Notion and Object: Aspects of Late Medieval Epistemology 0198244754

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NOTION AND OBJECT

NOTION AND OB'-JECT Aspects of Late Medieval Epistemology ALEXANDER BROADIE

CLARENDON PRESS · OXFORD 1989

Oxford Universi{Y Press, Walton Street, Oxford OX2 6DP Oxford New York Toronto Delhi Bombay Calcutta Madras Karachi Petaling Jaya Singapore Hong Kong Tokvo Nairobi Dar es Salaam Cape Town Melbourne Auckland and associated companies in Berlin Ibadan Oxford is a trade mark of Oxford University Press Published in the United States by Oxford University Press, New York

© Alexander Broadie 1!)89 All rights reserved. No part of this publication m�v be reproduced, stored in a retrieval .rystem, or transmitted, in a,ry form or by a,ry means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of Oxford University Press British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Broadie, Alexander Notion and object : aspects of late medieval epistemology. 1. £pistemology I. Title 121 ISBN 0-19-824475-4 Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available Set �v Hope Sen,ices, Abingdon Printed in Great Britain at the Universi{v Printin,l!, House, Oxford �v David Stanford Printer to the Uniz 1ersitv

Preface I delivered papers, of which revised versions are incorporated in this book, at the second Symposium on the History of Logic, held at the University of Navarra, Pamplona, in April 1987, an ,d at the eighth congress of the Societe Internationale pour l'Etude de la Philosophie Medievale, held at the University of Helsinki in August of that year. Fellow-speakers helped me to clarify my thoughts on a number of matters relating to the medieval theory of notions, and I am grateful to them. I owe a particular debt to Hester Gelber, Christopher F. J. Martin, and Katherine Tachau. I am happy to thank Glasgow University Library for help in securing copies of rare texts. Very few of the Latin works I consulted in writing this book have been republished since the Reformation. Wherever I have provided a translation from a work of which there is no modern edition I have footnoted the original Latin text, lightly edited though without critical apparatus. Wherever I have translated from a work which has been edited in modern times I have merely indicated my source.

A. B.

Glasgow 1988

Contents 1

Introduction

2

Notions

1 1

3 Objects

54

4 Sensory Notions and Intellectual Notions

go

5 Apprehensive Notions and Judicative Notions

1 25

6 Evident Assent and lnevident Assent

149

7 Concl usion

1

79

Appendix: Biographical Register of Philosophers cited

182

Bibliography

185

Index

189

I Introduction IT is a commonplace that the Cartesian revolution brought epistemology to the centre of the philosophical stage for the first time. But this commonplace should not be allowed to conceal the fact that during previous periods in the history of philosophy epistemology had been very close to, if not precisely at, the centre. This is certainly true of the medieval period. St Anselm of Canterbury began the most famous piece of philosophy of the Middle Ages, the ontological argument in the Proslogion, with a prayer. Faith was seeking understanding. And faith was not left behind when his argument began but was carried through the argument. For Anselm, and for his medieval successors, faith is the space of philosophy, and it was therefore inevitable that they would concern themselves with epistemology. They wished to know whether God is a possible object of human knowledge, or whether our cognitive faculty operates under certain restrictions, present by nature, which preclude cognitive grasp of him by his creatures. They wanted to know how our knowledge of God, assuming we have any, compares with our knowledge of his creation. How, for example, does perceptual knowledge, that is (roughly), knowledge which requires the exercise of the sensory receptors, compare with knowledge of what by its nature is not available for sensory inspection? There are many aspects to this question. For example, it calls for an investigation into perceptual knowledge itself, the kind of knowledge which was commonly regarded as having a natural priority over other sorts of knowledge. As we shall see, close attention was paid precisely to the problem of how perceptual knowledge is possible. Questions were also raised about the nature of God's knowledge. It was hardly to be doubted that God has knowledge, for a God who has a providential concern for his creatures must be assumed to know them, at least in some sense of 'know'. And that sense of 'know' was duly investigated,

2

Introduction

for there was good reason to suppose that it was not the usual sense, but an analogical one. There can, therefore, be no doubt that problems relating to the nature of knowledge pressed hard upon medieval philosophers. It is not to be wondered at that so much philosophy was written on that topic during the Middle Ages. I shall not be concerned here with the whole of the Middle Ages-this book is not a survey of the epistemology of ten centuries. I shall be dealing primarily with a number of scholastic philosophers writing in the decades before the Reformation. They were steeped in the writings of their predecessors and of course made very extensive use of the large body of literature on epistemology which had accumu­ lated by the end of the fifteenth century. They reported the earlier ideas, sometimes giving reasons for accepting them, and sometimes for modifying them; and often, as well as taking issue with their predecessors, they disputed with each other. I wish to focus on certain aspects of those disputes. In so doing I shall have to attend to writings by great masters of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. But I shall be relying especially upon the writings of a group of about eight masters from the decades around the year 1500. Most of them knew each other at the University of Paris. The masters in question were John Mair (Johannes Maior), Gilbert Crab, George Lokert, David Cranston, Robert Ceneau ( Robertus Cenalis), Nicolas Francus, Gervaise Waim, and Fernando Enzinas. Amongst their great predecessors were St Thomas Aquinas, William Ockham, Gregory of Rimini, and Pierre d'Ailly. 1 The epistemological concept which so interested those late medieval philosophers, and to which several of them devoted entire-and substantial-treatises, was that of a notion (notitia), a term with a long history, but which, in those treatises, flourished as never before. There is room for dispute about the most appropriate way to translate notitia; 'notice', 'knowledge', or 'cognition' might be suitable. But there is no single English term with precisely the meaning that notitia has when used in books devoted to the exposition of the concept of 1 For information on all these masters see Appendix. For more detailed information on Mair, Crab, Lokert, and Cranston see my George Lokert, ch. 1, and The Circle of John Mair, ch. 1.

Introduction

3

notitia. Nor indeed, as we shall see, was there full agreement

among the late scholastic philosophers over what the term does mean. The point here is that, even though the word is not an invention of medieval philosophers, the concept expressed by that word is in large measure just such an invention. They appropriated a term in general use and changed, or refined, its signification so that it could serve certain of their purposes. Notitia, then, is a technical term in medieval philosophy. In the absence of an English word which precisely matches the Latin word, I have done what the medieval philosophers did, namely, appropriate a term already in use. Throughout this book ·notion' will be treated solely as a technical term with precisely the sense given notitia by the philosophers who wrote the treatises on that topic. All the late medieval philosophers just mentioned were logicians as much as they were philosophers, and this fact about them will surface frequently in the course of this book. Indeed, given the nature of the medieval university the logical competence of its masters is inevitable. For the chief tasks of universities were to transmit knowledge and to extend its bounds, and the chief instrument employed was logic. Logic could be used as a means to those ends because it is the science of truth, in the sense that it lays down canons of inference whose correct application ensures that truth, and only truth, will be derived from truth. Since truth is the proper object of knowledge, it follows that whoever knows something, and argues from it on the basis of correctly applied canons of inference, can claim further knowledge, namely that expressed by the conclusion of the inference. Logic is necessary, therefore, for acquisition of knowledge over an immensely wide range of human concerns. Since philosophical insights are placed in question in so far as it is shown that the arguments for them are invalid, and since those insights are defended by the response that the arguments for their invalidity are themselves invalid, philo­ sophy is plainly as dependent as any other science upon logic. The point I wish to attend to here, however, is that it was recognized that philosophy's need for logic was matched by logic's need for philosophy. Most especially for our purposes, logic was seen to give rise to questions which are more

Introduction 4 properly dealt with in epistemology than in formal logic. We find, therefore, in medieval writings on epistemology, attention being paid to matters which are as relevant to logic as to epistemology. Not surprisingly, we also find in specifically epistemological writings wide use of terminology which is routinely used in medieval treatises on logic. In this book, therefore, I shall have to attend to matters which are no less logical than they are epistemological. And in line with the practice of the philosophers themselves I shall make use of the terminology of the logicians. It is important in this study to be able to make rather free use of it. I shall therefore begin by giving a very brief exposition of certain terms, and shall then indicate respects in which medieval logic calls for philosophical and especially epistemological discussion. In perceiving something or in thinking about it we form a notion of it. The notion is the cognitive act itself (actus intelligendi) through which we attend to the object. This statement is a very rough account indeed of what a notion is, and in the next chapter it will be modified and greatly expanded. At present I wish to focus on the point, universally accepted, that a notion of anything is a sign. As a representative, within the mind, of the thing outside, it is a sign of that external thing. William Ockham presented two definitions of 'sign', and late medieval discussions of notions have as part of their basis one or other of those two definitions. First, a sign is 'anything which, when grasped, brings something else to mind, though what is brought to mind is not in the mind for the first time but is there actually after being there dispositionally' (Summa Logicae, i. 1). I cannot recognize this thunder as a sign of rain unless I have a dispositional knowledge, actualized by the present thunder, that thunder generally precedes rain. And, to take Ockham' s own example, because I already associate a barrel-hoop outside a tavern with wine inside, I see this barrel-hoop outside this tavern as a sign that wine is available within. Ockham' s second definition of 'sign' is more complex and goes much further. A sign is that which (i) brings something to mind and is fitted by its nature to stand for that thing, or (ii) can be added in a proposition to what can stand for that thing-of this kind are syncategoremata and verbs

Introduction

5

and those parts of speech which do not have a definite signification, or (iii) is fitted by its nature to be composed of such things-a complex expression (oratio) is of this kind. (SL i. 1)

Thus in the proposition 'Every cow is a quadruped' the term 'cow' is a sign since it brings to mind cows. Likewise 'quadruped'. But what of 'every' and 'is'? 'Every' does not stand for anything. 'There is an every' and 'No every exists' are not even well-formed propositions. But, in Ockham's words, ·every' can be added in a proposition to what stands for some thing, namely, in this case, 'cow'. And likewise 'is' does not stand for any thing, but can be added to what does. It can be added to 'John' and 'happy' to form the well-formed proposition 'John is happy'. A term which does not itself stand for any thing, but which can be added in a proposition to what does stand for some thing is a 'syncategorematic term' or 'syncategorema' (plural 'syncategoremata'), as opposed to a 'categorematic term' or 'categorema' which by itself does stand for some thing. Amongst syncategoremata are 'every', 'some', 'no', 'and', 'or', 'if ', and 'is'; in general, quantification and negation signs, and propositional connectives-precisely the signs which are the most immediate concern of logicians. One question which has to be addressed is whether, just as there are notions corresponding to categoremata, there are also notions corresponding to syncategoremata. As we shall see, disagreement on this question showed up even at the level of definitions of 'notion'. It is easy to argue that there cannot be a notion corresponding to the written term 'every' for 'An every exists' is not grammatically weH-formed. But it will become clear that the matter cannot be resolved by so simple an argument, and we shall attend to some interesting discussions on whether there can be syncategorematic notions and on whether such notions have objects. A further feature of Ockham · s second definition is that it follows from it that not only a simple term but even a proposition (a complex expression composed of categoremata and syncategoremata) can be a sign. It was generally held that as well as spoken and written propositions there are thoughts corresponding to those propositions, and the cor­ respondence was regarded as of such a nature as to justify the claims that those thoughts are themselves propositional and

Introduction

6

that there are therefore propositional notions. Indeed, a theory of mental language, a language of thought, was developed to which most philosophers subscribed, though they disputed the details. I know of only one philosopher who totally rejected that theory, the Oxford Dominican Hugh of Lawton, as cited by his fellow Dominican William Crathorn; we shall consider Hugh's arguments later. Signs signify. They therefore have signification. Signification is the property of a term, whether possessed naturally as with a notion, or conventionally as with an utterance or inscription, by which the term signifies at all and signifies precisely what, or in the way, it does. But the signification which a term has when taken by itself, as when we say that 'man' signifies a rational animal, may not be the signification that the term has in the context of a proposition. Thus 'man' in '"Man" is triliteral' does not stand for a rational animal, but for the utterance or inscription 'man'. For while it is true that 'man' is triliteral, that is not true of any rational animal. The signification of a term in the context of a proposition was called 'supposition', and something must be said here about supposition in order to establish an important link between logic and epistemology in the Middle Ages. Let us attend to truth conditions. What are the truth conditions of the universal affirmative ( 1)

Every A is B

where A and B are common terms? Suppose there to be just two things A I and A2 which are A, and just two things B I and B2 which are B. ( 1) implies ( 2) A I is B and A2 is B That is, the universal proposition ( 1) implies a conjunction of singular propositions (singular because their subjects are singular terms). Additionally, neither conjunct in (2), that is, neither 'A I is B' nor 'A2 is B', by itself implies ( 1). This is expressed by saying that where a term of a proposition is immediately covered by a universal quantifier, descent can be made under the term to a conjunction of singular propositions, but ascent cannot be made from either of the singulars by itself to the universal proposition. If a term has such a

Introduction

7

property it is said to have distributive supposition. Given (2) we can infer (3)

A 1 is B 1 or B 2 and A 2 is B 1 or B 2

(3) contains no common term-all its categoremata are singular. Since descent is possible only under common terms no further descent is possible under (3). Let us take another example: (4)

Some A is not B

This implies (5)

A I is not B or A 2 is not B

which implies (6)

(A 1 is not B 1 and A 1 is not B 2 ) or (A2 is not B 1 and A2 is not B 2 )

Further descent is not possible under (6) since it contains no common terms; all its categoremata are singular. (3) stands to ( 1) as (6) stands to (4), namely, as giving the fully worked out truth conditions of ( 1) and (4) respectively. Medieval logicians devoted a good deal of space to the rules of descent. They attended to the position of the common terms in relation to quantifiers, distinguishing between different kinds of quantifier in terms of the different ways in which descent should be made (viz. descent to conjunctions or to disjunctions of singulars); they attended to the effects of the negation sign in a proposition (in general, negated terms have distributive supposition-though we shall observe that the matter was not plain sailing); and, crucially, they formulated rules governing the order in which descent has to be made if truth is to be preserved. 2 The purpose of all this was to establish a set of rules for specifying the truth conditions of any given quantified proposition in terms of a proposition containing no quantifiers, and whose only categorematic terms were singular. Logic, though concerned especially with quantified propositions and with the role of quantifiers in propositions, treated singular propositions as basic. There can be no question about this; the concepts of a singular term and :!

For details see my Introduction to Medieval Logic, 23-5.

8

Introduction

of a singular proposition lay at the base of the entire medieval logic enterprise. It was upon such terms and such propositions that those logicians constructed their logic of universally quantified propositions, within whose framework philosophers expressed the universal truths of natural science, metaphysics, and theology . The rules of descent were worked out in great detail by William Ockham in his Sum ma Logicae. It is important to note that the primacy of the singular proposition, as that primacy is developed in the Summa Logicae, is precisely matched within Ockham's system by the primacy assigned to the individual. For Ockham, everything in the natural order is individual. In so far as universals or common natures exist in nature they must be exactly as individual as everything else in nature. Philosophers had spoken of a common nature, possessed by many members of a species, in virtue of which they are all members of that species. There is one common nature, though it is in many individuals. Ockham did not deny that each individual member of a species has a nature in virtue of which it belongs to its species, but he did deny that the thing' s nature is any less individual than is the thing itself. What Ockham has to explain therefore is how universality is possible if whatever is is singular or individual. Ockham could not avoid this question by saying that there are no universals or common natures. For Ockham accepted the possibility of scientific knowledge and it is universals that are the proper objects of science. I t has been thought that Ockham began a revolution in philosophy by taking the individual as his starting-point. I think that the historical reality is a good deal more complex, but this is not an appropriate place at which to argue that matter. I wish instead to make the point, of philosophical rather than merely historical interest, that not only is the individual the starting-point of Ockham's logic and meta­ physics; it is also the starting-point of his epistemology. Just as the order of logic and of metaphysics is from the individual or singular to the universal, so also is the order of the acquisition of knowledge. That is, according to Ockham our knowledge of universals is based on, and in some way (yet to be specified) arises out of, knowledge of individuals, and Ockham describes

Introduction

9

precisely how knowledge of universals is attained. He does this in the context of his account of intuitive and abstractive cognition. In Chapter 2 we shall discuss those two kinds of cognition. But it can be noted here that in basing his epistemology upon the concept of intuitive cognition, and in treating universal knowledge as the product of a process of abstraction, Ockham can be seen to be providing an epistemological underpinning for his logic and also for his metaphysics. According to the theory of the demonstrative syllogism, expounded by Aristotle in the Prior and the Posterior A nalytics, such a syllogism has as premisses universal propositions, and indeed according to Aristotle there is not, in the syllogistic presentation of any science, room for any singular proposition. To the extent that the theory of the demonstrat­ ive syllogism is concerned solely with inferential relations between universal propositions, logic can correctly be said to begin with the universal, not with the singular. But though only universal propositions can occur as premisses in such a context, the question still arises, of course, as to the route by which those propositions were arrived at. The route identified was a certain kind of cognition of singulars. The universal was to be discovered only in individuals, and a rational inspection of the individual was required before the scientist could form a concept of the universal which the individual exemplified. Thus a distinction has to be made between ratio cognoscendi and ratio docendi, the order of acquisition of knowledge and the order in which that knowledge should be expounded. According to the first order, but not the second, singulars precede universals. This matches the order in logic; singular pro­ positions precede universal propositions, though in setting out demonstrative syllogisms, it is from universal propositions that inferences are drawn. This distinction was a commonplace among the philosophers to whom I shall be attending. For example, Gilbert Crab asks whether the singular is known before the universal and replies: 'This is to ask only whether we have singular notions before universal ones, and I say that we do. For the first notion of sense is an intuitive notion, as is the first notion of the intellect. But all such notions are

IO

Introduction

singular' (Not. c4 rh ). 3 And in sup port of this position he refers to Averroes' s Commentar�y on the Physics of Aristotle where ( Comment 5 on Book I) Averroes writes: Though the ind ivid ual is not the begi nning in demons trative science, it is nevertheless the begi n ning in the acq uisi tion of the u niversal wh ich is the begi nning of teach ing by demonstration , for demon­ stration proceeds from universal propositions. Therefore the singular is not the begin n ing , but it is the begin n i ng of acq uisi tion of a u niversal notio n . ( C rab, Not . c4'." )+

In the medieval period after Ockham, no one writing on the theory of knowledge could ignore the new focus which Ockham had helped to give philosophy, and certainly the late scholastics we shall be concentrating on accepted in broad measure the epistemological and metaphysical individualism which he developed in his philosophical and theological writings, especially in the Summa Logicae and the Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. However, those later philosophers took Ockham's epistemology a good deal further and in the following chapters I shall be examining a number of the theories they developed. I mportant work has already been done on the reaction to Ockham's epistemology among his contemporaries and his near successors. 5 But pre- Reformation developments have been largely ignored, and it is for this reason that I shall concentrate on the later period. ·i Hoc nihil aliud est q uaerere q uam utru m prius habea mus notitias singulares quam universaks. Et dico quod sic quia prima notitia sens us est notitia intuiti\'a sic similitcr prima notitia i n tel lect us. Modo om nes tales notitiae sunt sing ul ares . 1 Licet individ u u m non sit principium in scientia dcmonstrativa est tamen principium acq uisitionis universalis quod est prin cipium doctrinae demonstratione. Demonstratio enim ex propositioni bus u niversalibus procedit. l deo singu lare non est principi u m . Est tamen principiu m acq uisitionis notitiae universalis. '• E.g. see K . Tachau, Vision and Certitude in the Age of Ockham.

2 Notions I N this chapter I shall discuss several definitions of 'notion' , and shall describe ways i n which notions relate to a variety of other quali ties or acts of mind with which there might be some temptation to identify them. I n parti cular I shall consider the relations i n which species and mental disposi tions stand to notions. The late medieval philosophers I shall be attending to had a good deal to say on the question of the precise relati ons holding between these various sorts of qualities or acts, and there i s evi dence of much contemporary dispute on thi s matter. I shall di scuss several princi ples of division of notion, including, perhaps most importan tly, the di vi sion into i ntuitive and abstractive notions, and shall exam ine more closely a num ber of features of notions whi ch, though commonly noted, could not readily be extrapolated from considerati on s of the defini tions alone. First some definitions. Cranston wri tes: ' A notion is a quality through which a cognitive power knows something. For example, the seeing ( visio) by which I see a wall i s called a notion because through that seeing, the m i nd knows the wall' (Not. b 1 ra ). 1 This definition does not give away a great deal, though it does indicate some of the main features that appear i n all other definitions of ' notion'. One such feature is the mediating role played by noti ons, i n so far as a notion is a quality of a cognitive power by which the power knows an object. Cranston does not here say that what a notion qualifies is a cognitive power, but that he held that a notion is a quality of a cognitive power becomes clear in the light of his later discussion. I ndeed, he and others raise the question of whether a notion could, by God' s absolute power, be placed in a material object, say a stone, and they give the reply that it could. And this would seem to imply that notions do not have to qualify cognitive powers. But the matter is not so 1 Notitia est q ualitas per q uam po ten t ia cognitiva aliq uid cognosci t , ut visio qua video parietem vocatur notitia q uia per i llam anima cognoscit parietem .

I '2

Notions

straightforward. The view universally adopted was that _ though a notion could be placed in a stone it would not, while in the stone, be a notion (though it would still be the same quality that it had been when it had been in a cognitive power) , precisely because what is distinctive about notions is that they cannot exist without a knowing thereby taking place in what the notion qualifies; and stones cannot know anything. Cranston is quite clear on this matter, and invokes earlier masters in his support : Scot us and Ockham give a s u ffi cient acco u n t of what a notion i s . Thus they say that for something t o b e cal led a notion two condi tions arc req u i red . The fi rs t is that it i n here in a cogn i t ive powe r. The second i s that it h av e an o bj ec t as i ts term , that is, that by means of the notion the power know some thing. 2

Cranston adds that the second coridition, though sufficient, is clearer when conjoined with the first (Not. b2 rb ) . What the second requirement merely implies is that if a cognitive power know·s something by means of a notion t_hen that notion must qualify that power-a notion qualifies any power which knows something by means of that notion. Gilbert Crab makes explicit certain points which are inadequately represented in Cranston's definition, the chief weakness of this being that it implies that any quality through which a power knows something is a notion. Certainly this is a weakness for neither Cranston nor, I believe, any of his contemporaries thought that every such quality is a notion. In particular, species and cognitive dispositions were thought of as qualities through which something is known, and yet the common position, and it was Cranston's position, was that species and cognitive dispositions are not notions. I shall be dealing with this matter in detail. Let us make a start by attending to Crab's definition : 'A notion is a quality inherent in a cognitive power, vitally changing the power, and representing some thing or things to that power' (Not. a2rn ) . 3 This is a definition per genus et differentiam . The genus of notion 2 Scotus et Ockham sufficien ter declaran t q uid sit noti tia. U ncle dicu n t ad hoc (J U Od aliq uid dic i t u r notitia duae req u i ru n t u r conditiones . Prima est quod inhaereat poten tiae cognitivae . Secunda est quod term inetur ad obiec t u m , hoc est q uod median te i l ia potentia cognoscat aliq uam rem . 1 Notitia es t qualitas poten tiae cognitivae i n haerens vi taliter i m m utativa poten tiae aliq uid vel aliq ua eidem repraesen tans.

Notions is quality. That is the Aristotelian category within which all notions fall. The remainder of the definition differentiates notions from all other kind s of qualities. ' Inherent in a cognitive power' is incl uded in the definition, Crab tells us, in order to exclude material qualities, for they cannot inhere in a cognitive power-hence the refusal, already noted, to count a quality as a notion if it had been a notion and was then placed in a stone, for any quality of a stone is a material quality. Nevertheless, on this most important matter Crab wavers, for he asserts elsewhere (Not. a2 r1_)-v a ) that some notions are indeed material, namely those of animals. For animals do not have an immaterial mind. There is no doubt that Crab thought that in a variety of important respects the notions of humans differ from those of animals, and that those differences are traceable back to the materiality of the mind of animals. The implication of this is that Crab's definition of 'notion', which I quoted earlier, is not a definition of 'notion' tout court but of 'human notion'. Perhaps the most mysterious clause in Crab's definition is 'vi tally changing the power' ( vitaliter immutativa potentiae) . For a cognitive power to be changed vitally is for it to be thinking, to be exercising thought; not merely to have knowledge but to be thinking about what is known. It is a common observation that much, practically all, of our knowledge is dispositional. It is knowledge available for recall-if I am asked I can provide the answer, though I had not previously been thinking about the point expressed in the answer. Waim is attending to the same feature of notions when he says that they represent something 'formally' (formaliter) to the cognitive power (Not. a I ra ); likewise Ceneau, when he says that a notion is a quality in the mind through which the mind knows formal ly (Not. a I ra ). The notion is a quality which now informs, or gives form to, the cognitive power. Evidently, then, the phrase 'vitally changing the power' is used by Crab to exclude all cognitive dispositions. Crab is explicit: 'though dispositions are subjectively in the cognitive power, they are not notions since they do not vitally change it' (Not. a2 ra ). 4 The term 4 habit us . . . licet s u n t in potentia cognitiva non tamen sunt noti tiae cum non vitaliter immutan t.

Notions 'subjectively' is used here to express the fact that the cognitive power is the subject which has the dispositions, j ust as that power is the subject which has the notion. In general, to have subjective existence, as that term is used by late scholastic philosophers, is to be a subject or to be a qualification or a modification of a subject. To return to Cranston' s original example, the seeing by which I see a wall is subj ectively in my cognitive power, for it is a quality of the power by means of which I am presently seeing the wall . Having seen the wall I then cease to think about it. But I have dispositional knowledge of the wall and that disposition no less qualifies my mind than does my present seeing. It is not denied that a cognitive disposition can change a cognitive power, or at least that it can be a partial cause of such a change. It is, of course, commonly the case that the present exercise of knowledge would not have occurred had the mind not been disposed to exercise that knowledge. But this is insufficient ground for saying that a cognitive disposition is, after all, a notion. For what the disposition does is dispose the mind to form the notion. Ceneau writes: 'A disposition is a quality which is difficult to change [Aristotle, Categories, 8h 26 ff] . Moreover, after numerous acts we find that we are prompt at performing the acts, and this can only be by means of an acquired quality' (Not. a5 va ). 5 Waim, also relying on Aristotle, adds an important detail. He defines 'disposition' as 'a quality produced from, or deposited by , an act or acts, fitted by its nature to incline one to perform acts specifically the same as those by which it was produced' (Not. k6'-b). 6 Finally, Crab writes similarly: 'A disposition is ( i) a quality ( ii) inhering in some power, ( iii) produced by like acts, (iv) inclining to the performance of like acts, and (v) facilitating the same power' ( Term. Mor. a4v). 7 Both definitions make it clear that the disposition mediates between a cognitive power and an act of that power-the disposition qualifies the power and is a partial cause of the act. The relation between notion :> Habit us est q u a l i tas de d i fficili mobi l i . I tern pos t freq uent a tionem act uum experi m u r nos esse promp tos i n actus et non nisi m ed i a n t e a l iqua quali tate acq u i s i ta . h H abitus est q ua l i tas ex actu vel actibus ge n i t a seu derelicta nata in clinare in simi les actus i n specie illis ex q u ib us prod ucebatur. 7 H a bitus est q u a l i tas alicui potentiae i n haerens ex acti bus simi libus e t ad simi les inclinans ac eand e m po ten tiam faci li tans gen i t a .

Notions and disposition is commonly put by saying that a notion is the immediate cause of the cognitive power's knowing, whereas a disposition is a mediate cause. This is in a sense misleading. A notion is an immediate cause of the cognitive power' s knowing or thinking, for the notion is the very exercise of the cognitive power's power. Thus, instead of saying that a notion, vitally or formally, changes a cognitive power, it might be more perspicuous to say that the notion is the vital or formal change itself. Hence to have a notion of X is to be thinking about X, or imagining it, or seeing it, or hearing it, and so on. And though a disposition can produce a change in a cognitive power it is clear that to have the disposition is not itself to be thinking about, or imagining or seeing, a given object. Mair tells us that 'a notion by which a thing is grasped' is an act of understanding ( Term. 2 rb ) . This formulation captures the sense of ' vital' and ' formal' used in the definitions. If a person has a notion of X it is logically impossible that he is not at the same time thinking about or perceiving X. In the light of the sharp distinction drawn between notions and dispositions, it comes as a surprise to find frequent references to 'dispositional notions' ( notitiae habituates) , as for example when Ceneau writes: 'Besides the actual notion the dispositional notion should be posited' (Not. a5va ) . 8 But the air of paradox is easily dispersed. In his discussion of signs Ockham speaks, as we have seen, about a sign as bringing to mind what· had previously been known dispositionally . The prior dispositional knowledge is a dispositional notion. It is with this in mind that the Spanish philosopher Juan de Oria writes: 'There are two kinds of notion, viz. dispositional and actual. Though a sign signifying conventionally presupposes a dispositional notion . . . nevertheless with that sign mediating, either as an instrument or as providing the occasion, an actual notion is had'. 9 A dispositional notion therefore is a disposition which disposes us to have an actual notion. So what should be said is that a dispositional notion is not really a notion at all; and this is the line taken by all our philosophers. George Lokert defines 'dispositional notion' in this way : it is ' ( i) a quality ( ii) existing in a cognitive power, ( iii) produced or 8 Praeter notitiam actualem ponenda est noti tia habi tualis . 9 Opera Logica, i, Tractatus Elementorum D_yaLectice, 1 5 7 -8.

