Cajetan's Notion of Existence

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S T UDIFS I N PHIL OS OPHY IV

CAJETAN'S NOTION • OF EXISTENCE by

JOHN P. REILLY Salve Regina College, Newport, R.I.

1971

MOUTON THE HAGUE • PARIS

© Copyright 1971 in The Nether lands. Mouton & Co. N.V., Publishers, The Hague. No part of this book may be translated or reproduced in any form, by print, photoprint, microfilm, or any other means, without written permission from the publishers.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOG CARD NUMBER: 71-85900

Printed in The Netherlands by Mouton & Co., Printers, The Hague.

CONTENTS

Introduction

7

Saint Thomas's N otion of Existence

13

The N ature of God .

32

III.

Created Substances

41

IV.

The Problem of the Human Soul .

81

V.

Accidents .

I. II.

103

VI. Some Difficult Passages

117

Summary and Conclusion .

122

Bibliography

127

IN TRODUCTION

We hope in this book to give Cajetan's answer and not our own or any one else's to the question: what makes a being a being? After much textual analy sis we are convinced that Cajetan's answer is the same as that of Saint Thomas's: esse is the act of essence, esse is what makes being being. We will therefore try to prove in this book that Cajetan held that esse, the act of existing, is the only proper act, that form is act only because esse actuates it. According to Cajetan, therefore, essence in itself is not, properly speaking, real. I ts basic intelligibility is: pure potency for esse. In receiving esse, it does not add anything to esse; in receiving esse it becomes real and limits the esse it receives. Such is our thesis in nucleo. Our prime purpose is not to show that Cajetan's concept of existence is the same as Saint Thomas's; it is rather to present Cajetan's concept of existence. Our secondary aim, perhaps not really distinct from our prime purpose, is to show that Cajetan's notion of existence is fundamentally the same as Saint Thomas's. There are some who think quite differently, in fact who clearly associate Cajetan with the essentialists. 1 Their views are based on many textual passages in the works of Cajetan, which, taken in themselves, strongly suggest essentialism. Also there is the fact 1

M. Gilson appears to be of this school of thought. In an article in

Tijdschrift voor Philosophie, 1953, entitled "Cajetan et l'Existence", he is of the opinion that Cajetan did not hold that esse is the act of form. Gilson reduces Cajetan's position on esse to a position similar to that of Saint Albert the Great who held that esse is not the act of form but is

only the relation of an actual being to its efficient cause. This, of course, is essentialism.

8

INTRODUCTION

that Cajetan uses several of the same terms as Scotus, terms which some look upon as formally essentialistic; specifically, the terms esse actualis existentiae, esse quiditativum or esse essentiae, and actus ultimus. M. Gilson in one of his latest works 2 offers supposedly new evidence for an essentialistic concept of being in Cajetan; namely , Cajetan's denial of the demonstrability of per­ sonal immortality. In the course of our analy sis we will attempt to answer explicit­ ly and implicitly the charge of essentialism in Cajetan. For now, except for some general remarks, it suffices to admit the evidence materially taken. The general observations we would make here are as follows. It is said that there are essentialistic passages in Cajetan. Are there not also essentialistic passages in Saint Thomas, that is, texts which, taken in themselves, strongly suggest an essentialistic in­ terpretation? Y et no one would accuse Thomas of being an essen­ tialist. The point is that in the light of the total doctrinal context of Thomas's works, the essentialistic interpretation is absolutely untenable. We believe that if throughout any philosopher's works he has given a definite interpretation of being, this must be considered his metaphy sics. If one comes across passages that, taken in themselves, appear opposed to such an interpretation, one must first of all attempt to interpret them in line with the thinker's overall view before stating there is a basic conflict in his thought. If this is impossible, then there is a basic conflict and one must then proceed to resolve it. We are convinced that the overall evidence in the works of Cajetan for an existential metaphy sics is very strong; the evidence for essentialism is in no way as strong. Because this is so, the prevalent existentialism must be the immediate term of reference for apparent essentialistic texts. If these essentialistic texts are taken in themselves then, admittedly , one has some sort of unreal case for essentialism in Cajetan. If they are considered, as they should be, in relation to the entire doctrinal context, we believe that they in the light of this context not only can be explained existentially , but in many cases they can throw much light on, 2

Elements of Christian Philosophy, pp. 214-219.

INTRODUCTION

9

and in fact fortify , Cajetan's existentialism. The same can be said of essentialistic passages in Saint Thomas. The rule in this matter should be: l�t Thomas •explain Thomas, let Cajetan explain Cajetan, if at all possible. The treatment of this point at the moment is necessarily abstract. We will present it much more concretely as we get into Cajetan. With regard to the use of Scotistic terminology by Cajetan we intend to show that it is only materially Scotistic and formally Thomistic. By this we mean that the meaning of these terms in Cajetan's mind is throroughly existential. We would like here, with regard to these so-called Scotistic terms, to add this explanatory note. It is not completely accurate to label these terms Scotistic without further clarification. These terms, esse actualis existentiae, esse essentiae, and per­ haps actus ultimus, are called 'Scotistic' because Scotus, one might say, Scotized them by using them so frequently to express his own essentialistic concepts. Y et it must not be thought that no one before Scotus ever used any of these terms, or that they were alway s used in an essentialistic context. Saint Thomas himself speaks of an esse quiditativum 3 twice in his commentary on the Sentences; he also uses the term (only once) actus ultimus to express esse. 4 Granted that Saint Thomas did not use these terms throughout his works; nonetheless· he still used them and in an existential sense. After Thomas's death the great dispute as to whether there is a real distinction between esse and essence began. This controversy brought into prominence for the first time the terms, esse essentiae, and esse existentiae. Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent frequently used these terms though they em"Sciendum quod esse dicitur tripliciter. Uno modo dicitur esse, ipsa quidditas vel natura rei; secundum quod dicitur quod diffinitio est oratio significans quid est esse rei; diffinitio autem significat quidditatem rei. Alio modo dicitur esse, ipse actus essentiae; sicut vivere, quod est esse viventibus est animae actus; non quidem actus secundus, qui est operatio; sed actus primus. Tertio modo dicitur esse, quod significat veritatem compositionis in propositionibus; secundum quod est dicitur copula; et secundum hoc est in intellectu componente et dividente, quantum ad sui complementum, sed fundatur in esse rei, quod est actus essentiae." I, Sent., XXXIII, 1 , 1 . ad 1 um. Cf. also III, Sent., VI, 2, 2. 4 De Anima, q. 6, a. 2. 3

10

INTRODUCTION

ploy ed them as the instruments of essentialism. Thomas Sutton used the term esse existentiae 5 frequently, and in an existential sense; Henry and Giles lived shortly before Scotus; Sutton lived at the same time as Scotus. Between Thomas and Cajetan, Capreolus, the great Thomistic commentator, used these terms frequently. Capreolus was aware of Thomas's use of esse quiditativum in the Sentences, since he quotes the passage from the Sentences to back his own tripartition of esse. The fifth conclusion is that a certain esse is the very essence of the creature; another esse is the actuality of the creature, and a third is neither of the first two. This conclusion is proved by the very words of St. Thomas [Capreolus then quotes the text of footnote three]. 6

Y et Capreolus lived after Scotus, and it seems certain that he was also influenced by Scotus's frequent use of these terms, as well as by their frequent use by other Scholastics after Thomas. Even though Saint Thomas used these terms, it seems more probable that their frequent use by Scholastics after Thomas, especially by Scotus, would be the major influence in Capreolus's use of them. Certainly the meaning of these terms in Capreolus's works is existential. Sy lvester of Ferrara, a contemporary of Cajetan, frequently made use of the term esse essentiae and esse actualis existentiae, throughout his commentary on the Summa Contra Gentiles, and alway s in an existential sense. Because what designates something with an essential note makes it be in act, and is intrinsic to the thing designated, to be in act can be understood in a twofold way: first as quidditative and essential act, secondly as existential act. 1 Cf. Quaestiones de Reali Distinctione inter Essentiam et Esse, by Thomas de Sutton, O.P ., found in "Opuscula et Textus, Series Scholas­ tica", edited by M. Grabmann and Fr. Pelster, S.J. 6 "Quinta conclusio est quod aliquod esse est ipsa essentia creaturae; aliquod vero esse est actualitas ejus, et aliquod esse non est hoc nee illud. Ista conclusio probatur ex dictis sancti Thomae." I, Sent., VIII, 1 , 1. quinta conclusio. All translations in this text are our own, unless otherwise in­ dicated. 7 "Quod designat aliquid designatione essentiali, facit rem esse in actu, et est intrinsecum rei designatae, sciendum quod esse in actu dupliciter

5

INTRODUCTION

11

Both Sy lvester and Cajetan were simply using terms which, from the great controversy after the death of Thomas, had become traditional among many Scholastics. Some of these Scholastics (Thomas, Sutton, Capreolus, etc. ) used these terms in an exist­ ential framework; others (Giles of Rome, Henry of Ghent, and especially Scotus, etc. ) used them in an essentialistic framework. Cajetan was born at the time when the traditional use of this terminology had grown much stronger, especially among the Scotists. Quite naturally he was influenced by it, but being a true student of Thomas, and undoubtedly under the influence of Ca­ preolus, he used these terms in a legitimate existential sense. In this work our method will be that of textual analysis. When the text is difficult, we will try, if it is possible, to let Cajetan interpret himself by considering other clearer texts that bear on the same point. The works of Cajetan on which we have most heavily drawn are:

..

In Summa, Theologiae Commentarium In De Ente et Essentia Commentarium De Nominum Analogia In De Anima Commentarium.

