kuan Yew, 67 Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, 3 Liberal Democratic Party, 50 liberal institutionalism, 56 Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), 101, 102 air wing, 102 terrorist organization, 103 Lima series of exhibitions, 105 Look East policy, 7, 19, 20, 67 Mahathir Mohamad, 13, 18, 19, 80, 82, 83 major powers role in Southeast Asia, 56 Malaysia, 82, 83

12 PS&Dynamics_Index

116

cooperation with India, 105 economy, 6 major stake in Straits of Malacca, 103 objection against RMSI, 104 reform agenda, 83 Maldives interaction with Indian Coast Guard, 106 MALSINDO agreement, 105 Manila demonstrations, 81, 84 Marao Island lease by China, 73 Marcos, Ferdinand, 83 Maritime Safety Agency, 76 maritime security, 9 ARF, 44 Indian Ocean, 7 maritime terrorism, 9, 95, 101–07 Mayotte Islands, 74 Memorandum of Understanding Indo-U.S. nuclear deal, 38 methamphetamine tablets, 92 Middle East, 27, 35, 53 new security challenges, 46 migration, illegal, 93 Milan forum, 22, 107 military alliance Japan and U.S., 29 military sales France, 79 Mindanao, 34 Mittal group, 6 purchase of Arcelor, 16 Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), 34, 91 Mozambique Channel, 78 MSO initiatives, 102 Muslim population, Indonesia, 82 Myanmar, 6, 8 bombings, 95

9/26/07, 10:59 AM

Index

117

human rights issues, 89 issue of ethnic autonomy, 89 military infrastructure, 73 military junta, 81, 91 National Convention, 89 National League for Democracy (NLD), 88 removal from annual U.S. Presidential Determination memorandum, 93 resumption of National Convention, 81 State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), 88 tackling of narcotics issue, 92 Tatmadaw, 89 Nakasone, Yashuhiro, 76 narcotics, 80 security threat to Southeast Asia, 91 National Convention, 81 National Defence Programme Outline, 50 National Research Foundation, 16 National University of Singapore, 16 naval exercises bilateral ,75 operations, joint, 76 Naval Task Group 03, 75 navy, India, see Indian Navy Naypyitaw, 89 Narathiwat, 92 National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), 92 Nehru, J., 1, 2, 10 vision of Asian integration, 7 Nehruvian vision, 5 Nepal, 7, 46 New Defence Programme Outline, 49 New Order, 97 New Zealand, 2, 19

12 PS&Dynamics_Index

117

non-traditional security issues, 35, 43, 80 norm-based regional system, 65 North Arabian Sea, 71 North Korea, 48 nuclear issue, 44, 51 Northeast Asia, 10, 19 Norwegian mediation, 103 nuclear cooperation, 41 nuclear technology proliferation, 52 nuclear weapons, 48 Observer Research Foundation (ORF), 8, 14 Official Development Assistance (ODA), 1, 54 oil demand from China, 78 oil spill response exercises, 106 oil tankers target of pirates, 95 Okinawa Prefecture, 53 Oman, 72 Operation Gurita, 104 opium production, 92 opium-free zones, 93 Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM), 90 P&O purchase by Dubai Ports World, 16 Palk Bay, 103 Pakistan, 8 U.S. bases, 37 Major Non-NATO Ally status, 77 pan-Asian regional group, 11 Pancasila, 14 Papua Organisasi Papua Merdeka (OPM), 90 Pattani, 92

9/26/07, 10:59 AM

118

Index

peace-keeping operations Japan, 30 People’s Action Party (PAP), 84, 85 dominance in Singapore, 84 preparation for next elections, 98 People’s Consultative Assembly, 97 People’s Republic of China, see China Persian Gulf, 22, 76 Philippines, 8, 83, 84 allegations of electoral fraud, 83 corruption scandals, 83 influence of Catholic church, 84 insurgencies, 91 jihadi terrorism, 33 state of national emergency, 84 piracy, 80 attacks, increase, 104 Piracy Reporting Centre, 104 political instability legitimacy-deficit, 95 Port Blair, 31 President of India, 3, 4 Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), 9, 102 protectionism, 16 Protocol to the Treaty of the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ), 61 Putin, Vladimir, 2, 18 Pyinmana, 89 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), 44 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, 35 Rajah Solaiman Movement, 34 Rajapakse, Mahinda, 103 Ramesh, Jairam, 6 Rao, Narashima, 20