Notions fitted by its nature to be produced by an actual notion or by actual notions, (iv) inclining us to produce an act or acts similar in species to the act or acts by which that quality was produced' (Not. d4 rh ) . 1 0 He appends this definition to the assertion that the division of 'notion' into 'actual' and 'dispositional' is not a division of a superior term into its inferiors, but of an analogous term into its analogates (Not. d4 rb ). The point here is that in every case of the division of a superior term into its inferiors the superior term is truly predicable of anything of which the inferior term, taken literally, is truly predicable, but this is not so in the case of a division of an analogous term into its analogates. To take a standard medieval example, the division of 'man' into �live' and 'painted' is of an analogous term into its analogates. Painted men (that is, paintings of men) are analogously, not literally, men. For men are alive and no painting of a man is alive. We are therefore being told that just as 'This is a painted man, therefore this is a man' is invalid, so likewise is 'This is a dispositional notion, therefore this is a notion' (Cranston, Not. c I r b ) . The phrase 'vitally changing a power', which occurs in the definition of 'notion', was intended to exclude not only cognitive dispositions but also species. Waim reports ( without accepting) the following: I t is not possi ble to sense a se nsible obj ec t u n less between the obj ect and the sense th ere i s a m ed i u m through w hich the sensible obj ect m u l tiplies , or pou rs ou t , q uali ties of another kind than that of the sensi ble obj ect, by means of w h ich q u a l ities a notion of t he sensible obj ec t is prod u ced . Those q u a l i ties thus pou red ou t t h rough the med i u m a re cal led species or simili tudes of the sensible obj ec t . (Not. c s•·b . ) 1 1

We have here a version of the ancient idea that a necessary 1 1 ' Noti tia habitualis est q u a l i t as exis tens in pot entia cogn i tiva prod ucta vel nata prod uci ex noti tia actuali vel pl u ri bus act uali bus notit i i s incli nans ad p roducend um consimi lem act um vel consi m i l es in specie illi vel i l l i s ex q uo vel q u ibus nata erat prod uci . 1 1 N u l l u m obiec t u m sensibil e potest sen t i re nisi i n ter ipsum et sens um sit aliquod med i u m per q uod q u idem med i u m i psum sensi bile m u l tiplicat seu dilTundit aliquas qua l i t ates al teri us rationis ab i pso sen s i bi l i mediantib us qu ibus q u a l i tati bus producitur notitia talis sensi bilis. Et illae q u a l i ta tes sic per medi um dilTusae vocan t u r species seu simulachra i psorum sensi bi l i u m .

Notions condition for perceptual knowledge of an external object is the presence within us of a miniature replica of the external object, the replica reaching us after radiating or emanating from the object. The view is also related to the Aristotelian doctrine that in percei ving an object the form, though not the matter of the object, enters the mind of the perceiver. Species were invoked to ex plain how perception is possible. But what precisely requires explanation? One important feature of perception that seems to require it is the fact that perception apparently involves the occurrence of action at a distance. The external object is at a distance from us and yet we can see it. How does the mind manage to bridge the gap between itself and the object? Or alternatively, how does the object manage to bridge that gap? There is room for dispute about whether this fact presents a problem for all the sensory modalities, and in particular whether touch and taste give rise to this problem. But th ere is clearly at least the appearance of a problem as regards sight. Lokert raises the matter (Not. c4vb). It might seem that the existence of species can resolve it. For is the problem not solved by saying that the gap is bridged by something which emanates from the external object and strikes the sensory receptor? Thus the sensory receptor is affected only mediately by something distant from it. It is affected immediately by something proximate to it, namely, by something which travelled from object to rect.ptor. Waim has this problem in mind when he invokes the distinction between two kinds of contact, mathematical and virtual. He writes: I t is not universally true that mover and moved arc together in respect of mathematical contact , bu t it is sufficient that they be together by virtual contact . . . Things whose ends [i.e. surfaces] are together so that no true or imaginary body is intermediate between them, arc said to touch each other by mathematical contact. That is what is meant by saying that bodies are contiguous. Something is present and immediate by virtual contact when it is so present that it can cause an effect there,. given that it is not in the same place essentially or by mathematical contac t. Granted this, I say with Ockham that for an agent to act on a passive thing it is not required that the agent and the passive thing be immediate by the immediacy

18

Notions

of mathematical con tact. I t is sufficient that they be i m mediate by the im med iacy corres pond i n g to v i rtual con tact. (Not. d 2 ,·a ) 1 2

When Waim speaks about mover and moved being together by virtual con tact he has in mind as one case of mover and moved an external object and a sensory receptor receptive to the object. The visual sensory receptor sensing the object is, for Waim, a case of efficient causality in which 'what is proximate is not susceptible to an effect of the same kind as an effect which a distan t thing is fitted by nature to undergo' (Not . d2 v a). 1 3 Waim provides, as a mod el to help us understand the poin t, the example of the sun producing heat in the lowest region of air but not producing it in the sky around the moon, because the sky is not receptive to primary qualities ( that is, to heat, cold, wetness, or dryness). Lokert (Not . c4vb) provides two examples of action at a distance: (i) a magnet which attracts a distant piece of iron , and ( ii) a torpedo fish which causes trembling in the hand of the fisherman holdin g the net though it does not cause trembling in the net itself. As regards the magnet's power it might be responded that the magnet has an effect on . the intervening air, and without that effect it could not attract the iron­ much as it might be said that though the fire heats the stone which is at a distance from it, it does this by heating the intervening air, · and it is the air immediately surrounding the stone which heats the stone. The fire is thus the remote cause of the heating of both the stone and the air immediately surrounding the stone. And as regards the torpedo's power, it can be said, as Lokert says, that the fish does perhaps have an effect on the net, though not of course the effect of making it I'.! Non est un iversalit er veru m q uod movens et mot um sint simul secund u m contactum mathematicum sed s u fli c i t quod sint simul contactu virtuali . . . Contactu mathematico d i c u n t u r se tangere q uorum u l ti m a puta superficies sunt simul sic q uod int er i psa n u l l u m corpus veru m vel i m aginari um med i e t . Et hoc n i h i l aliud est dictu quam corpora esse con tigua . Sed con tactu virtuali d i c i t u r aliq uid praesens et immed iatum al teri q u a ndo sic est praesens q uod potest ibi causare elTect um d ato quod non sit ibidem pn essen tiam seu per co ntactum mat hematicu m . l s to supposi to dico cum Ockham q uod ad hoc q uod agens aga t in a l i q uod passum non req u iritur quod agens et passum sint im mediata i m media tione correspondence tactui mathematico. Sed suflicit q uod s i n t i m mediata i m m ed i at ione corres ponden te tactui virtual i . l :l Propi nquum non est receptivum efTectus eiusdem rationis cum elfectu q uern distans natum est reci pere.

Notions tremble , and without this effect on the net the hand holding the net would not have been affected as it was. There is clear evidence of reluc tance among some of our philosophers to accept the occurren ce of ac tion at a distan ce, if acceptance of that doctrine commits them to the claim that of two mutually distan t objects, A and B, A can cause a change in B while not having an effect on anything (C) in termediate between A and B, where the effec t on C is itself a partial cause of the change in B. There was considerable debate about this mat ter, in which the need to avoid admit ting to the possibility of action at a distance can be seen to have been an important motivating factor. I do not wish here to follow the details of that often tortuous debate. The point of immediate concern for us is this, that it was routinely held that an external object has an effect on an ex tern al sensory receptor, then on the in ternal sense , in particular on the imagination , and finally on the in tellect , and the change produced in each of these powers was described in terms of the power acquiring a species. The species is not itself a notion , but is part of the process which causes a notion. I f the sensory receptor were not modified in a certain way, we could not perceive the object. This is not to say that the species is perceived directly and that through that perception we acquire knowledge of the object. 'Species are not perceptible by sense' , Loken affirms (Not. c5 rb ). 1 4 Our perceptual notion is a notion of an external object, but we would not have that notion if our sensory receptor had not been affected in a certain way by the objec t. Species, understood in this way, can be classed as partial efficien t causes of a notion. In that respect they are like cognitive dispositions. They do not change the cognitive power im­ mediately and vital ly ( or formal ly) but mediately and efficiently ( that is, by efficien t causality). I should like to turn now to a further feature of the definitions of 'notion ' provided by Cranston and Crab. Cranston speaks about a notion as a quality through which a cognitive power knows some thing, and Crab speaks about a notion as represen ting some thing or things to that power. Waim and Lokert add an importan t element. Waim writes: 'A 14

Species non sunt percepti biles sens u .

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Notions

notion is a quality formally representing some thing or in some way to a cogniti ve power' ( Not. a i '-a ) , 1 5 and Lokert defines 'notion' as ' a quali ty immediately representing some thing or in some way to a cogni tive power' (Not. a2 '"a ) . 1 6 Waim and Lokert use the phrase ' in some way ' (aliqualiter) . John Mair does not commit himself: 'An actual is a quality inhering in a subject, through which quality the subject formally knows' ( 1 Sent. I v b ) , 1 7 and Ceneau produces almost the same formula (Not. a l ra) . Wai m says ' formally' where Lokert uses the term ' immediately ', but this is not a difference of substance. Waim explains that he uses 'formally' to indicate that a notion represents some thing to oneself immediately not mediately, and that the term excludes dispositions and species, for these latter are merely mediate causes of knowing. Lokert likewise uses 'immediately ' to exclude dispositions and species, for these latter are merely mediate causes of knowing. There is, however, a substantial difference between Waim and Lokert and C ranston and C rab, in so far as the latter two use 'in some way ' in thei r defini tions and the former two do not. All four men agree, as indeed di d everyone who wrote on the subject, that there are categorematic notions, notions which represent things. What is here at i ssue is whether there are also syncategorematic notions. Corres­ ponding to the spoken terms 'table' and ' book' there are notions (our notions of a table and of a book) , but are there notions corresponding to the spoken terms 'every ', 'some' , 'no' , 'and', 'or', and ' if'? Waim' s definition says that some notions represent in some way to a cognitive faculty. But there must be something to be represented in some way. Let us suppose that I am thinking of John and of a teacher, and that what I am thinking is that John is a teacher. One way to describe this situation is to say that I have a notion ofJohn and a notion of a teacher, and that I am thinking of these two things in a certain way, for I am thi nking of them predicatively. That i s, I am thinking ofJohn 15 Noti tia est q u a l i tas potentiae cognit ivae a l i q u id vel aliqualiter formaliter rcpracsen tans. 1 6 qualit as a l i q u id vel a l i q u a l i ter potentiae cogn i tivae im mediate repraesentans. 17 actualis est q u al i tas su biec to inhaerens per q u a m ipsum forma l i te r cugnosci t .

Notions

2I

and of a teacher as standing in a relation to each other which is properly expressed by a subject predicate proposition. There is clearly more to my thought John is a teacher' than my notions of John and a teacher. There is also that element which is expressed in the written proposition by 'is'. There is, therefore, a notion corresponding to ' is', but it is not the notion of predication-that is a categorematic notion. It is, instead, the predicative way in which I think of what correspond to the other two terms in the proposition. Likewise, if we are to follow the view of Waim and Lokert, in the thought ' Every student will pass' there is a notion corresponding to ' will', for again I am thinking predicatively, and there is a notion corresponding to 'every', for 'every' in the context of that proposition signifies the way in which I am thinking of students, namely, universally and affirmatively . If I think that no student will fail, I am thinking predicatively, universally , and negatively about students and failure (see Lokert, Not. bf a ). I am not saying that in thinking predicatively, universally , and negatively about something, I am having notions of predication, universality, and negation. For then I would not be having a single thought but five separate thoughts, namely, the three just listed plus the two corre­ sponding to subject and predicate. There are just two things I am thinking about, which are represented by subject and predicate terms. The rest of the proposition signifies the way I am representing those things to myself. 1 8 There are therefore grounds for holding that we cannot think anything about anything without at least one syn­ categorematic notion playing a role in the thought. What also emerges from the foregoing account is that we cannot have a syncategorematic notion unless a categorematic notion is already in place. For we cannot think in some way without thinking in some way about some thing. We must first be thinking about some thing if we are to think either universally or negatively, and so on. For we think universally about some thing or negatively about it, and given two things we can then think predicatively about them. Furthermore, given two propositions which we are entertaining, we can then think 18 See G. Nuchelmans, 'The historical background to Locke's account of particles', Log i que et A na(yse, , 13 ( 1 986 ) , 5 3 - 7 1 .

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Notions

conjunctively , or disjunctively , or conditionally about them. For conjunction-as-such does not exist; there is only a conjunction of proposition s. I t is useful to remind ourselves here that a notion is an act of thinking, an actus intelligendi. We can think negatively about a proposition P, as happens when we think that it is not the case that P, and thinking negatively about P is an act of thinking directed to the proposition P. And since a notion is an act of thinking there is good reason , on the basis of the characterization of 'notion' just mentioned, to hold that what corresponds, in thought, to the negation sign in the proposition 'It is not the case that P' is, after all, a notion. Of course if one starts from the insight that any notion is of some thing then no room is left for the concept of sy n categore­ matic notions. And it seems that Cranston and Crab start from that point. All the same, both are evidently attracted by the arguments for the view that syncategorematic notions are possible, and both waver on whether to admit such notions. Cranston argues on the basis of his definition of 'notion' when he discusses the question of whether dispositional notions are notions, for there he argues as follows: 'Every notion is a natural likeness of a thing. No disposition al notion is a natural likeness of a thing. Therefore, no dispositional notion is a notion. The inference holds in Camestres. Proof of the major premiss: it is a universal affirmative whose subject and predicate terms are interchan geable' (Not. c i ra- r b ). 1 9 Yet on the immediately preceding folio Cranston appears to contradict both his definition and the major premiss in the argument just quoted, for he defines 'actual notion' in this way: 'An actual notion is a notion inhering in a cognitive power, through which notion the cognitive power considers something or in some way (aliqualiter) ; for example, a natural likeness of Socrates, or the assent to " Gabriel usually calls well" ' (Not. b8v a) _ 20 " Omnis not 1 t1a est natu ralis s i m i l i tudo rei sed n u lla not 1 t 1a habi t ualis es t nat uralis similit udo rei , ergo n u l la notitia hahit ualis est not i t ia. Conseq uen tia tenet in Cames tres. Et maior probat ur qu ia est universalis affirmativa in q ua praedicat u r convertible d e converti b i l i . ( Camestres i s the name given t o the valid syllogistic form : ' Every A is B . No C is B . Therefore no C is A ' . ) :!II Notitia ac tual is est noti tia in haerens potent iae cogn i tivae per quam po ten tia cognitiva considerat al i q u id vel aliq ual i ter, ut natu ralis s i m i l i t udo Sortis, vel assensus huius 'Gabriel solet bene clamare' . 1

Notions Yet it i s unli kely that Cranston, one of the most brilliant logicians i n John Mai r' s ci rcle in the University of Paris, would have committed as blatant a contradicti on as this one appears to be. I suggest, hesitantly, that he is not contradicting himself at all, even though hi s mode of expression is very likely to mi slead. Earli er I referred to Cranston's acceptance of the position of Duns Scotus and Ockham regarding the two condi tions which are joi ntly sufficient for a quality to be a notion, namely, that the quality i nheres i n a cognitive power, and that i t has an obj ect as a term, that i s , that by means of that quality the cognitive power knows some thing. Cranston adds that the second condition is sufficient by itself, though the first condi tion helps to make the second clearer (Not. b2rb ). The point I wi sh to attend to here i s that it was commonly held that syncategorematic notions, no less than categorematic ones, have objects. Precisely what those objects are will be discussed in the next chapter. But if it i s held that syn­ categorematic notions have objects then i t i s not unreasonable to hold that in one sense syncategorematic notions do after all signify some thing, namely, whatever their object is, and thi s i s compati ble with the claim that in another sense such notions signi fy in some way, viz. universally, or negatively, and so on. It may be that a syncategoremati c noti on does not signi fy i ts object in the way in which a categorematic notion signi fies i ts object- we shall attend to that matter in Chapter 3. But in whatever way it is that a syncategorematic notion signi fies i ts object, i f it does signi fy i t at all then i t signifies some thi ng, and that is all that needs to be shown to defend Cranston against the criticism that, though he does not include the 'in some way' clause in hi s definition of 'notion' , he does hold that there are syncategorematic noti ons. One further element in the defini tions of 'notion' requires attention. Notions are s ai d to represent to a cognitive power. Juan de Ori a asserts : 'to represent is to make present a thing whi ch was absent' ( Summularum p. 157). But this cannot be quite how we are to understand the term 'represent' as it occurs in the various definitions of 'notion', for all of them allow for the possibility of a cognitive power having a notion of some thing where that thing is actually present to the power and i ndeed is, by i ts presence, mai ntaining the notion in

Notions existence. This is the si tuation in the case of Cranston's example of a visual notion, a seeing, by which I see a wall. Thus it has to be said that a notion can represent what is present no less than what is absent. I t is better to regard a notion as making some thing present again, that is, as giving some thing another presence. In some sense, therefore, the notion of a thing is that same thing again. The object and the notion of the object must therefore be held together in a relation of identi ty. How is this possible? We must employ here the central doctrine in the epistemo­ logy of Aristotle, according to which perception is effected by the mind of the perceiver taking into itself the form of the thing perceived, while leaving behind the matter. This doctrine, which lies at the heart of much scholastic epistemo­ logy, can be expressed by saying that, in perceiving, the mind is informed by the form which also informs the object perceived. The point here is that i t is the same form which informs both the object and the perceiver's mind. To say that the form informs the perceiver's mind is to say that the form provides the content of an intellectual act by which the perceiver secures cognitive grasp of the object. This intellectual act is the perceiver's notion of the object . The notion must have a content, for otherwise i t is directionless, and according to the theory under consideration the content, which fixes the direction, is the form of the object which is the external terminus of the intellectual act. We have therefore found a sense in which the notion and the object of which i t is the notion are identical, for they are formally identical. The object is, so to say, present in the mind in propria persona. One and the same form exists wi th esse naturale, natural being, in so far as i t i s embodied i n a physical object, and wi th esse intentionale, intentional being, in so far as i t is the content of a notion. That is the nature of a form; i t has the kind of esse which is possessed by whatever embodies it. I ndividualized in a material body, i t is material; individualized i n a notion, i t is as immaterial as the notion its elf. Notions are commonly said to be likenesses ( similitudines) of their objects, and i t might be wondered how an act of understanding can be a likeness of a physical object . But the propriety of the term 'li keness' should now be plain. The

Notions obj ect has a certain form, and the notion has the same form. If two things have the same form then one is a likeness of the other. That the forms have different kinds of being in no way undermines the point that, in so far as notion and object are formally the same, they mu st be likenesses. Given that a notio n ' s representation of its object is as I have described it, it has to be concluded that nothing could conceivably be a more fitting representative of an obj ect than the notion of it, for formally speaking the object outside the cognitive power is its own representative within it. The notion' s signifying the obj ect is, formally speaking, th e obj ect' s signifying itself. There was universal agreement that everything whatever is, for purely n atural and not at all for conventional reasons, a sign of itself. By the same token it has to be said that a notion of an obj ect is, for purely natural reasons, a sign of its obj ect. We do not impose a given signification upon a notion, that is, we do not fix its signification by an act of will. It has its signification by n ature. The co nventional term which conventionally expresses what is naturally expressed by a given notion does not of course stand to its significate in the same metaphysical relation as that in which the notion stands to its significate, for the form of the significate of the conventional term does not inform the term as it informs the notion. In so far as we are dealing with perceptual notions, it is plain , from the definitions of 'notion', that our philosophers held a representative theory of perception . But the title of the theory is liable to mislead. On a common understanding of the phrase 'representative theory of perception', what such a theory states is that in perceiving obj ects in the natural order we do not have an immediate cognitive grasp of those objects, but instead know them through their representatives 'in the mind' . The immediate obj ects of knowledge are the mental representatives of the n atu ral objects, and it is through a knowledge of them that we grasp the natural objects. This is a common interpretation of Locke's theory of perception. Locke tells us that 'idea' stands for whatever is the object of understanding when a man thinks, or whatever it is that the mind can be employed about in thinking; that the mind perceives nothing but its own ideas, and that all knowledge

Notions consists in the perception of the agreement of ideas. And he is taken to maintain that such knowledge of external things as we have is indirect, mediated by the ideas caused in the mind by the external objects. According to this view, Lockean ideas are representatives of the external objects. But it has to be said that such a theory of epistemological representationalism is as far removed as could be from the theory of notions, despite the fact that notions play a representational role. What makes the difference is that whereas the Lockean ideas (on the foregoing interpretation) are the immediate objects of knowledge, notions, functioning as representatives of extern al objects, are not themselves objects of knowledge. They are instead the very acts by which the cognitive power reaches out to the objects. Notions are essentially active, and Lockean ideas are essentially passive. Given the very different forms of re­ presentationalism here under discussion it is plain that the theory of notions does not constitute a version of the theory of ideas. 2 1 This i s not to say that notions cannot themselves be objects of knowledge. A distinction is drawn between direct and reflexive notions. Crab gives the following definitions: A direct notion is a notion whose immediate term is an object which is not a formal cognition of some thing. For example, the notion through which I know Socrates, is called a direct notion. But a reflexive notion is a notion whose immediate term is a formal cognition; the formal cognition is the notion's object. For example, the notion through which I know a notion of Socrates is a reflexive notion. (Not. c4va-vb . ) 22

Waim supplements Crab's definition with this caveat: 'A notion is not said to be reflexive because it has a notion for an object-for that condition is not sufficient. It is required in addition that it distinctly represent a notion or notions to the 1 1 For full discussion see my ' Medieval notions and the theory of ideas', PAS 8 7 ( 1 9 86- 7 ) , 1 53 - 6 7 . 11 Noti tia recta est notitia im mediate terminata ad aliquod obiectum quod non est formalis cognitio alicuius rei, ut notitia per q uam cognosco Sortem dicitur notitia recta. Sed noti tia reflexa es t notitia termi nata i mmediate ad cognitionem formalem tanq uam ad obiec t u m , ut noti tia per quam cognosco noti tiam Sortis est noti tia reflexa.

Notions rb

cogm t1ve power' (Not. g5 ). 2 3 An indication of what is at issue here is provided when he writes: 'I say "distinct" because t�ough " existent" is a likeness of a concept it is not a discrete ' ( Not. c4''a). 24 The notion of an existent, not of an existent notion specifically, but merely of an existent tout court, represents existent notions for they are existent, but it does not represent notions distinctly for it is fitted by its nature to represent every other existent as well. It therefore represents notions only 'confusedly'. A reflexive notion represents a notion X in so far as X is a notion, not in so far as it is a mental quality or in so far as it is ephemeral, and so on. Thus the notion of a mental quality is not a reflexive notion, despite the fact that every notion is a mental quality, for the notion of a mental quality represents notions and non-notions equally. Mair is succinct: ' A distinct notion of one object cannot represent another' (3 Sent. 31 va- b ) . 2 5 Likewise, a distinct notion of objects of a given kind cannot represent objects of another kind. I t is clear that there are categorematic reflexive notions. My notion of my notion of a given person represents some thing, _ namely, my notion of the person. Can there also be syncategorematic reflexive notions? Such a notion would not represent any thing but would represent in some way. It is, however, equally clear that the definition of 'reflexive notion' rules out the possibility of syncategorematic reflexive notions, for any reflexive notion can only be a notion of some thing, namely, of another notion. I f anything were an example of a syncategorematic reflexive notion it would surely be a notion of a syncategorematic notion. But Crab deals with that: ' I assume that the copula o f a mental proposition is a syn­ categorematic act, the act being a true quality in the mind. Now, a reflexive notion of that act is not a syncategorematic act' (Not. c5 ra ). 2 6 For what kind of syncategorematic act could 2 1 Non dicit u r notitia reflexa quia habet pro obiecto notitiam . Hoc enim non sufficit sed cum hoc req uiritur q uod repraesentet potentiae cognitivae notitiam vel notitias distincte. n Dico distincta q u ia licet ly ens sit naturalis similit udo conceptus non tamen ·2 s Notitia distin cta u n i us obiecti non potes t aliud repraesentare. discreta. ".!h Su ppono q uod copu la propositionis mentalis est actus syncategorematicus qui est vera q ualitas in anima existens . Tune notitia reflexa illius actus non est actus syncategorematicus .

Notions it be? As Crab points out, it could not be an act which unites subject and predicate, for it does not unite anything: 'A reflexive notion which is a natural likeness of a syncategore­ ma tic act ref resents nothing besides the syncategorematic act' (Not. c5r b ) . 2 It is therefore categorematic. A further conclusion can be drawn. It was commonly held that propositions do not signify some thing, they signify in some way, or they signify some thing in some way. That is, they were classed as syncategorematic. Crab thought it therefore likely that there is no such thing as a reflexive mental proposition. Since he elsewhere makes it clear that he does not regard propositions as categoremata, it is not at all obvious why he says it is 'likely ' that there are no reflexive mental propositions. That there are none follows , without qualification, from his view of the kind of signification possessed by propositions. The fact that notions have a representative function presents an immediate problem regarding the range of representation of reflexive notions , for it seems possible to argue that reflexive notions represent at least two things. They represent a direct notion and they also represent what the direct notion represents. This view, which was held, derives its strength from facts given in experience. I cannot think about my thinking about Glasgow without thinking about Glasgow. It seems to follow that there cannot be singular reflexive notions , but only common ones, for no reflexive notion is fitted by its nature to represent just one thing; every such notion must instead represent at least two things , a notion and what that notion represents. This line was however resisted , since a notion is common only if it is fitted by its nature to represent many things univocally and with equal immediacy or directness. Not all reflexive notions are like that for in so far as I have a distinct reflexive notion of a given direct notion then, even if that reflexive notion also represents what the direct notion represents , it does not do so with equal immediacy. The reflexive notion immediately represents the direct notion and only mediately represents what the direct notion represents. Waim takes a tougher line, namely, that reflexive notions 27 Notitia reflexa q u ae est na t u ra l i s simili tudo actus syncategorematici n i h i l repraesentat praeter a c t u m syncategorem aticu m .

Notions simply do not represent what their direct notions represent, by which he apr arently means that they do not represent them at all (Not. c4\· ). But it is not clear why he takes this view. It is possible that he was influenced by the considerations that (i) though the obj ect of the direct notion is represented whenever we have a reflexive notion of that direct notion, that representation is fully explicable by the fact that we cannot have a reflexive notion without at the same time having a direct notion, and (ii) that direct notion serves as representative of its obj ect. This, allied to a decision to restrict the signification of the term "represent' so that indirect re­ presentation of X is not to count as representation of X at all, would be sufficient to permit the conclusion that a notion of a notion of X is not itself a notion of X, while not denying the fact (assuming it to be a fact) that whoever has a notion of a notion of X does indeed have in his mind a direct representat­ ive ( = representative tout court) of X. It might be thought that there is a large class of reflexive notions regarding which there is no possibility of their representing the objects of the direct notions, namely, the class of reflexive notions whose objects are syncategorematic notions. Granted first that there are syncategorematic notions, secondly that in thinking about them we have notions of them and therefore have reflexive notions whose objects are syncategorematic notions, and thirdly that syncategorematic notions do not have objects, it follows that those reflexive notions logically cannot represent the objects of their objects. However, this argument, though valid, does not take us far since, as indicated earlier, the common view was that syncategorematic notions do have obj ects. The ground for this view will be considered in the next chapter. Here we need only note that if all notions are intentional, and all syncategore­ matic notions are notions, then all syncategorematic notions are intentional. And those who deny that all notions are intentional have to deal with the further argument that all acts are intentional and all notions are acts. The outcome is clear. Even if a given reflexive notion represents a syncategorematic notion, we cannot argue that the reason the reflexive notion does not represent the object of the direct notion is that the direct notion does not have an object.

Notions A group of concepts much employed in medi eval writings on physics was commonly introduced in the course of certain rather strange but highly suggestive discussions on notions. The concepts in question are those of latitude of forms (latitudo formarum) and intensity and weakness of qualities (intensio et remissio qualitatum), 28 and it will be helpful to discuss here the relation between notions and these concepts. The latitude of a form or of a quality is, according to one exposition, the range of variation in intensity possible for that form or quality ; 29 or, as another source has it, it is the distance between distant degrees. 30 There is, for example, no doubt about the propriety of speaking about latitude in respect of light and heat, and these were among the commonest cases discussed. 3 1 The point I am concerned to emphasize is that the concepts of latitude, intensity , and weakness ( or remission) , plainly at home in physics, prompted extensive discussion in treatises on notions. The linking concept is that of quality. For on the one hand intensity and weakness are features of qualities, and on the other a notion is a quality inherent in a cognitive power. There need then be no surprise at the fact that the concept of latitude was thought applicable to notions. Nor are we dealing here with something otherwise unheard of in philosophy. The concept of the intensity of notions seems to me very close indeed to the Humean concept of the liveliness or vivacity of ideas. However, to stay with the late scholastic scene, writers on notions had to respond to the following line of thought: let us suppose that God has the power to place in one subject a notion which is in another subject-perhaps in any other subject. In that case could he not place a notion in a stone? The common answer to that question was that he could place it in a stone, but though it would still be the same quality that it had been while in the cognitive power, it would not be a notion, for a stone neither is nor has a cognitive power. :.rn See E. Sylla, ' Medieval concepts of the latitude of forms: The Oxford calculators' , Archives d 'histoire doctrinale et littiraire du moyen age, 40 ( 1973 ) , 2 2 3-83 ; 'The Oxford Calculators' , in N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, and J . Pinborg (eds . ) , The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, 540-63. :lY See Sylla, · Medieval concepts' , for details. 30 M. Clagett, The Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages, 449-50. 3 1 Clagett, ibi d . 45 1 - 2 .