A FEW NOTES ON THE LIFE OF CAJETAN

Cajetan was born in 1468 in Gaeta, Italy, and died in 1534. He entered the Dominican Order at the age of sixteen. After study ing at Naples, Bologna, and Padua, he was appointed to the chair of Thomistic metaphy sics at the University of Padua. It was at this time (1494-1495) that he composed his commentary on Saint Thomas's De Ente et Essentia. After Padua, he lectured at Pavia; subsequently he held high offices in his order. In 150 8 he was elected Master-General; in 1517 he was created a cardinal; from 1518-1519 he was papal legate in Germany ; in 1519 he became bishop of his native city , Gaeta. accipi potest: uno modo, in actu quidditativo et essentiali; alio modo, in actu existentiae actualis." In Summa contra Gentiles Comm., I, 24, iv.

12

INTRODUCTION

We do not intend to list his works and their dates; we wish only to point out that all of his philosophical works were completed by the year 1509. We consider his commentary on the Summa a theological work; in 1507 he had already completed his com­ mentary on the first part. From 1509 until his death in 1534, all his works were theological. Cajetan had two major adversaries throughout his scholarly life: Scotism and Averroism. His commentary on the De Ente et Essentia is not only an explanation of Thomas but also a defense of Thomism principally against Scotus and his disciples. His com­ mentary on the Summa is the same thing, save that it also strongly attacks Averroism. His commentary on the De A nima of Aristotle is not only an explanation of Aristotle but also an attack on the Averroistic as well as the Alexandrian positions with regard to the human soul.

I SAINT THOMAS'S NOTION OF EXISTENCE

The first thing one should look for in trying to understand any metaphy sics is its first constitutive principle in the real order. The metaphy sics can be characterized by the answer it gives to the question: what makes a real thing real? Plato answered this question by saying that it is its approximation to the One that makes a being a being: 1 his metaphy sics is consequently termed a metaphy sics of the One. Aristotle's metaphy sics is one of sub­ stance because he believed that being was identified with the individual substance. To Saint Thomas belongs the honor of constructing a metaphy sics which posited esse or the act of existing as the ultimate intrinsic principle of the real. We will see, as we go along, that Saint Thomas's philosophy is through and through an existentialism. Esse is the pivotal principle on which the entire structure of Thomistic metaphy sics stands firm or collapses. The affirmation and clarification of the act of existence as the act of form is the greatest contribution that Saint Thomas has made to true metaphy sical knowledge. Prior to his profound anal­ y sis of existence, existence was for the most part either explicitly or implicitly identified with essence or else functioned as a 'separ­ able accident' in a sy stem in which the primacy was clearly given to essence. In short, before Thomas, essentialism definitely was the common way of viewing the real. William of Auvergne, it is Plato considered that the realm of ideas alone is the realm of true being; the sensible world is non-being. The ideas themselves are real in as much as they are approximations of the One which is outside of them. That which makes them other than the One is not a limiting principle but a negating principle termed the dyad. The dyad establishes difference through negation. 1

14

SAINT THOMAS'S NOTION OF EXISTENCE

tr ue, did give considerable thought to the esse of creatures which he posited as really distinct from their essence. Y et in his position esse is not the act of form, but the relation of a created essence to its first cause who is esse. 2 This is the same position as that of Albert the Great; 3 it is really essentialism because it posits no 2 M. Gilson gives the following clear presentation of William of Auver­ gne's position on esse, explaining also how this position differs from Avi­ cenna's. "Just as William of Auvergne stays close to Avicenna and Mai­ monides in his interpretation of the identity of the divine essence and existence, he does not clearly go beyond them in the distinction of created essence and existence. He clearly sees that this distinction is of quite another nature than the distinction of matter and form, which is already very important; moreover, he does not conceive it only as an ideal distinction posited by reason alone, but as a real distinction, which is no less important, but his foreshadowing of Thomism is restricted to this. For William, for Maimonides and their common master Avicenna, exist­ ence is a sort of addition to essence, whence follows this other difference that existence seems to combine with essence as a quo est, added from without to the quod est whose act it is. If William is urged to explain what he means by the esse of the creature, his answer will not be slow in coming: it is a participation in the divine esse. In expressing himself thus, he purposely breaks away from Avicenna, for whom the existence of a thing is a participation only in some other being anteriorly emanated from the First; but he links up created essence so directly to God that its own existence is volatilized, the creature being nothing more than an essence all of whose existing is reduced to a simple 'existing through God.' Of course, God is the being by whom all things are, and not at all the being they are (esse quo sunt, non autem quod sunt). Making use of a typical formula whose full import will only appear in Albert the Great and Eckhardt, William compares with the relation of soul to body the rela­ tion of divine esse to created essences. God is the being of all things as the soul is the life of its body; and that is exactly why the existence of beings is always in some way accidental to them. Since the unique supreme essence, which is God, is the unique existing by which all exists - which in no way takes away from the essential diversity of things - it can be said of the existing by which they are that it is not essential to them, but, in a way, superadded (esse quo sunt non est eis essentiale, sed quasi accidit). Beyond Gilbert of la Porree and the masters of Chartres, William is half­ way between the ontology of Boethius and that of Thomas Aquinas." History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle A ges, p. 254. 3 "As compared with what truly and properly is, namely, God, all other beings only are by accident; in other words, their esse (or quo est) is accidental to their being (or quod est). On this point, Albert expressly invoked the authority of Avicenna, plus that of a spurious work of Aris­ totle, who, indeed, never taught any such doctrine. In fact, Albert is keeping faith with the Boethian notion of being. There is no indication that, even at the end of his life, he became a convert to the Thomistic

SAINT THOMAS'S NOTION OF EXISTENCE

15

real foundation in a created essence for its relation of dep endence on God. I t does not answer the question: why does a created , essence really dep end on God and a p urely possible one not? GENERAL VIEW

Before considering MORE SPECIFICALLY the p ervasive and crucial role esse p lay s in the metap hy sics of Saint Thomas, we will first p resent a GENERAL p icture of its central p osition in the meta­ phy sics of Thomas. We think that the two basic concep ts in Saint Thomas's view of real ity are those of absolute existence and p articipated exist­ ence; or, to be p erhap s clearer, the ideas of subsisting esse and its p articip ation. For Saint Thomas subsisting esse is the first p rin­ cip le in the real order; in fact, qui est is the p rop er name for God. God as subsisting esse is the first efficie nt, first final, and first exemp lar cause of all things. We might add that the existentialism of Saint Thomas is made all the more evident when one considers that he seems to be the only p hilosop her to STRESS the fact that the essence of God is His existence. Saint Augustine, for instance, while admitting that God is essentially being, considered God p ri­ marily as subsisting imm utable truth. Duns Scotus, who lived after Thomas. viewed God primarily as the infinite being. Because for Thomas God is p rimarily existence itself, it follows that all God's creatures must be different kinds of existences; that is, they must p articip ate in existence in different way s. There is the whole broad picture; existence and p articip ation are the corn erstones of the entire Thomistic sy stem. Because God as p ure existence is the cause of all that is real, all else is real because it has its own p articip ated esse. I f esse makes a thing real, then it must also make a thing one, intelligible, and appetible, for a thing is one, true, and good inasmuch as it is real. I f the esse of each creature is p articip ated, then it is not the same as the creature, and must be reall y other than what the creature is. If a creature, though notion of esse. To him, as indeed to many of his successors up to our own times, the distinction of esse and quod est remained a technical ex­ pression of the fact that created beings require a cause of their existence.'� Ibidem, p. 291.

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SAINT THOMAS'S NOTION OF EXISTENCE

no t identical w ith esse, still has its own pro per esse, then it is absol utely o ther than all o ther beings; yet it must be pro po rtio n­ ally simil ar to all o thers, because all beings are actuated by their act o f ex istence. The creature must be simil ar to Go d in an ex tra special way because omne agens agit simile sibi. 4 We think that such a glo bal presentation enabl es o ne to see at a gl ance no t o nly how and w hy Tho mas's metaphysics is an existential ism, but al so how and w hy so many o f the great Tho m­ istic themes are bo und up in a strict metaphysical o neness w ith esse. TEXTUAL ANALYSIS

We wish to cite now the textual fo undations for the abov e precis of Saint Tho mas's metaphysics o f e xistence, and at the same time to present a mo re specific analysis o f how esse functions in this metaphysics. It wo ul d be w el l to co nsider at the very beginni ng a few texts w hich establish beyond a doubt the primacy o f esse ov er essence. The following texts 5 do this by explicitly stating w hat being is. In every being one can distinguish its quiddity, through which it sub­ sists in a determined nature, and its act of existing through which it can be said of it that it actually exists. The word "being" is imposed from the very act of existing, as Avicenna remarks, whereas the word "thing" is imposed from the essence or quiddity. 6 Being properly signifies: something existing-in-act. 7 The act of existing is not the proper act of matter, but of the com­ plete substance. The act of existing is the act of that of which we say "that it is".s I, 4, 3, C. In the translations of some of the texts of Thomas found in this first chapter, we have used Dr. James Anderson's A n Introduction to the Metaphysics of St. Thomas A quinas (Chicago, Regnery, 1959). Most of the translations, however, are our own. 6 " • • • cum in omni quod est sit considerare quidditatem suam, per quam subsistit in natura determinata, et esse suum, per quod; dicitur de eo quod est in actu; hoc nomen res imponitur rei a quidditate sua, secundum Avi­ cennam ; hoc nomen qui est vel ens imponitur ab ipso actu essendi". I, Sent., VIII, 1, 1. 7 "Ens dicat aliquid proprie esse in actu." I, 5, 1, ad 1. "Ipsum esse non est proprius actus materiae, sed substantiae totius. 4