12 PS&Dynamics_Index

118

regional economic cooperation, 51 Regional Maritime Security Initiative (RMSI), 102 regionalism open and inclusive, 2, 10 relief operations, 106 Report of the East Asian Study Group, 16 Representative’s Assembly, 97 Reunion French military presence, 74 Rice, Condoleezza, 39, 58, 62 RMSI, U.S.-led initiative, 104 Royal Navy warships, 75 Russia, 2, 7, 33 economy, 6 engagement in Indian Ocean region, 74 oil, 53 Russia-India relations, 77 Russian Pacific Fleet, 33 Russian warships, 74 SARS, 23 Sakhuja, Vijay, 14 Saran, Shyam, 21 Satyam Computer Services, 21 sea communication importance of, 101 Search and Rescue (SAR), 106 Security Council, Japan’s bid, 64 security threats from insurgencies, 80 Sethusamudram Ship Channel Project, 103 Shambaugh, David, 61 Shan State Army, 91 Shan United Revolutionary Army, 91 Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), 10, 44 Shanghai-Six meeting, 59

9/26/07, 10:59 AM

Index

119

Shanmugaratnam, Tharman, 4 Siberia, 54 Sino-Indian relations, 66 Singapore, 17 branches of Indian schools, 16 challenges ahead, 85 Defence Minister, 8 economy, 6 emphasis for research and development, 16 group representation constituency, 85 Indian companies, 15 IT links, 4 Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, 3 major stake in Straits of Malacca, 103 navy-to-navy talk with India, 106 nominated member of parliament, 85 non-constituency member of parliament, 85 Parliamentary Forum, 15 political investment, 4 relations with India, 15 representative schemes, 85 Singapore Lecture, 22 Singh, Jaswant, 31 Singh, Manmohan, 12, 13, 20, 21, 24 Singh-Talbott talks, 66 Sino-Indian relations, 11, 13, 14 Sino-Indian rivalry, 19 Sino-Japanese antagonism, 23 Sino-Japanese competition, 19 energy, 53 military, 49 Sino-Japanese relations, 11, 13, 15, 29, 64 military dimension, 48 unease in ASEAN, 57

12 PS&Dynamics_Index

119

Sino-Pakistan nuclear cooperation, 14 Sofia University, 40 Somalia piracy attack, 104 Sondhi Limthongkul, 87 South Asia, 10 economic and military potential, 39 impact of China, 27 maritime terrorism, 101–07 quagmire, 32 U.S. key interests in, 37 South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), 6, 10 South China Sea, 78 South Korea, 13 IT links, 4 Southeast Asia, 19 avian flu pandemic, 23, 94 China’s engagement, 62 extra-regional actors, 57 GDP, 45 haze problem, 93 HIV/AIDs problem, 94 human trafficking, 93 illegal migration, 93 impact of China, 27 importance of Straits of Malacca, 103, 104 influence of Japan, 30 international relations, 56 non-traditional security threats, 92 piracy, 94 political trends, 81 politics and security, 80–100 security challenges, 90–95 traditional security problems, 90, 91 threat of terrorism, 94 U.S. direct investment, 45

9/26/07, 10:59 AM

120

Index

Soviet Union, 20 disappearance of, 38 S.P. Jain Business Management School, 3 Special Economic Zone (SEZ), 16 speed pills, 92 Spratly Islands, 73 Sri Lanka, 7 attack on patrol craft, 102 Cease Fire Agreement, 102 Norwegian mediation, 103 Sea Tigers, 102 State Peace and Development Council (SPDC), 89 Straits of Malacca, 15, 22, 31, 73, 76, 95 coordinated patrolling, 105 importance to energy security, 103 initiatives by littoral states, 104 littoral states, 103 piracy problem, 103, 104 sea-lane of communication, 103 terror prone area, 104 sub-regional groupings, 6 submarine, Han class Chinese, 53 Suharto, 80 New Order, 97 Sun Tze, 27 Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 81 Suzuki, Zenko, 76 Taiwan investment in India, 14 mutual security concern, 26 security issue, 65 Taiwan Strait, 50, 52 Taiwan-China relations, 1 Taiwanese independence seekers, 30 Tak Bai, 92 Taliban regime, 30 Tellis, Ashley, 40