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Therefore a stone could not, even while possessing the quality that had previo usly been in a cognitive power, know anything by means of that quality. Such an act of God involves exercise of his absolute power, and that power is limited only by the fact that not even God can perform a logically impossible act. But there is room for doubt as to whether we are talking about a logically possible act in talking about taking a quality which is essentially a quality of a cognitive power, and placing it in a piece of dead m atter. However, our logicians seem at first on rather safer ground in speaking about God's power to place in a beast a notion which had been in an angel or in the rational mind of a human being, and to place in an angel or in a rational mind a notion which had been in a beast's mind. But such speculations about God's power appear to lead to the conclusion that notions in an angel or in a rational mind would be infinitely intense. The argument is as follows: every notion has a certain degree of intensity. Let us imagine a given notion in the cognitive power of a dog. Now a beast's mind has extension, and what is in what has extension also has extension. So the dog's notion, with that degree of intensity, is extended. If, next, that notion were placed in a subject with half the extension of the dog's mind, the notion would have twice the intensity. And so on. The rule here is evidently : halve the extension and double the intensity. But a rational mind and an angel's mind have no extension; they are indivisible. Hence if the notion in the dog's mind were placed by God in a rational mind, then that notion would be infinitely intense. By a similar line of reasoning one might conclude that if a notion of finite intensity in a rational mind were placed in the mind of a beast, that notion, in the beast's mind, would be infinitely weak. Cranston saw difficulties. If a notion which had been in a rational, and therefore indivisible, mind were placed by God in a beast's mind, and therefore in something divisible, does it follow that the notion would become a divisible quality in the beast's mind, that the notion would inhere as a whole in the whole mind of the beast, and that different parts of the notion wo uld be in different parts of the beast's mind? Cranston objected to this, on the grounds that even if the beast's mind is

Notions extended, it does not fol low that every notion m it must be extended . I n this con text C ranston refers to points in a con tin uum and in stants in a period of time, cl assic cases of the indivisible in the divisible. A great deal req uires to be said about the network of problems in this area . I shall focus here on one matter which seems to me cen trally i m portant i n the in terpretation of the various posi tions I have been examining. This con cerns the fact that when our philosophers speak about a no tion being i n one cogni tive power a n d God placing t h a t notion in another cogni tive power or even in something which is not cogn itive, they are speaking about the transference of notions, so that what is being said to occur is that n u merically the same notion had first been in one place and is next elsewhere. This point emerges i n d ifferent ways . For example, C rab (Not. c I ra ) raises a question about an accidens, viz . a certain notion, ' migrating' from one s u bj ect to another. And he objects to the idea that an angel ' s notion can migrate into a rational animal 's mind , not on the ground that notions cannot migrate from subj ect to subject, but on the ground that an angel's mind is essen tially superior to a rational animal's mind, and notions fitted to be possessed by a s u perior mind cannot i n here in an inferior mind . And Crans ton (Not. b 1 rb ) speaks abou t God creating 'in the air' a quality which is fitted to be a notion and which becomes a notion when, a thousand years l ater, God places this qual i ty in my eye, so that the thousand-year-old q uality is suddenly a vis ual notion . From these and other cl ues it seems to me to fol low that when our logicians speak about God placing i n one subj ec t a notion which had been i n ano ther subject, they are speaking about the transference of a notion . B u t i t h as to be asked what this way of speaki ng mean s . How can nu merically t h e same accident inhere i n o n e s u bj ect and then i n h ere in another? I t seems plain that the posi tion at issue implies rej ec tion of the Thomist doctrine that what i ndivid uates a q uality i s the subject that the quality qualifies , that i s, the s u bj ec t i n which i t inheres . B u t i f that doctrine i s rejected then the only position that appears avail able a s a n alternative is t h e Scotist doctrine t h a t the pri nciple of i ndivid uation for qualities is the degree of i n tensi ty ( gradus intensionis) of the quality . At first sight that would seem to

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allow us to speak i ntelli gi bly about the transference o f a noti on from one place to another . Yet there was general agreement that if a notion of a given i ntensi ty were transferred from a beast's mi nd to an angel' s , the intensity would not be the same after replacement as before-indeed, it would be infinitely greater . In that case there seems no ground for saying that the notion is �the same again' after the transference as before. How, after all, can it be the same notion, as it is said to be, if the grade of i ntensity is different? I am unclear about the answer to thi s question and can at present only speculate. I shall take my cue from Mai r. 32 He reports that there are many positions on the i ntensity of forms but he singles out four as of especial importance. These might be called the Radical Theory, the Succession Theory, the Mixture Theory , and the Addition Theory . The first, the Radical Theory, is particularly associated wi th William of Auxerre and St Thomas Aquinas . On Mai r's reading of A quinas , the theory is as follows . Any form is distinct from its being (esse) -that i s , from its esse in the sense of existence. The esse i n the sense of essence, on the other hand, is identical with the form. According to thi s view any form by nature has an i nfinite number of esses, each one being continuous with and more perfect than the next. A non­ essential, or accidental form i s said to be more rooted (magis radicari) i n its subj ect according to the degree of perfection of its esse. So a form' s becoming more intense will just be its acquiring esses which are successively more and more perfect. Moreover, there are never two esses persisting together . We must imagine that according to this claim the manner of coming to be and passing away of these esses is this: when some subj ect which i s hot becomes hotter by a qualitative change the terminus ad quern of the qualitative change is the same hotness , but subj ect to a more complete esse than is the hotness which is the terminus a quo. This manner of coming to be and passing away does not admit of two accidental qualities which are merely numerically different i nhering in the same subject. Thus Mair's account of A quinas . It is at this point in the theory of radicatio that Mair starts his attack, arguing that if person A loves two people, B and C, J:2 I Sent. , d . 1 7 , q . 1 0 , fols . 66' a-,·b.

Notions 34 there will be in A two distinct dispositions which are none the less of the same most specific species. And in that case the same subject at the same time does have two accidents which are only numerically distinct. It is true that John Capreolus ( 1 Sent., d. 1 7) holds that the love by which A loves B qua B is specifically different from the love by which he loves C qua C. But Mair rejects this line on the ground that the objects are of the same species, and similar notions directed to objects of the same species are themselves of the same species, and by the same token dispositional notions directed to objects of the same species are themselves of the same species. Whatever the strength of this criticism, it seems to me arguable that Mair has misunderstood Aquinas. For Aquinas sought to explain intension and remission of forms in terms of radicatio of esse, yet Mair appears to be interpreting Aquinas as explaining the greater or lesser radicatio of esse in terms of the intension and remission of forms. But Mair, satisfied with his attack on Aquinas, turns next to the Theory of Succession, associated with Godfrey of Fontaines and Walter Burley, according to which the intensification of a form is due to the destruction of a previous form and its replacement by a new one; then to the Theory of Mixture (attributed to Simplicius) according to which a change occurs in the proportion of mutually contrary qualities in a subject; and finally to the Theory of Addition, associated with Alexander of Hales and Duns Scotus, according to which intensification occurs by the addition of a new part to a form and weakening occurs by subtraction of a part. It is this last theory that Mair accepts, and there seems to me good evidence that the various members of his circle whom I have been discussing follow Mair in this respect. The important point here is that the new quality in the subject, produced by an addition to the old quality, contains within itself a part equivalent to the previous weaker grade. And it may be surmised that this relation between the weaker notion in the mind of the beast and the more intense notion in the mind of the angel was thought to justify the claim that it was the same notion that had been in the former and was then in the latter. This is certainly speculative, but it is not mere speculation when I say that the talk of transference of a notion from one

Notions

35 cognitive power to another could carry no conv1ct10n with those working within the Thomist tradition who might indeed wonder how much sense we could make of such talk. This is not to deny that Thomists can speak of a relation of identity holding between a notion in one person's mind and a notion in another' s, and indeed they can even allow the possibility of a relation of identity holding between a notion in a person' s mind and a quality in a stone. The key is the doctrine discussed above, essential to Aquinas' s epistemology , that when a person sees an object he takes into himself the form, though not the matter of the object. Another person seeing the same object takes into himself the same form, though not the matter. It is, then, the same form which informs the minds of the two persons. U sing familiar terminology we can say, instead, that the two persons have the same notion, where by 'same' we mean 'formally the same' . There is, then, an identity, though not of course a material identity, for we are speaking here about two individualized forms. Two cognitive faculties have been modified and the notions are therefore numerically distinct. As regards the possibility of an identity between a notion in a mind and a quality in a stone, our starting-point is again the doctrine that when we see an object, say , a stone, our mind is informed by the very same form which informs the object. The relevant metaphysical principle here is that a form is either material or immaterial depending upon what individuates it. The same form can therefore be material in virtue of informing a stone and at the same time immaterial in virtue of informing a mind. This teaching in no way implies that a notion placed in a stone must, after all, be a means by which a stone knows anything. For the power that a quality exercises, or rather the power that a thing has in virtue of its possession of that quality, is as much a function of the nature of what the quality inheres in as of the nature of the quality. It is because the mind is immaterial that a quality of a given kind is a means by which the mind knows. It is because the stone is material that that very same quality, now inherent in the stone, is not a means by which the stone can know. There is nothing however in all this to provide Thomistic support for the doctrine that a notion is transferable, for the doctrine of

Notions transference of notions goes a good deal beyond the claim that a given individual notion can be formally identical with another notion; in particular, the idea that God can detach a quality from a substance and place numerically the same quality in something else, is, as said before, incoherent from a Thomistic standpoint. The doctrine that God, by his absolute power, is able to transfer a notion from one mind to another or even to something which is not a mind, raises an important question concerning causes. I have been saying what a notion is, and wish now to enquire into the role of mind in the causal determination of notions. The starting-point for much medieval discussion was St Augustine' s dictum: 'A notion is produced by knower and thing known' (De Trinitate , ix. 1 2 ) . The dictum seems obvious, but was subject to dispute because of what might occur given the absolute power of God. Since the absolute power of God was, and had to be, invoked in these disputes they are as much in the realm of theology as of philosophy. But something should be said about them here all the same, even if very briefly. The theological principle which is brought to bear is that whatever occurs as the effect of a secondary cause can be produced immediately by the primary cause. God is the primary cause in the universe, all other causes are secondary. On the basis of that principle could it not be argued that God could be the sole cause of the occurrence of a notion in a given cognitive power? In that case the person who has the notion would in no way be a cause of it. Yet, as Crab points out, by means of that notion the person knows, or thinks, something, and therefore his cognitive power acts in the production of the notion, and in that case God is not the sole cause (Not. a3 ra). It is not at issue here that God can by himself produce a quality which becomes a notion-we recall here Cranston' s claim that God can produce in the air a quality which a thousand years later he places in my eye, thereby causing me to have a visual notion. The question is whether, without my co­ operation as cause, he can place a notion in my cognitive power. Robert Holkot raises this matter in his discussion of assent. Assent is relevant here since assent is a kind of notion, a 'j udicative notion' ( 1 Sent., q. 1 , a. 1 ) . The point about my

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assent is that I assent, God can not assent through me. Since it is I who say \es' , I co-operate causally in the production of the notion. The argument for the causal role of the cognitive power in the production of assent applies equally to other kinds of notion also. All notion s are acts of understanding or of think­ ing (actus intelligendi) and such acts require an agent. The alternative is to say that there are thoughts which are not thoughts of a thinker. If it is said that God is the thinker of those thoughts, not the person in whose cognitive power he has placed the notion , then this is perhaps acceptable, but not at all to the point, for in that case the notions in question are not that person's notions, for he is not thinking through them. They are God's notions alone. Crab wishes neither to abandon the principle that whatever occurs by means of a secondary cause can be produced immediately by the primary cause, nor to deny the causal role of the cognitive power whose notion it is. He effects a compromise: God can by himself produce a simple notion. The in tellect acts by means of that notion, but does not produce it, where 'produce' means 'make the quality have being after non-being'; but it does produce it, where 'produce' means 'conserve' (Not. a3 ra ). This is not a strong position, for in so far as conservation is a kind of causation, the implication is that God does after all require the co-operation of the person's cognitive power for the existence of any notion which lasts longer than an instant. Perhaps a better response would have been to acknowledge that God cannot produce a notion in a person's cognitive power without the causal co-operation of that power, but to add that that acknowledgement does not imply a rej ection of the doctrine of God's omnipotence, for that doctrine main tains that the limits on God's power are solely limits of logic; God cannot do what is logically impossible. But to produce a notion in the cognitive power of a person without the causal co-operation of that power is indeed logically impossible, precisely because a notion's being in a person's cognitive power is that person 's being engaged in an act of thought. To admit the action while denying the agency is to fall into contradiction. St Augustine's dictum, quoted above, that a notion is

Notions produced by the knower and the thing known, was not accepted without demu r either as regards its assignment of a causal role to the knower or as regards such an assignment to the thing known. We have now dealt with the first of these, and I should like next to prepare the grou nd for comment on the second, comment to be greatly expanded in Chapter 3 . Crucial to an understanding of the issues is the distinction between intuitive and abstractive notions, and I shall turn now to that distinction. Among our late medieval philosophers discussion of the distinction takes its starting-point from William Ockham, though writings of Gregory of Rimini loomed almost as large. Let us begin by clarifying the concepts of intuitive and abstractive notions. An i n t u i tive notion is one t h rough which a con t inge n t tru th a bo u t t h e notion's obj e c t can be k n o w n , for example, t h e tru th that i t i s white or sea ted , d i s tan t or n e a r , or t h a t the obj ec t exists or does not exist. An abstractive notion is the opposite . Through it no con tingent 3 tru th a bo u t i ts obj ec t can be know n . ( Lokert, Not. q ra-b) 3

Mair adds a further element by specifying that the judgement caused by the intuitive notion should contain no ampliative term ( 1 Sent. 32va ). An ampliative term is one whose presence. in a proposition extends the supposition of a term in that proposition to what was, will be, can be, or is imagined to be, the case. 34 Thus, due to the past-tensed copula, 'A man was seated' implies that the subject term stands for what is or was a man. Hence the proposition does not imply that a man now exists. Neither does it imply that anything is now seated. Likewise, 'Possibly a man is walking' does not imply either that a man now exists or that anything is now walking. The point Mair is making is that the judgement 'A is B' caused by the intuitive notion, does imply the present existence of A and of B and of B' s belonging to or being in some way an accident of A. Gregory of Rimini chooses a different approach. He defines Tl Notitia intuitiva dicitur per quam potest sciri aliq ua veritas contingens de ipso obiecto ut quad sit album vel sedens, distans vel propinq uum, vel quad illud obiectu m existit aut quod ipsum non existit. Et opposito modo dicit notitiam esse abstractivam per q uam non potest sciri aliq ua veritas contingens de ipso obiecto . .H For details see my The Circle of John Mair, 76-8 1 .

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' i ntui ti ve notion' as · a si mple notion by whi ch some thing is known formally and immediately in itself' ,3-'"> and he adds that such a noti on i s called ' i ntui tive' ( from intueri = to look upon) because the thing i tself is the immedi ate object , and is present objectively to the mind ( 1 Sent. d 3, q. 3 , fol. 46' . .. ). On the other hand, 'a n abstractive notion is a si mple notion by whi ch some thing i s known formally in some representative medium' ( i bid.). 3 6 Certain elements recur in the accounts of intui tive notions. Such notions gi ve ri se to assent to a present-tensed contingent proposi tion and the object ju dged is known directly, not via a representative or medi ator. A third element, rarely included in the defini tions, bu t which emerges in their exposi tion, is that the assent produced by the intui ti ve notion is 'evident'. Evident assent (evidentia ) will be discussed in detail in Chapters 5 and 6. Here i t i s sufficient to note that such assent ( i) i s to a true proposi tion, ( ii) is firm, that i s, i s given wi thout hesi tation, and ( iii) is caused naturally , that is, is not due to an act of will. An abstractive notion i s a simple notion which is not intu i ti ve. The termi nological waters are muddied, however, by a distinction drawn by Ockham between perfect and imperfect int u i ti ve notions. A perfect i nt u i tive notion is what we have been calli ng an intui ti ve notion. An imperfect intuitive notion is a recordative notion by means of which i t is known that a thi ng at some time existed, or di d not exist. Imperfect notions are memory no ti ons. Their connec tion wi th intui tion is plain. We cannot now remember X unless at some past time we had an intui tive notion of X. If I remember having seen the queen I mu st at some time have had an i ntui tive vi sual notion of her. But all the same, the memory notion does not yield assent to a contingent proposi tion about the present existence of the object of the notion, nor therefore about any thing which presently is true of tha t object. Recordative not ions also fail another criterion by which we judge whether a notion is intui tive. The point is presented by 1 ") Notitia intuitiva est notitia sim plex qua formalitcr aliq uid immediate in seipso cognoscit ur. It, Abst ractiva vero est notitia sim plex qua formaliter al iq uid in aliq uo medio repracsen tativo cognoscitur.

Notions Waim in this way: The judgement by which I judge that john did exist is caused in me because I remember that I have seen John at another time ; and on this basis I judgcd that John does exist. So I form this inference : ' I judged evidently that John exists, therefore John existed'. The inference is obvious. But can evident assent be given to the premiss? Waim thinks that it probably cannot. I can have faith in the truth of the premiss, or have an intense opinion that it is true. But the evidence is not so strong that without an act of wil l I can give firm assent, for I have to acknowledge the possibility that the proposition ' I judged evidently that john does exist' is false­ my memory may be failing me (Waim, Not. e6 ra ). The cl aim that the memory is a less reliable source of truth than are the senses needs to be investigated more closely than any of our late medieval philosophers allows. The problems are familiar. Our memory sometimes lets us down, perhaps often does so. But all the same there are many occasions when we are as sure of the deliverances of memory as we ever are of the deliverances of the senses, and are therefore prepared to say of many such deliverances of memory that if we are wrong about them then there is nothing about which we might not be wrong. Nor were our philosophers unfamiliar with the unreliabilities of our senses, and they discuss many kinds of case in which, on the basis of our sense experience , we judge falsely . Many well-known illusions are rehearsed, for example, the firebrand swung round rapidly in the dark which causes us to judge that there is a complete circle of fire. But these cases, and also much more ordinary ones, did not give rise to any doubt about the fact that we can have evident knowledge of presently occurring events but can never have evident knowledge of past events, only faith or opinion. Since our philosophers held that we can give true, firm, naturally caused assent to present- tensed contingent propositions and not to past-tensed contingent propositions, and since an intuitive notion yields such assent, it is plain why they denied that we can have an intuitive notion of a past event. But it is equally plain tha t the phrase 'imperfect intuitive notion' , used to describe memory notions, is not well chosen. ' Imperfect' simply cancels out or negates 'intuitive notion'. An imperfect intuitive notion is not an intuitive notion at all since it fails the

Notions criteri a laid down. It follows that imperfect intuitive notions are, in a straightforward way , abstractive noti ons. Cranston' s definition of ' abstractive notion' , viz. · a notion which remains, or naturally can remain in the absence of its object' (Not. bi-a) , 3 7 fits memory notions as well as anything could. The term ' abstracti ve' is ambiguous and before proceeding to a discussion of the causes of abstractive notions, one sense of 'abstractive nption' should be set asi de. Intuitive notions of many singulars whi ch resemble each other can produce a notion of the respect i n which those things are resembli ng. This notion is reached by ' abstracti on' from those si ngulars and the notion itself is an 'abstractive notion'. According to nominalists such a notion is the only kind of universal there is. Its universality lies in the fact that, as William Ockham states the matter, it is equally predicable of many singulars. There is, then, no one thing whi ch resides, as the realists held, in each and every one of its instances or exemplifications. That, for nominalists, must lead to absurditi es. If the real universal is in any one thing, how is it possible, wi thout the universal being fragmented, that it is also in something else? The nominali st way of dealing with the problem of universals has the merit that it has no difficulty in showing how a universal can maintain i ts integrity and yet still, in a recognizable sense, be universal. It maintains i ts integrity because it is not required to be 'in' each, or i ndeed 'in' any, of the things which exemplify it, or which it represents. It cannot be in them for it cannot leave the cogniti ve faculty of which it is a quality. The universal, then, has no existence independent of mind. 'Abstracti ve notions' i n this sense re-emerge in later philo­ sophical literature as the abstract ideas of the British empiricists and others, who adopted medieval nominalism without perhaps realizing where their roots lay. Thi s sense of 'abstracti ve notion' is closely related to a second sense, but the di fferences could not be more important. I might look at a tree, and then shut my eyes and in every other way remove myself from sensory contact with that tree. But I continue to thi nk about it. In each case I have a singular or discrete notion of the tree, but the two notions have very

17 Notitia abstractiva est ilia quae remanct vet natu raliter manere potest in absentia sui obiecti.

Notions different causal powers. In the case of the first notion I judge on the basis of it that the tree exists and has such and such properties. I know it has because I am looking at the tree; that is what it is for me to have an int uitive visual notion of the tree. But in the case of the second notion I am in no position to make such a judgement. Or, at least , if I make such a judgement I will be expressing merely an opinion or making the judgement as an act of faith. For the evidence that the tree exists is imperfect and I know that i t is. I saw it before I shut my eyes, and after shutting them it might have ceased to exist, whether through n atural means or by an act of God. I am still thinking about the tree but in the abstract, for my thought is abstracted from any evident judgement of the tree' s existence. This second kind of abstractive notion, the kind which is contrasted with in tuitive notions, was seen to give rise to a large difficulty, and St Augustine' s dictum, that a notion is prod uced by the knower and the known, helps us to focus the difficulty. In the case of intuitive notions it is easy to see that the object plays a causal role in the production of the notion. At least the object of the notion exists; if it does not even exist it is difficult to see how it can have any causal efficacy whatsoever. But in the case of abstractive notions just such a problem does arise over the causal efficacy of their object. For, in having an abstractive notion of something, I may in fact be thinking about something which has gone out of existence-in which case how can my notion be partially produced by that object?-and even if it has not gone out of existence, the fact remains that in having an abstractive notion of it I have withdrawn myself from all immediate, in particular, all sensory contact with it, and so it is for me as if the object had ceased to exist. How, then, can it contribute to the production of my notion of it? Among our philosophers there was a deep division of opinion over how this question should be answered. I shall turn now to the dispute. Given that the knower is a partial cause of an abstractive notion, what other partial cause or causes should be posited? We must remind ourselves here of Gregory' s view that an abstractive notion is a simple notion by which something is known formally in some representative. Gregory adds that such a notion is not called abstractive because it abstracts

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from existence ( for we can be thinking of the object as existing) or because it abstrac ts from singular condi tions ( for we can be thinking about that person or that house, and so on), but because in a way it abstracts from the objective presentness of the known object. For through an abstractive notion the thing i s not itself immediately before the mind; what is immediately before the mind i s a representative of that thing ( 1 Sent. d. 3 , q. 3). What is the representative? Gregory's answer is that i t is a species. We are thrown back upon the theory which posits mi nia ture replicas emanating from objects. They occur in the medium between object and knower, though are not, at least routi nely , visible i n the medium. Complex discussions on whether the image in a mirror is a species need not detain us here ( though i t i s worth remembering that the term species was used of the image i n a mirror (= speculum) ). The species also occurs in the cognitive power of the knower, where ·cogni tive power' i s to be taken to include the intellect and the power of sensory perception. Within the cogni tive power the species occurs, or was commonly thought to occur, as an image, a mental image. This mental image was identi fied by Gregory as the representative i n the mind of the object outside. The species is not however a notion, and there are therefore, according to Gregory, two representatives in the mind when a power has an abstracti ve notion, namely, the notion i tself and the species. Gregory ' s crucial thesis is that, in the case of abstractive notions, it is through our notion of the species that we have a notion of the external object. The species is known immediately and the obj ect mediately . 38 From this it follows that every abstractive notion is also intuitive, for there can be no abstracti ve notion without somethi ng thereby being im­ mediately present to the cognitive power. Furthermore, the abstractive notion yields evident assent to a contingent proposition affirming the existence of something or affirming :m Cf. Cen eau: 'The principal and primary object of an in t uitive notion is the external thing. B u t an abstractive notion terminates immediately at a species and terminates mediately at the obj ect ' ( l n t uitiva hahet pro obiecto pri ncipali et primario rem ad ex tra. Abs t rac tiva vero terminat ur ad speciem et media te termi natur ad obiectum) (Not. b5 r" ) .

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something about an existent thing. In other words, an abstractive notion, whatever else it is, is also an intuitive notion of a species . But the abstractive notion is more than that. There are two ways of knowing a species, for not every notion of a species is an abstractive notion. It is abstractive only in so far as the species is known as being of something else. Put otherwise, it is one thing to know an image and another to know it as an image. To know it as an image is to know it as being a representative of something else. Only in the latter case is the notion by which the image is known an abstractive notion (see Crab, Not. c2 ra-b). There is a problem here concerning the marks by which a mental image can be identified as a mental image of something else which exists . If we know that it is an image of something else because we have compared our image with the other thing and can see the similarity then does that not imply that we are after all in immediate contact with the other thing? In that case surely the notion we have of the thing is intuitive after all, and not abstractive. But if we cannot compare our image with the other thing then why should we ever think of that image as anything but a mental picture, without supposing that it is a picture of something external? The question that has to be asked about species considered as mental images is whether they can play the role assigned to them by Gregory . He thought that we need such an image if an absent thing is to have, in our mind, a representative through which we can secure cognitive contact with the absent thing. The Ockhamist response to this approach is to say that a mental image cannot play such a role for in order for the image to be identifiable as a representative we must already and independently be in cognitive contact with what is represented. In that case the image has to be bypassed if it is to be a representative and so there would be no justification for positing such a role for the image. It must be concluded therefore that an abstractive notion of an external object does not require an intuitive notion of a species . This is not to say that we cannot have a mental image of an object of which we have an abstractive notion. It is to say that, whether we can have such an image or not, it is certainly not necessary to have one as a condition of having the abstractive notion. To this

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extent, therefore, the dispute between Gregory and the Ockhamists is not a di spute about whether species exist, but is instead about the kind of role that must be assi gned to species in the acts of the cogniti ve power. To the extent that Ockhamists hold that they have no such role, it is only to be expected that the Razor would be wielded against species. To gi ve species a role in the cogni tive grasp of external objects is to multiply entities beyond necessi ty . Thi s appli cation of the Razor is clearly i n Mair's mind when he writes: ' I t is vai n to lay down that through the same notion we know two objects, one i ntuitively , the other abstractively . For everything can be maintained by layi ng down that through that noti on we know only the external object' ( 1 Sent. 3 3 rb ). 39 This position has an implication for the contents of the definition of 'intuitive notion' . If I look at a tree and then shut my eyes and thin k about the same tree, I have first an intui ti ve and then an abstractive notion of that tree. The tree is therefore the term of both notions, and the notions termi nate with equal i mmediacy at the object- in the sense that in neither case do I have a notion of a tree through a notion of something else. In that case it is not the immediacy of the object that makes a notion of the object intui ti ve. What makes the first notion i ntuiti ve, and the second not, is that the first produces an evident judgement of existence and of other contingent quali ties, and the second does not. A causal question arises here. If the object of an abstractive notion is, as St Augustine says, a partial cause of the notion and if, as is possible, the object of the abstracti ve notion c;loes not exist in the external world at the time we have an abstracti ve notion of i t, does it follow that what does not exist can have causal efficacy? The short answer is that it can. But that is an unnecessarily paradoxical way of making the point, for we cannot mean that, while not existing, it still manages to be causally active. What does not exist is not active. How, then, does the non-existent object of an abstractive notion manage to be a partial cause of a notion? Ockham gave a detailed answer to this question and the JY Frustra ponit ur quod per eandem notitiam cognoscamus duo obierta unum intuitive et aliud abstractive cum omnia possint salvari cognuscendo sol um per illam obiectum ad extra.