5

ij

SAINT THOMAS'S NOTION OF EXISTENCE

17

The act of existing is the actuality of every form or nature. 9

These texts cl earl y show that Thomas teaches that the act of existing is that what makes being being. The act of existing is not essence or merel y a rel ation of the essence to the efficient cause, but is the very act of form. Since being as being is the subject of metaphy sics in Thomas's mind, it woul d foll ow ac­ cording to the primacy he grants esse that esse, or more specifi­ call y an order to esse, is reall y the formal subject of his meta­ phy sics. Probabl y the two strongest texst emphasiz ing the primacy of essc are the foll owin g. The act of existing is the most perfect of �11 p�inciples. It is related to everything that is as its act. Nothing has actuality except inasmuch as it exists. Hence the act of existing is the actuality of all things, even of the forms themselves. Hence it is not related to things as the re­ ceiver to the received, but rather as the received to the receiver. When I say "esse hominis vel equi," the act of existing is considered as formal and as received, which is otherwise than the essence to which this act belongs. 1 0 What I call esse is among all principles the most perfect; which is evident from the fact that act is always more perfect than potentiality. Now any designated form is understood to exist actually only in virtue of the fact that it is held to be. Thus, humanity or fire can be con­ sidered as existing in the potentiality of matter, or as existing in the active power of an agent, or also as existing in an intellect. But that which has esse is made actually existent. It is evident therefore that what I call esse is the actuality of all acts, and for this reason it is the perfection of all perfections. Nor is it to be thought that some­ thing is added to what I call esse which is more formal than esse itself, thus determining it as an act determines a potentiality. For the esse I speak of is essentially other than that to which it is added as Eius enim actus est esse de quo possumus dicere quod sit." C.G., II, 54. 9 "Esse est actualitas omnis formae, vel naturae." I, 3, 4c. 10 "Ad tertium dicendum quod ipsum esse est perfectissimum omnium: comparatur enim ad omnia ut actus. Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi in quantum est: unde ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum, et etiam ipsarum formarum. Unde non comparatur ad alia sicut recipiens ad receptum: sed magis sicut receptum ad recipiens. Cum enim dico esse hominis vel equi, vel cuiuscumque alterius, ipsum esse consideratur ut formale et receptum: non autem ut illud cui competit esse." I, 4, 1 , ad 3.

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SA INT THOMAS'S NOTION OF EXISTENCE

a certain determining principle. Now nothing can be added to esse that is extraneous to it, since nothing is extraneous to it except non­ being which is neither matter nor form. Esse, then, is not determined by an act, but esse is determined as an act by a potentiality. 1 1

Ag ain the same conclusion presents itself, this time much more clearly and forcefully. Esse is the actuality of essence. It is what makes essence exist. Essence without esse is therefore nothi ng actual. Thomas in explicitly stating that esse is the act of form is implicitly say ing that form must of itself be pure potency for esse. Essence cannot add anything to esse because outside esse there is nothing. Essence therefore can only receive esse as a potency receives its act and determine it as a potency deter­ mines its act. A potency determi nes its act not through addition but through limi tation. According to the mi nd of Thomas essence in se is not only nothing actual but it cannot be thought of except as being related to esse. Can we not then conclude that Thomas would hold that essence is included in the subject of a metaphy sics only inasmuch as it is related to esse as a pure potency ? Now that we have a general textual picture of the prim acy of esse in Saint Thomas's sy stem, let us consider a few texts which relate God and the act of existence. The first text demonstrates in a beautifull y metaphy sical process of reasoning that God's essence must be His existence. God is not only his essence, but also his act of eiisting. This can be proven in many ways. First of all, because whatever is in a thing "Hoc quod dico esse est inter omnia perfectissimum: quod ex hoc patet quia actus est semper perfectior potentia. Quaelibet autem forma signata non intelligitur in actu nisi per hoc quod esse ponitur. Nam hu­ manitas vel igneitas potest considerari ut in potentia materiae existens, vel ut in virtute agentis, aut etiam in intellectu: sed hoc quod dico esse effici­ tur actu existens. Unde patet quod hoc quod dico esse est actualitas om­ nium actuum et propter hoc est perfectio omnium perfectionum. Nee intelligendum est, quod ei quod dico esse, aliquid addatur quod sit eo formalius, ipsum determinans, sicut actus potentiam: esse enim quod huiusmodi est, est aliud secundum essentiam ab eo cui additur determi­ nandum. Nihil autem potest addi ad esse quod sit extraneum ab ipso, cum ab eo nihil sit extraneum nisi non ens, quod non potest esse nee forma nee materia. Unde non sic determinantur esse per aliud sicut potentia per actum, sed magis sicut actus per potentiam." De Pot., VII, 2, ad 9. 11

SAINT THOMAS'S NOTION OF EXISTENCE

19

and outside the essence of the thing is caused either by the principles of the essence, in the manner of proper accidents following the essence, just as risibility follows man and flows from the essential principles of the thing; or it is caused by an external agent, as heat in water, for instance, is caused by fire. If, therefore, the act of existing of a thing is really distinct from its essence, it is necessary that it be caused either by an external agent, or by the essential principles of the thing itself. It is impossible that the act of existing be caused only by the essential principles of the thing, because nothing, if its esse is caused, is the cause of its own existing. Therefore it is necessary that a thing whose act of existing is other than its essence has its esse from an external agent. This cannot be said of God, since we say that God is the first efficient cause. It is impossible therefore that God's act of existing be really other than his essence. 1 2

T he secon d text shows that because God's essen ce is His esse, His supremel y proper n ame is qui est. Qui est is the supremely proper name for God. This name does not signify any form at all but the very act of existing. Hence since the esse of God is his essence and this is true of no other being, it is clear that this name among all other is most proper for God. Each being is named in accordance with its form. 1 3

The third text shows that the radix of God's infinite omni perfec­ tion is the fact that He is subsistin g esse. Al so as subsistin g esse, He must be the cause of all created perfection whi ch is perfection in asmuch as it is. 12 . . Respondeo: dicendurn quod Deus non solum est sua essentia . . . sed etiam suum esse. Quod quidem multipliciter ostendi potest. Primo quidem, quia quidquid est in aliquo quor est praeter essentiam eius, oportet esse causatum vel a principiis essentiae, sicut accidentia propria consequentia speciem, ut risibile consequitur hominem et causatur ex principiis essentiali­ bus speciei; vel ab aliquo exteriori, sicut calor in aqua causatur ab igne. Si igitur ipsum esse rei sit aliud ab eius essentia, necesse est quod esse illius rei vel sit causatum ab aliquo exteriori, vel a principiis essentialibus ipsius rei. lmpossibile est autem quod esse sit causatum tanturn ex prin­ cipiis essentialibus rei; quia nuila res sufficit quod sit sibi causa essendi, si habeat esse causatum. Oportet ergo quod illus cuius esse est aliud ab essentia sua, habeat esse causatum ab alio. Hoc autem non potest dici de Deo; quia Deum dicimus esse primam causam efficientem. lmpossibile est ergo quod in Deo sit aliud esse et aliud ejus essentia." I, 3, 4c. 13 . .Qui est . . . est maxime proprium nomen Dei . . . . Non enim significat formam aliquam, sed ipsum esse. Unde cum esse Dei sit ipsa eius essentia, et hoc nulli alii conveniat . . . manifestum est quod inter alia nomina hoc maxime proprie nominat Deum: unumquodque enim denominatur a sua forma." I, 1 3 , l l c.

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SAINT THOMAS'S NOTION OF EXISTENCE

Because God is the very act of existing per se subsistens, it follows that he possesses the entire perfection of being in himself. It is clear that if a certain warm object does not contain the entire perfection of heat, this is so because it does not possess heat according to its fullness. But if heat were a subsisting form, nothing of the form of heat would be lacking to it. Hence since God is the subsisting act of esse, nothing of the perfection of being can be lacking to him. The perfections of all things pertain to the perfection of existing inasmuch as things are perfect because they exist in a certain way. Therefore it follows that God possesses the perfection of every being. 1 4

All these tex ts prove one thing: to Saint Thomas God is above all el se the pure act of ex istence. This is the pre- eminent way of view ing God. The whol e of Saint Thomas' s natural theol ogy is bu il t on God as the pure act of ex istence. First of al l, to prove God ex ists h e proceeds from participated existence to su bsisting ex istence. All the divine perfections fl ow f rom this truth. I f God is pure ex istence He mu st formally be all that pure exi stence is. Pure ex istence is inf inity, simplic ity, immutabil ity, intell igence, goodness, l ove, freedom, and all the perfections th at are f ormal ly identif ied with being or perfection as such. With regard to all in­ tri nsical ly finite perfections, perfections that incl ude potential ity in their very intell igibility , God as pure bein g is certainly their cause, because they are perfect only inasmuch as they are diff erent way s of ex isting and God is the sou rce of all ex istence. We intend now to study Thomas' s doctrine on the rel ation of essence and existence in creatures as he proposed it in some of hi s more important works. What interests us now are tex ts that present the fact and proof of the real distinction between the esse and essence of creatu re. We will first consider the famou s tex t f rom chapter f ive of the De Ente et Essentia. The infl uence of Avicenna in this opuscul um 14 " • • • ex hoc quod Deus est ipsum esse per se subsistens: ex quo oportet quod totam perfectionem essendi in se contineat. Manifestum est enim quod, si aliquod calidum non habeat totam perfectionem calidi, hoc ideo est, quia calor non participatur secundum perfectam rationem; sed si calor esset per se subsistens, non possit ei aliquid deesse de virtute caloris. Unde cum Deus sit ipsum esse subsistens, nihil de perfectione essendi potest ei deesse. Omnium autem perfectiones pertinent ad perfectionem essendi: secundum hoc aliqua perfecta sunt, quod aliquo modo esse habent. Unde sequitur quod nullius rei perfectio Deo desit." I, 4, 3c.