12 PS&Dynamics_Index

120

Temasek Holdings purchase of stake in Shin Corp, 87 terrorism, 2, 8, 80 responses to, 8 transparency in combating, 107 Thai Rak Thai, 86 Thailand, 8 alliance with U.S., 45 Constitution, 85 Constitutional Court, 86, 88 Criminal Court, 88 Democrat Party, 88 democratization process, 85 economy, 6 Election Commission, 86 illegal migrants from Myanmar, 93 insurgency in south, 91 liberal populism, 86 major stake in Straits of Malacca, 103 National Commission on Human Rights, 86 National Counter-Corruption Commission, 86 new electoral system, 85 People’s Alliance for Democracy, 87 State Audit Commission, 86 Thai Rak Thai, 86 violence in South, 86, 96 Thaksin Shinawatra, 86, 92 stake in Shin Corp, 87 stepping aside, 87 Thaksinomics, 86 Tibet, 14 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), 19 Trengganu, state elections, 97 Tromelin, 74, 78 tsunami, 80 aftermath of, 102 relief operations, 106

9/26/07, 10:59 AM

Index

121

UNCLOS III, 77 UN Security Council, 33 United Arab Emirates, 72 United Kingdom engagement in Indian Ocean region, 75, 76 United Malays National Organization (UMNO), 82, 83 United Nations, Convention on the Law of the Sea, 77, 105 United Services Institution, 38 United States, 6 East Asia, 43 balance of power in Asia, 55 courtship of India, 14 engagement in Indian Ocean region, 70, 71, 72 engagement in Southeast Asia, 62, 68 fear Chinese military build-up, 44 fear of sea borne attacks by terrorists, 104 foreign policy principles, 46 future participation in EAS, 23, 24 helping India become major world power, 40 interactions with Asian powers, 7 interest in Straits of Malacca, 103 intervention in internal affairs of others, 28 investments in Southeast Asia, 45 nuclear deal with India, 38 partnership with India, 42 pre-eminent military position, 26 pressures on China, 2 relations with India, 39 relations with Pakistan, 37 relative decline, 26 role in Asia, 37–47 role in Asia-Pacific region, 25

12 PS&Dynamics_Index

121

significance in Asian strategic equation, 27 South Asia, 37–39 Southeast Asia, 43 unilateralism, 28 vigilance regarding China, 46 war on terrorism, 2 widening gap with Indonesia, 58 United World College, 3 UNOCAL, 16 U.S. Asian security policy, 45 U.S. ballistic missile defence system, 26 U.S. National Security Strategy, 43 U.S. naval forces, 72 U.S. naval task force, 30 U.S. navy, forward access facilities, 72 U.S.-ASEAN bodies, 61 U.S.-India economic dialogue, 42 U.S.-India nuclear agreement, 2 U.S.-India relations, 77 U.S.-India strategic cooperation, 31, 33 U.S.-India trade, high technology, 41 U.S.-Iran relations, 14 U.S.-Japan alliance, 26, 51, 64 global context, 52 U.S.-Japan Common Strategic Objectives, 52 U.S.-Japan Security Consultative Meeting, 52 Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, 14, 22, 42 Varma, P.K., 3 Vietnam, 80 economy, 6 bombings, 95 Violent Non State Actors, 71 viral epidemics, 80

9/26/07, 10:59 AM

122

Index

Wen Jiaobao, 12, 14, 60 West Asia, 7 Western Pacific Naval Symposium, 105 Wisner, Frank G., 38 World Economic Forum, Davos Conference, 16 World Knowledge Platform, 4 world order, reshaping, 12 WTO, 14

12 PS&Dynamics_Index

122

Xavier Labor Relations Institute, 3 Yala, 92 Yasukuni shrine, 13, 30, 49, 64 Zhao Nanqi, 73 Zoellick, Robert, 62

9/26/07, 10:59 AM