Notions answer was taken up and further refined by subsequent generations of philosophers. 'T'wo views were widely canvassed. According to the first, every intuitive notion produces a disposition in us. Some support is provided for this doctrine by the evidence of our memory. Having perceived something we might subseq uently recall what we had previously perceived. The act of recollecting what we had perceived is the possession of an abstractive perceptual notion of the previously intuited object. That object might not now exist but it is represented in us by something which does exist, namely, a disposition which is a dispositional notion of the object. Even if the object, because it does not now exist, cannot be a partial cause of the abstractive notion, that object's representative in us, the dispositional notion, is able to play the role of partial cause. And the stronger the disposition, due to frequent perceptions of that object or to frequent thoughts about it, the more an abstractive notion of the object is facilitated. For it is the nature of any disposition to incline its subject to a certain act, and the stronger the disposition, the more strongly the subject is inclined to perform the act, and the easier it is for the subject to perform it. For example, the more often I recall a certain event the more easy it is for me to recall it. The picture here presented is this, that an intuitive notion produces a disposition, and the disposition and the cognitive power produce the abstractive notion . Something else has to be added to this account for if nothing else is required to produce the abstractive notion it seems inexplicable why every dispositional notion is not permanently actualized. Here we would need to enter the realms of empirical science, since experience has to be consulted regarding what things might jog the memory into recall. But whatever precise answers are given to the empirical question it is clear that we do have, at least at first sight, a plausible overall account of how abstractive notions are produced in the absence or even non­ existence of their object . But the matter is not entirely straightforward, for Aristotle taught that every disposition produced by an act ·of a certain kind inclines us to an act of that same kind; for example, my just acts produce in me a disposition which inclines me to the performance of just acts . Aristotle's teaching on the relation

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between the cause and the effect of dispositions was something that the late medieval philosophers never forgot. Yet every dispositional notion is produced by an intuitive notion, and hence, in accordance with Aristotle' s dictum, every dis­ positional notion must incline us to a notion li ke the notion which produced the disposition, namely, another intuitive notion. But that is plainly not what happens. We have already observed that memory notions cannot be other than abstractive since they do not give rise to evident assent to a conti ngent proposition of existence. An alternative view was therefore proposed, also deriving from Ockham, according to which whenever an intuitive notion of a given object is produced, there is also produced an abstractive notion of the same obj ect, and it is the abstractive notion, produced at the same time as the intuitive notion, which causes the disposition. Two principles are at issue here. Both principles are supported by strong arguments, though the princi ples cannot both be accepted: (i) if every notion produces a disposition, it follows that the cause of a di sposition may be of a different kind from the effect of the disposition; (ii) if every dispositional notion is caused by an abstractive notion, it follows that some notions, in this case intuiti ve notions, do not produce dispositions. It has to be said that, as a historical fact, principle ( ii) won, in the sense that it was generally thought that less was lost if (i) was jettisoned. But it is not clear why it was thought that less was lost by that manceuvre. One further point should be made here concerning the doctrine that an abstractive notion is formed with the for­ mation of any intuitive notion. We can now see what the pressures were that led to this doctrine. They were due less to a recognition of the need to bow to manifest facts of experience, that is, the experience of forming abstractive notions whenever intuitive notions are formed, than to a recognition of the need to deal with a problem observed in the conceptual framework constructed to deal with certain questions about knowledge of things with which we are not in present perceptual contact. Since, in response to the needs of the theory, it was held that an abstractive notion is formed whenever an intuitive notion is formed, and since an abstractive notion does not give rise to an evident assent to a

Notions proposition affirming the present existence of the object of that notion, does it not follow that if an abstractive notion arises in those circumstances we would not give evident assent to that proposition? The answer to that must be 'no' for otherwise we would never give evident assent to a proposition affirming the existence of X, even if we were having an intuitive notion of X. The conclusion to be drawn must be that if we have simultaneously an intuitive notion of a given object and an abstractive notion of that object, the intuitive notion will override the abstractive notion in the sense that, despite the fact that the abstractive notion does not give rise to an evident assent to the proposition that the object of the abstractive notion exists, we shall all the same give evident assent to that proposition, for such assent arises from the intuitive notion in question. In other respects the intuitive notion may not be stronger; certainly, for example, the abstractive notion may not be any less intense-it might even be more intense . But evident assent is not a product of a given high degree of intensity of a notion. It is a product of the intuitive nature of the notion-that is all. And in virtue of having that nature, an intuitive notion is different in kind from an abstractive one. A point on which our philosophers never wavered was that no amount of intensification of an abstractive notion will lead to that notion becoming intuitive. This is not the only way in which an intuitive notion and an abstractive notion are different in kind. Another is that intuitive notions are of such a nature that it is impossible for them to be other than singular, whereas there can be common, or universal, abstractive notions. That an intuitive notion must be singular follows from the fact that by its nature it gives rise to an evident assent to a contingent proposition affirming the existence of a given object. We know that the object exists because we are in immediate cognitive contact with it. 'It' is the crucial word here. The object is singular. It is not in doubt that we can, by an act of reflection, have a notion of a given universal notion, and that the reflexive notion is intuitive. But that intuitive reflexive notion is itself no less singular than is any intuitive perceptual notion, for the reflexive notion is fitted by its nature to represent one notion only, and is not equally predicable of many.

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There was much discussion among our philosophers about the relative perfection of intuitive and abstractive notions. We are well placed to appreciate the grounds of their judgements. One reason for describing intuitive notions as more perfect is that we can learn m ore from an intuitive notion of a given object than from an abstractive notion of the same object, for the intuitive notion yields an evident assent which can not be produced by the abstractive notion. On the other hand, only abstractive notions are universal, and such notions must have an honoured place since it is with universal truth, and therefore with universal notions, that science deals. But one point should not be lost sight of in this context, and certainly our philosophers, all of whom were priests, did not lose sight of it, and that is that God cannot have an abstractive notion of anything. All his knowledge is intuitive. There is no notion that God has that gives rise to merely inevident assent concerning the existence of anything, for everything in creation is present to God with a presentness of absolute im mediacy. In determining the relative perfection of intuitive an d abstractive notions, it is difficult to ignore the fact that in at least one vital respect our intuitive notions provide us with a better model for God' s knowledge of his creation than do our abstractive notions. Of course, it might be replied that our abstractive notions also provide us with a model of God's knowledge, for his knowledge is universal, and only abstractive notions can be universal. But it should be noted that it was also held that though God's knowledge is universal in the sense at least that he, the omniscient God, knows everything, his univeral knowledge is not via concepts which yield a merely con fused knowledge of created things. He has discrete knowledge of every created thing. The- contrast with our own universal knowledge could not be greater. Though we do have universals, notions through which we can know perhaps an in finite num ber of things, that knowledge is confu sed, in that we do not, through a universal notion, know any of those things in their discreteness. We know them only as falling under the notion. But in that respect all things of which the notion is predicable are indistinguishable from each other­ hence the propriety of the term 'confused' as a description of our knowledge through universals.

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I shall end this chapter on a point concerning the relation between notions and thei r signi fication. Signi ficative spoken and wri tten terms are significati ve only in so far as they express notions. Spoken and wri tten terms which do not express notions, say the terms 'buf' and 'baf' (standard medieval examples) are what we should now call nonsense words. But 'buf' and 'baf ' could acquire signi fication. All that is requi red is an act of will by which someone confers signi fication on them. I n exactly the same way a term which already has a gi ven signification could acqui re another. Conferment of signification, or of a new signi fication, was called 'imposition'. Two things were requi red, first, a sound (or a string, perhaps one-membered, of visible marks), and secondly, an act of will. There i s no limit to the number of times a new signi fication can be imposed on a gi ven sound. The effect of each new imposition is to associate the sound with a new notion, a notion whi ch the sound, by the imposer' s will, expresses. I t i s crucial for our understanding of the machinery of imposition that signification i s imposed by an act of will. A sound or mark can of course have a natural signification, as when thunder signifies rain, and laughter signi fies joy. But the i nscription 'thunder' cannot signify thunder except by a human convention, and neither can any other term in English (except possibly a small number of onomatopoeic words). In contrast, a notion signifies not by will but by nature. I see a book on the table, that i s, I have an intuitive visual notion of a book. The notion therefore signi fies that book. I t does so not by imposition but i n virtue of a natural likeness whi ch it bears to the book. If the notion did not bear that likeness to the book it would simply not signify that book. I t follows that the notion cannot change its signi fication. Of course the notion can cease to exist, as it would if I simply ceased to look at or think about the book, and in that case it might be sai d that it had lost its signification. But then there would not be the same 'it', though with a different signification or with none at all. As long as that notion remains in existence it must have the same signification. There is, however, one consi deration which weighed with our philosophers, though it could not be expected to weigh wi th many of us. I have already considered the question

Notions whether a notion is transferable, whether for example one could be placed in a stone. The releva nt point for present purposes is that if the notion is transferred into a stone it would cease to have the signification that it previously had had, though the notion would continue to exist. The loss of its signification is due to the fact that for it to signify it must signify to a cognitive power, and the stone neither is nor has such a power. It might also be suggested, if the concept of a notion being transferred into a stone is dismissed out of hand, that though a notion remains in a given cognitive power God might not co-operate with that cognitive power in respect of that notion, though he has to do so if the notion is to continue to signify. This point rests on the theological principle that nothing whatsoever happens, or can happen, in nature without the general co-operation of God. If either of these possibilities (viz. the notion existing in the stone, and the notion existing, without God's co-operation, in the cognitive power) is accepted, it seems to follow that the dictum that no notion can lose its natural signification is fal se. For in the case of each possibility the notion continues in existence, though without signifying as it had previously done. In response to this line a distinction was drawn between two kinds of signification, namely, actual and aptitudinal. The notion in a stone, or in a cognitive power though lacking God's general co-operation, is fitted by its nature to signify what it had previously signified, and that it does not actually signify as it had done is, so to say, not its fault. Thus where the dictum 'No notion can lose its natural signification' is taken to refer to actual signification, the dictum should be understood to be saying that it is not possible for the notion not to have its proper natural signification, when the notion exists in a power fitted by its nature to know by means of that notion, and when God does not withdraw his general co-operation in relation to that power. The dictum, understood as referring to aptitudinal signification, is true without qualification (Loken, Not. a4 •· b - v a). A further distinction should be made here. It relates to the law of dou ble negation. Logicians routinely gave an account of the signification of the negation sign in terms of the kind of supposition the sign gives to the term or terms within its scope. In particular, it was held that a negation sign gives

Notions distributive supposition to those terms. T'hus m the mental proposition

(1)

No pupil is a teacher descent can be made to a conj unction of singular propositions under each of the extremes. Assuming there to be j ust two pupils, P 1 and P1 , and j ust two teachers, T 1 and T1 , the truth conditions of ( 1) are therefore given by: ( 2 ) (P 1 i= T ' & P 1 i= T1 ) & (P'.2 i= T ' & p '.2 i= T1 ) where ' i= ' renders 'is not the same as' and ' & ' renders ' and'. However, in the mental proposition (3) No pupil is not a teacher 'teacher' does not have distributive supposition. (3) 1s equivalent to the mental proposition (4) Every pupil is a teacher in which 'teacher' has merely confused supposition-descent is made under 'teacher' to a disj unction of singular terms. Thus the truth conditions of (4) are given by (5) (P 1 = T 1 v T2 ) & (P2 = T 1 v T 2 )

where 'v' renders 'or'. Does i"t not follow from this that the notion corresponding to the negation sign does not always signify in the same way? After all, in ( 1) it signifies distributively , and in (3) it does not. Lokert's reply is that in propositions with the same form as (3 ) the second negation sign signifies exactly as the first one does in respect of its essential mode of signifying, for the essential mode of signifying of a negation sign is the distributive mode. That is, essentially what a nega tion sign does is give distributive supposition to the terms within its scope. But as regards the accidental mode of signifying, a differ­ ent story is to be told. This is the mode of signifying of a term in the context of a given proposition. In such a context acci­ dental considerations, for example, the fact that the negation sign is itself within the scope of a negation sign, may prevent a term having distributive supposition even though it is within the scope of a negation sign. But here the point is that it is only because the notion corresponding to the negation sign in

(6) A pupil is not a teacher continues to signify negatively when a negation sign is prefixed to the whole proposition, yielding (3), that the

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predicate term which has distributive supposition in (6), has merely confused supposition in (3). The negation sign covering the predicate does not therefore change its signification when the proposition is itself prefixed by a negation sign. 40 There is a metaphysical aspect to the doctrine that a notion cannot change its signification. In the case considered earlier of utterances and inscriptions changing their signification, the possibility of their changing in that way is due, at least in part, to the fact that there is more to utterances and inscriptions than their significations, for utterances and inscriptions are composed also of sound s or marks. And those physical parts of the terms are substances which can slough off one quality , for example, their signification, and acquire another, a different signification. But it has to be remembered that notions are not � ike that_. They are acts of thought, a certain kind of modification of a cognitive faculty. They are therefore, in a sense, accidents. But accidents cannot change. What happens instead is that a substance ceases to have one accident and acquires another, contrary , accident. Notions therefore are not of the right metaphysical category to be able to change in their signification. They cannot be spelt, for they are not composed of letters. Nor are they composed of sounds, even of mental auditions (the aud itory correlate of mental images). Conventional terms are more than their significations. Notions are not; they are significative through and through. The contrast could not be plainer. The letters of a written term are not significative even though the whole inscription is, but nothing in a notion is not significative. This is the point which C ranston is making when he says of complex notions that 'from the signification of every part there arises partially the signification of the whole expression' ( Term . d2rb ). w C f. Enzinas: ' O n e co uld also . . . say that '' every" al ways has distributive su pposition, even in " Not every man is an animal ' ' , for " every" is distribu tive in relation to a part . And a l t hough " every" does not exncise that fu nction f sc. the d istri bu t ive fu n ction l i n relation to the whole, it should not th erefore be said that it has lost i t s sign ificati on or t h a t th ere is an obstacle to i t s significat ion , but only that it has temporarily ceased to perform its actual fu nction, j u st as you wo u ld say of natural agents which a re faced w i t h a n obstacl e ' . ( Posset etiam . . . di ce re ly omnis semper di stri buere et i n hac ' Non omnis homo est anim al ' . N a m in ordine ad partem distri b u i t . Et q u amvis ly omnis non exercea t offici um in ordin e ad totum non est propterea d i cend um cadere a sua significa t ione aut impedi tive sign ificare, sed sol um a suo act uali officio suspend i , q u emadmod u m de agentib us nat uralibus habentib us imped i m e n t u m d i ceres ) ( Comp. 1 6' a ) .

3

Obj ects S r N c E every notion is an act of a cognitive power and every act has an object it follows that every notion has an object. The conclusion might be resisted, however, on the ground that syncategorematic notions do not have objects. What, for example, is the object corresponding to the written term 'if ' ? Categorematic notions, for all the difficulties associated with them, are more easily dealt with, and it will be helpful to use them as a model in the clarification of the concept of the object of a syncategorematic notion . Lokert writes: 'The object of every categorematic notion is a thing signified by that notion, that is, the thing of which the notion is a natural likeness. For example, Socrates is the object of a natural likeness of Socrates, and every possible man is an object of a natural likeness of all men' (Not. a4ra ). 1 As regards categorematic notions, therefore, the object and the significate are the same thing. The form of a thing informs a cognitive power and, in coming to have the same form as the thing, that power acquires a natural likeness of the thing. The thing, as standing in that relation to the cognitive power, is a significate, or an object, of the natural likeness. For of course 'significate' and 'object' are both terms referring to an end­ point of a relation. A significate requires a sign, and an object a subject. But it is not necessary that the object exist. This is plain from Lokert's second example- the object of the natural likeness of all men is every possible man. Waim states the case with greater precision: 'Every p·ossible man is the object of the confused notion of all men' (Not. b 2 ra ) . 2 What Lokert and Waim are speaking about is a confused, and therefore C uiuslibet notitiae categorematicae obiectum est res significata per talem notit iam puta res cuius tal is notitia est nat uralis similitudo, ut nat uralis similitudinis Sortis Sortes est obiectum et naturalis simil it udin us omnium hominum q uilibet homo possibilis est obicctum. :.! Notitiae con fusae omni u m hominum q uilibet homo possibilis est obiectum. 1

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universal, notion of man . Through it no man 1s known di scretely, but all are known confused ly. But through it not only all presently existing men are known con fuscdly, so are all possible men . For example, the An tichrist is an obj ect of the confused notion of all men (Wai m , Not. b 2 .-a) . Lokcrt formulates the posi tion in this way : � For something to be the obj ect of a given notion it is not necessary for the thing to exist in nature. " O bj ect'' is an ampliative term ' (Not. a4'-a) . 3 Waim adds that i t is ampliative to all four tenses, that is, to the pas t, the fu t u re, the possi ble, and the imaginable. Hence, if all we know of som ething is that a person has a notion of it, we can infer no m ore than that it does, did, will, or can exist, or can be imagined to exist ( or more accu rately 'imagi nari ly ex ists '). Eviden tly, t hen , if something X cannot be imagined to exist then we cannot even form a notion of i t, for i t is ru led out as a possi ble obj ect of a notion. We have al ready observed that S t Augus tine's dictum, that a notion is prod uced by an obj ect and a cogni tive power, was generally accep ted . B u t there are importan t complexi ties underlying the si mple form ula. Lokert pointed out that the obj ect and the cogni tive power could not be the only partial causes, for di sposi tions and other notions can be shown to be partial causes of notions . And followers of Gregory of Rimini held that s pecies also are partial causes . Of course, what causes are in volved, and how they are invol ved, depends in part on the kind of notion bei ng considered . In particular, it depends on whether an intui tive or an abstractive notion is at issue. It was commonly held that there cannot be an intui tive sensitive notion, that is, an intui tive visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, or tactile notion, which is not partially caused by a prese ntly existing exterior obj ect (C rab, Not. c 2 va ) . Some argued that a sensi tive notion depends u pon i ts presently exis ting o bj ect no less than light depends upon i ts presently existing sou rce, n amely, a l u minous bod y . This is not however a persuasive argu men t since the bare affirmation of a parallel between l ight and notions would of course be q uestioned by anyone who q ues tions whether every presen tly exi sting 1 Quod aliquid sit obiectu m alicuius notitiae non oportet quod illud sit in rerum natura. Ly obiectum est terminus ampliativus .

Objects intui tive sensi tive notion has a presently existing obj ec t . Crab approaches the matter from a d ifferen t direction : An experien tial notion [ i . e . a j udgement abo u t what we are experi­ encing] is prod uced in u s fro m an i n t u i tive notion of a thing. But if an intu itive notion could be n a t u rally prod u ced i n u s wi thou t the co­ operation of the object, we would not be a b le to know, through the intui tive notion , when an obj ect exists and when it does not . For perhaps when we j udge that an o bj ect docs not exist it docs and vice ve rsa. But th is i s abs u rd . (Not. c 2 v a _ ) 4

Crab, who was no scep tic about the knowability of the external world , took his stand on the fact that our int ui tive sensi tive notions give rise to evident assent to con ti ngent present- tensed proposi tions of existence. By nature, and not by will, we j udge that certain thi ngs exist. We cannot withhold assent. Neither Crab nor any other of ou r philosophers discusses the ques tion of whether a metaphysical dou bt can be entertained about the real existence of objects of intui tive sensi tive notions . They ass ume that our sen ses are, at least i n general, reliable sources o f tru t h . Thei r interes t, which was a serious one, i n i l l usory experience, d id not prompt ques tions concern i ng whether every experience might be ill usory, or whether, even if not every experience is illusory , we m ight not be able to determine which are illusory and which not . Nor was this confidence i n the deliverances of the senses due to a failure to employ any methodological device comparable wi th Descartes ' s mauvais genie. For, as already observed , our philosophers h ad a l ively i nterest in the power of God by which he coul d pl ace a notion i n our cognitive power directly, that is, entirely bypassing the natural machi nery by which a notion of that kind would be acquired . They held i ndeed that by his absolute power, though not by his ordinary power ( potentia ordinata) , God could place i n our cogni tive power an intui tive notion of a non-existent obj ec t . This must be possible for him. For an i n t u itive visual notion, that is, an act of seeing, is absol utely d istinct from the object seen, one being a quality in a cogni tive power and the other a material object i n the � Noti tia experi men talis generatur in nobis ex notitia intui tiva rei . Sed si sine concursu obiecti posset causari not i tia intuitiva naturaliter non possemus scire per noti tiam intuitivam quando obiect um existit et q uando non quia fortasse cum nos iudicamus obiectum non existere existit et ed iverso. Sed hoc est inconven iens.

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57

natural world. And since they are di stinct the notion could exi st i n the absence, through annihilation, of the object. But, it was held, though that intui ti ve notion would give rise to evi dent assent to a proposition, the proposition in question would not be one affi rmi ng the exi stence of the object, but rather one affirming its non-existence. Otherwise a contradiction ari ses, for evi dent assent is firm, naturally caused assent to a true proposi tion. Any intui tive notion of a non-exi stent object cannot occur in us except by an act of grace. It is d i fficult, perhaps impossible, to say what possession of such a notion would be like, beyond saying that it is of such a kind as to gi ve ri se to evident assent to a proposi tion affirming the non-existence of something. Much the greatest emphasi s, accordingly, was placed upon intuitive notions of exi stent obj ects, where, of course, those presently exi sti ng obj ects are partial causes of the notions, in contrast to the kinds of notions just spoken of, where the objects could not count as causes in the same sense, for what does not exist is not anything and therefore i s not a cause either. Nothi ng said so far, of course, consti tutes a reason for saying that if God places in our mind a notion of something which does not exi st we must assent to the proposition that the object does not exist. For it may be that the notion placed in our cognitive power i s an abstractive noti on, and from such a notion there does not ari se evident assent, whether to the propositi on that the thi ng does exist or the proposition that it does not. In response to the question of how that notion can have the object it does have if the object is not the cause of the notion, we can take our clue from Waim. He writes: A qual ity is not a notion of this or that object because it is caused efficiently by this or that obj ect, for then a notion of Socrates could not be produced by God alone-though we have said that the opposite is the case . . . From its intrinsic nature a quality is a notion of this obj ect rather than of another, so that a priori no other reason can be given than the nature of the thing . (Not. b4'·a .f> ·, Non ideo al iq ua q ualitas est notitia istius vel isti us obiecti qu ia est causata effective ab isto vel ab isto obi ecto. Probatur q u ia tune notitia Sortis non posset produci a solo deo cuius oppositum diximus . . . Qualitas ex intri nseca sua natura habet q uod sit notitia h u i us obiecti poti us quam alteri us sic quod a priori nulla potest dari ratio nisi natura rei .

Objects Waim is not explicit on the matter of what the 'intrinsic quality' is to which he refers , but one obvious candidate is that feature of the notion as a result of which it is a natural likeness of whatever it is of which it is a likeness . Before leaving the topic of intuitive notions of non-existents, it should perhaps be added for the sake of clarification that even without divine grace, and indeed as a matter of routine experience, we can have an intuitive notion on the basis of which we judge that something does not exist; we may , for example, be looking at what we know must be, or what we take to be, the remains of the thing. But such occurrences do not involve possession of an intuitive notion of a non-existent object. We intuit the remains of the thing, and our notion of the no longer existing thing is a recollective notion, an intuitive notion of the kind Ockham designated 'imperfect' , which, as we saw, meant that it was straightforwardly abstractive. The intuitive notion causes the dispositional notion of the object to be actualized, and actualizations of dispositional notions are abstractive notions . We have attended so far to incomplex notions and their objects. In order to give an account of the objects of syncategorematic notions it is necessary to discuss the concept of a complex notion. Cranston introduces the distinction between incomplex and complex notions in this way: An i n complex notion is a notion which , i n so far as i t i s i ncomplex, is not composed of several parts of differen t kinds . . . A com plex notion is a notion which i s com posed of parts of different kinds, for example, ' wh i te man ' . Some complex notions are composed of several ca tegoremata, for example, ' ru n n i ng a n i m al ' ; some of a ca tegorema and a sy ncategorem a , for example, ' every man ' ; some of several synca tegoremata and one categorema , for exam ple, ' not every man ' ; some of several ca tegoremata and one syncategorem a , for example, ' every w h i t e m a n' ; some o f several categoremata and several syncategoremata, for example, ' Every m a n is w h i te' (Not . b4rb- 5''a ) . 6 6 Notitia in complexa es t i l i a q uae non co mple t i t u r p l u res partes d iversarum ra tionum secu nd u m q uod incomplexa est . . . Notitia comp lexa est q u ae complet i t u r partes d iversa rum rationum u t homo albus . E t aliq ua tali s e x pluri b us categorem ati­ bus co mpo n i t u r ut animal curre ns, a l i q u a vero ex categoremate et syncategoremate ut omnis homo, aliqua ex pl u ribus syncategorematibus e t u no categorem ate u t non omnis homo, aliqua ex pl u ri b us categorematibus et uno syn ca tegoremate u t om nis

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The reason why the phrase 'in so far as 1t 1s incomplex' is included in the definition of 'incomplex notion' is to deal with the fact that if we hear a term, say 'Socrates', we form a notion of the sound, and that notion is complex, for it is composed of notions of the sounds of its three syllables. When I hear the term I also form a notion of the philosopher, and that is an incomplex notion. The last point however was disputed. Why not say that our notion of the person is composed of parts of different kinds , namely , of a natural likeness of the matter of the person and a natural likeness of the form? Since the person arises from those parts , is it not reasonable to say that the notion of the person likewise arises from the notions of those parts? Cranston's reply to this argument is: 'I deny that the natural likeness of Socrates arises from a natural likeness of the matter and a natural likeness of the form. The notion of Socrates is abstracted from the matter and form taken together' (Not. 64 va). 7 I have, then, a single notion of the person, which is formed by abstraction, not by concatenation. It is true that in having a notion of the whole I have a notion of the parts, but the parts are each represented by the one notion of the whole. If each part of the person were represented by a separate notion then I would be said to have a complex notion of the whole. Cranston employs an important contrast in this context. The notion of the whole does not represent the whole in the same way that it represents each of the parts of the whole. It represents the whole per se, and represents the parts per accidens. 8 Of course, while having a notion of the whole we can have a distinct notion of a part. Cranston' s point is that we do not have a distinct notion of each, or even any , part in having a homo a l b us, a l i q u a ex pl u ri b u s categorematibus et pl uri bus syncategorematibus compo n i t u r ut omnis homo es t a l bus. 7 Nego quod nat ural is si mi li tudo Sortis consu rgat ex naturali simili tudine matcriat et naturali s i m i l i tudine formae. Sed notiti a Sortis a mat eria et forma simul iu nctis ahstra h i t u r . 8 C f. Ceneau (Not. af a ) where he ma kes the s a m e d istinct ion while presenting a closrly rr la ted poi n t : ' I say t h a t a spectator is l i m i t rd hy his nature so that he has a single seeing of a whole con t i n u u m , w h i ch is a seei ng of a wholr per se, and of the parts per affidens' . ( Dico tamen q uod vidcns est l i m i t a t u m ex sua natura ita q uod habet unam v1s 1onem totius con t i n u i q u ae est visio to tius de per se, part i u m de per acci drns . )

60

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notion of the whole. Lokert adds an interesting detail to the account presented by C ranston. He believed that if we have a distinct notion of the whole we wi ll not also have a distinct notion of any part except by an act of wil l . That is to say, the will determines the cognitive power to have a distinct notion of the part ( Not. d3 v b-4ra ). It is surely correct to say that whi le looking at a complex object we can decide to focus on a part, in which case the act of wi ll is a partial cause of the distinct notion of the part. But the object might have a part which draws attention to itself, say, the spectacular flower on a plant. Is it by an act of wil l that we form a distinct notion of the flower? I t might wel l be repl ied that it is. Our attention to the flower is an expression of our interests or values. On another day, having read about and acqui red a deep interest in stems, we might focus on the stem instead. Cranston's examples of complex notions are plainly of a variety of kinds, some of greater logical importance than others. One of particular importance was marked by special terminology . C ranston writes: Some complex notions are complex with a non-separating connec­ tion ( complexione indistanle) , others are complex with a separating connection (complexione distante) . 9 According to others the division should be described in this way: some notions are absolute or non­ comparative, others are comparative. But it comes to the same thing. A non-separating complex notion is one whose parts are not separated from each other by a con nective, for example, ' white man ' , ' man ' s donkey' , and so on . . . A complex notion with a separating con nection is one whose parts are separated by a con­ nective, for example, 'A man is an animal ' , ' man or animal' . . . Complex notions with a separating connection are divided into propositional complex notions and non-propositional complex notions . Non-propositional complex notions are divided into the conditionate, the disj oint and the conjoin t, and so on . Moreover complex propositional notions are divided into categorical and molecular. Categorical propositional notions are divided in to universal , indefinite, particular, and singular, and molecular pro­ positional notions are divided into disjunctive, conjunctive, and 9

I owe these translations of complexio distans and complexio indistans to P. V . Spade. See his Peter of AiLfv, 1 8 .

Objects conditional , 1 0 the lat ter including causal and temporal propositions etc . (No t . b6 rh-\·b ) 1 1

The foregoing divisions are not enti rely clear cut. Cranston raises the questi on whether · a man , s every donkey' (as in 'A man's every donkey is runni ng') is a separat ing complex notion. It mi ght be sai d that i t is since the catcgoremata are separated by 'every'. But Cranston does not like the suggestion, for though ' every' does separate the categoremata it is, all the same, not a connect ive. Why i t i s not i s not spelt out, but there is a clear hint that the reason has to do wi th the role of connectives in the mai ntenance of grammaticali ty . Where two parts are held together by a connective its deletion would lead to ungrammaticality. For example, if 'every' were deleted from 'A man' s every donkey is running' the result would be a grammatically well-formed propos1 t1on, but if 'or' were removed from 'Peter or Paul is running' the result would be an ungrammatical expression. Yet Cranston, who no doubt saw that the concept of a connective requires a much more prncise defini tion than he gave it, does not explain how he would exclude a whole range of particles, especially preposi tions, from the class of connectives. Why, for example, is 'of' not a connective i n 'a donkey of a man' (as in 'A donkey of a man is running'), or 'on' i n 'the book on the table'? Cranston's examples suggest that he is concerned to set up a concept under whi ch fall all, and nothing but, the conne·c tives in which logicians are interested, in particular, . ' t h c syncategoremata ' and ' , ' or ' , , 1· f ' , and , 1 s ' , wh ere and ' , ' or ' , and ' if' are connectives connecting ei ther categoremata or

1 0 T h e fu l l est medi eval t reatment of these is in t h e logica Magna b y P a u l o f Venice. See especially Logica Magna , pt. ii, fasc . 3, ed . and tr. A. Broadie, and logica Magna, pt ii, fasc. 4, ed . and tr. G. E. H ughes. 1 1 Notitiarum complexarum q u aed am est complexa co mplexione indistante, alia vero com plexione d is ta n te . Secu n d u m al ios sic datur d ivisio noti tiaru m : quaedam absol u ta sive non com parativa q u aedam vero com parat iva est, sed in idem redd i t . Noti tia com plexa i nd i s tans e s t c u i u s partes non d istant mediante aliquo coni ungibili sicut homo albus, hominis as i n u s etc . . . Notitia com plexa distans est cuius partes distant med i a n te aliquo con i u ngibili ut homo est animal, homo vel animal . . . Sed noti t ia complexa d istans in notitiam complexam proposi tionalem et in not i tiam co mplexam non p roposi tionalem divid i t ur . Et not i t ia complexa non propositionalis d ivid i t u r in cond i tion a t u m disiunctum et copu la tum . Et sic co nseq uen ter. I tem noti tia complexa propos i t ionalis in ca tegoricam et hypotheticam, et ca tegorica in unive rsalem particularem indefini tam et singularem, hypo thet ica in disi un ctivam copulativam condi tionalem comprehendendo causalem temporalem etc.