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i s quit e evi dent, not just i n the way Thomas argues for the real di sti ncti on but also, i n other doctri nes; for i nstance, wit h regard t o the noti on of t he absolute comm on nature proposed earli er in chapter four. I n chapter fi ve Thomas i s consi dering angels and i s tryi ng to di scover i f t here i s any real compositi on i n t hem. He has already denied t hat there i s any matter i n t hem. Thomas then shows t hat they are composed of esse and form whi ch are related as act and potency. Before Thomas proves thi s compositi on i n angels, he fi rst gi ves t he famous concept ual argu­ ment for the real di sti ncti on. Thi s argument i s certai nl y character­ i sti c of Avi cenna. 1 5 Whatever does not belong to the concept of an essence or quiddity is outside the essence and makes a composition with it. I can understand what a man or a phoenix is and still not know whether they exist. Therefore it is clear that the act of existing is other than the essence of a being, except in the case of a being whose essence is its act of existing. HI

Thi s text does not ex pli ci tly est abli sh the ex act relati on of esse to essence; it contai ns only a proof of thei r real di sti ncti on. I n chapter fi fty-two, book two, of the Summa Contra Gentiles, Thomas agai n consi ders whether there i s a compositi on i n angels of esse and quod est. It is clear t hat the quod est i s the pure form whi ch i s the very essence of an angel. Thomas has already deni ed that angels are composed of matter and form; he wants to show h ow they are sti ll di sti ngui shed from God. The act of existing, however, inasmuch as it is such, cannot be diverse. It can however be diversified through something that is really other than it; the act of existing of a stone is other than the act of existing of a man . That being, therefore, who is the subsisting act of existing must be one in number. Nothing therefore outside of him can be its 15 Cf. A.-M. Goichon, La Distinction de l'Essence et l'Existence d'apres A vicenne, Chapter III (Paris, Desclee de Brouwer, 1937), pp. 137-141. 16 "Quidguid enim non est de intellectu essentiae vel guiditatis hoc est adveniens extra et faciens compositionem cum essentia . . . possum intel­ ligere good est homo vel phoenix, et tamen ignorare an esse habent in rerurn natura; ergo patet good esse est aliud ab essentia vel guiditate, nisi forte sit aligua res cujus guiditas sit ipsum suum esse." De Ente et Essentia, V.

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own act of existing. It is necessary therefore that in every other being the substance and the act of existing be really distinct. 17

This text bases the real distin ction between esse an d essen ce on the prin cipl e that esse cann ot be div ersified by itsel f-. F rom the principl e it is cl ear that there can be onl y one esse subsistens. Yet esse is obv iously div ersified in creatures. Thomas speaks of esse hominis and esse lapidis. What div ersifies must be reall y distinct from the common el emen t that it div ersifies; otherwise how coul d it div ersify? It is clear that esse is what is div ersified; essence is what dive rsifies. Therefore they are really distin ct. Practically all the proofs that Thomas giv es for the real dis­ tinction are based on the fact that cre ated beings are div erse and l imited existences. This fact immediatel y impl ies participation in existence an d a consequen t real distinction between what partici­ pates and the existen ce which is participated. Le t us l ook at a few more of these proofs. The participated is related to the participating as its act. Participated esse is limited to the capacity of the participant. Hence God alone who is the very act of existing is pure and unlimited act. In intel­ lectual substances there is a composition of act and potency, not in­ deed of matter and form, but of form and participated existence. 18 The very act of existing of God is distinguished from every other act of existing, because it is subsisting existence, and not an act which "comes to" a nature and is really distinct from it. Because the act of existing of all other beings is not subsistent, it is necessary that it be individated by the nature and substance that subsists through such an act of existing. In such beings, the esse of this is distin­ guished from the esse of that because this being possesses a different nature than that. If there were a subsisting form of heat, just by the "Esse, autem, inquantum est esse, non potest esse diversum ; potest autem diversificari per aliquid quad est praeter esse; sicut esse lapidis est aliud ab esse hominis. Illud ergo quod est esse subsistens non potest esse nisi unum tantum . . . . Nihil igitur aliud praeter ipsum potest esse suum esse. Oportet igitur in omni substantia quae est praeter ipsum, esse aliud ipsam substantiam et esse ejus." C.G., II, 52. 18 " Quod omne participatum comparatum ad participans ut actus eius. . . . Esse autem participatum finitur ad capacitatem participantis. Unde solus Deus; qui est ipsum suum esse, est actus purus et infinitus. In substantiis vero intellectualibus est compositio ex actu et potentia; non quidem ex materia et forma, sed ex forma et esse participato." I, 75, 5, ad 4. 17

SAINT THOMAS'S NOTION OF EXISTENCE

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very fact of its subsistence, it would be distinct from all other heat; yet the various forms of heat existing in various subjects would be distinguished �nly through their subjects . t D

These texts in providing reasons for the real distinction between essence and esse explain their respective relations. Essence is poten cy for the act of existing. Esse is its act. Each existing essence has its own proper act of esse wich means that its esse is proportioned to it. What this proportion in fact implies is that the essence limits the act of existing to itself and in doing this di versifies it. Esse, therefore, in Thomas's thought, ca nnot be a s eparable accident which never really actuates an essence. A very metaphy sically factual presentati on of the relations be­ tween esse and essence which will help a great deal to further our analy sis is found in the f ollowing text. This text and the subse­ quent one we shall consider are found in the magnificent chapter fifty-four of book two of the Contra Gentiles, possibly the best presentation of this matter in the work of Saint Thomas. The act of existing is the proper act of the complete substance. The substance is that-which-is. Esse is related also to the form as its act. Because of this, in beings composed of matter and form, form is called a principle of existing; it is the form that completes the sub­ stance whose act esse is. Form can be termed quo est, inasmuch as it is a principle of existing; the entire substance is that-which-is; esse itself is that because of which the substance is called being. 20 19 ••1psum esse Dei distinguitur et individuatur a quolibet alio esse, per hoc ipsum quod est esse per se subsistens, et non adveniens alicui naturae quae sit aliud ab ipso esse. Omne autem aliud esse quod non est sub­ sistens, oportet quod individuatur per naturam et substantiam quae in tali esse subsistit. Et in eis verum est quod esse huius est aliud ab esse illius, per hoc quod est alterius naturae; sicut si esset unus calor per se sub­ sistens sine materia vel subiecto, ex hoc ipso ab omni alio calore distin­ gueretur: licet calores in subiecto existentes non distinguantur nisi per subiecta." De Pot., VIII, 2, ad 5. 20 .. lpsum esse est proprius actus substantiae totius . . . ipsa substantia est id quod est . . . ad ipsam formam comparatur ipsum esse ut actus. Per hoc enim in compositis ex materia et forma dicitur forma principium es­ sendi; quia est complementum substantiae cuius actus est ipsum esse . . . . Forma tamen potest dici quo est, secundum quod est essendi principium ; ipsa autem tota substantia est ipsum quod est; et ipsum esse est quo sub­ stantia denominatur ens." C.G. , II, 54.

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SAINT THOMAS'S NOTION OF EXISTENCE

Th is pa ssage is one of striking metaphysica l bea uty a nd clarity. I n i t Th oma s pinpoints th e esse of crea tures a s the a ct of form. Thoma s decla res tha t wha t exists is the whole essence, the sub­ sta nce. In an angel s ubsta nce or that-which-is is the sa me a s form. Th e substa nce of form of a n a ngel does not exist by itself but by a n esse which is its proper a ct. In materia l crea tures esse is primarily the proper act of the whole essence or substa nce whi ch i s ma de up of matter a nd form. The a ct of the substa nce is a t the sam e time the a ct of the substantia l form, beca use th e substa ntia l form forma lly completes the substa nce a nd ma kes it a specific way of bei ng, or to be clea rer, a proper recepta cle of esse. In the sense tha t i t makes the substa nce a proper subj ect for existence form is ca lled a principle of existing, a principium quo. W ith regard to esse form is therefore in the line of ma teria l ca usa lity; wi th rega rd to ma tter it functions a s a forma l ca use. Y et it only ca uses ina smuch a s it ha s been a ctua ted by esse. Our concluding text in this ma tter presents most gra phica lly th e reciprocal ca usality involved in th e union of esse with essence. The act of existing is also related to the form as its act. Because of this, in composits of matter and form, form is said to be a principle of existing since it completes the substance whose act is esse, just as the air's transparency is the principle of illumination because it makes the air a proper subject of light. Hence in composits of matter and form neither the matter nor the form can be called that-which-is, nor can even the act of existing be so termed. Form however can be called that-by-which-a-thing-is, inasmuch as it is a principle of existing; the complete substance however is that-which-exists, and the act of existing is that by which the substance is denominated a being. 2 1

In this tex t we see clearly the grea t contribution th e meta physics of Th oma s ha s ma de to the meta ph ysics of Aristotle. For Aristotle only form i s act. Form by giving a bei ng its substa ntial perfection 21 "Quia ad ipsam etiam formam comparatur ipsum esse ut actus. Per hoc enim in compositis ex materia et forma dicitur forma esse principium essendi, quia est complementum substantiae, cujus actus est ipsum esse: sicut diaphanum est aeri prineipium lucendi quia facit eum proprium subiectum luminis.Unde in eompositis ex materia et forma nee materia nee forma potest dici ipsum quod est nee etiam ipsum esse. Forma tamen potest diei quo est, seeundum quod est essendi prineipium, ipsa autem tota substantia est ipsum quod est; et ipsum esse est quo substantia deno­ minatur ens." C.G., 1 1, 54.

SA INT THOMAS'S NOTION OF EXISTENC E

25

makes it be. Aristotle n eve r appeared to con sider esse as the act of form. In fact, he n ever seemed to con sider existen ce much at all. Certainl y . to speak of an act of form would make no sen se to him. For Aristotle form does what esse does for Saint Thomas. Aristotle would have to main tain that an act of form would b e an act of act. To actualize form, therefore, is unnecessary because form is already act, is being. When Aristotle speaks of the differ­ en ce between man an d to be a man , 22 he is speaking of the differen ce between the absolute nature and the supposit; esse does n ot enter the picture. To Thomas, who posited subsisting existen ce as his very first principle, things appeared altogether differen t. The f orm of a creature by itself alone is n ot actual being at all. I t is act in the order of essence only because it has rec eived actuation from esse. If it really actuated a being, there would be n o such thing as an essen ce without existen ce, that is, a purely possible essen ce. Thus in the order of existen ce form is pure poten cy . This is its whole in telligibility: capacity for existing. As existin g its en tire actuality comes from esse. Of itself , therefore, it does not add anything to esse because nothin g can be added to existen ce. Y et esse, because it makes real a definite essen ce, becomes a defin ite existen ce. Thus esse actualizes essen ce an d in this sen se exerts some ty pe of causality on form. 23 In actual izing essence it actualizes a formal cause. Form as actualized formal ­ izes 24 esse by making it this ty pe of esse. Thomas say s that the proper subject of the act of existing is the essence which in an gels is form alone an d in material things is the composite made up of matter an d form. Y et he often indis­ crimin ately speaks of esse as f ollowin g upon form. What he means is that esse is immediately received by its proper receptable. In 22

Post. A nal., II, 7, 92b, 8-11.