Objects propos1 t10ns. Quanti fier expressi ons are to be excluded. In fact, on what I take to be hi s cri terion those latter expressions are indeed excluded; it is particles such as preposi tions which are more recalcitrant. In addi tion Cranston claims that he can include the negation sign in his list of connectives. There are at least two ki nds of negati on in common use in medieval logic, propositional nega tion and term negation. It is term negation that i s at issue here, the sort of negation found in 'non-man', a categorematic term which signifies every thing which 'man' does not signify. Ens non homo (one of Cranston' s examples) expresses the concept o f a n entity which is not a man, li terally 'enti ty not man' . Cranston' s claim is tha t 'entity not man' i s complex by a separating connecti on. His reason for holding this i s that although 'enti ty man' ( ens homo) , or more perspicuously 'entity which is a man' , forms a gram­ matical uni t, so that the 'not' does not bring those terms together in a grammatical uni t which they would no t otherwise form, nevertheless the ' no t' behaves in the same way as 'i s'. This explanation calls for clari fication though Cranston does not provide any. I think i t likely that the poi nt being made here is that 'enti ty not man' contains virtually, though not formally , a relative clause, and could be rendered more perspicuously as 'an enti ty which is not a man' . The 'not' therefore i n 'entity not man' could be replaced by ' whi ch is not' and might therefore, though misleadingly , be described as behaving like a negative 'is' . The concepts o f i ncomplex and complex can be approached from another directi on. In the Middle Ages many defini tions of 'term' were canvassed. One of the most popular, and obscure, was 'proximate part of a proposition' ( pars proxima propositionis) . Cranston expounds this concept as follows: 'A proximate part is said to be a part of an expression ( oratio) from the si gni fication of which part there arises r artially the signification of the whole expression' ( Term. d2.-a). 2 According to thi s account the distinctive semantic feature of a term i s that i t i s a n expression which ei ther has no parts which have a separate signi fication, or has parts which each have signification though the significations of those parts do not contribute to I:! Pars propi nqua dicitur pars orationis ex cuius partis signi ficatione cons u rgit pa rtia lit er sign i ficatio totalis i psius oration i s .

Objects the signification of the whole. For example, on this criterion 'morning star' would be not two terms but one. Though ' morning' and 'star' each has its own signification, those significations do not bo th con tribute to the signification of the whole for the expression signifies not a star but a planet. Correspondingly, any expression is said to be complex, and therefore not a term, if it has parts from the significations of which there arises the signification of the whole. Of course a single term might contain several letters, but that does not make the term complex unless the let ters, or several of them, each have signification and the signification of each letter contributes to the signification of the whole. We have here a clear route to understanding · Waim's assertion: ' Every com plex no tion is called com plex in the genus of sign, for by means of it an object is known in a way in which it is not known by an complex notion [ sc. of the same obj ect] which it presupposes' (Not. e i ra- r b ) . 1 3 To use the exam ple given earlier, 'every man' is a complex notion, for the signification of each part contributes to the signification of the whole. Additionally, to use Waim's mode of expression, 'every man' is com plex in the genus of sign for by means of it an object is known in a way in which it is not known by a notion which it presupposes. The no tion which it presupposes is that of man tout court. To have the notion of every man is not merely to have the notion of man, because in having the notion of every man I am thinking of man in a certain way, namely, universally or distributively, whereas in thinking of man tout court I am thinking of man indefinitely, that is, in an . unquant1 fi ed way. 1 4 To take another example, my pro positional notion ' Mair is a philosopher' is plainly com plex since the signification of the whole is a product of the significations of all its parts, and, to use Waim's phrase, it is complex in the genus of sign, for by it two obj ects are known in a way in which they are not known u Qu ael i bet notitia com plexa dici t u r comp lexa in gen ere signi q u ia mediante ipsa ahq uod obiectum a l i q u a l i ter cognosci t u r q u a l i ter non cognosci tur per noti tiam (i n)com plexam q u am praesu ppon i t tanquam notitiam ei usdem obiecti . 1 1 Wai m's example is t h a t of the complex not ion 'Socrates is Socrat es ' . That notion sign i fies no en t i ty beyond what is signi fied by the simple notion 'Socra tes' which the co mplex notion pres u pposes . But the complex notion, i n a ffirm ing th at Socrates is Socrates, signifies in a way in which the notion 'Socrates' does not signify. See Not. e I rb_

Objects by notions which the propositional notion presupposes. Two notions presupposed by the propositional no tion are those of Mair and of a philosopher, an d the ways in which those two objects are kn own are affirmatively an d predicatively. It is to be remembered here that Cranston stated that, as regard s complex notions, 'complex with a separatin g connection ' and 'comparative' signify the same thin g. The poin t of the term 'comparative' is plain. It is impossible to have a propositional notion while not at the same time making a comparison between two notions, namely , those in subject and predicate position. The outcome of the comparison is, to use the standard terminology , either a composition or a division. The two notions are compounded in so far as one is affirmed of the other, and are divided in so far as one is denied of the other. Such comparison results in the 'unitive' act of placing a copula between the two notions, and perhaps in the placing of a negation sign before the whole thus far united , or placing it after the subject but before the copula. Comparison might also yield information which would be expressed by the placing of a quan tifier before one of the categorematic notions or perhaps before both of them (as in 'Some man is every teacher' which would be true if there was only one teacher an d he was a man). To avoid confusion , it is as well to note here a poin t of disagreement concernin g the use of terminology. In con trast to Cranston's exposition , according to which any complex notion with a separating connection is a comparative notion, his teacher Mair writes as follows: There are two kinds of act of understanding . One kind is the com­ parative notion; that is the kind which signifies that this is that. I t is obvious from this that every mental proposition, and assent to or dissent from each mental proposition, is called a comparative notion. A non-comparative notion is one which does not signify that some­ thing is, or is not. They are notions to which incomplex terms, and complex terms which are not propositional, are subordinate. ( 1 Sent. go r b ) 1 5

1 5 Du plex est actus in tel ligendi. Quidam est noti tia comparativa et est ilia quae significat hoc esse hoc . Ex isto patet q uod q uaelibet mentalis et eius iudicium vocatur noti tia comparativa. Noti tia non comparativa est ilia q uae non significat esse vel non esse, ut sunt notitiae qui bus su bordinant u r termini incom plexi et complexi complexione non propositionali .

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Thus, according to Cranston, an expression composed of two categoremata connected by a conj oint ' and' , a disj oint 'or' , or a conditionate 'if' , is comparative, whereas according to Mair it is non-comparative. To modern ears the term 'comparative' does not seem apposite in this context, but one sense of the verb comparare is 'to couple together' or 'to form into pairs' , and on that basis it is understandable why ' Peter and Paul' and 'John is tired' should both be described as comparative notions. Exposition of the concept ' a notion which is complex with a separating connection' , whether we follow Mair' s exposition or Cranston' s, cannot make headway except on the assumption that syncategoremata play a role within such a notion. But do they play that role as notions or as something else? This question requires us to say whether the concept of a syncategorematic notion is a coherent concept. I shall turn now to that problem. The stumbling block to acceptance of the claim that there can be syncategorematic notions is, as already said, the fact that they appear to lack obj ects. The starting-point for our enquiry must be the fact that such a notion, if it exists, cannot have a significate, something to which one can point while predicating the notion truly of that thing. Yet no one questioned that syncategoremata have signification, since they signify in some way. There is no distinction in logic more important than the distinction between categoremata and syncategoremata, and the special kind of signifying done by a syncategorematic act was marked by the term 'consignify' ; it does not signify by itself but it signifies along with ano_ther term which it covers, in such a way as to have an effect on what that covered term duly signifies. We have just considered the examples of 'every' consignifying with 'man' , with the result that 'man' signifies universally, and of 'is' consignifying with 'Mair' and 'philosopher' , with the result that the latter two terms signify affirmatively and predicatively . There is therefore good reason to hold that a syncategorematic act is directed .to something as its immediate object, namely, the term or terms covered by that act. Thus, in the propositional notion 'Every man .is an animal', 'every' is directed to 'man is an animal' as its immediate obj ect, giving distributive

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supposition to 'man' and merely confused supposition both to animal and also, as Waim held , to the tense implicit in the copula (Not. b2 rb) . Waim does not further expound the claim that 'every' gives confused supposition to the tense consignified by the copula, but he seems to have the following in mind . G iven that every man is an animal, then every man is such that at some time he is identical with some animal. Each occurrence of 'some' gives merely confused supposition to the noun following. Why 'at some time' ? It is because the copula is not properly present-tensed . For example, the last king of France is not now identical with some animal. However precisely Waim's claim should be expounded , it is clear at least that it is possible to set up a concept of the obj ect of a syncategorematic act. The object is the term which is covered by the act and to which the act is therefore di rected . The chief stumbling-block to the concept of a syncategorematic notion seems therefore to have been removed . It has been shown that the impossibility of a given notion having a significate does not carry the implication that the notion lacks an object. But though both kinds of notion, categorematic and syncategorematic, have an object, a sharp d istinction must be drawn between those sorts of notion. The former sort, as an act of simple apprehension, can, even outwith the context of a complex notion, have a presently existing obj ect . On the other hand , a syncategorematic notion signifies, or rather con­ signi fies, only in the context of a complex notion in which a categorematic notion is covered by the syncategorematic notion. Hence · an isolated syncategorematic notion has no object, and since a syncategorematic notion is essentially intentional i t follows that no isolated syncategorematic notion can exist. The term covered by a syncategorematic notion is therefore a partial cause of the notion, at least in the sense that the act cannot occur unless there is a term for it to cover, nor can that notion remain unless it continues to cover that term. In the light of this consideration it must be held that categorematic notions have a certain priority, either in nature or in time, over syncategorematic notions. In nature external objects are prior to categorematic notions d irected to those objects, and those categorematic notions are likewise prior, as constituting

Objects objects for, syncategorematic notions. The external object is thus an object of an object of a syncategorematic notion. Put in different terms, we are dealin g here with the co ncept of the order of construction of propositional notions. A categorical propositional notion is not formed by adding the subject and predicate to the copula, but by adding the copula to the subject and predicate. The mental copula is a syncategorematic notion with a unitive function in the context of a proposition, and such a notion cannot perform that function unless there are already in place at least two categorematic notions. Since the syncategorematic notions which are parts of the propositional notion relate to the categorematic notions in the propositional notion as effects in relation to partial efficient causes, it follows that among the factors which contribute to the unitariness of the propositional notion is the role played by the syncategorematic notions as effects of the categoremata, and particularly the role of the principal syncategorematic notion, that is, the notion which takes all the rest of the proposition as its object. For a comprehensive insight into any syncategorematic notion would yield insight into the term or terms covered by that notion. In particular, insight into the principal syncategorematic notion must yield in sight into all the rest of the propositional notion, for the latter constitutes a partial efficient cause of the syncategorematic notion and something of the form of an efficient cause must be present in its effect. I wish to take seriously the thesis that a syncategorematic notion has an object, the object being that which the notion covers, or upon which it operates, and to note one corollary of the thesis, namely, that just as a categorematic notion with a given object could not represent any other object, however alike those two objects might be, so also a syncategorematic notion operating on a given term would not be the same notion if it operated on a term not synonymous with the first. Lokert writes: I t is not possi ble for a notion to termi nate successively at different objec ts whether that notion be a categorematic concept or a synca tegorematic ac t. As is customarily said about terms : 'No term can cease · to have i ts natural sign ification . ' I t follows as a corollary that j u s t as a d istinct natural l ikeness of Socrates

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cannot naturally and properly represent Plato, however alike Socrates and Plato may be, so also a d ist ri bu tive act which distribu tes j u st the term ' m a n ' cannot d i s tribute another term which is not synonymous with the term 'ma n ' , and neit her can an ac t wh ich u n i tes certain terms, 16 u n i te other terms which a re not synonymous w i th the fi rs t terms . (Not. a4 r h ) 1 7

Thus the distributive notion 'every' in 'Every dog barks' has a different content from that of the distributive notion in ' Every donkey brays' . Of course this is not to say that the two occurrences of 'every' do not have the same essential function, that of giving distribu tive supposition to the immediately following categorema; but shared essential function does not imply shared content. I think that the reason a syncategorematic notion covering a given term would be a different notion if it covered a different term is that the term is a partial efficient cause of the notion. For, -given that the efficient cause contributes to the content of the effect by imposing on the effect something of the form of the cause, the content of a given syncategorematic notion would have to be other than it is if the term covered by the notion were a different term. I think that the doctrine under discussion can be clarified with the help of an important concept which we owe to Professor P. T. Geach, that of an individualized form. 1 8 I wish to argue that, as well as the individualized forms of which Geach speaks, there are also individualized logical forms. That there are logi cal forms is not in dispu te. For example, ' Every donkey is brown' has the logical form of a universal affirmative proposition. 'Jack is tall and Jill is short' has the logical form of a conjunctive proposition. Our philosophers were _ not 16 C f. Enzinas : ' There is a cop u l a in the m i nd represen ting men and ani mals uni tively, and there i s another copula representing men and horses, and t h a t notion depends on the notion of men and h orses ' . ( Da t u r u na copula in anima repraesentans hom ines e t animalia u n i tive, et datur alia copula repraesen tans homi nes el equos q uae q u idem notitia d ependet a notitia hom i n u m el eq uoru m ) ( Comp. 5 .-a ) _ 1 7 Non potesl aliqua noti tia s uccessive cermi nari ad d iversa obiecta s ive fuerit conceptus categorematicus sive actus syncategorematicus. Hoc es t q uod solet dici in term i n is : n u l l us term i n us pot esl caderr a b eius sign ificatione n a t u rali . Seq u i t u r corol larie s i c u l disti n cta n a t u ra l is simi l i t udo Sortis n o n potesl rep raesen tare Pl a tonrm naturaliter proprie etiam quant umcunque Sortes et P l a to sint simi les, sic actus distributivus d i s t ribuens talem term i n u m homo praecise non potest d istri buere alium term i n u m non synonym u m cum i l l o term i no homo nee act us u n i ens aliquos termi nos adinvicem potes i u n i re a l ios terminos non synonymos cum i l l i s . 1 8 ' Form and existence ' , PA S 55 ( 1 954- 5 ) , 2 50- 76.

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Platonist s . For them there was no un iversal affirmation as such , nor conj u nction as such. I n line with St Thomas Aq u i nas ' s teaching that a form is not ens (something) but entis ( of something) , i t m u st be concluded that any universal affirmation is something being universally affi rmed of some­ thing. Any conj u n ction is the conj u nction of som ething wi th something else. Thu s ' - and - ' gives the logical form of the conj unctive proposi tion, and ' Every-is-' gives the logical form of a universal affirma tive. The syncategorematic terms plus certain features of the proposi tion constit ute the form, and the categorematic terms are the matter. The point that has to be stressed is that th ere can be no logical form without matter, and when t he m atter is informed, as for example when, of two given categorematic terms, one is predi cated universally and affirmatively of the other, then the logical form exi s ts as an individuali zed form . This ind ividualized form is as i nd ividual as the categorematic term or terms thus informed . The conj un ction of P and Q is, after all, not the conj un ction of R and S or of T and U ; but only of P and Q. The conj unction is therefore j ust as individual as are P and Q. We are faced here with an application to logic of the metaphysical principle that ma tter i ndivid uates . One form u­ lation of the logical analogue would be : 'Categorematic notions individu ate syncategorematic notions ' . I think this concept o f a n indivi d u alized logi cal form may be at leas t part of what the late medieval philosophers had i n mind when they said that a synca tegorematic notion, say 'every ', covering a given categorema is not the same as the syncategorematic notion 'every ' covering a d ifferent . cat­ egorema. A q uestion arises from the foregoing d iscussion . Mair s tates the principle: ' The more perfect the object the more perfect the notion ' (3 Sent. 2 2 v b ) . 1 9 This principle seems tracea ble back to Aris totel ian teaching which re lates a value hi erarchy of being and a correspond ing val ue hierarchy of knowing. At the apex of Aristotle's hierarchy is God, whose only possible obj ect of though t is hi mself, for he alone is sufficiently perfect to be an obj ect for his acts of thought. And wi thin Aristotle's I Y • • • licet semper perfectioris obiecti perfectior habeatur notitia.

Objects anthropology we find the doctrine that the universal, which has greater perfection than individual things in nature, is the prope r object of the intellect. Thus scientific knowledge, which is knowledge of the universal, cannot be acquired by the senses. The senses yield up only knowledge of the individual. Of course it is from knowledge acquired through the senses that the intellect comes to a knowledge of the universal by a process of induction. Nevertheless, Aristotle would have denied that the traditional syllogism 'Every man is mortal and Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal' is a demonstrative syllogism. The conclusion, even if true, and even if following from the premisses, does not express scientific knowledge for there can be no scientific knowledge of individuals. In a sense, therefore, the individual person is less perfect than the humanity which he exemplifies. Granted that it is possible to distinguish between different objects of notions in terms of their different degrees of perfection, and between different categorematic notions on the basis of the relative perfection of their objects, a question arises regarding syncat­ egorematic notions. If notion A is more perfect than notion B, is a syncategorematic notion which covers A more perfect than one which covers B? I think that the question has to be answered in the affirmative. A propositional notion P which can figure in an Aristotelian demonstrative syllogism is more perfect in virtue of its object than is a propositional notion Q which is about an individual object in the natural world. The principal syncategorematic notion in P represents, in the way outlined earlier, the whole propositional notion P, and the principal syncategorematic notion in Q represents Q. And to the extent that P is more perfect it seems to follow that the one syncategorematic notion is more perfect than the other. The question whether there are degrees of perfection among syncategorematic notions is not out of keeping with medieval speculation on notions. We have already had to deal with the question whether intuitive notions are in some respect more perfect than abstractive notions, and we discovered that a good deal of medieval theology as well as philosophy lay behind the question. This seems, therefore, a suitable place to raise a question concerning the relative degrees of perfection of categorematic and syncategorematic notions. One obvious

Objects response that might suggest itself is that syncategorematic notions must be more perfect, for whereas people (rational knowers) can have syncategorematic notions, non-human animals cannot . And since having syncategorematic notions is characteristic of more perfect cognitive powers it follows that such notions themselves are also more perfect. It has to be said straight away that there was a good deal of discussion, among our philosophers, regarding the notions that animals can have, and all of them would have rejected the response which I have just been suggesting. Some indeed credited animals with a very impressive array of intellectual talents. I shall now comment on this matter. We have already noted discussions concerning the possible transference of notions from the mind of a human being to the mind of an animal. Those discussions dealt mainly with the question of the effect such transference would have on the intensity of the notion-in particular, on whether a notion of finite intensity would be infinitely weak after the transference, in consequence of the fact that the cognitive powers of animals are extended. There was dispute about the correct answer to that question, but none of our philosophers doubted that animals could form notions. It was not, after all, in dispute that an animal can see, hear, smell, taste, and touch, and to say that it can do those things is to say that it has visual, auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactile notions. Such notions, however, are categorematic; they signify some thing for they are natural representations of what are seen, heard, and so on; they do not signify in some way. It has yet to be shown that the capacity for categorematic notions implie� , or is always accompanied by, a capacity for syncategorematic notions. We shall be dealing with a part of this problem in the next chapter. For the present it is sufficient to note that animals were credited with syncategorematic notions. For propositions contain syncategoremata, and it was believed that animals can think propositionally. Lokert is very clear on this matter. He begins with an objection: If the in terior sensitil'e power ( the imagi nation] cou ld form com plex notions it would follow that it could form a proposi tion for there is

Objects no more reason why i t should form a non-propositional complex than a propositional one. It follows from this that it could form an argument and a syl logism . And hence animals would be able to reason and to form syl logistic arguments, and so woud be rational . But that should not be conceded . Likewise i t would follow that an ani mal could form a syncategorcmatic act . (Not. aW a ) 2 0

Lokert's reply is as follows: Though some would say that ani mals cannot form proposi tions but can form notions correspondi ng to proposit ions, we concede that they form proposi t ions and other d iscursive acts. That seems some­ thing which can be known by experience of the many acts performed by animals . So we can say that animals are rational in this sense, that they can form reasons and arguments . . . But they should not be called rati onal i n the way that men are , for men, through their i n tel lect, can form reasons and argumen ts from common notions as well as from singular ones, and from notions of insensible things as well as of sensible things. (Not. a8 v b-b I ra ) 2 1

Lokert provides no examples of rational acts performed by animals, b u t by his time a large n u m ber of examples were common currency, some of them ancient, deriving from Sextus Empiricus or earl ie·r . One such example is that of the dog who sniffs his way along a trail till he comes to a fork in the road, sniffs one of the t urni ngs, and immedi ately (wi thout sniffing) rushes along the other. 22 This can of cou rse be i n terpreted as an exemplifi cation of the disj unctive syllogism: ' E i ther P or Q, and not P. Therefore Q' . This kind of example could easily be accom modated to Lokert' s belief that animals cannot form common notions, for the dog apparently reasons

'..W Si potentia sensitiva interior possit formare notitias complexas seq ueretur q u od possit formare unam propositionem cum non sit maior ratio de complexa non propositionali quam propositionali. Et ex illo seq uitur q uod possit formare argumentum et syllogis mum. Et per consequens bruta possunt ratiocinari et formare argu menta syllogistica et sic essent rationalia quod non est concedendu m . Similiter sequeretur ex illo brutum posse formare actum syncategorematicum. 2 1 Licet aliq ui dicerent bruta non formare propositiones sed aliq uas notitias proportionabiles propositionibus admittimus tamen quod forment propositiones et discursus. lllud videtur quasi experientia notum ex multis operationibus brutorum. Et conseq uenter possumus dicere bruta rationabilia ad istu m sensum quod possunt formare rationes et argumenta . . . Non tamen eodem modo omnino dicenda sunt rationabilia sicut homines . Possunt enim h omines per intellectum formare rationes et argumenta ex notitiis communibus sicut singularibus et ita ex notitiis rerum insensibiliu m sicut sensibiliu m. n Cranston, Questiones, d2' ".

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with singular notions only; that is, he reasons, 'This turning or that, and not this. Therefore that'. Lokert does not explain why he thinks that animals cannot form com mon notions. But one possible explanation for his thinking that they cannot may be that he holds a position similar to this one presented by Waim: 'There is no other obvious reason as to why a beast could not form a common notion, than that the co-operation of the will is required for the production of such a notion' (Not. c 4 •·a) . 2 3 But the fact that animals are evidently able to extrapolate from their experience of something of a given kind to something else of the same kind, seems to point to an ability to form common notions. Having learnt that he will be rewarded for treating this X in a given way, a dog treats other Xs in the same way. How can he do this without bringing them under the one notion, which will therefore be a common notion? Waim apparently has such phenomena in mind when he writes: 'Those who wish could, without great difficulty, see that beasts form common concepts and universal propositions. There are obvious appearances of this [ in beasts] as in us' (Not. c3 v b ) . 24 Among the kinds- of common notion which Waim lists are conditionate and disjoint notions, for example, 'Socrates if he is Socrates' and ' Socrates or Plato' , each of which is common because each is fitted by its nature to be truly predicable of more than one thing. For example, Socrates is Socrates-or-Plato and so is Plato . The point here is that a com mon notion formed in such ways implies the possibility of having syncategorematic notions. Waim sums up his view of the cognitive powers of animals in this way: I do not t h i n k it an abs u rd conclusion that a beas t be able to form a syncategorematic act having a common term as i ts object. I ad m i t th erefore t h at a beas t c a n form a sy llogistic inference with a s i ngular middle term and one with a com mon middle term. If you therefore wish to call beasts rational because they form reasons and argu ments, the dispu te is merely verbal . B u t that beas ts form proposi tions and :.n Non apparel alia ratio q u are brut um non possi t fo rmare not it iam co m m unem nisi q u ia ad p rod uct ionem notitiae co m m u nis req uiritur concursus vol unt atis . 24 Qui tamen vellet posset sine magno inconvenien ti tueri q uod bruta fo rmant conceptus co m m unes et proposi t iones universales et experien t iae apparent de hoc sicut in nobi s .

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j udgeme n ts is con firmed by many exp �rien ces . Even G regory and Pierre d ' A i lly agree w i t h it. ( Not. c4 ra ) 2 .)

A good deal more could be written about the views of our philosophers on the subject of the cognitive powers of animals. Enough has however now been said to deal with the argument that since people can have both syncategorematic and categorematic notions, and animals can have only categor­ ematic notions, it follows that syncategorematic notions are more perfect than categorematic ones. The short answer is that, whether or not the argument is valid, it is not convincing since the second premiss, that animals can have only categorematic notions, is manifestly false. Our philosophers observed animal behaviour, and the conceptual framework which they provided within which to discuss that behaviour was a very large fragment of the conceptual framework which they provided for discussing the cognitive life of people. There are limits of course to what we can ascribe to animals: 'They may not be able to form a practical syllogism which dictates in full what they are to do. Due to their very coarse humours, they have a dull mind (ohll!,SUm ingenium) and a small capacity' (Waim, Not. c3v 6 ) . But no one doubted their capacity for forming syncategorematic notions, and indeed for forming a good deal more besides. So far in this chapter we have attended to problems relating to the identification of the objects of syncategorematic notions. I should like to turn now to another, closely related matter. There are problems relating to propositional notions which are much like those with which we have just been dealing. Let us begin with an argument which is along much the same lines as one constructed earlier. Since a notion is an act of the cognitive power i t follows that propositional notions are acts. Every act has an object. Therefore every propositional notion has an object. But what is the object of a propositional notion? :.!�> Non habeo pro inconvenicnti brutum posse formare actum syncategorematicum habentem pro obiecto terminum communem. Hine concedo consequenter brutum posse formare conseq uentias syllogisticas de medio singulari et de medio communi. Quod si propter hoc velis vocare bruta rationalia eo videlicet quod formant rationes et argu menta disputatio est ad nomen. Sed quod bruta formant propositiones et iudicia multis experientiis convincitur. Etiam illius sententiae est Gregori us ( 1 Sent., d. 3, a. 1 in _principio) et de Alliaco ( 1 Sent. , q . 3 , a. 1 ) .

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In the late medieval period a major battle was fought over this question. It was a battle with many combatants and with by no means only two sides. Many issues were raised and I should like here to give an idea of some of the opinions canvassed, though I shall not take the matter very far. I hope to deal with the topic in depth elsewhere. Gregory of Rimini stated the position to which in due course everyone had to respond, whether favourably or otherwise. His theory was strongly criticized by Pierre d'Ailly, and after d'Ailly very few philosophers came out in support of Gregory's position. Gregory, addressing theologians and concerned to elucidate, among other things, the question of the object of theological knowledge, proposed that propositions do have objects, and those objects he called complexe signifi­ cabilia- things signifiable in a complex way. 2 6 These significabilia are possible or actual states of affairs. They are not things in the external world, for all such things are substances or accidents and a state of affairs is neither of these. Nor can these states be merely mental phenomena. The states are objects of thought, but that John is silent, which is the object of my thought 'John is silent' , is not a mental phenomenon. Complexe significahilia occupy therefore a third metaphysical realm, neither mental nor physical. Their metaphysical status caused difficulties for subsequent philosophers who could not countenance the mode of existence Gregory ascribed to the objects of propositions. I think that John is silent. The state of affairs I am thinking about is rendered in Latin by the accusative and infinitive construction, Johannem esse silentem, 'that John is silent' or 'John-to-be-silent'. This latter phrase is said to be the 'dictum' corresponding to the proposition, and the dictum names the object of the proposition. It does not merely signify John, (though it includes John's name) and neither does it merely signify a property ( though it includes a term which signifies a property). Neither does it merely signify John and silence, nor '.!fi For modern discussion see G. N u chelmans, Late-Scholastic and Humanist Theories of the Proposition, 53-4; N . Kretzmann, A . Kenny, J . Pi nbor� (eds. ) , The Cambridge Histo�v of Later Afedieval Philoso/Jkl', 203-5; E. J . Ashworth , 'Theories of the proposition : Some early six teen t h cen t u ry discussions', Franciscan Studies, 38 ( 1 978) , 88- 1 2 1 . repr. in E. J . Ashwort h, Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics ( 1 985) .

Objects even the silent John. It signifies that John is silent. What it signifies has a complexity of such a nature that it can be represented only by a certain kind of notion-a propositional notion. Why propositional? Because neither John, nor silence, nor John' s silence, nor the silent John, can be either true or false, bu t that John is silent can be true or false, and the kind of complexity required for representing truth or falsity is propositional. Since, according to Gregory ' s theory, propositions have significates, one implication of his position is that propositions must be classified as categoremata. Indeed, in Gregory 's view a distinction has to be made between the partial significates of a proposition, and its total significate. A partial significate is what is signified by an extreme, that is, by the s ubject or the predicate, or a part of an extreme. The total significate is what is signified by the whole proposition. Gregory was by no means the only major philosopher of his period to argue that propositions have significates. John Buridan, in a qualified way, held the same thesis, though he did not espouse the doctrine of complexe significabilia. Instead, he focused upon the mediating role of the dictum, for on the one side the dictum of a given proposition was said to be synonymous with the proposition with respect to the dictum's essential mode of signifying, and on the other side the dictum was said to be equivalent to a complex expression in which the accusative of the dictum is replaced by the nominative, and the infinitive verb of the dictum is replaced by the corresponding participle. Thus 'that John is loved' (Johannem amari) is equivalent to 'beloved John' (Johannes amatus) . What_ the dictum stands for is the same as what the complex of nominative plus participle stands for. According to this view every dictum is categorematic. And although a proposition cannot in itself be taken for something, it can be taken for something in so far as its synonym with respect to essential mode of signifying, its dictum, can be taken for something. Clearly, this theory does not say in a direct way that propositions are categorematic, but at the same time it is not false to say that Buridan regarded propositions as categor­ ematic. Thus, for Buridan, 'John is loved' signifies the beloved John.

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In the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries there were few who supported the claim that propositions were categor­ ematic. Almost universally it was held that propositions either signify in some way ( aliqualiter) , in which case they are straightforwardly syncategorematic, or signify something in some way ( aliquid aliqualiter) , in which case they are again, though less straightforwardly, syncategorematic. But those many who denied that propositions are categorematic had to justify their opposition. Let us consider an argument for the claim that a proposition signifying propositionally signifies some thing. 2 7 ( 1 ) • A man is an animal' signifies that a man is an animal. Therefore ( 2 ) that a man is an animal is signified by ' A man is an animal'. The inference holds since it is in accordance with the rule 'from active to passive' , by which rule we can, for example, argue that, since A lov�s B, B is loved by A. Furthermore ( 1) is true, and therefore so also is ( 2 ) . But if ( 2 ) is true its subject must stand for something. But the subject is the dictum 'that a man is an animal' . Therefore something, namely, what that dictum stands for, is signified by 'A man is an animal' . However, there is room for doubt over the justification for the move from ( 1) to ( 2). There is indeed a rule sanctioning the move from a proposition with an active main verb to the converse of that proposition with that same verb in the passive voice. As just stated, ' A loves B. Therefore B is loved by A' is valid. But it cannot be assumed that every proposition whose main verb is in the active can be converted salva veritate into a proposition in which the main verb is passive. For example, this is not valid: ' " Every" signifies distributively, therefore distributively is signified by "every" ' . Neither is this: 'A mental term signifies by nature, therefore by nature is signified by a mental term'. In each case the conclusion, or rather, what occupies the place of the conclusion, is not even grammatically well-formed. The point that has to be made is that the move from ( 1 ) to (2) fails in precisely this way. For though ( 1) is true, (2) is not even well-formed. What is wrong with it is that the dictum 'that a man is an animal' is not fitted to be a subject in relation to the verb, for the dictum cannot

Objects stand for anything, even though two of its parts can. But, in respect of their essential mode of signifying, the proposition · A man is an animal' and the dictum 'that a ma n is an animal' are synonymous. T'herefore, as with the dictum, the proposi­ tion, signifying propositionally, cannot stand for some thing, and hence is not categorematic. But if propositions are not categorematic it seems that they must be syncategorematic. Yet why must we say this? The division into categorematic and syncategorematic was in the first instance presented as a division whose head of division is 'term' . Why not say that propositions are not terms and hence cannot be either categorematic or syncategorematic? Yet 'term' was defined in numerous ways, and the definitions were not all equivalent. According to one definition a term is an extreme of a proposition; and since the conjuncts of a conjunctive propositior-1 were classed as extremes it follows that they are terms, and hence on a standard definition of 'term' a proposition, even a proposition signifying pro­ positionally, can be a term. However, this is to approach the problem from the wrong end . The point is, I think, that our philosophers had an enormously useful analytic tool at their disposal in the distinction between categoremata and syn­ categoremata. Some expressions signify some thing and others signify in some way but do not signify some thing. It was inevitable that their curiosity about the semantics of natural language would lead to speculation about the kind of signification possessed by propositions. Of course propositions have signification, but of what kind ? We have considered reasons for doubting that proposit_ions signify categorematically . But Lokert presents an argument (Not. e4va), which has to be treated with respect, to the effect that no proposition can signify syncategorematically . His argument is this: according to a standard account, if a term is syncategorematic it has an effect on the term to which it is added, for that latter term is then taken in a different way from the way it would have been taken before. Thus, if 'every ' is prefixed to 'man', 'man' is taken universally ; if 'no' is prefixed to 'man' , 'man' is taken negatively ; if 'is' is inserted between 'man' and 'animal', those two terms are taken predicatively, and so on. Additionally the term covered by the

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syncategorema 1s, as we have seen, the object of the syncategorema. Yet it i s di fficult to see how these crucial features of syncategoremata can be true of propositions. How can a proposi tion be so added to a term as to have an effect on the way that term i s taken? Indeed, how can a proposi tion be added to a term at all? The recursive procedure, adopted by our philosophers, for the construction of propositions involved adding syncategoremata to categoremata to form propositions, and of adding syncategoremata to propositions to form either more complex categorical propositions or else molecular propositions. They descri be no procedure for adding pro­ posi ti ons directly to anything, though of course a second proposi tion can be introduced and then connected to an earlier one by a sign of conjunction, disjunction, or con­ ditionality. However, there i s more than one way to understand the phrase ' si gnify in some way', and hence there is more than one way to understand the term 'syncategorematic'. Lokert (Not. e5 rb ) presents two ways of understanding these expres­ sions. ( 1 ) A term has a signi fication of such a nature that neither a part of the term . nor the whole of it signifies some thing. Such terms are pure syncategoremata. The list includes ' every', ' some', 'no', 'and', 'or', 'if', 'only', 'except', and " is'. In this sense of 'signify in some way' no proposi­ tion signifies i n some way, for no proposition is a pure syncategorema; every propositi on contains at least one categorematic term. (2) An expression has a signification of such a nature that the expression cannot be taken for some thing, even though a part of it signi fies some thing, for as regards the whole significati on of the expression, it signifies that some thing exists in some way. Lokert adds: ' I say that a proposition, in respect of i ts propositional signi fication, si gnifies i n some way'. In fact, Lokert gives two accounts of the si gni fication of propositions, for he says that they signify in some way, and some thing i n some way . Hi s position appears to be this: it does make sense to speak about the whole significate of a proposition if ' whole significate of a proposition' is taken to mean 'what is signified by the subject or predicate, or both' ( Not. e4 ra). In this sense a propositional notion i s directed to

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some thing, the �some thing' being the significate of the subject or predicate or both. But the proposition also signifies these things in some way, for minimal1y it signifies them predicatively , and also affi rmatively or negatively, and also quantitatively, and if the proposition is molecular, then it also signifies conjunctively, or disjunctively, or conditionally . Of course, it cannot signify in some way without some thing, accordingly, being taken in some way . It is by this route that we reach the concept of the object of a propositional notion, a concept which turns out to be unmysterious, but which has to be carefully delineated. As regards the object of a propositional notion, as of any notion which is complex with a separating connection, if the object of the propositional notion is what is signified by a part of the complex, or by parts of it, then there is no difficulty-a propositional notion has an object, or indeed several objects. . But if the only object that the notion can have is the thing, or things, for which the notion is fitted to be taken, then it has no object. I shall close this chapter by considering briefly a question about the limits to our capacity to have intuitive notions. Are there things which we think now exist, though they cannot be objects of a present intuitive notion? The answer given by all our philosophers was that there are such things. Sensible things are not among them. It was accepted that every sensible thing can be an object of an intuitive notion, though it was generally pointed out that for many sorts of reason it may not be possible for the obj ect to be intuited. The stock example was of a sensible obj ect which is so small that it cannot be seen. It is not clear from the descriptions of this case whe_ther what is at issue is a smallness due to distance and the laws of perspective, or whether the thing is so small that, however close it may be to the eye, it is still too small to be visible, as with atomic particles. In both instances it was recognized that what is, for some reason, invisible to people, may not be invisible to all with a power of sight. Much was made of the ability of cats to see in the dark. We need not concern ourselves here with the discussions on whether this ability is due to a cat's power to radiate into the air the luminosity of its own eyes, or whether its eyes are simply more perfect than human eyes in that a cat's can make good use of very low

Objects levels of light. 28 Whatever the means, the outcome is that something can be an object of a visual notion even if it is impossible for people to see it. I t is necessary merely that it be possible for someone or something to see it. We are dealing here with a tautology. 'Sensible' means 'can be se nsed' . To sense something is to have an intuitive sensitive notion of it. It is therefore tautological to say that every sensible thing can be the object of an intuitive notion. I ntuitive notions are not, however, only of sensible things. We have already considered reflexive notions. In so far as notion A has as its distinct obj ect the presently existing notion B, A is an intuitive notion of a notion and therefore of a non­ sensible obj ect. Since notions are acts of a cognitive power it follows that we can in tuit some mental acts. But whether certain other kinds of thing we believe, or know, to exist can be obj ects of an intuitive notion was subject to a good d.eal of discussion. I shall turn briefly to three matters raised under this heading. Lokert writes: 'Our min d . . . so far as it remains united to matter, and acting by nature and without God' s special help, can know intuitively no irisensible thing except itself and its own acts' (Not. d2v b). 29 But do we have an intuitive notion of our own mind? Crab wonders whether 'My mind exists' is known instead as the conclusion of an inference. 'I think, and not unless with a mind' might be the simply evident premiss from which we deduce 'My mind exists'. But Crab is unhappy about this suggestion, since the second half of the antecedent is not evident (Not. d2 r lrva ). He does not say why he thinks the second half inevident, but in any case his view, and that of all our philosophers, is that each of us has an intuitive notion of his own mind. Mair, for example, writes: 'The intellective mind in this life can have intuitive natural knowledge of itself. Proof: before discourse, the mind knows by experience that it exists and is alive. And according to Augustine [ De Trinitate 15 , 12] it cannot be deceived in this' (2 Sent. 45 va ). 30 28 e.g . Wai m , Not. d 3 ra _ :N A n i m a nos t ra . . . u t manet u n i ta ma teriae et natura l i ter agenda sine speciali dei auxilio n u l l am rem i nsensibilem po test i n t u i ti ve cognoscere n isi ipsammet et suos proprios actus. :m Anima i n tellectiva pro statu viae potest i n t u i tive natura l i ter cognoscere se

Objects But the thesis that the mind's knowledge of itself is intuitive was seen to give rise to a difficulty, namely, why if the mind ever knows itself intuitively it is not in a permanent state of knowing itself intuitively. If the mind is always present why is it not always an obj ect of knowledge? Since the sufficient cause is always present, why is its effect not always present also? But there are di fferent ways in which something might be present. Mair, dealing with a related matter, affirms that God is as much present to the mind as the mind is present to itself, but a distinction has to be drawn be tween different sorts of presentness, entitative presentness and obj ective presentness. X is entitatively present to Y if X exists in the presence of Y. Thus I am in the presence of the queen in so far as we are quite close and facing each other. But 'in the presence of ' in that sense does not imply that the queen is looking at me, or that she knows by an:y means that I am there . Objective presentness is being present as an obj ect in relation to a subj ect . To be obj ectively present to X is to be an obj ect for X, and in this case X has grasped that the obj ect is there . Mair' s point is that God, though always present to the mind, is always entitatively presen·t to it but not always obj ectively present. The same distinction can be applied to the mind itself. That it is always entitatively present to itself does not imply that it is obj ectively present. But we must ask whether the supposed parallel between the queen and myself on the one hand and the mind and itself on the other, is a helpful parallel. I and the queen are at some distance from each other, and it is easy to think of reasons why either might not be aware of the presence of the other. But there is no distance at all between the mind and itself, and in that case it seems that the reasons why one person might be entitatively present, while not obj ectively present, to another do not at all illuminate the problem of how the mind can fail to be obj ectively present to itself. Perhaps it is not always obj ectively present to itself because it is not its nature to be so. One possibility, that is, is that the mind is by its nature directed outwards. When I am looking at things in the natural world, my attention is not on myself or on my perceptual act ipsa m . Proba tur: ante d iscursum a n i m a novit experimentali ter se esse et vivere. Nee in hoc potest fa l l i secund u m Augusti n u m .

Objects but on the object. \Vhen I am pleased with someone my attention is directed to the person, not to my pleasure or to myself who am pleased. I f, then, the natural direction of the mind is outwards, and if, within the created order, the two kinds of causation · are, as our philosophers believed, natural causation and free causation, it follows that the mind directs its attention to itself not by nature but by wil l. And this, indeed, is the conclusion drawn by al l our philosophers. Lokert, for example, after pointing to the fact that we can turn inward to a knowledge of our own mind, adds that this cannot be done without an act of will. 3 1 Waim adds a rider not mentioned by some of his col leagues, though I believe they would have agreed with him: 'The mind of a beast cannot know itself intuitively. I give no other reason for the distinction than the imperfect nature of the mind of a beast and the perfect nature of a rational mind' (Not. g3"' 6 ) . 32 Since it was held both that intuitive knowledge of the self requires an act of free wil l and that beasts are not capable of such acts, Waim's rider can come as no surprise. The implication is, I think, that the difference, mentioned by Waim, between the imperfec t nature of a beast and the perfect nature of a rational mind is that the rational mind is capable of acts of free will. This teaching regarding the lack of self-consciousness in beasts is unexpected, in view of the extent to which our philosophers worked within a conceptual framework inherited from Aristotle. I t was generally held, as we have seen, that animals are capable of rational thought, are capable, in particular, of forming syllogisms whose middle term is singular. But in so far as we believe animals to have a capacity to reason this is because we believe their behaviour to be inexplicable except on the assumption that they do reason, or at least to be best explained on that assumption. Their reasoning therefore is of a kind that can be manifested in practice. That is to say, they are capable of practical reasoning, reasoning whose proper conclusion is an action, not merely a thought. Hence they must be capable of choice . 3 1 non potest fieri sine actu vol untatis (Not. df b ) . 32 Anima bru ti non potest se intuitive cognoscere. Aliud nihil pro discri mine do nisi imperfectam naturam animae bruti et perfectam animae rationalis.

Objects Choice, as all agreed, is rational desire, desire sanctioned in some way by reason, and such desire is, except in the problematical case of weakness of will, an immediate cause of rational action. Now, Aristotle maintained that an animal's action can be voluntary, 3 3 in the sense that (i) it can act knowingly and (ii) the principle of action, its desire, is within. 34 The desire itself may, of course, be prompted by something external, but that external thing is then merely a mediate cause of action, and therefore not a principle in the required sense. But Aristotle also maintained that an animal's action cannot be chosen, 35 for choice comes at the end of a process of deliberation, or practical reasoning, and animals, lacking a faculty of reason, are not capable of deliberation . It seems to me, therefore, that in respect of their teaching on the nature of the actions of animals, our late scholastics were in clear opposition to Aristotle, though none of them said so. It has to be stressed that it is not the Aristotelian conceptual framework that was at issue, but instead what is, in a sense, an empirical question, that of how animals stand in relation to that framework. All agreed over the conceptual question of what choice is. Of course there are limits that have to be attended to. We have already noted Waim's observation: 'They [animals] may not be able to form a practical syllogism which dictates in full what they are to do. Due to their very coarse humours, they have a dull mind and a small capacity' ( Not. cf' b ). 36 He is not saying that they cannot form a practical syllogism at all-he is fully committed to the view that they can. But in respect of subtlety, complexity, and depth, their practical syllogisms fall far short of those of which people are capable, and of course animals are absolutely incapable of forming a practical syllogism whose major premiss is a principle of virtue . However, we must not lose sight of the fact that reasoning of the form ' I want X . To get X I must do F. I can do F. Therefore . . . ', where the conclusion is the performance of F, :u Nicomarhean Ethics,

1 1 1 1b

8- g.

'!:) I bi d . 1 1 1 1 b 9. :H I bid . 1 1 1 1 " 2 2 -4. :iti Non oportet tamen q u od possi nt formare syl logi smum practicum dictantem plene de agend is. H aben t enim h u mores m u l t u m g rossos et ideo obtusu m ingen i u m et capacitatem parva m .

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is practical reasoning, and is one kind of practical reasoning of which animals were thought capable. My point is tha t, whatever the shortcomings of their practical syllogisms, to claim that they can prod uce such syllogisms at all is already to run counter to Aris totelian doctrine. Before leaving the topic of intuitive notions of one's own mind, I should like to mention, without here developing, two points concerning our notions of the minds of others. First, it was held that though we can have a notion of the mind of another person, that notion is not intuitive. Crab, referring to things known to us in the form of a concept made up or formed by the mind, gives as an example a person knowing the mind of another by noticing certain signs or actions, and by arguing that the other has a mind of the same kind as he himself has (Not. b7 ra). Plainly this knowledge, as mediated by premisses, is not intuitive. But neither is it abstractive without qualification. According to the stand ard account, an abstractive notion of X is formed after, or, according to Ockham, at the same time as, an intuitive notion of X. It is because our notion of the mind of another is not preceded by or accompanied by an intuitive notion of the other's mind ; that our notion of the other's mind is not abstractive without qualification. The peculiarity of the kind of notion at issue here is marked by calling it discursive; only by a discursive process do we ever reach the notion. But though we can never have an intuitive notion of another mind, none of our philosophers thought that such a notion was absolutely ruled out. Though such notions are unavailable to us they are available to others. Angels, unencumbered by the restrictions which beset human beings in this life. -in particular, by the constraints arising from materiality-were thought able to have an unmediated insight into the mind of another. We read the mind of another from his face, his actions, his utterances, and so on. An angel sees the mind as directly as we see the face. While it is difficult to gain a clear insight into this doctrine of the angel's view, it must mean more than nothing to us, for we do know what an intuitive notion of the self is like, since we have an intuitive notion of our own self. What we are required to grasp is just such a notion, though directed outwards and not inwards. Earlier I dealt with the role of will in securing an intuitive

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notion of one 's own mind, and argued that since the mind's natural direction is outwards, it is not by nature , but must be by will, that a notion of one's own mind is secured. The topic was raised because it seemed inexplicable how we can ever have an intuitive notion of our own mind without having such a notion all the time. But it can be argued that if will is required in such a case, it must also be required in respect of our mental acts. The question, briefly put, is how we can ever be aware of our mental acts without always being aware of them. Our philosophers appear to have thought that similar considerations arise in dealing with a notion of our mind and a notion of our mental act. They discussed the matter in terms of applicatio ( = 'application' or 'attachment'). Our mental acts, notions, are directed outwards to their objects. If I perceive an object the mind attaches itself to the object; if I am angry , my mind attaches itself to the object of the anger; if I want X , likewise . This is not of course to deny that the mind can attend to the acts themselves, it is only to say that the first move is always outwards. But since it was supposed that by nature our acts are directed outwards, the mind must apply itself to the acts themselves not by nature but by will. Thus Lokert say s: ' It should be said that the mind does not always know its own acts. For such knowledge a due application to those acts, through an act of will, is necessary' (Not. d3 rb ). 3 7 If it is insisted that the mind knows its own acts by nature then a serious problem is posed by something recognized as a fact by everyone who raised the matter, namely , that we only sometimes know our own mental acts. Why are we not aware of the acts during all the time that the acts exist? That we do not always will to attend to those acts seems a plausible answer to the question. One consideration which increases the plausibility of this answer is the considerable difficulty of the act of attending to one' s own mental acts. It is a commonplace that attention to the act, rather than to the object of the act, tends to diminish or destroy the act, for the act is sustained by its object, as for example when we are angry at someone and then apply our minds to our anger rather than to the person we are angry at :l 7 Oicend um est quod non semper cognoscit suos actus sed requiritur eius debita applicatio ad illos per actum voluntatis.

Objects and his heinous behaviour. Often, at least, it could only be by a considerable effort of wil l that we could direct our attention to the act as opposed to the object. We gain evidence of our inner life by looking at our mental acts in an oblique fashion, catching them unawares and out of the corner of our eye , in an effort to notice them without so directing our attention away from the objects of those acts as to destroy that without which the acts themselves cou ld not exist. This de licate operation, requiring skill and discretion, is covered by Lokert's phrase 'a due application to the acts, through an act of wil l'. It is easy to see why it should be thought that the wil l is required for that due application, and why, even with due application, little information may be yielded. This latter aspect is stressed by Waim: ' If a mind intuits its acts it does not follow that by virtue of that intuitive notion it can know all the truths knowable of such acts. It is su fficient that by virtue of the intuitive notion of its acts it judges that it knows that object, hates it, loves it' (Not. g3va ) . 38 Of course, as Waim goes on to point out, an intuitive notion of an external object does not yiel d all the truths knowable about that object. But it is plain that there are additional obstacl es in the way of discovering truths about one's mental acts . That we make oblique observations of the kind referred to above seems hinted at by Mair. This at least seems the implication of a remark by Mair: 'Our mind, in this life , can know its acts intuitively. This concl usion is obvious from experience when the mind reflects upon its acts of understanding or wil ling which it reme mbers after the event. Therefore sometimes it knows those acts intuitively' ( 2 Sent. 45 rb ) . 39 We must k_now our acts intuitively since we know them abstractively, where those abstractive notions are recordative. Why does not Mair simply say that we do sometimes intuit our mental acts? I think the answer is that we are barely aware of those acts while they are taking place, and certainly cannot linger over 38 Non oportet si a n i ma in tueatur actus suos q uad virtute illius notitiae intui tivae possi t omnes veri tates cognoscibi les de huiusmodi acti bus cognoscere sufficit quod virtute not i t i ae i n t u i tivae actus sui ipsa i u dicat se hoc obiectum cognoscere hoc odire hoc diligere. 19 · An ima nos tra pro hoc statu potest intuit ive cognoscere actus suos . l sta conclusio experien tia patet q uando anima reAectit se s u per actus suos in telligendi vel volendi de qui bus recordatur post factu m. Ergo in terdum cognoscit eos i n t u i t ive.

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them, for fear of destroying them. But we are able obliquely to catch a glimpse of them, and this glimpse can be recollected subsequently wi thou t detriment to the act recalled. If this is the best way to view our mental acts then there can be nothing surprising in Waim's remark concerning the pauci ty of knowledge yielded by our notions of such acts. Unlike our mental acts, which can, however obliquely, be objects of an intuitive notion, our disposi tions, and therefore our cognitive disposi tions also, cannot. Lokert reports: 'As regards disposi tions, all for the most part agree that there cannot be intui tive knowledge of disposi tions, and therefore there cannot be proper and distinct abstractive knowledge of them ei ther. We can have no experience of them' (Not . d2 \· h ). 40 His 'for the most part' implies dissenting voices, but I have found none among his colleagues. The central point, upon which there was unanimi ty among our philosophers, is that i t is only by an inference that we come to j udge that dispositions exist. They are known discursively. What we know by experience is that the more often we perform acts of a given kind the more prompt we become at performing such acts. The promptness calls for explanation. Evidently, sheer frequency makes a difference to us, and whatever that difference is in i tself it is known in i ts effect, the greater promptness of our acts. Thus the concept of disposi tion was regarded as having an explanatory force­ 'disposition' is a name given to whatever i t is that produces a given experienced effect. Of course we do not experience the effect as an effect. But nei ther do we doubt that i t is one. Yet we do not have an intui tive notion of the cause, and therefore have only a discursive notion of i t, a notion mediated by premisses. Our notions of our disposi tions must therefore be classed wi th our notions of the minds of others, and, as w i th our notions of the minds of others, we cannot have scientific knowledge of the existence of our disposi tions; our arguments for their existence are only probable arguments. Yet there is ground for puzzlement that we should not have an intui tive notion of our disposi tions, given that they are in w De habitibus omnes pro maiore parte in hoc conveniunt quod non poss unt in tuitive cognosci et ex consequen te nee abst ractive proprie et distincte. De illis nullam possumus habere experien tiam .

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some sense just as present to the cogmt1ve power as are its acts. They are 'there', present to the power. Why, then, not available for an intuitive notion? But we have already observed that distinctions have to be made between different sorts of presentness . There is objective presentness and local presentness ( the latter hardly, if at all, distinguishable from entitative presentness) , and the fact that the disposition is locally present to the cognitive power in virtue of being a quality of that power, does not carry the implication that it is a possible object of an intuitive notion. Of course, to say that a disposition is locally but not objectively present is not to solve our problem, but instead is merely to provide terminology in which the problem can be restated. What we wish to know is why a disposition, though locally present, is not also objectively present. But in fact no proof is offered by any of our philosophers for the proposition that an intuitive notion of a disposition is not possible . Each one says that a disposition cannot be an object of an intuitive notion but does not say what it is about dispositions which prevents their being such objects. Crab states that the only answer we can give is that it is in the nature of the thing ( de natura rei) not to be intuitable (Not. c4ra ) , but does not say what it is about that nature which makes the disposition non­ intui table. However, if Crab thinks that there is nothing more to be said, and therefore that no further explanation can be found in nature, he may well consider that the only kind of explanation left is supernatural. I n particular, the only explanation can be the fact that the creator willed dispositions to be outwith the bounds of possible intuitive cognition by his creatures, at least in this life. That things are as they are is always explicable in terms of God's will, and some ti mes is explicable only in those terms. For not everything in nature is explicable in terms of secondary ca uses .

4

Sensory Notions and I ntellectu al Notions I N this chapter I shall focus on a principle of division which is implicit in many points made in preceding chapters, and which is related in a variety of ways to other principles of division already considered. The starting-point is the role played by our sensory receptors in the acquisition of knowledge. We know of the existence of some things and of their properties because we see those things and their properties. We have to allow absolutely the possibility of a being either with sensory receptors utterly unlike ours, or lacking sensory receptors en tirely , yet who can acquire a notion which is much like the notion that we acquire by opening our eyes and looking at a material object . But though, absolutely speaking, to acquire such a notion receptors like ours are not necessary, God has ordered our world in such a way that, without a special act of grace, many of the notions that we do have we could not have without the exercise of our sensory receptors. But notions may be more or less immediately related to the exercise of our sensory receptors. The receptor is related most immediately to . the notion if the receptor' s exercise produces an evident notion of the present existence of an external obj ect and of the present possession, by the object, of certain properties. In this case . the notion depends, both for its existence and also for its conservation, upon the simultaneous exercise of the sensory receptor. A notion of such a kind is called an outer or exterior sensory notion. Such a notion is of one of five kinds, the kinds corresponding to the five sensory modalities. In medieval writings, as in writings since, much the greatest space is devoted to visual notions, far less to auditory notions, while tactile, gustatory, and olfactory notions receive very little attention, though their existence is at least acknowledged.

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Outer sensory notions are intui tive . I ndeed the visual notion is the pa rad igm case of an intui tive notion . But the term ' i n t uitive' has to be hand led care fully here . A cen tral feature of an intui tive act is that it makes immedi ate contact with its obj ect . It migh t be argued that in the case of an outer sensory notion, for exam ple, my visual notion of the sheet of paper I am wri ting o n , the notion is med iated , for only by using my eyes can I have that notion . Since my eyes are instrumental in my having the notion, they mediate between the perceptual act and the obj ect perceived . B u t this is to misund ers tand the concept of 'intuition' as employed here . ' I ntu i tion' is contrasted wi th 'discursive knowledge' , that is, knowledge mediated by premisses . To know something discurs­ ively is to know it as the conclusion of an inference. To know it intui tively is to know i t without any medi ating knowledge . Certainly, my eyes can .be said to med iate between the notion and the obj ect seen , but the rol e played by my eyes is neither the same as , nor even similar to, that pl ayed by a premiss from which I h ave inferred something. I n the latter case I know something not merely through something else, but through my knowledge of something "else, namely, of the premisses. I do not know something through my knowledge of something else if I know the something i n virtue of having an exterior sensory notion of i t . As w e l l as being intui tive, an ou ter sensory notion has two further, closely related properties which must be noted . First, such a notion is categorematic for it can only represen t the obj ect which is a partial efficient cause of the notion 's existence . A visual notion represents the thing seen , an aud itory notion the thing heard . Each ou ter sensory notion represents some thing. None therefore represents in some way, which is to say that none is syncategorematic. Secondly, every outer sensory notion is si ngular, for each is truly pred icable only of the objec t which is i ts partial cause. My outer sensory notion of a donkey cannot be of any and every donkey, for my notion is of the very donkey at which I am now looking and is of no other. One further property should be mentioned here, as providing the basis for a contras t which I shall be making shortly . Since an outer sensory notion represents a ' this ' , i ts proper syn tactic

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role is that of a subject or predicate in a proposition. Thom ists indeed would argue (rightly, I believe, though I do not wi sh to argue the point at present) that its proper syntactic role is that of a subject only, and certainly not that of a predicate. But whether a Thomist or an Ockhamist positi on is adopted on the matter, we must conclude that an outer sensory notion cannot be propositional since it is categorematic. Neither, by the same token, can it be non-propositional wi th a separat­ ing connection, for syncategorematic particles cannot, as already noted, be outer sensory notions. Outer sensory notions were regarded as simple, though of course they gi ve ri se in turn to complex notions since, on the basi s of them, we give evi dent assent to proposi ti ons affirmi ng the existence both of the objects of those outer sensory notions and also the possession, by those obj ects, of certain properties. The outer senses are by their nature directed outwards, and they cannot by any act of will be got to perform any act contrary to that nature. Vi sual notions are cogni ti ve acts which, by nature, can terminate only at obj ects external to the visual receptor. Mutatis mutandis the same must be sai d in respect of the other sensory modali ti es. It follows that no faculty of outer sense can perform a reflex;i ve act ( Wai m, Not. g3 rb-va ) . We can use our eyes to see a donkey, but not to see our seeing. But there i s no doubt that we can reflect upon our outer sensory notions, and if not with our outer senses then with what? We have two powers whi ch can perform such an act, that of inner sense and of intellect. I shall consider them in turn. The power of inner sense i s a power to imagi ne things w_hich had previously been objects of the outer senses. This statement will require clari fication, but should serve for immediate purposes. As formulated it appears to i ndicate a basi s for the disti nction, explored earlier, between intuitive and abstracti ve notions. I see an obj ect, shut my eyes, and 'visualize' the obj ect. Wi th my eyes shut, and i n no other immediate perceptual contact with the obj ect, I am of course no longer able to gi ve evi dent assent to a proposition affirming the existence of the object. But the present abstractive notion of the perceptual obj ect is no less dependent upon the previous exerci se of the outer sensory receptor than the intui tive notion

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which I had previously had of the object. It was therefore thought appropriate to classify the imagination as a sensory faculty. But it was called a faculty of inner rather than outer sense since, as just observed, for its exercise it requires neither the presence of its object nor the present exercise of any outer sense organ. Whatever the merits of the term 'inner sense', and I think they are few, all our philosophers used it . I shall retain it, though with the caveat that no more signification should be read into the term than our philosophers explicitly ascribed to it. In this connection Juan de Oria I draws a distinction between a thing being known either ·in itself, or in its likeness as in an image or picture. As regards exercise of the sensory powers, he is attending here to the distinction between outer sense, by which we know things in themselves, and inner sense (fantasia) , by which w� know things in the image or picture which is in our mind. Although the division of notions into intuitive and abstractive is immediately relevant to the division into outer and inner sense, for all outer sense notions are intuitive and some inner sense notions are abstractive, the concept of an intuitive notion is equally applicable to notions of outer and inner sense, for some inner sense notions are intuitive. It was commonly held that, unlike outer sense, which cannot reflect upon any mental act, inner sense can reflect upon acts of both outer and inner sense, as when the inner sense dreams that it is dreaming (Waim, Not. g3 va ) . But such a reflexive act is not possible unless we intuit a notion. Hence the act is intuitive. However, using the distinction between intuitive and abstractive notions, we can still formulate a logical distinction between notions of outer and of inner sense. Any notion of outer sense, merely in virtue of being of the outer sense, is also intuitive, whereas no notion of inner sense is intuitive merely in virtue of being of inner sense. Since a notion's being intuitive implies that it is singular whereas a notion's being abstractive does not, a question arises as to whether a further distinction can be drawn between notions of outer and of inner sense, for perhaps 1 De Conceptu et Modo Concipiendi, in Opera Logica, i.