"Actual existence, then, is the efficient cause by which essence in its turn is the formal cause which makes an actual existence to be such an existence." Being and Some Philosophers, p. 172. Esse can be considered as an efficient cause inasmuch as it actuates the essence without informing it. Rather than terming it an efficient cause, perhaps it would be better to call it an actuating principle or cause. 24 'Formalizes' is used here in the sense of LIMITS or SPECIFIES and not in the sense that essence adds anything to esse. As a pure potency for esse, essence cannot do this. 23

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material things this is the composite. Form makes the composite a proper receptacle by formally completing it, and in this sense esse follows form. Esse follows form also means that esse is limited by form which is really saying what is implicit in our first ex planation. I n Thomas's mind it was never a question of esse and essenc e being two things. A fi nite being is that whi ch has existence. Only the substance in its entirety or the supposit ex ists. I n creatures there fore essence of itself does not ex ist, nor does esse. Only the s upposit, whether it be essentially simple or compound, ex ists and it exists through the act of existing which is a principium quo. Thus within the supposit the essence which is real through esse is really other than the esse which makes it real. Later on when we discuss the real distinction between esse and essence in C ajetan, we will see that it is precisely on this point that the Scotistic objectors to the real distinction will concentrate. To th eir minds it is the crux of the matter. How, they ask, can essence be really other than which makes it real? How can essence b e reall y other than its own reality? This objection is answered by the reciprocal causality involved between esse and essence as two intrinsic principles of a finite being. We will discuss this problem at length when we come to it in our analy sis of C ajetan. SUMMARY

We trust that this presentation though brief has nonetheless clearly ex plained the central themes of Saint Thomas's meta­ physics of esse. We now intend to present the fundamental truth s discovered in this analy sis. Thomas teaches that a thing is real not inasmuch as it is or has form but inasmuch as it is or has esse. The prime being in the real order is being itself, that is, subsistin g esse, which is God. Esse is the actual radix of all the perfections that God actually is, a nd is the causal principle (efficient, (ex emplar, and final) of all bei ngs other than God which are but participations of esse. This does not i mply an emanationism whereby the esse of all creatures is divin e esse and not their own. The esse of creatures is not

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27

G od' s esse, but an imitation of God's esse. The esse of cre ature s is their own prope r be ing � hich is proportione d to the ir e sse nce s o r what the y are . The ir esse is cause d by God' s esse. God' s esse is infinite; the cre ature 's is finite. God' s esse is His e sse nce . The cre ature' s esse is the actuation of what he is, and the re fore is his own. It is cause d and conserve d by God but it is really the c re ature' s be ing. Esse actuate s e ssence . Esse nce as actuate d formalize s e xiste nce in the se nse that it make s it a definite way of e xisting. A thing is t he re fore re al be cause it is or has its own act of e xisting. What make s a thing re al also make s it one , true , and good. Hence al l the transce nde ntals are founde d on esse. In cre ature s be cause esse is participate d, limite d, dive rse , changeab le, it is re ally distinct from e sse nce , as one principle of be ing is distinct from anothe r. I t would be prope r to tre at Saint Thomas's notion of action in this chapte r on his notion of e xiste nce . As Thomas said, agere sequitur esse. Ye t we be lieve what we have thus far pre se nte d in this chapte r is sufficie nt for our purpose s. We wish only to pre se nt the sub stance of Thomas' s me taphysics of e xiste nce . We be lieve that we have done this save for one point; name ly , analogy. We cannot treat Saint Thomas's philosophy of e xiste nce without touching on the que stion of analogy which play s such an e sse n­ tial role in it. Be cause of the comple xity of this matte r, naturally we can only pre se nt what we conside r the b are e sse ntials of it. ANALOGY IN THOMAS

Le t us first conside r what might be te rme d the pre dicational ap­ proach to me taphy sical analogy. We vie w the re aso ning he re in­ volve d as re pre se ntative of Saint Thomas's mind on the prob le m of analogy. It is e vide nt that be ings are ab solute ly diffe re nt. Saint Thomas holds that this me ans the ir acts of e xisting are diffe re nt; he woul d say that the se are diffe re nt be cause the y actuate diffe re nt e sse nce s. In b rie f, in finite be ings the diffe re nt e sse nce s diffe re n­ tiate the ir acts of e xisting, thus making e ach be ing absolute ly differe nt in its be ing than anothe r. God diffe rs from all be cause

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SAINT THOM AS'S NOTION OF EXISTENCE

H is esse is His essence; this means that He is infinite esse. Y et if things differ absolutely in their being, how can we predicate being of them? To predicate being of them would indicate that th ey are somehow the same, otherwise being would be predicated in a purely equivocal way. To admit a pure equivocity of being would be to admit th at each being has nothing at all in com mon, th at th eir concepts have nothing at all in comm on; there would be no re al reason for calling different things being. I f things were abs olutely different, they would be totally unrelated to each other, there would be no foundation for rational discourse. It is easy to see that an eq uivocity of being is impossible. Y et when we predi­ cate being of each thing, we obv iously cannot mean that each being is the same in its being. The whole problem rests on the fact that beings are absolutely different. If we were to say that being is predicated as a genus, this would be to admit that differ­ ent bein gs do not exist. The differences of a genus are outside its comprehension; a genus is not predicated of its differences. Thus if being were a genus, the differences in being would be non- being, and every thing would be the same. I f beings cannot be equivocal, or univocal, the only alternative left is that they are som ehow alike and somehow different. Thi s is what metaphy sical analogy is: likeness and difference in being. It is because of the intrinsic similarity of what is absolutely different that we can de­ nominate different things being. The reasoning process presented above represents, we are sure, th e mind of Saint Thomas on what we term the predicational ap­ p roach to metaphy sical analogy. The predication of being of different beings involves analogy or similarity and difference in being. W hat this similarity is, we intend to explain now. Before we do this, we would like to point out that there is another approach to analogy found in Saint Thomas, an approach which is strictly metaphy sical. God as being itself is the proper cause of al l being. Ever y being as an effect of God must be similar to the cause as omne agens agit simile sibi in quantum est agens. 25 Thus God, as being itself, must produce being. This produced being, al though absolutely other than God, must be, as an effect of 25

I, 4, 3c.

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being itsel f, sim il ar to God. This is metaphy sical anal ogy : abs olute difference and y et sim ilitu.de in b eing. Let us now consider in what this sim il itude consists: b etween God and other b eings, between being and being. We will arrive at the answer to this question through an anal y sis of the th ought inv olv ed in what is prob abl y one of th e best presentation s of anal ogy in Saint Thomas. The text is found in De Veritate, II, 2. T hom as is talki ng about predicating perfections of God and c reatures. No perfection can be predicated univ ocally of God and creatures. This woul d entail the im possibl e: that God and th e creature share a common nature. The creature imitates God, but is not essentiall y the sam e as God. Creatures them selves may be the same in essence but th ey differ in their being. In fact, all things differ in their being. God's essence is His being. Therefore, as all thi ngs differ absol utel y in their being, God cannot share a comm on nature with creatures. Wh atev er is in God is His proper act of existence. Consequentl y , s ince the act of existence proper to one being is compl etel y different and incommunicable, it is im possibl e that the creature shoul d hav e anything essential ly in comm on with God. Y et because we cannot predicate perfections of God and crea­ tures univ ocally, this does not m ean that the onl y alternative is pure equivocal predication. Pure equiv ocacy would m ean that there woul d be nothing in comm on between God and creatures. This is fal se b ecause the divine essence is the exem pl ar of crea­ tures and the only way God knows creatures is through knowing His own essence. Al so it woul d be im possibl e for us to know an y thing about God from creatures. The only solution is that perfections are predicated of God and creatures by anal ogy. Anal ogy m eans according to som e proportional likeness. Thomas div ides proportional likeness into two ty pes. The first ty pe is called anal ogy of proportion. In this first kind of anal ogy a term is predicated of two things because of a determ inate rela ­ tion between them. Being, for instance, is predicated of substance and of accident because of the rel ation that substance and acci­ dent have to each other. Or heal thy is predicated of urine and of a nimal because urine has a certain likeness to the heal th of an

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animal. The second typ e of prop ortional similitude is called anal­ ogy of p rop ortionality. This is found when there is a similarity of p rop ortions, and not a determinate p rop ortion or relation of one thing to another. For instance six and four have no deter­ minate relation to one another, but are alike inasmuch as six is the double of three and four is the double of two. Vision is predicated of corporeal vision and intellectual vision by way of analogy of p rop ortionality. The relation between sight and the eye is similar to the relation between the intellect and the soul. Between the beings involved in an analogy of p rop ortion there must be some determi nate relation. If a creature had a determinate relation to God, the divine p erfection could be determi ned. It is therefore imp ossible to use the analogy of p rop ortion in p redi­ cating of God and creatures. 26 Because in the analogy of p rop or­ tionality no determinate relati on exists between the analogates, names can be p redicated of God and creatures in this way. Thomas notes two modes of p redicating by way of p rop ortion­ ality. The first is metap horical p redication and has come to be known as analogy of imp rop er prop ortionality. In thi s analogy the term is p redicated uni vocally of its p rop er subject and only metap horically or sy mbolically of other things. For instance, l ion or sun are said univocally only of lion and sun; y et they can be said sy mbolically of God because of a p rop ortional likeness H e bears them. They cannot be said of God p rop erly because they include matter in their comp rehension. The second way of p redi­ cating by prop ortionality is that of p rop er p rop ortionality in which th e term is p rop erly p redicated of the anal ogues which though different are similar according to an intrinsic likeness of p ropor­ tions. Such names that involve no imperfection, nor any actual dep endence on matter can be p redicated of God and creature in this way. Such names involve in their p rincip le meanings nothin g Dr. James Anderson points out that '°Saint Thomas does not argue here that analogy of proportion can in no sense obtain between the creature and God, but he does exclude this analogy in what he apparently takes to be the strict and proper sense of it, as involving some mutual determinate relation." Cf. Introduction to Metaphysics of Saint Thomas, p. 1 27, note 26.

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31

that coul d prevent such a mode of community ( proportionality) from existing between the J: reature and God. Being, therefore, when predicated of God and creatures, signifies the sim ilarity of the relationship God's esse has to His essence to the relationship a creature's esse has to its essence. 27 27

Some philosophers hold that there can be no analogy of proper pro­ portionality between God and creatures on the premise that for such an analogy four really distinct terms are required. Since in God his esse is his essence, there is only one real term present. A very clear and com­ plete refutation of this view is to be found in Reverend Maurice Hollo­ way's A n Introduction to Natural Theology, p. 1 1 5 (experimental edition): "We simply deny that two really distinct terms within each analogate are essential to the nature of the analogy of proper proportionality. It may be essential to the proportionality among finite beings, and it may also be essential to all mathematical proportionalities. But it is not essential to the very notion of the analogy of the proportionality of being. What is essential is that each being because of its ontological status as being is analogous to every other being. In creatures, this ontological status is due to the unique relation within each analogate of its essence to its act of existing. In God, the peculiar ontological status of the divine Being, that which makes God be God, is the absolute identity between essence and existence. Because of this identity, God is the Being he is; just as the creature because of its composition is the being it is. Because God is what he is and the creature what it is, there is constituted a proportionality or indirect likeness between the creature and God. The foundation for this proportionality is constituted by the way each exercises its act of existing, Moreover, since we come to know God through creatures, the intel­ ligibility of essence in God is rationally distinct from the intelligibility of his act of existing. We could not even affirm that essence and existence are absolutely identical in God, unless we first understood them as ration� ally distinct, or distinct in our knowledge of God. Now this rational dis­ tinction between these two terms is sufficient to ground our knowledge of the proper proportionality that obtains between God and the creature. We have an example of this same thing in psychology. The minor rational distinction in our knowledge between being as true and being as good is sufficient to ground the real distinction that we place between the intellect and the will, since the former knows being as true and the latter desires it as good. The rational distinction in our knowledge between God's es­ sence and existence grounds our knowledge of the proper proportionality between his Being and the being of creatures; whereas the absolute iden­ tity of the two in God makes God the kind of Being he is. Thus we can conclude that while it may be essential to our knowledge of the analogy of proper proportionality that two rationally distinct terms be considered in God, it is by no means essential to the existence of an analogy of pro­ portionality between God and creatures. All that is required for such an analogy to exist is that each analogate exercise in a unique way its ex­ istential act."

II THE NATURE O F GO D

It is hel pful to begin the anal y sis of Cajetan's notion of existence by presenting his thought on the nature of God, the prime exist­ ent, and the cause of all other b eings. We do not plan to present here a summary of the whol e of Cajetan's natural theol ogy. We intend to present onl y Cajetan's answer to three questions con­ cerning God. F irst, we wish to show that Cajetan viewed God prim aril y as ex istence itsel f, esse subsistens. Then we wil l ex pl ain Cajetan's view that God as subsisting ex istence is the metaphy sical foundation of His own divine perfections. Thirdl y , we will show that Cajetan thought that God as esse subsistens is the first ca us e of all creatures. What we intend to establish in this chapter are these two points: first, according to Cajetan, God as subsistent ex istence is the radix of His own perfections, then that God as existence itsel f is the cause of all other ex istences.

GOD IS ESSE SUBSISTENS

Let us first con sider the proof that God is subsisting esse which is found in chapter five of Cajetan's commentary on the De Ente et Essentia. 1 The principl e of the proof is stated by Cajetan thusl y , Omne quod est per aliud tale praeceditur ab eo quod est per se tale. This principle is appl ied to all creatures. They are real beings, y et not throug h themsel ves because their esse is distinct from their essence. If their esse efficientl y came from their essence then 1

In De Ente et Essentia Comm., V, Laurent edit., pp. 146-147.

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33

they woul d have to exist before they existed. Therefore their esse must come from a being \\7 ho is being per se and not per aliud. Otherwise there would be a processus in infinitum. Therefore the first cause is an ex se ens whose essence is really his esse. N otice that Cajetan has used the real distinction between esse and essence as the first step in the proof of a first cause who is his own esse. In this proof all Caj etan has done is to formaliz e the proof that is materially found in the actual text of Saint Thomas. 2 In fact, Saint Thomas presents the same proof of God's esse being His essence in the Summa Theologiae. 3 At the very beginning of chapter six4 of the De Ente et Essen­ tia Caj etan states three very significant propositions that follow from the truth that God's esse is His essence. The first is that a being whose essence is his esse cannot be contained in a genus. The reasoning is as fol lows. Every essence that belongs to a genus is as a genus essenti ally determinabl e by a specific difference from which it rece ives its esse. For instance, the genus animal is essen­ tial ly determinable by the differences, rational or irrational. If it determined by rational, then its esse will be esse rationale, if irrati onal, then esse irrationale. Y et God's essence is the same as His esse. Thus God cannot be in a genus because then esse will be receiving esse from another. The crucial principl e here is that a genus is determi nabl e by a difference from which it will receive esse. What Cajetan is basically saying is that because God is esse, he cannot be a way of being. God is esse itself; a genus concern s a way of being, concern s participation, and a real dis­ tinction of esse from essence. The second proposition Cajetan sta tes on this matter of the identity of God's esse with His essence will clarify this point. The second statement is this: "Exi stentia actualis ad nullum genus determinata est purum esse." 5 To illustrate the point Caj etan uses two ex amples. If the genus a nimal is not determi ned by a specific difference it will be pure 2 3 4 5

Ibid., p. 1 46. I, 3 , 4c. In De Ente et Essentia Comm., pp. 1 7 1 - 1 73. Ibid., p. 1 72.

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THE NATURE OF GOD

animal. If whiteness is not limited by some subject, it will be pure whiteness. N ow if existence is not limited by any p redica­ mental natures, then it really will be p ure esse. Here the p oint is clear. God as p ure esse transcends all p redicamental natures which belong to the order of essence and are lim ited ways of being.t1 They necessarily limit the existence they receive. There is much more we could say on this p oint, but we consider that the better time and p lace to say it will be when we are considering the ontol ogical constitution of creatures. The third prop osition of Cajetan is this: "Esse est de concep tu quiditativo p uri esse tantum." 7 Here Cajetan p oints out that as only God is p ure esse, only the quidditative c oncep t of God will include esse. Esse does not bel ong to the quidditative concep ts of other beings because they are not pure esse but they have an esse that is p ropo rtioned to their essences. In fact they can be defined without any inclusion of esse or non esse in their quidditative concep ts. Cajetan sums up these three p rop ortions thusly: Ex istence belongs to the concept of the quiddity of a thing because that thing is pure esse; furthermore that thing is pure esse, because it is not limited to any genus; also that thing is not limited to a genus, because it is identified with its existence. To summarize: existence belongs to a quidditive concept because that thing is identified with its existence. Hence since the glorious God is his own esse, he is esse subsistens separated completely from predicamental natures.a

God is a substance; substance is a predicament. Yet substance as predicated of God's essence does not limit God's esse, because His essence is His esse. Thus God as a substance is esse. Man as substance is pri­ marily an essence which calls for a proportioned substantial esse. 1 In De Ente et Essentia Comm., VI, p. 172. 8 "ldeo existentia est de conceptu quiditatis rei, quia res illa est purum esse; idea autem res illa est purum esse, quia non est ad genus aliquod limitata; ideo autem res illa non est ad genus Iimitata, quia est idem cum sua existentia, igitur de primo ad ultimum ; ideo existentia est de conceptu quiditativo rei quia res illa est eadem suae existentiae. . . . Unde cum Deus gloriosus sit suum esse, ipse nihil est aliud quam ipsum esse secundum rem separatum a naturis praedicamentalibus a sua puritate subsistens." Ibid., p. 173. 8

THE NATURE OF GOD

35

SUBSISTING ESSE AS THE FOUNDATION OF THE PIVINE PERFECTIONS

Now that we have established that God, according to Cajetan, is essentially esse subsistens we wish to show that Cajetan viewed Him primarily as this; that is, esse subsistens is, in Cajetan's mind, the metaphysical root of all divine perfections. God is also essentially wise, free, just, etc.; yet it is not true that any one of these properties is the fundamental aspect of the divine essence. Cajetan viewed esse subsistens as the primary aspect of God's essence because he pointed it alone as the actual radix of all the divine perfections. In chapter six of the De Ente Cajetan mentions the error of those who believe that because God is only pure esse, He is im­ perfect. In the view of these men beings, which have esse vivere and esse intelligere, are more perfect than a being who is only pure esse. A being who is pure esse cannot be alive and intelligent because then his esse would not be pure. Cajetan proceeds to uproot this error by first stating his response in crisp syllogistic form. Whoever possesses esse according to its fullness lacks no perfection of being. Whoever is esse subsistens possesses esse in its fullness. Therefore esse purum subsistens does not lack any perfection of being. 9

How does Cajetan prove the major of this syllogism? He first of all states that all perfection, no matter what kind it is, has its actuality from esse, or is a certain way of being1 0 Wisdom does not perfect a man unless it makes a man BE wise, nor is a man "Id cui convenit esse secundum totam virtutem seu potestatem ipsius esse, nulla perfectione seu nobilitate essendi caret; sed esse subsistens est id cui convenit esse secundum totam virtutem seu potestatem ipsius esse; ergo esse purum subsistens nulla perfectione seu nobilitate essendi caret." Ibid., VI, pp. 1 74-1 75. 10 In Cajetan's commentary on the Summa, this excellent text makes this same point. "Sic autem constat se habere esse ad omnia, nihil enim est in quacumque re, quin sit aliquod esse. Et propterea esse quod est in re non aliunde quam ab esse provenit. Et secluso eo quod ex parte esse se tenet, nihil restat: quoniam et materia et omnia participationes quaedam et modi essendi sunt." I, 1 4, 6, x. 9