60.

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though notions of the former sort must be si ngular there can be common , or un i versal, notions of the latter sort. But, wi th a certai n quali fication, it was gen erally held that there can be no common noti on in the in ner sense. Whatever we imagi ne is si ngular, that is, the act has a un ique proper object. The quali ficati on ari ses because of an unexpected, com­ monly held doctri ne. Lokert writes: 'I concede that in the i nner sensiti ve power there can be a common complex notion composed of singulars. But there ca nnot be an incomplex [ common notion� composed of si n gulars] ' (Not. b I rb) . 2 He adds that i t i s in respect of i ncomplex notions that we should accept the di ctum 'Common notions are not found in the faculty of sense'. 3 Of the two kinds of complex notion to whi ch we have attended, those notions which are complex by a separating connection (complexae complexione distante) and those which are complex by a non-separating con nection , i t is the former ki nd which i s here at i ssue. My notion of Tom i s si ngular. So also is my notion o f Dick. Each o f these notions i s i ncomplex. I n addition I can form a notion represented by the disjunction 'Tom or Dick'. This notion is plai n ly complex. Also unlike the other two, it is not si ngular. For Tom is Tom­ or-Dick, and so is Dick. My disjunctive notion is predicable of each of two thin gs, and hence is common. The surprising element in this doctri ne is the claim that there can be syncategorematic terms in the i nner sense. How can there be? They are certai nly not i nherited from outer sense. Crab affirms that beasts and men can not form complex notions i n the outer sense, for every notion of outer sense i s a simple intuitive notion , and no complex notion is of this ki nd. If the faculty of outer sense could have complex notions i t must be able to compose a n d divide (that i s , form affirmative and negative propositions)-whi ch i t can not do because it cannot form a copula , which i s a pure syncategorema. For it forms a notion only of what causes a species i n the organ of sense, but a sy ncategorematic 1_1otion i s not of any thi n g, and therefore is not of what causes a species in the organ of sense (Not. b4ra ). Why, then , hold that animals form complex 2 Concedo quod in potentia sensi tiva interiore potest esse not i tia com munis complexa composita ex singularibus. Sed nulla potest esse incomplexa. 3 In sensu non reperi tur noti tia com munis.

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notions? Crab continues: �This proposition is proved by experience of m any anim als, as the doctors teach. But there is one reason which Gregory puts in this way: There can be no discipline without com plex notions. But m any animals can be disciplined. Therefore they form complex notions. '4 No doubt wha t Gregory has in mind is that an animal can appreciate that either it behaves as instructed or it is punished. And in this context use could also be made of the supposed reasoning by which a dog sniffs one turning in the fork and rushes down the other without first sniffing it. Anim als are relevant here because it is allowed that there cannot be syncategorematic notions in the outer sense , and animals lack a faculty of intellect-the faculty which we would otherwise have supposed to be the only one which could generate such notions. Since the only remaining candidate for a facult-y which animals have which could produce such notions is that of inner sense, the conclusion to be drawn is that that faculty can indeed produce syncategore­ matic notions. Crab concludes therefore : I f you say that a beas t cannot form a copula or a syncategorematic act since nothing cou ld be known except through species and one cannot see by what such species [sc. species corresponding to com­ plex notions] are caused , I say that the imagination from its own nature can form s uch a unitive act out of incomplex notions of other, pre-existing things. 5 It should be added however that the sym pathy many of our philosophers had for the view that animals are capable of reasoning, tends to weaken their case for the claim that animals lack a faculty of intellect. Or perhaps it should be ·said that it was only by ascr�bing to the faculty of inner sense certain activities which we should naturally think of as intellectu al that they succeeded in maintaining that animals 4 Probatur ista proposito per experientiam in multis animalibus ut deducunt doctores. Sed formatur una ratio quam ponit Gregorius sic: disciplina sine notitiis complexis haberi non potest sed multa sunt animalia disciplinabilia. Ergo talia formant notitias complexas. 5 Si dicas quod brutum non potest formare copulam sive actum syncategorematicum cum nihil posset cognosci nisi per speciem et non videtur a quo causatur talis species, ad hoc dico q u od fantasia ex sua propria natura potest huiusmodi act um unitivum formare ex notitiis incomplexis aliarum rerum praeexistentiu m.

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can in fact perform all the mental acts they do perform, while maintaining also that animals lack a faculty of intellect. The sympathy I am speaking of breaks through at many points, as when Waim notes: �Those who wish could, without great difficulty, see that beasts form common concepts and universal propositions. We have obvious experiences of this in beasts as in us' (Not. c3 v b ). 6 And Crab takes his starting-point from the doctrine that a term signifying an act of the sensitive appetite gives merely confused supposition to the immediately following term. 7 He proceeds as follows: A donkey wants oats. Which oats? Does it want some oats in particular? It has a notion of oats, but it is surely not a singular notion, for any oats will do as well as any other. If the donkey had a notion of these oats then the mental term 'oats' would have determinate supposition, which is ruled out by the doctrine with which we started, concerning the kind of supposition given by a term signifying an act of the sensitive appetite. From which it appears to follow that the donkey 's notion of oats is a common, not a singular notion. I think that this last argument contains anthropomorphic elements which invalidate it. Does the donkey really imagine oats without imagining any oats in particular? It is important to keep in mind the fact that the donkey cannot intellectualize objects of his outer sense . He can only imagine them, and what he imagines, he has previously perceived. The donkey' s faculty o f imagination i s a faculty o f memory. He cannot imagine oats except by remembering oats. What he remembers seeing he now wants to eat. That he has already eaten them (if he has) is irrelevant, for the donkey is not aware that they are no longer available. And since recollective notions are by nature singular, the donkey's imaginative notion is singular. Since furthermore the object of his desire is the obj ect of his imaginative notion, the obj ect of his desire also is singular. There is a metaphysical underpinning to these epistemo­ logical points. The reason why a simple common notion cannot be in outer sense is that each notion in outer sense 6 Qui tamen vellet possit sine magno inconvenienti tueri quad bruta formant concept us communes et propositiones universales et experientiae apparent de hoc sicu t in nobis. 7

Not . b 2 " b _

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signifies some single thing. None signifies a common thing. What we have to deal with here is the nominalist response to the problem of universals. As is clear from their solutions� which I outlined earlier, universals are not possible objects of any notion of outer sense. Universals canno t even be imagined to be obj ects of outer sense, for universals are either, in accordance with Ockham ' s fictum theory, inten tional objects held in existence in the mind by an intellectual act, or, in accordance with Ockham ' s intellectio theory, are those very acts of intellect. But what cannot be imagined to be an object of outer sense cannot be an object of inner sense. Hence incomplex common notions cannot be in inner sense, whether the inner sense of humans or of animals. But by whatever means our philosophers succeeded in identifying certain notions of the inner sense as syncategorematic, their conclusion seems sound: if such notions can be produced in the inner sense then com mon notions, but only of the complex variety, also can be produced in it . Waim adds an important point : 'Several singular notions of things are required for a common notion. And the co­ operation of the will is required for this. For there is no other obvious reason why a beast could not form a common notion except that co-operation of the will is required for the production of such a notion' (Not. c4 ra ). 8 There are two stages in the production of a com mon notion, which I shall term the stages of information and of formation, the first passive and the second active. There must first be a notion in outer sense. The notion is in outer sense purely by nature for I have only to open my eyes and I see what I see. I do not will to see an object if I am looking at it. Either at the same time or subsequently I have in inner sense a notion of that same obj ect. This no tion of inner sense is, of course, singular. I next have in outer sense a notion whose object is of the same kind as the obj ect of the previous no tion, and at the same time or subsequently I have in inner sense a notion of the same object. What I have so far described is a process which can take place 8 Req uirun t u r plures notitiae singu lares rerum significatarum per talem notitiam com mu nem et cum hoc req uiritur concursus ipsius volunta tis. Nam non apparef alia ratio quare bru tum non possit formare notitiam communem nisi quia ad productionem notitiae comm u n is req uiri t u r concu rsus volun tatis.

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in the cognitive power of men and beasts. It is a process of being informed by external objects-the stage of information­ and is passive. We receive the forms of the extern al things. But the next process is not passive. I can reflect upon the two notions of in ner sense and notice the similarity between the obj ects of those two notions. I cannot notice the similarity without forming a notion of that in respect of which the two obj ects are alike. As already said, that in respect of which the two are alike is not itself an external thing available for inspection by the senses. If I notice that the two obj ects are both white, then I form a notion of what they are alike in, but I cannot say that since they are both white and since I can see the whiteness of each I can see the common thing, namely, whiteness. For what I see is the whiteness of the first obj ect, which is as singular as the first obj ect, and the whiteness of the second obj ect which is as singular as the second obj ect. What they have in common is something incomplete, which can best be expressed by the incomplete expression 'the whiteness of-' , and there is no such thing as that in the e xternal world. But we can certainly form a notion of it. The point Waim wishes to stress is that it is not by nature but by will that such a notion is formed. Since animals lack will they lack a faculty for the formation of incomplex common notions. It is because this stage, that of formation, occurs only by an act of will that I referred to it as the active stage . But when Waim states that the only obvious reason why an animal can not form a common notion ( that is, an incomplex common notion) is that an act of will is required, his point is not as clearly stated as it might be. There are two reasons why an animal cannot form an incomplex common notion. One is, as j ust noted, that an act of will is required. The other is that such a notion can not be in either outer or in n er sense, and animals have no other cognitive faculty . What I miss in the various discussions on this topic by our philosophers is a clear account of that aspect of the difference between incomplex and complex common notions which ensures that the will is necessary for incomplex common notions in humans, and is not necessary for complex common notions in animals. All our philosophers held that common notions are in the

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99 in tellect, that is, are i n tel lectual notions . Th u s , through the intellect we think u niversally abou t thi ngs . I t is also through the intellect that we grasp i nsensi ble thi ngs, for we do have notions of i nsensi bles , and plainly no sensi tive notion can be had of s uch thi ngs (Lokert, Not. at b) . Th us, as already discussed, we have a notion of our own mind and notions of our mental acts . We also have a notion of God . B u t there is a difference here for we can have an intui tive notion of our mi nd, and of our own acts ; but in this life, and without a special act of grace, we cannot have an intu itive notion of God . Our notion of him can be said to be abs tractive, but abstractive i n the sense that it is discursive. We have no i m med iate insight i n to hi m, but know of him through evid en ce, whether the evidence of someone who speaks wi th authori ty, or the cos mological evidence. But in all cases it is by' indirect means that we learn what he is like. A notion gained in this way is, by defini tion , not intuitive. We also have an abstractive notion of s u bs tance. We see an obj ect, notice that it changes, and distinguish between i ts accidents and something which is there and in which those accidents i nhere as in a s u bject . The subj ect is cal led ma tter or su bs tance (in one sense of the term 'substance') (C ranston , Post. d6 rb) . Plai n ly we have arrived a t our notion of substance by an intellectual process, and not at all by an immediate apprehens ion . Su bstance, as the term is here being used, is not a possi ble object of sensory i ns pection, but is what we su ppose to exist (or s u bsist) as a s upport for what is available for sensory i ns pection; for 'only accidents fall under the senses' (C rans ton, i bid .). 9 Since the notion of the substance in which certain accidents i n here is not intuitive it must be classed as abs tractive, but unl ike those abs tractive notions which are preceded by correspondi ng intuitive notions, our abs tractive notion of material s u bs tance is not a dis tinct proper notion (Lokert, Not. c6 ra) . The i ntellect is not, however, restricted t o having only notions of the k i nd j us t descri bed . C rab's di ctum: Of everything in the world there can be an intellectual notion (Not. b6va), 1 ° was not disputed by any of our philosophers . We 9 . . . solum accidentia sub sensu cadunt . . . 1 0 Omnium rerum mundi potest esse notitia intellectiva.

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can there fore form an intellectual notion of a perceptual object. This must be granted for it is otherwise inexplicable how we manage to correct the misleading evidence of the senses. There were popular examples. Waim gives three : 'Often by virtue of an intuitive notion an erroneous judgement is caused. For example, a peasant, because of his intuitive notion of the sun, judges it to be precise ly two feet across. He judges the sky coloured. He judges the stick half in and half out of the water to be broken' (Not . g3va ). 1 1 The important point about these examples is that in each case the intellect can correct the error, but it cannot correct the error unless it can make a judgement about the very same object which gave rise to the error. The intell ect judges that the sun is not, after al l, two feet across, even though it looks as though it is. And, to take the opposite case, the intellect can make an error which it could not make unless it could have a sensory object. For instance, after mentioning the usual examples of the stick half in water, and the fiery torch which is swung round so rapidly as to give an impression of an unbroken circle of flame, Lokert adds: 'Outer sense is never deceived as regards its proper object, though because of the diversity of the medium or because of the movement of the object or of the faculty, inner sense or intellect is deceived in judging the object to exist in some way in which it does not' (Not. d I v b ) . 1 2 That the outer sense is never deceived follows, as Waim points out, from the fact that the only notions of outer sense are incomplex, singular, categorematic notions. Hence outer sense cannot form judgements, and without false judgement there is no deception ( Not. c3vb ) . Though the intellect can judge truly, or falsely, about the objects of outer sense, this is not to say that the intellect has as imm ediate an apprehension of a sensory object as does the outer sense. On the contrary, the intellect was held to be able to approach a sensory object only through a sense image of that object, unlike outer sense 1 1 Saepe etiam virtute notitiae intuitivae causatur iudicium erroneum ut rusticus virtute notitiae intuitivae q uern habet de sole iudicat solem bipedalem praecise, iudicat caelum coloratum, de baculo pro medietate in aqua et pro medietate extra iudicat quod sit fractus. 12 Sensus exterior nunquam decipitur circa proprium obiectum licet propter diversitatem medii vet motum obiecti sive potentiae sensus interior vel intellectus decipiatur iudicando obiectum aliq uo modo se habere qualiter non se habet.

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which must first fu nction by perceivi ng, if there is to be any sense i mage in the i nner sense. But whatever route the intellect has to take, an i ndi vidual thi ng in the perceptual world could be a proper object of an act of intellect. It should perhaps be added that the argume nt just presented , to the effect that the intellect can correct the outer sense , does not imply that i nner sense is not also capable of correcting outer sense . And i ndeed, i t was held bo th that inner sense , in virtue of i ts power to produce synca tegorematic notions, can produce proposi tions, and also that it has the power to assent to those proposi ti ons. And to give assent i s to judge. Since i nner sense can judge , the obvious things for it to judge are i ts own proposi tions about the objects of outer sense. The doctrine that outer sense cannot be deceived about i ts objects, and tha t i n ner sense can be deceived about the objects of outer sense , was commonly held in the Middle Ages. St Anselm puts in the mouth of a pupil the words: Tru th is certainly in the senses of the body, bu t not always for they som eti mes deceive us. For sometimes wh en I see something through the med i u m of glass my sigh t deceives me, in that my body some­ ti mes reports to me that what I see beyond the glass is of the same colour as the glass, when it is of another colour . . . There are many other ways in which s igh t and the o ther senses deceive me.

St Anselm objected to the claim that truth is some times, but not always, in the senses. His reply i s: I t does not seem to me that this tru th or falsity i s in the senses but in opinion. For the inner sense dece ives i tself; the outer sense does not lie to i t . . . When a child fears a sculptured d ragon with a gapi ng mouth, i t is easy to perceive that i t is not sight which brings this abou t , since it repo rts nothing more to the child than to ad u l ts, but rather it is the childish inner sense which does not yet know how to distinguish clearly between a th i ng and the likeness of a thing. ( De Veritate, 6 )

There i s room for dispute whether Anselm's concept of inner sense is precisely the same as the one employed by our late medieval philosophers, but it i s at least almost the same , and i t is plai n that on this mat ter they take up the same posi t ion. From points made in the preceding two paragraphs i t follows that the three cogni tive powers, outer sense, inner

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sense, and intellect, can be ordered on the basis of the order in which notions make thei r first appearance in those powers. Lokert reports: 'Everyone agrees a hout this, that in man the first notion of a sensible thing, indeed the first notion tout court, is an outer sensory notion; next an inner sensory notion is produced; and after that an intellectual notion' (Not. a t a- b ). 1 3 He adds that thi s i s not necessarily a temporal ordering, but is certainly in accordance with the order of nature. That is to say, I must use my senses to perceive an object if I am to have a sense image of an object. And I must have a sense image if I am to have anything to think about. But this, though the order in nature, is not necessarily the order in time, for I may form a sense image of an object simultaneously with my perceiving the object, and I may thi nk something about the object simultaneously with forming a sense image of i t . Lokert's position on this matter was standard. Waim, for example, gives the same ordering of cognitive powers and adds that thi s is an order of either time or nature, for all three can be produced in the same i nstant, but the third presupposes the second, and the second the first (Not. c3 va ). An important authori tative source for this doctrine is William Ockham in 2 Sent. , q. 17, where it is argued that the first notion of outer sense is prior to the first of inner, for i t is its cause, and the first of i nner is prior to the first of the intellect, for it is its cause. One important conclusion Ockham draws from this i s that though there is a likeness of cause and effect where the cause and the effect are the first notion of outer sense and the first of inner, respectively, those two notion s are nevertheless unlike in one crucial respect, for the first notion (as indeed any notion) of outer sense is i ntui tive and the first of inner must be abstracti ve . Any intuitive notion of inner sense must be of some object which i s already in i nner sense, but there can be no object which is in i nner sense unless there was first an object of inner sense which represented something presented to outer sense. That first notion of inner sense cannot be intui tive for it cannot be the basis of evident assent to a proposi tion affirming the existence of somethingu Omnes in hoc conven i u n t : i n homine pri ma noti tia rei sensi bilis i mmo prima si mpliciter est sens itiva exterior post quam produci t u r sensi tiva i n terior et post illam intellectiva.

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it is the corresponding notion in outer sense which provides that basis. Since, according to one position that Ockham describes, and appears to ad opt, the first notions of outer and inner sense are simultaneous, we cannot experience the notion of outer sense as the basis of the evident assent. The grounds for the knowledge that it is the notion of outer sense that is the basis are a priori. We have already observed that the term 'abstractive' is ambiguous. A notion can be abstractive in that it abstracts from existence, and therefore cannot be the basis of an evident j udgement of the existence of the object of which it is a natural likeness. Secondly , a notion can be abstractive in that it is formed by abstracting from a number of resembling things that in respect of which they resemble. Such a notion is a common notion, also termed 'universal' by the nominalists. Plainly a person cannot have an abstractive notion in either sense of the term unless he previously had an intuitive notion. I should like to attend here to a corollary. Every notion of outer sense is singular, and notions of outer sense precede any other notion. Therefore, some singular notion precedes any universal notion. It was in this context that discussion took place on the priority of singular and universal notions, to which reference was made in Chapter 1 . The doctrine of the priority of singular notions was accepted by all of our philosophers, but so also was Aristotle's dictum 'We must advance from generalities to particulars' (Physics, 1 84a 23-4). How were these two positions to be squared? Of course, the question is how Aristotle' s dictum should be interpreted. Lokert makes a suggestion, commonly made and always promptly rej ected: This [Aristotle's dictum] is proved by reason : when Socrates is seen in the distance, first it is seen that it is a being, then that it is an animal, and next that it is a man . And there are all these notions before it is known that it is Socrates. Therefore common notions are formed in the senses before singu lar ones (Not. a i'b--W a ) . 1 4

Lokert' s reply is:

1 � Hoc etiam probatur ratione, quon iam videt ur Sortes a remotis prius videtur q uad sit ens et postea q uad sit animal et consequenter quad sit homo. Et omnes tales notitiae- haben t u r an teq uam cognoscat ur q uad est Sortes. Ergo prius in sensu formantur notitiae communes q uam singulares.

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I t is den ied that it is seen t hat Socrates is a be ing or a n a n i ma l , or such l i k e . Seeing is done only t h rough an i ncomplex notion , taking 'seeing' prope rly . But if by 'seeing' we mean ' a j udgement cau sed by means of an intui tive visual notion ', then [ what h as j ust been denied] is conceded , viz. t h a t i t is fi rs t j u dged that Socrates is a bei ng, and then that he is an an i m a l , and so o n , work i ng down t h rough com mon pred icates . And i t does not fol low from t h is that a common notion is formed before a singular. What follows i s that through common notions we j udge that a more general cond i tion or property belongs to a t h i ng before we j u dge that a more specific condi tion or p roperty belongs . And this can h appen because of a more perfect notion which we can h ave of a prox i m ate thing than of a d i stant one, or on account of more notions which we form of i ts condi tions or properties [when i t i s prox i mate t h a n when i t is d is tan t ] . (Not. a8 v b ) . 1 5 Given that Lokert's first suggested interpretation of Aristotle's dictum must be rejected, what interpretation should be accepted? Lokert's answer is this : 'Aristotle did not mean that a common notion is produced before a singular, but that, in passing knowledge on to some group (communitas) , propositions composed of more universal terms should be put forward first, and then propositions composed of less com mon terms. By "less common" he means "singular" ' (Not . aWa ) . 1 6 This is an important result, for clearly if Aristotle had meant that common notions are produced before singula r ones he would have had to conclude that intellectual notions are prior in nature to sensory ones. I t should be added that Lokert's view that Aristotle had in mind the order of teaching ( ordo docendi) is fully supported by Aquinas , who describes the order in question as ' an order of further learning' ( ordo addiscendi) . 1 5 Negatur quod videtur Sortes esse ens vel esse animal aut aliq uo tali modo. Visio solum fit per notitiam incomplexam proprie loq uend o de visione. Si tamen per visionem intelligamus iudicium causatum mediante notitia intuitiva visiva conceditu r illud sicut prius iudicatu r Sortes esse ens et postea quod est animal et sic conseq uenter descendendo per pracdicata communia . Nee ex illo seq uitur quod prius formatur notitia communis quam singularis sed per communes prius iudicamus conditionem vel proprietatem generaliorem convenire rei q uam specialiorem. Et hoc potest provenire propter perfectiorem notitiam quae h abetur de re propinq ua quam de remota vel propter plures notitias q uas formamus de conditionibus vel proprietatibus eius. 16 Nol uit dicere philosophus quod prius prod ucatu r notitia communis q uam singu laris sed quod tradendo alicui communitati scientiam praemittendae sunt propositiones compositae ex terminis universalioribus et consequenter propositiones ex terminis minus communibus . Minus communis ibidem intelligit per singul aria .

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Aquinas discusses the dictum in his Commentary on Aristotle' s Physics (i. 1). He paraphrases Aristotle, s argument for the dictum as follows: 'The natural way for us to proceed is to begin from those things which are better known to us, [ and go] to those things which are better known by nature. But the things which are better known to us, such as universals, are confused. It is therefore necessary for us to proceed from universals to singulars. ' We have already had occasion to glance at the concept here at issue. Aquinas is saying that to know something under a universal is to know no more about the thing than what can be learnt from a consideration of the universal under which the thing falls. But in respect of falling under that universal the thing is indistinguishable from all other things which fall under that same universal. It is plain that, in knowing the thing in this way, we have no distinct knowledge of it, that is, knowledge of it as an individual thing in its individuality. But to say knowledge is indistinct is to say it is confused. Hence anything known under a universal, so far as it is thus known, is known only confusedly, and it is in this sense that universals are said to be confused. Aquinas adds a further consideration: Knowledge of the universal is distinct when each of the things which are contained in potency in the universal is known in act. For he who knows an . animal does not know a rational thing [ viz . a rational animal-a man] except in potency. But knowing something in potency precedes knowing it in act. Therefore, according to this order of furthe r learning by which we proceed from potency to act, an animal is known to us before a man is.

Given this interpretation of Aristotle's dictum, the dictum poses no threat whatever to the doctrine that no notions are in the intellect before there are any in the senses. Though in the order of nature outer sensory notions come first, then inner sensory notions, and finally intellectual notions, there are other orders which could be described. In respect of what might be termed the order of perfection, the list j ust given must be reversed. As regards the order of perfection the important consideration is the degree of comprehensiveness or amplitude of the three cognitive powers. Outer sense is restricted since it cannot have an abstractive notion, unlike the two other powers. It can have a notion only

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of what presently exists, and is available for outer sensory inspection. Inner sense, on the other hand, can have intuitive and abstractive notions. It can, like outer sense, have as its object something which is at present available for outer sensory inspection, but can have as an object something which was, but is no longer, present in that way. In addition, unlike outer sense, which is restricted to forming categorematic notions, inner sense can form such notions and also syn­ categorematic notions. And given this latter power it can form complex notions, including propositional notions, unlike outer sense, whose notions are all simple . Furthermore, unlike outer sense, which has the power to form only singular notions, inner sense can also form common notions, though of course, and crucially, those common notions are complex notions, formed by connecting two singular notions by a syncategorema . It can in addition form reflexive notions, unlike outer sense, all of whose notions are direct. The intellect is more comprehensive still. I t can form notions of objects which are present to outer sense and objects which were but are not now present to outer sense . I t can form intuitive and abstractive notions, simple and complex notions, singular and common notions, direct and reflexive notions. Unlike inner sense, it can form simple common notions as well as complex common notions, and notions both of sensible things and of non­ sensible things. Only the intellect can form a notion of substance, and only the intellect can form a notion of God. In so far as the perfection of a power is measured in terms of the perfection of the objects proper to the power, there can be no doubt that in the order of perfection intellect precedes inner sense, and inner sense precedes outer. Perhaps the most important distinction in logic is that between categorematic and syncategorematic terms, and in so far as the faculty of outer sense can form only categorematic notions whereas the faculties of inner sense and intellect can also form syncategorematic notions, the latter two faculties must, in a fundamental logical respect, be contrasted with outer sense. But this way of distinguishing between outer sense on th� one hand and inner sense and intellect on the other, has to be defended against a radical attack made by the Oxford Dominican Hugh of Lawton upon his Franciscan

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contemporary William Ockham. I shall deal now with certain aspects of that attack. It will quickly become plain that what is at stake is the entitlement to speak about notions in the way I have throughout this book. Put briefly , Lawton's target is the doctrine that mental language exists. Let us for the moment return to basics. Speech expresses thought. In the standard case, if a person says that his coat is torn he is thinking about his coat, and about a tear standing in a certain relation to the coat. We can describe this situation by saying that he has two categorematic notions and a syncategorematic notion which plays a unitive part in relation to the other two notions. Since the utterance which expresses the thought has a subj ect, a predicate, and a copula, and since something in the thought corresponds to each of these three parts of the utterance, the claim that the thought is linguistic seems unassailable. That mental language is in many ways different from conventional language can be agreed by all. But the differences are not suffi cient to prevent thoughts, which are properly and fully expressed in an utterance, being correctly classed as linguistic. Nor is there any hint in this that thoughts, though linguistic, are linguistic only in some derivative or secondary sense. Quite the contrary , it is only because a thought contains a subj ect, copula, and predicate that the spoken proposition expressing the thought contains a subject, copula, and predicate. We should say, therefore, that speech inherits its linguistic character from thought. This last point is one aspect of the doctrine that thought is naturally prior to speech. In an important article Hester G. Gelber has drawn attention to Hugh of Lawton' s criticism of the doctrine that there is a language of thought. 1 7 Lawton does not doubt that we think. It is the alleged linguistic character of thought that is at issue. I should like here to rehearse, and respond to, certain of his arguments. Lawton' s contemporary at Oxford, the Dominican William Crathorn, reports Lawton as saying : I f to every u ttered proposi tion spoken by an attentive thinker th ere corresponded a s i m i lar propos i tion subj ectively in the mind , then a man could not lie, since to lie is to say something which con trad icts a

1 7 ' I cannot tell a lie : H ugh of Lawton's critique of William of Ockham on mental language' , Franciscan Studies.