36

THE NATURE OF GOD

call ed j ust unless he ACTUALLY 1s j ust. If this is true, then the b eing in wh om the fullness of actuality is f ound must have all perfection. It is repugnant therefore that sub sisting esse lack any perfection, as all perfection is perfection b ecause of esse. Caj etan amplifies the minor premiss in this w ay. If w hi teness could b e posited as a separate form, then it w ould contain all the perf ection of whiteness; that is, it w ould not be limi ted in any way. Th e reason w hy a particular whiteness is limited is b ecause it is received b y a defini te subj ect w hich cannot receive all the perfection of whiteness. So with esse. If it is received b y another, then it is limi ted b y the nature of the receiver, be it a sub stance or an accident. If it is unreceived b y any nature then it is ab so­ l utely inf inite an d it is necessary that it contain all the perfection of b eing. Caj etan goes on to discuss how God has all perfecti ons. He say s that there are two way s of having all perfections: either in themselves or in a certain eminent w ay . Ob viously God does not possess all perfections in themselves, that is, as really di stinct f rom one another, as a man has j ustice, wisdom, and so on. Thi s w ay of possessing all perfecti ons w ould result in a real composition in God. God must possess all perfecti ons emi nently uni ted in suo esse simplicissimo. 1 1 Esse divinum is equivalent to all the perfections of all the genera, and it exceeds all these perfections taken singularly or together, since it is a thing of a superior and inaccessible order. 1 2

The eminent possession of all perfecti ons b y God is compared by Caj etan to the li ght of the sun b y w hich alone the sun can do all that its inf eriors can do b y so many different quali ties. Thus it is clearly Caj etan' s mi nd that, b ecause God is esse subsistens, He is all perfection. It is his view that everything is perfect inas­ much as it is. If a being is b eing itself, it must be all perf ect.

In De Ente Comm., p. 175. "Illud quippe esse divinum aequivalet omnibus perfectionibus omnium generum et excedit singulas, et omnes simul utpote res superioris et in­ accessibilis ordinis." Ibid. 11

12

THE NATURE OF GOD

37

SUBSISTING ESSE AS FIRST CAUSE

,

The proof that we used to show that God is esse subsistens i s of course a proof that God i s the first cause of all beings. It i s a proof based on the fact of parti cipati on of bein g. Cajetan presents i t in sy llogi stic form in hi s commentary on the Summa. Whatever is participated by a being is caused by the being who essen­ tially possesses what is participated. But esse is participated by all beings except God who is his esse. Therefore all other beings are caused by God . 1 a

If God is esse subsistens, then when He acts effi ci en tly, He must produce bein g, cum naturalissimum sit unicuique agere sibi simile . 1 4 There can be n o other bein g more perfect than bein g i tself whi ch produces being. God alon e therefore i s the fi rst an d onl y proper cause of being. It i s i mpossible that an other bein g be being i tself in a more eminen t way , sin ce there i s n othing more eminen t than bein g itself. Bein g i tself con tain s emin en tly all fi nite perfecti on s, but what can con tain being i tself in a more eminen t way? Since it is most natural for a thing to effect what is similar to it, and since it is impossible that one being, more perfect in the same line than another being which is such by its very essence, effect what is similar to it, it necessarily follows that the being which is essentially such be the first cause of other beings who are such only by participa­ tion unless perhaps there should be another being who possesses in a more eminent way what is participated. In the question we are here discussing this is impossible since no being can be even thought of which is more eminent than he who is his own esse. 1 5

The exten si on of the active poten cy of a being correspon ds to 13 hOmne inventum in aliquo per participationem, causatur ab eo cui inest per essentiam: sed esse invenitur in omnibus aliis a Deo per partici­ pationem et in Deo per essentiam: ergo omnia alia entia causata ab ipso Deo." In Summa Comm., I, 44, 1, II. 14 Jbid., I, 44, 1 , VII. 15 "Quoniam cum naturalissimum sit umcmque agere sibi simile, et impossibile sit aliquid aliud perfectius suam similitudinem efficere quam id quod est tale per essentiam; consequens est necessario quod ipsum sit primum faciens talia per participationem nisi forte inveniretur aliquid eminentius praehabens illud; quod in proposito non habet locum, cum nihil possit etiam cogitari eminentius ipso esse per essentiam." Ibid.

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THE NATURE OF GOD

the act of the being. The active potency wil l extend to whatever is possible according to the act of a being. The act of God is esse as such. His active potency which is founded on His act therefore extends itself to all that can be. Every agent produces what is similar to itself; therefore to any active potency there corresponds as its proper object whatever is possible for that act which is the principle of acting; therefore to the active power of God there corresponds whatever can be. 1 6 The esse of God which is his essence contains in itself the total per­ fection of esse; it does not contain in itself however such or such a generic esse . 17

What is excl uded from God's efficient power? If it extends to all possible being, it must exclude onl y the absolutely impossible or non- being. Nothing is opposed to being except non-being; therefore nothing is opposed to the absolutely possible except what implies esse et non esse together; therefore only contradictions are impossible; therefore only contradictions are excluded from the divine omnipotence; all possibles come under God's power. i s

Y et, because God is infini te and absolutely perfect esse, should it not be said that the proportioned obj ect of His power is infinite a nd absolutely perfect possible being? 19 God cer tainl y must hav e an obj ect proportioned to His power. Caj etan answers this obj ection in the following man ner. God is not an univocal cause having a particular effect essen tially cor­ responding to Him. God as esse subsistens is above all genera and "Omne agens agit sibi simile: ergo unicuique potentiae activae respon­ det, ut proprium objectum, possibile secundum ilium actum quae est ratio agendi: ergo potenitae activae Dei respondet possibile secundum rationem entis." Ibid., I, 25, 3 , IV. 17 "Esse Dei quad est ratio agendi, est esse praehabens quidem in se totius esse perfectionem, non tamen esse tale vel tale, secundum quod­ cumque genus." Ibid. 18 "Nihil opponitur rationi entis nisi non ens; ergo nihil repugnat possi­ bili absolute, nisi implicans in se esse et non esse simul; ergo sola im­ plicantia contradictionem non habent rationem possibilium: ergo ea quae implicant non clauduntur; et ea quae non implicant, clauduntur sub omni­ potentia." Ibid. 19 / bid., I, 25, 3, VI. 16

THE NATURE OF GOD

39

species. Thus He is an equivocal cause who causes beings that have nothi ng essenti ally ip common with Him. If created beings are considered as they are, that is, as singulars, then they are not in any way on the same level as God's power. Their esse is limited and particular. If, however, esse is considered in universali, then it is not determined to any essence and is capable of ex­ tending to all modes of being; in this sense it is infi nite and total ly perfect and a proportioned object of God's power. Wh at Cajetan seems to be saying here is that the proportioned object of God's power is esse or being inasmuch as it is being. There is a difference between a univocal cause and an equivocal cause. The univocal cause produces an effect on its own level; the equivocal does not. Moreover, since esse Dei has these two conditions; namely, that it transcends all genera and contains all perfection, and since no causabile taken individually can be conceived to possess such conditions, it is necessary to consider the causabile universally. Such however is esse, considered in itself, since it is not limited to any particular genus. and extends itself to all types of perfections. Be­ sides, St. Thomas in the text in a very subtle way gives to the divine omnipotence a proportioned object, as is the case with univocal po­ tencies; this object is: whatever can exist. 20

As esse subsistens, theref ore, God's immediately proper effect is esse as such. He produces the entire being inasmuch as He pro­ duces its esse . The primary term of his power is therefore being inasmuch as it is being. Since to create is the same as to make things be, and is not ordered to making things such or such, to ask for the creator of all beings is the same as asking for the cause of all things inasmuch as they are being. A more proper cause of beings inasmuch as they are beings cannot be assigned than he who is esse per essentiam, just as a more 20 "Ad hoc dicitur . . . est differentia inter causam univocam et aequi­ vocam , quod causae univocae respondet aliquod adaequatum objectum in effectu, aequivocae non. Et propterea, cum esse Dei duas habet condi­ tiones ad propositum, scilicet elevationem supra genera et universalitatem perfectionis, nee possit fingi aliquod causabile cum his conditionibus in singulari , consequens est ut sumatur in universali. Tale autem est esse; quoniam ad nuJlum determinatum est genus, et ad omnes se perfectionum modos extendit. Et propterea satis subtiliter in littera proportionale objec­ tum, sicut potentiis univocis, assignatum est q uidquid potest entis rationem habere." Ibid., I, 25, 4 , VI.

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THE NATURE OF GOD

proper cause of living things inasmuch as they are living cannot be assigned than he who is essentially life, or of true things inasmuch as they are true than he who is essentially true. 2 1

In chapter three we will have something to say on the dif ference in Cajetan's mind between creation and generation. I t suff ices for now to state that Cajetan maintained that only God can create, because only he who is esse can produce per se primo esse. 22 That is what creation is: producere esse per se primo est creare. 23 Generation terminates primarily in form, and only secon­ darily in esse. Creatures can educe a form from existing matter; they cannot produce a being ex nihilo sui et subjecti. In this chapter we have presented Cajetan's explanation of these two points. God is essentially subsisting esse, as such he transcends all categories and is infinitely perfect; God, as the subsisting act of existing, is the first cause of all other beings.

"Creare enim cum nihil aliud sit quam facere quod res sint, et non mcludat quod sint tales vel tales, idem est quaerere creatorem entium omnium, et causam effectivam omnium in quantum entia. . . . Non potest autem magis propria causa entium, in quantum entia sunt, assignari quam esse �er essentiam ut �ic; sicut viventium, inquantum viventia, vita per essentiam, et verorum m quantum vera, veritas per essentiam." Ibid., I, 44, 1, VII. 22 Ibid., I, 45, 5, II. 23 lbid., I, 45, 5, V. :1

III CREATED SUBS TANCES

N ow that w e have established that it is Cajetan's mind that God, in asmuch as He is the pure act of existence, is the first cause of the real order, w e intend to consider w hat Cajetan had to say about the created real order. We w ill devote three chapters to this area of thought: the present one, w hich is the substance of our analy sis, a second one on the human soul, and a final one on accidents. The present chapter, entitled Created Substances, wil l be divided into three parts: (1 ) The Metaphy sical Consti tution of Material Substance (2 ) The Real Distinction between Essence and Existence (3) The Problem of the Supposit. THE METAPHYSICAL CONSTITUTION OF MATERIAL SUBSTANCE

I n chapte r f ive of Cajetan's commentary on the De Ente et Essentia there is an abundance of excellent material on just this subject: the intrinsic principles of material substance. Cajetan's commences his treatment of this subject by affirming that in all material substances, there are four realiter distincta 1 : 1

"Praenotandum est in substantiis materialibus inveniri quatuor realiter distineta, seilieet materiam, formam, essentiam eompositam ex eis, et existentiam. In homine enim est eonsiderare materiam in qua reeipitur ejus forma, et formam ipsam quae est illius materiae aetus, et essentiam humanam quae nee est materia nee forma et esse aetualis existentiae qua homo formaliter existit in rerum natura; unde fit ut in istis substantiis duae compositiones pertinentes ad genus substantiae reperiantur. Quarum prima est ex materia et forma; seeunda est ex essentia et existentia quae vocatur

42

CREA TED SUBSTANCES

matter, form, the composit, and existence. Matter and form unite to form the essence, or the composit, or the substance of the being. The essence is a tertium quid 2 that is really other than matter or form. Of itself the essence is not in rerum natura. To this a tertium quid, existence, must be added to have a real being. Exist­ ence, as has just been noted, is really other than essence; it unites w ith essence to bring about an actual being. There are thus two real compositions in all material sub­ stan ces; the first of matter and form, the second of essence and existence. Both compositions belong to the genus substance; the first is not acutal of itself; it needs existence to be in rerum natura. Cajetan then goes on to point out some similarities and differ­ e nces betw een these tw o compositions. They agree in tw o featu.res, and differ in ten. We shall consider all these basic agreements and differences because they gi ve a very clear picture of Cajetan's views on w hat the order of essence is, w hat the order of exi stence is , and what their mutual relationshi p is. The doct rine here pre­ sented by Cajetan is generally based on chapter fifty- four, boo k tw o of the Summa contra Gentiles. To it, how ever, Cajetan adds a great deal of his ow n. According to Cajetan, these tw o compositions agree first of all in that each is made up of act and potency . It is clear that matter and form are related as act and potency; that essence is related to existence as potency to act is clear from the fact that e ssence is posited in rerum natura through existence. We shall s oon see that this agreement in act and potency is not a univocal but an analogical similtude. These compositions also agree in that the principles of each belong to the genus of substance. We shall see here also that they d o not belong to the genus substance in an univocal w ay. Actually it is in the differences between the two compositions compositio ex esse et essentia." In De Ente et Esse11tia Comm., V, Laurent edit., p. 141. 2 Cajetan does not use the term tertium quid in his works. He does use, as we shall see, the term tertium per se unum to express material sub­ ,i;tance.

C R E A T E D SUBSTANC E S

43

th at we will really see them more as they are. This can be gathered from the fact that Cajetav lists ten differences. The first difference concerns the basic relations of these two c omposions to substance. 3 Matter and form are intrinsic com­ ponents of substance and not properly substance. Hence substance can be predicated of them only in obliquo; 4 non sunt in genere substantiae nisi reductive. 5 On the other hand, essence and exist­ e nce are not components of substance at all. Essence is substance; exis tence as really d isti nct from essence is outside subs tance. The order of substance or essence is a really distinct ord er from the ord er of existe nce. Y et, as we go on, we shall see that existence, as actuating su bstance, can also be cons idered as REDUCTIVE in the genus of substance. The second difference is this. Prime matter is purely potential b ein g. 6 Essence is not purely potential being but being that is complete as an essence. By the term PURELY POTENTIAL we think that Cajetan here means a state of thorough indetermination, that is, without essential d etermi nation, without existential actuation. Prime matter to Cajetan signi fies what is absolutely ind eterminate in itself. Aristotle' s description of prime matter, 7 we are sure, is in Cajetan' s mi nd. Prime matter receives all its determination from form; in itself it is only a pure potency for form and, through form, for existence. I t is not related to one form more than anoth er; its intelli gibility is pure relationship to substantial form as s uch. This we thi nk, is what Cajetan me ans when he calls pri me matter pure potential be ing: namely, a pure potency for Ibid., p. 142. Ibid. 5 Ibid. 8 "Extremum illius quod se habet ut potentia in prima compositione est ens pure potentiale, materia scilicet. Extremum vero illius quod se habet ut potentia in secunda compositione non est pura potentia sed ens in aliqua specie quiditative completum, essentia scilicet." In De Ente Comm., p. 142. 7 "By matter I mean that which in itself is neither a particular thing nor of a certain quantity nor assigned to any of the categories by which being is determined . . . . The ultimate substratum is of itself neither a particular thing nor of a particular quantity nor otherwise positively characterized." The Basic Works of Aristotle, McKeon edit., Metaphysics, VII, 3 , 1 029a 20.

a

4

44

CREATED SUBSTANCES

all forms and, as we shal l see th rough forms, for the act of exi stence. It is neither essence nor existence; in itsel f it is only a pure potency for essence. Cajetan does not wish to extend such a concept of pure potency to essence or, if y ou will, substance. He hol ds that a particul ar essence, as composed of matter and form, is not a pure potency in the sense that prime matter is a pure potency. A particul ar essence is not a pure potency to all existences. The essence of man cannot be actuated by th e existence of a rock; it must have its own proper actuality. This is to say that a particul ar essence or substance has a determinate intell igibility. Of its elf it is a specifi c way of receiving existence; it is a definite w hat, something that prime matter itself never can be. As a determinate potential ity it calls for its proper actual ity . As a determinate pote ntial ity con­ taining all that it shoul d contain to be an immediate subject of existence, essence in our text is termed by Cajetan: ens quiditative completum. 8 A good transl ation of these terms woul d be be ing in the order of essence. When Cajetan say s that essence is not ens pure potentiale, he is therefore not saying that essence is not pure potency in the order of actual being. Cajetan impl icitly admits this -when he el sewhere openl y avows that essence is nothing actual without existence, 9 that it has no proper actual determination in se. I n his In De Ente Comm., p. 142. "Ens reale dupliciter accipitur: uno modo ut distinguitur contra ens ab intellectu fabricatum, alio modo ut distinguitur contra non existens actu. Primo modo omnis res praedicamentalis est ens reale sive sit sive non. Secundo modo id tantum quod realiter existit extra causas suas est ens reale. Et quia hoc proprie est ens reale apud S. Thomam dicentem in quaestionibus de Potentia Dei (quaest. III, art. 5, ad 5) quod res antequam existat, est nihil . . . ideo unitas sicut et caetera realitatem habet, proprie loquendo, pro quanto ipsa existit actu extra animam et causas suas." (In De Ente Comm., IV, p. 92.) Here Cajetan states clearly that essence in itself is nothing actual and is not, properly speaking, being. Actual being proprie est ens rea/e. Essence may be considered as existing or as purely possible. The essence of an existing being considered in itself is, according to Cajetan, quidditative being. It is called being because it is a receptive potency for esse which makes it an actual being. Because the essence really exists, it bears a real relationship to its act. A pure possible essence exists only in the intellect. As such its proper being is esse intentionale. Its relationship to extramental 8

9

CREATED SUBSTANCES

45

C ajetan it is thus never a question of an al ready actual subject mi nd when he calls essel\C e being, he is not speaking at all of bei ng in its p roper sense which for him is actual being. 1 ° For being is not a real one, but a rational relation that is, one belonging to a concept. Cajetan would also call the pure possible essence, considered in itself, quidditative being because it is a definite capacity for the act of existence. It would appear therefore when Cajetan terms an essence ens re ale, he is using the analogy of extrinsic attribution. What he really is predicating quidditative being of is the essence, absolutely considered, that is, inasmuch as it is a definite capacity for esse, independent of whether it exists outside the mind or only in the mind. 10 There are two other very good texts proving Cajetan's existentialism; that is, being in its proper sense is existing being alone. The first text presents the famous distinction between being taken as a participle, and being taken as a noun. We are not interested here in whether Cajetan applied the wrong terminology to a correct understanding of being. What interests us here is his existentialism. "A quibusdam dicitur quod ens dupliciter sumitur, scilicet nominaliter et participialiter. Et quod ens nominaliter quiditative et intrinsece de omnibus praedicatur: sic enim unumquodque est ens per essentiam suam. Ens vero participialiter, cum idem sonet quod existens, non est praedica­ tum quiditativum, sic enim nihil aliud a Deo est ens per essentiam suam; unde secundum istas ens nominaliter convenit naturae absolute, non autem ens participialiter. Addunt quoque quod ens nominaliter est divisum in decem praedicamenta, et est transcendens conversum cum aliis, proprie loguendo, non ens secundo modo. . . . Mihi autem aliter dicendum occurrit. Dico enim quod ens participialiter est id quod est transcendens, divisum in decem praedicamenta; quod ex eo patere potest, quod S. Thomas (I Parte, quaest. V et VI, et in quaestioni­ bus de Veritate, quaest. XXI) ostendit bonum, quod etiam dividitur in decem praedicamenta, ut dicitur I Ethicorum, converti cum ente parti­ cipialiter non nominaliter, ut clare patet ex duobus. Primo ex eo quod