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j udgmen t of reason . B u t accord ing to those who pos i t men tal propo­ si tions, the j u dgmen t is a complex cognition or proposi tion opposed to the ut tered propos ition spoken by t h e liar . . . I f there were such proposi tions s u bj ectively in the in tellect then the in tellect could com pose s i m u l taneously con t radictory men tal proposi tions corres­ ponding to t h ese u t teran ces ' I u nde rs tand what I am sayi ng' and ' I do not u nde rs tand what I a m saying ' , which seems con t ra ry to experience . H is [ sc . Law to n ' s ] proof of the i n ference is t h i s : someone can, while lyi ng, say t h is u t terance 'I u nders tand what I a m sayi ng' ; therefore something like i t corresponds to i t in the m i nd . And i t is certain that someth i n g u nl ike and opposed to i t corresponds, for otherwise there would be no lie. B u t that the conseq u e n t is false is seen from Anse l m ' s Proslogion ch . 4 w h e re he says that no-o ne, understand ing what God is, can think that God does not exis t . B u t i t i s ce rtain t h a t h e can say that God does not exist . Therefore fo r j u st the same sort of reason , no-one, truly and eviden tly t h in k i ng that somet hin g exists, can t h i nk tha t it does not then exi s t , though he could say l y i ngly that it does not exist .

Lawton ass umes that i f any u ttered proposi tions lack a mental correlate then all do. He argues that some do, namely, lies . He concludes that mental language does not exis t . Why do lies lack a men tal correlate? The brief answer is that what we thi nk when we tell a l ie cannot be what we say, bu t must be the contrad ictory opposite of what we say . I n saying P lyingly I cannot be expressing my though t that P for I do not have the though t that P; ins tead I have the though t that not- P, or that it is false that P. Gelber d raws our attention to Ockham 's Augustinian treatment of lying and ind icates one means avai lable to Ockham for dealing with Lawton ' s line of critici s m . Ockham held that in order to lie, three acts must take place, two men tal and one external . The ord ering should be though t of as natural rather than as temporal . Fi rs t the liar thinks that i t is false that P, then he u tters the proposi tion ' P' , and fin ally he thinks that his u t terance is false . 1 8 The utterance is ' therefore ' pace Lawton , represented at the level of mental language . I t i s represen ted a t that level b y an expression signifying the ut terance . As Lawton saw, it cannot be represen ted by a men tal version of the u t terance precisely as u t tered , for the 18

1

Sent. , d . 2 7 , q . 2 , in Opera Theolog ica, iv .

2 1 1 - 1 2.

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proposition is uttered as true, though it is not thought as true. But Lawton did not see how else it could be represented . On this basis Ockham can deal with the insoluble proposition presented by Lawton. If someone lyingly utters ' I understand what I am saying' then, on Ockham's analysis, he must think that he does not understand what he is saying and also that his utterance is false. It does not follow that he thinks the proposition corresponding to the utterance, in precisely the way in which the proposition is uttered, for it is uttered as true, but it is not thought as true. I t is worth pausing here to note an important consideration underlying Ockham's position on lying. Propositions can be presented to others, either in speech or writing, without any indication as to their author' s assessment of their truth value. But it appears to have been Ockham's view that there is no such truth value neutrality at the level of mental language. We cannot entertain a mental proposition without judging it. If I do not know whether an uttered proposition 'P' is true or false I think that it is doubtful, that is, I assess as true the mental proposition ' I t is doubtful whether P'. If I believe the uttered proposition ' P' to be false, I assess as true the mental proposition ' It is false that P'. Thus all propositions at the level of mental language come complete with, or completed by, a truth value assessment. I t is in the light of this doctrine that we should understand the claim that a liar's lie cannot exist at the level of mental language precisely as it exists at the level of speech. At the level of speech the proposition carries the implication that it is true. But what is thus implicit at the level of speech cannot be explicit at the level of thought, for what the liar thinks is not that the proposition is true but ·that it is false. Lawton holds that some terms can be shown not to exist at the level of mental language, and seems to have been prepared to conclude on that basis that no terms exist at that level. The terms he particularly has in mind are negative terms. Crathorn reports him as arguing as follows: If to every term of a spoken proposition there corresponds a natural sign of something, then something would essentially be a negation and would signify a negation naturally j ust as the utterance 'not' signifies conventionally. And then negation would be a nature and

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something pos i tive, wh ich is false . . . I f men tal terms corres ponded to the terms ' nothing' , ' b l i nd ness ' , ' i mposs ib le ' , and 'contrad iction' there wou ld be s u bj ectively in the in tellect something which signi fied naturally the same t h i ng that the term ' nothi ng' sign ifies co nven­ tionally, and it would be a n a t u ral li ken ess of nothi ng, and so on.

In res ponse to this line of attack on men tal language, it has to be recalled that i t is false to say , as H ugh does, that ' to every term of a spoken proposition there corresponds a natural sign of something' . Some conven tional terms signify not someth ing, but i n some way . There are i ndeed men tal counterparts of su ch conven tional terms but they likewise, of course, signify i n some way . Thus 'not ' does not signify negation, con tra ry to Lawton's claim; it signi fies negatively, in this sense, that i n thi nking that A is not B I think of A and B predi catively and negatively. Lawton appears to be treating 'not' as a categorematic term. As regards his assertion about ' nothing', ' blindness', and so on, the problem at issue arises from the fact that men tal terms, at leas t, categorematic mental terms, are natural l i kenesses of things . Such terms occur fi rst as i n tui tive notions of things; they are, according to the intellectio theory, the cognitive grasp which we have of things in the worl d . B u t what i s i n the world is real . Negative terms, including so-called deprivatives, signify what is essen tially unreal, a mere absence from the world, or a deprivation . H ow, then, can there be natural l i kenesses, that is, mental terms, corresponding to such conventional terms? The answer to this question, as Gelber poin ts out, derives from Ockham ' s treatment o f negative terms a s connotative. They signify something directly and something else indirectly. ' B lind' signifies ' something that l acks sight but has s ight by nature' . I t is because we can form a notion of sight that we can form a notion of blindnes s . I n the order of nature, i f not of time, the notion of sight m u s t preced e that of blind ness . As Ockham puts the poin t : ' A negative term signifies nothi ng negatively un less the opposi te term signifies affirmatively' . 1 9 I turn to a fu rther argument o f Lawton's against the possibility of mental language . H is problem i n this case concerns not ind ivi d ual mental terms but the possibility of 19

Summa Logicae, pt. ii, ch .

1 2,

Opera Philosophica, i .

283.

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composmg mental propositions. Crathorn reports Lawton thus: Ass ume ( i ) that a mental propos1 t10n is something com posed of parts , ( ii) t hat it is not an act which com poses itself, (iii) that one part of i t does not com pose another part , but ( iu) that it is composed by a composi tive act of the i n tel lect . Assuming this, he [ Lawton ] asks whether that composi tive act of the in tellect is composite and com plex or is simple and incomplex . If it is said that it is a composi te act and not a simple one, then si nce it does not compose itself nor does a part compose a part, by the same token a composition would occur for every like act of u nderstanding (intelligentia ) . But that is false. I f it is said that the com posi te act is formally and in trinsically s i m ple, but that i t is called composi tive because the act is directed to several thi ngs, then against that, if that be so and if to compose is to consti t u te p ropositions s u bj ectively in the mind , it would then fol low that, by the same token, several external things, understood at the same time, would be a mental proposi tion and would exist subject­ ively in the i n tellect. But that is false.

Ockham holds that mental propositions are composite . Given that they are not self-composing, a n act o f composing must be posited to explain the existence of such propositions. Is that act composi te? If an affi rmative answer is given then the question arises as to the n ature of the act by which that compositive act is composed. Plai nly we are here at the start of an infinite regress. This is what Lawton means by the phrase 'by the same token a composition would occur for every like act of understanding'. As he says: 'That is false'. We seem forced to conclude, therefore, that the compositional act i s simple. In that case the act cannot contain within itself the various terms out of which the mental proposition is composed. The parts to be composed must therefore be external to the mind. And yet, according to the intellectio theory, the proposition duly composed would be subjectively in the mind. Lawton i s right to wonder how the mental proposition can be in the mind i f the various pa rts out of which it i s composed are external to that mind. He thi nks that the proposition cannot be related i n this way to i ts parts. His conclusion i s that mental propositions cannot, after all, be composed. And since they cannot exist unless they have been composed, it follows that they cannot exist. But thi s criti cism i gnores a crucial

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aspect of Ockham's teaching on the act by which mental propositions are composed. He writes: 'I say that the union of the extremes of a proposition in the mind is a syncategorematic concept of the copulative verb, that is, of the verb coupling the subj ect with the predicate'. 20 Hence, in Ockham's view, a mental proposition is not composed by a compositive act working on a subject, predicate, and copula. The copula itself is the compositive act. Since predication is effected by the presence of the copula when the two categorematic terms are in place, Lawton's search for a compositive act was in vain no t, as he thought, because there could be no such act, but because the act is in, or indeed simply is , the predicative relation in the proposition, and is not external to that relation. I t should be added that Lawton's premisses could be seen as supporting a conclusion opposite to the one he drew, and an important strand of late medieval speculation arose from a move made by Gregory of Rimini in which he reached an opposite conclusion on the basis of insights very similar to Lawton's. I f, in line with Lawton, we agree that mental propositions cannot be composed of parts, we can argue that since mental propositions cannot exist except as composed of parts it follows that there are no mental propositions. But it might instead be concluded that since mental propositions do exist they cannot be composed of parts and therefore are simple . I t was this lat ter move that formed Gregory's chief contribution to the debate on mental propositions. In one obvious respect mental propositions are free from conditions which ensure the complexity of spoken and written propositions . Spoken propositions take time, and it is therefore possible to distinguish between different parts of such a proposition on the basis of their order in the temporal sequence of phonemes, and likewise written propositions are spatially extended and the marks of which such a proposition is composed can be distinguished on the basis of their order in the spatial sequence . A mental proposition is not spatially ordered and may not be constructed in a temporal order either. Though when we listen to a proposition spoken by someone else there is a temporal ordering of notions in our 20

Quodlibet vi, q. 29, in Opera Theologica, i x . 695 ; see Gelber, 'I cannot tell a lie', n n .

59, 60.

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mind, and though we can rehearse propositions in our mind, or mentally translate phrase by phrase from one language to another, we can of course think a proposition without first hearing it, and that proposition can be grasped in its entirety in an instant. The instantaneity of mental propositions prompts an important question as to how we know the order of terms. I f I say ' Every beagle is a dog' the temporal order provides grounds for saying that 'beagle' is the subject, 'dog' the predicate, whereas if I say 'Every dog is a beagle' the obvious interpretation is that �dog' is the 'subject' , 'beagle' the predicate. These propositions have precisely the same terms. If I form the mental propositions corresponding to the two spoken ones then how can I distinguish between the first mental proposition, which is true, and the second, which is false, given that temporal ordering cannot provide any clue? Gregory's answer is that each mental proposition is a simple notion, as different from any other mental proposition with a different signification as are any two mental categorematic terms which differ in signification. Of course, a mental proposition is represented in speech by something complex in which the subject, predicate, and copula are distinguishable. But it is a mistake, according to Gregory, to suppose that the mental proposition also has parts of distinct kinds; we are not to read into our mental propositions all the features we find in the corresponding ut terances and inscriptions. Is there, then, nothing in the mental proposition corresponding to the subject, copula, and predicate of the spoken proposition? Of course there is something, but there is nothing in the mental proposition having the signification of one part of the utterance and not having the signification of the other parts also. I f we were permitted to speak of the parts of a mental proposition we would have to say that each part has the same signification as the whole proposition. It is plain that Gregory's position is a good deal less radical than Lawton's. Lawton believed that the fact that our expression of our thoughts is inevitably linguistic does not provide sufficient reason to conclude that our thought also is linguistic. Gregory evidently had no doubt that our thoughts were no less linguistic than their conventional expressions.

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And indeed his position may be even less radical than it appears . I have in mind a standard teaching which I have already considered, regarding the relation between the main syncategorematic term in a propos ition and the rest of the proposition. Different terms, I argued, have to be distinguished with respect to their obj ects. And this is no less true of syncategorematic terms than of categorematic. Given that the object of a syncategorematic term is whatever term or terms it covers , it follows that two syncategorematic terms of a given type might have a different content in view of the fact that the two cover different terms. In that sense, 'is' in 'A man is hungry' and 'A cat is hungry' have different contents . I t follows that if we had a sufficiently clear insight into the content of the term whose scope included the remainder of the proposition containing that term, we would be able to read off from that term the whole proposition. Hence that proposition is adeq uately represented by the term in it which has the widest s cope. The position j ust outlined is , I think, essentially Ockhamist, and in that case Gregory's apparently radical claim that mental propositions are simple is Ockhamist, at least to the extent that Ockham believed that a single part of a mental proposition adequately represents the whole mental proposition. Nevertheless , as we have seen, Ockham did believe that it is possible to distinguish different kinds of parts in any mental proposition, namely, categorematic and syn­ categorematic notions. It is true that Gregory believed mental propositions could be complex, but only in the sense that they are adeq uately expressible by a complex expression, that is , an expression in which categorematic and syncategorematic terms exist, and are not adeq uately expressible by a non­ complex one. Among the late medieval philosophers with whom we have been mainly concerned there were few advocates of the view that mental propositions are simple notions which can be said to be complex in a merely vicarious way , as being expressible by complex utterances or inscriptions . Gregory's arguments for his position were treated with respect, 2 1 in particular his arguments regarding the difficulty of establishing the order of 21

See e.g. Enzinas, Comp.

2 ra -5 r a _

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terms i n a mental proposition . But Lokert was correct when he declares : 'The common opinion is that every men tal proposi tion is com posed of several whole, and speci fically distinct notions . And if it is a ca tegorical proposi tion one notion is the subj ect, a second is the copula, and a third the pred icate, and correspondin gly for the com posi tion of molec u­ lar proposi tions' (Not. a i· a) . 22 Pi erre d' Ailly ' s compromise theory , that men tal categorical proposi tions are sim pie, _and men tal molecular proposi tions are com posi te, 23 found even less su pport t han did Gregory ' s theory . 24 I ndeed , the dis­ cussions of our philosophers concerning the order of construction of proposi tions make it q u i te clear that, in respect of com plexity , all mental proposi tions, whether categorical or molecular, m u s t be complex, though of cou rse men tal molecul ar proposi tions are more complex in the sense that they have parts which have a complexi ty characteristic of categorical p roposi tions and also have parts, proposi tional connectives , which do not fu n ction significative i n any categorical proposi tion . But no consensus emerged regarding how subject was to be distinguished from predi cate. Lokert makes a common point: i n the men tal proposi tion ' Every man is a man', subject and predi cate seem to con s t i tu te one notion. Does that imply that the men tal proposi tion l acks a s u bj ect, or a predicate? I f not, then how can the same notion be subj ect and predi cate (Not. b I va )? H is reply reveals a com mon wavering: I t is not a bs u rd [ that a categorical proposi t ion should have only two notions] when the extremes are synonymous. Nor does it fol low that . . . a n u l timate mental proposi tion lacks ei ther a subject or a pred i cate . I t would not be abs u rd in such cases to say that the same notion is, under differen t descriptions (diversis rationibus) , both subj ect and pred icate. Or i t can be said that of the whole concept [ ' Every man is a m an ' ] , one part i s a s u bj ect and another is a pred icate. And 22 Communis opinio est quod q uaelibet mentalis propositio componitur ex pluribus notitiis totalibus specie distinctis. Et si sit categorica una est subiect um alia copula et tertia praedicatum. Proportionabiliter de compositione hypotheticae dicend um est. 23 P. V . Spade, Peter of Ailly, 40- 1 . 24 e.g. Enzinas, Comp. 2 r \ where Enzinas states the position of Pierre d 'Ailly , and adds that he ( Enzinas) does not offer a proof ofit 'since it cannot be supported by any reason or authority' (non probo q uoniam nulla ratione au t auctoritate fulciri potest) .

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hence it is conceded that the syncategorem atic act of the copula does not pres uppose several whole notions , but can be ca used by one whole notion, j u st as by several , q u a ex tremes ' . (Not . b2 va ) 2 �>

Lokert does not say precisely how the first prescription applies to 'Every man is a man'. But his view appears to be that in thinking that every man is a man we have just one categorematic notion, namely , that corresponding to the inscription 'man', and we think in several ways about man. In the natural, though not perhaps in the temporal, order we think universally (or distributively) about man and merely confusedly about man, and then we think unitively about man as already being thought about in the two ways just stated; and in thinking unitively about man, man-considered-merely­ confusedly is now being thought of predicatively in relation to man-considered-universally (or considered distributively ) . This way of looking at the matter enables us to deal with the question of how we are to distinguish between the mental propositions corresponding to the two inscriptions 'Every man is a man' and 'A man every man is' . The problem arises from the perception that there is no element in one inscription that is not in the other, and therefore no element in one mental proposition that is not in the other; and while the physical ordering of the words on the page enables us to distinguish between the two inscriptions, we cannot, of course, distinguish between the two corresponding mental propositions on that same basis. But this is a mis-perception. It would be more true to say that though there is no word in one inscription that is not in the other, from the logical point of view there is no element that the two share. In 'Every man is a man' 'every' distributes 'man' on its first occurrence and gives merely confused sup­ position to 'man' on its second occurrence. 'Is' unifies a dis­ tributed 'man' and a merely confused 'man' . In 'A man every man is', 'every' distributes 'man' on its second occurrence and 25 Concedo non esse inconveniens quando extrema talis propositionis sunl synonyma. Nee propterea sequitur . . . aliq uam categoricam men talem ul timatam carere su biecto vel praedicato. Non esset inconveniens in talibus dicere eandem notitiam subiect um et praedicatum diversis rationibus . Vel potest dici q uod illius totalis conceptus aliqua pars est s u biectum et alia praedicatu m . E t conseq uen ter conceditur quod act us syncategorematicus copulae non praesupponit plures notitias totales sed potes t ab una causari sicut a pluribus in ratione ext remorum .

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has no effect on · man' on its first occurrence, and 'is' unifies a determinate 'man' (' man' on its first occurrence) and a distributed 'man' (' man' on its second occurrence ) , and consequently the proposition states that there is some one man who every man is, from which it follows that there is only one man. The logical properties of every term in ' Every man is a man' are therefore different from those of any term in 'A man every man is' . Here we should remind ourselves in particular of Lokert' s dictum: 'Syncategorematic acts are never of the same kind unless they cover like terms and in the same way' ( Not. b 1 \· b ) . 26 We can and should distinguish between essential and accidental properties of terms, and say that 'every' has an essential property , that of giving distributive supposition to a term which it immediately covers and giving merely confused supposition to a term which it mediately covers. But what we have to attend to in the present context is the accidental signification of the terms, that is, the signif­ ication of the terms as they occur in given propositions. Hence, as regards the two propositions we have taken as our examples, at the level of mental language we are not dealing with propositions whose elements have a different ordering but the same accidental signification. Because those elements out of which each of the mental propositions is composed have the particular accidental significations they do have, one order rather than another is appropriate for the conventional expression of each of those mental propositions. But what the conventional ordering expresses are the logical properties of the notions in the complex thought being expressed. In so far as it is appropriate to speak about an ordering in the mental proposition, and it surely is, we should speak about a logical ordering, and certainly not a spatial or temporal one. The position I am describing might also be presented in this way : it is misleading to say that in a mental proposition the signification of the terms is determined by their order, for the fact that those terms have the order they have is nothing beyond the fact that the terms in the mental proposition have the signification they have. But the order of terms in a conventional proposition is a partial determinant of the -.!ti N ung uam act us syncategorematici sunt eiusdem ration is nisi tales cadant supra consimiles terminos et eodem modo.

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signi fication of those terms, and indeed the ordering of conventional terms is one of the chief means avai lable to us to express in a conventional proposition the signification of the terms in the correspond ing mental proposition. There is no doubt that the order of terms in a conventional proposition does correspond to something in the mental proposition duly expressed by that conventional proposition. No harm is done if we conclude that in the mental proposition there is an ordering of notions, so long as we do not take metaphors too seriously and fall into the trap of supposing that mental propositions are merely silent speech. Grasp of the point that thought, and therefore mental propositions, can occur instant­ aneously, provides a defence against this error. I have not so far been concerned to clai m that every thought occurs in an instant. The point is that if any thought occurs in an instant then it has to be concluded that our thoughts are not essentially ordered i n a temporal way, that is to say, they are not essentially ordered in accordance with the temporal order in which the terms of mental propositions enter into the composition of those propositions. For there may be no such temporal order . Ceneau writes: 'To be the subject or the predicate does not depend on the order of conceiving but on an application of the intellect, for it seems that it should not be denied that every intellect could grasp si multaneously the subject, pred icate, and copula' (Not. d 4 va) . 2 7 One often sees a point, grasps an idea, i n an instant. We find the idea there, presented to us in its entirety. Only if we were already in the grip of a theory when we approached such a phenomenon, would we say that however we experience the thought its composition must have a temporal order. This fact about the composition of mental propositions, which is expressed by our philosophers when they say that the composition of mental propositions has a natural if not a temporal order, does not of course carry the i mplication that a mental proposition, once composed , can last for just an instant. It is the temporal ity of the composing process that is here at issue. It should be said that our philosophers had a lively interest in problems relating '2 7 Esse su biectum vel praedicatum non dependet ab ordine conceptionis sed ex applicatione ipsius in tel lectus . Non enim videtur negand u m q uilibet possit intel lectus simul apprehendere subiectu m praedicatum et copulam .

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to the tem porality of that process , and I should like to close this chapter with a brief di scussion of certain as pects of their argu ments in this fiel d . Some defini tions : Something is prod uced ins tant aneously if it has a first complete being for i ts begi nning. I t is i n stan taneously destroyed if it has a last complete bei ng for its cessation . Something is prod uced suddenly if it is prod u ced incompletely ( inadaequate) in time so that given any time i n which it is prod u ced , i t is prod uced in a lesser time. Likewise to be destroyed suddenly is to be destroyed incompletely ( inadaeq uate) in t i me in the given sense. Therefore every t h i ng which begi ns to be prod u ced through a last instant of non-being is produ ced suddenly. Likewise, whatever ceases to be t h rough a first instant of non- bei ng is destroyed suddenly, and therefore nei ther in stantaneously nor successively . Notice also that something is producible suddenly for whose begi nning t here can be assigned nei ther a first instant of being nor a last instant of non-being. ( Waim, Not. d6 ra ) 28

I t was consid ered i m possi ble for something to have both a last ins tant of non-being and a firs t i ns tant of being since that would req uire adj acen t i ns tan ts, and nobody believed that ins tants coul d be adj acent . That is, i t was routinely held that time was con tinuous i n the obvious sense that there can be no two ins tants which are so close to each other that there would not be an i n termediate i nstant. Thus if something has a last instant of non-being then any i nstant at which the thing has bei ng is preced ed by an instant at which i t has being. Therefore, i t m u st have come into being through time and hence not i n stan taneously. On the other hand, if it has a first ins tant of being it does not come into bei ng through time; i t therefore begins instan taneously. It might be argued -that among the thi ngs which cannot have a first i n s tant of being are mental proposi tions, for such proposi tions are com plex notions, yet not even simple notions

28 I nstantanee producitur q u od pro inceptione habet primu m esse completum et instantanee corrumpitur q uod pro desitione habet ult imum esse complet u m . Sed illud producitur s ubi to quod producit ur in tempore inadaeq uate sic videlicit quod quocunq ue tempore dato in quo producitur in minori illo produci tur. Similiter corrumpi subi to est corrumpi in tempore inadaeq uate ad sens um datum. Ex istis seq uitur quod omne quod incipit produei per ultimu m non esse produci tur subito. Simili ter omne quod desinit esse per pri mum non esse corru mpitur subito sic quod nee instantanee nee successive. Adverte etiam quod producibilis est aliq ua res subi to pro cuius inceptione nee potest signari primum esse nee ultimum non esse.

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have. a first instant of being; and if simple noti ons canno t have a first instant of being then nei ther can complex notions. Lokert approaches the matter di sputatiously. He begins wi th a report : The common opinion of the doctors is that every cognitive power, both sensitive and intellectual , and indeed the will itself, can for its part produce an act instantaneously. And so they would say about a luminous object producing light and about a sensible object producing species through a medium, that if such agents were appl ied instant­ aneously, then given that the reci pients and the media were suffi­ ciently receptive to the effects of those agents, they would produce their effects instantaneously. (Not. c 1 ra ) 29

But obj ections have to be deal t wi th. Consider, for example, visual notions. Lokert writes:

There is this argument: the sensitive power cannot produce its notion instantaneously. Therefore [its notion is prod uced successively J. The assumption i s obvious as regards the power of sight which cannot produce a notion except by s uccessive application of the object or by the moving or opening of the eye. Now, in whichever of these ways seeing is gained, the seeing m ust have a last instant of non-being, for one must not posit a first instant of being of seeing thus gained. And consequently seeing is gained successively in that power. One can argue correspondingly, ·as regards every other sensitive power, that it does not produce a notion instantaneously but only successively. Therefore [ the point is won] . Moreover one cannot say that ·an auditory notion is produced instantaneously, for its object, viz . an utterance or a sound, cannot exist instantaneously. Otherwi se there would be an outer sensitive notion, and hence an intuitive notion, with a non-existent object. (Not. c I rb-va . ) 30 29 Commu nis opinio doctorum est q uod q uaelibet potentia cogni t iva et sensi tiva et intellectiva sicut et ipsa vol un tas potest quantum est ex parte eius prod ucere actum in instanti et ita dicerent de l u m i noso prod ucente lumen et de obiecto sensi bili prod ucen te species per med i u m q uod si talia agentia appl icarentur in instanti passis et mediis su fficienter susceptivis suorum elTect u u m prod ucerent tales elTectus in instan t i . 3 0 Potentia sensitiva n o n po test prod ucere e i u s notitiam in insta n t i . I git u r. Assumptum patet de potentia visiva q uae non potest noti tiam prod ucere nisi per successivam applicationem obiecti vel motum aut apertionem oculi. Modo quocunque i l lorum modoru m acquiratur visio postquam non est dandum pri m u m esse visionis tali ter acquisitae oportet dare u l timum non esse et per conseq uens successive acquiretur visio in tali potentia. Et proport ionabi l i ter argui potest de qualibet alia poten tia sensitiva quod non prod ucat notitiam in instanti sed sol um successive. Igitur. I tem non potest dici q uod not itia audi tiva prod ucatur i n instanti postquam

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Lokert' s two kinds of case have to be treated differently. No one doubted that auditory notions did not have a first instant of being, for the obj ect of such a notion has by nature a duration, and the notion is incomplete until the whole object has been heard. Lokert' s position on this matter is as follows: As regards the audi tory notion I conced e that i t is prod uced suc­ cess ively i n t h e t i m e i n which i ts obj ect completely exis ts. The part of the notion prod uced i n the fi rs t half of that time represe n ts not the whole obj ect but represen ts the part of the object wh ich ex ists d u ring that half. And likewise no other part of that whole notion (a t any ra te, no other part demarca ted in terms of its temporal span ) re­ presen ts the w hole obj ect . I mean that an auditory notion, j u s t like its obj ec t , has a s u ccessive n a t u re w i t h respect to i ts bei ng and i ts becom i ng. ( Not. C2 ra ) 3 1

But it would be wrong to suppose that all sensory notions are like auditory ones in the respect j ust mentioned. It is true that in coming to look at an obj ect, and therefore 'in coming to have a visual notion, movement might have to take place. For example, I have to open my eyes. And in order to see parts of a large obj ect, or even of a small one which is very close, I may have to move my eyes to take in the whole object. But Lokert argues that if the object is in front of the spectator, if the medium is not obstructed, and if no impediment affects the efficacy of the eye or of anything else that matters, then seeing, that is, a visual notion, will occur instantaneously. But this was a much disputed point. Waim reports with approval Holkot's opinion ( 1 Sent. , q. 1 , a. 7) that every agent, whether free or natural, acting purely naturally, produces its effect successively, so that it cannot produce it instantaneously or suddenly (Waim, Not. d4va ). And Cranston declares: 'It seems to me that every sensitive notion which we have is acquired successively, a� d this is because every such notion is acquired through a movement either of the senses or of the cius obiectum non po tes t esse in instan ti scili cet vox vel sonus . Alias daretur notitia sensitiva exterior et per conseq uens in tuitiva non existence eius obiecto. 31 De notitia auditiva concedo ipsam prod uci successive in tempore in q uo adaeq uate existit t>ius obiec t u m . Nee pars talis notitiae producta in prima medietate illius tem poris repraesentat totum obiectum sed illam partem obiecti quae est in data medietate temporis . Et ita n ulla alia pars saltem quae capitur secundum divisionem temporis illius totius notitiae repraesen tat totum obiectum. Volo dicere notitiam audi tivam e._se nat urae suc